The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: Paradox, Polarity, and the Pursuit of Power

by

Peter John Paul Krause

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Signature of Author: ____________________________

Department of Political Science
September 8, 2011

Certified by: ____________________________

Stephen Van Evera
Ford International Professor of Political Science
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by: ____________________________

Roger Petersen
Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science
Chairman, Graduate Program Committee
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ABSTRACT

When is non-state violence politically effective? Existing scholarship suggests that insurgency and terrorism are generally effective or ineffective based on the analysis of unitary non-state coercers operating solely at the strategic level. Although this approach provides useful insight, a failure to account for the internal dynamics of social movements within which armed groups are embedded obscures many of the most important causes and effects of non-state violence.

The structuralist theory of non-state violence holds that the structure of power within social movements explains the greatest variation in both the use of violence by armed groups and its political effectiveness. Armed groups pursue common strategic goals that are characterized by collective action challenges against external enemies, such as the founding of a new state, while they simultaneously engage in zero-sum competition for organizational dominance with internal rivals. The central hypothesis of the structuralist theory is that violence is more likely to be strategically effective when employed by a unipolar social movement with one dominant armed group than by a multipolar social movement with two or more significant armed groups. The secondary hypothesis is that the strongest armed group in a social movement is the most likely to pursue strategic goals, whereas weaker groups in the hierarchy are more likely to pursue organizational goals exclusively, to the detriment of the movement.

This theory is tested with a longitudinal analysis of 29 groups in 33 campaigns marked by a mix of violent and nonviolent action within the Palestinian, Irish, Zionist, and Algerian national movements. Analysis of primary sources and extensive interviews with key participants and observers help to demonstrate that the hierarchical position of groups within each of the four movements drove their relative focus towards strategic or organizational objectives as well as their associated use or non-use of violence. Furthermore, violence was more politically effective during periods of unipolarity than during periods of multipolarity within each movement. The structuralist theory of non-state violence thus reveals and explains greater variation in the political effectiveness of non-state violence than previous scholarship.

Thesis Supervisor: Stephen Van Evera

Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
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This project is located at the intersection of international relations, comparative politics, coercion, social movements, civil war, terrorism, and insurgency, so it is fitting that its logistical origins are just as diverse.

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When is non-state violence politically effective? More specifically, when and how does the use of violence by armed groups cause the achievement of political objectives?

When non-state violence succeeds, groups that employ it can help to end military occupations, establish new states, and shift the balance of power among key political actors. When non-state violence fails, groups who use it can be weakened or even destroyed, and their affiliated social movements can suffer greatly as a result.

The structuralist theory of non-state violence holds that the structure of power within social movements explains the greatest variation in both the use of violence by armed groups and its political effectiveness. Armed groups pursue common strategic goals characterized by collective action challenges while they simultaneously engage in zero-sum competition for organizational dominance. The hierarchy and polarity of their social movement determines whether these two objectives will be complementary or contradictory for each individual group and the movement as a whole, driving the behavior of groups and the political effectiveness of their actions in the process.

The central hypothesis of the structuralist theory is that violence is more likely to be politically effective when employed by a unipolar social movement with one dominant armed group than by a multipolar social movement with two or more significant armed groups. The secondary hypothesis is that the strongest armed group in a social movement is the most likely to pursue strategic goals, whereas weaker groups in the hierarchy are likely to be less secure and have contradictory objectives. Weaker groups are therefore more likely to pursue organizational goals exclusively, to the detriment of the movement.
The structuralist theory of non-state violence reveals and explains greater variation in the political effectiveness of non-state violence than previous scholarship. The remainder of the chapter introduces the empirical puzzles that drive the study, the structuralist theory, the research design and methods, and the implications of this study’s findings for scholarship and policy.

Empirical Puzzles

The political effectiveness of non-state violence has varied significantly across time and space. Armed groups from Algeria, Lebanon and the Yishuv employed insurgency and terrorism as part of successful campaigns to drive France, Israel and Great Britain, respectively, out of contested territory. However, campaigns by armed groups in Egypt, Cyprus, and Spain to expel military forces or establish new types of states have been abject failures despite (or some would argue because of) the use of violence.

Variation in outcomes towards a single type of objective reveals only part of the story, however. No group aims at only a solitary political goal. Armed groups often launch violent campaigns to ensure their survival or increase their political clout, to varying effects. Violence employed by Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (“The Islamic Group”) led to the group’s marginalization and near destruction, while such violence helped the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) become the dominant oppositional actor in Sri Lanka for decades. Furthermore, the political effectiveness of non-state violence for the same groups has varied over time. Hamas’ use of

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1 Terrorism is defined as the intentional use of violence against noncombatants to inspire fear or alarm in an audience beyond the immediate target in order to achieve political ends. Insurgency is defined as sustained violence by non-state actors using primarily irregular tactics for political ends. Violence employed for no political end (crime), committed by states (war, genocide), or whose overriding purpose is simply the destruction of enemy forces (brute force) are outside the bounds of this study to varying degrees. The Yishuv refers to the Jewish residents that lived in Palestine before the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Historians often use the term ‘New Yishuv’ to refer to the Jewish community in Palestine after the first modern Zionist Aliyah (translating as ‘ascent,’ but meaning migration to the land of Israel) in 1882. See Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).
violence drove up its popular support and recruits in certain periods but was counterproductive in others. Attacks by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) during The Troubles in Northern Ireland led to increases and decreases in group strength at various points in the campaign.

The most interesting empirical puzzles arise when the achievement of various objectives are analyzed simultaneously. Violence employed by Fatah to stabilize its popular support during the Second Intifada hurt its prospects for achieving a viable Palestinian state. On the other hand, attacks by Hezbollah against western targets in the 1980s increased its strength and support dramatically, paving the way for achievement of strategic goals in the future. How can this variation be systematically conceptualized and explained? This project’s two-level framework provides the foundation from which to address these empirical puzzles, which have been inadequately answered or simply ignored by previous scholarship.\(^2\)

**The Two-Level Framework**

This study defines non-state violence as more politically effective the greater extent to which it achieves a significant political objective intended by the attacking organization. Two types of objectives fit the bill: strategic and organizational objectives. A two-level framework provides the optimal basis for analysis of the political effectiveness of non-state violence because armed groups aim for both types of objectives and the relation between the two drives their achievement, or the lack thereof.

Strategic objectives—such as ending military occupation, altering the nature of the ruling government, or changing discriminatory policies—concern the struggle between the attacker and

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\(^2\) Most studies of the political effectiveness of non-state violence ignore variation in the achievement of organizational goals. In subsequent chapters, I demonstrate that organizational goals are neither insignificant nor easy for groups to achieve, as some scholars claim.
its state adversary, who represents the key audience for strategic violence. By making violent threats and detonating bombs to manipulate the costs and benefits of present and alternative policies in the eyes of government officials and their citizens, attackers hope to coerce the state to concede and take action it otherwise would not take. These concessions generally benefit the attacker’s larger social movement, which includes all armed groups as well as their shared popular base. As such, strategic objectives resemble public goods, because the entire movement enjoys the benefits of foreign troop withdrawal, not just the attackers. 3

If terrorist and insurgent attacks were launched entirely by unorganized individuals selflessly pursuing the common, strategic good, then organizational objectives would be nonexistent. History has proven otherwise, however, as the majority of terrorist and insurgent attacks, in addition to nearly all campaigns, have been launched and sustained by self-interested organizations. 4 Although organizations may deploy individuals willing to kill themselves in attacks as part of a larger campaign, no organization talks of destroying itself as a strategy. To the contrary, armed groups have organizational interests, the most pressing of which are to maximize the strength of their organization and ensure its survival.

The key audience for the use of violence at the organizational level is the armed group’s popular base. The armed group launches attacks to raise or maintain its profile as a fighting organization ready to bear sacrifices and willing and able to inflict pain on the enemy. The use of violence can help mobilize support for the organization from the base and outbid other armed

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3 As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 3, most strategic goods are not pure public goods, and they do have some private benefits associated with them that can be effectively captured by individual groups. These benefits often accrue based on the social movement hierarchy, which helps explain why dominant groups are often more interested in achieving these objectives than weaker groups.

4 A few isolated campaigns have been launched by individuals that actively chose to avoid the creation of an organization, but as David Rapoport notes, they were ultimately ineffective: “The Anarchists, of course, refused to establish permanent organizational structures on principle, certain that any structure would compromise their ultimate ideal. But they failed miserably.” David Rapoport, “Preface to the 2nd Edition,” in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David Rapoport (London: Frank Cass, 2001), xi.
groups in the movement for leadership. Unlike strategic goals, whose benefits are spread more broadly, organizational goals resemble private goods, as armed groups can effectively capture benefits like recruits and funding and deny them to non-members.

The two-level framework holds that armed groups pursue strategic objectives that benefit their larger social movements while they simultaneously pursue organizational objectives that benefit the groups themselves. This framework leads to clear explanations for what are otherwise seemingly irrational behaviors and outcomes. For example, single-level frameworks cannot explain why a group would launch attacks to scuttle concessions being made in support of one of its strategic objectives. The two-level framework presents the possibility that the group fears that concessions will weaken its organizational position even as they attain the strategic objective, and opposes concessions accordingly. The framework yields the following 2x2 chart, which captures the four basic types of campaign outcomes used to assess the political effectiveness of non-state violence (see Figure 1).

5 For the best work on spoiling, see Stephen Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997), Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (2002). The tension between strategic and organizational objectives is often the source of seemingly 'irrational' behavior, as organizations ignore or actively try to prevent progress towards their strategic objectives in order to protect or promote their organizational position. This can lead to misperception on the part of researchers, as Martha Crenshaw notes: "This perspective on terrorist behavior indicates that there may be a fundamental disparity between the outside world's perception of terrorists and their own self-perceptions. What the outside world perceives as 'failure' may not appear as such to the terrorist organization." Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism," *Orbis* 29, no. 3 (1985): 487.
Figure 1. Two-Level Outcomes of Non-State Violence

The Structuralist Theory of Non-State Violence

When and why do violent campaigns end up in one of the four boxes? The structuralist theory of non-state violence holds that the structure of social movements explains the greatest variation in the outcome of campaigns both within and across movements. The structure of a social movement ultimately determines how groups within it can best survive and empower themselves, and more specifically, the degree to which this involves the pursuit of strategic objectives. The distribution of power within a social movement, specifically its polarity, determines whether strategic and organizational objectives are likely to be contradictory or complementary and, therefore, whether campaigns of violence are likely to be effective.

In theory, strategic and organizational goals are complementary. Organizational survival is necessary to launch a campaign to remove a military occupation, which itself can help that organization gain the popular support it needs to become the ruling party of the liberated territory. In practice, however, the actions required to achieve organizational and strategic
objectives are rarely complementary. On the contrary, organizational and strategic objectives often require different timing and different targets for attacks. For example, bombing a restaurant frequented by military troops may raise the costs of occupation for a state, but it could also alienate potential supporters within the groups' base who abhor violence against civilians, who are likely to be among the casualties. This poses a significant problem for armed groups, because a single act of violence generally impacts both objectives and their affiliated audiences simultaneously. The contrasting priorities of armed groups and the internal dynamics of their social movements thus often lead to mechanisms of violence that are counterproductive to strategic and/or organizational success.

The relationship between the two types of objectives gives rise to what I call the paradox of non-state violence. The paradox is simply that the pursuit of one type of objective often undermines the achievement of the other, even though the two appear complementary in theory. In some ways, the paradox is the security dilemma for non-state actors, as it implies that actions taken to make the group more secure often make the group's social movement (and at times the group itself) less secure, regardless of intentions.6

The central hypothesis of the structuralist theory of non-state violence is that violence is more likely to be politically effective when employed by a unipolar social movement than by a multipolar social movement. When a social movement is multipolar, meaning that it has two or more significant armed groups, the paradox is in full effect as competition for predominance among different groups undercuts their ability to collectively achieve the strategic goals they all share. In such an internally competitive environment, groups are more likely to engage in

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6 Robert Jervis explains that "many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others." Therefore, the security dilemma arises, which Barry Posen notes can also lead to the following: "What one does to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure." Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978). Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (1993): 28.
strategically counterproductive actions like outbidding, chain-ganging, and spoiling that represent an inefficient use of scarce resources. A unipolar movement, which contains only one significant armed group, ameliorates the paradox by ensuring that the dominant group can benefit most organizationally by pursuing strategic goals in a non-competitive internal environment. Furthermore, the presence of a leviathan in a unipolar movement imposes strategic coherence, clarity in signaling, and credibility in threats and assurances that translates into violent acts that are more likely to be politically effective (see Figures 2 and 3).

Figure 2. How Unipolarity Causes Politically Effective Violence
Figure 3. How Multipolarity Causes Politically Ineffective Violence

These claims are based in part on the second hypothesis of the structuralist theory, namely that the position of groups in the social movement hierarchy drives when, why, and how they employ violence. Specifically, armed groups are more likely to pursue strategic goals the greater extent to which they can capture their selective incentives, the smaller the internal threat they face, and the larger they are in size. In short, this means that the strongest group in a given movement is more likely to pursue strategic objectives, while weaker groups are more likely to solely pursue organizational objectives, regardless of age or ideology. Nonetheless, if hierarchy shifts over time but the polarity of the movement remains the same, groups are simply exchanging roles in a recurring play that is likely to have the same strategic outcome.

Research Design and Methods

The empirical analysis of the structuralist theory involves a comparative, longitudinal analysis of 33 campaigns by 29 groups within the Palestinian, Irish, Zionist, and Algerian
national movements. These movements each contain groups that share a common goal of a new, unified nation-state while simultaneously competing with each other over leadership. While holding their strategic objective constant, these cases offer significant variation on all variables of interest, as well as time and space. The polarity and hierarchy of each movement shifted significantly over time, and the use of violence met a mixed record of success and failure both organizationally and strategically. Rather than the snapshots of organizations provided by previous scholarship, the selection of these longitudinal cases allows for the evaluation of causal mechanisms as well as improved isolation of the impact of non-state violence on political outcomes. They include examination of periods when groups like Fatah, Hamas, the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), the Haganah, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were nonviolent, as well as the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), which was nonviolent throughout its history. Finally, the Palestinian and Irish national movements—which are the focus of the empirical analysis—represent crucial cases for this dissertation because they have been presented both as \textit{the} paradigmatic examples of how non-state violence succeeds and fails.

This study tracks the campaigns of the six major Palestinian organizations—Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas, Saiqa, and the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP)—within Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza from the prelude to Fatah’s first attack in 1965 through the end of the Second Intifada in 2006.\footnote{Although I am using the most recent names of these organizations here, I also analyze their predecessor groups that existed after 1965, such as the Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM) for the PFLP. Archival work and over one hundred personal interviews conducted over two years with current and former members of the organizations and target governments allowed entry into the internal deliberations of groups to help address the struggle between strategic and organizational concerns, as well as the groups’ own perceptions of strength, strategy and success.} The fact that the movement was often multipolar meant that the use of violence by groups like Fatah, the PFLP, and Hamas was at times organizationally

These longitudinal case studies are followed by a similar analysis of six Irish organizations—the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA), the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Sinn Fein, the Nationalist Party, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)—in Ireland, Northern Ireland, and England between the Easter Rising in 1916 and the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The use of violence by Irish armed groups was strategically effective when the movement was unipolar and strategically ineffective when it was multipolar. The main unipolar period saw large-scale British withdrawal and the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922, while the multipolarity of successive campaigns up to and including The Troubles of 1968-1998 yielded a consistent lack of strategic success, despite the longest sustained period of armed struggle against the British in Irish history.

In both the Palestinian and Irish cases, the hierarchical position of groups in the national movement drove their relative focus on strategic and organizational objectives as well as their associated use of violence, with striking results. After emerging in protest at the decisions by the PLO and OIRA to move away from violence and into politics and negotiation, Fatah and the Provisional IRA proceeded to take these exact same actions decades later when it suited their organizational ends after having supplanted their respective rivals. In the interim, weaker groups employed violence to spoil or outbid again and again. Their stronger rivals were often caught between choosing to curtail the violence or launch more attacks themselves to maintain
predominance, neither of which was beneficial for the movement. As long as the movement remained multipolar, organizational shifts in both cases generally resembled rearranging the hierarchical deck chairs on the proverbial Titanic.

The Zionist and Algerian national movements provide further strong evidence for the explanatory power of the structuralist theory. In the Zionist movement, the use of violence was most effective during periods of unipolarity (1897-1929, 1946-1948, 1948-1949) and largely ineffective during periods of multipolarity (1935-1945), with the periods of unity (1929-1935, 1945-1946) yielding limited to no strategic progress. The use of violence within the Algerian national movement was strategically effective during the one period of unipolarity (1958-1962) and ineffective during periods of multipolarity (1930-1944, 1946-1951, 1952-1957) and unity (1944-1945, 1951). Whereas the multipolar periods were marked by mixed strategies and signals, greater efforts expended on internal fights than external ones, and attempted side deals, the movement under the National Liberation Front’s (FLN) dominance yielded clear, consistent signals, a massive, concerted strategic effort at expelling the French, and a single, credible negotiator with limited potential for spoiling or sell-out due to the lack of a second pole.

Implications

Understanding the interplay between the internal and external dynamics of an armed group and its social movement is essential to cracking its operational code, as well predicting its likely actions and effects. The structuralist theory of non-state violence and the empirical findings in this study generate a number of significant implications for governments, scholars, and the general public, two of which I will discuss here.
First, all armed groups, whether communist, nationalist, religious, or otherwise, have organizational goals and can potentially be manipulated by them. The ‘Anbar Awakening’ in Iraq and Israel’s policy towards Hamas and its predecessors offer two poignant examples. Local tribal sheikhs that previously fought alongside Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) against the United States had a falling out with the jihadis from 2005-2007 over competitive control of smuggling routes in the western region. Although their strategic goal was to oust U.S. forces, their organizational strength and hierarchical position depended on the smuggling revenue. The U.S. helped foster this split further by providing weapons and training to the sheikhs’ forces, which led to the severe weakening of AQI in Anbar and the stabilization of a region that U.S. officials had previously proclaimed “politically and militarily ‘lost.’”

Although the subsequent U.S. troop surge of 2007 was often credited with stabilizing the region, John McCary notes, “The changes leading to this new alliance had already begun long before the surge was even an idea.”

In the next example, Yasser Arafat’s organization was Israel’s most threatening Palestinian enemy from Fatah’s first attack in 1965 through the First Intifada in 1987. The Israelis cracked down on the secular, dominant Fatah while later allowing the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist factions to grow, in part to encourage a multipolar rivalry within the Palestinian movement and weaken the influence of Fatah and the PLO that it came to control. The rivalry flowered after the founding of Hamas amidst the First Intifada, and the lack of Palestinian unipolarity or unity at numerous points in the subsequent decades crippled attempts to achieve strategic objectives.

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9 McCary, "The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives," 44. This is further supported by formerly classified government documents that have recently been released by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. "National Security Council Meeting, Security Update: Situation in Al-Anbar," (Washington, D.C.: October 27, 2006).
At first glance, both of these cases appear to be success stories from the perspectives of the American and Israeli governments. Analysis with the structuralist theory and two-level framework reveals a more mixed record, however. In the Iraq case, the violence in Anbar was decreased due to developing unipolarity in the region, but the U.S. and its allies in the Iraqi government had to cede resources and control to some of its former enemies, granting them progress in their strategic objectives in the process. The former AQI rivals have been replaced by rivals within the U.S.-backed, Shia-led government, who perceive the tribal leaders of the Awakening as armed warlords that pose a threat to the ruling regime.\textsuperscript{10} In the case of Hamas, the Israelis may have structurally weakened the Palestinian national movement, but they also faced significant increases in violence due to attempts at outbidding and spoiling by Hamas as a result of its newfound multipolarity.\textsuperscript{11}

These cases raise a key question: What exactly are the objectives of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency? Much ink has been spilt on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency of late, but scholars and practitioners alike have focused on the strategies linking means and ends—a ‘hearts and minds’ approach versus repression, discriminate versus indiscriminate tactics, a crime model versus a war model—rather than the ends themselves, which are paid comparatively little attention.\textsuperscript{12} There appears to be consensus on two broad goals for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency alike: decrease armed group violence and thwart the strategic objectives of the armed groups.


\textsuperscript{11} This is not to say that Israel is entirely responsible for the rise of Hamas or its later activities, merely that governments studying its example should be wary of the (unintended) consequences. It is worth noting that fractures within the Palestinian movement far predate Hamas’ arrival on the scene and have been promoted by a number of Arab regimes as well.

\textsuperscript{12} The framing of policy choices is further suboptimal because policymakers have focused on a tactic (‘The War on Terror’) or single organizations (see the U.S. State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations) rather than the larger movements in which these tactics and organizations are embedded.
If the goal is simply a decrease in violence, then the Anbar example may prove useful for governments, at least in the short term. Concentrating power within the opposition via unipolarity is likely to yield less internal competition and associated attacks. If governments seek to thwart the strategic designs of social movements, then the Hamas case provides possibilities. Similar to the historic role of Great Britain or the U.S. as off-shore balancers, states can foster division within the social movement of interest by promoting balancing against the strongest group, thus making it less likely that its strategic objectives will be pursued or attained.

Not unlike armed groups, however, states cannot entirely avoid the reality of the paradox. Both examples contain significant risk and potentially dire consequences.\textsuperscript{13} The former prevents violence but yields strategic progress for the adversary; the latter prevents strategic success but reaps increased attacks. Therefore, before academics and policymakers launch into debates over counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies, it would be wise to first clarify their own objectives, recognizing that they may well be at odds with each other as they are with their non-state adversaries.\textsuperscript{14} The absence of prioritization is found at the root of many operations that resulted in costly failures.

Ultimately, the public often asks about (and scholars often search for) ‘root causes’ of non-state violence without knowing much about what it actually achieves. Knowledge of the effects of violence beyond explosions and body counts can help educate the public and promote

\textsuperscript{13} A related challenge is that states may want to fight a divided enemy, but may need a unified one with whom to negotiate a deal. This leads to contradictory policy prescriptions for states considering how best to shape their adversary, to the extent possible. For a related discussion of ‘wedge strategies’ by states, see Timothy Crawford, "Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics," \textit{International Security} 35, no. 4 (2011).

\textsuperscript{14} This point is particularly relevant for those who would look to the literature on why terrorism or insurgency ends for insights into counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. This literature provides valuable wisdom concerning how to prevent armed groups from launching attacks and achieving organizational goals like survival, but it largely ignores the prevention of strategic objectives. Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida," (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), Audrey Kurth Cronin, \textit{How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, "How Insurgencies End," (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010).
realistic attitudes concerning non-state violence, which is rarely an existential threat, yet can become far more dangerous when misunderstood. This study suggests that non-state violence is less likely to achieve strategic success than alarmists fear, but is more likely to be attractive to groups than skeptics argue due to its organizational effectiveness. This helps to answer the question of why groups continue to use violence when it seems to ‘fail’ so often, and it implies that we must continue to reconsider the claim that armed groups are irrational or generally pursue violence as an end in itself.

Book Plan

Chapter 2 analyzes the arguments, concepts, and methods of existing scholarship on the political effectiveness of non-state violence, noting the contributions on which to build and the shortcomings on which to improve. Chapter 3 presents the structuralist theory of non-state violence and its two-level framework. Chapters 4 and 5 analyze the theory using longitudinal case studies of campaigns conducted by groups within the Palestinian and Irish national movements, respectively. Chapter 6 offers initial longitudinal analysis of the political effectiveness of violence within the Zionist and Algerian national movements. Chapter 7 summarizes the argument and empirical findings within and across cases, discusses additional scholarly and policy implications of this study, and presents remaining questions for future research.
Introduction

The most interesting aspect of the current scholarly debate over the political effectiveness of non-state violence is that, upon further examination, there is not much of a debate to be found. Despite seemingly irreconcilable positions, scholars exhibit far more consensus than disagreement on relevant concepts, arguments, and methods.

Most scholars conceive of effectiveness solely as the ability of violence to achieve strategic objectives, such as ending military occupation or altering the nature of the ruling government. Furthermore, scholars treat coercers as unitary and focus on the actions of a single armed group or an aggregated ‘insurgency’ to explain campaign outcomes. Notwithstanding this consensus on conceptual frameworks and units of analysis, scholars have engaged in a fierce dispute over whether non-state violence generally “works” or “does not work.” A key pillar in this debate largely dissolves upon a more accurate assessment of the scope of its competing theories, however. Differences in case selection and standards of measurement drive some of the most prominent opposing assessments of the political effectiveness of non-state violence, not an actual dispute over the historical record.

Analysis of this unrecognized consensus reveals that common variables such as coercer strength and campaign objective propel political effectiveness across forms of non-state violence previously treated as incomparable, including terrorism, insurgency, and civil war. The uniformity in concepts and methods across the subfields poses problems for applying these lessons, however. The use of single-level frameworks and the assumption of unitary coercers has
led previous scholarship to overlook the most crucial motivations for, dynamics within, and effects of the use of non-state violence. Future progress lies in the employment of two-level frameworks that incorporate the strategic and organizational levels of analysis to capture the dynamics of social movements and their impact on the political effectiveness of non-state violence. Furthermore, the increasing tendency of scholars to shun in-depth, longitudinal analyses of violent campaigns across time in favor of more shallow, snapshot assessments of effectiveness has hindered theory development and assessment in the subfield.

In sum, scholars have been having a debate over something about which they agree, but have been agreeing, implicitly and explicitly, about two things that they should be debating. This chapter will critique the arguments, concepts, and methods scholars have offered concerning the political effectiveness of non-state violence in order to place the structuralist theory in the proper context while laying the foundation for other cumulative research in the future.

The Debate that Wasn’t: When is Non-State Violence Politically Effective?

Observers wading into the literature on the political effectiveness of non-state violence cannot help but be struck by the strident tone and seemingly irreconcilable arguments of the most prominent studies to date. Soon after the 9/11 attacks and the publishing of a book entitled Why Terrorism Works, Robert Pape voiced what was increasingly becoming the dominant argument in the subfield, “The main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works.”15 Pape’s argument that terrorism works is supported by Ehud Sprinzak, David Lake, Rohan Gunaratna, Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, among others, who point to

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government overreaction and terrorists' imposition of unacceptable costs as reasons for the political effectiveness of the tactic. Andrew Mack, Ivan Arreguin-Toft, Jason Lyall, and Isaiah Wilson further argue that insurgency works, especially in the post-WWII era, due to a favorable balance of interests, strategic mismatch, and the mechanization of state militaries, respectively.

Max Abrahms responded to this growing scholarly camp with a study entitled "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," which supported the prevailing position before 9/11 summed up by Thomas Schelling and Martha Crenshaw, respectively, "Terrorism has proved to be a remarkably ineffectual means to accomplishing anything," and "Few [terrorist] organizations actually attain the long-term ideological objectives they claim to seek, and there one must conclude that terrorism is objectively a failure." These scholars have found renewed support from subsequent studies of terrorism's decline by Audrey Kurth Cronin, Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, who ask

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slightly different questions but still conclude that terrorism is a politically ineffective tactic.\footnote{Cronin, \textit{How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns}, Jones and Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida." Stathis Kalyvas goes further by arguing that terrorism is often not just ineffective, but is in fact counterproductive to the cause of those who employ it because of the emotional response it engenders and the unclear incentives it offers to its audiences. Kalyvas is unique for his analysis of both terrorism and insurgency, especially in the same study. Stathis Kalyvas, "The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War," \textit{The Journal of Ethics} 8, no. 1 (2004).}

Finally, not all scholars agree that insurgency generally works, as Timothy Wickham-Crowley argues that fewer than ten percent of the insurgencies in his study were successful.\footnote{Timothy Wickham-Crowley, \textit{Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). Also see Theda Skocpol, \textit{States and Social Revolutions} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).}

Despite these seemingly irreconcilable claims, a deeper examination of these valuable studies reveals more consensus than disagreement. Their selection of different cases and methods for assessing success or failure obscures the empirical record, which in fact indicates elements of a common logic for the political effectiveness of non-state violence. Pape and Abrahms unintentionally provide an excellent example of ‘the debate that wasn’t,’ as well as the explanatory power of objective type and coercer strength.

Pape and Abrahms make perhaps the most contradictory claims in the subfield, with the former claiming terrorism “works” 50% of the time and the latter countering that it “does not work” and instead succeeds only 7% of the time.\footnote{Pape, \textit{Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism}, 64.} Upon further examination, however, the gap between them disappears when differences in their standards of measurement and case selection are considered. Pape argues, “Perhaps the most striking aspect of recent suicide terrorist campaigns is that they are associated with gains for the terrorists' political cause about half the time.”\footnote{Pape, \textit{Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism}, 64.} For Abrahms, on the other hand, “terrorism’s effectiveness is measured by comparing their stated objectives to policy outcomes.”\footnote{Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 48.} The use of different reference points—the pre-terrorism status quo for Pape and the ultimate objective for Abrahms—helps drive the disparate
conclusions. For instance, a terrorist campaign that coerced the release of a prisoner would be a success for Pape, because it was a new concession, but would not be a success for Abrahms, since it did not lead to the group achieving a new state.

The second key reason for the opposing conclusions of Abrahms and Pape is differing case selection. Pape purports to study all campaigns of suicide terrorism, while Abrahms studies campaigns by all groups on the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list of the U.S. Department of State. Nonetheless, Abrahms includes four of the five groups in Pape’s study—Hamas, Hezbollah, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—and the two do not disagree on the outcomes of any of the campaigns they have in common. Their dispute is therefore not over whether terrorism has succeeded in certain campaigns, but rather which campaigns are included. The additional cases included in Abrahms’ study, but absent from Pape’s—such as campaigns by the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), the Abu Nidal Organization, and Revolutionary Nuclei—help to drive down Abrahms’ purported success rate. The striking thing about these groups is not simply that Abrahms measures their success against high magnitude objectives such as “establish Irish unification” (RIRA), “destroy

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24 One could also characterize the difference as a measure of absolute versus relative gains. Abrahms is most concerned with the former, asking “Did the terrorist campaign achieve its objective?” while Pape focuses on the latter, “Did the terrorist campaign achieve more concessions than had been previously realized?”

25 This happens in other cases as well. Abrahms assesses Hezbollah’s ability to “destroy Israel” while Pape analyzes the group’s ability to remove Israel from its security zone in southern Lebanon. For the PKK, Abrahms assesses the group’s ability to “establish communism in Turkey” while Pape analyzes the group’s ability to release its jailed leader. In all cases, it is clear that despite some crossover, Abrahms focuses on the highest magnitude objectives, while Pape assesses considerably smaller ones.

26 Abrahms’ use of the FTO list is problematic. Any armed group that succeeds in establishing a new state would no longer be on the State Department’s list, creating selection bias in favor of “no success” (e.g. the African National Congress). Furthermore, the State Department notes that only groups that “threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States” are included on the list. Weak groups are less likely to pose such a threat than strong ones, as are those whose intentions do not involve targeting the U.S. or its allies. There are logical reasons for a state to maintain such a definition, but they are clearly not entirely objective standards, and the state certainly has incentives to list its enemies as terrorists while ignoring its allies. "2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations," Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2001/5258.htm. For a basic discussion of the list, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, "The “Fto List” and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2003).
Israel” (Abu Nidal), or “establish Marxism in Greece” (Revolutionary Nuclei), but that these groups are so small and weak, especially as compared to those shared by Pape and Abrahms.27

The study of politics is the study of power, and scholars of international relations and conventional coercion have often looked first to the balance of power between adversaries to help explain the outcome of their various types of coercive encounters.28 It is surprising, therefore, that scholars of non-state violence are so quick to disregard power as an explanation for the variation in the effectiveness of non-state violence. For the most part, scholars note that terrorists or insurgents are weaker than their state adversaries. That is where their discussion of power often ends, however, as Pape, Abrahms, and others treat this relative power imbalance as a constant that cannot explain variation in outcomes.29 Of course, even if all groups that employ terrorism or insurgency are weaker than their state adversaries, there are certainly stronger and weaker groups, both relative to each other and relative to states.

Analysis of Abrahms and Pape’s data yields strong initial evidence for the significance of strength as an explanatory variable in some form. The two scholars find similar success rates for campaigns conducted by groups with the same size membership (see Figure 4).30 This demonstrates that differences in case selection help account for the differing conclusions

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28 For suggestions of the importance of strength in coercive encounters, see Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Charles Tilly, "From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements," in *How SocialMovements Matter*, ed. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). Interestingly, economic sanction episodes resemble asymmetric conflicts in this regard. In their study, Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Elliot (HSE) note: “The economy of the sender is usually very much larger than that of the target country. In most cases, the sender’s GNP is over 10 times greater than the target’s GNP, and in over half the ratio is greater than 50...In many instances, when the GNP ratio is under 10, sanctions founder.” Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990), 63.
29 Abrahms claims, “To say that the coercive skills of terrorist groups are poor relative to those of states because these groups are considerably weaker is to concede the point that compelling policy change is a low-probability affair for terrorist groups.” Perhaps, but Abrahms is not just trying to present the success rate for groups that use terrorism. He is also trying to explain the reasons for that rate, which he himself notes is non-zero. Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 52.
30 These measurements represent the peak membership size of the groups.
concerning the effectiveness of terrorism because of Abrahms' inclusion of a comparatively higher number of small groups (see Figure 5). In sum, differences in standards of measurement and case selection drive this supposed debate over the effectiveness of terrorism, rather than an actual dispute over the historical record.

These observations concerning the importance of objective type, group strength, and measurement standards for effectiveness can help resolve a number of other puzzles from the existing literature. For example, Wickham-Crowley's contention that only 8% of the insurgencies in his study succeeded is a stark outlier from the roughly 50% success rate found by other insurgency scholars, such as Lyall and Wilson. However, the gap can be explained in part by Wickham-Crowley's standard for success—the achievement of a social revolution—rather than empirical disagreements with other scholars. This represents a far higher magnitude objective than the battlefield victory or military stalemate used by Toft, Lyall and Wilson as a standard for "success." To avoid this problem of objective magnitude, the strategic objective for all cases in this study will be held constant: the achievement of a new state. However, this study will also analyze the extent to which objective type impacts rates of effectiveness in ways previous scholars have overlooked.

31 Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956, 312, Lyall and Wilson, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars."
32 The campaign objective plays a significant role in setting the stakes for the encounter, as it determines the potential benefit for the coercer and cost for the target if the campaign is successful. In their work on economic sanctions, HSE argued, "The nature of the objective may be the most important political variable of all: sanctions cannot stop a military assault as easily as they can free a political prisoner." Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 49. William Gamson agrees: "There is a certain absurdity in comparing an organization that seeks a modest change and threatens no major redistribution of power with one that seeks to sweep aside the old order and all of its supporting institutions." William Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1975), 38.
Group size is a satisfactory, if imperfect, proxy for group strength. It has proven to be similar to Winston Churchill’s opinion of democracy as a form of government: the worst one, except for all of the others.
The problem with many of these studies—and the reason for the illusory debate—is not that they are wrong, but rather that their conclusions overstate the scope of their findings (which remain significant even when circumscribed). Most of these studies represent a distinct part of the whole, rather than a representative sample. This becomes clear when they are considered alongside the few studies that do attempt to capture the universe of cases. Jones and Libicki (JL) analyzed 648 terrorist groups, yet their distribution of group size is quite different from that of Pape and Abrahms (see Figure 6).\textsuperscript{35} Most groups in JL’s study are quite small, with comparatively few reaching 1,000 or more members, yet groups of this size represent the majority in Pape and Abrahms’ studies. When studies like Pape and Abrahms’ are used by the authors themselves (or others) to debate larger questions concerning the political effectiveness of non-state violence, the incompatibility of the studies and the true scope of their findings must be considered.

**Figure 6. Distribution of Group Size by Study**\textsuperscript{36}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure6.png}
\caption{Distribution of Group Size by Study}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{35} Jones and Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida." Jones and Libicki used the RAND-MIPT data to build their database of 648 groups.

\textsuperscript{36} Polynomial trend lines have been added to the graph to help provide a clearer visual of the different distributions of cases across the three studies.
The biggest problem with existing studies is not their competing hypotheses, however, but rather the conceptual foundation on which these arguments are based. Thus far I have unearthed a degree of consensus amidst an ongoing debate. Although group strength and objective magnitude may be important variables, however, they are the product of static studies that assume a single dimension of interaction yielding a single campaign outcome. When the dynamics of non-state violence are more fully captured, it becomes clear that the true power of strength and objective type as explanatory variables lie in different conceptualizations altogether. As such, the subfield requires an open, healthy debate about what political effectiveness really is and how political scientists can best analyze and explain its variation.

A Limiting Consensus: Conceptualizing Political Effectiveness

Existing scholarship largely agrees that the effectiveness of non-state violence involves a unitary coercer employing force in pursuit of strategic concessions. This conceptual foundation, borrowed from the literature on conventional coercion, is problematic when applied to non-state actors. A campaign of non-state coercion generally involves numerous armed groups embedded in a larger social movement. Although these groups are working towards a common strategic goal, their actions are often uncoordinated. Furthermore, their use of force is driven as much by organizational rivalries as by the desire for successful strategic coercion. Therefore, assuming that the non-state coercer is either a unitary ‘insurgency’ or a single armed group (as is more common in the terrorism subfield) overlooks the dynamics that drive the use and effectiveness of violence. This section will critique the subfield’s employment of single-level frameworks and unitary coercers to argue for a shift in the conceptual foundation of the political effectiveness of non-state violence.
**The Preponderance of One-Dimensional Frameworks for the Study of Effectiveness**

Scholars demonstrate remarkable agreement on how to conceive of the political effectiveness of non-state violence, despite limited citation and discussion across the subfields of terrorism and insurgency and (seemingly) limited agreement within them. For authors of the most prominent, far-reaching works on the topic, political effectiveness starts and ends with strategic objectives, or those that involve concessions from state targets. This approach is based on the idea that terrorism and insurgency are forms of coercion, a phenomenon elucidated by Thomas Schelling, Glenn Snyder, and Alexander George, and best defined by Daniel Byman:

"The use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would."

It is therefore not surprising that scholars of terrorism and insurgency have focused on strategic objectives, since coercion theorists have done the same whether the tool is nuclear weapons, coercive diplomacy, or economic sanctions. For studies of insurgency, scholars

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37 Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*, 30. Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), Alexander George and William Simons, eds., *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994). Ironically, the study of coercion has most benefited from analysis of two other forms of unconventional warfare: nuclear and air power. These two types of force were both thought to be revolutionary since they allowed the attacker the possibility of using violence to influence politics without having to defeat the target’s ground forces, a description that resonates with terrorism and insurgency. As Thomas Schelling put it, with the advent of nuclear weapons, “Victory is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy. And it is no assurance against being terribly hurt.” Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 22.

38 HSE sum up the consensus on objectives in the economic sanctions subfield: “Domestic political motives may overshadow concerns about changing foreign policy behavior. Unfortunately, the literature on individual economic sanctions episodes seldom evaluates the role of domestic policy objectives, nor does it indicate whether they were satisfied. We have not attempted to fill those important gaps in our study.” Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy*, 41, Robert Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997), Daniel Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Lawrence Freedman seemingly wanted his edited volume on coercion to serve as a possible exception: “These chapters point to the dual character of every act of strategic coercion. First, there will be the specific issues which may have triggered the immediate crisis. Success or failure of a coercive act will be judged in the first instance in terms of these issues. However, second, there will also be at stake a general position within a power structure.” Unfortunately, the authors who wrote the subsequent chapters of Freedman’s book did not employ this intriguing framework, as they again focused on strategic objectives
gauge effectiveness based on whether a collective insurgency prevails in the conflict vis-à-vis its state adversary, which often means a withdrawal of state forces. Some terrorism scholars have expanded slightly beyond simple coding of conflict outcomes as win, lose, or draw, but even these additional benchmarks, such as severing relations between allies, are strategic objectives in which the state is the target audience. Unfortunately, even though seminal studies of coercion provide a solid foundation on which to begin building analyses of political effectiveness, their historical focus on states means that existing frameworks require adjustment in order to fully capture the dynamics of different units of analysis: armed groups and their social movements.

The strategic goals that scholars have included in their studies should serve as standards of assessment for political effectiveness, as they are political, intended, and significant. Previous scholarship is therefore not guilty of sins of commission, but omission is another story. If terrorist and insurgent attacks were launched entirely by unorganized individuals selflessly...
pursuing the common (strategic) good, then organizational objectives would be nonexistent.\(^4^3\)

History has proven otherwise, however, as the majority of such attacks and nearly all campaigns have been launched by self-interested organizations.\(^4^4\) Crenshaw asserts, “The organization may be more important than the individual to the initiation and conduct of campaigns of terrorism.”\(^4^5\)

The organizational approach is based on the assumption that the fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself.\(^4^6\) Under certain conditions, violence can help a group to inspire new recruits, raise funds, or improve cohesion, as described by Brazilian revolutionary leader Carlos Marighela: “What made us grow was action: solely and exclusively revolutionary action,” because “It is only through revolutionary action that an organization capable of carrying the revolution through to victory can be formed.”\(^4^7\)

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\(^4^3\) The case of Hamas illustrates many of the difficulties in the one-dimensional approach. In his study, Abrahms only evaluates the political effectiveness of terrorism employed by Hamas based on its ability to “destroy Israel” or “establish a state in historic Palestine.” There is no discussion of Hamas’ objectives concerning its own survival, its power within the Palestinian camp, its legitimacy in the region or internationally, or its desire to prevent progress towards a deal with Israel that does not align with its vision or empower its leaders. All of these are important political objectives, without whose attainment Hamas would not appear in Abrahms’ study and would be unable to achieve the strategic objectives he identifies. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that on numerous occasions, Hamas, like many organizations, has been more concerned with what Abrahms would call these “intermediate” goals than the “strategic” ones. Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 49. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).

\(^4^4\) Mohammed Hafez notes, “Without organizations, aggrieved individuals cannot act out their violence in a sustained manner.” Mohammed Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 25. Lone individuals have certainly launched significant isolated attacks, such as Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols with the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. However, such attacks are the exception rather than the rule, and only in very rare circumstances can such attacks have significant political effects.


\(^4^7\) Carlos Marighela, For the Liberation of Brazil, trans. John Butt and Rosemary Sheed (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971), 31, 30. Rather than assuming that groups employ terrorism in earnest attempts to achieve their stated objectives, scholars of the organizational approach trumpet Robert Michels and Max Weber’s analysis on
Within the terrorism and insurgency subfields, a growing number of scholars have made the organizational approach the focus of their efforts to understand the dynamics of armed groups. Crenshaw and Kent Layne Oots provided early introductions to the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the organizational approach to terrorism.\textsuperscript{48} Scholars like Roger Petersen, Mia Bloom, Scott Atran, Fotini Christia, Donatella Della Porta, Marc Sageman, and Wendy Pearlman have more recently offered powerful insights about the motivations and dynamics of armed groups derived from a focus on inner workings of social movements and organizations.\textsuperscript{49} These scholars have largely focused on the causes and mechanisms of violence rather than its effects, however, leaving the issue of the impact of violence on organizational objectives comparatively understudied.\textsuperscript{50}

bureaucratization, noting the “predominance of organizational survival over the transformation of external reality.” Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 84.

\textsuperscript{48} Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism.", Kent Layne Oots, "Organizational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups," Terrorism 12, no. 3 (1989).


\textsuperscript{50} Bloom and Pearlman, who completed two excellent studies using the organizational approach, elucidated the key concepts of outbidding and spoiling, respectively. Each analyzed their chosen organizational strategy using well-selected, richly detailed case studies. However, the main purpose of their works was not to analyze what impact attempts at outbidding or spoiling had on group or campaign success, but rather to demonstrate that terrorist attacks are often the result of groups’ internal struggles for power and influence (rather than driven by a strategy for achieving external objectives). Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism, Pearlman, "Spoiling inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process." Sageman has championed the use of network theory to analyze terrorism; however, he focuses on who joins terrorist organizations and why, rather than terrorism’s effects. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks. A large-N study by Oots, rare for the organizational approach, likewise takes a “terrorism as dependent variable” tack by addressing which types of groups and coalitions commit which types of terrorism. Kent Layne Oots, A Political Organizational Approach to Transnational Terrorism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986).
An Essential but Absent Debate: The Relevance of Organizational Objectives

Scholars of the effectiveness of non-state violence have been surprisingly dismissive of organizational objectives. Most have excluded them from their studies without making an explicit argument as to why. Those that have addressed them argue that although organizational objectives may be political and intended, they are not significant and there is little to no variation in the ability of non-state violence to achieve them. First, scholars like Audrey Kurth Cronin claim that organizational goals do not matter politically: “All these [organizational] forms of success offer no insight into the effectiveness of the tactic in achieving its political ends.”

Scholars of insurgency may not be as explicit as Abrahms, who refers to organizational objectives dismissively as “intermediate” or “tactical,” but they similarly exclude them from their studies of effectiveness.

The claim that organizational objectives are insignificant is similar to saying that to study the political effectiveness of the Republican Party of the United States, it is not necessary to

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51 A third reason that organizational objectives were comparatively understudied for a time is the assumption that if the target of violence is external, then the target of influence must be external as well. Selznick noted the fallacy of this assumption concerning Bolshevik actions: “Much propaganda activity apparently directed outward is in fact designed to bolster the organization’s own ranks and supporters. Such propaganda plays an indispensable role in strengthening cohesion and discipline.” Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960), 10. Most scholars today have discarded this assumption and recognize the existence of organizational objectives, but still choose to ignore or minimize their impact in studies of political effectiveness.

52 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, 80. Prominent scholars of military organizations disagree with Cronin: “The effort to obtain resources for military activity and the proficiency achieved in acquiring those resources constitute political effectiveness.” Allan Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman, “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” International Security 11, no. 1 (1986): 39. Pape does not dismiss organizational goals as insignificant, but he does argue that “demonstrative terrorism” is not the focus of groups who employ suicide bombing, and so coercion for strategic objectives will be his focus, as it is the (supposed) overriding focus of the groups he studies. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 9-11.

53 Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 47, Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, Lyall and Wilson, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars.", Connable and Libicki, "How Insurgencies End." Mack goes further than other scholars of the effectiveness of insurgency by noting how it is both necessary and difficult for armed groups to survive in order to achieve victory. However, like his peers he excludes organizational objectives from his dependent variable. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," 176-188.
analyze how it grew from nothing to became one of the two significant political parties in the most powerful country in the world, or how it mobilizes tens of millions of supporters, raises billions of dollars, wins local and national elections, defines the debate on many key political issues, or prevents the realization of objectives by its major rival, the Democratic Party. Of course, it would be absurd to overlook such accomplishments, and scholars who wish to gauge the effectiveness of the Republicans certainly do no such thing. For armed groups, becoming one of the dominant organizations representing a people, maintaining thousands of members, and gaining international recognition are all major accomplishments that shape the political landscape, especially when the very nature of an organization's actions means that much more powerful entities are actively working to prevent it from achieving these very goals.54

Abrahms and Cronin attempt to further diminish organizational objectives by claiming they are “process goals” that simply contribute to strategic ones.55 In addition to the fact that organizational objectives are significant in their own right, the arrows go both ways: organizational survival is a “process goal” necessary to launch a campaign to remove a military occupation, which is itself a “process goal” that can help that organization gain the popular support it needs to become the ruling party of the liberated territory.56 In fact, as demonstrated in

54 The challenge of armed groups is so direct and the normative case so strong that even their continued existence is a loss for the government because of the organizations' delegitimate nature according to Weber's notion of the state. Indeed, "No other strategy [than terrorism] invites harsher repression, greater moral censure, deeper alienation from the masses, or more potential for disaster." James DeNardo, Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 242.


56 Mack and Toft support the claim that organizational effectiveness is an important and necessary step for strategic success. Mack argues that armed groups succeed by doing two things: first, surviving by not fighting directly, and second, winning politically with the state's government and populace by imposing costs over time, because armed groups do not have the capacity to win militarily. Toft goes so far as to code any stalemate or ongoing conflict as a win for the insurgents. Neither scholar made organizational effectiveness the focus of his study, however. As Mack explained, "I took the fact that insurgents did not lose as a 'given' when I inquired into the more interesting problem—namely, how did they win?" Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," 195. Petersen agrees that organizational objectives are necessary and is one of the few to include variation in their achievement in his analysis: "In opposing a regime with superior numbers of weapons and trained soldiers,
Chapter 3, variation in the political effectiveness of non-state violence is based on the extent to which the process of achieving organizational objectives includes or excludes the pursuit of strategic goals. In other words, Abrahms and Cronin may consider organizational objectives to be process goals on the path to achieving strategic success, but the key to strategic success is getting groups to perceive strategic objectives as process goals on the path to organizational success. Recognition of these processes necessitates a two-level framework that captures the crosscutting mechanisms that are at the foundation of political effectiveness, not their dismissal.

In addition to the claim that organizational goals do not matter politically, scholars argue that they are easy to achieve. Abrahms notes, “There is little debate that terrorism often facilitates the achievement of intermediate objectives,” echoing Crenshaw, who previously argued that “extremist organizations frequently achieve their tactical objectives, particularly publicity and recognition.” This claim stems in part from the sound argument that non-state violence generally brings attention to an organization. Organizational goals include far more than just notoriety, however, as longevity requires transforming that attention into significant popular and financial support. Suffice it to say, this is not an easy task and most organizations sustained rebellion depends on significant numbers of individuals occupying roles linking armed, mobile resistance movements to fixed populations. Some clandestine organization that is impervious to the generally superior military power and organization of the occupier or the regime must develop and survive.” Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe, 2-3. Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.

57 Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 47. Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," 15. However, Crenshaw previously argued that “Any increase, however limited, in the terrorist organization’s influence over the political process is meaningful,” alluding to the possibility that she may support inclusion of organizational objectives in studies of political effectiveness under certain circumstances. Martha Crenshaw, "Introduction," in Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence, ed. Martha Crenshaw (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University, 1983), 25.

58 On this count, Schelling’s argument is emblematic: “True, an intermediate means toward political objectives could be attracting attention and publicizing a grievance, and terrorism certainly attracts attention and publicizes grievances.” Schelling further confirms his agreement with Abrahms, Cronin, and Crenshaw about the worth of such achievements with his next sentence: “But with a few exceptions it is hard to see that the attention and the publicity have been of much value except as ends in themselves.” Schelling, “What Purposes Can ‘International Terrorism’ Serve?,” 20. Crenshaw herself claimed that “The reason [terrorism] continues in the immediate is that extremist organizations frequently achieve their tactical objectives, particularly publicity and recognition.” Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," 15.
that employ terrorism or insurgency fail to achieve this key organizational objective. Even the most successful and famous campaigns are marked by organizations who remain little known to this day because of a lack of public support and resources—the South Londonderry Protestant Volunteers, Ahrar Al-Jalil ("Freedom of the Galilee"), and the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students—whereas others, like the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Fatah, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are better recognized and have enjoyed greater support from people across the globe than many current states.

Studies of insurgency generally only include conflicts that include 1,000 battle deaths and at least 100 people killed on both sides. As Connable and Libicki note: "We limited ourselves to insurgencies that passed a certain threshold; however, many protoinsurgencies die before reaching this threshold. Thus, while concluding, for instance, that most insurgencies that fought for independence succeeded, we omit all the protoinsurgencies that sought their country’s independence but never achieved sufficient momentum to make the threshold for inclusion. This may constitute a form of sample bias that skews results." Cronin cited organizational failure as one of her six pathways to the demise of terrorism groups, but even her study underestimates the likelihood of organizational collapse. She removed hundreds of organizations from the 873 in the

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59 David Rapoport differs with scholars who claim that it is easy for armed groups to survive and thrive, arguing that ninety percent of organizations that use terrorism do not survive their first year. Although subsequent studies on longevity by Cronin, Vittori, Jones and Libicki have tempered this claim a bit and stress the importance of group type for longevity, their studies do not refute the fact fifty percent or more of the organizations that employ terrorism have historically measured their life spans in months, not years. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Jodi Vittori, "All Struggles Must End: The Longevity of Terrorist Groups," Contemporary Security Policy 30, no. 3 (2009), Jones and Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida." Yet again, Crenshaw penned the best early work on the topic. Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," Terrorism and Political Violence 3, no. 1 (1991). Petersen and Bloom similarly undermine the claims that groups easily achieve organizational objectives, laying out key conditions for success—such as public support, intelligent targeting and the existence of strong communities—that are not always met. Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe, Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism.

60 This standard is employed by Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, Lyall and Wilson, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars.", Connable and Libicki, "How Insurgencies End."

original RAND-MIPT database before commencing her analysis because they did not display "sustained organizational capabilities."62 A brief examination of the data reveals that a failure to achieve organizational goals, rather than strategic choice, was responsible for the loss of most of these organizations from the dataset (and in most cases, the political scene).63 Furthermore, the original sample of 873 is certainly lacking many other organizations that have used terrorism briefly, but because they lacked supporters, publicity, and standing, the RAND-MIPT researchers could not find sufficient information about them, just like individuals in the organizations' societies with whom they did not catch on. The significant variation that exists in the achievement of these significant organizational objectives deserves explanation, not indifference.64

Unfortunately, the number of scholars who have conducted two-level analysis of non-state violence is even smaller than those who have analyzed organizational effectiveness. Crenshaw offered the earliest and best attempt to lay out the two types of approaches side-by-side in one study.65 Although she did not present a unified framework, she did suggest, "both

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62 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, 207-208. Connable and Libicki also eliminated a significant number of cases (51) from James Fearon and David Laitin's dataset for their study of insurgency, most of which also failed organizationally in short order: "Of the 51, almost half (25) did not see their second birthday, and all but nine of them ended within six years." Connable and Libicki, "How Insurgencies End," 199. James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," The American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003).

63 Over one-third of the 457 "durable organizations" Cronin subsequently analyzed lasted only 0-5 years, a proportion that would rise to well over half with the addition of the excluded cases.

64 Two welcome exceptions are recent studies by Kevin Siqueira and Todd Sandler, and Ethan Bueno De Mesquita and Eric Dickson, who analyze the impact of terrorist violence on the public support of terrorist groups. Their analysis does not include all key aspects of organizational strength, however, and both employ game theory, which is helpful for formalizing hypotheses, but does not provide significant insight into the empirical record of non-state violence on its own. Nonetheless, the theories offered by these scholars provide opportunities for further analysis within large-N and longitudinal case studies and alike. Kevin Siqueira and Todd Sandler, "Terrorists Versus the Government: Strategic Interaction, Support, and Sponsorship," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 6 (2006), Ethan Bueno De Mesquita and Eric Dickson, "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization," American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (2007).

65 Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches." Crenshaw cites Edward Mickolus' work on hostage negotiations as the foundation for her two models. Although Mickolus' study is groundbreaking in many ways, Crenshaw's presentation of the two models for terrorism writ large is far more detailed, systematic, and explicitly theoretical. Edward Mickolus, "Negotiating for Hostages: A Policy Dilemma," Orbis 19,
views may be necessary to understanding terrorism and its consequences.” Mack alluded to the existence of two-level games for states in asymmetric conflict: “The Vietnam War may be seen as having been fought on two fronts—one bloody and indecisive in the forests and mountains of Indochina, the other essentially nonviolent—but ultimately more decisive—within the polity and social institutions of the United States. The nature of the relationship between these two conflicts—which are in fact different facets of the same conflict—is critical to an understanding of the outcome of the war.” Mia Bloom was the most explicit: “Islamic extremist groups sending out suicide bombers are participating in a two-level game. Their attacks are intended to hurt Israel while at the same time undermine the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority.”

In rare cases, scholars have assessed political effectiveness in terms of strategic and organizational objectives, but only in related subfields. The earliest and perhaps best example is William Gamson’s study of the effects of social movements in the United States, which he observes, “Among goals defined in this way, there are two types: external goals and organizational goals. The latter refer to the enhancement of the strength and ability of the challenging group rather than to the realization of new advantages of the group’s beneficiary.”

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68 Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism, 36. In attempting to mediate between supporters of the strategic and organizational approaches, Hillel Frisch identifies the need for a unified approach by suggesting that the key question is not whether the strategic model or organizational model always applies, but rather which applies under what conditions since they both have merit. I would revise this promising suggestion by arguing that scholars should attempt to apply both approaches simultaneously by crafting a two-level framework, since it is rare that one or the other is ever entirely absent or unworthy of analysis. In this way, scholars would be able to analyze the true dynamics of group action and effectiveness while accounting for the gaps left by each model individually. Max Abrahms et al., "What Makes Terrorists Tick," International Security 33, no. 4 (2009): 189.
Gamson assesses the effectiveness of social movements relative to both types of objectives. Others have analyzed the crosscutting mechanisms that underlie the two types of objectives in terms of the creation of the earliest states by various types of armed groups. Charles Tilly’s famous claim that “war made the state and the state made war,” is based on an explicit, mutually reinforcing relationship between strategic coercion and organizational construction (in this case, resulting in the creation of modern nation-states). Samuel Huntington had earlier made a similar argument that “war was the great stimulus to state building.”

The next step is to employ a two-level framework as the basis for the development of a theory of the political effectiveness of non-state violence. This is the focus of the next chapter.

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The Preponderant, Problematic Assumption of a Unitary Coercer

The exclusion of organizational objectives has contributed to another common but collectively limiting practice: the assumption of a unified non-state coercer. Lyall and Wilson’s work is representative of insurgency studies, which analyze the effectiveness of the ‘Vietnamese insurgency’ or the ‘Algerian insurgency’ as single entities. Abrahms’ study is indicative of the terrorism subfield, which analyzes the effectiveness of violence by examining the Abu Nidal Organization or Hamas in isolation. The former approach captures movements but not groups, the latter groups but not movements. Neither is reflective of reality nor, more importantly, optimal for the construction of theory.

Neither unit of analysis is reflective of reality because insurgencies and their social movements are rarely unitary, cohesive entities, but are rather generally marked by multiple groups competing for power without any strong, centralized institution to grant a monopoly of legitimate force or help direct a centralized strategy. Furthermore, campaigns of coercion are rarely based on the actions of a single group, and so ascribing the outcome of a campaign to just one organization misses much of the story.

The main flaw in the assumption of a unitary coercer lies in the basis it provides for theory development. Rivalries between groups within social movements drive the pursuit of organizational and strategic objectives. Therefore, scholars have neglected the central factor in

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73 Lyall and Wilson, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars."
74 Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work."
75 As Waltz correctly notes: “Assumptions are not assertions of fact. They are neither true nor false. Theoretical notions find their justification in the success of the theories that employ them. Of purported laws, we ask: Are they true? Of theories, we ask: How great is their explanatory power?” Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 6.
76 This “fallacy of composition” identified by J.L. Mackie, “is committed whenever we assume, without adequate reason, that we can speak about groups in the same ways in which we can speak about their members, that we can speak of a nation having a will or interests.” Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 1.
the political effectiveness of non-state violence—unity of action—which happens to be a powerful variable, not an assumable constant. Indeed, the idea that the more unitary the coercer, the more likely its use of violence will be politically effective is at the foundation of the structuralist theory of non-state violence, detailed in the next chapter.

The assumption of a unitary coercer should not be discarded altogether, but neither should it be the sole, predominant approach to the study of the effectiveness of non-state violence, as is currently the case.

Getting Time on Your Side: The Benefits of Longitudinal Analysis

Shallow empirics often characterize studies of the political effectiveness of non-state violence, especially as sample size increases. Large-N methods have assisted in the testing of theories across cases, but their increasing predominance has led to a bias in favor of simpler variables that can be quickly coded across hundreds of campaigns. For potential explanatory variables, this situation has contributed to the near ubiquitous assumption of a unitary coercer. For the dependent variable, the rise of large-N studies has yielded comparatively few longitudinal assessments of campaigns. Unfortunately, some of the most promising theories cannot be captured by shallow empirical and temporal data.

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77 Mack’s study is small-N but he nonetheless objects to breaking up conflicts by time for the purposes of analysis, although he does claim that despite the rise of war termination studies, “The evolution of the war and its wider sociopolitical dimensions are largely ignored.” Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," 196-198. Connable and Libicki discuss the importance of time and armed group stages at length in their theory and case studies, but their large-N analysis does not include any variation in time for each conflict. Connable and Libicki, "How Insurgencies End." The same can be said for the other prominent large-N studies of the subfield. Jones and Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida.", Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Lyall and Wilson, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars."

78 On the distinction between “thick” and “thin” analysis, see David Collier, Henry Brady, and Jason Seawright, "Sources of Leverage in Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology," in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. Henry Brady and David Collier (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 244-266.
The most glaring example occurs when the effectiveness of campaigns or groups are presented as a snapshot, using only a single measure of the dependent variable. Reducing a forty-year struggle to a single data point surrenders a great deal of valuable information, including within-case variation in the explanatory and dependent variables over time as conditions and tactics change, as well as the ability to recognize and evaluate causal mechanisms. This practice is surprising given that the concept of stages and the importance of the temporal evolution of a conflict was a central concept in the thinking of the most prominent practitioners and theorists of insurgency and terrorism, including Mao Tse-tung, Che Guevara, Marighela, Vo Nguyuen Giap, and Abu Bakr Naji.\footnote{Mao Tse-tung, \textit{On Guerrilla Warfare}, trans. Samuel Griffith (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000), Ernesto “Che” Guevara, \textit{Guerrilla Warfare} (Thousand Oaks, CA: BN Publishing, 2008), Marighela, \textit{For the Liberation of Brazil}, Vo Nguyen Giap, \textit{People’s War}, \textit{People’s Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries} (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2000), Abu Bakr Naji, \textit{The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through Which the Umma Will Pass}, trans. William McCants (Cambridge, MA: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, 2006).}

A few prominent studies provide templates for how to analyze the political effectiveness of non-state violence over time, including the works of Abrahms, Peterson, Toft, Alexander Downes, and David Galula.\footnote{Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," 60-65. Peterson notes that “rebellions against strong regimes generally involve multiple stages.” Petersen, \textit{Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe}, 32. Toft provides an excellent example of analysis of within-case variation with his study of four stages of the Vietnam War, but his large-N analysis reverts to a single measure of success for entire conflicts. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," \textit{International Security} 26, no. 1 (2001): 116-128. Alexander Downes, "Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy," \textit{Civil Wars} 9, no. 4 (2007), Galula, \textit{Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice}.} These works demonstrate that the use of temporal variation within cases enables deeper analysis of causal mechanisms and variables that are otherwise overlooked. This study will employ in-depth, longitudinal analyses of a small number of violent campaigns to help build and assess a theory constructed on a more intricate framework and unit of analysis than is normally employed, but that has the potential for greater explanatory power.
Conclusion

Despite the growing attention paid to the political effectiveness of non-state violence, it remains a young section of a young subfield. Our knowledge of the effects of non-state violence is not as deficient as it was in 1975 and 1983, when Mack and Crenshaw noted, respectively, “The outcome of ‘asymmetric conflicts’ as described in this paper has been almost totally neglected,” and “the outcomes of campaigns of terrorism have been largely ignored.”81 Nonetheless, Crenshaw’s subsequent claim that “we know little about the links between terrorism and major political change,” still rings true.82 We still do not know when non-state violence is politically effective due to limiting concepts and research methods, even if a deeper examination of the current theoretical debate reveals a growing, implicit consensus. In the next chapter, I will present a robust structural theory that explains greater variation in the political effectiveness of non-state violence than previous studies.

81 Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," 176. Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), 5. The subfield is not alone in its relative lack of scholarship on political effects, which Marco Giugni explains: “As several scholars have pointed out at different times, the study of the consequences of social movements is one of the most neglected topics in the literature...The lack of scholarly work on this topic is all the more unfortunate if we consider that one of the raisons d’être of social movements is to bring about changes in some aspects of society, a fundamental goal of movements which is often acknowledged but only rarely addressed explicitly.” Marco Giugni, "How Social Movements Matter: Past Research, Present Problems, Future Developments," in How Social Movements Matter, ed. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), xiv-xv.
The Structuralist Theory of Non-State Violence

Introduction

This chapter presents the structuralist theory of non-state violence, which contains two central arguments. First, the theory argues that the hierarchy of social movements drives the actions of their armed groups. Second, the theory argues that the polarity of social movements drives the political effectiveness of non-state violence employed by those groups. The goal is to answer the question raised in the introduction: When and how is non-state violence politically effective?

Armed groups employ violence for two main purposes: to alter the behavior of adversaries and to increase their own strength. The former culminate in strategic objectives, such as the changing of a regime, the withdrawal of enemy troops, or the release of prisoners, whereas the latter manifest through organizational objectives, such as the raising of recruits or funding. The political effectiveness of non-state violence should be assessed across both objective types. The challenge for armed groups is that although organizational and strategic goals appear complementary in theory, they are often contradictory in practice. The use of violence to pursue one type of objective can undermine the achievement of the other type of objective, which gives rise to what I label the paradox of non-state violence.

Overall, armed groups prioritize their own survival and strength. This does not mean that groups will not take actions that help them to achieve strategic goals, however. The structure of their social movements ultimately determines how groups can best empower themselves, and
more specifically, the degree to which this involves the pursuit and achievement of strategic objectives.

The central hypothesis of the structuralist theory of non-state violence is that violence is more likely to be politically effective when employed by a unipolar social movement than by a multipolar social movement (see Figure 7). When a social movement is multipolar, meaning that it has two or more significant armed groups, the paradox is in full effect as competition for predominance among different groups undercuts their ability to collectively achieve the strategic goals they all share. In such an internally competitive environment, groups are more likely to engage in strategically counterproductive actions like outbidding, chain-ganging, spoiling, and infighting that represent an inefficient use of scarce resources. A unipolar movement, which contains only one significant armed group, ameliorates the paradox by ensuring that the dominant group can benefit most organizationally by pursuing strategic goals in a non-competitive internal environment. Furthermore, the presence of a leviathan in a unipolar movement imposes strategic coherence, clarity in signaling, and credibility in threats and assurances that translates into violent acts that are more likely to be politically effective.

**Figure 7. Central Hypotheses of The Structuralist Theory of Non-State Violence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Polarity Hypothesis: Violence is more likely to be politically effective when employed by a unipolar social movement than by a multipolar social movement.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Hierarchy Hypothesis: The stronger the armed group, the more likely it will use violence to pursue strategic objectives, and vice versa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These claims are based in part on the second hypothesis of the structuralist theory, namely that the position of groups in the social movement hierarchy drives when, why, and how they employ violence. Specifically, armed groups are more likely to pursue strategic goals the
greater extent to which they can capture their selective incentives, the smaller the internal threat they face, and the larger they are in size. In short, this means that the strongest group in a given movement is more likely to pursue strategic objectives, while weaker groups are more likely to solely pursue organizational objectives, regardless of age or ideology. Nonetheless, if hierarchy shifts over time but the polarity of the movement remains the same, groups are simply exchanging roles in a recurring play that is likely to have the same strategic outcome.

The remainder of the chapter will present the two-level framework, the dependent variable of political effectiveness, as well as the structuralist theory of non-state violence and its competitors in order to frame predictions for the rest of the project.

### Armed Groups, Social Movements, and The Two-Level Framework

#### The Actors

Campaigns of non-state violence include four key actors: armed groups, their popular bases, social movements, and states. Social movements are central to the causes and effects of non-state violence, and are defined as “informal interaction networks between a plurality of individuals, groups, and/or organizations” with “a shared set of beliefs and a sense of belonging” that are “engaged in political and/or cultural conflicts, meant to promote or oppose social change.” The central actors within social movements are the individuals that comprise them (the popular base) and the organizations that lead them (often armed groups), all of whom share

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83 Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 14-15. Social movements often have numerous organizations within them (in addition to many non-organized individuals), however, “A single organization, whatever its dominant traits, is not a social movement. Of course it may be part of one, but the two are not identical, as they reflect different organizational principles.” Porta and Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction*, 16.

84 Not all organizations within social movements are armed, but many are to varying degrees, especially within movements that aim to create new states. As this project analyzes the political effectiveness of non-state violence, the focus will often be on armed groups with the potential to use violence. Unarmed groups within the same social movements will also be examined within movement polarities and hierarchies, however. For a number of individuals
a common strategic objective, such as founding a new state or altering an existing law.\textsuperscript{85} The common strategic objective often involves changing the behavior of a state, making states the most common adversaries for social movements.\textsuperscript{86} Armed groups further aim to preserve their survival at a minimum and dominate their social movement at a maximum, as do states in the international system. These two objectives, altering state behavior and increasing group strength, correspond with the two levels of analysis, strategic and organizational, respectively, that form the basis for the theoretical framework of political violence presented here.

Table 1. Strategic vs. Organizational Violence

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strategic Violence</th>
<th>Organizational Violence</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Interaction</td>
<td>The armed group and the state</td>
<td>The armed group and its social movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Audience</td>
<td>The state and its supportive citizens</td>
<td>The armed group’s supportive base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Mechanism</td>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>Mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Objective</td>
<td>\textit{Public goods: Increase strength and security of social movement}</td>
<td>\textit{Private goods: Increase strength and security of armed group}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{85} For the purposes of this study, armed groups are treated as unitary actors, even though social movements are not. I argue that this imperfect assumption nonetheless better reflects reality, as armed groups are generally more institutionalized and centralized than social movements. Of course, groups often have their own internal struggles, but it is difficult to create systematic, parsimonious theories that include factions within groups as well as all of the other actors analyzed here. If a group is more unified internally, my theory holds that it should make for more politically effective uses of violence. Future research that analyzes the impact of armed group cohesion on coercion would represent a significant contribution to the subfield. For an excellent study of armed group cohesion, see Paul Staniland, "Explaining Cohesion, Fragmentation, and Control in Insurgent Groups" (MIT, 2010).

\textsuperscript{86} In certain scenarios, states can head supranational social movements or serve as part of the base for armed groups, but the most important state in this framework is the adversary. For a discussion of state support of armed groups, see Daniel Byman, \textit{Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Strategic Violence: Collective Coercion

Strategic violence involves the external coercion of a state for the collective, public ends of the social movement. At the strategic level of analysis, the focus is on the struggle outside of a social movement, between the movement’s key actors—armed groups—and their state adversary. The armed groups use violence to influence the state to change its behavior, e.g. end a military occupation, alter the nature of the ruling regime, or change its discriminatory policies. Violence can take the form of civilian hostage-taking, car bombings, or guerrilla attacks against state forces. The primary audience whose actions the armed groups aim to influence is the state and its supportive citizens.

Coercion is the primary mechanism by which armed groups hope to influence the state audience. Non-state actors have been practitioners of coercion since before the appearance of the nation-state and its predecessors. Thomas Schelling himself used terrorism and insurgency to help illustrate the concept, which involves the use or threat of violence to affect an audience beyond the immediate target for political ends:

The Jews in Palestine could not expel the British in the late 1940s but they could cause pain and fear and frustration through terrorism, and eventually influence somebody’s decision. The brutal war in Algeria was more a contest in pure violence than in military strength; the question was who would find the pain and degradation unendurable. The French troops preferred—indeed they continually tried—to make it a contest of strength, to pit military force against the nationalists’ capacity for terror, to exterminate or disable the nationalists and to screen off the nationalists from the victims of their violence. But because in civil war terrorists commonly have access to victims by sheer physical propinquity, the victims and their properties could not be forcibly defended and in the end the French troops themselves resorted, unsuccessfully, to a war of pain.

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87 Coercion is often contrasted with brute force, which is violent action that attempts to achieve an objective without requiring the target to take any action. As Schelling explains, “Brute force can only accomplish what requires no collaboration. The principle is illustrated by a technique of unarmed combat: one can disable a man by various stunning, fracturing, or killing blows, but to take him to jail one has to exploit the man’s own efforts.” Schelling, Arms and Influence, 8.


89 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 6-7.
Almost all campaigns involving terrorist or insurgent attacks are coercive because the armed groups who execute these campaigns are generally too weak to disable a target army or state.\textsuperscript{90} As a result, the state retains the ability to resist its non-state coercer’s demands.\textsuperscript{91} Armed groups therefore use violence to pressure the state to take action it otherwise would not take.

Conventional accounts of the causal mechanisms of state coercion provide initial insights into non-state violence: The non-state coercer launches attacks to influence the actions of the state, which is assumed to change its policy when the cost-benefit analysis of an alternative policy is preferable to its current one.\textsuperscript{92} Coercion is thus an attempt to alter that analysis (and therefore the state audience’s subsequent behavior) by manipulating the costs and benefits of present and alternative policies, as well as the probabilities and perceptions that are associated with them. As discussed in Chapter 2, coercion is more likely to work under three key conditions concerning the onset, conduct, and termination of violent campaigns. First, the stronger and more credible the coercer—both in starting and stopping violence—the greater the costs that can be threatened and the more the target state can trust that the violence will cease if the demanded actions are taken. Second, the more the objective sought is clearly signaled and small in

\textsuperscript{90} The onset of violence in the case of non-state coercion is often the start of the coercive encounter, rather than the failure of it, as with many studies of state coercion. Armed groups generally lack formal communication and credibility with state targets, and therefore have difficulty broadcasting demands or posing credible threats without violence. As Yezid Sayigh observes, “Strategic coercion involving non-state actors is likely to be part of inseparable, continuous adversary relationships rather than one-off episodes.” Yezid Sayigh, "A Non-State Actor as Coercer and Coerced: The P.L.O. In Lebanon, 1969-1976," in Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 212.

\textsuperscript{91} Martha Crenshaw makes this distinction explicitly, claiming that terrorism has “the purpose of manipulating political attitudes rather than physically defeating an enemy.” Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence, 2-3. Terrorism is defined as the intentional use of violence against noncombatants to inspire fear or alarm in an audience beyond the immediate target in order to achieve political ends. Insurgency is defined as sustained violence by non-state actors using primarily irregular tactics for political ends. In some cases, insurgents may aim only at the destruction of a state’s armed forces with no attempt to influence a larger audience. This would represent brute force rather than coercion. Such campaigns will not be included in this study.

\textsuperscript{92} As Karl Mueller notes, “Coercion depends not just on making what you want the adversary not to do appear unappealing, but on making it look less appealing than what you want them to do instead.” Karl Mueller, "The Essence of Coercive Air Power: A Primer for Military Strategists," Air and Space Power Journal (September 17, 2001).
magnitude, the more likely the state will understand the coercer's aims and make a concession. Finally, the more coherent and efficient the coercive strategy for connecting means and ends, the less that ill-advised, ineffective campaigns will be initiated or conducted.

For strategic violence, perhaps the most important distinction is that the benefits of the concessions it aims to coerce from a state audience often extend beyond the attacking group itself to include the larger social movement. Many strategic objectives resemble collective or public goods, because the entire movement enjoys the benefits of foreign troop withdrawal or an end to discriminatory policies, not just the attackers themselves. Such concessions are considerably, if not perfectly, joint (e.g. the enjoyment of a new law by one individual in the movement does not lessen its enjoyment by another individual) and are often not excludable (e.g. the armed group cannot easily prevent non-members from living in the liberated territory).

As such, strategic objectives are likely to be marked by collective action problems, meaning that these goals, although desirable from the perspective of the social movement and all of its constituent members and groups, are likely to be underprovided due to the incentive for individuals and groups alike to free ride and avoid paying the costs of campaigns whose benefits all would enjoy. Why risk life and limb to liberate a territory if you can let others do it for you?

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95 Collective action, also referred to as the prisoner’s dilemma and free-rider problem by social scientists, is defined as "actions taken by two or more people in pursuit of the same collective good." Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver, The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 4.
and still enjoy the same freedom in the end? If this is the case, why would armed groups ever pursue or achieve strategic objectives? The structuralist theory of political violence will provide the larger answer, which involves the selective incentives of strategic goals and the role of social movement hierarchy and polarity in structuring how benefits accrue across groups. For now, organizational objectives provide an initial clue, as they represent the private goods that never seem to lack for suitors.

_Organizational Violence: Competitive Mobilization_

Organizational violence involves the internal mobilization of the base for the private ends of armed groups. At the organizational level of analysis, the focus is on the struggle of armed groups for power and leadership within their social movement. Armed groups have organizational interests, the most pressing of which are to maximize the strength of their organization and ensure its survival. Although organizations may deploy individuals willing to kill themselves in attacks as part of a larger campaign, _no organization talks of destroying itself as a strategy._ Organizations live and breathe and need resources to survive and thrive, regardless of whether they are communist, religious, or nationalist. Under certain conditions,


96 In this regard, armed groups fit within Kenneth Waltz’s description of states: “[States] are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination.” Waltz, _Theory of International Politics_, 118.

97 Individuals may at times act selflessly, organizations almost never do. A Rand study from 1984 notes, “Organizations are dedicated to survival. They do not voluntarily go out of business. Right now, the immediate objective of many of the world’s hard-pressed terrorist organizations is the same as the immediate objective of many of the world’s hard-pressed corporations—that is, to continue operations.” Bonnie Cordes et al., _Trends in International Terrorism, 1982 and 1983_ (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1984), 29. Originally quoted in Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," 22. On the selfless behavior of individuals amidst insurgency, see Elizabeth Wood, _Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
violence can help a group to achieve these organizational objectives of inspiring new recruits, raising funds, or improving cohesion.

The primary audience for the use of violence at the organizational level is the armed group’s popular base. The base is mainly composed of individuals in the social movement, which are those civilians who would benefit from the achievement of the larger strategic goal. At times, the base can also include individuals in a diaspora as well as states who may lend their support to groups in a movement. An armed group launches attacks to raise or maintain its profile as a fighting organization ready to bear sacrifices and willing and able to inflict pain on the enemy. As a member of Earth First!, a group known for tree-spiking and other sabotage activities, noted: “You fire a torpedo and you have your banner hanging on the torpedo.”

The primary mechanism of organizational violence is therefore mobilization, as attacks are designed to increase support for the organization from the base and outbid other armed groups in the movement for leadership. Attacks are more likely to be successful the more they strike targets that are unpopular in the eyes of the base, demonstrate the group’s credible commitment to the cause, and distinguish the group from its competitors. Unlike cheap talk, acts of violence against an adversary are a clear demonstration of the group’s willingness to take the costly steps to ‘defend’ the base and promote its interests. A group can separate itself by using violence if others are not, launching more attacks than its peer groups, or striking targets that are more dangerous and extreme.

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99 Mia Bloom was on the right track when she claimed, “The public response to the tactical use of suicide bombing depends on how the tactic is used, against whom, and for what purpose.” Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism*, 81. When violence is used against unpopular targets, the base can grant “status rewards” to members of the attacking armed group (and sanctions to non-members), which can help drive up the resulting recruitment. Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe*, 20-21, 40-45, 165-167.
History reveals that targeting choices by armed groups have made a significant impact on their strength and support. Suicide bombings by an Al-Qaeda affiliate on a Jordanian wedding in 2005 led to plummeting support for the organization in the country, capped off by fifty-seven members of the family of the organization's leader (Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi) taking out half-page ads in all of Jordan's major newspapers that condemned the attacks and stated that "we sever links with him until doomsday." There is little doubt that the killing of Jordanian and Palestinian Muslim civilians at such a sacred event elicited the strong negative response, which would have been quite different among some parts of the population if the targets had been, for example, American military advisors.

The 'objective' identities of the target and state provide only half the story, however. Striking the same type of target may solicit far different reactions in one conflict versus another based on the attitudes of the respective bases. In Ireland, militant organizations found little support (and experienced a good deal of backlash) when they struck civilian targets of any kind, while Tamils seemed to support the striking of some civilians and not others in Sri Lanka, and at certain points in history, Palestinian organizations gained support within their base for striking a wide variety of Israeli civilian targets.

Unlike strategic goals, whose benefits are spread more broadly, organizational goals resemble private goods. Armed groups can effectively capture the benefits of new recruits and monetary donations and deny them to non-members. Furthermore, there is a finite amount of recruits and funding to go around, which is why competition for organizational objectives can be

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101 On the other hand, The Black September Organization's killing of the Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Al-Tal in 1971 led to hundreds of applicants lining up to join the organization, in no small part due to the ire directed at the Jordanians and particularly Tal following the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organization from Jordan (during the similarly named Black September). Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 307-309.
so fierce. The challenge with organizational goals is therefore not whether they will be pursued, but rather whether armed groups’ dogged pursuit of them will hinder progress towards the shared strategic objectives of the social movement.

Either the strategic or organizational level can serve as the basis for a study of non-state violence. If the goal is a comprehensive analysis of the political effectiveness of non-state violence that captures such dynamics, however, a framework that includes both levels is required. Given that this is the case, how should one conceive of and measure the two-level dependent variable of political effectiveness?

The Dependent Variable: The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence

This study defines non-state violence as being more politically effective the greater extent to which it produces the achievement of a significant political objective intended by the attacking organization. Progress is assessed towards strategic objectives and organizational objectives.
for a given campaign, which yield four initial types of outcomes for the dependent variable of the political effectiveness of non-state violence (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. Two-Level Outcomes of Non-State Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic</th>
<th>Failure</th>
<th>Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Total Failure</td>
<td>Selfless Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Selfish Success</td>
<td>Total Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Total failure_ means that the armed group gained no concessions from the state, was not strengthened through its efforts, and may have even been destroyed as an organization as a result of its violent campaign. The campaign of Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya ("The Islamic Group") to establish an Islamist state in Egypt in the 1990s is an excellent example. By the end of their

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are at odds, such as with the 1973 Yom Kippur War that Israel won overwhelmingly on the battlefield but lost politically. In either case, military or tactical effectiveness may well be a necessary condition for the political effectiveness of violence, but it is not sufficient, and it is certainly not the same concept. Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, *Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 11, 164-204.

104 Ordinal scales for capturing strategic and organizational effectiveness introduced in subsequent chapters ensure that even though there remain four basic types of outcomes, the measures of success are not simply dichotomous, although they can always be collapsed into these categories when required. Finally, it is important to note that this study is focused on effectiveness, not efficiency. Effectiveness is about the outcome regardless of cost, whereas efficiency is about what you get relative to the cost, with less of a focus on outcome: "A group which accomplishes what it sets out to do is effective, regardless of the costs it incurs...On the other hand, a group which gets a large return relative to the means at its disposal is efficient, regardless of the specific character of that return." Efficient use of resources makes effectiveness more likely, as I discuss in the subsequent theory section, but the two are not the same. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1978), 116.
campaign, the Islamic Group had coerced no significant concessions from the state and was itself all but destroyed as an armed group. Many little known armed groups that never find their way into scholarly studies, due to their inability to survive and conduct extensive coercive campaigns, also populate this box.

*Selfish success* means that although the armed group gained no significant concessions, the group itself was strengthened by the campaign. The campaign by the Provisional Irish Republic Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland from 1969-1972 is an example of a selfish success, in that the group’s use of violence yielded no significant concessions from the British government, but did lead to an increase in the strength of the PIRA within the Irish national movement. Campaigns launched to spoil negotiations are often found in this box.105

*Selfless success* means that although the group itself was weakened in the campaign, its use of violence elicited concessions that benefited the larger movement. This describes the outcome of the Vietcong’s Tet Offensive in 1968. The campaign nearly destroyed the Vietcong and severely weakened its strength within the Vietnamese communist movement, but it helped coerce the American public to pull U.S. forces out of Vietnam.106

Finally, *total success*, the ultimate desire of all armed groups in this study, represents a case where the armed group successfully coerced concessions from the state as well as increased its own position of strength. Hizballah’s campaign to end the occupation of Lebanon by foreign troops in the mid-1980s is often cited as this type of successes. The campaign both helped coerce

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105 It is important to note that these labels of “selfish” and “selfless” refer to outcomes of campaigns, not intentions of individuals, and do not represent normative judgments. Most violent campaigns involve both selfless and selfish individual acts, and almost all armed groups can rightly be labeled selfish. This study seeks to determine the effects of these actions on the groups from which they emerge and the movements which they claim to represent.

106 Selfless success is likely to be the emptiest of the four boxes for two main reasons. First, groups generally act selfishly but almost never selflessly, at least intentionally, and those that do are likely to be selected out. Second, as the structuralist theory suggests, when strategic success it occurs, it is often still due to ‘selfish’ action that is linked to organizational success.
the withdrawal of occupying forces and catapulted the group to prominence among the Shia, as well as within the political systems of Lebanon and the Levant at large.

This framework for the dependent variable is based on the two main entities included in this study: armed groups and their social movements. Essentially, when violence is good for a group, that represents an organizational success; when violence is good for the movement, it represents a strategic success, and vice versa. From this point forward, “politically effective” will mean both strategically and organizationally effective, whereas the labels “strategically effective” and “organizationally effective” will be used to discuss single-level effectiveness. Counterfactuals are at the foundation of assessments of effectiveness, as an ‘organizational success’ means that violence (and related explanatory variables) made the group stronger than it otherwise would have been absent the use of violence.107

The main unit of analysis for this project is the campaign, which is defined as a coordinated effort that involves one or more terrorist or insurgent attacks aimed at achieving a common political goal.108 Campaigns can be considered holistically, in that a 40-year campaign for national liberation is examined as a single case. Campaigns can also be split up into smaller units for the purposes of analyzing within-case variation in the effectiveness of violence. In this scenario, sustained breaks in the use of violence and shifts in geographic location can assist in

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107 Although imperfect, the situation before the start of the campaign will often be used as a point of comparison, even though it is only a proxy for what the situation would have been later if the campaign had never been conducted.
108 In contentious politics a campaign is defined as, “A sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on targeted authorities. Unlike a onetime petition, declaration, or mass meeting, a campaign extends beyond any single event—although social movements often include petitions, declarations, and mass meetings.” Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 119. Robert Pape wisely uses campaigns as his unit of analysis (at least in some fashion), defined as follows: “A suicide terrorist campaign can be distinguished from a string of isolated attacks. A campaign consists of an intended series of attacks that terrorist leaders explain and justify as aimed at gaining political concessions from a target government.” Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 39-40.
dividing the larger struggle into micro-units, which allows the researcher to increase the number of observations in a constructive and systematic fashion.\textsuperscript{109}

Campaigns can and often do include more than one armed group. In these scenarios, the groups share a common strategic objective, which gives all of them an identical outcome at the strategic level. The fact that each group wants to increase its own strength means that outcomes are often different across groups at the organizational level, however, given the largely zero sum nature of the objective. Comparisons within, across, and between campaigns are likely to yield valuable insights, and this study will make use of all three. For example, the political effectiveness of violence will be compared within longer campaigns of the Palestinian national movement, across the various campaigns of the Palestinian national movement, and between the campaigns of the Palestinian, Irish, Zionist, and Algerian national movements.

When and why do campaigns end up in one of the four boxes? Simply considering strategic level and organizational level dynamics for campaigns of non-state violence and gauging their political effectiveness using the two-level dependent variable would represent a significant step forward. \textit{The whole is greater than the sum of its parts, however.} To tap the full potential of the two-level framework, I offer a theory that accounts for the interactions across levels and their impact on variation in the political effectiveness of non-state violence.

Hypotheses and Causal Mechanisms of the Structuralist Theory of Non-State Violence

As stated in the introduction, the central hypothesis of the structuralist theory is that violence is more likely to be politically effective when employed by a unipolar social movement than by a multipolar social movement. The secondary hypothesis is that the strongest armed group in a social movement is the most likely to pursue strategic goals, whereas weaker groups in the hierarchy are likely to be less secure and neglect strategic objectives. The remainder of the chapter will explain the conceptual basis and causal logic of the structuralist theory, along with its affiliated hypotheses and their competitors, in order to set the stage for empirical analysis of each in subsequent chapters.

The Polarity of Social Movements: Concept, Typology, and Hypothesis

Although initially developed to explain the distribution of power among states in the international system, the concept of polarity can be profitably applied to the distribution of power among armed groups within social movements. Polarity and fractionalization have served as fundamental variables in the study of great power war and civil conflict, respectively, for decades. This study combines elements of both, as it applies the concept of polarity familiar to Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz to social movements as described by William Gamson and Charles Tilly to explain the use and effectiveness of violence as analyzed by David Laitin and Robert Pape.110

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110 The concept of polarity employed in this study most closely mimics that of international relations theorists, although their dependent variable was the outbreak of great power war, whereas the focus here is the use and effectiveness of violence by an armed group. See Morgenthau, Mearsheimer, Keohane. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Scholars of civil and ethnic conflict have analyzed similar groups and questions as this study; however, their units of analysis and explanatory variables possess a number of key differences. Economists and political scientists alike have favored fractionalization as an explanation for conflict and cooperation among non-state actors.
The polarity of a social movement, like the polarity of the international system, is defined by the number of significant actors it contains, under the assumption that the most powerful actors play the dominant role in campaign dynamics and outcomes. For social movements, a pole is either the strongest group in the movement or another strong group that has the capability to realistically challenge the strongest group for predominance. There may well be tens or even hundreds of other groups in the movement, but there are generally only a small number of poles.

For this study, the strongest group in a movement will be labeled a pole. Other groups will be labeled poles if they are at least one-third as strong as the strongest group. Strength is measured using data on group size, funding, armaments, and, where possible, helpful proxies like seat distribution within governing institutions, elected or otherwise.

In the international relations literature, scholars argue that there are significant differences between bipolar and multipolar systems (or even bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar...
However, for social movements the key difference is between those with one pole and those with two or more, since the latter includes a potential rival whereas the former does not. A movement with three poles may mean more potential rivals, but the major difference is between those movements with one pole and those with more than one, or in other words, between movements that contain a competitive and a non-competitive internal environment. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, a unipolar social movement contains one pole and a multipolar social movement contains two or more poles.

A weaker form of polarity that mimics some of its aspects involves alliances among armed groups. Alliances raise the possibility of coordinated action, but they are not the same as a pole represented by a single armed group. The key difference is institutionalization. For a number of individuals to qualify as a group, they must be part of a cohesive organization that has a clearly identifiable leadership, which exerts significant control over the actions of its members. In the vast majority of alliances, individuals are loyal to their groups first, and individual group leadership generally maintains decision-making power.

This is a key difference between states and social movements as coercers, because states are generally far more institutionalized, whereas social movements are anarchical. The Republican Party today does not control 48% of the U.S. Army with which it is free to make its own foreign policy, even if that total would reflect its current strength. Most social movements lack strong, centralized governing institutions, meaning power resides in individual groups, who may ally under certain conditions. Nonetheless, most alliances have far shorter life spans than do

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112 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 16.
113 This distinction finds support with economic theories of oligopoly: “When games are categorized by the number of players, the main distinction is whether n = 2 or n > 2. Often two-person games are simpler than their general n-person counterparts, whereas the differences between n = 3 and n > 3 are slight.” In this case, the two-person game would be the state and the dominant armed group (unipolarity), as opposed to multiple armed groups and the state. James Friedman, Oligopoly Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 209.
their member groups, and they have far less impact on the action of their affiliated members. Overall, the power concentrated in a single alliance is far less cohesive in organization, coherent in action, and stable in alignment than a single group, making a movement with a dominant alliance different than a multipolar one with no such ties, but not the same as a movement with a single dominant group. In this study, movements will count as unified if all poles are in a single alliance.

Using polarity and unity, we can generate three types of social movements based on their internal distribution of power: unipolar, united, and multipolar (see Figure 9). The bottom left quadrant is a null set because, by definition, a movement with one pole must have all poles unified. Both polarity and unity are important, but for the reasons introduced above and elaborated on below, polarity is the far more powerful distinction for explaining variation in the political effectiveness of non-state violence.

**Figure 9. Typology of Social Movements by Distribution of Power**

![Polarity Table]

114 To the extent alliances themselves are institutionalized, with their own leadership and ability to control their constituent groups and members, they approach the possibility of themselves being treated as a group and potentially a pole. NATO serves as an example of a more institutionalized alliance.

115 The impact of alliances between poles and non-poles is a worthwhile subject for another study.
The central hypothesis of the structuralist theory is that violence is more likely to be politically effective when employed by a unipolar social movement than by a multipolar social movement. Violence employed by a unified social movement is likely to be less politically effective than that of a unipolar movement, but more effective than violence employed by a multipolar movement. As summarized in Figures 10 and 11, there are six key mechanisms that sustain this hypothesis, revealing the explanatory power of polarity. The following sections will present the dynamics of violence within unipolar, multipolar, and unified social movements and explain the logic behind the central hypotheses in greater depth.

**Figure 10. How Unipolarity Causes Politically Effective Violence**

116 This represents a threshold hypothesis based on an ordinal scale as currently constructed. This hypothesis could be adjusted to predict variation in the political effectiveness of violence based on a continuous polarity scale (i.e. a 0-1 polarity index), however, this would require reliable, fine-grained data on movement polarity that is, as of yet, not abundantly available.
The Hierarchy of Social Movements: How Movement Structure Impacts Group Priorities and Political Effectiveness

Put simply, armed groups prioritize their own survival and strength above all other objectives. Based on the public pronouncements of armed groups, which consistently extol their own sacrifices for the greater good, we would expect precisely the opposite. As Jon Elster reminds us, however, "There are certain arguments that simply cannot be stated publicly. In a political debate it is pragmatically impossible to argue that a given solution should be chosen just because it is good for oneself." Nonetheless, as detailed in the collective action and principal-

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117 This diagram most accurately reflects the situation for a multipolar social movement. As explained in the next section, a unified social movement is likely to perform slightly better on each mechanism than a multipolar movement—especially for signaling and counterproductive actions like outbidding and spoiling—but far less well than a unipolar movement.

agent literature, armed groups’ preferences are different from that of their collective base. In reality, armed groups aim first to survive and prevent themselves from declining in strength at a minimum, and increase their power at a maximum.

This does not mean that groups will not take actions that help them to achieve strategic goals, however. On the contrary, they will certainly take, and often prefer actions that help to achieve both strategic and organizational goals, if available. However, groups will rarely, if ever, commit truly selfless actions that they believe will harm the strength of their organization. At times, however, groups will take selfish actions even if they harm the pursuit of their strategic goal.

The structure of the social movement ultimately determines how groups within it can best survive and empower themselves, and more specifically, the degree to which this involves the pursuit of strategic objectives. If the polarity of social movements drives their political effectiveness, the hierarchy of social movements largely drives the actions of their constituent armed groups. These two structural factors together determine when, how, and why armed groups employ violence. In this sense, the argument here is not that some armed groups are naturally more altruistic than others, but rather that the structure of their social movement

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119 Olson agrees and notes that organizations can serve their members by creating public goods or capturing more of the existing resources in society. He argues they often end up doing the latter. Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 41-47.

120 As James Q. Wilson notes: “The ‘logic of collective action’ of which Mancur Olson writes may be more applicable to coalitions of organizations than to those of individuals. Individuals will often contribute to large organizations without receiving any specific material benefit from it; organizations rarely will.” Wilson, *Political Organizations*, 277. Experimental evidence supports this, as individuals are more likely to cooperate and organizations are more likely to be competitive. Debra McCallum et al., "Competition and Cooperation between Groups and between Individuals" *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 21 (1985).

determines the extent to which their pursuit of private benefits appears more ‘selfish’ or ‘selfless,’ and that group behavior should shift as does the shape of the hierarchy and their position within it.\textsuperscript{122} These observations yield the second hypothesis of the structuralist theory of non-state violence, which provides the foundation for a theory of individual armed group behavior and marks a significant step towards explaining political effectiveness.

**Figure 12. The Hierarchy Hypothesis and its Corollaries**

*The Hierarchy Hypothesis (general):* The stronger the armed group, the more likely it will use violence to pursue strategic objectives, and vice versa.

*Corollary 2.1:* The stronger the armed group, the more of the selective incentives of a strategic goal the group is likely to capture, and so the more likely the group will pursue the strategic goal.

*Corollary 2.2:* The greater the internal threat to the armed group, the more likely the group will pursue organizational goals. Conversely, the more secure the armed group, the more likely the group will pursue strategic goals.

*Corollary 2.3:* The stronger the armed group, the more likely it will have critical mass to overcome the collective action problem of public goods and pursue strategic objectives.

\[ \therefore \text{ The Hierarchy Hypothesis (specific):} \] The strongest pole in a unipolar movement is the most likely to pursue strategic goals, the strongest pole in a multipolar movement is somewhat likely to pursue strategic goals, and poles that are not the strongest in multipolar movements are the least likely to pursue strategic goals.

Armed groups are more likely to pursue strategic goals the greater extent to which they can capture their selective incentives, the smaller the internal threat they face, and the larger they are in size. First, although strategic goals largely resemble public goods whose benefits are shared by all in the social movement, they often have smaller but not insignificant private

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\textsuperscript{122} Indeed, this is the trick to the political effectiveness of non-state violence: not to try to alter the politics or selfish focus of the groups themselves, but rather to shift the structure of their social movements so that their selfish nature drives them to pursue and provide public goods. For those who continue to bemoan the selfishness of organizations, it is worth noting that most individuals in the base do not provide public, strategic goods, but rather focus the vast majority of their activity on securing food, shelter, and wealth for themselves and their immediate family, a private goal if there ever was one.
benefits associated with them, such as political office, status, or wealth. These benefits are generally ‘lumpy’ in that they largely accrue at the successful conclusion of a campaign, rather than evenly along the way. Furthermore, the strongest group commonly captures the vast majority of the private benefits associated with strategic success, making it worthwhile for them, but not weaker poles, to pursue strategic goals for their own organizational good. Indeed, it is these private benefits, along with their lumpy, winner-take-all nature, that helps make organizational and strategic goals complementary for the strongest armed group, but contradictory for its competitors (see Corollary 2.1). At times these asymmetric incentives even influence weak groups to prevent strategic progress in order to deny their rivals and preserve the lumpy benefits for themselves, as detailed in the next section.

Second, the more an armed group is concerned with internal threats to its survival, the more likely it is to shun or even work against strategic objectives in pursuit of its own strength. The internal threat to an armed group is based on two structural considerations: whether the armed group is the strongest pole, and whether there are other poles in the movement. The strongest pole in a movement is generally more secure than weaker poles, which have to focus more of their scarce resources on surviving or climbing the ladder (see Corollary 2.2). However, the mere existence of other poles, even weaker ones, means that the movement is internally competitive and that no pole is without a viable rival who could supplant it. This has significant ramifications based on the polarity of social movements.

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123 For example, it is hard to exclude people from a new state, and enjoying its benefits are joint. Nonetheless, some aspects of this strategic goal, such as governing the new state, are both exclusionary and not joint, and so resemble private goods that can be captured by the lead organization. Determining *cui bono* is therefore key to assessing group actions.

124 Such rivals are often the most hated and dangerous enemies of all, in part because their similar objectives make them more plausible alternatives for the base than the state in many cases. Many Bolsheviks ultimately despised Trotskyites more than “external” adversaries, and even used terrorism against them since they were seen as a threat to the organization’s cadres and a rival for its base. Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics*, 226, 229.
Third, despite their affiliated selective incentives, strategic goals are still predominantly public goods, and as such are likely to be marked by collective action problems. It is generally in each group's interest to shun the pursuit of public goods and free-ride on the efforts of others, because all will enjoy most of the benefits of strategic success in any case.\textsuperscript{125} Of course, if all groups act this way, strategic success is unlikely, as no group would make the necessary effort. Mancur Olson and his critics agree that large, powerful actors represent a solution to the collective action problem, as they will be willing and able to pay the necessary costs for strategic success given that their expected benefit from the public good is significant due to their size.\textsuperscript{126} Thus, the stronger the armed group, the more likely that that group will overcome the challenge of public goods and pursue strategic objectives (see Corollary 2.3).

The hierarchy hypothesis and these three corollaries point to a single conclusion: the strongest pole in a unipolar movement is the most likely to pursue strategic goals, the strongest pole in a multipolar movement is somewhat likely to pursue strategic goals, and poles that are not the strongest in multipolar movements are the least likely to pursue strategic goals. The structure of social movements therefore plays the dominant role in determining how individual armed groups will pursue their objectives, and subsequently how different movement polarities are likely to yield different dynamics and outcomes (see Figure 13).

\textsuperscript{125} Olson, \textit{The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups}.
Figure 13. Social Movement Hierarchies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement 1</th>
<th>Movement 2</th>
<th>Movement 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time:</strong></td>
<td>( t )</td>
<td>( t_1 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Groups predicted to use violence at the time to pursue organizational, non-strategic ends (through mechanisms such as chain-ganging, outbidding, or spoiling) are highlighted in green with vertical lines, and groups predicted to avoid or restrain such violence are highlighted in red with horizontal lines. In both cases, the thickness of the lines indicates a stronger prediction. Red groups may well use violence, but it is more likely to be for strategic ends.*

In unipolarity, the distribution of power helps ensure that the best way for the dominant group to gain organizationally is by succeeding strategically, e.g. acquisition of a new state is likely to reinforce the current movement hierarchy by replicating itself in the nascent government (as with Group A in Movement #2 at Time \( t_1 \)). Furthermore, the presence of a single, dominant actor makes it more likely to pay the costs to pursue the strategic objective in any case, "since the benefits derived from the provision of a collective good accrue to group members in proportion to their 'sizes,' the larger the dominant member of the group, the more of any collective good this member will provide."\(^{127}\) Finally, the lack of a competitive internal environment leaves the single pole free to pursue strategic ends without having to spend scarce resources fighting for survival against internal challengers or worrying if attempts to negotiate with the enemy will fatally undercut its legitimacy.

The strongest poles are always more secure than their weaker counterparts, meaning that even in a multipolar movement, the top group will pursue strategic objectives far more than poles that are the second strongest or weaker (see Movements 1 and 3). However, the strongest pole in

\(^{127}\) Mansfield, "Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power," 120.
a multipolar movement faces a far more significant threat to its security and position, because it is surrounded by one or more groups that could supplant it in the near term. This means that it is likely to shun strategic objectives to a greater degree than are the top (and only) poles in unipolar movements, who do not face a competitive internal environment. Furthermore, power is more dispersed in a multipolar movement, making it less likely that any pole will have the critical mass to pursue strategic goals simply for their public benefits. For these reasons, although the structuralist theory predicts variation in group priorities based on their position in the hierarchy, multipolar movements are marked by less focus and effort towards strategic objectives, making the use of violence less likely to be politically effective.

Unified multipolar movements are likely to focus slightly more on strategic objectives than are their multipolar counterparts, but still far less than unipolar movements (see Movement 3). To understand why, we need to briefly analyze when and why armed groups unify under a single alliance. In truth, the vast majority of attempts by armed groups to form a grand alliance, or any alliance for that matter, fail miserably. The main reason for this is the underlying tension between organizational and strategic goals and the inability of groups to successfully resolve it on their own. Interestingly enough, groups usually recognize that having a unified movement is beneficial for strategic success. The problem is that, depending on their position in the hierarchy, unity is often not helpful for their organizational success. The strongest group almost always desires unity the most, because it generally cements its position and makes strategic success more likely, from which it stands to derive the greatest benefits. Weaker poles are less likely to support unity for the same reasons, as it generally locks them in to a subordinate position and helps their rival. This lasts, of course, until the weaker poles become the strongest, at which time

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128 This distinction has precedent in economics, as scholars note the difference between cooperative and noncooperative oligopoly based on whether significant actors collude and have legally binding contracts. In either case, firms know about others' actions, which is relevant for the next section. Friedman, *Oligopoly Theory*, 21.
they ‘coincidentally’ discover a newfound desire for a grand alliance (as with Group C in Movement 3).

Regardless of the specifics of any deal, discussions over alliances generally demonstrate how strength is the top priority for all. How often do groups say, “We must unify first; we can debate the distribution of power and benefits later”? In reality, it is always the reverse, and most discussions over unity fail without even an agreement in principle. On the occasions when a deal is initially reached (as in Movement 3 at Time t), it is often short-lived due to the commitment problem and the fact that shifts in the hierarchy make old deals unreflective of the current distribution of power (as at time t, of Movement 3). Groups can address some of these challenges with the construction of strong institutions to help enable compliance, but these institutions can at best ameliorate, not eliminate, the tension between organizational and strategic goals at the foundation of movement structure. As John Randolph of Roanoke wrote: “You may cover whole skins of parchment with limitations, but power alone can limit power.”

This is the tragedy of multipolar movements: even though all groups understand that unity will help them achieve strategic success, their very desire to exist and maximize their own strength often prevents them from ‘colluding to win.’ The fact that the armed groups themselves know the difficulties of alliances and their fleeting nature means that even a unified movement remains internally competitive. This is why multipolar or even unified movements are less likely to pursue strategic objectives than their unipolar counterparts. In this case, the best solution to

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129 For a discussion of the difficulty of bargaining among actors to provide a collective good but split the benefits, see Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, 30.
130 This project and related discussion focuses on poles, for which unity is comparatively rare and difficult. However, unity between a pole and a very small group is not as rare or as difficult given that the latter poses no significant threat to the former. Analysis of the relations between strong and weak armed groups represents fertile ground for future research. An initial assessment of the relevance of Stephen Walt’s claims for small powers and their proclivity to bandwagon, as opposed to balance, would be a good first step. See Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
the paradox is unipolarity, where power serves to create coherence in priorities and actions in ways intentions rarely do.

Group priorities are only the beginning of the story, as the specific actions and dynamics of armed groups in unipolar, multipolar, and unified movements further differentiate the political effectiveness of violence emerging from each.

The Paradox of Non-state Violence and the Dynamics of Counterproductive Behavior

In theory, organizational and strategic success appear complementary, so even if groups prioritize one over the other, their efforts should still seemingly move them towards total success. Organizational survival is necessary to launch a campaign to remove a military occupation, which itself can help that organization gain the popular support it needs to become the ruling party of the liberated territory. In practice, however, the actions required to achieve organizational and strategic objectives are rarely complementary. On the contrary, organizational and strategic objectives often require different timing and different targets for attacks. This poses a significant problem for armed groups, because a single act of violence generally impacts both objectives and their affiliated audiences simultaneously. The contrasting priorities of armed groups and the internal dynamics of their social movements thus often lead to mechanisms of violence that are counterproductive to any measure of success.\(^{132}\)

The relationship between the two types of objectives gives rise to what I call the paradox of non-state violence. The paradox is simply that the pursuit of one type of objective often undermines the achievement of the other, even though the two appear complementary in

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\(^{132}\) Posen’s analysis of how strategic and organizational factors interact in the creation of states’ military doctrines resonates here: “In some cases the external and internal constraints work at cross-purposes, in others they reinforce each other, in no case are they unimportant.” Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 37.
theory. These dual objectives present dilemmas to armed groups and their social movements because of the different audiences, actions, and mechanisms with which they are linked.

Individuals have often noted that Israeli and Palestinian political leaders say one thing in English to an international audience, and then something else in Hebrew or Arabic to a domestic audience in order to satisfy their distinct demands. Unlike speeches that can be delivered in different languages to different audiences, it is difficult to reveal bombings or hijackings to only one audience. Both state and base audiences generally ‘witness’ each attack, and violence is the one universal language everyone supposedly understands.

Recent scholarship has downplayed the importance of audiences for political violence, suggesting that Brian Jenkins’ famous claim over three decades ago that “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead” is no longer applicable in the era of mass-casualty attacks symbolized by those on 9/11. As Bruce Hoffman summarized:

For decades, there was widespread acceptance of the observation made famous by Brian Jenkins in 1975 that, ‘Terrorists want a lot of people watching and not a lot of people dead.’ Although entirely germane to the forms of terrorism that existed in prior decades, for too long this antiquated notion was adhered to. On September 11, Bin

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133 As Schelling notes, this situation represents a paradox: “For some people, the situation is a "paradox": what is "best" for each person separately is not best for all acting together.” Thomas Schelling, "Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A Study of Binary Choices with Externalities," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 17, no. 3 (1973): 399.

134 The same can likely be said of political leaders in any country, although the rise of the Internet and websites like YouTube are making it more difficult to confine one’s message to the audience in attendance.

135 As Gerry Adams said of the British: ‘The history of Ireland and of British colonial involvement throughout the world tell us that the British government rarely listens to the force of argument. It understands only the argument of force.’ Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 266.

136 As Asher Zvi Ginsberg a.k.a. Ahad Ha’am, the founder of Cultural Zionism, claimed that the Zionist settlers of the 1890s believed that “the only language that the Arabs understand is that of force.” Avi Shlaim, Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revision, and Refutations (London: Verso, 2009), 56. When accused by the British authorities in the Palestinian Mandate of terrorist attacks, David Ben-Gurion “[argued] tha he had been unable to prevent actions that he opposed because the British, the Jews concluded, understood only the language of force.” Uri Milstein, History of the War of Independence: A Nation Girds for War, trans. Alan Sacks, vol. 1 (New York: University Press of America, 1996), 43. A recent example of the challenge of multiple audiences emerges from Israeli/Turkish relations: “Diplomats said Wednesday that the two sides had been searching for a word that would sound like an apology in Turkish, but not in Hebrew,” in response to the flotilla incident in which Israeli troops killed nine ethnic Turks. Dan Bilefsky, "Israeli and Turkish Diplomats Try to Heal Rift from Raid on Flotilla," The New York Times, July 6 2011.

Laden wiped the slate clean of the conventional wisdom on terrorists and terrorism and, by doing so, ushered in a new era of conflict.\textsuperscript{137}

Tossing aside Jenkins’ observation altogether risks throwing the baby out with the bath water, however, as armed groups are still quite concerned with who is watching them. In fact, Al-Qaeda itself, the group who supposedly disproved Jenkins’ claim, reveals that the manipulation of audiences is as important as ever for armed groups. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s longtime second-in-command, wrote to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, former head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, stating that “In the absence of this popular support, the Islamic mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows,” and “The mujahed movement must avoid any action that the masses do not understand or approve.”\textsuperscript{138} Specifically, Zawahiri warned Zarqawi that although beheading hostages on video may strike fear into the hearts of Americans, it is distasteful to most Muslims and should be stopped. His admonitions to Zarqawi demonstrate that he is thinking about the impact of target selection on audiences at both the organizational and strategic levels. He wants Zarqawi to continue killing in order to coerce the U.S. to withdraw, but he also wants to tone down the slaughtering of Muslims and beheadings in general to avoid hurting the strength of the organization through popular backlash.

The challenge is that it is difficult to reveal violence to one audience and not another. Therefore, a proper revision of Jenkins’ mantra may be, “armed groups want the right people dead, because everyone is watching.” The problem is that strategic and organizational objectives often lead to different conclusions of who the “right people” are to target. For example, bombing a restaurant frequented by military troops may raise the costs of occupation for a state, but it


could also alienate potential supporters within the groups’ base that abhor violence against civilians, who are likely to be among the casualties.

A further challenge originates from the timing of the use of violence, which is not a constant for social movements or the armed groups within them. Coercion is not simply attacking an adversary, but rather clearly delineating in both word and deed when the violence will start and stop, depending on the actions of the target. In this way, successful coercive actions establish a link between the violence and the desired objective. Many negotiations occur amidst cease-fires, and major concessions often come attached to treaties that commit both parties to restrict their use of force in some way. The attainment of a strategic objective may ultimately necessitate limitations on violence, whereas continued attacks may increase group strength by mobilizing support or preventing the consummation of a deal that benefits certain groups more than others. Therefore, the different timing required by the two types of objectives presents further challenges for groups and movements seeking total success.

It is impossible to identify an ideal timing or target for an attack that applies in all cases, because it depends on the priorities of the attacker and, especially, the hierarchical position and actions of his rivals.\footnote{This is because multipolar movements resemble oligopolies, meaning that they include a small number of significant actors whose ideal strategies are dependent on each other. “The key distinguishing feature that sets oligopoly apart... is the oligopolists are strategically linked to one another. The best policy for one firm is dependent on the policies being followed by each rival firm in the market.” Friedman, \textit{Oligopoly Theory}, 1. Also see William Fellner, \textit{Competition among the Few: Oligopoly and Similar Market Structures} (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1965). The economic literature does not clearly define where oligopoly ends and `perfect competition’ begins, but the distinction lies generally between six and fifty significant firms (or armed groups in my case). Social movements will generally have five or fewer poles, so it is safe to consider multipolar movements as oligopolies. Friedman, \textit{Oligopoly Theory}, 8-9.} Nonetheless, it is possible to identify counterproductive violent mechanisms that are more likely to yield strategic (and often organizational) failure, four of which are more likely to emerge in multipolar movements: outbidding, chain-ganging, spoiling,
and infighting. These mechanisms affect all three stages of conflict: initiation, conduct, and termination. Let us examine each in turn.

Under certain circumstances, armed groups use violence to mobilize support: this is the basic story of organizational objectives. As previously noted, the use of violence acts as a signal to the base that the attacking group is making sacrifices for them against the enemy. Given the prominent, costly nature of such attacks, they can often help set a group apart in ways that fiery speeches and backroom dealings simply cannot, especially because, as principal-agent theory attests, the base cannot evaluate the latter. The challenge comes when multiple groups pursue the same tactic within a given social movement. In this case, launching an attack or two is not enough to set one’s group apart, since other organizations are doing the same thing. Therefore, spirals can develop where multiple groups launch attacks in larger and larger numbers and/or against more and more extreme targets in order to demonstrate their superior commitment to the cause. This scenario is what scholars refer to as outbidding, because each group seeks to quantitatively and/or qualitatively ‘outbid’ the other in costly demonstrations to win popular support.

Outbidding presents four significant problems for social movements. First, given that there is not an infinite amount of potential support from the base, outbidding can create a

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140 Each of these mechanisms has been written about extensively, but usually concerning states (chain-ganging), peace negotiations (spoiling) or motivations for violence (outbidding). They have not been systematically explained together using the two-level framework, especially for the purposes of understanding their impact specifically on the political effectiveness of non-state violence. The best example that considers two of these mechanisms in a somewhat similar theoretical fashion is Kydd and Walter, who tried to collect strategies described previously into a typology for individual terrorist groups. Kydd and Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism."

141 The base’s preoccupation with observable criteria means that attacks will be rewarded, although they may not be the best indicator of effort or effectiveness: “Difficulties often stem from the fact that some parts of the task are highly visible while other parts are not.” Steven Kerr, "On the Folly of Rewarding a, While Hoping for B," The Academy of Management Journal 18, no. 4 (1975): 780.

142 Outbidding is not limited to armed groups. The term was often used to describe the dynamics that occurred within rivalries among Arab states—such as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Libya—in their relations with Israel, the Palestinians, and the West. Schelling’s discussion of binary choices with externalities (the ‘interdependence of decisions’) provides an interesting description of outbidding. Schelling, "Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A Study of Binary Choices with Externalities."
scenario where groups are expending more and more effort for diminishing returns. Second, outbidding has a tendency to focus groups on organizational ends even more than they originally intend, despite the fact that strategic goals are publicly given as the motivation for all of the attacks. In this case, the targets, timing, and volume of violence used by the movement are more likely to be contrary to the requirements of strategic success. For example, a group may want to launch enough attacks to gain support, but not so many as to motivate the state to launch an all-out war in response. This leads to the third problem, namely that outbidding with multiple groups makes the risk of unwanted war higher. Finally, outbidding often has negative consequences for the assessment of intelligence and group decision-making, often leading to false optimism.\footnote{On the role of false optimism and war, see Stephen Van Evera, \textit{Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 14-34, Geoffrey Blainey, \textit{The Causes of War} (New York: Free Press, 1988).}

New members may believe the extreme rhetoric and the current leadership may be constrained by it, as it is difficult to self-evaluate in such a competitive environment.

Chain-ganging, which, like outbidding, is a concept that was originally applied to states, occurs when one armed group launches attacks in an attempt to embroil the entire movement in a conflict with the enemy. The strategy is that by starting a cycle of attacks and counterattacks, other groups in the movement will be pressed into joining the conflict due to popular pressure and/or the desire not to lose their credentials as defenders of the movement and its people. After all, how can a group claim to be a representative of a given population or an enemy of a certain state if, when that state is attacking members of the movement, the group does not get involved?

Chain-ganging implies that many of these groups would prefer that no conflict exist (at least at the time) or to not get involved, but, "In short, as one member of the chain gang stumbles..."
off the precipice, the other must follow.”144 In addition to wanting to retain their credibility, other
groups may worry that losing the attacking group could be detrimental to the larger movement,
so they have to join in to prevent its total destruction.145 The initiating group, however, decides
that the conflict is a good idea from the outset, likely because of its non-dominant position within
the movement hierarchy. This ensures that it will bear fewer costs and contributes to the hope
that the conflict can ‘change the game’ and perhaps improve the group’s relative organizational
position by driving up support or weakening its rivals. Unfortunately for the social movement,
this is risky behavior that forces groups that are unwilling and often unprepared to engage in an
uncoordinated conflict. For this reason, chain-ganging often yields strategic failure, if not
organizational failure as well.

Spoiling occurs when groups use violence to prevent the consummation of an agreement,
in this case generally between the state and another entity purporting to represent the
movement.146 The logic is that continuing attacks emerging from a social movement can create a
climate of conflict in which negotiating is politically impossible, especially since most treaties, if
not the negotiations themselves, include commitments to restrictions on violence. Those who
wish to ‘spoil’ the peace aim to weaken the trust between potential dealmakers, either about the
parties’ intentions to make peace or their capability to enforce it.

Spoiling results from a scenario where a group decides that it will be worse off if a deal is
done than if it is not, and that this loss outweighs any potential strategic gains for the movement

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144 Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in
Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44, no. 2 (1990): 141. Chain-ganging dynamics also occur as a result of
outbidding spirals.

145 As I discuss in the next section, however, letting competing groups be destroyed is not such a bad strategy
depending on the distribution of power within the movement. In reality, however, states rarely discriminate, and a
group that fails to fight may lose its support.

146 As Stephen Stedman notes, “Spoilers exist only when there is a peace process to undermine, that is, after at least
two warring parties have committed themselves publicly to a pact or have signed a comprehensive peace
from the deal. In this case, armed groups have the twisted aim of actively preventing strategic success as a way to bring about their organizational success. This is the essence of the paradox of non-state violence, and it makes the timing and targeting of the spoiling group’s attacks more likely to hurt the movement. In this way, spoilers are pursuing selfish success, albeit temporarily. In the long term, they still seek total success, and other non-spoiling groups seek total success throughout the period. Nonetheless, the presence of spoilers, which results from the paradox, can prevent total success.

In addition to attempts to outbid other groups, chain-gang them into war, or spoil their strategic progress, groups may also decide to fight their internal rivals directly. Such violence clearly diverts movement resources and focus from the strategic goal. As such, it is often disapproved of by the base and may lead to all involved parties losing support. As discussed in more depth at the conclusion of this chapter, under one condition such infighting (or possibly outbidding or chain-ganging) can be a positive step for strategic success: if one group successfully shifts the structure of the social movement from multipolar to unipolar by eliminating all of its rivals. Short of such an unlikely shift, however, infighting is likely to be politically counterproductive.

To what extent do these mechanisms emerge in unipolar movements? Outbidding is simply the logical extension of organizational violence in a competitive environment. In the non-competitive internal environment of unipolarity, the dominant group does not need to respond to attempts at outbidding by weak non-poles, because they are unlikely to bring about any significant shifts in the movement hierarchy. Thus, counterproductive outbidding spirals are unlikely. Similar logic holds for chain-ganging, as other groups are too weak to pull the dominant group into a conflict, and their potential destruction is not a major loss to the
movement, so the dominant group has greater freedom to calm the situation or simply ignore the attacks of weaker groups. Spoiling attempts are less likely to be successful when they are undertaken by non-poles due to their lack of support and capability, which also makes such campaigns less likely to be undertaken in the first place. Similar logic holds for infighting, which is unlikely to be undertaken by non-poles against the leader and would be over quickly with minimal loss of resources in any case. Collectively, this means that unipolar movements are likely to experience a far more efficient use of scarce resources.

In a multipolar movement without institutionalized alliances, a group could very well lose power quickly, making potential challenges via outbidding, chain-gang, spoiling, or infighting quite serious. This is true even if challenges are initiated by weaker groups, as each pole has to worry that a lack of credibility could lead to another pole becoming dominant. Returning to Figure 13, the structuralist theory predicts that weaker poles are the most likely to initiate such acts, to which top poles in multipolar movements are likely to have to respond. In a unified movement, groups are perhaps more likely to chain-gang due to their alliances, if slightly less likely to initiate outbidding or spoiling. Nonetheless, any attempts to do so must be met by other poles, since their leadership is under threat in an environment with potential rivals if alliances dissolve, as they often do.

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147 The international relations literature holds that the potential loss of a significant ally is a driving factor in poles being chain-ganged into war. As a bipolar system is structurally equivalent to a unipolar movement facing a state, Waltz's logic for why chain-ganging does not occur in such a system holds for unipolar movements as well. Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," 141, Waltz, Theory of International Politics.

148 This logic parallels that of A.F.K. Organski as applied to states. He argued that unipolarity is the most stable system, and war occurs when rising challenger in a multipolar system challenges the current leader for dominance: "A balance of power increases the chances of war. A preponderance of power on one side, on the other hand, increases the chances for peace, for the greatly stronger side need not fight at all to get what it wants, while the weaker side would be plainly foolish to attempt to battle for what it wants." A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1968), 294, 338-376.
Henry Kissinger once said, “the Arabs cannot make war without Egypt, or peace without Syria,” referring to two key actions for alliances: the initiation and cessation of conflict. In a unipolar movement, one group has the ability to do both, whereas in a multipolar movement, competing poles can prevent the larger movement from achieving peace or chain-gang it into undesirable war. As we shall see in the next section, when conflict does come, the ability of a movement to engage in coherent, credible action is the final key to political effectiveness.

Coherent, Credible Coercion: How Polarity Drives State Perceptions and Strategic Success

Any target of coercion will ask itself three key questions: what does the coercer want, how realistic is the threat, and can or will he uphold any deal? To successfully coerce an adversary, a social movement must therefore be able to clearly signal its objectives and threats, as well as be credible both in delivering on these threats of initiating violence and on assurances of withholding or stopping it when the target complies. The polarity of a social movement again plays the dominant role in determining the degree to which armed groups will be coherent and credible coercers.

Clarity of the objective and threat are key factors in the effectiveness of coercion.\footnote{149} Conventional coercion between states is more likely to involve interaction via ambassadors, international organizations, and other established, formalized channels of communication that make reliable transmission and receipt of objectives and threats more likely. Armed groups, on the other hand, often have no formal channels to communicate with their targets and hold a larger degree of private information. Therefore, their demands, threats, and guarantees are often

communicated through their actions, and to some degree through the media after an attack is carried out. This creates comparatively greater potential for miscommunication and mixed signals, especially when there are multiple groups not acting in concert.

Even if the target audience perceives the desires of the campaign with perfect clarity, there is often significant uncertainty as to the credibility of the coercer, either in his ability to make good on his threats or to commit to a deal. If the target state has little reason to believe that the coercer can or will actually deliver on its threats, it is unlikely to alter its behavior. It is the fear of future attacks, after all, not the concern over past ones, that drives states to change course. Scholars have demonstrated that the strength of the coercer drives a target state’s assessments of credibility, as stronger coercers have greater ability to both initiate and halt violence.

The credibility of being able to prevent violence is as important as the threat of its use, as Schelling explains: “The pain and suffering have to appear contingent on his behavior; it is not alone the threat that is effective—the threat of pain or loss if he fails to comply, but the corresponding assurance, possibly an implicit one, that he can avoid the pain or loss if he does comply.”

The importance of timing is apparent in the distinction between deterrence and compellence. For deterrence, the coercer issues a threat that will only be acted upon if the target takes a specified, undesired action (such as invasion), whereas for compellence, violence is often employed against the target, with the coercer claiming that it will not be stopped until the target

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150 According to James Fearon, the commitment problem refers to “situations in which mutually preferable bargains are unattainable because one or more states would have an incentive to renege on the terms.” James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 381.


takes a certain, desired action (such as ending a military occupation). In either case, violence used by the coercer at an inopportune time can prevent coercive success.

Unipolar movements are more likely to have coherent strategies that allow for clearer signaling to external audiences. This is crucial, as the state and its citizens generally perceive the movement as a unitary coercer, whether that is the case or not. One example of this phenomenon comes from the Palestinian factions over forty years ago: “Beirut correspondents, who apparently have easy access to all these organizations, can no longer make heads or tails in this jungle. In fact, one Lebanese paper stopped publishing the names of the organizations and instead used the general title ‘Fedayeen.’”

Unipolarity is a de facto, if not de jure, way of establishing a monopoly of force within anarchical social movements, which generally lack the sovereignty and central control over violence that most states possess. The nature of the dominant pole’s relative strength allows it to exert significant control over the timing and targets of violence struck by the movement, either from its own, sizeable group or those of non-poles. Furthermore, unipolarity lessens the ability of external powers to manipulate the movement by providing fewer points of entry, which could otherwise lead to similarly inconsistent or counterproductive tactics. Multipolar movements lack this monopoly of force, and even though unified movements may possess it to a degree for a time, organizational incentives are likely to bring more disparate attacks than in cases of unipolarity.

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153 This parallels Waltz’s claim that a bipolar system is the most peaceful because the two sides can better judge the other’s signals. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.
The result of these differences is that in both word and deed, multipolar movements send more mixed signals about the objective, threats, and guarantees of a campaign, while unipolar movements send clearer, more reliable signals. This makes it more difficult for target audiences to discern what the desired concession of multipolar movements is (and therefore whether it is worth making) and what actions the coercer will or will not take based on the target's actions, making success unlikely. If target audiences differentiated well between different groups, then mixed signaling would be less of a problem, but that is simply not the case. The majority of attacks are not claimed by individual groups, and the fact that groups in a social movement are bound together by a common popular base and at least one common strategic objective (not to mention possible ethnic and geographic similarities) makes differentiation by a target audience unlikely. Add that psychological studies tell us that individuals are more likely to perceive the 'other' as unified, and the mixed signals emanating from multipolar movements make success less likely.

Finally, poles in unipolar social movements are able to issue more credible threats and commitments to their state adversaries, making success more likely. The considerable power held by a dominant group increases the credibility of the unipolar movement in its ability to deliver on commitments to start or stop violence. As noted above, if the target state has little reason to believe that the coercer can or will actually make good on its threats or assurances, it is unlikely to alter its behavior. States understand that spoilers are less likely to emerge or succeed within unipolar movements, which provides greater certainty concerning the commitment problem that can emerge with multipolar movements, unified or otherwise. States know that alliances can and often do break just before or after peace deals, raising the possibility of
continued attacks despite concessions, making success less likely in the case of unity than unipolarity.

The Causes of Polarity: Escaping the Multipolar Trap

This study focuses on the political effectiveness of non-state violence and, as such, the structuralist theory offers the polarity of social movements as the central explanatory variable. Adequately explaining variation in movement polarity would require its own project. It is worth making a brief assessment here, however, in order to address potential concerns about endogeneity and tautology while providing a more complete picture of the dynamics of non-state violence.

The polarity of social movements has a number of causes that are largely exogenous, in that they exist outside of the model posited in the structuralist theory of non-state violence and are not explained by it. These include the ethnic and geographic homogeneity of the movement and its base, the number and type of prevailing ideologies, and the quantity and quality of external supporters (such as states). In this case, significant ethnic homogeneity could make unipolarity more likely, while a social movement whose members were spread across numerous states would be more likely to be multipolar. The number of potential external supporters could drive whether it is a buyers or sellers market, and so whether there are likely to be many or few competing armed groups. Finally, although groups may share a common strategic objective of a new state, the existence of competing religious and secular ideologies among the base may make multipolarity more likely. In any case, these variables pose few potential methodological problems to the structuralist theory, unlike their endogenous counterparts, which are partially the result of politically effective violence and not simply the cause.
Movement polarity can also be caused by the use of violence. Attacks may weaken a dominant group and make the movement multipolar, or one group could outcompete or directly destroy other groups, shifting a multipolar movement to a unipolar one. In either case, polarity would appear to be endogenous to parts of the structuralist theory, as the effective use of violence would be driving movement polarity, rather than simply vice versa. Such shifts in polarity are neither unnatural nor a problem for the theory, however. Although over the lifespan of a movement, the arrows may go both ways between polarity and violence, within a given campaign, movement polarity is exogenous to political effectiveness. As such, a campaign that shifted a movement from multipolar to unipolar would be an organizational success for the last remaining pole, but strategic success in the same campaign is neither guaranteed nor likely. The increased chance for strategic progress comes in the following campaign, as the dominant group benefits from the new distribution of power.156

This realization provides unique insight into the concept of stages that is seemingly at the foundation of every insurgent strategist’s thinking. Instead of Mao or Che Guevara’s concern with shifts in the types of violent conflict over time, the true mark of a movement on the verge of success is its ability to change its structure and transition from disorganization to multipolarity to unipolarity. Be it through rapid infighting or slow institutionalization, the key is to escape the trap of multipolarity, which otherwise involves rearranging the hierarchical deck chairs on the proverbial Titanic for the movement. This is not easy given the previously discussed variables that are exogenous to group action, but there is no more effective interim goal that groups can realize if they truly seek strategic success.

156 Empirical analysis of the theory in the study reflects this understanding.
Alternative Hypotheses: Ideology, Movement Strength, and a New Structuralist Theory

As Figures 10 and 11 demonstrate, the structuralist theory is potentially both parsimonious and quite powerful, as polarity impacts a large number of significant factors that bear on the political effectiveness of non-state violence, such as interests, strength, strategy, signaling, and credibility. No single variable can explain all of the variation in campaign outcomes on a single level, let alone both levels, but this study holds that polarity does the best job.

Nonetheless, there are alternative hypotheses. Even if they are not more powerful than those of the structuralist theory, they may account for outlying cases that the structuralist theory cannot and so help set the scope conditions of the theory. The three competing hypotheses with the greatest prominence and potential concern the ideology, strength, and polarity of the social movement. This section will briefly explain the logic of each and the evidence that would help to confirm or refute each hypothesis.

First, one could argue that ideology drives both when groups use violence and when that violence is successful. Scholars often divide armed groups and their movements into a variety of ideological groups, such as communist, nationalist, anarchist, religious, and the like. If this hypothesis is correct, we should see variation in group’s violent behavior based on their ideologies, which might suggest greater cross-group than within-group variation, given that ideology is not something that many groups change quickly, if at all. This hypothesis is a direct rival of the structuralist theory, which holds that the influence of a group’s position in the

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157 Explanatory powerful and parsimony are the two key characteristics of a good explanation according to Olson. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, 12. See also Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

158 In any case, the fact that there are alternative explanations that have merit, including one that is the precise opposite of the structuralist theory, demonstrates that the theory is not tautological.
distribution of power will trump its ideology and shift its violent behavior accordingly, even as groups try to find ways to explain how their shift in strategy is still in line with their ideology.

Second, the key factor in the political effectiveness of non-state violence may not be movement polarity, but rather movement strength. The stronger a movement is in terms of resources, theoretically the greater damage it can both visit on a state and absorb itself. This hypothesis would be confirmed if movements that include more overall members or funding perform better than weaker movements. On its own, this hypothesis is likely to be insufficient for precisely the reasons argued in this chapter about the impact of polarity. However, the hypothesis of movement strength may well be a complementary one that helps delineate the scope conditions of the structuralist theory. For example, a movement may be unipolar, but if the entire movement has thirty members, it is unlikely to coerce a state. Therefore, on extreme values, this hypothesis may help to explain aspects of cases that the structuralist theory cannot.

Finally, we come to the most important competing hypothesis, namely that the structuralist theory has it precisely backwards: multipolar movements are more likely to yield politically effective violence than are unipolar movements. This hypothesis follows three traditional lines of argument from the fields of political science and economics. First, this hypothesis holds that a multipolar movement provides all of the benefits of a freer market for ideas and competition, while a unipolar system involves all of the problems of a monopoly. In a multipolar movement, the existence of multiple significant groups may force all to compete to serve the base strategically, lest others do so more effectively and win out. On the other hand, the dominant group in a unipolar movement may become fat and happy with its position, and so put forth little effort to succeed strategically when potential rivals are absent. Furthermore, multipolarity allows the movement to employ competing ideologies and strategies in order to

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arrive at the best one.\textsuperscript{160} In this scenario, the movement yields the most effective violence amidst multipolar infighting, and is least effective if or when a single dominant group or alliance emerges.

Second, multipolarity may reduce infighting and promote strategic agreements with the state due to the flexibility offered by its multiple groups. Some international relations theorists claim that multipolar systems are likely to be more stable due to the significant number of permutations of alliances and agreements that can be achieved.\textsuperscript{161} As with the federalist American system, multipolarity may yield the ability for groups to balance against a hegemon, thus preventing any single group from taking the movement in an undesirable direction.\textsuperscript{162}

Third, the existence of multiple factions may yield a 'good cop/bad cop' dynamic that is effective at coercing concessions. In this case, a state could be more willing to bargain with a 'good cop' group when there is a 'bad cop' looming as a potential movement leader. Having multiple groups could leverage the benefits of various violent and non-violent strategies to appeal to multiple audiences. This dynamic seems to have some precedent from the U.S. civil rights movement: "The liberal group’s function is, literally, to start fights they are unable to finish. They are able to create a crisis, but are frequently unable to resolve it because they have no basis for contact with dominant white leaders...In the Atlanta dispute even the antagonism between the two groups was functional because it made the conservatives seem more reliable and

\textsuperscript{160} An extension of this line of argument might include an analysis that disaggregates multipolarity into bipolarity, tripolarity, quadripolarity, and beyond to see if this reveals variation not captured by this version of the structuralist theory.

\textsuperscript{161} Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," \textit{World Politics} 16, no. 3 (1964). Although they have a different dependent variable, Collier and Hoeffler argue that greater fractionalization makes a society safer and less prone to infighting, as predicted by the greed model, rather than more war-prone, as predicted by the grievance model. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," in \textit{Policy Research Working Paper} (The World Bank, 2000), 26.

responsible in the eyes of the whites, and so they were still able to act as negotiators when both sides were ready to compromise.\textsuperscript{163}

There are, of course, alternative views on this hypothesis that supplement the structuralist theory presented in this chapter. First, as previously noted, a group's desire to pay for strategic progress alone may wane, but the desire to increase its own strength and position never does. In a unipolar movement, the best path to selfish improvement is through strategic progress, whereas in multipolar movements 'selfish' campaigns spoil progress and inhibit strategic success. Furthermore, it is easier to assign responsibility for strategic successes and failures in a unipolar movement, whereas in multipolar movements the noise from competing factions make it easy for groups to pass the buck. Therefore, poles in unipolar movements have a greater incentive to deliver, not a lesser one.

Competition between groups yields risky behaviors like outbidding, infighting, and chain-ganging. If maximum violence is best, then such an arrangement may be beneficial. However, victory for non-state actors comes from the calibration of the ideal quality and quantity of violence at different points, as few movements have the ability to defeat states through sheer brute force. Finally, a competitive 'tournament' to yield the most fit group may ultimately bring a favorable result, but many of these tournaments never end; the players just change positions to the detriment of the movement. If they do end in a favorable way, they yield unipolarity, after which time strategic success is likely to occur, not before. As for flexibility, scholars like Karl

\textsuperscript{163} Jack Walker, "Protest and Negotiation: A Case Study of Negro Leadership in Atlanta, Georgia," \textit{Midwest Journal of Political Science} 7, no. 2 (1963): 121-122. From the same study: "One member of the conservative group, who has a reputation as a good tactician and organizer, acknowledged the importance of the students protests in bringing 'more integration in less than two years than we gained in ten,' but he argued that 'they will never get anything done on their own because they are cut off; they work in a righteous vacuum over there.'" Walker, "Protest and Negotiation: A Case Study of Negro Leadership in Atlanta, Georgia," 117.
Deutsch and David Singer have it backwards. Clarity and credibility lead to strategic success; uncertainty forces states to launch wars and forego deals, not the opposite.

Finally, the ‘good cop/bad cop’ dynamic has more pitfalls than potential in a multipolar context. Audiences are as likely to focus on the group of whose actions they disapprove as the one they approve, especially in the case of states. For evidence of this, one need look no further than the various terrorist group lists maintained by the U.S. and numerous other countries across the globe, which sanction and refuse to deal with movements that have included terrorist attacks, regardless of whatever else the movement does. Most of all, the key in this story is not simply complementary tactics, but coordinated ones, as revealed in the case of the civil rights movement: “Leadership unity and active mass support, in either the Negro or white community, emerged as central factors in the success or futility of specific protest movements... The protest was least successful when Negro leadership was split.”

In a multipolar movement, there may well be a ‘good cop’ and a ‘bad cop,’ but it is unlikely that either will have the strength to impose coordinated action. On the other hand, the single pole in a unipolar movement could employ multiple tactics itself, or it could manipulate those of a weak, non-pole, to yield the benefits of ‘good cop/bad cop’ without the lack of coherence and credibility that mark multipolar movements. In this case, the ‘good cop/bad cop’ approach can work when one is a non-pole, ‘useful nuisance’ in a unipolar movement, but is likely to be counterproductive in a multipolar context.

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165 For an example of Earth First! employing such an approach, see Elsbach and Sutton, "Acquiring Organizational Legitimacy through Illegitimate Actions: A Marriage of Institutional and Impression Management Theories."
166 The phrase “useful nuisance” comes from Wilson, who specifically noted that joint strategies between multiple groups (the Urban League and NAACP in his case) are hard to pull off in practice, because of competition between the groups over the scarce resources of recruits and funding. James Q. Wilson, "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 5, no. 3 (1961): 298-300.
In any case, the observable implications of these competing theories are clear and largely zero-sum. The most basic test will be whether unipolar or multipolar movements yield more politically effective uses of violence by campaign, and whether groups change their approach to violence based on hierarchical position, ideology, or neither factor. Furthermore, each of the causal mechanisms presented in Figures 10 and 11 and analyzed here are worthy of examination.

Conclusion: The Paradox as the Security Dilemma, and the Tragedy of Non-State Violence

The structuralist theory of non-state violence holds that the structure of power within social movements explains the greatest variation in both the use of violence by armed groups and its political effectiveness. The hierarchy hypothesis and its corollaries give us worthwhile predictions in their own right about when, why, and how groups will employ violence. Their most important contribution, however, is the link they provide to the political effectiveness of such action. No matter which particular groups rise or fall, if the number of significant groups and distribution of power within the movement remains the same, the structure ensures that there will always be spoilers, outbidders, and chain-gangers, with no real solution to collective action and principal-agent problems nor much hope for strategic success. Roles may change, but the story and its conclusion remain the same.

The remaining questions are clear: if the paradox exists, and unipolarity or, to a lesser extent, unity can help to solve it and make violence more effective, do armed groups know this? And if so, why do they not create unipolar or unified movements? The answer to the first question is ‘yes,’ most groups do understand that strategic success is more likely when their movement is unipolar or unified. However, in what could be labeled ‘the tragedy of multipolar social movements,’ the best of intentions are often thwarted by the inherently competitive
structure. Each group has incentives to pursue its own survival and empowerment to the utmost, which often precludes unity when coupled with the uncertainty of future power shifts. Groups still push for unity, but on their own favorable terms. Dominant groups want unity under their leadership, weak groups want unity that gives equal representation to all organizations. As alliances generally reflect the strengths of their signatories, one finds that, as with the discussion of movement hierarchies in Figure 13, the drive for unity dissipates quickly as one moves down the ladder. The leading pole often pushes for unity, with other poles resisting until they are on top.

Unipolarity remains the dream of most groups, however, it is usually difficult to achieve. Bargaining to unipolarity is rare, as it generally involves the destruction of other poles, an indivisible issue. One group must therefore thoroughly outcompete the others or simply destroy them, all while preventing significant splinter groups from breaking off. Although difficult, it can be done, and those groups that find ways to eliminate rivals and forge unipolar movements are likely to find greater strategic success in the future.

In some ways then, the paradox is the security dilemma for non-state actors. The paradox of non-state violence implies that actions taken to make the group more secure often

167 This concept is a version of John Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, which is based on the similar idea that even though states want to live in peace and security, the way to achieve that security—increasing their own power—often leads to conflicts and other suboptimal outcomes that are tragic for many involved. It must be noted that the 'tragedy' here is from the perspective of the social movement, not necessarily the author's. Indeed, from the state perspective, it may be a happy tragedy indeed depending on its goals. John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

168 On issue indivisibility, see Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War."

169 This brings to mind Wilson's relevant quote: "The discretion of the protest leader to bargain after he has acquired the resources with which to bargain is severely limited by the means he was forced to employ in order to create those resources." Wilson, "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," 293.

170 Robert Powell's description of the security dilemma applies well in this case, with the word 'group' replacing 'state': "A security dilemma exists when one [group’s] efforts to increase its security also has the—perhaps unintended—effect of reducing another [group’s] security. In an effort to restore its initial level of security, the second [group] may then take steps that diminish the effectiveness of the first [group’s] efforts to enhance its security. This, in turn, prompts the first [group] to take additional steps and so on." Robert Powell, *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 9.
make the group’s social movement (and at times the group itself) less secure, e.g. by inspiring outbidding and violent competition among peer groups for increased internal strength and support. As with the security dilemma, this occurs regardless of the fact that armed groups actually intend to increase both their own security and that of the social movement. In other words, few groups ultimately aim only for selfish success, but their actions yield either that outcome or total failure due to the contradictions inherent in the pursuit of organizational and strategic objectives. Therefore, the use of violence by non-state actors is often good for the attacking groups but bad for the social movements of which they are a part. The paradox helps to explain why non-state groups employ violence repeatedly even when it seems to “fail.”

We now turn to empirical analysis of the structuralist theory.
Ch.4: The Palestinian National Movement

The Palestinian National Movement: The Sisyphean Tragedy of Multipolarity

"Better a thousand enemies outside the tent than one within."

*Arab proverb*[^171]

Introduction

Analyzing the causes and effects of violence within the Palestinian national movement is a worthwhile endeavor in its own right, as scholars have claimed that this case is the paradigmatic example of how non-state violence works *and* that it is the paradigmatic example of how non-state violence does not work.[^172] The structuralist theory of non-state violence reveals that the truth is far more complex. Violence has caused success and failure for the Palestinians, although the structure of the national movement has helped to ensure that more successes were organizational and more failures were strategic.

As predicted by the hierarchy hypothesis, the position of an armed group in the hierarchy of the Palestinian national movement played the dominant role in when, how, and why it employed or worked to restrain violence (see Table 2). Weaker armed groups in the movement had incentives to launch attacks to improve their relative strength, either by increasing public support or instigating a larger conflict that could change the game and whose costs others would

[^171]: A different version of this proverb was used by Mustafa Akhmais, Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) member, to describe his desire to unite the Palestinian national movement. Yaari, *Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah*, 165. According to Greek mythology, King Sisyphus was condemned by the gods to roll a boulder up a hill, only to have to it roll back down to the bottom every time he neared the peak. Thus, a Sisyphean task is one that is seemingly repetitive and endless, with its successful completion always just out of reach.

disproportionately pay. At the same time, these non-dominant groups were unlikely to support peace settlements that would cement the current movement hierarchy or cut them out of the deal entirely, thus keeping them in a subordinate position. These dynamics explain the challenge of Salafi jihadist groups to Hamas in Gaza today, which was preceded by the challenge of Hamas to Fatah, which was preceded by the challenge of Fatah to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was preceded by the challenge of the PLO to King Hussein of Jordan, who also at one time saw himself as the leader of the Palestinians. Depending on the distribution of power, the strongest pole in these scenarios was forced to outbid the weaker groups to preserve its mantle of leadership, or to seek stability by preventing violence and perhaps pursuing negotiations that yielded them significant benefits—including moving them from the head of a movement to the head of a new state.

As predicted by the polarity hypothesis, the polarity of the Palestinian national movement drove variation in the political effectiveness of violence employed by its member groups as well as the strategic success or failure of the movement itself. Regardless of changes in time, space, or the movement hierarchy, violence within the Palestinian national movement was the most strategically ineffective when the movement was multipolar (1964-June 1967, July 1967-December 1967, 1968-1969, 1969-1970, 1970-1973, 1975-1986, and 1996-present), somewhat effective when the movement was unified (1974), and most effective when the movement was unipolar (1986-1996) (see Table 2). Unfortunately for the Palestinians, their national movement has almost always been multipolar due to the geographical dispersion of their people, the involvement of many Arab states with their own interests and rivalries, and the unwillingness and/or inability of armed groups to directly eliminate each other. The paradox of non-state
violence has therefore been a major problem for the Palestinian cause, ensuring that violence has been generally ineffective for the movement, even if it benefitted certain groups.

The concept of the paradox is particularly interesting in this case because it runs counter to what is unquestionably the best book on the armed struggle within the Palestinian national movement: *Armed Struggle and the Search for State* by Yezid Sayigh. Sayigh's central theme is that the strategic and organizational levels were complementary in Tilly-esque fashion, in that the armed struggle to recapture the Palestinian homeland helped to create a leadership and institutions to serve a new state. Although I agree with Sayigh that the armed struggle did help construct or strengthen a Palestinian identity, a leadership elite, and some basic institutions, the coercive and constitutive aspects of violence were often at odds, as were the strategic and organizational objectives with which they were associated.

Ultimately, a national movement that involves the actions of more than ten key states and ten significant organizations over one hundred years is incredibly complex, and all of its parts are not going to fit perfectly into a parsimonious theory and framework. This is precisely why the structuralist theory and its two-level framework are useful, however. They help us to organize and simplify complexity and focus on certain key aspects of the case, while at the same time recognizing how many questions are left unanswered. With these caveats in mind, let us begin.

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175 One of the key complexities of the case is that there were over twenty states involved (especially Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the Soviet Union) that were also playing their own similar two-level game on top of the Palestinian movement. The Palestinians themselves noted this complexity, as described by Fatah member Salah Khalaf: "Ours is an impossible revolution. When we were in China, Abu Ammar and I, we were shown a computer. Abu Ammar maliciously suggested that we take it with us. We could feed it all of our problems, and all of our contradictions, and it would tell us the solution. I answered that we didn't want the computer to explode. And, if it didn't explode, it would merely spit out a little card with the words—mush mumkin—not possible, an insoluble problem." William Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973), 134.
Table 2. Summary of Campaigns in the Palestinian National Movement, 1964-Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Polarity</th>
<th>Hierarchy of Poles at Start of Campaign</th>
<th>Hierarchy of Poles at End of Campaign</th>
<th>Strategic Outcome of Campaign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1968</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-present</td>
<td>Multipolarity</td>
<td>1. Hamas</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups using violence at the time are highlighted in green with vertical lines, and groups trying to stop violence are highlighted in red with horizontal lines (groups with no color neither used violence nor restrained it). The thicker the lines, the more strongly committed the group was to that tactic. Note that Fatah's half red, half green codings refer to it pursuing cross-border attacks against Israel, but attempting to restrain hijackings and other 'external operations' of the PFLP and other groups at the same time. By 1971, Fatah engaged in such attacks.

ANM: Arab Nationalists Movement
JCP: Jordanian Communist Party
DFLP: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PA: Palestinian Authority
PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization
PLA: Palestine Liberation Army
Figure 14. Map of Israel, the West Bank, Gaza and Surrounding Countries

The 1950 Israeli proclamation that Jerusalem be the national capital is not recognized by the United States Government.
The Paradox Triumphant: The Rise of Fatah, The Fall of the Old Guard, and The Thwarting of Palestinian Aspirations

Introduction

The 1960s were the most dynamic decade for the Palestinian national movement. During this period, almost all of the key players for the next half century emerged, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), The Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), and The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The fact that leadership of the movement changed hands multiple times and tens of thousands of Palestinians were mobilized into hundreds of organizations meant that the movement was almost unrecognizable in 1970 as compared to just ten years earlier.

Despite these shifts in the internal hierarchy, however, the movement was multipolar throughout the decade, which meant that the paradox of non-state violence helped to thwart strategic success again and again. Groups like Fatah and the PFLP employed violence effectively to increase their strength, but these same actions, undertaken in a competitive environment, helped spur outbidding and chain-ganging that led to disastrous consequences for the movement. Perhaps more than in any other period, violence was the clear driving factor in almost every significant success and failure, both organizational and strategic. Unfortunately for the Palestinian base, the fractured nature of their movement meant that most of the successes were organizational and most of the failures were strategic.

Setting the Stage: The (Re-)Emergence of Palestinian Nationalism

In 1960, the Palestinian national movement was structurally weak. 1948 had truly been the *Nakba* for the movement, as the war with the new Israeli state left the Palestinian population
dispersed, dispossessed, and disheartened. Like the latter stages of the Revolt of 1936-1939 before it, the war saw the Palestinians facing a well-organized adversary while they themselves were neither unipolar nor unified, which led to the uncoordinated and ultimately ineffective use of violence by a variety of armed groups. The aftermath of the 1948 War left the Palestinians at the mercy of the Israeli and Arab governments that now controlled all of historic Palestine, as well as those neighboring countries in which hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees now resided. Jordan, Egypt, and others in the League of Arab States wasted little time forcibly disbanding the few Palestinian armed groups that remained in existence at the end of the war—the Arab Salvation Army and the Army of Holy War—in part to avoid renewed entanglements with Israel.

Most of these Palestinian soldiers joined the armies of Arab states, which was quite fitting in that the Palestinian national movement would find itself deeply embedded in the broader movement of Arab nationalism for the next two decades. To the extent that there was a leader of the Palestinian national movement by 1960, it was either Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt

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176 Nakba means catastrophe in Arabic and is used to describe the 1948 War and the displacement of the Palestinian refugees.
177 During the Revolt of 1936-1939, “There was little coordination and considerable rivalry between the regional [Palestinian] commanders. The commanders also vied for support from Damascus, where the rump Arab Higher Committee had established itself and attempted to supply military equipment and funds for the mujahideen.” Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, 38. In the lead up to the 1948 War, Palestinian society was divided: “The pyramidal family and clan network, which built on relationships of support and protection from the village level through local potentates to leading families at the district level, offered the means of rapid articulation of opinion and mobilization of all levels of society. The main political parties were based on this structure, the parties of the particularly influential Husayni and Nashashibi families having ties throughout the country. However, this structure made it difficult to unify the national movement. Since each leading family had a political power base in client villages or town quarters, it felt itself the equal of the others and bargained vigorously before forming alliances. Even then the alliances shifted rapidly, on the basis of personal and family differences rather than policy. The most enduring and damaging split occurred between the Husaynis and the Nashashibis.” ———, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, 17.
178 These steps were taken against the wishes of the All Palestine Government in Gaza, which had tried to revive the Army of Holy War after the 1948 conflict. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 58-59.
or King Hussein of Jordan. Not a Palestinian himself, Nasser’s overthrow of King Farouk, nationalization of the Suez Canal, and creation of the United Arab Republic (with Syria) gave significant momentum to his anti-Western platform that aimed to empower and unify Arabs. Many looked to him as a savior for the Palestinian cause, in no small part due to his numerous, fiery speeches about Palestine and the challenge of Zionism, including his suggestion for creating a Palestinian ‘entity’ (kiyan) in 1959 and a Palestinian army in 1960.

The most powerful Palestinian organization in the early 1960s was the Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM), which had been founded in 1951 by Palestinian George Habash and Syrian Hani al-Hindi, both students at the American University of Beirut who had served with the Arab Salvation Army during the 1948 war. By 1960, the ANM had grown from a few AUB students to hundreds of members, which were to become thousands as the ANM became strong supporters of Nasser. The primary objective of the ANM was the liberation of Palestine. However, early in its history the ANM believed that “the road to Tel Aviv passes through Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, and Cairo,” as those countries’ resources would be required for the task. Although Nasser’s suggestion of a Palestinian entity inspired the ANM, his concurrent admission that he had no plan to liberate Palestine spurred the group to form a separate Palestinian Committee in 1959, which became the autonomous Palestinian Action Command (PAC) (Qiyadat Al-Amal Al-Filastini) branch in 1964.

179 One of the unique challenges for the Palestinians was that not only did they have to struggle with the Israelis for what they saw as their homeland, but they also had to contend with Jordan, who had annexed the West Bank in 1950 and wanted it back after the 1967 war, and Syria, who considered parts of Palestine to be ‘Southern Syria.’ Moshe Shemesh, *The Palestinian Entity 1959-1974: Arab Politics and the Plo*, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1988), 206.
181 The ANM had thousands of members across the Arab world, including several hundred Palestinian members in Lebanon, five hundred in Syria, several hundreds in the West Bank, somewhat fewer in Gaza, and dozens in Kuwait and Egypt in 1964. Ibid.
182 Ibid., 73.
183 Ibid., 108.
The second significant Palestinian organization in 1960 was the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP). The JCP had also been founded in 1951 in Jordan and the West Bank, which Jordan had annexed the previous year. Palestinians had maintained communist organizations since 1919, with both the JCP and its counterpart in Gaza, the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP), emerging from the defunct National Liberation League (NLL) in mandatory Palestine.\(^\text{184}\) The majority of JCP members were Palestinian and the party sought a Palestinian state, although the desired shape of that state shifted over time.\(^\text{185}\) King Hussein’s control of the West Bank and desire to integrate Palestinians into Jordan played a role in constraining JCP policy, and he sparred with Nasser and, later, Yasser Arafat and George Habash for leadership of the movement. Nonetheless, despite sporadic crackdowns by Hussein, the JCP were “arguably the most organized and experienced party in the occupied territories, they also regarded themselves as the largest,” with over two thousand members.\(^\text{186}\)

The smallest and least established of these Palestinian organizations in 1960 was the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, known by its reverse acronym in Arabic: Fatah. Fatah had been founded in 1958 by Khalil Al-Wazir, Yasser Arafat, and a small number of other Palestinian activists from Syria and Gaza. It soon grew to include Salah Khalaf, Khalid al-Hasan, and Mahmud Abbas, among others, and many of its members emerged from the Muslim

\(^{184}\) It is important to note that before the Palestinian Communist Party in Gaza, there was the Palestine Communist Party (also the PCP) in mandatory Palestine, which was a party of both Jewish and Arab communists and the official Comintern section for the region. The original PCP split up over tensions concerning Jewish emigration to Palestine, which led to the creation of the NLL. Emile Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics since 1967* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988), 88-92.

\(^{185}\) 70% of the JCP was Palestinian in 1980s. See Ibid., 112. The NLL pushed for a Palestinian state in line with the 1947 partition plan. However, the JCP saw union with Jordan as the best way to transition to a Palestinian state from 1951 until the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the JCP became the first significant Palestinian faction to actively push for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics since 1967*, 89-93. The concept of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza was not mainstream in 1960s or early 1970s. See Munir Shafiq, “Why Do the Palestinians Reject the Proposal if a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip?” Shuun Filistiniya, March 1972, pp. 65-73 Ghassan Kanafai, “The Ghost of a Palestinian State, Al-Hadaf, March 6, 1971

Brotherhood, which had been significantly weakened in the 1950s. Like the ANM and JCP, Fatah sought a Palestinian state, but the group placed greater emphasis on Palestinian \textit{wataniyya} than pan-Arab \textit{qawmiyya}. Fatah represented a few hundred people in 1959, although those numbers would ebb and flow over the coming years.

All three of these groups—the ANM, the JCP and Fatah—were secretive, underground organizations during this period, often requiring potential members to prove themselves over time before being accepted. Interestingly, Fatah was founded in part due to the reaction of Khalil al-Wazir to Egypt's suspension of all guerrilla violence against Israel as part of a deal for the Israelis to evacuate the Gaza Strip in March 1957 (which Israel had invaded in 1956). Fatah's future leadership understood that the ability to start and stop violence was key to achieving a variety of political objectives, a lesson it would put to use in the near future.

\textit{The Emergence of the PLO and the Launch of the Armed Struggle}

\textsuperscript{187} The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) lost a good deal of legitimacy in the eyes of many Palestinians due to its attempt to assassinate Nasser. The subsequent Egyptian crackdown in 1954, followed soon after by Israeli repression during their occupation of Gaza in 1956-57, left the Brotherhood in a weakened state. It did not help that Khalil Al-Wazir's suggestion that the MB form a guerrilla group to liberate Palestine was turned down. Soon after, Wazir helped found Fatah, which stole away many able MB members like Kamal Udwan and Muhammad Yusif al-Najjar. Ibid., 84.

\textsuperscript{188} Both terms loosely mean 'nationalism' in Arabic, but \textit{wataniyya} is tied to territory and the state (e.g. Palestine) whereas \textit{qawmiyya} refers more to people, in this case Arabs.


\textsuperscript{190} This is a key control for mobilization, because if one or more was open and easier to join, that would make comparison of group sizes as a proxy for strength and influence less helpful.

\textsuperscript{191} Sayigh, \textit{Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993}, 83. Raids before Fatah's emergence were largely disorganized and not built around a larger, enduring political purpose. After the 1948 war, there were many infiltrations into Israel (with a peak of 16,000 in 1952 and then 7,000 in 1953 and 4,351 in 1955), but less than 10\% were for political/nationalist motivations. Most were for economic or social reasons—to tend crops, resettle, smuggle goods, or theft, as well as visit relatives—and when there was an organization it was simply Palestinians sent by Egyptians to prepare the ground for the next engagement. Benny Morris, \textit{Israel's Border Wars 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Reaction, and the Countdown to the Suez War} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 28-. In a similar vein, Shaykh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam believed that the 1929 riots at the Wailing Wall and beyond had been ineffective because they were without purpose or organization. "Shaykh al-Qassam criticized the anomic violence of 1929 as self-defeating and maintained that maximum political effect could only be attained by building up dedicated cadres and hitting carefully selected targets." Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, \textit{The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism}, 33.
The ANM, JCP, Fatah, and, in truth, nearly all Palestinians were surprised when Ahmed Shuqayri, the Palestinian representative to the Arab League, acted on vague instructions from the League summit and held a Palestinian conference in Jerusalem in May of 1964 that created the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). There had been Palestinian institutions in the past that ostensibly represented and governed Palestinians, such as the Arab High Committee before the 1948 War and the All Palestine Government after it, but they lacked significant legitimacy, resources, and effective governing control during their tenure. At the PLO’s founding, there was no guarantee that it would fare any better. The Egyptians and Iraqis had bandied about the creation of a Palestinian entity in various forms since the late 1950s, yet they appeared more concerned with scoring rhetorical points than with setting up an institution with any real clout. 192 In fact, the mechanism that led to the creation of the PLO could easily be labeled outbidding—although this time in words rather than violence—as each Arab state would try to outdo the other in its proposals for a Palestinian ‘entity’ in order to prove its Arab nationalist credentials.

Nonetheless, in part due to the early push of Shuqayri, the PLO had the foundations of tangible legislative, economic, and military institutions. At the first assembly on May 28, 1964, the 422 Palestinian delegates became the first Palestinian National Council (PNC). The PNC subsequently adopted the Palestinian National Charter, which confirmed them as the supreme legislative body of the PLO (and, presumably, the Palestinians), tasked with making laws, passing budgets, and controlling state-like institutions. The PNC itself elected a 15-seat executive committee from among its members, which would determine policy between the

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192 In 1959 at its 31st session, the Arab League initially agreed to set up a Palestinian entity, but then Iraq went much further, in part to challenge Nasser, by proposing “the formation of a Palestinian government in Gaza and the West Bank, and the proclamation of a Palestinian Republic.” Egypt vetoed this idea, but would itself propose the creation of a Palestinian entity at different times for similar purposes. Alain Gresh, *The Plo: The Struggle within, Towards an Independent Palestinian State* (Totowa, NJ: Zed Books, 1983), 21-22. McLaurin, “The Plo and the Arab Fertile Crescent,” 23.
(roughly) yearly meetings of the PNC, and so was in some ways the true repository of power in the PLO.\textsuperscript{193}

The PLO also created the Palestinian National Fund (PNF), which was to help generate and manage economic support for the organization. The PNF received taxes collected from Palestinians living in Arab countries (between 5\% and 7\% of gross income), but its main source of funding, especially in subsequent years, was donations from Arab governments. Furthermore, the PLO had its ‘own’ military forces, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), which was created initially using Palestinian conscripts. In practice, however, the PLA was largely controlled by Arab governments. States like Jordan refused to allow PLA units on their territory, while those that hosted them (Egypt, Syria, and Iraq) held sway over their size, training, equipment, and employment. Nonetheless, the PLA had two brigades in Egypt, three battalions in Syria and another one in Iraq, yielding approximately 3,500 troops by the end of 1965, by far the largest concentration of strength among Palestinian organizations.\textsuperscript{194}

The PLO therefore represented a major challenge to other Palestinian groups, as it entered the scene as a group whose size, strength, and support from the Arab regimes made it an immediate candidate for leadership in the movement. The make-up of the PLO further presented a double challenge to Fatah, the ANM, and JCP, as the vast majority of the 422 delegates to the PNC were members of the pre-1948 Palestinian elite, with few refugees or working class individuals among them. This was no mistake, as Hussein and Nasser themselves nominated most of the delegates, who represented the Palestinian ‘Old Guard’.\textsuperscript{195} The coming struggle with the PLO therefore represented a simultaneous fight over the leadership of the Palestinian national

\textsuperscript{193} In theory, therefore, the Executive Committee was supposed to submit its resignation to each new PNC, as it would have to be re-elected. In between PNC meetings, two thirds of the Executive Committee members were required for a quorum, and votes were majority rule.


\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., 97.
movement with both a new Palestinian organization and the Arab regimes, who for so long had sought to control, appropriate, and exploit the Palestinian cause to their own ends.  

In such a strongly multipolar environment, the issue of unity naturally came to the fore for every Palestinian organization. According to the Palestinian National Charter, approved by the first PNC, “The Palestinians will have three mottoes: national (wataniyya) unity, national (qawmiyya) mobilization, and liberation.” The problem is that although in theory these objectives are complementary, the pursuit of them is often contradictory, as the mobilization carried out by groups often hinders the unity needed for liberation. The Charter goes so far as to describe the paradox itself, albeit with the wrong conclusion: “Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives, the attainment of either of which facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus, Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine, the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity; and work toward the realization of one objective proceeds side by side with work toward the realization of the other.” Of course, although the first half of this statement is accurate—unity, or, more accurately, unipolarity will more likely lead to liberation—the reality is that work towards one does not always progress side-by-side with the other. In fact, they are often at odds. 

This was no clearer than in the policies of each of the major groups. They all desired unity, of course, as long as it was on their terms, meaning that it maximized their power. Shuqayri pushed for the absorption of Fatah, the ANM, the JCP, and smaller groups into the PLO, as he saw no reason for these organizations to exist independently now that the PLO had

196 Fatah viewed the PLA like the Arab Salvation Army, which they claimed had been introduced by the League of Arab States in 1948 not to liberate Palestine but to control Palestinian decision-making. Ibid., 90-91.
197 Palestinian National Charter, Article 11
198 Palestinian National Charter, Article 13
emerged.\textsuperscript{199} Indeed, he had offered a smattering of seats on the first PNC to members of Fatah and the ANM, but would not agree to recognize them formally.\textsuperscript{200} The ANM tried to create the Politburo of Unified Action for Palestinian Revolutionary Forces along with other groups in May of 1964 as an alternative to the PLO, but this effort failed.\textsuperscript{201} The Leftists tried again with the Preparatory Committee for Unified Palestinian Action in February 1966, which was designed to stop Israeli nuclear weapons by launching armed struggle.\textsuperscript{202} It failed. For his part, even Mohammad Amin Al-Husayni, the former Mufti of Jerusalem and head of the Arab High Committee, boycotted the first PNC and set up a rival ‘national’ assembly of 300 Palestinians in Lebanon in mid-May of 1964, but it failed to gather any momentum.\textsuperscript{203}

Fatah did not want to join the PLO initially, despite popular notions today of the two organizations as synonymous. Instead, its leaders pursued their original aim of turning their own central council into a national one, thus making Fatah the leader under whose umbrella the movement would unify.\textsuperscript{204} Indeed, in its early strategic documents, Fatah argued as follows.

"[A lack of unity] has the potential to trip up the popular effort and decrease the effectiveness of the armed revolution, which is why the slogan of national unity was placed side-by-side with the fight against colonialism for many peoples who struggled or are struggling against direct colonialism." Furthermore "The armed revolution is required to work to unite the powers of the people and create a coalition, even one particular to this stage, between the different movements or national factions because the stage of fighting against direct colonialism dictates national unity to increase the effectiveness of the revolution and its ability to achieve the desired successes."

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{200} Ibid., 99.
\bibitem{201} Ibid., 100.
\bibitem{203} Ibid., 99.
\bibitem{204} Ibid., 91, 101. It is important to note that while unity among poles is rare and difficult, unity between poles and small groups is not as rare or problematic, and indeed, Fatah itself represented the unity of a number of groups, although these were largely small groups absorbed into the initial base that was founded in 1958-59 over the following decade. Of course, as the PFLP would demonstrate, even unity among non-poles is not guaranteed to last.
\bibitem{205} Fatah, \textit{Tahrir Al-Aqtar Al-Muhtalla Wa Uslug Al-Kifah Al-Musallah Dud Al-Istimar Al-Mubashir (Liberation of the Occupied Lands and the Method of Armed Struggle against Direct Occupation)}, Dirasat Wa Tajarib Thawriyya (Revolutionary Studies and Experiences), 13-14.
\end{thebibliography}
Nonetheless, Fatah’s efforts at unity among the poles yielded little progress. Thus, these Palestinian groups were part of a classic multipolar, non-unified movement in 1964, with Fatah and the JCP behind and the ANM “on par with its main competitors, the PLO and Fatah, if not ahead of them.”

With Fatah’s attempts at favorable unity unrealized, the weakening third or fourth strongest pole in the movement looked for options to turn the tide on its organization’s fortunes. The proposed solution was to launch attacks against Israel, and in the process distinguish Fatah from its competitors as a group of action, as opposed to those whose tactic of choice was simply revolutionary rhetoric. The logic behind the use of violence, as laid out in Fatah’s early strategy documents, resonates with the organizational part of the structuralist theory: “There must be a period in which the armed revolutionary vanguard tries to embody its real struggle in front of the public so that it can attract them in the end.” The attacks themselves would “detonate the revolutionary capabilities of the Palestinian people,” and the subsequent killing or capturing of Fatah members would only serve as a further costly signal to the base of Fatah’s commitment to the cause. Indeed, the name used for Palestinian fighters, fedayeen, means “those who sacrifice.”

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206 Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993*, 111. Even attempts at unity between individual poles failed, as former ANM leader Abu Adnan (Abd al-Karim Hamad) recounts: “We first met Yasser Arafat in 1964. At that time he had no mass support, but he asked us to coordinate the action of Fatah and the ANM. We agreed, on the condition we could agree on a common political programme. Yasser Arafat then said it was not worth the bother, and that the problem was one of joint armed action, ‘blood unity,’ as he put it. The negotiations failed.” Gresh, *The PLO: The Struggle within, Towards an Independent Palestinian State*, 24.

207 Nasser and Shuqayrī’s reputations as fiery speakers certainly did not hurt this charge.

208 “Fatah, *Tahrir Al-Aqta al-Muhtalla Wa Uslub Al-Kifah Al-Musallah Dud Al-Istimar Al-Mubashir (Liberation of the Occupied Lands and the Method of Armed Struggle against Direct Occupation)*, 11-12. This stance was confirmed by subsequent documents, which list “To mobilize the masses for their participation in the revolution” as the most important of “the main aims and objectives of the political struggle.” ———, *Political and Armed Struggle*, 9.

In addition to the desire to employ outbidding, or *muzayada* in Arabic, Fatah consciously sought to chain-gang the rest of the movement and the Arab states into war with Israel. As Khaled al-Hasan reiterated in two separate interviews:

Fatah wanted to liberate Palestine "though action and reaction, action and reaction."²¹⁰ "Our military action provokes an Israeli reaction against our people, who then become involved [in the struggle] and are supported by the Arab masses. This extends the circle of conflict and compels the Arab governments either to join us or stand against us. [Opposing us] means to diverge from their own people, who will then be transformed from a supportive role into an active one [on our side]. The cycle affects the evolution of Arab policy and has further international repercussions, and so feeds back to influence the central sphere [that is, Palestine]."²¹¹

Fatah had not originally planned to use violence at this point, but after the emergence of the PLO and PLA, its leadership was concerned about the survival of the group and argued that "intensifying the military bases and starting operations may limit the crumbling [of membership]."²¹² Therefore, Fatah decided to launch the ‘armed struggle’ on January 1, 1965.²¹³

Despite their relatively meager beginnings, which included a raid thwarted by the Lebanese and faulty explosive charges placed in the Israeli National Water Carrier, Fatah claimed over 80 attacks against Israel in the first nine months.²¹⁴ The attacks involved laying mines on roads, canals, and rail lines, as well strikes against power stations and security outposts. The attacks increased Fatah’s organizational strength, as Hasan explained: “The real increase, the

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²¹² Ibid., 102.
²¹⁴ The Israeli National Water Carrier was a symbolic target, in that the Arab Summit was convened in 1964 specifically to craft an Arab response to the project, which carried water from the Sea of Galilee to southern Israel. Fatah’s attempt attempts to strike at the Water Carrier were thus a shot across the bow to the anemic, ineffectual response of the Arab regimes to such an unpopular project. The Israelis counted fewer than 80 attacks, likely due to a combination of different measurement standards, knowledge, and exaggeration by Fatah, but still noted 35 attacks by the end of the year. Yaari, *Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah*, 76, Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993*, 107-108, Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, 172.
real support that comes from the people, and permanently, started in ’65 when we started our military action. Then the people realized that we were not just another movement, talking like the others.”

Competing Palestinian organizations and the Arab regimes immediately took notice. “Arab representatives on the Mixed Armistice Commissions meeting in January 1966 demanded an end to activities by al-Asifah [Fatah] on grounds of their being ineffective, jeopardizing the peace prematurely, causing Israeli reprisals, and antagonizing world opinion.” The ANM’s immediate response to Fatah’s first attack was that it was counterproductive and that it “aims to entangle Nasser in a battle for which he is not prepared.” The PLO also denounced the raids, as Shuqayri said, “Only the Palestinian Liberation Army can authorize any Palestinian military operation. The PLA alone is responsible for the military enlistment of the Palestinian people for the liberation of occupied Palestine.” Shuqayri resolved with the PLO executive committee to stop Fatah’s attacks “whether through gentle words and promises or with threats.” His meeting with Fatah was a failure, however, demonstrating how little leverage Palestinian poles had over each other in an anarchical, multipolar movement in which direct infighting was rare.

The most interesting aspect of the initial responses of Fatah’s rivals to its attacks is not that they were nearly 100% correct, which they were, but rather that despite their accuracy, the ANM, the PLO, and the Arab regimes would find themselves outbidding with Fatah in short order and chain-ganged into the very conflict they claimed should be avoided just two years

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218 Yaari, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah, 63.
219 Ibid., 71.
later.\textsuperscript{220} This demonstrates that foreknowledge and subsequent learning of the pitfalls of competition and the paradox of non-state violence alone cannot prevent groups in multipolar movements from succumbing to its deleterious effects.

Despite their public denunciations, privately, the ANM and others could not help but recognize the increased support given to Fatah, and the stark contrast the attacks created in comparison to their own inaction. The impact was palpable. Potential ANM recruits were joining Fatah, and current ANM members were defecting, as former ANM leader Abd al-Karim Hamad explained: “From 1965 onwards, we were explaining to our militants that we must wait, that we must train, and so on. Then we saw that our militants were joining Fatah. Because of the rightist leadership of the ANM [i.e. George Habash], we lost a historic opportunity.”\textsuperscript{221} It was not just fighters, but also funding that followed violence. Donations were often explicitly tied to evidence of attacks, as was the case with Kuwaiti and Algerian donors before Fatah’s first attack.\textsuperscript{222}

The ANM was certainly not morally opposed to violence: they had discussed launching attacks against the Israelis at a meeting of their executive committee in 1960, and could plausibly be labeled an armed group by 1962-63, when over one hundred of their members underwent military training with the Egyptians, who also provided the group with weapons.\textsuperscript{223} The ANM came closer to initiating violence with the emergence of the PLO in 1964, which threatened their position just as it threatened Fatah. Due to a combination of their ties to Nasser and, most importantly, their position as still the strongest group at the time, however, they decided to hold

\textsuperscript{220} Indeed, the few Fatah members in attendance at the second PNC told the press that they wanted “To entangle the Arab nations in a war with Israel.” Ibid.

\textsuperscript{221} Gresh, \textit{The Plo: The Struggle within, Towards an Independent Palestinian State}, 24.


\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., 78.
off, although an increasing number of their members called for attacks. Once Fatah started using violence and peeling away ANM members, they could no longer remain on the sidelines.

In mid-1966, the ANM decided to form a commando group, Abtal Al-Awda (Heroes of Return), in cooperation with a few anti-Shuqayri members of the PLO, although the ANM largely controlled the group. Abtal al-Awda launched its first attack on October 19, 1966, followed by seven more between December 1966 and June 1967. These attacks were enough to demonstrate ANM support for armed struggle, but they were still dwarfed by those of Fatah, who claimed five times as many attacks during the same period, not to mention the hundreds more from the previous two years. Nonetheless, the ANM actions contributed to the ramping up of attacks by multiple organizations that preceded the 1967 war. The JCP did not get involved this round, but smaller groups like the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) and Palestinian National Liberation Front (PNLF) did, contributing to the upsurge in violent competition and revealing the lack of any dominant pole or alliance of poles to direct the action. The increase in violence even spurred Shuqayri in mid-1967 to start claiming (falsely) that the PLO had been

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224 The ANM did launch some nonviolent reconnaissance missions into Israel late in 1964 to try to assuage their more militant members. They lost their first ‘martyr’ to Jordanian border patrols, but did not publish information about the operation until years later. Ibid., 110-111.

225 It is worth noting that similar outbidding and chain-ganging dynamics occurred with leading Arab states: “Syria exploited the dilemma in which Nasser constantly found himself: On the one hand, Egypt wished to avoid a deteriorating military situation—but on the other hand, the Egyptian army would have had to intervene if Syria would have been beaten by Israel.” Yaari, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah, 93.

226 The key players were anti-Shuqayri PLO members Shafiq al-Hut and PLA chief of staff Wajih al-Madani, along with ANM’s Ahmad al-Yamani. Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, 87.


228 The PLF (Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya) was formed in 1959 by junior Palestinian officers in the Syrian army led by Ahmad Jibril. Jibril’s group of 150 members was briefly absorbed into Fatah in 1965 and helped carry out a number of attacks, but they were forced out by Arafat and Wazir in 1966 after squabbles over control. The PLF went on to launch attacks of its own starting in October 1966, although largely under Syrian control. Yaari, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah, 100-101. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 125. Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, 60. The PNLF was “a broadly pro-Nasser group founded by Ahmad al-Sa’di at the end of the 1950s.” Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 135.
funding the Fatah attacks, and to note the PLO’s support for such violence, despite the groups’ concerns about entanglement with Israel.229

The increasing tempo of attacks brought harsh Israeli reprisals, which also started with small raids before increasing to major attacks, like that at the village of Sammu in Jordan in November 1966. The Israeli attacks increased tensions between Israel and its Syrian, Jordanian, and Egyptian neighbors, especially as Nasser and the Syrians started to more openly support the Palestinian raids by 1967.230 Most importantly, Palestinian attacks helped spark the crisis that led to the Six Day War: the April 1967 Israeli air raid against Syria, which included 171 sorties and the downing of six Syrian Migs inside Syrian and Jordanian territory.231 As William Quandt confirmed, “Syrian-sponsored raids by the commandos into northern Israel were the immediate cause for the crisis that triggered the Six Day war.”232 Based on new analysis of Israeli archives, Ami Gluska concurs: “If there is one factor which seemingly may be isolated and regarded as the main catalyst for the escalation which led to the Six Day War, it is the guerrilla activities of the Palestinian organizations.”233 The 1967 war was a well-documented disaster for the Palestinians.

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230 Indicative of the earlier attacks were the April 29, 1966 Israeli raids on the Jordanian village of Qal’at and the village of Hirbet Rafa near Hebron, in which the Israelis destroyed 28 houses and killed 11 Jordanian civilians. Ami Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces, and Defence Policy, 1963-1967 (New York: Routledge, 2007), 72. Like the Palestinians and Arab states, the Israelis were not immune from launching attacks that escalated tensions, but which IDF chief of staff Yitzhak Rabin knew beforehand would not achieve the Israeli objectives of eliminating Fatah or its allies. “The IDF often acted in ways which promoted escalation, and were at odds with the supreme objective of the security policy: prevention of war.” Instead, these actions were often taken to assuage the public that wanted the IDF to ‘do something,’ but whose government wanted to avoid large-scale confrontation at the time. Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces, and Defence Policy, 1963-1967, 107.
The Israelis took control of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians became refugees (some for the second time), the Arab armies were routed, and the Palestinian armed groups fared little better. The outcome cannot be understood as anything but a strategic failure, and one to which the use of violence by Palestinian armed groups directly contributed.

The competitive, multipolar social movement played a clear, dominant role in the use and effectiveness of violence by Palestinian armed groups. Fatah used violence in response to the emergence of the rival PLO at a time when it was not prepared or planning to do so. The ANM, the PLO, and Nasser himself eventually launched attacks or publicly supported them, despite initially denouncing them and noting their counterproductive nature, all due to concerns over the strength of their organization (or regime, in Nasser's case). A textbook case of outbidding and chain-ganging resulted, against the wishes of the vast majority of the actors, which led to false optimism and a strategically unsuccessful campaign.234

The most prominent competing argument, namely that ideology drove variation in the use of violence, performs poorly. Fatah supported the concept of armed struggle since its founding, but it didn’t use violence until the threat to its organizational survival emerged in 1964. A similar argument can be made for the ANM and PLO, who used violence when they felt threatened by Fatah, not due to some ideological change. In each case, one cannot explain a variable with a constant. Even the JCP, whose ideology did not favor violence, eventually joined the armed struggle due to the competition within the multipolar movement, as we shall see in the next section.

234 It is worth noting that Fatah’s strategy could therefore be considered more successful than the structuralist theory allows, if the focus was not on the ultimate outcome of the campaign but rather on whether violence successfully led to the next desired step in the strategic chain.
This scenario—in which multipolarity driven by groups’ positions in the hierarchy led to violence that was counterproductive for the movement—would repeat itself in the aftermath of the Six Day War: different landscape, different roles, same internal distribution of power, same result.

**The More Things Change, The More They Remain the Same: Violence in a Post-1967 World**

*1965 Redux: The ‘Popular Struggle’ in the West Bank*

The Six Day War permanently altered the landscape in the Middle East. Israel tripled the size of the territory it controlled, taking significant chunks of land from every one of its neighbors except Lebanon, who had remained neutral. The Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian militaries were significantly weakened in the fighting, which left Israel in a dominant position in the region. Nasser, previously the unquestioned leader of the Arab world, tried briefly to resign from the presidency of Egypt and was severely diminished. 300,000 Palestinians became refugees, some for the second time, as they moved into the West Bank, Gaza and surrounding Arab states. All of these developments would significantly impact aspects of the Palestinian national movement in the following decades, as Palestinian organizations would now operate in new territories, with new rules, amidst a shifting set of potential enemies and allies.

Despite some organizational gains for Fatah between 1965-67, however, the Six Day War and the preceding campaign did not fundamentally alter either the polarity or the hierarchy of the Palestinian national movement. Nasser and Hussein’s claims to leadership may have been weakened, but Fatah still found itself in a multipolar movement in which the PLO, ANM, and JCP emerged from the war intact, with the PLO still the leader in a tight race, if largely by default. Although the PLO and ANM took a hit among the base for their ties to the Arab regimes,
Fatah’s role in sparking what they claimed would be a successful war did them few favors with their supporters, state or civilian. Finally, the movement was not unified, as the poles could reach no agreement to come together, under the PLO umbrella or otherwise. The post-Six Day War period thus represents a ‘most different system’ comparison with the pre-Six Day War period, as so much of the political landscape changed, while the polarity and hierarchy of the Palestinian national movement stayed the same. As predicted by the structuralist theory, the same dynamics of politically ineffective uses of non-state violence and strategic failures were the result, in this case for two separate campaigns.

Just two days after the war ended, Fatah’s leadership met in Damascus to survey the situation and determine their next course of action. Fatah’s objectives and its progress in achieving them remained the same. It still wanted to liberate all of Palestine and lead the national movement, but had thus far failed at both. The group’s entanglement strategy had not yielded the desired result either from a strategic or organizational perspective. Nonetheless, Fatah saw few other ways to distinguish itself from the PLO, ANM, and JCP and win back Palestine, and so again decided that the (re)launch of armed struggle was the best way to accomplish both objectives simultaneously. The main thing that the Six Day War did change was the location where Fatah would launch that struggle. With Israel now in control of over 1 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, Fatah believed it had the necessary conditions for a ‘popular struggle’ inside Palestine in the tradition of the insurgencies in Algeria, China, and Vietnam, as opposed to their cross-border raids of 1965-1967.

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235 See Iyad, My Home, My Land, 88.
236 This time Fatah proclaimed that “We are planning to operate far from the Arab states so that they will not suffer Israeli reprisals for fedayeen actions.” The importance of organizational survival is prominent here, since Fatah did not operate from Syria because the Syrians told Fatah they would eliminate them if they did. After their organization got rolled up in the West Bank, they started to launch attacks from Jordan and later Lebanon without batting an eyelash. Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999, 365. Yaari, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah, 124-125. The 660,000 Palestinians in the West Bank and 400,000 in Gaza provided a potential
Yasser Arafat infiltrated the West Bank with a number of Fatah cadres in mid-June, and
the organization launched its first attacks at the end of August. It followed those up
with thirteen attacks in September, ten in October, eighteen in November, and twenty in December.

From the outset, the use of violence mobilized support. Over four hundred volunteers flew in
from Europe, and Fatah trained thousands of recruits in Syria in the second half of 1967.

Fatah’s early launch was also driven in part by its desire to prevent a deal that would establish a
Palestinian state on part of the territory, which would have been struck with Arab regimes or
West Bank Palestinians in the aftermath of the war. Fatah did this not simply because it did not
like the deal, but also because it would be cut out of it by the PLO or others. Fatah thus desired
to simultaneously outbid other Palestinian armed groups, spoil initiatives by local Palestinians,
and coerce the Israelis, all of which had one thing in common: they were designed to benefit
Fatah’s organizational ends.

Having experienced the problems that result from the uncoordinated use of violence
within a social movement, the ANM met with Fatah in mid-July to ensure that the post-Six Day
War period would not be a repeat of the pre-war period. The two groups even came to an
agreement on this issue, supported by the PLO, with all consenting to hold off on attacks until

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237 Fatah, Political and Armed Struggle, 31-32.
operations during this period, including attacks on police officers, kibbutzim, military trains, arms depots, and
energy infrastructure. Fatah, Political and Armed Struggle, 33.
239 By this time, Fatah considered itself the largest Palestinian organization, although the PLO, ANM and JCP would
have debated that claim. In any case, Fatah may have closed the gap, but it was not head and shoulders ahead of
others in terms of group size and strength. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian
National Movement, 1949-1993, 158, 162. Some Israeli Arabs joined Fatah, but they were still a trickle compared to
the refugees. Among Palestinians in Israel, 39% thought Fatah’s attacks were successful, compared to 28% who
thought they failed and 33% who didn’t know or refused to reply. Yaari, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah, 141.
240 This was not out of the realm of possibility, as later PLO chairman Yahya Hammuda intimated it. Sayigh, Armed
Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 176. It is further instructive in
this regard that the only Palestinians Fatah targeted for death during this period were West Bank leaders who called
In a shining example of the ‘the tragedy of multipolar social movements,’ the best of intentions were thwarted by the inherently competitive environment. As before, Fatah jumped the gun, in part to get an organizational upper hand, and as before, the ANM and PLO were forced to revise their plans and employ violence earlier than desired to prevent the loss of their positions in the hierarchy.

Soon after Fatah’s first attack, ANM leaders came to the realization that they were losing out on both recruits and funding to their rival. Would-be ANM members joined Fatah or Ahmed Jibril’s smaller PLF because they were the only groups that had training camps and were fighting.\(^{242}\) By mid-October 1967, the ANM had a hard time getting donations from the public without carrying out guerrilla attacks.\(^{243}\) In November 1967, Ahmad Khalifa, a member of the ANM’s central command, summed it up by saying, “the battle might start without us...Fatah and Jibril will be the only ones to reap the credit...and that will finish us.”\(^{244}\) The ANM leadership instructed its cadres to initiate attacks despite their lack of adequate preparation.\(^{245}\) The first attack, a failed operation against Ben Gurion airport on December 11, came the same day as the ANM announced the formation of a new organization that was to serve as Fatah’s main rival for the next two decades: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The PFLP was created from the Palestinian branch of the ANM, led by George Habash, as well as Jibril’s PLF.

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\(^{242}\) Ibid., 164.

\(^{243}\) Ibid., 165-166. See International Documents on Palestine, 723-726

\(^{244}\) Ibid., 166.

\(^{245}\) As the former ANM leadership noted, “Were the conditions right to begin the resistance or not? The answer to this question determined the development that happened to the resistance, or the path that it is currently taking. The conditions were not completely ready to start an organized, deep-rooted, far-sighted resistance. Only one condition out of all of those was right, and it was the condition of the presence of the enemy.” The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, *Kitab Al-Hadaf, Al-Fikr Al-Askari Lil-Jabha (Military Doctrine of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine)* (Beirut, Lebanon: 1970), 7.
the Heroes of Return, and Nayef Hawatmeh's Vengeance Youth. The ANM, which made up the bulk of the new organization, had joined with the PLF and Heroes of Return in part because of their demonstrated readiness and skill in launching attacks, which they had started again following Fatah's second launch.

Unfortunately for the ANM, Fatah, and other Palestinian groups, the lack of preparation and coordination doomed the attempt to launch a 'popular struggle' in the West Bank to a swift, costly end. Fighters' cursory training, inadequate weapons, and lack of experience with proper operational security allowed the Israelis to quickly roll up Palestinian networks. The Israelis arrested over 1,000 Palestinians in the West Bank by January 1968, including the majority of the Fatah and PFLP members involved in launching attacks. There were only six attacks in January, and the groups were forced to admit the campaign was a failure before moving their headquarters across the border to Jordan.

The campaign in the second half of 1967 had indeed been a clear strategic failure. It was, at best, a small success organizationally for Fatah, as they had gained thousands of more members and supporters, although many of those were in prison or killed at the campaign's conclusion. It is important to point out that a unipolar (or unified) Palestinian movement was unlikely to emerge victorious against the far stronger Israeli state in this scenario. With a non-competitive environment internally and a unified effort, however, the Palestinians could have opted to focus on concerted, non-violent tactics like boycotts and protests or pursued a deal for a separate Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. If they had opted for violence, it likely would have been better coordinated and planned (or else not started in the first place), and was unlikely to have been so quickly rolled up by Israelis with nothing to show for it. With the

248 Ibid., 143.
polarity and hierarchy still largely unchanged at the campaign’s conclusion, this story was to repeat itself, albeit with slight changes, once again.

*Karameh and the Ascendance of Fatah*

As their networks were being methodically destroyed by the Israelis in the West Bank, Palestinian armed groups started to shift their bases of operations to Jordan in early 1968. King Hussein welcomed them with open arms in public, even if privately he was seriously concerned about entanglement with Israel and the potential challenge the groups posed to his own regime. By early 1968, Fatah had 500 guerrillas in the Jordan Valley, with the PFLP maintaining another 300-400. Wanting to get involved in the fighting itself, but unable to work with the ANM, Heroes of Return or PLF (who were now all in the PFLP), the PLO announced the creation of its own guerrilla branch in early March, the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF/PLA). The guerrillas collectively launched 46 attacks across the border against Israeli targets in January and February, with Fatah leading the way. As the rate increased to 36 attacks in March, Israel decided to launch a reprisal raid to knock out the guerillas’ headquarters and send a message to Hussein. The Palestinian response to the raid demonstrated that non-state violence could have clear, significant, positive organizational effects, even if in the longer term the continued competition within the movement would inhibit strategic gains.

Although group size serves a rough indicator of the strength of these competing organizations, it is important to recognize that the Palestinian movement happened to have an

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249 Hussein’s actions were a good example of the dynamics of multiple audiences, as he had to simultaneously cater to the massive ethnically Palestinian population in his country (and their supporters), while at the same time maintain his own regime and quell concerns of some ethnic Jordanians and Bedouin who increasingly viewed the Palestinian refugees with concern. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993*, 177.

250 Ibid.
alternative proxy for helping to determine both the hierarchy and the polarity of the movement: the Palestinian National Council (PNC). If we recall, the PNC was the central decision-making body of the PLO, and was ideally supposed to represent all Palestinians. Although the representatives to the PNC were originally intended to be elected, obstacles thrown up by Arab regimes and the groups themselves prevented that from happening for decades. Nonetheless, when groups were included in the PLO, the distribution of seats allocated to them was a good estimator of their relative strength.

Competing groups had the most knowledge of their membership totals, funding, arms, popular support and attacks launched (as well as those of their rivals), and could use this information to haggle over their seat distribution. Therefore, if a group entered the PLO and took its seats, their number represented a figure agreed upon by the group itself and its peers of that group’s relative power. The problem, of course, comes when groups cannot agree on how many seats a group should have, in which case the group may opt to not attend the upcoming PNC, thus depriving observers of potential information. Groups both inside and outside the PLO had an incentive to get a deal done, however, as those inside understood that the legitimacy of the PNC decreased with the quality and quantity of groups outside, and groups outside understood that their legality and influence within the movement could decrease if they failed to join, especially as the percentage of groups inside grew.251 Even if a group decided not to join, details of negotiations can provide a range of potential values discussed by the various factions, which yields insight into the group’s strength. The fact that the PNC convened roughly once a year (and more often amidst crises) provides helpful insight into the evolution of the hierarchy and polarity of the Palestinian national movement.

251 These considerations played a major role in Fatah’s strategy surrounding its entry into the PLO, analyzed at the conclusion of this section.
As previously discussed, the first PNC was dominated by pre-1948 Palestinian elites largely approved of by Nasser and Hussein. Twelve Fatah members attended the first PNC in May 1964 and several more went to the second PNC in May 1965 as individuals, but the two sides could not reach a deal on seat distribution for Fatah’s formal inclusion. Before the third PNC convened in May 1966, Shuqayri met with Fatah leaders in Beirut to discuss the possibility of Fatah joining the PLO. Demonstrating their mutual desire to lead the movement, Fatah demanded two-thirds of the seats on the PNC’s Executive Committee and, predictably, Shuqayri refused. Therefore, from 1965-1967, the PLO’s ‘Old Guard’ had a stranglehold on the organization, but knew it increasingly lacked legitimacy due to its exclusion of Fatah, the ANM, and the JCP.

By the run-up to the fourth PNC in the summer of 1968, there had been two key changes. First, the leading guerrilla groups had raised their stature and relative strength to the point that the PLO leadership increasingly realized they would not simply fade away, but rather would have to be brought into the PNC if it were to remain relevant. Second, the leadership of the PLA, Palestinian unions, and Palestinian National Fund forced Shuqayri out as head of the PLO/PNC at the end of 1967. The final straw was Shuqayri’s false public claim that the PLO was leading

\[252\] Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics*, 30. Yaari, *Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah*, 70. There are some slight discrepancies in the number of Fatah members believed to be at the first PNC, likely due to a) Fatah’s position as a clandestine organization b) uncertainty over whether individuals who were later to become Fatah members were in Fatah at the time of the PNC. Sayigh claims there were 15-20 Fatah members in attendance, Nigel Parsons claims 7. In any case, the fact that Fatah members had zero seats on the executive committee and, at most, 20 of 422 seats, reveals that both their invitation and acceptance were a formality, not denoting true entry into the PLO. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993*, 101. Nigel Parsons, *The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 347.

the armed struggle and actually launching the attacks perpetrated by Fatah and the PFLP, which threatened to delegitimize the organization beyond repair.\textsuperscript{254} 

The leadership of Fatah, the PFLP, and other guerrilla organizations met in Beirut with Shuqayri's replacement as the head of the PLO, Yahya Hammuda, on March 17, 1968 to negotiate over seat distribution at the fourth PNC. Fatah demonstrated concern over a unified, but not unipolar, PLO, albeit not in so many words. Fatah worried that strategy by consensus would be unwieldy, yet the group resisted internal calls for physical elimination of other parties to achieve dominance.\textsuperscript{255} After extensive discussions, all groups tentatively agreed to a 50/50 split between the PLO 'Old Guard' on the one hand and all of the guerrilla groups on the other.\textsuperscript{256} Thus, the 'Old Guard' would remain the strongest single bloc, but Fatah and the PFLP would each garner a significant chunk of seats on the council.\textsuperscript{257} The events of the days following the negotiations would change the hierarchy of the movement forever.

The Israelis decided to launch a raid on the guerrillas' headquarters at Karameh, a village in the Jordan Valley just a few miles from the border, in order to weaken them at a time when their cross-border attacks against Israel were increasing steadily. The Israelis aimed to send a strong message, and so deployed the equivalent of an armored brigade, an infantry brigade, a parachute battalion, an engineer battalion, and five battalions of artillery for the task.\textsuperscript{258} Interestingly enough, the Palestinians and Jordanians acquired advanced knowledge of the

\textsuperscript{254} Ibid., 171-172, 204. To those who would argue that the 1967 war was the key factor in the shift, it is important to note that the PLO didn't force out Shuqayri right after war, but rather at the end of the next major campaign. To those who argue that it was the leadership change at the top, it is worth noting that Fatah presented Shuqayri's replacement, Yahya Hammuda, with a unity deal that involved Fatah all but taking over the PLO soon after his ascension. Hammuda may have been Shuqayri's polar opposite in manner and speech, but like his predecessor, he declined Fatah's proposal, which was a similar deal to that offered to Shuqayri before the third PNC. \textit{———, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah}, 207.

\textsuperscript{255} Laws of Peoples War, 845

\textsuperscript{256} Al-Hurriya April 8, 1968


impending attack, leaving them with a difficult decision: fight or flight? The PFLP leadership argued that with such a massive force arrayed against them, the correct strategy was to withdraw and live to fight again under more favorable circumstances. Arafat and the Fatah leadership disagreed, deciding to stand and fight the Israeli onslaught despite the asymmetry. The PFLP withdrew its members in disgust, while a smaller deployment of the PLF/PLA remained alongside Fatah. Importantly, the Jordanians deployed much of their 1st Infantry Division along bridges and key points around Karama in preparation for the attack, with most of its artillery massed around the heights near the village.

The battle itself was a total military success for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). After attacking the three main bridges, the IDF crossed the Jordan River in the early morning of March 21. By mid-day they had entered Karama, destroyed most of its houses, killed 100 Palestinian guerrillas, captured 128 more, and then returned to Israel in the evening. The Palestinian losses were grievous, as they represented over half of Fatah's full-time fighters in the area. Politically, however, Karama was a smashing Palestinian success. In the course of the battle, the Israeli press reported that the IDF had suffered twenty killed and ninety wounded, as well as the loss of four tanks, two armored cars, and one airplane (subsequent estimates suggested even higher losses). Although the exchange rate had been favorable to the Israelis, the fact that they had suffered significant losses and withdrawn under fire created an image of determined, powerful

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259 There is a debate over whether information about the raid came from Fatah's own intelligence unit, Jordanian intelligence, or via the CIA, which was plausible given that the U.S. government was against the attack and had tried to convince the Israelis to withhold it. In either case, it is clear that the Jordanians and guerrillas had advanced knowledge of the raid. Ibid. Abu Iyad p. 57 Yaari, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah, 353.

260 Ibid. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 178. Other historian have argued that there were greater numbers of fedayeen based in Karama, with Benny Morris suggesting 900 fighters. In any case, the guerrillas were severely outgunned by a foe whose armored columns, air force, and paratroopers would be met largely by guerrillas with small arms that still, according to the most generous estimates of Palestinians, were outnumbered by over 5:1. Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999, 368.


262 Trevor Dupuy argues that the IDF suffered 30-40 killed, more than 100 wounded, 20 tanks destroyed or damaged, 15 armored vehicles destroyed or damaged, one aircraft shot down and several damaged. Ibid., 354.
Palestinian *fedayeen* that were willing to stand up and bloody the noses of the IDF that seemed so invincible in the Six Day War.

The Jordanians were far from pleased with this perception, as they claimed that it had in fact been their artillery that knocked out the Israeli tanks, which were then paraded through the streets of Jordanian cities and Palestinian refugee camps as war trophies. Nonetheless, the impact of Karameh on the organizational strength of Palestinian armed groups was immediate and enormous. One Palestinian teenager described his reaction as follows: “When the news of Karameh came over the radio, all of the students and teachers ran out and celebrated in the streets for the rest of the afternoon. We were all proud to be Palestinians that day, and we were proud of the *fedayeen* who had done what the Arab armies could not do less than a year earlier against the Israelis.” Soon after, this teenager, Jibril Rajoub, joined Fatah, and would decades later become Arafat’s head of security in the West Bank.

Rajoub’s story was indicative of thousands of Palestinians around the world, as Salah Khalaf claimed that Fatah had 5,000 Palestinians attempt to join Fatah within 48 hours after Karameh. By May, Fatah claimed it had been approached by 20,000 would-be recruits in Egypt and 1,500 per week in Iraq. Although Fatah could not accommodate even close to these numbers, the group nonetheless tripled in size by June, with the surge further revealing the extensive popular support for the now public organization. Financial contributions “poured in from Palestinian circles” after Karameh, and the support for the guerrillas in Jordan and beyond forced King Hussein, against his own wishes, to give them more control to set up bases and

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263 The Jordanians certainly suffered as well: 61 dead, 108 wounded, 13 tanks destroyed, 20 tanks damaged, 39 vehicles damaged or destroyed. Ibid.
264 Jibril Rajoub, Interview with author, July 2009.
266 Ibid.
launch raids from his territory. The popular tide even washed over to other groups like the PLF/PLA and PFLP. Fatah, who had fought—unlike the PFLP—and led—unlike the PLF/PLA—received the majority of the support, however.

The history of the PNC tells an even starker story. Having negotiated seat distribution just four days before Karameh, the groups assembled just weeks afterward to renegotiate, as Fatah claimed that the old agreement no longer reflected the new reality. Ultimately, Fatah agreed to a compromise in which the PLO ‘Old Guard’ would maintain its 50 seats, but Fatah and its supporters would receive 38 of the 50 guerrilla seats, with the PFLP, who had fled Karameh, being forced to accept only 10. It is worth noting that even though the PFLP was forced to accept fewer seats due to the fallout from its actions at Karameh, 10% of the total seats was still a significant amount (equal to half of the PLA seats) that would not have been achieved without its previous devotion to the armed struggle. Nonetheless, the PFLP’s dissatisfaction with its seat total led it to continue its boycott of the PNC, which only strengthened Fatah’s position.

Given the short time-span between PNC negotiations and the lack of other significant events in the interim (not to mention the surges in membership and funding), Karameh demonstrates beyond any doubt the potential organizational effectiveness of non-state violence when it is employed against an unpopular enemy. Fatah was barely thwarted in its attempt to take over the PLO at the 4th PNC in July, 1968. Its use of violence and group strength continued

269 Even though the PFLP felt that it deserved more than 10 seats, it was clear that it did not think itself as strong as Fatah in subsequent PNCs (even if it thought it should still be the rightful leader). In later negotiations, the PFLP demanded 15 seats, the same as second pole Saiqa, but no more, which was slightly less than half of Fatah at the time. See Quandt 32.
to rise in the aftermath of Karameh, however, and it won a majority of the executive committee seats at the 5th PNC just over half a year later in February of 1969. Yasser Arafat was duly elected chairman, confirming Fatah’s rise to the top of the hierarchy in the Palestinian national movement. The ‘Old Guard’ of the PLO was the biggest loser, as its coalition fractured between PLO and PLA ‘independents,’ many of whom now threw in their lot with one of the guerrilla organizations. The movement remained multipolar, but the main rivalry would now be between Fatah, the newly minted #1, and the PFLP, which saw itself as the rival pole that should be the rightful leader.

In one of the movement’s most significant ‘what if’ moments, Fatah decided to enter the PLO along with other armed groups, instead of keeping them out in an attempt to marginalize them. Observers and participants at the time and in retrospect have expressed surprise, given that it seemed Fatah had a chance to pursue true unipolar dominance by 1969. It was not a selfless act, however, but rather Fatah’s concern for its own organizational standing that likely drove this decision. Fatah was worried that if many armed groups remained outside the PLO, one or more of them could do to Fatah what Fatah had done to the PLO ‘Old Guard,’ namely delegitimize them as Arab state pawns of the status quo. We will never know if that or the reverse—a reinvigorated and unconstrained Fatah successfully marginalizing its rivals outside the PLO—would have happened, but in any case, Fatah ascendance brought hierarchical change, but no shift in polarity, to predictable results.

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Footnotes:

270 Four of the eleven executive committee members were Fatah representatives, with three other ‘independents’ being pro-Fatah. Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, 91-92.


272 As Quandt notes, of the fifteen nationalists of the ‘Old Guard’ in the first executive committee of the PNC, only six held important positions within the PLO by 1968-1969. Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, 91.

273 Ironically, ensuring the continued multipolarity of the movement maintained the ‘buyers market’ for Arab states looking to meddle in Palestinian affairs.
Black September: New Roles, Same Outcome

Karameh helped drive a massive increase in the strength of Palestinian armed groups. Even though Fatah benefitted disproportionately, its new position was not as a dominant group in a unipolar movement, but rather as the new leader of a movement that still had four competing poles that were not unified. Based on the structuralist theory, the multipolarity of the movement leads to a prediction of continued outbidding and chain-ganging that yield strategically ineffective uses of violence, as in earlier campaigns, despite the increased overall strength of the movement. The new hierarchy within the movement, however, does lead to different predictions of which group was likely to initiate the chain-ganging and outbidding (the PFLP) and which group was increasingly likely to restrain it (Fatah).

The number of Palestinians mobilized into armed groups post-Karameh was even more impressive when considered on a percentage basis. As William Quandt notes: “The manpower base for military recruitment probably did not exceed fifty to seventy-five thousand; of these, perhaps twenty thousand were full-time commandos by the fall of 1970 and another twenty thousand were members of the popular militia.” The Palestinians were still far weaker than their Israeli adversary, but strong enough vis-à-vis King Hussein as to make the achievement of certain strategic objectives in Jordan a possibility. In a collective sense then, violence had been organizationally successful, as the movement was far stronger in rough, aggregate measures. However, internally the movement remained as divided as ever. Fatah was now the clear leader,

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274 Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, 76. Fuad Jabber claims there were up to 100,000 male refugees aged 15-45 in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon receiving UNRWA rations in 1967, but argues that the true available manpower was likely lower. Many of these men had to support their families or were not physically fit to fight. Of course, the armed groups recruited predominantly but not exclusively from the refugee population, so the potential manpower base was likely a bit higher. ———, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, 177-178.
with around 3,500 fighters in Jordan by the summer of 1969.\textsuperscript{275} The other strong poles were the PFLP, PLF/PLA, and Saiqa, who each had about 1,200 fighters in Jordan at that time, although each also had significant concentrations of guerrillas based elsewhere, be it in Gaza (PFLP and PLF/PLA), Syria (Saiqa) or Egypt (PLF/PLA).\textsuperscript{276}

Saiqa (or, more formally, Vanguards of Popular Liberation War-Thunderbolt Forces) had been officially founded in 1965, but was inactive until Syria decided to prop up the group in 1968 instead of simply supporting Fatah or the ANM/PFLP, who were becoming increasingly independent.\textsuperscript{277} Saiqa did not therefore follow the path of most other groups, in that it was largely a wholesale creation of the Syrian Baath Party and remained almost entirely beholden to it. Nonetheless, other groups welcomed Saiqa as a full member of the movement, even though many of its members were not Palestinian and it was not an independent entity.\textsuperscript{278}

The collective strength and popularity of the guerrillas among Jordan’s population were such that King Hussein was forced to recognize their ‘state-within-a-state’ in his country, despite his accurate perception of the threat they posed to his own regime as well as his designs on ruling the Palestinians himself. In the Jordan Valley and later in major cities and refugee camps, the guerrillas groups set up their own recruiting centers, courts, and roadblocks, while outfitting their vehicles with special license plates.\textsuperscript{279} Furthermore, youths were allowed to avoid mandatory conscription in the Jordanian army if they joined a Palestinian guerrilla group, which revealed

\textsuperscript{276} Ibid., 181-182. There were over ten other mid-size to small guerrilla groups functioning at the time, including the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) which was formed when Jibril split from the PFLP. Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, \textit{The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism}, 62-63.
\textsuperscript{278} Indeed, Saiqa was the first of the top groups to enter the executive committee of PLO with Fatah in February 1969, where they stayed until they sided with Syria against the other Palestinian groups in the Lebanese civil war. Gresh, \textit{The Plo: The Struggle within, Towards an Independent Palestinian State}, 39. However, even though Saiqa may have had more fighters than the PFLP, the latter’s Palestinian make-up, history, and independence gave it as much influence, if not more, within the movement. Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, \textit{The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism}, 64.
\textsuperscript{279} Yaari, \textit{Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah}, 249.
the depth of their influence. Nonetheless, the movement remained multipolar, and the refusal of the PFLP and, at times, the PLA to take their PNC seats within the PLO ensured the movement would remain divided as well. This leads us to predict continued outbidding and chain-ganging, this time initiated by the PFLP and restrained by Fatah, because the former was now the weakened pole and the latter was now the strengthened leader.

The massive increase in the size of the armed groups not surprisingly helped yield an increase in their attacks on Israel. In 1968, there were 77 fedayeen attacks per month, followed by 214 per month in 1969 and 319 attacks per month in early 1970.280 These were increasingly cross-border shellings of Israeli positions, as deep infiltration became more difficult and deadly for the guerrillas. Israeli casualty figures (95 in 1968 and 111 in 1969) were certainly significant enough to require a major Israeli response, but nowhere near the total necessary for successful strategic coercion.281 Fatah was the clear leader in the attacks, with Saiqa, the PLF/PLA, and the PFLP roughly equal in number.282

The use of violence for organizational ends had become seemingly so essential that the last major holdout, the JCP, voted to form a guerrilla branch in mid-1969. Like the ANM and PLA before them, the JCP had changed its mind after seeing its size and influence shrink relative to other groups. It lost members to other factions after Karameh, to the point that the JCP was concerned for its survival and could clearly no longer be considered a pole.283 Thus, the group that, more than any other, had argued that violence was futile and counterproductive, publicly stated that they had erred in their earlier statements, and formally introduced Quwwat Al-Ansar

280 Ibid., 366-367.
281 Ibid., 367-369.
282 According to Quandt, Fatah was responsible for over 50% of attacks, Sa‘iqa, PLF and PFLP about 8% each, with 25% impossible to identify or smaller groups. Given that casualty figures are often more reliable than attack figures, the former back up the latter. Fatah lost over one half of fatalities, while the PLF, PFLP, and Sa‘iqa suffered a little under 10% each of the total Palestinian fedayeen deaths. Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, 121-122.
(Partisan Forces) in early 1970. Although Al-Ansar never exceeded four hundred members, its formation alone confirmed the powerful allure of violence within a competitive, multipolar movement.

Although still a clear pole, the PFLP recognized by 1968 that they were trending downwards relative to their rivals, and were now clearly second or third in the hierarchy. Recognizing that they could not compete with Fatah quantitatively in cross-border attacks, they opted for a qualitative shift in tactics that they hoped would allow them to retain their current supporters and gain new ones in their drive for leadership. By mid-1968, the PFLP decided to embark on what it labeled ‘external operations,’ but what by most definitions would be considered terrorist attacks against civilian targets outside of Israel. By targeting Western and Israeli civilians in high-profile operations, the PFLP hoped to maximize the notoriety of their organization and the Palestinian cause, strike at the supporting tail of the Israelis, and in the process outbid their rivals with attacks that were more daring than any before.

The opening salvo was the hijacking of an El Al flight from Rome to Tel Aviv on July 23, 1968, which caught the Israelis off guard, generated massive press coverage, and resulted in both the release of PFLP prisoners and an increase in recruits. The PFLP went on to launch numerous other international attacks, including bombings of Jewish stores in London, grenade attacks on Israeli embassies and the El Al office in Brussels, and many more hijackings of American and European airlines. The PFLP attempted to justify their actions by noting the

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link between the Israelis and their Western supporters, arguing, "We will be kidding ourselves if we try to differentiate between hitting Israeli targets and imperial targets, as they are the same." As with Fatah's launch of the armed struggle in 1965, the PFLP's launch of 'external operations' also inspired competitors, as the recent splinter group PFLP-General Command blew up a Swissair aircraft in midflight, and the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) hijacked an Olympic Airways plane en route to Cairo. The attacks thus represented a qualitative outbid alongside Fatah's quantitative one.

The PFLP was not only aiming to outbid, however, but also to chain-gang the Palestinian national movement into a direct conflict with Hussein for control of Jordan. The PFLP and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which splintered from the PFLP in early 1969, coupled provocative verbal and violent attacks on the monarch. The DFLP raised the stakes by publicly proclaiming 'no authority over the authority of the [Palestinian] resistance,' in mid-1970, which was a direct challenge to Hussein's rule. The words of these groups were backed by actions, as they were responsible for significant chunks of...
the "43,397 violations of the peace" committed by the Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan by 1970, including illegal arrest, murder, kidnapping, rape, assault on civilians, and attacks on government property. Although these attacks helped create significant tension between the Palestinians and the Jordanian military and monarch, it was the PFLP's decision to carry out 'external operations' inside Jordan that first put the movement on the verge of war with their hosts and, soon after, plunged them into one.

The most interesting role reversal may not have been the PFLP's attempt to violently outbid and chain-gang, but rather Fatah's efforts to restrain them. The power of the movement hierarchy was perhaps no more apparent than in Fatah's actions. The formerly weaker pole, who just a few years earlier was launching the armed struggle on two occasions (1965 and 1967) in attempts to outbid and chain-gang, was now the leading pole looking to prevent conflict that could threaten its position. Fatah understood well what the PFLP was trying to do because they themselves had done the same. As Salah Khalaf noted, "Other small organizations are engaged in leftist overbids which are altogether unrealistic." In June 1970, the PFLP took sixty Westerners hostage in two hotels in Amman in order to challenge Hussein. Fatah was able to step in and negotiate a cease-fire that brought the crisis to an end, yet another example of its newfound role. In September of 1970, the movement was not so lucky.

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291 Indeed, as one former PFLP member describes, one of the major Palestinian refugee camps (Wehdat) was referred to as "The Republic of Wehdat" due to the lack of government control and sway of the guerrillas. Interview with author Former PFLP member, September 14, 2009.


293 Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, 120. This was not the first time Fatah leadership had to mediate. In February 1970, clashes between the guerrillas and Jordanian broke out while Arafat was in Moscow, and he had to rush home to negotiate a cease-fire. ———, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, 120. Fatah “sought to avoid the clashes of February, June, and perhaps even September 1970.” ———, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, 116.
On September 6, 1970 PFLP members attempted to hijack TWA, Swissair, El Al, and Pan Am flights simultaneously.\(^{294}\) The Pan Am flight was flown to Cairo and destroyed after its passengers were released, while the TWA and Swissair flights were flown to a desert airstrip near Zarqa, Jordan controlled by the PFLP. After the El Al hijackers were thwarted in their attempt and handed over to the British authorities in London, a PFLP sympathizer hijacked a fifth airplane from British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC, later British Airways) and landed it at what was being called ‘Revolution Airport’ in Jordan, bringing the total to three planes and over three hundred hostages under the control of the PFLP, including many from the United States, Israel, Great Britain, and Switzerland. Holding the planes and hostages just miles from the Jordanian capital was a direct challenge to its sovereignty, as the PFLP intended. As Leila Khaled, the one surviving attacker from the failed El Al hijacking noted, “We had a number of objectives in that operation, including not only raising the issue of the Palestinian people to the world, but also challenging the Jordanian regime.”\(^{295}\)

Fatah forced the expulsion of the PFLP from the PLO central committee and attempted to mediate, but the die had been cast.\(^{296}\) Hussein was convinced of the inevitability of a struggle, and he formed a military government ten days later. Even though Fatah had noted its desire to avoid a war for months, the Jordanian Army shelling of Palestinian guerrilla positions and refugee camps in Amman and Zarqa two days after the hijackings helped convince them that they could no longer hold back.

Unfortunately for the PFLP, Fatah, and the rest of the Palestinian national movement, the campaign was a total failure. Despite some initial organizational gains from their ‘external

\(^{294}\) The original plan was for the hijacking of three planes, but when two of the hijackers were refused entry to the El Al flight, they hijacked the Pan Am flight instead.

\(^{295}\) Interview with author Leila Khaled, 2010.

operations,' the PFLP's terrorist attacks contributed to the splitting off of the DFLP and a significant drop in popular support in Jordan and internationally, as such extreme methods were difficult to justify regardless of what one thought of the PFLP's objectives. As for the conflict that the PFLP successfully chain-ganged Fatah and the rest of the movement into, it was a disaster. The Jordanian army routed the divided guerrillas in what became known as 'Black September,' killing thousands and beginning the process of expelling all Palestinian armed groups from the country, which was completed the following year. Jordan had been by far the best example of the “secure base” Fatah had always sought, due to its long border with Israel and massive Palestinian population. This strategic failure would haunt the Palestinians for decades, as it was the beginning of a drift away from their homeland. Although unknown at the time, the armed groups reached their peak military strength by 1970, and would not find as favorable a political and geographical situation again.

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297 In 1969 and early 1970 almost all of Jordan's population supported the fedayeen. By September 1970 only the refugees and poor Jordanians did, as the fedayeen's reckless actions, of which the June hostage-taking and September hijacking were paramount examples, blackened their reputation. Ibid., 199-201. “The guerrillas may have been able to take over in early 1970, but their subsequent actions alienated the people. When the fighting came, most people stayed in their basements.” Interview with author Nawaf Tell, August 30, 2009.

298 After the conflict, other leftists claimed that the hijackings by the PFLP “invited much damage to the Palestinian revolution,” and had allowed the Jordanian regime to crack down. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 301. These operations were later called off by the PFLP at conference in November 1970 and again at an October 1971 conference, although some groups continued to carry them out. ———, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 272. 300-301

299 Fatah argued that the establishment of a secure base was a central objective. Jordan largely possessed the four key characteristics described by Fatah: “a place in which the revolutionaries have complete authority and control,” “it should be in contact with enemy grounds to enable the revolutionaries to undertake armed action,” “it should be in the midst of the people directly connected with the revolution,” and “it should be located so as to enable the revolutionaries to resist the siege and annihilation operations of the enemy.” Fatah, Political and Armed Struggle, 27.

300 The fact that the Palestinians would achieve degrees of strategic success in later periods when they were, in aggregate, a weaker movement provides support for the structuralist theory as compared to competing hypotheses based on total movement strength.
If the movement had been unipolar, it would have more likely been able to avoid an ill-timed war with King Hussein due to a reduction in the competitive outbidding and provocative tactics that alienated the populace and the regime.\textsuperscript{301} Khaled al-Hassan of Fatah argues as much:

"The Jordanian people had a tremendous desire to play their part in the Palestinian revolution, but again multiplicity and contradictions created the opportunity for counterrevolutionary forces (as represented by the Jordanian authorities) to incite the Jordanian people against the Palestinian revolution, and they succeeded in alienating the people from the resistance. And yet, had the resistance movement not been divided and full of contradictions, it would have been able, with the support of the masses, to overcome the conspiracies of the [Jordanian] government."\textsuperscript{302}

Furthermore, without multipolarity and its associated rhetorical and violent outbidding, the armed groups would have more likely avoided the false optimism that again marked the movement on the eve of war. As Fatah leader Kamal Udwan suggested in retrospect, "the scale of their decision exceeded the scale of their capabilities."\textsuperscript{303} Arafat claimed that the movement had close to 40,000 fighters in Jordan in August of 1970, when in reality the true combined strength of the guerrillas was a quarter of that figure. In short, the factions believed their own hype. Fatah intelligence chief Salah Khalaf confirms this, noting that "We felt that nobody could harm us in Jordan," while Farouk Qaddumi claimed that King Hussein was "a paper tiger, whom we can topple in half an hour."\textsuperscript{304} This false optimism was coupled with a lack of cohesive strategy and signaling, also caused by the multipolarity of the movement: "The Palestinian leadership would neither take the political and military initiative against the government nor curb

\textsuperscript{301} Adnan Abu Odeh, a Palestinian who is a former Jordanian minister and adviser to King Hussein, argued: "Fatah’s toleration of the leftists was its biggest mistake. The leftists alienated the people and shifted the image of the guerrillas from those who want to liberate to those who want to rule." Interview with author Adnan Abu Odeh, September 6, 2009. Interview with author.


the escalatory rhetoric and unruly behavior of its followers." The Palestinians thus stumbled into a war for which they were not prepared and some of them did not want, yet they had directly caused.

If a war had come regardless due to the implicit threat represented by the PLO's growing power, it would have been prosecuted more coherently and would likely not have ended in such total defeat for the Palestinians. The Jordanian army was three times the collective size of the Palestinian armed groups and better equipped, so even with a unipolar movement it is unlikely the Palestinians could have won a total victory at that time. However, a unipolar movement would have been more likely to avoid the ill-advised war altogether, cut a better deal with King Hussein short of expulsion, or previously have avoided alienating the local populace and some of their Arab allies, thus making military victory either unnecessary or far more likely. As King Hussein's former adviser Adnan Abu Odeh noted, "To have a rhythm you have to be able to play at least two notes." The lack of either unipolarity or unity ensured that the Palestinian groups would each dance to their own drummer, with disastrous consequences for the movement.

The same question again arises—why no unity?—and the answer is again the same—unity may have been the best for the movement, but it was not always the best for all groups in that movement. Everyone wanted unity, but on their own terms. For Fatah, the PLO was not the right forum for Palestinian unity until they controlled it, and then it was. For the PFLP, the PLO was the right forum as long as they got their desired number of seats on the PNC, but it was not

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305 Ibid., 258.
306 Multipolarity left the movement more vulnerable to agent provocateurs, such as the Special Branch in Jordan that carried out operations to sow further discord and hurt the public image of the guerrillas. Ibid., 244-246.
307 Adnan Abu Odeh. Interview with author.
when they did not. Fatah wanted all groups to unify, but helped the DFLP split off from the PFLP to weaken its rival.

Fatah helped create the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC) in February 1969 to unify movement efforts, but the PASC could not even accomplish the simplest task it was assigned, namely to serve as a clearinghouse of group claims for attacks so the entire movement did not look foolish when multiple groups claimed that they had conducted the same operation. Why did the PASC fail on this count? The answer is simple: few groups passed information on to the PASC, as they had organizational interests in being able to claim or deny responsibility for an attack depending on its impact. Not surprisingly, the strongest groups were the most supportive of the PASC, as they committed most of the attacks and did not like it when others tried to steal the credit. Predictably, the weaker groups were the least supportive, as they were not about to give up the opportunity to gain notoriety off the efforts of others. Thus, unity was once again sacrificed at the altar of organizational goals.

When the Palestinian movement finally got a glimpse of unity and coordinated action a few years later, the results (and subsequent fallout) were predictable: limited strategic progress, but resistance from those who were not on top to disproportionately benefit.

A Brief Glimpse at Unity: 1973-1974

One might think that in the aftermath of Jordan’s expulsion of the Palestinian organizations in 1970-71, self-assessment would be the order of the day. If so, one would be only

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308 "The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is working for and is calling for the establishment of a national unity according to a clear and precise work plan. This will be within a revolutionary front that has equal chances." Palestine, Limadha? Darabat Al-Jabha Al-Sha'biyya Li-Tahrir Filastin Dud a;-Mu'assasat Al-Isra'iliyya Wa Al-Sahumiyya Wa Al-Imbiraliyya Fi Al-Kharij (Why? The Pfpl Strikes against Israeli, Zionist and Imperialist Targets Outside the Arab World), 48.
half right. There certainly was a great deal of assessment and criticism, with every group declaring that a lack of unity or unipolarity (if not in so many words) remained the most pressing problem. Abu Iyad of Fatah noted: “Even in historic and critical decisions, the leadership of the various groups used to put hierarchical gain before the general good.”\(^{309}\) Sami Al-Attari of Saiqa made a similar argument concerning the PLO: “Because some organizations attempt to act singly, away from collective and democratic leadership, the organization is weakened and its effectiveness paralyzed.”\(^{310}\) This was confirmed even by smaller organizations like the Arab Liberation Front (ALF): “The problem is that the diversity became transformed into distorted and harmful rivalry which led the groups to engage in dubious practices for political gain. Much effort was expended in such activity instead of in confronting the enemy, mobilizing the masses and increasing the capabilities of the resistance.”\(^{311}\) Each group’s explanation for this lack of unity, however, revealed that true self-reflection was unlikely and politically dangerous in the competitive environment that persisted. As before Black September, everyone wanted unity on their own terms, and the problem was everyone else.\(^{312}\)


\(^{312}\) The PFLP submitted a proposal to the 10th PNC in February 1971 for a National Front with equal representation, separate from the Fatah-dominated PLO, but it failed. The PLA and Fatah signed a deal to unite their forces, but it never happened. The culmination came at the 10th PNC in Cairo in 1972, when groups outbid each other over who was more ‘pro-unity,’ even though none would take concrete steps to make such a union happen. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993*, 268-274. Shemesh, *The Palestinian Entity 1959-1974: Arab Politics and the PLO*, 236-237. Furthermore, it appeared at times that groups misunderstood that it was power, not words, that dictated the situation. Fatah claimed, “It is therefore necessary to bypass the leadership and descend to the level of the base for direct discussions to set forth the extent of the danger presented by these small organizations. We must not tire of talking to the base until we have deprived its leaders of every justification for the formation of these organizations and their continued existence.” Unfortunately for the Palestinians, the problem was not words or justifications, which all groups demonstrated that they had in spades. The problem was the distribution of power and organizational goals. *A Dialogue with Fateh*, 14.
The loss in Jordan and subsequent defeat of the insurgency in Gaza in 1971-1972 made all groups worry about their strength and survival, including Fatah. This concern, coupled with the loss of easy access to Israel from the Jordanian border, helped pull the movement’s new leader into hijacking and other terrorist attacks under its auxiliary Black September Organization (BSO), named after the Jordan debacle, starting in late 1971. Fatah was concerned that it would be severely weakened if it did not compete with the PFLP and others with such violence, as it feared losing recruits from the base or from within its own organization to its rivals. The PFLP and Fatah had thus reversed roles from 1965-67, when Fatah started launching what the PFLP considered foolhardy attacks, only to have the PFLP later follow suit. The group’s operations, including the shocking attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972, initially captivated world attention and drove some recruits to the BSO. Fatah was quick to disband the BSO, however, once it became clear that its operations hurt Fatah’s standing internationally and with large portions of the Palestinian public, putting larger organizational gains at risk.

The event that helped to shake the Palestinian movement from its perpetual multipolar outbidding, albeit briefly, was the exogenous shock of the October War of 1973. Although they eventually lost the battle militarily, Egypt and Syria’s surprise attack had nearly broken through the Israeli lines, restoring Arab pride and providing momentum to Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s successor, to seek negotiations with the Israelis over lands captured in 1967. Sadat wanted Arab unity in the upcoming talks, and he understood that that meant he would have to bring someone

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313 The PLA leadership openly questioned whether Arafat and Fatah should continue to lead the PLO. This was no idle threat, as the PLA had 8,000 troops stationed in Syria at the time, a considerable force that had escaped the September clashes. "Arab Commandoes Seen in Disarray," Washington Post January 28, 1971.

314 Despite all of these changes in movement hierarchy and debates over tactics, Fatah remained quite stable internally: “The seven key figures of 1957-1960 were still the undisputed leaders in 1971-1972.” Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, 84.
on board to represent the Palestinians. Although Fatah was the clear leader among Palestinian organizations by that time, other options remained. King Hussein wanted to regain the West Bank and still sought to incorporate Palestinians into Jordan. There was also the possibility of a local, West Bank leadership representing the Palestinians. The Israelis had held municipal elections in the West Bank in 1972 precisely to push the emergence of such an alternative group, which it clearly preferred to Fatah and the PLO.

Therefore, in this new context of international negotiations, the Palestinian movement hierarchy involved more than just the guerrilla organizations, and Fatah sought to confirm its predominance once again. Fatah had always worried about the rise of alternative representatives, and noted, “A settlement without PLO participation would be ‘the biggest defeat’ for the organization.” However, in order to improve its organizational prospects, Fatah would have to shift its violent tactics and unify the PLO. Fatah ordered an end to the Black September Organization in late 1973, and later came out publicly against attacks outside of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1974.

In terms of unity, Fatah pushed a common political program at the 12th PNC in late June 1974. The essential item on the Ten-Point Program (five of whose points focused on unity in some form) was that signatories agreed to “establish the independent fighting national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated.” This was an implicit departure from only accepting all of historic Palestine or nothing. Not surprisingly, dominant Fatah was the most in favor of such a plan, despite its earlier opposition when it was weaker.

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316 Shaul Mishal, The PLO under Arafat: Between Gun and Olive Branch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 17, 21. From early in its trajectory, Fatah noted that a ‘colonizing regime’ looks to cut separate deals with the bourgeoisie to cut out the revolutionaries, as with the British in Kenya and the French in Algeria. Fatah tried to warn Palestinians against this. Fatah, Al-Thawra Wa Al-'Unf Tariq Al-Tahrir (the Revolution and Violence Are the Way to Liberation), Dirasat Wa Tajarib Thawriyya (Revolutionary Studies and Experiences).
Also not surprisingly, the weaker PFLP was most strongly against this plan, and only agreed to consider such a concession as a stepping-stone to the larger goal. Fatah’s strength helped corral many groups to agree to the plan, although it was not the only pole: Fatah had only two official members on the executive committee of the PNC, and five out of fourteen if pro-Fatah independents are included. Ultimately, the Ten-Point Program was supported by all major groups and voted for by all but four delegates of the 165-representative PNC, giving the Palestinians a degree of unity among the poles that was unprecedented.

The unity of the PLO and the denouncement by Fatah of ‘external operations’ had two clear, strategic consequences over the next four months. First, the Arab League, led by Egypt but including Jordan, unanimously recognized the PLO as the “sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” at the Rabat summit in October of 1974. This was a major accomplishment for the PLO, its leading group (Fatah), and the majority of Palestinians, who preferred to have their own leaders represent them. Second, Arafat was invited to give an official speech to the United Nations General Assembly in November, where the PLO was granted observer status in approved resolutions that also confirmed the Palestinian right to self-determination and independence.

These accomplishments were the direct result of movement polarity and the use of violence. The armed struggle put Fatah (and the PLO) in the position to receive such recognition, although it did not come until initial moves towards unity and collective restraint in the use of violence were demonstrated. Of course, what the Arab League and much of the world perceived

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320 Others agree with this assessment: “It was on the basis of the PNC’s recently agreed 10-point program that the PLO there received the Arab states’ endorsements of its claim to be the ‘sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. On 13 November, with Arab League help, Arafat was in New York, addressing the UN General Assembly session.” Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics, 62.
as a moderation of the Palestinians' political program and tactics did not appear as such to the Israelis, who were still considered fair game by the Palestinians, fought against PLO recognition, and were not successfully coerced.

Unity, unlike unipolarity, is inherently unstable, especially when it is not institutionalized. Unfortunately for the Palestinians, groups began to consider the impact of the joint program on their own organizational interests, and the unity of the movement was short-lived. With few incentives or institutions to make them stay, the PFLP pulled out of the PNC in late 1974, formed a ‘Rejectionist Front’ with a number of other factions (including the PFLP-GC and ALF), and generally opposed any deal with the Israelis. Unlike Fatah, who was willing to signal a desire to accept a smaller Palestinian state in exchange for potentially ruling it, the PFLP in its subordinate position recognized it would get little for its concession, and set out to delegitimize Fatah’s leadership just as Fatah had done to the PLO ‘Old Guard’ before it. The PFLP-GC was pressured to vacate the PNC after leftist factions employed violent outbidding, and even the strongest supporters of the unity deal followed suit. The DFLP took approximately one hundred high school students hostage in the Northern Israeli town of Ma’alot near Israel’s independence day, May 15, 1974, leading to the deaths of the three guerrillas and twenty-six Israelis, including twenty-one school children.

Despite Fatah’s claim to moderate tactics, it demonstrated neither the capability nor the will to restrain the actions of other factions. Furthermore, the continuing competitive, multipolar, non-institutionalized movement meant that Fatah itself had incentives to continue engaging in violent outbidding. Fatah accounted for 90% of Palestinian attacks in the West Bank and Gaza

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after August 1973 as well as operations against civilian targets inside Israel, such as the killing of three members of an Israeli family in June 1974.323

The lack of a coherent strategy yet again allowed weaker poles to chain-gang Fatah and the rest of the movement into a conflict it wanted to avoid in its new base of operations: Lebanon. Thus, although the movement's brief period of unity had demonstrated its potential to yield strategic gains, the continued internal competition prevented such an occurrence for another decade.

323 Ibid., 349.
Figure 15. Map of Palestinian Refugees in the Levant

Palestinian Refugees - Area of UNRWA Operations

- Registered Refugees in camps
- Registered Refugees outside camps
- Total Registered Refugees (in & out)
- Destroyed Camp
- Official Camp

Total numbers of refugees are based on UNRWA data, as of 30 December 2003.
Camp populations are based on UNRWA data as of 30 June 2003.

Source: Public Information Office, UNRWA HQ, Gaza.

LEBANON
- RR = 11.5% of total population (2002)
- RR in = 223,956
- RR out = 170,576
- RR Total = 394,532

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
- RR = 2.7% of total population (2002)
- RR in = 120,365
- RR out = 79,962
- RR Total = 413,827

GAZA STRIP
- RR = 84.5% of total population (2002)
- RR in = 484,563
- RR out = 348,111
- RR Total = 922,674

JORDAN
- RR = 34.9% of total population (2002)
- RR in = 717,785
- RR out = 1,432,385
- RR Total = 1,740,170

Map: PASSIA, 2004
The Lebanese Civil War and the Endurance of Multipolarity, 1975-1986

After the armed groups’ expulsion from Jordan in 1970-71, they transferred the bulk of their forces north to Lebanon. Like Jordan, it possessed a number of factors that Fatah sought in a base of operations. Lebanon had a significant number of Palestinian civilians (approximately 400,000, or 10% of the total population), it shared a border with Israel, and the concentration of many Palestinians in refugee camps provided areas in which the armed groups could again develop a semi-sovereign ‘state-within-a-state.’ Nonetheless, Fatah and other factions recognized that the country could not serve as a permanent base. It was not a part of historic Palestine, it was strongly within Syria’s sphere of influence, and its residents were wary of the Palestinian presence in a country with a delicate ethnic balance, even if many of them supported the Palestinian cause.\(^{324}\)

Despite these challenges, the armed groups made immediate use of their new base of operations by mounting cross-border attacks against the Israelis. Massive Israeli counterstrikes inside Lebanon raised tensions with the host country, in a repeat of the recent experience in Jordan. Similarly, the Palestinian leadership worked out a deal with the government to ostensibly cut down on cross-border attacks in exchange for control of the Palestinian refugee camps and guerrilla bases on southern Lebanon.\(^{325}\) In this case, the multipolar weakness of the Lebanese state contributed to initial Palestinian success in Lebanon, as the internal divisions prevented the state from moving strongly against the fedayeen.

\(^{324}\) An An-Nahar poll in November 1969 showed that 85% of the Lebanese public supported Palestinian commando operations in general, but only 62% supported them from Lebanese territory. Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, 193.

\(^{325}\) The original Cairo Agreement to this effect was negotiated in 1969 and then renewed in 1973.
Unfortunately for the Palestinians, the next part of the story was familiar as well. The multipolar, non-unified movement led to a lack of centralized control that yielded serious consequences. Tensions between the guerrilla groups and the local population again began to run high in part due to “Palestinian ‘excesses’ (tajawuzat)—arrogant behavior by PLO members, theft, extortion, damage to property, nonpayment of rents, and physical injury.”\textsuperscript{326} PLO attempts to curb excesses among various factions and move guerrilla bases away from villages were largely a failure. More importantly, the Palestinian factions failed to present a united front amidst the rapidly deteriorating political situation in Lebanon. In 1974-1975, many of the weaker poles like the PFLP began to openly join forces with the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a Muslim-dominated leftist front that opposed the Christian Maronite-dominated government. At the same time, Fatah and the PLO leadership tried to stress the Palestinians’ neutrality in word and deed. Fatah negotiated with the Maronite-led government and even the Christian Phalangist militias on numerous occasions to prevent violence and maintain stability. However, other Palestinian factions responded angrily by shelling the Christian populations in east Beirut, making it impossible to maintain such ceasefires.\textsuperscript{327} Fatah had aimed to keep the movement out of a costly conflict outside of Palestine just as they were successfully rebuilding momentum post-Black September, but internal division made this impossible. Fighting between the two sides escalated until the Christian forces laid siege to Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut.

Even at this stage, Fatah aimed to use limited force to break the siege but still signal a desire for a deal to resolve the conflict. The plan was to launch a limited offensive to link up with the Palestinian refugee camps at Tal al-Za’tar and Naba’a in east Beirut. Unfortunately for the Palestinians, multipolarity proved an obstacle to the effective use of force just as it did to conflict

\textsuperscript{327} Ibid., 365.
initiation. In the course of the fighting, “each faction jealously insisted on retaining control over its followers and resisted subordination to a single military command...the disunity and indiscipline of the nine factions involved allowed Maronite counterattacks to wrest back most of the lost ground over the next three days.”

The Palestinians had thus upped the ante while failing to secure the defense of their people. Soon after, dueling massacres committed by the Christian forces at the Palestinian refugee camps and by the PLO in an attack on Damour, a coastal Christian city to the south of Beirut, shifted the conflict to a full-scale civil war. Fatah had been chain-ganged again into a major conflict it wished to avoid. As Helena Cobban confirms, “If, following the fall of Dbayeh and Karantina and the first imposition of the siege around Tel al-Za’tar in January 1976, [Fatah] had not thrown all available resources into the battle against the Lebanese rightwing, there were only too many hands from the other guerrilla groups hoping to take over from them the banner of leadership in the national movement they had toiled so hard to build.”

It is impossible the track all of the violence and alliance shifts among combatants that occurred over the following fifteen years of the Lebanese civil war in these pages. Hundreds of thousands were tragically killed and close to one million people were wounded in a country whose population today is only four million. The Palestinians provided only a few of the many actors in the war, but they were central players. From their perspective, the war was a complete disaster, rivaling that of Black September. Tens of thousands of Palestinian guerrillas and civilians were killed. Palestinian actions and involvement motivated the two strongest powers in

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328 Ibid., 374.
the region, Israel and Syria, to invade on separate occasions and, despite their mutual hatred for each other, both make the Palestinians their top target.\footnote{Syria's posture provides another example of the influence of power over identity, as the Syrians initially fought on the largely Christian side against the Muslim-dominated LNM and PLO. One key reason for this was the Syrian desire to avoid being chain-ganged into an undesirable war with Israel as a result of a PLO victory.}

The Palestinian armed groups lost their last major base bordering historic Palestine, as Arafat and much of the rest of the leadership were eventually exiled to Tunisia, far from their homeland and military forces. Finally, the multipolarity of the movement allowed Syria (and Libya) easy entry as they attempted to exploit Fatah's weakness and remove it from its perch using groups like Saiqa and Jibril's PFLP-GC.\footnote{The Syrian leadership considered Palestine 'southern Syria' and so believed it should be the rightful leader and protector of the Palestinian cause in any case.} As Adnan Abu Odeh argued, “If you live by yourself, no cohesion is no problem, but if you deal with the outside world, other powers will slide into the cracks of your division.”\footnote{Adnan Abu Odeh. Interview with author} The aftermath of Arafat's departure from Lebanon in 1982 after a ceasefire with the Israelis thus saw the most deadly infighting between Palestinians to this day. Thousands of Palestinians lost their lives as Syrian-backed factions tried to violently wrest control of the movement from Fatah over the next four years, all the while weakening the movement and distracting it from its strategic objectives.

A conflict as massive as the Lebanese civil war is almost never the result of any one factor, and this study will not argue otherwise. Nonetheless, from the Palestinian perspective, it is clear that multipolarity helped yield the worst of both worlds. The movement launched provocative attacks without adequately preparing to wage war. Some of its factions allied with Lebanese units while Fatah and the PLO tried to maintain neutrality. When it engaged, it lacked a unified command, which hindered tactical effectiveness. Ultimately, the threat of having Palestinian armed groups operating amidst hundreds of thousands of refugees near the border
with Israel and Syria may have led to a war in any case, but a unipolar movement was far more likely to have avoided the conflict, waged it more effectively, and avoided the significant infighting that occurred at its end.

As for individual group behavior, the hierarchy hypothesis performed well yet again. As in Jordan, the PFLP and other leftist groups led the movement into war in Lebanon, this time by fighting alongside their ideological brethren the LNM. This seems to be in line with the leftists' claim that the road to Jerusalem goes through Amman, and now apparently Beirut. The timing of their action correlates far more strongly with their position in the hierarchy, however. The PFLP (formerly ANM) actively worked against attacks from Jordan or Lebanon in the mid-1960s when it was on top of the movement, only to lead the use of violence when it had become a weaker pole. Conversely, the group who led those attacks in the 1960s, Fatah, was now the group trying to negotiate and constrain violence due in no small part to its position at the top of the ladder.

Nonetheless, although the roles had changed, the strategic outcome was still the same: failure. By the mid-1980s, however, just as things looked the darkest amidst the Lebanon defeat, the infighting, and a leadership in North Africa, the movement finally arrived at its own unipolar moment.

The Unipolar Moment: Fatah’s Dominance Yields Strategic Gains, 1986-1996

Fatah Cements Unipolarity

From the looks of the 1987 Arab League summit in Amman, the situation could not have been worse for the Palestinian national movement. Accustomed to a place at the top of the agenda, the Palestinian issue was pushed to the sidelines in favor of discussion of the Iran-Iraq war and restoration of relations with Egypt (which had been suspended after the 1979 Camp
David Accords with Israel). Those who suggest that the impact of violence or organizational strength can be measured in notoriety or agenda-setting would therefore claim that the Palestinians were at a nadir. Nothing could be further from the truth, however. Although the movement had been weakened in the 1970s and early 1980s by a series of wounds, self-inflicted and otherwise, by the mid-1980s the Palestinian house was slowly put into order as never before. By 1986-87, a confluence of factors had made the movement unipolar for the first and only time in modern history. Although dissent remained, Fatah became so powerful politically, military, and economically that no other group could provide a realistic challenge to its leadership for the foreseeable future. This concentration of power put Fatah in position to control the movement’s strategy, coercive and otherwise, leading to the most significant strategic gains in forty years.

Ironically, as much of a disaster as the Lebanese civil war was for Fatah, it was comparatively worse for the other groups, many of whom had intentionally pulled the movement into the conflict. Leftist groups like the PFLP and DFLP were decimated in the struggle. Saiqa, formerly the second strongest pole, suffered from mass Palestinian defections in 1976 when its leadership forced the group to fight PLO factions in support of the Syrians. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, not one of these groups represented a pole that could challenge Fatah. Recognizing this, the factions created a loose alliance in an attempt to balance Arafat’s group. Even their combined strength failed to unseat Fatah, however, as the left’s bid for power at the 1979 PNC was easily defeated. By this time, Fatah all but controlled the distribution of PNC.

333 "The rigors of the Lebanese civil war, moreover, left Fatah in a considerably stronger position relative to the other guerrilla groups in the PLO spectrum." Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics, 78-79.
seats (and so the PLO itself), later denying a proposal by the DFLP and PFLP for proportional representation.\textsuperscript{334}

Fatah’s political heft was backed by its growing predominance in wealth and armaments. In the Arab League summit in Baghdad in 1978, Arab governments agreed to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to the Palestinians as a result of the Camp David Accords, including $150 million annually to be distributed by the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza and another $250 million paid directly to the PLO. The factions fought over distribution of the funds, with Fatah ultimately receiving two-thirds, compared to one-third for all other groups combined.\textsuperscript{335} Fatah’s control and distribution of these \textit{sumud} funds (meaning ‘steadfastness’) further strengthened its political hold on the Palestinian base.

On the military front, Fatah had acquired T-34 tanks, an air wing, and had outfitted its battalions with significant heavy weaponry.\textsuperscript{336} To complete its military dominance within the PLO, Fatah merged its forces with those of the PLA, PFLP, and DFLP to form the Palestinian National Liberation Army in 1983, which ultimately “[left] Fatah in generally undisputed control of PLO military forces”\textsuperscript{337} As Aaron David Miller noted in 1983, Fatah’s triumph over its old rivals was complete: “[Fatah] has more fighters, more money, and a broader range of support among Palestinians, Arab states, and the international community than all the other PLO groups combined.”\textsuperscript{338}

\begin{footnotes}
\item “By spring 1982, a typical Fatah battalion with a strength of 150 fielded 24 medium and heavy weapons: three 12.7mm machine-guns; seven 23/37/55mm anti-aircraft guns; four 75mm anti-tank recoilless rifles; two 76-85mm guns; three 81mm mortars and three heavier 120/160mm mortars; and two 122mm and 107mm multiple rocket launchers.” Sayigh, \textit{Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993}, 510.
\item Parsons, \textit{The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa}, 38.
\item Miller, \textit{The Plo and the Politics of Survival}, 42. Helena Cobban supports this claim, arguing that “By the 1980s, Fatah’s far-flung and surprisingly durable organization was not only still intact, it had also beaten back much of the
Unfortunately for Fatah, just as its old rivals withered away, a new one rose to take their place from within the organization itself. Fatah dissidents led by Colonel Said al-Muragha (Abu Musa), who had led the PLO’s defense of Beirut, split from the group in the aftermath of Arafat’s exit from Lebanon in 1982. They formed a new faction called Fatah-Intifada, proclaiming that Fatah and Arafat’s leadership of the movement was at an end. The dissidents represented a significant pole of over 4,000 fighters in Lebanon and Syria who proceeded to launch attacks on Fatah units that had remained in Lebanon as well as supportive Palestinian refugee camps. The fighting led to serious losses on both sides and left many wondering who was leading the movement.

An Al-Fajr poll in the West Bank and Gaza from December of 1983 found 95% support for Fatah against the dissidents, but the fight would ultimately be won or lost in the political and military arenas. Arafat and Fatah won an early political victory when they achieved quorum at the 1984 PNC despite the refusal of the dissidents and their allies to attend (which included Saiqa and the PFLP-GC; the PFLP and DFLP remained on the sidelines). By the end of 1984, the dissidents were down to fewer than 1,000 fighters due largely to defections, and within two years these groups had no significant support outside of Syria or Syria-controlled Lebanon. Fatah had triumphed.

Fatah consolidated its position at the top of a unipolar Palestinian national movement at the 1986 and 1987 meetings of the Palestinian National Council. Although the conventional wisdom holds that the key was the return of groups like the DFLP, PFLP, and Palestinian

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341 Ibid., 598-599.
Communist Party (formerly JCP), this was the result, not the cause of the unprecedented power shift. The key development was the defeat of the Syrian-backed dissidents, which confirmed Fatah as the dominant pole in the movement and was the major reason that so many other factions decided to (re-)enter to the PLO. None of them had the strength individually or together to seriously restrain Fatah. Therefore, they decided to join with it to avoid being delegitimized by remaining outside of a PLO that now possessed a critical mass of military, economic, and political power.\textsuperscript{342} As with states, such widespread bandwagoning may be the best indication of Fatah's unipolarity, as weaker poles historically revealed their preference for balancing.\textsuperscript{343} Indeed, Fatah was so dominant that even old, bitter rival Abu Nidal tried (and failed) to be readmitted to the PLO.

Public opinion and economic power further cemented Fatah's dominance. A 1986 Al-Fajr poll found that 93.5\% of Palestinians said that the PLO represented them, while 78.6\% picked Arafat as their preferred leader (Habash received 5.6\% and Abu Musa 1.2\%).\textsuperscript{344} The main financial body of the PLO, the Palestine National Fund (PNF), had cash reserves of at least $1.5 billion (with estimates up to $14 billion).\textsuperscript{345} Fatah not only controlled the PNF, but research suggests that the group may have had even more money itself, with an estimated $7-8 billion on

\textsuperscript{342} 1987 therefore might represent a case of ‘unipolar unity,’ if unity was shifted to refer to an alliance among the vast majority of groups, regardless of whether they are poles or not. It is also worth noting that the institutions of the PLO made unity within it more like unipolarity, as the funding, military forces, and general strategy were consolidated and largely controlled by a single leadership. Parsons, The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa, 36.

\textsuperscript{343} This is an excellent avenue for future research.


\textsuperscript{345} This funding was based in part on an annual income of approximately $150 million, including $87 million from the Saudis, smaller amounts from other Gulf countries, and $10-15 million from the 5-7\% ‘liberation tax’ paid by Palestinians living in the Gulf. Adam Zagorin, "Auditing the Plo," in The International Relations of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, ed. Augustus Richard Norton and Martin Greenberg (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), 197.
hand. Other groups’ funds were paltry by comparison, just enough for a basic military and staff but little else. Many of the smaller groups were now directly financed by Fatah and the PLO leadership, raising the issue of whether they were even independent entities. Fatah’s dominance of the movement spread to all corners of its activity, as Habash complained that 95% of the over 100 PLO missions abroad belonged to Fatah.

Fatah had thus achieved unipolarity, which did not guarantee strategic success, but did make the use of violence within the movement more likely to be politically effective in conflict initiation, conduct, and termination. Ironically, the armed groups did not initiate the next major phase of the struggle, but the unipolar structure allowed Fatah to control, conduct, and terminate it to its advantage and, arguably, that of the movement.

The First Intifada and the Oslo Accords

By 1987, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza had been living under Israeli occupation for twenty years, with many of the refugees having lived incredibly difficult lives since the 1948 War almost four decades earlier. Facing high and rising rates of poverty and unemployment, these populations also lacked many of the basic political rights enjoyed in Israel, not to mention their previous occupying states of Jordan and Egypt. On December 8, 1987, an Israeli agricultural truck slammed into two cars carrying Palestinian workers from a refugee camp in Gaza, killing four of them. Palestinians were convinced the ‘accident’ was intentional, and rioting began against Israeli military outposts. There had been previous protests in the West Bank and Gaza in recent months, but these almost immediately spread across the territories with

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346 Ibid., 197-199.
347 Unfortunately for Habash and the leftist groups, their strength would only decrease further with the fall of longtime supporter the Soviet Union.
a force not seen in twenty years of Israeli military occupation. The focus of the national movement, which had for so long shifted from one part of the periphery to the other, was finally returning to the actual land of historic Palestine to which the refugees wished to return.

Fatah and the other armed groups did not start the intifada, but the former’s powerful organization soon allowed it to gain control of what began as a grassroots uprising. By January 1988, Fatah and the PLO had set up Unified National Commands (UNC), which were organizations set up in West Bank and Gaza to give Palestinian civilians guidelines for resistance and coordinated action. The UNCs helped organize many of the activities of civil resistance that defined the first intifada, including strikes by Palestinian workers, refusal to pay taxes, boycotts on Israeli goods, and massive protest marches. The symbol of the first intifada—the Palestinian youth (shabab) throwing rocks at Israeli soldiers—was not entirely unorganized either. Fatah had previously developed youth organizations like the Shabiba, which claimed tens of thousands of members and led many of these demonstrations.

Coercion against the Israelis was thus relatively unified. Khalil Al-Wazir, known as Abu Jihad, was a founding Fatah leader who had been building the group’s networks in the West Bank and Gaza since the early 1980s. His desire to limit the lethality of the intifada was shared by many in the leadership, and Fatah’s dominance helped ensure this. The tactics of the movement were largely non-lethal, if not non-violent (it depends on one’s definition of stone-throwing). The IDF claimed 23,092 unarmed protests or stone-throwing incidents, 1,390 involving Molotov cocktails, and 149 with knives, explosives, or guns for all of 1988. From the start of the intifada until 1993, fewer than 100 Israelis were killed in the territories, and fewer than 100 were killed in Israel as a result of the uprising, numbers that would later be dwarfed by

348 Interview with author Sari Nusseibeh, December 13, 2009.
350 Ibid., 619-620.
the multipolar second intifada. Conversely, over 1,000 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces during this period; the exchange rate and contrasting tactics helped boost popular support for the Palestinian national movement across the globe.\textsuperscript{351} Even when the intifada became more militarized in 1989, in part due to the Israelis relaxing their rules of fire and increasing the use of plastic bullets, the movement did not devolve into spirals of violent outbidding marked by massive Israeli casualties and extreme terrorist attacks. Weaker groups had neither the capabilities to do so nor the possibility of unseating Fatah. More importantly, Fatah’s dominance meant it did not need to outbid violently to maintain its position. Instead, Fatah saw the best path to organizational strength through strategic gains, by negotiating with the Israelis and United States over the future of Palestine.

Over the course of the intifada, two potential challengers to Fatah did arise, although neither became a pole by the Oslo negotiations in 1993. The first was the local leadership in the West Bank, which the Israelis had tried for so long to prop up as an alternative to Fatah and the PLO. The Israelis were thwarted, however, as 85% of seats in the 1976 municipal elections in the West Bank went to PLO supporters, leading Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to cancel and postpone the 1980 and 1982 elections, respectively, as there was no viable alternative to the PLO.\textsuperscript{352} Nonetheless, the middle class and intelligentsia in the territories were not entirely beholden to the PLO, even if they refused to act as the Israelis desired. Although many were allied to Fatah through the Shabiba or the UNCs, Arafat feared that, given the right opportunity, these individuals could form an alternative leadership to cut a deal with the Israelis. Nonetheless, Fatah’s cooptation of many local elites, in part through its previous distribution of \textit{sumud} funds, largely headed off this challenge. The comparative strength of the refugee-dominated Fatah was

\textsuperscript{351} Parsons, \textit{The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa}, 264-265.
\textsuperscript{352} Sayigh, \textit{Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993}, 467, 484, 519-520.
confirmed at the 1988 PNC, when only a few extra seats were added for representatives in the territories.

The second challenger was to prove more difficult to co-opt or defeat, although they were not strong enough to truly challenge Fatah until the mid-1990s: Hamas. The Islamist Muslim Brotherhood had long had a foothold in Gaza. Ironically, in fact, many of the original members of Fatah came from the Brotherhood, which was often persecuted by Arab governments in the Levant. Since the Muslim Brotherhood largely steered clear of violence from 1967 until the mid-1980s, the Israelis allowed them to develop their religious and social networks in Gaza, while comparatively repressing the largely secular PLO organizations. By the mid-1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood had a significant following in Gaza, but some of its members decided that the group should no longer foreswear violent jihad to retake Palestine. The first group left to form Palestinian Islamic Jihad before the intifada; the larger, more successful Hamas formed at its outbreak. Hamas got involved in the intifada early on, but its first attacks against the Israelis led to the imprisonment of its leader, Sheik Ahmed Yassin, and the deportation of hundreds of its members. In addition to these early blows, Hamas had little support outside of the territories and did not even form an armed wing until the early 1990s. Therefore, it could do little to affect the direction of the movement initially, and was not a legitimate pole until the mid to late-1990s.

With no major challengers on the horizon and the momentum of the intifada at its back, Arafat announced the founding of the Palestinian state at 19th PNC in November 1988. The timing of the move was driven in part by Jordan's recent announcement that it was giving up its claim to the West Bank (a small organizational and strategic success in and of itself), as Fatah feared Israeli annexation. Nonetheless, 84 countries offered full recognition of the Palestinian
state and 20 offered qualified recognition within two months of the declaration. This was a
diplomatic coup for Arafat and Fatah, who also secured PNC acceptance of United Nations
resolutions 242 and 338, clearing the way for Palestinian negotiations with the United States and
Israelis over the final status of Israel and Palestine.

Mid-size groups who disagreed, like the PFLP, nonetheless remained in the PLO and did
not engage in spoiling attacks. Weak groups outside of the PLO, like PFLP-GC and Islamic
Jihad, launched a few attacks against Israeli and American targets (such as the Lockerbie
bombing in December 1988), but rather than chain-gang the movement or drive Fatah to outbid,
Fatah stayed the strategic course even if, predictably, it did so for organizational reasons.

The structuralist theory does not attempt explain the ins and outs of the negotiations at
Madrid and Oslo, on which excellent volumes already exist. More broadly, however, it helps to
reveal that the decrease in infighting and counterproductive violence, the cohesiveness of the
intifada, the increased credibility of the movement, and the acceptance of a political program that
made these negotiations possible were a direct result of the unipolarity of the Palestinian national
movement under Fatah. Furthermore, the dominance of Fatah in the movement prevented the
violent spoiling attempted by Hamas and others from derailing strategic progress, which began
The Oslo Accords are far less popular today than they were at the time, but they nonetheless
represent the most significant strategic success of the Palestinian national movement either
before or since. They led to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and major cities in the
West Bank, the creation of a Palestinian Authority with varying degrees of control in these areas,
the return of thousands of refugees into the territories, and the indication of a resolution to the
conflict ending in a Palestinian state within a significant part of the West Bank and all of Gaza.

333 Ibid., 624.
Of course, as critics pointed out at the time, the Oslo Accords did not give the Palestinians any control over Jerusalem, left the vast majority of refugees outside of Palestine, made no agreement on the final borders of a Palestinian state, and did nothing to stop or dismantle Israeli settlements. This result can be explained in part by the massive imbalance of forces between the Palestinians on the one hand and the Israelis and Americans on the other. Other observers suggested the basis of the hierarchy hypothesis, such as former PCP leader Mustafa al-Barghouti, who argued that Arafat and Fatah focused more on securing their party’s predominance in the new Palestinian Authority than achieving a state.354 Indeed, organizational objectives were the reason why Fatah had initiated the secret Oslo negotiations in the first place. Arafat was concerned that the ongoing negotiations in Madrid under the auspices of the U.S., which Fatah was controlling but not directly participating in, could revive the elite in the territories to challenge for leadership. Haidar Abdel-Shafi, the head of the Palestinian negotiating team at Madrid, claimed in regards to a question concerning Fatah’s actions, “This is a question you should pose to Chairman Arafat… surely there was no national gain.”355

Therefore, as well as the polarity hypothesis performed in the years leading up to and including Oslo, the hierarchy hypothesis may have performed even better. Fatah accepted strategic gains that it had castigated and killed others for even suggesting two decades earlier, in no small part because its new position allowed it enjoy the benefits of the formation of the PA and the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by Israel and the United States.

Ultimately, Oslo and its critics highlight some of the great strengths and weaknesses of the structuralist theory. The theory is undoubtedly correct that violence was more strategically

354 Parsons, The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa, 6.
355 Ibid., 80.
effective during periods of unipolarity than in periods of multipolarity. However, *more* does not necessarily define precisely *how much*. To the extent that it does, the mechanisms of the theory suggest that groups will pursue strategic gains as far as they benefit the organization. In this case, the strategic gains of Oslo definitely benefited Fatah, and in the process did secure some strategic progress that benefitted the larger movement. Was Fatah selfish in this? Absolutely. However, they were no less selfish than other groups who took positions in the PA, or arguably those like Hamas who launched attacks in part because they were cut out of the deal.\(^{356}\) Could further strategic gains have been achieved? Perhaps, but any answer must contend with the fact that multipolarity had existed for over thirty years prior (and fifteen years after) with nothing to show for it. The strategic gains at Oslo certainly were not everything the Palestinian base desired, but they were far more than previous or future campaigns had or would achieve.

**A Harsh Return to Multipolarity: The Collapse of Oslo and the Second Intifada**

The Oslo Accords signed in 1993 were not the final step in the negotiations, but rather explicitly the first step. After taking control of Gaza and Jericho in the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority was to hold elections and later return to the table with the Israelis to determine the final status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees within five years. The ultimate failure of the parties to achieve an agreement on these issues was certainly due to a number of factors, but one key difference between the signing of the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s and final status negotiations at the end of the decade was the rise of Hamas.

\(^{356}\) As one local academic told me: “In all of my years here studying and interviewing individuals in Palestinian organizations, I have seen many selfless individuals, but I have never seen a group opt for a strategic goal over an organizational one in a selfless way.” "Interview with Author," (Jerusalem: 2009).
In 1990, Hamas had demanded 40-50% of the seats on the PNC in order to join the PLO, which Fatah and the other factions smartly rejected. Not only had Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood been on the sidelines for the past twenty-five years while the other armed groups bled and suffered to create and empower the PLO against numerous rivals, but in 1990 Hamas was nowhere close to as powerful as Fatah. By 1996-1997, however, Hamas had not caught up to Fatah, but it could rightly be considered a legitimate pole that posed a strong challenge to the leadership of the national movement. To the religious networks constructed by the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas continued to add social services like hospitals and schools that built support with the local populace. The group brought in increasing financial donations from the Gulf in particular, as Arab governments who chafed at Fatah’s power and/or secular ideology saw the potential to support a religious balancer that gave them renewed purchase on the movement. Finally, Hamas’s use of violence in the early to mid-1990s did not inspire mass support, as many Palestinians still hoped that Oslo would deliver them a state. As negotiations faltered, however, Hamas’ violence helped position them as the main alternative for those who felt that Fatah’s nonviolent negotiating strategy was unwise at best and treasonous at worst. Throughout, Hamas continued to build its armed wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, which were founded in 1992. By the mid-1990s, the Qassam Brigades had demonstrated their ability to carry out numerous attacks in Israel, including multiple suicide bombings. Such attacks not only helped to shift the Israeli electorate to the right, but they also heralded a new era where a group other than Fatah could again launch concerted attacks.

The rise of Hamas as a second pole led to three specific challenges to strategic progress within the context of Oslo. First, the presence of a strong Hamas constrained the ability of Fatah

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358 On the role of terrorist attacks in shifting the Israeli electorate to the right, see Berrebi and Klor, "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate."
and the PLO to make concessions or be seen as working too closely with Israel, as Fatah now had to worry that it could be pushed out of power in short order if it took a false step. Second, a strong Hamas prevented the Israelis from wanting to make significant concessions, as they were worried Fatah would not be able to deliver on their side of the bargain, thus leaving Israel to face a newly empowered adversary that would simply renew hostilities. Finally, Hamas could launch rhetorical or violent attacks against the Israelis to initiate reprisals and turn both the Palestinian and Israeli publics against any deal. When Hamas was weaker, each of these issues was much less of a problem; one could even argue that the Israelis were desirous of a deal with Fatah to head off the rise of Hamas. Once Hamas became a viable alternative to the PLO, however, the possibility of spoiling, outbidding, and general strategically counterproductive violence became a reality.

As talks failed to deliver a deal at the close of President Bill Clinton’s term, hardliners on both sides moved in to take advantage. Likud leader Ariel Sharon sought to undercut Labor Prime Minister Ehud Barak by laying claim to Jerusalem and its holy sites, which helped set off Palestinian riots that marked the beginning of the second intifada. As with the first intifada, Fatah had not started it, but it again moved to try to take advantage and employ limited coercion to yield greater concessions from the Israelis at the bargaining table. Unfortunately for Fatah and the Palestinian national movement, unlike the first intifada, the movement was now multipolar. Every single mechanism predicted by the structuralist theory for multipolar movements presented itself in spades, and the new uprising became one of the paradigmatic examples of politically ineffective non-state violence.

Rather than benefit from the violence, Arafat soon realized that the strength of Hamas and its allies meant that Fatah risked losing control of the intifada as well as the support of the people. As Mia Bloom demonstrated in excellent detail, Hamas dominated in early suicide attacks against Israelis, launching the only one in the last quarter of 2000 and seven more in the first half of 2001 before any other group got started.\textsuperscript{360} Fatah was now challenged for leadership in the armed struggle not only by Hamas, but also by its younger members who believed that increased violence was necessary to coerce the Israelis. As Nigel Parsons notes, "Fatah felt that Hamas had taken over the armed struggle and therefore encouraged the creation of the [Al-Aqsa Martyrs] Brigades."\textsuperscript{361}

The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were Fatah's answer to the Qassam Brigades, and they took over the lead in suicide attacks in short order, launching eleven such attacks in the first quarter of 2002 as compared to only three by Hamas and four by Islamic Jihad. The attacks were popular with significant portions of the Palestinian populace, which themselves were suffering three to five times as many casualties at the hands of the Israelis at the time. However, the outbidding spirals they represented yielded no significant strategic gains and, with all major groups now involved, diminishing organizational returns.

This increase in violence led to many more deaths than the first intifada on both sides, but it was neither enough to coerce Israeli withdrawal nor designed in a way to send any type of clear signal to the Israeli government or its people. The multiple competing groups had no coherent strategy. Fatah wanted to limit attacks to the West Bank and Gaza to signal the limit of

\textsuperscript{360} Bloom, \textit{Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism.}
\textsuperscript{361} Parsons, \textit{The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa, 267.}
their desires to those areas and to split the Israeli populace.\textsuperscript{362} On the other hand, Hamas pledged to reconquer all of historic Palestine and launched attacks inside the 1967 borders accordingly. Thus, many Israelis discerned no signal except that they had no partner with the Palestinians, Fatah or otherwise, and the Israeli peace camp all but collapsed.

The credibility of Fatah and the PLO was shot, and attempts by Arafat to utilize or constrain the violence were futile. The Palestinian national movement thus emerged from the second intifada divided between two equally powerful poles, neither willing to yield to the other, and each in control of part of Palestine. Strategic success seems further away than ever, and the continued multipolarity of the movement ensures that any use of violence is unlikely to advance the cause. A growing number of Palestinians recognize this fact, but whether they can successfully encourage a unified movement, if not a unipolar one, is anyone’s guess.

Conclusion: The Multipolar Drift and the Future of the Palestinian National Movement

In Gaza today, rockets are launched towards neighboring Israeli towns amidst increasing Israeli airstrikes, raising the specter of yet another war in the territory. In Ramallah, Palestinian youths have camped out in Manara Square on hunger strike, claiming that they will not leave until Fatah and Hamas hold unity talks, as their continued infighting has held back the Palestinian cause.\textsuperscript{363} And across the West Bank, Gaza, and the Diaspora, debates rage among Palestinian organizations and civilians over the wisdom of negotiating with the Israelis or using

\textsuperscript{362} “Fatah pressed for a clear acknowledgement that the goals of the national struggle was the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and that resistance, armed and popular, should be confined to these territories.” Ibid., 279.

\textsuperscript{363} It is interesting to note that one of the stipulations of the rallies surrounding the hunger strikes is that only Palestinian flags be waved, no flags from political factions. Even though Fatah and Hamas voiced support for the rallies, many of their members still tried to infiltrate them and display their group’s flag. “Youth Continue Hunger Strike in Ramallah’s Al-Manara,” Ma’an, March 14, 2011, http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=368555
violence against them, as groups differ whether to actively support, defer, or attempt to spoil upcoming talks.

The remarkable thing about these stories, which are littered across newspapers in the region and around the globe at this very moment, is not how unique they are, but rather how seamlessly all of them would fit into a description of the Palestinian national movement at almost any time in the past fifty years. The rockets launched by small groups in Gaza to increase their domestic support or spark a larger conflict—while the dominant Hamas dithers over whether to stop the violence or escalate it—evokes memories of the conflict in southern Lebanon in the 1980s. During the ‘artillery war,’ weaker Palestinian groups sent rockets into northern Israel as Fatah, then the dominant party in the region, debated whether to enforce a cease-fire or take the lead in strikes on the social movement’s central adversary. The calls for unity on the lips of youths today were once spoken by Mufti Haj Amin Al-Husseini, Yasser Arafat and George Habash, and were enshrined in the Palestinian National Charter in 1964:

Article 8: The phase in their history, through which the Palestinian people are now living, is that of national (watani) struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Thus the conflicts among the Palestinian national forces are secondary, and should be ended for the sake of the basic conflict that exists between the forces of Zionism and of imperialism on the one hand, and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On this basis the Palestinian masses, regardless of whether they are residing in the national homeland or in diaspora (mahajir) constitute - both their organizations and the individuals - one national front working for the retrieval of Palestine and its liberation through armed struggle.\textsuperscript{364}

The split over potential peace negotiations has literally hundreds of precedents, including the attempts of Fatah and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—today key supporters of negotiations—to derail peace talks between Israeli and Arab leaders over the fate of the Palestinians in the 1960s and 1970s. This is not mere coincidence. Rather, it is

\textsuperscript{364} Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement, Leila S. Kadi (ed.).
evidence of the existence of systematic explanations for the actions and effectiveness of Palestinian groups that are generalizable across time and space.

More than any observer, the Palestinians themselves have recognized the problems posed by a lack of coherence in strategy and signaling stemming from a movement with so many factions. As Saeb Erekat argued in internal meetings with his Negotiations Support Unit: “Palestinians are speaking with 2,000 voices just when we need to be speaking with one.”

The common path to achieving that one voice, suggested by almost every scholar and participant, has been an alliance between various factions. Unfortunately, such an arrangement is not easily attained, stable, or even the best solution to the problem. Such unity has been attempted countless times, most (in)famously with the Politburo of Unified Action for Palestinian Revolutionary Forces, the Permanent Bureau of the Palestinian Guerrilla Organizations, the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command, and various branches of the PLO itself. These attempts, which include some of the most successful of the bunch, brought unity among the strongest factions that was fleeting at best and illusory at worst due to the contradictory incentives facing the constituent groups.

If this situation between Hamas and Fatah continues, the best-case scenario for the current unity deal would be a situation similar to 1974, when Fatah, the PFLP and other groups united briefly behind a new PLO policy to pursue a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. This move helped garner international recognition for the Palestinians from both the Arab

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365 "Meeting Minutes: Dr. Saeb Erakat Meeting with the Negotiations Support Unit,” (Ramallah: June 2, 2009).
366 Indeed, it is hard to find a book on the Palestinian national movement that does not lament the lack of unity. Sayigh: “The major challenge facing the PLO leadership was to maintain national unity among disparate factions and scattered communities, and to do so in the face of constant intervention by one Arab state or another.” Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 679. Parsons, The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa, Gresh, The Plo: The Struggle within, Towards an Independent Palestinian State, Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics. Interestingly, Walid Khalidi once noted seven key differences between the struggle in Algeria and the one in Palestine to explain why the latter’s success might not be a good model for the Palestinians, but the one key factor he did not mention was the polarity of movement. Yaari, Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah, 186-187.
League and the United Nations, but little else due to the swift (re)fracturing of the movement. The worst-case scenario for the current agreement may be 2007, when the unity deal between Fatah and Hamas fell apart in a deluge of violence, recriminations, and foreign meddling after Hamas unexpectedly won the 2006 elections, leading to perhaps the starkest period of disunity since the Oslo Accords.

Without the emergence of a dominant organization or strong, centralized institutions that include all significant groups, the faces of leaders and funders may change, as they have for more than 50 years, but, unfortunately for the Palestinians, the ending will likely remain the same. The prospect of international recognition of a Palestinian state at the United Nations this fall, the lack of progress in talks with the Israelis, and the recent Arab uprisings may help spur these changes, but they are not a substitute for them. The elections called for by the current deal, the institutions Salam Fayyad is furiously constructing, and the rumors of Hamas accepting a comprehensive peace based around the 1967 borders rightly raises expectations. Fatah and Hamas are gambling that they can get a bigger pie to divide together, but as of yet there is little to stop either party from deciding at any time that it can get a bigger slice apart.

Without unipolarity, in which power serves to create coherence in ways intentions rarely do, the movement is likely to see ineffective attempts at coercion and mobilization. Absent such a change, the Palestinian movement will likely continue to resemble the story of Sisyphus, struggling mightily to achieve a state, while the structure of the scenario ensures an eerily familiar lack of success.
The Irish National Movement: Capitalizing on the Unipolar Moment

To subvert the tyranny of our execrable government, to break the connection with England, the never-failing source of all our political evils, and to assert the independence of my country—these were my objectives. To unite the whole people of Ireland, to abolish the memory of all past dissensions, and to substitute the common name of Irishmen in place of the denomination of Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter—these were my means.

Theobald Wolfe Tone

Introduction

Analysis of the Irish national movement finds strong support for the structuralist theory of non-state violence compared with competing theories. First and foremost, the use of violence by Irish armed groups was strategically effective when the movement was unipolar and strategically ineffective when it was multipolar. The main unipolar period saw large-scale British withdrawal and the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922, while the multipolarity of successive campaigns up to and including The Troubles of 1968-1998 yielded a consistent lack of strategic success, despite the longest sustained period of armed struggle against the British in Irish history.

Second, the hierarchical position of groups in the Irish national movement drove their relative focus on strategic and organizational objectives as well as their associated use of violence, with striking results. After being founded in protest of the Official Irish Republican Army’s decision to move away from violence and into politics and negotiation with the British, the Provisional IRA proceeded to take these exact same actions when it suited their organizational ends after having supplanted their old rivals years later. In the interim, weaker groups employed violence to spoil or outbid again and again. Their stronger rivals were often

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At the time of Tone’s quote, ‘Dissenter’ referred to Protestants that were not part of the Church of England. During this period, Catholics were severely discriminated against, as were Dissenters to a degree.
caught between choosing to curtail the violence or launch more attacks themselves to maintain predominance, neither of which was beneficial for the movement. Even when groups tried to coordinate, as with the ‘Armalite and ballot box’ strategy of the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein (perhaps the clearest test of the alternative good cop/bad cop hypothesis), their competing organizational needs yielded a lack of clear signaling, credibility, and, ultimately, a lack of strategic success.

The use of violence was not entirely unsuccessful during The Troubles, however, as it drove shifts in the hierarchy that represented organizational effectiveness for some groups, such as the Provisional IRA. Nonetheless, the outcome for the movement remained the same, so much so that the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 was called “Sunningdale for slow learners,” in that it was nearly identical to that deal, which was signed twenty-five years earlier. The fact that the Provisional IRA and Provisional Sinn Fein, the central actors in The Troubles, violently rejected the former agreement but were central supporters of the latter poses a puzzle that has frustrated countless members of the Irish national movement. Although it may do little to assuage those who felt that they fought thirty years for nothing, the structuralist theory is best poised to explain both outcomes. The polarity of the movement did not change in thirty years, therefore neither did strategic progress. The hierarchy of the movement did shift, however, hence Sinn Fein’s decision to reverse themselves and agree to a deal with the British that was similar in the main text but, importantly, different in which groups signed on the dotted line.

In this case, violence succeeded in getting the Provisional IRA and Provisional Sinn Fein a seat at the table, but it failed to change the movement structure or secure the hoped-for strategic objective of a unified Ireland. At best, unipolarity within the republican wing of the movement helped ensure that the PIRA and PSF could credibly constrain most violence within the
movement and refuse to be pulled in by outbidding and spoiling attempts by weak non-poles like the Continuity IRA and Real IRA. These findings are summarized in Table 3. The remainder of the chapter explains the political effectiveness of non-state violence within campaigns of the Irish national movement in greater detail.
Table 3. Summary of Campaigns in the Irish National Movement, 1908-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Name and Time Period</th>
<th>Polarity During Campaign</th>
<th>Hierarchy of Poles Before Campaign</th>
<th>Hierarchy of Poles After Campaign</th>
<th>Strategic Outcome of Campaign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Easter Rising (1908-1918)</td>
<td>Multipolarity</td>
<td>1. IRA/SF</td>
<td>1. IRA/SF</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Irish War (1918-1923)</td>
<td>Unipolarity</td>
<td>1. IRA/SF</td>
<td>1. IRA/SF/Fine Gael</td>
<td>Major Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. IRA/SF Anti-Treaty (Fianna Fail)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Campaign (1956-1962)</td>
<td>Multipolarity</td>
<td>1. IRA/SF</td>
<td>1. IRA/SF</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Troubles (1962-1970)</td>
<td>Multipolarity</td>
<td>1. IRA/SF</td>
<td>1. IRA/SF</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups using violence at the time are highlighted in green with vertical lines, and groups trying to stop violence are highlighted in red with horizontal lines (groups with no color neither used violence nor restrained it). The thicker the lines, the more strongly committed the group was to that tactic. This helps demonstrate how the weaker poles were often the ones initiating violent outbidding, chain-ganging, or spoiling, while the strongest group was the most likely to attempt to restrain it, regardless of ideology or other group characteristics. For one measure of the organizational effectiveness of violence for a given group, note its relative position in the hierarchy before and after a campaign.

INLA: Irish National Liberation Army
IPP: Irish Parliamentary Party
IRA: Irish Republican Army
IRSP: Irish Republican Socialist Party
OIRA: Official Irish Republican Army
OSF: Official Sinn Fein
PIRA: Provisional Irish Republican Army
PSF: Provisional Sinn Fein
SDLP: Social Democratic and Labour Party
SF: Sinn Fein
The Easter Rising and The Irish War of Independence, 1916-1923: Multipolar Failure, Unipolar Success

Introduction

Wolfe Tone understood that a united front was necessary to achieve the main goal of Irish nationalism: independence from Great Britain. The problem was that disagreements over the power and tactics of relevant groups generally led to a multipolar national movement that was poorly positioned to yield a politically effective campaign of violence. Tone’s generation was no exception, as his attempt to liberate Ireland at the close of the 18th century was not supported by many nationalists. Without unity, let alone unipolarity, Tone’s campaign was a total failure, yielding the establishment of the United Kingdom of England and Ireland in 1800.

Unfortunately for the Irish, this pattern of multipolar, violent campaigns of failure was to repeat itself numerous times over the next two hundred years. None was more famous than the Easter Rising of 1916, still commemorated to this day. As with its predecessors and many of its successors, the Rising was marked by a short-term burst of violence launched by a faction that did not enjoy a dominant position in the national movement, let alone a leading one.

Nonetheless, the aftermath of the Rising contributed to the first and only violent campaign launched by a unipolar Irish national movement. As the structuralist theory of non-state violence predicts, this campaign yielded a total success and the most significant gains for Irish independence before or since (see Table 3).

368 Commemoration of the Rising has always been a major event for the IRA and Sinn Fein in particular. The Irish government restarted commemoration of the Rising at its 90th anniversary in 2006, after moving away from such commemorations after The Troubles started in 1968.
Ch. 5: The Irish National Movement

The Easter Rising

A multipolar leadership fought over hierarchical position and the direction of the movement in the period up to and including the Easter Rising. The Irish national movement had a long history of split leadership, often coalescing into two broad factions known as nationalists and republicans. Although significant exceptions exist on all counts, nationalist groups were generally more moderate in their demands and tactics, whereas republican organizations generally sought a more robust version of independence and were more willing to take up the gun if political moves were frustrated. This division raises the question of just how a social movement should be defined, as nationalist and republican streams can be identified over time. Nonetheless, the fact that nationalist and republicans shared a common objective of greater Irish independence, a common base of supporters that often moved between them, and common enemies (the British and the Irish unionists and Loyalists who sought to keep Ireland part of the UK) means that conceiving of them as competing factions inside a single Irish national movement makes sound historical and analytical sense.

For example, Sinn Fein became the republican party by 1917, but when it was originally founded by Arthur Griffith, it followed a more nationalist line, envisioning not a Republic but a joint monarchy. The nationalists under John Redmond helped build up the Irish Volunteers (IRA) as a military force initially. In many cases, the nationalists looked to force when their hold on power in the movement was threatened (like Redmond), and the Republicans looked to engage politically when they shifted to the top position (like Eamon De Valera), demonstrating that hierarchical structure often trumped ideology.

The distinction between unionists and Loyalists is similar to that of republicans and nationalists, albeit on the opposite side of the issue. The two groups shared a common objective of keeping Northern Ireland separate from the Irish Republic and in union with England, had a common base of supporters that often moved between them, and shared common enemies (the republicans, nationalists, and the Irish government). Both groups are almost entirely Protestant, just as republicans and nationalists are largely Catholic. The distinction between the two groups is imperfect, but it is usually split along the lines of class and the use of force. ‘Unionist’ often refers to upper class Protestants, including most of those who long served in government to maintain the Union with England until recent times. ‘Loyalist’ is often used for working-class Protestants that are more amenable to the use of force in the face of republican and nationalist threats.

As a rule, groups that aim largely for greater independence for Ireland will be included in the movement, whereas those that either want to maintain or strengthen ties with the British (e.g. unionists and Loyalists) or focus on other social or economic objectives will not be included.
For decades before the Rising, Charles Parnell’s Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) led the national movement. A nationalist party, it pushed for Home Rule within the United Kingdom. As the dominant group, it focused on elections and Parliamentary politics. Its separation from, and distaste for, numerous armed revolts by competing republican groups in the 1800s helped doom them to failure. In the years before the rising, two key groups emerged that would shockingly dethrone the IPP and change the course of Irish history: Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

Arthur Griffith founded Sinn Fein in Dublin in 1905 as an explicitly non-factional organization, as he wrote two years later: “The Sinn Fein platform is and is intended to be broad enough to hold all Irishmen who believe in Irish independence, whether they be republicans or whether they be not.” Griffith’s mission called for self-reliance and separation from Great Britain, hence the name Sinn Fein, which means ‘We Ourselves.’ Griffith may have longed for total independence, but his original vision was for a dual monarchy in the model of Austria-Hungary, believing London could not stomach anything bolder.

Despite the growing attractiveness of Griffith’s approach, Sinn Fein was dwarfed by the IPP early on. The IPP bested the first and only Sinn Fein candidate for Parliament in 1908, 73% to 27%. Sinn Fein took slight comfort in the fact that nearly all unionists voted for the IPP candidate, demonstrating who the real leader for Irish independence was, at least in their eyes. Nonetheless, Sinn Fein did not run another candidate for MP until after the Rising, although it did start to gain ground in local elections.

The nationalist-republican rivalry was perhaps no more clearly on display than in the early years of the Ógláigh na hÉireann, the Irish Volunteers, or, as they were later known, the

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373 Ibid., 31-33.
Irish Republican Army or IRA. With Home Rule a possibility, the largely Protestant unionists in the north had formed the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) as a paramilitary group in early 1913 to keep Ireland under British control. In response, Eoin MacNeill founded the paramilitary Irish Volunteers in November of the same year with encouragement from the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), a longtime secretive republican organization founded in 1858. Although originally against the creation of an Irish Volunteer force that could serve as a rival to their dominant position, IPP leader John Redmond later sought to grow and control it. This led to a Volunteer executive council littered with republicans and nationalists from all relevant organizations: the IPP, Sinn Fein, and the IRB. Although the Volunteers could have served a vehicle for movement unity, instead the armed group was simply the forum for power struggles and little coordinated action.

The Volunteers ultimately split over World War I, with Redmond encouraging them to fight alongside the British and the republican groups urging them to secede and stay home. Only 10,000 of the 180,000 volunteers broke off, a further indication of the IPP’s superiority at the time. In the struggle for control of the Irish national movement, however, Redmond’s victory may have been a Pyrrhic one. The seceding Volunteers were the only Volunteers by 1916, the previous majority having been killed in the war or gradually disbanded.

A number of the remaining Irish Volunteers now set their sights on an armed uprising to expel the British, who were thought to be vulnerable with their forces deployed on the European mainland. The already severely diminished Volunteers were weakened by further splits, however, as MacNeill and Griffith both tried to stop the Rising just as it was scheduled to begin on April 23, 1916: Easter Sunday. The IRB-led conspirators decided to push on without

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375 Home Rule had passed Parliament by this time, but it did not go into effect. English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA, 9-10.
376 Feeney, Sinn Fein: A Hundred Turbulent Years, 55.
MacNeill, Griffith, and their supporters, leaving them with only 1,200 men to occupy key positions in Dublin the following day.\(^{377}\) Despite being caught entirely by surprise, the British crushed the Rising in less than a week, which resembled more of a Dublin-based coup due to its lack of significant mass or elite support.

As J. Bowyer Bell noted, “The IRB accepted that the Rising would probably be a military failure.”\(^{378}\) They were not disappointed; it was. As the structuralist theory predicts, the weaker pole tried to chain-gang the movement into a conflict for which it was not prepared, and the multipolar structure of the movement helped ensure the campaign’s defeat. Notwithstanding media reports to the contrary, it was not a ‘Sinn Fein Rising,’ as at the time Sinn Fein was still committed to a dual monarchy and had worked to stop the revolt. The IPP was even less supportive, with Redmond arguing that the Rising was ‘even more an attempt to hit us than to hit England.’\(^{379}\)

The outcome, at least, supports Redmond’s claim, as the Rising was at best a selfish success for the Volunteers and the IRB.\(^{380}\) Although it generated no concessions from the British, their reaction to the uprising helped turn the tide of popular support in favor of these republican factions. In a story that was to repeat itself time and again in the 20\(^{th}\) century, the majority of the Irish people did not approve of the use of violence against the British, but they hated the British use of violence against Irishmen even more. As Rising conspirator Eamon De Valera had suggested: “England pretends it is not by the naked sword, but by the good will of the people of the country that she is here. We will draw the naked sword to make her bare her own naked

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\(^{377}\) Ibid., 57.


\(^{380}\) Again, the ‘self’ in this case is the organization and the label ‘selfish’ refers to the IRB, not the individuals, as many would argue that giving up one’s life for the freedom of one’s country against long odds is the definition of ‘selfless.’
In the aftermath of the Rising, the British miscalculated. They believed that, as British commanding General Sir John Maxwell explained, a harsh line would “ensure that there will be no treason whispered, even whispered, in Ireland for a hundred years.” Instead, their decision to execute the leaders of the Rising (including the tying of a crippled James Connolly to a chair before a firing squad) and intern of thousands of Irish without trial sparked a wave of anger against the British that translated into support for the harder-line republican groups. As Liam Deasy, subsequent IRA member describes: “In consequence of the events that occurred in the decisive week of the Easter Rising of 1916, and more particularly of the events that followed it, thousands of young men all over Ireland, indeed thousands of men of all ages in the country, turned irrevocably against the English government and became uncompromisingly dedicated to the cause of obliterating the last vestiges of British rule in Ireland. I was one of them.”

Polar Shift: The Fusing and Rise of Sinn Fein and the IRA

The increase in popular support and recruits more than outweighed any losses from the Rising, but the problem for the Irish national movement was not force size but force structure. The Rising failed in large part because the movement had been split among competing groups for years. A subsequent campaign could only succeed if these factions somehow came together for the greater strategic good.

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The process started on the republican side of the ledger, whose own internal squabbles would have doomed the Rising even without the presence of the nationalists. The decisive moment was the conventions of Sinn Fein and the Irish Volunteers in October 1917. Going in, these were two separate organizations with significant disagreements over leadership and objectives within each. Coming out, they approached a single unit, with the same leader, governing elite, and strategic purpose.

After significant debate at the Ard Fheis (convention) among its 2,000 delegates, Arthur Griffith agreed to yield the presidency of Sinn Fein to Eamon De Valera, an IRB member and a former leader of the Rising. In the process, the two reconciled the supporters of their competing visions for Ireland of a dual monarchy and a republic. De Valera claimed that “We are not doctrinaire republicans,” and the leadership agreed to focus on achieving Irish independence, after which time the Irish people could vote in a referendum on whether they preferred a monarchy or a republic. After being unanimously elected president of Sinn Fein (with Griffith as vice president), De Valera was then elected president of the Irish Volunteers at their convention the next day, again in unanimous fashion, with Cathal Brugha as Chief of Staff and Michael Collins as Director of Organization. De Valera was not alone in his dual role: “The dual membership of both Sinn Fein and the Volunteers [IRA], which was normal at the local level, simply reflected what existed throughout the organizations from the top down.” At the time, six out of twenty were executives in both organizations, including the president and most key posts.

The outcome of these conventions was unprecedented. The factions could have gone their separate ways. They could have remained disconnected but pledged to work together. Instead, they institutionally bound themselves as one with a single leadership, thus shunning multipolarity or unity while putting themselves on the path to a unipolar movement for the first time. Whether, as Michael Collins suggested, the Sinn Fein politicians had captured the Volunteers, or “as Sean Ó Faoláin put it years later, the IRB [and the Volunteers] captured Sinn Fein,” matters little for the structuralist theory. The key was that the republicans were now a single pole, and only the nationalists stood in their way within the movement, not each other.

The momentum for Sinn Fein/IRA began building with four straight victories over IPP candidates in the by-elections of 1917. The synergy of the political and military wings of Sinn Fein/IRA was on display in these campaigns, as candidates were often dual members and IRA Volunteers made up most of the canvassers. In the first by-election in Roscommon: “The worst snowfall anyone could remember made electioneering extremely unpleasant. There was a big freeze; people and animals died. In the midst of all of this the young Volunteers, icicles hanging from their hair, struggled along highways and byways, carrying shovels to dig themselves out of snowdrifts. By contrast, Redmond’s teams of MPs and paid organizers sat in warm hotels. They were snowed in, unable to canvass, they said.”

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388 Ibid., 67.
389 Ibid., 61-66.
390 In De Valera’s election in Clare, “Throughout the campaign the Volunteers played the dominant role. Uniformed Volunteers marched, held band and torchlight parades, organized church-gate meetings after Mass and generally swaggered about the constituency.” In Kilkenny, “as in Clare, the Volunteers did the campaigning, helped now by the new Sinn Fein MPs who came to Kilkenny to make seditious speeches on [Sinn Fein candidate] Cosgrave’s behalf.” Ibid., 63-66.
during The Troubles, one of the elections saw a Sinn Fein/IRA candidate win while in prison. The motto? ‘Put him in to get him out.’

These victories were only a preview of what was to come in the December 1918 elections. Driven by the reaction to the Rising, the unification of the republicans, and the unpopular threat of British conscription in WWI that had further driven support from the nationalists, Sinn Fein won 73 of 105 seats in Ireland, including a clean sweep in 24 of the 32 counties. The IPP won only 6 seats, despite the fact that Sinn Fein candidates campaigned to varying degrees on an abstentionist platform, meaning they would refuse to take their seats in Parliament. The unionists won 26 seats, all but 3 in Ulster, meaning that they represented a challenge to independence, but not one internal to the movement. 1918 was the biggest electoral victory in Irish history, as it cemented Sinn Fein/IRA as the dominant pole in a unipolar Irish national movement. It really almost was ‘Ourselves Alone,’ as Sinn Fein is sometimes (mis)translated. As David Fitzpatrick noted, ‘There was a wonderful oneness about Irish politics.’

*The Irish War of Independence: 1919-1923*

Refusing to legitimize the British hold on Ireland, Sinn Fein set up its own parliament in Dublin (the Dáil Éireann) on January 21, 1919 with those members who were not in prison or

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391 In another precedent for The Troubles, Thomas Ashe, the president of the IRB after the Rising, died in prison while on hunger strike. This drove further support to Sinn Fein and the IRA. Ibid., 93.
394 It was a dominant showing by Sinn Fein. Their vote total would have been higher if the IPP had run more candidates against them instead of having them run unopposed, as well as if they had run candidates in the North against the IPP in four districts. Estimates of total vote support for Sinn Fein are 53% on the low end to 65% or more on the high end for all of Ireland. Removing the unionists, this translates to around 75% of the entire national movement, which is clearly unipolarity. Those who suggest that support for the IPP was higher overlook the fact that in the 37 head-to-head contests, Sinn Fein beat the IPP candidates in 35. Furthermore, the two exceptions were in Belfast and John Redmond’s old seat. In any case, Sinn Fein viewed the elections as a countrywide plebiscite for independence that went strongly in their favor. Feeney, *Sinn Fein: A Hundred Turbulent Years*, 109.
395 Ibid., 91.
otherwise impaired. The coalescing between Sinn Fein and the Volunteers was repeated with the Dáil and the IRA, now the official name of the Volunteers. De Valera was again president of both the Dáil and the IRA, Michael Collins was Finance Minister of the former and Director of Intelligence for the latter, and Cathal Brugha was Minister of Defense in the Dáil and IRA Chief of Staff.\textsuperscript{396} The day of the Dáil’s first meeting also marked the beginning of the Irish War of Independence (also known as the Anglo-Irish war or the Tan War), as the IRA killed two Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) policemen in Soloheadbeg of County Tipperary.

Unlike its predecessor from the days of the Rising, the IRA of 1919-1921 was neither conventional nor split between competing nationalist and republican groups. Collins had rebuilt the IRA to conduct guerrilla warfare and counterintelligence operations, rather than large-scale engagements.\textsuperscript{397} The initial attack on the RIC was thus emblematic of a larger strategy. By late 1920, the IRA had destroyed 513 RIC barracks, killed 117 RIC men, and helped coerce 2,000 resignations as well as a significant drop in new RIC recruitment.\textsuperscript{398} Negating this force destroyed Britain’s eyes and ears in Ireland, weakening their control and helping spur the British to further indiscriminate, counterproductive tactics.\textsuperscript{399} Coupled with the killing of British

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item De Valera was in prison at the first meeting of the Dáil, but after his escape in February, he took his position as president from Cathal Brugha, who had served as acting president. There would be some shifts over time in relevance amongst Sinn Fein, the IRA, and the Dáil as the focus moved from elections to running a war, but all major leaders were part of two of these institutions, if not all three, like De Valera. Furthermore, the IRA swore allegiance to the Dáil.
\item This was another contribution of the Rising, as its conventional failure convinced Collins and later IRA Chief of Staff Richard Mulcahy that a new approach was required. Smith, \textit{Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement}, 33-34. Although the IRA was not an entirely centralized army, as it relied in part on ‘flying columns’ and local commanders, the movement still had central leadership and control. The internal tensions over tactics would be familiar to any state that coordinated a nation-wide conflict, as were the civil-military squabbles between those who saw themselves more as soldiers or politicians and distrusted the other. Local units sometimes took actions on their own, but not under the banner of a competing party or army. There was no significant alternative for any who felt nationalism was a worthy objective and resented British actions. Thus, the army was part of a unipolar movement. Richard Mulcahy, both an IRA leader and member of the Dáil, argued that there was harmony between the political and military branches. English, \textit{Armed Struggle: The History of the Ira}, 24.
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intelligence agents and the launching of strikes and boycotts, the IRA and Sinn Fein ensured that “the pacification of Ireland would require a commitment of Boer War proportions: a raising of troop levels to 100,000 men, the establishment of security zones... at a probable cost of around £100 million per annum.” Ultimately, the British public and government were not ready to pay that price either in blood, treasure, or reputation as a colonial oppressor over their own United Kingdom.

The unipolarity of the movement was the key factor in the campaign’s success. The IRA and Sinn Fein were able to carry off the boycotts and killings of the RIC due to significant, undivided support from populace. The lack of internal competition (Sinn Fein won 124 of 128 seats unopposed in the southern Irish elections of May 1921) made the paradox all but vanish, allowing movement leaders to focus their energy on the strategic goal of independence. There was no outbidding among factions, and no initial spoiling when the truce came. From the British perspective, the movement had significant credibility to continue a long war, as there was no nationalist alternative to turn to and split its adversary. Finally, it was not just a numbers game, as the IRA had no more volunteers (and likely fewer) than the 180,000 of 1914. In fact, M. L. R. Smith claims that the focus of the war involved 80,000 British police, soldiers, and auxiliaries against 3,000 Irish irregulars. The difference was not the number of armed men in the movement, but rather the number of significant groups leading it: 1.

With a unipolar movement, Sinn Fein and the IRA successfully coerced the British to sue for peace in July of 1921. Subsequent negotiations in London did not yield the republic, but the

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401 The four other seats were filled by independent, ex-Unionist candidates that represented Trinity College, Dublin. Nicholas Whyte, "Dáil Elections since 1918," (Economic and Social Research Council, Northern Ireland, 2011).
402 Smith, Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement, 35. Bell claims that the IRA had 100,000-200,000 Volunteers by 1921, but even if true, that is no more than in 1914. Bell, The Secret Army: A History of the IRA 1916-1979, 26.
proposed Free State did achieve far more than Home Rule, as Arthur Griffith explained: “We have come back from London with that Treaty—Saorstat na hÉireann recognized—the Free State of Ireland. We have brought back the flag; we have brought back the evacuation of Ireland after 700 years by British troops and the formation of the Irish army. We have brought back to Ireland her full rights and powers of fiscal control. We have brought back to Ireland equality with England.”

As the hierarchy hypothesis predicts, and as would recur with the IRA’s successors, the leading group cut a deal and so did what they claimed they would never do when they were second to Redmond’s nationalists in the pecking order. To be fair, however, Sinn Fein did get much more than Home Rule, which the nationalists never achieved in any case. Although subsequent debates would rage over whether the rebellion could achieve more, this outcome can only be considered a major strategic and organizational success from the perspective of the structuralist theory of non-state violence.

Epilogue: Civil War, Partition, and a Return to Multipolarity

Although Sinn Fein and the IRA held together throughout the war, the Treaty ultimately led both groups to split down the middle. Pro-treaty members like Collins and Griffith argued that, although imperfect, it represented the best possible deal at the time and was a significant step towards an independent republic. Anti-treaty foes like De Valera and Brugha argued that the treaty did not go far enough, and that even a symbolic oath to England, coupled with the partition

403 Although the final claim was a stretch, the previous ones were certainly not. “Dail Eireann Parliamentary Debates,” (December 19, 1921).
of the North, was not what they and their comrades in the Easter Rising and the recent war had sacrificed to achieve. 404

Ultimately, the pro-treaty side won the day in the Dáil (64 ministers voting in favor to 57 against), with the Irish people (58 pro-Treaty Sinn Fein candidates winning seats versus 35 anti-Treaty Sinn Fein candidates in the 1922 elections) and, ultimately, on the battlefield. Having refused to honor the majority vote of the Dáil, the Anti-Treaty forces had by April of 1922 occupied much of western Ireland as well as key points in Dublin. In scenes reminiscent of the Easter Rising, civil war began in earnest on June 28, 1922 as Collins’ Free State army began shelling his old comrades holed up in Dublin’s major judicial building, the Four Courts. Brugha, Collins, and others were among the casualties in a conflict that was bloodier than the war just concluded with England, but the Free State army crushed the rebellion within a year.

In the 1923 Free State General Election, the pro-treaty Cumann na nGaedheal (‘Society of the Gaels’) cemented its victory over the anti-treaty ‘Republicans,’ who won only 44 of 153 seats, although unipolarity was finished. 405 These two groups would soon evolve into the two dominant political parties in Ireland to this day: Fine Gael (pro-treaty) and Fianna Fail (anti-treaty). The latter, headed by Eamon De Valera, would ultimately sign the oath of allegiance to Britain and join the Dáil after electoral gains in 1927, proving yet again that power trumps ideology, as Irish playwright George Bernhard Shaw suggested: “Any practical statesman will, under duress, swallow a dozen oaths to get his hand on the driving wheel.” 406 In any case, the treaty did lay the groundwork for Ireland to become a republic, as it did officially in 1949.

404 Interestingly, although both split, a majority of Sinn Fein went for the treaty and a majority of the IRA went against it. This perhaps further proves the extent to which, even within one pole (or to the extent they were soon to be two), the group that stands to benefit more from the selective incentives of strategic gain is more likely to support the deal, and vice versa.

405 Whyte, “Dáil Elections since 1918.”

Nonetheless, the Irish national movement lived on with its focus shifting to the North, which was the only part of the country still within the United Kingdom. In the future, however, the movement would not escape the multipolar trap.

Figure 16. Map of Irish Republic and Northern Ireland
Variations on a Theme: The Failed Multipolar Campaigns of The Troubles

Introduction

Given the success of the Irish War of Independence, one might have expected a similar result from the national movement’s violent campaign that began in 1969. Indeed, many republicans certainly did. The Troubles, as they became known, represented the longest sustained campaign of violence in Irish history, prolonged in part by the belief that, as in 1921, victory was just around the corner. The number of attacks, casualties, and paramilitary recruits were equal to or larger than those of the war fifty years earlier. As with the previous conflict, the Irish shunned conventional battles in favor of guerrilla warfare, bombings, and hunger strikes, while the British countered with internment, curfews, and a sizeable local constabulary force backed by the regular army. The ideology of the main participants was the same.

There was one key difference, however. During The Troubles, the national movement was significantly split internally. Numerous republican and nationalist groups wanted to pull the movement in different directions, but unlike in 1918, none were able to co-opt, rub out, outcompete or otherwise sweep the competition from the field. Multipolarity thus doomed each campaign of The Troubles to strategic failure or, at best, very limited success. As predicted by the structuralist theory, internal competition led to violent outbidding, chain-ganging, and spoiling that yielded counterproductive sectarian attacks, powerful Protestant militias, and fruitless negotiations. The infighting and lack of coordination among groups produced unclear signals and gave the movement little credibility in the eyes of the British and their allies.

Violence did help groups move up and down the movement hierarchy, but the inability to escape the multipolar paradox meant that they simply changed roles, not the strategic outcome.

407 This comparison resembles the method of difference. Other key variables are held constant except for the explanatory variable of polarity, which changes along with the dependent variable of strategic success.
There is no better evidence of the power of polarity and hierarchy than the two major
tried resolutions to the campaign, arrived at a quarter of a century apart. The multipolarity
of the movement in the years before, during, and after negotiations in both cases explains the fact
that there was little difference between the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 and the Good Friday
Agreement of 1998. The movement hierarchy and unity did shift between the deals, however,
which explained variation in groups’ willingness to sign and, more importantly, why one deal
held up and the other did not.

Figure 17. Map of Northern Ireland
Before The Troubles: A Movement Adrift

In the half century between the Irish War of Independence and The Troubles, the Irish national movement was adrift in a sea of splits and recriminations. The War of Independence and subsequent civil war had exhausted the country and torn at its social and political fabric. As the smoke began to clear in the latter half of the 1920s, the only sure thing was that leadership in the national movement was thoroughly contested. In the 1927 Dáil elections, the formerly pro-treaty Cumann na nGaedheal won 49 seats, the anti-treaty Fianna Fail won 44, the Labour Party won 22 seats, the Farmers Party took 11, the National League 8, and Independents 14. Furthermore, in an indication of just how divided the republican movement was, 5 seats were won by members of Sinn Fein who did not accept De Valera's leadership, and a further 2 seats were won by independent republicans who disagreed with both the rump Sinn Fein and De Valera. Although these parties would themselves vigorously debate which groups deserved to be considered part of the national movement going forward, it was clear that by any formulation, the movement was set up for a long bout of multipolarity.

As if internal political and military conflicts were not enough to divide the movement, the 1922 treaty had now added geography to the mix (see Figures 16 and 17). Although the north had always had a different socio-ethnic composition from the rest of the island, it had never before been part of a separate state. What had been a 32-county national movement evolved into more of a 6-county one, as those who sought a unified Ireland turned to the last bastion of British rule. The geographic shift made the fight harder, not easier, however, as the physical split helped split the movement as well (perhaps as the British intended). Now there were not only

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408 Whyte, "Dáil Elections since 1918."
409 Initially, IRA holdouts continued to target Dublin as well, but by the 1940s the movement had turned its attention to ending British rule in Northern Ireland.
nationalists and republicans, but rather northern and southern IRA, northern and southern Sinn Fein, and a northern and southern Nationalist Party, all of whom often disagreed over tactics and failed to coordinate their efforts.\footnote{For this section, the polarity of the movement will be considered for groups focused in Northern Ireland only. Although some parties in the Republic would have preferred a 32-county movement in the abstract, many were satisfied with their 26-county state and saw the North as more trouble than it was worth, paying it scant attention. To the extent individuals and groups within Ireland were an important part of the Irish national movement in the North, it was more as external supporters rather than internal, integral parts that drove the movement. The dynamics of the movement reflect this. To the extent one feels that groups like Fianna Fáil should be included in the movement hierarchy, that only adds further support to the structuralist theory, as the movement would then be coded as even more multipolar when unsuccessful, and more unified when progress came (as with the Good Friday Agreement). Furthermore as far as the PIRA was concerned, the Northern leaders (Gerry Adams, Ivor Bell, and Brendan Hughes) did take over the PIRA and Provisional Sinn Fein starting in the late 1970s.}

These divisions were on display for every armed campaign leading up to The Troubles, including the English Campaign of 1939, the Northern Campaign of 1942-1944, and the Border Campaign of 1956-1962. Initially, the IRA thought that the Border Campaign could echo the unipolarity of the War of Independence, as Sinn Fein had won 2 of the 12 seats in the 1955 Northern Ireland elections for Westminster, capturing almost all of the nationalist electorate. However, this was in part because the Nationalist party had held out of the elections, and the Sinn Fein candidates lost their seats in 1959 in any case.\footnote{Brendan Lynn, *Holding the Ground: The Nationalist Party in Northern Ireland, 1945-1972* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1997).} Furthermore, De Valera’s Fianna Fáil took power in the Republic in 1957 and proceeded to institute internment without trial of suspected IRA members, which was the final nail in the coffin for a campaign based around border raids between the Republic and the North. The fact that the strongest republican party in the south actively worked against the IRA demonstrated the lack of cohesiveness in the movement. This was to say nothing of the nationalists, who did not support the campaign and proceeded to outpoll Sinn Fein in future elections. With unipolarity in the short-term seemingly unattainable, unity remained the best alternative, but the challenges of internal rivalry and the allure of organizational gain would ultimately prove to be too strong to overcome.
The Troubles Begin: The Failure of the Civil Rights Movement and the Split of the IRA

After the failure of the Border Campaign, Cathal Goulding took over as IRA Chief of Staff from Ruairí Ó Brádaigh and led a reassessment of the group’s strategy. Goulding and others in the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Dublin believed that the IRA should focus more on workers’ rights and that the British were using the class issue to spark sectarianism and keep Northern Ireland under its boot. Goulding and his supporters also looked for alternatives to armed struggle to achieve Irish unity and independence. The civil rights movement in the late 1960s thus appealed to much of the IRA leadership for reasons of both objective and strategy. The IRA worked in part under the umbrella of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), which pushed to reform formal and informal housing, employment, and voting policies that disadvantaged Catholics and the working class.412 Inspired in part by the civil rights movement in America, NICRA and its allied groups began to hold protests, sit-ins, and marches to bring attention to the second-class status of Catholics in the north and put pressure on the governments at Stormont and London to enact reforms.413

The IRA GHQ initially wanted to stand with NICRA and the nationalist groups that helped support it, raising the possibility of strategic progress via a unified movement. However, the eruption of violence and its role in splitting the IRA helped ensure that unity would not be realized. In this scenario, the good cop/bad cop approach seemed to backfire, as the good cop’s credibility and signaling were hurt by the presence of a bad cop who many believed could not change its ways. As the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) later claimed: “The behavior

413 Stormont in East Belfast was the seat of the parliament of Northern Ireland at this time.
and tactics of the Civil Rights movement soon clarified the matter...this was really just the Republican movement in another guise.\textsuperscript{414}

Although the vast majority of the civil rights marchers were nonviolent, their actions were provocative, often deliberately so. They helped raise the temperature of the North, leading to attacks by Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) members and Protestant civilians on Catholics, and vice versa.\textsuperscript{415} After the first civil rights march in August 1968, subsequent acts of civil disobedience centered around Derry, long a nationalist stronghold near the western border with the Republic that held a Catholic majority yet a unionist, Protestant government. When a counter march by the Protestant Apprentice Boys attempted to pass through the Catholic Bogside area of Derry on August 12, 1969, rioting erupted between Catholics and the RUC for days, leading to a number of deaths. These events became known as ‘The Battle of the Bogside’ and marked the start of The Troubles.

In response to the RUC crackdown, NICRA called for uprisings in other parts of Northern Ireland to show solidarity and to stretch the RUC’s resources. The greatest violence erupted in Belfast, where six people were killed and 42 injured from gunshot wounds alone on the night of August 14.\textsuperscript{416} By the end of the riots on August 17, over 750 people in Belfast were injured and hundreds of homes and businesses were destroyed (over 80% of them Catholic-owned). Catholic areas in Derry and Belfast put up barricades to protect themselves from the RUC, the B-Specials (a reserve police force infamous for its brutality among Catholics) and Protestant mobs led by paramilitaries like the small but effective Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).


\textsuperscript{415} In this way, it is no stretch to say that the actions of the Civil Rights protestors helped bring about the PIRA, albeit indirectly and unintentionally.

The IRA had known that violence was a possibility from the beginning, as they often assigned members to protect civil rights marchers and Catholic neighborhoods. However, Goulding’s desire to shift the focus away from armed struggle left the IRA unprepared for the scope of the riots in the fall of 1969. The IRA had too few men deployed with too few weapons, having sold many of their armaments to the Free Wales Army in the mid-1960s. As a result, many felt that the IRA had failed in their historic mission of protecting Catholic civilians, leading them to look for an alternative group to stop what many considered a growing pogrom against Catholics by the majority Protestant population.

Despite the riots, the IRA leadership initially decided to double-down on their shift towards Marxism and nonviolent political action. At the annual convention in December 1969, the leadership and a majority of the party voted to end abstentionism and recognize the Irish government in Dublin, the British government in London, and the Northern Irish government at Stormont. For many, this was the final straw, as recognizing the governments of the partitioned states and the responsible colonialist power was the antithesis of achieving a 32-county republic. Abstentionism had split the pro- and anti-treaty IRA, it had split De Valera’s Fianna Fáil from the IRA, and it would now split the IRA once more, not for the last time.

Close to a quarter of IRA members broke off to form the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA or ‘Provos’), with the majority group now known as the Official IRA (OIRA). At the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis in January 1970, the party split in similar fashion, with a new

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417 English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 84. Ed Moloney disagrees with English and claims that the story of the IRA selling its weapons is “probably apocryphal.” In any case, the two agree that the IRA’s few, obsolete weapons left them woefully unprepared for the violence that erupted in 1969. Ed Moloney, *Voices from the Grave: Two Men’s War in Ireland* (London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 14.

418 The IRA in the north did not suffer a significant split during the civil war or in the following decades, in part because it was more concerned with its position vis-à-vis nationalist and unionists, both of whom were far stronger than in the south. For example, in the 1921 elections, Sinn Fein won 6 seats in Northern Ireland compared to 6 for the Nationalists and 40 for the Unionists. Whyte, "Dáil Elections since 1918."
Provisional Sinn Fein set up to support the PIRA.\footnote{Provisional Sinn Fein was also referred to as ‘Provisionals’ or ‘Provos,’ whereas “Official Sinn Fein first adopted the title Republican Clubs, later Sinn Fein-the Workers Party and then the Workers Party.” Sean Farren, \textit{The Sdlp: The Struggle for Agreement in Northern Ireland, 1970-2000} (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2010), 367.} The PIRA saw themselves as the true inheritors of the Easter Rising and the War of Independence, and most of their early leaders were of the older generation of the 1940s and 1950s who had conducted the Border Campaign.\footnote{They felt their claims were boosted when the only surviving member of the Second Dáil of 1921, Tom Maguire, recognized the PIRA and not the OIRA. Jack Holland and Henry McDonald, \textit{Inla: Deadly Divisions} (Dublin: Torc, 1994), 33.} Although comparatively far smaller initially, the existence of the PIRA ensured that there would be no united national movement, even within the republican wing. The rivalry between the OIRA and PIRA would drive the dynamics of the movement at the outset of the Troubles, but not to its advantage.

\textit{The Rise of Provisionals: Violence Yields Organizational Success}

Although the Provisional IRA was the weakest group in the Irish national movement at the time of its founding, its early use of violence was quite organizationally effective. Even though the PIRA had its General Headquarters in Dublin, its Belfast Brigade soon became the military, political, and general strategic center of the group, in large part because Belfast was the front line in The Troubles.\footnote{Moloney, \textit{Voices from the Grave: Two Men’s War in Ireland}, 148.} As Gerald Murray and Jonathan Tonge note, however, “At first the Provisionals were dwarfed by the Official IRA and there were sufficient members and new recruits for only one battalion in the [Belfast] Brigade area.”\footnote{Ibid., 48.} D company of that battalion was responsible for the Lower Falls Area, the Catholic heartland of Belfast based precariously near the Protestant stronghold of Shankill Road. D Company later became the largest unit in Belfast,
but it started out with only 12 members and a few obsolete guns. One of those twelve members was Brendan Hughes, who described how he and others were drawn to the PIRA:

"Most of us at that time did not have a great deal of political ideology. It wasn’t until later that we really began to learn what Republicanism meant. We were motivated by the fact that Catholic homes and streets had been burned down, [that] Catholics had been forced out of their homes. People like me, who joined what was later called the Provisional IRA, were the people who had been rioting for over a year, who burned lorries, who had come under fire from the Shankill Road, who had seen people shot. They had been fighting with petrol bombs and stones and whatever else they could lay their hands on. These were the people who were defending the areas, the people who were defending the Catholic Church, who were defending against the B Specials." 423

Indeed, a strong majority of both IRA and Sinn Fein members had stayed with the Officials, further demonstrating that the ideology of the PIRA certainly was not more popular. 424 There was no guarantee that the PIRA would survive in its first months; the group needed something to distinguish itself and pull its strength up from the depths.

Force was the answer, employed initially to defend Catholic areas against Loyalist mobs, paramilitaries, and the Protestant-dominated security forces. Hughes provides a picture of the early operations, which were largely defensive in nature: "In 1970-71, a lot of time was spent on standby, which meant that you were armed, you were sent to a particular house and told to wait there for further instructions—either an operation was going to take place or you were to patrol the streets with weapons to let the people of the area know that there was protection." 425 Even when the PIRA employed the gun in its early days, it was largely in defense of Catholic areas,

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423 Hughes died in 2008, which allowed an oral history project based at Boston College to publish its first book. Hughes was one of many republican and Loyalist paramilitary members that agreed to be interviewed in great detail about their experiences in The Troubles, provided that their words would only become public upon their death. Moloney’s book Voices from the Grave is based on the testimony of Hughes and David Ervine, a former member of the UVF. Ibid., 47.

424 English, Armed Struggle: The History of the Ira, 175. One could even go as far as Bell and argue that their ideology remained quite similar: "Neither IRA had foresworn physical force, neither had denied the need for revolutionary reform, neither failed to identify Britain as the major enemy, both continued despite the evidence to place hope in the Ulster Protestant working class." In either case, it is clear that the PIRA’s ideology was either unimportant or detrimental to their early struggle with the Officials, not a boon. Bell, The Secret Army: A History of the Ira 1916-1979, 372.

425 Moloney, Voices from the Grave: Two Men’s War in Ireland, 50.
such as when a few of its volunteers deployed to Short Strand, a small Catholic enclave of 6,000 surrounded by 60,000 Protestants in East Belfast. Although Loyalists and republicans disagree over who started the violence, it is clear that after an Orange Order march in the area, the groups exchanged fire.⁴²⁶ The PIRA men were perched atop the local Catholic church, St. Matthew’s, which they claimed the Loyalist mobs were aiming to burn down.⁴²⁷ PIRA Belfast Brigade commander Billy McKee led the republicans, who despite their few armaments gained a significant popular victory in the eyes of many Catholics for their efforts.

Thus in addition to their members’ individual desires to protect their neighborhoods, the Provos’ use of violence served as costly signals of their commitment to the cause for potential supporters in Northern Ireland and beyond. In sum, violence helped the PIRA acquire the three basic pillars of armed group strength: men, money, and guns.

Despite their meager beginnings, the PIRA had several hundred volunteers in the Belfast Brigade by the end of 1970 and over a thousand members in Belfast by early 1971.⁴²⁸ The group’s use of violence not only convinced new recruits, but also some OIRA members who had initially stuck with the organization. One such example was a man named Gerry Adams, who was the O/C (Officer Commanding) of the OIRA’s Ballymurphy Company, but did not join Provisionals until April 1970.⁴²⁹ By that spring of 1970, 15 of the 16 original OIRA companies in Belfast had shifted to the PIRA, with only the crucial Lower Falls still largely in the OIRA’s

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⁴²⁶ The Orange Order is a fraternal order founded in 1796, named in honor of Protestant William of Orange, who defeated the Catholic King James of England at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 and himself became King. The Orange Order is made up Protestants (Catholics are banned from joining) that are strongly unionist. Marches are a major part of the Order’s operations, with the most important being the marches on July 12 commemorating William of Orange’s victory. These marches have often become flashpoints for sectarian violence, especially when they pass near Catholic areas.

⁴²⁷ For an alternative, Protestant view, which held that the entire operation had been an IRA set up to attack Orange Order marchers, see Moloney, *Voices from the Grave: Two Men’s War in Ireland*, 320-323.


⁴²⁹ Moloney, *Voices from the Grave: Two Men’s War in Ireland*, 70.
column. This influx allowed the PIRA to expand to three brigades, as well as four battalions in Belfast alone.

The popular support generated by the PIRA’s use of defensive force helped secure warm meals, open doors, and helpful information from the local populace. The group also needed significant funding to maintain itself, however, and were unlikely to find much among their working class Northern Ireland base. Luckily for them, the attacks against Catholic communities and their defensive efforts convinced a number of funders in the Irish Republic and the United States to support the group. In the south, Fianna Fáil had been outraged by the 1969 riots, and some of its members looked to clandestinely support groups that would prevent a repeat. They began to provide limited funding, armaments, and training in late 1969 and early 1970. Although the subsequent public revelation of these acts led to the sacking of government ministers and an end to the policy, this early boost had helped the Provos along in the early stages when their survival was in doubt.

Far more significant and sustained financial support came from the U.S., where massive Irish-American communities harbored significant pockets of wealth and goodwill for the republican cause. The Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid) was set up in New York in 1970 to raise funds for Provisional Movement. Although it was continually monitored by the FBI, Noraid money officially went to republican widows, orphans, dependents, and refugees. Although this may not seem as glamorous as funding for rocket propelled grenades, financial

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430 Ibid. The OIRA was still dominant in Derry (300 members at its peak), Newry, and South Down, although this too was to change. Holland and McDonald, Inla: Deadly Divisions, 9, 16.
431 To the extent one considers Fianna Fáil as part of the national movement at this time, its actions make perfect sense according to the structuralist theory. Its support of the PIRA would both shore up its own credentials for defending Catholics while splitting and so weakening its major rival for republican leadership: the OIRA. In fact, many in the OIRA believed that this was precisely Fianna Fáil’s motivation. Bell, The Secret Army: A History of the Ira 1916-1979, 369-371.
432 As Bell described with the IRA’s English campaign of 1939, “Once the bombs started going off, there was every chance the flow of American money would increase as the donors vicariously followed the campaign.” Ibid., 151.
support for the dependents of volunteers was in many ways the most crucial task, since without it men were unlikely to remain in the field for long.

U.S. sources did provide funding for armaments as well, which was the biggest PIRA weakness at the outset. The Provisionals’ early use of violence helped secure them a number of donors. Hughes was instrumental in using connections in America to turn armaments from the PIRA’s major weakness to its major strength within the span of a few years. His pursuit of the Armalite, available in American gun stores at the time, yielded a weapon that was superior not only to the PIRA’s old weapons (Colt revolvers, Thompson sub-machine guns and Enfield .303 rifles), but to those of the British as well. The Armalite was an early civilian version of the M-16 that was ideal for street fighting. It could be folded up or dunked in water, and it was reliable, accurate, and powerful enough to shoot through British flak jackets and some armored vehicles. Hughes noted that, “We all fell in love with this weapon,” and the shipments he secured starting in 1971 significantly increased the strength of the PIRA.

Violence may have been the main factor in the PIRA becoming as strong and eventually stronger than the OIRA, but it still had an old rival in new form to contend with for leadership in the national movement: the SDLP.

Still the One? The SDLP Consolidates the Nationalists

The IRA’s British Campaign, Northern Campaign, and Border Campaign all had one thing in common: the dominant group in the Irish national movement in the North was nationalist throughout, not republican. The civil rights period leading in to The Troubles was no different; however, the reinvigoration brought by marches, boycotts, and sit-ins came at the price

\[433\] Ibid., 439.
\[434\] Moloney, *Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland*, 76-80.
of a splintering nationalist camp. The Nationalist Party, descendant of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) in the North after partition, had been dominant for decades. However, even as some of its leaders helped initiate the civil rights protests, the lack of cohesiveness in the party came to the fore. The Nationalist Party had to contend with the rising National Democratic Party and the Republican Labour Party, among others, each of whom won at least one MP seat in the 1965 or 1969 election. Had this trend continued, the PIRA may well have had a chance to repeat the story of 1918, getting its republican house in order and then sweeping the divided nationalist opposition from the field. Unfortunately for the republicans (and perhaps the movement), the rise of the SDLP ensured that the nationalists would retain a pole in the movement, and one at the top of the hierarchy at that.

Frustrated by the division and direction of the existing nationalist parties, six existing Stormont MPs—Ivan Cooper, Austin Currie, Paddy Devlin, Gerry Fit, John Hume, and Paddy O’Hanlon—agreed in August 1970 to found the Social Democratic and Labour Party, or SDLP. Indeed, John Hume wrote of the Nationalist Party in 1964, “In forty years of opposition, they have not produced one constructive contribution on either the social or economic plane to the development of Northern Ireland.” The SDLP aimed to change that by serving as the proactive, dominant face of nationalism in the region.

From the outset, the SDLP definitely shared the ultimate objective of all parties in the Irish national movement: a unified, independent Ireland. An internal SDLP policy paper from September 1971 said that the group would “ultimately wish to seek a socialist 32-County Republic enjoying a harmonious relationship with Britain and other countries.” Contrary to the PIRA, however, the SDLP believed that the best way to achieve this was through

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constitutionalism, community building, and consent. The SDLP’s founding document called for “friendship and understanding between North and South with the view to the eventual reunification of Ireland through the consent of the majority of the people in the North and in the South.”

The SDLP’s strategy for Irish unity was thus based on working with unionists in Stormont and building bridges between Catholic and Protestant communities to overtime dispel prejudices and fears of a unified Ireland. The civil rights movement was a reflection of this strategy, as the goal was to better the lives of the people in the North as an end in and of itself as well as a stepping stone to unity. The strategy thus depended heavily on Protestants and unionists, as the SDLP believed that the goals of the Irish national movement could not be achieved if they remained an implacable enemy.

For their part, republican groups viewed the SDLP as “a pro-British, ‘Redmondite’ party, located within the tradition of the compromisers of the Irish Parliamentary Party nearly a century earlier.” Republican attacks on the SDLP often went beyond mere words, as the PIRA and OIRA physically attacked a number of SDLP MPs and intimidated their supporters. The PIRA believed that the British were responsible for creating the sectarianism and division, so British withdrawal was a necessary step to end sectarianism, not vice versa.

As distasteful as the SDLP strategy was to the republicans, it was the strength of the party that really made them an internal threat (after all, the PIRA was not nearly as concerned with the ideologically similar but far weaker Nationalist Party). Upon its founding, the SDLP

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437 Ibid., 11.
438 Ibid., 12.
439 This strategy had its roots in the War of Independence. The nationalists in the North shared the desires of the IRA and Sinn Fein, but they believed that pushing for a republic too soon given the circumstances was a surer way for the Catholics in the north to have less power and freedom, as the prospect of a republic terrified unionists and made partition more likely.
immediately began to consolidate power. Its initial six MPs (and one senator)—coming from the National Democrats, the Republican Labour Party, the Nationalist Party, and the Northern Ireland Labour Party—made it the strongest nationalist group on the day of its founding. It then moved to absorb other parties, including the National Democratic Party, which dissolved itself and passed a resolution that all of its members should join the SDLP.\(^{441}\) The SDLP’s first conference in October 1971 drew over 300 delegates representing tens of thousands of supporters.\(^{442}\) The fact that the SDLP did not form an armed wing and Sinn Fein did not run for elections at the time made it difficult to compare the strength of these competing poles directly. However, it was safe to say that the SDLP was far stronger than the republican groups in Derry and perhaps overall in the North, although the PIRA may have held sway in Belfast. In any case, the rise of the SDLP helped ensure that a unipolar Irish national movement was quite unlikely.

Unfortunately for the SDLP and the Irish national movement in general, many unionists and most Loyalists saw the SDLP as a conspirator at worst or a cat’s paw at best for the IRA despite these internal rivalries. Thus, the SDLP, PIRA, and OIRA not only competed for power and pursued contradictory strategies, but their presence also sent mixed signals to the unionists and British and undermined the credibility of all parties in the movement.

The Unresolved Paradox: Irish Violence Amidst Multipolarity

Although violence helped catapult the PIRA from an unknown to one of the strongest groups in the Irish national movement, its multipolar environment ensured that its use of force (and that of the OIRA) would be strategically ineffective. As the PIRA became a significant pole in the movement, its strategy began to shift from one of passive protection to active defense to

\(^{441}\) Ibid., 10.  
offensive coercion. Indeed, this was the basic framework in PIRA Chief of Staff Sean MacStiofain’s three-stage strategy: 1) Recruit and train new units to defend Catholics in Belfast 2) Defend and strike back against Loyalists and the RUC when needed 3) When strong enough, launch an offensive campaign against the British army and other security forces to force negotiations over their withdrawal from Ireland. The PIRA perceived itself as a defensive force since its birth, as it initially protected Catholic communities in Belfast and Derry from Loyalist mobs when its rival, the OIRA, either would not or could not do so.

This type of defensive violence did not cause the PIRA too many problems, because their supporters would not disapprove of RUC men or even Loyalist civilians killed while the PIRA was directly defending Catholic homes. Furthermore, this approach allowed the PIRA to benefit from the heavy-handedness of the government and the security forces, as one PIRA recruit who joined in 1970 noted: “The British Army, the British government, were our best recruiting agents.” The image of the PIRA as a defensive force sacrificing for the cause was significantly heightened with the government’s initiation of internment without trial in August 1971. The widespread arrest and detention of Catholics suspected of involvement with the armed groups generated support from nationalist and republicans alike.

As Hughes described, the PIRA’s early actions (combined with British reactions) helped secure significant public support:

443 Moloney, *Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland*, 50.
444 Ibid., 18.
446 “Internment was a political disaster, nor was it particularly effective in military terms.” Ibid., 141. Internment also helped recruiting for the OIRA. One of its legendary tales involved Joe McCann, O/C of the Third Battalion in Belfast, taking over Inglis’s bakery in the Markets area of Belfast. He and his small group of men held off 600 British troops initiating the first wave of internment arrests, allowing many republicans to escape the British net. Holland and McDonald, *Inla: Deadly Divisions*, 10-11.
447 This was also true of one of the most infamous days of The Troubles: Bloody Sunday, when the British military killed 14 Catholic civilians during a civil rights march on January 30, 1972. “Bloody Sunday was a turning point...Recruitment to the IRA rocketed as a result. Events that day probably led more young nationalists to join the Provisionals than any other single action by the British.” Financial support via Noraid also surged. English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the Ira*, 151-152.
“Ninety-eight percent of the doors [in the Lower Falls] were left open at nights; people did not feel in danger of being robbed, they did not feel in danger of being assassinated because they knew we were there. So most people cooperated with the IRA; they left their back doors open, or if they saw you jumping over the yard wall, they’d open the back door if it was closed. So you had that sort of relationship; we were the fish and the war was our local community.”

Sitting on standby or patrolling the streets alone would not lead to Irish unity or independence from Britain, however, so the PIRA felt it needed to up the ante. It became difficult to continually demonstrate that the PIRA was protecting Catholics. After all, it is far easier to prove that one took a life than saved one. Being on the front lines facing down British curfews and Loyalist mobs certainly helped, as the PIRA did during the Siege of St. Matthews in Short Strand. Sectarian killings were another matter, however. In discussing such attacks, former PIRA-member Anthony McIntyre notes: “The IRA, who were supposed to be defenders, could never actually defend. There was no way to defend against these things. So the only way to appear to be defending, to appear to be active, was to take out other people.” In other words, deterrence via active ‘defense’ was necessary, which quickly spiraled into an offensive campaign against British soldiers, unionist businesses, and, ultimately, Protestant civilians.

Up until the latter part of 1970, the PIRA focused its attacks on RUC barracks. In February 1971, the group killed their first British soldier, after which the prime minister of Ireland, James Chichester-Clark, announced that “Northern Ireland is at war with the Irish

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448 Hughes further underlined the importance of popular backing: “I always had a very strict regime based on giving respect to the residents because I knew without them we wouldn’t survive.” Moloney, *Voices from the Grave: Two Men’s War in Ireland*, 67.

449 After the siege of St. Matthews, Ballymurphy was caught up in six months of rioting. However, as Ed Moloney notes, “Not once during that time, however, did the Ballymurphy IRA fire a shot. Instead, there were long nights of fierce hand-to-hand fighting between locals and British riot squads whose cumulative effort was to radicalize the whole community and entice scores of young men and women into the ranks of the [P]IRA.” It was this decision to defend while not upping the ante via shooting that helped ingratiate IRA with the community, which required a good deal of restraint. Unfortunately for the movement, this was to be the exception more than the rule as the rivalry with the OIRA heated up. Ibid., 71.

Republican Army Provisionals.” Soon after, the PIRA began its bombing campaign in earnest, launching fifty such attacks in June 1971. Turning to the offensive alone did not doom the PIRA’s efforts, but doing so while in competition with the OIRA and SDLP with its organizational and strategic objectives at odds certainly did.

The first problem for the PIRA was that although bombings may have been helpful to coerce the British to withdraw, casualties from such attacks, especially civilian ones, were often counterproductive in terms of organizational strength and support. As Moloney contends, “Not only did the [PIRA] claim to be a non-sectarian army which fought by the rules of civilized warfare, but in practical terms the IRA operated within well-understood boundaries set largely by its own community. One of the limits of acceptability was killing civilians, especially when it looked deliberate or casually careless.” The PIRA learned this when it bombed the Abercorn restaurant in downtown Belfast without warning in March 1972, which led to significant backlash after two young Catholic women were killed and 130 civilians were wounded. The PIRA’s reaction to this problem demonstrated that it recognized the existence of the paradox, but despite its best efforts it could not overcome it.

Given the paradox, the ideal attack was one in which there was an explosion and an imposition on the British without any casualties, especially Catholic ones. The PIRA believed that they found a solution in a tactic employed by the Zionist Irgun, if not earlier: call the RUC or local business on the telephone to notify them of the bomb after it had been placed, but before it had exploded. This way, the PIRA would tie up the security services, harm commerce, instill fear, yet avoid killing civilians. In the event the security services failed to clear the area in time, the public would blame them for failing at their job.

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452 Moloney, Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland, 101-102.
453 Ibid., 102-103.
Unfortunately for the PIRA, this tactic had a number of shortcomings. First, such games of telephone often failed somewhere along the way: calls were not answered, messages were not understood or acted upon, or the security services were unable to act in time. Second, despite the PIRA’s wishful thinking—which roughly paralleled that of American diplomats who believed that bombs dropped on the Vietnamese would lead to anger at the Vietcong—the Northern Irish public almost entirely blamed the PIRA for planting the bombs, not the security forces for failing to defuse them. Finally, even when the bombs killed no one, their increasing number led to a growing Protestant backlash that concerned their base even more than British repression. As Moloney continued, “It was not that the Catholic community was especially tender-hearted about the issue [of casualties] but rather that they knew the inevitable Loyalist retribution would be directed randomly, like scatter shot, against them. It is one of the reasons why causing civilian casualties has consistently cost Republicans politically down through the years of The Troubles, right up the carnage at Omagh in August 1998.”

The PIRA found just how problematic such attacks could be with what became known as ‘Bloody Friday.’ On July 21, 1972, the PIRA planted 21 bombs in Belfast that were scheduled to go off within a little over an hour of each other. The Provos called to warn the security services via the local media, but the scope of the attack was simply too much. Within 80 minutes, all 21 bombs detonated, leading to 9 people killed (7 civilians) and 130 injured, over half of whom were women and children. As Moloney noted, “The consequences for the IRA were devastating. Politically, ‘Bloody Friday’ placed the IRA ‘outside the pale of political

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454 Ibid., 101-102. As Bell confirmed, “It did not matter that the Provos insisted warnings were always sent. Innocent civilians were being killed and maimed. And the whole spectrum of Irish political opinion insisted the bombing was irrevocably alienating the Protestant population. In a sense the campaign was too explosive, insufficiently focused, and without a viable political purpose.” Bell, The Secret Army: A History of the Ira 1916-1979, 385.
455 Many of the bombs were car bombs, which the PIRA first introduced in March 1972 in Derry. Bell, The Secret Army: A History of the Ira 1916-1979, 389.
negotiation,' as one account put it, and turned moderate nationalist opinion on both sides of the border firmly against the Provos.456 Brendan Hughes, who organized the attack, noted in retrospect the problem of such bombings: "I was the operational commander of the 'Bloody Friday' operation...I sort of knew that there were going to be casualties, either the Brits could not handle so many bombs or they would allow some to go off because it suited them to have casualties. It was a major, major operation but we never intended to kill people."457 He also noted, "We took our own people for granted sometimes. I think it was youthful enthusiasm, but if I had to do it all over again, there are certain things I would not do and that would be one of them, putting our own supporters and civilians at risk. We did do it, I admit it and I regret it."458

The British launching of Operation Motorman in response to Bloody Friday was a further disaster for the PIRA, made politically possible by British, unionist, and Catholic anger. It involved the forcible dismantling of the barricades in Catholic areas of Derry and Belfast, ending the no-go zones that were the PIRA’s best sanctuaries.459 Outbidding with the OIRA had helped bring the PIRA to this point, and the Bloody Friday attacks were the paradox literally blowing up in Hughes’ face: the PIRA needed that level of attack to coerce the British and demonstrate its commitment, but it was too much to reasonably avoid civilian casualties and a popular backlash that would prevent any hope of a unipolar takeover of the movement.

Before the PIRA’s campaign began, the OIRA made it clear that it wished to avoid such violence. In part because of its position of strength within the movement, it sought to work towards strategic objectives through constitutional means. Furthermore, like the SDLP, the

456 Moloney, Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland, 104. Elliot and Flackes, Northern Ireland: A Political Directory, p. 184
457 Ibid., 105.
458 Ibid., 67.
459 Operation Motorman further stole the initiative from the PIRA, as their attacks went down 60% in the first three weeks after the operation and kept decreasing thereafter. Smith, Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement, 110.
OIRA claimed to recognize the importance of the Protestants to their ultimate success: “We want to try to get through to the Protestant working classes. We realize our success there depends on the amount of understanding. If these people understand, I believe they would support us.”

Unfortunately for the OIRA and the broader movement, their desire to remain the dominant group among the republicans pulled them into counterproductive infighting and outbidding with their Provisional rival. In both cases, the desire for organizational gain hurt strategic effectiveness.

From the outset, Hughes noted that, “Every night we had to have people on standby to protect ourselves from the Official IRA, not from the RUC, not from the British Army, but from the Official IRA... The Official IRA made an attempt to kill the Provisional IRA at birth.” The OIRA’s killing of the PIRA’s Charles Hughes, Brendan’s cousin, in March 1971 led to a drop in support for the OIRA and an increase for PIRA: “After Charlie’s death, the Official IRA got a bad press... They took a hammering, publicly, and a lot of people withdrew their support for the Official IRA and threw their weight behind us... there was a major influx of younger recruits coming in.” From the perspective of the movement, however, significant resources were lost in such infighting, yet because neither side was able to destroy the other, the result was simply a shifting hierarchy but the same polarity.

Even when the groups were not hitting each other directly, they competed for support from the base using violence. The OIRA recognized the potential for this early on: “In mid-1971 [OIRA Adjutant-General Sean] Garland warned the movement against allowing itself to be

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460 English, Armed Struggle: The History of the Ira, 93. For their part, the PIRA recognized that sectarianism existed but claimed that it was a creation of the British. Thus, the way to victory was to destroy the sectarian Northern Irish state. The PIRA, and to some extent the OIRA, did not develop a serious understanding and assessment of the unionists, either dismissing them or assuming they would go along with a unified Ireland.

461 Moloney, Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland, 61.

462 Ibid., 64-66. As a result, Brendan Hughes’ D Company rose to 120 members, becoming the largest unit in the Belfast Brigade. See Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 103.
swept up by the gathering momentum of PIRA’s violence: ‘Unfortunately, because of our history as a movement committed to force, we are liable to be brought down along with these elements.’\textsuperscript{463} Despite this note of caution, the OIRA’s desire to keep pace overtook its dream of a non-sectarian workers’ struggle for a united Ireland, leading to disastrous attacks.\textsuperscript{464} In addition to the detonation of 23 bombs in one day in April 1972\textsuperscript{465}, there was “Barnhill, an old man murdered; the Aldershot, [six] women and a priest; the botched Taylor assassination; and then, the last straw, the murder of a young British soldier, a local Catholic at home on leave in Derry, who his neighbors knew as a decent lad not a ‘traitor.’\textsuperscript{466}

The OIRA’s actions were even more surprising given their assessment of the PIRA as apolitical gangsters of minimal intelligence that “were in it just to fight Prods.”\textsuperscript{467} Indeed, the fact that the OIRA thought little of the PIRA and its actions, had a strategy to largely stay out of the violence, recognized the dangers of outbidding ahead of time, and yet still succumbed to large-scale, counterproductive violence demonstrates the power of movement hierarchy and the problems of violence amidst multipolarity.

The direct result of these attacks was a rise in sectarianism between Catholics and Protestants that undercut any attempt by the OIRA, or the SDLP for that matter, to signal credible intentions to work with the unionists. Despite their marches and the rioting that often resulted, the unionist community was relatively subdued during the early period of The Troubles,

\textsuperscript{463} The group later reaffirmed its desire to avoid such violence: “It has never been, and it is not now our intention to launch a purely military campaign against British forces in the North. We have seen the failures of past campaigns based on military action only and have set our faces against such campaigns which are doomed to failure.” Smith, \textit{Fighting for Ireland: The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement}, 88.
\textsuperscript{464} Chain-ganging dynamics were present as well. The OIRA claimed that the PIRA started the shooting that led to the Falls curfew. This forced the OIRA to get involved against their wishes and bear the brunt of the fighting, which led to them losing much of their weaponry that was stored in the area. As an OIRA member on the scene later noted: “The way we looked at it, we were not going to put up our hands and let them take the weaponry. We didn't want the confrontation, but we couldn't surrender.” Mallie, Bishop, \textit{The Provisional IRA} (1988), p.159
\textsuperscript{467} Murray and Tonge, \textit{Sinn Fein and the Sdhp: From Alienation to Participation}, 31.
so much so that PIRA Chief of Staff MacStiofain said: “I can’t see these people [the unionists] preparing themselves for a protracted guerrilla war. It’s just not in them.” With the spiraling increase in attacks by the PIRA and OIRA, however, a Protestant backlash began in earnest by mid-1972.

The two biggest inspirations for recruitment were the April bombings by the OIRA and the Bloody Friday attacks by PIRA. The story of David Ervine, a Protestant who grew up in East Belfast, was typical in this regard: “There had been a couple of attempts to recruit me by various organizations, and I didn’t move towards any, [although] I was getting increasingly fed up with attacks on my community... That culminated on the day of my nineteenth birthday, witnessing ‘Bloody Friday’. The following Sunday I joined the UVF.” Tommy Herron of the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the other major Loyalist armed group, noted, “Remember, we waited three and a half years. All that time we just didn’t believe the security forces would let us down—would leave us so exposed.” When they did feel exposed to the PIRA and OIRA attacks, Loyalists began to hit back in force, mostly against Catholic civilians. Loyalists killed 102 people in 1972 and 531 by 1977, led by the UVF and UDA.

The rise in sectarian violence was a major problem from the perspective of the PIRA, OIRA, and the Irish national movement for four reasons. For the perspective of the coercers, it first led to a decrease in support for the armed groups from their Catholic base, as the feeling of invulnerability slipped away with each sectarian attack. Second, the PIRA strategy was based on facing off solely against a colonial power. The rise of the UVF and UDA meant that it had to

469 An early sectarian killing that signaled what was to come involved the luring of three off duty Scottish soldiers from a bar by the PIRA, who then executed them on a hillside in March 1971. The attacks led to a massive Loyalist reaction as well as anger at the PIRA from Catholics. Moloney, *Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland*, 75.
470 Ibid., 306.
cope with a new enemy, which introduced a newly committed and violent veto player. Third, increased sectarian violence played into the hands of the British, who claimed that they had to remain in Northern Ireland to keep Loyalists and republicans from killing each other, making withdrawal less likely.472

Finally, when considered along with the non-violent pole of the SDLP, multipolarity yielded competing groups within the movement working at cross-purposes, which stymied strategic progress. On the one hand, the PIRA aimed to coerce British withdrawal to yield a united Ireland, as PIRA-spokesman Danny Morrison later explained, “It isn’t a question of driving the British Army into the sea. It’s a question of breaking the political will of the British government to remain.”473 However, the fact that the strongest group in the movement (the SDLP) not only did not join the armed struggle, but rather actively worked to stop it, prevented the Irish national movement from raising the costs above what the British government was willing to bear. On the other hand, the SDLP aimed to build bridges with the unionists to end sectarianism as a stepping-stone to a united Ireland. The spiraling violence of the PIRA and OIRA kept destroying these bridges and ultimately helped to strengthen extremist Loyalist groups that worked to veto the SDLP’s platform. These dynamics came to a head in 1972 and 1973, when each wing of the Irish national movement came the closest they ever would to their version of ‘victory,’ only to have the actions of their internal competitors prevent their individual and collective success.474

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472 Moloney, *Voices from the Grave: Two Men’s War in Ireland*, 172. Whether it was desired or not, Smith concludes that “By participating in the sectarian war PIRA condemned its strategy but saved itself,” thus selecting organizational goals over strategic ones when forced to choose. Smith, *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*, 123.


474 This might be called the reverse Goldilocks principle, in that the Irish national movement during The Troubles would have been better off if their actions were collectively hotter or colder, instead they collectively were a lukewarm middle that achieved neither.
Equal but Opposite Failures: The PIRA and SDLP Negotiate with the British

1972 was the high water mark for the Provisional IRA. Never again would they kill more people, bring in more recruits, or have greater support. Additionally, never again would they come closer to successfully coercing British withdrawal. Yet the existence of their internal rivals ensured that even their best was far from what was necessary to achieve the strategic success they envisioned.

In an attempt to secure a ceasefire and take measure of the PIRA, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland William Whitelaw agreed to meet with the PIRA’s leadership in late June of 1972. The ceasefire and meeting occurred due to SDLP efforts to bring the two sides together, which culminated in its leaders secretly shuttling back and forth between PIRA and British representatives to arrange the talks. This was no surprise, as the SDLP had a strong organizational interest in ending the violence. They recognized that their more moderate stance lost support as violence against their base increased, and they knew that any attempt by them to work openly with the unionists or the British in such a climate could seriously delegitimize them.

The ceasefire commenced on June 27 and held until the two sides met in London on July 7, demonstrating yet again that the PIRA had significant internal cohesion. The PIRA delegation included Sean MacStiofain, Martin McGuinness (O/C in Derry) and Gerry Adams, among others, with Adams having been released from prison for the occasion. The PIRA representatives met directly with Northern Ireland secretary William Whitelaw, in what some of

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475 The PIRA killed 133 security forces and 70 civilians, close to half of the 496 people killed in Northern Ireland in 1972. If one includes the 63 PIRA members that were killed, they were involved in over half of all deaths from The Troubles that year. Their forces topped out at over 1,000 members, including a growing number in prison. Nonetheless, arrayed against them were 28,000 security forces: 14,000 British Army, 6,000 RUC, 8,000 UDR. Moloney, *Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland*, 111. Smith, *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*, 102.

476 Hughes confirmed this, claiming that although the PIRA definitely had various sects, the leadership controlled the group and killed or dropped anyone who stepped out of line. Moloney, *Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland*, 288.
them thought would be the beginning of the end of British rule in Northern Ireland. The PIRA issued three demands, which were subsequently made public: “1) A public declaration by the British Government that it is the right of all the people of Ireland acting as a unit to decide the future of Ireland 2) A declaration of intent to withdraw British forces from Irish soil by January 1, 1975 3) A general amnesty [of prisoners].” This amounted to the maximal strategic objectives of the republicans, and they showed no willingness to negotiate on these conditions.

Although Whitelaw agreed to respond a week later (he never did), it was clear that there was no chance of the British accepting such a deal. This was the PIRA attempting to impose an unconditional surrender, yet the strength of their movement and its subsequent actions were not nearly adequate for such an outcome. For one, although the PIRA (and OIRA) inflicted significant damage, it had not brought the economy or the people of Northern Ireland or Britain to their knees. British Home Secretary Reginald Maudling famously noted that the British would stay with the violence at “an acceptable level,” and Whitelaw’s delegates told MacStiofain that “the level of casualties was not especially worrisome.”

Were the forces of the PIRA, OIRA, and SDLP joined within a single group, successful coercion may have been possible, but certainly not in a non-unified, multipolar movement in which the group leading the violence was not even the strongest pole. Furthermore, the existence of other, non-violent groups in the movement (and the leading group at that) gave the

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477 The Irish Times, July 11 1972.
478 Multipolarity may also have constrained the PIRA’s ability to think rationally, as it failed to effectively self-evaluate amidst all the outbidding and castigating of the OIRA and SDLP over their actions.
479 Whitelaw and his ministers certainly had a bargaining incentive to minimize the impact of PIRA actions with the group, but subsequent actions affirmed their analysis, especially given that the level of violence in 1972 would never be achieved again. Smith, Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement, 108. See MacStiofain, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 285. O’Clery, ed., Ireland in Quotes, 131.
480 To those who say that coercion would have been impossible under any circumstances, it is worth noting that “a Daily Mail poll in September 1971... indicated that over 60 per cent of the British public favored the withdrawal of the British Army.” Smith, Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement, 101.
British hope that the PIRA could be marginalized or simply defeated.\textsuperscript{481} Indeed, this was precisely the British strategy coming out of the talks with the Provos. It was ironic then, if predictable, that the group who set up the talks for the PIRA was the major reason they were doomed to fail. In any case, the ceasefire ended two days after the negotiations, with the PIRA and the movement no closer to its strategic goals.\textsuperscript{482}

Just two weeks later, the PIRA initiated the Bloody Friday bombings, helping to drive the rise of the Loyalist militias along with their sectarian violence and extremist politics. This significantly hurt the Irish national movement’s next chance for progress, this time led by the SDLP.

Having instituted direct rule in March of 1972, William Whitelaw and the British looked for a way to return to more local control, while maintaining British sovereignty over Northern Ireland, of course. The British solution came in the form of a White Paper in March of 1973, \textit{Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals}, which envisioned a power-sharing government that represented significant concessions to the Irish national movement on its strategic goals. The new Northern Ireland Assembly would be based on proportional representation and was specifically designed to avoid the tyranny of the (unionist) majority that had been Stormont for over fifty years.\textsuperscript{483} Furthermore, the new government would boast a two-chamber ‘Council of Ireland’ that included representatives of both Northern Ireland and the Dáil Éireann, thus

\textsuperscript{481} Furthermore, at the end of 1972 the OIRA still had 800 members in Belfast alone, so the PIRA was not the only republican pole at this point by any means. English, \textit{Armed Struggle: The History of the Ira}, 176.

\textsuperscript{482} It is worth noting that the PIRA’s only previous ceasefire had followed a similar pattern for three days in March. Bell claimed that their meeting at the time with British officials meant that “The Provos were now in the big time politically. At minimum they had veto power and at best they had bombed themselves ahead of [Irish Prime Minister Jack] Lynch in the queue to the bargaining table.” Nonetheless, this represented an organizational gain at best, not a strategic one, as nothing came from the PIRA’s four hours of talks with British Minister Harold Wilson. Bell, \textit{The Secret Army: A History of the Ira 1916-1979}, 386.

\textsuperscript{483} The first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, James Craig, famously called Stormont “a Protestant Parliament for a Protestant people.” Although Catholics may have rejected his phrasing, his words reflected reality for a half century. It is worth noting that many Protestants saw little problem with Craig’s wording or the shape of Stormont, given that they considered the Dáil as being run like ‘a Catholic parliament for a Catholic people.’ Murray and Tonge, \textit{Sinn Fein and the Sdip: From Alienation to Participation}, 5.
institutionalizing links with the Republic for the first time since independence. Although the powers of the Council were vague, it was intended to help coordinate North-South policy on industry, agriculture, tourism, and transport. These were significant concessions that were directly in line with the SDLP’s platform.

The subsequent bill passed in May brought the SDLP back into the Northern Irish government for the first time in two years, as it stood for the 1973 elections for the first Assembly. The SDLP had pledged on numerous occasions that it would never rejoin the government as long as internment without trial continued, and yet it was first in line for the elections despite the fact that more prisoners were interned than ever. Criticism of the SDLP’s move was not limited to republicans, as the nationalist ‘Unity’ group accused the SDLP of “selfishly collaborating with Whitelaw’s plans to gain the spoils of office.” The SDLP leadership knew that they had broken their oath, but they also knew that with proportional representation the party stood to have its best electoral showing in history. As predicted by the structuralist theory, the group opted for power over principle.

The SDLP’s hopes for organizational gains were vindicated, as 82 of the group’s 166 candidates won in the local elections, giving it 14% of the total vote. This made the SDLP the second strongest party at the local level to the long-dominant Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), as well as the strongest party in the Irish national movement. Sinn Fein did not participate in the elections and, along with the PIRA, encouraged voters to boycott. The high turnout of 72% was further evidence for the SDLP’s predominance over the PIRA. In the Assembly elections in late June, the SDLP performed even better, winning 22% of the vote and 19 out of 78 seats in the Assembly. No other nationalist party won a seat, and the SDLP was within five seats of the

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leading (unionist) party as well as eleven seats clear of its next closest challenger.\textsuperscript{485} The SDLP was now the sole, significant nationalist pole and had a strong claim to the top position in the movement.

The problem for the SDLP was consolidating this electoral triumph. The SDLP was able to reach an agreement for a power-sharing executive in November with the dominant UUP, an accomplishment in and of itself.\textsuperscript{486} SDLP representatives now headed Northern Ireland’s housing and local government, health and social services, and commerce ministries for the first time, with Gerry Fitt as deputy Prime Minister. Negotiations concerning the Council of Ireland were held between the Irish and British governments, the UUP, and the SDLP in Sunningdale, England in December 1973. Although the power of the Council was agreed to be far less than the SDLP initially had wanted, the party was happy that precedents had been set for cooperation on the RUC and other matters that it hoped could lead to greater coordination with the Republic over time. With this, the SDLP ministers entered Stormont and began their work, side-by-side with their new unionist colleagues. The longtime multipolarity of the Irish national movement would soon come back to haunt them, however.

Sunningdale brought further criticism of the SDLP from all sides, including from Dáil TDs like Neil Blaney, who said “I am ashamed of [the SDLP] now as I have never been ashamed of ‘Irish’ representatives before. They have sold out while they are participating in this sham assembly.”\textsuperscript{487} Then came massive PIRA bombings in the unionist-dominated towns of Lisburn

\textsuperscript{485} Furthermore, the SDLP ran 29 candidates in all 12 constituencies, which had never been done by Nationalists before. Ibid., 76.
\textsuperscript{486} The executive had 7 UUP members, 6 SDLP members, and two members of the Alliance Part of Northern Ireland (APNI), a liberal, moderate unionist party. This was a significant amount of power for the Irish national movement, especially given the situation for the previous fifty years.
\textsuperscript{487} TD stands for ‘Teachta Dála’ in Gaelic, and it is the Dáil’s equivalent of the British MP in Parliament. The Irish Times, December 10, 1974.
and Bangor, which had been designed specifically to target Sunningdale.\textsuperscript{488} The killing blow, however, came from the Loyalist side. The sectarian violence that the PIRA and OIRA had helped to spiral out of control for years had made many unionists wary of any deal with the nationalists and had led to the burgeoning of the Loyalist militias. In the days after Sunningdale, the more extreme unionist groups passed a resolution against the agreement, splitting the party. Then, the Ulster Workers’ Council called for a general strike, which was given great heft by the UVF and UDA, the largest Loyalist paramilitaries. The UVF detonated car bombs in Dublin and Monaghan, killing 33 and wounding close to 300 people, making May 17 the bloodiest single day of The Troubles. The UDA set up barricades in Protestant areas and led extensive rioting that was crucial to the strike’s success. Within two weeks, the unionist ministers were forced to resign, bringing the collapse of the power-sharing executive, the Council of Ireland, and everything the SDLP had worked to build since its founding. Unfortunately for the SDLP, everything the PIRA had done since its founding helped make the realization of Sunningdale impossible, and its subordinate, marginalized position outside the negotiations gave it no incentive to try to quell the dragons its violence had unleashed.

With the PIRA on its side, the Sunningdale Agreement would have had a better chance of enduring. With the SDLP as the only pole in the movement since its founding, the Sunningdale Agreement likely would have held to this day in some form. Because of the multipolar movement and the actions it inspired amidst internal competition, however, the SDLP and, more importantly, the Irish national movement, lost out on significant strategic progress for the second time in two years. The Sunningdale Agreement may have been “Nationalism’s answer to the tactic of armed struggle,” but it could not endure what violence amidst multipolarity had sown.\textsuperscript{489}

\textsuperscript{489} Moloney, \textit{Voices from the Grave: Two Men’s War in Ireland}, 164.
The Exception that Proves the Rule: The Fall of Stormont

An unlikely source of support for the structuralist theory in this period comes from a comparison of the PIRA and SDLP failures with their one small strategic success: the fall of the Stormont government in 1972. In order to even raise the possibility of the PIRA’s negotiations with Whitelaw and the power-sharing Sunningdale executive, the long-standing government of Northern Ireland first had to be removed. Indeed, the suspension of Stormont and the institution of direct rule from London was an intermediate strategic objective of the PIRA, OIRA, and the SDLP. All groups in the Irish national movement got their wish on March 24, 1972 as the British prorogued Stormont, initially for only one year.

The PIRA, OIRA, and SDLP argued over who deserved credit for this development, each believing that its actions had been decisive. In truth, a collective coercive effort, if a largely uncoordinated one, brought down Stormont. The marches and boycotts of the civil rights movement began to open cracks in the government that the PIRA and OIRA’s violent campaign helped to significantly widen. The SDLP’s subsequent decision to abstain from serving in Stormont put the government on the brink. The three groups’ unified backing for general strikes in the aftermath of the Bloody Sunday killings helped finally bring it down, coupled with the rise in Loyalist militarism inspired by the PIRA/OIRA. In this way, the coercive actions of the PIRA, OIRA, and SDLP worked in rough harmony to eliminate a government for which they shared disdain and achieve a small degree of strategic success.

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490 Scholars disagree as well, with Murray and Tonge holding that the IRA “effectively brought down the Stormont government in 1972.” Bell points out that “The leaders of the civil rights campaign claimed credit—as did all and sundry.” Murray and Tonge, Sinn Fein and the SDLP: From Alienation to Participation, xii. Bell, The Secret Army: A History of the IRA 1916-1979, 387.

The most interesting aspect of the entire ordeal was that, far from actively coordinating their actions, the PIRA, OIRA, and SDLP had no formal alliance in achieving this strategic objective. The outcome would thus seem to be the opposite of what the structuralist theory would predict. The fall of Stormont is the exception that helps to prove the rule, however. Although the movement was not unipolar, its actions were more unified than ever just before the fall. After all, in the wake of Bloody Sunday, many believed that SDLP leader John Hume echoed the republican line when he proclaimed on the walls of Derry, “It’s a united Ireland or nothing.” This was therefore not an example of good cop/bad cop; if anything it was transitory bad cop/bad cop as all groups employed coercion to bring down Stormont. Thus, the complementary actions of the groups in the Irish national movement resembled a cohesive strategy for the achievement of a shared intermediate goal, even if by chance rather than alliance. Even though the independent variable was largely different, the causal mechanism was the same.

Furthermore, multipolarity ultimately ensured that the final outcome of this campaign was less than it would have otherwise been if the actions of the movement had been truly coordinated via unipolarity or unity. The PIRA saw the fall of Stormont as their chance to coerce full British withdrawal and relaunched attacks with renewed vigor. The SDLP saw the fall of Stormont as an opportunity to build a new power-sharing government, the culmination of which was Sunningdale. In the end, neither group nor their movement was successful, in large part because their competition over strength and strategy endured while their common efforts ended with the fall of Stormont.\(^{492}\) This demonstrated that strategic success can indeed happen under

\(^{492}\) Indeed, the groups could not even work together the day after Stormont fell. The OIRA and SDLP wanted to institute a ceasefire, but the PIRA decided to press on with attacks because the British had not withdrawn. The OIRA was soon drawn back in, and multipolar morass began anew. Bell, *The Secret Army: A History of the IRA 1916-1979*, 387-388.
multipolarity, but as it was with the fall of Stormont, that success is likely to be rare, shallow, and the result of similar casual mechanisms as unipolarity.

*The Long War on Two Fronts: Multipolar Malaise*

After the dual failures, all major poles in the Irish national movement endured: the SDLP, OIRA, and PIRA. The SDLP continued their search for the next Sunningdale; the armed groups continued their bombings in the belief that British withdrawal was just over the horizon. Despite some shifts in the hierarchy over time, multipolarity was to remain firmly in place for the next quarter century of The Troubles. Tactics would change, weaker poles would come and go, but the ‘Long War’ would simply resemble variations on a theme: some new musicians, a slightly altered tune, but the same reprise.

After a failed campaign of terrorist bombings in England, the PIRA agreed to another ceasefire with the British in February 1975. The English bombing campaign was based on the idea that “one bomb in Britain was worth ten in Belfast.”493 Like its predecessor from 1939, however, the campaign yielded little more for the PIRA than near universal popular condemnation and no new British concessions. The new ceasefire of 1975, like that of 1972, ended with failed expectations. Claiming to finally recognize that victory was not around the corner, Gerry Adams help lead the PIRA to launch a ‘Long War’ strategy. Despite the new name, however, the plan had most of the same elements as previous campaigns: making Northern Ireland ungovernable via attacks on security forces and keeping the pressure on the British via terrorist attacks in England.494

494 The major change involved the reorganization of the PIRA into cells to prevent the group’s decimation from informants, but this did not alter its use of violence significantly.
The biggest change in the armed struggle in the mid-1970s involved a second splitting of the OIRA, which yielded actions and outcomes in line with the structuralist theory: the weaker groups challenging for predominance, the emergence of infighting and outbidding, and the ultimately lack of strategic success. The roots of the OIRA’s second major split lay in the group’s decision to agree to a seemingly indefinite ceasefire in May of 1972. The group’s official newspaper, the \textit{United Irishman}, acknowledged the successful chain-ganging of the PIRA in analyzing the ceasefire: “The reasons for taking this crucial decision lay in a growing awareness by the leadership of the Republican Movement that we had been drawn into a war that was not of our choosing, and that we were being forced to fight on enemy ground.”

Despite these concerns, the fact that the OIRA continued to employ violence in the coming years demonstrates yet again the pull of internal competition. Accounts later revealed the extent to which the OIRA was concerned with its republican rival. One former OIRA man claimed, “The Sticks [OIRA] supplied shit to the North, except when the Provos got out of hand.” The fact that the OIRA leadership did not send sufficient weapons to field units unless the PIRA threatened led Jack Holland and Henry McDonald to argue that “The Official IRA volunteers who were troubled by the ceasefire began to have even more serious doubts about just who it was their leaders were expecting them to oppose—the Provos or the British.”

At the same time, many in the OIRA disapproved of the ceasefire, not because of its impact on the campaign against the British, but rather against the PIRA. Terry Robson, a former member who helped lead the split suggested, “We were opposed to the ceasefire, because we felt

\footnote{Holland and McDonald, \textit{Inla: Deadly Divisions}, 18.}
\footnote{‘Stick’ is a somewhat derogatory term that refers to the OIRA and OIRA members. The term originates with the Easter Rising commemorations, for which republicans often wear Easter lilies. Starting in 1967, Sinn Fein and IRA members started wearing lilies with self-adhesive, sticky backing. After the split, the PIRA returned to the more traditional pinned lilies, and referred to OIRA members as ‘Sticks.’ Ibid., 6.}
\footnote{Ibid., 20.}
we were building up support, competing with the Provos.” Ultimately, OIRA member Seamus Costello led a separation from the OIRA. He first founded a political party in December 1974, the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP), and then an armed group, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). Although the IRSP was held publically to be the main force, the reality was the reverse, with the INLA holding most of the membership and all of the decision-making capability. As the IRSP name indicated, the group’s main ideology was socialism and republicanism. It claimed that the PIRA lacked the former and the OIRA the latter. The three groups did not wage ideological battles in debate halls, however, but rather violent fights over power in the streets.

In truth, the INLA defined itself by the use of violence, which paid early dividends. The INLA took 80-100 members from the OIRA at the outset, which already represented a significant portion of the Officials’ roughly 800-1000 members at the time. Within two months, the INLA had won many more defectors, peeling off half of the OIRA’s membership in the Belfast Market district and the entire OIRA unit in Divis Flats in the Lower Falls section of the city. By January 1975, Costello claimed that the IRSP (in truth, largely the INLA) had 800 members, and the OIRA had lost over a third of its membership.

Costello thought that the INLA and OIRA would not come to blows, but not surprisingly, the OIRA decided to put aside their stated desire for non-violence in an attempt to squash this internal threat. By February 1975, the two groups were in an open, violent feud. Numerous

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\begin{itemize}
\item[498] Ibid., 22.
\item[499] Ibid., 31. English, \textit{Armed Struggle: The History of the Ira}, 177.
\item[500] Holland and McDonald, \textit{Inla: Deadly Divisions}, 38-39.
\item[501] Costello claimed over 300 members for the IRSP at its founding, including Bernadette McAliskey, a prominent republican and former MP. Costello’s membership claim was supported by the Irish Press, which suggested 400 defections from Official Sinn Fein. Ibid., 35-37, 43, 108-109.
\end{itemize}
members on each side were killed, including the OIRA’s Sean Garland, who had warned his
group back in 1971 that it was “liable to be brought down” by outbidding and infighting.502

From the perspective of the Irish national movement, the problem presented by the INLA
was two-fold. First, its emergence led to increased infighting in the movement. Second, that
infighting did not initially lead to the INLA or any of its rivals being eliminated, ensuring that
counterproductive outbidding was likely to continue, if not increase. Even a concerted campaign
by the PIRA against the OIRA in the fall of 1975 failed to destroy its rival.503 With now three
significant armed groups, sectarian violence rose. By the beginning of 1975, more Protestants
were killed by assassination gangs than Catholics for first time.504 The fact that groups claimed
such attacks under false names or avoided taking responsibility altogether demonstrated their
grasp of the problems posed by such attacks. Nonetheless, the attacks did not cease.505

To unionists, Loyalists, and British alike, it mattered little which group committed or
claimed which act: “For Protestants it appeared as if Republican gunmen—no distinction was
made between the tiny INLA and the IRA, one Fenian killer much like the next—were striking
out at local Protestants as well as the police.”506 The lack of coordination posed problems for the
movement’s signaling and credibility, however. It seemed as if anytime one group agreed to a
ceasefire, another launched attacks, drawing the previous group back in, all making it difficult
for the other side to have faith in any deal with the movement.

502 Costello himself was killed by the OIRA in 1977, leaving his group without clear leadership. Smith, Fighting for
503 Holland and McDonald, Inla: Deadly Divisions, 343-344.
504 Ibid., 4.
505 The INLA tried to circumvent the paradox by claiming its attacks early on using a false name, the Catholic
Reaction Force. Not surprisingly, the INLA did not publicly claim any of its attacks on the OIRA, as they would
have hurt, not helped, its organizational support. The PIRA used similar tactics, as it generally either failed to claim
sectarian attacks or employed shell group names, like the South Armagh Republican Action Force (SARAF). One
magazine article even said, “It is a case of the Provo dog being waved by the [SARAF tail into civil war.” Ibid., 2.
Although the INLA and PIRA were initially friendly, as the INLA grew in stature the two groups predictably started to compete. 507 "[The INLA’s] aim was to outgun the Provos, according to one of its founding members, who said: ‘The INLA had to compete with the Provos. We had to out-shoot them.’ These words were not mere bluster, as the group carried out more operations in mid-to-late 1975 than did the PIRA, who soon after pulled out of its ceasefire, which Gerry Adams believed had weakened the group considerably. 508 The PIRA condemned most INLA attacks, in no small part because “The Provisional leadership strongly resented any attempt being made by the INLA to present itself as the ‘protector’ of the Catholics in Derry.” 09 After all, the PIRA saw that as its job.

Given the PIRA’s significant advantages in funding, weaponry, and membership, the INLA could not ultimately compete in quantity of attacks. Therefore, it looked to up the ante with more visible, extreme targets. Following this strategy, the INLA killed British Conservative Party member Airey Neave, a friend of soon-to-be British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in March 1979. Assassinating Neave may have “put the INLA on the map,” but it did little to bring strategic success. 510 For their part, the PIRA later one-upped the INLA when it killed the Queen of England’s cousin, the last Viceroy of India, Earl Louis Mountbatten, along with his grandson and two other civilians. 511

Nonetheless, despite the emergence of a new pole and the solidifying of the PIRA as the strongest republican group, the 1980s began just as the 1970s had for the movement: multipolarity without strategic success.

507 The INLA and PIRA later even tried to forge unity via the ‘Irish Front,’ which pushed for the familiar demands of British withdrawal and prisoner release, along with the Nationalist Party and three smaller groups. Not surprisingly, the attempt failed. Holland and McDonald, Inla: Deadly Divisions, 110-111.
508 Ibid., 78.
509 Ibid., 79.
511 Ibid., 220.
The most famous development in The Troubles of the 1980s provided a direct test of the good cop/bad cop mechanism under multipolarity: the 'Armalite and ballot box' strategy of PSF/PIRA. Under this strategy, Provisional Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA decided to gradually enter electoral politics while still employing violence, in the belief that the two tactics would complement each other on the path to organizational and strategic success. In reality, the violence that assisted the PIRA at the ballot box had largely long since past. The strategy did not allow the PIRA to take over the national movement, and the uncoordinated actions of the SDLP assured that the multipolar movement would continue to sputter strategically. Nonetheless, the PSF/PIRA control of the republican half of the movement and its subsequent shift away from violence ultimately laid the groundwork for the eventual unity of the movement and an end to The Troubles.

The 'Armalite and ballot box' strategy had its roots in the prisons of Northern Ireland, which played a central role in the development of armed groups and the course of the Troubles. With the initiation of internment, thousands of PIRA, OIRA, and INLA members (among others) would spend time in the infamous Maze prison, called Long Kesh by its inhabitants. The special category status granted paramilitary members—which included freer association among prisoners and the ability to wear their own clothes instead of prison garb—was ended in March of 1976 as part of Britain's desire to criminalize what they perceived as terrorist violence. New prisoners were unhappy to be housed in the recently constructed H-block wings of Long Kesh without special category status. Protests began, including prisoners going naked and refusing to bathe in order to avoid wearing the prison uniform. With these protests

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512 Gerry Adams' takeover of the PIRA was planned and initiated during his time at Long Kesh.
having little effect, the prisoners, led by the PIRA's Brendan Hughes, upped the ante in October of 1980. Seven prisoners began a hunger strike that they claimed would end either in their death or the granting of their demands, which roughly amounted to a return to special category status for political prisoners.

Even in prison, the familiar dynamics of The Troubles emerged. The INLA, who "both inside and outside prison need to be more militant than the Provos," pushed to have multiple members in the first hunger strike.\textsuperscript{513} Hughes only allowed one INLA member to participate alongside six PIRA members (including himself), however, thus ensuring his group's dominance.\textsuperscript{514} The coercive logic of the strike inside was similar to that of violence outside: raise the costs to the British so that they would comply with the demands. The fact that the hunger strikes risked no casualties beyond the strikers themselves helped the prisoners and their armed groups gain popular support. Indeed, the hunger strike has deep roots in Irish history, with Irishmen in the War of Independence using it as a political weapon.\textsuperscript{515} After Hughes' hunger strike was called off before the demands were met, PIRA member Bobby Sands was determined to lead a second hunger strike to compel the British or, at the very least, reestablish that the movement and its members were credible in their threats.

The Sands-led strike involved waves of prisoners refusing food in roughly one-week intervals after Sands began on March 1, 1981. In a move that echoed actions from 1917, the PSF/PIRA decided to run Sands as a candidate for the April by-election in Northern Ireland's Fermanagh and South Tyrone district for British Parliament. Sands shocking victory over the unionist candidate put an imprisoned PIRA member on the 40\textsuperscript{th} day of a hunger strike in

\textsuperscript{513} The INLA was worried that the PIRA would speak for all of the protestors and so reap all of the political advantage. Holland and McDonald, \textit{Inla: Deadly Divisions}, 177-179. Bell, \textit{The Secret Army: A History of the Ira 1916-1979}, 497.

\textsuperscript{514} Moloney, \textit{Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland}, 236.

\textsuperscript{515} Ibid., 216.
Parliament. Despite his new position, the British refused to give in to his demands, and Sands perished on May 5, 1981. His funeral was attended by over 100,000 people and watched by many supporters and sympathizers across the globe. The most significant immediate impact of Sands’ ordeal was not on the British, but rather on his own organization. His election helped the group’s leaders to recognize the potential of electoral politics and non-violent protest: this was the beginning of the Armalite and the ballot box.

At Sinn Fein’s subsequent 1981 Ard Fheis, Danny Morrison famously proclaimed: “Who here really believes we can win the war though the ballot box? But will anyone here object, if with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in this hand, we take power in Ireland?” So began a direct test of the good cop/bad cop strategy, whereby the PIRA/PSF hoped to take over the national movement and achieve Irish unity by mixing violence and electoral victory. Unfortunately for the PIRA/PSF as well as the alternative structuralist theory, the strategy did not achieve the group’s desired objectives. What the PSF/PIRA failed to recognize was that the strategy had already been employed and had exhausted its potential. It had been attempted by the PIRA itself, and it had been attempted collectively, albeit unintentionally, by the PIRA and the SDLP.

For the PIRA itself, its decent showing in the 1982 elections—when Sinn Fein won five seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly with 40% of nationalist vote—may have surprised some observers. It was not a result of the group’s current attacks, however, but rather the strength of the organization and its support that had built up for years, in part because of its use of violence.

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516 62 people died in the riots accompanying Sands’ hunger strike and death. Noraid went on to raise hundreds of thousands of dollars on a U.S. tour for the relatives of hunger strikers, including one from INLA. Nonetheless, all of the money went to the PIRA. Holland and McDonald, Inla: Deadly Divisions, 184. Moloney, Voices from the Grave: Two Men’s War in Ireland, 244. Bell, The Secret Army: A History of the Ira 1916-1979, 503.

517 Nine other hunger strikers would eventually perish before the protest was ended. One was elected to the Dáil Éireann in 1981, along with another PIRA prisoner who was not on hunger strike.

to defend and promote republican interests.\(^{519}\) To the extent that this was ‘Armalite and the ballot box’ then, it was Armalite \textit{first} then ballot box \textit{later}, as the group was soon to learn that mixing the two simultaneously did not produce the desired result. Second, from the perspective of the movement, the Armalite and ballot box had been the defining strategy since the start of The Troubles, if not before. The PIRA, OIRA, and INLA provided the Armalites and the Nationalist party and SDLP sought gains at the ballot boxes. However, as with the new strategy of Provisional Sinn Fein and the PIRA, all this produced was coercion campaigns that were not coercive or credible enough and power-sharing agreements that were spoiled at the polls and in the streets by powerful armed groups. The pattern indeed continued, as Provisional Sinn Fein failed to catch the SDLP at the polls in 1984 or 1985, the British failed to offer significant concessions to the PIRA, and multipolarity continued to prevent strategic gains.

By 1986, the Sinn Fein and PIRA leadership decided to take a further step by giving up abstentionism in the Dáil, meaning they would take their seats in the government of the 26-county Republic.\(^{520}\) This story was familiar, as it had played out before in 1969, not to mention 1922. Holding to the script, dissenters led by former President Ruairí Ó Brádaigh walked out of the Ard Fheis and formed Republican Sinn Fein, believing that abstentionism was a principle of republicanism, not a tactic to be discarded when politically expedient. As predicted by the structuralist theory, the PIRA moved to end abstentionism when its group stood to gain organizationally, just as the OIRA had when the PIRA castigated them for years and pledged they would never do the same.\(^{521}\) The key difference with 1969 and 1922 was that the new

\(^{519}\) Moloney, \textit{Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland}, 256.

\(^{520}\) This move had been foreshadowed in a 1984 interview when Gerry Adams noted that taking over the Irish parliament in the south was a “tempting option.” Brendan O’Brien, \textit{The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein}, 2nd ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 123.

\(^{521}\) As Moloney described, “The Provos had emerged in 1969 partly in protest at the then IRA leadership’s intention to ‘go political’ but the wheel had turned full circle.” Moloney, \textit{Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland}, 255.
dissenting Sinn Fein faction was significantly weaker and not backed by a strong armed wing at the outset. Therefore despite low-level rhetorical and violent outbidding, the republican half of the movement did not descend into full-scale civil war yet again.

The move did not split Sinn Fein from the PIRA, but it furthered a shift in power within the two branches. The leadership, funding, and strategy would increasingly come through the political wing, not the other way around, as had been the case for so long. The leader of the PSF and PIRA, Gerry Adams, recognized that “there are contradictions between our struggle and the political structure in the same way there are contradictions in Irish society.” Nonetheless, the greatest contradiction remained between the PSF/PIRA and the SDLP. The former’s increasing stranglehold on the republican part of the movement finally provided structural incentives and a bit of breathing space to pursue the unified action that for so long had evaded it.

*Old Deal, New Structure, United Success: The Good Friday Agreement and Beyond*

After thirty years of conflict, The Troubles ended with a puzzle: Why couldn’t the Good Friday Agreement have been signed twenty-five years earlier, when it was called the Sunningdale Agreement? After all, despite certain nuances, the basics of the deal—power-sharing between unionists/Loyalists and nationalist/republicans, Northern Ireland and the

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523 Smith, *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*, 171. Adams continued to try to straddle the line between the two. For example, he all but condemned a PIRA bombing on Shankill Road in 1993, but then was a pall bearer at PIRA bomber’s funeral (the bomber died in the blast along with nine others). Later, Adams began to publicly claim that he was not then and had not ever been a member of the IRA, although there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary. ______, *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*, 199. As former PIRA member Brendan Hughes claimed, “I never carried out a major operation without the OK or the order from Gerry. And for him to sit in his plush office in Westminster or Stormont or wherever and deny it, I mean, it’s like Hitler denying that there ever was a Holocaust.” Moloney, *Voices from the Grave: Two Men’s War in Ireland*, 131.
Republic, and Ireland and Great Britain—were the same. Various parts of the conventional wisdom suggest that the answer lies in ideological shifts, the involvement of the United States, or simply the fact that key parties learned from their mistakes. After all, SDLP deputy leader Seamus Mallon called the Good Friday Agreement “Sunningdale for slow learners.” Contrary to much of the existing analysis, however, the discrepancy is not due to philosophical changes, external actors or organizational learning. The Good Friday Agreement was offered, agreed to, and endured because of changes in the structure of the Irish national movement since the time of Sunningdale. The republican wing of the movement became unipolar, lessening the internal, violent threat to the Sinn Fein/PIRA and structuring its incentives towards the pursuit of organizational ends through movement unity. This unified movement, lacking at Sunningdale (and in the decades prior), thus made the Good Friday Agreement endure where Sunningdale had failed, securing a moderate strategic success that had eluded the Irish national movement for so long.

One need not marginalize the individuals themselves and the peace process to demonstrate the importance of movement structure. The secret talks between Sinn Fein’s Gerry Adams and the SDLP’s John Hume, which began in 1985, were an important step towards the movement’s later unity. The involvement of the United States, which ably fulfilled the role of ‘honest broker,’ helped bring credibility to the process and the various factions. The tireless

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524 “The institutions of the Good Friday Agreement can be traced to the SDLP’s first policy documents, outlining the party’s political strategic options for resolving the Northern Ireland conflict.” These same documents provided the basis for SDLP proposals for Sunningdale as well. Murray and Tonge, *Sinn Fein and the SDLP: From Alienation to Participation*, xiv.

525 The first is a symptom of the main cause, the second is a relevant but not crucial element, and the third suggests a development that was not new.

526 From this point forward, Provisional Sinn Fein will simply be referred to as Sinn Fein. Official Sinn Fein changed its name to The Workers’ Party in 1982, in part due to Provisional Sinn Fein’s increasing dominance of the brand.

527 The situation was set up well for the U.S. to play such a role, given its historic special relationship with Great Britain as well as its significant Irish-American population.
work of the leaders of the SDLP, Sinn Fein, the UUP, and the Irish and British governments no doubt involved a great deal of discovery and statesmanship, without which a deal may not have happened exactly when it did. Nonetheless, the key lessons for the Irish had been learned long ago; groups (particularly the PIRA) simply needed shifts in the power structure to act on them.

The IRA had clearly understood the importance of a unified effort for some time, as they proclaimed at outset of the Border Campaign in 1956: “This fight will be won when the united strength of our people is thrown in the scales against British imperialism.” If Sinn Fein, the PIRA, or any other group needed further inspiration, they could just look to the War of Independence, which was successful in large part because of the unipolarity that had been established in the movement. Gerry Adams echoed this sentiment in 1988 when he stressed that there was an “urgent need to build an all-Ireland movement which would be open to everyone committed to the principle and objective of Irish national self-determination.” The key difference that made Adams want to attend the talks with Hume and ultimately work together for the Good Friday Agreement was the PIRA’s dominance within the republican wing of the national movement.

The PIRA had previously been against such a deal because it was weaker than the OIRA, let alone the SDLP. Although it became the strongest republican group in the mid-1970s, there were still other poles to challenge for supremacy. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, Sinn Fein/PIRA were the only republican pole left standing. Groups like Republican Sinn Fein and the Real IRA splintered off as Sinn Fein/PIRA moved towards Good Friday, but they never became

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528 It should also be noted that many of these leaders put themselves at significant personal risk by supporting the Good Friday Agreement, whatever the political impact on their parties.
530 Adams, A Pathway to Peace, 77.
531 As the leading group in the movement, the SDLP always wanted to hold such unity talks, as predicted by the structuralist theory.
significant poles that could challenge their former group, forcing it to extensively outbid or chain-ganging it into unproductive violence. Instead, the PIRA was able to effectively start and stop violence on its own. It called for a ceasefire in 1994, which gave it popular support and significant public exposure in the U.S. and beyond. Having been promised a seat at the negotiating table, repeated British foot-dragging on this score led the PIRA to end the ceasefire and employ limited bombings in 1996 and 1997 to remind the other side of its potential to inflict significant costs. With their position reassured, Sinn Fein/PIRA then called another ceasefire in July 1997, which held as the group signed the Good Friday Agreement. The PIRA’s ceasefires helped encourage similar ceasefires by Loyalist militias and a corresponding drop in sectarian violence. Had there been another significant republican armed group at the time, the potential for outbidding and spoiling that would have prevented the deal in some form would have been much higher.

In addition to their ability to control violence within the movement, Sinn Fein’s position gave it a greater incentive to join with the SDLP and sign the agreement, as its potential organizational gains were much higher than they would have been at any previous point in time. In fact, even though SF/PIRA was the second strongest group, they were near equals with the SDLP, and within three years of the signing of the deal they had overtaken them at the polls.

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532 Republican Sinn Fein, which had split off from the Provisionals in 1986, developed an active armed wing at the 1994 PIRA ceasefire, the Continuity IRA (CIRA). Despite carrying out a few attacks, the group had only 30-50 members in mid-1998 and was not a serious threat to the dominance of Sinn Fein/PIRA. English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the Ira*, 316. The Real IRA split off from the PIRA in 1997, led by Bobby Sands’ sister and her husband, the PIRA Quartermaster at the time. They formed a political wing, the 32-County Sovereignty Movement, and accused Sinn Fein of deserting republicanism. Like the CIRA, however, they never topped many more than 100 members or represented a serious challenge to the movement leadership. O'Brien, *The Long War: The Ira and Sinn Fein*, 389.

533 This adds a further addendum for future analysis within the structuralist theory. Namely, second strongest polls are more likely to use violence except in cases where ceasing that violence will allow them to become the strongest group.
Thus, the biggest different between Sunningdale and the Good Friday Agreement was who was at the table.

Therefore, if there was any learning going on over the years, it was not that a unified effort could yield strategic success, as it often implied, but rather that, unlike in 1918, unipolarity was simply not going to happen. Sinn Fein/PIRA realized that they could neither destroy nor outcompete their nationalist rivals, so their best hope for organizational and strategic success was unity. This realization shines new light on the pithy quote of Cathal Goulding, former chief of staff of the IRA: “We [OIRA] were right, but we were right too soon. Adams [PIRA] may be right, but he’s right too late. And Ó Brádaigh [Republican Sinn Fein] will never be right.”

This realization did not prevent SF/PIRA from suffering the slings and arrows of new and old rivals alike, as 32-County Sovereignty Movement member Marian Price one-upped Seamus Mallon’s claim by suggesting that the Good Friday Agreement was “Sunningdale for retards.” As former PIRA member Anthony McIntyre asked: “Why did so many people have to die to bring us back round to accepting what we rejected in 1974, and called everybody else bastards for accepting?” While no dispassionate justification can be given for so much death, a single-level strategic analysis makes this a puzzle; a two-level framework that incorporates organizational concerns provides the answer. In short, the reason the later deal got done and the earlier one did not was due to the structure of the Irish national movement.

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535 Ibid., 317.
536 Ibid., 319.
Conclusion

The Good Friday Agreement represents both the political success and failure of non-state violence. In part, it is an indication of violence not working, because the Provisional IRA was unable to coerce the British to withdraw or ascend to the top of movement using violence, as intended. Therefore, this campaign cannot be coded as a total strategic success or a total organizational success. At the same time, the PIRA/PSF would not have become as strong as it did—the second most powerful group in the movement and rising—without employing violence. Therefore, violence was organizationally beneficial for the PIRA, at least to a degree.

Furthermore, as previously noted, the Good Friday Agreement may not have represented a larger strategic gain than Sunningdale, but the former endured and the latter did not in part because Good Friday did not inspire violent spoiling from an Irish pole and Sunningdale did. As discussed from the outset, coercion involves not only the credible commitment to use violence but also the credible commitment to stop it, which the PIRA demonstrated from 1994-1998. One could also argue that the British would not have offered either Sunningdale or Good Friday without the threat of violence made credible by the earlier actions of the PIRA, among others, before either deal was broached. Ultimately, the preceding analysis of the two agreements points to the difficulty of linking violent actions to political outcomes, and why shallow, snapshot assessments of campaigns are likely to provide misleading conclusions on the political effectiveness of non-state violence.

As predicted by the structuralist theory of non-state violence, this chapter demonstrated that violence was the most politically effective within the Irish national movement when the movement was unipolar, least effective when it was multipolar, and somewhat effective when it was united. The significant variation in polarity, hierarchy, and strategic and organizational
success provided excellent ground for analysis of the structuralist theory. The theory does not come close to explaining every political twist and turn in the Irish national movement, but it does an excellent job of explaining the political effectiveness of non-state violence across time and, at least within the bounds of two islands, space.

It is fair to note that from 1916-1921, significant strategic success could be had by gaining independence for the South alone. It is seemingly harder to subsequently gain such independence for the North, which the earlier campaign did not achieve in any case. Fair enough. Nonetheless, there are apples to apples comparisons to be had within each time period, and those definitively demonstrate that unipolar/unified movements yielded more politically effective violence than did non-unified multipolar ones. Campaigns before 1916 aimed for Irish independence and failed, in no small part due to a lack of a strong, unipolar movement that wed violence and politics. In the post-1922 period, there is variation in political effectiveness that strongly correlates with the unity of the movement. Unfortunately, at least for scientific purposes, unipolarity in the North was never fully tested. Nonetheless, the unipolarity within the republican wing of the movement suggests that overall unipolarity would have performed even better, e.g. no spoiling of Sunningdale, no infighting or outbidding contributing to sectarian violence, and greater credibility.

The hierarchy hypothesis performed just as well, if not better. As predicted, weaker poles were more likely to outbid, chain-gang, spoil, and initiate violence; stronger poles were more likely to restrain violence, seek negotiations, and push for unity. After all, the OIRA wanted unity when it was on top of the republican heap, the PIRA did not until it was on top, the SDLP—always on top of the movement—always wanted unity, and the INLA—always on the bottom—never did. In every case in which abstentionism was ended—the IRA, OIRA, and PIRA
with the republic, the SDLP with internment—what changed was not what the group
ideologically said had to change, but rather the movement structure and the fact that the group
would be guaranteed a leading role in the new order. Ideology may have played a role in the
splitting of various groups, but it was the movement structure that subsequently drove group
behavior. The strongest case for ideology occasionally influencing behavior was the SDLP,
which remained nonviolent throughout The Troubles. There is some credence to this, although
the SDLP was always the top group, meaning that its actions were in line with the predictions of
the structuralist theory in any case.

This chapter raises the possibility of two additional hypotheses for future research that
may lead to revisions of the structuralist theory. The first is that if only one pole is violent (the
others being decidedly non-violent perhaps for ideological reasons), the violence from that
multipolar movement may resemble that of a unipolar movement and thus be more politically
effective. This may especially be the case if the one armed group is the strongest pole. The
second hypothesis is that if there are two clearly identifiable wings of a social movement,
unipolarity within one wing may have similar, if less powerful, effects on the leading group’s
behavior as those predicted based on hierarchy within the entire movement. In the final stages of
The Troubles, the Irish national movement experienced both conditions, as the PIRA was the
only violent pole and the PIRA and SDLP were both the only poles in their respective wings of
the movement. Both of these hypothesis point to the need for further analysis of different types
of multipolarity, although based more on qualitative than quantitative distinctions. In any case,
this chapter has demonstrated that the structuralist theory appears to be quite powerful, even if
further analysis may yield helpful revision.
The Zionist and Algerian National Movements: Alternate Paths to Unipolarity

"The violence of the colonized, we have said, unifies the people. By its very structure colonialism is separatist and regionalist. Colonialism is not merely content to note the existence of tribes, it reinforces and differentiates them. The colonial system nurtures the chieftainships and revives the old marabout confraternities. Violence in its practice is totalizing and national. As a result, it harbors in its depths the elimination of regionalism and tribalism. The nationalist parties, therefore, show no pity at all towards the kaids and the traditional chiefs. The elimination of the kaids and the chiefs is a prerequisite to the unification of the people."

-Frantz Fanon

"Why was the Second Temple destroyed? Because of sinat chinam, senseless hatred of one Jew for another."

-Talmud, Yoma 9b

Introduction

With a thorough analysis of the explanatory power of the structuralist theory within the Palestinian and Irish national movements in hand, a brief examination of the Zionist and Algerian national movements provides further empirical depth and breadth. First, each provides variation in its own right in polarity, hierarchy, the use of violence, and political effectiveness. Second, the Algerian and Zionist cases have proven to be of great interest to scholars and policymakers concerning the utility of non-state violence and counterinsurgency. Third, these cases provide additional spatial and temporal variation. In addition to struggles in Europe and the Middle East, we now add North Africa, as well as a non-Arab Middle Eastern case. These new campaigns encompassed the mid-20th century, whereas previous analysis of the Irish and Palestinian cases focused on the first and last thirty years of the 1900s.

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537 Frantz Fanon, born in the former French colony of Martinique, was a philosopher that moved to Algeria, joined the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), and wrote a number of famous tracts on colonialism and the unifying aspects of violence. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 51.

Finally, these campaigns offer some fruitful comparisons to the previous cases. The Irish and Zionists shared the same British state enemy, the Zionist and Palestinian national movements have always been at odds due to their claim of sovereignty over the same territory, and the Algerian and Palestinian movements emerged from within the same broader Arab nationalist movement. Additionally, the Algerian and Zionist movements followed different paths to unipolarity. The Irish Republican Army and Fatah achieved unipolarity through a combination of cooptation, violent competition, and electoral success, after years of finding themselves or their predecessors at the bottom of a multipolar movement. The Zionists built a movement prone to unipolarity (or at least unity) from the outset through the construction of centralized institutions, while the National Liberation Front (FLN) fought its way to unipolarity in a way that Fatah, the PFLP, the PIRA, and the INLA, among others, were unable to do for decades.

What do these movements tell us about the structuralist theory of non-state violence? The use of violence within the Algerian national movement was strategically effective during the one period of unipolarity (1958-1962) and ineffective during periods of multipolarity (1930-1944, 1946-1951, 1952-1957) and unity (1944-1945, 1951) (see Table 4). Whereas the multipolar periods were marked by mixed strategies and signals, greater efforts expended on internal fights than external ones, and attempted side deals, the movement under the National Liberation Front’s (FLN) dominance yielded clear, consistent signals, a massive, concerted strategic effort at expelling the French, and a single, credible negotiator with limited potential for spoiling or sell-out due to the lack of a second pole. There was no Algerian ‘third force’ with whom the French could negotiate a deal short of independence; the FLN had swept all of its internal rivals from the field, allowing its organization and the Algerian people to reap the benefits. Furthermore, the dominance of the FLN within the Algerian national movement allowed it to
largely ignore the *colons’* violent attempt to spoil the peace deal. Attacks of the *colons’* Secret Armed Organization (OAS) were met with significant restraint and finally a truce, despite the fact that the OAS had killed three times as many civilians in the Algiers area during the first six months of 1962 as had the FLN from 1956 to 1962, including the Battle of Algiers. Had the movement been multipolar, OAS violence would have made it less likely that the FLN could have negotiated with the French, because they would have been worried that a loss of legitimacy would lead to their rival’s ascendance. Given that the movement was unipolar, however, the FLN knew that there was no viable alternative group to benefit from any loss of face, and so they proceeded with the negotiations amidst the attacks.

The structuralist theory explains significant variation in the effectiveness of violence within the Zionist movement. The two-level framework captures the dynamics of the movement, which was initiated in 1897 around the common objective of creating a Jewish homeland, but contained competing organizations that emerged over time to try to lead the struggle. The use of violence was most effective during periods of unipolarity (1897-1929, 1946-1948, 1948-1949) and largely ineffective during periods of multipolarity (1935-1945), with the periods of unity (1929-1935, 1945-1946) yielding limited to no progress (see Table 5).

Unipolarity during the early period of the movement yielded unified Zionist diplomacy that won key British support for a Jewish state, followed by the construction of centralized institutions like the Jewish National Fund, the Jewish Agency, and the Haganah to acquire, settle, and defend land that was to become the foundation of Israel. The rise of multipolarity led to mixed messaging and a lack of credibility during the Arab Revolt of 1936-39, which yielded the largest strategic setback for the Zionist movement. The British White Paper of 1939 severely curtailed Jewish immigration and called for a binational state in Palestine that would have
prevented the ultimate Zionist objective of a Jewish state. The ability of Mapai and the Haganah to ultimately return the movement to unipolarity was crucial to the Zionists defeating the Palestinian resistance in 1947-1948 and then winning the 1948 War, which successfully protected and enlarged the boundaries of Israel, which otherwise might not have existed. Unipolarity gave the Zionist movement and, subsequently, the Israeli state centralized command and control that allowed its forces to triumph against the loose, multipolar coalitions of Palestinian armed groups and Arab armies.

As for the hierarchy hypothesis, the National Liberation Front (FLN) was the weakest of the four poles in the Algerian national movement when it launched what became the Algerian War of Independence. The stronger Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA) and National Algerian Congress (NAC) both denounced the onset of violence and warned their supporters off the FLN initially. Later, when it became clear that violence had catapulted the FLN to prominence, UDMA and NAC members joined the FLN and supported violence as their parties were weakened. The strongest pole at the outbreak of the war in 1954, the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), was outraged at the FLN’s use of violence. Ironically, if predictably according to the structuralist theory, the MTLD was playing the role of its old rival, the UDMA, who had previously denounced and sought to constrain violence the MTLD itself had launched as a weaker pole in a chain-ganging attempt in 1945.

In the Zionist movement, the strongest pole of Mapai/Haganah often sought to restrain violence and pursue strategic objectives (and their organizational benefits) through negotiations and diplomacy. On the other hand, the weaker Revisionists/Irgun and Lehi were constantly instigating violence in attempts to chain-gang the movement into a conflict that would force the British and Arabs to withdraw under fire.
In both the Zionist and Algerian movements, attempts at unity largely failed. Furthermore, the two brief alliances of the Zionists and the Algerians in 1945 ended in disastrous uses of violence within both movements that put an end to the short-lived unity. In the Algerian case, the brutal massacre of civilians at Sétif led to the killing of thousands of Algerians and a lack of French concessions. In the Zionist case, the blowing up of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem and the killing of 91 people, largely civilians, hurt popular and official support for the Zionist cause significantly. In both cases, unity had not removed multipolar incentives for the attacks, which failed to yield political gains.

This remainder of this chapter will analyze the political effectiveness of violence within the Algerian and Zionist movements over time in greater depth.
Table 4. Summary of Campaigns in the Algerian National Movement, 1930-1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Polarity During Campaign</th>
<th>Hierarchy of Poles Before Campaign</th>
<th>Hierarchy of Poles After Campaign</th>
<th>Strategic Outcome of Campaign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930-1944</td>
<td>Multipolarity</td>
<td>1. ENA/PPA&lt;sup&gt;539&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1. AML</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. AAU</td>
<td>2. PPA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. PPA</td>
<td>3. AAU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-1945</td>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>1. AML</td>
<td>1. FLN</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. PPA</td>
<td>2. MTLD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. AAU</td>
<td>3. MTLD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1951</td>
<td>Multipolarity</td>
<td>1. MTLD</td>
<td>1. MTLD</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. MTLD</td>
<td>2. UDMA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. NAC</td>
<td>3. NAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Unity&lt;sup&gt;540&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1. MTLD</td>
<td>1. MTLD</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-1954</td>
<td>Multipolarity</td>
<td>1. MTLD</td>
<td>1. FLN</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. UDMA</td>
<td>2. MNA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. NAC</td>
<td>3. NAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1956</td>
<td>Multipolarity</td>
<td>1. MTLD</td>
<td>1. FLN</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. MNA</td>
<td>2. MNA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. NAC</td>
<td>3. NAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1957</td>
<td>Multipolarity</td>
<td>1. FLN</td>
<td>1. FLN</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-1962</td>
<td>Unipolarity</td>
<td>1. FLN</td>
<td>1. FLN</td>
<td>Major Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups using violence at the time are highlighted in green with vertical stripes, and groups trying to stop violence are highlighted in red with horizontal stripes. Groups with no color or stripes neither used violence nor restrained it. This helps demonstrate how the weaker poles were often the ones initiating violent outbidding, chain-ganging, or spoiling, while the strongest group was the most likely to attempt to restrain it, regardless of ideology or other group characteristics. For one measure of the organizational effectiveness of violence for a given group, note its relative position in the hierarchy before and after a campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AAU: Algerian Association of Ulama</th>
<th>MTLD: Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AML: Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty</td>
<td>NAC: National Algerian Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENA: North African Star</td>
<td>PPA: Algerian People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLN: National Liberation Front</td>
<td>UDMA: Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNA: Algerian National Movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>539</sup> During this period, Ferhat Abbas’ Fédération des Elus Indigènes (FEI) was roughly as powerful as the ENA/PPA, but did not aim for Algerian independence until Abbas issued a manifesto in 1943 and subsequently formed the Amis du Manifeste de la Liberté (AML). Therefore, Abbas’ group is not considered a pole in the movement until that time.

<sup>540</sup> Although not poles by this time, the Algerian Association of Ulama (AAU) and Algerian Communist Party (PCA) joined this alliance in 1951, making the movement unified not only among poles but also among smaller groups.
Figure 18. Map of Algeria

The Algerian government changed some of the city names after gaining independence from France, most notably Skikda, formerly Philippeville.
The Algerian National Movement: Fighting To Unipolarity

Multipolar Beginnings

The Founding of the Algerian Nationalist Movement, 1930-1944

Unlike the Zionist movement, which began with a geographically dispersed base but a single organizational pole, the Algerian national movement began with a concentrated base whose leadership was divided into three main poles: the liberals under Ferhat Abbas, the religious reformers under Abdel Hamid Ben Badis and Tawfik Al-Madani, and the more radical nationalists under Messali Hadj. The internal struggle between these three groups served as the central feature of the Algerian national movement and helped ensure the strategically ineffective employment of violence for the first 25-30 years of the movement.

This division among the Algerians had precedent from their very first reaction to the French invasion of their homeland in 1830. Algerians offered fierce resistance to the French conquest for fifteen years under a number of leaders, most prominently Abdel Kader Ben Muhieddine. Nonetheless, “Though winning remarkably wide support in western and central Algeria, he was never able to unite totally the warlike Algerian tribes which, traditionally, were little more inclined to submit to this authority than they were to the French.”\textsuperscript{542} The division between Abdel Kader’s forces and the eastern Berber tribes in particular helped doom the Algerian resistance, and France had conquered and officially annexed most of Algeria by 1848.

The concept of Algerian nationalism did not develop until a century after the French invasion, although this inherently unifying ideology failed to unite the competing factions.

One of the most prominent Algerian nationalists, Ferhat Abbas, was not a nationalist at all during his early years in politics. Instead, Abbas and his liberal supporters pushed for equal rights for Algerians within French rule in the 1920s and 1930s. At the time, the Muslims who comprised over 95% of native Algerians were subjects of France, not citizens, and they enjoyed few of the political, economic, or social rights of the French in France or the French colonists in Algeria. Abbas and the liberals helped found the Fédération des Elus Indigènes (Federation of Elected Natives or FEI), whose over 150 members pushed for equal pay and electoral reform within the government to which many of them were elected. Unlike the SDLP in Northern Ireland, however, the liberals pushed for these reforms as part of a plan to further integrate Algeria into France, not vice versa. As such, they can only be considered an important player on the fringes of the national movement, not a pole, until Abbas’ commitment to Algerian independence in 1943.

In the meantime, the two other factions were developing the concept of Algerian nationalism and organizing to lead the growing movement. Muslim religious scholars led by Abdel Hamid Ben Badis began encouraging Algerians to return to the true Islam and speak Arabic amidst a larger push for a renewed Algerian identity. As part of this effort, they also began advocating for Algerian independence from France, whose influence they saw as corrupting. To these ends, Ben Badis founded the Algerian Association of Ulama (AAU) in 1931. The AAU did not engage directly in politics to the degree of Abbas and Messali’s followers, but its growing following ensured that the Ulama represented a significant pole in the early years of the movement.

543 Despite government reforms to supposedly improve this situation, fewer than 2,500 Muslim Algerians had become French citizens by 1936. Ibid., 35.
The earliest organization within the Algerian national movement was led by Messali Hadj, an anti-imperialist who hailed from the town of Tlemcen in northwest Algeria. While living in Paris, Messali became president of Étoile Nord-Africaine (North African Star or ENA) in 1927. The ENA, which initially had strong connections to the Algerian Communist Party (PCA), sought independence for Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, all currently under French control. Although the group was non-violent and had no armed wing, its ideas alone were enough for the French to dissolve the group and imprison Messali. Undaunted, Messali’s Algerian nationalists formed the Algerian People’s Party (PPA) on March 11, 1937, only two months after the dissolution of the ENA. The PPA was similar in outlook to the ENA, although it focused solely on Algerian independence.

Although the Algerian national movement was nonviolent up until the mid-1940s, the multipolarity of the movement nonetheless inhibited progress through its associated lack of cohesive effort, mixed signaling, and internal struggles for power. With Messali imprisoned again in 1943 and the PPA on the verge of dissolution at the hands of the French, Abbas officially entered the national movement in force. Disillusioned by continued French foot-dragging on even moderate political reforms, Abbas issued the Manifesto of the Algerian People in February 1943, in which he finally called for Algerian independence. Abbas had consulted with the AAU and PPA before issuing the Manifesto, and in 1944 he unified the movement for the first time. Abbas’ newly formed group, Amis du Manifeste de la Liberté (AML), joined in an alliance with the Ulama and Messali’s organization to push for the realization of the Manifesto. In a relatively short period, the AML garnered half a million followers, and some Algerians argued that this period represented the greatest unity between the national elite and the people,
more so than the latter dominance of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). 544 Despite these developments, the movement remained multipolar (if unified), not unipolar. As such, the autonomous factions continued to compete for power, this time by employing violence.

*Unsuccessful Unity, Sétif, and Continued Multipolarity, 1944-1951*

Although he had agreed to unite with the AML, Messali had maintained the PPA as a separate entity in part because he believed his group should be at the head of the movement. In 1945, Messali took two significant steps that reflected this desire for organizational power and spelled the end of the alliance. First, at the AML Congress in March 1945, which was designed to strengthen movement unity, Messali’s followers attempted to wrest control of movement policy. They then passed a motion naming Messali “the incontestable leader of the Algerian people,” a clear challenge to Abbas. 545 Although these steps did not bring the collapse of the AML, the PPA’s subsequent move to violence did.

With the Allies’ triumph over Germany by May 1945, many Algerians believed that significant political reforms were (or should be) in the offing, if not complete independence. On May 8, 1945 (VE Day), 8,000 Algerians turned out for a march in Sétif, a major town in the northeast of the country. Some of the marchers displayed banners in support of Messali and Algerian independence. When police stepped in, shots were fired; it was unclear by which side. Nonetheless, what is clear is that soon after, the marchers—some of whom were armed and prepared for a fight—overwhelmed the mere twenty policemen in the town. The Algerians then

544 If true, this provides further evidence of the power of unipolarity and the relative weakness of unity, as the latter failed despite even greater grassroots support. William Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 50.

545 Ibid.
began attacking the *colons* in Séïf and the surrounding areas.\footnote{By this time, *colons* were Europeans but not only French, as there were also significant proportions of Italians and Greeks, among others.} Over the next four days, 103 *colons* were killed and another 100 were wounded, with many victims brutally mutilated or raped. The French military responded by killing 500-600 Algerian civilians using ground troops, airplanes, and even naval bombardments from the Mediterranean Sea. The *colons*, horrified by the violence and wishing to brutally deter such action, organized vigilante groups that killed many thousands of Algerians. The police ultimately arrested thousands of nationalists of all stripes, and the short-lived uprising was put down.

As Alistair Horne relates, “To this day, Abbas believes that Messali, in collusion with the colonial police, instigated [Séïf] with the aim of destroying the unity achieved by his Amis du Manifeste de la Liberté created the previous year.”\footnote{Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, 73.} Messali and the PPA had partially organized the massacre, although later accounts suggest Messali had second thoughts but nonetheless could not stop it. The Ulama was on the sidelines. Abbas and the AML had not been involved and denounced the attacks. Nonetheless, the AML and PPA were both dissolved and their members arrested, while any hope of strategic success for the movement fizzled.

Each of these aspects of Séïf—the weaker group launching attacks to change the game and rise to the top, the leading group attempting to restrain violence, multipolarity yielding strategic defeat—are consistent with the structuralist theory. Had the movement been unipolar, the counterproductive violence at Séïf would have been less likely. If it had occurred, it would have been based on better planning and support for a widespread revolt in an attempt to coerce French concessions and benefit from any overreaction.\footnote{The harsh French and *colon* reaction to Séïf did help to alienate a large portion of the Algerian population, however, none of the current nationalist groups were prepared to take advantage of this shift in attitude.} As it was, Séïf presented the worst of both worlds—extreme violence in small amounts amidst mixed messages of support and
condemnation between competing poles—inspiring the French and colons into brutal responses against an adversary lacking both credibility and organizational cohesion to survive and continue the struggle. Worse still, the violence destroyed the unity that had been achieved in 1944 without leading to the predominance of any one faction. Instead, Abbas and Messali simply regenerated their organizations under new names in 1946.

In direct reference to his 1943 Manifesto, Abbas founded the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto or UDMA) after the dissolution of the AML. The group aimed to consolidate its top position and pursue independence in part through electoral means. In mid-1946, the UDMA won 11 of 13 seats for nationalist parties in the French Constituent Assembly elections. Although this helped confirm the UDMA’s strength, the margin was due in part to the absence of Messali and many of his followers, who were in prison.

Jail did not prevent Messali from reorganizing, however, as he remained President of his group, the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties or MTLD), which emerged from the ashes of the PPA. The MTLD performed better in the 1947 municipal elections, garnering 31% of the vote compared to 27% for the UDMA among Muslim electors. By this point, the development of the UDMA and MTLD into larger political parties meant that the Ulama was no longer a significant pole, although they remained the most significant group outside of the leadership whose support was sought by all.

549 “All groups were more disunited than ever before” in 1946 after Sétif revolt. Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, 73.
550 Crenshaw claims that the UDMA was stronger than the MTLD and the Ulama after Sétif. Martha Crenshaw, Revolutionary Terrorism: The Fln in Algeria, 1954-1962 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 5.
The French government appeared to make a strategic concession to the national movement in 1947, creating an Algerian Assembly of 120 members, 60 of whom would be Muslim. Although this was still far out of proportion with actual demographics, which were dominated by the native Muslims, it appeared to be a significant advance in the ability of Algerian Muslims to affect political change. In the lead-up to the elections, however, “Each party accused the other of refusing to unite in a nationalist front.” The UDMA and MTLD ran candidates separately and captured 8 and 9 seats, respectively, with pro-French Muslims capturing the far larger balance. The small percentage of nationalist victories was not reflective of popular opinion, however, as confirmed by the 58% of the Algerian vote garnered by the two groups in the 1947 municipal elections. Instead, the French had employed massive electoral fraud, delivering ‘victories’ to pro-French candidates that should have gone to nationalists. The French went further in the 1951 elections, giving the nationalist parties only 7 or 8 seats combined in the Algerian Assembly and none in Paris due to massive vote-rigging.

Unfortunately for the movement, just as the factions could not unite to contest the elections, neither could they successfully ally in response to their fraudulent results. The UDMA, MTLD, the Ulama and the Algerian Communist Party did in fact form the Common Front for the Defence and Respect of Liberty in 1951, but it did not last the year nor, did it garner any strategic progress.

All of these groups walked away from the elections frustrated at French duplicity. Some were convinced that the electoral path would not lead to independence. One small faction,

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Ibid., 58. Quandt claims pro-French Muslims won the other 43 seats. Horne agrees on the UDMA and MTLD seat totals, but claims that pro-French Muslims won 55 seats (which would mean more than the 60 originally intended). In either case, all concur that the UDMA and MTLD ‘won’ close to an equal number of seats that combined were still a small minority of the Muslim half of the assembly.
Ibid., 75.
however, believed that victory could only come through the application of violence and the
destruction and/or absorption of other groups. Within the next few years, it was to change the
shape of the Algerian national movement and, subsequently, the future of its homeland.

The Algerian War of Independence

The Rise of the National Liberation Front (FLN), 1951-1956

After the brutal reaction of the French and *colons* to the Sétif massacre, a growing
number of Algerians in the national movement became convinced force would be necessary to
protect themselves and, ultimately, to achieve independence. Rather than turn away from the
violence that had damaged it, a weakened MTLD prepared for another uprising. The
organization believed that this time the use of violence would yield mass support, the
predominance of the MTLD, and French withdrawal. In this spirit, the MTLD formed a secret
paramilitary branch in 1947, the Organisation Spéciale (OS). Although originally part of the
MTLD, the OS soon became a near autonomous unit that gathered arms, conducted robberies for
funds, and prepared for war with France. The rise of the OS, which had 4,500 members in 1950
led by Ahmed Ben Bella, helped the MTLD become the strongest nationalist group. However,
the French dismantled the OS in 1950, which precipitated a crisis within the MTLD. A power
struggle over the future of the group played out over the next few years, resulting in three
separate factions.

The MTLD led by Messali remained the dominant faction in the movement in terms of
size, support, and electoral heft. Former members of the MTLD’s central committee formed the
National Algerian Congress (NAC) in mid-1954, which engaged in reciprocal violent attacks

556 Ibid.
with their former cohorts. Finally, the former OS members, the smallest and weakest of the factions at the time, formed the Comité Révolutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action (Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action or CRUA). CRUA members were despondent over the burgeoning split in the MTLD, and their earliest efforts were made to maintain unity among the members. When it became clear that this was impossible and CRUA itself began to lose members to the NAC, CRUA shifted to its larger strategic objective: liberating Algeria through violent means. Nonetheless, CRUA’s early statements and actions demonstrated that its desire for a unitary national movement endured, now under the unipolar auspices of its organization, of course.

CRUA met in July 1954 after the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam—which provided renewed hope of French vulnerability—and voted unanimously to initiate a long-term revolt against France until its withdrawal from Algeria. In a public statement released to coincide with the first attacks on November 1, 1954, the group, now renamed Front de Libération Nationale (the National Liberation Front or FLN) explained that their main strategic aim was national independence. However, the FLN also noted that they aimed to “rescue our nationalist movement from its impasse—an impasse into which it has been dragged by clashing interests and personal rivalry.” Furthermore, “We wish to make it quite clear that we are completely independent of either of the two factions which are struggling for power. According to true revolutionary principles, we place the interests of our nation above petty and misguided personal

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557 Ibid.
disputes or considerations of prestige. Our only enemy is the hostile and blind colonialism which has always rejected our demands for freedom, when presented by peaceful means.560

Of course, it was a bit rich that the FLN would denounce factionalism and preach unity, given that their group was created by splitting from the MTLD, an act that made the movement even more multipolar. In this, the FLN may have been saying it was distinct from the other groups, but its subsequent actions demonstrated that the group cared deeply about the same internal struggle for power. Therefore, the FLN’s strategic and organizational aims were the same as those of their rivals in the UDMA, MTLD, and NAC: gain Algerian independence and become the leader of a unitary movement. Unlike its predecessors, however, the FLN was to succeed at the latter, and so ultimately the former as well.

The hierarchy hypothesis explains variation in the reactions of the nationalist poles to the FLN’s launch of the revolution, which began with the sabotage of communications systems, the burning of stores, and attacks on police barracks on November 1, 1954. The leading MTLD, which had 60,000 supporters in Paris at the time in addition to tens of thousands more in Algeria, had previously assaulted members of the CRUA leadership.561 Messali was outraged at the outbreak of violence and denounced it as ill-advised, although he allowed rumors to percolate that it was his group who had launched the attacks in order to reap popular support.562 Ironically, if predictably according to the structuralist theory, the MTLD was now playing the role of its old rival from Sétif, the UDMA, while the FLN had assumed the MTLD’s historic role as a weaker pole looking to shake things up using violence. For its own part, the still potent UDMA spoke out publicly against the revolt and the FLN’s violent excesses. The NAC warned its supporters

away from the FLN and its plan, which cut down on early FLN recruits significantly. In part due to this lack of support from other factions, the FLN began the revolt with estimates of only 900-3,000 men across the entire country, with as few as 350-400 miscellaneous guns between them.\(^{563}\) In the harsh winter of 1954, a lack of support from fellow poles as well as the popular base meant that the FLN was down to 350 rebels in the eastern region of the Aurès mountains, which was the hub of the revolt.\(^{564}\)

Against such odds, it appears difficult to label the FLN 'selfish' according to the structuralist theory, given that the members of the FLN put themselves at great individual risk. The group's own statements, however, make it clear that national liberation was not all that was on their mind. The FLN was formed in part because of a frustration at the MTLD to fund and reform the OS after the initial French crackdown. Furthermore, as FLN leader Ben Bella later recounted, “We knew that in case of an uprising the French government would not hesitate to dissolve the MTLD and to imprison its leaders. This it did, to our great relief. The French helped us get rid of the politicards whom they suspected of being our accomplices, but who in reality greatly bothered us by the confusion they caused among the masses. The FLN, which the Organisation Spéciale had founded on November 1, became in this way, and thanks to our enemy, the only political force in Algeria.”\(^{565}\)

Although the FLN would eventually become the only pole in the national movement years later, the initial French crackdown on the MTLD was helpful, but far from sufficient for such a smashing organizational success. Nonetheless, Ben Bella confirmed that organizational goals played a significant role in the FLN decision to initiate violence.

Although the FLN ordered its members to avoid civilians in their initial attacks, by mid-1955 they shifted their target set to include local Muslim leaders and some French civilians. In and around Philippeville, a town in northeastern Algeria, the FLN massacred 123 people on August 20, 1955. Most of the victims were civilians, including many young children. The French and colons responded by killing over a thousand Algerians in retaliatory strikes reminiscent of Sétif. Unlike the MTLD during Sétif, however, the FLN had fully planned and prepared to bring in recruits inspired by the French attacks, and Philippeville turned into an organizational success for the group, raising the FLN’s numbers to 1,400 fighters in the North Constantine area alone.

The key problem for the FLN was that the movement was still multipolar, and so its actions continued to inspire internal condemnation and competition that inhibited organizational and strategic progress. The pitfalls of division were on full display on the very first day of the uprising, as a French ethnologist thwarted an FLN attack on the town of Arris by playing one pro-FLN Auresian tribe off another non-FLN tribe. Indeed, the FLN expended far greater efforts killing fellow Muslims than they did the French army or the colons. One of the first victims in Philippeville was Ferhat Abbas’ nephew, also a UDMA supporter who had criticized the FLN. The FLN focused even more of its striking power against Messali’s group, renamed the Mouvement National Algérien (Algerian National Movement or MNA) soon after the FLN launched the revolt. The MNA, which was unhappy with the uprising initially, had proceeded to form its own armed wing, which included a contingent of 500 fighters in Kabylia. The FLN massacred this unit in the summer of 1955, part of the 6,352 Muslim civilians the group killed in

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567 Ibid., 123.
568 Ibid., 92.
569 Ibid., 119-121.
the first two years of the revolt, against only 1,035 Europeans civilians and far fewer French soldiers.\textsuperscript{570} The discrepancy was not just quantitative. Many of the FLN’s worst atrocities were against internal enemies, which often hurt support domestically and internationally.

Ultimately, this organizational violence helped bog down the revolt in the first few years. By 1956, the FLN (and the movement) had not achieved the desired popular insurrection against France, a negotiated end to the conflict was not on the horizon, and most conventional accounts argue that the French had reclaimed the initiative militarily. Despite these seemingly dark signs, however, the FLN’s strategy finally began to bear fruit internally. The structure of the national movement began to shift significantly towards unipolarity for the first time, putting it—and the FLN—in position for strategic success.\textsuperscript{571}

\textit{Fighting to Unipolarity: The FLN Triumphant}

Although FLN attacks on other Algerians initially shifted scarce resources from the fight with the French government and yielded unclear signals to both of their respective bases, a combination of diplomatic skill, determined brutality, and a little luck ultimately allowed the FLN to escape the multipolar trap where many Algerians groups had failed, not to mention Palestinian and Irish ones. An FLN order instructed units to “Liquidate all personalities who want to play the role of \textit{interlocuteur valable},” or legitimate negotiator.\textsuperscript{572} There was to be no viable Algerian force in the field other than the FLN. Whether this was due to a desire for organizational benefit, subsequent strategic success, or both, the FLN effectively mixed the tools

\textsuperscript{570} Ibid., 135-136.
\textsuperscript{571} This observation is an example of the disconnect noted earlier between military and political effectiveness. At the moment when the situation seemed the darkest militarily for the FLN, as French stole back initiative starting in 1956 and was ‘winning’ militarily, shifts in movement structure made political effectiveness more likely in the future. Furthermore, a single-level analysis based on the assumption of a unitary Algerian coercer would miss this key development.
\textsuperscript{572} Horne, \textit{A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962}, 135.
of diplomacy, force, and a bit of good fortune to achieve this unprecedented restructuring of the Algerian national movement.

As the FLN managed to survive through increasingly harsh French repression in 1954-1956, the group had a number of opportunities to augment its forces with those of its competitors. In general, the FLN struck a wise balance, working to integrate individuals and groups of all ethnicities, religions, and ideologies—as long as they were nationalist—who agreed to be absorbed into the FLN as individuals, not as allied groups. As FLN leader Amar Ouamrane explained, “it was decided that all tendencies must be brought into the FLN to avoid the failures of earlier anti-French revolts, such as those of Mokrani and the Sidi Cheikh in the nineteenth century, both of which had remained regional in appeal.” From the outset, the leaders of CRUA and the FLN included both Arab and Kabyle leaders (the two main ethnic groups of Algeria). Furthermore, they accommodated the Ulama and the liberal nationalists alike. Tawfik Al-Madani, the secretary general of the Algerian Association of Ulama (AAU), entered the FLN along with many of the members of his organization. Abbas initially suggested that the FLN ally with the UDMA, but the FLN held the line. In April 1956, Abbas dissolved the UDMA and brought its members into the FLN, of which he himself became a leader.

Despite their initial aversion to violence, the Algerian Communist Party (PCA) set up their own armed group in April 1956, the Combattants de la Libération, after being similarly rebuffed in attempts to ally with the FLN. However, the armed group was soon destroyed by pro-French forces, likely due to a tip-off by the FLN. Nonetheless, the Combattants and PCA dissolved in July and were absorbed by the FLN with open arms. By this time, members of the

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575 Abbas later became President of Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA), which was set up by FLN in September 1958. He held the presidency until 1961.
short-lived NAC had largely joined the FLN wholesale, meaning that by mid-1956, the FLN had absorbed and removed from the field three of the four other Algerian poles in existence since the 1930s (not to mention some smaller groups like the PCA). The movement was nearly unipolar; the only remaining rival was a weakening MNA.

The FLN’s continued use of violence had no doubt helped convince the UDMA, Ulama, and NAC of the wisdom of joining the FLN. When groups like the MNA refused to be coerced, however, the FLN had no qualms about physically exterminating its rival. The FLN’s strategic use of brutality was embodied by Ramdane Abane, a new FLN leader who joined the group in 1955. Having served time in prison for his involvement in the Sétif massacre for the MTLD, Abane brought a sharp mind and single-minded focus to the FLN: “He was not interested in clothes, nor money. The only thing of importance to him was national unity, and he was determined to obtain it by any means. This is what shocked many militants.”

Starting in 1956, the renewed presence of MNA forces alongside those of the FLN meant that “The Aures lapsed back substantially into fratricidal warfare, contributing little to the common cause.” An MNA commander named Bellounis commanded nearly 2,000 armed men in the area, whom the French began to arm as a counterweight to the FLN. After the destruction of Bellounis’ 500-man unit in Kabylia in 1955, he went to Melouza to regroup. Melouza was a town in the mountains about 100 miles southeast of Algiers, whose residents backed the MNA. After some minor killing of FLN members in the area by the MNA, the FLN commander ordered the town’s men ‘exterminated’, so on May 28, 1957, “the FLN had rounded up every male above the age of fifteen from the surrounding area, herded them into houses and into the mosque and slaughtered them with rifles, pick-axes and knives: a total of 301 in all, with

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577 Ibid., 132.
578 Ibid., 142.
579 Ibid., 258.
another fourteen severely wounded survivors.\textsuperscript{580} Press coverage of the massacre led to significant popular backlash against the FLN both domestically and internationally. The group tried to claim it was a French attack, but to no avail. This use of violence was certainly strategically counterproductive, and had it continued in a similar pattern this could have led to the downfall of the revolt. Unlike the Palestinians and Irish, however, who had relied on outbidding and limited feuds, the FLN was able to escape this cycle of infighting by destroying its rival through continued direct assaults. Between 1956 and 1958, the FLN eliminated the MNA as a significant threat to its leadership of the national movement, and so created the unipolar conditions that made strategically effective violence far more likely.\textsuperscript{581}

In addition to the FLN's cunning political maneuvering and targeted employment of extreme force, the group benefited from one fortunate external circumstance that aided its push for unipolarity: the general lack of foreign meddling. No state tried to lead the Algerian nationalist cause, and none other than the French made serious efforts to prop up alternatives to the FLN. This was a coup for the FLN because, as we have seen with the Palestinian case, states with deep pockets and enduring interests in an external national movement can make it difficult to eliminate their proxies. To the extent that there were states with natural interests in the Algerian conflict due to geography or ideology, they largely remained aloof, and what little action they took helped the FLN. Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Egyptians seemed natural allies for a nationalist movement in North Africa dominated by Arabs and aimed at expelling a western colonial power. The Egyptians offered no aid at the outset, however, telling the FLN to "Start the

\textsuperscript{580} \textit{Ibid.}, 221-222.

\textsuperscript{581} The FLN's effort to eclipse the MNA was also apparent in France. In 1954, the MNA was dominant among the Algerians there. By 1957-1958, the FLN had won the backing of the vast majority of the 500,000 Algerians working in France (the FLN suggested 90%) through a combination of violent intimidation, individual lobbying, and natural shifts in support stemming from the FLN's rise. This diaspora population contributed significant funds to the FLN, totaling 600 million francs per year by 1958. Such influxes of capital were crucial to FLN operations. \textit{Ibid.}, 237.
revolution first...then aid will follow.” Nonetheless, surprisingly little aid came to the FLN via the Egyptians until comparatively late in the game due to Nasser’s focus on the Suez and the civil war in Yemen, among other more pressing issues. Algeria was too far afield for significant interest or assistance from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Syria. Algeria’s two closest neighbors, Tunisia and Morocco, certainly had an interest in the outcome of the rebellion. Having been granted their independence from France in 1956, however, they were keen to avoid either a new French invasion or an attack by an armed group (the FLN) that could possibly defeat their own nascent military forces. These countries provided crucial sanctuaries to the FLN, but they did not involve themselves extensively in internal Algerian politics. Therefore, although the FLN had to deal with far fewer foreign fighters or aid flowing into its organization from abroad than the Palestinians, this lack of foreign meddling helped the FLN secure the unipolarity that had eluded its peers.

With unipolarity in its grasp by late 1956 and decidedly accomplished by 1958, the FLN reaped the benefits. Recruiting increased, strategy and resources could now be focused on strategic objectives, international support solidified, and the signaling and credibility of the movement was clarified and strengthened. This translated into violence that helped the national movement coerce French withdrawal, leave no group but the FLN to negotiate a deal, and ensure that spoiling from either side was not a threat to strategic progress.

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582 Ibid., 85.
583 It is worth noting that the FLN had a small hand in the French decision to grant independence to Tunisia and Morocco. It appears likely that the French did so in part to free further troops to deploy to and hold on to Algeria, as the French had been unable to put down the FLN revolt to that point.
584 The internal struggles within the FLN leadership have been well-documented by other scholars. As Crenshaw notes, “During the war, these divisions [within the FLN] had been rather precariously subordinated to the overriding shared interest in attaining independence.” Crenshaw, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962, 8. I argue that the FLN nonetheless can be profitably considered as a single group, rather than multiple autonomous factions, and that the clear shift to FLN unipolar dominance had a significant impact on the use and effectiveness of violence within the Algerian national movement. Although the structuralist theory treats groups as unitary, I welcome attempts to explain these same variables using the tensions between the various institutions and personalities within the FLN and other groups. For an excellent analysis of individuals within the FLN, see Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968.
Ch. 6: The Zionist and Algerian National Movements

Horne trumpets the impact of unipolarity, albeit not in so many words: “To the Muslim masses of Algeria the mere appearance of this seemingly unruffled, undivided, and unrelenting façade was immeasurably heartening and encouraging, and probably did more to keep the flame of the revolution alight than a steady flow of dozens of fresh katibas across the Morice Line would have done.”\(^{585}\) Thankfully for the FLN, the undivided movement also helped provide dozens of fresh kata‘ib (battalions) to the dominant faction. In early 1956, the FLN had 15,000-20,000 fighters, a mix of regular and irregular forces.\(^{586}\) By 1958, the FLN had more than doubled in size to 30,000 regulars and 30,000 irregulars in its Armée de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Army or ALN).\(^{587}\) There simply was no substantial alternative force within the Algerian national movement.\(^{588}\)

Internationally, the predominance of the FLN ensured that the movement spoke with one voice. An Arab summit of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan declared total support for the Algerian cause after the rise of the FLN in 1957. Furthermore, the FLN made contacts with the Soviet Union and China, and convinced the United States to begin to abstain rather than veto United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning French actions in Algeria.\(^{589}\) The FLN’s use of violence helped the movement gain credibility in such circumstances, as one FLN lobbyist at United Nations argued, “You must realize that every time a bomb explodes in Algiers we are

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\(^{585}\) Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, 408. The plural of *katiba*, the Arabic word for battalion, is *kata‘ib*, not *katibas*.

\(^{586}\) Ibid., 141. David Galula, who was a French officer at the time deployed to Algeria, suggests that the FLN fielded 8,000 regulars and 21,000 auxiliaries in March 1956. David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 19.


\(^{588}\) Harkis units of anti-FLN Muslims fought with the French and grew to reach 60,000 men. However, these units were fighting for continued French dominance, and so in no way can be considered part of the national movement. They represented an alternative force for Algerian Muslims, but not for any who considered themselves nationalists. Ibid., 255.

\(^{589}\) Ibid., 247.
taken more seriously here.\textsuperscript{590} This was spurred by the fact that there was no significant contingent of UDMA, NAC, Ulama, or MNA lobbyists to speak of.

Unipolarity allowed the FLN to shift its relative focus from Algerian to French enemies, but that alone did not guarantee strategic success. Unipolarity helped shift incentives, centralize decision-making, and ensure better strategic coordination, but one of the first operations launched amidst the FLN’s growing dominance demonstrated that failed campaigns were still quite possible. The Battle of Algiers, in which the FLN struck at the heart of French control and the colon population rather than rival Muslim groups, ended in military defeat. The bombings against civilians and general strikes initiated by the FLN were designed to make Algiers ungovernable and coerce the French to withdraw. However, intensive and, at times, brutal counterinsurgency tactics rolled up what had been an FLN network of 1,400.\textsuperscript{591} The first bombs went off in September 1956, but by March 1957 they were none, and the local FLN ringleaders were captured or killed by the fall. French excesses during the Battle of Algiers may have helped FLN recruiting and disgusted parts of the population in France, but the FLN was defeated in Algiers without any strategic gains to show for their efforts.

The internal dominance of the FLN did not ensure that it could not commit tactical mistakes, such as the call for a weeklong general strike that could not be realized. Unipolarity did, however, mean that it could survive such errors, self-evaluate, and strategically adjust its strategy without fear of losing its position. Had the movement been strongly multipolar in late 1957, the fallout from the Battle of Algiers would likely have been marked by extensive outbidding and infighting as competing poles smelled opportunity and the FLN felt the need to demonstrate its continued vitality in strategically counterproductive ways. Instead, the FLN had

\textsuperscript{590} Ibid., 246.
\textsuperscript{591} Ibid., 184.
the breathing space to learn and implement the right lessons from the Battle of Algiers—that it could not face French forces directly in the cities and instead should wear them down in the countryside, while ensuring that it retained the only Algerian address for a resolution to the conflict. 592

After the French leadership and civilians began to resign themselves to a withdrawal from Algeria due to a combination of rising economic and human costs, an inability to destroy the FLN, international pressure, and a growing distaste with the conduct the conflict, they looked to find a suitable compromise with a desirable Algerian counterpart. Unfortunately for the French, their wish to end the conflict by granting as few strategic concessions as possible was thwarted by the total lack of an alternative Algerian force to the FLN, which had maintained its same demands since its first declaration on November 1, 1954: full French withdrawal, full independence for Algeria, and no dual citizenship for colons that remained.

The writing was on the wall by the time of French Prime Minister Charles De Gaulle’s speech on September 16, 1959, in which he called for self-determination for Algeria, which, given the demographics, all but ensured Muslim rule. Nonetheless, De Gaulle kept looking for a Muslim ‘third force’ with which to negotiate, but, finding none, he continued to move closer to dealing with the FLN and giving in to their demands as the only option. The fact that the FLN had foreseen this very development drove its previous uncompromising destruction and absorption of internal rivals. 593 Unipolarity thus ensured that the FLN signals were clear, it was

592 Ibid., 219. Indeed, despite some squabbling by leadership at the top in the aftermath of the Battle of Algiers, FLN leader Benyoucef Benkhedda noted, “The base of the pyramid held firm.” ———, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, 229.

593 As Horne describes, “A second principle for which the FLN had fought with equal persistence was that it, and it alone, represented the sole Algerian interlocuteur valable with whom France could discuss peace. There could be no other partner, no “third force,” whatever.” Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, 466. Crenshaw notes that the FLN had reinforced this goal of making itself the seul interlocuteur valable for the national movement at the 1956 Soummam Conference. Crenshaw, Revolutionary Terrorism: The Fln in Algeria, 1954-1962, 37.
the only group with which to negotiate, and the French knew the FLN could credibly threaten to continue the war and credibly guarantee an end to violence.

When the French finally turned to the FLN to negotiate their departure, the unipolarity of the Algerian national movement helped ensure that the deal would be consummated. After French intentions to grant Algerian independence became clear with the holding of a 1961 referendum in France that approved self-determination for the territory, a number of colons formed an armed group of their own to spoil the peace, the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (Secret Armed Organization or OAS). The OAS launched attacks against French soldiers and Muslim civilians alike in attempts to drive the parties apart and prevent a deal. As FLN leader Benyoucef Benkhedda described, “Our greatest danger was that, because of the OAS, anybody treating with the French might be regarded as a traitor by his own side.”

Had the movement been multipolar, OAS violence would have made it less likely that the FLN could have negotiated with the French, because they would have been worried that a loss of legitimacy would lead to their rival’s ascendance. Given that the movement was unipolar, however, the FLN knew that there was no viable alternative to benefit from any loss of face, and so they proceeded with the negotiations amidst the attacks. The two sides agreed to the Evian Accords, which called for a ceasefire on March 18, 1962, to be verified by referenda in France and Algeria in June and July. In response to increased OAS attempts to violently spoil the deal, the FLN held off from retaliating for months. Horne explains why: “Up to this point the FLN in Algiers—secure in the knowledge it was about to inherit the earth—had shown remarkable discipline and restraint.”

Even the FLN’s eventual retaliation in May remained limited, despite the fact that the OAS had killed three times as many civilians in the Algiers area during the first

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595 Ibid., 530.
six months of 1962 as had the FLN from 1956 to 1962, including the Battle of Algiers. Nonetheless, the FLN resisted colon spoiling and even negotiated a truce with the OAS in June.

The FLN finally celebrated Algeria’s independence on July 5, 1962, its organizational and strategic goals achieved. Violence had thus yielded total strategic success for the Algerian national movement, although not until the movement structure shifted to unipolarity for the first time in its history.
Table 5. Summary of Campaigns in the Zionist Movement, 1897-1949

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Groups using violence at the time are highlighted in green with vertical lines, and groups trying to stop violence are highlighted in red with horizontal lines (groups with no color neither used violence nor restrained it). This helps demonstrate how the weaker poles were often the ones initiating violent outbidding, chain-ganging, or spoiling, while the strongest group was the most likely to attempt to restrain it, regardless of ideology or other group characteristics. For one measure of the organizational effectiveness of violence for a given group, note its relative position in the hierarchy before and after a campaign.

I thank Udi Eiran for his insights on this periodization.

The armed group Lehi also part of this alliance, although it was not strong enough to be considered a pole.
The Zionist Movement: Building To Unipolarity

Auspicious Unipolar Beginnings: The Founding of the Zionist Movement, 1897-1929

The modern Zionist movement was built for unipolarity, or at least unity, at the outset. When Theodore Herzl, a Hungarian Jew living in Paris, published *The Jewish State* in 1896, the movement was composed of only a few thousand Jews out of the millions scattered across the globe. Few conceived of or desired the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine as envisioned by Herzl, preferring to pursue equality within their current countries of residence. Among those relatively few Zionists, organization was scant, with the small, localized *Hovevei Zion* (Lovers of Zion) the most influential of a weak bunch. In terms of movement structure, however, this situation was ideal for the rise of unipolarity, since a strong single pole would face little competition in leading the movement.

Herzl helped create just such a pole in 1897 with the founding of the Zionist Organization (ZO), which immediately became the central institution of the movement. The ZO brought together individual Zionist leaders from all over the world, absorbed the members of groups like *Hovevei Zion*, and quickly marginalized the few who remained outside of it. The Zionist leadership came together at the Zionist Congress—held annually starting in 1897 and then bi-annually after 1901—to elect a president and executive council to lead the movement and present its unified face to the world. For the next three decades, the Zionist Organization served as the

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598 *Hovevei Zion* were local groups that arose in 1880s and focused on building settlements in Palestine, including the first Jewish settlement at Rishon LeZion in 1882. The groups were motivated in part by the pogroms in Russia and Eastern Europe that led to the death and displacement of thousands of Jews. However, only a small number of Jews migrated to Palestine as a result, especially as compared to the many millions that went to the Americas and Europe. Overall, 20,000-30,000 Jewish immigrants came to Palestine during the First Aliyah from 1881-1903, although many subsequently returned to Russia or proceeded to leave to Europe or the Americas. Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999*, 19.
central actor, first as the dominant pole containing individuals in the movement, then as a unifying institution for competing organizations that subsequently emerged.

Make no mistake, the early years of the Zionist movement were in many ways the most contentious of all, as the leadership passionately debated ends and means to a degree not seen again. First and foremost, the leadership considered multiple proposals concerning the location of the future Jewish state. The vast majority preferred Palestine, given the Jews' historic and religious ties to Jerusalem and the surrounding area. Multiple Zionist Congresses debated the possibility of settling in Uganda or the Sinai Peninsula, however, both of which were offered by the British in 1903 (and ultimately rejected) as possible territories for a Jewish homeland.\(^599\)

Even though the movement settled again on Palestine as the destination for the future state by 1905, debates raged over the best means to achieve it. Political Zionists pushed for engagement with great powers like Germany, the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, and France to secure a charter for the Jewish state. Practical Zionists chafed at diplomacy and delays, preferring instead to take immediate, small but tangible steps of acquiring and settling land, by which they hoped to build the foundations of a state that could be recognized later.\(^600\) The debate was embodied by the first three presidents of the ZO—Herzl, David Wolffsohn, and Otto Warburg—the first two of whom were political Zionists and the third a practical Zionist. However, Chaim Weizmann and the General Zionists won the debate by 1911 by pushing Synthetic Zionism, which, thanks to unipolarity, pursued both strategies on parallel, simultaneous, and, hopefully, complementary tracks.

\(^{599}\) Some in the movement wanted to accept the “Uganda offer” (indeed the Zionist Congress in 1903 voted to dispatch a committee to Uganda examine the possibility), but the majority ultimately rejected the idea in 1905 (after committee sent back negative report). Ibid., 24. During this period, a number of Cultural Zionists suggested that Jews focus on recapturing their Jewish identities before seeking a state. However, the influence of these groups faded with the founding of the ZO, which many of them did not join.

\(^{600}\) Herzl was a political Zionist, as was his successor as president of the ZO, Wolfson. The third president however, Warburg, was a practical Zionist. Weizmann’s victory as the fourth president united the ideologies and ensured a dominant pole of coordination.
To this point, these debates had occurred between individuals, not organizations. By the time the first political party within the ZO was formally recognized at the Ninth Zionist Congress in 1909, the General Zionists had become the dominant bloc, holding leadership of the movement and dwarfing their competitors for two decades (Weizmann himself was the president of the Zionist Organization from 1921 until 1931). This meant that for roughly the first thirty years after the founding of the Zionist Organization, the movement enjoyed a unipolar structure. This led to a lack of counterproductive infighting (violent or otherwise), cohesive diplomacy, and the construction of powerful institutions connected to the Zionist Organization that yielded strategic progress.

The early Zionist period was marked by a near total lack of violence, and none of the counterproductive, internal variety. There was no organization that could compete with the ZO and no armed groups that tried to operate outside of it. Individual Zionists joined state armies during World War I, but even after political parties began to form within the Zionist Congress, the vast majority did not develop armed wings. The first loosely organized ‘armed group’ was the Hashomer, which was tied to the socialist party Poale Zion. However, the Hashomer attempted to provide local protection for the early Jewish settlements in Palestine; it did not employ violence against competing factions or launch attacks to gain political support. There was no armed Jewish competition at the time and, to the extent there was political competition, the General Zionists dominated Poale Zion in size and stature. Therefore, violence during this period can safely be qualified as strategic, and the Zionist Organization and General Zionists generally attempted to restrain violence, which they perceived as detrimental to their diplomatic efforts.
The unipolar structure of the movement and its subsequent lack of violent infighting allowed the movement to present a unified face internationally. Even on controversial issues, such as the possibility of initiating settlement in Uganda or the Sinai, the decision of the ZO was final and almost universally respected. Had there been a multipolar structure, competing groups may have had the incentive and the capability to initiate settlements in these territories, likely leading to divisive, competing Zionist projects in different regions that would have weakened the movement and its prospects for success.  

Furthermore, foreign states wishing to champion the Zionist cause were forced to deal with a single entity, allowing the latter to benefit from competition among the former, rather than vice versa. Indeed the Zionists’ clear signaling and unipolar structure led to the biggest strategic success of the early period: The Balfour Declaration of 1917. In it, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour stated that “His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object.” The British issued the declaration in part to outdo the French and Germans, who also expressed a desire to be the leading Zionist patron. In any case, the clarity of Zionist objectives due to its long-time unipolar structure left little wiggle room in terms of the British commitments necessary to retain the mantle of ‘Zionist protector.’  

Although Weizmann himself was correct to note that the Declaration was “no more than a framework, which had to be filled in by our own efforts,” the subsequent defeat of the Ottoman Empire (which had previously controlled Palestine) in World War I and the establishment of the British

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601 Indeed, a small group of Zionists broke off from the Zionist Organization in 1905 and formed the Jewish Territorialist Organization (JTO), which was committed to settling Jews as soon as possible in safe, fertile areas. The JTO was spurred in part by the pogroms in Russia at the time, as its founders believed that lives were being unnecessarily lost while the ZO’s obsession with a state in Palestine remained out of reach. Nonetheless, the JTO failed to initiate settlements due to their significant political, financial, and numerical weakness as compared to the Zionist Organization.

Mandate in Palestine suddenly gave the movement the political backing necessary to significantly increase their efforts at building the foundations of what they hoped would be their future state.603

The Balfour Declaration provided a significant boost to Zionist efforts, but the rise of Synthetic Zionism meant that the movement had not been waiting idly by for the previous two decades. On the contrary, the Zionist Organization’s dominance allowed it to establish significant, unrivaled institutions for fund-raising, immigration, and governance that consolidated its hold on the movement and furthered strategic progress. At the Second Zionist Congress in 1898, the ZO initiated the Jewish Colonial Trust. This bank acquired capital, conducted the economic dealings of the ZO, and set up a subsidiary Anglo-Palestine Bank that bought land and provided loans to Zionist farmers in Palestine. The Trust worked in concert with the Jewish National Fund, founded in 1901 to raise money from the Jewish diaspora for the purchase of land in Palestine.

The creation of the JNF was an effective move for the Zionists in that it solved their collective action problem regarding private land purchases while exploiting those of local Palestinians. In both cases, individual Jews or Palestinians may have ultimately wanted a state for their people, but they often had individual incentives to profit from selling their land to the highest bidder, as their individual action would have little consequence for the larger collective. The JNF adopted a policy of purchasing land from Palestinians and absentee Arab landlords, but then forbidding the sale of its own land because its objective was state-building, not profit.604

603 The importance of relations with state powers was further demonstrated by the impact of the Turkish reaction to World War I. The Turks ordered that Jews in Palestine had to become Ottoman citizens or leave the territory. Close to 30,000, or one-third of the total Jewish population, left Palestine, dealing the immigration efforts of the Zionist Organization a significant setback.

604 Various Arabs and Palestinians discussed establishing similar organizations, but were unsuccessful due to internal divisions and the fact that the interests of the Palestinian fellahin often clashed with that of the landowners,
Furthermore, the JNF would only sell long-term leases on the land to Jews, not full ownership (the JNF would not ‘rent’ its land to Palestinians in any case). By retaining ownership of the land under a single organization, the JNF helped ensure the Zionist Organization’s control of the territory for a potential Jewish state. From 1920s to 1940s, the JNF acquired one third of all Jewish-owned lands, making it by far the dominant landholder in all of Palestine. 605

The JNF acquired land for settlement, and in 1908 the Zionist Organization founded the Palestine Bureau to coordinate activities of the growing Jewish population in Palestine. The Bureau’s work began immediately, as the Zionist Organization helped to bring 35,000 Jews to Palestine during Second Aliyah of 1904-1919, almost doubling the previous Jewish population. The Palestine Bureau was the forerunner to the Jewish Agency, which was established as part of the British Mandate in 1921 to subsequently serve as the governing institution of the Yishuv (pre-Israel Jewish population in Palestine), a role it fulfilled until the founding of Israel in 1948.

From 1897-1935, there were no competing Zionist Organizations, or Jewish National Funds, or Jewish Agencies in Palestine, as every major faction of the movement remained a party to them for their first thirty years or more. Therefore, whoever controlled these institutions had control of the movement to a large degree. Early on, it was the General Zionists, as Weizmann himself served as head of the Zionist Organization and the Palestine Zionist Executive until 1929. This unipolarity in the movement allowed for significant strategic gains due to diplomacy based on a unified signaling and credibility, incentives to build the foundations of the state without internal competitors, and a lack of violent infighting.

who were often Arabs who lived in Beirut or other cities far from Palestine with little interest in Palestinian nationalism.

However, following his election to the presidency at 10th Zionist Congress in 1911, Otto Warburg had presciently proclaimed that, after the geographical center of the Zionist movement had moved around Austria and Germany, “It might in the future, which is as yet unknown to us, move to London, Paris, or to Russia, however, there is one thing we are quite sure about and that is that its final destination will be Jerusalem.”606 Indeed, the very nature of the Zionist movement meant that maximum power was in the diaspora at outset, as the leadership in Europe doomed itself to weakening over time by the very essence of its project. By the 1930s, the center of gravity would shift to Palestine, where the emergence of new political challengers shifted the movement from unipolarity to tenuous unity and, ultimately, divisive and violent multipolarity for the first time.

The Growth of Political Parties Amidst Decreasing Unity: 1929-1935

By the mid to late 1920s, the General Zionists’ dominant hold on power began to slip, largely due to the rise of competing parties that increasingly found their strength in the growing Jewish settlements of Palestine. While the General Zionists held the moderate center, they were outflanked on the left by the Labor parties, who found their strength in unionized workers and the communal living of the growing kibbutzim, and on the right by the Revisionists, who pushed for greater private enterprise and more robust immigration to the Palestinian Mandate. Initially, these groups competed for influence within the Zionist Organization, leaving the movement unified, if increasingly multipolar. However, the splitting off of the Revisionists and the creation of rival political and military institutions led the movement to contested multipolarity by 1935.

606 Yaakov Thon, Otto Warburg: the Third President of the Zionist Movement, [Hebrew], (Herzlia: Massada Print, 1938, 59.)
Elections to the Zionist Congress provide excellent insight into the shifting strength of the three factions. At the 14th Zionist Congress in 1925, the General Zionists were still near the height of their power, taking in 70% of the vote. By the 15th Zionist Congress in 1927, however, the General Zionists received only 54% of the vote, as compared to 23% for two Labor parties and 8% for two right-wing parties. The General Zionists held on to 51% of the vote in 1929, but at the 17th Zionist Congress in 1931, their dominance of the Zionist movement was over. The General Zionists received only 36% of the vote, subsequently split, and “forfeited its traditional hegemony in the Zionist movement.”

The fall of the General Zionists had been driven by the rising popularity of the Labor and Revisionist parties. The Labor wing had existed nearly since the dawn of the movement, but it often had multiple groups competing for influence. Labor parties received 8% of the total vote in 1921, 26% in 1929, and 29% in 1931, when its members entered the Zionist Executive for first time. The Revisionists captured 7% at in 1929 and 21% in 1931, putting them within striking distance of the General Zionists and Labor parties and giving the movement three poles for the first time. However, as in the Irish national movement, the unification of parties within one wing soon led to its ascendance to the top. The two major Labor parties coalesced into Po'alei Eretz Israel, or Mapai, in 1930. At the 18th Zionist Congress in 1933, Mapai secured 44% of the vote to the Revisionists 14%. This victory helped to consolidate Mapai’s dominance across the global movement, as it had already risen to the top in Palestine, based on the 40% of the vote it won in elections to the Constituent Assembly of the Jewish Agency in 1931 (the Revisionists received 20%).

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608 Ibid.
Although the General Zionists faded as a party, Chaim Weizmann was still a force politically within the Zionist Organization for years to come. Nonetheless, although he did not officially join Mapai or the Revisionists, he despised the latter group and his policies were largely in line with those of the former in terms of settlement and the use of violence. He and his supporters might be considered a pole unto themselves, at least in the international arena. However, this would not change the overall coding for the movement, as it would simply add a third pole from 1935-1945, after which point World War II and the Holocaust destroyed Weizmann's constituency and any hope of challenging Ben-Gurion and Mapai for control of the movement.

Mapai was now the strongest pole in the movement, and it would remain so up to and through the founding of the Israeli state. The Revisionists, led by their founder Ze'ev Jabotinsky, subsequently withdrew from Zionist Congress and formed the competing National Zionist Organization in 1935. The movement was now neither unipolar nor unified for the first time. As such, it was to experience some of its greatest strategic setbacks, in no small part due to mixed signaling and ineffective coercive violence.

_The Rise of Labor, the Withdrawal of the Revisionists, and the Failures of Multipolarity: 1935-1945_

Mapai came to lead the Zionist movement not through the violent destruction of its foes, but rather through the capture of the strong, centralized institutions built largely by earlier factions. Mapai's control of the Zionist Organization, Jewish National Fund and, more importantly, dominance of the Jewish Agency, Histadrut, and Haganah gave it the strategic incentive and considerable wherewithal to acquire, settle, and defend territory in order to
strengthen itself. In a way, what was good for Mapai was good for the Yishuv, at least one vision of it, and Mapai’s leadership provided strategic progress for the movement. Unlike previous eras, however, its main competitor was not content to serve as a unified rival within the institutions that Mapai dominated. Instead, the Revisionists formed their own political, economic, and military institutions. Although the budding rivalry would generate some strategically beneficial outbidding in the form of competitive immigration and settlement, the incoherent response to the Arab Revolt and the later Irgun Revolt led to significant strategic failures.

As the Zionist center shifted from European capitals to Palestine in the 1930s and 1940s, Mapai’s greatest assets were its control of the Jewish Agency (JA), which helped govern the Jewish population in Palestine, the Histadrut, the dominant labor union in the Mandate, and the Haganah, the leading underground armed group. The Jewish Agency was the most powerful organization in Mandatory Palestine and, eventually, the Zionist movement itself, due to its near stranglehold on the settlement mission. The JA had been founded as part of the Palestinian Mandate in concert with British officials, and as such they were given control of the visas dispensed to Jews across the globe that wanted to emigrate to Palestine. This gave Mapai enormous power, as the party could largely determine the demographic, economic, and political make-up of the Yishuv. Not surprisingly, Mapai used this power to distribute visas to its members and would-be members that it then settled in cities and on kibbutzim, the collective agricultural communities that were to be the backbone of Mapai and the Yishuv in general, to a degree. Mapai recognized the power they held in controlling Aliyah (immigration), as confirmed by their leader, David Ben-Gurion: “They (the Jews of Europe) are coming to us because it seems to them that we are the pipeline for Aliyah. If we are not—they will turn elsewhere. Our ideology has attracted the youth in the past. Now there is a different decisive factor—Aliyah; and
they will go to the place that has control of Aliyah.\textsuperscript{610} Or, in short: “Control immigration and funds, and you control the Zionist movement.”\textsuperscript{611}

Ben-Gurion’s assessment at the time is shared by scholars in retrospect, as Baruch Kimmerling argues: “From the end of the first decade of the century, the settlement activity, one of the central collective tasks, was undertaken by the left wing of the Zionist organization, which in exchange received the lion’s share of the land and capital for the development of settlements which flowed from outside the system. As a result, the left succeeded in creating power foci which enabled it to achieve the predominant position within the Yishuv’s structure—as the bearer of the power controlling the allocation of resources (national capital, immigration certificates, etc.) and political decisions and, as a result, recognition as the symbolic bearer of the central collective goals.”\textsuperscript{612} As predicted by the structuralist theory, however, Mapai was not carrying out these tasks for purely selfless reasons, as demonstrated by their acceptance of lower immigration quotas, as long as they could control the distribution of visas: “The Jewish leadership continued to accept the principle that the Mandatory Government determined the amount of immigration if in exchange the leadership of the Yishuv would partially determine its composition. Had immigration not been limited, the Jewish leadership could not have controlled its composition. Such control was exercised abroad through the various preparatory organizations of the parties making up the Jewish leadership. This selection of the immigrants was an important control mechanism for preserving the left’s predominance in the Jewish community.”\textsuperscript{613}

\textsuperscript{610} Yitshaq Ben-Ami, Years of Wrath, Days of Glory: Memoirs from the Irgun (New York: Shengold Publishers, 1983), 316. Aliyah is a Hebrew word that literally means ‘ascent,’ but became the term for immigration of the Jews to Eretz Israel, or Palestine at the time.

\textsuperscript{611} Ibid., 320.

\textsuperscript{612} Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics, 18.

\textsuperscript{613} Ibid., 97.
Mapai’s control of settlement was reflected in the data. Through 1944, 165 of the Jewish settlements were affiliated with Labor, as opposed to 95 for right-wing parties. The importance of institutional control to Mapai’s dominance was clear: Of the 181 settlements funded by the ZO’s Jewish National Fund, 152 were affiliated with Labor. 614 Who did Mapai chose to populate these settlements? Largely, the group provided visas to young workers that would become part of the Histadrut and Haganah youth that would join their affiliated military forces. The massive labor union that was the Histadrut may have been the most powerful Jewish institution in the Mandate. It was the Yishuv’s largest employer, as its membership rolls contained over two-thirds of all Jewish workers. David Gurion became its Secretary in 1921, and it was synonymous with Mapai. The Histadrut’s influence extended beyond the economic realm into military affairs, as it controlled the Haganah in the 1920s. 615 As Revisionist Yitshaq Ben-Ami lamented: “The Socialist Zionists, through the Federation of Labor (Histadrut), dominated the Haganah. Since the early twenties, their goal, in conjunction with the moderate cultural Zionists, had been to dominate the Yishuv. Together they had steamrolled all opposition.” 616

The Haganah emerged from the kibbutzim, and so further strengthened its ties with Mapai. As the History of the Hanaga noted: “Of all types of settlement, the kibbutz is, in its structure, closest to a military formation.” Due to the kibbutzim’s organizational structure, youthful populations, and physical construction that often resembled military forts in hostile territory, the kibbutzim provided sanctuaries where nearly unlimited military training could be conducted in relative secret from the British authorities. This aided the rise of the Haganah; the

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614 Ibid., 45.
615 By World War I, David Ben-Gurion was already pushing for Hashomer, the precursor to the Haganah, to be placed under the authority of the Zionist movement and, more specifically, his left-wing Poale Zion party (which was a predecessor to Mapai). Milstein, History of the War of Independence: A Nation Girds for War, 196.
616 Ben-Ami, Years of Wrath, Days of Glory: Memoirs from the Irgun, 92.
Revisionist forces generally lacked such sanctuary. Nonetheless, the Haganah was still a reserve force that lacked adequate equipment or training until the 1940s. Even when control of the Haganah shifted from the Histadrut to the Jewish Agency in the early 1930s, it remained controlled by Mapai, who by that time controlled the JA as well. The Haganah can be treated as a single pole along with Mapai and the Jewish Agency because “The Hagana was a disciplined underground. Its members obeyed their military commanders and the Yishuv’s elected political leadership.” Furthermore, “The monopoly on weapons, however, was awarded to the Hagana to ensure that it acted only against external enemies and not in the Yishuv’s internal political wrangles.” Unfortunately for the movement, splits in the Haganah and the creation of rival Revisionist institutions meant that this moratorium on infighting would not last.

Having been defeated in their own efforts to capture the Zionist Organization in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Jabotinsky and the Revisionists decided that controlling their own smaller organizations was preferable to being themselves controlled within the main Zionist institutions. As such, they created the National Zionist Organization (an alternative to the ZO), the National Labor Federation (alternative to the Histadrut), and the Irgun Zvai Leumi (alternative to the Haganah). Although these institutions were developed separately, by the late 1930s they were all under the control of a centralized Revisionist leadership. The Revisionists made requests to the British Mandatory government to give them visa certificates directly,

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618 Mapai’s leader, David Ben-Gurion, led both the Histadrut and Jewish Agency for much of the Mandate period, and had control over appointments to the Haganah leadership, which followed orders from the Jewish Agency in any case. Milstein, *History of the War of Independence: A Nation Girds for War*, 203.
619 Ibid., 198.
620 Jabotinsky’s son was the head of Betar in Palestine, where he told Ben-Ami in June 1937 “My father [Revisionist leader Jabotinsky], the Irgun, and Betar are becoming closer and closer identified, and there soon may be no difference between underground and overt activities.” Ben-Ami, *Years of Wrath, Days of Glory: Memoirs from the Irgun*, 125. At a meeting in February 1939, the Irgun and Betar all but merged. The head of Irgun became the head of Betar (Jabotinsky), who was also the head of the NZO. Indeed, Lehi later broke off from the Irgun in part because it was so wedded to the NZO and Betar.
because, as they correctly claimed, the Jewish Agency discriminated against them and favored Mapai supporters and workers.\textsuperscript{621} When those requests came to naught, the Revisionists turned to illegal immigration to grow the Yishuv and, just as importantly, their own strength in the region.\textsuperscript{622} Ben-Ami as well as subsequent Irgun leader Menachem Begin often protested at the time and in retrospect that their actions were not political nor designed to increase the strength of their party.\textsuperscript{623} If the Revisionists were not concerned with politics, however, they would have focused solely on the number of Jewish immigrants, not their composition or ideology. Instead, they focused on the immigration from their strongholds in Poland and from Betar, their youth organization. Whether this was simply in response to Mapai's similarly discriminatory policies or not, it was clear that both sides used immigration and settlement in attempts to increase their strength in the movement.

Ironically, the issue of Jewish immigration amidst multipolarity provides an example of strategically beneficial outbidding. The desire of Mapai and the Revisionists to improve their political position undoubtedly led to increased efforts at bringing more and more Jews to the Yishuv, so as not to lose political influence. Unlike violent outbidding, which may yield organizational gains but often has no strategic benefits, outbidding over immigration and settlement provided immediate benefits to the Zionist base, many of whom were rescued from increasingly dangerous societies in Europe. Furthermore, because Zionist groups were able to compete over the provision of strategic goods like immigration and land, there was less of a need to prove their commitment to the cause through the use of violence. During much of the Palestinian national movement, the inability of groups to compete over the return of refugees or

\textsuperscript{621} Kimmerling, \textit{Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics}, 98.
\textsuperscript{622} 40,000 Jews entered Palestine illegally from 1934-1938, 9,000 by the outbreak of war in 1939, and only 16,000 during the war. Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999}, 163.
\textsuperscript{623} As Ben-Ami noted in his memoirs, "The Irgun saw itself as a non-partisan National Army in the making." Ben-Ami, \textit{Years of Wrath, Days of Glory: Memoirs from the Irgun}, 93.
the purchase and settlement of new territory contributed to the draw of violence as a method of demonstrating costly sacrifice as well as perhaps emotional benefits to the cause. Therefore, multipolarity may be less of a problem in certain contexts that allow groups to avoid violence. Nonetheless, increased Jewish immigration, illegal or otherwise, was nearly as provocative to the British and Arabs as violent attacks. This helped to spur the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 and the British White Paper of 1939, which aimed to significantly constrain Jewish immigration and create a binational state in Palestine.

By 1936, Palestinian resistance to increasing Jewish immigration and British control of the Mandate coalesced into a significant uprising. In the early period, the Arab High Committee launched a general strike and numerous protests, which were followed by a violent campaign against British authorities and, to a lesser degree, Jewish citizens, when initial efforts failed to achieve Palestinian objectives. The Jewish Agency and the Haganah worked hand-in-hand with the British, providing police forces while restraining any large attacks on Palestinians. By this time, however, the Irgun had split from the Haganah and come under Revisionist control. Attempts to unify the groups failed due to organizational concerns: "Jabotinsky agreed to Haganah-Irgun merger negotiations, but opposed anything but full parity in the command of a united military organization. The Socialists, of course, wanted the Jewish Agency to control the organization."624 In the lead-up to unity negotiations in 1938, Ben-Gurion cabled "I agree to negotiations with the Revisionists on only one basis: their acceptance of political obedience to the Zionist Organization. Without this prior condition, I will not discuss with them any joint political action, and there is no more critical political action at this time than mobilization of our military strength."625 Ben-Gurion scuttled unity talks in 1939 and 1940 on the same basis.

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624 Ibid., 110.
625 Milstein, History of the War of Independence: A Nation Girds for War, 224.
Tensions between Mapai and the Revisionists were high due to their competition for power, as Ben-Gurion referred to Jabotinsky as ‘Vladimir Hitler’ and NZO as ‘NAZO.’ 626

The Irgun chaffed under the Haganah policy of Havlagah (restraint), which called for no reprisals against Arabs (or, subsequently, the occupying British forces). This policy complemented the attempts of the Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency to curry favor with the British, which had yielded the Balfour Declaration and subsequent facilitation of Jewish land purchase and immigration, all strategic gains. Of course, such cooperation had also yielded the organizational domination of Mapai in the Yishuv, which the leftists celebrated and the Revisionists detested. Therefore, the Irgun began to launch attacks against Palestinians and, later, the British themselves.

The first Irgun attack came on November 11, 1937, when the group killed two Palestinians and wounded five near a bus station in Jerusalem. Numerous simultaneous attacks on Palestinian targets three days later confirmed the Irgun’s commitment to the use of violence, often against civilian targets. 627 On July 6, 1938, Irgun members dressed as Arabs placed bombs in the Arab market of Haifa, killing 21 and wounding 52. Another bomb in the same market on July 25 killed at least 39 Palestinians and wounded at least 70. On August 26, a bomb in the Jaffa marketplace killed 24 Palestinians and wounded 39. 628 As Ben-Ami describes, “When Arabs threw a bomb from the Jaffa-Lydda train passing through Tel Aviv, several unit commanders sprayed the train with automatic gunfire the following day. When an Arab village harbored terrorists who had fired on Jewish buses, Irgun men attacked the village to force it to expel the attackers.” 629

626 Ben-Ami, Years of Wrath, Days of Glory: Memoirs from the Irgun, 223.
628 Ibid.
629 Ibid.
In response to the Irgun attacks during the Arab Revolt, the Jewish Agency issued proclamations in June of 1939 signed by hundreds of Zionist leaders, which stated, “Let the Yishuv unite to defend the national homeland from the terrorists from within, as from the enemies from without.” These proclamations also claimed that the Irgun aimed, “not to fight the Mandatory power but to weaken the Yishuv…to take over its control.” At the same time, Irgun leaders wanted unity as well, and hoped the leftist leaders would join them: “We hoped that partisanship would be buried—that the time had come for Jews to stand together to throw off the British overlords.” Whatever Irgun intentions, the group’s not insignificant strength and violent actions posed a challenge to the Mapai leadership. Furthermore, the lack of strategic coordination hurt the effectiveness of competing policies of using and restraining violence.

Because of the multipolarity of the Zionist movement during the Arab Revolt, the movement lacked a cohesive response to its greatest challenge to that point, mixing violent attacks and attempts at non-violent restraint with public denouncements and private diplomacy. This divided strategy helped allow the British to issue a White Paper in 1939, which limited Jewish immigration to 75,000 over five years, in order to maintain a Jewish population that was only one-third of the total in the Mandate. Furthermore, the White Paper proposed a bi-national state of Jews and Arabs in Palestine with political power proportional to population. This was the biggest diplomatic disaster to befall the Zionist movement to that point, and it was caused in no small part by the mixed political and violent response of the competing organizations in the movement.

Ironically, the White Paper proved to be less of a problem to the Zionist movement than it might have been due to the similarly divided Palestinian national movement. The Nashashibis

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630 Ibid., 232-233.
631 Ibid., 233.
supported the paper, but the Arab High Committee, led by their rival the Husseinis, rejected it. This mixed response and ultimate rejection by the main Palestinian political body gave the British little incentive to work with the Palestinians to implement any of the changes suggested by the White Paper. As a result, the Palestinian national movement squandered a potential strategic gain, which softened the blow of the White Paper to the Zionists. Nonetheless, the White Paper was seen as serious enough to help inspire the Irgun to initiate direct attacks on the British in the coming years, as the group cited its continued enforcement as a key reason for the initiation of its own revolt against the British in 1944.

The Arab Revolt was not the last time the Zionist movement would suffer from the use of violence amidst multipolarity. During World War II, the Haganah and Irgun restrained from attacking the British while they fought with the Nazis, although a new splinter group from the Irgun, the Lehi (or Stern Gang), continued attacks on British targets throughout World War II. With Allied victory seemingly assured by 1944, the Irgun decided to return to the use of force to coerce British withdrawal from the Mandate. Early on, the Irgun focused their attacks on British police stations and military installations. As Uri Milstein noted, “The actions that Etzel [Irgun]—and later Lehi—carried out, on their own in most circumstances, prevented concerted effort, squandered fighters and nearly brought down on the Yishuv very brutal counter-measures by the authorities (as recommended by British military leaders in London).” Instead of responding with their own attacks to outbid, however, Mapai and the Haganah sought to weaken their rivals directly. In late 1944, Jewish Agency and Haganah launched what became known as the ‘Hunting Season’ or just the ‘Season,’ in which they fired Revisionists from their jobs, tipped off British authorities to the whereabouts of Irgun fighters, and even went so far as to arrest many of

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632 The Lehi committed more than twice as many assassinations as the Irgun and Haganah, including the killing of many Jews. N. Ben-Yehuda, Political Assassinations by Jews, State University of New York, 1993, 397.
633 Milstein, History of the War of Independence: A Nation Girds for War, 15.
the Irgun themselves. The precipitating event for the Season was the November assassination of Lord Moyne, the top British diplomat in the Middle East. The assassination itself was nearly a strategic disaster for the Zionist movement, as longtime supporter Winston Churchill noted: “If our dreams for Zionism are to end in the smoke of assassins’ pistols and our labours for its future to produce only a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany, many like myself will have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently in the past.” 634

The subsequent Season also weakened the movement, as resources were now spent on internal disputes rather than strategic objectives. The role of hierarchical power struggles was apparent in the Season’s conduct, as the Lehi had conducted the Moyne assassination, but the stronger Irgun bore the brunt of the repression by the Jewish Agency and Haganah. Lest the Haganah be seen as the only ‘traitorous’ organization, however, both the Irgun and the Haganah tipped off the British to the location of Lehi members. 635 Furthermore, although Irgun leader Begin demanded that its members not fight back against the Haganah, by mid-1945, the Irgun and Lehi had launched attacks on “Labor-affiliated Jewish targets, robbing banks and Histadrut affiliates of money and stocks of explosives.” 636 Ultimately, the Season did not degenerate into civil war, but it was a further strategic setback that represented an inefficient use of resources and divided Zionist movement that could not present a unified face to the British or the Palestinians.

In the long-term, however, the Season helped push the Zionist movement to the precipice of unipolarity, which made politically effective violence and strategic success more likely. Along these lines, “Ben-Gurion believed that the existence of separate military organizations would

635 Ibid., 174.
636 Ibid., 175.
undermine the accretion of national-Zionist authority, one of the basic conditions for success in the struggle to found a state."

(Unipolar) Unity: The Hebrew Resistance Movement, 1945-1946

World War II changed many things for the Zionist movement: tens of thousands of Jews either living in the Yishuv or soon to immigrate there received military training and experience within Allied forces, some Palestinian leaders hurt their standing by siding with the Germans, and, most importantly, the brutal murder of six million Jews in the Holocaust sent shockwaves through the movement and the world. Because of the Jewish Agency’s loyalty to the British and the massive desire for Jewish immigration as a result of the war, the Mapai leadership expected the British to remove the White Paper, if not work towards the founding of a Jewish state. British foot-dragging and continued restrictions on immigration finally pushed Mapai and the Haganah to employ violent coercion. The relative strength of Mapai meant that it was not chain-ganged into the conflict by the Irgun and Lehi, but once its leadership decided to fight, they sought an alliance with their rivals.

Ben-Gurion ordered the Haganah to, “Invite the two rival factions [Irgun and Lehi] to join us in full cooperation, on the conditions of unified authority and absolute obedience.” The groups agreed to form the Hebrew Resistance Movement (HRM), the leadership of which contained two Haganah members and one each from the Irgun and Lehi. As Ben-Gurion desired, the structure of the HRM meant that the Hagana would not be obliged to follow any commands from its rivals, whereas the Irgun and Lehi may be ordered to employ or refrain from violence, at least in theory. At the outset of the unified campaign, the Haganah’s new strike force, the

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637 Milstein, History of the War of Independence: A Nation Girds for War, 27.
638 Ibid., 39.
Palmach, freed over 200 illegal immigrants from a detention camp and sunk a British patrol ship. The peak of attacks was in June and July of 1946, when the Palmach destroyed or severely damaged ten bridges between Palestine and neighboring countries, and the Lehi and Irgun launched significant attacks on rail lines.\textsuperscript{639}

In practice, however, the HRM largely placed a unified veneer over factions that still valued their independence and happened to be acting in a similar fashion with or without the HRM structure. As such, “Etzel [Irgun] and Lehi yielded to the Haganah’s operational authority, with one proviso: they declared that they would persist in acquiring private military supplies.”\textsuperscript{640} Infighting between the groups did all but disappear, but groups continued to operate on their own, for their own organizational ends, with limited oversight from the HRM leadership. In one case, the Irgun kidnapped five British officers from a military club in Tel Aviv to prevent death sentences on their own men. This represented a qualitative departure in the type of violence employed by the HRM to that point, which had targeted the occupation and Mandate but not British soldiers themselves. Ben-Gurion was caught by surprise and denounced the operation, which made it difficult for the Zionist movement to send a clear but firm coercive message to the British about the actual threat from the Jewish leadership and its ability to constrain violence accordingly. The Jewish Agency was now forced to pressure the Irgun to secure the release of the British officers, and the British themselves arrested 2,700 people in response, significantly weakening the Zionist movement.

The most infamous attack of this period provides a further a case in point of the failure of unity and the challenges of a multipolar movement. The Irgun bombed the King David Hotel in July 1946, killing 91 people—41 Arabs, 28 Britons, 17 Jews, two Armenians, one Russian, one

\textsuperscript{639} Ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{640} Ibid., 40.
Greek, and one Egyptian—and injuring many more, the majority of them civilians. Not one senior British official was killed.\textsuperscript{641} The HRM command had initially approved of the operation, but then rescinded its approval, with some officials telling the Irgun to postpone or halt the operation. Nonetheless, the Irgun carried out the attack anyway, leading to significant popular backlash from within the movement and without. Chaim Weizmann wrote Moshe Sharrett, chairman of Jewish Agency’s political department, that “I cannot continue to play the part of a respectable façade screening things which I abhor but for which I must bear responsibility in the eyes of the world,” then threatened to resign unless the Irgun and Lehi were brought under control.\textsuperscript{642} The attack spelled the end of the HRM and movement unity. However, Mapai’s previous decision to finally turn the Haganah into a professional fighting force gave the movement the unipolarity it had lacked, as the leftists emerged in late 1946 as the only pole in the movement, with the incentive and flexibility to present a unitary front diplomatically and a powerful coercive force within the Mandate.

\textit{Unipolar Success: British Withdrawal, the 1948 War, and the Founding of Israel, 1946-1948}

The Haganah had always been the largest armed group in the Yishuv, but until early to mid-1940s, it was largely an underground reserve force with little fighting experience, whose active strength did not dwarf that of the Irgun. As Milstein argues, Haganah members “received no regular military training and were fit—in the best of circumstances—only for static defense.”\textsuperscript{643} World War II helped to change this, as the British and Jewish leadership combined to fund and train the Palmach, the strike force of the Haganah. Although the British wanted the

\textsuperscript{641} Ibid., 46.
\textsuperscript{642} Ibid., 44.
\textsuperscript{643} Ibid., 200.
force to help repel a potential Nazi invasion, the Mapai leadership recognized that it could potentially be deployed against enemies already in and around the Mandate: the Palestinians, the Arab states, and the Irgun. By 1945, the Palmach had 2,000 fully mobilized troops. With the return of thousands of Jewish fighters at the end of the War, the Haganah rapidly became the only major Zionist armed group. By late 1947 and early 1948, the Irgun had 2,000 fighters and the Lehi had 800 under its control, but the Haganah had 12,000 active duty troops plus 37,000 reservists. Furthermore, the Haganah had 80 times as many explosives, 100 times as many mortars, 4 times as many machine guns, 50 times as many rifles, and 10 times as many grenades as the Irgun, the second largest armed group.

Unipolarity had returned, as the military distribution of power reflected what had long been the case politically and economically. Mapai and the Haganah now dominated not only legal but also illegal immigration. The Haganah controlled 11 of the 12 boats used for illegal Jewish immigration, as 70,700 illegal immigrants made it past British nets between August 1945 and founding of Jewish state on May 14, 1948. On the international front, Chaim Weizmann’s influence had lessened considerably. He was replaced as the President of the Zionist Organization in 1946 by none other than Ben-Gurion himself, further strengthening Mapai’s dominance of the movement.

As the movement structure returned to unipolarity after World War II, there remained three key steps to the long sought Jewish state: British withdrawal, international approval, and

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645 Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974, 8-10. It helped the Haganah’s positions that the British held 10 Haganah prisoners as compared to 1,600 Irgun and 270 Lehi prisoners. Nonetheless, even with these individuals released the Haganah still would have remained far and away the only pole. Milstein, History of the War of Independence: A Nation Girds for War, 226.
646 Milstein, History of the War of Independence: A Nation Girds for War, 226.
648 Weizmann had lost most of his constituency with the Holocaust, either through deaths, immigration, or a decrease in support for his humanist approach.
the defeat of the local Palestinian and Arab forces. Unipolarity would play the decisive role in
two of these events, if not all three.

After the dissolution of the Hebrew Resistance Movement, the Irgun and Lehi continued
to launch attacks against the British and the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{649} However, the Haganah felt no need
to respond with violent outbids due to its dominant position, and instead continued to apply
diplomatic pressure (while strengthening its forces) to encourage British withdrawal. Ultimately,
the attacks of the weaker groups helped raise the costs of occupation to the British. In particular,
the brutal hanging of two British sergeants by the Irgun in 1947 shocked British public opinion
and helped increase momentum for withdrawal.\textsuperscript{650}

Nonetheless, there was not strong support for British maintenance of the Mandate before
the attacks. Furthermore, the British had turned the issue of the Palestinian Mandate over to the
United Nations months before the hanging of the sergeants, and they did not initiate withdrawal
until after the United Nations and its leading powers voted for an end to the Mandate and the
partition of Palestine into a Jewish and Palestinian state. Therefore, the Irgun attacks may have
provided the ‘bad cop’ to the Haganah ‘good cop,’ who denounced them and refrained from
attacks on the British after the brief period of the Hebrew Resistance Movement. Unlike the good
cop/bad cop of the Irish or Palestinian movements, however, these divergent strategies occurred

\textsuperscript{649} Despite public pronouncements to the contrary, these weaker non-poles continued to focus on organizational
strength. By early 1947, Lehi leader Natan Yellin-Mor told the Irgun’s Begin that he thought the British were
readying to leave, and wondered, “Would it not be worthwhile, in light of this possibility, to slow the pace of the
war and use the extra time to gather strength?” Milstein, \textit{History of the War of Independence: A Nation Girds for
War,} 225-226.

\textsuperscript{650} Historians continue to debate the impact of the Irgun attacks. Historian Michael Cohen: “There is no doubt that
the hanging of the sergeants was the most influential event in the period of the Jewish struggle against the Mandate.
Despite the meager resources at the disposal of Etzel and Lehi by comparison to the Hagana, it was their extremist
actions that made a great impression in Britain. Along with other factors, they were instrumental in Britain’s retreat
from the Mandate.” Ibid., 93-94. Amitzur Ilan argued, “not only did Jewish terror, which British and American
public opinion believed might have been the main cause of Britain’s desire to quit the problem of Palestine, not
frighten the British army chiefs but, at any level of escalation, they preferred it as the lesser of two evils to a conflict
with the Arab world.” ———, \textit{History of the War of Independence: A Nation Girds for War,} 71. Amitzur, \textit{America,
Britain, and Palestine: The Origin and Development of America’s Intervention in Britain’s Palestine Policy 1938-}
47, 253-254
in a unipolar context. Therefore, the hierarchy of the actors was stable, and the level of violence from the ‘bad cop’ remained small in quantity, if at times extreme in quality. The dominant pole was able to present a strong, unitary face to the world, while restraining its own vastly superior forces. The dominance of Mapai and their unhindered efforts at strategic negotiations would prove to be the key to the diplomatic phase.

After the war, British reliance on the United States contributed to the creation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (AAC), with 6 members from each country. The Committee was formed to help determine the future of the Mandate and the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from the war. At the time, the British were not aiming for a Jewish state, as Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin said that the British would give up the Mandate to a trusteeship and ultimately a Palestinian state, not a Jewish one. Historian Benny Morris relates how important it was to have unipolar Zionist leadership during the Committee’s deliberations: “Of particular effect was the month the committee spent touring DP [displaced person] centers, especially in Poland. Haganah and Jewish Agency representatives coached the DPs and made sure the AAC met only Jews propounding the Zionist solution.”651 When the time came for Zionist representatives to meet with the committee, “Ben-Gurion banned all but mainstream spokesmen from appearing.”652 The committee recommended the immediate acceptance of 100,000 Jewish immigrants in Palestine, which Mapai welcomed, even though the British government demurred.

On February 14, 1947, the British cabinet announced its intentions to leave the Palestinian Mandate and turned to the United Nations to determine the future of the territory and its people. Later that year, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was

652 Ibid., 178.
created to investigate the issue and recommend a solution. Again, the dominance of Mapai ensured a unified, credible message. UNSCOP ultimately proposed partition of the Mandate into separate Jewish and Palestinian states. The Palestinians rejected it, citing their claim to the entire territory. Had they been stronger, the fact that the Irgun and Lehi did the same may have led to a different outcome at the United Nations and in the Mandate. However, the Mapai leadership publicly supported what they considered to be an imperfect deal, and went to work to ensure the proposal’s passage.

The united, tireless efforts of the diplomats of Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency were crucial to the outcome. The United States was won over, and it subsequently made significant threats to twelve wavering states that swayed many of them to vote in the affirmative. “Greece was threatened with a foreign aid cutoff, Liberia with a rubber embargo.” Therefore, a vote that looked initially like it would fail passed 33 to 13 on November 29, 1947, just three votes clear of defeat (United Nations' votes required a two-thirds majority for passage). Not only did the Zionists win international approval for their state, but their 37% of the Mandate population was given 55% of the land, even though they only owned 7% of it. This represented a strategic triumph that would not have occurred under the incoherent violent strategies and mixed messaging of unipolarity. Nonetheless, a vote existed on paper. The Zionists still had to defend their new state to ensure its survival, and unipolarity was clearly the dominant factor in the successful conduct of the ensuing conflict.

653 Neither the Irgun nor Lehi actively opposed the partition plan, even though they disagreed with it. Had they been stronger, it is far from certain the would have acted similarly. Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics, 58.
In the First Jewish-Roman War of 66-73 CE, the Jewish Sicarii, Zealots, and moderates killed each other even as the Roman army was on their doorstep, leading to the fall of Jerusalem and the Jewish power in Judea. Reflecting on this period, Irgun leader Yitshaq Ben-Ami made a counterfactual argument shared by many Zionists: “Had the Galileans and Judeans not fought each other and, instead, engaged in proper preparations for the war [with the Romans], history
would have followed a different course." During the 1948 War, history did not repeat itself, at least on the Jewish side. However, this was not because the various armed groups came together amidst renewed proclamations of unity and brotherhood, but rather because there was one group that made it clear through threats and, ultimately, limited violence that the Zionist movement would present a unitary front due to the dominance of one faction, not the alliance of many.

Competition between Mapai/Haganah and the Revisionists/Irgun continued up to and through the two wars fought by the Zionists in 1947 and 1948. In the first phase, the Zionists fought a civil war against local Palestinian armed groups, which began after the UN approval of partition in November 1947 and continued through the announcement of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948. In the second phase, the now Israeli state (but still the same institutions of the Zionist movement, albeit with different names) fought against the surrounding Arab states, including Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Despite these threats, the two groups continued to build their own forces and try to weaken those of the other. The Irgun made a down payment on six fighter-bombers in Canada, but a Haganah member tipped off the Canadians as to the destination of the planes. The deal was terminated and the Irgun lost their down payment. Leftist newspaper accounts of the early Irgun attacks on Jaffa “[suggested] that the Irgun was less concerned with capturing Bustros Road in Jaffa than with Allenby Road in Tel Aviv.” As Begin explained, “‘Allenby Road’ is another name for the votes of the Jewish people.” The largest confrontation between the two groups, however, came with the arrival of the Altalena.

In late June of 1948, a ship from France named the Altalena arrived off the coast of Israel loaded with significant weaponry and hundreds of recruits for the Irgun. Fearing the return of a

655 Ben-Ami, Years of Wrath, Days of Glory: Memoirs from the Irgun, 114.
656 Ibid., 433.
strengthened rival, Ben-Gurion demanded that the weapons be placed under the control of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the new name for the Haganah. Menachem Begin and the Irgun protested, claiming that it simply wanted to help the Zionist cause and that it needed the weapons to continue the struggle in Jerusalem. Begin initially proposed that 20% of the weapons go to the Irgun in Jerusalem, and 80% go to the Irgun units that had agreed to join the IDF just weeks earlier. Begin later improved his offer to 80% of the weapons simply going to the IDF to be distributed however the leadership desired.\(^{658}\)

This was not enough for Ben-Gurion, however, who did not want a separate Jewish armed force. As Ben-Ami noted, the Altalena had enough weapons “to arm six battalions,” which would have meant a significant boost to the Irgun.\(^{659}\) Furthermore, despite claims to the contrary, Ben-Ami himself wrote hopefully of how: “A successful landing of the Altalena might give a great push to the ambitions of Menachem Begin and his newly announced Herut Party, offering a serious threat to Ben-Gurion’s political dominance over the Yishuv.”\(^{660}\)

After the Irgun moved the Altalena to the beaches of Tel Aviv, where it had greater support, the Haganah launched an operation to take control of the vessel, which was ironically named “Operation Unity.” Begin and other Irgun members yelled from the deck of the Altalena: “We are not going to open fire! We shall not lift a finger against brothers!” Nonetheless, they also sent a message that if fired at, the Altalena soldiers would fire back.\(^{661}\) Furthermore, when firing started on the beaches of Tel Aviv, Irgun units fought back, and many of those that had recently joined the IDF began to defect. Ultimately, the Irgun battled the IDF on the beaches for

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\(^{658}\) Ben-Ami, *Years of Wrath, Days of Glory: Memoirs from the Irgun*, 491.

\(^{659}\) Ibid., 485.

\(^{660}\) Instead, in the January 1949 constituent Assembly elections, Herut received 11.5% of the vote, Mapai got 35.7% and Mapam, a new Labor party, received 14.7%. The Labor coalition proceeded to dominate Israeli politics for decades. Ibid., 498.

hours before giving in. 18 men died, mostly Irgun members.\textsuperscript{662} The IDF sunk the Altalena amidst the fighting, along with most of its arms. By June 28, 1948 the Irgun was broken up and absorbed into the Israel Defense Forces, to which it swore an oath of allegiance.\textsuperscript{663} The Revisionist challenge was again squashed, and a unipolar Israeli state was then able to fight and win the 1948 War, helped along by the problems of a multipolar Arab foe that suffered from outbidding, false optimism, and a lack of coordination. As a result, the state of Israel not only survived, but it gained significant territory above and beyond that envisioned in the United Nation’s partition plan.

Ben-Gurion himself never regretted the actions surrounding the Altalena. In 1948, he told the Knesset, “Never did the burning of a ship serve the welfare of the Yishuv so well as the burning of this Irgun ship... The Irgun ship could have blown up our military power and this had to be prevented...Blessed is the gun which exploded this ship...When we build the Temple, that gun should be placed near the main gate.”\textsuperscript{664} Given how important unipolarity was to the success of the Zionist movement, Ben-Gurion may have been right, at least in terms of political effectiveness.


\textsuperscript{663} Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974, 71.

\textsuperscript{664} Sprinzak, Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, 32.
I will never forget the day that I encountered Mancur Olson in the cramped confines of a Palestinian refugee camp. Olson himself had of course passed away a decade earlier, but his ideas never seemed more vibrant than they were that day, unintentionally described by a former leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Amidst an extended discussion of the history of the Palestinian national movement, he summed up the feelings of its groups when he said: “I care not only about the size of the pie, but also what size slice I am going to get.” In this quote and his subsequent elaboration, the former DFLP member eloquently elucidated the tension between strategic and organizational objectives, even if he did not refer to them by the same name.

Extending his analogy to this project, I have argued that all armed groups want the biggest possible slice, but it is unclear if that means they should work to increase the size of pie and capture it, or if they should focus on fighting with others to position themselves for a larger slice in the future. Ultimately, the structure of a social movement, specifically its polarity and hierarchy, determines the optimal strategy for individual groups and the likely outcome for the movement. In a unipolar movement, the size of the pie conceded by the external adversary (strategic) begins to approximate the slice of the most powerful armed group (organizational), which circumvents some of the challenges implicit in the paradox and makes the use of violence more politically effective. When movements are multipolar, the two objectives are often contradictory, leading to no pies or fewer pies than might otherwise be secured.

665 Interview with author DFLP Leader, July 23, 2010.
After a brief summary of the argument, this chapter will assess the explanatory power of the structuralist theory for the key empirical findings as compared to its competitors, and then conclude by identifying implications for policy and scholarship.

**The Structuralist Theory of Non-State Violence**

*The Pursuit of Strategic and Organizational Objectives by Armed Groups*

Armed groups use violence for two main objectives. On the one hand, they employ violence to achieve strategic goals shared by their entire social movement, such as the creation of a new state or the withdrawal of foreign military forces. Armed groups achieve strategic objectives by coercing states using a combination of threats and assurances concerning the instigation and cessation of violence. On the other hand, armed groups employ violence to achieve their own organizational goals, such as surviving and increasing their groups’ strength. Armed groups achieve organizational objectives by launching attacks against the state to gain support or by using violence to weaken their internal opponents directly.

Although scholars have somewhat ironically demonstrated that they are more concerned with strategic objectives in their analysis, non-state groups themselves care more about their organizational objectives. In fact, it is at best an axiom and at worst an incredibly useful assumption that armed groups prioritize their organizational objectives, will do what they can to increase their own strength, and are unlikely to take any action that they believe will threaten their survival or position of power. The structure of an armed group’s social movement determines how it can best achieve its organizational goals and, more specifically, the extent to which their perpetual pursuit of their own strength involves the pursuit of strategic objectives. In other words, despite isolated acts of selflessness by individuals, all groups are selfish. The
structure of a social movement simply determines whether a group can serve itself by helping others in the movement or hurting them. These assertions concerning group objectives, preferences, and movement structure provide the foundation for a number of powerful predictions about the use and effectiveness of non-state violence.

**Figure 20. Hypotheses of The Structuralist Theory of Non-State Violence**

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<th>Hypothesis</th>
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<td><strong>The Hierarchy Hypothesis:</strong></td>
<td>The stronger the armed group, the more likely it will use violence to pursue strategic objectives, and vice versa.</td>
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<td><strong>The Polarity Hypothesis:</strong></td>
<td>Violence is more likely to be politically effective when employed by a unipolar social movement than by a multipolar social movement.</td>
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*The Hierarchy Hypothesis of Group Action*

The first hypothesis of the structuralist theory is that the stronger the armed group, the more likely it will use violence to pursue strategic objectives that benefit the larger movement, and vice versa. This is because a stronger group is more likely to capture a significant amount of the private and public benefits of a strategic objective and less likely to lose its position in the movement hierarchy by focusing its efforts on coercing and negotiating with an external foe. It is generally in each group’s interest to shun the pursuit of public goods and free ride on the efforts of others, because all will enjoy most of the benefits of strategic success in any case. Large, powerful actors represent a solution to the collective action problem, however, as they will be more willing and able to pay the necessary costs for strategic success given that their expected benefit from the public good is significant due to their size.

Strategic goals largely resemble public goods, but they often have smaller but not insignificant private benefits associated with them, such as political office, status, or wealth. These benefits are generally ‘lumpy’ in that they largely accrue at the successful conclusion of a
campaign, rather than evenly along the way. Furthermore, the strongest group commonly
captures the vast majority of the private benefits associated with strategic success, making it
worthwhile for them, but not weaker poles, to pursue strategic goals for their own organizational
good. Indeed, it is these private benefits—along with their lumpy, winner-take-more nature—that
helps make organizational and strategic goals complementary for the strongest armed group, but
contradictory for its weaker competitors. At times these asymmetric incentives even influence
weak groups to violently prevent strategic progress in order to deny their rivals and preserve the
lumpy benefits for themselves. Finally, an armed group has greater incentive and flexibility to
pursue strategic goals when it lacks a viable rival who could supplant it. When significant
competitors exist, groups are more likely to use violence to pursue organizational ends
exclusively in ways that harm strategic progress.

The Polarity Hypothesis of Effective Violence

The second and central hypothesis of the structuralist theory is that violence is more
likely to be politically effective when employed by a unipolar social movement than by a
multipolar social movement. For social movements, a pole is either the strongest group in the
movement or another strong group that has the capability to realistically challenge the strongest
group for predominance. In a unipolar social movement, the single dominant group can benefit
most organizationally by pursuing the public and private benefits of strategic goals. Furthermore,
the non-competitive internal environment of unipolarity ensures that the dominant group does
not need to respond to attempts at outbidding, chain-ganging, spoiling, or infighting by weak
non-poles, because they are unlikely to bring about any significant shifts in the movement
hierarchy. Knowing this, weak non-poles are less likely to use violence for such acts in the first
place, which are likely to end in short order in any case if the dominant group responds, given its significant power advantage. Collectively, this means that unipolar movements are likely to experience a far more efficient use of scarce resources. Finally, the presence of a leviathan in a unipolar movement imposes strategic coherence, clarity in signaling, and credibility in threats and assurances that translates into violent acts that are more likely to be politically effective.666

Figure 21. How Unipolarity Causes Politically Effective Violence

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666 Unipolarity is a de facto, if not de jure, way of establishing a monopoly of force within anarchical social movements, which generally lack the sovereignty and central control over violence that most states possess. Furthermore, unipolarity lessens the ability of external powers to manipulate the movement by providing fewer points of entry, which could otherwise lead to similarly inconsistent or counterproductive tactics. Multipolar movements lack this monopoly of force, and even though unified movements may possess it to a degree for a time, organizational incentives are likely to bring more disparate attacks than in cases of unipolarity.
In a multipolar movement with two or more significant armed groups, violence is far less likely to be politically effective. Within a multipolar structure, the internal competition for predominance among different groups undercuts their ability to collectively achieve the strategic goals they all share. Weaker poles are more likely to initiate organizational violence to ensure their survival and/or increase their strength relative to their peers. Whether the initiating group intends to or not, such violent actions can generate strategically counterproductive mechanisms like outbidding, chain-ganging, spoiling, and infighting. Other poles, including the strongest one, are likely to respond violently to such actions, as each pole has to worry that a lack of credibility or a small loss of strength could quickly lead to another pole supplanting it in the hierarchy. Therefore, actions taken to make a group more secure often make the group's social movement (and at times the group itself) less secure in a multipolar context. These pathologies of multipolar movements mean that scarce resources are likely to be expended in an inefficient fashion that makes strategic success less likely. Finally, due to the anarchical nature of social movements and
the lack of a dominant group to impose coherence, multipolar movements are more likely to pursue multiple strategies simultaneously, generate mixed signals to the state, and lack credibility in threats of initiating significant violence or assurances in being able to stop it.

Multipolar movements in which all poles are unified are likely to generate more politically effective violence than non-unified multipolar movements. Unity can help to create coherence in strategy and signaling while possibly making the pursuit of strategic objectives more likely if the poles agree to a division of their private benefits. Nonetheless, depending on one’s position in the hierarchy, unity is often not helpful for one’s organizational success. The strongest group almost always desires unity the most, because it generally cements its position and makes strategic success more likely, from which it still stands to derive the greatest benefits. Weaker poles are less likely to support unity for the same reasons, as it generally locks them in to a subordinate position and helps their rival. Furthermore, chain-ganging may actually be more likely in a unified movement, and attempts at violent outbidding or infighting are likely to be met in kind by other poles, because the multipolar structure means they could easily lose their position. Therefore, violence is more likely to be politically effective when employed by a unipolar social movement than by a multipolar social movement, unified or otherwise.

_Endogeneity Embraced: The Multipolar Trap and the Paradox of Violent Action_

What are the causes of variation in the polarity of social movements, given that it is the key explanatory variable of the structuralist theory? The polarity of social movements has a number of causes that are largely exogenous, in that they exist outside of the model posited in the structuralist theory of non-state violence and are not explained by it. These include the ethnic and geographic homogeneity of the movement and its base, the number and type of prevailing
ideologies, and the quantity and quality of external supporters (such as states). The most interesting cause, however, is one that is seemingly endogenous to the theory: the use of violence itself.

Violence is organizationally effective if it strengthens a group by increasing its recruits, funding, or popular support. If violence leads to a group that is stronger but in the same position in the hierarchy, that represents a limited organizational success. If violence leads to a group climbing the hierarchical ladder over one or more internal competitors, that represents a moderate organizational success. The ultimate organizational success, however, is for a group to use violence not only to become the strongest in the movement, but also to decrease the strength of all other groups to the point that there is no viable rival. In other words, the ultimate goal of organizational violence is the creation of a unipolar movement. On the other hand, violence could also weaken a dominant group and make the movement multipolar.

This raises the issue of endogeneity, as the key variable in the structuralist theory is at times the result of politically effective violence and not simply the cause. Such shifts in polarity are neither unnatural nor a problem for the theory, however. Although over the lifespan of a movement, the arrows may go both ways between polarity and violence, within a given campaign, movement polarity is exogenous to political effectiveness. As such, a campaign that shifted a movement from multipolar to unipolar would be an organizational success for the last remaining pole, but strategic success in the same campaign is neither guaranteed nor likely. The increased chance for strategic progress comes in the next campaign, as the dominant group benefits from the new distribution of power.667

In fact, rather than posing a problem, this realization reveals unique insights about the effectiveness of non-state violence. First and foremost, actions that are the most

667 Empirical analysis of the theory in the study reflects this understanding.
counterproductive strategically in the short term at times represent the greatest possible contribution to strategic success in the long term. For example, outbidding and infighting may involve striking internal targets for organizational ends, leading to the disregard of strategic targets. If one group successfully outbids its rivals to insignificance or directly eliminates them, however, in the next campaign period the group and its movement are far more likely to enjoy strategic success, ceteris paribus. Of course, such actions are guaranteed to be counterproductive strategically in the short term, with no guarantee of organizational effectiveness of any kind, let alone the rare achievement of unipolarity. Therefore, such actions remain incredibly risky for armed groups. Although in many cases, depending on exogenous factors, internal violence may be the only plausible way to achieve unipolarity. Nonetheless, be it through exogenous forces or successful infighting, the key to strategically effective violence is to escape the trap of multipolarity. Failure to do so means that at best, groups can hope to rearrange the hierarchical deck chairs on the proverbial Titanic for the movement.

We now turn to analysis of when and why groups in this study were able to alter the structure of their social movement, as well as whether those changes had the impact on political effectiveness predicted by the structuralist theory. Having started this project by arguing that our understanding of political effectiveness needs to change, it is now worth asking how the structuralist theory and framework performed in light of the evidence.

**Empirical Analysis of the Structuralist Theory of Non-State Violence**

In-depth analysis of the Palestinian and Irish national movements, along with secondary analysis of the Zionist and Algerian national movements, provides strong evidence for the explanatory power of the structuralist theory of non-state violence. The two-level theoretical
framework and associated longitudinal analysis reveals significant variation in organizational and strategic effectiveness not captured by previous scholarship. Most importantly, the hierarchical position of groups explains significant variation in their use and non-use of violence, and polarity explains most of the variation in the political effectiveness of that violence across all four movements.

**Empirical Analysis of the Hierarchy Hypothesis**

As predicted by the hierarchy hypothesis, the position of an armed group in the hierarchy of the Palestinian national movement played the dominant role in when, how, and why it employed or worked to restrain violence. Weaker armed groups in the movement—such as Fatah in 1965, the PFLP in 1970, and Hamas in 1996—had incentives to launch attacks to improve their relative strength, either by increasing public support or instigating a larger conflict that could change the game and whose costs others would disproportionately pay. At the same time, these non-dominant groups were unlikely to support peace settlements that would cement the current movement hierarchy or cut them out of the deal entirely, thus keeping them in a subordinate position.

These dynamics explain the challenge of Salafi jihadist groups to Hamas in Gaza today, which was preceded by the challenge of Hamas to Fatah, which was preceded by the challenge of Fatah to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was preceded by the challenge of the PLO to King Hussein of Jordan, who also at one time saw himself as the leader of the Palestinians. Depending on the distribution of power, the strongest pole in these scenarios was forced to outbid the weaker groups to preserve its mantle of leadership, or to seek stability by...
preventing violence and perhaps pursuing negotiations that yielded them significant benefits—including moving them from the head of a movement to the head of a new state.

Despite a universally expressed desire for movement unity, the tension between organizational and strategic goals meant that there was only a single, short-lived alliance between Palestinian poles in a forty-year span. All groups desired unity, of course, as long as it was on their terms, meaning that it maximized their power. As such, unity failed in 1966 when Fatah agreed to the join the PLO if it received two-thirds of the seats on the Executive Committee of the Palestinian National Council (PNC). Not surprisingly, the still powerful PLO leadership refused. In 1990, Hamas demanded 40-50% of the seats on the PNC in order for it to join the organization. This time, the offer was refused by none other than Fatah, who had since assumed control of the PLO as well as the role of top pole unwilling to unify if it meant surrendering power to a potential usurper. Because of these multipolar dynamics, the current Fatah-Hamas unity deal of 2011 is unlikely to lead to a meaningful, enduring alliance. The clear victory of one faction over the other, electorally or otherwise, is by far a more likely route to a coherent strategy and political success within the Palestinian national movement.

The hierarchical position of groups in the Irish national movement drove their relative focus towards strategic or organizational objectives as well as their associated use of violence, with striking results. After being founded in protest of the decision of the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) to move away from violence and into politics and negotiation with the British, the Provisional IRA proceeded to take these exact same actions when it suited their organizational ends after having supplanted their old rivals years later. In the interim, weaker groups like the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and, at times, the PIRA and OIRA

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668 For further discussion on this point, see Peter Krause, "Is It Really a New Start for Palestinians?," The Providence Journal, May 26 2011.
themselves employed violence to spoil or outbid again and again. Their stronger rivals were often caught between choosing to curtail the violence or launch more attacks themselves to maintain predominance, neither of which was beneficial for the movement. Even when groups tried to coordinate, as with the ‘Armalite and ballot box’ strategy of the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein (perhaps the clearest test of the alternative good cop/bad cop hypothesis), their competing organizational needs yielded a lack of clear signaling, credibility, and, ultimately, a lack of strategic success.

As an external validity check, the hierarchy hypothesis also performs well within the confines of the Zionist and Algerian national movements. In the Zionist movement, the strongest pole of Mapai/Haganah often sought to restrain violence and pursue strategic objectives (and their organizational benefits) through negotiations and diplomacy. On the other hand, the weaker Revisionists/Irgun and Lehi were constantly instigating violence in attempts to chain-gang the movement into a conflict that would force the British and Arabs to withdraw under fire.

In the Algerian national movement, the National Liberation Front (FLN) was the weakest of the four poles in the movement when it launched what became the Algerian War of Independence. The stronger Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA) and National Algerian Congress (NAC) both denounced the onset of violence and warned their supporters off the FLN initially. Later, when it became clear that violence had catapulted the FLN to prominence, UDMA and NAC members joined the FLN and supported violence as their parties were weakened. The strongest pole at the outbreak of the war in 1954, the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), was outraged at the FLN’s use of violence. Ironically, if predictably according to the structuralist theory, the MTLD was playing the role of

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669 The same was true for Fatah. After emerging in protest at the decision of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to move away from violence and into politics and negotiation, Fatah proceeded to take these exact same actions decades later when it suited its organizational ends after having supplanted its rival.
its old rival, the UDMA, who had previously denounced and sought to constrain violence the MTLD itself had launched as a weaker pole in a chain-gang attempt in 1945.

In both the Zionist and Algerian movements, attempts at unity largely failed. Furthermore, the two brief alliances of the Zionists and the Algerians in 1945 ended in disastrous uses of violence within both movements that put an end to the short-lived unity. In the Zionist case, the blowing up of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem and the killing of 91 people, largely civilians, hurt popular and official support for the Zionist cause significantly. In the Algerian case, the brutal massacre of civilians at Sétif led to the killing of thousands of Algerians and a lack of French concessions. In both cases, multipolarity had provided incentives for the attacks, and, as discussed in the next section, multipolarity would lead to a mixed response that ensured political ineffectiveness.

Empirical Analysis of the Polarity Hypothesis

Analyzing the political effectiveness of violence within the Palestinian and Irish national movements is a worthwhile endeavor in its own right, as scholars have claimed that these cases are paradigmatic examples of how non-state violence works and that they are paradigmatic examples of how non-state violence does not work. The structuralist theory of non-state violence reveals that the truth is far more complex. Violence has caused success and failure for the Palestinians and Irish, although the structure of their national movements has helped to ensure that more successes were organizational and more failures were strategic.

The polarity of the Palestinian national movement drove variation in the political effectiveness of violence employed by its member groups, as well as the strategic success or failure of the movement itself. Regardless of changes in time, space, or the movement hierarchy,
violence within the Palestinian national movement was the most strategically ineffective when the movement was multipolar (1964-June 1967, July 1967-December 1967, 1968-1969, 1969-1970, 1970-1973, 1975-1986, and 1996-present), somewhat effective when the movement was unified (1974), and most effective when the movement was unipolar (1986-1996). The unipolar structure of the movement just before the First Intifada allowed Fatah to gain control of the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza and employ a cohesive strategy of strikes, protests, and largely non-lethal violence that successfully coerced the Israelis and generated significant international sympathy and momentum for the most significant strategic gains to that point in the struggle, even if they fell far short of Palestinian aspirations.

Unfortunately for the Palestinians, their national movement has almost always been multipolar due to the geographical dispersion of their people, the involvement of many Arab states with their own interests and rivalries, and the unwillingness and/or inability of armed groups to directly eliminate each other. The paradox of non-state violence has therefore been a major problem for the Palestinian cause, ensuring that violence has been generally ineffective for the movement, even if it benefitted certain groups like Fatah that successfully moved up the ladder. Palestinian campaigns amidst multipolarity have yielded paradigmatic examples of outbidding and chain-ganging, such as Fatah’s instigation of violence against Israel from 1965-1967, the PFLP and DFLP’s attempts to violently spark conflict with King Hussein in Jordan from 1968-1970, and the violent rivalry between Fatah and Hamas during the second intifada of 2000-2006. The former two cases resulted in the Six-Day War of 1967 and Black September; the latter erased many of the prospects for strategic gains made during the previous unipolar period. In all three cases, the use of violence generated strategic disasters for the Palestinians.
Analysis of the Irish national movement finds further strong support for the polarity hypothesis. The use of violence by Irish armed groups was strategically effective when the movement was unipolar and strategically ineffective when it was multipolar. The main unipolar period saw large-scale British withdrawal and the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922, only six years after the Easter Rising failed due to the internal division caused by multipolarity. In contrast, the unipolarity of the movement during the Irish War of Independence ensured a lack of violent infighting and chain-ganging, the use of violence for strategic ends, and a coherent strategy and signaling towards the British. The multipolarity of successive Irish campaigns up to and including The Troubles of 1968-1998 yielded a consistent lack of strategic success despite the longest sustained period of armed struggle against the British in Irish history. Outbidding between the PIRA, OIRA, and INLA degenerated into ethnic violence that hurt popular support and inspired the rise of Protestant paramilitaries. Uncoordinated violent and non-violent strategies between these poles and the SDLP yielded an inefficient use of resources and mixed messages delivered to the general public and government of Great Britain. Finally, the active Irish spoiling of strategic gains due to British attempts to cut deals that excluded certain poles in the movement held back political progress.

The use of violence was not entirely unsuccessful during The Troubles, however, as it drove shifts in the hierarchy that represented organizational effectiveness for some groups, such as the Provisional IRA. Nonetheless, the outcome for the movement remained the same, so much so that the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 was called "Sunningdale for slow learners," in that it was nearly identical to that deal, which was signed twenty-five years earlier. The fact that the Provisional IRA and Provisional Sinn Fein, the central actors in The Troubles, violently rejected the former agreement but were central supporters of the latter poses a puzzle that has frustrated
countless members of the Irish national movement. Although it may do little to assuage those who felt that they fought thirty years for nothing, the structuralist theory is best poised to explain both outcomes. The polarity of the movement did not change in thirty years, therefore neither did strategic progress. The hierarchy of the movement did shift, however, hence Sinn Fein’s decision to reverse themselves and agree to a deal with the British that was similar in the main text but, importantly, different in which groups signed on the dotted line. In this case, violence succeeded in getting the Provisional IRA and Provisional Sinn Fein a seat at the table, but it failed to change the movement structure or secure the hoped-for strategic gains of a unified Ireland. At best, unipolarity within the republican wing of the movement helped ensure that the PIRA and PSF could credibly constrain most violence within the movement and refuse to be pulled in by outbidding and spoiling attempts by weak non-poles like the Continuity IRA and Real IRA.

The Zionist and Algerian national movements provide further strong evidence for the explanatory power of the structuralist theory. In the Zionist movement, the use of violence was most effective during periods of unipolarity (1897-1929, 1946-1948, 1948-1949) and largely ineffective during periods of multipolarity (1935-1945), with the periods of unity (1929-1935, 1945-1946) yielding limited to no strategic progress. Unipolarity during the early period of the movement yielded unified Zionist diplomacy that won key British support for a Jewish state, followed by the construction of centralized institutions like the Jewish National Fund, the Jewish Agency, and the Haganah to acquire, settle, and defend land that was to become the foundation of Israel. The rise of multipolarity led to mixed messaging and a lack of credibility during the Arab Revolt of 1936-39, which yielded the largest strategic setback for the Zionist movement. The British White Paper of 1939 severely curtailed Jewish immigration and called for a binational state in Palestine that would have prevented the ultimate Zionist objective of a Jewish
state. The ability of Mapai and the Haganah to ultimately return the movement to unipolarity was crucial to the Zionists defeating the Palestinian resistance in 1947-1948 and then winning the 1948 War, which successfully protected and enlarged the boundaries of Israel, which otherwise might not have existed. Unipolarity gave the Zionist movement and, subsequently, the Israeli state centralized command and control that allowed its forces to triumph against the loose, multipolar coalitions of Palestinian armed groups and Arab state armies.

The use of violence within the Algerian national movement was strategically effective during the one period of unipolarity (1958-1962) and ineffective during periods of multipolarity (1930-1944, 1946-1951, 1952-1957) and unity (1944-1945, 1951). Whereas the multipolar periods were marked by mixed strategies and signals, greater efforts expended on internal fights than external ones, and attempted side deals, the movement under the FLN’s dominance yielded clear, consistent signals, a massive, concerted strategic effort at expelling the French, and a single, credible negotiator with limited potential for spoiling or sell-out due to the lack of a second pole. There was no Algerian ‘third force’ with whom the French could negotiate a deal short of independence; the FLN had swept all of its internal rivals from the field, allowing its organization and the Algerian people to reap the benefits. Furthermore, the dominance of the FLN within the Algerian national movement allowed it to largely ignore the colons’ violent attempt to spoil the peace deal. Attacks of the colons’ Secret Armed Organization (OAS) were met with significant restraint and finally a truce, despite the fact that the OAS had killed three times as many civilians in the Algiers area during the first six months of 1962 as had the FLN from 1956 to 1962, including the Battle of Algiers. Had the movement been multipolar, OAS violence would have made it less likely that the FLN could have negotiated with the French, because they would have been worried that a loss of legitimacy would lead to their rival’s
ascendance. Given that the movement was unipolar, however, the FLN knew that there was no viable alternative group to benefit from any loss of face, and so they proceeded with the negotiations amidst the attacks.

Finally, the FLN’s rise to prominence perfectly illustrates the complex relationship between organizational and strategic objectives and the multipolar trap. Like its predecessors in the Algerian national movement, the FLN’s violence in a multipolar context was largely counterproductive strategically, even if it helped the group strengthen organizationally. However, the FLN’s willingness to persevere in the total destruction of its internal rivals allowed it to fight its way to unipolarity in a way that none of its Algerian predecessors or modern Irish or Palestinian peers could. As such, the infighting of the FLN could be described as beneficial to the strategic success of the national movement in the end, even if at the time it hurt the campaign’s strategic progress. Nonetheless, such a strategy is risky at best, as there is no guarantee that it would so dramatically shift the movement structure. In fact, the modern Irish and Palestinian national movements provide two of the best examples of how outbidding, chain-ganging, and infighting can lead to decades of significant death and destruction for a society without altering movement structure or achieving strategic success.

Competing Theories and Comparisons Across Social Movements

The structuralist theory revealed and explained greater variation in the political effectiveness of non-state violence within the Palestinian, Irish, Zionist, and Algerian national movements than previous scholarship.\(^{670}\) The two-level framework provided an excellent basis

\(^{670}\) Although at the most shallow level of analysis one could consider these only four cases, the fact that so many excellent works exist on these movements provides a hard test for the structuralist theory. Explaining greater variation in the use and effectiveness of violence than previous works is therefore not an easy task.
for the analysis of these movements and their use of violence, as groups seemed to care as much or more about organizational goals as strategic ones. It is hard to imagine how the dynamics and effectiveness of non-state violence within these movements could be adequately captured with a single-level model. In effect, the unitary nature of the non-state coercer proved to be a powerful explanatory variable, not an assumable constant as scholars often treat it.

Furthermore, the variables commonly associated with single-level explanations, such as state regime type or relative strength between combatants, did not perform nearly as well as movement structure. The three state adversaries for the social movements—Great Britain, Israel, and France—were all democracies, yet their opponents experienced a wide range of success and failure against them. Indeed, there was even variation across cases for a single state, as Great Britain withdrew entirely from the Palestinian Mandate but not from Ireland. The state strength hypothesis was turned on its head, as by far the weakest of the three states (Israel) was the most successful strategically.

Total movement strength may help to explain the magnitude of successes or failures, e.g. why the unipolar Irish and Zionist movements achieved states that were sizeable but nonetheless fell short of their original aim. Nonetheless, total movement strength does not explain variation in the political effectiveness of violence nearly as well as the structuralist theory. For example, the Irish and Palestinian national movements were at their strongest in recruits, weaponry, sanctuaries, and attacks in the early 1970s and far weaker in all of these categories in the 1990s, yet strategic success was achieved in the latter period, not the former. Furthermore, it was not a coincidence that both movements happened to be multipolar in the early 1970s and unipolar or united during the 1990s. Therefore, total movement strength is a worthwhile complement to the structuralist theory, but not a preferable alternative.
As for two-level competitors, the alternative structuralist theory that predicted that violence would be more politically effective within a multipolar movement performed poorly. On the contrary, armed groups and their social movements suffered continuous, costly strategic failures during periods of multipolarity, even if occasional groups employed violence successfully to benefit their own standing. Whatever the supposed benefits of multipolar competition, movements that were able to come out of such situations generally performed better strategically in short order. Those movements that had the most multipolar competition—the Palestinians and the Irish during the Troubles—did not experience effective checks and balances or good cop/bad cop dynamics, but rather repeated infighting, outbidding, chain-ganging and spoiling that prevented collective and organizational progress. In all four movements, sustained unipolarity yielded greater concessions towards a new state than at any other period, while movements saw limited success when unified and almost no strategic success amidst non-unified multipolarity.

Finally, there is a significant competing theory for the strategic outcome of these four cases in particular: colonialism. Some suggest that the rise of colonialism explains the failure of ‘national liberation’ movements, and the era of decolonization explains their success. One certainly cannot ignore the broad shifts in power projection and conquest that marked the colonial enterprise. After all, William Roger Louis notes, “The number of people under British rule in the two decades after 1945 was reduced from 700 million people to five million,” while the French experienced a similarly drastic decline.671

Nonetheless, this explanation yields predictions that are precisely wrong for the two central cases of this study. The Irish achieved their greatest strategic success—a free state on the

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path to a republic—during the height of colonization, and they failed to secure a similar outcome for Northern Ireland amidst the height of decolonization (hence making them part of Louis’ five million). The Palestinians have as of yet failed to achieve a state, even though their struggle reached its peak during a global period of decolonization. In the Algeria case, the French government made a clear distinction between Morocco and Tunisia—former colonies to which it granted independence in 1956—and Algeria, which it retained at that time and considered part of France. The Zionist case provides some potential support for the colonialism hypothesis, although it does not account for why the British did not remain in Palestine until the 1960s (as they did in south Africa and southeast Asia), why they supported a partition plan that was favorable to the Zionists, and, of course, why the Zionists were able to defeat the Palestinian armed groups and Arab states. Finally, unlike the polarity hypothesis, the colonialism hypothesis fails to explain variation in strategic success during periods of colonialism or decolonization in all four cases, which is as important as cross-case comparison.

At the organizational level, these cases collectively suggest that the structuralist theory and its hierarchy hypothesis explain far greater variation in groups’ use of violence and organizational effectiveness than does ideology. In the Palestinian and Irish cases, groups such as Fatah and the PIRA, whose very mission statements foreswore ceasefires, negotiations, and participation in elections and who used violence against stronger groups for these very reasons,

672 It is worth noting that many individuals, Israeli or otherwise, dispute the notion that the Zionist movement should be considered colonialist in the same fashion as the British and French cases. Benny Morries offers one perspective that highlights some of the similarities and differences: “These Jews were not colonists in the usual sense of sons or agents of an imperial mother country, projecting its power beyond the seas and exploiting Third World natural resources. But the settlements of the First Aliyah were still colonial, with white Europeans living amid and employing a mass of relatively impoverished natives. Things changed somewhat with the Second Aliyah. Many of the newcomers possessed a mixture of socialist and nationalist values, and they eventually succeeded in setting up a separate Jewish economy, based wholly on Jewish labor. But the Second Aliyah’s collective settlements, the kibbutzim...existed alongside the burgeoning First Aliyah moshavot, which were based on private property and exploitation of cheap native labor. The settlers, especially in the moshavot, and the natives quickly developed ‘normal’ colonial relations based on stereotyped images and behavior patterns; exploitation; and mutual dependence, contempt, racism, hatred and fear.” Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999, 38-39.
reneged on these ideological positions like clockwork when they moved up the ladder. Ideology may help to explain the actions of groups that foreswore violence, such as the SDLP in the Irish national movement. It is fair to note, however, that the SDLP was never a weaker group like the Palestinian or Algerian communists or the UDMA, who similarly foreswore violence for years before forming their own armed wing or joining other violent groups and launching attacks when they felt their survival was at stake. Scholars and policymakers alike should heed these findings, as power and hierarchical position look to be a better predictor of groups' behavior than ideology.

Policy Implications

Why does the political effectiveness of non-state violence matter? First and foremost, almost every state in the international system today, strong or weak, is engaged with non-state groups that use violence in some form. Many suggest that non-state violence poses the greatest threat to their security, in part because of the relative decline of interstate war. Nonetheless, governments and their citizens generally have an inadequate understanding of the mechanisms of non-state violence, making it difficult to shape intelligent policy. Policymakers and the public know that non-state violence can kill and terrorize, but they know surprisingly little about why it occurs, and even less about what such violent acts can accomplish politically.

Scholars have offered little help until recently in understanding the effectiveness of non-state violence, and some of the most prominent works have provided advice that this study suggests require revision. Perhaps the most significant connection that has been made links the effectiveness of non-state violence to its causes. In terms of terrorism specifically, Robert Pape

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673 This includes counterinsurgency (COIN) or counterterrorism (CT), to say nothing of the many states that are actively promoting terrorism, insurgency, and non-state violence for various purposes.
claimed that “Over the past two decades, suicide terrorism has been rising largely because terrorists have learned that it pays”674 Alan Dershowitz took this claim to its logical conclusion, arguing that the best way to prevent terrorism was to prevent its success: “The real root cause of terrorism is that it is successful—terrorists have consistently benefitted from their terrorist acts. Terrorism will persist as long as it continues to work for those who use it.”675

The concept of armed groups learning from each other’s exploits is not new. Indeed, the Zionist Irgun admitted to studying the Irish War of Independence of 1918-1921 for their own struggle against the British in the 1940s, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army then read Irgun leader Menachem Begin’s book, The Revolt, whose lessons they tried to apply during The Troubles.676 Nonetheless, the key to motivations for violence is not learning, but rather movement structure. As described in the first chapter, states can exert some control over this variable, but their desire to prevent strategic success is often at odds with their desire to prevent violence. Therefore, the implication that the prevention of strategic success for all movements that employ non-state violence will lead to a cessation of that violence overlooks the paradox and the organizational dynamics at its root. If Pape and Dershowitz are suggesting that states find a way to ensure that terrorism does not pay organizationally, then they may be on to something. However, Pape’s subsequent assessment of effectiveness on strategic grounds alone suggests that may not be the case.

For policymakers and the general public, hopefully this study has demonstrated that terrorism, insurgency, and non-state violence in general does not represent a monolithic challenge, but rather is employed by organizations embedded in larger movements that differ

674 Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," 343.
675 Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge, 2.
considerably in their objectives, strength and strategies. There is no silver bullet for dealing with such groups or their movements, and policymakers and their constituents should look beyond one-size-fits-all strategies for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. This study should further help guide policymakers with limited resources who must choose where their efforts are most needed in order to address, support, or, at times, blunt the political impact of armed groups. It can further inform policymakers whether the best policy is to institute countermeasures or to forgo them because they might worsen the situation. The issue is not just where to engage but whether and how to engage at all. This project should help guide those essential policy decisions.

Implications for Scholarship and Future Research

The political effectiveness of non-state violence is a young subfield, if such a subfield can even be said to exist as of yet. This project might be better understood as the intersection of numerous other subfields, with a focus on their comparatively ignored aspects. That is to say, there is far less scholarship addressing non-state violence than state violence, far less addressing the effects of violence than its causes. As such, the theory and conclusions of this study have a number of implications for scholarship that highlight options for future research.

First, this study implies that non-state violence may be most effective at changing the game, rather than simply winning it in its current form. In other words, non-state violence often appears to be most effective at altering the strength or tactics of the other players involved, rather than simply imposing an outcome directly. Non-state violence certainly has an impact on strategic results, but its greatest influence may come in more ‘intermediate’ steps, by encouraging outbidding, forcing the state to employ force, or shifting the hierarchy or polarity of
groups in its own movement or that of its adversary.\textsuperscript{677} Those solely examining the final campaign outcome thus miss much of the causal story. The two-level framework presented here captures more of these effects than do single-level models, but this study ultimately still holds ‘strategic success’ as the ultimate measure of what violence achieved. These revelations imply that further rethinking of how to best define and analyze political effectiveness is necessary.

Second, the exchange between studies of state and non-state actors need not be a one-way street. This project makes use of a number of concepts and hypotheses from the literature on state coercion. However, the two-level framework presented here for non-state groups could provide fresh insights into the causes and effects of state coercion, studies of which are similarly dominated by a singular focus on the strategic level. Although scholars have written extensively about the importance of domestic concerns for foreign policy, few, if any, studies of the effectiveness of coercion assess the impact of economic sanctions, nuclear or conventional threats on the domestic balance of power. Diversionary war theory offers some initial insight, but a broad reassessment of conventional coercion across both levels is in order.

Furthermore, the structuralist theory can be applied to state alliances, which resemble social movements in the sense that they occur under anarchy and are often organized around a strategic objective. Do unipolar alliances perform better than multipolar ones, in war or otherwise? The Arab-Israeli conflict provides fertile ground for such analysis, as the Arab states surrounding Israel simultaneously competed with each other for predominance while they attempted to coordinate their actions against a common enemy.\textsuperscript{678} This is a fruitful path for future analysis.

\textsuperscript{677} Indeed, this was the explicit strategy of Carlos Marighela, who noted “It is necessary to turn political crisis into armed conflict by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation of the country into a military situation.” Marighela, \textit{For the Liberation of Brazil}.

\textsuperscript{678} McLaurin, “The Plo and the Arab Fertile Crescent,” 28.
Third, in focusing on the broad contours of non-state violence, this project analyzed terrorism and insurgency in the same study. Unfortunately, this practice is currently the exception rather than the rule, as the two topics each have their own growing subfields that suffer from a largely artificial division. Even though scholars from both subfields engage many identical questions and face the same methodological challenges, too often scholarship on terrorism and insurgency yields separate lines of inquiry that fail to productively engage the other and cumulate knowledge. It is hoped that this study can serve as one of a growing number of examples that profit from engagement with the theory and empirics of both the terrorism and insurgency subfields. 679

Fourth, this study confined itself to national movements that sought the creation of new states, but it is worth considering how the structuralist theory performs in other types of social movements, such as those for civil rights. Furthermore, how should scholars address the fact that many groups are part of multiple social movements simultaneously? For example, the SDLP, OIRA, INLA, PFLP and PPP considered themselves part of the socialist and communist movements even as they were struggling within the Irish and Palestinian national movements. How do objectives and hierarchies work across movements, and can a parsimonious theory possibly be constructed to engage with so many levels of analysis?

Fifth, does empirical support for the structuralist theory imply that successful revolutions are more likely to yield one-party and/or authoritarian states? Movements can certainly split upon the achievement of strategic success, as in the Irish War of Independence. If unipolar movements are more likely to be successful, however, the presence of a single dominant group is

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For analysis of this phenomenon and a suggested way forward, see Peter Krause and Paul Staniland, "Understanding Violence: A Research Agenda for Integrating Analysis of Terrorism and Insurgency," (Cambridge, MA: 2010).
a distinct possibility. If so, could this be a further reason that post-revolutionary states are more
(or less) likely to go to war?680

Finally, although the Palestinian, Irish, Zionist, and Algerian national movements have
provided fertile ground for initial analysis of the structuralist theory of non-state violence, they
cannot provide conclusive tests of the theory alone. In addition to further longitudinal studies
that assess causal mechanisms, I plan to supplement existing data sets on non-state violence with
codings for campaign outcomes and movement structure (both polarity and hierarchy) in order to
analyze the structuralist theory across a large number of cases and assess its generalizability.
Data availability constraints will likely make progress in this endeavor a bit methodical at times,
but the analysis of the four movements in this study demonstrates that such analysis is possible.
The related large-N analysis will carry its own shortcomings as well as benefits, but the former
will be less of a concern when combined with the in-depth empirical research completed here.

This project began in earnest six years ago, as I sat frustrated in a graduate course with
the state of knowledge concerning the political effectiveness of non-state violence. Despite some
welcome scholarly developments in the interim, there is still a long way to go. This study
represents an initial step that I humbly hope can help adjust our collective thinking on what
political effectiveness is and when, why, and how non-state violence achieves it.

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