The Process of Revitalizing Highland Park: A Case Study

by

Mara Cherele English
B.A. Gordon College (1972)

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Signature of Author

Department of Urban Studies and Planning
May, 1981

Certified by

Phillip L. Clay
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by

Langley Keyes
Chairman, Departmental Graduate Committee

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

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Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on May 26, 1981 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of City Planning

ABSTRACT

Highland Park, a residential community in Roxbury was developed during the nineteenth century for suburban living, it is a historically, physically, and socially diverse area suffering from the ills common to many inner city areas. During the past ten years, the neighborhood has experienced reinvestment, both private and public.

An effort to halt decline has begun for this neighborhood. Today, Highland Park is embarking on an era of revitalization. It is marked by a resettlement of principally black, but also white middle and upper class people.

This thesis develops an understanding of the physical revitalization of Highland Park by looking at the the actors involved in the process and the models they employ to restore this once splendid neighborhood in Boston.

Thesis Supervisor: 
Phil Clay 
Associate Professor
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Highland Park represents one of Boston's most historically significant residential communities. Located in Roxbury, Boston's first suburb, Highland Park is a striking sub-neighborhood of rich and varied architecture and topography. Over the years, the dramatic mobility shifts from the cities to the suburbs by the upper and middle class and the disinvestment associated with this pattern, have contributed to the physical decline of this once splendid, upper class neighborhood.

An effort to halt decline has begun for this neighborhood. Today, Highland Park is embarking on an era of revitalization. It is marked by a resettlement of principally black, but also a significant number of white middle and upper class people, who prefer to live in cities as opposed to suburbs. These people are preserving and restoring the physical and social fabric of Highland Park using mostly private reinvestment. Their success with restoring Highland Park depends on their ability to reverse the obstensible deterioration so apparent in the neighborhood.

While the principal asset of this neighborhood is its historical buildings, built over 125 years ago, it is this age factor that contributes to the neighborhood's decay. Initially, developed sparsely, then intensively, the area is characterized by many vacant and unimproved lots made so by
the clearance of blighted buildings, buildings that reached such deteriorated condition resulting from disinvestment by former owners.

In addition, some 50 percent of the area's existing housing stock, is to varying degrees deteriorated. Renter occupancy is high (47 percent) and so is absentee ownership. These and other conditions tend to cast a heavy shadow over the neighborhood's future as a solid residential community.

Regardless of the above conditions, there are many actors within the neighborhood, who are committed to the difficult task of revitalizing the Highland Park neighborhood.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to study, in depth, the past and present attempts at revitalizing Highland Park. I will look at the actors involved in the process, their respective philosophies, their actions, thus far, towards revitalizing the neighborhood. Based upon our case study examination, we will identify the emerging model(s) of the revitalization development and make recommendations to facilitate further development of this slowly emerging but, steadily up and coming neighborhood. This thesis will study only the physical revitalization of Highland Park, specifically its housing.

We have chosen Highland Park as an area of study
because regardless of its deteriorated physical condition parts of Highland Park is becoming an increasingly attractive neighborhood to live in. As it stands now, the neighborhood has many elements that attract middle class resettlers. Highland Park has a copious supply of deteriorated but architecturally significant houses that are particularly suitable for rehabilitation and restoration. It is located within minutes of downtown Boston. It is amply supplied with public and private transportation routes and it is in reach of many of the city's cultural institutions - museums, universities - commercial centers, and parks.

It is my contention that the return of the middle and upper class to older city neighborhoods is a viable mechanism for reversing the decline apparent in older city neighborhoods. This does not imply that older, poorer urban neighborhoods become totally resegregated by affluent whites and/or blacks, but rather, that heterogenous neighborhoods be created.

Throughout this study the term neighborhood revitalization will be used, but we will identify the type of revitalization we are speaking of in reference to Highland Park. The terms defined below connote a renewed interest by private investors mostly, to change disinvested, blighted neighborhoods into stable, viable ones again.
Neighborhood revitalization can take on many forms: community development incumbent upgrading, gentrification, historic preservation, etc.. For the purpose of our study, we will focus on the neighborhood revitalization schemes occurring in Highland Park. They are: (1) a community development upgrading model; (2) a private investment development model; and (3) a selective gentrification model. These three, distinct processes form the core of Highland Park's revitalization. In order to delineate among the three, a definition for each term is given.

**Community Development Upgrading Model**

By a community development model of revitalization, we are referring to an incorporated nonprofit community group, in our case a Community Development Corporation (CDC), who develops plans and strategies aimed at reversing physical, social, and economic decay in a specified turf by using mostly public funds.

**Private Investment Development Model**

By a private investment development model, we are referring to an incorporated profit-oriented group in our case, a private development corporation, that buys, sells, rents, and/or builds residential property by using private financing exclusively.

**Selective Gentrification Development Model**

Gentrification is a derivation of the word gentry. Planners use the term to identify a trend of young professionals who as individuals, reinvest in urban neighborhoods.
Gentrification can include most of the neighborhood, all of the neighborhood, or just a few streets. Instances where a neighborhood experience just a small degree of revitalization in a targeted area is an example of selective gentrification.

Though a similarity exists between definitions of a private investment and a selective gentrification development model, I separate them because the difference is more important. The former involves the actions of a company, while the latter includes the actions of individuals. A company has greater financial leverage than most individuals to buy, renovate, and construct new housing. The company can accelerate the revitalization process for a particular neighborhood and influence greatly the overall patterns and extent of revitalization, more so than recent homeowners can. Also, specific to our case study, HiPark Corporation - was the impetus for the gentrification of a section of the highland Park neighborhood.

A major reason why the process of revitalizing center city neighborhoods is important to planners is that it provides some solution to mitigating the adverse social costs and economic losses associated with disinvested neighborhoods in cities.
The recent efforts of residents, neighborhood associations, and community organizations to transform urban neighborhoods around the country is significant and merits attention. It is alleged that a "back-to-the-city-movement" is occurring. If such a movement is happening, then planners must identify who has moved back, who have they replaced, and measure what impact their move will have on city services.

In spite of the local and federal programs aimed at reversing physical blight in city neighborhoods, patterns of disinvestment have continued to plague Roxbury. In this study we will determine how the actors involved in revitalization of Highland Park are attempting to succeed in arresting physical decay. The actors involved in the process not only desire to reverse physical decay, they also want to create a model black neighborhood.

In the succeeding chapters, we will initially discuss the evidence and the extent of revitalization occurring nationally, and then discuss that which is occurring in Highland Park. In the case study section, we will focus our study to answer the following questions:

1. Within Roxbury, why was Highland Park chosen to be revitalized as opposed to some other area? What about the neighborhood is attractive to middle and upper-income newcomers; especially black people?
2. Within Highland Park, why were certain streets chosen for selective gentrification and/or renovation compared to other streets that were also in decline?

3. Who are the actors involved in the revitalization process? What roles are played by individuals, developers, institutions, local government, neighborhood associations, and leading institutions?

4. At what stage of revitalization is Highland Park?

5. What are some of the problems inherent in the process of revitalization? What are the recommendations to further enhance or facilitate the process?

6. What is the interplay between the various revitalization models? Are the revitalization schemes compatible?

7. Who are the beneficiaries of the revitalization of Highland Park? What are the costs associated with the process?

8. What externalities will influence future patterns of revitalization for Highland Park?
METHODOLOGY

There are three models that were employed to gather data for this study: (1) a literature research to identify information pertinent to the subject; (2) use of the 1970 and 1980 census data, when available; and (3) interviews with residents, community organization staff, neighborhood associations, public officials, bankers, and realtors. In total I interviewed some 75 people, homeowners and renters, who are new to the neighborhood or who have lived in Highland Park for years.

Since a section of Highland Park attracts a growing number of professionals, I was able to interview three planners, one who formerly worked for the city and another who still does. All of them reside in Highland Park.

Originally, a questionnaire, was designed for the resident interviews. While most residents did not reject to a formal interview, more information was obtained by just allowing the interviewee to talk freely. Therefore, the survey is more informal and is not intended to represent a sample.

Last but not least, I relied on my own impressions about the neighborhood. I sensed that the neighborhood was undergoing revitalization because of the newly painted, renovated houses dispersed among the more blighted houses, the resurfaced streets, and the new media interest in the neighborhood. Yet it appears from the overwhelming blight that the process is
slow and internal.

**THESIS STRUCTURE**

The structure of the thesis is tripartite. The first part: Revitalizing Older City Neighborhoods - recognizes the necessity for placing the thesis into a contextual framework. It does so by discussing factors contributing to a renewed interest in residing in older, city neighborhoods. Then in order to explore the dynamics of the process of neighborhood revitalization occurring in older, city, neighborhoods, an overview of the patterns and the extent of this recent phenomenon is discussed. (Chapters 2 and 3).

The second part: Case Study: Highland Park - begins with a historical analysis of the development and the utilization of the housing stock from inception to the present. The balance of this section discusses the process of revitalizing Highland Park by examining three distinct models of neighborhood upgrading (Chapters 4 and 5).

The last part: Synthesis and Recommendations - provides a synthesis of the three models that form the revitalization scheme for the neighborhood; to identify problems which effect or are caused by revitalization; and to make recommendations to facilitate the revitalization of Highland Park (Chapter 6).
CHAPTER II

FACTORS LEADING TO RENEWED INTEREST IN OLDER CITY NEIGHBORHOODS

Recently, people from various public service related professions, especially planners, are discussing the trend of middle class resettlement in older city neighborhoods. The trend is not unique to a few cities, but most major cities can boast of having several neighborhoods that have been transformed from a low income, physically blighted area to a middle income "chic" neighborhood. There are numerous reasons why people choose to live in the central city as opposed to another area, but we have identified three factors that are felt to be crucial to understanding the renewed interest in older city neighborhoods. They are:

(1) the high costs of buying and financing new housing;
(2) the growing demand for housing, and
(3) the inevitable reduction of federal assistance to cities. While the first two factors relate to the inability of middle class people to afford housing, the last factor, relates to the city's inability to continue to attract or to support neighborhood revitalization because of impending federal retrenchments.

The degree to which the above three factors contribute to the process of neighborhood revitalization is unclear. However, what is clear is that these factors are combining to play an increasingly important role in setting the stage for declining city neighborhoods to be rediscovered as
places to live. The end result of a group of individuals moving into particular city neighborhoods, may lead to significant reinvestment in the inexpensive, and deteriorated neighborhood housing. The balance of this chapter will be devoted to discussing how the factors stated above contribute to a renewed interest in older city neighborhoods and to determining their policy implications.

**Homeownership: Dream, Myth, Or Reality**

Americans, regardless of race and class are conditioned to want to own their home, preferably, a single-family detached house. If the house is surrounded by grass, trees and other open space amenities, greater status is attached to it. In other words, most Americans share aspirations of owning a single detached house in the suburbs. But the high cost of housing is deferring and shattering this dream for many middle-class and especially lower-class Americans. Newly constructed housing as well as some renovated houses in Boston, today range in price from $65,000 to $85,000. This reported price for housing does not differ significantly from the costs of housing in other regions of the Northeast. In the west the median sales price of an existing single-family home soared from $39,000 in 1975 to $92,000 in late 1980.¹

In 1970, a house cost less than two and a half times a family's income. By 1974 housing cost began to rise faster
than family income. Now, a house costs more than three times as much as a family's income. (See Figure 1) Bernard Frieden of MIT suggests that the high costs of housing does not amount to a housing crisis, but that the inability of first-time buyers to afford a house is an emerging serious problem.²

At the crux of Frieden's argument is that median incomes have risen disproportionately to median housing costs. Therefore, the first-time homebuyer, who is without equity, but who is seeking to buy a new house, may be priced out of the market due to insufficient income.³ The time span which Frieden used for his data analysis falls between 1970 and 1976. Within this six year period, the median sale price for new houses went from $23,000 to $44,000, a 89% increase.

Using two median variables, one for the price of a new home and the other for household income, (Figure 2) depicts in detail, the bases for Frieden's argument.

Column one (median new home price) reports the price for a new home from 1964 to 1979 went from $21,300 to $70,000, the price, during this fourteen year interim more than tripled. Concurrently, column two (median household income after tax) reports that income barely doubled. Other housing consumption costs besides mortgage are not included. The third column (ratio of home price to median income) reports that when the two variables are compared that the resulting ratio has steadily climbed upward, placing further
FIGURE 1

Prices And Income

Ratio of Median Sales Price to Median Family Income

**FIGURE 2**

**AFFORDABILITY OF NEW HOMES**
Costs of Home Ownership (conventional mortgage)
Compared to Median After-Tax Household Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Median New Home Price (Conv. Mtg)</th>
<th>Median Household Income After Tax*</th>
<th>Median Household Price to Median Income</th>
<th>Mortgage Rate %</th>
<th>Mortgage Payment (25% down 30 Years)</th>
<th>Mortgage Payment as a % of Median Income*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>$21,300</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5 3/4%</td>
<td>$93.23</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>22,700</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5 3/4</td>
<td>99.36</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>24,400</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>6 1/4</td>
<td>112.69</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>26,600</td>
<td>$6,207</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>6 1/2</td>
<td>126.10</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>6,646</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>6 3/4</td>
<td>138.64</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>30,400</td>
<td>7,091</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>7 3/4</td>
<td>163.36</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>30,800</td>
<td>7,477</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>8 1/4</td>
<td>173.55</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>31,900</td>
<td>7,805</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>7 3/4</td>
<td>171.42</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>31,600</td>
<td>8,245</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>7 1/2</td>
<td>165.73</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>35,200</td>
<td>9,006</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>193.72</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>9,461</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>229.32</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>43,900</td>
<td>10,236</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>265.95</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>10,880</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>289.67</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>11,566</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>339.22</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>61,200</td>
<td>12,855</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>9 1/2</td>
<td>385.97</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>70,300</td>
<td>14,072</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>11 1/4</td>
<td>512.21</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979IV</td>
<td>70,700</td>
<td>14,072</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>12 1/2</td>
<td>565.70</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Median income after tax is calculated by multiplying median household income by the ratio of total disposable to total personal income.

financial strain on the first-time homebuyer. Over the years mortgage rates have increased with the amount of downpayment; thus 43.7% of after tax income must go towards housing consumption. This 43.7% of a household's income going towards housing clearly exceeds conventional judgment that a family should not spend over 25% of their income for housing.4

Another economic analysis of the "affordability" problem put forth by John C. Weicher differs from Frieden's. Weicher disagrees with the argument that the issue of affordability for first-time homebuyers is the result of rising housing costs. He argues that income and prices for new houses have risen proportionately. He further argues that to the extent that new homes are becoming more difficult to afford, the cause of the problem is rising interest rates, not rising housing costs.5

The "affordability" problem alluded to by Frieden and Weicher stemming from the high costs of housing and high interest rates is further exacerbated when you add on such monthly housing costs as mortgage payments, utilities, and property taxes. At an interest rate as low as 9 percent, a couple or an individual, must have a combined income of $34,000 in order to purchase a new house and cover related costs. Only 20.6 percent families qualify.6 (See Figure 3).

Since the mid-sixties mortgage rates on new homes have risen from less than 6 percent in 1965 to over 12 per-
FIGURE 3

See Figure 3 which displays the costs for a thirty-year loan at varying interest rates for $60,000 mortgage costs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Rates</th>
<th>Monthly Payments*</th>
<th>Annual Income Needed**</th>
<th>Percent of Families Who Qualify</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9%</td>
<td>$698</td>
<td>$33,504</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>37,776</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>42,192</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>46,704</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,022</td>
<td>53,712</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes $215 for insurance, taxes and utilities

**Assumes that 1/4 of income goes toward total housing payment

Source: National Association of Home Builders
cent in 1980. Lenders, especially Saving and Loans, have raised interest rates to protect themselves against indeterminate inflation, and to accommodate the periodic shortages of capital caused by disintermediation. If lenders did not, then what they pay for funds and what they receive on mortgage loans would continue to shrink their profits.

In conclusion, we have discussed the first factor contributing to a renewed interest in the city - the high costs of housing and financing within the context of the "affordability" problem. From either perspective, looking at the causes undermining housing "affordability" - increased prices in new houses or increased interest rates - may still culminate with the inability of some first-time homebuyers to make their dreams of homeownership a reality. Furthermore, the high costs of housing construction in the suburbs as well as the high costs of money, may make inner-city property rehabilitation more attractive to first-time homebuyers.

In 1979, the cost of existing housing in disinvested sections of city centers ranged from $20,000 to $30,000.7 Housing is even cheaper in some older and more deteriorated city neighborhoods. Even for those people choosing to reside in the suburbs, they may discover that they cannot afford the downpayment for the house. In the city, they may be able to purchase a house, renovate it with the
assistance of low interest loans such as 312 loans, Historic Preservation loans, and FNMA revitalization loans. While these types of housing assistance loans and programs are not usually available in suburban communities, they are available in older city neighborhoods.

The Growing Demands For Housing

Between 1947 and 1960, the period following World War II, America experienced a bulge in her population growth. More babies were born during this period than during the preceding decade placing greater demands on public institutions such as schools and hospitals. People born between 1947 and 1960 constitute members of the "baby-boom" cohort. In many ways members of the "baby-boom" cohort differ from the previous age cohort. They are delaying having children; their households tend to be smaller, both heads of household tend to be employed; and they are entering the housing market at a later age.

One major empirical finding is that recent cohorts have advanced into single-family homeownership more slowly than the 1937-38 birth cohort, while they were in their twenties, but as recent cohorts pass age thirty, they achieve even higher ownership levels that exceed their predecessors. (Meyers, 1981)8

The implication of the above finding is that by the late seventies and early eighties, which corresponds to the time period of renewed interest in city neighborhoods, the
"baby-boom" cohort, during a period of slow housing starts, will saturate the housing market. The role of people reaching age 30 will trail off in the late 1980's and decline in the 1990's. (See Figure 4)

Goetze and Colton (1980) aware of the "baby-boom" phenomenon came up with a family settlement index. The settlement index purportedly measures family formation by the number of persons reaching age thirty each year. During the late fifties and the sixties the settlement index sagged indicating a soft demand for housing. In 1970, the settlement index showed an abrupt reversal as the "baby-boom" cohorts began to increase its demand for homeownership.⁹ (See Figure 5)

Close to home (Figure 6), Life Cycle Characteristics Of Persons In Boston, 1980 reports that out of a total of 2,620 observations of Boston households, 46 percent are under age 30, are unmarried, and are childless. As these individuals form households, unless a significant number choose to out-migrate from the city, they will place an excessive burden on an already tight Boston housing market. Later, providing they have children, they will place additional demand on city services.

In conclusion, members of the "baby-boom" cohort in their attempts to cope with inflation and the growing demands for housing have adjusted their lifestyles accordingly. They delay parenthood, rent longer, and both the
UNITED STATES
NUMBER OF PEOPLE (IN MILLIONS)
REACHING AGE 30, IN EACH FIVE
YEAR PERIOD 1900 THROUGH 2005

Source: Mass. Office of State Planning Calculations
From U. S. Census
FIGURE 5

FAMILY SETTLEMENT INDICES

MASSACHUSETTS
NUMBER OF PEOPLE (IN THOUSANDS)
REACHING AGE 30 IN EACH FIVE YEAR PERIOD 1900 THROUGH 2005

Source: Mass. Office of State Planning Calculations from U. S. Census
FIGURE 6

LIFE CYCLE CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS IN BOSTON HOUSEHOLDS, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital/Parental Status</th>
<th>Under 30 Years</th>
<th>30-39 Years</th>
<th>40-64 Years</th>
<th>and Over</th>
<th>All Ages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not married, no children</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married, no children</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest child is 5 or under</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest child 6-12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>*a</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest child 13-17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest child 18 or over</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital/parental status N/A</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ALL STATUSES | 54% | 14% | 22% | 11% | 100%

*Youngest child is under age 18.
*Less than 0.5% of the population is in this category.
Based on 2,620 observations (weighted).

Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority Household Survey, conducted by Center for Survey Research, 1980.
adult members of the household work. Many of the people moving into older city neighborhoods share these characteristics. By having children later, these couples are better prepared to buy homes than couples with children. They are also better able to remain in urban neighborhoods across the country to purchase existing homes, rehab them, thus circumvent the high costs for land, material, construction, and labor - costs associated with building a new house.

**IMPELLING REDUCTION OF FEDERAL ASSISTANCE TO CITIES**

In early 1970, Nixonian politics ushered in the initial trend of reducing federal aid to urban distressed cities. Under the Nixon administration, the 1974 Community Development Block Grant program (CDBG) entitlement was created. The espoused intent of the CDBG program was for the federal government to financially assist municipalities with distressed urban neighborhoods beset by chronic social, physical, and economic ills. Cities, oftentimes using CDBG funds to cope with the myriad needs of their low-income populations soon found themselves aligned with suburban communities who used CDBG funds for resurfacing tennis courts and golf courses.

Under the Carter administration, new CDBG regulations required that plans for targeted neighborhoods be coordinated with other local public activities and that these plans be supported by quantified needs statements. HUD further
mandated that cities applying for CDBG funds prove that local activities, which may range from street repair to park construction, are part of the city's overall capital improvement program.

A convincing argument could be made that the new regulations would help to alleviate the spurious uses of the federal grants in suburban communities as well as urban ones. Clearly, the revised CDBG regulations could assist HUD with monitoring and evaluating the uses of federal monies. But unfortunately, these revised guidelines, came at a time when CDBG funding is declining in real terms and soon in nominal terms and the city's problems are worsening due to citizen demands to reduce taxes i.e. Proposition 13 in California and 2 1/2 in Massachusetts.

The Reagan administration is set on significantly reducing federal spending which includes aid to cities. It appears that Reagan will be successful with his endeavors to trim the federal budget; but, it may be largely at the expense of the poor, who are concentrated in cities.

Federal retrenchments influence cities to eagerly support middle-class resettlement in older urban neighborhoods. Cities view the return of the middle and upper class to the city as a vehicle to increase the tax base;
to restore the housing stock; and to improve employment opportunities because the resettlers are professionals representing a variety of occupations. Thus cities play active roles in attracting middle class resettlement and enhancing the process of neighborhood revitalization.

Using Boston as an example, city employees played a significant role in marketing Melville Park, a gentrified neighborhood of Boston.\(^{10}\) In Bay Village and South End, another gentrified neighborhood of Boston, urban renewal monies were used to upgrade the infrastructure (sidewalks, lights, parks) which help to stimulate additional private reinvestment.\(^{11}\) Even in Highland Park, the case study, the city designated a section of the neighborhood an urban renewal area so it could receive 312 funding as well as restoration grants for historically and/or architecturally significant houses.

Yet it is fitting to mention here that the city's ability to continue to attract members of the middle and upper class may become difficult. Financial constraints from Proposition 2 1/2 may impact the city's ability to augment private reinvestment with public funds, thus city support of neighborhood revitalization will be curtailed.

There is renewed interest in and new strategies for restoring older city neighborhoods. Neighborhoods that
have been neglected within the last three decades are becoming desirable for middle-class reclamation. The old, dilapidated housing stock, including some with architectural quality, is being renovated to its original elegance by mostly middle and upper class resettlers.

These middle class resettlers, many who may be first-time homebuyers, cannot afford new housing, so they are buying existing homes in older city neighborhoods. Not only do older city neighborhoods offer cheaper housing prices, it offers homes that can be renovated to suit the unique tastes of the buyer.

Many of these middle class resettlers are members of the "baby-boom" cohort who are now at the family formation stage of their life cycle. Their competition for housing, creates new housing markets in alternative areas other than in suburbs. Such areas include older city neighborhoods. As more middle and upper class people move into these central city neighborhoods, the more eager the city is to support and/or augment their private reinvestment endeavors. However, cities fiscally constrained by federal retrenchments and tax cut laws, are becoming hard pressed to support middle and upper class resettlement.

RENEWED INTEREST IN OLDER CITY NEIGHBORHOODS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS

We have discussed three factors contributing to a renewed interest in cities. The first two factors talk about the
inability of middle class "baby-boom" cohorts to afford or find their first house, subsequently, they are buying existing houses in older city neighborhoods. The third factor addresses the city's willingness to support middle class resettlement, but its inability to continue to attract or support their move because of impending federal retrenchments. Each of these factors have policy implications for revitalizing older city neighborhoods. We will discuss these policy implications.

The emphasis of early housing policy was directed toward all Americans, but especially the poor. The National Housing Policy Act of 1949 insured each American "the right to a decent home". For those individuals who could not afford a home - poor people - public housing was provided via Local Public Housing Authorities throughout the country. By 1968, another National Housing Act was designed to enable low-income people a means to afford private homes. The Housing Act of 1968 setup high-risk loan mortgage funds for houses in older, declining neighborhoods.

Today, the emphasis of national housing policy has shifted from housing the poor to making homes affordable for the middle class. During 1976, former Senator Edward Brooke (R. Mass.) introduced the Young Families Housing Act and Senator Brock (R. Tenn) and Representative Ashley (D. Ohio) introduced the Housing Incentive Investment Act. Both bills sought to subsidize new home purchases for middle-income
families, on the premise that these families were being priced out of the housing market.

The successful passage of either of the two bills or similar ones will provide a further stimulant for middle-class resettlement in older city neighborhoods. Vital to a policy which encourages middle-class resettlement in older city neighborhoods, will be the need to expand concurrently, housing affordability and opportunity for both the poor and the middle class. A policy aimed at neighborhood revitalization must balance housing opportunities for both groups of urban dwellers. If not, the demand for housing in the city core will rise, causing costs to accelerate, thus forcing both groups out of the housing market. In short, a poorly designed, or poorly intended urban revitalization policy could exacerbate the very problem it is attempting to solve.

Though for most people the pattern is not so fixed, American society in a deterministic manner links age with life stage cycles i.e. between age 5 and 17, you attend grammar school; between age 18 and 23, you attend college and graduate school; between age 23 and 29, you get married and raise children; and by age 30, you own your first home. These life cycle patterns are changing. Inflation is a contributing variable. Because we must pay more for goods and services, we wait longer before making major investments,
especially buying a house. The impact of these social demographic changes are beginning to be felt.

Public housing policies should recognize that members of the American homebuying public are making major social and economic adjustments which allow them to realize the goals of homeownership. First-time homebuyers, a major national concern, are buying homes in large numbers despite today's price structure. They are doing so by relying on secondary incomes, having smaller families and purchasing far less costly existing units. Public policy should recognize these social demographic changes in the establishment of housing programs and goals. (Thygerson, 1978)

Today, planners are advocating that housing subsidies be targeted to specific age cohorts "who are reaching their highest lifetime ownership rates". They argue that people in their middle ages, who have not achieved homeownership, are most worthy of government subsidy. Though this type of subsidy targeting to a specific age beneficiary may be more cost effective than many other housing subsidy programs, it is discriminatory in nature. It provides an incentive to those who can afford homeownership to delay it and for poor people who cannot afford homeownership, it forces them to wait until their children are grown before they can reap the benefits accompanying homeownership.

Lenders have begun to change their lending underwriting criteria relative to single women. Single working women are no longer perceived as credit risks by bank loan officers when applying for loans. The rise
of feminism and more women entering the work force has created an image of women as being financially independent.

In conclusion, because social demographic changes are still evolving, it is difficult to surmise in what way such changes will effect policies, especially urban revitalization policy. However, what is clear is that in the next decade, these changes may significantly alter the American ethos as we have grown to know it.

Formerly, Urban Renewal, a federal program instituted in the fifties to ameliorate blight in decaying American cities had a very substantial impact on reshaping older central cities. Urban renewal planners engaged in massive demolition schemes which reshaped both the physical and sociological character of many urban neighborhoods. This mostly physical approach employed by planners to mitigate the social costs of slums - housing abandonment, squalor, and crime - resulted in the crude dismantling of the social and physical fabric of many city neighborhoods. Scott Grier in his book: Urban Renewal And American Cities provides a thorough analysis of the outcomes of urban renewal strategies.

Today, there is renewed interest in and new strategies for restoring older city neighborhoods. Accompanying this renewed interest in cities, neighborhoods especially, is a shift from a policy of urban renewal to one of neighborhood
revitalization. Even more important, is the shift from public to increasingly private sector involvement in revitalizing and reshaping older, central city neighborhoods. City's beset by financial woes are spectators to how residents are becoming more involved in improving their own living environment with minimal assistance coming from the public sector.

Such actions by residents indicate that an urban revitalization policy must have guidelines that allow for neighborhoods, not cities to be treated more uniquely. The program must be prepared to creatively combine the ingenuity of individual efforts to revitalize declining urban neighborhoods with shrinking city resources.

In conclusion, we have discussed factors which have led to a renewed interest in cities and their policy implications. Interest in older city neighborhoods is growing as first-time homebuyers choose the city for their first house. Cities eager to accommodate the middle class resettlement as a way to reverse decline, are unable to do so, because of 2 1/2, Proposition 13, and impending federal cutbacks. Meantime people are rediscovering older city neighborhoods and are privately revitalizing them. In the next chapter, we will discuss the extent and patterns of this recent phenomenon.
CHAPTER III

NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION: PATTERNS AND EXTENT

Renewed interest in older city neighborhoods by members of the middle and upper class is a recent phenomenon. The individual efforts of mostly young professionals to revitalize older, poorer city neighborhoods and incumbent residents to often follow suit has attracted public attention. Planners are attempting to understand the dynamics of neighborhood revitalization because the process often culminates with the reversal of neighborhood blight and renewed neighborhood confidence. As such, local and federal policy makers view the private reinvestment activity occurring in many older city neighborhoods as a successful mechanism for inner city neighborhood renewal.

However, not all the neighborhood renewal occurring in older city neighborhoods is the result of middle and upper class resettlement. In addition to the gentrification of neighborhoods by the middle class, there is incumbent upgrading. We will discuss both these processes of neighborhood upgrading in this chapter.

Gentrification, a recent addition to planning jargon, comes from the word "gentry". Borrowed from the British, the term originally was used to denote the return of an aristocratic class of people to the city. Today, planners use the term to identify a trend of young, professionals
prefer to purchase houses in older city neighborhoods. These recent newcomers to older city neighborhoods are seeking affordable housing which serves a hedge against inflation. While the gentrifiers may view themselves as agents whose efforts help to upgrade the neighborhood; incumbent homeowners have mixed emotions about their "new" neighbors.

The significant entry of "gentrifiers" into a neighborhood can signal an increased in the value of the property for a particular neighborhood. Thus for an incumbent resident, they may experience an increased resale value for their property and/or higher property taxes. For the incumbent renter, "gentrifiers" signal a decrease in the affordability and availability of rental units. "Gentrifiers" carefully select neighborhoods that contain an architecturally significant and sound housing stock, that are in close proximity to employment, commercial, and recreational spots; and that have good access to public and private transportation routes.

As we pointed out earlier, not all neighborhood revitalization in older city neighborhoods result from middle-class resettlement. Another type of neighborhood revitalization scheme is incumbent upgrading.

Incumbent upgrading refers to owner/occupants who have lived in particular urban neighborhoods for years and who share civic pride in the neighborhood - enough to maintain
or enhance the investment value of the property. The Neighborhood Housing Service* (NHS) is a widespread model of incumbent upgrading. One caveat about the NHS approach: Is that municipalities may look at it as the be-all and end-all in incumbent upgrading, it is not. NHS, augmented by other public and private housing renovation sources, serves to galvanize residents to take necessary steps to maintain their property. Such efforts at property maintenance and cosmetic rehab minimize disinvestment, but it does little to arrest it. For instance, NHS has limited resources, if any, that would provide incentives for absentee landlords to properly maintain their property or for city foreclosed property to be renovated. The program is generally structured to assist owner-occupants not businesses, or absentee owners.

*The Neighborhood Housing Service program involves a unique partnership of public, private and community interest working together at the neighborhood level. Local programs are coordinated by the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation developed by local NHS programs. The Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation is a congressionally chartered public corporation. The local NHS corporation has a paid staff and is governed by a local board of directors, a majority of whom are community residents. NHS programs are operating in more than 106 neighborhoods located in more than 80 large cities. Most NHS's provide housing services consisting of counselling and referral, rehab services, code enforcement, and low interest revolving loans (usually 0-7%) to residents within the target boundary.

To what extent revitalization occurring in older urban neighborhoods results from incumbent upgrading or gentrification is difficult to document. What is clear though is that revitalization is occurring. "In all the nations largest cities, reinvestment is a small albeit extremely significant phenomenon." (Clay, 1979)¹ Research conducted by the Urban Land Institute, concluded that 48% (124) of the 260 cities surveyed were experiencing some private-market reinvestment, in older deteriorated city neighborhoods. The greater the size of the population, the larger the percent of housing rehabilitation. (Black, 1975).²

So far the occurrence of urban neighborhood revitalization has been established. The balance of this chapter seeks to determine: 1) What type of people are revitalizing older urban neighborhoods; 2) What types of neighborhoods are experiencing incumbent upgrading and gentrification; and 3) What are some of the externalities of the process of gentrification. In a latter chapter, the process of neighborhood revitalization for a sub-neighborhood of Roxbury - Highland Park is studied in detail.

CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN PIONEERS AND GENTRIFIERS

Dennis Gale in his article, "Middle-Class Resettlement In Older Neighborhoods" identifies specific and common demographics for resettlers in older city neighborhoods. He observes that people choosing to resettle in older neighbor-
hoods are mostly whites, ranging from their mid-twenties to mid-thirties. They are typically professionally educated and have annual incomes that exceed $15,000. Their households tend to be smaller, thus they are in need of lesser city services and amenities such as schools and parks. (Gale, 1979).³

The initial round of recent homebuyers who trickle into older, deteriorated city neighborhoods are labelled "urban pioneers". This analogy played out suggests that the gold these people are seeking is cheap, but potentially valuable housing that blights many a city across the nation. At the point of entry, the risk associated with their resettlement - equity loss, conflict with incumbent residents - are outweighed by the potential benefits - cheap housing, equity accumulation, and good access to urban amenities. Because urban pioneers often purchase abandoned properties, their resettlement does not necessarily displace incumbent residents. However, their sudden encroachment on a given turf or neighborhood may signal more intensive reinvestment later.

The next round of newcomers move into the neighborhood after determining that, though resettlement is still risky, returns on their investment, an appreciated property value and a nice residential community, is quite possible. During this second stage, speculation begins. Individuals and
small developers begin to buy up some of the prime property in the neighborhood in anticipation that market forces will catch on and more middle class people will be attracted to buy in the neighborhood.

The renovation efforts by pioneers, speculators, and newcomers begin to physically reshape the neighborhood. The now chic neighborhood receive media attention. What occurs during this third stage, is a social and cultural reshaping of the neighborhood. The newcomers organize themselves via neighborhood associations in efforts to induce and/or promote activities in the neighborhood that are congruent with their middle class lifestyles. Tensions emerge between incumbent residents and the newcomers. Displacement becomes a more serious problem as the newcomers purchase occupied tax delinquent properties, rooming houses, and owner-occupied housing, ultimately evicting renters and poorer homeowners.

The final stage concludes the process of neighborhood gentrification. The neighborhood is full of streets with attractive, renovated housing. The remaining or available housing in the neighborhood is in high demand causing housing prices within the neighborhood and the adjacent areas to rapidly accelerate. Still more middle and upper class families move into the neighborhood because market and social perceptions about the neighborhood are at an all time high.⁴
Boston's South End, a gentrified neighborhood that underwent transition from a largely black low-income to a largely white upper-middle-income neighborhood within a relatively short period, is a case whereby middle-class reclamation polarized the incumbents and the resettlers. Middle and upper-class resettlers, eager to change the image and the character of the South End to suit their particular taste, did so with the poor and people of color bearing the costs of the transition. Many people were forced to move when former rooming houses and three and four story brick, row/houses were converted to single-family homes or to luxurious apartment rentals. (Auger, 1979).  

Another characteristic that urban pioneers and gentrifiers share, is their choice of a "city-based lifestyle". (Clay, 1979). Their preferences for heterogeneous neighborhoods which city-living offers, suggest that many of the resettlers are rejecting the homogeneity prominent in suburban neighborhoods.

For example, the Federal Mortgage Association conducted a study in 1975 on consumer preferences for middle-income inner-city housing. Consumers selected, represented a national cross-section by age, income, education, and race. Their findings report that the majority of people prefer an ethnic, age and income, mix neighborhood. Those people
who moved out of city neighborhoods, did so because their new neighbors were incompatible with them.\textsuperscript{7}

In conclusion, middle and upper-middle class resettlers, serve a maverick role in revitalizing decayed, older neighborhoods by choosing to return to neighborhoods, in most cases, abandoned by the preceding generation. They provide the impetus for boosting confidence in disinvested neighborhoods. The effect that early resettlers have on the neighborhood may result in merely raising perceptions about the stability of the neighborhood, or in stimulating market forces that make the neighborhood ripe for middle-class reclamation. Resettlers seek to buy cheap housing in a soft housing market that will prove to be profitable in the future. In some cities where there has been considerable urban reinvestment, these newcomers have constituted segments of the gay population, the artistic community, and of course, the professional population.\textsuperscript{8}

\textbf{NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH REINVESTMENT}

Neighborhood conditions are one of the key determinants of an urban reinvestment strategy. Whether or not a neighborhood will be revitalized depends mostly on the condition of its housing stock. The market perceptions about the neighborhood and the "type" of residents who live in the neighborhood are crucial variables. It is not surprising that there would exist differences between neighborhoods
experiencing incumbent upgrading and ones experiencing gentrification. However, many neighborhoods, such as the one we will examine in our case study, have both neighborhood revitalizing schemes occurring concurrently.

Neighborhood conditions for incumbent upgrading and for gentrifying differ significantly. Neighborhoods undergoing incumbent upgrading have a reasonably sound, but perhaps an architecturally mixed housing stock. While there is a high degree of owner-occupancy (usually 50% and above) the housing stock is visibly and sufficiently in deterioration. Neighborhood residents share and identify a common turf and have some level of organization either through neighborhood associations and/or community housing services. In most cases, because the neighborhood is organized, private upgrading efforts are supported by the residents and the city alike.

The NHS selection criterion reflects typical characteristics of neighborhoods undergoing incumbent upgrading:

1. Housing within the neighborhood should be basically sound but exhibit some deterioration and a need for maintenance.

2. The housing units should be predominantly single-family structures.

3. The homeownership rate should be a least 50 percent.

4. The median household income in the neighborhood should be at least 80 percent of the city's median household income.9
Several unique elements stand out for a neighborhood undergoing incumbent upgrading; (1) the residents in the process usually are not alone in their efforts, but are supported by the city banks, and local businesses all bent on maintaining and/or enhancing the neighborhood; (2) most of the residents, after increasing, somewhat, the value of their property, usually continue to live in the particular neighborhood; and (3) displacement in the neighborhood is minimal.

The resident may take the first steps to upgrade their property by securing a loan from a private lender, usually a Savings and Loan. In some cases, lenders will revise their loan underwriting criteria so that more residents within the neighborhood can qualify for home improvement loans. The resident may supplement the bank loan with either a low interest city 312 loan or a NHS revolving loan. The city will often make capital improvements in order to further enhance the attractiveness of the neighborhood.

Displacement, though it does occur sometimes, is minimal mostly because the homeowners have accumulated equity in their property and they are able to repay the low interest loans without renters incurring all the costs. Also, the homeowners who have acquired capital outlays can recover these outlays upon the resale of the appreciated property.
Finally, there is an incentive to remain in the neighborhood because the neighborhood is becoming more stabilized. So fears of neighborhood decline are subdued by ongoing housing renovation and the amount of newcomers to these neighborhoods are reduced by limited property transactions.

NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS FOR GENTRIFICATION

Neighborhoods experiencing gentrification show greater signs of disinvestment than neighborhoods experiencing incumbent upgrading. The housing stock through architecturally significant and more uniform in style, it is in more serious decline. (Clay, 1979)¹⁰

Urban pioneers, the newcomers to the neighborhood who assume the greatest socioeconomic risks, purchase usually tax delinquent property from the city and/or HUD, while gentrifiers often acquire property that may still house low-income residents who are ultimately evicted. The distinction made is that while urban pioneers are "risk oblivious", gentrifiers are more so "risk adverse" because they make an investment in the neighborhood when signs of revitalization are apparent.¹¹

The economic viability of the housing stock is paramount when deciding to gentrify a specific neighborhood. So the decision by resettlers to move into a given neighborhood is often a market decision. In a study to determine why
resettlers choose to move into older city neighborhoods in Atlanta, New Orleans, New York, and Washington, in order of priority, the four reasons given most frequently by respondents were (1) an acceptable housing price; (2) the investment potential of the property; (3) accessibility to place of employment; and (4) the architectural/historical significance of the house and/or the neighborhood. Neighbors which contain houses with antique features, stained glass windows, handcrafted wood, fireplaces, and original doors are sought after. Even if the wood or brick structure fails to meet city housing codes, the shell, with just its original features may add nothing to its total cost, but a great deal to the renovated product's resale value.

It follows that middle-class first-time homebuyers would be attracted to older city neighborhoods rich with three and four story brick rowhouses and wooden triple deckers and mansions as opposed to neighborhoods full with single-family structures. The former housing types allow the owner to convert and renovate the structure to suit personal tastes. Neighborhoods ripe for gentrification may fail to show signs of civic pride immediately, but as market forces take over, internal and external perceptions about the neighborhood begin to change for the better rapidly.

Finally, neighborhoods chosen for incumbent upgrading and gentrification, especially, have undergone significant
housing filtration. Filtering the downward movement of housing structures to households of lower-income and economic mobility is a pre-condition for reinvestment. The housing ownership shift from upper-class to middle-class; than from middle-class to lower-class completes the filtration process. However, middle and upper-class reclamation of the previously disinvested housing stock results in an inverse of this process. In that the poor will not be the recipient of the disinvested housing, in most cases, they will be displaced.

THE EXTENT OF NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION

The extent of neighborhood revitalization that results from incumbent upgrading or gentrification is difficult to determine. Furthermore, both processes can mutually exist simultaneously in the same neighborhood, albeit in different parts.

Present trends indicate that most older cities have, or soon will have neighborhoods or pockets of neighborhoods that are being upgraded by incumbent upgrading and/or gentrification. Thus far the media has focused on the more "chic" revitalized neighborhoods. Washington has Capital Hill; Brooklyn, Park Slope; Philadelphia, Society Hill; and Boston, South End. The list is growing. Each of these cities, as well as others, has neighborhoods that
have been reclaimed recently by middle and upper class professionals. New York, Washington, San Francisco, Chicago, and Boston lead other cities relative to revitalized neighborhoods.\(^\text{13}\)

Though other cities may have more gentrified neighborhoods than Boston, Boston still can boast about its few. The celebrated South End, Bay Village, Melville Park, pockets of both Jamaica Plain and Charlestown are examples. While these neighborhoods have experienced an influx of white professionals, Highland Park, if successfully revitalized, will continue to experience an influx of black professionals. It would join LeDroit Park in Washington as a mainly black revitalized neighborhood.

In conclusion, according to HUD research findings in all regions of the country, private renovation of the housing stock is apparent. Regionally, renovation is occurring in 60 percent of cities surveyed in the South; 53 percent of those in the Northeast; 43 percent in the North Central region; and 25 percent of those cities in the West.\(^\text{14}\)

**IS THERE A BACK-TO-THE-CITY-MOVEMENT?**

Chapter II discussed factors leading to a renewed interest by mostly "baby-boom" cohorts to reside in central older city neighborhoods. Also, evidence suggests that there is a significant amount of housing renovation occurring
in older city neighborhoods - enough to attract the attention of local and federal officials who concern themselves with housing and community development. The question then is does the recent attractiveness of rediscovering the cities as places to live and the degree of housing renovation occurring in most cities constitute a "back-to-the-city-movement"? Are people immigrating to city neighborhoods from the suburbs in such numbers that the norm of out-migration to the suburbs is reversing?

According to David Birch of MIT, city people move from city to city. Suburban people move from suburb to suburb. Only a few people move from the suburbs to the cities. There is still net migration of people from cities. The out-migration from the city to the suburbs is still overwhelmingly the pattern of residential mobility and contributes to disinvestment.

Evidence suggests that resettlement in older, urban neighborhoods is significant and that people moving into these neighborhoods are from outside the neighborhood but not from outside the city. The "back-to-the-city" phraseology is misleading. It implies that the people are moving back to the city from somewhere else. This somewhere else is commonly thought to be the suburbs. To the contrary, research indicates that the majority of people moving into older, central neighborhoods in cities have relocated from
other urban areas. (Lipton, 1977). Specifically, the "back-to-the-city-movement" involves mostly former renters, from neighborhoods that are within the city, who decide to acquire and to rehab houses in older city cores. (Grier and Grier, 1977).

While the reclamation of older, city neighborhoods by middle and upper class resettlers as well as by incumbents does indicate that urban reinvestment is occurring; it does not suggest that disinvestment in older, city core areas is being curtailed significantly. The two trends occur together within cities. The present phenomenon of a "back-to-the-city-movement" is more correctly labelled a reinvestment and upgrading movement, but it is in total, only part of the inner city picture. Reinvestment is insignificant to reverse totally historical patterns of urban disinvestment.

EXTERNALITIES OF THE GENTRIFICATION PROCESS

A neighborhood undergoing incumbent upgrading as alluded to earlier, experiences minimal adverse externalities. Renters could be displaced if homeownership increases or if market forces discover the potential rising value of the property in the neighborhood. However, the costs associated with the process of gentrification are far more adverse. For this reason we will focus on the externalities resulting from neighborhood gentrification.
Neighborhood revitalization resulting from gentrification has widespread benefits while the costs are borne solely by incumbent homeowners and renters. Present patterns of reinvestment via gentrification indicate that while the newcomers and the city are the chief beneficiaries, the poor are the most negatively impacted. (See "Potential Effects of Neighborhood Revitalization" matrix). The most significant adversity of neighborhood gentrification is the displacement of lower-income residents who either own homes or rent in the neighborhood, but who can no longer afford to remain in the neighborhood due to rising costs in taxes or rents. The extent of urban reinvestment displacement has yet to be documented. Howard Sumka of HUD has developed a research strategy for tracking displacement in a revitalized neighborhood. In addition Phillip Clay of MIT has put together a compendium of tools and strategies for minimizing displacement. To date, displacement, still occurs and remains an intractable problem resulting from revitalization schemes.

The displacement scenario occurs when private reinvestment in a particular neighborhood by newcomers, results in increased property taxes and a decrease in the total number of moderately priced rental units. Initially forced out are people on fixed incomes - single household heads on welfare and the elderly - who are both unable to afford rising rents or who are evicted as an incumbent property owner, or
## POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION

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<th>Unit of Analysis</th>
<th>Potential Costs</th>
<th>Potential Benefits</th>
<th>Indeterminate Effects</th>
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<td>1. Individual Households</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Remaining Neighborhood Residents</td>
<td>Increased housing costs</td>
<td>Equity appreciation for homeowners</td>
<td>Change in characteristics of neighborhood population</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-- Owners: Increased taxes</td>
<td>Improved municipal services</td>
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<td>-- Renters: Increased rent</td>
<td>Improved physical environment</td>
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<td>Subjection to pressures to move through harassment by real estate brokers or landlords</td>
<td>Improved equity of local goods and services</td>
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<td>Increased costs for locally sold goods and services</td>
<td>Increased availability of mortgage home improvement credit</td>
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<td>Loss of ties with former residents and neighborhood social institutions</td>
<td>Increased availability of hazard insurance</td>
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<td>B. Former Neighborhood Residents</td>
<td>Moving costs</td>
<td>Homeowner recapture of equity appreciation</td>
<td>Change in characteristics of housing (size, cost, quality)</td>
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<td>Unit of Analysis</td>
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<td>Loss of old social and institutionalities</td>
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<td>Change in physical characteristics of neighborhoods</td>
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<td>Trauma of forced move, especially renters</td>
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<td>Change in accessibility to public and private services and employment</td>
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<td>C. New Neighborhood Residents</td>
<td>Physical danger due to conflict with remaining residents</td>
<td>Proximity to employment</td>
<td>Change in social and institutionalities</td>
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<td>Risk of equity loss if neighborhood does not stabilize</td>
<td>Proximity to cultural amenities of city</td>
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<td>Lower housing costs</td>
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<td>Homeowner equity accumulation</td>
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<td>sense of accomplishment</td>
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<td>D. Residents of Recipient Neighborhoods</td>
<td>Increased cost for housing due to greater competition</td>
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<td>Change in characteristics of neighborhood population</td>
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<td>II. Central City</td>
<td>Cost of improved services demanded by new residents</td>
<td>Increased tax base (property, sales, income)</td>
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<td>Increased employment</td>
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<td>--Real estate and building sectors</td>
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<tr>
<td>III. Suburban Fringe</td>
<td>Increased service needs of low-income populations</td>
<td>Decrease in costs of services required by low-income population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction in tax base (property, sales, income)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loss of employment in real estate and building sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. The Nation</td>
<td>Subsidy for residents wishing to remain in area</td>
<td>Revitalization of central cities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relocation assistance</td>
<td>Conservation of existing housing stock and capital infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conservation of energy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conservation of land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Restoration of local fiscal balance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Howard J. Sumka, "Displacement In Revitalizing Neighborhoods: A Review And Research Strategy"
an absentee landlord sees a potential property gain for either rehabing or selling the property. The people most affected by displacement are people who are poor, of color, women, and the elderly. All who usually earn low wages, are on fixed-incomes, and who have limited housing options because of their financial constraints. Next to involuntarily move, are low to moderate-income incumbent homeowners, who are unable to pay increase taxes so they face the onerous threat of foreclosure. Last to leave are long-term residents, who view the changing socio-economic and racial character of the neighborhood as incompatible to their lifestyle and tastes, so they too move.

In this chapter we discussed the patterns and the extent of the phenomenon. Neighborhood revitalization via incumbent upgrading and/or gentrification is occurring in most major cities. While either revitalization scheme leads to reinvestment, incumbent upgrading is supported more so with public funds than is gentrification. Neighborhoods experiencing either process have different outcomes and different type residents participating in the process. Since the two processes are quite distinct, policy designed for neighborhood revitalization must recognize their unique dynamics. While incumbent upgrading is an internal restoration of a neighborhood, by people who have lived in the neighborhood for several years, gentrification is
an external process that attracts newcomers. There is no evidence, as stated, earlier in the chapter to support the occurrence of both types of neighborhood upgrading schemes in many older cities.
CHAPTER IV

HIGHLAND PARK FROM SUBURB TO URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD

INTRODUCTION

Roxbury, a predominantly black neighborhood of Boston, originally spelled Rocksburough or Rocksbury because of its rocky surface, was found in 1630 before the settlement of Boston. Roxbury was connected to Boston by a stip of land named after the first president of the United States, George Washington (Washington Street). Soon after the settlement of Boston, Roxbury, specifically Highland Park emerged as the preferred residential location for Boston's early gentile class.

As such, Highland Park is one of Boston's most historical residential communities. Its rocky and steep topography indicates that it has been and still remains one of the city's most picturesque vistas. Having emerged from early suburbani- zation by American settlers; later the same process and actors, eventually discarded it.

In this chapter, we will trace the transformation of Highland Park from a suburban to an urban neighborhood. Close attention will be paid to the development, utilization, and architectural significance of Highland Park's housing stock. We will discuss disinvestment patterns that are so apparent today and end with the current demographic profile and land uses for the neighborhood.
Housing development in Highland Park had three distinct time periods and utilizations. The initial period comes between 1825-1870. The first to build during the period were a group of former Boston residents seeking a suburban community. They collectively purchased 26 acres of land around the Fort Hill site and subdivided the land amount themselves for both residential and limited farming uses. Then in 1935, Alvah Kittredge, acquired a substantial amount of parcels, developed some and sold other parcels to buyers for the construction of single and duplex structures. In 1846 Roxbury was annexed to Boston, as a suburb. This period of suburbanization was described by Sam B. Warner, a Historian, in his book, The Discarded Suburbans: Roxbury and North Dorchester 1800-1950.

In the mid-eighteenth century, gentlemen of wealth and leisure began to build country houses in the English manner in Roxbury and Dorchester. Gov. Francis Bernard and John Hancock built summer houses in Jamaica Plain, Roxbury. Roxbury especially was the site of these proto-estates, since it was located on the only road from the Boston peninsula.

Though the number of people involved in this movement was small and their houses and grounds did little to change the basic physical arrangement of Roxbury Highlands and North Dorchester, the movement was an important one. These estates of the wealthy and the upper middle class railroad commuters stood as a model for all city dwellers to imitate.
The second period, 1870-1900, Highland Park experienced intense land use and building. During this period, row housing was built as well as multi-family dwelling units to house middle-class families. This period hallmarked the settlement of the white middle class in Highland Park.

Lastly, the period from 1900 to 1970 Highland Park became essentially fully developed with three story brick tenements, such as the ones founded on Fort Avenue and Morley Street. Those buildings housed some of Boston's white and black lower income people. Black people began moving into the neighborhood in the late 1950's.

Highland Park, an area initially developed for suburban living was discarded for alternative suburban living further and further away from the city core. While the automobile helped both the upper middle and upper class to move out and to still maintain ownership of their property in Highland Park, the first street cars in Boston aided the mobility of the lower middle and lower-class to move into Highland Park. Again Warner describes this period.

After those who could afford new dwellings abandoned the old suburbs, their places were taken by those who could not afford new housing. This group, the lower income half of the population, inherited an environment that no longer satisfied the middle class and was unsuited to the newcomers' needs and capabilities. The structures often had to be divided to keep each family's rent bill small.
The housing consumers living and moving in and out of Highland Park in the late fifties, sixties, and seventies are mostly black people. They inherited a disinvested housing stock and a declining neighborhood. The racial transformation of Highland Park from white to black marks another historical development of the neighborhood. But what is far more interesting in Highland Park's housing development is the transformation of the neighborhood from lower class black to middle and upper-class black. This period of development is on the horizon.

HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HIGHLAND PARK'S HOUSING STOCK

Akin to the rich history of Highland Park is its architecturally significant housing stock. Four houses, a wall, a church, and a water tower located within the neighborhood, are listed in the National Register of Historic Places. An additional building is listed in the Boston Landmark Commission.

These include:

1. Dillaway House, 1750
2. Edward Everett Hale House, 1840
3. Alvah Kitteridge House, 1836
4. William Lloyd Garrison House, 1850
5. Ionic Hall, 1803
6. First Church of Roxbury, 1804
7. Fort Hill, 1775

8. Cox Building* (listed with the Boston Landmark Commission)

Each of these properties, in their respective ways have contributed to the development of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and/or to the nation as a whole. In addition to having historical significance, they share architectural and artistic importance as well. The Boston Architectural Center received a grant from the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities to study the architectural significance of Highland's Park housing stock. (See map).

Today, each of these structures, with the exception of the Cox Building and Ionic Hall which are abandoned, are in use and have been somewhat restored. The Dillaway House is an apartment complex, the Edward Everett Hale House and the William Lloyd Garrison House are owner-occupied, the Alvah Kitteridge Square House provides office space for the Roxbury Action Program, and the First Church of Roxbury is one of the few churches in the neighborhood. Similar to the early New England township tradition, the land around the church is used for community gatherings. Last, but not least is Fort Hill, a rocky terrain with a water tower that provides a panoramic view of Boston.

PATTERNS OF DISINVESTMENT 1850-1970

The single most important factor that contributed to
First Church, 1804
onic Hall,
illaway House, 1750
orfolk House, 1853
ownstone Block, 1865
artment House, 1870
ooner Lambert House, 1780
ward Everett Hale House, 1840
roley Street Row Houses, 1873
taliane House, 1855
ival Kitteridge House, 1830
ansard Block, 1870
rownstone Row, 1860
Mid-century Mansions,
onional Revival House, 1896
acker, 1890
thic Revival House, 1896
illiam Lloyd Garrison House, 1850
art Hill Apartments, 1969
ry, Highland Street House, 1820
ghland Park Fort, 1775
reek Revival House, 1840
gency Greek Revival House,
rble Row Houses, 1860

Source: Highlands Study, August, 1971
the decline of American cities was the massive movement of the middle-class population from city to suburb during two decades: 1950's and 1960's. With their departure, many older, cities fell prey to a declining tax base and rising operating costs.

The patterns of residential mobility by the middle-class from city to suburb was studied by Peter Morrisson. Morrisson's study focused on suburbanization and its effects on central city neighborhoods.¹ This process of decentralization was found to produce deterioration and property abandonment in central city neighborhoods as investment capital is withdrawn with a concomitant result of producing social obsolescence in previously stable neighborhoods.

Highland Park did not escape this pattern of disinvestment. As affluent whites discarded the neighborhood for the suburbs, middle-class whites replaced them. As more working-class people migrated to cities seeking employment opportunities, many of the white members of the middle-class, who by now had gained some equity, moved to more homogeneous neighborhoods in the suburbs, imitating their upper-class predecessors. The property for the second time was discarded and abandoned, sold or rented to people, many of color, with less housing options.

Thus the physical decline of Highland Park is far more obstensible than are the signs of revitalization.
According to a study conducted under the auspices of the Roxbury Action Program in 1973, the following findings were made: Of the total parcels comprising Highland Park, 93 percent were studied. Of this 93 percent, 36 percent of the property was reported to be owned by absentee landlords and 23 percent was owned by the city. Thus over 50 percent of Highland Park’s property is owned by outsiders. This figure closely concurs with 1970 census reports which indicate that 53 percent of Highland Park’s housing stock is owner-occupied.

The percentages per block of deteriorated homes were mapped out for Highland Park. Over half the neighborhood has streets with deteriorated structures. The percent of structures on each block that are in serious decline, range from 10 to 80+ percent. Approximately, a quarter of the neighborhood contains structures that are in need of major gut rehab. (See map: Percent of Deteriorated Buildings).

Along with the percentage of deteriorated buildings, another map displays the location of vacant or unimproved land. Much of this land represents where a blighted building once stood, now demolished. The amount of vacant or unimproved land (27%) is extensive for an area that covers less than 170 acres. The vacant or unimproved land is dispersed throughout the northern, western, and southwestern sections of Highland Park. While the eastern and southeastern
sections are the most developed areas. (See map: Vacant or Unimproved Land).

NEIGHBORHOOD PROFILE

Highland Park; originally called the Highlands because it could boast of having the highest topographical peak in Boston, comprises some 170 acres. The neighborhood is located about 2 1/2 miles from the city's center. It is enclosed by three major city arteries that form its borders: Washington Street on the east, Columbus Avenue on the west, and New Dudley Street on the north. The southern border is Richie Street, Marcella Street and Connolly Park. As an enclosed, physical unit, Highland Park is geographically isolated from the rest of Roxbury's sub-neighborhoods.

When compared to Roxbury's three other sub-neighborhoods, Highland Park is more socially and ethnically diverse. According to the 1970 Population Census, Highland Park has 8 - 18% less blacks, 2 - 7% more people of Latino descent, and 6 - 11% more whites than other sub-neighborhoods of Roxbury.

In 1970 the median income was reported to be lower than the city's average. In 1980 Roxbury still reports the lowest median income of any Boston neighborhood. The percent of unemployed is reported at 8.6%. Homeownership is over 50% and the median value for a home is reported at $8,800. (See Statistics - Roxbury Planning District).
## FIGURE 8

**STATISTICS - ROXBURY PLANNING DISTRICT**

1970 U.S. Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Highland Park</th>
<th>Sav-Mor</th>
<th>Lower Roxbury</th>
<th>Washington Park</th>
<th>Total District</th>
<th>City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7,639</td>
<td>7,163</td>
<td>8,596</td>
<td>19,503</td>
<td>42,901</td>
<td>641,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Spanish</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>05%</td>
<td>08%</td>
<td>03%</td>
<td>06%</td>
<td>03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% White</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>09%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Under 18</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 65 &amp; Over</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>% Below Poverty Level</th>
<th>% Unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$6,100</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highland Park</strong></td>
<td>$6,300</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sav-Mor</strong></td>
<td>$4,900</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower Roxbury</strong></td>
<td>$6,600</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Washington Park</strong></td>
<td>$6,300</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City</strong></td>
<td>$9,100</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HOUSING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Units</th>
<th>Median Value</th>
<th>% 1 &amp; 2 Family Structures</th>
<th>% Owner-Occupied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,258</td>
<td>$8,800</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highland Park</strong></td>
<td>2,455</td>
<td>$9,500</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sav-Mor</strong></td>
<td>3,443</td>
<td>$7,400</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower Roxbury</strong></td>
<td>6,919</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Washington Park</strong></td>
<td>16,705</td>
<td>$10,300</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City</strong></td>
<td>232,448</td>
<td>$19,600</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Roxbury District Profile Boston Redevelopment Authority Neighborhood Planning Program
NON RESIDENTIAL LAND USES

The majority of the interior of Highland Park is zoned for residential use with non-residential use occurring around the periphery and bordering arteries. Roughly 60 percent of the land is zoned for residential but only 37 percent is actually used, the remaining percent is distributed among 7 other land use categories.

Below is a percentage breakdown of land uses within the Highland Park neighborhood:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Use</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Facilities</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Facilities</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Open Space</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant or Improved</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streets</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Supposedly, 19.4 percent of Highland Park's total land mass is in use for community facilities and open space. Eighty percent (80%) of the public open space in the neighborhood is represent by two parks: The High Fort, which is steep and used for passive recreation or an infrequent neighborhood gathering, and Connolly Field, an intensely used playground. The remaining 20 percent of the open space is not well suited for construction because of the topography. Or it is under-
utilized land that is representative of where a demolished building(s) once stood.

Highland Park has only a few streets and most of them service the interior residential sections of the neighborhood. The streets are narrow, many are curvilinear and almost all, accept those recently resurfaced, are in various stages of disrepair. The major street, with the exception of Highland Street, are on the periphery. Recently, residents of a neighborhood association organized to change the direction of vehicular traffic as to improve the overall traffic network system. At present, residents are not pleased with the vehicular traffic changes.

So Highland Park, once a splendid residential community, is now a neighborhood that is indicative of prolong decline. Many of the architecturally significant buildings, the beautiful mansions and rowhouses, have yet to be restored to their original elegance. They still show signs of dis-investment caused by the out-migration of the upper and middle classes from the city to the suburbs. Today, however, Highland Park is on an uptrend. The balance of this Case Study will discuss this revitalization uptrend.
CHAPTER V

CASE STUDY: HIGHLAND PARK: THE PROCESS OF REVITALIZATION

The purpose of this case study is threefold. It seeks to trace the process of revitalizing the Highland Park neighborhood from its inception to the present. It identifies the actors involved, their respective philosophies, roles, and the outcomes of actualizing their goals. In addition, it attempts to describe the revitalization process of the various actors and analyzes their mode of revitalization.

REVITALIZING HIGHLAND PARK

The Highland Park neighborhood is old and much of its property reflects the ravages of time. Still the housing stock exhibits outstanding architectural, artistic, and historical qualities even though its condition is deteriorated. Since 1969, there have been actions taken by groups and individuals to reverse the deterioration so apparent in the neighborhood. The various actors are struggling to have Highland Park exist, at least physically, as it once did when it was a wealthy suburb of Boston. In this section, we will discuss each of the major actors who provide the impetus for the revitalization of this neighborhood. They are in order of importance, the Roxbury Action Program (RAP), HiPark Corporation, and the residents – newcomers, mostly.
In 1969, when the Roxbury Action Program moved into the neighborhood, the area was not attracting new residents. Nor had it attracted the reformers, the social workers, or the storefront community organizers, and the political hustlers who clustered and competed along Blue Hill Avenue, Roxbury's political and social action artery. Blue Hill Avenue is perhaps ten or twelve blocks outside Highland Park, and RAP too was originally located there, in unrewarding competition with other social action groups. That is one reason why RAP moved into Highland Park: no one cared about Highland Park, and there were no competitors for the right to care about the neighborhood.

(Stewart Perry, 1978)

The Roxbury Action Program is a non-profit community development corporation controlled by residents that was established in 1967 when the Metropolitan Housing Program of the American Friends Service Club transferred the operation of its Roxbury Office to the newly organized group. Since its inception, RAP has been able to achieve significant inroads in curtailing physical blight and in providing the momentum for further neighborhood revitalization schemes.

RAP's main goal has been the revitalization and rehabilitation on Highland Park into a "Model Black Community". Consistent with this intent are three broad, but supportive goals, developed by RAP staff. They are stated below.

*To organize the Black citizens of Highland Park area politically, economically, and culturally; to develop a wide use of cooperative and individual ownership of housing;
*To promote and support the economic self-development of groups and individuals in the community in cooperative efforts;

*To provide through education and training the opportunity for participation in community development by those who have the most to gain in salvaging the neighborhoods, the residents.3

In practical terms when RAP refers to a "Model Black Neighborhood", it is speaking about a neighborhood that is controlled by blacks, that is viable economically, and that contains a racial and economic mix of residents. Underlying RAP's goals to build a "model black neighborhood" is their intent and efforts to prevent Highland Park from becoming another South End, where gentrification led to extensive displacement of incumbent renters and homeowners.

**INTERVENTION STRATEGY**

RAP viewed Highland Park as a chance to control a potentially valuable turf and chose two mutually reinforcing strategies for doing this. One, RAP began to buy property in Highland Park cheaply because of the deteriorated condition of the housing. The other strategy was to establish political clout, especially with the city, and economic influence that would discourage current property owners from either leaving or selling their property thus increasing the ability of RAP to attract more black families to buy and move into
Highland Park. With both endeavors, RAP was partly successful. In 1975 the BRA designated RAP "the primary community planning group" which meant that RAP became an advisor to the BRA for all city-owned parcels within Highland Park. In addition, with RAP's assistance, blacks and whites of higher income began trickling into the neighborhood with the intent of becoming homeowners. RAP was able to minimally promote homeownership by selling houses they acquired from the city to newcomers and by serving as a facilitator between the prospective homebuyer and the BRA.

Since its inception over eleven years ago, RAP has acquired and owns 11 individual parcels. Most of the buildings were purchased from the city, but some from private owners. The renovation of the buildings occurred in four stages.

RAP had to select the housing on certain streets, such as Centre Street for renovation because the 4 and 5 story brick rowhouses on these streets and others, render excellent opportunity for rental conversions for low and moderate income people.

RAP-UP I

This project, now completed and occupied, consists of 33 units of rehabilitated housing on scattered sites within Highland Park. The units housed low and moderate income people. The buildings are located on the following streets:
Bartlett, Kenilworth, Marcella, Thornton, and Highland Streets. The project investment was $500,000.

RAP-UP IIA

This project, now completed and occupied, consists of 160 units of elderly housing and 80 units of family housing located in John Elliot Square and on Centre Streets. The project investment costs were some $4,000,000.

RAP-UP IIB

This project, now completed and occupied, consists of 50 units housing for low and moderate income people located on Highland Avenue, Centre and Elliot Streets. Also included with its project was the renovation of two commercial spaces within John Elliot Square. The housing is located on Highland and Centre Streets, Highland Avenue and John Elliot Square. The project investment costs were approximately $1,000,000.

RAP-UP III

This project still in the planning steps will consists of 100 newly constructed units of housing for low and moderate income residents. The property, bordering the Washington Park neighborhood, will be located on Vale, Vallentine, Thornton, and Fulda Streets. The anticipated future investment is $3,600,000.
KITTERIDGE SQUARE FAMILY HOUSING

Using the state's 705 program, RAP is the designated manager for a low-income multi-family housing project, located in Kitteridge Square, adjacent to RAP's headquarters. The multi-family housing unit is currently being renovated using state monies.

During the early years RAP's financing for its projects came from grants and limited partnerships. By 1978, the financing for most of RAP's projects came from three primary resources: (1) the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MFHA); (2) Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Section 236; and (3) and limited partnerships as RAP as the general partner and outside investors as limited partners. Grant sources for RAP-UP IIB included a grant for the Episcopal City Mission, in the amount of $220,000 for costs covering land purchases and technical planning. Model Cities Administration granted RAP $200,000 for land acquisition and MIT gave RAP $92,000 for preplanning for RAP-UP III.

NEIGHBORHOOD PERCEPTIONS

The perceptions of renters concerning RAP's efforts to revitalize the neighborhood vary from high to low. RAP's ability to handle conflicts of competing purpose is surely put to the test, when having to serve as developer, landlord, and community service agent. Those
renters who have had management-related problems give RAP its low ratings, while other renters speak highly of RAP. (Over 70% of RAP's initial renters have remained in the same unit since inception).

The incumbent residents who have lived in the neighborhood prior to RAP's inception, give RAP its highest ratings. Some of these people used to or still do serve on RAP's Policy Committee. They feel that RAP has made a significant "investment" in and "commitment" to Highland Park.

Newcomers to the neighborhood share mixed views about RAP. While some credit RAP with being the sole pioneer for boosting interest in the neighborhood, others feel that RAP will impede further development of the neighborhood because RAP's housing developments attract low to moderate income renters. Renters, who do not provide as stable a force in the neighborhood as owner-occupants do. So newcomers would like to see a moratorium on subsidized housing within Highland Park. Many feel that RAP has lost its political clout, leadership ability and it is now too influenced by the Boston Redevelopment Authority. It is unclear how much of what the newcomers feel is a camouflage to protect their own investment.

As pioneers to the neighborhood, RAP concentrated most of its efforts in physically revitalizing the
Highland Park neighborhood. Since its move to the neighborhood, RAP has invested over $9,100,000, mostly public funds, in renovations and new construction. Of the total existing housing units (3,258), RAP has renovated 325 units, (10 percent) and revitalized two commercial areas in John Elliot Square. RAP's projects are subsidized and provide housing for a low to moderate renters.

Today RAP depends on federal and state housing programs which change for the worse with each new administration. RAP, like so many other community organizations left over from the sixties, has recently been plagued by bureaucratic changes, fiscal constraints, and uncertainty - all of which create management problems. The future of RAP to continue to develop or renovate housing within Highland Park is in question because of present local, state and federal retrenchments.

ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNITY UPGRADING DEVELOPMENT MODEL

RAP's approach for revitalizing Highland Park originates from the neighborhood self help programs of the sixties. As a non-profit Community Development Corporation (CDC). RAP's programs encompass the social, political, economic and physical development of the Highland Park neighborhood. Cognizant that its goals were expansive, RAP concentrated its energies and resources mostly into
physically developing Highland Park. It is in the area of housing renovation and development that RAP's efforts are most evident.

Though RAP won acclaim for packaging successful housing developments, RAP had very little autonomy over the approach it took to revitalize Highland Park. RAP's property acquisition and funding for its developments came from the public sector. Most of the property RAP acquired came from the city, while the funds to finance renovations and construction came from state and federal housing subsidies. As such, RAP's revitalization efforts benefited low and moderate income renters. While the provision of low-income housing is an expected part of the RAP program, a proper balance between promoting homeownership and providing rentals was unobtainable. At the inception of RAP's attempts to revitalize Highland Park, incongruency exists between its espoused theory and its theory in use.

RAP's preoccupation with acquiring and renovating city-owned property and leveraging the appropriate financing curtailed a maze of bureaucratic procedure. Oftentimes RAP's projects were delayed for long periods due to changes in national administration and each president's subsequent policy changes. Such delays were costly and inefficient. A painful result was that RAP did not take the time to organize incumbent residents, especially homeowners, around
the issue of neighborhood upgrading. While incumbent residents were aware of RAP's efforts to revitalize the neighborhood, they did not assume an active role in promoting it. Such lack of involvement is evinced by the "wait and see" approach adopted by the incumbents. In essence RAP has done more to assist renters than incumbent homeowners. The formers helps to destabilize a neighborhood, if only perceptually, the latter helps to stabilize it.

RAP either recognizes the need to promote homeownership or that subsidies for financing housing have been curtailed. Today, RAP with HiPark's assistance, is studying the feasibility of converting some houses into condominiums aimed at moderate income families, the prices are $25,000.

By examining RAP's community upgrading model, we can draw some preliminary conclusions about the problems inherent in the model:

Negatives:

(1) Lack of control over the revitalization process - only those buildings that are city owned and that can be converted into subsidized units are renovated.

(2) Inability to stick with overall and project objectives - RAP was unable to carry out its espoused theory or to keep project deadline dates.

(3) Preoccupation with bureaucratic matters causing less time to complete program goals.
(4) Inability to create a heterogeneous neighborhood with an income, race, and age mix.

Positive:

(1) Provides housing for low and moderate income residents.

(2) Avoids reinvestments-displacement.

In conclusion, RAP's community upgrading model places limitations on its arduous efforts to revitalize Highland Park. RAP has yet to complete RAP-UP IV and its funding is precarious. RAP, in the role of pioneer to the neighborhood made a significant, though not substantial, contribution to the process of revitalizing Highland Park.

**HiPARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION: A PRIVATE INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT MODEL**

HiPark Development Corporation is a privately financed housing development corporation that was formed in 1978 as a joint venture between four, black professional men. Since its inception, HiPark Development, thus far has acquired, rehabbed, rented, and sold property in the Highland Park neighborhood for residential use exclusively. Though the office is located in downtown Boston, three of the principals reside in the Highland Park neighborhood.

As a private housing development firm, HiPark's first priority is to put together housing development packages,
This is the most complete text of the thesis available. The following page(s) were not included in the copy of the thesis deposited in the Institute Archives by the author:

p. 81
the principals stated "that if they are unable to find buyers who are black, they will sell to whites."

Since incorporation, HiPark has purchased, renovated, and/or built the property listed below:

- Two buildings on Kenilworth Street
- Four marble front buildings on Cedar Street
- One house on Highland Park Avenue*
- Seven newly constructed townhouses on Fort Avenue

The Boston Five Cents Savings and First National Bank have been the major financiers of HiPark's housing development ventures. The bank's decision to award HiPark a loan approximately $563,920 to construct seven townhouses on Fort Avenue was influenced by three factors: (1) that the previous investments on Fort Avenue by newcomers amounted to $500,000, (2) that the Avenue was in the path of development, and (3) that the banks could show compliance with CRA regulations.

NEIGHBORHOOD PERCEPTIONS

Many renters are adament that HiPark Corporation will continue to acquire and rehab property which it will rent or sell at high prices. Such actions will result in a

*The property on Highland Avenue was sold this month (April, 1981) for $45,000 to a family who owns two other properties on the same block.
decrease in the amount of affordable rentals for low and moderate-income families. Naturally, displacement is a concern of most renters, especially, the younger families and the elderly. Renters still lament about HiPark's eviction of some tenants who were living in houses that the Corporation brought.

The Roxbury Action Program's rental units are not viewed as a solution to displacement caused by private reinvestment and rightfully so. According to RAP's property manager, over the past 8 or 9 years the vacancy rate for RAP's rentals has been 12 percent, while in the last 2 years, the vacancy rate has been less than 5 percent.

Older incumbent residents, who have lived in Highland Park for 15 years or more, regardless if they rent or own their home, are pleased with HiPark's efforts to revitalize the neighborhood. Many of the elderly homeowners are quick to view HiPark's real estate endeavors as a bellwether of things to come, but they have not been influenced personally. Some elderly homeowners are skeptical about making major property renovations because decline is still too apparent. Others, out right refuse to do it, because they can't afford to or they do not want to. "Why should I take out a loan at my age on my property, when all the buildings around me are in bad shape. It would be stupid, don't you think?"
Recent newcomers to the neighborhood speak favorably about HiPark Corporation. One person even purchased their home from HiPark, while others live on the same streets as the principals. Some see the future of their investment, in some ways, tied to the success of HiPark to market the neighborhood.

The Highland Park neighborhood was chosen by HiPark Corporation in 1978 to develop real estate for urban enthusiasts. Since 1978, the Corporation has purchased houses, renovated 2, sold 2, and built 7 new townhouses. As speculators in the neighborhood, HiPark is the recognized realtor for the Highland Park neighborhood. It has invested some $563,920 in the neighborhood's housing stock. This figure does not include personal loans ranging between $50,000 and $70,000 that three of the principals assumed on their own homes located within Highland Park.

In the dual role as speculators and homeowners, HiPark's principals have both a monetary and civil investment in the neighborhood. Unlike the speculation that occurred in the South End when it was revitalized, where houses were brought for low prices and quickly sold for much higher prices, there is no evidence that HiPark is attempting to or able to carry out similar speculation practices in Highland Park. At least it is too soon to determine.
The difference between the speculation that is occurring in Highland Park and that which occurred in the South End has to do with the amount of profit gained from each housing transaction. In the South End, realtors aware of the increase demand for housing in the area, would hold on to the property without making any improvements, long enough to make handsome profits. For example, shells purchased from the city for under $5,000 would be sold to buyers at a price range between $40,000 and $60,000. Or houses purchased from elderly incumbent residents would sell from three to four times more than the price the speculator paid for it. (More examples of this rampant speculation activity by developers can be examined by tracing recent property transactions for the South End in Bankers and Tradesmen). Thus far HiPark has not been able to make easy profits from selling property in Highland Park because the market demand for housing within the area is slow, low interest 312 loans are not available, and HiPark concentrated its efforts on newly constructed housing as opposed to renovating existing houses.

HiPark Corporation's development is aimed at the middle and upper class buyer is seen from the prices. The newly constructed townhouses sells for $84,000 and are located on Fort Avenue. The townhouses fail somehow to duplicate the elegance of their older, renovated counter-
parts, but inspite of this, the houses are said to be selling.

HiPark Corporation selected Fort Avenue as the site for new construction because the street is located at the apex of the Highland Park Neighborhood. It has good locational features and it is gentrified.

Highland Park was chosen by HiPark Corporation for housing development because it is a predominantly black neighborhood that contains many of the urban amenities that attract urban enthusiasts seeking to reside in the city. Highland Park has a rich history and an architecturally significant housing stock; it is close proximity to downtown Boston; and it has good access to public transportation and major street arteries.

HiPark Corporation's grand scheme is that it is attempting to create a certain type neighborhood - one that is controlled by blacks and attractive to middle and upper class homebuyers, regardless of their race.

PRIVATE INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT MODEL ANALYSIS

HiPark Corporation's approach to revitalizing Highland Park is entrepenurial. Two of the principals are businessmen and graduates of the Harvard School of Business, while the other two are lawyers, graduates of Harvard and Boston College Law Schools. The principals praise themselves on their success for being "the first
black developers who have been able to get conventional financing for housing, other than individual owner-occupants. Much of their success with securing property from the BRA and a loan from the bank may have to do with their individual expertise and contacts.

Using their private enterprise approach, HiPark uses exclusively private financing from Savings and Loans and Commercial banks. As such, the Corporation seeks to make good on their loans as well as make a profit. Their newly constructed houses sell for between $84-89,000. Subsequently, their properties are aimed at upper middle and upper class people, preferably, blacks.

HiPark is autonomous and privately financed, it can choose where it wants to develop and construct property. HiPark chose to construct its housing in a "gentrified" section of the neighborhood and has purchased some of the more architecturally significant housing in other parts of Highland Park. It is in a position, perhaps, to direct how revitalization will occur, at least for newcomers to the neighborhood.

In the wake of federal cutbacks in housing subsidies HiPark is a believer in "private initiatives" and typifies the private reinvestment mode to revitalize neighborhoods. By not having to depend on housing subsidies, the Corporation is not delayed by bureaucratic changes; nor does it
have to relinquish its control of who lives in its renovated and/or constructed houses.

By playing up the charm, historical character, locational features, and architectural significance of the housing, HiPark has begun to reshape the negative perceptions about Highland Park, inspite of its apparent blight. More urban enthusiasts are moving into the neighborhood, purchasing homes thus indicating a commitment to the neighborhood. As a result, the Corporation is helping the neighborhood to become more heterogenous. It is too soon to determine whether Highland Park will emerge into a heterogenous neighborhood by race, income, and age, or if it will become another "gentrified", principally black neighborhood.

Consistent with its entrepenurial approach, the Corporation has displaced those people unable to afford new rents for buildings in Highland Park, it is still too soon to determine the amount of displacement that will result from HiPark's private reinvestment, albeit it will be some. Displacement is the most significant drawback of the private investment model.

The risk inherent in a private investment model is the uncertainty about market forces. In this case, HiPark will lose, if Highland Park does not continue its revitalization uptrend. Two of the principals are uncertain about the future of their investment. They both agree that "black people are not willing to take the chance in neighbor-
hoods like Highland Park, they'd rather move to Newton or Brookline." However small, there is confidence in the revitalization of Highland Park because HiPark would have been refused a loan from banks and the principals would not have made such major investments, if there was not. The success of the private investment model, depends on the ability of the actors involved to market the neighborhood.

The private investment model for neighborhood revitalization of older neighborhoods is useful and an emerging phenomenon. The success of the model depends on the following:

1. Changing market perceptions about the neighborhood; and
2. Attracting a different mix of people to a poor neighborhood.

The role of the planner in a neighborhood on the advent of reinvestment via gentrification is to detect and modify the market forces in order to balance reinvestment/displacement.

FORT AVENUE: A MODEL OF SELECTIVE GENTRIFICATION

Fort Avenue was singled out for study because it is the only section of the Highland Park neighborhood where gentrification is visibly apparent. The odd side of Fort Avenue has rows of look alike attached, renovated, row-houses with individualistic, wooden doors. While the
even side is represented by a well maintained park and Roxbury's Historic Standpipe, commonly called Fort Hill. Fort Avenue forms the apex of the Highland Park neighborhood, it offers a panoramic view of Boston. Before the newcomers, all who have moved into the neighborhood within the last four years, purchased the elegant rowhouses, the buildings were purportedly, abandoned. Still there are two abandoned buildings on this winding street that have yet to be renovated. Because these two buildings are located at the end of the street, side by side, one almost does not see them. Even with this blemish, Fort Avenue stands out as a model of selective gentrification.

PHILOSOPHY

What these black professional newcomers share in common and work to develop is an urban enclave of black professionals. They view themselves as part of a civic network of professional blacks who refuse to leave the city to live.

Most of us want to live with others who vote, make contributions to campaigns, who will become full participants in Boston life, buy memberships to the Elma Lewis School of Fine Arts and the Boston Ballet, support retail and commercial development which will come later quite candidly will like the warmth of a black cocoon. To move to a white suburban neighborhood does not satisfy that at all.
INTERVENTION STRATEGY/PARCEL ACQUISITION

The intent of this group of newcomers was not focused on Highland Park's revitalization as it was to find an urban environment where they could afford to buy a home, one they would enjoy living in. They chose Fort Avenue, not Highland Park. One interviewee stated "that when I tell people where I live, I first tell them I live in Roxbury, then I tell them I live on Fort Hill."

Today there is only one white family on Fort Avenue (the commune is located on Fort Avenue Terrace which abuts Fort Avenue). The remaining houses are occupied by black people representing the following professions: attorney, doctors, nurse, administrator, consultant, carpenter, and painter. Unlike their white counterparts in the South End, Fort Avenue residents have children, some have two.

Most of the residents living on Fort Hill Avenue paid between $15,000 and $25,000 for their homes. The major expenses were costs to rehab their structures which ranged between $50,000 and $70,000. No resident had problems obtaining financing because of their high salaries. Bankers are more interested in the applicant's individual portfolio as opposed to the collateral the property could offer.
NEIGHBORHOOD PERCEPTIONS

Many renters and a few homeowners have misconceptions about who lives on Fort Avenue. Many people believe that whites live on Fort Avenue as opposed to the many blacks who do. Such misconceptions indicate that there is little or no contact between the homeowners who live on the exterior of the neighborhood with the renters and homeowners who live in the interior, regardless of color.

Incumbent residents, especially the elderly homeowners, view the newcomers entry into Highland Park as a sign that the neighborhood will again be a nice place to live.

Newcomers – black and white – are dispersed throughout the neighborhood and share the view that Highland Park is an affordable place to purchase a home in Boston. Regardless of color, many people commented about how they initially searched in the South End for a house, but found that they had been priced out of the market; Highland Park offered cheaper and in some cases nicer homes than anticipated.

Fort Avenue was chosen for selective gentrification because the site possesses all the amenities that middle and upper-class resettlers are seeking. It had a relatively cheap, but sound housing stock, the Avenue has historical importance, open space, and its steep terrain provides a panoramic view of Boston.
HiPark Corporation served as an impetus for further gentrifying Fort Avenue. In efforts to sell their newly constructed townhouses on the Avenue, they use a twofold market approach: First they sell Fort Avenue, then they sell the Highland Park neighborhood. For example, their brochure cover reads in bold capital letters: "MAY BE YOUR LAST HOMEOWNER OPPORTUNITY ON FORT AVENUE! The inside flap reads: THE HIGHLAND PARK ADVANTAGE

CLOSE PROXIMITY to
Downtown Boston
Southwest Corridor Development
Madison Park High School
Northeastern University

ACCESS TO
Buses and MBTA Orange Line
Major Highway and Public Transportation Arteries
Neighboring Communities of Jamaica Plain, Brookline, and South End

RENEWED INFLUX OF URBAN ENThusiasts

INHERENT CHARM OF HISTORICAL NEIGHBORHOODS

Black professionals occupy the more architecturally significant homes on Fort Avenue as well as other nicer ones throughout the neighborhood. In their role as newcomers to Highland Park, they provide the major impetus that attracts more people like themselves to the neighborhood.
ANALYSIS OF THE SELECTIVE GENTRIFICATION MODEL

People who gentrify neighborhoods seem able to attract people like themselves. Many of the people who live on Fort Avenue are members of the "baby-boom" cohort who lamented about how they could not afford housing in the South End, so Highland Park became the alternative. They are professional, married, urban enthusiast who transform blighted streets into rows of restored housing using their own money. (In the case of Highland Park, newcomers could not rely on 312 loans or the likes, but had to make major investments). It is for this reason, that the newcomers to Highland Park are sensitive about being labelled. They see themselves as people who prefer to live in the city as opposed to the suburbs.

Though Fort Avenue constitutes an enclave of gentri- fiers, others are dispersed throughout the neighborhood. Like a beacon, their houses stand out among the deteriorated ones. In our case the location of the house was less significant than the architectural quality and soundness of the structure. More so, than RAP or HiPark, the newcomers provide the evidence that the neighborhood is on the uptrend.

It is still too soon to determine to what extent, newcomers will influence the revitalization of Highland Park because they are too few. So far they have attracted
people like themselves and there is no reason why they will not continue to do so.

OTHER ACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE REVITALIZATION OF HIGHLAND PARK

CITY

The city plays a supportive role in Highland Park's revitalization. The neighborhood's three designations by the city and state enables funds to be concentrated in the area. In May, 1972 Kitteridge Square, a section of Highland Park, was designated an urban renewal area by the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA). Kitteridge Square Urban Renewal Area is primarily a residential project comprising some 27.3 acres. It is bounded by Centre, Highland, Milmont, Lambert, and Cedar Streets. (See Kitteridge Square Urban Renewal Plan in appendix).

The city then designated Highland Park a neighborhood strategy area and in 1974, at the request of the city, the Massachusetts Historical Commission and the Boston Landsmark Commission designated the Kitteridge Square, a historic preservation area. (See Historic Preservation Statement in appendix).

The historic preservation designation, allowed for properties located within Kitteridge Square with historical and/or architectural significances to be restored pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.
Between 1974 and 1978, owners of some 23 properties received restoration grants to recover the original form and details of the facades and roofs of their homes as they appeared at an earlier period in Highland Park's history. Listed are properties receiving restoration grants and the corresponding amount of the grants. (See list on next page)

**BANXS**

Banks are more willing to lend money in Highland Park today than in the past. According to a loan officer at a local bank, banks have been reluctant to make mortgage and home improvement loans in Highland Park because of (1) the low value of the housing collateral; (2) the costs to renovate; in many cases, exceeded the appraised value after restoration; and (3) the residents in the neighborhood were not bankable. I suspect that in the past that the neighborhood was redlined.

Today, influenced by the ongoing revitalization activity that has raised market perceptions about the neighborhood, banks are loaning money to individual households in the neighborhood who meet loan underwriting criteria. (No newcomer, who purchased a home, indicated that he or she was unable to secure a loan).

Three banks, the Boston Five Cents Savings, First National, and the Provident Institution for Savings, used
## Architectural and Historic Restoration Grants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROPERTY</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64 Centre Street</td>
<td>$25,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Dorr Street</td>
<td>4,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Highland Avenue</td>
<td>11,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Highland Avenue</td>
<td>12,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 Highland Avenue</td>
<td>29,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 Highland Avenue</td>
<td>25,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67 Lambert Avenue</td>
<td>10,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Linwood Avenue</td>
<td>41,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 Linwood Avenue</td>
<td>11,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Linwood Square</td>
<td>13,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Linwood Square</td>
<td>6,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Linwood Square</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Linwood Square</td>
<td>24,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Millmont Street</td>
<td>16,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Alvah Kitteridge Square</td>
<td>18,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Morley Street</td>
<td>30,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Morley Street</td>
<td>39,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 Highland Avenue</td>
<td>31,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Morley Street</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Morley Street</td>
<td>29,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Morley Street</td>
<td>37,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 Cedar Street</td>
<td>11,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Morley Street</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$493,629</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Highland Park as a vehicle to meet requirements pursuant to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977. The Act establishes that lending institutions have a "continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local community, especially low and moderate income areas". One of the sales pitches effectively used by HiPark Corporation to secure loans from the Boston Five and First National was to convince the banks that their loans would be in compliance with CRA regulations. In the same vein, the Provident Institution for Savings, took the initiative to make loans in Highland Park, exclusively on Morley Street, a cul de sac with historical houses. Though the cumulative loan amount was $125,000, residents refused the banks offer because the amount of money the bank agreed to lend each resident was deemed insufficient.

Other financial support included funds for infrastructure improvements (streets, parks, lights), neighborhood economic development, and human services. (See Neighborhood Strategy Area Funding Levels in appendix). Highland Park as of April 30, 1979, received a total of $108,000 in 312 money. The loans were concentrated on one street, Morley Street. Infrastructure improvements are too insignificant to really enhance the neighborhood at this point.

The real test of city support will be evinced when more people, in and outside, of Highland Park begin to
submit bids to develop city-owned vacant property. It will be interesting to watch just who secures the city property, for what costs and uses. The city can accept bids that are controversial or not. For instance, RAP-UP IIA was developed and managed by whites just as HiPark's townhouses were built by a white firm. There are some residents who feel that people of color are denied the jobs because the city, purportedly, uses a patronage system when awarding contracts. The city often can influence the choice of the contractors.

REAL ESTATE AGENTS

Presently, there are only four mechanisms by which property, private sales and/or vacant parcels, is either acquired or sold in Highland Park. Property is either sold or acquired via HiPark Corporation, Fred Saunders' Realty, Boston Redevelopment Authority, and/or an internal network system. (Betty Gibson Realty does own one house in Highland Park on Kenilworth Street which sells for $84,000). Such finding indicates that market forces have not caught on, as of yet.

HiPark Corporation serves as an internal realtor. The Corporation is acquiring property, fixing it up, and either selling or renting it to newcomers to the neighborhood. They have an advantage over other realtors who may become interested in doing business in Highland Park because three of the Corporation's principals live in
the neighborhood and aware, almost immediately when a property becomes available for sale.

Before HiPark Corporation, Fred Saunders' Realty was the other major realtor operating in Highland Park. As early as 25 years ago, Mr. Saunders acquired and sold property in Highland Park. However, Mr. Saunders stated that over the years, Highland Park was not a desirable place to live so property transactions within the area were minimal, though on several occasions his agency served as a broker to individuals seeking to sell their property. Today, Mr. Saunders is interested in "aggressively becoming involved in property transactions within Highland Park because it is becoming a priority area".

Boston Redevelopment Authority has acquired foreclosed property from the city and within the past two years the BRA has auctioned approximately 12 parcels. The parcels include both vacant land and buildings. According to a source in Real Property, people are not eager to purchase property in Highland Park because there is a lack of confidence in the neighborhood so selling city-owned property is a slow process. My suspicion is that the factor contributing to this slowness is the city's refusal to waive some of the back taxes on properties.

Internal to Highland Park is a real estate networking system. Residents who are homeowners in Highland Park
are very much aware of available property within the neighborhood. Generally, most of the people who have purchased property within the last four years, the newcomers to the neighborhood, found out about their property from a friend living in the area. A planner who lives in Highland Park stated that, "you do not find out about what properties are for sale in Highland Park from the Boston Globe, but generally by word of mouth". Another sign of networking is that at least 25 properties within the last 10 years are sold for under $100.00: Some were sold to people who have the same last name.

Property transactions occurring in Highland Park are recent and the involvement of outsiders is not widespread. It also appears that those people who have purchased housing within the last few years as well as some incumbents, have made a commitment to stay in the area for long periods of time.

There was only one case of speculation on Beech Glen Street, number 27. The property was purchased in the late sixties for $1,500.00, sold in the early seventies for $11,000, resold a year later for $23,000, and now the present owner is about to sell the house. There were no repairs made on the house since the sale in the late sixties.
NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

There are some 5 neighborhood associations in Highland Park, all grew out of the Roxbury Highland Park Neighborhood Association. Former members of RAP's Policy Committee formed the umbrella neighborhood association. The five include: The Linwood Hill Neighborhood Association, Fort Hill, Morley Street, Thornton Street, and of course Roxbury Highland Park. With the exception of the Roxbury Highland Park Neighborhood Association, the neighborhood associations have not contributed to the revitalization of Highland Park, fragmented, uncoordinated, the associations hold ad hoc meetings only when a problem arises that concerns their turf.

The Highland Park Neighborhood Association has played a role in the revitalization of the neighborhood, albeit the role has been small. Members of the association formed a land trust in efforts to protect the vacant developable lots owned by the city. The city turned over four lots to the land trust so that residents could cultivate "survival gardens". Members of Roxbury Highland Park Neighborhood Association and other residents transformed unused, littered lots into productive gardens ripe with vegetables and fruits. Though the results of this neighborhood association's efforts may go unnoticed, they are significant enough to mention.

In closing, there has been support, of varying
degrees from the city, banks, realtors, and a Neighborhood Association to revitalize Highland Park. Each of the various actors have used their respective resources to assist residents and organizations in meeting their goals. Though their roles are not as significant as RAP's HiParks, or newcomers to the neighborhood, they still play an integral role in Highland Park's revitalization.

EXTERNALITIES THAT MAY IMPACT HIGHLAND PARK'S REVITALIZATION

Mainly, there are two external developments which may positively shape the revitalization of Highland Park. They are the Southwest Corridor (SWC) and the construction of Roxbury Community College (RCC) within the corridor. (For the proposed impact from either development, see "Highland Park - A Development Plan", Jacquelyn Hall Crichlow, unpublished Master's thesis (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September, 1976). While the Southwest Corridor project is to be completed in 1983, the construction of Roxbury Community College has a bleak future.

The Southwest Corridor development is a transportation project that includes the reconstruction of mass transit, commuter rails, and intercity rail lines with a linear park system and commercial and residential development continuous of Highland Park neighborhood. The corridor area also includes the South End, Back Bay, and Jamaica Plain, neighborhoods of Boston. Upon completion, it will
provide high quality transit and rail service and enhance the economic and physical development of the area.

The negative developments that continue to negatively impact Highland Park are Mission Hill, a public owned, unkept project where poor people of color are concentrated, plagued by urban ills. Mission Park is located to the north of Highland Park while the east and the west are Roxbury's Washington Park and Lower Roxbury neighborhoods. Each of these neighborhoods are poor and do little to enhance Highland Park. So Highland Park is surrounded by poor neighborhoods with people of color. Unfortunately, both of these factors have impacts which shape negative perceptions about the marketability of the neighborhood.
CHAPTER 6

SYNTHESIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this final chapter, we attempt to put all the parts back together again to create the whole picture of the process of revitalizing Highland Park. Roxbury Action Program, HiPark Development Corporation and newcomers have assumed, for different reasons, the task of preventing further decay of Highland Park and restoring it to its original place as a viable and desirable community. RAP, attempting to upgrade the neighborhood is the pioneer in the process. HiPark attempting to market the neighborhood, is the speculator. Newcomers, with their enthusiasm for city living, gentrify the nicer sections of the neighborhood. All have made an investment in and commitment to the neighborhood.

It is not enough to study the models in detail, unless we construct the whole and determine how the parts function as a collective. In the balance of this chapter we will examine the interplay between the upgrading models employed in Highland Park, identify problems and make recommendations to alleviate the problem.

Inherent in the models to revitalize Highland Park are commonalities. One, is the shared view to keep Highland Park predominantly black and to make it an attractive, if not, "chic" neighborhood. Implied in this view is that
Boston needs an affluent black neighborhood that is desirable to outsiders, but one where blacks are in control.

Two, the underlying assumption of each model and the respective theory in use, is that the Highland Park neighborhood lacks the internal capacity to revitalize itself. As soon as RAP moved into Highland Park, it proceeded to promote homeownership by attracting newcomers. HiPark is marketing its property to people outside the neighborhood and has succeeded in convincing newcomers to invest in and commit themselves to restoring Highland Park. Both HiPark and the newcomers feel that the significant entry of the gentry into the neighborhood will conclude the revitalize process.

There is a disregard for the incumbent homeowner. Homeownership is high in Highland Park (53%), but each of the models fail to interact with incumbent homeowners. Potentially, this "civil class" may pose a threat to the individual designs of the actors. Why else would they not recognize that "incumbent homeowners are critical to the success of neighborhood revitalization"?¹

Cumulatively, Highland Park's three development models have ingredients which foster a heterogenous neighborhood. Two models are able to simultaneously attract and keep renters, while HiPark can attract newcomers and gentrifiers. Though the population that
either model attracts will probably live in, essentially enclaves, newcomers will be dispersed throughout, following patterns of development. Due to the containment and smallness of Highland Park, as newcomers reinvest more in the interior sections of the neighborhood, the greater the heterogeneity. This same process could also lead to enclaving, which we will discuss later.

We have discussed what we view as commonalities among the models, we now will discuss their conflictual differences. From earlier discussion, we assume that other differences among the models have been made clear (See Chapter 5). Some of our observations may be presumptive because Highland Park is at an early period of its uptrend. Regardless, we will concentrate our policy considerations on those aspects of revitalization models that negatively effect the future revitalization of the neighborhood.

Since Highland Park is in the early stage of the process of revitalization, tensions between the actors and their applied models have been minimal. There appears to be no tension between HiPark and newcomers. They share a mutually supportive relationship. Discernable tensions exist between HiPark and RAP. The points of conflict are around issues of reinvestment displacement and subsidized housing.
A scenario is created. When HiPark was attempting to purchase a parcel from the BRA to build its townhouses, RAP sent members of its Policy Committee and residents to the hearing to contest the sale. RAP's argument was that HiPark's proposed development, the construction of townhouses, aimed at a more affluent market, would lead to further gentrification of the neighborhood and subsequent displacement. The BRA, in spite of RAP's protestations sold the land to HiPark.

Similarly, the principals of HiPark have announced at neighborhood meetings and to the Globe, their displeasure concerning subsidized housing. A subsequent move by HiPark to secure a moratorium on subsidized housing within Highland Park, would have a negative impact on the future of RAP-UP IV A.

This sort of dissent can only serve to polarize the actors involved in the revitalization process, and the residents, who support either actor. What is evolving is a classical conflict over land and/or turf rights. As either actor competes for land, that will be developed for different housing consumers, they will intensify internal conflict within the neighborhood. As the revitalization process continues, so will conflicts over land.
Furthermore, neither RAP nor HiPark has the clout to serve as an advisor to the BRA concerning city owned parcels. The city still owns a significant number of developable parcels in Highland Park and it has ultimate control over who gets it. The city may pit the two actors against each other, only to sell the land to an outsider. This is a real, but an unfortunate possibility.

It is evident that there are commonalities in the revitalization models that could lead to a harmonious co-existence; however, areas where the interplay between the models breakdown are more serious:

1. Possible Reinforcement of Racial Segregation and Enclaving;
2. Lack of Coordination of the Revitalization Process;
3. Lack of Involvement of Incumbent Homeowners;
4. Problem of Property Acquisition

THE POSSIBLE REINFORCEMENT OF RACIAL SEGREGATION AND ENCLAVING

Case Study Observations

The spatial distribution of people of color and whites tend to compose three distinct sub-groups with blacks concentrated around Kitteridge Square area, Latinos around Centre Street area, and whites tending
to form a distribution around High Fort Park (Fort Avenue Terrace and Beechglen Street) and Linwood Square.

The spatial distribution of people with high incomes are concentrated on Fort Avenue and Kenilworth Street, while for those people who are poorer or on fixed-incomes, they are concentrated around the Kitteridge Square area.

A further intensification of homogenous enclaving could result from the revitalization models. While for one population, renters, the trend is created by the location of the rental units, the other two models can work towards mitigating these patterns of segregation and enclaving.

RECOMMENDATION:

If Highland Park is to develop as an heterogenous community than the actors involved in the neighborhood's revitalization process must avoid reinforcing homogeneity by race, income, and age which has developed. While recognizing the possible desire for homogeneity of people of similar backgrounds, the further intensification or non-mitigation of these patterns could result in essentially separate enclaves or sub-neighbourhoods defined by turf which would produce a Highland Park neighborhood in name only. Attempts, such as the dispersion of newcomers, must be made to bridge this settlement gap if this situation is to be avoided.
LACK OF COORDINATION OF THE REVITALIZATION PROCESS

Case Study Observations

The actors involved in the process to revitalize Highland Park share an overall objective to restore the neighborhood and to keep it predominantly black, albeit their modes and beneficiaries differ.

Conflict over city owned parcels could possibly create schisms between the actors which would ultimately work contrary to revitalization goals.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Recognizing that the revitalization models do not lend themselves to joint housing development proposals, the revitalization actors must identify those areas where collaboration is feasible such as:

- developing political clout as a neighborhood entity, as opposed to an individual set of actors
- putting together a comprehensive land use plan which determines the appropriate development scheme
- articulating the revitalization strategy for Highland Park
- utilizing the resources of the (3) planners who live in the area
- monitoring the sales of city owned property, and
- promoting a neighborhood leadership model that attracts media attention
LACK OF INVOLVEMENT OF INCUMBENT HOMEOWNERS

Case Study Observations

Incumbent homeowners are being left out of Highland Park's revitalization schemes. All of the actors involved in the process of revitalizing the neighborhood have overlooked the internal revitalizing strength of Highland Park's incumbent residents.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Organize incumbent homeowners around the issue of neighborhood revitalization so they can make prudent decisions about their investment.

Investigate the possibilities for establishing a NHS in the Highland Park neighborhood to provide loans for rehab, counselling and rehab services.

Restructure and re-enact Highland Park's land trust so that it benefits incumbent residents, homeowners and renters.

PROBLEMS OF PROPERTY ACQUISITION

Case Observations

Throughout the neighborhood signs of restoration are becoming more apparent. Once restoration of the area becomes more viable, the nature of the existing residential building types should prove to be a valuable asset in the
promotion of homeownership in the area. Property ownership is dispersed throughout the neighborhood. While property acquisition is presently not a major problem, implications reveal that this facet of community restoration could become an obstacle in the future. This possibility can be seen from the nature of the housing market being competitive, individual owners, though absentee, may tend to hold on to property as signs of the restoration in the area become more apparent.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The actors in the process of revitalization should collaborate among themselves then with the city to have absentee owned property with serious code violations cited. Failure of the owner to comply, should be registered by formal complaint to the Boston Housing Court.

Determine whether or not the city or state has eminent domain powers to seize absentee owned property by condemnation.

Prepare a definitive property acquisition procedure manual.

In closing, the recommendations presented here not conclusive. They apply to the emerging problems which stem from the present revitalizing of Highland Park. As Highland Park becomes more intensively
revitalized, as I hope it will, new problems will emerge needing alternative solutions.
Chapter II

FOOTNOTES:


Chapter II

FOOTNOTES


Chapter III

FOOTNOTES


Chapter III

FOOTNOTES


Chapter IV

FOOTNOTES


Chapter V

FOOTNOTES

Chapter V

FOOTNOTES


Chapter VI

FOOTNOTES

Funding levels for Years VIII and IX will roughly equal those of Years V, VI and VII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HIGHLAND PARK</th>
<th>NEIGHBORHOOD STRATEGY AREA</th>
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**COB-FUNDED ACTIVITIES**

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**CODE:** $=(expected) allocation  
#=(anticipated) goals
Funding levels for Years VIII and IX will roughly equal those of Years V, VI and VII.

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The Kittredge Square Survey and Planning Area is full of potential for historic and architectural preservation. The area is located between the historic center of Roxbury (John Eliot Square, with its imposing First Church of 1804) and the high ground of Highland Park (the site of a Revolutionary War fort, since 1869 crowned by an ornamental 130-foot water standpipe). Just outside the Kittredge Square area, toward Highland Park, is the William Lloyd Garrison House (125 Highland Street), a National Historic Landmark. Both topographically and architecturally, the area is interesting and varied. The ground slopes considerably, providing handsome views in several directions; on this land, well endowed with trees and other foliage, is a full cross section of suburban architecture of the period 1830-1900.

Historical Background

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Kittredge Square area was undeveloped agricultural upland. Centre Street existed as part of the road from Boston to Dedham and points south, but Highland Street and the various cross streets of the area were not laid out until the second quarter of the nineteenth century. In the summer of 1775, a fort was built at what is now Highland, Linwood, and Cedar Streets; this was the Roxbury Lower Fort, a companion to the High Fort, (now Highland Park) in the chain of defenses that helped bring about the evacuation of the British from Boston.

The beginnings of suburbanization in the area occurred when Highland Street was laid out in 1825. Other streets followed in succeeding years, until by 1860 the present-day street pattern was virtually complete. In 1835, Alvah Kittredge (after whom Kittredge Square was named) purchased several large parcels of land, one of which included both sides of Cedar Street from Centre Street to Washington Street. The following year he built his columned Greek Revival mansion (now at 10 Linwood Street) on the old Lower Fort site. Kittredge was responsible for developing much of the area in the years from 1835 until he sold his mansion in 1866 (he died in 1876). The pattern of development during this period consisted of a gradual selling off of individual lots on which detached single or double houses were built, either by the original developer (such as Kittredge), by a builder on speculation, or by the new owner for his own use.
Besides the Kittredge house (owned after 1871 by architect Nathaniel J. Bradlee), the other major Greek Revival mansion in the Kittredge Square area is the Edward Everett Hale house, originally fronting on Highland Street but now around the corner at 12 Morley Street. The Hale house was built in 1841 by a carpenter named Benjamin Kent; it came into Hale’s ownership in 1869, on a considerably reduced parcel of land.

The easterly parts of Dorr, Millmont, Lambert, and Norfolk Streets were developed beginning in the 1830’s by Nathaniel Dorr, who built the two stone houses on the parcel—21 Dorr Street (1830’s) and 34 Lambert Street (ca. 1840), the latter his own residence. Other sections of the Kittredge Square area were developed in a similar way, so that by 1870 there was a scattering of buildings throughout the area. All were single or double houses, and nearly all were of frame construction. Their size and elaboration varied, and small and large houses were often built in close proximity, although the mansions were generally located on the largest or highest pieces of land. All the mid-nineteenth century styles are represented--Greek Revival, Gothic Revival, Italianate, Mansard.

Row housing first appeared in the Kittredge Square area about 1870, and for a few years it dominated the building scene. Unlike the Back Bay, where most row houses were built for individual owners, the suburban row housing of Roxbury Highlands was built in blocks by developers and then sold off house by house. Some rows were elaborate, such as the brownstone block at 15-27 Highland Avenue (1873). Most were built of red brick, such as those on Morley Street (1872) or at 1-3 and 5-8 Kittredge Park (1871-1874). The row-house boom was a phenomenon of the early 1870’s; subsequent development took the form of multiple-family housing types rather than single-family row houses. The frame three-decker became the most prevalent type in the 1880’s and 1890’s. The most dense and most urban development occurred at the turn of the century, when two estates on Kittredge Park were subdivided and built up with three-story brick tenements. This was when the Kittredge house was moved to its present position at 10 Linwood Street, and another Greek Revival house that originally fronted on Kittredge Park (9 Millmont Street) was all but enveloped.

By about 1900, the Kittredge Square area had reached its maximum density. More recent years have brought a reduction in intensity of land use, as vacant or unmaintainable buildings have been demolished. Through this process, more vacant lots exist now than in the late nineteenth century. The reasons for this situation are tied up with the decline of the neighborhood as a desirable place to live, despite its architectural and environmental assets. The original farming community became suburbanized in the mid-nineteenth century, reaching its high point of development around 1870. Fast, efficient streetcar service from Boston made this development possible, but extension of the service westward opened up outlying regions for settlement for those who wished to move on. The coming of the automobile in the twentieth century enormously increased the commuting range. The Kittredge Square area was passed by, occupied by successively poorer groups of people as their predecessors moved away. The next chapter of the area’s history is about to be written, as urban renewal helps make inroads against the physical decline of the aging buildings. The architectural historian hopes that the best of these buildings will be respected and enhanced as the Kittredge Square area enters its next phase of development.
Major Landmarks

The two most important buildings in the Kittredge Square area, both meeting National Register Criteria of Evaluation for historic or architectural significance, are:

**Alvah Kittredge House, 10 Linwood Street, 1836.** A handsome Greek Revival columned mansion important both for its embodiment of the distinctive characteristics of its type and period and for its associations with the lives of two locally important persons—Alvah Kittredge, early developer of the area, and Nathaniel J. Bradlee, noted Boston architect. Although hemmed in by later buildings, the house occupies a key position visually on Kittredge Square, being clearly visible to anyone approaching the square on Highland Street.

**Edward Everett Hale House, 12 Morley Street, 1841.** Another fine Greek Revival mansion with columned front porch, embodying the distinctive characteristics of its type and period and associated with the life of an illustrious person—Boston minister and writer Edward Everett Hale.

Also an important landmark, though not a building, is:

**Milestone, Centre Street (opposite No. 45), 1729.** Marking the three-mile distance from Boston, this was one of a series of eighteenth-century milestones on the route to Dedham and points south. It is comparable to the nearby Parting Stone (1711) at the intersection of Centre and Roxbury Streets, already listed in the National Register as one of the 1767 milestones along the old Boston Post Road.

Other Buildings of Architectural Interest

While of less significance than the Kittredge and Hale houses, the following buildings in the Kittredge Square area embody the distinctive characteristics of their type, period, or method of construction and may also qualify for the National Register—either individually or collectively. They are all of more than ordinary architectural interest.

1-2-3 Alvah Kittredge Park (1871). Handsome group of three mansard-roofed brick row houses, specifically adapted to the corner site (the entrance to No. 1 is around the corner on Linwood Street). Alvah Kittredge Park, now unfortunately asphalt covered, was originally known as Highland Park, then (beginning around 1870) as Lewis Park. In the present century it was renamed after Kittredge, whose own house, mentioned above, faces the park at 10 Linwood Street.
140 Cedar Street (ca. 1890). Wooden three-decker of ample proportions and considerable style, in admirably original condition.

146 Cedar Street (ca. 1860). Imposing Italianate house with overhanging hip roof, wide corner quoins, and projecting front entry with round-arched door. Later asphalt siding does not obscure the original trim.

6-8 Centre Street (ca. 1860) Bow-fronted brick double house with mansard roof.

48 Centre Street (ca. 1840). Two-story Greek Revival house with full-height facade pilasters.

64 Centre Street (ca. 1840). Greek Revival cottage with one-story temple portico. Unusual pediment treatment.

21 Dorr Street (1830's). Small, hip-roofed stone house, built for and occupied by Captain Nathaniel Dorr, early developer of the surrounding blocks.

41 Dorr Street (ca. 1890). Well-preserved three-decker with round bay at the corner of Lambert Avenue.

15-27 Highland Avenue (1873). Row of seven high-stooped, mansard-roofed brownstones with angular bay windows. In derelict condition but still the most imposing row-house group in the area.

26-28 and 32-34 Highland Avenue (1859). Pair of originally identical double houses set back from the street on elevated grounds. Built at the same time by the same builder, both originally had cupolas; only 26-28 (which is in better condition) does now. The roofs are mansards cut off at either end, giving a gambrel profile.

38 Highland Avenue (ca. 1840). Greek Revival house with two-story pillared porches at either end and one-story pillared porch across the front.

3-5 Highland Street (ca. 1880). Brick double house with Queen Anne dormers and an oriel bay. Although the entrances are paired at the center in the standard double-house pattern, the two halves are not identical—No. 3 is somewhat larger and more ornate than No. 5.

74 Highland Street (ca. 1850). Wooden Italianate house with later brown shingle siding but retaining most of the original trim—entrance porch, dormers, bracketed cornice, round-arched windows.

82 Highland Street (ca. 1890). Bow-fronted brick Colonial Revival house, originally the left end of a three-house row (the other two houses have been demolished).

67 Lambert Avenue (ca. 1860). Frame house with a one-story front porch and a gambrel-like, cut-off mansard roof facing the street. The house is set unusually far back on a deep, narrow lot.
54 Linwood Street (ca. 1840). Greek Revival house with a boxed pediment and a one-story side porch. Faces Linwood Park, a small circular park in Linwood Street.

56 Linwood Street (ca. 1870). Elaborately detailed mansard cottage with corner tower. Faces Linwood Park at the corner of Centre Street.

29-31 Millmont Street (ca. 1870). Brick double house with one-story front porch, high mansard roof, and segmental-arched window lintels.

39 Millmont Street (ca. 1910). Well-preserved twentieth-century three-decker with front and back porches for all three flats.

Groups of Buildings of Architectural and Environmental Interest

In addition to a grouping on Highland Avenue formed by several buildings mentioned above (15-27, 26-28, 32-34, and 38 Highland Avenue), the Kittredge Square area contains two groups of buildings of considerable architectural and environmental interest. In these groupings, the architectural quality of the individual buildings is less important than the combined environmental effect.

Linwood Square. A cul-de-sac extending north off Linwood Street. Bounded on the east by a group of seven brick row houses (2-14 Linwood Square), on the west by a double house (25-27 Linwood Street) and four mansard cottages (5, 7, 9, and 13 Linwood Square). The street narrows at the end and turns into a dirt path leading down the hill to the intersection of Centre Street and Highland Avenue. The final house on the west has an extravagant tower that takes advantage of the commanding view of the Boston skyline.

Morley Street. A cul-de-sac extending northwest off Highland Street. Beyond the Edward Everett Hale house at 12 Morley Street, two groups of brick row houses (both built in 1872) face each other at an angle across a triangular open space (now part of the street but potentially a pedestrian courtyard). The ground drops off beyond, providing views (as at the end of Linwood Square) of downtown Boston.

Conclusion

Major landmarks, buildings of architectural interest, even groups of buildings of architectural and environmental interest do not tell the whole preservation story for the Kittredge Square area. There are a number of lesser buildings that make an important environmental contribution, and many of the area's badly maintained buildings could be rehabilitated to bring back their original style and character. Furthermore, the various parcels of vacant land offer the possibility of new construction that respects and enhances existing historic assets. In sum, Kittredge Square has the potential for broadly based preservation activity that, coupled with conventional rehabilitation efforts, could enormously enhance the physical appearance of the area. There is no reason why the future of Kittredge Square should not be as varied and interesting as its past.