ACCOMMODATING EXISTING SETTLEMENTS IN LARGE SCALE DEVELOPMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SHA TIN NEW TOWN HONG KONG

by

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Abstract

This thesis examines several problems associated with large-scale construction projects proposed for areas with existing settlements. It focuses on how local people affect and are affected by government policies and the resulting project development.

The purpose is to suggest how the development office in Sha Tin New Town ought to design its policies for existing villages. Two additional international new town projects are reviewed as examples of problems that governments encounter. The two other projects also provide examples of policies that the governments have instituted.

Historically, many large-scale development projects have encountered resistance from local settlers. Conflicts between indigenous settlers at the project site and governments that are creating new environments occur because of rapid environmental changes and uncertainty surrounding the local settlement's future. Many of the immigrants arriving in the early stages of development also experience uncertainty and perceive the same rapid changes.

The thesis makes recommendations for three villages located in Sha Tin. The villages were chosen to illuminate issues and problems with relocating a village in one case and preserving a village in another. The final case addresses redeveloping a village with the villagers retaining development rights. Recommendations will be made for each of the villages around:

--- structuring positive interactions between the development office professionals and the local villagers.

--- resolving problems with land occupancy, both by the villagers and by nearby squatters.
--organizing the appropriate processes and institutions at the village level to ease each village's transition in the new town development.

The thesis concludes with recommendations for the development of Sha Tin New Town in Hong Kong. The recommendations suggest how the development office can structure a participatory process for villages and residents in the new town.

It is hoped that the findings of this thesis may be useful for the Sha Tin New Town Development Office and for practitioners seeking to improve means of working with indigenous populations and settlements in large scale development.
Acknowledgements

This thesis is dedicated to Penney and to Mother who gave so much and asked for so little.

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Chapter 1:

Introduction
In the spring of 1976 I received a fellowship from the Henry Luce Foundation to work and travel in Southeast Asia. My professional work assignment as a Luce scholar was with the Hong Kong government in the Sha Tin New Town Development Office. The assignment began in the fall of the same year when I arrived in Hong Kong; it concluded late in the summer of 1977. My responsibilities ranged from administrative duties and contract supervision to design review, site planning and large scale design.

When I arrived, the Sha Tin professional staff included three engineers, two planners, an architect and a project manager. My official position was senior architect/planner; working in this role allowed me the freedom to observe and research several issues related to the Sha Tin development process. In 1976 the project was three years into a ten year time horizon and in all phases of development: long range planning, detailed design and construction.
I became interested in the future of several Chinese villages located in the Sha Tin Valley as a result of coordinating the Sha Tin landscape master plan consulting contract. Interactions with professionals from the landscape firm and frequent observations in the field revealed several conflicts between the goals of the development office and local villages. These problems, including land rights, village relocation and the socio-economic future of the villagers, seemed analogous to situations in America with which I was familiar.

Although Hong Kong is a British colony in which most land belongs to Britain, the land tenure system for the New Territories of Hong Kong is similar in many respects to the land tenure system structured for Indian reservations in the United States. Just as traditional Chinese villagers in Hong Kong have legal rights to their land dating back to the 1898 Treaty of Nanking between China and Britain, American Indians also have treaty rights to their reservation lands. In both cases the government
has instituted an administrative system to protect and coordinate the lands held by the indigenous population. In Hong Kong the New Territories Administration coordinates Chinese land ownership for the traditional villages; in America, the Bureau of Indian Affairs administers land owned by Indian tribes. Further, the Hong Kong government has limited legal jurisdiction over traditional village areas -- state governments in America also have severely limited jurisdiction over Indian reservations located within state boundaries.

These similarities were particularly meaningful to me because I had worked as an architect for the Rosebud Sioux Indian tribe and had lived on the Rosebud Reservation in South Dakota for three years prior to returning to graduate school at MIT. Thus there were several analogies to spark and guide my curiosity as I worked for the Hong Kong government in Sha Tin.

Given my past experiences with American Indians and an interest in land tenure systems, I became fascinated
with examining the relationship between the Hong Kong government and the traditional villagers in the New Territories of Hong Kong. This experience led to an investigation of how the Sha Tin development office approached problems with the existing villages on the new town site and how the local villagers were responding to the government's policies.
Chapter 2:

Framework For Analysis
In order to look at Sha Tin New Town in a broader context, I selected two additional new town projects to illuminate several key issues. My choice was motivated by a desire to select two other projects having comparable tension between the government's development goals and the resulting development pattern. The projects also should have several similar dimensions including urban scale, population goals, existing village settlements, distinct government policies and local land rights.

I therefore chose to examine the new towns of Ciudad Guayana in Venezuela and Milton Keynes in England -- both confronted with indigenous populations to accommodate and existing settlements to incorporate in the development. In each project the indigenous settlers had legal rights to their land, and in each development the respective government formulated policies that were directed at these settlers.

Ciudad Guayana is a new town project undertaken in the mid-1960's by the Venezuelan government in an
ambitious effort to develop remote natural resources. In addition to the problems encountered by any development in a remote area, the Venezuelan government had to cope with indigenous settlements and a flood of squatters since the project's inception.

Milton Keynes, a new town under construction north of London, is scheduled to reach its target population by the year 2000. This project, reflecting the best tradition of British town planning and design, is also government sponsored. The land for Milton Keynes will be taken publicly and converted from farm land to urban uses. The development area is occupied with several small towns and villages.

The Sha Tin design also reflects the traditional land use pattern for many British new towns. The Hong Kong government has had to confront problems with incorporating legally existing villages, communicating with indigenous settlers and accommodating squatters. Like Ciudad Guayana and Milton Keynes, the infrastructure,
land formation and some housing in Sha Tin is to be financed with public dollars.

The local population in each of these projects responded to government policies directed at the settlements, but the process of policy initiation and local response has engendered differing consequences for each development. In all three cases the response fluctuated according to the level of sensitivity exhibited by the government toward the settler's interests.

Government policy objectives have explicit and often implicit implications for the residents of indigenous settlements. In many cases settlement policies are instituted because measures must be taken to compensate local villagers for land that has been taken or to ease the economic transition from rural to urban life. These policies usually are derived from a range of choices available to the government authorities.

Some of the government policies are designed to preserve existing settlements, some to relocate
settlements and some to integrate settlements into the new town environment. In Milton Keynes, the policies are designed to encourage the local population's participation in planning and development decisions. Many times the policies may clarify the local settlement's role in the project and accommodate local social and economic needs. Essentially, however, all of these policies are aimed at facilitating the development process.

An indigenous population often can influence the government's settlement policies. Typically, this influence is exerted after construction on the project begins and the concomitant effects on the local land values ensue. The influence usually results in a high degree of interaction between government and the concerned local people. The following framework will be used to clarify this interaction so that the results of the government policies can be more clearly evaluated.

An examination of three key relationships will be used in this thesis to assess the degree to which
indigenous settlers affect the direction of government policy objectives. The first relationship centers on interactions between government professionals working on the development and the local settlers. These interactions will be examined according to physical proximity and the socio-economic relationship existing between the professionals and the local community. Specifically, this inquiry will ask:

-- Where is the planning and development office located relative to the project site?

-- What are the class relationships between the local inhabitants and the professionals?

-- How do the planners view the local citizens?

-- How does the local population view the government project, its programs and policies?

The second dimension includes highlighting the relationship between the local settlers and the land. This inquiry will include looking at both historic relationships and legal rights that the local settlers have to the land they occupy at the project site. This analysis asks:
Political and Institutional Relationships

The third and final dimension of this analysis addresses political and institutional relationships including the local settlers' support for or opposition to the project. In addition to defining the capabilities of existing local government institutions this part of the evaluation asks:

--To what extent do local groups exert political pressure on the government?

--What is the government's response to local pressure?

--How effective are the local governmental institutions at the project site?

Each of the three new towns presents a unique context for development: each project reflects its own culture, society and political economy. Although there are similarities, each project is guided by its particular land tenure and legal relationships. However, early in
the planning stages each government development entity made a set of choices that determined both the government's policies and the resulting response from the local settlers.

These choices set the pattern for the resulting dialogue by establishing a process for molding government policies. Initially, the governments decided whether to produce a detailed master plan for the project or provide a flexible structure within which the new town could incrementally grow. The governments chose to locate the development authority near the project or some distance away from the site. Professional government planners and consultants helped decide whether to alter and redirect established local growth patterns or whether to structure the development so that it grows outward from existing settlement patterns.

These early strategic decisions determined if the government should preserve existing settlements or relocate the settlers to another site. Relocation
policies required that the governments address questions of compensation. These questions include asking how much compensation is fair; to whom should the compensation go; and what form should the compensation take? Finally, the governments decided whether to consult the local people in making development decisions or whether to inform them of after-the-fact decisions.

Ciudad Guayana is planned to house an estimated 400,000 people in order to develop an abundant natural resource base. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the project was planned for completion in 1975. Early in the planning phases the Venezuelan government imported a broad range of professional skills and expertise from the Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies to help develop the new town.

In 1960 several governmental bodies that shared responsibility for developing Ciudad Guayana were consolidated into the Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana (CVG). The CVG was granted broad authority to develop
and implement a coordinated new town plan. However headquarters for the CVG was located in Caracas, some 300 miles from the new town project site. Consequently, the professionals had little contact with the indigenous residents of the Guayana region. The government's development strategy called for relocating large segments of the existing population and reorienting the flow of immigrants to fit a pre-established physical master plan. Although the squatters and villagers were compensated for relocation costs, the planners and citizens alike had many misconceptions about development of Ciudad Guayana. The government found immigration flows to be difficult to control, and the rudimentary local government and villagers perceived Caracas based directives to be confusing. Finally, the local people mounted several protests, and in 1974 the CVG opened an on-site development office. The local development office provided the residents with an avenue for essential information and allowed the professionals to respond more rapidly to on-site problems. The project is still under construction today.
In Milton Keynes, England, 21,900 acres of farmland is being developed to accommodate a new town for 400,000 people by the year 2000. The project is planned according to a flexible set of physical and program guidelines proposed by the consulting firm of Llewelyn-Davies, Weeks, Forestier-Walker and Bor. The authority to develop Milton Keynes is derived from the British New Towns Act of 1946 and is delegated to the Milton Keynes Development Corporation. Planning work on the new town began in the mid-1960's, while the consultant's report was issued in 1967. There is an on-site office for the development corporation, the chief agency in the new town with responsibility for coordinating the appropriate governmental authorities affecting the development. However, the corporation does not replace the normal functions of the existing local governments.

In Milton Keynes the professional staff consults with residents of villages located within the development boundaries through surveys and open public meetings. The
Sha Tin New Town corporation and consultants made an early decision that existing villages in the area would be incorporated into Milton Keynes through an incremental process of renovating, upgrading and preserving selected structures. The government hopes that these actions will enhance the economic life of the villages and contribute to social diversity in Milton Keynes. The project is still under construction.

British law requires that the new town plan is reviewed by the affected local governments at each stage of development. Local government in England is well organized, mature, and politically integrated into the fabric of public decision making. In Milton Keynes the arriving immigrants were, for the most part, well educated and there were no problems with squatters.

Sha Tin New Town, located in the New Territories of Hong Kong, is being developed to ease severely crowded living conditions. A detailed master plan for Sha Tin was first issued in 1960 and later revised when
construction began in 1975. The new town will be constructed over a ten year time horizon, will provide housing for approximately 500,000 people, and will cover some 4,500 acres.

The Hong Kong government decided the new town projects should have an on-site development office. However, because the staff is dominated by western professionals, there is limited direct communication between the Chinese settlers and the government planners. There are more than thirty-five traditional Chinese villages in the Sha Tin valley and approximately 20,000 immigrants are living in new housing estates constructed since 1975.

Since the project began, the residents have had one official opportunity to comment on the new town master plan, but local villagers have protested on several occasions. According to the Sha Tin master plan, some of the villages will be relocated, but most will be preserved within the new town structure. The development office
has not articulated an overall strategy to guide these villages through economic and physical transition from the existing rural setting to urban life.

Today, squatters occupy available land near the existing villages, while light industrial and manufacturing enterprises abound in response to the first phases of construction on Sha Tin and the increasing land values. So far, the master plan does not allow for village level incremental redevelopment in the development process. Each development zone is phased on a pre-set time line, and the government moves the illegal squatters and enterprises so that Sha Tin can proceed on schedule.

Working and living in Hong Kong keyed in my interest to explore what actions can aid the Sha Tin New Town development process. The analysis of Ciudad Guayana and Milton Keynes new towns provide direction for resolving conflicts between the traditional villagers and the Sha Tin development office. This research shows that indigenous populations can be accommodated and government
professionals can provide residents with an avenue to receive and give information about the development process.

The thesis makes specific recommendations for each of three villages located in the Sha Tin Valley. The villages were chosen to illuminate issues and problems with relocating a village in one case and preserving a village in another. The final case will address redeveloping a village with the villagers retaining development rights. Recommendations will be made for each of the villages around:

-- structuring positive interactions between the development office professionals and the local villagers.
-- resolving problems with land occupancy, both by the villagers and by nearby squatters.
-- organizing the appropriate processes and institutions at the village level to ease each village's transition in the new town development.
Chapter 3:

Ciudad Guayana - Venezuela
The planning and development of Ciudad Guayana presents a clear case of rapid population growth and technological progress in a short time. The new town, located in southeastern Venezuela, was planned to accommodate 400,000 people by the late 1970's. The development resulted from a national planning effort aimed at the region's abundant natural resources. The Venezuelan government intended to develop hydroelectric power and primary industries by attracting a skilled labor force and private investment sufficient to create a major new regional economic center.

The first ten years of formal planning for Ciudad Guayana reveal contradictions between the government goals for the city and the immediate needs of the local residents. The government professionals viewed Ciudad Guayana as an ideal arena in which to implement a complex development program, and the local population viewed the economic activity as beneficial but experienced problems with the distribution of utilities, housing, jobs and community services.
The project was remote and local expertise scarce. There was no major, tradition-bound population living in Guayana, transportation networks were simple and rudimentary, and the national government could control the existing land ownership patterns.

The lower Orinoco Valley, located some 300 miles from Venezuela's capital city, Caracas, is a region teeming with natural resources. After early development by two U.S. owned steel companies, the Venezuelan government began constructing the Macauga hydroelectric station on the Caroni River in the early 1950's and initiated development of a steel plant on the Orinoco River boosting the population to 45,000 people over the following ten years.¹

In 1960 the president of Venezuela established the Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana (CVG), an autonomous public corporation, and charged it with the responsibility to devise an overall strategy for developing the region. The CVG decided to augment its limited staff
Cuidad Guayana - New Town Plan
with foreign expertise by contracting with the Harvard-M.I.T. Joint Center for Urban Studies in 1961. The Joint Center team came to Guayana with a broad range of skills including architecture, anthropology, agriculture, economics, education, engineering, housing, law, real estate, political science, sociology and transportation planning.  

The boundaries for the new town included the existing mining settlements, the steel mill, and the hydroelectric project. The most important traditional settlement, San Felix, contained concentrated housing and an active commercial base. By 1960 the population of San Felix was 13,000 with 8,000 persons living to the south and west in two communities called El Roble and Dalla Costa. There were few paved roads, no water lines and underdeveloped utility systems; expansion was haphazard.  

The CVG planners decided to ignore this existing development pattern when they designed the masterplan for the new city. The CVG wanted to create a new commercial
center for Ciudad Guayana on the west bank of the Caroni River. This new center, Alta Vista, was to be created by providing space for immigrants in planned sub-divisions on the west side of the river. The planners hoped that these new residential settlements and commercial amenities would attract skilled labor and the management personnel essential to the future economic viability of Ciudad Guayana.

The government decided to locate the CVG headquarters in Caracas, nearly 300 miles from the project site, because it was the national focus of political power. In addition the available professional expertise was located there, and Caracas was a major social and cultural center.

The administrative personnel responsible for city planning were committed to civil service, but neither their work nor the centers of power and advancement necessitated their living near Ciudad Guayana. The Joint Center professionals were oriented toward developing
international careers. They tended to prefer Caracas as a place to live and had an acute sense of their dependence on official approval from the CVG headquarters. At that time there were no telephone connections, the mail system was inefficient, and bus transport took 14 hours. Because the professionals were based in Caracas, they could not benefit from first hand knowledge about the effects of their planning decisions.

In addition to communication problems, many of the planners had a paternalistic attitude toward the local population. One MIT researcher, Lisa Peattie, observed that the planners viewed themselves as the motivating force behind the project and viewed the city as something they were planning and developing for the good of Venezuela. This attitude complemented a feeling by some of the professionals that the local population was too unfamiliar with the project and too uneducated to take part in the planning process. Most of the 45,000 local people were lower class and were so viewed by the planners in Caracas.
At its inception the CVG was granted broad powers to acquire and dispose of public and private lands. Control over public land was transferred from the government land agency to the CVG corporation, and private land was purchased by negotiating with the respective owners. Through this process, most of the land within the city's boundaries came under CVG control. Although the government's policy objectives for Ciudad Guayana had important implications for the local population, there was no effort to consult with the people. The objectives of the growth management policies included:

1. Expanding the population with economic growth;
2. Attracting people with industrial skills to staff Ciudad Guayana's economy;
3. Postponing the build-up of a population of unskilled migrants not essential to industrial development.

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1. Expanding the population with economic growth;
2. Attracting people with industrial skills to staff Ciudad Guayana's economy;
3. Postponing the build-up of a population of unskilled migrants not essential to industrial development.
(4) Importing technical support staff on a temporary basis; and

(5) Expanding the more desirable parts of the city faster than the squatter settlements and locating most new growth near Puerto Ordaz.  

The local settlers affected these government policies by choosing to live in the traditional centers and through their own efforts, to improve these areas which resulted in complications for the project. Initially the choices new immigrants made about where to live influenced the development of Ciudad Guayana. In 1962, three quarters of the 50,000 people living in the city chose to live near San Felix, because it was the traditional center of commercial activity and community life. It served as the political center for the local government when the offices of the district council were located there.

The planners selected a site for the new city center removed from the traditional centers near San Felix. The planners hoped that the creation of the Alta Vista center
would stimulate high quality commercial development. However, most immigration occurred around the traditional centers near San Felix, and the city's development was not balanced as planned.⁸

Alta Vista was vacant as late as 1964, because most immigrants were lower class and had insufficient income levels to support a major commercial center some distance from their homes. Additionally, squatters arrived faster than the planners could accommodate them. Many of the new arrivals simply squatted on the edge of the existing centers creating "unplanned" development.

Squatter's legal rights are protected by the Venezuelan civil code stipulating that any person improving the land of another in good faith is entitled to compensation if removed from the land. The CVG officials quickly discovered that once the land was cleared it had to be developed immediately or another group of squatters would move in, and compensation would have to be paid a second time in order to clear the land.⁹
In 1965 the CVG established a local entity to deal with low income community development in response to squatter immigration. The Fundacion de la Vivenda del Caroni (FUNVICA) was created to give the local people limited authority and to implement several experimental self-help housing projects.

The creation of FUNVICA represented the first step toward aligning government planning more closely with the local governments. Addressing the needs and expectations of the local population represented a major shift in the government's mainline planning strategy.

Local influence in Ciudad Guayana can be divided roughly into two time periods: from the formation of the CVG in 1960 to the mid-1960's; and from 1966 to 1970. The earlier period was dominated by a lack of community structure sufficient to represent broad interests, while the later period represented more organized resistance and coordinated response.
In most instances the municipal government competed for jurisdiction with the local school system, the FUNVICA, and the CVG. On the local level a district council handled complaints by neighborhood residents against the controlling powers; however, the local people did not believe the council offered a viable avenue for influence, because it had not developed an ability to understand the operating style of the CVG.

A survey taken in 1964 revealed that half of the local people contacted had not even heard of the CVG or were misinformed about its role in development of the city. Lisa Peattie pointed out in her book, *View from the Barrio*, that "The local politicians are very, very local indeed; their access to the party structure at the top, even within their own party, is hardly greater than that of the average local resident, ... the members of the San Felix municipal council know nothing about the sewer systems and very little about the structure of the development agency, they too felt powerless with reference to the CVG."
Revising the Strategy

An analysis of population projections showed that to attain the CVG's balanced growth goal, 99% of all growth (for six years) after 1962 would have to occur on the western side of the Orinoco River. The planners decided that the only way to begin controlling the flow of squatters was to provide planned settlements or "reception areas" for the arriving immigrants. Unfortunately, planners were unable to provide housing sites fast enough for the incoming population.

In 1966 the CVG revised its implementation strategy in an effort to mitigate local problems at the site. The result was a change in the style of interaction with the local settlers and arriving squatters. The Municipal Council's representative on the FUNVICA board was given equal voting weight with the CVG representative. A local office of the CVG was established to coordinate planning decisions with the Municipal Council, various utility interests, and community service organizations.
Because the planners underestimated the influx of low income settlers, the government altered its goal of attracting people with industrial experience and skills to staff Ciudad Guayana's economy. By the mid 1970's the CVG had yet to reduce substantially the level of imported foreign expertise to provide assistance to industrial operations. This situation is slowly changing as local government solves problems, the quality of housing improves, and commercial activity emerges in the town center.

The relationship of the professionals to the local people, the relationship of the local people to the land; and the patterns of local influence in Ciudad Guayana all affected the government's original set of objectives.

The initial decision to locate the headquarters of the CVG 300 miles from the project prevented adequate communication between the local settlers and the professionals. The planners were unable to respond to day-to-day problems at the site, and the locals could not
understand the planners' goals. Ultimately, the government learned that it was necessary to staff an on-site office of the CVG.

Class distinctions between the planners and the local people led to delays in dealing with the massive influx of immigrants. In time the professionals realized that it would only be possible to build the city as envisioned by accommodating the needs of the overwhelmingly low income populous. The strategy of neglecting squatter settlements in order to construct a new town center to attract skilled, higher income workers simply did not work; it had to be adjusted and a balanced approach pursued.

In Ciudad Guayana the existing villagers have strong historic ties to the land and there are legal rights assumed by arriving squatters. By failing to recognize the importance of these ties the planners assumed that growth could be directed away from San Felix and reoriented near Puerto Ordaz. The objective could not be realized. The traditional settlements had a vitality and economic life
matching the expectations and needs of the existing population and most new immigrants. The planners learned that they must provide housing sites and services to accommodate these immigration streams in order to avoid paying unnecessary dual compensation for the squatters' land rights.

The new city center was not constructed within the intended time frame, because the CVG was unsuccessful in attracting the necessary private commercial business ventures. The economic status of the immigrants could not support high quality commercial activity, and the department stores were reluctant to locate in Ciudad Guayana because of these market conditions. The government learned to institute programs aimed at upgrading the education and skills of the local population as well as to import Venezuelan professionals to work in the Guayana industries.

The patterns of local influence demonstrated that detailed master planning alone does not guarantee
success. The longer the planners remained in their world of plans and papers, the more the local settlers resisted the efforts of the Caracas based directives. It was only after the local political infrastructure organized and after the CVG established formal avenues for communication that the local people began to understand the nature of the project. The FUNVICA organization resulted in a more coordinated effort to solve low income housing problems. Compared to the early planning years, Ciudad Guayana is now moving toward a partnership between the local residents and government planners.
Chapter 4:

Milton Keynes New Town - England
INTRODUCTION

When complete Milton Keynes will provide homes for four hundred thousand people by the early 1990's and accommodate population overspill from the urban areas of London and Birmingham. With legal authority derived from England's New Towns Act of 1946 Milton Keynes is being constructed on 21,900 acres of farmland.¹

The government established a development corporation located at the project site to provide a central authority for all aspects of the development. When the development corporation began to assemble land for the development in 1967, the population of Milton Keynes was approximately 40,000 people who were living in existing towns and villages; construction began in 1970 and by 1975 the population had grown to 70,000 people in accordance with the predetermined strategy.

Milton Keynes lies in one of the most important transportation corridors in Britain: the M1 highway connects London with the industrial midlands. The project site is midway between London and Birmingham with two
railways and the Grand Union Canal crossing the site. The consultants believed the project's proximity to the Technological Institute at Cranfield and to Cambridge and Oxford Universities made it an exceptionally attractive center for the development of new science-based industries.²

When Milton Keynes was designed, the bulk of the existing population lived in one of four towns: Bletchley, Stony Stratford, Wolverton or New Bradwell. Additionally, there were eight smaller villages in the designated area with the balance of the population spread across 17,000 acres of countryside.³

Although the location of existing communities define its basic physical form, the design for Milton Keynes was based on a transportation grid.⁴ Additionally, within these communities the planners had to accommodate a number of buildings having historic or architectural significance. The development area contained sites of archaeological interest, including the main corridor from
London to the northwest originally built and used by the Romans.5

The planners' strategy called for providing medium-sized neighborhoods with local schools, shops and community facilities. The plan also detailed a new city center containing a regional shopping mall that would offer entertainment, offices, shops and recreational facilities.

Milton Keynes has overspill agreements with London and Birmingham to provide jobs and relieve congestion in residential areas. Citizens willing to move to the new city are put on waiting lists by the older community, and when job vacancies open in Milton Keynes they are notified and given priority status over applicants from other areas. Citizens become eligible for housing when their new employer nominates them. In addition to ensuring that the new city takes most of its population from London and Birmingham, the overspill agreements control development timing and location of immigrants by
coordinating the arriving settlers with available housing and jobs.⁶

The Milton Keynes Development Corporation hired a consultant who showed special sensitivity to local control and social development. In their response to the request for proposal the consultants said, "The general conclusion was that Milton Keynes must be planned to give people what they want and no committee of experts should try to dictate the future patterns of life in the city. This is not a new idea, but it is new to take it seriously..."⁷

Seventy-three percent of the land designated for development in Milton Keynes is currently agricultural land supporting a total of 225 farmers and farm workers. Farmers are concerned that they may live in an "agricultural slum" during the transitional period, although plans for the new city are phased so that farm land can be used as long as possible before actual construction begins. Additionally, farmers losing income will be fully compensated for their land and livelihood.
Consultations

Shortly after a local office of the development corporation opened at the Milton Keynes site, the consultants held several open meetings on the master plan and administered a door to door survey. Concerns included the link road alignment, provision of public transportation, effect on existing settlements, preservation of village areas, the city's cost, and adequate public services. The corporation responded to questions and concerns of the citizens, and several aspects of the master plan were refined to reflect these local concerns.8

Indeed, the ongoing communication between the planners and the residents increased local understanding of the project, allaying many of the fears of the farmers, and was instrumental in pinpointing development problems. Throughout the development process the people have had ample opportunity to review and comment on the plan. The government has responded by amending the new town structure to meet local needs. Although a number of problems remain to be resolved, such as the lack of mass
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LOCAL PEOPLE AND THE LAND

transit to access shopping in the older districts, the corporation continues to address local concerns.

Outside the villages and hamlets, generations of family farmers have worked the land. There are two major costs that the agricultural community bears because of the new town development. The first is that farmers will lose income during construction. Even though the government's policy is to compensate farmers for their land, there are additional costs to the farmers that include moving to another location, changing occupations and possibly receiving lower earnings or remaining unemployed. The second is the loss of one's traditional work place and historic method of making a living, an important although unquantifiable cost. 9

Many of the residents were concerned with the phasing and timing of Milton Keynes because they had historic ties with their homes and forms of livelihood. The consultants planned to provide an economic role for the older communities as regional shopping centers, and with
incentives provided by the government some of the existing commercial areas have thrived providing newcomers with adequate shopping services before constructing the new shopping districts. This phasing will help the older commercial centers remain viable after Milton Keynes is complete.

Stony Stratford, for instance, is similar in character to a traditional English market town. When the project began, Stony Stratford had several empty shops and houses; property values decreased and traffic congestion worsened. The corporation was able to attract new commercial prospects to the community by working with the citizens to upgrade the declining buildings and by constructing a new by-pass road to route heavy traffic around the district. It was important to the citizens of the community that the character of the town be preserved, and so far it has been. 10

Farmers have influenced the form and phasing of Milton Keynes by collaborating with researchers at the
Agricultural Department of the University of Reading. However, local influence was greatest in the older commercial areas, because the business people and residents were concerned about the impact of the new town development on their economic activity. As a result of this concern the development corporation has worked to ensure that their position as neighborhood commercial centers is preserved and enhanced.

Local village inhabitants and early arriving immigrants have influenced the development of Milton Keynes through public meetings and surveys. The government has used their responses from these sources of information to refine the master plan before it was published and to open better lines of communication between the residents and the planners. One result of the survey was improved government coordination of social services delivered to existing residents and immigrants.¹¹

The process for designing and constructing new towns in England ensures that local authorities review and
approve proposals at various stages of the project development. The first step is to designate a site. To accomplish this the Minister of Housing and Local Government consults with local authorities and allows for public inquiry. The second step is to create a development corporation, and the third step is to prepare and submit a master plan for review by national agencies, local government and concerned citizens. Finally, detailed design plans are prepared by the corporation.\textsuperscript{12} The consultants went beyond these legal requirements and directly consulted the local residents.

Because of historic weakness in new town social planning, the consultants not only requested special surveys of the existing communities and new residents but also considered a social development plan as a necessary component of the physical development plan for the new city. To this end they addressed institutional roles and responsibilities for health care delivery, educational systems, public relations, local government, churches, housing management and public participation.\textsuperscript{13}
Community Councils

In addition the government supported the formation of local community councils. These councils supplied the institutional framework to deliver social services in Milton Keynes, addressing such diverse activities as grass-mowing, managing schools, delivering meals on wheels to elderly residents, and providing basic health care.14

Economic conditions of the mid 1970's presented the greatest influence on Milton Keynes development. The worldwide economic downturn caused the planners to reassess several major assumptions and revise the transportation system. In spite of severe criticism, the government was able to redirect the interim development and proved that the plan could adapt to new conditions.

CONCLUSION

In developing Milton Keynes, the government addressed issues resulting from the relationship of the professionals to the local people, the relationship of the local people to the land, and the patterns of local influence and institutions.
In the early days of the development the farmers and local people were concerned about construction phasing, relocation and the impact of the development on existing towns and villages. The decision to locate the development corporation at the project site enhanced the ability of the government to communicate directly with the citizens. Working within a legal framework that fosters consultation in new town development with the proper local authorities, the consultants went beyond requirements of the law to encourage participation in many forms: surveys, open meetings and formal design reviews. The result was a better understanding of the project at the local level; a more predictable future for the farmers whose land would be condemned; and an ability on the part of the designers to fine tune the physical and social development strategy.

Historically the existing communities (Bletchley, Stony Stratford, Wolverton and New Bradwell) played key roles in regional development north of London and the
residents felt historic ties to their communities. Many buildings were on the historic register and several sites of archaeological significance dotted the Milton Keynes development area; the planners therefore designed programs to renovate and rehabilitate these older communities.

In addition to providing an economic role for these communities as regional shopping centers, the development corporation also framed much of the overall design plan around these older communities and their existing transportation networks. The strategy for Milton Keynes reflected the planners' desire to expand on existing growth patterns and provide a flexible framework to accommodate future change.

The local population influenced the form and timing of Milton Keynes' development through public meetings, door to door surveys and complaints about the lack of adequate public transportation. Existing institutional support from local government in the region reinforced these patterns of influence.
The formal overspill agreements with London and Birmingham assured that the development would have a predictable stream of immigrants. But, more importantly, the policy of not providing housing for the immigrants before they secured employment allowed the planners to coordinate housing supply with the incoming population.

Poor economic conditions were the most pronounced influence on Milton Keynes' physical form and development timing. The world wide recession slowed economic growth, tilting the ratio of private investment in housing and industry and assuring that the already small transportation system would be inadequate. Fewer people moved to Milton Keynes and those that arrived did not own automobiles. This situation tested the major goal of the plan: flexibility.

After a thorough review and analysis the planners discovered that the plan could be altered to meet this changing situation and rising local expectations. Adjusting density and changing land uses within the
overall framework allowed the professionals to iron out these difficulties in preparation for future development.
Chapter 5:

Sha Tin New Town - Hong Kong
When construction is complete Sha Tin New Town will provide housing and employment for one-half million people by 1985. The majority of the residents will come from congested areas of Hong Kong and Kowloon. According to a recent government publication on Sha Tin, "The environment is planned to be convenient, attractive, and self-contained, providing new opportunities and freedom of choice in a socially-balanced community." 1

The project is being developed in the New Territories of Hong Kong along the Shing Mun River at the intersection of several important transportation routes connecting the People's Republic of China to Hong Kong. A major portion of Sha Tin will be constructed on land fill, and the town center will be structured around an inter-modal transportation complex linking the Kowloon and Canton Railway to major highway networks. A central bus terminal and regional parking complex, together with offices, housing and shopping facilities, will be unified around a central plaza. The existing Sha Tin village and
Sha Tin New Town - Regional Location
Urban squatters, a regional shopping place for nearby villages, will be removed to make way for the new development.

Historically, most immigrants from China chose to locate in the urban areas of Hong Kong and Kowloon. Many of these families constructed homes out of almost every conceivable material wherever space was available including the rooftops of highrise buildings or junks anchored in typhoon shelters. Today the density of one section of Kowloon is estimated to be 5,000 to 6,000 persons per acre, while at the urban fringe living conditions for squatters have never been free from disease, fire, typhoons, and landslides.

Housing conditions in Hong Kong are complicated because steep topography and soil characteristics make 79 percent of the land virtually unbuildable -- there is little room to grow. Soon after a devastating fire ravaged a squatter settlement in 1960 leaving 50,000 people homeless, the government began to investigate...
prospects for future urban development and expansion. In 1972, the Governor of Hong Kong approved a major housing program to provide housing for 1.8 million people by the mid-1980's.

The four major objectives of the housing plan are to:

-- Rehouse all of Hong Kong's remaining 250,000 squatters;

-- Relieve overcrowding in the urban areas;

-- Provide self-contained accommodation for all households; and,

-- Provide housing for those who must be rehoused as a consequence of other government schemes.

Three new towns, Sha Tin, Tsuen Wan and Tuen Mun, will provide most of the housing and industrial development over a ten year time horizon. Detailed planning and design of the new towns is being carried out by government professionals and engineering, transportation and architectural consultants. The Government Town Planning Office and the Architectural Office of the Public Works Department (PWD) are the project's major coordinators.
Regional New Towns Map
These offices also provide most of the site planning and design work for public buildings.

The New Territories, leased from China in 1898, include 335 square miles of mainland as well as over 100 small islands off the Kowloon peninsula. When Britain leased the New Territories in 1898, there was little need for governmental administration in the scattered villages and towns; most activity was devoted to farming rice and vegetables, or growing commercial flowers and raising livestock. Two District Officers (one living in the northern territories and one living in the south near Sha Tin) were appointed by the Hong Kong Governor to handle administrative duties for land transactions and to serve as magistrates for criminal and civil matters.

Hong Kong's flood of immigrants after World War II stimulated development in the rural areas and made it necessary for the District Officers to allocate land for housing and industrial use, and therefore the Governor formed five separate districts to handle the rapidly
growing new territories. With the development of the three new towns, two new districts were created in 1974 bringing the total to seven districts, each with a District Officer and a staff of a hundred or more.³

The Commissioner for the rural district officers, officially known as the Secretary for the New Territories, is generally responsible to the central Hong Kong government for New Territories affairs and the welfare of its inhabitants. The Secretary is also the land authority for the New Territories, and is in charge of controlling land use including allocating, disposing and acquiring land for development.⁴

The original inhabitants of the New Territories retained possession of their village land at the time of the British takeover. The remaining land was deemed "unallocated crown land" and was leased by public auction. However, at the time of the occupation Governor Sir Henry Blake issued a proclamation promising "commercial and landed interests will be safeguarded and usages and good customs will not in any way be interfered with."⁵
In keeping with this original directive, the Secretary for the New Territories must ensure that all government policies and programs are explained to the villagers in a way that is understandable to them. A network of Rural Committees structured this necessary communication. Each village has one or more "village representative" elected or nominated to sit on the Rural Committee. These village representatives are organized into 27 Rural Committee areas and stay in contact with the government through the District Offices. In addition to providing a liaison with the Hong Kong government, the committees arbitrate clan and family disputes and give advice to the people in their village.6

The chairman and vice-chairman of the Rural Committees along with other community leaders in the New Territories form the Heung Yee Kuk. The Kuk was established in 1926 as an assembly of appointed elders to advise government, but over time it matured into an elective body making its own choices. In 1957 this
system broke down when a number of elders resigned in order to speak authoritatively on behalf of the people. They claimed that government had no right to interfere with the villages in the New Territories.  

Such an assertion was unacceptable to the colonial government which withdrew its recognition of the Kuk, making it an unlawful society. Then a new ordinance was passed reconstituting the Kuk as an advisory body organized under a new structure. Today, this statutory body meets with the Secretary for the New Territories on a regular basis to discuss problems and government policies, and senior members of the Kuk also sit in on government sub-committees dealing with land tenure and selected policy matters.  

According to the ordinance, the Heung Yee Kuk was formed to promote mutual cooperation with the central Hong Kong government. The Kuk also advises government on social and economic development matters and encourages traditional customs and functions in the New Territories.
In fact, the Kuk's influence is greater than its constitutional functions suggest. For example, in 1972 the Kuk threatened to organize a protest march to demand changes in land policy and village building regulations; after three weeks of negotiating the Secretary for the New Territories announced that agreement had been reached with representatives of the Kuk on all their demands.10

When the decision was made to build the new towns, the government decided that the rural committees could not deal with problems related to urbanization of the New Territories. In 1977 the Governor announced the formation of local urban advisory councils to fill the consultation gap between the government and the people. However, officially the councils are limited to giving advice on "the provision and use of recreational and other public facilities."11 In contrast, the responsibilities of the District Officers include: gathering political intelligence, representing the interests of the villagers to higher authorities, coordinating activities
of local government agencies, explaining government actions at the village level, administering land transactions, controlling squatters, encouraging local development, arbitrating disputes, assisting in educational administration, organizing relief work in emergencies, and organizing social welfare activities.\textsuperscript{12}

In 1973 the Public Works Department was charged with the responsibility to plan and develop new towns. The PWD therefore established the New Territories Development Department (NTDD), a new division under its structure and purview, to implement the new towns program. During planning and development each new town is under the direct control of a Project Manager supported by an on-site professional staff and several consultants. When the projects are complete, the New Town Administration and other government departments will be responsible for the daily management of each new town's activities. The Sha Tin development team is composed of senior architects, engineers, and town planners who organize and
review the work of consulting engineers, private architects and Public Works Department employees assigned to the project.

In the fall of 1976 the development office consisted of a project manager, a chief planner, one senior staff planner, one architect, and three engineers. The project was three years into the ten year time line and was in several overlapping phases of development: long range planning, detailed design, site preparation and building construction. By the end of 1977 the staff had nearly doubled.

Sha Tin New Town will be developed in two major stages. Stage One will accommodate a population of approximately 240,000 people in the central area of Sha Tin. Stage Two, which will begin while Stage One is still under construction, will finish the remaining work necessary to complete the project and to house a total of 500,000 people.
Sha Tin New Town - Phase Map
As with both Milton Keynes and Ciudad Guayana, the first priority for the Sha Tin development office was to prepare a physical plan for the new environment. Unlike Milton Keynes, however, the Sha Tin development team is designing a detailed master plan for the development. Today there is an outline master plan that details land use by development parcel and structures the major transportation networks. The government professionals and private consultants are now producing site designs for each individual land parcel. After a site design is complete it is approved by several government agencies; the land is then acquired and cleared of any structures or squatters. Next, the site is prepared, roads are built, sewers are installed and utilities are connected. After designs for individual buildings are produced and reviewed by the government, construction begins.

As in Milton Keynes, several types of residential communities are planned for Sha Tin. The residential zones will vary in style, size, location and population.
density in order to encourage maximum diversity throughout the new town. While the density in Sha Tin will be much greater than those in either Ciudad Guayana or Milton Keynes, it will be considerably less than that of Hong Kong as a whole. Just as a key function of the physical plans in Milton Keynes and Ciudad Guayana is balance, a great deal of effort in Sha Tin has gone into creating an appropriate balance between various town functions. According to the plan, housing will be balanced with available jobs; schools, with numbers of children; shopping, with residential areas; and health and social service facilities, with service needs.\textsuperscript{13}

To achieve a balanced living environment facilities are planned to meet the residents' basic needs including safety, shelter, security, health, education, employment and recreation. A development program is updated annually to coordinate the physical development and guide the new town's progress. The development program outlines the population projections, highlights the progress to
date, details changes in the government's policies, allocates public resources and estimates the level of private investment in the project.

Investment for Sha Tin is balanced between public and private interests; the government hopes to build a partnership. Approximately sixty percent of the investment in Sha Tin will be from government sources, and forty percent is anticipated to come from the private sector. However, private investment is complicated in the New Territories because the lease is due to expire in 1997, less than twenty years from the start of the new town construction. The government's goal is to develop Sha Tin in time to allow a reasonable amortization period for investment before the lease expires. Completing the new town by the mid-1980's leaves a ten year period before 1997, and given the structure of Hong Kong's dynamic mortgage market, private investors can realize returns from Sha Tin before the lease expires.
Like Milton Keynes, the site for Sha Tin was chosen because of its physical features, its proximity to central urban areas, and its immediate access to major transportation networks. The New Town will be built on a flood plain around a wide, shallow cove on the southern end of Tolo Harbor. Surrounding this cove are foothills leading to steep, high mountains that frame the valley's environment. Since most of the city will be constructed on land created from fill in the shallow cove, massive reclamation works will be required before actual development can take place. To date about three-fourths of the required reclamation is complete and construction on two residential areas, the town center, and several private developments is underway.

Except for fill areas, land not under construction in Sha Tin Valley has been leased back to the local villagers mostly for agricultural purposes. Of the eventual 500,000 people who will reside in the new town, approximately 45,000 currently live in the valley. About
General Land Use

KEY

- **TOWN CENTER**
- **RESIDENTIAL and COMMUNITY USE**
- **LIGHT INDUSTRIAL**
- **OPEN AREAS (GREEN BELT)**
half of this population lives in two public housing projects built since 1973, and the remaining people live in villages scattered across the valley floor and nestled in the foothills. There are approximately 35 villages located within the boundaries of Sha Tin New Town and, as stipulated in the New Territories lease agreement with China, villagers have rights to their land. The remainder of the land in Sha Tin Valley is crown land and belongs to the British government.

Most people living in the new housing estates travel to Kowloon to work, while most villagers living in the low-lying areas grow vegetables and commercial flowers to sell in Sha Tin and Kowloon. Tourism also provides a major source of income for the local people, since a number of Hong Kong's major tourist attractions lie in the Sha Tin Valley. The development office plans to incorporate many of these attractions into the new town including the historic walled village of Tsang Tai Uk, the Sha Tin Floating Restaurant, the Temple of Ten Thousand Buddhas, and the To Fung Shan Mission.
There are already some officially sanctioned light manufacturing operations in the valley offering local employment, including a cotton yarn factory and textile dye works. As in Ciudad Guayana, there are also numerous small-scale manufacturing enterprises scattered throughout the valley that have been established primarily by squatters. However, with the exception of some short term leases, the government considers the latter operations illegal.

Government planners in the development office have decided which villages are most compatible with the new development and which villages must be relocated. Several villages have already been programmed for redevelopment or relocation, but the cost of relocating villagers is expensive, time consuming and sometimes violent confrontations between villagers and the district police. The villagers find it difficult to leave their ancestor’s land to find new employment, as did the farmers in Milton Keynes. Land in transition is not
easily controlled, as the Ciudad Guayana planners learned. Unguided squatting in these areas has led to confusion, conflict and unintended land uses.

Planning and design of Sha Tin New Town reveal western methods. The planners and engineers in charge of the development are European, and many of the Asian professionals on the design team have educations from western institutions. Consequently, the Sha Tin masterplan reflects the spatial organization and land use arrangements of other British new towns.

Like the Milton Keynes planning office, the Sha Tin New Town Development Office is located on the project site near the new town center in a building immediately above the regional District Office. The interdisciplinary team of architects, engineers and planners are working within planning and design standards that are more liberal than those constraining previous Hong Kong projects. To address environmental issues a consulting firm completed a landscape masterplan for the project in
April, 1977. In addition to delineating the landscape and urban design features of the city, the master plan provides a wealth of data on natural systems in the Sha Tin Valley.

However, to date there has been no concurrent effort to evaluate the human or social systems existing in the valley. The development office has not attempted to accommodate impacts of the rapid population build up on the government's ability to coordinate necessary services. So far the main thrust of the Development Office is to create a physical place while the District Office coordinates land transfers and relocates villagers or squatters when necessary.

The professionals in the Sha Tin Development Office tend to have a paternalistic attitude toward the local settlers, viewing themselves as the driving force behind the creation of the new town. Like their Venezuelan counterparts, they feel that the local people are insufficiently educated and too unfamiliar with the
project to benefit the development process. An interview with a Sha Tin planning official in 1976 revealed the prevailing attitude of the professionals toward consulting with local residents.

"Participation?; Oh yes...well, it doesn't work here. Why, the reason for participation at all is to help inform our planning decisions. Look, in this housing crisis we don't have time to participate, neither do the community people. We have looked at the problems, that tells us what the needs are...then we set the goals; that's planning."\(^4\)

The pressures created by Hong Kong's exploding population are compounded by severe land constraints and fueled by the tight time horizon. In this environment government staffing constraints and capital expenditures have become criteria to justify urgent decisions that are often based on insufficient information and inadequate communication. As in Ciudad Guayana, there has been minimal effort to respond to village problems or to accommodate squatter's needs. However, unlike the Venezuelan venture, social scientists and professionals from related
disciplines have not been encouraged to aid the government's planning process. Since the new town projects began, one conference on social planning in a new town was held at the Chinese University in 1975. In spite of a large response from the public and university researchers, none of the conference recommendations had been implemented as late as 1977.

Once a public or private design plan has been submitted to the Development Office, the design review is coordinated among those agencies having an interest in the development (often as many as 32 separate government departments). Comments are synthesized, and the developer has the opportunity to negotiate requested changes through conferences with the project management staff. Once approved the plan may undergo schematic design, detailed design, working drawings or construction. At each threshold there is ample opportunity for the government team to evaluate the proposal critically. In spite of this thorough government review, there is little room for local comment.
Unlike the level of local comment sought for Milton Keynes, Sha Tin villagers and residents have had the opportunity to view the overall master plan once at an exhibition held in the old Sha Tin town center. The government designers displayed a land use map as well as a model of the proposed town center. Suggestions could be offered in a suggestion box placed near the display. The planners were surprised that so few responses were received in the box, although one senior planner remarked that the villagers needed no education on how to read and understand the land use map. The district office received a flurry of requests for more information about the status of villages and homes that were in clear conflict with proposed uses.

To accommodate the existing villages in Sha Tin the Development Office has indicated which villages are to be preserved, relocated, or redeveloped. The government has no jurisdiction within village boundaries until development rights have been acquired, but once the rights are
acquired redevelopment can begin. If the village is to be preserved, a village boundary is delineated on the master plan. In some cases the boundary abuts the village buildings, and in some cases a small green belt surrounding the village is included.

Delineating a boundary around a village does not alter the pressures exerted by the surrounding development on land values. Already villages are showing signs of responding to the rapidly changing social and economic forces. In addition to illegal industrial operations, the widespread immigration of squatters into Sha Tin is a predictable response to the growth of the new town. Like the Ciudad Guayana experience, this rate of immigration is increasing. So far the government has instituted a limited program to provide squatter settlements but has done little to guide the small scale industrial growth.

Unlike improvement schemes for the existing villages and commercial centers in Milton Keynes, at present there are no plans for upgrading village areas or for
developing village extension areas. This condition is likely to result in confusing land use, deterioration of traditional village environments and unguided development in the surrounding natural landscape, as it did in Ciudad Guayana.

Village industrial and manufacturing enterprises are likely to continue to spread as the local economy and life styles change, but there seems to be no institutional or legal mechanism short of police powers to cope with the type, style or tenure of these industries when they appear. Because of this lack of control, many of the industries are now becoming environmental hazards.

In the fall of 1977 the development office was not responding to these problems; the planners and designers were busy solving Hong Kong's housing crisis. Repeated attempts by junior Chinese planners to direct more effort toward the villagers and squatters were not effective. The development office, with its mandate to construct a city in ten years, did not have enough time to
accommodate the increasing flow of immigrants or to guide local "illegal" industries. In the interim the villagers resorted to more active means to express the need to resolve conflicts in land use, improve utility systems, institute health care and coordinate social services.

The Sha Tin Valley, which has been farmed since the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), has historical importance. Flat land in the valley bottom is noted for its excellent fertility and production of large volumes of rice. According to local history, Sha Tin rice is of such legendary quality that it has been served at the Emperor's table in Peking. Today these agricultural lands produce rice, vegetables and commercial flowers.

Many people in Hong Kong follow traditional religious and mystical beliefs that blend elements of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism into a form of local religion. Incense burning and direct communication with dieties are integral aspects of daily life. In addition, Chinese villagers have been using "fung shui" for thousands of
years to select the best possible village sites. This ancient practice is based on the belief that spirits associated with water, vegetation and climatic shelter (considered the three essential life giving elements) will provide the residents with good fortune, successful livelihoods and wellbeing. Faced with change in the surrounding environment, villagers believe that steps must be taken to soothe the disturbed fung shui and ancient spirits. The appeasing process usually involves extensive ceremonial rites and paying attention to the village ancestors.

In the early stages of the development Sha Tin planners discovered they must accommodate these religious beliefs and therefore began working with local fung shui experts to choose relocation sites for villages and burial grounds. Since village burial grounds are as important to the residents as the village itself, the costly, time consuming process of moving the burial grounds has been programmed into the annual development plan for Sha Tin.
Local Land Rights

Unlike any other inhabitants of the Hong Kong and Kowloon colonial region, the villagers have historic land rights. The British lease for the New Territories protects the villagers' rights to their community land unless the rights are purchased. The lease states that..."there will be no expropriation or expulsion of the inhabitants of the district included within the (New Territories) extension, and that if land is required for public offices, fortifications, or the like official purposes, it shall be bought at a fair price."\textsuperscript{16} Further, the treaty requires the government to provide each village with an area for future growth. Because of the importance of clan lineage to the Chinese, the treaty allows the sons of village elders to have housing space in the village area, so each village in Sha Tin must have land adjacent to the village designated as an "expansion area."

Currently the government compensates the village for taking land and residential structures by granting the
owner lease rights to a new lot and constructing a house. The government provides these new houses at a rate of one house for each 0.01 acres of land surrendered, whether or not there is an existing structure on the lot. The government provides compensation for use of village expansion areas by giving the owner a new lot and a replacement structure. In practice, however, fung shui and religious practices severely complicate the siting of these new structures.

The methods used to compensate the local population for adverse development impacts are similar to government requirements in Ciudad Guayana, except that new Sha Tin immigrants and squatters lack inherent rights to the land and are only indirectly compensated for relocation. While squatters sometimes receive compensation for loss of livelihood, tenants holding short term land leases lose their legal rights after the tenancy expires.

Given these legal, historic, and religious complexities in the relationship between the local people
and the land, the government has adopted policy guidelines for land acquisitions in the development area. There are six policies aimed at simplifying these complex land transfers. The policies include:

-- relocating villages to another site more compatible with the future development;

-- purchasing development rights through direct cash compensation;

-- acquiring development rights by issuing land exchange entitlements;

-- relocating tenant farmers to other areas of the New Territories;

-- housing squatters in public housing estates; and,

-- preserving villages in their existing form and location.

The first policy is to move the village to another location. This option differs significantly from any of the policy alternatives available to the governments in Ciudad Guayana or Milton Keynes. Already because of imminent engineering works, some villages are being programmed for relocation. Relocated homeowners receive
a new house and land at the government's exchange rate as well as compensation for moving expenses.

The second and third policies rely on market forces to establish appropriate levels of compensation. If a village is to be redeveloped, the landowner may choose between cash compensation (the second policy choice) and a 'letter B' land exchange entitlement (the third option). The letter B entitlement gives the landowner development rights to two-fifths of a unit of urban building land in exchange for each unit of rural land surrendered.

These certificates are marketable in a series, starting with the oldest issue and progressing to the most current. Each New Town development office has designated several parcels of urban development land for redeeming title B certificates. Developers who bid for the lease by purchasing the required number of certificates in the open market. The price of the certificates fluctuates with the market value of the land to be developed.
Because the government began issuing the letter B documents over ten years ago and has only recently begun to redeem them, certificate holders may have to wait some time until the entitlement enters the market. Some landowners are reluctant to participate in the program because the certificates are not tied to a specific piece of land, and the local landowners in the Sha Tin Valley have no guarantee that the certificates will be redeemed in time to provide their needed compensation.

More importantly, the land exchange program is now close to a point where the number of outstanding certificates will be greater than the amount of available urban building land. However, there is still village land that must be taken for urban development in all three new town projects. The government may soon have to revalue the ratio at which land is currently exchanged or offer cash compensation only for taking land. In either case, once the villagers sell or trade their land they typically move into Sha Tin public housing or the Kowloon urban area to enter the job market.
The government's fourth policy is directed at the farmers and some manufacturing enterprises in the Sha Tin Valley. In most cases the farmers and a few local industries lease land from the government or other villagers to engage in their livelihood. Like Milton Keynes farmers, they face a particularly uncertain future when the lease expires and government takes the land for development. In several cases the local district office has been able to lease agricultural land outside the boundary of the new town and has provided it to the farmers, but unfortunately it is impossible to meet all of the requests to relocate farmers in other parts of the new territories. There simply is not enough land to support all of the Sha Tin farmers, and as in Milton Keynes most will have to learn other skills.

The fifth policy addresses squatters who have settled in the valley. Some government officials maintain that among all the affected groups squatters benefit most from the new town because they are moved into public housing
estates. As in Ciudad Guayana, however, squatters are arriving faster than the government can accommodate them. In particular, squatters and ad hoc manufacturing operators are locating with surprising speed and density near the existing village areas in the head of Sha Tin Valley.

In 1976, the Sha Tin Development Office and the District Land Office attempted to institute an experimental reception area program, similar to the one in Ciudad Guayana, by providing two "resite areas" in the new town. The areas were designated for officially sanctioned squatting and provided a site, sanitary services and minimal building materials. The government's strategy was to move squatters from existing shanty areas to the resite area and finally into public housing when it became available. The strategy proved to be successful, but as in Ciudad Guayana the overall program was too limited to provide an effective means to coordinate the influx of new settlers.
As the government planners in Ciudad Guayana learned, it is difficult to ease the transition from squatter village to resite area and finally to a flat in a housing estate. The government's experience with relocating squatters, farmers and villages has revealed that the task is always expensive, sometimes violent and usually takes more time than anticipated. Further, new village houses must be constructed before old homes are demolished, and if the new village is not completed in time, the government must pay the villagers' housing expenses in the interim.

Difficulties encountered with each of the five policy alternatives, particularly high costs associated with relocation efforts, has caused the development office to decide that the majority of the 35 villages in the Sha Tin Valley shall be preserved. The local villagers and some Chinese members of the development team fear that this policy of blanket preservation may have resulted from the government's desire to avoid costly relocation
in favor of leaving things the way they are in the villages. Current government publications reinforce this point of view by highlighting the importance of preserving the local lifestyle, culture and heritage.¹⁷

Unlike Milton Keynes, the development office is presently unconcerned with upgrading the environment in the preserved villages. As a result some villages, particularly those that are surrounded with high density development or industrial zones, risk becoming small, impoverished ghettos once the traditional forms of livelihood are gone. Conversely, without guidance and assistance some villages may become light industrial areas outside immediate government control.

Because of the Hong Kong government's limited authority over village land use, speculation by local developers is leading to ad hoc village redevelopment. Even though the government intends to preserve most villages, land speculation will ultimately erode traditional patterns of ownership in many of these villages. For
example, in Tai Po a developer built 12 semi-detached, 3 story homes and sold them as condominiums on a flat by flat basis. If redevelopment of this nature were to take place in Tsang Tai Uk, Sha Tin's historic walled village, the consequence would be a loss for the entire Hong Kong community as well as the new town. Although the government is currently allocating resources for open space around Tsang Tai Uk, no administrative or financial actions have been directed at internally preserving the village itself; there are no guarantees for its future.

As in Ciudad Guayana, the villagers who are able to move to better living conditions will do so, but those who remain may become the victims of poverty or unsafe and unhealthy living conditions. Development of the historic Kowloon City demonstrates economic impacts that can be caused by surrounding a rural township with intensive development without providing the local settlers with a means to improve their immediate environment and to stimulate commercial enterprises.
The Sha Tin master plan calls for balance between planned levels of employment and the availability of housing units. Sixty percent of all housing in Sha Tin will be public, and forty percent will be privately financed apartments and houses. The master plan shows three major light industrial zones located at the east and west ends of the new town and north of the Sha Tin race course. In spite of the importance the planners have placed on the balance between employment and housing, firms have been slow to relocate. Current Sha Tin residents commute to work in Kowloon, do piecemeal assembly work at home or are employed in small illegal enterprises at the head of Sha Tin Valley.

Whether employment will be available at the same rate that housing is constructed is an unanswered question. So far no new major manufacturing plants have chosen to locate in Sha Tin. In addition to uncertainties about the future availability of employment opportunities, the development office planners face another potentially
critical problem: recent environmental studies indicate that if automobile traffic reaches predicted levels and polluting industries locate in Sha Tin, air pollution will become severe.

Ironically, the planners' concerns reveal a lack of knowledge about the distribution of work throughout Hong Kong and the New Territories. Many manufacturing and assembly enterprises are decentralized; they are located in small locally owned structures or on the first two floors of older private housing estates. The potential for siting small scale manufacturing enterprises within walking distance of the workers' homes is evident by looking at existing situations in communities throughout the new territories.

Perhaps Sha Tin planning is tied to the European notion that work and industry must be centralized in industrial zones away from housing. Economic conditions in Milton Keynes forced the planners there to consider decentralizing some small scale manufacturing to reduce
the worker's commuting distances. The local people in Sha Tin are ignoring the land use map and instituting small scale manufacturing near the housing estates and villages. Their actions are already influencing the development -- business activity abounds in locations contrary to the plan.

Although an important component of the Sha Tin development process is to provide neighborhood schools, health and recreational facilities, the Sha Tin plan, unlike Milton Keynes, addresses physical space and construction rather than social development programs. By providing the appropriate physical facilities for social welfare activities, the planners hope that the voluntary and charitable organizations (which traditionally provide most Hong Kong social services) will step in to deliver the necessary services. Attempts to ensure that the services will be provided at a level that meets demand are not as comprehensive or coordinated as the efforts underway in Milton Keynes.
Local Organization

As in Ciudad Guayana, however, the local people are beginning to organize and influence the actions of the development office because of problems in making the transition from the rural setting to an urban environment. In the *South China Morning Post* a village leader, Tsang Ying-Chung, expressed his opinion of the development office's attitude toward the villagers' concerns. Mr. Tsang said, "I am proud of our past and even prouder to see a glorious future for Sha Tin. But I think it unwise that the government will not consider the views of those who, after all, have lived on and been developing that piece of land for generations, land of mine and my fellow Shatinians." 18

In an effort to make village needs known, a delegation including Sha Tin residents visited London to discuss the future welfare of people in the New Territories with British government leaders. As the Heung Yee Kuk delegation argued, if the population of the New Territories doubles by 1985, as projected, "better water
and power supplies, medical services, educational facilities and other amenities are urgently needed."^{19}

This plea for direct contact with the government in London and greater local control in the New Territories not only achieved the desired close contact with Great Britain but resulted in plans by the Kuk to keep a permanent office in London.

When the planning and development office sponsored a symposium in 1976 to address social service planning, government and academic speakers offered a range of views on the nature of the project and ways to improve social services and health care delivery in the new town. The chief planner for Sha Tin stated that, "The aim of Sha Tin is not only to provide 500,000 people with satisfactory homes and employment, but also to encourage the formation of a healthy and balanced community where the basic needs of all its residents can readily be met: an identifiable and meaningful community in which people of all ages and incomes can live and develop healthily and socially."^{20}
However, most of the independent speakers stressed the need for more frequent communication between the government planning officials and the local residents. One researcher made three recommendations aimed at creating more cohesive social organizations at the community level:

1. Both government and public agencies should mobilize and organize the new residents to speed up the natural formation of primary groups and voluntary organizations which constitute a concurrent, solid and stable community.

2. Government must link and coordinate these primary groups and organizations to form a solidary social network. This network in turn is the basis for promoting community cooperation, fostering community spirit, controlling crime and instituting a responsible political infrastructure.

3. Physical facilities and carefully designed social welfare programs must be provided to enhance this process.

The researcher went on to say that community development especially at the grass roots level has significant role to play in Hong Kong and that government should initiate community development and participation rather
than make sporadic responses to local frustration. The experience of this native born Hong Kong researcher was that local people are willing to participate in planning and guiding their community's future if they know their efforts will bring results.

In the fall of 1977, the Sha Tin Development Office was building the new town according to the programmed master plan. Perhaps because of cultural differences or the overwhelming mandate to complete the project, opposition expressed by immigrants and the villagers was having little effect on overall planning decisions. In spite of recommendations made at the symposium on social planning, there were no sociologists or Chinese community development specialists on the development team. However, there was growing concern for the villages on the part of several Chinese planners and architects in the Development Office. The Sha Tin planners and designers continued to make strategic decisions in a vacuum:
although the office was located on the project site, those in control of the development remained isolated from the farmers, villagers and squatters. Site visits were made for engineering purposes, not to make contact or enhance communication with villagers or squatters.

Like Ciudad Guayana, these early years of formal planning and development have highlighted contradictions between the professional's view of the city and the more immediate needs of the local population. The professional staff in both Sha Tin and Ciudad Guayana are paternalistic toward the local residents. Both teams operated as though the villagers, settlers, and squatters are not educated enough or familiar enough with massive engineering works to contribute in a constructive way.

Local government in Sha Tin found that it was easier to influence project decisions by going directly to the highest power: the British government in London. As in Ciudad Guayana, there was no effective means for the villagers to communicate the need for on site services.
except through protest. At times in Sha Tin confrontations with disgruntled villagers were violent and police were needed to clear land or resolve disputes.

While the Hong Kong economy remains strong, the influx of squatters and unanticipated light industrial activity may affect locational decisions of needed investors. Most high income residents in Hong Kong live away from impoverished squatter settlements and may not wish to live in Sha Tin if there are immediate local problems. There could be an emerging conflict between the government's new town vision and the reality at the site, and as in Ciudad Guayana the development office may have to solve these immediate problems in order to realize their future goals.

So far the Sha Tin plan is a master plan in the truest sense. Roadways, infrastructure and land use parcels are fixed; many are under construction. There is little room in the plan for substantial change. The planners and designers have not analyzed what to do
should the social or economic climate of Sha Tin change. Already there is growing concern about what to do about the potential air pollution problems. Contingencies are not built into the system as they were in Milton Keynes and will be difficult to institute within the plan's rigid structure.

Sha Tin developers made the same decisions about preserving local towns and villages as the Milton Keynes professionals did. The rationale, however, seems different. Milton Keynes designers tried to weave the fabric of the new town within and between the villages; in Sha Tin the town seems to be designed in spite of the villages. A look at the Sha Tin land use map reveals several situations where a village's location conflicts with surrounding uses.

The mandate to develop Ciudad Guayana was based on the desire to develop natural resources. The mandate to develop Milton Keynes grew from a long term regional planning process to accommodate urban growth between
London and Birmingham. Sha Tin's mandate is the recognized need to house Hong Kong's population. Even though the ultimate population targets differ, all three projects have been analyzed at a time just after the first influx of residents; each project had between 40,000 and 50,000 residents. Hopefully, it is possible to learn from the experience in Ciudad Guayana and Milton Keynes for the benefit of the Development Office in Sha Tin.
Chapter 6:

Three Villages
This chapter outlines strategies for resolving problems with three Sha Tin villages. The first village, Tsang Tai Uk, was selected to illuminate problems and opportunities experienced when preserving a village in its existing location. The second village, Tin Sam, was chosen to illustrate how a village can be redeveloped with the villagers participating in the transition and financial outcome. Finally, Wong Uk village gives examples of complexities encountered when relocating a village to another site.

My decisions to recommend preserving, relocating or redeveloping these three villages grew out of published information gathered from the Sha Tin Development Office (engineering reports and landscape planning data) and my experience while working in Hong Kong. There is no decentral process for village level decision making in the new town development system. Evaluating the Sha Tin outline master plan illuminates contradictions in locational logic -- two of the three villages were
clearly out of context with the proposed new town structure.

Cultural preservation issues were considered because of the government's objective of preserving the villagers' lifestyle, culture and heritage. Clearly, culture and lifestyle have a far better chance of being preserved if a village is moved to a rural location, rather than being retained in the urban core.

The strategies and recommendations for guiding the village's transition are structured in response to questions asked in the assessment of Milton Keynes, Ciudad Guayana and Sha Tin New Town. The suggestions look at ways to structure interactions between professionals in the development office and the local villagers.

The recommendations will also address problems with land occupancy based on an understanding of the villagers' historic relationship to the land. In Tin Sam recommendations are also made for squatters occupying land near the village.
Finally, this chapter suggests what local institutional needs are evident within each village. In some cases the suggestions are in the form of procedural or organizational steps that should be taken by the villagers and the development office. As these processes mature it may be necessary to institute committees to take responsibility to ensure that the steps are taken efficiently and effectively.
Of all the villages in Sha Tin Valley designated to be preserved, perhaps the most important is Tsang Tai Uk. This village retains special historic significance because it was constructed early in the 19th century shortly after the British began to rule Hong Kong. Unlike any other village in the valley, Tsang Tai Uk is a walled village reflecting traditional Chinese city form. Government publications note that the village is the best preserved walled village in Hong Kong. Further, Hong Kong has ample administrative laws to protect historic structures.

The walled village is rectangular, approximately 300 feet (100 meters) long and 150 feet (50 meters) wide, and the walls are tall enough to accommodate a two story development. In 1976 it appeared that there were 600-800 people living in some 100 to 150 apartments and houses within the village walls. The village is located on the south side of the valley below the road leading from Lion Rock Tunnel.
The Sha Tin Development Office has recognized the role that the village can and already does play as a tourist attraction in the new town. In late 1976 the development office had allocated ample open space in front of Tsang Tai Uk to provide for recreational amenities and to accommodate parking for tourists. The village was in need of renovation, and engineering work was underway to solve flooding problems. However, no actions had been taken to negotiate directly with the villagers or to preserve the integrity of the physical structure. The villagers did not know that their role in the new town was to become a tourist attraction.

The development office should form a team to work with the village leaders to insure that the villagers understand and are prepared for their changing role in Sha Tin. The development professionals and the villagers should agree on what work is necessary to improve the existing buildings. They should also decide how to accommodate any necessary expansion and work together to
bring Tsang Tai Uk within the protection of historic preservation laws.

The team representing the development office should contain the skills necessary to communicate with the local villagers. The team must also be able to help organize a representative group from the village and work with the central Hong Kong government to secure the historic status of the village. This team should be composed of:

--An architect with particular knowledge of or expertise in architectural history and Chinese city form;

--A planner who speaks Chinese and who is knowledgeable about Hong Kong's preservation laws;

--An engineer who is the professional that has handled the site preparation work thus far;

--A land specialist from the district land office who knows the status of home ownership within the walled village; and

--A "development specialist" with experience in working at the community level, preferably one who has worked with villagers in the past. This team member may come from the district office or from the Chinese University.
The villagers should be represented by their elders and immediate leaders together with representatives elected to sit on the district rural council. Other villagers concerned with the status of homes within the village should also be on the village team. The village and the development office should agree on a date and place for a formal meeting between the village representatives and the development office team. The first formal meeting should be devoted to exchanging information about the future of the village as envisioned by the development office and reviewing problems that the villagers currently experience or perceive they will experience as Sha Tin is developed around the village.

Subsequent meetings should address the need for and timing of physical improvements. The development office team should also take the lead in helping the villagers plan and prepare for expanding the village. Expanding Tsang Tai Uk will be particularly sensitive because of the need to preserve historic qualities of the walled village.
The development office team can provide the villagers with educational information about the new town. The team can illuminate the villagers' future and their new economic role in Sha Tin. The role of the professionals should also include helping to express the interests of the villagers in development office decisions. Most importantly, the development office team should provide professional expertise to the village at the request of the representatives. The professionals should support the villagers' desire to overcome administrative and legal obstacles when dealing with the government.

Tsang Tai Uk is the home of descendents of a man named Tsang. The village was originally founded over 120 years ago as a rural retreat from the urban settlements in Hong Kong and Kowloon. The land adjacent to the village has traditionally been farmed in low lying rice paddies.

If the village structure is not protected by historic preservation laws, it is probable that ad hoc
redevelopment will destroy the historic qualities that make the village attractive. It is unclear whether the villagers understand their changing economic role in Sha Tin or their changing relationship to the land. They are losing one source of livelihood (agriculture) and are assuming a different way of life (tourism).

In 1976 the villagers were not engaging in agricultural activity on land in front of and along side the village. The paddies were drained and a few water buffalo were grazing on a small amount of grass that had grown. The villagers seemed already to be engaged in tourism or had found other means of employment.

Since the village already had become something of a tourist attraction without resistance from the villagers, the transition from agriculture to alternate ways of making a living is underway. However, it is apparent that some villagers may have problems making the transition because they lack job skills. The development office should help the village initiate a training
program through the Hong Kong social welfare department or private business in the new town.

Because the treaty with China allows sons of village elders to have homes within village boundaries, Tsang Tai Uk may need space for expansion. In 1976 there were no immediate occupancy problems with squatters or illegal industrial enterprises, and it appeared that local enforcement was successful in keeping adjacent land clear for site improvements and recreational development.

Should expansion space be required by the villagers during negotiations with the development office team, additional space will have to be found near Tsang Tai Uk to accommodate the growth. It appears from a site evaluation that there is room for the village to grow on the rear site toward the nearby hill. Providing for growth in this direction preserves the integrity of the walled form and allows necessary expansion. Alternately, individual houses may be sited on the nearby hillside without intruding visually or contradicting the scale of the walled structure.
A physical layout plan for the village extension area should be prepared. The layout should show the specific land uses, the arrangement and location of structures and should detail a phasing plan for implementing improvements. The group representing the village should guide and review the preparation of the layout plan for Tsang Tai Uk. The plan should also encompass the existing village area and outline a strategy for physically upgrading sanitary and housing conditions.

One of the initial problems that the development office and the village representatives should address is the appropriate strategy for preserving the physical integrity of the walled village. However, once there is consensus between the village representatives and the development office that Tsang Tai Uk is to be preserved as a tourist attraction, then the villagers can play an integral role in ensuring that the intended preservation takes place.
The first step should be to protect the village through Hong Kong's historic preservation laws. However, the village representatives should understand implications of the law for redevelopment and rehabilitation of the village. The development office team can be instrumental in assisting the villagers in applying to the Hong Kong Historical Society for historical building status. After the village is on the historic register, most of the necessary enforcement can take place within the village itself.

Perhaps the best means toward this end is for the village representatives to review proposals for village improvement. A set of preservation guidelines should be developed so that any changes or improvements to the village reflect the traditional architectural form. When necessary, the group could play a coordinating role with the Historical Society, the Hong Kong government and the Sha Tin Development Office by reviewing redevelopment and preservation proposals.
Options for growth and rehabilitation should be explored by the development office team together with the village representatives, and there should be mutual agreement on preferred strategies. Physical improvements, including drainage and sewer connections, should be identified and scheduled for capital expenditure improvements. The 1976 engineering report identified some physical improvements, however it was unclear who would incur the cost or whether the village agreed that the list of necessary improvements was in the correct order of priority.

The village representatives, working with the rural council, could also help the district land office coordinate housing transfers within the walled village itself. Should homes be sold or transferred to other villagers, the villagers could help insure that the physical space is maintained and improved within the overall set of preservation guidelines.
Finally, the village representatives and the development office team should develop a strategy for managing Tsang Tai Uk as a tourist attraction. The groups should address how income can be generated from tourism through concession sales and should define what areas of the village are off limits to tourists. The groups should also decide how the village is to be policed in the future and how the recreational and parking areas are to be managed.

The villagers should know whether they can charge admission to visitors and should establish what is the most beneficial mix of concession sales to be offered. More importantly, the development office and the villagers must agree on who should manage and derive revenue from parking facilities and recreational areas adjacent to the village. The villagers should have a role in managing these areas and should receive income from them as a form of compensation for lost land.

The village representatives should develop a strategy for internally distributing the revenue generated from
tourism. For instance, the village could either divide the income on a per capita basis or establish a development fund from which payment is drawn for those who work for the tourist operations. The balance of this fund could be retained for on-site improvements and invested for the benefit of the village as a whole.

Tsang Tai Uk should retain its physical position in the development and has an economic role to play in Sha Tin New Town. Squatting and uncontrolled light industrial activity are not problems in the area. Further the villagers seem content with the village becoming a tourist attraction. The villagers can, however, play an integral role in the development of Tsang Tai Uk as a preserved entity.

It is important to enhance the relationship between the development office professionals and village representatives. By structuring positive negotiations with the villagers and by providing an open avenue for information about the new town development, the
with the villagers and by providing an open avenue for information about the new town development, the development office can benefit from enhanced local management. The villagers, on the other hand, should take the necessary steps to insure that preserving Tsang Tai Uk will result in decisions that are economically beneficial to the village.

Addressing preservation and growth issues in Tsang Tai Uk should result in building local capacity to provide for enhanced development decisions and local management. The villagers should take the lead in developing guidelines to review proposals for improving or upgrading the village. They could also help the development office schedule and approve capital improvements.

The village representatives should guide the preparation of a physical plan for extending Tsang Tai Uk. The representatives can play an integral role in deciding in which direction the village should grow and in siting
individual houses near Tsang Tai Uk. The elders and elected representatives of the village should also negotiate with the development office team to arrive at a strategy for managing the adjacent land.

Structuring local institutions to address issues that include village preservation, income generation and distribution, and management of the adjacent land should result in a development area that the villagers are willing to maintain because it is in their financial interest to do so. Ultimately, Tsang Tai Uk should become less of a burden on Sha Tin because the management and preservation enforcement can be accomplished locally.
Tin Sam Tsuen village provides a prime example of a village that will be out of context with the surrounding new town development. Tin Sam is located at the head of Sha Tin Valley on the south side of the tidal cove, and should it be preserved, the village would be surrounded on three sides by high density (10 to 20 story) public housing and on the fourth side by a light industrial zone. The village is medium sized by Sha Tin standards. There appears to be 60-70 individual structures, and the population is estimated to be at least 1000 people.

Government publications originally listed this village as being scheduled for relocation because of primary road works and the adjacent high density public housing. However, a 1976 engineering report noted that because there were problems with finding a suitable resite area the village should be retained. The land that Tin Sam occupies is suited to denser residential or commercial development related to the surrounding housing estates.
For Tin Sam the available policy choices should extend beyond preservation or relocation. The options should include the opportunity to redevelop Tin Sam in cooperation with the villagers.

Because Tin Sam is located in an area that is strategically appropriate for higher density development, the village runs the risk of becoming an impoverished ghetto or an unofficial light industrial zone if it is preserved. Early in 1977 several illegal industries were already operating in the village area, some of which were becoming safety and environmental hazards. A rattan factory had no fire fighting equipment at all and an auto repair shop was spilling waste oil, damaging nearby commercial fruit trees.

In spite of these conditions, the development office decided that the most appropriate strategy was to preserve Tin Sam and not recognize that the land was already in transition. Redevelopment was taking place in response to the economic pressures on the value of the
land -- the villagers had decided to put their land to a more productive use.

The Sha Tin development office can build on this local initiative by structuring a process to redevelop Tin Sam with the villagers participating in planning for the transition and in the financial outcome. Since land values as far back as 1977 indicated that the area is ripe for redevelopment, the government should rezone the land and offer the villagers joint development rights.

In forming a team of professionals to work with Tin Sam villagers, the development office should assign expertise similar to the team formed for Tsang Tai Uk. Instead of retaining an architect experienced in history and preservation, however, the team will require expertise in the procedural and financial aspects of development. Other expertise -- planning, engineering, and land transfers and community development specialists -- should remain the same.
The villagers should have broad representation including village elders and leaders, and representatives to the district rural committee. Representatives of homeowners in Tin Sam and representatives of the light industrial enterprises should also be included on the Tin Sam team.

Once both the village and development office teams are assembled, the groups can set an agenda on issues requiring negotiation. The first step is to outline a range of options for the future development of Tin Sam. Alternatives for consideration may range from expanding the light industrial activity (with the area becoming a legitimate small scale light industrial zone) to creating a commercial shopping center that connects to adjacent housing estates. Tin Sam may even be redeveloped into a medium density commercial housing area.

Although the current activity indicates the villagers have adopted light industrial activity, the development office may think the more appropriate use is residential
development. Alternatively, developing a commercial shopping center may bridge some of these problems and provide high income to the developers of the project.

Once a preferred option is identified the groups should agree on an overall phasing plan to guide the village's transition. The phasing plan should address such broad issues as the appropriate timing for offering development options to staging for the land clearance. However, the phasing plan should also detail a coordinated strategy for redevelopment that ensures that villagers are not left homeless during and after construction. The Hong Kong government can be instrumental in assisting the villagers during this transition period by offering low interest loans repayable from the proceeds of the villagers' interest in a transformed Tin Sam.

After the groups have agreed to what kind of development is appropriate for Tin Sam and a phasing plan is set, they should achieve consensus on a strategy for acquiring and distributing revenue from the redevelopment
project. The mechanism for administering the villagers' interest in the development can be a Community Development Corporation described in the section on local institutional needs. Sha Tin villagers by law must receive fair compensation for losing village land. Fair compensation can be achieved through a market mechanism if the villagers retain joint development rights in the new development.

The relationship between the development office professionals and villagers from Tin Sam should be one in which the professionals support the existing entrepreneurial skills evident in the village. As in Milton Keynes, the planners and designers should help the local people improve their existing environments and structure economic links to the surrounding communities. Conflicts between the existing village and the new development can be resolved and the development office team can assist the Tin Sam villagers in continuing the redevelopment that started in 1977.
Local Relationship to the Land

Tin Sam is not the oldest village in the valley, having grown after World War II when there was an influx of Chinese people from China into the New Territories. Traditionally, the villagers were farmers on the paddy land which surrounded the village. However, the rice production declined as the villagers turned to growing commercial flowers and ornamental trees because these crops were more lucrative.

With the development of Sha Tin New Town most of the agricultural land near Tin Sam was taken for road works and public housing. The villagers responded to the construction activity in the same way that rice farming was converted to more valuable crops; they opened small commercial and light industrial operations to maintain incomes. In Tin Sam agriculture ultimately gave way to small scale manufacturing and industrialization. These transitions indicate that the villagers accepted their new economic activity; it was the development office that thought the village should remain as it always had been.
The construction works and development activity on Sha Tin resulted in limited squatting near Tin Sam, most likely because there were job opportunities in the village. In 1977 the squatting seemed to be contained on the east side of Tin Sam near the roadway construction.

The squatter settlement should be included in the phasing plan for redevelopment because it is an important aspect of land in transition and Sha Tin's urban form. The development office professionals and the village representatives should discuss what role the squatters should play in Tin Sam's redevelopment scheme. The squatters were providing a source of labor for manufacturing activities underway in 1977, and their labor may be required in future years. From the point of view of the development office the area may be suitable for an official squatter location in the new town.

As the development office and the village representatives form a strategy to accomplish the redevelopment, there will need to be an institutional mechanism to guide
the development process and to distribute proceeds from the resulting development. As stated previously, the most equitable and profitable means toward redevelopment may be for the Sha Tin development office to offer both the villagers and private entrepreneurs joint development rights in the intended development project.

A village development corporation could be the representative organization within the village to coordinate redevelopment. This organizational structure enables legal and administrative functions of a joint venture to take place in the village. The village corporation should take the lead in determining whose rights in the village are honored and at what rate they will be valued.

A system similar to the letter B development entitlements could be applied within the village so that land owners are compensated from the development corporation in proportion to the market value of the land. Alternatively, as in Tsang Tai Uk, interests in the new development could be divided along clan or family lines.
or could be distributed on a per capita basis. The objective is to design an equitable disbursement system, but the villagers themselves should take the initiative in defining what is equitable.

The final duty that the village group should address is to institute a process for guiding individual family relocation. The development corporation can be effective in coordinating these transitions by working with the Hong Kong housing authority, the district land office and the Sha Tin development office. Making the transition between a traditional village environment and new housing estate is rarely easy; it is often time consuming, confusing and difficult. The development corporation, aided by the development office team, should contact the social welfare department to provide assistance to families in need of counseling, medical attention or assistance to ease these difficulties.

Conclusion Studying a land use map for Sha Tin New Town reveals that Tin Sam is not in scale with the proposed surround-
ing development. A village the size of Tin Sam is out of context with light industry and high density public housing. Further, the villagers themselves recognized the changes and responded to these opportunities by opening illegal small scale manufacturing enterprises.

In spite of the lack of a suitable location to resite the village on another location, the development office and the villagers can cooperatively redevelop Tin Sam. It is uncertain whether the villagers will agree with any redevelopment proposal; what is certain is that they are already willing to convert a substantial portion of the village and that the development office did not approve of the ad hoc redevelopment taking place in 1977.

The villagers can play an integral role in the future physical and economic development process. It is critical to structure a positive link between the village and the development office by forming a team of professionals with diverse skills to negotiate with representatives from the village. These meetings should result in
decisions that benefit both the new town developers and the villagers. It will also be necessary to structure local institutions to address development timing, phasing and distribution of finances. A community development corporation can provide the necessary administrative organization to make decisions about land rights and local compensation and can aid in relocating village families.

If the group representing the village and the development office team negotiate openly and if the development office team is willing to assist the villagers technically, decisions about Tin Sam should be productive and appropriate to the needs of both groups. More importantly, the redevelopment process could become a precedent for organizing development and arriving at a means for compensating villagers in other parts of the new town.
Wong Uk is a small village located at the foot of Yuen Chau Kok, an important Fung Shui mountain in Sha Tin. The exact age and population of the village is unknown, but the houses in the village appear to be 20 to 30 years old, and in 1977 about 100 to 200 people lived in the village. Wong Uk occupies an area approximately 825 feet (250 meters) long and 165 feet (50 meters) wide, while 15 to 20 village structures are well integrated into the landscape of Yuen Chau Kok. Near the village is a burial ground located on the back side of the hill.

This village is targeted in the master plan for relocation because of its small size and conflicts with the surrounding development. The development office has filled in the tidal basin fronting the village, and there will be 15 to 20 story private housing constructed on the new land. High density private housing estates will also be developed immediately to the right of the village site. The Yuen Chau Kok mountain will remain an open space in Sha Tin new town.
In 1977 the development office and district land office had contacted the villagers to begin negotiations for moving the village. These discussions indicated that the villagers were willing to move if new houses were provided. However, the villagers disagreed with the number of new houses that the government offered.

The Sha Tin Development Office and District Land Office have had extensive prior experience with relocating villages. Early negotiations with the villagers revealed that there was agreement that Wong Uk should be moved; where to move the village had not been decided and how many new homes to build was disputed. The development office should form a team with the district land office to negotiate with the villagers and to provide professional expertise to resolve problems around house construction and siting. The team from the development office should include:

--an engineer who is familiar with site preparation work for village resite areas;
--a representative from the district land office who has worked with Wong Uk villagers;

--a Chinese speaking planner from the development office who is familiar with available alternate sites for village development;

--a Fung Shui expert who can aid in the resiting of individual homes and the burial grounds; and

--an architect who can prepare site design alternatives and communicate with villagers.

Since Wong Uk is so small, the traditional elders and elected leaders may be sufficient to represent the villagers; however because resiting the village may have implications for other Sha Tin villages, Wong Uk's representative to the rural council should also be a member of the team. The village's size creates the opportunity to review site plans in village-wide open meetings when broad consensus is required for making decisions.

Once the villagers have agreed to a date and time to meet with the development office team, the group should resolve problems with the number of houses the government is willing to construct. Regulations allow the
government to provide replacement houses at the rate of one house for each 0.01 acre of land taken for development. If the result of this formula is to reduce the total housing stock within the village, the development office should consider replacing the total number of houses.

If that is impossible, the government could provide basic shells for the additional houses requested and allow the villagers to complete the house. This process could resemble that of a self-help housing project; the expense to the government is minimized and the occupant gets credit for labor needed to complete the house. Another option which builds on local entrepreneurial skills is to provide extra land in the village resite area for additional housing. A villager could then construct additional houses to sell or transfer to other villagers. This added income to the village may be taken as a form of compensation for moving the village.
After agreeing to the number of houses to be provided in the new village, the groups should evaluate options for resiting the village. Expertise from the Fung Shui master and the development office planner will be required, because the location of the burial grounds and the orientation of the village as a whole is critical. It would be beneficial at this stage to organize open meetings in the village so that all concerned villagers have an opportunity to review and comment on the siting alternatives.

After agreeing to a location for Tin Sam, the next step should be to site the individual houses. The architect and the fung shui master should play primary roles when working with villagers to locate houses on the new Tin Sam location. These professionals should coordinate choices for house location and community buildings with the engineer so that water and sewer infrastructure may be constructed.
The development office professionals should meet individually with home owners at this stage to resolve any locational or orientation problems. In addition, the architect and fung shui expert should meet with groups of families because of fung shui complexities or because families may wish to cluster their houses.

Finally, a phasing plan for moving the village should be detailed so that the villagers can see that there will be new homes available before the old village is taken for development. The transition for the village can be eased if the team of professionals help insure that the process of moving is well coordinated and timed with ongoing development activities. The plan should outline each step that will have to be taken to move individual homes and all community structures, and the professionals should involve the villagers in creating the plan so there is clear understanding of any difficulties that may occur.
Local Relationship to the Land

Since the site for Wong Uk is small and borders the Fung Shui hill, there were no immediate problems with squatting or illegal light industry in 1977. Since the village had existed for approximately 30 years, the villagers, like most villagers in Sha Tin, probably derived their livelihood from farming and fishing. However, by late 1976 the cove in front of the village was reclaimed and site preparation work was underway for the residential development planned for the area. The villagers had begun the transition from a rural lifestyle to urban existence.

The major problem in Wong Uk will be to accommodate the necessary fung shui aspects of site planning to resite the village and burial grounds in an appropriate location. These local beliefs involving the villager's relationship to the land; spirits must be respected.

When siting a house or moving into a new apartment, the spirits associated with these elements must be consulted so that the residents will have good fortune.
and successful livelihoods. As the development office learned in the early stages of Sha Tin, these factors must be integral to the process of relocating villages. When designing the phasing plan, it will also be necessary to allow time for the appropriate rites and ceremonies to take place when the burial grounds are moved.

If it is possible to accommodate, the new village site should allow space for farming. Few villagers in the Sha Tin valley were growing rice in the late 1960's because most had found that income was greater from growing commercial flowers and ornamental and fruit trees. If the village is to be resited on the hillside south of Sha Tin, it may be possible to allow space for these forms of agriculture because these crops require less space than rice paddies do and can be grown on small hillside terraces. Maintaining as much of the traditional ways of life as possible will ease the villager's transition and may result in an easier site selection process.
Local Institutional Needs  

Because Wong Uk is a small village, the group that represents the villagers should be able to be the primary negotiators with the team from the development office. But the village team should be supported with open meetings for the entire village. Unlike Tin Sam, there is no need to form a Community Development Corporation; it is however, important to institute a process that enhances and facilitates village wide consensus.

All villagers who hold land and houses in Wong Uk have a stake in the outcome of site location decisions and should have the opportunity to approve the general location of the village as well as help site individual homes or groups of homes. It is therefore important for the professionals to delineate options for the village to consider; the options can be reviewed and evaluated at open village meetings.

Early village wide meetings should achieve consensus around the general location for Wong Uk and later open meetings should set the specific site orientation of the
village. Options that are presented at these meetings should illuminate the positive as well as negative aspects of the site; dialogue during the meetings should result in consensus decisions.

Finally, the group representing the village should address relocation issues similar to Tin Sam because it is important to schedule the timing between construction of the new houses and demolition of the old structures. If the development office needs the village land before the new homes are constructed, then the Hong Kong Housing Authority will be required to find and pay for temporary accommodations. The transition may be easier if there is a group within the village that helps resolve these problems and coordinate activities involved with moving the households.

Wong Uk is in conflict with the proposed surrounding development, and in 1977 the Sha Tin Development Office and the District Land Office had initiated consultations with the villagers about relocating the village. The
villagers were in agreement about the need to move the village, but there was disagreement around the number of houses that the villagers would receive as compensation for losing their land.

The development office should form an interdisciplinary team to continue talks with the villagers. Compensating the villagers on a house for house basis or instituting a self-help housing program in Wong Uk may resolve the disagreements that initially halted the process. The team from the development office should build on past experience with relocating villages by employing fung shui experts and by reviewing options for relocating the village at open meetings. Instituting such an open process for making relocation decisions may result in decisions that are more timely and better understood by the villagers.

The villagers should be led by a representative team that links to the District Rural Council. The village team should coordinate relocation and siting decisions
with other members of the Rural Council representing villages near the chosen relocation site.

The key to a more harmonious relocation process lies in professional recognition of traditional beliefs and respect for the graves of village ancestors. It is especially important in this instance to support the villagers' desire to achieve the best location for the new village and to retain, as far as possible, their traditional life styles and ways of making a living.
SUMMARY

The Sha Tin Development Office and the District Land Office should work with Sha Tin villagers on the suggested strategies for preserving, relocating or transforming the villages. The objective should be to offset short, medium and long range impacts affecting the villages. The strategy should include: (1) identifying employment opportunities; (2) upgrading the villages to be preserved; (3) accommodating shifts in land use; and (4) redeveloping of some existing village areas. Key elements involved in implementing such a strategy include revising the Sha Tin development plan, preparing a physical layout plan for village extension areas, and communicating with village residents. Interim measures (such as connections to utility service) and long term actions (such as instituting community development corporations) should be taken to guide the villages to ensure that they will be preserved in a way that complements the new town as well as the village.
Local employment patterns will shift when the villagers are no longer able to farm in the Sha Tin Valley. Employment opportunities for these villagers will be limited, especially for those who are unaccustomed to modern mechanization and industrial organization. Typically, unskilled workers engage in small scale manufacturing or assembly activities. The Social Welfare Department should be contacted to assist residents who cannot enter the job market. Training courses in nearby industries should be structured to help upgrade this labor force.

Certain types of nonpolluting cottage industries should be planned and encouraged. Cottage industries can link to nearby light manufacturing through packaging, sewing, prefabricating, or constructing components. Cottage industry of this kind is already widespread throughout Hong Kong and does not seem to disrupt living conditions or social patterns. This development can be encouraged in village extension areas, since the
entrepreneurial activity will benefit the villagers as well as the local industries.

Finally, a top development priority should be to upgrade sanitary conditions in the preserved villages. Some villages lack sanitary facilities completely, and most village houses lack separate kitchens and running water. Open sewers often pose severe health problems.

Sha Tin will be the first development in Hong Kong to have central sewage treatment, and the villages that are preserved should be connected. In the short run these facilities could be provided at a central location in the village, and in the long run the village improvement plan should provide water and sewer connections to each home.
Chapter 7:

Conclusion And Recommendations
The Ciudad Guayana and Milton Keynes cases reveal the importance of accommodating the needs of the indigenous population at the project site and integrating new immigrants into the development. The cases illustrate different approaches to working with the local settlers to coordinate the transition from rural to urban environments.

The Milton Keynes case illuminates the relationship between the professionals and local settlers. The case shows that it is possible to structure frequent and positive interactions between professionals and local people at the project site. The Ciudad Guayana case illustrates issues in the relationship between the indigenous people and the land. This case describes complexities encountered when large numbers of squatters immigrated to Ciudad Guayana.

Taken together, these studies reveal the patterns of influence and describe institutional relationships at the local level of government. Ciudad Guayana had rudimentary municipal and local government institutions
that were not coordinated with development decisions. Milton Keynes was developed in a political economy in which local institutions and government offices were well staffed and highly integrated into public decision making. Development decisions for Milton Keynes were reviewed and approved by several local entities and citizens at each stage of the planning effort.

In Ciudad Guayana the government learned that its efforts were often thwarted because Caracas based master plans failed to coincide with conditions at the project site. Immigration far exceeded the planners' expectations, squatting was rampant and most immigrants continued to follow traditional development patterns. Because the planners failed to solve development problems by preparing physical master plans 300 miles from the site, the government ultimately learned it had to open a local development office in Ciudad Guayana and began working to resolve more immediate problems. The development process became somewhat smoother once the Venezuelan planners learned to accommodate needs of the local
settlers rather than to expect that the master plan itself would create the new city.

In Milton Keynes local participation and consultation on development decisions was by design. The government involved both the existing population and immigrating people from the outset. The planners were able to change the design of the plan when economic conditions and local choices revealed inadequacies in transportation system and housing densities. They learned that the residents provided the best source of information about necessary improvements in the quality of existing village centers and local service needs. However, in Milton Keynes there were no problems with squatters immigrating to the project (as there were in Ciudad Guayana), and the local government was well organized and institutionally mature.

In summary, the first two cases illustrate that activities at the project site and interactions with the local settlers can slow, halt, or alter strategic decisions. Like Milton Keynes, the Hong Kong government chose to locate the Sha Tin development office at the
project site; however, the professionals viewed the local people paternalistically as the Ciudad Guayana professionals did. Class distinctions in Sha Tin are similar to the Venezuelan operation -- the local people are lower class and are so treated by the professionals.

In Sha Tin the local people are poorly informed unlike the citizens in Milton Keynes. At times violent confrontations have erupted between the development authorities and villagers. The situation is similar to Ciudad Guayana where the local settlers do not understand the planning or development effort.

As in Milton Keynes there is a tradition bound population living in the Sha Tin villages. The villagers have historic land rights and, like Ciudad Guayana, these villagers have been joined by an influx of squatters into the region. However, unlike squatters in Venezuela, Hong Kong squatters have no legal occupancy rights.

In all three new town projects the local people influenced development decisions. Sha Tin is more like Ciudad Guayana where the influence was ad hoc and
confrontational. Interactions with local people were designed into the Milton Keynes development process. The Venezuelan government ultimately responded to the local pressure by opening an on-site office and being more attentive to local problems.

To avoid the pitfalls of Ciudad Guayana and to build on the Milton Keynes experience, local consultation should become a part of the Sha Tin development process. A process of consulting with the local citizens as suggested in Chapter 6 can foster a greater sense of community on the part of the residents and should result in environments more suitable to local needs. It is in the interest of the professionals to take advantage of the residents' ability to pinpoint problems before they become insurmountable.

Consultation and local participation can be used as a way to educate, inform, gather information or convince people of the wisdom of pursuing a certain objective. Local project reviews, as in Milton Keynes, can also be used as a way to make local people more aware of changes
occurring around them. However, the basic objective is to enhance decision making through responsible local control. Once the local residents demonstrate that they have the capacity to provide relevant information and are informed about their future, local problems in Sha Tin should be easier to coordinate and resolve.

In the best of all possible worlds a development process should include both central and decentral ways of consulting local people and making decisions. As in Milton Keynes, the local residents played a major role in ensuring that their environments were appropriate to the intended development. However, the process of consulting with the residents was central to and coordinated by the development office.

The chapter on three Sha Tin villages outlines steps that should be taken when preserving, relocating or redeveloping a village. The chapter keys on structuring positive relationships between the professionals and the local people and suggests ways to accommodate complexities with the local people and the land. By
building local institutions and networks to solve problems the chapter suggests that decision making and participation should be decentral at the village level.

In Sha Tin there should also be a centrally coordinated process of consulting with the new town residents similar to Milton Keynes. The process should be coordinated by the development office so that decisions made at the village level do not adversely affect other aspects of the new town development.

Techniques similar to those used to consult with local residents in Milton Keynes can also be used in Sha Tin. Door to door surveys reveal not only attitudes (or misconceptions) that residents have toward the project, but can also be a means toward assessing the environmental quality of villages that may be preserved. Public meetings in Milton Keynes organized to review development proposals aided communication about the new community's ultimate form and implementation strategy. The dialogue generated at such meetings can be instrumental in alerting the development office to potential service
delivery problems or land use conflicts before a crisis takes place.

To strengthen local government institutions, the Heung Yee Kuk, the rural committees and the urban councils should become part of the government's planning and design review process. These groups should begin reviewing development proposals and decisions at strategic points. The groups should become part of the development office's regular design review process and their comments can be coordinated with the other government agencies that review planning proposals.

Instituting these forms of interaction with Sha Tin villagers and new town residents will work in the long term interest of the Hong Kong government. The overall result of these measures should be heightened community spirit, more informed planning decisions and more positive relations with the development office.
CHAPTER THREE NOTES:


15. Robbins, pp. 133-137.
CHAPTER FOUR NOTES:


5. Llewelyn-Davies Weeks Forestier-Walker and Bor, "Response to Brief for Master Plan," p.2.


7. Bendixson, 103.


CHAPTER FIVE NOTES:


2. New Territories Development Department, p. 4.


5. Miners, p. 140.


7. Miners, p. 144.


15. New Territories Development Department, p. 6.


17. New Territories Development Department, pp. 6-8.

18. South China Morning Post (n.d.)


20. Hong Kong Council of Social Services, p. 11.

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