THE LANGUAGE OF CITY PLANNING:
an essay in historical and
philosophical understanding

by

M. Christine Boyer-Karalis

B.A., Goucher College (1961)
M.S., University of Pennsylvania (1964)
M.C.P., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1968)

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

17 April 1972

Signature of Author

Department of Urban Studies and Planning
17 April 1972

Certified by

Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by

Chairman, Departmental Committee on
Graduate Students

Rotch
THE LANGUAGE OF CITY PLANNING: an essay in historical and philosophical understanding

M. Christine Boyer-Karalis

ABSTRACT:

This thesis focuses on a critical analysis of city planning in America as a form of public communication from 1890-1970 with special attention emphasizing the planners' developing attitudes of the public realm as opposed and related to the technical interests of order, rationality and objectivity.

This thesis begins with the assumption that planning is and has been a profession dedicated to positively changing the quality of life within urban cities and regions. At the same time, it makes the assumption that the crisis of city planning in America is the result of the successive devastation of its original intent, i.e., the quality of life, by a middle class rationality solely concerned with technical efficiency and objective manipulations. This thesis then becomes an attempt to criticize and to understand the crisis of city planning by returning to a historical description of the ways in which planning has been captivated by the quest for order and the subsequent play between the interests in the quality of life and the technical interests in rationality and objectivity.

This thesis also assumes that the separation of city planning from the world of everyday life has allowed the language of city planning to become frozen in pre-defined categories that no longer adequately reflect reality or no longer refer to original goals. Consequently this thesis also presents a description of the accumulations of planning objectifications and the extent to which knowledge of the city and the public has been distorted by the planners' own interests, by social relationships among men, and by the context of leader-led authority. Finally this thesis attempts to suggest why certain conceptualizations and abstractions developed and how the social system has perpetuated these distortions.

Thesis Supervisor: Lloyd Rodwin

Title: Professor of City Planning
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Along the various pathways which this thesis and I have traveled, many people have offered helpful suggestions and patient concern; to them a special gratitude is due.

Numerous present and past staff members at MIT have also contributed assistance. It was Professor Bershers, on my first day at MIT, who suggested the juxtaposition of language and city planning. Later, it was Professor Rodwin's enthusiastic response which helped me select this fringe area in which to find a thesis topic and again it was his suggestion that I pursue a historical analysis of the language of city planning. At various stages of this event, Professors Fogelson, Gakenheimer and Gans have offered their special advice. They and many others have helped me create some form and direction to this thesis. To Sara Stewart goes the appreciation for the herculean task of typing the manuscript.

M. Christine Boyer
17 April 1972
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>symbol</th>
<th>definition of the symbol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>=</td>
<td>&quot;is further defined by the following entries,&quot; &quot;has the following similar aspects&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>&quot;is produced by . . .&quot;, &quot;is a result of . . .&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>&quot;produces . . .&quot;, &quot;results in . . .&quot;, &quot;is a determiner of . . .&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>,</td>
<td>&quot;and&quot; (separates a list of almost similar entries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/</td>
<td>&quot;or&quot; (separates a list of alternative entries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>:</td>
<td>&quot;is characterized by . . .&quot;, &quot;has the following characteristics as . . .&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>{...}, [...], (...)</td>
<td>Three sets of parentheses and brackets have been used to enclose a list of entries. Juxtaposed lists enclosed by parentheses or brackets are to be expanded into all possible combinations which make sense. For example: [(red/blue) (balls/squares)] would &quot;red or blue balls or red or blue squares.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>denotes a list of adjectives; A, O, and V have been used when the use of parentheses and brackets yields an unreadable entry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>denotes a list of noun objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>denotes a list of verbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\equiv</td>
<td>&quot;changed into . . .&quot;, &quot;transformation from . . . to . . .&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to the table of symbols, the following statements would read in this manner:

Order \text{+ (reform/control/health/beauty/systematic study)}

"Order is produced by reform, or control, or health . . ."

Reform \text{= (awakening/regeneration)}

"Reform is further defined by the following entries of awakening or regeneration."

Planning \text{= (Systematic, sequential) (action, operation)}

"Planning is further defined as systematic action, sequential action, systematic operation and sequential operation."

Education \text{= [control (mind/instincts)]}

"Education is further defined by control of the mind or control of instincts."

Americanization \text{: [American homes, American communities, American (standards/ideals), English language, (American/blooded) citizens]}

"Americanization is characterized by American homes, American communities, American standards or American ideals, English language, American citizens or blooded citizens."
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstract</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Symbols</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter

1. **INTRODUCTION**
   - History, Language and the Philosophy of Planning  11
   - A History of the Profession of American City Planning  11
   - Span of Materials and the Form of Intellectual History  14
   - The Form of the History of Ideas  18
   - Summary and Further Work to be Done  29
   - Organization of the Thesis  32

## Scheme One:

**CITY CHAOS AND URBAN ORDER--THE QUEST FOR CONTROL 1890-1919**

2. **INTRODUCTION**  37

3. **DISORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT**  48
   - Environmental Problems  48
   - The Population Problem  53
   - The Call to Reform  58
   - The Semantics of Chaos  66
   - Terminology  80

4. **SOCIAL RESPONSES**  86
   - The Dangers of the Mass of People Congregating in the Cities  86
   - The Answers to These City Dangers  92
   - The Semantics of Fear  96

5. **THE IDEAL OF HARMONY**  99
   - The Order of Municipal Health  99
   - Aesthetic Harmony  104
   - Terminological Matrix  110
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>SOLUTIONS PROPOSED</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TEXT:</td>
<td>The Management of the Environment</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Systematic Study of the City Was Required</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td>The Concept of &quot;Systematic Study&quot;</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXT:</td>
<td>Terminology</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td>The City as a System</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXT:</td>
<td>The Semantics of A City System</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td>Terminology</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXT:</td>
<td>The Problem of Waste</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Emerging Pattern of the City Plan</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td>The Semantics of Waste</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business Interests</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terminology</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>CONCEPT OF THE PUBLIC</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TEXT:</td>
<td>Individualism vs. Collectivism</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td>Planning Politics and Planning Language</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terminology</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUMMARY OF SCHEME ONE | 187  |

SCHEME TWO:
DISINTEGRATION OF ORDER 1919-1929

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>THE INVASION OF THE MACHINE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TEXT:</td>
<td>Physical Breakdown</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td>The Intentions Behind the Mechanical Revolution</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terminology</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXT:</td>
<td>Sustaining Life Needs</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td>Theme of the Good Life</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terminology</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Chapter 9

**Continued**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEXT:</th>
<th>Escape From the Cities</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td>The Rationality of the Replicability of the Results</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terminology</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Commentary:** The Rationality of the Replicability of the Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEXT:</th>
<th>Neutrality of the Planning Boundaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td>The Intentions Behind Planning Neutrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXT:</td>
<td>The Organization of Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td>The Semantics of Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Terminology:**

| TEXT: | The Organization of Planning |
| COMMENTARY: | The Semantics of Organization |

**SUMMARY OF SCHEME TWO**

## Chapter 10

**MECHANICAL PROCEDURES OF PLANNING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEXT:</th>
<th>Neutrality of the Planning Boundaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AN OBJECTIVE STANCE DEALS WITH FACTS</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td>The Intentions Behind Planning Neutrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXT:</td>
<td>The Organization of Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td>The Semantics of Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Terminology:**

| TEXT: | The Organization of Planning |
| COMMENTARY: | The Semantics of Organization |

## Chapter 11

**CENTRALIZED/DECENTRALIZED CONTROL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEXT:</th>
<th>Group Life as a Force for Decentralization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td>Restrained Communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Terminology:**

| TEXT: | Group Life as a Force for Decentralization |
| COMMENTARY: | Restrained Communication |

## Chapter 12

**INTRODUCTION**

| TEXT: | The Problems of the Mature City 1919-1945 |

## Chapter 13

**THE LIMITATIONS ON EXPANSION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEXT:</th>
<th>The Obsolescence of the Modern City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning for What?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Re-established Ideal of Progress: Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Progressiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledge as Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Planning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 14

**THE RHETORIC OF THE NEW**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMENTARY:</th>
<th>An Ahistorical Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terminology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Scheme Three:

**THE DISORDER OF THE MATURE CITY 1929-1945**

| TEXT: | The Problems of the Mature City 1919-1945 |

## Chapter 12

**INTRODUCTION**

| TEXT: | The Problems of the Mature City 1919-1945 |

## Chapter 13

**THE LIMITATIONS ON EXPANSION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEXT:</th>
<th>The Obsolescence of the Modern City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning for What?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Re-established Ideal of Progress: Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Progressiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledge as Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Planning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 14

**THE RHETORIC OF THE NEW**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMENTARY:</th>
<th>An Ahistorical Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terminology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. SYSTEMS PROBLEMS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Model of Urban Mechanics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Organic Model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. PURPOSIVE SYSTEMS AND THE PROCESS MODEL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems Persistence and Accomodation: Rational Process Planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXT:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Textual Description of the Process Model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Rational Management and Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Legitimations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposive Rational Planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Action: Choice Among Programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programming Strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMENTARY:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Intentions Behind the Process Model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Intentions of Rational Process Planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Continuum of Rational Action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. SYSTEMS INTERACTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Political System of Rational Behavior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXT:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Textual Description of the Political Process of Planning: The Ideology of Liberal Democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning in a Democracy Implies Participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problem of Democratic Planning: Whose Interests are Being Served?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Assumption of Planning Constraints in Liberal Democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Mandarins</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planners as Technicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mediators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Advocates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Chapter 18.

Continued

The Participants in the Process of Planning: A Case of Distorted Socialization

- The Leader's Role
- Strategies of Behavioral Change

*COMMENTARY:*

- The Intentions Behind the Political Process Model
- The Problems of Planning in a Democracy
- Group Theory of Pluralistic Planning
- The External Constraints of Planning
- The Planning Mediator
- Distortive Socialization
- Terminology

**SUMMARY OF SCHEME FOUR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Participants in the Process of Planning: A Case of Distorted Socialization</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Leader's Role</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies of Behavioral Change</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Intentions Behind the Political Process Model</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problems of Planning in a Democracy</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Theory of Pluralistic Planning</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The External Constraints of Planning</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Planning Mediator</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distortive Socialization</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminology</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUMMARY OF SCHEME FOUR</strong></td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX A.** THE RATIONAL AND OBJECTIVE BACKGROUND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>APPENDIX A.</strong> THE RATIONAL AND OBJECTIVE BACKGROUND</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APPENDIX B.</strong> THE PROBLEMS OF THE MATURE CITY 1929-1945</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APPENDIX C.</strong> THE URBAN CRISIS 1945-1970</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part One: The Vocabulary of Crisis</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Two: The Mechanical Model</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Three: The Organic Model</td>
<td>604</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HISTORY, LANGUAGE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLANNING

If we would discover the little backstairs door that for any age serves as the secret entranceway to knowledge, we will do well to look for certain unobtrusive words with uncertain meaning that are permitted to slip off the tongue or the pen without fear and without research; words which, having from constant repetition lost their metaphorical significance, are unconsciously mistaken for objective realities. . . . In each age these magic words have their entrances and exits.1

This study is an essay in the philosophy and history of American city planning. Since planners generally agree there is no planning philosophy, perhaps this effort requires some clarification. The planner's choice is to order the urban and national environment, although of course,
his perceptions of the environment and order, have changed with the sentiments of nature and the flow of time. At first the environment meant the paths and forms of the physical city, but it has meant as well a set of social, political, and economic relationships among men. Delimiting city planning to physical design has never been an adequate definition; even in their physical phase, planners held convictions about the order of the world, their place in it and their ability to change it. But to hold such convictions about the order and arrangement of society necessarily involved the planner in a struggle against the convictions of others. In this sense planning thought and action have always had a political and social orientation, tantamount to the problem of social politics-in-planning as well as planning-in-social politics. As the general conception of the role and political position of the public has changed, so have the authoritative convictions and political position of the planners. How and why and when they changed; these are among the subjects of this thesis.

Along with and opposed to the recognition of the public realm, however, we find that society has become increasingly technical and rationalized in directing itself toward efficient means of problem-solving and goal attainment. The profession of city planners has been among those following the imperatives of instrumental action for which science and technology have provided the models. Following the ideal of science, however, the disciplines of action, be they political science, sociology, economics or city planning, find themselves concerned with an image of man, and in turn an image of society which has enabled them to interpret social problems in terms of the order of
technical solutions. How then, we must ask, has the expertise of problem-solving been related to the social and political realm? How have the interests and needs of the public been unified with the instrumental interests of order?

It is not a question of throwing off the cloak of rational action in order to freely "do-your-own-thing," and it is not a matter of dividing the planning field into technical and social concerns because the interest of order sees no boundaries and turns all planning into a form of technical planning. Instead it is a task of philosophy to understand the technical interest of order and control and relate it to the practical/political interests of the public realm; to understand the contradictions inherent in the rational and humanistic aims of planning. A philosophy of planning, therefore, must reflect critically upon its professional history, the concepts developed and presuppositions taken for granted and in light of these to clarify its orientation to the world, its view of man, its methods and explanations. To delimit myself, however, I shall in the length of this thesis, deal only with the conceptual and ideological problems of order in technical planning and with the pre-suppositions of rationality and objectivity.

Before beginning however, I should first define the type of study which the reader will find in the following pages. I should also address myself to the reasons why certain people and ideas were selected for treatment and detail the implications of the concept of order. Finally the assumptions and ideals upon which this study rests should be clearly developed.
A HISTORY OF THE PROFESSION OF AMERICAN CITY PLANNING

As customarily written, the history of a profession seems to have followed three approaches. The first is to describe the progression of events or accomplishments. Historians of city planning interested in this pursuit deal with the series of local or national events that have surrounded changes in the institutions of city planning. They focus on the details of planning within one city or across one planning function such as zoning, housing or transportation. For example, Robert Fogelson in The Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles 1850-1930 relates how the growth of planning institutions in Los Angeles such as the City Planning Commission, the Board of City Planners, the adoption of a Zoning Ordinance and so forth reflected the interplay between the idealistic planners and the speculative interests of the subdividers and businessment and how the balance between the effective use of the police power and the issue of private rights was always tipped on the side of the property owner. Consequently, Los Angeles developed a program of dispersal and decentralization which over-zoned for residential-income and commercial or industrial purposes.

Second there is the approach which Herbert Gans calls the "sociological analysis" of a profession. This is the kind of study which asks who did what, by what means, for what interests and ends, for whom and at what time. As an example, Gans' analysis explains how the early American city planners sought the restoration of order.
Their means ranged from legislative control of urban growth to principles of scientific management and public administration but their programs supported the narrow ranged interests of the middle-class voter, the property and business owner, and the municipal politicians. For Gans, the game of city planning has changed by the 1960's. Now the ultimate goal of a balanced order is seen as the product of political and economic equality, means selected have to do with underlying causal processes and not simple environmental effects, proposals reflect the process of incremental and rational decision-making. This study can quickly lead into the third kind of approach: the socio-economic analysis of certain key professionals and their subsequent implications for the growth of the profession.

Now, these normal approaches present certain problems for this writer. The first kind of study is limited to the deeds of planning; the description of planning implementations and planning realities. Further restriction follows from the choice of functional area or geographical location. Except for the latter choice, it is difficult to delimit the field of planning within precise disciplines and boundaries, or to select a few organizing concepts or protean ideas. On the other hand, the third approach assumes there have been significant leaders in the history of planning. This, I think, distorts the position of planning in America, for it has ever been a profession of "modest" men whose influence could never be said to have held sway over the minds of many men.
The second approach offers the most inspiration but to analyze only the ends and means and interests of city planning is to overlook the critical question of why these ends, means or interests were selected or held in the first place. Thus it fails to ask the prior, more fundamental question of why social-political reality was organized and interpreted in each epoch in the way that it was. To understand the world first as an object of thought and knowledge leads one inevitably to criticize the hold of ideas and beliefs upon subsequent actions. This study offers therefore a critical approach to the history of city planning, an approach which falls within the range of intellectual history.

The questions which this study raises begin with the social, political and cultural reasons behind the acceptance of order as the city planner’s measure. It asks about the contextual arrangements in the general historical and cultural period which held special implications for this concept; about how the planners’ concepts varied with the changing times, with influences from science, business, philosophy or politics. This thesis proposes, therefore, to be a critical survey of the ways in which the concept of order has been used and the socio-historical conditions under which it has been applied.
Specifically this analysis searches to understand the technical interest of order and control as it relates to the changing practical/political interests of the public. Since the present position of planning is dominated by modern manipulative thinking encapsulated in instrumental methods, it is of particular import to review the context in which planning's image of scientific procedure originated and how the uncritical transference of objective, value-free and disinterested natural science to a practical or action oriented science such as planning was accomplished. With respect to technical planning, I shall be particularly concerned with the historical development of ideal rules of prediction and decision-making, of means-end efficiency, of hierarchical and authoritative control, of unreal expectations of repetitive and conforming urban qualities, of the technological aim of progress. But I shall also be concerned with the planner's concepts of social, political and moral order and particularly with the problematics of consensus and the development of pluralistic planning strategies, the quest for civic responsibility and rational restraint. Thus I shall ask how planners have limited the possibility for an open dialogue with the public through restrained communication, and how their technical methods have demanded inauthentic rationalizations and reified abstractions.
It is not the development of concepts alone which draws my attention, but I shall also try to understand in the light of socio-historical implications how the quest for order predetermined the functional knowledge and interests reflected on the conceptual level and how this led to its eventual alienation from the "human-societal world." Since interpretation of planning action depends upon the point of view of the planner's world, I inevitably have found myself trying to reconstruct the socio-political fabric which surrounded the particular writings and opinions about the city. I have sought within the "literature" of planning, therefore, to understand the world of the planners from their communications with public groups to their manipulations of the environment, from the traditions of art and religion, to the reflections of philosophy and politics.

All of this I have hoped to encounter in the manifold expressions of the "language of city planning," and so it becomes important to reflect for a moment upon the implications inherent in the selected material. The material, of course, determines the ideas to be considered and, therefore, we should examine the limitations of the selected corpus.

SPAN OF MATERIALS AND THE FORM OF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

The "literature" of city planning has multifarious forms. It could consist of the records and accomplishments of city planning commissions or similar professional associations. Alternatively architectural renditions, Master plans, Land-use maps and so forth
offer a material form of planning intentions. Then there are the legislative and legal records, the personal memos and memoirs of individual city planners, the theoretical and practical writings. Finally there are what has been called the public-regarding writings: those writings from professional planners with explanatory intent directed either within the profession or to the public at large. It is this latter corpus which shall compel our focus for it is the assumption that these public-regarding writings exemplify certain commonly shared assumptions and popular ideas and common metaphors revealing the developing sentiments of the profession.

The material selected, that is the professional journals, and conference proceedings and articles by planning professionals in the mass media, has predetermined the profile of the planner. This choice restricts the definition of planner to those men who identified with certain professional institutions such as the National Planning Conferences or The Journal of the American Institute of Planning or to those men who offered a general account of the profession's orientation and logic of procedure to the public at large. Thus these planners maintained an ideological stance well within the confines of the profession. They do not reflect the kinds of technical knowledge or advice which the profession also presented and in this sense do not offer a full range of activities within planning, i.e., they are not speaking about the techniques of zoning, of housing, or of transportation. Instead they are focused on the general interpretation of planning. Being institutionally conservative, these planners moreover
do not represent outside influences upon the profession; they were not political propagandists for change but men who spoke for the professionally established line. By definition, this choice therefore excludes the presence of foreign writers.

Although these limits place confines upon the analysis, they offer a decided advantage in allowing the given material to be exhaustively analyzed. But further, the basic assumption behind this restriction implies that whatever significant conceptual approaches (note not functional approach) existed, they would find their way into this body of literature. In other words, the massive iceberg of planning practice and theory may lie underneath but significant outcroppings should appear upon the surface and it is these significant outcroppings, these shared assumptions and common conceptions, which we are after.

THE FORM OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS:

Language, in any age, becomes the receptacle for our shared values and assumptions. To communicate necessitates the mutual recognition of these subjective values and assumptions, and so it is that this study of public-regarding literature is particularly concerned with understanding and interpreting the planners' historically formed concepts of himself and his world as revealed in his preassumptions, purposive intentions and explanatory metaphors and models.

But why this linguistical qualification upon the history of ideas? The situation and language of planning are historical and our interpretation of them can be nothing if not also historical.
Configurations of understanding encapsulated in words arise as reactions to particular social, moral, political, natural events and relationships among men. Our vocabulary today is a product of and is genetically related to the terms and concepts of another day. If they no longer hold any meaning for us or appear as vacuous arguments it is perhaps because we have forgotten the system of ideas and situations to which they originally belonged. Though we may never avoid having presuppositions, we can be aware of their influence from the past, into the present and future.

There is a fundamental assumption behind this thesis which holds that the language of city planning is no longer a dialectical product of its social-historical foundations. Failing to be based on concrete reality, the theory and practice of city planning have become captivated by the mystical vision of progress and a better quality of life which the technical sciences promise. This is a reified conceptual product of the middle-class: that all human needs can be satisfied through commodities and services, i.e., the products of technological progress, and furthermore that all men find themselves in and through work and incidentally thereby ensure the longevity of progress. Beyond this however, the romance with the technical sciences has led city planning into the realm of hypostatized abstractions and inauthentic rationalizations and the false and misleading use in the social sciences of analogies drawn from natural, empirical-analytic science.
We begin therefore with the assumption that planning is and has been a profession dedicated to positively changing the quality of life within urban cities and regions. At the same time we make the assumption that the crisis of city planning in America is the result of the successive devastation of its original intent, i.e., the quality of life, by a middle class rationality solely concerned with technical efficiency and objective manipulations. This thesis then becomes an attempt to criticize and to understand the crisis of city planning.

Consequently, this work presents a historical description of how technical planning became captivated by the bourgeois quest for order and its related concepts of rationality and objectivity.* We need to begin therefore by defining some positions: first there is the concept of technical planning, then there is its production of the crisis of planning and the perpetuation of crisis through distortions and abstractions, finally there is the ideal which pervades the intent of this thesis, that is the ideal of an emancipated, truly inter-subjective, society.

By "technical" I mean a subject area which has been captivated by the scientific ideal, i.e., aspiring to be respectable, legitimate, rigorous, objective, fact-oriented and value-free, and as a result having focused directly upon a quest for order both in its subject material and its theoretical manipulations. The phrase "technical planning" also assumes that planning in an industrial society is technologically determined. In this sense a technical and bureaucratic
nature dominates the organization of the city and society, its values, associations, and so forth. In technical planning, we do not talk, therefore, about the institutions of the private property system, the labor market, the fetishized commodity system, or the control of the forces of production. These relations which are technological society, shape and have formed the order of planning. They are the bonds upon the planner which he accepts, with a shrug of his shoulders, as "inevitable constraints" thereby accepting the alienated reality of society as if it were the natural order of things. The language of the city is the vocabulary of technical planning. To "plan" is to set forth programs of change but in technical planning the problems are those of social and physical reforms, never transforms: they are programs of conservation and affirmation, never destruction or transcendence. The language of the city, therefore, is not a critical language, it is a language of permanence and positivism; specifically it is a language of order.

For our discussions it is important to note this coupling of objective knowledge based on the natural sciences with the rational inquiry into the quality of human life, for it allows for the problematic victory of reason in support of the harmony and order of the social whole. In the long run, however, the rule of reason is compromised by its subordination to a pre-given, irrational, non-experiential essence whose existence and directives demand an uncritical acceptance, thereby preserving the ideal harmony or internal consistency of the social whole.
It is the problematics of this social order accepted as a universal natural-rational order which will require our attention in technical planning ofr it is the belief in this social whole which compels our uncritical acceptance of authoritative and dominating values and laws of control. This natural-rational order contains the ideal of the capitalist market system, of universal moral values, of technical-scientific standards of rational objective thought. It relegates planning, moreover, to the organization of things, of reforming or precising, within an ultimate unity of ends by placing the determination of these ends of society (i.e., its telos, which is the ultimate end or purpose of society, the happiness of men, the Good Life, etc.), outside of the control and criticism of reasonable men.

The aim of technical planning becomes the establishment and extension of rational order to both the physical design of the city and the conflicts and dysfunctions within the social system, as well as the decision-making processes pertaining to the city. Its interest in knowledge, therefore, is guided by two overall themes: that of the mastery over nature, or the technical control and order of the urban and social environment and of the public and that of the establishment of ideal technical rules for prediction and decision-making. The process of decision-making becomes a technical problem requiring information and instrumental strategies analyzed by experts who are removed from the biasing pressure of politics. Under the scientific guise, as we have described, the social world appears as a rational outcome of natural forces and causal determinations. Its ultimate goals and correct organization as a whole are taken for granted.
The assumptions of technical planning thus perpetuate the crisis of planning. By treating the problem of the quality of life as a technical issue of order and efficiency, by removing itself from the biasing pressures of politics, by seeking ideal goals ripped out of the social-historical context, it subjugates men to a false consciousness and reduces the self-understanding and self-determinations of the participating public to passive and accepting objects. Technical planning operates within the status quo, its procedures are activated through a manipulative bureaucracy, its theory is a veil which conceals the real motives behind the order which governs the city and the behavior of men. In theory and practice, it has become divorced from the world of everyday life.

This separation has allowed the language of city planning to become frozen in predefined categories that no longer adequately reflect reality or no longer refer to original goals, i.e., its telos. Language is the medium through which consciousness of reality is expressed and handed down through tradition. But through predetermined representations and categories already designated in the acquired language immediate consciousness of objects and relationships becomes abstracted and mechanically supplanted by institutionalized objectifications. Thus the consciousness of society is directed toward the uncritical acceptance and perpetuation of social arrangements and ideas already acceptable to the dominant groups and powers.

Not only is it a question of the objectifications of a certain profession or class, i.e., a matter of who determines these values and
assumptions and who defines and labels the projected categories of reality, but also it is a matter of the error of criticism, i.e., the fallacy which assumes that the constructs of our theories are invested with the attributes of reality. It is only in the practical everyday world that the quality of life assumes relevancy, that it gives rise to conceptual categories that adequately reflect its original goals and experience.

Could it be possible that we do not understand the language of city planning? That beneath the surface vagueness of our concepts such as "order," democracy," "progress," "The Public Interest," "participatory democracy," and so forth, lies a deeper structure of intentions? It is possible that our concepts, ripped out of their socio-historical context, have become parasites upon their original meanings? If this is so, then the public-regarding literature of city planning is distorted communication. Distorted in the sense that abstractions, assumed authority and legitimations, acceptance of universal values and normative ideals dominate our thought processes. Our self-reflection and critical abilities are repressed by accepting appearances as reality, by neglecting to question how words are related to meaning and how meaning is related to reality.

Demystification of distortion is important for the ideal of emancipated, truly intersubjective communication. If language as social consciousness is a medium of the superstructure then our endeavor for honest, non-distorted communication lies in each person's ability to reflect upon and criticize the presuppositions, the normative directives,
the so-called ideologies, opaquely hidden within the terms and phraseology of language itself. As a medium of the superstructure, language reflects the contradictions of the base structure; but captured by the forces of the status quo, it becomes a vehicle of distortion which represses self-awareness and reflection upon these contradictions and eventually becomes a positive support for its own distortions. Conceptual configurations as well as social relationships become frozen for reasons which lie beyond the critical ability of theoretical and practical knowledge. The problem of ensuring an "unconstrained but reflective communication" is, therefore, twofold: first it is a problem of understanding the socio-historical relationships among men which create the distortions and second, it is a problem of being critically aware of the effects of these distortions and false socializations on the everyday lives of men. Thus we find our interests in history and language irrefragably merged, and it is in this direction that we shall proceed.

First, however, let us ask what this form of demystification achieves for the field of planning? By bringing to consciousness false preassumptions it destroys what might be labeled planning's naive
acceptance of value-free, uninterested objectifications and false rationalizations. There is, however, already a tendency apparent within the planning profession to recognize its value dependent position and its need for justified, i.e., rational authority and so in this respect, this critique only re-emphasizes and re-examines how deeply the roots of objectification and rationalization have gone. Perhaps more significantly this form of demystification enables the planner to see the "operations of history" inherent in his actions today, to relate his professional orientation to the ongoing socio-political traditions of America. Instead of accepting new policy and planning instruments as if they were new creations, the planner might more openly understand the implications of actions as they relate to the profession's prior historical role. If so many of the preassumptions of planning had not been acting, so to speak, "behind the backs" of citizen awareness, we might not now seem to be in a "crisis of authority."

Much of the criticism within this thesis is aimed at unmasking the distortions embedded in the language of planning. Such an approach necessarily reveals the negative effects of unjustified authority. But authority is not always unjustifiable, and it is in this sense that reflection upon the presuppositions and conceptions of planning might enable both the planner and the citizens to recognize when control by experts is necessary and right and when it is not. This possibility preassumes, however, that communication "in good faith" has already been established, that planning has clarified its "ultimate social ends," its telos,
that objectifications and concepts adequately match the original intentions of the profession of planning. It is toward this goal, therefore, that the deceptions of language need unmasking, for change in the quality of life is dependent upon the establishment of emancipatory nondistortive relationships among all men.

SUMMARY AND FURTHER WORK TO BE DONE

The subject matter of this history of ideas then takes the following form. First it is a historical description of how planning has been captivated by the bourgeois quest for order and the subsequent play between the interests in the quality of life and the interests in rationality and objectivity of technical action. Secondly this thesis is a description of the accumulation of planning objectifications and the extent to which knowledge of the city and the public has been distorted by the planners' own interests, by social relationships among men and by the context of leader-led authority. Finally, this thesis attempts to suggest why certain conceptualizations and abstractions developed and how the social system has perpetuated these distortions.

It is the last approach which requests further work. This thesis offers the reader evidence that there existed concerns among certain planners who were responsible for generating the language of city planning, which had consequences for specific cities and for the directions in which institutionalized planning proceeded. This thesis also points out the determinacies of the socio-historical environment
upon the form of the planners' objectifications. But it is not an evolutionary history of certain key concepts. In other words, this approach does not take the notion "plan," for example, and go back to its first appearance and follow its evolutionary development over the centuries. Instead this study is saying that after certain commonly shared assumptions about the need for a systematic study of the city arose from the historical context in which planning was operating, then the comprehensive plan becomes a natural option. This work therefore needs to be supplemented by a diachronic analysis of the changes and refinements within the vocabulary and distortions, the reversal between positive and negative valuations in the use of a concept, and a fuller historical account of specific concepts.

However, there is more to pursue with respect to the socio-historical reasons behind the production of certain objectifications. It is the assumption behind this work that there exists a nonconscious deep structure of meaning to the given concepts in a particular period and that this structure is related to the growth and development of a capitalist society. This study, although its initial intent is a descriptive analysis of the meanings and usages of the language of city planning, needs eventually to explore beyond, to study the social significance of these meanings and usages.

In essence the American city planner is a pragmatic liberal: his philosophy is pragmatism and his political theory is liberalism. It therefore becomes important to surround the development of these positions within planning with their political and philosophical theories at large, to trace the paths of the planner through the fields of intellectual
thought and practice. What is the planners' theory of social organization? How has he formulated his apology for the capitalist status quo? How has he promoted the development of professionalism and reformism? How has he represented social issues and where and why has he taken a stand? What has he borrowed from the philosophies of naturalism or pragmatism, liberalism, positivism, socialism and who has been the spokesman for these themes?

Without a conscious philosophy, urban planning or the professions involving man and his urban environment will never have a critical theory; they will have no basis for a social critique of their methods and procedures, they will hold no evaluative role. Understanding the full implications of the crisis of city planning therefore requires that the profession evaluates its unconscious philosophy and politics, that it seeks to realize how philosophically ready and able it is to proceed toward real analysis of social issues.

Counterbalancing the theoretical, however, this study also needs to be grounded in the practical. For example this thesis does not fully explain all the forces which have created planning commitments: the priorities of time allotments, the implications of pressure groups, the degree to which certain theories were held by various planners, the success of operationalizing such beliefs, the changing identities and social roles of the planners.
The substantive areas of focus have influenced the organization of this thesis. In approaching the problem of the configuration of planning knowledge, the period of history from 1890-1970 has been broken into four schemata: 1890-1919, 1919-1929, 1929-1945, 1945-1970. Each scheme represents a way of relating the planner's socio-political-material concepts of order to the city and public environment. The first scheme encompasses the years between 1890 and 1919. 1890 is a natural enough point to begin; it is three years before the Chicago World's Fair, before Turner's famous "frontier thesis," including Social Darwinism and the beginnings of Progressivism and reform. The termination point of Scheme One is somewhat problematic. If this history was a history of planning events then perhaps the separation should have occurred in 1909 with the First National Conference on City Planning or in 1910 with the First International Conference. Instead the pivot point of 1919 was selected as illustrative of a break in the "spirit of the times," an end to the optimistic rhetoric and moralism of Progressivism and the beginning of a period of privatization of interests and spiritual failure as witnessed in the 1919 Red Scare, the final adoption of the prohibition amendment, and the production of the ideal consumer-producer. The 1920's extended the material interests of real estate and business as the city spread into the country aided by subdividers, zoning ordinances, the automobile and affluence. 1929 therefore offers a natural division with the financial collapse of the depression and 1945, as well, presents another break with the end of the Second World War and the death
Roosevelt. The inclusion of 1945 through 1970 in one scheme, however, presents another problem. Should not the years of Urban Renewal, 1945-1960, represent one scheme and 1960-1972 another more radical approach? The answer for the critical intent of this thesis is no, for Scheme Four represents the implementation of New Deal reforms, it is the period therefore of rational process planning, a period in which the crisis of planning is no more understood in the 1950's than in the 1960's, a period which leaves us, in the end, as unsettled about our principles and directions as we were when we entered the process of planning.

The schemata are written in different styles. The first scheme places most emphasis on the actual terminology and semantics of the planner's language of chaos and disorder, but as the schemata proceed toward greater abstractions and methodological procedures, criticism is focused at the level of ideas contained within the base structure. Each scheme, moreover, is divided into several components repeated in the following series: a textual description offering the reader a view of the content and flavor of the public-regarding literature,* a section of commentary upon the semantics and ideological intentions embedded within the text, and finally a lexical ordering of the vocabulary of the language of city planning.† These word tablesψ

*R. statements cut, rearranged and shaped from various sources.
† See page 4 for the Table of Symbols in which the dictionaries are written.
ψ Certain words have been selected as pivot words, usually the most repetitiously used or commonly known among the list of similarities or alternatives.
offer different readers various advantages. They are meant first of all as a summary of the textual component, a moment for reflection upon the totality of concepts and an indication of their semantic intent as related to their configurations. For others they might offer the beginnings of a conceptual or communication system which reflects the changing interests of city planners; the suggestion of how word classes and thought groups were structured, how we use forms for purposes of classification, how environmental experiences were organized and what functions these classes and groups have served. Rather than elaborate upon the linguistic code of the city planners, however, I think it is more profitable to search for the reduced models or deep structure of ideas which are implicit to the whole system of communication about the city and the public. This thesis then is an initial attempt to discuss the social and political origins of the language of city planning.
REFERENCES: CHAPTER ONE


SCHEME ONE

CITY CHAOS AND URBAN ORDER

The quest for control  1890-1919
The main problem for the early city planners* who struggled to develop a social movement around their desire for better city form, involved the translation of their interpretations and ideas about urban problems into directives for social action. In this dilemma between theory and practice, Marx had claimed that although theory provided man with a program it would be a false, mystical theory if it were not grounded in and reformulated by social action,

*Those architects and landscape architects who turned their attention towards the city plan.
i.e. praxis. In this conception, praxis becomes the designator of practice. Claude Levi-Strauss has added the comments that he "believe[s] that there is always a mediator between praxis and practices, namely the conceptual scheme by the operation of which matter and form . . . are realized as structures, that is as entities which are both empirical and intelligible."¹ I wish to explore the formulation, conscious or unconscious, of such a conceptual scheme which enabled the city planners to organize the problems confronting them and through which their social logic, their values and ideas, are illuminated for us today. We shall find that the basic conceptual scheme which the early planners developed for their analysis of city problems was the notion of "system" and it is this concept which they hoped would aid them in developing a rationally ordered and controlled environment. Before we can explore the terminology and significations of their concept of 'system,' however, we need to reflect upon the historical context from which the desire for order and control developed.

City planning as part of the greater reform movement during the last quarter of the 19th century and the early part of this century has to a large extent been overlooked. This is especially surprising when it is discovered that the journalistic coverage* which has offered so many historians' accounts of the spirit and intent of the reform movement included as well, many descriptions of city planning reforms. Although it cannot be claimed that all the social and political characteristics of the reformers hold true for planners much of the spirit

and mood for reform was identical. If we look at the semantics of "reform" however, we discover that most historians have emphasized the meanings which stress "the correction of municipal corruption and political abuse" or "the return to a former political and social ideal." But "reform" literally means "to improve by change of form" and it is this sense that planning reformers added to the wider movement for municipal order and control. Borrowing the basic fear of disorder and demands and tactics for reform from the Progressives, planners added their own beliefs of the influences of disorderly environment on the city and its population.

I want to stress throughout this work that "disorder," "chaos," "dirt" and their synonyms are essentially cultural concepts and so being, entail a long list of expectations and behavior patterns. One of the first notions to explore is the semantic dichotomy between "disorder"/"order." This dichotomy is included in the concept of "reform" which implies the need for reordering and remaking the urban environment, i.e. a return to order. In an anthropological study of pollution and taboo, Mary Douglas similarly remarks that "as we know it, dirt is essentially disorder. There is no such thing as absolute dirt; it exists in the eye of the beholder. . . . Dirt offends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative movement, but a positive effort to organize the environment."¹ Not far behind the dichotomy of "disorder"/"order" comes the evaluation bad/good, so that beliefs about disorder quickly take on a moral overtone compelling social behavior and action along directed paths. This re-ordering of the environment soon relates to efforts that compel conformity to an ideal pattern, a
unity of form and function, that can be accepted as analogous to the perfect social order. Ultimately these concepts lead to the imposition of a "system" on the chaotic environment which removes the dreaded anomaly and ambiguity and their feared consequences; for as Mary Douglas believes, "... ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating, and punishing transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an inherently untidy experience... It is only by exaggerating the difference between within and without, that a semblance of order is created." It is this belief system entailing concepts of disorder, chaos, perfection and tidiness and their moral evaluations that I wish to examine here by describing how the reformers' fears and needs plus the planners' aesthetic and moral ideals culminated in the conceptual notion of "system."

But first let us return to the problem of order and just why this became such an important concern for the reforms of the early part of this century. The focus of almost all stable societies by definition is placed on social order as opposed to disruption and revolution, so in this sense the interest is elementary. However, the fears of the collapse of society were augmented during the latter quarter of the 19th century by the chaos and corruption following the Civil war reconstruction. The Great train strike in 1877, which Wiebe has called "... America's first national strike, ... the first national holiday of the slums" combined with the general depression during the 1890's which displayed the conflicts and stresses between the educated few and the uneducated masses, the native and foreign born, the wealthy and the poor only added fuel to the fire. These problems
coupled with the rapid process of growth, expansion, and change which America had recently undergone in the settlement of the West and which necessarily entailed disruptive forces, created a dramatic fear of disorder and mass riots and the rampant desire of the middle class to find some form of authority with sufficient power and control to both bypass the threats of mob rule and quell the random process of urban growth.

In this general desire for the maintenance of social order, the municipal Reformers raised their special voices. Hofstadter in The Age of Reform has described for us their attacks on three central issues: the monopolistic power of giant corporations, the corruption and ward bossism of municipal politics, and the indifference and neglect of urban abuses effected by insulating private interests. The first two were crucial reasons—so Hofstadter claims—why the middle class professionals and businessmen had lost their political clout and were, therefore, turning to the expedience of reform to regain their original positions of power and political voice. It is not clear that this is the position, if indeed Hofstadter is correct in his statements, which the early city planners wished to regain for themselves. For the most part, architecture and landscape architecture had been apolitical ventures and not entirely ignored by the owners of the giant corporations in their desire for splended and lavish office and home environments. Furthermore, the early planners were not so bound to obtaining political power in a given city as much as they were interested in developing a general national climate receptive to the implementation of their planning ideals.
The third aspect of the reform platform sanctioned the reawakening of civic involvement and municipal concern which had existed in pre-industrial times. The reformers sought a return to the middle class values of morality and civic pride, or as Hofstadter terms it, an "ethos of personal responsibility" and an appeal to law and patriotism. Not only had these been disrupted by the growth patterns of most local communities, but the rural migrants and foreign immigrants who were inundating the cities, could not be held socially accountable for any values of involvement in and responsibility for the affairs of the city. The reformers placed considerable faith in the values of restraint and involvement, thus enabling them to claim that temperance and charity would eradicate the ills of the city. Consequently the problem of civic reform seemed to reduce itself, at times, to the problem of making the immigrant and the poor socially accountable.

Although the planners may not have claimed so strong a faith in the curative ability of "right ideas," they did, however, have much to gain by placing great interest in the development of an active civic spirit which would provide them with the opportunity, i.e., the legitimation, to influence physical changes and remake the city in the interest of this renewed civic awareness. It is for this same motive, moreover, that the planners failed to support the reformers' belief in "laissez faire" government for their desire for public buildings and city plans required public support and an allotment of public monies that, in turn, necessitated the expansion of government involvement in the restraint of private affairs. We shall explore below how
the planners' zeal and idealism amounted not only in a hope and faith for something better, but also culminated in a religious belief for a more perfectly ordered world. Embedded in this collective ideal and hoped for public responsibility was the middle class dislike or distaste for the national degradation visited upon them by the city's ugly surroundings and by its failure to obtain world eminence by being beautiful and well-ordered.

In their urban analysis, the early planners did not make a distinction between the problems of the physical environment and those concerning only the urban population. Environmental reform of ugliness and filth were correlated, influenced by and influencing, the reforms of population congestion and degeneration. In this sense, the structure of the city was viewed as coterminous with the social order. Faced with the imminent fear of chaos, disorder and riot, the problem for the planners was how to develop a conceptual scheme recognizing the relationships between the physical urban environment and the urban population. The problems of the city were essentially thought of as physical problems whether they influenced the city itself or the urban population.

Perhaps it should be asked why the early planners in their physical and ethical reforms focused on the management of the environment and the adjustment of the population to fit into this ideal setting, consequently treating both the city and the public as objects to be changed and manipulated much as in a laboratory experiment. Instead, the emphasis could have been placed on the interpretation and understanding of man's diverse social and psychological needs as
a function of his environment but not necessarily determined by it; and
a focus could have centered on the education, both intellectually and
spiritually, of the mass population to thrive and be creative in chaotic
and disordered surroundings. These latter are foreign thoughts for us
for they are not derived from that basic value of order and the conse-
quent controlled environments we have had imposed upon us. But having
once established these former as primary values, the moral dilemmas
related to the problems of order and control were easiest to see and
to solve in the physical environment. Dirt and disorder can always
be erased, whereas spiritual and psychological deficiencies become
harder to remove. In addition to this, the architects and landscape
architects who formed the early reform movement for planning were
already trained to deal with the problem of disorder in the physical
mode. To this training, they added the ethical idealism of the
reform period.

The problems of the city were described in terms of simple
systems, i.e. causal models linking the environment to the population.*
At no time did the conceptions of the linkages between the environment
and the population reach anything analogous to the circular paths of
exchange embedded in the concept of an ecosystem. At most, what occurred
to the planners were loose concatenations of causes and determinations,
sometimes only links or short chains of causes, which offered a weak
conceptualization of an urban "system." The environmental problems did
however elicit multilevel ramifications as a result of both social and

*The problem of foresight had thus not developed to include
detailed causal chains of prediction dependent upon technical and
scientific knowledge.
and cultural implications. Finally, the planning response itself can be accepted as a tacit recognition that the problems of the city were multilevel reactions which required an integrated and systematic analysis.

In order to explore this complex conceptual ordering of the city and its population, I wish first to examine the pieces. We shall begin with the planner's target, that is the disorder and chaos of the environment before proceeding to the cultural and social reactions. Next we want to question the organizational responses which the planners offered as solutions to these problems. We then want to examine the attitudes about the public which the progressive planners offered us as well as the role which the planners reserved for themselves. Finally we wish to organize these parts into the overriding conceptual scheme with which the planners could approach the city and its public.

The history of city planning which we shall explore is the history which men make unconsciously through the terminology and concepts they use to organize their universe and through the problems which they select to resolve. We shall study the journalistic and professional writings of the planners in order to ascertain not only the projects and directives they were overtly suggesting but also the concepts and ideas which their language betrays. It is through the organization of reoccurring allusions and depictions that the full significance of the planning movement in the early days of the century can be illuminated. The usual approach to the history of planning is one of recording events and projects, the city beautiful movement, the Chicago Worlds' Fair, the designs for Public post office buildings and City halls, the parks of Olmsted, the municipal plans by John Nolen,
and so forth. What we shall search for here, in the original words of the planners, is the vocabulary and ideas with which the planners approached both the city and the public. One of the difficult problems we have to face is the question of interpretation of the concepts. For this reason we must try to understand the context in which the terminology and concepts were developed and used before expounding on the signification of the symbols. Our approach, therefore, in the chapters that follow will be to first explore, historically, the descriptive writings of the city planners. After having analyzed these accordingly, we shall proceed to discuss the implied semantics.
REFERENCES: CHAPTER TWO


3 Douglas, p. 15.

CHAPTER THREE
DISORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT

ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

We must remember throughout the following that "chaos," "disorder" or any of their synonyms are cultural concepts. Since chaos held such a dominant position in the minds of the early planners, it is the planners' perception of chaos that we wish to explore, so as to determine both the role it played and the expectations of behavior it motivated. As we have commented above, we shall expect to find that the concept of "chaos" itself will lead us into a complicated series of responses, expectations and restrictions.

The ugliness and filth of the city: Since the theme of city chaos is not directly defined by the early planners, we shall begin to interpret
their idea of disorder by looking at the explanations which are offered to us as to what or who was to blame for the creation of these environmental conditions. We expect indirectly, therefore, to expose the planner's implicit distaste for disorder and to proceed from there to illuminate the presumed effects of this chaos and the suggestions projected in terms of what should be changed.

Practically as old as the first appearance of the machine, the blame for disorder and filth was laid on the exigences of manufacturing and trade, i.e. the industrial revolution, which according to F.T. Carlton "have gathered this great host of men, women, and children into our crowded, smoky, restless cities . . . [and] everything dear to the poet and lover of humanity has been ruthlessly and heedlessly sacrificed on the altar of industry and wealth." Another writer saw our unplanned cities as "surplusage of the monster city's industry and life . . . [in which an] endless chaos of straggling towns . . . or disgorged fragments of communities" were scattered across the surface of America. The mass effect of this " . . . chaotic savagery . . . was like the heavens had opened and dumped out upon the desolate prairies the architectural garbage of some celestial city."3

Offsprings of the industrial age, of course, were the tenements, those "foul cores" or "seething slums" which had long been held in disrepute. City planners and the "housers," as the social workers and housing reformers were called, were quick to join hands and indeed they jointly called the first city planning conference in 1909 which focused on the problems of sanitation and tenement codes. Planners
came to define

the housing problem . . . as largely a sanitation problem . . .
the problem of good municipal housekeeping, the prompt
removal of garbage, rubbish and other waste materials from the
homes of the poor, the cleanliness of streets and alleys, the
provision of adequate water supply in convenient locations, of
proper sanitary conveniences in the place of antiquated
expedients.  

Far from excluding any of our modern pollution concerns, the
air of the city also came under strong attack for the "fierce
dust-storms in our cities . . . the heavy smoke pouring from soft-coal
fires . . . [creating in] our cities today . . . a peril far too much
like that . . . in greater Pompeii."  
Even the "visual stenches" were
decried as being given freedom of the cities and call went out to stop
the curiously illogical situation which protected the public sense of
smell against soap factories and tanneries but failed to provide for
the "visual stenches."  Based on the principle of the smoke and
smell ordinance, the need was felt to "preserve the aesthetic atmos-
phere by putting some limit upon the architectural anarchy and
lawless bad taste that runs riot in our cities."  
Another declared
that "the next great war which American people must wage is that
against the desecration of our landscape and of our surroundings by
billboards and unsightly posters."  
The problem of chaos, as
Mr. Ernest Flagg pointed out, existed because "Everyman's right to
disfigure the city by the erection of eyesores and monstrosities along
the streets has never been questioned."  

External influences alone were not the cause, for much blame
was also placed upon the quality of citizens who would allow such public
untidiness. Handlin summarized the feelings of this age by defining for us the terminology of dirt and disorder. "Dirt is matter out of place"; "Disorder is things out of place"; hence "dirt and disorder are the common manifestations of untidiness . . . [and] untidiness is the unfailing concomitant of wastefulness." This "wretched municipal housekeeping" has produced "a callous indifference to appearance," the cause, Handlin explains, of our "municipal slovenliness." In turn, this "national weakness," "provincial complacency," "national self-satisfaction" has caused America to be the "most untidy of all the great nations of the world . . . with more filth, squalor and general slovenliness in public places and works." 9

Disorder and sprawl of the city: Although some of the disorder could be blamed on the evils of industry and trade as well as on the public bad taste and slovenliness, there was another factor which was claimed as a basic cause for the incongruity of the American city scene. This explanation lay the blame on the youth and newness of the American city, indeed born but yesterday, America's towns "had not had time to become cities, . . . [they had] no cohesion." 10 In these cities which had "just grewed like Topsy," to use an oft repeated phrase of the day, no attention had been placed on a rationale-plan for development because untrammeled growth itself was valued as the main symbol of successful development. In this "sprawling, incoherent babyhood . . . everything is tolerated that makes for development . . . [although it be] hobbledehoy-big-framed, uncouth, obtrusive, but vigorous and full of promise." 11
On one hand this newness and rapidity of growth created the necessity for makeshift arrangements. In the years following the Louisiana purchase and cultivation of endless amounts of land to the west, the ethic of the day became the subjugation of whatever means were closest at hand for any given end, but thereby creating in their wake conditions of disorder and ugliness. On the other hand, this same rapid growth became a prevailing American value as a key to the vigour and health of any city. What Americans seemed to believe was that every city should be "a live productive organism . . . in a constant state of change and growth."

We are told, furthermore, "that rapid urbanization is symptomatic of normal, extremely rapid growth." Since the upward progress of society [is measured by] . . . the increase of urban population, concomitant evils of congestion are merely the natural growing pains . . . [which] cannot be stopped. What is to be expected when all the conflicting forces of vigorous growth are allowed to run riot . . . [but] chaotic disorder, the squalor and pretentious show of our bombastic "centers," "junctions," and "cities"?

In the midst of these conflicting values, the city planner raised his head to point out that although "some folks say that the city must be allowed to grow and you cannot control its growth . . . cities are not really growths at all, for proper growth follows the lines of some plan; witness the tree or the child in nature. What our cities do is to expand, or bulge out by accretion." At the same time, it fell to the planners to point out to city builders that the popular checkerboard plan of the 19th century American cities was really the neglect of a plan, for it "considers nothing, observes nothing, reflects on nothing, takes nothing into account, aims at nothing,
it becomes] a negative rather than a positive defect... [sic]
the foundation for many of our most vicious city errors."\(^{15}\)

THE POPULATION PROBLEM

The effects of people on the environment: For a long time the "drift
to the cities" had meant ever-increasing multitudes crowding daily
into tenements to create what Jacob Riis had pointed out as the "evil
offspring of public neglect and private greed... a storm-center
forever of our civilization."\(^{17}\) By the turn of the century however,
Adna Weber could report, optimistically, that the gigantic dimensions,
which most metropolitan cities had assumed, were forcing the "evils
of congested population more and more... upon public attention."\(^{18}\)
The question of the day was no longer whether cities could be abolished
or whether city life was healthful but rather, how could "overcrowding"
be done away with. The belief was widely held that the "massing and
herding" of human beings into the storm-centers of population was a
deplorable and distressing accompaniment of civilization which was
allowed to go on both unregulated and unchecked.

So far ahead as anyone can see [it was proclaimed in 1903] cities
will continue to crowd to the edge of the stream of human life
in a "blacker, incessanter line"... there will always exist
certain problems peculiarly urban and created by what some curiously
term the artificial conditions of city life.\(^{19}\)

For some, urban congestion was taken as an "irresistible and
inevitable" phenomenon which would remain "insoluble until some great
systematist, aided by some convulsion of nature or a strong-handed ruler,
is able to make a fresh start."\(^{20}\) For others the problem lay in the
"ceaseless thronging-in of immigrants."\(^{21}\) Some of the causes working
at slum development were laid to the "product of the existing population of that character, the unnatural influx from the country to the town, and the pauper immigration from Europe." It would not be long, so it was claimed, before statistics would reveal the "full extent of foreign influence in our great cities." Finally we would be shown that "cities . . . do not raise [the immigrant] but are themselves dragged down to a low level by parasitic and dependent conditions which they foster among the immigrant element." "Parasitic motives [occurred] among the city influx as a response to charitable societies and an alarming extent of abject penury brought on by immigration."22

The effects of the environment on population: America in the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century has been described as the Darwinian country and so it is not surprising that we find borrowed concepts from social darwinism embedded in the planner's ideas about society. While borrowing the concepts of environmental determinism of the fit or unfit, the evil or moral, the planners held a different approach to social change. The theory of evolution implied that social change must result from a slow and natural process and that man was unwise to intervene and attempt to change this process. The planners, believing indeed that the environment determined behavior as we shall explore below, felt also that the environment could be controlled and manipulated in order to remedy unsound development resulting from unchecked competition and survival. It is especially in this sense that we claim the planners to belong intellectually to the social reform movement, which also believed in the ability and freedom of man to control his own environment.
Nevertheless, the planners were far from united over the issue of social change. Some maintained that a rural exodus or a back-to-the-farms movement would counteract the degenerative effects of city life, while others claimed moral and social progress could result from positive manipulations of the physical forms of home or city. Whatever they advocated, they clearly agreed on the fundamental assumption that society as a whole, as a result of its degenerating environment, was changing for the worst. What they failed to explore, however, was the process by which the purity of the rural environment or the reformulations of an orderly urban environment would affect the behavior of men. This process they accepted on faith; control over the environment itself would offer beneficial effects.

Far from having the experience of generations of city dwelling, the urban phenomenon occurred to the Americans as a not altogether welcome benefit. Environmental effects were blamed for causing, or at least influencing physical, moral, social and national degeneration. It was generally believed during these early years of planning that city environments contained "evil possibilities for the future of the race that are enwombed in city growth. A steady deterioration of mind and body, a tendency to movements of social unrest and disorder, and increasingly unsanitary conditions" led to the common conviction that city life was an artificial way of life. Cities, it was decried, were "destined to become the graveyard of the human race . . . for an inevitable degeneration is bound to attend life in the great centers of population." Urban life would eventually reach the point where it threatened the national vigor, for congestion was obviously
destructive of bodily vigor. Fears were spread that a nation could not grow "strong, vigorous and progressive if a large percentage of its population lived in cities." Clearly race deterioration was bound to set in at some point as the example of England had taught. There during the Boer War, it was discovered that many army recruits were physically unfit for war as a result of generations of city residence. Not internal security alone, but national preparedness became the victim of the evil crowding of life into cities.

Some hoped that the pendulum was about to swing the other way and that "a counter-current . . . from tenement-ridden quarters toward the more healthful outskirts of the city" would divert the "stream of population flowing into the city into suburban channels. . . . Clearly, [they proclaimed] . . . the age of decentralization is just ahead." Others hoped that the separation of the city from the country had reached its limit and that "disintegration is in progress" with a backwards movement, "an exodus now only in its beginning from the city to the country." Still others preached that "the demoralizations and deprivations consequent upon congested centers of population have at length taught . . . the essential sin of divorcing the children of men from their Mother Earth."

Physical and moral degeneration in the society at large, however, was not the only fear and perhaps not even the strongest; for the real dread lay in the "insipid mob" that ruled the "rotten city cores" and threatened any day to contaminate the regions beyond its current domain. Jacob Riis had clearly outlined the upheavals and violence that were forced upon the city from their "nurseries of crime." Crowding
and discomfort led their inevitable way to evil vices and crimes
and "the evil they breed are but just punishment upon the community
that gave them no other choice."33 "The tenement had bred their
Nemesis, a proletariat ready and able to avenge the wrongs of their
crowds."34 Poverty was consequently seen as a "contaminating poison
... ever-recruiting ranks of the lowest grade of humanity."35

The evils of the moral, physical and social defects of city
life were blamed on the unfit environmental conditions which surrounded
city dwellers. It was not long, therefore, before some planners
could pronounce that the housing problem was the most fundamental of
all social problems related to the environment. As one writer
describes for us, "the physical, moral and social evils are closest
relations to bad housing."36 "The home [he explained] is the
character unit of society."37 "Populous masses, crowded together
[become] absolutely unable to resist the influences by which they
are surrounded."38

Although some centered their focus on the housing problem,
others came to feel that the evil influences of the city had to be
attacked in its totality. Echoing the message given above, another
reformer could claim that "The city is the home of the community:
by their streets ye shall know them, ... [and in them] read the
strengths and weakness of our civilization."39 Humanity and its
environment were mutually associated, for on one hand the home
environment determined evil behavior but on the other "the city
[expressed] the good and evil in human nature in excess." Because
of this environmental determinism, not only the homes of the population
required a closely kept vigilance against the perpetuations of moral and physical defects, but the city itself demanded a facade that would adequately reflect the highest ideals of the community in hopes of counteracting its disintegrating effects.

Social darwinism was kept alive in the planners' attack on the environment through such borrowed terminology as "inevitable degeneration," "contamination," "deterioration," "vigor," "determinism," "deficiency," etc. But nowhere other than in the following quotation is the contradiction which was to become stronger between the Darwinian concepts of environmental determinism and the reform ideals of social change, reflecting the Hippocratic view that sickness calls forth its own natural forces to combat the disease, made more apparent.

"The Brand of the City" is upon all men, it was written in 1915, for it is

a commonplace of science that all organisms, plants, animals and human societies change as their environment changes. The influence of the environment . . . is . . . potent . . . .

A certain moral disapproval . . . [occurs in] the city . . . like the ogre in the fairy tale, devouring its own children and the children of the country . . . . In its melting pot all our good virtues, all our pious traditions, disappear forever . . . .

[But from the] heart of the omnipresent city evils themselves arises a new social civic ideal . . . everywhere the city problems are being envisaged and attacked . . . City poverty, city crime, city misgovernment are being studied, analyzed and combatted . . . . The city is emerging from the lawless and anarchic spirit which accompanied its early growth."

THE CALL TO REFORM

These were times of widespread reform and progressive movements and city planning was not to be held apart from these greater
turbulations within the American society. It was then the time to come face to face with the problems of the city! Although the earliest movement sweeping the cities was the Municipal reform of the 1890's, this attack aimed only at procuring efficiently and honestly run city governments and approached the question of city problems solely as political dilemmas. Its solution was hardly satisfactory to planners who held the chief causes of evil to be the disorderly chaotic relationships between man and his environment. Indeed as F. C. Howe summarized,

"we have been a builder who seeks a caretaker . . . rather than an architect; like a businessman who neglects his factory in the perfection of a system of bookkeeping. We have thought of men rather than of things. We have had no city problem. . . . The city problem is primarily an economic not a personal problem. The basis of the city, like the basis of all life, is physical. . . . The attitude of the city to physical things . . . [should be] to control the city's superstructure."

The first stance the city planners took against the city was to look at its extrinsic qualities, the environmental conditions which spelled out chaos, ugliness, disorder and filth. Clearly the problem of the city was seen as the problem of controlling growth, tidying the chaos, returning order to the arrangements of buildings, separating and dividing uses, as answers to "things out of place."

This solution becomes the first abstraction that the planners held toward the city. Instead of looking in depth at economic, political and social causes which produced these conditions, chaos as an entity itself became the culprit to eradicate, it was the condition which all Americans should reject. "Our battle . . . and it is a battle which we must wage . . . is not so much against a definite or an established order of things as it is against chaos. Chaos is our problem."
The solution was easy; first an awakening to the crimes of chaos, then an education to desire better surroundings, specifically the desire for ordered environments, through a few well placed examples, and consequently the battle against disorder would be nearly won. The strategy was simple, to activate concern after a long history of urban neglect and city misuse; indeed to Frederick Lamb, writing in the 1890's about the disastrous management of city affairs during the preceding fifty years, the real mystery concerned the reasons why the American citizens had been so "willing to sacrifice natural advantages and recklessly disregard the material at hand?"43 C. M. Robinson observing the same indifference claimed that America was content ". . . to plod along on village lines and methods . . . marring with patchwork improvements that disfigure . . . ignorant of past . . . and unconscious of future."44

Consequently the first problem for those who cared about the city, for those budding professionals later to be known as city planners, was how to turn their own imaginations and hopes into a social movement which would "awaken the cities" from their long slumber of neglect. To aid them in these attempts, they sought an adequate symbol which would fully express their ideals of order and beauty, and found such an offer in the "white city," the Chicago exposition of 1893, for they believed that no one who laid eyes on that magnificent wonder could henceforth refrain from prophesy about the cities of the future. As John B. Walker expressed the hope of those times,

Who believes that the people of the second half of our century will be content to live in those abominations of desolation we call our great cities . . . brick and mortar piled higgledy-piggley, glaring
vulgar, stupidly offensive, insolently trespassing on the right to sunshine and fresh air, conglomerate result of a competitive individualism which takes no regard for the rights of one’s neighbors?45

Walker was not alone in his beliefs and hopes, for many felt the World's Fair had offered a public education as to what American cities could and should be like and that after this year, Americans would begin to give thought to how things looked around them. Out of all this enlightenment and education, claimed Daniel H. Burnham in 1902, "... came a national purpose to express the fullness of this art, in Washington, D.C. ..."46

"... The people ... bid their wise men not alone to safeguard them from foreign invasion or internal corruption, but to remove and forever keep from view the ugly, the unsightly, and even the commonplace."47 The abomination of the city was felt so strongly by planners during these early years that they hailed from on high with great faith, albeit little assurance, that

the message ... has spread to every portion of the civilized world ... acclaimed by men and women by whom the existing state of affairs is seen to be not only ugliness and inconvenience but degradation, ... the loss of the love of the beautiful things of the earth, the obsession of the mind with things that are of little value and the neglect of the great and overwhelming problem of existence.48

Capitalizing on the spirit of the times, the early planners spoke out in order to create a community of consciousness that would react against the perceived evil conditions prevailing in the urban environment. One of the most effective ways was to align themselves with the "awakening" of the cities to the problems of municipal reform and to orient this general spirit toward more physical solutions. Consequently, the early days of planning placed much emphasis on this
greater ideal of ethical and spiritual "awakening," and like the newly converted believer they were quick to turn to their fellow men to persuade them of the benefits to be received if only one believed.

Jacob Riis had pointed out as early as 1890 that the "awakening" of the cities and its citizens was the route to "remedial legislation." This spirit for the planners was first to find form in the Municipal art and philanthropic movements, for as Frederick Lamb pointed out in 1897, the terms "municipal art reform," "religious awakening," "social reform," and "social movement" were all names for the same thing. But this awakening soon attached itself to more than aesthetic and social reforms for as C. M. Robinson described it, not only were citizens awakening to the "general shortcomings of our cities, from the aesthetic point of view . . . [but there was occurring within] a surprising common awakening to the civic consciousness and pride, leading to a dissatisfaction with existing conditions and then an earnest desire for improvement."

So it came about that this "awakening of the cities" provided the planner with a spirit and a belief upon which he could attach his desire for a broader conviction that would outlaw ugly and disorderly environments. Not to stop at that alone,

this awakening . . . [would show the city] that good citizens are its best assets . . . [and reflect] the city's obligations toward the poor, unemployed, sick and the delinquent. [Finally it] would recognize that poverty, disease and crime . . . are results of conditions that . . . are subject to control . . .

The culmination of this new civic spirit was held to be

an awakening to the imperative need of a different and better method of city making . . . This civic awakening . . . seeks to provide convenience in streets and buildings, to meet the requirements of public health, to recognize the function and place of art, to regard
obligations to future generations, to supply the imperative needs of children, to satisfy the love of nature and the desire for outdoor life.\textsuperscript{53}

Underlying all these statements about the proper order of the city, lay a symbolic pattern of the ideal city. Planners themselves were able to admit that there was some intangible, subjective ideal toward which they sought to guide the city. First of all was that "dream of perfection," that idealistic belief in the marvels of the city that could be brought about by the "aspirations of the human mind under the unfolding intelligence of an advancing civilization."\textsuperscript{54} That ultimate ideal was the example of the "white city" and the "Capital city" so that "if it was said [of older times] that 'all roads led to Rome' so now it may be said that all city plans refer to the Columbian exposition . . . that dream of the White City."\textsuperscript{55}

If it was held that the civic awakening would lead to a widespread conviction of the benefits to be obtained from the city plan, so too it was believed that "When this spirit is caught . . . there will develop an esprit de corps that will build cities not only for dignity and beauty, but for the grace and art of common life, a comradeship in labor and a unity of ideal."\textsuperscript{56} There was not only an ideal of the perfect city, but also a belief in the city plan itself as the embodiment of this ideal. To those who challenged "of what value [is] the knowledge of 'what should have been'?" the response was quick to defend: " . . . directly in the comprehensive planning of the extension of the city upon surrounding areas and indirectly by the application of the factors which evolve the ideal plan and the incorporation of this plan itself in the changes which . . . occur . . . in the misbuilt
City planning was thus to be, or so the planners wished to claim, "the practical realization of the highest ideals"; a movement at once idealistic and practical.

Often echoing the concepts of social darwinism, many planners revealed a belief in society's slow evolution toward a higher level of life. As one housing reformer described it "the world ... progresses toward higher social justice. ... [The] Evidence [being] the tendency of important problems to assume various definite and successive aspects." For others, their faith led them to see the necessity for "Collectivist, Individualist and Commercialist to work upon the situation as it exists, each willing to trust to evolutionary processes to work out eventual social regeneration." But for others, the glacial evolutionary progress toward a higher level of civilization was not fast enough; their temperament called for outright reform. As one planner claimed,

In spite of our bewailing it, the growth of cities goes on ... [it is] possible that we are mistaken ... in thinking that city life is necessarily noisy and crowded and bereft of green freshness ... that we must flee to the country really to live. [It is a] cowardly act to abandon the city, shirk its problems and yield it to the dingy jostling, jangling conditions that prevail there ... that our own neglect has permitted.

It was time to face the city directly, to reform not only the physical environment but the common thoughts and actions associated with those city problems. The trouble was "... we have a habit here in America of getting what we want by indirection, our reforms come in by the back door. Rarely do we frankly face a problem and correct it by reforming the evil itself."

If reform would only begin, then the "redemption" of the city, "the rehabilitation of the city in the eyes of the world and the confidence
of the country," would quickly follow. Any "national impulse for civic improvement . . . [would] mean the redemption of our American community from the sordid, the selfish, and the base." By 1911 it was proclaimed the civic "revival," "the era of physical regeneration of the American city," "the replanning of cities," "the recasting of physical civic conditions," "the expert remodeling of our cities" had begun. To this replanning effort, other movements soon joined hands. The Garden city advocates claimed that "cities are to be rebuilt," that they would "reunite man with the land from which he has been forcibly divorced for a generation." The movement for city parks showed that "city planning reaches its apex in recreation." The settlement houses promised "to reconstruct city life" and "to renovate evil neighborhoods." In sum, city planning was to be "the remaking of the American city."

The reaction to the chaotic environment during these early years of city planning had produced a myriad of responses. There were either those reforms related to the City Beautiful movement such as the movements for Municipal art, for Civic betterment, for Improvement associations, for parks, and neighborhood centers. Alternatively, there were reforms related to the improvement of city life such as the multifarious philanthropic movements, the housing movement, the movement for garden cities and for municipal hygiene. Because the reactions were as bountiful as the existing problems, it is difficult to summarize the spirit of reform which gripped the city and its planners in close alliance. But whatever the form these movements assumed, it was felt that they were an embodiment of the national impulse for improvement, an impulse so ingrained in an assumed American character that by 1911 it could be claimed
that there existed "an almost universal movement to improve city life
. . . the scope of the movement covering the whole sum of urban
existence." Nor was this impulse expected to abate, for the new
spirit that would produce the "great municipal improvements" and
create the cities to which even Europe could not compare, was only just
beginning.

THE SEMANTICS OF CHAOS

In the graeco-roman tradition, chaos is the personification of
the primordial void, before the creation, at a time when order
had not been imposed on the elements of the earth.

--Dictionnaire des symboles

Scientists do tolerate uncertainty and frustration, because they
must. The one thing that they do not and must not tolerate is
disorder. The whole aim of theoretical science is to carry to
the highest possible and conscious degree the perceptual reduc-
tion of chaos that began in so lowly and unconscious a way with
the origin of life.

--Simpson, Principles of Animal
Taxonomy, quoted by Levi-Strauss,
The Savage Mind

Knowledge about a given field of study begins with the
problem of classification, the desire to organize the chaos of
reality into some discriminatory order. "Any classification," claims
Levi-Strauss, "is superior to chaos and even a classification at the
level of sensible properties is a step towards rational ordering." Classification or patterning of experience are synonymous operations
during an initial approach to an undifferentiated area. The mind can
begin to operate upon a field of study only by being able to discriminate
elements from each other. This elementary procedure operates through
the simple arrangement of dichotomizations: what is x, becomes not y;
what is "x" is opposed to what is "y." Gradually through these orderings,
the continuum of reality, that unordered and continuous stream of information becomes regularized through an imposed conceptual pattern. On an infinite plane, an arbitrary choice draws the lines of separation of one unit from another. But once the segments are described, and the elements have been defined, they can fall prey to the motivations behind any conceptual or symbolic scheme.

Planning could have begun its study of the city by classifying the elements, separating uses from each other, and putting each in its place; to some degree the later stress on zoning regulations and conflicting land-uses pursued this approach. But planning by definition is a second order system, it is the method, the rules and regulations, through which we can arrive at an ordered environment. It is called second order because it operates on the organization of elements that create disarray or order, and in this sense operates on a level of abstraction that is once removed from objective knowledge of city conditions. The plan to reject chaos, the motivation behind the planning movement, begins with the dichotomy of order/disorder; the first step in detotalizing the continuum of urban reality. Disorder is what prevails in the city, order is what we must have! Reflection upon chaos in the language of the early planners reveals four discriminations: that of disorder/order, of congestion/dispersal, of ugliness/beauty, and of defect/improvement.

Let us explore more closely the semantics behind the word "chaos." The rhetorical device, to which this language was put to task, was to convince the public that chaos in their physical surroundings was bad and should be rejected; what is being played upon at this level is a public sense of guilt, a social morality that will
reject chaos and constrain future desecrations by prohibiting disorder or disarray in our cities. The focus of the planners, therefore, was placed on the external chaos created by men as surplus from their daily relationships with the urban environment. The goal was to establish a language of rejection and we shall explore how this was done through the various significations of the word "chaos."

One of the major preoccupations throughout the conceptual history of planning dwells on the problem of agreement both within the elements of the environment and among men. This concept is reflected in the prevalent appearance of words using the prefix "con"/"com"/"co": all derived from the Latin prefix "cum" meaning "with," "together," "jointly." In the concept of chaos as disorder we turn first to look at the synonyms for disorder contained within these words with the prefix "con." Perhaps there is no worse feeling about the disorder of the city than that expressed through the use of the term "incongruous." Taken literally incongruous things do not fit together, they do not agree among each other, they can not form a whole together; and in this sense they offer nothing by which an order can be established prior to some sense of form or agreement. So we begin our semantic dictionary of "disorder" with the synonym "incongruous." A stronger sense of this meaning appears in the use of city "conflict," "conflicting spaces or uses"; and in this case "disorder" not only refers to things not suitable for each other but that these things battle among each other, they clash and strike with

* "Synonym" is used in a weak sense of having similar conceptual aspects.
one another. Along side of things which do not fit together we find two opposing concepts of disorder. One is in the sense of "no coherence"; things which do not stick together, things which create a logically inconsistent experience out of the continuum of urban reality. But on the other, we find disorder is "confusion," things so blended together that they can not longer be distinguished; they begin to fuse the separations and distinctions which would present some degree of order to the continuum of experience. From "confusion" we arrive at the conditions of "congestion" and "conglomeration"; both words referring to the existence of an indistinguishable mass of things or people. In the first case the meaning refers to the process of bringing things together into a mass and in the second the sense of rolling things together, accumulating things into a ball; a process which can continue indefinitely. One other term of disorder appears, which we shall have occasion to refer to again and again: this is the etymological or literal sense of the word "inconvenient" which refers to the fact that things do not fit together, they do not "come with" each other being either out of form or out of order. Consequently for the chaos of the experiential urban plane in one sense of disorder we have developed the following list of synonyms: disorder, = (incongruous, conflict, no coherence, confusion, conglomeration, congestion, inconvenience).

In another sense we can find disorder associated with the concept of sprawl; an indefinite, unlimited, disorderly pattern extending across the plane of existence. The full power of this concept lies in the realization of the destructive ability inherent in unlimited disorder
in the vision of "incongruent" things extending themselves indefinitely, reducing reality to its primordial void. A synonymous term is the use of "straggle," a "wandering off from others of its kind," implying a further introduction of elements of disorder. This process of disorder is characterized by limitlessness, first in the term "expansion" which refers to the spreading out across a plane taking more and more space, secondly through the term "bulge" which refers to expansion also but a type which contains a protruberance, an increase beyond the containing surface, or units of distinction creating order. In both these terms the threat of danger is to the external boundaries within which order can be maintained. The final characterization of sprawl is the concept of accretion, and here we are fundamentally dealing with the essential problem presented to the early planners; "accretion" is "the growing together of parts that are naturally separated," a fusing of terms, a return to confusion and chaos, the destruction of any sense of order or classification. We add therefore to our dictionary, the meaning of disorder in the sense of sprawl and straggle, disorder_2 = (sprawl, straggle), and characterized by the list of following synonymous processes: disorder_2: (expansion, bulge, accretion).

Finally we arrive at the sense of disorder in terms of "dirt," of matter out of place. "Dirt," described by Mary Douglas in Purity and Danger, "is never a unique, isolated event. Where there is dirt there is system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements." Dirt is the superfluous object that is left over from man's activities, it is that which is thrown off, cast
away and is disruptive of the very basic process of ordering and classification. Order, therefore, is the answer to "matter out of place" for dirt destroys any conception of order. We must find therefore some manner by which to isolate and reject "dirt" if the pattern of order is to be maintained. In this sense of chaos, disorder refers specifically to things which destroy the good order of the city. The early planners used a long list of elements synonymous with the term dirt or filth and in this sense disorder = (dirt, filth, squalor, slovenliness, dusty, frowzy, uncleanliness, [bad] housekeeping, unkempt, untidy, garbage, waste, surplus, smoke, dingy, noise, jangle, unsanitary). All of these words in some sense refer to the condition that implies disorder that is dirty, foul, unclean, worthless and confused. Let us focus on the meaning of "dirt" and "filth" which are also meanings implied by most of the other words. "Dirt" and "filth" refer to any "foul substance or matter" and in this sense relates directly to our concern with finding some physical sense of order and classification for the chaos of the city. But in another, more important sense, these words refer to a condition of being foul in a moral sense, of having committed some transgression or wrong and it is in this moral sense that we find the early planners to place their emphasis. The rhetorical use of "a dirty city" or "filthy public places" could draw upon a sense of social guilt inferring these conditions to be a moral wrong, transgressions if indeed not sins. Any use in this manner was expected to elicit a sense of public indignation and public censoring of those who had transgressed. As we shall continue to explore, these early planners counted deeply on arousing a middle-class morality; one that believed a condition of disorder in the city was a moral wrong and must be rejected or corrected.
In an alternative meaning, "chaos" was used in the sense of "congestion": of a mass of people, indistinguishably herding into the cities. Because this sense of chaos will remain throughout the development of the language of planning, it is perhaps helpful to consider it separately from the sense of chaos as disorder. The synonymous terminology for congestion is the following:

congestion = (herd, mass, throng, host [of men], crowd, overcrowd, jostle). All of these words make use of the meaning in terms of "a great multitude of men" but there is also a more subtle signification in terms of a great number of beasts assembled together (a herd), pressing together, shoving and pushing (crowd) to the point of creating an uncontrollable crowd, a rabble, a weighty mass of the body politic. In this sense, the significance of the word "herd" is essential; for only in this term is the implied necessity for a herdsman, an authority who will control the pressures of the crowd made entirely explicit and only in this term is the connotation of senseless animals assembled together who at any moment might break away and turn toward their natural instincts made entirely clear. The threat of the crowd is not only in its multitude; for the process of crowd formation has a similar fear: the terms for congestion are characterized by the following processes: congestion: (drift, a stream of influx, a flow, a pressure, incessant, ceaseless). All of these terms connote an infinite process that has no apparent end, therefore, no way to be controlled. It foresees an inevitable doom of the city that not even eternal vigilance can forestall. Only the term "pressure" implies the presence of a continual force applying itself against some opposing
force and in this sense depicts the eventual conflict of the infinite
drift to the cities and the counteracting forces of order and con-
tainment within the cities with which it eventually will struggle
head on.

Chaos also has a third signification in our semantic
dictionary of planning terms. This meaning refers to the state of
ugliness of the city, establishing the important dichotomy between
beauty/ugliness. Ugliness is not art and therefore is not beauty;
but also ugliness is lack of organization, for both art and classifica-
tion have a certain inherent need for order. As Levi-Strauss has shown,
an aesthetic sense can be in itself an approach to classification. 76
Like a mirror, both a painting and a taxonomy reflect a certain order
and classification of reality. Both are a mere reflection of reality,
containing a distortion embedded in their representation. Art
becomes one of the social outlets through which man's deviant charac-
teristics are channeled into socially acceptable directions such as the
production of public works of art. What first struck the early planners
however, was the apparent ugliness of chaos: ugly in the sense of
being visually distorted and offensive: ugliness\textsubscript{1} = (unsightly, eyesore,
marring, disfiguration), and ugly in the sense of being base, profane,
inferior in quality and morally offensive: ugliness\textsubscript{2} = (vulgar, bad
taste, sordid, base, abomination). Later as we shall see, they saw
the educative advantages of public art.

Finally we come to the ultimate meaning of chaos in the sense
of being equivalent to a negative moral and physical defect in the mind,
the body, social group or the nation. These words derive their meaning
from the prefix "de" or "dis" which means "separation; a parting from up or down," and the consequent absence or deprivation of some quality or thing. For the first time, we begin to be aware of the idea that will become fundamental to planning concepts; the idea of the city, not only as a continuum of parts which should have an order, but the arrangement of these parts into a concept of the whole with some ideal of unity and perfection. It is in this sense that "defect" means an imperfection, the absence of something required in order to be complete and it is also in this meaning that these defects are characterized in dramatic terms of evil, viciousness and unnaturalness. In all the following definitions, "defect" refers to a reduced or lowered state, a movement toward the original state of chaos, before differentiation, hierarchy and order were established.
All of the significations of "chaos" refer to some social characteristic which is deficient in the urban public and which can therefore be eradicated through education or enlightenment. "In modern analysis," it has been said, "chaos connotes only a symbolic denomination. Chaos precedes the formation of the unconscious and appears as equivalent to indifference, informality, and total passivity." Consequently the emphasis for remedial work was placed upon the erring individual and his byproducts, i.e., upon external programs of change, as opposed to the structural deficiencies within society which produced the conditions of squalor, of congestion, of sprawl. First of all chaos was assumed to be caused by a state of indifference among the urban residents; indifference in opposition to responsibility. In all the synonyms of "indifference," the state of failing interest or concern depends upon conditions of neglect, of failing or refusing to notice or not even being aware of the pathetic urban conditions. "Indifference," therefore, as a cause of chaos is easily remedied by stressing the importance of care and responsibility, by bringing the neglected conditions to the forefront.

Two other causes of chaos would also be remedied by external programs, by laying further blame upon the social offenders which society had previously punished. The immigrants and the slum tenants would be held responsible for both failing to survive the competition of society and causing the contamination of the slums.
The final cause of chaos, that of growth, presented the planner with dilemmas that would haunt him in years to come. This cause immediately established the dichotomy between progress/decay and it was the positive marking, i.e. valuation, of the meaning of progress as opposed to decay. The latter conflicted with the valuative markings on the dichotomy infinite/bounded as reflected in the fears of the infinite process of congestion and sprawl and the desire for some limitations and boundaries on growth. All the synonyms for "growth" carry the same markings and it was this essential problem concerning the beliefs associating infinite with growth and bounded with decay which would remain as basic contradictions underlying the causal determinations of chaos. All things that grow, received the positive valuation; it is alive, it is normal, it progresses towards a higher stage of life. On the other hand, anything bounded was dead or in a state of decay and must be avoided if possible.

It was not enough to reject the terms of city chaos, its disorder, its ugliness, its congestion and the negative defects implied by such an environment. Planners not only wanted to facilitate the rejection of these conditions, they also begged for outright reform. "Reform" in the sense of changing the physical place of the demarcation along the continuum of order/disorder; to reform in the sense of returning to some ideal form of the city at a time when the city elements were supposedly clearly demarcated and where a certain degree of order was
maintained. It is in this sense that "reform means a religious awakening," an arousal from a former state of indifference and a turning toward a common goal, a common self-esteem and an awareness of common problems. This "awakening" besides meaning a new consciousness of common needs, also was characterized by a longing for perfection, for a state of flawlessness and perfect harmony, a return to a rightful order of things. "Reform" was also expected to be a result of a renewed dissatisfaction over city conditions and a sense of obligation; an ethical idealism which expected middle-class values to be maintained throughout the city.

Throughout the language of the city planners, we shall be dealing with a peculiar set of words; those words with the prefix "re." This prefix denotes two ideas; first in the sense of "back to an original or former state or position" and second in the sense of "again" denoting a repetition of events. It is in this double signification that this family of words reveals unconscious motivations of the early planners. First in the sense that some ideal existed in their minds,
the pre-industrial city, to which their "reforms," "rehabilitations,"
and "reconstructions" would turn the city back; and secondly, in a
more subtle concept, that a solution found in one city or neighborhood
could be repeated in another. This latter meaning requires some
further explanation. The words "restoring," "replanning," "remedial,"
"rebuilding" and so forth, as well as having some ideal in mind to be
"restored," also bring to mind some pattern of the city, some answer
to a city problem that can be replicated. As Harley Shands in
_Semiotic Approaches to Psychiatry_ has elucidated, a dominant theme
running throughout scientific work is the _rationality of replicability_
of results. What has been found to be true in one case, must be
found true in another time and place or else it is not valid. What
becomes apparent, as Shands explores the linguistic usage of scientists,
is their apparent prevalence for words with "re" and "con" prefixes
revealing their preoccupation with replication and agreement. We can
find the same results in the language used by city planners. As well
as undoing parts of the city and awakening former values in the public's
behavior, these "reform" terms offer the beginnings for a concept of a
technical city machine, the parts of which can be mechanically replicated
again and again and a concept of the public which can be manipulated and
reclassified at will. Note that the city in its form or structure has
no uniqueness nor is it conceived of as dependent upon the lives of the
residents who find in the spaces of the city their homes and their
livelihood. The public, moreover, can be formed to fit into and adjust
to the requirements of the city structure. This abstraction allowed the
planners from the beginning to approach both the city structure and the
public from an objectified point of view which permitted the conceptual "undoing" of what had been done as well as the repetition of what was considered a successful solution. Reform seen as manipulation, however, was yet to come. Steeped in the rhetoric of morality, reform merely passed for a spiritual prodding of the public for the "common good."
### THE SEMANTICS OF CHAOS (Terminology)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>chaos</strong></td>
<td>= disorder/congestion/ugliness/defect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>disorder</strong></td>
<td>≡ disorder₁/disorder₂/disorder₃</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>disorder₁</strong></td>
<td>≡ (incongruous, conflict, no coherence, confusion, conglomeration, congestion, inconvenience)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>disorder₂</strong></td>
<td>≡ (sprawl, straggle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>disorder₂</strong></td>
<td>: (expansion, bulge, accretion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>disorder₃</strong></td>
<td>≡ (dirt, filth, squalor, slovenliness, dusty, frowzy, uncleanliness, [bad] housekeeping, unkempt, untidy, garbage, waste, surplus, smoke, dingy, noise, jangle, unsanitary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>congestion</strong></td>
<td>: (herd, mass, throng, host [of men], crowd, overcrowd, jostle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ugliness</strong></td>
<td>≡ ugliness/ugliness₂</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ugliness₁</strong></td>
<td>≡ (unsightly, eyesore, marring, disfiguration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ugliness₂</strong></td>
<td>≡ (vulgar, bad taste, sordid, base, abomination)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>defect</strong></td>
<td>≡ (degeneration, demoralization, degradation, disfigures, disintegration, destruction, decrepitude, desecration, deprivation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>defect</strong></td>
<td>: (evil, sin, vicious errors, savagery, unnatural, unfit, contaminating poison)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>chaos</strong></td>
<td>+ (indifference/immigrant/slum tenants/growth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>indifference</strong></td>
<td>≡ (disregard, ignore, neglect, indiscriminate, slackness, heedlessness, unconscious)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>immigrant</strong></td>
<td>≡ (dependent, parasite, penurious)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>slum tenants</strong></td>
<td>≡ (poison, contamination, nemesis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>growth</strong></td>
<td>≡ (development, upward progress, [live/productive] organism, constant change)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>growth</strong></td>
<td>: (natural, vigorous, normal, rapid, constant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>reform /reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>(dissatisfaction, obligation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reform</td>
<td>awakening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>awakening</td>
<td>(social movement, social reform, art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reform, civic consciousness, civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pride, city spirit, dignity, common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>life)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>awakening</td>
<td>ideal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(perfection, aspiration, dream, unity,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>beauty, justice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ideal</td>
<td>regeneration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(revival, remedial, remake, redemption,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reunite, recreation, rebuild, renovate,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reconstruct, recast, replan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rehabilitate, correction)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES: CHAPTER THREE


3 Ibid.

4 L. Veiller, "Buildings in Relation to Street and Site," The Proceedings of the Third National Conference on City Planning (1911).


13 Atterbury, "Model Towns."

14 Ibid.


26. Ibid.


28. Carlton, "Urban and Rural Life."


30. Carlton, "Urban and Rural Life."


32. Ibid.

33. Riis, *The Other Half."

34. Ibid.


37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
46 Burnham, "White City."
47 Ibid.
49 Riis, The Other Half.
50 F. S. Lamb, "Municipal Art."
51 C. R. Woodruff, "City Planning in America," The Atlantic Monthly (June, 1908).
52 "The Awakening of the Cities," The World's Work (June-October, 1911).
55 Ibid.

Woodruff, "City Planning in America."


Diggs, "Garden City."

Gregory, "The Coming City."


"The City and the Citizen," *The Outlook* (May 9, 1903).

Woodruff, "The National Impulse."


Gregory, "The Coming City."


Howe, "The City as a Socializing Agency."


CHAPTER FOUR
SOCIAL RESPONSES

THE DANGERS OF THE MASS OF PEOPLE CONGREGATING IN THE CITIES

Every group has its own special threats and fears as part of the problems which it seeks to solve. Besides the environmental effects of deprivation and degeneration suggested above, the planners saw the massing of people into the great city centers as a promoter of deviant behavior; deviant from the middle class ethical ideals of order, restraint and control. Because the early planners were part of the white middle class's "gentlemanly reformers of the cities," they envisioned the rest of society as controllable if only it could be
assimilated into this "core society," or "core culture." Overtly patronizing, if somewhat idealistic, the early planners dwelt specifically upon two overlapping social groups that required "uplifting": the numbers of immigrants whose loyalty and patriotism to the American way offered a constant challenge and the problem of the herding masses at the city center who threatened disorder and riot.

**Loyalty of the newcomers:** The swiftness of city growth during the 19th century from both the extensive numbers of foreign immigrants and the "draining of the country" involved many political dangers. Since the city could make "no claim for hereditary loyalty of its newcomers," all it could face was a collection of people, never amounting to dependable citizens. During the first three quarters of the 19th century America had maintained a somewhat ambivalent policy towards immigration. On the one hand America needed foreign laborers to fill out its work force but on the other hand their foreign ways and beliefs produced among the native-born a deep suspicion and dread of foreign-born radicalism. In 1886 the incident of the Haymarket Riot in Chicago brought these premonitions to a culmination for here was evidence of their symbolic fear; a group of foreign-born radicals, with dynamite and bitter words, had incited a mob to riot. From this time on, America entered an era of nativism which was not to be abated until the passage of quota legislation during the 1920's.

During the early years of the 20th century, there escaped, from the mouths of many native Americans, a fear that the valued process
of assimilation was failing. Many felt that the immigrant was "suspicious of American institutions, the government to him means punishment rather than protection . . . [i.e.,] he should learn to hate all constituted authority." Consequently, during the early years of the 20th century, there sprang up independently in many cities a series of Americanization programs which attempted to coerce the foreigners into accepting American ways. The problem of the immigrant took on crisis proportions during the years before America entered the First World War; a time when Anglo-conformity was forced upon the foreign residents of the cities compelling them to renounce all allegiance and association with their foreign background under the shameless name of liberty and justice.

An article appearing in the American City in 1916 summarized the strands of feelings behind the Anglo-conformity program in telling us "How to Americanize the city":

Our municipalities typify the melting pot of nations, but there has been little melting in proportion to the enormous supply of raw material which our cities possess from the many countries of the world. . . . our greatest industrial asset, our host of foreign-born workmen, is at present a liability in our social organization. . . .

A city with [so many] unnaturalized . . . males cannot be an American city. A city with dozens of factories where the sign language is used wholly . . . is not an American city . . . A city of separate villages where the shops are foreign shops, the churches foreign churches, the newspapers foreign newspapers, the homes Southern European homes, quite outside the health code of the municipality . . . is not an American city. American standards of living cannot be enforced where they are not known.

It is not a campaign of education . . . the challenge is more urgent, the need of action practical and immediate . . . Upon the line our cities take now depend our industrial efficiency, our social solidarity, our national unity. This . . . is the city's problem: to put English-speaking workmen in its factories . . . to understand orders . . . guard against accident, men able to grasp American industrial ideals, open to American influences and
not subject only to strike agitators or foreign propagandists, to turn indifferent, ignorant residents into understanding voters, participants in the laws under which they reside; to make immigrant homes American homes and to carry American standards of living to the farthest corner of the community; to unite foreign-born and native alike in enthusiastic loyalty to our national ideals of liberty and justice.  

Such a program for Anglo-conformity held in contempt any sign of foreign culture; its churches, its language, its foods, its living style. Specifically, the white Anglo-Saxon native was being confronted with the southern European immigrant whose mores and manners were completely foreign and threatening. In contradiction to their former sympathy with the abject state of poverty forced upon the immigrant as a result of his immigration to America, planners, social workers, educators, and private citizens were urged to establish a program for "Americanization in National Defense." As another article in the American City described, it was not currently a question of disloyalty, although there did exist indications of what may develop as enemy propaganda becomes more insidious and the minds of the simple and ignorant become inflamed with passion and distorted with prejudice... We can anticipate the discontent, restlessness and uncertainty... and utilize every agency... to counteract effectively the practices of enemy policy of enemy agitators and sympathizers... Americanization means loyalty and loyalty means unity, and with unity the efficiency of Democracy is assured and the future of the great world experiment can be faced with confidence."

What we need, another claimed, was to "go after the immigrant in his home and induce him to partake of what his community has to offer." The fear of unrest and disorder, as well as the more practical understanding that our industrial efficiency and hence our preparedness for war, depended upon the loyalty and hard efforts of the working class, removed the last traces of reasonableness and concern for the poor which
humanitarian reformers of the 19th century had struggled in vain to establish. Such a program of enforced Americanization, as well as stripping the immigrant of his cultural heritage, also demonstrated the overt denigration and contempt that these planning reformers had for the "ignorant and simple-minded" foreigner. Again we see that the home was to be violated, for as we have shown above, the home was believed to be the chief environmental determinant of the moral and physical standards of its residents. But a program of inducement and forced patriotism, one which held American standards above all others, only proved to show how great the distance had become between the native reformer and the foreign immigrant. The fear of failing to obtain national unity in the face of war led even President Woodrow Wilson to proclaim in 1915 to a congregation of foreign-born citizens that "America does not consist of groups. A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American." To the contrary, as we shall see subsequently, the ruling elite of America, whether they be presidents or planners, has tended to deal explicitly with groups, but only the groups which they condone for specific reasons that benefit their own goals and values.

The fear of disorder and riot: The immigrant problem was only a special problem of social control growing out of a general fear in the latter part of the 19th century for the "untrained, unorganized poor" massing in the city centers. The real "problem of the submerged classes [is that they lay] . . . below the range of cooperation and trade-unionism" "an unorganized, misled, undisciplined mass of the unprivileged." If
the Haymarket Riot brought forth the fear of foreign radicals it also spread a general alarm for mobs and rioting throughout scores of American cities. Truly the tenements had "bred their Nemesis" but it was the police and the middle class citizen who sought retribution and revenge. During the 1890's the local police, the state militia as well as the United States Army strengthened their forces while a series of "law and order" leagues sprang up among citizen vigilantes. Robert H. Wiebe explains that "behind this insistence upon reprisals lay the assumption that fundamentally the masses could understand only the bared fist, that without the authority of an indisputable force . . . always visible, always ready . . . chaos would reign."9

The "herding instinct" in man was recognized as one of the great social evils of the time. Large cities produced conditions that fostered social unrest and disorder as well as a shiftless character, and as the uninterrupted stream of men flowed into the city the unrelinquished fear of riots and street conflicts fed upon itself in ever hastening doom. The city was blamed for producing the unemployed. . . which meant an essentially wrong attitude of mind in multitudes of people. Willingness to lie idle rather than undertake anything they do not quite like, to hang on charity rather than go where they are wanted and can be of use, with callous incapacity for hearing any call of duty or feeling any thrill of interest at a summons for help in an hour of somebody's necessity. That is the kind of men that our cities make, or too many such.10

There appeared little remembrance within this general fear, that many of those who had "drifted" to the cities were no longer needed on the farms or found no work in their native lands and subsequently found themselves forced to move into the American cities. For those who
followed the Puritan ethic with its compelling duty to work, there was little effort to look much deeper than shirkfulness for an explanation into the general causes of poverty. Nevertheless, this inveterate fear of the sanguinary and callous character of the poor was only one of many strands of thought among the reformers and planners of these years.

By the end of the First World War a more rational approach could be offered for the problem of the "massing herds" for not only had the cities avoided the threatened uprisings but they had also demonstrated concerted efforts of organization and cooperation during and preceding the war effort. It is not surprising therefore to find Winston Churchill writing to a receptive American audience that we must learn to apply our knowledge of the human mind to social evils that have ravaged our communities in the past... human nature takes a terrible vengeance on the community and on itself if certain fundamental instincts are thwarted or denied; ... the "herding instinct" is this ... instinct gone wrong, and manifests itself in mobs and riots; properly provided for in community centers, clubs and forums ... it provides for a gregarious need.11

THE ANSWERS TO THESE CITY DANGERS

Although the fear of the mob lay narrowly submerged beneath the reformer's zeal, some began to see that the answers to the environmental deprivations creating these ambivalent loyalties and anomalous behavior lay in directing the minds of the immigrants and the poor into more controllable and predictable alignments. They placed their answer therefore in an absolute and unfailing faith in the process of education; education of all kinds, as we shall come to see, but
especially education directed to awaken and instill a public spirit and a sense of responsibility in the minds and hearts of America's citizens. Far from accepting this period of crisis as a point of critical re-evaluation of social disorder, and to question the accepted values of the middle class, the planning reformers never swayed from their positive acceptance of what they referred to as "native American values" of civic responsibility and gentlemanly restraint on unreasonable social demands. From their point of view, the newcomers to America had to be taught to accept their proper role as citizens of this country; all should be made worthy of receiving the benefits which this country had to offer them. For the first time, a new concept becomes explicit which directs attention to the control and influence of the minds of the immigrants and poor in order to dictate acceptable behaviour patterns. Some of the planner's approaches naively accepted this stance but the recurrent use of the term "uplifting" in itself demonstrates the biases held against the submerged character of these demi-citizens.

The planners proposed two paths by which to educate the city's newcomers. Since "city-making" and "citizen-making" were regarded as one and the same thing so it is that these planners directed their attention to citizen betterment through environmental determinations and the proposal of new institutional arrangements to control their environment. One of the first planning efforts to take up this challenge was the movement for Municipal art, for public art had long been "a public and municipal educator" and had "beautified, stimulated, commemorated her patriotism." "The whole town talks to us, preaching
sermons in stones." 12 "Art as an educator . . . [had taught patriotism] through an artistic portrayal of our history, . . . nothing would be a more effective agent in making good citizens of our foreign population than such movements." 13

Among the efforts to environmentally improve the citizens of our cities was the movement to depopulate the slum districts. The cities were awakening to face the problem that good "citizens are [their] best assets," and were beginning to accept that the slums were prime creators of human wreckage. . . . The city . . . in condemning some, marking others for extensive alteration and repairs, forcing out many families because of overcrowding, [has] started a compulsory exodus where . . . these immigrants must live to some extent, as American citizens should . . . removed from the deadening, demoralizing influences of the district . . . The struggle to lift the level of the citizens 14 and "the breeding of blooded citizens 15 had begun.

Another group to take up the challenge of uplifting the citizens of the American cities was the neighborhood center movement for as one supporter put it, since "the lasting value of improvement works its influences on the mind, . . . the neighborhood center[s] . . . have as their aim the mental, moral or physical up-building of the neighborhood in which they are situated . . . to mould the character of its people." 16 Another enthusiast claimed that "neighborhood centers . . . [were] part of planning a city's service to its people that makes for health, happiness, prosperity and good order." 17 Soon after these statements, Robert Park pointed out, to generations of students who would follow his directives, that "local interests and associations
breed local sentiment . . . [therefore] the neighborhood becomes the
cbasis of control . . . The purpose of social settlements . . . attempts
to reconstruct city life . . . [and provide the] methods and techniques
for stimulating and controlling local communities."

These attempts to establish social control over the citizens of the cities never amounted to a comprehensive program of authority and control. Instead, they stand mainly as efforts to underline two developing themes which we shall see recurring. Both themes reflect a fundamental belief in environmental determination in the struggle for life: first the belief that the environment can educate and turn to social advantage the base instincts of man; and second the feeling that the process of environmental or social adaptation occurs in the home and hence, it is as near to this level as possible that society should and must intervene to achieve social fitness. As reflected in the following words, the planning movement accepted the promise and challenge of these beliefs: "City planning . . . is the first conscious recognition of the unity of society. It involves a socializing of art and beauty and the control of unrestrained licenses of the individual."

The basis of all good city planning is the home of the citizen. . . . There is one justification, and only one for limiting the individual freedom in many ways as we must do in city life, namely that the citizen should be given wider opportunities than he could otherwise obtain and a fuller life.
THE SEMANTICS OF FEAR (Terminology)

fear = (slum tenants, immigrants)

slum tenants : (undisciplined, unrestrained, misled, unorganized, untrained, unprivileged, unemployed, submerged [class level], below cooperation, below unionism, lower half, human wreckage, ideal, wrong attitude of mind, no call of [duty/help summons/necessity])

immigrants = (newcomers, raw material, unnaturalized, foreign, ethnic groups, poor)

immigrants : (no loyalty, suspicious of American institutions, hate authority, discontent, restless, uncertain, disability for [social organization/social solidarity/industrial efficiency/national defenders])

immigrant minds : (simple, ignorant, indifferent, inflamed, impassioned, distorted, prejudiced, subjected)

immigrant minds + (agitators, propagandists [foreign/enemy], sympathizers)

immigrant and slum tenants + (riots, turbulences, uprisings, [sanguinary/tattered/revengeful] mobs)

control = control\textsubscript{1}/control\textsubscript{2}

control\textsubscript{1} = (Americanization)

control\textsubscript{2} = (Education)

Americanization = (participation, partaking of offers, loyalty, voters, patriotism, unity)

Americanization : (American homes, American communities, American [standards/ideals], English language, [American/blooded] citizens)

Americanization + (art, community centers, depopulate slums)

art : (educator, preacher, socializer)

(community/neighborhood) : (basis of [control/order/health/happiness/prosperity/wider opportunities/mental/moral/physical] upbuilding)

depopulate slums : (condemn, mark, force out, remove, compulsory exodus)

education = (control [minds/instincts])

education : (understanding, knowledge, grasping, stimulating, influencing, uplifting, improving, control, enforce, order, induce)
REFERENCES: CHAPTER FOUR

1Robinson, "City Life."

2"The Neighborhood Center--A Moral and Educational Factor," Charities and the Commons, February 1, 1908.


5Ibid.

6Oscar Handlin, The American People in the Twentieth Century.

7Diggs, "Garden City Movement."

8F.C. Howe, "The City As A Socializing Agency."

9Wiebe, The Search for Order, p. 79.

10G.S. Dickerman, "The Drift to the Cities," The Atlantic Monthly, September, 1913.


12Blashfield, "A Word for Municipal Art."


15Atterbury, "Model Towns in America."

16"The Neighborhood Center--A Moral and Educational Factor," Charities and the Commons, February 1, 1908.

17McFarland, "The Growth of City Planning in America."
18 Park, "The City."


20 "The City and the Citizen," The Outlook, May 9, 1903.
Behind the motives of many supporters for municipal improvements lay the assumption that the birthrights of man, "the health and happiness among the people," were being sorely neglected. The development of the field of "municipal hygiene," or public health, was aimed at combating disease and squalor in every pocket of the large city through the application of sanitary practices in everyday living and the adoption of sanitary codes by municipal authorities. But there was more to the concept of health than cleanliness. Rene Dubos offers
us an insight into the conception of public hygiene by reminding us 
that the goddess Hygeia was "the guardian of health and symbolized the 
belief that men could remain well if they lived according to reason." 1

The followers of the cult of Hygeia, which blossomed in the public 
health movement accepted the Hippocratic doctrine that health was 
achieved through harmonious adjustment to the order of nature. Pleasant 
surroundings, a harmonious equilibrium between man's physical state and 
his social surroundings, purity in air, food and water, became keynotes 
for the social philosophy of public health. Behind all these beliefs 
lay the ultimate faith that someday man could achieve absolute harmony 
in his relationships with the world and in turn that nature alone could 
offer the restoration of good health.

An integral part of this movement aimed at educating the public 
to achieve good standards of health and to know the natural laws by 
which a man could achieve a healthier state of mind or body. All of 
these early concepts of public health are quite at variance with the later 
concept of inoculation and the germ theory of disease. Since any 
concept of disorder might threaten the so-called health of society, all 
the components of chaos which we have studied above, dirt, filth, 
ugliness, congestion, slums, poverty, violence and disorder were held 
as accompaniments of disease. Disease was defined as a body, mind or 
society in a state of disequilibrium with nature. Social measures of 
control would be necessary to restore the American society to its state 
of pre-industrial purity. However vague their concept of purity, it was 
this goal alone which would support and maintain a state of health.

Many of the planning reforms therefore aimed to reconstruct society and 
the urban environment in more favorable alignments with this healing concept 
of nature.
These concepts of hygiene, therefore, accompanied the fear that the city was "an unnatural and unhealthy location for the development of mankind" as a result of "the pathological costs of our neglect of the physical side of the city." Indeed, "the hope and salvation of the large city . . . its growth and very existence . . . [were a consequence of] the proper application of methods of municipal hygiene." Much of the public health reform that attracted the city planner's attention was directed at the unhealthy conditions arising from tenements and slums. Since the "evils of bad housing" were well known in their undermining attacks on both the physical and moral health of their inhabitants, planning effort was focused on the development of a "sanitary code" to remedy these existing evils. The whole city plan, including the street plan, the block plan, the lot plan, street widths, and building heights were "of vital moment to the future sanitary welfare of the city."

Parks too received their due attention for the healthy and purifying influences which they spread upon the city population. "Those city fathers who see nothing but aesthetic value in parks or tree-lined boulevards, recognize not the sanitary value of such breathing spots." The "potential values of the city's existing open spaces must never be lost sight of . . . [they offer] breathing spaces as essential to the mental, moral and physical health of its people as building space." Thus it seems advisable to remember this belief in the curative power of fresh air and nature when we review the early proposals for comprehensive systems of urban parks.
One other concept often attending the efforts of health planners was the association of aesthetic harmony with social and individual health. Perhaps it escapes us why Frederick Lamb in 1897 could question in one breath why "aesthetic questions and common laws of sanitation and everyday living [had been] ignored." If we look at the etymology of the word "sanitation" however, we may come closer to understanding the approaches of the early planners to maintain public health through beautiful surroundings and harmonious environments. "Sanitation," "sanitary," "sanity" all stem from the Latin "sanitas" meaning "healthy living in a salubrious and pleasant environment." As long as the emphasis on health was placed on the belief in the curative powers of nature and "purity," "sanitation" implied not only cleanliness and order but also trees and flowers and beautiful surroundings to help restore healthy conditions to man's urban environment as well as his state of physical and mental health.

So far our discussion has been focused on the concept of social and individual health through the good order of the environment. Still another concept of health involved the planners. In the Republic, Plato claims that the need for doctors and hospitals was an indication that the city was evil and sick. This theme wound its way throughout the planning literature in a struggle over the evil city and the good countryside but it also took on another aspect as it was felt that the country was being neglected at the expense of the city. In an article decrying the ills of "lopsided development," the cities were blamed for being "the hospitals for all and sundry social ills. The great pity attending this social vaccination, treatment and convalescence is the jealousy with which the cities hold on to their hospital function
and permanently house all patients applying." This "hospital function" was only one more indication of the city's sickness which viewed all of humanity and its social conditions exclusively from a city point of view. It was far better to keep all of society, the country and the city, in a healthy state than to exhaust oneself in the care and the curing of the sick.

In 1872 Samuel Butler had written Erewhon, a tale about a utopia in which disease was considered to be a social crime, a social sin. Such a concept of disease as a social failing could draw upon a public sense of shame, guilt, and punishment. These too, were the considerations of the planners in their attempts to reform the social evils of the city chaos and to "cure the evil repute in the matter of healthfulness." The slums of the city had been well established as "the sore spots to shame society" which festered at the core of society but more than that, "Slumdom was humanity sick and ignorant"; it needed to be healed and taught. "We speak . . . of a city's slums as though they were a local evil . . . while . . . they form a sore which denotes disease in every part of the body politic." Not only the slums but the collection of city ills, its filth, ugliness and disorder, were considered as "social evils" and "social ills" and as such were believed to be crimes against the whole society. But somewhere, somehow the faith was held in the public sense of shame which would arise; that "city spirit," that sense of "public responsibility" that would itself be "aseptic and heal their wounds."
AESTHETIC HARMONY

"Psychology and the new social science [were spreading] . . . the gospel saying 'that man does not live by bread alone.' Bread is essential, but beauty and art are equally."15 Beauty and art directed at reordering, tidying and restoring harmony to the congested and ugly urban environment was a major focus for the planners of this era. Not left alone to support itself with claims of "art for art's sake," this period embedded every moral and spiritual consequence that the planners and city reformers held so dearly to their hearts; every ideal of democracy and freedom were claimed to gather support and strength from these physical reforms so that as one writer could report, this spirit which gripped the cities for reform and cleanliness,

this city sense, this urge of democracy is but the spirit of good will in humanity . . . to improve the lot of man . . . [this spirit which could be termed] a neo-democratic spirit [meant] aesthetic, ethic beauty . . . [and demonstrated for citizens how to be] beautiful in their morals, in their spirit, and in their common lot.16

This is a fair summary of the cultural responses to the movements for physical reform, and we shall explore below the rationalizations that were offered in support of the aesthetic and the beautiful for the sake of moral, spiritual and collective ideals.

Moral order: For the early planners, avoidance of chaos was not only seen from the perspective of hygiene but also from that of aesthetics and religion. The cult of hygia had taught that health was a function of a constant interplay between the internal state of man and the external environment in which fitness and social adaptation were achieved through the manipulations of the environment. In the effort to restore social equilibrium, it was possible to substitute the city for the physical
body and to place art as the curative force behind restoration. As one planner claimed,

The city beautiful is a joy forever . . . a joy is essentially a wholesome feeling. Beauty is preventive and curative medicine . . . if sickness has invaded our system, we are much more likely to find the necessary vitality to recover in the contemplation of things that are graceful, pleasing and inspiring than in the contemplation of drab ugliness. 17

Since the time of Aristotle, men have often turned to the physical environment for aid towards the development of man's moral ideas and social conduct. Perfection could be obtained through the contemplation of the aesthetic, for the city beautiful was not to contrive cities . . . that are [only] clean, beautiful and symmetrical in their physical proportion, but cities . . . which by a stupendous and supreme summing up of all the sciences and all the arts shall express the ideals of the people and work wonderful ameliorations in the human soul. 18

But moral ideals are rules for social conduct and relate to social action; behind every moral statement lies an implicit command. The beautiful was therefore believed to be the channel through which the ideals of moral perfection would become a final, ultimate goal for the citizens of the cities. This "natural craving for things beautiful," "this universal seeking after beauty" shall produce the city beautiful, whose object is "to make the city more adequately express the high ideals of the community."19 "The ideal city [then becomes] the beautiful and perfect"; 20 a fundamental enlightenment and guidance.

Maria Ossowska in a discussion about the social determinants of moral ideas maintains that in the work of perfecting ourselves aesthetic considerations play no small role and combine with moral evaluations, for the ideas toward which we strive are usually judged with the eye of an artist as well as with the eye of a moralist. 21
In a survey of "The Moral Effect of Public Beauty" done in 1903 by The Chatauqua: A Magazine of Things Worth While we find the same ideas reflected. This survey asked if the provision of more beautiful physical surroundings would help Americans live better, more moral lives. The following reveals some of their ideas:

The highest moral sentiments can not be developed in ignorance, rags and filth.

Beauty and morality . . . are both attributes of moral life, and anything that helps one is certain to help the other.

Beautiful surroundings of common life . . . are a great factor in intellectual development. They assist moral growth by filling the mind with good things.

The beautiful is a wonderful civilizer. It brings peace to mind and to heart; it elevates both, it leads to good morals.

Spiritual harmony: Besides the highest ideals of the community, the city was to unite spiritual harmony and order. "A Chinese philosopher's . . . idea of heaven . . . [had been the idea of] harmony . . .

Harmony throughout all" would be the city ideal in the 1900's as well. For "the enormous waste of planless, haphazard city-building has taught the necessity of the application of 'Heaven's first law,' i.e., order, in the construction of the places of human habitat."

This time the equilibrium between man and his environment was envisioned as absolute harmony and peace between the "soul" of the city or the spirit of man and the physical city. Planners sought "to lessen [the city's] imperfections and to make the outward force of the city a more harmonious embodiment of its indwelling spirit." In the "coming city" all would see the "deep sense of the relationship between physical order and spiritual life." "For who shall declare, even of a city, where the body ends and the soul begins?"
At the highest level, "spirit" becomes God; and artistic spirit becomes a religion. We have shown before that "municipal art reform," "religious awakening," "social reform," and "social movement" were all names for the same thing. "Art and religion go hand in hand, picture writing [being] man's universal language." [28] "The beautiful [not only] ... leads to good morals; it lifts the soul into regions of the supernatural and becomes thus the very fountain spring of religion itself." [29] For "the moral and religious sentiments of our nature are very closely connected with the artistic." [30]

The common lot: As we shall analyze further, these early years of planning were concerned with developing a sense of community and cooperation among citizens who, it was believed, were conditioned to be competitive and individualistic in response to the compelling needs of the industrial and urban revolution. Since aesthetic endeavors were expected to offer religious and moral salvation, it is not surprising to find them equally applied to the needs of unifying and strengthening the spirit of a nation.

How one learns about national values from aesthetic considerations, how the behavior roles prescribed by national standards were defined, how the elements which constituted this sense of community were selected, whether this spirit was an innate quality of national collectives, a national instinct or an educative ideal; these were all questions presupposed by the early planners. It was accepted on faith that everyone knew what a nation was and what were its benefits. Patriotism could be counted among its values as well as a conformist's attitude towards its allegiance. Some belief in national and social
progress through aesthetic and physical achievements was also part of
this concept. "A nation is only truly great that is ruled by ideas
and ideals. I believe the steady growth of interest in the arts and
crafts is significant and is pregnant of larger development and still
greater and more satisfactory advance." American cities had finally
 gained "manhood . . . a sense of responsibility and acquired dignity
of demeanor . . . in the general dignity and beauty of the city." If the chaos and maladaptations of the city were signs of decay,
so aesthetic considerations were evidence of social growth slowly
unfolding in time toward some advanced stage of civilization. Behind
the ideal of national "dignity," "valor," and "prestige" was hidden
some mythical sense of purpose or national destiny. The progressive
planners believed that everyone must be compelled to work for this
intangible goal, and anything that thwarted its progress should be
eradicated. As much as the belief in the spiritual effects of aesthetics
took on a dogmatic tinge, so too did the belief in progress through
aesthetic achievements.

No only would the execution of a program in municipal art be
profitable, but "by increasing the beauty of [the] city . . . [it]
enhances the prestige of a nation and by encouraging the best
instincts of the people, raises their whole moral tone." Municipal
art was becoming known equivalently as "the material dignity of the
city." "Wealth never made a great city . . . but by its character,
breadth of policy, dignity of its life, variety of interest and splendor
of appearance" shall it be known. These dreams of national prestige
seem to us now as mere coverings over a general fear that the barbarisms
and uncouthness to which American cities were subjected through their historical youth and immigrant inundations, would never completely disappear. Their hope lay in the day when the new city planning spirit "catches on" and prevails across the land, "this spirit . . . will give to American cities an eminence among the municipalities of the world, which it will be difficult to excel and impossible to overtake."36 Somehow in their zeal to achieve stature in the eyes of the world the planners were to overlook the contradictions implicit in their struggle on one hand, to remove competition among individuals and the battles, on the other hand, promoting competition among cities and nations.

Accompanying the galvanization of society, the desire for beauty in everyday surroundings was to have had an analogous effect on individual development and self-improvement. As it was expressed, ". . . the underlying motive towards beauty . . . is . . . an almost universal step in the evolution of the individual":37 this "love of beauty was a step toward the peace and calm so necessary for individual development."38 Aesthetic environments would help produce the individual characteristics influencing the moral and intellectual improvement of society. "Art as an educator will be welcomed on all sides and no longer regarded with suspicion by the 'lower half' . . . The better impulses of the people will become hereditary."39 Those individual abilities necessary for the bureaucratic workings of society would also result from public beauty for ". . . civic order and civic beauty, well kept streets and noble school houses, capable government and museums, [would] . . . teach integrity, intelligence and efficiency."40
TERMINOLOGICAL MATRIX

Semantics of Health/Disease:

Disease = \{(chaos, neglect of environment, disequilibrium, unhealthy, unnatural, pathological)/(social ills, social evils, social sin, humanity sick, humanity ignorant)\}

Health = (hygiene, sanitation)

Health = (harmony, order, equilibrium, beauty, nature, parks, pure air, breathing spots)

Health + (education, public spirit, social vaccination, healing, cure, public responsibility)

Semantics of aesthetic harmony:

Beauty = \{(art, ethic beauty, physical order, harmony)/(religion, supernatural, spirit, awakening, harmony, unity, perfection, ideal)\}

Beauty + (V 0)

V = (civilize, ameliorate, encourage, better, educate, improve, perfect, lift, raise, elevate, develop, advance, evolve, step, grow)

0 = {[(nation/common lot/city) (prestige, valor, dignity, integrity, responsibility, excellence, eminence)]/[(individual (character, mind, soul, spirit, impulses, instincts, morals, sentiments, intelligence, efficiency)]}

Beauty : {essential, vital}/[(wholesome, curative, preventive]/[(inspirative, contemplative, expressive)]/[(natural/universal) (craving/seeking/step/language)]/[joy, feeling, sentiments, pleasure]
REFERENCES: CHAPTER FIVE


2 Howe, "The City as a Socializing Agency."

3 Jordan, "The Field of Municipal Hygiene."


5 Veiller, "Buildings in Relation to Street and Site."

6 Hollis, "The Air of the City."


8 Lamb, "Municipal Art."


11 Jordan, "The Field of Municipal Hygiene."

12 Diggs, "Garden City Movement."


14 Whitlock, "The City and Civilization."

15 Blashfield, "A Word for Municipal Art."

16 Whitlock, "The City and Civilization."


19 Caffin, "The Beautifying of Cities."

20 Robinson, "City Life."


24 Diggs, "Garden City Movement.


26 Gergory, "The Coming City.

27 Churchill, "Supreme Question Facing our City and Country To-day.

28 Lamb, "Municipal Art.


30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Caffin, "The Beautifying of Cities.

33 Lamb, "Municipal Art.

34 Caffin, "The Beautifying of Cities.

35 "The City and the Citizen," The Outlook, May 9, 1903.

36 Woodruff, "City Planning in America.

37 Caffin, "The Beautifying of Cities.


39 Lamb, "Municipal Art.

40 "The City and the Citizen," The Outlook, May 9, 1903.
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT

In their attempt to obtain a stable social and physical environment, the early planners used the concept of "system" and applied it against both their endeavors to establish a systematic study of urban conditions, and their attitudes towards their object of study, the city. Today, we are quite familiar with system's concepts, indeed we tend to view them as special results of technological advancements in the field of engineering, so that it is perhaps surprising to find that system's concepts were also important ingredients in the almost pre-technical state of planning offered in Scheme one.
"System" entered the English language from the Greek "systema" meaning "organized whole." As early as the 17th century, however, "system" was used in the two alternative meanings which planning also used. In one sense "system" referred to "a set of principles, etc., a scheme, a method"; that is, "the set of correlated principles, ideas or statements belonging to some department of knowledge or belief"; "an organized scheme or plan of action"; "an orderly or regularized method of procedure." In another sense, "system" meant "an organized or connected group of objects"; "a set or assemblage of things connected, associated or interdependent so as to form a complex unity." It is in these two meanings that "system" formed such an adequate description of the early activities of planning; first in the provision of a planning procedure and second in the conception that formed a unity out of all elements that were related to the city and its inhabitants. As we shall explore, however, the concept of "system" offers several viewpoints which are either exaggerations of reality or erroneous assumptions about experiential knowledge.

A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE CITY WAS REQUIRED

One of the first reactions to contend with the problematic conditions of the city, was to propose that systematic studies be undertaken to resolve the respective disorder. During the early years of the planning movement, there could be discerned a pervasive tendency to achieve the development of a "higher urban life" as reflected in the progression of several separate, yet related movements concerned with the city's needs and responsibilities. One of
the early and most pervasive reforms was an effort to develop a "Science of Municipal Government." As Frank Prichard pointed out in 1891, not all the difficulties of the city came from dishonesty; instead the "problem of the economical and successful government of cities . . . require[d] very thorough scientific knowledge and very great scientific knowledge and very great scientific skill."\(^1\)

To a large extent, he claimed, "local independence, capital control by corporations and [the] phenomenal increase of large cities" imply that the "ordinary administration of the government . . . was inadequate, . . . a more scientific construction and a more systematic operation was [as] imperative."

A similar tendency could be seen in the philanthropic movement, for as C. M. Robinson indicated, the new university courses in the field of sociology were turning the task of "poor relief" into a legitimate career and these same courses would "make of philanthropy a science" not "a sentiment." With the collection of data, the subsequent development of a field of knowledge and a series of working plans, the "philanthropic movement passed from a fad and an impulse into conviction and honest purpose."\(^2\)

All in all, Robinson could see that the "shortcomings of our cities" were creating an honest and common desire to "treat [their] conditions scientifically and systematically."\(^3\)

By the turn of the century, the field of Municipal Hygiene could be added to the list of hopes for and salvations of the city for it was proclaimed that the city's growth and very existence . . . [was dependent upon] the proper application of methods of municipal hygiene . . . Municipal hygiene [it was suggested] should not confine itself to combating only the most dreaded or most dramatic forms of disease,
but after a scientific study of the whole problem of city life
should enter upon a carefully planned and systematic endeavor
to remove or lessen some of the causes of excessive disease.4

The housing movement was not far behind, first with the outrage
over conditions of tenement life in the early 1890's and then with the
rise of the housing inquiry . . . [so that] certain details of
housing . . . [were] becoming . . . scientifically understood;
. . . [although it was admitted that the] forms of living are
too various to permit such an investigation to develop a strict
science.5

Nevertheless, city and town planning were "the beginnings
of organized attempts to apply scientific, aesthetic and economic
principles and methods to the problem of housing civilized humanity."6

Out of these movements came the idea that the systematic
study of the city and all its problems should culminate in the produc-
tion of a general plan, for the "plan of a city . . . involves . . .
[a] comprehensive and thoughtful proposal of sequential action."7
Similar themes were revealed in the first City Planning Conference in
1909 called by the housing reformers and social workers who contended
that
town planning should regard the total influence of what is
proposed upon the character of dwelling in which the ordinary
citizen will live and upon the immediate surroundings of
that dwelling and only second the economy and perfection.8

Not to be overlooked in the attempts at comprehensiveness
was the claim that "presentation at the outset of a complete plan
. . . [would] ensure harmonious development in all its parts.9

City planning

involve[6] new terms, a wider outlook, and the co-ordination
of urban life in all its relationships . . . [so that] the
housing question . . . recreation, transportation, municipal
ownership and engineering . . . have become related parts
of the whole.10
"Comprehensively defined city planning" could be seen as arranging the public highways, buildings, parks, playgrounds, amusement and recreation centers, in an harmonious whole . . . [Thus city planning became defined as] a correlation of all the activities of the city, of aiding or restricting . . . or unifying the various parts.  

The point of focus was precisely "the bigness and complex unity of the subject as a whole."  

City planning had become a "scientific reality"; it differed from "other municipal movements which [had] . . . preceded it in being physical, mechanical, material." Consequently by the time of the third conference in City Planning in 1911, Olmsted could state that one of the major emphases which city planning must cultivate . . . [is] the conception of a city plan as a device or piece of administration machinery for preparing and keeping up to date, a unified forecast and definition of the important changes, additions and extensions to the physical equipment and arrangement of the city . . .  

"In the science of city planning the whole city is a laboratory. All its facts and symptoms are more or less under observation, but the expert city planner soon sifts the significant from the less important."  

In an article praising the "City Scientific," George B. Ford defines the meaning of "plan" as "proceeding logically from the known to the unknown."  

In almost every case [he claimed] there is one and only one logical and convincing solution of the problem involved . . . the facts [furthermore, which] we want to hunt for . . . can actually be standardized . . . [we can] change a hitherto rather capricious procedure into a highly respectable thing known as an exact science. . . . The same scientific investigation, analysis, deduction and the same definiteness in determining the best solution of the problems is now possible and feasible . . . [in the case of transportation, and sanitation, as it is in city planning].
The job of the city planner is to be in no way indefinite; in the pursuit of success, the city planner's motto had become "First know you are right, and then go ahead."\(^{18}\)

THE CONCEPT OF "SYSTEMATIC STUDY"

The analogy of the scientific method which the planners so enthusiastically applied to their study of the city, carries with it several implications concerning what we might expect about both the method and the object of study. We should, therefore, explore the implications or significations of this scientific concept. First of all, we expect that a scientific study would be pervaded with a theoretical attitude. "Theoros" in ancient Greek refers to the holy representative sent to public festivals to oversee the sacred events.
He was the typification of the impersonal onlooker. "Theatre" comes from the same stem "thea" which means "view" or "sight." Thus "theoretical attitude" comes to signify the idea that knowledge can be obtained much as in a theater or spectacle, through observations which are neutral and impersonal; or to use more modern terms, which are value-free and objective.

It appears at first sight that this objective approach of the planners is radically different from the a priori concepts of harmony which we have been considering under the problem of city chaos. In the latter analysis we have been shown how the planners viewed the environment and man as elements of a symbiotic totality. By this I mean that physical and moral order both drew their meaning and value from and yet, at the same time, created the harmonious whole. The disorder of the environment, the threat of urban violence, the failure of civic responsibility and other aspects were all related to problems of social morality and these problems, in turn, were related to the perfection of harmonious relationships between man and his environment. In this slightly metaphysical approach, it seems that objectivity or the positivistic viewpoint, introduces a radical change. The point of similarity to both the moralistic and positivistic viewpoint however, lies in the fact that they both accept the existence of some a priori rational order to the social, political, physical or moral environment which reason alone can explain.* Now in the case of social

*This is no more than the empiricists' coupling of Locke's natural law and Newton's scientific explanation, see: Gillespie, The Edge of Objectivity (Princeton, 1960).
morality, an educated "reasonable" man would perceive the limits to his actions which must exist if men were to live in harmony. Hence the planners's moral emphasis is placed upon programs of upliftance through education. The objective planner on the other hand, assumes that facts as replications of the rational order, are based upon values which are universally accepted. Hence, "reason" becomes nonarbitrary and public and, therefore, obviates the planner from the necessity of validating the correctness of his values. The objective stance, therefore, holds that the meaning of an element is determined by sense data, measurably, quantitatively determined and devoid of emotional or evaluative content. The point then is not that morality and objectivity deny one another but that they differ in their respective uses of the moral superiority of their presupposed rational order.

The objective stance of the scientific method assumes that the world can be experienced as a series of facts; more specifically, that there exists some external objective structure or order to reality instead of some internalized experiential knowledge of personal beliefs or subjective convictions. The terms "comprehensive," "total," or "whole," indicate that the city and its components could be grasped as a unity and organized as a whole. Furthermore, the continuum of reality, the field of knowledge containing urban facts, was conceived without break as is revealed by the use of such terms as "sequential," "consecutive," "coordinate," and "correlate." (Sequential = succeeding or following in order; consecutive = succeeding one another in a regular order, without break; coordinate = of equal rank or order; correlate = to connect systematically; so related, one implies the other.)
Reality, then, is perceived as a closed and ordered system; it is no more than the sum of all the facts internally linked and externally ordered. Thus the method of learning about reality is to collect facts, to understand processes and to draw relationships among elements. No matter how comprehensive, however, the totality is ever evasive because there are always more facts to collect and more relationships to be drawn. There is always, therefore, a discrepancy between the series of facts and reality itself. The continuum of reality can be cut finer and more facts can be abstracted out of reality, but the gap itself can never be closed. Moreover, the positivist's viewpoint is always onesided; he selects the facts, he defines their relationships. Facts however are historical products, they are the result not only of the observer's point of view, but of the problems and dilemmas of the historical period, the collective knowledge, values and purposes of the times as well.

These are not important considerations for planning of this period for we find it more concerned with an abstraction of the structure of parts which would determine the order of the city. This idealized sense of order dominates the process of fact-finding. The goal of the systematic analysis of urban problems thus was to obtain organized knowledge of urban reality; through a method, i.e., a plan, which would impose an order on the relationships and through rational knowledge that would lead to prediction and control over that order. As we have demonstrated, this becomes conceptually possible because of the a priori assumption of some structure to experience which can be objectively observed and recorded. Reality beyond the observational,
the measurable and replicable is not trusted as knowledge, the
subjectively experiential is removed from attention. The focus is
placed on what is, what exists is what can be observed; attitudes,
beliefs, and motives are of little concern to the scientistic
planner, interactions and subjective emotions are unknown.

One of the tenets of the scientistic method is its rationality
over and above the realm of guesswork and probability. The field
of knowledge being closed and ordered, objects of knowledge can be
measured with certainty and therefore lead to law-like hypotheses
for the purpose of explanation and prediction. The idealism of
these early planners enabled them to believe that scientific observa-
tion would guide the solution of urban problems, for "rationality" is
also synonymous with deliberate or purposive action; a goal or end
orientation. "Purposive" assumes thoughtfulness and reasonableness,
as well as regulation and authoritativeness; an implied mastery
over problems and objects of experience. "Purposive" implies as
well an idea of foresight which the planners mistook for predicta-
bility. It also, consequently, presumes the ability to forego
immediate rewards for the pleasures of distant goals; a concern which
any disorder threatens.

Purposive reasoning however does not necessitate a rational
order to the city's components. Planners assumed this link and in so
doing created the idea of planning as a method for unifying and
controlling urban knowledge. As Jurgen Habermas has pointed out,
planning becomes a second order system operating at a level above sys-
tems of purposive-rational action; a system which concerns the
maintenance, expansion and improvement of systems of purposive-rational action. But other ideas such as "plurality," "communication," "power," "interests" will never provide rational harmony; by necessity they are elements which conflict with each other. The concept of "system" occurs at a level abstracted above these ideas of conflict and chaos and therefore pays more attention to the method for meshing components, the adaptation of parts, and the procuring of efficiency and productivity. The city becomes the systematizer's machine, its form and function are united. Perfect unity and harmony are the goals which technical methods will first master and then manage and manipulate. Planning thus comes to focus on the principles of organization and the problem of management.

Systematic planning results in rational action; logical, consistent, deliberate, instrumental and strategic intervention into the affairs of the city. Talcott Parsons has explained that rational action or means-end analysis pursues possible goals with available means. Non-utopian, non-exploratory, rational planning action is therefore pragmatically concerned with the description of the world as it appears to the planner of the day. Rational action becomes the method by which planners resolve the problems of the city; the solutions being determined by the fixed conclusions of order and perfection embedded in the concept of means-end efficiency. We shall further discuss this problem below.
THE CONCEPT OF "SYSTEMATIC STUDY" (Terminology)

\[
\text{scientific method}_1 = \text{scientific (knowledge, facts, observation, principles, standardization, understanding, study, analysis, inquiry, investigation, deduction, skill, construction, treatment)}
\]

\[
\text{scientific method}_2 = \text{Plan}
\]

\[
\text{Plan}_1 = \text{plan}_1/\text{plan}_2/\text{plan}_3
\]

\[
\text{Plan}_1 = \text{A} 0
\]

\[
\text{A} = \text{(systematic, sequential, consecutive, comprehensive)}
\]

\[
\text{O} = \text{(action, operation, treatment, endeavor)}
\]

\[
\text{Plan}_2 = V 0
\]

\[
\text{V} = \text{(coordinate, correlate, relate, arrange, harmonize, unify)}
\]

\[
\text{O} = \text{(whole, all parts, total influence)}
\]

\[
\text{Plan}_3 = \text{(device, machinery, physical plan)}
\]

\[
\text{Plan} = \text{purposive}
\]

\[
\text{purposive} = 0_1 V 0_2
\]

\[
0_1 = \text{(thoughtful, logical, conviction, definite, right, careful, honest)}
\]

\[
V = \text{(forecast, propose, execute, solve, determine)}
\]

\[
0_2 = [(\text{physical/mechanical/material}) \text{ (changes, additions, extensions)}]
\]
THE CITY AS A SYSTEM

The structure of the city system: The birth of the comprehensive concept of planning offered two fundamental standpoints from which to view the city: the first was the city as a unified whole, and the second that this whole contained the beginnings of a concept of an urban framework or structure. Both these concepts, as we shall explore later, are crucial to a systems viewpoint. The lessons of the Worlds' Fair in 1893 had taught "the need of design and plan for whole cities... and the harmonious design...[and] unity of a comprehensive plan." The suggestions of a plan, civic centers, neighborhood centers all were based on the need for what was at one point termed "intra-mural communication... the unification of the entire metropolitan district." City planning treated the "city as a unit, as an organic whole." Before these early planning efforts, there had been few "attempts to apply large scale planning to the idea of the city as a functioning unit."

As well as unity, the urban whole contained an inherent shape and structure. Consequently, "replanning of cities... has to do with the urban framework made up of streets and avenues and space... It treats of the skeleton of the city, that which gives the city its constructional form." Besides having a skeleton, the urban form had a "nucleus" as well as boundaries so that to be "developed as a comprehensive whole... it must be from the foundations upward, centre to circumference." Slowly the idea developed that the "monotonous lack of local structural design... in our outspread cities...[was because they failed to be] looked at as wholes."
Every system contains internal relationships: As has been demonstrated above, the problems of the environment were viewed as multifarious but interdependent whether the subject was the urban chaos, the city slums, congestion, public health, housing needs or municipal art. The awakening of the city to its problems was, therefore, synonymous to "society . . . [becoming] increasingly conscious of vital interdependences and relationships"29 concerning the needs of urban life. It was not long before the other movements were concerned with the study of "comprehensive systems of interrelated" components. The physical city was soon described as the "result of coordinate action of housing and city planning, each also acting and counteracting upon each other."30 John Nolen maintained that "the new term 'city planning' stands in a growing appreciation of a city's organic unity, of the interdependence of its diverse elements, and of the profound and inexorable manner in which the future of this great organic unit is controlled by the actions and omissions of today."31

The organic unity of a city: Having obtained some conceptual apparatus dealing with the structure and interrelationships within the city system, there were soon those who imbued the city with its own life-like processes and it was not a far leap to the use of organic metaphors. As we have shown above, the definitions or descriptions of the city as a unit were quickly termed "organic wholes" or "organic unities." One of the more visible changes in the city structure, the constant expansion of the city's boundaries, also lent itself to the obvious analogy that "a town is not a static proposition, but of the nature of a growing organism."32 Critics damned the American city because "no organic
arrangement accompanied these great structures." What was needed, claimed the advocates of the Civic and Neighborhood centers, was "a new network of pulsating centers . . . [to yield] efficient organic character in these outspread cities."34

"We are concerned," the planners told us, "with a continuous vital process of the social organism which we call the city." We thus conceive the city plan as a live thing, as a growing and gradually changing aggregation of accepted ideas or projects or physical changes in the city, all consistent with each other and each surviving by its own merit and virtue of harmonizing with the rest."35 City planning was thus "an attempt to make cities perfect, complete organisms."37

An organic whole was conceptually related to nature; to living, perfect elements which contained some implication of purity, innocence as well as curative powers. There was something complete and good about the concept of an organic whole and we find these themes throughout the idea of the city as an organic entity. "The beauty of a city [we were told] must be organic, in-dwelling, not applied on the outside; must lie in fitness, convenience and ease."38 Or equivalently, "whatever is good in a municipal plan or architectural design has an organic motive . . . [and is] developed from the nature of the site."39 Therefore, it was claimed, civic centers were not artificial devices but were "purely natural growth[s] derived from primitive circumstances and from the requirements of local convenience."40

The problems of the city were simply the reordering of the organic relations between man and his environment, or in other words "the adjustment of city life to what may be called the organic needs including the physical health of the people."41
Organisms, functions, and life-giving processes are all closely related concepts aiding the classifications of reality. They imply a sense of organization in that the life-offering elements are the most important characteristics; so too the analogy of the parts of the city as life-yielding components underlines their importance. Planners pointed out that "each organ in the functional life of a town should be insisted upon at the very outset. . . . Towns [it could be demonstrated] have it in their power to grow right and to grow healthy and wealthy by so doing." But "the American city has neglected its site . . . its plumbing . . . the vital organs of the city . . . they failed to see they form the sensory, the circulatory system of the community. European cities [however] recognize these organs as life-giving ones." Since "the body's healthy glow comes from good circulation, so it is with the big city. A good circulatory apparatus is necessary to its general vitality and to its beauty."

The need to adjust and control the city system: Along with the concept of a city system goes the point of view that every part should have its appropriate place and the totality should present an appearance of well-orderedness. One of the earliest city concepts which yielded this sense of order was a belief in the aesthetic arrangement of the city proper. Since the "dream of the White city [1893], . . . beauty awakes our dormant sense of form and appropriateness in architecture and environment and show[s] what planning could accomplish." "The City Beautiful . . . [was] a permanent denial of the assumption that the city must of necessity be an uncontrolled behemoth of ugliness and disorder." It was held with clairvoyancy that we must begin "to think
of the town as a communal house to be made well-ordered and beautiful... because from the chaos and ugliness of the American cities flows too palpably our economic and human waste.""47 Although the City beautiful movement was generally held responsible for the reordering of the city along aesthetic lines, the park movement also "tend[ed] to breed a desire for beauty and order in the sections where they exist[ed]... As... any example of ugliness and disorder seem[ed] to contaminate its vicinity, so the presence of a park... seem[ed] to spread a benign influence.""48

Anyone could see that the cities were out of control; indeed "a city without a plan [was] like a ship without a rudder.""49 "We have failed to control the city's superstructure [it was moaned]": "we need experts to control this city behemoth.""51 It was hoped that the awakening of the cities would "stimulate [them] to action, to prevent the direful conditions of congestion and maladjustment..." and would compel each municipality to "recognize its protective and preventive function.""52 Within a given system, everything has its proper function and place. Any discrepancy from this ideal stirs up a storm of protest and condemnation so that great expenditure is called forth to adjust the system to equilibrium. Congestion, maladjustment, chaos and disorder had thwarted normal development of the city but the planners believed with cardinal faith that "a plan [would] develop normalcy." "City planning [would see]... the adaptation of a city to its proper functions... [with] real criterion for its standards and its efficiency.""53 The growing group of architects and sociologists involved with the betterment of city conditions were called upon to
"design fit groupings for local institutions . . . with a view to the better performance of their proper functions."\(^{54}\)

City planning was the answer! It was "no idle folly but the habit of a majority of well-ordered cities."\(^{55}\) As John Nolen described however, "'City Planning' is a phrase much more often used than defined . . . [it is] an appeal for the substitution of order in the place of chaos in town growth."\(^{56}\) As we have described above the concept of both the comprehensive scope of planning as well as the unity of the city viewed as a system were becoming gradually dominating and conceptually orienting points of view around which the planning profession would come to mobilize. Consequently, when John Nolen described the definitions and scope of "city planning" in 1919 he could summarize all these concepts by saying that "city planning is the intelligent control and guidance of the physical conformation, growth and alteration of cities, towns and parts thereof considered in their entirety."\(^{57}\)

**THE SEMANTICS OF A CITY SYSTEM**

The census of 1890 marked the end of the American frontier; no longer to be conceived of as an expanding nation, the romance of the frontier had ended and with it the dreams of conquest and competition. It was time for America to turn inward and focus on her city life; to come face-to-face with its urban problems. As Frank Norris explained in an article in 1901 called "The Frontier Gone at Last," American patriotism now meant civic pride. History had progressed to the age of cities and it was time to turn away from the romantic frontier characteristics of rugged individualism and limitless expansion and
turn toward the construction of a new urban social order. This new order would stress the need for cooperative efforts within closed national boundaries. Reflecting the national dilemma at the city level, the early planners became concerned with the abstract principle of the city "system." The city is not in reality a system; this is an abstraction, for a "system" can neither be seen or experienced. Merely an intellectual construct, the idea of a "system" is helpful in understanding the problems accompanying the growing awareness of the city as a whole, with its boundaries and ordered relationships.

**System properties:** The city was conceived of as a bounded system much like the human body in need of external cure for its internal ailments. The cure, however, could not be piecemeal; it demanded an exhaustive awareness of the city body as an entity in and of itself, an image that offered an idea of something special, some greater concept in the city whole than in its respective parts. In part this unity was a symbolic representation of social solidarity. We shall explore later how the
planners had to mould a sense of cooperation and communication out of the individualistic temperament of those who made up the parts of the social city. For others, however, the urban totality referred to a desired spatial whole which would organize all the heretofore random parts into a coherent order; again we refer back to the idea of system implicit in the concept of order. Either idea, however, refers to an additive relationship among the city parts which can be built one upon the other to form the sum of the city whole. But the city was more than the sum of its parts, it was a concept implying completeness, perfection, total harmony, devoid of defects or omissions, and in this sense the city whole was symbolic for the procurement of all the social needs and social services requisite of a good life; a concept of utopia towards which the planners would direct society.

One of the fundamental properties of systems is the idea of connection and interdependence of parts, the obvious image of connection being that of the skeleton of a body or the framework of a building. It is these arrangements, whether physical or conceptual, that create a system, hold it together and integrate it. The problem of an urban system is that the parts and connections even at the physical level are innumerable and it is exhaustively impossible to account for all the consequences and determinisms, although a cohesive system demands that nothing contain an independent status, unrelated or prior to subsequent causes.

The result of this imagery, however, is to direct attention to those simplistic relations and elements that can be observed; the flow and congestion of traffic or the disorderly arrangement of land uses,
and not to the more subtle relations between the people and the government, their needs and the city's resources. Furthermore, only the isolated parts of the city, its people, buildings, institutions, pathways, all those elements and properties and processes which have material representations and can be visually differentiated or sensually experienced create the total city "picture." Thus it is that in the interest of order, the parts lend themselves to alteration, the structures can be redefined, the total abstract city can be methodically reordered and the total unity redefined; but the system's contradictions and historical relationships, such as the fear of the mob, the desire to gain world stature, the industrial production and distribution requirements, the economic centralization of monopoly power, the class distinctions between the worker and the wealthy, contradictions which made order problematic in the first place are no longer questioned. The dialectical system of order which I have been defining reveals the multifarious and reciprocal interdependencies between the different levels of moral, social, physical, aesthetic, and spiritual order. As soon as reality was externally defined by abstract principles of organization and management, the dialectical process between order and reality was lost. This is what Karel Kosik has called "false totality" where the formalized whole is given a "superior reality" in which its creation and development are no longer understood or reflected upon, in which its organization becomes so refined that it no longer reveals fundamental socio-political contradictions.
At times, symbolizing only a push-pull connection, interrelatedness can also imply the ability of a system to over-compensate for interventions and return the system to equilibrium. This concept leads us to the final system's property of adjustment. The source of energy or power to drive the adaptive mechanisms is accepted as given. For the planners, what is important is the belief that society and the environment can be managed and driven from a centralized authority. Not offering an explanation of how the process of adaptation operates, it does however reveal the planner's conservative concept of a managed city: one which maintains stability and conforms to an established set of values, one which recognizes its preventive and protective responsibilities.

The organic analogy: The protean system for the planners was the organic system. Borrowing Herbert Spencer's organic metaphor (organism/society), planners modified its use for city comparison. The organic system typifies the characteristics of wholeness and interdependence as exemplified through
the subservient and vital functioning of each part of an organism (e.g., take away the heart and the body dies, cut the system and pain is felt). Thus, viewing the city as an organism, as some totality greater than the sum of its parts, added strength to the planner's need to develop a concept of solidarity and centralization in the minds of its individualistic citizens for the metaphor added the persuasive concept of life or death of a city, a reality superior to factual proof. The key idea, embedded in the organic analogy is the notion of life. Each part of the organic whole functions in such a way as to be completely supportive of this life process. The systemic functionings of the city, its vital organs, became therefore an essential determinant of the city's health and life-support. Spencer conservatively held, however, that no one or no government should intervene to legislate this cooperative effort among the organic parts under fear that the complex order and harmony, the natural and inherent meaning of these components would be dramatically altered. The planner's analogy, however, supported the belief that it was their role to see that the life-supportive processes of the city were allowed to function and this would at times necessitate legislative resuscitation.

Aligned with the idea of life is the concept of growth. Again the Spencerian notion inferred that as all organisms grow they acquire greater complexity in structure and they progress toward some ultimate ideal perfection. These teleological ideas held powerful implications for the city. First of all we have shown how the concepts of disorder and chaos were dependent in part upon rapid conditions of growth and expansion of city size. For some, this growth was a sign of "upward
progress" of civilization, its "natural growing pains" and the Spencerian arguments added support to their convictions. Secondly, these notions offered a sense of security and optimism in the positivistic belief that the city too operated under natural laws of growth that progressed steadily toward some advanced stage of civilization. For many, it became a repugnant idea to curtail any aspect of this natural evolution; progress was, as Spencer held, a "beneficent necessity." If chaos prevailed at the moment, evolutionary history would show that the city too evolved purposively and perfectly toward some ideal form of harmony and stability, wealth and happiness where all conditions of evil would completely disappear.
THE SEMANTICS OF A CITY SYSTEM (Terminology)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>system</td>
<td>: (whole/structure/parts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whole</td>
<td>= (unity, entirety, general, comprehensive, large-scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structure</td>
<td>= (form, conformation, arrangement, framework, skeleton, construction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parts</td>
<td>= [(nucleus/center) (circumference/boundaries/walls) foundations/body]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>system interdependence</td>
<td>= (counteract, relate, coordinate, communicate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>system adjustment</td>
<td>= (adapt, control, guide, compel, prevent, protect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic system</td>
<td>= [organic (whole/unity/growth/arrangement/character/function/beauty/motive/needs)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organic</td>
<td>= (life-giving, growth, wealth, health)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organic</td>
<td>: (good/normal/natural/proper function/in-dwelling)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organic</td>
<td>→ (order, harmony, symmetry, beauty, fitness, convenience, ease, efficiency, well-orderedness, appropriate, proper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vital organs</td>
<td>= (plumbing system, sensory system, circulatory system)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE PROBLEM OF WASTE

The planners posited that there was a perfect inviolable order to the city and to achieve such order they imposed a concept of "system" upon the city's elements and people. We have shown that dirt was any matter which was left over from this systematic ordering, any item which produced confusion and disarray among the belief of beneficial order and clarity. Waste is a threat to the idea of system; it is matter which destroys the concept of system. In the attempt to re-establish order in the city, waste was one of the basic enemies from which the city needed to be protected. Besides this materialistic view, waste could be envisaged from two quasi-economical standpoints: that of utility and that of efficiency. The reform movement, in adopting a utilitarian stance, subjected all institutions and social efforts to the supreme test of usefulness in support of the welfare of man. The
concept of system underlined this notion by requiring each part and form of the city to function in support of the needs and goals of the whole. On the other hand, a city system was an efficient city; a technically well-oiled machine, all parts meshing well and all parts arranged in a harmonious whole.

Public art, physical reform and eventually city planning were subjugated means to attaining middle class enjoyments of orderly and harmonious environments. Not to be valued for aesthetic qualities alone, these movements were judged from their usefulness in elevating the citizens of the city and advancing the economic status of the town. Failing to demonstrate its utility, the city beautiful movement had received an immense amount of criticism for emphasizing the purely aesthetic and physical aspects of the city in the face of so many other ills and disorders. The challenge to offer a greater function for architectural and artistic perfection in the city was met straight on, for as early as 1893 the claims were made that

utility is economic, . . . but artistic utility is greater economy. The lines of beauty are lines of utility. Let a problem be solved from the point of view of art . . . and all other requirements, such as utility, economy, sanitation, and convenience, are solved also. When the intention proceeds upon correct principles and methods, whatever the cost, economic results are assured.59

A few years later it could be claimed that "Americans are reaching the point where they see and realize that utility and beauty are not antagonists, but handmaids, who, when working harmoniously together, produce far greater results than the sum of their separate efforts."60 Efficiency
thus defined its own dominating self-justification. As Marcuse has
pointed out, a presupposition involving "correct principles and
methods" and efficient systems removes the political necessity for
public choice, reflection and justification over the methods chosen,
the systems established and the principles applied. 61

As the movement passed from an overt emphasis of the aesthetics
of the city, to a more general emphasis on the complexity of the city,
accompanied by innumerable extensions to the scope of city planning
itself, it began to be queried whether this very comprehensiveness
might

stand as [an] obstacle in the path of its practical application
... this new social ideal of unified and comprehensive city
planning insisting that it is a duty to study and provide for
the remoter needs of the city and to consider the remoter con-
sequences of every change proposed, may easily appear a counsel
of theoretical perfection leading into a fathomless ocean of
investigations, and encumbering the route toward effective
partial accomplishments. 62

The answer, which was to become part of the common vocabulary of
the planner, was to be found in the "commonsense application" of
the planning ideal. The utility of planning in the face of chaos
and complexity was to remain a recurrent theme; "the city test
[would be one] of practicality and results." 63

On the other hand, the challenge to the disorder of the city
lay in the claims that it created an inefficient city, inefficient in
time, money, and comfort, and consequently was wasteful both of public
and private resources. The challenge that would be forever held up
to planning was one of "economic self-defense." It was clear in the
climate of opinion in America, that "the future of town-planning ...
depends on whether it can be shown to pay for itself ... [everything]
depends upon its economic success." There had been early claims that "civic art pays" because it attracted a higher class of people who could help pay for city expenses, it brought tourists flocking into the towns, and it increased the value in real estate. Since the pressure was upon planning to prove itself a commercial success, planning formed a liaison with the business interests of the community. It was felt that "the demands of beauty are . . . identical with those of efficiency and economy." C. M. Robinson could show that there was indeed a strong argument for the value of money behind the movement for city improvement, for "the lesson sought [is that] ... it is financially worthwhile for a city to make itself attractive; lovely to look upon, comfortable to live in, inspiring and interesting. 'To the City that hath, more shall be given.'" John Nolen could add to this by claiming that one of the general principles which should govern the preparation of a city plan is "economy and the saving of waste in an endeavor to secure the desired results for a minimum of expense." The motive for planning had become the securing of "comfort, convenience, and happiness at minimum financial and personal cost." In addition to supporting the commercial adventures of the city, planning would also demonstrate "the requisite business sagacity in the development of these public service enterprises." The replanning of cities was defined as "one great remoulding of the cities, modernizing them by recasting them on scientific lines, on lines of business convenience, good sense, of social service and of art." The awakening of the cities in their desire for "artistic public buildings [was seen] . . . as a sign of business sense and the [desire] . . . for
parks and playgrounds [was held] . . . necessary to efficient business.\textsuperscript{72}

In seeking their own reforms, planners had turned to support the middle class businessman or professional; those men, whom R. Hofstadter describes, as being the backbone of the reform movement, those men whose power had been usurped by the giant corporations and ward bossism and who sought municipal reforms as a way to regain their legitimate power. If the planners were not motivated by desires for power and control of the city's enterprises, they did, nevertheless, see that the future of city planning lay in establishing sound business tactics in order to prove to the monied interests of the city how financially successful physical reforms could be. They neither called on the support of government in their efforts, nor did they look to the monopolistic enterprises to subsidize their work. Instead, they turned to their fellow businessmen and professionals. Thomas Adams summarized these intentions when he described that "the first object of town planning is to conserve and provide for the extension of its business interest . . . the root questions [of planning] were its economic and engineering development."\textsuperscript{73}

By the turn of the century, it was feared that the appalling urban conditions had themselves called forth much good but harmful waste in the duplication of relief organizations forming the "urban philanthropic" movement. Their desire for efficiency in everything, recalls the Roman principle of the "economy of forms" valuing the fewest number of institutions and the least amount of duplication of efforts.\textsuperscript{76} In this respect, C. M. Robinson was cheered to see the development of a movement toward what he termed "a protest against waste
and duplication . . . employing the advantages of economy and system
and efficiency and procurement of data for scientific social study"; 75
"unless [the cities'] endeavors rest upon basic facts showing condi-
tions and tendencies, it is likely to sink into oblivion . . . for
lack of efficiency." 76 Therefore, the city planning movement soon
felt that its fundamental purpose, as John Nolen tells us, was "to
save waste, the almost incalculable waste due to unskillful and
planless procedure." 77 The movement was directed at cultivating the

conception of a city plan as a device . . . [for] a unified
forecast and definition of the important changes, . . . of
the physical equipment and arrangement of the city . . . so
as to avoid . . . ignorantly wasteful action and ignorantly
wasteful inaction. 78

THE EMERGING PATTERN OF THE CITY PLAN

While the planning movement vacillated from one focus to
another, it meanwhile was developing its own awareness of the city and
of the problems it wished to relieve as well as a conceptual apparatus
with which to attack the sources of neglect. Slowly the concept and
meaning of the general plan began to take form. It was generally
believed that "if cities . . . were planned first and induced to grow
accordingly there would not be so much of a contrary depravity in
their makeup. Intention does not precede growth; they grow first and
the rational order of creation is reversed." 79 "[We must have] deliberate
comprehensive planning from the beginning . . . [to stop cities which]
grow up along lines of least resistance and inobedience to immediate
needs, with practically little thought of the future and none of the
aesthetic side." 80 Nothing of "importance should be undertaken singly,
but rather as a part of a general plan for city improvement." 90
Along with a consideration for the general plan, came the emphasis on the physical city. "That the town should be laid out with reference to the purposes of its use, in itself marks a revolutionary step in city planning as practiced in America, and yet unless this is done we cannot reasonably say that we are practicing city planning."91 City planners must figure out how to "lay out the city [so] that evil results from it will be minimized."92 By 1910, it was shown that the phrase "city planning"... [had] already been given an enlarged meaning... [referring to] plans relating to the physical side of the city's development and includ[ing] planning for the intellectual and the moral, the industrial, the commercial and the economic development of the city.93

But this was not all that was to be included in the city planning concept, for much effort was directed against

the short-sighted American custom of striking debit and credit balances for the month or year instead of the decade or generation [which] is against the kind of foresight which constitutes the first essential of good town and city planning... foresight is the vital essence which produces the concrete thing we call the plan.94

The complex subject of city planning had come to embrace "the intelligent control and guidance of the entire physical growth and alteration of cities."95 As John Nolen pointed out, the most significant ideas of the planning movement were first of all the awareness of "the increasing dependence of the individual upon the prosperity of the city as a whole; the importance of planning, not merely for the routine requirements, but also for those of the future; and the necessity... to coordinate the planning of various features."96
THE SEMANTICS OF WASTE

The rhetoric of waste becomes apparent under an exploration of the terms which define it: waste = (Inefficient/impractical/unnecessary/planless/maladjustment/economic expense/duplication). "Waste" belongs to those "dialectical terms" which are best expressed in reference to what they are not, having no precise positive descriptors. Using the negative of such words as efficiency, practical, skillful, etc., focuses attention of the privation of conditions accepted as positive benefits; they thereby commit the user to a specific position of value, and completely forbid the negative threat.

The meaning of utility and efficiency in the ethic of waste: Social service was the ultimate standard of "utility." The city beautiful, public buildings, the city plan were useful only if they increased the level of civilization to which the city might rise, if they augmented the authority or control over the rabble in the streets, if they increased the coffers of the town. The service and function of
each art object and every planned component for the city were delegated
to conform to the standard of utility. Things were valued only because
they were useful for something; everyone and everything had to be
reformed for some purpose or function. The poor and the immigrant would
be rehabilitated to provide useful labor and the town would be reshaped
to elevate and control its citizens. Equal results from equal expendi-
tures thus became the test of utility. To judge the usefulness of an
object is to be concerned over its accomplishments. The services or
advantages it provides are the sole value of its existence. To expect
a balance between outputs and investments, to manipulate objects to
provide maximum service, to look for immediate results are technological
axioms which place all their stress on the order and value of the means
to the confusion of the ends. Questions concerning the correctness of
functions or the usefulness of benefits for the ultimate receivers
or the principles upon which social ends depend are never raised.

Technical notions of economy moreover demand requirements
of efficiency; the ordering of means to ensure the greatest results
from the least expenditure. Subjecting the city to these requirements
implies it must be well suited to use; convenient, comfortable, well-
ordered, and pleasing. But more than this, the efficient city commands
the best results for the most parsimonious effort and money. A perfectly
ordered city is imperative for an efficient city; for what is accidental
is costly in time, effort and resources necessary to achieve an adjusted
balance. An efficient city alone was believed capable of accumulating
great wealth and prestige. Urban economy thus took on a warped meaning
of usefulness and thrift. The city concept stood stripped of its joyful
inefficiency and irrational juxtaposition of events, awaiting an alienated man who could be adjusted to this perfect ordering.

The intentions of the plan: Planning is rational, purposive decision-making and action, the junction of rational choice with the utilitarian concept of purpose. But this language of planning presents us with a context-free domain. Specifically supportive of the principles of rational control, calculated efficiency and purposive guidance, the sought goals and the manipulated material which are dependent upon the definition of a given context are left as abstractions. Planning as a second-order system can be applied to numerous domains; the city, the economy, a factory, a personal life. So defined, planning thus operates at two levels; the everyday world of objects and practical values and the abstract world of management and organization. It is this distinction which has allowed planning to be used as instrumental action focusing solely upon the perfection of its method and process to the exclusion of interaction with the everyday domain and indifferent to many of the needs of men defined outside of the systemic needs. Stripped of its content, the method can itself become a universal force to which all special interests become subjugated.

Purposive: Planning is purposive because it searches for information by which it can successfully anticipate, predict, and control future actions. Purposive action is mediated by the process of careful, determined reasonings and deductions about current events and future
directions. It assumes the dominant interests are those of certainty and control; of calculable relationships among measurable entities. The supreme goal of purposive action would be quantification of all properties and relationships to ensure the ability to project and control all future events. Planning thus imposes a matrix of meanings upon reality; it is "rational," "deliberate," concerned with "control and foresight."

**Domination:** Planning as a technical activity, is subordinated to a concept of domination. Attacking Max Weber's idea of technical domination, Marcuse points out that it is not bureaucratic domination or pure technical reason per se which enslave men but it is the concept and form of technical reason allowing for such domination that is to blame.

The very concept of technical reason is perhaps ideological. Not only the application of technology but technology itself is domination [of nature and men] ... methodical, scientific, calculated, calculating control. Specific purposes and interests of domination are not foisted upon technology "subsequently" and from the outside; they enter the very construction of the technical apparatus. Technology is always a historical-social project: in it is projected what a society and its ruling interests intend to do with men and things. Such a "purpose" of domination is "substantive" and to this extent belongs to the very form of technical reason.96

The idea of "the mastery of nature" leads to the concept of scientific method as an "instrument of domination"; as we have shown, city planning tried to extend the scientific method to the mastery of the city and the mastery of man. To achieve a better life, a more
convenient city existence, man must submit to the technical rules of the city plan. In exchange for his loss of freedom, he receives a more orderly and comfortable life. This is what Marcuse calls "the great rationalization of the unfreedom of man and demonstrates the 'technical' impossibility of being autonomous, of determining one's own life."\( ^{99} \) Planners believed their methods were correct, indeed their vocabulary ensures certainty and validity. They dealt with "principles," "essence," and "root questions," they proceeded on "correct principles," and "fundamental purposes." This accounts for an implicit political domination of rational action, for as Habermas points out,\( ^{100} \) it lies beyond the realm of interests wherein choices are made, it demonstrates its certainty by removing the necessity for discussions over principles and directions. It proceeds upon correct assumptions and imposes an order upon the city. In return for this power, it offers a predetermined concept of a better life.

BUSINESS INTERESTS

Politically astute, the planners aligned themselves with the monied interest by supporting and extending the business interests of the community. Economic growth of a town would become one of the major
apologies for city rehabilitation. If it could pay for itself or show its pecuniary implications, then the plans would be realized; if not they would remain dusty blueprints upon the shelf. Since city wealth was considered to be public welfare, if a few were caused to suffer from planning actions, they would in the end benefit from the greater economic stability of the whole.

In 1911 an economic argument was offered that underlines the recurrent theme of business support and extension.

If public buildings are to be built at the existing center of the city, where their presence will not materially enhance present values, and where the land which they occupy must be taken from the best part of the city's tax roll, public welfare will be little benefited by the expenditure, and the city may lose many valuable historic associations. . . If . . . sites for the new buildings be chosen in poor quarters which may be transformed and made valuable, the land will cost the city less, the revenue from taxation, instead of being decreased, would be increased, and old associations would be preserved. In

As well as providing a model to direct efficient city improvements, the business enterprise and the planners held many similar convictions. First of all city reforms were first to be called for by the local chambers of commerce. These reforms sought efficient municipal governments and centralized control over city-wide regions in order to secure economic extension and control by local businessmen. Secondly, planners believed they could support the business interest by creating efficient and convenient cities. And finally, they knew the only road to implementation required the support of the city's economic enterprises.
THE SEMANTICS OF WASTE (Terminology)

Waste

(INefficient/impractical/unskillful/planless/maladjustment/economic expense/duplication)

utility = (economy/beauty/social service)
efficiency = (economy/beauty)
economy = (economy, economy, economy)
utility : (results, effective, accomplishments, consequences, advantage, worthwhile, use, practicality, purpose, application)
economy₁ = (convenience, comfort, happiness, inspiring, interesting)
economy₂ = (order, system, scientific, whole)
economy₃ = (minimum cost, minimum expense, pay for itself)

(General/Physical) plan = (deliberate comprehensive plan, induced growth, rational order, control, guidance, device, forecast, foresight)

plan : (essence, essential, governing principles, general principles, fundamental purpose, motive, correct principles, root questions)

BUSINESS INTERESTS (Terminology)

Planning

= (V)(0)
V = (consider/study/treat/intend/secure/insist/compel/conserve/extend/develop/provide)
0 = (utility, efficiency, business interests)
business interests = (business convenience, business sense, business sagacity, economic development)
REFERENCES: CHAPTER SIX


2 Robinson, "City Life."

3 Ibid.

4 Jordan, "The Field of Municipal Hygiene."


6 Atterbury, "Model Towns in America."

7 Harder, "The City's Plan."


9 Howe, "The Remaking of the American City."

10 Ibid.

11 Helen G. Preston, "City Planning," The Outlook, December 24, 1919.

12 Olmsted, "Reply of the City Planning Conference."

13 Howe, "The Remaking of the American City."

14 Flagg, "Public Buildings."


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.
153.


19 Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 201–317.


22 Burnham, "White City and Capital City."

23 Woodruff, "City Planning in America."

24 Howe, "The Remaking of the American City."

25 Smith, "The Reconstructed City."

26 Charles M. Robinson, "The Replanning of Cities," *Charities and the Commons*, February 1, 1908.


29 Wychoff, "Incidents of Slums."

30 Crawford, "The Interrelationship of Housing and Community Planning."


32 Atterbury, "Model Towns in America."

33 Caffin, "The Beautifying of Cities."

34 Hooker, "City Planning and Political Areas."


36 Ibid.

Woodruff, "The National Impulse for Civic Improvement."

Sylvester Baxter, "The Civic Center—A Dominant Aesthetic Feature," Charities and the Commons, February 1, 1908.

Ibid.

Collier, "City Planning and the Problem of Recreation."

Edward T. Hartman, "Town Planning," Charities and the Commons, February 1, 1908.

Howe, "The City as a Socializing Agency."

George E. Hooker, "Traffic and the City Plan," Charities and the Commons, February 1, 1908.

McFarland, "The Growth of City Planning in America."

Godfrey, "The Air of the City."

Bourne, "Our Unplanned Cities."


Marsh, An Introduction to City Planning.

Gregory, "The Coming City."

Howe, "City Sense."

Marsh, An Introduction to City Planning.

Ibid.

Hooker, "City Planning and Political Areas."


Nolen, City Planning.

Nolen, New Ideals in Planning.

Karel Kosik, "The Concrete Totality," Telos, IV (Fall, 1969), 35-54.

Harder, "The City's Plan."

Woodruff, "City Planning in America."
155.

1 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, p. 82.

2 Nolen, City Planning.

3 Ibid.

4 Atterbury, "Model Towns in America."

5 Krielin, "The City Beautiful."

6 Frederick L. Olmsted, "Basic Principles of City Planning," The American City, August, 1910.

7 Robinson, "City Life.

8 Nolen, New Ideals in Planning.

9 Howe, "The Garden Cities of England."


11 Robinson, "The Replanning of Cities."


13 Adams, "Town Planning Principles."


15 Robinson, "City Life."

16 "Art Commissions and City Planning," The American City, February, 1914.

17 Nolen, "New Ideals in Planning."

18 Olmsted, "Reply of the City Planning Conference."

19 Harder, "The City's Plan."

20 Woodruff, "City Planning in America."

21 Olmsted, "A City Planning Program."

22 Walker, "Gaining Public Support."

23 Ibid.
93 "City Planning and Urban Congestion," The Outlook, June 11, 1910.
94 Atterbury, "Model Towns in America."
95 Olmsted, "Reply of the City Planning Conference."
96 Nolen, City Planning.
98 Marcuse, Negations, pp. 223-224.
100 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, pp. 81-122.
101 Flagg, "Public Buildings."
Laissez faire: One of the most fundamental issues which the early planners, or for that matter all of the reformers, had to contend with was the sacred quality of free enterprise, of laissez faire management of individuals or groups. Whether the issue was tenement housing, municipal art, public improvements, street and building restrictions, the question boiled down to what each individual considered his private rights. "Nothing short of the strongest pressures will avail to convince him that these individual rights
Almost any suggestion concerning the improvement of the city seemed to place some "restrictions upon individuals and corporations . . . [all of which] interferes with that liberty which is the essence of American institutions." As one journal article in the American City wrote, "Inhibition . . . Permission . . . Compulsion . . . 'thou shalt not,' 'thou mayest,' 'thou must' . . . by these three signs may be designated the pathways of city planning progress."

Before these claims of progress could be pronounced by planners in 1916, it was first necessary to create a "public consensus" that would permit these inhibitions or restrictions and which would enable their directives to be followed with some degree of compulsion. Even in the early years of this century, the issues of planning regulations were accepted by some as a battle between the "socialists" or "collectivists" and the "capitalists" and extreme "democrats." As one writer spoke, in reference to the Garden City movement, the battle lines were drawn around these terms;

to the Socialists the terms, "capitalism," "commercialism," "employer" and "employed" will be offensive . . . any degree of affiliation with those concomitants of the competitive system . . . [would be] regarded as perilous to progress. Equally the extreme democrat and commercialist will denounce the Garden City plan as undemocratic, "socialistic" and subversive of the right of people to build cities according to their untrammeled desires.

As a result of this laissez faire policy, the necessary "public spirit" or eagerness for the "common welfare" in large cities was "apt to be weakened by selfish individualism." "Individualism" or "jealous pride" was not the "public-spirited pride" that the cities so badly required. Instead this jealous pride left the planners
with few resources other than those sparse allocations which the
municipal fathers saw fit to provide, for whatever the dilemma, "the
use of private capital and the responsibility of the individual has
been urged as the solution of the problem."5 "The orderly growth of
the city is left to the selfish, unregulated interests of land specu-
lators and builders..."6 "dictated more by an optimistic opinion
of the intelligence of prospective purchasers than by a disinterested
desire to promote their future welfare."7

Products of individualism: One of the basic results produced by
valuing the untrammeled rights of the individual was the fact that
we do not think in city terms... or appreciate that the
... community must have a life of its own separate from,
or the composite of, the lives and property of all of its
people. We have exalted the rights of the individual above
the common weal.8

As a result the city fathers were accused of "indifference or rather
obliviousness to the direction of the path they were treading. Their
interests were those of today and not of tomorrow... of themselves,
not of their neighbors."9 Individualism had its direct effects upon
the city; positively in "a rampant assertion of itself" and negatively
"by a disregard of its responsibility to the community."10

This indifference could also be attributed to the competitive
life that had come to dominate the industrial cities. Competition and
conquest were interchangeable words taken from the dictionary of the
warrior. "The trend of modern life, by the pressure of competition
... is clearly away from mutuality of contact and interest... It
is in the metropolis or city that one is most struck by those conditions."
The social life of the city produces a common indifference to what concerns
a position not one's own; a life which divides itself more and more into separate callings and separate concerns. So it is that in the large cities there develops an "entire ignorance of more than a few who surround us, the intense competition that numbers produce, the need to struggle and the absorbing interest as well as necessity to struggle, lure men back into themselves and lead them to concentrate on home and business. Indifference results."

Individualism and competition were, on the other hand, elements of the cherished American character. An eager pioneer development and waves of immigrant settlers had placed more emphasis and value on individualistic effort, and the development of a "competitive race" than on cooperative effort and collective needs. Now it was time to give up this pioneer appearance and think of the city as a "communal home": "The American city which arose out of a precipitate, unordered, ultra-individualistic exploitation of vast natural resources, and grew up parentless and without tradition is now evolving a new ideal of democratic co-operation."  

The ideal of the communal whole: The city problems would be reduced to the vanishing point if the city thought in public rather than private terms, in social rather than personal terms. The psychology of politics . . . the neglect and indifference of the voter . . . springs from the relation of the city to the citizen . . . The city has neglected the people and the people in turn have neglected the city.

For Winston Churchill the issue of the new century would be "the need for socializing and democratizing the modern industrial community. . . . If the city is to prosper [it will be necessary] to replace the individual effort by community forehandedness."  "Individualism without
being swamped has merged itself in the communal idea. . . . Today's stage of development . . . [sees] a transition from individualism to civicism as the vital force."15 The new force opposing that of individualism was "the enlightened judgment of the many . . . a wide-spread public opinion."16 When the war of commerce ceases to value destructive competition, when individuals are educated to more socially useful endeavors, "then we shall . . . have the sites of the cities selected by commissions having the highest good of the community at heart. . . . Harmony throughout all--instead of the freaks of individuality."17

Out of this concern for the community came the spirit embodied in the city planning movement, for the [planning] process is democratic, . . . secured by many men, animated by many motives, working together in increasing harmony. . . . This spirit of democratic co-operation . . . [means] discipline, a measure of subordination, a capacity for united effort to attain distant goals.18

Although strong selfish, almost unchecked individualism still has its sway in our cities, and many of the evils which better city planning may help to correct are due to this cause. . . . [One of the broad purposes behind city planning with respect to the "common welfare"] is to control and check rank individualism and to exercise collective power in the name of the entire community. . . . [In this way John Nolen could claim that] the field of collectivism is being steadily extended and its power increased.19

THE NEED FOR COOPERATION AND COMMON INTEREST

Cities by their very size, their large populations, by gathering diverse races and incomes into their shelter, discouraged any sense of unity; it became most difficult to "secure cohesion
and cooperation" and made "unanimous action impossible, even partial cooperation . . . difficult." Somehow a public sense of the "common good" and the "common welfare" had to be developed out of this amorphous mass called the city; a sense of the "common good" which would prod the collective city to pursue common needs and concerns. As one writer put it, what the American cities needed was a united spirit which might be called the city sense. It has nothing to do with those superior airs . . . of urban sophistication. It is something more than civicism, or the sense of solidarity or mass consciousness; it is the expression of the common hopes and the social ardors of mankind; it somehow comprehends and restores all those emotions that are dampened by stotic indifference and the hard selfishness of unrestrained individualism.

The "public" or the "community" referred to an abstract combination of all the conflicting individuals within the city. If this group ideal was educated to a "united action," then it was felt, a "communal force" for the "benefit of all" would be ensured. This concern over the public spirit reflected the recognition by some city members of the utter dependence of each city resident upon his thousands of neighbors. The welfare of each individual was seen as inexorably connected with a higher concept of the "common welfare." Slowly the city was being considered from the standpoint of the needs of all classes of men, not just those few enterprising leaders and expansionists.

The city's superstructure, public utilities, transportation networks, office buildings, houses and tenements, were matters of "community concern." Many of the city's problems were now being discussed as if they could be solved "by intelligent community action." Now it was recognized and accepted that "our failure to control property in the interest of the community has sacrificed the American city."
Now the city was becoming accepted as "one great social organism, whose future welfare is in large part determined by the actions of the people who compose the organism today, and therefore by the collective intelligence and will that control those actions."  

The planners believed that community welfare and common interest were the values by which they could direct action for and about the city. The whole philosophy behind the city betterment movement maintained that a city "must be reconstructed by its citizens working in the spirit of cooperation and mutual concession." The vital, permanent force was this "principle of systematic cooperation"; effective "combination and cooperation" were evidenced in this earnest desire for improvement. "Organization, cooperation, community pride have gotten everybody to work in some way to make the town better." City planning moreover was the epitome of this deliberate "conscious co-operative action"; it involved new conceptions of democracy, new values of duty, rights and interest. It was just this aspect of city planning, or so it was claimed, that would keep democracy from failing in our cities.

Civic pride: But cooperative action required a deeply rooted popular conviction for collective improvement. This "public opinion" was in turn dependent upon the strength and secure establishment of a "civic pride." Such a city pride could be fostered by both a pride in one's achievements, as well as a pride and loyalty attached to one's city or place of residence. City planning, it was claimed, must therefore struggle to obtain opportunities for work and investment which would stimulate the instincts of self-pride as well as provide for magnificent
surroundings which would fill the citizen with pride for his city. "Pride and loyalty" however must not be mistaken for "rampant individualism"; although the precise boundary line between pride that would embellish the city for the common good and pride that would succor only the benefits of beauty and order for oneself, is difficult to establish.

Public responsibility: Along with a need for civic pride came a closely aligned quest for public responsibility for the concerns and matters of improving the city. "The remedy [we are told must] . . . proceed from the public conscience." It was time for the cities to be awakened in earnest, to develop a sense of "civic pride" and "public responsibility." "The awakening of American cities . . . marks a new era in the spirit of the cities. They have come to a new sense of responsibility. They want to be . . . better as well as bigger." This sense of responsibility was proof that the "city advances . . . in moral and physical sense . . . [for] profound curative forces are at work and from the heart of the omnipresent city evils themselves arises a new social civic ideal. . . . In the midst of the omnipresent dangers the city finds itself." This public responsibility however did not always extend to a widely based concept of the public touching all citizens; it more often referred to a selected responsibility of the governing elite.

DEFINITIONS OF "THE PUBLIC" AND "THE PUBLIC INTEREST"

"The public" and "the public interest" belong to those concepts which are best described in their absence; clearly any movement for city
planning which does not tend to the public interest is bound to be
deficient in its results. Kenneth Burke calls these summarizing
words, "God Terms" because they have been elevated to such sancti-

fied positions that all other ideas are subjugated to their supremacy.
Nowhere clearly defined, they exist as global markers which can be
filled with any concept and which reap magnificent benefits upon
incantation. Similar god terms are such concepts as "freedom," "democracy," "liberty"; all terms which are somehow connected with
the belief in the "public interest."

The main question to be asked is whether "the public"
referred to the individual citizens of the cities or to the body
of elected or chosen representatives of the many? For example, some
felt that although "the desire to beautify the city must have its
origins in the individual . . . ultimately it is upon municipal
authorities that the aggregate form of individualism must act to
secure the widest possible beauty." Others claimed that "the public"
referred to an ethereal concept supporting the interests of each
individual citizens. For this latter reason, "the public interest"
was the rationale behind each city improvement. Civic centers were
thought to be "in the public interest." If public buildings did not
dignify and emphasize the city's greatness, then "the public interest
would be sacrificed." Sites were to be chosen in support of "the
greatest good" or "the public welfare." The "public prestige" of
stately court houses, magnificent city halls, majestic post office
buildings would symbolize for all the beneficence of the municipal
government.
Great things were expected from this thickening "public opinion." As it was put, "within another generation public opinion will no longer tolerate the slum and the tenement than it does the plagues that were prevalent a generation ago." And as this sentiment swells, "the intelligent public more and more [will be] attracted towards the ideal of social control of city development."  

Fire, flood and earthquake are doing much to create a public opinion more favorable to the reasonable restriction and control of private property. The disasters of San Francisco, Baltimore, Galveston, Chelsea, Dayton and Salem are convincing people that it does not pay to permit the degree of freedom in the use of private property that has prevailed heretofore.  

Function of public opinion/public interest: The need for developing a clearly defined public opinion was a matter of instilling the planning movement with the democratic tradition which placed the ultimate source of power and decision in the body politic, i.e., the individual voters. In the last resort, it was believed, "the main solution to the problem of municipal art rests in the establishment of . . . public opinion. The voters are . . . the repositories of power . . . a court of final appeal, they must form themselves into a body of initiative." Somehow the intangible would be materialized in this way, for the "standards of excellence . . . are regulated by public opinion only."  

Even more so, the corruption and inefficiency in political life was laid at the doorstep of the public for "the prosperity or failure of governments [is a function of] . . . the character of the people and their interest in local affairs." The cities needed therefore an "intelligent and wisely directed public opinion," to
redeem them from the evils of corrupt and incompetent government. The ultimate "cure for public untidiness [or for other city problems for that matter] . . . rests with the people."40 A "citizen" it is defined for us is one who "shares the burdens of the city, cherishes its interests and contributes to the richness of its life."41 In the end, the city is dependent upon its citizens for its reconstructions; only through their efforts, "working in the spirit of cooperation and mutual concession" will the city be restored.

The planners, however, saw this "public opinion" as a mandate for their skills. The city might be improved to keep pace with other cities, to attract tourists and to rid itself of the evils of mismanagement, "but it all boils down into one thing, public spirit . . . the appreciation of the great trust which thousands of persons are reposing upon [the planners]."42 Others being somewhat less boastful, or sure of themselves, felt this "splendid discontent" working such wonders in the American city did not add up to, as of yet, an "absolute and pervading demand for better city conditions."43 Changes within the city, if they were to be pervasive and fundamental must "spring from the people and be at bottom an expression of the life of the people."44 From this point of view, it would be quite some years before "city planning would reflect the growth of the demand for definite, intelligent, expert, official planning of our cities."45

Patronizing tones: If a sufficient demand for planning from the depths of the "public spirit" was not yet secured among the people's desires and felt needs, then the expert planners must take it upon themselves to speak to these conditions. The vocabulary of the planners of these
days is full of terms which put words in the mouths of the innocent public: "the people want parks, ... there is a popular movement for better cities ... they have come to a new responsibility ... a common awakening of a wish to improve them, ... [a] yearning toward a condition we have not reached." As Daniel H. Burnham was called upon to announce, what [the people] know and want, that they will have ... out of the [World's Fair] came a national purpose to express the fullness of this art ... It is a sign of the times that the people will no more continue to endure gross violations of landscape art then they will the disgusting and disorderly in domestic and municipal environments."

Since it was a serious matter to replan and rehabilitate a city, Charles M. Robinson allowed that "it is best that local prejudices not warp the judgment, nor familiarity dull the sense to opportunities for change. For these reasons, the best results are obtained from outside advice." Planners should be called upon to "plan ... their development in the interests of the people ... [to aid] the development of our civic conditions." In this city crisis, the people should turn to their "professional members and from them expect, nay demand, the benefit of their technical training." Expert control and civic pride would both be the guides to public ideals and desires. The planner was then to be "the channel or medium through which [this public opinion] would find expression." City planning meant a city built by experts who visualize the complex life of a million of people and who could harness their dreams into intelligent and wisely directed projects.
Let us carefully reconstruct the planners' perspective of the public: who they are, what they benefit, what they threaten; for it is here, through their arguments which seek implicitly to commit their fellow citizens to a predetermined community ethic, that the planners will display their political intentions. We have already shown the fear in which the planners saw the destruction threatened by the inferior immigrants and dwellers of the city slums. We have examined their distaste for chaos and disorder, and their desire for order and rational city management. It is now time to turn to explore the directions in which they believed their dreams would become reality.

As long as there remained a distinction between private and public, personal and social, the perceived order of the city would continue to be unstable. The "private" and "personal" world presupposed a concept of freedom; freedom in turn referred to private rights, it constantly supported and justified them. Within the privatized world of modern individualism, man could rid himself of undesired social restrictions, he was free to manage and enjoy his household and property as he would so desire. This freedom stressed the independence of man from other men's needs and concerns; it viewed man as an isolated unit. This freedom, however, entailed a concept of disorder in which the concerns of society were unrealized. To enable each individual his rights without allowing him to impinge on the rights of other's implied some degree of order and regulation; but this in turn required a limitation upon the complete freedom of the individual. Conversely, freedom for all, i.e., the social whole, could
not be maintained without some degree of restraint or order, for disorder implied anarchy or the loss of freedom. Freedom and order are thus irreparably interlocked; extension of the one implies a loss to the other. The realization of the public's interests and beliefs thus became part of a concept of order in which the stress was placed upon the division of public from private rights in order to maintain a balance between freedom and order. As Carl J. Friedrich has clarified for us, this dividing line is never very obvious and the usual delineations of order without regard to the values, interest and beliefs of the community fail to reflect the fact that in the actions of various representatives of different groups of the community, pursuing a plurality of goals, disorder is inescapably necessary. The political community, by organizing itself into a political order, is required to allow for a measure of disorder . . . any dynamic order is characterized by emergent disorder."

The world which confronted the early planners was a world in need of physical and political reform. Both the establishment and success of any reform program was consequent upon an expectation of continuity and consensus. Within any society, at any period of time, moreover, there is more apt to be a division of interests than an acceptance of solidarity. Nevertheless the early planners needed to rely on a concept of union and agreement among the citizens which could be taken for granted. For this reason they tried to educate and to organize the public's impulses toward right conventions and shared assumptions. It was believed that only if there existed a consensus about the collective needs of society, in the interest of all those living together in close proximity, could there be solutions to the problems threatening the dissolution of the urban society. For this reason as well, the planners stressed the union and cooperation of
society for the assumed common good. Such harmony and security alone
would allow them the opportunity to work their wonders upon the city.
For the sake of the social good, the immigrants' private homes would
be violated; and for the sake of the public interest, private
capitalism would be curtailed.

**Individualism vs. collectivism:** The term "individualism" holds a
multitude of connotations, changing invariably with its social and
historical context. "Individualism" in America has primarily been
the cudgel of free enterprise and laissez faire government. After
the Civil War, "individualism" became a symbol for the national
American character. As James Bryce could describe in 1888, the
American sense of "individualism" or "the love of enterprise, and pride
in personal freedom, have been deemed by Americans not only their
choicest, but their peculiar and exclusive possession."

In 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner delivered his famous frontier
thesis in which he attributed the American character, its spirit and
energy, to the frontier's influence. Among these personal values were
those of human ingenuity, enterprise, adaptation and initiative. These became the values supportive of the mythical concept of individual enterprise and success. Implicit to this concept of "individualism" however was an idea that man could be completely separate and distinct from all others and that it is through his competitive efforts and energies that he alone acquires wealth and property. This, under any condition, is always somewhat of an illusion, but especially under industrial conditions, for even the private capitalist is not a "self-made man" and is not distinct or more important than any other.

Laissez-faire ideas, supported by Spencerian doctrines of social evolution allowed for an unrestrained "competition" and "exploitation" among business enterprises and individuals, in which the fittest alone would survive. This in turn would enhance the American character, naturally weeding out under so-called conditions of equal opportunity the more unsavoury and less successful elements. "Individualism" then as Marx explained, gave confidence to the bourgeois, the valued personal characteristics offered him self-confidence in his own abilities and allowed him to overlook the atrocities he perpetrated in the competition called progress.

It was not singularly to curb the excessive belief in the competitive power of the individual that the battle for social reform was waged, but also to restrain an excessive self-interest and privatization which was felt to undermine any collective effort. Marx interpreted the individualist's issue over private rights and his desire for ultimate independence from the rest of society as a function of the organization of scarcity. But even in an economy of abundance,
in which individualism might appear to be only the means of distribution of resources, as was the claim in America the bountiful, there were always the haves and the have nots. Private rights therefore were translated into "selfish-interests," "public indifference," and general disregard for the welfare of the whole. The private man of the nineteenth century was split from and oblivious to the rest of society. For the sake of those in need, subordination of the individual to society was seen as a necessity.

For others, "individualism" stood as an evil threat to social cohesion. Durkheim had shown in his work, *Suicide*, that "individualism" was coterminous with the destructive concept of "anomie" and "egoism," and that social control and social solidarity as a result, were immeasurably destroyed. The public evils of neglect and disregard were the result of abandoning the society at large and withdrawing into an ego-centric sphere devoid of any sense of responsibility for the whole. The reformers therefore feared the evils of "individualism" because it destroyed the integrative mechanism (i.e. collective structure) by which individuals could be linked to society and the means by which the excessive powers of the state could be dampened. Throwing men back upon their individual resources therefore threatened the concept of social order. The community ethics of the early planners, was in part an attempt to submit the voice of the many to the voice of the collective whole. "Individualism," "socialism," "exploitation," "harmony" and "cooperation" were nineteenth century socialist's expressions. Nonexistent in the English-American dictionaries of 1825, they had all become current additions by the end of the century.
These words which survive today, encapsulate many of the implications of the nineteenth century struggle between man and society and for these reasons alone they are worthy of contemplation. We want here, however, to explore them as additions to the planner's vocabulary.

The followers of Saint-Simon in the 1820's were the first to systematically use the word "individualism" in reference to the evil distortions of disorder, atheism, and egoism which were undermining the future order of society. In contrast stood the ultimate stage of social development setting "universal association" and devotion against the pernicious effects of "individualism." Later in the century the socialist reformers would consistently relate "individualism" to its antonyms of "harmony," "unity," "socialism," "cooperation," "association," and "communism" and it is these terms which we find introduced into the planner's vocabulary.

"Community" reveals two different connotations; referring at once to individuals who share common possessions as well as to a group of people who in living together have developed some common organization or cooperative network. The early 19th century reformers were concerned with both the problems of cooperative community and collective property and they consequently developed a vocabulary through which they could express these new ideas.

Charles Fourier, accredited to be the first socialist on record, was an unabashed neologist. Among his collection of terms which concern us are "harmony," and "association" and his extended meanings to the terms "mutualism," "solidarity," and "collectivism." While rejecting the concept of common property, Fourier focused his attention on
the idea of cooperative communities or phalanxes. This highest stage of social organization or evolution he termed "harmony" or its synonym "unity," Fourier believed a union of interests in production and consumption would be the "secret of voluntary association."

"Universal harmony" would thus result from an agreement between the individuals living together in "mutual" association. This "solidarity" within, however, left no provision for a cooperation without, for no mechanism existed by which the "collectives" were tied together. These were precisely the connotations which the early planners wished to support. Only focusing upon the problem of social organization within the city, they allowed, indeed supported, rampant competition among cities. "Harmony," "unity," "solidarity," "collectivism," etc. referred to the requisite necessity to obtain a voluntary agreement among the individuals of a city to "cooperate" on urban improvements. Without this belief in a common goal and common welfare, it was feared, no progress could be made.

The other early socialist who contributed to the planner's vocabulary was Charles Owen, offering the important terms of "socialism," "socialist," and "socialization." Owen was specifically sympathetic to the problems of common possession of property as a means of eliciting mutual interest and binding commitment. "Mutual possession and enjoyment" were thus equated with "the appropriate participation of all members in one another."

Consequently men must be retrained to form a cooperative union among themselves before they could challenge the relationships of power at a more aggregate level. "Individualism" must thus be destroyed as a first step toward the development of a new "societal structure." This was Owen's basis
for "socialism"; the reform of society from individual to national units. The Owenist's terms of "socialization," "socialism," "social affections," slipped into the planner's language as over-all terms connoting any social reform which begins in depth with the basic mutual interactions between people and stresses the importance of education as a means of obtaining the desired associative units. The community centers and Garden city reforms were most orthodox in their use of this terminology. By 1920, "Collectivism" and "socialism," had become cross-referenced dictionary entries, and were used in reference to any reform based on fundamental alterations to the concept of private rights and private capital.

The order of the city was thus envisioned as a common concern; the opposite of the "individual," i.e., the "social," had come to dominate the concept of the public realm. As Hannah Arendt describes it,

... the realm of the social has finally, after several centuries of development, reached the point where it embraces and controls all members of a given community equally and with equal strength. But society equalizes under all circumstances and the victory of equality in the modern world is only the political and legal recognition of the fact that society has conquered the public realm and that distinction and difference have become private matters of the individual.  

Abstracted above the individuals of the city lurked the ideal of a social whole with its superior values and common directives. "Cohesion," "combination," came to mean conformity. All individuals would thus be subordinated to the community's needs and norms of this ideal union. The "common interest" presupposed the existence of a single goal, a directed opinion. Conflicts of interests were consequently overcome, repressed or removed from consideration. Society was accepted as a unified concept, a failure as Hannah Arendt elaborates, to view social activity as the product of many individual interactions.
The extinction of individualism and the extinction of individuality, however, should have remained two separate concerns.

The tendency of the day to confuse and blend the two strains meant, in the words of one writer, "the increasingly strong inclination for minds . . . to surrender themselves to what is known as public opinion or the spirit of the age." The "common interest" thus established a supra-individual force which demanded conformity.

The values of individual uniqueness and originality sank into oblivion while the false trust in the "commonweal" or "common wealth" merely disguised the accumulation of more wealth by the private capitalist and "common forehandedness" or thrift merely forestalled a distribution of goods.

The public interest: The early planners failed to spell out the meaning of "the public interest"; what it defined or how it could be accounted for. Its very vagueness however allowed the voice of authority to
take hold of the public mind and be a symbolic reminder of the chaos and disorder that private interests at any moment promised to unleash. On the other hand, this vagueness questioned the validity of its assumed existence. Did the "public interest" or the "public mind" exist if no one was aware of it, did it refer to the potential common consciousness the "public" might contain? If the latter, how was the "public interest" confirmed? Who called it forth? How was a common agreement, a common ideology, a common goal produced out of the conflicting and interacting individuals and classes which comprised the society's base structure? Since the planners failed to direct themselves to these questions, we must accept the "general interest" as no more than an a priori assumption relating individuals to a concept of society by means of their common concerns and mature loyalty.

The "public interest" was a representative interest and hence involved an abstract relationship between the public demands and the actual human demands; there existed a break between the people's power and the power of the represented interests. Hofstadter in The Age of Reform describes why "public opinion" must be diffuse and hard to locate; for "authority that can be clearly located in persons, or in small bodies of persons, is characteristically suspect in America. Historically, individual enterprise has been at a premium." The "public interest" was thus conceived specifically as a consumer interest. This universal interest included such considerations as housing codes, living standards, drug and food regulations. Consideration of the individual as a consumer of material, spiritual, and political products is a way of linking him to the social order, for
society is consequently given the role of protecting the consumer from being exploited by special interest groups. However erroneous it was to assume that the "general interest" or "public interest" could be more benevolent and objective than any other interest, the "public interest" as a consumer interest was vested with the ability to check all promoters of mass suffering and exploitation. The principle of "general welfare," "common good," "greatest happiness" was therefore offered as an inducement by which men were asked to support the public power of authority; in return for their service to the "greater good," they were offered protection of their beneficent interests, i.e., the Lockean contract.

Among the definitions available for the "public interest" we find the planners indeterminately using two significations. The "public interest" thus being defined by two diverging assumptions; either it was the guardian of the individuals' authority or it was the guardian of the municipal authority. In the first sense, the "public interest" is a commonly held interest which appeals to and is represented by the total public. The ultimate power of this self-enlightened interest resides with the amorphous public so it is the citizens' demands and convictions that guide the public life of the city.

The second meaning of the "public interest" can best be examined through the analogy which the planners made of the city as a "ship without a rudder." In this case the interests of the parts must be subordinated to the whole which in turn will be intelligently directed by the superior interests of the ship's captain. In the case of early 20th century reformers, the middle class opinion and professional elites would wisely direct and educate the public in their own best interests. Believing strongly in the harmony of common interests these social
reformers found no contradiction between class desires, professional demands, and ruling interests. Their basic concern, as described by Paul Rogin, was aimed at subordinating politics to those competent in social engineering. Their concept was a neutral government, wisely advised by expert opinion, which could objectively, technically and efficiently solve the problems of reform. The solution of such problems was to be far removed from any political process of conflict and concession. The Social Darwinian ethic of self-help and survival of the fittest was to be supplanted with a collective intelligence and wisely directed by social expertise.

Statements inculcating "the public interest" are directed at policy issues. The "public interest" thus becomes a standard against which programs can be measured and evaluated. A policy or program is always "in the public interest," "for the common good," "towards the benefit of all"; consequently its antonyms stand against these values, they are of mistaken, confused, or evil intent. The consumer interest thus becomes clarified; if new public buildings are "in the public interest" then this infers the public wants these new buildings and "what they want, they shall have." Brian Barry calls these statements "conclusive arguments." They allow neither for mistaken interests nor for people to judge for themselves. Beyond this, they assume all policy arguments have been satisfied. "To be in the public interest" is therefore the final demonstration of a given policy's or program's benefits; the justification for its intervention. There is consequently to be no more discussion of its merits or disadvantages. The "public interest" thus articulates the unspoken rules of the game;
it is aimed to evoke consensus because it believes that underneath the individual behavior of the American citizen lies a deep structure of "shared assumptions" and it is these rules which generate normative actions for the benefit of the whole.

Whatever the concept of the "public interest," the planners failed to come to grips with it by spelling out the various values and commitments that would contend for it. They wished neither to make clear distinctions between interested or disinterested concerns, cooperative or uncooperative forces, group or private interests. Hoping mystically for a common cause to descend upon the people, the consequently never whipped their arguments into popular support. Glossing over private rights and capital interests in the hopes of a common commitment to consumer management, the planners did little to mitigate the general addiction to "individualism." The most they could accomplish were small reforms in support of the monied interests and power; never touching the underlying contradictions of class structure or distribution of wealth.

Pride and responsibility: The responsibility for the urban
problems of this period had been bandied about from person to person, or institution to institution, without allowing for an advantage of blame. The early city planners believed this common evasion to be an ethical wrong. Enveloped in a shroud of the Protestant ethic, the planners believed the citizens ought to feel more responsibility for their city's troubles than they did. Richard Hofstadter, in *The Age of Reform*, maintains the aim of the muckrakers was first to bring the ugly picture of urban reality to the citizens' eyes, then to develop a common sense of guilt through moral exhortation, and finally to expect reform to follow as citizens stirred themselves to respond with indignation and shame over their own transgressions and failures. It was believed therefore that discontent, guilt and anxiety could be directed into channels of social reform.

Civic pride would sustain these social actions; it would counterbalance the deep loyalties of ward politics with the more global pride in the whole community. It would bring prestige and honour to the American City. According to Bergson, "public instinct" would promote and maintain the traditions of the city while "public sentiment" would allow for its individuality and uniqueness. Both appeals to pride would eventually save the city from corruption and self-destruction.

Every citizen was held responsible in some way for the evils of the city. A new sense of loyalty and spirit was to be awakened; city reform would be a conscious concern. This ethic of responsibility therefore sought practical solutions for the problems at hand; neither utopian nor fatalistic, it relied upon moderate demands and expert...
direction. But above all, it was based upon the awakening of a "civic consciousness" and a "public conscience." Harley Shands’ has described an intriguing relationship between the words "conscious" and "conscience" which I think explores two avenues by which the planners sought to build awareness of a city's problems. First of all, "to be conscious" infers that "one knows what one is doing." "Conscience," on the other hand, is derived from the present participle of "scire," "to know" and hence refers to a "persistent, or chronic attitudinal knowledge." "Civic consciousness" thus implies the current awareness of the rules of the city; the rules which are shared knowledge with other citizens. "Public conscienteness" on the other hand is the continual awareness of the moral obligation one owes to the whole; a stand against which one's own conduct or intentions can be evaluated. The planners thus sought to instill a middle-class ethos among all the citizens; knowledge of its shared social norms and an expectation of moral responsibility and commitment to these values. Then and only then, the cities would be redeemed, the government would prosper, and the ills of the city would be cured. Reform was thus the responsibility of the citizens, but those citizens in turn must be taught to be aware of their obligation and duty, to become knowledgeable and informed about the problems of the city.

Planning and patronizing: We have discussed, earlier,
planning's concern with the systematic, the rational, and the practical. To this it added the capacity for group action whose mission it was to guard against future infringements and to regulate the activities of the present. Characterized as "democratic teamwork," planning supported the values of "harmony," "restraint," "cooperation," fearing in fact to enter the arena of political conflict. Planning believed its mandate came from the people; its power was a public trust. Having defined itself into existence, planning was free to extend its trust in any direction it believed fit. Planning was, after all, the intelligent and expert guidance of the many; it was the product of "unanimous action." If this was idealistic then with the proper amount of education all the public would come to value the contribution offered by planning. With these convictions planning established itself among the growing occupations such as public health, law, education which in support of the public interest sought to return the confusion of the city to a semblance of order. Indeed to thrive, as a profession, planning needed a sense of continuity and regularity. This was achieved only by removing their operations from the control of the people and thus only allowing intervening influences to filter through a screen of "public opinion."

Considering "civic consciousness" and "public responsibility" to be universal concepts, the planners tended to be patronistic and naively behavioristic. "Civic consciousness," for the planners and the public, lacked intentionality; meaning it lacked an intended or directed concept upon which the individual could reflect, judge, and react. Specially this meant that the "public" lacked a "self."
"Civic consciousness" was therefore devoid of a sense of "personal consciousness," referring only to the ideological and totalized "public consciousness" it thereby disallowed a private value system which might possibly differ from the accepted social value system.

The planners conceived of the rational man as a goal-oriented reasonably motivated man; they never questioned how this was so or how this might collectively create a rational society.* Since the private man lacked a reflective attitude, i.e., he lacked a self, he could be easily controlled through education or acculturation. This private man could be made over, or managed, to realize certain ends which the planners decided were socially important. By so doing, the planners separated themselves from the private man. The planner was the educator and authoritarian; he was the ideal public man. He held the knowledge by which he could control and predict the outcome of other actions involving the city. The private man was devoid of such knowledge, he could not control but merely respond. He was expected to reply to the planner's stimulus, but not to react; to follow but not to suggest the direction; to obey but not to object. The overriding necessity of adapting men to their social environments made it possible, for the moment, to ignore their reacting "selves." This ideal position would allow the planners the time to establish their profession and to solidify their perspective but the concept of the passive, easily convertible public would continually present itself as a major dilemma; one which would never be satisfactorily resolved.

*Alfred Schutz explains how the social sciences take the intersubjectivity of thought and action for granted.
PLANNING POLITICS AND PLANNING LANGUAGE (Terminology)

individualism = [(private/individual/personal) rights, public (indifference/obliviousness/disregard/ignorance/neglect/selfishness) jealous pride]

individualism = (competition/private capital/commercialism/exploitation)

collectivism = [cooperation, combination, cohesion, community (home/life), common (weal/forehandness), communal (idea, home, whole), collective power, mutual (contact/concessions), solidarity, harmony, unity, social (affections/effort), socialism, socialization]

Public/General Interest = (P.I.₁/P.I.₂)

P.I.₁ = [public opinion, citizen's (interest/wishes/concerns/demands), (community/mutual/common) interests, popular convictions]

P.I.₂ = [(public/collective) (intelligence/will), wisely directed public]

P.I.₁ + (individual authority)

P.I.₂ + (municipal authority)

In the public interest = [(greatest/common/highest) good, (public/common) welfare, common need, benefit of all, public prestige]

Civic pride = [civic loyalty, civicism, community pride, public (pride/spirit/instinct/sentiment)]

Public responsibility = [community responsibility, public (conscience/interest/awakening), (mass/civic) commitment]

Civic pride/public responsibility + [(redeem/improve/reconstruct) the city, city advancement, cure for disorder, standards of excellence, social civic ideal, (prosperity/failure) of the government]

Planning : (harmony, united effort, democratic teamwork, democratic spirit, systematic cooperation, discipline, subordination, expert, intelligent, definite)

Planning + [communal force, (cooperative/community/unanimous/united/conscious/deliberate) action]

+ [people's (demands/expression/trust)]
SUMMARY OF SCHEME ONE

To obtain security in a world of uncertainty, the early planners glorified the ideal totality. Some "greater good," some "ideal of perfection and purity," some "natural harmonious order" set mystical standards by which relations among men and between man and his environment were regulated. Everything in the city and in the lives of men was conceptually subordinated to and enveloped by this universal order. The stereotype criticism of the Progressive era sees a shift in the pattern of thought prior to the First World War. This shift, so the argument goes, consisted of a reaction against the middle class politics of morality and uplift and a substitution, instead, of the rational principles of efficiency and organization, of purposive programs and scientific analyses. As we shall see, the concept of normative natural order failed to provide an adequate social ideology for the post-war years, but emphasizing the revolution in values which accompanied the transition from a natural to a rational order suppresses the fundamental contradiction inherent to both conceptual configurations. "Rationalism" and "naturalism" are not simply two schools of thought. Instead they contain social, political, ethical, aesthetical, philosophical ramifications. What is more important, they are not directly opposing points of view but have elements which draw support from each other.

In the final analysis, they both refer to a greater harmonizing totality which sets regulating standards for the whole of society.*

*Marcuse, Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, has pointed out a similar sequence in which totalitarian ideology can be seen as a product of classical liberal ideology; both occurring within the framework of a given "natural" social totality.
For the early planners, the natural order held man and his environment in a healthy, purifying, aesthetically pleasing and morally valuable enclosure. From the laws of nature he drew his moral lessons, principles of healthy equilibrium and aesthetic enlightenment. The natural order encapsulated his normative ideals of perfection and shared social values, principles of restraint and consensus. There existed a natural order of things; independent of the endeavors of man, which surrounded and enveloped him in a harmonious equilibrium. The moral order as mediator of these natural laws in turn adjusted and subordinated the social order to this larger totality. Thus it is that we find the planner's principle of organization revolving around some pre-industrial image of perfection and harmony and unity. Environmental changes would restore the artificial city to the healthy order of nature; they would bring harmony to the struggle between man and his environment. Aesthetic order would educate and uplift the wayfarer, calm the struggle between the forces of good and evil, and develop the solidarity of society through its patriotic message. The national destiny depended upon the harmony of all conflicts; the perfection and spiritual unity of form and function embodied in the ideal city order.

From the rational order, the planners drew their principles of organization; perfection of efficiency, replicability and prediction, rational restraint and conscience responsibility. To obtain harmony and equilibrium men could be adjusted to the environment through education. Reasonable men could be taught to be responsible, socially accountable, restrainable and cooperative. Through education and enlightenment, men learned to adjust to and accommodate the collective whole.
Because of the existence of an a priori objective body of knowledge, moreover, the planner could instrumentally predict and control, coordinate and influence, under law-like hypotheses, a better order, smoother functionings and normal development of the city whole. The progress of civilization depended upon this public responsibility and rational organization.

Progress moreover was made possible by the acceptance of the collective unity, of universally shared values, of a greater totality subordinating the individual to the social whole. If the rational order revealed a world of perfect competition among reasonable men, the new order of the industrial 19th century required the protection of a mediating collectivity to constrain and unify the self-interests of men. So we find, under such universal values as the "public interest," the "common good," "consensus" and "collective" that the reason of all men was subordinated to an irrational normative whole, i.e., a totality unaccountable to critical reason. Whether this harmonious balance under which all antagonisms disappeared, is called a natural or accidental order of things, it assumed a universal validity and primacy for all men.

The assumption that there existed normative pre-givens or shared values among men, meant that the dominant middle class values organized the whole of society. Thus men's behavior was measured against the social morality which called forth a sense of shame and rejection over the degradation determined by the chaos and disease of the urban condition, a sense of obligation and responsibility to the service of society, a deeply felt need for efficiency, practicality,
organization, and purpose, for cooperation, consensus, and restraint.
The sole standard for the acceptance and justification of institutions
was their rationality and their service to the "greater good."
Expecting conformance to the idealism of the harmony of the whole is
to create the necessity for a guardian of the order. The very complexity
of society where all men depend upon each other is said to demand a
superior regulator. As the ideal public man, the very perfection of
the socially moral man, the planner was among the rational engineers,
the self-appointed, "keepers of the order." It follows from the
neutrality of the social whole that these rational managers and
organizers themselves would not be accountable to reason. The very
abstraction of the planning methodology, presupposing the harmony of
the whole, transcends the contradictions from which it proceeds; it
neither stops to criticize the irrational totality nor its own
authoritarian reasons for planning.
REFERENCES: CHAPTER SEVEN

1 Riis, How the Other Half Lives.
2 Harder, "The City's Plan."
3 "Inhibition-Permission-Compulsion," The American City, April, 1916.
4 Diggs, "Garden City Movement."
5 Lamb, "Municipal Art."
6 Howe, "In Defense of the American City."
7 Olmsted, "Basic Principles of City Planning."
8 Howe, "The City as a Socializing Agency."
9 Harder, "The City's Plan."
10 Caffin, "Municipal Art."
11 Caffin, "The Beautifying of Cities."
12 Weyl, "The Brand of the City."
13 Howe, "The City as a Socializing Agency."
14 Churchill, "Supreme Question Facing Our City and Country To-day."
15 Caffin, "Municipal Art."
16 Ibid.
17 Walker, "The City of the Future."
18 Weyl, "The Brand of the City."
19 Nolen, New Ideals in Planning.
20 Caffin, "The Beautifying of Cities."
21 Whitlock, "The City and Civilization."
22 Howe, "The Garden Cities of England."
21 Howe, "City Sense."

22 Nolen, City Planning.


24 Harder, "The City's Plan."

25 Bourne, "Our Unplanned Cities."

26 Riis, How the Other Half Lives.


28 Weyl, "The Brand of the City."

29 Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion, p. 3.

30 Caffin, "The Beautifying of Cities."

31 Howe, "The Garden Cities of England."


33 Nolen, "New Ideals in Planning."

34 Caffin, "Municipal Art."


36 "The Neighborhood Center," Charities and the Commons, February 1, 1908.

37 "The City and the Citizen," The Outlook, May, 1903.


39 "The City and the Citizen," The Outlook, May, 1903.

40 Robinson, "The Replanning of Cities."

41 McFarland, "The Growth of City Planning in America."

42 Nolen, New Ideals in Planning.

43 Nolen, City Planning.

44 Robinson, "City Life."
Burnham, "White City and Capital City."

Robinson, "The Replanning of Cities."


Blashfield, "A Word for Municipal Art."


Ibid., p. 63.


Barry, Political Argument.


Shands, Semiotic Approaches to Psychiatry.
SCHEME TWO

THE DISINTEGRATION OF ORDER

1919 - 1929
The overriding question for Scheme One had been the relationship between man and his environment; specifically focusing on the problem of disorder, the fragmentary leftovers from man's relations with his physical environment. The basic question for the 1920's was the problem of machine technology and its implications for society, more specifically for the city. The question was not directed towards the relationships between man and the machine, that would come later; for now the focus was directed toward the machine's invasion of the city and what this might mean for "city civilization." The imagery of the city consequently branched out from references about the fears of a chaotic and disorderly
environment, to fears of mechanism and standardization. The city was caught in the throes of a "new revolution." The concept of the city as a "tool," as a "mechanism" to thrust civilization forward in unknown directions had to be recognized and absorbed.¹

Returning to domestic concerns after the war, disillusioned over the terms of peace, and fearing to believe in their former religions of reform, the planners and the city dwellers were pressed to acknowledge the stark reality of the "city machine." Scarcely trying to disguise their hostility toward the invasion of machine technology and the destruction of their old concepts of order, many planners nevertheless inconsistently feared the products of the machines while overtly acclaiming the rewards and benefits of mechanical procedures. We shall turn first to explore the implications of the mechanical upheaval of the city and its implications for city life before examining the case of claims for mechanical procedures.

During the period after the First World War, the cities were subjected to "the most revolutionary factors," i.e., the "building of the skyscraper and the bewildering increase in the manufacture and use of motor vehicles,"² household electricity, radios, canned food, the cinema, etc. The city had been invaded by machines. "Henry Ford" and "the mammoth collections of skyscrapers" had consequently "doomed our great cities."³ If "yesterday our American city expressed the haste and dead-sureness of the pioneer; today . . . [it demonstrated] the morbid, relentless inertia of the machine-process."⁴ If once the damage was disorderly growth, now the problem was the "mangled urban environment[s]" with "intolerable effects."⁵ If once filth and dirt
were the city's shame, now the "machine-city [was] the disgrace."  
Society had responded once before to the invasion of the machines in the Industrial revolution, now there would be an "industrial counter-revolution" which would arise to destroy the "results of crude applications of the mechanical and mathematical sciences to social development."  

The new technological powers invading the privacy of the everyday life had "gone to the extreme of artificiality" and had rendered the "conditions of life more inhuman" than ever the disorder of the physical environment implied. The city machine was both a source of anxiety and repulsion. "City life" had become "abstract, mechanical, and rational"; "the city-dweller [had become] rationalistic, skeptical, and irreligious," he lived in "symbiosis with the machine, the dead creature of man, allowing rationalistic materialism" and "mechanistic atheism" to take hold of his soul. The "mechanical extension" of the cities and the "fetiche of the efficient" had "reduced the world to soul-killing machines"; while "the machine [which] drives relentlessly forward, crushing the old order to earth" enslaves man who thus becomes captive to his own inventions. 

Man had become a product of the machines, produced and forced by matters beyond his control. He had become the victim, not the hero; the created not the creator. Now all the effort possible was necessary to turn again "toward a more natural mode of living in which our inventions will serve instead of dominate." Man must throw off this passive cloak and turn once again to self-direction. We must learn "to use our mechanical devices to strengthen instead of destroy these essentials."
Furthermore

we should get over our fear of the city, . . . cease trying to ameliorate it by giving it weak echoes of the country or to make it innocuous by great dilution, but try rather to make this new machine a good one that will work, instead of saying all the time, it's too big, it will not work."

"If we are to live in mechanical cities . . . then we ought to respect the mechanism." 15
REFERENCES: CHAPTER EIGHT


3 "Henry Ford Dooms Our Great Cities," The Literary Digest, November 15, 1924.


7 Lewis Mumford, "Regions--To Live In," Survey, May 1, 1925.

8 Ihlder, "The City Plan."


11 Mumford, "The Intolerable City."


13 Beard, "The City's Place in Civilization."


If "chaos" of Scheme One signified the primeval absence of order, now "chaos" meant "disintegration." The "mechanical revolution" had reversed the direction of the vector of change: if before society progressed toward order and organization, now it was feared that society threatened to digress to undifferentiated disorder. If the idea of progress was no longer inevitable perhaps regression was. The Spencerian theories of social evolution had been replaced by the doom spelled out in the process of entropy.

From the Greek word meaning "transformation," Clausius had coined the word "entropy" to describe the conversion of heat into work
and its subsequent transformation in the loss of temperature. "Entropy" thus became a measure of order degenerating into disorder. Gillispie has pointed out that both "energy" and "entropy" are functions of the organization of a system in reference to some initial or final configuration. Energy reveals a certain underlying force that "makes nature go" while "entropy" is the natural process of all things seeking their own level, of springs unwinding, of magnetism losing its power. As philosophy has become more and more concerned with the problems of organization and information and the difficulties of communication as opposed to the implicit educability of man, "entropy" has become a "protean concept." It is these implications which make the entropic process of "disintegration" such an encapsulating concept for the post war years; a transformation from inevitable progress to possible disintegration, a focus from an assumed totality and the ultimate educability of man to the problems of organization and the uncertainty of our knowledge, a departure from ideal perfection to pessimistic disaster.

The doom spelled out by entropic processes rests in its essential irreversibility; a process which took from the environment with no compensatory replacement. "Entropy" belongs to a "closed system" for it has no place in an organic environment. It seemed to reveal the brake of friction within the mechanical city. The 1920's symbolized the "fears of passage," the fear of the unknown and the impenetrability of the future. These years erased the enthusiastic idealism in the voice of the planner and brought instead the tone of disillusionment and despair over insurmountable problems. The First
World War had brought the end to the religions of reform and their moral crusades. The machines had yielded the final blows to the old faiths; they killed life and crushed the organic relationship between man and his environment to the ground. The religions of reform, i.e., aesthetics, patriotism, nature, science, had become transparent. They relied on a basic idealism that believed in an inevitable progress toward perfection and an ultimate harmony among men and between man and his environment. All these had seemed an outright contradiction in front of the atrocities of war. Further, this idealism, by placing its faith in the educability of man, had depended upon his basic social intelligence and his responsible instincts, but war had given evidence that man was but a brute and an uncontrollable machine.

The Progressive's language and rhetoric had been harnessed to the war movement. In the same tones and tempo, Americans were called upon to ensure "national efficiency" in preparation for war, "to help in establishing freedom and democracy throughout the civilized world." Hofstadter claims that this tie which bound the ethos of responsibility to the war effort led inevitably to a reaction against Progressivism and moral idealism as part of a deep-seated repulsion against the war. In the Twenties, the progressives' wish for public responsibility was turned into public neglect and apathy, the desire for moderation and restraint became a clamor, then and there, for the joys of the "Good Life," lawlessness and corruption clutched at the city while religious fundamentalism and prohibition swept through the countryside. World War One had shown that man did not always progress toward moral perfection, that he was often victim of uncontrollable
regressive forces that could not always be harnessed for the best of mankind. The war, consequently, destroyed the image of harmony among men and undermined their confidence in the future. The phrase on the mouths of many asked "Where do we go from here?" The past was dead, nothing remained to guide men, no one was looking out for man but man.

The "new era," the "Roaring Twenties," as it was called, gave witness to the discontents and disquietudes of the age. The numerous occurrences of "new," in itself, showed the quest for fresh beginnings and a release from earlier determinisms. The Twenties, as well, were years of prosperity and peace. They offered the middle class an opportunity to retreat into privacy, to abandon the concerns of society and focus on the secular needs of the self. Although the reactions to the war and the machine world were ones of exhaustion and escape they were also ones of promethean attempts to begin anew. From "new towns" to "the Flapper" there were reactions to throw off the past, to begin anew, to reconstruct the world. But above all they were efforts to determine what the good life could mean in a mechanical age and how to maintain autonomy in an inhuman environment.

PHYSICAL BREAKDOWN

Locked in the vice of the machine, the "rhythm" of the American city alternated between "congestion" and "expansion" and produced what was feared as an "endless circle, where the relief measures failed to eliminate the cause of congestion and [might even have] create[d] more congestion, requiring additional relief." All the efforts, we are
told, "to combat the disease of congestion" were failures:

none of our current plans for city improvement break out
of this vicious circle, ever building more and more sky-
scrapers and ever seeking more adequate methods of carrying
increasing multitudes to the central "hives" of
industry.

The drones of the machine kept the wheels of expansion moving
while the factories drew inevitably more numbers to their centers
until finally the 1920 census announced that the urban population had
"overtopped" the rural population. By enormous strides the American
population had increased from the census of 1890 when the mark was
placed at one half urban, one half rural. America had to learn to be
reconciled to a "civilization of cities." This is the background
upon which the fears of the machines and the fears of the future have
to be placed. For the first time the city gained ascendency, at least
in numbers, and many hoped that the political control would soon follow.
Contrarily the rural legislations maintained their stronghold
subjugating the nation to such restrictions as Prohibition, rigid
Immigration Laws, tariff protections and Blue Laws. The battle
between the country and the city would be played out in divers ways,
but the chief concern for the city planners of this decade would be
the "titanic city of the present."

"Newton's great law" was illustrative of the rapid growth
of the great cities. "When a town has a habit of growing it goes on
growing until some great external change compels it to stop or perhaps
decay." Some believed Spengler's fear that "powerful impulses [were]
driving us on to the megalopolis of greater and greater congestion."
The automobile, while tending to "diffuse" population and promising
"decentralization," was no match for the apartment houses, the skyscraper and the elevator, all of which increased congestion at a rate beyond control. Almost all major cities were based upon the expectation of a continuous increase in population. [The] purely quantitative goal was the chief ideal of city development and . . . the increase in ground values as the chief motive force . . . [established the premise by which city planning was] merely a way of providing the physical means for a continuous expansion and congestion of our cities.

The question might be raised whether the "great agglomerations" were really desirable but the question as to retarding the "intensive growth" of large cities and forcing them to "decentralize" could scarcely be raised.

"The modern city man . . . [places] his faith in the Good to flow indirectly from accelerated growth . . . [He thinks] some limit on growth and concentration [is] . . . suicidal." A "dead community" is one with a stable population; a "live city" is a "materially expanding city." Only "if the community [was] growing, if concentration, congestion and traffic [were] increasing, . . . [was] the prospect good. . . . 'Progress' means a bigger city" "measured by the growth of the city's population, the number of its skyscrapers and the length of its transit lines." American cities had been the victims of a "militant boosterism" for the past twenty years, a doctrine underlying "the national mania for bigger and better everything." Now "we are like a child who has outgrown not only his clothes, but his thoughts and everything he touches and uses." Soon Boston, New York and Philadelphia, the highpoints of congestion, would merge into "a vast belt of suburbs and industrialized districts." After years of worshipping size, Americans had finally fashioned a "colossus."
These "megalo-planners" were "not dealing . . . with a rational plan . . . [but were] face to face with a religion, with a deep mystical impulse . . . Traffic and Commerce [were] the names of the presiding deities." 15 Nothing was to be gained by "diffusion," for the "obsession of bigness" and "the idea that size must be greater to accommodate great crowds . . . is a mistake." 16 If the cities were to stop growing, so the logic went, then the city must be made less efficient for the goal of efficiency from one point of view meant having a few large cities and a few specialized regions exchanging their products over large areas at a lowered cost of production.

The final solution became the hope that "the city, like the industrial plant, [would be] subject to the law of diminishing returns after it pass[ed] a certain size." 17 Only then would the great cities and the farm land be "stabilized" in "supplementary balance."

Blight as an example of the encroachments of the city machine: The expansion of the city machine had created several offspring or "depreciatory improvements" as a result of the "inroads of business and manufacturing" which "reacted disastrously . . . upon old residential neighborhoods." 18 "Blight" became known as the machine left-overs for the "encroachment of mixed land uses, i.e., garages, machine shops, filling stations, freight yards, elevated railroads, all accompaniments of the machine's entry into the city, as well as the "invasion of business and manufacturing," were as much to blame for an area's "depreciation" and "degeneration" as were the contributions of "undesirable people."

The blighted districts as products of the transitions of the machine city
were "man-made contrivances" and as such could be "un-made" by judicious improvements and "removed" with proper zoning.\textsuperscript{19}

Another aspect of the definition of blighted districts, however, brings to light the obvious dilemma, for a "blighted district" was an area where "land values [were] stationary or falling." Such a "sacrifice of values" naturally attracted "an undesirable class" who were not the most "careful tenants" and hence a "general depressing effect upon values" resulted.\textsuperscript{20} Nothing seemed more important to the city's welfare, therefore, than the "conservation and restoration of impaired land values."

Where private capital halts and dreads the risk and feels no responsibility for future conditions, public credit must be applied and declining values, social and economic, must be supported until they can stand alone, for a city . . . cannot liquidate, it cannot discard its unprofitable lines.\textsuperscript{21}

During the 1920's the onward march of business and industry continued to leave in their wake the blighted district as a "sign of [their] unwholesome contact."\textsuperscript{22} The only "cure" for this "cancer" was the "surgeon's knife" and the "great preventive" use of zoning to "confirm and regulate districts."\textsuperscript{23} Since the slum was a "handicap of orderly development," land values must be restored by "permanent improvements" such as parks and recreation centers and "municipal clearance" must "condemn" and "raze" the useless property for public use.

Fear of the city machine's failure: "Are our great cities breaking down?" This was the question to be repetitively raised for too many people, too many machines, too much traffic threatened imminent "failure." Some said the city had become "intolerable"; "sewage" clogged the rivers, "artificial lights" attacked the eyes, "gasoline
"fumes" filled the nose and "traffic" and "congestion" thwarted one's nerves. "The Mouths of our great cities are like gigantic hoppers. In them pour... the food... the energy... the metals... the men and women. What comes out?" Our "botched cities" have become "self-destructive." "The hurly-burly racket, turmoil and press of people [produced only] spiritual fatigue or social nausea." Man's adaptation to the rapid changes in his environment have lagged behind the "artificial settings" which have been created in our cities. Having paid heavily "in terms of loss of life for the inclination or rather determination to live in cities," now the "technical tenuousness" of the city itself threatened "disintegration" and "total collapse."

There is neither faith nor courage to be found in their words; the fate of the cities seemed pressed to the abyss and the complexities of life and the fear of the unknown foretold of an inescapable doom. "Our elaborate urbanized civilization must break down." How long, it was asked, can the American people stand the "strains and difficulties" peculiar to their large congested areas? Inevitably the city would be the "graveyard of men," not necessarily because men could not adapt to these artificial surroundings but because the clock was running down, the mechanized world of the city was losing its energy to progress and was instead clearly showing signs of disintegration. "The city [of reality]... was a nightmare"; the plight of these "dinosaur cities" constituted a series of breakdowns in housing, water systems, street systems and the mechanical means of transportation.

In order to reduce the horrors that result from [these] breakdowns... the city spends all its funds on futile palliatives. The great city... is like a man afflicted with hardening of the arteries, a man so conscious of his condition and so pre-
occupied with carrying out the incidental medical treat-
ment that he has no time to work, to think, to play, to
create, or to perform any of those acts which separate a
state of invalidism from a state of health. 29

Megalopolis is not a pleasant home. The machine has gathered
us up and dumped us [there. But] no man therefore knows
where this conglomeration . . . with the most complicated
nervous system, a giant with a weak digestion . . . is headed.
[Its present course leads to a life] increasingly more con-
gested, hectic and biologically alien to an ordered human
life . . . until a saturation point is reached [implying]
sudden and disastrous technical breakdown. 30

What if "a swarm of bombers [should] appear above the skyscraper
tops" and with a few tons of radium atomite, poison gas or typhus-
fever cultures put an end to city life? Furthermore the "city
machine" was itself vulnerable for "steel, like flesh and blood is
subject to fatigue." 31 If the water mains burst they would create
"more havoc than dynamite," one punctured gas main would "spread
wholesale death," any stoppage or failure to telephones, electricity,
steam, subways, bridges, railroads, milk and ice supply, sewers,
fire-engines, ambulances, elevators, etc. would cause untold disaster.

So interconnected is this city machine that

if one prime nerve is cut then the urban environment starts
rapidly to disintegrate leaving the wayfaring man . . . as
helpless as an airplane in a tail spin. Furthermore, so
interlocked is the whole structure that the failing of one
nerve is almost sure to result in the rupture of others.
. . . [We have no] rational system for lessening the pressure.
The drift is toward an even worse confusion and so, inevitably
toward . . . an ever more serious technical collapse. 32

Incredulously, the city man is sublimely unaware of his foreboding
extinction while "the margin of safety continually declines . . .
[and] the cities drift blindly toward breakdown." 33
THE INTENTIONS BEHIND THE MECHANICAL REVOLUTION

"The very fact, that man becomes the subject and the world
the object is the result of the establishment of the essence of
technology, not vice versa." 34

The writers of this "new era" seemed to believe the American
city was in a position of unique peril. The natural-organic harmony
which the planner idealistically felt enveloped man and his environment
during the early 1900's had been destroyed. The presupposed oneness
with the ethical worlds, the bond between man and nature was fragmented
by the mechanical city experience. Something else separated man from
his environment; his tools and machines had divided the city up with
elevated railroads, with displacement of work and home locations, with
impersonal confrontations with his fellow residents, with automobiles
dominating the pathways and demanding new city forms, with the mechanical
procedures invading his everyday life and the sanctity of his home.
Gone were the images of harmony and perfection in unity. Alienated by
the machine, man and the city no longer seemed to belong to each other
and the planner turned instead to a monastic retreat; one which discredited
the present and transcended the past without providing a real alternative.
The city had lost its organic quality and its immediate unity; now it was "abstract," "artificial," "biologically alien," "inhuman."

The new city machines offered a different dialogue between man and the city for the inorganic world of steel and glass was no longer conceptually malleable nor spiritually intersubjective. The world which had surrounded the life of man now became the environment which his tools manipulated, which his man-made creations dominated. His manipulative attitude toward everyday life changed his sense perceptions; the world stood outside of his existence, a world to be conquered, pacified, and subjugated to the production of need-satisfying conditions.

Ervin Laszlo has pointed out that technology cognitively structures

the environment in a manner satisfying our "rational codes," stated as rules and principles of common sense and the laws and principles of science. . . . Technology affirms our implicit trust in the consistency and law-like rationality of our surroundings, satisfying thereby a cognitive urge to understand, and not merely enjoy, our environment."

This may seem tautologically true for a "technology-habituated person," but the planner's mechanical metaphors of the 1920's seemed to embody a principle of evil which revealed the aggressive tendencies of the mechanical world. Man no longer was the source of evil in failing to apply himself to the laws-of-nature; now the artificial structure of the city and its mechanical procedures embodied an independent sense of aggression and alienation which controlled and manipulated the environment and everyone in it. These city machines operated automatically, needing to be controlled only in the process of starting and stopping and perhaps in the process of guidance. Man's role became one
of supervisor, he began to lose his old orientation and question who was the creator and the created, the consumer or consumed, the powerful or the powerless. Since the purpose of these new devices did not appear so obvious, it was perhaps for a moment worthwhile to question "who was controlling whom for what purpose?" The city man began to fear that life could be richer than the homogenized standardized life the machines offered. Continually we find references to the fact that the machine left man's life and his life needs outside of its processings. Man's consciousness had become alienated from his surroundings; engineered by the machine in his daily life, he found nowhere to find relief for his life needs, for a sense of beauty, a desire for imagination, comfort or protection. Rather than cognitively affirm his trust in nature, the "irrationalistic materialism" of the "mechanical revolution" seemed to conceal the qualitative and material character of things. The city world seemed to become an artificial, inauthentic experience separate from the desires, needs, dignity and worth of men.

The machine cycle: Let us turn for a moment to look at the first form of disintegration, that of the "never-ending" mechanical process, for it brings forth the analogy between the automatic assembly line and the city's functionings. The pre-civil war era had witnessed the major inroads of mechanization in which the struggle over the love of natural processes and the dangers of technological processes had yielded widespread fear and anxiety. During the twenties the "mechanical revolution" was merely an insidious one which touched the everyday life of the city resident in his transportation and communication needs, his
amusement distractions and pastimes. Mechanical processes had become more important focuses than organic processes and organization valued above spontaneity. There was a certain heaviness, some said "morbidity," associated with this city machine and a degree of domination. It is the principle of the "machine cycle" which typifies the domination of objectified and rationalized processes which we shall explore here.

Georg Lukacs has demonstrated in History and Class Consciousness how the concept of production had developed from a relationship between man and the object he fashioned with the aid of his tools to a rationalized machine process which eliminated the qualitative and human attributes of the worker and broke the work process into specialized objectively calculable operations. As the production process ceased to be a product of the work-process but the function of a collection of arbitrarily connected operations, the worker lost touch with the production of the end-product. The worker was no longer the master of the work process but a mechanical part of the autonomous mechanical system to which he passively conformed. So the worker's whole stance toward the world was transformed into a passive conformity to a mechanically presupposed set of fixed ends impervious to his possible interventions. The principle of rational mechanization came to embrace every aspect of life and every individual was subjected to the dominating imperatives of the machine cycle which were both offered and accepted as a pre-given totality.

The new concept in the 1920's to be added to this Marxist reaction to the industrial revolution, was the automatic assembly line production; the faster and faster speed with which the products were
assembled and the operations repetitively standardized to yield greater efficiency. If the assembly line production was part of the mechanical revolution then bureaucracy and dehumanizing domination were its social characteristics. At the level of production, the machine cycle produced an endless commodity exchange in which more machines were designed to increase the level of production with the result that more consumers were needed to keep the machines operating at capacity level. Commodity demand no longer depended upon material needs but a universal economic process which supplied both the creation of false needs and the supply of commodities that would satisfy these needs and so satisfy the functionings of the capitalist machine cycle. This machine cycle seemed to mystically unleash the sorcerer's apprentice who kept the machines running continuously for maximum efficiency, never making allowances for catching up with its increasingly faster pace. Technological control seemed to have escaped the self-conscious control of average men. The motivations behind the production process, the distribution of goods, the socio-economic dependencies, the conditions of work were opaquely hidden behind the ideological necessity of keeping the machines operating under the assurance of progress.

Applied to the city, the metaphor of the "fatal circle" seemed to entrap all aspects of the city machine in an organized totality of its functionings. Caught in the rhythm of production, the city had surpassed the stage of mass aggregation of Scheme One and expansion now dangerously threatened the very existence of the city itself. Continual mechanical extension of the city was an impossible and fearful goal; a harbinger of inevitable death. But the production needs of the machine
demanded an increasingly greater work force at what seemed to be perilous cost. The planners, bent on reconstruction and rehabilitation had a double fear of this "vicious circle" for circular causality offered no point of entry. Since the "endless circle" could neither be stopped nor unraveled, the planner was relegated to a passive and helpless role.

Growth and development: Let us focus, briefly, on the second source of disintegration, i.e., the supercongestion of the city. The process of growth or change across space and time was a central preoccupation of the planner's during the 1920's and schemes of containment or dispersal filled the journals. Growth was inevitable, so they said, but beneath this acceptance lay the wonder, growth for what purpose? Congestion no longer was described in mildly disturbing terms of Scheme One, now congestion meant "supercongestion," a "colossus," a "titan," a "great agglomeration." The adjective "great" commonly preceded the term "the city" allowing the distinction to be clearly labeled between what was considered as dreadful congestion before and what was intolerably implicit in the current "Megalopolis." "Great" was not in praise; "Great" was the fear of the "giant with the bad disposition," "the dreaded demon" of the technological city.

The whole image of the demonic qualities of the giant city is summarized conveniently in the special case of the use of the term "titanic." Of course there is the special reference to the sinking of the Titanic in 1912, but beyond this reference lie the giants of Greek mythology. Man the maker belongs to the race of the Titans to whom the invention of arts and magic have been attributed. The Titans symbolize
enormous power struggling to harness elemental forces that might at any moment spring free and destroy the world. They thus symbolized the brute earth forces in revolt against the world of the mind, the struggle of animality against elevating consciousness. Beyond this the Titans serve to symbolize the tendency toward domination of such exemplaries as high functionaries and technocrats. They have thus come to refer to the passage from the world of concrete reality to one of abstraction and alienation. The "great city," "the titanic city," "the colossus" refer to all the fears of destruction, domination and alienation either by brute force or by the power of abstraction.

The city may have been advancing, in size, in power, into the countryside; but was it progressing for the good of mankind? The battlefields of the First World War were proof that the machine could crush flesh and blood beneath its advance, was the machine in the city to be as devastatingly useful? "Supercongestion" implied "automatic increase," "accelerated growth," "continuous aggregation" and so forth, all words which referenced the duplicating and irreversible process of the mechanical cycle. But "supercongestion" also held implications which were damaging for life qualities. Marx had considered the concept of historical time to contain both a growth and a developmental aspect. Growth was simply quantitative accretion, continuous numerical aggregation as exemplified by the progress of technology, economic growth and material production. Development was on another level; it was marked by unpredictable leaps and bounds of emerging qualities and was concerned specifically with the progress toward social development, the quality of life, and the flexible
arrangements to meet these social needs. These two processes, while related, did not necessarily appear hand in hand. This was the haunting realization behind the city machine; that material expansion did not alone imply the development of the Good Life; a theme which we shall postpone for a moment.

Doom: Turning now to consider the fourth type of disintegration, i.e., "breakdown" and "doom," we sense the ultimate disillusionment and disenchantment of the 1920's which undermined the American faith in the myth of progress. The promise of heavenly harmony, the inevitable evolution toward higher civilization, scientific and humanitarian advances, no longer seemed clairvoyant. The new behavioral psychology of the 1920's had devastated the concept of man as rational and innately good, claiming instead that he was but a victim of uncontrollable subconscious impulses. The fear of the machine seemed to capture the repressions, complexes and neuroses of Freudianism and become an outward symbol of the standardizing, conforming coercions of the themes of domination and distortion. The tragedy of the 1920's seemed to be reflected in this general malaise in which the fear of the machine brought its own sense of "social nausea" and "spiritual fatigue." Many were world-weary from the years of the war, and life itself, mesmerized by the drone of the machine, seemed to offer no relief from the inevitable march of doom.

It is not just a resistance to change which this voice of doom spells out, however. Mary Douglas in Purity and Danger has described how the unknown dangers of society are often mirrored in the images of bodily dangers and that bodily margins are especially believed to
contain special powers and threats: "... all margins are dangerous. If they are pulled this way or that the shape of fundamental experience is altered. Any structure of ideas is vulnerable at its margins." But it is a mistake to consider the bodily margins as separate from all the other margins which threaten the society's existence. From one aspect, the boundaries of the sacred city "urbs" had been polluted; i.e., the machine had created such expansive cities that city life as it had been known was threatened with extinction. Another aspect, however, indicates that the domination of the city machine itself spelled out inevitable death for it was the "dead creature of man," the "soul-killing," "self-destructive" promise of death. Without organic life its only purpose was the function it performed and the rationalization of organized processes, of conformity and standardization. The only relevant question seemed to be technical request of "does it work?" or "does it threaten to break down?" The pragmatic criterion of workability, however, fell far beneath the specifications of a humane existence. Unable to distinguish between inevitable processes and conscious determinations, the city seemed headed for "total collapse."

The mechanical city had annihilated the natural and stood as the final and last stage of the civilization of man. Alienated from the land the city man turned his city into a wholly intellectual product and with his methods, decisions and policies he exploited and dominated the land, destroying the last traces of organic growth, culling and devouring fresh streams of men until the country lay a wasteland at his feet. The inorganic accumulation of stone upon stone
amassing without end in the unrestrained process of city growth necessarily entailed its death as it moved ever forward, never back, toward the final hardening. So the city produced the sterility of man, a "fellah type," a uniform man who became the tool of the abstract organization of the city and eventually the tool of the leader. It is interesting to note how similar the account just given above, which is a brief summary of Oswald Spengler's thought on the "Soul of the City" in The Decline of the West,4 reflects the tones and fears of the planner of the same era. There is a deeper message, however, to be gleaned from this simple analogy.

Spengler had written that civilizations are the most external and artificial states which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, the thing-become succeeding the thing-becoming, death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built, petrifying world-city following mother earth and the spiritual childhood of Doric and Gothic. They are the end, irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached again and again.1

And later Spengler adds,

He who does not understand that this outcome is obligatory and insusceptible of modification, that our choice is between willing this and willing nothing at all, between cleaving to this destiny or despairing of the future and of life itself ... must forego all desire to comprehend history, to live through history or to make history.41

As Theodor Adorno has pointed out,52 implicit to the arguments of Spengler is a fatalistic determinism which subjects man to the blind dominating process of the inorganic city forces. Completely ahistorical in character, men are simply victims of manipulative

4Decline of the West first appeared in English during the 1920's.
self-perpetuating domination; they are the mere creatures of an
external and inevitable fate. Spengler, and the planners, have both
forgotten that it is man who makes the choice to use his tools in
certain manners and that it is the social relationships which result
from his technical choices which diminish the capacity for men to
freely determine their future. It is men's tendency to dominate
nature through the extension of his technical tools which eventually
involves the domination of one group of men over another that should
be the real culprit. Fate and the fear of inevitable doom on the
other hand place the blame on the machine and not the makers and
users of these machines.

So it is that the fears of the margins of the city involve
the planner in the fateful acceptance of the inevitable decline of
the whole urban environment and its way of life. A certain compla-
cency and indifference resulting in a failure to actively control and
redirect the economic and social, not natural, forces behind the city's
growth and decline follows upon this blind acceptance of fate. The
future becomes worse than the present, not because of the forces of
decay and death locked within the inorganic matter of the city environ-
ment but because men have failed to take an adequate stand against the
historically determined relations among men which have produced the
subsequent conditions of distortion and domination. The fear of the
machine, the fear of technological devastation of the environment,
appear again and again as the acceptable scapegoats to veil the
conformist's acceptance of our "laissez-faire" approach to the
problems of environmental growth and decline.
THE INTENTIONS BEHIND THE MECHANICAL REVOLUTION (Terminology)

machine city = (mechanical city, tool, city hoppers, city mechanism, mechanical culture)

machine city : (abstract, not natural, inhuman, intolerable, bewildering, not rational, rational, mechanical atheism, irrationlistic materialism, synthetic, artificial, mangled environment, biologically alien, nightmare, crushing horrors)

machine city + (mechanical revolution, revolutionary factors)

Chaos = disintegration = disintegration_1/disintegration_2/disintegration_3/disintegration_4

disintegration_1 = (machine cycle, fatal circle, endless circle, never-ending process)

disintegration_2 = (overgrown, supercongestion, concentration, turmoil, great agglomeration)

supercongestion = [automatic increase, accelerated growth, continuous (increase/expansion/aggregation), intensive growth, material expansion, never-ending process, relentless inertia, powerful impulse driven, habit of growth]

supercongestion : (megalopolis, vast belt, quantitative goal, colossus, mammoth collection, obsessive bigness, titanic city, great city, great agglomeration)

disintegration_3 = (blight)

blight = (encroachment, invasion of business and manufacturing, man-made contrivances, unwholesome contract between business and industry, not orderly working organism, cancer, leftovers of machine)

blight : [depreciation, degeneration, (stationary/sacrificed/falling/declining/impaired) land values]

blight + [ depreciatory improvements, disastrous reactions, undesirable class]

cure = (unmake, remove, municipal clearance, condemn, raze, surgeon's knife, conservation, restoration, public credit, public support)
disintegration = (breakdown, doom)

breakdown = [failure, technical tenuousness, inevitable, technical collapse, total collapse, (botched/dinosaur) cities, havoc, invalidism, spiritual fatigue, social nausea, diminishing returns, margin of safety declines]

doom = (loss of life, wholesale death, stop, victim. Morbid, dead creature of man, soul-killing rupture, decay, self-destructive, helpless tailspin)
SUSTAINING LIFE NEEDS

Social Planning: The 1920's brought to light for the first time the strain over physical and/or social planning. For some, a "survey of social and living conditions [was] essential to wise city planning."

"Regulation of the use of land [must] take account of the habits and desires of the people." "The city planner must get beneath the skin of the citizens of his community. He must feel their wants, he must sense their needs. He must, in short, forget his own point of view and find theirs."

For others, the objective to be obtained by city planning was the solution of physical problems prior to the consideration of the "social" or "human program."

It is sometimes argued [we are told] that the ultimate purpose of city planning is actually social and that no beginning can be made on a comprehensive plan until the social conditions have been carefully examined. But if the social survey is preliminary there is danger it will not appeal to some of those whose interest and support are essential to success, i.e., the city officials.

Although social ideas as outright aims had to be slowly introduced into the vocabulary of the pragmatic planner, the interest in the quality of urbanized life and the quest for the "good life" resulted directly from this era's search to humanize the city machine. The "roaring twenties" brought with it new conceptions of man's relationship to his environment. The machine had intervened between man and nature; of immediate concern then was the effect of this machine on human life and the fear that the "good life" might be devastated by its threat. If the machine could produce the material satisfactions of life, who would be concerned with the quality of such life? In
part the responsibility fell to the planners to engineer the city machine so as to serve the needs and aspirations of men. As one planner tells us, "If we put clearly before us the essentials in wholesome city life . . . and then use our mechanical devices to strengthen instead of destroy these essentials . . . then we need only give wider application to what we already are doing." 46

Lewis Mumford was perhaps the loudest voice during the '20's to remind those committed to the "synthetic city ideal" of the present "mechanical culture" that the city should have at bottom, a "human base." The present expenditures on wasteful mechanical palliatives, he reminded, provide little left for "the human arts." 47 Others joined the protest and claimed that planning should make "the city a more human as well as a healthier and more convenient place to live in." 48 Town planning's ideal's [had] broadened and deepened until they comprehend[ed] all that is implied in that truest beauty which consists of the harmonious adaptation of a thing to the needs of human life. . . . From a question of art, town planning [had] become more and more one of engineering and a program for future construction. 49

The main business of planning concerned "the human significance."

City design . . . [would] create this humanized environment; its prime end [was] not mechanical efficiency alone, still less [would] it seek merely to produce the greatest amount of financial profit for the investing classes . . . it [would be instead] an attempt to create a shell favorable to the best life, possible. 50

The ingredients of this "human city" were, however, difficult to outline. For some homes close to work, unimpeded movement, removal of the stress and annoyance of too many people, open space, good public schools and adequate housing were among the essentials. Others added the requirements of a happy family life, economic and physical security, and supports for man's basic instincts of imagination, curiosity,
creativity and competitiveness. For most in those days of prosperity, "the good life" remained an illusive goal toward which America was slowly advancing.

For many, the overgrown city was clearly not "the good life of our ideals." The prospects for "decent human living" in the great cities had become distinctly worse. In the newly formulated words of the psychoanalysts, one city critic claimed that we must "allow . . . the pleasurable and the painful sensations of city living to filter through to consciousness." We must face both the "positive and negative reactions" and become aware that there are more painful than pleasurable sensations in one's contact with a huge American city. Pleasure comes from the arts, adventures and architectural splendors. Pain results from the constant harangue of "noise, dust, smell, crowding, the pressure of the clocks, negotiating traffic, stretches of bleak and dour ugliness, in looking always up instead of out, in a continually battering sense of human inferiority."  

City planning must pick up the banner for the development of "the good life in a community." "We used to say that cities existed primarily as service stations. We might now say that they exist in equal part for the opportunity of serving their communities and making life richer for their own people." Now the "first requisite of our new plan . . . [foresees that] every man must have room to live . . . to work . . . to play. . . . [If we] secure this . . . all else becomes possible." No longer can we "substitute population statistics . . . for the common conveniences of life." We are faced with the "mechanical job of catching up" to the good life our cities must offer;
"the individual and his life" must now be the basis upon which we build our cities.57

The City Beautiful and Livable: In pandering to the practical businessmen of the 1920's, the city beautiful movement had become "the skeleton in the closet." Nevertheless filtering through the statements of "the good life," we find the inevitable appeals to the beneficence of beauty. It was hoped that "the City Beautiful and Livable" would soon inspire the imaginations of men. The current crop of city plans, it was feared, suffered from two defects; first they "abstracted" from reality presenting no vivid picture to fulfill one's "hopes" and second they were too "intellectual" failing therefore to appeal to one's emotions.58 Nevertheless, we are at the beginning of a new era in the planning of our American towns.

... Today with our rapidly increasing wealth and leisure we are insisting more and more on the amenities of life. History says that means beauty. The new period we are now entering is one where utility and beauty will share alike.59

"In a recent flood of 'Main Street' books we have been shown all too graphically what drab, barren, uneventful lives we live. ... Men were now searching [or so it was believed] to recover some of the beauty of life that seemed to promise in ... childhood."50 We can not be so "materialistic," it was proclaimed, that we become dead to the "finer things in life" and refuse attractive as well as useful environments. Beauty would alleviate the crushing standardization of "The Babbits," for "beauty means the preserving of the personality of a town."61

This is the planning age ... this urban age faces [us] with stern responsibilities. Above all, remember that man must have the joy of living, the real pursuit of happiness which after all is only truly satisfied by a highly esthetic environment, as well as sound social and economic conditions. ... [In this new
social values are being readjusted to demand beauty and order... we must provide for the perfection of the environmental effect, for the deliberate attainment of attractiveness and beauty. ... Our station in civilization [as the richest nation on earth] demands and requires a better dress, our progress in education and culture insists upon... better environmental conditions. ... Getting in step with Beauty is the problem now upon us... The aesthetic ideals, we instill in our city plans are the measure of us. 62

Nothing, it was feared, could be valued with this degree of sordidness and ugliness in our everyday surroundings.

Beauty must become "the thing to do." "What we have already done in our automobiles and airplanes, we can surely expect to do in the civic design of our cities, towns and countrysides, i.e., the commercial demand for beauty." 63

THE THEME OF "THE GOOD LIFE"

The antithesis of despair over death is, of course, the value of life. "Social planning"
became the consequent synthesizer of the dreaded conforming stamp of the machine and the promise of life fulfilling processes. If the machine promised productive growth then "social planning" would ensure worthwhile development. Social planning aimed to plant the natural, the humane, the social into the planner's dialogue. The concerns of the 1920's therefore transformed the planner's idealistic concepts of reform, i.e., "awakening" and "regeneration," into the problem of the meaning of everyday life in the cities and although the planners never grasped the full import of their mission, they nevertheless added some important concepts to their vocabulary.

Today we are apt to suggest that "social planning" is a product of the dilemmas of our own times; the ghetto unrest, the persistence of poverty in the presence of affluence, the misconceptions of our national priorities and so forth. The twenties however were also years of abundance and it is interesting to note that social concerns, of a particular kind, were issues of those days as well. Raymond Aron has aligned the terms "social," "socialist" and "socialism" with the idea of separation and conflict: "the social," he says, "seems autonomous when society itself breaks up." Reflecting a similar theme, John H. Randall, a social philosopher writing during the 1920's has pointed out that the deepest concerns of those days focused on "social ideas"; a preoccupation with the ends of human activities and the aims of human institutions. For men of those days, social ideals were pre-eminently ideals of change, ideals by which
society could be transformed. Randall saw every statement of the "good life for society" as fundamentally involved in programs for reconstruction, reform and reorganization.

The visions of the "good life" for the 1920's, nevertheless, fell far short of programs for social reform; they found their focus instead in the common sense meaning of such concepts as "wholesome life," "liveability" or "joy of living." It is an open question as to how much Freud's theories of instinctual life conditioned the protest of the Twenties against the machine. Glimpses at their vocabulary suggest that fears of "uncontrolled impulses," "mechanical drives" and "self-destruction," "pleasure-pain reactions" only allow for a surface recognition of the regressive tendency of the mechanical death wish. In counterbalance, the emphasis on the liberating spontaneity of the pleasure principle merely seemed to be aimed at lessening some of the complaints against the deadening coercion of the machine as well as answering the practical problems of leisure recently raised by the newly gained Forty-hour week and the freedom of the "weekend."

Bringing the needs of everyday life to the attention of planners however presented an important conceptual orientation. For some planners, planning was henceforth to be grounded in the "life-base" and needs of the city dwellers. The important change of focus is demonstrated by the introduction of the concepts of "liveability," "good life," "amenities of life," "humanized environment" and so forth, all concepts which drew their emphasis from the commonsense value of "life" itself. If the reforms of Scheme One had remained slightly ethereal in terms of perfecting harmony, the 1920's demanded that social reforms
be more pragmatically based on tangible reactions to fragmented, mechanical life as it was presented everyday, then and there, to the city dweller.

Judging by the request for social surveys, the planners seemed to want to base their own social actions upon a detailed analysis of the desires and needs of the residents for a better life. In this sense planning was perhaps trying to establish a frame-work of social theory on a common sense level of life experiences. Interestingly, if this approach had been developed, planning might have proceeded toward a truly critical analysis. Husserl had pointed out just this same problem in 1935; the missing interrelationship between the life-world and the scientific world and the question of how men might structure their relationships among each other and with the natural sciences on the basis of freedom and rationality. It is in this sense that the changing goals and purposes of the everyday life world should be the grounding for a truly critical social analysis. The individual man was thus seen as the ultimate source of consciousness of everyday experience. Although an individual is born into a world with an established set of common preconceptions and conventions which present themselves as objective reality, it is the individual alone who can perceive when these predetermined factors impinge upon his freedom and development. Thus the planner's concern for the "life-base" of the city residents, i.e., their perceptions of reality as opposed to his predetermined concepts, could have directed the planner's attention away from the commonly accepted concepts of the pre-given, pre-interpreted social system toward a more critical attitude of distortive formalities.
Instead, the 1920's saw the solution for human problems to stem from the increased satisfactions of human needs as promised by the steady growth of technical and scientific progress. Thus we find that the idealistic concepts of Scheme One, which believed in the efficacy of spiritual and mental effects, were replaced by a materialistic orientation that maintained true happiness to flow from the attainment of goals and the acquisition of objects. This latter focus contained a concept of man as a rationally acting individual, i.e., one who was always maximizing his self-interests and in turn, this model of man assumed that human behavior was purposive, that pleasures came from goal attainment or from the removal of felt blockages to goal attainment. The "good life" became the fulfillment of material needs and wants, such as housing, convenience in transportation, and the "finer things in life." The equal distribution of goods, the relative value of promised pleasures, the definition of a non-repressive concept of happiness, the possibilities of a change toward a more rational society, were issues of "the good life" that were never discussed.

The "pursuit of happiness" was assumed to be a self-explanatory goal which took precedent over all other life-demands. As Marcuse has pointed out however, such a universal principle of happiness restricts the satisfaction of goals and hence the ultimate happiness of individuals to the world of material objects which are defined by the existing social order. Human happiness, however, should lie beyond the implicit resignation of the individual to the expectant goods of his social class or his consumer's wants which are manipulated as functions
of the market economy. But as an editor of a New York newspaper of the 1920's remarked, a "citizen's first importance to the country is not to be a citizen, but to be a consumer." The subjective life-needs and wants of the individual are symbolically dashed in this one statement. From then on the needs and wants, i.e., the very conditions of happiness and the good life, were to be defined by the uncontrolled productions of the economic system and the distorted consciousness of commodity acquisitions as perpetrated through the fraudulent claims of advertisement. It is not until the 1960's that the critical analysis of the quality of life in a highly industrialized society would again return us to the problematics of "the Good Life."

Business Support and the Good Life: Since we find that the dominant materialism of the business tradition of the 1920's also influenced the outcome of "social planning," it is perhaps worthwhile to briefly review the background of business interests as they found their expression during this period. If the 1920's have been called the era of the "city practical," they were also known as the "era of business." In this period of prosperity, we are told, "sane city planning is all business." "The reason for the city's existence is business, commerce and industry. . . . Business creates wealth . . . the means by which we rise. Our first consideration in city planning must then be given to the needs of business." City planning, moreover, was "quite in line with modern tendencies in business. It is order, system, planning ahead. It means doing for the city what every good business man or manufacturer does for his own plant and . . . it saves these men a great deal of annoyance and expense."
commentary 233.

Others criticized the municipal engineers and the city planners for being "the agents of a Higher Power; [their plans] . . . exist to protect and tenderly cherish the function that all American cities have traditionally looked upon as the main end of human activity, namely gambling in real estate." The American city development rests upon a speculative pyramid of values and the present use of zoning ordinance, the chief planning tool of the 1920's, was seen as only an attempt to keep this pyramid in equilibrium. No one had yet discovered a way "to reckon with the land speculator and his colossal pyramid of values [which] . . . capitalized on congestion."

Clearly, the critics pointed out, any city plan vitally affects "enormous and active property interests"; nothing could be devised as comprehensive as a city plan that would have all economic interest affected in the same or better way. "It happens that certain specific persons and groups reap the major portions of the economic returns [of planning] in the form of increased land values, improved productive facilities and enlarged earnings." "Hope, Faith and Charity" had been translated into "Boost, Credit, and Six Per cent." "The Americans . . . [have] developed a business community above which there never floated any unifying ideal, and national, spiritual or religious conception, only the ideal of success."

The sort of city planning that serves and stabilizes its financial conquests is, by its necessary limitations, not the kind that promotes a better life for the majority of its inhabitants. . . . If city planning is to be on the side of the humanizing elements in our civilization it cannot identify itself with our programs for metropolitan aggrandizement. Its task is to systematically aid those forces which are working against the domination of purely financial values."
The Control of Business: The problem of the "relentless machine" on the level of commerce and industry had turned into the problem of how to dispose of its products and how to keep the machine operating at maximum capacity. Thrift was no longer an economic and social value; now it was the order of buy if we are to survive. The necessity of having to dispose of the machine's surplus products dominated the social institutions and controlled political thought. In order to make people want what they did not really need, the services of advertisement, salesmanship, credit system, the development of new markets and new appetites were all relegated to the production, distribution and promotion of standardized low quality, low-priced products. The machine process had accentuated a new instinct for solidarity, a new economic world integration in which the ultimate effect of each individual action was intensified under conditions of uniformity and standardization.

The American society of the 1920's was controlled by the businessmen, the "Babbitts" and "realtors," the "go-getters" and the "good-fellows" and this, not so surprisingly had its effects on the outcome of city planning as well. The public, as John Dewey pointed out in The Public and Its Problems, seemed to be lost: "Business is the order of the day . . . it is their firm belief that 'prosperity' . . . a word which has taken on religious color . . . is the great need of the
country, that they are its authors and guardians, and hence the right
determiners of polity.""40 "Public men" seemed to have withdrawn into
their private worlds of specialized concerns while business interests
themselves presented powerful diversions from independent political and social concerns. As business interests were generally unopposed by other organized forces and indeed fought for conditions of laissez-faire management, they tended to motivate political action toward their own special concerns. Thus we find the intentions of "social planning" were subjugated under the demands of production and consumption, and the demand for profit and progress at all cost undermined most of the planner's social ideals. Social planners found themselves consequently as the spokesmen for the very forces which they sought to criticize.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>reform</th>
<th>+ Social planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social planning</td>
<td>: [Human problems, social values, humanized environment, (individual/life) base, (social/living) conditions, community service, consciousness of (pleasure/pain/positive/negative) reactions to city life]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social planning</td>
<td>+ [(good/best/wholesome) life, amenities of life, humane city, common conveniences of life, joy of living, pursuit of happiness, room to (live, work, play), city beautiful]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Beautiful</td>
<td>: beauty₁/beauty₂</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beauty₁</td>
<td>= [(harmony/appropriateness/fitness/adaptation) (of form to function/of object to needs of human life), liveability, finer things of life, perfect environmental effect]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beauty₂</td>
<td>= [(appeals to/fulfills/educates) (emotions/hopes/imaginations)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Beautiful</td>
<td>+ (commercial demand, advertisement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Beautiful</td>
<td>+ [city liveability, city personality, (not drab/not barren/not standardized/uneventful) lives]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>materialism</td>
<td>+ (business, commerce, industry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>materialism</td>
<td>: (business ideal, capitalism, ideal of success, financial value)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| materialism | = {[(considers/protects/cherishes] [business, real estate gamblers, land speculators, certain (groups, interests), speculative pyramid, agents of higher power, business management]}

...
ESCAPE FROM THE CITIES

One of the most prominent movements of the 1920's was the tendency toward suburban development; the twentieth century city, as one writer claimed, would be known henceforth as the "suburban city." Since the rising economy enabled the well-do-do to "escape from the big city," the suburban movement was acclaimed to be the "public acknowledgement that congestion and bad housing and blank vistas and lack of recreational opportunity and endless subway rides [were] not endurable." The suburbanite was "an intelligent heretic" who had discovered that the mean environment of the city was no place to live. Moreover, those who escaped to the suburbs, while taking advantage of the city's business center could also "escape the increasing
burden of taxes." In the rush toward the "blessedness of country life," the "abandoned city" was left behind, a chaotic jumble of cars and skyscrapers, a place it was far easier to escape than to try to control. "If the city [had] nothing to give but dirt, disorder and inhuman racket . . . [then let it become] a thoroughfare . . . [and] let them pass through it and escape."

The "real solution" which the suburban migration seemed to offer the congested city however was that of "decentralization." All the city interests which had been turned toward the center were now beginning to regard the "circumference." "Regional planning" would aid this reorientation by looking to the "circumference" of the city problems. "Among city planners decentralization [was] now a magic theory for curing the serious defects in the physical growth in cities." Decentralized development was offered as a "fundamentally different theory," a process which would be hastened and guided by intelligent regional planning. Only central administrative and cultural activities related to the whole community would be centered in the downtown district. All the rest would be distributed in "secondary focii." The basic point behind decentralization was the idea of a "controlled and limited development of an indefinite number of interrelated cities, each for special or mixed uses, with a 'hub' of limited purpose. . . . This theory . . . would seem to break the fatal circle of the more and bigger street theory."

One of the objectives behind the regional planning movement was the establishment of "garden-cities." Lewis Mumford called this effort the "new conservation of human values . . . with natural values."
Regional planning, he claimed, was not the concern of a profession but a "mode of thinking and a method of procedure." It meant the "reinvigoration and rehabilitation of whole regions so that the products of culture and civilizations [would] . . . be available to everyone at every point in a region." The "regional community" would become the center of focus. The notion that congestion was a boom was to be supplanted by the "deliberate planning and building up of new communities . . . in the hinterland . . . [under] a new policy of community afforestation."

"Regional planning" was after all only "city planning carried to its logical conclusions, under modern economic and social conditions." "It [was] the logical next step in planning . . . to find a way of controlling and directing the development of the whole contributory region." The difference between city and regional or metropolitan planning, as it was sometimes referenced, was only the unit of planning, or the "relative area of ground covered."

The city [had] never been a thoroughly satisfactory unit for planning. The opportunity for really effective work [had] been limited by arbitrary boundaries . . . [while] meantime urban development [had] extended beyond the city boundaries with little or no intelligent planning or control . . . and the same costly problems of reorganization and reconstruction [were] being reproduced.

Regional planning was to focus on the relationships between town and country and "the regulation of growth on elastic principles over wide areas and at greater expense of time and money." The regional plan, however, must be both "tentative and elastic," for regional planning deals not with the past but with the future. Thus we find the field of city planning had been naturally extended;
"what was characterized as the 'city beautiful' movement [had] widened to embrace the constructive ambitions and enterprises of nations and states as well as towns and cities." The need for planning the "reorganization and reconstruction" of built-up areas had given rise to the problems of "city-extension." "City planning, having grown into regional planning, [would soon] be merged into state, and national planning, with technology as its basis." 

The rationality of the replicability of results: One apparent alternative to the dreaded city machine was escape. Many during the 1920's took this road; the moderately well-to-do escaped into suburbia, the intellectuals retreated to Paris, while the middle-class found absorption in speakeasies, the Flapper and movie stars. Escape for the planners came in the form of regional planning. By admission, regional planning was merely the "logical conclusion" of
city planning; based on the same premises, using the same techniques, regional planning was a simple extension of technical planning to the "hinterland." Again there occurs the planner's predilection in programs of reform for the use of words with prefixes "re" and "con," e.g., "reinvigoration," "reproduction," "rehabilitation," "reorganization," "conservation," "constructive enterprise," "controlled purpose," etc., and again these terms bring to mind the rationality of the replicability of results which we explored in Scheme One.* These notions enable the planner to perceive of the city or a new community as an essentially reproducible phenomenon. "Cityness" becomes divorced from its human and biological base and as an abstract entity is conceptually manipulatable in terms of replication and reversibility. In the abstract, the ideal city processes lend themselves to mechanical and technical reversal, re-doing and re-building in opposition to the entropic reality of the empirical world.

The introduction of these terms of replication in the planning vocabulary are also based on a notion of conservation; an assumption that expects objects and events which occur in reality to remain constant or approximately the same for all time. Piaget has pointed out that one of the remarkable properties of conservation is the concept of reversibility; the recognition that operations can be returned to their original point of departure.

It is this reversibility which enables the child to understand the conservation of a quantity or of a set when its spatial disposition is altered, since when the modification is seen as reversible, it follows that the quantity in question remains invariant.**

*See page 78
Thus the concept of reversibility entails the elaboration of invariant properties and the concept of permanence and equilibrium. The linguistical references of regional planning, as were the earlier reform procedures, are preoccupied with such terms as "conservation," "reproduction," "reorganization," "rehabilitation." The question, perhaps at the risk of unnecessarily laboring a point, is how much the technical emphasis on possible facsimile production biased the planner's preconceptions on the replicability of "new communities"?

This question concerns the validity of the expectation of constancy; namely the expectation that the city and the "city-life" can be reproduced; that the city can be cured or restored by beginning anew, or that a new city can be "logically deduced" from prior principles of city building. Again attention is directed at the meaning of "city reproduction" based upon "re-doing" or "un-doing" if the process is based merely on the logical extensions of the original distortions.

In this case the needs of life, the concerns for a better existence apart from the crushing city machine, become only the means for expanding the given system. Conceptually, there has been offered no fundamentally new ingredient to this process of "city reproduction."

The problems of the machine city, those of self-regulation and self-determination which we shall now turn to, were the offsprings of technological domination. Regional cities, garden cities, suburban retreats although structurally reproducible, did not address themselves to the problematics of the pre-given political framework. Decentralization during the 1920's, however, meant more than population redistribution, it also meant the struggle against the relentless centralizing
tendency of the machine and the search for intermediate structures that would offer some voice of leadership and some strength of control.
The rationality of the replicability of results: (Terminology)

Escape

regional planning = suburbia/regional planning

= [(controlled/limited) (environment/purpose), (control/direct)
(contributory region/hinterland),
constructive (ambitions/enterprise),
not arbitrary boundaries, development
beyond boundaries, decentralization,
reorganization, reinvigoration,
rehabilitation, reconstruction,
reproduction, (elastic/tentative)
growth, problems of city extension,
new conservation, (new communities/
garden cities), community afforestation]

suburbia

= (wealthy, unendurable cities, defects,
tax burdens)

= (country life, tabloid nature,
standardization, devitalized
relationships with men)
REFERENCES: CHAPTER NINE

1 Gillispie, The Edge of Objectivity, p. 396.


3 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform.


6 "Are Big Cities Breaking Down?" The Literary Digest, May 30, 1925.

7 Cox, "The Overgrowth of Cities."

8 Crane, "Decentralization--Eventually But Not Now."


10 Frederick L. Ackerman, "Our Stake in Congestion," Survey, May 1, 1925.

11 Ibid.


13 Lewis, "Getting Off the Bandwagon."

14 Mumford, "The Intolerable City."


16 Lay, "The Freedom of the City."

17 Soule, "Will the Cities Ever Stop?"


20 Cunliff, "Blighted Districts in St. Louis."


22 Cunliff, "Blighted Districts In St. Louis."

23 Ibid.

24 Mumford, "The Intolerable City."


26 Ibid.

27 Chase, "The Future of the Great City."


29 Clarence Stein, "Dinosaur Cities," The Survey, May 1, 1925.

30 Chase, "The Future of the Great City."

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, quoted in Rolf Albers, "Is Technology Intrinsically Repressive?" Continuum, IX (Spring-Summer, 1970), 114.

35 Ervin Laszlo, "Human Dignity and The Promise of Technology," The Philosophical Forum, IX (June, 1971), 175.


247.


37 Douglas, Purity and Danger, p. 145.


39 Ibid., p. 38.


44 Ihlder, "The City Plan and Living and Working Conditions."

45 Mumford, "The Sacred City."


48 Mumford, "The Next Twenty Years In City Planning."

49 Chase, "The Future of the Great City."

50 Ibid.


52 Ibid.

53 Raymond Unwin, "The Overgrown City," The Survey, October 15, 1922.

54 Lewis, "Getting Off the Bandwagon."

55 Unwin, "The Overgrown City."

Ibid.

Ford, "Planning the Attractive Town."

Charles Cheney, "Building For Permanency: The Esthetic Consideration in a Master or City Plan," Proceedings of the Twentieth National Conference on City Planning, 1928.

Ford, "What Makes the City Beautiful?"


Marcuse, Negations, pp. 160-161.


McFarland, "The Relation of City Planning to Business."

Ihlder, "The City Plan and Living and Working Conditions."

Ford, "What Planning Has Done For Cities."


Ibid.

Chase, "The Future of the Great City."


Ibid.

Mumford, "The Sacred City."

Mumford, "The Next Twenty Years."


Mumford, "The Intolerable City."

Ibid.


Ibid.

Mumford, "Regions--To Live In."

Mumford, "The Intolerable City."


Haldeman, "Report on Regional Planning."


CHAPTER TEN
MECHANICAL PROCEDURES OF PLANNING

What was to be the role of city planning in this transition period? If planning had been a vehicle of progressive urban reform, what was it to be in this era which felt itself forsaken by the idealistic promises of the progressive period? If the machine was altering the relationships between man and his environment what were to be the changing role and function of city planning and its regional extensions? What corner of authority were planners to cut out for themselves in a time when all support was lent to the practical businessman and the forces of the private real estate market?
Earlier planners had carved out three divisions of official planning effort related to the securing of public support, the development of the plan itself and the translation of plans into "facts." The 1920's while keeping these same guidelines for planning were to change the rationality of the planning function. The planner now wanted to plan for action, not ideals, and in so doing he sought to separate his role from interference with market forces and political and administrative pressures. In consequence while he ensured the uniqueness of planning as a profession, he dramatically limited the focus and intent of his plans.

NEUTRALITY OF THE PLANNING BOUNDARIES

The question of whether city planning was to be developed as a "branch of the official tree . . . stimulated and fostered by friendly gardeners" or whether it was to be an "independent growth in wholly different soil" had been raised in the early days of planning.¹ "City planning," it was then warned, "must keep within its own jurisdiction and not trespass upon the other conventional agencies already established."² If planning becomes entangled in administrative duties, it will have neither the time nor perspective to pursue innovative measures and it will become so burdened with daily concerns that it will pay no heed to the future directions in which the city might grow. The City Planning commission must remain comprehensive in design and execution. Therefore, it was proclaimed "let it not specialize . . . let it not originate where a beginning has been made . . . let it not investigate so much as stimulate others to investigate;
let it not criticise so much as sympathize."[^3] City planning was thus not to encroach on the powers of any authority already assumed; it was merely to bridge the gap existing between independent public authorities. . . . It is the centripetal element in a sea of inert and diverging energies; it is the element which supplies a vision of time, space and proportion in a field of routine, the element spreading enlightenment among the ignorant and enthusiasm in the fight against passivity.

These same concerns were voiced again in the 1920's; we are told the first problem of planning "is to mind its own business, to concentrate on the problems where its value is most certain, to avoid those where its advantages are apt to be purchased at too high a cost in circumlocution and wasted effort."[^5] City planning is limited in function to the concerns of physical development, "it has nothing to do with political or administrative policies. The city plan will largely influence . . . the lives of its people . . . It should transcend all other considerations."[^6] A city plan, moreover, will never be sold to the city officials if they think it interferes "in functions within their own jurisdiction and control."[^7]

AN OBJECTIVE STANCE DEALS WITH FACTS

The city planner was concerned with action; but only action in regard to the physical and social problems of the city's environment. "To be assured that city planning is the only rational point of view . . . is 9/10's of the battle . . . [Planners must therefore show a] dramatic presentation of facts."[^8] "The local survey and the collection and interpretation of reliable data have become an essential part of good work."[^9] The "planning foundation" was thereby constituted by
"facts, figures and experiences of city and regional planning." They
must be "studied," "coordinated," and placed "at the disposal of the
public." City and regional planning were simply

logical deduction[s] from the facts . . . the elimination of
guesswork . . . . This means that a searching, quantitative
study should be made of all the contributory factors. Then
every solution, one after another, should be tried out and
tested by the facts until almost automatically the one most
effective solution stands out.

The sequence of operations in planning thus came to be focused on
the collection and presentation of facts relating to the engineering
group of problems, e.g., street plan, transportation, traffic control;
the economic problems, e.g., municipal public services, effect of
planning on taxable land values, financing of planning, local assess-
ments; the architectural problems, e.g., the symmetry of the plan,
building regulations; and the social, administrative and legal
problems, e.g., better housing, space for recreation and zoning.

The "science of city planning" had steadily advanced from its
earlier years of reform, especially in "the technical phase of making
civic surveys, preparing city plans and zoning ordinances. . . . [But
city planning] is not a panacea. . . . [It] involves nothing more than
the exercise of enlightened common sense. There is nothing mysterious
about it." Now the city was finally to be saved by "functional
planning." "We have the technical knowledge to do it . . . we have
the engineering ability." Somewhere the inclination to save those
cities which were not yet beyond human aid would be found in time.
THE INTENTIONS BEHIND PLANNING NEUTRALITY

The voice of the 1920's spoke often about the enslavement of man within the city machine. Finding themselves controlled by the needs of an expanding consumer economy, many of the writers sought to humanize their situations and to relieve the goal of standardization held by modern industrial techniques. The city may had become a consumer not only of the produce of the machine but of ideas as well. Raymond B. Fosdick" writes during these years that the machine process through the radio, press, telegraph and telephone was creating a mental propinquity from which individuals can't escape and which in consequence was destroying the critical judgment of the people. The result was the creation of a "public mind" which was increasingly more suggestible, receptive, uncritical and unresisting.
The city planners echoed some of these themes as well but neglected to relate them to their professional commitments. Planning, in these years, could have adopted a critical stance; it came close to forming a base in the concerns of human affairs and it could have gone further and aimed at the emancipation of man from the machine's conformity and repressions. The crucial flaw was the failure to see that the effects of the machine were related to the established political authority; those of production, administration and organization. Planning believed it could maintain a neutral position, neither challenging nor interfering in the political process. The concerns of human life, for the planners, had nothing to do with politics. Thus the planners were tacitly unaware, or chose to ignore, the dominant social and political institutions which formed the framework that controlled most of the "life-decisions" within the city.

Looking closely at the language of the planners we can depict quite clearly the desire to place boundaries around the consciousness of planning. It was to criticize nothing, never to question the legitimations of authority, to avoid overstepping its limited function and to gloss over questions of right or wrong. It was, therefore, not only to conform to the framework already established by the existing power structure but it was fundamentally anti-critical, a mere reproduction of the official authority. Planning forgot to relate the essence of its concerns over human life with the fundamental critical basis of freedom of opinion and thought. Planning's essentially negative stance was only in relation to powers it should not usurp and discussions it should not pursue under fear of its own extinction. Planning's interests
were henceforth to be bounded by the official power structure and not to be developed independently within its own critical reflection and internal professional needs.

By admission, planning became the "centripetal" force, the "filler of gaps" between authorities. Its position of "sympathizer," "enthusiast" and "stimulator" revealed its basic assumption that unity and harmony did indeed surround the process of decision-making and therefore because the elite planners and the public individuals shared the same universal interests no watchdog or critic was deemed as necessary. Critical planning, in opposition, would have rejected any integration of opinion and sought instead to outline the illegitimate and inhuman authority implicit to such theories of harmony. Theodor Adorno has similarly criticized Karl Mannheim's use of the concept of the "social totality" as a neutralized order and specifically the term "integration" because it serves not so much to emphasize the intricate dependence of men within the totality as to glorify the social process itself as an evening-out of the contradictions in the whole. In this balance, theoretically, the contradictions disappear, although it is precisely they which comprise the life-process of "society."13

Was society in harmony or conflict, in ultimate agreement or masked by distortions? The planner's ideology was based on the harmony and agreement assumptions at the expense of developing itself as a "critical science." Instead the planners overlooked the problems of subordination and dependence implicit in the given political and administrative structures by insisting on the neutrality of the democratically elite planner. Planning, as envisioned by the planners of the 1920's, contained the laissez-faire principles of agreement,
understanding and compromise in a benign environment which saw no necessity for warding off subversive distortions of social power and social goals. Because of the presence of harmony, planners could operate under the assumption that their endeavors were neutrally independent and that any opposite position of privatized concerns and atomized class interests was dangerous to the very order of things.

As we shall explore, the concept of harmony led the planners to recognize the necessity of consensus politics as embodied in pluralistic group structures without dwelling on the problems of imperfect harmony, i.e., coercion and subordination. On the other hand, the absence of this supposed harmony between society and individuals, between the ruling elite and the public and hence the contradictions embedded in the concept of neutrality, would have been the real focus of a critical theory.

Still further perpetuating the misconceptions of their positivistic viewpoint, planners failed to observe the separation between "facts" and "values." Facts are never neutral objective creations or a priori elements awaiting collection, they are first and foremost reflections of interests. One planner even went so far as to claim that the "planning foundation" was based on "facts, figures, and experience" but left it as though experience had no influence on the creation of said "facts," as if the uncritical acceptance of unbiased facts was not one more evidence of an irrational acceptance of so-called "rationality." Functional planning as "the only rational point of view" is perhaps justifiable if "rational" means the most plausible strategy for action or the best rules for procedure but if
planning is "rational" because the best solution can be logically deduced from "reliable" unbiased facts then the implication of the assumption of "rationality" is questionable. Logical deductions are by definition non-critical assumptions, that is they assume the constancy and replicability of given laws and rules and never question the biasedness of either the rules and laws or the insistence that experience uniformly conform to them. Rational functional planning in support of the given order makes no allowance for logical inconsistencies in the foundation of its system or for subjective influences or "meanings" held in reserve. Shielding basic contradictions from criticism, rational planning acts as if the market economy, for example, was consistent with housing demands, as if the planner's fear of failure or alignment with business interests was entirely neutral and objective.

The belief in the "one most rational plan," furthermore, focuses attention on the attainment of such through the development and extension of logical rules of decision-making and quantitative analyses of official "facts." This focus assumes, or hopes, that the decisions and facts of planning can influence the world of events abstracted out of the illogical and predetermined judgments and actions of the economic and political context. It would be years before the concept of planning as "muddling through" would arise, until rational decision processes based on objective facts would in part be displaced by context dependent analysis of personal decision-making. At this point the concept of rational planning was an empty abstraction, an ineffective ideal, for even if plans could be logically deduced from unbiased facts and even if the mechanism carrying the city from chaos
to order were known, there would be no rational procedure to recognize when the desired "end" had been achieved and no uniform agreement as to what the ends should be. With a planning background which assumed the harmonious order of society and a uniform totality of interests, the "one rational point of view" was also taken for granted as an abstract "fact." But in this world of so-called harmony, it meant a return to the idealism of Scheme One to assume that social ends and goals were also to be recognized as the fulfillment of this natural and uniform order.
| city planning boundaries | : [not criticize, not originate, not investigate, not interfere with (administrative/legislative) functions, not deal with (political/administrative) policies, not trespass on established agencies, minds its own business, keeps within its own jurisdiction, limited to physical planning, not specialize] |
| city planning function | : [sympathize, spreads (enlightenment/enthusiasm), centripetal element, bridges the gap, stimulates others to investigate, transcends all other considerations, concentrates where value is certain] |
| city planning | = (the only rational point of view/one most effective solution) |
| | + {show of facts, reliable data [collection/interpretation], [(facts/figures/quantitative experience) (coordinated, studied)], logically deduced from facts, not guesswork, not mysterious, solutions [tried/tested] by facts, [quantitative/searching] study} |
THE ORGANIZATION OF PLANNING: PLANNING MACHINERY

If "system" had offered the conceptual focus in Scheme One, now it was to be "organization" and "management" of the system's functions. Comprehensive planning, we are told, demands the development of "administrative machinery" to coordinate and enforce cooperation among the various parts involved in the planning process. The expanding cities of the 1920's had "outgrown their organization." Only the "machinery" of city planning, it was believed, would offer "continuous systematic control and cooperation." "we need more efficient governmental machinery and community organization for carrying out our city plans." We need "conscious and integrated projects embracing the whole community." We need "drastic measure of coordination and pre-planning . . . to adapt Megalopolis to civilized existence." City planning was to offer "the intelligent leadership," the unifying forces which would "induce collaboration with degrees of ease . . . to suggest, to consult and advise . . . to supplement work rather than assume charge of it." City planning would evolve out of "a well-organized
combination of effort: combination of authorities; combination of professional advisers; combination of interests of all kinds each in their respective sphere."23

Coordinated Action: Olmsted explained in 1919 that he felt "in complex problems ... conflicting interests and essentially hostile motives are much less the cause of failure to unite on the best plan than is generally supposed, and that sheer mental inability to get together" is the real cause.24 The cooperation on war housing and planning had shown that there were "men of experience" in government who recognized the need of dealing

with the interrelations between planning in the wide variety of special technical fields involved in making complete cities; men who recognized both the need for specialists in many fields, and the need of getting them to work together as a unit on a problem too complex to be fully understood by any one of them.25

This was the planner's special role in the post war years, to be "comprehensive, related and coordinated"; and to develop "a plan that is masterly in control."26 To balance the units, to provide "a stable environment for a stable population,"27 to "suggest ... physical readjustments ... and provide for the coordination of all future improvements,"28 to offer a "greater uniformity of development and a more balanced type of growth," i.e., "the adaptation of form to function."29

Functional planning: Functional planning was to assure "neatness and uniformity" in its results although Lewis Mumford warned that "the uniform plan supposedly adapted to fit every use in reality fits none ... the result [being] complete disorder."30 Nevertheless, for most city planners of this era, the technological mandate specifying the
adaptation of "form to function" became the requirement for a "useful" and "efficient city." City improvements were to represent pieces of a "logical plan" and were to be "test[ed] with respect to fitness and economy in accomplishing their purpose and a proper regard for appearance and for the preservation or increase of amenities.""32

"Harmony" and "appropriateness" were thus defined as the "fitness of form to function." The city planners' work was to involve a "synthetic grasp of all the elements of a city's life, and to provide such a framework that each part may exercise its appropriate function and exhibit its special individuality.""33

THE SEMANTICS OF ORGANIZATION

If the machine-city was feared for its manipulations and threatened breakdown, the machine itself was the model of integration and the paradigm of organization. Machine production turned a supply of material fed to it into a finished product; it passed the material through a series of related processes until it reached a predetermined end.
Take away the material and what remained was the abstract organization of parts or an ordered totality of operations. The machine itself was a physical unit with all of its parts arranged into a functional productive whole; every part served a particular need, and every action was organized to achieve a given end. This was precisely the conceptual model which was needed for "functional planning." All the parts of the city needed to be organized into interrelated functions where each element would be given an appropriate role with respect to the overall goals of efficiency and/or convenience.

Mechanical concepts were consequently applied to the organization and administration of the city. "Planning machinery" thus became a new conception embodying many of the abstractions whereby systematic continuous operations were coordinated to achieve prescribed goals. Management and organization now became the most important functions of the city and out of these requirements developed the bureaucracy of planning, the organizers and integrators with their rules of instrumental actions, standards for "fitness" and means-end analyses. As the concept of city planning became more complex, more training was required to figure out the necessary city functions and required urban forms. Consequently fewer men were able to join the ranks of the "master planners"; fewer were allowed to freely participate in the intricacies of guidance and the necessities of control. As Robert H. Wiebe has pointed out in The Search for Order, a new order had been created acting from common assumptions and speaking a common language. A bureaucratic orientation now defined a basic part of the nation's discourse. The values of continuity and regularity, functionality and rationality, administration and management set the form of problems and outlined their solution.
THE SEMANTICS OF ORGANIZATION (Terminology)

(planning/administrative/governmental) machinery = [(continuous/systematic/enforced/induced) (cooperation/coordination/control/collaboration), community organization, integrated projects, preplanning, well-organized combination of effort, combination of (authorities/professional advisers, interests/specialists/leaders/supervisors)]

Co-operative action: (interrelated, related, coordinated, masterly in control, comprehensive, uniform, balanced, synthetic, grasp of all)

Functional planning: (fit form to function, uniformity, fit use, fitness, appearance, harmony, appropriateness, appropriate function)
REFERENCES: CHAPTER TEN

1 Olmsted, "A City Planning Program."


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.


7 Lewis, "Sequence of Operations in City Planning."

8 Overstreet, "Arousing the Public Interest."


11 Ford, "Regional and Metropolitan Planning Principles."


13 Ibid.

14 Fosdick, The Old Savage.

15 Adorno, Prisms, p. 38.

16 Overstreet, "Arousing the Public Interest."

17 Unwin, "The Overgrown City."
267.

18. Crane, "Errors to Avoid."


20. Beard, "Conflicts in City Planning."


22. Nagee, "The Organization and Functions of a City Planning Commission."


26. Nolen, "Twenty Years of City Planning Progress."

27. Mumford, "The Intolerable City."


29. Ibid.


31. Nolen, "Twenty Years of City Planning Progress."

32. Ford, "What Makes the City Beautiful?"

33. Mumford, "The Next Twenty Years in City Planning."

GROUP LIFE AS A FORCE FOR DECENTRALIZATION

On one level, the reaction to the growing world of mechanization was evidence in a battle between decentralization and centralization. "Socialism" in the 1920's had come to mean "State Socialism"; the organization of individual units under the benevolent guidance of a friendly government for the benefit of the whole. In this conception the welfare of the nation was set above that of the individual citizens and was checked only by the intelligent and expert guidance of the leaders. The complexity of the modern industrial state
required, some believed, a degree of neutral regulation and control.

Woodrow Wilson expounded on this new type of freedom by explaining the following:

Life has become complex; there are many more elements, more parts, to it than ever before. And, therefore, it is harder to keep everything adjusted—and harder to find out where the trouble lies when the machine gets out of order. You know that one of the interesting things that Mr. Jefferson said in those early days of simplicity which marked the beginning of our government was that the best government consisted in as little government as possible. . . . But I feel confident that if Jefferson were living in our day he would see what we see: that the individual is caught in a great confused nexus of all sorts of complicated circumstances, and that to let him alone is to leave him helpless as against the obstacles with which he has to contend; and that, therefore, law in our day must come to the assistance to see that he gets fair play; that is all, but that is much. Without the watchful interference, the resolute interference, of government, there can be no fair play between individuals and such powerful institutions as the trusts. Freedom today is something more than being let alone. The program of government of freedom must in these days be positive, not negative merely.¹

Machine civilization meant consequently new principles of integration. The idealism during Scheme One which depended upon the responsibility of the individual to maintain the commitments of society to the individuals had vanished. Nothing seemed to link the mass of individuals to the collective whole and meantime the multiplication of units and the growing complexities of organization rendered the cities and the nations more and more susceptible to fatal disruptions. How were the cities and the nation to be unified?

The answer was to attempt to build a "community cosmos"² out of the planlessness and disorder; the development, as another writer put it, of "community trusts" to provide the "nucleus of city civilization."³ The battle of the day was declared between "centralization versus decentralization." Some men in America, it was claimed, were
seeking to produce an overriding if benevolent bureaucracy with an intensively centralized government in hopes of reducing "America's millions to the submissiveness of sheep who will follow the bell-wearer." "Socialism" means a "centralized autocracy," a "bureaucratic strangle-hold on society," and "an intrenched paternalized government."

With the great machine civilization that is America's there is being developed the machine-mind--that Prussian mind, i.e., scientist, churchman and financier join hands as exemplified by Henry Ford, which seeks centralization, which means crystallization. . . But . . . evolution always runs along the line of differentiation. . . Youth is evolution's mainspring. So America differentiates and decentralizes. 5

"It is out of the individualistic genius" that decentralization will spring. The example had already been set in New York where the town hall was used "to give point and form to the civic sense through the open forum . . . established by New York citizens for the discussion of their common interests." 6 These "community trusts" created a foundation to which all citizens could contribute, they were administered by the community and they recognized the city itself as the chief beneficiary. "The community . . . is [consequently] delegating the administration of such trusts to its law officers . . . [but] all these cities are working for themselves, for the glorification of their own city, not that of the country." 7 There exists a small number then in each city who are consciously fighting the "centralized concept" and there is the great indifferent mass . . . forming 95% of the population, knowing nothing of these things and caring less, but who unconsciously, blindly are working out America's destiny in their rotary clubs, their community schemes, their noonday lunches . . . America is developing a collective type . . . a decentralized soul. 8

"The city, like a language, is the product of a whole people." 9

But as in language, the elements of construction can become the
products of a centrally controlled and integrated technical order. The result, as Marcuse has pointed out in *One-Dimensional Man*, can destroy and obliterate the existence of disparate opinion groups who might openly challenge the ruling group's directives. Language and the city can thus both be affected by the decisions of a select group and the "speaking community" as a result may have little opportunity to affect its development or usage. Language, or the city, as a social institution ruled by an elite groups raises several questions. It is not enough to say that the city is a "community of individuals"; we must also ask who are its leaders, what are their ideals and motivations, and who is responsible for their training or education and the development of their moral and rational commitments.

**Group and citizen committees:** During the 1920's the words "group" and "citizen committees" join the language of the planners in full force. These were the missing components in Scheme One where we found the concept of the public wavering from a mass of individuals to a collective whole without the intermediary concept of group structures. The great problem for the 1920's was "the revitalization of our community life . . . through encouraging group membership and through enlisting groups in the vital community projects." Communities have "disintegrated into a kind of futile atomicity. . . . Neighbors . . . are simply human integers in spatial juxtaposition. . . . We are going to think more and more of citizens as group citizens, not as atomic citizens."
Pluralistic liberalism, with its reliance on groups, had entered the planner's ideology. As we shall see these groups were the homogeneous parts of the working city whole; they remained without uniqueness or opposition, they held equal power and interests. These vertical divisions of society were the answer to the centralizing tendency of socialism. More units could always be added as representative of the people's voice. Nevertheless different groups were bound to have powerful interests and any manipulative adjustments to the city whole inevitably would diversely affect some of these interests. Conflict, therefore, would necessarily raise its head sometime or other to disrupt the ideal consensus. Considering these "disruptive and centrifugal forces at work in our communities," one critic asked whether "comprehensive municipal planning" was at all a feasible idea. Only by chance in a democracy might the "unity of spirit and the dictatorial powers" necessary for a plan's realization be acquired, for we have no thoughts on "community organization"; we have no theory demonstrating the planner's expectation of "support of his project on some theory of pure reason or aesthetic or indefinable public welfare." We don't know whether he finds "his backing [to come] from all classes and groups in the same proportions and without reference to trade, calling, interests or profession," or whether he receives undue pressure from particular groups. We can only see at this point the signs of change by which we abandon our faith in "the beneficent capacity of individual anarchy to produce the highest type of productive mechanism and community life" but we can not foresee the direction in which we are going.
The direction in which the planners traveled, while it abandoned the beneficent idealism of the Progressives which relied upon the responsibility of individual citizens to correct the disasters brewing in the city caldrons, nevertheless forsook this wise man's directives and failed to develop a theory of community organization. The pluralist's democracy was a decentralized arrangement whereby power was shared by a multitude of groups. "Civic organization," it was explained, is based on definite group life. . . . [They] organize around some definite center. . . . They or their chosen representatives . . . meet to promote a still larger group's life . . . grouped into boroughs, suburbs or satellites . . . a federation of these [becomes] the city [which will] provide the council of control for all the greater matters which concern the whole community. . . . This [council in turn] must dictate the form of the city plan. 16

America had experimented with the idea of a "human individual as an atom" and found it not to be a very effective political force. Power, we are told, is achieved through the combination of individuals.

If we wish people to do things, we should seek first of all to get them in their social groups. Then the doing is not only more powerful, but it is so profoundly liked that it becomes the joyous part of the life of those that do. City planners should . . . get across to these voluntary groups in a community. When the interest of a voluntary group is enlisted . . . one has the whole power of that group back of the idea. The pride of the group is involved and the pride of the group pushes the project into success. 17

Furthermore in dealing with these "various vital groups" in a community, it is a mistake to tell them "what they 'ought to do."

This only makes the teller feel "superior" and the others, "inferior." Instead, it was suggested that a "fairly complete but still tentative plan" be presented to the groups "asking for their consideration and their constructive suggestions." This is an "instant appeal to the
they are asked to contribute their wisdom, . . . if the plan has been carefully thought out, there will be no suggestions, for the simple reason that each suggestion will involve so many other changes that the task will at once appear too difficult for the ordinary citizen. . . but the very asking . . . will arouse friendliness toward the plan, not otherwise to be achieved. 18

EXPERT KNOWLEDGE REPLACES COMMON KNOWLEDGE

Leaders and the led: Pluralistic Liberalism in America relies upon the group leaders both to control the other group members and to ensure the continuity of rational demands and understanding involving the directions of the expert leaders. The real expectation for moderation and compromise falls on the group leaders and not on the broader public. As one planner writes, "Society is made up essentially of the leaders and the led. Most of our effective work, then, must be with the leaders. They are the active, controlling minds . . . they are the elements persuading and educating the groups of our citizens." 19 The mass, moreover, offers the planners the role of expert leader for it was claimed that the mass looks to us for leadership because they recognize that we have the competence to solve their problems effectively. In fact, if we do not lead who will? It is our duty and our privilege. . . . It is a great responsibility that rests with us. 20

Still the city plan was held to be "not only for the city and of the city, but . . . made by the city"; only in this case private individuals as such could neither challenge nor terminate the procedure of plan-making. The community groups now held priority over the consumer interests of reform politics in Scheme One. Although the city
plan which allocated land to different uses was "stamped ... by law[.]

The power that [did] the stamping [was] the community ... acting
through its legislative body."\textsuperscript{21} An "adequate city plan" in America
is ultimately democratic; it "begins with the interest of the people,
reaches up to the creation of a Commission representing the people, and
through the Commission then employs the planners, producing the plan
as the product of interest on the part of all the people."\textsuperscript{22} The com-
munity receives "advice" from engineers, architects, and so forth; and
they will "always do well to take their advice." But it is wise to
keep in mind that the "professions in city planning ... are [only]
advisers to the community ... If anyone else can give just as good
advice, that ... should be accepted."\textsuperscript{23}

Knowledge and advice: There was at the outset nothing mysterious or
secretive about planning; their legitimations of expertise relied
more on their comprehensive skill and fair judgment than on elaborate
knowledge or deliberate obscurity of the occult sciences.

The planning consultant [was] an essentially practical man whose
recommendations [were] guided by the actual facts ... facts
which he [was] better able to discover than the average individual
because he [was] trained by long experience to recognize and
evaluate data ... and he [was] unbiased in his attitude.\textsuperscript{14}

A city planner is not "a godlike person who from his infinite wisdom
vouchsafes remedies for human ills. Rather he is an erring and humble
man, doing his best to record the tentative necessary decisions of a
large number of his fellows in common affairs."\textsuperscript{25} As someone else put it,

we do not want in the preparation of a town planning scheme either
a Moses or a Napoleon. People of this sort are all very well for
forcing everyone into the same mold. Town planning exacts the
opposite ... it means meeting every diversity of requirement
that a free community can need ... we must use the innate
imagination of simple ordinary men. Town planners must be first ordinary men and not so well educated as to have lost all imagination and the originality of children . . . specialized attainment must at the outset be laid on one side until all the varying interests have been expressed. 25

The gap between the elite and the public: Even if the planner was a simple practical man there was still a distance between his elitist attitudes which felt most at ease relating to some group conception, and a direct dialogue involving some concept of the masses of the city population. City planning, it was claimed, brought the "city government and its citizens together in preparing for their own future needs . . . and requirements." 27 The problem nevertheless was how to bridge the gap between elitist knowledge and citizen demands for "the public today demands information and expects also to be accepted as judge and jury on matters that have a wide public import." 28 The answer, as the planners tell it, was to "make planning information available in such form, i.e., not technical, that it will be a practical guide to the lay bodies which administer planning locally." 29 But the policy urged by another city planner underlines the professional biases. If the public demands involvement then the planner should present to the people first something they can understand; the advantages of which are obvious, and do not have to be proven. Give the public officials who will sooner or later have to accept or reject the plan, something which will interest and appeal to them . . . [else they] will not be enthusiastic about it or will be openly hostile if it involve[s] the appropriation of public funds. 30

"Getting action in city planning" was a serious problem in most American cities. John Nolen warned that it was not merely supplying the appropriate publicity when a comprehensive plan was completed but
City planning had suffered from "sleeping sickness; i.e., inadequate promotion and publicity," but it also went about securing action by the wrong methods. Planning should not be promoted by "a single class of a community"; nor should it attempt to carry out too ambitious a scheme at one time; nor excessive or untimely promotion. Instead Nolen suggested that action be obtained through an official planning board, provision for legal aspects of planning, a well grounded financial policy, basic education of public opinion, appropriate publicity on all projects and reports, discussions and local exhibitions.

The weakest link in the planning chain, no matter how well thought out, was "the general lack of understanding by the public of what city planning is; its purpose, its methods, its advantages, its cost, its justification." "Citizen's committees" therefore were essential mechanisms to fill the gap between the planners and the ignorant public. Citizen's committees can "initiate city planning work before its value is appreciated by the general public ... [they can] guide city planning once a program has been made, by keeping proposals before the public ... [they can help] a city government 'put across' ... projects approved by the city government," the purpose of such publicity work being the fundamental education of the uninformed public.

"Arousing the Public Interest in city planning" for others called for less formal methods than the use of open forums and citizen committees. "Mere repetition has an almost compelling effect." "Repetition and inevitability" can become powerful methods. "Say 'city planning' enough times and people will take it for granted that city
planning is one of the accepted procedures in our civilization." 35

"Public relations"--the study of the "public mind . . . [strives to interpret the] clear or obscure enunciations of the public." 37 City planners have need of this field of study for the purpose of city planning is not simply to sell to the public something which it wants of which it has become conscious. The possibility of getting the public to demand or accept city planning . . . depends to a considerable extent upon those back of the movement understanding the nature of public opinion; the motives of human action and the influences that can practically be brought to bear upon the public. 38

The future of the public opinion is the future of civilization . . . it is more and more being influenced, changed, stirred by impulses from below. . . . The duty of the higher strata of society . . . the cultivated, the learned, the expert, the intellectual . . . is therefore clear. They must inject moral and spiritual motives into public opinion. Public opinion must become public conscience. 39

RESTRAINED COMMUNICATION

To be "in the public interest" was a vital concern for Scheme One; it was the reformer's legitimization which secured
his role as protector of the public's consumer rights against the forces that threatened the public's freedom. The emphasis on "the public interest" is removed during the 1920's, "the public" as a broadly based concept referring to the common interests of each individual was seldom referenced. "Public sentiment," "civic spirit," "public responsibility" evaporated. The planners, nevertheless, needed the support of the public; not yet independently financed by the federal government, their projects were solely dependent upon the acceptance and support of local public officials. If planning proposals could be translated into local votes then and only then was it felt that planning would succeed.

The planners of Scheme One held the belief that the collective needs of society could best be served if the public sense of responsibility was tapped. Consequently they aimed to reach the general public through
projects that educated and elevated, they aimed at evoking the underlying "shared assumptions" of the whole community. The "public consciousness" of Scheme One rested upon a concept of the public man as innately rational and good; one who would readily respond to the beneficent directions of the planners. This idealism was destroyed after the First World War; man was now viewed as potentially destructive, the whole concept of underlying assumptions that were shared by the social whole appeared as a fraud. The psychology of the 1920's explained that man was the victim of destructive instincts, a product of base forces; the social man moreover was but a mere reflection of the same. Society and the city both threatened to disintegrate unless some mechanism was found to relate the horde of individuals to the necessary rules of social and political behavior. The planner of Scheme One had already allowed that he was the model "public man," that he could control and educate the common man. The planner of Scheme Two accepted this mandate but sought as well to acquire some method to implement his wisely selected goals. He chose to solve these problems through the mechanism of decentralization and group structures but in so doing, as we shall explain, he began to consider the public as a limited category embracing only those elements found to exist in the middle-class definitions of "group behavior."

The normative ought-order of Scheme One was replaced in the 1920's by a rule-order, i.e., hierarchial control. John R. Searle in *Speech Acts* has made a distinction between "regulative rules" and "constitutive rules" from which we can draw an analogous explanation applicable to the change in the concept of control from Scheme One to
Scheme Two. Regulatory rules

Regulatory rules regulate antecedently or independently existing behavior; for example, many forms of etiquette regulate interpersonal relationships which exist independently of the rules. But constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behavior. Constitutive rules constitute an activity the existence of which is logically dependent upon the rules.¹¹

Now I find that Searle's description of constitutive rules is inadequate; he neither explains how the rules enable new behavior forms nor how the activity depends upon these rules. Nevertheless, the difference between these rules does help clarify the distinction between the normative order of the public good and the order of constitutive or positional groups.

The regulative rules of Scheme One were imperative ought-orders; they were a priori conceptions that regulated social activity independently from any given set of rules. For example, cities were to be beautiful, the public was to be orderly because their arrangement would conform to pre-existing hence pre-defining constraints of order and harmony. Beyond all there was the ultimate concept of the social totality that transcended individual actions and interests. The constitutive regulations of Scheme Two, however, were dependent upon an established set of rules as exemplified by the abstract law of hierarchies. Literally "hierarchy" means the "sacred rules," i.e., "ieros" meaning sacred and "archon" meaning ruler. Thus the hierarchy of groups which formed the "city federation" was a mechanism by which the rules of order were to be transmitted from the top of the structure to the bottom. Constitutive rules of group structure provided the necessary control over and organization of individual behavior and
development. The process of group constraint is somewhat vague but endemic to pluralistic liberalism is the concept that the group controls the consciousness of its members thereby creating certain regularities of intentional behavior. Now an "orderly city" had come to mean a city whose citizens were acting under the convention of a given set of behavior rules and no longer referred to an abstract ideal of heavenly order or harmony.

Specifically, this change of rules meant that indirect concepts of control had changed to direct concepts and with it the focus was transferred from the collective whole to the structure of groups. Without group regulations there seemed to be no way for planners to account for political support. For the planners, political power, i.e., local votes and persuasion of public officials, was obtained only if local groups would identify with their proposals. This in turn depended upon the successful influencing and control of group citizens. Their intentions are thus explicit: planning actualization was threatened by community disintegration and was fearful of mass pressure politics; hence planning sought to "enlist" and "promote group membership" both to counter the general public apathy and dissuade the disruptive threats of popular ignorance. The planner's power lay in the explicit intention to influence the group leaders to accept their plans as they were given, to convince the group members to adopt the approved view of the group and thus to direct the "public officials" to likewise accept these procedures. Their power strategy is defined in the very definitions of and relations with the various "vital groups" that formed the core focus for planning persuasion.
The planners decided the structure of the hierarchy they would deal with; they picked the already existing "civic organizations" and "citizens groups." These groups were essentially "voluntary" and hence opened to all but in reality were semi-exclusive. These natural "social groups" were collections of like-minded men, they offered gregarious outlets in a milieu which muted conflict and strengthened common interests. Groups by definition are restricted to the participation of a few unless there be a near infinite number of them. This restriction, in turn, lessens the threat of disruptive mass politics. Group membership is further limited to include those who respect law and legal arrangements as instruments for decision-making, who value having leaders direct their concerns, who are socialized to carry on discussions through processes of "fair play" and compromise. Group constraint focuses on the leaders; it is they who "persuade" and "educate" the other members. Thus the planners found themselves relating to the leaders for their most "effective work" and the leaders, who were "the active and controlling minds," in turn restrained the group members by checking that they conformed to group ideals. Groups therefore created a solidarity between the leaders and the planners; no longer dealing with the social totality, planners similarly refrained from relating to the group as a whole and instead directed their attention solely at the elite group leaders, "the higher strata of society."

Group structures, therefore, supported the stability of the social whole by introducing several layers of control and dependency; first they broke the centralized concept whereby individuals were
related only to the government by introducing groups between these levels; second the planners related only to the leaders of these groups focusing all their effort on controlling these pivotal forces but never allowing them to develop autonomous power. These layers of pluralism thus helped to disguise any real social antagonisms by restricting the number of points susceptible to pressure from below and by keeping a close control on the directives from above.

Pluralism thus helped to increase the complexity of society by multiplying the elements of control and pseudo-control. John Dewey in *The Public and Its Problems* had explained that the current public apathy was a direct result of the complexities of life. The development of natural groups would help men to identify with real issues and offer them some degree of control in a sea of forces too vast for their understanding. In the highly technical machine called society, how could simple laymen understand the technical problems necessary to keep society under control? Experts and technical administrators were those nonpolitical executers who would direct the energies of social action which were too complicated for the ordinary voter, they would relieve the paralysis of the legislators who were too confused to deal with these dilemmas. But the other side of the coin from these experts meant the further removal of the individual from social decision-making and the further denial of open access to public information. This undermined whatever strains remained of the faith in man to access information for himself and to judge and act upon it in the light of his rational common sense. It further elevated the man of expertise to an autonomous position whereby his interventions into
the daily life of each citizen were legitimized under the guise of nonpolitical performatory authority. The superior insight of technical knowledge and competency thus came to be uncritically accepted as the necessary requisite for both the smooth functioning of the city machine and the consequent stability of society.

We have explored above how the planners encountered groups during the 1920's, we shall now turn to see how this developed into the source of citizen manipulation as well. If the public had withdrawn from social action, it may have been as a result of being overpowered and outmanipulated by the most powerful groups. If city planning failed "to get action," it may indeed have been because of "wrong methods," but not necessarily those of strategy as much as those of intention. The planning language masked authority by restricting the release of public information. The demands for information and the expectation of public judgment were refuted by the planner in their lack of sincerity in entering into a mutual dialogue with the public, or with their restricted idea of the group-public. The planners advised each other to reveal to the public only things of practical values, simple facts, with obvious implications and appeal. The public was to be played with, it was to be given only that amount of information which would not confuse but which would flatter as a result of its requested involvement. This language was authoritarian because it determined "on behalf of others without justifying the determination rationally." It knowingly withheld information and undermined the faith in the public to hold an effective dialogue with the planners. The role of the public and the planners
was never opened to public discussion; questions of the legitimacy of the planner's authority were consequently never issues that were reflectively justified.

This language constituted a pseudo-communication because it failed to establish a mutual dialogue between the "planned for" and the planners. It assumed only one part of mutuality, i.e., the planners did the directing and the "planned for" never questioned nor answered back. Planning could have aided reciprocal communication between the public and its needs and the planners and their decisions. The aims of planning and the pursuit of law-like solutions were political issues and were therefore responsive to public discussion. Viewing planning as an administrative and technical process, however, removed the focus from the public's understanding and interaction. The public having become passive and failing to understand the complexities of society were twice excluded from public decision-making. Consequently planners and administrators were no longer accountable to public debate. But this "... solipsistic abstraction from the public discussion is unjustifiable because public discussion is a presupposition for all justification" of scientific and technical authority which affects the public sphere. It is in this sense then that the language of city planning can be called "distortive" or "restrained."

Effective administration thus called for control over the "public mind" to direct the public behavior toward desirable reactions. In this effort the primitive market psychology of "public relations" came to the planner's aid. Misunderstanding the goals of the human
sciences, the planner-public relations man "applied" the primitive probings of psychology which explored the "motives," necessary "influences," and workings of the "public mind" in order to draw their own planning proposals closer to fulfillment. The radio, the press, the cinema, and advertisements were similar channels of deception pacifying society and organizing the public into a predictable whole. Techniques of persuasion, beyond outright compulsion, regimented the public mind into an uncritically receptive and unresisting condition through the simple application of repetitive messages. Planners too would take advantage of the ideology of consumption which compelled the public to respond in predetermined ways. In the end the citizen groups became merely the rubber stamp for already determined programs.
RESTRAINED COMMUNICATION (Terminology)

Centralized concept = [socialism, centralized autocracy, bureaucratic strangle-hold, paternalistic government, machine mind, crystalization, fair play, (watchful/resolute) governmental interference]

Decentralized concept : [community (trusts/cosmos/organization), centrifugal community force, citizen contribution, delegated administration, collective type, decentralized soul]

Decentralized concept  → (city beneficiary, city glorification, rights centralization)
Group politics:

vital groups = (citizen committees, group citizens, voluntary groups, not atomic citizens, community organization, civic organization, group life, organized around a center, chosen representatives)

vital groups \rightarrow (revitalized community life, not disintegrated community, not futile atomicity, abandon individual anarchy, promotes larger group life, federation, city is council of control, power)

power of group back of idea \rightarrow [enlist groups in community projects, encourage group membership, enlist group interest, get across to groups, ask for (consideration/constructive suggestions), appeal to civic pride, contribute wisdom]

Expert knowledge:

complex life = (great confused nexus, complicated circumstances, obstacles to overcome)

complex life \rightarrow (man alone is helpless, tasks too difficult for the ordinary citizen)

leaders = [higher strata of society, (cultivated/learned) expert, intellectuals, (active/controlling) minds, competent, (persuade/educate) groups, responsible voice]

Planner = (produces plan, solves problems, advises community, consults)

Planning consultant : [(practical/average/simple/ordinary/humble) man, experienced, unbiased, erring, imaginative, not godlike]

led' = [masses, influenced from below, the (city/community) whole, (receivers/takers) of advice]
Public persuasion:

Groups → [(put across, promote, publicize, initiate, guide) (city plan once a program/projects approved by city government)]

Public opinion = (publicity₁/publicity₂)

publicity₁ = (repetition)

publicity₂ : [compelling effect, (inevitable/taken for granted) results]

public relations = (public relations)

Public relations = [study of public mind, interprets public messages, understands (motives of human nature/nature of public opinion/influences to bear on public), injects (moral/spiritual) motives into public opinion]
SUMMARY OF SCHEME TWO

The 1920's illustrate the fallacy of judging society according to its own standards. It was the mechanical standards of organization and production which offered the predominant images and categories for society and the city: on the one hand they identified the fears of mechanization and standardization and the threats of technical disruption, blight, breakdown and vicious cycles of growth and congestion; but on the other hand they served as the definition of fitness of form to function, of the organized integration of experience, of the regulation of everyday life under abstract rules of controlled behavior and operation. Thus we find that the 1920's witnessed the uncritical transfer of mechanical order to the public realm and in spite of the critical questions raised by the stark reality of the city machine and its devastating effects upon the quality of human life, we find the planners heartily embracing the technical-practical considerations of organization and management in both the urban and public order.

In their concerns for immediate results and efficient actions an impersonal use of techniques and methods would conquer the disintegrating city order. A rational city would be the outcome of scientific not aesthetic order, or mechanical not organic principles of integration. The humanistic and social vocabulary which entered the planner's thoughts during this period merely hid the cry behind the crushing machine. At the expense of criticism, planning was to take a neutral position between the management of urban needs as a consequence of the market economy and the organizational requirements of the functional city. The planner-engineer would master the whole and conceal the contradictions of society under the guise of a well-oiled machine.
The techniques of organization and planning gained special impetus under the demands of the "technically tenuous" city. But of what significance was this city machine if it failed to order city life in ways that were productive to all its citizens and if it neglected the social basis of its new scientific attitude. The city seemed entrapped in its own contradictions; it was both unable to avoid its own mechanical disintegration and unable to escape from further imprisonment by its own methods of mechanical domination. Without some awareness of the social ends towards which it might strive and around which it might order the practical life needs of urban society, the science of urban planning was left to pursue its ideals of perfect efficiency and rational organization in contradiction to the value of human life and spontaneity. Although it might shrink from the fears of an unchecked mechanical order, the bureaucracy of experts unaided would direct the organization toward greater stagnation and passivity.

Denying the hegemony of the social totality, the planners of the 1920's focused upon the social and public aspects of the individual. Stressing the importance of conformity to the demands of productive action, the planner saw the rational individual as one who adapted himself to the higher order of group decisions and constraints. The result of group behavior would be the elimination of socially disruptive responses and the universal acceptance of conditioned needs. The elite planners were among the set of conditioners who structured and programmed the operations of the social machine. The problems of the social order were consequently left in the hands of these technicians whose actions remained blindly outside the realm of justified authority.
Focusing on the modes of organization and management of interest groups, however, sets no ends before us; we have no criteria by which to criticize and judge the actions of society as a whole. We are still left to search for the social ideals we should pursue and the structural system reforms which would enable us to transcend the limitations of the present situations. The social whole becomes neglected; not as the transcendent whole of Scheme One which ordered the behavior of individuals but a whole which determines the material and spiritual conditions of "the Good Life." This failure to study the quality and significance of the social whole, as Carl Ratner has pointed out,

prevents the examination and changing of the status quo, because it [the status quo] becomes universalized as a contentless, formal, general quality which is permanent and omnipresent. It also renders the human subject passive; transcendence of the given is ruled out. Man becomes finite and incapable of going beyond the "facts of life."^5

The social individual of the 1920's was examined only as an element that society influenced through his natural social groupings and not as a reciprocal influence upon the directions society was or should be pursuing. Expecting obedience to the higher order of group control, the planners distorted the mutuality of social relatedness. The city machine had segmented and serialized society into hierarchies of groups and power structures. Distancing themselves from the human life struggle, the planners offered the public only a restricted vocabulary with which to express their needs and desires. Rather than focus directly upon the inhuman machine environment and the totality of human needs, the planners sought instead to substitute abstract rules
of environmental order over which the public would have no control. It would be years before the public realized the intentions of neutrality against which they were struggling and would demand instead an active role and a responsive dialogue in the process of decision-making.
REFERENCES: CHAPTER ELEVEN


2Overstreet, "Arousing the Public Interest."


4Ibid.

5Ibid.

6Ibid.

7Ibid.

8Ibid.

9Mumford, "City Planning and the American Precedent."


11Overstreet, "Arousing the Public Interest."

12Ibid.

13Beard, "Conflicts in City Planning."

14Ibid.

15Ibid.

16Unwin, "The Overgrown City."

17Overstreet, "Arousing the Public Interest."

18Ibid.

19Ibid.

20Ford, "Planning the Attractive Town."
Edward M. Bassett, "What Really is City Planning?" American City, May, 1926, p. 469.

Albert, "What City Planning Means to The Community."

Bassett, "What Really is City Planning?"


"City Planning is Cooperation," American City, May, 1925.

Adshead, "Imagination in Town Planning."


Lewis, "Sequence of Operations in City Planning Work."


Ibid.

Nolen, "The Importance of Citizens' Committees."

Ibid.

Overstreet, "Arousing the Public Interest."

Ibid.

Nolen, "The Importance of Citizens' Committees."

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., pp. 33-34.

43 Hellesnes, "Education and the Concept of Critique," p. 44.

44 Ibid., p. 51.

SCHEME THREE

THE DISORDER OF THE MATURE CITY 1929-1945
CHAPTER TWELVE
INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEMS OF THE MATURE CITY: 1929-1945

On October 24th, "Black Thursday" of 1929, came the "great crash." Working devastating effects on the labor market, the depression had its most visible impact on unemployment which increased steadily until the spring of 1933 when between fourteen and sixteen million workers were recorded out of a job. From 1933 to 1937 the effects of the New Deal began to be felt but these were set back by the renewed depression of 1937-1938 when ten million were measured as unemployed. Many of the New Deal reforms were unable to mitigate the
large-scale economic crisis which prevailed throughout these years
and so it was not until 1941 with the stimulation of the war effort
that the "Great Depression" was in fact ended.

These years were truly times of crisis--near panic ranged from
city to farm, a sick economy demanded to be cured, leaders at first
refused to acknowledge the difficulties in fear of undermining the
faith of the business community; others felt that a little taste of
hard times would put the worker back on his feet eager to pursue his
job without so much shiftless attention. All in all, American culture,
society and economy appeared to be coming unglued. It was not until
1932 that Roosevelt took over with his pledge of a "new deal" for the
American people. Stating in his inaugural address that "the only thing
we have to fear is fear itself," Roosevelt launched into a vigorous
program aimed at restoring confidence in the American way, i.e., progress,
and rebuilding the vanished faith in man's dignity and worth.

Since the depression and the New Deal have been assessed from
conflicting points of view, many feel the thirties to be particularly
misunderstood and misinterpreted. Some say these years represented
an economic and social crisis that changed the fundamental cultural
foundations of America, others maintain that these years saw once more
the rebirth of liberal reformism that aimed to restore social and
economic harmony to the advantage of the whole country. In truth these
years were ones of deep ferment but whether they sponsored fundamental
social change or merely extended reform principles established in
earlier times is a quixotic affair.
If these years were bitterly divisive ones of heated controversy and dangerous discontent, the city planning literature reveals little of this. If the era saw the rise of the proletariat and social protest, planners ignored the struggles of this class war. If the gravity of unemployment was a nightmare to many Americans, the complacent tones of the planners fighting for their usual issues of controlled growth, city order and balanced relations between city and country reflect only glimmers of these horrors. The city breadlines, the rural starvation, the disastrous dust-storms of the mid-West, the destitution of the southern tenant farmer seemed to escape the eyes of even the most insightful planners. The renewed issues over Regional Planning only weakly reveal the implications of the migratory flux brought on both by the multiple problems enveloping agriculture and the continual shifting search by millions for employment.

For the most part, city planners joined Roosevelt's small army of men fighting to restore confidence in the concept of American progress. Led more by the government's invitation to aid the recovery of American institutions and prosperity than by an outright wedding of planning and politics, planners plunged headlong into the task without reflecting on the implications of government alignment in terms of critically divergent planning, i.e., innovative or radical. Hofstadter in The Age of Reform has claimed that the New Deal produced very little in the way of a literature of political criticism. What he is really contending is the evidence that the government's invitation to participate in the planning and programming of recovery distracted those critically minded among the professionals and scholars of social
and political science and therefore created a vacuum of political criticism in these fields. But this is hardly true if one reads the works of literary minded men who felt the coming social change must necessarily be reflected in the creation of a new art. Consider the editorial of the first Partisan Review (1934): "we propose to concentrate on creative and critical literature, but we shall maintain a definite viewpoint—that of the revolutionary working class." The political-economic revolution was to be reflected therefore in a somewhat confused development of a "proletarian literature" in the early 1930's: a social protest literature crying for equality and justice. The city planners and other professionals, however, rushing to aid in the death throes of society, were to act now and reflect, perhaps, only later. They forfeited once again the role of critic.

Hofstadter has claimed further that the Great Depression broke the spirit of the twenties as abruptly as the First World War had ended the spirit of the Progressives and created thereby a totally new revolution which eventually called forth unique programs and original spirit. Hofstadter supports the arguments that claim the torrent of books on semantics and "the tyranny of words" were but an indication of the uselessness of many old concepts and terms which inhibited progress during the 1930's. A new vocabulary, a new language of administration, a new understanding of the meaning of words, and a "new deal" were necessary to stabilize American society after the upheavals of the depression.
Stuart Chase, writing in 1937, in a book with the title *Tyranny of Words* reflects the same desire to subject the words of communication to a laboratory investigation. The question behind his search is the wonder of how many of the world's misfortunes could have been avoided if men had understood the words each was using.

From 1870 to 1914 in the United States this kind of thing did not make so much difference. Men were busy overrunning a continent, and words could not seriously deflect the course of hustling and impetuous action. But those of us who have lived through the Great War, the Great Boom, the Great Depression, and now observe the rise of the dictators abroad are not so easy in our minds as were our fathers in the days of Cleveland and McKinley. Even if not caught in an active catastrophe of fighting, financial ruin, personal suppression, deportation, or violence, one reads the headlines morning after morning with a kind of dazed incredulity. Has the planet begun to spin in the wrong direction? Is the oxygen leaving the atmosphere? Is agricultural mass production taking essential vitamins out of foodstuffs and slowly poisoning us? What is the matter with people? What is the matter with the government? What is the matter with me?

In turn, I find it too tempting and too easy to ignore the continuities which the years of the Thirties had with the ideas brewing in the Twenties and rooted in the fears of the earlier reform movement. The emphasis on "new" had other implications as we shall see. We have studied before the difficulties the city civilization of the 1890's presented in the symbol of the closed society, the end of the frontier and the limitations on expansion. We have also watched as the 1920's took these same fears and focused on the machine as symbolic of the entropic processes embedded in urban civilization and the consequent threat of mechanical failure as well as ultimate disintegration. So I find, that the Great Depression may have been symbolic of the end of civilization, the end of America as it had been known, but the culmination therefore of a fear of chaos and disintegration that
had lurked beneath the surface for many years. The language of planning in the 1930's reflects these traditions inherited from earlier years.

In the Thirties, the machine, "the industrial symbol of the urban way of life"² was no doubt a fundamental ingredient to the Great Depression, but the "machine [was inevitably] here to stay"³ and therefore had to be adjusted to and managed in order to avoid recurring cycles of the same depressions. Having accepted the quagmire presented by the "machine," focus thus turned toward the problems of a "mature" city civilization, one in which it was no longer possible nor advisable to expand limitlessly. Did the depression therefore symbolize the "end or peak of civilization"?⁴ Was "the metropolis . . . the harbinger of death"?⁵ Oswald Spengler had claimed "in place of a world, there is a city, a point, in which the whole life of a broad region is collecting while the rest dries up. This is a very great stride toward the inorganic, toward the end."⁶ Had the city civilization therefore finally reached maturity and was death waiting not far behind the shadows?

In support of these doubts, Steven Kesselman⁷ has allowed that Frederick Jackson Turner's "frontier thesis" held an influential position for it epitomized the concepts of limited expansion and used the significance of the closed frontier as an indication that the past was finished, completed, there were to be no more additions, it was over and ended. In turn, the present would be drastically different, it would be the beginning of a new era in which we would be forced to deal with our problems without the possibility of escape and indeed with the
necessity to solve them or perish. The closed system, economically, physically, or socially, meant learning to adjust all parts to the benefit of the whole; it meant, most significantly, adjusting the concept of the "rugged individual," a product of the freedom of the boundless frontier, to the necessities of a controlled and regulated society.

Kesselman demonstrates further that Turner's thesis is a supportive concept for those who seek to persuade the rest of society of the necessity for a new social order. In its ahistorical rationale, it points out that the past being over it is therefore irrelevant in solving the dilemmas of the present and future. The present requires new proposals and new directions because it is utterly different from early social conceptions. The focus therefore is on today and how to solve the problems we face. Consequently, the depression symbolized the end of American civilization as it had been known; as far as the city planners were concerned the closing frontiers seemed to be witnessed in the physical and social limitations of the city's development, the loss of urban population and the decay of the central core, the conflicts in the path of metropolitan expansion and the economic crises of city insolvency and unemployment. The mature city required comprehensive planning and controlled intervention to stabilize its path between paralyzing depression and destructive expansion.

Now these concepts were not new for city planners, indeed their rhetoric and ideals are dulling in their repetition. Scheme One had used the closed system of the "frontier thesis" as an indication of the necessity for physical reform and urban planning control. The Twenties had drifted along with watchful eyes for indications of incompetency
and disintegration in their closed mechanical system which finally produced the depression of the Thirties. The problems were old but the spirit requickened as it was believed that the dreaded determinations of the past could be disregarded and a new era of planning for the future could finally begin. There was "never an end without new beginnings" we are reassuringly told again and again. Thus the crisis of maturity, as we shall see, was to be attacked with a renewed faith in technological and scientific progress, an expanded professional involvement defining new roles and definitions for city planners, and an augmented revival of the "Public Interest" introducing a new concept of "citizen participation." But first, the imagination and faith of the public needed to be won through "fireside chats" and through a rhetoric of the new which supposedly criticized the given social and economic conditions in support of "new" relations. Let us look, now, more slowly at the problems of the mature city, the limitations on expansion which come from early years, the ahistorical rationale which exhausted the implications of the past, and the renewal of the ideal of progress as a necessary condition of American society and civilization.
REFERENCES: CHAPTER TWELVE


2Benton MacKaye, "End or Peak of Civilization?" The Survey, October, 1932, p. 441.

3Ibid.

4Ibid.

5Ibid.

6Ibid.

In many ways the language of the 1930's is direct, the American economic and social system was suffering from structural diseases and threatened to collapse. The environmental and population problems inherent to the city of the past now seemed to have reached maturity. If before they had been accepted as inevitable fate or as a result of relentless forces they were now seen as the deadly diseases of old age. Left without a cure, these forces would eventually destroy life as it was then known in the cities. Because there is essentially nothing unique about the urban liabilities within the problems of the environment and the population, the text of these complaints has been placed in Appendix A.
The New Deal era, especially in its approach to the city, was a transitional period. It took the old problems of organic and mechanical order and related them to the systemic problems of the mature city. The rhetoric of maturity stressing the limitations on expansion placed special emphasis on the end of the old way of life. Based on the principles of the past, the city, it was believed, could go neither forward nor backward without destroying itself. Change was essential, but in actuality the experimentalness or radicalness of the New Deal reforms has become a key historical issue. The rhetoric of the new is stirring, but remember we encountered the same in Scheme Two, and it is not difficult to accept the language at face value and find dramatic new beginnings in the solutions of the New Deal. Nevertheless, it was the rhetoric and not socio-economic-political reality that was the real source of transformation, it was the consciousness of the public that was ultimately reformed to accept a greater role in the democratization of governmental power, i.e., to legitimize the greater administrative power now placed under the control of the federal government. These operational methods, as we shall see, were the real changes of the New Deal: that is more central administrative control and greater decentralized legitimization. These changes however reach their real fruition in the post-World War Two years when the methods of rational process planning were fully exploited. Consequently, in Scheme Three, I shall not deal in substance with the administrative and organizational reforms but postpone these discussions until Scheme Four. Instead I shall explore the "limitations on expansion" and its ahistorical rationale which, while always present
in the language of city planning, appeared particularly in evidence
during the 1930's.

THE OBsolescence of the modern city

The city troubles presented by the 1930's were innumerable;
all of a sudden the fears and problems of earlier times culminated in
the voice of the 1930's. "City deterioration, city growth, rapid
obsolescence of the city plant, real estate booms and depressions, lack
of a sane urban land policy, tragic housing conditions, menaces to
health, juvenile delinquency, the burden... of unprevented crimes,"\(^1\)
were some of the manifold problems drawing attention. The "fear of
change" we are told "had reached everyone, the "fatuous Twenties,"
"the era of Peace and Prosperity" had suddenly turned into the
"Frightening Thirties" bringing with them a "change of scale... an
enhancement of power... [reversing] the fundamental conditions of
human life."\(^2\) "Our world is changing with an ever-increasing violence
... [but] none of our new powers [is]... so rapidly applied as
our powers of mutual injury."\(^3\) The necessity for change was clear but
the direction unsure and the possibility for improvement slight; all
that appeared clearly was that

American cities [were] on the march... many don't know where
they are going, and those that do are weighed down by such a
pack of troubles... technical, financial, administrative,
and social... that their progress suggests comparison with
those "Deserts on the March."\(^4\)

"How do the cities stand?"\(^5\) "Without plans, without strong national
leadership, with meager and uncertain funds"\(^6\) was the answer. A number
of cities approached the brink of "insolvency." Obviously the city was
not "an economic machine . . . [for] the law of diminishing returns . . . [which] applies to factories, offices, stores, warehouses . . . [applies as well] to cities as complete units." Our "economic enterprise" it was warned, "cannot go forward, driven by its past motives without destroying civilization through war, impoverishment and chaos. Nor can our productive mechanism go backward without destroying itself." 8

It was becoming obvious that the average "American city [was] about the most wasteful of all the creations of man. Increased debt, ever mounting taxes, unsatisfactory living conditions, deep seated economic ills and unsound social standards" 9 were constantly threatening to undermine its structure. "Land speculators . . . and commercial organizations . . . [in] a form of competitive megalomania . . . spell[ed further] anarchy in the economic and social development of these [cities]." 10 "Inequalities of income and wealth," "fiscal and governmental difficulties," "archaic and impossible taxing systems," 11 only amplified the economic crises of the nation in general. The American cities needed a "program to prevent economic disintegration"; 12 they required help in guiding themselves "out of the quagmire of financial embarrassment and of laying down clearer guidelines with which to avoid future disaster." 13

"The vulnerability of city life": 14 The acute crisis of the depression uncovered many inherent economic weaknesses of the cities which were related to "the drastic inequalities of income, widespread poverty and cyclical unemployment." 15 The spectre of distress raised by the millions of unemployed required "radical reconstruction of our government and a
public provision . . . for those who were losing regular employment."

The cities "need to look to the higher strategy of planning as basic to decent city life and the conservation of our human resources."16

Finally it could be claimed, "the fallacy that private funds could cope with a situation of such proportion . . . [had been] remorselessly exposed. . . . Private funds [were only a] thin emollient on a deep wound."17

The instability of the city: The attitudes about the future of the city reflected the vicissitudes of optimism brought on by the depression. Many felt that the "modern citified society finds itself . . . one foot in the Promised Land and one in the grave";18 "as an organized community structure, [therefore] the modern city must be counted as a failure."19 "Inevitable collapse," they cried threatened the "present method of urban living."20 Others stated that as a result of the depression, "the city trembles in the balance."21 They waited anxiously to see the outcome for the fear was "if the city fails, America fails."22 "It [was] true that instability, even to the extent of threatening the very existence of [the] city [was] a reality."23 "The great modern city [was] becoming so complex that real catastrophe due to its breakdown [was] by no means an impossibility."24

If the machine-city of the Twenties brought with it the fear of disintegration, the depression and the threat of World War Two were proof enough that "disintegration [was] taking place."25 "Declining cities," "urban stagnation" brought forth so many complaints that one city planner cried out "Let the cities perish!"26 Coupled with their economic, physical and social griefs however, the cities were also
"headed for a serious political or governmental decline." The modern city, we are told, was "obsolete." "City planners, [it was criticized] have disregarded the fact that when cities reach a certain degree of maturity they all exhibit the same alarming symptoms which endanger their very existence." Beyond this point, how "can the cities come back?"

Signs of Disease: The fear of the city in the Thirties was encapsulated in the renewed references to the organic metaphor. Since cities, as living organisms, had their life-stages of birth, development, disintegration and death; it was felt that the depression had advanced the stage of life to disintegration and death. But the city as a living organism had another reference, that of plant life, for "a city ... grows and flourishes or sickens and withers like a plant according to profound natural laws and the condition of its environment." "Signs of disease are already in evidence ... [in the city organism the] atmosphere, condition and facilities of our community are bad. ... [They show evidence of] autointoxication, arrested circulation, community scurvy [and] national arteriosclerosis."

The modern city gives forth such "maladies."

Our cities today are sick: they suffer from the chronic and progressive slum disease ... blight: in a city is like blight in a plant or cancer in the human body. It spreads from its center, year by year. ... Our cities are decaying at the core; and in a vicious circle ... the situation is serious and the treatment must be radical.

"Sooner or later all cities must confront the crisis of maturity: [and provide for] stabilization and competition by qualitative rather than quantitative standards."
The disaster of war: The approach of the renewed war effort was for some "an organic expression of a disintegrating society,"34 it signalled moreover the end of the visible city for "anything that can be bombed will eventually go out of use."35 The cities were now in their "death throes"; "the only moot point is whether they will die lingeringly of internal maladies or violently by bombing."36 Imagine the havoc . . . a few bombing airplanes could produce in any large city . . . or aqueducts . . . were dynamited or disease germs were judiciously scattered among the people during rush hours or gas supply . . . shut off for a few days because of labor troubles or a crippling explosion . . . The more complex and delicate any organization . . . the less power of adaptability . . . and the more danger there is that it will succumb at a time of crisis . . . The great modern city . . . [was] liable to sudden and overwhelming catastrophe.37

"Where there is no planning cities perish":38 "The new motto for our civilization might well be 'plan and survive.'"39

It is obvious that if our civilization is to endure we must go forward along the road of social planning and self-determination. We may not like the road, some may believe it is the road toward the maintenance and security of capitalism; others that it is merely a transition stage to socialism; but travel the road we must . . . the alternative [being] social anarchy and disintegration.40

The depression could thus be read as "a challenge to city and regional planning to justify itself and [to test] the strength of the movement."41 "The problems of metropolitan government, the economy and society plead so insistently for rational treatment that no one who claims title to membership in the fraternity of planners can ignore them."42 Only by city planning, it was claimed, "can we hope to avoid the chaos [that] continually threatens us . . . [as] the jungle returns to recapture and set at naught the work of man . . . so our urban life is threatened with extinction unless we plan to conserve the values which
we create."\textsuperscript{43} Beyond this, moreover, "it was difficult to conceive of any adequate solution of the problems of urban redemption without comprehensive planning of entire urban areas implemented by unified administrative control."\textsuperscript{44} The "critical problem . . . [was] how to adapt the social organism to change . . . [and] how to adjust the social organism to the environment."\textsuperscript{45} "Planning . . . [seemed to have the only] orderly method for social change."\textsuperscript{46} But the continued "failure to recognize [the instability of cities makes] . . . impossible a satisfactory adjustment of the nation to the social and economic revolution now in progress."\textsuperscript{47} "In this matter of communal adjustments we have muddled . . . long enough. What a community needs is not a set, crystallized plan; it needs planning . . . for a breathing, pulsating, dynamic humanity is a continuing affair."\textsuperscript{48}

The lack of control: "Planning and positive action, both in government and industry, [were] obviously needed"\textsuperscript{49} to prevent the continuation of past mistakes. But in 1932 "there [was clearly] a lack of evidence of any real statesmanship for the future. . . . Congress [was] deaf, legislatures [were] adjourning, cities and counties [were] temporizing with pinchback appropriations."\textsuperscript{50} "There [was] no integration, no brain, no national plan";\textsuperscript{51} "the [cities'] difficulties [were] more the result of abuse and lack of control than of the faults peculiarly inherent in the form itself."\textsuperscript{52} But still "the question that continually persist[ed was] whether our planning [was] really profoundly and beneficially influencing the full growth of our cities or whether it [was] merely playing around the edge of forces incapable of control."\textsuperscript{53}
"Was the city incapable of control?" Or could "planning be effective without control? ... [without some] mechanism ... [i.e.,] social rules and regulations ... to stop [the] recurrence of social catastrophes?" But "let anyone suggest that planning may be used to delimit as well as to expand and the lack of desire to foster the public interest [was] at once exposed."

The problems of the cities required "diagnosis," the "causes of evils in the civic structure" needed to be discovered and "the causes most essential to be controlled or removed." Three types of planning existed by which the planner could aid the cities: "economic planning," "planning from the point of view of administration or social organization," and "physical planning." "They [meant] quite different things. Although ... they [had] a common interest in forethought and organization ... [and] the development of order and direction out of the chaos of 'rugged individualism.'" If the modern metropolis was to be accepted as the index of mechanical civilization then planners "must bring order out of the snarl into which [the] communal machinery [had] gotten itself. Simplicity and directness must supplant [these] complicated arrangements." The planner must "consider the inter-relatedness of the problem with which he deals and the scope of potential control that is to be exercised."

Equalize and balance: "The watchwords for the new age [were] not expansion but balance, not exploitation but renewal, not conquest but cultivation." Automatic controls on the city would "create a stability compatible with motion like the gyro-stabilization of a great ship." "The new civilization" of the Thirties was "committed ... not to expansion
but to stabilization, not to a ruthless struggle for existence but
to a wider and richer cooperation . . . not to providing a field of
action for the predatory types but to building an environment in which
the nature of life . . . [would] spread the benefits of [the] scientific
and humanistic culture to all members of the community." 63 The city
needed, consequently, to develop "defensive and insulating devices"
commonly found in natural organisms. "Nature has developed a vast
range of compensatory devices . . . [which] set up a fundamental
stability with reference to the general conditions of the environment." 64
Although the social organism of the city was not exactly like the
natural organism, it was evident that some form of "a central thinking
agent" was necessary to ensure the stability of both the cities and
the nation.

The purpose of planning therefore would be to "secure order
and balance" 65 throughout the controlled areas. To maintain direction
in "conformance with preconceived plans," 66 to provide "stabilized
redevelopment." 67 "Profession[s] in the social order [were a result
of] sound and basic principles . . . of the past and the vision with
which [they] adapted these principles to evolving challenges of the
future." 68 City planning thus entailed a "balanced conception of
community needs and [a] synthesis of [new] ideas." 69 The city planner
was therefore the "director" of the scope and character of public
improvements as well as the "controller" and "stabilizer" of private
developments, the "coordinator" and "adjustor" of "irrationalities"
and "maladjustments" in the "city's functionings." 70
The past is dead: "Now this whole process of expansion is rapidly coming to an end." Those "in the belief of our 'boundless destiny' are dismayed or nonplused." They "still hold to the dream of the early pioneer," but "the old pattern of life can lead only to poverty, insecurity, blight, and bankruptcy. . . . Stability" of territory, industrial equipment, population "will shortly be reached . . . all these [prior] causes for expansion belong to the past. The United States is now entering a period of economic stability. The era of physical growth lies behind us, as it lies behind any adult organism." We are "now about to enter a period of maturity, where the problem is to maintain a dynamic equilibrium, as in the human body. Mere physical growth can no longer be our main activity." We can "no longer expand physically. We must expand vertically, by cultivating our resources." We can "no longer expand industrially . . . we must reorganize our productive mechanism for the purpose of using it more continuously, more intensively . . . more purposively." 71

"Our cities need not follow the course of evolution and revolution characterized by pioneering, exploitation and obsolescence." 72 "Our so-called 'rugged individualism' can no longer function. . . . [Our society requires] changes not merely in production and distribution procedures but in human psychology . . . in ways of thinking and aspiring." 73 "We need not accept" any longer "the chaos that we have inherited from history as an immutable and inflexible fact before which we can only stand in awe and reverence. . . . The rationale of planning is that even if we accept the past as given . . . the future is ours to influence if not to make." 74
The modern city is not fettered by its past or enslaved by iron traditions and vested survivals, but freely looks to a future finer and richer in the desiderata of life. . . .

What seem to be weaknesses of cities . . . that is their disintegrated character . . . may be the open way to readier reconstruction, if our social intelligence can frame and form our resources in constructive patterns. 75

"Most crises [it must be remembered] contain germs of opportunity as well as danger." 76

The end of one period is always the beginning of another. If we understand our present situation, and do not seek sentimentally to live in the past that no longer holds our future nor attempt by aggressive means to prolong the habits of expansion, we shall lay down the pattern for a more durable culture. The new period before us is the period of resettlement and rebuilding. 77

The "true renaissance in the thinking back of urban planning . . . [is] based squarely upon a realistic understanding of what has been happening." 78 "City planning must be more closely related to the realities of the present before it can provide safe plans for the future." 79 But "too often [it was warned] contemporary thought in a transitional period is focused on the immediate crisis; it fails to weigh carefully the permanent results which may follow from the decisions of the moment." 80 We must undertake "a junking of what is obsolescent and a reconstruction along lines in harmony not with tradition, but with social trends in which work and leisure, civic and cultural advance will replace the economic and industrial functionalism of the past." 81 "All [the] facts" from the depression "indicate the need for rational economic action . . . new enterprises and new public agencies . . . to mitigate the worst effects of our economic paralysis. . . . That and to devise a more valuable pattern of social and economic activities."

"We live in an era which dissolves boundaries": 83 "a new concept of community-building must be formulated" since the old "definition
of city planning . . . [i.e.,] the technique of changing the physical
structure of a city in harmony with established conventions, practices
and objectives, is no longer valid." Moreover "it is these very
practices and objectives that must be scrutinized and challenged. The
functionalism of the past has lost its objectives . . . or become
obsolete, as have the communities themsel-ves." "It is for the planners
to recognize the actuality of the new leviathan that has been created
by the economic, social and political forces of our time." "It is for the planners
to recognize the actuality of the new leviathan that has been created
by the economic, social and political forces of our time." "It is for the planners
to recognize the actuality of the new leviathan that has been created
by the economic, social and political forces of our time."

This is to be "a new age of conscious planning," i.e., "the
planning renaissance." We shall build "new cities for the new age" and provide means for a "revolutionary social reconstruction." We
can no longer be asked
to turn back to the old processes of private enterprise for urban
regeneration; to that same private enterprise that has built our
slums, brought untimely blight upon our homes, created congestion
in our streets and despoiled our countryside with surplus sub-
divisions! . . . [That way of thinking is] fairly typical of the
wishful thinking in which we all indulge, thinking which has led
us, with cities steadily becoming more and more and worse and
worse about us, to hope that the way out of the difficulty might
be some happy variant of the way in, and that the forces that
year after year have relentlessly been making cities worse might
somehow be depended on to make them better. . . . At the risk of
being charged with treason to the American way, I make bold to
assert the way out is in fact the opposite of the way in.

"Needed: A new name for city planning": "City," "town," "community,"
"land" planning were various responses to the crises of the depression
and urban disintegration. New planning terminology, it was felt,
needed to reflect the division between the "social approach" and the
"physical approach," between the efforts to establish a "planned
social order" and a "planned economy"; it was further required to fragment
the field still further into the "kind of planning" and the "areal extent of planning." 92

In 1940, "the change of name of the American City Planning Institute to the American Institute of Planners recognize[d] the disappearance of a boundary line that for many years had been indistinct if not actually non-existent." 93 Many however saw this reduction of terms to signify portentous effects for "the breadth of this term [i.e., planning] is of itself an invitation to superficiality." 94 "The word 'planning' occurs rather frequently . . . and has come to mean so much of anything and everything that there is danger it will mean nothing in particular." We need "a terminology which will, without elaborate explanation, differentiate the kind of planning in which the national recovery administration is engaged and that which we mean, is still to be invented." 95 "If the planning concept is to develop roots . . . and planning is to justify itself as a special art or its technicians as a special profession we must be able and willing to reach and fight for a moral and intellectual integrity in our own conceptions and in our own definitions." 96 The "defects of a former lack of comprehensiveness are . . . replaced by defects incidental to spreading planning over too wide a field and embracing too many phases of human activity . . . therefore lessening the power of planners to acquire adequate knowledge of any one phase." 97

The call for a new terminology also reflected the internal need for planning to change its old directions. The depression has taught that "the free and easy meeting of problems as they rise will no longer suffice." In the past the main basis for planning was the conquest of
land and the machine. Profits, not human needs were the major incentives. "Today these conditions have changed before our eyes." Although "old myths and catchwords still hold men's allegiance, their actions point in a new direction. . . . We are not merely on the brink of a new era in human activity . . . in many cases we have moved over the brink . . . laying down the foundations for a new stage in human culture." 98

The aims of planning: "Planning is nothing more than an incidental phase in the accomplishment of work or the attainment of an objective." 99 It is "a function to be found . . . generally throughout human institutions." 100 But there is a "new word" related to planning which is "purpose in view rather than the method of attainment. . . . The plan stands for the way instead of the thing." 101 "Planning is" consequently "not merely an engineering or an economic task, but also a psycho-social one." It is "a scheme for redirecting individual human behavior in terms of a reintegrated collective purpose." A "planning program" thus reflects a "desire to change the total cultural pattern . . . its main" implications "would lie in the direction of fundamental social change; to identify the state with the economic process . . . to identify education with social programs . . . [so that] children and adults" can "participate in the creation of social justice and idealism . . . to invent new forms involving functional relationships between managers, workers, technologists, scholars, consumers." 102

"All planning is presumable for human benefit." 103 Its "ultimate aim . . . [is] social betterment." 104 Planning in its fullest sense means "the regulation of the physical features of the community for the encouragement of the fullest and best life of the members of the community
... but planning" does not only mean "setting the environmental stage of life ... it is the very shaping of that life ... social, economic, recreational and spiritual." Planning moreover, is not a static affair, it involves "control, as a means for directing the forces and energy which make a city into a living and constantly changing thing." It ensures "the social control of chance developments affecting the whole of society." "Planning aims at stability, and the avoidance of rapid and excessive changes in economic life." Planning has meant "the control of man-shaped and man-built physical environment[s]." Now planning has come to imply "every form of foresight, all kinds of programming, every variety of scheming for social and economic betterment." It involves such concepts as "projecting," "purposing," "designing," "charting," "listing," "programming," "coursing," "drafting," "scheming." "Planning is [simply] an organized effort to utilize social intelligence in the determination of natural policies." "Planning may be unbounded, [but] its application must be weighted and guided by good judgment and expediency." "Planning" is thus "a means of obtaining an objective" in which planning itself is "a highly intellectual procedure." The "core of planning [becomes the] selection of determining urgencies and priorities," an attempt at "pushing back the curtain which veils the future."

Professional claims: As a profession, it was warned, planners must "build a temporary fence around a specific field of planning which we may call our own." Planners must learn to keep "physical features
separate from planned economy or political planning" unless they were to welcome a "dissipation of energy . . . and a weakened resistance against the invasion of the unskilled." Planners must further learn to be "masters of the situation with politicians, economists and sociologists as aids. . . . Outside the physical field [however] . . . planners [would be the] servants of other groups." Planning . . . [is] interested in the coordination of fields so long as [it] remembers that a 'field' connotes a fence, which shuts the owner in as much as his neighbor out." "Planning education" therefore reflects a "synthesizing extent of knowledge and techniques in [various] fields . . . drawing upon the fundamental sciences, but . . . adding what they believe are desirable aims and objectives. In other words they become advocates and cease to be scientists." "A generation ago it was rather the vogue to invite into this occult science an expert planner . . . and then to turn the city completely over to him and ask him to bring back the plan . . . the plan returned and was spread before the people." This view, however, divorced the planner from the responsibility for action and seemed to militate against the view of planning as a continuous and comprehensive operation. Consequently the "consultant system of planning" was currently being replaced by a "staff type planner." Planning was, in this way, being recognized as a partnership among the business leaders, labor leaders, local government officials and the professional staff planners, i.e., a consensus among contending interest groups."
The implications of the New Deal:

It is in the field of federal legislation and federal activity . . . where we will find our greatest source of encouragement and the greater justification for the feeling that the planning concept has taken root and has durable and growing strength. . . . [the] striking phenomena of the present period is the extent to which the states and localities, in their financial plights, have been willing to turn to the federal Government for help and whether this be good or ill, we must recognize that the arms and hands of the Federal Government reach down into the localities to an extent which belies or repudiates many a boasted principle of local self-government. . . . The lure of federal monies for local construction has galvanized a number of local planning bodies and the local governments into extensive intensive planning studies. 122

The policy of Federal cooperation and assistance to urban populations has lifted "planning . . . from the realm of a struggling profession and from the field of abstract scientific discussion and made it a matter of national policy." 123 Through the six-year public works program, the Federal-Employment Stabilization Board, The Tennessee Valley Authority, the National Park Service, the National Forest Services and National Resources Committee; the federal government and its agencies maintained an official recognition of the value of planning for the future. All these changes involving the concept of planning were paralleled by

an expanding concept in the so-called administrative functions of government. . . . These extensions of the governmental function have of themselves led to the need for more and more thought on the general purposes and objectives of government in its service to society, i.e., on the primary purpose of comprehensive planning. 124

Among the considerations of the new federal involvement lay the implications of its authority at the local, state and regional level. Many seemed to proclaim that "if city planning has been worthwhile, why not go in for national planning? . . . A further step forward . . . confident that in the future Government [would] come to rely upon the advice
and counsel of experts with a national vision." They argued to the effect that it was merely "consistent with the spirit of democracy for the government to engage in planning on a large scale." Others were not so easily persuaded and saw "the latest development of the modern state as an endeavor to detach the social life in all its aspects from the city and to substitute for local aims and intentions the aspirations and policies of the national state." If the cities so desired "to preserve [their] freedom of action [they] dare[d] not surrender [their] own privileges in favor of remote control by a bureaucratic regime." "If the city is the keystone of the nation . . . [then] any attempt by the national government to serve as a paternalistic authority operating under the guise of seeking to establish equality in purchasing power and wealth for all, is certain to weaken that keystone and to cause the collapse of the entire structure."

The new involvement of the federal government with the cities, however, brought to mind the past negligence of the role of the city in political theory. Regardless of the importance of the city, economically and culturally, "yet, the city as city and its people as people . . . [are the] forgotten item in the nation's inventory. . . . Reliable information and guidance on urbanism" remains nonexistent. There exists "no department, bureau, division or section in any state or federal government which systematically or causally undertakes to study the daily problems which face the city . . . no policy exists which thinks in terms of the city on a national scale." But now with the Federal interest, surely "urbanism [would] dominate the future," and determine "a new start for the cities." "Rural life and agriculture
... [had] challenged our government for generations. America as symbolized by the city [had never] entered into our public consciousness." Finally our nation would come "to recognize the new and preponderent place of our cities in the national economy ... The city [would be] the new mode!" 13

THE RE-ESTABLISHED IDEAL OF PROGRESS: COOPERATION

"The basis of planning [is] intelligent cooperation." 13 "True planning ... [is not] a manipulative process; it does not come by imposition from without; but rather by means of redirection from within ... [and consists of] a scheme for redirecting human behavior in terms of a re-integrated collective purpose." 15 Planning moreover is "a coordinating process"; 15 "the immediate need is for achieving a coordination and even a synthesis of certain horizons which are so closely related that they should be grouped together." 17 More than this, the "profession of planning" requires "cooperation and blending varying points of view into one unified object ... [as] expressed in mapped plans, in stated policy, in adopted procedures and in work programs." 13 Planners consequently "need training and practical experience in collaboration and cooperative planning. It is the lack of this proper coordination that is today hampering the planning program." 19 As one of the "newer integrations" city planning requires the "collaboration of several kinds of specialists." 140

At the opposite end of the planning pole, the Federal planning agencies offered a "coordination or synthesis of the individual planning [efforts] for all the plans of the physical world within its [national]
National planning operates through existing local agencies and thus represent "a definite change from individual initiative, enterprise and industry to a form of central collective approach," "a desire and a method for creating new wholes out of parts which have become so far fractionalized through lack of collective control as to have lost their functional relevancy." "If so geared together with all branches of government like a multiple engine on a single shaft, tremendous progressive power will be applied toward social and economic welfare."

"Planners have undertaken to promote the idea of [a] collective approach to the solution of community problems." They "are about to prove to a people averse to direction that planning for the best interests of everybody does not mean necessarily a curtailment of civil liberties, and may even become a factor in their increase." "Planning starts with the people" and is rooted in the fundamental assumptions of democracy"; i.e., "the dignity of man and the importance of treating personalities upon a fraternal rather than a differential basis"; "the perfectibility of man"; "the gains of civilization and of nations [as] essentially mass gains [and] the product of national effort"; "confidence in the consent of the governed ... as the base of authority"; "the value of decisions arrived at by rational processes, by common counsel, with the implications of tolerance and freedom of discussion." "The problem of the dying city" is first and foremost the problem of how to "create a new kind of democratic commonwealth" based on these assumptions.
"Never since the birth of religion and the advent of scientific medical practice has any profession had as great an opportunity to serve mankind." But "progress presupposes not only energy, ability and farsightedness in the leading members of the city, but also a sense of honor and duty and devotion to the commonweal in every citizen."

"Planning believes in evolution not revolution ... [and] therefore adopts a policy of patience ... [and] counts progress in terms of generations." Progress, however, will result only if we regain "faith or confidence in [our] creation[s]"; "the paramount psychological factor [rests in the development of] the planning will."

"Masses are conservative by nature, under the pressure or crisis, under threat of catastrophe, the general anxiety makes mass thinking move and provokes a general will for change." But this will depends upon a belief in the future progress of America and a faith in our leaders to direct our way. "What we require ... [above all] is faith ... in ourselves ... in our fellows." "The effective planners of today ... [therefore] must be not only good technicians, good collaborators, yes even good politicians, but they must encompass all the three graces, and of the three, faith not charity for the planner is the greatest."

KNOWLEDGE AS CONSTRUCTION

The planning process: "Planning should be conceived as a process not as a given field of subject matter, nor as a given set of procedures, nor as a stereotype form of organization." Planning is "a method, a procedure, an approach, an attitude," "it is a technique for putting
any plan into effect." Planning as process entails the following considerations:

1/ getting at facts pertinent to the developmental problems of the governmental unit . . . 2/ analysis and interpretation of the facts . . . 3/ preparation of conclusions, solutions and constructive proposals growing out of the facts . . . 4/ bringing the facts and recommendations to the attention of the responsible officials.

Planning had learned, so it was claimed during the depression that it "must be more positive and objective than in the past . . . positive in the sense that it must be effective through closer tie-ins with administrative agencies and policy . . . and objective in the sense that" it "must continue to have planning agencies representative of the aims and objectives of the whole community." This form of argument held that "planning [was] one aspect of governmental administration." Since "laying down general policy and planning are to all intents and purposes synonymous," "planning broadly speaking . . . [becomes part of] the daily thinking and action of every administrative and technical official" and is therefore "an ever-present ingredient in the administrative process."

Others warned sharply against this conception; "planning and administration" they cried, "do not mix . . . planning requires deliberate analytical and contemplative processes while execution is dependent upon more immediate action for results." Planning which is removed from governmental functions and city officials will be removed from "unwarranted political influence." The "danger . . . in integrating planning with government and governmental administration" is "to forget that there is a highly technical job of plan making," is "to overlook the fact that plans are more than a body of policy."
Planning . . . is two processes . . . one is the technical process of making plans . . . and the other is the administrative process of maintaining the integrity of plans.\(^{16}\)

**Policy-formation:** "Policy making is an integral part of planning . . . possibly policy making . . . is the preliminary step of planning."\(^{16}\)

Up to this point in history, planning has over emphasized the preparation of plans and the efficacy of the existing plan. What is more important "is the policy of determining what" the city's problems are and whether or to what extent it is definitely expected to change or eradicate them . . . Planning must be a dual process in which policy is . . . more important than depiction. . . . Most of our present planning enthusiasm is wasted because we must continue to work on the basis of impossible hypotheses.\(^{16}\)

Who shall devise the policies and what is to be their nature must be a central focus of planning. "The interrelationships between planning and the determination and interpretation of public policies cannot be ignored. A public policy becomes such through legislative action interpreted and detailed by the administrator."\(^{17}\) Planners must see that they hold at least an advisory position to these decision-makers. The official planning agency, the one entrusted with the master planning function must operate like the "mechanism of the steering wheel"\(^{17}\) becoming a central and directing force for the replanning of our cities.

**Instrumentalities:** "We need . . . methods of measuring the results of planning activities . . . to express in quantitative terms the comparative effects of different procedures and the comparative importance of factors which determine both the desirability of a given plan and its effect." We "need general research in planning relationships and in the
establishment of standards . . . a large development of the science of community planning to lift it further out of the realm of conjecture or personal opinion and more into the realm of demonstrable fact."\textsuperscript{172}

Planning relies upon two basic "tools": its "equipment" and its "machinery." "Its equipment" consists of "statistical and other factual information as basic for description of past, analysis of present and forecast of future. . . . Its machinery [is] built up in an effective organization . . . interpretive, advisory, administrative and executive bodies."\textsuperscript{173} Planners concern with facts reflected, as one writer described it, that

those attracted to city-planning . . . [have] a predilection for fact-finding and . . . just can't stand any monkeying with the truth. . . . The well armed planner has a weapon peculiar to science. He has the goods and can deliver . . . the planner both feels and knows and he demonstrates what he knows. . . . Having the hard cold facts . . . through research and study he is on a sure course when he indicates the logical course to be pursued.\textsuperscript{174}

DEMOCRATIC PLANNING

Public housing: Under the re-established concept of progress, democratic ideals returned to support planning interventions. The value of "collective freedom" established in Scheme One was transformed into a concept of "equality for all": programs under the New Deal were offered as means to "redistribute" the economic benefits of industrial and technological power, to ensure at least "minimum standards" for everyone with respect to wages, housing and social security. Among its efforts to be more "humane," the New Deal experimented with housing reforms, demonstrating the principle, for years to follow, by which more equitable
treatment was offered to the underprivileged by suggesting benevolent reforms from the top down, thereby allowing them to share in what others might have begun by considering to be but their "rights."

We have never recognized the minimum decency standard in housing for all our people. We must change public opinion. . . . These principles of democracy which some of us still believe valid and which [were] . . . sadly lost during our boom period must at least find a realistic expression in our attack on the housing problem. . . . Somewhere along the line there must be housing at public charge. The choice is between continued degradation and recognition that this residue are dependent . . . and must be provided with decent housing.1

We must recognize the "public responsibility for a function . . . heretofore private."156 Public housing in America has always been an "emergency measure"; the "Wagner-Steagall Housing Bill . . . took housing out of the emergency class with the intention of making housing a long-time program for the provision of decent shelter for the citizens of this country."177 But it was warned that the rush during the late Thirties to get housing projects approved, contracted and constructed only returned housing to the emergency class; "unless new housing projects are very carefully located, they do face the danger of becoming projects in a sea of vacant land . . . [which] will further detract from the potential value of the blighted areas for housing purposes."178

The "public interest" renewed: "An awakening in the whole people of a sense of common purpose is the very life principle of democratic planning."179 "This is a democracy . . . citizens must be heard through personal and joint action of its citizens . . . we must see that [plans] are the right kind of plans."180 "The common good is best promoted when
the community has something to say about it, when the community has power to determine what is the general good and how that shall be discussed, decided and administered." Therefore it was reasoned "city planning is the public's business, it is for public enterprise, not private enterprise, to say where cities shall be located, in what direction they shall grow, what their structure should be. . . . The public interest" should be established "as the sole arbiter of the form which cities shall assume." It is a "delusion . . . that as individuals we can escape the consequences of unplanned growth and are quite unconcerned about those who cannot." We must learn to develop "new attitudes and a recognition of public responsibility." 

The "success of any planning movement in a democracy [is dependent upon] the creation of a popular sentiment that will invite and support official action." "Government is [consequently considered as] the sum total of public spirit in a democracy." Without public support working through the elected officials, administrators and bureaucrats, planning is futile. "If our planners are realistic, they themselves must be the educators of these agents of government" to ensure an intelligent understanding and subsequent recognition of planning proposals.

By the early 1940's under the discussion of redevelopment statutes, the concept of the "public" as a group of local government administrators was well established. The bills under consideration were involved with a concept of "public participation" with respect to the determination of redevelopment uses of the public acquisition of parcels of land. They proposed through the use of some "public authority"
that the public plan its own development, and, in order that the plan may be carried out, that the public assemble the land, stamp the assembled land with the public's plan and then transfer that portion of the land which is devoted to private uses to those who will undertake to carry out the plan. 

"It is the planning and the assembling and the stamping which may be said to be the public uses or purposes for which the public acquires the land." 

Community support: During the Thirties, Clarence Perry's idea of the "neighborhood cell" took hold as the "unity of future city planning."
The neighborhood appeared to be the "logical unit for housing and slum clearance . . . [centering] the interest of the individual . . . in the welfare of the community rather than upon the individual lot." In the past there had "been no personal sense of responsibility to the community. We [were] all caught in the same squirrel cage." Now we shall finally all learn to "place community interest and responsibility above individual interest."

"The planning of cities [had] become a recognized community activity . . . and responsibility." "City planning [as] community planning . . . pass[ed] from the old community physical idea to the community spiritual concept." The concept of "maximum local autonomy" also developed during these years while ascertaining "the role of the community in the national economy." American cities were told they must help their citizens "organize neighborhood groups of property owners to protect and further the interest of their areas. . . . [These groups would become] a medium of joint action and develop a feeling of unity and stability." They would "restore local control and participation, recognizing the fact that a city is always a collection
of neighborhoods and groups. . . . Organized into neighborhood improvement associations . . . such groups [would] be purposeful and [would] aid city officials in giving greater value for the tax dollar; citizens would thus "become effective allies in combating the disease of blight and disintegration" by preservation of "their land, their homes, and their property dollars." With new governmental interest in the community with respect to "the organization of local leadership in each community in order to help that community plan itself," there was simultaneously a counter-criticism that aimed to point out the patronism of the superimposed form of community organization. Saul Alinsky, during the early Forties, organized in support of the use of "indigenous interest and action groups of the community" who would "clearly reveal the issues of the area as defined by the local residents." Only "indigenous organizations" through their vast knowledge of the intimate needs and fears of the neighborhood could "mobilize the sentiments of the community" to create a "movement": a "People's philosophy."

Citizen participation: There were other efforts during these years "to broaden the base of planning." Among these lay the concern to develop the meaning of "citizenship" to include the "obligation of [every] free citizen of a free country to do his or her share of dreaming, planning." "Planning [we are told] is both essentially democratic and essential to democracy . . . to plan wisely we must have the participation of the people." "The citizens of each community must ask themselves: What have we got? What do we want? How can we get it?" "The American people [must be] behind the steering wheel." "The test
of democratic planning is whether the people will fight for it . . . not simply whether they will accept it, or approve it, or join in it."^28

T.V.A. was one of the basic New Deal planning experiments which played with the idea of a "Grass roots Democracy." This "method embodies the voluntary and the ardent and the enthusiastic participation of the people and of the people's institutions." (Note that "people" was defined as every interest and group, chamber of commerce, labor union, farmers' organization, stores, factories, civic organizations, preachers, teachers, doctors, construction workers and individuals.)^29

The people should not be offered "one goal, but a direction, not one plan, but the conscious selection by the people of successive plans. . . . The people must be in on the planning; their existing institutions must be made part of it; the way a plan is developed and carried out is at least as important as the physical project itself."^30 These planning ideals finally saw "the merging of planning and responsibility for carrying out those plans" which forced the "technicians to make themselves a part of the main stream of living in the region or community; . . . the expert [could not longer] escape from the consequences of his planning."^30 "The main thing," we are told, "is that if we do our local planning on a local basis with the local citizens participating, we will have the kind of communities we want."^30
We must therefore place a "tremendous emphasis on citizen participation."  

If our planning is to be successful it is just as necessary for our planning to be democratic as it is for our government to be democratic. . . . Until we bring into the planning process real citizen participation and by that I mean a great deal more than citizen education, until we do that, I think we will not have succeeded in bringing about the community plans that we all want.
REFERENCES: CHAPTER THIRTEEN

1 C.A. Dykstra, "If The City Fails, America Fails," The Survey Graphic, XXVI (December, 1937).


3 Ibid.


5 "How the Cities Stand?" The Survey, April 15, 1932, p. 71.

6 Ibid.


11 C.A. Dykstra, "Your City and You," Vital Speeches, April 1, 1937.

12 Bartholomew, "Program to Prevent Disintegration."


14 Dykstra, "If the City Fails."

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 "How The Cities Stand?" The Survey, April 15, 1932, p. 71.

18 "Form of Forms," Time, April 18, 1938.

20 Aronovici, "Let The Cities Perish."


22 Dykstra, "If the City Fails."


26 Aronovici, "Let The Cities Perish."


28 José Luis Sert, "Can Our Cities Survive?" Science Digest, May, 1943, p. 25.

29 Boyden Sparkes, "Can The Cities Come Back?" The Saturday Evening Post, November 4, 1944.

30 "How To Cure The Cities," Time, July 20, 1942.


33 Catherine Bauer, "Cities In Flux," The American Scholar, XIII (Winter, 1943-44).


37 Thompson, "The Future of The Large Cities."
341.


5 Alfred Bettmann, "City and Regional Planning in Depression and Recovery," Proceedings of the Twentyfifth National Conference on City Planning, 1933.


5 Dykstra, "The Future of American Cities."


7 Cleef, "Cities and Nationalism."

8 Rexford Newcomb, "City Planning Becomes Community Planning," The American City, October, 1939.

8 Bauer, "Cities In Flux."


9 MacKay, "End or Peak of Civilization?" p. 441.

5 Bartholomew, "Program To Prevent Disintegration."

5 Harland Bartholomew, "Is City Planning Effectively Controlling City Growth In The United States?" Proceedings of the Twenty-third National Conference on City Planning, 1931.

5 Bartholomew, "Program To Prevent Disintegration."

5 Donham, "Can Planning Be Effective Without Control?" pp. 1-11.
Henry Wright, "To Plan Or Not To Plan," The Survey, October, 1932, p. 468.


Newcomb, "City Planning Becomes Community Planning."

Wirth, "The Metropolitan Region as a Planning Unit."

Mumford, "Social Purposes and New Plans."


Mumford, review of Can Our Cities Survive? by José Sert.

Donham, "Can Planning Be Effective Without Control?"


Winslow, "The Evolving Pattern of Tomorrow's Health."


Ibid.

Mumford, "Social Purposes and New Plans."

Aronovici, "Let the Cities Perish."


Wirth, "The Metropolitan Region As A Planning Unit."

Bauer, "Cities In Flux," The American Scholar, XIII (Winter, 1943-44).

Mumford, "Social Purposes and New Plans."


Wright, "To Plan Or Not To Plan."


Aronovici, "Let The Cities Perish."

Mumford, "Social Purposes and New Plans."

Wirth, "The Metropolitan Region As A Planning Unit."

Aronovici, "Let The Cities Perish."

Wirth, "The Metropolitan Region As A Planning Unit."


Aronovici, "Let The Cities Perish."


Aronovici, "Let The Cities Perish."

Tracy B. Augur, "City Planning and Housing," National Conference on Planning, July, 1940.

"Needed: A New Name For City Planning," The American City, March, 1934, p. 79.


Bettmann, "City and Regional Planning in Depression and Recovery."
Adams, "Town and Country Planning In Old and New England."

Munford, "Social Purposes and New Plans."


Lawrence M. Orton, "What is the Place of the Planning Function in Local Government?" Journal of the American Institute of Planners, VI (January-March, 1940).

"Needed: A New Name For City Planning," The American City, March, 1934, p. 79.


Newcomb, "City Planning Becomes Community Planning."

Carl Feiss, "One Nation Indivisible," The Survey Graphic, XXIX (February, 1940).

Maurice F. Neufield, "Shall Mr. Crockett Enter Planning?" Journal of the American Institute of Planners, IV (September-October, 1938).


Eliot, "Planning By the Federal Government."


Black, "Planning As A Professional Career."

114 Bettmann, "City and Regional Planning in Depression and Recovery."


116 Black, "Planning as a Professional Career."

117 Adams, "Town and Country Planning in Old and New England."


119 Burdell, "A Sociologist Looks at Planning Education."

120 Wyatt, "The Time for Talking is Past."

121 Ibid.

122 Bettmann, "City and Regional Planning in Depression and Recovery."

123 Augur, "Land Planning for State and Regions."

124 Walker, "Planning Problems II."


128 Cleef, "Cities and Nationalism."

129 Ibid.

130 C.A. Dykstra, "Your City and You."

131 Frederick F. Stephan, "Population Trends and City Planning," The American City, April, 1934.


Merriam, "Planning In A Democracy."


Black, "The Composite Profession of Planning."

Gray, "Large Scale and Rural Land Planning."

Black, "Planning as a Professional Career."


Comey, "What is National Planning?"


Elwood, "Planning Problems, IV."

Badger, "Federal Grants for the Making of Plans."

Feiss, "One Nation Indivisible."

"Organizing to Plan," The American City, November, 1943.

Merriam, "Planning in a Democracy."


Kekoni, "The Problem of the City."

Haan, "International Planning."

Herrold, "Obsolescence in Cities."
15. Haan, "International Planning."

15. Ibid.


17. Elwood, "Planning Problems IV."

19. Orton, "What is the Place of the Planning Function in Local Government?"


19. Ibid.

19. Orton, "What is the Place of the Planning Function in Local Government?"

19. Walker, "Planning Problems II."

19. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

15. Stone, "Planning as an Administrative Process."


17. Eliot, "Planning The Use of Our Resources."

12. Osborne, "Increasing the Depth of Planning Responsibility."

17. Haan, "International Planning."

12. McKernon, "Public Planning and The Press."


16. Kohn, "What Next in Housing?"
Harland Bartholomew, "The Location of Housing Projects and the City Plan," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, IV (May-June, 1938).

Ibid.


Feiss, "One Nation Indivisible."

Merriam, "Planning in a Democracy."

Augur, "City Planning and Housing."

Bartholomew, "Is City Planning Effectively Controlling City Growth in the United States?"

Oliver McKee, "Slums--Still the Cities' Shame," The Commonweal, XXIX (March 20, 1939).

McKernon, "Public Planning and the Press."

White, "The City as the New Mode," p. 129.

Elwood, "Planning Problems IV."


Ibid.


Bartholomew, "A Program To Prevent Economic Disintegration."

Bartholomew, "Is City Planning Effectively Controlling City Growth In The United States?"

Newcomb, "City Planning Becomes Community Planning."


Ibid.
137 Bartholomew, 'The Neighborhood--Key to Urban Redemption.'

138 Picard, 'The Challenge of Urban Blight.'


201 Ibid.

202 Eliot, 'Planning the Use of Our Resources.'

203 Ibid.

204 Newcomb, 'City Planning Becomes Community Planning.'

205 Eliot, 'Planning The Use of Our Resources.'

206 Lilienthal, 'The People's Stake In Planning.'

207 Ibid.

208 Ibid.

209 Ibid.

210 Wyatt, 'The Time For Talking Is Past.'

211 Ibid.

212 Ibid.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
THE RHETORIC OF THE NEW

AN A HISTORICAL RATIONALE

Hofstadter, in The Age of Reform, enjoys emphasizing the uniqueness of the reforms and focus of the New Deal because he feels their problems were original to the years of the Thirties. Reforms
of the Progressive era for him were based on a concept of a "healthy society" not one threatened by the collapse of the 1930's and its focus was one of democratizing the distributions of the economy and not that of the restoration of an economy which had ceased to operate. Hofstadter suggests than an original contribution to the theory of American reform movements lies in the "social-democratic tinge" that invaded the later programs of the New Deal in the form of social security, unemployment insurance, minimum income standards, farm subsidies and housing provisions. I suggest the change is only one of emphasis; Hofstadter overlooks city planning as part of the reform tradition of America and hence the planner's long established concerns for social and physical urban reform were not included in the development of political reforms. I have argued in Scheme One that the planners in tactics and ideals belonged to Progressive thought. If we extend the focus of reform beyond that of the monopolistic powers of big business, municipal corruption and the reawakening of civic responsibility to the concerns of disorderly, unhealthy, behaviorally disorienting and evil conditions of the urban environment than we can discern a general development within the reform tradition of a "social-democratic tinge" and not an entirely original invention of the Thirties as Hofstadter claims. What is unique to the Thirties is the extent to which the federal government became the patron for these reforms.
As an example of the separation of the thought of the New Deal from that of the Progressives, Hofstadter refers to two books by Thurmin W. Arnold, *The Symbols of Government* and *The Folklore of Capitalism*. In these books, Hofstadter sees an implicit attack on the moralism of Progressive thought and by way of depicting this attack he chooses to outline the discrepancies in terminology between Progressive thought and Arnold's New Deal thinking.


The point of Hofstadter's separation is clearly between the moral idealism of the Progressives and the pragmatic action orientation of the New Dealers. I maintain however that it was not the "economic emergency" and the "imperatives of [the New Deal] bureaucracy" which created new pragmatic conceptions and the desire for direct action. Instead I have explained the inclusion of the pragmatist's vocabulary in the language of city planning ever since the beginnings of the systematic thought about the American city. Moreover, a glimpse at the rhetoric of the social and political illnesses of either Scheme One or Scheme Three reveals a similar moralistic terminology, i.e., from Scheme Three we have "urban redemption," "spiritual advance," "social betterment," "schools of bad citizenship," "moral and social reorientation," "duty or devotion of citizens," "citizen's planning obligation or responsibility."
Not to quibble over the source of ideas, I suggest instead that the ahistorical rationale of the New Deal, that is the idea that the moralistic ideals and inefficiencies of the past held back the necessary organizational and spiritual changes of the present, may not be as valid as Hofstadter and others have suggested. As I have pointed out in the summary of Scheme One, moralistic and pragmatic concerns are not opposing positions but simply two liberal strategies which depend upon different applications of a universal set of values and an appeal to rational order. Therefore the death of the past and the birth of the new are merely rhetorical devices, used by the New Deal planners to prod the nation toward action not on "new" but on "necessary" programs.

Marcuse has pointed out that operational and functional, i.e., one-dimensional, thought suppresses history. Language which is oriented toward technical reasoning has no need for the monisms of the past which govern human actions from some external authority. Critical thought, however, while not succumbing to historical domination, is historical consciousness; it is the awareness that men are the creators of history from within a given socio-physical context. Criticism, however, can produce consciousness that would try to de-stabilize and transcend the accepted order because it is the mediator of the awareness of false objectifications, of leader-led domination, of real limitations and possibilities.

An ahistorical rationale, moreover, offers a certain degree of self-sufficiency, a detachment from the particulars of reality which in turn produce a level of abstractness or universality, of domination or reification. Consequently men become subordinated to the reified totality,
integrated and administered by superimposed values and normative rules of behavior. "Is this fight against history," asks Marcuse, "part of the fight against a dimension of the mind in which centrifugal faculties and forces might develop—faculties and forces that might hinder the total coordination of the individual with society?"\(^3\)

The New Deal had no need of the past; it desired an intellectual and emotional orientation toward and acceptance of new methods, new procedures, new forms of order and stability. The leaders of the New Deal sought to break through social conceptions, that is to transcend the current conceptual constraints that held the nation to the old order of individualistic laissez-faire. The tension between individualism versus community spirit is not original to the New Deal, why then such emphatic emphasis on the selfishness of the "rugged individual?" First of all, the success of business and its assumption of public responsibility during the 1920's had given the ideology of "individualism" a new strength. Secondly, Herbert Hoover had pledged the Republican party in the presidency campaign of 1928 to the philosophy of "rugged individualism," that is to a belief that an increase in the responsibilities of centralized government was a direct reduction of individual freedom and a threat to national progress. Consequently the crises of the early years of the depression were left to suffer alone on the meager efforts of private charity and state and local governmental aid. It was Roosevelt and his Democratic program of 1932 which sought in the New Deal recovery to renew the collective faith in the strength of America, which labored to erase the authority of the past and purify the road to the future. The past being an error, men were consequently free to
operate upon rational thought, to progress toward operational and functional patterns of behavior. More than this, however, the rhetoric of the new appealed to the spirit of men who were open to change, to new reconstructions, to active support of a government committed to the welfare of the general totality.

The New Deal initiated the role of positive federal government concerning the welfare of the average man. The federal government therefore now assumed not only the responsibility for the well being of the public but became the guardian of the "public interest" as well. The apparent brutality of the depression the abhorrent "enhancement of power," the "change of scale" in the potential of mutual injury and the "end of expansion" gave little choice, or so it was claimed, between the road to "anarchy" and the road to order, between individualistic freedom or national regimentation, between "survival" or "perishment."

The diseases of the mature city easily lent themselves to the metaphors of organic systems. The health or stability of the given national system became the major concern, recovery not reform, followed in sequence to be the basic innovation. The government, therefore, came to underwrite the dysfunctions of the given economic system, to fill in where there were gross inequalities and destructive competitiveness in the private sector. "Stability," "balance," or "equilibrium," in other words the protection of the given system and the reconstruction of order were the intentions behind the imposition of governmental regulations. The errors of the past, that is the chronic needs produced by the diseases of the mature city, would be cured under the care of a central authority. "Urban redemption" meant an expanded "public enterprise,"
a redeemed economy purified by the mechanisms of stability and unified by the powers of central control. To make the system a functional whole was the sole concern of the present.

The rhetoric of death and extinction, enveloped by the conceptual constraints of the depression, spelled out a special horror over the chaos of the urban environment. Nothing new has been added to their cries except a special tone of dejection and a special plea that acted as if the problems were distinctly related to the depression crises. Survival was achievable only if there was national planning, order was linked directly to the method of the "crystallized plan." Tradition held no method for the future; the path to the future was to understand and to follow the current social trends. Without an end in sight, without principles or goals, the pragmatic New Deal reconstructions swung into action stressing the "process" of achievement, the "way" to success, the "program," "project," "procedure," or "proposal." Governmental action, the fact that movement itself would relieve the present stagnation, was encapsulated in the emphatic use of these pro-words. Progress, therefore, was to be realized by the passage of time, by the addition of production to production. The rhetoric stressed that the future promised events and products that were of greater value than those of the past.

Belief in the American way and faith in inevitable progress formed the basic New Deal outlook. Progress would be restored if human behavior was redirected in terms of a reintegrated collective purpose: weakly translated this meant the securing of mass support and public legitimization for governmental interventions. To re-establish
the ideal of progress, the New Dealers borrowed support from the concepts of scientific progress. Scientific knowledge, publicly shared and democratically produced by cooperative and collaborative efforts over time, ensured its own perfectibility and cumulative advancement. Scientific knowledge as construction meant the use of models to explain the workings of the universe and instruments to measure and record observations. It meant further the union between the practical world (techné) and scientific knowledge (epistémē). Translated into the social world, the progress of society rested upon the universal values of technical knowledge: "intellectual cooperation," "collaborative efforts" and the view that our future history depended upon the efforts and products of our common endeavors of today. The New Dealers added nothing new to the Baconian tradition of scientific progress and mastery of nature by method but found it metaphorically applicable to the psychological re-conditioning of "rugged individualism."

Stressing the public utility of technical knowledge, the planner as coordinator, governmental adviser and administrator received an official federal invitation to share in the process of governmental policy and decision-making, the selection of "urgencies" and "priorities." The federal government for the first time would be the coordinator, subsidizer, and synthesizer of individual planning efforts within its national boundaries. The political ramifications of this central collective approach, however, meant offering reforms from the top down and it meant a further destruction of the "public interest" as embedded in the collective whole and an application of the term "public" to the administrative overseer of the general welfare. The New Deal brought
the "brain trust" to Washington and subordinated Congress to the role of ratifier of executive policies. Increasing the competition among official interest groups, the New Deal also increased the middle level or bureaucratic voice in the politics of power. The nonpartisan "disengaged" expert brought the best and most able men to aid in the nation's recovery. Those groups who found inclusion from the "grass roots" did so only because they promised to secure, by their avid identification and commitment, the success of the project or plan, e.g., citizen participation and T.V.A.

So the managerial and administrative "leviathan" of the federal government came to dominate the public interest. The moral consensus politics of pluralism never challenged the universality of the "social rules and regulations" which would put an end to the catastrophes of disorder, which would provide the necessary obedience to authority from above, which would create the partnership among business and labor leaders, government officials and professional staff planners, which would bind the planner's intentions by good judgment and expediency. Who is to say that the rulers or governmental participants were not biased, that they shared only altruistic interests? How do we know that contending groups held equal power or equal access to power, that public behavior could be consciously induced to accept the values of middle class political standards. Who is to keep vigilance over the power of the disinterested professional and to mend the increasing gap between the leaders and the led?

Octroyed from the government, the reforms of the New Deal set the stage for the democratic process planner of the 1950's and 1960's. Against the interest of emancipation, of self-reflective awareness on
the part of every citizen, of an open dialogue that offered the lower
groups as well as the official groups a right to self-determination,
recovery meant an official recognition of the one-sided powers of the
saviour-leader and the democratic responsibilities of the led. As
long as there are groups or people who are kept from an active partici-
pation in the decisions surrounding their everyday lives and as long
as consensus theory represses the distortions of power and communication,
full emancipation can never be achieved. Reforms from above, as Marx
has told us, only augment the opposition between the intellectual
elite and the submerged masses, although it can be said that

... the humanitarian school ... sympathizes with the bad side
of present-day production relations. It seeks, by way of easing
its conscience, to palliate even if slightly the real contrasts;
it sincerely deplores the distress of the proletariat, the
unbridled competition of the bourgeois among themselves; it
counsels the workers to be sober, to work hard and to have few
children; it advises the bourgeois to put a reasoned ardour into
production. The whole theory of this school rests on inter-
minable distinctions between theory and practice, between principles
and results between idea and application, between form and content,
between essence and reality, between right and fact, between the
good side and the bad side.

The philanthropic school is the humanitarian school carried to
perfection. It denies the necessity of antagonism; it wants to turn
all men into bourgeois; it wants to realize theory in so far as it
is distinguished from practice and contains to antagonism. It goes
without saying that, in theory, it is easy to make an abstraction
of the contradictions that are met with at every moment in actual
reality. This theory would therefore become idealized reality.
The philanthropists, then, want to retain the categories which
express bourgeois relations, without the antagonism which con-
stitutes them and is inseparable from them. They think they are
seriously fighting bourgeois practice, and they are more bourgeois
than the others.
Disorder = [(arbitrary/unexpected/unstable/haphazard) change, fear of change, enhancement of power, change of scale, change of powers of mutual injury, reversal of conditions of human life, ever-increasing violence]

end of expansion = (disease/dead past)

disease = (congestion disease/slum disease/social liabilities/decentralization disease/regional disease/economic ills/crisis of maturity)
end of expansion + (need_1, need_2, need_3, need_4, need_5, need_6, need_7)
need_1 = (slum reconditioning)
need_2 = (social purpose)
need_3 = (regional unity)
need_4 = (prevent economic disintegration)
need_5 = (national stabilization)
need_6 = (conscious planning)
need_7 = (new name for planning)

Order + (New Deal)

New Deal : (Federal activity/City as the new mode/ Ideal of progress)

Ideal of progress = (cooperative planning/progressive faith/ Knowledge as construction/democratic planning)

CONGESTION DISEASE

congestion disease = [megalopolitana, land sweating, over-intensive land use, density problem, false scarcity of land, (continual/bewildering) congestion]

congestion disease + (man's defective control, failure of technological civilization).

SLUM DISEASE AND SLUM RECONDITIONING

(chronic/progressive) slum disease = [sick cities, blighted areas, dry rot at center (decayed/rotten/decadent) cities, schools of bad citizenship, breeding place of (disease/crime/vice/bad citizens), high death rates, robberies, assaults, murders, induced delinquency]

slum disease + [destroys family life, menace to (morale/health/economic independence), (blighted/stunted/twisted/dwarfed) lives, acts of violence, immorality, pauperism, alcoholism, juvenile delinquency]

slum tenants = (latest immigrants, homeless, shiftless, jobless, derelicts, migrated negroes, families of meager means)
slums: [non-city, shambles, grime, sordidness, squalor, unfit, unsafe, unsanitary, shacks, hovels, bad housing, ill health, rabbit warrens, no air, no light, no play space, inadequate (garbage/refuse) disposal, below (American/decent) standards]

slum reconditioning = [(social/physical) reconditioning]

social reconditioning = [(aiding/developing/habilitating) people, moral rebuilding, human betterment, fundamental social rehabilitation]

physical reconditioning = [redeem (abandoned/depressed) areas, urban (conservation/redevelopment), clearance, slum elimination, war against slums, physical rebuilding, wipe out slums, rehabilitate blighted areas, protect good areas, eradicate blight]

slum reconditioning → [better people, better surroundings, physical improvements, social benefits, behavior conducive to general welfare, (permanent/higher) social standards]

SOCIAL LIABILITIES AND SOCIAL PURPOSE

social liabilities = {destructive giantism, menace to [social betterment, (spiritual/cultural) advance], not express social functions, conflict between business and leisure}

social purpose = [cultivate human life, new philosophy of leisure, new concepts between (man and his environment/man and work/community and man), better civilization, culturally productive communities, integrated culture of human personality, moral and social reorientation, change of method, change of heart, change of mind, change of purpose]

DECENTRALIZATION DISEASE

decentralization disease = (center city population loss/metropolitan invasion)

center city population loss = [(cessation/temporary halt/slow down/backflow/exodus/not assume increase) of urban population growth, time of maximum population, depopulation of inner core, abandonment of center city]
exodus = [escape, flight, hastening away, emerging, rush to suburbs, outward drift, push from center, back-to-the-land, trek from congestion, seek (refuge/shelter/food/safety), reshuffling of population]

metropolitan invasion = [(congestion/confusion) (rolled out/engulfment/invasion/malign intrusion)], massing, collection, inorganic deposit, cancerlike growth, human and social waste, regressing cycle, Megalopolis, Parisitopolis, Patholopolis, Necropolis

metropolitan invasion: [burst into country, overwhelms, exploded, swallowed whole, wave, floods, relentless force marches on, pressure, ooze toward country, spread limitlessly, hydralike tentacles, organized parasitism, (social/economic) hold remains]

decentralization disease + [flux, social instability, population and employment redistribution, indiscriminate population distribution, fluidity of population drift, destroys (revenues/values), jeopardizes financial structure, economically unsound movement, (social/economic) disadvantages, economic consequences of abandonment, spreading circles of blight and decay, disintegration, stagnation, economic shock, vicious circle of danger, not financiable, obsolescence, urban vacuum, economic life endangered, economic losses of maladjustments]

REGIONAL DISEASE AND REGIONAL UNITY

regional disease = (systemic problems/urban-rural tensions)

systemic problems = [quackery to stop at corporate limits, reputable physician treats (whole/region-wide) problems, distressed areas, favors capital city, weakened provinces, derelict cities, encroaching edges of city, spreading fungus, wastelands]
urban-rural tensions = (reciprocal relationships, complicated interrelations, jealous of each other, clash of interests, economic and social interdependence, mutuality of services, functional confines, interlocking parts, set one region against another, cities grow at expense of rural environment, interrelated land uses)

regional unity = (region as natural unity for new order of community life, channel growth like gardener, well-organized satellite towns, divert population overflow, organic decentralization, balance relationships, national responsibility, reapportion political control)

ECONOMIC ILLS AND PREVENTIONS

economic ills = [(meager/uncertain) funds, insolvency, diminishing returns, past economic enterprise destroys (civilization/itself), impoverishment, wasteful city, increasing debt, mounting taxes, economic and social anarchy, inequalities of (wealth/income), fiscal difficulties, financial embarrassment, widespread poverty, cyclical unemployment, precarious insecurity, private funds (can't cope/thin emollient)]

prevent economic disintegration = [clearer guideline to avoid future disaster, radical reconstruction of (government/public) provision, national urban preparedness, strategy of planning, conserve human resources, meet urban (insecurity/unemployment)]

CRISIS OF MATURITY AND NATIONAL STABILIZATION

Crisis of maturity collapse = (collapse/instability/signs of disease)

= (city failure, American failure, catastrophe of breakdown, decline, promised land versus the grave, stagnation, city perishes, extinction threatened, obsolescence)
instability = (trembles in the balance, threatened city, endangered existence, alarming symptoms, less adaptability, danger of succumbing, liable to a catastrophe)

signs of disease = [[plant/cancer] blight, [(grows/flourishes) versus (sickens/dies)], autointoxication, arrested circulation, community scurvy, national arteriosclerosis, dry rot at core, decay at core, internal maladies, death throes]

national stabilization = [social (rules/regulations), secure (control/balance), stop recurring social catastrophe, radical treatment, rational treatment, maintain dynamic equilibrium, (defensive/insulating/compensatory) devices, direct conformance, planning, positive action, integration, national planning, central (brain/thinking agency)]

planning → [survival versus perish, endurance versus social anarchy, cooperation versus struggle, (gyro-stabilization/stability), avoid continual chaos, urban redemption, balance versus expand, renewal versus exploitation, cultivate versus conquer, nurture of life versus predatory action, adapt social organism to change, adjust social organism to environment, adapt to future, balanced conception of needs, adapt to social and economic revolution, communal adjustments, synthesis of new ideas, adjust (maladjustments/irrationalities)]

city planner = (director, coordinator, adjuster, advocate, governmental adviser, administrator, executive)
AHISTORICAL RATIONALE AND CONSCIOUS PLANNING

dead past

= [destiny bounded, stability reached, not fettered by past, not enslaved by iron tradition, causes for expansion are past, era of growth behind us, entering period of (maturity/resettlement/rebuilding), no longer (physical/industrial) expansion, no revolution, no exploitation, free future, readier reconstruction, every end is a new beginning, every danger is an opportunity, past no longer holds our future, action points in new directions, brink of new era, new stage in human culture, functionalism of past is obsolete]

= (poverty, insecurity, blight, bankruptcy, slums, disease, untimely blight, congestion, worsened cities, despoiled countryside)

conscious planning

= [rational economic action, cultivate our resources, reorganize our productive mechanisms, change our (distributive procedures/human psychology/thinking/aspirations), lay a more endurable culture, new (enterprises/public agencies концепция построения/континенты для нового века), revolutionary social reconstruction, planning renaissance (based on understanding of present/related to realities of present), free and easy meeting of problems is not sufficient, junk obsolete, reconstruct in harmony with social trends, civic-cultural advance versus economic and industrial functionalism, mitigate economic paralysis, era dissolves boundaries]

new name for planning

= [(social versus physical) approach, planned (social/order versus economy), (kind/areal extent) of planning, differentiate kind of planning, (moral/intellectual) integrity in conception and definition]
planning = \{\text{comprehensive planning, unified administrative control, orderly method for social change, social control of changing developments, direct force and energy, avoid [rapid/ excessive] changes, incidental phase [in accomplishment of work/ attainment of objective], purpose versus method of attainment, the way versus the thing, [economic/engineering/psychosocial] task, scheme for [redirecting human behavior/reintegrated collective purpose], fundamental social change, change total cultural pattern, invent new [forms/social relations], planning for [human benefit/social betterment/best life/fullest life], set environmental stage of life, shape [economic/social/recreational/spiritual] life, [(economic/administrative/physical/city/town/regional/national/state/agricultural/social/community/land) (planning/forethought/organization/direction/order)], guide adjustments between [man/activities/environment], foresight, programming, scheming for [social/economic] betterment, organized utility of social intelligence, [guided/weighed] by good judgment, intellectual proceeding, selection of [urgencies/priorities], synthesis of knowledge, expediency, profession in social order}\}

THE NEW DEAL

Federal activity = \{\text{federal help, lure of federal monies, federal cooperation, national planning policy, government's service to society, nationalism, national vision, [national (aspirations/policies)] versus [local (aims/intentions)], [administrative/governmental] functions expand, planning concept rooted, not self-government, democratic spirit, expert's [advice/counsel]}\}

city as the new mode = [(new/preponderant) place of cities, urbanism dominate future, national city policy, city studies, national city (department/bureau/division/section)]
ideal of progress:

cooperative planning = [(intelligent cooperation/redirection from within), reintegrated collective (purpose/approach), coordinative process, synthesis of horizons, blend points of view, unified objective, collaboration, Federal (coordination/synthesis), central collective approach, new wholes out of (fractionalized/functionally irrelevant) parts, multi-engines geared together]

progressive faith = {planning serves mankind, generative progress, [(faith/confidence) in (ourselves/our creations)], [planning will/general will of change]}

progressive faith = [(energy/ability/farsightedness) of leaders, (honor/duty/devotion) of citizens, planner's faith]

knowledge as planning process/policy formation/instrumentalities = (planning process/policy formation/instrumentalities)

planning process = [not a field, not a set of procedures, not a form of organization, not administrative method, procedure, approach, attitude, technique for effect, based on (pertinent facts, analysis, interpretation, proposal, official attention), thinking ahead, preparing, picturing objectives, proposing methods, programming, organizing, purposing, projecting, designing, charting, listing, coursing, drafting, scheming, (positive/effective/objective) planning, (deliberate/analytic/contemplative) process, technical job]

policy formation = [preliminary step of planning, more important than depiction, (determine/depict) public policies, mechanism of steering wheel]

instrumentalities = [method to measure results, comparative [effects of procedures/importance of determining factors], establishment of standards, [hard core/demonstrable] facts, factual information, statistics, [science of planning versus (conjecture/personal opinion)], planning [equipment/tools/machinery], factual planning pattern, fact-finding, truth, sure course]
DEMOCRATIC PLANNING

democratic planning = (public housing/public interest/community planning/citizen participation)

public housing = [minimum decent standard housing for all, decent shelter for citizens, principle of democracy, housing at public charge, public (responsibility for private function/recognition of dependent residue), not emergency measure]

public interest = [awaken sense of common purpose, new (attitudes/recognition) of common purpose, public (purpose/participation/responsibility/support), popular sentiment, citizen's voice, common good, community (say/activity/responsibility/determination)]

public = (public business, public enterprise, group of local administrators, government is sum of public spirit, public authority)

community planning = [community spiritual concept, neighborhood unity, planning role for community, organized (property owners/local leaders), medicine of (joint action/unity/stability), collection of neighborhoods and groups, neighborhood improvement association, purposeful groups]

community planning = [welfare of community versus individual, community (interest/welfare), maximum local autonomy, (protects/furthers) interest of neighborhood, restore local (control/participation)]

citizen participation = [broaden planning base, citizen's planning (obligation/share), test of democratic planning, people fight for planning versus approve planning, people behind steering wheel, participation of (people/people's institutions), (voluntary/ardent/enthusiastic) participation, people select successive plans, merge planning and action, local planning, not citizen education]
REFERENCES: CHAPTER FOURTEEN

1 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, pp. 272-328.

2 Ibid., p. 320.

3 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. 98.


SCHEME FOUR

THE URBAN CRISIS

1945-1970
The post-World War Two decades have been labeled the "years of anxiety." Unquestionably the threat of atomic desolation, international Communist encroachment and colonial warfare can account for some of the general malaise. But technological derangements, corporate state expansion and private rights usurpation have added their own forms of discontent. This period of inquietude, in its various appearances, has shattered American self-confidence and has brought with it a special meaning of social disorder. In turn, these disturbances have
had their sequel in the "crisis of our Cities." Since the "crisis" with our cities, which is at least as old as the history of planning in American thought, reached a particularly acute form during the 1950's and 1960's, it is perhaps significant to try to understand what the ideas of "crisis" are trying to comprehend and how their concepts can best be approached.

The function of the word "crisis," which seems to conceal more than it reveals, represents what may be called a "noise" introduction, i.e., a discrepancy between language and experience, a loss of meaning and truth. Becoming a catch-all phrase of the mass media, it almost takes on a positive appearance as American audiences are repetitively subjugated to the latest coverage of the spoils of our urban conquests. In its frozen appearance it brings instantly to mind our standard fears and hatreds of urban life without really encountering the basic social contradictions which lie at its base. "Crisis" is at once a consequence of technological forces which "have deranged the whole structure of society."¹ Let it not be thought that "urban chaos" and "urban vulnerability" in an atomic age² are the only products, however, for these forces have produced a city which is itself "destructive of the very qualities it had brought to social man."³ Alternatively the problem is one of authority and the dilemma of power and conflict; i.e., "a crisis of involvement"⁴ or a "crisis of our civic life."⁵ Still further the "crisis" is a failure of liberal social-political structures to account adequately for social

---

¹For text see Appendix C, Part One.
mobility and widespread dissent. Urban institutions have failed to meet the requirements of the so-called "disadvantaged" and as the city threatens to become an "urban battlefield" the social and political order become increasingly irrational. "Crisis," then, is the "time bomb ticking in the heart of the richest nation"; the "crisis of class and race." So we can proceed to recount the various contexts in which the word "crisis" appears, but we are no closer to understanding what these anxieties really reflect other than a rejection of our current pattern of urban existence.

Still further we find that the "crisis" is an intellectual crisis and this seems to bring us closer to what we really may mean by the concept of "crisis." "The failure of cities is an intellectual one [we are told] . . . a failure of the intellectuals to generate a viable concept of a modern city and a modern region."

In place of the conceptual order that once composed the urban system into discrete and separable parts, the clarifying images are revealing blurred boundaries demarking ambiguous sub-systems. In turn, these are seen enmeshed in such complex interplay as to deny us our previous conceptions of order and causation and our traditional perceptions of our roles.

So, at the bottom, we find "crisis" defined as a failure of our cities to be dominated by the law and order of science.

In such a manner we have returned to the problem of "disorder." Having passed through the denotation of "disorder" meaning physical and spiritual chaos, to social and physical disintegration and structural disease and collapse, we now find "disorder" related to a concept of the process of "uncoordination"; i.e., the failure to establish mechanisms correlating levels of orders and entities within order. "Order," by this definition, deals with a plurality of entities
hierarchically organized into levels of sub-orders and requiring rational, efficient and repetitive patterns of interactions among these entities. But more importantly, we find this concept of "disorder" related to the crisis of the social sciences: that is the problematic relationship of rational positivist science with the human and social sciences. Here the problem of "crisis" splits into two opposing dilemmas: either the issue is grounded in a search for a better alignment of the social sciences with the problems of disorder or the argument consists of a challenge laid against the theoretical essence of the social sciences themselves.

I think the problem which we confront today in the "crisis" of the social sciences is similar to that which Husserl raised in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology in 1935. It questions the significance of scientific orientation, and more specifically that of technology whose rationality is one of control and domination, for problems which abound in the social-cultural world. Husserl views the crisis as endemic to the rational sciences which fragment reality into abstract and quantifiable models. Since the so-called "facts" of the social human world do not allow themselves to be paralleled by the objective description of the natural world; the trend toward "mathesis universalis" is misguided rationalism. If we separate the social elements from their human base and treat them as so many abstract objects to be manipulated and structured into hierarchies, we have created a permanent crisis of invalidation. The categories of social life reflect true knowledge only as they reflect and return to the individualized experience of their social and historical base. Idealized categories, which are abstracted out of their socio-historical context, can be used
to support any interest and for any end. If the ends are determined by technical and scientific rationality then all sources of irrationality or human spontaneity must be erased and the law and order of the categorizable elements become the unquestionable goal. The rationalized system becomes the end in itself and its concepts and methods become frozen in form. When changes are no longer possible in the frozen whole, the system becomes distortive and no longer yields to self-reflective criticism. Thus the socio-historical context and man and his experience as both the subject of investigation and the source of justification are lost. If the social and human sciences are to avoid distortions and false objectifications, then their starting point, their genesis, as Husserl explains, must be the life-world, i.e., the everyday practical world we all experience.

Systems in the abstract: "Crisis" for the planners has been interpreted as a quest for a more "mathematized whole" or system. One could say that the essence of city planning is to logically reorganize disorder and chaos. To deal rationally with the city, therefore, means to structure, however hypothetically, some model or system of how the city or the process of planning operates. This is necessary but not sufficient for an understanding of the urban whole. The mathematization of reality must also be mediated by both the immediate reality of work, play, family, friends, of fears, hopes and beliefs as well as a critical analysis of the role of historical assumptions in guiding our experience. In other words the abstract conception of a system ripped out of reality must return again and again to its social-historical context in order to accept new facts and new syntheses of these facts. "False totality and
synthesis," Kosik has explained, "are manifested in the method of the abstract principle that overlooks the wealth of the real, or its contradictoriness and multiplicity of meanings, in order to consider only those facts in agreement with the abstract principle."\(^\text{13}\)

Since it is claimed that the progress of science and production has brought with it its own social fulfillment, the givens\(^*\) of the modern technological world ignore the determining evolution of history. Each problem-solving event is accepted as essentially new, although its formation and appearance really stand in a genetic relationship to socio-political history. Since reality is accepted by the technological method of systems analysis as so many pieces of quantifiable information, "facts" are perceived without unity to the past or without relationship to the analyzer's conception of the social whole. Moreover knowledge and action seem to rest upon the collection and analysis of all the pertinent facts. On the other hand, Kosik explains,

> gathering all the facts does not imply that one knows reality, and all of the collected do not constitute the totality. Facts amount to knowledge of reality if they are understood as facts of a dialectical whole, i.e., if they are not unchangeable, indivisible and undemonstrable atoms, from whose assemblage reality can be constituted.\(^\text{14}\)

The concept of the system as an organic whole, a physical mechanism of gravity, a process-control model, or whatever, pre-determines the relationships among the parts. Discrepancies between the model and reality, that is the aspects of reality which the given forms

---

\(^*\)That is the focus on process and interaction, organization, means-end efficiency and so forth.
do or do not express, are minimized when the emphasis is directed toward the technical problems of system composition and system invariance. Concern with the functions and dysfunctions of a given order, in turn, stifle understanding which would accept the system and its facts and organization as elements which in themselves are of historical interest. Any selection of a particular model and its relevance to and association with reality needs to be explored both as a historical product and as a determination of the formulation of facts and formation of parts. Therefore, every fact and every relationship need to be considered with respect to their system's context as well as their historical context. Throughout the study of Scheme Four, consequently, I will concentrate on the assessment of systems concepts of the 1950's and 1960's.* Reflecting upon their image of reality, their internal forms and processes, and their genetic social-historical development, I will try to understand the intent of their construction and their limitations. I will begin, however, by returning to the problem of social and political order.

Social order: In the malaise of disorder during the 1940's through the 1960's, the concept of social order was required both to restore a feeling of security to a trembling society and to allow for individual freedom and rule in a highly complex society. Thus the social order was conceptualized as a system of equal parts functioning synchronically within a mutually dependent whole. Although we have

*I use "the 1950's and 1960's" to refer to the whole period of Scheme Four.
analyzed systems concepts before with respect to ideas about the city, now we find them being applied to thoughts about social stability as well. It was during the 1930's that L. J. Henderson, a professor of biological chemistry at Harvard, under the influence of Pareto's concept of social equilibrium, related the problematics of social organization with the concept of stability-oriented systems. The juxtaposition of "order" and "stability" in the social sciences, quickly led to scientific and theoretical development for it is only order among elements under conditions of stability which allow for prediction and control, i.e., the very object of scientific method and theory. By the 1950's equilibrium had become a dominant concept of many American social theorists, e.g. Parsons, Homans, Merton. However it was through the concatenation of liberal social theories to the organization and management needs of the federal government in the New Deal, which we shall explore below, that equilibrium theories had also found their way into government, industrial and urban policy setting and planning as well.

Thus the overriding conceptual idea of the planners during the 1950's and 1960's was the city system; i.e., the organization and integration of the city and its citizens into a social whole. "Order" or system equilibrium was perceived as a function of the dependencies and interaction of the behavior* of the system as a whole. As complexities and social conflict increased during this period, the concerns for "order"

*"Behavior" being revealed by the process of hypothesis formation on the subject of the system's functionings and a consequent search for quantifiable data to verify the hypothesis.
brought more focus to bear on the possibility of diverting "dis-equilibriums" produced by conflict into less threatening channels and searching for more predictable means by which to produce beneficial social change. But again, this leads us back to the old problem of mastery over the city and man with its predetermined goals of order and progress. By viewing society and the city as a system we are considering an ideal model and using metaphorical references. Our terms can therefore conceal the necessity for conflict by abstracting themselves above the traditional class struggles, e.g., control of the technological apparatus, capital and land, and by devoting themselves instead to a more "equitable" distribution of the systems' "goods" under the belief that it is systemic needs which deflect stability. Conflict can thus be assumed as cooptible with commodities and services from within the system. We are thus led by our view of the system as an exact model of reality to focus our attention on systems maintenance and direct it away from elements which might surpass the given system. We forget to learn to deal with the "unsystematic" by coopting conflict into our ideal system. We fail to see that in reality there are areas outside of the systems metaphor which produce spontaneous change, areas with superfluous functions, areas over which we can have no plan or control. We fail to question consequently, just where the technical model of systems planning is applicable and where it is not. We shall try to emphasize during this Scheme, just how over exaggerated the systems concerns of technical planning have become and outline some of the contradictions which they tend to conceal.
Political order: At the political level, the ideas of "order" have a genetic relationship with the ideals of American liberalism. It is within an ideal social system of integrated entities, that "order" will be rational if and only if no one component is allowed to violate another's freedom and no rule of organization or end-goal fails to be consistent with another rule or goal. Thus the liberal concerns of freedom and rationality become essential components of the planner's concept of "order." Along with the liberal's concept of law and order, e.g., legal and political guarantees for security of private rights, the ensurance of rational means of governmental organization and administration is necessary if the organization is to be efficient and consistent. Such a liberal ideology had become governmental ideology during the New Deal: indeed the Executive Reorganization Act of 1939 brought a breed of political engineers who, committed professionally to securing the maintenance and efficiency of the social system, placed at the service of the government their rational means of policy formation and technical administration. But further than this, liberalism became the bastion of technocracy for it coupled the belief in progress with the ideal of equal opportunity for individual development. Its viewpoint linked progress, made possible by rationally structured and operated mechanisms of production, with the belief that only progress would offer the freedom and security for all through the deliverance of its promised "goods."

The New Deal, moreover, had expanded its own role of government into the area of welfare and social planning as well as having encouraged private enterprise's entry into the field of social reform. But at
the same time as the technocrats and managerial elites increasingly assumed responsibility for and control over business and government, private individuals were left with a minimized realm of self-management and self-determination. Under these conditions liberal Democracy with its concerns for the individual as the measure of all things was weakened, and as the cries of civil rights joined the din for private rights, the social order itself seemed threatened. Thus in the post-World War Two years, technocrats, the monopoly rule of specialists in management and planning, became the nonpartisan mediators between the expanding interests of the welfare government, the particular interests of the corporate and business elite, and the private interests of the individual citizens. Somehow these interests had to be organized into levels of groups, participation of elements at each level had to be increased, and efficient and continuous processes of communication between and within levels needed to be established if the order of technocracy was to be secured.

This concept of systems harmony, however, presupposes universal laws or values as stabilizing mechanisms which would overcome contradictions between private and public rights, progress of technology and manipulation of individuals, inequalities of income and power, the growth of professionalism and uninformed laymen, and so forth. These ideals assume that the system is ultimately workable. Basing their values upon a concept of man as a reasoning individual, the liberal planning mediators believed that a free flow of knowledge and an open access to participation would maintain the natural balance of society in the interest of everyone, that a universally accepted rational order
of society would guarantee security. But these ideals of reason are
divorced from reality; they deny, among many things, the arbitrariness
of interests and their often harmful influence on knowledge, they
involve the belief in a nonexistent therapy of free competition and
participation, and they conceal the growth of instrumental powers
removed from rational justification. Consequently the systems models
depicting the law and order of the urban social and physical whole are
imbued with these liberal ideals and we must therefore keep in mind
during our study this double abstraction: first with respect to the
distorted use of systems metaphors and second in regard to liberal
ideals of order.
REFERENCES: CHAPTER FIFTEEN


12 Piccone, "Reading the Crisis," pp. 121-129.


14 Ibid., p. 37.

Since the problems we solve are a product of the models we pick, I want briefly to review two configurations which planners frequently use and to indicate some of their implications for problem-solving. These are the models of urban mechanics and the biological organic system. Because their language is by now familiar and repetitive to the reader the series of quotations have been placed in Appendix C, Part Two. Instead I will review only the configuration of terms and some semantical intentions of the two models.

The model of urban mechanics: In this model, the order of urban space is thought to resemble the law of order in the universe: more specifically,
it is a projection of celestial mechanics and its model of regularity onto the urban plane. The city and all that surrounds it are metaphorically conjoined by the forces of gravity within the same "sphere of influence." It is not the city or the suburbs or the problematics of their couplings which necessarily receive attention, but it is their forces moving against each other, the push and pull of gravitational pressures which are emphasized. This model consequently studies the results of urban attraction and repulsion, centripetal and centrifugal forces which "dislocate" the given structure of the urban "container."

The specific focus revolves around the problem of balance among elements and the maintenance of "easy fluidity."

The semantics of urban mechanics: Since the mechanical model is one we have become quite familiar with throughout this
thesis, rather than repeat in full the model's intentions.

I want only to pause briefly over some of the model's inherent weaknesses and refer to reader to Appendix C, Part Two.

for a full textual description.

Because this model assumes that the urban boundaries enclose a static structure, all forces which change the relationships of parts within the city are seen as inevitably entropic. For example, the population flows are perceived as a "drain" upon the city whole, either by "siphoning off" the quality citizens or by changing the economic dependence upon the urban structure of the inflowing populations. Either way since the city's physical, social and economic structure is held as basically change resistant, these disequilibriums all tend toward disintegration. There seems, therefore, to occur in the conceptualization a confusion over the process of equilibrium and the process of entropy and which one is the stronger force. For example, in this model the urban structure is accepted as basically in equilibrium while the flows vary.* "Good health" is defined as a free flow of pressure of forces so that attention is placed on the development of equations of production and distribution to enable the misplaced pressures to be

*For a full treatment of mechanical and organic models see Walter Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (New Jersey: 1967).
modified and shifted and so to maintain the systems balance. Without these redistributions, it appears the system would tend to destroy itself. Structural systems changes are placed outside of the model's considerations.

There is and always has been a certain amount of fate connected with the use of the mechanical model; some unanalyzable force keeps driving the waves of population inward and outward, some indeterminate pressure causes the city to monotonously reproduce itself in an invariant manner, some essential element of the central city places all the rest of the field, the suburbs and hinterland, under its dominating influence. There is no spontaneity and no variety to this system in which a hidden teleological intent drives us relentlessly forward. Of course, most planners in no way expect that they are offering teleological explanations, nevertheless, there exist recurrent formulations which attribute to some unexplainable element the force which operates to maintain or dissolve the domination of the central city. Leon J. Goldstein has explained that a "teleological judgement involves construing the role of some aspect of what is studied in terms of its real or alleged contribution to the persistence or operation of some larger entity--organism or socio-cultural system--of which it is a part." By way of illustrations let us review the following statements:

.. eroded urban areas do not gather energy when left fallow, but pull down all that surrounds them to their level.

The struggle between center and circumference, between centripetal and centrifugal forces, is not one that can be settled by a formula for it represents a continuing effort to establish an equilibrium.

---

*Scheme Two, page 219
The urban crisis: a crisis of change and movement with people abandoning the central cities to move to suburbia where the same problem will inevitably follow at best a generation later.4

... the concept of decentralization ... represents a basic human urge.5

What are the teleological explanations in the examples given above? First there is the eroded energyless area which purposively strives to pull down all that surrounds it. Next we find the struggle between center city and the suburbs serving as a necessary element in the equilibrations of the whole. Thirdly, a basic human urge operates the city's forces of decentralization. Finally there is the inevitable reproduction of the effects of change and movement upon the suburban structures. The point is, as Goldstein puts it, that only if teleological statements are predictions from stable and recurrent structures does it seem fair to say they are not merely statements of a highly speculative nature. But how can we claim that the structure of the city is stable and recurrent? Although this is just what the model of urban mechanics assumes it can justify, what evidence is offered in its support? In other words, by defining the urban system as an invariant structure of balanced opposites, it subsequently becomes quite easy to formulate laws and principles that both govern the system's operations and serve to maintain it. But this assumption does not prove these are teleological statements of a non-speculative type. The point in fact is that the structure of the urban system is itself undergoing rapid and constant change; further as we have discussed before, it is not reasonable to speak of the city structure reproducing itself in a new town or a new suburb. In other words, the urban physical or social structure is neither recurrent nor stable. Consequently teleological formulations
really hold little explanatory meaning because they simply embue the forces of disintegration, of decentralization, with a purposive design.

Thus the urban mechanical model focuses on the forces of equilibrium within the system without explaining how the forces come to be. What specifically is the "human urge" for decentralization or the "effort to establish equilibrium"? How do these purposive motivations manifest themselves? How are they related to the preservation or destruction of the city structure? Furthermore, how do these forces seemingly resolve the conflict between the goal of maintenance and the law of entropy; between the principle of objectivity and the mystery of universal forces? These are questions the model can not or does not explain. The assumption of purposive forces, however, provides other difficulties. It reduces the evolutionary development of the city to sheer fate; that is changes which occur as a result of a play of forces reveal no indication of the hand of man. Purposive development or disintegration holds man in its power; he becomes the product and not the producer of history.

Now the anxiety of the 1950's and 1960's may have produced an environment that was susceptible to static equilibrium theories and subsequently promoted their formulations. But their acceptance by planning, a field which is explicitly purposive itself, reveals an inherent contradiction. Allowing the free forces to establish a balance between the inward and outward flows of the city is equivalent to allowing the injustices of race and money to control the city's growth. Moreover, an emphasis on the reciprocal forces of centralization and decentralization easily reduces itself to an effort to restore
balance by changing the "polarity of forces," i.e., "to lure back suburban defectors," "to gratify the speculator" in urban redevelopment. A free market economy or a free play of internal forces essentially "negates planning" for it becomes enough merely to oil the machine, to ease the flow of goods and services already provided by the system. But the model also misapplies the "ceteris paribus" assumptions. There is nothing tentative about some of the controls which the mechanical model places outside of its boundaries, for example, the locational influences of the Federal highway legislation or the Federal home financing policies which have had devastating effects upon the so-called forces of balance. Moreover the "field of influence" which the city supposedly maintains over its hinterland is being somewhat devastated by the communications revolution; suburbia it appears is more a choice of mass middle class tastes and desires than a product of its local urban dominator. All in all, the metaphors of the mechanical model, by placing their emphasis upon static equilibrium theories, have misdirected the focus of concern away from economic, social and historical determinations of the urban structure and way of life and stressed, in consequence, the inevitable acceptance of certain background assumptions and forces.
The configuration of urban mechanics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boundary conditions</th>
<th>: (urban enclosure, urban container, urban girdle)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gravity problems</td>
<td>: (force of community development, urban explosion, outward push, centrifugal movement, dislocations of industrial inventions, revolt against the city, impact of urban decomposition, repelled by metropolis, magnetic power of the metropolis, sphere of influence, satellite communities, suburban planets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban flows</td>
<td>: (fluid city, sprawl, oozing of metropolis, overflows, expanding urban universe, succession of population waves, sea of ugliness, human tides run in and out, human tides flow out, dark tides run in, drain of decentralization, siphoning off of city population)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
urban balance : [(counterbalance/renewed) (energy, decay), struggle between (center and circumference/centrifugal and centre-petal forces), extreme complexity of parts vs. integration, reverse blighting influence, bring affluent back into cities, trickle down into ghettos, lure back suburban defectors, harmonious interaction between (non-urban/urban)]

Law of urban entropy = [urban disintegration, (rigid/obsolete) city structure, disorganization, dissolving into formless nonentity, urban (chaos/travail), urban erosion]

Planning + [fine adjustment to physical world, modification of current trends, balance between efforts, draws energies together, balance (exploiting/conserving) energy, maintain easy fluidity, refocuses of region's core]

Interurban space = (center city/grey areas/suburbs/rural America)

center city = (deserted city, obsolete city, eviscerated core, functionally outmoded city, dead carcass of the past)

suburbs = (exurbanite, interurbanite, fringe dweller, rurb, subtopia, packaged community, enclave, private sector, classless, homogeneity, insulation, unbalance, boredom, explosive invasion of the countryside, urban fall out)

grey areas : (growing wasteland)

rural America : (new frontier, hinterland)

Urban imbalance + (bad economics, reflection in city's purse, imperialism, tax base disappears, property deteriorates, prodigal waste of suburban stampede)

Myth of the market economy : [(self-regulatory/automatic/cyclical/self-correcting/all-sufficient/all purpose) economy]

myth of the market economy + (negates planning)

planning constraints = (transforms surplus, allocates surplus, allocates scarce means with alternative uses among multiple ends, minor sums to eliminate unnatural obstacles)
restore city's economic balance + [private developers, (public/private) investment in blighted areas, tax producing sites in downtown, backing by private capital, capitalist money for urban renewal, gratify (the contractor, the speculator)]
THE ORGANIC MODEL

The multiple complexities of the "urban crisis" have given a new impetus to our old organic analogies. "Interdependence"* or the concept of mutual dependence of all parts, accepts a new significance in the highly volatile years of the 1950's and 1960's. "Rugged individualism," which had been dying its slow death over the years, receives its final blows in our technocratic society. Now it is the spirit of "consensus," of "mutuality," and "cooperation" which necessarily must unify society. Only if this spirit is accepted as a normative regulation, so the organicist's argument goes, will society and men be able to function effectively. Thus certain normative functions or

institutions are defined as essential to the preservation of social
unity, essential to the very order of man and his environment in which
man's needs and purposes can be satisfied. In other words:

Integration, regularity, stability, permanence are all
requirements of society as we conceive it; their disappearance
means the dissolution of that very entity, society, and their
strength or weakness, a measure of social existence. Thus
in analysing any society we cannot but assess its capacity to
achieve stability and continuity, to function smoothly and in
an integrated fashion, and on this basis evaluate its
adequacy. 6

Consequently the homeostatic intent of the organic society
is to avoid the causes of disequilibrium, to search for conditions
of constancy by which the systems structure is maintained and to
follow the norms of adjustment allowing it to perform its functions.

As in the mechanical model, we find a similar unconscious teleological
role and a similar fear of disintegration. Again, I am not going to
describe in detail the implications of the Organic Model for they
have been repeated earlier, and I refer the reader to Appendix C, Part Three
for the textual description of the Organic Model. Instead, I will
point out a few of the model's current discrepancies.
Social Change and the Organic Model: Since "organic interdependence" involves the complementarity of all parts within a given level, the organic model under conditions of abundance and progress finds the matter of systems equality to be problematic. Under conditions of scarcity, the organic model seemed to have adequately described the competitive struggle for existence, the survival of the fittest, and what seemed like a necessary condition of equilibrium between man and a not too supportive environment. Without the problems of economic security for the masses, however, the current use of the organic model is required to explain the occurrence of poverty in the eye of abundance, and institutional racism under conditions of complementarity. Since it is technology that has ever and again aimed at universal progress, the systems tensions of poverty and inequality could possibly erupt into challenges against the given control of technology and the mode of private capital utilization. It is just these conflicts which the organic model seeks to avoid; for any threat to society's integration and equilibrium by itself can upset the conditions for further progress. Consequently the disequilibriums between man and his environment are perceived as situations of need and the threatening struggle over who controls technocracy becomes absorbed into the provision of human satisfactions, i.e., needs, goods and jobs.

And so we find the meaning of "need" to be associated with the organic concepts of "function," "equilibrium" and "adaptation" in the following manner:

1) There are certain vital functionings of society that are failing to bring full satisfaction to every individual or to the collective whole;
2) "Abnormal demands" or pressures from these felt-needs disturb the stability and integration of society;

3) The social environment can provide only certain "goods" and "services," i.e., opportunities, without radical restructuring and instability;

4) The "systems needs," therefore, lie in the successful correlation of the individual's needs with the systems opportunities, e.g., through "assimilation" and "accommodation";

5) Thus the systems "dysfunctions," those threats to the integration, regularity, stability and permanence of the system, are attacked by adapting the dissatisfied individuals through an open access to "opportunities" and by increasing their capacity to utilize such "opportunities."

In this manner, the organic model simultaneously alleviates the human condition of those whom progress has passed by and secures its own chances for still further disequilibrating progress. From this viewpoint the measure of humanity becomes the organic "balance of functions" enabling all men to be satisfied, their needs and desires fulfilled. Therefore awareness of racial and economic discrimination, the past failures of the system to reach full complementarity, raises middle class America's consciousness to accept poverty as a social problem, as a problem of systemic inequality, incompatible with democracy. However, consciousness of lags and imbalances, so easily filled with commodities and services, does not reflect upon the foundation of disparity on which the system operates. Indeed, as countless students of Marx have described, gaps in the economic system, those of unequal control and ownership of capital and land, exist on purpose therein forcing the worker to sell his labor in order to avoid his own extinction. Now it appears from what I have said that the organic system sows the seeds of its own destruction: in pursuit of disequilibrating progress
the organic model fails to direct itself to radical restructuring which alone would remove the contradictions of disparity. We must ask, therefore, how threatening the pressures of the "underprivileged" are and if the "remedial efforts" of the systems planner might be the result of other causes? These are the issues now to be explored.

Habermas has noted that

open conflicts about social interest break out with greater probability the less their frustration has dangerous consequences for the system. The needs with the greatest conflict potential are those on the periphery of the area of state intervention. . . . Conflicts are set off by these needs to the extent that disproportionately scattered state interventions produce backward areas of development and corresponding disparity tensions, 7

i.e., disproportional allocations between the military-industrial complex and the urban stagnation and poverty problems. While this technique, as Habermas has described, removes the real conflict of the traditional class struggles over the ownership of production and private capital to a state of latency and places instead the "underprivileged" in the conflict zone, it in no way disposes of the threat of conflict. However, since the eruptions of the "have-nots" are fragmented into many parts, such conflict groups never really threaten to overthrow the system. Moreover these "underprivileged" and "unwanted minorities" sink far below the position of the traditional worker class as the system has itself denied them access to or entry into the line of production. Their demands, while sometimes violently expressed, present little direct threat to the systems order.

Their threats confront, instead, the consciousness of the liberal. In full force the "humanistic planner" strives to reform the "egalitarian ethic" in which "human needs" will come to dominate in the
removal of systemic "maladjustments." What is defined as a systems "dysfunction" for the poor or the minorities then becomes a systems function for the liberals. "Poverty," as Joseph Kershaw explained to the ASPO convention in 1966, "is a new business . . . and poverty planning is even more novel."8. Thus we find that "the poor" have become estranged from their individual subjective conditions and needs as they are simplified, categorized, quantified and objectified in the eyes of the poverty expert. The rationalization of the poverty process becomes a specialized field in which "the poor" and the planners are related through their reciprocal needs. Defining "the poor," "the have-nots," or "the underprivileged" in terms of insufficiently satisfied needs allows the planner to provide for their satisfaction through the acquisition of goods and services.* Defining "the depressed" or "the dependent" in terms of a failure of purpose or motivation in goal achievement proposes that planners be the mediators of training in skills and cooperation to enable their full participation in the act of production.† Subordinated to the production process, "the poor" have first been discarded as of useless and inefficient value and then later repaired through programs of "human renewal" to achieve some form of production and value if only as ends for the expanded needs of the poverty planners. Is it not difficult to see how "the useless" could be subject to radical change within the same system that has antecedently defined their use as unnecessary or, at best, marginal?

*See Need₁, Need₂, Need₃ above.
†See Need₄ and Need₅ above.
### Configuration of the Organic Model:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Order + organic system</strong></td>
<td>(urban organism, natural community, organic society)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organic process</td>
<td>(life-process, growth, development, decay, degeneration, thrombosis, circulation, specialization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organic interdependence</td>
<td>[order of the whole, organic unity, equilibrium, balance, adaptation, continuous adjustment, coordination, cooperation, mutual (adaptation/instrumentality/stimulation/interdependence/integration/influence), direct relations, interactions, collective effort, team work, subordination, harmonious relationships]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organic system</td>
<td>+ [city survival, society's (improvement/success)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organic change</td>
<td>= [creative evolution, dynamic balance, balance between functions, change in (function/purpose), responsiveness]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorder + system dysfunctions</td>
<td>(functional lag/minority problems/social pathology/city stagnation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>system needs</td>
<td>= need$_1$/need$_2$/need$_3$/need$_4$/need$_5$/need$_6$/need$_7$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>need$_1$</td>
<td>= aspiration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>need$_2$</td>
<td>= equality of opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>need$_3$</td>
<td>= distributive justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>need$_4$</td>
<td>= human renewal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>need$_5$</td>
<td>= community development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>need$_6$</td>
<td>= urban redevelopment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>need$_7$</td>
<td>= conservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ideal of progress</td>
<td>+ (reformer/humanistic planning/remedial planning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reformer</td>
<td>: [caretaker of the idea of progress, faith in progress, tradition of service, awareness of future (possibilities/goals), utopian, sense of freedom, pragmatic orientation to betterment, setting aright the evils, noble purpose]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
humanistic planning = \{\text{conservation/achievement} \text{ of human values, human factors/problems/needs/values} \text{ dominate, responsibility toward mankind, egalitarian ethic, maximization of human satisfaction/social well-being, goal of individual dignity/highest and best development/fulfillment/highest (aspirations/capacities) of people}\}

remedial planning = \{\text{therapeutic planning, remedial social action, to cushion blow, ad hoc solutions, diagnose malady, systematic treatment, make (democratically/culturally) functional}\}

functional lag = \{\text{revolution of rising expectation, incoherent progress, residual issues of affluent society, (wastage/breakage) of competition, anachronism of poverty}\}

functional lag (the poor, slums) = \{\text{the have-nots, the disadvantaged, the downtrodden, the helpless, permanent lower class, backwash in the midst of wealth, the deprived, the depressed, those in (insufficiency/want), dependent persons}\}

slums = \{\text{isolationism/pressure against unwanted (minorities/in-migrants), urban-suburban polarization, racial-class schism, (political/residential) apartheid}\}

minority problems = \{\text{assimilation/integration/absorption/urbanization} \text{ difficulties, racial friction, crucible of change, (poverty, race) discrimination, underdeveloped}\}

Need_1 = \{\text{aspirations, wants, goods, purchasable items, services, acceptable living standards, decent homes, suitable environments, close gap between the poor and the rest, minimum family income, (adequacy/equality) in public services, learn means of earning the city's riches, antipoverty measures}\}

Need_2 = \{\text{equality of opportunity, ordered opportunity, wider choice, new freedom, self-help, help themselves, coping strategies, lifting out of poverty, gain a sense of potency, jobs for all, demolition of economic and cultural barriers, occupational mobility}\}
Need_3 = [distributive justice, optimum allocation of goods and services, justice of allocation of (wealth/knowledge/skills/social goods)]

social pathology = [network of social ills, social disorganization, hard-core problems, social maladjustment, abnormal demands, culture of (despair/resentment), unable to cope unaided, sick (society/communities/cities), urban headache, chronic despair, disabling conditions]

Need_4 = (human renewal, human enablement, master themselves, self-improvement, self-help, rehabilitation of people, influence behavior, knowledge of the rules of the game, change habits of people, positive discrimination, capacity to shape the future)

Need_5 = [community development, gain control over local aspects, growth in social (sensibility/competence), from minimum to maximum cooperation, local people make the most of their resources, participation, strengthen local social structure]

city stagnation = [physical (breakdown/stagnation), unstable form]

Need_6 = (urban redevelopment, reshape, renewal, reconstruct, rebuild, reconvert, remake, replan, repair, overhaul, convert, raze, clear, demolish, expand, slum elimination, slum exertation, slum clearance, mitigation of slums, arrest of blight, blight redirection, rejuvenate, revitalize, rehabilitate, redevelopment, relocate, restore, drastic change, accelerating change)

Need_7 = [conservation, stabilization, security enforcement, soundness, coherence, wholeness, wholly sound city, save the cities, new cities for old, rebirth, new bases on life, adaptation to new needs, system-maintenance, maintain equilibrium (voluntary/peaceful/free) revolutionary change]
REFERENCES: CHAPTER SIXTEEN


7 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, p. 108.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
PURPOSIVE SYSTEMS AND THE PROCESS MODEL

SYSTEMS PERSISTENCE AND ACCOMODATION: RATIONAL PROCESS PLANNING

The process model assumes that the nature of the model's structure is constantly changing and therefore focuses attention on the interaction between components and the consequent state of structural adjustment or accomodation. The process model moves away from the descriptive analysis of the mechanical model and the functional analysis of the organic model to stress instead the method of systems accomodation and organization, the intent or purposes of the system, the fluid interplay of systems changes, feedback and modifications. On the
organization level the process model stresses the mechanisms of arriving at decisions, of comprehensively relating all the influences and forces that maintain the system in equilibrium. Order thus depends upon what can be "manageably known" and optimal processes of action become a function of rational modes of analysis and prediction of choice and value preferences. The process planner finds himself concerned with the efficient organization and smooth functioning of the urban system and the process of rational efficient decision- and policy-making that necessarily accompany the systems operations. The comprehensiveness and complexities of the urban process model eventually demand the use of computers and other rationalized procedures. In turn, the availability of computers and rational techniques had produced the prior conditions for more complex and comprehensive models. Thus the city and the city resident become the manipulable objects of rational principles of organization.

In this chapter I want to explore the managerial and organizational aspects of the problems of systems persistence and accommodation before turning to explore, in the next chapter, the political system of rational behavior, i.e., rational action implies normative principles of behavior. Here I shall first review some textual descriptions of the city as process and the process of planning before turning to the configuration and intentions of the process system of instrumental action.

THE TEXTUAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS MODEL

The city as process:

A city is process. Not a process... but a constant series of motions, actions and events. It is process in itself. The city is in constant flux, always going but never arriving. This process,
the city, is a combination of forces. . . . Our problem is to represent the forces which create the city. The total form is a structural process . . . composed of forces in action. . . . These forces are organized according to the dictates of the conceived functions, the potential functions and the possible functions of the structure as a totality. [We must] abandon our earlier oversimplified conceptions of social, economic and political order. [New] social theory . . . is seeking the deeper understandings that find order in the interactions, rather than the action, of diverse social forces."

This implies a "new conception of order." The "city as a process state" is "a living, cyclical organism." We are developing a "growing appreciation of the organizational complexities marking the societal systems that the city mirrors." Our attention is being "re-directed from the form of the city to the processes that relate the interdependent aspects of the city one to the other. . . . The city system [means that] effective intervention and willful change are improving."3

The city parts are "functionally interlocking and interdependent" . . . [we can] distinguish the urban subsystems by their economic and social functions . . . by the roles they play and the purposes they serve . . . each subsystem is being seen as open to the flows of information, money and goods from other subsystems it depends upon. The stability, growth, and efficiency of each is being understood to depend upon the complex self-organizing and self-regulating processes through which flows between subsystems are modulated and adaptation to environmental change is accomplished.

"This involves . . . new conceptions of system structure and behavior."4 We must develop new methods of "coordination . . . integrative linkage[s] between individual and group activities . . . intuitively or consciously purposeful . . . automatic, semi-automatic or deliberate mechanisms . . . vital function[s] of rendering operative the complex of separate and specialized activities . . . [the] justification [lies in an] adequate delineation of this network of causative interconnections.5

"Isolating of phenomena is not the aim but rather the tracing of the effects of their interrelationships."6 We must seek a "causal analysis" of these effects.
The city has an extremely complex social system... each aspect lies in a reciprocal causal relation to all others, such that each is defined by, and has meaning only with respect to its relations to all others... The result of this broadened conception of the city system... implies that we can no longer speak of the physical city versus the social city versus the social city or the economic city or the political city or the intellectual city.

The process of planning: A "problem orientation identifies issues with component urban processes... each process is partially independent and in continual self-adjustment as well as change in response to external forces. The problems of some processes are self-correcting; those of many are self-reinforcing."

If comprehensive planning... is to be regarded... as a way of thinking through simultaneously a complex, nonhierarchical, and interdependent constellation of parts, then the methods of investigation and implementation should respect these characteristics.

"In this way comprehensive planning can be thought of as the articulation of an outline of probable future interactions among imperfectly analyzed variables."

The concept of human environment has several dimensions other than physical which are linked by a high degree of interaction and interdependence... [We need] to comprehend those linkages to other dimensions that influence the outcome of a given strategy... The arching concept [is] comprehensive environmental planning and development... a field in which each of its dimensions... physical, social, economic, psychological... plays an interdependent and interacting role.

Planning serves to relate the components of a system. In order to allow decision-makers to choose rationally among alternative programs, the planner must detail fully the ramifications of proposals. In a world of imperfect knowledge this requirement must be balanced with that of action.

Many planners are therefore searching for an action-shaping approach to planning and deciding that might succeed in those fields where the traditional end-stating approaches cannot. Most of these explorations are trying to develop methods for formulating some types of programmatic, goal-directed courses of action.
"This implies the formulation of generally stated goals conceived more as directions of travel than as end states." 

"The entity for which planning is undertaken ... will typically consist of interrelated parts generally in flux. Any action has consequences that add additional reverberations to such a system."

It is not enough to "draw a picture" of the desired future city and then try to adjust each short-range program to somehow conform to this picture. The processes of private ... public action-reactions ... must be systematically traced through future time and evaluated. ... [This means] comprehending the city in dynamic process, ... not static configuration.

To be comprehensive [planning] must [therefore] be conceived as a self-regulating process of concept-action-modification-concept. It is in a measure a circular movement without beginning and without end, in which the process continuously redefines the nature and form of the product, and the product modifies the process.

COMPREHENSIVE RATIONAL MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION

Efficiency and rational action:

Efficiency and rational action [are ultimate objectives of planning, i.e.,] reducing waste or producing the greatest return from employment of resources, [and] optimum allocation[s]. ... Efficiency thus is measured in terms of the purpose it serves. ... Rationality is sometimes conceived as (a.) referring to increasing the reasonableness of decisions, and sometimes as (b.) involving full knowledge of the system in question.

"Purpose of planning [is therefore] to benefit the human element of the total object by helping to overcome conflict and waste in the functioning of the whole." 

"Professionaism ... [always involves] specialization, the defining of limits of individual and group interest and activity in order to facilitate efficiency ... be it for thoroughness or for productivity."

"Administrative efficiency" is a matter of concern for the
"Great Society." "The Great Society" is to be the "Efficient Society." "Efficiency analysis techniques," "performance tests," "the drive for evaluation of the effectiveness of . . . service programs" are all part of the plan.

Through city planning a coordination of . . . programs could take place which would prevent overlap and thus inefficiencies, and provide increased amenities in communities at no higher costs than current expenditures, or even with savings. . . . Great successes of city planning [therefore] lie in this area of coordination of diverse public policies and resulting efficiencies and improvements of amenity.

"Planning . . . a continuous process of programming government activity."

Planners . . . [have] a new assignment: to use planning methods as a way of coordinating intergovernmental programs and policies . . . [with a] clear interest in trying to get more orderly administration of these grant-in-aid programs, the federal government has begun to assign important coordination functions to metropolitan planning agencies.

"There will be greater need for and application of powerful rationalized methods for assigning program priorities, for evaluating program progress, and for terminating or modifying programs when they no longer merit high priority."

Systems Approach: "Coordination is correlation . . . more recently, the terms systems approach and systems engineering [have been] used to describe the higher levels of coordination required in complex groupings of many interdependent parts." The "systems approach" has been "synthesized and crystallized in comprehensive planning." Indeed "systems engineering," "management service," and "comprehensive planning" are coequal concepts.
The theory of systems, which is the basis of rational planning, seeks precisely to bring sense and order to the most turbid question. It calls for consideration of all factors and interactions pertaining to a problem. It demands that all forces which bear upon the problem should be assembled, evaluated, and organized in order to reach a solution.

Therefore, "the synthetic, organizing role of city planning, which once might have been dismissed as 'holistic' nonsense or Bergsonian mysticism, becomes, in a world of expanded technical possibilities, a valuable approach." "Thus there will be more rationalization of activities for planning, guiding and controlling the development and operation of region-wide activities and of new cities." This "call for greater comprehensiveness in the practice of planning will continue; comprehensiveness in scope of subject matter, geographic scale, time scale, and in the roles that planning discharges."

SCIENTIFIC LEGITIMATIONS

Attributes of a science: "Chief attributes of a 'science' are:

1) a clearly defined scope, 2) a method of analysis . . . conform[ing] to the general standards of scientific method . . . and 3) some body of 'received doctrine,' a basic set of laws or principles accepted as 'true.'" Another "measure of a science" is its "ability to predict."

Planning is in the primary, or analytical stage of science, endeavoring to reduce the elements of disorderly phenomena to mathematical order. That the planner has not . . . the slightest idea what his numbers mean . . . or what they signify . . . or what to do with them except accept them as 'facts' does not invalidate the method. . . . [He is] trying to get together the information necessary for a rational approach to a highly complex problem.

Mobilize scientific knowledge: "Reliance on the use of scientific knowledge is, of course, a main feature of professionalism." "Can we agree that the prime issue of our time, stated in pristine simplicity,
whether we can mobilize vast, proliferating knowledge in science, social science, the humanities and geometrically accelerating technology to human ends?"37 "The resulting marriage of the social sciences and the planning profession holds . . . promise that a new level of intelligence will be merged with noble purpose."38 This will ensure that planning will be "predominantly universalistic, affectively neutral, collectivity-oriented and functionally specific, as well as achievement oriented."39

Planners "for the most part [are] not scientists. The practice of scientific pursuits requires a patient acceptance of the ordering of the universe which is far removed from the insistent urge to restructure and reshape."40 But "planning [today is] . . . expected to make use of rational-technical means of arriving at decisions . . . [and to] buttress rational decisions with technical information."41 "A planner [therefore is] . . . a person who believes in using the best available information and talent to attack the problems of urbanism."42

Normative insurance: "Competence in the positive aspects of the sciences [moreover] strengthens competence in the normative aspects."43 The scientist-politician-planner

mirrors the special character of science. . . . He has learned to doubt; to question his beliefs, his data, and his findings; to submit his conclusions to critical evaluation by his peers, to tolerate uncertainty and ambiguity . . . to bear the frustrations of not knowing, and of knowing he does not know; and by far the most important, to adopt the empirical test for validity. . . . It is the new injection of the scientific morality into urban policy-making that makes the saturation of scientific talent into urban affairs a happy event . . . . Those in the information- and planning sciences may help to eliminate the most negative consequences of partisanship and ignorance;44

"to exercise independent judgment on the basis of accurate and objective facts and to transcend emotions and personalities in taking positions."45
A scientific proposition is one that can be proved fallacious by comparing it with the empirical world, and thus a scientist constantly shuttles between his hypothesis and his data, between the model he constructs and the pattern he observes. The analogous process is the evaluation of plans.46

"Planning will become a continuous process . . . frequently revised . . . proceeding from early assumptions based upon informed judgement through testing, adaptation and refinement as new data becomes available and as analytical methods are improved."47

Objective facts: "The planner needs, above all, empirically derived knowledge of the processes of social and cultural change in which he is perforce intervening."48

The information supplier, whatever his motives and methods, is therefore inevitably immersed in politics. . . . Our facts are instruments of change. To play the role of scientist in the urban field is also to play the role of intervener, however indirect and modest the interventions may be.49

Failure to develop a science of community planning "results from failure of planners to reach agreement on a set of concrete and measurable objectives. . . . Objectives [must] be non-controversial . . . objectives should be reduced to measurable quantities so that they provide an empirical test of the extent of improvement to be sought."50

"Only when criteria are stated in objective form can alternative means be reliably compared, with assurance that the means selected are directed toward the same goals."51 Planners must therefore "increase our knowledge about communities, improve our techniques of analysis, and propose effective alternatives that could overcome the deficiencies which we see in current urban and metropolitan development."52
Modern complexities require the use of the computer: "The problems of metropolitan growth and development are 'many-bodied' problems which are best handled through extensive computations on high speed computers."53

A combination of circumstances . . . size of our population, complexity of the social welfare programs . . . powerful and esoteric techniques of planning and implementing these programs, and an insufficiency of highly skilled professionals to do all that needs to be done, will drive us toward and increasingly rationalized society in which the computer plays a powerful role.54

"Given the increasing complexity of society, if we are to avoid social disaster we must have long lead-time planning and be confident of its implementation."55

The flow of information will receive a great deal of attention as a tool for policy coordination. . . . A common data base of population and economic projections, monitoring the impact of many public programs, and maintaining current information on the social and economic character of the community56 will be useful policy resources. Planning's objective thus becomes one of "market aid or replacement." It is "a vehicle which collects, analyzes, and publicizes information . . . required to make reasoned decisions."57 This "central intelligence function [of the planning agency becomes] . . . the pulse-taking function."58 "Data systems . . . [will] meter the state of affairs of various population groups, economy, municipal fisc, the physical plant."59 "Diagnostic surveys" will provide "new linkages between different kinds of public investments."

The circle of logic: "One of the continuing objectives of the planner is to bring the conduct of public affairs within the circle of logic."60

The planner should most assuredly be one of the men whose opinions are based upon reason. . . . His job is made more difficult by the growing influence of nonlogical decisions in the formation of public opinion. . . . If logic plays an ever-diminishing part in the determination of public policy and action, neither planning or political democracy can long survive.61
PURPOSIVE RATIONAL PLANNING

Problem-solving: So too, we find that the "planning process refers . . . to problem analysis"; "planning . . . is the initial or guiding step in the process of problem-solving." "Today the experts and technicians in our cities cry out against the complacency which allows social and economic problems to go unsolved." "Planning is fundamentally merely deciding in advance, either tentatively or definitely, actions to be undertaken at some future date. . . . [It is] . . . a systematic approach to problem-solving": "our society emphasizes technology and science as the most efficacious means for solving problems. . . . [This focus] will result in greater emphasis on and attraction to rationalized procedures for dealing with the issues society poses." Technology moreover offers rational techniques for choice making: these choices which constitute the planning process are made at three levels: first, the selection of ends and criteria; second, the identification of a set of alternatives consistent with these general prescriptive, and the selection of a desired alternative; and, third, guidance of action toward determined ends.

Rational goals: "Planning incorporates a concept of a purposive process keyed to preferred, ordered ends." The "emphasis of purpose over function [indicates a] great underlying revolution." "Purposes" are "end-directions," they are "trends not reaches," "a direction not a location," "an ideal," "a value to be sought after." "Planning involves the conscious selection of goals," and "the process of establishing and meeting goals." "Planning, [as] an end-directed process, is therefore future oriented."
city planner may hinge on the remoteness of promised results, as with
the clergy."\textsuperscript{74} "Plans are always forward looking: they are attempts
to get future human events to conform to predetermined patterns."\textsuperscript{75}
Because we are "torn by increasing desire for social security,
stabilized business cycle, and in general as little risk as possible...
[we find] this can be achieved only by anticipatory action."\textsuperscript{76}

"The most important thing about plans [however] are the goals
they seek to fulfill."\textsuperscript{77} The planning "process rests upon a precept
of our democratic system which rightly insists that the means are
equally important as the ends. The process as well as the goals
[therefore] must be consistent with our democratic traditions."\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{Rational choice:} "Planning stresses exercise of choice as its charac-
teristic intellectual act."\textsuperscript{79} As such, planning "research may focus
... [on the] detection of community goals and attitudes." It may
"sensitize policy-makers to types of goals or ends which had not been
previously considered ... [and] make clear the contradictions or
problems involved in attempting to achieve goals ... [or an]
analysis of the best means of reaching goals."\textsuperscript{80} "The comprehensive
planner must assume that his community's various collective goals can
somehow be measured ... and welded into a single hierarchy of
community objectives."\textsuperscript{81} "The identification of a best alternative
implies a need for operational criteria for such choices."\textsuperscript{82} "Each of
these choices requires the exercise of judgement; [for] judgement
permeates planning."\textsuperscript{83}

Reasonable choice "is best attained by bringing to bear on every
decision the greatest amount of relevant information concerning the
ramifications of all alternatives," i.e., establishing "a goals-
achievement matrix." This focus on planning criteria . . . [offers] the basis for rational
selection, . . . of the level of living the people want and of the
goals for community development. [There is] a chronic and gaping
need for adequate planning criteria to guide the judgements of
legislators, administrators, judges, builders, and bankers, land-
scape architects, and planners and consumers, and "the analysis of these goals from the standpoint of the wishes,
needs, and resources of the community, with reference to their
mutual compatibility, their order of priority, their implications and
probable consequences." "Values are inescapable elements of any rational decision-
making process." It is only when the broad, and often conflicting,
values are translated into operational terms that society can begin to
make choices." The planner's role "is to identify distribution of
values among people, and how values are weighed against each other."

Values exist in a hierarchy. The hierarchical relation of
values provides a means for whatever testing of values is
possible. . . . Knowledge of gaps between desired and predicted
conditions may suggest the nature of further controls needed.
. . . The planner deals with values to discover which future
conditions are presently desired and which may be desired by
future clients . . . But once a particular set of values con-
cerning the future is posited, knowledge of facts is needed to
determine the relative weight of a particular value.

There are at least three processes the planner may employ to
resolve value conflict and efficiently attain plural goals.
First, assigning exchange prices to several goals permits their
joint pursuit. Second, posing alternatives, analyzing ramifi-
cations, and disseminating information contribute to effective
bargaining between proponents of contending values. Third,
rendering value meanings explicit provides common grounds for
appraisal.

The final product of the value formulation stage of planning should
be alternative sets of objectively measurable goals and criteria.
Objective measures are prescribed first because they limit the
possibility of abuse through arbitrary decision. Second . . . the
ends must be achievable.
"Any theory of planning must [in the end] be valid for any kind of political matrix and must not be dependent for its truth on any particular political system or the ideas on which that system may be based." \(^9\)

"On what basis can planning . . . presume to be a superior rationality? . . . Individual value is so ingrained in our view of rationality that we have difficulty making social value the starting point for a definition of rationality." \(^9\) "We cannot deny rationally the logic of organized forethought, [although] there are within us as human beings certain conscious and unconscious antipathies to planning and some of its implications for our lives." \(^9\) However, "rationality is more highly valued by the planner than by his constituents." \(^9\) "An individual's well-being is measured by: a) his absolute stock of valued entities; b) divergence of his stock from his own goals . . . and c) divergence of the stock of valued entities from a level set by others." \(^9\) But man finds that enjoyment brought on by additions to those goods and services already held pales with possession of increasing amounts . . . . Actors vary in their preferences . . . [which] complicates the allocation problem in society. . . . [Even more] man will doubtlessly continue to operate somewhere in the realm of bounded rationality, rather than reach perfect rationality. \(^9\)

**STRATEGIC ACTION: CHOICE AMONG PROGRAMS**

"The policy-clarification function": "The urban-policy sciences" holds its service to be in "providing . . . administrative and political figures with the sorts of data . . . they need to make decisions as rationally as possible; and to monitoring the effectiveness of programs when implemented." \(^10\)
Policy planning ... [thus involves] the formulation of goals and the development and cataloguing of effective policies for many goals in all subject areas of interest to cities and other planning clients. ... Once developed these catalogs will constitute the basic technical contribution to the planning process. 101

"Policy making [provides] general directions or courses of actions to be established in the interest of the general public." 102 "Policy decisions ... [see to it that] judgments ... are based on values and on political and other interest positions." 103 The outcome of these decisions is "a set of policy instruments," 104 "a time phased, sequenced set of governmental policies and programs for public and private action." 105

"The essence of planning is policy and the essence of democratic planning is choice." 106 But the real question lies in the process which will "yield more rational public policies within a democratic framework." 107

Policy planning ... [tries] to urge more wholesome relationships between the planner and democratic authority ... to meet more effectively the growing desire of people to participate in the settling of directions pursuant to their own views and understanding of their needs and aspirations. 108

But "the growth of separate planning centers will pose formidable problems of management and coordination." 109 Moreover "planning will be a fully accepted function of society ... [only] when planning knowledge can be brought to bear upon policy decisions made outside the official family." 110

If public planning is not as effective as current knowledge and techniques permit ... the fault lies with public management. ... Planning ... is possible [therefore] only when management has authority over that which is planned for, and only when management has some reasonable capacity to effectuate its planning decisions." 111
"Planning and decision theory": An alternative . . . or is it?  "Planning is a kind of decision-making, one that has come into being in part to fill gaps left by other kinds of decision-making, and one that takes on special requirements as a result of accepting this task." Planning is "a process of facilitating better decision-making." and "planning . . . must not be separate." But we must distinguish decision-making from planning: the former is usually restricted to choices among given alternatives, whereas we see the latter as a process incorporating the formulation of ends, as well as ways of identifying and expanding the universe of alternatives.

A change in society's attitudes about planning heralds [this] shift in emphasis from monitoring, guiding, and coordinating ["response" planning] to more dynamic efforts to use public and private decisions to shape and direct the development of the environment in ways which will achieve stated objectives.

[But] "decision" is not always equivalent to choice. Choice is the act of choosing one preferred item from among several possibilities, and is made with a view to action. . . . Decision need not involve action, and because it can be independent of action, it need not involve the future.

We must consequently "distinguishes between plan-making and planning as an institutional way of reaching decisions and as the guiding process in a long chain of decision-making by people over a long period of time. Occasional crystallization into plans is only part of the process." The tactic of programming [is an] alternative to program-making or plan-making. It calls for the installation of decision-aiding processes that might never yield a formal program. . . . Rather, it would support the incremental, multi-centered processes of deciding and acting; but it would expand the probabilities that these decisions and actions would be taken more rationally.

There is a new togetherness among the many players in the urban-policy game. . . . This growing pluralism among the pros is being paralleled by increasing diversity in the population at large and by ever-more complex relations among the many governments, agencies, and firms that take actions affecting those populations. . . . The number of
decision centers are increasing, the networks of influence among publics and decision centers are becoming more intricately woven; and, hence, the decision rules are getting more complicated. In this context of ever-increasing ambiguity and pluralism among open, self-organizing and self-regulating systems, then, what sort of planning strategy is most likely to work? 

PROGRAMMING STRATEGY

Courses of action: Another service of the policy sciences is "programming strategy"; i.e., "programatic, goal-directed courses of action." Planning, by definition, is "to intervene in what might be regarded as the normal course of change . . . [and] purposefully to guide it in new directions." Plans will be programatic . . . [therefore if they involve an understanding of] the nature of changes, the underlying forces which influence them and the kinds of change which are consistent or inconsistent with each other . . . The planning process should then try to guide the direction and the rate of change in accord with the general strategy evolved in the plan.

Planning's "purpose [consequently] is the continual formulation of the best technical solution for realizing agreed-upon objectives"; "and the selection of the most efficient and acceptable means for attaining them." "Planning thus represents the closest approximation we can reach to collective rational action."

Feedback: An aspect of "programming" must involve a "feed-back review function." "All good planning is in the nature of what is called 'feed back' in the field of communication engineering and the design of control apparatus. Planning [then] must be backed up by a continual reference to its own success." "The planning process can adjust to guide development much as the course of a missile is guided by a feedback of information on its deviation from a projected course." Planning
can offer "a societal guidance system"; "a system [which] exerts a complex of multiple influences on the forces operative in society, . . . adding new component roles, altering the pattern of linkages, joining the components, or improving the functioning of components." The "planning process" must therefore be revised to include "built-in social science research and feedback." A "concept of an evolutionary planning-process which function[s] as a learning experience-communication-feedback-control basis in which each stage builds on previous work in a continuously adaptive sequence."

"Prediction and control are [thus to be viewed as] complementary." "Analyzing and inventing devices of social control [consequently] affect[s] the attainment of social goals." Research which "focus[es] on social controls . . . [therefore affects] the devices . . . [which] modify the underlying forces of urbanism in the direction of accepted goals." Cost-Benefit Analysis: "Programming" is both "the process of selecting among alternative programs over time and from among varying rates of investment that are financially feasible." "Rational planning" involves "a process for determining appropriate future action by utilizing scarce resources in such a way as to maximize the expected attainment of a set of given ends." "In addition to predicting efficiency effects of alternative actions, we may also be able to predict distributions of benefits and costs to the various public that would be affected." "Benefit-cost analysis . . . makes it possible to appraise a heterogeneous array of proposals against a common set of criteria." Therefore "planners should be more effective investment counsellors to their legislatures." "Decisions on these investments" physical and social
environment "demand the most deliberate efforts to improve rationality."
This requires that the "distribution of the benefits and costs . . . [he] consciously intended and democratically warranted . . . [that] levels and priorities of investments are so staged as to induce the desire repercussions . . . that public resources are used for" projects with "the highest social payoffs." \(^{19}\)

Individual programs thus optimized are then analyzed collectively and optimization takes place at successively higher levels [where] continual analysis of alternative cost-benefit relationships and effective trade-offs between program elements are developed. Feedback is presumed to be built into the system . . . . It puts heavy emphasis on suboptimization of individual functional systems as an essential part of achieving broader optimization. \(^{14}\)

"Analytical concepts emphasizing the concepts of marginality and differential incidence become paramount to the planner's kit of methodological tools." \(^{14}\) "The planner owes it to the people to provide such [cost-benefit] accounting if for no other reason than the fact that the availability of real alternatives is essential to the concept of freedom." \(^{12}\)

Simulation techniques: "The processes of private . . . public actions and reactions . . . must be systematically traced through future time and evaluated." There is thus a direct need for "experimental simulation models [to] monitor and analyze the various interrelations that tie the city's subsystems together." \(^{14}\) "Decision models . . . simulate what would happen if given policies were adopted . . . and thus . . . pretest . . . alternative courses of action." \(^{14}\) "The focus is on 'planning' models, as opposed to purely predictive devices. . . . What is sought is an instrument for more thoroughly exploring the consequences of alternative public and private actions." \(^{16}\)
An idealized urban intelligence center, an effective city planning agency, [would be] oriented to improving theory and action. . . . Such an intelligence center would seek to describe and explain what is going on, to report on stocks and flows, and to identify cause-and-effect relations. Using simulation-type techniques, it would try to predict . . . [alternative] course-of-action[s] . . . and to trace the repercussions of those actions . . . By thus feeding-forward predictions of likely outcomes, the center would inevitably become an agent of change . . . [It would help] design . . . targets . . . programs . . . and prearranged strategies. 146

We can expect very substantial increases in the knowledge needed to understand and manipulate society and to alter its institutions . . . and complex models to simulate the behavior of men and institutions. 147

We will need "new conceptions of system structure and behavior . . . [and] new understanding of how decisions get made." 148

The computer . . . becomes the core component conceptually and organizationally . . . Computers are especially useful for dealing with social situations that pertain to people in the mass . . . [they] will induce planners of all phases of human activity to invent a society with goals that can be dealt with in the mass rather than in terms of the individual . . . [There will be] an effort to remove the variabilities in man's on-the-job behavior and off-the-job needs . . . because . . . their non-statistical nature . . . complicate production and consumption. . . . Increasingly the attempted solutions to social problems will be statistical solutions, partly because the aggregate needs of such large numbers of people lend themselves to statistical solutions and partly because the techniques for defining as well as solving those problems [are based on] statistical methods and "world views" of the social technicians. . . . The computer . . . [is] the basis of and the opportunity for this increased rationalization. [It will] . . . push and pull this society toward increasing rationalization." 149

"Individual behavior [is a] friction to be overcome in administration."

Naturally, planning and policy people will be attracted to institutional arrangements which would remove these impediments [i.e., those who refuse to give information, redirect programs and obscure the results] to systematic planning and its systematic implementation. Rationalization and particularly the vast capacities of the computers . . . will be more attractive to those whose farsighted plans are blocked by shortsighted, indifferent, or contrary human beings with other less inclusive
plans to implement. This will give further impetus to the trend toward centralized decision-making, planning and operations management, for the resources needed to bypass present barriers are the same ones which can be more effectively used by centralized planning personnel reaching out through their computers and related techniques.\textsuperscript{15}

[The] inability of institutions to change as fast as their roles in society require, plus the need to give occupational self-respect and income to... mediocre professionals displaceable by computers, will encourage the persistence and proliferation of nonrationalized patterns of behavior... [thus indicates a] separation or tension between operating missions, life styles, and social roles for those institutions and individuals in highly rationalized activities compared to... nonrationalized ones.\textsuperscript{15}

The conservation of the highly skilled will encourage rationalization in another way... there will be increasingly extensive use of technicians and subprofessionals to do the nonessential work of the professional... The aide role will be used along with the computer to lighten the burdens of many professions, especially at the top... [This] will require a careful breakdown of the essentialities and nonessentialities of skills and procedures within the professional task [i.e., increased rationalized activity].\textsuperscript{15}

Now that the computer can manipulate as many variables as necessary, "there will be increasing incentives for large-scale government support of such real life studies in which the computer's ability to simulate social data and process data are prerequisite: the poverty program, the extended education program... the nation's counter-insurgency ability."\textsuperscript{15}

In particular, the convergence of government funds, the computer, and the pressures to rationalize urban conditions will result over the years in longitudinal studies on individual and institutional change... such knowledge will significantly increase the ability to affect social change and thereby increase the capacity to rationalize many programs and projects.\textsuperscript{15}
THE INTENTIONS BEHIND THE PROCESS MODEL

The controlling description of process: The position which I want to clarify during the following exposition of the management and organizational aspects of the process model, is that technical interests clothed vaguely in a rationality model is a problematic assumption for many aspects of research and practice of city planning. Moreover this interest as well as providing a misplaced optimism based on normative rules for social intervention, i.e., stressing the means to the neglect of the ends, also commits the researcher-planner-manager to an internal viewpoint from which he can only support and accommodate the "social system" at large. This is achieved by following two different channels. First by adopting the liberal positivist's position which believes that conflicts are best explained through processes of rational decision-making and good judgment. This belief maintains, further, that law and order of the process system is determined through rationally structured and operated mechanisms. The universal value of reason becomes its essential stabilizing mechanism. This universal value, in turn, holds that man conducts himself rationally, that in all he does, chooses, values, or decides he does so in light of what is best for himself, which is coterminous with what is best for society. Thus the principle of rationality optimistically refuses to deal with the subjective world, it fails to see that men's actions are often turned against themselves and others; it refrains from looking outside its system of rational determination; instead the principle of rationality deals only with the measurable and testable, only within the system of quantifiable processes among men. In this form the process model reflects only a rational model
of reality, a distorted model, which assumes that men cooperate toward common ends, and that the means of arrival can be sufficiently directed by common knowledge and reason. Problems of choice and decision-making are consequently substantiated as technical problems, questions directed to the method of achieving action rather than the efficacy of such predetermined ends or directions.

The second mode of systems accommodation is determined, as opposed to the rational determiner, by social reality. Order must now be defined from the context of extremely complex and interactive situations: social and technical changes are occurring in rapid succession, with unknown ramifications, with multiple decision and planning components exploding the old hierarchical authority. However, the production and reproduction of rational decisions and actions is the basic factor of process planning and this depends upon conditions of stability and replicability. How then does the process model accommodate the new interactive situations and still maintain its objectives of rationality? First by systems of rational behavior, which will be explored in the next chapter, and second by abstracting the decision process above the arena of political conflicts over ends and by deflecting the real issues of the "neutrality" of the State by eliminating the questions of power.\textsuperscript{135} By focusing solely on more flexible methods of decision-making, e.g., as an explanation not an understanding of how decisions are made, more decision components and looser organizational arrangements of parts can be subsumed without drastically changing the systems direction. Indeed, variability and flux within predetermined realms are the key to the control mechanisms of the process model. Given the systems constraints, which limit decision-making to the pursuit of means, the process model views all
interactions as essentially directed toward the same rational ends, as if what was wrong with authoritative decision-making was solely grounded in the failure to involve enough participants and not that the decision mechanism was itself essentially distortive by equalizing and abstracting individual differences. Thus, adding more components and less authoritative directives merely facilitates new commitments in the same predetermined direction, i.e., "end-directions" are kept within well defined action areas. More voices are added but these are seen as quantitatively similar to earlier voices; matters of choice are therefore reduced to arithmetic tallies of value matrices and conflicts are viewed as bargaining processes. Thus the process model plays a defensive role of accommodation, failing to take a criticist standpoint, failing as Marcuse has stated to "disavow" the old system and establish a new; it nevertheless obtains legitimization by basing decision choices on a hierarchical structure of reified values and on a plurality sum of rational voices.

The distinctiveness of the planning process model lies in this approach to problem-solving; on one hand it brings to problem clarification and solution the methodology of the empirical sciences, while on the other hand it considers itself to be modeled after an open system susceptible to changes, redirections and reformulations. The difficulty lies in relating these two confrontations* for the interest of the former lies in explanation of cause and effects for the purposes of control and

*This is a renewal of Dilthey's 19th century discussions involving the "explanation" of nature and the "understanding" of the historical-social world. See: Karl-Otto Apel, p. 2.
prediction while the latter's interest lies in "emancipation" or the problem of self-understanding based upon reciprocal communication in the practical life world. The history of technical planning has shown the confusion between these two interests and displayed its progressive reliance on empirical reason while forfeiting reliance on any consideration of "practical" interests. In the realm of political problem-solving, as Habermas has shown, this allows the decision-making apparatus, the chief stabilizing mechanisms of the process model, in the extreme case, to be reduced to pure quantifiable form. Values guiding the choice process are no longer grounded in the practical world of the individual and are consequently removed from critical analysis. In the following I wish to point out the abstractness of the planning process model and its separation of value questions from the realm of the political dialogue.

The process model presents a system of interactive parts in various degrees of association. Assuming that elements have already been ordered into some arrangement it consequently focuses all attention on how the whole operates by accepting and adapting to external stimuli. The structure is assumed as modulated only by minor changes as it directs action toward special purposes and ideals. The model applied to planning reiterates these points; it conforms naturally to a universal rational order and works within this assumption toward systems maintenance through establishing rational decision mechanisms which play the role of system stabilizers.

"Process" means both an act of proceeding or advance and an event or operation which changes over time and may proceed toward an
end. It contains implicitly the concept of going forward, of procedural operations toward some goal. But it also contains the meaning of change or flux without the connotation of direction. It is in this latter aspect that "planning process" or the "city process" claims its essential meaning. Since the coupling of components is taken for granted, the problematic becomes action itself and stresses the problem of control mechanisms and stabilizers. It is at this point that causal analysis of changes, interrelationships, interdependencies are developed to explain how the system operates, i.e., its processes. But as purposive elements of change are considered the two meanings of "process" fuse and although the model claims to be open-ended or "end-directed" it becomes captive of predetermined pursuits or purposes implicit to its model of rationality.

The teleology of self-maintenance: "Self-organization," "self-correcting," "self-adjustment" are references to ideal internal maintenance or adaptation mechanisms, i.e., responses which dampen fluctuations and changes within the system. In a world of flux, these "self" operations work to return the system to stability and constancy and allow its pursuit of purposes. A. Grey Walter has pointed out that the introduction of the concept of purpose allows the causal relationships to become confused. What the system or function is for, i.e., what it stabilizes or regulates, becomes dominant over the causal arrangements within the system itself. Hence the system is accepted as a functioning whole to the discredit of the understanding of its determinative mechanisms. Internal corrections are either passive unreflective adjustments to external stimuli or judgments based upon evaluations of strategies or results of attainment. They are essentially
efforts of self-preservation aimed at the correction of directions and purposes rather than changes of structure. Every adaptive system carries within itself a decision-making process to allow it to make a series of changes towards or away from its target; hence notions of feedback are essential for corrective mechanisms to refine the search for end-directions or goal-directions.

At the societal level, the a priori plan or strategy becomes the instrument of correction, while political decision-mechanisms help to move us closer toward what planners now maintain are not goals but some rational "hidden agenda" or policy directives. In a highly automatic decision-process, social behavior must be conditioned to accept technical not normative orders which allow guidance through indirect stabilizing mechanisms which are assumed and accepted as valid and beneficial. Responsible behavior thus can be defined as adaptive and domesticated action. Social political constraints consequently hold the permissible systems adjustments within a realm of passive, near automatic, tunings, while feedback mainly comes from governmental voices and legitimate groups requesting program adjustment or providing new directions or new incentives to pull the system toward stability. A fully automatic process model would become homeostatic, internally containing all corrective mechanisms and hence eliminating the possibility of searching for new ends.

Purposive action: At the same time that planners are expounding on teleologically specified systems stability, they are searching to remove the final vestiges of purposive action as a predetermined or ideologically goal driven activity and replace it with the concept of purpose as an
objective scientific explanation of motives. Since planning goals are now end-directions which may never be reached they can no longer serve as the mystical pull toward a stated prize but instead must be viewed as the causal agitation which antecedently motivates a certain action along a path presumed to produce the desired effects. This same reasoning as Karl-Otto Apel has clarified assumes the aim of knowledge to be nothing but the objectivists' desire for causal explanation. Causal explanation assumes that specific outcomes can either be predicted from a given set of rules or by virtue of antecedent conditions. Teleological assumptions, on the other hand, destroy the technical ability to test future probabilities by objective methods of observation. However, "purposive rational action" or "success-controlled behavior" are based on the causal assumptions that there exists a set of technical rules that can either empirically control the physical environment or manipulate human behavior in specified ways. The planner's success at predicting alternatives and preferences depends upon such technical knowledge.

The claim for end-directions (antecedent push) as opposed to goals (ends) is reflected in the planner's vocabulary. Specifically we find that the meanings for "purposive action" seem to break down into Habermas' two definitions for "purposive rational action," i.e., either instrumental action or rational choice. First there are "instrumental action" terms such as "willful changes," "dictates of functions," "effective interventions" which imply some ability to make conditional predictions about observable events and second there are "rational choice" terms such as "assemble, evaluate, organize forces in order to
reach solutions" or "sought values" which reflect strategies based on decision rules or value preferences. Either form of purposive action assumes that it can objectively realize predefined goals under certain specified conditions. The argument thus seems to fall into the positivist's ideal which is to provide empirical explanations for actions and choice, i.e., rational action and choice, instead of teleological reasoning presuming mystical categories of purpose. But "purposive rational action" in no way obviates the planner from claims that goals or directions are not predetermined nor does it justify his acritical stance which neglects to understand through self-reflection what past goals still operate as idealistic or pre-determined ends, e.g., order, control and stability. Only if society holds some notion, consciously or not, of the directions in which it is going can "purposive reasoning" focus solely on the means; if on the other hand directions are debatable then it appears that "purposive action" must be centered on goal-determinations. What needs to be clarified within the theory of planning is that "actions," "means," "ends," "purposes," "projects," "purposes" and "interests" are all elements of the same system of concepts, or family of words, and that conscious focus on one element does not erase the implications or effects of the other elements. For example, jobs for the poor may appear as an end towards which planning programs may operate but at another level jobs for the poor can become a means for avoiding further urban violence; Public Housing may appear as a means for providing decent homes for Americans in poverty but at the same time under the controlling interests of the housing industry, it becomes the only end we can offer.
Scientization of Politics: For Habermas, the scientization of politics is the final stage in Weber's concepts of "rationalization." Power is now defined in terms of control and directives offered by new technologies and strategies. Systems Analysis and its component decision mechanisms offer objective rational choice and action to guide political strategies. The practical human decisions, once authoritatively directed by the politician, have now been usurped by the power of the technical decision-makers. The State has abandoned control to the technocrats in return for rational management and organization, i.e., efficiency. Human concerns of emancipation or repression, practical needs or social objectives are removed from political dialogue. In the technocratic model only the politician and the technician exchange advice and directives. The scientification of politics in its extreme form retracts public understanding of political policies based upon communication and mutual exchange of information among individuals in society and instead allows the scientific rational model of decision-making to dominate. Systems Analysis, driven by self-regulated computer programs controlling relationships between political, social and economic subsystems creates the new politics in which machines have absorbed the human base of rational action or choice. In the extreme case, systems engineering begins to denote models of persuasion, manipulation, domination and coercion.
THE INTENTIONS OF RATIONAL PROCESS PLANNING

A theory of society is rationalist when the practice it enjoins is subject to the idea of autonomous reason, i.e., to the human faculty of comprehending, through conceptual thought, the true, good, and the right. Within society, every action and every determination of goals as well as the social organization as a whole has to legitimate itself before the decisive judgment of reason and everything, in order to subsist as a fact or goal, stands in need of rational justification.¹⁰

I have traced before the planners' desire for legitimacy, i.e., certainty and exactness, from the rational scientific process and aspirations of respectability from rigorous and objective knowledge. I have also shown their adoption of Weber's idea of reason involving the mathematization of experience, scientific experimentation and verification, allowing for and promoting the development of a technically trained and organized managerial elite, i.e., the professionalization of planning. I wish to explore here two new problems of rationality, or rational action as it is often called, which arise as the idea of reason is shifted from its traditional human base towards a technical base. The first problem considers the framework of technical interests and its implications for research and action, while the second problem questions the assumption that there exists a continuum of rationality from practical to scientific knowledge and participation.

THE FRAMEWORK OF TECHNICAL INTERESTS

Instrumental action: The planning profession conceives of the "System" as an instrument of rationalization. Working from a technological-scientific base they promise social progress, i.e., faster distribution of goods and services and security of law and order, if only the social organization of the city or society is rationally, efficiently
maintained and ordered. This is an old position of the planning profession, but what appears as a new element is the level of commitment to and involvement with the State and the degree to which planner's reason and interests are expressed in terms of technical instrumentalities. It appears that we have reached a new point in history where problems of organization, distribution and administration seem paramount and in consequence we have allowed the technical sciences to achieve autonomy.

In the realm of problem-solving, as Antonio Gramsci has described,

no society sets itself tasks for whose solution the necessary and sufficient conditions do not already exist or are not at least in process of emergence and development; [and] . . . no society dissolves and can be replaced unless it has first developed all the forms of life implicit in its relation.\[12\]

Reflection, then, allows that the "Affluent Society" and the "Efficient Society" are one; that is that technology, being the means to affluence, will also be the means for achieving "more" equitable distributions through its own processes of rational management and organization.

These solutions are efforts both to heal the criticisms apparent in the concentrated allocations of technocracy's wealth and power and to reorganize the technical forces for a better defense of the structure. The urban renewal and poverty programs can thus be viewed as propaganda for certain modes of thought and problem-solving. Governmental planning intervention in the social sphere and efficiency requirements all go under the same banner, i.e., to preserve us against irrational dangers such as poverty among affluence and paradoxically, inefficiency among scarce resources, planned obsolescence and planned insufficiencies.
The base of social problem-solving thus finds itself thrust deeply into technical instrumentation, trusting administered decisions more than expressions of individual concerns, facts which are supportive of decisions made more than indications of misconstrued directives, new challenges and "new" changes more than historical determinations or genetic relations. Society will function best and social conflicts will best be resolved if society is rationally administered, technically controlled and procedurally operated. Thus, as Marcuse has pointed out, more and more areas of society become subject to rational treatment and as human reason is transferred to a technical base, it becomes the "logic of domination." Since technical instrumentality assumes man and nature to be "the mere stuff of control," no technical society can be above reproach in its use of technologies. The crucial question must be, not how to abolish machines and instruments, but how to allow a return to the human base of reason and how to relate technical rationality to human reason as both critic and amplifier of human interests.

The Ideology of Efficiency: At the bottom of the technical interest lies the ideology of means-end rationality. The aim of a purely rational process is efficient action, the economy of means to ends and the establishment of recipes of conduct avoiding disorder. Efficiency, by definition therefore, is aimed at the support of the status quo. Thus the process planners' decisions, their strategies, their choice of action are predetermined by the practical values of economization, integration, and automatization. Any rational action is consequently judged in terms of efficiency. Although efficient action may produce
moral implications, it must be kept in mind that judgments of efficiency remain essentially value-free.

Nevertheless rational process planning involves a position-taking. It requires the acceptance of universal economic ends such as were revealed in the War on Poverty. The War was launched not as a result of pressure from the poor, for the poor have no lobby, but as a recognition that piecemeal governmental attacks on poverty only scratched the surface of the problem, that only a full scale attack would eliminate the causes of poverty. But poverty becomes the stumbling block for efficient action. How is "opportunity" to be best organized and delivered? Can the poor effectively react to opportunity or must their behavior, that is the "culture of poverty," be modified so that they can capitalize on their "opportunities"? How were piecemeal efforts such as the Community Action projects, Urban Renewal, the Job Corps to be coordinated and related so that "program overlap" would be averted? How were separate means such as the Community Action Agencies to be routinized and instrumentally controlled so that their efforts would not fluctuate too greatly from the norm? Finally how could the War prove that its expenditures were effective and its programs evaluated as efficient action and so undo the strings that controlled the highly conditional budget appropriations? The problem was that the War on Poverty proved to be a not so efficient game.*

The valuation of "efficient action" thus forces researchers and policy planners into an unfortunate position. First of all their

*The projection of national figures for the Community Action Program alone reached to $30 or $40 billion; see James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy, p. 154.
programs and actions must be aimed at calculable efficiency; there must be measurable, not merely qualitative, improvement. But this requires the process planner to focus on ex post facto evaluations of a course of action, evaluation which is steered furthermore by the market concepts of "profitability." Process planners thus become social engineers focusing on the precising, reconstructing phase of knowledge to prove their rationality, i.e., efficiency. They consequently become ideologically dependent, as well as monetarily, if the two can be held separate, upon the valuations of the government or agencies who request their services and thereby force criticism outside of the framework of social action. The interests of efficient action become disguised under the belief that smoothly functioning organizations themselves increase the freedom available for society as well as individuals. This position, however, may be misplaced for it implies at the most that the basic motive of rational society must be an economical one.

THE CONTINUUM OF RATIONAL ACTION

As technical planning invades the political arena implicating new elements of rational choice and strategic action, it is time to stop to ask about the ideal model of rationality. Just what does "rational" mean, just what does it allow us to do or be? What should be classified as "rational planning" and what "irrational"? What is a "rationalized society"? Let us first consider, or reconsider, several definitions offered by the planners during the 1950's and 1960's as to what "rational action" constitutes:

1) Planning, future thinking, an acceptance of organized forethought, themselves mean "rational action" involving concepts of prediction, deliberation and projection.
2) A basic element of rational action involves the amount of information available for decision-making. If enough information is supplied, and this meaning assumes that "enough" is available, then decisions or choices are rational or reasonable. Concern for "rationalizing the urban condition" thus leads to pressure for longitudinal studies, data banks to store information and central intelligence systems to organize knowledge.

3) A similar meaning of rational action is based in systems theory, involving the extent to which full knowledge of the linkages and repercussions of the system under consideration is involved. This implies the ability to identify the best alternatives evaluated with respect to all ends; but it also presumes that full knowledge of all ends and means, interactions and alternatives is available and can be manipulated into hierarchical arrangements. Note that this definition of "rational action" comes very close to Max Weber's original definition.

4) Another meaning of rational action is reflected by the juxtaposition of "rational" and "procedures." Only if problem-solving relies upon technical-scientific means of arriving at decisions, establishing priorities or evaluations will planning action be rational.

5) Rationalization also means efficient organization and management of operations for planning, guiding and controlling. This implies that institutional arrangements should be logically ordered so that there exist no obstacles to complex programming, systematic planning and implementation, that the use of subprofessionals and aides and a careful breakdown of activities and skills be such as to enable the best skills to be allocated most effectively.

6) Rational planning means economic efficiency; the optimum distribution of costs and benefits for the highest social payoffs, the allocation of scarce resources to maximize ends.

7) Rational action also involves values, people's wants, and community goals. Planning then holds a superior "rationality" if it is based upon the knowledge of social values.

8) Thus rational action is collective action. Public policies become rational only if they occur within a democratic framework.

Whatever its various definitions, whether related to information, methods, organizational efficiency, etc., technical rationality seems to reduce human thought, consciousness, awareness and feelings to a reliance on technical abilities of problem-solving and organization. A problem
over these definitions occurs when they become involved with models of rational human action. Definitions of rational action on the abstract level of the planning process are one thing but when the process becomes involved with the participation of men and over considerations of rational choice and rational strategies implicating decisions based upon human needs and desires then the principles of rational action lead to reductive models claiming to describe certain aspects of men's actions. It is the entry of values and democracy into the rational model which prove problematic. As J. Kockelman has described, there are certain considerations dealing with the existential orientation of man toward the world which the scientific method cannot explain, "empirical science has to treat abstractly the fact that every concrete orientation toward the world is intentional, purposeful and of a typical finality."\(^{18}\)

The meaning of practical rationality, the rationality of human action, involves us directly with questions of contextually determined, e.g., traditional, emotional, or experiential, action. Is efficiency of organization to be the only value? What about notions of power sharing and broadening the base of participation in decision-making; how do these effect rational action? What about the principle that men do not often act rationally in their daily lives? The answer to some of these questions involves us directly with problems of rational choice and strategic decisions to which we shall now turn.

**Rational choice:** Planning action presupposes rational choice: choice between means, or among goals, selection of the most appropriate means or the most socially acceptable ends. The realm of values permeates
the problem of choice but in rational choice, the meaning of value is determined by what can be measurably known. To treat a value as a fact is necessarily to change the value, to set limits to what questions are asked about values. Judgments about values must necessarily stand in the full complexity and plurisignificance of the valuative context.

The objectivistic attitude, on the other hand, maintains that values exist in themselves as things to be manipulated, ordered and compared, as elements lifted out of their valuative human context of beliefs, emotions, experiences upon which they depend for meaning. Valuation, however, can not be interpreted as objective facts for values can never be complete; man never understands all that he values or why.

The planners' valuation schemes assume that values are universal, that every rational man knows basically what is right or wrong. Therefore, the planner can rationally appraise and order these values into hierarchies and matrices. Soon it is forgotten that we are dealing in the socio-historical world, we begin exchanging value-things instead of subjective desires, we begin to bargain among contending beliefs. The very idea of value exchange, however, becomes the contradiction of valuation; it is a reduction of quality to quantity. By their nature, to bargain with values is to de-value them. Of what meaning does an "exchange value" of values have? If it can be exchanged, it can no longer be valued. Can we so easily slip into a market evaluation of desires unless we have absolutely confused the realm of values with the realm of objective knowledge? This confusion, however, leads nowhere except to the distortive use of knowledge, a problem to which we will return in the following section.
If values are to be assigned weights, what is to be a standard of weight? Whose interests assign the order upon which the act of valuation is based? Alfred Schutz has said that "any choice refers to pre-experienced decisions of a higher order, upon which the alternative at hand is founded." This pre-experience determines the weights, but they are only disclosed by retrospective observation. The question is, whose retrospection?

To say that planning is no longer value-free is not enough for it is not only the planning profession's internal valuations that are to be questioned but its external values as well, e.g., obligatory values of democracy, private property, and the control of technology. Values, internal or external, must be made explicit and submitted to argumentation for value judgements are positional statements which stand the user against all those who maintain an alternative viewpoint. Valuations must be returned to the level of conflict and "linguistically mediated interaction"; they can no longer be "valid for any political matrix" or separated from questions of practical life. This is what Habermas has called "the requirements of the confrontation of technical knowledge and capacity with tradition-bound self-understanding. The latter forms the horizon within which needs are interpreted as goals and goals are hypostatized as values."

It is not the planners who must evaluate the community's desires but these must be resolved through reciprocal communication between the planner and the community. Not as an improbable phenomenon involving interaction with every responsive citizen, but as a program of public consciousness such that "a scientized society could constitute itself as a rational one only to the extent that science and technology are
mediated with the conduct of life through the minds of the citizens . . . i.e., the controlled translation of technical into practical knowledge." Technical interest removes many aspects of decision-making from criticism. Many decisions are therefore no longer a part of the political arena to be discussed and debated, what Habermas refers to as the detachment of "human behavior from a normative system linked to the grammar of language-games and integrating it instead into self-regulated sub-systems of the man-machine type." Positivism, however, removes this framework of "linguistically mediated interaction" and allows the social engineer to dominate over the consciousness of rational choice and decision-making. Non-distortive valuations, however, can not be separate from mutual interaction under conditions which maintain them in "good faith"; a theme we shall return to again.

Thus we find the problem of valuing has been naively translated into a problem of social engineering; the search begins for quantifiable desires and measurable needs. But this is not to understand values but to rationally explain them as those elements pertaining to rationally objective methods of choice and decision-making. This involves the substitution of statements of normative laws such as "order should always be valued by the community" with statements of descriptive laws, "order is always valued by the community." Thus valuation becomes an external explanation of what we assume to be a priori causal deductions and not the understanding of community intentions. Every rational explanation consequently assumes universal applications, i.e., that communities in similar circumstances would choose or decide in the same way. Rational explanations thus imply behavioral maxims which are misused as empirical
laws because we neglect to specify why behavior should be determined as such or why a given community chooses to act in such a way.

Extending these concepts to the Rational model of society, we find that at the bottom of each social action lies the rational individual. In consequence the actions of the social whole can be ascertained from facts about rational actions of individuals. Moreover, the actions of the social whole share in the individual's reasonableness in pursuing private ends and satisfying particular needs. The rationality model of maximization of some individual value is taken to be the model for social action; society is to be seen as a means to fulfill certain private ends. The error lies in assuming that social choices may be based on models of interpersonal game behavior or that social valuations are maximizations of individual valuations.

Let us take the example of Game Theory: this is a model of rational competition and cooperation in situations of conflict, not of actions which have been performed but of behavior which should be followed by rational actors if they wish to achieve certain calculated ends. The rational strategy of minimizing the opponents maximal gains reveals a ruthless individualism. Paradoxically, as R. P. Wolff explains, the apparently rational course of action in a zero-sum game does not maximize value unless there is an element of trust present; in other words the strategy to both player's advantage can only be obtained through trusting each other to act in reference to everyone's best interests. In the world of the minimax strategy, responsibility for others along with such social values as freedom of speech, trust, beauty, justice, or peace have no role. As Hazel E. Barnes has
pointed out, "rational self-interest" is dangerously close to the ideal society of perfect laissez-faire and minimal authoritative intervention or control in which society would inevitably give support to the stronger. Marx had expressed his own insights on the strategy of self-interested cooperation in an essay criticizing the French revolutionary Declaration of the Rights of Man. It is perhaps of interest to rethink his position:

Freedom is thus the right to do everything and promote everything which harms no others. The limit within which each can move without harm to others is determined through law, as the boundary of two fields is determined by stakes. It is a matter of the freedom of men as isolated and secluded monads. . . . The right of men to freedom is based not on the union of man with man, but rather on the sundering of man from man. . . . The right of private property is the right to enjoy one's wealth and to dispose of it willfully without relation to other men, independently of society . . . the right of self-interest. This individual freedom . . . forms the foundation of bourgeois society. It lets each man find in each other man not the realization, but the limit, of his freedom. . . . Far from man being conceived in himself as a species being, the species life itself appears rather as an external film on the individual, as a limitation of his original independence. The only bond which holds society together is natural necessity, need and private interest, the conservation of their property, and of their egotistical selves.  

The example of game theory brings out an essential dilemma of rational action. Values cannot be defined within the situation of the game-playing model unless their intent is to limit responsibility and self-transcendence. Mutuality, faith, trust must be values established outside the model before the competition begins. Thus the rational model of individual behavior becomes a dubious model for social action, and game-playing a questionable tactic for situations of conflict. It seems therefore that methods used to consider social choice and values must be adapted to the essential demands of "irrational" man as a
social valuer. The model of man as a rational value-maximizer needs to be replaced with an historically and experientially conscious model.

Strategic action:

The "correct" attitude toward instrumentality is the technical approach, the correct logos is technolog-ogy, which projects and responds to a technological reality. In this reality, matter as well as science is "neutral"; objectivity has neither a telos in itself nor is it structured toward a telos.  

In our programs of instrumental action, we can slip easily into the inhumane. Melvin Weber's account of the "rationalized society"* speaks out for the extremist's position of technical domination. The computer will "push" us toward conditioned behavior where "irrational" workers will be either systematically rooted out and removed or domesticated until behavior "variabilities" have been ironed out and the machinations operate effectively smoother. "Farsighted," "inclusive" plans are unquestionably valued over "short-sighted" ones as if breadth and weight of the future vision were more important arguments than the implications contained in the content of the plan. Counter-insurgency and poverty programs are given an appearance of equal value, while questions of individual privacy and governmental surveillance are pressed aside as the expanding powers of information analysis bring us closer to being effective instruments of social change, i.e., behavioral and personality changes.

As a result of being blinded by the optimistic belief in rational actions, these proclamations are dangerously close to amoral techniques.

*See page 424 of the process model.
of behavior engineering. Our instruments of rationalization are potent and they can easily lead us toward believing that our inability to overcome institutional and behavioral lags keeps us from resolving the crisis which beset our times. Although these claims are tinged with an element of the unrealistic, they do offer insight into a position which seems to be gaining prevalence under the guise of rational action. In a battle over the technical interests of order and control as opposed to the hermeneutical interests of emancipation and individual development, the former are winning the struggle. We seem to have developed our technical powers at the expense of repressing our powers of "understanding" which would allow us to choose the direction in which we wish our collective life to go. We fail to have an "ultimate" end, a "technique" for better ordering of human life as opposed to behavior.

The principle of organization is clearly dependent upon knowledge: it must be an ordering by wisdom and intelligence. And so the treatment of the theme of knowledge is inextricably interwoven with the treatment of the theme of the organization of the Good Life . . . of Justice.173

"Rational Democratic Policy Framework": Policy planning is a method whereby the planning professional serves the interests of politicians and administrators in the development of a rationalized society. It maintains a position within the ideology of governmental bureaucracy in the interest of the general public. This location, juxtaposing the concepts of "bureaucracy" and "democracy," becomes problematic under considerations of "rationalization." Again we are faced with the problem of domination: the forced contraposition of the rational knowledge of the bureaucrat or professional in the service of the government against an
increasing demand for democratization of the process of decision-making, i.e., an increase in the public's influence on the direction and content of governmental policies. To assume these are equivalent means, is to simplify matters; to repress the historical role of democratic self-determination within bureaucratization is to misconstrue the intent. It is true that bureaucracy's projects often slip away into areas removed from public discussion, but is it similarly true that equalization of decision power, if indeed possible, is a safeguard against domination? Perhaps it is inherent to bureaucracy that legitimization of a certain kind of domination is itself the intent of democratization. If so, what level of self-determination remains accountable?

As reinforcing and opposing elements, bureaucracy and democracy have tended to develop together. Both are factors of the rising demand for "equality before the law" made possible by substituting impersonal legal authorities for the influences of local traditional rulers. Nevertheless, democracy stands opposed to bureaucracy in spite of its continual promotion of the same. Confused over the ideal of reason, liberal democracy sees both the progressive potential of reason in its increased rationalization of society and the repressive tendencies of the dominating authority of the experts. The history of planning has encountered this struggle between the progressive and regressive tendencies of knowledge over and over again. Now with the advent of the policy planner the issue, once again, is reopened.

Marcuse in an essay "Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber," has helped to point out one of the contradictions
of the necessity for democratization within bureaucracy. The problem, as Marcuse explains it, rests upon the charismatic leader as the balancing force of bureaucracy's dominating tendencies. Let me try to unwind Marcuse's interpretation of Weber in light of the problem for policy planning. The separation of the worker from the means of production, i.e., labor is forced to sell its services in order to avoid the alternative of starvation, and the worker's consequent subjugation to the control of authorities who are solely responsible for production is seen, by Weber, as a technical necessity guaranteeing the discipline and direction of the worker required for the progress of industrial society. Organizational discipline thus becomes the ideal model of discipline necessary to effect the cumulative progress of industrial society. Irrational domination of man over man, i.e., hierarchical control, and things over men, i.e., the machine process, is justified as the sole promoter of technical progress.

Bureaucracy becomes the mode by which the efficiency of the industrial order is extended to the whole of society. But it must be remembered that this order contains within it the principle of objective domination, i.e., "'domination by virtue of knowledge,' ascertainable, calculating knowledge, specialized knowledge," equally valid for any political or institutional situation. But as pure administrative apparatus, bureaucracy becomes the means to an end outside of its own satisfaction of needs. "Every administration requires some kind of domination, since, for its direction, some commanding powers must always be placed in someone's hands." Bureaucracy, as
value-free rationality of administration, becomes subject to the power of the State; domination resulting from the fixation of obedience to the abstract apparatus of reason thus comes up against self-determination by nature of the "public interest." Which force is to win? Complete self-determination would erase all traces of irrational domination whereas unconstrained domination would destroy self-rule. It is here that Marcuse suggests that the role of the charismatic leader becomes pertinent. The voice of the people becomes the correction mechanism ensuring technical efficiency and a better selection of political leaders who are willing to assume the necessary responsibility. Democracy tends to limit the term of the rulers, and replaces them periodically with more rational decision-makers. The assumption, for Weber as interpreted by Marcuse, and also for the rational policy planners upon whom we are focused, is that progress depends upon cumulative technical rationalization obtained through periodic replacement of inefficient and irrational leaders by a more perfectly rationalized apparatus. Democratization, the equalization of power, tends to adjust the irrational compelling force of the charismatic leader to a more rational means of control, i.e., "the routinization of charisma" and ultimately to bureaucratization. Weakly translated into liberal democracy, elections and participation of the public thus result in perfecting the apparatus of domination.

The essential conflict with democracy and bureaucracy lies in the latter's total dependence on an abstract apparatus of reason. Expressing the issue of domination as one of rational rule of man over men, of things over men, is to create a system in which domination can
rule. Technical reason becomes political reason. But the abstraction of formal reason should not be allowed to float over the heads of the control of men; reified, neutral reason then becomes the force of domination. Thus it appears that reason must itself form the essential ingredient to democratization. Governmental administration by absorbing the concept of rationalization unto its own denies the individual or the public the ability to reason, i.e., the right of self-determination. Political reason does not have to be neutral dominating reason, state power politics does not have to be the controlling interest if the democratic participant is fully informed. The question then relies on the supplier of knowledge. Does the information upon which the policy maker depends come from independent interests outside of the bureaucratic apparatus or from within the planning-policy establishment? Have the advocate planners made their way into policy formation? Whose interests do the policy’s really reflect? More importantly, if the participant is given an opportunity to be fully informed and to participate in policy formation what type of decisions is he allowed to make? Herb Gintis' has made an important distinction between political and institutional decisions. Those types of decisions in which the public is allowed to participate, he says, are political decisions over tax rates, income redistribution and welfare programs. The majority of decisions such as the distribution of income, the land market, the role of technology, are institutionally determined by economic rationality and quite removed from participant control. Thus we find that the "democratization of the policy framework" coupled with the appearance of "rational" only means affecting the "political decisions" but
removing, from control by the many, the rationalized institutional arrangements. As Marcuse has shown, this abstraction is no longer apparent; we find "participation" being understood as real participation and institutional domination being accepted as rational. We are allowed to participate in political decisions of income redistribution, for example, when the problem does not really occur in a more rational redistribution of goods but in the matter of institutional arrangements which control, in the first place, the goods to be produced and distributed. Thus we find that rationalized society defines the ends toward which men may struggle and the means by which they may participate. This leads us into the next important consideration: the political system of rational behavior.
Configuration of the Process System: Part A

Process system: (open subsystem, functional organization, nonhierarchical, developmental, complex)

Process = (cyclical organism, motion, dynamic, flux, order in interaction, flows, forces in action, behavior, circular movement)

Process interactions = [interdependence, interrelationship, (interlocked/interdependent) functions, subsystem dependence, integrative linkages, activity coordination, causative interconnections, trace effects, reciprocal causal relations, interdependent constellation, detailed ramifications, action consequences, action reverberations]

Process structure/plan: [modulation, adaptation, self-regulatory, self-organizing, continual (self-adjustment/ change), self-correcting, self-reinforcing, revise, refine, feedback, learning experience, continuous adaptive sequence, communication-feedback-control]

Purposive action = [dictates of (possible/potential/conceived) functions, effective intervention, willful change, response to external forces, influence outcomes, intervening actions, direction goals, (assemble/evaluate/organize) forces in order to reach solutions, purposes, end-directions, trends, ideals, sought values, complementarity of prediction and control, future directed, forward looking]

Systems analysis = [(coordination/correlative/synthetic organizing) role, systems engineering, comprehensive planning, management science, operations management]

Systems analysis + [rational process planning, (sense/order) to questions, (complex/many bodied) problem orientation, systematic problem-solving, (guide/plan/control) comprehensive (subject matter/geographic scale/time scale/roles)]

Systems analysis + (technical possibilities, computer, technical knowledge)
Configuration of the Process System: Part B

Rational process planning = (rational goals/rational choice/strategic action)

Rationality = [reason, deeper understanding, increased knowledge, scientific-technical intelligence, full knowledge of systems, new level of intelligence, judgment on (accurate/objective) facts, improved techniques of analysis, exercise of judgment, (criteria/guide) for judgment, value judgments, logic of organized forethought]

Rationality : (universalistic, affectively neutral, collectivity-oriented, nonpartisan, value-free, scientific morality, unemotional, noncontroversial, objective, non-arbitrary, limits abuse)

Purposive rationality : (achievement oriented, decision arrival, intelligent action)

Scientific-technical intelligence : [planning and social sciences, analytic stage, reduce disorder to mathematical order, measurable (objectives/criteria), numbers are facts, information buttresses rational decisions, (information/talent) attacks problems, empirical (proof/validity), peer evaluation, empirically derived knowledge, reliable comparison, (meter/monitor) (program/state of affairs), central intelligence function, pulse-taking function, means for problem-solving, instruments for change]

Scientific-technical intelligence → (professionalism, mobilize knowledge to human ends, positive competence, normative competence)

Rational process planning : (efficiency₁/efficiency₂)

efficiency₁ = [economy of means, waste reduction, greatest return on resources, optimum resource allocation, savings, overcome (conflict/waste)]

efficiency₂ = [administrative efficiency, orderly administration, performance tests, effectiveness evaluation, efficiency analysis, prevent program overlap, coordinate (programs/public policies)]

efficiency₁/₂ → (thoroughness, productivity, professionalism, specialization)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rational goals</th>
<th>Rational goals</th>
<th>Rational choice</th>
<th>Strategic action</th>
<th>Rational democratic public policy framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[conscious goal (selection/formulation), purposive process to (preferred/ordered) ends, (establishing/meeting) goals, conform future to predetermined patterns, anticipatory action, within democratic goals, means as important as goals)]</td>
<td>([analyze/identify/assign/detect/clarify/measure/operationalize] [collective community goals, goal contradictions, (best means/best alternative) for goal achievement, hierarchy of objectives, goal achievement matrix] with respect to [(values/wishes/attitudes/needs/resources)/(mutual compatibility/order of priority/implications/probable consequences)])</td>
<td>(efficient attainment of plural goals)</td>
<td>(value distributions/value weights/value hierarchy/value conflict/contending values)]</td>
<td>[expanding alternatives, not choice among alternatives, not monitor, not guide, not choosing one preference, not with a view to action, not institutional way of reaching decisions, may not involve the future, guiding process in a long-chain of decisions, occasional plan crystallization, (incremental, multi-centered) (decision/action) process, rational, pluralistic, ever-increasing ambiguity, increased number of decision centers, network of influence, complicated decision rules, open, self-organizing, self-regulating systems]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>: (achievable ends)</td>
<td>: (valid for any political matrix)</td>
<td>= (policy planning/programming strategy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational (choice/ decision-making/ decision-selection)</td>
<td>= ([analyze/identify/assign/detect/clarify/measure/operationalize] [collective community goals, goal contradictions, (best means/best alternative) for goal achievement, hierarchy of objectives, goal achievement matrix] with respect to [(values/wishes/attitudes/needs/resources)/(mutual compatibility/order of priority/implications/probable consequences)])</td>
<td>= (policy planning/programming strategy)</td>
<td>= [policy (clarification/coordination/cataloguing/prescription/development), (time phased/sequenced) set of governmental (policies/programs), decisions based on (values, political interests, other interests), rational democratic public policy framework]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
programming strategy = [programmatic (goal-directed/general directed) courses of action, guide direction with planned strategy, instrumental action, selection of (most effective, acceptable) means, continual formulation of best technical solution for agreed-upon needs, feedback review function, monitor program, product modification, process redefines product, adjust to guide development, evolutionary (plan/program) development, cost-benefit analysis, simulation models]

instrumental action : (action shaping, intervention in normal course, purposively guides change, societal guidance system, exerts multiple influences on forces operative in society, devices of social control, modify underlying forces in direction of accepted goals)

cost-benefit analysis : [links public investments, utilizes scarce resources, maximizes expected attainment, predicts efficiency effects, appraises heterogeneous proposals against common criteria, (conscious/democratic) distribution of (benefits/costs), stages (levels/priorities), investment for desired repercussions, uses public resources for highest social payoffs, program optimization, effective trade-offs between program elements, suboptimization of functional systems, marginality, differential incidence, accounting]

simulation models = [systematically (trace/evaluate/explore/predict) (public opinion/public reactions/alternative consequences/course-of-action/action repercussions/predictions/prearranged strategies), real life studies, longitudinal studies on (individual/institutional) change]

simulation models : [agent of change, knowledge to (manipulate/understand) society, simulate (men's/institution's) behavior, overcome behavioral (frictions/impediments), bypass present barriers]

simulation models computer: [deals with people in mass, invent society with (mass goals, aggregate needs), statistical social solutions]

   + [(push/pull) society toward rationalization, centralized decision-making, reach out through computers]
REFERENCES: CHAPTER SEVENTEEN


4 Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems."


7 Webber, "Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility."


12 Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems."


Ibid.


Ibid.

Myerson, "Research and City Planning."


Ibid.

Ibid.


Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems."

Michael, "Urban Policy in the Rationalized Society."

Lueks, "The New Comprehensiveness."

34 Branch, "Concerning Coordinative Planning."


38 Webber, "Comprehensiveness Makes Planning and Social Responsibility."


40 Ibid.


43 Webber, "The Role of Intelligence Systems."

44 Ibid.


49 Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems."

50 Higgins, "Towards a Science of Community Planning."


Michael, "Urban Policy in the Rationalized Society."

Ibid.


Robinson, "Beyond the Middle-Range Planning Bridge."

Webber, "Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility."


Ibid.


Michael, "Urban Policy in the Rationalized Society."


Ibid.


Adamson, "Physical Planning and Social Planning."

Dyckman, "What Makes Planners Plan?"

Bogue and Hart, "Clinic: Public Opinion Surveys."

Branch, "Comprehensive Planning: A New Field of Study."


Myerson, "Research and City Planning."


Ibid.

Ibid.


Wirth, "Planning Means Freedom."


Harvey S. Perloff, "How Shall We Train Planners We Need?" National Conference on Planning, 1951.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Dyckman, "Planning and Design Theory."

Branch, "Comprehensive Planning: A New Field Study."


Ibid.


Myerson, "Research and City Planning."

Robinson, "Beyond the Middle-Range Planning Bridge."

Ibid.

Aschman, "The 'Policy Plan' in the Planning Program."


Aschman, "The 'Policy Plan' in the Planning Program."


Dyckman, "Planning and Design Theory."


116 Loeks, "The New Comprehensiveness."


118 A. Benjamin Handler, "What is Planning Theory?" *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, XXIII (Summer, 1957).

119 Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems."

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.


123 Mitchell, "The New Frontier in Metropolitan Planning."

124 Branch, "Concerning Coordinative Planning."

125 Wirth, "Planning Means Freedom."

126 Ibid.

127 Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems."


129 Mitchell, "The New Frontier in Metropolitan Planning."


133 Ratcliffe, "How Can Housing Research Serve City Planning?"

134 Ibid.

135 Robinson, "Beyond the Middle-Range Planning Bridge."

Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems."

Webber, "Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility."

Ibid.

Bolan, "Emerging Views of Planning."


Perloff, "How Shall We Train Planners We Need?"

Robinson, "Beyond the Middle-Range Planning Bridge."

Webber, "Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility."

Bolan, "Emerging Views of Planning."

Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems."

Michael, "Urban Policy in the Rationalized Society."

Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems."

Michael, "Urban Policy in the Rationalized Society."

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, p. 65.

138 Apel, Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften, p. 20.

139 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, pp. 91-92.

140 Ibid., pp. 81-85.


143 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man.


146 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, p. 74.

147 Ibid., p. 80.

148 Ibid., p. 118.


152 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, p. 156.


155 Ibid., p. 216.


THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR

The process model of political behavior: The process of planning during the 1940's through the 1960's became overtly political under a viewpoint which held social and political life to be the immediate action systems of contending interests. The planners' focus on interests found them concerned with the action of groups which lay behind the governmental framework. Since group interests and group activity were viewed as synonymous, the problem of group accommodation and group behavior, that is group action, became paramount.
This concept accords with the growing concern over empirical research, for behavior lends itself to immediate measurement, experimentation and theory building. The planners thus adopted the positivistic or behavioristic notion that a thing is what a thing does, i.e., that a group's interests are observable from its behavior. Thus the political process of planning referred to the empirical analysis of pressure group tactics, the need for mutual accommodations and the determination of open competition to allow full interest action. Society was assumed to be in a state of equilibrium when there was a full complement of contending groups and interests. The quest for rational government or planning became conceivable only if maximal participation was gained. So it was to the concept of interest action that the planners turned their attention in the post war era, raising the systems questions of how to adopt their practices to group interests and how to adjust group behavior to their own planning interests but neglecting the fundamental questions of the historical determination of the categories of group transactions or relationships.

Again in this chapter, I shall first review the textual description of the political behavior of the process model before turning to the intentions of rational behavior.

THE TEXTUAL DESCRIPTION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS OF PLANNING: THE IDEOLOGY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

PLANNING IN A DEMOCRACY IMPLIES PARTICIPATION

The "shame of the cities" has come at least as often from their stumbling over democratic procedures as from their failure to use them. . . . Our classic model of good government supposes a kind of free market place of interests. . . . [It] assumes that most social conflicts can work themselves out through a natural harmonization and that only a residuum of conflicts must be left to artificial devices of government.
"In our country it is real or asserted democracy that legitimizes." 2 "If planning [is] . . . public policy and if public policy in a democracy can be determined only by a consensus of the member citizens . . . [then] planning must go back to the people if its basis is to be legitimate." 3

Our "Western liberal tradition . . . [goes back] to a root individualism which holds (1) that power is evil and must be contained and (2) that its only legitimate exercise is based on common participation and consent." 4 "The idea of consensus . . . [is] interpreted to mean that authority must constantly be refreshed from the wells of popular participation." 5 "The planner is not the dictator of the community . . . he is the servant of the community, enjoying no powers which the community has not given him and enjoying these only by the consent of the citizenry." 6

"Citizen participation is part of our democratic heritage, [it is] often proclaimed as a means to perfect the democratic process. . . . Citizens should share in decisions affecting their destinies. Anything less is a betrayal of our democratic tradition." 7 "An effective urban democracy [thus becomes] one in which citizens may be able to play an active role in the process of deciding public policy." 8 "Public participation in planning . . . [therefore is taken as an] important element in the development of democracy." 9 "There is nothing in which the citizens of a city have greater common cause than in the planning of the place in which their lives are spent, no subject which better expresses the fundamental purpose of democratic government." 10
[It is consequently a] sign of returning health for local democracy . . . [in the] discovery by the politician of the value of planning as means of getting votes . . . . The politics of metropolis will be a battle to control the pictures in people's heads . . . . That plans should be policies, political programs critically, self-consciously understood as such and debated as such, will be a clear gain for local democracy. One element of conscience, as yet unattained but high on the civic agenda, is to create a civic order that is capable and desirous of planning as a prized means to desired ends. [The] goal of political rationality . . . [is to develop] critical, self-conscious, awareness of a wide range of relevant values including probable consequences . . . . Planning as the eyes and science of politics is a high aspiration of democratic theory. 11

Citizenship: "The planning idea is like democracy . . . it just doesn't work if it is in the hands of a few . . . . It is not a democracy until it is a part of the basic attitudes of the people." 12

If we are to define democracy as the directive knowledge and imagination of the masses in determining their own destiny through organization of their institutions for service and control . . . [then the] ultimate destiny of democracy rests not alone in the right to choose, but in knowing how to choose. 12

We cannot have democratic planning until we have capable democrats. The training ground organization may not be the only means of transforming bewildered adults into competent citizens, but it is certainly one that promises much. Our democracy needs to develop a root system before it can make sturdy growth overhead. 14

So too, "citizen apathy" is a "main cause of planning's political problems." 15 "Participation" is defined as "an informed interest in political events on the part of the rank and file citizen, which develops into political activity, if and when the best interests of the citizen or the community as a whole demand it." 16

But without a broad educational program the participation of the citizenry will be limited to the few who are well informed or who have a special personal or business interest which leads them to participate. The average citizen . . . will not think he is qualified to express an opinion on the development of his community. 17
"One focus [therefore] is education, [i.e.,] citizenship training . . . to learn to value and appreciate cooperation as a problem solving method. This would strengthen local government, spur community development and create a sense of community or community identification."18 "Community organization" thus becomes a "training ground in citizenship, to prepare the soil in which democratic planning can flourish and mature," to "combine investigation of community problems and needs with group discussion and training in the techniques of political action"; to "inform citizens and equip them to act upon their convictions." "Adults have many prejudices, preconceived ideas, inflexible habits; these must be broken down little by little before unfamiliar facts and new concepts can be accepted."19 Thus education is one "means of overcoming some of the apathy, ignorance and reaction that thwart community reorganization and development."20 We will thus instill a "professionalization of citizenship" by which "an increasing number of responsible individual citizens will be engaging in the adventurous game of formulating concepts of end-direction. . . . The profession of citizen neither will nor can be . . . restricted to the chosen few." It is "vitally important to social and political health that the process of direction-finding be broad-based."21

Majority Decisions: "The goals . . . and the actions . . . must represent majority decisions if the plans are to be valid."22 Since the "aims and directions of moral choice are 'policy' matters, [they are] not to be entrusted to experts."23 "Planning . . . grows
from the ground up, not from the top down by force or overthrow; ideas are sold into action by individual initiative, not by bureaucratic edict. Democracy [therefore] represents a widening-out, centrifugal force." 24

"It is natural to recoil from 'planning' if planning implies the power of some mere majority vote or centralized bureaucracy to make decisions that affect our environment and our freedom to make choices everafter." 25 But "the old idea of planning being limited to a certain selected few has been broken down ... the habit that these few act exclusively under the responsibility of the highest governmental leaders has been recognized as incompatible with modern democracy." 26 Consequently the planning "process is collaborative, bringing citizens and planners together in a common effort." 27

Responsibility: "Once it is admitted ... that pure laissez faire will not suffice, a new kind of public responsibility and collective decision is immediately necessary." 28 "The problem of planning as a profession lies within the general area of responsibility and decision and of the principles upon which responsibility and decision rest." 29 "Professional response ... [must] entail prescriptive advice, comprehensively developed, disciplined, and expert in nature, for which personal responsibility is taken in the public interest." 30 But also "we must stimulate public interest ... Responsibility ... It is this word, I believe, which is still lacking, or at least not sufficiently strong, in the vocabulary of our people regarding community planning today." 31
We are forced by our failures to conclude that the quality of life in American cities can only be improved if people of all classes, races, ethnic groups, public officials, private agencies and institutions and businessmen together create mechanisms for assessing problems, developing strategies, and planning and implementing major changes.32

Today there is

increasing agreement . . . [that the] responsibility for overcoming that failure rests on the people as a whole. . . . It is not the job of the chambers of commerce, the taxpayers associations, the labor unions, the real estate boards, the churches, or the good government league but of the elected governments . . . that alone can act for the people as a whole.33

Therefore

let us save this tired, faltering world once more through an intermarriage of all community elements and agencies. Let us move toward a comprehensive community government with the full participation of all of our peoples assigning a crucial role to planning and management across the disciplines and across government agencies.34

"Community control": "Roots for Democracy" are found in "citizen effort to improve the community . . . as a permanent activity."35 "The democratic principle . . . applied to town planning . . . [is a] healthy sign."36 Communities "have been persuaded that community planning and rebuilding is the work of all the citizens of the neighborhood."37 Citizens "through a voluntary sense of responsibility and interest, have decided to organize for the purpose of becoming better acquainted with the needs of their locality in order then to press for the solution to those needs in a united nonpartisan and informed manner."38 Great effort is going into "organizing residents of conservation and rehabilitation neighborhoods, attempting to arouse interest and participation and instill a degree of neighborhood pride and a sense of community responsibility."39 "If [citizens' interest] had existed, our
cities would not be as deteriorated as they are, nor would there be so many new slums appearing in our suburbs." The "strategy objectives for citizen participation" became the attempts "to rebuild deteriorating neighborhoods, [to] devise realistic and better plans"; to "stimulate the creation of neighborhood organizations which will define 'positive' goals for their areas in collaboration with the relevant city agencies and in accord with the time schedule which binds most federal renewal efforts."  

THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRATIC PLANNING: WHOSE INTERESTS ARE BEING SERVED?

Public vs. Individual Interests:

The line between public and private responsibility has been an ever shifting one. It has moved toward public responsibility as the impact of the industrial revolution and urbanization has been felt and it has oscillated back toward the pole of private responsibility as reaction against the growing power and scope of government has touched the vital nerve center of American tradition embodied in the popular belief that government itself is an evil.

In a complex and pluralistic society most individuals will be exposed to varying forces and pressures, and their own "interests" may well be nearly as complex and plural as are the forces of the society in which they are embedded. The possibility of divergence between the "public interest" and the interest of the particular individuals who are making the public decision is therefore always present.

"City planning in America involves the adjustment of [this] conflict between the needs and drives of private interests and the public welfare." Its "aim requires an organic structure involving the cooperation of individuals, and ... paradoxically ... some measure of subordination of the individual to the community."

The relation between the individual and his society, however, cannot be reduced to such a simple formula because they are practical as well as abstract. In practice, total self-determination
results in tyranny as certainly as does unlimited central authority. . . . If one believes that individual acts are the only source of true moral value, he must, for example, regard planning collectively for the People a dubious and suspicious activity at best. . . . The planners . . . stand in a uniquely favorable position to effectuate that compromise between the general and the specific on which sound government depends.\textsuperscript{47}

THE PUBLIC GROUP

"The public interest in most urban areas reflects not a unitary concept but the outcome of a political dialogue between group and individual values and interests, favoring the dominant."\textsuperscript{48}

Planning in a democratic society is being seen as a process by which the community seeks to increase the individual's opportunity to choose for himself. . . . Expanding freedom requires deliberate governmental actions designed both to extend and to restrict individual liberties, as the contextual circumstances demand. . . . Justification of regulations: . . . forestalling social costs . . . preventing one person from imposing hardships upon others without compensating them for their losses . . . political decisions to redistribute income among the population . . . [are measures which allow] all individuals [to] profit by yielding certain of their rights to a central authority.\textsuperscript{49}

A mass community can only be operated if the actions of the individuals are controlled so that they do not conflict too grossly. The control cannot be personal contact . . . there must be central administration of regulations about health, schooling, taxes, hours of work, and a host of other things.\textsuperscript{50}

Collective success [therefore] is deemed more important than the development of the individual. . . . Humanity is groping for a new social ethic which will answer the feeling of the solidarity of its components. Such is that ambivalence of humanity at its two extremes: totality and singularity.\textsuperscript{51}

Freedom is only possible in a group; the isolated man is always in solitary confinement. . . . [This is] one of the basic reasons . . . for the flight . . . from the countryside into the big city.\textsuperscript{52}
Universal Goals: "Planning requires . . . understanding of the overall public interest."\textsuperscript{53} "As our society becomes more complex and inter-dependent, and the strain on our resources increases, there is a great need for planners who can help give definite form and content to the crucial democratic concept of the general interest."\textsuperscript{54}

Collecting all the available facts and drawing responsible conclusions, relating expertise, promoting goals and collaboration among those concerned with urban development and formulating plans for the future can contribute significantly to the identification of the public interest and achievement of the good life in metropolitan areas.\textsuperscript{55}

But there is a "great difficulty finding a common code of behavior and criterion of the general interest."\textsuperscript{56} "The concept of 'planning with people' . . . assumes on the part of the people involved a willingness and a capacity to engage in a collaborative search for the common good."\textsuperscript{57} Thus the "social basis of planning [rests upon] a social instinct for cooperation and individual expression."\textsuperscript{58}

"The planning profession . . . [in turn, depends upon a] public-spirited and obligated group . . . the recognition of a common dedication and the development of a generous and cooperative group solidarity."\textsuperscript{59}

Who participates? "Planning, true to the democratic theory . . . goes on the assumption that given proper public relations, the people for whom the planning is being done should support the program."\textsuperscript{60} "The public [should] be completely and continuously informed about planning . . . through citizen groups."\textsuperscript{61} Planning must operate so as to include rather than exclude citizens from participating in the process. "Inclusion" means not only permitting the citizen to be heard. It also means that he be able to become well informed about the underlying reasons for planning proposals, and be able to respond to them in the technical language of professional planners.\textsuperscript{62}
"Citizen participation in planning ... [is therefore a]
necessary tool";63 it is a "'watchdog of the public interest,' a
'conscience,' a catalyst, a needler, a sounding wall, a hand-holder."64
"The citizen's freedom to differ and criticize, where necessary, should
not be sacrificed in the interest of harmony."65 But "this ... in
no way implies that the final responsibility for making ... decision[s]
does not, and should not, rest in the governmental representatives of the
public."66 "Even the most ardent supporters admit that citizens cannot
participate in all decision-making functions."67

In the absence of organized or adequate planning programs,
citizens' groups have often contributed considerable impetus
to the recognition and establishment of planning. A problem
arises only when they perpetuate themselves beyond their
basic contribution and attempt to assume a position for which
they have neither the preparation nor the authority ... authorization and adoption by a representative body are plans
for citizens but formulation, analysis, administration are the
work of the specialist.68

"A planning director must not only appreciate all the ways in which a
citizens' group can help him but he must also know how to use it and
how to develop citizens' interest in the community."69 "It is
assumed [moreover] that the [citizen] volunteer is in agreement with
the organization's objectives and is recruited to assist in carrying
out those objectives."70

MAXIMAL INTEGRATION

Consensus Participation: The aim in planning is to "seek consensus
through broad participation."71 "Citizens participation provides
the only stable base for community planning that results in sound
community development."72 "To the extent gain[ed] ... to that extent
planning may proceed with understanding, realism and stability."73

"Citizen participation . . . is [consequently] designed to counter organized resistance to the program."74 "The public recognizes that the citizen group has no axe to grind." It becomes "a lifeline between the laymen and the professional agencies nourishing favorable public support for their proposals." The citizens group should "never sidestep a controversial issue, but . . . take no position if a substantial percentage of the board of governors is in disagreement; . . . to remain anonymous whenever it will expedite getting a job done."75

The planner and his group "would strive [therefore] to build an organization respected for its careful analysis of problems, admired for its consistent advocacy of proposals of genuine benefit to the community and supported because of its record of achievement."76

The objective should be to achieve maximum consensus and support and minimum opposition when the measure is finally adopted. . . . The public hearing [thus becomes] . . . a testing ground for determination of rationality and clarity of the proposal, for determining how much of the proposal falls within the area of passive public consent and how much is to be the subject of active controversy. The public hearing is [consequently] an arena for the reduction of conflict to consensus."77

Cooperative Participation: "What we really have to decide is, do we want them [the citizens] on the inside working with us, or on the outside making trouble? . . . The official alone can not save our cities. . . . The private citizen must be stimulated to help."78 Only "naive syllogists [make] . . . the assumption that as the public understands so will it support planning. . . . Today it is participation we are after."79 "A citizens group which has helped develop [a plan] will be ready to support its implementation, since it represents their handiwork."80
"The planners would find out all about [citizen] needs sooner or later, but this method gives the citizens a good chance to assume an identity with the plan by having their personal thinking incorporated into it." 81

THE PRIVATE GROUP: LOCALISM

"In our time, the human voice has become as insistent as a riveting gun," we see "a relentless quest for separation and identity. . . . Man . . . feels the danger of being lost in the faceless mass." 82

We find that the accumulation of mass decisions . . . do not obey the principle of reciprocity; they cannot be made in one direction as readily as in another. . . . But when many people must integrate action to achieve an end result, it is not only easier to achieve some ends than others: the range of alternatives is narrowed and individual responsibility is diluted, often to the vanishing point. 83

For example, lower-income neighborhoods are more likely to produce collective action in response to threats than to create opportunities. . . . they are likely to collaborate when each person can see a danger to him or his family in some proposed change; collective action is a way . . . not of defining and implementing some broad program for the benefit of all, but of giving force to individual objections by adding them together in a collective protest. 84

"Planning with the poor . . . [thus means planning with] slum dwellers banded together to protect what they perceive as their interests and to strive for what they consider their rights." 85 "Localism has come to be regarded as a good in itself. . . . Its derivatives include distrust of the big city as an 'unnatural' perhaps even an 'un-American' place and a 'we-they' perspective on national government." 86 "This emphasis on resident responsibility . . . reflects an effort to counteract the bureaucratization of urban life . . . to provide the
poor with control over the impersonal forces that tend to shape the
urban environment." 87

The amalgam of interests: "We are now part of a pluralistic system of
urban planning and administration. ... The monopoly of the professional
is dead; ... and we must work to make this system work, for in its
success is the only hope for a better tomorrow." Pluralistic planning
"is an arena for the pursuit of plural goals held and expressed by
variously endowed segments of society." 88 "The planner must make, of
the totality of interests of disparate groups, an amalgam rather than
a compound ... Harmony [depends upon] recognition of the disparities,
inequalities and conflicts." 89 "The purposes [of planning] ... will
emerge from a pluralistic approach to all of society itself." This
implies that a "growing, changing concept of the public purpose will
emerge from the stereo-psychic process of blending and synthesizing
of these points of view." 90 "If pluralistic planning is a rational
process, rationality also tells us that different problems not only
require different solutions but different approaches for reaching
the solution." 91

The need for leadership: "Planning is community leadership or it is
totally unimportant." 92 If "the method of discovering community goals
... [is through] public discussion ... [the problem then becomes]
... how to find appropriate discussants." 93

Innovation for urban action probably needs to take greater account
than it has of the functioning of the mediating devices and
mechanisms of the society. It needs to decide what its proper
publics are and what questions they are asking. ... The concept
of consensus implies the question of consensus among whom, the
question of the relevant community public. 94
Increasing the majority. "Pluralism and advocacy are means for stimulating consideration of future conditions by all groups in society."

"In performing its role of prescribing courses of action leading to future desired states, the planning profession must engage itself thoroughly and openly in the contention surrounding political determination." "Pluralism in support of political contention describes the process, advocacy describes the role performed by the professional in the process. . . . The concept of advocacy . . . implies the opposition of at least two contending viewpoints in an adversary proceeding." "The planner distinctly abandons the pretense that he serves the whole public interest"; he "views that any plan is the embodiment of a particular group of interests. . . . Planning becomes . . . pluralistic and partisan."

Role and power of the local group: The "War on Poverty and the Model Cities programs stress substantive participation in planning, policy and decision-making." The focus is "either to win control of the resource allocating mechanisms or to establish effective pressure points in order to change the ways in which resources are delivered to poor people." This emphasizes what the direction of decisions will be as opposed to who will get what. "Citizen control . . . [means] that degree of power which guarantees that participants or residents can govern a program or an institution, be in full charge of policy and managerial aspects, and be able to negotiate the conditions under which 'outsiders' may change them."

Citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power. . . . It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens presently excluded from the political and economic
processes, to be deliberately included in the future, . . . the means by which they can induce significant social reforms which enable them to share in the benefits of the affluent society. 103

"It is around these facts . . . [of] communalism and its attendant focus on self-interest and determination, that future issues of citizen participation will have to be agitated and decided." 106

But still the "crucial problem is how to make attention to these neighborhood demands compatible with city-side programs"; "dominated by the struggle of neighborhood residents with city hall for various degrees of power control over the programs." 105

COMMON ASSUMPTIONS OF PLANNING CONSTRAINTS IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Universal Morals: "The planners must . . . write the limitations upon his actions, prepare checks upon his own power, and balances to prevent arbitrariness from running amuck under the licence of discretion." 105 "The planner's role in dealing with values must be constrained so that he acts as a responsible agent." 107 "Neither [the planner nor the community organizer] must be perceived by the community as 'taking sides' with or against the residents." 108 The planners are "specialists with a generality: this approach involves . . . a high degree of awareness of interrelations . . . an ability to come to grips with value problems, to have a social consciousness and to identify your own goals with those of the community." 109

The planner "works not only for but in behalf of his client, in a confidential relationship, submerging any personal interest to the interests of the client." 110 "He affirms their position in language understandable to his client and to the decision makers he seeks to
"It is also clear that planners must perforce say what they would like to happen. . . . The ablest students of human problems have often known their client's wants better than the clients have, and they have often known better what the clients should do." The planner should [therefore] do more than explicate the values underlying his prescriptions for courses of action; he should affirm them; he should be an advocate for what he deems proper."

The Federal Guardian of Planning: "This nation's federal leadership is thoroughly sold on planning." The federal government believes metropolitan planning has come of age. [It] believes the profession can deliver high quality planning and make it work."

The emergence of the federal concern with urban development and the consequent enlargement of its role not only as helpmate but as a mentor and arbiter is a case in point. . . . An emerging national commitment to planning and development is being expressed in the form of strengthened public institutions for its execution.

"As federal programs affecting urban areas continue to increase there is greater need to develop an accepted national policy with respect to fostering and promoting sound development and redevelopment of the nation's metropolitan areas."

The Federal Involvement at the Metropolitan or Local Level: "The world as it gingerly seeks an alternative to the threat of atomic war . . . looks to the nation as it attempts to cope with a multitude of human and technological problems which defy the artificial boundaries of states and localities."

Urban problems have become national problems, and metropolitan social space has flowed over all sorts of geographic confines. Still, the federal system is such that nation, states,
and local governments remain as often rival and to some extent independent centers of problem identification and policy-making. ¹¹⁹

Increasingly, we are coming to see that the many legally discrete governments, governmental departments, and private organizations are in fact functionally interlocking and interdependent. And so, we are finding it useful to view local government and federal government as but aspects of each other and as continuous with the larger spectrum of authority centers. ¹²⁰

New federal elements evolving naturally from the heritage of our governmental system can induce formulation of national policies in urban development, strengthening headquarters and field organization, modification of federal programs to meet emerging urban problems and imaginative utilization of the many aspects of metropolitan planning and development as requirements for federal aid. ¹²¹

There must be explicit recognition that governments at all levels have to work in increasing harmony: "cooperative partnerships" . . . "creative federalism," and now "the new federalism." [It has become] necessary for the federal government to play a more activist and strategic role in aiding urban and metropolitan areas. Social and economic interdependency explicitly assumes the necessity of shared power within vertical and horizontal federalism frameworks. ¹²²

.Fragmentation: "Can the federal government long continue to act as though the local neighborhood was its natural focus of interests?" ¹²³ Most planning programs during the 1950's and 1960's assumed that "the fundamentals of our cities [were] wrapped up in the neighborhoods," ¹²⁴ thereby reiterating "our commitment to territorially representative democracy", ¹²⁵ and recreating "small town democracy in a complex urban society." ¹²⁶ Time and again we are told that there is "no substitute for territorial representation as a means to coordinate and integrate the functional organizations that share territorial fields." ¹²⁷ "The neighborhood is a powerful element and formative tool in our society: it can either strengthen or frustrate the democratic process." ¹²⁸
Paralleling the Federal interest at the local level were the local "demands for 'community representation' and for 'community self-
determination'"; "where the social group is treated primarily as a set of distinct individuals." "Resident participation," "neighbor-
hood organization," "community development," "community mobilization," "community conflicts," "racial separatism," all shared in a common concern in "the encouragement of a 'coming together' of the affected citizenry at the neighborhood level."  

THE NEW MANDARINS: "The planner's task [is to] . . . keep the balance between what is technically possible and humanly desirable."  

PLANNERS AS TECHNICIANS

"Planners [are like] Galahads riding off to retrieve the Holy Grail from the heathen." "It is not likely that the problems of the complex urban community are to be solved by laymen." "As an executive the planning educator would rely heavily upon his trained staff. He would know [however] that he could not entrust to untrained citizens exact and specialized studies." The technical planner must remember that community participation usually turns against planning. . . . [It] cannot and does not stimulate the community-oriented impersonal thinking required for planning decisions. Planners must thus do their planning for the best interests of the people without ever really knowing whether and to what extent they support the planning program.  

Gauging how far to go with a community: "Gauging 'how far' one can go with any given community is part of the professional attitude toward doing a good job." "Where the decision as to the planned action can
be made in terms of knowledge, and not opinion, we rarely resort to
expressions of opinion of the people involved."
"The city planner's
idealism, his orientation to the whole city, and his focus on future
conditions have placed him in a position of intellectual leadership." "
"In playing the roles of producer of new facts, as identifier and evalu-
ator of potential action courses, and as prophet of the future, he
thereby plays the role of the planner."

The planning advisor: The planner's

forte is command over a commodity which though rough and home-made
is still not accessible to most citizens. That commodity is a
view of the future, not the future of a single enterprise, but of
a whole complex system like the urban community. The planner is
thus a purveyor of vital advice.

"The advisor [however] depends upon his acceptance as an expert by an
audience." Similarly "the planner takes his regards in professional
prestige, for respect for his profession grows even as its threat to
established forms diminishes."

THE MEDIATORS

Interceding between planning and the public: "Most professional planners
did not enter the field for the purpose of studying the city . . . they
wanted instead . . . to practice the art of planning." In this art,
"planners . . . have no special competence for the making or guidance of
social policy, but only for the enlightenment of the process by which it
is made." The planner thus becomes "an administering arbiter. He
must intercede between planning and the world in which it is to be
realized." The responsibilities of leadership [are twofold: first
the planner] . . . serves as a mediator . . . between the organization
and the rest of society . . . [and second] administering the organization, of putting policies into practice, of making decisions into the smoothest possible operations." 147

Internal control: "Yet . . . planners must be humble, especially in a democracy; they must continually deal with the people, as their superior clients." 148

The planner must psychoanalyze the majority to know their needs, the hopes, their fears. This is the first precondition to build up planning on mutual adjustment rather than on preconceived regimentation. . . . The necessity to continuously inform him, Mr. Everyman, why communal planning is to his own best advantage calls for the highest psychological ability in a planner. 146

The planner, however, "cannot plan for a community which is internally so discordant that it possesses no discernible direction, and he must not attempt, in an authoritarian manner, to impose goals or direction upon it." The "very genius of planning" is "to evoke a willing unity from within and to let the physical community reflect the inner accord." 150

The planners thus see their "mission as that of gathering the positive forces in the community together behind a program leading to a better city." 151 "The art of politics in planning . . . [becomes] an art that deals with human beings in action." 152

A catalyst for participation: "Truly effective city planners have functioned as catalysts for synthesizing the development plans prepared by the more specialized groups in government. . . . [They have] helped to create new amalgams that better reflect both the separate and mutual goals of the various participants." 153
The pluralistic process . . . [therefore] closes the traditional gap between planning and implementation . . . when the planning process explicitly involves the many forces pertinent both to a problem and to its solution, each with resources that can be transformed into programs and improvements, the urban planners and the urban administrator become a team whose job is to organize these resources, building alliances and support needed for accomplishment. A plan is no longer an end in itself; the end we seek is implementation of an agreed course of action. The planner becomes an action planner, a leader and arbiter, whose work involves gaining consensus and commitment to action by those who must act if positive and orderly change is to take place. The job of the urban professional is to mobilize all levels of government . . . into an effective instrument of cooperation for a joint response to public needs. To achieve this, he can at best identify, assess, and seek to manage the conflicts which exist, to yield maximum benefit to the goals of the planning effort.

Action-planning is trans-technical. To be involved in action is to interact with others who contribute skills and knowledge that are different from those of planners. . . . In action-planning . . . the planner moves to the foreground as a person and autonomous agent. . . . His success will in large measure depend on his skill in managing interpersonal relations.

The planner as actor, would, first of all, seem to require a sharpened knowledge of himself, a heightened consciousness of the roles he will be asked to play, and a penetrating insight into his own biases, limitations, and strengths, particularly as these reveal themselves in interpersonal situations.

THE ADVOCATES

Fragmenting the Public Interest: "If the party politicians can organize a neighborhood for voting purposes, and if the realtors can frighten a neighborhood into fascist isolationism, the progressive planners and housers had better learn how to do a little organization and education at the neighborhood level themselves." "The question is not whether planning will reflect politics but whose politics will it reflect. What values and whose values will planners seek to implement? The politics of planning . . . is subject to a pressure-group analysis."
The planning advocate's role is to defend or prosecute the interests of his clients. Advocacy planning and the representation of "disadvantaged constituencies" means the planner must be considered a key actor in the essentially political process of interorganizational decision-making. The planner must be recognized as representing a constituency rather than an alleged 'public interest.'

Expanding choices and technical assistance:

In a bureaucratic age great care must be taken that choices remain in the area of public view and participation. The advocate would have the job of informing other groups, including public agencies, of the conditions, problems and outlook of the group to be represented. informing his clients of their rights under planning and renewal laws, about the general operations of city government.

The chooser must be informed of the range of choices and of the implications of each of the choices open. This suggests that the planner ought to render explicit the implications of proposals. The planner, as an agent of his client, has the task of assisting them in understanding the range of the possible in the future and of revealing open choices.

Citizen participation then is built largely upon consultation between planning experts and the citizenry and provision of opportunity for the citizen to understand the planning proposals being made and to comment upon them. Real citizen participation in planning requires genuine understanding and interest.

"Serving as professional advocates for local groups, [planners] 'advise,' 'represent them,' 'propose,' and 'give aid.' Advocacy is a synonym for technical assistance and implies evolutionary rather than revolutionary changes in institutional or delivery systems." As "advocates for the disadvantaged . . . [planners' aid is] analogous to foreign aid, . . . insuring efficient use of funds without imposing imperialistic controls."
Support roles:

The planner [has the task] or reconciling the different and sometimes mutually contradictory ends which the same people seek. . . . The planner does not set these goals. Rather he discovers them and aids the community to define them. Having ascertained what they are, and having noted their interrelations and probable consequences, he proceeds to analyze them in order to discover whether they are capable of realization, and by what means, in what order and at what cost.  

In "an advisory relationship to that majority . . . [the planning professional] cannot assume authority without violating a fundamental principle."  

"Like a counselor, [the planner's role is to] . . . assist the community in discovering and achieving its objectives. . . . [He] considers citizens of his community to be intelligent, able to think, decide and grow."  

Process planning . . . [consequently] limits the planner to symbolic emotional support roles and unduly hampers his capacity for professional judgement as to feasibility of means and ends in any given problem situation. . . . Our concepts of optimality, our focus on an abstract welfare function, and our concern for an illusory greater good or "public interest," is brought into serious question by the framework.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROCESS OF PLANNING:* A CASE OF DISTORTED SOCIALIZATION

THE LEADER'S ROLE

Modification of the public's consciousness: "The planner . . . has come to assume the role of spokesman and guardian of the image of the ideal that Americans hold, for their cities and for many other things they must live with." The planner has thereby become the "symbolic advocate of society's subconscious values. . . . As custodian of the conscience, the greatest payoffs are likely to come in concentrated.

*See Appendix C, Part Three
efforts to modify the conscience." In our strategy of human desires . . . we should persuade people instead of forcing them to do the things we want them to do. This does not mean manipulating people against their knowledge, but inviting their cooperation based on insight and understanding. The first step . . . [however] is willingness by the public to be persuaded.

The principle of "maximum feasible participation" is more than a technical legal requirement . . . is a principle which should stand at the heart of community planning for America's future. . . . Given healthy attitudes of cooperation and mutual respect, we will have no difficulty creating the necessary structures for cooperation in planning.

**STRATEGIES FOR BEHAVIOR CHANGE**

Planning . . . [is] the closest approximation we can [make] . . . to collective rational action . . . of course, the rational behavior of individuals does not necessarily result in rational action by the community. . . . In order that a plan may result from individual rational action there must be organization and coordination of individual efforts and their articulation into a general strategy.

There are, however, "class differences in the capacity to organize" which imply that "middle-class persons who are beneficiaries of rehabilitation will be planned with [while] lower-class persons [will] be planned without." We need greatly improved tools and techniques for encouraging citizens to identify themselves with their over-all communities and to find ways for their increased participation." Such "instrumental strategies," however, tend to range "from imposition or manipulation to self-determination."

**Education for stability:** "Planning is a movement where education and the shaping of communities becomes reciprocal." Thus planning involves both "taste-making, as well as taste-serving . . . [and assumes that] citizens of the megalopolitan world must be saved from themselves . . .
the inarticulate disadvantaged are [to be] saved from a temporary ignorance of their own best interests." 180  "The higher the level of indigenous organization in a lower-class neighborhood, the poorer the prospects for renewal in that area. . . . [Hence] a protracted, subtle, and assiduous wooing of neighborhood sentiment must first take place." 181

**Therapeutic self-awareness:** The "complexity of society" places a "new demand upon our people to address themselves to the needs of the day. . . . Let there be no resort" however "to clever devices which help the expert to force specious gains at the expense of the growth, maturity, and self-reliance of the people and their established institutions of free local government." We have been "backward" in our attempts to use participation therapeutically or in "the development of a popular demand motivated by healthy self-interest." 182  "The participation of the poor" should be used "to strengthen the self-esteem of the poor" and to develop a "genuine spirit of cooperation and respect" among the planners "for the values and priorities of the people who are to be served. . . . The services must be regarded as matters of right rather than public largesse." 183

The "philosophy underlying the advocacy function is to end the feeling of dependence and passivity that usually characterize relationships between the poor and the public agencies." 184  Efforts are being made "to restore the integrity of suboptimization to those who in the past have shouldered the burdens or costs of city-wide or system-wide optimization . . . to give this same group an effective and
skillful voice in public decision-making,”¹⁸⁵ "to pave the way for the initiation of the poor into the mainstream of American life."¹⁸⁵ Thus "the community development process . . . [becomes] a group method for expediting personality growth . . . through group responsibility for the local common good.”¹⁸⁷
THE INTENTIONS BEHIND THE POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL

During the 1940's through the 1960's there were political events such as the Cold war and the McCarthy era, the 1954 school desegregation law, the ensuing march for civil rights, the peace movement, the succession of liberal Presidents, the space age, and so forth which profoundly influenced the context of American thought. Surprisingly these proceedings received little direct reference in the development of planning thought, therefore allowing us to criticize two aspects of planning theory. First that its interest in knowledge is for the sake of practical action here and now. Thus a collection of empirically derivable facts is sufficient knowledge to explain the appearance of reality and provide a base for action. It neglects however to ask how the facts or ideas arose and developed and what context they reflect, or to consider knowledge as a social product. Thus planning theory remains ahistorical and nonreflective. Second that its orientation to the world lags behind the rush of political events and follows either the push of the federal government or the pull of political theorists without a full realization of the consequent effects upon its own knowledge and interests. Let me dwell upon the latter abstraction.

Many political scientists* of the 1950's and 1960's developed elaborate models of decision-making which they empirically tested as examples of the pluralistic process by which conflicts become resolved through temporary coalitions among the represented interest groups.

*For example, Dahl, Polsby, Banfield, Altshuler, Braybrooke and Lindblom.
Along came the city planners (let me use Richard Bolan's article "Emerging Views of Planning" as an example) and ask how they can adapt the planning process to the results verified in the political scientist's studies of community decision-making. The intent as given by Bolan is to enable the planner to improve the management of urban change as well as to produce more rational public policies.

The model which planners subsequently had to attack was the ideal view that comprehensive planning could proceed to implementation because it was the embodiment of the whole public interest. Now this viewpoint had been cracking over the years, but the final blow came from the community studies which revealed that political decisions were never the resultant of "planned" outcomes. How then, asks Bolan, can planning adapt to reality? He proceeds to outline several strategies which deal with the reality of the decision process. All the models are based on the pluralist's assumption that decisions are the outcome of an interplay of interest forces. Therefore he concludes; as the number of decision-makers increase and as responsibilities become fragmented and specialized, it is no longer advisable that planning should continue under its former ideal of comprehensive policy-making. It should be recognized that plans are political agendas, that they affect various groups and interests differently. Hence plans should work both to adjust themselves to and to elicit commitment from these varying interests. They should adapt to the strategies outlined by the political analysts. Thus the descriptive analysis of competing forces becomes a normative end in itself.
It has been pointed out by Theodore Lowi\textsuperscript{189} however, that the rise of the pluralist ideology of the 1950's and 1960's was an inevitable outcome which resulted from the historical struggles to justify governmental intervention in the private sector. Returning to the 1930's, he shows that during the depression it had been impossible to justify the New Deal legislation by majority rule, i.e., the reliance on Congress as the essence of public consensus. Further complications issuing from the Cold war, McCarthyism and the investigatory curtailment of civil rights cumulatively demanded an alternative justification for governmental powers. The political arena of pressure-groups seemed a likely choice; indeed as Lowi explains, the same practices which made majority rule impossible, that of delegation of power to administrators and larger interest groups such as the unions, accorded with the political scientist's conception of the realities of power.

But this justification is exactly the opposite from that which had been offered in Scheme One; there all justifications had to spring from the people, from their court of final appeal. Harmonizing union and cooperation of all members of society was the promisory note against the predelection for individualistic competition of interests; social cohesion was mandatory over and above the conflict of interests, indeed, the private individual needed to be saved from exploitation by special interest groups and the evils of ward politics undone. Just the reverse is happening in Scheme Four. "Political reality could be grasped scientifically as a 'parallelogram of forces' among groups and the free competition of interest groups: 'the necessary composing and compromising of their differences is the practical test of what constitutes the public interest.'"\textsuperscript{190} Thus group structures decentralized and distributed
the power of the federal government, consequently justifying its interventions. Conflicts of interest were transformed from the evils of Scheme One to the beneficent consensus of Scheme Four. The "End of Ideology" had come in the act of policy-making administered by the ultimate control of official group representation. Most importantly, the political scientist had transformed a description of the way they saw power operating into a normative evaluation of the way power should operate. The planners seemed consequently to accept the political scientist's definitions of pluralism abstracted out of the historical context but with all its normative appeal. They remained unconcerned over the greater issues entailed in modern pluralism and hence abdicated a true understanding of the political strategies which they mediated.

But what about the pluralist's model? Does it so adequately reflect reality that it may be taken wholesale without criticism? Is power by nature something that can be distributed? The name of the game as defined by the political scientist is participation; hence you are only powerless if you don't participate in the decision-process. The focus then is to participate, to get the unrepresented as well as the represented group interests involved in the same arena; moreover the search involves a competition for official recognition of group interests. But I suggest, due to the constraints of the decision system, that the definition of power must go much further than sheer group participation, that the assumed model of decision behavior is only one aspect in the total question of power and decision-making. As we shall explore below, by focusing on the process of decision-making,
planning leaves out all judgments with respect to the determination of issues which are or are not essential to planning and ways to best secure their success. It leaves a whole world of system constraints to be accepted as binding. It ignores the essential considerations of potential class consciousness as a directive force and as the reflection of their internal reasoning. Finally it absorbs the political concept of participation into a governmental administrative concept.

The political model of process planning thus finds itself embedded in the historical tradition of liberal democracy and the concept of pluralism. "Contending interests," "competition of elite powers," "balance of countervailing powers," "responsible government," "accountability," "participatory democracy" are all concepts with which the process planner of the 1950's and 1960's has become familiar. Critics and supporters of the planning concept of pluralistic politics are merely positions on the opposite sides of the same coin, that is they both operate under the basic assumption that an equitable balance of contending interests would be the ideal. Arguments over power, decision-making, questions of interest representation are therefore all caught within the same pluralistic assumptions. I want consequently not to reconstruct the pluralistic arguments for more equitable participation, but instead to criticize the issues with which pluralism does not deal, to begin the search for an alternative form.

The ideology of liberal democracy: Let us review for a moment the justifying ideology of Liberal Democracy which the planners basically support. What about the concepts of a "free market of interests," "root individualism," "natural harmonization of social conflicts,"
Where do these ideas come from and what dilemmas do they bring along with their introduction into planning? These concepts, of course, are the fundamental tenets of liberalism; the view that free competition and popular rule are essential for the maintenance and stability of society. A balance of power occurs when one interest checks another thus allowing the system to simultaneously pursue multiple goals. Natural harmony or consensus equilibrium prevent the domination of any one group or interest. Again this focus tends to reverse the need for collective effort and a belief in an overriding social good which was deemed so crucial for the reforms of Scheme One. Now the evils of power are to be held in sway through open access to the struggle among interest groups. "Consensus" means believing in the American way, that is in the ultimate rules of the game defining the equality and unity of all citizens and in the power of citizen redress as an underlying control in all social contentions. Liberal ideals of reason, liberty and human dignity thus create the "natural harmony of social conflicts," the law and order of systems maintenance. Consensus politics thus does away with the need to consider basic systems contradictions and class struggles at the expense of placing an unrealistic weight upon the reality of consensus attainment, i.e., the belief in an irrational superior harmony. A concentration which is quite difficult to uphold in light of the ruthless competition among political interests. It is just this tradition of self-perpetuating consensus, however, that forms many of our misunderstandings and misinterpretations for it stands outside of the socially determined distortions of relationships among groups and the self-understanding of individuals, of the fundamental presuppositions involving authority and legitimations.
"Root individualism" as the legitimizing base of power raises the issue of the paradox of pluralism. Since it is no longer possible to achieve full participation in a highly complex industrialized society, some mediating device is necessarily required. To this end, the process model has reinterpreted individual interests as group interests. But as Adam Smith himself had evidently pointed out, there exists an inherent spirit within groups that "naturally" tends toward the authority of a few whereby group goals and values become distorted. Adam Smith reveals this inherent tendency of collective endeavors to subvert justice as a consequence of the inequality of property distribution and the subsequent need for many to depend upon the directives of a few. His remedies, of course, are to maintain a free competition among individuals and a limited governmental agenda. Today the paradox enters in because the application of Adam Smith's recommendations at the group level necessarily involve introducing the distortions of the "power elite" or the managing few. Thus the remedy either introduces more interest groups into the competition, that is the unrepresented or unorganized, or calls for the addition of a governmental "legislator" or umpire, thereby increasing the government's "agenda." Neither solution can today solve the basic objection of either Adam Smith or James Madison, for that matter, which held that

---

*Adam Smith's terminology was "corporation spirit" and "collective endeavors."

†C. W. Mills was one of several critics to point out the bias of power of the corporate elite during the 1950's. Other critics of the 1960's have been Baran and Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, and Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man.

^See The Federalist Papers #10.
factions or collectives are necessarily evil.

It appears that the arguments of process planning end up to be merely over the strategy to be applied in order to sustain a more pluralistic society. Moreover all solutions seem to rely upon the ability of any interest to organize itself, or be organized, and thereby restrict the competition to play among organized interests. In the effort to extend the access to as many interests as possible the competitors overlook the fact that groups may struggle against irreconcilable contradictions inherent to the competitive system itself. Instead "participatory democracy" is based upon the optimistic note that a "free market of interests" ensures the progress and stability of society. But it appears that the market metaphor extended to the political arena misfocuses the reality of the political process. As R. P. Wolff¹ has shown, manufacturers unlike political competitors do not have to withdraw their goods upon the appearance of superior products. But this is what pluralistic planners misconstrue; they consider themselves as competing producers of interests. Acting like a manufacturer seeking profits they turn planning debates into advertising battles or the "control for pictures in the public's head."

From the experience of advertising, we know that "free competition" does not always produce the best advantage for everyone and that it mostly results in the domination of middle class standards. As we shall point out the strategy involving the legitimacy of represented interests is not the only question to raise but also questions related to the meaning and bias of group participation and its resultant
fragmentation of consciousness, that is of nongroup direct action politics, which should be of vital concern to the strategy of planning.

Democratic process planning: Citizenship and participation became dominant concerns during the 1950's and 1960's, first as a question of national loyalt during the internal and external divisions of the cold war years and second as fundamental issues of civil rights and "equality for all" during the 1960's.

The formative force of American national unity has been, then, the idea of citizenship; through this concept the integration of state and society into a nation has been achieved. The identification of the people with the state as citizens has meant participation in political power and the enjoyment of order and security, of civil rights and communal benefits. [13]

"Citizenship" however means not only the passive enjoyment of these values, but for the pluralists it becomes the creator and guarantor of stability and hence the promise of continual enjoyment. But as we have seen before in Scheme One, the question of universal citizenship rests upon several basic assumptions.

Responsibility: First of all is the social concept of "responsibility": it is accepted that freedom and the success of democracy require "responsible" citizens. Although the meaning of "responsible" can reduce itself to an invective against those to blame for the failures of our society and in particular to blame "the poor" for the deterioration of the order of the urban environment, this is not the intention of the classical liberals. A rational order of society arises only when men assume a responsible position on all public decisions. The ultimate justification of social and political action rests on the existence of morally civilized, reasonable, thoughtful and informed
citizens. Only if they elect wise and capable leaders and create popular institutions to control abuses of power can freedom and democracy survive. Thus it seemed natural in the years of anxiety during the 1950's to seek a more rational society, in particular to avoid the turmoil of mass pressure politics, by reinforcing stability through citizen involvement in the liberal's ideal of "voluntary associations."

The "Great Society" in the words of John Dewey during the 1920's was a society in which the ever-expanding and intricately ramifying consequences of associated activities shall be known in the full sense of that word, so that an organized, articulate Public comes into being.

Lyndon B. Johnson would re-echo these principles in his 1960's dreams of "The Great Society."

Legitimations: More importantly, however, participation and self-direction are deemed necessary to justify governmental intervention and to avoid direct administrative manipulation of private lives. The broader the participatory base, moreover, the more likely accountability and hence rationality will be. "Professionalization of citizenship" compels the individual to become an expert in citizen affairs, to perform his decision-making role as rationally and efficiently as possible. Hence in the 1960's, "participation" becomes institutionalized and consequently reified, thereby relieving it of its potentially disruptive effects. Thus rationality turns into adaptive citizen behavior. "Responsibility" becomes restricted to areas directed by governmental action and not answerable to a real democratization of responsibility. Even in programs of community control, the local or federal governments defined the participatory rules, i.e., program
directives such as the quantity and type of goods and services to be delivered, the locality to be served, etc. Reified participation, however, conceals the intent by institutionalizing participation into government programs such as Model Cities and the poverty programs it allows for accountability at the expense of exploisible criticism, that is community groups become ritual formulas. "Professionalization" focuses on the new kind of "functionaries" citizens need to be in a highly industrialized society: conditioned, cooperative, behavior depoliticizes the normative "ought"-order in which agreement becomes a pre-determined concept thereby reducing the meaning of "consent" to a supportive position.

By stressing the educational intent of participation it emphasizes the technological concept that man finds himself in and through productive associations. Professional participants then find themselves struggling for the organization, development and defense of their group rather than against fundamental contradictions inherent to the government-citizen relationship. Citizen decision-making thus becomes an instrument for action, a conservative force organized to execute particular governmental affairs and unable to adapt to a broader more "popular" mandate. By focusing on decision-making, effectuations and efficiency of actions, participation distorts the idea of consent of the governed. It is, moreover, a misrepresentation to assume that participation, as an educative device, will remain free from the biases of its context. Participation in a pre-defined governmental role is not the same event as participation in a voluntary self-directed manner. The former gains limited power and ties the
participant to the social status quo while the latter struggles against the liberal division of powers between the government and the citizen, representing a belief in the concept that power of control is inherently indivisible and belongs to the people. In the meaning of Herbert Marcuse, "rationality" has moved from Weber's definition related to the displacement of irrational, unreasonable citizens to the displacement of capacities to control or criticize determined purposive action. "Citizen training" thus becomes a measure for securing an asymmetrical structuring of participatory relations which favors the government's power. Justification of governmental interventions, therefore, can not be accepted as based on free agreement and unlimited discussion, i.e., on non-distorted consensus.
GROUP THEORY OF PLURALISTIC PLANNING

In times of crises it is most common for societies to rely on the effect of groups to control irrational and unstable elements that might disrupt still further the social instability. Already in the anxieties of the 1920's, group life had alleviated the worst fears and in turn offered new support for planning. In the deep crisis following the 1929 depression, a public response required both a renewed collective spirit in support of governmental programs and a strengthened democratic base through local community groups. Thus planning of the post-World War Two years inherited a tradition of decentralized authority. As we shall see, with the increased federal and technocratic involvement in the private sphere, with the fear of communist centralism, with the threat of atomic disintegration if we failed to cooperate, and with the pressure of increasing urban violence and so forth, there occurred during the 1950's and 1960's a "crisis of authority." Now the issue became quite clear--how best to decentralize authority and draw as many
participants as possible into the decision-making process. Traditionally, decentralization had been facilitated through "voluntary associations" but as the tension increased over abstract impersonal processes, the group structures were themselves adjusted to more participatory functions.

The group, as we have seen, is the basis of liberal pluralism. Nevertheless, the concept of "group" has a genetic relationship with the conservative theorists of the 19th century. The beginnings of social pluralism, Robert Nisbet argues, find their source in the problems incurred by the destructive impact of the French revolution on the social groups of the family, church and guilds. The social group was the only source of security for the individual. The fortunes of the revolution, that is equality and freedom for all men and a share in political power, meant nothing for the individual who stood alone against the centralized power of the state. It is only through the non-political social groups, the intermediary level of society, that the political power of the State could be checked and man could enjoy a full sense of freedom. Authority, argues the conservative, reinforces the individual if it is legitimate but it is only legitimate when it comes from the traditions of the people, when it is shaped by the social group and rises hierarchically from the individual to his family, to his community, to his class and eventually to society. Social pluralism, then, is a check against state despotism but it is also a check against mass control and rapid change. Since the group disciplines the values and behavior of the individual, belonging or participation are of paramount importance. Harley Shands
has suggested that participation is a matter of following the leader such that "faith" or "belief," i.e., the natural law of the group, becomes more important in promoting group solidarity than the participants' achievements. Thus groups, as self-regulating mechanisms and moderators of social order and authority, become the center of focus while the inquiry into social change shifts to a study of social order. Security and continuity are assured through the trial and error functionings and compromises of social groups which progressively commit the individual to the primacy of stable democratic society.

As it has been described, the group is the intermediary force between the individual and society. However the focus varies, for the conservative finds his interest to be in the junction between groups and society while the liberal's attention is directed to the individual as an element of the group. Group structures and functions become quite different as a result of the analyzer's focus and there is a long history of research into the affiliation of society, community and the individual. The question these classifications raise for the planners become important when it is realized that the planner's shift of focus during the 1950's and 1960's has moved from the collective group of the conservatives to the personal group of the liberals. It is important to understand the problems which created these reactions but also to remember the limitations in general of group theory.

Let us look first at what Erich Kahler\textsuperscript{196} has called the "collective group" or the traditional "voluntary association" which has been described in Scheme Two.
For the purpose of an industrial society, this group is an abstract group which stresses, over and above the individual, the "common shared assumptions," the universal priorities which enable the group to be nonpartisan, and the rational interests which assure compromise, agreement and unity. Such groups represent a "compound of interests," or a "solidarity of components," and it is interesting to note that a meaning of the verb form of "compound" is "to compromise," "to agree" and that of "solidarity" is the quality of a "perfect coincidence of interest." The "public interest" then arises out of the "common needs," "common code" of the group and pervades all the functions which relate the group to society.

As an industrialized society becomes more and more specialized and functionalized, i.e., rationalized, the "common interest" becomes further removed from group control and hence more liable to distorted interpretations as the group leaders turn into a class of intermediaries or "advisors" developed to carry out the rational directives of "the public interest." From then forward, the group becomes a functionary, in total sympathy with the established ends, which operates to assure action that may be completely adverse to its own concerns, to standardize and stabilize the "base" for social and political plans. The public and private interests become fused, they are themselves a "compound" united in the interests of the whole. But this is precisely what Marcuse\textsuperscript{199} claims is the irrationality of rationalization for in the end harmony, unity and order must be constituted from an irrational "natural" source, i.e., "the public interest" which itself lies beyond the bounds of rational justification and is removed from the limits of
individual criticism. Of course, the "irrational" public interest is unable to provide an "ultimate end," the source from which would come the good society and individual happiness. This is what Georg Lukacs referred to as reification: when the understanding of the totality of human relations disappears from the individual's consciousness, when reality loses its transparency and becomes opaque and when men lose control of their active direction and become disorganized. It appears then, that as long as the issues and conflicts between the public and private interests are neither important nor emotional then the assumed universal authority of a public interest can hold the consciousness of the social groups together, but when tensions become overt then the groups become sensitized to the distortive abuse of authority and the struggle for the justification of abstract controls begins.

In certain areas of consciousness, this is what happened during the 1960's with the shift to more personal participatory groups, i.e., the second form of citizen participation. Now the group becomes the active "synthesizer" of multiple interests and no longer the passive container and the functionary is replaced by local do-it-yourself participants. The liberal concerns which look out for injustice and the tyrannical use of authority become doctrinal. The issues of "the public interest" and nonpartisanship dissolve in the "contentions" against universal authority and predetermined standards, in the question of "in whose interest," and "in whose wisdom." The individual thus becomes part of the plan for he alone can best express his needs and problems. No one can know the group's interests except for the individual members themselves. The group's interests is then found from
a "synthesis" of the "self-interests" of the members,* a "blend" in the sense of "passing imperceptibly into each other," or an "amalgam" in the form of "an intimate mixture of any two or more substances."

Sensitive to the power of the centralized authority, the group struggles against purposes which are other than their own, although it remains subject to the power of the most forceful interests among its own elements. As long as the challenges are directed from the outside, the group can mobilize to fight its adversaries, but without a specific context in which to struggle the group can not always find its role and dissolves until another issue threatens to erupt and another group forms.

In Scheme Two, I discussed the change in the concept of "control" from regulatory to constitutive rules. In the latter case, the context of the group provides the appropriate behavior rules as opposed to the a priori or normative orders of control of the former. Again in Scheme Four, we are also referring to regulatory and constitutive rules but another dimension has been introduced in a shift from abstract to personal orders of meaning. This is quite similar to Basil Bernstein's dichotomy between positional and personal families. Bernstein describes the positional family as having well defined relationships among family members, that is, status and boundaries between members are clearly outlined and strong, differentiation of members is unambiguous, authority is clear-cut and roles are sharply outlined, obligations and privileges have formal patterns. Thus we have our positional groups of citizen participation where final authority rests with the elected representative and the official agency, where citizens

*The reader should refer to the discussion of private self-interests in the previous chapter.
know their contributions and don't attempt to assume authority, where citizens criticize only when necessary and for the most part support a rational and clear program.

The personal family on the other hand has weak and flexible boundaries between members, differentiation is a matter of individual differences, relationships are egocentric and roles are self-defined, attributes of members become most important, and ambiguity and ambivalence are never suppressed. So we find the personal group of our second form of citizen participation where local values are most important, where "self-control," "self-direction," define the relationships, where disparate interests, inequalities and conflicts are fully voiced, and where roles are defined as the concept of public purpose changes. But is this form of participatory behavior more freely determined than the prior form?

The point of constitutive rules is that control is defined as a product of rule oriented behavior. The mechanisms of group behavior, that is the wisdom and direction of the leaders, the well defined tasks and lines of authority, moderate the behavior of individual members and
turn the whole group into a functional force upon which the planners can rely. In the eyes of the socialized participants, moreover, the greater system becomes rational. If the personal group is also to be a constitutive group then it appears two things may happen. First the lines of authority may be changed to a more interactive process where hierarchical authority is split horizontally and control is obtained through the commitment of individual members to each other and to the task they must perform. In this case, the personal group becomes co-opted into a task force; ego-centric values are placed in the service of the government project, political contention is accepted but only as it is related to the advisory force which congeals the group and compels it forward into action. One way or another, it is essential that choices be stated and decisions made. This is similar to what T. Lowi refers to as the "corporatizing of the governmental-group nexus." Local participatory groups have now become part of the official implementors and legislators of governmental programs. "Partnership" is the control of and key to corporativistic success. "Creative federalism" and "participatory democracy" become the pluralistic solutions for parcelling power out among the central and local governments and non-governments. Supposedly governmental coercion loses its full intent but the struggle for local control and the imperatives for responsive action suggest their own forms of compelling authority.

Second, the personal constitutive group creates what can be called a paradox of participation, which dramatically limits its potential effect. Since "participatory democracy" is an effort to
make more men competent and responsible it necessarily must begin with incompetent and irresponsible participants. Consequently unsound, and probably un-implementable, decisions must be produced long before a level of competent decision-making has arisen. There is more to the paradox than the incapacities and myopic view of local participatory groups, however. There exists also a contradiction embedded in the faith of the people as the final authority and the degradation of the faith in the expert. Fear of the centralized authority and the expert and their subsequent power exists alongside of the intellectual incapability of any one individual to comprehend the totality of society's knowledge. On top of this dilemma lies the increase in global power of the technocrats, since World War Two, which virtually monopolizes the decision-making authority leaving a much diminished realm for indigenous choice. "Equality of power," whatever that means, "local control," and "participation in decision-making," these are the liberal pluralist's source of power. His fears of illegitimate and distortive authority, although I use the terms myself, in the face of the expansion of knowledge in the hands of a few have created the "paradox of participation." In some areas the participant is forced to rely on technical advice; it becomes impossible to attend the thousands of meetings which bear on his decision power and so he must be able to trust in a representative to express his opinions, and finally he must extend his consciousness beyond the local participatory level to technocracy's horizons if he really seeks an active control. In all this it seems the issue must revolve around the trust and faith
in suitable leadership and the development of, what Lucien Goldmann has called a "potential consciousness."

I find a rather abstract essay by David R. Bell is helpful in clarifying the confusion over authority and distortive power on one hand and faith and trust on another. Let me try to paraphrase his argument. Bell begins with the suggestion that "authority" belongs to the family of concepts which includes "knowledge," "belief," "evidence" and "justification" rather than that of "power," "imperative control," "order" and "command." His argument suggests that authority is linked as much to epistemological concerns as it is to political and social philosophy. It is the liberal's and the closely related positivist's concept of "authority" which seems to have confused the issue. To support his arguments, Bell returns to Locke, the so-called father of political liberalism. Men, Locke had argued, acquire knowledge not because of authoritatively dictated principles of unquestionable truths but because of simple ideas of sense and reflection and then, later, by abstracting and deducing from their base. "Authority," for Locke and the liberals subsequently, is defined in terms of a form of domination between men which is always in the interests of the dominator.

Bell finds that a simple confusion is compounded by viewing "knowledge as power" rather than "knowledge sometimes results in power." Dependence of the ruled upon ruler with his co-related imperatives is then viewed as coercive authority. Such a position however negates the fact that the dependent often obeys not out of fear or coercion but out of a belief in the validity or appropriateness of the directives
as matters of fact or practical advice. Authority, Bell argues, must account for this concept of "beliefs as to right."

The problem seems to stem from the emphasis Locke placed on the self-reliant knower. But in spite of Locke's suggestions, reality has it that first hand knowledge of experience is unequally distributed in a community of scholars and somewhere there must be individuals who accept knowledge on trust from others who they believe to have primary knowledge. Then authority is made possible by a relationship among people whereby firsthand knowledge is diffused or shared throughout the system. It is in the political and social context, however, that the trusting characteristic of authority becomes problematic. The sharing of knowledge necessarily takes place in a social and political context. In order, therefore, for one to believe the rightness of the directives issued, that context must ensure that the ruler's judgments be competent. Thus Bell finds the idea of authority belongs to both the fields of epistemology and sociology, for authority must arise from knowledge as well as the social context in which the knowledge is shared and put into action. Hence, we find "communities of belief," be they religious sects or scientific communities, in which the unity of its members is a direct consequence of the "authoritative" use of shared knowledge, in which the justification and criticism of authority proceeds from its ability to satisfy the deficiency for which it is a remedy.

Knowledge as directives or advice loses its objectivity if the social context does not ensure its validity. It is here in dialogue that "knowledge on belief" and objective knowledge intermingle.
Jacques Monod has pointed out that authentic dialogue or action is possible only if the two spheres of values and knowledge are preserved as distinct yet associated categories. Objective knowledge, he argues, may be value-free but the very acceptance of the principle of objectivity itself constitutes an ethical choice. This choice defines the basis of an ethical system in which man alone is responsible for the powers of science, for the ideals towards which he reaches. Thus ethical man is required to use objective knowledge with the full recognition of its ethical implications, to create institutions, i.e., the social context, which would preserve and extend the ethical base of ideas of knowledge.

Returning to the original discussion of authority and city planning, it appears that some authority based on knowledge must take place if we are to improve the conditions of life in our environment. This necessarily involves us in the discussion of the authenticity and responsibility of communication and action based on the mutuality of trust and the explicit narrowness and distortions of instrumental strategies based on the concept of rational action. So we return to our theme throughout this thesis of the concepts of "objectivity," "rationality," and "order" and the related problematics of "authority" and "legitimacy" embedded within the structure of ideas of technical planning and the need to reverse the relationships among them such that knowledge is not gained solely by an objective or subjective stance but as well through a process of communication and interaction. Similarly the question is not one of imperative control and order but of the ideal of self-reflective understanding that would destroy the need for illegitimate powers of authority.
Thus we find ourselves in the pursuit of a critical concept of planning. I have been throughout this thesis in the process of critically reflecting upon the kind of things planners say they do, the concepts they use and the presuppositions which they have taken for granted. I have most explicitly been critical of the technical interest of rational and instrumental action, an interest which has influenced the epistemological basis of planning research and practice. But I have not, up until now, directly considered an alternative interest. It is the concern with the context-dependent understanding of "trust" and "shared knowledge" which brings this issue to the forefront. Throughout this thesis I have tried to keep within the tradition of the historical-hermeneutical sciences in an attempt to allow the historical context of the language of planning to aid us in arriving at a "sensible understanding" of what the "facts" might mean. "Understanding" has meant a search for the historical "reasons" for planning assumptions and positions as opposed to the "causes" of such actions. This tradition, however, can also be the basis of a self-reflective understanding of planning action, one in which the technical interest of order might be replaced by the interest in emancipation through "self-knowledge."

As the concept of "authority" is related to the family of words such as "power," "imperative control," "order," and "command" by the technical interest in knowledge, so "authority" is related to the family of words such as "belief," "trust," "justification," "intersubjectivity," "consciousness" and "self-reflection" through the interest in emancipation. Gadamer has claimed that authority is
rooted in "insight" as a hermeneutical process. This means that authority is justified through a self-reflective process such that we understand the determination and development of past events and the implications of their consequences. Thus we become emancipated as we bring to conscious awareness the prejudgments which historically shape our understanding or reality. Experience of practical life and of tradition is ever and again bringing to light new interpretations so that our pre-understanding is constantly being reshaped, but understanding can not exist separated from intersubjective communication. Language provides understanding for it is both the medium in and through which we interpret the world as well as the reservoir of our tradition. It is also the medium through which we communicate intersubjectively without domination; it is the way we begin to understand the actions and works of others. As I have studied the historical language of planning, have allowed it to influence my prejudgments and understanding of planning action, so too understanding of different points of view among communities or societies can be acquired through a dialectical unity of the forms or usage of language, the practical necessities of a given situation, and the forms and institutions of life.

In the context of planning, then, the problem of understanding must be placed in the discrepancies between the theory and practice of the public and private spheres. The public sphere with its interest in progress and stability and the private sphere of self-understanding and self-growth in reference to the everyday world and its traditions. As Habermas has said, these spheres distinguish two concepts of rationalization; one at the level of systems of purposive rational
action which I explored in the technical interest and another at
the institutional level which allows for free non-distorted com-
munication of the public with respect to the suitability and
desirability of socio-cultural repercussions of expanding systems of
purposive rational action. Each sphere therefore must be allowed to
confront and correct the other if coercion is to be avoided.
Radnitzky has continued this theme by pointing out that in an
open society mediation of these interests is by means of free communi-
cation of "mature" citizens and not in a dogmatic resolution from
above. It must be kept in mind that the emancipation of humanity is
mediated through the emancipation of individuals and vice versa.
Thus, Radnitzky continues, if the individual wishes to emancipate
himself he must participate in the emancipation of humanity and in
return society must work toward the full emancipation of all
citizens. Individuals are thus seen as responsibly seeking to deepen
the understanding and knowledge of society by their participation and
contributions. G. H. Mead has said,

universal discourse is the formal idea of communication. If
communication can be carried through and made perfect, then
there would exist the kind of democracy . . . in which each
individual could carry just the response in himself that he
knows he calls out in the community. That is what makes
communication in the significant sense the organizing process
in society.  

Ideally, "democracy is then the practical-political realization
of the idea of the re-foundation of all institutions through the
meta-institution of language . . . of the free discussion of each and
every case by 'all with all.'" However the prescriptive model of
democratic dialogue presupposes that the "other" with whom one
communicates already accepts the emancipatory interest. Dialogue then
involves the "co-understanding" of the community of communication amongst each other and with the past. The criticist frame becomes none other than the presupposition of all dialogue, of a free exchange of positions in both thought and discussion which aims to understand society as a whole.

A problem still remains, however, in the creation of institutions of unforced or non-distortive citizen dialogue. Such institutions would depend upon the process of translation in the pursuit of agreement from the public into the private sphere and back again at all levels of decision and policy-making. The necessity lies in the creation of new channels by which the individual can be related to abstract social decisions and categories. This brings us back again to the problem of public opinion because communication of "all with all" is in reality impossible. This time however, instead of a priori valuations of the public interest, the concept of public opinion must be mediated through an ideal discourse of citizen dialogue, a concept which necessitates reinstating, as Habermas has described it, the politicization of the mass and the public realm as a political institution. It is only through an open dialogue that justification of doubtful authority can be obtained. Along with the increased citizen role however there must also be a politicization of the planning profession if the intent is to try to understand society as a whole. It appears that both sides of the dialogue must take no organization or institution of society for granted, no constraints or pressures of society that cannot potentially be changed. So we must also look at the constraints of planning if we wish to create a truly emancipatory dialogue.
THE EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS OF PLANNING

Accepting knowledge or advice on the "belief as to right" requires the necessity for both participants in a dialogue to communicate "in good faith." This requires on the part of the planner that his message should not be unduly influenced or hindered by external constraints and that he should not capitulate to forces within the structure of communication which would favor certain distortive positions. "Truth" and "justification" become part of the ideal communication process where no remark or motive needs to be left unexplored or uncriticized. As Habermas has already said, "only then does the peculiarly unforced compulsion of a better argument dominate, a compulsion which lets the methodical examination of assertions competently come into operation and which can rationally motivate a decision on practical questions."299 Such an ideal model of communication necessitates, above all, that technical planning accept itself as a moral activity in the full awareness of what "moral" entails. Planning is consequently required to develop its own ethical principles. This means that the planning profession must be aware that governmental standards and directives are a response to pressure politics and it must therefore assert its own independent position, arguing for its own
special contributions, its own social philosophy. Planning must become conscious of both what it is doing and the reason why. This requires that planning forsake its mediator role and establish itself, ethically, as a self-dependent, self-reflective profession. I will return to the implications of the mediator role in the next section; here I want to develop the concept of critical planning in its relationship to distortive authority, in particular with respect to the politicizing of participation by replacing group interaction which is within administrative control with a fully accountable dialogue.

This brings us to a consideration of the constraints of liberal democracy within which planning now operates. I will begin by questioning the institutional constraints provided by the increased interest of the Federal government in the project of planning and this will develop into the subsequent issues of choice and consciousness.

Walter Buckley in Sociology and Modern Systems Theory has stated that systems organization derives from a set of actors who are rule-followers and their interactions with each other and with an environment whose constraints are too rich to be covered by rules. For the planner and the public these constraints should be problematic and therefore should not be defined as external to the system or institutional operations. If they are held as external then this implies for the participatory decision-maker that there exist certain areas of participation, certain kinds of decisions which lie beyond his interest or involvement. This, of course, destroys the potential of open dialogue.
Herb Gintis claims there are two modes of organizing decisions: institutionally and politically. On one hand there are the economic institutions, far removed from the average citizen, which direct the major capitalist decision mechanism and on the other hand there exist the political decisions which we can witness in the pull and tug of the political arena. The institutional decisions, by placing themselves outside the political context, from the constraints of our social environment. They are the decisions in which the participant is never involved. To change the rules or behavior of the system, to use the terminology of Buckley, we must change the constraints of the institutional decisions.

For the participatory planner then the institutional constraints mean the amount of money which is allotted for poverty or community development programs; the form in which the money is to be offered, such as housing for the elderly, transportation, pollution control; the functioning of the private market mechanism in such areas as land values and business district redevelopment; the private ownership of land and business; the regulations and requirements of the labor market and the level of incomes and wages, and so forth. Participation confined to the political level of decision-making reveals the battles between City Hall and the community over the allocation of determined amounts of money and services; over income redistribution and job retraining; over legitimate community representatives and the community’s rights to control the neighborhood once the money arrives. The participant is basically involved in the allocation of services and commodities for predetermined needs and problems such as the minimum
level of standard housing, job training or education enrichment, but he does not have the choice of exchanging money for housing into money for education, money for transportation into money for food, or to switch the services and money from community to community. Fragmenting the sources of money and program directives into many pieces only complicates the problem of choice.

On top of the economic constraints, there exists the expanded role of the federal government and its own set of judgments and constraints. Since the New Deal, the government has stressed the concepts of "cooperative partnership" by which it has involved an increased number of official groups in the bargaining process over the redistribution of governmental powers. The division of powers however has only multiplied the forces at play such that all governmental programs seem to be distilled in a suffocating bureaucracy. The government has appeared as an "arbiter" of contending forces ensuring the representation and organization of weak groups and shoring up the local levels of state and metropolitan interests. "Creative federalism" has meant that local groups and organizations have had to bargain directly with federal powers invested in the state and metropolitan governments. Increasing the number of official groups and allowing the local governments to wield veto power and "leverage" over neighborhood proposals have nearly created a mandatory necessity for consensus and partnership among the organized groups. The acceptance, since the New Deal, of interest-group liberalism as the official government ideology has enabled the government to deal only with organized groups and it has placed a premium on "cooperation" and "consensus" as well.
More than this, however, the "federal helping hand" has found the justification of its programs and policies to be in the expert's advice as to the "efficiency" and equity of program delivery, the effects of social control, the ability to "think big," and "recommend parametric changes," as opposed to the terms of desirability and relevancy which belong to areas of citizen judgment.

Government aid moreover has not been a free gift. In return the community must produce significant changes. It must become more productive and self-reliant in measures which range from decision-making to the tax base. Many contradictions arise, however, in the relationships between the exercises of governmental power and the local residents. Above all, the government puts pressure on "positive" action based on consensus, a pressure which at times amounts to coercive federal legislation since there is no other unifying link between the contending positions. At depth, it may be the discrepancies resulting from the separate identifications of vital community problems which is at issue, but on the surface it is a question of terminating the discussions and getting the action and delivery begun. On the part of the federal functionaries this means a job well done, on the part of the neighborhood participants it may mean accepting action they do not want and in the long run submitting to governmental hegemony beyond the point of decision-making. From the point of view of the functionaries however, the choice should also be involved around the "insight" of program definitions and locations. "Dropping out," or negative action in participation should remain a real possibility for the neighborhood in violation of the so-called governmental rules of bargaining.
It appears, however, that the interest in action distorts the context in which participation is defined. The positive vocabulary stressing the "balance of rights," "cooperation," "partnership," "shared power," "consolidation," "creative federalism" reveal only the value system of liberal pluralism. These predefinitions of group interaction exaggerate the autonomy of the local groups and alienates them from real control over their life-questions. By avoiding the contentiousness of conflict the pluralists deny the reality of leaders and the led and consequently involve themselves in serious errors. In Scheme Two the planners were fully aware of the desirability of group politics precisely because it allowed them an access to the group's behavior through the middle class leader. Now in Scheme Four the problematic control of the leader has been dispensed with, not because group politics have advanced beyond the necessity of leaders and the led but simply because "participatory politics" calls for equal sharing of power. As Antonio Gramsci has put it, "the first point is that there do in fact exist rulers and ruled, leaders and led. The whole of the science and art of politics is based on this primordial, irreducible fact."²² The reality of this fact then necessitates its inclusion in order to question whether the power of the leader can be minimized or dissolved. But this reality can not be willed away by positive predefinitions on the side of the rulers.

This brings us to the passivity of the led. Perhaps for some the local battles contesting the program directives from city hall describe the participatory pageant as an active battleground. More important, however, is the question of why the participatory groups are
resigned to struggle over a field constrained by government and economic specifications. Why have they not struck out for specific institutional ends which would involve them in program decision-making as opposed to local political problems? This leads us still further into the question of fragmentation vs. class consciousness. Liberal pluralism has supposed that social reality is composed of an "insuperable plurality" of particular groupings which necessarily obscures the nature of the totality of social life. At the level of participatory planning, social reality is defined as so many "territorially" or "minority" representative groups. Either way, the issue is to capture neighborhood control from city hall or some other definition of outside interveners in the group's internal affairs. "Neighborhood power," however, should not be the first goal to be achieved but the final. If it becomes the first priority then consciousness will never arise because it has been intentionally fragmented, and abstracted into a neighborhood or minority closure. The life of minorities or a specific neighborhood is determined by greater institutions which lie beyond the rules involved in the participatory game; neighborhood control without changing these institutional rules means nothing. "Consciousness" means an awareness of society's opportunities and one's past, present, and future relationships to them. It means more than the "localized" awareness of one's specific needs.

Gintis has redefined the working class as a totality of all elements compounding the white-collar-bureaucratic and service strata which extends from unskilled to managerial "labor." Because of the fragmenting impact of productive relations and activities on the various types of workers, they no longer experience a common subculture, i.e.,
they have no social consciousness. They have therefore no base for solidarity or political action except their self-estrangement, i.e., alienation brought about because of the conditions of production and consumption. The raising of consciousness on a mass basis, therefore, becomes a vital strategy. There are parallels between Gintis' argument and the piecemeal participation role which I have defined above.

To admit that the democratic rights of participation have been denied to the minority groups is not enough. To say that this denial is unjust is merely to say that our sense of justice or morality is affronted, it is never to ferret out the contradictions of our society which produce these injustices. Participation in administratively defined groups needs therefore to be replaced by political participation of mass politics if institutional constraints are to be part of the dialogue. This is no more than a repetition of the common criticisms which are leveled at irrational strategies of the Black Power advocates, the Women's Caucus, the Young Lords and similar radical splinter groups, that is, that although they exist at the junction of true class consciousness they can not succeed in achieving their demands unless they can gain support on a mass basis. Instead their rewards, gained more as concessions than rights, will be piecemeal palliatives measured more for their successes in pacifying social stress than for their mutations of the rules of the game. The point is that real needs can only be met by restructuring the institutional constraints and this, it seems, can only be achieved through the strategy of consciousness based on the dialectic between individual life experience and social reality, i.e., the understanding of how the individual is both structured by and an influence upon society.
The definition of pluralistic participation appears therefore to take on a one-sided perspective in which the constraints of the dialogue act to deny the participant a full awareness of alternative situations and potentialities by freezing him to the functional needs of a fragmented group. The participant is abstracted into a set of encapsulated characteristics which define the needs and concerns of a particular neighborhood or minority. This obscures the true nature of his total political, social and life-needs. The participant's ability to relate to others is predefined by the given participatory situation and the demands which he is expected to represent. His influence as a full member of the dialogue is considerably diminished. Fragmented out of the total situation, the ideal participant is fitted with only those characteristics that the situation seems to demand. He has no understanding of the total situation nor the historical contradictions which keep him and others frozen into objects and thus prevented from radical change in their own self-development. A strategy to overcome these distortions would aim at the total consciousness of the individual as a member of the alienated and powerless working class, as a member of society that aims to satisfy all needs through meaningless commodities, as a product of an educational system which socializes individuals into acceptable roles and so forth, a strategy which seeks to raise the full consciousness of the individual in terms of the ever changing social and historical conditions of his life structure. Thus the problem of consciousness is linked indeterminably with the concepts of intersubjectivity and self-understanding, i.e., the criticist framework.
THE PLANNING MEDIATOR

True to his model of reality, the process planner places himself at the junction of two or more interacting components. Whether the planner's strategy is that of an expert, an arbiter or an advocate he represents, in all professional roles, the buffer between levels of government and some concept of "the public." The "keeper of the balance" however appears to perceive the world through opaque lenses. His position relating both to the centralized and decentralized powers is compromised by contradictory claims of nonpartisan and partisan valuations. Let me explain. The planner requests to be both a "nonarbitrary," "nonpartisan agent" and at the same time to "affirm his prescriptions of client's needs." He never "takes sides for or against the community" on the other hand he "identifies with the community goals." In sum, he seems to hold an ambiguous position between the principles of planning and his intent to "affirm the client's position." He seems to both protest the authoritarian planner at the same time he is dedicated to the rationality of his intentions. The planner may know best but he is or is not telling, depending upon the situation.

The problem of values for the planner revolves around a specific context. Can he authoritatively assert autonomous values from his special privilege of insight and knowledge or must he become involved in the given situation in order to interpret and clarify the value contentions? Either stance, it appears to me, is a different application of the same presupposition which refers to the justification by which a planner is confirmed as nonpartisan or, under the pretension of
partisanship, as an honest advocate. This can be phrased more specifically by asking what assumptions enable the planner to say "what is" or "what should be" in the realm of value determinations. At one end the reply is an objective decision buttressed by facts. At the other end the response is prefaced by the need to know "whose values are being represented" by the partisan informer. It is not, however, sufficient for the planner to involve himself in contending values, his or others; but he must also search to understand his own values and his perception of other's values as they relate to his concept of human nature and social reality. For those in the pursuit of action and progress the interruption of motives of values is, no doubt, irritating. To question beyond seems inexcusable, except that it is there where we shall find a relationship to the other forms and organizations of process planning.

The planner is above all dedicated to the view of man as a rational being and subsequently to the process of planning as a rational mediation among forces for the sake of unity or balance. Harmony is possible because all men basically share in the same universal values. Conflicts, protests, disputes can be resolved through rational, unemotional, considerations. We have returned to these themes again and again. As the administering arbiter, the planner becomes the very embodiment of the liberal rational man; regardless of the social, political or cultural context the rational man is embued with universal values ensuring "consensus," "smooth decision-making," and "mutual adjustment." By defining the systemic contradictions and inequalities in the light of universal reason, the liberal planner's ideology, which has ever
sought to suppress conditions of conflict, is reinforced. Even the
negative protests of the advocates seem to stress the optimistic
intent of the "reconciler" and "educator" if only all voices achieve
full expression.

Because of his faith in the rational man, the planner claims
to be "client-centered" and non-directive. Trust and faith are
solicited not as a result of a long involvement between the planner and
his client, nor from a tradition of beneficial directives, but
because the planner claims to "submerge his personal interests" on
behalf of his client's interests. This may in reality be possible, but
the planning context in no way guarantees that it is. In the absence
of prior commitment and principles, the community or client has no way
of judging or understanding the values of the planner. They remain
almost as passive agents as in the authoritarian expert case, left with
a diminished voice which allows them to accept or reject the directives
of the "informer" or "proposer." A hands-off, laissez-faire value
system seems to be neither for nor against anything and is only to
the advantage of the advisor. Nor does it answer the problems of
"authority in good faith" which were questioned above.

What I am suggesting is that the reasonableness of the
authoritarian expert's directives as well as the liberal artiber's or
advocate's advice are both based on the acceptance of the universal
values of the reasonable individual. Experiential or contextual
factors seem to have little implication for rational competency. But
as the hermeneutical school has claimed, distortion and forced consensus
result from a dialogue if it is not based on a concept of an ideal
Speaking situation of unlimited, unforced, mutual communication. True consensus and acceptance result not alone from the rational competency of the adviser but also from the client's evaluations of his suggestions in terms of the client's own beliefs as to truth and rightness. There needs then to be some prior establishment of a context for dialogue if the distortive effects of the varieties of experience and socialization on the part of the participants are to be minimized. "Privitization of reason" allowing the planner to assert a rational appraisal of his values through "self-checks" and "self-balances" is not sufficient justification for his subsequent actions. For the sake of authenticity, we need to go further than that. Habermas has said "discourse is the last resort for the re-establishment of a disturbed consensus in cases of doubt and justification. In the end the legitimation of existing orders lets itself be confirmed only in discourse, i.e., is reduced to the basic norms of conversation."\(^{23}\)

**DISTORTIVE SOCIALIZATION**

So we come at long last to the real subject of discussion, the rational behavior of the participant. I want to speak briefly before closing about the liberal planner's concept of participation as instrumental behavior, i.e., technically manageable. This issue occurs in Scheme Four with respect to the need to develop citizen training in the 1950's and again with the inclusion of the unrepresented poor during the 1960's. Both times the focus has been on the remedial and educational aspects of participation. Inherent to this focus lies an assumption of the malleability of the individual, of the conditioning
of behavior by external standards and determined roles. Since participation is a political role "managing" and "shaping" of citizen behavior take on portentous implications. Social action or participation, let it not be mistaken, are necessarily beneficial to the ideal society but under ideological control they can become techniques for distortive socialization. This clarification becomes essential for the discussion of a concept of critical planning.

Education and politics are both means for stabilizing society. Politics, however, is a means for obtaining pre-established social goals and values and involves a struggle of forces competing to achieve the right to establish these directives. Education on the other hand, diffuses the dominant social values and goals and should involve the ideal of "mutuality" and "self-reflection"; that is the development of a free dialogue between participants and the ability to reflectively restore all elements which become distorted through socialization. Education and politics consequently must remain separate if free discussion and hence full participation are to take place.

Political participation as an educational technique comes under the internal directives of the controlling power. "Shape," "form" and "co-operation" become instrumental strategies or "tools" for predetermined ends. The reciprocal dialogue of the educative process is replaced by a passive voice of instrumental action in which the planner or community organizer is to do the "shaping," "saving" or "wooing" in order to elicit the predicted effect of participation. Consequently the individual's integrity is invalidated by the planner who becomes the "taste-maker" and the savior against self-destruction. Free dialogue
is obstructed by the authority relations existing between the "have-nots" and the "haves," the "suboptimized" and "optimized."

The context of using these words, that is the planner's need for community involvement within a limited context, gives them political intent. "Willingness to be persuaded" may mean the acceptance of an irrational system. The planner's "insight" or "understanding" can not erase the fact that the participatory situation may be potentially coercive. "Cooperation" and "mutual respect" may be necessary for productive relationships but an oppressive situation can not always be combatted through passive acceptance. The social context in which participation is to occur must form an essential part of the dialogue, that is it can not be assumed that participation and cooperation are healthy attributes in themselves. The questions must always be asked, "cooperation or participation for what and under what conditions and what kind?"

Carl Ratner describes how the liberal's concern with the individual negates all concern with the social order, all awareness of the social conditioning of behavior. He recounts studies which optimistically maintain that social life can be changed as a consequence of "personality growth"; that delinquent behavior results from a lack of awareness which can be remedied through education; that rational behavior never deviates from the rules once the rules are established and known. Regardless of the occurrence of a socially distortive or supportive environment, awareness and participation become the protection against coercion. However, egocentric behavior terms such as "self-esteem" and the pursuit of "self-interests" themselves pre-condition
the good life; "personality growth" and "maturity" may only enable the individual to passively adapt to the systems demands. Participation itself is expected to teach socially healthy behavior as if the impediments of a socially destructive context could be so easily eliminated.

By removing all references to social determinations, planners are able to reinforce behavior concepts which they perceive as socially useful whether the participatory environment validates them or not. Indeed, no adequate philosophy of participatory democracy has ever been empirically analyzed. It is not sufficient to study participation as a method of behavior reform without reinstating the social context and questioning what influences it has on the form of participation and in reverse what effect participation might have on the political and social structure. Far beneath the optimistic belief in educative participation lies the Marxian view that knowledge is a social product, that ideas, speech forms, and behavior are products of the social relationships among men, i.e., they are elements of the superstructure. Thus the split between society and individuals which liberal planners create, needs to be restored and the full implications of each on the other needs to be entertained so that the passive voice of the participant can take up his active challenge and attempt as well to modify the prestructured social patterns. This requires the removal of the role of education from the politically governable and the substitution of other participatory forms for the present form of direct involvement.
THE IDEOLOGY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Democratic process: [free market of interests, root individualism, natural harmonization of social conflicts, common consent, (citizen/common/population) participation (as process perfection), directive (knowledge/imagination) of the masses, broad-based direction-finding, centrifugal force, pluralistic, strengthens local government, participatory democracy]

Democratic process: (capable democrats, knowing how to choose, broad educational program)

Citizen participation: (citizen participation₁/citizen participation₂)

Democratic process planning: [plans as (vote getters/controlling pictures in people's heads/eyes and science of politics), (majority/collective/community) decision-making, consensus planning, collaborative process planning, (collective/community/people's/professional/personal) responsibility, professionalization of citizenship]

Democratic process planning: [(valid/legitimate) plans, lasting policy decisions]

Professionalization of citizenship: {citizenship [training/education/informing] democratic root system, [(spur/develop) (community/neighborhood) (identification/development/organization/pride)], train in techniques of political action, [value/appreciate] cooperation, overcome [apathetic/ignorant] thwarts to community reorganization, activate decision role, inform political interests}

Professionalization of citizenship: (political rationality, developer of democracy, fundamental purpose of democracy)
THE PROBLEM OF PLANNING IN A DEMOCRACY: WHOSE INTERESTS ARE BEING SERVED?

Collaborative process planning : [public interest vs. private interest, dialogue between group and individual (interests/values)]

public interest = [public (responsibility/welfare), general interest, collaborative search for the common good, (public-spirited/obligated/generous/cooperative) group, group solidarity, compound of interests, solidarity of components, common code of behavior, common dedication, social instinct for cooperation, restrict individual liberties, control conflicts of individuals]

public interest → (preservation of freedom)

public interest + [citizen participation, central administered (control/regulation)]

citizen participation, = [citizen (groups/advisory committees), public (discussion/hearing)]

citizen participation, : [public (enlightenment/relations/information/response), catalyst, conscience, watchdog of public interest, sounding board, wailing wall, hand-holder, informed pressure, (authorize/adopt/not formulate/not analyze/not administer) plans, carries out objectives, gets job done, proposal advocacy, maximizes (consensus/support), minimizes opposition, reduces conflict to consensus, supports implementation, stabilizes base for planning, counters resistance, non-partisan, takes no position against governors, no axe to grind]

private interest = [(specific/specialized/individual/local/group/plural) interests, (blending/synthesizing/amalgam of) interests, individual rights, (private/resident/communalism) responsibility, localism, we-they perspective, separatism, self-interest, self-choice, self-determination, individual initiative]
private interest → (counteract bureaucracy, political determinism, control life-shaping forces, rational process)

private interest ← (citizen participation)

\[\text{citizen participation,}_2 = \text{[resident participation, community (representation/self-determination/mobilization), citizen control, racial separatism, mediating devices, stimulates all groups]}\]

\[\text{citizen participation,}_2 : (\text{relevant community public, political contention, partisan adversary proceeding, substantive participation})\]

\[\text{citizen control} = \text{[redistribution of (power/resources), govern (program/institutions), charge of (policy/management), control outisde changes]}\]
CONFIGURATION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR: PART C

PLANNING CONSTRAINTS: THE ASSUMPTIONS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

**Federal role** = [national commitment to (planning/development), balances (rights/demands) of central control and local interests, helpmate, mentor, arbiter, defines spectrum of authority centers, defines artificial (state/metropolitan/local) boundaries, cooperative partnership, creative federalism, new federalism, (develop/direct/coordinate) long-range national programs, induces national policy, works in harmony, (activist/strategic) role in (urban/metropolitan) aid, shared power, (expansion/consolidation) of (governmental agencies/professions/private organization), strengthens public institutions, professionalizes bureaucracy, federal helping hand]

**Federal helping hand** = [federal financial assistance, federal aid, federal government funds, technical advice, federal grants-in-aid, money from Washington, Federal (resources/superior fiscal capacity)]

**Federal role** → {([stricter/enforced] federal planning provisions, efficient governing machinery, orderly administration, dominant device for social control, [overview/review/leverage] of metropolitan planning agency in local programs, [(incentive/encouragement) to (effect change/yield decisions/program action/ recommend parametric changes/ think big/achieve better society)]

**fragmentation** → [(local neighborhood/community) planning, territorially representative democracy, small town democracy]

**The planning mediator** : [(self-checks/self-balances) power, (responsible/discrete/nonarbitrary/nonpartisan) agent, identifies with community goals, affirms his prescription of client's wants, submerges personal interest, affirms client's position, never "takes side" for or against community, works for and on behalf of clients]
planner's task = (intellectual leadership/administering arbiter/advocate)

intellectual leadership = [executive problem-solver, impersonal thinker, community gauger, professional, acts on knowledge not people's opinions, producer of new facts, (identifies/evaluates) potential action, purveyor of vital advice, accepted as an expert, technical adviser]

administering arbiter = [intercedes between planning and the world, mediator between organizations and the rest of the world, smooths decision-making, manages conflicts, mutual adjuster, action planner, manages interpersonal relations, catalysts, creates new amalgams, evokes a willing unity, gathers positive community forces, builds (alliances/support), gains (consensus/commitment) to action, seeks implementation, mobilizes all levels of government, trans-technical]

advocate planner = {[(community/client/disadvantaged constituency) (articulator/organizer/reconciler/educator/informer/proposer/adviser/representer/defender/assister/supporter)], pressure-group analyzers, informer of [group's outlook/client's rights/choices/proposal/implications of plan/range of possible choices/ evolutionary changes], gives [foreign/technical] [aid/assistance], not imperialistic, insures efficient use of funds, not optimizer]

Conscience planner = [(spokesman/guardian) of image of the ideal, advocate of subconscious values, modify conscience, persuader, invites cooperation based on (insight/understanding/mutual respect)]

Conscience planning instrumental strategies = [education, (tools/techniques) for community (identification/participation), shaping of community, taste-making, save citizens from selves, save (inarticulate/disadvantaged) from ignorance, (protracted/subtle/assiduous) wooing of neighborhood sentiment, expediting personality growth]
expediting personality growth [self-reliance, self-esteem, self-interest, self-confidence, growth, maturity, end (dependence/passivity), assert rights, restore integrity of suboptimization, give (effective/skillful) voice, spirit of cooperation, respect for (values/priorities)]
SUMMARY

From the perspective of the 1970's, the history of city planning in America can be viewed as the development of pragmatic interventions into the disorder and chaos surrounding the material and human urban systems. Scheme One presented us with spiritual abstractions of order embedded in concepts of religion, health, community and the public interest in which the planner became the mediator between the ideal whole and the broken order, between fragmented interests and the external social totality. By the time we come to Scheme Four, we have reached the ultimate in idealized formalizations of rational reality embedded in systematic piecemeal knowledge, i.e., the study of isolated parts and processes, in which the technical development of rational and efficient processes has invaded all aspects of the social praxis, e.g., urban management and organization, policy-making, group dynamics, forecasting. In this scheme the planner becomes the expert of order, organization, management and systems stabilization.

Whatever scheme we consider, we are essentially dealing with the conceptual abstractions with which the planners measure reality. They are abstractions in the sense that they focus on universal values and behavior, consensus models and ideals of stability and order to the neglect of individual uniqueness and the determinations of the historical and social context, the necessities of change and transformation. As a result of the abstractions of Scheme Four and as part of the increased specialization within the planning field, we find that
planners have become more concerned with questions of methodological rules and regulations to the neglect of what should have been their first conceptual concern involving the investigation of "reality" itself: how it could be known, how it might yield to measurement and model building, how what we assume is "reality" influences our concepts and ideas of measurement and investigation, how our patterns or frames of reference are moments, product and producer, of the interactions between man and his historical, social, political and material environment.

Focus on the conceptual schemata of the history of city planning has led us inevitably to the consideration of the role of language in the configuration of planning knowledge. The fixed and formal system of the language of city planning is related to the social context, i.e., to social practice. Specifically, language as an element of the superstructure is determined by, as well as determiner of, the base structure through the mediation of consciousness. Therefore, sociolinguistics, as I define it, couples the study of society, social class, historical and social determinations, the practical life of various groups and professions with the study of language and consciousness. This does not imply that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between language and the base structure but that they are both mediated by social or class consciousness. In other words, change in society can not be expected to have a direct reflection in the words, concepts and definitions embedded in the system of language but the process of language change must be studied through the mediation of consciousness. This makes the study of sociolinguistics doubly opaque and idealistic, complex and difficult to explain.
We have been studying, all along, the distortive communications of a system which has created rational and objective planning as its offspring. I mean, distortive in the sense that the jargon and theory of planning have dominated the thought processes of both the planners and the public by the use of abstractions, by assumed authority and legitimations, by the acceptance of universal values and normative ideals, by repressing the self-reflective and critical abilities of language and dialogue. This critique has therefore aimed at bringing to light the distortions of planning. "The role of critique," as Dick Howard has explained about Marx's various critiques and manifestos, "is to clarify the actually existing system, to demystify the fetishized relations, and thereby 'to make these petrified relations dance by singing before them their own tune.'\textsuperscript{215} The critical task is to understand the coercive forces of society, the implications embedded in the normative and formal order of things so that men's reactions, interpretations and self-reflections may become freely determined and not a result of false socialization, repressive conformity, and passive reconciliations. It is through language that we learn the expected social behavior, values and goals; that we inherit a given social or class consciousness and an accepted way of viewing the world; that we uncritically accept the distortions of the various schematization, definitions, concepts and objectifications. The critical intent of the language of city planning has therefore sought to make the planner sensitive to areas where technical dominations have become inhumane, where it too glibly erases differences that are significant, where it offers commodities and services in place of spiritual needs, demands
social responsibility and civic involvement at a repressive cost, and educates for patterns of conformity and alienation. The critique of language is aimed at a continual re-grounding and re-enlivenment of a false and fetishized language which has excluded the process of self-reflection and mutual dialogue so that we can become aware of abstractions as abstractions, of contextual implications and limitations, of the institutions of normalized consciousness, of the opaqueness of socio-political practice, of our position in the world and the possibilities of changing it.

To criticize the given, however, does not presuppose that an alternative truth is known or suggested. A planning alternative would be the end to which the critique has offered only the means. Moreover an alternative must develop from within the practice of city planning itself. But the agent of the alternative must first become aware of the distortions of the present situation, of the domination of the city thing over man himself, of the planner over the planned, of rational order over subjective spontaneous life. In this endeavor, the life-world, i.e., the concrete immediacy of the surrounding world of experience, must be the foundation of all planning. It is the people who make up the city, not the reverse, and so planning must necessarily focus on the human interest as the active subject of planning intentions. The critical stance assumes that there is nothing in socio-political practice and/or reality that can not be changed, for it is men that collectively have created society and not the reverse. Therefore, it is the greater public who should define the political and institutional goals of society, the themes which are emphasized and toward which society
aims. Thus the realization of freedom and rationality involves the full understanding of the how and why of social determinations so that authenticity and conscious choice in public directives may be gained.

Authenticity, however, results from a return to the pre-categorical life-world in the sense that the real denial to the formalization of realities lies in the acceptance of the practical everyday lived world as the foundation of study. This is Husserl's major theme throughout his work *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. But what is this "life-world" that we have alluded to and how is it to relieve what seems to be man's "inevitable" quest for mastery over nature and the subsequent control over social organization? In our review of the history of city planning, we have found the planner as the mediator of socio-political directives to be more the captive of the dominating machine, market economy, corporate state, or what have you, than the spontaneous determiner of social relations, modes of authentic communication and mutual understanding, and emancipation through self-knowledge. The planning mediator offers social modifications in certain directions, he restructures the original social whole to meet new needs and conditions but never completely transcends the original. When most of the original socio-political context is accepted as natural, as taken for granted and dominating, then reflective, mutual interrelationships between men and the world become frozen into static forms, then concepts such as "citizen participation," and "social normalcy" for example, become purposively institutionalized and devoid of liberating initiative and self-reflection. How is the practical life-world to aid us in gaining authenticity in
our socio-political practices, in avoiding the reified fetishizations which our uncritically collective language has come to encapsulate, in destroying the conditionings and privations of passive experience?

I have maintained all along that the concepts of city planning are second degree, that they dance above our heads to a different tune that we hear in the first degree essence of our human experience. Thus we find that planning has substituted the idealities of its own world of order for the realities of the real world. An overly rationalistic mode of expression has created stereotyped patterns of environmental order and public behavior in which the communication between the planner and his social and physical environment has lost signification. More than this, however, planning has been a follower of other disciplines and other theories which it has not always philosophically understood. The abstractions of planning are parasites upon the images of reality and if it is to be planning's critical intention to return to the original foundation of humanity, to involve the dialectics of the past and present, knowledge and interests, thought and action as part of its political practice then planning must return to the world of pre-categorical experience. As Merleau-Ponty tells us,

[to return to the life-world this side of the objective world . . . [is] to give the thing its concrete physiognomy, to organisms their own manner of handling the world, to subjectivity its historical inherence; to rediscover phenomena, the layer of living experience through which others and things are first given to us . . . to arouse perception and reveal the ruse by which it lets itself be forgotten as a fact and as perception in favor of the object it reveals to us and of the rational tradition it founds.26]

The description of Husserl's life-world, however, is ever evasive and idealistic. It is on one hand the world of tradition, our social and historical framework of meaning which selects, at different
periods of time, the themes of interest and their conceptual configurations, the goals and values of society and their dimensions of realization. More than this, however, the life-world is the surrounding world of experience, the pre-categorical, pre-scientific, pre-logical world of intuition, sensitivity and understanding. It presupposes no operations or abstractions but is the subsoil from which all science and exact knowledge must grow and the source of all meaning and abstraction. Objective knowledge, either science or language for example, is therefore a departure from the life-world and by positing the neutral mediator, or observer, allows intuitive meaning and knowledge to become modified and distorted. To return to the life-world then is to restore the base of authentic meaning. The life-world moreover is the common sense knowledge of everyday reality, i.e., praxis. It is therefore the material world of experience in which men struggle for existence, i.e., the realm of insufficiency and need, the base of social conflict and social purpose. The life-world, therefore, offers us a starting point from which to return to the pre-categorical level in order to clarify the present obscurities and dominations of social reality.

Finally we find the life-world provides the telos for critical planning in the dialectical norms of mutual and reciprocal communication between the past and the present, the planner and the planned. We have found that certain values such as trust, good faith and the question of the good life, require external establishment, that planning needs to be informed by principles and commitments, by realization of the consequences of its actions, by ethical and political practicabilities. Either we accept the fetishized and reified systems and institutions
already built upon the false assumptions of the needs and values of
the practical life world, or we seek to re-value and re-ground these
distortions by returning to the fundamental base of everyday life. It
is from the problems and contradictions of everyday life, that
fundamental transformations of society will arise for this is the
realm upon which subjective consciousness is built, the realm of
immediate dialogue and meaning and not of frozen images and structures,
and represents therefore the potentiality for social change and
transformation as opposed to the uncritical acceptance or rejection
of established norms and institutions. It is the realm of utopia for
the language and intentions of city planning.
REFERENCES: CHAPTER EIGHTEEN


4 Greer and Minar, "The Political Side of Urban Development and Redevelopment."

5 Ibid., p. 62.

6 Wirth, "Planning Means Freedom."


8 Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning."


12 O'Harrow, "The Planning Present."


14 Scott, "Roots for Democracy."


16 Ibid.
553.


18Burke, "Citizen Participation Strategies."

19Scott, "Roots for Democracy."

20Ibid.

21Hoover, "On Master Plans and Constitutions."

22Howard, "The Planner in a Democratic Society--A Credo."


25Rubel, "Fate or Freedom?"

26Schweizer, "Popular Planning."


30Loeks, "The New Comprehensiveness."


33Augur, "Citizen Participation in City Planning."

34Sullivan, "An Exploration of Planning's Relation to Integration."

35Scott, "Roots for Democracy."


Burke, "Citizen Participation Strategies."


Wirth, "Planning Means Freedom."


Charles Abrams, "How Shall We Train Planners We Need?" National Conference on Planning, 1951.

Howard, "The Planner in a Democratic Society--A Credo."


Webber, "Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility."


Simard, "Planning Ideals and Objectives."


Altschuler, "The Goals of Comprehensive Planning."

Perloff, "How Shall We Train Planners We Need?"

Ibid.

Wilson, "Planning and Politics in Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal."


Lee, "Planning and Professionalism."

Gans, "Planning and Political Participation."

Schweizer, "Popular Planning."

Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning."


Rubel, "Clinic: Role of a Citizen Planning Agency."


Slayton, "Urban Renewal Philosophy."

Burke, "Citizen Participation Strategies."


Morton, "Clinic: Role of a Citizen Planning Agency."

Burke, "Citizen Participation Strategies."

Mocine, "Urban Physical Planning."

Wirth, "Planning Means Freedom."


Thabit, "Renewal--A Planning Challenge."

Rubel, "Clinic: Role of a Citizen Planning Agency."

Scott, "Roots for Democracy."
77 Bair, "Opportunities for Community Relations."
78 Sarchet and Wheeler, "Behind Neighborhood Plans."
80 Sarchet and Wheeler, "Behind Neighborhood Plans."
82 Simard, "Planning Ideals and Objectives."
83 Rubel, "Fate or Freedom?"
84 Wilson, "Planning and Politics in Citizen Participation."
86 Freer and Minar, "The Political Side and Urban Development and Redevelopment."
89 Ibid.
90 Hoover, "On Master Plans and Constitutions."
91 Watt, "Planning Power: Coordination and Diffusion."
93 Altschuler, "The Goals of Comprehensive Planning."
94 Freer and Minar, "The Political Side of Urban Development and Redevelopment."
95 Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning."
96 Ibid.
Ibid.

Bolan, "Emerging Views of Planning."


Gilbert and Eaton, "Who Speaks for the Poor?"


Ibid.

Mogulof, "Coalition to Adversary."


Abrams, "How Shall We Train Planners We Need?"


Sarchet and Wheeler, "Behind Neighborhood Plans."

Handler, "What is Planning Theory?"


Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning."

Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems."

Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning."

Weaver, "Planning in the Great Society."

Ibid.

Loeks, "The New Comprehensiveness."

Sullivan, "An Exploration of Planning's Relation to Integration."

Greer and Minar, "The Political Side of Urban Development and Redevelopment."

Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems."

Beckman, "Our Federal System and Urban Development."


Taylor, "Community Participation in Planning."

Loeks, "The New Comprehensivess.

Burke, "Citizen Participation Strategies."

Long, "Citizenship/Consumership in Metropolitan Areas."

Bauer, "Good Neighborhoods."


Popence, "Community Development and Community Planning."

Mogulof, "Coalition to Adversary."

Aronovici, "Education and Community Planning."


Scott, "Roots for Democracy."

Gans, "Planning and Political Participation."

Perin, "A Noiseless Secession From the Comprehensive Plan."

Dewey, "Planned Use and Democratic Choice."

Beckman, "Our Federal System and Urban Development."
Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems."

Dyckman, "What Makes Planners Plan?"

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Reiner, Reimer and Reiner, "Client Analysis and the Planning of Public Programs."

Lee, "The Role of the Planner in the Present."

Nisbet, "Leadership in a Democratic Society."


Gropius, "Faith in Planning."

Lee, "The Role of the Planner in the Present."

Rubel, "Clinic: Role of a Citizen Planning Agency."


Webber, "Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility."

Watt, "Planning Power."

Clay, "Megalopolis in Passing."

Friedmann, "Notes on Societal Action."

Ibid.

Bauer, "Good Neighborhoods."

Long, "Planning and Politics in Urban Development."

Kaplan, "Advocacy and the Urban Poor."

Warren, "Model Cities First Round."

Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning."


Kaplan, "Advocacy and the Urban Poor."

Dyckman, "Social Planning, Social Planners and Planned Societies."

Wirth, "Planning Means Freedom."

Howard, "The Planner in a Democratic Society--A Credo."

Godschalk and Mills, "A Collaborative Approach to Planning Through Human Activities."

Friedman, "Notes on Societal Action."

Adrian, "Metropology and the Planner."


Wirth, "Planning Means Freedom."

Wilson, "Planning and Politics in Citizen Participation."


Popenoe, "Community Development and Community Planning."

Aronovici, "Education and Community Planning."

Dyckman, "Social Planning, Social Planners, and Planned Societies."

Wilson, "Planning and Politics in Citizen Participation."

Bauer, "Good Neighborhoods."


Frieden, "Toward Equality of Urban Opportunity."
Bolan, "Emerging Views of Planning."

Burke, "Citizen Participation Strategies."

Popenoe, "Community Development and Community Planning."

Bolan, "Emerging Views of Planning."


Ibid., p. 75.


Wolff, "Reflections on Game Theory and the Nature of Value."


Ibid.


Shands, Semiotic Approaches to Psychiatry.


Marcuse, Negations, pp. 17-19.


20 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, pp. 118-119.

205 Radnitzky, Contemporary Schools of Metascience, II.


207 Radnitzky, Contemporary Schools of Metascience, II, p. 172.

208 Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, p. 75.


212 Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings, p. 143.


214 Ratner, "Totalitarianism and Individualism in Psychology."


Objectivity: Because they separate the objective world of reality, i.e., the natural order, from the subjective world, the empirical-analytical sciences can draw their knowledge from the successful control and prediction of objects under experimentation. There is nothing innate, nothing introspective or magical dwelling within this world of experience.
Instead reality, being external to the mind, can be objectively grasped, measured and quantified. Within the world of the laboratory the objective mood of science presents few problems, but extended to the world around us it proves problematic. First of all the objective scientist maintains a subject-object relationship between himself and his experimental objects. But planning occurs within a community in which the destruction of reciprocal communication among subjects is distortive. False objectivity thus allows the planner to establish a distance between the focus of study, or the planned for and himself, which consequently enables him to authoritatively manipulate and manage the planner for objects according to his own projection of order and control.

Secondly, false objectivity hides the role of the researcher by considering facts as nonevaluative, noninternalized things. The determination of facts however must be seen as a product of the historical context, the values of the researcher, their intended use, the proposed method and so forth. If facts are refused their auxiliary determinations then they become reified, frozen abstractions, lifted out of their contextual base and hypostatized as pre-given categories. Abstractions refer to established preconceived notions about reality and subsequently pre-structure our experience. When reality is presented as natural or inevitable happenings it consequently helps to establish a conformist attitude with respect to the dominant norms of conduct and common assumptions about possible and probable procedures. Thus false objectivity misrepresents the historical determination of so-called "facts" and by stressing their positive value as replicas of given
reality it represses critical reflection on those aspects of reality which the "facts" do not encapsulate.

Thirdly, false objectivity arises under the assumption that "facts" can supply values. This leads us back to the dichotomy* by which we have argued that the objective explanation of natural events can never supply us with an understanding of human actions. Understanding occurs when the human subjects are not regarded as the objects of research, whose behavior requests explanation. Instead only after there has been agreement upon the interpretation of "facts" as a result of intersubjective communication over an exchange of ideas and interpretations, can there be so-called "understanding." Karl-Otto Apel has said that "the sociologist, just like the psychoanalyst, cannot completely separate his own descriptive 'object-language' from the language of his 'objects,' who are his 'co-subjects.'" Understanding is a subjective process in which "facts" become "objective" only if they have a prior socio-historical valuation resulting from communication among researchers or between the researcher and his objects of study. Thus it is not the "facts" which supply the values but rather the prior interpretation and agreement as to the intended meaning of such "facts" which supplies the valuations. An objective attitude and an ethical attitude are two separate if complementary stances. Values are subjective attitudes derived from the flow of history as internal consequences of social class, social period, social purpose and so forth. Since shared values enable reciprocal communication

*Originally argued by Wilheim Dilthey in the 19th century.
among men they are constituted in the common terms and conceptual configurations incorporated in our language. Thus criticism of values is seen as a self-reflective analysis of language and although separate from the objective attitude they are the presuppositions upon which the objective sciences proceed. Thus an objective attitude which assumes universal values does so only because the researchers have shared convictions. It is these shared assumptions among the planners, pertaining to the health or equilibrium, i.e., the order, of society as a consequence of their shared values, which become problematic when no longer accessible to reflective criticism.

Rationality: Since nature is external to the process of thought, reason becomes autonomous. Thus it was that the liberal reformers sought to rebuild the order of men in line with the idea of autonomous reason. Consequently the idea of a rational society is based upon two presuppositions: first that men are rational beings and second that there exists a rational justification to the order, goals and actions of society. A rational man is subsequently defined as one who aligns his behavior in accord with a set of rules pre-defined as rational and who places restraint and bonds upon his own irrational urges. Under this definition responsibility becomes an ethic of rationality and as such encompasses the politics of cooperation, compromise and consent. For the rationalists of the Enlightenment, individual man was the source of reason but as monopoly power and bureaucratic organizations have developed, rationality has been removed from the individual base and placed in the institutional structures instead. In this sense the ideal collective whole which the rational man responsibly supported has been
replaced by a plurality of contending groups. Either strategy, however, depends upon an idealistic rational whole unifying the parts whether they be individuals or groups.

It is this idealistic belief in the harmonious whole which embues liberalism with its optimistic faith in laissez-faire politics. Since the harmony of the social whole is accepted as a transcendent value, no one worries about the rationality of ultimate social ends. Stability seems to be ensured as long as conflict is relegated to the reality which determines the rational adequacy of social organization, i.e., the distribution of goods, the adaptation of dysfunctions, the assimilation of deviants, the satisfaction of needs. Scientific and technical means-end rationality and the replicability of experiments as they have increasingly become involved in the practical world have extended our power to control and predict and have consequently moved us toward a more ordered and stabilized society. This explains why planning reduces all social contradictions to technical problems of systems reorganization and administration, i.e., the maintenance of a smoothly functioning machine. Since it is assumed that there exists a rational order to the structure of society, the institutional subsystems must be organized in accordance with these rational means of operation. Thus the given social order becomes justified by the extension of subsystems which ensure the replication of predictions and decision-making and a means-end efficiency of goal attainment.

THESIS INTENTIONS

The problem for us today is how to work within expanding areas of technical domination without giving up our freedom. The task is not
to destroy the control of "scientistic" procedures and technical planning but to complement them with humanistic-subjective concerns. Thus the ideal situations in the practical sciences would be the irrefragable intermingling of explanatory objectified meaning with the intersubjective process of understanding. This presupposes, however, a conscious awareness of the false objectifications and inauthentic rationalizations within technical planning. It demands, furthermore, a restoration of the total awareness of the implications of our socio-historical context. As Rolf Ahlers has expressed it

the total terror, which becomes the real slave-master of man is the other side of the idea of total (history- and) world-domination. Naked, unhistorical, unmediated freedom is the basis of total terror and enslavement. The man who believes himself totally emancipated and the complete lord over his world . . . no matter whether by means of political or scientific manipulation . . . inevitably gets caught up in the massive and irreversible development of institutions which he believes he is creating, but which in reality become his master, which demand his total attention, and which he has to serve with his whole person. Unmediated, unhistorical freedom, the notion of the emancipated humanity which transcends the past and lives for the glorious future alone . . . this freedom Hegel conceived to be the source of man's complete servitude. The apparent manager becomes the managed. The only remedy as to this development is the internalization of personal autonomy, as Hegel said.
It is the Liberal's concept of order, rooted in the Enlightenment, where we shall find the separate meanings of technical planning, i.e., its scientific ideal and concept of order, to be joined. Newton's cosmological theory (See Gillispie, The Edge of Objectivity, p. 143 and pp. 151-164) had revealed nature as a world of order and harmony, a world well made where each part had its place and worked according to the law of nature to unify the order of the whole. Society, on the other hand, showed a realm of conflict and corruption, or hierarchical orders of privilege and domination. In Newton's world, philosophy, the science of humanity, would find the natural law of the human order, the social law of gravity. Clearly stated these natural laws of human nature would be understood and conformed to by all reasonable men. Interpreters of Newton claimed that reason would rebuild and shape the human order. Not willing to leave alone the descriptive knowledge of how the physical world works, from the enlightenment to our day, men have sought a social and moral message hidden in the teachings of science. This is what Gillispie refers to as "the rationalist tradition coupled by science with empiricism...[which] conceived the function of scientific explanation to be a kind of cosmic education of humanity in the order of nature" (p. 156).

ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

Slum disease: The moral indignation over slum conditions during Scheme One was interpreted as both the effect of a deep rooted fear of the "foreign newcomers" and their "suspicious" ways as well as an outright conviction that we must develop a humanitarian or social ethic. These conditions and threats of the slums were to be controlled through programs of education and "compulsory depopulation." Let us explore, briefly, the values revealed by the depiction of slums and blighted areas during
the thirties to develop the continuity of thought between the social reforms of Schemes One and Three.

"Our cities today are sick," we are told, "they suffer from chronic and progressive slum disease. It is no mere figure of speech when we talk of 'blighted areas.'"\(^1\) The "non-city" of the slum\(^2\) is tolerated only by "the complacent credo which interprets them as but a stopping place, a prod to the ambitious and at worst, the unavoidable retreat of the shiftless."\(^3\)

Behind the bold and sometimes beautiful front which many cities boast are the shambles and the slums, the smoke, the grime, the din, the crowds, the workers and the children... the latest immigrants, the thousands of recently migrated negroes, the homeless, the shiftless, the jobless and the derelicts.

Slums are a major liability to every American city... schools of bad citizenship and breeding places of disease, crime and vice... sordidness and squalor... blighted areas... families of meager means... unfit, unsafe and unsanitary buildings... deplorable shacks and ramshackled hovels... high death rates... robberies, assaults, murder and other crimes.\(^5\)

So we see that "the specter of the slums and the gaunt picture of bad housing and ill health... [still remained while] millions [still] lived... in rabbit warrens which induce[d] delinquency and destroy[ed] family life."\(^6\)

A slum is a condition as well as a place... it is a condition of lack of air, light, and play space, inadequate garbage and refuse disposal, aggravated in summer... These physical conditions directly menace morals, health, and economic independence... Blighted areas connote blighted lives, stunted, dwarfed, twisted lives, behavior patterns that square with acts of violence and immorality, where pauperism and alcoholism come to be regarded as normal and natural.\(^7\)

The inhabitants of the slums are [therefore] a very real factor in slum reconditioning... [We] do not mean the need for providing good housing for these people but... [we] mean the social or human problem of dealing with these people and aiding or developing or habilitating them at the same time we construct and reconstruct the areas in which they live... Slum-razing [thus becomes] a national war against the slums.\(^8\)
Because slum environments breed crime, disease and bad citizenship, the federal slum clearance and low-cost housing programs have high social significance. . . [They aim] toward the rebuilding of America both physically and morally. . . [Since] one third of the homes of the nation . . . are below standards accepted as "decent" or "American" . . . the 1937 U.S. Housing Act [was planned] . . . to wipe out as many city slums as possible . . . to build new homes . . . within reach of those who live in existing slum areas."

"What manner of 'atmosphere' is required for human betterment?

. . . [Culture can be maintained, we hear, only] be developing the 'natural resource' of the innate environment." 10

The causes of the slum are now rather largely understood. . . . We can almost cite them, and proceed to the more interesting and helpful question of whether slum clearance, for instance, will result in permanent higher social standards. . . . The recognition of the influence of environment on human behavior is at the bottom of the movement for slum elimination . . . the whole community . . . benefits from this movement, for the alternative to slum elimination is greater and greater subsidies to our jails, prisons, hospitals and relief agencies. A rehousing program [must] . . . have as its aim fundamental social rehabilitation."

Social liabilities: The "social realization" of a significant everyday life which developed during the Twenties, was still a major concern in the Thirties. The city as a social institution had a social function, "in its various and many sided life, in its very opportunities for social disharmony and conflict, the city create[d] drama." 12 But the city had become a "social liability" where it should have been an "asset"; 13 "the destructive phases of all giantism . . . were a menace to social betterment as well as to the spiritual and cultural advance" of the modern city. 14

When the physical environment itself becomes disorderly and incoherent, the social functions that it harbors become more difficult to express. . . . [In] this concept [of the city as drama] . . . social facts are primary, and the physical organization of a city . . . must be subservient to its social needs. 15
Only then would cities become "functional indices to the cultural and economic structure of the regions of which they are part."¹⁶

The creation of more leisure hours which occurred during the twenties only aggravated the situation and in the thirties accumulated further liabilities upon already meager cultural resources. The increased separation between places of living and work augmented the intense conflict between "the art of living and business of making a living."¹⁷ Adding these dilemmas together, it became clear that America needed to make leisure a "construction element," it needed furthermore a "new philosophy of leisure"; "new concepts between man and his environment, between man and his work, between the community and man."¹⁸

[The] desire for a better civilization . . . [was] working like a ferment in American life. . . . Above these past aims [of "mechanical perfection" and the "subordination of spiritual and moral values to material success" stood] a new one: the cultivation of human life. . . . [Americans had to learn to] turn shacks into houses . . . barren arteries of traffic into parkways, return wastelands . . . into grass covered fields . . . take . . . socially eroded areas . . . run-down factory . . . blighted areas, over-expanded metropolises . . . and turn them into culturally productive communities; repairing with public funds what is good, rebuilding what is bad. . . . [America needed] a fresh set of social purposes . . . the desire not for mere physical survival but for a robust and energetic life, not for merely material prosperity but for a vivid emotional and cultural existence.¹⁹

But first, "to rebuild our cities [America] must transform [her] civilization, and base it, not on the automatic expression of the machine but on the integrated culture of the human personality. . . . [America needed a] moral and social reorientation . . . [a] change of heart, change of mind, change of purpose, change of method."²⁰
POPULATION PROBLEMS

Center cities lose their population: Between 1920 and 1930 "every large city lost population in its central areas";21 "suddenly [there] came an amazing cessation of urban population growth."22 Many proclaimed that "increasing population in cities may not be safely assumed . . . [that we must] abandon the 'boom' philosophy"23 and "disregard . . . the assumption that the rapid increase of the past will persist."24 Because "urban growth will slow down . . . [and the] expansion of the suburban ring will be even slower,"25 it appeared that the "spectacular growth of urbanism of the past century and a half has come to at least a temporary halt."26 The reasons had several accounts: the decline in birth rates, the restriction of foreign immigration, the cessation of the trend of population from rural to urban areas,27 "the disruption of trade routes by wars and governmental control and the bombing of great cities from the air."28 All these were offered during the Thirties as proof that "we are gradually approaching the time of maximum population."29 Some maintained population would stabilize by 1970, others by 1950 or 1960; but regardless of the date, most metropolitan areas were warned that they would not experience much more growth. Add to this cessation, the "backflow . . . the push from each central city backward to the suburbs and beyond,"30 and you find that the big cities have exceeded their powers of expansion. "Cities [having] . . . no physical roots are likely to lose population and die from 'decentralization' and 'suburbanization.'"31
"Exodus 1930-1933":

By the beginning of the century the centers of our cities had worn out. The factory fumes had killed the trees. Population was increasing. Up came congestion, taxes, noise. After the war came the automobile and the cities burst into the country . . . [to] escape from the noise and the ugliness and the danger of living in the city . . . [to gain] a chance to achieve human scale, to be a person again. 33

During the depression, the drift was augmented by "a 'back to the land' tendency . . . [in an effort] to seek refuge again . . . where they may be sure of food and shelter." 34 In this "flight from the city . . . amazing numbers are hastening away from it . . . emerging and escaping from it . . . with hardly a look over their shoulders." 35 Perhaps this was only part of "the natural adjustment of a nation settling itself down to work with the machine age . . . just reshuffling." 36

Nevertheless the suburban trend brought with it portentous social implications for "the suburb is almost wholly dependent for its importance on the adjacent metropolis . . . the growth of the former only reflects conditions in the latter." 37 Thus as the cities decentralized, "urban congestion and confusion rolled out to engulf" 38 the new suburbs. The cities moreover, persisted to relentlessly "invade" the suburbs:

Invasion . . . it is in essence an intrusion . . . a malign intrusion . . . on the innate American background. The intrusive taint . . . [is the result of] the metropolitan environment which follows [the people]. The crudity and not the culture of the big city . . . flowing to the outskirts and beyond. 39

Thus we find that the metropolitan environment is "intrusive, not innate; it is a massing not a unity, a collection not a community, an inorganic deposit not an organism . . . The metropolis is [thus] the source of the 'metropolitan invasion.'" 40
"Enormous human and social waste [were] involved in the cancerlike growth ... a regressing cycle [involving] Megalopolis, Parasitopolis, Patholopolis, Necropolis." 41

This hydralike reach of the metropolitan tenacles into the recesses of suburban development and growth [was deemed necessary] in order that outlying areas may still remain vassals of the "great" population which has sought refuge from its political boundaries and its social inadequacies ... retaining a hold upon whatever new way of living the people of the congested area may find of their own accord. 42

Semi-rural districts ... [were being] swallowed whole. ... [They became] suburbia overnight after a fairly successful digestive process. ... The approaching wave of suburbanism ... the relentless force which has its farms and cities in its grasp marches on ... changing from the ever increasing pressure of metropolitan growth ... [and turning slowly into a] nonentity. 43

Economically unsound decentralization: The depression created the so-called "cities in flux." 44 Many fled the city to "small plots of land sufficient to provide subsistence farming." 45 Others drifted "away from economically starved rural areas toward a small group of 'metropolitan areas.'" 46 Clearly, it was foretold, we must "resign ourselves to a long period of social instability, of wasteful trekking back and forth across the country." 47 The question lurking with portentous meaning behind these fluctuations was whether "the redistribution of population and employment [could] be guided in the interests of national prosperity, social progress and constructive individual freedom." 48

What is called "decentralization," many cried out, "is destroying our greatest sources of tax revenues in the downtown districts of the centralized city"; 49 because of it "the whole financial structure of cities ... is in jeopardy." 50 Decentralization
was economically unsound more or less destructive in fundamental character and may ultimately produce social disadvantages as great as those found in the centralized city. . . . [Those proponents who look beyond the city limits for the future of the city never ask, or so it was criticized,] about the economic consequences of abandonment of our present city structures or of the economic disadvantages which may be inherent in a new mode of decentralization or its mystic companion "regionalism."\(^5\)

"The oldest, centrally located residential sections of the city are experiencing loss of population. The midtown areas . . . have become stagnant and blighted. A more appropriate term for this process of urbanization [would be] . . . disintegration."\(^2\) This loss of population generates an untold "economic shock, . . . more annual overhead to furnish public services in the newer outlying areas [are needed, and meanwhile] . . . the older central districts' values are destroyed and revenues reduced while municipal services continue" to require support. This disintegration and expansion was creating a "vicious circle of inestimable danger."\(^3\) Metropolitan expansion had gone "beyond the ability of its citizens to finance the great structure of public improvements needed to service a vast decentralized urban area."\(^9\)

Now the cities were faced with a dual problem; how to curb "uncommon and unjustifiable further expansion . . . [and] how to redeem abandoned or depressed older areas." The "inner cores" of the city were constantly threatened by "depopulation," "blight," and "decay." Many urban supporters believed "American [was] outgrowing her cities because there [was] no strong organized program to eradicate blight and keep the older residential districts permanently desirable."
A major objective [then was to] rehabilitate our blighted areas, protect our good areas, and thereby halt the excessive flow of population into remote suburbs. 56

The "obsolescence in cities" 57 created by the fluidity of the population drift ... [called for programs of] reconstruction ... This urban vacuum and obsolescence ... [required therefore] a complete revaluing of the physical structure and equipment. ... [The] economic structure [of the] "rotting" "decadent" central areas [was fast giving way]. ... Community equipment ... [was] becoming obsolete ... [not only with the transition of population but] with the change in productive and use values of vast city areas. 58

"The rehabilitation of the centers of our cities, the so-called blighted areas, ... [was therefore] a constructive move for eventual municipal economy and lower taxes. ... Something had to be done about [the rotting centers] not only for decency's sake, but because the economic life of the city [was] endangered." 59

So we find that "the era of exploitation [was] being replaced by a period of conservation and reclamation." 60 "The chief new thing ... [was] far-sighted urban redevelopment." 61 We were not to use the familiar term "'rehabilitation' because of its common misinterpretation and to refer only to 'redevelopment' as the best generally applicable term." 62

"Redevelopment" ... refer[red] only to those portions of a replanned community where complete reconstruction [was] found to be the only possible course of action. ... "Conservation" [occurred] in less wholly blighted neighborhoods of a community. ... Redevelopment and conservation ... [were thus] the means of rehabilitation whereby an entire deteriorating urban community may be effected. 63
Definitions of regionalism: The opposite focus from redevelopment and conservation occurred in the movement for regional planning. For some, regional planning was an "opportunity for spreading ourselves over limitless areas, . . . it furthermore merely beg[ged] the issue of what the actual needs and absorption abilities of the city really [were] and of what to do with the growing dry rot at the center of the city." Regional planning many claimed was based on an erroneous assumption . . . [that] rapid growth in population would compensate for losses and maladjustments incident to the enlargement of areas. . . . Decentralization in practice seems to mean . . . moving population from the centers of the city to the outskirts, and distributing stores and shops more or less indiscriminately throughout the whole urban area. . . . Regionalism . . . appears [therefore] to be based upon a form of economic geography which presupposes the transfer of large numbers of our urban population to so-called "economic regions" . . . closer perhaps to natural resources and more widely distributed over large areas of land as distinguished from regions surrounding present cities. Others saw the development of regional cities as the only way to obtain a balanced adjustment between the encroaching metropolitan areas and the rural hinterland. "The fault with the state is in its structure and not in the economic system. . . . The organization is proceeding according to a principle which, while favoring the growth of a capital city, weakens the provinces and creates distressed areas and derelict cities." It had become the thesis of the regional movement that just as no reputable physician would treat a case of scarlet fever by applying local plasters to the erupted parts of the patient's anatomy, so a city planner is indulging in professional quackery by purporting to make a plan for a city which stops abruptly at the corporate limits. Most of the problems that call for the knowledge and skill of the planners . . . are systemic or region-wide and not at all or only in slight degree amenable to treatment on the scope of the legally defined municipality.
The fundamental premise that the reciprocal relationships between the city and rural population . . . [entails] points of friction, clashes of interest, and various types of economic and social interdependences, calls for a careful appraisal of these two population elements . . . [Interdependency is inescapable when] suburbs and satellite towns are drawn functionally within the confines of the central city itself . . . [when] the reduction of time closes areal gaps, and extends the radius of influence of each of them . . . Interrelations . . . become increasingly complicated . . . The city . . . [comes to] acquire regional characteristics and regionalism [consequently] implies a certain responsibility associated with nationalism. 6

"Regional planning . . . [therefore is] concerned with the technique of community integration in its relations to a family of communities . . . ; regionalism [is then defined as] the natural unit in which the new order of community life must find reality." 69

"Urban-rural tension": 70 "Conflict and jealousy between urban and rural communities is a chronic occurrence in any urbanized society. . . . [Between 1930 and 1931 this tension] forced Congress to consider the question of reapportionment; . . . a fight for political control between rural and urban areas." 71 The balance between rural and urban areas meant more than political balance however; in the destitute years of the Thirties when farms and city residents alike were hungry and forlorn, the question concerned economic stability as well. Proponents of the regional concept proclaimed that "city and rural areas being interlocking parts of an economic structure they can not be divorced without destroying that structure. . . . The conflicts . . . between people of urban and rural areas are [therefore] due to a lack of appreciation of the mutuality of their respective services." 72 "Urban prosperity is linked to rural prosperity . . . rural forces are more conscious of this fact than urban because . . . the urban power is
dominant and rural life is unwillingly dependent upon city power. . . .
The problem of the relationship between farm and city . . . [becomes] the problem of the distribution of national income between the agricultural population and the producers in the city."

"American cities . . . [have] to a great degree grown at the expense of their rural environment and in isolation from it, . . . they have set one region against another, so that the very idea of obtaining a genuine balance seems utopian." But "metropolitan and rural land uses [being] intimately interrelated . . . [they thus become] the two great frontiers for pioneer land planning work." Growth and change of these regions has to be recognized and accepted as interlocking elements so that growth might be channeled as a gardener might gradually control the growth of a lusty plant . . . [Otherwise the] city's outward edges [will] encroach on and devour the countryside like the rim of a spreading fungus. . . . [But we can be alert and] anticipate its own expansion . . . by well-organized satellite towns . . . into which the overflow . . . [can be] diverted in an orderly, practical and convenient manner."
REFERENCES: APPENDIX B

1 Winslow, "The Evolving Pattern of Tomorrow's Health."
2 "Form of Forms," Time, April 18, 1938.
4 Dykstra, "Your City and You."
5 McKee, "Slums--Still the Cities' Shame."
6 Dykstra, "Your City and You."
8 Ihlder, "A Constructive Housing Program."
9 McKee, "Slums--Still the Cities' Shame."
10 MacKaye, "End or Peak of Civilization?" p. 441.
11 Burdell, "The Social Problem Involved in Slum Elimination."
12 Kekoni, "The Problem of the City."
13 Ward, "Cities That Consume Men."
15 Lewis Mumford, "What is a City?" Architectural Record, 82 (November, 1937), pp. 59-62.
16 Cleef, "Cities and Nationalism."
17 Aronovici, "Let The Cities Perish."
18 Ibid.
20 Mumford, review of Can Our Cities Survive? by José Sert.
Bartholomew, "A Program to Prevent Economic Disintegration."

Bartholomew, "The Neighborhood . . . Key to Urban Redemption."


Aronovici, "Let the Cities Perish."

Stephan, "Population Trends and City Planning."

Homer Hoyt, "Forces of Urban Centralization and Decentralization," The American Journal of Sociology, XLVI (May, 1941).

Bartholomew, "The American City."

Hoyt, "Forces of Centralization and Decentralization."

Dykstra, "The Future of American Cities."

MacKaye, "End or Peak of Civilization?" p. 443.

Dykstra, "The Future of American Cities."


Feiss, "One Nation Indivisible."

Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Back to the Land," The Review of Reviews, October, 1931.

Wilhelm, "Exodus: 1933."

Ibid.


Bauer, "Cities in Flux."

MacKaye, "End or Peak of Civilization?"

Ibid.

Ward, "Cities That Consume Men."

Aronovici, "Let The Cities Perish."

M.C. Baynes, "Middle Country," The Survey Graphic, XXXVII (September, 1938).
Bauer, "Cities in Flux."

Wilhelm, "Exodus: 1933."

Ward, "Cities that Consume Men."

Bauer, "Cities in Flux."

Ibid.

Harland Bartholomew, "Is City Planning Effectively Controlling City Growth In The United States?" Proceedings of the Twentythird Conference on City Planning, 1931.

Bartholomew, "The American City."

Bartholomew, "A Program to Prevent Disintegration."

Bartholomew, "The American City."

Bartholomew, "A Program to Prevent Disintegration."

Bartholomew, "The Neighborhood . . . Key to Urban Redemption."

Ibid.

Picard, "The Challenge of Urban Blight."

Herrold, "Obsolescence in Cities."

Aronovici, "Let the Cities Perish."

Kohn, "What Next In Housing?"

Picard, "The Challenge of Urban Blight."

Wright, "To Plan Or Not To Plan?" p. 468.


Weinberg, "A Technique for Urban Rehabilitation."

Wright, "To Plan Or Not To Plan?" p. 468.

Bartholomew, "A Program to Prevent Disintegration."

Kekonic, "The Problem of the City."

Wirth, "The Metropolitan Region as a Planning Unity."

Cleef, "Cities and Nationalism."
8 Aronovici, "Let the Cities Perish."


7 Ibid., p. 931.

7 Cleef, "Cities and Nationalism."

7 Town vs. Country," The Commonweal, XXIX (March 10, 1939).

7 Ward, "Cities that Consume Men."

7 Gray, "Large Scale and Rural Land Planning."

6 "How To Cure The City," Time, July 20, 1942.
"Since the early 1950's we have become aware that the ills of the city are bigger and more terrifying than the slums ... the whole central city is decaying physically and economically."¹ "The development of the technical sciences and their product technology has created a nightmare world in which man, like the sorcerer's apprentice, has unleashed forces which he can no longer control and which he has not tried to fully understand. ... Their force and momentum have deranged the whole structure of the city."²
"Planning cities in an atomic age": 3

We need not wait for a long range Russian bomber to teach us dramatically what street congestion, multiple parking, overbuilding and lack of open express arteries can do to inspire fear, panic and public fury as distinguished from mere inconvenience, delay, expense, retrogression and slow rot.... [These failures are]... intolerable... in a perilous atomic age.... In today's world struggle, the United States in relation to our enemies is short in manpower... thus to come back to our city and urban areas, all the wasted time and energy resulting from congestion, the long and wearing journey to work and other similar circumstances become more and more important as items of national defense. As a result of these new weapons, it is likely that the destruction of our urban areas will be the first and main object of our enemies.... [We must] reduce urban vulnerability.... [we must face our] national security needs."

"The only hope for cities... [is] that atomic war does not occur." 5

"Is there something symbolic in the fact that nuclear weapons designed to destroy whole cities at one blow now threaten all life on the planet?" 6

Planning or Fate? "Do Americans hate cities?... [The] rising wave of doubt, dissatisfaction and concern... [implies] we have not yet found the ideal answer to the modern metropolis." 7 "It is evident that the urbs, the word for city from which urbanity is a derivative, is today destructive of the very qualities that it had brought to social man... we live in an 'unsacred' world, a profane world." 8 "Facism and communism and naxism... [are] the revolt of a cultureless people against unbearable chaos." 9 The city must become "the nation's hope, [the] battleground of democracy." 10
"The crisis of our cities is a crisis of our civic life."[11]

This is an age of opportunity . . . [but] it is also an "age of anxiety," a diffuse anxiety that seems to be engendered by the conditions of modern life in industrial societies[,] . . . a common sense of insecurity and powerlessness in the face of vast and ever-growing powers, increasingly exercised by the society as a whole, although the shape of the future, even where it depends most explicitly on human decision, seems to be beyond control. . . . Is man able to shape his future? Or will he be swept into it by that concatenation of interacting forces beyond anyone's control that men call Fate?[12]

The urban battleground: "Are we only maintaining order in a doomed jungle? . . . Why do we go on pushing against such strong currents?"[13]

"The urban ghetto . . . [is] a time bomb ticking in the heart of the richest nation in the world."[14] Therefore "the second major public policy decision is whether the 'urban crisis' is in fact an 'urban crisis' at all or a crisis of class and race in the nation as a whole."[15]

Intellectual Crisis: "The failure of cities is an intellectual one . . . [a] failure of the intellectuals to generate a viable concept of a modern city and a modern region."[16]

In place of the conceptual order that once composed the urban system into discrete and separable parts, the clarifying images are revealing blurred boundaries demarking ambiguous subsystems. In turn, these are seen enmeshed in such complex interplay as to deny us our previous conceptions of order and causation and our traditional perceptions of our roles.[17]

Simple one-to-one cause-and-effect links that once tied houses and neighborhoods to behavior and welfare are coming to be seen as strands in highly complex webs that . . . are woven by the intricate and subtle relations that mark social, psychic, economic and political systems. The simple clarity of the city planning professions' roles is thus being dimmed by the clouds of complexity, diversity and the resulting uncertainty that seem to be the inevitable consequences of scientific inquiry and of the deeper understanding that inquiry brings.[18]
"Crises and violence mark the start of many innovative periods in urban history. . . . While wrenching the established order into unfamiliar forms and balance, these outbreaks and disasters simultaneously open new opportunities for planning to improve the quality of life and the environment." 19

"The trouble with the word crisis . . . is that it seems to call for massive, undisciplined, and unplanned action of the 'damn the torpedoes' kind." 20

Crisis in urban social policy . . . [is] the complex rapidly changing set of circumstances and processes, at once exciting and alarming, which we designate as "the urban crisis." This overarching sense of crisis seems to alter not merely the urgency and specific focus of the planning field, but alters its very character . . . the questions which seem to be central to the crisis are psychological, social and political in character and deal with issues such as social institutions and organization, identity and power. 21
REFERENCES: APPENDIX C, PART ONE


2 Aronovici, "Towards Humanism in City Planning."

3 Nelson, "Planning Cities In An Atomic Age."

4 Ibid.


6 "Think About the City!" The Christian Century, LXXVI (October 21, 1959).

7 Catherine Bauer, "Do Americans Hate Cities?" Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXIII (Winter, 1957).

8 Simard, "Planning Ideals and Objectives."


10 Augur, "Decentralization--Blessing or Tragedy?"

11 Long, "Citizenship/Consumership in Metropolitan Areas."

12 Rubel, "Fate or Freedom?"


14 Brooks and Stegman, "Urban Social Policy, Race and the Education of Planners."

15 Davidoff, Davidoff and Gold, "Suburban Action: Advocate Planning for an Open Society."

16 Bacon, "Urban Process: Planning with and for the Community."

17 Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems."
18. Webber, "Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility."


APPENDIX C
THE URBAN CRISIS 1945-1970

PART TWG: THE MECHANICAL MODEL

DECENTRALIZATION: THE REVOLT AGAINST THE CITY

"Technology has assisted in this revolt against the city,"¹ for "urbanism is a characteristic result of technology . . . [and] the defects of urbanism . . . [are therefore] dislocations caused by industrial inventions."²

Container problems: The Latin word "urbs" related to "orbis," the circle . . . like the English "town" and the Slavic "gorod" related to "yard" and "girdle," . . . denotes the basic characteristic of the urban phenomenon, [i.e.,] the enclosure which separates it from the open country . . . Urban development . . . constantly changing and growing . . . [has] burst its girdle and overflows into . . . urban sprawl.³
A "struggle results from the violent impact, of modern urban civilization against the rigid obsolete structures of [the] cities."  

Anti-city . . . [is] a by-product of urban decomposition. . . . The urban container explodes upward in . . . "urban renewal" projects or . . . explodes outward in suburban and exurban subdivisions. . . . The paramount urban problem today [therefore] is to invent an adequate urban container which will do for our complex and many-sided culture."  

Gravity Problems and "The outward push":  

The metropolis has repelled a considerable number of those whom it drew to it: repelled them with its noise, soot, fumes, barren pavements, traffic tie-ups, nervous pressures and inhuman dimensions. . . . [It has] not repelled them all the way back to the countryside, for its magnetic power is too strong for that . . . what it has done has been to hold them within its sphere of influence like so many planets."  

"Suburbanization . . . [is] a centrifugal movement," 8 creating "the oozing outer limits of metropolis." 9 "The siphoning off of city population to these various suburbias is not only a change to better living conditions . . . [it is] also a reaction from the congested, filthy anonymous and sometimes violent neighborhoods of our cities." 10 

"The great magnet of the city has changed its polarity." 11 Now "great human tides, made up of white mid-income Americans, [are] flowing out of the cities into the rural hinterlands. Into the cities to take their place, dark tides [are] running." 12 "Succession of population waves gradually moving outward from the center [produce] constant neighborhood changes." 13 "It all adds up to the fact that, on balance, the cities are losing. The 'in-migration' roughly balances the outward flow . . . the loss, however, is in quality of citizenship." 14
"We are faced factually, with the disintegration of big cities into smaller suburban and satellite communities." This "metropolitan explosion cannot be stopped." "Growing cities are like expanding universes. They shoot outward until they flow together in regional complexes like constellations." "The city and all its organs have been dissolving into the formless nonentity miscalled Megalopolis."

"'Megalopolis' or 'conurbations' are ugly words." Urban blight, decay and sprawl, the rings of segregated slums that separate the center cities from the suburbs, the desecration of the countryside, the waste of time and life in metropolitan traffic, the pollution of air and water, the failures of public services, and the poverty of public schools... [is the result of the] reckless and shortsighted ways... we let our cities sprawl across the land.

"The sea of ugliness is spreading. It threatens to drown us." We must "bring order out of today's urban, suburban, rural, regional, statewide, interstate and national travail and chaos." "Slums and blight are a form of erosion... [But] unlike the land, eroded urban areas do not gather energy when left fallow, but pull down all that surrounds them to their level," and our "blighted areas have tended to grow more extensive and decadent."

Because planning takes place in the physical world it must have regard to the law of entropy;... the laws of thermodynamics lead us to suppose that the long-term trend of the physical world is a steady degradation of the physical energies of our existence. The most significant technique used by man to effect this temporary delaying of his common fate is the process of planning. Entropy is highly significant, because it shows that a fine adjustment to the physical world is required by human societies. On the other hand we must make adequate efforts to increase the efficiency of our society if we are to live at all. Planning can therefore be understood as a careful balance between efforts to
draw energies together and use them effectively; and close attention to ensuring that this process is not too rapid or too violent. We live by simultaneously exploiting and conserving the energy of the universe. Planning, is the holding of the balance.

Balance: "The city as a whole is an arbitrary unit. Its life is continuous with outlying areas. . . . What is lacking is balance."27 "Centralization vs. decentralization is in truth a perennial problem. The struggle between center and circumference, between centripetal and centrifugal forces, is not one that can be settled by a formula for it represents a continuing effort to establish an equilibrium."28 We must learn about the "forces of community development . . . where they are pushing us . . . where restrictions or stimuli must be applied . . . to achieve desirable modifications in current trends."29 "The city of the future . . . [will be] organized in cells and clusters with some sense of unity and order and balance, stretching away to the horizon to meet the chaotic and disordered sprawl of suburbia."30 We are beginning to make a "massive effort necessary to arrest the drain of urban decentralization and to refocus economic and social life of the region on its core."31 "The urban renewal emphasis has shifted from slum clearance per se to reconstructing the urban tax base by bringing business and the affluent back into the city. . . . With hopes . . . [that] the benefits will trickle down into the ghetto."2 "Urban renewal . . . [is] a strategy to call back the straying sheep from their suburban pastures."32 "The renaissance . . . [is to] lure back suburban defectors . . . and lead off any further exodus."33
"Community growth is by definition a manifestation of constantly renewed energy and decay in counterbalance. The continuous change requires constant revision and perfection of plans."35 "The degree of urban integration . . . [depends upon] harmonious interaction between the non-urban and the urban sectors of the land."36 "The urban region must be the center of focus: . . . the idea of community self-sufficiency falls apart in the face of interdependent regions."37 "The essence of planning . . . [is dependent upon] consideration of the immense new interdependent metropolitan areas created by highways."38 Planners are turning their attention from considerations of form to considerations of process . . . [and] beginning to ask how [the system] works. . . . Our preoccupation with stocks of people, goods, buildings and wealth is being supplemented by a growing attention to the flows of money, goods, services, information and satisfactions among the individuals and groups who inhabit cities; for it is these flows that shape opportunity and welfare. . . . Thus social organization and human interaction are replacing density and place as the foci of inquiry and of political strategy.39

Input-output studies, the tracings of interregional income and commodity flows, the studies of the interactional consequences of relatively falling transportation and communication costs, the investigation of social mobility and of changing social organization and social behavior . . . reveal an urban-system complexity we had not previously suspected.40

The decentralization movement represents a basic human urge. . . . [We must] make way for the fluid city of tomorrow. . . . We should oil the mechanism and make the transitional process as smooth and painless as possible . . . [to enable] great human tides to flow in and out easily and readily. . . . The maintenance of easy fluidity will be the sine qua non of municipal health.41

"Reconstruction . . . [will come] through planned decentralization, nation-wide dispersal, and deconcentration."42 "A national program of dispersal offers as good a defense against internal enemies as against those whose attack is launched from outside our borders."43
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MARKET ECONOMY

Decentralization upsets the economics of the city: The "modern metropolis represents the farthest stage of the imperialism of urban culture . . . it has captured, bled and assimilated what we once knew as the city . . . reduced farming and other elemental occupations to ancillary forms of business."44

Paradoxes of our time . . . [are seen in the] city's troubles [which] stem from our great prosperity and productiveness. The people who are leaving the city go because they can afford it. . . . The new . . . are coming because jobs are there . . . and if the job gives out, they are on welfare rolls, whose minimum monthly payments seem like affluence to folk who have lived most of their lives on less. Thus the bigger and richer the city becomes, the more it begins to suffer . . . from "boom-town dry rot at the core."45

"Sprawl is bad aesthetics, it is bad economics."46 "These shifts and eddies of the population tides are more dramatically reflected in the city's purse than in its population figures."47 "The social trauma and economic consequences of this suburban movement cannot be underestimated. . . . The departure of the middle class . . . exposes painful vacuums. . . . [The] tax base [which] disappears . . . [and the] deterioration of property"48 are blamed upon "the prodigal waste . . . [of] the stampede to the suburbs."49

And yet we hold to the myth of the self-regulatory, self-correcting effect of our market economy. . . . [This is] the problem of an ingrained assumption by middle-class business-oriented Americans . . . that our market economy is a kind of all-sufficient, all purpose dynamic that quite automatically makes everything come out best in . . . the long-run. . . . An automatic, cyclical self-adjusting system [however] nullifies [the planner].50

"The translation of social policy into implementing regulations is now the missing link between good intentions in planning and what the private
market is still permitted to put into place." But "the realities of the market place . . . [allow] the American consumer . . . [to have] a freedom of choice. If the center city is obsolete, unattractive, the customer will buy elsewhere." In the end, "the political philosophy of the country rests on the market as the key means to allocate resources."  

**Surplus planning:** "Planning . . . is possible only when a surplus exists. . . . The whole problem of planning [therefore] revolves around the kind of capital into which the surplus is to be transformed." Since the surplus is taken to be a scarce entity, the "problem of planning is a matter of allocating scarce means with alternative uses among multiple ends." But the surplus can be expanded with the "cooperation of the private developer and municipal authority. . . . We need a marriage between government and private capital on a practical, workable basis for the redevelopment of our cities."  

The National Housing Act of 1949 . . . [used] the role of public investment [as] one [way] of eliminating the obstacles of private investment in blighted areas. . . . [It was an effort] to restore their economic balance . . . [and an] attempt to ward off "socialization" by giving private enterprise every help and incentive to perform successfully.  

"City planners [have been] more interested in upgrading the value of the city's real estate than in upgrading the lives of human beings who inhabit the real estate." For this reason it was felt that "the downtown area of the cities in the United States should not be used for housing but should be devoted to high tax producing sites, to give . . . the greatest long-term tax benefits." Clearly it was believed that "no anti-slum program will ever succeed unless it is
backed heavily by private capital." Thus in the "urban renewal" program, "Entrepreneurs," "Capitalists," and "Managers" joined hands. "The capitalist role [was] furnishing necessary money for the enterprise. . . . The managerial role . . . maintain[ed] the enterprise as an organization . . . [while] the entrepreneurial role . . . determine[d] the purpose, the spirit and the place of the enterprise." "The specific projects [then] seem[ed] better calculated to gratify the contractor and the speculator than to restore urban community." "Urban Renewal: . . . assume[d] that the expenditure of minor sums to eliminate unnatural obstacles to a supposedly natural process of rejuvenation would suffice to revitalize central city real estate."
REFERENCES: APPENDIX C, PART TWO

1Churchill, "Some Reflections on Planning."

2M.A. Mikkelsen, "Have the Cities Reached Maturity?" Architectural Record, CXLII (December, 1951), p. 60.


4Aronovici, "Towards Humanism in City Planning."


13Kloetzli, "Planning Tomorrow's Cities."

14Martin, "Is Downtown Doomed?"


18 "Think About the City!" The Christian Century, LXXVI (October 21, 1959).

19 Lewis Mumford, "Yesterday's City of Tomorrow," Architectural Record, CXXXII (November, 1962), 139.

20 Harold H. Martin, "Are We Building a City 600 Miles Long?" The Saturday Evening Post, January 2, 1959.


22 Richards, "Planning Design and Public Opinion."

23 Sullivan, "An Exploration of Planning's Relation to Integration."

24 Dewhurst and Associates, "Urban Redevelopment."


28 Augur, "Decentralization--Blessing or Tragedy?"

29 Ratcliffe, "How Can Housing Research Serve City Planning?"

30 Martin, "Is Downtown Doomed?"


32 Von Eckardt, "Bulldozers and Bureaucrats."


Aronovici, "Towards Humanism in City Planning."


Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems."

Ibid.

Walker, "The American City is Obsolescent."


Augur, "Decentralization--Blessing or Tragedy?"

Ylvisaker, "Diversity and the Public Interest."

Martin, "Is Downtown Doomed?"


Martin, "Is Downtown Doomed?"


Martin, "Are We Building a City 600 Miles Long?"


Perin, "A Noiseless Secession from the Comprehensive Plan."

Levi, "Crisis of Our Cities."


Handler, "What is Planning Theory?"

Higgins, "Towards a Science of Community Planning."

Zeckendorf, "Cities Versus Suburbs."


Zeckendorf, "Cities versus Suburbs."


Long, "Citizenship/Consumership in Metropolitan Areas."
"A community of people is an organism that exists in space and time . . . a living organism, it is something more than the sum of its parts. This characteristic of a living organism, this synthesis which adds to a simple sum something not existing in any of the separate elements"¹ is a concept familiar to the biologist [who] approaches his subject from the standpoint of structure, function, development and adaptation. . . . [The] ecosystem [of the biologist, however] finds a close parallel in the essential unity of the city and its hinterland. In the ecosystem concept, then, pattern and process are brought into synthesis, giving rise to the problem of regulation. Competition, parasitism, predation . . . are important forces in the regulation of national communities and have their counterparts among the "fauna and flora" of urban social life.²
What a city is, then, is how it relates to what it is not, as well as of its inner detail. And the relevance of its relations with what lies outside it is direct, logical and not . . . causal. . . . These types of exchange are aspects of its form. They are its form, a change in the relationship [implies] a drastic change in the city itself.  

With the growth of the "megalopolitan" phenomenon, planners saw that "the multiple problems . . . [would] overlap and interact on a scale of mutual influence which had[ned] never before confronted those trying to sense the problems and opportunities for the public welfare or for the private sectors of the economy."  

Thus systematic concepts indicated the failures of "the huge urban organisms [which had] no head. No single brain or central nervous system govern[ed] and direct[ed] it." "Behind the disharmonies of the modern urban community . . . lie a lack of effective regulation." "This cooperative organic society requires specialization of effort. . . . A society must be changing, dynamic, going somewhere."  

If the government initiative will provide the nerves and bones and blood vessels and sinews, the organism can well be left to grow and organize itself. If these elements are faulty, then no man, no government, be it as overseer, partner or entrepreneur, will organize the metropolis.  

"The central mission to society of city planning [therefore] remains careful advice on the desirable attributes and consequences of the interactions among population, land uses, circulation systems, and public institutions, and the apportionment of public resources."  

Planning . . . [is] concerned [operationally] with relationships among people, physical objects and ecological forces; of trying to coordinate and integrate the different kinds of physical improvement and development activities carried out by the government.  

In spite of mechanical artificialities galore, . . . [there is] something organic about city growth, circulation, thrombosis, decay, degeneration. . . . Physiology [is] . . . pledged to a policy of not interrupting life-processes but watching them in flux and progress just as city planners do. 11

THE PROGRESS OF TECHNOLOGY

Technology and science had been singled out "as the sources of many of society's ills." 12 "Technological advances have precipitated the [urban] problem in the first instance. . . . Revolution [in] . . . scientific agriculture . . . displaced our rural population, . . . revolution in mass communications . . . [produced] the revolution of rising expectations . . . the vision of fuller personal fulfillment in the city." 13 "The major social problems of today . . . are [therefore] problems of eliminating maladjustments occasioned by technological advance." 14 "What is planning? . . . [but] to escape from frustrations brought about by the superimposing of technical methods of implementing life for which humanity was ill prepared?" 15

"Ugliness and congestion . . . mock the statistical rise in our so-called standards of living." 16 The Federal Housing Act of 1949 "opened [a] way for healing the blight, rebuilding the neglected areas . . . for reclaiming the land of residential and industrial slum districts which progress [had] passed by." 17

Social planning . . . [was a] belated and tentative response of American planners to functional lag . . . [i.e.,] residual issues of the affluent society. . . . [The] whole complex of welfare services . . . [were] devices to compensate for the wastage and breakage in a competitive, individual-serving society . . ., to cushion the blow . . . for those so disadvantaged as to be unable to compete effectively . . . ad hoc solutions for specific problems . . . [i.e.,] remedial social action. 18
"The civil rights movement and the rediscovery of poverty in the United States . . . [were consequences of] a fear that a permanent lower class may be emerging in the midst of our affluent society." 19

The "guilt grows . . . [with the] increasing recognition that poverty could well become a virtual anachronism." 22

Urban renewal is indeed one expression of a religious and ethical philosophy of helping those who cannot help themselves . . . [it is a] moral obligation . . . The fact that we have become an affluent society in no way reduces our obligation . . . there is a backwash in the midst of relative wealth which is manifested by urban blight and its captives. The complexities of our modern society have created a substantial segment of people who are unable to cope unaided with a changing mode of life and need a helping hand. 21

**Myth of perfection:**

Contemporary planning inherits a proud tradition of service, an egalitarian ethic and a pragmatic orientation to betterment. . . . The caretaker of the idea of progress . . ., the planner is now being wooed as the Cinderella of the urban ball. . . . The resulting marriage of the social sciences and the planning profession holds . . . promise that a new level of intelligence will be merged with noble purpose. 22

"Progress in the future as in the past must consist in the very faith in progress, the awareness of further possibilities and further goals, the sense of freedom and the open road, the happiness of pursuit . . . 'the going is the goal.'" 23

Behind all planning is [consequently] the belief that the future course of events can be influenced for what is deemed better. It is therefore an indispensable part of theory that there is an ideological base of conviction that the possibility of planning is to be accepted and not rejected. 24

"The utopian, or reconstructionist, function is well entrenched in city planning." 25
Behind the compromises, techniques, and rituals that are called planning there still exists a tradition of reform: of setting aright the evils of the world . . . guided by the dream of a better world; of helping the downtrodden; of responsibility toward all mankind, and not merely those almighty and already in power and in office. 26

The Urban Humanist: "Ours is the task of the urban humanist." 27 "The mind is not modern which is still conditioned by self-interest or clings desperately to quantity instead of quality." 28 "The sickness of our present communities is the pitiful result of our failure to put basic human needs above economical and industrial requirements. Our unfailing determination to let the human element become the dominant factor will be imperative for the training of a new generation of planners." 29 The "ultimate objective of all planning . . . [must be the] maximization of human satisfaction." 30 "The basic goal . . . [is] the dignity of the individual . . . the highest and best development and fulfillment of each individual." 31

"Humanism in community planning" 32 was essentially planning from a "democratic point of view." 33 "A humanistic philosophy of community planning cannot be evolved out of the anachronistic physical structure of our cities and towns. . . . Nor . . . solved by technology. . . . It is not functional efficiency that we are seeking, but an economy in which the conservation and achievement of human values will shape our endeavors." 34 The Housing Act of 1949 placed an explicit "emphasis upon human values as the end objective of the slum clearance and urban renewal program." 35 The "first phase of Urban Redevelopment . . . [was] planning for livability." 36 "Urban renewal [sought] to respect,
serve, and express the highest aspirations and capacities of people today. . . . They expressed a concern for the human need for beauty as well as concern for the fulfillment of other needs with grace and richness."37 The Demonstration Cities legislation was a "comprehensive act on the human problems as well as the physical problems of blight and decay."38 "The explosive elements . . . that are . . . at work [in the urban ghettos] must [likewise] be harnessed to a different and more human set of purposes. As with the mixture that composes gunpowder, the individual components of this urban explosion are in themselves innocuous."39

A QUESTION OF SYSTEMNESS

Integration and Adaptation: "Cities can be treated as systems seeking integration and adaptation to survive."40 "Adaptation . . . refers to the procurement of things from an environment and the disposal of things to the environment . . . , 'integration' of a system . . . [means] the mutual adaptation of its parts . . . [Therefore] mechanisms of adaptation [are] mechanisms of integration."41

Today in our endeavor to create again an integrated society, new methods of cooperation in teams must be found with the aim to dovetail individual efforts by continuous adjustment . . . Under the voluntary collective effort and by mutual stimulation the stature of the individual will grow with the performance of the team and with the development of its "composite mind."42

"Society . . . requires an organic structure involving the cooperation of individuals and . . . some measure of subordination of the individual to the community."43 "Salvation will come [then] with the mutual recognition of interdependency and the sobering realization that a 'house divided' in today's urban revolution is the worst thing possible."44
Interactions and functions: "The metropolitan area is a very complex functional entity in which people, businesses and institutions interact vigorously."45 "The city consists of ordered institutions ... functional relations between urban institutions and also the harmonious relationships of the city with the wider social system."46 "The question is mutual instrumentality of these relations ... [and] the tendency of the individual process to support the order of the whole."47 The justification of coordinative planning ... [therefore] is determined by the adequate delineation of [the urban] network of causative interconnections ... [This implies in turn that plans will be] related ... to a more complete and concrete formulation of the structure of the organism.48

"Comprehensiveness ... require[s] that ... man's environment [be viewed] as being composed of several interacting and interdependent dimensions."49

"The slum [for example] is an organic part of the complex urban society which serves important social and economic functions for the region as a whole ... [i.e., 'support,' 'adjustment,' and 'accommodation' for new urban migrants]."50 "American slums ... [have] represented an isolationism enforced by social pressures against the unwanted minorities."51 "Racial discrimination has put the lid on the urban ghetto ... denied the urban poor the means to escape ... has closed the safety valve of hope. Almost unnoticed, America's urban culture is undergoing a dangerous polarization. ... The culture of the suburbs is becoming a culture of the closed door."52 The "1960 Census ... [revealed] an urban-suburban racial and class schism."53 "If the suburbs continue to balk the entry of Negro households, there could grow up a
form of political and residential apartheid." "When the Negroes and Puerto Ricans arrive, upward mobility and the American dream seem to come to an end." The "biggest domestic problem ... [for the Sixties therefore lay in] absorbing the Negro [and other minorities] into our national life."55

The urban problem ... [could be defined as] the Negro problem. ... Speeding the Negroes' integration into American life ... is the largest and most urgent piece of public business facing the United States today. ... Bringing people from society's backwaters into the mainstream of American life ... has always been the principle business, and the principle glory, of the American city.57

But today we find that "the large city is not absorbing and 'urbanizing' its new Negro residents rapidly enough ... its slums [are not] the incubator of a new middle class."58

Adaptation and balance: "The city of accelerating change and unstable form ... [is] this new city [which] is adapting to the function it is supposed to serve ... a process of creative evolution in which the organism ... [acts] as a modicum of choice in determining the nature of its form and way of life."59 The "working hypothesis of desirable development ... [i.e.,] certain balances between functions ... provides a frame of reference which helps maintain a dynamic balance as one proceeds."60 Adaptability thus becomes a standard of success for "the adaptable ... survive, the inflexible succumb."61 It becomes a measure for evaluating societal performance: ... society's ability to successfully adapt itself to external and internal changes ... , society's responsiveness to demands made upon it by different groups within it ... , society's ability to conceive and carry out large-scale projects that transcend mere adaptability and are widely regarded as "advance" or "improvement."62
"The function of the planner [therefore] is to help create an environment and to assist in adapting to it": 63 "a method to bring order into the community picture." "The problem is the form of the whole . . . partial solution will not solve it . . . . What is lacking is balance . . . the idea of wholeness as the evolution of man in his institutions has defined it which condemn this misuse of the physical environment." 65 "The key to a fresh architectural image of the city as a whole lies in working toward an organic unit of urban order which will hold together its component parts through successive changes in function and purpose from generation to generation . . . [and] archetypal image." 66

But "implementation of planning is handicapped by lack of acceptance of the idea that planning should provide the framework for community development and hence that other municipal services should adapt their activities to it." 67 For example "urban renewal . . . means trying to adapt the physical structure and the services and controls of an urban area to the needs and requirements of the occupants of the area in view of their relationships and activities." 68 "Planning for the city secure . . . [means] the life cycle of the urban community is determined by the adjustment it makes to changing economic conditions"; 69 "[a] qualitative adaptation to the changing interplay of economic forces within the area." 70 "Today, softened [even more] by the heat of violence, the established social order in the United States and other countries is receptive to creative adaptation and recasting." 71
MAKING THE MARKET SYSTEM WORK

Needs and opportunities: "We need nothing so much as a deeper search into the needs and wants of city dwellers, or in other words, of the individual"; and a "recognition of these wants as needs [and the] eligibility to receive goods or services . . . [based upon these needs]." "All community planning is essentially the physical implementation of individual and social purpose inherent in the needs, capacities, and aspirations of the individuals and the groups." "The aspirations [of families in slum and blighted areas] are, by and large, for acceptable if not middle-class standards and for items purchasable in the common market." The "guiding policy should be [therefore] to close the gap between the poor and the rest of the urban community." "The city must become the school for learning the means of earning the city's riches." "The purpose [therefore] of planning is to help the people of the community to get what they want."

The "deprived," the "have-nots," the "Poor," "this group of people is a subject of interest, concern and policy because it wants to, or is thought to want to move out of its deprived and depressed state." "The culture of the ghetto is a culture of despair . . . and resentment" without "the feeling of access to the wider world." This feeling of "deprivation," "adversity," and "insufficiency" and "want" yield multiple, direct and indirect, effects on the "psychology of the poor and upon their coping strategies and potential for occupational mobility." "It is the 'have-nots' who must gain a sense of potency from helping themselves." "The individual is poor as long as he feels poor, rejected or alienated from the economic or cultural
mainstream."  

"America needs nothing less than a crash program to catapult this minority subgroup out of what has become a permanent, dependent hopeless way of life."  

"Toward equality of urban opportunity":  

"Can we create mechanisms that will add a new dimension to freedom? Can we open up wider choices, new opportunities?"  

"The philosophy of the city [must have as its] central normative concept that of ordered opportunity."  

The goal of the War on Poverty is one of providing opportunities . . . [OEO's] primary objective is to generate conditions which give people the opportunity to help themselves . . . our problem became one of deciding which problems of poverty groups were most pressing for lifting people out of poverty, and then which ones OEO could most effectively try to meet.  

The objective was "a 'decent home and suitable environment' for every family . . . jobs for all and minimum family income . . . adequacy and equality in public services and facilities."  

The problem of the Demonstration Cities Act of 1966 . . . [was] to rebuild and revitalize large slum and blighted areas; expand housing, job and income opportunities; reduce dependence on welfare payments, improve education facilities and programs, combat disease and ill health, reduce the incidence of crime and delinquency, enhance recreational and cultural opportunities; establish better access between homes and jobs and generally to improve living conditions for the people who live in such areas.  

Distributive justice: Americans dream of "a fully competitive market" yet such a market system does not exist, it remains a goal for some purposes: particularly as a model for optimum allocation of sets of goods and services in response to preferences of participants. Planning may be desired precisely in order to bring the society a few steps closer to such a goal.  

"The People's will . . . [therefore] if not the central aim of city planning, must be the demolition of economic and cultural barriers that
prevent some of the persons in the city from claiming their rights as part of The People."

"But the great issues in economic organization, [nevertheless] those revolving around the central issue of the nature of distributive justice, have yet to be settled. . . . The justice of the present social allocation of wealth, knowledge, skill and other social goods is clearly in debate."

RESTORING SOCIAL PATHOLOGY TO NORMALCY

Social Pathology: The "presence of social pathology alongside of planning [is an indication of the] argument against an excessively 'materialistic' view of planning." Social planners treat social pathology. Whereas a physical planner will work toward making the environment more convenient to our habits, the social planner works toward the improvement of some of these habits themselves. . . . The physical planner will work to supply physical facilities to meet the normal demands for independence and freedom, the social planner will work toward raising the dependent person to independence and to calming the abnormal demands of individuals for "freedom."

"The attack on poverty is . . . a series of antipoverty measures . . . [focusing on the] network of social ills" and "social disorganization." "The War on Poverty" represents "a coordinated and concerted attack on the hard-core problems of entire neighborhoods or sections of cities." It "focuses on insufficiency . . . [and attempts to] establish success indicators, targets, and causality chains." It aims to relieve "social maladjustments" and "race friction," "poverty and race discrimination," and such "social ills" and mental health and chronic unemployment which constantly afflict our cities today.
The planning physician: "The planner [is like a] physician. Request comes from the patient after health is visibly, and even critically, impaired." Since

the body called society is an indivisible entity [it] cannot function when some of its parts are not integrated or are being neglected, and when it does not function properly it will sicken. The sickness of our present communities is the pitiful result of our failure to put basic human needs above economical and industrial requirements.

"Planning is most effective as a form of preventive medicine, [but planners prefer attempting to] avert catastrophe rather than in planning for the long range health of the community." But "the urban headache is not going to be relieved until the malady is diagnosed and systematic treatment prescribed and carried out."

"Remedial planning is necessary in our society . . . we need therapeutic planning," "because the major processes shaping our lives are unplanned."

"Human Renewal, a new dimension in planning": "To renew cities, [we must consequently] renew their people." The "chronic despair of so many central-city residents . . . [sets up] a range of disabling conditions [which] resonate upon each other in self-perpetuating waves," augmented by the "dysfunctional direction of current welfare programs in confronting recipients with their inadequacies."

The objective of community renewal programming . . . [is] the renewal of the community through environmental and nonenvironmental activities whose purposes are human enablement, the conservation and best disposition of human and capital resources, and responsiveness to the disparate needs of a pluralistic political and social system.

"A man's changing view of himself and the world is [therefore measured as] an emerging awareness of his potential capacity to actually shape the future by design."
"The primary reason for the stagnation of the city today is not desertion by the middle class. It is the failure of the city to produce a middle class out of the human ore of the poor."114 "Spontaneous rehabilitations . . . have not . . . proved contagious."115 For this reason "community renewal must focus on . . . designing means to influence behavior so as to increase the probabilities of development in desired directions in selected homogeneous or nodal areas of the nation."116 "Much of the racial friction in cities today has less to do with skin color than the new arrivals' lack of knowledge of such rules of the game as not throwing garbage out the window."117 "New to urban life, the in-migrant [is] not assimilated in many cases and in many cases difficult to assimilate. . . . If therefore we are attempting to eliminate slums through an Urban Renewal Program, we must change the habits these people have brought with them."118

"The city . . . must exercise 'positive discrimination' in favor of the Negro if it is to enable the mass of Negroes to compete with whites on equal terms. The United States must learn to look upon the Negro community as if it were an underdeveloped country."119 "Humanism deals with man and society and with their attempts to master themselves; . . . planning . . . partakes of both science and humanism."120 Hence "community development . . . [must be viewed] as a social process by which human beings can become more competent to live with and gain some control over local aspects of a frustrating and changing world."121 Development should focus on a "growth in social sensitivity and competence."122 "Human Renewal" means enabling the poor to go
from a state of minimum to one of maximum cooperation; from a condition where few participate to one where many participate; from a condition where all resources and specialists come from outside to one where local people make the most use of their own resources and so forth.

REPAIR TO THE CITY STRUCTURE

"The physical breakdown of our urban organization . . . [shows the] necessity for large-scale urban redevelopment." The question is "how to reconstruct our cities to make them democratically and culturally functional." President Johnson declared that "our society will never be great . . . until our cities are great . . . . In the next 40 years, we must rebuild the entire urban United States . . . whole cities must be reshaped and decay removed."

City planning . . . [is] chiefly concerned with repairing the old cities . . . to fit the old essential needs into a framework that will take care of the new mechanism so that we can go from one to the other . . . to provide ways by which the opposing requirements of our time can be if not reconciliated, at least brought into some sane relation with each other."

"Shaping the Community in an era of dynamic social change": In a sense all city planning . . . anticipates a reconstruction of the physical city." "Urban renewal's ultimate objective is a wholly sound city." Its aims are "revitalizing and reshaping the whole fabric of our central cities," in order to "not permit the evil to recur." All redevelopment or rehabilitation should lead to conditions "which would be socially and economically sound and stabilized." Again during the 1950's and 1960's we find ourselves dealing with the familiar terms of "renewal": those of "reconstruct," "rebuild," "reconvert," "remake," "replan," "overhaul," "convert," "raze,"
"clear," "demolish," "expand." These terms and those of "total slum elimination" such as "slum exterpation," "slum clearance," "mitigation of slums" slowly changed towards terms such as "arrest of blight," "blight reduction," "rejuvenate," "revitalize," "rehabilitate," "redevelop," "reshape," "relocate," "restore"; accompanied by terms of "conservation," "stabilization," "security enforcement," "soundness," "coherence," and "wholeness."

"Conserving the Old": In today's fast moving and complex world, the value of conservation is often overlooked. The "saving of the city" will be the replacement of "new cities for old." The "rebirth of the cities" will result from the "rebuilding and beautifying of U.S. civic centers . . . [they will] give municipalities new bases on life."

Beyond the saving of the old, that "there is a social structure which functions as an organism is a fact with which diverse agencies are doing business at this time. . . . The strengthening of local social structure [has become] one of the important new fields of social work." "Good neighborhoods" is the goal to be sought involving "the neighborhood as an elemental unit in human environment." "It means acceptance of the metropolitan area as a network of neighborhoods." "The fundamentals of our cities are wrapped up in the neighborhoods in which we live." "Urban Renewal . . . breaks up the huge inchoate mass of city problem into manageable pieces . . . [into] the 'projects.'" "Slum clearance and urban redevelopment" both have "the development of well-planned, integrated residential neighborhoods and the development or redevelopment"
of communities," as their goal. The "future residential neighborhood... [should] be self-contained and present a distinctive character... [it should] be fully developed and arranged properly to fit into the master plan."\textsuperscript{144}

The question of system changes: "Drastic change, then, is the order of the day."\textsuperscript{145} "The main reliance of the city for peaceful, voluntary and free revolutionary change is on leaders and organization that conserve community institutions by adapting them to the needs of the newcomers."\textsuperscript{146}

System-maintaining actions may be either adaptive or developmental... adaptive actions strive to maintain the equilibrium... in the face of changing external conditions or unforeseen internal changes. Development actions are concerned with changes that will propel a society toward new forms of self-realization.\textsuperscript{147}

"Environmental development processes] [then, involve both]... planning which is the act of deciding in advance what to do, and development, which is the act of doing it. Development is of course, the end product and payoff of the whole process of environmental adaptation."\textsuperscript{146}
REFERENCES: APPENDIX C, PART THREE


6. Evans, "Biology and Urban Areal Research."


9. Perin, "A Noiseless Secession From the Comprehensive Plan."

10. Perloff, "Education of City Planners."


14. Mikkelsen, "Have the Cities Reached Maturity?"

15. Aronovici, "Education and Community Planning."

16. Chase, "Future of the City."

17. Churchill, "Modern Cities--Now or Never."


Aschman, "The 'Policy Plan' in the Planning Program."

Webber, "Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility."


Philip Clayton, "Can We Plan For the Atomic Age?" Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXVI (May, 1960).

Dyckman, "Planning and Design Theory."

Clay, "Megalopolis, in Passing."

Blessing, "Perception in Planning."


Gropius, "Faith in Planning."

Higgins, "Towards a Science of Community Planning."

Howard, "The Planner in a Democratic Society--A Credo."

Aronovici, "Towards Humanism in City Planning."

Sullivan, "An Exploration of Planning's Relation to Integration."

Aronovici, "Towards Humanism in City Planning."


Dewhurst and Associates, "Urban Redevelopment."

Ibid.


Mumford, "Beginnings of Urban Integration."

Long, "Citizenship/Consumership in Metropolitan Areas."

42. Gropius, "Faith in Planning."

43. Howard, "The Planner in a Democratic Society--A Credo."


46. Haworth, "An Institutional Theory of the City and Planning."

47. Ibid.

48. Branch, "Concerning Coordinative Planning."

49. Loeks, "The New Comprehensiveness."


53. Cunningham, "The Indispensable City."

54. Marris, "The Social Implications of Urban Redevelopment."

55. Von Eckardt, "Bulldozers and Bureaucrats."

56. Chase, "Technology and Urban Life."

57. Silberman, "The City and the Negro."

58. Ibid.


60. Handler, "What is Planning Theory?"


62. Friedman, "Notes on Societal Action."


Haworth, "An Institutional Theory of the City and Planning."


Mitchell, "The New Frontier in Metropolitan Planning."


Charles F. Fuller, "Man Against the Skyline," The Commonweal, XLVIII (August 20, 1948).

Reiner, Reimer, Reiner, "Client Analysis and the Planning of Public Programs."

Aronovici, "Towards Humanism in City Planning."


Frieden, "Environmental Planning: The Elimination of Poverty."

Webber, "Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility."

Higgins, "Toward a Science of Community Planning."

Reiner and Reiner, "Urban Poverty."

Cauty, "Architecture and the Urban Emergency."


83 Michael, "Urban Policy in the Rationalized Society."
84 Reiner and Reiner, "Urban Poverty."
85 Schuer, "To Renew Cities, Renew Their People."
86 Frieden, "Toward Equality of Urban Opportunity."
87 Rubel, "Fate or Freedom?"
88 Haworth, "An Institutional Theory of the City and Planning."
89 Wright, "Program Coordination for Urban Planning."
91 Taylor and Williams, "Comments on the Demonstration Cities Programs."
93 Starr, "The People are Not the City."
94 Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning."
95 Dyckman, "Social Planning, Social Planners, and Planned Societies."
96 Adamson, "Physical Planning and Social Planning."
97 Reiner and Reiner, "Urban Poverty."
99 Taylor and Williams, "Comments on the Demonstration Cities Programs."
100 Reiner and Reiner, "Urban Poverty."
104 Gropius, "Faith in Planning."

Walker, "The American City is Obsolescent,"

Dyckman, "Social Planning, Social Planners, and Planned Societies."


Scheuer, "To Renew Cities, Renew Their People."

Webber, "Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility."

Reiner and Reiner, "Urban Poverty."

Perin, "A Noiseless Secession From the Comprehensive Plan."

Loeks, "The New Comprehensiveness."

Cauty, "Architecture and the Urban Emergency."

Seligman, "The Enduring Slums."


Whyte, "Are Cities Un-American?"

Taft, "Housing and Urban Renewal."

Silberman, "The City and the Negro."

Harris, "The Limits of Science and Humanism in Planning."

Popenoe, "Community Development and Community Planning."

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Stanbery, "Planning for the City Secure."


Churchill, "Planning in a Free Society."


Dichter, "The Strategy of Human Desires."

Dewhurst and Associates, "Urban Redevelopment."

Bettman, "Statement to the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Redevelopment."


Bellush and Hausknecht, "Entrepreneurs and Urban Renewal."


"Rebirth of the Cities," Time, December 5, 1955.


Bauer, "Good Neighborhoods."

Wright, "The Need for a Change in Attitudes."

Taylor, "Community Participation in Planning."


Ratcliffe, "How Can Housing Research Serve City Planning?"


Quigg Newton, "Planning Comes of Age," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXIII (Fall, 1957).


Friedmann, "Notes on Societal Action."

Loeks, "The New Comprehensiveness."
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


______. "Our Stake in Congestion." Survey, May 1, 1925.


"Are Big Cities Breaking Down?" The Literary Digest, May 30, 1925.


"Art Commissions and City Planning." The American City (February, 1914).


______. "City Planning and Housing." National Conference on Planning July, 1940.


Bailey, William L. "The 20th Century City." American City, August, 1924.


______. "Is City Planning Effectively Controlling City Growth In The United States?" Proceedings of the Twenty-third National Conference on City Planning, 1931.


Bailey, M.C. "Middle Country." The Survey Graphic, XXXVII (September, 1938).

Baxter, Sylvester. "The Civic Center--A Dominant Aesthetic Feature." Charities and the Commons, February 1, 1908.


Booth, William. "Social Needs of American Cities." Charities and the Commons, April, 1903.


Buttenheim, Harold S. "Does the Planner's Field Have A Boundary?"

______. "Where City Planning and Housing Meet." Proceedings of the Twenty-First National Conference on City Planning, 1929.


"The City and the Citizen." The Outlook, May 9, 1903.

"City Planning and Urban Congestion." The Outlook, June 11, 1910.


"City Planning is Cooperation." American City, May, 1925.

"A City Planning Primer." American City, January, 1927, p. 89.


Commons, John R. "City Life, Crime and Poverty." The Chautauquan, April, 1904.


Dickerman, G.S. "The Drift to the Cities." The Atlantic Monthly, September, 1913.


Diggs, Annie L. "Garden City Movement." Arena, December, 1902.


———. "If The City Fails, America Fails." The Survey Graphic, XXVI (December, 1937).

———. "Your City and You." Vital Speeches, April 1, 1937.


———. "Planning The Use of Our Resources." Journal of the American Institute of Planners, VI (July-September, 1940).


Feiss, Carl. "One Nation Indivisible." The Survey Graphic, XXIX (February, 1940).


"Form of Forms." Time, April 18, 1938.


Fuller, Charles F. "Man Against the Skyline." The Commonweal, XLVIII (August 20, 1948).


Handlin, Oscar. The American People in the Twentieth Century.

Harder, J.F. "The City's Plan." Municipal Affairs, II (1898).


Hartman, Edward T. "Town Planning." Charities and the Commons, February 1, 1908.


"Henry Ford Dooms our Great Cities." The Literary Digest, November 15, 1924.


Hooker, George E. "City Planning and Political Areas." *The American City.* February, 1917.

______. "Traffic and the City Plan." *Charities and the Commons,* February 1, 1908.


"How the Cities Stand?" *The Survey,* April 15, 1932, p. 71.

"How to Cure the City." *Time,* July 20, 1942.


______. "City Sense." *The Outlook,* August-September, 1912.


______. "In Defense of the American City." *Scribner's Magazine,* April, 1912.


"Inhibition--Permission--Compulsion." The American City, April, 1916.


Kellor, Frances A. "How to Americanize a City." The American City, February, 1916.


Lamb, Frederick S. "Municipal Art." Municipal Affairs, I (1897).


McKee, Oliver. "Slums--Still the Cities' Shame." The Commonweal, XXIX (March 10, 1939).

Mann, Frederick L. "Architecture and Civic Programs." The Chatauquan, June, 1907.


Martin, Harold H. "Are We Building a City 600 Miles Long?" The Saturday Evening Post, January 2, 1959.

Martin, Harold H. "Can We Halt the Chaos?" The Saturday Evening Post, January 16, 1960.


Mikkelsen, M.A. "Have The Cities Reached Maturity?" Architectural Record, CXLII (December, 1967), 60-64.


_____. "Botched Cities." American Mercury, October, 1929, p. 143.

_____. "City Planning and the American Precedent." The New Republic, June 11, 1924.


Mumford, Lewis. "Regions--To Live In." Survey, May 1, 1925.


______. "Yesterday's City of Tomorrow." Architectural Record, CXXXII (November, 1962), 139.


"Needed: A New Name For City Planning." The American City, March, 1934. p. 79.

"The Neighborhood Center--A Moral and Educational Factor." Charities and the Commons, February 1, 1908.


Neufeld, Maurice F. "Shall Mr. Crockett Enter Planning?" Journal of the American Institute of Planners, IV (September-October, 1938).


______. "Planning and Other Scientific Pursuits." Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XX (Spring, 1954).


Newcomb, Rexford. "City Planning Becomes Community Planning." The American City, October, 1939.
Newton, Quigg. "Planning Comes of Age." Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXIII (Fall, 1957).


Olmsted, Frederick L. "Basic Principles of City Planning." The American City, August, 1910.


"War Housing." Proceedings of the Tenth National Conference on City Planning, 1918.


"Organizing to Plan." The American City, November, 1943.

Orton, Lawrence M. "What is the Place of the Planning Function in Local Government?" Journal of the American Institute of Planners, VI (January–March, 1940).


_____. "How Shall We Train Planners We Need?" National Conference on Planning, 1951.


Robinson, Ira M. "The Replanning of Cities." *Charities and the Commons*, February 1, 1908.


Roosevelt, Franklin D. "Back To The Land." The Review of Reviews, October, 1931.


Rubel, John H. "Fate or Freedom?" National Conference on Planning, 1957.


Schroyer, Trent. "Marx and Habermas." Continuum, VIII (Spring-Summer, 1970), 52-64.


Sert, José Luis. "Can Our Cities Survive?" *Science Digest*, May, 1943, p. 25.


Shapiro, Jeremy J. "From Marcuse to Habermas." *Continuum*, VIII (Spring-Summer, 1970), 65-76.


Stephan, Frederick F. "Population Trends And City Planning." American City, April, 1934.


"Think About The City!" The Christian Century, LXXVI (October 21, 1959).


