NEW SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION IN BOSTON:
A STUDY OF THE POLITICS AND THE PROCESS

BY

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ABSTRACT

New School Construction in Boston: A Study of the Politics and the Process
William Lee Roberts
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in City Planning, January, 1972.

The thesis document analyzes some of the factors which enter into the process of new construction of public schools and how these factors are influenced by community groups, public agencies and individuals in crisis situations. In order to provide data for the construction of an analytical model of this process, seven case studies of specific school building problems are presented. The first of these case studies concerns a proposed vocational school in Portland, Maine and the remaining six case studies concern various school projects in the City of Boston.

The study begins with a brief preface which introduces the author and describes his personal experience with municipal administration and planning as a planner employed by Portland, Maine and Boston, Massachusetts. An introduction to the case studies presents an analytical framework consisting of a recurrent pattern of conflict, crisis and resolution which is used in the presentation of each of the case studies. Definitions are given for these three phases of the school planning and construction process utilizing the model which is developed in the analysis and conclusion of the thesis.

The seven case studies present illustrations of various problems encountered in the process of planning for new public schools. The first case presents a simplistic situation, followed by five cases presenting examples of community interaction, internal bureaucratic conflict, community frustrations, bureaucratic response to community needs, and problems of community leadership and organization. The final case study presents a complex situation which combines many of the problems discussed in the previous situations.

An analysis of the recurrent theme of conflict resolution is presented through the use of a quasi-economic model based upon minimization of cost and completion time. Several diagrams are included to provide a graphic representation of the analytical model. The conclusion discusses the possibility of the development of this model to provide management strategies for future use in accelerating the process and in increasing its responsiveness to the needs of the various actors.

Several appendices are included which describe the history and background, actors, and process in school construction in the City of Boston. Relevant legislation and a supplementary bibliography are also included.

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PREFACE

In the summer of 1968, while working for the Planning Department of the City of Portland, Maine, I had my first experience with the process of planning for a public school system. Although my thesis concerns itself primarily with the process of school planning in the City of Boston, I believe that the Portland experience may help to supplement the Boston data insofar as it allows certain contrasts and similarities to be demonstrated. Therefore, the first portion of this document describes my experiences with Portland in 1968 in the hope that the less politically sophisticated population and administration in that small city may provide the reader with some guideposts to use in examining the Boston experience.

Since June of 1969 I have been employed by the Public Facilities Department of the City of Boston as a "community planner." Along with two other planners, I have been charged with the responsibility of working with individuals, community groups, and governmental agencies and bodies in producing completed school buildings in Boston. Just as the process itself, the position is nebulously defined and often the work seems to have little structure or logic in its mandated responses to complex and unexpected circumstances. It is my intention to describe some of these circumstances and the process in general by examining
several specific projects.

After three years of involvement with the planning of educational services and facilities, it is still unclear in my mind that there is any rational structure which can be said to be imposed upon the process. However, there are some recurrent themes and patterns which do become apparent and in the third part of this document, I will attempt to describe those commonalities and use them to establish at least a partial framework which constrains the process.

Of primary interest is the recurrent theme of problem, conflict, crisis and resolution. It becomes apparent through examination of the seven case studies presented herein that the primary goal of the actors in the process is to either allow or prevent the process from reaching some preestablished goal. Those actors on the prevention side attempt to provoke crisis while those on the side of allowing the goal attempt to avoid crisis. Utilizing this simplistic framework it is possible to construct infinite variations of provocation or prevention of crisis.

Traditionally, an effective and efficient institutional structure is expected to function smoothly, avoiding conflict, and, when conflict occurs, resolving it below the crisis stage. It is possible that any attempt to reconcile this theory with maximum citizen participation in
the governmental process produces a significant paradox. Citizen participation appears to thrive on crisis and therefore the bureaucracy finds itself charged with both avoiding and provoking crisis situations. "Controlling crisis" may be the best description of the process but that itself raises certain ethical questions of forcing artificial crises on the lives of individuals. These questions are among those addressed in the conclusions of this thesis and should be kept in mind by the reader as each case study is presented.

In addition, I have attached several appendices to describe the legal and bureaucratic structure within which the Boston school building process occurs. These appendices should be of assistance to the reader in understanding the formal responsibilities of the various political actors and contrasting those responsibilities with the actual functions as described in the case studies. The two major pieces of legislation affecting the Boston school building process are Chapter 641 of the Acts of 1965, known as the Massachusetts Racial Balance Act, and Chapter 642 of the Acts of 1966 establishing the Public Facilities Commission. I have included both of these acts in their entirety in the appendices.
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

The objective of this thesis is to construct a model which behaves in a manner similar to the conflict situations which occur in the school building process and to use that model to devise certain rational strategies which will allow a degree of management to be imposed on the process by the controlling actors and agencies. To accomplish this end, seven specific case studies have been examined to obtain empirical data as to the behavior of the process and to allow a set of situations against which the model can be tested.

The case studies themselves are presented as three part situations consisting of conflict, crisis and resolution. These three elements are the result of a situation model which sees the school building processes as fundamentally linear with a constant objective of producing a completed and operating school. Because of the linear nature of the process, at any given point the outcome falls within a defined set of possibilities which becomes more specific as the process nears completion.

In addition, the process is constantly responding to demands which reflect the acceptable outcome as perceived by each of the actors and agencies involved. As long as the acceptable outcome of each actor
lies within the set of outcomes described by the linear process, the process continues without interruption. Different actors may have different acceptable outcomes within the possible outcome set. This disparity may be termed "conflict."

When the outcome set becomes more restricted, either due to the normal progress of the linear process or to some external action, certain outcomes are excluded from the outcome set and the actors desiring these excluded outcomes now find themselves engaged in a "crisis" situation. By either modifying the excluded outcome to fall within the outcome set or modifying the outcome set to include the excluded outcome, the crisis ends and this process of modification may be called "resolution."

Basically, conflict situations arise between two actors in the process although it is possible to have situations wherein individual accepted outcomes are shared by several actors causing conflicts between groups or groups and individual actors. How these conflicts reach crisis stage and how they are resolved are the core questions to be answered by the crisis model. By developing this sort of general typology for crisis situations it is hoped that it will be possible to recognize incipient crises and to maintain them at the conflict level or below.
Naturally, many crises situations occur wherein the acceptable outcome of a specific actor is excluded from the outcome set and the actor spontaneously resolves to change his accepted outcome without any attempt to modify the outcome set. For the purposes of this study these situations are both invisible and unimportant. However, application of the general model would indicate that these situations have almost infinite opportunity to exist and possibly it is this mode of resolution which keeps crises sporadic and discrete.

An examination of the case studies will make this structure more obvious to the reader. In the final analysis and conclusion the model performs fairly well and has already been a help to the author in ordering the apparent random chaos of the various interactions in the school building process.
CASE STUDY A

THE PORTLAND AREA

VOCATIONAL TECHNICAL HIGH SCHOOL
CASE STUDY A: PORTLAND AREA VOCATIONAL TECHNICAL HIGH SCHOOL

This specific case study is provided in order to present a simplistic model which identifies issues and processes which are common to school building programs in general. The Portland case concerns itself with a major state subsidized vocational high school to be built in a small city by a school administration and municipal administration naive about the broad spectrum implications of their actions in the building of such a facility. This case dates from about 1967, with the major decisions being made in 1968 and the school building under construction but not complete as of this writing at the end of 1971.

GENERAL BACKGROUND. The City of Portland, Maine has a population of approximately 65,000 persons in a metropolitan area of 200,000. Portland is located in the southern part of Maine, approximately 100 miles north of Boston, Massachusetts. Portland is governed by a nine member city council whose members are elected at large for three year terms, three members being elected each year. The Council employs a city manager who serves at the council's pleasure. The School Board is composed of six members, also elected at large, and employing a professional Superintendent of Schools who serves at the pleasure of the Board.
As specified in the city charter, municipal government in Portland is non-partisan, the party affiliations of the candidates not being allowed to appear on the ballots or in campaign literature. Municipal elections generally produce a small response from the electorate, with bond issues and referendum questions generally being a bigger attraction to the voters than the selection of municipal officials.

Geographically, the City of Portland consists of a downtown area, two older residential neighborhoods, a blighted residential-industrial neighborhood, and the waterfront area situated on a peninsula bounded by Portland Harbor, Casco Bay and Back Cove. During the period shortly preceding and following the turn of the century, the city annexed several of the small towns to the north and north west off of the peninsula. The town of South Portland (then Libbyville, Cash Corner, Knightsville, etc.) remained un-annexed, incorporating as the City of South Portland. Attraction of industry and commerce, both real and imagined, away from Portland and to South Portland is one of the prime issues in the minds of Portland officials and is given considerable weight in almost all decisions made by the Portland Municipal government.

Portland, like the entire state of Maine, is economically
depressed. The metropolitan area is growing with the predominant growth occurring in the white-collar suburbs in response to expansion in the service industries, distribution, banking and insurance. The city itself has been experiencing a decline in population since about 1950.

In response to the economic problems of the state, the State Legislature passed a bill in the early 1960s to create a number of vocational-technical high schools throughout the state. These schools would be located in specific municipal school districts with the state assuming 40% of the construction cost and adjacent municipalities reimbursing the district operating the school for staff and facilities costs on a per pupil capita formula.

In 1967, the School Department of the City of Portland made application to the State Department of Education for the construction of one of these schools to serve the City of Portland and the adjacent towns of South Portland, Scarborough, Gorham, Westbrook, Falmouth, Yarmouth, Gray, Cumberland, Windham and Freeport. It is unclear how these towns were selected as the school systems in the towns reported that they were not contacted until much later in the process. The selection appears to have been somewhat random and
possibly was made only for the sake of informal solicitation of comment from the State. Further investigation of the selection indicated various problems, often quite obvious, which were not considered. For example, the Town of Freeport, although only a few miles from Portland as measured by a straight line, is 50% closer to a proposed vocational high school in Brunswick, Maine due to the windings of the irregular coastline.

Based upon what one Portland school administrator terms a "not unfavorable reaction" by the State Department of Education, the Portland School Department Staff, consisting primarily of teachers who had come up through the system, prepared a list of courses which they felt should be included in the proposed school. The generation of this list was totally internal and no significant research was done into the local labor market nor into the aspirations of students or the parents of students in the school population. Based upon this list, and without further consultation with the State, the School Department established approximate areas required to conduct each program and a total site area of approximately six acres. This information was presented in an eight (8) page application to the State in early 1967, which was the only written document produced by
the School Department to justify their program and site requirements. The State took no action on this document, neither accepting nor rejecting it.

Based upon this tenuous beginning, the School Department undertook a brief and informal search for a site. This search took the form of an internal discussion among the various administrators outlining their needs, both operational and psychological. In Portland, as in most other urban school systems, much of the problem in arriving at any course of action is reconciling the perceived needs of teachers, principals and administrators in maintaining their constituencies and jurisdictions within the school bureaucracy. Compromises must be made and to do this various incentives of power and prestige must be used by the Superintendent to arrive at a consensus among his staff. In Portland, the acting Superintendent realized that his primary difficulty would be convincing the Director of Vocational Education to cooperate in producing this new facility. The incentive which the Director of Vocational Education required was an increased "empire" to offer each of his staff and an increase in prestige for himself before his rapidly approaching retirement. The result was the selection by the School Department of a site which was large and highly visible to the downtown area (although not in downtown) and
apparently easy to acquire under urban renewal plans already accepted by the City Council.

Under Title I of the Urban Renewal Act, the Portland City Council had undertaken two small renewal clearance projects, "Downtown I" and "Baby Bayside." Both were intended to be first phase prototypes for major projects, the former in the central business district and therefore unsuitable for a major non-taxable school development, and the latter in the Bayside industrial-residential area adjacent to the central business district. Neither project had been disposed of by the Renewal Authority with the exception of a portion of the Bayside site which had been developed as low-rise public housing in the early sixties. The clearance and relocation costs on both projects had been large and it was common knowledge that the City Council would look favorably on any scheme which would help make these sites attractive to taxable development. With this in mind, the School Department immediately settled on the large Bayside area as the ultimate site for the proposed vocational school.

Although it is impossible to establish any substantive proof of a connection between the actions of the School Department and the City Council, it is a fact that the elected leadership of the City
of Portland, both on the School Board and the Council, tends to be
drawn from the same social circles, business men's clubs, neighborhood
associations and industry affiliations. Therefore, it is not unreasonable
to assume more than coincidence in the selection of a preferred site by
the School Department which coincided not with the already acquired
land, but the bulk of the residential neighborhood which was to be
included in the second phase of the Bayside Renewal project had the
first phase been disposed of to a suitable developer. Moreover,
accepting the School Department proposal as a convenient method of
achieving previously accepted goals, the City Council had a few
misgivings about accepting the Bayside site and, in an official vote
in July 1968, acted to select eight blocks of the Bayside neighborhood
as the school site. Again, this action was at the recommendation of
the School Department and no contact had been made with the State
Department of Education to determine the acceptability of the site
for a school for which the State was providing 40% subsidy.

It is important to examine some of the general relationships
which govern the actions of the City Council and School Board in order
to understand the motivation for this action. Public leadership often
tends to act in accord with role models provided by the successful
private business community. This is not to say that business runs
the community, but that the officials in communities such as Portland
attempt to act as if they were business leaders as they perceive
business leaders act. In his presentation of this site to the Portland City Council, the acting Superintendent of Schools argued that the construction of a new vocational school on this site would remove some of the blight which was discouraging industry from locating on the already acquired and cleared land in the "Baby Bayside" renewal project. The dominant theme in the council discussion was that the school would provide an opportunity for completing the larger Bayside Renewal Project and that the Phase I portion had proven unmarketable only because it was not large enough to show good faith on the part of the Council to prospective developers.

Up to this point the City Planning Board had been uninvolved in planning for this major facility. Such non-involvement on the part of small city local planning agencies is not uncommon. For the most part these agencies are maintained by the municipalities solely for the purpose of administering the local zoning ordinances and fulfilling the requirement of preparing a "workable program for community development" in order to keep the municipality eligible for federal funds. Most such workable programs are lengthy documents which are carefully prepared by the planning agencies only to be sent to Washington and forgotten.

In accordance with law, the City Planning Board was required
to review the sites of all proposed municipal facilities and therefore, as a result of the School Department presentation to the Council, the City Manager instructed the City Planning Board to fulfill its duty and present a report at the next Council meeting, two weeks following the first presentation.

If past experience had held true, the Planning Board would have prepared a brief report giving projected acquisition costs, existing zoning, relocation problems, tax returns from the existing uses on the site, and a neutral recommendation deferring to the wisdom of the Council. At this point several independent factors came into play, interrupting the normal bureaucratic process and making it of particular value as a case study.

First, several months earlier, the Director of the planning agency died suddenly of a heart attack and the assistant director was left in charge of the staff operation pending the appointment of a new director. Normally, the Director acts as a buffer between the Planning Board and the Council through the City Manager's office. In this instance, the acting director did not realize the significance of the facts which his staff was uncovering until it was too late to keep these from being incorporated into the report and presented
Second, the Chairman of the Planning Board had been hospitalized and had just returned to his position on the Board. While in the hospital he was quite displeased to see his Board being ignored by the City Council in several minor zoning matters and felt that as a matter of good practice he would not allow the Council to easily override the Board recommendation on the next issue. He later admitted that he had no idea that the matter in question, the Vocational School, would present such a controversial tangle of conflicting interests.

Third, the matter had been assigned to the staff in mid-summer when five of the fifteen members of the staff were college students employed as "interns" by the department. Normally, the regular staff would have produced the cursory report described above, but the interns had been plagued by very minor tasks for the preceding weeks and felt that this matter deserved a serious job with considerable research.

Fourth, and possibly most significant, was the fact that the Office of Economic Opportunity had established a neighborhood office in the Bayside area three months earlier and that for the first time, Portland was experiencing some activism on the part of its low-income residents. In May, the local OEO staff had organized a mothers' march, complete
with baby carriages, to City Hall to demand better street lighting because of a rash of street crimes in the Bayside neighborhood. Normally, the City Council would have been affronted and would have ignored such tactics. However, the Public Works Commissioner had already recognized the lighting problem in his capital budget the preceding year and a contract had been let. A week following the march, the street lights began to go up, and although the march had nothing to do with the installation, the neighborhood residents perceived it as a victory and testament to the efficacy of neighborhood action.

It should be noted at this point that there was considerable animosity between the Bayside citizens and the City Council. In its action several years earlier of targeting Bayside as a prospective urban renewal area, it had in effect cut off the residents from any chance of obtaining loans for property improvement or from receiving their fair share of municipal repairs to streets, playgrounds and other public property in the annual budget. The neighborhood residents interpreted this as a method of the Council to cause blight and decrease property values and to reduce municipal expense in eminent domain takings.

The combined animosity and frustrations of the neighborhood
and the Planning Board resulted in a staff report which identified several problems and options unexplored by the school department and which strongly questioned the advisability of using this major school facility as a tool to allow the City Council to pursue its already ill-fated urban renewal scheme. Among the items discussed in the report were relocation costs and resultant time delays, availability of more suitable sites in middle class areas of the city, potential of the Bayside area for uses producing tax revenue for the city, and the inability of the school department to justify the specific site requirements. The staff report was accepted by the Planning Board and transmitted to the Council.

It is the practice of the Portland City Council to meet in executive session in the afternoon prior to its biweekly evening public meeting. At this executive session, the councilors were presented with their agenda for the evening and any back-up material which they may have had to consider. At four o'clock on an afternoon in July 1968, the nine members of the Portland City Council were handed the Planning Board report on the Bayside site of the Area Vocational Technical High School. Most councilors glanced at the report and put it aside to read during dinner. The City Manager went over the items on the agenda one at a time, giving the councilors a brief
description of what to expect. Having only scanned the Planning Board report because it had not come from the city printer's office until a few minutes before the start of the executive session, the City Manager made only brief comments upon the report, reminding the councilors that it was merely the document which they had requested the Board to prepare at the previous council meeting. At five-thirty, the executive session adjourned and the councilors left City Hall to go home or to have dinner at various restaurants in Downtown Portland.

Shortly before seven o'clock, the councilors began arriving and taking their seats in the Council Chamber. A quick inspection of the public gallery indicated the usual number of spectators and persons with business before the Council. Several of the councilors recognized the OEO director seated in the gallery and made mention of it to the manager. With the OEO director were several neighborhood residents.

In a later conversation, the reporter from the Portland Press Herald told me that he immediately noticed that the councilors were obviously upset about something. He noted that they were talking among themselves in hushed tones and the usual spirit of conviviality
was almost completely subdued. He used the public telephone in the corridor to telephone his wife and inform her that he was probably going to be quite late. As with most veteran City Hall reporters, he had a good feel for when something was amiss. As it turned out, he was quite correct.

CONFLICT. At seven o'clock sharp the Council was called to order. The City Manager read the first item on the agenda. It was briefly debated and voted upon. The next several items were treated similarly.

Following the reading of each item, citizens are granted three minutes each to make any comments which they may have to the Council. This hearing is not statutory but is a custom agreed to by the Council. Usually, one or two citizens will speak on each item. Appeals for zone changes or variances and applications for liquor licenses tend to draw most citizen participation as they affect the land-use patterns in the neighborhoods. Therefore, it is not surprising that a council action which not only changes land-use but displaces 115 families should evoke major response.

The item to accept the report of the Planning Board concerning the proposed Vocational Technical High School was read and quickly
voted upon. Only persons who have attended many council meetings are able to follow the action. This vote, being primarily administrative and not really debatable was quickly passed with a mumble from the clerk, an inaudible nod of heads and a quick bang of the council chairman's gavel. Several of the citizens who had come to the meeting to speak interpreted this action as their having been deprived of their right to be heard through some nefarious parliamentary maneuver. At this point a few of the Bayside residents left the gallery feeling frustrated and defeated. Others, who were more vociferous, let out with boos and catcalls.

After a brief consultation with the Council Chairman, the City Manager explained the action just taken "for the benefit of those in the gallery." This conciliatory action calmed the spectators and the meeting proceeded.

Next the clerk read the agenda item to accept the site proposed by the School Department at the previous Council Meeting. At the request of one of the Councilors, a practicing physician and non-professional politician who had run for council on a "good government" platform, the Chairman of the Planning Board presented the Board's report and read excerpts of it to the Council and to the spectators. Several
questions were asked by various councilors, few addressing the contents of the report and most questioning the credibility of the Planning Board in view of various past situations.

At his own request, the acting Superintendent of Schools rebutted the Planning Board report. His primary argument was that the City of Portland had to make application to the State Department of Education rapidly as there was stiff competition for available funds under the 40% subsidy. He assured the Council that everything was all right and that the most important thing was that they take immediate action. This strategy on the part of the acting Superintendent cost him two votes from councilors who later admitted in a cloak room conversation that they never made decisions under pressure and were offended by the attempt by the Superintendent to rush them into a decision.

Several area residents then addressed the Council. The general subject of their testimony was that previous eminent domain takings by the City for a road improvement project at the edge of the neighborhood had been unjust. The citizens argued that the City had forced low appraisals and had blighted the area through partial early takings to decrease values. Only the OEO director made any mention of the viability of Bayside as a residential neighborhood or the desire of
The Council then debated the issue for an extended period with the councilors' opinions apparently either preconceived or forming along traditional liberal-conservative lines. The Council chairman, who had been voted that post by his colleagues because of his apparent neutrality, was apparently weighing the implications of his voting with either side in view of other political considerations. The topics discussed by the councilors were not always directly applicable to the issue under debate, with several councilors taking obvious delight in insulting their colleagues' past performances.

Showmanship is a prime consideration in the styles of several councilors. One councilor, who was elected mostly through his comical and dramatic actions as a spectator present at each and every council meeting broadcast on the local radio station, made a considerable effort at his favorite ploy of placing his head on his desk and feigning sleep, including guttural snoring sounds, throughout much of the hearing and debate.

This council, having exhausted the possibilities for further insults and antics, accepted a motion to take a vote. The councilors settled down to reaching a decision which the majority had already
accepted two weeks earlier. The vote was five to three with one abstention.

Chaos broke out in the gallery and the meeting was recessed to allow calm to be restored. Usually a recess, in and of itself, will be adequate to allow both councilors and spectators to recover from any fits of temper or frayed nerves which a debate and vote may produce. In this instance, it was not the recess but the efforts of the OEO director which restored order to the chamber. Several of the neighborhood residents were determined to remain to resume debate after the recess. Only through the urging of the OEO director and his reassurances that a motion for reconsideration at the next meeting was the only course of action, did the residents leave the chamber or quietly remain for the remainder of the meeting.

Even though the remaining items on the agenda were dispensed with at a maximum speed, the Council did not adjourn until after 1 a.m.

CRISIS. If past experience in Portland politics had held true, this Council meeting would have signaled the end of the issue, the loosing actors would have conceded and all would have prepared for future challenges on other issues. Instead, the next day, when two
staff members of the Planning Board called upon the OEO director to express their disappointment in the turn of events, he did not commiserate but asked their help in planning a course of action to reverse the Council's decision.

In the ensuing discussion, it was decided that the planning staff members would help the OEO director in preparing an advocate report proving the Council with alternatives to the Bayside site. The question of municipal employees participating in an advocacy action against the municipal government was raised but had to be discarded as there was no other resource in a small city to which a neighborhood organization in the circumstance could turn.

In the following two weeks, the OEO director, his staff, and the two Planning Board staff members, including the author, prepared a brief report outlining two or more options available to the council in finding a site for this school. These options were either equal to or better than the Bayside site in view of cost, ease of acquisition, number of families and businesses relocated, future development potential to the City, and other common planning criteria. The report was informally presented to three of the councilors for their use. As only a councilor voting with the majority can move for reconsideration, the report was
presented to the one councilor who appeared to be still flexible although on record as in favor of the Bayside site. After a brief discussion he agreed to move for reconsideration at the next council meeting.

At this point in the process the crisis was reached. The Council could either vote for reconsideration and thus begin a foreseeable set of events through which compromise could be achieved or it could refuse to change its position thus forcing the neighborhood into a position of concession or minor rear-guard actions. It was clear from the attitude of the OEO director that he was organizing his community for a full scale action. Concession was not an alternative in his mind. He was also aware that a series of minor confrontations would cause the Council more embarassment, especially if it could be shown that their actions were based upon inadequate research and planning. Contacts by his advocates with the State Department of Education indicated that the school was totally unapprovable in the present form devised by the School Department.

Contact with the councilors and distribution of the report eliminated the surprise and confusion which were present at the preceding council meeting. Discussion in council executive session showed the
essence of the problem to be one of saving face while preventing any action for reconsideration from appearing as willingness on the part of the council to back down in the face of pressure. Inquiries by one councilor to the State Department of Education had confirmed the Planning Board's contention that there was no need for undue haste in applying for state subsidy as Portland, being the center of the largest metropolitan area in the state, had already been targeted as the location of one vocational facility provided that the Portland School Department would do a reasonable amount of work to make the project possible. Several councilors felt betrayed by the acting Superintendent and saw him as the logical scapegoat for their action.

Normally, the Superintendent of Schools, being the hand-picked administrator of the School Board, would be politically unchallengeable by the City Council unless the Council were willing to enter into a direct confrontation with the only other major elective body in municipal government. Fortunately, the Superintendent had recently retired and the man presently in the office was only acting superintendent temporarily promoted from a lesser position to fill the gap. The School Board did not have any direct stake in his actions or competence.

At the evening's public Council Meeting, the motion for reconsideration was made and passed with the acting superintendent being admonished by
several council members for misrepresenting the facts. The matter was remanded to the Planning Board to produce the comprehensive report which it recommended in its earlier document. The Council did not use the proposed alternatives put forth in the advocate report as alternatives for site selection, but only as a justification for reconsideration and restudy. The reconsideration motion was worded in such a manner that it did not abandon the Bayside site as a favorable possibility but merely requested more data from the Planning Board.

THE RESOLUTION. During the next three weeks the planning staff researched and assembled a document of over two-hundred and fifty pages considering implications of educational program, shifting demographics, site acquisition and development costs and many other factors. The document analyzed eight possible sites both in the Bayside area and in other parts of the City of Portland. Intensive contact was made with the State Department of Education, consulting engineers, educators in and out of Portland, real estate and financial experts and Portland area residents. To produce such a major study in such a short period of time, the planning staff worked overtime, nights and weekends and traveled thousands of miles around New England gathering data on the experiences of other cities and towns.
This heroic effort on the part of the planning staff was of considerable use in assembling ultimate plans for the school but was not entirely necessary to the resolution of the crisis. When the document was presented to the Council at its next meeting, it was accepted and the reconsideration was allowed to stand. By removing the immediate pressure on the Bayside residents and agreeing to a major restudy, the Council had, in effect, diffused the neighborhood organization's power by removing its impetus and counteracting its substantive issues. This was adequate to place the site selection problem into a state of limbo until a more effective course of action could be developed by the Council.

Almost as a postscript, the Council acted several months later to employ a private consultant to verify the findings of the Planning Board. The consultant's report was essentially in accord and proposed an alternative site consisting of an older industrial complex recently vacated by a bakery. The buildings were obsolete and easy to acquire. The Council accepted the proposal and demolition and clearance began in 1971 as of this writing.

The Bayside neighborhood remains. The spectre of renewal clearance has been removed in part by this confrontation and in part
through the efforts of the Model Cities Program in Portland. Some rehabilitation of existing residential properties has occurred and the municipal Capital Improvements Program is constructing new streets, sewers and utilities in the area.

ANALYSIS. The conflict of goals between the Portland School Department and the OEO Bayside Neighborhood Center forms the core of this case study. Had the School Department foreseen the potential problems of family relocation in the destruction of a low-income neighborhood or had the OEO Center not existed to provide an organizational core for the neighborhood, the direct confrontation could have been avoided or at least reduced to a bureaucratic skirmish between the School Department and the Planning Board. The School Department, through careless examination of the alternatives, placed itself in a vulnerable position where confrontation could be provoked. The OEO Center, advocating for its constituency, exploited the situation in such a manner to raise the conflict to a crisis state.

On reexamination of the internal bureaucratic goals of the School Department in view of the ultimate location of the school, it is clear that the goals of power and prestige were achievable without conflict outside of the School Department bureaucracy. The bakery site or other similar site was available from the beginning had the School Department
only made the effort to search out the alternative. The acting Superintendent's strategy to give the Council the opportunity to complete an ill-fated renewal plan while obtaining 40% State Aid was only partially complete, not having taken into account the Bayside community.

It is significant to note that the prime strategy of the School Department was to create its own crisis situation, the need for immediate application for State funds. Had this crisis been accepted by the Portland City Council, it is doubtful that the neighborhood would have been able to alter the outcome. The crisis provoked by the neighborhood, however, was much more significant to the Council and hence overshadowed the School Department effort. In view of its functional constraints, it appears to be impossible for any group decision making body, such as the Council, to act on more than one crisis at a time. The implications of this will be discussed further in the conclusions of this thesis.

Another significant issue which can be identified in this specific case is the use of a leadership-constituency coalition in the OEO Neighborhood Center to provide an instrument for influencing the actions of the City Council. The three distinct elements of leadership,
issue, and constituency necessary for grass-roots action will be discussed further in the Carter School case study. Suffice it to say that as necessary as the OEO director was to this process, he could not have nucleated his constituency without the issue of neighborhood clearance nor could his constituency have applied pressure on the Council without specific leadership from his agency or some other source.
CASE STUDY B

THE GEORGETOWNE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
CASE STUDY B: THE GEORGETOWNE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

As in the preceding case study, this second case study deals with community interaction and influence in the school planning process. However, in this instance the issue is educational philosophy and not site selection and the community interaction is formalized rather than ad hoc. This case is presented as an illustration of structured interaction between the bureaucracy and the community, the techniques used by both groups and the factors which prevent both groups from presenting a unified position which can be designated "community" or "bureaucracy".

The Georgetowne Elementary School case study is concerned with the events and strategies used by a municipality to convince a community of the merits of "open-plan" school buildings. In the Georgetowne case, the community was not ignorant of the open-plan concept, but knew only of it through rumors of an unsuccessful open-plan school in an adjoining neighborhood.*

GENERAL BACKGROUND. Georgetowne is a particular neighborhood of the West Roxbury district of the City of Boston. Of all of the diverse sections of Boston, West Roxbury has the highest per capita

* A description of the open-plan school concept is contained in Appendix C in the discussion of the Educational Program.
income and can be described as "suburban" in character, it having been one of the last towns annexed to Boston in the 1890's. Being a stronghold of the white middle class within the city limits, West Roxbury traditionally has been considered a key district to all aspiring politicians. Moreover, as Boston elects its nine-member council, as well as its mayor and school committee, at-large, it is imperative that any candidate wishing to achieve or retain office perform well in the district. This fact, combined with the high level of education and political awareness of the residents of West Roxbury, make any action of the municipal government subject to sharp scrutiny by elected officials wishing to remain visible and positively regarded in the district. The residents are aware of this and do not hesitate to exploit their position.

Historically, West Roxbury has had more than its share of residents on municipal payrolls. Many policemen, firemen, teachers, clerical workers and administrators live in the district. Moreover, there has been no lack of native sons aspiring to and achieving elective office in the city government. Approximately 50 per cent of the households in West Roxbury have some member of the immediate family on a city, county, state, federal or other government payroll. Such jobs as teacher, policeman, fireman, civil service clerk and others account for this high rate of government employment. With such a personal stake in the running of the public sector, voter turn-out in the district is consistently high.
In 1962, a study of the Boston Public Schools was done by Dr. Cyril Sargent and a group of educators from Harvard University. The now famous "Sargent Report" documented what was effectively common knowledge: Boston's schools were old and decaying and there was no comprehensive plan to rebuild them. The majority of Boston school buildings had been built before 1900, often to absorb the residential population of recently annexed suburbs such as West Roxbury. A few more schools were built just prior to World War I and another handful in the late 1930's. World War II halted new school construction and it was not until the early 1950's that Boston built a few more elementary schools. Therefore, by the mid 1960's of the over 190 school buildings in Boston, at least 90 per cent were over fifty years old.

As a result of the Sargent Report and another special report on school construction prepared for Mayor John Collins in 1966, the Public Facilities Commission was created and endowed with special powers and charged with building new schools rapidly, efficiently and in numbers unseen in Boston for over 70 years. Further information of the structure, powers, responsibilities and operations of this Commission are contained in the Appendix of this document.

One of the first new schools to be built following the scathing
Sargent Report was located in West Roxbury. This school, known as the Hastings Street School, was a small elementary school of about 300 pupils. It was unusual only insofar as it was the first new school to be completed by the Public Facilities Commission and that its second floor classrooms consisted of an open area for six classes surrounding a central learning area. This open plan scheme had been proposed by the Harvard study and was being tried on a small scale after having surmounted many bureaucratic hurdles in the conservative Boston School Department.

Unfortunately, design compromises made to appease the elements in the bureaucracy opposed to the open plan concept, inexperience on the part of the newly formed Public Facilities Department in open area schools, and the employment of an architect insensitive to the problems of open space planning produced a school which was far from perfect. However, design alone was not the nemesis of the Hastings Street project; problems of design were multiplied many times by a principal and teaching staff unprepared for open plan teaching and antagonistic to the open plan concept. And so West Roxbury received the first of the Boston open plan schools and the worst of the open plan problems.

The Hastings Street experience taught many lessons. Following
Hastings Street, the Public Facilities Commission contracted with the Harvard Graduate School of Education for a school planning project to produce programs and design criteria for twelve new elementary schools, all open-plan in varying degrees. The study group was headed by Professor Robert Anderson and produced the philosophy which forms the basis of Boston's ongoing school construction program. It should be noted that the Harvard Schools Project advocated total open-plan schools - clusters of six classroom areas around a common learning area and separated by no walls whatsoever. However, internal problems within the School Department forced a compromise and the basic twelve schools incorporated moveable partitions which could be used to separate the open area into self-contained classrooms.

Following the adoption of the Harvard Schools Project programs for the twelve schools, the Boston School Department established its Educational Planning Center using federal funds under Title IV of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. The Educational Planning Center was staffed by educational professionals, most committed to instituting change but with sympathies to the existing system having come up through its ranks as teachers and administrators. The Educational Planning Center is more fully described in the Appendix. It is sufficient to note here that the Educational Planning
Center had already completed several school programs and were in the process of producing others, beyond the twelve in the Harvard Schools Project, before the Georgetowne Elementary School became a community issue. Unfortunately, even with the firm commitment of the City of Boston to produce well over a dozen new open-plan schools, the concept of open area teaching was not, and still is not, accepted in every quarter of the vast School Department bureaucracy. Although this division within the School Department is of some consequence to this case study, it will be discussed in much greater depth in the next case study concerning the Edward Everett School annex.

Thus it was with one year of operations at Hastings Street School and with approximately fifteen other open-plan schools in various stages of design and construction that the City again turned to West Roxbury as the site of a new elementary school at Georgetowne. Recently 600 new units of housing had been constructed as part of a development in this area. It was this new housing, above and beyond the politics of the area, which forced the City of Boston to return to an area with relatively new schools to build a second new facility.

Neighborhoods do communicate, and although Hastings Street School was some distance from the proposed Georgetowne site, parents of children at Georgetowne had heard of the Hastings Street "disaster"
and were already convincing themselves that an open-plan school would not be built in their neighborhood. Working through local community organizations and individually, the parents made their sentiments known to the Public Facilities Department, the School Department and the Mayor's Office.

CONFLICT. As the situation developed, it was obvious that the various elective officials could not allow the municipal bureaucracy to force an unpopular decision upon the powerful voters of West Roxbury. Moreover, these same elective officials were quick to recognize the explosive nature of the school issue and were reluctant to jeopardize their stature in the West Roxbury community attitude.

Normally such recalcitrance on the part of a neighborhood would be met with a range of strategies from quiet cajoling to administrative imposition. And, of course, if such tactics failed, the School Department could always construct a conventional school which was designed in such a way that it could be modified to become open-plan in the future. However, West Roxbury was a very different situation. One could not impose by fiat and defeat of the open-plan concept in West Roxbury would seriously jeopardize the credibility
of open-plan programs in other neighborhoods of the city. Despite protests to the contrary, low-income communities still look to the upper-income areas such as West Roxbury for models in dealing with the city and a major defeat of open-plan in West Roxbury would mean many low-income neighborhoods badly in need of new schools would view open-plan as a contrivance foisted upon the poor.

With this in mind, the Public Facilities Department and the Educational Planning Center undertook a program of meeting with community leadership in West Roxbury and, ultimately, a public meeting wherein the open-plan concept would be presented in detail to the community to counteract the damaged image of Hastings Street School. At stake was not only the fifteen-plus schools in planning, design and construction comprising a $75 million commitment to open-plan, but the very philosophy of educational innovation in Boston which so many persons both within and without the bureaucracy had worked to achieve over the preceding decade.

Under the sponsorship of the Educational Planning Center, community leaders in West Roxbury, including the highly respected principal of the existing conventional elementary school in the
Georgetown area, were taken on tours of operating open-plan schools in the suburban Boston towns of Andover, Concord and Winchester. A concerted effort was made to meet with the principal and teachers of the Hastings Street School in a continuing effort to resolve difficulties. Educators and community people were invited to compare successful operations in the suburban towns with the Hastings Street operation in a similar physical plant. The principal and several of the Hastings Street School were never convinced, but many persons were pleased with what they saw and returned to West Roxbury with a belief that open-plan could work and could work well.

Meanwhile, the Public Facilities Department staff was put in contact with the northeast regional office of the Massachusetts Department of Education. This office had overseen the successful completion and operation of open-plan schools in Andover and Winchester and had been in close contact with several school districts in New Hampshire where open-plan schools had been favorably received.

Working closely with Mr. Louis Amadeo of the Department of Education, the Public Facilities Department prepared a collection of 200 color transparencies which could be presented to the community at a public meeting. Included were slides of the open-plan schools in New England as well as drawings, charts and photographs of schools
across the United States and in Europe. Mr. Amadeo graciously agreed to make the presentation to the community, despite the fact that the City of Boston does not fall into the Northeast Region which his office represents.

Simultaneously, Public Facilities Department contacted school committee members and city councillors to inform them of the upcoming public meeting and to brief them about open-plan schools. It was understood that few, if any, of these officials would openly participate in a crusade to convince the community. The school committee was already well aware of the implications of open-plan education. The council was less informed, but its members, as a rule, accepted the information in preparation for any turn of events on the part of the community. Not all councillors or committeemen would attend the public meeting, but it was felt that it would be better if those in attendance were at least personally, if not publicly, receptive to the open-plan concept.

The architect was instructed to prepare a set of presentation drawings showing the new school and strongly indicating how open-plan could function by the illustration of classroom furniture layouts and various flexible configurations possible within open-plan.
It was further shown on these drawings that the proposed Georgetowne Elementary School was not totally open-plan, with special spaces provided for art, music, reading, physical education and other specialized activities. Moreover, even the classroom clusters were not true open-plan, as walls had been provided in strategic locations to separate class areas from one another although not to enclose these areas on all four sides. This last filip was in part in response to certain elements within the School Department who were as yet unconvinced that open-plan could work.

With this background, the Educational Planning Center and the Public Facilities Department held a public meeting to sell an unpopular idea to a hostile community - an idea which the School Department itself did not accept completely.

CRISIS. On a chilly evening in late October of 1969, community people, teachers, politicians and school administrators began arriving at the Robert Gould Shaw School auditorium in West Roxbury. The meeting was well attended with approximately 250 persons present when the program began. Surprisingly, only one school committee member and no councillors attended. Apparently, the issue was so unfavorable
many politicians felt that it would be unwise to give any voter the opportunity to misconstrue their presence as a statement of support for the bureaucratic innovators, who were, after all, also part of the city government.

Unlike the elected officials, the Public Facilities Department and Educational Planning Center staff were well represented in the audience. Although a community meeting of this nature usually involves only one or two staff members, many of the staff decided to attend just to see the presentation and to be present at what may have well been the verdict on the future of the open-plan program in Boston. Of the 250 persons in the auditorium, about ten were staff members of the two agencies.

Public meetings often involve small intrigues on the part of both the community and the bureaucracy. Georgetowne, being a significant milestone in the open-plan program, had its share of these small strategems and counter-plots. Certain members of the Georgetowne community had gone to great effort to get parents of Hastings Street School pupils to attend, despite the fact that the Georgetowne project held no implications for Hastings Street, a
fait accompli, and community persons seldom attend meetings which do not affect their lives directly.

On the other side, members of the group making the presentation station themselves, either intentionally or out of curiosity, around the periphery of the hall, usually standing, and observe audience reactions. Few persons remain silent throughout a public meeting, usually commenting to spouse or neighbor in adjacent seat upon points both extremely favorable and unfavorable. Such reactions can be communicated to the person making the presentation, especially if several persons are jointly presenting and one or more have the opportunity to speak with colleagues during the presentation. In this fashion problems are anticipated and often avoided. Each side attempts to catch the other off guard and any reasonable method for keeping the upper hand is worth the effort.

The slide presentation by Mr. Amadeo took approximately 90 minutes. Even though this presentation was quite long, most people remained attentive and the presentation seemed surprisingly well received. Following the lengthy general presentation, the architect showed slides of drawings of the school and explained how modified open-plan arrangements could work within the proposed building.
Having presented a total of about 225 color slides showing everything from furniture to children laying on carpeted floors reading, questions were invited from the audience.

RESOLUTION. At this point, the meeting was now wide open and the acceptance or rejection of open-plan was totally in the hands of the community. A few questions were asked concerning such things as furniture. One of the Hastings Street parents noted that the furniture shown in the slides was not like the furniture at the Hastings Street School. The educational planner confirmed this and explained that one of the problems at Hastings Street was inappropriate furnishings and that the lesson had been learned and some new equipment had already started arriving at Hastings Street. This parry turned a negative question into a positive response. Most people had expected the City to defend Hastings Street School and were caught off guard by the willingness of the bureaucracy to confess its mistakes.

It was at this point that the highly-respected principal of the existing Georgetowne Elementary School made a statement. For well over five minutes she spoke about the virtues of open-plan, making reference to the schools which she had toured with the Educational Planning Center. At all times she was especially careful to tread
a thin line praising open-plan but arguing equally that it did not negate her conventional school but only provided further options for teaching. This plea marked the turning point in the meeting. Community persons who had been slowly convinced by the slide presentation were now free to break ranks with their neighbors.

The first person to speak following the principal was a mother who said that she was most impressed by the children involved with books and projects by themselves and in positions seated on tables, under tables, lying on the floor and so forth. She argued that it was silly, but it always seemed to her that her eight year old son was always most engrossed when he was in such an improbable position. Her statement was well received and similar statements and questions of genuine concern and not hostility flooded the speakers.

It was only through this chaos that it was possible to adjourn the meeting before the embarrassing question of why only modified open-plan was being attempted. Several times this point was raised by parents who had suddenly been converted to open-plan zealots. The volume of questions allowed only brief answers and thus saved the Educational Planning Center from having to make an attempt to justify the dissension within the School Department itself.
The final question after the call for adjournment was not a question at all. It was a statement by the lone school committeeman in attendance who had been quietly seated at the rear of the auditorium throughout the entire meeting. Taking the floor, he made a brief but forceful statement about how the Boston School Committee had worked long and hard to bring about educational change in response to the community and open-plan was just one way in which the desires of the citizens of West Roxbury were being anticipated and responded to by the Committee.

ANALYSIS. The core of this case study is the resolution of a potentially disastrous conflict between the Georgetowne community and the school bureaucracy. Had the community forced the hands of the elected politicians, which would have been the case had this incident come too close to a Council or School Committee election, the Public Facilities Department and the Educational Planning Center would not have had the opportunity to carefully prepare for the public meeting. The result in that case would have been the community, acting out of ignorance, achieving responsiveness from its elective officials but seriously jeopardizing a valuable program, not only for Georgetowne but also for the other neighborhoods within the City of Boston. This sort of timing is not within the control of anyone
in most instances and shows how luck, as well as skill, often plays an important role in both politics and community relations.

Even with the careful preparation, there was no guarantee that those community leaders carefully taken on tour of the successful open-plan schools would be able to reverse their constituency without damaging their stature in the community. Often community leadership, and for that fact leadership in general, finds it difficult to make policy reversals even in the face of strong evidence for fear of appearing inconsistent or for fear of the issues being stronger than the leadership itself. It was fortunate that the principal of the existing Georgetowne school was secure enough in the community to lead such a reversal.

There have been instances when group pressure has prevented community persons from admitting reversals of this nature and it is only several days later when mail begins to trickle into City Hall that it becomes clear that many persons do not endorse the course of action committed at a public meeting. This leads to the question of whether or not large public meetings are suitable tools for achieving community interaction. In view of the number of man-hours spent doing groundwork for the Georgetowne project, it becomes clear that
it is well beyond the scope of the present municipal government to implement this magnitude of operation on each and every project and decision. Nonetheless, it does point out the pathetically small commitment to community interaction generally made as compared to that which could be made in the ideal situation.

Finally, the issue of dissension within the school bureaucracy on the question of open-plan as a suitable educational philosophy should be mentioned. It is clear that the job of introducing open-plan schools to the neighborhoods would be much easier if the school department were to fully endorse the concept. However, change does come slowly, and in order to make an innovation within the antiquarian structure of the public school system some compromises must be made. Over the years, power has distributed itself quite broadly within the system and to implement change without a reasonable commitment at all levels would be impossible. This very problem of internal politics and change will be discussed in more detail in the next case study about the Edward Everett School annex.
CASE STUDY C

THE EDWARD EVERETT SCHOOL ANNEX
CASE STUDY C: THE EDWARD EVERETT SCHOOL ANNEX

Conflict within the school building bureaucracy, rather than conflict between the bureaucracy and the community, forms the core of this third case study. While the bureaucracy is able to establish some rational guidelines in dealing with external pressures, internal problems tend to be less manageable, with pockets of power and political intrigues being more covert than in the simple confrontation of two declared opposing camps. Especially in an older bureaucratic structure like the Public School System, power has been distributed to many actors and agencies and does not lie exclusively with the nominal directorship.

GENERAL BACKGROUND. The Town of Dorchester was annexed to the City of Boston in the year 1870. Its annexation was part of a large expansion movement involving the construction of streetcar lines and the development of the small towns surrounding Boston into commuter suburbs for the working class. Dorchester lies just to the South of Roxbury, both areas being covered with three-story wooden frame buildings, some older brick row houses, and a number of larger apartment buildings built during the early twentieth century. Certain sections of both Roxbury and Dorchester
remained as detached single-family homes and a few farms, but for the purpose of this case study, the areas concerned were and are almost entirely composed of multiple occupancy buildings.

Roxbury, being the older of the two sections, has traditionally taken the brunt of ethnic immigrations to Boston over the past century. First Irish, then Jewish and finally Black populations have made Roxbury the staging area for their upward mobility toward better paying jobs and eventual migration to neighborhoods of lower density. The Jewish pattern, following the Irish, is most pronounced with Roxbury being abandoned for the newer apartments of Dorchester and eventually fleeing Dorchester to move again Southward into suburban Milton and throughout the Metropolitan area. The Black migration since the early 1950s has followed this pattern, pushing out of Roxbury and gradually shifting the Northern portions of Dorchester from Jewish to Black. In the wake of this migration, many institutions which had served the Jewish community suddenly found themselves with a new clientele, one to which they could not always respond. In the case of the synagogues and Jewish philanthropies, the institutions moved with their community leaving
their edifices behind to be purchased and run in many instances by Black groups. The Public Schools, however, did not move, could not change, and school administrations which had dealt with a reasonably stable Jewish society were struggling to cope with the problems of an entirely different sort of minority community.

When a new school is built in a minority community many problems are resolved just by virtue of a new staff and new administration taking a fresh approach in a new facility. This is not to say that the new school is perfect but merely to point out that it is still flexible enough in organization to address the many specialized problems of minority education. Often this sort of flexibility is impossible within an existing school due to the inability and unwillingness of a principal and teachers to change a half-century of habit within what has been their absolute domain.

The Edward Everett School is located in North Dorchester. It has had an ethnic composition changing from Jewish to Black over the past ten years. Only the shrinking enclave of Irish in Dorchester keeps the school racially integrated. In addition to its racial shift, its enrollment has increased
as families with larger numbers of children have occupied the available housing in the area. Most recently, an influx of Puerto Rican families has added even more children to the enrollment with the resultant effect of making the Edward Everett not only a minority school, but an overcrowded school as well.

In response to this problem, the Public Facilities Department acquired a former automobile showroom and garage for conversion to an annex for the Edward Everett School. The acquisition of this building was due in part to the immediate need for additional pupil places in the district. Rehabilitation often proves the best solution when speed is necessary, for reasons which will be discussed in subsequent case studies.

The architectural firm of Bedar and Alpers of Boston was hired to prepare a design for the renovation of the garage into an elementary school building to accommodate approximately 300 students in kindergarten to 5th grade. Public Facilities assigned a project planner to coordinate the project and he began to work closely with the Educational Planning Center and the architect. Usually, the
architect receives a complete written document known as educational specifications which details the exact functions and relationships which his design should reflect. In this instance, however, the pressure of time to open this building by the beginning of the next school year forced all design to be based not upon a complete document but instead upon a series of memoranda drafted by the Educational Planning Center and the Public Facilities Department.

The Educational Planning Center, as part of the School Department, has a much more intimate grasp of internal problems within the School Department bureaucracy. Most of the staff of the Planning Center have worked as teachers or administrators in the school system and hence are sensitive to its problems. As mentioned in the preceding case study, the first twelve schools built and programmed after the creation of the Public Facilities Department were conceived by the Harvard Boston School Study Team and not by the Boston School Department. Although the Harvard group did an admirable job in responding to the needs of the School Department, it was felt by the top level administrators that the only way to guarantee understanding on the part of the programming
agency would be to have that agency part of the School Department itself. Hence, when the federal funds available under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act provided for a planning function, the Boston School Department formed the Educational Planning Center to assist the Public Facilities Department in the programming of new facilities.

In the case of the Edward Everett School Annex, the Educational Planning Center described in its programming memoranda what was essentially a conventional school of about a dozen fully self-contained classrooms. Despite the fact that this format was completely contrary to the avowed policy of open-plan schools, the planner in charge of the project at Public Facilities Department understood that internal problems within the school bureaucracy were preventing this building from being an open-plan facility and in view of the severe time restraint, it was decided to proceed along these obsolescent lines rather than struggle with what could become a difficult situation within the School Department ranks. The Educational Planning Center never fully explained what the problems were but merely advised Public Facilities Department that, in the professional judgment of the Planning Center, the problem did not lend
itself to resolution within any reasonable length of time.

With the parameters clearly specified for a conventional school, the architect produced a set of preliminary drawings which were approved by the Superintendent of Schools. With this much of the design resolved, the project planner left on a brief vacation anticipating the architect could continue along the lines of the preliminaries to produce working drawings and specifications for bid.

CONFLICT. Normally, at this point the project would leave the Design and Planning Sections of the Public Facilities Department and be assigned to the Engineering Section for review of technical details and cost estimation. Such was the case in the Edward Everett School Annex. However, when the cost estimates were returned the price of completion was considerably above that which had been anticipated when the garage building was acquired. Moreover, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Public Safety, which is responsible for administering the schoolhouse construction code, would not approve the basic design in view of the lengthy corridor needed to connect the classroom spaces.
The design had also incorporated an indoor play area in the center of the building surrounded by classrooms. These classrooms utilized the common play area as part of the egress system and this was not permissible under the Massachusetts code. The only apparent alternative to complete redesign was to provide additional corridors and this would use much of the available space within the building for non-educational purposes.

The Chief Engineer in charge of rehabilitation for the Public Facilities Department called a hasty meeting with the architect, the Department of Public Safety and the project planner who was managing the project in his colleague's absence. After much discussion, it was agreed that the only logical course of action would be to redesign the school in such a manner that it became an open-plan school with self-contained kindergartens, seminar rooms and remedial education spaces along one edge. This configuration is typical of most of the new schools in construction and was agreeable to the Department of Public Safety. In addition, the Chief Engineer favored the idea. With an eye toward the budget, he felt it inefficient to demolish all of the existing partitions in the garage building only to build new partitions for the school.
Moreover, as this facility would have a minimum life of twenty years based upon present long range planning policies, it seemed foolish to build an obsolescent facility which would cost money at a later date to remove the interior partitions between the classrooms.

As a result of this meeting, the architect was instructed by the Public Facilities Department to produce an alternate scheme using the open-plan approach. This scheme could then be presented to the School Department and the costs and benefits of it versus the self-contained and corridor heavy scheme discussed. Despite no obligations to redesign under the terms of his contract, the architect consented and incurred additional expenses in office time and consultant fees to produce a second set of plans for the Edward Everett School Annex.

This decision to proceed with the development of an open plan scheme was made entirely on the basis of safety codes, cost, time and the official policy of the School Department. The Educational Planning Center was not consulted about the change, it being felt that the most expedient approach would be to involve them at the design review level after drawings were completed. The Chief Engineer could see no rational alternative within the constraints defined to him and therefore it
was not until about a week later that the School Department reaction to open-plan at the Edward Everett School Annex was sought.

CRISIS. A meeting was called at the offices of the Public Facilities Department at City Hall in Boston. In attendance were the project planner, returned from vacation, the architect, the special consultant on State Public Safety Codes, the Chief Engineer, and two planners from the Educational Planning Center. The Chief Engineer explained to the group what had happened with the cost estimates and the code problems. He also gave his professional opinion about the possible obsolescence of the self-contained facility and the comparative ease of construction of the open-plan rehabilitation.

The architect explained how he had contacted a respected Rhode Island firm involved in educational space planning and had had them develop a scheme which would accommodate the same number of pupils and meet the guidelines published in the official programs for new schools under construction in Boston. He then presented his new scheme which included a roof-top play area enclosed under a transparent inflatable bubble among other impressive features available at the same cost as the self-contained scheme with its hundreds of feet of interior partitioning.
The general reaction of the group was positive. Even the educational planners from the School Department felt that the scheme was quite good and could be workable. However, the Educational Planning Center could not accept an open plan scheme at this location.

For the first time, the Educational Planning Center explained in detail the factors prohibiting the use of modern educational concepts in the Edward Everett School Annex. It was carefully explained that the principal of the existing school had been in that location for most of his career. His achieving the position of principal was tantamount to a naval officer receiving command of his own ship. However, after many years of work with the school district at a school which had scored high on standardized tests within the system, he had suddenly found his prestige being eroded as his school's demography shifted from Jewish to Black and Puerto Rican. As he neared retirement, his sole goal was to keep the situation under control. By control, he meant that his teachers could operate with these minority students within their individual classroom and thus contain any problems to a small unit without having to confront them on a school-wide level. According to the educational planners, his educational philosophy was not atypical among many of the senior members of the school.
system and was in part why the system had never accepted totally the open-plan concept.

Despite the assurances of the educational planners that the principal was unwilling to compromise, the Public Facilities Department felt that it was worth the effort to attempt to acquaint him with the advantages of open-plan school in a similar manner to that which had been so successful at Georgetowne. A meeting was arranged between the principal and the planning staffs, architect, engineer, and consultants.

RESOLUTION. In late April of 1970 a meeting was held at the offices of the Public Facilities Department. The academic year was drawing to a close and it was imperative that the Edward Everett School Annex be in construction as soon as possible to be available in time for the opening of school in the late Fall. Therefore, this meeting was the last chance to convince the principal, there being no time left to organize within the community or even within the school staff.

A rather lengthy presentation of open-plan schools and of the technical problems of the garage building was given to the principal. As predicted by the educational planners, his reaction was negative. He argued that the schools which
were shown and the new schools in construction were not as heavily occupied by minority students. Despite the fact that several of the new Boston schools were located in areas with 50% non-white populations, the principal was not to be swayed. He expressed his view that the students who were assigned to his school could not be educated unless they could be "controlled" and hence his first objective was order and, to his mind, this would be impossible with the open-plan context.

There was little point in prolonging the meeting. His tenured staff would back him up on this point and his non-tenured staff carried little weight or respect in his mind. The only resolution would be to impose the concept upon him by administrative fiat. And, as he was only two years from retirement and respected among the senior staff throughout the system, any attempt by the School Department Administration to counter his desires would have far spreading ripples within the bureaucracy.

Following this meeting it was agreed by the Public Facilities Department and the Educational Planning Center that the only course of action available would be to adapt the first design to meet the public safety codes and proceed to create a conventional self-contained classroom environment. The Chief
Engineer and the Budget Officer were unhappy with this arrangement as it would mean diverting funds from other alteration and repair projects to provide the additional money for the obsolescent design. However, only in this manner could the building be ready for occupancy in September and without it the school system would be hard pressed to find seats for several hundred Dorchester children.

The school went into construction on schedule and opened in the Fall of 1970 close to its anticipated completion date. Thanks to thorough work on the part of the architect, the building proved to be bright and attractive with a pleasant outdoor play yard adjacent to the main entrance. Nonetheless, it is educationally a building of twenty years ago and cannot, without extensive renovations, provide many of the options available in the new school facilities.

ANALYSIS. The core of this case study lies in the inability of the bureaucracy to cope with an internal problem even when that problem has its source in a single person within a staff of several thousand. Possibly, the parents of the pupils who were to attend the Edward Everett School Annex could have mustered enough strength to overcome the principal's opposition to open-plan education. However, the fact that the
problem occurred close to the end of the school year and was too critical with respect to time to allow a possible protracted community debate, this option was not open to the educational innovators.

Rejecting resolution from outside the bureaucracy, as in the Georgetowne Case, the problem has its only resolution within the Boston School System or between the system and the Public Facilities Department or State Regulatory Agencies such as the Department of Public Safety or the Department of Education. The internal structure of most public school systems makes such internal resolutions all but impossible. Although nominally in charge, many administrators cannot afford to go against the sentiments of their subordinates for fear of losing legitimacy and hence control. In order for top level decisions on policy to be truly accepted by the operating staff, the administration must make a concerted effort to work directly with the teachers*. To do this is a break in faith with middle management, the principals and area superintendents. To expect middle management to take on unpopular chores on its own is to invite the accusation that the administration is using its area superintendents and principals as a shield against the teaching staff. This, of course, is an over-simplification but indicates part of the

*See David Rogers' book 110 Livingston Street for a detailed description of the internal problems of a large school system bureaucracy.
structural problem of resolving internal conflict internally.

A strategy more likely to achieve success is to have unpopular decisions imposed from without. In the case of the first of the open-plan schools, the Public Facilities Commission was a new agency charged with what had traditionally been a School Department problem. It was not so difficult for an external force to take the blame for an unpopular move and allow the school policy makers to blame any problems on the newcomers. Unfortunately, after the completion of the Harvard Boston Schools Study which produced the twelve first-generation open-plan schools, the Boston School Department established the Educational Planning Center in the hope that internal planning would be more responsive to the needs of the system. Unfortunately, such internal planning is much more subject to pressure from within the system and results in it being more difficult to impose change on a recalcitrant system.

It is worth noting that the move to produce an open-plan design at the Edward Everett School Annex was undertaken by the Public Facilities Department and that had that department had the authority to impose its solution on the school system, the School Administration could have apologized to the principal and pleaded lack of control.
As in the case of the Georgetowne Elementary School, it can be seen that the situation is most distorted by time constraints. Given adequate time to carefully plan and convince key actors and elements, inertia to change can often be overcome. However, placed against a tight deadline and the course of least resistance becomes the only viable alternative. This fact, if none other, makes advance planning a most valuable tool in producing a rational decision-making policy. This problem of time constraint will be looked at further in the next case study concerning another renovation project, the Copley Square High School.
CASE STUDY D

THE COPLEYS SQUARE HIGH SCHOOL
CASE STUDY D: COLEY SQUARE HIGH SCHOOL

This fourth case study involves the creation of a new high school, unlike any other in the City of Boston, in an existing building on a downtown site acquired by the City specifically for this purpose. As in the preceding case, time is one of the most important constraints on the project. However, unlike the Edward Everett School Annex where the prime impediment were personalities, the Copley Square High School project is faced with a seemingly endless set of legislative and bureaucratic restrictions which combine to thwart the goal of producing a completed school facility on schedule.

GENERAL BACKGROUND. Copley Square High School is an outgrowth of the Title I, Elementary and Secondary Education Act program which was run in the Dorchester High School Annex building for several years preceding its ultimate relocation to a site at Copley Square in Boston's prestigious Back Bay section. The school is dedicated to providing a quality education to its 350 pupils and to do this it is utilizing many of the concepts developed in Philadelphia's "Parkway" program wherein students use resources throughout the city as part of their learning experience. The federal Title I program assures that the student body of Copley Square High School
is racially and economically integrated. Its new location on Newbury Street in the heart of the art gallery district gives the students many opportunities to involve themselves in special projects involving the arts and the many commercial businesses which abound in the Back Bay and Downtown areas.

In this specific case study, the problems confronted include the organization of the students and parents to favor a move to the Copley Square site as well as the problem of explaining to the parents and students why all of the amenities promised in the new location are not completed on schedule as the work drags on for two academic years.

Under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act an Experimental high school was established within the Boston Public School System. It, along with its corresponding experimental elementary and middle schools, was given the name of the Model Demonstration Subsystem, a title which described its intended function. The Model Demonstration Subsystem High School was located in an older yellow brick building at Codman Square in the Dorchester section of Boston. This building was located near Dorchester High School and its basement was occupied by a vocational program in
baking run by Dorchester High School. Other than this common occupancy, the Model Demonstration Subsystem had no connection with Dorchester High School. Nonetheless, under the terms of the establishment of the Subsystem it was not an official Boston high school and its students received their diplomas bearing the imprimatur of Dorchester High School.

During the occupancy of the Dorchester High School Annex, the Title I program granted the Model Demonstration Subsystem special funds to install chemistry and biology laboratories and other specialized equipment in the art suite of the school. Meanwhile the enrollment at Dorchester High School increased and two additional temporary classroom buildings were constructed to relieve overcrowding in the main building. By the spring of 1970 it became obvious that additional space would be needed for the Dorchester High School and an investigation was made by Public Facilities Department to see what relocation resources would be available for the Model Demonstration Subsystem.

Fortunately, a building on Newbury Street in the Back Bay section of Boston which had been occupied by a private business school for the preceding twenty years was going to become available for
occupancy. The owner of the building was asking a substantial rent increase upon the expiration of the business school's twenty-year lease and the school was forced to consolidate its operations at another location. The building itself was a historic structure, originally constructed in the 1880's as the Boston Art Club. It was the feeling of the Public Facilities Department that this would be a good opportunity to acquire a building already certified by the Department of Public Safety as a school and at the same time to preserve an historic edifice which might be demolished as several other major historic buildings in the area had been during the preceding several years.

However, before the City of Boston could commit itself to the acquisition of this facility, the parents, staff and students of the Model Demonstration Subsystem High School would have to be agreeable to the move. By statute, the School Department and the Public Facilities Department have the authority to locate school facilities. However, community pressure from the parents of the students and the students themselves could prevent these agencies from exercising their authority. A conversation with the administrator of the Title I program revealed that the parents and students had just become settled into the Dorchester building and had just completed the
laboratory and art facilities. They would be reluctant to move without some incentive that the new facility would be a further improvement.

Such an incentive took the form of a commitment by the Public Facilities Department to provide complete chemistry and biology laboratories in the new building as well as all new furnishings and equipment, a photo darkroom, a cafeteria, a complete art suite for sculpture, and other techniques requiring tools and equipment, new lockers and carpeting throughout the building and other amenities. Furthermore, the Boston School Committee agreed to designate the Model Demonstration Subsystem High School an official high school, giving it the name Copley Square High School. On the basis of these commitments, the move was agreed to by all concerned and the Public Facilities Department began the process of acquiring and renovating the building for September occupancy.

CONFLICT. In order to understand some of the problems confronted in this renovation process it is necessary to have some understanding of the funding process for school construction in Massachusetts. Basically, school construction falls into four
classes: construction of new facilities with state aid; construction of new facilities without state aid; renovation of existing school buildings; and, renovation of non-school buildings into school facilities. Suffice it to say that under various statutory constraints, Boston must pay for renovation of non-public buildings into schools entirely out of operating revenues collected during the fiscal period in which the renovation is performed. That is to say, money may not be borrowed by the issuance of bonds and therefore the entire cost of renovation is reflected in the immediate tax rate rather than distributed over a period of years. However, equipment such as furnishings may be financed through new construction bonds and therefore has a less pronounced effect on the municipal tax rate.

For the purposes of this case it is important to note that the municipal corporation counsel makes the distinction between city owned buildings and public buildings owned by the city. The latter, such as a Park Department building being converted to a school, is eligible for the use of bond revenues. However, the former, such as the Copley Square High School building which was acquired by the City and had not served as a public building cannot use such bond monies. For a further description of this and other
technical constraints the reader is referred to the Appendices describing agencies and actors and the flow of projects through present procedures.

In view of this limitation on the use of borrowed monies, it was decided to remove as many items from the renovation contract and order these items as equipment, delivered and installed, through the City's Purchasing Department. Items such as laboratory equipment, chalk boards, public address and intercommunication systems, moveable partitions, cafeteria and kitchen equipment, cabinet work, office and classroom furniture, lockers, library shelving and even carpeting could be treated as equipment and hence purchased with new construction funds.

An architect was hired to prepare a renovation scheme and to provide specifications for this various equipment. His design resulted in a general contract which included the relocation of some partitions, new electrical and plumbing work, vinyl asbestos tile in the laboratory and cafeteria areas, new lighting fixtures and interior painting. Not included in the general contract was the equipment listed above. It was to be ordered through the purchasing department and delivered to the job site and installed in coordination with the
work of the general contractor.

As soon as the general contractor began work it became apparent that this procedure was going to produce many more problems than had been anticipated. The Purchasing Department and the Public Facilities Department were having a great difficulty in obtaining suitable specifications for equipment from the architect. Public bid laws require the specification of non-proprietary items and this made several of the specifications illegal and required their redrafting by the Purchasing Department. Failures on the part of manufacturers to meet specifications were another source of trouble. The supplier of the laboratory equipment had recently modified his designs and therefore supplied upgraded equipment to the job site. This created a problem with the plumbing not lining up with the connections of the new equipment.

Probably the worst of the problems was with the carpeting supplier who produced the lowest bid but did not start work for eight months claiming that he was awaiting the appropriate carpet from the manufacturer. His contract would have been cancelled except that under the public bid laws the process of cancelation and re-award might have required more time and legal effort than waiting for the
first bidder to fulfill his agreements. As of this writing the carpeting has still not been installed on the stairways, the supplier claiming that the drawings and specifications were ambiguous and that they did not call specifically for the stairways to receive carpeting.

Still other problems occurred when the general contractor was prepared to install the art room sinks and the sink cabinets, not included in the contract, had not been delivered to the job site. The result was the general contractor leaving the sinks leaning against the walls of the classrooms and promising to return at a later date, at his discretion, to install the sinks after the cabinet work was in place.

When the Copley Square High School opened in September of 1970 the building was in a state of chaos. The general contractor was still working in the building and the principal was required to shift classes and even assign several classes to borrowed spaces provided as a courtesy by nearby private schools and institutions. The result was a feeling of betrayal by the students, faculty and parents. By mid-October there was still no sign of the work being complete and the parents decided to take their grievances to City Hall.
CRISIS. As Copley Square High School is composed of students seeking an alternative to the more conventional high schools in Boston, their parents are quite involved in shaping the educational policy of this experimental school. For that reason, and despite the fact that the students come from all social and economic sections of the city, the parents are especially articulate and concerned about the facility in which their children are educated. Therefore when the parents met with the Public Facilities Department they were quite understanding and sympathetic to the complex problems of the bureaucracy. Their objective was not to indict the administration but to find out what sorts of grass roots pressure they could apply to insure the speedy completion of the Copley Square building.

The result of the meeting was that the parents went away with a better understanding of the complexity of the problem and a sense of helplessness in the face of the seemingly insurmountable bureaucratic red tape. At the same time, the Public Facilities staff promised to do everything within its power to expedite the construction, but it too felt helpless in view of the legal constraints.

During the academic year the parents met several times with the educational planners and the Public Facilities Department director
and staff. The result each time was a status report of the project and a little more of the promised work being done. By the end of the school year the science laboratories were still not installed and the kitchen equipment had been delivered but sat still crated and uninstalled for several months. Needless to say the parents and students were frustrated. The teachers and principal were upset because many of the students could not have science laboratory courses before graduating.

Throughout the summer of 1971 the work continued. The carpeting was installed in the classrooms and the laboratory equipment was installed after some modifications to the plumbing. This work continued through the opening of school in the fall of 1971. At that time the parents again met with the Public Facilities Department to discuss the problem and hopefully to find some way in which the work could be completed.

Among the alternatives available would be to continue to attempt completion on a piecemeal basis, to attempt to scrape together funds to let a small general contract which would involve all of the planned items which were still undone as well as several other major items such as a new elevator and additional egress for the fourth floor
rooms which were not legal for classroom use but could be used if egress were added.

RESOLUTION. The parents agreed that little was being accomplished by continuing piecing together the shambles which the project had become. They conceded that little more would be accomplished and that the best course would be to budget a major contract in the following year's budget for completion during the summer of 1972. This was agreeable to the Public Facilities Department as the building had now been in use for almost two academic years and hence could be considered a "public building owned by the city" and hence be eligible for the use of bond monies in the second general contract.

At the time of this writing the architect is at work producing an evaluation of the situation and developing some cost estimates on the additional work to be performed. It is apparent that the statutory constraints which forced the city to approach this project through a piecemeal contract and purchase strategy were quite costly compared with the price of including all work in a single general contract. Nonetheless, the direct impact on the tax rate was reduced even if the total project cost, not considering intangible losses to school operations, was increased considerably.
ANALYSIS. The key factor generating the problems encountered in this case study was the unanticipated need of the City of Boston to produce a high school facility to meet the criteria demanded by the parents and students of the Model Demonstration Subsystem in a matter of four months and without any funds specifically budgeted for the project. Had the parents and students been willing to make the move into a less complete facility, the Public Facilities Department could have budgeted funds for a major rehabilitation for the following year after the school had become a "public building". However, the parents felt, and rightly so, that pressing needs unforeseen might have diverted funds from their project if they allowed the work to be postponed until after they had agreed to the move.

At no time was the bureaucracy acting out of malice. The situation was equally out of control by all parties involved. At the time that the small general contract and major purchasing strategy was conceived, the Public Facilities Department had already used this approach on several smaller projects. The added complications of coordination and scheduling with the general contractor on such a major project were largely unanticipated. Moreover, the separation of the purchasing function from the Public Facilities Department meant that the coordinating agency was not in control of one of the
most critical operations within the project.

The parents may have been too understanding to accomplish their own goals. Possibly if they had taken a less sympathetic approach demanding completion rather than empathizing with the bureaucracy they could have precipitated a second general contract at once using revenue funds diverted from other alteration projects in the city. This type of intense pressure never materialized, the parents always operating within the liberal rather than the militant framework of citizen participation.

It is disquieting to think that militancy is the only effective mode of community control but this case seems to point out that only by demanding personal goals over goals of the entire city could the Copley Square High School parents and students achieve their immediate needs more rapidly. This, of course, is more the result of scarce and restricted resources rather than anything structural in the bureaucracy which tends to favor one group over another.

Yet another factor to consider is the statutory restrictions which limit the municipality to accept low bidders and the inability to restrict contracts to firms of known capability and performance. True,
every public bidder is required to post bond in the amount of the contract guaranteeing performance. However, declarations of default are subject to a lengthy court process and hence most defaults are negotiated. Furthermore, the slowness in payment by the municipal accountants and the numerous restrictions upon public contractors often produce situations where only one or even no contractor bids upon an item. Possibly a tightening up on the specifications on items bid along with a streamlining of the bidding and payment processes could improve this situation. However, the multitude of statutes and pressure groups with an interest in maintaining the status quo make such changes unlikely in the near future.

Finally, and possibly most significant, is the fact that the parents and students agreed that they would not have demanded such extensive work to be performed so rapidly if they had known that it would result in such chaos in the completion of the school. Possibly this is the reason why the relationship between the bureaucracy and the parents and students was more sympathetic and less demanding after the agreement to move to Copley Square was reached and the problems of renovation had become obvious.

It is not uncommon for the community to believe that the bureaucracy can do anything if placed under sufficient pressure. This may
be true, assuming the proper element of the bureaucracy is pressured, but the community is rarely equipped to recognize what bottlenecks will occur where in the process. This inability of the community to foresee the long range implications of its demands is the core of the next case study concerning the selection of a site for the Washington Allston Elementary School replacement.
CASE STUDY E

THE WASHINGTON ALLSTON ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
CASE STUDY E: THE WASHINGTON ALLSTON SCHOOL

The selection of a site for a major elementary school and school for the hearing handicapped forms the fifth case study. In this case study the primary issue is the resolution of conflicting community goals involving the retention of homes, park land, and business in selecting a school site. In an effort to be responsive to community desires, the City of Boston responds to each of these factors and in so going severely constrains the design of a multi-million dollar educational facility - a facility whose primary function is to serve the community which imposed these constraints.

GENERAL BACKGROUND. The Brighton section of the City of Boston is located to the west of the bulk of the city and forms a peninsula bounded by the towns of Brookline, Watertown and Cambridge across the Charles River. It is basically a fairly dense middle class area which has developed since the end of the last century. Several major arteries from the west of Boston pass through Brighton on their way to the downtown area. These arteries have produced a growth of strip commercial developments including drive-in restaurants, service stations, and other uses.
which the long term residents feel are detrimental to the stability of the neighborhood. A further factor contributing to the lessening stability of the Brighton neighborhood is the influx of students from the neighboring universities in Cambridge, Boston and Newton.

In the face of this Brighton has maintained a relatively stable number of school aged children. The two existing elementary schools in the Union Square area are both reasonably full and show no sign of declining in enrollment. Both of these schools, the Andrew Jackson School and the Washington Allston School are over fifty years old with the Washington Allston approaching the end of its first century in operation. In 1969 the Washington Allston suffered damage to its assembly hall in a minor fire and it was determined that in view of the overall condition of the building that only temporary repairs would be made.

At about this same time a bill was filed with the Massachusetts State Legislature for the replacement of the Horace Mann School in Roxbury. The Horace Mann School is a special school serving hearing handicapped children since the end of the nineteenth century. Under special state funding it serves children from throughout the Metropolitan area. Because of the location
of other schools for the deaf in the Metropolitan area, it was decided by the special education specialists that the new Horace Mann School should be located in a site which could conveniently serve the western suburbs of Boston and be integrated with a conventional elementary school in order for the handicapped children to benefit from functioning in an environment more representative of the real world. The decision was made to combine the Horace Mann school with a replacement for the Washington Allston and Andrew Jackson Elementary schools. The State, through special legislation, would pay 65% of the construction cost of the new facility.

At approximately the same time another bill was filed in the State Legislature by Brighton representative Norman Weinberg to give a portion of the Stanley A. Ringer Playground in Brighton to the West End House, an organization similar in structure to a boys' club. Representative Weinberg had been a member of West End House as a youth in the inner-city and his objective in this legislation was to allow West End House to build a new facility to serve Brighton youth and to replace the old West End House lost to the West End Urban Renewal Project. The bill was passed with little publicity and the West End House was given its choice of site within the boundaries of the Ringer Playground adjacent to the
Andrew Jackson School.

In theory, the West End House was to serve the Brighton community. In reality, it was being built as much to serve the alumni of the old West End House as the community. When approached by the City of Boston to arrange an agreement wherein the swimming pool and gym at West End House could be used by the public school children during school hours (the boys it was to serve would be in school at those times), the West End House responded by saying that the facility could not accommodate girls and that the many of the retired alumni had given funds with the anticipation of being able to use the facility during the day. Needless to say, the Brighton community was somewhat disgruntled about this use of park land with little or no community consultation and this sentiment was later to have considerable impact in the community selection of a site for the new school.

CONFLICT. In late June of 1969, at the very end of the school year, a public meeting was held at the William Howard Taft School in Brighton. At that meeting about a half-dozen school sites were proposed by various members of the community and were subsequently evaluated by the Public Facilities Department. Discussions at the public meeting indicated that the Brighton community was
unwilling to sacrifice any residential buildings in the face of a mounting shortage of moderate income housing. Moreover, no businesses employing local people or contributing major sums in tax revenues could be removed to make way for a new school. Finally, the community was adamant about the taking of park land and open space for a school facility. In the face of these constraints, it was still the general sentiment that the school should be centrally located and adequate in size.

During the following weeks the Public Facilities Department evaluated the several possible sites on the basis of these criteria. It was determined that only through the use of the Andrew Jackson School site adjacent to the Ringer Playground could a school be built which fulfilled the community criteria. Even at that the park would have to be used for open play space, but as it was already unofficially used by the Jackson School it was felt that this would pose no problem.

A meeting was held at the Allston-Brighton Area Planning Action Center (APAC) with the various community leaders who had identified themselves at the public meeting. At that smaller gathering the possibilities of using the existing Jackson School site were discussed. Among the solutions posed by the Public Facilities De-
partment was a scheme wherein the school would be built on the cramped Jackson School site and a gymnasium, for school and community use, would be built underground in a hillside in the park. After much heated discussion comparing the school scheme with the West End House, it was agreed by the group that the school gym, being totally buried in the hillside would use no area of the park and could be used after school hours independently of the school for community girls and women who had no recreational facilities in the area.

The site of the existing Jackson School is one block from Union Square, a major intersection and formerly the commercial and institutional center of the community. Over the past quarter century, Union Square has seen its prominently steepled church, its theatres, and its shopping replaced by gas stations and drive-in restaurants. It was proposed by one community organizer that the school site be extended to Union Square and that the school auditorium and community facilities be located in a position of prominence in the hope of revitalizing the Square. As this extension would involve the taking of one building containing three dwelling units, a gas station and a drive-in fried chicken restaurant, it was agreed that this would be a reasonable trade-off to make for the expanded school site. Two houses adjacent to the gas
station were not to be included as that would increase the number of dwelling units removed from the housing market.

Subsequently another public meeting was held at the Taft School to present this proposal. At first community reaction was negative concerning the use of the park for the underground gymnasium. After lengthy discussions about park ecology, recreation planning, the coasting hill used by the youngsters and the ultimate form of the park, it was apparently agreed that the scheme was a sound one. The general reaction to the taking of the three dwelling units was favorable as it would eliminate a drive-in restaurant and a filling station which the neighborhood felt were blighting elements.

The scheme which was evolved at that public meeting consisted of a school with adequate off-street parking for faculty and visitors, with an auditorium, library and community room located on busy Union Square and with a gymnasium and recreation complex located at the opposite end in and adjacent to the Ringer Playground. The existing Ringer Playground was divided into several areas consisting of a flat ball field and tennis courts, a rolling hill for coasting and kite flying, a heavily wooded cliff area and an area of benches and paths used by the elderly and mothers with small toddlers. The proposal for the development of the buried gymnasium
would change no feature of the park except for a slight elevation of the tennis courts as a barrier between the active play of the ball field and the quiet area of the paths and benches. It was the general feeling at the meeting that the scheme was sound, sensitive, and even beneficial to the park which had shown signs of vandalism and blight over the preceding years.

CRISIS. Although the sentiments expressed at the public meeting seemed to indicate that the problem of site had been resolved, the following few days brought about a dozen letters to the School Department and the Public Facilities Department protesting any encroachment on the Ringer Playground. One woman, a biology instructor at Boston University who had spoken about park ecology at the public meeting but who was seemingly convinced that the design would be sensitively handled, had obviously changed her mind and presented the Mayor with a petition bearing approximately fifty signatures protesting the use of parkland for school purposes.

Subsequently, a group of about ten women from the Massachusetts League of Women Voters called upon the Director of the Public Facilities Department. They were presented with the scheme and agreed that the proposal was both reasonable and sensibly handled. However, as they could not be given a positive
guarantee that the park land would not be further violated when and if the school were abandoned in the distant future, they refused to endorse the proposal and remained in opposition to any incursion into the park.

In the face of this opposition, it was decided by the Public Facilities Department to again meet with the community leadership. Upon presenting the fact that the city had come under pressure by various elements to abandon the park scheme, it became known that the community leadership had also been contacted by these persons and groups and had decided that the only possible site would be the Jackson School Site without the parkland.

As the Educational Planning Center had yet to complete the program and specifications for the new school, it was impossible to prove one way or the other that the reduced site would be impossible for a school of this size. The only guidelines available to the Public Facilities Department were site sizes for other schools in construction and none of these contained the unknown of a special school for the hearing handicapped. Unfortunately, in the fear that the community would oppose the Horace Mann School component if it were thought that it was contributing to the site
size problem, the Public Facilities Department decided to con-
tinue its exploration of the reduced site without any specific
mention of the size problem other than a general statement
concerning the severe limitations which had been imposed upon
the school.

As knowledge of the proposed site spread through the
community other problems became apparent. Many of the resi-
dents of the immediate neighborhood contacted the Public Facili-
ties Department to decry the lack of off-street parking and the
narrow and congested streets which could not accommodate the
traffic produced by such a major new facility. These people
were assured that the new facility would include off-street
parking and would have vehicular access directly from the
major arteries at Union Square.

The owner of the fried chicken drive-in contacted the
Public Facilities Department to protest that he had been
unaware of the public meetings despite their publication in the
local newspaper and notices appearing in local stores including
his own. He explained that he had a chain of eleven of these
drive-ins throughout Boston and that the Union Square operation
was one of the few which was turning in a profit. He further
argued that his operation was unlike the other fast food franchises in the area with few meals being consumed on the premises, his primary market being take-home dinners. He claimed that his relations with the neighborhood were cordial and that the neighborhood would back him up in his desire to remain on that site. Despite his protestations, no community person ever came forth on his behalf. His protestations were rechanneled to legal and political ploys, including the gift of reduced cost meals to senior citizens as part of the Mayor's Elderly Project during the recent campaign by the Mayor for reelection. As of this writing he is still on the site although legal actions have been started toward acquisition and eviction.

When the program for the school was finally obtained from the Educational Planning Center, an architect was hired and he commenced to produce some preliminary site studies as to building massing and traffic flow. The Boston Traffic Department was consulted concerning access from Union Square and their reaction was negative unless the city acquired an additional two houses to increase the length of street frontage and thus further separate the distance between entrance and exit driveways. The owners of both of these houses were contacted by the City and both expressed
a willingness to sell. Unfortunately, both owners had also been contacted by the owner of the fried chicken drive-in and he had expressed an intention to pay an inflated price for the purpose of relocating on that adjacent site.

An analysis of this situation showed several interesting implications. First, the total land area of the two houses was inadequate for the drive-in restaurant without a variance under the present zoning ordinance. Such a variance would require a public hearing and in view of the community sentiment against the fast food franchises was unlikely to be granted. However, as damage awards in eminent domain cases are based upon appraisals which consider present market transactions in the area, it may have been the intention of the restaurant owner to use this transaction to increase his damage award in the anticipation that the city would need the additional land and would then be forced to reimburse him for his added acquisition expenses. A second possibility was that this was merely a tactic to further confuse the situation in the hope that the municipality would be reluctant to get involved in such a legally complex situation with the danger of interminable delays in the Courts.

And so, the City was faced with the quandry of proceeding with construction on a possibly inadequate site or returning to
the community for a complete reexamination of the criteria which had been so adamantly endorsed over the preceding two years.

RESOLUTION. Faced with the possibility of a lengthy delay, it was determined that the best course of action would be to attempt to continue with the design of the school on the reduced site. The architect would produce a preliminary design and the community would be given a chance to reevaluate the criteria in view of the problems of traffic, parking, recreational space, building mass, height, and setback, access of emergency vehicles and general neighborhood impact.

At the time of this writing the architect is at work producing these preliminary designs. Discussions with community leaders have indicated that there may have been a softening of the community stand on the various criteria over the past year. The West End House has been completed and in use for one year and is now only an issue in memory. The housing crisis, although still severe, has been alleviated somewhat by rent control and the economic freeze. If the project is brought back to the community, it is hoped that the design can be evaluated in a less emotional light and that decisions taking into account the long
range effect on the neighborhood can be made.

Moreover, community leadership has not been constant over the past two years as persons move in and out of the neighborhood. What the reaction of the present leadership will be is hard to assess but it can be reasonably assured that solely by virtue of the fact that it is new leadership, it will not be locked into decisions made in the past. Usually, this lack of continuity creates problems for the ongoing school planning process by forcing the municipal planners to backtrack over decisions already made. In this case it may prove the saving grace of the community.

ANALYSIS. The core of this case study lies in the inability of the Brighton community to reconcile the conflicting goals of the school and the need to retain housing, park land and businesses. As both housing and park land were crisis issues at the time that the original site selection meetings were held, the community could not accommodate another crisis and hence placed the school on a site smaller than it deserved.

In the first case study concerning the Portland Area Vocational Technical High School, this tendency of any group or organization to cope with only one issue at a time was demonstrated. Possibly,
had the Brighton community not been in a furor concerning West End House and the student housing situation, the Washington Allston School would have taken prime importance to the detriment of the park and housing situations.

When the Public Facilities Department met with the community to discuss the scheme involving the buried gymnasium the reaction was not so unfavorable as to predict the vehement response in letters, telephone calls and the visit of the League of Women Voters. Had the City had a full time community organizer in the neighborhood to counteract rumors and to explain the plan to concerned residents this problem might have been avoided. However, present funding and staffing patterns seem to limit community interaction to formalized meetings thus allowing problems to grow in the community until they reach a level where they are difficult or impossible to overcome.

Despite the fact that the owner of the fried chicken drive-in restaurant was given relocation assistance and offered over a dozen possible sites for such relocation, his protests were not entirely unreasonable. The community had singled him out as a sacrifice for the school as they had little liking of any of the fast food franchises in the area. Despite the fact that this
particular drive-in was clean, well operated and catered to families for take-home food which was usually a substitute for home prepared meals, the community made no distinction between this operation and the numerous hamburger and pizza restaurants which attracted rowdy crowds of youngsters with the attendant litter and fast and noisy cars. In this instance the community was acting much like the Portland City Council in the first case study wherein the Council saw a new school as an opportunity to remove an undesirable use of a neighborhood as low-income housing.

The inclusion of the Horace Mann School for the Deaf in the project always had the potential of becoming an issue with the community. At several points in the process citizens raised the question of whether or not the special facility was increasing the need for land takings in assembling a suitable site. The response of the educational planners was that the actual space used by the handicapped students alone was comparatively small, less than fifteen percent of the total building area. The special reading and speech laboratories would benefit all of the pupils in the school as would the impressively staffed evaluation unit. Despite the fact that the community facilities such as the auditorium and community meeting rooms contributed almost as much
to the school's bulk as the Horace Mann component, the issue of overly large community facilities was never raised. Thanks to careful work in the community by several parents of handicapped children who were attending the Horace Mann School, the prospect of excluding the special education function never materialized as an issue to more than one or two persons in the community. This local grassroots organization paid large dividends in the aversion of this possible second crisis which, through the loss of the special 65% State aid, could have completely stymied the school project.

Because all of the community leadership was already committed to the issues of park preservation and the alleviation of the housing shortage no additional leadership came forth to address the school site issue within the framework of the educational needs of the school itself. Even if such leadership had existed it would have been doubtful that the community could have been mustered around this issue as the intensity of concern with parks and housing tended to preclude any other concerns in the neighborhood. Any additional leadership coming forth would have been forced to operate within the same organizational framework and hence with the same issues before any attempt could be made to concern the citizens with the school as a separate issue. Community leadership depends heavily
upon at least minimum acceptance of its nucleating issue and any attempt by the leadership to change issues or reverse positions seriously jeopardizes the leader's ability to remain in control and presents other personalities with the opportunity to displace the existing leadership on the very issues which that leadership had been using as an organizing force. This point was discussed to some extent in the second case study concerning the Georgetowne Elementary School and will be expanded upon in the next case study wherein the actual operations of community leadership will be looked at in more detail.
CASE STUDY F

THE MARGARET FULLER ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
CASE STUDY F: THE MARGARET FULLER SCHOOL REPLACEMENT

This sixth case study is concerned with the operations of community leadership in the school building process. Unlike the preceding case where the major issues were already formed in the community prior to the proposal of the new school, the Margaret Fuller Elementary School Replacement is a new issue injected into a relatively unorganized community. The case concerns itself with the methods and techniques used by the president of the local Home and School Association in exploiting the new school as an organizing issue in a campaign for community prestige. Of particular interest are the strategies used by the school building bureaucracy to keep the issue of the school divorced from other community goals and the attempt by the bureaucracy to assure broad spectrum community representation in the search for a new school site.

GENERAL BACKGROUND. Jamaica Plain is a diverse section of Boston whose neighborhoods range from large estates overlooking Jamaica Pond to shabby ethnic ghettos of blighted housing and low grade industrial uses. Recent attempts by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to construct a major eight-lane expressway parallel to an existing railroad right of way through the center of Jamaica Plain have been met with fierce
community resistance. Through the efforts of various community leaders and advocate planning organizations such as Urban Planning Aid of Boston, certain segments of the community have learned that community organization can be a successful technique in obtaining a measure of responsiveness from major bureaucracies such as the Massachusetts Department of Public Works and the Governor's Office.

The section of Jamaica Plain dealt with in the particular case study is the area around Egleston Square. Egleston Square is a badly blighted area centering around a decrepit terminal of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority's elevated transit line. Moving away from Egleston Square in an easterly direction the neighborhood gradually improves in condition and meets the edge of Franklin Park, the largest park in the Boston park system designed and planted by Frederick Law Olmstead near the turn of the century. To the west of Egleston Square lies an area of moderately well kept multiple family buildings gradually being occupied by increasing numbers of Spanish speaking persons, many of whom are Cubans of middle-class background. To the south extends the elevated structure along Washington Street toward Forest Hills, its terminus and northern edge of a substantial white middle-class area among the more suburban in nature within the Boston city
limits. Along Washington Street lie many light industries and blighted residential and commercial buildings suffering from the noise and darkness caused by the elevated transit structure. Midway between Egleston Square and Forest Hills is the intersection of Green Street and Washington Street, another station on the transit line. Green Street runs east and west, passing into Franklin Park on the east and into a squalid industrial area which stretches to the railroad on the west. Green Street forms the southern boundary of the Model Cities program area in Boston. The existing Margaret Fuller Elementary School is on the portion of Green Street known as Glenn Road, to the east of Washington Street and just out of the Model Cities area.

Fortunately, over the past few years of its existence, the Boston Model Cities Agency has overcome its original reluctance to cross its arbitrary boundaries and has become increasingly involved in programs and projects lying just over its boundaries which affect the lives of Model Cities residents within the program area. For that reason, the Public Facilities Department turned to the Model Cities Agency to act as a preliminary study and organizing group for the community planning effort to find a site for the new Margaret Fuller School.
The Model Cities Agency, working through the Education Taskforce and its planning staff, prepared some preliminary land-use studies of the area and scheduled several community meetings through the Home and School Association at the Margaret Fuller School. The result of these meetings was the preliminary selection of about four sites for consideration by the Public Facilities Department.

Subsequently, the Public Facilities Department met with the parent's organization for a brief summary of the project status and to solicit community views. At that initial meeting, seeming restricted to those who had received notices sent home with the children attending the Fuller, Ellis Mendel and Theodore Roosevelt Schools, the Public Facilities Department first encountered the woman who was president of the Home and School Association. Her husband, a young architect working for a Boston firm was in attendance at this meeting. Despite the fact that he had not yet obtained his registration as a professional, he was teaching evenings at the Boston Architectural Center, a non-degree granting institution run by the Boston Society of Architects. As an academic project he had several of his students prepare a design and model of a possible elementary school for one of the proposed sites. Despite the fact that the school designs could not meet State standards
in size and arrangement and that it was premature to consider design when a site had yet to be selected, the Public Facilities Department and the Education Planning Center commented favorably about the design thinking that this first meeting would be a good time to present the concept of open plan schools to the community. As the designs shown were open plan in basic nature, comments from the professionals in attendance were addressed to that facet alone in the assumption that open-plan would be an issue which could be avoided as a controversy at this early stage.

CONFLICT. Unfortunately, what the professionals overlooked at this first meeting was that these models had been prepared not in advocacy of open plan but instead with the thought of expounding upon the virtues of this one site possibility to the exclusion of the others. Of the four proposals, this site was the most "rural" in nature, abutting Franklin Park near one of its most rustic areas and occupying an area presently including some of the best and most stable large houses in the neighborhood. Conversations with the Home and School Association president and her husband much later in the planning process indicated that they saw themselves as protectors of the suburban ideal within the inner city and that this school site was being proposed in an effort to equip their neighborhood with
a suburban status symbol as a psychological device to encourage their children to what they believed to be the American dream.

At a subsequent meeting held at one of the neighborhood churches, the Public Facilities Department made an attempt to present the four preliminary sites as to their basic comparative virtues and faults. By that time it had already become obvious that there was a movement underway to promote the Franklin Park site although the source of that movement was still unknown to the municipal planners. This meeting, was the second contact between the Public Facilities Department and the community although several other meetings had been held by the Model Cities Agency.

Normally, a second meeting is used to further eliminate site possibilities on the basis of general observations. In preparation for the second meeting in Jamaica Plain the Public Facilities Department had discussed the sites with the Model Cities Agency and had the planning staff make a brief tour of the proposed sites to familiarize itself with the problems and possibilities. As a result of the survey tour, it was the intention of the Public Facilities Department to use the second meeting to eliminate two of the four sites because of severe
family relocation problems or totally inadequate site size. However, when the Public Facilities planner arrived at the meeting the situation was quite different from that which had been anticipated.

After a presentation of the four sites with color slides made a few days before the meeting, the Public Facilities Department planner attempted to solicit comments on each of the sites from the audience. Using a chalkboard divided into four columns, one for each potential site, the planner attempted to get the audience to list the various advantages and disadvantages of each site. As Model Cities had distributed printed material concerning each site at a preceding meeting, this approach should have brought the various conflicts out into the open. However, response was minimal and the planners from Model Cities, the Educational Planning Center and Public Facilities Department were forced to fill in the chalkboard with little support from the assembled community.

After a few minutes of this approach, one member of the community took the floor and requested that a vote be taken. It was explained that the purpose of the community meetings were to hear public sentiment and not to be a quasi-elective process. Many citizens are unable to attend community meetings for one reason or another and such a voting process would completely
disenfranchise those persons who were absent through apathy, conflicting commitments or ignorance of the meeting. This particular meeting concerning the Margaret Fuller School Replacement vividly demonstrates the danger in taking a single community meeting as a reliable indicator of community sentiment.

Allowing various persons to speak to the issue of site selection, it became obvious that with only one exception all of those assembled were in favor of the Franklin Park site. The only dissention came from a person who owned a home which would have to be taken by eminent domain if that site were selected. The general tenor of the meeting was a strong dissatisfaction with the City as it had not prepared detailed acquisition and relocation cost figures and a timetable for the construction of the new school on this one specific site. The meeting was finally adjourned with those present demanding that the Public Facilities Department provide this information at once and proceed with the design and construction of the new school.

CRISIS. At this point in the process it became obvious to the Public Facilities Department that an unfortunate error had been made in trusting the community organizing task to the local leadership. No matter how solid a community is concerning
an issue such as site selection, it is beyond all reasonable probability that a community meeting will produce such complete lack of dissent. There are always persons in a neighborhood with conflicting goals and aspirations and usually these persons will make an extra effort to appear at public meetings to make their sentiments known. By allowing the Home and School Association to distribute notices of the meeting in the neighborhood the leadership of that organization had effectively edited the community which would attend the public meeting either through selective distribution of the notices or by carefully wording the notices in such a way as to not arouse dissent.

In part because of a commitment to community participation and in part because of a sound knowledge of the implications of such exclusionary practices, the school planning bureaucracy makes a conscious effort to achieve the broadest possible representation at these community meetings. By excluding persons in the preliminary planning stage, problems of dissent at the time of relocation and land acquisition often occur. Such problems at a point in the process where funds are being expended and designs have been made are both costly and delaying. Unfortunately, the community leadership at the Margaret Fuller School did not foresee the implications of their
The Public Facilities Department recognized the potential problems which could occur if the Franklin Park site were pursued without additional community inputs. Moreover, the Home and School Association prepared a press release for publication in the Model Cities Newspaper stating that the Franklin Park site was all but official as a result of the community meeting. This press release was sufficient to precipitate several telephone calls and letters to the Public Facilities Department from community people who felt unrepresented in the process.

If it were true that the Franklin Park site was the most desirable location for the school, the Public Facilities Department could call another meeting, this time doing its own publicity and community organization, and attempt to quell any opposition in the neighborhood. However, if the other site (two having been eliminated in the cursory survey) were superior, the situation had already been reached wherein the municipality would have to attempt a reversal of organized community opinion through the use of factual material and the involvement of those community persons thusfar not involved. It should be noted at this point that it was the opinion of the Public Facili-
ties Department based upon past experiences that the Franklin Park site was a poor choice. However, bureaucratic opinion is of little value in convincing a community and more specific evidence would have to be provided.

Utilizing its planning, architectural and engineering staff, the Public Facilities Department commenced a detailed investigation of the two potential sites. It became apparent that the second site, a partially vacant piece of land abutting the existing Margaret Fuller School and containing a rock cliff face, a large Boston Edison Company transformer substation and located to the rear of some unattractive industrial buildings along Washington Street was far from ideal. However, the Franklin Park site was much too small and would require the closing of a street between the site and the park and legislative consent to turn part of the Olmstead woodlands into playing fields for use by the school.

In order to enlarge the site adequately to not require the street closing or removal of rustic parkland, about thirty-five houses would have to be taken. This, of course, was an alternative which was obviously unreasonable. Therefore, the Public Facilities Department concentrated on the site as proposed by the community and the alternate site adjacent to the
Fuller School.

As a result of the detailed research done by the Public Facilities Department, the following information was uncovered concerning the Franklin Park site: The Traffic Department was vehemently opposed to the closing of the street between the proposed site and the park. The street contained below its surface a major four-foot diameter water main which would have to be either relocated or rebuilt to accept a school building over it. The street contained six six-hundred pair telephone cables including the Boston to Providence toll trunks. The telephone company informed the City that it would take a complete engineering study and the replacement of these lines from repeater station to repeater station as they were among the first installed in the Boston area and dated from 1901. The site was quite hilly with large outcropping of ledge requiring extensive blasting in close proximity to houses and two nursing homes. Due to limitations of the powers of the City concerning park lands (as opposed to playgrounds like the Ringer Playground in the preceeding case), a special act of the Massachusetts State Legislature would be required to turn a portion of the park over to the School Department for school use. The construction of a school on this site would seriously damage one of the few remaining well-kept streets in the area and would locate the school
against a park which was unused and hard to police during the night time.

The alternative site adjacent to the Margaret Fuller School was not without its limitations; it was also rocky and would require considerable blasting and filling. It was composed of many smaller parcels which would have to be severed from the industrial buildings along Washington Street with the resultant loss of parking and expansion space for these industries. The Boston Edison transformer at one end of the site would be costly and difficult to relocate although it might be enclosed or located within the school building. The site was close to the Washington Street elevated transit structure and the heavily travelled truck route below as well as the blight along Washington Street. The existing Margaret Fuller School may have to be demolished to make room for the new school requiring the displacement of the pupils for two academic years. The site did not have the pleasant suburban character of the Franklin Park location.

With this information in hand, the director of the Public Facilities Department and the staff planner attended a small meeting called by the president of the Home and School Association. At that meeting, owners of the business along Washington
Street who would be affected were present although none of the owners or residents of the Franklin Park site were invited. The director briefly presented the problems involved and assured the group that the City would make every effort to respond in a reasonable fashion to the needs of the community. It was explained that the Washington Street site would cause the minimum amount of damage and that as the Edison transformer was at one end of the site, efforts to enclose or relocate it could proceed even while the school was in construction. However, the relocation of the telephone lines from the Franklin Park site could not begin until the telephone company was assured of the approval of the site by the State Department of Education and this approval could not be given until the State Legislature had agreed to the transfer of the parkland. In effect, this meant that the Washington Street site could yield a completed school in about two and one half years while the Franklin Park site would take about five years, assuming that the legislature was amenable to transferring a park serving a city-wide function to a neighborhood use. Following the meeting, those in attendance were taken on a tour of both sites and their potential as building sites was explained. The business owners in attendance, although not overly pleased at the prospect of losing expansion space, admitted that the plan would not cause irreparable damage to their operations. It was agreed that a third, and final public meeting would be held to
present both sites in detail to the full community.

Having now learned that the local community leadership was not to be trusted in mustering maximum community involvement, the Public Facilities Department requested that Model Cities and the principal of the Fuller School take charge of distributing announcements of the public meeting. Special emphasis was to be given to contacting residents, owners and abutters on both sites.

At this point it should be noted that the community leadership had stated on numerous occasions to both the community and the school planning bureaucracy that the only buildings to be demolished on the Franklin Park site were two houses, a "fraternity" house, a burnt out house and an abandoned Ukrainian social club. The Public Facilities Department had received telephone calls from the owners of the two houses but had heard little from the other owners and occupants. This intensive leafleting of the neighborhood produced the following information: The fraternity house was not a fraternity house but an apartment building owned by a Northeastern University fraternity and operated for profit as part of that organization's endowment. It was a source of housing for several neighborhood families and some unmarried individuals who were possibly the source of the "fraternity
house" image. Similarly, the Ukranian social club was a recreation building run by a Ukranian group and was not abandoned. The group was about to undertake renovations in the hope of opening the building to all community youngsters and was awaiting word from the City before expending any funds for fear of losing the building to the new school. And finally, a building permit had been let to start renovations on the burnt out building which had been recently acquired by a new owner.

As astonishing as these facts may seem in light of the apparent sentiment expressed at the community meetings and seeming difficulty of excluding parties with such strong interests from the participatory process, they were no fabrication of the school building bureaucracy.

RESOLUTION. In June of 1971 the third and final public meeting concerning the selection of a site for the Margaret Fuller School Replacement was held in the auditorium of the Theodore Roosevelt School in Jamaica Plain. Not surprisingly, the attendance at this meeting was larger than at any previous meeting. Usually, attendance declines from one meeting to the next as community people get tired of the long planning process. However, the new publicity methods had worked and many persons previously
uninvolved were now anxious to express their viewpoints. Among those present were the owners of the businesses on Washington Street, residents and abutters of both sites, and a contingent of about a half dozen Ukranian-Americans concerned with the future of their building.

A presentation of the site alternatives was made by the Public Facilities Department. Before opening the meeting to comments and questions, the representatives of the Educational Planning Center and Public Facilities Department made an effort to thank the president of the Home and School Association and her husband for their efforts and to praise them for their work in organization and research in the community. This was of course done to pave the way for an easier reversal of their position without embarassment.

The community reaction was clear. Although a large number of persons still favored the Franklin Park site, most people felt that the added delays were not worth the trouble. Parents with children above the first grade level would not get to send those children to a new school if that school were built on the park site. Moreover, a number of Spanish-speaking and Black people previously uninvolved made it clear that their value system did not place such priority on a suburban image site but favored
speedy implementation of any program which could benefit their children's education. The president of the Home and School Association graciously bowed to the sentiment of the gathering stating that she could not support the long delays and that when she and her husband had done their initial research into the sites the problems of underground utilities and special legislation were unidentified to them as lay people. Her husband, having represented himself as an architectural professional to the community had a more difficult time of making this reversal and later stated privately that he felt that the City had been unfair in surpressing the desires of the community.

The meeting was not without its compromises. From the Northwest corner of the Washington Street site to the southeast corner of the Franklin Park site was only about three hundred yards, although, as one community person noted, the difference in environment from industrial to rural was such that the distance could have well been over a mile. At the urging of some members of the community to provide some continuity of the school site with the less industrial portions of the neighborhood, it was agreed that four houses to the west of the Washington Street site would be acquired and their land added to the school site. This would give the school a major access from one of the more
pleasant treelined streets in the neighborhood and allow it to
turn its back on the industrial area.

Subsequent to the meeting the Washington Street site, modified
to include the additional land to the west, was officially
selected by the Public Facilities Commission as the site of the
new school. As of this writing land acquisition is in progress
and contractual negotiations with a noted Boston architectural
firm are underway.

ANALYSIS. This case study is significant insofar as it
demonstrates how the motivations of community leadership are not
always simple nor the use of political intrigue limited to the
bureaucracy. In retrospect it becomes clear that the president of
the Home and School Association and her husband were using this
new school issue as a tool to build their prestige within their
community and as a method to reassure themselves of the middle-
class suburban nature of their neighborhood in view of the
incursions by lower income people from the Model Cities areas
to the north. In addition, the husband, having seen the pro-
cfessional advocates address the highway issue in the neighborhood,
was using his role as self-appointed advocate architect to bolster
his own self-image. Neither of these people should be condemned
for their actions as their conscious motivations were always in
the interest of the neighborhood as they conceived it. Only the morality of attempting selective involvement in the guise of community participation can be questioned and it would be false to assert that the bureaucracy has not been guilty of similar offenses in advocating for its concept of community interest from time to time.

As both the Model Cities Agency and the Home and School Association are community based and run agencies, it would seem reasonable to assume that they would be ideal organizing tools in gaining citizen participation in the school planning process. This case study shows how such naive belief by the bureaucracy in honest search for community involvement can lead to extreme problems. However, time, money and staffing limitations usually prohibit agencies such as the Public Facilities Department and the Educational Planning Center from undertaking independent community organizing efforts. Even if such efforts could be made in every instance, their very independence from established community organizations would give them a stigma of illegitimacy. Therefore, community organizing efforts usually fall somewhere between the two extremes of complete independence and complete dependency. It is the professional judgment of the school building bureaucracy which makes the decision as to what specific actions should be taken in a given neighborhood. This case study shows how those judgments can sometime be in error.
Although the bureaucracy makes every reasonable effort to keep an open mind in situations such as the Margaret Fuller site selection, past experience usually indicates which site will be most advantageous long before the community is aware of the facts which lead to that opinion. In the case of the Franklin Park site, the professional planners could logically assume that underground utilities would pose a construction problem. However, the community wanted the specifics of what utilities and it is not incorrect to state that the professionals were as surprised as the community in discovering the sheer magnitude of the telephone and water main conduits. This is not to say that the community should not demand as much factual material as possible; it is merely to indicate that if the facts bear out the professionals' assumptions it is difficult to convince the community that the facts were not "created" to justify an a priori decision by the bureaucracy. Despite every attempt by the professionals to create an image of neutrality, it is all but impossible to conceal professional opinions once they have begun to be formed. In effect, the professional, being human, always tends to lean one way or the other in presenting the alternatives to the community and in so doing exposes the bureaucracy to the beginnings of community doubt.

The Margaret Fuller case is particularly significant in this respect. Although the Public Facilities Department made every
effort to allow the community to make a logical decision and thereby justify its apparent reversal, there will always be a certain sense of defeat on the part of some members of the community and a reinforcement of the belief that one cannot fight City Hall. In the specific case of the Home and School Association president and her husband this frustration will always be especially strong. Nonetheless, the school planning bureaucracy made an effort to give them every opportunity to reconcile themselves to the situation gracefully and it appears that they will continue to participate in the design and curriculum planning phases of the new school.

In this case study, as in each of the preceding five case studies, the issues and problems have been reasonably defined and isolated. This has given the bureaucracy the ability to cope with crisis situations on a sequential basis. Such linearity of the planning process is not always the case and in the next and final case study concerning the Carter School Complex in the South End of Boston many of the issues already explored combine with additional problems to produce a situation wherein the very multiplicity of problems defy rational project management.
CASE STUDY G

THE CARTER SCHOOL COMPLEX
CASE STUDY G: THE CARTER SCHOOL COMPLEX

This seventh and final case study is included in order to present a complex situation which demonstrates the interaction of a large number of critical events including those which have been illustrated in the preceding six case studies. The Carter School Complex is a proposed cluster of an elementary and middle school sharing certain common facilities and located in a poor Black neighborhood of the South End of Boston. The project was conceived at the time of the preparation of the South End Urban Renewal Plan prior to 1965 and, because of a sequence of many crisis situations, is just beginning architectural design as of this writing at the beginning of 1972. If reasonable progress is made with no further interruptions of the process, which is of course unlikely, the new facility should open at the start of the 1974 academic year. Thus, children of kindergarten age at the time that the school was first proposed will be too old to attend its eighth grade by the time of the school opening. By examining the Carter School Complex it is possible to see how crisis situations combine and interact to produce problems which often tax the school building process beyond its limitations of effectiveness. It is the cascading and overlapping of crises which form the core of this final case study.
GENERAL BACKGROUND. Of the many neighborhoods of Boston, the South End is probably the most diverse in terms of the ethnic and income characteristics of its residents. Included in the South End are Boston's Chinatown and part of the Black ghetto which forms Roxbury to the south. In between are enclaves of Syrian, Armenian, Italian, Greek and Puerto Rican families. During the last decade numbers of middle and upper income business and professional people have purchased and rehabilitated nineteenth century townhouses throughout the South End, especially in the areas adjacent to the Prudential Center whose back edge abuts the South End.

Historically, the bulk of the South End is the result of efforts by various developers to fill the South Cove and South Bay of Boston during the period preceding 1870 to produce sites for attractive brick townhouses along a formal street pattern of parks and squares. Through the center of the South End runs Washington Street now shaded by an elevated transit viaduct constructed just prior to the turn of the century. Washington Street is the only part of the South End which has existed from colonial times, it having been originally the roadway linking the peninsula of Boston to the farmlands of Roxbury. The South End appears to have been at one time the site of expensive bow front brick buildings which
could have housed some of Boston's most prominent families. This however, was not the case, the elegant buildings having slipped directly into use as rooming houses for low-income persons in the great depression of 1873, bankrupting most of the developers and producing a neighborhood of poor immigrant families.

In the early 1960s the South End was incorporated into an urban renewal plan under the auspices of the Boston Redevelopment Authority. Many bitter debates and the factionalism of the diverse ethnic and interest groups made the South End Urban Renewal Plan one of the most controversial programs in the recent history of the City of Boston. The first few years of the renewal program were marked by incendiary public hearings, picketings, demonstrations, the occupation of the Boston Redevelopment Authority offices by various community groups and other dramatic actions such as the take over of the United South End Settlements building by a group of disgruntled citizens and the creation of a "tent city" on a commercial parking lot which had been established as an interim use of a potential site for new housing.

This case study concerns itself primarily with the portion of the South End lying at its extreme southern boundary and fading indeterminately into the Lower Roxbury section of Boston's Black
ghetto. Historically, this area had been one of the last sections of inner city Boston to be developed, its buildings constructed from about 1890 to the beginning of World War I as dense tenement housing for immigrant families employed in the many industries along South Bay to the east. The neighborhood itself was sharply bounded by East Chester Park Street (now Massachusetts Avenue) a major east-west artery to the north, by South Bay to the East, by the tracks of the Boston and Providence Railroad to the west and open only to the Roxbury area to the South. Within this area were located the stables and yards of the street railway which ran along Tremont Street from downtown Boston and the Chickoring Piano Manufactory, built in 1852 on part of the original unfilled land and establishing the tone of the area as a locale for industry and housing for industrial workers. At the time of its construction, the factory was the largest building in the Americas with the exception of the United States Capitol in Washington. The structure remains to this day as a home for many smaller light industries and continues to overshadow the smaller residential scale of the neighborhood.

Despite its location at the extreme southern edge of the South End, this neighborhood contains one of the two public playgrounds serving the over 20,000 residents of the South End area.
This facility, the William E. Carter Playground is located along the Boston and Providence Railroad tracks (now part of the Penn-Central System) and was originally the National League Ballfield in Boston. The neighborhood itself, caught between the bulk of the South End and the Lower Roxbury area, has no formal or historical name. For the purposes of the renewal plan and this particular school project it has taken its name from the playground and become known as the Carter Playground section of the South End.

Because Massachusetts Avenue effectively severed the Carter neighborhood from the amenities of the South End to the north, it has drawn its supportive services from the Dudley Square area of Roxbury to the south. As Roxbury shifted from Jewish to Black in population in the 1940s and 1950s, the Carter Neighborhood experienced the same shift. Being cut off from the more diverse sections of the South End, this shift was almost total and by the time the South End Urban Renewal Plan was conceived, the Carter neighborhood contained some of the worst housing stock and people in most need of social services of any neighborhood in Boston. Unlike the Roxbury area which had a reasonable number of large homes built for blue-collar families, the Carter neighborhood had always contained only tenement housing for immigrant
families and thus while Roxbury attracted enough middle class black families for some nucleus of community leadership, the Carter neighborhood received the poorest and least self-sufficient of the Black population in Boston.

To compound the problems of the Carter neighborhood, a major cross-town highway, known as the innerbelt was planned along a route which would form a barrier between the neighborhood and its one source of some stability, Roxbury. Acquisition and clearance was done along this route in the mid-sixties, and although various protests and restudies have placed the future of this highway in some doubt, a four-hundred foot wide swath of rubble now separates the Carter neighborhood from Lower Roxbury and Dudley Square.

The ultimate indignity to the Carter neighborhood came in the form of the loss of its two small and antiquated elementary schools. The first fell to clearance for a proposed new low-income housing development and the second was destroyed by fire. With only a few elementary school seats available in the nearest elementary school in the South End, north of Massachusetts Avenue, the school aged children of the neighborhood were and are being bussed to the Brighton section of Boston.
Were it not for the efforts of the residents of the area to demand the inclusion of new housing and schools in the South End Urban Renewal Plan in the early 1960s, the neighborhood might have been designated for industrial use by the Boston Redevelopment Authority. Some of the area was designated for industrial sites, but several hundred new units of low and moderate income housing was included as dominant land-use element in the renewal plan. Because of demolition to make room for this new housing and because of the availability of other new housing openings in the South End and other areas of Boston, few of the people who lived in the Carter neighborhood are still there today. The plans made with these people are still very real, however, and the new and continuing residents have had to find ways to adapt, or adapt to, these plans in view of changing values and ideas.

Included in the South End Urban Renewal Plan, as approved by the South End community through many long public hearings in the early 1960s, was a new school to be located on a parcel designated as PB-4 bounded by Massachusetts Avenue, the Boston and Providence Railroad, and the Carter Playground. PB-4 lay at the extreme northwest corner of the Carter neighborhood and was selected as a school site because it contained housing occupied mostly by transients and could utilize the Carter Playground for school
recreational use. Moreover, as the Boston and Providence tracks were to become the new right-of-way for the transit line presently on the Washington Street Elevated and as the frontage on the east-west arterial of Massachusetts Avenue would make the school visible and accessible to the white middle-class Back Bay community to the northwest, it was agreed that this would be the only site which could attract a sufficient number of White children from outside the Carter neighborhood to racially integrate the school and make it legal to construct in accord with the Massachusetts Racial Balance Act. And so, from 1965 until 1969, the Boston Redevelopment Authority proceeded to acquire the property on PB-4 while the construction of new housing continued throughout the Carter neighborhood. As a result of the acquisition and demolition for the school and the new housing the population of the neighborhood dropped, and as the completion of the new housing became predictable and thus the point at which the new school would be needed became known, the Carter School Complex on parcel PB-4 became an active project for the Public Facilities Department.

The status of the project as of the beginning of 1969 was that the site had been selected through the urban renewal community planning process and that the development of an educational program
should begin in anticipation of construction being completed by late 1971, approximately three years later. This assumed about a year for programming and design and two years for construction, about typical for any new school. The first of the new housing would be opening at about this time and the new facility would then be ready to accommodate the children of the new tenants. However, when the neighborhood planning effort was begun for programming the new facility in early 1969, it was discovered that some of the assumptions had changed and the entire process was just beginning.

FIRST CONFLICT. When the Carter neighborhood community was contacted concerning the start of educational programming in early 1969, it was discovered by the Educational Planning Center that the issue of program would not be discussed by the neighborhood until the site selection process was reopened. In the intervening years since the PB-4 site was selected by the Boston Redevelopment Authority after a number of public hearings, the composition of the community and its values had changed. The housing market, in part because of demolition to make way for new housing, had tightened considerably, and the previously undesirable transient housing on PB-4 had become family housing which the community desired to see rehabilitated. A group of architectural
students from the Community Project Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology had been working with the tenants of PB-4 to assess the rehabilitation potential of two major apartment buildings and to prepare a report exploring the possibility of funding such rehabilitation and locating the school on another site.

The report*, titled Tenant Cooperative Housing Rehabilitation, made a concerted effort to reconcile the school with the retention of the apartment buildings. Unfortunately, the students from Community Projects Laboratory, in an effort to be responsive to the Carter community, failed to realize that the change in designation of the PB-4 site was desirable not so much as a correction of the Boston Redevelopment Authority plan but rather as a reflection of changing community values. More importantly, they did not contact the Public Facilities Department concerning school size and site standards but dealt instead with the Boston Redevelopment Authority and the Educational Planning Center. Although the Educational Planning Center is the agency which programs the buildings, it is the Public Facilities Department which negotiates with the Massachusetts Department of Education, School Building Assistance Bureau concerning the acceptability of a site to receive state construction aid. Had the

*"Tenant Cooperative Housing Rehabilitation" by David Judelson, John McCrae and Robert Yelton, Community Projects Laboratory, M.I.T. 1970
Community Projects Laboratory utilized current site standards in their report, it would have been possible to translate their recommendations for relocation of the school directly into a new school site.

At one of the preliminary planning meetings with the Carter community, the Community Projects Laboratory did present their scheme. However, they did not identify themselves sufficiently and left hastily to attend another meeting. Subsequent attempts to contact them through Harvard and M.I.T. failed to disclose their project or identities. It was not until the matter of site was substantially resolved that the Public Facilities Department obtained a copy of their report and then only after a Public Facilities Department planner had glanced at a copy on a community organization office desk in an entirely different neighborhood of the South End. He noted the names of the co-sponsoring agency, Housing Innovations, Incorporated, and the report was tracked down through referral by the Housing Innovations staff.

The Carter community, rejecting the PB-4 site, proposed that the new school be located on parcel 16, a city block opposite the Carter Playground and separated from the playground by heavily travelled Columbus Avenue. This site had previously been the location
of the Tremont Street yards of the now abandoned Tremont Street streetcar line and its dominant use was a small building which had been recently constructed by a trucking company for warehousing and maintenance purposes. It was the understanding of the trucking company that it would be relocated from the site to make way for new moderate income housing. However, the housing developer had shown little interest in pursuing the proposal and the community rightly felt that this site could be put to more productive use for the new school.

Unfortunately, whereas PB-4 had been separated from the playground by a minor dead end street which could be discontinued, the parcel 16 site was isolated from the play area by a 120-foot wide artery. As the Urban Renewal Plan called for this artery ultimately to be discontinued, the community suggested that it be discontinued at once and the school constructed on parcel 16. However, the discontinuance of Columbus Avenue depended upon the construction of a new limited access arterial, known as the South End Bypass, parallel to the railroad on the other edge of the playground. This bypass was being vigorously opposed by another South End neighborhood to the north of the Carter neighborhood which would lose considerable housing if the new road were built. To further confuse the issue, the Carter community suddenly decided
that the concept of sharing the Carter Playground with the school was unacceptable as the elderly, unemployed and mothers with pre-school children used the Carter Playground during the morning and afternoon hours. This resulted in a proposal by the community at a public meeting to extend the school site to include numerous industrial buildings and abandoned apartment buildings to the south of parcel 16 in an attempt to enlarge parcel 16 to accommodate the school with its own outdoor physical education areas.

The Public Facilities Department explored this possibility with the Boston Redevelopment Authority and determined that some of that abandoned housing was already beginning rehabilitation and that the industrial buildings provide employment for approximately 15% of the employed in the Carter neighborhood. At the next public meeting, even before the Public Facilities Department could present this data, the community leadership announced that conversations with various residents had made these facts known and that the proposal was therefore unacceptable.

Meetings were held with the Traffic Department to see if Columbus Avenue could be closed in an attempt to combine a portion of PB-4 with parcel 16. Present traffic patterns clearly excluded this possibility unless the South End Bypass were to be constructed
first. Even if the bypass were acceptable to the South End, it would take several years to obtain funding and to construct and so this possibility was ruled out.

Yet another complication was the overriding need to comply with the Massachusetts Racial Balance Act. Despite a shift in thinking in the Black community since its enactment in 1965, the Act required that 50% of the new facility be reserved for white students or all State aid to the entire Boston Public School System would have to be suspended. Even though the Carter neighborhood could easily fill every seat in the new facility and still have need for more pupil places as a result of new housing construction, the facility would need to accommodate white students, gathered from wherever possible, to comply with the law.

The site selection process had reached a stalemate. The Carter community was adamant in its desire to utilize none of the existing playground and to retain the apartment buildings on PB-4. The only solution could be an innovative and unorthodox one as all of the conventional solutions had failed to produce a suitable site.

FIRST CRISIS. The Public Facilities Department planning staff decided to take a fresh look at the problem, disregarding
State standards in the belief that any conflict with the State would take no longer to resolve than the present impasse with the community. The result was a set of five options:

The first was, of course, the originally proposed school on PB-4 as shown in the South End Urban Renewal Plan. This was clearly unacceptable but provided a comparison for the other schemes.

The second was the construction of a high-rise tower at one end of parcel 16 which would occupy the minimum amount of ground area, leaving the bulk of the site for outdoor play for the school.

The third scheme was a school building which accommodated the outdoor play areas on its roof and covered most of parcel 16 to a height of two stories.

The fourth scheme proposed the location of the school building on the areas of PB-4 not occupied by the two apartment buildings and the utilization of Carter Playground as a school play area. A new public playground would be developed on Parcel 16 simultaneously to replace the existing facility.
And, the fifth scheme was the construction of the new school in part on air-rights over Columbus Avenue in a manner linking Parcel 16 to PB-4 and placing school play area on the vacant portions of both parcels, retaining the contested housing and Columbus Avenue as a through street.

These five schemes were presented to the community at a meeting held at the United South End Settlements building in Union Park in the South End. The community was cautioned that all of the schemes with the exception of the first were unorthodox and could prove unacceptable to the School Building Assistance Bureau. It was agreed that the unorthodox options were the only ones open and the community threatened to picket the State Department of Education if a solution could not be found.

After much debate concerning the dangers and costs of rooftop play areas, the environment of high-rise building for an elementary school and the distrust of the municipal promise to replace the Carter Playground on parcel 16, it was agreed that air-rights was the only acceptable solution. The community was not overly excited about air-rights construction as a positive concept but would accept the idea as a last resort. It was decided
that a meeting would be held with the State Department of Education to gain approval of the concept and the site.

FIRST RESOLUTION.*  A meeting was held at the offices of the Public Facilities Department to discuss the possibilities of an air-rights solution to the problem of site selection for the Carter School Complex. In preparation for that meeting, a set of slides showing air-rights facilities throughout the Boston area was prepared by the Public Facilities Planning Staff for presentation to the state. It should be noted at this point that the School Building Assistance Bureau had never approved any public school facility on a non-contiguous site, that is, one with a road or street separating it into two or more parcels. Just as the State does not have a separate site standard for dense cities as opposed to rural areas and just as the State does not reimburse site acquisition costs due to the disparity in land values between cities and rural areas, the State has traditionally

*In view of the fact that the proposal of an air-rights school created a conflict between the City of Boston and the Massachusetts Department of Education as well as a conflict within the Department of Education between the School Building Assistance Bureau and the Deputy Commissioner of Education charged with administering the Racial Balance Law, there exists here yet another case study in conflict. However, as this problem was resolved with comparative ease, it is sufficient to note the existence of this sub-case and suggest that it be considered as an additional example of crisis resolution without its being presented within its own conflict-crisis-resolution framework.
felt that to allow the construction of a school in Boston on a non-contiguous site would invite small towns wishing to save money to request approval of non-contiguous sites when better possibilities were available.

Present at the meeting were the following persons: the Director of the Public Facilities Department, the Public Facilities Department Advance Planning Officer, the Public Facilities Department Community Planner; the Deputy Commissioner of Education; the Director of the School Building Assistance Bureau and his staff planner; the Director of the Educational Planning Center and the educational planner who had been working on the Carter Schools Complex; the Boston Redevelopment Authority South End Project Manager and the community coordinator who had been involved in the project; and, two members of the community committee concerned with the Carter Schools.

The meeting began with a brief presentation of the background of the project and the problems which had forced the air-rights solution. It was noted that this school complex would be the second school to be built in a Black neighborhood since the inception of the Racial Balance Act and would be a significant breakthrough in the advancement of interracial education in Boston. The Deputy Commissioner concurred with this and agreed that the Carter School
Complex was a key facility in the City of Boston plan to alleviate racial imbalance. The reaction of the Director of the School Building Assistance Bureau was negative in view of the facts outlined above.

The slides of air-rights facilities were presented to the group. Included were views of a supermarket over the Massachusetts Turnpike, the Prudential Center, the plans for the new Outpatient Department at Boston City Hospital, the portion of the Jordan Marsh Department Store which spans a street in downtown Boston, and finally, the Massachusetts State Capitol Building which spans Mt. Vernon Street on Beacon Hill. Wherever possible views of the interiors of these buildings were shown prior to views of the air-rights conditions demonstrating how the air-rights configuration was not at all obvious to the occupants of the buildings.

It was explained that although no elementary schools had been constructed in the United States utilizing an air-rights design, the placement of common facilities such as cafeteria, auditorium, administrative offices and gymnasium in the air-rights portion of the proposed school would keep a conventional ground level relationship with the outdoors in the classroom sections of the proposed facility. The Educational Planning Center representatives expressed
their professional opinion that there was nothing in this scheme which would limit the functioning of this facility in terms of educational program.

Despite some skepticism by the Director of the School Building Assistance Bureau that an air-rights elementary school was an unknown situation for the State to invest its funds in, the Deputy Commissioner of Education made a brief statement that he could not be opposed to educational innovation, especially in view of the evidence shown in the slide presentation. The Director of Public Facilities was quick to add that Boston had engaged in a number of innovative facility designs including a multi-million dollar high-rise high school building under construction. As a result of these comments, especially the remarks by the Deputy Commissioner, the Director of School Building Assistance agreed that the air rights concept would be acceptable with the provision that some additional site were acquired to the south of parcel 16 to bring the site size closer to State standards. The Boston Redevelopment Authority Project Manager agreed that this was possible and the meeting was cordially adjourned. The community representatives, never shy and often militant, had spoken not a word save introductions at the meeting. The City had represented their
interests successfully and their reserve potential of community pressure did not have to be called upon.

Following the meeting with the State Department of Education, the interest of the community in site selection had been met and the process would appear complete. However, on the day following the meeting, the Boston Redevelopment Authority Project Manager telephoned the Public Facilities Department to explain that the additional land to the south of Parcel 16 included a building which had just begun renovation. This building could not be included in the school site despite his verbal commitment at the meeting on the preceding day. Although the exclusion of this piece of the site reduced the total utility of Parcel 16 in laying out playfields, it was agreed that little could be done and the site boundary map was transmitted to the School Building Assistance Bureau without mention of the change in the hope that the verbal description had been sufficiently vague to allow this modification. Fortunately, it was and the site was tentatively approved in a letter from the School Building Assistance Bureau several weeks later.

In addition to the building which was under rehabilitation, a row of about six buildings were now included in the school site
which had not been scheduled for acquisition under the South End Urban Renewal Plan. As the renewal plan is in effect a contract between the City, acting through the Redevelopment Authority, and the property owners of the area that eminent domain will not be used except in accord with the plan for a period of forty years following the adoption of the plan, the acquisition of these buildings could only be accomplished by amendment of the plan, failure of the owners to rehabilitate in accord with the plan, or voluntary sale to the city by the owners. State law prohibits the City from purchasing property for amounts greater than an amount based upon an average assessment on the property during the preceding three years. This statute is intended to prevent unscrupulous dealings between municipal officials and property owners, but, because of a low ratio of assessment to actual values, the result in Boston is that negotiated purchases are rarely used, the process instead taking the form of an amicable eminent domain taking where appraisals are used to determine fair market value. Unfortunately, eminent domain could not be used in the renewal area without a default on the part of the owners or an amendment of the renewal plan. The Boston Redevelopment Authority, claiming that the Department of Housing and Urban Development was granting no supplemental funds for plan changes and that all existing funds were encumbered, refused to amend the plan or declare defaults.
Letters from the owners of the buildings were obtained by the Public Facilities Department stating that the owners had no intention of rehabilitating in accord with the plan and requesting that the City acquire the properties. Despite these letters, it was over a year before the City's Corporation Counsel would assent to the Public Facilities Commission making the takings in the renewal area with its own funds.

SECOND CONFLICT. While the issue of site had been unresolved, the construction of the new housing in the Carter neighborhood continued. No sooner was the site for the school agreed upon, than the community requested the City to construct some sort of temporary school facility to accommodate the lower grade children of families who would be moving into the neighborhood prior to the completion of the new school. As such temporary facilities receive no State aid, and, because of their short life must be financed out of direct tax revenues, the Public Facilities Department was reluctant to pursue this course of action. The Educational Planning Center felt that the children moving into the new housing could be accommodated by bussing to other parts of the city during the interim preceding the completion of the new school. However, as the community was reluctant to cooperate in the programming effort unless the Educational
Planning Center recommended a temporary facility, the Planning Center sent a written request to Public Facilities Department expressing a desire to have space in the neighborhood at least for kindergarten, first and second grade pupils from the new housing.

This request would have normally been placed on a low priority in view of the many more pressing needs throughout the city which do not have alternate solutions such as the interim bussing possible in the Carter neighborhood. However, as delays in programming would probably be as costly as the provision of interim facilities and as postponing the construction of the new school pending a resolution of the temporary facility issue would only allow time for even more families to move into the neighborhood, it was decided by the Public Facilities Department that space would be found.

The first explorations were directed toward existing spaces in the community which could be leased by the City of Boston for the interim. Negotiations were conducted with the developers of the new housing in the hope that several units could be converted to classroom space prior to the partitioning of these units into apartments. Under the terms of the Federal funding involved, these units could only be made available for one year before the
housing would have to be used solely as housing. One developer had some commercial space under design but leasing of it would not be possible until its completion and that would require two interim solutions instead of one. Investigations were made of some space in the basement of a local church but the building did not meet the public safety laws for elementary school facilities. The possibility of leasing one large open floor of a fireproof industrial building was explored. Despite the fact that the space was on the fifth floor and would require the use of elevators for the children to get to and from their classroom area, the State Department of Education was agreeable to this interim solution. However, the community was not agreeable in part because of the elevator situation and in part because the idea of sending children to an industrial building was not considered desirable. It is curious to note that the community had endorsed the church basement which was panelled with a highly-flammable plywood veneer paneling and had inadequate egress but would not accept a large open floor in a concrete and steel warehouse building because of the "fire safety" of a fifth floor location.

Obviously, the only solution would be construction of a facility specifically for the temporary school. In the hope of putting some of the capital investment to permanent use, the
Public Facilities Department examined a vacant row house in an attempt to remodel it as a school with the possibility of it becoming housing at a later date. Unfortunately, safety requirements would have required extensive renovation, the cost of which was greater than new construction.

Several years earlier the Public Facilities Department had constructed two small temporary buildings of six classrooms each at Dorchester High School. It was found that these cinder-block buildings were less expensive than so called portable or demountable prefabricated facilities. Therefore, it was decided to modify the Dorchester design to accommodate four elementary school classrooms in each building and to request that the Boston Redevelopment Authority make available a site large enough to accommodate these buildings.

The first site proposed by the Boston Redevelopment Authority was a portion of a proposed new park to the southwest of the Carter Playground known as the proposed Ball Street Playground in the South End Urban Renewal Plan. A tower for housing the elderly was under construction at one edge of this proposed park and it was felt that the temporary school buildings could be converted into a recreational facility for the elderly upon their being vacated by the school department.
This proposal was made to the community and was rejected abruptly. The only comments which could be elicited at the community meeting were to the effect that there would be no school at Ball Street and that the issue would not even be discussed. A subsequent investigation by the Educational Planning Center revealed that there was a permanent school shown in the urban renewal plan on a site abutting the proposed Ball Street Playground. Prior to the enactment of the Massachusetts Racial Balance Law, the NAACP had lead an effort in the community to stop the construction of this school in the knowledge that because of its location in would open as a racially segregated school. Despite the fact that the present values of the community were in favor of Black neighborhood schools for Black neighborhood children, the memory of a hard won victory against the Boston School Department in the early 1960s precluded even the discussion of Ball Street as a site for any sort of school facility. Paradoxically, almost no community people could remember the issue involved in the early Ball Street debate but only that the community had achieved a victory. That the use of the Ball Street Playground as a temporary school site was seen by the community as a maneuver by the municipal bureaucracy to thwart community desires.

About a block to the north of Ball Street playground, the Boston Redevelopment Authority had cleared two small parcels on
either side of Arnold Street, a street being closed for new housing construction. The community toured this site, fronting on Shawmut Avenue for several hundred feet on either side of the Arnold Street intersection and agreed that it would be an agreeable solution. The south boundary of the site was only about seventy-five feet from Ball Street but as the site never touched Ball Street it was considered acceptable. The Public Facilities Department assigned its engineering staff to modify the Dorchester buildings to fit this linear site along Shawmut Avenue at Arnold Street.

The configuration of the site was such that one of the temporary buildings would be located in part on what was Arnold Street. After modifying the building plans and showing them to the community with favorable response, it was discovered that the Boston Redevelopment Authority had not relocated all of the families out of adjacent buildings on Arnold Street. Although the site itself was clear and Arnold Street could be closed to traffic where it would become part of the school buildings, a sewer line serving the other apartment buildings on the street would have to remain. In order to build over this sewer line, the design of the temporary buildings would have to be considerably changed and the sewer line reinforced. This would mean extensive delays
and when the community was informed of the situation, their interpretation was that the sewer line was merely another attempt by the City to thwart the community.

**SECOND CRISIS.** At that point, the Carter School parents committee angrily marched into the offices of the Public Facilities Department to demand action. A meeting was held with the Director of Public Facilities and the various alternative were examined. The community suggested that the temporary buildings should be constructed on the agreed site of the permanent school. It was explained that as the design of the permanent school was unknown, it would be impossible to place these buildings in a position where they could not interfere with the construction of the new facility.

On the issues of the temporary and permanent facilities, many of the community people seemed confused. Despite the fact that the temporary buildings would accommodate about 200 children with no supportive facilities and would cost about $250,000 while the permanent buildings would house 1,450 pupils, provide gymnasium, cafeteria, auditorium, library and community facilities at a cost of over eight million dollars, the two buildings seemed to be somewhat interchangeable in the thinking of the community. Some members of the community feared that the temporary building was a cheap substitute by the City for the permanent facility.
Others felt that only by the construction of a building at once could the neighborhood be guaranteed of any school at all.

At this meeting was producing little in the way of progress on the matter, the Public Facilities Department staff decided to give the community a clear commitment concerning the building and site in a dramatic manner at the meeting. A letter was prepared, in the presence of the community people, stating simply that the Public Facilities Department would construct a temporary school facility on any site in the City of Boston provided that the site was of specific dimensions (given in the letter), was cleared and available through the Boston Redevelopment Authority, did not interfere with the construction of any immediately planned facility and had no unusual subsurface conditions which would prevent the rapid construction of the temporary building. The community was further invited, in the letter, to consult with any registered engineer that they chose to verify any subsurface problems which the City might claim to exist.

As a further statement of good faith, the Public Facilities Department offered to place the temporary buildings on the portion of the permanent site which could possibly be included in the proposed South End Bypass. It was recognized that the un-
certainty of the bypass would prohibit the long term investment of the permanent school building on that portion of the site but would guarantee the availability of that area for at least four years while the permanent school was being built.

SECOND RESOLUTION. Despite the fact that the community was demanding definite and immediate action at that meeting with the Public Facilities Department, the same community refused to make any agreements pending discussion of the matter in the neighborhood. The result was a letter from the chairman of the parents' committee about a week later agreeing to the siting of the temporary school on the portion of the permanent site subject to uncertainty from the South End Bypass. Contracts and designs were prepared and the building was started using an incentive system of bonuses to assure that the contractor would have the facility complete by the opening of school in the Fall.

It normally takes about four to six weeks to process a construction contract, and the community called yet another public meeting to protest the apparent lack of progress on the site. When the Public Facilities Department was criticised at this meeting, the community people were invited to walk from the meeting room to the school site, about five blocks away. Needless to say, they were surprised to discover that in the period since their
preceeding meeting two weeks earlier, the contractor had started work and the exterior of the school building was approximately 50% complete.

**THIRD CONFLICT.** Following the start of construction of the temporary facility, the process of programming the new school finally began in earnest. The community people participating in the programming process conceived the new school as a facility which should contain every possible amenity which could be found in the white community. Time and time again the sentiment was expressed that if some other school had something, the Carter school should have it as well. A program was developed which included not only the elementary and middle school classroom clusters and media center, but also an auditorium, cafeteria, community room, meeting rooms, gymnasium, locker and shower facilities, and swimming pool.

The planner from the Educational Planning Center cautioned that although these facilities should all be included at this stage, it was important to realize that the Boston School Department has to evaluate the program in view of the operating and construction cost as well as the availability of facilities throughout the school system. The draft of the community program document was transmitted to the Superintendent of Schools for
evaluation and approval by the various divisions of the School Department.

Following the approval of the program by the Superintendent with what the School Department referred to as minor revisions, the Public Facilities Department contracted with Architectural Programming Associates, Incorporated to translate the program into a set of specific educational specifications which an architect could utilize in the design of the building. Such educational specifications enumerate each space in the building as to size, equipment, special needs, relationship to other spaces and so forth.

Upon the completion of the Educational Specifications, a meeting was held with the community to present the new document and to introduce the architect for the new school. The architect was well received by the community and he explained how this meeting was merely for him to get an idea of priorities in the community and that it would be several months before he would even start drawing, having to evaluate and understand the program and educational specifications.

The first problem to arise was the size of the auditorium. The educational specification showed the auditorium to seat about
three hundred. The community felt that the auditorium should seat the entire fourteen hundred and fifty students of the two schools. Recognizing the problem, the architect explained that bigger was not necessarily better and that young children would be overwhelmed by a space large enough to accommodate the entire school. His arguments were convincing and tended to satisfy the community to some degree. However, were it not for the issue of the swimming pool, the auditorium probably would have become a crisis issue, if not at that meeting, over the course of the next few days while the community pondered on its significance.

THIRD CRISIS. To the surprise of the community, the swimming pool had been dropped from the educational specifications. Outraged inquiries yielded the information that the swimming pool had been excluded from the program by the School Department. As a new pool was being built in another elementary school in the South End less than a mile from the Carter site, it was the belief of the School Department that an adequate physical education program involving swimming for both schools could be run utilizing the one pool.

At this point a crisis clearly existed in the point of view of both the community and the bureaucracy. However, the community took no immediate action other than a few letters of protest. It
appears that as this problem had become apparent in June, it would be difficult for the community to organize over the summer vacation months and by keeping the crisis simmering, the leadership could use it as an organizational tool in the Fall.

In early September the community leadership and a few members of the community at large met with the Director of Public Facilities to demand the swimming pool. They were shown a map which indicated pools or planned pools in several locations near to the Carter site. They countered this argument by evaluating each pool and demonstrating how they felt that these facilities were all utilized by other groups or communities. Their orientation appeared to be more toward the pool as a community resource than as part of the educational facility. The Director of Public Facilities agreed to study the matter further, considering the community arguments.

It should be noted that although the School Department approves the program, it is the Public Facilities Department which prepares the educational specifications and can control the inclusion of such facilities unless directly disapproved by the Superintendent of Schools, in which case the Massachusetts Department of Education arbitrates. For this reason, it would have been possible for the
Public Facilities Department to take a position on the matter almost immediately.

However, September was the time of the primary election for Mayor and pending the results of the primary, the incumbent might find it desirable to be seen as directing his Public Facilities Department to include the pool just prior to the final election in November. As it turned out, the candidate opposing the incumbent in the final election had little chance for support in the Black community and therefore the arbitrary announcement of the inclusion of the pool was avoided while Public Facilities Department continued to study the availability of resources.

THIRD RESOLUTION. As the matter of the pool had reached a standoff with the community leadership convinced that they would win their point and realizing that the issue could keep the community together until the start of architectural design, the City continued to leave the status of the pool unresolved for fear that its resolution would only provide an opportunity for other problems to surface. Of course, architectural design cannot begin in earnest nor drawings be shown to the community without the prior resolution of what is officially included in the new building.
As of this writing at the beginning of 1972, the architect has started developing some schemes for the site development and specific external parameters of the school complex. A letter has been prepared, although not sent, explaining the situation and agreeing to the inclusion of the swimming pool. Soon the community will meet to review the site plan schemes and shortly thereafter the matter of the pool will be resolved.

If the program has been properly prepared and if the distortions and compromises inherent in the process are comparatively minor, the community should have little problem with the architectural design process. Hopefully, their energies will be diverted to working with the School Department in establishing curriculum and programs for the new building. However, there is no guarantee that this will be the case and it is possible that still other crises will emerge over specifics of the design. Such has been the case at the Quincy School project in the Chinatown area of the South End where the design has been progressing slowly for almost three years as the community committee insists in involvement in each detail of the process. It will be unfortunate if this happens at the Carter School Complex because it will further delay the project and possibly require a repetition of the temporary school crisis as the immediate need for school space
increases in the neighborhood.

ANALYSIS. This case study includes pathologies common to the preceeding six case studies such as conflicting community goals, internal bureaucratic conflict, adaptation to new ideas concerning school construction, problems created by strategies of community leadership, an unwieldy process and external problems of elected officials. The case study contributes an additional problem in the continuing paranoia of the community for the bureaucracy, particularly this Black community for the White bureaucracy.

Significantly, the case study does demonstrate that the community tends to engage in only one crisis at a time with the conflict situations sometimes overlapping and making perceptions of incipient crises difficult. Moreover, difficulties in maintaining a constantly high level of community interest throughout the processes become apparent as the ability to prolong a crisis by either the community leadership or the bureaucracy develops during the third crisis situation. Even though the prolonged crisis does maintain a moderate level of community interest, the incendiary situations common to most sporadic crisis situations was completely missing after the start of the swimming pool crisis, with both camps
seemingly recognizing the artificiality of the situation.

The real potential conflict in the last situation lies in the frustrations of the community in not seeing the permanent school start design and construction. As few of the participants in the community have been involved since the beginning due to the shift in housing patterns, this frustration is probably not as great as it would be in a stable neighborhood. In the case of the Quincy School where the community leadership has been promoting a long series of minor crises, the majority of the community have become disinterested and resigned to the lengthy process which is preventing the completion of their school.

In the final analysis of the seven case studies, an attempt will be made to construct a model which simulates the behavior of the various actors in a crisis situation and by combining that model with techniques for limiting the occurrence of crises such as the one crisis at a time rule, some strategies for expediting the process will be proposed.
ANALYSIS

The preceding seven case studies have provided examples of some of the varying pathologies of crisis situations in the school building process. In each of these situations, the various actors behaved in a manner which they felt would alter or maintain the process outcome in a form which would best suit their ends. In each situation it would appear superficially that this limited objective of outcome control is the only rationale which exists in the process. Generally, it is the only rationale of which the actors are aware. For the most part strategies are and appear to be ad hoc responses in specific situations.

Nonetheless, a careful examination of the data shows that there are certain general parameters which seem to apply in almost all situations. Most obvious of these parameters is that the existence of one crisis is resolved. Another parameter of crises is that crises always happen on the trailing edge of a step in the process. That is, crises happen immediately following a decision and prevent the project from passing into the next decision-making step until the crisis is resolved. If there are contemporaneous decision-making steps, the one crisis rule still holds, with the crisis concerning only one of the
contemporaneous decisions and the others escaping scrutiny by the crisis-concerned actors.

A PROCESS MODEL. In order for these parametric observations to be of any value in understanding and controlling the process, it is necessary to construct a simple model of the process itself. As designed by legislation and bureaucratic convention, the school process may be described as a basically linear and axially symmetrical process. This process may be described as a straight or essentially straight line starting at a point, the beginning, and terminating in contact with some concave multi-dimensional surface at another point, the outcome. At any point along the process line, a plane perpendicular to that line describes the possible output as that area of the multi-dimensional surface lying on the same side of that plane as the portion of the process line as yet uncompleted. Figure 1 shows a simplified two dimensional representation of this model wherein the process line carries with it a perpendicular line which in turn intersects some curve defining the outcome. The effect, of course, is that the position of possible outcome points is constantly being delimited until the process line meets the outcome curve or surface, at which time the process is complete and the outcome is one unique and specific point.
As the time to complete the process is proportional to the length of the process line, the predetermination of the outcome point is essential to the minimization of time from beginning to end of the process. This, in effect, means that any modification of the direction of the process line in order to alter the outcome of the process distorts the line into a curve, increases its length and hence increasing the time to completion of the process.

The linearity of the process is implicit in the stated goals of the legislation and the bureaucracy. By attempting to minimize the time from inception to completion of a school facility, the design and specification of the process. Furthermore, if this minimization of time is the primary goal, then the process is not intended to modify the outcome through a refinement process as alleged by the bureaucracy, but is merely to provide a structure wherein the process can be arrested at various points if the outcome appears to be irreconcilable with the goals of any of the actors.

It may be argued that there is no basic difference between the situation wherein the process is halted and realigned and the situation wherein the process is undergoing constant refinement. This argument follows from the premise that the process line is made up from an
infinite number of points, any one of which may be used to force a realignment of the process. In reality, however, these multitudinous points become aggregated into continuous segments with only the leading and following tangents visible to all of the actors. These segments, not the points, are the activities in the process described by statute and convention and are shown represented in Figure 2.

The points hidden within these segments are the multitude of minor internal bureaucratic decisions which are usually invisible to all of the actors outside of the actor or agency charged with making the decision. Extending this concept of discreet segments, it can be seen that the visible points between segments are the only opportunity actors outside of the decision making entity have to modify the resultant process alignment and hence the limitation of crisis situations to the trailing edge of a bureaucratic step.

In the case of contemporaneous decisions, the output alignment of the several decisions combine upon entry to the next segment, producing a new alignment which is both invisible and impossible to evaluate until the completion of the next step. This, in effect, is a coding of the output of a step into several lesser outputs with the
effect of obscuring the actual effect on the total process outcome until the completion of some later step. Although this operation tends to avoid a crisis point through ambiguity or to precipitate a crisis which may be based upon an actor's misinterpretation of the complex output, it also prevents any actor or agency other than ones which participates in both the preceding and following steps to have any knowledge of the possible final outcomes which are possible as a result of that stage of the process.

The significance of this contemporaneous decision-making strategy is that it often produces a set of outputs which deceive actors in the process into believing that one of the contemporaneous decisions has excluded their desired final output from the possible outputs still described on the output curve of the model. To the actors who do not recognize the segmental nature of the process, the simplistic continuous line time minimization model gives further reinforcement to the spurious interpretation of partial output. This reinforcement is the result of the fact that in the continuous line model modification of the output of an activity is difficult except at the point in the process which is identified as that activity. That is to say, if an output appears which is unacceptable to an actor, that actor must make every effort to modify that output immediately as it is impossible
to make modifications that expand rather than reduce the possible final output or output set. In the continuous line model the acceptance of the output at any stage precludes expansion of the output set without looping back along the process line and hence departing from the time minimization objective in the recognition that such looping is the only way in which all subsequent output sets will not have to be included in the preceding sets.

This misinterpretation of partial outputs from contemporaneous decisions is not restricted to any single type of actor, bureaucrat or community. Very often decisions of major importance are made whose implications are not realized until much later when modification of those decisions is impossible due to the need for extreme looping back in the process. Conversely, partial outputs can be related to issues so sensitive as to precipitate crises over matters which are in reality unresolved.

An example of this sort of partial output would have been seen in the case of obtaining state approval for the air-rights solution as examined in the final case study. Had the sections of the Massachusetts Department of Education been contacted separately, neither of their conflicting first opinions concerning the practicality of air-rights would have been sufficient to indicate the fate of the scheme. However
had the community received solely the negative opinion of the School Building Assistance Bureau, there was a high probability that their threat to picket the Department of Education would have been carried out. On the other hand, by combining the usual steps of approvals by the School Building Assistance Bureau and the Racial Balance administrators into a single operation along with the usual negotiations between the two entities, the parallel decisions and subsequent combination were included in a single step. Figure 3 illustrates this type of system behavior.

CRISIS BEHAVIOR. It would be simple if this model led directly to the conclusion that time minimization and responsiveness to all demands upon the process could be obtained by allowing all actors, community and bureaucratic, to participate at each and every point on the process line as in the continuous line model. Disregarding problems of mutually exclusive goals, this type of total involvement over a time period lasting months and years is impossible to obtain from every actor. Sensitivity sessions, encounter groups, and the recent "charrettes" sponsored by the United States Office of Education wherein all the actors are locked in a room and do not emerge until a solution is produced do not translate easily into the prosaic operations of research and data collection and especially involvement of thousands
of individuals within bureaucracy and the community. Therefore, actors tend to limit their involvement to points in the process where they perceive their individual interests to be at stake.

In the case of the bureaucracy, this type of behavior is institutionalized into a set of approvals by various agencies charged representing specific interests which must be included in the final outcome. The total bureaucracy is continuous over time and hence commitments made in order to obtain approvals early in the process are continued as fixed criteria to the outcome. The community, however, has an entirely different manner of coping with involvement at points of community significance. Community interest is so broad that it is virtually impossible to delimit it to any specific point of entry as is attempted in the site selection and programming processes as presently conceived by the bureaucracy.

Difficulties of bureaucracy-community interface stem from two major structural differences between the two entities. While the bureaucracy is constant or reasonably constant over time in its concerns and the roles of its actors, the community is constantly changing in values, goals, composition, concerns, aspirations and interests. And, while the bureaucratic actors have specific legitimate spokesmen such as officials and administrators, the community has no such structure
and every citizen has the right to express a unique opinion on every issue.

The potential for chaos in this situation is reduced by community apathy and the logistics of numbers. Apathy limits community involvement to points in the process wherein the community member perceives his interests to be jeopardized beyond some unspecified threshold. The logistics of numbers limits citizen participation to a great degree to participation through ongoing groups as the sheer size and diversity of bureaucratic operations make it impossible for any single individual to involve himself in all decisions affecting his life.

These two delimiting factors of apathy and logistics tend to make community involvement most likely at crisis points in the school building process. The effect of these factors on bureaucratic actors is similar but because their interests are much more specific than the general interests of the community, the result is that bureaucratic crises tend to happen only occasionally in instances such as the Edward Everett School Annex discussed in the third case study.

This problem of bureaucratic-community interface is so crucial to the process that it is surprising that it is so little understood by the participants. Despite the fact that community involvement
comes time and time again in the form of crisis situations, it is usually perceived as a specific problem of public relations by the bureaucracy or bureaucratic malfeasance by the community rather than an unavoidable situation endemic to the structure of the two entities.

Therefore, any attempt to avoid community-bureaucratic crisis must either take the form of the sensitivity session model or place the community in a position where interaction is completely impossible, thus precluding crises. As the former solution appears unworkable and the latter solution unethical, if not ultimately impossible, then the most productive course of action is to attempt to understand crisis interaction and exploit whatever virtues it may have.

A CRISIS MODEL. Returning to the system model which describes the process as a curve composed of discreet segments wherein the trailing edge of each segment marks a point where the process outcome set is delimited, it is possible to establish a model of crisis behavior which is generally applicable to all of the actors in the process.

At this point, it is helpful to review the working definitions
of conflict, crisis and resolution proposed in the introduction. "Conflict" is considered the situation wherein the desired outcomes of two or more actors are disparate but both are included within the possible outcome set. A "crisis" situation exists when the outcome set is changed to exclude the desired outcome of one or more of these actors. "Resolution" occurs when the excluded actor abandons his previously desired outcome for one included in the delimited set or the outcome set is changed again to reinstate the excluded goal.

Which of the two courses of resolution is achieved in a conflict situation is therefore the deciding factor in the modification of the output set. As was noted in the introduction, crises often exist which are resolved by spontaneous alteration of the acceptable outcome of the actor who has been excluded from the outcome set. These invisible crises are significant only so much as their existence, demonstrated by statements such as "you can't fight City Hall", is indicative of some form of overt crisis aversion which takes place in the majority of decision-making events. That is to say, as crises exist overtly only in a few instances in every major project although opportunities for crises may number in the hundreds, some mechanism other than conscious action to avoid crisis must be in effect in order to restrict unresolved conflict to statements of
frustration. Moreover, this sort of spontaneous resolution is not restricted to the community but is apparent in the various interagency relations and even in personal relationships within specific agencies.

It may be asked why do not all incipient crises reach an overt crisis situation, and is there any rational structure, conscious or unconscious, on the part of the actors which determines crises versus non-crisis situations. An evaluation of the behavior of the process model under crisis situations gives some indication of perceivable criteria which can be used to measure the probability of crisis occurrence in any given situation assuming adequate data concerning the aspirations of both conflicting actors are reasonably ascertained and that some future prediction of the course of the process is accessible to the actors involved.

One primary assumption in this model is that both actors agree that the completion of the process is the goal and that without the completion of the process all other issues are meaningless. An equally important condition is the time urgency which both actors feel. In the case of the community versus the bureaucracy, the community desires the school for its children before they are too old to attend it or before conditions change which will make the
school no longer significant to their needs (such as a changing community value structure which may disenfranchise the present residents unless the decisions concerning the school are made rapidly). Similarly, the bureaucracy is faced with the problem of providing adequate educational facilities both in size and quality under pressure from statute and other regulatory agencies and the longer the process is extended the more difficult it is to accomplish this end in view of inflation decreasing effective budgets and obsolescence of early planning decisions.

A CRISIS MODEL. Constructing a time-economic model of the crisis situation, it can then be reasonable asserted that time to completion (or failure to complete) is the prime measurement which the actors use in determining their actions in a crisis situation. Examination of the seven case studies shows that in all of the cases the various crisis actors were in some way concerned with project completion time or the limit condition of abandonment wherein completion time approaches infinity. Utilizing this parameter, the behavior of the various actors becomes reasonably predictable.

For example, if an actor is dissatisfied with the outcome set as compared with his acceptable outcome he has two options available:
alter the outcome set or alter his acceptable outcome. He makes this decision, either consciously or unconsciously, by comparing the costs incurred in accepting a previously unacceptable outcome. The cost of changing that decision in terms of extension of completion time depends upon where in the process the decision was made which excluded the actor's acceptable outcome from the outcome set. From the process model it can be seen that the farther back along the process curve that an outcome altering loop must extend, the longer the total process completion time. Coupling this fact with ability of the actor to assign some value to the speedy completion of the process, it is possible to arrive at a rational cost-benefit approach for specific crisis situations. In the case of the invisible crises, the actors who spontaneously change their acceptable outcomes make the determination that the cost of fighting the outcome set is greater than the benefit to be achieved. Similarly, in the overt crisis situation, the costs and benefits are considered reasonable equal by actors on both sides of the controversy and therefore a confrontation in that situation is a reasonable action.

The time-economic model has yet another important characteristic insofar as both sides in a crisis situation make time evaluations based upon a strategic evaluation of the opposing side and some prediction of the future outcome of the project. In this respect, the
action of each side is dependent upon its perception of the process and of the opposing side. In the case of the bureaucracy versus the community, the community has the advantage of some amount of secrecy and unpredictability of the degree in which an issue is felt by community members. The bureaucracy, although required to be open to public scrutiny by law, has the power to publicize only selected portions of its process and to force the community into making its own interpretations of the future course of the bureaucratic process.

The crisis behavior model is further reinforced by considering the operation of changing an actor's acceptable outcome or changing the process outcome set as a situation wherein some political force acts through some distance of change to accomplish that change. Borrowing from the physicist, it may be asserted that the political force and distance of change multiply to produce some quantity known as work which in turn implies the expenditure of energy. In addition, the greater the political force, the shorter the time period to alter the process through some change, either to acceptable outcome or to outcome set.

In overall perspective, the process model behaves as most systems and tends to minimize the expenditure of energy in reaching its final
equilibrium at completion. Therefore, if completion time versus time to change outcome set or acceptable outcome of the disenfranchised actor is considered in terms of the available political force to either side of the controversy, it becomes possible to predict crisis outcomes when such crises are incipient.

This type of prediction of crisis behavior is, however, restricted by the ability of the actors to appraise the energy resources of the opposition and the possible future course of the process. Therefore, it becomes increasingly important that adequate and correct information is available to each of the actors in order for crises to be resolved at an early stage. This follows from the fact that if both sides can predict the outcome there is little to be accomplished in a crisis confrontation other than the expenditure of time which neither side finds desirable. The exception to this is, of course, the situation wherein one side wishes to halt the project and prevent the process from reaching a conclusion. This special case will be discussed later.

The prime difference between the time-economic model of crisis behavior and the balance of power model often applied to crises situations is that in the time-economic model neither side benefits from
the maintenance of the status quo. For example, in the balance of power model often applied to the nuclear arms race there is an implicit benefit in the prevention of one side achieving superiority over the other. The situation is not static, as both sides continue to expend energy in escalating their respective arsenals and a condition of dynamic equilibrium therefore exists. In the case of the school building process such constant escalation is impossible as the process goal is desirable (having a school) rather than undesirable (having a nuclear war or surrendering). The recognition of this distinction between the two models is crucial to rational behavior in a crisis situation.

Returning to the special case of completion versus non-completion, the economic factor becomes something other than time. The model takes on the characteristic of considering costs in terms of available political force. In the first case study, concerning the community effort to halt the construction of a vocational school, the bureaucracy was still time dependent although the community had only the end game consideration of its continuing existance versus its complete destruction. Obviously, the bureaucratic time constraint of obtaining state funds was much more limiting and therefore it could have been determined early in the process that the outcome was predictable. The bureaucracy did attempt to force the community into
a time constraint by way of cutting off neighborhood improvement funds and allowing normal deterioration to happen on a time based scale, but this factor was never really significant as the time scale of blight is so much more extended than the closely managed state funding processes.

Again this emphasizes the necessity of adequate data in making early prediction of outcome. As both the bureaucracy and the community are usually naive about the operation of the crisis model, they often freely release information which is strategically damaging to their specific positions. Whether or not the experienced politician, bureaucrat or community leader is consciously aware of the behavior of the crisis model is unimportant. What is important is that an examination of his behavior would indicate that his actions follow the rational strategy suggested by the model and therefore he is able to advance his strategic position by feeding and ignoring spurious signals in the process.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT. Even with adequate information, crises would not be controllable if their existence were solely a function of some constant crisis threshold being exceeded in every conflict situation. Time-economic evaluations would take place at each step in the process and crises would occur as a result of process parameters which are
a function of decisions necessary at that step and not as a result of any rational strategy for crisis management. Fortunately, the process does not have to be uncontrollable due to the fact that crises themselves are not independent events occurring at potential crisis points solely on the basis of the time-economic model. Crises are interdependent and the crisis threshold, the point at which an actor feels that the alteration of the outcome set is worth the costs involved, is determined to a large extent by the energy resources available to him to change the outcome set. If the actor has recently expended energy in a crisis situation, his resources have been depleted and it becomes more difficult for him to muster the force necessary to participate in an overt crisis. He then has the option of reconciling has acceptable outcome with the outcome set or engaging in a confrontation which he knows he cannot win.

In the case of community participation, this phenomenon takes the form of increasing levels of community apathy following shortly after the resolution of a crisis. It should be noted that the crises must be separated in order to prevent them from being treated as a single crisis utilizing the same community organization effort in order for this rule to hold. Moreover, the community segments or bureaucratic actors involved must be the same entities in each of the
crises in order for the first crisis to have any effect on sub-
sequent crises. This, of course, follows directly from the energy
depletion hypothesis. Nonetheless, in behaving in accord with this
rule actors often make the mistake of considering different entities
to be the same and therefore find to their surprise that a supposedly
depleted actor is not depleted at all.

By utilizing the system parameters of the process, including the
one crisis at a time, energy depletion, and time minimization hypo-
theses, it is possible for a sophisticated actor to exercise some
degree of control of the types and frequency of occurrence of crisis
situations. The potential of this control will be discussed
further in the conclusions to this thesis and its utility to various
actors examined.
The progress of the process from point $P_1$ to point $P_2$ reduces the possible outcomes from those included in outcome set $AB$ along the outcome curve to those included in outcome set $CD$. As long as the process does not change direction significantly and the process curve remains substantially linear, the set of outcomes will always reduce in size as the process continues toward completion. That is, current outcome sets will always be subsets of preceding outcome sets.
In the segmented, non-linear process the outcome set CD described by $P_2$ does not necessarily include the entirety of the output set EF described by subsequent point $P_3$. As the changes in the process curve vectors at various points on the process curve cause an increase in length of the process, the time elapsed from start to completion is increased. Every change in vector direction of the process implies some force acting upon the process and therefore the expenditure of energy by some actor to cause the direction change.
In the case of contemporaneous decisions such as $d_1$ and $d_2$ as in the step $P_1P_2$ shown above, the outcome set is not exclusively the set $C_1D_1$ nor $C_2D_2$ but rather the resultant set $C_rD_r$. It should be noted that despite the fact that an output possibility is not included in both sets, such as those possibilities in $D_rD_2$ and $C_rC_1$, it may well be included in the resultant set. The resultant set is impossible to identify until the tangents of both decisions, $T_1$ and $T_2$ are combined in some subsequent step. The line $C_rD_r$ is in reality unmeasurable and shown here only for purposes of argument.
CONCLUSIONS

The process model and the crisis model constructed in the preceding analysis are useful insofar as they allow the identification of some specific criteria for rational decision making in crises situations in the school building process. Moreover, by using the models to predict the behavior of various process actors, it may be possible to avoid overt crises or to resolve crises at a low level of energy expenditure or to provide spurious information to provoke crises in an effort to accomplish some future goal.

The understanding of these or similar situation models, either consciously or instinctively, allows many political actors to operate successfully in crisis confrontation situations. Usually, the political skill of such actors is the result of many years of experience with conflict situations. However, it should be possible to utilize the case studies and models presented in this document to get some general understanding of the systemic nature of the process, its patterns and themes, and through this understanding to identify the critical factors in conflict situations.
The application of the models to future real world situations rather than to documentations of historical cases should provide the real test of its effectiveness as a management tool. Such tests have not been made as a part of this thesis but should be feasible without too much difficulty.

Assuming that the models are effective and reliable in controlling systemic behavior, several questions regarding the ethics of their application become obvious. For example, the use of contemporaneous decision making as a means of providing spurious data to provoke crisis. If such a false crisis is created and a community group is decoyed from pursuing a significant decision until some future time when the reversal of that decision will be too costly in time and energy, then the crisis which would have occurred had that decision been visible is ultimately resolved as community frustration. Extending the model to a more general situation, which may or may not be accurate, it can be extrapolated that such frustrations eventually may reach a point where an extremely long loop back in the process becomes a reasonable alternative to a major outcome which is seriously antipathetical to community aspirations. An example of this major looping would be the St. Louis housing project which is being demolished by the
municipality only sixteen years after its construction because its design is so unsuited to community needs. To precipitate such a costly response, the divergence between outcome and acceptability had become cataclysmic.

On the opposite extreme, it is possible that a number of concerned actors could utilize the model to construct a situation wherein the process is so closely monitored that no divergence is allowed to occur. As mentioned in the analysis, the logistics of this close relationship between actors in a major process is necessarily limited to small numbers of persons in situations analogous to sensitivity sessions. As most community persons choose to participate sporadically on issues of major concern to themselves, this level of interaction tends to favor a closed community subset willing to devote the time and effort to the process. As laudable as their motives may be, by their existence they tend to become just another layer of bureaucracy between the community and the process, their taking on the time-continuous character of the bureaucracy and shedding their personal characteristics as independent community members. An example of this sort of response is the Community Committee at the Quincy School mentioned briefly in the final case study. This group has been
participating in weekly decision making sessions with all actors in the school building process for the past several years. The result has been a process of constant review and revision on the most minor of details with no regard to the time-economic model which may be relevant to community needs. In their fascination with the process itself, many of the committee members have lost site of the product goal and their new interpretation of their role is process refinement rather than product orientation.

Of course, the fascination with process and process modelling is always a dangerous trap. The situation models presented herein appear to be reasonably analogous to the real world. However, it is all too easy to accept the model as a reflection of reality and not the simplification which it really is. By necessity, all models are merely simplifications which approximate the behavior of a real system. In this instance the approximation appears to be good at the critical points demonstrated in the case studies. There is no guarantee that the approximations will hold equally well in all future situations.

One of the reasons that further work is needed in quantifying seemingly indeterminate systems such as the school building
process is that more and more determinate systems such as the large system management projects of agencies such as NASA and HUD with their specific goals have direct implications in the easily quantified lives of individuals. At present, the City of Boston is attempting to rationalize the physical design and construction of new schools through a "systems construction" process wherein several schools are constructed simultaneously with the resultant time and money saving benefits of economy of scale. In order for this program to be effective it will be necessary for several schools to reach the end of their planning processes simultaneously.

At present, the ad hoc management strategies being used in the community relations and planning process do not lend themselves to such close control of the projects. Unlike the management strategies used by the architects, engineers and contractors wherein there is a clear hierarchy of control, the community planning process has no such strategic advantage. Moreover, even with the relatively rational structure of the design and construction process, the school building systems approach has taken tens of thousands of man hours to develop and still is suffering from numerous limitations which will have to be eliminated before
the process can become truly effective. Considering these problems and translating them into the context of the unstructured confrontation situation of community relations and planning, it can be seen that the process and situation models presented herein are merely a beginning.

It is hoped that the examination of additional cases in other cities and some quantification of the data into a simulation model will provide some workable solutions in the near future. Until such refinements are made it is certain that the process will continue to respond in a reflexive rather than rational manner. And, as projects become larger with more capital commitments and longer potential lives, such a reflexive manner will become more and more costly to maintain.
APPENDIX A

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE BOSTON SCHOOL BUILDING PROCESS
APPENDIX A: HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

In 1962 a study of the Boston Public Schools was done by Cyril Sargent and a group of educators from Harvard University. The famed Sargent Report documented what was effectively common knowledge: Boston's schools were old and decaying and there was no comprehensive program underway to replace them. The majority of Boston school buildings had been built before 1900, often to absorb the residential expansion into the recently annexed suburbs of Jamaica Plain, West Roxbury, Dorchester, Roslindale, Charlestown, Hyde Park and Brighton. Similarly, many schools were built in the South End and Roxbury to absorb the population shift which expansion produced.

A few more schools were built just prior to World War I and another handful in the late 1930s. World War II halted new school construction and it was not until the early 1950s that Boston built a few more elementary schools. Therefore, by the mid 1960s of the over 190 school buildings in Boston, at least 90% were over fifty years old.

Part of the problem of new school construction was
the fact that new construction in general was done by the various involved agencies with the appropriate approvals and review of state and local regulatory bodies. The process had become unwieldy and the confusion and repetition had effectively caused the wheels of government to grind to a stop in this vital area.

Other problems were created as a result of the overall political climate and history of Boston municipal politics. Much of the highly skilled construction management and design work was being done or delegated by marginally equipped civil servants. For many years Boston had had regular scandals in the press concerning construction work and contracting procedures. It was clearly time to streamline the process if anything was to get built.

In a special report to Mayor John Collins in 1966, the creation of the Public Facilities Commission was first proposed. In part the product of the dynamic Edward Logue, the Public Facilities Commission would be
endowed with certain broad and sweeping powers. The new agency would assume the function of the Boston School Buildings Commission as well as the responsibility for all public facilities. The Commission would prepare the City's capital budget for the City Council's approval. It would have the power of eminent domain and be exempt from the city building code. It would build schools on the request of the superintendent of schools, thus side-stepping the lengthy process of school committee debate.

LEGISLATION FOR CHANGE

The new agency came into being as a result of the enactment of Chapter 642 of the Acts of 1966. Basically, the Public Facilities Commission is a three member commission appointed by the mayor and serving at his pleasure. The Commission hires a director who in turn hires a staff with the approval of the Commission. The staff is not under civil service and serves at the pleasure of the Commission. The functions and operation of the Public Facilities Department will be discussed in
Almost simultaneously with the establishment of the Public Facilities Department, the Boston Public Schools became subject to the Massachusetts Racial Balance Law, Chapter 641 of the Acts of 1965. Although the law had been enacted a year earlier, the Boston School Committee had been challenging the law through the courts. The law was upheld and all future construction of schools in Boston was to conform.

The Massachusetts Racial Balance Law was the product of two state legislators, Eliot Richardson and Michael Dukakis. Mr. Richardson is now Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in the Nixon Cabinet and Mr. Dukakis was defeated as Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor in the most recent election. Legislators Richardson and Dukakis proposed the law in part as a result of prodding by the NAACP and other moderate black organizations.

The reasoning behind the law appears to have been
that the only way to insure first quality education for black children is through integration. This should be in part because the school situation should be a model of the integrated community in which the child will grow up and in part because by placing white children in the same schools with black children the political power of whites would be used to insure adequate teachers, materials, and facilities. Without challenging either of these assumptions, it is interesting to see how these premises were translated into law.

The most curious feature of the Massachusetts Racial Balance Law is its definition of racial balance: no more than fifty percent non-white. This means that a school which is 51% non-white is legally imbalanced while a school that is 100% white is balanced. Because of this wording in the law, the law affects only a few cities in Massachusetts, notably Boston, Springfield, Worcester, New Bedford, Cambridge and Medford. The law requires that the school committees of the cities and towns file annual reports listing the racial composition of each school in their systems. If racial imbalance is found to
exist, the State Commissioner of Education then requires the school committee of that city or town in which the imbalanced school exists to file a plan to alleviate racial imbalance and to take steps to implement that plan. The state offers to reimburse the city or town 25% of the cost of any new school built to alleviate racial imbalance in addition to the normal 40% state schoolhouse construction aid. The following year the school committees must file their racial composition reports again and if racial balance has not been achieved another plan must be submitted and so forth.

In addition to the additional 25% state construction aid, the state may also suspend all state aid payments to the school system if it finds that the system is not making satisfactory progress toward the elimination of the imbalance situation. This would not be quite so bad except for the fact that the state reimburses the cities and towns as their school construction bonds are retired. Therefore, if the state sees fit to withhold aid it not only stops present expenditures but leaves the city or town liable for any
debt it may have incurred under previous construction projects which are receiving reimbursement.

The Massachusetts Racial Balance Law was a hastily and sloppily drawn statute. Since its enactment it has been illegal to build new schools in black neighborhoods where the need for education is great. Such schools, by virtue of their location would be predominately non-white and hence would automatically cause the suspension of state aid not just to themselves, but to the entire system. Moreover, if schools are to be built in black neighborhoods, at least 50% of the seats must be reserved for whites to balance the school. The law does have its purpose, but do not try to explain that to the black mother whose child is denied admittance to the school next door because the seats are being saved for the children of liberal whites who are willing to send their children into the inner city.

Each year when hearings are held to modify or repeal the Massachusetts Racial Balance Law, the majority of those at the hearings are white ethnic residents of the inner city who do not like the law because they feel that it will
bring blacks into their neighborhoods. The legislators seeing this response have been reluctant to repeal the law feeling that this response shows that the law must be working. Moreover, the NAACP and several other moderate black groups still support the law and feel that it can be made to work.
### The Boston School Construction Program

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<tr>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>SBAB %</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Est. Cost</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Dorchester H.S. Annex</td>
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<tr>
<td>Curley Addition</td>
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<td>John Marshall</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Joseph Lee</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>in const.</td>
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<td>Hart-Dean</td>
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<td>Georgetowne</td>
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<td>Physical Education Bldg.</td>
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</tr>
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<td>School Name</td>
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<td>Project Type</td>
<td>Budget (in $)</td>
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<td>Project</td>
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<td>Mason/Logue</td>
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<td>Roosevelt</td>
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<td>Fuller</td>
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**Total Program Cost to Date**

(Expended and Committed) $297,815,000
APPENDIX B

THE ACTORS IN THE
SCHOOL BUILDING PROCESS
APPENDIX B:
DESCRIPTION OF ACTORS IN THE SCHOOL BUILDING PROCESS

THE BOSTON SCHOOL DEPARTMENT

It is logical to assume that the Boston School Department plays a major role in the creation of each school facility. Insofar as the School Department, acting through one or more of its various subdivisions, is responsible for instigating and planning of a new school, this assumption is correct. It is the formal request by the Superintendent of Schools which first prompts action on the part of the City to build a new facility.

Thanks to a Federal grant, the Boston Public Schools maintain the Educational Planning Center which attempts to keep tabs on changing space requirements and programmatic needs. The Educational Planning Center, an outgrowth of the former Office of Program Development described in Peter Schrag's book, Village School Downtown, is located in temporary quarter in a building leased from the Boston
Army Base in South Boston. The Educational Planning Center is an agency staffed by educational professionals whose major objective is to prod the sometimes inert structure of the Boston Public Schools into keeping abreast of the present.

Under Title III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the educational planning center is to provide supplementary planning services to the public school system. Prior to its creation, planning was done in a haphazard manner. After the passage of Chapter 642 of the Acts of 1966, the planning function was taken from the School Department and made the responsibility of the Public Facilities Department which will be discussed later. During the first year of its operation, the Public Facilities Department contracted with Dr. Robert Anderson and the Harvard Graduate School of Education to conduct intensive planning and programming efforts to enable the start of new school construction.

At the prodding of Action for Boston Community
Development, a non-profit community action organization, the Boston Public Schools, through action of the School Committee hired Evans Clinchy, an outside educational specialist, to develop a proposal to obtain ESEA Title III funds. As a result of this proposal, Clinchy organized the Educational Planning Center under the three year term of the grant. Planning Center staff was appointed to the center by the School Committee from among the ranks of teachers and administrators already in the system. In addition, some funds were expended under the authority of the center's director to hire outside talent under annual contract for specified services.

At present, the Educational Planning Center is staffed almost entirely by personnel who have their roots within the Boston Public School System. A number of these persons have been with the center since its inception and carry much of the original philosophy of change. As the original Federal Grant nears its expiration in August of this year, it is unclear what will become of the Educational Planning Center. It is hoped that the center
will have proved its usefulness to the Boston School Committee and will be included in the regular annual operating budget. However, in this year beset with fiscal crises, it is certain that even if the planning center survives it will suffer reductions from its present budget with the possible implication that portions of the planning and programming process will again be contracted to outside professionals.

Based upon recommendations of the Educational Planning Center and sometimes other sources such as the area superintendent, the home and school association, or the chief structural engineer of the School Department, the Superintendent periodically files formal requests for the provision of additional pupil spaces in the various sections of the city.

Although the School Committee has no official role in the determination of school space needs, it is required by the Massachusetts Racial Balance Law to file annual plans for the elimination of racial imbalance with the State Department of Education. This requirement is
statutory in nature and is directed toward the majority of city and town governments in Massachusetts where the local school committee is charged with determining building needs. The Superintendent and the School Committee do not necessarily find themselves in total agreement concerning strategies to eliminate racial imbalance and even if they did the Superintendent is only impowered to request additional space and not to determine its ultimate location or form. The resulting racial balance plans are often somewhat incongruous with the realities of the school construction program as determined by the Educational Planning Center and the Public Facilities Department.

Moreover, the Boston School Committee is, to a certain extent, an anachronism in this era of both community involvement and control and systems management techniques. Being elected at large from all parts of the City of Boston, the School Committee is usually composed of persons representing the white, Catholic majority. There is little hope for the election of any minority group members in a school committee election and
hence the several minority neighborhoods find themselves frustrated and without representation on the Committee.

Even so, the election of a minority member to the School Committee might be a victory in name only. The powers of the committee are basically two: selection of the Superintendent and approval of the operating budget. Having discharged both of these obligations during a relatively short portion of each calendar year, the School Committee then addresses itself to minor administrative matters such as approving sick leave, transfers of teachers, approving appointments, and other details of the ongoing school operation. School policy, although not set, is definitely shaped by the Superintendent who very carefully monitors the attitude of his committee and recommends policy which will be tolerable to them.

Although the School Committee has no legal authority over the capital improvements program spending for new school construction, the Superintendent may work with the Committee to pass resolutions to be transmitted to the City Council for its consideration in approving school loan
orders and the actual capital budget. It is uncertain what effect such resolutions have on council thinking, as other budgetary considerations are usually much more pressing on the council than a resolution from another elective body.

Nonetheless, being in the political spotlight is sufficient justification for the Boston School Committee to engage in many spectacular if not meaningful gestures to show their responsiveness to some ill-defined electorate. Constrained by a multitude of laws which fix liability upon them and heavily overburdened by lawyers turned educators among their membership, the School Committee frustrates those within and without the school system by engaging in interminable semantic debates calculated to keep themselves out of law suits and hopefully place them in higher elective office.

Also in the School Department is the office of the Chief Structural Engineer and his planning and engineering section. It is the responsibility of the Chief Structural Engineer to repair and maintain the almost two hundred
school buildings in the Boston Public School system. From time to time the Chief Structural Engineer will recommend the replacement of obsolescent buildings and consult with the Superintendent concerning strategies to relieve overcrowding in districts which have outgrown their available space. When the City submits plans for a new school building to the Superintendent for his approval, it is the Chief Structural Engineer who works with the Superintendent in reviewing the design.

The Superintendent also calls upon his assistant superintendents to help evaluate programs and plans for new school buildings. Often the assistant superintendents will be able to bring special expertise such as compensatory education, training for the handicapped, science and physical education to bear upon criticism of the proposed design.

In addition to the traditional organizational divisions, the School Department also has some peripheral special function sections which have come about primarily in response to State and Federal funding programs. Among
these special functions are the Hot Lunch Program which uses State and Federal aid to provide food services in all the new schools. A small staff of expert dieticians and kitchen specialists make sure that all new programs in the schools are capable of providing a suitable meals program to meet Federal guidelines. This involves everything from planning the size and equipment for a new school cafeteria to working out an ongoing budget and menu for the school lunch program.

Under a special legislative act, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts makes available special funds for the education of the hearing handicapped. Boston operates the Horace Mann School for these deaf children and works in conjunction with Boston University to provide a comprehensive program in this area. The Horace Mann School is to move to a new facility within the next few years and the planning for this facility has involved numerous educational specialists from both within and without the Boston Public School system.

Probably the most exciting of the sub-agencies which
are within the Boston school system is the ESEA Title I program. Under the Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Boston receives funds to provide supplementary services and to develop new educational programs not otherwise found within the system. The very presence of this Federal incentive gives the ESEA program a valuable independence within the normal school system. Presently these ESEA funds are being used at the Trotter Elementary School, the Lewis Middle School, and the new Copley Square High School. The Trotter has received much publicity as the first "magnet" school in the Boston system. It was planned in the center of an urban renewal area which is composed of a predominately black population. By providing special programs the school attracts white families to send their children into this otherwise black neighborhood thus racially integrating the school. In its two years of operation, the program can best be described as a qualified success. Although the Trotter School was able to attract sufficient numbers of white students to attain "racial balance" under the law, it is highly unlikely that a second magnet school would be able to attract additional white children from liberally-minded
families, the supply having been exhausted by the Trotter.

The Copley Square High School, which is in its first year of operation, was planned to allow high school students to take advantage of the resources of the Back Bay and Downtown areas of the city. It is located in a small building which has a capacity of only three hundred and fifty students. Although the idea of a downtown "Parkway" type high school program such as the one in Philadelphia has never been officially accepted by the Boston School Department, the Copley Square High School functions somewhat in this manner and will probably become even less structured as space needs exceed the capacity of the building. This type of leverage achieved through the use of Federal funds and a quiet style of gradual "subversion" of the traditional system by the Title I director, the school principal and the parents and students has achieved an effective open-campus school with little publicity while neighboring cities such as Cambridge are still embroiled in debate over the merits of the program.
THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Through the efforts of the famed American educator, Horace Mann, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was the first state in the nation to create a state department of education. It was Mann's goal in the mid-nineteenth century to provide a state standard to bring quality education to all school systems, including the most rural throughout the state. Today, the Massachusetts Department of Education labors diligently toward this same goal, offering both technical and financial assistance to all public school systems in the state and administering legislation to insure equal opportunity.

Unlike New York State which classes its public school systems into the "big six" cities and then the rest of the state, Massachusetts applies one standard to every system in the Commonwealth. This equality under the law has many devastating implications to school planning in the dense urban areas. One such problem with uniform standards is site size for eligibility for state financial aid. The State Department of Education's School Building
Assistance Bureau (SBAB) reasons that what is adequate physical education space does not change from Boston to Billerica. Unfortunately, finding an acre of open ground in densely populated Boston for a baseball field is not the same as finding that same acre in suburban Billerica or rural Bolton. Moreover, the School Building Assistance Bureau has a finite amount of funds to allocate among the cities and towns. Therefore, the SBAB has chosen not to pay for site acquisition in view of the widely varying cost of land throughout the state. The SBAB will pay 40% of the cost of new buildings and related site improvements, but it will make no distinction between one thousand dollar per acre land in the Berkshires and one hundred thousand dollar per acre land in downtown Boston.

Fortunately, the SBAB does flex a little on minimum site standards. Realizing that the strict adherence to state-wide site standards would mean no new schools in Boston, the SBAB is willing to compromise providing the City of Boston can prove to the satisfaction of the SBAB that the site being proposed is the largest possible under the circumstances and that a full and adequate school
program can be conducted within its boundaries. This approach has lead to some very interesting solutions ranging from cooperative agreements with the Parks and Recreation Department for the use of adjacent public playgrounds during school hours to high-rise schools, mixed-use developments and the use of air rights. Nonetheless, the State will not accept these novel solutions without being first convinced that acquisition of a larger site is impossible. Often this approach is reminiscent of the policy of "destroying a town to save it." To conform to minimum standards it would be necessary to relocate several hundred families and demolish their homes in order to build a school for their children to attend.

The Massachusetts Department of Education also administers the Racial Balance Law through its Racial Balance Taskforce. Headed by the Deputy Commissioner of Education, the Racial Balance Taskforce is responsible for reviewing the racial balance plans submitted by the cities and towns and is required by law to instruct the state comptroller's office to withhold all state funds to
any system which it finds is in violation of the law. In view of the fact that racial imbalance is basically an urban problem common to only the larger cities and that sometimes the most desirable solution to racial imbalance is to locate a new school in a specific location which may not have adequate site potential, the Racial Balance Taskforce and the School Building Assistance Bureau have from time to time found themselves in conflict over the approval of a proposed school site. At moments like that it is all but impossible for a city or town government to explain to local residents that it is powerless and merely caught in the middle.

Although the Racial Balance Taskforce and the School Building Assistance Bureau are the primary actors in the school building process on the state level, the Massachusetts Department of Education also maintains several other divisions which are concerned with the quality and scope of instruction within the school systems, the school budgetary process, the compulsory attendance laws and other operating considerations of the various school systems.
THE PUBLIC FACILITIES DEPARTMENT

Central to the construction of new schools in Boston is the Public Facilities Department. Under the control of the three member Public Facilities Commission, the Department is responsible for preparing the city's capital budget, selecting and acquiring school sites, contracting with architects for the design of schools, getting construction contracts, performing major renovations on existing school buildings, leasing temporary school quarters, ordering furniture and equipment for new facilities, and disposing by sale, lease or transfer of surplus school buildings and property. In order to carry out these responsibilities, the Commission is given sweeping powers including eminent domain and exemption from local building and zoning ordinances. It is required by law only to give the affected agency fourteen days notice before taking action on design, construction, site selection or disposition of municipal facilities.

The Public Facilities Department is organized into
several functional areas. It maintains a professional planning staff which is responsible for making budget projections, working with the involved agencies and community groups in programming and site selection and coordinating municipal and private interests to produce an efficient facility. There is also an architectural staff which reviews and coordinates architectural work and insures compliance with the functional program and numerous fiscal and safety requirements. An engineering section involves itself with major renovations and some new construction not only of schools, but also of all public facilities. The engineering section also supervises construction and advises the Public Facilities Department contract lawyers of contractual requirements and technical considerations in bidding documents. In addition, specialists in the fields of real estate and contract furnishings are involved in land acquisition and the specification and bidding on furniture and equipment respectively.

The Public Facilities Department works closely with
the Educational Planning Center in the development of each new school facility. While the Educational Planning Center uses its educational expertise to produce a concept for a new school, the Public Facilities Department works to translate that concept into a functioning school building. Both agencies work closely with community groups, drawing upon each other's resources, whenever possible.

THE BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

In urban renewal areas, the Boston Redevelopment Authority becomes an essential force in the shaping of a new school facility. By administering Federal urban renewal funds in accordance with an urban renewal plan, the BRA is the acquiring agency for school sites in renewal areas. As land acquisition must be done in accordance with an approved plan in a renewal area, and as most renewal plans in Boston were drawn up in the early sixties without regard for changing school site standards, the BRA has often had to work with the Public Facilities Department and the residents of the renewal area to revise the renewal plan to accommodate an expanding and changing school site need. Through the use of Federal renewal funds these sites are
to be acquired at minimal cost to the city. Unfortunately, the multi-layered involvement of Federal, State and Local funds in such projects can often produce procedural bottlenecks which are all but impossible to comprehend.

The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) as successor to the former Boston City Planning Board, is also charged with the responsibility of comprehensive planning for the entire city. As the Public Facilities Department is responsible for proposing the long range capital improvements budget for the construction of all public buildings and facilities, the two agencies find themselves thrust together in the process of planning Boston's future. Recently, the Boston Redevelopment Authority has established a number of "Local Advisory Committees" which are composed of residents of the various neighborhoods. These committees work through the BRA to reach grass-roots decisions concerning playgrounds, street signing and recreation facilities. The committees promise to be a useful resource in allowing downtown decision makers to sense the mood of a neighborhood without having to
undertake renewed community organization with the beginning of each specific project.

THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Although the Public Facilities Department is exempt from local city building codes, it is still subject to the State Public Safety Code, and, in the case of school buildings, the Schoolhouse Construction Code. In many states, school buildings are subject only to a special state code written and administered by the State Department of Education. In Massachusetts the Schoolhouse Code is under the purview of the Massachusetts Department of Public Safety sometimes facetiously referred to as "those wonderful folks who bring you the State Police."

Although this may seem a reasonable place in state government to place the responsibility for public safety, it also means that the Massachusetts Schoolhouse Construction Code always tends to lag behind the most recent state of the art in new school construction.
Also under the auspices of the Massachusetts Department of Public Safety is the Handicapped Advisory Board. Composed of handicapped persons, the board writes and administers a code of requirements to make all public buildings accessible to the 14% of the population which has some form of physical handicap. The Handicapped Board is known for its stringent interpretation of its own code and its requirements which have at times made old buildings which were otherwise adequate but infeasible for renovation. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the handicapped requirements are the only strong pressure to make taxpayer supported facilities available to all of the taxpayers.

ELECTED OFFICIALS

Among the many elected officials who influence the school building process is, of course, the Mayor of the City of Boston. Insofar as he appoints the Public Facilities
Commission and submits his budget to the City Council, he is a prime actor in the process. The more politically sensitive the mayor is, the more politically sensitive the process becomes. However, the mayor's direct role is usually more one of setting general policy. There is nothing in the statutes which requires that the normal bureaucratic actors and agencies go out of their way to involve the general citizenry. The law assumes that the electorate has its chance at election time. However, the mayor, working through his commission, may establish a policy of direct community involvement. Unfortunately, as such involvement is initiated by the bureaucracy itself it may provide the community with only superficial and ineffective entry points into the system. However, as there is no other agent who has the immediate power to require community involvement, The Mayor is in a position where he must attempt to do this as best he can.

Just as the School Committee's power rests in its approval of the actions of the Superintendent, the City Council uses its power of the purse in approving or
disapproving the city budget as submitted by the Mayor. The Council must vote on all loan orders and hence has some control of the school building process. However, unlike the old procedure of issuing bonds for specific projects which was in effect for so many years before the establishment of the Public Facilities Commission, school construction bonds are now issued in large packages without being tied to any individual school building. Without the reason to debate the merits of individual projects, the Council finds itself restricted to the debate of whether or not new schools are needed in Boston. In view of the general public sentiment, the issue is almost automatically resolved, the loan order is passed, the bonds are issued and the Council returns to debating the relative efficiency or inefficiency of the administration.

This is not to say that the Boston City Council does not make the budgetary planners work for their money. Especially in election years when many Councilors may have aspirations to higher elective office, council meetings have been known to turn into personal public relations
efforts on the part of the participants. This can be assumed to be part of the democratic process of government and as long as the school building process can continue on funds from the preceding loan order, it is only fair to allow the debates to range free and wild.

Among all the cities and towns in Massachusetts, Boston has a rather unique relationship with the state legislature. Being the capital city, Boston finds that many decisions otherwise given home rule in the other cities and towns are in Boston the exclusive domain of the state legislature. One constant source of confusion to the neighborhood group involved in the school building process is the fact that it takes a legislative act to allow a school to use park land as part of the school site. While the Boston City Council is entrusted with the municipal playgrounds, the State Legislature is the only power which can transfer control of parks.

The park question may seem a minor point, but when
the efficient use of public space in some of the denser neighborhoods is considered, often the only viable solution is to use a public park as school play area from 9 a.m. to 2 p.m., returning it to the general public after these hours. Moreover, if the city intends to use state financial aid from the School Building Assistance Bureau to make site improvements such as baseball diamonds or bleachers, the park land must be transferred to the School Department in order to allow the expenditure of "school" funds. The problem becomes even more complex when the park land in question is under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan District Commission and not the City of Boston.

Generally a park land transfer affects only the immediate neighborhood using that park. Therefore, the state legislature can treat its disposition as a minor problem. Usually, the local legislator who proposes the bill can use accumulated voting favors to his party leadership or other legislators to assure passage. The process is time consuming but not impossible to cope with and may prove to be a good safeguard when examined in
the light of our ever shrinking reserve of open space.

However, sometimes neighborhoods look upon major parks which serve the city as a whole as likely resources to avoid land takings in the neighborhood. In those instances it is unlikely that the municipal government would pursue the issue as far as the legislature, but if it did it would be met with the established lobbying power of numerous conservation groups and other community pressures.

The State Legislature also enters the school building process through funding of Massachusetts Department of Education programs. A good example is the legislation which enabled the Department of Education to offer state aid for the renovation and rehabilitation of existing school buildings. Although it may be more economical to rehabilitate an existing building, the legislature has never seen fit to appropriate any money for this program. And so the major cities are forced to pursue a course of total new construction with the state
paying 40% of the cost rather than a program involving renovation when the cost would fall entirely upon the municipality.

Finally, the State Legislature has passed numerous pieces of legislation over the past several years to enable the cities and towns to enter into condominium arrangements with private developers. This means that a school can now be built as part of a mixed use complex wherein the site will continue to return tax revenue to the city. Other legislative acts, both passed and pending, include such things as aid for construction of schools for the hearing handicapped, special state aid for the establishment of the bilingual programs for Spanish speaking children and other specific acts to accomplish educational purposes.

OTHER INVOLVED AGENCIES

As if these many major actors in the school building process were not enough to provide comprehensive services
and safeguard the rights of the citizens, there are at least a dozen other public agencies which are involved to varying degrees in the construction of a school building.

One of these agencies is the city's Law Department. The Law Department, under the direction of the Corporation Counsel, must approve all actions taken by the municipal government. Often this is merely a review of a Commission vote or Council ordinance to insure that it is properly worded and not in violation of the City Charter. At other times the Corporation Counsel is requested to render a legal opinion on the proper form by which some power granted by a new law can be utilized. The Law Department is composed of a small staff which is woefully overworked. In the case of any agency wanting to innovate by departing from normal city practices, the Law Department may take several years to research the matter before giving an opinion as to the legality of the action. If the true function of the Law Department is to keep the city from being sued for an illegal action, then it must be credited with doing an admirable job. However, if the function of
corporation counsel is to find legal routes for implementing positive programs without infringing upon the legal rights of other bodies and individuals, then the Law Department is so understaffed that it can never hope to keep up with the research and innovative thinking which would be required.

The Boston Finance Commission is called a "watchdog" agency which closely monitors the city's financial and contractual policies. The Finance Commission, much as the Law Department, has difficulty coping with any procedure or policy which departs from the usual. All no-bid contracts which the city awards must be reviewed by the Finance Commission as well as approved by the Law Department. The Finance Commission also, from time to time, issues reports about situations or projects within city government which it feels are inappropriate or mishandled. Here again, departure from the commonplace is the red flag which will stop a project or program dead in the Finance Commission for several months of review. The Finance Commission has been known to hold up an architectural contract for two
months over a discrepancy of three hundred dollars in the fee while construction costs on the project were escalating over $2500 per week.

The City Auditor is responsible for, among other things, making sure that there are adequate funds on hand to cover any contract or agreement which the city may enter into. This means that all contracts must also pass through the auditors office for his approval. A large amount of paperwork is required before any disbursements are made which usually means that those who contract with the city must be prepared to wait extended periods before payment is made. The effect that this has is that municipal contractors, be they contracting for a gross of pencils or a multi-million dollar building must bid city work high in order to realize a fair profit. This situation has been improving to some extent but it is not unusual for the uninitiated contractor to suffer badly at the hands of the auditor and his accountants.

The City maintains a Purchasing Department which is
charged with the responsibility of advertising for bid all materials and equipment which the city buys. This includes furnishings and equipment for new school buildings.

In and of itself, the concept of a Purchasing Department is not a bad idea. By centralizing purchasing, advertising and conformance with advertising standards can be accomplished rapidly and effectively. Suppliers are immediately aware of when and where to place bids. However, it is the bidding procedure itself which sometimes confounds the best of intentions on the part of innovative school designers and architects. All items advertised for public bid must be described as three manufacturers or equivalent. It is impossible to specify proprietary items under the law. This often hampers architects from obtaining comfortable and compatible equipment. When dealing with visual environments, as in school furnishings, the "or equal" in the specification rarely translates to a precise equal delivered to the school.

The Public Improvements Commission is a commission which acts as a liaison between the Public Works Department highway division, the Public Works Department sewer
division the Department of Traffic and Parking, the Fire Department and other agencies concerned with the maintenance and functioning of public ways. Although the Public Facilities Commission has the power to close streets at will, if the assembly of a school site should entail the closing of a street, the matter will be brought before the Public Improvements Commission. As a matter of good practice, this Commission will consider the problems of traffic, free access of fire equipment, underground utilities and costs of realignment of adjacent streets, signalization, and other implications of any street closing. The Public Improvements Commission also involves itself with some public squares and some of the new intown pedestrian malls where school buildings may wish to have curb cuts for access or to locate displays or exhibitions of student works such as in the Dartmouth Street Mall adjacent to the Copley Square High School.

A new actor in the school building process is the Model Cities Administration and Model Neighborhood Board
which operates in portions of Roxbury, Dorchester and Jamaica Plain. These two bodies are a product of the now renowned Model Cities program of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Model Cities Administration is a group of paid professionals and community people who are working to develop the community resources and social and physical environment of the Model Cities Area. The Model Neighborhood Board is composed of elected representatives from each of the six Model Cities sub-areas. All projects in or adjacent to the Model Neighborhood are coordinated through the Model Cities Agency and the Model Neighborhood Board to assure "maximum feasible citizen participation."

Education taskforces established by the Model Cities Agency work with the residents of the Model Neighborhood to plan sites and programs for new educational facilities. The city government is legally bound by the terms of its acceptance of the Federal Model Cities Grant to work through this agency in all projects in the Model Neighborhood.
The administration of Mayor Kevin White has added yet another set of actors to the school building process. This is the Office of Public Service and the Little City Halls which are located in the various neighborhoods of the city. Most of the BRA Local Advisory Committees function out of the little City Halls and thus provide an ongoing contact between the municipal government and the communities. In addition, the managers of the Little City Halls are full time professional "mini-mayors" working in each community and sensitive to the feelings of that community. Citizens use the Little City Halls to conduct such mundane business as paying tax and water bills, obtaining copies of birth and marriage certificates, applying for permits and other paperwork which heretofore would require a trip downtown to the Government Center. In the process, many citizens have learned to use the Little City Halls as a place to go with problems which cannot seem to be solved through the maze of the normal bureaucracy. When the City Council recently attempted to cut the Little City Hall program from the budget
claiming that it was a public relations tool and patronage resource for the Mayor, citizen outcry quickly assured that such a budget cut would not come about. This in itself shows that the Little City Halls are performing some useful function in the neighborhoods.

The Boston Parks and Recreation Department is possibly the best liked and least controversial of all city agencies. Under the present Commissioner, Joseph Curtis, the Parks and Recreation Department has had its various service trucks and other vehicles repainted in bright colors and bearing the legend "PARKS AND RECREATION" with neither the word Commission nor the ubiquitous City Seal featured on the logotype. This is only one way in the Parks and Recreations Department that they have tried to remove the normal bureaucratic stigma attached to a city agency. Working with the School Department, often leading the way, the Parks and Recreation Department has instituted a number of programs to allow community people of all ages to use recreational facilities such as gymnasia and
swimming pools which have traditionally been the exclusive domain of the School Department whose buildings housed them. Partially in response to the prodding of the State Department of Education, the School Department has entered into more and more cooperative agreements with Boston Parks and Recreation to assure greater utilization of the city's scarce recreational facilities.

In response to the recent public interest in ecology, the State Legislature has created a new agency known as the Conservation Commission. It is unclear as yet as to what the powers and functions of the Conservation Commission will be. However, under the present statute, the City must notify the Commission of every intended transfer of city owned land from one function to another. The Commission then has fourteen days to make a recommendation concerning the city's action. The city has no legal obligation to act on the Commission's recommendation.

Finally, the Mayor has established his Office of
Human Rights to act as an advocate for minority and other
groups who feel that their rights are being circumvented.
Although this agency has no direct and automatic involve-
ment in new school construction, it sometimes finds itself
acting as mediator between the city government and certain
community groups. If anything, the Office of Human Rights
has won the confidence of a large number of persons in the
various communities and has had this role thrust upon it
as a result of that confidence. Often when an impasse is
reached between the city and a community group or between
two or more community groups themselves, the Mayor's
Office of Human Rights can successfully step in and use
its skill in human relations to effectively defuse an
otherwise explosive issue.

THE CONCERNED COMMUNITY

The community is too often spoken of as if it were
a clearly defined body of users with unity of purpose and
opinion. The community is composed of many different segments, some of which may not even exist in the neighborhood immediately abutting the proposed school site.

Of both moral and practical concern the city government owes its first allegiance to the broadest city-wide electorate. After all, this is the body which elected the present governmental officials to their offices and it is therefore their responsibility to attempt to serve the broadest "public good." In this sense, the long-range city-wide planning goals and objectives must be considered here. It may be nice to give an individual neighborhood exactly what it wants, but to do so the expense of future neighborhood development and municipal fiscal stability is not political responsiveness but instead political opportunism.

In this sense, the municipal official is charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the general public interest. There are few organized or ad hoc interest groups which are willing or able to come forth on issues
of broad policy implications. With the possible exception of the venerable and ubiquitous League of Women Voters, no organization volunteers time and effort on an ongoing basis to supervise the process of government and speak in the broad public interest.

A second form of community is ongoing quasi-public and private organizations and interest groups. Social service agencies are constantly advocating to the municipal government on behalf of the neighborhoods which they serve. These agencies may range from United Community Services settlement houses to local church executive boards. Other organizations such as conservation and special interest organizations have specific functions and goals which they want to be sure are thoroughly considered in any governmental action.

Some special interest groups take a long term interest in the specific issue of school politics. Such is the Citizens for the Boston Public Schools which concerns itself primarily with educational issues. The CBPS has not yet involved itself in matters of new school
construction except insofar as to decry the general overall condition of the majority of public school buildings. If an organization such as the CBPS were to become deeply involved in specific neighborhood issues, it would quickly expend its energies on adjudicating local controversies and thus dilute its growing impact on system-wide policy. Such local issues are best left to involved parents and possibly the Home and School Associations.

Sometime villainized and sometimes praise are the local Home and School Associations, Boston's own version of the ubiquitous Parent Teachers Associations which exist in almost every school district in the United States. These groups usually represent the interests of their own families and children who attend the existing schools in the neighborhood. As most buildings take about four years from the first conception to completion, it can be said that if one's youngest child is in the second grade, participating in planning a local elementary school is planning for one's grandchildren. Attempts of Home and School Associations to interest mothers of preschool
children in participating in school planning meetings have met with minimal success. The mobility of the average American family is such that fewer and fewer neighborhood residents are certain enough that they will not be moving to bother to participate.

Working through the Educational Planning Center and the ongoing local agencies such as Home and School Associations, the Little City Halls, the Local Advisory Committees, Model Cities, or just plain sending notices home with the children at the local schools, the practice has been for the city to invite the formation of two committees: a site committee and a curriculum committee. Everyone is welcome to participate in these committees and to make recommendations to the School Department and the Public Facilities Department concerning possible school sites and local needs in the program and facilities of the proposed school. The curriculum and site committees generally compose the strongest link with the community throughout the school planning process.

A new community actor has arrived on the school
planning scene during the past several years. He is the community advocate or advocate planner. Usually he is attached to a nearby school or university, although he may be a practicing professional in architecture, planning, law or other related urban fields. He volunteers his time free or at minimal charge to community groups to help them represent their interests to the powers that be. Community advocates come in all manner of qualifications and motivations. Some are highly motivated professionals who have lived or worked in the neighborhood in the past and feel that they can contribute to the project with their skills. Some are academics attempting to get their sincerely motivated students to use their time and skills to help a neighborhood prepare proposals and avoid being shortchanged by the overworked and sometimes incompetent civil servants who may not investigate all alternatives to the problem. Some community advocates are merely self-styled demagogues who wish to inflate their own egos, try out "innovative solutions" from the journals which may or may not fit the neighborhood, or merely engage in an exercise to prove their paranoia of the municipal government is justified.
Nonetheless, when seriously involved and guided by a workable ethic and professional competence, the community advocate performs a beneficial function. Except to the most insecure bureaucrat, community advocates can be a real help in solving complex school building problems. The community's confidence in them, their added time and skills, and the fact that they are not prejudiced by previous solutions makes them an excellent resource in the planning process. As long as the community advocate realizes that he is dealing with real people with hopes and frustrations and that his goal is to solve a problem and not to prove a point, the result is usually beneficial to all concerned.

Last but not least among the community actors are the concerned individuals. These persons usually fall into two categories: the abutters and the displaced. As soon as a proposed school site is reasonably determined, both those who will be displaced by the facility and those who will find themselves living next to a school will suddenly come to the fore with all manner of questions, concerns,
threats and pleas. No one likes to be displaced and no one can argue against the fact that the burden in these cases falls unfairly on some individuals. Often the city will attempt to gerrymander a school site boundary to avoid taking a small business or multiple family dwelling. Sometimes such takings are unavoidable and sometimes the gerrymandering is done at a large cost to the final design of the school. Often abutters will come forth and offer to sell their properties to the city to be added to the school site.

One of the major problems with both purchase agreements and eminent domain takings is the manner in which compensation is fixed by the law. The Constitution of the United States guarantees that no private property may be seized by the government without just compensation. In the practice of eminent domain in Massachusetts this means fair market value as determined by an independent appraiser. There are certain relocation expenses which must be borne by the government and in the case of a land taking involving more than four families, a relocation plan
must be filed with the State. Eminent domain is an absolute power and the citizen cannot contest the taking, only the amount of damages he is compensated for his property.

In the case of a negotiated purchase, the city is prohibited by statute from paying more than 25% over the average assessed valuation of the property for the preceding three years. As assessments in the City of Boston generally average about one-third of fair market value, negotiated sales are rarely used and the procedure is instead one of eminent domain with the fair market value determined by appraisal being used to set the amount of compensation. This process is referred to as amicable taking and is not uncommon in many land acquisition procedures.

Non-resident owners of businesses comprise a much maligned and little understood community which is often short-changed at public meetings. Not living in the neighborhood, these persons are rarely informed about
local planning decisions until it is too late to affect them. Often community groups will suggest taking "that ugly factory" rather than the homes of local residents without being aware that many residents find employment in that factory.

Business relocation poses still another unique problem under Massachusetts law. Relocation expenses for businesses are limited by statute to a maximum of three thousand dollars whether that business be a corner newsstand or a steel mill. This fact often restrains the city from making an otherwise justifiable business taking as such an act would certainly put many major employers into bankruptcy with the resulting social costs to the neighborhood and the city as a whole.
APPENDIX C

THE PROCESS OF
NEW SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION
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THE PROCESS OF NEW SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION

The bureaucratic process through which each new school project in Boston flows from conception to completion is complex. The following is a description of the actual flow with notations made wherever possible of how this departs from the theoretical operations suggested by legislation and organizational charts.

PLANNING NEW SCHOOLS

The overall planning of new school needs comes from several sources. Officially, the Public Facilities Department is responsible for the preparation of the long range Capital Improvements Program and the Educational Planning Center is responsible for predicting new school needs. In reality the process is not quite so simple.
Data relative to new school needs impinge upon the Superintendent's office from many different sources.

The School Committee's Racial Balance Plan and the outcome of the ongoing conferences between the Department of Education Racial Balance Taskforce and the Public Facilities and School Departments produce a portion of the projected building program which must be more or less adhered to to guarantee the continuance of state financial aid to the system. Similarly, the Boston Redevelopment Authority is constantly monitoring new housing construction in Boston and notifying the Educational Planning Center of projected upswings in the residential population of the various neighborhoods.

The Educational Planning Center reports from time to time to the Superintendent of Schools concerning the projected pupil space needs of the school system. The Educational Planning Center projections are based upon lower grade enrollments, new construction trends, census data and demographic trends in the neighborhoods related to open enrollment and racial balance.
To further complicate the matter, old school buildings may suddenly fall victim to fire or malicious vandalism which requires their replacement ahead of anticipated schedule. One recurring problem is massive failure of antiquated heating systems in buildings which are scheduled for replacement within the next several years. Economics does not warrant the replacement of these heating plants but pressing space needs can override logical economic analysis.

In receipt of all this data plus less specific grumblings from parents, students and staff, the Superintendent requests the Public Facilities Department to provide new or replacement pupil spaces in specific areas of the city. The Public Facilities Department has the legal right to act upon these requests as it sees fit. However, unlike the organizational flow charts which show this process to be linear, decisions are usually made by animated discussions between the Superintendent and the Public Facilities Commission. These discussions are further facilitated by the fact
that one of the three members of the Public Facilities Commission has traditionally been the Superintendent of Schools himself, although this is not required by statute.

As a result of these discussions between the Superintendent and the Public Facilities Department, the decision is reached that a new school is needed in a specific neighborhood. The Educational Planning Center specifies the approximate capacity of the school and, with the Chief Structural Engineer, makes some predictions as to how pupils will be distributed between this new facility and existing facilities once the new school is completed.

FINANCING THE FUTURE

Meanwhile the financial planners at the Public Facilities Department have been making some rough estimates
as to the overall cost of the new school construction program during the next fiscal period. These predictions are included into the overall capital improvements program which the Public Facilities Department then transmits to the mayor's Administrative Services division for inclusion in the proposed budget. Although most city borrowing is constrained by a debt limit fixed by law which allows the municipal corporation to have only so much money outstanding in debt compared with the total city tax base, school construction loans are not included in this debt limit.

The mayor and his Administrative Services staff analyze this budget in light of the existing financial status of the city and, with consultations with the involved departments, adjust it into a form which the mayor feels will be palatable to the City Council.

The budget is then transmitted to the City Council for approval. The Council usually challenges many items in the budget and holds hearings to determine the
necessity of specific budgetary requests. Unfortunately, many of the budget items are statutory obligations of the city such as interest and retirement of outstanding debt, assessments to support the MBTA and MDC, mandatory veterans benefits and other items. This leaves the Council with a number of items which it can pare and a finite time to approve or veto the budget before it goes into effect automatically.

In view of the operating budget, the capital budget is usually much less controversial. However, the debate can become quite brisk in relation to how debt obligations will affect the immediate tax rate.

Assuming that the capital budget is accepted in substantially its original form, it is now the legal responsibility of the City Council to pass loan orders to authorize the issuance of municipal bonds to finance the construction of various municipal facilities. Following the passage of a loan order there is a period within which the voters may petition the city government
for a referendum on the issue. However, as this petition requires a large number of signatures and as school loan orders are not tied to specific projects, this referendum procedure has not been used in many years and loan orders invariably go unchallenged.

Working through a commercial "bond house" and with the approval of its bond counsel, the city prepares the bond issue for sale to private and institutional investors. Although authorized, bonds are generally marketed only as projects make demands upon funds in order to avoid having to pay debt service of monies which are lying fallow in the city treasury.

Although the School Building Assistance Bureau will pay 40% of the construction cost of all new school buildings and 65% of the cost of buildings which help alleviate racial imbalance, this reimbursement comes only as the city retires its bonds. Assuming that the city did not borrow for new construction, the reimbursement would
come in a lump sum upon completion of the facility. However, as the state sees no reason to assume debt service in lieu of the cities, it is the obligation of the cities to assume their own debt and pay all debt service with the state only reimbursing the fixed percent of the principal. A recent amendment of this process by the State Legislature will result in the State reimbursing debt service on new schools constructed after 1971.

Other non-capital projects such as alterations, repairs and renovations do not fall into the capital improvements budget and must be paid for directly out of operating funds and hence have a pronounced influence on immediate tax rates. The School Building Assistance Bureau is quite strict in its interpretation of new construction versus renovation and often this interpretation borders on the ridiculous.

A good example of this interpretation was the
McCormack School built adjacent to the existing Dever School at Boston's Columbia Point Housing Project. The McCormack School has a full hot lunch program and cafeteria. In order to make this program accessible to the students at the Dever School, a bridge between the new and existing buildings was constructed as part of the construction of the new school. The School Building Assistance Bureau reimbursed the city for a portion of the cost of the new bridge but would not pay one dime toward the cutting of a doorway in the wall of the existing school to complete the connection.

In view of this reimbursement formula and fluctuating obligations on the part of the city, it is not always the case that total project cost is a direct indicator of a project's impact on the municipal tax rate. Although it is reasonable to argue that all deferred costs catch up with the tax payer sooner or later, the constantly escalating construction costs of our inflationary economy have made this truism less and less certain with each passing year. Often maintenance and renovation
costs to keep an obsolescent facility running may have a more deleterious effect on municipal finances than the seeming large expenditure incurred for new construction. It is difficult enough to explain this reasoning to the fiscally initiated, but the counterintuitive logic is often enough to send the City Council membership to new heights of florid debate.

THE SITE SELECTION PROCESS

Of all the actions which must be taken in the construction of a new school building, the act of site selection is probably the most dramatic and politically controversial. While finances and educational philosophy, architecture and construction management may lend themselves to intellectualized debate, the simple act of finding a place to put the building strikes close to home in dealing with the physical realities of every neighborhood.
It would be laudable if the intense community interest in site selection could be maintained throughout all facets of the planning process. A brief analysis of the attraction of site selection debate yields several obvious features unique to that issue. Primarily, site selection impinges upon every member of the community, whether he has school aged children or not. In the processes of siting a school, everyone's home is in some jeopardy of being taken at one time or another. Traffic flow and kids climbing backyard fences are issues of concern to many residents who do not want their properties encroached upon by an adjacent schoolhouse. Issues of safety, transportation, and walking distance are invariably debated by parents interested in the comfort of their own children. Every homeowner who has ever had to pump out his flooded basement or pay to remove a rock from his property suddenly stands up at public meetings as a soils engineer conversant with the water table and foundation problems of the neighborhood. There are few local citizens who, if prodded, will not volunteer to give an opinion on a proposed site.
Usually, the first act in site selection is the establishment of a site committee in the neighborhood through public meetings held under the sponsorship of the Educational Planning Center. The site committee is briefed on some site selection criteria to be considered and is asked to make proposals for discussion. Here, more than anywhere else in the process, community participation is strong, viable and positive. Living in the neighborhood, community members often have ideas which are not obvious to the outsiders professional making a cursory inspection of the area.

Unfortunately, site standards are not absolute and often the community feels that a proposed site is being rejected arbitrarily by the bureaucracy. It is not uncommon for a few persons to say that a "payoff" or some political favoritism is involved in the city's rejection of a favored site. Generally, sites are evaluated on the basis of three rather broad considerations: feasibility for acquisition and construction;
approvability by the School Building Assistance Bureau; and, suitability under the Racial Balance Plan. As no site is ever optimum and as Boston has more than its share of special cases, it is almost impossible to arrive at a set of unbending criteria. Over the years experience has indicated where snags and bottlenecks will occur in land acquisition. The School Building Assistance Bureau will approve some extremely unusual sites if it can be convinced that there is no alternative. The Racial Balance Plan being a very subjective document responding to a somewhat vague law even leaves some room for administrative flexibility providing that the State's Racial Balance Taskforce can be convinced that the objectives of the plan are not being circumvented.

In case of physical feasibility and case of land acquisition, physical feasibility is by far the simplest problem. Almost anything is possible if the budget is large enough. However, sometimes it is not desirable to distort a school into an educationally inadequate
building in order to conform to a particularly difficult site. Moreover, as new schools are paid for by the city and state as a whole, neighborhoods rarely consider economics as a real criteria, reasoning in their own way that if they do not spend the money in their neighborhood, some other neighborhood will spend it on its school building.

Often school sites involve street closings as well as the use of contiguous parks or playgrounds for school recreational purposes. In the case of street closings, the Public Facilities Department has the legal power to close streets at will. However, as a matter of good practice, the Public Improvements Commission is usually consulted and some of the resulting problems which are brought to light are often enough to delay complete assembly of the proposed site for long periods of time. One primary consideration in street closings is vehicular circulation, both from the standpoint of general traffic and also in consideration of the movement of emergency vehicles such as fire fighting
apparatus. Few neighborhoods are concerned with the impact a street closing may have on through circulation serving the larger city. The free flow of fire apparatus may appear to be a dodge on the part of the city, but anyone who has witnessed fire department operations can testify to the fact that often seconds do count.

Often what lies under the street may be more of an obstacle to a street closing than what travels on it. Sewer, water, gas, steam and electric utilities all have to be considered. Often it is impossible to place a building over such utilities not only for structural reasons but for reasons of accessibility for maintenance. Here bottlenecks in site acquisition may arise due to the complexities of maintaining adequate slopes for relocating sewer lines. The fact that private utilities such as Boston Edison and Boston Gas may bring their added bureaucracies to the problem may further slow acquisition.

As mentioned earlier, it is sometimes desirable to
utilize existing parks and playgrounds as part of a new school site in order to provide adequate physical education facilities to meet state standards. In most cases the School Building Assistance Bureau has insisted that the School Department have full control over school play areas so that other non-school functions have no possibility of usurping the play areas during school hours. This means that cooperative agreements which can be changed at will between the Parks and Recreation Department, the Metropolitan District Commission or other recreational agencies and the School Department are not adequate in the state's opinion to justify the expenditure of state funds on a potentially inadequate school site. The lawyers at the School Building Assistance Bureau have insisted that the School Department must have the equivalent of "fee simple" interest in all of the school site in order to spend state school funds on site improvements. The "fee simple" interest can take the form of either direct transfer of title or 99-year leases in the case of quasi-public areas and MDC lands.
As the transfer of title of playgrounds requires the approval of the City Council and as the transfer of title of park land requires an act of the state legislature, these arrangements can often further delay the acquisition and approval of school sites. Moreover, in view of the ever shrinking resource of open space in the inner city, it is often more desirable to use the school building program as a lever to obtain new open space and recreational facilities which can be used by all the community after normal school hours.

The School Building Assistance Bureau publishes minimum standards for school sites. Unfortunately, state standards are set with the more sparsely settled suburban and rural community in mind and cannot be realistically applied to the inner city. Therefore, the state has been willing to accept novel solutions including air rights, roof top play areas, mixed use structures and other novel practices. After working with the state for a number of years, a fairly good understanding has been generated on
the part of the City of Boston as to what is acceptable and what is definitely not acceptable. As acceptability varies from one neighborhood to the next depending upon population density, topography, land acquisition costs and other factors, it is not possible to assure approval in every neighborhood just because a specific solution was accepted in one particular part of the city. This again is seen as an evasive tactic by many communities which cannot understand why a site solution accepted in a dense inner-city area is not acceptable in their more sparsely settled neighborhood.

The small, tight sites being utilized in the dense urban core are seen by many minority groups as an effort on the part of the city to deprive them of a rambling suburban type school while the larger sites utilized in the more suburban neighborhoods of Boston are perceived by the white middle-class residents as a failure on the part of the city to respond to their desire to minimize takings of private homes. Even at this it is hard to predict how a neighborhood will react to any given site
proposal and that, in part, is why the site committees for all their limitations have proven to be an invaluable tool in planning for new school construction.

THE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM

The educational program is the written document which details what programs and facilities are to be included in a new school. The Educational Planning Center is responsible for the preparation of this program and to do so it organizes a curriculum committee much in the same manner that the site committee is structured. Ideally, the curriculum committee is programming the new school at the same time that the site committee is off searching for a site. However, the controversy which usually surrounds site selection frequently distracts community interest from the abstract consideration of programming until such time as the site is resolved.

Just as the Public Facilities Department and the
Educational Planning Center brief the community site committee on site selection criteria, these agencies also make short presentations, often illustrated with slides and augmented by field trips, to acquaint the curriculum committee with the present state of the art and possibilities for new school construction. Boston is presently engaged in a program of "open plan schools" which are a radical departure from the traditional closed classroom organization which typified the schools most parents attended as youngsters. The presentation of the open plan concept, its purposes and possibilities often proves to be a series of surprises both to the community people and to the educator who are never sure of what reaction this relatively innovative program will receive.

Basically, open plan schools differ from the more traditional educational plants in that they place several class sized groups under the supervision of several teachers in a common open area. Furnishings and partial dividers are designed so that the space may be used in a large number of ways to accommodate all sizes of groups engaged
in the learning process. Children are encouraged to work independently in this environment and use the teacher and other resource personnel to help them with learning problems which they cannot solve on their own.

Needless to say, one of the first questions which invariably arises from the parents is how can order be maintained in this unstructured environment. The answer given is that the comfortable, carpeted environment usually provides enough educational diversions for the children that they gladly participate in the learning process. Field trips to several well designed open plan schools in the Boston area bear this out and the majority of parents are quickly convinced of the benefits of this more relaxed program.

Of the early open schools which Boston constructed, one or two suffered from programatic and architectural errors in acoustical treatment and space planning. This, added to a failure on the part of the school system to adequately train and brief teachers on how to cope with
this new environment, gave the open plan school program a poor reputation in some neighborhoods of the city. Here again slides and tours of properly functioning schools have readily overcome the qualms of most parents.

Most elementary schools being built in Boston have a capacity of approximately one thousand pupils with none smaller than seven hundred and fifty. By aggregating large numbers of pupils at a central location it is possible to provide all manner of specialized facilities. Schools opening in Boston within the next several months include such facilities as gyms, pools, science suites, art suites, special work shops, animal rooms, greenhouses, aquariums, performing arts center and more. Economics prevents the inclusion of all of these facilities in every school, so by working with the neighborhood it is often possible to see exactly where community interests lie. The Educational Planning Center encourages parents to suggest specialized facilities which will be relevant to the particular social structure of the neighborhood.
and to propose community programs which can be conducted in these facilities either by the School Department, the Parks and Recreation Department or the neighborhood itself. An excellent example of this type of programming is the new Kent School, now under construction in Charlestown. Although this is an elementary school, full locker facilities have been included adjacent to the school gymnasium for use by adults in the community who want to use the gym in the evenings. Other neighborhoods have generated such ideas as the inclusion of the neighborhood health clinic in the school complex to serve both the children in the school and the community as a whole. The School Building Assistance Bureau has generally accepted these ancillary functions of the school and declared them eligible for state financial aid.

With all its advantages of economy of scale, the larger elementary school does pose the problem of being too big for a small child to cope with. Generally this problem is met by dividing the complex into "houses" which function as smaller schools surrounding a core of
central facilities. Kindergartens have their own private toilets and separate play areas adjacent to the classroom space to further reduce the scale of the school for the smaller children. Through intelligent programming the open plan classrooms become intimate communities within the total complex. This is to be contrasted with the traditional school where the child is placed in a rectangular room containing twenty-nine other children and asked to function as if he and the teacher are the only ones present.

The ultimate product of the efforts of the curriculum committee and the Educational Planning Center in the form of the program document goes to the office of the Superintendent of Schools for his approval. There it may sit for several weeks or longer being scrutinized by the Superintendent and his assistants for problems which may prohibit the operation of the school as the planners have envisioned it. Assuming that the program poses no insurmountable problems from the standpoint of legality, maintenance, teacher training and acceptance and other operational and philosophical criteria, the program is
approved and transmitted to the Public Facilities Department for translation into a physical reality.

THE EDUCATIONAL SPECIFICATIONS AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

The program which arrives at the Public Facilities Department is rarely in a form which can be directly translated into a building by an architect. Generally the Public Facilities Department hires a consultant to take the programatic requirements and translate them into specific spaces of given square foot areas and definite interrelationships. This process may take several weeks while the consultant carefully analyzes the educational goals of the program documents and enumerates the various spaces and areas which will be required to implement them. As this process nears completion it is possible for the first time to see if the site selection process has produced a site which is totally adequate for the accommodation of the total school program.
The document which the consultant produces is known as the educational specifications. It is submitted to the School Building Assistance Bureau for its approval as to its adequacy in view of state standards and hence its eligibility for state funds. Meanwhile the Educational Planning Center, the Public Facilities Department and the consultant evolve a set of design requirements which detail such things as the types of equipment and furnishings, the special cabinet work to be included in each room, the specific spatial arrangements and other details which the architect is to follow in his design.

With the state's approval received, the educational specifications and design requirements are submitted to the Superintendent for his final approval. Under the law he has fourteen days to make any comments he has about these document known to the Public Facilities Department. With the site and program defined, the Public Facilities Department now takes the first step toward an architectural design.
At the recommendation of the director of the department, the Public Facilities Commission votes to hire an architect to design the school. Generally the architect is selected for major projects from a list prepared by the chief architect of the Public Facilities Department. It has been the objective of the department to hire highly competent architects for all major projects. Although politics does enter into the architect selection process, usually architects for new schools are selected on the basis of professional reputation and the recommendation of the highly professional chief architect. Other minor municipal projects may not do so well in the architect selection process, but for the most part the quality of public building in Boston is superior to almost every other major American city. One need only to look at the general design quality of New York City's public building program to verify this statement.

Architects' fees are set by standard rate tables published by the American Institute of Architects. Fees
are based upon a fixed percent of the total construction cost, the percent being determined by a graduated scale adjusted for different building types. After selection by the Public Facilities Department, architects receive a written contract outlining the scope of their work and the manner of payment of all fees and allowances for supplementary services such as site surveys, soil borings, and so forth. Many architects start work on city projects long before they have a signed contract in hand as following the Commission vote to award contract the actual contract must pass through the Finance Commission, the City Auditor, the Law Department, and end up in the Mayor's Office for his signature. This process may take months and hence many architects informally agree to begin their design work with little more than an informal agreement with the Public Facilities Department director.

DESIGNING THE SCHOOL

The architect may take several weeks studying the
program document, the educational specifications and the design requirements before even putting pencil to paper. During this period he may meet with the Educational Planning Center and attend several community meetings to clarify priorities and specific details of the program.

While this is going on, site acquisition is proceeding so that by the time the design is complete the city will have clear title to the site and be able to begin construction. The design process will take the better part of a year but this is none too long to allow the real estate specialists in the Public Facilities Department and, where applicable, the Boston Redevelopment Authority to complete all the legal and financial arrangements necessary.

Having grasped the complexities of the program, the architect will make several informal submissions of design schemes for review by the community and by the architectural section of the Public Facilities Department. Based upon
the response to these submissions he will prepare a
formal set of schematic drawings of how the school is to
be designed. These drawings will be submitted to the
Public Facilities Commission for formal approval. Upon
receipt of the submission of preliminary drawings, the
Public Facilities Department transmits the drawings to
the Superintendent of Schools for his comments. The
law requires that the Superintendent be given fourteen
days to review the preliminary drawings. His comments are
noted and, if agreeable, the Public Facilities Commission
approves the preliminaries and the architect may receive
his first payment under the terms of his contract.

While this has been going on the architect has been
requested to submit the names of several engineering firms
which he feels he can comfortably work with to do the
structural, mechanical, electrical and soils engineering
required to produce the school building. The engineering
branch of the Public Facilities Department reviews the
qualifications of these proposed engineers and based upon
its recommendation the Commission votes to award contracts
to the appropriate firms.

With the approval of preliminaries in hand, the architect proceeds with design development. In this phase of the project he begins to consider some of the pragmatic details of how the school is to be constructed. He and his engineers meet constantly with the design and engineering staff of the Public Facilities Department. Designs are submitted to the Massachusetts Department of Public Safety for their informal review as to conformance to state safety and handicapped code requirements. Submissions are made to the School Building Assistance Bureau to make sure that the ultimate design will be approved by that agency.

During this period, the community groups often feel frustrated and uninvolved. Their input having been completed, there is nothing for them to do while this technical process is going on. Until the design is brought before them for final review as to conformance to their previously defined requirements, little that
is visible will happen on the site with the exception of some clearance and borings.

Some of the more militant communities take this period to accuse the city of "making decisions without them." It is unclear exactly how the community can participate in the specification of structural systems and air conditioning equipment but the drive for involvement is there nonetheless. To offset this isolation to some extent, the Educational Planning Center continues to meet with the community to discuss operational programs which will move into the new school upon its completion. There are still many loose ends which can be cleared up concerning the specifics of cooperative community programs such as recreation, youth activities, participation of museums, zoos and other educational and cultural organizations in the new facility and other operational details which the community is best at organizing for itself.

The process for approvals of the design development
drawings or basics as they are also known is similar to that used for approval of preliminaries. Following acceptance by the Public Facilities Commission, the architect then proceeds to the preparation of working drawings, specifications and contract documents.

The working drawings are the actual plans which the contractor will follow in the construction of the school building. These drawings show every detail of how the building goes together. Each feature is carefully described and dimensioned from the building structure to the smallest cabinet latch. Along with the working drawings a specification book is prepared, describing in somewhat formal and unambiguous language what materials are to be used, how they are to be installed and how well they are to be guaranteed to perform.

Contract documents describing the specific scope of work which the general contractor and sub-contractors are to perform are prepared and reviewed by the engineers, architects and contract lawyers. These documents, the
working drawings and the specifications are then reproduced into many copies and the job is advertised for public bid. Contractors may come to the Public Facilities Department engineering office and, for the payment of a small deposit, may obtain a set of these documents and drawings for their use in the preparation of bids. After a fixed period of time, usually about one month, the bidding period ends and the sealed bids are opened. The law requires that the construction contract be awarded to the low bidder unless it can be shown that the low bidder is incapable of fulfilling the obligations required by the contract.

A contract is prepared and the usual procedures of passing through the Finance Commission, Auditor, Law Department and Mayor are again followed. Under the Massachusetts File Sub-Bid Law, each sub-contract for such things as heating and ventilating, mechanical work, plumbing, electrical, acoustical ceilings, et cetera must be bid separately. The general contractor is obligated by law to work with the low bidding sub-contractors even
though his firm may feel more comfortable working with a sub-contractor of its own choosing. Each sub-contract moves through the bureaucratic mill according to the usual form.

The architect is paid to supervise the construction of the school and to assure that the contractor does not depart from the design and specifications. If the contractor fails to conform to his obligations, he has already had to post bond with the city for the entire value of the job and a portion of that bond could legally be withheld pending his satisfactory completion of the work required. The statutory requirement of 100% bonding is intended to protect the city from loss due to failure of the contractor to satisfactorily complete the job. Often this bonding requirement prevents small minority contractors from bidding on city work as their credit rating has yet to be established enough to allow them to obtain bonding from a bonding company.
ACCELERATING THE PROCESS

Sometimes in order to speed up the construction of a new school or other facility, the city will contract for site preparation and foundation work while the upper portions of the building are still being detailed. This process, known as "fast tracking" allows the total construction time to be shortened and sometimes gains advantages in allowing foundations to begin before the onset of winter weather.

The Public Facilities Department is presently developing a systems construction technique which will allow the bulk buying of stock components to further accelerate design and construction of new schools. The implementation of this system approach has required certain legislative changes and involved working closely with local contractors and building trades unions to assure the implementation of this departure from traditional construction techniques.
During the construction period, the Public Facilities Department advertises bids and orders the furnishings and equipment for these new schools through the traditional City Purchasing Department. If planned properly, the furniture, equipment and accessories should arrive at the new school not too long after the completion of construction. The real art of this procedure is to get everything to come to completion at the same time.

PREPARING TO OPERATE A SCHOOL

Having the Public Facilities Department give the keys to a completed and furnished school building to the School Department does not assure the operability of that school. Much careful planning within the School Department goes on prior to the opening of a new school.

It is the responsibility of the School Department to order books and consumable supplies to implement the
educational program which it has planned for the new facility. Similarly, special educational materials such as films, science supplies, animals, art materials and so forth must be on the scene the day school opens or not too long thereafter.

After its unfortunate experience with the early open plan schools, the Boston Public School system adopted a program of orientation and staff training for teachers who are to be assigned to these new schools. During the summer preceding the opening of the new school, teachers attend a series of workshops designed to acquaint them with the possibilities and functions of the new school plant. As many of these teachers will be teaching outside of the self-contained classroom for the first time, many of these workshops become a type of sensitivity session to help teachers better function as teams and overcome their inhibitions about teaching in front of other teachers.

Personnel within the School Department plan for food
services in the new school cafeteria. "The school-lunch lady," as she is affectionately known in the system, must prepare a comprehensive list of materials and supplies which she must have on hand to operate the new kitchen. Specialized staff must be hired and in some cases trained to operate the equipment.

Similarly, the Schoolhouse Custodian who is in charge of all custodial maintenance in the school system must make sure staff and supplies are on hand for the school opening. During the last days of construction he meets with the contractor and sub-contractor and the engineers to understand what his staff must be trained to do to monitor the operations of the complex mechanical systems which keep a new school functioning. The old days of shoveling coal are gone, at least as far as the new schools are concerned. The custodian must be acquainted with what to do or who to call to maintain the air conditioning, closed circuit television system, electrically operated moveable partitions and swimming pool filtration system to name but a few of the many devices included in the new school buildings.
Demographic data must be updated to insure that children are assigned to the new school and that enrollment is coordinated with existing schools in adjacent districts. The Educational Planning Center performs this function, and at the same time continues its efforts in community relations to have workable community programs ready to go into the school soon after its opening.

The Parks and Recreation Department is hiring staff for after school programs and in some neighborhoods the Commission of Affairs for the Elderly is preparing to operate a hot meals program at reduced cost to senior citizens during the early evening hours.

The behind the scenes process is indeed complex and it is impossible for any one agency let alone any single community group to participate in every facet of the process. Nonetheless, citizen groups and concerned individuals can find entry points to the process if they care to investigate and to express their interest.
Expressing interest, however, requires more than a simple "what can I do to help?" in response to being told that the wheels are grinding. Such a broad offer of help will usually evoke little from the established agencies who are most likely already overburdened with technical details. Taking his cue from the country doctor attending the mother in labor in the old movies, the administrator will occasionally shout the bureaucratic equivalent of "Boil lots of hot water!" and hope that the make-work will maintain the interest of the community until their participation can again be useful. The ploy is usually to be avoided as almost all community groups can detect when their efforts are having no effect on the process.

More beneficial, and less frustrating, is the community's attempt at self-organization during this period of bureaucratic machination. In a somewhat similar fashion, neighborhoods do well to mobilize support of business and cultural institutions to supplement the services of the new school. Although it is helpful to the school for the community to approach the museum or zoo with
a request for involvement, it is ten times more helpful if the community works intensively with the museum or zoo to develop specifics of an operating program. The best of ideas do little good if there is not a full commitment to action and a strategy for continuing involvement on the part of the community-discovered or community-generated resource.

Thusfar, few community groups have been willing to devote the unglamorous effort to developing such programs. The problem is a very real one, with Philadelphia's Parkway High School being a good case in point. In that instance, paid school administrators worked closely with local businesses to draw upon their resources in educating high school students. The program was an acclaimed success, but after its first year of operation many businesses have dropped out, neither willing nor able to make an ongoing commitment without some permanent mechanism for compensating them for their expenses.

Few community persons are professionals at fund raising and generating commitments. This may be one area where the School Department or some other established
agency could lend technical expertise to work with the community in doing its own housekeeping detail while the bureaucracy is attending to its equivalent details. Still, if programming and planning are less glamorous and interesting than site selection, then this sort of thing may not be able to attract more than a few diehards from even the most motivated community.

EVALUATION

Following the opening of each new school facility, an ongoing evaluation takes place. No matter how comprehensive the planning and design process may have been, there are always details which are in need of modification or correction. It is impossible to predict every user need and sometimes needs are generated by the very existence of the new facility.

Looking back on the Hastings Street School, the first
open-plan building in the system, it is easy to see that many mistakes were made but much learning has taken place. It is hoped that in the future better evaluation techniques will lead to constant improvement and revision of the programming, planning and design processes. Better teacher training and more effective use of furnishings to define space are two concepts just beginning to become part of the process. Certainly more changes will be implemented as the process is refined.
APPENDIX D

CHAPTER 641 OF THE ACTS OF 1965
THE MASSACHUSETTS RACIAL BALANCE ACT
APPENDIX D:

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

Advance copy 1965 Acts and Resolves

KEVIN H. WHITE, Secretary of the Commonwealth

Chap. 641 An Act providing for the elimination of racial imbalance in the public schools.

Whereas, The deferred operation of this act would tend to defeat its purpose, which is to eliminate forthwith racial imbalance in the public schools, therefore it is hereby declared to be an emergency law, necessary for the immediate preservation of the public convenience.

Be it enacted, etc., as follows:

SECTION 1. Chapter 71 of the General Laws is hereby amended by inserting after section 37B the following two sections: -

SECTION 37C. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Commonwealth to encourage all school committees to adopt as educational objectives the promotion of racial balance and the correction of existing racial imbalance in the public schools. The prevention or elimination of racial imbalance shall be an objective in all decisions involving the drawing or altering of school attendance lines and the selection of new school sites.

SECTION 37D. The school committee of each city, town, and district shall, annually, at such time and in such form as the commissioner shall determine, submit statistics sufficient to enable a determination to be made of the non-white pupils in all public schools and in each school under the jurisdiction of each such committee. Whenever the state board of education finds that racial imbalance exists in a public school it shall notify in writing the school
committee or regional school district committee having jurisdiction over such school that such finding has been made. The school committee shall thereupon prepare a plan to eliminate such racial imbalance and file a copy of such plan with the board. The term "racial imbalance" refers to a ratio between non-white and other students in public schools which is sharply out of balance with the racial composition of the society in which non-white children study, serve and work. For the purpose of this section, racial imbalance shall be deemed to exist when the per cent of non-white students in any public school is in excess of fifty per cent of the total number of students in such school.

Said plan shall detail the changes in existing school attendance districts, the location of proposed school sites, the proposed additions to existing school buildings, and other methods for the elimination of racial imbalance. Said plan shall also include projections of the expected racial composition of all public schools. Any plan to detail changes in existing school attendance districts, the locations of proposed new school sites and proposed additions to existing school sites and proposed additions to existing school buildings with the intention of reducing or eliminating racial imbalance must take into consideration on an equal basis with the above mentioned intention, the safety of the children involved in travelling from home to school and school to home. Said plan may provide for voluntary co-operation by other cities and towns in rendering assistance and in making available facilities to effectuate said plan.

No school committee or regional school district committee shall be required as part of its plan to transport any pupil to any school outside its jurisdiction or to any school outside the school district established for his neighborhood, if the parent or guardian of such pupil files written objection thereto with such school committee.

Said board may, from time to time, require each school committee to submit to said board a report on the
progress of the plan and its implementation.

The supreme judicial and the superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity upon petition of the board of education to enforce the provisions of this section.

SECTION 2. Chapter 15 of the General Laws is hereby amended by inserting after Section 1H the following three sections:

SECTION II. The board of education shall provide technical and other assistance in the formulation and execution of plans to eliminate racial imbalance, made pursuant to section thirty-seven D of chapter seventy-one. Whenever the board determines that a school committee or regional school district committee has failed to file a plan in compliance with the provisions of said section, it shall consult with and make specific recommendations for a plan by such school committee or regional school district committee. If, following the receipt of notification from the board of education that racial imbalance, as defined in section thirty-seven D of chapter seventy-one exists, a school committee or regional school district committee does not show progress within a reasonable time in eliminating racial imbalance in its schools the commissioner of education shall not certify the amount of state aid for such city or town or for such towns which are members of such regional school districts, as required by section nine of chapter seventy, and the school building assistance commission upon receipt of notice from said board that racial imbalance exists shall not approve any project for school construction for such city, town or regional school district under chapter six hundred and forty-five of the acts of nineteen hundred and forty-eight, as amended, and the commissioner of education may notify the commissioner of corporations and taxation and the comptroller to hold such funds as have been so certified under said section nine but have not been disbursed. The commissioner of education may thereafter upon receipt of a plan acceptable to the board of education notify the commissioner of corporations and taxation and the comptroller to pay any such withheld funds to such city or town in such amounts
and at such times as he may designate, and the school building assistance commission upon receipt of notice from said board that a plan acceptable to it has been received may approve such projects.

The school building assistance commission shall, notwithstanding any contrary provision of chapter six hundred and forty-five of the acts of nineteen hundred and forty-eight, as amended, increase the amount of grants for schoolhouse construction to sixty-five per cent of the approved cost, whenever the board of education is satisfied that the construction or enlargement of a schoolhouse is for the purpose of reducing or eliminating racial imbalance in the school system and so notifies the school building assistance commission.

SECTION 1J. Within thirty days after (1) a school committee or regional school district committee declines to accept the recommendations submitted to it by the board or (2) the board disapproves a revised plan submitted to it by a school committee or regional school district committee, said committee may file a petition for judicial review in the superior court for the county in which it is located or in the supreme judicial court for Suffolk county. The court may affirm the board's determination of the recommendations submitted by it or its determination of disapproval of a revised plan submitted to it, and order compliance with the recommendations of the board by appropriate decree, or if it finds and rules that the determination by the board is (a) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the board, or (b) based upon an error of law, or (c) arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, then it may set aside such determination by the board and remand the matter to it for further action.

The supreme judicial and the superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity upon petition of the board of education to order funds withheld as provided in section one for such period of time as the court may determine.

SECTION 1K. The board of education, with the advice
of the commissioner, shall appoint an advisory committee on racial imbalance and no individual shall be appointed to this advisory committee on racial imbalance who has been listed in any state or federal document as being a member of a communist front organization. The members of the committee shall serve without compensation except that they may be reimbursed for the necessary expenses actually incurred in the performance of their duties.

Approved August 18, 1965
BOSTON RACIAL BALANCING PLAN - FEBRUARY, 1967

SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
(Supplement to Task Force Report)

1. Measures to be applied in evaluating effect of a school construction plan to eliminate racial imbalance.

Qualification: Chapter 641, Acts of 1965, requires that the school building assistance commission (since abolished and placed under the Board of Education) shall not approve any school construction projects until the commissioner of education has notified said commission that an acceptable plan to eliminate racial imbalance has been received from a school committee previously not in compliance with this statute. Accordingly, Boston and other communities have been including in their plans vitally needed school construction projects not markedly affecting racial imbalance, as well as those which do. Approval of a total plan is based upon reaching an agreement that an equitable share of construction monies will be reserved for those schools which will eliminate racial imbalance.

A. Basic Principles

1. The degree to which the proposals seriously contribute to the reduction and elimination
of racial imbalance in terms of the number of children moved out of imbalanced schools and the extent to which the number of presently imbalanced schools will be lessened.

2. Provision for safety of the children involved.

3. Provision for other stages of school construction if total design cannot reasonably be expected at this time.

4. Integrated education beginning with primary grades.

B. Subsidiary Principles

1. The school projection indicates opening with less than fifty percent non-white pupils.

   N.B. Provision for extenuating circumstances as case of Humboldt Avenue School where commitment to recruit white pupils is expected.

2. The school has a sufficiently large enrollment to forestall future racial imbalance, i.e., carries out the "larger neighborhood school" concept of 800 or more pupils.

3. The attendance district related to the school is flexible; i.e., laid out in such a way as to avoid or forestall future racial imbalance.

4. The construction of the school permits other combinations of districts which would bring about the elimination of racial imbalance.

5. The construction project is a necessary link
in a series of moves to bring about the elimination of racial imbalance at another location, such as drawing off non-white pupils from imbalanced schools or attracting white pupils to a potentially imbalanced school.

6. The utilization of relocatable units precedent to new construction.

7. The utilization of a voluntary transfer system from closed schools precedent to new construction.

C. Provision of Adequate Supportive Data

1. Demographic projections of expected school population and racial composition thereof.

2. Capacity of the school.

3. Timing of the proposed construction.

4. Class size and pupil-teacher ratio.

5. Grade levels.

6. Map of individual school attendance lines and related descriptive statement.

N.B. Not to be confused with Boston's School District Map encompassing two or more schools per administrative district.

7. Approximate site location.

8. Distances to school.
APPENDIX E

CHAPTER 642 OF THE ACTS OF 1966
AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PUBLIC FACILITIES COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF BOSTON
APPENDIX E:

ACTS, 1966.--CHAPS. 641, 642.


Be it enacted, etc. as follows:

The first sentence of section 22 of Chapter 6 of the General Laws is hereby amended by striking out, in line 4, as appearing in section 1 of chapter 801 of the acts of 1963, the work "twelve" and inserting in place thereof the word: -fourteen.

Approved September 3, 1966

CHAP. 642. An Act Establishing in the City of Boston A Public Facilities Department, abolishing the Department of School Buildings and transferring its functions in part to said Public Facilities Department and in part to the School Committee of said city for the more efficient and economical construction and alteration of municipal buildings.

Be it enacted, etc., as follows:

SECTION 1. There shall be in the city of Boston, hereinafter called the city, a department, known as the public facilities department, hereinafter called the department, which shall be under the charge of a board, known as public facilities commission, hereinafter sometimes called the commission, consisting of three members, known as public facilities commissioners, each appointed by the mayor for a term expiring on the first Monday of the January following the next biennial municipal election at which a mayor is elected. The mayor may remove any
The commission shall elect one of its members as chairman and another as vice-chairman and shall also appoint a secretary who need not be a member of the commission. The members of the commission shall serve without compensation and shall be deemed to be special municipal employees for the purposes of chapter two hundred and sixty-eight A of the General Laws. No person shall serve as a member of the commission while holding the office of mayor, city councillor or school committee-man, but a member may simultaneously hold any other office or position under the city government or any office or position under the state or federal government.

The commission shall meet at least once each three months. All words in this act purporting to give authority to, or to direct an act by, the commission shall be construed as giving such authority or direction to a majority of the commission acting either in meeting or by a writing signed by such majority and filed with the secretary of the commission.

SECTION 2. There shall be in the department an officer, known as the director of public facilities, hereinafter called the director, appointed by the commission to serve at its pleasure, and such other personnel, including accountants, architects, engineers, construction, financial and other experts, managers and superintendents, as the commission may from time to time deem expedient; provided, however, that no person shall be elected or appointed by the commission to any office or position, other than those of chairman, vice-chairman and director, unless such person is nominated for such election or appointment by the director. Without obtaining the consent of any other board or officer or further authority than that contained in this act, the commission may fix the compensation of the director and, upon recommendation of the director but not otherwise, of all other personnel elected or appointed by it. Neither chapter thirty-one of the General Laws nor any rule made thereunder shall
apply to the director or any other personnel elected or appointed by the commission; provided, however, that said chapter thirty-one and rules made thereunder shall continue to apply to every person transferred to the service of the commission if at the time of such transfer such person holds an office or position under a permanent civil service appointment and is not still serving his probationary period; and further provided that said chapter and rules shall govern promotions among those to whom they continue to apply.

The director shall be the executive officer of the commission and shall have such powers and perform such duties as the commission shall from time to time determine. The commission may delegate to, and recall from, the director, whenever the commission deems it expedient, the power to make contracts and any or all of its other powers, as the commission may from time to time determine.

SECTION 3. It shall be the duty of the commission, and the commission shall have the exclusive power and authority:

(a) To prepare and from time to time amend a long-range capital improvement program designed to provide the necessary structures, facilities and equipment when needed or as soon thereafter as the conditions and adaptability of buildings then existing, the expected availability of buildings then being constructed and the financial resources of the city will permit. Such program shall specify the capital improvement projects to be undertaken in the ten years immediately following the year in which such program is prepared, the estimated cost of each such project, the proposed commencement and completion dates thereof, and, to the extent practicable, the proposed or alternative sites therefor. Such program shall include not only all proposed alteration, rehabilitation, modernization, change in use or demolition of structures and facilities from time to time existing.

(b) Subject to the limitations in section four of this act, to select the site for each new structure and facility and each extension of structures and facilities
from time to time existing.

(c) Subject to the limitations in section four of this act, to prepare such plans and specifications as may be necessary or advisable to construct new structures and facilities from time to time existing, and, except as otherwise provided in section eight, to make major alterations and major repairs of such structures and facilities.

(d) Subject to the provisions of sections forty-four A to forty-four L, inclusive, of chapter one hundred and forty-nine of the General Laws, to construct new structures and facilities and to reconstruct, remodel and demolish structures and facilities from time to time existing.

(e) To make major alterations and major repairs of all structures and facilities from time to time belonging to the city, other than school buildings and their yards. As used in this clause and clause (c) "major alterations" and "major repairs" shall mean respectively alterations and repairs the estimated cost of which would require compliance with sections forty-four A to forty-four L, inclusive, of chapter one hundred and forty-nine of the General Laws; and "alterations" as used in this section and in section eight means work which does not involve the whole of the structure or facility affected or involve a change in its use and which is not in connection with the construction of a new structure or facility or of an addition to a structure or facility from time to time existing or in connection with other reconstruction or remodeling of structures or facilities from time to time existing.

(f) To plan, lay out, relocate, widen, alter or discontinue, in the manner provided therefor by law, any public way or alley or any public sewer and to provide for the planting or removal of public shade trees in connection therewith whenever such way, alley or sewer is within the limits of a project of the commission.

The commission shall also have power and authority:

(i) To accept grants, gifts and other aid from the federal government or any agency thereof, the commonwealth
or any authority or agency thereof, or any charitable foundation, private corporation or individual and, notwithstanding the provisions of section fifty-three of chapter forty-four of the General Laws, to expend the same without appropriation.

(ii) To delegate any of its powers or functions to any other department or officer, board, commission or authority of the city or to any other public body politic and corporate incurring expenses which the city appropriates money to defray. Each such officer, department, board, commission, authority and public body is hereby authorized and directed to accept such delegation and exercise the power and perform the function so delegated.

(iii) To contract with a company or companies authorized to do such business in the Commonwealth for the issuance of a policy or policies insuring the city against (a) legal liability for loss or damage on account of personal injury or death or property damage caused by accident on or about any real estate which has or shall have been let or leased; (b) loss or damage to any such real estate, and legal liability for loss or damage on account of personal injury or death or property damage, caused by the breakage, explosion or rupture of, or any accidental injury to, steam boilers and pipes and containers connected therewith, any lighting, heating or cooking apparatus or their connections, fly-wheels, power wheels, and engines or other apparatus for applying or transmitting motive or electrical power, tanks or other receptacles under pressure, or their connections, or machinery of any kind on any such real estate; and (c) loss or damage to glass on any such real estate, including lettering and ornamentation thereon, and loss or damage caused by the breakage of such glass.

(iv) To engage by contract from time to time such architects, construction or financial experts, accountants, engineers, custodial or maintenance firms, and other independent contractors as may be necessary or convenient
and recommended by the director.

(v) To make and execute all contracts and instruments and do any and all other things necessary or convenient for the exercise and fulfillment of the commission's powers, duties and responsibilities pursuant to this act.

(vi) To continually investigate and study, and from time to time report in writing to the mayor on, the services the city should provide and the manner in which its functions can best be performed in all areas of existing or potential municipal endeavor and the structures, facilities and equipment necessary therefor.

SECTION 4. (A) No site shall be selected by the commission for any new structure or facility or for the extension of any structure or facility from time to time existing unless the director shall have recommended such site to the commission; and no architect, engineer or other expert shall be engaged as an independent contractor by the commission in connection with the construction, reconstruction, alteration, remodeling, or demolition of any structure or facility unless the director shall have recommended such architect, engineer or other expert to the commission for such engagement.

(B) The director shall not recommend any site to the commission for selection unless he has given every board, officer, authority or body to use the same in the first instance written notice of his proposed recommendation nor until each such board, officer, authority or body has filed with him written comments thereon or fourteen days, or such longer period as the director in his said notice may specify, have elapsed after the director's delivering said notice without his receiving such comments.

(C) The commission shall not approve the preliminary studies of any architect or engineer for any structure or facility, unless a statement of functional requirements respecting such structure or facility and such studies shall be submitted by the director to every board, officer, authority or body to use such structure or facility in the first instance nor until each such board,
officer authority or body has filed with the director written comments with respect thereto or fourteen days or such longer period as the director in his said submission may specify, have elapsed after the director's delivering such submission without his receiving such comments.

(D) Whenever the superintendent of schools in response to a notice of proposed site or a submission of architectural or engineering studies and statement of functional requirements with respect to a school building delivered by the director, as provided in this section four, disapproves such site or the plans for such school building and files within the period of time specified in such notice or submission a counterproposal of such plans, without further notice or submission the director may recommend and the commission may select the site specified in such counterproposal or approve the plans after modification in accordance with such changes; and if the commission rejects a site or changes of plans specified in such a counterproposal, the director shall submit to the commissioner of education copies of such counterproposal and all accompanying statements of the superintendent of schools together with the notice or submission delivered by the director and statements of the director in support thereof. Within thirty days after a submission to the commissioner of education pursuant to the preceding sentence, the commissioner of education shall notify the director of his selection of the site or plans as proposed by the director or as specified in such counterproposal; and such selection by the commissioner of education shall be binding upon the director and commission.

(E) The construction, reconstruction, alteration, remodeling, and demolition by the commission of structures and facilities shall be subject to the provisions of chapter one hundred and forty-three of the General Laws relative to the safety of persons in buildings, but shall not be subject to any other building, fire, garage, health or zoning law or any building, fire, garage, health or
zoning ordinance, rule or regulation applicable in the
city of Boston.

(F) In entering into contracts on behalf of the city,
the commission shall be subject to the provisions,
so far as apt, of section six of chapter four hundred
and eighteen of the acts of eighteen hundred and ninety.

SECTION 5. Every board and officer of the city,
including the school committee, and every authority and
public body politic and corporate incurring expenses
which the city appropriates money to defray, may, and
at the request of the commission shall, conduct
theoretical or action research designed to define improve-
ments in the services offered or provided, and the
functions performed, by such board, officer, authority
or body; and the school committee may prepare and from
time to time amend or supplement a report of educational
specifications and programs for the guidance of the
commission. The results of all such research and such
report of the school committee and any amendment or
supplement thereto shall be submitted to the commission,
and may also be made available to, and information
respecting the same may be disseminated to, appropriate
agencies of the city, state and federal governments.

SECTION 6. Not later than the first Monday in
February of each year, the mayor shall submit to the city
council an annual loan order making such appropriations
as may be met by loans and, when added to the appropriations
in the annual budget, will enable the undertaking in such
year of the capital improvements specified in the approved
capital improvement program to be undertaken in such year,
and thereafter may submit such supplementary loan orders
for such purposes as he may deem necessary.

SECTION 7. The city, by a two thirds vote, as
defined in section one of chapter forty-four of the
General Laws, may borrow from time to time sums not
exceeding, in the aggregate, one hundred fifteen million
dollars for the purpose of planning, designing, acquiring
land for, constructing and originally equipping structures
and facilities it is authorized to construct, and may issue
bonds or notes therefor, which shall bear on their face
the words, City of Boston, Capital Improvements Loan, Act of 1966. Each issue shall constitute a separate loan; and such loans shall be paid in not more than thirty years from their dates. Debt incurred from time to time under this act shall not be included in determining the limit of indebtedness of the city as established by law, but shall, except as herein provided, be subject to the provisions, applicable to the city, of chapter forty-four of the General Laws, exclusive of the limitation contained in the first paragraph of section seven thereof, but including the provisions of section seventeen thereof relative to temporary loans in anticipation of the issue of bonds or notes.

SECTION 8. It shall be the duty of the school committee of the city, and the school committee shall have the exclusive power and authority to perform necessary alterations, as defined in section three, maintenance and repairs of public school buildings and their yards and furnishings.

SECTION 9. Section 1 A of chapter 231 of the acts of 1906, as appearing in section 1 of chapter 208 of the acts of 1965, is hereby amended by inserting after the second paragraph the following paragraph:--

Subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of section one, the school committee shall also elect a chief structural engineer, a senior structural engineer, and not more than three structural engineers, who shall severally hold office until removed by the school committee. The chief structural engineer shall constitute the awarding authority within the meaning of sections forty-four A to forty-four L, inclusive, of chapter one hundred and forty-nine of the General Laws with respect to contracts for the alteration or repair of public school buildings. At such times as the chief structural engineer is absent or unable from any cause to perform his duties or as there is a vacancy in the office of chief structural engineer, the senior structural engineer, or in case of his absence or disability or of a vacancy
in such office such structural engineer as the school committee shall from time to time designate, shall act as chief structural engineer.

SECTION 10. Section 3 of chapter 486 of the acts of 1909, as most recently amended by section 1 of chapter 604 of the acts of 1941, is hereby further amended by inserting after the third sentence the following sentence:—The city council shall take definite action on any supplementary appropriation order for the public facilities department by adopting, reducing or rejecting it within sixty days after it is filed with the city clerk; and in the event of their failure so to do, such supplementary appropriation order as submitted by the mayor shall be in effect as if formally adopted by the city council and approved by the mayor.

SECTION 11. Section 14 of said chapter 486 is hereby amended by striking out the last sentence and inserting in place thereof the following sentence:—The provisions of this section shall not apply to the school committee, the public facilities commission, or any official by law appointed by the governor.

SECTION 12. Said chapter 486 is hereby amended by striking out section 31 and inserting in place thereof the following sections:—

Section 31. Without obtaining the consent of any other board or officer or further authority than that contained in this act, the public facilities commission, in the name of the city, may acquire by purchase, lease, gift, devise or otherwise for any municipal purpose a fee simple absolute or any lesser interest in any land, public or private, within the limits of the city, including air rights and riparian rights, and may take by eminent domain under chapter seventy-nine or chapter eighty A of the General Laws any such fee or interest except in parks and playgrounds and except also, unless there be express consent, in lands belonging to or covered by contract with the United States, the commonwealth, the Boston Housing Authority or the Boston Redevelopment Authority. Whenever the price proposed to
be paid for any land to be acquired for any municipal purpose is more than twenty-five per cent higher than its average assessed valuation during the previous three years, such land shall not be acquired by purchase, but shall be taken by eminent domain. No land shall be taken until an appropriation by loan or otherwise for the general purpose for which land is needed shall have been made by the mayor and city council by a two thirds vote of all its members; nor shall a price be paid in excess of the appropriation, unless a larger sum is awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction. Nothing in this section shall affect in any way the powers and duties of the real property board under chapter four hundred and seventy-four of the acts of nineteen hundred and forty-six as now or hereafter amended, or of the public improvement commission as successor in function to the board of street commissioners under chapter four hundred and thirty-seven of the acts of eighteen hundred and ninety-three or chapter four hundred and twenty-six of the acts of eighteen hundred and ninety-seven or chapter three hundred and ninety-three of the acts of nineteen hundred and six, as severally now or hereafter amended, or acts in addition thereto.

Section 31 A. Without obtaining the consent of any board or officer other than the mayor, and without interdepartmental payment, the public facilities commission, without further authority, may transfer any land now or hereafter belonging to the city, except parks and playgrounds, but including school lands and land acquired by foreclosure of tax title, from the municipal purpose, if any, to which it is devoted at the time of such transfer to any other specific municipal purpose, and may also transfer the care, custody, management and control of any such land, except parks and playgrounds, but including school land and land acquired by foreclosure of tax title, from such board or officer, including itself, as at the time of such transfer may have the same to such other board or officer, including itself, as it may determine.

Section 31 B. Without obtaining the consent of any board or officer other than the mayor, the public facilities commission, without further authority, may, for such rent or price and upon such terms as said
commission may deem appropriate, lease or sublease or sell, grant, and convey any surplus land, as hereinafter defined, to the federal government or any agency thereof, the commonwealth or an political sub-division or authority thereof or, if notice of intent to lease or sell such land or buildings together with a statement of when and where written details of such proposed lease or sale may be examined shall first have been publicly advertised in the City Record once a week for two successive weeks, to any person, firm, corporation or trust. "Surplus land" as used in this section, shall be deemed to mean land, buildings and real estate now or hereafter belonging to the city and in the care, custody, management and control of said commission (except parks and playgrounds) which at the time of such lease or sale are or have been used for school purposes, or which have been acquired by foreclosure of tax titles or acquired under section eighty of chapter sixty of the General Laws, or which irrespective of the manner or time of acquisition, are not held by the city for a specific purpose, or which have been transferred to the commission by the city council.

SECTION 13. Section 2 of chapter 224 of the acts of 1936 is hereby amended by striking out clause (a), as appearing in section 1 of chapter 117 of the acts of 1949.

SECTION 14. Section 17E of chapter 452 of the acts of 1948 as appearing in section 1 of chapter 376 of the acts of 1951, is hereby amended by striking out, in lines 3 and 4, the words "other than for school purposes" by striking out, in lines 17 and 18, the words "other than for school purposes", and also by striking out in line 26, the words "the amount of land to be sold or".

SECTION 14A. Notwithstanding the provisions of the third paragraph of section one A of chapter two hundred and thirty-one of the acts of nineteen hundred and six, as appearing in section nine of this act, the incumbents of the position of chief structural engineer and of the position of senior structural engineer in the school department of the city of Boston when this act takes effect shall, without nomination or appointment, become
respectively the chief structural engineer and the senior structural engineer provided for by said third paragraph, and the civil service law and rules shall continue to apply to such incumbents, but not to their successors in office; and the deputy superintendents in the department of school buildings of said city when this act takes effect shall, without nomination or appointment, become the structural engineers provided for by said third paragraph, and they, but not their successors in office, shall hold office subject to sections forty-three and forty-five of chapter thirty-one of the General Laws.

Neither the chief structural engineer, the senior structural engineer or any such deputy superintendent shall suffer any reduction in compensation or any impairment of his retirement, vacation or sick leave rights by reason of the passage of this act.

SECTION 15. The board of commissioners of school buildings of the city, the department of school buildings of the city, and the offices of the superintendent of construction, and of the deputy superintendents, in said department are hereby abolished. All property in the care and custody of said department is hereby transferred to the care and custody of the school department of the city. Section six of chapter two hundred and forty-one of the acts of eighteen hundred and seventy-five, as amended, chapter four hundred and seventy-three of the acts of nineteen hundred and one, as amended, and chapter three hundred and fifty-one of the acts of nineteen hundred and twenty-nine, as amended, are hereby repealed.

Every person holding in said department of school buildings on the effective date of this act an office or position subject to the civil service law and rules shall be transferred without civil service examination or registration to a similar office or position under the school committee of the city without reduction in rank or compensation or impairment of his civil service rights or his retirement, seniority, vacation or sick leave rights; and his service shall be deemed to have been continuous to the same extent as if the abolition of said department of school buildings had not taken place. No person holding an
office or position in said department of school buildings on the effective date of this act shall suffer any impairment of his retirement or pension rights by reason of the abolition of said department of school buildings.

Approved September 3, 1966.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
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