Assessing Guerrilla Doctrine:

Battlefield Lessons on Network Structure and Multi-Front Insurgency

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Submitted to the Department of Political Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science in Political Science

at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

September 7, 2011

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Abstract

This thesis will assess influential guerrilla doctrine advising optimal insurgent (1) operational environment, (2) organizational structure, (3) logistical capacity, and (4) dependent tactics – items of consistent, yet incomplete analysis in counter-insurgency (COIN) analytics and civil war scholarship. Following a review of five of the most infamously disseminated guerrilla doctrine and training manuals, this thesis derives a model of advised guerrilla war production. The derived model illustrating the strategic and operational principles of reviewed doctrine presents an organizational hybrid between guerrilla hierarchies and networks, positing optimal organizational structure as a function of operational environment. Logistical capacity, tactics, target set, and military classification are in turn best determined by organizational structure. An otherwise unobserved operational dynamic relating each of the above four enumerated strategic considerations is thereby illustrated, with implications for COIN theory and praxis.

To present a more systematic evaluation of reviewed guerrilla doctrine, the derived model is evaluated against a qualitative case-study of Peru's Shining Path insurgency. Case-study empirics are drawn from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset (ACD) on dyadic conflict (Cederman, Min, Wimmer 2010), Arc Geographic Information Systems (GIS) spatial analysis software, declassified Peruvian intelligence reports, and captured Shining Path documents and directives from the Peruvian insurrection between 1969 - 1989. This study finds that evaluated guerrilla doctrine accurately reflects the material conditions of insurgency. There is one caveat: The global trends of increasing urbanization, dissolution of state power, and decline in politically motivated insurgency, may contribute to an observed shift in non-state actor war production from rural to increasingly urban and civilian-centric economies of violence. Lessons on strategically important considerations like sanctuary, terrain, state capacity, network evolution, and weapons proliferation, attend.

Key Words: doctrine, guerrilla, operational environment, network structure, rural, tactics, urban

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Abbreviations

ACD: Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset
CCN: Civilian-Centric Network
BAS: Beginning of Armed Struggle
COIN: Counter-Insurgency
CPP: Communist Party of Peru
CRH: Comité Regional de Alto Huallaga, or Regional Committee of the High Huallaga
CT: Counter-Terrorism
DIRCOTE: Dirección Contra el Terrorismo, or the Counter-Terrorism Directorate
ELP: Ejército Popular de Liberación, or Popular Liberation Army
FR: Fracción Roja, or Red Faction
GICM: Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain, or Moroccan Islamic Combat Group
GIS: Geographic Information Systems
GPW: Gridded Population of the World
GRUMP: Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project
HAMAS: Harakat al-Muqāwamah al-‘Islāmiyyah, or the Islamic Resistance Movement
HTML: Hypertext Markup Language
IED: Improvised Explosive Device
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NIS: National Intelligence Service
NCBR: Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, Radiological
SL: Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path
WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Alberto Bolivar and Patricia Vargas for their encouragement and advice. To my parents, Victor and Mercedes Adams, I am forever grateful for your guidance and support. Professors Marc Trachtenberg, Ismail Poonawala, and Stephen Van Evera, Assistant Professor Peter Krause, and Drs. Max Abrahms, Mac Bunyanunda, and Dris Soulimani, you helped me achieve my goal of receiving a graduate education. Professor Roger Petersen, Assistant Professors Fotini Christia and Vipin Narang, and graduate administrator Susan Twarog, thank you for your confidence, counsel, and for graciously allowing me the flexibility to complete my thesis while pursuing Arabic studies abroad.
i. Introduction: Composition, Findings, and Contributions

Practitioners and scholars of COIN often debate the effects of operational environment, network structure, logistical capacity, and tactics on the ability of violent non-state actors to initiate and sustain insurgency. What guerrilla theoreticians say *themselves*, however, on fundamental strategic considerations like front and organization, is rarely cited. This thesis will accordingly assess the strategic and operational value of influential guerrilla doctrine, infamously proliferated in print and HTML, while addressing the failure of COIN and civil war scholarship to fully illuminate the relationship between guerrilla operational environment and organizational structure. Yet how useful is guerrilla doctrine, often labeled the work of unsound minds, to the student and practitioner of COIN? What can it tell us about the organization and evolution of guerrilla networks, and asymmetric conflict today?

This thesis attempts a threefold response. First, a survey of five of the most influential guerrilla manuals in the history of modern insurgency is presented.¹ Invariably, the theoretician’s aim is to advise his cadre on how to best organize and effectively prosecute guerrilla war against a superior force. As such advised strategy and tactics bear a striking similarity across a heterogeneous sample of major asymmetric violent conflicts, representing a scholarly continuum of insurgent thought developed, tested, and refined over decades. As in COIN scholarship, four interacting strategic considerations are consistently emphasized by guerrilla theoreticians, namely: (1) operational environment, (2) organizational structure, (3) logistical capacity, and (4) dependent tactics. Particular attention is given to guerrilla organizations, as they are conceived and optimized to fight in distinct urban and/or rural theatres.

¹ "On Guerrilla Warfare" (Tse-Tung 1937); "Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla" (Guillén 1966); "Guerrilla Warfare" (Guevara 1969); "Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla" (Marighella 1971); and "A Practical Course for Guerrilla War" (al-Muqrin ca. 2004). A rationale for manual selection is presented in section II.
Second, to advance a more rigorous evaluation of influential guerrilla doctrine, this thesis derives a model illustrating the underlying operational dynamic relating each of the above four enumerated strategic considerations. To this end, the essential material constraint of operational environment is first identified and selected as an independent variable. A model illustrating how the independent variable of operational environment affects the dependent variables of organizational structure, logistical capacity, and military classification, is subsequently derived. This model presents a fluid spectrum of guerrilla organization, positing optimal organizational structure as a function of operational environment. Tactics, target set, and military classification are in turn best determined by network structure. An operational dynamic relating insurgent front and organization—otherwise unobserved in COIN analytics and civil war scholarship—is thus illustrated, with lessons on how guerrilla networks do and will evolve across multiple operational environments in rural and/or urban theatres.

Third, this thesis examines the validity of its derived model against a case study review of one of the most successful guerrilla organizations in modern history: Peru’s Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path (henceforth SL). Case-study empirics on approximate conflict location, onset, duration, and termination are drawn from the Uppsala/PRIIO Armed Conflicts Dataset (ACD) on dyadic conflict (Cederman, Min, Wimmer 2010). To determine the external validity of guerrilla doctrine reviewed and modeled in this thesis, captured SL documents and directives from the Peruvian insurrection between 1969 – 1989, and secondary-source literature documenting SL organizational evolution and areas of operation are assessed against terrain, topography, and population maps generated through ArcGIS spatial analysis software. It is subsequently determined that evaluated guerrilla doctrine accurately reflects battlefield conditions. The modeled operational dynamic relating insurgent front and organization, as detailed in reviewed
guerrilla doctrine, is also observed. The global trends of increasing urbanization, dissolution of state power, and decline in politically motivated non-state actor violence may, however, contribute to an increase in typically rare urban guerrilla war.²

This thesis makes four contributions to the field of insurgency studies. First, it confirms the strategic and operational value of influential guerrilla doctrine. Second, guerrilla field manuals are reviewed and evaluated not in isolation, but as belonging to a rich, parallel dialogue the COIN scholar and practitioner would do well to consider. Third, by modeling the underlying operational dynamic relating optimal insurgent (1) operational environment, (2) organizational structure, (3) logistical capacity, and (4) dependent tactics, this thesis highlights the fundamental variable of operational environment, and by extension, sanctuary. As will be discussed, an appreciation of the organizational salience of guerrilla sanctuary, and the mediums that provide it—physical or otherwise—is essential to understanding and predicting past, current, and future modes of insurgent mobilization. Fourth, a shift toward urbanized, apolitical modes of guerrilla organization and violence, is identified, and suggested as an avenue for future research.

The remainder of this paper will proceed in five sections. The first section will provide a literature and data review, and define working definitions and analytical scope. The second section will review relevant guerrilla doctrine vis-à-vis optimal network organization and choice of tactics as a function of theatre. The third section will provide a model, derived from reviewed manuals and data presented in Section I & II, of the relationship between operational environment, organizational structure, and dependent logistical capacity. The implications of this model with regard to guerrilla military classification, as determined by tactics, will also be

² Although a study of relevant global trends is beyond the scope of this thesis, increasing, likely unsustainable urbanization, exacerbating state security and services provision, will be considered. For an in-depth look at some of the challenges of 21st century urban governance, see “Governance in the 21st Century.” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2001. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/0/17394484.pdf
considered. The fourth section will present a case study of $S_L$, evaluating the external validity of models derived in Section III. The fifth section concludes with a summary and policy implications. Appendix I provides advised guerrilla force structures. Appendix II lists a universe of identified insurgencies (Fearon and Laitin 2006).³

I. Review: Literature, Definitions, Data, and Scope

This section will review COIN and civil war literature examining guerrilla operational environment, organizational structure, logistical capacity, and dependent tactics. Working definitions, study scope, and case-study datasets will also be presented. Following a review of COIN and civil war scholarship, it seems a complex operational dynamic relating insurgent front and network structure remains unexplored. Relevant guerrilla doctrine may thus be illuminating.

1.1. Literature: Missed Connections

Operational Environment

To say that insurgent operational environment, organizational structure, logistical capacity, and dependent tactics, are variables meriting equal consideration, absent any implicit hierarchy, is inaccurate. Operational environment is of principal study and emphasis in civil war scholarship and guerrilla theory alike. This is because systemic, ethno-geographic variables such as terrain, government control, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and distance from capital—variables largely defining insurgent operational environment—are widely acknowledged to influence, even determine the capacity of violent non-state actors to initiate and sustain insurgency.4

As such extant civil war scholarship presents a series of studies on the relationship between non-state actor modes of war production and the relative effects of distinct operational environments (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Cederman and Girardin 2007;
Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød 2008; Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009). Of particular interest is research on the systemic variable of terrain, which advances an observed distinction between rural and urban models of asymmetric conflict. Influential scholarship posits rural sanctuary, and rough, especially mountainous terrain, limiting state control and services, as essential for initiating and sustaining rebellion (Lemke 1995; Kalyvas 2006). New work challenges this assumption, citing overlooked examples of protracted urban violence and insurgency (Rodgers 2007; Staniland 2010).

Although scholarship exploring the perceived divide between rural and urban guerrilla war illuminates the essential variable of operational environment, and establishes an implicit link between theatre and organizational capacity, it fails to identify a more complex relationship between front and organization and its corresponding effect on civil war onset and duration. Case study guerrilla mobilization and dependent tactics are for example presented as definite models

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7 Noting a critical shift in the political economy of violence in Latin America from “political” to “social” violence, Senior Fellow Dennis Rodgers at the London School of Economics examines urban violence in Nicaragua as representative of a paradigm shift from politically motivated violence and insurrection, to rent motivated, apolitical, urban war production. Rodgers however focuses on apolitical criminal networks, rather than the politically motivated rebel organizations that are the focus of this thesis. Work by Professor Paul Staniland at the University of Chicago is more relevant to our purposes. Citing, for example, the rise of insurgency in Karachi from 1978 to 1996 in “Cities On Fire: Social Mobilization, State Policy, and Urban Insurgency,” Staniland is more or less at odds with Kalyvas’ notion that it is rural, rather than urban operational environments, that are most likely to serve as a base for guerrilla insurgency. Staniland, however, provides an important caveat: urban centers are as likely as rural hinterlands to give rise to guerrilla insurgencies provided incumbent governments are somehow limited in the level of violence they may expect to apply. As will be noted, this observation complements the basic findings of this thesis. For when cities burn, see Staniland, Paul. “Cities on Fire: Social Mobilization, State Policy, and Urban Insurgency.” *Journal of Comparative Politics*, 2010. On slum wars, see Rodgers, Dennis. “Slum Wars of the 21st Century: Gangs, *Mano Dura*, and the New Urban Geography of Conflict in Central America.” *Development and Change*, 40(5). 2007, pp. 949-976.
of non-state actor violence, often removed from a more fluid spectrum of organizational patterns
determined by the material constraints of battlefields within or across examples of urban and/or
rural asymmetric conflict. Guerrillas do not, however, limit war to the operational dichotomy of
rural or urban. They fight across multiple fronts, with organizational patterns of varying
logistical efficiency optimized for mission and theatre.

It would stand to reason that the material constraints of distinct operational environments,
often shifting longitudinally across a campaign in both time and space, may affect the
organizational sophistication and corresponding capacity of a guerrilla organization to initiate
and sustain insurgency.\(^8\) Civil war onset and duration may thus be linked to the impact of
operational environment on successful guerrilla mobilization and organization. A more inclusive
model of the relationship between the operational environment and organizational structure of
violent non-state actors, is however lacking.

**Organizational Structure**

The question of participation is fundamental to an understanding of guerrilla mobilization—what
motivates men and women to rebel, and to what degree of participation and organization? COIN
and civil war scholarship has accordingly moved from binary modes of guerrilla participation
(Berdal, Mats and Malone 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004),\(^9\) to a range of organizational

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\(^8\) For example, the material constraints of distinct operational environments may shift as a nation moves from
predominantly rural to urban-centric economies and demographics (time), and from the rural periphery to the urban
center (space).

\(^9\) Guerrilla motivation and participation in COIN literature were initially limited to “greed” or “grievance,” with the
would-be fighter deciding to either “rebel” or “not rebel.” Although useful for microeconomic modeling, this limitation
of the human decision making process and available range of social roles to a more tractable binary obscures the
complex web of systemic and individual mechanisms compelling men and women to commit and/or aid mass violence.
On the greed or grievance debate, see Berdal, Mats, and Malone. *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars.*
Economic Papers* 56. 2004, pp. 563-595. On the tendency in civil war scholarship to limit guerrilla participation in guerrilla
involvement considering multiple, micro-mechanisms triggering action (Petersen 2001; Lindsey and Petersen 2011). This new focus in civil war studies at once offers a more nuanced theory of insurgency, specifying a spectrum of organizational participation, while shifting the unit of analysis from nations, to individuals.

Despite new research exploring individual participation in insurgency, less is said on the intermediary of the cooperative, as recorded by insurgent theoreticians themselves. Counter-insurgents fight as a group, and according to doctrine specifying strategy and procedure (Petraeus et al. 2006). Unsurprisingly, so do insurgents. Work on individuals is important, but men rarely fight alone, and less so effectively. They fight as dynamic organizations, evolving war to a simple binary, see Petersen, Roger. *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe.* Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 8.

10 Petersen (2001) moves from the binary “to rebel” or “not rebel,” to a spectrum of individual participation moving from -3 (full military commitment to the rebel cause), to +3 (full military commitment to the incumbent cause), with degrees of individual involvement in between (-2, 2 [strong]; -1, 1 [weak]; 0 [neutral]). At each stage, mechanisms motivating or dissuading of movement along the conflict spectrum are specified. Lindsey and Petersen (2011) provide a similar spectrum of Iraqi insurgent involvement between 2006-2007. COIN strategy targeting systemic and individual factors motivating escalation in participation is subsequently identified. The above noted spectrum of insurgent involvement considering multiple mechanisms triggering action will be revisited when presenting a working definition of insurgency and a description of SL graduated force structure. On graduated insurgent participation, see Petersen, Roger. *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe.* Cambridge University Press. 2001, pp. 8-9. For an application of Petersen’s spectrum of insurgent participation to COIN theatres in Iraq, see Lindsey, John, and Roger Petersen. *Varieties of Counterinsurgency: A Case Study of Iraq.* Newport: Naval War College, 2011.


12 The 2006 Army and Marine Corps counter-insurgency manual FM-34 represents the first revial of Army and Marine Corps counter insurgent doctrine in more than two decades. The essential message of FM-34 is to “learn and adapt the ideas from the manual to their particular location and enemy.” With a focus on doctrinal development and distribution, and tactical evolution as a function of enemy organization, FM-34 illustrates the strategic value of defined procedure, and organizational flexibility necessary to defeat a nimble enemy. Petraeus, David H., and James F. Amos. "FM-34: Counterinsurgency." *Headquarters Department of the Army.* 2006.
with mission, environment, and opponent, with observable implications for expected tactics, targets, and fields of operation (Randy and Gelles 2005; Binder, Gelvin, and Rapoport 2011).\(^{13}\)

Recent scholarship does consider insurgency at the organizational-unit of analysis; however, most is best associated with post-9/11 work on civilian-centric terrorist networks (CCN) (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2002 et al.).\(^{14}\) CCN—although often deployed by larger parent organizations in hazardous operational environments—are different from hierarchical, military-centric groups. The consequences of not appreciating this organizational distinction, and environmental factors driving organizational evolution, dependent tactical innovation, and military classification, are considered below.

**Logistical Capacity, Dependent Tactics, and Military Classification**

If guerrillas fight largely as organizations, fit to field and objective, what does this mean for

\(^{13}\) The organizational evolution of al-Qa'ida from a centralized, anti-Soviet insurgent organization, to a post-9/11, decentralized network, is a subject of much scholarship. Academics seek macro and micro-mechanisms prompting organizational evolution, while COIN practitioners try to stay one step ahead of a dynamic and dangerous target. Pre and post-9/11 al-Qa'ida's record of organizational and tactical innovation across multiple rural and urban guerrilla fronts is, for example, compelling evidence. Notably, organizational evolution is often accompanied by dependent tactical innovation. One example is the use of Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) by guerrilla combat units countering US armor in Iraq and Afghanistan. Upon detonation, an EFP with a 20 cm (8 in) penetrator lens can throw a ~3 kg slug of molten copper at ~2,000 m/s, producing ~60 times the kinetic energy of a .50 BMG round. EFP IED slugs are capable of penetrating 10.2 cm of armor at 90 m. The portable Iranian-made Shawaz EFP IED used by HAMAS against Israeli vehicles, for example, is reported to be capable of penetrating 20.3 cm of steel. EFP IED were used extensively by al-Qa'ida and Saddamist insurgents during the Third Gulf War. On EFP IED general construction and use, see Burton, Fred. "The Imminent Spread of EFPs." *Stratfor.*

http://www.stratfor.com/imminent_spread_efps. For Army estimates of EFP penetration, see *EFP: Explosively Formed Penetrators.* CNN. On the HAMAS Shawaz EFP IED, see *Shawaz.* United States Army Combined Arms Center.


logistical capacity and dependent tactics - seemingly important, material considerations, influencing the muddled military classifications insurgent, guerrilla, and terrorist? Work on networks does consider the relationship between organizational evolution and logistical capacity. It is for example understood that low network interconnectivity caused by cell compartmentalization limits the logistical capacity of violent non-state actors lacking men and support (Enders and Su 2007). What is less studied is how a drop in logistical efficiency caused by network evolution toward more compartmentalized models of organization affects feasible tactics and corresponding target set - may less logistically capable units necessarily gravitate to soft-target, civilian-centric tactics?

That a military classification of terrorism may lie with organizational rather than tactics-based determinants, however, is unexplored. A conflation of military classification, as determined by tactics, follows. Due to a primary or secondary employed tactic of terrorism, CCN are often aggregated with distinct, military-centric guerrilla organizations (Hoffman 1999; Abrahms 2004). And this is not an academic exercise - military classification matters. Policy

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16 Although a discussion of scholarship on CCN is best considered on sub-section "organizational structure," it is included here to demonstrate how a given violent non-state actor's choice of tactics - irrespective of other, more broad organizational determinants, e.g. horizontally organized networks vs. hierarchical guerrilla armies - may result in a misleading military classification, and corresponding recommendation of sub-optimal responsive tactics. For example, following a review of several successful terrorist campaigns, Hoffman concludes "terrorism works." Yet Hoffman’s case studies seem to describe urban insurgencies (FLN in Algeria, EOKA in Cyprus, and the Irgun in Palestine), rather than CCN. Hoffman may be assigning success to urban insurgencies using terrorist tactics. As such, perhaps Hoffman should have concluded his historical overview with the less ambitious "terrorism, as a tactic, can work." In "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," terrorism scholar Max Abrahms challenges the conventional wisdom that terrorism is an effective coercive strategy. Analyzing the armed struggles of twenty-eight terrorist organizations - the complete list of foreign terrorist organizations as designated by the US Department of State since 2001 - Abrahms finds that terrorists only accomplish first-order strategic objectives 7% of the time. Yet although Abrahms holds an opposing view to Hoffman on the relative utility of terrorism as a coercive tactic, his analysis is plagued by the same definitional problem: rather than confound urban insurgents with CCN, as Hoffman had, Abrahms confuses CCN with urban insurgents. Throughout his analysis, Abrahms relies on the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations. The State Department makes no distinction between primarily insurgent/quasi-political organizations that capture and control territory (e.g. Hezbollah), and the civilian-centric terrorist organizations (e.g. post-9/11 al-Qa’ida) he claims to analyze. For Hoffman’s review of successful terrorist campaigns, see Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Colombia University Press,
makers may otherwise counter the wrong target, with the wrong strategy (Cronin 2011).\textsuperscript{17} As will be further discussed in the proceeding pages, COIN and counter-terrorism (CT) may be considered different models of warfare, with divergent –even antagonistic- strategic assumptions, objectives, methods, and tactics (Boyle 2010).\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{Missed Connections}

The effects of operational environment on the organizational and logistical capacity of guerrillas to initiate and sustain insurgency is widely recognized; that guerrillas need sanctuary to effectively contest state power is a truism. Precisely why and how different operational environments affect insurgent fighting ability, however, remains unexplained. Is it simply a question of state capacity to punish insurgents over rough physical and/or human terrain? Or, since guerrillas fight in groups, are there other, material constraints imposed by distinct operational environments on the capacity of guerrillas to effectively organize and wage war? What would this mean for feasible guerrilla logistics and tactics, and, correspondingly, how the counter-insurgent identifies, targets, and counters his enemy?

There thus seems to be a complex, yet understudied material dynamic relating insurgent operational environment, and organization, with material implications for logistical capacity and feasible tactics. A model of this dynamic may provide the counter-insurgent and policy maker with a more accurate understanding of how systemic conditions influence guerrilla organizational evolution. Distinct organizational patterns may in turn affect COIN responsive


\textsuperscript{18} Michael J. Boyle, "Do Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Go Together?," \textit{International Affairs} 86(2). 2010, pp. 334-353.
strategy and tactics. We have seen what COIN and civil war scholarship have to say about the relationship between insurgent front and organization. But what do the guerrilla fighter and theoretician think?

Together with the counter-insurgent, the guerrilla fighter and theoretician are, after all, the actors most affected by the material constraints of asymmetric battle. Guerrilla doctrine – what may indeed represent a useful, parallel academic discussion, considering decidedly operational, material battlefield constraints - may therefore be of use to the counter-insurgent. This thesis will see to what extent, while shedding light on how guerrillas organize and fight as a function of theatre.

1.2. Definitions: Insurgents, Guerrillas, Terrorists, CT or COIN, Terminology

One objective of this thesis is to distinguish between the oft-confounded terms insurgent, guerrilla, and terrorist. The military classifications insurgent, guerrilla, and terrorist may be briefly defined, respectively, as (1) the passive, sympathetic, or logistically active member of a violent movement seeking to overthrow an existing social order through primarily military tactics; (2) the militarily active member of a violent movement seeking to overthrow an existing social order through primarily military tactics, and (3) the logistically or militarily active member of a relatively small civilian-centric organization seeking to overthrow an existing social order through primarily terrorist tactics.¹⁹

With that, two important definitional determinants of the military classifications of insurgent, guerrilla, and terrorist, are apparent. They are (1) degree of participation in insurgency, and (2) scale and sophistication of organization. We may now return to previous civil war scholarship advancing a spectrum of rebel participation in guerrilla war.²⁰ Fig. 1.2.1, and accompanying explanations provided below, reproduced with permission from Lindsey and Petersen (2011), additionally clarify the military classifications of “insurgent” and “guerrilla”:

Fig. 1.2.1: Moving Beyond Binaries to a Spectrum of Participation

Neutral (0): During any conflict between a government and its opponent, many individuals will choose neutrality; these actors will try to avoid both sides and go about their daily lives with a minimum of risk. They will not willingly provide information or material support to either the government or the insurgents nor will they participate in public demonstrations for either side.

Unarmed, unorganized insurgent supporter (-1): While avoiding any armed role, some individuals will occasionally provide information, shelter and material support for the insurgents. While unorganized, these individuals may show up at rallies supporting the insurgents and will boycott elections and other activities that could legitimize the government.

**Armed local insurgent (-2):** Some individuals will adopt a role of direct and organized participation in a locally based, armed organization. In the absence of a powerful state, individuals in this role often take the form of local militia members. In the presence of a powerful state, such individuals may appear as uninvolved citizens by day, but play the role of active fighter at night. Even the most powerful states can have trouble identifying and neutralizing actors in this role.

**Mobile armed insurgent (-3):** Some individuals will join mobile and armed organizations, becoming members in a guerrilla unit or rebel army. These individuals will fight outside of their own local communities.

These four roles form one side of a spectrum of participation. At the onset of an occupation or violent conflict, many individuals will begin at neutrality, but then move into a support role (-1), and then on into even more committed and violent roles (-2, -3). Of course, individuals may also move along a parallel set of roles in support of the government. These roles basically mirror those above.21

If we combine the previously proposed definitions of “insurgent” and “guerrilla,” with the above noted spectrum of insurgent involvement, we may place the “insurgent” at a (-1) -or possibly (-2), according to degree of participation in armed rebellion- with the “guerrilla” at (-3). As apparent, individuals at each stage of conflict participation may exist within an organization, or more broadly across a movement. As opposed to (-1) and (-2) insurgents, perpetrating local,
opportunistic acts of guerrilla assistance and/or anti-government violence, fighters belonging to mobile urban cells and/or rural military units are (-3) guerrillas.  

Although the support and occasional armed role of the (-1) and (-2) insurgent will be noted when considering graduated guerrilla force structure, the primary focus of this thesis will be on the more organizationally active (-3) guerrilla. This thesis thus aims to build on previous work studying micro-level insurgent participation. Rather than individuals or larger movements, however, the unit of analysis will be guerrilla organizations, as they are doctrinally conceived, and refined across distinct operational environments.

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22 This division between obstructive, but unarmed (-1) insurgents; lightly armed, but untrained, opportunistic, and local (-2) militia; and well armed, regimental, and mobile (-3) guerrillas, is usefully illustrated by US counter-sniping efforts in Iraq. Three classes of guerrilla snipers are described. First, the untrained “pot-shot sniper.” This individual may not have even zeroed his own rifle, and may have got started “with as little as two hours instruction.” Although fire from this first class of Iraqi sniper is only marginally effective, it is regularly concealed by obstructive (-1) insurgents reluctant to divulge information on sniper identities, or even acknowledge “having heard a shot.” The cited study estimates this category “constitutes half the snipers in Iraq.” Second, above the “pot-shot sniper,” we find the “trained marksman.” The “trained marksman” is likely a former military or sports shooter, who although a competent shot, lacks sniper training and experience. This second category is associated with the (-2) “opportunistic neighborhood sniper,” who, operating mostly around where he lives, sees Americans as “a convenient, opportunistic target right in his own backyard.” Often the “trained marksman” is operationally limited by optics and weaponry (Soviet-made 4x PSO-1 mounted to SVD Dragunov or Kalashnikov-derivative [e.g. Romanian PSL, Yugoslav M76, Iraqi Tabruk et al.] sniper rifles), and lacks an extensive support network. Last, above the (-1, -2) “pot-shot sniper,” and (-2) “trained marksman,” we find the (-3) “one shot one kill” sniper. The “one shot one kill” sniper is a fulltime guerrilla with competent, likely outside training and/or operational experience in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and other guerrilla fronts. This most dangerous category may capably target—and win against—Coalition forces. A number of tragically successful attacks against Coalition officers, Special Forces soldiers, and well-known sniper teams are described. As the above cited target set demonstrates, each attack required substantial preparation, intelligence, and skill to execute—a mark of the organizational and logistical sophistication of third-tier (-3) guerrillas, capable of acquiring and fielding, for example, Austrian-made .50-caliber rifles (Steyr Model 50 HS) smuggled from Iran. Plaster, John. Counter-Sniping in Iraq. Paladin Press, 2006, chpt. 20.

23 It should be noted that insurgencies are best understood, and indeed often observed as broader movements, in which multiple organizations may participate. The Iraq insurgency during the Third Gulf War is representative, with distinct organizations like al-Qa‘ida in the Land of Two Rivers (AQI), the Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM), and the Badr Organization, among others, participating in a wider popular insurgency. A comprehensive study of insurgency as a broader movement, rather than as comprised of distinct organizations, each meriting in-depth study, is best left to another analysis. For a taxonomy of Iraqi guerrilla organizations, see “Iraqi Insurgency Groups.” Global Security. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_insurgency.htm. For work on insurgency both considering individual participation, and a more inclusive, popular phenomenon, see Petersen, Roger. Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Although insurgency, defined as the violent contest between rebel and incumbent for complete or partial control of territory, is better defined, the concept of terrorism is notoriously nebulous, with as many definitions as scholars and practitioners. However, several elements prevail across interpretations. Terrorism may be firstly understood as a fundamentally political project. The utility of an attack is only in its ability to exploit fear. That is, to inflict an asymmetric psychological impact capable of forcing concessions from a captive audience. Terrorism, secondly, is essentially violent, with attacks, or threat thereof, primarily directed against unarmed civilians. For the purposes of this study, terrorism may be defined as a tactic, centering on the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear, through violence or threat of violence, directed primarily against unarmed civilians, in the pursuit of political change.

A word on the practitioner of terrorism is in order, with attention to scale and sophistication of organization. Considered a weapon of the weak, terrorism is associated with small, often parasitic non-state actors lacking popular representation and power to affect systemic change. Although guerrilla armies also attack unarmed civilians to extract political concessions, the guerrilla, unlike the terrorist, operates as a military unit, attacks state military forces, and captures and holds territory. Terrorists, in contrast, avoid direct combat with state military units, and rarely hold sovereignty over territory.

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24 This definition of insurgency is derived in part from Counter-insurgency Field Manual FM-34. An alternative definition of insurgency, proposed by Fearon and Laitin (2003), characterizes the dominant type of civil war in the post-World War II era: “[Insurgency] is defined as a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas.” By specifying base of operations, Fearon and Laitin note the effect of environment on the initiation and successful prosecution of modern insurgency. For the FM-34 definition of insurgency, see Petraeus, David H., and James F. Amos. "FM-34: Counterinsurgency," Headquarters Department of the Army. 2006, pp. 1-4. For Fearon and Laitin, see Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, 97(1). 2003, p. 75.

25 This definition of terrorism is in part derived from Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Colombia University Press. 1998, p. 43.

26 The term “military unit” is deceptively parsimonious; it belies a spectrum of organization type, capability, and size. This spectrum may begin with small rifle, mortar, and grenade teams, e.g. Somalia’s as-Shubaab, and move toward logistically complex units capable of affecting asymmetric and even conventional warfare, using small and heavy arms, e.g. Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
Thus employing a fundamentally asymmetric tactic, the practitioner of terrorism is likely a relatively weak, non-state entity, lacking the cadre and capacity to assemble and field more organizationally sophisticated and logistically capable units. Even at this more general definitional level, relying on distinctions rather than parsimonious definitions, a relationship between organizational sophistication, military classification, target choice, and tactics, is apparent. This thesis will explore the doctrinal and operational relationship between each.

*CT or COIN?*

As this thesis does not equate insurgents and guerrillas with terrorists, it considers CT and COIN two separate models of warfare. To this end, COIN may be understood as a competition between counter-insurgents and insurgents for the loyalty of a population and control of or secession from the state. Given this definition, the primary strategic objective of COIN is to wrest insurgent political influence from the population, build the capacity of central and local governments, and eliminate subversive agents and influence.

As terrorist organizations are generally smaller than guerrilla armies and lack the military assets and popular support of an insurgency, the primary strategic objective of CT, in contrast, is cell penetration and network dissolution, with minimal concern as to long-term population-centric efforts important to COIN. As the counter-terrorist is not facing an enemy that attempts to seize and hold territory, the counter-terrorist need not concern himself with the resource and time-intensive COIN project of capturing territory, holding cleared areas, and building state capacity in order to win the support of the local population. CT is thus a quick, kinetic model of warfare that involves the systematic targeting and elimination of leaders and operatives deemed to have only superficial ties with the surrounding community.
Given divergent strategic objectives on issues as fundamental as the use of force, the methods and capabilities of the expected adversary, conflict duration, and the importance of population control, protection, and relations, CT and COIN may not only be seen as different models of warfare, but as having antagonistic objectives that may jeopardize greater mission success.27 A ruthless and relentless CT targeting campaign may, for example, lack accurate intelligence informing raids and strikes, resulting in a high level of collateral damage, public outcry, and a realigned network of militant factions galvanized against a common adversary. Such results would be counterproductive to a COIN campaign given its fundamental strategic objectives of population control and protection.

Accordingly, although many of the guerrilla organizations examined in this thesis resemble CCN in organization and tactics, they will be studied as insurgencies, as defined by previously specified organizational determinants. Now in practice, this is difficult. Terrorist organizations often operate within the security vacuum of a greater insurgency [e.g. al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) and Yemen (AQAP)]. Terrorists also organizationally cross pollinate with indigenous guerrilla networks [e.g. al-Qa’ida in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North West Frontier Province (NWFP)], and strike against counter-insurgents and other symbols of incumbent legitimacy.28

Nevertheless, an attempt to appropriately assign –where relevant- the military classification of case-study violent non-state actor organizations (i.e. insurgent, guerrilla, or terrorist) should be made. AQI, for example, although considered part of the Iraqi insurgency, differed greatly in ideology and corresponding tactics from other guerrilla organizations

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27 Michael J. Boyle, "Do Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Go Together?," *International Affairs* 86(2). 2010, pp. 334-353.
28 Ibid.
operating in Iraqi rural and/or urban asymmetric theatres. The ability of counter-insurgents to exploit this distinction in organization and tactics, leveraging the ideological and organizational schism between AQI and hosting Sunni tribal networks –particularly with regard to civilian-centric attacks- was crucial to the US-led Coalition’s defeat of AQI. Considering the essential role of military classification in selecting appropriate CT strategy countering AQI, this thesis will strive to incorporate this important battlefield lesson throughout its analyses.

Terminology

Finally, terms should be clarified. “Operational environment” refers to the theatre of combat, or front, classified largely according to physical and human terrain, e.g. rural and/or urban, and other systemic variables like government control, state capacity, and population density. “Tactics” refers to practical modes of procedure employed to accomplish second and/or first order strategic objectives, e.g. HAMAS’ targeting of civilian bus riders (tactic) to halt a perceptibly regressive peace deal (second-order strategic objective). “Logistical capacity” refers to the ability to procure, supply, and maintain shelter, equipment, and personnel, and to plan and execute operations. “Network” refers to a loosely connected constellation of small cells, employing varying levels of hierarchy and organization as determined by environmental constraints. “Multi-front” refers to multiple theatres of operation, including simultaneous rural and urban campaigns.

29 AQI used terrorist tactics (e.g. suicide bombings), and targeted civilians (e.g. Shi’a Muslims), as opposed to traditional, military-centric guerrilla strategy and tactics. For a personal letter to AQI head Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi outlining the rationale and methods for attacking Iraq’s Shi’a Muslim majority, see “English Letter Press Release.” Director for National Intelligence. 2005. http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/letter_in_english.pdf.
31 In the proceeding pages, other definitional variables, like degree of government control, will be explored.
I.3. Data: Sources and Tools

The Uppsala/PRIO ACD provides useful information regarding conflict onset and termination (dates); severity [“minor” (25-999 battle-related deaths per dyad per annum) – “civil war” (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths)]; and location (approximate latitude and longitude). ACD will be supplemented with primary-source Peruvian intelligence reports and SL documents and directives from the Peruvian insurrection between 1969 – 1989, and relevant secondary source literature. Additional geospatial information and proxies for variables like government control (e.g. topography and visible infrastructure) will be obtained through ArcGIS spatial analysis software and corresponding data sets, and from commercial venues like Google Earth. A universe of cases, most featuring insurgency, is provided in Appendix II.32

I.4. Scope: Insurgency, Terrorism, Global Trends, and Case Study

Terrorism or Insurgency?

This thesis is about guerrillas and insurgency and not terrorists and terrorism. Although a working definition of terrorism is proposed, and organizational characteristics defining its practitioner are suggested, it will not attempt to explain terrorism as a phenomenon. This thesis will, however, consider terrorism as a tactic, and how the material constraints of distinct operational environments may motivate or dissuade its use by guerrilla units.

As primarily a tactic, employed by a range of non-state actor organizations, the use of terrorist tactics will therefore not be considered definitional of a terrorist organization. Other

32 See Appendix II for a universe of civil wars, many featuring insurgency, compiled by Fearon and Laitin (2006). For original, see Fearon, James and David Laitin. “Additional Tables for Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” Department of Political Science, Stanford University. 2006, pp. 7-10.
variables, like membership, popular support, and logistical capacity are more important determinants –especially with regard to COIN and/or CT responsive strategy. Prior to the US retaliatory annihilation of al-Qa’ida’s best fighters and assets, for example, what is today considered the quintessential terrorist group was once closer to a guerrilla organization, fielding military units against conventional forces in Europe, Africa, and Asia, than the minimally connected, often amateurish post-9/11 al-Qa’ida affiliate CCN terrorizing the local and undefended.

*Global Trends*

This thesis will in part consider the effects of global trends like increasing urbanization, dissolution of state power, and decline in politically motivated non-state actor violence on guerrilla organization. The reason for this seemingly digressive discussion is that each of the above identified global trends may be more broadly classified under the variable of operational environment. As guerrilla operational environment appears to be the variable most discussed and considered by scholars and practitioners of guerrilla war alike, and therefore selected as the independent variable of derived models illustrating the strategic and operational principals of reviewed doctrine, it would seem worthwhile to consider the potential effects of each.

A comprehensive study of the effects of increasing urbanization, dissolution of state power, and decline in politically motivated non-state actor violence on guerrilla organization would however require a separate assessment. As such this thesis is limited to an analysis of influential guerrilla doctrine only, and what this means for asymmetric conflict today. What for example increasing urbanization may mean for the relevance of rural-centric guerrilla doctrine will be considered only in passing. Extrapolating as to what tomorrow will bring, and how that
will change the nature of guerrilla organization and war production, is outside the scope of this paper. The value of briefly considering the effects of global trends like urbanization is to however appropriately qualify the conclusions of this thesis, and suggest future research.

Case Study

*SL* is selected for four reasons. First, *SL* effectively waged a guerrilla campaign against the Peruvian government for twenty years. *SL* therefore had time to refine its model of warfare as determined by front and adversary. To closely observe the material effects of distinct operational environments on guerrilla organization and dependent logistical capacity and tactics, it is important to select a longer standing guerrilla campaign. With lengthy insurgencies, as opposed to shorter ones, we may better observe how guerrilla organizations change over time, and possibly identify mechanisms prompting network evolution.

The vaunted *SL* insurgency, fated to war against state military and police forces for over two decades, may thus resemble the expected organization and tactics of a rational actor implementing and discarding theory as dictated by observable material incentives and constraints. 33 *SL* network evolution may thereby reflect the shifting topography of systemic variables determining the organizational structure and dependent logistical capacity of fighting organizations. A long operational history will accordingly prove useful when attempting a more inclusive theory modeling the largely unobserved material dynamic relating guerrilla front and organization.

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33 With regard to just how reasonable it is to assume that *SL* is a rational actor, it is well understood that revolutionary organizations and movements—especially at the level of the nation-state—discard potentially costly ideology in favor of more rationally defensible policy as they mature. For words on how revolutionary regimes may be “tamed” with time, see Saraiva, José Flávio. “Foreign Policy and Political Regime.” *Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais*, 2003, pp. 49–50.
Second, the added benefit of observing precisely to what extent doctrine counts in the face of protracted combat is apparent. As valuable as theory may be to initial organization and operations, the following stands: No battle plan survives first contact with the enemy.\textsuperscript{34} \textit{SL} commanders did study and hierarchically implement influential guerrilla doctrine.\textsuperscript{35} But they also modified theory as required to effectively do battle.\textsuperscript{36} This simultaneous emphasis on theory and praxis—which is well documented in captured \textit{SL} documents and directives, and externally verifiable by shifting \textit{SL} attack patterns—may therefore allow us to see not only what guerrilla theoreticians say, but whether or not guerrilla doctrine reflects the material conditions of war.\textsuperscript{37}

Third, \textit{SL} operated in rural and urban theatres, using guerrilla and terrorist tactics and organizational patterns as required. \textit{SL} operational diversity may thus challenge or compliment this thesis’ derived model, and, by extension, the strategic and operational principals of reviewed guerrilla doctrine considering the organizational effects of distinct asymmetric theatres. This is helpful because the inclusion of more than one case study is beyond the modest scope and means of this thesis. The added value of selecting \textit{SL} is therefore longitudinal variation in the independent variable of operational environment. And as will be discussed, this thesis will not

\textsuperscript{34} Or, as originally quipped by the great 19th century German military strategist Helmuth von Moltke the Elder: “No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy’s main strength.” Moltke, Helmuth, Graf Von, \textit{Militarische Werke.} vol. 2, pp. 33-40.

\textsuperscript{35} As noted by premier \textit{SL} scholar Gustavo Gorriti, the hierarchical dissemination of \textit{SL} documents and directives “permitted an exact distribution of the agreements made to lower levels in the organization without compromising internal security or the integrity of the political ideas. The precision and organization of the information ensured that militants who had attended meetings could disseminate the reports without forgetting any of the points, accord each their proper emphasis and transmit the information from the top of the hierarchy to the bottom without distortion.” Gorriti, Gustavo and Robin Kirk (trans.). \textit{The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru.} Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press. 1999, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{36} The \textit{SL} March 18 plenary session “began with a long methodological reflection from Mao. In addressing the problem of linking theoretical reflection to praxis, Mao not only emphasized the traditional Marxist affirmation that ‘theoretical knowledge, acquired through practice, should be returned to practice,’ but also that ‘what is most important is that this must manifest itself in the jump from rational understanding to revolutionary practice.’” The decision of \textit{SL} commanders to leave the countryside for the cities—entirely in contradiction to rural-centric Maoist political philosophy—is an example of how \textit{SL} was willing to question and modify even its most fundamental tenets. For the March 18 \textit{SL} plenary focusing on Mao’s revolutionary nexus between theory and praxis, see ibid, p. 23. On the decision of \textit{SL} commanders to move to the cities, see Weinstein, Jeremy M. \textit{Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence.} New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{37} Criteria for manual selection will be presented in section II.
only explore the impact of terrain-based determinants of operational environment, but of important global trends like increasing urbanization and dissolution of state power that affect insurgent organizational preferences and dependent logistical capacity. *SL* operated over periods of both low and high urbanization, in mountains, jungles, and cities, and pushed the Peruvian state to near collapse. Accordingly, this thesis is not limited to a study of only one set of systemic variables directing organizational evolution.

Despite useful variation in the independent variable, a narrow focus on *SL* may nevertheless limit the external validity of this thesis. Future work would do well to evaluate its findings against additional cases, especially sustained urban insurgency. Data availability and collection are however problems in insurgency and civil war studies. So information is the fourth benefit of selecting *SL*. Following the capture of *SL* leadership, Peruvian intelligence, military, and police officers conducted thousands of interrogations and collected a wealth of documents and directives outlining *SL* doctrine, tactics, and organization. Called the “bedrock of *SL* military strategy,” the captured *SL* central archives were once a classified battlefield spoil of Peru’s National Intelligence Service (NIS).38 Today, they are available in microfilm to scholars at Princeton University Library.39 In addition to a supplementary collection of declassified Peruvian military and NIS reports,40 the *SL* central archives will inform the presented case study. One well documented case study may thus be as useful as several less so.41

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39 A large collection of primary-source reports from the Peruvian civil war are today available in microfilm at the Princeton University library. Specifically, the 1st and 2nd collections of ephemera from the Peruvian insurrection (8 and 4 reels, respectively), and the Sendero Luminoso collection of pamphlets, serials, fliers, and party congresses from 1962 to 1985 (3 reels).
40 Ibid., 2nd collection of ephemera from the Peruvian insurrection.
41 A brief word on translation: All primary source material is in the original Spanish. Throughout, the author strives to provide a close translation of relevant passages. As all translation is however performed by the author only, all errors in word, intent, and meaning, are accordingly his.
Not many insurgencies share the above noted, especially fortunate case-study characteristics with SL. Consider Appendix II, which provides a list of civil wars featuring insurgency. Less than a fifth of identified insurgencies last anywhere near as long as SL. And of these, only two, i.e. the IRA and FARC, share SL's attractive case-study attributes of (1) an emphasis on the implementation and refinement of guerrilla doctrine; (2) operational diversity over human and physical terrain; and (3) accessible, high-quality primary-source data. An extended version of this thesis may include the IRA, FARC, and even pre and post-9/11 al-Qa’ida as additional case-study organizations. In the meantime, SL should provide a useful starting point.

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42 Civil war is defined as “fighting reaching a threshold of 1,000 deaths between governments and organized groups seeking either to control the state or separate from it.” This definition is proposed by Fearon and Laitin. See Fearon, James and David Laitin. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War Research Project.” Department of Political Science, Stanford University. http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/.
II. Guerrilla Doctrine: Network Structure and Multi-Front Insurgency

“Though geographical and social conditions in each country determine the mode and particular forms that guerrilla warfare will take, there are laws that hold for all fighting of this type.”

Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 1969

This section will present a review of influential guerrilla doctrine. The criteria for manual selection is twofold. First, to include only mature theory as closely reflective of battlefield conditions as possible, this study will limit its review to doctrine developed by major guerrilla practitioners involved in longstanding campaigns, irrespective of victor, only.

Second, to maximize the external validity of this study, manuals with the greatest cross-conflict doctrinal impact will be selected. For example, the “Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla” (Marighella 1971), is possibly the most widely read guerrilla manual in modern history. The mini-manual served as the official guidebook of the Italian Red Brigades, the German Red Army Faction, and the Irish Republican Army. Together with the doctrine of Ernesto “Che” Guevara, it “has informed virtually all Latin American insurgent terrorists for the last twenty-five years.”

Considering the extensive doctrinal influence and theoretical cross-pollination of each examined theoretician and manuscript, the admonishments of each will be treated as largely equivalent.


Five manuals and doctrinal works will be examined, including: “On Guerrilla Warfare” (Tse-Tung 1937); “Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla” (Guillén 1966); “Guerrilla Warfare” (Guevara 1969); “Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla” (Marighella 1971); and “A Practical Course for Guerrilla War” (al-Muqrin ca. 2004). Guidebook lessons on (1) operational environment, (2) organizational structure, (3) logistical capacity, and (4) dependent tactics and military classification, will be considered.

II.1. Operational Environment

Rural or Urban Insurgency?

The question of operational environment is a consistent point of debate and consideration in each manual. Longitudinally, advisements on operational environment moved from prima facie tenets of dialectical-materialist theory, positing rural theatres as the preferred base for insurgency (Mao 1937; Guevara 1969), to more practical and/or Marxist-Leninist revisionist doctrine considering urban centers as optimal loci of rebellion should rural mobilization prove fruitless (Guillén 1966; Marighella 1971).

Similar to COIN scholarship, despite the often binary emphasis of some guerrilla theoreticians on either rural or urban operational environments (Mao 1937; Guevara 1969; Guillén 1966; Marighella 1971), recent doctrine develops and expounds a sophisticated range of non-state actor modes of war production, consisting of an inter and/or intra-organizational spectrum of optimal network structure as a function of operational environment, e.g. rural and/or urban (al-Muqrin ca. 2004). This shift in operational focus reflects the ongoing trend of migration from rural to urban centers, as well as a progressive refinement of guerrilla thought expounding a multi-front model of insurgency.
Regarding rural theatres, Mao Tse-Tung, in contrast to Marxist-Leninist dogma, considered the Chinese industrial proletariat too weak and few in number to successfully revolt. Having disastrously failed to establish an urban guerrilla network in Nationalist-controlled Shanghai in 1927, Mao built a rural insurgent army in Ching Kang Shan, a mountainous region in the Fukien-Kiangsi borderlands. Mao used this army to launch a three-phase guerrilla war, which he formulated as (1) Organization, Consolidation, and Preservation; (2) Progressive Expansion (Guerrilla War); and (3) Destruction of the Enemy (Conventional War). As Phase I guerrilla operations gradually expanded from secure mountain strongholds to engage and defeat government forces in Phase II and III guerrilla and conventional war, Mao would establish a doctrinal link between operational environment, i.e. concealing terrain outside government control, and the revolutionary potential of attached rural populations.

Drawing heavily from Maoist revolutionary doctrine, Ernesto “Che” Guevara similarly advances a phased, rural-centric guerrilla strategy in his treatise “Guerrilla Warfare.” Although Guevara acknowledges that “the struggle of organized city workers should not be underrated,” he considers urban and suburban operational environments to be unfavorable, and as centers of government control, hazardous. Citing Mao and Ho Chi Minh, Guevara theorizes that as the economic aim of the proletariat revolution is primarily driven by the aspiration to own land, “the

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46 Mao’s strategy for guerrilla war is phased. Mao’s three phases of guerrilla war are: (1) Organization, Consolidation, and Preservation, consisting of surviving government anti-guerrilla campaigns and securing bases of operation outside government control; (2) Progressive Expansion (Terrorism-Guerrilla War), consisting of guerrilla and terrorist operations against government forces, as areas of control expand, and (3) Destruction of the Enemy (Conventional War), consisting of a transition to conventional war to capture control of the state. Ibid., pp. 20-26.

guerrilla fighter is above all an agrarian revolutionary." Guevara thus posits rural bases of insurgency as a strategic consideration, in addition to a doctrinal necessity.

Brazilian urban guerrilla Carlos Marighella, and Spanish revolutionary theoretician Abraham Guillén, leave the jungle for the city. First, Marighella considers cities essential foci of rebellion because of a greater (1) density of targets, e.g. foreign agents and government police and military forces, and (2) availability of financial resources open to guerrilla assault and expropriation, including foreign firms and banking and financial services sectors. What was once a military-centric target set, thus expands to include civilian production and foreign nationals/firms. The initiative of attacking units is paramount; Marighella urges the urban guerrilla to shatter citizen confidence in government through an unrelenting campaign of psychological warfare, employing robbery, assassination, sabotage, and terrorism.

Guillén concurs with Marighella’s assessment stressing the strategic and revolutionary primacy of cities and urban proletariat, writing that because of the capitalist accumulation and centralization of capital and population in urban centers, “a revolutionary war must be initiated in the cities [emphasis added].” Unlike Marighella, however, Guillén neither considers civilian production, enabled by foreign banking and financial services, nor unarmed state and/or foreign

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48 Ibid.
49 Brazilian urban guerrillas following Marighella’s doctrine robbed hundreds of banks. This range of target selection stems from what Marighella considered the two “essential objectives” of urban guerrilla warfare. He writes “Within the framework of the class struggle, as it inevitably and necessarily sharpens, the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla points toward two essential objectives: (a) the physical liquidation of the chiefs and assistants of the armed forces and of the police; (b) the expropriation of government resources and those belonging to the big capitalists, latifundists, and imperialists, with small expropriations used for the maintenance of individual urban guerrillas and larges ones for the sustenance of the revolution itself.” Throughout “Mini-manual” Marighella urges that banks and other lootable franchises be targeted. Marighella, Carlos. *Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla*. 1971, p. 6.
50 Terrorism, sabotage, execution, assassination, strikes, propaganda—all are considered acceptable and necessary tools of the urban guerrilla, according to Marighella. There is to minimal centralization of command, and as much operational flexibility as possible. Ibid., pp. 1-29.
51 Ibid., p. 257.
agents, politically productive targets. 52 Although Guillén acknowledges the importance of rural food production, 53 Guillén believes Mao could not have assembled a mountain army without having first recruited cadre and equipment from Shanghai, and considers Guevara’s misguided, rural-focused theory of revolution to be the cause of his demise in Bolivia. 54

Unwedded to a particular interpretation of Maoist and/or Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory emphasizing the revolutionary potential of either the rural or urban proletariat, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) theorist ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Muqrin presents a more fluid theory of optimal operational environment. 55 The primary strategic consideration, according to al-Muqrin, lies not with prima facie social theory, but with a comprehensive, case-by-case assessment of the material advantages of distinct operational environments. Different theatres of operation may thus occur inter-nationally (e.g. Egypt [urban] vs. Afghanistan [rural]) or intra-nationally (e.g. Baghdad [urban] vs. al-Anbar Province [rural]), with availability and state control of potential fronts the only consideration. 56 Rural bases that are “easily defensible for a

52 Guillén served as the mentor for Uruguay’s leftist revolutionary movement Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN), more commonly known as Tupamaros, after Incan revolutionary Tupac Amaru II. In his work “Strategy of an Urban Guerrilla,” Guillén admonishes Tupamaro operatives for having kidnapped and executed suspected CIA agent Dan Mitrione, and for widespread Marighella-esque looting of banks, writing “the Tupamaros not only failed to accomplish a political objective, but also suffered a political reversal in their newly acquired role of assassins—the image they acquired through hostile mass media... The Tupamaros are perilously close to resembling a political Mafia. In demanding large sums of money in ransom for political hostages they have sometimes appeared to be self-serving.” Guillén, Abraham and Donald C. Hodges (trans.). Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillén. New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc. 1973, pp. 270-271.

53 Guillén notes “The countryside, however, can subsist for a longer period of time without manufactured goods from the cities. Consequently, not even in those countries with a high percentage of urban population is an effective strategy possible without including the countryside. Cooperation between the laborer and the peasant is essential to the revolution.” Ibid., p. 239.

54 Ibid., pp. 255-257.

55 Al-Muqrin writes, “The types of guerrilla war are to be based on the type of terrain on which the operations are conducted. For example, I cannot conduct mountain warfare in the Najd. However, there are some countries that have a variety of terrain features (mountains, woods and forests, swamps, cities) and it is then possible in such countries to conduct operations in the first-mentioned sector (mountains), which is what happened, in fact, in several countries, including Chechnya, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. If, on the other hand, in a specific country you do not have any appropriate areas for operations, such as mountains or forests, you must make do with urban forces.” Al-Muqrin, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and Norman Cigar (trans.). Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: A Practical Course for Guerrilla War. Washington DC: Potomac Books. 2004, p. 126.

56 Ibid., p. 126.
period sufficient to carry out an exfiltration of forces,” and in an area “where there is ample
cover and concealment,” are considered optimal.\textsuperscript{57}

Although al-Muqrin, explicitly influenced by Clausewitz and Mao, advises a three-phase
guerrilla war proceeding from rural strongholds,\textsuperscript{58} he suggests rural operations occur alongsideurban attacks in multi-front guerrilla war. For urban operations, al-Muqrin proposes a Marighella
model of decentralized urban warfare and terrorism, targeting regime forces, in addition to
unarmed civilians/foreign elements, including Jews, Christians, Westerners and apostates—albeit
employing strict unit discipline.\textsuperscript{59} Unlike Guillén, however, al-Muqrin does not consider the
adverse strategic consequences of civilian-centric terrorism.

With the phenomenon of urbanization increasing through the middle of the twentieth
century, there is thus a notable shift in guerrilla doctrine from Maoist, rural insurgent theory,
toward traditional Marxist-Leninist dogma emphasizing the revolutionary potential of the
industrial proletariat. And in at least one example of urban guerrilla doctrine, this shift in
operational environment entails an expansion of target set to include civilian production and
unarmed imperialist agents. AQAP theorist al-Muqrin manages to synthesize Maoist and urban
guerrilla theory, presenting a multi-front model of asymmetric warfare, dependent only on the
material constraints of a given conflict. Yet how must guerrilla units organize themselves in each
theatre, and what effect may this organization have on logistical capacity and tactics?

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., pp. 114-115.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., pp. 94 – 100.
\textsuperscript{59} Al-Muqrin, when discussing urban guerrilla objectives, ranks human targets according to religion (or assumed lack
thereof) and nationality: (1) Jews (further subdivided according to nationality, with Israelis, Americans, Britons, and
other Occidentals prioritized); (2) Christians (similarly subdivided according to nationality, with Americans, Britons,
Spaniards, and Australians prioritized); and (3) apostates (subdivided between “those who are close to the Jewish and
Christian governments…such as Hosni Mubarak and the rulers of the Arabian Peninsula and their advisers,” innovators
and secularists “who spread corruption among the believers,” and spies and intelligence agents “who are the armor
II.2. Organizational Structure

Rural Armies and Urban Networks

The guerrilla army Mao sought to create was a sophisticated hierarchical enterprise, dependent on broad popular support. Although explicitly distinguishing more decentralized guerrilla units from pyramidal conventional forces, Mao's advisement for the organization of guerrilla forces in rural terrain proceeds from nine-man units, to ~1,000 man regiments under a "centralized strategic command [charged with] the general management of all guerrilla units, their coordination within warzones, and the general policy regarding guerrilla base areas." This hierarchical command structure enabled Mao's forces to organize a three-phase guerrilla war. A well delineated chain of command maintained unit cohesion, and enforced proper troop conduct necessary for popular support (Appendix I). Throughout, Mao stresses the importance of rugged, concealing terrain, necessary to effectively abscond such noticeable physical and organizational assets, consisting of thousands of men and light weapons. It is thus apparent, in Maoist guerrilla theory, that a principal advantage of rough terrain is the opportunity to build and field large, hierarchical, and logistically capable guerrilla military units. No admonishment is given to urban organization.

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60 Ibid., p. 45-48, Appendix I.
61 Ibid., p. 52.
62 Ibid., pp. 75-80; p. 114.
63 Ibid., pp. 20-22.
64 On guerrilla discipline and interactions with local populations, Mao remarks "There is also a unity of spirit that should exist between troops and local inhabitants. The Eight Route Army put into practice a code known as "The Three Rules and the Eight Remarks," listed here: Rules: (1) All actions are subject to command. (2) Do not steal from the people. (3) Be neither selfish nor unjust. Remarks: (1) Replace the door when you leave the house. (2) Roll up the bedding on which you have slept. (3) Be courteous. (4) Be honest in your transactions. (5) Return what you borrow. (6) Replace what you break. (7) Do not bathe in the presence of women. (8) Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest. Ibid., p. 92.
65 On optimal operational environment, Mao comments "Guerrilla bases may be classified according to their location as: first, mountain bases; second, plains bases; and, last, river, lake, and bay bases. The advantages of bases in mountainous areas are evident...these bases are strongly protected." Units proceed as follows: squad (9-11 men), company (12 x 11-man squad), battalion (4 x company), and regiment (3 x battalion). Ibid., p. 110.
Guevara similarly stresses the salience of concealing rural terrain and popular support vis-à-vis optimal organizational structure and dependent logistical capacity. Although not nearly as explicit as Mao regarding rural insurgent force structure, Guevara suggests a rural guerrilla unit consist of ~25 men, armed with small arms (e.g. “Browning, Belgian FAL, and M-14 automatic rifles”) and light anti-tank weapons. The rural insurgent structure is thus more akin to a conventional army unit than, as we shall discover, their urban guerrilla comrades.

When considering “unfavorable” suburban/urban guerrilla operations, Guevara advises a force of “at most four to five men,” citing the security challenges of urban operations in government-controlled city centers. Smaller urban guerrilla units are to be armed with at most “weapons for self-defense...[and] no more than one carbine, with pistols for the other members.” This prescribed force reduction at the unit level -and apparent logistical capacity considering the corresponding reduction in allocated weaponry- is at once intuitive, and striking.

Yet despite a polar focus with regard to advised operational environment, fellow revolutionary Guillén suggests a similar allocation of small, mobile four-member cells “that live separately and fight together” for clandestine urban operations. As Guevara, Guillén cites the operational hazards of government-held cities as motive for a smaller force allocation. With

66 On the preference of rural to urban theatres, Guevara writes “It ought to be noted by those who maintain dogmatically that the struggle of the masses is centered in city movements, entirely forgetting the immense participation of the country people in the life of all the underdeveloped parts of America. Of course, the struggles of the city masses of organized workers should not be underrated; but their real possibilities of engaging in armed struggle must be carefully analyzed where the guarantees which customarily adorn our constitutions are suspended or ignored. In these conditions the illegal workers' movements face enormous dangers. They must function secretly without arms. The situation in the open country is not so difficult. There, in places beyond the reach of the repressive forces, the inhabitants can be supported by the armed guerrillas. Guevara, Che. Guerilla Warfare. 1969, chpt. 1.
67 Ibid., chpt. 4.
68 Explaining the precipitous reduction in force requirements when moving from rural to urban environments, Guevara notes: “…The suburban guerrilla must be considered as situated in exceptionally unfavorable ground, where the vigilance of the enemy will be much greater and the possibilities of reprisals as well as of betrayal are increased enormously. Another aggravating circumstance is that the suburban guerrilla band cannot depart far from the places where it is going to operate…and the need to remain totally hidden during the daytime.” Ibid., chpt. 6.
69 Ibid.
regard to organizational structure, both Guevara and Guillén imply an inter and intra-unit hierarchy across horizontally organized urban cells. In both manuals, although four-man cells are not to communicate horizontally, they are to maintain tight security - ensured by a cell captain- and operational discipline - executing attacks only as ordered by division commanders located outside the immediate area of operations. Marighella is an outlier; as he advises the urban guerrilla to strike often and with no outside direction, engineering state collapse through manufactured anarchy, only intra-cell hierarchy is considered.

Al-Muqrin, expectedly considering his synthesis of rural and urban modes of guerrilla organization, proposes a force structure explicitly modeled after a hierarchical Maoist guerrilla army for rural theatres, and a cell network resembling the Guevara-Guillén model of urban insurgency for city work (Appendix I). For mountain forces, al-Muqrin suggests nine to twelve-man squads, moving to three-squad platoons of twenty-seven to thirty-six men; three-platoon companies of 100 – 150 men; four-company battalions of 300 – 450 men; four-battalion brigades of 1,200 – 1,800 men; and four-brigade divisions of 4,800 – 7,200 men. Each squad receives

71 Regarding cell discipline, Guevara writes “It is fundamental to recognize that a suburban guerrilla band can never spring up of its own accord. It will be born only after certain conditions necessary for its survival have been created. Therefore, the suburban guerrilla will always be under the direct orders of chiefs located in another zone. The function of this guerrilla band will not be to carry out independent actions but to coordinate its activities with overall strategic plans in such a way as to support the action of larger groups situated in another area, contributing specifically to the success of a fixed tactical objective, without the operational freedom of guerrilla bands of the other types. For example, a suburban band will not be able to choose among the operations of destroying telephone lines, moving to make attacks in another locality, and surprising a patrol of soldiers on a distant road; it will do exactly what it is told... If there is more than one guerrilla band, they will all be under a single chief who will give orders as to the necessary tasks through contacts of proven trustworthiness who live openly as ordinary citizens.” Guillén is less explicit, yet nonetheless emphasizes the importance of cell-level discipline, especially necessary for appropriate relations with the population. Through this advisement on intra-cell discipline, and open critique of Marighella’s decentralized model of urban guerrilla warfare, Guillén implies a degree of hierarchy within units, and across the urban network. On Che’s admonishments, see Guevara, Ernesto. Guerrilla Warfare. 1969, chpt. 6. For Guillén, see Guillén, Abraham and Donald C. Hodges (trans.). Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillén. New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc. 1973, pp. 240-241.


orders from a unit captain and deputy, who responds to an area commander. Squad armament is prodigious; a comprehensive assortment of weaponry is allocated to engage military units.\textsuperscript{74} Moving to urban operational environments, al-Muqrin advises urban units to exceed “not more than four,” organized hierarchically, in a “pyramid force structure,” or in a horizontal chain, “like a set of worry beads.”\textsuperscript{75} Teams are to consist of (1) command, (2) intelligence collection, (3) logistics, and (4) assault elements.\textsuperscript{76} Each cell element is to be aggressively compartmentalized.\textsuperscript{77} Only the organization’s “best personnel in terms of education, sophistication, and training,” warns al-Muqrin, are to be selected for operations in cities “full of eyes” —a nod to the operational hazards of government-controlled cities.\textsuperscript{78} Equipment is not to exceed anything that cannot be safely hidden in a rented apartment or dead drop.\textsuperscript{79}

This structural dichotomy, prescribed as dictated by operational environment, is reinforced at its doctrinal extremes (Mao [rural-centric] vs. Guillén [urban-centric]); observed as a fluid spectrum with Guevara’s description of preferred rural and urban force allocations; and fully refined with al-Muqrin’s detailed itemization of required rural army equipment and optimal urban-guerrilla network structure. As apparent, such drastically dissimilar organizational structures and equipment allocations —moving from heavily armed rural armies, to minimal

\textsuperscript{74} Al-Muqrin lists squad level armament as follows: 9 x Kalashnikov (2,700 rounds 7.62 x 39); 1 x designated marksman rifle (150 rounds 7.62 x 54); 1 x PKM general purpose machine gun (1,000 rounds 7.62 x 54); 1 x rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG) (10 x rocket); 2 x pistols (N/A). Additional equipment (e.g. grenades, binoculars, GPS, shovels, cellphones, etc.) is also itemized. Ibid., pp. 112 – 114.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., pp. 120 – 121.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} On team compartmentalization, al-Muqrin notes: “There is an error that most jihadi groups have fallen into, namely that an individual in the organization knows everything about the organization, including its secret affairs…Instead, the one who collects the intelligence should not know what the target is by collecting the intelligence about an individual or installation. Nor should he know how the operation is to be carried out, nor the means to be used in the operation or how they are to be brought to the operation’s location. Likewise, the logistician should not know why certain weapons were collected or why certain explosives are being prepared.” Ibid., p. 120.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., pp. 122 – 125.
equipped urban-cell networks- are likely to affect the logistical capacity and dependent tactics of units fighting in different theatres.

II.3. Logistical Capacity, Dependent Tactics, and Military Classification

Guerrilla or Terrorist?

As alluded in the foregoing analysis, Mao organized guerrilla war proceeding in three phases. A more comprehensive overview of each, applying a spectrum of insurgent participation presented previously, may be useful. The first phase is devoted to the “organization, consolidation, and preservation”\(^80\) of local (-2) guerrilla bases in terrain outside government control, where volunteers are trained, indoctrinated, and dispatched to enlist the support of the surrounding countryside, weaving a protective belt of (-1) “sympathizers willing to supply food, recruits and information.”\(^81\) The Phase I guerrilla’s purpose is to survive, and grow stronger, while avoiding infiltration and direct attack from a still strong state.\(^82\)

The second phase is devoted to direct-action operations, increasing in tempo and scope as state power deteriorates. Descending (-2) local mountain units conduct sabotage, assassination, and terrorist attacks against “spies,” “reactionaries,” and “enemies of the revolution,” ambushing weak columns and vulnerable police outposts for the procurement of arms, ammunition, medical supplies, and communications equipment.\(^83\) As the (-2) mountain guerrilla becomes better equipped and logistically capable, an increasing percentage of units begin the transformation to a

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81 Ibid.
82 As will be demonstrated, the question of state power, reasonably proxied by terrain, is central to guerrilla capacity to organize.
83 Ibid.
(-3) conventional establishment capable of engaging the enemy near and far, entering Phase III: Destruction of the Enemy (Conventional War).\(^8^4\)

Thus doctrinally—as well as in practice—the availability of *sanctuary*, afforded by rough terrain outside state control, allowed Mao’s guerrillas to gradually grow in numbers and capacity. Communist forces progressed from small, local (-2) sabotage and terrorist units, to a mobile, logistically capable, hierarchical (-3) military-centric force, equipped with a full range of weapons and equipment. Mao’s inclusion of non-military targets (e.g. spies, reactionaries, and enemies of the revolution) at an earlier stage of organizational development (Phase II), is noteworthy; it suggests, considering the military-centric focus of Phase III, an accompanying shift in primary target set, occurring alongside organizational evolution.

Both Guevara and al-Muqrin imply an almost identical degree of logistical capacity afforded to (-3) mountain forces, i.e. the capacity to maneuver, engage, and destroy large, well-armed state-military units. The effect of fielding a more capable, hierarchically organized mountain force on prescribed guerrilla tactics, target set, and resulting military classification, is apparent. Guevara advises a strategy of attrition, gradually wearing down government military forces through hit-and-run tactics, including partial encirclement, and day/night raids.\(^8^5\) Al-

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\(^8^4\) Ibid.

\(^8^5\) Guevara refers to a tactic, for example, called “the minuet,” as well as other possible engagement tactics:

“Characteristic of this war of mobility is the so-called minuet, named from the analogy with the dance: the guerrilla bands encircle an enemy position, an advancing column, for example; they encircle it completely from the four points of the compass, with five or six men in each place, far enough away to avoid being encircled themselves; the fight is started at any one of the points, and the army moves toward it; the guerrilla band then retreats, always maintaining visual contact, and initiates its attack from another point. The army will repeat its action and the guerrilla band, the same. Thus, successively, it is possible to keep an enemy column immobilized, forcing it to expend large quantities of ammunition and weakening the morale of its troops without incurring great dangers....This same tactic can be applied at nighttime, closing in more and showing greater aggressiveness, because in these conditions counter-encirclement is much more difficult. Movement by night is another important characteristic of the guerrilla band, enabling it to advance into position for an attack and, where the danger of betrayal exists, to mobilize in new territory. The numerical inferiority of the guerrilla makes it necessary that attacks always be carried out by surprise; this great advantage is what permits the guerrilla fighter to inflict losses on the enemy without suffering losses.” Guevara, Ernesto. *Guerrilla Warfare*. 1969, chpt. 4.
Muqrin notes (-3) Phase III forces will “be completely familiar with conventional war,” 86 and may begin “attacking smaller cities...[for] as the enemy sees the fall of cities into the mujahidin’s hands, [his] morale will collapse.” 87 Logistically complex attacks -the raid and ambush- are explained in detail. 88 The Guevara – al-Muqrin model of mountain/rural warfare is invariably military centric, with no mention of attacks against civilians during Phase III operations.

If numerous, well-equipped, hierarchically organized, (-3) mountain forces, operating in rough, concealing terrain, are tasked with the logistically challenging task of destroying a superior military force, how may small, hermetic, lightly armed urban cells operate? Guevara, Marighella, and Guillén suggest a tellingly similar mode of operation. For Marighella, smaller urban units may only defeat government forces through an indiscriminate sabotage and terror campaign. 89 The Guevara – Guillén model of urban guerrilla warfare places a far greater emphasis on unit discipline, eschewing politically counter-productive acts of terrorism; however, advised tactics emphasize sabotage, and a campaign of sporadic attacks against state forces. 90

86 On familiarity with conventional war, al-Muqrin writes: “During the preceding phase, the mujahidin were able to create conventional-like forces that will be transformed gradually into conventional forces with modern units. By “modern” I mean that they will be completely familiar with conventional war and with an army’s order of battle and how it operates in the field. [These units] will not be used as is the case with those military regimes and military tribunals, and ape the infidel West in ways that everyone knows. However, the mujahidin must also retain guerrilla fighters.” Al-Muqrin, ‘Abd al-`Aziz and Norman Cigar (trans.). Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: A Practical Course for Guerrilla War. Washington DC: Potomac Books. 2004, p. 101.

87 Al-Muqrin’s “city-hopping” strategy follows the strategy of Afghan mujahidin: “After Khost fell, and then Gardez, into the mujahidin’s hands, and then one city after the other followed, culminating in the fall of Kabul.” Ibid.

88 The ambush formation al-Muqrin suggests bears a striking resemblance to Guevara’s “minuet.” “The ambush force splits into four units, each one of which takes a position along four specified geographic directions, where they hunker down to await the enemy. When the enemy comes upon one of these units, the latter proceeds to open fire, and if attacked, withdraws while another unit hits the enemy with fire. The four units alternate with attacks and withdrawals until the enemy’s morale collapses and the latter becomes fixed in one spot, making him easy prey in the end for the ambush. The time of day is not important in carrying out this mission, as it could be either at night, or during the daytime, but the distances should be reduced if this maneuver is carried out at night. The ambush force is split into two, in the shape of an L, and both detachments should be prepared to attack if the enemy falls into the ambush. In this type of ambush, it is especially important to de-conflict fires.” Ibid., p. 118.


90 Regarding urban tactics and organization, Guevara advises: “The essential qualities of the guerrilla fighter in this situation are discipline (perhaps in the highest degree of all) and discretion. He cannot count on more than two or three friendly houses that will provide food; it is almost certain that an encirclement in these conditions will be equivalent to
Although only under the most desperate of circumstances do Guevara and Guillén advise terrorism, an essential element of terrorism is explicitly apparent: The compensation for an imposed numerical inferiority, by maximizing the *psychological* impact of an operation.

Al-Muqrin synthesizes the operational discipline of Guevara and Guillén, with the savagery of Marighella. As discussed, al-Muqrin considers small, compartmentalized cells to be optimal modes of urban operation. Yet throughout, terrorism is considered a *fundamental* tool of the urban guerrilla. The target of the urban guerrilla, according to al-Muqrin, is considered *diplomatic-military*, [with] “a political meaning connected to the nature of the ideological struggle; that is, it is considered the way to send messages to multiple audiences.”

Al-Muqrin then presents a discussion on optimal human targets –invariably unarmed- and assassination, hostage taking, and urban combat techniques using light-weapons and explosives.

A pattern is evident. Although al-Muqrin considers urban units, as Guevara and Guillén, logistically capable of undertaking relatively complex assassination, hostage taking, and sabotage operations, at no point does urban unit complexity of operations and organization death. Weapons, furthermore, will not be of the same kind as those of the other groups. They will be for personal defense, of the type that do not hinder a rapid flight or betray a secure hiding place. As their armament the band ought to have not more than one carbine or one sawed-off shotgun, or perhaps two, with pistols for the other members. They will concentrate their action on prescribed sabotage and never carry out armed attacks, except by surprising one or two members or agents of the enemy troops.” On terrorism, Guevara warns: “Acts of sabotage are very important. It is necessary to distinguish clearly between sabotage, a revolutionary and highly effective method of warfare, and terrorism, a measure that is generally ineffective and indiscriminate in its results, since it often makes victims of innocent people and destroys a large number of lives that would be valuable to the revolution. Terrorism should be considered a valuable tactic when it is used to put to death some noted leader of the oppressing forces well known for his cruelty, his efficiency in repression, or other quality that makes his elimination useful. But the killing of persons of small importance is never advisable, since it brings on an increase of reprisals, including deaths. There is one point very much in controversy in opinions about terrorism. Many consider that its use, by provoking police oppression, hinders all more or less legal or semi-clandestine contact with the masses and makes impossible unification for actions that will be necessary at a critical moment. This is correct; but it also happens that in a civil war the repression by the governmental power in certain towns is already so great that, in fact, every type of legal action is suppressed already, and any action of the masses that is not supported by arms is impossible. It is therefore necessary to be circumspect in adopting methods of this type and to consider the consequences that they may bring for the revolution.” Guevara, Ernesto. *Guerrilla Warfare*. 1969, chpt. 4.


92 For human targeting, see Ibid., p. 130-131. On assassination and hostage taking, see Ibid., pp. 141- 164. On urban operations and tactics, see pp. 165 – 175.
approach that of rural forces. The target set is likewise restricted—as in each examined model of urban guerrilla warfare—to “soft” targets, e.g. isolated police and state forces, and in the case of Marighella and al-Muqrin, unarmed civilians. Last, the urban guerrilla is not only predisposed to terrorist operations because of a limited logistical capacity relative to more organizationally sophisticated rural units, but due to the availability of clustered human targets and physical assets ideal for psychologically traumatizing mass causality terrorist attacks. Urban units are thus optimized for environment, as well as target set.93

Throughout, in contrast to the military-centric rural guerrilla afforded sanctuary, the urban guerrilla is forced to value security over logistical and operational efficiency—the maximum advised cell size does not exceed half that of the smallest rural unit, compartmentalization limiting the efficient transmission of information is required, and advisable operations are accordingly restricted. The military-centric rural guerrilla thus more appropriately fits the military classification of guerrilla-insurgent, while the military/civilian-centric urban guerrilla most closely resembles the guerrilla-terrorist.94

II.4. Battlefield Lessons

*Network Structure and Multi-Front Insurgency*

With a review of influential guerrilla doctrine complete, we may now consider battlefield lessons on network structure and multi-front insurgency. In review, the essential material condition of

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93 That target-rich urban centers—especially in developing nations—are more prone to terrorist attacks because of the likelihood of greater economic, psychological, and destructive impact, and the “theatre” afforded by high-visibility cities, is considered by London School of Economics Professor of Development Studies Jo Beall. Beall, Jo. “Cities, Terrorism and Urban Wars of the 21st Century.” *DESTIN.* 2007.

94 Although the military classification of guerrilla-terrorist is assigned, it should be emphasized that the primary determinant of this classification is *organizational*—that is, small, civilian-centric cells, with minimal connection to the surrounding population.
operational environment is consistently emphasized as the *fundamental* determinant of (1) organizational/network structure, which in turn determines (2) logistical capacity,\(^{95}\) and (3) feasible tactics.\(^{96}\) Organizational structure and feasible tactics, subsequently, influence COIN military classifications of guerrilla or terrorist, with implications for responsive strategy.

The dynamic illustrating organizational evolution and dependent tactical innovation as a function of environment is therefore clear. What is also apparent is a shift from the urban-rural dichotomy, previously established by rural-centric Maoist guerrilla doctrine and social theory,\(^{97}\) to multi-front insurgency conducted by organizationally distinct guerrilla units. This shift toward multi-front insurgency, across both rural and urban operational environments, is in turn accompanied by an evolution in advised guerrilla organization from Mao’s centralized army, to al-Muqrin’s vision of an organizational hybrid between hierarchies and networks fit to front and campaign. Guerrilla doctrine, as reviewed, hence seems to represent a rich, parallel discussion, developed and refined in battle over decades, with a captivating emphasis on *where guerrillas fight, and what that means for how they do it.*

Discussion

To consider the effects of government and counter-insurgent control more closely, as determined by the accessibility of contested geophysical and human terrain, the organizational and operational sophistication of guerrilla organizations may be said to wax and wane with the ebb and flow of state power imposing security constraints on urban and/or rural guerrilla units. As

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\(^{95}\) Specifically, extensive, heavily armed cadre, with relatively open lines of communication, vs. small, lightly armed, compartmentalized cells.

\(^{96}\) In particular, military vs. civilian-centric.

\(^{97}\) The shift of guerrilla theoreticians from an ideologically-imposed urban-rural dichotomy is a doctrinal phenomenon following an almost identical pattern to COIN and civil war scholarship moving from rural, to increasingly urban-centric theories of insurgency. The difference is, however, that this doctrinal shift occurred before Western academics caught on, and with the best robustness checks available: live-fire military operations.
cities tend to be centers of incumbent power, guerrilla networks are likely to take an evolutionary trajectory dissimilar to more militarized units operating in the rural periphery. In urban operational environments, organization is advisably limited to fighting cells employing a Marighella-model of randomized violence against state power and legitimacy to force government collapse and withdrawal. This may be a reasonable strategy against a foreign occupier lacking intelligence, will, and popular support.  

However, an incumbent with many men, short supply lines, cash, spies, and nowhere to run, may be more capable -and willing- to crush opponent organization and subversion.

This may in part explain why sustained insurgency in urban centers of incumbent control is so rare, and why rural insurgency, at the periphery of state control, has been the dominant mode of guerrilla war in the post-World War II era. What has been the 20th century standard of rural-centric guerrilla war production may not, however, hold. The global trends of increasing urbanization and dissolution of intra and inter-state power may contribute to the now (1) essential strategic and operational salience of target rich, high-visibility cities, today home to a majority of the world’s population; the (2) renewed revolutionary potential of urban proletariat trapped in mega-city slums across the economic and population engines of the Global South; and (3) an observed decline in politically motivated economies of non-state actor violence.  

98 Examples of successful urban insurgency provided by Hoffman (1998), i.e. the FLN in Algeria, EOKA in Cyprus, and the Irgun in Palestine, are, for example, all against an over-extended foreign occupier. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Colombia University Press, 1998, ch. 1,2.

99 To repeat, that target-rich urban centers -especially in developing nations- are more prone to terrorist attacks because of the likelihood of greater economic, psychological, and destructive impact, and the “theatre” afforded by high-visibility cities, is considered by London School of Economics Professor of Development Studies Jo Beall. Beall, Jo. “Cities, Terrorism and Urban Wars of the 21st Century.” 9(2). DESTIN, 2007.


101 The incidence of politically motivated non-state actor violence is today declining, and shifting toward ethnic, sectarian, and resource/rent-motivated warfare. Post-defense discussion with Assistant Professor of Political Science Fotini Christia at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on September 7, 2011.
What does the above discussion, considering the effects of current global trends, mean for the validity and relevance of guerrilla doctrine, both today and tomorrow? The following pages will attempt a more systematic evaluation of presented lessons on operational environment, organizational structure, logistical capacity, and dependent tactics. Although it seems surveyed guerrilla doctrine is representative of rural-centric asymmetric warfare in the post-World War II era, global trends like (1) increasing urbanization, and (2) dissolution of state power, must also be considered to maintain model predictive purchase.

III. Model: Mapping Guerrilla Doctrine

This section will derive a model from the foregoing review of guerrilla doctrine. The derived model will attempt to further clarify the relationship between terrain, structure, capacity, tactics, and the military classification of violent non-state actors. Where appropriate, a quantitative demonstration of model principles will be provided. A complementary model, directly illustrating the effects of state capacity rather than by proxy through terrain, will also be proposed largely independent of reviewed doctrine. Last, tentative hypotheses derived from each model are in turn presented.

III.1. Modeling Front and Organization

Operational Environment and Organization

Working from the premise that rational organizers will attempt to assemble the most logistically efficient and operationally capable army possible given the material and security constraints of a given operational environment, this model suggests groups afforded sanctuary, outside government control, will develop highly centralized, military-centric, guerrilla-insurgent armies. Once organizationally mature (Phase II-III), armies operating from rural sanctuary are considered capable of capturing territory, and affecting a three-phase Maoist guerrilla war. This model of rural guerrilla organization is invariably advised by guerrilla theoreticians fighting in Asia, the Near East, and Latin America. It is intuitively considered the optimal mode of non-state actor war production for its ability to (1) capture and control territory, and (2) eventually usurp incumbent authority, providing security, basic services, and other public goods.
As also expounded across the selection of reviewed guerrilla doctrine, groups operating in hazardous urban environments that are not afforded sanctuary will be forced to value security over logistical efficiency and operational capacity. The urban operative will thus lack the rural guerrilla’s wider popular support and military capacity, opting to instead form more secure and closed, yet operationally limited civilian-centric cells employing descending organizational models of logistical efficiency as a function of security requirements. These urban guerrilla cells are, organizationally, closer to terrorist CCN. Model 3.1.1 presents a simplified visual.

Model 3.1.1: Modeling the Relationship Between Operational Environment and Hierarchy

Source: Author
The y-axis maps the level of organizational centralization, or hierarchy, moving from highly capable, pyramidal rural guerrilla-insurgent structures, to operationally limited, horizontally organized guerrilla-terrorist cells operating in urban centers. The x-axis maps the operational environment, or terrain, moving from highly secure cross-border and/or impassibly treacherous rural sanctuaries, to increasingly urban, government-controlled operational environments. The apparent third dimension does not measure a third variable. It is only used to demonstrate the breadth of feasible cell structures suitable for urban operations. Cells move from hierarchical, pyramidal cells (forefront left, fig. 1.1), to a series of modified structures, decreasing in inter-cell communicational connectivity (density $\rho$), as a function of increasing government control (proxied by operational environment/terrain, x-axis).

As organizationally mature groups move from predominantly rural sanctuaries to increasingly urban centers of government control, there is thus an observed decline in hierarchy and group membership. As such model 3.1.1 presents a series of cell structures representing various levels of intra-cell hierarchy and compartmentalization as dictated by security requirements. Each cell corner represents a cell member, or “node” ($N$) – not to exceed four, as advised by al-Muqrin and Guevara ($2 \leq N \leq 4$). Each horizontal line connecting cell nodes represents a compartmental communicational “link,” e.g. between cell command, intelligence, logistics, and/or assault elements. Cell “density” ($\rho$) may be formally modeled as the actual number of links between nodes ($L$), over the maximum number of links connecting nodes.  

$$\rho = \frac{L}{N(N-1)/2}$$

The hypergeometric distribution indicates that $N$ items taken two at a time without regard to order can be accomplished in $N!/[N - 2]!2!] = \frac{N(N - 1)}{2}$ ways. Enders, Walters, and Xuejuan Su. "Rational Terrorists and Optimal Network Structure." Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(1). 2007, p. 56.
Toward the low end of the security spectrum, forces are organized hierarchically, in a “pyramid force structure” (forefront right, fig. 1.1).\(^{103}\) This cell structure, \(\rho = 6/4(4-1)/2 = 1\), maintains a maximum communicational density, and hence logistical capacity.\(^{104}\) Although hierarchy and unfettered cell-compartment communication may permit greater unit cohesion and logistical efficiency, security concerns, i.e. infiltration, necessarily limits member knowledge of comrade identities and unit occupations as cells moved into more secure urban zones.\(^{105}\) As such, the remainder of feasible four-node cells in model 3.1.1 proceed in a series of modified star structures, of decreasing \(L\) and dependent \(\rho (5/6 & 2/3)\), until reaching a minimally linked chain structure \((\rho = \frac{1}{2})\), organized horizontally, “like a set of worry beads.”\(^{106}\)

In order to demonstrate that cell security is a function of density \(\rho\), the following exercise, proposed by Enders and Su (2007), is useful. Suppose the counter-terrorist infiltrates any node, with the probability of successful node compromise given by \(p_1\). If the network structure is unknown to the counter-terrorist, each node has an equal probability of being compromised.


\(^{104}\) This phenomenon, that of communicational density affecting logistical efficiency and operational capacity of illicit networks, has been examined previously in terrorism studies (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008). Evaluating the danger posed by centralized illicit networks, Sangiovanni and Jones demonstrate why a minimal communicational density, although improving cell security, actually inhibits capacity. Citing business management literature evaluating the efficiency of tele-meetings and numerous anecdotal accounts of illicit network organization, the authors discover that decentralized networking is so inefficient, causing confusion, misunderstanding, and incoordination, that, for example, in the case of the 9/11 conspirators, cell members had to abandon strictly imposed compartmentalization to meet face to face in Las Vegas, in a setting maximizing network density and hierarchy before hashing out final attack details. It is at this point -the necessary, if brief, organizational re-shuffling of otherwise hermetic cells- that networks are most vulnerable to infiltration and decapitation. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette and Calvert Jones. “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qa’ida May be Less Threatening Than Many Think.” *International Security*. Fall 2008.

\(^{105}\) As al-Muqrin tells: “There is an error that most jihadi have fallen into, namely that an individual in the organization knows everything about the organization, including its secret affairs. Or, one finds that one of the operational groups know everything from A to Z about a specific activity or a specific operation, since it collects intelligence, plans, executes, and commands.” ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and Norman Cigar (trans). *Al-Qaeda’s Doctrine for Insurgency: A Practical Course for Guerrilla War*. Washington DC: Potomac Books. 2004, pp. 120 – 121.

Thus if there are $N$ cell members, the probability that any node is compromised is $1/N$. Given $N$ and $L$, the expected number of compromised nodes ($C$) is:

$$C = \rho_1 (1 + 2L/N)$$

Given $L$ links among $N$ people, the average person is connected to $L/(N/2) = 2L/N$. Thus, the infiltration of any single node compromises $1 + 2L/N$ cell members with probability $\rho_1$. To express $C$ as a function of density $\rho$, the equation may be rewritten as:

$$C = \rho_1 [1+(N-1) \rho]$$

In figure 1.1, $\rho = 1$, and $N - 1 = 3$. Therefore, in the case of the most hierarchically organized, logistically efficient model of cell organization, the infiltration of any node is expected to compromise four people – or the entire cell – with probability $\rho_1$. In contrast, maximum-security, low-efficiency chain-structure cells, with $\rho = 1/2$, would only be expected to compromise 2.5 cell members with probability $\rho_1$ should any node be infiltrated $(2.5 = 1 + 3 \times 0.5)$. Al-Muqrin and Guevara’s suggestions limiting cell members – minimizing $N$- and advising compartmentalization – minimizing $L$- thus appear well founded.

### III.2. Additional Dependent Variables

**Logistical Capacity, Dependent Tactics, and Military Classification**

Having covered the relationship between operational environment (rural vs. urban), and organizational structure (pyramidal vs. modified cell), we may consider additional dependent variables. Given the forgoing discussion, it would thus seem that only those cells adopting a

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108 Ibid., p. 46-47.
high-security, low-efficiency structure, as determined by cell density $\rho$, are likely to survive in urban environments under a high-degree of government control.

It thus follows that high-security, logistically inefficient urban units, unable to effectively organize a numerous, well equipped force, will be more inclined to strike "soft" targets, e.g. unarmed civilians and isolated state-forces, and to compensate for numerical inferiority with operations inflicting maximum psychological impact at minimal cost, e.g. spectacular explosive attacks. As security is valued over logistical efficiency, hermetic urban cells will additionally lack strong popular support—an essential requirement for any successful insurgent organization. When combined with an organizational predilection selecting soft targets for spectacular attack, weak popular representation, reinforced through isolation, thus makes the urban guerrilla more representative of parasitic CCN than a mass insurgent movement.

The above presented model of rural and urban non-state actor organization predicts that (1) the independent variable of operational environment (rural vs. urban) will dictate the (2) dependent variable of organizational structure (army vs. cell). A change in organizational structure will subsequently affect the (3) logistical capacity (efficient vs. inefficient), and (4) corresponding tactics (phased guerrilla war vs. terrorism) and target set (military-centric vs. civilian-centric). Tactics and target set in turn determine (5) military classification (guerrilla-insurgent vs. guerrilla-terrorist).

Model 3.1.1 illustrates the effects of operational environment, determined largely by terrain. What results is an organizational hybrid between hierarchical rural units and decentralized urban networks operating side-by-side in a multi-front mode of insurgency. The following subsection will also consider operational environment, but with a direct focus on state capacity rather than the proxy of terrain. As guerrilla war is today shifting to multi-front
insurgency in the wake of increasing urbanization and declining state power, a model considering state capacity directly may more accurately draw 21\textsuperscript{st} century asymmetric conflict.

III.3. Complementary Model

Terrain or Government Control?

Guerrilla theoreticians discuss the independent variable of operational environment at length, with a particular emphasis on the security hazards of urban operations limiting cell size and dependent logistical capacity (Mao 1937; Guevara 1969; al-Muqrin ca. 2004 et al.). For al-Muqrin, government-controlled cities are “full of eyes” - spies, police and soldiers.\textsuperscript{109} Guevara warns the would-be urban guerrilla of enemy “vigilance,” and the “much greater” risk of betrayal.\textsuperscript{110} The message is clear: Operational environment, largely defined by terrain, matters only because it may reasonably proxy for government control and strength.

The term “operational environment” has therefore been considered synonymous with government control. But is it always true that terrain may reasonably proxy for government control,\textsuperscript{111} especially in today’s increasingly urban world?\textsuperscript{112} Terrain may positively correlate with degree of government control in a rural-centric society and past. Yet may not incumbent power flag -even collapse- in urban centers, as Baghdad, Karachi, and Rio de Janeiro, have similarly burned?

\textsuperscript{109} Al-Muqrin, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and Norman Cigar (trans.). \textit{Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: A Practical Course for Guerrilla War}. Washington DC: Potomac Books. 2004, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{110} “The vigilance of the enemy will be much greater, and the possibilities of reprisals as well as of betrayal are increased enormously.” Guevara, Ernesto. \textit{Guerrilla Warfare}. 1969, chpt. 6.

\textsuperscript{111} Government control may be approximated by variables including density of police and troops to inhabitants, level of infrastructure development and economic activity, and proximity to the capital, for example. Rough terrain may lack all. Intra-conflict micro-level data is needed to determine exactly to what extent.

\textsuperscript{112} For the first time in human history, more people live in urban rather than rural centers, with 70\% of the world’s population projected to live in cities by 2040. This is a monumental change, with implications for police work and COIN. For statistics on global urbanization, see “Human Population: Urbanization.” Population Reference Bureau. 2007. \url{http://www.prb.org/Educators/TeachersGuides/HumanPopulation/Urbanization.aspx}. 

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This thesis accordingly proposes a second model (model 3.3.1) complementing model 3.1.1. It should be emphasized, however, that unlike model 3.1.1, model 3.3.1 is only indirectly tied to reviewed guerrilla doctrine. Surveyed doctrine only suggests organization is a function of government control. As noted throughout the foregoing review of influential fighting manuals, the only explicitly stated determinant of guerrilla organization is operational environment, classified according to terrain. The following model is therefore based on impressions and insights garnered from reviewed doctrine only. To this end, model 3.3.1 maps the effects of government control—irrespective of terrain—on organizational structure and dependent logistical capacity. Model 3.3.1 may reflect a modern world of mass, urban slums, far from incumbent centers of power, more accurately than model 3.1.1.
The above model illustrates the relationship between government control and organizational structure. Moving upwards, the pyramidal and cell-based structures represent decreasing levels of hierarchy and membership, as a function of increasing government control.

In model 3.3.1, two intersecting planes represent government control. An insurgency is thus
much like an iceberg: A tip of local guerrilla cells, of decreasing inter-cell communicational connectivity (density $\rho$), as a function of increasing government control, is but all that is initially visible. As the sea of government control evaporates, larger, more capable units, are increasingly apparent.\(^{113}\)

The large pyramidal base (center bottom) corresponds to mobile, centralized, well equipped (-3) guerrilla organizations. These groups have many fighters and an extensive base of popular support - an organizational and logistical feat only possible at the model base of low government control.\(^{114}\) The smaller pyramidal structure above the first plane of average government control (center) represents the variety of (-2) local militias that proliferate as states fail.\(^{115}\) Finally, above the second plane of high government control, horizontally organized (-2) guerrilla cells, of varying $p$ values and corresponding logistical efficiency, emerge.\(^{116}\) When combined with a limited capacity for the incumbent - political or otherwise - to impose violence, an urban base of social mobilization may thus affect a successful guerrilla war.\(^{117}\) Urban fighters may then attack all facets of state power, rather than necessarily soft targets.

### III.4. Global Trends, Model Hypotheses, Discussion

Model 3.3.1 applies not only to rural peripheries, largely free from government control, but urban centers under decreasing government control – especially in the developing Global South.

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\(^{114}\) This appears to accurately reflect urban insurgencies in for example lawless Fallujah during the Third Gulf War.

\(^{115}\) The work of Lindsey and Petersen (2011) is here relevant: “Some individuals will adopt a role of direct and organized participation in a locally based, armed organization. In the absence of a weak state, individuals in this role often take the form of local militia members.” Sunni and Shi’a defensive militias organized in Baghdad and al-Anbar province during the Third Gulf War are examples. Lindsey, John, and Roger Petersen. “Varieties of Counterinsurgency: A Case Study of Iraq.” *Newport: Naval War College*, 2011.

\(^{116}\) Again, from Lindsey and Petersen (2011): “In the presence of a powerful state, such individuals may seem uninvolved citizens by day, while fighting at night. Even the most powerful states can have trouble identifying and neutralizing actors in this role.” Ibid.

home to weak states, and target-rich, exploding urban populations. Model 3.3.1 thus makes four hypotheses we may evaluate against a case study insurrection:

1. Guerrilla organizational hierarchy and corresponding logistical capacity will increase as government control fades in either rural peripheries or urban centers. Failed-state urban centers are thus as likely to see sophisticated organized violence on the scale of rural armies.

2. As a function of organizational structure, urban cells will likely use terrorist tactics at campaign onset. They may however graduate to more organizationally and operationally sophisticated military-centric guerrilla organizations as the state begins to fail.

3. Model 3.3.1 seems most applicable to the highly urbanized, largely weak-state Global South. There, terrain may not necessarily correlate with government control as marginalized urban slums expand beyond the reach of government security and services.

4. Should the global trends of increasing urbanization and dissolution of state power continue, the next wave of highly organized and logistically capable insurgency and social violence may expectedly occur in urban centers rather than the rural periphery.

Model 3.3.1 is useful; it more directly illustrates the effects of state capacity on guerrilla network structure, and is more readily applicable to examples of asymmetric conflict in a more urbanized world. It also challenges the relevance of guerrilla doctrine, mostly written in a more rural-centric past. However, model 3.1.1 is still valuable. From it we may derive the following four hypotheses:
1. Model 3.1.1, and hence most influential guerrilla doctrine, is still applicable to insurgency today. A prevailing condition of politically motivated urban insurgency has yet to arrive.

2. Model 3.1.1 will accurately reflect less urbanized states, like Afghanistan and Yemen,\textsuperscript{118} economically and demographically similar to those of rural-centric theoreticians.

3. Model 3.1.1 will accurately reflect guerrilla organization in states in which terrain may still reasonably proxy for government control, like the better policed cities of the Global North.\textsuperscript{119}

4. Model 3.1.1 thus seems to apply to states at opposite ends of the developmental spectrum. For weak, poor urban states, model 3.3.1 seems to apply.

Model 3.1.1 applies to the past and immediate present, as well as rural-centric and developed states. Model 3.3.1 applies to the immediate present, an urbanized future, and urban-centric developing states. Both are thus complementary. Each may be applied to different societies as prevailing socioeconomic conditions indicate. Lessons on expected centers of organization, network structure, tactics, and feasible target set, attend. The fig. 3.4.1 presents a concise review.

\textit{Fig. 3.4.1: Review of Cases Applicable to Model 3.1.1 and 3.3.1}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ccc}
\textbf{Mod. 3.1.1} & \textbf{Mod. 3.3.1} & \textbf{Mod. 3.1.1} \\
\textbf{Rural Weak State} & \textbf{Urban Weak State} & \textbf{Urban Strong State} \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textit{Source: Author}

\textsuperscript{118} As of 2010, the populations of Afghanistan and Yemen are 20 and 32\% urbanized, respectively. “Urbanization.” The Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2212.html

\textsuperscript{119} There, cities are relatively well policed and serviced, and the phenomenon of rural periphery to urban center migration is largely complete.
Discussion

Al-Muqrin’s vision of multi-front insurgency, occurring intra and inter-nationally as urbanization increases and state power wanes, seems more probable. Multi-front insurgency, or the simultaneous pursuit of urban and rural campaigns, was once only theoretically feasible – rarely have guerrilla groups graduated from the rural-urban dichotomy to pursue multi-front insurgency. Today, more sophisticated urban guerrilla operations and organization in less policed, bloated cities -occurring alongside rural drives- is increasingly a reality.

A hypothesized divide between the Global North and South is also clear. If trends of state power dissolution and increasing urbanization are expected to affect guerrilla organization and mobilization, it seems the Global South may experience a wave of violent non-state actor mobilization moving past cell-based structures, to well organized and logistically sophisticated urban units wreaking systemic havoc –even usurping state authority in particularly marginalized areas. The better policed, serviced, and population-stable Global North, in contrast, is unlikely to see more than logistically limited model 3.1.1 urban cells employing civilian-centric

120 Only 5% of militant organizations last more than a decade. Although the cited study refers to mostly “terrorist” organizations, many are confounded guerrilla organizations (e.g. Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers), while most others are structurally similar to an incipient insurgency. Byman, Daniel. “Meeting the Threat of Terrorism after 9/11.” Brookings. 2003. http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2003/0331terrorism_byman.aspx.

121 The gang-ruled slums of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and the bloody, narco-terrorist battlefields of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, are salient examples. However, it must be stated –and emphatically so- that the mass urban violence in both states is almost in its entirety apolitical, and thus dissimilar from politically motivated guerrilla organizations and insurgent movements examined in this thesis. This is, indeed, another 21st century trend, at least in Latin America: the advent, or “shift” in the political economy of violence, from political, to material/rent motivated subversive organization and attacks. Although an essential phenomenon worth observing and incorporating into future work, it is beyond the scope of this thesis, limited to politically motivated, guerrilla organizations. For a taxonomy of Mexican drug cartels, see Cook, W. Colleen. “Mexico’s Drug Cartels.” The Congressional Research Service. 2007. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf. For a comparison of Mexico’s drug cartels to a logistically sophisticated insurgency, see “Clinton says Mexico drug crime like an insurgency.” BBC. 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11234058.

terrorist tactics.\textsuperscript{123} The proceeding section will evaluate model 3.1.1 and corresponding hypotheses against a qualitative insurgency case study, with suggestions on future work evaluating the external validity of model 3.3.1. We may thereby assess the strategic and operational value of influential guerrilla doctrine considering operational environment, organizational structure, logistical capacity, and dependent tactics, as presented and modeled.

\textsuperscript{123} The most immediate examples are the Madrid 2004 and London 2005 terrorist attacks. Although the implicated parties were largely middle-class, operationally inexperienced "gangs," more akin to hermetic terrorist cells than logistically sophisticated guerrilla organizations, the men were tied to larger guerrilla organizations in North Africa, like the Moroccan Combatant Group, or GICM. On the amateurish logistics of the London attacks, see Silber, Mitchell D. "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat." \textit{NYPD}, 2006, p. 24. On organizational ties with more sophisticated guerrilla groups, see "In the Spotlight: Moroccan Combatant Group (GICM)." \textit{Center for Defense Information}. 2004.
IV. Case Study: Peru’s Sendero Luminoso

This section will present a qualitative case-study of Sendero Luminoso (SL). The independent variable of operational environment will be operationalized through ACD on dyadic conflict, providing in-country empirics on conflict location, onset, duration, and termination (Cederman, Min, Wimmer 2010). Additional resources, including topographical and satellite imagery, will be used to approximate government control through a rough terrain proxy.

The dependent variables of organizational structure, logistical capacity, tactics, and military classification, will be operationalized through a limited review of declassified Peruvian intelligence reports, SL’s captured central archives, and secondary-source literature identifying force structure and modes of attack during Phase I initial organization (ca. 1980), and Phase II - III rural and urban guerrilla operations (ca. 1982 – 1992). Windows of initial and peak SL organizational and operational sophistication are selected in order to demonstrate (1) the location of initial guerrilla organization, advised throughout reviewed doctrine to occur in rural sanctuary; and (2) the maximum extent of guerrilla organizational sophistication, reflecting only the material constraints of asymmetric battle, rather than deductive doctrine more useful for initial organization than sustained combat. This way, we may evaluate whether guerrilla doctrine accurately reflects the conditions of asymmetric warfare, or if it is best discarded once bullets, rather than words, begin to fly.

Notably, phased SL organizational evolution occurred as Peru shifted from a rural-centric, agrarian society, to an increasingly industrialized, urban-centric economy and population. In this way, we may (1) evaluate the strategic and operational value of both rural and urban-centric guerrilla doctrine; (2) determine to what extent doctrine matters with protracted combat; and (3) the potential effects of global trends like increasing urbanization and dissolution.
of state power, more broadly defined under the independent variable of operational environment, which may affect how guerrillas organize and fight.

IV.1. Origins: Doctrine, Organization, and Phased Guerrilla War

Origins

SL began as the "Fracción Roja (FR)," or "Red Faction," established in 1964 as the military wing of the Communist Party of Peru (CPP).

In 1970, at the direction of Abimael Guzmán, CPP officer and professor of philosophy at the San Cristóbal of Huamanga National University, FR would be rechristened as SL. The CPP SL splinter organization would subsequently begin an ideological shift from urban-centric Marxism-Leninism, to rural-centric Maoism.

Through an intensive program of psychological intimidation and force of character, Guzmán would from this point consolidate his near complete control over the well defined SL hierarchy - an extensive apparatus he would come to call his "killing machine."

By 1980, having relocated from San Cristóbal of Huamanga National University to the mountainous southern highlands surrounding the city of Ayacucho, SL would initiate a series of party conferences prior to insurgency onset. Party conferences would culminate with the Central Committee’s Second Plenary on March 17, 1980, and the establishment of the SL Military

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126 Party leaders and upper-echelon recruits were subjected to grueling "self-criticism" sessions at the direction of Guzmán – naturally the sole party member excluded from the process. In this way, Guzmán established a Stalinist-Maoist cult of personality in his mountain strongholds. Gorriti, Gustavo and Robin Kirk (trans.). *The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru*. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press. 1999, pp. 29-36.

127 Ibid., p. xi.

128 As regionally coded by ACD. "UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2009." 2009. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.
School on April 2, 1980.\textsuperscript{129} On May 17, 1980, the SL insurgency was launched when five hooded men assaulted and burned the voter registration office in the rural town of Chuschi near Ayacucho.\textsuperscript{130} By 1981, SL claimed to have over 500 armed rebels.\textsuperscript{131}

Doctrine, Organization and Phased Guerrilla War

Three items deserve emphasis: (1) SL's fundamental, comprehensive implementation of guerrilla doctrine; (2) initially centralized, logistically capable organizational structure; and (3) phased model of guerrilla war. First, from the beginning of SL organization, theory eclipsed praxis. The decision to move SL's core network deeper into Peru's mountainous rural periphery was as much based on the perceived merits of Maoist rural-centric guerrilla doctrine as the more material, near irresistible opportunity to strike at state power in urban Lima. Guzmán thus began the decisive Second Plenary not with a discussion on conventional military strategy, but with a literary and methodological reflection linking "[Maoist] theoretical knowledge to revolutionary practice."\textsuperscript{132} Following an intensive plenary study of Mao (1934),\textsuperscript{133} Irving (1850),\textsuperscript{134} and Shakespeare (ca. 1605),\textsuperscript{135} Professor Guzmán would, deductively, declare the strategic primacy of Maoist rural-centric revolt,\textsuperscript{136} with "conditions ripe for violent upheaval in the countryside."\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{129} The SL Military School, however, bore little resemblance to a traditional military training camp. Although SL did not neglect standard infantry courses, including raid, ambush, sabotage, and weapons training, direct action was consistently subordinated to political indoctrination. Ibid.


\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., p. 117. The 500 member figure Weinstein cites comes from captured SL document "Desplegar la Guerra de Guerrillas," May 1981, DINCOTE Sendero collection, Lima, Peru.


\textsuperscript{133} Tse Tung, Mao. "Three Short Poems." 1934.


\textsuperscript{136} The CPP had long venerated Mao, with a singular focus approaching deification. Guzmán only built upon and extended this ideological tradition. For reams of CPP propaganda venerating and eulogizing Mao following his death in 1976, see Bandera Roja, "¡Gloria eterna al Presidente Mao Tsetung gran maestro del proletariado internacional, de los pueblos oprimidos y
When criticized by party cadre for emphasizing rural mobilization at the expense of city operations, Guzmán, citing Mao, Lenin, and Ho Chi Minh, silenced his critics with the observation that “a particularity of the popular war in Peru is to make the countryside the principal theatre of actions and the cities a necessary complement,” and any confusion as to the revolutionary potential of Peru’s urban proletariat was due to “bourgeois propaganda,” focusing disproportionate media attention to city attacks, rather than sound “Marxist analysis.”\(^{138}\) With the decision to fight from the hills thus decided according to primarily doctrinal considerations, SL released its last public document prior to initiating hostilities. Titled “The Celebration of May First by the Revolutionary Proletariat,” this last party pamphlet, issued on May 1, 1980, outlined SL grand strategy, and emphasized the essential role of rural-centric doctrine:

“Marxist-Leninist-Mao Tse Tung thought is the ideology of the international proletariat and the general political line of the revolution is its application to our concrete reality...in all its glory the task of the coming revolution ... is to BEGIN ARMED STRUGGLE [emphasis in the original]. To begin the hard and prolonged Agrarian War that follows the path of surrounding the cities from the countryside, creating revolutionary bases of support [sic].”\(^{139}\)

According to captured internal directives, SL rural-centric ideology –ascendant even military training–\(^{140}\) would thus establish three essential concepts and corresponding tasks: (1) The “Popular War,” or the “Unitary Popular War,” where the countryside is the principal theatre of operations, and the city its complement; (2) the construction of “Revolutionary Armed
Forces,” or the “Popular Guerrilla Army,” called the “Popular Liberation Army,” and (3) strategy and tactics, defined as the art of directing military operations, and studying the laws that influence war in general, and military operations in particular.141

Second, the Second Plenary fundamentally affected SL organization, and consolidated Guzmán’s position as the anointed leader of the SL millenarian insurgency. It was during this meeting, on the eve of battle with Leviathan, that Guzmán formally advanced SL’s strategy for guerrilla war with an urgency and intensity apropos the irrevocable decision to contest state power by force of arms. The firm agenda and path to victory delineated throughout the Second Plenary are evidence of Guzmán’s centralized control over the hierarchically organized SL guerrilla network, himself to head every major committee in the organization, including the Central, Political, Permanent, Presidential, and Military Commissions.142

Announcing at the Second Plenary that SL was logistically “able to take on the Beginning of the Armed Struggle (BAS),” party chiefs were to determine “how the masses [would] be incorporated, mobilized, politicized, organized, and provided with weapons.”143 Having identified the initial extent of SL centralization and corresponding logistical capacity, we arrive at a third point: SL’s phased model of Maoist guerrilla warfare. Identifying when SL shifted from Phase I to Phase II-III operations is important; doing so will lend perspective as to the extent and sophistication of SL organization and operations at a time of strategic parity with state forces. We may thus observe the longitudinal effects of the independent variable of operational

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142 Ibid., pp. 82-83. As for the Second Plenary, it was dedicated to the discussion of the (1) actual situation of the party and its union to mass struggle; (2) development by actions of the militarization of the party; (3) readjustment of the party to focus on military matters; (4) action plan for the BAS (Beginning of the Armed Struggle); (5) rectification campaign; and (6) agreements. The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press. 1999, p. 23.
143 Ibid., p. 24.
environment, defined by a given conflict’s physical, human, and institutional terrain, and identifiable systemic trends like increasing urbanization.

A series of captured SL directives and declassified military and civilian intelligence reports delineate the structured shift from Phase I to Phase II-III guerrilla operations. First, SL documents deductively establish four principal characteristics of the Peruvian asymmetric battlefield, from which the strategic outline for staged revolt would be derived. They are:

1. Peru is a semi-feudal state and semi-colonial, ruled by “Bureaucratic Capitalism.” This oppressive system crushes 50% of the masses, so there is reason for revolt.

2. The enemy is tactically strong but strategically weak.

3. The Popular Guerrilla Army is tactically weak but strategically strong.

4. The CPP pursues a just war.144

From points one through three, SL moves to argue that the Popular Guerrilla Army “...cannot grow quickly nor soon defeat the Peruvian armed forces and national police. These are the peculiarities that determine the prolonged character of the Peruvian revolution,” which is to unfold in “three stages.” SL’s phased model of warfare, bearing a striking similarity to reviewed Maoist doctrine, proceeds as:

1. The phase of the “Strategic Offensive” of the “Ordered [i.e. State] Forces” and the “Strategic Defensive of SL.” This war is specified as “Guerrilla War.”

2. The phase of strategic consolidation and preparation for the SL counter-offensive, which will result in "Strategic Parity." This war is specified as "The War of Movement."

3. The stage of the "Strategic Offensive of SL," and the "Strategic Retreat" of state forces. This war is specified as "The War of Positions."  

The specific timeline for SL's staged campaign is documented by a National Intelligence Service (NIS) report delivered in 1984 to President Fernando Belaúnde Terry and his Chief of Staff. Described as "waves" rather than phases, the SL insurgency was cited to have initiated the phases of Guerrilla Warfare (I), Strategic Parity (II), and Strategic Offensive (III) on March 17, 1980, October 20, 1982, and March 15, 1984, respectively. We may thus identify SL Phase II-III to have began between 1982–1984, with Phase I to have occurred from 1980, immediately following the Second Plenary, to 1982, immediately prior to Phase II-III. With this introduction emphasizing the strategic primacy of rural-centric guerrilla doctrine vis-à-vis SL's selected base of operations, Guzmán’s centralized control over his hierarchically organized killing machine, and SL’s phased model of Maoist guerrilla warfare, we may examine SL operational environment, dependent organization, and tactics.

145 Two important dynamics are apparent, namely (1) the fundamental influence of Maoist guerrilla doctrine, and (2) the evolution in organizational sophistication from guerrilla bands to more sophisticated conventional military units as state power fails. Ibid., p. 36.

146 Nota de Información No. 001-DGIFI. Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional. July 18, 1984. 2nd collections of ephemera from the Peruvian insurrection (reel 1).
IV.2. Independent Variable: Phase I-III Operational Environments

*Phase I-III Operational Environment: Peru’s Physical, Human, and Institutional Terrain*

According to ACD and relevant secondary-source literature, the SL rebellion is approximated to have initiated north of the Ayacucho Highlands, in a river valley at decimal degrees latitude -12 and longitude -74 (fig. 4.2.1-2). The nearest road, highway 28C, terminates 40 km away. Ringed by the ~3,000 m Peruvian Andes, the valley altitude of 420 m, twice that of Lima, rapidly climbs to ~2,000 m when entering Otishi National Park 50 km away. The valley is ~350 km from Lima, a city of ~8,000,000 inhabitants. ACD location coding remains constant throughout conflict duration (1965 – 1999).

Fig. 4.2.1: Initial Base of SL Mobilization: Ayacucho River Valley Rural Settlements

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147 The ACD supplement listing approximate coordinates of conflict location puts initial SL activity at decimal degrees latitude -12, and longitude -74.
149 The cited conflict duration includes “minor” (25 -999 battlefield deaths) and “civil war” (at least 1,000 battlefield deaths). Accordingly this study thus cites 1980 as the beginning of civil war.
With ACD and satellite imagery approximating the initial base of SL mobilization, the following sub-section will review captured SL documents and directives, and Peruvian intelligence and military reports, to more precisely identify SL modes of Phase I-III organization and attack. Primary-source reports will then be evaluated against topography and population maps generated through ArcGIS spatial analysis software. In this way, we may observe the effects of the independent variable of operational environment, defined by terrain, population, and government, on the dependent variables of guerrilla organization and logistical capacity, operationalized through the above noted review of declassified intelligence and military reports.

Regarding SL Phase I-III operational environment, period military and civilian intelligence confirm SL was initially based in Peru’s treacherous Ayacucho highlands. On December 6, 1978, report 17-DPE from the Civil Guard’s Central Intelligence Office “described
how SL had divided Ayacucho city zones," with preparations to "initiate armed struggle in the rural sector, for which it should be establishing support bases in the Apurímac River jungle."\textsuperscript{150}

An air force intelligence report written on February 22, 1980 a the outset of Phase I attacks noted "the Communist Party Peru [sic] Shining Path is preparing a guerrilla war conceived within the Maoist idea of war from the countryside to the city and war from the urban periphery (young towns) to the urban center (residential areas)."\textsuperscript{151} The same report would "precisely record" the areas that would be the "primary and secondary theaters of war three years later" during Phase II operations, namely the Upper Huallaga Cayamarca, Ayacucho, and Huancavelica regions.\textsuperscript{152} Fig. 4.2.3 maps the above reports' cited locations of Phase I-II SL operations against ArcGIS satellite topography data.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
Fig. 4.2.3: ArcGIS: Mapping Report 17-DPE on Phase I-III Zones
In fig. 4.2.3, each provincial center of primary SL Phase I-II base of operations is outlined, proceeding, North to South, from the Upper Huallaga Cayamarca, Lima, Huancavelica, and Ayacucho areas. As apparent, SL organization was initially confined to only the most inaccessible terrain, far from coastal Lima. By the mid-1980’s Phase II-III SL regional committees had spread to most of Peru, including the Principal Committee (Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurímac); Regional Committee (Cerro de Pasco, Huánuco, and Huancayo); and the Northern and Southern Committees (Piura, Huallaga, Cajamarca, and Cuzco et al.).

One of the largest SL regional committees, the Comité Regional de Alto Huallaga (CRH), centered its operations in the coca-growing jungles of the Upper Huallaga.

By 1988, SL began intensive urban attacks alongside rural operations, with the middle-class Lima district of Miraflores one of the hardest hit. Interestingly, at this stage of SL organization, urban operations began to supersede rural subversion –so much so that Guzmán decided to shift his central network to Lima. An intensive urban bombing campaign followed.

Himself a victim to the operational hazards of the better surveilled and policed urban guerrilla theatre, 57 year-old Guzmán was finally apprehended during a Counter-Terrorism Directorate (DIRCOTE) raid on an SL safe-house in the middle-class Lima neighborhood of Surco on September 12, 1992.

Figs. 4.2.4-5 give period satellite imagery (1990) of urban Lima, site of the 1992 decapitation of SL, and rural Cuzco, site of one of the largest SL massacres.

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154 Ibid., pp. 151-155. Imagery provided by Google Earth.
155 Ibid., p. 87. Imagery provided by Google Earth.
156 The operation was so secretive, not even President Fujimori was notified. “Guerrilla Chief’s Arrest Shifts Tide of Conflict and Evokes Relief.” The Sendero Files. Issue No. 4. October 1992. http://www.gci275.com/peru/sf4.shtml
157 Ibid.
Fig. 4.2.4: Satellite Imagery of Urban Lima and Surrounding Highlands (1990)
Fig. 4.2.5: Satellite Imagery of Rural Cuzco and Surrounding Highlands (1990)
Human Terrain: Rural to Urban Migration

Figs. 4.2.1-5 present the treacherous physical terrain defining SL’s operational environment. But what about the human terrain? For this, we may turn to period urbanization studies. In 1971, the Ford Foundation commissioned a study examining urbanization in Peru.159 The authors peg urbanization in Peru at “no more than 35%” in 1970.160 Rural-centric mobilization therefore expectedly coincided with a large agrarian population, in 1980 (Phase I) 38% of the total population –and there is reason to believe this figure is much lower than actual.161

The above cited Ford Foundation project also identifies a second interesting phenomenon of “macrocephaly,” defined in urban studies as the disproportionate preponderance of a single mass city.162 Lima is reportedly home to 20% of Peru’s 1971 population—an urban population primacy of “15 to 1”- which the authors accurately project to only grow with increasing

161 This figure is drawn from the UN. However, there is reason to accept the Ford Foundation study as indicative of the actual level of urbanization in Peru due to its more precise differentiation between “rural” and “urban” communities. The study notes that “Peru, like any other country cannot be understood by studying statistics –no matter how detailed. This becomes immediately clear when the statistics which define ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ places Peru are examined, not on their face or census value, but on the validity of the classification which may be variously employed. The census statistics gave Peru an ‘urban’ population of 47.2 per cent in 1961, but they classified as urban any settlement which served as the administrative headquarters of a district, plus any other settlement which was the equivalent of such a ‘district’ headquarters. Another method of calculation, used places of more than 2,000 population for statistical purposes; on this basis, the percentage of urban population fell to 39.4%. In our judgment, all of these classifications exaggerate the urban quality of Peru. The country has only one major urban center, which is metropolitan Lima. Its true percentage of genuine urban population, generously interpreted, is now almost certainly no more than 35 per cent, instead of the more than 50 per cent which would be the estimate for 1971 if the official definitions were not critically examined.” Thus, the Ford Foundation projects Peru’s rural population, in 1980, to be at 62%, rather than the UN estimate of 38%. Ibid. For UN estimates, see “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database.” United Nations. 2007. http://esa.un.org/unup/p2k0data.asp.
162 Ibid. ii – iii.
urbanization. The identified trend of macrocephaly holds, with Lima’s 8.769 million residents today ~30% of Peru’s 71.6% urbanized 29.248 million population.

Against a backdrop of millenarian insurgency, Peru’s population therefore shifted over thirty years to Lima, and a handful of provincial urban centers [Arequipa (841,120); Callao (813, 264); Trujillo (747,450); and Chiclayo (577, 375)]. This trend of urbanization, moving to 66.9% by 1985 (ca. Phase II-III), and 68.9% by 1990 (ca. Phase III urban attacks), also coincided with a shift in SL base of operations from the rural periphery, to urban Lima. Table 4.2.1 gives UN estimates on the percentage of urban population in Peru during the approximate period covered by the ACD dataset. The Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP) (2009) and Gridded Population of the World (GPW) (2005) map Peru’s macrocephalic, largely urbanized population (fig. 4.2.6), today largely removed from rough mountain settlements (fig. 4.2.7-8).

Tab. 4.2.1: Percentage of Urban Population in Peru (1970 – 1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

163 Ibid.  
165 Ibid.  
166 As noted, these figures, drawn from UN World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database, should be interpreted with caution. If accounting only for settlements with more than a 2,000 person population, rather than any perceived position as an administrative headquarters, the actual percentage of urbanization in Peru would be far lower. Nevertheless, these statistics are presented as they are the most available and widely cited. For UN estimates, see “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database.” United Nations. 2007. http://esa.un.org/unup/p2k0data.asp
SETTLEMENT POINTS

Fig. 4.2.6: GRUMP: Macrocephalic Lima

Settlement points with population estimates are used in GRUMP as a guide to reallocation of population from rural areas to urban extents defined by stable night-time lights. The level of detail available in the settlement points database varies by country.

Note: National boundaries are derived from the population grids and thus may appear coarse.
Fig. 4.2.7: GPW: Population Density in Peru, Coinciding Largely with Terrain

Fig. 4.2.8: ArcGIS: Mapping Population Density in Peru by Province

Perúdiv2006
POP_ADMIN
- 55000 - 161200
- 161201 - 386100
- 386101 - 720100
- 720101 - 1662200
- 1662201 - 8126700
Peru’s physical terrain of rough mountains, and human terrain of rural-to-urban migration, are thus defined. To briefly discuss period institutional topography, Peru underwent a relatively painful bureaucratic transition from military dictatorship to civilian rule beginning in 1980, coinciding with Phase I SL operations. First, a serious of particularly egregious corruption scandals immediately gutted the ranks of top state enforcers.\textsuperscript{167} Second, the ousted military pilfered and absconded state intelligence and analytics on SL, thereby depriving the newly minted civilian government of a decade of information on SL organization and operations.\textsuperscript{168}

The purpose of the military’s perfidy was as cunning as it was disastrously bloody: To “award the new democracy a Trojan horse, carrying an insurgency it neither understood nor clearly detected,” thereby ensuring a return to military rule.\textsuperscript{169} Simply, the civilian government was unprepared to fight. Accordingly, an NIS report dated September 15, 1984, coinciding with Phase III offensive operations, considers a truce with SL, to later include amnesty for its thousands of fighters, and a withdrawal of state forces from the declared emergency zones.\textsuperscript{170}

We have thus identified four important variables defining SL’s operational environment immediately prior to insurgency onset. They are (1) mountain highland and jungle bases in Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and the Upper Huallaga Cayamarca provinces; (2) a largely rural-centric population; (3) an overarching trend of increasing urbanization; and (4) a relatively weak, transitional state government. Last, an organizational emphasis on the hierarchical implementation of Maoist guerrilla doctrine is apparent. Now, given the foregoing discussion on

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., pp. 43 – 54.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid. p. 42.
\textsuperscript{170} \textit{Implicancia de las iniciativas para una tregua con Sendero Luminoso. Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional.} September 15, 1984. 2nd collection of ephemera from the Peruvian insurrection (1st reel).
guerrilla doctrine describing the material relationship between insurgent operational environment, and dependent modes of organization, logistical capacity, and feasible tactics, what does this mean for how we may expect SL to organize and fight? What may we predict vis-à-vis Phase I-III SL war production, between 1980-1992, considering the above described socioeconomic and organizational conditions?

IV.3. Dependent Variables: Structure, Capacity, Tactics, Classification

In the first noted operational environment, pinpointed in ACD, SL fielded a highly centralized insurgent army, with manpower allocations almost identical to Mao’s rural force recommendations (Appendix I). During Phase II - III operations (1982-1992), the SL rural Ejercito Popular de Liberación (ELP) of the Ayacucho Zonal Committee was organized into the following military units: three-battalion regional armies; three-company battalions; three platoon companies; and nine-eleven-man platoons. Again, Guzmán himself headed every major committee, including the Central, Political, Permanent, Presidential, and Military Commissions. Most equipment was stolen from overrun police stations, with explosives, e.g. dynamite, obtained from ransacked mining operations. As such SL units were (1) highly hierarchical, and (2) well equipped.

SL rural units were additionally divided into three organizational tiers: (-1) “local guerrillas,” the (-2) “regional force,” and the (-3) “principal force.” The (-1) local guerrillas were expendable villagers who worked the fields by day, and conducted SL raids by night. The (-2)

171 Reproduced in Appendix I.
172 Although ACD codes the insurgency to have started in 1981, SL did not enter Phase II and III fighting until later in the conflict. Ibid., pp. 104-105.
173 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
"regional force" consisted of better armed and trained local guerrillas, covering several provinces. Finally, the (-3) "principal force" consisted of the best trained and equipped men, kept in reserve. 175 A centralized military structure had an important effect on SL logistical capacity; ELP moved to capture and hold much of Ayacucho Province.

By 1982-3, then President Alan García declared Ayacucho an emergency zone, and ordered an intensive counter-insurgency campaign to clear entrenched ELP forces. 176 Accordingly, NIS intelligence report no. 001-DGIFI documents a quantitative and qualitative escalation in emergency zone attacks as Phase II SL forces gained in organizational and logistical sophistication between 1983 – 1984. Operations moved from "sabotage, assaults, death threats, and urban-cell agitation" in 1983, to the "assault of state military forces, and the capture of territory and highland towns by 1984 [emphasis added]." 177 Military intelligence report no. 35 B-2, delivered on April 15, 1986, documents reported SL subversive activity and enabling capacity by operational environment during SL Phase II-III campaigns, particularly from the Huánuco and Pasco, Huancavelica, and Huancayo departments. The following summary tables are derived from this report, which although less than representative, is nevertheless striking. 178

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location and Terrain</th>
<th>Forces and Mission</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

175 Ibid., p. 69.
Northern SL forces were even more sophisticated and capable than the above cited emergency zone forces. CRH units, centered in the Upper Huallaga, managed to outlast even the decapitation of SL following the arrest of Guzmán in 1992. Between 60-120 soldiers, CRH units were larger than ELP Ayacucho highland forces and were “heavily militarized.”\textsuperscript{179} CRH units were equipped with heavy weaponry, and a full range of equipment, including uniforms.\textsuperscript{180} Unlike the more lightly equipped highland ELP forces, CRH guerrillas most approximated a Phase III conventional force. Tellingly, CRH operated in the densest terrain: the Amazon.\textsuperscript{181}

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textit{Location and Terrain} & \textit{Forces and Mission} & \textit{Capacity} \\
\hline
\textit{Location:} Huancavelica & Forces: \textasciitilde{}120 men and women & \textit{Capacity: “Simultaneously attack [area] mines…attacks may be launched at any hour, with the authority to eliminate any impeding police forces.”} \\
\textit{Terrain:} Encamped in the “highlands of a small town called Laramarca.” & Mission: “Procuring large quantities of explosives, and organizing “militias in all cities and peasant communities.” & \\
\hline
\textit{Location:} Huancayo & Forces: \textasciitilde{}25 members of the “Red Army,” directed by Abimael Guzman himself & \textit{Capacity: “Equipped with machine guns, bombs, and dynamite charges.”} \\
\textit{Terrain:} Huicracocha Lagoon & Mission: “Department meeting” on new strategy and tactics. & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., p. 156.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., p. 89.
In terms of tactics and dependent target set, an interesting dynamic is apparent. Although acknowledged to be highly organized, ELP military technique was initially “extremely poor.” Organization -no matter how complete- cannot compensate for lack of operational experience. Initial (-1) and (-2) insurgent attacks were amateurish, mob-like raids, directed against wealthy ranchers and under-manned police stations. Guzmán noted the essential paradox of launching a guerrilla war with an uneducated peasantry; however, the solution was not to offer better training, but rather escalate attacks —the cauldron of battle was considered the best training ground.

Tactical sophistication would advance to military-centric raids and ambushes and heavy industrial sabotage after Guzmán’s 1982 directive “Desplegar Guerra de Guerrillas,” or the commencement of Phase II guerrilla war. However, SL terrorism, both a Phase I vestigial tactic and doctrinal perversion (Guzmán had strayed from Mao’s prescriptions regarding proper

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182 SL was said to be “much larger and more disciplined organization that almost anyone realized then —or afterward: distributed over territory with a rudimentary, yet functional communications system, and a centralized leadership, which guaranteed unified control over the party apparatus at all times.” Gorriti, Gustavo and Robin Kirk (trans). The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press. 1999, pp. 85-87.

183 Ibid.

184 SL activity in Ayacucho had intensified throughout 1980. By early 1981, numerous attacks were conducted across the province. Small police outposts were especially hard-hit. On January 13, 1980, fifteen SL fighters attacked the police station in the town of San José de Secce. The completely unprepared police force at station simply fled. The attackers made off with two machine guns, two revolvers, an M-1 automatic rifle, and several crates of ammunition. A string of apparently ill-defended stations were subsequently attacked. However militants were often beaten back, and many later captured. Several of the militants arrested for the San José de Secce attack, for example, had participated in every prior SL attack in Ayacucho. This suggests not only an initially low operational capacity, but cadre. Ibid., p. 79-81.

185 Ibid., pp. 86-87.


187 SL was responsible for several massacres of rural peasantry considered uncooperative or collaborationist, and terrorism remained an essential SL tactic throughout its organizational evolution —despite its dubious strategic value. In 1989, for example, a reported ~250 SL guerrillas attacked a small village outside Ayacucho, allegedly for having formed a self-defense militia, at the behest of the army, to protect from SL attacks. The attacking rebels identified the villages 23 men and dragged them to the village courtyard. The militants then killed each of them by crushing their heads with a rock and slitting their throats. The battered corpses were then further mutilated in front of the victims’ families. This is only one of many village massacres reportedly perpetrated by SL. Hayes, Monte. “Survivors Describe Massacre by Shining Path.” The Washington Times. April 26, 2002.
population conduct), continued.\textsuperscript{188} Therefore hierarchical SL rural units, although tending toward military-centric attacks, are nonetheless best classified as guerrilla-terrorists. The applicability of model 3.1.1 is immediately apparent, with rural hierarchies operating alongside limited city networks, “the necessary complement,” in a multi-front mode of insurgency.

In 1988, Guzmán made the decision to shift toward urban operations. Phase II – III guerrilla operations were on the verge of affecting state collapse;\textsuperscript{189} urban operations were considered the last step in a rural-centric strategy designed to slowly surround and strangle isolated cities.\textsuperscript{190} With regard to urban force structure, period intelligence cites a three to five member cell structure (tab. 4.3.1).\textsuperscript{191} Cells were concentrated according to municipal division, with the Lima metropolitan area divided into six areas of operation.\textsuperscript{192}

\textit{Tab. 4.3.1: Intelligence Citing SL Urban Force Structure}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics{urban-force-structure.png}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{188} In addition to bloody civilian-centric reprisals, SL conducted an intensive sabotage campaign targeting urban centers. Some 1,200 high-voltage towers were destroyed by SL between 1982-1999. For SL industrial sabotage, see Marticorena, Manuel. “Historias detrás de los apagones.” El Comercio. March, 2011.


\textsuperscript{191} A similar proposed urban-cell force structure (Enders and Su 2007), with the added advantage of mapping cell density as a function of security, is provided in Appendix I, table 2. On captured SL documents indicating advised urban cell force structure, see Inca, Gerónimo. \textit{El ABC de Sendero Luminoso y del MRTA}. Lima: Grupo Editorial Gerónimo Inca SA (GEGISA). 1994, pp. 97 – 108.

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., p. 96.
With regard to tactics and classification, as according to a directive issued by the SL metropolitan committee, the above noted cellular force structure was divided into two operational tiers, each with distinct responsibilities. The expendable (-1) and (-2) second-tier cell network, part of an “action committee,” was charged with vandalism, propaganda, arson, and low-level level explosives attacks. “Higher-level” actions, consisting of “sabotage, public disturbance, and political killings, were to be carried out by the (-3) “Destacamento Especial,” or Special Detachment.\footnote{Gorriti, Gustavo and Robin Kirk (trans.). The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press. 1999, pp. 83-84.}

Expectedly given the above noted cell-based force structure, limited to three to five member teams, feasible operations were limited to soft targets, with a proclivity for spectacle. NIS intelligence delivered on July 18, 1984, reports SL urban cells to be mostly tasked with “terrorizing voters, arson, hostage-taking, exploding roads and state posts, sabotage, and acquiring arms.”\footnote{Nota de Informacion No. 35-B-2. Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional. Lima: Grupo Editorial Gerónimo Inca SA (GEGISA). 1994, p. 107.} By 1992, a wave of Marighella-model urban terror culminated with a truck bomb explosion in the middle-class Lima suburb of Miraflores, killing 22, injuring 250, and destroying 400 homes.\footnote{Weinstein, Jeremy M. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007, p. 87.} The tactic of choice for SL urban cells is hence terrorism, with a military classification of guerrilla-terrorist. As with rural SL forces, the model suggested in this study may benefit from a consideration of a multi-tier urban force structure. Last, it does not seem SL ever eroded state urban power sufficiently to reach more logistically sophisticated (-2) or (-3) urban guerrilla hierarchies specified in model 3.3.1.

In conclusion, we may tentatively propose the following. SL initial mobilization, according to NIS intelligence and captured directives, occurred over the rough Ayacucho highlands. Following a review of ArcGIS satellite topography and supplementary population data, and it is clear that Phase I SL units made (1) use of rough mountainous terrain, and (2) hosting rural communities, then a (3) large percentage of the population, located far from the (4) disorganized and transitional incumbents in coastal Lima.

Furthermore, rural-centric, Maoist guerrilla doctrine played an essential role throughout SL modes of organization and attack. The impact of doctrine is apparent from Guzmán’s decision to move to Ayacucho, to a later emphasis of rural mobilization at the expense of city work –even as urbanization accelerated over Phase I-III operations. Interestingly, by 1988, the operational emphasis of rural-centric Maoist doctrine had shifted, with urban Lima the focus of SL operations rather than the previously stated “complement” of country drives.

This seems expected, as by this year, urbanization in Peru would be approaching ~70%. Despite this apparent modification of doctrine advising optimal guerrilla operational environment, SL force structures are essentially identical to those suggested throughout fighting manuals reviewed and modeled in this thesis. An organizational hybrid between rural hierarchies and urban networks is thus apparent; however, a major shift in population, from, in the case of Peru, the rural periphery, to a preponderant urban center, may result in a strategic and organizational return to single-mode insurgency.
IV.4. Relevance of Guerrilla Doctrine and Derived Models

The above presented case study of Peru’s vaunted Sendero Luminoso in part confirms the external validity of model 3.1.1, which, prior to the noted shift in Peru’s population to macrocephalic Lima during the 1980’s, seems to better apply to a once rural-centric Peru than model 3.3.1.\textsuperscript{197} To this end, it seems terrain may adequately proxy for government control in rural-centric asymmetric conflict, should prevailing conditions of urbanization hold constant.

As illustrated by model 3.1.1, guerrilla operational environment, as defined by the physical, human, and institutional terrain, largely determined SL organizational structure and dependent operational sophistication. Highland and jungle guerrilla forces, launching demanding military attacks, were more numerous and better equipped than small, hermetic Lima terror cells. Interestingly, guerrilla doctrine –in addition to accurately reflecting the material conditions of battle vis-à-vis optimal network structure as a function of operational environment- factored perhaps more upon initial organization, than even more pragmatic, material considerations.

Second, in addition to the modeled relationship between operational environment and organizational structure, SL guerrilla forces were able to graduate from Maoist, rural-centric guerrilla war, to al-Muqrin’s conception of multi-front insurgency. As illustrated by model 3.1.1, SL forces initially organized and spread from the low-control rural periphery (e.g. the Ayacucho Highlands and dense Upper Huallaga jungles), to the high-control urban center (e.g. Lima’s

Miraflores district), as state control correspondingly receded. A military-centric rural drive thus subsequently proceed alongside civilian-centric urban operations in multi-front insurgency, with mountain, jungle, and city units structured accordingly. This structural hybrid between rural hierarchies and urban networks presents a fluid spectrum of guerrilla organization, unconfined to the rural/urban dichotomy postulated in civil war scholarship and COIN analytics. And this may have remained the dominant mode of SL war production had Peru not experienced such drastic urbanization over Phase I-III operations, shifting SL’s hosting rural communities to the city.

Several hypotheses derived from model 3.1.1 may thus be tentatively confirmed. First, influential guerrilla doctrine advising (1) optimal network structure as a function of environment, and (2) staged multi-front guerrilla war, accurately reflects the material conditions of prevailing rural-centric insurgency. Presented guerrilla doctrine is hence of strategic and operational value to the scholar and practitioner of COIN looking to understand how guerrillas organize as a function of operational environment. Second, model 3.1.1 accurately reflects the course insurgency may expectedly take in less urbanized states economically and demographically similar to those of rural-centric theoreticians. Third, model 3.1.1 will accurately reflect guerrilla organization in states in which terrain may still reasonably proxy for government control. The developed Global North seems to apply, where cities are relatively well policed and serviced, as well as still rural-centric states in the Global South. However, as in the case of Peru during the latter half of the 1980’s, however, the global trends of increasing urbanization, dissolution of state power, and decline in politically motivated violence may contribute to an increase in typically rare urban guerrilla war.

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198 If any guerrilla insurgency in Latin America after Castro’s has come closer to capturing state power, it was SL. Prior to intelligence leading to the capture of Guzmán, the Peruvian government seemed on the verge of collapse. Weinstein, Jeremy M. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007, pp. 88-89.
Thus far only the relevance of model 3.1.1 has been discussed. This is because model 3.3.1 is, as explained, more readily applied to and evaluated against the modern phenomenon of highly urbanized, weak states, where terrain may not reasonably proxy for government control and expected guerrilla organization and tactics. This would seem to be the case with Peru during the mid to late 1980’s; however, Abimael Guzmán was captured before SL urban units could evolve sufficiently to confirm or challenge hypotheses derived from model 3.3.1.

A comprehensive evaluation of model 3.3.1 against a second case-study insurgency, occurring within a wider context of appropriate socioeconomic variables, is better conducted in a separate assessment. Model 3.3.1 may still reasonably apply to individual theatres of SL operation, i.e. the rural – urban binary, rather than the observed multi-front insurgency employing rural and urban units. However, this thesis -as limited to a case-study confirming the strategic and operational value of largely rural-centric guerrilla doctrine only- may thus, accordingly, only speculate as to the effects of cited global trends on non-state actor war production. For the purposes of this study, it is enough that they are recognized and considered when evaluating guerrilla doctrine.
V. Conclusion: Summary and Implications

V.1. Summary

This study aims to assess the operational value of guerrilla doctrine, and to clarify essential characteristics of non-state actor modes of organization and dependent war production debated in COIN analytics and civil war scholarship. To this end, the independent variable of operational environment is identified. Following a review of influential guerrilla doctrine, the modeled independent variable of operational environment, defined by the physical, human, and institutional terrain of a given asymmetric conflict, appears to have the greatest effect on the dependent variable of organizational structure.

Organizational structure, in turn, affects feasible tactics and target set—it is inadvisable for clandestine cells to acquire notable physical assets, and employ them against well equipped state forces. Attrition to infiltration, and battle, would simply impose prohibitive costs. Yet in the bush, far from watching eyes, the guerrilla may grow in strength and number unobserved—or worse, ignored. When afforded sanctuary, small units may reach a level of organization and dependent logistical capacity comparable to conventional armies.

This thesis has attempted to capture this dynamic, described throughout evaluated guerrilla doctrine. Consistently, guerrilla theoreticians, fighting across multiple guerrilla fronts, find groups afforded sanctuary are most likely to develop numerous, centralized, forces, best equipped to capture state control from incumbent militaries. Hermetic urban cells, quantitatively demonstrable of valuing security over communicational efficiency and logistical capacity, are accordingly expected to interact less with a population often the only feasible target for impactful, mass-casualty attacks. This operational dynamic, discussed by guerrilla theoreticians,
and modeled in this thesis, is partly confirmed in the preceding case-study review. As such, influential guerrilla doctrine presented in this thesis is assessed as accurately reflective of prevailing rural-centric asymmetric conflict, granting a valuable perspective on items of interest to the counter-insurgent and civil war scholar. Indeed, doctrine may count *more* than material considerations vis-à-vis preferred organization and modes of operation at insurgency onset.

However, any evaluation of practitioner literature failing to consider the socioeconomic conditions of its writing may be theoretically incomplete and prove operationally inadequate. This is true when assessing influential guerrilla doctrine. Much reflects a mostly rural-centric past (Mao 1938; Guevara 1969). Even reviewed urban-centric theoreticians were obliged to recognize the essential role of the food-producing countryside (Guillén 1966). Indeed, the contest over rough terrain has featured prominently in most incidents of asymmetric conflict. Examples of sustained urban insurgency have been rare—major cites tend to be centers of state power, whereas the inaccessible rural periphery, where it exists, tends not to be.

But today, in a world of a deserted rural periphery, and sprawling, marginalized urban slums—a human terrain as treacherous and inaccessible as any mountain or jungle stronghold—may we soon witness a new era of predominantly *urban* insurgency and civil war? May the conventional wisdom positing rural centers as the only feasible base for sustained insurgency be outdated, reflecting a world of a once rural majority now passed? By removing the independent variable from an entirely physical conception of operational environment, i.e. terrain, model 3.3.1 attempts to capture the global trends of increasing urbanization and dissolution of state power. And model 3.3.1 does so while reflecting still relevant model 3.1.1 lessons on optimal urban network structure and multi-front insurgency. A case-study review of one of the most

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successful guerrilla organizations in the 20th century appears to confirm the basic findings and derived hypotheses of model 3.1.1. SL units were structured according to theatre, and removed from the artificial rural–urban operational binary proposed in COIN and civil war scholarship. However, additional case-study research, focusing on examples of violent conflict and insurgency in modern, urbanized states, with still operational guerrilla units, is required to assess the external validity of model 3.3.1.

As such, the conclusions of this study are limited. Influential guerrilla doctrine, speaking to an understudied dynamic relating insurgent front and organization, is relevant to our understanding of asymmetric conflict today. However, it is only in states in which terrain may still reasonably proxy for government control. Outside this condition, and the COIN scholar and practitioner would do well to consider additional socioeconomic variables.

V.2. Implications

In terms of policy implications, this study provides five. First, sanctuary is considered paramount. Groups need sanctuary to effectively organize and affect logistically complex -and in the case of pre-9/11 al-Qa’ida- transnational strikes. Should the US choose to leave COIN battlefields in the Near East and Central Asia, our political leadership would do well to maintain a contingency of Special Operations Forces, augmented by weaponized drone wings, in theatre to deny hostile organizations sanctuary. Otherwise, we may be again faced with mass-casualty attacks against US interests in the region, or at home. And, by defining operational environment to for example more broadly include the human and institutional topography of a given asymmetric conflict –as much as physical terrain- the contribution of identifying any alternative sphere of social mobilization as potentially hosting and coordinating of more sophisticated
modes of non-state actor organization, is provided. This includes the virtual spheres of social interaction, coordination, and organization, and indeed any platforms exploiting state regulation and power voids.

Second, this paper emphasizes the importance of properly identifying the military classification of a given non-state actor. Politically and militarily, it may be productive, for example, to note the organizational structure, logistical capacity, and preferred target set of a party before classifying it as a terrorist group. Hezbollah and HAMAS are salient examples. Both are quasi-state organizations that have conducted terrorist attacks—HAMAS has killed scores of Israeli civilians, and Hezbollah is responsible for more American deaths than any violent non-state actor with the exception of al-Qa’ida.

Yet are HAMAS and Hezbollah, groups that provide important local services, represent a sizeable constituency, and maintain active political wings, equivalent to post-9/11 al-Qa’ida? The answer is no. And this response is not born of moral relativism. It is because target set dictates strategy and tactics. HAMAS and Hezbollah, for example, seem to be at the organizational extreme of model 3.1.1. That is, guerrillas offered sanctuary so secure and for so long that they have organized into quasi-state agencies, with a dependent logistical capacity so developed, each today usurp state responsibilities of popular governance, and in the case of Hezbollah, inter-state war. As such both HAMAS and Hezbollah seem closer to insurgencies, best combated with population-centric COIN strategy and tactics, than parasitic CCN with little popular support, best neutralized with kinetic CT.

Third, strategy, tactics, and public rhetoric must therefore be disaggregated and refined according to front and campaign. Drone strikes in the Afghan COIN theatre, are, for example, a

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CT tactic, and as such should be subordinated to a comprehensive COIN strategy -indeed dispensed with if proven to cause more harm than good. And if we are to take evaluated guerrilla doctrine presented in this thesis at face value, the term “war on terrorism” is similarly misguided. It suggests a military solution to what is a problem best handled by police and intelligence agencies. As guerrilla organizational structure and dependent logistical capacity are largely a function of operational environment, civilian-centric urban cells are best monitored, infiltrated, and destroyed by local security services, and not invading militaries.

Fourth, if terrorism is, as guerrilla doctrine and derived models presented in this thesis suggest, best defined by a range of organizational determinants, rather than an employed tactic of terrorism, then the oft-cited menace of terrorist organizations acquiring and deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is overstated. Logistically limited urban cells are unlikely to boast the expertise and resources required to design, assemble, test, and deliver workable nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological (NCBR) WMD. Conversely, the value of NCBR WMD to rural units seems limited unless miniaturized and deployed tactically. This is outside the technical capability of most states, let alone guerrilla organizations.

The real WMD threat thus lies not with exotic, resource-intensive NCBR technology, but with small arms and conventional explosives proliferation, and unconventional tactics. The ubiquitous Kalashnikov and its derivatives, military and commercial-grade high explosives, and unconventional tactics employing available technology [e.g. Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) IED], have killed more civilians and soldiers in the post-World War II era of small wars.

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and asymmetric conflict than devoted WMD systems. Civilian-centric terrorism, conducted by either guerrilla or terrorist organizations, is thus more likely to be modeled after the largely conventional 2004 Madrid, 2005 London, and 2008 Mumbai attacks, and not terrorist WMD strikes. Policy makers would hence be well advised to focus on other, less visible weapons proliferation threats.

Fifth, if state capacity is to be considered the fundamental determinant of guerrilla organization and corresponding operational sophistication, then the next wave of non-state actor violence may expectedly occur in weak, urban states. As much of the Global South is plagued by endemic overpopulation, and unsustainable urbanization straining government capacity, the developing world seems as much at risk of once rare urban guerrilla war—politically motivated or otherwise—as typical patterns of rural-centric insurgency. Marighella’s strategy of decentralized, civilian-centric urban war, and al-Muqrin’s conception of multi-front insurgency, thus seem more probable than ever should the current trends of increasing urbanization and state

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power dissolution continue. As such researchers, while acknowledging the value of influential guerrilla doctrine, should perhaps shift their focus to urban, rather than rural-centric asymmetric conflict.
Appendix I: Advised Rural and Urban Guerrilla Force Structure

Appendix I.1: Organization of a Rural Maoist Guerrilla Regiment

Regimental Commander

- Political Officer
- Chief of Staff

Regimental HQ and Three Battalions

1st Section: Operations and Training
2nd Section: Intelligence
3rd Section: Public Relations
4th Section: Administration
Medical/Transport Sections

First Battalion
Second Battalion
Third Battalion

Source: Mao (1938)
Appendix I.2: Advised Urban Cell Structure: Density vs. Security

Cell 1: $p = 1$

Cell 3a: $p = \frac{2}{3}$

Cell 3b: $p = \frac{2}{3}$

Cell 4b: $p = \frac{1}{2}$

Cell 2: $p = \frac{5}{6}$

Cell 4a: $p = \frac{1}{2}$

Key:
- "Node," or cell member
- Communication link

Source: Enders and Su (2007)
Appendix II: List of Civil Wars and Insurgencies

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