CITYWIDE URBAN DESIGN POLICIES

by

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Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in May 1981, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Urban and Regional Planning

ABSTRACT

This study proposes citywide policy planning as a way of improving the practice of urban design in American cities. Citywide policy planning involves the formulation of citywide urban design goals, objectives, and policies to guide decisions affecting the physical form and character of the city. This activity also prepares for the official adoption of citywide urban design policies and helps begin their implementation. A series of background studies covering the entire city usually supports this activity.

Despite the fundamental importance of what a city looks like and how it feels to many people, urban design has been seldom extended beyond the conceptualization of individual projects and into the arena of policy planning to be carried out citywide. At the same time, urban design has been largely divorced from the rationality that has been common in city planning: articulating goals, making decision-making criteria explicit, informing decisions with the empirical data, etc. A planning report survey conducted as part of this study confirms these observations: only several cities have ever studied their form and character systematically; among major cities, only a few have ever formulated citywide urban design policies. The promise of citywide policy planning is great; its practicability and merit are not yet clear.

Chapter I through III report case studies of citywide policy planning efforts in three cities. In Minneapolis and San Francisco, citywide urban design policies have been actually formulated and officially adopted. In Dallas, staff efforts fell short of policy formulation, but a series of citywide studies were carried out.

Chapter IV discusses a set of common themes emerging from the case studies. Urban designers in the three cities expressed four kinds of intent which as a set distinguish their approaches from more traditional ways of practicing urban design: improving the perceptual and behavioral quality of the physical environment; studying citywide issues and overall city strategies; responding to the needs of the people who live in the city and its neighborhoods; and increasing overall rationality in approach to urban design. Of strategic importance to those urban designers were the development of an empirical data base and the formulation of citywide urban design policies.

(i)
Chapter V discusses the benefits of citywide policy planning. Potential benefits are reviewed in terms of fundamental functions, uses, implementation, and effects. Cases in the three cities are not definitive, but overall successes with citywide policy planning, development projects and design controls that worked within a framework of citywide urban design policies, problems that emerged in specific situations without initial policy discussions, and the potential for improving present practice by having citywide urban design policies formulated and agreed upon, together, provide initial confirmation as to the actual benefits of conducting citywide policy planning.

The three case studies generally support the practicability of citywide policy planning in certain situations. Chapter VI reviews the factors that affect the practicability, use, and effect of citywide policy planning: the theories and techniques of city design policy formulation; the governmental context; and the context of citizen participation and the role government urban designers play in the planning process. Various difficulties as experienced in the three cities should not entirely prohibit citywide policy planning.

The last part of the thesis speculates where citywide policy planning could be useful and where it might be applied. Not all cities in which this activity could be beneficial would support it. The political and business leaders of the community might even see the very purpose of citywide policy planning (e.g. to guide the development of the perceptual form of the city) inconsistent with what they consider the important business of their community (e.g. to remove constraints on real estate development).

At present, there is much uncertainty as to whether citywide policy planning can be successfully practiced in each city. Each urban designer entering this new area of practice must necessarily search his own way as part of efforts to devise the process of urban design that is adapted to his community.

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Much of the literature review for this study was conducted at the Main Library of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., the Municipal Information Library of the City of Minneapolis, the Management Services Library of the City of Dallas, the Loeb Library of Harvard University, and the Rotch Library of MIT. I would like to thank the people who helped me in these libraries.

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INTRODUCTION

Problems of Traditional Urban Design Practice

Urban design defined generally is a discipline concerned with and the process of giving form to ensembles of structure, to whole neighborhoods, or to the city at large so as to make an urban area comprehensible, functional, and aesthetically pleasing (Abrams, 1971: 329). The primary concern of urban design could be just form giving, while I believe its true concern has to do with human experience in urban environment -- something more than aesthetics or visual quality alone. The origin of urban design can be traced back in the history of cities. However, the concept of urban design as a public planning function to be assumed by city governments, with which this study is concerned, is relatively new in this country; it began to emerge only around the late 60s to the early 70s (Urbonas, 1969; Barnett, 1974; and Kaiser et al., 1974).¹

Traditionally, urban design has been practiced dominantly as project planning or project design. Project planning or "project design" (Lynch, 1968: 249) means planning or design of a defined geographical area in which there is a definite group of clients, a concrete program, and a foreseeable time of completion. This type of activity assumes the existence of effective controls over the significant aspects of environment. Examples are a housing project, an urban renewal project and, perhaps, a small new town. (Note that "project planning" or "project design" here is not the development of a project management plan or work program.) While most urban designers are strong in project design, project design-oriented practice has drawn various criticisms. At first, criticisms to
"disjointed-incrementalism" in city planning generally apply. Without an overall framework to see to it that individual projects are carried out in view of citywide intentions for the form and character of the city, economic efficiency and overall rationality in approach are questionable. The effect of one project often detracts from that of another. Long and repeated public controversies over individual projects, studies and restudies, and delays in project execution often result. Resources could be wasted in this way.

Second, urban design carried out in individual projects is usually no more than a stock of techniques to get development projects done or an art of giving form to projects, schematic or detailed. Without explicit definition of the quality of the environment to be pursued, there is no assurance that projects really make the environment better even if certain general values such as aesthetics and functional efficiency are implicit in the mind of designers. More generally, urban designers designing projects more often than not neglect or fail to articulate goals or value premises of urban design. Goals or value premises, if articulated, are often dissociated from actual decisions. The effect of this is arbitrariness of criteria for decision-making. Without explicit criteria, it is difficult to have reasonable public debate. Urban design in this sense remains to be a personal art of professional urban designers. Superficiality of analysis and lack of accumulation of real knowledge are often the result.

Allied with the special importance urban designers give to their artistic skills is a lack of real concern with the people who live or use the place, the neighborhood, and the city. Without faithful efforts to secure inputs from groups of people which have a stake in the project, there is no assurance that urban design will be responsive to the needs and wishes of the people of the city. Good design (aesthetics functional efficiency) from a professional point of view is often unperceived by people whom the project is supposed to serve. Urban designers in this way invite public criticism that their pursuit is "elitist" and irrelevant.

In projects, planning goals/objectives and basic concepts are often imposed by others because projects are conceived as means of
implementing more comprehensive plans. Thus, project design creates little demand for articulating broad goals or objectives for the urban environment or specific criteria for decision-making. Moreover, good urban design demands artistic skills of designers and their professional devotion. Demands to serve the wishes of people and to make design criteria explicit so as to allow broad participation in decision-making are not inconsistent with this demand but they are often lost, subjected to all-or-nothing choices. In this way, problems with traditional practice derive partly from the nature of projects and partly from the nature of urban design. However, what is really in question is the context in which project design has been carried out (e.g. without any citywide policy framework).

There are few new constructs in urban design that depart from the project design-oriented bias. The notion of urban design as public policy (Barnett, 1974) is one. Observing its practice in New York City, it has operated in two ways: district-level design controls (e.g. special district zoning) and, to a lesser extent, citywide design controls to deal with specific systems or areas of concern (e.g. housing quality: Urban Design Council of the City of New York, 1973). In either case, it is implementation (development of specific design controls and its enactment) rather than policy planning that has been emphasized. Thus, "urban design as public policy" in fact has been urban design as public "programs" or "regulation" (cf. policy as program, Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: vix). With weak emphasis on policy planning, responsiveness to the overall needs of people may be questioned as in project design-oriented practice. Being incrementalism in its own way, overall rationality and effect on the overall form and character of the city are doubtful. The construct of architectural and environmental programming (including user needs assessment) that has been emerging from around the mid 70s is another. This represents efforts to make the design of physical settings responsive to the needs and wishes of people who live or use them. However, we see little application of this concept at a scale of major district or city as a whole. Most of the research has taken place for project or system design (cf. some efforts by Alexander et al., 1979).
At present, we lack a general-state-of-the-art survey of urban
design practice in this country to confirm these impressions of the
"domination of project-centered urban design practice". (What we
have at present are a few studies of cases that are exemplary rather
than common or dominant (e.g. Hack, 1980; Ray, 1979). However,
criticisms outlined above seem to correctly identify the basic nature
of traditional and dominant ways of practicing urban design.

Citywide Policy Planning as a Response

There would be many ways to respond to these problems commonly
associated with urban design practice on an individual project or
control basis. But, as a set, they seem to be best dealt with by
introducing into the government urban design program "citywide policy
planning" which reflects important concerns about urban design. Those
concerns should include at least the following:

- Urban design has not dealt with the perceptual and behavioral
  quality of the physical environment broadly;
- Urban design has not dealt with citywide issues and overall
  city strategies for urban design directly;
- Urban design has not been responsive to the needs of the
  people who live in the city and its neighborhoods (suggesting
  a need to incorporate surveys, citizen participation, and
  other means of eliciting inputs from citizens and communicating
  with them); and
- Urban design has been largely divorced from the rationality
  that has been common in city planning for some time, such
  as articulating goals, making decision-making criteria
  explicit, and informing decisions with the empirical data.

I use "citywide policy planning" loosely here. I only suggest that
its core should be the formulation of city design policy without sug-
gesting its boundaries. City design policy is a set of goals,
objectives, and policies to guide decisions affecting the physical
from and character of the city. Ideally, it should be adopted as
official city policy but it could be internal policy of the planning
agency made explicit and used publicly. Closely allied with the
formulation of city design policy are activities 1) to prepare for
its official adoption by the decision-making body (the planning
commission or the city council or both) and 2) to begin its imple-
mentation. Implementation can be made part of citywide policy planning,
but it does not need to be. This is because of the nature of policy implementation; implementation has a logic of its own (the politics of implementation). Moreover, implementation does not need to be carried out citywide while most of essential activities in citywide policy planning take place on a citywide basis.\(^5\) A series of studies would be carried out citywide or perhaps in an additive way encompassing the entire city. Their purposes are to support city design policy formulation and to allow informed decisions on city development by urban designers, decision-makers and, perhaps, citizens at large.

The promise of citywide policy planning seems great. At first, it is a response to major criticisms to the kind of urban design people have seen in many places to date. In fact, its important benefits seem to derive from the very way it responds to those criticisms. For example, formulating policies and subjecting them to public discussion following the formal process of decision-making in the community means better incorporation of the various interests of the community in planning and development (response to the needs of people). Once adopted and used as a decision framework (overall city strategies for urban design), city design policy would guide public and private actions to further efforts to achieve community goals. As public statement of what a good city is in the community (explicit decision-making criteria), it would put public and private interests on notice of the intent of the city (Kent's (1964) "communication"), increase public awareness of urban design-related issues, and stimulate public and private improvement activities ("education"). A bonus of such an effort would be increased staff experience and a better basis for project-level urban design (e.g. data bases and informed citizens).

An idea of extending urban design to the arena of policy planning to be carried out on a citywide basis is ambitious; its practicability and actual merit are not yet clear. There seem to be many obstacles, including the everpresent danger of duplicating efforts of more traditional city planning in policy setting and the political reality which generally favors short-range, opportunistic programming. Moreover, urban design has problems of its own:

- Relatively undeveloped theories and techniques of urban design; technical issues of policy formulation (e.g. How
can urban designers define the "elusive" qualities of the environment? How can a policy be a decision guide specific enough to choose among alternatives at hand, yet general enough to deal with numerous project proposals over years?

- Issues of the city government as it defines the status, role and client of urban design or urban designers (e.g. How can urban designers deal with city officials if the latter view urban design only as a tool of getting development projects done, and argue for citywide policy planning? How can they justify a new set of government controls — various design controls which would stem from city design policy as well as city design policy itself as a form of control through communication?); and

- Issues of citizen participation and the role of government urban designers in relating to interests of various groups of people in the city (e.g. How can urban designers discuss design-related issues with lay citizens if they are not supportive of good urban design or appreciative of urban designers' principles of good design?).

Questions thus arise: Is citywide policy planning as suggested here actually happening in cities? Does the promise of citywide policy planning match the actual merit of conducting it in practice? Is citywide policy planning practicable in cities given various obstacles? How have urban designers attempting citywide policy planning dealt with those obstacles? How can they make citywide policy planning work? This study is an attempt to answer these questions in a general way on the basis of in-depth case studies of citywide policy planning efforts in three cities and to develop a framework for studying citywide policy planning. A section to follow at first examines citywide policy planning in its historical context and in theory.

Citywide Policy Planning: An Emerging Area of Practice

Historical context

In the early development of American cities, urban design, especially aesthetics, was given little consideration. Sanitation, drainage, transportation, street extension, and police and fire protection were among more important concerns of growing cities. In the mid 19th century, an interest began to emerge in romantic landscapes. Frederic Law Olmsted designed Central Park in New York
City in the 1860s and landscaped the grounds of the Capitol in Washington, D.C. in the early 1870s, but without an immediate impact in stimulating formal beautification programs in cities (Wrenn, 1980). But an idea of designing a city as a whole, or at least a major part of it, is not totally alien to American cities. The initial pattern of development in cities like Philadelphia and Savannah was set by the design of great minds (William Penn and John Oglethorpe).

The Columbian Exposition of 1893 in Chicago gave birth to the City Beautiful Movement. The depression of the 1890s delayed the movement for a while but, with recovering economy, the early 20th century brought grand schemes of street and park systems to many cities throughout this century. Cities then lost their ambition in the face of financial difficulties and shifting national priorities during the two great wars, economic depression, progress of suburbanization and deterioration of downtown and inner-city neighborhoods in the post-war era.

Major public efforts to design cities came back with the federal urban renewal program in the 50s and the 60s. Exercise of strong public power -- condemnation and redevelopment -- enabled good urban design in some large areas of cities but results were not always enviable. Big-scale architecture often created sterile environments. The process of urban renewal projects was often problematic, and design programs seldom made value premises and reasoning about the basis for specific forms explicit. The art of urban design remained largely a domain of personal skill of urban designers. More importantly, the influence of urban renewal projects on the overall design of cities was limited except in a few cities where a "critical mass" had been created by massive public investment. As a positive impact, urban renewal created new opportunities for architectural design and stimulated the development of imaginary schemes to renew cities or create entirely new ones. Urban design became viewed among architects as the art of relating a single building to surrounding ones and streets in the 60s. English townscape designers, especially Gordon Cullen (1960) helped architects to expand their views and to think about buildings as they related to streets, plazas, and other buildings. However, the art of designing townscape remained unrelated to broader
social concerns which city planners had to deal with in guiding the
development of the visual form of the city.

Recent interest in city-scale urban design owes much to Kevin
demonstrated that a seemingly elusive subject of urban design could
be informed by data and discussed as a matter of public interest.
As a result, the role of urban design in city planning became more
legitimate. The book provided urban designers with a host of ammuni-
tion to deal with urban design as a matter of public policy -- a set
of clear premises (legibility, or imageability; identity, structure,
and meaning), models of city form and image of the environment (made up
of elements such as landmarks, paths, and nodes), design concepts
(e.g. strategically locating highrises as man-made landmarks), survey
methods (especially, image map drawing) and, most importantly, a new
way of viewing the city environment and a new philosophy of urban
design.

The federal Community Renewal Program gave government urban
designers the first opportunities to try out city-scale urban design.
A few cities thus embarked on citywide urban design studies in the
mid 60s (Brookline, Mass. -- Lynch, 1965; Minneapolis, 1965-70). This
program, however, was not entirely supportive of systematic citywide
studies because of its emphasis in identifying short-range improvement
needs to deal with physical deterioration in selected areas (urban
renewal, rehabilitation, code enforcement, etc.).

The major impetus for citywide urban design studies came with
an extension of the federal Comprehensive Planning Assistance Program
(the so-called 701 Program) to large cities during the late 60s and
the early 70s. With few strings concerning the substance of compre-
hensive planning, the program allowed several cities to conduct
innovative citywide urban design studies (Oakland, Ca., 1968, 1969;
Jacksonville, Fla., 1971, 1972; Los Angeles, Ca., 1971; San Francisco,
Ca., 1968-70, 1971; Seattle, Wash., 1971; and Dallas, Tex., 1974;
cf. Appendix).

The federal Highway Beautification Program, beginning in 1965,
encouraged many cities, large and small, to prepare citywide beauti-
fication (or appearance) plans and programs. Some cities incorporated
their plans as an element of their comprehensive plans, but their scope was quite limited, largely determined by the federal guidelines for funding. Moreover, the emphasis in beautification and appearance studies was on the preparation of a short-range improvement program and they seldom involved systematic analysis and articulation of a set of goals, objectives, and policies. This program is nevertheless significant because it raised the level of public support for city beautification nationwide and created a ground for urban designers' initiative to plan on a citywide basis.

Nation-wide interest in city beautification, increased public awareness of the quality of urban life, and grass-root efforts for historic preservation, among other things, convinced some cities that assuring the quality of their city environment should be a high priority concern of city government (e.g. San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 132). A notion of urban design as an arena for public policy (Barnett, 1974) began to emerge in this context. In the face of immediate demands, the primary attention of government urban designers was directed primarily to short-range programs, opportunistic intervention, and downtown where important public and private investments were taking place. Citywide policy planning seldom happened. While important innovation in techniques of urban design control (e.g. incentive zoning, special district zoning, and transfer of development rights) took place to support the work of urban designers, the theoretical and methodological underpinning of citywide policy planning had to come at first from outside the group of new government urban designers (cf. Lynch, 1960).

Theories

Until recently, very little has been known about city-scale urban design. It is thus not clear if citywide policy planning is happening in cities. The literature that has existed is small, offering nothing more than a brief account of the best-known urban design reports and plans (Lynch, 1976; Kaiser et al., 1974; Gulak, 1978; Southworth and Southworth, 1973; Jacobs, 1971). Only few people have examined implementation and use of citywide urban design plans (O'Hern, 1973; Staten, 1973; and Svirsky, 1973). A few case reports have recently been
published to offer us in-depth accounts of cases that are considered to be exemplary in this country (Jacobs, 1978a, b; Lu, 1979; cf. Skaff, 1978). While some attempt has been made to develop a general, theoretical framework (Lu, 1979; Lynch, 1968, 1976, including a brief discussion on "area policy"; Kent, 1964, including a discussion on the civic design element of the urban general plan), theory of city-scale urban design is yet to be developed with more cross-case knowledge. Theories in related fields (including city planning, especially comprehensive planning and planning theory) are of limited use given little substantive knowledge we have on urban design practice at a scale of city. 6

In the past several years, we have been observing two contrasting trends in urban design without knowing what is actually happening in cities. On the one hand, the 70s saw increasing emphasis on neighborhoods, incrementalism, and opportunistic improvements in city planning. Some observers of the planning scene thus conclude that it is not the time for citywide things today. On the other hand, the 70s was a decade of rediscovery of comprehensive planning. Some states mandated municipal comprehensive plans and created a good ground for increasing faith in comprehensive planning (California, Minnesota, and Florida). Not only a renewed interest in citywide urban design plans came from those who led the most successful urban design programs in this country (Jacobs, 1978a, b; and Lu, 1979), but also there are some observers who saw citywide urban design studies as part of process-oriented approach a cutting edge of environmental quality management practice (Kaiser et al., 1974). In the face of these contradictory descriptions, there is a need to survey the general state of the art of citywide urban design studies and plans at first.

The general state of the art of citywide urban design studies

In the summer of 1979, I conducted a survey of citywide urban design study reports and plans prepared in American cities since 1960. (The results of this survey are discussed in more detail in Appendix.) This survey generally confirmed observations Lynch (1976) and others made: among major U.S. cities, only a few cities have ever
formulated a citywide urban design plan or a set of goals, objectives, and policies that are more than a beautification plan and incorporated it into their decision-making process by officially adopting it. Only several cities have conducted in-depth studies of their physical form and character on a citywide basis.

Traditionally, urban designers have been preoccupied with studies of the quality of the existing physical environment. They have seldom attempted to define the desirable urban design management system (decision-making processes) and explored ways of achieving or approaching it. Worse, many citywide urban design studies stopped short of formulating policies to define the desirable quality of the environment and chart action strategies after completing surveys of the existing form and character of the city. Changing priorities of the city and resource problems of the planning agency, among other problems, have often prevented urban designers from going one step further. The relatively undeveloped theories and techniques of city-scale urban design (e.g. without any standard procedure) must have made it difficult for urban designers to know what to do next. As a result, resources tended to be allocated to surveys and analyses at a cost of neglecting policy and action strategy formulation. In some cases, too much emphasis was placed on simply publishing the data. In others, urban designers considered it inappropriate to define the desirable quality of the environment for their city whether in general policy terms or as specific blueprints. (Defining the quality of the environment was often equated to drawing up a blueprint of a future city.) Numerous beautification and appearance plans may be included in this category. They surveyed the city's appearance, diagnosed problems, resources, and potentials, and directly went on to prescribe specific actions to be taken within the next three to five years. General, long-range urban design policies for the city were seldom formulated.

Among several exemplary cities, Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Dallas have emerged as cities which deserve in-depth case studies. These cities have tried major citywide urban design studies, putting real faith in policy planning. The planning staff in San Francisco viewed the city-wide urban design plan defining the quality of the environment as the beginning of their urban design program. As the
result of two years of concentrated efforts, they completed such a plan and sought and received early adoption of it by the planning commission as an element of the comprehensive plan (the Urban Design Plan of 1971). In Minneapolis, citywide policy planning began almost at the beginning of its urban design program (the CIP Urban Design Study, 1965-ca. 1970, following the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study, 1961-64). A citywide urban design plan was drafted in an adoptable form in 1971, although its adoption had to wait until 1976 (the Visual Design Framework). The Visual Quality Plan recently adopted incorporates policies for design management as well as those for the physical environment. The urban design staff in Dallas have not gone beyond the survey and analysis phase in their citywide studies. Without studies specifically aimed at formulation of city design policy, Dallas has been without overall citywide policy planning (my definition). However, the staff made much effort to introduce citywide policy planning into their urban design program throughout the 70s: they continued their work to prepare the citywide urban design framework which would set forth policies for the quality of the environment. Also, the staff did policy planning in a few specific areas of concern (e.g. escarpment area design guidelines and flood plain management policies). Articles in professional and popular journals suggest that these cities have built their own urban design capability and have been achieving good results in urban design for some ten years or so.

The in-depth case studies which follow do not cover cities without any citywide policy planning effort. This is because situations with and without citywide urban design policies ought to be compared in cases in which it is practicable in one way or another. In a context in which citywide policy planning is very difficult to practice, problems with the urban design program might not be attributable to the lack of citywide policy planning. The same context could make the practice of urban design difficult and create those problems; citywide policy planning might not make differences. Without a theory defining situations that demand and support citywide policy planning at the outset, I have chosen cities in which it has been tried.
The Organization of This Thesis

Chapters I through III report cases of citywide policy planning efforts in the three cities (Chapters I - III). Attention is given to the theories and techniques and their evolution over time, results, issues of practice, and factors that might have affected the urban designer's approach and the effectiveness of citywide policy planning. Chapter IV discusses common themes that have emerged from the three case studies. Citywide policy planning for the physical environment has been actually tried fully in Minneapolis and San Francisco and partially in Dallas. Chapter V examines the actual benefits of having citywide urban design policies formulated and debated, contrasting experience in the three case cities with the promise of citywide policy planning. Cases in the three cities provide initial confirmation as to the merit of conducting citywide policy planning. To describe the promise, this chapter develops a general framework for defining the effectiveness (use and effect) of citywide policy planning.

The three case studies generally support the practicability of citywide policy planning in certain situations. The last chapter considers important factors that affect the practicability and effectiveness of citywide policy planning in terms of 1) the theories and techniques of city design policy formulation, 2) the governmental context, and 3) the context of citizen participation and the role of government urban designers in the planning process. While three case studies are not sufficient to make broad generalizations, it is possible to speculate where citywide policy planning might be useful and where it could be applied. The final section of this thesis thus discusses the prospect for citywide policy planning.
CHAPTER I
CASE STUDY 1: CITYWIDE POLICY PLANNING IN MINNEAPOLIS

Introduction

Minneapolis has been known for its urban design achievements for more than a decade. The Nicollet Mall project designed by Lawrence Halprin is the first and best-known example: it has become one of the most successful examples of downtown malls in this country, contributed greatly to downtown revitalization, and created a sense of place, beauty, and identity in the downtown retail area. A skyway system, a series of second-level pedestrian passageways to link retail and office spaces in the downtown core has grown into the most extensive system in this country and become a model of similar development in other cities. While it is a superb response to a severe Minnesota climate during the winter, it is not just an expression of pragmatism of Minneapolitans. It created a marvelous center piece of Minneapolis urban design as well: the Crystal Court at the foot of the IDS Tower designed by Phillip Johnson in the early 70s. Finally, Metro Center '85, one of the most successful downtown development plans in this country, received much attention from the professional community.

On the other hand, little is known about citywide studies which underlie Minneapolis' approach to urban design (cf. a brief account in Lynch, 1976: 82; Lu, 1979). We learn how the city's recent comprehensive planning effort began in the late 50s through Alan Altshuler's (1965) case study but little is known about urban design within the context of city planning in the 60s and the 70s. This case study is an attempt to illustrate how systematic studies carried out citywide to formulate city design policy and to make the process of urban design work better during the formative era of the Minneapolis urban design program helped the development of the theories and techniques
of urban design in this city and prepared a ground for integrating urban design into the process of planning and development.

The Minneapolis urban design program is quite complex. It has evolved over some twenty years through several citywide and district-level studies and programs. To place its evolution in a perspective, I suggest two phases of development in the theories and techniques of urban design in this city. The first phase began with a few urban designers in the planning department (to be called the urban design staff hereafter) applying their new idea of urban design at first at a planning district level (the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study, 1961-64) and, then, at a citywide scale (the CIP Urban Design Study, 1965-ca. 1970). In this phase, the theories and techniques of urban design were developed primarily in respect to the technical aspect of city design policy formulation -- methods of studying the quality of environment, design concepts, and form of city design plan. The publication of the second downtown plan Metro Center '85 in 1970 marked the culmination of this phase of development.

During the first half of the 70s, the urban design staff did studies and projects identified in the CIP Urban Design Study (reiterated in Metro Center '85). Systematic studies were no more carried out at a scale of district or beyond. Efforts to formulate city design policy were made without further studies of the quality of environment and research about citizen concerns. Meantime, the context of urban design changed gradually. In 1976, three events took place and made the need for further development of the theories and techniques of urban design clear: At first, the Visual Design Framework proposal developed over five years had to be completely revised as a result of intensive neighborhood review in a several-month period. Second, the master design district ordinance proposal did not take off the ground after several rounds of revisions to incorporate neighborhood groups' wishes. Finally, the Minneapolis voters approved administrative reorganization to move the planning department away from the city coordinator's development function. The second phase of development should allow the urban design staff to increase their sophistication in ways of communicating with people and influencing decisions of a plural set of actors inside and outside city government. This phase
has just begun through the Metro Center '90 program, 1977-78, and comprehensive planning for the 80s.

City planning behind the progress

Minneapolis is a mature Midwestern city of 434,400 (as of 1970) with its relatively small territory (59 square miles) confined by surrounding communities. Together with Saint Paul, the city forms the heart of the Twin Cities metropolitan area, a region with 2.0 million people. The city was initially established in 1849 at St. Anthony on the east bank of the Mississippi River and grew into a regional center for lumbering and milling with the coming of railroads during 1860-75. The city today is the economic center for the entire region, and the home for major national industries and businesses. Minneapolis as the "City of Lakes" owes much to landscape architect H. W. S. Cleveland's visionary master park plan of the late 1880s which guided the subsequent acquisition and development of the land around lakes. The city's park system linking lake, creek, and river areas has a profound effect on the form and image of the city today. (Minneapolis P&D, 1970a: 10)

The City Planning Commission was created in 1919. The commission occupied a rather prominent place in city government in the 1920s but a series of events including the Depression and the withdrawal of businessmen from civic activity after the 1933-34 strike brought an end to the period of prominence. (Altshuler, 1965: 200) Plans were prepared to accommodate the already established city form to new needs -- especially automobile traffic -- but their impact was very little before World War II. (Minneapolis P&D, 1970a)

In the early 50s, Minneapolis was behind the progress of city planning in this country. The role of the planning department was in many ways vague and city officials were not supportive of long-range planning. This owed much to the very design of the Minneapolis government. The city's somewhat antiquated government structure was determined by the 1920 charter which provided for a weak mayor-strong council form of government. Highly decentralized nature of city government was paralleled by extremely weak political party organization. (Altshuler, 1965: 191-2)
Planning department rejuvenation

Minneapolis' downtown saw its speculative peaks in the 1920s. The Depression and World War II halted investment and business activity in downtown began to lag behind other places in the region from around the mid 50s. Inner-city decay and other factors contributed to migration of city residents to the suburbs. Spacious outlying areas attracted the city's industries and businesses away as well.

In August 1955, concerned business leaders formed the Downtown Council and began an impending campaign for downtown revitalization. Studies to assess the effect of freeways on the Minneapolis CBD followed its initial attention to the Lower Loop urban renewal project. City planning began to draw sudden attention in this context (Altshuler, 1965: 200). George Barton and Associates working with a city planning consultant Frederic T. Aschman evaluated the State Highway Department's proposals from a local point of view and found deficiency in the city's planning programs that would be necessary in harmonizing freeways with the city's street system. Barton and Aschman thus convinced the Downtown Council and the city engineer the role city planners ought to play. Subsequently, Aschman did a study of the general state of city planning in the city, recommending the city to strengthen the planning department. Among his recommendations were hiring of a planning director and fivefold budget increase. This brought the city a successful administrator-planner Lawrence Irvin from Columbus, Ohio. (Altshuler, 1965: 203, 205)

Irvin came to Minneapolis on March 1958. He was with a ready-made constituency: the business community had induced several prominent businessmen to accept membership of the planning commission. There were no vocal opponents. (Altshuler, 1965: 205) The planning director saw his small planning staff and budget (increased three times) further increased over the next few years.

Urban design in early comprehensive planning efforts

The planning director at first concentrated on a downtown plan for the business community and saw the completion of the first downtown plan, First Report on the Central Minneapolis Plan, in 1959 (Minneapolis CPC,
1959b). Studies were also initiated within six months of his arrival to develop a new citywide zoning ordinance, a new citywide industrial land use plan, and three neighborhood plans. Neither the business community nor the city council was particularly interested in comprehensive planning but the planning director made an early commitment to comprehensive planning and a program to revise the city's official plan (comprehensive plan or master plan) was initiated in 1961. According to Lu (1979: 7), the history of planning in Minneapolis after the planning department rejuvenation closely followed the national trend: the first focus on public housing; then on urban renewal; then on freeway systems, joint land use-transportation planning, and community renewal programs in the mid 60s; and, finally, on model cities programs, social services and health care planning, and human resources development in the late 60s and the early 70s.

It was only in the early 70s that a separate urban design office was established within the planning department and "urban designer" became official position in Minneapolis. However, a few urban designers (including Weiming Lu, principal planner) began to work as part of the planning staff back in the late 50s. Planning for the downtown area already incorporated urban design considerations. For example, Goals for Central Minneapolis: Its Functions and Design (Minneapolis CPC, 1959a) included "appearance" along with land use and transportation in "design goals which [would] most fully enable Central Minneapolis to perform its proper functions." The report recommended that the underlying goal for appearance should be:

In all matters of the design and location of physical features in or relating to Central Minneapolis, the effects of such features on the appearance of the area should be taken into account so as to create the most rewarding, stimulating and memorable environment. [Emphasis mine.]

Three specific goals relating to distinctiveness, unity, and variety were recommended. These goals not only found their way into the downtown plan but also remained important in the second downtown plan Metro Center '85 (Minneapolis P&D, 1970a) and its revision Metro Center '90 (Minneapolis P&D, 1978a-d). It is also important to note that design-related goals were defined in terms of image and behavior at this point (e.g. "memorable" environment, "understandable" layout, and focal
points as "points of reference"). Urban design was not just a matter of fine views or formal order. However, it took a few more years for the urban design staff to fully articulate these new value premises in urban design and operationalize their definitions. Moreover, no work was done to formulate policies and programs for urban design in response to once articulated goals. On the contrary, the 1959 downtown plan did not deal with design issues directly (Lu, 1974: 80).

Comprehensive planning on a citywide basis, begun in 1959, produced the official city plan in the fall of 1962 (Minneapolis CPC, 1962). Urban design considerations were integrated into some parts of the plan but urban design goals were not articulated except in a few sections. As in the first downtown plan, formulation of policies and programs for urban design was not possible. Clear articulation of urban design goals came at first in the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study. To formulate urban design policies, the urban design staff had to continue their exploration till the end of the 60s.

From the Beginning to Early Maturity

An emerging approach in the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study

A significant change in the status of urban design took place in the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study. In 1961, the planning commission began a program of comprehensive planning for Southeast Minneapolis upon the request of citizens and businessmen of the community (official planning district in Minneapolis). The program was concluded in the spring of 1964 with the publication of A Workable Plan for the Active Conservation and Orderly Development of Southeast Minneapolis (Minneapolis CPC, 1964). This program had five important characteristics which distinguished it from previous studies in Minneapolis and most of the studies that were carried out in this country around that time:

- Substantial involvement of citizens and businessmen took place in the community;
- Urban design was recognized as a distinct element of the comprehensive plan for a planning district;
- Urban design was defined at goal, plan, and data levels;
- Urban design was defined in terms of image and behavior,\(^2\) and
- The comprehensive plan was conceived as a framework or process-oriented tool.

The progress in the development of the theories and techniques of urban design the staff made in this study is significant. Basic approach, important goals, and key concepts were developed for reuse and refinement in later studies. On the other hand, finding prescriptions for a good environment and stating them in policy terms remained to be a problem. Policy recommendations in the plan were ambiguous as in the following examples:

- Some of the existing landmarks including churches, schools and other significant structures, are hidden. They need to be brought out and be properly presented.
- A number of new landmarks including high-rise apartments, campus office buildings and other tall structures of distinction may be created and strategically located.
- Particular attention should be given to the general grouping of buildings, the relationship between building and parking space and streets and buildings.

The urban design staff needed to know how to determine what would constitute "proper presentation" or "strategic location" or "particular attention". At the same time, the staff needed to learn to balance generality with specificity in policy statement, knowing what would make the environment better. Also, they needed to study the urban design management system that would be essential in incorporating urban design considerations into the process of planning and development. All these point to a need for more studies. It was good however that the urban design staff demonstrated the level of their sophistication. With successful completion of a plan and community acceptance of urban design in the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study, the staff perhaps forcefully argued for a legitimacy of urban design within city planning (comprehensive planning). Introduction of an urban design component in the Minneapolis Community Improvement Program (CIP) in 1965 when the program was half way through should be viewed in this context. As we shall see, issues the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study raised were taken up in the CIP Urban Design Study.\(^3\)
The first citywide urban design study

The Minneapolis Community Improvement Program (CIP)

The 1962 official city plan was conceived as an interim plan. The planning department needed time and resources to develop a data base on which systematic research of goals and policies for the city and its communities should be based. In March 1961, the city applied to the Housing and Home Finance Agency for a Community Renewal Grant. With the federal grant, the Minneapolis Community Renewal Program (CIP) commenced in 1962.

The purpose of the CIP Study was to determine the best means of eliminating and preventing blight in the city. The city planning commission administered the program under the direction and approval of the city council to the point where plans became action. The Citizens Advisory Committee was established for the program with various subcommittees, both citywide and community-level. This committee was charged to recommend a comprehensive program of action for the community's immediate and long-range improvement, evaluating the existing conditions of each community and identifying its assets, liabilities, problems, and potentials. (Minneapolis CPC, 1965)

The CIP Urban Design Study

In 1965, an urban design study component was formally introduced into the CIP Study as a new addition. The primary goal of the urban design study was "to provide readily acceptable image of the city's environment, emphasizing its function, and fostering the observer's sense of civic pride in that environment" (Minneapolis CPC, 1965). The study was to develop an urban design plan called citywide "design framework" setting forth an overall design policy for the city and outlining an action program for its implementation. The study, in the second phase, was also to examine the process of decision-making and identify "missing links in the legislative framework" (Lu, 1979: 14). The urban design staff had a clear idea of what they wanted from the outset, if not a clear image of the product they should produce. An initial work program for the first-phase study (pilot study) was
issued in January 1965 and approved in February with some revisions. The pilot study started in March and ended in about twenty weeks. Since the last phase of the CIP Study to put together final recommendations was soon to begin, the pilot study had to be completed before the end of June 1965. The second-phase study work program proposing a twelve-month study was issued in January and October of 1966.

The first-phase study (pilot study)

The pilot study focused on surveys of the city's visual form and image and prototype case studies. Selected for study were a freeway corridor, a residential renewal area, two business/commercial centers, and a changing industrial area. The Urban Design Committee was formed to direct the urban design study as one of the CIP subcommittees. The study was administered by the Design Coordinator (Weiming Lu, principal planner) under the overall supervision of the planning director and the Minneapolis Chapter of the American Institute of Architects. Almost all the individual studies were contracted out to local consultants. This was due to funding and staffing constraints and a decision to involve the local architect and art communities (Lu, 1979: 8).

Seminars and exhibits were planned during the study period. A major exhibition called "Toward a New City" was organized during September 21 - October 24, 1965 to present the results of the pilot study to the public. A series of program events -- lectures, panel discussions, film presentations, and "city planning workshops" -- accompanied the exhibit at the Walker Art Center. The exhibition and its program events were well attended. Press coverage of the progress and the results of the pilot study suggests increasing public awareness of urban design and expectation for a "New City". A report to conclude the pilot study, Toward a New City: A Preliminary Report on Minneapolis' Urban Design Study, was issued in December 1965. This report summarized all the individual studies of the pilot study (except one). The Preliminary City Design Policy Plan and the Powderhorn Community Design Plan are important in understanding the evolution of the theories and techniques of city design policy formulation in Minneapolis.

The Preliminary City Design Plan as presented in the December 1965 report contained the following sections:
Twelve basic design issues (relating to the city's identity, lake-side highrises, views from freeways, and aesthetics as standards in neighborhood design among others); 6
- Four basic planning goals for the city (such as a "balanced" population and the ideal community);
- Fourteen specific design goals (such as "integration of freeways to the city form", "new identity for old neighborhoods", "careful location of highrise structures", and "preservation of historic buildings"); and
- Preliminary city design plan (sixteen recommendations and mapped visual image and form structures without any comment).

The plan was sketchy, suggesting only general approaches to deal with general design issues. For example, one recommendation aimed at guiding proposed development was:

We should permit highrise apartment development in carefully selected locations which are accessible, near employment centers, and near parks, providing they are compatible with existing and future land use.

This, like many others, not only failed to respond to the initial question (Should social, aesthetic considerations be given equal emphasis in determining the placement of highrises?) but also left much ambiguity as to procedures and criteria (e.g. How do you determine "carefully selected locations" and "compatible with ... future land use"?). Generally, the plan did not discuss the study team's reasoning as to how their recommendations would respond to issues and implement goals. The plan also failed to clearly state its basic value premises. The purpose of the CIP Urban Design Study was to enhance the city's visual image. Yet, the plan did not define what a good city image would be as the Southeast Minneapolis Plan did. The urban design staff was aware of the preliminary nature of the plan and the refinement of goals, policies, etc. became an important part of the second-phase study.

Other case studies of the pilot study, except one for a freeway corridor and another for the Powderhorn Community, had little immediate impact on city design policy formulation and changes that actually took place in the physical environment. The former study was initiated from concerns about the visual impact of freeways upon the city's landscape (from a point of view of travellers through freeways) and carried out drawing upon a set of methods and concepts that had been developed by a group of urban design researchers working with Kevin Lynch at MIT (Appleyard, Lynch, and Myer, 1964). The latter, a community design
study, was carried out "for building a more attractive, stable Powderhorn Community" (Minneapolis CIP, 1965j). This study made significant headway toward development of the concept of "the design framework". It analyzed major forces and trends in the community, surveyed visual forms and residents' images drawing upon Lynch's methods, and proposed a design plan setting forth the visual image and form structures for the community. Its proposals include a zoning control system for visual character, setting categories defining the city's visual scene in terms of mass, light, spacing, etc. Design control (design guidance) was to be exercised according to several levels ranging from design control more potent than the existing zoning in visually strategic areas to freedom in design greater than the existing zoning in other areas.

The concept of the "design framework" had been well developed by the end of the pilot study. While the Preliminary City Design Policy Plan did not clearly articulate this concept, its theoretical basis was established in an introduction to the December 1965 report (Minneapolis CIP, 1965k) and reiterated in Lu's (1966) paper. At a community level, this concept saw its application in a primitive form in the Southeast Minneapolis Plan (the basic "urban design structure", Minneapolis CPC, 1964) and, then, fully in the Powderhorn Community Design Plan (Minneapolis CIP, 1965j). The term "design framework" derives from the concept of the plan as a "framework" or "guide" for design and change, allowing "freedom of expression" and "work toward a common goal" at the same time (Minneapolis CPC, 1964). The design framework in Minneapolis would especially attempt to "set up a systematic design approach" which will guide public action -- urban renewal and capital improvements so as to "enable public improvement to serve as an effective incentive for private investment" (Lu, 1966) -- as well as private constructions (Minneapolis CIP, 1965j). The design framework could have informational and educational uses as well:

- The power of "the framework" is expected to be in its uncomplicated new insights of existing systems of predictions and urban socio-economic reality. (Minneapolis CIP, 1965j)
- This design framework is necessarily to create both a keen awareness of the central-area form and a strong visual identity ... . (Minneapolis P&D, 1970a)

Several requirements and orientations characterize the design framework:
- A fifteen-year time frame (with flexible and expandable design proposals) (Lu, 1966);
- A balance between specificity (to solve problems of today) and generality (to meet the needs of tomorrow);
- Both imaginative (to inspire the creativity of designers) and realistic (to attract the confidence of farsighted builders); and
- Attention to certain key elements of city form: tighter controls of strategic elements and more freedom in the design of the rest of the city (Lu, 1966; Minneapolis CIP, 1965).

Urban designers in Minneapolis learned much from Lynch's theory. According to Lynch (1960), legibility and its three components — identity, structure, and meaning — were among the fundamental values in the city environment and those qualities could be managed by way of influencing key visual image elements (landmarks, paths, nodes, edges, and districts). This led to an idea of controlling those key elements while leaving the rest of the city relatively free in design. This is what the design framework as device for control was for. It is quite natural, then, that urban designers in Minneapolis associated the design framework closely with achievement of certain qualities (e.g. a vivid and coherent image of the city) rather than others.

The ideal was high but it was difficult to achieve. As we shall see, the urban design staff had to learn more over the next ten to fifteen years in order to have their city design policy proposals officially adopted. Over years, the concept of design framework received transformation as members of the urban design staff changed.

* The second-phase study

The second-phase CIP Urban Design Study began in 1966. The primary focus of this study was on the decision-making process. A study on urban design legislation was conducted by Richard Babcock with a prestigious law firm Ross, Hardies, O'Keefe, Babcock, McDugale and Parsons (e.g. enabling legislation for historic preservation, design district, and development district). Barton-Aschman Associates (1970) worked on a study of organization, administration, programming, and financing.

Work on the urban design framework continued, adding a few more case studies "to put our design framework into the form of more specific standards and principles for guiding future urban renewal and freeway
design" (Minneapolis CIP, 1966b). Another freeway corridor was taken for a case study. A prominent architect, Ralph Rapson at the University of Minnesota, worked on a design plan for the Phillips Neighborhood and proposals for specific design control. Some studies were continued from the pilot study: a survey of historic buildings and further analysis of image survey and livability study.

About one-fifth of the total budget of the second-phase study was allocated to further work on the citywide urban design framework itself. Robert Isaacson reviewed the city's socio-economic goals and formulated new goals and policies for urban design. Dennis Grebner reviewed proposed design standards and principles to make specific proposals for necessary revisions (Community Planning and Design Associates, Inc., 1969). Finally, Weiming Lu and Robert Isaacson reviewed design issues identified earlier and proposed specific policies and design structures to deal with those issues.

During 1966, the design coordinator produced a series of notes but the first few years since the commencement of the second-phase study saw little progress in the development of the citywide design framework. Meantime, the environmental design study for Metro Center '85 began and the design coordinator put much of his time in directing this second downtown planning program. The design coordinator's two-volume draft report "Design Framework for Minneapolis" and "Design Process for Minneapolis" was completed only in May 1970.

The status of urban design in Minneapolis Community Improvement Program

Around February-April 1966 when the urban design staff was beginning the second-phase urban design study, the planning commission issued Goals and Policies for Comprehensive Programming for Community Improvement as one of a series of reports to synthesize the whole results of the CIP Study (Minneapolis CIP, 1966a). The report recommended policies in eighteen areas for discussion purposes. Urban design was not recognized as a distinct policy area in this report. Neither was there any general or specific urban design policy included excepting a policy to continue and expand a strategy for city development which would encourage "versatility of city design". The results of the pilot study did find their
way into the report, however. A fine drawing of a proposed design structure for the I-35W corridor illustrated one side of the table of contents without comments. A few sketches and plans from the West Broadway Plan (one of business center case studies) were presented in a section presenting policies for commercial facilities as "Urban Design for Commercial Areas", again without comments. Urban design was thus no more than an art of policy implementation.

In 1967, the Executive Committee of the Citizens Advisory Committee completed the CIP Summary Report putting together all the recommendations for the Minneapolis Community Improvement Program (Minneapolis CIP, 1967a). The planning commission and the city council adopted the document along with a small brochure, Decision '67, as a guide for city development. The CIP Study was concluded at this point except for a continuing urban design study. (The Urban Design Committee was dissolved perhaps at this point.) The Summary Report set forth eight major goals and outlined city development strategies (policies, programs, and actions), available resources, and the decision-making process. No urban design goal was included. Only few of urban design concepts developed in the urban design study were officially recognized as the city's policies (e.g. a policy for transportation corridor landscaping), although some policies adopted have important urban design implications.

The Five-Year Community Improvement Program ended in 1971. The planning department issued a report highlighting the accomplishments of the program since its commencement in 1962 and directions for future actions (Minneapolis CIP, 1971). This report confirmed the status of urban design in CIP primarily as an area of implementation program. Urban design -- "Citywide Urban Design Framework" -- was given one sub-section in the report but only in a section called "Action Programs Instituted".

Urban design in CIP was in this way a lower-level means (programs and actions rather than policies) without its own goals. The urban design staff had to give up the status of urban design once acquired in the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study. This has serious implications. Like comprehensive planning programs, CIP emphasized systematic pursuit of each goal in community improvement. The Summary Report stated:
Progress is determined, not just by our actions, but by the goals toward which we act -- not just by how we shape the land, but by the people and the productive ends for which we shape. Our decisions as to why, when, and where we apply our time, money, and energy to improvement actions will determine the efficiency and excellence of our progress. (Minneapolis CIP, 1967a: 62)

That is, urban design without a set of goals and policies of its own had to remain incremental and, perhaps, fragmented. To raise the status of urban design, the urban design staff had to do more work to refine their urban design framework.

Impact of the CIP Urban Design Study

The CIP Urban Design Study did not produce a citywide urban design framework in an adoptable form. It did not give urban design a new status -- an area of public policy that was more than an art of policy implementation. The impact of the study was nevertheless significant at least in four areas:

- Policies and actions for the environment;
- Effects on the process or urban design;
- Educational effects; and
- Increased urban design staff capability.

At first, it produced a number of design concepts. A few of them were formally adopted by the city council as the city's community improvement policy. Even before such an official action was taken, the urban design study in progress had begun to influence the I-35W freeway corridor design. A special design team made up of the Design Coordinator of the CIP Urban Design Study as chairman, and representatives from the State Highway Department, Park Board, and consulting landscape architects was formed to prepare a plan for improving the design of the corridor. Subsequently, the Highway Department made a substantial commitment to improve landscaping in accordance with the beautification plan, with the result of an increase in landscape expenditures of thirteen to fourteen times the amount originally programmed. (Minneapolis CIP, 1967a)

The urban design study also developed important ideas to improve the process of urban design. The establishment of CUE in 1968, and the passage of state laws to enable Minneapolis historic preservation, design review (design districts), and tax increment financing
(development districts), represent the most important impact in this area. Inside the City Hall, recognition of the use of urban design resulted in an increase in the size of the urban design staff following the 1968 administrative reorganization. The quality of urban design incorporated in studies was markedly improved around the late 60s and the early 70s. *Metro Center '85* is the best example. Also, use of inter-agency interdisciplinary task forces (like the one for the I-35W corridor beautification plan) became a normal operating procedure in dealing with complex urban design problems. The city coordinator played an important role in eliciting cooperation from other city departments for the urban design staff. Also important was the city's adoption of a policy to develop a design framework component for each urban renewal project plan (not in effect today). This allowed the staff to improve the techniques of developing urban design frameworks through experience and design considerations were promoted in urban renewal, model cities, code enforcement, and neighborhood improvement program. *(Lu, 1979)*

Invaluable was the educational effect. Wide publicity of the urban design study, city sponsorship of exhibitions, design conferences, planning workshops, etc. beside CUE's contribution helped the urban design staff educate the public in urban design. Community and neighborhood design studies increased the staff's contact with neighborhood leaders and helped the staff to demonstrate the use of urban design in neighborhoods. The result was increased public recognition of urban design and design awareness (e.g. Star, October 22, 1965). The urban design study also resulted in appreciation of their roles in urban design on the part of several education and cultural institutions in the city which were involved in the pilot study. This effect varies according to institutions. The Walker Art Center has held exhibitions and conferences in the area of urban design from time to time since the urban design study. On the other hand, the rest of the institutions such as the Minneapolis College of Arts and Design and the University of Minnesota's School of Architecture are not active in this area anymore. Similarly, the urban design study created an opportunity for local architects and landscape architects to work together and develop their ideas about city-scale urban design. The effect was training and increased urban design-consciousness on the part of those design
professionals.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the urban design staff laid out a foundation for the later initiative. The basic approach to urban design studies, which involved analysis of visual images and forms and formulation of design frameworks, had been established in a general way and was waiting for refinement. Important issues had been identified to direct future efforts and, in fact, the agenda set in the urban design study was reiterated in Metro Center '85 and largely followed by later projects and programs. Also important was increased awareness of the need for a systematic approach to urban design among local planners. The research on city design policy (the urban design framework) that was proposed in the second-phase study continued throughout the late 60s and was carried on to the Metro Center '85 Environmental Design Program during 1968-69. At the beginning of a comprehensive planning program in 1971, the City Design Framework became an element of the comprehensive plan to be prepared. It took another five years before its adoption (the Visual Design Framework of 1976) but the CIP Urban Design Study opened a way to integrate urban design into the comprehensive planning process and to make urban design principles fully a part of the city's official policy.

Basic as these may seem, there had been no such technical expertise, understanding, and recognition when a few urban designers began their work in the late 50s and the early 60s. It is rather surprising that the whole effect of the CIP Urban Design Study has been largely unnoticed by most observers of the Minneapolis urban design scene. Usually, observers attention to systematic approach begins with Metro Center '85.

The Minneapolis urban design program coming to maturity:
Metro Center '85

- The planning director as an assistant city coordinator

A change in government organization took place in February 1968: the city council established the City Coordinator as the city's chief administrative officer. The primary impetus came as a result of
recognition that the city needed to improve administrative capacity to effect the newly adopted CIP city strategy. This reorganization brought under the city coordinator physical, social service, and human resource planning and development, and regulatory, budgeting, and general administrative functions. The city coordinator with expanded staff support thus played a significant role in guiding and coordinating the city's planning and development programs in the next ten years.

This administrative reorganization made the planning director (now the Director of Planning and Development) one of assistant city coordinators. Planning thus became part of the city's central decision-making process. The role of the planning department expanded at the same time to include such activities as social and employment planning and development coordination as well as physical planning in a tradition sense (hence, Minneapolis Planning and Development [Division]). Planning was tied closely to the city's development functions, all in one office. Thus, after 1968, high priority plans saw early implementation (e.g. the 1969 parking ring plan calling for parking ramps on the downtown fringe) (Lu, 1979: 12).

The Metro Center '85 Environmental Design Program

In 1967, the city council authorized the preparation of a new downtown plan under the Decision '67 Program. The plan was initiated because of the need to assess new forces and trends affecting downtown to guide its development some ten years after the first downtown planning effort. Despite its strategic importance, the downtown was beginning to lose its people, especially families, in the late 60s when the Twin Cities region was growing. Downtown development was staggering and businesses were no more expanding. The skyway system began to grow and Nicollet Mall was soon to open but various projects were being carried out without much coordination.

The work on the Metro Center '85 Environmental Design Program began in 1968 under the leadership of the newly established city coordinator. It was to develop a comprehensive plan with a program and priorities for downtown development for the next fifteen years. Weiming Lu, principal planner, directed the interdisciplinary design team under the
general policy direction of the city coordinator and the planning
director. The design team's approach was systematic. The chief of
the team wrote:

The team believed that in trying to solve a problem, it was
important first to list all the problems, then focus on them,
take them apart, and then put them back together piece by
piece, until an intelligent decision was reached. (Lu, 1974)

Thus, the eighteen-month study involved 98 work items such as land use
survey, landmark survey, visual image survey, and visual form analysis.
Some 400 problems were identified and more than 200 alternative solutions
were developed. The scale of the downtown community was manageable,
allowing the design team to conduct a thorough study of its design
features. The team, for example, systematically inventoried signs on
streets, developed design concepts for them, and prepared recommendations
for street-name signs. 8

The comprehensive downtown development plan, Metro Center '85, was
It is significant that urban design entered the plan in all key com-
ponents of plan: goal, policy (plan), program, and data. Moreover,
urban design was an important part of the purpose of the program. It
was a program to improve the physical environment, to strengthen the
economic vitality, and to enhance the visual identity of the downtown
area (Lu, 1974: 78). Urban design considerations were integrated into
all the physical planning components of the plan, suggesting the use
or urban design as a "stitching" or "integrating" element of the plan.

The urban design staff's approach to plan-making had been firmly
established in this study. The urban (visual) design plan of Metro
Center '85 was a two-tier system consisting of the visual image and
visual form frameworks. At first, the visual image framework set forth
the visual image structure that was desired for the downtown. The
visual image framework was a form of goal or "guidelines" expressed in
terms of spatial relationships among image elements -- open spaces,
gateways, and Lynch's five elements (landmarks, nodes, edges, paths,
and districts). It was an attempt to create a vivid and coherent visual
image by giving some places a sense of entrance, others a sense of focal
point, etc. 9

Metro Center '85 then proposed the visual form framework. This
framework defined basic relationships among important form elements which would reflect the existing form, character, heritage, and topography of the downtown and realize the desired visual image. The idea was that individual actions, if taken in accordance with guidelines of the visual from framework, would help to achieve the visual image framework and create a strong visual identity over years. The visual form framework in Metro Center '85 consisted of the following components:

- The visual district description: including proposals to strengthen visual districts (compact sub-areas with identity) and visual sequence in travel;
- The skyline and building illumination plan; and
- The street design framework: including cross section and spatial framework design; the street lighting plan, principles and standards; the landscaping plan; and principles and standards for public and private signs and street furniture.

The visual form framework was not that different from conventional urban design plans setting forth design principles, standards, prototype designs, etc. except for one special feature: it directed its primary attention to those elements of the environment that were strategically important. Strategic elements were to be determined on the basis of visual image survey data and according to Lynch's theory.

Impact of Metro Center '85

The planning commission adopted Metro Center '85 but the city council took no action. The plan, however, became a useful guide to policy-making and civic action in the downtown area. This owed much to strong support from the downtown business community and a new administrative structure which put city planning and development functions under one administrative head. Metro Center '85 proved to be a very successful plan. At first, it won recognition of the national profession community a few years after its publication (a HUD Design Award). Recognition by the fellow professionals was substantiated by the plan's implementation.

Metro Center '85 saw many of its recommendations being carried out in the next eight years. In fact, the most important progress toward implementation was made within a few years after its publication. Private development in downtown was affected much by national and regional
economy but active development which began to take place in the late
70s suggests that the plan was successful in creating the confidence in
downtown. The skyway system developed further and, later in the 70s,
connection to the system became an important factor of locational deci-
sions. This owed much to systematic studies carried out to develop a
major implementation program.\textsuperscript{10}

Eight years later when the plan was revised, little addition
was necessary to its basic contents (goals, principles, standards,
implementation devices). This attests the significance of the progress
Metro Center '85 had made in defining the quality of the downtown
environment for the future and devising strategies for achieving it.
Essential programming devices (including design districts, historic
preservation, and development districts) and administrative mechanisms
(e.g. strengthening of CUE and creation of the Heritage Preservation
Committee) had already been identified in this plan and many of them
realized to improve the process of development.

The chief of the environment design team later wrote that Metro
Center '85's contribution to city planning and urban design in
Minneapolis was perhaps in the following three areas:

- The strategy it developed for coordinating public and private
  actions;
- The acquisition of legal tools to enable it to happen; and
- The process it followed.
(Lu, 1974)

In regard to the last point, Metro Center '85 marked an important
milestone in the Minneapolis urban design program. The environmental
design study offered the urban design staff a chance for integrating
urban design considerations into a major planning program and a new
focus -- to develop an urban design framework and an urban design
management system for the downtown community. Many of the design
concepts and approaches developed earlier were refined in this study on
the basis of intensive studies of the downtown environment. The agenda
-- projects and studies to be carried out -- became clear. With the
creation of a permanent design office (the Urban Design Studio) in the
planning department, specific projects and studies were actively
carried out to put recommendations of Metro Center '85 forward. In this
way, the urban design staff acquired a firm basis on which to work on
the urban design framework for the entire city later. All these were possible because the CIP Urban Design Study prepared the urban design staff for this study. In fact, the most significant impact of the CIP Urban Design Study seems to be the success of the Metro Center '85 Environmental Design Program.

A New Phase of Development

Demand for further development of the theories and techniques of urban design

An overview

In early 1976, the first public hearing was held before the planning commission to consider a proposed citywide urban design framework. This public hearing revealed that neighborhood groups had not been consulted about the proposal during five years of "public review and comment". Upon neighborhood groups' request, a process of neighborhood review and revision began. The result was the staff proposal virtually replaced by neighborhood groups'. This and public controversy over the proposed master design district ordinance suggest deficiencies that existed in the planning process at the time. In a word, the planning process allowed city design policy to be developed without firm knowledge of the concerns and wishes of people in neighborhoods. Moreover, the process of city design policy formulation did not offer a forum for public discussion on issues that were basically policy matters like the role of design review in the process of development. The mid 70s was the time of rising neighborhood interests in Minneapolis. Neighborhood groups' opposition to these two proposals began to make such a problematic nature of the process of urban design visible.

At the same time, public sentiment was increasing that the city coordinator had concentrated too much power in one office. Subsequently, in 1976, the Minneapolis voters approved government reorganization moving the power of the city coordinator to plan and budget to the mayor. This event suggests that the whole orientation of city government in
planning and development -- to facilitate coordination and development from top down -- was in question, not just a matter of what to propose and how to incorporate citizens' wishes in planning proposals.

The government reorganization implemented in 1978 drastically changed the context of city planning and urban design. The planning department was no more at a single decision center. The public was demanding more responsiveness from city government at the same time. This made the improvement of the process of urban design and the theories and techniques of urban design of immediate necessity. Above all, the planning department had to develop sophistication in means of communication and control in planning and implementation.

The Visual Design Framework

In May 1970, Weiming Lu completed a two-volume draft report to conclude the CIP Urban Design Study -- "Design Framework for Minneapolis" and "Design Process for Minneapolis". The first volume presented issues, goals, objectives, and policies for the citywide urban design framework in seven strategic areas (e.g. preservation and enhancement of natural resources; improving housing and living environment; and working environment) among other things. The second volume discussed legal tools (e.g. zoning, street design, and design review), administrative process (e.g. zoning and building process, design review, and capital program process), and the private sector's roles (e.g. education, design professionals, and news media).

Without waiting long, the urban design staff was able to go ahead with the preparation of a citywide urban design framework for official action. In 1971, the planning commission set out to frame a new city plan as part of work to revise the comprehensive municipal plan. The project was to develop goals, objectives, and principal policies as a guiding instrument through which functional elements and area development policies would be developed. In the fall of 1971, the planning department produced a discussion draft for the Program Policies and the Area Development Guide, the latter including the City Design Framework. Gordon Wagner, principal planner, headed the project team and worked on the City Design Framework himself. Weiming Lu moved to Dallas in 1971.
to head a newly established urban design division. Wagner's strategy was to draft the City Design Framework as a summary of the "Design Framework for Minneapolis". Neither additional surveys nor citizen involvement was called for.

Around 1972, the Program Policies and the Area Development Guide were subjected to public review and revised upon comments received. In May 1974, the planning commission adopted the Program Policies as revision of goals, objectives, and principal policies of the comprehensive municipal plan. The city council followed the planning commission in amending the comprehensive municipal plan later in February 1975.11

The planning staff continued their work on the Area Development Guide. During 1975, some of its sections were adopted after three public hearings. On March 18, 1976, the first public hearings were held before the planning commission to specifically consider the City Design Framework as the first supplement to the Area Development Guide. In this hearing, the staff suddenly found problems with the planning process. Upon neighborhood groups' request, the planning commission resolved that the staff be directed to redraft the document and distribute it to neighborhood groups (especially PDCAC's) and interested organizations for comment. The staff also had to assess how their proposals would fit into neighborhood plans, since the official community-level citizen planning groups called Planning District Citizens Advisory Committees (PDCAC's) had been conducting needs assessment of communities upon the city's request.

An intensive neighborhood review process began. A few public hearings were held during June and September only to reveal that the staff was not responsive enough to satisfy neighborhood groups. For example, on September 23, Ted Horowitz, Calhoun-Isles PDCAC, speaking on behalf of the Council of Community Councils, expressed concerns of neighborhood groups while Normal Olson, Chairperson of CUE, regretted that the first section "Overview" "had been lost because it put people back on their own in defining urban design" (Minneapolis CPC Minutes, September 23, 1976). The neighborhood review process was almost over when the staff completed the October 4 draft of the urban design framework, now renamed the Visual Design Framework. This draft was significantly different from ones that had been prepared before May 6,
Some sections received major revisions, even wholesome replacement, while others minor ones. Before the planning commission's unanimous action to adopt the proposal on November 23, 1976, the Visual Design Framework was laid over a few more times for further revisions but no significant changes were made in its substance.

The fact that changes that were made before May 6, 1976 are relatively minor suggests that little input was secured from neighborhood groups early in the process of drafting and public review. It is problematic that some five years of "public discussion" neither allowed the urban design staff to understand the way people in neighborhoods defined design-related issues nor prepared the staff for effective dealing with their wishes. The staff drafted the Visual Design Framework without up-to-date knowledge of what people wanted in neighborhoods to begin with. These problems in the planning process derived from imbalance in the development of the theories and techniques of urban design by this time. On the one hand, the form of city design plan ("design framework"), design concepts, and technical means of developing plans (including citizen image surveys) had been refined well. On the other hand, mechanisms of collecting up-to-date information as to how people in neighborhoods saw design-related issues and wanted their environment to be and, perhaps, more actively communicating with them on a regular and citywide basis had been virtually non-existent.

Successes in the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study and the Metro Center '85 Environment Design Study in creating such mechanisms were not repeated.

Changes that took place reflect a change in viewpoint -- from one of the urban design staff to one of people in neighborhoods. The Visual Design Framework became more responsive to the wishes neighborhood groups expressed. A problem here is that the urban design staff was not successful in balancing neighborhood groups' wishes with their professional judgement. The effect was to have the value premise of the Visual Design Framework and the purpose of taking each course of action proposed in policies obscured. Policies lost the goal-like quality to encourage research and exploration. The Visual Design Framework became like a wish list of more or less specific courses of action. Specific solutions dominated general approaches, strategies,
procedures, and planning programs. This must be a problem with the process of urban design and the theories and techniques which supported it.

It is significant that the Visual Design Framework recognized urban design as major part of the city's official policy for the first time in this city. However, urban design was without goals of its own; the Area Development Policies were a set of middle-range policies (five- to ten-year time frame) to implement goals set elsewhere (in ten- to twenty-year time frame). Moreover, value premises were not made explicit in the Visual Design Framework. 12

The master design district ordinance

Two of the three major legal tools for urban design that had been developed in the CIP Urban Design Study -- development districts and historic preservation procedures -- became part of the process of urban design and development in the early 70s. Design districts, however, remained unimplemented even in the mid 70s while their distinct advantage had been recognized by the urban design staff: they would allow design review to deal with key issues of design quality in each district (Lu, 1979: 15). Many of neighborhoods in Minneapolis were ordinary and diverse, rejecting uniform design controls to mandate a high level of design. Earlier, Metro Center '85 and Weiming Lu's draft report on the urban design process called for establishment of design districts. There was much outside expectation for design districts as well: the state enabling legislation for the establishment of design review boards and design districts was passed and approved in 1971 with broad support. Meantime, many U.S. cities started to use Minneapolis's proposed ordinance as a model for their own. Thus, establishment of design districts became an internal mandate of the urban design office in the mid 70s.

Earlier in 1974, the city received a matched grant from the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to work on a comprehensive city design framework and city design process. A later phase of the study was to create specific, highly detailed design guidelines for the areas where potential for implementation was highest. The urban design staff chose to work in the Whittier East area after considering several areas identified as possible design districts in 1973 -- the downtown area
around the Hennepin County Government Center, Nicollet Island, Seward East, and Whittier East.

Whittier East was a subneighborhood of Whittier. The area had distinctive character and its location had strategic importance to the city because it surrounded the Minneapolis Institute of Arts, the Minneapolis College of Art and Design, and Washburn Fair Oak Park. At the same time, the area needed some planning attention as it was experiencing substantial social and physical changes (Minneapolis P&D, 1976b: 4). In February 1975, the city council authorized the city planners to begin considering how to designate Whittier East as a design district. The Whittier East Design Study was thus begun.

The area residents and others interested in the design study started to meet on a regular basis in February 1975, right at the beginning of the study. While there was "a pocket of resistance", the staff found the study attracting "support from a broad spectrum of interest within the proposed boundaries" (Star, August 12, 1975). The urban design staff concluded their work with the area residents in the spring of 1976. The final report, Whittier East Design Study, including recommendations for design district designation and design review guidelines was completed and presented to the planning commission and the area residents in December 1976.

Meantime, revisions of the master ordinance for design districts was in progress. Back in April 1975, a temporary citizen advisory group in Whittier East was reviewing the latest proposal. A draft dated July 10, 1975 already incorporated "community comments". However, when the first public hearing on the proposed ordinance was held on October 28, 1976, the planning commission found it necessary to refer it back to the Comprehensive Plan Committee with a request that the staff hold a working session with concerned citizens to resolve objections raised. Major opposition came from neighborhood groups including those in the Whittier East area.

Debate continued. The planning commission once having delayed its action in November 1976, endorsed the proposed ordinance as revised, 6 to 3, on January 27, 1977 after heated debate. The revised ordinance proposal significantly incorporated neighborhood groups' demands: especially, the design review board was to be established with four district members
representing property owners, residents, proprietors and their employees along with three citywide members appointed by the city council and CUE. Initially, the board was conceived as a technical advisory committee made up of design experts and was authorized as such by the state enabling law. The ordinance proposal forwarded to the city council began to draw opposition from two sides. Some neighborhood groups were pushing the city council to allow better representation of neighborhood residents on the design review board -- more district members and election rather than appointment. Urban designers and others, on the other hand, were worried about neighborhood groups taking over control to maintain the status quo in neighborhoods (e.g. Dewey Thorbeck, chairman of the Urban Design Committee, CUE, in Tribune, March 11, 1978). Basic issues such as adding another layer of burden on development and displacement of low-income residents had remained unresolved. The ordinance proposal had to go back and forth between the planning commission and the Community Development Committee of the city council, until the committee tabled it indefinitely upon the request of CUE in early 1978. In the course of public debate, various new factors entered the scene. Most important, however, was perhaps a sense that a polarization had developed to lead proponents of the ordinance nowhere (Dewey Thorbeck and Mike Sindt, chairman of the Standish Neighborhood Council, in Tribune, March 11, 1978).

This case raises various issues:

- Implications of the way the purpose and scope of the study was initially defined (a "design district" study) or the way urban design was packaged in a planning program;
- Issues around control: the urban design staff's control over the planning process vs. neighborhood groups' demand for control over the whole process of physical development and change in neighborhoods; and
- Implications of the strength of neighborhood groups and rising neighborhood interests in the mid 70s; among others.

However, what I am most concerned with here is the process of urban design that was followed. It is problematic in two ways. At first, looking at the process of developing and adopting the ordinance itself, the urban design staff was not effective in measuring neighborhood feelings toward design review and design districts, citywide and early in the process. Neither were they effective in reaching neighborhood
groups and guiding public discussion toward the building of a broad consensus early. It became increasingly difficult to make tradeoffs and compromises as more and more details were set. Ironically, the circle of discussion (participation) became larger as time passed. Initially, the proposed ordinance was reviewed by a temporary advisory committee and the Whittier East area residents, both in conjunction with the Whittier East Design Study. A series of working sessions with "concerned citizens" then began upon a request of the planning commission. Finally, the ordinance had to be carried out to each PDCAC's and neighborhood organizations upon a request of the city council. All these took place in the face of rising neighborhood power.

Second, viewing a larger context, a fact that a specific ordinance was proposed without initial public consensus as to the desirability of establishing design districts and the role design review ought to play in the process of development may be taken as an issue. The concept of design district was at first developed in the CIP Urban Design Study as a tool for implementing urban design frameworks and, then, reiterated in the implementation program of Metro Center '85. No broad citizen participation took place to discuss this concept of a citywide basis. Neither the process of developing and adopting the Visual Design Framework offered a forum for elaborating this concept. The Visual Design Framework proposed during 1971 - mid 1976 had no mention of design districts. Once a policy to "consider the use of design districts to protect areas of critical visual importance" so as to "support individual neighborhoods in determining the best means for improving visual quality" (an action policy; cf. Chapter VI) was incorporated into the proposal, public discussion did not go further to define the nature and role of design review to be exercised in design districts (no design management policy). The process of debating the Visual Design Framework thus did not materialize an opportunity for creating broad public consensus on these issues. The process of adopting the master design district ordinance had to carry the burden of creating such consensus.
Administrative reorganization of 1978

In 1976, another event took place to signal the change that was taking place in the context of city planning and urban design in Minneapolis: in a referendum, voters approved charter amendments for administrative reorganization. This involved relocation of planning and finance departments from the city coordinator's office to the mayor's office. Reducing the power of the city coordinator and strengthening the mayor to balance the two wings of government was the intent of this move.

The root of this reorganization was deep. At first, the State of Minnesota has had no home-rule charter. Each city has to petition the legislature to see its wishes through. This had created a demand for political efficiency and accessibility to city government. At the same time, there has been a long tradition of "good government" in Minnesota cities. A system of checks and balances to insure no one individual or office has too much power and decisions are made through open discussion has been considered to be of special importance. On the other hand, a sentiment was increasing in the mid 70s that the consolidation of all the planning and development functions under the city coordinator resulted in too much power in one office.

The Minneapolis Citizens League and other influential civic leaders led the general public and lobbied for a Charter Commission. In the early 70s, the commission was established to find an alternative structure for city government. The commission concluded that the public needed to know who was advocating things on their behalf and who was deciding them. The whole orientation of city government in planning and development -- to facilitate coordination and development from top down -- was in question. City government was expected to be more responsive to the needs and wishes of people. The 1976 referendum was the commission's solution. The effect of this administrative reorganization was the splitting of the powerful planning function combining long-range planning and development programming down in the middle. To develop plans and implement them, the two wings of government have to negotiate more openly. The planning department (to be the Mayor's City Planning Department in 1978) had to adjust to this new context.
A new phase of development in the theories and techniques of urban design: comprehensive planning for the 80s

The Metropolitan Land Planning Act of 1976 created a carrot and stick for completing a comprehensive plan. This act required that a comprehensive plan be submitted to the Metropolitan Council by July 1980 for review and, then, adopted by the city council by January 1981. A local comprehensive planning assistance grant was available from the Metropolitan Council. At the same time, a new context of government after administrative reorganization demanded that the mayor and planning staff put a real faith in comprehensive planning. The new administrative organization made city planning linking policies and plans to budget the primary source of the power of the mayor. It was essential that the mayor and planning staff develop sophistication in ways of communication and control in order to get their wishes through. They had to influence decisions of city departments that were outside the sphere of the mayor as well as those of actors outside city government. This was a demand for a new phase of development in the theories and techniques of urban design as well. Long-awaited work on the comprehensive plan was thus begun. At first, the staff worked on a program to revise Metro Center '85 during September 1977 - August 1978. Work on the entire comprehensive plan waited till a new mayor took his office on January 1, 1978.

The city expanded the scope of the comprehensive plan and did more than what was mandated by the state. The city wanted to prepare a plan which would take community and neighborhood concerns into consideration and to make it useful for influencing day-to-day decisions about city development. (Minneapolis PD, 1979a) A four-step planning process began in February 1978 with a series of meetings in planning districts under the sponsorship of the mayor and the planning commission. The process went through identification of issues (the first step), formulation of goals and policies (the second step), and development of specific plans (the third step). The third step ended with the planning commission adoption of the Plan for the 80s on July 26, 1979 after five public hearings. At the time of my field visit, the city was going through the last step -- the Metropolitan Council's review and the city council action. Under the mayor's leadership, citizen participation received
much emphasis. Citizens were involved broadly (e.g. several rounds of community and neighborhood meetings) and substantively (e.g. drafting of community plans by PDCAC's). According to the Hearing Draft of the Plan for the 80s, the document drew upon the contribution of 8,000 to 9,000 people who had attended over 500 meetings during an eighteen-month period (Minneapolis PD, 1979a).

The Plan for the 80s as adopted by the planning commission consists of twenty chapters. The first chapter is an overview which summarizes the rest of the chapters. The next seven chapters are citywide plans for functional elements such as housing, economic development, and property services (including water treatment and supply, sewers, and solid waste collection and disposal). Then come eleven community plans. The last chapter defines general management and implementation strategies.

The Plan for the 80s includes two separate sections (plans) to deal specifically with urban design concerns -- heritage preservation and the visual quality in the physical environment chapter. The Heritage Preservation Plan sets forth a rather specific goal of "preserv[ing] historic and significant buildings and districts allowing modifications for contemporary use" and discusses the process by which the city's architectural and historic heritage can best be saved. Other aspects of a more comprehensive urban design perspective are discussed in other parts of the plan, though, like in individual community plans, without clear articulation of urban design concerns and explicit reference to value premises of urban design.

The Plan for the 80s makes the Visual Quality Plan the key urban design element. This follows the precedent of the Visual Design Framework. While many of the basic ideas and concepts adopted in the Visual Quality Plan were in earlier plans, it has done several things for the first time in Minneapolis at the same time, suggesting an important change that has taken place in the official status of urban design in this city:

- It has given recognition to the strategic importance of the visual quality to the city as a whole as part of official policy statement;
- It has made a goal for visual design part of the city's goals: "to protect and enhance the visual quality of the natural and man-made environment in Minneapolis";
- It has articulated basic value premises in visual design
explicitly as part of official policy statement: three "basic visual design principles";\textsuperscript{14}
- It has incorporated legibility (identity, structure, and meaning) into basic value premises in visual design: e.g. "recognizable" functional areas, "understandable" city, and "reflect functions and activities"; and
- It has incorporated a set of policies for the decision-making process as well as each of four kinds of environment (residential, commercial, and industrial areas and scenic assets).

Earlier, the Visual Design Framework lost explicit reference to city images (legibility, identity, and structure) and city-scale views in the process of neighborhood review. Design for the purpose of these has regained its legitimacy in the Visual Quality Plan (cf. the three "basic visual design principles" and Policy 18). The official status of urban design in Minneapolis means more than simple designing for "visual amenities" of neighborhoods or beautification of places to be made without reference to the overall visual structure of the city.

The Visual Quality Plan recognizes that it is difficult to find an agreement on what the city should look like while the goal of a more attractive and livable Minneapolis is widely supported and that the visual image of the city in a private market economy continually evolves as a result of many individual development decisions (Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-79). The plan thus emphasizes "policies and strategies" for guiding this evolutionary process to enhance visual quality. It follows that policies of the plan ought to be used and implemented. Naturally, the plan puts much substance in its Action program ("Implementation Strategy" and "Priority Framework"\textsuperscript{15}).

The Visual Quality Plan is a success in several respects:
- The staff proposal (the Discussion Statement) proved to be responsive to the concerns and wishes of people, especially neighborhood groups; it thus received little change in its substance, yet represents good professional judgement for the following reasons:
  - It has value premises explicitly stated in terms of concepts that were once removed from the staff proposal for the Visual Design Framework (legibility, identity, structure, and meaning); and
  - It has allowed the formation of a general community agreement (i.e. city policy) as to the use of design review in the process of urban design and the role of the design review board (accepting the CUE's role as the design review board) -- issues that were extremely controversial at the time the
proposed master design district ordinance was considered; in conjunction with this,

- It has allowed the formulation of a general community agreement as to the need to define desirable qualities of environment in communities and to develop design principles for citywide systems such as street lighting and traffic signs, policies and guidelines for sign removal and consolidation, and design review guidelines (Policy 33 and the Implementation Strategy, Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-94, 98-100, and 102); and

- It has made highrises outside the downtown less of an issue by adopting a policy to develop height limits in areas outside the downtown (Policy 33).

The process of preparing the Visual Quality Plan differs greatly from that of the Visual Design Framework except in one respect: the basis for the plan was already there at the beginning of the planning (drafting) process -- the "Design Framework for Minneapolis" in a case of the Visual Design Framework, and the Visual Design Framework (publicly debated and adopted only a year or so before) in the case of the Visual Quality Plan. The Discussion Statement of the Visual Quality Plan issued in December 1978 as a section of "Protecting the Environment through the 1980s" was subjected to broad public review along with other elements of the comprehensive plan. Hard questions were asked: Should the city use a design review process or develop other suitable guidelines and incentives to encourage and educate towards good design? If the city decides to develop a design review board, should CUE be that agency? What should the city's stand be on stricter sign control? To what extent should the city's approach and plan for visual quality be more aggressive, gutsy and integrated into the other elements of the plan? ... (The Independent-Republican Caucus of the City Council, Minneapolis, 1979) The Hearing Draft issued in June 1979 saw little change from the Discussion Statement in the substance (basic concepts in principles, goals, objectives, and policies). It is important to note that the process of comprehensive planning for the 80s allowed the project staff to have a good idea of the concerns and wishes of people in neighborhoods from the outset. Issues in neighborhoods were identified with extensive citizen involvement (the first step). Community planners were reporting what they were getting while PDCAC's were drafting community plans (the second step). Moreover, the staff was already fully aware of specifics that would make policy proposals...
controversial (e.g. highrises and freeways) after much debate with neighborhood groups during the process of revising the Visual Design Framework. The Visual Quality Plan was thus drafted to be ready for adoption. It is too early to assess the effect of the Visual Quality Plan now. However, it would be appropriate to see that this plan along with the Visual Design Framework and the master design district ordinance proposals has put the staff on the road toward a new phase of development in the theories and techniques of urban design in Minneapolis.

Epilogue

Issues around Minneapolis' approach

In Minneapolis, a citywide urban design study to formulate city design policy began in 1965, almost at the beginning of its urban design program, and a preliminary city design plan was drafted within a year (the Preliminary City Design Policy Plan of 1966). However, it took six years for the staff to propose a city design plan in an adoptable form (the City Design Framework, discussion draft, 1971) and eleven years to have city design policy officially adopted (the Visual Design Framework of 1976). The staff did several major urban design studies but the progress toward the completion of an official city design plan was gradual.

While the Minneapolis urban design program is exemplary in many ways, it was only the Visual Quality Plan of 1979 that made urban design a full element of the comprehensive plan with a goal, objectives, and policies of its own. Up to this point, the status of urban design changed gradually from 1) a rather undefinable area of city planning (the first downtown plan of the late 50s) to 2) primarily an area of implementation programs and actions (the CIP), and further to 3) an area of policy without its own goals officially adopted (the Visual Design Framework). Observing the nature of major studies and plans, the general trend was:

- From district-level to citywide (from the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study to the CIP Urban Design Study; from the Metro Center '85 downtown plan to the Visual Design Framework);
- From unofficial plans to official plans (from the 1959 downtown plan to Metro Center '85; from the Preliminary City Design Policy Plan to the Visual Design Framework);
- From internal-technical development (in the 60s and the early 70s) to formal-political development with substantial citizen participation (since the mid-70s); and
- From initial completion to comprehensive revision (from the Visual Design Framework to the Visual Quality Plan).

This form of prolonged process of city design policy formulation maintaining important aspects of the one-time comprehensive study has merit of its own. Above all, urban designers can learn through experience. They can do much exploration over time, and problems at one time (e.g. the loss of the urban design staff's proposals in the Visual Design Framework) could be corrected later (e.g. the recovery of important urban design concepts in the Visual Quality Plan). This is thus a trial-and-error approach. When citizen inputs are assured as in Minneapolis in the late 70s, citizens can learn during the process as well and the result would be city design policy responsive to their concerns and wishes while balancing them with professional judgement (e.g. the Visual Quality Plan).

This strategy, on the other hand, had forced the urban design staff to stay with incomplete (at least unofficial) products and uncertain status of urban design (i.e. a city design plan only in the mind of urban designers or in the urban design office) till they got their plans completed at a small scale (Metro Center '85) and, then, with it till a city design plan is adopted (the Visual Design Framework and the Visual Quality Plan). It is rather surprising that urban design in Minneapolis during the first half of the 70s functioned reasonably well in areas where city design policy could make a difference. (There were other problems like a difficulty of getting development districts going during a time of economic slump.)

Problems had to surface later, however. Interim products internally developed became obsolete over time while untested with citizen inputs. The Visual Design Framework as proposed by the staff was inconsistent with the aspiration of people in neighborhoods and criticized by neighborhood groups as "oriented to the 1960s ideals" (Charles Warner, the Council of Community Councils, Minneapolis CPC Minutes, June 17, 1976). Various circumstances seem to have prevented
the staff from completing their city design plan early despite their wishes. (At first, they wanted to prepare the citywide urban design framework in the CIP Urban Design Study. Second, the City (Visual) Design Framework was drafted in an adoptable form within several months once a program to revise the comprehensive municipal plan began in 1971 while it took some five years to see its official adoption.)

Reflecting the context of the Minneapolis urban design program

Presented below is a brief discussion of the following factors as they relate to the status of urban design and the progress toward the completion of the city design plan:

- The theories and techniques of city design policy formulation;
- The general social-political environment: little demand and support from the people of the city; and
- The governmental context: opportunities but little demand for sophistication.

In Minneapolis, the most important factor seems to be the theories and techniques of city design policy formulation. Urban designers had been part of the planning staff since the planning department rejuvenation in the late 50s. But they had to wait for some years so that their awareness of the role urban design should play in city planning could match the development of the theories and techniques of urban design. By the mid 60s, necessary technical expertise had been developed in the field. Kevin Lynch's work provided the urban design staff with theoretical and methodological guidance. New concepts and methods in Lynch (1960) and Appleyard, Lynch, and Myer (1964) helped the urban design staff articulate goals and policies for urban design and allowed conscious pursuit of the purpose of urban design as a matter more than personal taste and artistic skill.

However, the urban design staff needed to do much exploration and learning themselves through experience. They knew what their approach should be (formulation of city design policy as a framework for decision-making and design control) and what they wanted (an urban design framework for the city) in general but they had to find out exactly what city design policy should state and how it should address urban design issues. Thus, they spent considerable time during the latter half of the 60s in refining policies once formulated preliminarily. (Given
limited resources, they had to do this with a weak data base. No extensive visual form inventory was made on a citywide basis.) The concept of urban design as public policy was yet to be articulated in this country then. The Minneapolis urban design staff were ahead of the national progress in the field. Viewed this way, more money and staff (implying public support and favorable governmental context) would have helped but they would not have reduced the need for exploration and learning through experience.

Also, the urban design staff capability per se was not an issue. It is true that a few urban designers dispersed in the planning department allowed only limited in-house development of the theories and techniques of urban design. But this was an asset as well: The CIP Urban Design Study was benefited greatly by broad participation of urban design talents in and outside the city. Limited leadership from the top, the administrator-planning director, seems inevitable given the level of sophistication in the theories and techniques of urban design. There was much uncertainty about the capability of urban design (rather than the urban design staff) to deliver and the use of the product of citywide urban design studies. Drawing examples from precedents is a powerful way to argue in this field without a strong theory but there was virtually no precedent of citywide studies at the time.

Neither was there any strong outside pressure on city government to deal with urban design or demand for improving the theories and techniques of urban design (not urban development). A city like Minneapolis in the late 50s and the early 60s that was experiencing little physical change did not make urban design so much an issue, although urban design to create an attractive city could do something about staggering economy and deterioration of the central city gradually in progress. It is only in the 70s that some specific urban design-related concerns, especially freeways and highrises, began to be important issues of the city. Minneapolis, being an ordinary mid-Western city, the level of design consciousness on the part of citizens was not high. The city's physical environment was neither so good nor so bad to make a need for good urban design visible. Moreover, without much physical and economic development happening
in this city, people, especially city officials and businessmen, were not inclined to support strong design controls. The city wanted development. Thus, except in downtown, there was little immediate demand, pressure, or support for good urban design. The downtown business community was supportive of good design, if tangible improvement was assured without too much extra cost (e.g. Nicollet Mall).

The governmental context in Minneapolis has been generally favorable to urban design, though in different ways at different times. The governmental context seems important especially during 1968-77 because it created little demand for sophisticated means of communication and control in urban design like city design policy at the time when the Minneapolis urban design program was maturing. Going back in the history of urban design in Minneapolis, the planning department was already winning the status of city planning within city government around the late 50s and the early 60s. There remained much skepticism about city planning, especially in the city council, in the late 50s, but the planning department was beginning to establish its firm position within city government through its work in downtown planning and comprehensive planning. Initial confidence was won from some neighborhood groups and the downtown business community, the very group which had persuaded the city to strengthen the planning department. Stimulating private development and reversing the trend of declining population and business in the city and its downtown had become the major concern of city government in Minneapolis since the mid 50s. City planning in this climate received much support. At the same time, the importance of good design in downtown was well recognized by the business community. City planning in Minneapolis thus created a place for urban design.

As it entered the mid-60s, the locus of city planning in the administrative structure meant little since the planning commission began to develop close ties with the city council which oversaw community improvement activities. The Minneapolis Community Improvement Program allowed the planning staff to conduct a series of studies at citywide and district ("community") levels and to develop goals, objectives, and policies for the improvement of the city. This gave the urban design staff an opportunity to conduct a citywide urban design study as a later addition to the CIP Study when it was half way
through. Increasing ties between city planning and development functions were formalized in the government reorganization of 1968. Creation of the office of the city coordinator with a strong, combined planning and development function, along with the creation of a small urban design office within the planning department, facilitated the promotion of urban design in the city's planning and development programs. Urban design became a forceful tool of city development.

Ironically, however, a favorable climate for urban design in the office of the city coordinator created little demand for sophisticated mechanisms of communication and control in urban design. With a close link to the city coordinator's function to coordinate and develop, there was little need for city design policy as a tool of communication, decision-making, and design control. Important city decisions took place within the city coordinator's office. Also, the city's interest in getting development projects done diverted the city's attention from long-range policy planning on a citywide basis to middle-range programming (e.g. the Metro Center '85 comprehensive downtown development plan) and opportunistic intervention in strategic projects. Also, the governmental context which put the urban design staff at the city's decision center did not encourage sophistication in ways of dealing with multiple interests of the community in the plan-making process.

The form and substance of the urban design framework has been refined, but ways of incorporating inputs from citizens (especially neighborhood groups) and communicating with them had not. Thus, the theories and techniques of urban design became a problem in another way in the mid 70s, at the time of rising neighborhood interests.

The 1978 administrative reorganization is thus very important. It made the practice of urban design difficult but in a way it facilitates the development of the overall theories and techniques of urban design -- broadening of the base of urban design to meet challenges in neighborhoods and sophistication in formulation and use of city design policy to deal with a plural set of actors inside and outside city government. Considering all these factors, Minneapolis' strategy for city design policy formulation may be viewed as one-time comprehensive study repeated several times -- unsuccessfully initially (with no formal plan adoption) and successfully later. Cyclic process (repeated studies on
a citywide basis and in a few strategic districts) does not seem to be the result of the urban design staff's first choice.
CHAPTER II

CASE STUDY 2: THE SAN FRANCISCO URBAN DESIGN PLAN

Introduction

In 1968, the San Francisco Department of City Planning embarked on a total revision of the comprehensive plan (master plan) for the City and County of San Francisco for the first time in twenty-five years. The work of revision was separated into a series of elements, each representing a category of city concerns or facilities such as residence, education, social services, transportation, and urban design. (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 3) The work began at first on the urban design element and a citywide urban design plan was completed in May 1971.

The Urban Design Plan marks significant innovation in urban design in this country. It sets forth as public policy for the entire city a broad definition of the desirable quality of physical environment developed on the basis of systematic studies of the quality of environment and implementation approach. Urban designers in San Francisco and other cities at the time knew no precedent dealing with the form and character of a major city so extensively. Even today, this plan remains to be one of the most extensive public statement of principles of good design for a city.

The Urban Design Plan was also a success. Within a few months of its publication, the City Planning Commission adopted it with significant citizen support. Some policies set forth in the plan saw early legislative actions for implementation and the whole document has become an important basis for day-to-day decision-making of the planning commission and its staff. Citizens use the plan as common terms of reference in discussing design-related issues in the city. In view of its broad acceptance and widespread use, it is perhaps one of the most
successful comprehensive plan elements ever formulated in this country. It has become a model in some other cities as well (e.g. Spartanburg, S.C., and San Diego, Ca.).

The planning staff in San Francisco held a view that the whole process of urban design had to begin with a comprehensive plan, in this case, a citywide urban design plan. This is a view that is orthodox in planning thinking but rarely implemented successfully in actual practice (cf. comprehensive plans prepared to be shelved). This chapter discusses the intent and nature of the planning staff's approach to urban design, especially looking at the following in the context of their practice:

- The status of urban design: an element of the comprehensive plan;
- The urban design plan as a definition of the desirable quality of environment;
- The urban design plan as a systematic response to design-related issues of the city;
- The substance of the urban design plan: policy;
- The role of the urban design plan: a process-oriented tool; and
- The relationship of the urban design plan to decision-making and implementation.

Mad rush toward the sky

San Francisco abounds with image evoking natural and man-made features. This is a city built at the head of peninsula endowed with rolling-hills between the sea and distant mountains. A sweeping pattern of streets and small-scale buildings follow the natural topography of hills and valleys, giving the city color, texture, and views. Its history brought various groups of people together and added to its rich image and character: the initial establishment as a Spanish mission in 1776; Mexican rule during 1821-46; seizure by the U.S. naval force in 1846 and naming of the town as San Francisco in 1847; the gold rush following the discovery of gold in California in 1848; development of the town as a terminus of trans-continental railroad since 1869 and as a gateway to the Far East, receiving waves of immigrants; rise of trade and finance to become the banking and shipping capital of the West, quickly recovering from the great earthquake and fire of 1906; the United Nations Conference on International Organization in 1945 ... . In this
way, San Francisco has grown into a cosmopolitan city, and, at the same time, a city of neighborhoods. The vitality and charm of this city owe much to its neighborhoods with various cultural traditions and life styles as well as its unsurpassed physical setting. Some 150 active neighborhood organizations, along with several major educational institutions in and around the city, add special sophistication to this city.

In 1966, a Gallup poll named San Francisco the city that most people would like to live in and the city with the most beautiful setting. It is said that every American who has travelled from coast to coast claims two cities — his own and San Francisco. San Franciscans have been well aware of their rich natural and cultural endowment and have been very proud of their city. Views, images, character, beauty, aesthetics, livability, the quality of life — all about urban design — matter in this city (Jacobs, 1971: 27; Herb Caen in Chronicle, January 4, 1970, quoted in San Francisco DCP, 1969d).

Naturally, most of major planning issues in San Francisco have involved urban design questions for some time (Svirsky, 1973: 9). The city has only a small area of 45.4 square miles with most of its area already developed, yet it is still growing. Growth, however, has been posing serious questions on the future of this city. Growth in an already built-up city inevitably means loss of familiar, small-scale buildings and taking of valuable open spaces to make way for larger buildings, generally out of scale and character of the existing areas. In the 60s, an awareness was growing that with each new building the beloved quality of the city, its fine texture or human scale, was being lost. Negative effects of growth were becoming quite visible. A dramatic change in downtown skyline during the 60s more than anything else told San Franciscans the progress of an alarming situation in the face of strong pressure for development. The image of the city was being threatened: "Once there was a San Francisco that was light and pastel, hilly, open and inviting," said Alvin Duskin's coloring book (ca. 1970), "Then rich men built tall buildings and San Francisco began to look stiff and forbidding like any other American city." People started to fear the consequence of continued growth which in many other cities had led to extremes inconsistent with the traditions
that were valued in San Francisco — "Manhattanization".

San Franciscans expected their city to be a good place to live and experience. As they cared much about their city, they were willing to do a battle if its image and character, beauty and tradition, were threatened. The world-famous "freeway revolt" in the late 60s is a dramatic example. A list of individual development proposals which resulted in confrontations — like Fontana Apartments and International Market Center — grew throughout the 60s. At the same time, neighborhood residents were increasing their sophistication throughout the 60s and mounted protests to all sorts of projects that might offend them (Jacobs, 1978b: 190-1).

It is important to note that San Franciscans thought of their city as a whole. The city had rich images. It had a fine skyline. The small scale of the entire city, matured stage of urbanization, and topographic form, all made city-scale views of special importance in this city. But not all design-related issues were inherently city-scale or citywide. There were many other concerns that were basically small-scale and local in nature but were important citywide: traffic, open space, and the quality and maintenance of streets and properties among other things (Jacobs, 1971: 27). Neither did all of physical problems come from growth. The counter-trend of deterioration plagued some areas of the city (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 2).

Citizen concerns about these issues and about the image and character of the city did not take an expression of explicit demand for city planning, however. Individual groups protested specific projects before them, and those groups tended to be dissolved soon, exhausting themselves in the battle. Moreover, protests against specific projects did not take care of the very sources of important issues. Public conflicts persisted.

Urban design in the late 60s

"Urban design" had already been a part of the city planners’ vocabulary in this city in the late 60s and there was a good ground for a strong urban design program. In 1963, for example, the planning department and an architectural consultant, Mario J. Ciampi, prepared
a general plan and design plan for the downtown and a few concepts developed in those plans became the planning department's policy (San Francisco DCP, 1969c). The Market Street design study carried out for the planning department was also an important urban design study (Mario J. Ciampi and John Carl Warnecke and Associates, 1967). This study represents a major attempt at urban beautification in conjunction with BART construction. A $24 million bond issue was approved by the San Francisco voters in 1968 and the study's beautification proposals were actually carried out. Today, many observers of the San Francisco urban design scene regard the Market Street improvement project as one of the most significant urban design accomplishments in the city in the recent years in terms of the quality of design and the scale of project.

Urban design considerations were also an important part of the downtown zoning study, which was completed in 1966 by the planning staff with the aid of consultants (San Francisco DCP, 1966; Jacobs, 1971: 24). A new planning director found much problem with the study: the proposed zoning was not tied to any explicit plan while some kind of plan was implicit (e.g. to create a more compact, transit-oriented downtown). However, he went along with the study which had been completed after two years and one-half of staff work. Amendments to the planning code involving major rezoning of the downtown area were approved by the Board of Supervisors in 1968.

However active the practice of urban design may have been, principles of good city planning process were not followed in this way and incorporation of urban design considerations was made haphazardly. The city had not articulated urban design guidelines citywide except a general height and form envelope which was implicit in the zoning ordinance. Moreover, there had been a general preoccupation with the area in and around the downtown and only limited attention had been given to design of the rest of the city (San Francisco DCP, 1969c: 47, 48).

The planning staff later observed that, just as there was no overall plan for urban design, there was no overall administrative (implementation) system, no authorized hierarchy of standards and procedures (San Francisco DCP, 1969e: 6). For example, strong public
interest in the views, skyline, and character of development along the northern waterfront had resulted in a series of height limits since 1963. It is only in June 1969, however, that those height limits were related with other development criteria and, together, incorporated into a plan (the Northern Waterfront Plan adopted as an element of the comprehensive plan, San Francisco DCP, 1971d). Street vacation had been controversial for some time, but the city had no standard for giving up street space. Similarly, the city established the process of historic landmark preservation with the Landmarks Preservation Advisory Board in 1967, but the status of historic preservation within urban design objectives and the place of its process within an overall process of urban design were left uncharted.

Without an orderly process to guide development, many of major development projects in the late 60s created conflicts and confrontations between private developers and neighborhood residents and between private developers and city planners. This was problematic since "the results of repeated showdowns [would] almost inevitably be poor design solutions, arbitrary standards and public frustrations". (San Francisco DCP, 1970e: 11)

Without a public statement of what the city should look like (Jacobs, 1978b: 190), design as a matter of personal taste prevailed over urban design as a matter of public interest and there was no way of realizing an orderly process of urban design. Little preparation on the part of city planners matched haphazard reaction of citizens. Allan Jacobs, who had arrived in San Francisco to head the planning department in 1967, immediately saw the problem (Jacobs, 1978b: 190). His approach was to prepare a citywide urban design plan.

**Preparation and Adoption of the Urban Design Plan**

The purpose and nature of a citywide urban design plan

The purpose and nature of a citywide urban design to be prepared can be stated in a few ways. Basically, the planning staff conceived it as a public statement defining the quality of environment for the city. It would address important design-related issues that the city
was likely to face so that it could become a means of expressing public concerns and a basis for community agreement for a better city. Adopted as part of the city's master plan, it would be used as a guide for decision-making in the process of urban design and physical change and help create a sound process in government. The planning staff especially expected that it would provide a framework for private development that would help eliminate costly and divisive conflicts that were becoming characteristic of major building proposals at the time.

Beginning the urban design study

Actual work on a citywide urban design plan began more than a year after Allan Jacobs came to San Francisco, but preparation for the work began without waiting long. There were some pressure and support for such a plan. Many of private design professionals -- architects, landscape architects, and planners -- were calling for a plan both they and their clients would be expected to observe. A Joint Urban Design Committee made up of these professionals urged in late 1966 that without a plan and process for urban design, "San Francisco [was] rapidly throwing away its reputation as the Nation's most beautiful city by following trends that eventually [would] make it unpleasant, either to live or to visit". (Quoted in San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 7) The planning commission was sympathetic, being sensitive to criticism that it was overly concerned with two-dimensional land-use matters (Jacobs, 1978b: 191). It was also the time when Robert Weaver, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, said in San Francisco, "This city and every city long ago should have documented for itself and its citizenry a clear and unequivocal physical design for how the city should look and live and feel and breathe". 3

In 1967, the planning staff, having considered several alternative approaches, decided to undertake a study to prepare a citywide urban design plan which would become a major part of the city's comprehensive plan. The planning department made requests to Mayor Shelly and the Board of Supervisors to hire new staff members with urban design expertise. They responded favorably and the department started to form an urban design team.
Securing funds for the study was a major problem. The planning staff saw no chance of the mayor or Board of Supervisors approving the total cost of the study. However, they soon learned that San Francisco as a county was eligible for the federal comprehensive planning assistance grant (the HUD 701 program). They prepared more detailed study outlines and cost estimates and came up with a proposal for a two-year study costing about $270,000 ($70,000 of local share $90,000 by assignment of the existing staff, and $20,000 from the mayor and Board of Supervisors). It proved to be difficult to obtain even $20,000 from the board, but the board finally approved the budget request in early 1968. An application for the 701 money was approved in June 1968, approximately one year after the decision to undertake an urban design study. Contracts were signed and work commenced at the end of 1968. (Jacobs, 1978b: 194-6)

The urban design study

Jacobs (1978b) offers us a detailed account of the Urban Design Study. According to him, the planning staff had some general idea about the Urban Design Study -- what they would like to do and what they wanted, if not a complete image of the form and content of the final product. They wanted to study the city's natural and man-made physical elements, including topography, views, landmarks, building height, land cover, open space, and transportation systems. The study would be carried out at citywide, district, and neighborhood scales to ultimately produce a citywide urban design plan with objectives, policies, and principles. Research on means of implementing the plan would be an essential part of the study.

The study was carried out in three phases during December 1968 and October 1970. Eight preliminary reports and three special studies marked the completion of important steps in the study. A citizen advisory committee called the Urban Design Advisory Committee was formed at the beginning of the study and played an important role in guiding the study. The committee, regularly meeting to review and criticize the staff's work, acted as a sounding board for the ideas of the staff and eventually became influential in determining the outcome of
the study. During the early period of the study, the staff had to feel out their way and get various studies going. They spent considerable time in preparing detailed study outlines and work programs, considering consultants to be hired, starting hiring special staff for the project (seven individuals), and beginning ground work. Thus, the planning department issued only three preliminary reports during a one-year period of the first-phase study while detailed research by staff and consultants was underway. Those three preliminary reports defined study format, organized available information, and drew up preliminary goals, objectives, and policies to guide the study (San Francisco DCP, 1969a, c, d).

The second phase was to develop and analyze new information in order to determine the strengths and weaknesses of existing physical features and resources in the city (cf. especially Preliminary Report No. 4), the needs and desires of people (cf. especially Preliminary Report No. 6 and the Open Space Study), and the measures that could and should be taken to preserve and improve the urban design character of the city and its districts (cf. especially Preliminary Report No. 5). The fourth preliminary report published in January 1970 marked the beginning of this phase. Much of research by staff and consultants started earlier was contained in this 207-page report consisting of the following four sections (San Francisco DCP, 1970a):

- Quality of environment;
- Internal pattern and image;
- Road environment; and
- External form and image.

The staff had to do much exploration in the search for their direction by this time. The planning director observed in late 1969:

Outside of the meetings [of the Urban Design Advisory Committee], neither committee members nor staff did much to publicize their work. Everyone seemed to be feeling out his way and not too rapidly at that. The work at this point was like a very large pot of stew slowly simmering on a back burner, continually being changed by new additions. (Jacobs, 1978b: 201)

Even after basic data had been compiled (the fourth preliminary report) and an initial direction of the study had been suggested (the third preliminary report), no one knew for sure where the study was heading:
Still, the members [of the Urban Design Advisory Committee] had a hard time digesting and some of them wondered aloud what to do with it [the fourth preliminary report]. If the staff at that point was none too sure, no one let on. (Jacobs, 1978b: 202)

While the ideal of citywide policy planning must be to develop policies and principles upon the analysis of physical inventory data, concerns or issues identified, and goals and objectives articulated at least preliminarily. However, the urban design study team without a clear sense of where they were heading favored a short cut: a set of "fundamental rules of achieving aesthetic and functional urban design goals and objectives for San Francisco" were developed as personal observations of a consultant, Thomas R. Aidala who worked with the planning staff, largely unrelated to the data developed by this time (the fifth preliminary report; San Francisco DCP, 1970b). 5

The presentation of the fifth preliminary report in July 1970 nevertheless (or for this reason) marked a turning point in the study. The planning director found people accepting the proposals of the report as "design truth" about the city. The reaction of the Urban Design Advisory Committee and of the planning commission was enthusiastic and a slide presentation of the report at the annual meeting of the San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association (SPUR) met with similar approval. By the summer of 1970, the planning director felt sure that the final plan would represent "top-notch professional work" while he could not yet anticipate the details or the form of it (Jacobs, 1978b: 205). A "social reconnaissance survey" and a few special studies -- the Open Space Study and the Street Livability Study -- were conducted around this time as well (San Francisco DCP, 1970c; Okamoto/Liskamm, 1969a,b; Appleyard, 1976).

In the third phase, preliminary citywide urban design plans were developed along with district- and sub-neighborhood level studies. October of 1970 saw the following reports:

- Preliminary Report No. 7: Implementation Approach (San Francisco DCP, 1970e);
- District and Sub-Neighborhood Studies; and
Toward the end of 1970, most of the scheduled research and analysis had been completed and final plan proposals were underway. There was a three-month period since the publication of the last preliminary report (citywide urban design plans) for public comments to assist in revisions. A questionnaire distributed with the report brought "a preponderance of responses to the effect that the policies and guidelines were reasonable as proposed" (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 155). (The response to the questionnaire was light, according to Jacobs (1978b: 207).) A significant number of responses stated that there should be more restriction than that proposed and, in the case of the guidelines for building height and bulk, a majority felt that greater restriction was called for (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 155). This was around the time anti-highrise movement was building up.6

Adopting the urban design plan

The staff made major decisions as to the form and presentation of the final proposal as 1970 came to a close. As to the substance of the plan, the staff reviewed all the reports and other materials previously prepared in the study, as well as the opinions and responses given at public meetings, through questionnaires, and by other means. The earlier materials were reorganized, supplemented, and re-expressed to form a unified plan to be proposed in an adoptable form (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 155).

On May 20, 1971, the planning department made its first presentation of the final proposal, The Urban Design Plan for the Comprehensive Plan of San Francisco (San Francisco DCP, 1971b), before an invited audience including the mayor, members of the Board of Supervisors, the planning commission, and citizen advisory committee along with department heads and officers of neighborhood associations. Three more presentations that followed made it clear that the planning department was a winner. Some 1,300 people attended the initial four presentations -- with some people coming back for the second time. Standing room audience cheered at the conclusion of each presentation. Mayor Joseph Alioto praised the plan himself. In June and July, the plan was presented to neighborhood and citywide organizations. During July
or August, the planning commission held three public hearings on the plan and over 100 people and organizations aired their views or submitted written comments. The plan received generally favorable responses throughout. The planning director observed as follows:

Although many minor changes would be made as a result of the hearings, the testimony was not so much concerned with the substance of the plan as it was with implementation. Many people seemed to be saying, "Well of course, but what are you going to do about it? What are you, the commission and staff, going to do to make the plan a reality?" There was a ring of challenge to their words. (Jacobs, 1978b: 214)

The staff had given much thought about possible actions to implement the plan. Given strong citizen concerns on a matter of building height, immediate action to control the height and bulk of buildings citywide was due. The idea was for the staff to make a formal proposal that the planning commission hold hearings on zoning proposals that would reflect the plan's height and bulk guidelines. In San Francisco, a simple resolution of the commission could put the height and bulk guidelines of the plan into immediate force as interim legal controls. The staff would then be given six months to prepare specific zoning standards and maps.

Seven months earlier, members of the planning commission had favored a "go slow" approach for legislating height and bulk controls. However, since Alvin Duskin's first height limit initiative had been placed on the November 1971 ballot (Proposition T), immediate pressure was created for strict citywide height controls. The initiative, if passed, would limit the entire area of the city to six stories or 72 feet in height. They had also seen broad acceptance of the plan. Thus, they were generally positive toward the idea of going ahead with height and bulk controls. In the meeting Commission President Walter Newman arranged on the morning of August 26, Mayor Alioto expressed to the planning director all sorts of reservations about the proposal. However, he did not oppose further after it has been found that two labor leaders were not in opposition. On the same day, the planning commission adopted the Urban Design Plan as an element of the comprehensive plan and, to a surprise to the public, put interim controls on height and bulk of buildings in force in a separate action.
The Urban Design Plan

The final proposal, The Urban Design Plan for the Comprehensive Plan of San Francisco, contained a proposed citywide urban design plan itself along with three brief sections -- "Introduction", "Background", and "Implementing the Plan". An appendix outlined the process and method of the Urban Design Study. The planning commission adopted the plan itself after necessary revisions. The Urban Design Plan as adopted (San Francisco DCP, 1972a) was organized according to four categories of concerns (issues): city pattern, conservation, major new development, and neighborhood environment. In each category, the plan defined essential human needs, set forth an overall objective, and established fundamental principles and policies. Each overall objective was a response to a corresponding set of human needs and the general purpose of recognizing, enhancing, and conserving the special quality of the city. Fundamental principles, expressed as a verbal statement with graphic illustrations described "the measurable and critical design relationships among parts of the environment such as open spaces, buildings, hills and streets". A series of policies were formulated to provide a continuing guide and direction for public and private decisions pursuant to the plan. Altogether, the plan contained four objectives, eighty-six principles, and forty-five policies. No implementation program was prepared for adoption or endorsement, but the "Implementing the Plan" section of the May 1971 document offered a general guide for implementation.

The Urban Design Plan marked a significant change from the plans that had been prepared in San Francisco and in other cities to deal with the design of a city in several respects:

- Urban design was recognized as a major element of the comprehensive plan;
- Urban design was defined in terms of image and behavior;
- The plan was conceived as a policy plan to be used as a process-oriented tool;
- The plan was conceived as a definition of the quality of environment; and
- The plan was prepared as a systematic response to design-related issues of the city.
The fourth characteristic was rather unique to this plan, while the rest of characteristics were shared by some plans prepared in Minneapolis during the mid 60s and the early 70s.

Urban design as an element of the comprehensive plan

The planning staff in San Francisco believed that, while city planning operated at many levels of environment and in different degrees of scope and time duration, it was most effective and meaningful when it fitted within the city's comprehensive plan (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 3). Given a strategic importance of the comprehensive plan, it is significant that they considered urban design as a distinct element of the comprehensive plan for the first time in this city. Adoption of the Urban Design Plan by the planning commission as an element of the comprehensive plan meant public recognition and official use of urban design as an area of public policy.  

Urban design defined in terms of image and behavior

In the Urban Design Plan, urban design was defined in terms of image and behavior:

[Urban design] has to do, above all, with the visual and other sensory relationships between people and their environment, with their feelings of time and place and their sense of well-being. (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 3)

Some ten years after the publication of *The Image of the City*, the concepts and methods Lynch (1960) had presented in the book had already been applied in some American cities. More importantly, his concepts had become an important part of urban designers' way of thinking about the design of the city (e.g. Okamoto and Williams, 1969; Okamoto/Liskamm, 1970a,b). Also a former co-worker of Lynch at MIT, Donald Appelyard, was available for the Urban Design Study as a consultant. It seems natural that Lynch's value premises, concepts, and methods became an important part of the stock of ideas and techniques assembled and applied in the Urban Design Study. Important but difficult task of articulating "sensory relationships between people and their environment" in credible terms (more than as a matter of personal taste) was facilitated by Lynch's theory more than anything else.
To define urban design in terms of public image and behavior meant that urban design became a response to important human needs. This, along with attention to the form structure of the whole city, gave urban design a significant role to play in the entire process of city planning:

Application of good urban design produces a logic and cohesion in the physical form of the city, and a respect for the salient features that give character to the city and its districts. ... In a city such as San Francisco, urban design is inseparable from economic and social vitality, and it has a major role in making the city at the same time more noble and more bearable. (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 3)

A policy plan as a process-oriented tool

The planning staff in San Francisco considered that central to any citywide plan were basic principles and policies. Policy, the substance of the Urban Design Plan, was a guide for decisions and a directive for courses of action affecting the city's physical environment. Thus, unlike a development plan or program to determine precisely what should be done or when or where, the Urban Design Plan was "all-inclusive but more general, indicating types of programs, stating rules, and outlining the nature of appropriate controls" (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 4). The staff did not include any illustrative plan that would give an architectural expression of what the city might look like at some future date, or from which models could be made, because they thought architectural drawings and models tended to draw attention from those central elements (Jacobs, 1978b: 211).

It follows that the Urban Design Plan had to be used and implemented. Use and implementation means such things as follows. Incorporated into the city's comprehensive plan, it should become a lasting set of reference points for rational decision-making in changing the city. It should be a working tool to generate and judge many individual projects, programs, and studies. It should also be a tool to help realize a sound process in government, timely inputs of professional judgement, and adequate means for expressing public concerns -- all that would be essential in bringing problems in planning and urban design, even the most difficult ones, under control
Jacobs (1971: 32). Jacobs (1978b: 220), speculating reasons for successful completion, widespread acceptance, adoption, and early use of the Urban Design Plan, wrote as follows:

It was important to focus on the plan as a policy document. Specific project designs might have diverted attention from the debate about visual aspects of the environment. Even detailed examples of ways to divert or slow neighborhood traffic were placed in a policy context. ... The public was aware of the policy-setting role of the plan ...

A definition of the quality of physical environment

The planning staff in San Francisco saw their urban design plan as a definition of a good environment and urban design as a part of the process of defining the desirable quality of physical environment for a community (Jacobs, 1971: 27; 1978b: 209; San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 3; 1972a: 1). To define quality meant to determine such things as:

- What exists that is good;
- What should be conserved;
- What needs to be improved;
- In what respects changes should be made;
- Where and how future development might occur; and
- What criteria should be applied to proposed changes. (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 11; Svirksy, 1973; Jacobs, 1971: 27)

Policy as "a general course of action leading to the realization of objectives and goals" (San Francisco DCP, 1969a: 25) would not be the best means to convey a definition of the quality of environment. It only suggests the quality which the course of action is intended to bring about. For example, the following policy of the Urban Design Plan says in effect that a good environment in San Francisco is the one in which buildings, when seen together, produce a total effect that characterizes the city and its districts but not directly:

Recognize that buildings, when seen together, produce a total effect that characterizes the city and its districts. (Policy for City Pattern 3, San Francisco DCP, 1972a)

In the Urban Design Plan, it is "fundamental principles" that assumed a primary role of defining the quality of environment. Stated in terms of "what is good or bad" or "what does good or bad things", they expressed directly what sort of quality the city wanted in its environment (e.g. Fundamental Principles for Major New Development in fig.
Principles, like standards, are sometimes included in comprehensive plans. However, the Urban Design Plan as a definition of the quality of environment seems to make incorporation of principles especially effective. Two technical aspects of principles are important in this respect. At first, principles are not mandates ("should" of policy or law). Policies are "necessary" in achieving or approaching the objectives (San Francisco DCP, 1972a: 1), suggesting strong intention for action and readiness for public control. Principles, on the other hand, are suggested courses of action or alternatives ("can"), though maybe essential in some specific context. They educate people and serve as sources of ideas for creative design. Principles in the Urban Design Plan were presented just to "describe" measurable and critical urban design relationships reflecting the needs and characteristics with which the plan was concerned.

The second technical aspect of principles derives from the first one: they can go with examples or situations presented by means of photographs and sketches as in the Urban Design Plan. Commonly used to present design guidelines, illustrations seldom find their way into presentation of policies except in the places where graphic presentation is essential in defining dimensions, locational relationships, etc. Graphic illustrations of specific examples or situations, like models, sketches, and illustrative plans to suggest architectural expression of a future city, tend to be in conflict with an idea of presenting basic design concepts or action directives in policy terms. On the other hand, graphic illustrations can be used to help visualize the verbal definition of principles. They facilitate rather than harm the presentation of basic ideas of principles and make the whole document readable.

Together, these two characteristics of principles helped the planning staff describe important urban design relationships that made the environment of their city desirable. Issues around the visual and sensory quality of the environment, very illusive perhaps, could not have been successfully addressed by policies alone. Extensive use of illustrated principles, then, was an innovation in defining the quality of environment in comprehensive plans.
The relationship of a building's size and shape to its visibility in the cityscape, to important natural features and to existing development determines whether it will have a pleasing or a disruptive effect on the image and character of the city.

A: Tall, slender buildings near the crown of a hill emphasize the form of the hill and preserve views.

B: Extremely massive buildings on or near hills can overwhelm the natural land forms, block views, and generally disrupt the character of the city.

C: Low, smaller-scale buildings on the slopes of hills, at their base and in the valleys between complement topographic forms and permit uninterrupted views.

D: Low buildings along the waterfront contribute to the gradual tapering of height from hilltops to water that is characteristic of San Francisco and allows views of the Ocean and the Bay.

E: Larger, taller buildings can blend pleasantly with small-scaled areas if the change in scale is not excessive and if their form or surface pattern is articulated to reflect the existing scale.

Fig. 2-1. Fundamental Principle for Major New Development 1, the Urban Design Plan (San Francisco DCP, 1972a: 32)
The idea of making the fundamental design principles that have created the desirable form and character of the city explicit and returning to those principles reminds us of Christopher Alexander's theory of pattern language. Fundamental principles of the Urban Design Plan, viewed as "patterns" should guide individual decisions of public and private actors so that they may be made more sensitive to the form and character of the city and, collectively, result in a coherent pattern of physical environment.

A systematic response to design-related issues of the city

The Urban Design Plan may be viewed as a response to important issues of the community which fell within the framework of urban design (Jacobs, 1978b: 190). In fact, the plan in its final form was organized according to an overall framework of four general categories of issues — city pattern, conservation, major new development, and neighborhood environment. Viewed this way, systematic studies of citizen concerns and physical features that defined the form and character of the city were necessary in making the plan responsive to issues which the city was likely to face.

It is important to note, however, that the issue framework of the final plan was not what led the planning staff in the Urban Design Study. Earlier reports were organized according to different frameworks without explicit reference to issues, suggesting that the four-category issue framework came about only at the time of final presentation. A view of the plan as a systematic response to important issues of a community, even if implicit earlier in the process, is nevertheless important since it is consistent with the planning staff's basic orientation to urban design. It must be a view that underlay the importance of citizen inputs throughout the planning process and influenced the staff's choice of approaches to citizen participation and surveys:

If a plan is to be useful and its impact significant, it must be responsive to citizen concerns. Therefore, one of the foremost efforts in the Urban Design Study was to determine what the people of the city identify as the relevant issues. (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 5)
Implementation

The planning staff's orientation to implementation

Since the Urban Design Plan was policy in its substance, it ought to be implemented. Thus, the planning staff drew up their plan with an intent that every policy would be implemented (Svirsky, 1973: 13). Specifically, the staff made a study of "Implementation Approach" a major part of the Urban Design Study. To use a word of Svirsky (1973: 10), the seventh preliminary report "took stock of the various city powers in urban design questions... . In the case of each power, the process of public involvement was reviewed and the relevant parties and their decisions were identified." Means of implementation were reviewed in respect to controls over private development (including zoning and other formal and informal controls) and direct city actions relating to streets (including street improvements and vacation or other release of streets) and other public development (including street priorities, site selection, and facility design). Thus, "this ... report helped to gear the study to practical actions by which the plan would later be carried out". (Svirsky, 1973: 10)

Moreover, the planning staff thought continually about means of achieving desired ends by asking two questions over and over again throughout the Urban Design Study: "How would you carry it out?" and "How realistic is the proposal in terms of its being implemented?" (Jacobs, 1978b: 219-220) The most illuminating example is a case of the height and bulk guidelines in the plan that saw an early legislative action for implementation. The staff was especially careful to make them readily convertible to zoning concepts. They knew that sound zoning concepts had a reasonable chance for enactment since the administrative structure to carry it out was well established.

Finally, the "Implementing the Plan" section of the May 1971 document defined a general approach to implementation (e.g. premises for effective implementation and the need for a "planning-development process") and outlined for the staff and other public and private agencies major actions that should be carried out to implement the plan. Recommendations for more specific courses of action were included as well as general directions for implementation (e.g. education programs and coordination with federal agencies):
Public projects: carrying out the Plan for Street Landscaping and Lighting in future programs ... ("Emphasis on City Pattern: Orientation for Travel");
- Support effort to establish a Golden Gate National Recreation area ("Conservation of Resources: Natural Areas");
- Legislation: designation of historic districts, with immediate action upon the Jackson Square area; and adopt street vacation ordinance ("Conservation of Resources: Richness of Past Development");
- Legislation: develop precise proposals for regulation of height and bulk, using the Guidelines of the Plan ("Moderation of Major New Development: Height and Bulk"); and
- Carry out the Protected Residential Area Plan: detailed planning and execution, preceding design of prototypes and demonstration ("Improvement of Neighborhood Environment: Health and Safety").

Actual use, implementation, and effect of the Urban Design Plan

Over the past ten years since the adoption of the Urban Design Plan, many things happened as consequence of the plan or in relation to it. While they may be discussed in a few different frameworks, I choose the following based on types of action across issue areas and actors:
- Dealing with the quality of environment directly (use and implementation of policies for environment);
- Dealing with the process of urban design (use and implementation of policies for design management system);
- Responding to directives of policies and implementation strategies (use and implementation of policies for action and action strategies); and
- Overall effect.

Since each policy cannot always be classified uniquely into one for environment, management system, or action (cf. Chapter VI), there would be some overlaps between the first three categories. These categories are nevertheless important because they correspond to three essential factors of urban design which policies could define.

Dealing with the quality of environment

Given an initial definition of the Urban Design Plan as a definition of the quality of environment, the strategically most important actions are those to deal with the quality of environment directly. 
Generally, four kinds of actions were taken in this category:

- Legislation of legal standards;
- Implementation through design review;
- Influence — persuasion and education; and
- Most items in the third category (responding to directives of policies and implementation strategies);
  . Translating down to public improvement projects; and
  . Seeking better linkage between the plan and implementation through area planning, prototype design, and development of more specific design guidelines and data.

The first two kinds of action were dominantly directed to private actors. This is understandable given relative importance of private development in San Francisco on the one hand, and orientation of the planning department toward matters that could be controlled by themselves — legislation and influence as means (Jacobs, 1978b: 223) on the other. Public sector actors become important in the third and fourth kinds of action.

At first, policies were translated into legal controls, especially as additions or revisions to the City Planning Code (zoning ordinance):

- The height and bulk ordinance, 1972 (to be discussed below);
- The bay window ordinance, 1973 (Jacobs, 1978b: 217; Staten, 1973; Solomon et al., 1978: 24);
- Comprehensive revision of residential zoning provisions, 1973-78 (San Francisco DCP, 1978a: 136; Jacobs, 1978b: 216-7); and
- Creation of the Jackson Square Historic District (also an action to deal with the process of urban design).

The most illuminating case is the action of the planning commission to put interim citywide height and bulk controls into effect, which subsequently led to the approval of the height and bulk ordinance by the Board of Supervisors in July 1972 "with dispatch" (Jacobs, 1978b: 216). The permanent controls became in effect in September 1972.

The adoption of the height and bulk ordinance was a highly significant event. At first, it was a response to an overriding community concern at the time as testified by heated public debate over two Duskin initiatives, one on the November 1971 ballot (Proposition T) and another on the June 1972 ballot. The event impressed people of the Urban Design Plan at work. As such, it was commonly stated by the public that the Board of Supervisors had "adopted the Urban Design Plan" (Svirsky, 1973: 14). Second, the process of public review and
adoption of the ordinance had an effect of promoting the use of the plan in public debate. The process demonstrated before the public how useful to have common terms of reference in considering matters of urban design (Svirsky, 1973: 13; Jacobs, 1978b: 220). Finally, the passage of the ordinance was an important step forward in implementing the whole Urban Design Plan. The height and bulk guidelines of the plan and the ordinance were drawn up to incorporate objectives, principles, and policies of the plan (e.g. moderating the effect of major new development and respecting the richness of past development), as well as more specific considerations for relating the height and bulk of buildings to the important attributes of the city pattern (e.g. topography, skyline form, clustering, and views) and height, scale, and character of existing development (cf. Policy for Major New Development 5 and 6). As a result, for example, the ordinance contributed to the conservation of the unique and livable character of Telegraph Hill. The ordinance continued the existing strict limitation of heights on and around the hill and, by stepping down heights from the downtown commercial areas across to the hill, aided in containing the downtown growth and directing it away from the hill (Staten, 1973).

It so happened that the planning department proposal for height and bulk controls hit a middle ground between anti-highrise groups (cf. the two Duskin proposals) and business/development interests (e.g. the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce). You might see some parallelism to Catanese's (1974: 105-7) Cui Bono (the Naive Theory) case. The planning staff's success might not have been so much to do with the technical quality of studies leading to the adoption of the ordinance or the content of it as some other "true reasons" that allowed support from the two sides. In fact, several years later, some problems with the ordinance became quite visible in downtown (Skaff, 1978), and the city saw another height-limit initiative attempting to curb the growth of the city and its downtown (Proposition 0 on the November 1979 ballot). I however argue that the long-term effect of the height and bulk ordinance does not tell us much about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the Urban Design Plan and citywide policy planning which produced it. The Urban Design Plan and citywide policy planning created a place for the ordinance. To develop and adopt the ordinance is better
viewed as another set of activities. In fact, the ordinance, while having stemmed from the height and bulk guidelines of the Urban Design Plan, was developed on the basis of much additional work and public discussion.15

The second important kind of actions to implement the Urban Design Plan is use of its principles and policies in formal and informal review procedures applied in "a positive and creative manner" to assure visual harmony of major new development (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 147). Generally, project review means the review of plans for buildings and other projects proposed by either a government agency or a private party in order to determine the urban design implications of those plans and recommend any change that will bring the plans into closer conformity with the Urban Design Plan (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 136). Specifically, the planning commission and the planning department have been exercising the following kinds of review:

- Master Plan referrals;
- Review of capital improvement projects;
- State-mandated environmental review in accordance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) of 1970;
- Review of cases arising under the provisions of the planning code (especially, conditional uses and discretionary reviews of the planning commission); and
- Project reviews carried out on a less formal basis by the planning department, including provision of urban design terms of reference to interested developers and regular communication with developers throughout the review process.

Project review is important at least for three reasons. At first, it puts the city planners in a strategic position to help implement their plan (Jacobs, 1978b: 217). Second, it could be made primarily through extension of existing procedures rather than imposition of new and potentially arbitrary forms of architectural controls (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 147). Finally, it could address design considerations that are difficult to enforce as legal standards, thus, those considerations that are not incorporated into the planning code. Thus, project review helps promote such design considerations as:

- Harmony in the visual relationships and transitions between new and old buildings (Policy for Major New Development 1);
- Contrasts in color, shape, and other characteristics (Policy for Major New Development 2); and
- General efforts to achieve high quality of design (for buildings to be constructed at prominent locations) (Policy for Major New Development 3).
Project review has been successful in implementing some principles and policies of the Urban Design Plan but not others that are supposed to be implemented through project review. This is partly due to the very assumption of the plan: the plan should not mandate principles and policies and allow tradeoffs among them. However, more important are tradeoffs developers make between urban design and economic considerations. Conceivably, project review alone would not be successful in encouraging developers to respect the principles and policies of the plan if they mean additional costs to them, but the plan has not resulted in any revision of the downtown zoning bonus provisions or other new incentives.16

The effect of the third kind of actions -- influence, persuasion, and education -- is less visible but important. At first, the planning staff thought that the Urban Design Plan ought to have an educational effect on developers, builders, and architects, that the plan would alert them of the city's design concerns (San Francisco DCP, 1970b: 2-3). Most people in my interviews agreed that education had been the most significant impact of the plan. On the other hand, insightful observers of the professional practice indicated much doubt about an idea that architects and developers would specifically consult the plan in doing their projects. The plan is general and rather voluminous -- with 155 pages as initially proposed (San Francisco DCP, 1971b) and 57 pages as printed for wide distribution in 1972 (San Francisco DCP, 1972a). Direct communication with the planning staff through project review and informal advice seems to have been more important. Also, in the past several years, the planning department has been increasing the use of design guidelines put together for specific uses rather than the plan itself (San Francisco DCP, 1975b; 1976b; 1979a; and "Design Guidelines for New Development in Downtown" in preparation at the time of my field visit).

The Urban Design Plan was intended for use by all city departments and agencies on matters of urban design in conducting design reviews, developing projects and programs, and making decisions affecting the city (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 2-3). An example is a case Jacobs (1978b: 217) reports: Designers of a major sewer construction project indicated to him in 1977 that they were sensitive to the principles
and policies of the plan. Important as such use of the plan by other
city departments and agencies may be, my interviews suggest that the
impact of the plan in this area is minimal.

More important has been the educational effect of the plan on
the public at large. Jacobs (1978b: 218) wrote:

The plan is significant as an educational document. It
was widely distributed and apparently widely read.
Following its adoption it was quoted in detail by citizens
at public meetings to support or to oppose all sorts of
planning proposals and new projects. It proved to be a
worthwhile aid to citizens in helping to determine the
kind of community they wanted.

This is what the planning staff in the Urban Design Study meant by the
use of the plan as a "general educational document calling public
attention to the city's many design problems and issues" (San Francisco
DCP, 1970b: 2-3) and "widespread agreement on points or terms of refer-
ence" (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 135). Especially significant is the
fact that some neighborhood groups planned for themselves, heavily
drawing from the Urban Design Plan (e.g. Planning Association for the
Richmond, 1972; Mission Housing Development Corporation, 1974; and
Community Design Center, 1979).

Dealing with the process of urban design

It seems natural that we see only few actions to deal with the
process of urban design, given the definition of the Urban Design Plan
as "a definition of the quality of environment". Important actions
were taken in the following areas:

City policy formulation:
- The Urban Design Plan (and its background studies) as
an input into other elements of the comprehensive plan
(e.g. transportation; recreation and open space; and
environmental protection: San Francisco DCP, 1972b,
1973b, 1974);

Legislation of legal procedures:
- Designation of the Jackson Square Historic District
(San Francisco DCP, 1971c; Staten, 1973; Jacobs,
1978b: 216);
- The street vacation ordinance (recommended in the May
1971 document but not actually proposed) (Svirsky, 1973:
14); and

Administrative procedures:
- e.g. Progress in historic preservation.
Especially important was city policy formulation because the general approach to implementation as the planning staff reasoned was dependent on processes in planning. In what they called a "planning-development process", the initial definition of objectives and policies (especially preparation and adoption of master plan elements) should play a crucial role (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 135). A case in point is the recreation and open space element prepared during mid 1970 to mid 1973. This element amplified much of what the Urban Design Plan said about open space (Svirsky, 1973: 14) and led to the establishment of an open space acquisition and park renovation program. This program provides for acquisition of open space, development of new parks and recreational facilities, and renovation of existing properties under the jurisdiction of the Recreation and Park Department as authorized by the San Francisco voters upon the passage of Proposition J in November 1974. Thus, it has much to contribute to the implementation of the Urban Design Plan. Priorities for open space acquisition and renovation were developed as part of the Urban Design Study to begin with (i.e. the Open Space Study). 17

Responding to directive of policies and implementation strategies

The Urban Design Plan itself did not offer much in way of explicit directives for action, but the implementation strategies outlined in the May 1971 document included many that would be necessary in actively translating the plan into actual practice in development and preservation. They included the following kinds of action:

- More studies to link the plan to implementation:
  - Neighborhood planning;
  - Prototype design;
  - Development of more specific design guidelines (San Francisco DCP, 1975b, 1976b, 1979a, and in progress, for project review; San Francisco DCP, 1977a, for education);
  - Development of data bases for better decision-making (e.g. a citywide architectural inventory survey -- San Francisco DCP Annual Report, 1976-77: 10; Ray, 1979: 152);
  - Studies of development controls (not active); and
- Public improvement projects.
Allan Jacobs has considered it important to have an urban design element (or section) in each area plans (in an interview with me, March 1980). As the planning director during 1967-74, he generally practiced according to this conviction (e.g. San Francisco DCP, 1969b; 1971d). Contrasting with this early orientation to urban design in neighborhood planning is that of the planning department in the mid to late 70s, which is characterized by unpretentiousness. At a neighborhood or district level, urban design was not recognized as a distinct area of concern as housing, recreation and open space, community facilities, economic development, transportation, and land use/zoning were. Generally, neighborhood planners did not think they had systematically considered urban design or specifically attempted to incorporate principles and policies of the Urban Design Plan in their work. There was little way to do so in the first place. Generally, they were not trained in urban design and the staffing situation that became increasingly tight in the 70s took urban designers' time away from neighborhood planning.

Thus, it is surprising to find plans, upon close examination, did incorporate some of the important principles and policies of the Urban Design Plan in their recommended strategies and actions. Examples are as follows:

- Consistent use of one kind of street trees on thoroughfares surrounding a neighborhood to emphasize the edges of traditional neighborhood boundaries (San Francisco DCP, 1977d: 25) (cf. Policy for City Pattern 5);
- Creation of street mini-plazas (widening of sidewalks at intersections -- "bulbs") to slow traffic and increase recreational use of streets (San Francisco DCP, 1977d: 47) (cf. Policy for Neighborhood Environment 11); and

Two factors seem important. At first, principles of the Urban Design Plan had perhaps become an important part of neighborhood planners' working knowledge of neighborhood improvement techniques. Also, materials put in earlier plans in which the planning staff consciously incorporated urban design considerations must have been handed down
to neighborhood planners who worked on subsequent neighborhood plans. Second, there must have been public acceptance of urban design-related objectives and policies to support planners' proposals for strategies and actions that derived from principles of the Urban Design Plan and, perhaps, even demand for incorporating them into neighborhood plans. The Urban Design Plan from which many decisions, actions, and projects stem has been at work in this way.

Given limited resources, the planning staff worked to assist efforts of various neighborhood groups as requests came more than they did neighborhood planning on their own to implement the Urban Design Plan. To take a case of the Plan for Protected Residential Areas, a high-priority and major departmental program that encompassed many aspects of conservation and improvement, the staff's work in the early to mid 70s focused on development of a series of detail sheets further amplifying the prototypes given in the Urban Design Plan with addition of cost estimates. The purpose of this activity was to assist neighborhood groups interested in studying their own areas and developing plans with basic data and design alternatives. (Staten, 1973) Once neighborhood groups' efforts began, the staff's role was to provide design concepts, cost estimates, and other technical advice as needed, as well as plan review and critique. The staff also tried to play a coordinative role between neighborhood groups and appropriate city agencies and explored all possible ways to secure funding and action. Actual implementation of protected residential area projects was the responsibility of the Department of Public Works and the planning department's role in coordination was limited. While "demonstration" was especially important in stimulating community interest in new concepts like this (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 136), the planning department had to wait for opportunities — neighborhood groups' requests and funding.

As a case of the Haight-Ashbury neighborhood planning study suggests, neighborhood planning is more than simple detailing or application of principles and policies of the comprehensive plan to a specific context.18 To make neighborhood planning a way of linking the comprehensive plan to specific programs and projects, it must be
viewed as a process of creating support and commitment for a better neighborhood on the part of neighborhood residents. Viewed this way, it can be expected that neighborhood planning is more successful in cases in which neighborhood groups request the city to do planning for them or, better, they do planning on their own. Cases in point are programs of the Planning Association for the Richmond (1972) and the Mission Housing Development Corporation (1974). The Jordan Park Improvement Association developed specifically a protected residential area plan for their district building upon the Urban Design Plan and detail sheets (Staten, 1973). In these cases, the planning staff's ideal of comprehensive planning (preparation of a citywide urban design plan) followed by neighborhood planning, which in turn would clear ways for specific projects to implement urban design policies, was realized well. The most important projects were those to implement the protected residential area concept. In cases of the Richmond and Inner Mission Districts, the planning department did follow-up studies (San Francisco DCP, 1975a; 1975c; 1976a). This helped move neighborhood groups' recommendations forward to implementation.19

Besides some protected residential area projects, there were not many public improvement projects worth noting. Redevelopment, urban beautification, code enforcement, and rehabilitation programs all slowed in the mid 70s (Jacobs, 1978b: 217). There were no major road projects. Moreover, public improvement projects depended much on availability of funds and priorities that were set outside the sphere of influence of the planning commission and staff. Generally, implementation that dealt with capital improvements and programs that required continuing coordination among city and regional agencies or which depended upon federal funding were difficult (Staten, 1973). The planning department's role in these cases had to be one of advocate and coordinator who in fact was rather weakly empowered. It seems appropriate to see that, in most cases of projects that were actually executed, the planning department's efforts or the influence of the Urban Design Plan followed rather than preceded.20 The Urban Design Plan, however, has been a valuable guide for the city planners deciding upon project proposals even if they were initiated and controlled by outside agencies (e.g. master plan referrals).
Overall Effect

In assessing the overall effect of the Urban Design Plan, it is important to note that the contribution of the plan is all relative to what used to be, however deficient the plan itself and specific measures like project reviews that have been taken to implement it may be. What seems most significant is the institutionalization of a set of urban design objectives, principles, and policies in the process of decision-making administered by the planning commission and the planning department. The plan has been used as a guide for a great variety of decisions by the city planners with much citizen support and participation (e.g. public hearings). It is such that even critics of the plan (e.g. anti-highrise groups like San Francisco Tomorrow and San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth) use the plan in their argument before the planning commission when specific projects are considered. In addition, it has become an important part of the way San Franciscans see the environment of the city, discuss about it, and plan for it. The effect of this has been an overall improvement of the process of development as the planning staff in the Urban Design Study hoped — better incorporation of the important community values into development decisions, more timely input of professional judgement from government urban designers, etc. Public controversies over development projects — especially those that are related to design characteristics of the city, its neighborhoods, and buildings — have been significantly reduced. Also, developers and architects seem to have become more aware of public concerns and ready to cooperate with the planning staff (Jacobs, 1978b: 250).

Visible use of the Urban Design Plan seems to have been reduced significantly several years after its adoption. Copies of the plan have been no more available in the past few years to begin with. Viewed another way, this is an indication of the institutionalization that has taken place within several years after its adoption in the forms of zoning standards, specific design guidelines, neighborhood plans, and the way citizens discuss about their environment. If the plan really helps the staff in assuring that decisions are made in "the best long-range interests" of the city as they hope (Jacobs, 1978b: 250), that seems to be a bonus, although that was in fact the primary
impetus to comprehensive planning.

Epilogue

Issues around San Francisco’s approach

Exemplary as it is, the Urban Design Plan is not free from problems. Some of them are problems of the plan itself. Obviously, there are design-related concerns that were or have become important but were not addressed in the plan (e.g. factors of ground-level pedestrian amenity; bulk of building groups and districts). Also, there are important relationships that were not considered in the plan (e.g. between building bulk and shape -- problems of seemingly bulkier octagonal plan). Given that some of these problems could be resolved as a matter of detailing, the fact that not much area planning, especially downtown planning, has taken place in the city compounds these problems.

Other problems of the Urban Design Plan, perhaps more important ones, are those of the entire comprehensive plan. It should be reminded that the Urban Design Plan was developed primarily according to principles of visual design. Once completed, they were not adjusted to incorporate considerations that were made in other elements of the comprehensive plan. Moreover, the entire comprehensive plan did not systematically address some important issues -- issues of development and growth of the city and its downtown, especially. Highrises were more than a matter of views and images and the whole amount of development that could take place in the city and its downtown was in question. However, growth implications of the height and bulk controls, social and economic, were not directly addressed in studies to develop the height and bulk guidelines and the subsequent ordinance. Thus, highrise issues, which appeared to have been calmed down with the adoption of the Urban Design Plan and the passage of the height and bulk ordinance, had to emerge again, this time much more clearly as issues of development and growth (cf. the SPUR's highrise report in 1975 and the Proposition 0 in the November 1979 ballot). Given that many urban design issues (e.g. sunlight on sidewalks and plazas) were
reflection of much deeper issues of development and growth, it seems natural that the Urban Design Plan in the face of strong development pressure downtown has been rather powerless in dealing with them.

Finally, ineffectiveness of the Urban Design Plan as it has been used and implemented owes much to ineffectiveness of specific design controls (implementation measures) -- things other than overall approach to urban design (e.g. comprehensive planning vs. incrementalism). Taking the downtown zoning bonus system as a case, until recently bonuses had been offered to plazas that were located to the north of buildings, creating rather unusable shady places at the cost of more building, more shadow, more traffic congestion, etc. The height and bulk ordinance offers us another case. There is an apparent looseness or slack in the height envelope. An important assumption, creating "downtown hill", has not been successfully realized because buildings have fallen short of the envelope at the downtown core and risen higher than expected at its periphery. There are also some unaddressed questions: Why do you control bulk of individual buildings, while leaving spacing of buildings and an overall bulk of the district unregulated?

To put it another way, problems of the Urban Design Plan are problems of the way it has been used and implemented. A part of the ideal in city planning is comprehensive-plan making followed by area planning, which would link policy to specific projects and programs to implement it. In San Francisco, active neighborhood groups have helped bring the reality close to this ideal but the planning department did little itself. Implementation through public improvement projects has had to remain opportunistic. Similarly, another part of the ideal -- from comprehensive plans to specific controls -- has not been followed in crucial areas. The result, for example, was rather uncoordinated sets of controls in downtown: the zoning bonus system and the height and bulk ordinance. Less than systematic methods like various kinds of project reviews that are made case by case have barely mitigated this problem. To see the years that followed the adoption of the Urban Design Plan in a perspective, significant actions to implement it took place only in the first half of the 70s. We see the comprehensive revision of the residential
zoning provisions and the beginning of the open space acquisition and park renovation program in the late 70s but they were initiated around 1973-74.

Finally, the intent of the city planners who prepared the 1968 downtown zoning revision, the Urban Design Plan, and the height and bulk ordinance was to frequently monitor their effects along with development trends. This has not been realized. Without monitoring the effect of earlier plans and controls, effective learning through experience has not taken place. It has taken more time to see emerging problems clearly (e.g. amenities of the downtown environment) and the planning department has had little way of dealing with them as they become visible.

The city planners are not to be blamed. The planning department with the increasingly tightening budget and staffing situation has had no resources to maintain an active program of implementation and monitoring. In fact, the whole thing called "research and development" in private sector terms that must be required for the city to remain competitive has been neglected, especially in the late 70s (Rai Okamoto, planning director, in San Francisco DCP Annual Report 1978-79). For past several years, the planning department has been pointing out the need for a downtown conservation and development plan which would redefine regulatory structure in downtown, without seeing funding for such a plan.

Is it worth preparing a citywide urban design plan if no systematic action can be taken to implement it and resources are too limited to keep monitoring its effect? Review of uses and effects of the Urban Design Plan has offered a case for having a citywide urban design plan (especially in the area of neighborhood planning and review of private development projects in San Francisco).

Increased public awareness about conservation and growth management issues and a sense that the Urban Design Plan has not been doing its job well in the downtown and in some other areas, especially during the late 70s, has been creating strong pressure for more city planning. With the successful placement of the third height-limit initiative on the November 1979 ballot, the planning department finally saw the city fund the first phase of the long-awaited downtown study.
(The study was completed in October 1979 and the Proposition 0 was defeated at a close margin -- 98,248 to 82,333.) While the planning department has not been successful in securing necessary funds for the second and the third phases of the study (by late 1980), the pressure for a comprehensive look at downtown conservation and growth issues has remained with anti-highrise groups standing ready for further action, possibly another initiative (San Francisco Progress, December 5, 1979). This pressure must be beneficial to the further development of the San Francisco urban design program.

Reflecting the context of the San Francisco urban design program

San Francisco seems to have a special environment that supports a citywide urban design plan -- especially in the late 60s and early 70s. Presented below is a brief discussion of the following factors:

- The general social-political environment of the city: demand and support from the people of the city;
- The urban design capability;
- The already advanced theories and techniques of urban design; and
- The governmental context: relative independence of the planning function in the San Francisco government and discretion of the planning director.

At first, there were demand, pressure, and support for immediate public action to protect the form and character, and livability, of the city (Jacobs, 1978b: 191; San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 7-8). A doubt had been increasing among San Franciscans during the 60s about the virtue of continued growth in the city, especially about highrises in downtown. Major development projects tended to be controversial throughout the city. The city's superb environmental setting was unequalled by other major cities in this country and San Franciscans were well aware of the rich but fragile nature of their assets. In this city, it was not just urban design-related issues raised citywide that were important, but the scale of city mattered: city-scale views and image of the city as a whole. Urban design studies short of citywide ones would fail to address the most important issues in the design of this city and have only limited uses.
It is significant that the planning director was the urban designer in this city. Allan Jacobs, upon his arrival in San Francisco, saw a need to develop a citywide urban design plan. He was ready to exercise his leadership in initiating and carrying out a major study to produce such a plan. Also, the planning staff was relatively strong in the area of urban design (Jacobs, 1978b: 7) and the department was ready to expand already existing urban design capability to support a major study. Moreover, there were additional planning resources available in the San Francisco-Berkeley area. Especially important were urban design talents necessary for such study. Some major planning and urban design consultants located their offices in San Francisco and some faculty members at the University of California at Berkeley were among those who had been leading the urban design scene of this country.

Less visible but crucial was the fact that the theories and techniques of urban design had already been well developed by the late 60s. On the one hand, there had been only a limited number of precedents in citywide or city-scale urban design studies in this country. Little knowledge had been shared among professionals about experience of cities in this new area of practice. Virtually no other cities had ever formulated urban design policies for a city as a whole on the basis of systematic studies of physical form and character. On the other hand, there was no major breakthrough necessary technically. Advanced theories and techniques allowed the production of tangible outputs in a study in a relatively short period of time.

Finally, the San Francisco government gave the planning director a broad range of discretion in defining his approach. This was because the city's administrative structure put the planning department under the planning commission which had relatively independent power over city planning. With some tradition of city planning and comprehensive plan making, there was no problem of securing the status of city planning or comprehensive planning involved in embarking on the preparation of a citywide urban design plan. Financing was a major problem, but the federal 701 program limited the local share of the cost of comprehensive planning to one-third of the total cost and allowed the planning department to have only limited dependence on the city's
coffer. You might also add that highly dispersed nature of the city's government stimulated and supported the planning staff's idea of developing sophisticated methods of communication and control in urban design such as a citywide urban design plan, while the same factor made urban design difficult to practice.

Considering these factors, it is not surprising to find an urban designer who subscribed to a comprehensive plan (Jacobs, 1978b: 190; Herald, December 11, 1978a) chose to conduct a major study ("comprehensive planning") to quickly produce a citywide urban design plan.
CHAPTER III
CASE STUDY 3: THE CITYWIDE URBAN DESIGN FRAMEWORK,
AN IMPOSSIBLE DREAM IN DALLAS?

Introduction

In 1971, a nationally recognized planner/urban designer came to Dallas to head the urban design division newly established in the planning department. Only a few years later, his division with an active program of urban design surprised the people of the city and many professionals in this country by winning national recognition for design excellence (e.g. the 1974 HUD Design Award). According to Andrew Euston (1975), HUD urban design program officer and chairman of the HUD Design Award jury, Dallas had the most innovative urban design concept of any major American city. The urban design director himself later wrote as follows:

The design office has become an important unit of the city's administration, because its program is structured within the city's decision-making processes, which are in turn closely linked to overall growth management. (Lu, 1979: 33)

This is a surprising achievement given that the planning department had just been reorganized to do more than zoning administration around the time. Both city planning (especially comprehensive planning) and urban design had been virtually non-existent in the Dallas government in the 60s. Never before had the city been known for good urban design or city planning.

On the other hand, the Dallas urban design program accomplished little in the late 70s. You learn that major development decisions in the city were made without much input from the urban design staff (e.g. ReUnion Project). Talking with some architects and planners in the city, you learn that many of them see the urban design division's work quite disjointed, just having several nice projects like Akard
Street Mall and Thanksgiving Square here and there beside its relative success in historic preservation. They find the division largely unsuccessful in affecting the city's important decisions and creating a network of relationships with city departments that would be essential to an effective urban design program. They tend to think that the urban design staff emphasized too much on actual physical design (e.g. Akard Street Mall) at the cost of influence on the decision-making process.

How can such widely divergent observations be possible? What happened around the Dallas urban design program? As we shall see, the Dallas urban design program was very active, multi-faceted, and complex, even if it was small. Divergence in observation, I think, is one indication of the richness of the urban design program. Different groups of people saw different facets of the program. It follows that in what perspective I see the program could make my observation quite different. My task of writing a short case report, then, must be a difficult and challenging one.

In this chapter, I will give my attention primarily to the staff's approach to urban design that was carried out on a citywide basis -- what they called "jointed-incrementalism" -- and how it worked. At the end of this chapter, I will speculate what affected the nature of urban design practice in this city.

Dallas: an unplanned city of phenomenal growth

The City of Dallas, Texas, was originally founded in 1841 as a small village encampment on the Trinity River, and has since seen a phenomenal growth. The city today has the seventh largest population in this country (844,401 in 1970) and encompasses a huge area of 350 square miles within its city limit. The city forms one of two centers of an eleven-county region called Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex, some 2.4 million in population (as of 1970). This is one of the fastest growing urban areas, boasting one of the strongest regional economies in this country.

Dallas is a city of business run by businessmen for businesses and real estate development is the big business in this city. Developers in this city are those with real power to influence the city's development decisions and, in fact, move the whole city. (Robert Folsom, a North
Dallas developer, has been the mayor since 1976.) Important part of Dallas' politics is played out in a place difficult for city planners to reach. Much persuasion takes place on golf courses, over drinks, and in private gatherings (Betty C. Ecker, News, April 28, 1974). The Goals for Dallas program is indicative of the nature of power structure in this city: there haven't been strong neighborhood-based groups. The early 70s was the era of rising neighborhood interests in Dallas as well. However, neighborhoods meant deteriorating inner-city neighborhoods and those with little power. In this city, discussions and politics that have been played out before the public are not as powerful as you might see on the surface.

Dallas as a city of business goes back to 1907 when the powerful business leaders who were getting increasingly dissatisfied with the reality of an aldermanic government formed an association to institute a City Commission. The City Commission governed the city untill it gave way to the council-manager form of government in 1931. Today, an eleven-member city council, including the directly elected mayor, runs the city through a city manager. The city manager and his office, the Office of Management Services, act as intermediaries between the general city service departments under him (including city planning) and the decision-making administrative boards (e.g. Parks and Recreation) and legal and financial departments.

Dallas has always been with problems associated with its phenomenal growth. As early as the 1870s, after the railroads had come, congestion on the business streets downtown was no new problem. The streets of the city were not planned -- they just grew. (Reece, 1976) The first real challenge to this unplanned city was the 1908 flood of the Trinity River. As a result, the leaders of the city formed an organization called the Dallas City Plan and Improvement League, which hired a planning engineer George E. Kessler. Kessler's master plan presented in October 1910 called ambitious projects which were "a little too rich for Dallas' frontier blood" at the time (Reece, 1976), but in some twenty years some of major projects proposed were completed.

Since then, however, Dallas has remained in the business of getting bigger, richer, and busier, away from city planning (Reece, 1976). Problems of growth -- congestion, delivery of services, etc. --
remained unaddressed.

The situation began to change in the early 60s. The city council became less interested in economy and more in projects to improve the city, reflecting the changes in the outlook of the business community and probably also of the electorate. (Kovner, 1969) (During the 60s only, the city's population increased some forty per cent, adding some 40,000 new residents). Growth management was beginning to be a real community concern. The city had come close to a point where it could not afford to grow without limit. Problems created by the unparalleled growth in the northern half and neglect in the southern half of the city were increasingly visible (Stahl, 1980). The fact that Dallas had little historic heritage and unspectacular natural landscape did not make those resources unimportant. 1

In parallel to the nation-wide environmental movement, awareness of pollution, energy, and protection of natural and man-made resources increased as the 60s went by. People in Dallas were increasing their expectation that the city government should take some action to ensure the quality of their lives and the future of the city.

Goals for Dallas: a victory of "comprehensive planning"

In 1964, an old mayor resigned and the city council appointed Erik Jonsson to the council and, then, chose him as acting mayor. Jonsson was an immensely wealthy and prestigious businessman who had been active in civic affairs. It was known that he wanted to "repay Dallas for all it had done for him" with public service of some kind (Kovner, 1969). On November 11, 1964, in an address before the Dallas Rotary Club, Mayor Jonsson proposed the main idea of what was later to become the Goals for Dallas Program: "We in and for beautiful Big D develop goals for Dallas ... to ensure accomplishments of the level and scope which we desire and of which we are capable." (Jonsson, 1966) The idea was to bring the best minds together to solve the problems of Dallas by the methods of research and analysis and the formal planning system that had been successful in big business. As applied to a city, the program would be a form of participatory democracy, involving citizens in debating and deciding the future of the city and communicating their wishes to public and private organizations changed with specific
functions of the city. (Goals for Dallas, 1979c)

In the spring of 1965, Jonsson ran for the mayor's seat, campaigning for his goals program. Jonsson won an overwhelming victory with seventy-three per cent of vote. This gave him a popular mandate to engage in "comprehensive planning". The Goals for Dallas program was formally instituted in December 1965 as a privately financed project, with Jonsson providing most of the fund. The program followed Jonsson's three-stage process with massive citizen participation:

1) Setting goals by widespread citizen participation, 1965-1967;
2) Developing plans and priorities for achieving those goals, 1967-1969; and
3) Evaluating progress toward achieving the goals, 1970-1972, and revising goals as circumstances change. (Goals for Dallas, 1979c)

More than 50,000 people attended neighborhood meetings in the goal-setting stage and over 50,000 people, in the planning stage. Newspaper and mail surveys were conducted during the process to ensure the formulation of broad-based goals.

Dallas had been a city of free enterprise. The idea of council-manager government was, among other things, to maintain an efficient government -- a small government which would keep interference in private businesses minimal. The city had been largely without city planning and design controls for fear that these should interfere in private businesses and hinder development and economy. The beginning of the goals program became a turning point:

Alden Deyo, director of the city plan office, says, Dallas needs a comprehensive plan. ... Dallas City Manager Scott McDonald said he is personally in favor of a comprehensive plan.\(^2\) City councilman Jack Moser said he believes the city needs a comprehensive plan. Dallas Mayor Erik Jonsson... 

Goals for Dallas (1967, 1970 as revised) presented twelve general goals, each accompanied by a set of specific goals. The goal of overriding importance, thus presented first, was the government of the city:

We should continuously examine our government to assure that it is sufficiently representative and
responsive to the needs of the area and its people. ...

Second on the list was the design of the city:

We demand a city of beauty and functional fitness that enhances the quality of life for all its people. A series of studies and plans must be made which will become a continuing dynamic, living design for our city.

Nowhere in the document was any explicit statement that the design of the city was second only to the government of the city in its importance as some took (Euston, 1975; Webb, 1976; and News, August 29, 1969), but the order of presentation inevitably suggested the strategic importance of this goal among others such as health, welfare, and the economy of the city. Special attention given to this goal, if only implicit, is not surprising, however. The image of Dallas as a beautiful city was important in the mind of Mayor Jonsson (1966). More importantly, it was the time of rising concerns about the problems of growth in Dallas. The design of the city, especially comprehensive planning, was the beginning of the future. Achievement of other goals like transportation and communication, recreation and entertainment, and cultural activities would hinge upon the physical framework of the city.

Birth of the Dallas urban design program: the planning department reorganization and creation of the urban design division

The Goals for Dallas program proved to be very influential, affecting many decisions in the Dallas government. As early as August 1970, Goals for Dallas (1970: x) reported that work was under way on almost ninety per cent of the goals and some had already been achieved. During the evaluation stage, they found that seventy-five per cent of the goals were well on their way to being achieved (Goals for Dallas, 1979c). Regarding the design of the city goals, the first two of ten specific goals in the document adopted in 1967 were specifically concerned with the organization of the city planning function within government:

1. Develop a continuous and coordinated city planning process; to that purpose strengthen the Department of City Planning.
2. Appoint a Municipal Design Advisory Commission to counsel city officials.

(Goals for Dallas, 1967)
The proposal for achieving the goals specifically recommended the locus, role, staffing, and budget of the new department to be called the Department of Planning and Urban Development (DPUD) (Goals for Dallas, 1969: 192; 12). The impact of these recommendations was significant. The city took a series of actions largely following them. With voters approval of 1968, the city council activated a charter revision in 1969 with a new ordinance, creating the Department of Planning and Urban Development. James T. Schroeder, Jr., was appointed as acting planning director. A major reorganization of the planning department to more than double the staff (a staff of 142 was authorized) was announced in June 1969 and the staff was actually increased to 86 permanent and 22 part-time members by mid 1970. Two branches then existed were expanded into five including urban design.

Meantime, Manager McDonald officially directed a request from Schroeder to the Dallas Chapter of the American Institute of Architects for assistance in the development of goals, guidelines, and priorities for the urban design division. Subsequently, in July 1969, the AIA Dallas Chapter formed the Urban Design Task Force as a panel of architects, urban designers, and planners. The first set of recommendations mapping the initial course of the urban design division came out in September 1970 (The Urban Design Task Force, Dallas, 1970). The Urban Design Task Force was also instrumental in recruiting Weiming Lu, then chief of the environmental design team, from the City of Minneapolis. Lu became the Assistant Director for Urban Design (the urban design director hereafter) early in 1971 and began an active program of urban design with a new staff.

The Urban Design Staff's Approach to Urban Design

Comprehensive approach as an ideal

The urban design director was a comprehensive planner. He regarded "comprehensive approach" as one of three main characteristics of the Dallas urban design program along with interdisciplinary team work and active public participation:

People are increasingly aware that the quality of life relates to the quality of the environment, and they demand
more commitment to solve environmental problems. A comprehensive approach generally proves the most productive in addressing urban environmental issues. A specific problem seldom is resolved in isolation, but through measures tailored to serve interrelated community goals. ... Dallas' urban design program consistently has promoted -- and been an example of -- the application of a comprehensive approach to meet the challenge of enhancing the urban environment. (Lu, 1979: 49)

To use a language of the Urban Design Committee of the American Institute of Planners (ca. 1976), which the urban design director chaired in the mid 70s, urban design had to be "inextricably linked to all levels of government and institutional process". Interdisciplinary teamwork and the high-voltage staff were essential requirements for dealing with diverse design issues in a systematic manner.

With support from outside groups like the Goals for Dallas and the Urban Design Task Force, he was able to begin an urban design program with a broad definition of urban design. The division's responsibilities, according to him, included the following among others as well as the development of design frameworks to deal with the city's visual form:

- Improvement of the decision-making process affecting city design;
- Assistance in the refinement of administrative and budget procedures for the division, the department, and the city; and
- Programs to increase public awareness and support for urban design and improvement of urban environment.

(Lu, 1979: 38)

The urban design division's work encompassed, "all aspects of environmental quality, ranging from street sociology and downtown economic viability to creating new urban spaces and strengthening a sense of civic identity" (Lu, 1979: 33). 4

The key element of the "comprehensive approach" was the development of citywide and community design frameworks. The work was to identify issues, formulate goals, order priorities, and articulate city policy regarding the built environment. Standards and principles would evolve out of this work to guide large- and small-scale decisions. (Lu, 1979: 38)

A work program for a citywide urban design framework was prepared as early as 1971 (ca.) (Dallas DPUD, 1971a). The work program as proposed (or considered) recommended that the urban design staff start a series of surveys and analyses in October 1971 and complete urban design framework
and structures for ecology, visual form, and visual image in two years.  

Jointed-incrementalism as a model for practice

As we shall see, this work program was never followed systematically while the preparation of a comprehensive plan including urban design was a mandate from the Goals for Dallas (1970: 39-42). The planning department could not afford a luxury of doing one-time studies to prepare an all-inclusive plan for the city. Its attention in comprehensive planning in the late 60s to the early 70s was directed primarily to overriding issues of growth management (the land use element). Neither was the urban design division ready to go ahead with a major citywide urban design study to immediately complete the citywide urban design framework. Initially, staff size was small and staff capability yet to be developed.

The Dallas urban design program, rather, evolved as the result of the urban design staff striving for the ideal of what Lu called "jointed-incrementalism". Lu (1979: 83-5) has not offered us a precise definition of this strategy. To characterize it according to him, it was a response to "a challenge before the field of public administration ... to devise ways to minimize the disjointed nature of incremental decision-making". To realize "jointedness", long-range goals (comprehensive planning which includes urban design) would help but there also needs to be a realistic agenda of short-range projects keyed to maximizing the long-range goals.

Implementation of the jointed-incrementalism approach

Lu (1979: 39-42) has distinguished three stages in actual development of the Dallas urban design program. During 1971-72, the urban design staff selected relatively noncontroversial projects that would show results in a reasonably short time. It was essential for a newly created office to demonstrate what it could do, establish its own identity, and develop relationships with public and private interests, while starting basic studies. Akard Street Mall and Thanksgiving Square (underground pedestrian pathway redesign in conjunction with Phillip Johnson's design of the square itself) are examples of early "demonstration
projects". The large projects that were carried out later in this stage included the Study 10 completed in July 1972 as part of the Community Analysis Program (CAP). Surveys for the citywide urban design framework were initiated in two areas: the ecological study and the historic landmarks survey. Outside consultants played essential roles in providing necessary technical expertise and augmenting the young staff in these highly specialized areas of concern.

The urban design division entered an intermediate stage in 1973. The staff started to tackle more long-term, increasingly complex, and often more controversial projects. Positive results from those projects were not necessarily visible immediately. Also important during this stage were more of basic studies. The visual form survey was carried out and the inventory data was published in July 1974. A systematic study of visual image had to wait till 1976 but the staff instituted public attitude surveys as component of various planning projects. This helped them understand public attitudes toward neighborhoods and priorities for solving problems. The staff began to work on their own and learned themselves in these studies.

The urban design division began to mature in 1975. The office was firmly established and could take on projects of still greater scope and complexity, including growth strategy (the planning department's work on the comprehensive land use policy plan) and an urban design framework for the city. As we shall see later, the urban design program began to meet serious obstacles around this time, however. The preparation of a citywide historic preservation plan had remained to be on the agenda of the planning department for quite some time (Dallas CPC Annual Reports, 1973-74, 74-75, and 75-76). In 1976, a systematic survey of neighborhood identity and environment was carried out without the staff seeing the completion of the entire analysis and the publication of the data.

As Lu (1979: 84) has suggested, environmental planning and management activities represents a rather successful application of the jointed-incrementalism approach. I will at first review how this approach worked in this area. I will then point out some "jointedness" that is found in the area of neighborhood conservation and historic preservation and discuss inherent problems of disjointedness in this approach.
Success in environmental planning and management

The urban design staff completed no comprehensive policy framework to work from but successive projects carried out opportunistically in the area of environmental planning and management were effectively linked to next ones and to a larger purpose of developing an urban design framework. Crucial to the relative success in this area are two factors:

- A systematic data base and staff capability developed early in the program (a citywide ecological study); and
- A comprehensive agenda developed in corporation with an outside group (Dallas Environmental Quality Committee, 1974).

These and accumulating experience allowed the staff to anticipate new problems and increase ability to deal with city officials, developers, etc.

At first, increased environmental concerns in the city resulted in the urban design staff's early effort in the ecological study during 1971-73. In 1973, the staff completed the study with major technical assistance from consultants, scientists, and environmental groups and support from a council-appointed citizens committee called the Environmental Quality Committee. An ecological data bank thus developed helped the urban design staff identify "fragile zones" and became part of the basis for critical decisions on large-scale physical changes. The most dramatic example of the use of the data was the escarpment study during 1974-75. City officials reviewing a plan for a $200 million "new-town-in-town" project to cover 1,800 acres of the city areas consulted the data bank and found that some of streets designed to cut through the project would severely damage the ecologically fragile White Rock escarpment. The urban design staff worked with the developer, developed guidelines for the escarpment area, helped him to revise the plan and assisted the city redraw street routes. Subsequent to this study, the city adopted policies for the escarpment area and rezoned critical areas (Dallas DUP, 1977b; Lu, 1979; 54).

The ecological study also became a basis for later work in the area of flood plain management. Flooding had been a major problem in the city and region due to rapid development of unimproved land and encroachment of flood plains over years. Goals for Dallas (1970) thus called for the
preparation of an areawide drainage plan to insure an effective flood control program. In 1975, the urban design staff initiated the Newton Creek study in anticipation of a flood plain management problem. This enabled them for major responsibilities in the Upper White Rock flood plain management study (Lu, 1979: 85). The latter study was carried out in 1976 and guidelines were drafted by the urban design staff working under the supervision of the city manager's office and in corporation with the city attorney's office and the public works and parks developments. In November 1976, the city council adopted a set of general guidelines governing filling in all flood plains without management plans. (Dallas DUP, 1977c and d; Lu, 1979: 85) The product of the flood plain management study, together with that of the escarpment study, became an important part of input to the natural open space plan completed in 1979 (an element of the comprehensive plan).

Another source of "jointedness" went back to 1972. Upon the city council's request, the urban design staff started a program of technical assistance to the Environmental Quality Committee. This expert citizens' committee was authorized by Mayor Eric Jonsson's council in September 1971 and appointed by Mayor Wes Wise's council in January 1972 with a mandate to survey environmental conditions citywide and recommend environmental policy to the city council. The committee conducted a series of studies, field investigation, and public hearings for two years and developed a comprehensive set of goals and policy recommendations. The committee's 185-page report, covering ten areas of environmental concerns, was intended to be a comprehensive framework for future action of the city (Dallas Environmental Quality Committee, 1974). Subsequently, the city council established a permanent committee in November 1975 to monitor the environmental quality and the progress in the city's programs. The urban design staff provided technical support to the committee, coordinated inputs from other departments, and assisted the committee's environmental policy formulation.

The progress of environmental quality management in Dallas rested on a fine balance of power within the city and environmentalists had to make some retreat later as we shall see. The impact of the urban design program is nevertheless significant. It was instrumental in eliciting
the city's initial commitment to environmental protection and raising
the level of public awareness about environmental issues in the mid 70s.
The city's decision-making framework was strengthened by the ecological
data bank, policies for escarpment and flood plain areas, and increased
staff capability. Internally, the urban design staff was able to pro-
duce basic materials for the ecological (environmental planning and
management) element of the urban design framework after several years of
work in this area. A body of data and experience developed over years
amounted to de fact urban design framework, if only internal to the urban
design staff.

Some "jointedness" in neighborhood conservation and historic
preservation

In other areas of urban design, "jointedness" is less obvious.
Neither the urban design director nor his staff has left us much account
of how individual studies and projects were linked with each other and
with a larger whole to begin with. However, detailed examination shows
links that are worth noting in the areas of historic preservation and
neighborhood conservation, though not as dramatic as those in environmental
planning and management. It appears that the urban design staff was
gradually proceeding toward the completion of an urban design framework
for the city.

The basis for historic preservation efforts in Dallas is the histo-
ric preservation ordinance passed in March 1973 in the process of creating
the Swiss Avenue Historic District (designated in July 1973). Designation
of three more districts and several individual structures followed.
Again, in this area, there was no citywide policy framework to work from.
Urban design worked rather effectively, however, perhaps because the
historic preservation ordinance was flexibly designed and played a role of a
policy framework. It defined historic preservation process, allowing
designation of each district or landmark to be made case by case through
individual ordinance. This framework became effective as there was a
systematic data base created early in the program -- historic landmarks
survey data (Alexander, 1974) supplemented by more general visual
form survey data (Dallas DUP, 1974b). Once things got started, constituenc-
cies developed to support the process of historic preservation and
historic preservation has become a citywide movement. Among many organizations and individuals involved in historic preservation are the Historic Landmark Preservation Committee (HLPC) and the Historic Preservation League. The former was created in accordance with the historic preservation ordinance and has become a group to continuously advocate historic preservation. The latter was incorporated by a group of the Swiss Avenue area residents in the process of creating the Swiss Avenue Historic District (The Historic Preservation League, 1975) and has become a citywide advocate for historic preservation. Quite a few neighborhood groups have since made a request for historic district designation (e.g. the third district, South Boulevard/Park Row, designated in August 1976 and the fourth one, Munger Place, designated in March 1980).

A more general basis for the urban design initiative was an urban design study carried out at a major district ("community") level -- the Study 10 of the Community Analysis Program (CAP). This study began in 1971 and produced a report, Design Guidelines for Inner City Neighborhoods, in July 1972 (Dallas DPUD, 1972a). The staff directed their attention to two communities, Oak Lawn and East Dallas. From a physical design point of view, the staff inventoried design elements, identified typical environmental problems, recommended remedial projects and, finally, suggested design guidelines. No official action was taken on the study but the study was well received by neighborhood groups and offered valuable inputs to later projects the urban design staff carried out. A few projects can be clearly identified as the offspring of this study: the Pike Park project (El Barrio Study) and the Turtle Creek Environmental Corridor.9 The study also allowed the staff to learn historic significance of the Swiss Avenue area, leading to an idea of creating an historic district. The fact that a few areas considered for conservation district designation are located in Oak Lawn also suggests long-term benefits of early studies in strategic places like this one.

Basic studies on a citywide basis to prepare for the later urban design initiative in ordinary neighborhoods were begun while the urban design staff was working on the most urgent task of protecting elegant mansions and venerable warehouses (cf. the West End Historic District, a
downtown warehouse district, designated in October 1975 after three years of staff efforts; Lu, 1980): the visual form survey and the neighborhood identity and environment survey. The former was carried out in 1974 (Dallas DUP, 1974b). Viewed as an analysis of neighborhood environment, this study systematically described visual characteristics of every neighborhood in the city. Viewed as an analysis of city-scale form structure, it mapped major visual elements such as nodes, landmarks, focal points, views, and tree cover. The report of the survey issued in July barely drew public attention. However, the use of data bases could be quite different from the use of published reports. As a neighborhood data base, the visual form data, and perhaps the whole experience staff members had gained in the survey, proved to be invaluable in later projects (Lu, 1979: 44-5).

The visual form survey report wrote that a study to develop an urban design framework as part of the planning department's interim comprehensive plan program was being initiated for the 1975-76 fiscal year (Dallas DUP, 1974b: 149). An "attitudinal survey" suggested in the report produced in July 1976 a report, "Neighborhood Image: An Initial Analysis of Data from the Neighborhood Identity and Environment Survey" (staff working paper). According to the report, the staff conducted a questionnaire survey with a citywide random sample of 400 households to find out how citizens perceive their city and neighborhoods in terms of visual form, physical amenities, public facilities, and other attributes and problems. The entire analysis initially conceived was never completed but, according to Lu (1979: 44), the data became a primary tool for subsequent neighborhood improvements.

The impact of the visual form survey may be traced into 1) a quick response the staff made to a group of residents in the process of creating the South Boulevard/Park Row Historic District, 2) the special importance of a Mexican-American neighborhood, "Little Mexico", it confirmed for the Pike Park project (El Barrio Study) and, perhaps, 3) the Neighborhood Notebook, a series of inexpensive how-to pamphlets intended to guide citizens in self-help neighborhood improvement activities. Threads that link the citywide visual form and image studies to specific projects are not quite visible, however. This may
be taken as an indication of the relative weakness of the citywide data base not supported by a citywide policy framework. 12 A case in point is a project of strategic importance to the whole city -- the conservation district ordinance proposal. The ordinance never took off the ground, suggesting a problem of drafting an ordinance for specific design controls without initial public consensus as to the desirable nature of design controls at a general, policy level (cf. the Minneapolis master design district ordinance). 13

* Disjointed "jointed-incrementalism"

If urban design with citywide data bases alone -- without agenda of short- and long-range projects or a policy framework -- was vulnerable to some "disjointedness", it is likely to have been difficult to create "jointedness" around projects that were carried out without any framework (excepting the first Goals for Dallas). The two city-level studies, the sign ordinance and the arts facilities plan, and one special project, Akard Street Mall, may be viewed as cases.

The former two projects began upon a request of the city council. In either case, the first Goals for Dallas (1967, 1970) created a mandate and political pressure was building up for the city to do such a study. At first, an intensive two-year study during 1971-1973 paid the staff as it produced a new sign ordinance to tighten controls that had already existed on commercial signs, which proponents had long desired. Moreover, the process of debating and winning the ordinance raised the level of public consciousness about design issues and demonstrated the strength of citizen expectation for improving the quality of the visual environment. Passage of the ordinance also showed how citizens could organize themselves to win a battle against big businesses (sign industries and related business interests). And the effect of the ordinance is gradually revealing itself in the visual environment. Second, a prominent planning/urban design consultant completed the final report on a comprehensive arts facilities plan in October 1977, recommending the arts district and suggesting ways of creating difficult but important links between arts facilities planning and work on larger urban design issues -- neighborhood conservation and neighborhood arts/urban design programs (Carr, Lynch Associates, 1977). On the other hand, sign controls
and arts facilities planning, partly due to their very nature, have not been successfully tied to a larger effort in urban design. The problem here seems to be not so much the fact that the staff had to work in rather isolated projects as one of missing policy planning that links one area of urban design to a larger whole in a strategic manner and allows the building of broad public support.

The latter project, Akard Street Mall, is perhaps the best example of disjointed project in "jointed-incrementalism". In 1972, the urban design staff started to develop a concept of creating a three-block mall on Akard Street, working with the Central Business District Association (CBDA) and other city departments. The mall was completed in November 1974, one year after funds were provided in the 1972 bond program. It was constructed to create a ceremonial link between the downtown core and the civic center complex (Myrick-Newman-Dahlberg and Partners, Inc., n.d.) and, along with the new City Hall, became a brilliant example of what good design would mean in Dallas. However, the mall never acquired the power to draw people from the downtown core. The mall, thus, was successful as a beautification project but was lacking a program to increase use and visibility. It has become an isolated incidence with little impact on the design of the downtown as a whole.

The mall began to have more problems. At the design stage, the design consultant saw "clearly defined space with two of the city's oldest prestigious hotels" one of the opportunities of the mall (Myrick-Newman-Dahlberg and Partners, Inc., n.d.). Soon after its construction, however, the mall lost one building in front of Baker Hotel. An open parking space covering an entire block replaced the building. At the time of my field visit, in April-May 1980, the Adolphus Hotel building at the one end of the mall across Market Street remained vacant and the Baker Hotel building was in a process of demolition. Urban design was not sucessfully tied to downtown revitalization strategies. There had been no overall policy framework or plan to see the mall in a larger context.

National Recognition and Repurcussions

National recognition

The urban design division reached an early period of maturity by
1975. At the same time, its active program began to draw national attention. The first reward for its enthusiastic work and insistence on "comprehensive approach" (jointed-incrementalism) came as national recognition of their city for its design excellence. In early 1975, Dallas was cited by the 1974 HUD Design Award jury for outstanding work (Euston, 1975). In June 1975, another award came. The city won two top awards for "ecological excellence" in the nation-wide Community Quality of Life Awards Program sponsored by The Environment Monthly magazine. One of the two awards was for the city's "innovative sign control ordinance" "designed to reduce ugliness yet provide necessary graphic information". (Herald, June 22, 1975). Increasing national recognition around the mid 70s can also be observed in the number of articles that reported the Dallas urban design program in professional and popular journals.17

The urban design director consciously sought national recognition. It was his belief that "to get dramatic and meaningful results from an urban design program you have to start with a staff of carefully trained, innovative professionals ..." and "in order to build a great city ... you have not only to attract industry, but planners of vision and motivation." (Weiming Lu quoted in Reece, 1976). Thus, he made continuing efforts to recruit creative people for his staff (Lu, 1979: 51). National recognition of the Dallas urban design program was instrumental in attracting capable young people to the city.18 The urban design division in the mid 70s, then, started to follow a good cycle of "national recognition - capable staff - design excellence".

A step forward with the second Goals for Dallas program

In the mid 70s, the urban design staff was gradually building up basic materials for a citywide urban design framework. However, they were not able to bring the work beyond the survey and analysis phase to formulate policies. On the contrary, the urban design division saw budget and staff cuts around 1975. Meantime, an exceptional opportunity came with the second Goals for Dallas program.

In late October 1975, civic and plitical leaders announced a major
effort to revive the Goals for Dallas program. In 1976, the second goals program started with citizen task forces beginning to write new goals for public discussion. The program largely followed the three-stage process that had been instituted ten years ago. This time, the urban design staff got actively involved in the program from the outset. They served on panels, recommended goals, and helped develop plans for achieving adopted goals. Some sympathetic observers of the urban design program saw the new goals program with a special hope: the new goals might reiterate the priorities of its predecessor and help improve the budget and staff situation of the urban design division (Webb, 1976).

In mid October 1976, Dr. Bryghte Godbold announced his resignation. He had been the director of Goals for Dallas since its inception and one of the most influential civic leaders in Dallas. Former Mayor Jonsson had already left the battle front while he remained on the Board of Trustees of the program. The first stage to set new goals proceeded well, however. The final set of new goals was published in April 1977. This time, goals were presented in seventeen topic areas. New topics -- citizen involvement, housing, energy, and environment among others -- suggest expanding scope of the program and changing emphasis after ten years. A dictionary order introduced to present the seventeen topic areas had an effect of removing the appearance of a special emphasis on the design of the city goals in the first program. Another shot at the planning department did not come. New goals for the design of the city nevertheless supported good urban design at least in three ways.

At first, they confirmed the importance of comprehensive planning (Specific Goals 2 and 3). Second, they spelled out what would constitute basic values in urban design. Those include:

- The visual character, a sense of history, identity, diversity, and beauty (Goal 1);
- The quality of life (Goal 3); and
- Protection and enhancement of the natural resources and the environment (Goal 6).

They also suggested what important areas of concern in urban design were such as public education programs (Goal 3); revitalization of CBD and inner-city neighborhoods (Goal 4); environmental planning and management (Goal 6); and urban design processes (Goals 5 and 13); along with
broader concerns which would have important bearings on urban design such as growth management (goal 2) and metropolitan planning (goal 11). Third, the scope of goals was broadened significantly. For one thing, specific goals were increased from ten to thirteen in number. Some goals in a new section "Environment" were also within the scope of the urban design program. More important, however, is the definition of each goal. New goals dealt with desirable qualities in the urban environment and the planning/urban design process rather than desirable projects. They could mean any number of projects. For example, one new goal incorporated as many as three specific goals in the first program along with few others:

Specific Goal 4
Revitalize the central business district (CBD) and inner-city neighborhoods with specific attention to stimulate the economy, to rehabilitate inner-city housing, to enhance Fair Park, ... to construct Town Lake, and to build substantial additional cultural facilities within the District. (Goals for Dallas, 1977) [Emphasis mine on three specific goals in the first program.]

The three earlier goals thus became just lower-level goals, i.e., means to achieve a higher level goal. This new approach resulted in having the thirteen specific goals identified more or less at the same level, and generally at the highest level, on the means-end continuum. You might say the second program represents better understanding of what it means to set goals. One implication of this would be less imposition of certain solutions (stated in terms of goals as in the first program) that may or may not be the best way to achieve important goals (which had been left unstated in the first program) on those who were responsible for achieving goals. You may not need to create a municipal design advisory commission (old Goal 2) to establish within city government a mechanism for coordinating and reviewing the quality of city-related design (new Goal 13). You may not need to create Town Lake (old Goal 10) but you would like to revitalize CBD and inner-city neighborhoods (new Goal 4). The first goals as a wish list of means imposed; the second goals as a more or less comprehensive set of goals would encourage the search for creative solutions and guide decisions. This was a significant step forward toward the ideal of the goals program. You cannot deal with such a complex thing as the design of the city by
doing a few pet projects.

In the spring of 1977, the goals program started to develop plans and to set priorities (within each topic area) for achieving the goals. With active participation of the urban design staff, this stage ended in the fall of 1978. Achieving the Goals for Dallas, 1978-83 was published in March 1979. The second goals program saw significant rejuvenation throughout these two stages. At the same time, it made a significant headway toward identifying worthy goals of the community and achieving them. Citizen participation increased and significant broadening of the base of representation took place. The goals program became less "elitist" and the scope of the goals was expanded -- goals thus formulated could be a good basis for the urban design framework to be prepared by the urban design division. Moreover, the program was brought closer to the achievement of goals by a new approach -- by designating about 100 agencies as "lead agencies", obtaining their commitment to the achievement of goals, having them develop plans, outlining the steps they would take to achieve the goals and, finally, asking them to periodically report the progress to the goals achievement committees.

How did the urban design staff proceed with their work on the urban design framework? Through active participation in the second goals program, they had in effect developed a set of goals for the urban design framework with massive citizen participation. With those goals and the systematic data bank they had already developed, the completion of the urban design framework with policies and strategies for urban design appears to have been just a few steps ahead.

Changing context of urban design

Building a high-voltage staff (Lu, 1979: 51), especially "a diverse and adequately sized interdisciplinary staff" (Euston, 1975), was the key to the achievement of design excellence in Dallas. Around 1975, things started to change. Webb (1976) reported:

Even in Dallas, which was not hit especially hard by the recent recession, budget cuts are beginning to eat away at urban design objectives. With a staff reduced from 20 to 11... 

The budget and staff cuts had serious implications on the urban design
program. At first, a need for long-awaited studies increased as the urban design division entered a period of early maturation. Much ground work had to be done to develop the urban design framework and ultimately to fully realize the "comprehensive approach" to urban design. Shrinking resources meant that basic studies had to make way to routine work. As the scope of work quickly expanded in the early 70s, routine work for program maintenance increased to begin with. The creation of the second and the third historic districts in 1975 and 1976, for example, resulted in substantial increase in demand for staff time in administering those districts (especially in response to design review requirements). Finally, the division had been the center of activity and the locus of quality work in the planning department. Resource cuts in the division created an apparent effect of deterioration in the quality of work in the department. It was not just the urban design division or the planning department that was experiencing changes in the mid 70s. The whole atmosphere in Dallas appears to have been changing, clearly in some parts and subtly in others.

Most important are changes that were taking place in the city council through several bi-annual elections, generally from the councils of the late 60s and the early 70s concerned with issues of environmental quality and unbalanced growth -- overdevelopment in the northern half and deterioration of inner-city neighborhoods -- to the councils of the late 70s oriented toward facilitating development and growth. The data of the city council and the planning commission's zoning case approval rate seem to reflect those changes well (rather than just the increase in sophistication of developers in preparing zoning change proposals):

The city council's zoning case approval rate increased each year since 1972 (73%) to 1977-78 (87%) but one. (During the same period, the planning commission saw its approval rate increased from 51% to 67%.) The biggest disparity between the city council and the planning commission occurred in 1975-76, when the council denied 8% of the proposed zoning cases while the commission denied 32%. (McCarty, 1978) (As we shall see, an election of early 1976 brought a developer-mayor Robert Folsom.) Two cases -- the Environmental Quality Committee and the Comprehensive Land Use Policy Plan -- illustrate the nature of those changes well.
The establishment of a permanent committee to monitor environmental programs was the first recommendation of the initial Environmental Quality Committee (Dallas Environmental Quality Committee, 1974: 3). The city council took no immediate action, however. About six months later, in November 1974, the city council established a permanent committee in the face of strong prodding of the former committee members and increased public attention to the city council's inaction (e.g. Herald, October 2, 1974), but in a way it would be ineffective as environmentalists saw. (Herald, November 12 and 18, 1974; News, November 13, 1974; etc.). The permanent committee had in fact accomplished little until it was finally disbanded in mid 1977. There is little evidence that the permanent committee, the city council, or any other body found use of the product of the initial committee's two years of work.

Another case which suggests changes in the city council in the mid 70s is the fate of the comprehensive Land Use Policy Plan adopted by the planning commission in late 1975. Comprehensive planning was a mandate from Goals for Dallas (1966, 1967). Given strong public concerns over issues of growth management, the land use element naturally became the focus of the whole comprehensive planning effort of the planning department during the late 60s and the mid 70s. Beginning in October 1968, the planning department did much work but the citywide comprehensive land use plan remained half-complete throughout the early 70s. The planning department's work on a citywide comprehensive land use plan began again in 1974 at the direction of the city council (Dallas CPC Minutes, October 23, 1975). On February 17, 1975, the Comprehensive Land Use Policy Plan (citywide) completed in dispatch was finally presented to the city council. The first public hearing before the City Plan Commission was held on October 23, 1975. On November 8, 1975, after another public hearing, the planning commission voted 14 to 1 for approval of the plan subject to minor changes in wording of the text, and submitted the plan to the city council.

A city council election followed in early 1976. This election brought Mayor Robert Folsom. He was reputed to have run for the mayor's seat to beat the Comprehensive Land Use Policy Plan, being himself
a North Dallas developer. The plan submitted to the council remained in limbo.

The level of development-orientation of this council was not as high as that of more recent ones. The city council changed further in the April 2 election in 1977. In September 1977, the planning commission saw a drastic change in its membership -- ten new faces were added on the fifteen-member commission. More developers were on the commission, and it was thought to be far more sympathetic to developers than their predecessors, shifting toward the increased growth thinking of Mayor Folsom and others. According to the Dallas Morning News, the removal of Mrs. Shapiro, chairperson of the commission, and Mrs. Dunsavage in the commission appointment had been predicted for months because of their sharp "philosophical differences" with the more conservative city council members such as Mayor Folsom and Mr. Leedom (News, August 21, 1977). City planning came to be viewed as an obstacle to growth and business opportunities with the result of eliminating discussion and debate over what kind of a city Dallas was going to be. (Mrs. Clegg, member of the planning commission, Herald, December 11, 1978a) Mayor Folsom won the latest council election in early 1980, rejecting a challenge of former mayor Wes Wise. General atmosphere in the city council has remained development-oriented throughout the late 70s.

The 70s was an era of increasing neighborhood interests. The Goals for Dallas program of the late 60s raised public awareness about problems in the city. Older inner-city neighborhoods began to demand their share of the benefit Dallas was getting from its phenomenal growth. Meantime, in the early 70s, federal courts ordered the city to devise a bussing plan and a single-member district plan for city council election so as to enhance representation of minorities. The city council had been elected entirely at large until then. This stimulated public discussion on inner-city problems (e.g. the Inner City Committee of the city council) and issues around representation. More important in politics, however, was the revival of the ward system in the mid 70s (nine ward members and three at-large members including the mayor). The change that was taking place in the urban design scene should be
viewed in the light of these changes in a larger context. A question remains as to how well the city council represents public opinion. It would be appropriate to see the second Goals for Dallas program a fair representation of public opinion on the future design of the city. What did the second Goals for Dallas say?

Major citizen involvement programs like Goals for Dallas must rest on a fine balance of power in the city. It would not be surprising that the Goals for Dallas program experienced much change after ten years of experiment with an idealistic tone. However, the change must have been subtle: you see little change, perhaps a slight progress, just looking at the goals and plans that were printed. What you do not see is the same enthusiasm -- and faith -- that had been part of the first program. It is not clear whether the fact that the new goals did not deal with the staff and budget problem of the planning department and its urban design division and they did not give a special recognition to the importance of preparing the urban design framework as the initial Environmental Quality Committee did in its 1974 report is part of the change. As I have pointed out, the new goals supported comprehensive planning and good urban design as in the first program. There was no explicit statement that the design of the city became less of concern. Thus, we have a disparity: public opinion measured by the Goals for Dallas program was generally supportive of comprehensive planning and good urban design; the city council on the other hand was tilted toward more development and less planning and control -- no comprehensive plan like the 1975 comprehensive land use policy plan. What would such a disparity mean?

Repercussions

- Planning department reorganization

While the context of urban design was gradually changing in the mid 70s, a sense was increasing in the City Hall that the planning department was not doing a good job. In August 1977, City Manager George Shrader told the Dallas Times Herald that the department had been scheduled for a major realignment (Herald, August 28, 1977). Details of actual reorganization were still tentative at that time but
it was soon to change the nature of the work of the urban design division completely. The basis of this reorganization was a management study of the planning function conducted by a management consulting firm, Lifson, Wilson, Ferguson and Winick, Inc. (LWFW, 1976).

In October 1977, a long-time planning director Schroeder was moved to the Office of Development Services created as part of this reorganization. One of the city manager's administrative assistants, Rick Douglass, started to direct the planning department under Assistant Manager Gerald Henigman. The urban design staff had a hard time under an interim director who "appreciated little of the use of city planning and urban design" [a former planning staff person in an interview with me]. In November 1978, Gary Sieb, formerly an assistant to Schroeder, started to handle the department's duties. The planning staff had to wait till May 1979 to have a new permanent director. The wholesale turnover of the planning commission took place in September 1977 and the planning department had little support from outside during the most difficult time in its history.

An operation to "clear dead wood" from the planning department was nearing its end in late 1978. Many of the functions it used to perform had been transferred to other departments and its role and influence over city policy, especially over capital expenditure, diminished significantly. This however was part of the purpose of the reorganization. for example, the 1976 management study recommended that the planning function be broadened to include physical, economic, and community and resource planning, and be performed by a group of departments (LWFW, 1976: 5). Planning-related departments were then placed under one assistant city manager (Gerald Henigsman).

The effect was the planning staff experiencing general downgrading of their status in the city bureaucracy. Some staff members were unhappy, finding their jobs reduced to processing of papers like clerks (Herald, December 11, 1978a). Some mysterious stories haunted around the planning department around this time:

- A few [of the planning staff members] complained that reports they have written have been mysteriously doctored before being presented to the commission or to the council. (Herald, December 11, 1978a)
The draft of a 1977 neighborhood plan says it should remain a four-lane street because the people who lived and worked in the area wanted it that way. But the planning department employee [sic] responsible for the draft was accused of being too close to the people in the neighborhood and was reassigned to another project. The 1977 plan was never finished. Ten days ago [December 1, 1979] the planning department recommended that McKinney be widened from four lines to five [six?] despite the continuing objections of neighborhood residents [Roseland Parkway, a six-lane East Dallas thoroughfare to help relieve congestion on North Central expressway] (Herald, December 25, 1978a).

On the last day of November 1978, the urban design director announced his resignation. This came as a surprise to some but to many who knew the situation in the planning department it was not. His resignation warned Dallas' citizens of an alarming situation (e.g. Herald, December 1 and 3, 1978). Several news articles pointed the public to a problem of not having a permanent planning director (e.g. Herald, December 11, 1978b; News, December 16, 1978). Also, it was the time outside pressure on the city manager to find a permanent director soon was increasing. One of the longest searches for a city department director in recent Dallas history ended in March 1979 with an appointment of E. Jack Schoop. Schoop had been the planning director of the California Coastal Commission and former newspaper editor with nineteen years of experience in state and municipal planning (News, March 9, 1979).

Demise of "the Dallas urban design program"

Some observers find that the planning function was made more effective under the city manager's direct control, that it was "at home" in the Office of Management Services. Progress in comprehensive planning offers us a case. In October 1977, the city manager authorized the planning staff the restructuring of the planning department's work to develop a citywide comprehensive plan. The work was separated into a number of components and, for the first fiscal year 1977-78, two plan components were selected for development: the parks and recreation plan and the (natural) open space plan. Coordination and cooperation with other city departments worked well in these planning projects. The natural open space plan, for example, was completed in June 1979 by the planning department (primarily the urban design division) with
the participation of the Departments of Parks and Recreation, Public Works, and Streets and Sanitation (Dallas DUP, 1979c). A close tie with the city manager's office also meant better linkage between initial planning and implementation. The first phase program for the preparation of the parks and recreation plan, for example, provided data on existing park land and facilities in each community (planning district) for use in the development of the 1978 capital improvements and Community Development Block Grant program recommendations. Studies to develop implementation programs for the natural open space plan followed immediately upon the plan's completion. The interim arrangement also resulted in planning programs closely reflecting the city's priorities as recommended in the 1976 management study. According to Manager Schrader: "We are working on an open space program for Dallas. We take each program one at a time, and the land-use plan will come later."(News, December 13, 1978) The city was thus effectively planning for the future -- plans for housing, thoroughfare, and location of new fire stations along with the two comprehensive plan elements -- according to city officials (Herald, December 11, 1978a). (The urban design framework was not a priority item.)

Progress that had been made in some specific planning programs did not satisfy critics, however. Neither the deemphasized planning department nor the assistant city manager in charge of planning was providing necessary overall coordination, according to those critics (Herald, December 11, 1978a). Moreover, priorities in the City Hall did not necessarily go well with priorities of people in neighborhoods. While the city council in the late 70s was supportive of unconstrained growth -- in effect more growth in the northern half of the city and toward outer fringes, the first and second Goals for Dallas and others (e.g. Herald, December 3, 1978) were calling for revitalization of downtown and inner-city neighborhoods. The planning department came to receive much criticism that it was insensitive to the needs of people (e.g. Herald, December 1, 1978), that it had become "a rubber stamp for highways and huge developments" (Khan Husain, former chief planner with the planning department, regretting public views of the planning department, Herald, December 1, 1978). Projects like Roseland Parkway
and a bridge over Turtle Creek support critics' claim that "decisions were made in favor of quick development and away from long-range planning, toward facilitating building and away from considering long-range impacts" (News, March 4, 1979). And there was "a narrowing of access to city hall that [had] left those with doubt about growth nowhere else to go" (News, March 4, 1979). Viewed another way, the planning department reorganization accomplished its objectives rather well. The 1976 management study was carried out "to improve the organization and operation of the planning process in a manner that [would] allow the elected and appointed officials of the City ... to have whatever impact on the evolution of the City" (LWFW, 1976: 1) and Mayor Folsom's main priority was "to provide a framework for growth" (News, March 4, 1979). Thus, it was initiated "to add to the convenience and economy of the system" (Manager Schrader in Herald, August 28, 1977) for those who use the system — developers.

Since the arrival of a new planning director in May 1, 1979, the planning department has been in the process of filling vacant positions with carefully selected, qualified individuals while working on proposals to determine its new direction. It would be appropriate to see that "the Dallas urban design program" which had been begun as a son of the Goals for Dallas program and with a new urban design director in 1971 ended with the 70s. Many sympathetic observers in Dallas today hope for a rebirth of a strong urban design program under new leadership. How to rework on the preparation of the urban design framework or the urban design element of the comprehensive plan is part of the agenda of the new planning department.

Epilogue

Issues around Dallas' approach

The accomplishments of the Dallas urban design program in the early 70s owe much to the urban design director's effort to realize systematic (or "comprehensive") approach upon the jointed-incrementalism model. A HUD Design Award in the "management approach" category testifies the visible effect of jointed-incrementalism approach. A close examination
suggests that the staff's early investment in basic citywide and
district-level studies rather successfully provided agenda and frameworks
for later initiative in specific projects. Many of the seemingly
unrelated projects executed individually were in fact tied to the main
stream of work and contributed to the preparation of an urban design
framework, clearly in some areas like environmental planning and management
and loosely in others like neighborhood conservation and historic
preservation.

However, disjointedness is inevitable in any incrementalism
approach. Disjointedness plagued the urban design program where initial
studies were weak (e.g. downtown development and design -- the Akard
Street Mall case) or when the staff had to work in a completely new and
rather independent area (e.g. art facilities planning). Some projects
the city mandated (e.g. sign ordinance) also helped create disjointedness.
Disjointedness is inevitable not just because jointedness had to depend
on a map in the mind of the urban design staff members (particularly,
the insight and leadership of the urban design director),
agenda (the Dallas Environmental Quality Committee's 1974 report and the
second Goals for Dallas), a systematic data base (in the areas of ecology,
historic landmarks, visual form, and citizen perception) and accumulating
staff experience and because these are just imperfect substitutes for a
more comprehensive policy framework. Jointed-incrementalism assumes
the context in which the urban design staff cannot follow a large-scale
approach systematically (e.g. comprehensive planning). Thus, once
comprehensive agenda, data, and experience are developed through
incremental work on studies and projects over years, the same context
limits their use as a framework for selecting projects to be carried out.
Hence, jointed-incrementalism must always be disjointed-incrementalism at
the same time. (In the long run, it could change the context of urban
design.)

Overall rationality of jointed-incrementalism is therefore doubtful.
It would be difficult to maintain the program's continuity and
direction. Without official recognition of urban design as an area of
public policy, the status of urban design was uncertain in Dallas (cf.
conflicts between the aspiration of the urban design staff and the city
manager's conservative expectation). Neither was there any way of materializing the full potential of formulating and adopting city design policy. For the same reason, the urban design staff's approach and specific strategies have little significance in explaining the fate of the Dallas urban design program in the late 70s. What seems important in Dallas is the city government as it defines the status, role, and client of urban design within its social-political context. The level of support for urban design in the City Hall changed significantly in the mid to late 70s. The city council in the late 70s found the planning department (and its urban design division) not in their service and this resulted in the planning department reorganization. This in effect dismantled the urban design program which was effective according to the professional standards (e.g. a HUD Design Award). In fact, it was the very intent of the planning department reorganization not to allow city design policy or its substitutes (agenda, data bank, accumulating staff experience, etc.) to have much impact on the city's decision-making.

The planning department, rather, should allow the elected and appointed officials of the city to have "whatever impact on the evolution of the City" (LWFW, 1976: 1). It follows that the urban design staff should not define urban design on their own -- broadly and aggressively -- to justify their intervention in the city officials' businesses. In this context, "the policy of discouraging neighborhood participation ... typical of City Hall's current approach to planning" (W.W. Wilson in Herald, December 11, 1978a) was justifiable, however harmful it might be to the effectiveness of the urban design program. This is especially true as the city officials heard little demand for citizen participation in city planning to begin with. It was also the very intent of the planning department reorganization "to develop a framework for growth" (Mayor Folsom in News, March 4, 1979). Since the purpose of the urban design framework was to provide a framework for improving the quality of the physical environment for those who lived and worked in the city at large, it was more or less a part of the "awkward non-system" and obstacles to development. All these suggest that the Dallas government in the late 70s rejected city design policy formulation or, even, "jointed-incrementalism". Other kinds of obstacles to the urban design program,
while there were many, such as

- Weak leadership and poor management practice in the planning department as a whole, and
- A new urban design division with staff capability yet to be developed in its early era,

seem rather trivial. The urban design staff's approach -- or innovative and aggressive nature of the urban design program -- mattered only in that it made the effect of conflicts between the city officials and the planning/urban design staff in the mid to late 70s dramatic.

Good urban design according to the professional criteria is not necessarily good to the city government. Urban design the city government wants does not necessarily serve the community at large. There is little way urban designers can sell good urban design to the community -- good according to the professional standards and good for the community at large -- if the city government does not want it. The Dallas government in the 70s decided not to have an urban design framework. The urban design framework is perhaps not entirely an impossible dream in Dallas, however.

In a long history of Dallas, the first significant chance for city design came with the 1908 flood of the Trinity River. George Kessler completed his master plan which gradually shaped the central part of the city over next three decades. The second, valuable occasion came in 1965 with the Goals for Dallas program and passed quickly by the mid 70s. The period was too short for one of the best urban designers in this country given a reasonably sized staff and strong outside support to complete an urban design framework. The urban design director or his staff cannot be blamed, however. He had to start from scratch. Allan Jacobs, building upon already well established planning department with relative strength in urban design needed four years to complete an urban design plan and get it adopted since his arrival in San Francisco. It is difficult to see when next opportunity will come. But next time, the urban design staff may very well make it. Urban design has already been institutionalized within the Dallas government, if in a less than the optimal way according to the professional standards and the expectation of people in neighborhoods. Also, basic materials for the urban design framework are already there in Dallas today. This is a great
contribution of the Dallas urban design program of the 70s.

Reflecting the context of the Dallas urban design program

I have so far outlined the special importance of city government in understanding the later course of the Dallas urban design program. Presented below is a brief review of the context of the Dallas urban design program in terms of the following:

- The governmental context;
- The general social-political environment of the city; and
- The staff capability and the state of the art of urban design.

At first, the status of city planning, especially long-range policy planning, had not been established well in the Dallas government -- not to mention the status of urban design as an area of city planning. With no prior experience in working with the comprehensive plan, it must have been difficult for the urban design staff to create the understanding of what a citywide urban design framework would do and generate support for it. If the status of urban design was left unclear at the beginning of the urban design program, the locus of the urban design office said something about the institutional definition of urban design in this city. The centralized administrative structure of the council-manager government put emphasis on the role of city officials (the city council members including the mayor, and the city manager) in giving policy and administrative directions to each department. The planning department worked effectively when it responded to mandates from the city officials. The urban design staff had little discretion in initiating projects, and it had to do so with much friction. This is partly because the office was new without established jurisdiction, procedures, and links to various parts of the city's administrative structure and partly, perhaps more importantly, because it was not an usual, effective way of operation in this form of government. The federal 701 program helped the urban design staff finance some of the studies that were important in preparing an urban design framework largely on their own but with a cost of upsetting the administrative system whose essence was central control. It is also important to note that a sophisticated system of communication, influence, and control in urban design as represented by city design policy was rather alien to this form of government (i.e. central control).
An urban design framework, if developed, would primarily look at the private sector activity.

The form of city governments, along with administrative procedures, is in an important way a response to the wishes of the people of the city. A question has to be asked, however: Who are important people? In Dallas, the people who had been influential in city affairs were developers and businessmen. In a long tradition of free enterprise in this city, those "significant citizens", especially those in real estate development, were not supportive of strong, effective city planning, especially an idea of preparing a comprehensive land use plan, which inevitably meant development controls. It was not their preference to institute a new system of control like an urban design framework which would allow the powerless majority much say about the future development of the city. Their business was business and their design, unpretentious -- or poor as some critics say (Pratt, 1976; Dillon, 1980; and Herald, September 24, 1967). Neighborhood groups and environmentalists had been relatively weak in this city. Goals for Dallas which began in 1965 made voices of the majority of citizens, relatively powerless ones, heard in the City Hall. The group called for comprehensive planning, rational management of growth, and a beautiful city, but their influence in the City Hall was relatively limited in the long run, with the height of their strength felt during the late 60s and the early 70s. Goals for Dallas also made a tactical error in that, in effect, it mandated a few specific urban design projects in their wish list, rather than encouraging systematic approach to urban design, namely the preparation of an urban design framework in close conjunction with the comprehensive plan for the city. Thus, neither city government nor "people" was ready to support an urban design framework. Gradually building up good results and constructing inevitability were perhaps the only practical strategy for city design policy formulation in this city. Such a strategy, at the same time, was adapted to the internal circumstances of the urban design division.

The urban design staff in a newly created office needed many things before they began to work on an urban design framework: they had to develop their capability, create a network of relationships with other
city departments and outside groups, establish constituencies, determine internal procedures, and set agenda for the next few years. There was the strong leadership of the urban design director but the planning department as a whole was not in a good shape to support its urban design program. The planning department had just been strengthened and was in search of its own direction. Also, some observers find, the department was under weak leadership, technically and politically. In short, major planning studies which would not produce immediate, tangible results, like long-range city design policy formulation, were not the right ones to tackle at first. Obviously, the theories and techniques of urban design (which were already well advanced in the early 70s) in this context does not seem to be a relevant factor.
CHAPTER IV
COMMON THEMES IN CASES

A set of common themes have emerged from cases of citywide policy planning efforts in Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Dallas. Those themes can be described in terms of the intent of urban designers and key activities:

The Intent of Urban Designers
- To improve the perceptual and behavioral quality of the physical environment;
- To address citywide issues and to devise overall city strategies for urban design;
- To be responsive to the needs of the people who live in the city and its neighborhoods; and
- To increase overall rationality in approach to urban design -- to develop a systematic data base and pursue the purpose of urban design consciously by way of making goals and decision-making criteria explicit.

Key Activities
- City design policy formulation and a series of studies to support it.

This chapter discusses these themes individually, describing actual practice in the three case cities and, in cases of some themes, speculating their implications on the practice of urban design.

The Intent of Urban Designers

The perceptual and behavioral quality of the environment

Urban designers in the three cities have been very much concerned with the quality of the physical environment as people experience it and as it accommodates human activities (image and behavior). To improve the perceptual and behavioral quality of the environment in fact has been one of the primary purposes of urban design in these cities. Obvious as this may seem, urban design has often been practiced without explicit reference to the quality of the environment.
For example, Bacon (1963), in justifying the place of urban design in the comprehensive planning process, argued as follows:

Urban design is a crucial force in the planning process, with the power to transform plan objectives into images that seize the public imagination and generate widespread enthusiasm.

Urban design in his view is a means of translating planning concepts into the physical reality; it is a technical tool of city planning or urban development.

In San Francisco, urban design was conceived as something that had to do with the visual and other sensory relationships between people and their city, with their feelings of time and place and their sense of well-being (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 3). According to the May 1971 document:

Quality means degree of excellence, and when applied to cities it depends upon pleasing physical relationships, a fitting together with scale and interest and without jarring contrasts. Over time, quality means cultural heritage, and things and values that last. For the city’s residents it means a good life, and the ability to take for granted a certain measure of security, health, comfort, enjoyment and convenience and freedom from over-congestion and pollution. Quality in life must also include a chance for privacy, for interesting activity and achievement. (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 3)

In Minneapolis, the Urban Design Plan for Southeast Minneapolis was "for the enhancement of community images" (Minneapolis CPC, 1964); the CIP Urban Design Study, "to provide readily acceptable images of the city's environment, emphasizing its function, and foster the observer's sense of civic pride in that environment" (Minneapolis CIP, 1965c); the Visual Design Framework, to provide policies "intended to enhance, protect, and create perceptual quality in the built and the natural environment" (Minneapolis P&D, 1976a); and the goal for the Visual Quality Plan, "to protect and enhance the visual quality of the natural and man-made environment" (Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-79). While emphasis in the late 70s returned to the visual quality, the traditional core of urban design, the visual quality has been defined broadly and includes images (legibility, identity, structure, and meaning).
The urban design staff in Dallas has not articulated the purpose or goal or urban design in any official policy statement but similar purposes are implicit in the visual form and image surveys, the design of the city goal of the second Goals for Dallas program prepared with the participation of the urban design staff, and others.

An objective of improving what Lynch (1960) calls the legibility of the city has been especially important in the three cities and public perception of the visual environment of the city was studied as part of citywide urban design studies. For example, urban designers in Minneapolis pursued an objective of projecting "a vivid and coherent visual image of the city" in the CIP Urban Design Study. In San Francisco, the desirability of achieving a community where people knew with ease where they were and how to get where they were going was accepted as a legitimate and important objective of urban design from early in the Urban Design Study.

In relation to this, the scope of environmental quality concerns in the three cities has been broad. Studies and plans collectively encompass many environmental quality concerns and incorporate a wide range of values. Issues addressed include more than traditional concerns in urban design such as appearance and various livability and pedestrian amenity factors (e.g. street furniture, access to recreational open space, and maintenance of streets and properties): city-scale views, citywide visual form and image structures, visible activity patterns, visual experience of moving through the city, and human comfort (e.g. weather protection and safety from traffic, psychological as well as physical) among others. Not only issues of experiencing space, static and sequential, but also issues of experiencing time in the physical setting (e.g. historic quality of buildings and districts and, in Dallas, organization of events such as street-corner concerts and community festivals) have been addressed. Historic preservation, neighborhood conservation, access to recreational open spaces, and development of design controls and development tools have been important as well perhaps not only because these are important city planning and development concerns but also they are instrumental to the purpose of creating a better city in terms of human experience.
Attention to the quality of the physical environment as people experience it and as it accommodates human behavior is found in Gordon Cullen's studies of English townscapes. Improving the aesthetic quality -- appearance, views, visual order, etc. -- are at least implicit in any urban design project. However, the breadth of definition and attention to the perceptual and behavioral quality of the physical environment together distinguish the urban design programs of the three cities from others.

Attention to the perceptual and behavioral quality of the environment in the three cities is especially important because it was accompanied by efforts to measure them through methods of empirical research. In Minneapolis and Dallas, citizen image surveys were conducted according to environmental psychological methods. In Dallas, "street sociology" has been studied by an environmental psychologist in an occasion to develop performance-based sign ordinance.

While the purpose of urban design can be broad or narrow and stated in many ways, it seems especially important to include the enhancement of the quality of the physical environment as people experience it and as it accommodates the spatial and temporal patterns of human activities. For such a definition gives urban design a focus for attention and a purpose of its own. Despite its importance, no other areas of city planning pursue it in any systematic manner. A purpose of its own justifies and demands its conscious pursuit, and distinguishes urban design from other areas of city planning as an area of unique concerns.

There are other purposes as well, such as:
- To get development projects done;
- To unlock space economy and stimulate development;
- To coordinate capital improvements; and
- To enhance functional efficiency of the physical setting.

But they do not make urban design special. For example, "to get development projects done" and "to stimulate the development of the city" can be a concern in other or all areas of city planning. Since they imply higher-level purposes such as city economy and job creation, they make urban design just a means to achieve things that are
important in other areas of city planning. Urban design as an area of
city planning ought to serve these and other purposes of city planning
anyway (e.g. social equity and access). Moreover, without explicit
reference to the perceptual and behavioral quality of the environment, they
do not necessarily warrant a good city in terms of human experience
(e.g. problems of urban renewal).

The purpose of urban design defined in terms of human experience
is important also because it could naturally lead to a view that urban
design is a central element of city planning as has been the case in
the three cities.\(^3\) Traditionally, urban design, visual quality, and
aesthetics have been considered to be somewhat peripheral to more
central concerns in city planning such as housing, land use, and
transportation. To simply put, views and visual images put together
all aspects of the physical environment in our experience: for example,
we see and feel the whole city from a vantage point. This creates
a demand that individual actions you take to change physical environ-
ment be coordinated in accordance with the goal of urban design
(human experience). You might even view that the goal of creating an
expressive and legible environment as well as socially and economically
logical city is in fact the very purpose of city planning (The Joint
Program, 1965). In this view, urban design could help stitch together
various areas of policy which are in fact interdependent. The urban
design goal comes to embrace all areas of policy and relates to the
way you express and carry out policies in other areas of city planning
(The Joint Program, 1965); application of good urban design produces
a logic and cohesion in the physical form of the city, and respect for
the salient features that give character to the city and its districts
(San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 3). Urban design is then inseparable from
economic and social totality and has a major role in making the city
at the same time more noble and more bearable (San Francisco DCP, 1971b:
3). The city's overall development will have to begin and end with
good urban design (Minneapolis CPC, 1964: 41).
Citywide issues and overall strategies

Urban designers' concerns have seldom extended beyond the scale of a neighborhood or a small district. Downtown plans and major urban renewal projects typically represent the largest scale for urban designers. City planners, on the other hand, have believed that certain issues of city development ought to be addressed in a citywide plan while others are better addressed in neighborhood or district plans. It is not surprising then to find urban designers seeking to make urban design a legitimate area of concern in city planning have begun to deal with some design-related issues on a citywide basis. In San Francisco, the planning staff in Urban Design Study concentrated on what they called citywide issues. The planning director observed that the members of the Urban Design Advisory Committee had learned to differentiate between "citywide matters that were legitimate concerns" in the study and specific neighborhood issues that were not (Jacobs, 1978b: 128). In Minneapolis, the Plan for the 80's included both citywide and community plans since the planning staff recognized that not all policies and plans that were important to the city could be generalized citywide. The Visual Quality Plan, a major urban design element was one of citywide plans. In Dallas, one of the responsibilities of the urban design division was to develop citywide and community design frameworks (Lu, 1979:37), suggesting a similar recognition. The actual work of the Dallas urban design staff was directed primarily to groundwork for the preparation of the citywide urban design framework.

The three case studies suggest that citywide policy planning means literally attention to citywide issues and overall strategies for urban design:

- Issues of those elements of the environment that create a form pattern extending citywide (e.g. overall patterns of major roadways, street lighting, landscaping, and natural base -- hills, valleys, shorelines, etc.) or city-scale (meaning a scale beyond a neighborhood or a district; e.g. views in San Francisco);
- Issues of those elements of the environment that form a citywide system (but not a citywide form pattern), with significant implications on urban design (e.g. open spaces, schools, and neighborhood commercial nodes) or some implications (perhaps, fire stations);
Those issues of the environment that are basically small-scale in nature but are found throughout or in many places in the city (e.g. traffic through residential neighborhoods and maintenance of streets and properties in San Francisco);

Issues of those elements of the environment whose locations and designs have strategic importance in the form and character of the city, though limited in number and scale, warranting formulation of city strategies (e.g. Coit Tower and Telegraph Hill in San Francisco, a major stadium in downtown Minneapolis, and the arts district in Dallas (proposed); and

Those actions that are best taken at a level of city as a whole -- those related to
  - Things best regulated by a citywide control (e.g. the height and bulk of buildings in San Francisco); or
  - Things addressed best by a city-level organization (e.g. CUE in Minneapolis); or
  - Things best supported by a city-level constituency that is not found or strong at sub-city levels (e.g. environmental groups in Dallas); or
  - Overall city strategies for urban design.

There are strategic reasons for urban designers to address issues concerning these. A notion that decisions affecting one place or area of the city ought to be made in view of citywide intentions must be a primary impetus for citywide policy planning but citywide policy planning is more than the thinking of a place or an area in terms of the whole city (e.g. Metro Center '85, Minneapolis, considering the downtown community as a strategic area for the entire city). It is the thinking of the form and character of the entire city. An interest in the citywide visual form structure described in terms of form elements such as landmarks, paths, and nodes is found in all the three case cities as well as most of exemplary cases identified in the general-state-of-art survey of citywide urban design studies, suggesting the primary source of interest in the quality of the environment at a scale of city (Lynch, 1960, etc.).

Desirability of addressing citywide issues and formulating overall city strategies would vary according to cities. For example, citywide views constitute an important urban design concern in San Francisco but not so much in Dallas.
Urban designers for people

It can be expected that citywide policy planning begins with a view that urban design is for the people who live and work in the city and its neighborhoods. Neither urban design for artistic expression of designers (perhaps, monuments, plazas, and grand boulevards) nor urban design for "elites" (perhaps distinguished commercial and business centers, cultural complexes, and tourist places) seems to have a place in ordinary neighborhoods. In fact, urban designers in the three case cities have intended to be responsive to the needs and concerns of people. The purpose of the San Francisco Urban Design Plan was "to respond to the public's interest in a better city" (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 135). Thus:

If a plan is to be useful and its impact significant, it must be responsive to citizen concerns. Therefore, one of the foremost efforts in the Urban Design Study was to determine what the people of the city identify as the relevant issues (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 5).

In Minneapolis, the purpose of urban design was to identify "the needs of the average person", to "help them [average persons or the people of the city] to fulfill these needs in the environment", and to shape "the form of their cities to meet their own needs" (Minneapolis P&D, 1970c: 217). In Dallas, the urban design staff helped "residents articulate their ideas and wishes" and worked to give them tools to influence policy (Lu, 1979: 51-52).

In practice, urban designer's concern did not necessarily result in the proposals that were responsive to the wishes of the people. However, it would be appropriate to view a common theme in cases is not just urban designers' concern but actual responsiveness of the proposals to the wishes of people. For proposals that were not responsive to people in neighborhoods were revised in the process of adopting them (the Minneapolis Visual Design Framework) and the staff's approach changed soon to allow substantial citizen inputs early in the process of policy formulation (comprehensive planning for the 80s).

Increasing rationality in urban design

At the heart of citywide policy planning seems to be an intent of urban designers to increase overall rationality in approach to urban
design. To increase overall rationality here means such things as:

- Articulating broad goals and objectives of urban design to be consciously pursued;
- Searching means of achieving once articulating goals and objectives more or less systematically by way of formulating policies or general action strategies;
- Studying ways of implementing policies or general action strategies to help strategic implementation;
- Making decisions less arbitrary by way of informing them by empirical data and making decision-making criteria explicit;
- Coordinating decisions of various actors to ensure that they are made consistently to further public interest, in this case, the achievement of publicly adopted urban design goals, objectives, and policies; and
- Enabling to monitor the effect of goals, objectives, and policies as they are applied in decisions over time and feeding the information back into the urban design program.

It is important that the urban designers attempted to formulate policies or action strategies before the execution of specific programs, projects, design controls, or decisions. This must be for the same reasons they attempted to articulate goals and objectives explicitly: to make decision-making criteria explicit and to encourage exploration and creativity in the search for means of implementing them.\(^5\) Policies or action strategies, once formulated may be implemented systematically (like in the rational-comprehensive planning model) or strategically but in response to rising opportunities (like in the disjointed-incrementalism model).\(^6\)

Citywide policy planning in these cities has been advanced by a new breed of believers in comprehensive planning (e.g. Jacobs, 1978b: 190, 210; Herald, December 11, 1978a; Lu, 1974: 21; 1979).\(^7\) As such, they have drawn basic concepts from the rational-comprehensive planning model such as the broadness of the scope of goals and objectives, systematic search for means, and interrelatedness of plan elements. On the other hand, they did not stick to incapacitating requirements of rational-comprehensive planning. For example, in Dallas, they were ready to adopt incrementalism as their basic approach while preparing for the formulation of the citywide urban design framework ("jointed-incrementalism"). Their survey of visual form was less than systematic in that they examined only several factors in describing environmentally and visually "common types". (The survey was still systematic in that
it was carried out citywide, not just in some strategic areas.) In San Francisco, they were ready to focus on strategic issues rather than to do comprehensive research in preparing the recreation and open space element of the comprehensive plan and to follow "a strange way to set public improvement priorities" (implementation of the plan via charter amendment) (Jacobs, 1978b: 299).

Naturally, what they did in their studies and how vary much across cities. In San Francisco, studies of visual forms were carried out but not studies of visual images (citizen images) while the opposite is the case in Minneapolis. Studies of the urban design management system carried out in Minneapolis (the second-phase CIP Urban Design Study) suggest a strong interest of the urban design staff in considering all that were important in improving the quality of the environment: both the quality of the environment and the process of designing and changing the city. Later, the Minneapolis urban design staff even formulated policies for the design management system (the Visual Quality Plan). On the other hand, the planning staff in San Francisco attended to implementation, only a part of the design management system. Because the Urban Design Plan concentrated on citywide issues of the environment, some important issues of the design management system were not studied (e.g. design controls that matter at a level of district such as the downtown zoning bonus system). In Dallas, no studies were carried out on the urban design management system as a whole (thus, excepting a few specific elements of it -- the sign ordinance, the historic preservation ordinance, and a few zoning permit procedures).

City Design Policy Formulation

Of strategic importance to urban designers in the three cities were citywide urban design policies. Thus they conducted a series of studies to prepare for their formulation. In Minneapolis and San Francisco, urban designers actually formulated policies and submitted them to the decision-making body for public discussion and formal adoption. In Dallas, urban designers' efforts fell short of policy formulation but basic data have been developed to allow policy formulation in the future. Viewing the formulation of citywide urban design policies as the key activity of citywide policy planning, this section
presents my view as to how this activity relates to at least three of
important concerns in urban design. A brief discussion on strategies
for city design policy formulation follows.

° Reflecting the concern with citywide issues and overall
city strategies for urban design

Citywide urban design policies are formulated to guide decisions
affecting the form and character of the city and to serve as a city-
wide framework within which actions of public agencies, neighborhood
groups, and others could take place. Thus, they necessarily address
citywide issues and define overall city strategies for urban design.
(Citywide urban design policies here are contrasted with policies
for an area or a project -- area or project design policies). For
this reason, the formulation of city design policy requires the develop-
ment of a citywide data base and incorporation of considerations to
ensure that individual decisions affecting one area of the city are
made in view of citywide intentions for the form and character of
the city. The purpose of citywide urban design studies is to do these.

° Reflecting the concern with the needs of people

Citywide urban design policies define in general terms what sort
of city the community wants and how it should get it. Because citywide
urban design policies are not just urban designers' vision of a future
city, their formulation presumes studies of citizen concerns and wishes
along with the three factors of urban design -- the quality of the
environment, design management system, and action strategies. Citizen
inputs in the process of policy formulation must be essential while
whether broad citizen participation and public discussion should take
place early in this process would depend on situations (cf. the level
of existing public consensus; the plurality of interests in the
community). Official adoption (by the planning commission and/or the
city council) is important since it is the process of the community
de debating and agreeing upon citywide urban design policies following
the formal decision-making procedures prescribed in the community.
So far, I have used a term citywide urban design policies (city design
policy) loosely, but they should mean city policy officially adopted by the community for the design of the city. Citywide policy planning in its ideal must represent a democratic approach to urban design; it could be "citizens collectively searching for a better city".

- Increasing overall rationality

City design policy formulation seems to help consciously pursue the purpose of urban design and increase overall rationality in approach to urban design at least in four general ways. At first, it is in itself the process of consciously pursuing the purpose of urban design, articulating goals and objectives, and searching for means of achieving them. This process could help create basis for pursuing the urban design objectives of the community in the long run as well. For this process could include studies to develop strategies for implementing policies.

Implementation does not need to be a part of citywide policy planning given the nature of policy implementation (the politics of implementation). Post facto evaluation and information feedback nevertheless have significant bearings on citywide policy planning. They are one of basic requirements of the comprehensive plan and are essential in allowing the use, implementation, and revision of policies in an informed manner. Effective learning through experience hinges on them. On the other hand, this requirement is seldom put into practice in cities (e.g. San Francisco's failure to monitor the effect of the Urban Design Plan). Evaluation and feedback require long-term commitment of resources, yet the result of such commitment is not immediately visible. City design policy formulation could facilitate the establishment of a monitor process by setting forth policies stating the desirability of establishing such a process, defining its important attributes, and charting general strategies for establishing it (cf. the Plan for the 80s, Minneapolis).

Finally, but perhaps most importantly, its product, citywide urban design policies, would help make decisions more explicit and less arbitrary. At the same time, they would help ensure that decisions of various actors would further the achievement of urban design objectives of the community if made in accordance with them. Once agreed
upon, they would also stimulate pursuit of urban design objectives on the part of those who are in a place to make decisions affecting the form and character of the city.9

* Strategies for city design policy formulation

Citywide urban design policies may be formulated according to various strategies. The planning staff in San Francisco implemented what might be called the one-time comprehensive study strategy. All important issues of the environment that were considered to fall within the scope of the citywide urban design plan at the time were addressed in a two-year urban design study to produce the Urban Design Plan. General desirability of one-time comprehensive study is obvious (its practicality and use in specific situations aside). Given strategic roles goals, objectives, and policies could play in the whole process or urban design (cf. Chapter V), citywide urban design policies ought to be formulated as quickly as possible, even if tentatively. The one-time study could allow concentrated efforts for this purpose. Urban designers in the three case cities in fact considered this strategy to be most preferred, at least initially. This is obvious in San Francisco and Dallas. In San Francisco, the planning department actually followed this strategy. In Dallas, the urban design division in its first year prepared a work program proposing a study to complete a citywide urban design framework within two years (Dallas, DPUD, 1971a).

In Minneapolis, one of the goals (objectives) of the first citywide urban design study, (the CIP Urban Design Study) was "to develop a city-wide design framework within which changes can occur without creating a blighting effect" (Minneapolis CIP, 1965a: 1; Minneapolis CPC, 1965: 29) while in reality the first-phase study was for the development of a preliminary plan (Minneapolis CIP, 1965a, b) and the second-phase study, for the formulation of "some broad outline for the citywide framework" (Minneapolis CIP, 1966b: 3).

However preferable the one-time comprehensive study strategy may be, urban designers do (did) not necessarily see it appropriate and useful in the specific context of their practice. Neither can it always be implementable due to various constraints (funding, staffing,
technical skills, the purpose of the parent program (e.g. the Minneapolis CIP to develop middle- to short-range improvement strategies), official mandates, outside support, etc.). The urban design staff in Dallas thus saw what they called "jointed-incrementalism" as their model. Here, individual studies were carried out opportunistically and incrementally -- each dealing with only limited aspects of the environment (ecology, historic preservation, visual form, and visual image) and primarily in the survey and analysis phase only, although important studies were carried out citywide.

The urban design staff in Minneapolis could not propose a city design plan in an adoptable form by the end of the CIP Urban Design Study. An urban design plan was at first completed at a district level (Metro Center '85, 1970) and then, much later, citywide (the Visual Design Framework adopted by the planning commission in 1976). Their strategy may be viewed as the one-time comprehensive study strategy repeatedly applied, unsuccessfully initially and successfully later or, alternatively and perhaps better, a form of cyclic process or incrementalism with individual increments quite large (major city-wide and district-level studies, each dealing with a wide range of issues of the environment and going through all phases or elements of the planning process -- from data analysis to policy formulation).

Reviewing these themes, it can be concluded that citywide policy planning reflecting several important concerns in urban design as I propose has been tried fully in Minneapolis and San Francisco and partially in Dallas. Urban design carried out on an individual project or control basis with no citywide policy framework would not reflect those concerns sufficiently. Moreover, those concerns seem to suggest the status and role of urban design quite different from those in more traditional ways of practicing urban design. What are actual benefits of conducting citywide policy planning of this kind, then?
CHAPTER V
USE AND EFFECT OF CITYWIDE POLICY PLANNING

The effectiveness of citywide policy planning can be assessed by measuring the use and effect of its key element -- city design policy and the process of formulating and debating it. The use and effect of another element, citywide urban design studies, can be measured also and this helps such assessment. This chapter at first presents a framework to consider the use and effect of these two elements and outlines the promise of citywide policy planning. Situations with and without citywide urban design policies in the three case cities are then reviewed in relation to the promise so as to demonstrate the actual merit of citywide policy planning.

Assessing the Effectiveness of Citywide Policy Planning

We would like to know how effective or successful each city's urban design program is with or without citywide policy planning. An attempt to measure the effectiveness of "citywide policy planning", however, would not be productive because the unit of analysis is undefinable. We only know the core of citywide policy planning, city design policy formulation, without knowing where "citywide policy planning" ends and other activities in city planning or urban development begin. The effectiveness of citywide policy planning can be assessed, however, by examining the use and effect of its two key elements: 1) city design policy and the process of formulating and debating it; and 2) citywide urban design studies. Assumed here is urban design that is made a distinct element of the comprehensive plan. City design policy is distinguishable in the urban design element of the comprehensive plan. The process of formulating and adopting it as well as each citywide urban design study is also definable as a unit of analysis according to
a work program of its own or as a section of a larger one. (Each citywide urban design study may consist of a series of studies in specific areas of concerns or tasks as in the San Francisco Urban Design Study.)

Assessing the effectiveness of city design policy

The effectiveness of city design policy should be measured in terms of the use, implementation, and effect of policies (including the effect of the process of formulating and debating policies). Use, implementation, and effect are different kinds of activities or consequences, although the common usage of these three terms distinguishes differences only loosely. I define them generally below, expanding T. J. Kent's (1964) five legislative uses of the urban general plan (policy determination, policy effectuation, conveyance of advice, communication, and education). There are many ways to implement or use policies. Also, there are various effects of having policies formulated and agreed upon. Obviously, there will be much overlap and interrelatedness across categories.

Implementation is both a process and a product. Generally stated, it is the process in which the intent of the policy gets translated into action (the policy being implemented) and the achievement of the intent as the consequence of the action (the policy having been implemented). Implementation carried out on the part of city governments may take forms of direct design (capital improvements), administrative reorganization, legislation (cf. Kent's (1964) "policy effectuation"), etc. Studies may be conducted to develop implementation programs and plans.

Use in the short run is the application of policies to decision-making so as to choose among alternative proposals (cf. Kent's "policy effectuation"). The use value of policies for this purpose is measured in terms of how well they guide decisions. A good decision guide means the balance between specificity and generality in its substance and between conformance and creativity in its effect. Policies could also be applied to generate proposals for studies, projects, specific designs of physical objects, etc. Policies in this use are a set of directives for action, an idea source, and a framework for studies, projects, programs, etc. In the long run, the use of policies in individual
decisions that are made in day-to-day decision-making as well as major ones that take place only once in a while (e.g. locating a sports arena) is expected to lead to their implementation over years. Use is thus part of implementation as process. In practice, policies may be used by urban designers in such ways as:

- Conveyance of advice to the city council (Kent, 1964) and effectuation stimulation;
- Decision guide in various forms of formal and informal reviews:
  - Master plan referrals;
  - Reviews of projects and plans that come before the planning commission (or the city council) under the provision of the city planning code;
  - Administrative reviews by the planning department; etc.
- A framework for capital improvement programming;
- A set of terms of reference for municipal design services (e.g. furnishing design advice, design guidelines, schematic designs, etc. to city departments, community groups, etc.); and
- Education programs and public relations to raise the design consciousness of the public and stimulate public and private actions to implement the plan (cf. Kent's "education").

The city design plan setting forth citywide urban design policies is a major instrument by which the planning commission and staff present their findings and recommendations to the decision-makers (the city council) — in a comprehensively studied and coherently unified form (conveyance of advice). Actively sought, the city design plan, as well as the process of formulating it, could be a vehicle to stimulate the decision-makers' actions to effectuate the policies of the plan (effectuation stimulation). The city design plan as well as reports and working papers produced during the plan-making process could be useful also as a record of data for later reference. Published for public distribution or used internally within the planning department, they form a valuable compilation of information as to existing and predicted conditions, problems, needs, and opportunities in the city and the way the urban design staff has responded to them.

The effect of policies is not only the consequence of using or implementing them but also the consequence of just having them formulated and agreed upon. The latter type of consequences cannot be easily attributed to specific decisions or actions that stem from them, although it may be consciously sought. To differentiate effect from use and implementation, I emphasize this type of consequences. The effect may
be desirable or undesirable; expected or unexpected. The purpose of my suggesting various effects policies could or might have is to encourage urban designers to predict and expect the kind of effects that are important to their communities beforehand rather than to have them as unexpected "side effects". The effect of policies includes such things as:

- Communication (Kent, 1964);
- Issue raising;
- Discussion facilitation;
- Educational effects (cf. Kent's "education");
- Support mobilization and implementing action stimulation; and
- Public-decision prediction.

Citywide urban design policies may be formulated for other, more specific reasons as well:

- To unlock space economy and stimulate private development;
- To guide private locational decisions; and
- To coordinate capital improvements; among others.

Our ultimate concern is the effect of policies on the progress toward the achievement of a better city (in terms of human experience) and, to this end, the improvement of the decision-making process (design management system). The purposeful act of use and implementation is important to the extent it is tied to this effect. In terms of decision processes, the effect of policies includes such things as:

- Planning coordination ("comprehensive" plan);
- Building of local urban design capability and a whole range of improvement in the decision-making process in urban design; and
- Coordination toward rational and orderly development within a citywide decision framework.

In terms of the quality of the physical environment, citywide urban design policies are the basis for protecting and enhancing the environment. Measurements can be taken according to various environmental concerns such as legibility, conservation, diversity, comfort and convenience, etc. (Southworth and Southworth, 1973) or environmental stress, behavioral support, identity, legibility, meaning, etc. (Lynch, 1974; also Lynch, 1966; 1976). The most basic categories of relevance to this study are the following:

- Place qualities (which citywide policy planning, as well as other kinds of activities in urban design would address); and
Citywide qualities (e.g. citywide form and image structures, including city-scale views, street lighting systems, park system, etc.), place qualities with a citywide distribution (e.g. traffic-related problems in San Francisco), and place qualities of citywide significance (e.g. a major stadium downtown).

A brief description of the categories I have used so far follows:

. **Communication**

The city design plan communicates city design policy, a set of general and long-range goals, objectives, and policies for the design of the city to the city officials, people of the city, and those who are involved in physical development and change of the city. It puts public and private interests on notice of the intent of the city and indicates a set of common goals, priorities for action, and public guidelines for physical development and change in the city.

. **Issue raising and discussion facilitation**

Citywide urban design policies as they are being developed are a public response to important urban design-related issues of the community and have a function of defining issues and stating problems in objective terms to facilitate necessary research and public discussion. Once adopted, they express public concerns and offer a common language or set of terms of reference for constructive public debate on matters of urban design. They continue to raise issues for public attention as they clarify what issues have already been addressed (cf. increased attention to downtown conservation and development issues in San Francisco in the late 70s).

. **Education**

Citywide urban design policies as well as the process of formulating and adopting them and the document which presents them (the city design plan) can have educational effects. They help the planning commission and staff educate the city officials, people of the city, and those who are involved in physical development and change of the city. Education means many things. To mention just a few: stimulating interest of people in matters of urban design; increasing public awareness about urban design-related issues; expanding the scope of environmental values in the community; informing people of the operation of their local government in physical development and design, principles of good
design, and means that are available to them to improve their environments. Ultimately, all these should increase the personal capability of people to participate in decisions that are shaping their environments in an informed manner and build lasting constituencies to support not only the city design plan itself but also the whole effort to improve the quality of the environment, i.e., urban design.

The stated purpose of citywide urban design studies and plans almost always includes education. Individuals and organizations in the private sector sometimes commission or conduct city-scale urban design studies to stimulate public action (Georgia Chapter AIA, 1962; Georgia Urban Design Committee, 1966; Portland Chapter AIA, 1971; and Appleyard and Lynch, 1974, for the City of San Diego through a grant from the Marston family). Their primary purpose is education. Education, like the role of citywide urban design policies to guide decisions, is perhaps one of the most important functions of the city design plan, while it does not produce immediate physical consequences. Its effect is not quite visible because it becomes part of your decision-making process as it should be -- routinized.

The San Francisco Urban Design Plan has achieved an exceptional accomplishment in this regard. Almost all the people I interviewed in the city pointed out that they considered the most important impact of the plan to be education. Their comments were in no way meant to allude a plan of inaction. Given the importance of education in public expectation and in actual achievement, it is not surprising that it is considered to be one of the key measures of the effectiveness of comprehensive planning programs (e.g. Real Estate Research Corporation reported in Hammer et al., 1969: 38). I, however, argue that the educational effect as evaluation criterion should be somewhat deemphasized because it is often used as justification for inaction. Even urban design programs which die on the way, only producing a few preliminary reports, can have a "significant" educational effect (e.g. Seattle, 1971).

Support mobilization and implementing action stimulation

Closely allied with the educational effect is the effect of the city design plan to mobilize support, create a broad-based constituency which becomes a watch-dog to see to it that the policies
of the plan are implemented by the city government and other actors in
the city, and stimulate public and private actions toward the implemen-
tation of the plan. Citywide urban design policies are a set of
community agreements to begin with (cf. the profound impact of the Goals
for Dallas program).

. Public-decision prediction

Good citywide urban design policies would guide decisions of the
planning commission (and the city council). It follows that they allow
the property interest engaged in the physical development and change
of the city to predict the position of the planning commission (and the
city council) in its decisions. It is a predictive device, a prophecy
of public action (Kent, 1964). The substance of this effect is rational
and orderly development of the city without unnecessary public conflicts
over projects. For example, city planners in San Francisco have
observed that the Urban Design Plan has an effect of preventing the
kind of projects that had created public conflicts in the last 60s and
the early 70s from being proposed (Jacobs, 1978b: 250).

. Planning coordination

This is the essence of citywide policy planning. By studying the
quality of the physical environment and the process of development and
by formulating and agreeing upon citywide urban design policies, stra-
tegic responses to important urban design issues and coordination of
planning decisions become possible. Overall rationality and efficiency
in approach to urban design could be increased in this way.

. Improving the local urban design capability and the process
of decision-making in urban design

Citywide urban design policies, if implemented, contribute to the
building of the local urban design capability through organizational and
procedural changes inside and outside the city government. These may
include changes in the following:

- Administrative organization (e.g. creation of CUE, Minneapolis);
- Administrative procedures (e.g. new procedures for
designating historic districts, Minneapolis);
- Financing and programming device (e.g. tax increment
financing method, Minneapolis);
- Development tools (e.g. development districts, Minneapolis); and
Legal controls (e.g. the height and bulk ordinance, San Francisco).

Moreover, citywide policy planning always helps improve the local urban design capability by way of educating the urban design staff members and those in the city government who are involved in decisions affecting the design of the city. For this reason alone -- even if citywide urban design policies cannot be officially adopted, citywide policy planning would be worth attempting.

Coordination toward rational and orderly development of the city within a citywide decision framework

Closely allied with public decision prediction is a function of citywide urban design policies to serve as a citywide framework with which to guide public and private decisions affecting the design of the city. It has an effect of coordinating decisions of various participants in the process of decision-making toward rational and orderly physical development of the city.

Implementation is perhaps strategically most important of all that you can do with citywide urban design policies. Implementation, be it by way of capital improvement projects or legislative actions or other public actions, demonstrates the city's commitment to its policies in the most visible and dramatic manner (cf. the passage of the height and bulk ordinance in San Francisco). Especially, policies for action (cf. Chapter VI) implemented in large public projects result in immediate and symbolic physical consequences (hence, pet projects). However, I argue that implementation is not the most important criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of citywide urban design policies.

Citywide urban design policies that see no implementation (in the short run) can still be useful and effective ("effect"-ful), with implementation taking place in the long run (policies being implemented). For example, citywide urban design policies can guide everyday decisions in design review. They can educate people and stimulate public and private efforts to enhance the quality of the physical environment. However insignificant use and effect may seem, they should be considered essential in assessing the effectiveness of citywide urban design policies. Use is often considered unimportant 1) because people tend not
to take notice of it once it becomes a matter of course (institutionalization of the use of policies in day-to-day decision-making),
2) because it does not result in dramatic changes in the physical environment (the effect of use is highly dispersed spatially and
temporally, with many projects, mostly small, being carried out throughout the city and over years), and 3) because a traditional
notion of plans in the mind of most people pushes them to expect the city design plan to be "implementable". The purpose of formulating
citywide urban design policies could be any and every of functions and impacts discussed so far, be it in the category of use or implementa-
tion or effect. Implementation as consequence (policies having been implemented) is not a sole measure of the effectiveness of citywide
urban design policies. 3

If all sorts of impact in use, implementation, and effect represent a range of what you can expect from citywide urban design
policies, a set of basic functions represents the core of it. At first, citywide urban design policies as they are being formulated are a
response to important design-related issues of the community, defining issues of the physical environment and its change. They thus become a
basis for beginning studies and discussions. They are an instrument through which a community considers, debates, and finally agrees upon
"a coherent and unified set of general, long-range policy" for the design of the city (Kent's (1964) "policy determination"). For this
reason, citywide policy planning may be viewed as the very beginning of the whole process of urban design.

Second, citywide urban design policies respond to important design-related issues by identifying basic public values, defining desirable
qualities of the physical environment and the design management system, spelling out fundamental principles of good design, and charting
general courses of action to be taken along with general priorities. It follows that citywide urban design policies, if used as a decision-
making framework, should help assure that decisions of various actors in the city are made with important public values taken into account,
principles of good design followed, important consequences of decisions considered, and priorities for action incorporated. Once adopted as a
public statement, citywide urban design policies become an expression
of public concerns for the present issues and future design of the city, continue to raise issues (as they distinguish those issues that have already been defined from those that are left undefined), and facilitate public discussion.

Third as public agreement as to the definition of a good environment and a good process of development, citywide urban design policies should become a common goal of public and private actors and a framework from which many studies, programs, projects, actions, and decisions stem. They also chart general courses of action to be followed strategically to achieve or approach what is desired. They thus become a directive for public and private action and a basis for drawing public and private commitment to carrying them out. Finally, citywide urban design policies are a form of communications; they define a common language or set of terms of reference to facilitate constructive discussion. As a process-oriented tool, they are a device for public control through communication and a basis for coordinating public and private decisions toward the improvement of the city's decision-making process and physical environment. In all these ways, citywide urban design policies could become a basis for purposeful pursuit of broad urban design objectives and help increase overall rationality in approach to urban design. However intangible these functions may seem, they are important since they form the basis from which specific functions of use, implementation, and effect derive. The essence of citywide policy planning lies in the effort to realize these fundamental functions of citywide urban design policies. The assessment of the effectiveness of citywide policy planning is thus part of the description of urban designers' approaches.

Assessing the effectiveness of citywide urban design studies

The effectiveness of a citywide urban design study has to be assessed according to the following factors:

- Its contribution to the formulation of city design policy, including the development of necessary theories and techniques to allow effective policy formation;
- The effectiveness of citywide urban design policies once formulated, in terms of their use, implementation, and effect; and
Other uses and effects of the citywide urban design study -- its process and products (e.g. staff experience and the use of data).

At first, we are concerned with the "productivity" of each study -- how much material it produces for a plan to be prepared and contributes to the formulation of citywide urban design policies. This directly relates to the design of strategies for city design policy (e.g. one-time study vs. incrementalism). A study or a series of studies which produces a plan quickly and economically in an adoptable form is a good one. However, the effectiveness of plan-making per se has to be balanced with the benefits of making the process longer and more costly. At first, urban designers have to spend some time and money to do good professional work. They have to produce a plan that is useful, implementable, and effective ("effect"-ful). The plan should receive widespread acceptance, adoption, and early and continued use. Some studies will have to be made specifically on implementation strategies. Moreover, citywide urban design studies could do many other things that are good for the city. Production of a data base is one (e.g. Dallas' ecological data bank). Building of urban design staff capability, institutional and personal, is another. Furthermore, citywide urban design studies could involve citizens in discussion about the design of the city, educate them about concepts and techniques of urban design, raise their consciousness about the quality of the environment, and mobilize their support for the plan to facilitate its later implementation. Such effects are difficult to measure but possible to assess case by case through interviews and reviews of news articles, records of public hearings, etc. A series of urban design studies which never produces a plan is of limited value in citywide policy planning but it would surely have other values, as we see in the Dallas case.

The citywide decision framework will be complete with citywide urban design policies. However, just a citywide data base -- always, the more systematic or comprehensive, the better -- can perform some of its functions, if combined with "a plan" in the mind of urban designers. The insight and leadership of urban designers in this regard is crucial. Better still, a comprehensive agenda identifying issues and necessary studies, if not action strategies defining the nature of
decisions to be made in response to those issues, should go with the
citywide data base (e.g. the Dallas Environmental Quality Committee's
report, 1974). The Dallas case suggests inherent limitations of city-
wide decision frameworks short of citywide urban design policies. The
primary source of the effectiveness of citywide policy planning is the
process of formulating and debating citywide urban design policies.

Taking all the fundamental functions, uses, and effects of these
two elements of citywide policy planning together, the promise of city-
wide policy planning is great. Just looking at citywide urban design
policies, they could perform important functions which other elements
of urban design would not do at all, such as:

- Addressing more than one of important citywide issues at a
time and in relation to each other and devising overall
city strategies for urban design;
- Coordinating decisions of various actors within an official
citywide framework; and
- Allowing the conscious pursuit of the broad urban design
objectives of the community and helping increase overall
rationality in approach to urban design.

Citywide urban design policies could also perform certain functions
much better than other elements of urban design:

- Public discussion and policy determination;
- Conveyance of advice;
- Communication and public decision-prediction;
- Broad educational effects; and
- Building of local urban design capability.

Do actual benefits of citywide policy planning in Minneapolis and San
Francisco match the promise? Are situations with citywide urban design
policies formulated and adopted in fact better than others? Could
situations without policies be improved by formulating and agreeing
upon policies?

Relative Benefits of Citywide Policy Planning in Practice

Because of a number of factors involved, a comparative case study
of urban design practice in Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Dallas does
not offer us definitive cases for the relative merit of formulating and
debating citywide urban design policies. Nevertheless, overall successes
with citywide policy planning, development projects and design controls that worked within a framework of citywide urban design policies, problems that emerged in specific situations without citywide urban design policies, and the potential for improving present practice in these cities together seem to point to the desirability of formulating and debating citywide urban design policies.

My discussion to follow primarily looks at cases in Minneapolis and San Francisco. When the city has adopted citywide urban design policies, problems of not having citywide urban design policies in specific situations can be seen rather clearly. On the other hand, it is difficult to assess the situation in Dallas because various difficulties prevented the urban design staff from beginning and completing the process of formulating citywide urban design policies in this city. The disjointed and incremental nature of the Dallas urban design program may be shaped by the nature of its context (e.g. the ideal of city government and city officials' preferences) much more than by the staff's approach. Citywide urban design policies, if formulated, might not change the effect of the context of urban design. Thus, while the Dallas urban design program as a whole is a case without citywide urban design policies, I limit my discussion to a few cases in Dallas.

The use and implementation of policies differ according to what they define -- the quality of the environment, the attribute of the urban design management system, and general strategies for improving either. I therefore organize my discussion according to these categories.

With and without policies for the environment

Looking at situations before and after the adoption of the Urban Design Plan, the whole San Francisco case may be viewed as a case for having clearly articulated policies for the quality of the environment. While the plan has had various effects such as education (e.g. neighborhood groups incorporating urban design principles in their plans) and facilitating discussion (e.g. focused attention to the quality of the environment in discussing project proposals before the planning commission), it has above all contributed visibly to actual preservation and improvement of the form and character of the city (e.g. the effect of the 1973 bay window ordinance and the 1978 residential zoning
revision incorporating improved controls over bay window design; the form and character of Telegraph Hill protected by the height and bulk ordinance and the Jackson Square Historic District). Also important is the effect of the plan on overall improvement of the process of development. According to Jacobs (1978b: 250), public controversies over development projects, especially those that are related to design characteristics of the city, its neighborhoods, and buildings, have been significantly reduced. There have been fewer controversies over major building proposals and still fewer related to the height and bulk of buildings since 1972. As he has speculated, such factors as high interest rates, over-building, decreased demand and, perhaps, increased difficulty of assembling large parcels of land may have contributed to reducing controversial proposals to begin with but the Urban Design Plan's contribution must not be little.

It is also important to note that with the Urban Design Plan the project review section of the planning department seems to have had more influence than it did earlier (Jacobs, 1978b: 250). (See situations before the plan in Jacobs (1978a: 21).) Again, other factors, like the strong possibility of a discretionary review, which the planning commission has begun to use recently, are involved but the effect of the Urban Design Plan broadly supported by the public must not be little. Along with focused attention to the quality of the environment made possible by policies and principles of the plan, this supports a view that better incorporation of important community values into development decisions, more timely input of professional judgement from government urban designers, etc. as the planning staff hoped (e.g. Jacobs, 1971: 32) have actually been realized.

Minneapolis has had only short experience of working with official citywide urban design policies and we do not see such a dramatic effect. The status of highrise controversies in this city nevertheless suggests important roles citywide policy planning played. From around the mid 70s, highrises, especially those around the Lakes Cedar, Isles, and Calhoun area, created much public controversy in this city as well. However, as the 70s came to an end, highrises around lakes became less of an issue due to two cycles of citywide policy planning efforts as well as neighborhood residents' actions against specific project
proposals (e.g. Lake Point and 2900 Dean Boulevard). At first, highrise issues were publicly debated in occasions to adopt the land use and visual design framework elements of the comprehensive municipal plan around 1976. Subsequently areas around lakes were rezoned in accordance to the land use plan to discourage highrise construction. Then, comprehensive planning for the 80s created another forum and a policy to establish height limits outside the downtown was incorporated into the Visual Quality Plan.

Since the definition of the quality of the environment has an important role in making decision-making criteria explicit and setting common terms for public discussion, the situations in which project proposals have to be evaluated and debated without official policies or guidelines defining a good environment would be problematic. A case in point is the environmental review process in Minneapolis. Neither the Visual Design Framework of 1976 nor the Visual Quality Plan of 1979 has systematically defined the desirable quality of the environment. Thus, terms of discussing the visual impact of project proposals like one for the Boisclair East River Bank Development Project were inarticulate and public debate, without clear reference points:

C. Sensitive Resources
...
1. Aesthetics
...

Macro-Scale Impacts. The mass and the height of the two residential towers have generated considerable visual controversy. It has been argued that the mass and scale dwarf and detracts from the Our Lady of Lourdes Church, that highrise development should be kept on the West Bank of the river in the central business district.

These arguments are vigorously disputed by the project sponsor, other area residents...

The City Planning Commission staff made particular note of the visual aspect of the project, finding it the "best solution" for the site. There is a subjective element in aesthetic judgements, and the perspective figures allow the reviewer to judge this impact directly... . [Emphasis mine.] (Minneapolis PD, 1979b: 14-5)

Compare this with the situation in San Francisco (e.g. a case of the final environmental impact report for the Crocker National Bank Northern California Headquarter building). With a set of policies and "fundamental principles" defining the quality of the environment as a
checklist of concerns and as a set of decision criteria, design evaluation was more systematic and explicit:

C. Urban Design

... Relationship to Comprehensive Plan

The Urban Design Element of the San Francisco Comprehensive Plan provides a basis in City policy for summarizing the urban design implications of the proposed project. This summary is shown in Table 12, pp. 90-94. [See an excerpt in fig. 5-1. Emphasis mine.] (San Francisco CPC, 1979: 79-94)

With and without policies for the design management system

The process the urban design staff in Minneapolis followed in proposing the master design district ordinance is problematic. I present this as the first case for formulating policies for design management tools and subjecting them to public discussion. The concept of design districts was initially developed in the CIP Urban Design Study as one of a few legal tools to implement urban design frameworks. Subsequent efforts of the urban design staff to draft and pass the master design district ordinance began without a broad public agreement as to the general desirability of creating such a tool. Neither did the staff have good knowledge of public views at the outset as to the desirable attributes and roles such a tool should have in the process of physical change. Thus, the process of adopting the ordinance had to carry the burden of creating necessary public consensus as to these -- unsuccessfully, in this case. The result was a controversy and deadlock. The circle of public discussion expanded gradually as the controversy developed, each time following a discovery that certain important groups of people had not been consulted. The positions of participants in debate became firmer as time passed. It became more difficult to make tradeoffs and compromises as more details were set. Ultimately, disagreement on a few specifics of the proposal determined the whole idea of establishing design review procedures to protect the visual character of key locations in the city.

It is important to note that the process of citywide policy planning as a stage for defining the desirable nature of design management tools like design districts was soon realized in Minneapolis. The Visual
TABLE 12: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPLICABLE URBAN DESIGN POLICIES OF THE SAN FRANCISCO COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND THE PROPOSED PROJECT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPLICABLE URBAN DESIGN POLICIES*</th>
<th>RELATIONSHIP OF PROJECT TO APPLICABLE POLICIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Policies for City Pattern</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Policy 1. &quot;Recognize and protect major views in the City, with particular attention to those of open space and water.&quot; (p. 10)</td>
<td>The project site is outside the City's major designated view corridors along Pine St., 2 blocks to the north, and California St., 3 blocks north. The project would interrupt some views of the Bay from the Aetna Bldg., and toward distant open space to the south and west (including Twin Peaks and San Bruno Mountain) from the 111 Sutter Bldg. and neighboring high-rise structures to the north and east. The project would block few views to the Bay from neighboring buildings located to the west, because most such views are already blocked by intervening structures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Policy 3. &quot;Recognize that buildings, when seen together, produce a total effect that characterizes the City and its districts.&quot; (p. 10)</td>
<td>The proposed project would be visible in many distant views of the downtown skyline. It would join a number of other comparably sized high-rise buildings in the Downtown area. Collectively, these towers provide the major visual identification for the central business district.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Policy 6. &quot;Make centers of activity more prominent through design of street features and by other means.&quot; (p. 12)</td>
<td>The galleria would provide a prominent pedestrian activity center vacated to adjacent streets. Pedestrian seating, bicycle racks, and interior plants would be provided in the galleria. Landscaping and outdoor seating would be provided on a rooftop terrace above the galleria. Awnings would be provided at street level along the Kearny and Post St. frontages of the proposed tower. No street trees or street furniture are proposed for public sidewalks. The arched, glass roof of the galleria would be a distinctive design treatment, which would help set off the project as an activity center. Continuation of existing horizontal facade lines (see Figure 16, p. 26) would help clarify the extent of the Crocker complex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Policies for City Pattern</strong></td>
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<td>4. Policy 4. &quot;Maintain a strong presumption against the giving up of street areas for private ownership or use, or for construction of public buildings.&quot; (p. 20)</td>
<td>Lick Pl., a private street which extends through the site from Post to Sutter Sts., would be closed to permit construction of the galleria. Above-grade circulation through the site would be limited to pedestrians. Ver Mehr Pl. would remain open and would provide pedestrian access to the Kearny St. level of the galleria; the eastern end would be vacated as a public right-of-way.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>C. Policies for Major New Development</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Policy 1. &quot;Promote harmony in the visual relationships and transitions between new and older buildings.&quot; (p. 36)</td>
<td>See Item 7, above. According to the Urban Design Plan, the surfaces of large buildings should be articulated and textured to reduce their apparent size and to reflect the pattern of older buildings. The probable masonry exterior finish materials of the tower would be similar in character to those of most neighboring buildings. Details of surface articulation and texture have not yet been developed. The horizontal building lines at the lower levels of the No. 1 Montgomery Bldg., the 111 Sutter Bldg., and the Sutter Hotel would be continued in the facades of the galleria and tower. Differentiation in the surface treatment of the mechanical level at the top of the tower would help visually terminate the structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Policy 2. &quot;Avoid extreme contrasts in color, shape, and other characteristics which will cause new buildings to stand out in excess of their public importance.&quot; (p. 36)</td>
<td>See Item 9, above. The tower would be basically rectilinear in shape. The light gray reflective glass and light-colored masonry exterior materials would impart medium to light color values to the tower. These values would shift, depending on time of day, natural lighting conditions, and reflected sky colors.</td>
</tr>
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Fig. 5-1. Evaluating Urban Design Implications of Proposed Projects: A Case of the Crocker National Bank Northern California Headquarter Building, San Francisco. (San Francisco DCP, 1979: 90, 92)
Quality Plan of the Plan for the 80s incorporates policies and implementation strategies defining the limited but legitimate roles design review procedures and the design review board should play in the decision-making process (Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-92, 93, 98-100). The plan also recommends an action to develop design review guidelines (Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-102). Public agreement was possible at a general policy level on a once controversial issue. It would be appropriate to see that it is the nature of design review and its procedures that were in question in the design district controversy, not the concept of design districts itself.

In Dallas, the fate of the conservation district ordinance suggests similar problems. Given general applicability of conservation districts to many areas of the city (which were yet to be identified except for a few), citywide policy planning to establish broad consensus as to its desirability and basic attributes seems to be due. The success of the historic preservation ordinance suggests that the need for citywide policy planning depends much on situations. The historic preservation ordinance was successful without initial policy planning efforts perhaps because it had a clearly established constituency; the ordinance proposal received strong backing of a group of residents in the Swiss Avenue area and the area was the only one specifically considered for historic district designation at the time.

The success of the height and bulk ordinance in San Francisco may be contrasted with the Minneapolis master design district ordinance case. Potentially controversial actions of the planning commission to enact the interim height and bulk controls and the Board of Supervisors to approve the permanent controls were possible importantly because the Urban Design Plan had established basic community agreements on policies to regulate the height and bulk of buildings and the height and bulk guidelines. Broad public support was created. The planning director could argue for the interim controls before the mayor on the ground that the action was a step toward implementation of a plan which the mayor himself had praised.

Citywide policy planning to define the desirable nature of the design management system may be suggested as a general way of improving the present practice in San Francisco in two respects. At first,
certain qualities of the environment defined in principles and policies of the Urban Design Plan have proven to be difficult to obtain through reviews of individual building proposals. Crucial here are not only tradeoffs among principles and policies but also tradeoffs between urban design considerations on the one hand and other considerations, especially economics of real estate development, on the other. Here, I see policy issues regarding the desirable roles of design review and other means in obtaining important qualities of the environment -- more than those of policy implementation. An argument that the city planners would not be able to go further without a public statement of what the city should look like (Jacobs, 1978b: 190) must apply equally to issues of the design management system: unless a broad consensus is formed as to what the city should get, at what cost, and by what means, the city planners would not be able to go further. The Minneapolis Visual Quality Plan suggests how the Urban Design Plan might deal with such issues. The Minneapolis plan clearly defines the roles design review should play in the decision-making process, although design review is given very limited roles to play in Minneapolis.

Second, the planning staff in San Francisco has not been successful in establishing a process of continuously monitoring and occasionally reassessing the use and effect of the Urban Design Plan. Recent public attention to the downtown conservation and development issues points to the problem of not having such a process which would work as an early warning system. Perhaps, the planning staff in San Francisco could have elicited public support and commitment for establishing such a process by way of proposing policies stating its desirability and defining its basic attributes. Again, the Plan for the 80s of Minneapolis suggests how such policies might look (the Implementation Plan, Chapter XX). Much support for the Urban Design Plan and high expectation for its implementation that existed at the time of adopting the plan seem to warrant inclusion of such policies.

Viewed this way, the Visual Quality Plan may be taken as a case of judicious use of policies for the urban design management system and action strategies. The urban design staff, knowing the difficulty of agreeing upon the definition of a good environment in their city, at first established public consensus as to the need of identifying
desirable qualities of the environment to be enhanced (Policy 33), developing design review guidelines (Recommended Action), and establishing design principles for citywide systems such as street lighting and traffic signs (Implementation Strategy) (Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-94, 98-100, 102). They can thus legitimately and, perhaps, with broad citizen support embark on the work to define the desirable quality of the environment. This has to be contrasted with the way development of design review guidelines for an unsuccessful experimental design district (the Whittier East Design Study) and drafting of the master design district ordinance were begun.

With and without policies for action

In contrast with the Minneapolis Visual Quality Plan as part of the Plan for the 80s, the San Francisco Urban Design Plan does not treat overall city strategies for urban design as a matter of policy. If important decisions as to action strategies that are basically policy matters have been made under the guise of policy implementation internal to the planning department, that would be problematic. However, a more important issue here is one of missing opportunities. If important decisions as to action strategies that could be treated as policy matters have been reduced to matters of policy implementation, that would mean the benefits of formulating and agreeing upon policies as discussed in the preceding section have not been materialized. A case presented earlier, a policy that the city should encourage an ongoing partnership with responsible local citizen groups in identifying desirable qualities of the environment to be enhanced (Policy 33, the Visual Quality Plan), for example, allows the urban design staff to work on studies legitimately and perhaps with broad citizen support. With a policy in the same plan to establish height limits, neighborhood groups can see to it that the city takes appropriate action. To have such a policy at first would be much more effective for neighborhood groups than to propose a specific set of height limits from the outset. In San Francisco, a few drafting errors damaged two Duskin proposals (height limit initiatives). Specific proposals that have to be prepared in dispatch and by a small group of people cannot be free from flaws; specifics of the proposals
would make them difficult to agree upon.

In San Francisco, the planning department could have at least subjected the general implementation strategies once developed and presented in the May 1971 document to the formal consideration of the planning commission. In this way, policy issues could have been discussed as such and the staff could have been able to improve upon their proposals, incorporating public preferences and insights in basic action strategies. A bonus of such a rigorous approach would be a higher level of citizen support and public commitment for carrying out recommendations of the plan. An argument that urban design would not go further without a public statement of what the city should look like (Jacobs, 1978b: 190) may be extended to issues of basic action strategies. In San Francisco, the planning commission endorsed the implementation program for the recreation and open space element of the comprehensive plan in July 1973, suggesting the practicability of such a procedure.

Cases in Minneapolis and San Francisco suggest the actual merit of citywide policy planning that match its promise. At first, citywide policy planning in these cities reflects several important concerns in urban design in a way urban design carried out on an individual project or control basis would not do (e.g. keen attention to the quality of the physical environment as people experience it; responsiveness of proposals to the needs and concerns of the people who live in the city and its neighborhoods). The overall process of urban design and development in these cities seems to have worked better with citywide policy planning (e.g. before and after the Urban Design Plan in San Francisco; the process of formulating the Visual Quality Plan following the adoption of the Visual Design Framework). Not only projects or design controls initiated within a framework of citywide urban design policies worked well (e.g. design review in San Francisco vs. that in Minneapolis) but also problems often emerged in specific situations in which projects or design controls of citywide significance were proposed without initial policy discussion at a level of city (e.g. the Minneapolis master design district ordinance). In addition, some situations in Minneapolis and San Francisco seem to be improved by formulating and
debating urban design policies on a citywide basis (e.g. the role of design review in San Francisco).

Dallas offers us a case suggesting that citywide decision frameworks short of citywide urban design policies (e.g. the visual form survey data and the Environmental Quality Committee's report) cannot entirely correct basic problems of urban design carried out incrementally. However, "disjointedness" in the Dallas urban design program may have derived from the very nature of the context of urban design in this city. Full-scale citywide policy planning, which seems not entirely impractical in this city, might not have changed the context and increased jointedness significantly.

In this way, cases from the three cities individually are not conclusive but together they seem to point to the desirability of formulating and debating citywide urban design policies whenever issues involved are citywide in nature and policy matters in substance or overall city strategies for urban design are in question.
CHAPTER VI
MAKING CITYWIDE POLICY PLANNING WORK

There would be many issues urban designers attempting citywide policy planning must face. There would be many decisions they must make to begin and complete formulation of citywide urban design policies and use them to make their urban design programs work better. There would be many factors that would affect the nature of decisions they make and their results. Generally, urban designers must deal with issues at least in the following areas of concern:

- The theories and techniques of city design policy formulation;
- The governmental context -- the city government as it defines the status, role, and client of urban design (urban designers) and the politics within the city government; and
- The context of citizen participation and the role government urban designers ought to play in the planning process (the politics of city design policy formulation).

This chapter discusses several issues that seem most important in conducting citywide policy planning, drawing upon the three case studies. Some issues are important because they suggest special difficulties in the practice of citywide policy planning (especially in regard to the second and the third areas of concern). Others are important because the way urban designers respond to them significantly affects the nature of their practice (especially in regard to the first area of concern).

The three case studies suggest that various difficulties experienced in the three cities should not entirely prohibit citywide policy planning in these cities. In Minneapolis and San Francisco, city design policies were formulated and adopted officially with much public support. Even in Dallas where staff efforts fell short of policy formulation, most of the basic materials that would be essential in beginning policy formulation had been accumulated by the late 70s. Also, the basic urban design goals on which policy formulation could be based were identified through staff participation in the second Goals for Dallas program. City officials in this
city were not supportive of this kind of activity in the late 70s but the city councils of the late 60s and the early 70s encouraged the planning department to work on the comprehensive plan (the planning department made urban design one of its elements to be prepared) and specifically requested the preparation of the comprehensive land use plan. Conceivably, the staff could begin the formulation of citywide urban design policies anytime with new council's support. Thus, my attention in discussions to follow moves to a question of how urban designers should respond to important issues of practice in order to make citywide policy planning work better.

City Design Policy Formulation

There are at least two kinds of issues that are important to urban designers considering strategies for city design policy formulation:

- The substance of city design policy:
  What do you define or prescribe in your policies?
  What is the importance of defining a good urban design management system relative to that of defining a good environment?

- The form and content of policy:
  How do you define or prescribe in your policies?
  Especially, how do you balance specificity and generality in policy statement? (How can a policy be specific enough to respond to issues of today, yet general enough to meet the needs of tomorrow? How can it be specific enough to guide decisions to reduce public conflicts and poor design solutions, yet general enough to stimulate creativity in design?)

There is another kind of issues that are more general: How do you create links between policy formulation and implementation?

Deciding upon the substance of city design policy

Citywide urban design policies, in contrast with area or project design policies, address various sorts of "citywide issues" and define overall city strategies for urban design. Important distinctions can be made of individual policies in regard to what they define or prescribe: the quality of the physical environment; the attribute or component of the urban design management system; and general strategies or courses of action to improve either. Thus, there are "environmental quality policies", 
'design management policies", and "action policies". The environmental quality policy, while cast in the statement of a general course of action, defines (suggests) more than anything else what it is that is desirable in the physical environment:

- Recognize that buildings, when seen together, produce a total effect that characterizes the city and its districts. (Policy for City Pattern 3, the Urban Design Plan, San Francisco DCP, 1972a)
  [Suggesting that a good environment has buildings producing a total effect that characterizes San Francisco and its districts when seen together. Viewed as a definition of what and how of action, "Recognize such a design principle" defines little.]

- Street layouts and building forms which do not emphasize topography reduce the clarity of city form and image.
  A. Tall, slender buildings at the top of hills and low buildings on the slopes and in valleys accentuate the form of the hills. (Fundamental Principle for City Pattern 2, the Urban Design Plan, San Francisco DCP, 1972a)

- Trees, vines and other landscape materials should be used to integrate freeway rights-of-way into residential neighborhoods and to screen and soften the appearance of noise barriers and other visually incongruent structures. (Policy 6 - Residential Areas, the Visual Quality Plan, Minneapolis PD, 1979a)
  [This is a "checklist-type" environmental quality policy according to a definition given later. This policy generally suggests that it is a good environment which has trees, vines, etc., used to integrate freeway rights-of-way into residential neighborhoods without suggesting how those landscaping materials should be used. Viewed as a directive for action, this policy defines little as to how to go about obtaining such landscaping.]

Similarly, the design management policy defines (suggests) more than anything else what it is that is desirable about the design management system or its element:

- Design controls should integrate visual considerations into the decision-making process. They should rely on specific standards and requirements as much as possible in order to minimize the need for discretionary judgement and design reviews. (Policy 28 - The Decision-Making Process, the Visual Quality Plan, Minneapolis PD, 1979a)

- Rehabilitation should be favored over clearance as a renewal technique in order to preserve the visual character of residential neighborhoods.
Review proposals for the giving up of street areas in terms of all the public values that streets afford. Every proposal for the giving up of public rights in street areas through vacation ... [etc.] shall be judged with the following criteria as the minimum basis for review:

a. No release of a street area shall be recommended which would result in:

(5) Elimination or reduction of open space which might feasibly be used for public landscaping or public recreation;

The action policy defines a course of action to be taken in general terms. The virtue of this type of policies is their capacity to suggest a specific program or course of action, a litter control program in the following example:

Litter control should be encouraged through educational efforts and the provision of trash receptacles, particularly in pedestrian areas and new fast-food, carry-out restaurants.

Each city can determine how specific or general their policies can be. There is nothing that prevents cities from adopting a policy to carry out a specific program or course of action: e.g. "Create a Town Lake." (The Design of the City - Goal 10, Goals for Dallas, 1970).

Like goals and objectives, environmental quality and design management policies set broad quality or performance goals. Because they do not prescribe specific courses of action to be taken while they might imply some, action strategies (general courses of action) must be identified before the implementation of these two types of policies begin. Cities
could even adopt some of such action strategies as part of citywide urban design policies perhaps as in the following example:

The feasibility of purchasing scenic easements at key bridgehead locations should be assessed.
(The second sentence of Policy 20 - Scenic Assets, the Visual Quality Plan, Minneapolis PD, 1979a)

The relationships of implementing and being implemented are all relative and there could be "layers" of policies in a plan in this way.

The point of my introducing distinctions among these three kinds of policies is to consider what sorts of issues are addressed as a matter of city policy and whether each of the three essential factors of urban design -- the quality of the physical environment, the urban design management system, and action strategies -- is defined in city policy.

In reading the following qualifications, attention should be directed to the core of each policy type, not to its boundaries.

Whether a policy defines a quality rather than a course of action is a matter of relative emphasis. Technically, this is because all policies are stated in terms of a course of action. Distinctions among the three types of policies can be made only in terms of the substance they define, not their forms. The following is an action policy, viewed as a directive for an education program; a design management policy, viewed as a statement pointing to the importance of design-conscious citizens in creating a good urban design process:

Encourage a continuing awareness of the long-term effects of growth upon the physical form of the city.
(Policy for Major New Development 9, the Urban Design Plan, San Francisco DCP, 1972a)

Some policies might even define both a quality and a course of action at the same time as in the following example:

Visual clutter at bridgeheads should be avoided. The feasibility of purchasing scenic easement at key bridgehead locations should be assessed. (Policy 20 - Scenic Assets, the Visual Quality Plan, Minneapolis PD, 1979a)

The first sentence of this policy suggests an environmental quality policy setting forth a broad goal which in effect defines a desirable quality of the environment ("A good environment has visual clutter at bridgeheads avoided.") rather than a course of action (What shall we do to "avoid"
it?) or a nature of design management system (What sort of design controls, procedures, etc. should we have to "avoid" it?). The second sentence suggests an action policy defining a course of action (to assess feasibility, i.e., feasibility studies) to realize the quality of the environment suggested in the first sentence, more than a quality of the environment or design management system. Together, these two sentences form a policy which is both environmental quality policy and action policy. Similarly, the following policy at first defines a quality of the environment, and, then, an action strategy:

The City should prevent development that blocks or has a significant negative impact on key scenic views and encourage design which preserves, enhances, or creates key scenic views.

18a. The City should establish height limits in areas outside of Downtown. Buildings taller than those limits should be permitted as a conditional use after adequate review of their visual and other impacts. ...

(Policy 18 - Scenic Assets, the Visual Quality Plan, Minneapolis PD, 1979a)

An immediate issue that faces urban designers is one of allocating their resources (funds, staff, and time) to more or less studies of policies of each type. The general desirability of having as many types of policies as possible must be obvious. It means that more of important factors in urban design are explicitly defined in terms of what is good or bad and subjected to public discussion as a matter of city policy. Urban designers' decisions should not be so much choices from among them (as a matter of style or approach) as attempting to incorporate as many of them as possible in city design policy within constraints. Their resources, jurisdiction, mandate, and outside support in a given situation may not allow them to work on certain kinds of policies. For example, the urban design staff in Dallas was rather away from studies of the design management system perhaps because such studies were within the jurisdiction of the city manager's office rather than the planning department.

Relative importance of the environment, the design management system, and action strategies depend upon situations and urban designers will necessarily have to make decisions strategically case by case. For example, problems or urban design around the late 60s in San Francisco
as the planning staff saw derived from the lack of an environmental quality definition. In fact, basic procedures and design controls were already in place at the time (e.g. project reviews and historic preservation procedures). Thus, it seems sensible that they defined their urban design plan primarily as a definition of the quality of the environment. However, once the Urban Design Plan had been formulated and adopted, problems of the design management system and action strategies became visible. This suggests a need to incorporate policies for these in the future revision of the plan.

In practice, urban designers' theories seem to count for much in their decisions, relative to actual constraints and opportunities. In Minneapolis, the urban design staff did not attempt to define the quality of the environment in the Visual Quality Plan because they saw little prospect for obtaining public support for such an effort. On the other hand, citizens were generally supportive of an idea of defining the quality of the environment. Part of the problem seems to be the staff's theory which put design (review) guidelines at a level of policy implementation, not at a level of policy. Also, the staff does not seem to have held a notion of policies to define the quality of the environment (environmental quality policies) distinguished from a plan mapping or defining fixed "end state" visual image (blueprints) (Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-79).

Similarly, a decision of the planning staff in San Francisco to make the Urban Design Plan a definition of the quality of the environment, at first sight, seems to have been made for reasons of the limited resources the planning department had for the Urban Design Study and the jurisdiction of the planning commission. For example, the staff could not afford to prepare district-level plans while they knew areas like Van Ness Avenue were of strategic importance to the design of the city. Also, the department was distant from the mayor, Board of Supervisors, and development and budget functions of the city. However, it is the staff's theory that allowed a conscious decision that they stay away from defining a good process (design management system) at a policy level:

The substantive issues [of development] can be addressed in a plan for urban design, but the process of achieving the plan must depend upon the sincerity, high motive and
skill of the leadership chosen by the community. (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 10; cf. also p. 11 of the same document and Staten, 1973: 21)

The planning commission in reality had important roles to play in implementing the plan (e.g. project reviews and recommending planning code revisions) and there were important policy issues that were within their jurisdiction (e.g. the role of project review and principles of choosing among alternative design control mechanisms). One purpose of my suggesting the environment, the design management system, and action strategies as important substance in urban design for which policies might be formulated is to encourage urban designers to consider issues around them more openly in deciding what to address in their plans. There is no outright prescription for what city design policy should define.

**Deciding upon specificity in policy statement**

How you state a policy or what you specifically define in it is an important question each urban designer has to ask. Viewing the policy as definition of who (the actor), what (the environmental quality and form, or the design management system attribute), how (the action), where (the location), when (the timing), and for whom or to whom (the client or the target), this question may be interpreted as a matter of specificity in regard to these. Especially important are the following:

- Environmental quality-specificity (the level of operationalization);
- Location-specificity;
- Form-specificity; and
- Action-specificity.

The actor and the client (or the target of action) are often unstated because they are already implied or naturally follow from the statement. Also, they are generally difficult to agree upon (e.g. Who should pay for the bill?). Citywide urban design policies (general and long-range) emphasize the timing of actions least.

The key variable in defining the environmental quality policy is the level of operationalization. A policy can at least name what it is that is valued in terms of the quality of the environment and that has to be considered in designing projects without precisely defining it and without determining how it should be considered. A city design
plan consisting of such policies suggests a checklist of important environmental quality concerns. Such a plan defines the quality of the environment only weakly since it just lists important attributes. Policies for the environment in the Minneapolis Visual Quality Plan (contrasted with policies for the decision-making process) are generally of this type. For example, Policy 6 would make you wonder how trees, vines, and other landscaping materials should be used to integrate freeway rights-of-way into residential neighborhoods. Many of them are better classified as action policies than environmental quality policies. Policy 18 to establish height limits, if viewed as environmental quality policy, just says that the building height is an important design consideration.

The San Francisco Urban Design Plan has demonstrated that urban designers can do more than this, however elusive the quality of the physical environment may seem. They treated good design relationships as measurable (cf. "measurable and critical design relationships" -- fundamental principles). The level of operationalization could be low (principles) or high (guidelines or standards). Conceivably, standard/guideline-type policies (including principles) must be more difficult to formulate and agree upon but more useful as decision guide than checklist-type policies.

The decision as to whether urban designers should prescribe specific requirements or do no more than to indicate the type of result they favor is a strategic one. Urban designers' decision will be affected by various factors. At first, what quality is in question matters. Some qualities of the environment allow the level of operationalization that is higher than others. The height of buildings and the number of high-voltage transmission lines (Policy 21, the Visual Quality Plan) are at one extreme. Close to these is the bulk of buildings but the planning staff in San Francisco has not been entirely successful in translating the visually perceived bulk into measurements (e.g. diagonal rules). At another extreme, they left the darkness of building surface color without any precise definition. Thus, to some observers, buildings like the State Compensation Insurance Fund building are too dark while they went through a series of reviews (project review of the planning
Whether a city design plan remains to be a checklist seems to be more than a matter of the nature of qualities which the plan deals with and, thus, the nature of the city's environment, however. The theories and techniques of policy formulation and the amount of experience that has accumulated in the city by the time must be important. Various policy statements and action recommendations in the Visual Quality Plan suggest that efforts to make the definition of a good environment explicit have just begun in Minneapolis (e.g. a policy to identify desirable qualities to be enhanced).

Each policy can be specific or general in terms of the location of things. At one extreme, the policy would not determine location at all. A policy for appearance and maintenance of streets and properties, for example, may be applied citywide as in the following example:

> Use care in remodeling of older buildings, in order to enhance rather than weaken the original character of such buildings. (Policy for Conservation 5, the Urban Design Plan, San Francisco DCP, 1972a).

At another, a policy may be formulated for one specific location (in a citywide plan perhaps because it has citywide significance). For example, a policy might be set forth for recognizing and protecting design characteristics of Telegraph Hill, San Francisco. ³ Somewhere between these two extremes is a policy in the Urban Design Plan to protect residential areas from the noise, pollution, and physical danger of excess traffic (Policy for Neighborhood Environment 1). This policy is location-specific: the Plan for Protected Residential Areas (a map) determines where residential areas should be protected from through traffic. Within those protected residential areas, however, detailed examples of ways to divert or slow neighborhood traffic (design prototypes) were placed in a general policy context, without location-specificity.

The San Francisco Urban Design Plan includes several location-specific elements (mapped plans and guidelines) while the Visual Design Framework and the Visual Quality Plan in Minneapolis have none except one. ⁴ There are at least two prerequisites for location-specificity:
- The location-specific knowledge of the existing quality of the environment -- citywide visual form surveys; and
- Readiness to prescribe a good environment for the city in more or less location-specific terms on the part of the urban design staff, and public support for this.

The difference between the San Francisco and Minneapolis plans seems to be explained by these two factors.

Each policy can be more or less specific in terms of its prescription for the form of the environment. The San Francisco Urban Design Plan incorporates much form-specificity through its principles. In contrast, the Minneapolis Visual Quality Plan has few form-specific elements. Unlike in a blueprint plan, form-specificity in a city design policy plan does not always come together with location-specificity. An example is a set of design prototypes for street intersections to divert or slow traffic presented in the Urban Design Plan. They are form-specific (defining form patterns) but general in terms of location.

Finally, each action policy can be specific or general as well. While action policies tend to be rather specific, measurable, and achievable with the commitment of a certain amount of resources, some action policies may just outline general orientation or approach, rejecting an idea of achieving those policies. Not all of such general and unimplementable action policies would be ill-formulated and bad. Viewed as design management policies, they could be important and useful in their own ways, perhaps educational and inspirational.

It is often said that comprehensive plan policies are unimplementable and useless because they are too general (and too long-range). It is important, however, to define generality-specificity more precisely as I have done in terms of quality, location, form, and action. To formulate a policy that is specific enough to guide day-to-day decisions should not mean simple "insistence on greater detail in plans" (Catanese, 1974: 171). It should be an act of balancing each type of specificity with generality that makes application of the policy to various situations that are considered important. Urban designers have to make strategic decisions in terms of these factors of specificity (location-specificity, form-specificity, etc.), considering the purpose of formulating each policy. The form-generality of a policy to protect residential areas from
through traffic has helped the adoption and implementation of the policy in various situations, rather than made it "too general to implement". Similarly, the planning staff in San Francisco successfully combined form-specificity and location-generality in defining design prototypes for protected residential area projects. Traditional conceptualization, blueprint plans vs. policy plans, viewed in this context is too general. While citywide urban design policies ought to be general, there are many ways they can be specific at the same time. Blueprint plans suggest just one way -- location-specific and form-specific at the same time -- that is rather ineffective in guiding the physical development and change of the entire city.\(^5\)

Finally, it is important to note that how specific a policy can (and should) be is determined as part of the "politics of policy formulation". Not only the policy should be specific in regard to what needs to be agreed upon but also it can be specific only in that aspect on which the community can agree upon. Taking the earlier example of a policy for freeway landscaping as a case, increased specificity in terms of actors (e.g. "The city should do something.") and methods (e.g. "increase expenditure on landscaping" or "provide incentives for property owners") may be not always be desirable in view of encouraging the consideration of a broad range of alternatives (e.g. the possibility of the city using the policy in persuading the State Highway Department to put more money into highway landscaping: "This is a dominant public sentiment of our community."). It is also possible that no agreement was possible in regard to actors because no one wanted to spend more money (the state or the city or property owners or else). Whatever the case may be, the policy is a record of an important agreement of the community, in this case, an agreement as to the importance of someone doing such landscaping somehow. Less specificity in terms of who, how, and when here should not necessarily mean that this is a poor policy statement. In this way, strategic decisions urban designers must make in regard to various factors of specificity are both technical and political.

Deciding upon strategies for linking city design policy formulation to implementation

The definition of policy implementation as well as the process,
methods, and consequences of policy implementation varies according to the type of policy. Different sorts of issues are involved in implementing different types of policies. For example, implementing an action policy means carrying out a specific course of action which belongs to a general course of action specified in the policy. A policy to establish height limits, for example, may be implemented by a height ordinance. You will have to follow a series of studies to draw up specific zoning standards and maps, public hearings, planning commission and city council actions, etc. The way you go about the process defines a specific course of action. Involved here are traditional problems of beginning and completing implementation such as "aspiration too high" and "things go wrong during the course of action in one way or another."

Beginning and completing implementation of an environmental quality policy involves different kinds of problems. Policy here is given as broad environmental quality goal rather than more or less specific means. Nothing is said about what might be specifically done or whether anything has been or will be done to accomplish that goal. Implementation of this type of policy thus requires that you at first find appropriate means, perhaps initially defined in terms of general courses of action which could be translated into more specific courses of action to be actually carried out. For example, to implement a policy to increase the visibility of major destination areas and other points of orientation (Policy for City Pattern 8, the Urban Design Plan), you might 1) preserve, 2) create, and 3) improve views from streets and other public areas where they include the water, open spaces, large buildings, and other major features of the city pattern (San Francisco DCP, 1972a: 13). Each of these suggests more specific courses of action such as purchase of hilltops for parks, incentives for observation decks at the top of highrise buildings, and selective pruning of street trees. When you actually carry out such specific courses of action, you have almost implemented the policy, but not completely. The implementation of an environmental quality policy should mean that you get the quality the policy defines. It is difficult to begin implementation of this type of policy and it is still more difficult to get things going and complete them. Problems in the implementation of this type of policy have much to do with the "theories" that link courses of action to their effects on the quality of the environment.
(To what extent will the purchase of hilltops increase the visibility of major destination areas and other points of orientation?)

It follows that the relative emphasis the city design plan puts on each type of policy should necessarily be reflected in urban designers' decisions as to overall strategies for plan implementation. From the point of view of making citywide policy planning work, my question is: How do you link city design policy formulation to policy implementation? Here I do not discuss specific methods of implementation such as legislation, direct project, and administrative reorganization.

At present, urban designers have only a small repertoire of specific approaches to create good linkage between policy and implementation, not to mention implementation mechanisms and strategies sufficient to ensure "a tight fit" between policies and the day-to-day decisions that regulatory agencies and departments must take (Susskind and Aylward, 1976: 55). Looking at the two case cities in which citywide urban design policies have been formulated, the urban design staff in Minneapolis sought to create structural linkage within their plans to help link them to design controls. Their approach was to define a desirable visual image structure as environmental quality objective or performance specification (the visual image framework) and suggest how they might be achieved in terms of the visual form structure of form pattern (the visual form framework). Their concept of new zoning controls to implement the visual form framework has not been tried.

The planning staff in San Francisco adopted a more traditional, yet not always practiced approach: they did an implementation approach study as part of the Urban Design Study (a general strategy -- at a macro level). Also, they kept asking, "How would you implement it?" (Jacobs, 1978b: 219) Some policies, especially those that could be implemented through zoning, received special attention. For example, they developed a set of height and bulk guidelines for policies relating to the height and bulk of buildings so that those policies could be readily translated into specific zoning standards (specific policies -- at a macro level). Subsequently, those guidelines were used as interim controls (Svirsky, 1973: 13). Likewise, they developed detailed criteria to govern street vacation procedures for a policy relating to the vacation of street space.
Finally, the recognition of the urban design management system or decision-making process (rather than the implementation process) as a legitimate subject of citywide urban design studies as in the Minneapolis CIP Urban Design Study suggests another approach. Improving the performance of the design management system (including implementation) could and perhaps should be among the purposes of citywide policy planning.

Cases in Minneapolis and San Francisco also suggest that the organizational integration to create closer ties between city planning and implementation functions should help the formulation of the policies that can be implemented. In Minneapolis during 1968-77, the urban design staff in the city coordinator's office had a good access to the know-hows of implementation in the same office and saw important plans being implemented quickly due to the power of the city coordinator to coordinate and develop. (Plans, on the other hand, were formulated in the way they could be implemented by departments under the city coordinator: much emphasis was placed on capital improvements as in the Metro Center '85 downtown comprehensive development plan.) In San Francisco, the planning department combined long-range policy planning and zoning administration functions. Thus, the urban design team had a good access to the know-hows of policy implementation through zoning. (On the other hand, they were distant from other implementation functions, especially development-related functions.)

It is important that the question of how to organize the urban design function in a municipal government be viewed in a larger context, not just from a point of view of creating links between city design policy and implementation. I shall now turn to issues around government organization and the locus of urban design within administrative structure.

Urban Designers in City Government

To have urban designers practicing in city governments must have important implications. In designing their approach, urban designers must define 1) the status and role of urban design and 2) their client and the way they relate themselves to the client. City governments are of fundamental importance since they provide, or could provide,
urban designers with basic definitions as to these. City governments do this from three sources:

- The formal structure (the charter and municipal codes, the administrative structure, and the ideal of city government behind them);
- The city officials as they translate the formal structure and as they act as personalities (e.g. a developer-mayor); and
- The process of administration that actually takes place in the city government, both as precedence and as the reality at the time.

Each of these may mandate or prohibit, encourage or discourage, suggest to do or not to do certain things, explicitly or implicitly.

At first, city governments, by providing basic definitions as to the status and role of urban design through these three sources, condition urban designers in determining what they should be doing (e.g. policy formulation vs. policy implementation) and how they should go about it (e.g. citywide, one-time comprehensive study vs. incrementalism). In Dallas, for example, the formal structure puts the urban design staff in the planning department away from the central management function performed in the city manager's office. The ideal of the council-manager government is to give the entire policy-making role to elected officials (the mayor and council) and the policy implementation (administration) to the bureaucracy under the council-appointed city manager. The urban design staff may be involved in city design policy formulation only upon a request of the city council. In the late 70s when the urban design staff completed most of surveys and analyses for the citywide urban design framework, the city council was not inclined to make such a request.

City governments, especially their forms and processes, are important in another way. They create more or less of demand for sophisticated mechanisms of communication and control in urban design which citywide urban design policies represent. In San Francisco, for example, it was difficult for the planning department to carry out its responsibilities in coordination and priority setting since other city officials also had responsibilities for coordination (especially, the Mayor, the Chief Administrative Officer, and the Controller) and other departments had considerable autonomy in carrying out their projects and programs
(Jacobs, 1978b: 44-5). It was thus essential for the planning department to develop sophistication in ways of influencing various actors away from it. Comprehensive planning was a way to develop necessary sophistication. The citywide urban design plan was a source from which various design controls would stem and itself a device for communication and control.

Second, city governments, through the three sources, provide basic definitions as to who may be urban designers' primary client (e.g. city officials vs. citizens), who are significant citizens the city government should serve (e.g. developers vs. neighborhood residents), and how urban designers should relate themselves to various groups of people in the city. City governments thus explicitly or implicitly encourage or discourage participation of various groups of people in the process of city design policy formulation. In Dallas, for example, it was reported that city officials discouraged the planning staff from involving neighborhood organizations in neighborhood planning programs and citizen representation in committees and commissions were reduced in the late 70s (Herald, December 11, 1978a). Obviously, the people of the city or its social-political context conditions the city government. The form and process of government ideally is the reflection of the wishes of the people. In fact, the recent trend has been toward city governments' opening up the process of city planning and urban design to the people of the city, especially to neighborhood groups. In this context, technical and political issues around citizen participation have become important concerns of urban designers. On the other hand, the people of the city would come to have direct relevance to urban designers' practice only when the city government encourages or accepts citizen participation (in the short run). Otherwise, what would become relevant is the nature of inconsistency among definitions given by the city government, urban designers, and various groups of people in the city as to the client of urban designers and the role each group ought to play in the process of citywide policy planning. The way the inconsistency is resolved in the long run would be also important (cf. the planning department reorganization of the late 70s in Dallas).

Finally, city governments through the three sources direct or suggest
how urban designers should relate themselves to the city officials, especially the chief executive and policy-makers (the city council). In fact, urban designers' relationship to the city officials is of fundamental importance since they are primary clients of the urban designers (collectively, they hire the urban designers). Urban designers not in service of the city officials would be deemed to be ineffective.

In sum, city governments have fundamental importance as a source of basic definitions and demand that direct, suggest, guide, constrain, or facilitate (depending upon your perspective) the practice of urban designers attempting citywide policy planning. They are urban designers' primary client and they represent the city's people whom urban designers must ultimately serve. The definition of urban design, the role of urban designers, and the place of citizen participation in the process of city design policy formulation, all depend on the governmental context among other things. It is important to note that, as city governments can define these, they can choose not to do so themselves, allowing urban designers or others to define as they best can.

Part of the problem in practice is that the definitions that come from the three sources are not always clear and explicit and that they are not always consistent. Obviously, the actual processes of government do not necessarily follow the form of administrative structure or directives from the city officials. To the extent the city officials are not a unified body and to the extent they do not always represent the people of the city in regard to specific issues, urban designers cannot merely respond to their directions by simple conformance.

The effect of the three factors of government (sources of definitions) as observed and as speculated seems to fall into a certain pattern that can be described well in terms of several situations:

- Urban designers under the independent planning commission (within a city government which attempts to disperse power broadly) (e.g. Minneapolis before 1968; San Francisco);
- Urban designers dominated under the city manager (the dominance-subordination situation, complete or obscured; e.g. Dallas);
- Urban designers with the city manager (the integration situation; e.g. Minneapolis, 1968-77);
- Urban designers under the strong mayor (cf. Catanese, 1974); and
- Urban designer under the weak mayor (cf. Minneapolis since 1978).
These situations seem to allow good prediction of the urban designers' relationships to the chief executive and policy-makers. The similarities and contrasts in responsibilities and behavioral and personality characteristics of actors involved could take quite different expressions depending on these situations. Also, the way city governments define the status and role of urban design and the way they define the client of urban designers and the client-urban designer relationships seem to vary, in large measure, according to these situations. Presented below is a speculation of the nature of the practice of urban designers attempting citywide policy planning in the first two situations. The first one seems most conducive to citywide policy planning; the second one seems to make it most difficult to practice. The purpose of my presenting this on the basis of only three case studies is at first to illustrate how a basic framework to consider issues of urban designers' practice in city governments outlined so far might be applied and, then, to suggest that in no case citywide policy planning is entirely impractical.

- Urban designers under the independent planning commission (within a government which attempts to distribute power broadly)

The situation in San Francisco comes close to this model. This situation has a few important implications on the status and role of urban design. Obviously, this situation placing urban designers away from the city's decision center and implementation functions (especially development and budget) restricts urban designers significantly as to what they can do. The same factor, on the other hand, creates much demand for citywide policy planning. It is essential that much research be made to develop sophisticated mechanisms of communication and control so as to deal with a multitude of actors in this situation. Also, citywide urban design policies backed up by citizen support could be an indispensable source of power of the planning agency. This situation supports citywide policy planning also because urban designers have much discretion in determining their approach.

Urban designers in this situation are relatively free in defining their client. The urban designer-chief executive relationship would not have a tone of personality conflict. Perhaps, more important in this
situation is how urban designers relate themselves to policy-makers in conducting citywide policy planning. Close communication or even close working relationships with policy-makers during the process of city design policy formulation would be essential. On the other hand, policy-makers may not wish to be involved in the process (e.g. San Francisco).

In sum, city governments in this situation would not be so much a set of constraints as a source of challenges and demands for technical and political sophistication in urban design, to which citywide policy planning can contribute much.

Urban designers dominated under the city manager (the dominance-subordination situation)

Unlike other forms of government, the council-manager government, in its form and ideal, clearly suggests a certain status and role of urban design, which are not quite supportive of citywide policy planning. At first, this form of government attempts to clearly separate government administration (policy implementation) from the policy setting function and politics. The role of urban designers under the city manager is primarily policy implementation. Second, this form of government attempts effective reflection of public opinion in city government. This means not only that urban designers' time horizon has to be middle- to short-range but also that the very idea of formulating general, long-range policies runs counter to the image of governments that are highly responsive to public opinion, since the former implies the generation of agenda and, then, programs and projects internally according to directives of goals, objectives, and policies. (Obviously, this is to be done in response to public opinion at the time. Urban design with citywide urban design policies is not totalitarian urban design.) Third, the council-manager government is a government for businesses. It strives for the ideal of efficient government and efficiency in one sense means fewer government controls over private businesses. Citwide urban design policies which represent a form of control and from which design controls stem do not sit well in this situation unless businesses want them. Finally, the council-manager government values the centralization of control. The
situation in which urban designers are placed under the city manager and away from him (the dominance-subordination situation) makes the practice of urban design as part of the central decision-making function of the city difficult. In sum, urban design in this situation is defined as policy implementation function in a staff department or, even, urban design as engineering, as far as the formal structure is concerned. The Dallas case suggests that the city officials may very well interpret the formal structure strictly.

The way city governments define urban designers' client could raise another set of serious questions as to the practice of citywide policy planning in this situation. The city council, being the only body of elected officials to perform the overall policy-making function representing the entire voters of the city, can define who should be the client of the city government in a project or a program or a study. Urban designers' client definition and citizen participation strategy ought to be consistent with the city council's wishes. Some social-political context makes the client definition of the city government and that of urban designers inconsistent and puts urban designers in a problematic situation. In Dallas in the late 70s, "significant citizens" to the city council (and the city manager) were developers; they did not quite coincide with the planning staff's concept of client.

The urban designer-city manager relationship in the dominance-subordination situation is equally problematic. While the city manager and urban designers have overlapping responsibilities to compete for, especially in regard to coordination of city decisions pertinent to the physical development and design of the city and, thus, more or less of interdepartmental relations, the two actors have very contrasting behavioral and personality characteristics. Thus, the role urban designers define for themselves could be very well in conflict with the city manager's definition of the role his urban designers should play. Urban designers could unwittingly run into an adversary relationship with the city manager. The dominance-subordination situation demands that any conflict be resolved through more or less formal and explicit processes while it does not offer mechanisms to facilitate such processes. Contrasting behavioral and personality characteristics, assumptions, and
languages of the two groups of actors make communication difficult and hinder timely conflict resolution.

In the complete dominance-subordination situation, the initial role assignment is made directly, clearly, and completely to make the city manager superior and urban designers subordinate. This prevents conflict, competition, and interference. Urban designers would be placed at a level of staff departments under the city manager and away from him to perform staff functions like those of the city architect and the city engineer. Interdepartmental coordination, be it design-related or not, ought to be made through the city manager. Any conflict in roles and responsibilities should be resolved by the city manager from the top.

In reality, the dominance-subordination relationship is bound to be obscured and urban designers are vulnerable to various problems as outlined so far. In case of Dallas in the late 70s, conflicts were resolved from the top and the function of the planning department was redefined to conform to the formal structure of the Dallas government. Overall, the dominance-subordination situation could make citywide policy planning in urban design very difficult to practice. However, the Dallas case suggests that even in this situation citywide policy planning is not entirely impractical.

**Citizen Participation and the Role of Government Urban Designers in the Planning Process**

Sometimes, and increasingly, city governments require city planners to involve citizens, especially neighborhood residents, in a substantive way in planning programs. However, citizen participation at a citywide scale is not easy to practice even if there is such official support. Thus, urban designers attempting city design policy formulation face many issues that are usually not around traditional urban design practice at a scale of project or a small area. For example, it is often said that neighborhood groups dissociate themselves from general, long-range policy-oriented studies carried out citywide and wait until matters get boiled down to more specific ones at a level of neighborhood or specific project. The complexity of social context, at a scale of city (Who
should be involved and how can they be reached?) and resource problems (How much time and money can you afford?) add to difficulties of citizen participation in citywide policy planning. Can you involve citizens meaningfully in decisions on citywide urban design policies? Can you really discuss urban design issues productively on a citywide basis? Can you make citywide urban policies really responsive to various groups of people in the city? In addition, the formulation of citywide urban design policies (or policy alternatives) inevitably involved the act of balancing various interests in the city. Can government urban designers (rather than elected officials) be effective in this? These are questions that might be raised to challenge the practicability of citywide policy planning and the use of citywide urban design policies. Experience in the three case cities, while problematic in many ways in present practice, suggests that city design policy formulation can be made productively with citizen participation.

Citizen participation

In Minneapolis, five years of "public review" resulted in little revision of the proposed Visual Design Framework. The staff proposal had to be rewritten almost entirely, however, once an intensive neighborhood review process began. This process took no more than a year. It would be appropriate to see that the Visual Design Framework had to accommodate wishes of neighborhood residents whenever neighborhood groups' involvement took place. Early participation of neighborhood groups in this case, could have prompted the whole process of formulating and adopting city design policy. There were some drawbacks to neighborhood groups' involvement. Important value premises and design strategies were struck out with some specifics of design concepts (e.g. those related to highrisers and freeway corridors). This, however, must be a problem of the urban design staff not having been prepared well for intensive involvement of neighborhood groups, not a problem of citizen participation itself. For the staff was successful a few years later in balancing the responsiveness to the concerns and wishes of people and the professional judgement as to what a good city would be and how it might be realized. They were successful in putting some important design
concepts back into the Visual Quality Plan and, at the same time, made an important progress in the development of the theories and techniques of urban design in Minneapolis (e.g. the status of urban design and explicit statement of basic value premises).

Experience in Minneapolis and San Francisco offers us a few lessons. At first, in Minneapolis, such a limited participation mechanism as public hearings resulted in substantial citizen input in the process of revising staff proposals for the Visual Design Framework and the master design district ordinance. Public hearings in both cases triggered off a series of working sessions with neighborhood group representatives. Neighborhood groups had most of their wishes through in this way. The planning staff in San Francisco also depended on public hearings, here as a primary mechanism to elicit substantive citizen inputs. It is important to note, however, that neighborhood groups are not just one to be involved in the process of citywide policy planning and that public hearings do not necessarily assure involvement of other groups of people. For example, influential civic groups like the Minneapolis Citizens League are usually not represented in public hearings (cf. Catanese, 1974: 121).

Second, the same cases in Minneapolis suggest that the existence of neighborhood groups that would speak for the interests of neighborhood residents, especially if they are official planning groups like PDCAC's in Minneapolis, could help broaden the basis of citizen participation in citywide policy planning significantly. Minneapolis, neighborhood residents participated in debate over the Visual Design Framework and the master design district ordinance through neighborhood organizations and PDCAC's once a neighborhood review process began. A citywide umbrella organization, the Council of Community Councils, facilitated the staff's access to neighborhood groups. In San Francisco, neighborhood groups were already a strong force around the late 60s to the early 70s and the planning department was quite responsive to their concerns in planning programs.

Attention to neighborhood groups is important because they are difficult to involve on a citywide basis and because they have often been underrepresented at a level of city relative to more influential groups (e.g. the Chamber of Commerce). On the other hand, "broad citizen
participation" made possible through mass meetings and open public discussions should not be taken as effective citizen participation. Other groups that speak for the interests of businesses, users (e.g. automobile associations for automobile drivers), etc., must be reached. In Minneapolis, the Minneapolis Citizens League was not involved in the process of comprehensive planning for the 80s, according to one observer of the Minneapolis planning scene.

Third, certain situations seem to make direct citizen participation relatively unimportant. In San Francisco, four factors are important in understanding the wide acceptance of the Urban Design Plan upon its presentation to citizens despite relatively limited participation of citizens in the Urban Design Study:

- The planning staff was sensitive to the concerns of citizens (Jacobs, 1978b: 248) and sought citizen inputs from other sources;
- The special political climate of San Francisco allowed the planning staff to read the concerns of citizens well (Jacobs 1978a: 24-5); active use of public hearings as place of public discussion was part of San Francisco's citizen participation and political tradition;
- Important community issues at the time were clear and unmistakable (major new development and highrises) (Jacobs, 1978b: 213, 220); and
- High level of interest in urban design-related issues existed but the level of interest in the Urban Design Study remained low; specific project proposals and, later, the first Duskin initiative to limit the height of buildings seem to have absorbed public attention (Jacobs, 1978b: 201; San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 5).

It follows that massive, citywide citizen participation programs are not the only way to make citywide urban design policies responsive to the people of the city and to create necessary constituencies for their use and implementation. Citizen participation should be part of the whole system of eliciting inputs from citizens and communicating with them. Difficulties of citizen participation at a citywide scale and in general, policy-oriented studies would not make citywide policy planning an impossible dream in major cities (i.e. large and pluralistic).

There seem to be at least two general prerequisites that seem important in making citizen participation a productive force. At first, it is important that the theories and techniques of urban design in Minneapolis, technical if not political, had already been well developed
in the 70s. Important urban design tools were becoming part of the city's decision-making and development process. The urban design staff had an agenda, basic value premises, and design concepts. There was a reasonable amount of substantive knowledge. This meant that they had something with which to guide public discussion and, themselves, advocate, argue for, and return to (after a defeat). The presentation of the staff's perspective helped the clear articulation of the neighborhood perspective and, ultimately, reaching a community agreement upon visual design policies for the city. Citizen inputs were structured effectively around staff proposals, and public discussion was given a definite direction and an image of the desired product (the visual design framework).

The theories and techniques of urban design (technical) per se brought the staff to a point of the Visual Design Framework. Another factor marked the departure of the process of preparing the Visual Quality Plan from its predecessor. The staff, at the beginning of comprehensive planning for the 80s, had up-to-date knowledge of what were the concerns and wishes of people in the neighborhoods and what would make policy proposals controversial — the whole things they had learned in the process of adopting the Visual Design Framework just a year or so before. For example, they knew highrises and freeways would cause problems. They knew jargons like landmarks, nodes, and paths would create more skepticism than understanding. Thus, the staff was able to balance professional demands and neighborhood groups' wishes effectively. This points to the importance of allowing early citizen inputs in the planning process (in the absence of up-to-date knowledge) and designing an urban design program which allows urban designers to learn through experience in its course. Systematic reviews and revisions of citywide urban design policies during an early period of their use would significantly mitigate many of the drawbacks citywide policy planning might have, especially if it is implemented by way of a one-time study, and help make the city design plan more than a document of somebody's neat ideas to sit on a shelf.

Finally, the way urban designers package an urban design program seems to have important implications on citizen participation. Whether to do a single-purpose urban design program or to put an urban design
component in a multi-purpose program must be an important strategic decision. This is because in many communities urban design is not among the priority item on their agenda, especially in neighborhoods. Strategically, packaging an urban design study as part of a large planning program to deal with a wide range of issues around physical development and change that are important in the community would allow better citizen support. It has been the way neighborhood groups studied urban design for themselves (e.g. Planning Association for the Richmond, 1972; Mission Housing Development Corporation, 1974). To allow focus on urban design, urban design could be made a distinct element with its own goals, objectives, and policies. Integration is desirable in theory but it often results in the loss of the substance of urban design in practice, without goals, objectives, and policies of its own to stick to (e.g. the Whittier Urban Design Framework, Team 70, 1977; cf. Jacobs, 1978b: 193-4). Examples in Minneapolis and San Francisco generally support this view. 12

City design policy formulation in the political process

Urban designers submit policy proposals or policy alternatives to policy-makers for consideration. Policy-makers may be the official policy-making body of the city (the city council) or, as in San Francisco, a lower-level body (the planning commission) which sets policy for its own action. 13 Whichever the case, city design policy formulation necessarily draws urban designers into the political arena -- politics of policy setting -- since it involves the act of balancing the interests of various groups in the city anyway, implicitly or explicitly, whether from early in the planning process or later in the process of revising and adopting policies. Viewed this way, it must be essential that urban designers develop citywide urban design policies (recommendations) not only on the basis of technical studies but also on more direct citizen inputs and discussions in one form or another. Citizen participation comes into the scene in this context. 14 The more pluralistic is the community in its interests, the more important will citizen participation in the process of city design policy formulation be. A problematic nature of the process of developing the Visual Design Framework in Minneapolis
has already been pointed out.

You might quite naturally argue further that it is desirable to link the process of city design policy formulation to the political process. For the purpose of the political process is to allow various interests to foster their own wants and needs and it, as a result, incorporates the values which the people of the community hold collectively (Catanese, 1974: 94, 114, 121) -- the values which the urban designer wants to incorporate in the process of urban design. The benefits of involving political parties and elected officials early in the process of city design policy formulation, then, must be obvious: city design policy is debated in a real public forum to negotiate and balance various interests in the city. The process of city design policy formulation can become a process of public discussion to determine the desirable future of the city in this way. The consensus on common goals and policies that are formed and the support for city design policy that is generated in such a process would be valuable.

Obviously, citizen and political involvement would make urban design difficult to practice. Various difficulties exist in the first place to discourage government urban designers from getting themselves involved in the political process (cf. Catanese's (1974: 139-141) "anti-political factors"). The governmental context permitting, they still have to face many technical and resource problems. They have to spend much energy and time with people in neighborhoods and with elected officials (Catanese, 1974: 161). However, this is a view that would allow us to overcome that morbidity long-range plans have. We know many instances in which the comprehensive plan called for a project or endorsed one and local residents had to fight later against the project about which they were not consulted. Minneapolis offers cases to support a view that city planning and urban design can be a part of the political process to resolve issues of city development and design in the community. Lakeside highrises, for example, is an issue close to a settlement today due to active public debate (as well as neighborhood groups' fight against specific projects like Lake Point and 2900 Dean Boulevard). The contribution of city design policy formulation in the mid to late 70s (the land use and visual design framework elements of the comprehensive municipal plan and the Visual Quality Plan of the Plan for the 80s)
is not a little.

Catanese (1974: 139) observed that there were not many cases in which city planning had been directly linked to the political process. A case of comprehensive planning for the 80s in Minneapolis is exemplary among the three case cities, suggesting how productive political participation could be in some context. The involvement of the city council began only later in the process but its committees and political party groups started early involvement. The Independent-Republican Caucus of the city council, for example, started to hold a series of seminars to discuss key sections of the comprehensive plan soon after the publication of the Discussion Statement. Minneapolis today seems to offer a political climate especially favorable for city planning and urban design as policy-setting activity. It is often the case in recent planning studies that local aldermen initiate a planning program, call in a community planner from the planning department, and themselves serve as a discussion leader in the planning process (e.g. the 27th and Lake commercial node study).\(^{15}\) Good working relationships between city planners and elected officials must have much to do with the previous administrative arrangement in which city planners under the city coordinator worked for the city council. Whether what Catanese (1974: 131-2) calls a critical flaw of the executive dominant role of city planners -- their adversary relationships to city councilmen -- will emerge in Minneapolis is yet to be seen.
PROSPECT OF CITYWIDE POLICY PLANNING

In-depth studies of experience in three cities have offered cases to support the practicability and actual merit of citywide policy planning. At first, despite various difficulties, it has been fully applied in Minneapolis and San Francisco. In Dallas, staff efforts fell short of policy formulation but a series of citywide surveys and analyses has prepared the staff for beginning policy formulation anytime in the future with the city council's support. Second, citywide policy planning efforts in these cities respond to several important concerns in urban design which distinguish them from traditional, project design-centered or incremental ways of practicing urban design. Finally, the actual merit of citywide policy planning which cases in these cities suggest generally match its promise. The desirability of formulating and debating citywide urban design policies whenever issues involved can be regarded as citywide in nature and policy matters in substance, or overall city strategies for urban design are in question, has been generally supported by overall successes with citywide policy planning, development projects and design controls that worked within a framework of citywide urban design policies, problems that emerged in specific situations without citywide urban design policies, and the potential of improving present practice by having citywide urban design policies debated and agreed upon in these cities.

Obviously, citywide policy planning would be useful in some cities but not in others, given its basic functions and common uses. It would be practicable in some cities but not others even if it could be useful, given that certain situations of government and people are not particularly supportive of this kind of activity. While the three case studies are not sufficient to make broad generalizations, some speculation is possible as to where citywide policy planning might be useful and where it might work. With a qualification that
various factors work together, with some reinforcing and others counteracting with each other, and none of them determine the need or practicability of citywide policy planning alone, I speculate the effect of factors in four general categories: physical setting, governmental context, social-political context, and development situation.

At first, of various physical features, some seem especially important in creating demand for citywide policy planning. Spectacular land form (e.g. San Francisco) and the system of lakes, creeks, and parkways (e.g. Minneapolis) which everyone in the city can share are examples. On the other hand, some physical features would not only create little demand but also discourage citywide attention. The flat terrain, for example, allows no major views and makes it difficult for people to see and feel the city as a whole.

In more general terms, the relative diversity of the physical setting of the city within which physical changes occur seems important, this for technical reasons. For example, a number of business and commercial nodes, each of a scale of small-community downtowns or beyond, could create a need of general urban design policies for all commercial nodes citywide, rather than just plans for the downtown and one or two specific commercial nodes. A variety of residential neighborhoods in terms of density, use mix, form character, and historical background would demand keen attention to the fundamental principles of good design that make the residential environment desirable. Similarly, all sorts of public open spaces, not just a village common at the town center and a series of neighborhood playgrounds, suggest a place of citywide urban design policies in the city. A number and variety of public and private development projects, especially if they create public conflicts, would make a need of devising overall city policies for new development to allow effective response to individual project proposals visible.

Conceivably, traditional ways of practicing urban design -- downtown planning, prototype designs, direct design in strategic locations, and design controls in a few specific areas of concern such as historic preservation -- would suffice in small communities essentially consisting of the downtown and largely uniform residential neighborhoods. Beautification and appearance plans prepared for small communities
suggest the urban design approaches which generally support this observation.

Diversity is implied in the size of cities. Major cities, say the fifty largest cities in contrast with cities under 50,000 in population, would necessarily create such demand to justify citywide policy planning efforts. Not all major cities would need citywide policy planning, however. We have to look at the governmental context as well.

City governments which attempt to disperse power broadly seem to create much demand for citywide policy planning (e.g. San Francisco). Urban designers in such governments would be benefited greatly by the city design plan which puts various actors in the government on notice of their intent, explicit and well-researched decision-making criteria which make it difficult for other actors to challenge their decisions (e.g. master plan referrals) and, most importantly, broad public support which this activity creates for urban design goals, objectives, and policies. Centralized governments could mean the prospect of creating strong implementation tools to allow effective implementation of citywide urban design policies. On the other hand, strong government power to coordinate centrally and develop directly would create little demand for articulating urban design goals, objectives, and policies generally and citywide. Those at the decision center can control decisions of various actors by more direct means each time (e.g. the city council's policy directions to the city manager; the city manager's administrative directions to department heads).

The broad social-political context must also be important. At first, urban designers in socially and politically simple communities could be able to identify the values various groups in the community hold, and express them in more simple ways such as direct personal communication with elected officials, community leaders, and developers. Many of small suburban communities would fall within this category. Relatively simple social-political structure would not necessarily mean small communities, however. Dallas in the late 70s is characterized by strong development
interests dominating the interests of weak neighborhood groups and environmentalists in the City Hall. The effect was the clear understanding of the city officials as to the interests of the city (those of developers); they saw little need for articulating goals, objectives, and policies for urban design.

In contrast, citywide policy planning would be necessary where demand exists for relating to a multitude of interests in the development of community. Especially in the communities in which powerful groups create a deadlock situation in confrontation with each other, citywide policy planning could play a difficult but important role of creating a rational basis for establishing community consensus. The situation in San Francisco around the late 60s may be taken as a case. In justifying their budget request before the Board of Supervisors, the city planners could argue that the citywide urban design plan would provide a framework for private development that would help eliminate the costly and divisive conflicts that were then becoming characteristic of major building proposals (Jacobs, 1978b: 195).

Similarly, how well the tradition of development and physical change has been established in the community would matter. Citywide policy planning would be necessary in communities in which people (including developers) do not express a common view of what it is that is desirable about the quality of the physical environment and how they should develop and change their city, yet there exists a belief that something could be done to improve their environment. Citywide policy planning must have had no place in medieval communities where everyone built in the same way with common materials and according to long-established techniques.

The development situation of the community in a historical context must also be important. At first, citywide policy planning would be in greater demand in cities which have the already established form and character to be protected from pressure to develop and change (e.g. San Francisco). For some reason, an idea of city governments controlling the quality of design in already existing cities is better supported for the purpose of preservation (e.g. historical preservation and environmental planning in Dallas) than creation of a new kind of environment, however good it may seem to urban designers (cf. the
difficulty of establishing design districts in Minneapolis).

If there is neither expectation nor demand for much physical change, cities with the already established physical form and character would have little reason to embark on major citywide policy planning efforts. Policy planning efforts those cities might make would be ones for specific areas of concern such as historic preservation or for a few strategic locations (e.g. urban renewal). Many of the old and stable communities in the North East region would fall within this category. Some communities might value citywide policy planning even if their form and character have already been well established and not changing much. For example, in the face of population decline and staggering businesses in the 50s and the 60s, Minneapolis came to recognize that the visual quality was one of the important factors of the attractiveness of the city and that overall city strategies for urban design would matter much in an effort to retain people and businesses in the city.

New communities which are expecting much development and change would need citywide policy planning for a different reason: they need to chart a direction for the development of the emerging form and character of the city and coordinate individual development projects and design controls toward the direction. Citywide policy planning could contribute much because this is one of its basic functions. Whether those communities support this activity is another question. Often strong preoccupation with development and growth dominates community consciousness about the quality of the environment. With the form and character of the city yet to emerge, urban designers are vulnerable to a criticism that their recommendations are arbitrary. Without much to protect -- man-made features if not natural assets -- it is difficult to argue for public controls over the quality of design.

Taking all factors of physical setting, government, people, and development together, citywide policy planning must be essential if "citywide issues" and overall city strategies for urban design really matter in the city. Perhaps, San Francisco is unique in this regard. The city has the unparalleled quality of the physical environment with a capacity to make things citywide; there exist the well-developed
form and character that deserve protection on the one hand and strong pressure to develop and change on the other; the long-established tradition of respecting the form and character of the city was beginning to erode in the 60s... The context of urban design in other cities are usually ambivalent. However, in most cities, citywide policy planning seems to have important roles to play. For example, the physical setting of Seattle, Wash., creates a number of "visual basins" suggesting localized urban design efforts, but its regional transportation and travel pattern suggests a need for attending to the form and character of the city as a whole. Cities of neighborhoods on a flat terrain may not need citywide policy planning for one reason, perhaps because neighborhoods perform important functions in city planning and government (e.g. little city halls and neighborhood government) and there are no major views to see and feel the city as a whole. Yet, citywide policy planning might benefit those cities for other reasons. For example, citywide policy planning could be effective in reducing public conflicts over development projects that are repeated throughout the city over years.

Not all cities in which citywide policy planning could be beneficial would support it. What the people of the community consider the important business of the community (e.g. real estate development vs. providing stable and quiet residential neighborhoods for business and workers) and how the city government responds to the wishes of the people must be important. People could mean just a limited number of "significant citizens". In Dallas in the late 70s, for example, the influential political and business leaders saw the very purpose of citywide policy planning (e.g. to guide the development of the perceptual form of the city) inconsistent with what they consider the important business of their community (development and growth) and the role of their government (to remove constraints on real estate development). The citywide urban design framework which necessarily implied design controls was not supported in the City Hall.

One predictor of the practicability of citywide policy planning is the strength of city planning (especially, comprehensive planning) and the experience of the community in design controls. For citywide
policy planning could be added as a new element of comprehensive planning and it could be supported as a way of improving necessary design controls (cf. Minneapolis). City official's support for good urban design in general is another predictor (e.g. Mayor Arthur Naftalin and City Coordinator Thomas Thompson in Minneapolis). There would be many more. However, there is much uncertainty about whether citywide policy planning can be successfully practiced in each city. So far, urban designers have had very little experience in this new area of practice. Perhaps, urban designers won't know its real practicability in their cities unless they actually try it. Moreover, its practicability would change as urban designers experience more. Also, citywide policy planning would have an effect of changing the context of urban design to create a better basis for its use, once tried in the city, at least as an internal effort of the planning agency (cf. the Minneapolis CIP Urban Design Study). Too much attention to the present practicability of this activity in cities would harm its future development. Each urban designer entering this new area of practice must necessarily search his own way as part of efforts to devise the process of urban design that is adapted to his community.
APPENDIX

A SURVEY OF THE GENERAL STATE OF THE ART OF CITYWIDE URBAN DESIGN STUDIES AND PLANS IN AMERICAN CITIES SINCE 1960

This appendix reports the results of a survey of citywide urban design study reports and plans prepared in American cities since 1960. Planning reports reviewed are those which as a whole or in part deal with large-scale urban design. Reports were identified by title and by reference in two professional journals.¹ The majority of reports reviewed were funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) or the federal Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) through the 701 or Community Renewal Programs. For those reports, a computerized key word index to report titles was available from HUD. Cities of all sizes were included in the survey, while special attention was given to the fifty largest cities. For the latter, planning studies for the city as a whole or its major section which might contain an urban design element or contents (e.g. comprehensive plans, development plans, and downtown plans) were reviewed beside urban design-related reports identified in the above-mentioned manner. The special attention paid to large cities is not accidental: the larger the city, the greater a chance of creating a permanent urban design staff within city government to support a continuing program of urban design. Yet, urban design is much more difficult to practice in large cities due to the complexity of their social needs and physical circumstances.²
Relative Emphases on Studies of the Quality of the Environment and the Urban Design Management System

There are three general kinds of substance each citywide urban design study could deal with:

- The quality of the physical environment (its performance or form pattern, general or specific);
- The urban design management system (its performance, elements, and organization, general or specific); and
- Action strategies or courses of action to improve either (general or specific).

Not all studies would deal with these with equal emphases. Important distinctions among studies can be made in terms of relative emphases on the quality of the environment and the design management system. Studies of action strategies are something that would follow, or ought to follow, studies of the quality of the environment and the design management system and, thus, help us little in distinguishing basic studies.

In regard to the quality of the environment and the design management system, three levels of study are important to distinguish:

- Policies were formulated, officially adopted or not;
- Surveys and analyses were carried out (with or without strategies for improvement considered); and
- No in-depth studies were carried out (with or without a brief section outlining general strategies for improvement (or implementation) or discussing the importance of plan/policy implementation without mentioning implementation strategies).

The importance of distinguishing the second and the third levels must be obvious -- study or no study. Whether policies are formulated or not is an important concern in this survey since city design policy formulation is the key activity of citywide policy planning. This offers us a basic framework for describing citywide urban design studies (fig. A-1).

A New Breed of Citywide Urban Design Studies

Some cities systematically studied both the quality of the environment and the urban design management system (Minneapolis and San Francisco). Minneapolis made "the first large-scale comprehensive analysis of the form and image of an entire city" (Lynch, 1976: 82) --
Fig. A-1. Relative Emphases on the Quality of the Environment and the Urban Design Management System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Urban Design Management System</th>
<th>Policies Formulated</th>
<th>Surveys and Analyses Carried Out</th>
<th>No In-Depth Studies Carried Out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minneapolis, the Visual Quality Plan, 1979</strong></td>
<td><strong>Minneapolis, the CIP Urban Design Study, 1965-70.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Spartanburg, 1977</strong></td>
<td><strong>San Diego, 1979</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>San Francisco, the Urban Design Plan, 1971</strong></td>
<td><strong>Jacksonville, 1972</strong></td>
<td><strong>Oakland, 1969</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Los Angeles, 1971</strong></td>
<td><strong>San Antonio (SOM, 1972)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Seattle, 1971</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dallas, 1974</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* With a brief section outlining general implementation strategies or recommending ways of improving the urban design management system.
** With a brief section discussing the importance of plan/policy implementation, without recommending implementation strategies.
the first-phase (pilot study) of the CIP Urban Design Study (Minneapolis CIP, 1965k, etc.). The second-phase study during ca. 1966-70 added studies of the design management system (e.g. Barton-Aschman Associates, 1970) to environmental quality studies. The CIP Urban Design Study had a significant impact on the Minneapolis urban design program (Minneapolis CIP, 1971; Lu, 1979): It contributed to the establishment of the Committee on Urban Environment (CUE), creation of the Heritage Preservation Commission and subsequent designation of historic landmarks and districts, freeway beautification projects, and further studies and projects including a successful downtown comprehensive development plan Metro Center '85 (Minneapolis P&D, 1970a). At a policy level, Minneapolis' urban designers attended more to the quality of the environment than the design management system until recently. The Visual Quality Plan adopted by the planning commission in 1979 as part of the comprehensive plan marks a significant departure from previous studies and plans in this city in that it included policies for the design management system (the decision-making process) (Minneapolis PD, 1979a). In fact, the Visual Quality Plan is exceptional since no other cities in my survey have articulated this kind of policies.

Only few cities conducted studies of the design management system (Minneapolis, San Francisco, San Antonio, Tex., and Albuquerque, N.M.). San Francisco included in its citywide urban design study a study of "implementation approach" (San Francisco DCP, 1970e). San Antonio had a report, Urban Design Mechanisms for San Antonio, prepared by a consultant (SOM, 1972) (which received a HUD Design Award). This city, however, has not studied its visual form and character. Albuquerque made an urban design study with the assistance of a consultant as part of its Community Renewal Program (David A. Crane and Associates, 1970). While the consultant's report, Quality in Environment: An Urban Design Study for the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico, discusses both the quality of the environment and the design management system, only a cursory look is given to various qualities of environment (environmental problems, potentials, and the broad framework within which environmental action and design would occur). The strength of the report is rather in its recommendations for planning mechanisms and processes. The report also
suggests major concepts and ideas that might be adopted to guide the city's future design and development strategies.

Several cities carried out studies of the form and character of their environments that went beyond the scope of traditional appearance studies or surveys to identify "blighted areas" and determine "necessary urban renewal treatments". Among those cities, Minneapolis and San Francisco had policies formulated and adopted for the quality of the environment as part of their comprehensive plans:

Minneapolis:
- The Visual Design Framework adopted by the planning commission in 1976 (Minneapolis P&D, 1976a); and
- The Visual Quality Plan as a section of the Plan for the 80s adopted by the planning commission in 1979 and before the city council for its adoption in the spring of 1980 (Minneapolis PD, 1979a).

San Francisco:
- The Urban Design Plan adopted by the planning commission in 1971 (San Francisco DCP, 1971b, 1972a).

The San Francisco Urban Design Plan was the result of a two-year study carried out during 1969-70 -- "the most thorough set of analysis to date, covering neighborhood quality, the street system, the general image, implementation, and objectives -- published in a series of ten reports completed in 1971" (Lynch, 1976: 82). The assessment of this plan varies according to observers. Some see little impact -- perhaps, only a height and bulk ordinance that was passed in 1972. On the other hand, other observers including Jacobs (1978a, b) see the plan's impact significant: the passage of the height and bulk ordinance was a timely response to an overriding issue of the community at the time and the plan had furnished ammunition to San Franciscans seeking to protect and improve the unique character and image of their city (Lynch, 1976: 82). Its impact on the professional community is also important. City planners in Spartanburg, S.C., for example, learned much from this plan in preparing an urban design plan for their city (Spartanburg, 1977). Some of the policies, principles, and illustrations in the San Francisco Urban Design Plan have found their way into studies and plans in other cities (e.g. San Diego, 1979).

Outside city government, Appleyard and Lynch (1974) conducted an urban design study of the San Diego Region for the City of San Diego through a grant from the Marston family. Their study, Temporary
Paradise?: A Look at the Special Landscape of the San Diego Region, was "the consultants' personal observations" "intended for discussion purposes only" but it was prepared on the basis of much research including some 200 interviews (including image map drawing). The impact of the study was significant while it has remained unnoticed by most urban designers in other cities. In early 1975, the San Diego city council accepted the report and asked the planning department to study questions raised in the report. A task force of various professionals was gathered under the initiative of the San Diego Chapter of the American Institute of Architects to meet with city staffers. (The Urban Design Task Force, San Diego, 1976) The Urban Design Task Force completed its work in "1977" [1976], with the publication of a three-volume report, which defined urban design, its state of art, and ways of incorporating it into the city's overall planning and development program. The report was received very favorably by the public and by the city council. Subsequently, the planning department took the report and incorporated it into the comprehensive revisions to the city's general plan, which was approved by the planning commission in 1978 and by the city council in 1979. Urban design thus became one of the major components of the Progress Guide and General Plan (San Diego, 1979). In fact, the urban design element was the framework that tied together all elements of the general plan; urban design considerations were introduced into most elements of the plan. (Mike Stepner, supervising planner, San Diego Planning Department, in a letter to me, dated January 25, 1980)

A few cities put together data and recommendations as a result of systematic visual form studies (Brookline, Mass., Oakland, Ca., and Jacksonville, Fla.). In 1964, Lynch (1965) conducted a systematic sensory quality analysis, one of the first of its kind in this country, scrutinizing visual forms and citizen images of the Town of Brookline for its Community Renewal Program. His report, Visual Analysis, had some influence in introducing a design review process in the zoning code (Lynch, 1976: 82), but his recommendations did not find their way into the city's comprehensive plan. Oakland studied the visual form of the city as part of its 701 comprehensive planning program (Oakland, 1968) and completed a report, A Design Framework for Oakland: Proposals
from the 701 Urban Design Staff (DeMars and Wells et al. for Oakland, 1969). Jacksonville studied citizen images as well as visual forms (Jacksonville, 1971) and put together recommendations, Jacksonville Form and Appearance: Two, including "central reasons, ideas, and techniques" for the visual environment (Jacksonville, 1972). The Oakland and Jacksonville reports present what are in substance policy recommendations but they were not prepared in a form adoptable as city design policy. Not much progress has been reported about these two cities' urban design programs.4

There are a few more cities that conducted exemplary studies of visual forms but stopped short of producing recommendations for action (Kansas City, Mo., 1967, Rye, N.Y., 1967, Los Angeles, Ca., 1971, and Dallas, 1974). An early citywide urban design study, Measuring the Visual Environment, the Planning Department of Kansas City (1967) conducted as one of the technical studies for the city's Community Renewal Program does not seem to have much impact. However, recent progress in the city's urban design program offers us a case for citywide policy planning. According to Ray (1979: 217), a four person urban design staff in the Development Department "viewed their eventual product not as a long-range plan, but rather a management process, a guidebook and mechanism for directing day-to-day development decisions."

The Kansas City Design Guidebook (Kansas City, 1978) provides design suggestions and techniques that are comparable to the policies and principles of the San Francisco Urban Design Plan. It is city design policy, if unofficial. (The guidebook received a HUD Design Award.)

Los Angeles' report, The Visual Form of Los Angeles, describes the results of visual form and citizen image surveys and discusses problems and opportunities (Los Angeles, 1971). Like the Oakland and Jacksonville reports, this report has given only a cursory look at the urban design process. The report discussed actions that might be taken to improve visual environment in general terms such as incorporating considerations of the visual environment into the general plan, continuing analysis, citizen participation, and considering general ways of implementing visual objectives.

Dallas conducted a systematic survey of visual form of the city in 1974 (The Visual Form of Dallas; Dallas DUP, 1974b). The survey
identified "resource/potential areas" and "target areas", defined "environmentally common types" and "visually common types", and mapped "form elements" and "form structure". Description of environmentally common types included brief recommendations for urban design actions but this report was just a beginning of further studies and analyses to be carried out in the process of developing an "urban design framework" for the city. During the 70s, the urban design staff completed only the survey phase of the work that had been proposed initially (Dallas DPUD, 1971a):
- The ecological study (Dallas DUP, 1973a, b);
- The historical landmark survey (Alexander, 1974); and
- The visual image survey (Dallas DUP, 1976a).
Seattle, Wash., produced a visual form survey report, The Determinant of City From: The Urban Design Report No. 1. This report presenting the data without recommendations "had perhaps the briefest official life" (Lynch, 1976: 83). Citywide urban design studies have not been carried out in the city since then while the city has been achieving good results in urban design at a project level (e.g. Pioneer Square and Freeway Park) and in management processes (Clark, 1976; Erikson, 1978).

The cities which I consider are exemplary in citywide urban design studies are the following:
- Brookline, Mass.;
- Dallas, Tex.;
- Jacksonville, Fla.;
- Los Angeles, Ca.;
- Minneapolis, Minn.;
- San Francisco, Ca.; and
- Seattle, Wash.
These cities share the following characteristics:
- Urban design was defined beyond the scope of beautification or design of the architectural form of the city;
- Value premises in urban design, explicit or implicit in reports, included those that mattered at a scale of city (e.g. the clarity and vividness of the visual image and form structures) as well as a scale of place (e.g. identity, amenity, beauty, etc.); often, efforts were made to consciously articulate basic value premises in urban design;
- Much interest existed in public perception of the city and in projecting a vivid and coherent city image (cf. Lynch, 1960) on the basis of citizen image surveys or otherwise (exception: Oakland, Ca.); and, finally,
Much emphasis was placed on systematic (or "comprehensive") surveys of the visual form and character (and, sometimes, citizen images) to measure the quality of the visual environment.

Several other cities share the same characteristics (Kansas City, Mo.; Oakland, Ca.; Rye, N.Y.; San Diego, Ca. -- Appleyard and Lynch (1974); and Spartanburg, S.C.).

**Downtown Design Plans and Beautification Programs**

Some cities had similar studies carried out for a major part of their territory (e.g. Detroit, Mich., 1969, along with a citizen image survey (cf. Melting, 1969); Minneapolis P&D, 1970a; and examples to follow). Some of them were carried out outside city government to advocate good urban design:

- Atlanta, Ga. -- Georgia Chapter, AIA (1962) and Georgia Urban Design Committee (1966); and

There are many cities which had a "design" or "urban design" study or plan prepared for their downtown that do not have the characteristics of exemplary cases (e.g. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 1969; Rogers et al. for Cincinnati, Ohio, 1964; and Okamoto and Williams for the Regional Plan Association, New York, 1969). "Urban design" in those cases is usually synonymous with architectural form analysis and image sketches or development studies or just planning studies.

Numerous citywide urban design studies were carried out to prepare beautification or appearance plans and programs in cities of all sizes. Some were prepared as an element of the comprehensive plan (e.g. Meridian, Miss., 1970). Others were prepared independently (e.g. New York, N.Y., 1968; Chicago, Ill., 1970). Generally, beautification and appearance plans defined urban design narrowly, largely in response to the scope of the federal open space and highway beautification programs. Their primary concerns were beautification and appearance improvements -- facade improvements of commercial properties; paint-up, fix-up, clean-up campaigns; landscaping of boulevards and streets; marking of city entrance; etc. In fact, a term "urban design" was seldom used in those plans. "Urban design", if used, was usually without much substance -- interchangeable with "urban planning" or "urban development". Similarly, a term "the
image and character of the community" may be used but its use departs
from that in exemplary cases. Without articulation of what it was
that defined or constituted the image and character of the community,
it was a good way of referring to the visual attractiveness (beauty)
of the city -- that important, but elusive quality most people would
like to realize in their community. There were also a few "urban
design plans" whose scope was limited to open space acquisition and
improvement programs (e.g. Jefferson Parish, LA., 1974). There were
some special purpose citywide urban design studies and plans such as
historic preservation plans, but I have not included them in my review.

There are small cities which made urban design an element of
their comprehensive plans. The following are examples:

  Chapter IX "Urban Design" of The Claremont General Plan
  (18 pages of a 66-page report);
- Sebastopol, Ca., city of 3,993 (1969):
  "Urban Design Element" of the Sebastopol General Plan
  (5 pages of a 40-page report);
- Archadia, Ca., city of 42,866 (1972):
  "Community Design Element" of the General Plan Report;
  (6 pages of a 93 page report);
- Fremont, Ca., city of 100,869 (1967):
  "Community Design Element" of Fremont Planning Program,
  1965-67: Summary Report (7 pages of an 81-page report);
- Moss Point, Miss., city of 19,321 (1970):
  the Comprehensive Plan: The Design Element; and
- Cocoa Beach, Fla., city of 9,952 (1960/61):
  Chapter VIII "Aesthetics and Civic Design" of the Compre-
hensive City Plan, vol. 2 (4 pages of a 50-page (+ appendix)
report).

I do not attend to these and other examples in small communities for
several reasons. At first, the small size of those communities
(people and environments) and relatively simple structures of their
environment (e.g. the downtown equivalent to one of many commercial
nodes in a major city) do not create much demand for in-depth studies
of the form and character of their environment. In fact, most
tables in this category do not mention systematic surveys. Second,
for the same reasons, small communities do not create much demand for
citywide urban design policies as a device for communication and
control. Prototype studies, attention to key areas and projects, and
policies and recommendations naturally tied to specific places or
projects characterize most of the examples listed above. Third, small communities do not always afford to retain a permanent urban design staff to continue an on-going urban design program. The nature and quality of studies and plans tend to be determined by their consultants' approach. Naturally, most examples in this category do not share the characteristics of exemplary cases. They are rather "development" or "beautification" studies and plans. They seldom articulate value premises, goals, objectives, and policies for urban design.
FOOTNOTES: INTRODUCTION

1. Urban design I discuss in this study is Lynch's (1968, 1974) "city design". I do not use his term here, however, since "city design" or "the design of the city" as it is used in Goals for Dallas (1967, 1970, 1977, and 1979) could mean planning or comprehensive planning for the city broadly. A term "urban design", while it has acquired meaning of architectural and landscape design for building groups, streets, and districts (which I do not want), can convey a modest sense that it is a small area of city planning. Exceptions are "city design plan" and "city design policy" which I use to mean "citywide urban design plan" and a set of urban design goals, objectives, and policies, respectively.

2. According to Hack (1976), environmental programming is the process of arriving at a set of specifications about what to build or change in the way of man-occupied settings. This activity takes various forms, including preparation of architectural programs, the development of environmental development standards, and ongoing management of built settings.

3. "System design" literally deals with a functionally connected set of objects, which may extend over large areas but not make a complete environment such as an arterial street system and a lighting system (Lynch, 1968: 249).

4. There are many definitions and kinds of "policy" as I discuss in Chapter VI. For the moment, I define policy simply as a general course of action leading to the realization of objectives and goals. I use "city design policy" in a sense of a set of goals, objectives, and policies, rather than a specific piece of policy. This follows common usage of a term "city policy". Distinctions among goals, objectives, and policies are relative in terms of relationships of implementing and being implemented. All objectives and some goals may be seen as higher-level policies.

5. Implementation process exists precisely because no acceptable tradeoff rules can be formulated in advance of practice. Policy leaves some decisions to be made later in the process of implementation that are necessary in putting it into practice. Policy, thus, is inherently ambiguous. On whatever level or whenever disagreements are masked by ambiguities, implementation becomes the strategic stage for resolution. This is what Rein and Rabinovitz (1977: 6, 9) call the politics of implementation. Also, during the process of implementation, the urban designer must deal with things that are inherently changing over time, thus, things that ought to be dealt with case by case (e.g. changes in the administrative direction, changing preference of the client and arrival of new actors, and new factors in construction such as unexpected rate of inflation and worker strikes). We have no deficiency in cases to demonstrate the difficulty of implementing city design policies. To list a few important ones in the three case cities:
- The Richmond Experiment, San Francisco (failure);
- The proposition J and the open space program, San Francisco (failure of Proposition C turned into success); and
- The height and bulk ordinance, San Francisco (success with much "good professional work" in the process of translating the height and bulk guidelines of the Urban Design Plan into an ordinance); also,
- The master design district ordinance (failure; a case of implementing an action strategy internal to the planning department rather than a policy).

It follows that implementation has heavy demands that go beyond the scope of formulating city design policy and beginning its implementation. Thus, it is appropriate to see that the actual process of implementation is no more a part of citywide policy planning.

It makes sense to conceptually separate implementation from citywide policy planning because implementation does not need to be carried out citywide. "Citywide implementation" is possible (e.g. the San Francisco height and bulk ordinance) but viewed as an approach or an area of emphasis it has little substance.

6. Inquiry into other kinds of plans (comprehensive plans, urban general plans, metropolitan plans, community renewal programs, etc.) include Kent (1964), Black (1968), Goodman and Kaufman (1975), Boyce et al. (1970, 1974), Gruft and Gustein (1972), Lavine (1976), Lichfield et al. (1975), and Susskind and Aylward (1976). There are only a limited number of empirical studies of plan implementation: Susskind and Aylward (1976), Lam (1976), and Southworth and Southworth (1973). Important contributions to the building of conceptual frameworks in the planning theory that seem especially pertinent to this study come from Faludi (1973), Ravinovitz (1969), Altshuler (1965), Bolan (1967), Bolan and Nuttall (1975), and Catanese (1974).

7. The urban design management system means the whole set of procedures and devices that make decision-making in urban design and physical development of the city work, both in the short run and in the long run. Specifically, it includes such things as administrative organization, administrative procedures, financing and programming devices, development tools, and legal controls as well as the general way of arranging programs, studies, projects, and specific actions and decisions in the time space -- the whole process of urban design in the long run. Broadly defined, it also includes various actors -- citizen groups, communication media, architects in private practice, etc. -- as they play their roles in the process of development.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER I

1. Among six areas of general goals was "community appearance" including three goals:
   - Enhancement of the community's natural and man-made assets to strengthen the image of the University [i.e. Southeast Minneapolis] Community;
   - Improve the appearance of the business centers and industrial areas in the community; to make them attractive and distinctive in design; and
   - Seek proper planning of the freeways in order that they ... tie into the general function and design of the community.

In the "Plan" section, urban design was an element along with land use, community facilities, circulation, and university campus. The urban design element defined three "specifications" with which to prepare the urban design plan and recommended a basic "urban design structure". Those three specifications were in effect urban design goals or objectives formulated to meet SEMPACC's (Southeast Minneapolis Planning Area Planning and Coordination Committee) goal: "The natural [and] manmade assets of Southeast Minneapolis should be enhanced so that the image of the University Community may be strengthened." They included:
   - Every section of the community be distinctive and vivid in appearance;
   - The sections be tied together as one clear image structure; and
   - The image give meaningful expression to the functions of the community.

The basic "urban design structure" was presented as a schematic model. The document summarized its major elements in terms of entrance points, paths, districts, nodes, landmarks, and street furniture (e.g. [S]everal entrance points to the community be designated and properly designed. ...). To illustrate the basic "urban design structure", the document also included preliminary designs for selected paths (e.g. University Neighborhood Greenway), nodes (e.g. Dinky Town), and a district (Como Neighborhood).

The urban design perspective was also important in data analysis. The staff conducted a survey of visual image along with other surveys (e.g. land use and housing). The staff made a field reconnaissance and mapped the spatial/image structure of the community in terms of Lynch's five elements (landmarks, paths, etc.) and defined major assets and liabilities (e.g. the nondirectional paths and poor use of waterfront). An accompanied map diagnosed problems of the community image (e.g. discontinuity, ambiguous gate, and characterless path).

2. Urban design goals in the Southeast Minneapolis Plan were articulated in terms of Lynch's (1960) legibility:
   e.g. The Urban Design -- for the Enhancement of Community Images; Strengthening the image of the University Community; ... distinct and vivid in appearance [identity]; ... tied together as one clear image structure [structure]; and ... meaningful expression to the functions ... [meaning]; and "Clarity of its image structure" and "vividness in its expressions" are important to the success of [the community's] design.
3. The urban design staff in Minneapolis had a chance to test their notion of urban design before working full-scale in the CIP Urban Design Study. While proposing a major city-wide urban design study to be part of the Minneapolis Community Improvement Program in mid 1964, they were participating in the Joint Program, an inter-agency land use-transportation planning program for the Twin Cities area. The program was initiated shortly after the commencement of CIP, and the Metropolitan Planning Commission, a predecessor of the Metropolitan Council, was working with local agencies to prepare the Metropolitan Development Guide. (Star, June 20, 1964; The Joint Program, 1965)

4. It would be appropriate to characterize the pilot study as a survey-and-plan-and-public review approach with little citizen participation during the study process. The final report Toward a New City (Minneapolis CIP, 1965) made no mention of the role of the Urban Design Committee. Except in community-level design studies, the pilot study was carried out as technical study of the urban design staff, participating organizations, and outside consultants. Similarly, the second-phase study was carried out mostly by the staff and consultants, this time, without presentation of its results for broad public review. The Urban Design Committee had been dissolved earlier, perhaps at the time the pilot study was completed.

Citizens' role in the whole CIP Study was more substantive. For example, it was the CIP Citizens Advisory Committee that recommended the citywide community improvement program (Summary Report) to the planning commission, mayor, city council, officials and citizens of the city. Various groups, including community organizations and business associations were drawn into the Study.

5. The following are examples of news articles: Minneapolis Star, June 20, 1964; March 20, September 7, 27, 28, October 20, 22, 1965; Minneapolis Tribune, September 19, October 16, 1965.

6. The study team had very limited input from people in the city and those issues identified dominantly reflected urban designers' point of view at the time. The data from some 4,600 personal interviews conducted throughout the metropolitan area in late 1963 and early 1964 were analyzed as part of the pilot study (the "Livability Study"). This offered the study team some knowledge as to residents' attitude toward neighborhoods, housing types, etc. but from an urban design point of view the questionnaire was rather poorly designed. The citizen image survey (the "Imageability Study" and "Imageability Analysis") produced valuable information about how people viewed the city and its parts but questions had been asked from urban designers' point of view. Moreover, the Urban Design Committee was never representative of the city's people.

The following examples would illustrate how dominant urban designers' point of view was in the study:

- As we build from 4 to 10 freeways through the city in the next 15 years, can we make the view of the City from each of them attractive?
More highrise apartments are going to be necessary and desirable, but should their placement be mainly based on economic considerations, or should social, aesthetic considerations be given equal emphasis?

7. In 1968, the city council authorized with the mayor's support the Minneapolis Beautification Committee, later named the Committee on Urban Environment. Mayor Arthus Naftalin formed the committee in the same year. An idea of creating a beautification commission was developed in an organization study then in progress as part of the second-phase urban design study. Several environmentalists initiated a step to create the committee with backing of the urban design staff (Lu, 1979: 7). The primary responsibility of CUE, among its nine charges, has been education, information, and voluntary design review and CUE has been active in these.

CUE has become an important advocate of good urban design and supporter of the urban design program. For example, it helped the city obtain three design-related bills in the state legislature in 1971 (historic preservation, design districts, and development districts). As we shall see, CUE played an important role in balancing neighborhood groups' point of view with the urban design staff's point of view in the process of public debate over the Visual Design Framework and the master design district ordinance.

8. The work program (Minneapolis P&D, 1968a, revised in February 1969) emphasized the role of technical and citizen advisory committees in reviewing the design team's work at critical points in the study process. However, broad citizen participation took place in the study perhaps due to the nature of the downtown community. The downtown business community was well organized around the Downtown Council and a few residential neighborhoods in the area could be reached without much difficulty (e.g. Loring-Nicollet Community Council). Thus, virtually "every segment of the downtown community became involved in setting goals, developing alternatives, selecting a plan, and outlining a program of action" (Lu, 1979: 12). The Downtown Council played an especially important role throughout the study. Its contribution went beyond reviews of various proposals. For example, it hired a consultant on its own to explore the development potential of the Hennepin Avenue entertainment area (Lawrence Halprin Associates, 1969).

9. The criteria for developing the visual image framework were:
- Visual diversity and contrast [identity implied];
- Expression of functions and activities [meaning];
- Structure or relatedness; and
- A comfortable visual image, neither visual pollution nor monotony.

The work to formulate the visual design framework would begin with surveys of citizen images and visual form. Analysis of the public image was important because it would give the design team clues for determining how to shape the form of visual environment. Metro Center '85 used the 1964 survey of the public image of the downtown environment carried out with participation of a random sample of Hennepin County residents. The survey drew upon Lynch's method involving a sketch-map drawing exercise.
10. Moreover, the new administrative structure allowed the design team to work with specialists in operating departments and to absorb essential know-hows in implementation. The administrative reorganization also increased funding and staffing of the planning department. The innovation in the theories and techniques of urban design which made Metro Center '85 so different from the first downtown plan could not have been possible without these changes in city government.

11. Some urban design-related policies were integrated into the Program Policies. For example, the Housing and Living Environment element included a policy concerning "design quality" under an objective of "choice", and policies of "image" and "reinforcing character" under an objective of "diversity".

12. The purpose of the Visual Design Framework stated in the "Introduction" can be viewed as a general goal statement: "to provide policies for evaluating visual issues ... intended to enhance, protect, and create perceptual quality in the built and natural environment". Implicit in policies were legibility (identity, structure, and meaning) in the earlier draft and "visual quality", "primary visual amenities" and, perhaps, just fine views and atmospheres (e.g. "a parkway-like visual image") in the revised draft. "Perceptual quality" in the "Introduction" was not defined.

13. My discussion on the Plan for the 80s hereafter is based on the Hearing Draft of June 1979. The planning commission made some changes before adopting the plan and further changes were being made in community plans around April 1980.

14. According to the Visual Quality Plan, "basic visual design principles" are:
   - Visual diversity among the city's communities and neighborhoods and the individual qualities of each should be retained and reinforced;
   - Visual design should reflect functions and activities and should provide identifying characteristics which made functional areas recognizable and the city more understandable;
   - The potential for visual clutter and chaos of signs, parking lots, automobile-oriented establishments and adjacent incompatible land uses should be minimized. (Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-79-80)

These principles are considered to be an expression of the concept of patterned variety: the (good) natural scenic quality is patterned variety that is neither monotonous nor visually chaotic. These three principles, according to the plan, also support policies related to the visual quality of residential neighborhoods and commercial and industrial areas.

15. Devising effective implementation strategies was an important concern of the planning staff. Thus, the Plan for the 80s as a whole gives much attention to implementation. It even includes a plan (a set of a goal, objectives, and policies) and an action program for implementation: the second section of the final chapter, "General
Management/Implementation". This section describes key processes for implementing the Plan for the 80s and offers guidelines for conducting each process to assure consistency of programs and actions with the policies of the Plan for the 80s in regard to the budget and redevelopment processes, land use controls and intergovernmental relations.

The primary implementation tool is the Priority Framework to rate priorities of capital improvement budget proposals on the one hand and the Priority Framework in each section of the Plan for the 80s rating priorities of policies and actions on the other. Each Priority Framework defines priorities according to eight categories distinguished into five priority groups. A resolution passed by the city council in January 1979 and approved by the mayor established the concept that budget categories should match up with the categories of the Plan for the 80s. Other tools of implementation discussed in the plan are zoning, legislation, lobbying, planning and research including program administration.

The "Implementation Strategy" section of the Action Program for the Visual Quality Plan proposes four basic types of action: educational efforts; public improvements and capital expenditure; design control and design review; and city design services.

16. The urban design staff's early problem was thus to win recognition of fellow city planners. The rule of the battle they had to fight was well known to all involved -- to develop the theories and techniques of urban design, technically. Urban design would be secure within city government if the urban design staff could demonstrate their capability and win the confidence of the planning director. The whole thing was largely a matter internal to the planning department. Contrast this with the situation in Dallas.

2. Several events heightened the planning director's sense that the planning department could not go anywhere without an urban design plan: cf. the planning commission's decision on the Embaracadero Center section of the Golden Gateway redevelopment project and the planning director's meeting with Justin Herman, director of the Development Agency, and John Portman, architect-developer for the Embaracadero Center project (Jacobs, 1978a: 21).


4. The Urban Design Plan was prepared and adopted according to a survey-and-plan-and-public hearing approach. As Jacobs (1978b: 207) has observed: Without question, city planners had played the dominant role in the study. It had been their idea in the first place and they had controlled the work. They also had a major say in choosing the [citizen advisory] committee, which was their brainchild to begin with. Important and active as the role of the citizen advisory committee, "for the most part ... the involvement of the committee ended when the meetings ended." Generally, there was "the apparent lack of public interest" and the study received little public attention in its first year. The staff thus hoped to compensate for the deficiencies in citizen participation by direct contacts with diverse community groups -- through detailed community studies, ongoing neighborhood planning studies, interviews (a "social reconnaissance survey"), and responses to preliminary reports that were distributed in the community. "Nevertheless, from a look at committee membership alone, one might well conclude that the urban design study was in the hands of a somewhat elitist group." (Jacobs, 1978b: 207-8, 201, 197) Broad and substantial citizen participation began once the staff completed a plan in an adoptable form.

5. An idea of having a set of principles for good design identified for a community in the keen eyes of architects and urban designers (rather than on the basis of analysis of needs and wishes of citizens and systematic inventory data) reminds us of a then emerging tradition of urban design along the line of Christopher Alexander's theory (Alexander et al., 1968, 1969). On the other hand, the fourth preliminary report represents a different tradition of urban design that was being developed as an area of city planning, largely on the basis of Kevin Lynch's work (Lynch, 1960; Appleyard, Lynch, and Myer, 1964).
6. For example, Alvin Duskin's second full-page ad objecting to highrise development appeared in the *San Francisco Chronicle* on October 19, 1970 ("Skyscrapers are economically necessary; but only if you own one.").

7. The Urban Design Plan, as well as the whole comprehensive plan of the City and County of San Francisco, is not the city's official policy in that the Board of Supervisors has never adopted it, and it does not need to base its decisions on it. However, given relative power of the planning commission and citizens' support for the Urban Design Plan, it is little different from the city's official policy for physical development and urban design. Some people in San Francisco even think that the Urban Design Plan was adopted by the Board of Supervisors (The *San Francisco Bay Guardian*, 1971; and my interviews).

8. An early statement of goals and objectives for the Urban Design Study (*San Francisco DCP*, 1969d) already accepted "the desirability of achieving a community where people knew with ease where they were and how to get where they were going" (Jacobs, 1978b: 200) as a legitimate and important concern in urban design. This is what Lynch's legibility, structure, and identity are about:

   - **Goal 2:** To provide a basis for individual orientation within the city.
   - **Objective A:** To strengthen the city's visual structure.
   - **Objective B:** To strengthen the distinctiveness and visual order of the city's districts.

   Perhaps, general importance of images in this city as expressed in the following policy statement in the same report supported application of Lynch's city image concepts:

   - New buildings projecting above surrounding development should be light in color to maintain the image of a "white city", contrasting with the dark water of the Bay and Ocean.

   In the fourth preliminary report presenting the results of systematic surveys of the visual environment, we see major application of Lynch's concepts (in the fourth section "External Form and Image" by Okamoto/Liskamm, Inc. -- e.g. "form and image development within visual districts" and "visual reinforcement of a citywide pathway system") and the whole approach of Appleyard, Lynch, and Myer (1964) in *The View from the Road* (in the third section "Road Environment" by Donald Appleyard and staff). While no citizen image survey involving map drawing was conducted, inventory and analysis of form/image elements applying Lynch's concepts were made as part of the study (in the second section "Internal Pattern and Image" by the staff -- e.g. major and minor focal points and landmarks).

   Finally, Lynch's concepts became an important part of urban design principles in the preliminary citywide urban design plans (especially in the "Open Space and Landscaping" and "Streets" sections) (*San Francisco DCP*, 1970f) and all elements -- human needs, objectives,
fundamental principles, and policies -- of the final plan (especially in the "City Pattern" section) (San Francisco DCP, 1971b).

9. As we see in the fifth preliminary report and "fundamental principles" in the final plan, a few other urban design traditions -- perhaps, ones like Gordon Cullen's (1960) townscape design and Christopher Alexander's (1967, 1969) pattern language -- must have been important also in articulating principles of good urban design. My emphasis here is on an empirical basis and behavioral significance of Lynch's concepts.

10. Some principles in the Urban Design Plan stated in terms of a suggested course of action or alternative ("can") only suggest desirable qualities as in policies: e.g. The city's overall visual structure can be strengthened and enhanced by use of large-scale planting on certain streets and open spaces. (Fundamental Principles for City Pattern 1, San Francisco DCP, 1972a)

11. Alexander defined "pattern" loosely (Alexander et al., 1968, 1969, 1979). Emphasis of his definition is on its form of presentation (diagram - problem - solution) and the theory of its use. In terms of its substance, his pattern could be any of Hack's (1976: 28-9) " environmental package", "environmental pattern", "environmental requirement" and, even, "clientship" or their combination. According to Hack, these four kinds of environmental programming information are:

The overall ENVIRONMENTAL PACKAGE -- what is to be included, how it is to be defined, how it relates to what exists or might be done in the future, how it meshes with the institutions which will build or inhabit it, what the schedule for actions should be.

The ENVIRONMENTAL PATTERNS ... -- specific notions about spatial relationships or configurations, sometimes in the form of analogies, sometimes held only metaphorically, and at other times in the form of partial design solutions, abstract or precise.

The PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS for the qualitative dimensions of the environment -- how it is expected to serve its occupants in behavioral, operational, or maintenance terms.

The sense of CLIENTSHIP -- who the principal groups of users will be, how they might regard the environment, what typical routines of use might be, how users might shift over time.

Fundamental principles of the Urban Design Plan comes close to Alexander's patterns in use and Hack's patterns in content.

12. The four-category issue framework appeared first in the May 1971 document (San Francisco DCP, 1971b). The third preliminary report is organized according to goals, then, objectives and, finally, policies without explicit reference to issues:

Goal 1: Safety, cleanliness, and comfort;
Goal 2: Orientation;
Goal 3: Variety; and
Goal 4: Harmony between new and old. (San Francisco DCP, 1969d)

The fifth preliminary report presenting urban design principles is organized according to the following conceptual framework:
- Streets;
- Relationships of streets to building facades; and
- Relationships among street patterns, building masses, and topography. (San Francisco DCP, 1970b)

I have already pointed out that this report was prepared as personal observations of a consultant, largely departing from the data and analyses of issues developed earlier in the Urban Design Study. Even the last preliminary report presenting the basic components of the final plan is without reference to issues. Five plans in this report are defined according to "important aspects of San Francisco's physical form and environment":
- Open space and landscaping;
- Street design;
- The preservation of street space;
- The height of buildings; and
- The bulk of buildings. (San Francisco DCP, 1970f: 3)

13. The city has matured with major public infrastructures already in place. It is private development that was responsible for the greatest quantity and variety of changes – and controversies – in all development with which the Urban Design Plan was concerned. Primary emphasis of the implementation approach study was also on private development on privately owned land as Skaff (1978: 49, 80) has observed.

14. As Skaff (1978) has observed, developers encouraged by downtown zoning incentives have created a 550-foot "wall" along Market Street which is both visually disruptive and out of character with the city's skyline. The "wall" has resulted in a dark, cold, ominous feeling on the street on which citizens spent $24 million for beautification. The original intent of the ordinance was to create a "man-made hill" in downtown by way of concentric rings of height limits. The bulk controls have been fairly successful, but had an effect of favoring odd-shaped buildings due to the maximum diagonal rule. Bulk has become a problem anyway because of the lack of control over spacing between towers. Moreover, building bulk and density on a district-wide basis are not under tight control in terms of the total amount allowed under the height and bulk envelopes and bonus zoning provisions and the resultant effects on light, air, wind, and views.

15. There is no doubt that the Urban Design Plan had played an essential role in the whole effort to establish the citywide height and bulk controls for the first time in this city. Jacobs (1978b: 245) wrote as follows:

We have been advised that the part of the city planning process that calls for plans to be adopted and carried out by a series of actions, including legislation, rarely runs smoothly. In this case, however, that part of the process
worked in the way it was supposed to: the ordinance derived directly from a plan and, with very few exceptions, its final substance reflected the plan.

On the other hand, the planning staff had to do much work in translating those guidelines into specific zoning standards — even after twenty-five changes were made in the height and bulk guidelines and the map for building bulk was restructured before the adoption of the Urban Design Plan subsequent to public comments (Svirsky, 1973: 10). Svirsky (1973) and Jacobs (1978b: Chap. 9) offer us good accounts of "good professional work" that was done in the process. The planning staff's work is surely thorough. The fact that the ordinance, once adopted, had not undergone any serious challenge or amendment by late 1977 but one (the "Executive Park" amendment in 1976) since the flurry of early, minor adjustments (Jacobs, 1978b: 250) attests this. This had remained true till the Nob Hill Neighbors managed to win height reductions in early 1979 and anti-highrise groups put another height-limit initiative on the November 1979 ballot.

Much work of the planning staff does not necessarily mean enough research, however. As Skaff (1978: 108) had pointed out, studies to relate the height and bulk controls to the zoning bonus provisions and those to assess economic and growth implications of the ordinance as it was combined with the zoning bonus system were tenuous.

16. It is not surprising to find project reviews as a means of implementing the Urban Design Plan rather successful in influencing the color of the facades of highrises (cf. Fundamental Principle for Major New Development 6) since it has little cost implication to developers. Prior to the plan, several buildings — especially, Alcoa, Bank of America, Great Western Savings, and Bechtel — began to disturb the image of San Francisco as a city of light-colored buildings against the dark Bay. New highrise buildings have been returning to the light-color tradition. A few rather dark buildings that were recently built, such as the State Compensation Insurance Fund building and the Merchandise Mart Extension, make some people wonder if the Urban Design Plan is really in effect; but these buildings, the planning staff argues, do not project significantly into the skyline. Also, they are substantially lighter in color than, say, the Bank of America building. Improvements are all relative to what was happening before the Urban Design Plan.

Not so successful are facade articulation, height relationships, and pedestrian-level amenities among other things. These have serious implications on the developers' economy. At first, Skaff (1978: 177-8) has observed that the facade articulation has been encouraged by the planning staff in project review without successfully influencing developers' decisions. The Urban Design Plan calls for articulation of form or surface pattern of buildings to reflect the existing scale (Fundamental Principle for Major New Development 1E), rich facade treatment to enhance the character of the street (Fundamental Principle for Conservation 3), etc. Developers already constrained by bulk controls, which in effect limits the maximum size of each floor, favored slick curtain walls in many of the most recent highrises.

Reviews of individual projects have done little to influence the form of skyline. Not only cornice lines of adjacent buildings were
unrelated in some parts of the downtown but also a 550-foot wall of
highrises has been created along Market Street, which detracts from
an image of idealized skyline form — a downtown hill as was assumed
in the height and bulk guidelines of the Urban Design Plan and the
height and bulk ordinance. The bulk controls prescribing maximum
dimensions of each floor have in effect determined how tall buildings
could rise economically — far shorter than expected (700-foot limit)
at the core. None have persuaded developers to build taller buildings
at the downtown core. The zoning bonuses that allowed developers to
build more elsewhere had an effect of flattening out the skyline.

Wind-blown plazas and plazas left in deep shadow to the north of
highrises are one of common complaints about the San Francisco down-
town, especially because those plazas brought developers bonus floor
areas until recently. Project review offered little to mitigate such
basic problems in siting and design. More generally, pedestrian-
level amenities in the downtown are problematic. The Urban Design
Plan, for example, calls for continuity of interest and activities
in commercial buildings adjacent to pedestrian ways so as to create
rich street life and enhance pedestrian experience (Fundamental Prin-
ciple for Neighborhood Environment 16). While the plan specifically
stated that major office buildings contribute more to street life
if they have commercial activity at ground level (the same fundamental
principle), the planning staff's suggestions for such commercial space
have almost never been taken seriously by developers. Economic and
"image" considerations of developers and building managers have over-
ridden urban design and created highrise development that not only
lacks commercial facilities other than banks and airline ticket
offices, but also eliminated shops that once occupied the ground
level to make way for new highrises. (Skaff, 1978: 174)

17. Jacobs (1978b: 279-301) offers us an in-depth account of the
process of preparing the recreation and open space element and imple-
menting it through the open space acquisition and park renovation
program. In mid 1970, the planning department began its work on the
Improvement Plan for Recreation and Open Space. The planning staff
were not so much worried about getting the plan adopted as they were
concerned about implementing those parts of the plan that would
require major expenditures for land acquisition and physical improve-
ments. There was a clear need for additional open space. At the
initiative of the planning director, a steering committee was formed
in February 1973 to develop the best of alternative methods to imple-
ment the plan that was emerging. The planning staff played a
significant role with the committee in developing implementation
proposals.

In May 1973, by the time the committee finished the first phase
of its work, the planning commission adopted the revised Improvement
Plan for Recreation and Open Space as the recreation and open space
element of the comprehensive plan and, in July, endorsed its imple-
mentation program and authorized the planning director to "take all
reasonable steps" to implement the program. Subsequently, the com-
mittee came up with a proposal to amend the Charter and create an
open space acquisition fund for a fifteen-year period (a tax of 10
cents per $100 of assessed valuation). The first proposal,
Proposition C, was lost at a margin of only 4,153 votes out of 151,983, but the San Francisco voters passed a revised proposal, Proposition J, in November 1974, 116,654 to 64,527.

Implementation of the open space acquisitions and park renovation program began in 1976 with the appointment of the Open Space/Park Renovation Citizens Advisory Committee. By fiscal year 1979-80, the city has authorized the acquisition of thirty-three parcels for open space projects, twenty-nine renovation projects, and thirteen development projects (San Francisco, 1979: 1).

18. According to Jacobs (1978b: 263-4), general attitudes in the Haight-Ashbury neighborhood at the time was not supportive of government-initiated planning programs and substantial commitment of the staff in the study during early 1971 and mid 1973 was not rewarded by neighborhood support (cf. San Francisco DCP, 1973a).

19. A case of the Richmond Experiment and the progress of the Protected Residential Area program in San Francisco are discussed below.

Around early 1970, a group of residents in the Richmond District founded the Planning Association for the Richmond (PAR) and began efforts to retain the quiet residential character of their district and improve it (Chronicle, January 15, 1974). This group of no more than a hundred activists worked voluntarily with staff assistance of the San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association (SPUR) and consultants, Whisler-Patri, and developed a plan for their district (Richmond District Improvement Plan, December, 1972).

The focus of the group's efforts became the implementation of the protected residential area concept. The group's immediate predecessor, the "Ad Hoc Lake Street Traffic Safety Committee", was created for the very purpose of protecting residential environment from through traffic (Chronicle, January 15, 1974). According to Staten (1973), the group already published and mailed to residents a newsletter outlining eleven proposed treatments for streets designed to control traffic in May 1972. Six of them were drawn from the Urban Design Plan. In December, the group presented a traffic management plan to the Department of Public Works for consideration (San Francisco DPW, 1976b: 2). All details were ironed out with operating city departments and a series of public hearings were held by the public works department and the Board of Supervisors. The project went ahead and the final design was worked out. A contract was let in 1976 and work started in June with Mayor George Moscone breaking the first hole in the pavement. This became the first and the largest permanent project of the kind in San Francisco.

The project failed. As the contractor began to construct the various islands and bulbs, phone calls started to come in the public works department and the Board of Supervisors. As construction proceeded, initial inquiries were taken over by complaints. As pressure mounted in July 1976, the Board of Supervisors made a formal request that the project be stopped and a poll taken of the residents. Most of the concrete island curbs were then in place. (San Francisco DPW, 1976b: 4) Seventy-eight percent of responses (of 3,095 respondents out of 6,336 mailed) in the public works department survey wanted the construction removed (San Francisco DPW, 1976a: 1). After another
public hearing, the Board made a request that the construction be removed and all access be restored, which was put into effect with a signature of the mayor. The Richmond Experiment cost $162,000 to partially install and then to remove. (San Francisco DPW, 1976b: 1)

Because of the controversy generated by this project, the Board put an advisory measure on the ballot to seek guidance from the electorate:

**Proposition R**

Declaration of Policy: Shall the Board of Supervisors adopt the policy of supporting projects requested by residential neighborhood areas throughout the City that are intended to impede the flow of traffic by the use of barriers and other physical means of control? [Emphasis mine.]

The vote was: "Yes", 75,270; "No", 124,206. (Examiner, November 3, 1976) This was a blow to the proponents of the concept.

Neither the Richmond Experiment nor the voters' response to the Proposition R should be taken as public rejection of the protected residential area concept itself. The public works department staff observed as follows:

- Failure to assess community wants: PAR was not representative of the Richmond District; volume of traffic was not a major concern in the district;
- Failure to assess community needs: the public works department's traffic counts did not support the inundation of the area by traffic;
- People did not realize the local impact of the project until they saw actual changes in streets; people had trouble relating drawings to what would happen in real life; and
- A formidable group of opponents to this project were residents of adjacent areas (with additional traffic in some cases). (San Francisco DPW, 1976b: 5)

My interviews add some more:

- The project took some two years to get started after it was approved and its funding assured. This meant new participants with different views (Jacobs, 1978b: 217). (The planning department staff, in view of this delay, advised, not successfully, that PAR inform the project area residents broadly before actual construction.);
- Some people believed that the public works department had not been willing to slow or divert traffic; hence, long delay;
- The project, in its final design, was not well landscaped (concrete islands without landscaping) and construction was not entirely completed — what people saw were just holes and obstacles on the streets; and
- There were some external factors involved as well. The contractor was in labor dispute and the delay in project execution was a part of the workers' tactic.

What was in question seems to be how to assure support for the project from residents in and around the project area and how to execute the project timely, securing funding and necessary actions of participating actors. It was a question of implementation more than that of the protected residential area concept or the Urban Design
Plan as a whole. Experience in Berkeley, Ca., and Minneapolis, Minn., support this interpretation. In Berkeley, proponents of their protected residential area plan had to fight heavy political battles to win two initiatives questioning their plan, once traffic diverters and barriers were installed. In Minneapolis, city planners found neighborhood residents' responses to street barriers unpredictable. Thus, they considered it essential to put intensive efforts to communicate with residents of the project area case by case.

In San Francisco, the Jordan Park Improvement Association initiated a similar project in 1972 and saw a temporary barrier plan implemented for a test period in early 1975. Opposition developed and the barriers were removed in June 1975, approximately four months and a half after their installation. The result of a subsequent mail vote suggests the existence of relatively broad support for the project: 61% (of 350 respondents out of 696) in favor of permanent implementation, 38% in opposition. (San Francisco DPW, 1975) In other areas, application of the protected residential area concept achieved fair successes:
- Dubos Triangle (a FACE area);
- St. Francis Boulevard at St. Francis Circle; and
- Inner Mission (Folsom, Harrison, and Bryant at 23rd and 24th).

However, the scope of these projects were generally reduced — "smaller bulbs and a less severe mender" as suggested by the public works department (San Francisco DPW, 1976b: 5). Successful projects added landscaped areas and on-street parking spaces (which contributed to slowing of traffic and served residents' needs at the same time) without reducing much of traffic capacity. In some areas, through traffic had not been serious to begin with — thus, without much opposition. The protected residential area concept thus was transformed significantly as it was implemented.

20. Examples are 1) improvements that took place around 1972 along Market and Mission Streets where rapid transit stations were soon to open (Svirsky, 1973: 14), and 2) the establishment of the Golden Gate National Urban Recreation Area as a national park by the Congress around 1972 (Staten, 1973).

21. Some architects and developers are critical that the city's review processes make development in San Francisco very costly. It is not uncommon that a developer has to go through layers of reviews: possibly, conditional use permit process (staff review, planning commission hearing, and commission action), discretionary review (staff review and planning commission hearing and action), and state-mandated environmental review (environmental evaluation, drafting of Environmental Impact Report (EIR), planning commission hearing, and certification).

22. According to the Potrero Hill Neighborhood Improvement Plan, a demand for tighter design/land use control was expressed by the Potrero Hill neighborhood residents. The plan recommended the creation of an experimental design review board for the neighborhood to allow finer control over neighborhood change. (San Francisco DCP, 1977d)
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III

1. According to Reece (1976), there were only five buildings of a pre-1900 vintage in downtown Dallas, and three of them were threatened by expansion plans in the mid 70s.

2. Manager Crull resigned in 1966 after fourteen years of service. According to Kovner (1969), Crull was opposed to the Goals for Dallas program and Mayor Jonsson's approach to city government -- long-term planning, capital budget, and other standard practice of large-scale organizations.

3. Goals for Dallas (1969) recommended much broader representation on the Municipal Design Advisory Commission than was realized.

4. The activity of the division expanded quickly to encompass the following areas of work by the mid 70s:
   - Landmark preservation;
   - Neighborhood conservation;
   - Downtown revitalization;
   - Streetscape design;
   - Environmental protection, planning, and management;
   - Citywide urban design framework (on-going);
   - Improving decision-making processes;
   - Design review process;
   - Environmental education; and
   - Developing staff capabilities.
   
   (Lu, 1979: 38)
   
   The levels of activity and success vary much across areas.

5. The process as proposed generally followed standard planning steps. Surveys were to be conducted in seven areas such as ecology, visual image, land use/activity pattern, and historic landmarks. Like in the Metro Center '85 Environmental Design Program (Minneapolis P&D, 1968a), the technical and citizen advisory committees were to be the formal means of citizen participation. The two advisory committees were at first to review design goals, issues, and studies and, then, "review, make recommendations and contribute their ideas and reactions to the alternative design frameworks and in particular the preferred design framework [and evaluation criteria]". The urban design staff would recommend the design framework for the city following the second review. The proposed work program did not describe the process of public review and adoption. (Dallas DPUD, 1971a)

6. One such example involved a search for the most appropriate new route between the city and the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport.

7. It is significant that the environmental character section of the committee's report dealt with major urban design issues (visual character and cultural/historic preservation among others) -- factors of human experience. These factors had often been excluded from "environmental
planning". Also significant is the committee's support for comprehensive planning. One of the four priority recommendations in the environmental character section was:

Complete a comprehensive plan for the City and prepare an urban design framework in close conjunction therewith. (Dallas Environmental Quality Committee, 1974: 30-31)

8. The concept of jointed-incrementalism assumes that urban designers consciously create "jointedness" between individual studies and projects. Links are trivial if they happen incidentally. Thus, two questions have to be asked: Is there any evidence of intention to link individual studies and projects on the part of urban designers? Have the urban designers really influenced later studies and projects by doing earlier ones?

9. In the Study 10, the urban design staff took a close look at Little Mexico, one of the three most distinctive neighborhoods in Oak Lawn. It was a neighborhood with sufficient cultural continuity and solidarity to be popularly referred to as "Little Mexico" (i.e. a Mexican-American neighborhood). The neighborhood, however, had been completely broken into three separate parts by Harry Hines Boulevard and was threatened by "slow but determined" industrial and commercial development from the Stemmons area (Dallas DPUD, 1972a: 103). The urban design staff, building upon this initial analysis, decided to undertake an in-depth survey of the neighborhood along with other Mexican-American districts in the city. With a HUD comprehensive planning grant for a more detailed study, the Pike Park project (the El Barrio Study) was begun in August 1974. The final product of this study was a plan for the park along with user-generated design guidelines for park facilities. Subsequently, the park was renovated according to the users' ideas.

Small as this project may be, its impact was significant. The study helped institutionalize a structure for citizen action in the area and established a bond of friendship and communication between the neighborhood and two agencies of the City Hall -- the planning and park departments. Moreover, the whole exercise allowed the urban design staff to test and refine a process for citizen involvement. Subsequently, the approach used in this study became a model for later neighborhood design studies (Lu, 1979; Dallas DUP, 1975b).

In the Study 10, the urban design staff also paid special attention to the Turtle Creek corridor. The late 50s and the early 60s saw civic outcry for protecting the city's invaluable asset in this area along Turtle Creek Boulevard/Parkway. Major office and apartment development and rezoning proposals were threatening the area. In the early 60s, the city joined with developers by proposing and going ahead with a project to widen a four-block part of the boulevard into a six-lane divided thoroughfare. The city's proposal met with much opposition, with involvement of some national figures like Charles A. Blessing, then head of the Detroit City Planning Department and president of the American Institute of Planners (News, March 20, 1960). Thus, in the 60s, the area became the focus of many studies initiated by citizen groups, the planning commission/planning department, and the park and recreation department. In February 1971, the planning commission adopted the Interim Comprehensive Plan for the Oak Lawn Community, recommending the protection and
preservation of the Turtle Creek corridor and the expansion of the parkway. Meanwhile, the pressure for development in "Dallas' finest address" was increasing. This is the time when the urban design staff started their study of Oak Lawn in the Study 10. The staff saw Turtle Creek as the main element that defined the character of Oak Lawn and made a close examination of the area along it.

The time for action came soon. In 1973, a citizen group SOS (Save Open Space) asked the planning and park departments to prepare plans which would protect the area. The urban design staff completed a plan in May 1974, drawing many ideas directly from the Study 10. The plan received a strong support of local citizens, the park board, and the Oak Lawn Community Design Committee of the planning commission (Dallas DUP, 1974a). Upon recommendations of the planning commission and park board urging the city council to adopt the plan, the city council held a public hearing in November 1974 and directed the urban design staff that an ordinance containing guidelines and standards for the area be prepared. An ordinance created the Turtle Creek Environmental Corridor in April 1975.

10. The visual form study identified resource/potential areas, target areas for physical improvement, environmentally common types, and visually common types. Needed urban design treatments were suggested for each common type. Some observers feel the study could have been more thorough but it was essential that the staff make the survey manageable. Resources for the study were limited. Many projects had to be carried out at the same time. Thus, the description of the environmentally common types was made according to five categories of characteristics only (e.g. level of building maintenance, corridor diversity -- jargons like this were part of the problem of this report -- and tree and natural features). Similarly, the description of the visually common types was made according to four categories only.

11. The Neighborhood Notebook went beyond the traditional scope of urban design since it addressed such concerns as solving neighborhood problems and getting a neighborhood organized. It was a creative response of the urban design staff to common urban design problems in neighborhoods. Those problems were important not only because they were found throughout the city but because they had a profound impact on the visual quality of the city. On the other hand, they were largely beyond the easy reach of city services. Broad education programs like this to stimulate citizens' self-help improvements were essential. And this is the kind of project that needs a systematic data base. The urban design staff had to know what common problems were, where they were located, and how prevailing/important they were. Also, the more innovative is the staff's approach as in this case, the more crucial will the role of a systematic data base be in arguing for it.

Those pamphlets were intended for wide distribution through city officers, neighborhood organizations, and social agencies, but for some reason many of them remained in a storeroom of the planning department. The Neighborhood Notebook was well taken, however, once it reached neighborhoods. For example, one of neighborhood leaders in the South Boulevard area told me that he had been using some pamphlets in his neighborhood newsletters.
12. It is important to note that not many projects were carried out in the area of inner-city neighborhood conservation/design to begin with. The city was growing outward.

13. The development of urban design tools to deal with ordinary neighborhoods in need of public intervention was especially important in a new city like Dallas. Like in the case of the Neighborhood Notebook, the development of such a tool rested on systematic understanding of urban design problems in the city (the citywide visual form/neighborhood condition survey).

In July 1976, the urban design staff developed an ordinance proposal with review procedures and design guidelines, and forwarded it to the city attorney's office for review (Lu, 1979: 45). Conservation districts would be established as replacement zones on the zoning map to control land use, use characteristics, and design features. Unlike the success in historic districts, conservation districts did not take off the ground, however. Local residents in one of the areas initially considered for designation expressed reservation. We have to see the future of the conservation district concept since awareness that such a tool is necessary has been increasing and the present urban design staff is doing further work to get the ordinance passed.

14. In addition, sign control turned out to be extremely controversial and this project absorbed much energy of the urban design director and his staff. Unfortunately, as some observers of the Dallas urban design scene see today, sign control was relatively unimportant an issue in the long run in the face of larger urban design problems in this city such as development and design strategies for downtown. Also, the project created an undesirable image of the urban design director -- a "sign ordinance man" and, by extension, an obstacle to major development interests (which took over the city council in the late 70s). This image hindered his later work.

It is true that "location of each cultural facility is an important urban design decision" (Goals for Dallas, 1970: 42), but the relatively limited impact arts facilities planning has had so far seems to be attributable to the nature of arts facilities, especially when they are to be concentrated in a single sector of downtown (arts district). Urban design in this area is more like project-level urban design than a policy framework for the entire city.

15. A few factors are important. At first, the mall was located away from major pedestrian flows and was not made part of a system of pedestrian walkways. Second, land use along the mall was never pedestrian-oriented. Along the mall were offices of a few insurance companies, the Federal Reserve Bank, and Southwestern Bell Company with the exception of Baker Hotel. The former establishments had little interest in re-orienting themselves to open their storefronts to pedestrians on the mall. The largest property owner along the mall, Southwestern Bell, kept using the Jackson Street entrance for access to its main building. One exception is a few "sidewalk symphony" concerts the Dallas Symphony Orchestra has been offering each year in the past few years as part of the City Arts Program of the Park Board.
16. Back in April 1971, the city council adopted two functional elements of the CBD plan -- "Boulevard and Green Spaces" and "Streets and Vehicular Circulation" -- but no action, general or specific, was proposed on that segment of Akard Street (Dallas DPUD, 1971c and d). Neither did a few studies carried out in the mid 70s include proposals for developing links to or from the mall (Dallas DUP, 1975a and 1976d). We have yet to see whether recent and future studies are successful in giving a new life to the mall (Dallas DUP, 1979a; Ponte, 1979; and Myrick-Newman-Dahlberg and Partners, Inc., 1980).

17. The following are examples: Lu (1972, 1976), Euston (1975), Reece (1976), Webb (1976), and Miller (1977, 1978).

18. The urban design director even included the following among major functions of the urban design division:
   It [the division] contributes toward building a national image for the Department of Planning and Urban Development, as an innovative center for environmental design.(Lu, 1979: 38)

19. A few noticeable changes of relevance to the setting of the design of the city goals are as follows. The membership of each task force or committee was greatly expanded -- more than doubled in size -- and broadened. Just looking at the chairmen of the design of the city goals task forces and committees, you find a councilman and a developer along with a developer-architect this time while you only find architect-planners in the first program. A large group of outside consultants was no more a part of the program as in the first one. A survey conducted with 8,000 individuals in the second program represents increased effort to achieve broader representation. A few groups of minorities -- blacks and Mexican-Americans -- ran parallel programs and set goals of their own.

20. Obviously, the city council at the time wanted a citywide comprehensive land use plan. On January 20, 1975, at the time the plan was nearing completion, the city council passed a resolution requesting "the earliest possible completion" of the plan and imposed a moratorium on zoning reclassification in five critical areas until the adoption of the plan (e.g. the flood plain, historic districts, and the Turtle Creek corridor).

21. A section in the Comprehensive Land Use Policy Plan which would limit the construction of new apartments on the city's outer fringes (outside Loop 12) drew much opposition from bankers and those in the construction trade and real estate business. According to the Dallas Morning News:
   Mayor Folsom says the council and planning commission were becoming increasing obstacles to development when he was elected mayor, and one of his main priorities was to provide a framework for growth. ...
   "When I ran in 1976, I said the council was unknowingly getting a negative attitude. It wasn't the things they were for. It was the number of things they were against."
   (News, March 4, 1979)
22. In one instance, the city council supported the planning commission's power. It had been a city policy for more than forty years to require a three-fourths vote of the city council to overturn a planning commission recommendation in a zoning case. In 1977, however, San Antonio court struck down the requirement as unconstitutional and, when the Texas Supreme Court declined to review the decision, it automatically eliminated the three-fourths requirement in Dallas. The San Antonio court decision was taken as a major victory by those in the development business. (News, March 22, 1977) In late March, about ten days before the April 2 council election, Mayor Pro Tem Adalene Harrison proposed to ask the Texas Legislature for a bill that would restore the planning commission's original power on zoning decisions. One week later, the city council voted 9-2 in favor, with Mayor Folsom and Mrs. Rose Renfroe voting in opposition. The planning commission restored its power at least by the end of 1977 (News, January 2, 1978). Mrs. Renfroe told a reporter that vote would be different if taken later (News, March 29, 1977), suggesting a subtle balance that existed in the city council on matters of planning and development at the time.

23. Douglass accepted a job with one of major real estate developers in the region.

24. Source unknown. The intent of the city manager was to remove all incapable staff persons. He was ready to lose some of the capable ones at the same time. (George Shrader in an interview with me, May 1980).

25. The planning department reorganization introduced a new system called pool planners. Under this system, some planning staff members do not permanently belong to one section and are assigned to specific projects as needs arise. Thus, some planners did have to move from one project to another, sometimes without seeing the whole planning process through in one project.

26. The following is an example:
Lu's superior, Gerald Henigsman, an assistant city manager in charge of the planning department, said he was surprised by the resignation. "We will be losing a talented and innovative planner," Henigsman said. (Herald, December 1, 1978)

27. The following is an example:
Many citizens have taken the resignation of Dallas city planner Weiming Lu as a clear indication that the city planning department is in a sad shape, in fact almost disappearing as an entity. ... [H]is resignation reminds many citizens of the once active nature of the department and the encouragement it formerly gave to citizen participation in planning. (Herald, December 3, 1978)

28. This interim arrangement during October 1977 - April 1979 comes close to what the first Goals for Dallas program recommended: Create a Department of Planning and Urban Development (DPUD) operating under the immediate direction of the City Manager to assure coordination of planning among all departments. ... (Goals for Dallas, 1969)
29. The project was approved by the city council at the request of Russell Perry, developer and former president of the Chamber of Commerce (in late 1978?) (News, March 4, 1979).

30. Manager Schrader was reported to have said, "I have seen very little indication that people care much about participation in city planning." (Herald, December 11, 1978a)
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER IV

1. In San Francisco, public perception of the form of the city as a whole was not studied but a few studies examined how citizens viewed a few specific elements of the city. The most important one is the Street Livability Study. This is a study of the effect of traffic through residential streets measured in terms of residents' behavior and perception of the street environment. The fourth preliminary report includes another study, which examined the visual effect of overhead wires conducted according to the method of paired comparisons.

2. Obviously, emphasis on each area or item of environmental quality concern varies across cities. For example, environmental planning (the "ecology" element) has been an important part of the urban design program in Dallas but not in Minneapolis and San Francisco. The San Francisco Urban Design Plan defines in detail various qualities of the environment (such as continuity of interest and activities at ground level) through its "fundamental principles" but the Minneapolis Visual Quality Plan offers only a coarse definition of the quality of the environment. Likewise, human comfort in an environment of harsh winter climate has been an important urban design concern in Minneapolis (weather protection -- skyways and enclosed plazas and malls, etc.) but it has not in San Francisco and Dallas.

3. In Minneapolis and San Francisco, this view has been officially adopted as part of city policy (the comprehensive plan). In Dallas, the city has not officially recognized this view of the urban design staff. However, the status of the design of the city goal in the first Goals for Dallas suggests broad support for such a view in Dallas.

4. A special case of overall city strategies is the urban design study itself. To know what is citywide, it would be most effective to conduct a citywide survey. A citywide data base would be essential in determining relative urban design significance of such things as historically and architecturally significant buildings, natural/ecological resources, and problems of neighborhood deterioration.

5. The virtue of articulating goals, objectives, and policies clearly has been discussed much in the planning theory arena (e.g. Altshuler, 1965). Chapter V of this thesis specifically discusses strategic roles city design policy could play in the process of urban design.

6. Policies will necessarily be implemented opportunistically and over years. This is because implementation has a logic of its own (cf. the politics of implementation discussed later). A notion that implementation and day-to-day decision-making can be made incrementally without losing overall rationality so far as you are deciding within a citywide decision framework is an important part of the idea of doing citywide policy planning.
7. For example, Allan Jacobs was reported to have said, "I am a believer in the comprehensive plan... . Otherwise, you come back to the question 'What the hell are you talking about?'" (Herald, December 11, 1978a). Also he wrote, "The city planning process begins (if there is a specific point of beginning) with a comprehensive or master plan." (Jacobs, 1978b: 190)

8. Note that the citywide urban design plan in practice may be a simple compilation of district-level policies or even a set of policies for strategic places and areas. Examples of citywide urban design plans without any citywide component abound in beautification and appearance plans.

9. This is a form of community participation in the process of physical development and change of the city. In this way, citywide urban design policies could make urban design what a whole community does through numerous decisions of individuals and groups over time: "citizens collectively striving for a better city." Regardless of whether such an ideological view was held or not, urban designers in Minneapolis and San Francisco, and perhaps those in Dallas, were well aware of such a role citywide urban design policies could play (e.g. Minneapolis CPC, 1964; Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-79; San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 4; Lu, 1979).
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER V

1. Policy effectuation (Kent, 1964) is a function of the urban general plan (the city design plan, in this thesis) to be a practical working guide for the decision-makers (the city council members) in making decisions to effectuate citywide urban design policies. I use "policy implementation" when actors who make decisions to implement policies are not limited to the official decision-makers.

2. In fact, some types of citywide urban design policies cannot be ultimately implemented in theory. Most of the policies defining the quality of the environment fall in this category for a few reasons. At first, they are given as broad environmental quality goals rather than as specific objectives or action strategies as in the following example:

   Respect the character of older development nearby in the design of new buildings. (Policy for Conservation 6, The Urban Design Plan, San Francisco DCP, 1972a).

   You strive for the achievement of goals. You achieve them only when you give up further pursuit because further pursuit means too much cost. Environment can always be better. Unimplementability for this reason goes with the purpose of setting goals.

   Second, this type of policy in most cases relates to a number of physical elements in the city, infinite or practically uncountable as in the following example:

   Use care in remodeling of older buildings in order to enhance rather than weaken the original character of such buildings. (Policy for Conservation 5, the Urban Design Plan, San Francisco, DCP, 1972a).

   Since their changes take place over years through numerous projects and decisions, you may implement these policies in some projects and some parts of the city but not in a whole city or even in a major part of it at one point in time. Unimplementability in this sense derives from the very nature of the environment.

   Finally, many of the important qualities you would like to have in your city are difficult to define. Combined with the fact that implementation methods and design controls you have today are not perfect, this makes implementation difficult. For example, the passage of the height and bulk ordinance in San Francisco has brought the city planners closer to the implementation of related policies of the Urban Design Plan but the ordinance has left some problems (e.g. seemingly bulkier buildings due to the diagonal rule). On a project-by-project basis, project reviews allow progress toward the achievement of many of the qualities defined in the plan that are otherwise difficult to achieve, but decisions inevitably slip away from time to time, leaving some policies unimplemented in some parts of the city (e.g. a few dark buildings recently built in San Francisco). Given that many environmental changes, once made, are difficult to modify later, you are away from implementation. Unimplementability here derives from the way our society works as well as the nature of the environment. None of these reasons should discourage urban designers from formulating policies to define the quality of the environment.
3. There is another reason for suggesting the deemphasis of implementation as evaluation criterion. However you define citywide urban design policies and their relationship to the process of urban design, implementation has a different set of demands, as discussed in the Introduction (the politics of implementation). There is no assurance that good policies naturally lead to successful implementation.

4. The Visual Quality Plan, for example, primarily defines a good decision-making process and action strategies. It does not attempt to define what a good city is in visual terms. It is important to note that "policies for the environment" do not necessarily define the quality of the environment. They could instead define the urban design management system (decision-making process) and action strategies to deal with the quality of the environment as in the Visual Quality Plan (e.g. "develop design principles for the street lighting system" and "establish height limits outside downtown"). In the Visual Quality Plan, policies for the environment (residential, commercial, and industrial areas and scenic assets), if viewed as environmental quality definition, are presented mostly as a checklist of environmental quality concerns to be considered (e.g. The height of the building is an important concern in this city.) and not so much different from policies defining action strategies (e.g. to establish height limits outside downtown) in the way of suggesting what a good environment would be in the city.

5. Design districts must have been subjected to some public discussion in conjunction with the following:
   - Metro Center '85 calling for establishment of design districts and design review procedures in downtown in its implementation program, 1970;
   - The city council's request to the State Legislature for a law enabling the city to establish design review boards and administer design review procedures in design districts, 1971;
   - The passage of the state enabling law, 1971;
   - The passage of a resolution approving the state law in the city council, 1971; and
   - The city council's authorization for considering design district designation in the Whittier East area, 1975.

The process of developing and adopting the Visual Design Framework did not offer a forum for elaborating this concept. The staff proposal had no mention of design districts during 1971 - mid 1976. Once a policy to "consider the use of design districts to protect areas of critical visual importance" so as to "support individual neighborhoods in determining the best means for improving visual quality" (action policy) was incorporated into the proposal, public discussion did not go further to define the nature and role of design districts (no design management policy).

6. The Plan for the 80s is exemplary in this respect. Supporting implementation by "a healthy evaluation and monitoring system which measures accomplishment and need" is part of the plan's general approach to implementation (Minneapolis PD, 1979a: I-49). "Implementation" in the Plan for the 80s is not only a program for each plan element but also itself a plan with a set of a goal, objectives, and
policies. The plan for implementation sets forth an objective of regularly amending the comprehensive plan (Objective 8) and a policy to periodically review and amend it on a regularly scheduled basis so that each section of the plan is updated at least every five years (more frequent reviews and amendments when warranted by the nature of the topic area or by changing conditions) (Policy 27).

7. The introduction to the Visual Quality Plan reads, "While the goal of a more attractive and livable Minneapolis is widely supported, it is much more difficult to find agreement on what the City should look like." (Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-79)
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER VI

1. You might say that the first sentence is also an action policy due to its implication of regulations, trimming of trees, etc. I suggest that this is an action policy much less than an environmental quality policy because such "implication" involves more than translation of a general course of action (action policy) into specific courses of action to be actually carried out. What is involved in this case is a search for appropriate courses of action, general or specific (regulations etc.), to achieve a more or less general goal or objective ("to avoid visual clutter at bridgeheads"). A comparison with the second sentence will make this point clearer. "To assess feasibility" naturally suggests a general course of action (feasibility studies) which can be taken as a specific course of action (e.g. a six-month feasibility study to be carried out by the planning department during the fiscal 1981-82 year with a $1,000 fund). Similarly, the second part of the next example (Policy 18) naturally suggests a general course of action (legislative actions -- a height ordinance).

2. The planning staff was well aware that city development was both a substance and a process and that there were issues of the process of development (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 10). Moreover, they knew that the decision-making process in urban design was important and that there was something which the Urban Design Plan could do to improve it (Jacobs, 1971: 32).

   It is important to note that the staff's theory did not allow consideration of the process of urban design (design management system, at least a part of it which was within the jurisdiction of the planning commission) as something more than the process of implementation and a legitimate area of concerns in the Urban Design Plan. The concept of the process of urban design (design management system) was not established in the Urban Design Plan or elsewhere to begin with, while the concept of the implementation process was (including the "planning-development process" (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 135)). This may be because the planning staff stretched their idea of the comprehensive plan as the beginning of the whole process of urban design too far. Obviously, the Urban Design Plan cannot be prefectly comprehensive or all-inclusive. No recognition of other parts of the process of urban design is a deficiency in the planning staff's theory. Without such recognition, there was no role the Urban Design Plan could play in defining their desirable qualities.

3. Policy for Conservation 7 in the Urban Design Plan (San Francisco DCP, 1972a) comes close to this. It suggests five outstanding and unique areas in San Francisco including Telegraph Hill.

4. The Visual Quality Plan includes a map presented in conjunction with a policy to locate "greenway windows" and scenic observation areas along the Mississippi River, proposed and existing (Policy 26). The plan includes another map identifying several major "key scenic views" but with a note suggesting that many other scenic resources unmapped should not be ignored. (Minneapolis PD, 1979a)
5. The concepts of urban design frameworks, concept plans, and design guidelines are not well understood even among urban designers. Some reject an idea of government urban designers providing them because, "You are then designing the whole thing." Not to mention a rather new concept of poliices that define the quality of the environment (environmental quality policies).

6. There is virtually no theory about the implementation of comprehensive plan policies. Policies that have been studied in the public policy arena, where much of research on implementation has taken place in the past several years, are programs (a special kind of policy -- see below) and, even in this area, the question of how policies change as they are translated from administrative guidelines to practice is still largely unexplored. Implementation thus is a matter of puzzlement: "Men collectively wondering what to do." (Rein and Rabinovitz, 1977: 1, 5) In fact, the implementation of comprehensive plan policies that are usually given as broad goals or objectives, like environmental quality policies, have been considered to be undefinable by theorists. According to Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: vix), there is no implementation to study when policy remains a disembodied objective, without specifying actors in the scene or the acts which are already initiated and in which they must engage to achieve the desired result. That is, you cannot finish what you haven't started. According to the same authors, the subject of study in the public policy arena, policy as program, is defined as: "Given X, we act to obtain Y." Policies become programs when, the initial conditions X are created by authoritative action. We ought to be sympathetic to urban designers concerned with the problems of beginning implementation.

7. Looking at personality types, some characteristics of the urban designers who manage urban design studies or projects parallel those of city managers. For example, city managers' time horizon is relatively short. They value maintenance of equilibrium, strive to balance the present and future opportunities, and respond to changes or innovation with caution and skepticism. They are ready to make compromises to get things done. Obviously, city managers are more than these, however. Their training and experience circumstances differ greatly from those of urban designers. Their experience would involve management in public or private sector or both and they would ultimately take executive positions in major businesses. Their exposure to the political reality of their community makes them highly astute to politics. Their business, in effect, makes them the "comprehensive planner" of the community in that they deal with all matters of their community from the top of government bureaucracy and that managing means at the same time planning, advocating, and implementing. Urban designers could have difficulties in claiming their ability to coordinate things in the face of a strong city manager administrator whose business is to coordinate things.

8. The following views are not uncommon:

The stark reality of the matter is that direct and highly interpersonal citizen participation is not possible in complex and large-scale problems (Catanese, 1974: 117).
"Citizen apathy is inversely proportional to the proximity of a proposed project to the individual and his neighborhood." Citizens are naturally more knowledgeable and concerned about the specific areas in which they live, work, and shop. "When presented with a comprehensive plan for the entire city, of which only a small part would affect his daily life, the average citizen is likely to respond with disinterest." (An often accepted belief that there is a fundamental relationship between size of area and the degree of participation that underlay the operational imperative in comprehensive planning in Fort Worth, Tex., as presented by Susskind and Aylward, 1976: 58-9.)

9. Generally recognized barriers to citizen participation are as follows:
   - Inadequate financial resources;
   - Time required to complete planning projects involving citizen participation;
   - Inadequate staff resources;
   - Maintenance of adequate interest and involvement by citizens and citizen groups; and
   - Citizen pressure to deliver results sooner than is realistic. (Thorwood, 1976; cf. Cunningham, 1972: 599)

10. What I have in mind in Dallas is the Goals for Dallas program rather than the government urban design program. My discussion to follow, however, primarily looks at cases in Minneapolis and San Francisco where citywide urban design policies have been actually formulated.

11. As I shall point out later, what seems important in this case is the fact that the urban design staff did not draft the Visual Design Framework on the basis of up-to-date knowledge of the wishes of people and issues in neighborhoods, not the fact that it was developed without substantial citizen participation per se. The allegation is true that the basic ideas developed in the mid 60s were presented suddenly to the neighborhood groups of the mid 70s. Time lag as well as the way citizens were (not) involved is an issue here.

12. In Minneapolis, the Whittier East Design Study was completed successfully but it received much criticism that it was elitist, neglecting important social issues of the Whittier East area. The Whittier Urban Design Framework program, on the other hand, addressed a range of social issues around physical development and change and received much support from the neighborhood residents. Minneapolis' Metro Center '85 downtown development plan was also a complex package. Urban design was only one element (the visual image and form frameworks), although it was the most important, strategic one. Similarly, attention to urban design was possible in San Francisco at least in part because other areas of concerns were to be taken care of by other elements of the comprehensive plan in element-by-element revisions. (Jacobs (1978b: 218) has observed, however, that some San Franciscans took the Urban Design Plan as the whole comprehensive plan -- perhaps partly because it was the first element presented to
them and partly owing to the very nature of urban design as "stitching element".) The CIP Urban Design Study, the Visual Design Framework, and the Visual Quality Plan in Minneapolis were likewise part of a larger program.

13. The Urban Design Plan, as well as the whole comprehensive plan of the City and County of San Francisco, is not the city's official policy in that the Board of Supervisors has never adopted it, and it does not need to base its decisions on it. However, given relative power of the planning commission and citizen's support for the Urban Design Plan, it is little different from the city's official policy for physical development and urban design. Some people in San Francisco even think that the Urban Design Plan was adopted by the Board of Supervisors (the San Francisco Bay Guardian, 1971; and in my interviews).

14. T. J. Kent (1964) has argued that city planning should be part of the legislative branch of government and that the urban general plan (comprehensive plan) should be adopted by the city council since city planning is primarily a policy-setting activity and the comprehensive plan the city's official policy document. With increasing awareness of the importance of relating the planning process to the political process ("politics of policy") (Catanese, 1974: 141-151; etc.) or, at least, the need of increasing city planners' political sophistication, in recent years, Kent's idea is intriguing. However, it has never been put into practice precisely as stated in any major American city.

I believe the council adoption of citywide urban design policies is a desirable direction as Kent has reasoned, but if only the city's governmental context is supportive of the procedure. Council adoption would be a natural course of action in the council-manager or similar form of government (e.g. city planning under the council-appointed city coordinator) as in Dallas and Minneapolis. On the other hand, in cities like San Francisco where the planning function is given a relatively independent power in the city's administrative structure, council adoption does not seem to make much difference in determining and implementing city design policy. Rather, city planners in San Francisco (the planning commission and staff) thought, negative effects of council adoption would override its benefits.

e.g. The Board of Supervisors had little time to consider details of the plan;
Political review before the Board would not be supportive of the plan's orientation to advocate good urban design and set forth the principles of good design to be flexibly applied.

What is important must be to relate city design policy formulation to substantive discussion leading to the determination of policy for the city, not a specific form of council adoption. Each city defines the roles of elected officials (the city council) and citizens (voters) differently. In Dallas, for example, elected officials play primary role in policy making, while in Minneapolis the city council (and, recently, the mayor) has been encouraging involvement of citizens in the process of adopting city policy. In San Francisco, where its city design plan received overwhelming support at the time of its adoption (by the planning commission), some groups remained critical as to its legitimacy.
as official policy. The Board of Supervisors' formal action on the plan does not seem to have been a solution anyway: cf. "At no time have any of the changes codified in these plans [the Urban Design Plan] been approved by San Francisco voters -- nor will they be presented to voters in the future." (The San Francisco Bay Guardian, 1971: 26; Emphasis mine.) This brings us back to the whole issues around the city government as it defines the status and role of urban design and the place of citizen participation in the planning process.

15. Another example: In the early 70s, the Model Cities Communication Center operated a mobile planning van which provided detailed information on proposed plans and projects in the Model Neighborhood. The van was also used as a traveling office for local aldermen so that citizens could voice their views about land use development proposals directly to elected officials. (Susskind and Aylward (1976: 61) quoting from a report by the Urban Institute entitled Citizen Involvement in Land Use Governance: Issues and Methods (Rosenbaum, 1974).)
FOOTNOTES: APPENDIX

1. Key words I used to identify urban design-related reports include "urban design", "community design", "neighborhood design", "beautification", "appearance", "aesthetic(s)", "amenity", "visual", "image (-ability)", "identity", "environment", and "(urban) form". The two professional journals that were reviewed are the Journal of the American Institute of Planners (the Journal of the American Planning Association) and the Journal of the American Institute of Architects.

2. Reports were reviewed at the MIT Rotch Library, the Harvard University Loeb Library (the Planning Deposit Library in the HUD Region I) and the HUD Library in Washington, D.C.

3. The urban design element of the comprehensive plan of Spartanburg draws heavily from the San Francisco Urban Design Plan in terms of its format and design principles. The Spartanburg urban design plan departs from the San Francisco plan in adding more concrete prototype designs and improvement proposals to its environmental quality-oriented substance. The result of three interviews I conducted in the city -- with the project director/urban designer, the city manager, and a representative from the Spartanburg Chamber of Commerce -- suggests rather divergent views as to its use and impact to prohibit further comments without more interviews. The interviews did suggest 1) the difficulty of creating enthusiastic citizen support as the Urban Design Plan had done in San Francisco and in other cities and 2) a tendency of people to see environmental quality-oriented policy plans to be "unimplementable". (They have no schedules and cost estimates to begin with.)

4. Urban designers in Oakland did not see their recommendations finding their way into a larger work to prepare the comprehensive plan. See Options for Oakland: A Summary Report on the Oakland 701 Project (Oakland CPD, 1969). According to Lynch (1976:83), "Oakland, Portland [Ore.], and Seattle ... did studies that were not long sustained."

5. According to Lynch (1976:82), an early study of the visual form of Rye, New York, by Alan Melting used many of the techniques that had been used in Lynch's (1965) Visual Analysis. Melting's report was not available for my review.

6. Parish in the State of Louisiana corresponds to county.

7. An undated memo inserted in the report reads: "... not acted upon by the Planning Commission or the City Council."

8. My survey has not identified communities which made urban design an element or section of their comprehensive plans because urban design elements and sections could not be located by a report title survey unless they were issued as a separate volume. I only reviewed those 701 comprehensive planning reports and plans prepared in California communities that were deposited in the Region I Planning Deposite Library (the Loeb Library at Harvard University).
The small communities which prepared a separate citywide urban design plan as part of their 701 comprehensive planning program include:
- Acoma Indian Pueblo, N.M. (not an incorporated city) (1973)
  Historic Preservation and Urban Design Plan (Work Item 4), 70p.;
- Tahoe City, Ca., unincorporated area of 1,394 (1975):
  Urban Design Plan; and
- Rosemead, Ca., city of 40,972 (1962):
  Community Design Plan.

Some small communities prepared urban design reports as part of their 701 comprehensive planning or community renewal program:
- Elmira, N.Y., city of 39,945 (1965):
  Urban Design Suggestions: Interim Report No. 8
  as part of its Community Renewal Program, 13p.;
- Leiston (city of 26,068) - Clarkston Urban Area, Idaho
  (1968): "Urban Design" (a 5-page report to the planning commission);
- Zanesville, Ohio, city of 33,045 (1965):
  Community Renewal Program: Land Utilization and Urban Design
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- White Plains, N.Y., city of 50,125, (1977):
  Urban Design: Fringe Residential Neighborhoods, Commercial
  Districts and School Properties (findings and recommendations
  prepared for the Department of Planning), 60p.
- Fairfield, Ca., city of 44,146 (1968):
  Community Design Study;
  Comprehensive Plan, Interim Report, Part G: Community Design;
- Milpitas, Ca., city of 27,149 (1966):
  Community Design Sketches;
- Twinsburg, Ohio, village of 6,432 (1972):
  Comprehensive Planning Report 7: Community Design Manual,
  Part 1 and 2;
  Appearance and Design Study; and
- Childersburg, Ala., city of 4,831 (1975):
  Urban Area Design Study.

Carter, Sumek, and Frost (1974: 257) reports that the City of Garland, Texas, set policy guides (a general statement of environmental goal or policy) for urban aesthetics and land management (along with air pollution, solid waste management, water pollution, and control of noise) to provide general guidance for the entire city administration, but I have not reviewed its policy statement. According to them, explicit statements of environmental goals or policies were not typical: of 1,094 cities reporting in their survey, 20% had adopted statements and 23% had them under consideration. Of those cities which had adopted environmental goal or policy statements, those which included urban design would be much smaller in number.
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