FOSTERING EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION:
LESSONS FROM FOUR URBAN RENEWAL
NEIGHBORHOODS IN THE HAGUE

by

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ABSTRACT

The author examined citizen participation in four urban renewal neighborhoods in The Hague, the Dutch seat of government. Research was conducted in The Netherlands between October 1979 and January 1980. Methods of research included personal interviews, neighborhood visits, and a review of Dutch and English literature.

Definitions are derived for citizen action and citizen participation. A scheme is set up to assess the effectiveness of citizen participation by means of five criteria: diffusion of conflict, recognition of the residents' goals for renewal of their neighborhood, strengthening of the organizational structure of the community, democratization of community institutions, and community-wide learning. The five cases are analyzed in light of these criteria.

In the cases studied, three conditions antecedent to the beginning of participation were critical influences on the effectiveness of the participation efforts: attitudes of city officials (and planners) and neighborhood activists toward one another; the level and nature of conflict before and during participation; and the presence, strength, and opinions of neighborhood leaders. Participatory techniques were a secondary (but consequential) influence on effectiveness.

Recommendations are derived for American officials, planners, and activists regarding ways of increasing participatory effectiveness in the United States.
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this document.
This study involves an analysis of five participatory experiences in The Hague, the Dutch seat of government. Before I analyze the events in each neighborhood, I would like to explain why I chose The Netherlands as my country of research, and The Hague as my focus.

I wanted to select a nation with a rich history of citizen participation, and with a demonstrated commitment to the idea that citizens should be involved in deciding issues that affect them. Under a grant from the German Marshall Fund, my research was to provide recommendations for planners, politicians, and citizen activists in the United States; I was therefore concerned about comparability. Although no culture in Europe is truly similar to our own, I tried to locate a country whose history and procedures of urban renewal are at least roughly comparable to those in America. At the same time, I hoped to study a nation which had tested participatory procedures that were different from those in use in America, and which might therefore be instructive. Finally, I wanted to choose a country where I would be able to circulate freely among citizens and officials, and where language obstacles would not be too serious.

There is no doubt that Dutch and American cultures and political institutions are very different. However, in the
field of urban renewal, there have been many important
similarities -- both procedural and historical. Planning
in both countries is conducted essentially at the local
level by bureaucrats and members of popularly-elected city
councils. Physical plans are broadly influenced by policies
adopted at the state (provincial) and national levels;
regional and national authorities oversee (and in many cases,
must approve) planning decisions made by municipalities.
Finally, most of the money which finances urban renewal
stems from the central government and private developers
(both profit and non-profit).

Even more importantly, the history of urban renewal
in both countries is very similar. In both the U.S. and
Holland, early renewal plans called for the construction
of high-rise office buildings, luxury apartment houses, and
major highways. Significant displacement of residents was
proposed, and actually occurred in many cities. Post-
renewal rents usually proved too high for the original
residents of the neighborhoods involved. Citizen groups
organized to protest renewal plans, and eventually to
participate in the revision of those plans. Most municipal
governments have generally accepted citizen participation
as an unavoidable political reality, but effective parti-
cipation is still elusive. Difficulties have arisen in
getting "average" citizens to become seriously involved,
and to sustain their involvement over time. Finally, many (if not most) major plans are still made without significant citizen participation.

However, despite these similarities, Dutch and American societies have responded quite differently to calls for citizen participation in terms of both philosophy and methodology. Some of these different responses will be explored in this case, and others have been examined by John Zeisel and David Godschalk in their portion of our report for the German Marshall Fund. My hope is that these differing approaches to similar problems will be instructive to Americans and Dutchmen who review our analyses.

As a last point, The Netherlands met several of my pragmatic concerns as well. Most Dutchmen can speak English fluently, and I am also able to speak some Dutch. Government records and officials are generally available to foreign guests, and I never found myself lacking for contacts among citizen groups and activists.

My choice of The Hague similarly reflected academic and pragmatic concerns. The case of Schilderswijk was one of the most critical occurrences in the history of modern Dutch renewal; the capacity of citizen groups in this neighborhood to substantively alter government plans on two separate occasions had reverberations in every major city in Holland.
At the same time, The Hague offered examples of more limited successes in citizen participation, as well as failures. The Hague (like most other large Dutch cities) has adopted a general system for citizen participation, but it was not as sweeping a reform as in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, or Groningen. On the whole, The Hague is a conservative city with a generally docile population -- a bit less spectacular than some Dutch cities, but perhaps more typical -- and that is precisely why I chose to study it.

During my four months in The Hague, I studied five participatory experiments in four neighborhoods. The period I studied covered about ten years, from 1970 to the present, although only my study of Schilderswijk covered activity during this entire period.
CHAPTER I
AN INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH SOCIETY

Understanding the cases to be presented requires some background knowledge of Dutch society. Naturally, it is impossible to thoroughly analyze a very complex social system in one brief chapter. However, I will try to highlight basic political and cultural facts which have particular bearing on the case studies, and on the implications which will be drawn from them.

I will begin by explaining the rudiments of Dutch politics and social traditions, followed by a discussion of two fundamental aspects of Dutch culture: the accommodation of differences between social blocs, and deference to authority. I will then explain the role which planning plays in the political process. The final section of this chapter will discuss recent stresses in Dutch social fabric, and the rising demand for political participation and democratization.

Political and Social Organization

The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy governed by a parliamentary system. The royal House of Orange is quite popular, and a new Queen ascended the throne in April 1980. The House of Orange, which dates back to the liberation of
Holland from Napoleonic domination, is one of the country's major national symbols, serving to unify diverse groups. "There is wide consensus among both religious and secular groups, and among nearly all political parties in favour of the retention of royalty."¹

Under the constitution, the sovereign is inviolable (which is the Dutch way of saying that she cannot be responsible for official acts of state); the Ministers are accountable to Parliament. The "States-General" holds legislative power in its two houses: a First Chamber (consisting of seventy-five members appointed indirectly by the Provincial Councils), and a Second Chamber (consisting of 150 members elected by the Dutch people and representing various political parties). True power resides essentially in the Second Chamber.

Members of the Second Chamber are elected nationwide; there are no electoral districts. All Dutchmen over eighteen may vote for slates of candidates representing the different parties. As a result, the number of party members in the Second Chamber accurately represents the percentage of the vote received by that party in the last election, which is not the case in Britain and many other parliamentary nations. Since the major parties represent the four "pillars" of Dutch society (Catholic, Dutch Reformed, Re-Reformed, and secular), this system of filling seats in the Second Chamber enables each group to be represented roughly in accordance
with its population in the country -- to the degree that voters stick by the party of the group to which they belong. (The pillar system (verzuiling) will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.)

The Netherlands has eleven provinces. Three western provinces (North Holland, South Holland, and Utrecht) form the heart of the nation in many respects. Economic activity is centered here, in the "ring city" (randstad), a massive conurbation which includes Utrecht, Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and a number of smaller cities in very close proximity. Comprising only one-quarter of the country's land area, approximately half the population lives in the vicinity of the randstad. The province of Zeeland lies south of the randstad at the mouths of the Rhine River. Historically a site of major flooding, Zeeland is the location of the Delta Project, one of Holland's major efforts to protect its land from the sea.

Moving east, we come to the provinces of North Brabant and Limburg, which hold the core of the country's Catholic population. Catholics form about forty percent of the total population of The Netherlands, but about ninety percent of the populations of these two provinces. Here resides much of the strength of the Catholic People's Party, the party which has traditionally won the largest number of seats in the Second Chamber (until the 1970's).
As we proceed north through the provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel, the percentage of Catholics diminishes. The three northern provinces of Groningen, Drenthe, and Friesland are the heartland of the Protestant parties. Only about ten percent of the population of these three provinces is Catholic.

The provinces are weak in the Dutch political system. Provincial Councils are popularly elected, and each Council appoints a Provincial Executive from among its own members to run the day-to-day affairs of the province. Although generally weak, the provinces do have an important planning function, since they must approve all physical plans sent to them by the municipalities.

Each of The Netherlands' 842 municipalities is governed by a College of Mayor and Aldermen, which is responsible to a Town Council. The Council is elected by the citizens of the municipality in an at-large election; the councils are generally divided into factions according to party lines. Large cities, for example, are often dominated by Labour Party councillors; whereas more conservative, southern cities are frequently dominated by members of the Catholic party.

The Council appoints some of its own members to be aldermen who manage the daily affairs of the municipality. The mayor is appointed by the "Crown", i.e. the Queen and
her Ministers (the Queen, of course, is not actually involved; but decisions made by her Ministers are frequently called "Crown decisions"). The mayor chairs the College and the Council, and serves a six-year term. He jointly administers the municipality with the aldermen.

We will now move on to a discussion of the traditional organization of Dutch society into four major pillars, or verzuiling. These pillars represent the three major religious groups of The Netherlands: the Catholics (approximately forty percent), the Dutch Reformed (a Calvinist denomination comprising about twenty-eight percent of the population); and the Re-Reformed (a stricter Calvinist group of about nine percent); plus the secular (or "Humanist") Dutch citizens who have no formal religious affiliation (eighteen percent).3 (This leaves about five percent of the population who belong to other religious denominations not included in the three major religious groups.)

The division of society into these four separate pillars pervades all aspects of Dutch social life. The most obvious aspect, perhaps, is the existence of political parties associated with each group. The Catholics generally adhere to the positions and candidates of the Catholic People's Party; the Dutch Reformed belong to the Christian Historical Union, while the stricter Re-Reformed group dominates the Anti-Revolutionary Party. (We should note
here that the distinction between the Anti-Revolutionaries and Christian Historicals is also based partly on class as well as religion, with the Christian Historical Union originally splitting away as an off-shoot for higher-class members of either Calvinist group.)

The secular pillar claims two major political parties: the Party of the Workers (Labour) for socialists, and the Liberals for conservative thinkers (sic). This rounds out the "Big Five" parties of Dutch politics. There are about a dozen minor parties (many of which have sprung up in the last fifteen years), also frequently divided according to religious lines. (For example, the Catholic National Party is an ultra-conservative offshoot of the Catholic People's Party; Democrats '66 and the Farmers Party are both secular in ideology, with the former being left-wing, while the latter is extreme right.)

Support for the Big Five from their respective constituencies has been remarkably constant since the beginning of the century, with the Catholics usually polling the greatest number of seats in the Second Chamber. The close affiliation between party and social bloc is evidenced by the fact that four of the Big Five draw about ninety percent of their support from one bloc; the exception is the Christian Historical Union, which draws about eighty percent of its support from Dutch Reformed voters. (This level of clear-cut
support for the party(ies) of one's bloc has deteriorated in recent years, as we will examine later.)

The division of Dutch society according to bloc spreads beyond political party, however. Individual blocs have their own newspapers, television stations, schools, hospitals, social welfare agencies, and labor organizations; even retail stores are often informally labelled by the bloc membership of their owners.

In addition, personal associations are largely governed by the bloc to which one belongs. According to a 1965 survey, about seventy-five percent of all Catholics, Dutch Reformed, and Re-Reformed respondents stated their objections to the marriage of their daughter to a man of a different religion; perhaps even more strikingly, a full sixty-two percent of people who classified themselves as secular (but most of whom have some religious background, if only through parental association) indicated their objection to such marriages. 5

Similar patterns can be found in friendship. Although there is little objection to having friends in other religious blocs, intra-block friendships clearly predominate, especially among those who attend church regularly. 6

Despite the deep divisions which exist among the pillars of Dutch society, the nation is stable and passionately democratic. Equality among the groups is manifest
in many ways, not the least of which is a powerful historical anomaly: despite centuries of prejudice toward the Catholic minority (based largely on the association between Catholicism and Spanish dominance over Holland), Catholics have played a fundamental (and often dominant) role in Dutch politics throughout the last century. "The paramount position of the Catholic party is not only taken for granted by the leaders of the other parties in the negotiations preceding the formation of new cabinets, but is also widely accepted by the rank and file of the non-Catholic parties." 7

When non-Catholic Dutchmen were asked in 1963 to state which party or parties should form the new government, they generally preferred the party of their bloc. In most cases, however, their second choice was the Catholic People's Party.

Equity among the groups is manifested in many ways throughout society. The existence of parallel institutions (social, economic, and political) for each bloc indicates that no group has been prevented from developing its own "internal society" to whatever degree it sees fit. Air-time is provided to bloc television stations in proportion to their memberships; financial aid to church schools is appropriated according to enrollment.

The roots of this anomalous situation of separate but equal roles can be found in a complex system of accommodation which developed during the early years of this century.
Accommodation and Deference

During the early part of the century, three critically divisive issues dominated Dutch politics: state aid to religious schools, extension of the franchise, and collective bargaining and labor rights. Details of the conflicts need not be presented at this time; a fuller explanation can be found in The Politics of Accommodation by Arend Lijphart (see note 2, p. 53). The important point for our summary is that these issues bitterly divided the four blocs (and consequently the major parties). Ideological and religious debates threatened to destroy the Dutch state. In 1913, Prime Minister P. W. A. Cort van der Linden attempted a solution by placing the cabinet in the role of "honest broker". He established commissions to seek compromise solutions to both the education and franchise issues (the labor issue was not at that time quite so divisive). The commissions included representatives from all seven political parties then in existence.

After months of deliberation, the commissions recommended compromise solutions on both issues. Parliament embraced the compromises almost without dissent. Parliamentary debates on the agreements took place during 1916 and 1917, during the national emergency provoked by World War I. However, the war was not the central factor in forcing a settlement. Lijphart cites the following three
factors as key to the achievement of a solution:

Three special characteristics of the pattern deserve special emphasis: (1) the pre-eminent role of the top leaders in recognizing the problems and in realistically finding solutions in spite of ideological disagreements -- a process in which the rank and file were largely ignored even to the extent of rigging an important election; (2) the participation of the leaders of all blocs in the settlement; and (3) the importance of the principle of proportionality in the substance of the settlement -- state aid to education on the basis of proportional treatment of all schools and representation in future parliaments on the basis of the proportion of vote received by each party. 8

This "peaceful settlement" (known as the Pacificatie in Dutch) represented a critical political turning point in The Netherlands, and ushered in an era where the accommodation of differing interests became the watchword of the Dutch state.

Lijphart identifies seven "rules of the game" which allowed the Dutch to continue the process of accommodation for fifty years following 1917. These rules are: 9

1) Government is very much like business; it is a serious means toward a serious end, and not a game in which individuals play differing interests off against one another regardless of risks to the system as a whole.
2) The major blocs agree to disagree about major ideological and religious questions without dragging them into daily politics.

3) Summit diplomacy among the elites of the blocs serves to maintain communication and achieve compromises on important issues.

4) Proportionality governs key aspects of state life. Jobs in the civil services, air time for television and radio broadcasting companies, financial assistance from the central government, and other scarce resources are all allocated with bloc proportions in mind. This division of resources is not coincidental, but intentional. Equitable distribution of government jobs does not result from the fact that equally-talented members of each bloc apply for positions in exact proportion to their numbers in the population. As one researcher has pointed out in a study of the town of Sassenheim:

The total amount of money for the salaries of the personnel is divided among them roughly in the same way as the electorate is divided into various political (virtually religious) factions. Thus, for instance, if about one half of the population is Roman Catholic, the money which is paid to the Roman Catholic clerks at the village-hall will amount to about one half of the total sum. Hirings are governed by the same rule. As there are no sudden changes in the
political composition of the electorate, elections do not disturb the system.\textsuperscript{10}

5) When an issue cannot be neutralized by proportionalizing an allocation decision, it is often "depolititized" by resorting to legal or constitutional principles, or even hazing facts and figures deliberately to preserve the peace.

6) Secrecy governs negotiations among the elites of the four blocs. In order to prevent the need for face-saving showdowns:

The leaders' moves in negotiations among the blocs must be carefully insulated from the knowledge of the rank and file. Because an 'information gap' is desirable, secrecy is a most important rule. In Holland, covenants are usually, though not always, open, but covenants openly arrived at are rare indeed.\textsuperscript{11}

Generally, Parliament has cooperated in this "conspiracy of silence" by limiting use of its right to public inquiry. Academics and the press are amazingly cooperative (from an American standpoint) in supporting this process of secret deliberations. Reasons for this are not completely clear. Dutch academics have never developed the muckraking tradition which characterizes certain disciplines in America. In addition, we must remember the degree to which newspapers are controlled by the blocs themselves; editors can expect to pay a high price for indiscretion.
The government has the right to govern. This attitude reflects the high level of Dutch deference to authority. The right of the government to lead the nation as it sees fit (once elected) is manifested in the general quiescence of Parliament regarding ministerial actions, and in the docile way in which most citizens have accepted the dominant planning role of the Dutch municipality.

This seventh rule of the game leads us to a discussion of Dutch deference to authority, a key element in the Dutch code of civility. Dutch civil behavior precludes violent displays of emotion and rejects the indulgent pursuit of personal goals. As Goudsblom has indicated:

This prestige function of civil conduct has sometimes called forth resistance, especially in socialist quarters; nevertheless, in practically every national organization, including labour party and labour unions, the dominant code of behaviour is civil: Civility appears to present a generally acceptable set of rules for the kind of relationships that sustain a nationally integrated social structure.12

Civility and tolerance go hand-in-hand in The Netherlands, provided that no group violates basic codes of conduct.

Dutch society is an extremely tolerant one; the Protestant respects the rights of the Catholic, and Protestants, Catholics, and Humanists have
mutual respect and tolerance for each other. Other groups, which would be labelled deviant in some societies - such as homosexuals - are accorded a wide degree of tolerance. But homosexuals in Holland, by in large, conduct themselves with orderliness and restraint, and indeed, form their own verzueling. Prostitutes and pornographers occupy similar roles, carrying on their professions with dignity and restraint. The idea of tolerance, as Goudsblom says, is matched by the idea of orderliness. Nonconformity is tolerated as long as it does not interfere with the prevailing social order. At points where the norm of orderliness is violated, the tolerance of the social system ends.13

The "norm of orderliness" was preserved by middle-class Indonesians who moved to Holland in the 1950's. It has been similarly maintained by other ethnic groups who have found havens in the country, such as Spanish Jews and English Pilgrims. This norm is currently being violated by South Moluccans (Ambonesians), Surinamers (immigrants from this former Dutch colony in Latin America), and Mediterranean guest workers who live in styles very different from the Dutch majority. Significant discrimination does exist against these groups, and integration appears unlikely -- apparently proving that the Dutch are willing to accept
people who think differently, but not people who act differently.

Perhaps the most critical aspect of Dutch civility for our study is deference to authority. Lijphart described this phenomenon as follows:

Neither the ideologically stylized pattern of elite - mass communications nor the high degree of elite dominance of the bloc organizations can fully explain the persistent allegiance of the rank and file of the blocs to their leaders. The people must have an inherently strong tendency to be obedient and allegiant - regardless of particular circumstances. This tendency will be referred to as deference. This term is here used in its broadest meaning: an individual's acceptance of his position both in the social hierarchy and on the scale of political authority, accompanied by a low level of participation and interest in politics. For the masses this entails respect for and submission to their superiors.14

Cross-cultural survey research has indicated a particularly high Dutch admiration for people who are "respectful, [and who do not] overstep their place". Dutch citizens are not likely to act singly to redress social grievances; in fact (like many Europeans) the individual citizen is most likely to do nothing at all, contrary to a more activist outlook prevalent in the United States.
Of those Dutchmen who claim they would take action, very few are willing to contact political leaders directly through letters or visits, in contrast to respondents from other countries. The idea of organizing an informal group to seek redress is far more acceptable to Dutchmen. They are also more likely than other nationals to work through existing formal organizations like political parties or labor unions. These attitudes indicate a high level of deference toward leaders, skepticism about the correctness of one's own opinions (or about one's power to induce change), and a willingness to approach leaders through formal or informal organizations if an issue is serious enough to demand attention.

As Lijphart notes, "The Burkean dilemma of whether an elected official should be a representative or a delegate is not a dilemma in Holland. Leaders lead; followers follow."16

The system of accommodation may seem an unlikely setting for the development of a movement for political participation. The acceptance of summit diplomacy, the conspiracy of silence, and the intensity of deference to government leaders suggest that the Dutch system of accommodation is not likely to spawn demands for citizen involvement. In the past this has been true. As long as accommodation worked to the satisfaction of most citizens,
they were willing to allow bloc elites to control the country's destiny, and the future of individual cities and neighborhoods as well. In recent years, however, the process of accommodation has decayed -- and with it popular deference toward government decision-making. We will examine this situation in the final section of this chapter, after discussing briefly the role of planning in the political process.

Planning in the Dutch Political System

Planning in The Netherlands is deeply rooted in the age-old need for neighbors and communities to join forces to protect the country from the ravages of sea and storm. Massive national projects (like the IJsselmeer Polder Reclamation Project to drain and reclaim the Zuider Zee, and the Delta Project to protect the islands of Zeeland) are modern-day extensions of efforts to drain the marshes, build dikes, and dredge canals in medieval Holland.

This traditional need to plan the physical environment has made the Dutch people significantly more amenable than Americans to planning as a national (and local) public policy tool. As one observer commented:

The hard communal struggle to gain and hold land has given [the Dutch] a common concern -- a common ground -- causing them, in the words of
the British architect William Holford, 'to sink lesser differences and [accept] a certain discipline in their environment'. If planning is . . . the organization of shortage, then the Dutch have been planners since the first tribes moved out of the German forests and settled on the coastal heath and marshes. 17

There are many kinds of planning in Holland: economic, land-use, regional, and a special planning system related to the waterstaat en waterschappen (dikes, canals, bridges, and roads). Here, we are concerned primarily with land-use planning as it relates to urban renewal, since that is the planning process involved in the cases to be presented in Chapter III.

In the United States, one could argue that modern land-use planning developed from laws and institutions designed to build roadways and zone economic activities. In The Netherlands, however, current state land-use planning powers arose from an effort to reverse bad housing conditions in urban neighborhoods. The Housing Act of 1901 is considered the ancestor of modern Dutch planning law. 18

The Housing Act enabled the creation of a special Dutch institution known as the woningbouwverenigingen, or housing association. These organizations are similar to cooperative housing societies in the U.S., but in Holland they are much more powerful since they construct a far larger proportion of housing. Prior to World War II, many
associations were controlled directly by labor organizations, wealthy philanthropists, or one of the churches; of course, each pillar of Dutch society boasted its own housing associations.

If the association was controlled by working-class members, they paid dues over the years and eventually received a new housing unit from the association. If the association was philanthropic, most of the funding was provided by wealthy benefactors.

Since World War II, however, most of that has changed, as housing associations became a tool for post-war redevelopment. Although government had always supplied some financial support to the associations, they are now almost totally government-funded and do most of their work for municipalities. Most are now large, bureaucratic organizations in which members and the church play only minor roles. Although they are technically non-profit, critics charge that the woningbouwverenigingen are more interested in creating corporate financial empires (based not only on thousands of rental units which they lease and manage, but also on investments in dozens of other fields), than in serving the interests of low- and moderate-income citizens.

Having digressed on this discussion of housing associations, let us now return to our history of Dutch planning law. The Housing Act of 1901 enabled municipal governments
to reserve land specifically for the laying of dikes, squares, and canals. In 1921, these three categories were dropped in favor of more general land-use planning provisions; in 1931, the possibility of regional and inter-municipal planning was added; and the Act was fully extended to include rural areas in 1937. Regulations governing development of the regional plans and a National Plan were laid down during the Occupation, and incorporated in the Act in 1950. The physical planning and housing functions of the Act were eventually separated when two new bills (a Physical Planning Act, and a new Housing Act) were enacted in 1965.

The Physical Planning Act set down procedures whereby municipalities can draw up development plans and obtain (where necessary) approval for these plans from provincial and national authorities. Various subsidies are provided to help the municipality in the planning process. Most municipalities have substantial town planning departments to carry out this work; smaller towns contract out to private planning consultants.

Dutch land-use planning revolves around a series of plans which are completed in succession (although localities do not always adhere strictly to the normal order). For example, a typical series of plans for the renewal of an urban neighborhood would include the following:
1) A **structuurschets** ("structure sketch") describing long-term goals for the neighborhood and outlining ways in which the municipality might achieve these goals.

2) A **bestemmingsplan** ("destination plan", more loosely translated as an allocation plan) explaining the land uses which will be permitted in various parts of the neighborhood. A destination plan may include zoning maps, a system for phasing the plan in, various exemptions to plan rules, details concerning the granting of building and construction permits under the plan, and various provisions concerning penal sanctions against violators and compensation for those adversely affected by the plan's implementation.

National law lays out procedures for drawing up destination plans, involving regulations for publicity, impact assessment, approval by the Town Council and the Provincial Executive, and appeals of planning decisions to municipal, provincial, and national authorities.

Under Dutch planning law, Town Councils can pass a "preparation decision" (**voorbereidingsbesluit**) during a destination planning process. The preparation decision requires municipal officials to review every development plan submitted by a private developer (even requests for simple building permits) to make sure they conform to the destination plan under consideration. The preparation decision is only temporary, however, and must frequently be
renewed before a destination plan is completed. The availability of the preparation decision provides Dutch citizens and planners with a degree of control over development which we lack in the United States. A preparation ordinance, if applied early enough, might prevent the glut of speculative activity which tends to follow the announcement of renewal intentions in American cities.

The destination plan is the centerpiece of Dutch municipal planning efforts, but it is normally followed by plans which detail neighborhood development even further, such as:

3) The verkavelingstudie (or "parceling-out study") which gives the plan spatial detail, deciding what types of buildings are needed in certain places, and where single-family and multi-family housing will be located.

4) The end of the planning process usually involves a bouwplan ("building plan") which provides architectural details for individual buildings, parks, and roads.

Three aspects of national policy encourage citizen participation in urban renewal planning: the publicity requirements of the Physical Planning Act of 1965, the appeals process and subsidies for participatory efforts:

1) Publicity requirements. The Physical Planning Act was passed before the major demands for increased citizen involvement of the late 1960's and the 1970's; it therefore reflects the paternalistic attitude toward citizen impact
which flourished in Holland at that time. For example, at various points during the destination plan process, "The burgomaster [i.e. the mayor] must publish the fact that the plan has been laid open for public inspection beforehand: in the National Gazette, in one or more (daily) newspapers distributed in the Municipality, and in the customary manner. If the draft indicates any land in respect of which the realization of the plan is deemed necessary in the near future, separate notice to that effect must be given to those who appear on the cadastral registers as owners or holders of a right in rem in respect of that land. The notice also makes mention of the right to lodge objections."¹⁹

The current government has proposed new legislation which contains a section dealing specifically with citizen participation in urban renewal planning. It is designed to expand significantly the publicity requirements of the 1965 Act. Under provisions of the bill, each municipality would be required to do the following for each bestemmingsplan it creates:

Firstly, a city government must announce its intention to create a destination plan prior to the start of the planning process. It must indicate the neighborhood involved, and the reasons behind the decision to create a plan. It must also publish an address where people can obtain further information.
In addition, the Town Council must pass a by-law explaining precisely how citizens will be involved in the planning process. The by-law must establish procedures for negotiation between the citizens and city officials, and procedures for discussion among citizens themselves.

Finally, the municipality must publish a report after the participation process, specifically addressing the issues raised during the procedure.

Government officials with whom I spoke consider the new legislation to be as supportive of participation as a piece of legislation can be. They readily admit, however, that a municipality which is intent on frustrating participation could do so regardless of national legislation on the subject.

Currently, about half of the destination plans dealing with urban renewal which are drafted in The Netherlands involve no significant public participation, according to preliminary results of a study by the Advisory Council for Physical Planning of the Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning. Under the new bill, municipalities would no longer be able to create plans completely without public participation; nor would purely reactive method of participation satisfy the requirements of the law.

If a municipality fails to abide by the provisions of the Act, the province (and if necessary the Crown) can intercede to carry out the law's intents.
2) The appeals process. A central part of the Dutch accommodation process is a procedure which allows any Dutch citizen to appeal virtually any government decision to municipal, provincial, and Crown authorities. After publication of a destination plan, for example, anyone can lodge a complaint with the Town Council, seeking some amendment to the plan. There are no restrictions regarding who can lodge a complaint (although complaints by persons with no legitimate interest in the plan are not likely to be accepted), and there are no restrictions regarding the nature of the complaint (except that the complaint must be germane to the contents of the plan). Legal counsel is not required for the complaint procedure.

Within three to six months after publication of the plan, the Town Council passes judgment on all the complaints and decides whether or not it will adopt the plan. If the plan is adopted (vastgesteld, more literally "established"), it passes on to the Provincial Executive, the next body which must consider the bestemningsplan.

Complaints about the plan can be lodged with the Executive up to one month after it receives the plan for review. The Provincial Executive must approve the bestemningsplan before it can be implemented. If the plan is out of accordance with the regional plans of the province, or if the Executive believes that one of the complaints
against the plan is justified, it can send part (or all) of the plan back to the municipality for amendment. If the plan is approved (goedgekeurd) by the Executive, it is still possible to lodge a complaint with the Crown.

The Crown is the last resort of citizen complaint about the contents of a destination plan. The minister responsible for the resolution of the complaints is the Minister of Housing and Physical Planning.

However, complaints to the Crown do not go directly to the Minister. First, they must be considered by the Council of State (Raad van State), a body of "old wise men" who play an important advisory role in many aspects of Dutch central government. The Council delivers its opinions directly to the Minister, who resolves the complaint on behalf of the Crown.

In judging complaints, the Council of State needs the advice of experts in the planning field. Thus, the Council "borrows" some personnel from the Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning. These personnel form a special office known as the Advisory Bureau of the Council of State (Bureau Adviseur Raad van State) where they work full-time recommending how the Council of State should judge complaints brought to the Crown against destination plans. There is an obvious opportunity for conflict of interest when Ministry personnel advise the
Council of State on what recommendations it should make to the Minister himself. In fact, this is one of several complaints lodged against the Crown appeal process.

The bureau has seventeen staff members who review 300 to 400 files a year. There is one file for each destination plan under review; a single file may contain as many as eighty complaints. A staff member from the bureau must personally interview every person lodging a complaint against a destination plan. Since it is obviously impossible for seventeen people to see all complainants separately, group meetings are often arranged; this is frequently suitable because many people complain about essentially the same problem. However, the system is still backlogged. It often takes well over a year to resolve a single complaint. The bureau is trying to reduce this time-lag by pushing for more personnel, and seeking procedural changes in the complaint process.

After the bureau completes its recommendation on the complaint, it sends it to the Minister, who can indicate his concurrence with or objection to the recommendation if he wishes to do so. The recommendation then proceeds to the Raad van State, which will usually (but not necessarily) agree with the advice of the bureau. From the Council of State the recommendation goes back to the Minister, who makes the final decision for the Crown.
However, the advice of the Council of State is never taken lightly. Only on one occasion since the procedure was adopted in 1965 has the Minister for Housing and Physical Planning failed to abide by the recommendation of the Council of State. He has complied in all other cases.

Some people allege that the Crown appeal process works against the interests of poor people. This argument was raised by the Labour government of Prime Minister Joop den Uyl before he left office in 1977. Den Uyl and some of his advisors complained that the appeal process was used mainly by landowners, developers, and the rich to frustrate plans for urban renewal and to protect their personal interests. They wanted to scrap the Crown appeal procedure and replace it with more meaningful participation at the planning stage. However, the Den Uyl government lost power before it had a chance to implement any of these recommendations.

In speaking with about half a dozen government officials, academics, and citizen activists, I could not find anyone who believed the former government's opinions were well-founded. Most said that ordinary citizens were well-served by this fairly uncomplicated way to appeal municipal decisions to national authorities. In fact, some suggested that the influence of money and political
friends was greater on the municipal and provincial levels, leaving the Crown as the only sympathetic resort for poor people who had few friends at city hall or in the provincial administration.

The Crown appeal procedure is not token in impact; about fifty percent of the Crown appeals are granted annually, and many of these assist common citizens who would have been adversely affected by municipal plans. Since about half of all destination plans in Holland are still created without real citizen input, a full range of complaint procedures seems absolutely necessary, even though the process may be used on certain occasions as a roadblock to serve the interests of the powerful.

Most persons I interviewed were sympathetic to the former government's desire to increase "front-end" participation. They recognize that the complaints procedure, no matter how effective, is only reactive in its character. Nonetheless, there is a general reluctance to dispense with it.

3) Subsidies for citizen participation. There are four major kinds of subsidies which the central government provides to finance citizen participation in plan-making. The first is specifically designed to help municipalities prepare urban renewal plans; it is called "urban renewal preparation costs" (voorbereidingskosten stadsvernieuwing).
This subsidy provides .35 Dutch guilders (approximately eighteen cents) per dwelling unit, plus 7,000 guilders per hectare (about 2.5 acres) to cover such projects as organizing exhibitions to explain the neighborhood situation, holding public hearings, dispensing information to the population, researching the quality of existing housing, investigating the social and economic characteristics of the neighborhood, hiring a project coordinator and technical staff to assist in the participation process, projecting the probable level of post-renewal rents, and making a report on the results of participation. In 1980, about thirty-five million Dutch guilders (about eighteen million dollars) will be disbursed for urban renewal preparation costs through this subsidy program.21

In addition, other urban renewal subsidies directed to municipalities may be used in part to finance participation efforts, even though this may not be the central intent of the subsidy.

The central government also funds experiments in citizen participation. Communities must apply for these funds through the Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning, which judges applications not only on the objective potential of the procedures suggested, but also on their newness or experimental quality.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Ministry of Culture, Recreation, and Social Work pays the salaries of about 500 "social/cultural workers" (opbouwwerkers) who are active in renewal projects throughout the country. In addition, the Ministry subsidizes the operating expenses of many organizations run by these opbouwwerkers, providing money for supplies, news bulletins, and even political demonstrations (generally against the local government). In many cases, subsidies are provided to organizations run by neighborhood residents who are not opbouwwerkers, as is the case in the Schilderswijk neighborhood which we will examine later.

The notion of the central government providing money for social workers to organize demonstrations against city administrations may seem to be an unlikely political situation. However, it stems from the special place social/cultural workers hold in Dutch society, and the high value which the Dutch attach to "welfare work" (welzijnwerk). Welzijnwerk was handled almost exclusively by the churches prior to World War II, and church-related organizations employed most opbouwwerkers. Although the churches' role in social work has diminished considerably, the country has maintained its respect for welzijnwerk and its practitioners.
As urban residents have formed action groups to deal specifically with complaints against the municipality, they have demanded (and usually received) subsidies to hire opbouwwerker\textsuperscript{s} and other staff, many of whom espouse radical ideas and spend much of their time organizing political dissent. Both central and municipal authorities have found it politically disadvantageous to move against these workers, fearing reprisals from the action groups (and their voting members).

In 1979, however, the entire system of financing social work underwent a major change. Instead of dispensing subsidies from the level of the central government directly to the organizations which hire social/cultural workers, the Ministry is now disbursing its subsidies to municipal authorities according to a mathematical formula. In 1979, between 400 and 500 municipalities (out of 842 in The Netherlands) received community development subsidies. They were able to spend this money in almost any way they please, making most social workers (and their organizations) completely dependent on the municipal government for their funding.

The central government places only three fairly weak restrictions on how the municipalities can spend their social welfare funds. The money must be disbursed in a way which takes into account cultural and racial
minorities. The rights of women must also be given special consideration. Finally, neighborhoods in need of urban renewal must be given priority in the expenditure of funds. Municipalities must also go through a planning process to determine how the money will be allocated; citizens must participate in this process.

If these conditions are not met, the central government can withhold payments; but two high-ranking Ministry officials readily admitted they expect this weapon to be used very rarely, if ever.22 The decentralization scheme was intentionally designed to give municipal governments maximum flexibility in determining how the money will be spent. The new scheme bears striking resemblance to our own Community Development Block Grant Program, which seems to enjoy quite a good reputation in The Netherlands -- at least among government officials.

Many opbouwwerkers, and the organizations they serve, are openly hostile to the decentralization scheme. Although workers for the more established and "respectable" social service agencies claim their finances are safe, the employees of smaller and more dissident action groups fear municipal authorities will cut off funding from any groups which "make too much noise". They would much rather receive their money from distant bureaucrats in The Hague than from the aldermen and planners they are
regularly fighting in their own cities. An even greater worry is that neighborhood groups will begin to fight among themselves as welfare funds grow more and more scarce (the decentralization of welfare funding is expected to be accompanied by a general decline in the total amount of money allocated to community development.)

Secularization, Protest, and Urban Renewal:
The Growing Demand for Citizen Participation

Now that we have explored some of the underlying attributes of Dutch culture and politics, it is possible to say a few words about the growth in the demand for public participation. It was not the purpose of my research to determine the roots of this demand, so I am hesitant to claim the discovery of causal links.

However, my research in Holland led me to believe that three trends in recent Dutch history may help explain why citizens are demanding greater involvement in government at this time. The trends are: a) the increasing secularization of Dutch society, b) the legitimation of protest as a political tool in Dutch politics, and c) insensitive urban renewal planning. We will discuss each factor separately.

1) Increasing secularization. The powerful position of the churches as pillars of society depended heavily
upon popular devotion to religion and deference to religious leaders. This preserved not only bloc segregation but also public acceptance of the role of religious elites in shaping national policies. During the 1960's, however, the Dutch willingness to be led by religious elites declined as part of a general retreat from religion.

A few statistics indicate the significant decline in religious ties which occurred in the short period between 1966 and 1970:

**TABLE I: VIEWS ON RELATIONS BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS - (percent of "yes" answers)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Would you prefer to send your child to a denominational school for primary education?</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Should politics and religion be kept separate?</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Should broadcasting be organized on a denominational basis?</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Should trade-unions be organized on a denominational basis?</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Are denominational political parties necessary?</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These statistics indicate that approval for several key manifestations of verzuiling declined substantially in the late 1960's, and leveled off during the next
five years. At the same time, neutral newspapers and television channels enjoyed increased popularity. On the political front, support for the Big Five parties waned in favor of numerous new splinter parties; and of the Big Five, the three religious parties suffered the greatest losses -- even among regularly church-going members, as Table II indicates:

**TABLE II: RELIGION AND SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS PARTIES**
(percentage of respondents voting for party)\(^{24}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics (regular) for Catholic party</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics (irregular) for Catholic party</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Reformed (regular) for Chr. Hist. Union</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Reformed (irregular) for Chr. Hist. Union</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-Reformed (regular) for Anti-Rev. Party</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-Reformed (irregular) for Anti-Rev. Party</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These forces indicate a decay in the strength of the verzuiling system in The Netherlands, and the gradual shift of Dutch public support to secular media, parties, and other institutions such as schools and unions. Not
only are the people less willing to have religious leaders negotiate key issues in Dutch politics, but the willingness of these leaders to accept a system of accommodation has lessened under the strain of the forces described above.

For one thing, as religious issues became less important in national life, secular issues have caused deep rifts within the blocs themselves -- especially with the weakening of religion as a binding factor. The major Calvinist parties have lost votes to conservative splinter groups on the right at the same time they were losing support to the Labour party on the left. Social issues related to religious doctrines (such as abortion, contraception, and marriage laws) have caused serious splits in the Catholic bloc, not only between the generally liberal Dutch Church and Rome, but also between liberal and conservative Dutch bishops and their followers. While the Catholic bloc has seemed generally willing to become part of a more integrated Dutch social system (with a reduced emphasis on separate institutions), the Calvinists have remained aloof on key fronts (such as the merging of Catholic, Socialist, and Calvinist labor organizations, and the long-term refusal of the Calvinist Free University to secularize its faculty).

In at least one instance, however, the Calvinist leaders agreed to bridge the gap between themselves and
their Catholic countrymen. In the 1977 elections, the three major religious parties joined to form a new coalition: the Christian Democratic Association (CDA), whose primary purpose was to combat the growing power of the Labour party. The coalescing of the three major religious parties into one united front is a fascinating, if counterintuitive, result of the declining place of religion in Dutch society, especially since the coalition succeeded in forming a cabinet after the 1977 election.

It would be a mistake, however, to interpret this development as a sign of old accommodation politics at work. We must remember that the accommodation system insisted upon strict separation of all four blocs. Instead, the creation of CDA should be viewed as a sharpening of tensions between the centrist forces of the religious parties and the socialist Labourites (and, to a lesser extent, the Liberals).

Even before the creation of CDA, the Labor party ceased to support the system of accommodation. Under pressure from the left-wing of its own membership, and new splinter groups like Democrats '66, the Labour party began reemphasizing traditional socialist demands. It has virtually ruled out the possibility of a cabinet coalition with the Catholics, and has attempted in recent elections to present voters with the kind of "clear alternative"
that rarely occurred in the bland elections of the accommodation era.

Other "rules of the game" are also under attack in the move toward a more secular society. Left-wing parties have demanded that executive positions at the provincial and municipal levels be filled by members of the party winning an electoral majority, rather than proportional representation from each bloc. In addition, members of the Second Chamber have made increasing use of their right to question the cabinet publicly, breaking the rules of secrecy and summit diplomacy, and challenging the government's right to govern.

2) Acceptance of protest as a legitimate political activity. Dutch deference to authority has waned during the past fifteen years. Action groups to deal with political problems (particularly in urban areas) have proliferated, frequently led by social/cultural workers (and often led by Marxists in the nation's larger cities).

These groups have become increasingly willing to engage in demonstrations, acts of civil disobedience, and violence as they found the verzuiiing and electoral systems notably impregnable to their demands. The influx of young Americans to Amsterdam in the 1960's may have contributed to the increasing demands for liberalization in laws and social mores, but the source of the movement was
more probably indigenous -- springing from real dissatisfaction with a process governed by religious and secular elites.

Initially, "those who most readily involved themselves in . . . direct action [were] young people who have received a higher education and who live in urban areas". During the 1970's, however, the tendency to be involved in such actions "spread to another population category, namely those who are less educated, aged forty-five or under, and live in cities". This trend can be seen as evidence of the increasing legitimacy of protest as a form of political activity in The Netherlands.

3) Insensitive urban renewal planning. In this case, a direct link can be drawn between the insensitivity of government plans for urban renewal and the demand for citizen participation. Urban renewal began later in The Netherlands than in the United States. After World War II, the Dutch government concentrated energy and money on the construction of new housing to solve the critical housing shortage which remained as a legacy of the occupation. Much of this new construction helped to spur the decline of inner-city neighborhoods. It was not until the early 1960's that the Dutch government began to pay attention to its "blighted" central cities. The chief mechanism for renewal, however, was demolition. In fact,
the central government openly encouraged the destruction of "inferior" housing by awarding municipalities a refund of eighty percent of the cost of acquiring such properties.26

In early cases, Dutch deference to authority (and the unwillingness of the major parties to object to the destruction of inner-city neighborhoods) muted significant public response. We will examine such cases later in two neighborhoods near Schilderswijk in The Hague; in these two areas, massive displacement occurred with relatively little opposition. Gradually, however, students, left-wing politicians, opbouwerkers, and neighborhood leaders organized and demonstrated to fight the demolitions.

Convinced that government leaders would never take their demands seriously unless residents participated directly in the planning process, these confrontations generally featured demands for greater citizen involvement in urban renewal planning. Municipalities have not responded uniformly to these demands, but many have recognized that citizen participation is indispensable to the modern renewal process. As one central government official told me, "It is currently impossible for any municipality to plan without citizen participation; the action groups would raise too great a cry."27
This particular statement seems a bit too optimistic, since many plans are still created without significant citizen input. Nonetheless, his comment certainly applies to The Hague and other major urban areas, where action groups are strong and citizens' willingness to pursue their interests through the "normal channels" of party politics is very weak.

I would postulate that these three factors (secularization, protest, and urban renewal) provide good reasons for the growing demand for citizen participation. (At very least, they are logical reasons which deserve closer study.) In the past, institutions associated with the pillars of Dutch society could mediate an individual's complaints about the system. He would seek the redress of grievances through political parties, trade unions, and other institutions associated with his church or the secular bloc.

In recent years, however, these associations became less helpful to Dutch citizens, partly because the religious elites failed to provide assistance where it was desperately needed (as in their failure to prevent massive displacement in the inner-city), and partly because people's expectations had increased (which helps to explain the call for major expansions of public services in the 1960's). As a result, people drifted toward the secular bloc, or toward splinter groups associated with no bloc at all. Since they may well
have felt abandoned by leaders they had previously trusted, deference toward authority declined and protest became an acceptable political instrument.

However, ingrained cultural traditions die hard. Although they are no longer afraid to express their disagreements strongly, the people of The Netherlands are still deeply committed to preserving the system around them for the sake of the "common good". Accommodation may no longer rule the political life of the country, but it remains a respected mode of social conduct.

This condition provides two factors which are both critical to the growth of citizen participation as a national movement. Recent developments provide an impetus for citizens to recognize and defend their own interests vigorously; Dutch traditions, on the other hand, provide a willingness to sit down and reach compromises in an atmosphere of mutual respect and trust.

This does not mean, of course, that the conditions for citizen participation are universally excellent throughout The Netherlands; our cases in The Hague will certainly indicate that participation does not always work flawlessly in Holland. Nonetheless, the country does appear to provide a healthy climate for the growth of effective citizen involvement in government decision-making.

In the next chapter, I will try to build a way for assessing the effectiveness of particular participatory efforts.
NOTES


3. Lijphart (see note 2), p. 16.

4. Ibid., p. 31.


7. Ibid., p. 120.

8. Ibid., p. 111.


15. Ibid., p. 145-54.

16. Ibid., p. 158.

17. Anthony Bailey, "The Little Room -- Part I", The New Yorker, August 8, 1970; p. 34.


19. Ibid., p. 34.


22. Interview with G. Hendricks and Adrian C. M. de Kok, Social Development Division, Ministry of Culture, Recreation, and Social Work; Rijswijk, November 15, 1979.


27. Interview with Cornelis de Cler, Deputy Inspector-General for Housing, Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning; Zoetermeer, November 5, 1979.
CHAPTER II
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Researchers and practitioners who have written about citizen participation usually explore techniques which can increase or improve citizen involvement in government decision-making. The literature on how one might evaluate the effectiveness of citizen participation efforts (and the specific techniques in use) is much more limited.

In a recent paper, Judy Rosener lamented:

Too few evaluations generate data on the effectiveness of techniques in the context of some set of goals and objectives. For the most part, existing evaluations are 'after-the-fact', philosophical, and lack support for a determination that there is a relationship between a technique and some desired outcome. Even in those cases where the term effectiveness is used (implying that a specific technique produces some intended effect) the criteria for measuring effectiveness are not spelled out.¹

Before we left for Europe, members of our project team were specifically asked to address the question: what makes citizen participation effective? In attempting to answer this question, I will be guilty of at least two of the charges leveled by Rosener. My evaluation will be after-the-fact and largely philosophical. Rosener is not the only person to criticize ex post facto evaluations; in fact, at the same
conference, Robert Shingles noted:

The reason most research is inadequate is because impact analysis is the study of causation whereas most research findings depend almost exclusively on ex post facto, correlational data. Studies depending upon data collected at one point in time cannot differentiate between association and cause and effect or between effect and self selection. In the great majority of cases (unless one is uncommonly lucky and avoids the usual threats to validity) only experimental designs and, to a lesser degree, quasi-experimental designs provide the logical and empirical rigor necessary for making cogent causal inferences.2

Unfortunately, it is very difficult for foreign nationals to induce European governments to launch controlled experiments in social science research. The fact that some provocative cases can be studied only ex post facto should not, in my opinion, stop us from studying them. Nonetheless, I carefully avoid drawing causal links between given techniques and outcomes when I believe that only correlation can be safely supported by the evidence I have gathered.

In addition to being after-the-fact, my study will also be at least somewhat philosophical in searching for implications in the data I have studied. This seems easily justifiable, since the struggle for greater citizen participation in government has involved serious conflicts between differing value systems over such questions as: who will
determine the future of residential neighborhoods, what are the limits of representative democracy, and how will the interests of the inarticulate and disadvantaged be represented in society?

Later in this chapter, I will attempt to overcome a third charge which Rosener has leveled against the evaluators of citizen participation; I will present a scheme of criteria through which we can evaluate the effectiveness of citizen participation in The Hague.

Defining Citizen Action and Citizen Participation

Before moving to the evaluation criteria which are the main purpose of this chapter, I would like to explore possible definitions of citizen participation itself -- and contrast it with citizen action. This step is important not only because citizen participation is the central focus of this study, but also because it arises from citizen action in each case I examined in The Hague.

In the cases I studied, and in many of those examined by other members of our project team throughout Western Europe, citizen action and participation seemed to be ends of a continuum (see Figure I) which described the historical evolution of participatory processes (although it was certainly possible for the continuum to "double back on itself" if a participatory process decayed).
The descriptive listings under each of the three categories are meant to provide a preliminary idea of the characteristics in each step, rather than rigorous definitions. For the time being, I would note that the continuum presented above illuminates the following important points which we ought to remember as we seek a more comprehensive definition of citizen participation:

1) Since citizen participation frequently arises from conflict and protest, there is a "gray area" where citizen action and participation merge. Although the two are different, we should not shy away from definitions which overlap.
2) Citizen participation does not exist in a "time-free zone". It evolves, and can regress as well. A comprehensive definition of citizen participation should take note of this development process.

Stuart Langton has noted the difference between citizen action and citizen involvement. He argues that citizen action "is initiated and controlled by citizens for purposes that they determine. This category involves such activities as lobbying, public advocacy, and protest."³

Langton's notion of citizen action as being citizen-initiated (or "bottom-up") is particularly appropriate to the cases I studied, where movements toward participation always began with organizing efforts on the part of grassroots citizen groups. So defined, citizen action can include not only lobbying, public advocacy, and protest, but also neighborhood organizing, coalition-building, and the development of alternative plans. Janice Perlman elaborates on Langton's definition by noting:

Both [citizen action and citizen involvement] are supposedly mechanisms to gain power through participation. It is important to point out, however, the unfortunate paradox of our system: that only those at the lower end of the social hierarchy need to participate in order to generate power. Large corporate and banking interests, for example, have ample power without any 'participation'. They are generally able to promote their self-interest
successfully through the use of corporate resources and without the sacrifice of much personal time or energy to hearings, meetings, or demonstrations. Individual citizens, on the other hand, are often asked to participate at considerable personal sacrifice in public hearings or on local boards, only to find themselves as powerless as before. The citizen-action approach, then, is based on a substitution of numbers for monetary resources and of commitment and courage for position and authority.4

This substitution of numbers, commitment, and courage for money, position, and authority is critical to understanding the place of citizen action in the political process. It enables us to recognize citizen action not simply as a procedure for accomplishing political ends, but more specifically as a effort to overcome political inequality in a hostile environment.

If we see citizen participation as an outgrowth of citizen action (as it is in most cases), then this definition allows us to understand why government officials are so unwilling to respond by creating participatory mechanisms, and why citizen activists find it so difficult to shift from the conflict-oriented mode of action to the cooperation-oriented mode of participation. Citizen activists (as here defined) do not merely seek political decisions which would serve their interests, but they do so from the position of underdogs seeking to overcome an unfavorable
balance of power. This definition separates citizen activists from more powerful actors in society who may also lobby to protect their interests (such as bankers, large landowners, and corporations).

As we now move on to defining citizen participation, we consider Langton's definition of citizen involvement. Langton asserts that citizen involvement (in contrast to citizen action) "is initiated and controlled by government to improve and/or to gain support for decisions, programs, or services. This category involves such activities as public hearings, consultation with advisory committees, and attitudinal surveys."\(^5\) Langton acknowledges his belief that involvement and citizen participation are very different, when he writes, "[Involvement] implies that one thing is encumbered or controlled by another. But participation connotes variation in how things 'take part' in each other, because the control may rest in either or may be equally shared."\(^6\) I would not create so sharp a distinction between involvement and participation; in fact, I use both terms interchangeably throughout this report. However, Langton's discussion of this issue brings forward the important point that responsibility for participation is shared between government and citizens.

Langton's actual definition of citizen participation, however, is disappointing. He defines participation as
"purposeful activities in which people take part in relation to political units of which they are legal residents". This definition falls short of the mark in several respects. It does not emphasize the importance of the cooperative aspect of participation. It is unclear, because "to take part in relation to political units" is highly ambiguous; it can include open conflict (which seems too far to the left of our continuum), and voting in elections (which would make the definition so inclusive as to be meaningless). It also fails to recognize citizen participation as a developmental process which can evolve or regress.

The 1976 Report of the Social and Cultural Planning Office of The Netherlands presents a definition which has similar problems, although its language is a bit more precise. The report calls participation "that part of the behaviour of the citizen that is aimed at exercising influence, directly or indirectly, in the political sphere".

In light of the inadequacies of these definitions, I would like to suggest the following explanation of the components of citizen participation (rather than a simple definition of what citizen participation is):

Citizen participation is a process wherein citizens and government officials jointly plan or implement public policies. This process contains (at least) the following components:
1) Both citizens and government tacitly or explicitly agree to cooperate with each other in the formulation of policy; although cooperation need not be complete at all times, an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect must dominate the process.

2) Both citizens and government have real power to affect public policy decision-making; although one side may have more power than the other, the power of neither side may be trivial.

3) As a process rather than a stable state, citizen participation may evolve or regress; an example of evolution would be the expansion of subject areas covered by the process, or a deepening of cooperation between government and citizens; an example of regression would be a lessening of cooperation and a return to conflict.

One possible criticism of this definition is that it is too broad, because it overlaps with the definition of citizen action which we discussed earlier. Certain forms of lobbying, coalition-building, the development of alternative plans and many other aspects of citizen action are not ruled out by the existence of a participatory process, nor do I believe they should be. The notion of a citizen action – citizen participation continuum necessitates some definitional overlap.
A second criticism (paradoxically) could be that the definition is too specific, because it rules out forms of alleged participation (such as information-sharing and *ex post facto* opportunities for public reaction) which characterize many government efforts to appease citizen activists. In Figure I, such efforts were labeled "pseudo-participation" because they only *appear* to be participation, although they actually are not. Naturally, I can easily visualize such attempts as part of a broader participatory process; but they cannot stand on their own. Since this study aims at isolating examples of effective citizen participation, I think we should not hesitate to define the phenomenon strictly.

At this point, we will return to the primary intent of this chapter: to outline a series of criteria for judging the effectiveness of citizen participation.

**Evaluation Criteria**

In choosing criteria, I have been influenced by existing literature in the field of citizen participation and by my own judgment of what the goals of participation ought to be. In addition, I have given careful consideration to the normative values of the people I studied, that is Haagenaars themselves. I had the opportunity to interview city workers, community organizers, neighborhood
residents, independent planners, politicians, and academics in the course of my research. I asked them to explain their views on what constituted effective citizen involvement, and to comment on whether they thought the participatory experiences I was studying were examples of this. In cases where the criteria I finally selected differed from their views, I will so indicate.

I have isolated five major criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of citizen participation:

1) The diffusion of conflict within the community, and/or between the community and the municipal government. For purposes of this report, we define conflict between residents and the municipality rather broadly, to include active efforts on the part of residents to:

   a) discredit or embarrass the government in the public media;

   b) legally maneuver to delay the implementation of government plans;

   c) publicly demonstrate (legally or illegally); and

   d) commit acts of violence, including not only violent demonstrations, but also acts designed to stall the implementation of certain plans (such as tearing up cobblestones or squatting in vacant buildings).

   It is important to note that conflict is not only resident-initiated; municipal officials also "wage conflict"
against residents, in forms such as:

a) efforts to deceive the public about the stage of renewal planning, or the actual content of renewal plans;

b) plans that aim to displace large numbers of residents (directly through demolition, or indirectly through severe rent hikes), without adequate compensation or relocation assistance; and

c) attempts to discredit or embarrass neighborhood leaders by attacking their legitimacy in the public media, or attempting to divide resident groups or coalitions through under-the-table deals with individual groups or persons.

Conflict is costly both in terms of time and money. Generally speaking, I observed that little renewal was actually accomplished in most Dutch cities during periods of active conflict. In addition to this practical consideration, the Dutch place a very high value on the maintenance of stability in society, as indicated in our discussion of civility, tolerance, and deference in Chapter I (see pp. 22-26). Although the past twenty years have witnessed a marked increase in the willingness of Dutch citizens to openly oppose government authority, the overriding Dutch sentiment remains that conflict is an unnatural state which ought to last only until a reasonable
accommodation among parties can be reached.

A German researcher currently teaching at the University of Amsterdam emphasized the need for a "timely" end to conflict. If the point of cooperation comes too soon, the action group risks co-optation of its interests, and a renewal process which it will find unsatisfactory. If, on the other hand, the point of cooperation comes too late, the community will be damaged by neighborhood instability and the threat of violence. Furthermore, the city must seek cooperation at some point, since it cannot practically expect to begin renewal independently under the Dutch system of appeals to the Town Council, the province, and the Crown (see pp. 34-38). Therefore, we find both cultural and procedural roadblocks to continued conflict in the Dutch planning system.

In the United States, conflict is sometimes viewed as an acceptable enforcer of stalemate. Protesters are often willing to maintain a high level of tension in order to stymie authorities until they give up their plans completely. This view is socially less acceptable in Holland than it is in the U.S., although it is not without its practitioners. The Renbaankwartier/Scheveningen case will present an example of a residents' group which maintained a high level of conflict even during a participatory process, until the government
backed down to most (but not all) of the group's demands.

The diffusion of conflict applies not only to conflict between the community and the municipality, but also to conflict within the community itself. Renewal issues are sufficiently complex and Dutch neighborhoods are sufficiently diverse, that conflict can develop between differing factions within individual neighborhoods over both substantive and procedural issues.

The Schilderswijk cases will show how conflict developed between left-wing and moderate groups largely as a result of the way in which a participation process was being conducted. The correlation in this situation between the participatory effort and an increase in neighborhood tension is certainly disquieting.

Even more unsettling is the probability that certain agreements reached during participation may adversely affect minority groups who were not involved (or failed to involve themselves, depending upon your point of view) in the negotiating process. Such oversights can lay the seeds for future conflict within the neighborhoods involved.

Once again, Schilderswijk is a prime example of this problem.

Finally, conflict can develop between the residents and their leaders, especially when these two groups have differing values about the proper characteristics
of renewal. If a participatory process fails to circumvent or eliminate this conflict, as in Schipperskwartier, it is fundamentally flawed.

A final caveat is in order before we proceed to the second criterion. Some analysts (particularly Marxists, who form an important segment of the Dutch social science establishment), may dispute the value of reducing conflict at all under current conditions of capitalist society in The Netherlands. Since I am sensitive (and even sympathetic) to this outlook, I emphasize that my use of this criterion does not mean that conflict has no place in renewal politics. On the contrary, I believe that most citizen participation efforts I studied would have achieved very little success (and in fact, would probably never have occurred) had conflict not preceded them.

However, conflict is a resource of limited utility -- particularly to action groups which are understandably concerned about achieving modest improvements in living conditions in a short space of time. Their success in this endeavor is dependent upon their ability to influence numerous parties in power, particularly municipal authorities (who must approve final plans) and national ministries (which provide most of the funding). The residents of Schilderswijk adopted a cooperative ideology
when their ability to influence these actors by conflict faded; the residents of Renbaankwartier failed in this regard, and may have permanently damaged their reputations by doing so.

2) **Municipal recognition of the current residents' goals for renewal of the neighborhood.** Recognition is a two-step process of a) legitimizing those goals, and b) implementing plans which flow therefrom.

In order to legitimate the goals of the current residents, the municipality must agree to a series of process-oriented reforms, assuming that residents were heretofore essentially excluded from the planning process. These reforms should:

a) provide residents with increased access to official information;

b) involve residents in the plan-making process, as well as the process of implementation; and

c) enable citizens to have a **real** impact on the decision-making process (in other words, the consensus of the community should substantially shape the future of the neighborhood).

Reforms such as these comprise the whole range of participatory techniques which have been the focal point of most studies of citizen involvement in government decision-making. Frequently, residents in conflict with
the municipality will demand not only substantive changes in plans for their neighborhood, but will also insist upon participation in the plan-making process itself. In fact, the search for these procedural changes may become the central focus of the group's struggle.

However, the creation of a participatory process which the neighborhood considers satisfactory does not necessarily mean that the process will be effective. I would argue that an effective participation process must attain concrete results which improve the physical and/or social qualities of the neighborhood, such as housing improvement, greater traffic safety, more park space, reduced crowding, greater equality of housing opportunity, expanded educational opportunities, and/or reduced social tensions. Without such accomplishments (i.e. actual accomplishments, not merely planning documents generated by the participatory process), effective participation will remain merely a promise to those who were involved.

Before we leave this point, two caveats are in order. The first notes that a true neighborhood consensus is very difficult to find. Accepting the involvement of a particular residents' group does not automatically mean that the city has legitimized the aspirations of the entire community. In fact, Schipperskwartier provides us with an example of a case where the opposite appears to
be true: the group accepted by the city in that case seems to represent only a portion of the neighborhood's opinions. An even more perverse situation prevails in Molenwijk, where many of those involved in the participation process will not remain in the neighborhood after renewal is completed.

Secondly, acceptance of the residents' goals for the neighborhood does not require that the municipality direct renewal completely toward fulfillment of the residents' desires, since these desires may conflict with the general welfare of the municipality. However, in most cases, the opposite appears to be true: municipal plans for low-income neighborhoods generally ignore the welfare of the citizens who live in these areas (often on the pretext of serving the general interest). Citizens often demand participation in an effort to overcome this situation.

In order for participation to be successful, government must recognize that residents' desires for their own community must play a major role (perhaps the major role) in shaping the future of that neighborhood. Nonetheless, a complete acceptance of the majority view (or even community consensus) can damage not only the general public welfare, but also the interests of minority groups within the community itself whose views (even if vocally expressed) may not be "loud enough" to significantly influence the outcome of the participatory process. Since government is
charged with protecting the interests of such persons (and this viewpoint is very seriously held by most Dutchmen, despite the existence of discrimination against racial/ethnic minorities), the need to balance general neighborhood desires with the interests of under-represented groups must be carefully considered in evaluating the effectiveness of participation.

Generally, this second caveat is at odds with the opinion of most activists I interviewed, as well as many planners who have "bought into" the participation process. In a reaction to the callous way in which Dutch municipalities have treated residents of low-income neighborhoods, the advocates of citizen participation have adopted as a rallying cry "renewal for the current residents" (stadsvernieuwing voor de bewoners). This position is understandable in a political atmosphere where tremendous pressure exists to ignore the interests of community residents entirely. However, there are times when implementation of this philosophy contradicts standards of equity which are supposed to underlie the municipality's public policy responsibilities.

For example, the goal of attracting more young families with few children to inner-city neighborhoods played an important role in the municipality's plans for Schilderswijk and Schipperskwartier. This goal may be worthy as an effort to improve the economic and social
climate of the central city, and decrease income disparities between the city and new expander-towns. However, this objective has been significantly compromised by the new plans for these two neighborhoods, largely as a result of the degree to which current residents shunned the idea of developing housing for new inhabitants.

More importantly, many cities in Holland are increasingly concerned about providing wider housing opportunities to blacks and guest workers who have been crowded into a handful of neighborhoods in the past. In the present climate of "current-resident chauvinism" many resident groups are able to scrap city plans which would result in higher minority populations in their neighborhoods.

3) Strengthening the organizational structure of the community. Although a "strong organizational structure" is difficult to define, it is possible to list certain developments which will improve a community's ability to articulate and defend its interests during current, and future, planning. Such developments include:

a) evolution of a representative, cohesive resident organization(s);

b) emergence of a dedicated community leadership;

c) establishment of useful contacts between residents and municipal officials; and

d) expanded resident concern for and involvement in
planning the neighborhood's future.

Analyzing a community for evidence of a strengthened organizational structure is a task fraught with pitfalls. Use of the following three questions can be of help:

a) Has the entire community been strengthened, or only one organization? In Schilderswijk, there are legitimate reasons to believe that the majority of power flowed to one particular group which did not necessarily represent the opinions of certain segments of the population.

b) Who has been strengthened: the community as a whole, or the leadership cadre alone? In Schipperskwartier, most of the power has accrued to a select group of professional organizers.

c) Has strengthening occurred in a way which will benefit the community in the future? Much of the organizational infrastructure which has developed recently in Molenwijk will probably decay during the next decade as residents move out of the neighborhood.

4) Democratization of community institutions. Paradoxically, citizen participation -- touted as a great exponent of modern-day democracy -- frequently imposes authoritarian structures on the neighborhoods involved. We have seen the dominance of charismatic leaders and militant elites in many U.S. cities, and Dutch cities follow a similar pattern.
Ideally, participation offers a unique opportunity to expand the democratic institutions which exist at the grass-roots level, as the following examples illustrate:

a) bringing into the process groups which had not previously been active in neighborhood politics, or in the protest which usually precedes participation; in the cases I studied in The Hague, this would mean particularly blacks, guest workers, women, the elderly, and children;

b) delegating powers and responsibilities within citizen groups in such fields as group administration, policy-making, public relations, and negotiations with the city; and

c) developing direct lines of authority from group members to group leaders, enabling the membership to routinely influence the participation process.

Using participation as a lever to increase neighborhood democracy is near and dear to the hearts of many Dutch intellectuals who study citizen participation, as well as certain planners and activists. Some planners, on the other hand, charge action groups with undemocratic activities in order to discredit them and derail the participation process; some politicians, especially those of right-wing parties, are likely to do the same.

Similarly, many activists resist pressure to democratize their institutions, whether that pressure arises from
within the neighborhood (as in the case of Schilderswijk), or from outside the community (as may well be the case in Schipperskwartier, if the city becomes increasingly uncomfortable with the questionable representativeness of Actiegroep Vergetendorp). Activists may oppose democratization (although rarely in public) for differing reasons. Some are merely jealous of their own power. Others, however, sincerely believe that increasing openness will put them at a disadvantage against their natural enemy: the municipality. After all, if the city can function as a bureaucracy (with bosses making decisions and subordinates carrying them out), how can an action group be expected to keep pace when its leaders are restricted by the need to send recommendations through public, democratic channels before taking action?

These complaints, although understandable, may be exaggerated. Numerous American experiences, as well as my review of cases in The Netherlands, seem to indicate that significantly more democracy is both possible and practical in urban communities. To the degree that citizen participation in government decision-making can serve as a catalyst for democratization, such trends should be encouraged. I believe, therefore, that the effectiveness of a participatory process should be judged partly on its record as a democratizing influence on the community involved. As
a result, I am including this criterion, although I fully expect that many planners and activists will disagree.

5) Community-wide learning. This may well be the most illusive of all outcomes of participatory efforts; in fact, observers rarely agree on what community-wide learning is. The proponents of participation cite it as one of participation's chief benefits; opponents claim it is very overrated. I define learning to include a series of skills which would help people defend their interests more effectively in the next round of conflict or participation.

Some of the skills which action groups and residents could benefit from learning (and which participation can in fact teach) are:

a) appreciating political relations within the city;

b) knowing how to engage in bargaining, negotiation, and mediation;

c) understanding planning techniques and problems;

d) learning the economic realities of urban life, and some ways of coping with them;

e) developing an ability to set priorities and identify goals (both personal and community-wide); and

f) learning how to work in groups, and lead groups when necessary.

The list could go on indefinitely, since the number of skills which individuals can learn is surely limitless.
In addition to examining the skills learned, however, it is equally important to ask who learned them. The importance of particular skills varies among different types of people, and certain groups clearly manifest greater or lesser ability to learn in the course of the participatory process.

My observations indicated that the communities broke down into three essential groups according to the type and amount of learning which was accomplished:

a) the leadership cadre (such as action-group leaders and social/cultural workers);

b) the average residents of the community (the Dutch working class); and

c) the most disadvantaged members of the community (such as black immigrants from Dutch colonies, guestworkers, and the elderly).

Although these groups clearly learned at different rates, I do not presume to compare their actual learning abilities. Instead, we should recognize that the degree of learning depends not only upon the talent and dedication of the group involved, but also upon external conditions such as past educational opportunities, fluency in the Dutch language, previous exposure to democratic institutions, and the degree of involvement which the participatory process affords to different classes of people.
Before leaving this criterion, I wish to take note of a deeper way to look at the idea of community-wide learning, as suggested in the work of Donald Schön and Chris Argyris; this is the notion of single-loop and double-loop learning. In single-loop learning, community leaders and residents would pick up individual lessons one at a time (such as the skills mentioned above), while the central theories and expectations of the community or organization would remain unchanged. In double-loop learning, on the other hand, the learners would do more; each subsequent experience in the course of participation would alter their concept of how the world around them worked, changing their expectations and (consequently) their strategies for dealing with the participatory process as it proceeded.¹¹

This concept is provocative because it gets to the root of what learning is all about, rather than merely dallying with the question of what has been learned. Unfortunately, I did not examine my four communities closely enough to make definitive statements about their potential for double-loop learning. However, there are indications that double-loop learning has manifested itself in Renbaankwartier and Schilderswijk due to major changes in the political orientations of those communities during
the period I studied.

This concludes the explanation of the five major criteria I will use to evaluate the effectiveness of citizen participation in The Hague. We will return to these criteria in Chapter IV to examine in more detail how the five participatory cases I studied fared in relation to each criterion. Now, let us turn to the details of the cases themselves.
NOTES


2. Robert Shingles, "The Effects of Citizen Participation on Citizens: A Program for Evaluation"; presented at the Symposium on Citizen Participation (see note 1); p. 2


4. Janice Perlman, "Grassroots Participation from Neighborhood to Nation"; in Langton (see note 3), p. 66

5. Langton (see note 3), p. 21

6. Ibid., pp. 20-21

7. Ibid., p. 16


10. Interview with Wolfgang Beck, Subfaculty for Andragology, University of Amsterdam; Amsterdam, November 21, 1979; see also Wolfgang Beck et al. in Research Group Schilderswijk, From Action Group Payable Rents to Residents' Organization Oranjeplein-Schilderswijk; Institute for Science and Andragology, University of Amsterdam, June 1977; Chapter VI, pp. 142-76 (Dutch language document)

CHAPTER III

FIVE CASE STUDIES OF PARTICIPATORY EXPERIENCES IN THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS

Renbaankwartier/Scheveningen:
Conflict Under the Guise of Participation

Scheveningen is one of the most famous seaside resorts in Western Europe. It was partially reconstructed to suit the needs of the tourist industry between 1918 and 1938, but the period after 1960 saw a steady decline of the resort. Decay along the waterfront and in the surrounding residential areas resembles that of many ocean resorts in the cooler parts of Europe and North America. (Cheap airfares to Spain have victimized Scheveningen just as cheap airfares to Florida have hurt Atlantic City.)

The process I studied in this neighborhood was not really a participation process at all, in light of our definition of participation (see pp. 62-65). Conflict was never replaced by cooperation; an atmosphere of respect and trust did not develop between the city and the activists. The procedure which was adopted for involving citizens was unsophisticated and very brief, providing little opportunity for long-term citizen impact, community-wide learning, or the democratization of neighborhood institutions. Although some immediate gains were achieved, the
process ended in acrimony: a clear case of participatory effort in regression back toward open conflict.

The beach resort in Scheveningen is surrounded by a ring of residential neighborhoods, which are in turn separated from the center of The Hague by parks. The residential neighborhoods include multi-unit rental structures, attractive single-family homes, boarding houses, pensions, small hotels, and several modest business districts. One such neighborhood is Renbaankwartier, the focus of this case.

Unlike the other districts I studied in The Hague, Scheveningen is not poor, even by Dutch standards. Most of the people could be called "middle-class", with a good number of wealthy residents as well. There are, however, a few pockets of immigrants and lower-class Dutch workers who perform the low-skilled tasks which every resort requires. Although some of the housing stock could use rehabilitation, it is for the most part in good shape.

During the early 1960's, the largest single landholder in Scheveningen was the Zwolsman Company. As it began to lose money, Zwolsman discussed several possible renewal plans with the city. Eventually, however, the company decided it did not want to undertake the renewal (at least not on the city's terms), and it put its properties up for sale.
Three companies were interested in purchasing the Zwolsman holdings. Each company discussed the future of Scheveningen with city officials. The city insisted that the purchasing company agree beforehand not only to renew the beachfront, but also to preserve and upgrade the resort's grandest hotel, the Kurhaus -- a huge white elephant which was a symbol of the area's romantic past and its present decline. Only one company, Bredero, agreed to this stipulation. The company made the purchase, accepted financial risk for the redevelopment project, and put up fifty percent of the cash which would be needed.

In return, Bredero received permission to build 760,000 cubic meters in a designated area of Scheveningen. They were allowed to build essentially anything they wanted: hotels, office buildings, or housing. The city and Bredero reached agreement on a plan for the beachfront, which included a maximum of 40,000 cubic feet of office space. In addition, the government agreed to run a major highway from The Hague to Scheveningen to allow for the increased tourist traffic which the renewal was expected to generate.

Business and citizens in Holland accept government intrusion in economic affairs far more readily than do Americans. However, despite a cultural acceptance of government's dominant role, citizens are not always
pleased with the outcome. Private deals between government and big business are common; one hand frequently washes the other. Such was the case with Bredero in Scheveningen; we will see another such example with the MAVOB corporation in Schilderswijk.

Neighborhood residents were outraged by the Bredero plan. Although they were eager to see the beachfront rejuvenated, they were equally concerned about the integrity of their residential neighborhoods. The plan adopted by the city and Bredero would have completely changed the residential character of Scheveningen. Houses would be torn down and not replaced. Luxury apartment complexes and office towers would destroy the physical integrity of the neighborhood and bring a wealthier class of residents to Scheveningen. Traffic would increase, and safety for children would decline.

The government claimed that the revitalization of Scheveningen was vital to the city's economic well-being. If the neighborhood was to be renewed, certain sacrifices were required. In addition, the government noted that it had set up a special citizen advisory panel to assist in formulating the beachfront plan; this group was called Inspraakgroep Scheveningen. The residents, however, charged that most of the group's members came from outside the neighborhood, and could not therefore presume to
speak for the residents. (Inspraakgroep Scheveningen is a good example of pseudo-participatory techniques discussed on p. 65. In the United States, we have certainly seen similar examples of government-sponsored citizen commissions essentially rubber-stamping municipal plans.)

A public hearing held in October 1976, revealed the depth of citizen hostility toward the beachfront plans and the proposed highway. The residents at the hearing demanded changes in the beachfront proposal, a reversal of the plan for highway construction, and a new detailed plan to protect the residential parts of the neighborhood. The city, however, refused to budge on the beachfront and highway plan, and it refused even to discuss the possibility of a new plan for the rest of Scheveningen.

Throughout this case, we will see examples of municipal recalcitrance pushing residents further and further into a corner, radicalizing local groups, and polarizing relations between the inhabitants and the city. The government's actions were understandable, if inexcusable. The stakes in Scheveningen were very high — perhaps higher than in any other neighborhood we will examine. Scheveningen was a national symbol of The Hague; and the resort's decline was a great embarrassment to City Hall. Finding a suitable developer had been difficult, and city planners and officials were pleased that they had succeed-
ed. They were probably quite angry at the "ingratitude" of the neighborhood's residents.

The four months after the October meeting saw intense citizen mobilization. Spearheading this drive was the organization Werkopbouwverband Scheveningen (WOS), a counterpoint to Inspraakgroep Scheveningen; WOS was dominated by the social/cultural workers who were active in the neighborhood (see pp. 40-43 for a discussion of the role of social/cultural workers in protest organizing). The organization was at the end of a four or five-year period of latency during which it had been absorbed by internal conflict over authority and procedure, and had allowed its agenda to be effectively set by city officials. It had limited itself to minor discussions about rehabilitation in the residential quarters, and ineffectual protest against the beachfront plan. Now, however, neighborhood concern about the roadway and the beachfront, coupled with an uneasy fear throughout the neighborhood that the city was preparing to carve up the residential quarters for more offices and luxury housing, led to a radicalization of WOS -- at least temporarily.

Among the most militant members of WOS were the representatives from Renbaankwartier, an old district particularly near the beachfront. The city had steadfastly refused to discuss the future of Renbaankwartier
with WOS, claiming that the quarter did not belong to "Scheveningen Village", which was the city-recognized "turf" of WOS. The residents believed the reason for this refusal to discuss Renbaankwartier was more sinister: the city was willing to make at least minor commitments to the residential integrity of the other parts of the Scheveningen Village, but it wanted to eventually seize most of the prime land in Renbaankwartier, tear down the housing, and extend the beachfront plans to include this area.

In February 1977, a major public meeting was held in the Circus Theatre in Scheveningen. Over 1,000 people showed up, and some were refused admittance due to the size of the crowd. Residents came from all parts of Scheveningen and formulated three demands to present to the municipality:

1) the beachfront plan must not be extended further, and the road must not be built;
2) demolition of houses must cease; and
3) the physical harmony of the neighborhood must be maintained (i.e. no more high-rise office or apartment towers, and replacement housing at affordable rents for those displaced).

Meanwhile, the people of Renbaankwartier formed their own organization, Residents' Council for Renbaankwartier
(Bewoners' Beraad Renbaankwartier, BBR), to deal specifically with their own area. This organization began action in earnest to press not only for the demands of the meeting, but also for a separate city plan which would specifically protect the residential integrity of Renbaankwartier. The organization held sit-ins on the resort's major pier. It drafted a letter, signed by respected members of the community, asserting that Mayor Schol of The Hague was not welcome to set foot in Renbaankwartier. BBR sought out the help of the press, and organized strategy meetings.

American observers may be surprised by the mild forms of protest. In the context of Dutch society, however, such actions were major departures from normal deference to government authority (see pp. 22-25). Surprising as we may find it, Dutch officials were shocked at such brazen protests (not only in Scheveningen, but in other neighborhoods throughout the country), and they were eventually forced to respond.

BBR divided into five separate working groups. The first publicized the group's demands outside the neighborhood; the second published a newspaper for the neighborhood itself. A third group coordinated protest actions. The final groups documented changes which were taking place in the neighborhood and explored the history of
redevelopment in Scheveningen.

After arguing about the powers and composition of a governing board, BBR agreed to have no single board in control. As might have been expected, however, a cadre of active members rose to positions of control, calling frequent neighborhood meetings to discuss strategy and positions. The leader of the group was L. Pronk, a doctoral candidate from the Royal University at Leiden. Significantly, Pronk's dissertation dealt with the complex Dutch procedure for appealing municipal decisions to the province and the national government (see pp. 34-38 for a discussion of this process). In the course of the next several years, BBR would use the appeal process masterfully to stymie municipal plans.

After several months of action, BBR located a leverage point which forced the city to bow to its demands. Scheveningen Village was under authority of a "preparation decision", a temporary ordinance in which the City Council mandated careful review of all requests for private building permits while a municipal planning process was in progress (see pp. 30-31 for an explanation of the role of preparation ordinances in the planning process). The city had been preparing a plan for Scheveningen Village (in which it refused to include Renbaankwartier), and it needed an extension of the preparation ordinance in order
to continue its work.

The City Council, however, refused to grant the extension unless the municipal government included Renbaankwartier in Scheveningen Village. The College (i.e. the mayor and aldermen) at first refused, but they finally agreed to prepare a separate plan for Renbaankwartier. The Council then insisted that the executive accept the three demands of the February 1977 meeting, and complete the plan for Renbaankwartier within one year. The mayor and aldermen backed down, and the deal was struck. However, they would not soon forget the deal was forced on them. Although the very people involved in the Renbaankwartier process had agreed to participation schemes in other parts of the city, they began the participation process in Renbaankwartier on a uniquely sour note.

Reluctantly, the city officials contacted BBR to prepare for a process of consultation. Immediately, a conflict arose concerning the boundaries of the area to be included in the plan for Renbaankwartier, with the city demanding that certain streets be excluded. BBR agreed, but explained that if the city did anything to those streets which damaged Renbaankwartier, there would be an immediate return to protest.
The "consultation group" was to consist of one resident from Belgischepark (another Scheveningen neighborhood, part of which was included in the Renbaankwartier planning district), two residents from Renbaankwartier itself, one storekeeper, one pension/hotel owner, one representative from the building company involved in the planning process, and one representative from the City Development Agency. Although initial contacts began in July 1977, the actual meetings did not begin until November. The major concession extracted by BBR regarding the process itself was that all meetings would be open to the public.

Six meetings were held, all during the month of November. There is disagreement about attendance. Pronk claims about 100 people attended each meeting; city officials believe the figure was closer to an average of thirty. Once, the procedure appeared on the verge of breaking down completely, as members of the group charged that the city's representative lied about municipal plans for the adjoining neighborhood of Seinpostduin. The city countered with the charge that it could not possibly reveal everything BBR wanted to know if the meetings were kept public. At one point, Michel Hardon, the Alderman for Physical Planning and Urban Renewal, invited Pronk to his office for a private meeting; but Pronk arrived with
thirty citizens, boldly demonstrating his insistence on the public character of all contacts with the city.

Finally, after a month of agreement on certain points and persistent bickering on others, BBR told the city to finalize its plan. The group would take any remaining complaints it had to the City Council, as well as provincial and national authorities.

The plan set a maximum height for future construction in Renbaankwartier; no building may be more than one floor higher than the current housing stock. There will be no more hotels, pensions, or office buildings constructed in the quarter. There is no ban on demolition, but the building restrictions mentioned above greatly reduce the financial incentives which could lead to massive demolition. Although limits have been placed on rent levels, there are still quarrels about the details of this stipulation.

On other issues, however, BBR was less successful. The city has adopted no official policy to preserve the low-income housing which currently exists in Renbaankwartier, or to ensure replacement housing for people who may be forced to move. There are currently several factories and schools in the area; the residents do not mind if these remain -- but if they close, BBR wants the city to promise to construct low-income
housing in their place. The city claims it does not have the funds to make such a commitment. These issues will have to be fought out at higher levels.

There can be little doubt that BBR will fight hard, not only through demonstrations and publicity, but also through use of the appeals process. When BBR disliked certain provisions of the plan for nearby Seinpostduin, it filed no less than 1100 individual complaints with higher authorities; the Seinpostduin citizen organization filed only 500.

In many ways, the Renbaankwartier participation procedure fell short of an ideal process. It failed to involve a large number of citizens in a long-term planning effort for the neighborhood. After the one month participation process, the City Development Agency worked by itself for another six months before producing a draft plan. Although the residents accomplished some of their objectives, critical guarantees about housing, rents, and demolition were not obtained.

Conflict between the residents and their city government has not been replaced by trust, not even by tolerance. Conflicts continued throughout the process, and BBR has promised to carry the fight even further now that the plan is finished. Although Renbaankwartier itself is safeguarded by aspects of the new plan, the
surrounding neighborhoods of Scheveningen are gentrifying rapidly, with luxury apartment houses and office buildings sprouting along most major streets. Although the roadway has been stopped, that appeared totally unconnected with the participation effort itself; it was the demonstrations and protests which stopped the highway.

In fact, most of the successes of WOS, BBR, and the other residential organizations of Scheveningen appear to stem from conflicts with the city, rather than participation. This does not mean that participation was useless: on the contrary, it served to formalize and tie down victories which the residents had already won in the streets and meeting halls of the neighborhood. Furthermore, BBR's insistence on public meetings confirmed the residents' determination not to be co-opted by attending carefully-orchestrated meetings in the conference rooms of municipal agencies. However, the insistence on public disclosure may well have reduced the degree to which participation could actually influence critical planning decisions. In Schilderswijk, for example, many important pro-neighborhood compromises have been struck behind closed doors, distasteful as this process may be.

Participation in Renbaankwartier did not replace conflict as the dominant mode of action in the community.
Resident-municipal relationships are no more productive or stable today than they were ten years ago. Pronk was unexpectedly candid in telling me that there is no trust for the city in his neighborhood. He has no confidence in the recently-passed "participation by-law" which formalizes citizen participation throughout The Hague; in fact, he assumes it will be used to co-opt residents' groups and win support for city plans. "The mayor and aldermen have not learned anything yet," he asserts. He still speaks in terms of "using people's anger" to gain support for BBR actions, and of "showing your strength when the chips are down". ¹

This is not to say that the skillful management of conflict by a citizen's organization is a bad thing; on the contrary, it is critical in a pluralistic society. However, there are certain goals which we ascribe to participation which conflict cannot attain.

Some of these objectives were discussed in Chapter II. A participatory process can give residents an opportunity to build up a store of legitimacy with municipal authorities, increasing the likelihood that they will be called upon to help shape the neighborhood's future in the long term. BBR has built up very little legitimacy at City Hall. Participation can also lead to democratization of neighborhood institutions through
the need which exists to delegate participatory tasks and maintain an image of representativeness; conflict usually depends more heavily upon powerful leaders who made decisions for, but not with, the community. A small cadre of leaders seems to dominate decision-making in Renbaankwartier. In addition, a sophisticated participation process can give citizens throughout the community important learning opportunities. The residents of Renbaankwartier had few such chances. To the degree that conflict has crowded out real participation in Scheveningen, the community has been the loser -- and the city as a whole.

Schipperskwartier: Participation as a New Form of Paternalism

Schipperskwartier is an inner-city neighborhood of The Hague. It is much smaller than Scheveningen. The housing is older and in worse condition. On the whole, the people are less well-off, and there is little to distinguish the neighborhood as an attractive place to live.

The participatory process adopted in Schipperskwartier was, in many respects, more successful than that in Scheveningen. The process has lasted for several years, and it has resulted in real gains for the residents, although most of these gains are still in the form of
plans to improve the neighborhood physically. Other possible accomplishments of participation (such as neighborhood democratization and community-wide learning) are not strongly indicated. Most importantly, it is possible that the municipal paternalism which characterized early planning for Schipperskwartier has been replaced by the paternalistic way in which action group leaders treat the residents of their own neighborhood.

Schipperskwartier, which translates into English as "the captains' quarter", borders broad canals which form an inner-city harbor. Adjacent to one of the city's two main railroad stations and bordered on two sides by major access roads, Schipperskwartier is therefore at the very nexus of rail, automotive, and water traffic for the city. As such, the land is valuable -- coveted by many private development companies, and the city itself.

Planning for the neighborhood in the early 1970's involved the type of paternalism which was so common in Dutch planning at that time. The city decided that the neighborhood was "blighted" and had to be radically altered in character. Housing would be torn down and office buildings constructed in its place. The quarter would be made "more physically attractive", so that drivers approaching The Hague's central business district would have a more pleasant view in the morning. The Rijswijkseweg, one of the bordering access roads (and
one of the most treacherous thoroughfares I have ever had the displeasure to negotiate) would be widened to accommodate even greater traffic.

In 1973, the neighborhood rose to action. Led by the social/cultural workers from the communiter center Vliethage, they formed a residents' organization: Action Group for the Forgotten Village (Actiegroep Vergetendorp, AV). For three years, the action group's demonstrations and publicity had little effect; fortunately, implementation of the plans also lagged behind schedule. Finally, the city agreed to a participatory process; representatives from the City Development Agency, one member of the City Council, and three residents sat down at a table to bargain about the future of the Forgotten Village.

Almost immediately, the process broke down. The residents walked out of the meeting, refusing to come back until the city promised that the residential character of Schipperskwartier would not be compromised. The city gave in, and the residents returned, presenting their specific demands:

1) no widening of the Rijswijkseweg;
2) preservation of the houses near the road;
3) a very limited amount of industry and commercial buildings would be allowed into the neighborhood -- nothing that could compromise the residential character of Schipperskwartier; and
4) preservation of the harbor area.

I was not able to find a definitive explanation of why the municipality gave in when it did, although there is reason to believe that effective political organizing by AV eventually threatened to hurt the incumbent aldermen at the polls, particularly in light of a well-executed publicity campaign.

The government and the social/cultural workers then set up a process for continuing participation. A "consultation group meeting" (overleggroep vergardering) was established, including representation from the City Development Agency, AV, citizens themselves, business, the housing association which would build any new housing in the neighborhood (see pp. 27-28 for a discussion of housing associations), and a representative from the office of Michel Hardon, the planning and renewal alderman.

Each member of the group had equal status, although the City Development Agency would present "starting-points" at meetings, in other words, recommended plans for the overleggroep to consider. Sometimes the group accepted the starting-points of the agency (with or without making amendments). At other times, the members of the group could not agree, in which case the views of the various parties would be passed on to the College of Mayor and Aldermen for a decision. In all cases, the final judgment remained with the Town Council.
The consultation group has produced a structure plan for the neighborhood which satisfies many of the demands outlined above. The main points of the plan are as follows:

1) The houses along the Rijswijkseweg and in the south will be rehabilitated.

2) All other housing in the neighborhood will be demolished and replaced by a new style which blends with the old buildings; no high-rise apartment buildings.

3) Most of the parking for cars will be provided along the streets, but thirty percent of necessary parking spaces will be provided under the houses in drive-in carports.

4) The Vliethage community center will remain untouched.

5) A system of parks has been agreed upon. (This was a particularly thorny issue, which was resolved only after the architect proposed a compromise plan which both the residents and the city reluctantly accepted.)

6) Low rents are more important than the beauty or soundness of construction. The city is still complaining about the physical character of many of the buildings, and the materials being used.

7) Sixty percent of the new units will be one- or two-bedrooms in size; the other forty percent will be larger. Originally, the city wanted a fifty-fifty split
in order to attract more young families into the city; AV, on the other hand, wanted seventy percent small units and only thirty percent with more than two bedrooms. Both parties moved their positions by ten percent in order to reach the sixty-forty compromise.

The structure plan is now complete, and a "parcelling-out study" (another step in the detailed process of Dutch planning; see p. 31) is now being worked out. However, City Development workers and independent researchers at the Delft Technical University are skeptical of the results which have been achieved so far. They doubt that the social/cultural workers in Actiegroep Vergetendorp have adequately consulted with the people in the neighborhood, who appear to want more rehabilitation than AV is calling for, and who may also be interested in higher-quality construction even if rents are slightly higher. 2

The City Development Agency tried to get residents to attend the regular meetings, but AV would discourage residents from attending. They claim to have held their own meetings without city presence, where the residents made their feelings known. Nonetheless, some officials believe AV bullied residents into accepting their own ideas of what would be best for the neighborhood. City officials have not canvassed or surveyed the neighborhood
(as they did in Schilderswijk) to learn resident feeling about rent levels, parking, building design, parks, schools, traffic, etc. They must take the word of a handful of AV social workers, who have dominated every meeting with the city. They doubt that any learning has taken place in the community as a whole as a result of the participation process, even though -- on paper at least -- the process was similar to the one adopted in Schilderswijk (to be discussed later in this chapter).

Whereas the city officials complained that the process in Renbaankwartier was too open to the public, the lack of public input in Schipperskwartier is making City Development officials nervous; they fear the residents may suddenly discover they do not like the new plans and place the blame on the city alone, and not AV. The action group retains a sort of hero status in the community as the tiny group of underdogs which overturned the city's original plan for the Forgotten Village.

Two researchers have attributed some of the results of the Schipperskwartier process to the communist sympathies of the opbouwwerkers at Vliethage. Communist activists in old Dutch neighborhoods have a very negative image of the districts in which they work. In their struggle to achieve a new social order, they want all physical vestiges of the past torn down -- even if the opinions of the residents are less radical.
Up to this point, the respect which the city has for the political strength of the AV has prevented it from taking any action to challenge the group’s leaders. Alderman Hardon is aware of the political damage which the group caused to his predecessor, and he is apparently unwilling to risk its wrath.

For the people of Schipperskwartier, however, two questions remain even after a supposedly open participatory process has been completed. The first is whether the new plan truly serves their interests and meets their desires. The second, and more important from our point of view, is whether the paternalistic planning of the city has merely been replaced by a new form of paternalism on the part of the social workers -- who are not necessarily representative of the residents in terms of housing demands, class or income, and political affiliation.

Molenwijk: Participation with an Ulterior Motive

Molenwijk, "the windmill neighborhood", is an area just south of the city center, filled with low-rise apartment buildings. The housing stock is solid, but the units are small, frequently lacking showers and gardens (in Holland the latter may be more important to most people than the former).
The participatory process in Molenwijk is highly elaborate and thoughtfully constructed. There is a good potential for community learning, and special efforts have been made to include women, children, and foreign immigrants in the planning process -- with varying degrees of success. The actual outcome of the procedure, however, will result in significant displacement, as well as hardship for foreign residents of the community. Many residents are using a regulation in Dutch planning law to escape from the neighborhood after it is renewed; this ulterior motive has tainted the process, and reduced sensitivity to the needs of immigrants and native Dutchmen who would prefer to remain in Molenwijk.

The presence of foreign immigrants is a particularly thorny issue in Molenwijk. Both guest workers from Southern Europe and North Africa, and immigrants from the former Dutch colony of Surinam began moving into Molenwijk at a rapid pace during the late 1960's, to the distress of long-time Dutch residents. The foreigners have many habits and customs which the Dutch find offensive. They live together in very large families, speak different languages, and compete with Dutch natives for jobs. On the whole, Dutchmen do not like the outsiders; they think they are dirty and uncivilized, and they are willing to tell you so.

Molenwijk, like Schipperskwartier, is a relatively poor neighborhood. About sixty percent of the residents are below Dutch minimum income standards. Unlike the other
neighborhoods in my study, the initial action of Molenwijk's citizens did not occur in response to an existing government plan. Actiegroep Laakkwartier (the name of the primary action group in Molenwijk) was apparently started five or six years ago simply because people wanted the city to fix up their deteriorating and inadequate housing, especially in light of the fact that a large percentage of the units were publicly owned.

A technical evaluation of the housing indicated that it was essentially sound. Therefore, a combined strategy of renovation and new construction has been decided upon for Molenwijk.

Actiegroep Laakkwartier (AL) was originally established by social/cultural workers and other interested persons in the neighborhood. As time passed, however, the social workers became the most active members of the group. Purportedly, average citizens had trouble following the technical nature of many of the conversations.

A consultation group consisting of AL members and City Development representatives conducted the participation process. Together, the members and the city chose an architect to work on the plan. Eventually, the residents hired a consulting group called "Planwinkel" (or the "plan store") from Delft to provide them with technical information, establish a better participation process for new
construction in certain parts of Molenwijk, and to run a project which seeks to involve school children in planning the neighborhood's future (more on this later).

AL and Planwinkel have attempted to broaden the base of the participatory process. They have established sub-groups to do initial planning in specific subject areas (such as social welfare services and schools), or to perform certain functions (like providing information about the planning process to residents). Each month, the consultation group meets in two public sessions: the first is a general meeting to make progress with the city on neighborhood plans; the second meeting provides an in-depth discussion of a particular planning issue. Many of the meetings are held during the day, giving housewives in the area maximum opportunity to participate (very few Dutch wives work outside the home).

Special efforts have been made to involve foreigners. All of Planwinkel's documents are printed in Dutch, Turkish, and Arabic. Simultaneous translation in meetings has been attempted. One social worker keeps in regular touch with foreign residents of the community. On the whole, however, few foreigners come to meetings, and none is a regular member of the action group.

At first, I was surprised at the apparent passivity of the people in dealing with the municipality. There seemed to be no major conflict. Although the techniques of partici-
pation were highly elaborated (involving publicity, expert assistance, special discussion sessions, etc.), the meetings routinely accepted the recommendations of city workers. I was amazed to hear that the new houses which are being constructed will be fancier than those in Schilderswijk or Schipperskwartier, and the rents will be much higher as well. In fact, Planwinkel estimates that about half the people currently living in Molenwijk will not be able to afford the new housing. There will also be fewer units in the neighborhood after renewal is completed (although this reduction in total number of units will occur in most renewed neighborhoods). Why would a well-organized group of residents demand that the city renew their entire neighborhood, and yet not complain when the rents are forced to exorbitant levels? In other parts of the city (and throughout Holland) citizen groups have demanded, and often obtained, extra subsidies from the national government to cover increased post-renewal rents, or they have demanded less fancy renewal in order to keep rents low.

I discussed this issue with three people: two city workers and one planner from Planwinkel. In each case, their astounding answer was the same. The people did not really care, because they did not plan to remain here after the renewal process is completed. Under Dutch planning law, the government must provide a family with a comparable housing
unit at similar cost if it cannot provide housing in the renewal zone. Had there been no renewal, the people would not have been able to leave Molenwijk -- and leaving was the real objective for most of them.

They do not like living in their present neighborhood. After all, the housing is crowded, the infrastructure is sub-standard, and they find the foreigners annoying. If the neighborhood is renewed, the government will have to find them a living situation elsewhere. The new unit should be comparable, and it might be better.

It is not surprising, therefore, that few people are overly concerned about the future of Molenwijk. Some will remain, of course -- those who enjoy living near the city center and have the money to pay the higher rents. The end result is simple to predict: fewer units at higher rents yields a wealthier population. In fact, the numbers bear out this trend. In one part of northern Molenwijk, an area of 500 families is being demolished; only forty of these families are expected to return to the new units.

The strategy of the Molenwijkers to escape from their neighborhood is not without risk. Despite the letter of the law, it is often impossible for municipalities to find new housing of comparable quality and cost for displaced residents; there may be years of waiting. For the white Dutch residents who are eager to leave Molenwijk, the risk
is worth taking. Although they might not be fully satisfied with the quality of their new unit, they can always apply for subsidies to reduce the cost; and at least they will be living in an area with fewer foreigners.

The picture is less rosy for the foreigners themselves. In Holland, as in the U.S., government policy is frequently bent to the will of the strongest — and foreigners are last on the totem pole. There are many neighborhoods which actively and successfully resist "immigrant incursions", and most housing associations (which control a large percentage of Dutch housing units) impose low quotas on the numbers of foreigners they will admit. The foreigners fear that the government will not try particularly hard to find them suitable replacement housing at a price they can afford. Some may have to move to Schilderswijk, which is already congested with the city's highest concentration of immigrants. Others fear they will be moved far from family and friends, upon whom they depend in the midst of a strange culture.

There are also native Dutch residents who will suffer: those who have low incomes and want to remain in Molenwijk. The elderly, who are rarely involved in Dutch participation schemes, are one probable example, although I have been unable to determine their view of the situation in Molenwijk.

Planwinkel claims to have conducted research into the satisfaction of residents who have recently left Molenwijk
-- finding out that eighty to ninety percent of them are satisfied with their new surroundings. Foreigners, however, generally do not respond to such surveys, and the destination of many Molenwijkers is hard to trace.

The Molenwijk case left me with mixed feelings. A sensitive and elaborate participation process had been created, one which held great promise for improving the neighborhood in accordance with community wishes and fostering a great deal of citizen learning about the planning process and the urban environment. The neighborhood is undergoing a significant physical renewal, through carefully balanced rehabilitation and new construction. The future of Molenwijk as a physical space looks bright.

On the other hand, the purpose of participation is being corrupted by a quirk in legal regulations. Many people who are doing the planning are not even planning to stay! Many of those who may be forced to leave are not involved in the process, or cannot understand how the process will affect them. The contradictions of this situation made one of Planwinkel's major efforts in the community seem all the more ironic:

Planwinkel, in cooperation with Actiegroep Laakkwartier and the local schools, is conducting an experiment to involve children in the planning process for Molenwijk. When buildings are torn down, the children paint murals on blank
walls. The teachers divide their classes into small groups which are asked to come up with solutions to simple renewal problems, based on information provided by Planwinkel and the instructors. The children produce pictures, reports, and exhibitions which are used to explain the renewal process to members of the community. Perhaps most importantly, the children bring information about the renewal process to their parents, trying to get the entire family involved. This is especially useful in the case of foreigners, since their children are able to present information to the parents in their own language.

The idea is to get the children involved in the life of their community, to make them feel a part of the change which is occurring in Molenwijk. Since youth vandalism and arson are problems in the neighborhood, Planwinkel hopes that these crimes can be reduced in years to come if young people learn to take greater pride in their neighborhood.

This hope may be valid -- but only if the children, and their parents, remain in Molenwijk. If they leave, the lessons (if they are at all transferable) will leave with them.

Schilderswijk I: Co-Production in Action

"The Schilderswijk is generally considered to be the largest continuous urban problem area in The Netherlands."²

Housing density is very high, and most of the structures
were built in the second half of the nineteenth century before strict building codes were in force. Schilderswijk is inhabited largely by low-income groups, including immigrants from Surinam and guest workers from Turkey, Morocco, and other Mediterranean countries. The city claims that immigrants account for forty percent of the population of Schilderswijk, although some native Dutch residents claim the figure is closer to fifty or sixty percent. Young people form an unusually large percentage of the population of the neighborhood.

The neighborhood is bordered on one side by the central business district of The Hague, and on the other side by a railway complex. It is both physically and socially isolated from the rest of the city. Since 1960, the area has suffered a considerable reduction in population and housing stock, although the rapid influx of immigrants during the last five years may be pushing the population above its low-mark of 40,000 in the early 1970's.

The Schilderswijk case can be divided into two separate participatory experiences. The first involved city officials and the organization Payable Rents in the development of a plan for two low-income housing complexes in the Oranjeplein area of Schilderswijk. The second
concerned the development of a structure-plan for all of Schilderswijk; the principal (but not the only) citizen group involved in this participatory effort was Residents' Organization Oranjeplein-Schilderswijk (Bewoners Organisatie Oranjeplein-Schilderswijk, BOS), an outgrowth of Payable Rents.

Concerted protest by the residents of Schilderswijk preceded each participatory effort. In each case, municipal willingness to set a participatory process in motion resulted directly from the conflict which the citizens waged. First, we will consider the Oranjeplein participation process which developed housing complexes for the Jacob Catstraat and the Gort Molen, replacing city plans which would have displaced many persons and radically changed the character of the neighborhood.

There are several important themes to the Oranjeplein experience. Both the city and the action group Payable Rents agreed in writing to a series of goals for the neighborhood (and a process for carrying out these goals) before participation began. Once the participatory process commenced, conflict between the city and the neighborhood declined significantly, although a certain level of conflict among various groups in the neighborhood continued.

The procedure resulted in significant changes in plans for the neighborhood, and these plans have already been
implemented. Payable Rents (and, more generally, the citizens of the neighborhood) became legitimate parties to renewal planning and implementation, although this status proved temporary in nature. Significant learning has taken place within the community and among city workers as well. The organizational base of Schilderswijk has been strengthened. Unfortunately, there were only minor signs that the process democratized community institutions.

The Oranjeplein participation process did not spring from a vacuum. For several years prior to the unveiling of the city's plan for the area, relations between the city and Schilderswijk were tense. On several occasions, municipal planners had made "forays" into the neighborhood in an effort to change its social and physical texture in ways which would have adversely affected the current residents. The most notable of these attempts involved efforts to widen streets and route more traffic through the neighborhood -- especially on one particular street, the Falckstraat. Citizens organized meetings and protests to let the city officials know that the residents did not want more cars on their streets. In the case of the Falckstraat, the city backed down. It did not always, however.

In two cases directly on the borders of Schilderswijk, the city ignored protests and implemented its plans. Old,
"blighted" neighborhoods were torn down. Roads were widened, luxury apartment houses were built, and major institutions (specifically, a hospital and a technical school) expanded in these two areas, which are known as Stieltjestraat and Kortenbos. Estimates of the total number of residents displaced from these two small neighborhoods run as high as 12,000 people.

Thus, when the city presented its dismemberment plans for Schilderswijk, the community already possessed an indigenous cadre of protest leaders and two nearby examples of what would happen if they remained silent. Stieltjestraat and Kortenbos were vivid proof that the low-income, working-class population of the central Hague was being uprooted. If the process was allowed to begin in Schilderswijk, the social base for protest would swiftly be reduced. Not only would buildings and streets be lost, but so would the people who would be needed to protest further evictions. The time for action had arrived, and it could not be delayed.

The plan which the city put forward in 1971 for the renewal of Oranjeplein was the latest in a series of ill-fated plans dating back to 1953. This newest plan was the brain-child of a powerful private development company called MAVOB. The plan called for the demolition of the entire neighborhood, replacing it with high-rise towers
filled with high-rent units. MAVOB agreed to put up all the money to prepare a more detailed plan, plus a substantial amount of capital for the project itself. Through its close ties to the provincial planning agency, MAVOB could guarantee the city that the plan would receive provincial approval — a particularly important bargaining point, since the province had recently been quite displeased with planning efforts in The Hague.

The city apparently never argued that displacement would not occur; it realized that the plan would radically alter the physical and social fabric of the neighborhood. It frequently claimed, however, that the plan was absolutely essential to rejuvenating the core business district by bringing in a clientele with money to spend. It further argued that the city would benefit from a greater mixing of social classes (although the gentrification of Kortenbos and Stieljestaat had provided more displacement than mixing). These "planning philosophies" may have played a role in the city's adoption of the MAVOB plan, but there were also less philosophical factors at work: a politically powerful development company saw a good chance to make money at the expense of the residents of Oranjeplein, and the city could not resist the scheme. After all, it was guaranteed provincial approval, a free planning process, and lots of private capital for the venture itself. As a
final sweetener, the president of a major housing association sat on the Town Council; there was little doubt that his organization would have played a prominent role in the MAVOB project.

Protest in Schilderswijk took several forms. Of course, there were demonstrations and skillful use of the media. Perhaps most important, however, the action group Payable Rents decided to produce a viable alternative plan for Oranjeplein. I have not been able to find a similar example of a pre-participation attempt to produce an alternative plan in any other neighborhood of the city. The genesis of this alternative plan was significant in several respects.

At the time of the protests, the city asserted that it was impossible to create a plan for new housing in Schilderswijk at rent levels which the current tenants could afford. Payable Rents might have been content to merely protest the city's plan. This was, after all, the tactic which had been followed by many citizen groups in The Hague. However, this particular organization decided to challenge the assertions of the politicians and their planning experts by drafting a plan of its own. In a
sense, they decided to play ball in the opponent's park.

Despite the distrust residents displayed for city officials, they accepted the informal (and sometimes secret) assistance of several city workers and employees of the architectural firm which had made the original plan. These professional helpers joined the residents in the evenings to expose flaws in the plan and to recommend alternative solutions which would involve lower rents.

This cooperation indicated that the leaders of Payable Rents were willing to work with outside allies. On the other hand, the group retained all decision-making authority, and would not allow the outside professionals to become anything more than strictly advisory. This balanced policy toward outside assistance would serve the group well in the future, encouraging contacts with the outside world (and the city government, specifically) while avoiding domination of the group by outside experts.

The alternative plan was not a comprehensive planning document. It was a political strategy -- one in a series of tools for conflict with the city. It outlined three key principles, conditions which the residents considered indispensable for a satisfactory renewal of their neighborhood:

a) rents must be affordable by the current inhabitants;
b) current residents must have priority for new units; and

c) any new architecture must blend in with the old (e.g., no high-rise apartments in Oranjeplein).

It also presented some ways in which these goals might be achieved -- enough to be persuasive, but not enough to fulfill the rigorous demands of a real plan. The plan was valuable not because it provided a definitive explanation of how to renew Oranjeplein, but because it drew a base-line along which future planning might proceed.

For months, the city refused to bargain with the residents. It insisted that any plan featuring lower rents was impractical, and that the MAVOB plan was necessary for the economic welfare of the city as a whole. In an effort to calm the troubled waters of Schilderswijk (and save the MAVOB plan), the new Minister of Housing and Physical Planning, B. J. Udink, decided to visit the neighborhood for a personal tour. Wherever he went in Schilderswijk, people greeted him with black flags flying from their windows -- a sign of the residents' united disapproval of the MAVOB plan. The incident attracted nationwide media attention. Shortly after his visit, Udink agreed to increase the subsidies available to the development project, thereby reducing the projected post-renewal rents.
The Hague could now argue that the current residents could afford the new units.

Schilderswijk legend and lore attributes the Minister's action to the hanging of the black flags; undoubtedly, this had strong impact. However, other factors were also at work. Early in the planning process, some of the architects working on the project became restless, and began to question the soundness of the plan. They claimed they could not keep the rents anywhere near a level which the current residents might be able to afford under the guidelines MAVOB had given them. The developers had to quiet the architects down. Therefore, MAVOB officials visited their close friends at the Ministry and convinced Udink's predecessor to guarantee informally that adequate subsidies would be provided to keep post-renewal rents reasonable. When Udink came to office, he refused to recognize the action of his predecessor. As the protests became more serious, however, he came under tremendous pressure from MAVOB, The Hague, and other parties to change his mind and grant the subsidies. The black flags incident was apparently the final factor which changed Udink's mind.

His action, however, failed to defuse the situation. The leaders of Payable Rents would not budge from their original position. They made their stand on three key points:
a) if the same subsidies were applied to their alternative plan, rents would be even lower;

b) the buildings in MAVOB's plan are still too tall and entirely out of character with the surrounding neighborhood; and

c) the residents wanted more rehabilitation and less demolition.

The impasse did not break until the spring of 1972, when they alderman in charge of urban renewal, W. Nuy, finally agreed to a series of four working sessions at which the city and Payable Rents could work out a set of mutually-acceptable renewal goals. Nuy and city planners would represent The Hague, and representatives from Payable Rents would speak for the residents.

Undoubtedly, Nuy was tiring of continued protest over the MAVOB plan. Perhaps he feared political damage to his own reputation if he allowed the impasse to continue. These factors seem inadequate, however, to explain Nuy's sudden turn-around. An additional factor may have been the action group's success in stymieing Nuy's attempt to hold a public hearing to discuss the plan. Nuy felt he could prove that the action group was not representative of the people of the neighborhood; but Payable Rents mounted a boycott of the public hearings. When only journalists and city
workers showed up, Nuy began to understand the depth of resident feeling against the MAVOB plan.

Whatever additional convincing Nuy may have needed was provided by the same group of architects discussed earlier. They drafted a letter from their firm (Buro van Tijen) to the local government stating two simple points: a) they had warned The Hague that the plan was unreasonable for the current residents, and b) even with Udink's new subsidies, the current specifications could never produce reasonable rents. They brought it to one of their directors and threatened to resign and go to the newspapers if he did not sign it; he signed, and the letter was sent. Nuy was left with little choice but to enter into negotiations with Payable Rents.

The outcome of the four working sessions was a doelstellingennota, or a "declaration of intents" agreed to in writing by both sides. The declaration committed the parties to a set of goals (affordable rents, priority for the current residents, improved housing conditions, a harmonious physical environment, adequate park space, and no increase in through-traffic) and a series of steps for jointly reaching these objectives. The first step was to make a global plan which would explain, in approximate terms, what the area would look like after renewal, and how that end-point would be achieved. Step two involved
adding detail to the global plan. The third step was to set up a mechanism for distributing the new housing units. Finally, the buildings would be constructed, along with various amenities, and the units would be distributed.

The process for consultation which the parties agreed upon was far from spectacular. It was a two-tiered process, with representatives of the action group, the municipality, the housing associations, and the architects working together on a Building/Design Committee which had to review all aspects of the plan. After proposals were worked out in the Building/Design Committee, they went for review to a Steering Committee -- on which residents were initially not allowed to sit.

Payable Rents soon became very dissatisfied with their lack of members on the Steering Committee. They therefore decided to stall every proposal which came before the Building/Design Committee, until Nuy granted them positions on the Steering Committee as well. After that, the planning process proceeded smoothly. Eventually, plans were prepared for two low-rent housing developments in the Oranjeplein. The Town Council approved the plans, and the first pile was driven on August 3, 1973. Both developments are now complete and inhabited, and several streets
near the two new complexes have been rehabilitated.

Despite the simplicity of the participatory structure, several characteristics of the process indicate that it truly represented *bona fide* co-production:

1) The declaration of intents committed both sides to rights and obligations not only about goals, but also about the process itself. Accepting this agreement required an enormous leap of faith for both sides. The city was in essence admitting that it had lied when it stated that low-rent development was impossible in Oranjeplein. The residents, on the other hand, were agreeing to sit down and bargain in trust with an opponent whom they had fought for more than a year.

2) As far as Payable Rents was concerned, conflict with the city came to an end. Protests and other efforts to embarrass city officials ceased. The organization was responsible for attracting the largest possible number of people to the meetings with the city -- but for the purpose of constructive dialogue, not for a brute show of force.

Cessation of conflict was limited in two important ways. Firstly, Payable Rents was at all times ready to return to protest if the city reneged on its commitments. Secondly, other groups in the area, especially a large rival organization known as Renters' Association of
Schilderswijk (Huurdersvereniging Schilderswijk, HVS), continued their protests and refused to accept the notion of co-production. In an important respect, this continued conflict helped Payable Rents' position vis-à-vis the city, because the municipality was forced to recognize the pressure being applied to Payable Rents on its left flank. Unless the city kept its promises and compromised on substantive planning issues, the moderate leadership of Payable Rents could have been overthrown and the whole process may have fallen apart.

3) Although many public meetings were held, important decisions were made in behind-the-scenes negotiations between the city and the leaders of Payable Rents. The organization never sent less than two representatives to these meetings, and they were required to report back to frequent public meetings which were held afterwards. While we may argue about the advisability of joining the city in "smoke-filled" rooms, there is little doubt that city workers would try to circumvent a process which committed them to make all decisions in public (as was precisely the case in Renbaankwartier). The interests of the residents of Oranjeplein seemed to be well-served by a combination of private negotiations and frequent public meetings.

4) The residents and the city did not merely co-plan,
but they actually co-produced. The buildings were constructed according to specifications determined by the city and the citizens, and units were distributed according to agreements which all parties reached. Although the degree of renewal may not have pleased all members of Payable Rents (in fact, there are still many run-down buildings and vacant lots in Oranjeplein), there is general satisfaction with the physical and social outcome of the new buildings. 7

Schilderswijk II: Ossification and Recovery

In 1974, Payable Rents decided to expand into a new organization which the Dutch call a stichting. The stichting is a kind of foundation which has the legal right to receive government subsidies. It has a board of directors which is self-regenerating, i.e. board members pick their own successors. The members named their new organization Residents' Organization for Oranjeplein-Schilderswijk (Bewoners' Organisatie Oranjeplein-Schilderswijk, BOS).

With the arrival of government subsidies, BOS opened up a permanent office and hired several staff members. The staffers were non-professional, and most were from Schilderswijk. However, they performed functions which made close consultation with the residents less vital. The leader of the group, Aad Kuypers, was particularly skilled
as an organizer and as a housing advocate. He began, eventually, to go to negotiating sessions with the city alone. Meanwhile, the "residents' council" (bewoners' raad), or primary governing body of the organization, dwindled in number of attendants; eventually, the council stopped meeting -- a moratorium which lasted for about two years.

BOS workers, especially Kuypers, developed closer associations with a number of city departments. People began to say that Kuypers liked the new-found respect he had acquired in City Hall; he enjoyed being able to call up an alderman and say, "I need to see you in an hour," and have the appointment granted.

In 1976, the organization became involved in a process to develop a "structure sketch" (see p. 30 for an explanation of this kind of plan) for the entire Schilderswijk neighborhood. This process also arose out of conflict, this time concerning a structure plan which municipal planners formulated entirely without the participation of the citizenry, sparking bitter fears that the city was trying to reverse the gains made by Payable Rents in Oranjeplein.

The structure plan was similar to the MAVOB proposal, only on a much grander scale. It called for massive demolition throughout Schilderswijk, and the construction of new
units whose rents would be far beyond the means of the current residents. A grandiose linear park was to weave its way through the district, and roads were to be widened to accommodate increased traffic. The plan was geared to serve people who lived "individuated" rather than "communal" lives, according to one observer. In other words, the neighborhood visualized by the structure plan would be excellent for young families with few children, a car, and most of their friends living outside of Schilderswijk. The plan was uniquely unsuited to the needs of larger, poorer families with close ties to other people on the block or down the street.

For a year, the city tried to get the residents to discuss the plan on its merits, but they refused. Finally, the city agreed to drop the plan, and involve citizen groups from Schilderswijk in a new process to formulate a second structure plan.

We can isolate several major themes in the participation experience which followed this decision. Firstly, the citizens themselves were involved in shaping the process by which they would participate. The process which evolved was more sophisticated than the Oranjeplein procedure, involving more people and broader issues. At the same time, however, BOS was growing further away from its constituency;
it was becoming increasingly dependent on the talents of one charismatic leader. The organization began to ossify, failing to keep in touch with citizen needs and frustrations about the time it took to translate plans into action. By the end of my study, however, BOS had begun taking steps to restore its legitimacy in the community.

We will now examine some of the key ways in which the participation process for the structure plan differed from that process that was used for the Oranjeplein developments:

1) A detailed survey was conducted throughout the neighborhood by workers for the City Development Agency, soliciting resident opinions about current conditions in the neighborhood (housing, schools, traffic, etc.), people's perceptions of Schilderswijk vis a vis other neighborhoods where they might choose to move, and how people wanted their housing circumstances to be improved (rehabilitation versus new construction, parking availability, height of buildings, trade-offs between amenities and post-renewal rent levels, etc.).

The research indicated that the leaders of BOS did, for the most part, accurately represent the views and desires of their members, with two important exceptions which indicate that the information channels within the organization were not completely clear. First, the leaders
wanted a higher rate of demolition and new construction than did their constituents, who frequently liked their old houses and preferred rehabilitation. Secondly, the leaders were less concerned about parking places for cars than the residents; in fact, residents were willing to pay higher rents in order to have carports placed underground.

2) The residents of Schilderswijk were directly involved in formulating the participation process itself. In fact, the process negotiations frequently generated as much controversy as substantive planning issues.

The leaders of BOS and other neighborhood organizations sat down with workers from the City Development Agency to set up details of the process. HVS (BOS's left-wing rival) wanted a more public process, with no behind-the-scenes bargaining; BOS was less rigid in its demands, but insisted that public meetings be held to examine all major issues and review all major decisions.

3) They agreed on a five-step participation process, for which they divided the neighborhood into ten districts. The first step was to disseminate information about the neighborhood and the structure-planning process throughout the quarter. The second phase involved organizing district consultation groups in all ten parts of Schilderswijk, and
five neighborhood-wide working groups to deal with particular subjects (housing and parks, traffic, clubhouses and recreation, shops, and schools). Essentially, membership on these committees was open to anyone who wanted to attend; in reality, however, most of the attendants represented individual neighborhood organizations, such as BOS, the organization with the most power in the process.

In the third phase, the neighborhood-wide working groups (housing and parks, traffic, clubhouses and recreation, shops, and schools) conducted research and came up with basic proposals, which were then reviewed by the ten district consultation groups. These proposals were then "fleshed-out" by the City Development Agency (fourth phase).

Finally, the proposals were reviewed one final time by the working groups and district consultation groups, after which they were routed to the mayor, aldermen, and Town Council for final approval. The Town Council approved the new structure plan in January 1979 without any amendments to the agreements worked out between the residents' groups and the City Development Agency.

This process was obviously much more complicated than the earlier process involving Payable Rents. Firstly, plans went through several iterations, with different groups being involved at different occasions. In addition, several
neighborhood organizations were involved, with different opinions about what ought to happen in Schilderswijk. Although a coalition of groups opposing the original structure-plan did exist, its members were far from unanimous in their opinions on substantive planning issues.

4) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the agenda of issues had been extended far beyond mere housing concerns. Residents were now asked to comment on green space -- not for two housing complexes, but for an entire neighborhood. They were concerned not with the volume of cars on a few streets, but traffic loads through and around all of Schilderswijk. Recreational facilities and schools, subjects which were hardly discussed in the first participation process, now had working groups of their own. In the first participation effort, there had been only one question to settle regarding the neighborhood economy: will stores be concentrated within the housing complexes, or will they be moved down the street? (The latter was chosen.) Now, however, a whole range of economic and business-location decisions had to be considered to spur the economic revitalization of Schilderswijk.

Toward the end of the first effort, observers had noticed that certain residents (although not an overwhelming number) were becoming more interested in issues "larger" than just housing. The new participation process
confirmed that interest in these issues had grown to the point where citizen opinions could no longer be ignored.

While the four factors indicated above suggest that the participatory process was maturing, still other events threatened to derail the structure-plan effort, or at least make similar participatory attempts in the future unlikely.

Perhaps the most significant development was the growing distance between the leaders of BOS and the residents of Schilderswijk. The residents' council had been an integral part of Payable Rents, and BOS during its early period. Gradually, however, people lost interest in the regular meetings of the bewoners' raad. Meetings became less frequent, and eventually disappeared altogether. Once the work on the structure plan began, everyone was busy going to other meetings -- especially the leaders and workers of BOS.

Internal problems in BOS have always been numerous, as can be expected for any complex citizen organization. During the structure-planning process, one of these problems was the failure of the bewoners' raad to meet and to serve as an effective forum for policy-making. In addition, the organization's board of directors saw its power diminish as Kupyers became more and more powerful. He controlled
the hearts of many (if not most) of the organization's members. Even more importantly, he had amassed tremendous knowledge about urban renewal and city planning. He was BOS's foremost spokesman and negotiator with The Hague, and his contacts in the city bureaucracy were invaluable. The organization could not (or thought it could not) get along without him. His abrasive character and willingness to negotiate agreements on his own increased complaints about him, while his successes simultaneously increased his control over the organization.

When one head of the board of directors resigned, rather than face a showdown with Kuypers, a new vice-chairwoman was appointed to take his place -- at least on an interim basis. Her main effort (and that of her allies) was to resurrect the bewoners' raad. Kuypers and the other workers stiffly opposed this effort, and delayed reconvening of the raad for several months. Eventually, the new vice-chairwoman also resigned.

At the same time (and perhaps predictably), city workers began to have doubts about BOS's representatives. Was the organization still speaking for the residents? The survey of the City Development Agency indicated a general agreement between the opinions of the residents and those of the leaders -- but there were differences in at least a few areas: rehabilitation and parking
(see pp. 133-34). Fortunately for BOS, this distrust among certain city employees never surfaced in any serious way. More important to BOS's legitimacy were increasingly vicious attacks on its representatives and criticism of Kuypers' strategies from left-wing forces in the neighborhood, most notably HVS, disenchanted members of Payable Rents, and certain social workers in Schilderswijk. Even one relatively conservative community worker complained to me that the leaders and workers of BOS were no longer "close to the people".

In certain districts, opponents of BOS were able to disrupt the planning process entirely for weeks at a time, influencing people not to attend meetings and to demand that the city do something about the immediate problems of the neighborhood (crime, traffic, unsanitary housing conditions, etc.), rather than all this "useless long-term planning".

The demand for immediate remedial action as a substitute for endless months of planning struck a sympathetic chord throughout the community, highlighting a key fact which BOS's leaders had begun to forget. In their excitement about the structure plan, they forgot that it was only a plan. Plans, after all, are only as good as the city's word and the money which is allocated to back it up.

The people of Schilderswijk were tiring of plans. They remembered old promises which the city had made at the
time of the original process for the Oranjeplein, promises of concrete action to fix leaky roofs, to put new buildings up in vacant lots where old residences had been demolished, to make the streets safer for children. Then, without realizing these promises, the city had come right back with a secretly-produced structure plan which required a major return to the conflict of the past. Many residents -- even long-term supporters of Kuypers -- began to ask why they should return so readily to the bargaining table before the city made good on some of its old promises.

In some cases, BOS could no longer stem the course of conflict, even during the participation process. When people got tired of vacant buildings standing next to their own homes, they would burn the buildings down; arson as a form of protest is Schilderswijk's worst-kept secret. When people tired of their own unsatisfactory quarters, they squatted in more desirable, but vacant buildings -- some of which were scheduled for demolition as part of plans BOS had been instrumental in formulating. When the city failed to respond to complaints about street safety, the social workers sometimes led people out into the streets to tear out the cobblestones, making the roads impassable. Actions such as these were particularly serious in light of the mild forms of protest which had characterized Schilderswijk up until that time. The serious confrontations which were
now occurring were quite out of tune with Dutch traditions, and indicated the depth of people's anger. Each action of protest embarrassed BOS and its process of participation.  

I contend that the troubles plaguing the structure-planning process were manifestations of ossification in BOS. I have chosen the word ossification deliberately. Its meaning is: "a tendency toward a state of being molded into a rigid, conventional, sterile, or unimaginative condition". This word accurately describes what was happening to BOS as it embarked on a process which, on the surface at least, was far more sophisticated than the process for Oranjeplein which had preceded it. An unwillingness to concentrate on the immediate needs of the residents, the loss of legitimacy which flowed from the disbanding of the residents' council, increasing domination by one man (albeit a talented and dedicated man) -- these factors created an organization which was increasingly rigid and authoritarian, unable to meet attacks on its legitimacy from the left, and in many important respects, increasingly deaf to the complaints from the neighborhood it was trying to serve.  

Fortunately, BOS and its leaders (including Kuypers) had invested too much time and effort -- and learned too much about the danger signals of organizational decay -- to allow ossification to continue indefinitely. They recognized that the structure-planning process was essentially sound; they were firmly committed to the future of Schil-
derswijk, and the people remembered that their successes in negotiation with the city were not inconsiderable.

At the time I left The Netherlands in January 1980, there were distinct signs that BOS was beginning to rebuild its legitimacy and strengthen its bargaining position with the city. Kuypers had agreed to the reinstitution of the bewoners' raad, which has met several times since the summer of 1979. A new chairman of the raad has been appointed.

Kuypers justifies his delay in reconvening the bewoners' raad on two grounds. Firstly, he claims that the consultation groups involved in the structure-planning process served the same purpose as the raad; as long as the procedure continued, these groups provided contact between the leaders and members of BOS. In addition, the structure plan was so time-consuming and important that it had to take precedence over activities such as those of the residents' council. Kuypers admitted, however, that an organization like BOS must avoid assigning itself too many tasks—lest it begin to lose contact with its own members. Therefore (in the future at least), the workers and board of BOS will carefully choose which projects the organization will work on. Kuypers never admitted to any internal problems during the structure-planning process; but his statements appear to imply a recognition of the fact that the process came close to over-loading his organization.
In addition, the organization has begun to re-emphasize small, street-level meetings to discuss neighborhood problems -- one of its initial organizing methods. One such effort, on the Nooldwijkstraat and the Falckstraat, involves intensive conversation with about eighty families to determine their current problems and desires for the future. A number of people who were skeptical of BOS's recent activities cited this as a very positive step.

Finally, the city made certain efforts which have helped defuse a potentially explosive situation in Schilderswijk. By appointing a special committee to deal with immediate problems of the residents rather than just plan for the long-term, some of the inhabitants' most pressing problems may be solved. The structure plan itself, which could easily have been a very general plan with few time limitations, states rather explicitly the steps to be taken in each district and by what dates, presenting short-term actions as well as long-term plans.

The plan differs from the original one in several important respects. Displacement is not encouraged in this plan. Massive demolition has been replaced by selective demolition; for example, the old plan recommended that all houses in the central district of Schilderswijk be torn down, while the new plan calls for the destruction of only two-thirds of these units. City traffic will be routed
around (instead of through) the neighborhood. Finally, the linear park has been replaced by a series of smaller parks scattered throughout the neighborhood, and more suited to the recreational needs of children.

The planning process has now shifted from the general structure plan for the neighborhood to specific building plans for blocks and individual housing complexes. If the momentum toward real renewal can be maintained, the process of participation in Schilderswijk may well be rejuvenated. If it cannot, however, many of the gains which have been accomplished at great expense during the past decade could be lost.

The city, and BOS, must remember that when the people tired of conflict, they turned to participation as an alternative. Now, many people in the neighborhood are tiring of participation, dropping out of the process, certain that "nothing they do can make a difference". An effort to turn this feeling around with concrete developments is BOS's greatest current challenge.
NOTES

1. Interview with L. Pronk, Coordinator of Residents' Council for Renbaankwartier; The Hague, January 22, 1980

2. Interview with Wybo Jurgens, City Development Agency, Municipality of The Hague; Delft, January 16, 1980

3. Interview with Jaap Wolf and Paul Smeele, Department of Civil Engineering, Delft Technical University; Delft, January 10, 1980

4. Interview with Patrick Boel, Planwinkel; The Hague, December 21, 1979


6. Interview with Henk van Schagen, Department of Architecture and Town Planning, Delft Technical University; Delft, December 14, 1979

7. For a detailed account of the Organjeplein participation process and related events, see van Dijck (note 5), and Beck (note 10, Chapter II, p. 84).

8. Interview with Paulinus Kuipers, Jacob Maris Group, Schilderswijk; The Hague, December 3, 1979


10. Interview with Aad Kuypers, Executive Director, Residents' Organization Organjeplein-Schilderswijk; The Hague, January 17, 1980
CHAPTER IV
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PARTICIPATION IN THE HAGUE

Reviewing the Evaluation Criteria

In Chapter II, I presented a set of five criteria which could be used to assess the effectiveness of citizen participation. Some of the criteria were divided into subsections. To refresh the reader's memory, the criteria are presented below:

1. diffusion of conflict
   a. between citizens and the municipality
   b. within the neighborhood itself
2. recognition of the residents' goals for the neighborhood
   a. a meaningful planning role for community residents
   b. implementing the goals of community residents
3. strengthened organizational structure of the community
4. democratization of community institutions
5. community-wide learning
   a. leadership cadre
   b. average residents
   c. disadvantaged
Table III explains how each of the participatory experiences presented in the last chapter fared in relation to the criteria presented above (see the next four pages for Table III).

We will now review Table III to analyze the findings for each of our five criteria. In each case, I will examine the possibility of causal links between the participatory effort and the end result. I will also discuss the role which various antecedent conditions may have played in determining the outcomes. If any particular participatory techniques seemed to correlate with effectiveness in relation to any of the criteria, I will explain that situation as well.

1) Diffusion of conflict. For the most part, participatory efforts were accompanied by reductions in the level of conflict within the community, and between the community and the municipality. Both forms of conflict declined as divergent community elements jointly focused their attention on co-production efforts with the municipality. There were two major exceptions: in Renbaankwartier, open forms of conflict (e.g., sit-ins and demonstrations) ceased, but subtle confrontation politicking continued in full force. During the second effort in Schilderswijk, conflict within the community reasserted itself as BOS suffered from increasingly severe legitimacy problems.
TABLE III: EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA FOR FIVE PARTICIPATORY EXPERIENCES IN THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participatory Experience</th>
<th>Diffusion of Conflict Between Citizens and Municipality</th>
<th>Within the Neighborhood Itself</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renbaankwartier/ Scheveningen</td>
<td>no; participation only masked continued conflict</td>
<td>neighborhood appeared united during brief participatory effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schipperskwartier</td>
<td>yes; actual conflict declined substantially</td>
<td>disagreements between opbouwwerkers and residents remained muted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molenwijk</td>
<td>yes; actual conflict declined substantially</td>
<td>participants appeared united; tension remained between Dutch residents and immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schilderswijk I: Oranjeplein</td>
<td>yes; temporarily at least</td>
<td>most conflict diffused; minor attacks continued from the left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schilderswijk II: Structure Plan</td>
<td>yes; but less completely than in Schilderswijk I due to attacks on municipality from groups other than Bewoners' Organisatie Oranjeplein-Schilderswijk (BOS)</td>
<td>conflict heated up as BOS came under attack from the left, and from ideological neutrals who wanted greater democratization and more attention to immediate problems of residents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE III (cont.): EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA FOR FIVE PARTICIPATORY EXPERIENCES IN THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participatory Experience</th>
<th>Recognition of Residents' Goals for Community Residents</th>
<th>Implementing the Goals of Community Residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renbaankwartier/ Scheveningen</td>
<td>partial role; participation process was too brief and too simple to involve residents deeply in planning process</td>
<td>displacement largely halted; pro-resident agreements reached on most major issues; neighborhood to remain essentially as it is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schipperskwartier</td>
<td>strong role created for opbouwerkers; weak role for average residents</td>
<td>plans now being implemented; significant new construction, but probably less rehabilitation than residents desire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molenwijk</td>
<td>meaningful role created, but mainly for people who are soon to leave neighborhood</td>
<td>plans now being implemented will lead to gentrification and significant displacement, corresponding to desires of most residents, but harmful to large minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schilderswijk I: Oranjeplein</td>
<td>meaningful role created for both leaders and residents; impact for community ensured through &quot;declaration of intents&quot;</td>
<td>new apartments built for current residents; plan included some amenities, economic development, and rehabilitation of nearby buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schilderswijk II: Structure Plan</td>
<td>role for leaders became more elaborate; many residents remained involved, but others lost contact with BOS</td>
<td>plan has been approved but not yet implemented; most aspects correspond to community desires; significant improvement over original plan prepared without participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE III (cont.): EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA FOR FIVE PARTICIPATORY EXPERIENCES IN THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participatory Experience</th>
<th>Strengthened Organizational Structure</th>
<th>Democratization of Community Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renbaankwartier/ Scheveningen</td>
<td>yes; Bewoners' Beraad Renbaankwartier (BBR) became a strong force in the community</td>
<td>some involvement of residents on BBR working committees and in public meetings; structure remained essentially authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schipperskwartier</td>
<td>yes; Actiegroep Vergetendorp became powerful and respected in community and at City Hall</td>
<td>only on paper; opbouwers control flow of information and decision-making process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molenwijk</td>
<td>yes; but much of this will be lost if present community leaves</td>
<td>some democratization; noteworthy efforts to include women and children; unsuccessful attempts to include immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schilderswijk I: Oranjeplein</td>
<td>yes; neighborhood organizations became stronger, more knowledgeable, and far more capable at defending their interests</td>
<td>yes; roles of average residents expanded; BOS established residents' council and daily board of directors to link leaders with members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schilderswijk II: Structure Plan</td>
<td>at first, position of BOS in community erodes; attacks from left and reduced credibility at City Hall; then, evidence of mild recovery</td>
<td>roles of residents no longer expanding; evidence of authoritarian rigidity and weakening of democratic procedures; then, evidence of mild recovery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE III (cont.): EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA FOR FIVE PARTICIPATORY EXPERIENCES IN THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participatory Experience</th>
<th>Leadership Cadre</th>
<th>Community-Wide Learning</th>
<th>Average Residents</th>
<th>Disadvantaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renbaankwartier/ Scheveningen</td>
<td>yes; but cadre is fairly small</td>
<td>only among selected individuals</td>
<td>none observed</td>
<td>none observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schipperskwartier</td>
<td>yes; especially among opbouwwerkers</td>
<td>little observed; probably quite low</td>
<td>none observed</td>
<td>none observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molenwijk</td>
<td>yes; Actiegroep Laakkwartier employs Planwinkel for technical assistance</td>
<td>some; extent uncertain</td>
<td>efforts made to include immigrants meet with low rate of success</td>
<td>none observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schilderswijk I: Oranjeplein</td>
<td>yes; substantial increase in knowledge and sophistication of cadre in dealing with city</td>
<td>yes; evidence of expanded knowledge of and concern about broader neighborhood issues</td>
<td>little to none</td>
<td>none observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schilderswijk II: Structure Plan</td>
<td>maybe; level of increase over previous gains not clear</td>
<td>some increase; varied among districts depending on composition of groups, levels of attendance, etc.</td>
<td>little to none; only minor success of efforts to involve immigrants</td>
<td>none observed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In most cases, the reduction in or elimination of conflict was directly tied to the participatory process. In several cases, in fact, conflict between the people and the municipality centered more heavily on the demand for participation than it did on the substantive renewal issues under consideration. Therefore, it was only logical that the beginning of a participatory process should see some reduction in the level of conflict, especially if representatives of the community had been involved in designing the process.

In all cases, however, community organizations left open the possibility of a return to conflict. The only case where this can be disputed is Schilderswijk II, where BOS because so heavily invested in the ethic of participation (which places the burden of quiescence on participating organizations), that the city (at least temporarily) came to expect a negotiating partner which would be reliably docile in the neighborhood, if still fiesty at the bargaining table. BOS's eventual move away from this stance resulted largely from conflict within its own ranks, its leaders' recognition that participation was not "all things to all people" (i.e. participation could not completely substitute for political action), and pressure on BOS's left flank.

The "open door" policy with regard to conflict (ranging from Renbaankwartier where the door was left wide
open, to Schilderswijk II where the door was left barely ajar) was critically important to the success of the participation process, at least from the residents' point of view. City politicians who gave orders to the negotiating agencies were very nervous about the potential impact of further conflict on the next elections. The Hague government is a delicately balanced coalition of Labour (socialist), Christian Democratic (centrist), and Liberal (conservative, sic) town councillors (see pp. 14-16 and 46-47 for an explanation of the Dutch parties). The Christian Democrats and Liberals were not eager to see the left gain the upper hand, as it had in Rotterdam and Amsterdam, which The Hague views as its "less stable" sister cities. This fear of the adverse political results of conflict applied particularly to Schipperskwartier and Schilderswijk, where the action groups were powerful and very well-organized. In Renbaankwartier, the Town Council allied itself with the residents' group to force the mayor and aldermen to make a separate plan for the quarter, involving citizen participation.

Within the city bureaucracy, the view toward participation was by no means uniform. Although younger planners tended to see the need for participation (some actually have made their reputations by skillfully dealing with participation efforts), the older planners and city bureaucrats were vehemently opposed to the notion of citizens (mere planning
amateurs) questioning their professional judgment. When the professionals working for the city were at odds on this matter, the potential threat of resurgent conflict was one of the strongest arguments younger planners could use to bring other bureaucrats into line and continue support of the participatory efforts during times of stress.

City workers involved in the participation efforts in The Hague faced no greater challenge than breaking through the endless red tape and bureaucratic delay which characterize Dutch municipal government. Citizens expected a little more progress every day. If they asked a question on Tuesday they wanted an answer on Wednesday. If a building was demolished, plans had to be ready to begin new construction on that site immediately.

Holland, unfortunately, is a quintessentially bureaucratic state. Every decision must pass through a maze of committees and approvers before it becomes reality. Nothing, however, is more likely to prompt a return to conflict than bureaucratic delay; it is prime fuel for citizens' insecurity about entering into a participation process with "the enemy". Delay, generally, is interpreted as deception.

In many cases, the City Development Agency and other departments of the municipality had to develop special techniques to deal with this problem. These techniques included the assignment of specific contact persons in the City
Development Agency and various resident groups to act as
trouble-shooters if the process hit a snag. In the case of
the Schilderswijk structure planning process, the agreed-
on procedures provided for a special "signal team" to
be called into action if negotiations broke down on any
particular issue; the signal team was never used.

An important, if informal, agreement between the
City Development Agency and various citizen groups involved
in participatory efforts was the strict adherence to dead-
lines -- for both sides -- in order to engender trust, and
give the proceedings an air of professionalism. In addition,
the city developed a strict policy of never promising more
than it could deliver to avoid raising expectations so high
as to risk disappointment later. Through mechanisms such
as these, the city and the participating communities sought
to ensure smooth bargaining and minimize the chance of a
return to conflict. Perhaps one of the most important
precedents was set by Alderman Nuy during the Schilderswijk
Oranjeplein process, when he gave his on-the-spot negotia-
tors wide discretion to make promises and act on their
commitments, rather than having to report back to City
Hall for permission on every small point.

(In the even more complicated maze of Amsterdam's
administration, one of the most serious problems facing the
"project group" participation efforts was the question of
whether or not middle-management negotiators could speak for their departments, and even communicate officially with the representatives of other agencies before receiving permission from their bosses. Eventually, they received this authority, but only after bureaucratic delays almost derailed the experimental project group procedures.

Although techniques such as those discussed above can certainly help diffuse conflict (and keep it from returning), conditions antecedent to the beginning of participation are also critical. The attitudes of city workers and neighborhood leaders seemed particularly important in the cases which I studied.

In Schilderswijk, city workers and citizen activists initially approached each other with grave misgivings. A working relationship quickly developed, however, largely due to the respect which the city workers accorded to the leader of Payable Rents, Aad Kuypers. Kuypers and his associates developed a reputation for keeping the process on track, being direct but reliable, and willing to bargain behind closed doors when necessary.

In Renbaankwartier, the same level of respect did not develop. On the one hand, leaders of Bewoners' Beraad Renbaankwartier did not share the Kuypers philosophy of participation. They believed that conflict was their best weapon, and they were unwilling to lay it aside. They had
little respect for the city workers. The city, for its part, immediately tried to redefine the boundaries of the Renbaankwartier planning district at the start of the process. They responded to the public character of the meetings with statements which the group considered downright dishonest. Above all, the city executive resented the fact that the Town Council had foisted the participation process on them. In short, conditions for mutual respect were poor.

2) Recognition of the residents' goals for the neighborhood. Ideally, a participatory process should legitimize residents' goals for their neighborhood by providing them with a meaningful role in the planning process. In most of the cases I studied in The Hague, a meaningful role was achieved -- but the credit seemed to go to the protests which preceded participation, rather than to the processes adopted themselves. In some instances, however, particular techniques deserve special note for enlarging the roles of residents and allowing for a more precise articulation of desires.

In Schilderswijk, three such techniques stand out. The first is the in-depth survey of resident attitudes which the City Development Agency conducted prior to the structure-planning process. An enormously comprehensive survey, this research provided planners with detailed information about the feelings of Schilderswijkers -- most importantly those
who were not vocal enough to actually participate in the more public aspects of the process. The second technique involved the division of the neighborhood into ten small districts, each with its own consultation group to handle the unique problems and concerns of that district. Thirdly, the process expanded participation beyond the realm of housing, the subject area which was the sole focus of most participatory procedures in cities throughout Holland. By involving working groups on schools, recreation, traffic, and businesses, the process ensured that resident views would be heard on a broad range of issues.

Similarly innovative techniques for capturing the essence of resident opinions have been used in Molenwijk, although they are less valuable in light of the fact that most of the residents will be moving away as renewal proceeds. Nonetheless, efforts to involve immigrants (such as simultaneous translation, assignment of a special social worker, and multi-lingual documentation) are worthy of note. The projects involving children in the neighborhood's renewal are surely worth the time and effort, even though the outcome of this program is not yet known.

I would not go so far as to draw direct causal links between techniques such as these and the degree to which the process has given legitimacy to the residents' goals for their neighborhood. I do believe such techniques make the
planning role of residents more meaningful and enable them to articulate their desires more precisely.

Above and beyond the processes themselves, however, what have the residents actually accomplished? The key political issue at stake in the struggles over participation revolved around the displacement of current residents which the city was recommending (explicitly or implicitly) in most of its plans. In Scheveningen, residents were to be removed for the promotion of the tourist trade -- allegedly an economic necessity for The Hague; this argument, however, could not justify the luxury apartment houses and office buildings which were also being planned for the neighborhood. In Schipperskwartier, office buildings and a widened road were to replace housing in much of the district. In Schilderswijk, luxury apartments, office buildings, widened roads, and major parks were planned.

In cases where new housing was proposed, there would be far fewer units and far higher rents after renewal. Despite the government's official relocation policy (which the residents of Molenwijk depended upon so heavily), the most disadvantaged and politically weak residents of the other quarters feared there would not be enough housing for them in other parts of the city. They worried that they might be paying far higher rents in their new homes. They did not want to lose the familiar faces and streets they had lived with for
so long; and they feared being moved into some of the sterile, cardboard-construction neighborhoods which had recently been build as repositories for "undesirables" being moved away from the city's core, which was now to be put to "more economic use".

The single greatest achievement of the residents' struggles, therefore, has been a series of commitments from the municipality to abandon their relocation schemes, and plan renewal of the old quarters for the current residents, and not for newcomers. The single major exception to this rule is Molenwijk, where the new neighborhood will probably house a substantially wealthier population than currently resides there.

In addition, there have been some compromises on the part of the citizens. Although most of Renbaankwartier is safe, the city has still not given a firm commitment to prevent future demolition of housing; and luxury apartments are still sprouting like mushrooms all around the borders of the quarter, increasing the economic pressue for development in Renbaankwartier itself. In Schipperskwartier, Actiegroep Vergetendorp was forced to accept a slightly larger percentage of apartments for new families who are expected to move into the quarter from the outside, plus a few office buildings. On the whole, however, the quarters
have been preserved for their current residents, at affordable rents.

Was the participation responsible for this commitment, however? The answer seems to be: partly, but not entirely. The initial commitment flowed from the conflict which in all cases was a necessary precedent to participation; without conflict, the city would certainly not have changed its plans. However, participation gave the commitment detail, and ensured its duration. Backsliding from the commitment on the part of the city became significantly more difficult when city workers had to attend meetings with citizens several times a week. In addition, the participatory process allowed citizens to influence the precise ways in which the commitment would be carried out.

In most cases, the planning process involving participation led to actual physical improvement of the neighborhood. Designers may argue about the quality of the new housing, the mix of rehabilitation versus new construction, the traffic patterns, and the green space; but there is little doubt that the residents believe their neighborhoods have been improved physically.

As usual, there are some exceptions. In the Renbaankwartier section of Scheveningen, the residents were more concerned with preserving the physical structure of their neighborhood, rather than altering it -- and they
achieved this goal. In Schipperskwartier, the quality of the new construction which is beginning to flow from the new plans may be below the standard which the residents want; that is uncertain, however. In Schilderswijk II, the structure plan has not yet produced physical improvement, although building plans are already being produced and implementation appears imminent in certain districts.

Improvement of the social environment was considerably less evident than physical improvement in the neighborhoods I studied. This event was not surprising, for several reasons, the most important of which was that the city and the action groups tended to concentrate on physical problems almost exclusively. Several people with whom I spoke in the neighborhoods lamented the lack of attention to social issues, particularly education, crime (especially vandalism and arson), and relations between Dutchmen and minorities. It is understandable, however, that these problems received less attention since they are less easy to solve.

Participation processes have a very low tolerance for failure. A lack of swift, concrete results, can easily derail a process. Physical successes, although difficult to obtain, are far more easily attained than improvements in social milieu.

Another factor in the downplaying of social issues is the idea (well-tested and proven in Holland) that successful
participation depends on stressing "doorstep issues" and "making the process of renewal 'real' to the people". (Zeisel and Godschalk discuss this extensively in their portion of the report of the German Marshall Fund project team). It is argued that physical issues (especially housing and traffic) are "closest" to the people and most easily understood.

I agree with the idea that participation is more likely to succeed if the issues considered are readily understandable and part of people's immediate concerns. A failure to deal with immediate problems almost derailed the second Schilderswijk effort. However, I think this argument is faulty when applied to the question of including social issues in the participation planning process. The people I interviewed were deeply concerned about education, crime, and race relations -- and eager to seek solutions. The city agencies, however, are dominated by physical planners who are not usually comfortable with these questions; and many of the citizen activists are also architects, or residents who have developed expertise in dealing with the physical environment. This bias, as well as the desire for relatively quick successes, may be the reason why social issues received a low priority in the planning process.

3) Strengthened organizational structure of the community. Generally, the cases I studied involved a
strengthening of the organizational structure of the neighborhood. New action groups were formed, coalitions (however tenuous) were created, and old groups grew stronger (or were replaced by stronger successors). A powerful leadership cadre regularly emerged to represent the interests of communities which had been previously under-represented on the municipal level. The politicization of the population increased the attention city politicians paid to these neighborhoods, and in some cases, indigenous organizers emerged to run for public office on the city level (although this created loyalty conflicts which occasionally alienated these leaders from their natural constituencies).

However, most of these results can be traced to the stage of conflict, rather than the period of participation. Conflict, if it is to be successful, demands strong organization. Participation, on the other hand, can induce a softening in community power institutions, as witnessed most noticeably in BOS during the second phase of participation in Schilderswijk.

Furthermore, much of the strengthening which did occur seemed to be largely centered in particular groups, with questionable spin-off effects through the rest of the communities. I could find no techniques which seemed to induce (or which were even highly correlated with) a strengthening of community institutions beyond the level which existed at
the time the participatory processes began. It is the period of conflict which must take primary credit for the significant amount of institutional development which occurred in the neighborhoods I studied.

4) Democratization of community institutions. Only limited democratization occurred in the cases I studied in The Hague. More frequently militant elites or charismatic leaders came to dominate the process of participation. In the case of Schilderswijk, group leaders still seemed able to represent neighborhood views accurately on most issues; in Schipperskwartier, representativeness is in greater doubt.

A lack of democratic operating principles is not without cost. The single greatest cost is the risk that group leaders will not accurately represent the views of residents, leading to renewal which the inhabitants may not find suitable -- an event which could lead to conflict in the future. There are also other costs. An excessive dependence on individual leaders can negatively affect the learning process. If residents are not regularly involved in the process of participation (and in the supervision of their leaders' actions), they are unlikely to pick up any of the skills listed on p. 79. There is little reason to believe that these skills are being picked up by the residents of Renbaankwartier or Schipperskwartier.
In addition, the failure to democratize a participating organization can have negative repercussions within the leadership cadre itself. In Schilderswijk, the conflict over the bewoners' raad split the leadership, forcing one active member to remove herself from the organization; an outside advisor to the group is also planning to leave soon, partly because of this controversy. In short, a hierarchical, authoritarian style of operation can deprive an action group of allies and members who might otherwise contribute to the effort.

City officials are often anxious to have community institutions democratize their operations, in order to fend off attacks from the opponents of participation who claim that militant activists "are terrorizing" community residents into protesting against their elected officials. On the other hand, political pressures often prevent city governments from pressing for democratization. Hierarchical neighborhood organizations which are capable of disciplining their members and "delivering the goods" are often much more useful to a city government, at least in the short term, than pluralistic action groups which have trouble making up their minds.

Our cases in The Hague give us a bleak outlook on the role of participation in democratizing neighborhood institutions. There are some bright spots, however. Although BBR
in Renbaankwartier is still under the control of a militant elite, citizens play important roles on the organization's working committees, and they are frequently called upon to attend meetings with the city (which are always public) where they can influence proceedings by their very numbers.

In Molenwijk, some attempts have been made to include in the process groups which have been largely ignored in the past, specifically women, immigrants, and children. Although success in this endeavor has been mixed, the attempt is at least a step toward democratizing the participatory process in that neighborhood -- although it gives us no assurance that Actiegroep Laakkwartier is run in a democratic fashion.

In Schilderswijk, Payable Rents tried very hard during its early stages to develop a democratic institution. It created a residents' council and a "daily board of directors" (dag-bestuur) as part of this effort; regular meetings with the community were held, and BOS organizers worked on the street and block level.

In all three neighborhoods discussed above, democratization was correlated with the arrival of participation. In each case, the efforts made to increase the democratic nature of the action group related to the group's need to prove its own representativeness, and its need to delegate the complex and time-consuming tasks of participation. Little democratization was observable during the period of open conflict.
Participation can also lead to organizational rigidity, however, and a trend away from democratic values, as proven in the Schilderswijk structure-planning process, where the leaders of the organization became so wrapped up in the process itself that democratization took a back seat (although efforts are now underway to reverse this situation).

As a final note, we should point out that the trend toward (or away from) neighborhood democracy was dependent upon factors external to the participation process, most notably the level of conflict remaining in the community (which tended to work against democratization) and the attitudes of the group leaders (who frequently considered democracy a waste of time and effort).

5) Community-wide learning. On the whole, skills possessed by the leaders increased markedly in the communities studied in most skill categories listed on p. 79. People with natural organizing and planning talents emerged rapidly, and set up positions of dominance in the community. For example, Schilderswijk, which has now gone through two phases of conflict and participation, has developed an especially sophisticated leadership cadre. Laborers with no more than a primary-school education have risen to positions of great power in their communities, based not merely on the strength of their personalities (although this has play a role), but also on the basis of real knowledge and skills.
It is equally important, however, to analyze learning among those members of the Dutch working-class who did not rise to positions of leadership. Generally, the average citizen who attended a number of meetings and offered opinions about the future of his/her block and street has learned a good deal about setting priorities, the economics of planning, and planning procedures. Increased organizational abilities and deeper understandings of political realities are not so strongly evidenced, however. If they were willing to put in some time and buy into the process, they would come away with greater knowledge which might help them defend their own personal interests better in the future.

This phenomenon was generally observable in most of the neighborhoods I studied, although different processes used different techniques to induce greater learning among average citizens. In Renbaankwartier, all meetings with the city had to be public -- a fact which may have had adverse political implications, but which gave many residents an opportunity to learn about the planning process.

In Molenwijk, the consultant firm Planwinkel instituted a series of efforts to induce learning among the community's average residents, including contacts with children and special monthly meetings at which thorny planning issues were dissected.
BOS in Schilderswijk hired part-time (sometimes volunteer) experts from inside and outside the community to provide technical information and help with drawing up responses to city proposals; BOS members and workers learned much from these outside experts. The working groups instituted in the structure-planning process also enabled citizens to learn about subject areas other than housing (such as schools, economic development, and traffic).

On the whole, however, these techniques were not very useful in involving the disadvantaged members of the community in the participation process. The elderly, handicapped, and immigrant members of the community were not, on the whole, deeply involved. These groups are prevented from participating in at least three ways. Firstly, they are less able to involve themselves due to infirmity, a lack of skills, or an inability to articulate their desires in Dutch. Secondly, (especially in the case of minorities), the dominant participants are not eager to see them involved, and make few efforts (if any) to encourage them to overcome their participatory disadvantages. Finally, these groups lack natural leaders and spokespersons who can bring them into the process, or at least represent their interests.

As with the other criteria we have examined, the role of antecedent conditions cannot be discounted. Although certain techniques seemed linked with a high level of learning,
an impetus was required to put these techniques into effect in the first place. This makes the role of community leadership particularly critical. In the case of Schipperskwartier and Renbaankwartier, for example, the leadership was not apparently interested in encouraging learning within the community, and has installed few techniques to do so.

Finally, I would like to comment on the notion of single- and double-loop learning discussed in Chapter II. Single-loop learning was evident in all the neighborhoods, since the leaders and/or the residents obviously learned quite a bit about particular planning issues and strategies for dealing with the city.

Double-loop learning, on the other hand, was more difficult to detect. BBR in Renbaankwartier seemed to change its philosophy about the world when it broke away from WOS and pursued its own pattern of militant conflict with the municipality. It would not change its theories a second time, however, to engage more earnestly in participation.

BOS in Schilderswijk did change to a participatory philosophy when it shifted from the conflict-mode to the cooperation-mode. The BOS and BBR examples would seem to indicate that neighborhood leaders are critical in determining whether or not double-loop learning can occur within an organization. If they are resistant to change and strongly
convinced of the rightness of their own assumptions, the chances are bleak. On the other hand, leaders who are willing to have their own positions challenged are more likely to learn in a double-loop fashion, and although organizations do not necessarily learn everything their leaders do, the chances for group learning are improved when leaders themselves learn.

The Primacy of Attitudes, Conflict, and Leadership

Practicing planners, and academic researchers who try to improve planning practice, seem ever to be involved in a search for the correct mix of "participation techniques" which will ensure "effective participation" (or at least promote it with a reasonable frequency of success).

My research in The Hague, and briefer visits to Amsterdam, Groningen, Nijmegen, Rotterdam, and Utrecht, have convinced me that conditions antecedent to the beginning of a participation process have much more to do with its likelihood for success than the actual format of the process.

Specifically, I would identify three key antecedent conditions: a) the attitudes of city workers and citizen participants toward each other; b) the level and form of conflict preceding the participation (and chances for the re-emergence of conflict during or after the participation process); and c) the presence, strength, and opinions of an
indigenous neighborhood leadership. In the preceding section on effectiveness criteria I have tried to indicate the importance of these conditions in all five cases I studied in The Hague. In the next few pages, I would like to explore these conditions citing the Hague examples, as well as others I explored more briefly in The Netherlands.

1) Attitudes. The history of planning practice in Holland, as in the United States, makes participation an unnatural form of behavior. Planning professionals and politicians usually see conflict mediated through the electoral process, or through standardized, although informal, political mechanisms of reward and punishment. The idea of having all parties to a dispute sit down at a table to plan the future is a new and frightening phenomenon to many associated with municipal government.

Similarly, citizens are not used to the process, or to the very idea of bargaining for neighborhood renewal. Naturally, they enter the process with trepidation and mistrust.

As they begin participation, both sides will make mistakes which hurt their negotiating counterparts. The level of respect and trust which the parties bear for each other will directly affect their ability to overlook problems early on, and proceed with the process. The Schilderswijk and Renbaankwartier cases in The Hague are
opposite examples of how the attitudes of citizens and city workers can affect a participatory process (see pp. 156-57 for a comparison of these two cases).

The city of Groningen, in the northern part of the country, was in many ways Holland's laboratory for participation, largely because of the efforts of Max van den Berg, the alderman in charge of urban renewal. A member of the socialist Labor party (and currently national party head), van den Berg believed that participation was the best way to ensure that neighborhoods were renewed without displacing the present residents. He and his associates spent several years encouraging action groups to form throughout Groningen, followed by efforts to actually plan renewal efforts in accordance with citizen desires. Although van den Berg did not have a completely smooth relationship with the groups he helped create, his own personal commitment to participation laid a firm groundwork for an atmosphere of trust and cooperation.

Nijmegen, a staunchly Catholic and conservative city on the German border, provides a counterpoint to the Groningen experience. City officials long sought to undermine organizing efforts, and repeatedly supported plans which displaced residents (or threatened to do so). For years, they refused to recognize action groups as legitimately representative. A recently adopted code to govern future participation in Nijmegen is viewed with distrust by many
residents of the neighborhoods who believe it will do nothing more than co-opt their interests. A number of action groups fear that the city will try to cut their budgets now that the bulk of social service funding has been decentralized from the national government to local municipalities (see pp. 41-43).

On the whole, citizen participation in Nijmegen has not accomplished very much at all, except in certain neighborhoods where militant conflict must take primary credit for victories by the residents. The process of participation today is not very much smoother in Nijmegen than it was several years ago, largely because the critical base of trust has not formed.

2) Conflict. The typical American typology of citizen participation techniques (most notably Sherry Arnstein's "ladder of citizen participation") describes participation according to a series of possible power relationships between the city and the residents. The greater the real power of the residents, the higher the form of citizen participation.

These systems, although they provide accurate snapshots of various stages of participation, have always been rather unsatisfying to researchers who recognized that the evolution of citizen participation does not flow evenly up the ladder. The stages do not necessarily follow each
other in a logical order, and the various ladders which have been proposed tell us little about the evolution of participation.

Professor Hugo Priemus of the Delft Technical University has concluded substantial research on citizen participation in The Netherlands, with particular attention paid to Crosswijk in Rotterdam, one of the neighborhoods discussed in the paper by Zeisel and Godschalk. Priemus has advanced an historical explanation of the participation process, in five stages:

Stage I: No role for citizens in the renewal process.

Stage II: Protest and conflict.

Stage III: Informal role established for citizens (or certain citizens).

Stage IV: Creation of a formal structure (usually considered a victory by citizens).

Stage V: Recognition of the inadequacy of formal structures for participation. Priemus explains that Dutch groups have not developed a coordinated strategy for dealing with Stage V yet, although some are beginning to recognize that formal structures often work against their interests.

Like any model, this one is far from perfect, and several Dutch scholars have criticized it. In my opinion, however, it makes two significant contributions to our understanding of the dynamics of citizen participation. First, it recognizes the integral role of conflict as an
antecedent condition for meaningful participation. Participatory schemes may be set up in the absence of conflict, but they are rarely meaningful and genuine processes in which citizens receive and exercise real power. Before the municipality is willing to share power, it must be made to see the price of retaining all power to itself.

Each case I studied in Holland involved concerted conflict between citizen groups and the municipality. Only Groningen provided an example of effective participation which was set up without twisting the arms of those in power. And even in that city, Max van den Berg ran into conflict from forces within city government which did not approve of his reforms; and once the new citizen action groups were organized and recognized their interests, conflicts between the groups and the city ensued on many fronts. Van den Berg may well have wondered why he created a monster in his own house.

Amsterdam has probably recorded the bitterest conflicts over urban renewal and citizen participation. Protests in The Hague were tame in comparison to the frequently violent demonstrations and occasional riots which arose in neighborhoods slated for demolition during the construction of the Amsterdam Metro and other such projects. These conflicts continue today, despite the creation of a formal mechanism for participation. No one I spoke to believed that the "project group" system of participation
which currently operates in Amsterdam would have been considered if bitter conflict had not followed the city's initial planning efforts.

Priemus' second major contribution, in my opinion, is his recognition of the fact that the participation process can go sour, necessitating the re-introduction of conflict strategies. We saw several cases of this in The Hague. In Renbaankwartier, the participation process ended on schedule, but without complete agreement. Instead of proceeding to a higher level of bargaining, the confrontation process was re-introduced, almost willingly by the action group. Since conflict is both costly and time-consuming, its return to Renbaankwartier can hardly be applauded. However, knowledge on the part of the government that BBR could swiftly re-introduce open conflict probably contributed to the city's willingness to compromise on issues in the participation process. A municipality which recognizes that conflict can easily be resurrected is more likely to make the concessions necessary to move a process along.

If a group is divided, or tired of protest, or financially unable to mount more confrontation, government will have little incentive to bargain in good faith -- a process which requires concessions from both sides.

The recent decentralization of community development funding will probably have a great effect on the degree to
which action groups are free to reintroduce conflict. (See pp. 41-43 for a discussion of this decentralization program.) By giving individual municipalities full control over the appropriation of subsidies for neighborhood groups, cities and towns can now use the power of the purse to punish groups which "get out of line", and reward groups which are well-behaved.

3) **Presence of a Neighborhood Leadership.** In all the neighborhoods of The Hague which I studied, an effective leadership was present for purposes of organization and, eventually, participation. Since the integration of average residents into the participatory process is difficult and time-consuming, an existing leadership is vital to get a new participatory process off the ground.

The leadership formulates citizen opinion into rational positions which can be negotiated with city workers and politicians. The leaders facilitate integration of other citizens into the process (although there is evidence in Schipperskwartier that the leaders prefer to handle things themselves). Perhaps most importantly, an effective leadership makes the threat of conflict credible to the municipal authorities.

Community leaders shape participatory procedures in innumerable ways, both in formal discussions with municipal officials, and in the way they handle the day-to-day operation
of their organizations. Their opinions and actions are critical in determining how a participatory effort will fare when judged according to our two final criteria: democrati-

zation and community-wide learning. The leaders of each of the four major organizations I studied have proven that their concern for democracy and learning (or their lack of concern) will be translated into group policy (and thereby, into the process of participation).
CHAPTER V
LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCES IN THE HAGUE

This chapter will briefly explore what activists and government officials (particularly in the United States) can learn from the experiences recounted in this report. Before proceeding to the lessons themselves, however, I wish to propose a model of effective citizen participation.

Modeling Effective Citizen Participation

The most important characteristic of my model is that it is not a model at all, in the conventional sense of the term. We commonly conceive of a model as a complex scheme of interdependent variables which, when applied to a given situation, enables us to predict the future (or explain the past). My model boasts no such pretensions. Rather I hope that it will provide a rough guide to the influences which are important (or unimportant) in determining whether of not a participatory process is "effective" according to the five criteria we have been discussing throughout this paper.

The fundamental premise of my "guide" to effective citizen participation is simply this:

The effectiveness of participatory processes is determined primarily by three conditions antecedent to the
establishment of the process, and secondarily by the participatory techniques employed in the process itself.

The three antecedent conditions have been discussed at length in the previous chapter; to recapitulate, they are: a) the attitudes of city workers and citizen participants toward each other; b) the level and form of conflict preceding the participation (and chances for the re-emergence of conflict during or after the participation process); and c) the presence, strength, and opinions of an indigenous neighborhood leadership.

Since I believe the importance of these conditions has been thoroughly discussed in the previous chapter, I will not repeat my claims here. I will, however, note that antecedents are the predominant influences on participatory effectiveness for two distinct reasons. Firstly, they tend to impart their effect before the process begins, or at the very beginning, whereas techniques come into play only at some point during (and perhaps very far into) the process. The earlier the influence is applied, the greater its impact will be on the end result, because the factor has more time to manifest itself.

Secondly, antecedent conditions are simply more powerful in their own right than most techniques. The attitudes of city officials, for example, can substantively influence the entire process, and all of its constituent parts,
including each technique used. A single technique, however, is no more than a part of a larger process; it can have influence, but rarely can its influence be so great.

One final point is critical before we proceed to recommendations: both antecedent conditions and participatory techniques are amenable to change, although the former are undoubtedly more difficult to influence.

Recommendations for U.S. Activists and Officials

As U.S. citizen activists and government officials consider the creation and implementation of participatory procedures, they will undoubtedly review the techniques they should employ -- regardless of the fact that techniques are not the primary influence on effectiveness. Do the experience of The Hague indicate any particular techniques (or, more generally, kinds of techniques) which seem highly correlated with effectiveness, or (since it is often difficult to draw correlations from only five case studies) techniques which the participants themselves found useful? The answer is "yes"; although it would not be possible to definitively describe each technique, I will present a few which I believe are particularly likely to be transferable to the U.S. scene:
1) Use written agreements between the municipality and residents' groups to clarify a set of goals and determine a mutually-acceptable process for attaining those goals in a fixed space of time. The written agreement (based on the doelstellingennota from the Schilderswijk case) is undoubtedly difficult to achieve, especially when parties have been bickering for a long time. However, these problems are generally easier to solve than the substantive issues, and a few months of working out a procedural agreement can go a long way to cooling tensions and building trust before the hard bargaining begins on substantive renewal questions.

This period of time can also be used to allow both sides to decide who will serve as key persons in the participatory process, what the division of responsibility will be within city agencies and within the neighborhood group(s), and to locate various "third parties" who should be represented in the process but who have not yet been involved.

2) Citizens must have time by themselves to think, meet, iron out their own differences, and talk freely without municipal presence. Overbearing city administrations in the U.S. frequently demand that municipal representatives be present at all meetings; they will often send people to neighborhood meetings uninvited. This can be extremely
counterproductive because it reduces the level of trust between both sides. Just as municipal officials can meet alone in their offices, citizens should also have a chance to take care of their own business in private, and prepare positions for negotiating sessions without municipal interference.

The Dutch code of civil behavior places a high priority on privacy, and each case I studied in The Hague made allowances for the type of meetings discussed above.

3) Hold special neighborhood meetings (with the attendance of municipal planners, where appropriate) to discuss specific planning issues, provide information, and compare the relative merits of differing opinions — without the need to make a decision on that day regarding any particular stand. Such meetings organized by Planwinkel in Molenwijk were very useful in explaining key issues to residents, expanding community-wide learning, and making the decision and negotiating sessions more efficient.

4) Employ a host of mechanisms to cut down on red tape and bureaucratic delays. Special trouble-shooters, adherence to strict deadlines, intra-agency coordination teams, and other such methods could be useful. Since delay breeds mistrust, it must be minimized.

5) Use innovative techniques to involve children, the elderly, and the handicapped in the process. Special
outreach workers are probably needed in this regard; but even more can be done, as evidenced by Planwinkel's efforts to involve children via the schools, and to arrange meetings at times convenient for housewives. In Schilderswijk, part of the Oranjeplein development was targeted to the elderly, and Payable Rents tried to get their opinions about how their units should be organized.

6) **Make certain** that all interested parties to a renewal project **are represented** in the process, and encourage democratic operating procedures within the citizen organizations that are involved. Both of these steps strive to ensure that the participation process takes into account the true feeling of as many residents as possible in order to locate a true neighborhood consensus (if that can be achieved), and to prevent future conflict by limiting the number of parties who will feel that the process left them out.

7) Urban neighborhoods are large and diverse. It is frequently useful to **divide them up into small districts**, with a planning team to consider the problems and needs of each. This will help isolate localized issues, encourage people to become involved even though they are only concerned with their immediate area, and take advantage of small working groups of people who probably know each other.
At the same time, the interests of the entire neighborhood should not be ignored. The neighborhood-wide working groups organized in Schilderswijk to deal with particular subject areas represent one way of bridging the gap between localized, district issues and concerns of the entire neighborhood.

Now we arrive at the more difficult issue of telling activists and citizens what they might do to make the all-important antecedent conditions more favorable to citizen participation. Such steps are hard to locate, and once located they are hard to accomplish. However, I believe there are three particular classes of actions which U.S. activists and officials could benefit from knowing:

1) Leadership is not pre-ordained. Group members must choose their leaders carefully, not based merely on who knows the most, who speaks the best, or who has the most forceful personality. Here are some other qualities to consider (and to examine carefully if they are not obvious at first glance): respect for the opinions of others, willingness to work with groups, concern for the knowledge and understanding of those working with him, and capacity to change his own theories and assumptions about the world around him. At one point or another, groups usually have the chance to decide who will be in charge, and they must choose with care.
2) Municipal governments should **encourage neighborhood self-organization**. Dutch traditions of *opbouwwerk*, plus recent political developments like the organizing efforts of Max van der Berg in Groningen (see p.174) create a social expectation in Holland that the municipal government will help (or, at very least, will not hinder) the efforts of neighborhoods to develop coherent residents organizations to lobby on behalf of local interests. This expectation does not yet exist in the United States, where municipalities are allowed (and even expected) to attempt to undermine neighborhood organizing in any way possible.

Under the American system, neighborhood groups usually organize themselves anyway, attack government, and are repeatedly attacked by government in an attempt to destroy or weaken them. This process makes the growth of trust and cooperation virtually impossible.

In The Netherlands, the right of citizen groups to organize and protect their interests is recognized. This is essentially a manifestation of the politics of accommodation on the local level: any group can organize to take part in Dutch pluralism provided they abide by the basic groundrules of civility and deference. The result is a set of resident groups which are generally more docile than American groups, but also more accepted
as political entities that speak for recognized constituencies and have guaranteed rights as organizations. Dutch municipalities (and the central government) help these organization to grow by providing subsidies, meeting spaces, opbouwwerkers and other staff persons, and regular contacts with municipal personnel. Naturally, some Dutch municipalities are more generous and cooperative than others; Rotterdam is very helpful, while Nijmegen is obstructive. On the whole, however, municipal officials adhere to a policy of "self-organization" which states: government will help neighborhood groups to organize themselves (as long as they obey the code of civil behavior), but we reserve the right to disagree with and oppose these neighborhood organizations in relation to specific policy issues.

My observations in Holland indicate that the Dutch system creates a more coherent neighborhood network capable of defending neighborhood interests to city hall with a minimum of conflict and distrust. A greater effort on the part of American municipal officials to aid in the development of neighborhood organizations (or at least not interfere with such efforts) would probably improve the climate in which participatory efforts can develop.

3) Neighborhood groups must leave the door to conflict open even during a participatory process. If they do not,
they are likely to suffer attacks from more militant organizations in their own community. In addition, the municipality is always more likely to grant concessions to an organization which it knows is capable of reasserting protest at any time. Without an open door to conflict, a participatory process is likely to stagnate when the municipality realizes that it no longer has anything to fear from the residents.

A municipality has many weapons to use against communities; but neighborhoods have only protest. Once they give that weapon up, municipal officials will have little reason to listen to them. A good participatory process demands a balanced power relationship. Without an open door to conflict, this balance disintegrates, as the leaders of BOS painfully learned during the Schilderswijk structure-planning effort.
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