THE YOUTH SERVICES BUREAU STRATEGY:
COMMUNITY - BASED DIVERSION
AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION RECONSIDERED
by
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The Youth Services Bureau: Community-Based Diversion and Delinquency Prevention Reconsidered

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This study attempts to evaluate the potential feasibility and effectiveness of the Youth Service Bureau strategy proposed by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Specifically, the study attempts to identify the constraints which are likely to be imposed on a Youth Service Bureau by the criminal justice system, the youth service system, and by the agency's funding structure. It also attempts to identify variables of internal agency structure which critically affect the ability of an agency to carry out the three Youth Service Bureau goals -- diverting youths from Juvenile Court; providing delinquents and non-delinquents with rehabilitative services; and preventing future delinquency by modifying youth-related institutions and services ("systems change").

The study attempts to identify these constraints and variables by examining the process which occurred when the City of Cambridge attempted to implement the YSB strategy. Information was gathered primarily through a series of semi-structured interviews.

The principal finding of the study was that YSB goals required conflicting program models, and thus should be considered separately in planning delinquency programs. The ability to develop less stigmatizing, rehabilitative alternatives to juvenile court was found to be severely constrained by the unwillingness of the criminal justice system to cede responsibility for cases to a non-authoritarian agency, and by the inability of the youth service system to provide appropriate services for "delinquent" youth.
It was also found that mode of funding, type of internal structure, and level of dependency on criminal justice or youth service agencies were critical factors in determining the YSB's selection of strategies and institutional priorities for change. It was hypothesized from the Cambridge case that a horizontal staff structure would minimize internal conflicts over strategies and priorities. Finally, it was found that the Cambridge YSB's opportunities to intervene in the existing social structure most commonly occurred at the fringes of existing agency mandates; and it was hypothesized that YSB's are more likely to produce changes in the overall shape of the service network than to produce modifications in existing institutions.

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Youth service bureaus were proposed by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1967 as an innovation in pre-judicial process which would not only provide more effective rehabilitation for juveniles than juvenile court, but also help prevent future delinquency within the community. The recommendation was one of the most widely implemented recommendations of the Commission. In late 1971, the Department of the California Youth Authority in a national survey discovered two hundred and sixty two agencies which state, regional and local authorities identified as Youth Service Bureaus (ysb). Sherwood Norman of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency has estimated that over one hundred youth service bureaus were established in 1970 alone. Despite their wide implementation, very little is known about the effectiveness of youth service bureaus.
It will be the purpose of this thesis to examine the value and feasibility of youth service bureaus as a strategy for reducing the incidence of juvenile delinquency. Chapter One will indicate the major trends in delinquency practice and research, as well as the underlying theories of delinquency which led to the formulation of the ysb strategy, and will explain the Youth Service Bureau Model. The existing research on youth service bureaus will be summarized and the major issues yet to be resolved will be indicated. This discussion will provide a basis for defining a set of research questions, and the methodology used for exploring them will be indicated.

**Underlying Theory and Rationale**

The youth service bureau strategy was advanced in response to several different trends in the field of delinquency treatment and prevention. Most directly, according to Lloyd Ohlin, originator of the ysb concept, the strategy responded to mounting disillusionment with the Juvenile Court. This section will briefly examine the reasons for that disillusionment, and indicate how it influenced the attempt to establish ysbs as an alternative to Juvenile Court. It will also explain the Crime Commission's theory of delinquency and indicate how it affected the type of rehabilitative and preventive approaches that were also included in the ysb concept.
The movement to create special courts for juveniles was motivated by what has been characterized as the "protective, rehabilitative ideal", or the desire to treat child law-breakers "as a wise parent would deal with a wayward child" rather than as criminals subject to the full criminal process. Consequently, juvenile court judges were given broad discretion to intervene in the lives of juvenile offenders and guide their "rehabilitation". In the twentieth century, however, it became increasingly apparent that juvenile courts had neither the resources nor the expertise to provide special treatment for juveniles, and that the new juvenile "training schools" were no more humane than adult criminal institutions. Juvenile courts came under increasing criticism in the 1960's with the rise of the civil rights movement; and by 1967, there was considerable evidence that many youth actually received more severe dispositions in juvenile court than they would have in adult criminal court, where rules of due process were in effect. The Crime Commission's Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency recognized the failure of the Juvenile Court to rehabilitate the delinquent youth and bring compassion to the child offender. It recommended that due process be returned to juvenile proceedings, and that a "great deal" of minor juvenile misbehavior be handled by alternative programs.
better equipped for rehabilitation.

The currency of "labeling theory" in the 1960's made the need to find an alternative to Juvenile Court appear even more pressing to the Crime Commission. Several studies in the 1960's tended to support the theory that processes which define individuals as deviants (called labeling) can create negative attitudes, both on the part of society and the individual, which inhibit his ability to succeed in any given context. The Crime Commission pointed out the importance of this theory for juvenile "delinquents":

The juvenile will wear the label longer, while he is likely to outgrow the conduct that brought him the badge; one who acquires the status of a deviant in his youth faces the prospect of lifelong stigmatization.

They argued that official action could help to fix and perpetuate delinquency in a child through a process in which the individual begins to think of himself as delinquent and organizes his behavior accordingly. Furthermore, they postulated that the process was further reinforced by the effect of the labeling on the child's family, neighbors, teachers, and peers, who would come to expect delinquent conduct.

This theory of labeling led the Task Force to the conclusion that official contact with the court should be avoided wherever possible, especially for minor offenders.
In place of the court, a less formal, and therefore less stigmatizing process should be substituted which would "meddle less" in children's lives. It was hypothesized that if a program also dealt with non-delinquents, was based in the offender's community, included youth and other local residents as staff, and required that youth participation be voluntary, then the resulting process would be less stigmatizing.

Thus the Task Force, on the basis of labeling theory and the shortcomings of the juvenile court, argued for the need to establish a less stigmatizing alternative, better equipped for rehabilitating youth. The Task Force Report fails, however, to link this notion explicitly to a theory of rehabilitation. In discussing the rehabilitative and preventive aspects of youth service bureaus, however, the Task Force appeared to be responding to current trends in theories of delinquency causation.

The Task Force noted that there is no shortage of theories of the etiology of delinquency. These theories vary most significantly according to the extent that they fix the cause of delinquency in the make-up of the individual rather than in the structure of the society and its institutions. The earliest theories placed primary emphasis on deficiencies in the innate traits of individuals or on
their individual psychologies. More contemporary theories have emphasized the role of immediate environmental factors, such as a weak family structure or exposure to a deviant subculture, in leading to delinquent behavior. Several relatively recent theories have emphasized the role of the social structure in promoting delinquency by blocking legitimate paths to wealth for lower-class individuals. These theories often suggest the formation of deviant subcultures as an intervening variable in the causal model.  

It is clear that the Task Force ascribed to this latter ("structural") view of delinquency:

The Commission doubts that even a vastly improved criminal justice system can substantially reduce crime if society fails to make it possible for citizens to feel a personal stake in it...The sense of stake, of something that can be gained or lost, can come only through real opportunity for full participation in society's life and growth.  

The Task Force indicated that their theoretical orientation was derived primarily from Cloward and Ohlin's *Delinquency and Opportunity* (1960). In that work, the authors summarize their theory of delinquency as follows:

It is our view that pressures toward the formation of delinquent subcultures originate in marked discrepancies between culturally induced aspirations among lower-class youth and the possibilities of achieving them by legitimate means...delinquency is not, in the final analysis, a property of individuals or even of subcultures; it is a property of the social systems in which these individuals and groups are enmeshed.
This "structural" theory of delinquency fixes the cause of delinquency primarily with existing "social systems". Its broad implications for prevention strategies are fairly clear. Cloward and Ohlin indicate that the primary focus of delinquency prevention efforts should be on changing social systems so as to expand the opportunities for lower-class youth to attain material success (since they consider material success to be the culturally-defined measure of success). Accordingly, the Task Force indicates that, "It is insuring opportunity that is the basic goal of prevention programs." 12

The implications of this theory of delinquency for rehabilitation programs are less obvious, and the Task Force Report does not illuminate the transition. The types of measures they recommend suggest, however, that they were responding to an approach described in the Mobilization for Youth Program's Proposal for the Prevention and Control of Delinquency by Expanding Opportunities. Based on the work of Cloward and Ohlin, the proposal provides a rationale for working with individual youths in order to help bridge the gap between deviant subcultures and social "opportunity structures".

...merely providing new opportunities may not alleviate delinquency if youngsters are not also helped to exploit these opportunities. We noted that people who are denied access to various social resources soon lose the capacity to make use of them. Indeed, they may even develop organized patterns of living which become barriers to the utilization of opportunity...We suggest, therefore, that program forms must be evolved which
will permit us to intervene in arresting these self-defeating models of behavior. \(^{13}\)

The statement suggests that under a structural theory of delinquency an appropriate strategy for rehabilitating youths would be to provide them with services which will increase their capacity to take advantage of opportunities for success.

Later in the proposal, the authors argue that a second major function of a rehabilitation program should be to engage youth in efforts to change the "social systems" which are the cause of their "alienation from the large society". They argue that by providing youth with opportunities for constructive expression of alienation, a program would reduce the likelihood of its expression in delinquent acts.

**The Youth Service Bureau Model**

In proposing the youth service bureau concept, the Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency appears to have been attempting to respond to all of these trends in thought about the juvenile court and about rehabilitation and prevention programs. The Task Force Report appears to specify three levels of goals or purposes for ysbs. In apparent order of importance, they are: to divert youths from the stigmatizing effect of juvenile court; to provide improved rehabilitative services to individual trouble-making youths at the neighborhood level (primarily as an
alternative to court processing); and to increase public pressure for better "youth development services" as a means of delinquency prevention.

The prescribed methods for achieving these goals are consistent with the theories of labeling, rehabilitation, and prevention indicated above. Unfortunately, the program model is never specified very precisely. The scheme for diverting youths from court and establishing an alternative process primarily appears to entail a "referral model" - i.e., the youth service bureau is envisioned as receiving referrals from the police and courts and guiding those youths and others (school-, family-, or self-referred) to the service resources of the community. The Task Force Report makes it clear that the primary target group for these services should be delinquents, although troublesome or potentially troublesome non-delinquents should also be included.

While some of its [ysb's] cases would normally originate with parents, schools and other sources, the bulk of the referrals could be expected to come from the police and the juvenile court intake staff, and police and court referrals should have special status in that the youth service bureau would be required to accept them all. 15

It is emphasized that to the maximum extent possible, acceptance of bureau services should be voluntary so as to avoid labeling, and so that the dangers and disadvantages of coercive power would not merely be transferred
from the juvenile court. The Task Force recognized however, that it might be necessary to vest youth service bureaus with the authority to refer to court those individuals with whom they could not deal effectively.

The Task Force Report also indicates to some extent the type of rehabilitative services to be provided and comments on how they should be provided. The types of services could include group and individual counseling, placement in group and foster homes, work and recreational programs, employment counseling, and special education (remedial, vocational). They should primarily be obtained from community agencies, either through purchase or by voluntary agreement with community organizations. Use of community agencies is emphasized as a means of avoiding the stigma of being processed by an official agency regarded by the public as an arm of crime control. According to a consultant's report by Burns and Stern (which is appended to the Task Force Report), the role of the YSB in obtaining these services should be that of an "advocate", "on behalf of youth whose behavior or social situation...denies them full access to community services and opportunities". Advocacy is not further defined, however.
In accordance with the Mobilization for Youth proposal, the Task Force Report also suggest a more active role for youth in their own rehabilitation. It suggests that a youth's "responsible involvement" in activities which provide more opportunities for growth for himself and his peers will help give him "a reason to care about his world -- a stake in a healthy society."

Thus it is indicated that youth should be encouraged to help operate community centers, plan neighborhood organization and improvement efforts, develop programs that will attract other youth, run youth centers of their own, and participate in civil rights and political activities. It is hypothesized that these activities would help keep youths out of further trouble, since they would engage their immediate energies and at the same time enlist them for more long-term commitment to the goals of society.

Consonant with this concept of youth responsibility, and involvement in expanding their own opportunities, Burns and Stern recommend that ysbs should have local governing boards with heavy youth representation on them.

The report is particularly vague on the issue of how and to what extent youth service bureaus should "increase pressure for better youth development services". At one point the Task Force Report indicates simply that the use of locally sponsored or operated organizations will
heighten the community's awareness of the need for recreational, employment, tutoring and other youth development services. It then suggests that community residents should be involved in "engendering the sense of public responsibility" that will be necessary to gain support for new youth programs. Numerous other portions of the Task Force Report suggest that obtaining better youth development services will require changing existing institutions as well as creating new programs. In particular, Burns and Stern point to, "the need for our institutions to produce better education, strengthen family life, improve opportunities for employment, and make...social services more relevant and more accessible to those who need them most." 17 They indicate that youth service bureaus should be involved in making institutions more relevant. They point out that a ysb should have the authority to coordinate other youth services and to bring pressures on those agencies to make their services more relevant to the needs of "youth in difficulty". It is suggested that this pressure could be brought to bear on agencies if ysb staff was located in schools, recreation departments, gang projects, neighborhood development centers, and welfare agencies. Thus the concept of prevention (through the creation and modification of youth programs) is linked to the ysb concept, but its relation to other bureau functions is never clarified.
In summary, the Commission appears to describe youth service bureaus as non-coercive, community agencies which perform the following functions:

-- diverting minor delinquents from juvenile court by means of referrals from police, courts, and other agencies.

-- rehabilitating these youths (and other potential "delinquents") by linking them to community-based services and involving them in activities to expand their own opportunities for development.

-- promoting changes in current institutions, and developing new programs so as to increase the access of youth to opportunities for success.

Other significant features of the bureaus are the involvement of youth and community persons in agency decision-making, and the inclusion of youth and local non-professionals, along with trained professionals as staff.

Several other writers have sought to refine the ysb concept. The most significant of these was Sherwood Norman of the NCCD, who produced an extensive set of guidelines for the establishment of youth service bureaus. Labeling them as the "the key to delinquency prevention", Norman defines a ysb as:

a noncoercive, independent public agency established to divert children and youth from the justice system by (1) mobilizing community resources to solve youth problems (2) strengthening existing youth resources and developing new ones, and (3) promoting positive programs to remedy delinquency-breeding conditions.

He then lists three functions of a youth service bureau as linking referred youth to community services, developing new resources for disadvantaged youth, and modifying
existing systems (institutions) which "discriminate against troublesome...youth and...contribute to their anti-social behavior" so as to make them responsive to youth needs. Norman's conception is significant in that it places much more emphasis than the Crime Commission Report on the need for ysbs to play an active role in modifying systems which affect youth.

For the purposes of this study, it seems reasonable to summarize the purposes of youth service bureaus as being three-fold: diversion of youth from the "stigmatizing effect" of juvenile court; provision of more effective rehabilitation through procurement of community services and involvement of youth in systems change; and long-range prevention of delinquency through social change. Systems, or social, change, for the purpose of this study, is defined as any change in the number, internal structure, or patterns of interaction of institutions (or services) within a system or related systems such that youth access to power or services is improved. 19

Thus both labeling theory and a structural theory of delinquency causation formed the basis for the development of the youth services bureau strategy. The implicit assumption of this strategy is that all three ysbs functions can be carried out within the framework of one comprehensive agency; i.e., that one agency can operate within the framework of the criminal justice system in
obtaining referrals, within the framework of the youth service/child welfare system in securing services and modifying institutional patterns, and within the framework of the lower-class community in enlisting youth cooperation and participation in systems change. The issue which then must be addressed is whether or not the systems and settings within which a ysb must operate are sufficiently compatible to tolerate all three types of activities.

State of Existing Research

Despite the wide implementation of the youth service bureau concept, very few studies have been conducted to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of the strategy. Most of the literature to date on ysbs has been largely descriptive or conjectural. Scattered reports have provided descriptions of local programs, and a recently completed national study of youth service bureaus, commissioned by the Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration, provided gross national statistics on the number, types of programs, target populations, and level of funding of youth service bureaus across the country. These studies do not contain a sufficient level of empirical detail, however, to permit analysis of the factors which affect the ability of a youth service bureau to fulfill the role envisioned by the President's Crime Commission.
Most of the other literature on youth service bureaus has consisted of critiques, clarifications or elaborations of the Crime Commission's proposals. Most of these critiques have been based on conjecture, rather than empirical studies, and their assumptions are as badly in need of testing as those of the Commission. The controversy in the literature has primarily focused on the relative emphasis which should be given to each goal and on the variables of agency design which would be most conducive to their attainment. A number of authors have argued that some of the most important variables would be:

-- the percentage of cases which come from the police and courts

-- the types of offenses which the ysb handles

-- the strength of the formal ties of the youth service bureau to the police and courts

-- the amount of coercive authority vested in ysbs

-- whether the agency is public or private

-- the percentage of staff which is non-professional

-- the extent to which youth participate in or control the agency

-- the extent to which the ysb remains as an advocate of youth in conflicts with parents or authorities

-- the extent to which a ysb focuses on coordinating existing agencies, rather than developing new services

-- the extent to which it provides direct services as opposed to referred services

-- the methods used to change existing systems
--the extent to which the program uses "detached workers" to recruit clients from the neighborhoods (referred to as the extent of "outreach")

--the systems, which are selected as objects of change

It has been hypothesized that each of these variables will have an effect on the role which the youth service bureau establishes within the juvenile and youth service systems and thus on the extent to which it fulfills its goals of diversion, rehabilitation, and prevention.

Preliminary reports on existing programs suggest that there is a critical need to determine appropriate values for the above variables. John Seymour, reporting on a conference on youth service bureaus held in January of 1971, indicated there was considerable confusion among the participants about the appropriate role of ysbs in the pattern of organizations for dealing with youth. Models of agency operation varied widely along all of the dimensions outlined above, and the agencies assumed widely different roles within their communities. Many of the bureaus found their objectives conflicting, and were embroiled in internal conflicts and conflicts with other agencies.

Before local, state, and federal criminal justice planners can reasonably make policy decisions with respect to the implementation of youth service bureaus, at least three general issues eventually must be resolved: How feasible and effective are youth service bureaus as a
strategy for providing a rehabilitative alternative to juvenile court? How feasible and effective are youth service bureaus as a strategy for preventing delinquency through systems change? How do the constraints imposed by the juvenile justice and youth service systems, as well as variables of agency design, affect the success of operation in each case?

The Study Approach

This study will attempt to shed light on these issues through an examination of what happens when a city attempts to implement the youth service bureau as a comprehensive youth agency with several possibly conflicting goals. Five areas of questions will be addressed:

1. What role does the ysb establish in the juvenile justice system?
   - What level of referrals is it able to obtain?
   - Is it able to circumvent the adjudicatory process?
   - Is it accepted by the police and courts?
   - For what type of cases does it assume responsibility?
   - Does it avoid stigma?

2. What role does the ysb establish in the youth service/child welfare system?
   - Can it obtain community services?
   - Does it coordinate delivery of service to individual youths?
   - Does it produce changes in other agencies so as to better meet youth needs?
   - Does it create new services in response to youth needs?
   - Does it increase the ability of youth to generate better services for themselves?
What alternative self-definitions does the ysb create for itself?

3. What are the critical features of (and conflicts between) these two systems which determine the ysb's role?

4. What are the internal organizational factors which are determinant of its role (e.g., staff structure, leadership, client participation, base of operation - detached workers vs. office, advisory boards, prevention ideology)?

5. What other factors external to the above systems are critical? In particular, how does the federal, state and local control structure affect the role and success of operation of the ysb?

These questions will be addressed in the context of the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Cambridge Youth Resources Board provides an excellent model for a case study because of its age and its prototypical proposal. Now entering its fourth year of operation, the YRB was one of the earliest youth service bureaus. Its original proposal responded precisely to the President's Commission's recommendations, and in its brief history, the YRB has been involved in the full range of issues at the heart of the youth service bureau controversy.

As with all single case studies, it is difficult to generalize confidently from the experiences of one agency. The density of information available in the case study, however, makes it possible to begin to generalize about the necessity of particular types of organizations where
certain internal conditions or external influences are present. Thus the richness of empirical data available in the Cambridge case should make it possible to begin to identify variables and construct models of the systems and organizational constraints on the roles and functions of youth service bureaus. Future studies comparing the experiences of other YSBs would make it possible to develop and test these models.

The comparative work that does exist suggests that most youth service bureaus have been subject to most of the problems — with criminal justice agencies, youth service agencies, city administrations, staff, and goal priorities — which the Cambridge YRB encountered; even though different agency design features or idiosyncrasies of personality have produced very different resolutions of these problems. The Cambridge YRB was unusually comprehensive and well funded, and had available to it as resources an unusually large number of social service agencies. Thus it should have had unusually good prospects for success. Its outreach component was more highly developed and aggressive than that of most YSBs, however, which may have led to an unusually high level of staff conflict and biased the way in which the agency determined goal priorities. Otherwise, however, the circumstances facing the Cambridge YRB were very similar to those which would face any agency in a city of comparable size, and the Cambridge model was
generally consistent with the guidelines for youth service bureaus established by the President's Crime Commission and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD).

The primary research technique employed in this study was the interview, since that appeared to be the most promising means of obtaining descriptive information on Cambridge social systems and the process by which the YRB attempted to establish a place in those systems. Over sixty-five individuals were interviewed from five basic groups: YRB staff - present and past; YRB clients, both youths and parents; juvenile justice system agencies -- police, court and probation; interacting youth service agencies; administrative control agencies -- the City of Cambridge and the Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. These groups were the only sources capable of providing answers to the five areas of questions raised earlier. Semi-structured interviews were conducted, in which the interviewee was asked to respond to a pre-specified set of topics. Interviews ranged from one to two hours.

Quantitative data was unfortunately scarce, but such data as did exist in YRB evaluations and quarterly reports was used to provide information on referrals from court and police and referrals to and from other agencies. Some limited observation of YRB activities was also made to increase personal understanding and
appreciation and to corroborate findings.
CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

1. Hereafter referred to as the President's Crime Commission, the Crime Commission, or the Commission.


8. Task Force, p. 16.

9. For a concise summary of the works of the principal proponents of each of these genres of theories, see Rosenquist, Carl and Edwin I, Megargee, Delinquency in Three Cultures (Austin, 1969), pp. 11-33.

10. p. 41.


12. p. 41.

14. The Task Force does not specify the age range of the target population, but they generally appear to imply that a ysb'd jurisdiction should be coextensive with Juvenile Court.

15. p. 20.


17. p. 361.


19. Robert S. Weiss, "Alternative Approaches in the Study of Complex Situations," Human Organization, XXV (1966), pp. 198-206. Weiss defines a system as a collection of variables such that from any state of the system at a particular time, there can result only one possible state of the system. He indicates that real social institutions only approach this condition. They may be described as bounded with respect to certain elements, and externally determined with respect to others. See also Mayer, pp. 21-30.

20. By Kenneth Polk, John Martin, John Seymour, Margaret Rosenheim, Sherwood Norman, and others.


22. For a careful analysis of the merits of the case study in modeling complex situations, see Weiss, pp. 198-203.

24. In 1972, the YRB had an annual budget of about $250,000 compared to the $75,000 median annual budget of youth service bureaus reported in Youth Service Bureaus: A National Study.

CHAPTER II: SETTING AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE CAMBRIDGE YOUTH RESOURCES BUREAU

Considerable insight into the feasibility of the youth service bureau strategy can be gained from a close examination of the setting in which youth service bureaus must function. Accordingly, Chapter II will have three purposes: 1) to describe the origins and rationale for the initial design of the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau, indicating its basic similarity to the Crime Commission model as well as its distinctive design features, 2) to set out the significant actors within the CYRB, the administrative control agencies, the juvenile justice system, and the youth service system, and indicate their initial expectations, and 3) in so doing, to begin to identify the internal structural variables and the systems constraints which critically determine achievement of the YSB goals set out above, i.e., court diversion, co-ordinated delivery of remedial services, and long-range delinquency prevention through youth development.
Original Rationale and Design

The history of the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau began in the fall of 1967, although it was almost three years before the fledgling organization opened its doors. The original idea for a youth service bureau in Cambridge quite clearly stemmed from the President's Crime Commission report. Not only did the report provoke the interest of local politicians, but it was a letter from James Vorenberg (Executive Director of the Commission), Lloyd Ohlin (originator of the youth service bureau concept), and others at the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice which initiated Cambridge's efforts to establish a local youth service bureau. John Nelson¹, then attached to the Community Development Section of Cambridge City Government, was assigned to follow up on the letter, which suggests developing a proposal to obtain federal funding for a youth service bureau in Cambridge.

Nelson began meeting with the Harvard group, and the idea which they outlined emphasized the formal diversion goal as expressed in the Crime Commission report. At the same time, however, another group in Cambridge, spearheaded by Cambridge Corporation², was making plans to establish a year-round, detached field worker program to provide outreach counselling and services to anti-social pre-delinquents. Their efforts grew out of limited previous streetwork programs aimed at bringing services to those "hard-to-reach-
youth" who resisted traditional services and disrupted agency programs. Nelson brought the two groups together and effected an uneasy political merger. The Cambridge Corp. group welcomed the formal diversion concept since they would be able to deal with the individuals in their own neighborhoods; the Harvard group more reluctantly accepted the detached worker component, presciently retaining concerns that this component would make the program too diffuse. Nonetheless, they were willing to accept the detached-worker feature as a potentially effective means of involving non-delinquent youth in the YRB programs, thereby reducing Bureau stigma.

With the help of both groups, Nelson drew up a single proposal. The envisioned bureau was to perform two functions: 1) long-range prevention, to be carried out by the detached neighborhood workers acting as advocates for individual youth, and 2) rehabilitation for police and court-referred youth, to be handled by a separate staff prepared to act more coercively. Both staffs, with the director, would be responsible for coordinating the delivery of existing services to individual youth and for helping "to introduce needed services that are not currently available".

Also, during this time, Nelson, with the support of members of the City Council and City Manager's Office, made the highly critical decision to establish the YRB as a line city agency, with the director immediately responsible to
responsibility of the city. Consequently, Nelson opted for a public agency, hoping that the Advisory Board, comprised of community people and a few political allies, such as a former councilman and a judge, would help the YRB to resist certain city pressures.

A cooperative City Council approved Nelson's proposal, which was submitted to the Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement in the summer of 1969. The council later created the YRB by executive order and voted it a first year supplementary appropriation of forty thousand dollars.

While Cambridge was thus engaged in developing a model, the Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement was also taking action to promote the development of youth service bureaus. The staff adopted the idea from the President's Crime Commission and the standards and guidelines subsequently prepared by the California Youth Authority and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. According to one staff member, "we had a very naive simplistic view of it then. It sounded good, and we thought we ought to try it in Massachusetts." Consequently, in 1969, the Committee circulated a prospectus (patterned after the Crime Commission guidelines) requesting proposals for "Youth Resources Bureas" to serve delinquents and pre-delinquents and act as a central agency for dealing with youth problems. Because of their own uncertainty about appropriate models, the Committee encouraged experimentation. Thus, Cambridge's detached worker feature had a particular
appeal to the Committee staff. Prior to final approval of the Cambridge proposal, however, the Committee made the critical decision to delete from the proposal a provision which would have allowed the Bureau to refer unmanageable cases back to the court after a 30 or 60 day trial period. This decision constituted a departure from the Crime Commission's recommendations, and Nelson and others in Cambridge feared that it would "turn off" the police and courts from using the YRB. The Committee concurred with NCCD however in maintaining that the provision would make the Bureau too stigmatizing and coercive. This decision, along with the decision to establish a public agency, was to be of paramount importance in shaping the future of the CYRB.

At the time that funding was officially approved in early 1970, the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau appeared to have excellent prospects of success. Nelson had spent considerable time talking to and securing support from representatives of the police, the courts, and city and private agencies, so that, as a former Cambridge agency worker put it, "everyone was waiting with bated breath" for the arrival of the new agency. The Chief of Police wrote that, "Of all the 1969 law enforcement action projects for which Cambridge is eligible, we would give top priority to this proposal." The City Manager also gave the YRB "top priority" and the funding proposal was also officially endorsed by the Cambridge District Court and over 20 public
and private agencies. 6

The same agency worker quoted above also indicated, however, that everyone was not quite sure of just what it was they were waiting for. In fact, interviews conducted with many of those who originally endorsed the proposal revealed a multitude of diverse and often conflicting expectations. The apparent coalition of enthusiastic support was in reality a rather fragile confederation of self-interests.

Nelson, as principal designer of the YRB, anticipated that court diversion would be the dominant role of the agency, and his greatest fear was that the Bureau would be so overwhelmed with the day-to-day processing of police and court referrals that it would lose sight of its long-range prevention goal. (The 1969 proposal estimates that the police and courts would wish to refer about 210 youth each year.) He was also concerned that the field workers not become too extended for fear they would stray too far from serving youth in "serious trouble." 7 He hoped that "case-work with individuals would lead to a recognition of common problems and lack of resources and then the YRB would initiate change." They would not take on the new functions themselves, because "if they adopted the actual functions, who would be the agitator?" In order to protect against the YRB losing sight of its program development and systems change role, Nelson helped secure a grant from the President's
Youth Opportunity Council to pay for a separate person, who would have no caseload, but would work with the Board, the kids, and agencies to develop needed programs.

Nelson's conception was not shared by many other agencies in Cambridge, however; and it would not be accurate to say that it represented the city's view. The City Councilors certainly had a range of expectations; furthermore there was a massive change in executive city personnel immediately after the hiring of the YRB's director, with Nelson, and most of the city administration personnel which supported the original proposal, leaving Cambridge government.

**Police Expectations**

Interviews with police revealed that although the head of the juvenile bureau was in favor of the idea of the YRB, he saw the Bureau more as a social work resource which could help relieve police of the burden of dealing with time-consuming, non-criminal cases which were brought to their attention. Several policemen were apparently at least a little suspicious of the prospective new agency, for as one commented, "Maybe in California or someplace they're used to this, but the whole idea was pretty new around here!" There were apparently three functions which the police expected the new YRB might serve for them: 1) to relieve them of the burden of dealing with the least serious cases. Many cases which involved personal, family, neighborhood, or school
problems were normally handled by "station adjustment". --
a Saturday morning conference consisting of a lecture on
some sort of settlement. These cases usually did not
warrant arrest, but were time-consuming; and policemen
often felt inadequate to resolve the problems they presented.
The existence of a Youth Resources Bureau would enable them
to refer these cases to someone else who could take responsi-
bility for follow-up. As one lieutenant put it, "When
there was a runaway, and the parents complain they have no
control over the kid,... at least we could tell them there
was someplace to go." An officer from the narcotics unit
indicated that he had intended to send every marijuana
smoker to the YRB. 2) to help the police deal with their
most recurrent offenders. With these cases, in addition to
taking the youth to court, the police wanted to be able to
call the YRB to provide counseling or other professional
help to keep the individual from continually repeating his
crime. The processing of cases of continual repeaters
(especially where severe psychological or social problems
were involved) were also time-consuming and particularly
frustrating for the police. 3) to assist the police in
penetrating high crime areas. Some of the policemen apparently
hoped that the detached workers would act in some situations
as an extended arm of the police, helping to maintain order
and aiding detectives. Notably absent from this list, con-
try to the intent of the original designers, is the intent to use the YRB as an alternative to taking youth to court.

**Court Expectations**

Court personnel viewed the YRB from an entirely different perspective. One of the judges of the Cambridge court explained it this way, "Well, yes, I was on the original task force, but I was mostly a front man, you know. We took the idea right out of the Crime Commission report. 'Diversion' was a pizazz word then, and it had selling power. I put my name on it along with Vorenberg and the others. It was a way of getting more resources for the court... Diversion is overrated in my opinion. The main thing is to have the most resources you can so that somebody is always paying attention to the cases." [emphasis added] A probation office confirmed the desire to use the new YRB as a probation resource. "Yeah, I expected the YRB to do pretty much the same thing as probation staff, only they could be more thorough because of the smaller caseload." Staff also hoped that the YRB could be "a sort of central clearinghouse", a link from the probation staff to the staff and resources of outside programs. Thus the intent of the court, again contrary to the original purpose, was apparently not to cede responsibility for less serious cases to the YRB, but rather to use the YRB as an additional resource for its grossly overworked probation staff.
### Expectations of the Youth Service Agencies

The endorsing social agencies, meanwhile, had an entirely different set of interests in the YRB. It is difficult to determine their expectations precisely, because of the wide range of agencies and the considerable staff turnovers which have occurred since 1969. Although there was general enthusiasm, there was also considerable uncertainty. Agency executives professed a predominant "wait and see" attitude, but were able to indicate some of the following hopes and fears:

1) A few predominantly new agencies with similar target populations hoped that the YRB workers would be able to help them to begin to identify potential clients.

2) Several hoped that the YRB, as general delinquency experts, would be able to help them with their troublesome cases. This help could be in the form of consultation or outright referral. A Recreation Department official expressed his expectations as: "If we were having trouble with a youngster in one of our facilities,... Or, if there was vandalism at one of our centers (vandalism is a large cost to us every year) and we thought we knew who was doing it, then... the YRB could go in and do the job of the police department -- see if our assumptions were right, and try to get the youngsters back on the straight road.... They could have been a turn-off in the right direction, short of having to call the police."
3) Several of the private agencies hoped that the new YRB might "transcend usual agency boundaries" by helping them to coordinate competing programs and make better use of each other's resources.

4) They also hoped that the YRB might make available additional personnel and funds that would help them develop new programs, and

5) They thought the YRB, as a city agency, might give them "a direct pipeline to the City Manager", but

6) The agencies were also quite cautious and anxious about whether or not the new agency had any better answers than they had. The public agencies were particularly uneasy, since the YRB could become a competitor for funds and the right to control services; to some extent, its very existence was an indictment that, as one city politician put it, "somehow, the School Department and the Recreation Department just weren't doing the job."

Thus, the youth service agencies presented a range of expectations (differing according to whether the agency was public or private, and whether or not it was concerned with the same target population) which suggested both reasons for cooperation and reasons for resistance to YRB goals.

Initial Expectations of the YRB Administration

It was in the midst of these conflicting expectations that the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau officially came
into being in June of 1970. The recently appointed director was from Chicago and had had little contact with the group which prepared the original proposal and approved his hiring. Initially, however, he set out to establish the Bureau according to the proposal guidelines.

It is clear from interviews and a Bureau report appearing in February 1971 that the original priority of the YRB administration was to establish themselves as a referral agency, with the police and courts providing the bulk of their caseload. A former administrative staff member recalled, "The original idea was to be a referral agency. The target population would be delinquents, pre-delinquents, generally troublesome or unmanageable kids. The YRB would be an advocate for the kids; it wouldn't provide direct treatment, but it would evaluate and refer. The idea was that it would not be labelling. We wouldn't say 'you have a problem', but rather 'there is a problem; what can we do about it?'... And then, they'd (YRB) provide consultation to programs around on how to relate to kids that were causing them trouble." The February report estimates that 68% of YRB staff time would be occupied with police referrals, and 20% with court referrals, with neighborhood outreach work presumably consuming most of the rest. Initially it was conceived that professional counselors would back up the non-professional streetworkers, who would establish "trust relationships" and provide neighborhood expertise.
The referral model was the primary focus in early planning, but the director and his staff were interested in exploring a variety of approaches to youth problems. Staff members got the impression that the new agency would be "very flexible and very active", and that the concepts of youth advocacy and social change would be integrally related to the referral model. At least rhetorically, the Bureau seemed to want to take all of its charges seriously -- but as will be explained presently, doing so was to bring them into sharp conflict with juvenile justice agency expectations, with serious implications for the effort to establish a referral agency.
CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. Since Nelson had only recently joined the city administration, and spent only a brief time in that position, there seems to be little reason to assume that he had any hidden ulterior motives in designing the YRB.

2. A local, non-profit United Fund agency.

3. Cambridge has a City Manager type of local government. The Manager is appointed by the City Council for an indefinite term. Although the Mayor and the City Council have general responsibility for setting policy, implementation is entirely the responsibility of the City Manager.

4. As opposed to amending the City Charter, and thereby establishing the YRB as a more permanent City Department. This step left the City with the option of simply discontinuing the Bureau, if desired, if and when Federal funding elapsed.

5. The Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement is the State criminal justice planning agency, which is responsible for distributing Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funds in Massachusetts. 70% of these funds must be channeled through local units of government.
CHAPTER III: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM -- WALKED OUT OR LOCKED OUT?

In the course of its brief history, the Cambridge YRB has undergone a considerable shift in goal priorities -- moving away from the formal diversion goal of providing a services alternative to juvenile court and toward "systemic change" of "systems relevant to youth". The announcement that "priorities have shifted" first appeared in an October 1971 funding proposal, and by the end of 1972, the director stated that "police and court referrals are no longer a significant part of our program plan."

This chapter will trace the development of pressures generated by the YRB structure, by the Youth Service and Criminal Justice Systems, and by the State funding source which led to both considerable internal goal confusion and the eventual failure of the diversion-referral model. The chapter will also examine the Bureau's early struggles to redefine its goals, and attempt to explain why, at least a rhetorical commitment was made to a systems change goal.
Inside the YRB - Initial Problems

Staff Composition and Structure

In order to fulfill its mandate to perform a variety of functions ranging from streetwork and community organizing to professional counseling to agency coordination and program development, the YRB required a staff with diverse capabilities. About half of the staff that was initially hired were professionals, with bachelors degrees or better, generally with some training in social work or psychology. Part of this staff was hired, according to the Director and other staff, to provide diagnoses, evaluate referred cases, and to back up non-professional outreach workers; and a part of this staff was hired to carry out agency coordination and program development aimed at long-range prevention through expanded youth opportunities.

The non-professional staff was comprised primarily of local residents who had considerable experience as community street workers. Some of them had police records; most of them had little or no college education. They were largely local representatives of ethnic Cambridge communities whose role it was to penetrate those communities and establish the "trust relationships" with youth that would facilitate voluntary acceptance of outreach and referred services and voluntary participation in local program development. A few sympathetic Court officials supported the director in his effort to gain City approval for some of these hirings, because, as one judge put it, a "worker like Jack Tyson
[a particularly charismatic and effective street-worker with a police record, according to the YRB director and several youths] could make or break a new program like that." The director further clarified his reasons for hiring non-professionals and "long-hair types" with a heavy street-work orientation:

The YRB had its origin in a time of considerable political turmoil -- war protests, Kent State -- and the street scene was very big. Street kids were becoming very politically aware and were hanging around places like Harvard Square because of the political activity, the street scene, and the drugs. Youth-police and youth-establishment tensions were running very high... If we were going to be a voluntary organization, we needed to have workers who could communicate with the kids, who the kids would trust.

After staff was hired, the YRB began operation with a very loose and flexible structure, but with the role of administrative and line (or service) staff fairly well differentiated. Administrative Staff (the Director and the Program Coordinator, and later the Assistant Director) primarily directed their activity at other Cambridge agencies. The director began meeting with the police, the courts, the City Council, the City Manager, the many social agencies, the Governor's Committee, etc, in order to get the program set up internally and to establish the relationships and agreements that would bring referrals in and make referrals out possible. Supposedly, the director was also to have done some casework, but as the YRB 1971 funding proposal states, "Experience has proven that a great deal of the Director's time is spent developing inter-personal relation-
The rest of the staff, on the other hand, in sharp contrast to the administration, had little official contact with the agencies. The formal referral model took time to negotiate and establish, and in the interim, the staff was dispatched to establish the detached worker model. At least for some of the staff workers, this street activity was quite natural, and the Bureau was able to set this model into motion very quickly. Three teams of 2 to 3 workers were formed, each containing professionals and non-professionals, and each working with the youth in a particular high-crime area of the city. They began talking with youths and local community leaders about local youth problems, and began informal counseling and crisis intervention. In order to be effective in averting crises, the Bureau decided to establish a 24-hour on-call policy since most juvenile activity and crime took place, according to police records, between 3 P.M. and 1 A.M. Workers tried to keep their kids out of trouble, and the kids began to come to workers with their problems -- a family problem, a drug overdose, a school problem, a job problem, an attempted suicide, etc. As trust relationships developed (as one girl from Jefferson Park put it, "They were the first adults we'd ever met that we could talk to -- it was really different."), youths also began to "drop in" at the YRB to "rap" with the street workers.
The need to perform a wide variety of functions created confusion over appropriate staff roles and generated considerable tension between professionals and non-professional staff. "Patty Jones [a Ph.D. psychologist] for example", said one former YRB worker, "had a hell of a time figuring out whether she was supposed to be in the office diagnosing and counseling referred kids or out on the wall in Roosevelt Towers [a housing project hang-out]. Their roles weren't clear -- they weren't 'social-worker' or 'clinician' or 'teacher'. All the traditional roles were wiped out. That was part of what the agency was supposed to be all about...but it led to confusion, confusion led to frustration, and frustration led to anger and disorder."

The "expertise" of professionals was challenged by the street-knowledge of the non-professionals. For example, the Bureau had set a policy on police and court referrals of waiting 10 days for the youth to contact the YRB, in order to allow the opportunity for voluntary contact (thus reducing stigma) before a YRB outreach worker would contact the youth in his neighborhood. The YRB had planned that the non-professional outreach worker would then turn the case over to the supervision of the professional on that team, who would be responsible for final diagnosis and referral. Both youth and non-professional staff often objected to this approach however, and finally it was decided, in a full staff meeting, to allow non-professionals full responsibility for those cases
where they had established "trust relationships" with a youth.

Non-professionals, on the other hand, sometimes had problems seeing beyond a street-work, crisis intervention perspective. Some of them had difficulty interacting with court or police or agency personnel who many of them mistrusted, or they lacked interest in the program and service development aspect of the Bureau's mandate. They sometimes felt inferior, or overwhelmed by professional jargon. One such worker had to be fired early in the Bureau's history because of his conflicts with other staff and his inability to internalize long-range YRB goals.

In response to these tensions, staff roles became more highly differentiated according to the skills and inclinations of staff members. Non-professionals tended to dominate street and neighborhood work, with a few of the younger, less highly trained professionals also shifting primarily into the neighborhood worker role. Professionals tended to either move into the role of consultant on police and court referral cases or into administrative or program development roles. One effect of this increased differentiation of functions was to widen the separation between administrative staff (who were primarily absorbed in office-based work and interagency meetings) and line (or service) staff (who were primarily involved in neighborhood work). This separation bred mistrust, particularly on the part of
line staff, who began to question the director's ability to appreciate and deal with daily youth problems. Both staffs became increasingly concerned about how the other was representing the YRB to outside parties.

**Implementation Problems -- The Youth Service System**

As referrals from the police and courts began to come in, the staff encountered several practical problems in attempting to implement the referral model. In attempting to resolve these problems, the staff was forced to make some hard choices about the role which the Bureau was to assume vis a vis clients. They were forced to determine the extent to which the YRB would act as advocates for youth in those situations when their needs conflicted with the needs of existing social institutions. These conflicts arose in the course of two processes: 1) trying to obtain social services for their clients, and 2) determining appropriate courses of action for police and court referred cases.

The YRB quickly encountered tremendous practical difficulties in their attempts to coordinate the delivery of services to referred youths. They discovered that it was impossible to retain a model of brief YRB contact for evaluation and then referral, because: 1) many of the services that were diagnosed as needed simply were not available, 2) many of the services that did exist were inadequate or inappropriate for their youth, 3) some of the
service agencies, particularly those with competing views of the service network, tended to reject or somehow screen out the type of "troublemaking" youth the YRB was likely to refer, and 4) YRB workers usually found it was impossible to sever relationships with youths after referrals were made. Each of these four problems are discussed in turn.

The first observation is fairly straightforward. As a consultant to the YRB commented, "You couldn't send the kid to an alternative school that didn't exist or have him work half a day if there was no work-study program."

With respect to the second problem, the same consultant observed that, "part of the irony of the YRB idea was that you had to refer the kids back to the same agencies that had failed them in the first place." Part of the rationale cited for creating youth service bureaus with para-professionals, youth participation, and a community base, was the failure of traditional social work agencies to deal effectively with delinquency. Yet it was the same agencies, the consultant explained, "with their traditional methods and allegiances, their caseload hang-ups, their rules and red tape" that the YRB found itself forced to turn to for many of the services it required for its clients. The YRB director related that "many times the kids had been through those agencies already, and they'd had it. They [the agencies] were completely out of step with the times -- they'd have
one 60 year old woman there to deal with 16 year olds. 

...The psychiatric agencies, family counseling, home placements -- those agencies couldn't produce. I remember one time it took eight months for them to get a kid placed in another home, even though he'd been thrown out on the street and absolutely everyone agreed he should be placed immediately."

Frequently the YRB was distraught with the way traditional agencies treated their clients, and increasingly they began to turn to less traditional agencies -- the poverty law office, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, Education Warehouse (tutoring and equivalency diplomas), Group School (a new alternative school), Cambridgeport Problem Center, etc.

The agencies to which the YRB most often referred clients were those agencies who had what Martin Rein has termed "a humanitarian view of the service network", i.e., those agencies which saw their function as enabling "a helpless and deprived population...to win access to [heretofore inaccessible] social institutions." Rein suggests four competing views: 1) "the network may be viewed as a production-delivery system where customers purchase a product ...dispensed by a professional acting as a salesman or intermediary" (e.g., recreation, group work services), 2) "the service network may be seen as a helping process aimed chiefly at the malfunctioning individual" (client or patient), 3) "the network may be seen largely in terms of social control -- to bring the deviant...to adopt more conforming
behavior.

and 4) "the service network might be viewed as
serving a helpless and deprived population...enabling the
victim to win access to social institutions which heretofore were inaccessible to him." In its advocacy role of
securing needed and deserved services for youth, the YRB
increasingly adopted this fourth view; and eventually most
of their referrals went to agencies such as alternative
schools, NYC, etc. which shared this view, whereas agencies
(such as the City hospital, Family Counseling, etc.) which
viewed their clients as "patients" or "deviants", were less
likely to receive (or accept) YRB referrals. As will be
seen later, these agencies were also less likely to resist
referring clients to the YRB, typically complaining that
they found the YRB insufficiently professional, structured,
and/or authoritarian.

The third type of problem which the YRB encountered
in attempting to secure referral services stemmed from what
Cloward and others have termed the "creaming" phenomenon,
whereby agencies tend to screen out those clients who most
need their services, preferring to work with those who are
most likely to result in agency successes. The nature of their clients, the YRB found many agencies un-
willing to accept them. The Director of the YRB indicated
that YRB's association with the police and courts and their
appearance on the streets gave them a reputation very early
as an agency that worked with "bad" kids, and several agencies refused to redefine their intake priorities, claiming "YRB-type kids are untreatable". A former employee of a local employment service, for example, revealed that he had been advised by his supervisor "not to work with kids who are going to be in trouble", because "you know the kid won't stay on the job and there's no sense getting in trouble with the employer." Conflicts consequently resulted in some of these cases when the YRB made serious attempts to carry out its mandate of acting as a advocate for its clients in securing needed services and of modifying services so as to make them more relevant to the needs of youth.

There were at least two reasons given by consultants and staff for the fourth problem of severing relationships. In the first place, it took considerable time to work out agency problems and get the youth the services he needed. Considerable time-consuming follow-up was involved, that might involve several trips to the school, a job placement agency, an employer, as well as support counseling and arranging transportation with the youth. In the second place, after working hard to gain the trust and confidence of a youth, workers began to feel committed to that youth, especially when no easy answer to his problem could be found, and the worker continued to see the youth as part of his neighborhood work.
All of this is not to say that the YRB was completely unsuccessful in fulfilling the role of coordinating service delivery to youth in trouble with the law. They did get considerable cooperation from a larger number of agencies -- from the Child Guidance Clinic to the Recreation Department to the Group School in agreeing to accept YRB referred clients. The YRB does now refer many youth to less traditional agencies, and probably could refer more to traditional agencies if it were so inclined. The Assistant Director of the Child Guidance Clinic commented that the discontinuation of referrals from the YRB was "more a matter of their choice than our assistance." Furthermore, there is some evidence that the agencies also would have accepted the YRB's role in fostering cooperation between the agencies and the courts and police, and perhaps coordinating future service development. For example, in March of 1971, the YRB sponsored a half-day conference for major public and private institutions involved with youth before the courts. According to Jane Brent, who planned the conference for the YRB, the conference was designed to ameliorate communication problems between the Probation Department and other community agencies dealing with youth. The staffs of ten agencies attended, including the Probation Department, the Police Department and School Department. The meeting was eminently successful, according to Ms. Brent and other
participants, as careful group dynamics preparation led to a significant exchange of information and the development of trust and valuable interpersonal contacts between agencies. A second meeting held in June 1971 was also fairly successful in bringing the agencies together to discuss plans to coordinate efforts to deal with specific youth problems, especially school-related problems.

The problems they encountered did mean, however, that if the YRB was going to fulfill its mandate of securing for its youth the appropriate and needed services, then they had essentially three, not necessarily mutually exclusive, alternatives: 1) they could provide the services directly themselves. Direct service delivery was specifically a pitfall which youth service bureaus were supposed to avoid, but at least to some extent, it seemed an inevitable function if the YRB was not to completely abandon its clients when existing agencies could not meet their needs. 2) they could work on modifying the nature and method of delivery of services currently being provided by existing agencies. This function was specifically a part of their mandate, but it also entailed the risk of offending and threatening agencies, and thus jeopardizing any further relations, and 3) they could concentrate on stimulating and assisting new or current groups to develop new types of services. This function was also a part of the YRB mandate.
In practice all three of these things began to occur in spontaneous reaction to the agency referral problems that arose. Street-workers began to provide such direct services to their youth as pregnancy counseling, driver training, job-finding assistance, tutoring, etc. Others, especially those with more professional backgrounds, argued that direct services were too short-sighted, and did not change the basic problem of a lack of services; they tended to concentrate on developing new programs. Others found themselves attacking uncooperative and unresponsive agencies (sometimes charging racism and/or, as with the schools, attacking them publicly on television) or, in the case of administrative staff, working with the agency's head to encourage changes or develop proposals for new programs.

All of this activity tended to generate further confusion over appropriate staff roles. Staff had trouble deriving job satisfaction because there were no clear standards for success. As Tony, a former worker reflected,

The staff began to have problems working together. They were competing, threatened by each other's work. If one was successful, the others felt threatened...So whatever was successful came to be defined as the right thing to do. We went from one crisis to the next with the standards always changing. When the Jefferson Park project (a model teen center, delinquency prevention project initiated by a YRB staff member in cooperation with community organizations) began and was new, it had high status and that was the
type of thing we should be doing. When it began to encounter delays and difficulties, subjective evaluations changed, disillusionment set in, and something else became the thing to do. There were always tremendous swings.

Thus the issue of how to respond to problems with the youth service agencies was a source of considerable staff controversy.

Implementation Problems -- The Criminal Justice System

The second major dilemma which confronted staff in their attempt to establish the referral model was the issue of how to handle cases referred by the police and courts. Much of the line staff insisted on the need to maintain complete confidentiality on these cases, and several were reluctant to handle them. In their neighborhood work, the staff expended their energies trying to win the trust and confidence of youth so that: 1) police and court referred youth would voluntarily cooperate with the YRB in resolving their cases, 2) other "potentially delinquent" youth would voluntarily seek out their services, thus not only making the YRB effective in preventing them from future delinquency, but also giving the YRB some non-labelled clientele, thereby reducing the stigma associated with the YRB, and 3) they would have a constituency who would actively participate in YRB program development efforts, and inform and support their efforts at changing systems so as to increase youth opportunities and prevent future delinquency.
Interviews with youth suggested that to build these relationships, YRB workers had to be able to do two things. First, they had to be able to deliver a real service. Cambridge has a long history of short-lived social agencies, and Cambridge youth are agency-wary. Thus, trust could be built up only if "that YRB worker was there when you really needed him" and "came through with that job he promised" or "with his promise to get you back in school." Secondly, the worker had to make it clear that he was on the youth's side. Youth praised workers who they could trust "all the way" and criticized a worker because "you hardly ever see him down here on the streets, and when he comes around, he wants to play ball with you. He slaps you on the back and tells you to do this and do that and you'll be all right. He's like your fucking mother!!...Nah, I don't trust him. Everybody's on to his game." YRB staff workers all reported being continually tested by their kids. "Kids were confused on how the YRB related to the law", one worker reported. "They'd test you to see how much they could trust you. It was like they were asking you, 'Will you turn me in? Are you on my side, or are you just like everyone else? What limits will you set on me?' They forced you to take sides." "It was tough with the court referrals", reported another. "The kids could identify YRB with the court and the cops --
they'd figure, "These people are here to punish me' so they'd try to hustle you, rip you off like everyone else... I think kids saw me as being on their side; with some of the others, I think the kids saw them as being on the cops' side." Furthermore, some of the staff had inherent distrust of police because of their own previous experiences.

The director and the administrative staff, on the other hand, had spent considerable effort trying to maintain good relations with the police and courts so that referrals would be forthcoming. The director was particularly sensitive to the fact that the successful establishment of the referral model could determine the YRB's future funding. The Governor's Committee and the city would want statistics on police and court referrals, and he had to consider how Bureau policies would affect the level of those referrals.

Much internal debate and heated argument resulted as workers began to handle referrals, often taking the youth's side, and the administrative staff tried to maintain good relations with the police and the court. The issue of how to balance youth advocacy with responsibility to the juvenile justice system was never fully resolved internally (either for the staff or for many youth), but police and court reactions soon made the issue moot.
External Resistance -- The Police

Given the police department's expectations of the YRB, it is not surprising that relations initially came to a cordial statement and soon progressed to open conflict. In the early negotiations, the police steadfastly refused to circumvent the court, and the YRB just as determinedly refused to accept referrals of "hard-cores". Both issues were points of contention. Finally it was agreed that beginning in February 1971, the YRB would accept referrals of all cases which would normally require station adjustment. The YRB was dissatisfied in that these referrals did not involve real court diversion (they were primarily cases where the complainant dropped charges), but they encountered firm resistance to their attempts to gain referrals of more serious cases. The lieutenant in charge of the Juvenile Bureau made it clear that he believed the police guidelines gave them almost no discretion to refer youths to the YRB. "They couldn't change our pattern too much", he reflected. "We're very limited in what we can do; once an arrest is made, we must go to court. There's nothing we can do about that." And since they defined an arrest very technically as any stoppage of free movement of a suspect, and since the lieutenant insisted that all YRB referrals be made through his office (as opposed to through individual officers) for record-keeping, there did not seem
to be any leeway. Consequently, for fear of intimidation, the YRB relented, hoping to be able to broaden referral guidelines once their credibility was established.

On the other hand, the police were somewhat perturbed that the YRB refused to accept referrals of repeated serious offenders who were being sent to court. Not only were these youths outside of the official YRB target population, but also no diversion from court was involved. Many policemen felt, however, that they could handle the minor cases as well as anyone, and that their "hard-cores" were the only ones who really needed outside help. As the lieutenant commented, "we run into some trouble on that issue"; but for the most part, official and personal relations remained cordial. The head of the Juvenile Bureau served on the YRB Advisory Board and there were occasional meetings of administrative staffs. Referrals were handled informally by phone.

Like the calm before the storm, the initial peace did not last long. Several referrals were made in the beginning, but the volume slowed as resentment and conflict developed. To some extent, the very existence of a YRB was an indictment of the job being done by the police department, since it inferred that present police treatment of youth was inadequate or inappropriate. Police resentment was reflected in remarks like, "I'll tell you something, the closest rapport of delinquents is with cops. Many repeaters ...understand us, they feel close to us...If they need a
driver's license or a job, they come to us. We try to help them...But they (the YRB) didn't refer anyone to us."

or "I don't know if they're effective. I know juvenile arrests kept going up. I know that."

The "looseness" of the YRB structure, their lack of authority and their close identification with youth were also particularly disturbing to police officers, making them hesitant to make referrals. "I don't know what they do with a kid once he's referred there," one remarked. A sergeant expressed his suspicions about the staff's competence, "YRB is too unofficial...They're out there drinking wine with the kids and everything." (In fact, several times YRB workers were almost arrested while working with gangs late at night.) "I'll give you an example", he continued.

We have a plain-clothes liason officer at the school, and the kids respect him because he's a big, black man...well, let's say we see a kid who's supposed to be in school, and we see him hanging around MIT or Harvard Square, and we think he's fleecing cars, but we don't have anything on him -- that's the type of case we might refer to YRB, right -- well, we'd just call Herbie (the liason officer) instead...and he'll grab the kid next time he sees him and he'll straighten him out -- and we won't see the kid hanging out around MIT anymore either."

The police wanted assurance that visible corrective action was being taken.

But most of the police's strong reaction to questions about the YRB stemmed from their perception that their roles were entirely different, a perception that many YRB staff
workers also came to share. In trying to carry out their mandate to act as advocates for youth, YRB street-workers often found themselves in conflict with the police. As one former worker summed it up, "Having good relations with the cops is the antithesis of successful work with kids...Cops protect the society from kids; the YRB is to protect kids from the society."

The advocacy role of the YRB led to numerous incidents which drew harsh responses from police officers. For example, "I don't get along with them at all," reported a sergeant from the Juvenile Bureau, "they've gotten too involved in my cases." He proceeded to relate an incident in which he had three youths up on a charge of mayhem, a serious felony, when,

...there's the YRB trying to assist the defendants and telling my key witness she better get a lawyer or she would be charged. Well, I was screaming mad. I threatened to go to the D.A. and bring them up for intimidating a witness. Oh, there was a big stir, all right, and they apologized all over the place; but, Jesus, they got no business interfering in my cases like that!

Several times the police tried to enlist YRB aid in solving cases or restoring order. In fact, the only positive comment the sergeant could make about the YRB was that one of the workers had helped his squad in that respect several times. ("He stopped a full-scale race riot where no one else could have done it!") But cooperation was not always forthcoming. The sergeant told of another incident where a youth
escaped from prison with a gun, and the youth's YRB worker refused to bring him in, even though "he could have come up with him." YRB workers, of course, saw the same problem from the other side.

A cop called me late at night and asked me to come down to the station right away and help talk a kid into signing a confession so they could send him away. The kid was eleven! I came down all right, with a lawyer for the kid!

Numerous incidents such as these, stemming from very different views of the client population, cost the YRB the trust of many police officers, as did other aspects of the Bureau's non-coercive policy of working with youth, voluntarily toward the solution of their problems. The issue of follow-up and police control on referred cases, for example, was a source of police grievances. "Police like to get information, and they (the YRB) didn't want a reputation as informers, so there were some problems", explained a police lieutenant.

When we sent them a case, we wanted some follow-up. We expected it. But when we'd ask, we'd get little information, and they'd never tell you anything detrimental; they wouldn't tell you that he's out stealing cars again.

He underscored the separateness of the two agencies with,

They didn't want to be affiliated with the police. (I can understand that; they need to have the kids trust them.) They consider themselves a social agency, not an enforcement agency. Their office is up at 930 Mass. Avenue, you know, not down here.

The YRB's style of operation, their loose structure, and their mandate for non-coercion and youth advocacy
eventually completely compromised the Bureau's ability to function as a referral resource for the police. "There are no referrals now," reported the sergeant in the Juvenile Bureau. "The YRB is a social agency; there's no need to refer cases to them. We can take care of things better ourselves. The sergeant steers the group, and that's the way I feel about it...and I think the rest of them would agree." [emphasis added] A few personal relationships between individual policemen and YRB streetworkers remain solid, resulting in occasional personal informal referral, and there has been some cooperation in times of crisis, but for all practical purposes, police referrals are now quite non-existent.

**External Resistance -- The Court and Probation**

The failures of police referrals made court referrals absolutely cardinal to the success of the YRB as a formal diversion program. Yet, despite Bureau efforts, the court never became a significant source of referrals, and, in fact, referrals came to a virtual halt when the court, in October 1971 opted to establish its own diversion program, the Model Juvenile Probation (or Intake) Program.

Initially, relations between the two agencies developed slowly, but cordially. By February 1971 initial referral guidelines had been agreed upon, with the Bureau once again
finding itself compromised, for the guidelines clearly reflected the court's intention of using the YRB as a probation staff resource. After much negotiation, three categories were agreed upon for referral: 1) Cases "continued without a finding", which are cases where a decision on adjudication is delayed, usually one year, after which time the case is dismissed if there are no further violations. This was the usual disposition on relatively minor first offenses. 2) Recidivist cases (those where an offense is repeated) whose initial disposition was "continued without a finding". (According to court personnel, these offenders usually were placed on probation), and 3) all first offender "use of motor vehicle without authority" cases (normally disposed of by "continued without a finding", probation, or a suspended sentence, depending on circumstances and social background).

It is significant that this arrangement lacked the most salient feature of diversion: avoidance of official labeling and avoidance of the stigma of the court process. For all of the above cases, the judge would handle the case in the same manner as before; as is usual in juvenile court, the probation staff would maintain official responsibility for the case, but would refer the youth and family to the YRB, whose services they were free to accept or reject. The completely voluntary nature of the YRB's service made court officials extremely reluctant to surrender control of
a case to them. This reluctance is clearly illustrated in the following language from the referral guidelines explaining the courts' refusal to refer "stubborn child" cases (a juvenile offense based on parental complaint):

...The authority of the court (e.g. Court Clinic involvement) seems to be necessary for the family to make use of an available resource. Taking the decision-making power out of the hands of the family, which is antithetical to the Youth Resources Bureau's emphasis on self-determination, has been identified as critical in enabling these families to accept services. It may be that a non-coercive agency, such as Youth Resources Bureau, is incapable of giving the family the structuring it appears to need to deal with its problem. [emphasis added]

The YRB continued efforts to gain court sanction for referrals prior to the signing of a complaint (thus transferring official responsibility for cases from the probation department to the YRB) but these efforts never came to fruition in any formal way. Several referrals from the court were made in the early months, but even these tapered off because of the reservations of many probation officers about the YRB's methods of operation. One probation officer, who spent an unusual amount of time on the street, reported that he was satisfied, "by and large" on the cases he referred, but most officers lacked confidence in the new organization and a few were "absolutely distraught." Feelings somewhat similar to those of the police motivated the following comments from various court staff members:
"YRB's operation was just too cumbersome, and we didn't know about their responsibility -- we'd rather do it ourselves"

"They were seen as do-gooders by a lot of people, mollycoddlers. They'd put their arm around a kid and tell him 'You're O.K., the rest of the world's against you', when the kid needed a good kick in the pants."

"They (the judges, probation officers, and police) were never very comfortable with them. It's a very difficult job to stand between an authority and being an advocate for the kids -- a very difficult job... and they seemed from the beginning to be on the street, not in the office. That was the impression everyone had about them."

"Their biggest problem was that they didn't have enough staff supervision. They tended to over-identify with kids -- you have trouble setting limits if you're a street worker...you have to really refer kids to places that will help them, otherwise rapping is just a lot of shit!"

Thus the street image, the lack of authority and the lack of a concrete structure contributed to court mistrust of an agency outside their control. Despite their need for additional resources, probation officers were unwilling to accept a completely non-authoritarian handling of their cases, since the show of authority was an integral part of court ritual. Furthermore, court officials eventually came to view the YRB as having another mission that set them apart from the court, "They were picking up kids off the
street with and without records," commented a probation officer. "They had their own caseload."

These circumstances led the court to go after their own diversion program, which very quickly accomplished what the YRB was unable to do. Under the Intake program, minor first-offender cases could be referred by the clerk to a special model probation staff without the issuance of a complaint. If the youth cooperated and was not re-arrested, the case would be dismissed after 60 (or in some cases 90) days. This program, run in the court building, quickly gained acceptance and received 79 referrals in its first ten months of operation (almost 30% of all juvenile cases).

A juvenile session judge offered this explanation for the acceptance of the Intake Program,

'It was much easier to sell a program under DiNatale's (chief of probation) control...to the judges, the probation officers, the police, especially the police...The court just had more credibility with the police than the YRB. How could you tell the police that Harvard Law School and the City Manager wanted them not to charge a kid, but to take him instead over to some new agency run by some Greek...from Chicago -- you see what I mean? In the court...you could do it.

The police confirmed this analysis, traditionally trusting the court and being particularly satisfied with the structure of the process, which left the arresting officer the option of insisting that a complaint be issued.

Now we refer kids to the Intake Program...It's up to the judgement of the Clerk and the Police officer whether or not he goes to Intake or comes up on a complaint. Intake is better than YRB. It has more of an official tinge to it, you know; they don't have to see a judge, but its in court, before a clerk --
the kids relate it to probation, the whole bit. They don't really know what it's all about. They think they're on probation.

Court officials also expressed satisfaction with the fact that a complaint could be issued if the youth failed to cooperate, and expressed confidence in the program "because it is inside the court."

It is worth reviewing in greater detail some of the features of the Intake program, since they may shed some light on the features of a diversion program which juvenile justice officials consider desirable. Some of the significant features are:

1) The program is under the direction of the Chief Probation Officer and housed in the court.

2) Police and court officials have the option of demanding an adjudication hearing at the time of referral and within 90 days. Youths and their families similarly can demand a judicial hearing.

3) Only first offenders on minor offenses can be diverted (16 types of offenses are currently eligible, and the list may expand, but the majority of the cases to date have been school-related).

4) The staff is highly professional, and most have had training in psychology or social work. (On a staff of eight, all have at least a bachelor's degree, and four held more advanced degrees). The Probation aides are well supervised.
5) The program is fairly highly **structured**, uniformly involving at least administration of a battery of psychological tests and regular meetings with probation aides.

6) The program is aimed at short-term behavior-modification. It assumes that "overt behavior can be modified **without** getting to the underlying causes," [emphasis added] according to a staff member. The focus is clearly on **individual remediation**.

Since the commencement of the Intake Program, there have been virtually no more referrals to the YRB. There is still informal contact and discussion of cases between probation officers and YRB workers, since workers often appear in court with their clients, and there are a few solid personal relationships. One judge and one probation officer also sit on the YRB Board, but as the judge commented, "I miss a lot of their meetings lately." The probation officer summed up YRB's current role with the courts as, "They're a resource, like Catholic Charities, Big Brothers Association, or any other social agency. There aren't any referrals anymore. Probably I would say the way they're most useful to me now is in the programs they've set up that I can channel kids into."
External Resistance -- Other Agencies

It was estimated that a small proportion of the YRB's referrals would come from social agencies, particularly the schools. These referrals did (and do) occur, although on an extremely irregular basis. An evaluation report on the YRB conducted by Human Development Associates indicated that of 170 referrals recorded as of November 1971, 6% came from Cambridge schools, and another 8% from other social agencies.

There are many reasons for the low level of agency referrals, not the least of which is that it was never anticipated that these agencies would be a major source of referrals, and hence were not nearly so actively solicited as were police and court referrals. Initially there were a few formal referrals made by agency heads to the YRB administration, but resistance developed to these on several fronts.

More traditional agencies, such as the schools and the Recreation Department, found the YRB to be insufficiently professional, authoritative, or structured to meet their needs. "I certainly don't feel the YRB is the agency to refer our problem kids to", remarked the Superintendent of Recreation.

They're not equipped or staffed to do a thing to effectively take care of youngsters in trouble. If there were excess vandalism in one of our teen centers, we'd still call the police. I had hoped
that there would be closer relationships between the YRB and the Juvenile Bureau of the Police Dept., but I don't have any reading that that exists.

The superintendent had been dissatisfied with the few referrals they had made, complaining that he didn't really know what the Bureau was doing, that he got insufficient feedback from them, and that they didn't seem to be effective in putting a stop to the troublesome activity. He was not anxious to give youths a record, but he did want concrete action. "Our Teen Center directors work just as effectively or better with the kids," he noted.

We'd rather not have to send a youngster to the police if we can avoid it. Sometimes a worker will talk to the family or the school, and he'll get things straightened out...If there was damage, they'll tell the parents and present them with a bill for 50 dollars for damages -- and the next day we'd get a check back, and there'd be no more trouble from the boys, either. They could have been in plenty of trouble with the court, and their parents knew it!

The superintendent was also concerned that YRB workers would react by directing efforts at criticizing the relevancy of recreation programming rather than working with the individual troublemaking youth. "They shouldn't be doing teen center work, or any recreation programming. They should be working to restore togetherness in family units, keep kids out of court, and their parents off welfare. They can communicate any needs they identify to us -- we'll take care of them."

The schools had some similar problems with the YRB. To some extent, as noted before, the very existence of the
YRB was a threat to the school: if they began referrals to YRB, they would be forced to admit the existence of massive systemic problems which the schools preferred to keep quiet. For example, the school officially claimed a drop-out rate of less than 5%, whereas unofficial studies conducted by various private and city groups indicated that the actual rate was closer to 40%. A controversial changeover in Cambridge school administration made it difficult, initially, for the YRB to establish a formal relationship, and YRB staff reported that relations were further strained by YRB staff criticism of the racial and academic policies of the conservative interim administration. Although individual teachers and counselors established relations with a few detached workers around individual problems, the high schools came to rely eventually on the Intake Program for the handling of their problem cases; the existence of a professional staff with testing capabilities, especially testing for reading disabilities, was cited as a primary reason for preferring the Intake Program to the YRB. Other traditional social work agencies also charged that the YRB was "too unprofessional" and had "poor staff supervision."

Some of the non-traditional agencies, such as the Model Cities Multi-Service Center or the Group School (a student-controlled alternative high school in Cambridge), held off on referrals for the opposite reason. -- they were
uncertain that the YRB was sufficiently committed to youth advocacy when conflicts with "the establishment" arose. Most agencies, however, simply reported that they believed they could handle most of their cases better themselves and could refer directly to another agency if needed rather than going through the YRB. As a referral resource, the YRB was regarded more as a provider of a street-work service than as a central clearing house for referrals.

Inside the YRB -- The Need for Redefinition

As resistance mounted from the police, the courts, and the agencies, the YRB was increasingly pushed in the direction of youth advocacy. The line staff had few contacts with officials from these organizations and received little from them in the way of personal rewards. They did have considerable street contact however, and it was from these youths that staff derived most of their work satisfaction. Crisis situations, including riots at the schools, and police brutality in the black section of Cambridge further forced line staff into taking visible stands against "the establishment". As the YRB director later reflected, "The detached workers couldn't function in the neighborhoods without being affected by the political and social undercurrents of those neighborhoods...it led to a situation which fostered very polarized stands." And the more polarized the line staff became, the more the juvenile justice system became antagonized; the more antagonistic
they became, the more the YRB staff gravitated towards the youths' sides, etc. Despite the administrations' efforts to mollify police and court officials, it soon became apparent that the court diversion or referral model simply was not feasible.

Many of the staff had become disenchanted with the referral model by then anyway. As a YRB consultant observed, "A lot of those kids [YRB street workers] weren't too comfortable working with police to begin with". As the detached fieldwork expanded, it became clear that the YRB could easily acquire a full caseload without police and court referrals, since communities would readily absorb new available resources. Street workers found that local youths began to make increasing demands on their time; and there were always new groups they had not yet reached, new neighborhoods clamoring for a share of their time and attention. Many workers preferred to work with the youths that they contacted on the streets, rather than referred youth. These youths were likely to be more cooperative, and workers had much more freedom in dealing with them. Furthermore, workers reported that they found more satisfaction and less frustration in helping a youth to avoid trouble than in trying to bail him out after he had already become entangled in the juvenile justice system. One former staff worker expressed his feelings this way,

They [court referrals] would automatically identify you with authority. It was much easier to get in
touch with kids on the street, seeing them in their own environment. The referral model is basically bullshit. It serves the courts and the cops; it's not there for the kid. The referral agency doesn't do shit for kids.

Thus, by the time the juvenile justice system agencies had become disenchanted with the YRB, many staff workers had become disenchanted with the idea of providing a simple referral service for the police and the courts.

As the failure of the referral model became increasingly clear, the internal power struggle intensified as the Bureau sought to redefine its goals and establish a new direction for itself. As a former worker recalled, "There was a major goal struggle. The staff looked to Ted [the director] for direction, and also they wanted to push their own views. Ted wanted to be "the director" and at the same time he was looking to his staff for direction."

There was considerable confusion, and individuals became increasingly frustrated over the lack of standards by which to measure their success.

Some of the street workers were apparently content to simply continue individual casework with neighborhood youth, providing counseling and acting as advocates for them in securing services. Workers took particular pride in their ability to work with "tough kids", to keep them out of trouble, to avert crises, and evoke the trust of their youth. Black workers took particular pride in their ability to penetrate the black neighborhoods, avert racial crises,
and to speak for the needs of the black community youths.

There were several problems, however, with shifting to a straight detached worker program. In the first place, a straight direct-service detached field worker program was clearly far too limited to be consistent with the original goals of youth service bureaus. Youth service bureaus were specifically supposed to avoid the direct provision of services; they were to avoid becoming just another social service agency. Youth service bureaus were supposed to be new agencies with new approaches which would play a centralized role in guiding delinquency prevention efforts in the community. Detached field work programs were not new; they had a history clouded by the tinge of old and inadequate social work techniques, and other agencies could regard such a program as an entirely separate, rather low-prestige service which had no clear relation to their activities. Pure reliance on a direct service detached worker program would be too significant a departure from the original youth service bureau concept, would be a blow to much of the staff's original expectations for the Bureau, and would probably jeopardize future funding from the Governor's Committee.

In the second place, several members of the line staff were becoming frustrated with the short-sightedness of individual casework. These workers either came to the Bureau with a very structural view of delinquency (primarily a few
recent Harvard graduates), or acquired it as a result of their street work experience. These workers came to have a radically different view of their target population than the original YRB proposal assumed. As they became familiar with the youth in their area, they learned that often the majority of youths were involved in delinquent behavior or heading toward it, and that dissatisfaction with the schools, the police, the teen centers, and many such institutions was widespread, if not universal. One worker estimated that as much as 80% of the youth in Cambridge could be officially considered delinquent, or pre-delinquent. 6

As the street workers continued working with these youth, frustration mounted over their inability to make lasting changes in youths' lives. As one worker put it,

After a while you say to yourself, 'Hey, wait a minute. I'm not going to get up out of bed at 2:00 in the morning every time John Jones calls to tell me he's going to jump off the roof of Roosevelt Towers...I know he's not going to jump. And I'm not really accomplishing anything -- because he's going to come down to the same lousy problems that sent him up there in the first place.'

Workers got frustrated when they had to go to court time and time again for youths who were arrested for "cutting up on the street corner because there was no place else to go" or who were charged with assault and battery on a police officer but looked badly beaten and swore the police started it; or they got frustrated going up to try to get kids back in school who were quitting because they thought the education was irrelevant or that
the teachers were racists. "After a while, it gets to be ridiculous," a former youth worker explained. "I mean it gets to be pretty obvious that some of those institutions have to change." Thus, many of the street workers came to view much of the youths' "delinquency" as being a result of dysfunctions of their social institutions and, seeing the same "delinquent" activity constantly, came to view much of this "delinquency" as at least a somewhat sane response to their social conditions. In crisis situations, where there were riots at the schools with black youths and parents demanding the superintendent's resignation or where there were massive demonstrations after police beatings resulted in the deaths of two black youths, many of the street workers strongly believed that the YRB should play a leadership role in advocating youths' viewpoints and producing institutional change. These more radical street workers wanted to retain the detached worker model, but believed that the primary focus of the Bureau should be on community organizing and resource development aimed at institutional change, rather than on direct services to individual youth.

Finally, the administration also had good reason to avoid a detached fieldwork program as the eventual endpoint for the Bureau. On the one hand, several of the staff had observed that the director was "not comfortable supervising fieldwork" and preferred working in the political arena with agency heads and city officials. But more importantly,
the director explained that he believed that, in the long-run, a broader approach was critical to the Bureau's survival. As a private agency head observed, "They've got a budget of what? about one-quarter million dollars. Where would they get that kind of money as a private agency? How would they do it?" And the YRB director underscored the observation, "It was clear that revenue sharing was coming down from Washington. There weren't going to be any more direct Federal grants to agencies, it was all going to go to the cities...The YRB floats because I've made sure we've always had city matching funds. Otherwise we couldn't survive." Thus it was clear that whatever the YRB's future direction was, it had to be fairly clearly within the public sphere if the agency was to survive. As the director sought outside sources of funding, he found that new Federal and city dollars could be attracted by developing new services or for coordination of existing services. A detached worker program could too easily be viewed as one public agency head expressed it, "the business of a private casework agency, not a public agency."

There was no clear consensus among the staff, however, on the direction that the agency should take. According to several staff members (and also outside observers), "All of our psychic energy was being poured inward." Individual staff members pushed their own views and began operating independently, as the administration hesitated, unsure of
what to do next, and blocking many staff actions out of fear that they would antagonize others and further jeopardize future roles which the Bureau might assume in the City. "The Bureau was paralyzed into inaction", a former staff member explained, "and some of the best people got turned off by the lack of action. They became increasingly radical." As the radical staff pushed for the Bureau to commit itself to a goal of systems change, the Governor's Committee took action to further their cause.

The Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement

Impact of the Funding Source

Initially, the Governor's Committee took little initiative in trying to shape the direction of its Youth Resource Bureaus. In late 1970, however, Dr. Kenneth Polk became the consultant to the Committee and heavily influenced several of the young administrators there who were responsible for the administration of the YRBs. One former juvenile delinquency specialist, Paul Fontane, explained their receptiveness to Polk in the following way.

We were just B.A.s practically just out of college. We didn't really know much about juvenile delinquency ... so we relied heavily on Ken, Josephine and Ira [other consultants] who had more experience. We pretty much went along with whatever the communities wanted until Ken came along and gave us a real idea of what we wanted. He was the first person who really seemed to have some concrete ideas about Youth Service Bureaus and what they should be doing.

As indicated in the first chapter, Polk's conception of youth service bureaus represented a fairly significant
departure from the Crime Commission's concept. As the above specialist put it, "Ken was opposed to the referrals and coordinating services bit -- he thought it was a lot of bullshit." As outlined in Chapter One, Polk favored a YSB model which included individual counseling and treatment, but which stressed working as a "systems change agent" to increase community responsiveness to youth problems, to open youth opportunities for participation in community activities and decision-making, to influence the development of institutional programs as an alternative to the justice-correction system, and to create new kinds of education-work flows which expand youth opportunities to achieve "success". His approach, according to Fontane, stressed involving youth in solving problems within their own peer groups and within the larger social context. He strongly advocated developing a "New Careers" strategy within the helping professions, a strategy which could begin by hiring youth as Bureau workers to deal with the problems of other youths.

Late in 1970, under contract to the Governor's Committee, Polk began providing regular technical assistance to the (then three) YRBs operating in Massachusetts, but none of the Bureaus were very receptive to his ideas. At that time, the Cambridge YRB was just beginning their attempt to establish a referral model. Fontane recalled one of the sessions Polk had with the YRB director.
Ted wouldn't buy his youth-to-youth or new careers stuff. He was a traditional social worker. I thought Ken was making good sense...Ted just wouldn't listen, though; he wouldn't do anything new in that direction, he'd just talk different, you know...I was hot on their program before too, but he just wasn't creative enough...then became disen- chanted with the YRBs and he got us disenchanted too.

Over a period of over two years, the Cambridge YRB received increasingly consistent messages from a series of Committee juvenile delinquency specialists to move towards a systems change focus. As a consultant to the delinquency staff, Ira Goldenberg strengthened the staff's commitment to a structural view of delinquency causation, leading to a policy of giving priority to programs aimed at "collective advocacy...for and with youth...aimed at widening access to power and goods for disadvantaged youth."

Specifically, the Cambridge YRB was urged to move on three fronts: 1) to organize a street political base to advocate youth issues, 2) to provide funding to other agencies to stimulate new or better services, and 3) to be general lobbyists for increasing the power and resources of youth.

It would not be accurate to state, however, that the Juvenile Delinquency Section was representative of the views of the Governor's Committee. Interviewed Committee staff and consultants indicated that the Committee Administration was generally more conservative than its staff and more sensitive to the political implications of its actions. As Fontane indicated, "They [the Administration] didn't really buy Ken's stuff." A staff consultant characterized
the Executive Director and Associate Director in the following manner:

The Director is a very sharp guy...He's very sensitive to the political climate. He's got political ambitions in this state...I think he'd like to be a judge...he wants to do things quietly and he wants to be very careful about making any waves...so he'll go with the tide. But he's basically a liberal-type guy -- I mean, deep in his guts,...he'd like to do liberal-type things. And when the tide is swinging toward the liberals, he goes along with it happily and he'll push it along. But when the tide rolls back the other way, he'll be a little reluctant, a little slow, but he'll go with it...The Associate Director on the other hand, goes just the opposite. When the tide swings toward the liberals, he's depressed, but he glumly goes along with it -- but when it swings towards the conservatives, he'll be right out in front leading the way...

It is significant, though, that despite this relatively middle-of-the-road administration, the Governor's Committee was a setting which was supportive to the existence of individuals trying to implement social change goals. This fact may be the result of two situations: 1) as a state agency which disbursed funds for programs at the local level, the Governor's Committee was not immediately affected by the impact of the programs it funded. As one Committee consultant put it, "Sure,...the Governor's Committee isn't threatened by social change in Cambridge or Brockton."

2) The Committee had only minimal accountability to the Federal Government for the way it spent its funds. Two delinquency specialists both indicated that they did not feel that Federal LEAA pressures had affected their handling of their YRB's and that while the request for statistics or
guidelines handed down from the Federal Government constituted some indirect pressure, they were fairly easily manipulated. Several Governor's Committee staff members indicated that the Massachusetts LEAA planning agency operated fairly independently, and was much more liberal than its counterparts in other states, spending "a lot less on police helmets and riot gear." Only recently, they indicated, since the Nixon Administration's firm stand on law and order has the Committee felt constrained by the Washington political atmosphere.

Thus the Governor's Committee exhibited a fairly high tolerance for the existence of would-be social change agents. The staff of the Juvenile Delinquency Section considered it to be the "radical corner" of the Governor's Committee, and one staff member offered an explanation for their survival;

We were a pretty far-out bunch for this place when we first came here. We had...freaky-looking people with long-hair and beards...and we had some pretty radical ideas...And I think a certain part of the director felt really good about having us there. We were away in our own office kind of stuck back in a corner, but we could be trotted out when it was convenient and he could say, 'See, look at the racy new programs we got going on in here' ...we had a couple of Ph.Ds and some new ideas, and those could be prestigious things for the Committee.

Within the Committee's politically imposed constraints on the allocation of funds among Massachusetts cities, the juvenile delinquency specialists were fairly free to design programs, encourage or discourage proposals, and help fund programs which fit their personal perceptions of what was worthwhile or needed.
Once programs were funded, however, it was very difficult for the Governor's Committee to control their direction. The Committee had essentially six possible means of influencing the YRB:

1) Direct Communication -- one delinquency specialist, for example reported that she spoke to or met with the YRB director about once every ten days to two weeks, occasionally dropping in at their office.

2) Technical assistance -- the Governor's Committee's technical assistance team met with the YRB director and/or staff at regular intervals, varying from once a month to twice a week on issues of programming, goal-setting, staff supervision, crisis intervention, etc.

3) Veto power over personnel hirings

4) Evaluations and reports -- formal and informal evaluations were either conducted by juvenile delinquency staff or were contracted out. The Grant Management section of the Committee required quarterly and other reports on Bureau fiscal and program activity, sometimes requiring performance statistics. The Annual Comprehensive Plans published by the Committee were also a means of communicating the Committee's goals and objectives for its programs.

5) Grant-conditioning -- or making payment of funds dependent on the YRB's meeting certain requirements

6) The threat of de-funding.
According to the Governor's Committee staff, however, there were several reasons why these mechanisms proved to be of limited effectiveness, including:

1) tremendous staff turnover; ("I remember there were about five different fiscal managers responsible for Cambridge programs over a period of about a year and a half", remarked Fontane), 2) limited staff time for program supervision, and 3) distance from the localities where the programs operated; plus internal and external political constraints.

These factors limited the effectiveness of the first and second mechanisms listed above. The staff responsible for meeting with the YRB kept changing, and different representatives presented different demands, sometimes with Grant Management representatives requesting caseload statistics while juvenile delinquency specialists urged getting away from a caseload approach. But, with the staff turnovers, even juvenile delinquent specialists were not always consistent. As Golden remarked,

"As we would pick things up...our ideas on what we wanted from them changed -- but no one at the agency could afford to let them know that, so we'd start telling them something different, and pretend we'd been telling them that all along."

Furthermore, the staff at the YRB became increasingly suspicious of Governor's Committee Staff. The YRB director commented, "Most of the people they sent down here had never spent any time on the streets. They just had no under-
standing of the problems we had to face over here!"

Josephine Lambert, the head of the technical assistance team, agreed that there was a lack of sensitivity to daily local problems on the part of many Governor's Committee representatives that occasionally led to what she felt were unreasonable demands. Even Committee staff admitted their limitations in this regard, and for that reason felt reluctant to make use of the third and fifth control mechanisms (personnel, grant conditioning). "I was against conditioning grants then," Fontane recalled. "We were just too unsophisticated and had too many staff turnovers -- I felt it was better to let the communities handle it their own way." He indicated that, "We tried putting conditioning on their grants, but they were rarely substantively followed up by me or the Committee -- I just didn't have the time or the ability to coerce them." Another delinquency staff member indicated that they had never vetoed the hiring of any YRB staff because they just didn't have the time and weren't sufficiently involved to feel qualified to make judgements; though Fontane indicated the Committee had lent support through endorsements to the Director in the early stages in his attempt to hire some ex-offenders and block some pressures to make patronage appointments.

The Governor's Committee administration, in attempting to avoid controversy and respond to pressure to continue funding from local politicians, also limited the
ability of delinquency specialists to exercise potential sanctions. The juvenile delinquency staff felt that the Administration would let them go "just so far". As was suggested before, many of them believed that the Director did not want to create controversy and did not want to let the agency stray too far from the middle-of-the-road. Thus annual reports, evaluations, requests for Bureau reports all contained softer language than the juvenile delinquency staff probably would have used and many times stressed individual remediation approaches as well as systems change approaches. Demands for "hard statistics" on diversion often appear contradictory with the delinquency staff emphasis on changing institutions and developing alternative programs and settings. Furthermore, in the time that I was associated with the Governor's Committee, two attempts were made at producing a juvenile delinquency strategy paper, but both were rejected as unsatisfactory, and the staff's feeling was that the reason was because the administration could not afford to be committed on paper to a collective advocacy-systems change approach to delinquency programming.

The need to respond to local political funding pressures also affected the ability to use funding cutbacks as a means of coercing program to conform or be eliminated. As a former Committee consultant stated, "You couldn't write them a letter and tell them they were being de-funded because they weren't subversive enough!". In fact it was
very difficult to cut off funds at all because of the political complications involved in channeling funds through city governments. One delinquency specialist recalled that she had tried "several times to kill the Brockton YRB" because she believed their approach "too psychiatric", too aimed at individual change, and that "the director was not receptive to changing the direction of the program". One year, she recalled, during the annual budget review, she tried to cut their budget back, but [the Director] wouldn't stick up for it in the full Governor's Committee meeting. The mayor of Brockton got all upset and protested to...the top Committee people (and I don't know who else)...

There was always a political trade-off on funds. Most of the money had to go to the cities, and if we cancelled their juvenile delinquency program, we'd probably end up giving them riot gear instead.

Despite her objections to the Cambridge YRB because of 1) their inability to "make up their mind whether they were a youth agency or a city agency" and 2) their "ineffective management" -- their inability to "share power and responsibility", she indicated that their budget was increased each year while she was there, "because they kept asking for it"and the amount of money coming into the Governor's Committee kept increasing. When the CYRB's budget was finally cut back in 1973 by 25%, the reasons that were used were a decrease in the Governor's Committee total budget and the fact that it was a "fourth year program".

In summary, although there was a clear and fairly
steady stream of inputs from the funding source pushing the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau in the direction of social change, the Governor's Committee's impact was much less significant than might have been expected. Staff limitations and their distance from the daily problems of the Bureau constrained the ability of juvenile delinquency staff to intervene in the goals struggle, staff crises, and actions of the Bureau. Even the technical assistance mechanism was of limited effectiveness because staff turnovers at the Committee left virtually no juvenile delinquency specialists for Lambert to report to for an extended period of time. The Committee was further constrained by their lack of real sanctions which resulted from the necessity of responding to local government funding aspirations and priorities.

Observers at both the YRB and the Governor's Committee noted that to some extent the Committee's lack of appreciation for the problems of the youth services bureaus model coupled with their "bureaucratic meddling" had the effect of retarding the development of the CYRB and further contributing to its confusion and turmoil. Josephine Lambert, writing in May of 1971 commented that,

The Governor's Committee is also another barrier to the efficient functioning of the YRB. Because of legislative mandates, the staff of the Committee are always pressured to prove the validity of the programs they have funded. Guidelines and blueprints are handed down from on high...Because of this, the YRB staff are constantly caught in a series of memos, conditions and proposal writing
which hampers creative programming. Agencies that have to exist on a three, six, or nine month funding basis cannot begin to prove the value of their being...Therefore, whether the model employed by a particular city is viable rests with so many intervening factors that the Committee,...need to examine the realities faced by the bureaus, and how funding processes can be help instead of hindrance. 

**Resolving CYRB Goals**

The impact of the Governor's Committee on the CYRB goal-setting process was not negligible however. At about the time that Ron Hansen was taking over as delinquency planner (the end of 1971), the 1972 YRB funding proposal was being drafted; the YRB was in the midst of its goal struggles; Hanson and other members of the Committee were receiving input on the YRB from street worker Gus Myman, a former student of Ira Goldenberg's and a strong systemic change advocate within the Bureau; Hanson's power within the Governor's Committee was apparently increasing in the most recent reorganization. As a juvenile delinquency staff member put it, "Ron really laid a heavy rap on them" concerning the direction he believed the YRBs should take. The YRB staff subsequently had several meetings in order to agree on a goals statement draft to include in their 1972 funding proposal. Between Hanson's message and the urgings of the more radical YRB staff, the statement that emerged clearly identified systemic changes as the primary goal of the Bureau, indicating "the purpose of the Bureau" as being,
to divert the youth of Cambridge from involvement with the Juvenile Justice System, and by so doing, cause that system to be modified... these same youth are a part of and are affected by other systems such as the educational and economic systems. Therefore, it is also the purpose of the Bureau to help youth function within and change the systems...change in this context to be defined as an identifiable difference over time in the power, values, and structure of the system. All of the activities of the Bureau should be directed towards changing the negative elements of relevant systems within which youth play a part, as well as enhancing...positive elements... Activities on the part of the staff which are not directed toward change within the systems, or which... maintain...the status quo of negative elements, are clearly inappropriate and non-productive.

The proposal, furthermore, in sharp contrast to the 1971 proposal, made only token reference to the referral model, and discusses projected 1972 activities with the police, courts, and agencies almost entirely in the context of developing or modifying programs.

Thus, at least rhetorically, the YRB had pretty clearly committed itself to a systems change goal. One must be wary, however, of confusing rhetoric with reality. It would soon become apparent that "systems change" had considerably different meanings for different staff members, and in practice, individual remediation and the provision of direct services remained as competing goals. It was clear, though, that the referral model was no longer viable, and the internal focus shifted to the problem of how to implement the goal of social change.
CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

1. All YRB staff hirings were subject to the approval of the City Manager.


4. The Court had traditionally preferred to develop services internally rather than rely on outside agencies.

5. The YRB director of Greek nationality, came to Cambridge from Chicago.


8. For a more detailed explanation of the "New Careers" concept see, Pearl, Arthur and Frank Riessman, New Careers for the Poor (New York, 1965), summarized in Mayer, pp. 74-80.

9. Primarily in the form of consultation with the directors on program development and training sessions with the staff. Contact was approximately bi-weekly.

10. In A Theoretical and Conceptual Approach to Juvenile Delinquency: Implications for Planning (Boston, 1972) p. 11. Goldenberg states, "...juvenile delinquency...can be defined as a condition of being in which the 'offender'...serves notice to the world that he will no longer be contained or deluded by a social system which fails to take him or his needs seriously."
CHAPTER IV: CREATING SYSTEMS CHANGE -- YRB IN-ACTION

The YRB's shift to a systems change goal failed to relieve internal tensions. Instead, staff conflicts intensified as the Bureau sought to define and implement change strategies appropriate to their level of resources and credibility. As the YRB program coordinator commented in the Fall of 1973, "The total staff is unified on goals, but divided on methodology."

Chapter Four will examine the Bureau's attempts to implement a systems change goal. It will begin with an articulation of the constraints on YRB activity imposed by the Cambridge City Government. It will then explore the effects of these constraints and the differences in staff roles on: the process of selecting a methodology for systems change; the process of setting institutional priorities for action; and the ability of the YRB to sustain itself in a systems change role. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an assessment of the YRB's impact and its capacity for creating change.
Political Constraints -- The City's Role

As was indicated in Chapter II, the new city administration which took office after the hiring of the YRB director had not been involved in the original effort to establish the Youth Resources Bureau, and hence had no particular stake in it. However, Paul Lerner, the new Assistant City Manager, who was the primary city liaison with the YRB, entered his position with some pre-conceptions of what the Youth Resources Bureau should be doing.

Lerner's conception was vague, but he saw two primary functions as being appropriate for the YRB: diversion and coordination. He viewed diversion as an alternative to the courts for dealing with youth who get into trouble, but who are not really "bad kids". The YRB could help school officials, for example, determine "when a kid needs help...and when he need institutionalization". The YRB could then "act as a catalyst to get them [the school, social welfare agencies, and the youth] to work together to solve the kid's problems...help him to make it in the system". He viewed coordination both in terms of coordinating and thereby making the most efficient use of existing youth programs and resources, and in terms of making "kids aware of the help...opportunities, and resources that are
available to them." In either case, Lerner saw the YRB's role as being quite limited -- restricted to "communicating to others what is available" and "complementing the activities of other agencies". He emphasized that "they shouldn't do their own resource development, or else they have their own self-interests." Thus Lerner saw the YRB not only as a means of helping to keep some youth out of trouble, but also as a means of economizing through efficient use of resources. Furthermore, he had no long-term commitment to fulfilling these needs, commenting, "If Federal money dried up, it [the YRB] could just be dissolved."

Lerner also stated that he was "alarmed" by the change in direction (to systems change) discussed in the 1972 YRB funding proposal. Initially, as far as the YRB's efforts were concerned, there had been little friction between the city administration and the YRB. However, as the detached-worker model developed, as conflict with the juvenile justice system widened, and as the YRB focus shifted to systems change, city disaffection with the YRB mounted.

Over the course of an interview, Lerner indicated at least five aspects of the YRB's operation that disturbed him because they were either disruptive to city priorities for maintaining order, or threatened city administration attempts to centralize power. In the first place, Lerner saw the YRB as ineffective in controlling delinquency.
because of their non-authoritarian approach and their failure to take delinquency seriously. "Street work is just that; it's all bullshit," he indicated.

It doesn't change kids' attitudes;... the YRB gets kids off, and the kids laugh that they got away; it encourages more kids to do it. I talk to their workers and they tell me ripping off cars is not really serious. Well, I think maybe it is serious...I think those kids need a little fear of being caught.

Lerner also viewed the YRB as alienating youth from the society by incorrectly blaming delinquency on the society, indicating,

You have to tell the kid he can make it if he works at it...not put your arm around him and tell him there's something wrong with the rest of the society, not him. The YRB...tells him he's O.K., it's just that everyone's against him.

Lerner further saw the YRB as disrupting the ability of present institutions to carry out their function in controlling delinquency. Specifically he mentioned the Probation and Police Departments as being upset over the interference of the YRB in their cases.

Lerner was also concerned that the YRB (because of its neighborhood focus) tended to decentralize services instead of centralizing them. Lerner believed that services should centralized so as to "take maximum advantage of existing resources."

Finally, Lerner saw the YRB as becoming a large city bureaucracy involving considerable public funds, and
pursuing its own self-interests independent of City Hall priorities. As the YRB obtained increased Federal grants (and correspondingly, increased local matching funds) to support new staff and new programs in new areas of the city, Lerner became increasingly concerned over the rising public cost, especially without city ability to manipulate expenditures according to its priorities.

"Basically they're not responsive to City Hall," he complained. "...They're supposed to coordinate...and reduce waste, but instead they have their own interests...I don't know why, but every damn time you set up a government program, they want to build an empire."

Thus Lerner, the most influential man in City Hall as far as the YRB was concerned, had several reasons for disliking the systems change goal of the YRB and for resisting YRB attempts at program expansion -- since the goal was disruptive to city priorities for order, and expansion threatened city administration attempts to centralize power. Lerner further indicated that he intended to "try damn hard" to "turn the YRB around" and bring it under closer city control. The city, furthermore, had several avenues available to it for doing so.

There were at least four types of formal sanctions available to the city, aside from the general mandate of the City Manager as the chief administrator for the City: personnel control, proposal sign off, budgetary control,
and reorganization.

The City Manager technically has the power to fire the director, and all staff hirings must be approved by the City Manager. Secondly, the YRB proposal for LEAA funds must be approved by the City Manager, thus giving him an opportunity to intervene in the goal-setting policy decisions of the agency. The City Manager's Office also has responsibility for preparing the City budget for all line departments and agencies. (Lerner was also Acting Director of Budget and Personnel.) The budget must then be approved by the City Council. Additionally, all YRB expenditures are subject to the approval of the City Manager or Auditor (appointed by the City Council), and all expenditures of over $100.00 require a City Council sign-off. The City administration can manipulate the amount of in-kind resources, including rental space, which it will make available to the YRB. Finally, it is within the power of the City Manager, generally with Council approval, to reorganize the responsibilities of agencies, transferring functions between agencies, subordinating one agency head to another department head, etc.

These are powerful sanctions, but for a number of reasons which Lerner discussed, they did not give the City as much control over the YRB as it might appear. Primarily, the City's ability to utilize its sanctions is constrained by the public visibility of its actions,
and the accountability of the Councilors to their districts and of the City Manager to the City Council (see Chapter II). Another limitation is the lack of city administrative staff, funds and time to monitor agency activity. Lerner explained the first limitation with, "The City can't just manipulate them the YRB according to cost benefit ratios -- their agency is too volatile to do what you think is right," and he indicated concern that moves on his part to bring the YRB under closer control would be interpreted by his critics as "empire-building". He also bemoaned city staff limitations which he indicated made it impossible to conduct the evaluations or investigations of agency activities and hirings which would justify exercising potential sanctions. There was no internal personnel training to supply staff to agencies; budgets tended to be relatively fixed from year to year based on department head recommendations. "Practically, the system precludes the City Manager from [running the city]. It runs itself...and the City Council can do much less -- they have almost no staff."

Aside from these general limitations on the Cambridge City administration, the YRB had one additional point of leverage: it was bringing considerable amount of federal money into the city (almost $150,000 in 1972). By clever maneuvering, the YRB could take advantage of the City's desire not to jeopardize the continuation of federal funding. Lerner commented,
We're lucky if we see their application for 48 hours. They'd always come in with it at the last minute. I was alarmed by some of the things in those proposals. I said, 'Wait a minute, I think we should take a look at the direction these people are going in'...But they'd get Connie Wheeler [Chairman of the YRB Board and a former City Council member] to go straight to [the City Manager] and tell him it had to be signed right away or they'd lose the federal funds...So it would be rushed through without anybody really reading it.

Thus the availability of outside funding gave the YRB additional freedom to pursue its own course.

Despite these limitations on the City administration's power to use its formal sanctions, the City retained considerable ability to informally affect YRB activities and thus influence their direction. Lerner indicated that he had numerous indirect means of frustrating the YRB projects of which he disapproved. "I can get mad. I can give them little hassles," he explained, and by way of an example he indicated that "I can slow up the paperwork, let it sit on my desk for a few weeks or longer...that really makes them decide on what the 'musts' are! It's not a professional approach, but it works..."

Through this mechanism, the City administration could delay and often effectively block YRB attempts at hiring staff, filling Board positions, finding rental space for their projects, paying staff or hired youth, getting equipment for projects, etc. This mechanism could not only thwart YRB efforts, it could also embarrass them publicly, by rendering them incapable of delivering on promise,
and contribute to internal staff job dissatisfaction and dissension (especially since the resistance was subtle and largely blocked from public view). Furthermore, if the YRB became too radical and alienated too many powerful Cambridge political figures, the city administration would have the support it needed to make bolder, more dramatic use of its sanctions. Lerner let the YRB director know, from time to time, when he disapproved of the agency's actions (as would the mayor or city council members). At the same time he was slowly documenting a case for stronger action, indicating to the City Council "where we're going" in the area of Human Services and Education and "showing them the waste and implication in the system".

The City, then, was an important source of resistance to the YRB's systemic change goal with considerable power to undermine the agency. YRB administrative and line staff were not equally sensitive to this influence, however.
Defining An Appropriate Methodology --
The Administration's Perspective

As was indicated earlier, the YRB director apparently began with a fairly flexible conception of the agency's role and a desire to experiment with different approaches to change. A former staff member observed that, "He had a psychological self-image as...a progressive innovator. He was attracted to people with new ideas". Several staff members observed that in the beginning he did not try to give a specific strategy direction, but rather encouraged staff initiatives. Jack, a former worker, recalled, "He was always saying, 'Work with me and we'll do it together. It's us and the kids against the city.'"

In practice, however, there proved to be definite limits on the range of change strategies which the director was willing or felt he was able to pursue. As Chapter III indicated, he was very politically conscious and acutely sensitive to the YRB's dependence on public funds for survival. This sensitivity was no doubt heightened by the fact that internal YRB structure put administrative staff in a position of having very little contact with youth while dealing regularly with agency heads, city officials, and funding source representatives.

Consequently, interviews with administrative staff revealed fairly conservative expectations and an extended
time-table for systems change, as well as a conviction that it was necessary to work within the system. The director's perception of the constraints imposed by the YRB's funding and administrative status was reflected in statements like,

When we were new and first hit the streets, we were immediately branded as another renegade agency...People should have realized that as a public agency we couldn't go that far out.

and

...we'd privately incorporate if we could, but there're no funds. We're forced to politic at the local level...we have to accept our city tinge...the way we're funded makes change difficult.

This perception of limitations led the director to the conviction that it was necessary for the Bureau to proceed cautiously, utilizing strategies which would alienate city officials as little as possible. A former YRB worker recalled the director often told them,

There's a conservative majority on the City Council and the School Committee. We can't cause trouble there, or they won't like us when we come to them for funding; they won't let us in the schools, and all...We've got to establish good working relationships, then we can hit them with the big stuff.

Thus the strategies for change indicated by the administrative staff reflected their concern for political constraints. In interviews, the director, assistant director and program coordinator all stressed the need to build credibility with established institutions. They believed that before they could begin to impact local agencies and
institutions, it would take time to establish their expertise and success in handling youth and delinquency problems, and demonstrate that they were a permanent force to be reckoned with, "not just another agency that comes and goes". The program coordinator outlined an overall strategy for change which included establishing viability by:

-- getting the Bureau together internally
-- gathering the relevant facts about delinquency
-- getting a constituency together
-- lining up internal contacts

and then effecting change by:

-- educating from within
-- attacking from without

On the face of it, this plan would appear to include of both, what the agency referred to as "within the system" and "outside the system" strategies. All three administrators stressed however, that they "could not confront until we're viable", and the director and the assistant director emphasized the need to "establish friendships", "work with agencies", "provide technical assistance and consultation", "open communications", and "re-orient agency thinking".

In summary then, the administration's approach appeared to include making use of a youth constituency, but stressed caution and a heavy reliance on "within the system".
Defining An Appropriate Methodology --
The Staff's Perspective

Interviews with line staff, on the other hand, revealed a much shorter time-table for creating change and a more predominant reliance on "outside the system" strategies of confrontation. As Chapter III indicated, this strategy orientation flowed from the staff's political ideology, their accountability to their clients and their limited contact with establishment figures. One staff member expressed his feeling that the role of the YRB was to organize clients as a pressure group, "building neighborhood constituencies...and organizing a loose network of kids city-wide". Furthermore, staff indicated a willingness to use these pressure groups in active confrontations with existing agencies, claiming,

The YRB should organize for input into the schools... It's a huge task but... the Bureau should be for kids -- if you have to cut into the patronage system, O.K.!...we should be taking public stands on the schools, the police...forcing agencies to act!

Another staff member felt the Bureau was "more dangerous out on the streets" than "sitting in offices". Several of the staff also carried these convictions over to their own agency. One worker suggested, "We should be working ourselves out of jobs and putting community people in... we should be hiring kids".
The staff was not completely unified, however, in their attitude toward systems change, as Chapter III also suggested. As one former worker commented, "Some of the staff was more committed to direct services than to change", and staff competed on issues of determining priorities among neighborhoods, target populations, service needs, and approaches to change. One former part-time staff member indicated, "They had little incentive to work together, except for friendships". In general, however, line staff indicated a much stronger inclination toward confrontive strategies than the administrative staff, and in times of major city crises (such as with the schools or police) staff tended to pull together in feeling the need to take stands and force issues. Some of the line staff concurred with the administration's perception of the need to build internal contacts and establish credibility, but disagreed with the amount of time that had to be invested in that effort. As one worker commented, "Yes, You have to establish credibility, but two years is too long."
Defining Appropriate Systems Priorities

The same forces which led to differing administration-staff perspectives on methodology, also led to differing views on defining priorities for change. The 1972 systemic change goals statement of the Bureau does not indicate which agencies or institutions most critically need changing, what features of those institutions contribute to delinquency, and therefore how those institutions should be restructured.

Administrative staff seemed to prefer not to take a stand on settling change priorities among systems. The director specifically stated that he did not think the Bureau should be setting priorities, but rather should "remain flexible", letting the communities define a priority of needs as they arose. The assistant director added further that she thought they "should work with agencies which look like they can move". This refusal to specify priorities for systems to be changed allowed the administration to avoid the threatening position of open confrontation with specific Cambridge agencies.

Line staff saw this refusal as opportunistic. One former worker commented,

If the primary goal of the Bureau was, for example, to open employment opportunities for kids, then that gives a clear message. It's debatable as an aim, and you can begin to measure yourself. They made the purpose something impossible to measure,
which means no one can really criticize you. It gives you maximum flexibility. You can be all things to all people as the opportunities present themselves...or, you can be nothing to all people.

Line staff members, on the other hand, were much more likely, in interviews, to specify definite priorities among the institutions and issues they thought the YRB should be attacking. The choices of staff were not always in agreement and individual opinions were not well formulated but staff did indicate priorities among agencies, sometimes specifying racism, or lack of vocational orientation, for example, as primary institutional problems. Again, because of their closeness and feeling of accountability to their clients, line staff tended to want to establish Bureau priorities according to the needs and problems most often articulated by their youth. Particularly during a crisis, the staff was likely to want to establish "the schools" or "the police" as primary targets for change, sometimes even with little apparent regard for the YRB's ability to affect those systems.
It is not surprising that conflicts soon developed between administration and line staff. By virtue of their defined roles, staff and administration had widely different perspectives on the nature of the YRB's resources, leverage, and constraints: the fact that their tasks within the YRB were conflicting meant that they had limited appreciation or sympathy for each others' points of view.

The conflicts which occurred between the YRB administration and the line staff apparently followed a fairly consistent pattern: because of the relative cautiousness of the administration, the line staff typically took the lead in developing and implementing proposals for change. Because of their perspective on change strategies, these proposals tended to involve mobilizing their constituency and openly confronting agencies and institutions. Characteristically, complaints would then stream in from officials and threatened agency heads with the director typically finding himself "in a tough position", having to decide "who to back" and "sometimes backing outside people against the staff." At other times, even when the director supported his staff, the city administration subtly blocked YRB action; and since staff workers had little contact with city officials, they often
blamed the director for these delays, assuming that he was not really advocating their cause with the city. Each such incident served then to further alienate line staff and heighten the tension between staff and administration. A few examples will serve to illustrate the pattern.

During the height of a crisis in the Cambridge Public Schools, when there were race riots, youth staying out of school in protest of school policies, and a threat that the schools would be closed down, YRB street workers felt compelled to take a stand on the school issue. Staff began circulating a petition calling for the resignation of the Superintendent of Schools, and a staff member related his views in an interview on television. The YRB director explained,

"...staff get on Channel 2 T.V. and say, 'I am a YRB worker...and then proceed to attack the schools and the superintendent...Well, you see, the YRB can't do that as a city agency -- you just can't attack another city agency. I got all kinds of flack coming in from the Mayor, for the City Manager, from the schools...'

The staff was then extremely resentful and angered when the director "backed off" from their position, lectured the staff, and sought conciliation.

In another instance illustrating the same pattern, four staff members developed extensive plans for a medical testing project. The project was to include a
semester course in the high school to train youth as paramedics, a summer project of door-to-door neighborhood testing for such diseases as Sickle Cell Anemia, tuberculosis, and lead poisoning, and follow-up programs to expose youth to career options in the medical field. The workers did extensive groundwork to secure promises of outside grants to support youth salaries and to secure commitments from doctors to volunteer time for training and supervision. The administration blocked the program just prior to implementation however. The feeling of the four staff members was that the director saw the projects as too threatening -- they meant that other city agencies, like the Cambridge City Hospital or the schools, weren't doing their job. The hospital was supposed to have a lead poisoning program and a sickle cell anemia program, but they weren't reaching the people who needed them. They saw the director's move as an attempt to "avoid conflict" and "keep in good with the power structure". The four workers were extremely alienated, and three of them eventually resigned.

Another example which illustrates how staff sometimes blamed the administration for city imposed delays concerned the hiring of youth in significant positions within the YRB. Several staff members felt that since it was the long-range objective of the Bureau to increase youth opportunities for self-determination and income earning, the YRB should take the lead in hiring youth
and promoting their participation and control within the Bureau. The administration concurred, but believed that the YRB had to progress slowly so as not to jeopardize the credibility of the agency in the eyes of the courts, police, city government, other agencies, etc. The Bureau did decide to hire several youths on a part-time basis through a contract arrangement, but the Bureau was unable to pay the youths because of city delays in processing the paperwork. "It took six months to get two kids paid," commented a former street worker, "and twelve kids still haven't been paid since last summer." (March, 1973 interview) Some of the youths quit and the Bureau's credibility with its youth clientele was damaged. Several of the staff members believed that the director was partially to blame for the delays. Similar incidents occurred on the issue of putting youth and community representatives on the Board and on the issue of securing a building from the city to house a model teen center.

Numerous other examples could be cited, all conforming to the same general pattern. The cumulative effect of these incidents was to increase the separation and level of hostility between the administrative and line staffs. As service staff became increasingly frustrated, their proposals became more radical and rebellious, ranging at times from forming youth unions to burning the schools. The adminis-
tration, in reaction, became increasingly cautious, trying to keep the staff divided and contained. Former staff members have described the Bureau at this time (roughly from the end of 1971 to fall, 1972) as being "paralyzed into inaction" with "all of its psychic energy turned inward" in a struggle for the control of the Bureau and the right to establish its policy direction. Personal hostilities ran high, and there was generally "low morale, no confidence in the agency's ability to do anything". Former administrative support staff, who had contact with many local agencies, reported that the internal discension was evident to outsiders and severely hurt YRB credibility.

The conflict peaked in the Spring of 1972 when the director decided that it was necessary to take firm control of the agency. In April, he announced the hiring of a "program administrator" over the objections of a staff administration Board personnel subcommittee, which had preferred another candidate. The program administrator was given responsibility for developing new programs, providing consultation to agencies, and supervising all staff. At the same time, the director declared that there would be no more staff meetings or staff participation in administrative decisions, and, as one former worker put it, "The hint was, if you didn't like it you could leave".
The staff fought back briefly with an abortive attempt to force the director to resign. All but three staff signed a thirty page position paper requesting the resignation, but the group delayed seeking Governor's Committee support and taking a public stand hoping to win over the hesitant three. In the interim the news was leaked to the director, and the new administrative arrangement began to erode staff unity. Staff were isolated from contact with the director and other staff in what workers perceived as a "divide and conquer" strategy. Staff unity weakened; and fatigue, frustration, and alienation resulted in a series of resignations by dissident staff.

Although limited discussion continued through the end of 1972, control of the agency clearly shifted to the director and the program administrator with an accompanying change in the method of operation of the Bureau. The new staff that was hired included more professionals than the staff that left, and at least two outside agency personnel observed that the new staff consisted of "more insiders, with political ties within the city". The director also established a fairly strict vertical chain of command in the agency, ranging from those who worked directly with individual youth to "neighborhood advocates" to "program developers", who led the community teams,
to the program administrator to the director. The job description and activities of "program developers" suggest less direct involvement with youth and more concentration on technical assistance to existing agencies and planning community projects. The overall impact of the new structure was to reduce the number of workers directly involved with youth and to isolate youth workers from each other and from direct input into policy decisions. The director indicated that the new structure allowed more efficient decision-making and was the only way to rescue the agency from its previous "paralysis".

The new structure appears to signal a shift in the primary goal and direction of the Bureau as well as a resolution of the issue of appropriate systems change strategies. A recent interview (April, 1973) with the director revealed that he was trying to move the Bureau toward the goal of establishing itself as an ongoing city agency with general responsibility for providing a range of youth services -- which he indicated might include foster care, alternative education programs, and general neighborhood-based counseling. He also saw the possibility of the YRB assuming responsibility for "stubborn child" cases if the State legislature decriminalized that "offense"; and he hoped that the Bureau would gain control of the city teen centers and run them as neighborhood multi-service centers for youth. The director conceded that this shift
into a city service provision who would involve "increasing bureaucratization" and "a more limited capacity for systems change"; though he hoped to help "keep the YRB from becoming like any other city department" by "programming in constituent participation and control" through "neighborhood councils". The director expressed some regret at having to pursue this course of action, but he saw it as essential to the survival of the agency. "We'd privately incorporate if we could", he indicated,

but with revenue sharing coming down from Washington, ...those [youth service bureaus] that didn't establish a place for themselves in their cities aren't going to survive. All the federal money is going to be going through the cities ... If there's one thing I want to do before I leave here, it's to institutionalize this place!

Several former YRB staff workers, and officials from the Governor's Committee, the City administration, and several public and private agencies also perceived this shift in the goal priorities of the YRB: although they tended to describe the shift less charitably as "moving toward the goal of establishing itself as a city bureaucracy" or simply "empire-building". Thus it would appear that after a period of prolonged conflict, the YRB is now proceeding toward the goal of establishing itself as a city institution, leaving the future of the systems change goal in doubt. As one former staff worker described the change, "We had hoped to establish the YRB as a kids' agency...but it looks like it belongs to the city now."
Effecting Social Change --
An Assessment of the YRB's Impact

Systems (or social) change has been defined as any change in the number, internal structure, or patterns of interaction of institutions (or services) within a system or related systems such that youth access to power or services is improved. Most observers of the YRB have perceived it as an organization which has had little impact in causing systems change. Internal conflicts consumed most of the Bureau's energies and led to a series of false starts and abandoned efforts as line and administrative staff failed to agree on appropriate projects and often compromised each others' efforts. Many of the projects which were completed were minor or not significantly related to changing systems -- a black cosmetics course, a poster project documenting existing youth emergency services, a summer camp project, etc.

Nonetheless, in its three year history, the YRB engaged in several major social change efforts, and some of these have been fairly successful. It is instructive to briefly examine a few of these efforts because they shed light on at least four issues related to the capability of a juvenile delinquency agency to effect social change:
--What were the points of entry which the YRB was able to use to intervene in existing systems? What agency characteristics made intervention possible?

--What were some of the advantages of city funding and affiliation as resources for effecting systems change?

--What were some of the advantages of strong community affiliations as social change resources?

--What were some of the conflicts inherent in the use of these two sets of resources?

In general, the Cambridge YRB was most successful in gaining entry into existing systems at the fringe of agency mandates. Opportunities to intervene most often occurred because a subgroup of the agency's target population created special problems for smooth and efficient agency functioning. Generally, the problem subgroup consisted of youth who came to the agency's attention, but did not fit the agency's perception of its clients and the service network. For youth service institutions, (such as the schools or teen centers, for example, which saw the service network as a "production delivery network", and viewed their clients as customers) the disruption caused by troublesome "deviant" youth most often yielded the YRB an opportunity to intervene in the service delivery of that institution. For example, the Superintendent of Recreation indicated that, "there's no delinquency prevention component as such to what we do...that's not our job", and as Chaper II suggested, he was not anxious to have to be involved with youths who vandalized or other-
wise disrupted teen centers or other facilities. Consequently, the superintendent was willing to seek outside assistance in coping with special youth problems, such as drug use in and around recreation facilities, which presented staff with difficulties. He indicated that he hoped that "an agency like the YRB could come in and run a drug education program for recreation department staff". The role which the superintendent wanted the YRB to play clearly was limited, but the problem presented the Bureau with a potential opportunity to intervene and have some influence over the manner in which Recreation Department staff delivered services to youth. Furthermore, in cases when the Recreation Department's ability to function was totally disrupted, the YRB had a much greater opportunity to intervene beyond a limited role. For example, after a police brutality incident in East Cambridge, rioting youth completely disrupted the local teen center which, youth indicated in interviews, was considered particularly unresponsive to their needs. The Recreation Department felt compelled to close the teen center down, indicating, "We won't put up with these things." East Cambridge citizens and politicians insisted on their right to a city Teen Center however, and the city administration felt compelled to take action to help alleviate the stress in that neighborhood. The crisis created a situation in which the city was responsive to the YRB's offer to reopen
the teen center with greater youth participation and to provide an expanded range of non-athletic services which the youth desired.

Similar opportunities for the YRB to take on "troublemakers" from other agencies presented themselves at the Cambridge schools. A growing group of drop-outs who "hung out" outside the library between the two public high schools began to disrupt the smooth functioning of the library and the two schools. The librarian and school officials approached the YRB for assistance (since YRB workers were often seen with the same youngsters), providing the YRB with the opportunity to propose running a limited alternative education program inside the library building during specialized hours.

Other agencies provided the YRB with opportunities for intervention because they saw working with youth as being of the fringe of their mandate. Thus Cambridge Community Services (CCS), the local United Fund planning agency, was receptive to a YRB proposal for coordinating private and public recreation programming, because while agency coordination was a primary CCS mandate, the director saw "youth programs are a small part of what we do... it's their bag." As Chapter II suggested, opportunities for YRB intervention in the criminal justice system were most likely to occur because of agency difficulty in processing cases which were only marginally criminal and involved psychological or social problems.
For criminal justice, youth service, and other agencies, then, opportunities for YRB intervention usually resulted from agency difficulty in dealing with those youth who came to their attention, but did not fit the agency's view of its clients and the service network.

The advantages for systems change which accrued to the YRB because of its city funding and affiliation largely resulted from their credibility with the city and private agencies. For example, the director of CCS indicated that it was the YRB's willingness to make available its relatively abundant money and staff time which made the recreation coordination project possible; and that it was the credibility of the YRB, the impression that they "had a direct pipeline to the City Manager" which enticed private agencies to cooperate, since they hoped to gain greater access to Recreation Department resources.

The YRB's experience in grantsmanship and their access to funds from the City of Cambridge, LEAA, and other Federal sources frequently was a potential lever for the YRB to introduce, or entice other agencies to introduce, new or modified services. Two of the most successful YRB programs were the North Cambridge Pilot Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Project, designed to stimulate community development of youth programs as alternatives to criminal activities in a high crime area.
housing project, and the East Cambridge Job Resources Bank, designed to provide career counseling and open employment access for high school drop-outs. Both programs were conceived as demonstration projects which could lead to expanded recreation and employment programs city-wide. In both of these cases the YRB, working with and deriving impetus from local community agencies, served as a catalyst for preparing proposals and securing substantial grants from the Governor’s Committee and the City of Cambridge, and contributed its staff time for development. In other cases the YRB worked with other agencies to help them prepare grants to perform certain functions (such as establishing an emergency youth shelter or a new community-based program in family counseling); and although internal conflicts obstructed most of these attempts, the YRB director indicated that he saw control over future revenue sharing funds as a "major potential leverage point with private agencies".

The YRB's position as a city agency also gave the Bureau an advantage for bargaining with the city, especially in times of crisis, for new or modified services, since it could offer itself as a viable city agency willing and available to take on responsibilities. Thus, the City Council was willing to approve funds for a new teen center in East Cambridge under YRB control.

The YRB's strong community affiliations also proved to be a potentially significant (though underutilized)
systems change resource in several ways. First, their neighborhood penetration enabled them to organize local youth and adults into working groups who could develop and run new community services. Thus, for example, the North Cambridge Pilot Delinquency Prevention Project was possible because YRB street workers were aware of the need for a project, could identify neighborhood leaders and interested groups, and bring them together for purposeful action. These groups then became potentially powerful sources of leadership in attacking other community problems. (The North Cambridge group became involved, for example, in an effort to force the local housing authority to improve conditions in the housing project.)

Secondly, local trust of YRB workers could be capitalized upon to build community political pressure groups. For example, when the City Council was debating the issue of reopening the East Cambridge teen center, the YRB was able to "pack the galleries" with its supporters. Furthermore, street workers saw their ability to precipitate or prevent riots during crisis situations (as with the schools or the police brutality incident) as a potentially powerful bargaining point with the city and city agencies.

YRB's knowledge of the communities where they worked also provided a potential entry into the ventures of other agencies because of YRB "expertise" in community work.
For example, CCS wanted to involve the YRB in one of its projects to revitalize the Cambridge Community Center, a settlement house in the black section of Cambridge which faced extinction for lack of use by local residents. CCS saw the need to do a survey to determine what types of services the community would utilize, but preferred to have the YRB develop that information, indicating,

They have rapport with the residents there. They are actively involved with a lot of the kids. Can you imagine what the reaction would be if I sent one of my [all white] staff members in there to do a survey...

Thus, both city and community affiliation offered potentially valuable resources to the YRB in its systems change efforts. Unfortunately, they frequently presented conflicting opportunities. In the issue of the East Cambridge teen center, the YRB managed to use both of these resources to maximum advantage, using both the political power of their constituency and their credibility as a City agency to create the opportunity to increase youth control and change the nature of services being rendered by the City. And as the director put it, "If we can set up a model that works there, the other five teen centers will fall." In most cases, however, City affiliations and community affiliations offered conflicting opportunities for change, and the YRB was rarely able to manage these resources as effectively as it did with the teen center issue. The primary problem was one of
maintaining credibility with two groups with conflicting values -- in order to utilize effectively the advantages of strong community affiliation, it was necessary to maintain credibility with local "troublemaking" youth and adults; and in order to utilize the advantages of City affiliation, it was necessary to maintain credibility with city officials. As Chapter III and IV have repeatedly pointed out, however, the perceived needs of youth, especially "delinquents", often conflicted, sometimes violently, with the needs of police, schools, and other agencies to process cases efficiently, deliver a service, and maintain order. Youth, who often tended to see themselves as victims, had dramatically different views of youth services than many agencies, which tended to view the youth as "customers", "patients" or "deviants".

In most cases the YRB was simply unable to satisfy the perceived needs of both groups.

Numerous examples could be cited of the conflicts which resulted when the YRB attempted to utilize the resources of both city and community affiliation; but perhaps the most poignant example involved the Largey police brutality incident of October, 1972, referred to several times previously. The incident involved alleged police beatings of two East Cambridge youths which may have contributed to the death of one of them. Police: brutality had been a major issue in East Cambridge and
other parts of the city for quite some time, and the incident touched off weeks of rioting and social disruption, accompanied by demands for the dismissal of police officers and increased community control over police. Many street workers were heavily involved with participating youths and felt that in order to maintain credibility with their clients, it was necessary for the YRB to take a strong stand on the issue. Furthermore, they believed that their capability to precipitate or avert rioting presented a strong bargaining advantage in pressing for action and reform. To take such a strong stand, however, would clearly jeopardize the Bureau's credibility with the City administration and the police, who were trying to maintain order. Furthermore, to do so would destroy the progress the administration felt it was making in negotiations with the police for running a police community education program. The YRB could help improve its credibility with the City by helping to maintain order and supporting the City's efforts at investigating the incident.

In the end, the YRB staff members took independent actions in both directions, and took no official stand on the issue. The director reported that discussions with the police had to be terminated, and several youth and line staff members reported that "kids saw the YRB as finking out, cooperating with the police". Consequently,
the YRB was completely ineffective on an issue of extremely high priority to its target population.

In conclusion, the overall impact of the YRB, to date, in effecting systems change has been quite limited. Their two largest accomplishments appear to be in the areas of recreation and employment. In the area of recreation, they have initiated a major new program in North Cambridge which has provided increased cultural, educational, vocational, and recreational programs for youth, has strengthened community organization, and probably reduced youth crime to some extent; although the effectiveness of the program has been hampered by a lack of cooperation with City Hall. The YRB also appears to be moving towards taking over responsibility for running the City's teen centers, despite stiff opposition from the Recreation Department. The director of the YRB indicated that the Bureau intends to separate the centers as multi-service centers, governed by community boards, and providing employment opportunities for youth with in the centers -- a significant departure from the current service being provided by the Recreation Department.

In the area of employment, the YRB has successfully promoted the development of a vocational counseling and job development center in East Cambridge, which has hired youth counselors, engendered considerable community
support and participation, and (according to interviews with youth and adults) is becoming increasingly well-known and well-received in the area. The Bureau, in conjunction with the East Cambridge Job Bank, has also sponsored the development of a Youth Employment Project, which has received financial support from the Chamber of Commerce and the City of Cambridge and is seeking additional funding. The project won official City sanction and financial support when it became apparent that Federal funds would no longer directly support such summer youth programs as the Neighborhood Youth Corps.; thereby enabling the YRB to present its proposal for a year-round employment program for youth to replace them. The project is just starting, but represents a potentially significant departure from the nature, amount, and administration of youth employment sources in the City.

Although the YRB appears to be on the verge of making significant impact on the amount and administrative control of recreational and employment services for youth, their long-range impact on youth access to power and services is difficult to predict. Former YRB workers have expressed skepticism for example that YRB-run teen centers will eventually be any different from Recreation Department-run teen centers. One worker speculated that,
Hip things will get done in the beginning to attract people, and they'll bring some hip people in with some new approaches that really sound good...but people like that tend to lose out after the first stage. There'll be youth involvement in the beginning, but then the kids will want to do things that the YRB won't want to happen -- things that could cause too much trouble, be too threatening...And the YRB will either stop them, or begin to control their meetings and activities...the only kids that Ted the Director will let get to leadership positions are the ones he can co-opt...Eventually it will be another Recreation Department. Indeed, it is not yet possible to determine the extent that significant changes in youth access to recreational and employment opportunities will actually be accomplished.

Thus, as the YRB moves into a more central role within the Cambridge agency structure, it is difficult to know what capacity for systems change that role will provide. It may be significant, however, that the primary changes which the YRB has been able to implement so far represent not so much modifications of existing institutions, as they do changes in the shape of the service network. YRB personnel generally perceive that they had little impact (despite numerous efforts) on changing the operation of the schools, the police, the recreation department, the Division of Employment Security, or other agencies. Where they appear to have been more successful has been in absorbing existing services, creating or encouraging new groups to provide new services, and in transferring control over service provision from one agency to another -- that is, changing the content of and the actors in the service network. This observation
would appear to be consistent with the finding earlier that the YRB's opportunities for change tended to occur at the fringes of other agencies' mandates and the fact that those existing agencies wanted only limited YRB involvement and highly resisted major internal changes. If this observation is correct, then the potential of the YRB for creating sustained change in youth access to services and power, would appear to be highly dependent upon the ability of the YRB, and any new groups which they create, to both maintain control of services and maintain a pattern of behavior significantly different from the agencies they sought to transform. Whether or not they can be successful in this respect is yet to be determined.
CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. "Within the system" strategies are defined, in the context, as those strategies which involve working cooperatively with members of the current power structure to attain an agency objective. Typical techniques might include interagency conferences, seminars, task forces, technical assistance, investments of funds and staff to encourage new agency programs, sharing of resources. "Outside the system" strategies are defined as those strategies which involve working with relatively powerless youth and community groups (the "constituency") in order to obtain new services or create changes in current institutions. Typical techniques might include community organizing, demonstrating, filing class action suits, lobbying through public media, creating competing alternative settings.

2. The YRB often referred to all non-administrative staff as "line staff". In this text, the terms "line staff", "service staff", and "street workers" are therefore used interchangeably.

3. See Rein, P. 52.
Youth services bureaus, as indicated in Chapter One, were proposed as a strategy for diverting youth from the "stigmatizing effects" of Juvenile Court; providing more effective rehabilitation by procuring community based services and organizing youth to participate in social change; and for preventing juvenile delinquency through systems change. Chapters Two, Three, and Four indicate the results of one particular city's attempt to implement this strategy. This chapter will try to trace the implications of that case for evaluating the youth service bureau strategy. Specifically, it will indicate the kind of constraints which are likely to be imposed on a youth service bureau by the criminal justice system, the youth service system, and by the agency's funding structure. It will also indicate the variables of internal agency structure which appear to critically determine the ability of a youth service bureau to provide a services alternative to juvenile court and to prevent delinquency through
systems change.

A short summary of the overall impact of the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau is first presented. The feasibility of each of the three youth service bureau goals will then be discussed in turn.

Summary -- Overall Impact of the CYRB

After three years of planning and three years of operation, the Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau appears to have:

--failed as a formal services alternative to juvenile court,

--had limited effectiveness in modifying systems relevant to youth opportunity and delinquency causation,

--had its most major impact in the provision of direct services. The vast majority of youth and community adults interviewed, as well as many agency representatives, identified the YRB with its street workers or one of its programs, and saw the Bureau primarily as providing a range of direct services aimed at "helping kids to keep out of trouble". The move to provision of direct services seems to have occurred in response to the Bureau's inability to obtain needed services for its target population from existing agencies or institutions.

--initiated the process of establishing itself as a City institution providing a range of youth services. This move was made in response to a perceived need for survival, and in light of a concomitant effort by the city administration to bring the Bureau under closer city control, this effort appears likely to succeed.
**Diversion of Cases from Juvenile Court**

The purpose and design of youth service bureaus makes them dependent upon the police and courts (and to a lesser extent other agencies) for clients. This section will first examine the constraints the criminal justice system imposes on the ability of a youth service bureau to gain referrals, and will then consider the constraints imposed by other youth-serving agencies.

Youth service bureaus appear to have an advantage in gaining referrals from the police and courts in that those agencies, especially juvenile courts, tend to be overwhelmed with cases. Furthermore, those cases which are not clearly criminal or which involve severe social or psychological problems are time-consuming and difficult to process. Thus there is some incentive for the agencies to refer such cases to a youth service bureau in order to improve efficiency in maintaining arrest and clearance rates or reducing case backlogs.

Two other characteristics of the juvenile justice system appear to be important, however, in determining its willingness to cede responsibility for cases. In the first place, it was found that, at least with respect to the element of trust, the criminal justice system does appear to be a fairly bounded system.¹ Policemen, judges, and probation officers were used to interacting with each
other; and they demonstrated considerable mistrust of outside agencies and a disinclination to deal with them.

Secondly, the criminal justice system was observed to operate primarily on a "social control" model of the service network. When police, probation, or other court officers did utilize outside resources, they appeared to prefer to deal with those agencies which either shared a "social control" perspective (i.e., viewed their clients as "deviants") or (at the most) held a "treatment" perspective (i.e., viewed their clients as "patients"); they further appeared to mistrust particularly those agencies which viewed their clients as "victims" and held an "advocacy"view of the network.

Accordingly, the YRB's experience with the criminal justice agencies indicates that there are a number of variables which may determine the ability of any diversionary program to obtain referrals from the police and courts:

Relationship to Other Agencies

--The program should be publicly sponsored.

--It should have a formal linkage to the criminal justice system, either through contact or direct supervision by police or court officials.

--The program should contain an option to refer non-cooperative cases back to the court for issuance of a complaint.

--Police and court officials should have the option of insisting that a case be handled by adjudication.
- The program should provide regular and complete feedback to the police and court.

Internal Structure

- The program should have a formal and visible process for handling cases.

- The program should have the authority to require a youth and his family to cooperate if necessary.

- The program should be primarily office-based rather than street-based. Outreach should be restricted to home visits and follow-up.

Staff and Personnel

- Staff should consist primarily of trained professionals and should be well-supervised.

- Youths generally should not be used as staff, and youth participation in agency decision-making should be minimal.

Functions to be Performed

- Clientele should consist primarily of those cases referred by the justice system.

- The primary function should be to provide or secure individual remedial services or resolve individual problems.

- Individual advocacy in other cases before the police or courts should be limited to supplying information.

- Systems modification efforts should be confined to "within the system" approaches, since change efforts directed at the criminal justice system may jeopardize relationships.

To the extent that a diversion program deviated from this set of characteristics, police and court officials would become increasingly concerned that the program was too far removed from its "system" or was
providing inappropriate or unnecessary services. Since the program would appear to be less directed at fulfilling police and court needs, those officials would have less incentive to make referrals.

Other agencies, primarily the schools, which were intended to be a third source of youth service bureau referrals, appear to impose very similar constraints on a diversion program. Most of the agencies which were intended to be referral sources operate on a "production-delivery" model of the service network (e.g., schools, recreation facilities), and apparently expect "social control" or at least "treatment" of those "deviant" (or "sick") individuals who disrupt their efficient functioning. These agencies appear to desire a public program, preferably with some linkage to the juvenile justice system. They also appear to have requirements similar to those of the criminal justice system for staff and internal structural variables similar to those of the criminal justice system, and to find individual advocacy or systems change particularly inappropriate responses to their need to deal with troublesome youth.
Establishment of Alternatives to Court

Just as the youth service bureau is dependent upon the juvenile justice system for referrals, it is also dependent upon the youth service/child welfare system to provide community-based services and upon the cooperation of youth to involve them in attempts at systems change. The demands which youth service agencies and juvenile clients placed on the youth service bureau, however, were found to be directly in conflict with the constraints imposed by the criminal justice system -- thus making it necessary to reconsider the whole concept of diversion. This section will examine the constraints imposed by the youth service system, and those imposed by the clients, and will indicate the implications of these constraints for the internal functioning of a Youth Service Bureau.

Unlike the criminal justice system, youth service agencies do not necessarily view themselves as a "system", nor do they share a uniform perspective on the service network. Consequently, the agencies do not have a uniform set of requisites for accepting referrals, but rather it would appear that a Youth Service Bureau would be most likely to be able to use the resources of those agencies which have a view of the service network similar to their own.
The most important constraint imposed by the youth service system is that the services required for youth service bureau clients may not be available. Even in Cambridge, which is particularly rich in social services, many of the youth services which were diagnosed as being necessary either were simply not there, were available in such an inappropriate manner that most youth refused to utilize them, or were available, but the agencies providing them continually screened out YRB clients as "bad" and therefore "untreatable". These characteristics of the youth service system would appear to inhibit a ysb's ability to provide community-based referrals, thus forcing substantial reliance on the direct provision of services and/or more aggressive advocacy and systems change efforts.

In order to gain the cooperation of delinquent and potentially delinquent youth, it appears that a program must respond to another set of structural requisites imposed by the target population. It is significant that these characteristics directly conflict with those which were essential for obtaining referrals from the criminal justice system. The YRB experience indicates that there are several variables that determine whether a program will be accepted by juveniles:
Relationship to Other Agencies

-- The program should have minimal ties to the juvenile justice system.

Internal Structure

-- The program should have a strong outreach component, entailing considerable time spent on the street.

-- The program should be non-coercive.

Staff and Personnel

-- At least a good number of the staff should be as similar in background to the youths as possible, entailing the hiring of non-professional and others from the local neighborhoods, perhaps some with prior criminal records.

-- Youth should be given the opportunity to participate in agency decision-making and to assume responsible staff or board roles.

Functions

-- The program should be able to provide advocates in obtaining services which youth consider most important.

-- The program should be willing to stand behind individuals as advocates in conflicts with authority.

-- The program should be willing to take strong stands on pressing issues of concern to youth, especially in times of crisis. It should be prepared to take an aggressive systems change role.

It is clear, however, that a program which incorporated these features would suffer from internal staff conflict. In the YRB experience the incorporation of these features led to a situation where staff preferred to acquire their own caseloads from the neighborhoods
rather than work with police and court referrals. Additionally, in this agency model, staff may tend to reject a case-by-case orientation in favor of a systems change approach — particularly in times of crisis.

Thus it appears that the features which the President's Crime Commission, the NCCD, and others have recommended as essential to the youth service bureau concept may actually subvert the diversionary goal of the program. Some of the recommended features were youth advocacy and systems change, weak and informal linkage to the juvenile justice system, lack of coercion and feedback, reliance on non-professionals, local residents and ex-criminals for staffing, outreach, and heavy youth participation. Yet it is these very features which appear to lead to both a refusal of the criminal justice system to make referrals and a staff preference not to accept them.

**Diversion Reconsidered**

It is not possible to determine from a single case study exactly how many of the structural requisites of youth and of the juvenile justice system must be satisfied in order to gain the acceptance of each group. Undoubtedly there are trade-offs involved. Nonetheless, the Cambridge case clearly demonstrates that the goals
of court diversion and involvement of youth in systems change are inherently incompatible because they require conflicting program models. Furthermore, the ability to provide community-based services as an alternative to court processing is constrained by the unwillingness or inability of the youth service system to handle referrals. Providing juveniles with community-based services and involving them in systems change efforts may be a very appropriate and much needed innovation in the way in which society deals with actual and potential delinquents; this study suggests, however, that this innovation can not be introduced into the criminal justice system as it is presently structured.

This conclusion suggests an inherent limit on the ability of any program to divert cases from juvenile court and substitute a less stigmatizing process. Labeling theory implies that voluntary participation of youth, involvement of non-delinquents, use of non-professional community staff, and reliance on community services are all important means of reducing the stigmatizing effect of official processes. The Cambridge experience suggests, however, that these characteristics inhibit the ability of an agency to obtain referrals. Presumably (as the Cambridge Intake Program suggests) a program formally linked to the criminal justice system and adhering to the other characteristics desired by criminal justice agencies
could successfully obtain referrals and at least avoid formal court handling and the issuance of formal complaints. It must be recognized, however, that in such a program, many, if not most, of the services would have to be provided directly, and that the process would probably still be stigmatizing.

Furthermore the ability of such a program to engage in a systems change would probably be quite limited. Staff would probably be in a central position to document available services and could call inter-agency conferences about service problems, encourage outside groups to establish new services, and perform similar non-threatening functions; but any substantial undertaking of social change efforts (especially those involving youth or tending to produce conflict) appears likely to seriously compromise the agency's ability to obtain referrals.

Other studies and experiments with diversion programs linked to the criminal justice system should help to clarify the range of variation permissible in the variables (discovered in this study) which appear to determine the level of police and court referrals. The trade-offs between reduced referrals and steps to decrease stigma and produce systems change need to be clearly understood in order to evaluate the merit of such programs properly.

The limitations of this approach, however, suggest
consideration of diversion programs which are not structurally dependent on the police and courts to obtain referrals. Although full exposition of these models is beyond the scope of this thesis, options which would entail more flexibility might include: introducing youth service bureaus simultaneously with decriminalization legislation which would provide the bureaus with official responsibility for certain categories of "offenses"; or introducing diversion programs which intervene earlier in the criminal justice process, i.e., programs which concentrate on obtaining neighborhood and community agency referrals. In each of these cases it would be necessary to resolve the issue of the "due process" rights of juveniles.

Effecting Change in Systems Relevant to Youth

Unfortunately, the President's Crime Commission provided very few guidelines for the accomplishment of this goal -- either in terms of the methods of intervention to be employed or the specific institutional structures to be changed. The study does shed light on the way in which particular variables of agency design are likely to influence the following decisions: the selection of a methods for change; the selection of institutional priorities; and the ability to sustain a systems change model.
Selecting Strategies for Change

City funding and administrative control provides a number of advantages, in terms of increased credibility and improved access to funds, for implementing "within the system" strategies for change. City funding and control also tends to constrain an agency from utilizing "outside the system" confrontive techniques, since it becomes essential to avoid conflict with City Hall and city agencies in order to survive.

Funding from higher levels of government or private groups would appear to create additional freedom to utilize "outside the system" techniques, since these settings are more likely to be supportive of social change advocates and less likely to be directly affected by the operation of a local agency.

If an agency is internally structured so as to maximize youth cooperation (as indicated earlier, i.e., hires local non-professionals, is non-coercive, uses detached workers, provides advocacy, etc. -- this structure is hereafter to be referred to as a "youth-oriented structure".), then the agency will have a number of advantages in implementing "outside the system" strategies. These advantages stem from the ability to mobilize a constituency to create community programs or exert pressure on existing institutions. In a more limited way, this structure could also enhance ability to work within
the system because it establishes the agency's credibility as a "community expert".

The use of non-professional community staff in advocacy roles tends to create strong staff preferences for "outside the system" strategies, especially in times of crisis. The use of professional staff with little direct community contact and substantial contact with city and agency officials (i.e., a "professionally-oriented structure") tends to create staff preference for "within the system" strategies, especially in times of crisis.

Additionally, it would appear that agency dependence on criminal justice system or youth service system agencies (for referrals, services or other program elements essential to survival) increases the need for an agency to limit itself to "within the system" techniques.

Selecting Institutional Priorities

The same variables which critically determine selection of methods for change are also important in determining the manner in which an agency assigns priorities to institutions to be changed. It would appear that city funding and administrative control, a "professionally-oriented structure", and dependence on the criminal justice and youth service systems, tend to produce a desire not to assign priorities, but rather to respond to opportunities for intervention as they occur. It would also appear that
that a "youth-oriented structure" generates considerable pressure to set priorities according to the needs articulated by the client population, sometimes regardless of the prospects for successful intervention.

**Sustaining a Systems Change Model**

These observations from the Cambridge case suggest that it is essential for a youth service bureau to select a consistent strategy for change, and a structure appropriate to that method if it is to be successful in planning for delinquency prevention, under a systems change paradigm. Failure to do so appears likely to result in self-defeating attempts to maintain credibility with both a youth constituency and city and agency officials. It also leads to severe internal staff conflicts over appropriate strategies for change and institutional priorities. It was seen in this study that these conflicts can virtually paralyze an agency and undermine its capacity for effecting systems change. To the extent that an agency intends to use both "within the system" and "outside the system" strategies for change, it would appear important to utilize a horizontal staff structure, whereby staff members share responsibility for a wide range of agency functions.

Furthermore, dependence on city funding and substantial city administrative control may have the effect of making it difficult for an agency to maintain a goal
of systems change, since that goal conflicts with city priorities for maintaining order and stability. A youth service bureau, or similar agency, is likely to experience considerable pressure to establish itself as a city institution with ongoing responsibility for a range of services in order to survive.

Finally, it would appear that the opportunities for an independent delinquency prevention agency to intervene in the existing social structure are likely to occur at the fringes of agency mandates. These opportunities result from agency difficulty in handling those youth who come to their attention, but do not fit the agency's view of its clients and the service network. Since opportunities occur at the fringes of agency mandates, and since agencies are highly resistant to internal structural changes, it would appear that an independent delinquency agency is more likely to produce changes in the overall hope of the service network than to produce modifications in existing institutions. Accordingly, an agency's ability to produce sustained change in youth access to services and power would appear to be highly dependent upon that ability (and the ability of any new groups which they create) to both maintain control of services and maintain a pattern of behavior significantly different from that of the agencies they seek to transform.
Summary -- Need for Future Research

The youth service bureau strategy, as a means of providing an alternative to the juvenile court process and preventing delinquency through systems change, needs to be critically re-examined in light of the constraints imposed by the systems in which the youth service bureau must operate. Specifically, the two goals should be considered separately in designing models of delinquency agencies. Directions for future research appropriate to developing an effective model for court diversion have been discussed. Additional research is badly needed to more clearly determine appropriate settings and structures for agencies which include "changing systems relevant to youth" as a primary goal. More highly developed theories of institutional causation of delinquency, and of social intervention are needed in order to provide such agencies with direction and consistent patterns of operation. Ultimately, comprehensive comparative studies of a large sample of agencies are needed in order to assess the feasibility of changing youth-related systems through an independent, comprehensive delinquency agency.
1. See Weiss, p. 200 for further elaboration of this concept of "system".

2. This last problem is obviously exacerbated by association with the criminal justice system.

3. "Decriminalization" refers to the process of legally redefining "offenses" such that they no longer carry the possibility of criminal sanctions.

4. Variations of this approach are used in the Scandinavian countries and in China with promising results. The Scandinavian countries rely on child welfare committees instead of courts; and in China, complaints are handled by neighborhood committees, and the courts are used only as a means of last resort for those problems which the committees cannot resolve. It is not clear whether or not these approaches are transferrable to the American social structure.

5. Horizontal staff structure, at a minimum, refers to a sharing of responsibility for agency tasks and decision-making among all staff. For a further discussion of the concept, see Ira Goldenberg, Build Me a Mountain. Youth, Poverty, and the Creation of New Settings. (Cambridge, 1971). pp. 126-130, 426-436.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
THE YOUTH SERVICE BUREAU
REFERRAL FLOW CHART

Schools, Social Agencies
Parents, YSB Outreach Staff

Self

Referral

Law Enforcement Agencies

YOUTH SERVICE BUREAU
(Voluntary Service Only)

Identifies problems; refers to agencies; continues contact;
Strengthens resources; purchases and coordinates services;

Develops new resources through citizen and youth action;
Modifies systems through consultation and demonstration

COMMUNITY RESOURCES
Family Counseling
Special Education
Recreation Program
Guided Group Interaction
Mental Health Services
Tutoring
Job Placement
Group Residence
Foster Home
Health Services
Individual Counseling
Day Treatment Centers
Big Brother or Sister
Camp Experience
Neighborhood Youth Corps
Leadership Training
Parent Study Groups
After-School Programs
Drop-In Center; Lounge
Financial Aid
Other

Court
Intake

Shelter
Detention

Probation

JUDGE

Diagnostic
Center

Aftercare

Institutional
Resources

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
DISPOSITION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS
IN CAMBRIDGE
PRIOR TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE YRB

POLICE APPEHENSION

POLICE JUVENILE OFFICER

JUVENILE COURT SESSION
MIDDLESEX COUNTY THIRD
DISTRICT COURT

POLICE DEPARTMENT
SATURDAY MORNING SESSION

RELEASE

"DELINQUENT"
"NO FINDING" *
"NOT DELINQUENT"

YOUTH SERVICE BOARD
(DETENTION)

PROBATION

SUSPENDED SENTENCE

RELEASE

LONG CONTINUANCE**

RELEASE

FORMAL FINDING
"DELINQUENT”***

* Enough evidence for conviction, but no formal finding.
** Required supervision, i.e., probation without delinquency finding
*** See "Delinquent" above.

From September 1969 Proposal
INITIAL YOUTH RESOURCES BUREAU

Staff Organization Chart

From September 1969 Proposal
APPENDIX D

1973 YRB STAFF ORGANIZATION CHART
(Approximate)

CITY MANAGER

ADVISORY BOARD

YRB DIRECTOR

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

PROGRAM ADMINISTRATOR

NORTH CAMBRIDGE PROJECT

EAST CAMBRIDGE JOB BANK

PROGRAM DEVELOPERS (3)

NEIGHBORHOOD ADVOCATES (3)

YOUTH ADVOCATES (3)

Outreach
or
"line staff"
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Cambridge Youth Resources Bureau, Proposals to the Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement, 1968-1973.


