AN ANALYSIS OF LOW INCOME HOUSING POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF CITY PLANNING

May 1980

at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Abstract

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Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on May 22, 1980, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of City Planning.

The overwhelming majority of the twenty million Black people in South Africa are inadequately housed. This inadequacy is reflected in the acute shortage of housing, the inability of Black people to meet the high cost of housing, the lack of facilities and the wide range of social problems experienced in Black housing environments.

It is the contention of this thesis that these problems are a direct and inevitable outcome of the dominant political ideology. The problem can be understood most clearly when it is traced to its roots. This entails an historical analysis of low income housing policy that attempts to encompass the holistic interaction between economic and social processes and spatial form as it evolved over time.

During the preindustrial period in South Africa, the White settlers changed and incorporated the indigenous social structures into a new social system that was characterized by the stratification of society along color lines. Blacks were relegated to the lowest social strata.
With the discovery of minerals, this hierarchical social structure was intensified. Blacks were housed under appalling conditions in native reserves, in backyards of White homes and on the urban periphery because they were socially equivalent to units of labor.

When the present government came to power in 1948 it inherited a formidable array of institutional and legislative measures to control Black housing. The Nationalist government intensified and systematized these measures. In the field of housing a unique model emerged in which the capitalist government of South Africa pre-empted the functions of the market system in order to maintain political control.

The problems associated with Black housing in South Africa will, therefore, not be overcome by token measures such as 99-year leasehold or increased expenditure on Black housing. What is needed is a new social structure in which the house is not a political tool, but an enabling device which can satisfy the diverse needs of the individual, the family and the community.
Acknowledgements

Thank you:

Lisa Peattie
Mary Anderson
Julian Beinart
Langley Keyes
Mary Daniels

This thesis is for Mary and Nazli.

David P. Daniels
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CHAPTER 1

A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS of HOUSING

INTRODUCTION

It is generally accepted that the overwhelming majority of the twenty million Black people living in South Africa are inadequately housed. This inadequacy is expressed in several ways. First, there is an acute shortage of housing for Blacks. In 1978 the Government estimated that there is a shortage of 57,600 houses for Coloreds and 20,700 houses for Indians. Most planners would consider these to be very conservative estimates. Justice Steyn of the Urban Foundation has estimated that 200,000 urban and 200,000 homeland dwelling units were required immediately to reduce the deficit of housing for Africans.

Second, in the face of this severe shortage, the concomitant problems of overcrowding, dilapidated physical conditions and lack of facilities have been exacerbated. Third, housing costs have escalated very rapidly, particularly since the 1974 oil crisis and people's incomes have not increased at the same pace as the rate of inflation. This has further restricted the already limited access that poor people generally have to decent living environments.

There appears to be tacit agreement among urban planners that the housing problem has grown much more serious in the period that the present Government has been in power. This is certainly one issue we have to explore.

One way in which this exploration can be undertaken is by analysing the housing supply "model" designed by the Government of South Africa.
This model is neither a purely capitalistic nor a purely socialistic model, although it has elements of both. It is perhaps more correct to say that South Africa has a unique housing system which has evolved out of the interaction between a very particular set of economic, social and political forces.

Our aim is to provide a description of the historical evolvement of this model and to analyse how it is functioning at this time. This explanation will hopefully provide a clearer understanding of the housing crisis being experienced by Black people in South Africa.

It will also become apparent from our analysis that one of the root problems underlying the housing crisis is the very narrow interpretation of what constitutes "housing". We therefore begin our analysis with a brief exploration of the concepts "housing" and "housing policy".
SECTION 1.1: WHAT is HOUSING?

At the most basic level housing refers to the physical artifact which provides people with shelter. Variation in the form, shape and size of housing units is determined by socio-cultural factors, climate, materials, technology as well as political forces. Amos Rapoport, lists four objectives that housing, in its function of providing shelter needs to achieve in order to be successful:

1. "It needs to be socially and culturally valid
2. It should be sufficiently economical to ensure that the greatest number can afford it.
3. It should ensure the maintenance of the health of its occupants.
4. There should be a minimum of maintenance over the life of the building".

It is generally accepted however, that shelter is but one aspect of people's housing needs and that 'housing' is in fact much more complex. In most Western cultures the notion of privacy is strongly imbedded in the definition of housing. Privacy is a rather complex social concept but it is closely linked to the idea of household size - that is how many people ought to live under the same roof - and the arrangement, size and number of the various elements that comprise the dwelling unit. Privacy is one of the crucial elements in the determination of personal and family comfort and satisfaction.

However, the meaning of housing goes well beyond the notion of privacy.
The home not only provides privacy - it is also the individuals' major locale for social interaction with family, friends and the broader community. Within the environment of their homes, people also perform most of their life sustaining functions of eating, sleeping, recreating, loving, learning and working.

For poor people, who generally suffer from a lack of mobility and are therefore forced to spend a large part of their living routine inside the house, the factor of domestic comfort and security is particularly important. This also applies to housewives, the incapacitated, children and the elderly (the majority of the population) who spend more time in the house than in any other single place.

The concept of "housing" can also be generalized very readily to include the environment of the house. When people express their desires about housing, physical barriers between inside and outside are not maintained.........

"Rather, they talk of the outside as an inevitable extension of the inside and of the inside as deeply affected by what goes on immediately outside."

The "outside" not only includes the immediate space around the dwelling unit but also the street, the neighbours and their houses - as well as amenities and facilities for education, shopping, recreation and community interaction. When we speak of the quality of housing environments, we are not merely measuring the performance of all these
attributes - more importantly, we are concerned with the ability of all these factors to foster greater social, psychological and economic security for the individual, the community and for society in general.

This implies that the house and its environs are fundamental aspects of human development in general...... and that there is a very close link between housing and the issues of poverty, inequality, illiteracy, unemployment, underemployment, malnutrition and disease. The intention is not to suggest that "the problems of employment, education and crime will be swept away by moving into a good home in a nice neighbourhood." What we do suggest however, is that good housing can provide a supportive environment for change.

In thinking about the "meaning of housing" we have to consider whether it is functioning as an enabling device which permits freedom and full personal expression and whether it helps people to develop "a sense of worth and self-respect, of not being used as a tool by others for their own ends." It is important to emphasise this developmental aspect of housing because the overwhelming majority of ill-housed people are trapped in a syndrome of subservience involving their landlords, their employers - and the prevailing political ideology.

Housing can also be defined in terms of the dominant "mode of production" in a particular society. In South Africa housing is allocated according to the capitalist mode as a commodity or a consumer good. Viewing it from this perspective, we have to focus on those aspects of housing
which make it a very distinctive economic good. Briefly these attributes are: it is durable (lasts several generations); it is bulky (requires a lengthy construction period); it is fixed to a location and is, therefore, subject to the economic advantages and constraints of that location; in the short term demand for housing is inelastic - it is a necessity, and, therefore, changes in price are not likely to make a significant impact on demand; very importantly - it constitutes, for most people, their largest single item of consumption expenditure. On the vast terrain of consumer items available in capitalist societies, housing and food are by far the most important commodities.

In societies where goods are allocated via the "market mechanism" in terms of people's ability to pay, it is self evident that people with the lowest ability to pay will in general live in the worst housing environments. This is often cursorily dismissed as an aberration or as "inefficiencies of the free market." The correction of this "inefficiency" becomes the responsibility of the public sector who "must subsidize the housing sector as a whole in some fashion to overcome problems of socially inadequate market demands for housing."

Defining housing in terms of the socialist mode is a more difficult exercise. There does not appear to be a normative view of housing in Marxist thought. What the Marxist perspective does imply, in very forceful terms, is that the "problem" is simply a product of the capitalist system and only capable of solution once that system is
overthrown. In "The Housing Question", the principal Marxist text on this subject, Engels espoused this point of view very strongly ".... one thing is certain: there are already in existence sufficient buildings for dwellings in the big towns to remedy immediately any real 'housing shortage', given rational utilization of them. This can naturally only take place by the expropriation of the present owners and by quartering in their houses the homeless or those workers excessively overcrowded .....Immediately the proletariat has conquered political power such a measure will be.... easy to carry out...."

In Capitalist societies the notion of owning one's home has been accepted very widely. The message of Lyndon Johnson to the Congress on the crisis of the cities in 1968, is often quoted in support of homeownership:

"Owning a home can increase responsibility and stake out a man's own place in his community. The man who owns a home has something to be proud of and good reason to protect and preserve it."

Engels, however, regarded the notion of homeownership as a reactionary attempt to defeat the process of economic and political evolution.

"the ownership of house, garden and field, and security of tenure in the dwelling place, is becoming today..... the greatest misfortune for the whole working class, the basis for an unexampled depression of wages below their
As for speculation about solving the housing problem, Engels goes on to say:

"I am satisfied if I can prove.... that there are houses enough in existence to provide the working masses for the time being with roomy and healthy living accommodation. To speculate as to how a future society would organize the distribution of dwelling leads directly to 'utopia'."

An analysis of housing policies in Communist countries does not shed much light on the meaning of housing in that particular context. In 1927, just before the first Five Year Plan, the Soviet Union "imposed standard levels of payments that were reasonably high in relation to income and not very different from those to be found in capitalist countries at the time...." It is clear, though, that housing has been accepted as a responsibility of the state, to be provided as a form of social service.

Whatever one's perspective, housing definitely has a very broad social, economic and political meaning. The anonymous and amorphous housing environments in which we live, are in part, due to a failure to appreciate the complex meaning of the concept "housing".
SECTION 1.2: WHAT IS HOUSING POLICY

One dimension of housing policy refers to the array of regulations, control measures and subsidy programs which governments use to manage the production and allocation of housing.

Since we have defined "housing" in very broad terms the above definition of housing policy is perhaps too parochical for the purposes of this analysis. In its broader dimension housing policy includes public policy in other areas such as education, employment and urban transportation. The broad social policy may not be geared specifically towards housing, but it does contain elements which would impact very strongly on housing policy.

The implicit purpose of all housing legislation in our society is to promote the general welfare, whether in terms of physical health, social and civic efficiency, national defense, protection of the family, maintenance of business prosperity and full employment or the fulfillment of egalitarian social ideals. Although these goals are very general, they are translated into very specific, tangible and permanent environments in which people work, live and play. It is, therefore, possible to use the "performance" of the residential environments as a barometer to gauge the relative success or failure of a housing policy.

Housing policy can take the form of indirect actions such as taxation or other measures to control the private sector; or direct actions
intended to influence or control the housing process; or inaction - comprising those actions that could or should be taken - but are not.

As regards indirect action - in Capitalist societies the private sector is expected to take some responsibility for the delivery of housing. The private component of the housing sector is extremely complex, however, and housing policy must lay the ground rules related to property rights, building standards, as well as the functioning of financial and other private institutions.

When housing policy takes the form of direct action, the public sector either constructs housing units itself; or subsidizes construction directly; or makes money available to people, through loans, rent subsidies, or income maintenance subsidies - to enhance their ability to purchase housing. Housing provided directly by the public sector, unfortunately, has very negative connotations. Hartman's description of the stigma attached to public housing in the USA certainly applies (perhaps even more forcefully) to Black housing environments in South Africa:

"The very words 'public housing' are anathema to too many people, including the program's clientele; the words evoke images of massive ugly projects (townships) located in the most undesirable parts of the city, teeming with problem families.... people are simply turned off by the notion of public housing no matter how creative and subtle the form in which the public subsidy comes wrapped."
A corollary to this description is the fact that public housing mainly accommodates the poor and in South Africa, mainly Blacks. Since this housing is heavily stigmatized it only reinforces class differences and color prejudice. Poor people need not necessarily be stigmatized in this manner. Some of the northern European countries, Sweden in particular, have had notable successes in this area of housing policy. Nathan Glazier writes in this respect:

"The housing of the poor.... is in effect the housing that most people in those countries have; and it is not marked by any stigma of deviance."

In response to the failure of public housing policy, and in particular the rigid implementation of unilaterally designed housing standards, a body of literature, spearheaded by John Turner, emerged in the 1960's. Turner's central proposition was that housing policy should incorporate the notion that housing is a process or an activity ("housing is a verb") - and when people are provided with ready made, standardized units, they are denied the benefits inherent in participating in the housing process.

It is now considered as almost self evident that people must be "permitted to participate in decisions that mould their communities before directions are fixed and policies are set." In 1976 the United Nations Symposium on Housing (Habitat) held in Vancouver adopted the principle that:

"All persons have the right and the duty to participate,
individually and collectively in the elaboration and implementation of policies and programmes of their human settlements."

The policy of involving people in the making of their environments has been criticized rather strongly by the Marxist Left who believe this policy to be "objectively reactionary". The argument is based on the premise that the Turner model diverts the attention of the working class from the "real problem" - which is their class position in society. The argument states further that the depressed condition of low income housing is merely a symptom of this class position and involving these people in the housing process only serves to sustain their impoverishment and to maintain a pool of cheap labor for exploitation by those who own the means of production.

This leads us into another way of looking at housing policy - namely from a perspective which tries to determine whose interest housing policy is designed to serve. Marxists as we have pointed out, would argue that housing policy under Capitalism is designed to minimise costs in order to maintain a pool of cheap labor. Liberals would argue that housing policy is often designed to project an image of care and social concern. This accounts for their negative attitude towards squatting and their insistence on adherence to rigid building standards.

There is something to be said for both points of view, but as Lisa Peattie points out, the problem is more complex:
"There is not a single government interest, and thus no clear-out, unambiguous government policy. Rather there are diverse and conflicting interests, and shifting alliances between them... housing is a complex social institution within which various groups contend in shifting disequilibrium."

In order to understand what housing policy means in any particular context, we have to take into account "specific constellations of power and conflict," within that particular contextual environment.
SECTION 1.3: WHY AN ANALYSIS OF HOUSING POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA?

The South African scenario is unique in terms of the way in which the entire "constellation of power", which of course encompasses housing policy, has been placed under the complete control of the minority, White ruling class of that society. This means that the housing system in South Africa is not a dynamic process of interaction, bargaining and conflict between different interest groups.

What has happened is that the Government has pre-empted the functions of the free market and has taken it upon itself to house the bulk of the Black population. Only a small number of Indian and Colored families obtain their houses via the market system, within strict parameters set by the Government.

Such centralization of the housing process is usually associated with socialist economies, where the model is ostensibly designed to overcome problems of inefficiency and inequity in the market system. The South African housing system can certainly not be characterised as socialist, however, because the houses provided by the South African government provides accommodation for a cheap pool of labor which serves a burgeoning capitalist industrial system. Our aim is, therefore, to determine how and why this unique model has evolved, how it works and to evaluate how it impacts on the housing environments of Black people in South Africa.

Such an analysis, by definition, places us directly within the political domain. This adds a novel and academically satisfying element to this
analysis. It is fair to say that most planners in South Africa tend to shy away from the political issue. This study began as a reaction to these planners who seldom fail to espouse their sensitivity and social concern and their perturbation at the malevolence of apartheid - but in practice function as if apartheid is part of an entirely different reality divorced from their planning.

We have observed a tendency to focus on carefully selected, "neutral" aspects of the housing problem - a technique which allows them to sidestep the political reality.

Thus we have a complete volume which attempts to "prove that what the Colored townships near Cape Town lack, fundamentally, is an esoteric physical attribute called "urbanity". True - these environments are not successful urban places, but this problem is symptomatic of a much more fundamental problem. We cannot wrench the built environment out of its societal context and examine it through the myopic and opaque disciplinary filters of architecture or physical planning.

The most recent publication of the Urban Problems Research Unit at the University of Cape Town deals with low income housing policy in South Africa. It also follows the pattern described above. The entire "analysis" is devoted to notions such as "appropriate goal formulation; selecting a realistic planning path; and selecting effective implementation mechanisms." In a chapter dealing with the overriding reasons for the inadequacies of housing policy, the following "reasons" are advanced for the failure of the present housing policy; "housing is not
seen as a development issue; the definition of the issue of housing is too narrow, the definition of the issue of housing is too static; the dominant mode of environment development is inappropriate; financial viability should not dominate economic viability."

These "reasons" are not invalid - in fact, on the general landscape of policy analysis they may be perfectly valid. Their inadequacy, however, is derived from the fact that they are cloaked in "universal", non-specific terms which ignores the South African reality. The reality, as our analysis of the housing model will indicate, is that the failure of low income housing policy in South Africa is unambiguously the result of the political ideology of that country. In the next chapter we shall describe the historical evolvement of the social policy within which the housing model is framed.
CHAPTER 1 - REFERENCES


2. Ibid., p. 330


11. Engels, Frederick, op. cit., p. 15


20. Ibid, p. 1021


23. Ibid., p. 4

24. Ibid., pp. 207 to 212
INTRODUCTION

Any attempt to analyse the low income housing model in South Africa which focusses exclusively on its present manifestations (or selected aspects of it) and ignores its history is at best, superficial, and can only provide a very limited understanding of the problems endemic to Black housing environments in that society. Low income housing policy in South Africa can be understood most clearly when it is framed within an historical analysis that attempts to encompass the holistic interaction between economic and social processes and spatial form as it evolves over time.

In the historical period preceding the discovery of minerals, there was not a clearly espoused housing policy. This assertion also holds true for the period following the first wave or urbanization, with the important difference that the change in the economic base helped to give rise to a social system of urban segregation. The location, as well as the physical and social structure of Black housing is a direct outcome of this system.

The history of South Africa since European settlement is extremely complex, in spite of the fact that it spans a period of just over three hundred years. Since our major concern is Black housing, the scope of this analysis will be confined to those historical events which have the most explanatory value as far as the evolvement of
the legal and institutional system that determines housing policy in South Africa is concerned.

To facilitate analysis, this discussion will be placed within the following time frames: preindustrial South Africa from settlement to the discovery of minerals; the first wave of urbanization following the discovery of gold; World War I to World War II; the period extending from World War I to 1948 when the present government of South Africa came to power.
SECTION 2.1: PREINDUSTRIAL SOUTH AFRICA

The institutionalization of the policy of residential segregation in South Africa is largely due to economic conditions that followed the change to an industrial society, but it was also built upon a pattern of social relations that had become firmly established before the discovery of minerals. This social system was characterized by a clear stratification of society along color lines. In this section we shall delineate briefly how this system evolved in order to place subsequent historical events within a much clearer context.

White settlement in South Africa began in 1652 with the Dutch occupation of the Cape of Good Hope. The decision to settle at the Cape was not made by the Dutch government, but by a trading company, the Dutch East India Company. This Company was a typical creation of the rapidly expanding system of mercantile capitalism - which made its purpose for establishing a refreshment station at the Cape very clear:

"..... the Company had no desire to tame the wilderness, nor to find new homes for Dutchmen over the sea, Jan van Riebeeck's (the commander's) duty would be done if he provided the Company's vessels with fresh meat and vegetables, for the settlement at the Cape was not a separate venture. It was a cog in a great commercial system which every year yielded those dividends that were the envy of English merchants...."
The settlers were, in general, unskilled, uneducated and many were in fact completely illiterate. Leonard Thompson points out that these men "were not a microcosm of seventeenth century Dutch society. It was a inferior, partial selection from it". Because of the inefficiency of the settlers as a labor force, the company was forced to seek alternative sources of labor in order to make the station serviceable and economically viable. This was done by appropriation of the two sources of wealth - land and cattle, of the local Khoikhoi and San people, and by the importation of slaves, firstly from Angola and West Africa, and later from Madagascar and Delagoa Bay.

In 1967 the Dutch East India Company freed some of the rich original settlers from its service. These free burghers or trekboers, as they became known, gradually moved into the interior and began to establish themselves as cattle and sheep farmers - an occupation which proved to be profitable because of demand from Cape Town. Slave labor had become an integral part of the Cape economy and the slaves were mainly employed as domestic servants, artisans and manual laborers. The trekboers, therefore, considered slave labor as an integral part of their resource base.

In 1795 the British occupied the Cape. After a brief cession back to the Dutch in 1803 the British finally established themselves in 1806. British policy at the Cape was mainly designed to consolidate their colonial position. This was accomplished by encouraging English immigration; by military and political subjugation of the indigenous
population; by the introduction of Christianity and by introducing liberalizing measures culminating in the abolition of slavery.

The abolition of slavery, in particular, jeopardised the class position of the Boer frontier farmers. In view of what was perceived as a threat to their economic and political security, the Boers began a series of migrations into the northeastern interior in the period 1835 to 1837. Their purpose was to establish independent states beyond the borders of the British colony. This event, known as the Great Trek, led to the interior of the country gradually being populated by Whites.

In 1838 the Boers founded the colony of Natal but this was annexed by the British in 1843 as a Crown Colony. The trekkers moved back into the interior and settled the area that subsequently became the Orange Free State and the South African (Transvaal) Republic.

Two significant development took place in Natal during this period. In the late 1840's the British administrator, Theophilus Shepstone, introduced a system of Native Reserves that became the first large scale scheme for the segregation of the races in South Africa. The Reserves, which became a blueprint for subsequent "native administration", were designed so that "each European emigrant would have it in his power to draw supplies of labor from the location in his more immediate proximity". In addition to serving as a pool of cheap labor for White farmers, the reserves served the additional function of providing an environment in which Black labor could be controlled with
relative ease.

The second important event was the arrival of indentured Indian laborers between 1860 and 1866 to furnish a cheap and "reliable" work force for the sugar-cane industry along the coast. After completing their terms as indentured laborers, the bulk of the Indian population settled in Durban and the surrounding peri-urban areas.

The Indians set up shops in competition with Whites in the towns of Natal and later in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. White shopkeepers in these colonies began to agitate against the Indians. The economic ascendancy of the Indians was perceived as a threat to White economic and political dominance. White agitation led to the introduction of measures to curb the Indian population politically and economically and to "encourage" them to return to India. In 1891 Indians were prohibited from living in the Orange Free State.

Cape Town, at this time, was the largest urban center in South Africa. The Cape was dominated by an English speaking element which was largely urban based, official, mercantile and professional in character. The Afrikaans (Dutch) - speaking community was numerically stronger but had less political influence. Both groups depended on the services of Colored and African labor. The Colored people were undergoing a period of adjustment after legal emancipation - urban Coloreds successfully because of their access to skilled trades, the rural Colored less so, on account of their "general landlessness, lack of schooling, and lack of bargaining power."
The significance of these events for the social policy that was to emerge later, lies in the development of a class structure highly congruent with race. Within a generation "color had become the primary index of status."

Political and economic power had became the exclusive domain of the White group. The majority of Black people were incapable of satisfying their own housing needs because they had become incorporated into a new social system which had removed their economic and social independence.
SECTION 2.2: THE DISCOVERY of MINERALS - the FIRST PHASE of URBANIZATION and the BEGINNING of RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

The discovery of diamonds in 1867 and of gold in 1886 transformed the economic structure of South African society. The phenomenal expansion of the mining industry stimulated the development of industrial and economic enterprises and initiated large scale urbanization.

With the discovery of minerals a number of laws were instituted to exclude non-whites from property, residential and trading rights in the mining areas. Blacks were not allowed to acquire mining licences or the right to trade in mining areas. The Gold Law of the Transvaal prescribed that:

"No coloured person may be a licence holder, or in any way be connected with the working of the gold mines except as a working man in the service of whites."

These measures ensured that the only class position in which non Whites were legally permitted access to mines and minerals, was that of workers in the employment of White property owners.

The diamond and gold mines also initiated what later became the model for Black urban housing by the provision of special compounds for their African workers. Their main concern was to obtain labor at the lowest possible cost. With the price of gold fixed, cheap labor constituted one of the productive forces they could control in order
to maximize profit. Providing decent living conditions for their workers would have increased the cost of labor. The governments of the four colonies also introduced legislation which impeded access of Blacks to good housing in the towns. For example, the Transvaal government introduced a system of taxation which forced Africans to seek wage employment in order to pay these taxes. At the same time it also instituted a set of laws (Law 11 of 1887 and Law 21 of 1895) to prohibit independent squatting by Africans. The purpose of these laws was to regulate and limit the number of African squatters per White land-owner, so as to equalise the distribution of African labor to white employees.

This period was also marked by a bitter war - the Anglo-Boer War (1899 to 1902) - between British imperialism and the Boers to determine which white authority held real power in South Africa. The Boers were heavily defeated and at the Treaty of Vereeniging the settlement was reached which gave political control to the Boers, while the British retained control of the economy. Article 8 of the Treaty made the enfranchisement of non-white people in the new colonies dependent on the consent of the white majority. Because racial discrimination had, at this point, became so well entrenched, this effectively meant that Blacks were not likely to become enfranchised - and would always be dependent on the White political and economic system for satisfaction of their housing needs.

As part of the settlement, the British Governor of the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies, Lord Milner, appointed the South African Native
Affairs Commission (the Lagden Commission) to achieve uniformity in native policy to inform the future South African federation.

The Lagden Commission proposed the complete territorial separation of Black and White, for purposes of residence and ownership, as a permanent, mandatory feature of public life. It gave approval to the establishment of segregated "locations" for urban Africans at a time when the governments of all the colonies were beginning to set them up. The Commission also urged the separation of Blacks and Whites in the political sphere, with Africans being represented by Whites in the future federal legislature.

The Lagden Commission became an important reference point in terms of shaping the future model of housing provision for Blacks. This is underlined by the enactment between 1902 and 1909, of laws which either enabled local authorities to establish "locations" for African townsmen, or entrusted a similar responsibility to the central government. For example, the Transvaal restricted accommodation for African servants to rooms in the backyard of White homes. The Cape Parliament also carried a Native Reserve Location Act (1902) authorizing the Government to set up and control African residential areas outside towns. Natal carried a Location Act in 1904 empowering local authorities to set up and control locations.

In 1910 the four colonies united to form the Union of South Africa. The first Act of the Union Parliament was the creation of a Department of Native Affairs to enact the recommendation of the Lagden Commission.
The Native Land Act of 1913 was the first legal enactment, at the national level, of the principle of territorial division between Blacks and Whites.

The 1913 Act demarcated certain areas known as Natives Reserves. White individuals or organizations were prohibited from acquiring land in these areas and at the same time Africans were prohibited from acquiring land elsewhere. The Reserves constituted 7.3% of the total land area of the country.

The purpose of the policy of confining Africans to Native Reserves was to provide a pool of cheap labor for White agriculture, mining and industry. A member of the ruling party made this clear with the statement that the Bantu......

"..... only came here to supply labor...... As soon as the opposition understands this principle that it is labor we are importing and not laborers as individuals, the question of numbers will not worry them either."

Translated into housing policy this makes it clear that Black housing in the urban centres was seen as serving no more than a temporary and dormitory function. In physical terms this has meant that Black housing environments have been planned without care to their comfort and amenity. This view is corroborated by Julian Beinart's description of the Johannesburg City Councils' decision in 1918 to build its first African township, in which he says:
"... for an administration whose annual expenditure on Africans and on the zoo has for a long time coincided, the decision to build WNT (Western Native Townships) must have caused greater economic concern than concern about the kind of environment they were about to create."

Another important dynamic during this period which had a major impact on the provision of housing for Blacks, was the class position of the Afrikaner. The change in the economic base from agriculture to mining also had serious consequences for the Afrikaner. The demand for agricultural products from the urban market transformed some Afrikaner farmers into large scale agrarian capitalists using wage and tenant labor, while the majority became seriously impoverished. De Kiewiet describes this Afrikaner proletariat as follows:

"At the base of White society had gathered, like a sediment, a race of men so abject in their poverty, so wanting in resourcefulness, that they stood dangerously close to the natives themselves.... the century had in other words produced a race of 'poor whites' and 'poor blacks'."

This rural proletariat - both Black and White - became the reservoir for the growing urban worker masses. The poor Whites, faced with competition from Blacks in a "free enterprise" economy, could only rise out of their deprivation by organizing their labor power and by State protection, because they had neither the skills nor the private
capital to compete except on the labor market.

The period immediately succeeding Union was consequently marked by intense struggle between the State, capital and White labor. Essentially the White mineworkers wanted their jobs protected by the introduction of a policy which would officially make skilled work their exclusive domain. This agitation on the part of the White working class helped to accelerate the introduction of a housing system that would allow maximum control over the lives of competing Black workers.

At the outbreak of World War I some definite attitudes towards Black housing had emerged. The provision of housing had been accepted as a function of the Central Government. However, since Blacks in the city were regarded as temporary and the Native Reserves were regarded as their "real homes", their shelter in the city could be very rudimentary. The hostels and barracks used by the mines were considered to be adequate. Because of these attitudes there were no institutional mechanisms directly responsible for the provision of Black housing. These institutions would only begin to take shape after the second large influx of people into the city following World War I.
The second phase of urban growth in South Africa began at the end of World War I. The impetus that the war gave to secondary industries resulted in an influx of Black workers into the urban labor market. Between 1904 and 1921, the number of Africans in the urban areas rose by 71.4% and of Whites by 50.9%. This influx created a housing crisis among the African population and they literally sought shelter everywhere - in mining compounds on employers' premises or in uncontrolled settlements on the periphery of town.

The post-war economic boom was short lived, however, and in 1922 the country was experiencing a serious recession. The White working class resented being retrenched on the mines and the advancement of Africans. This antagonism culminated in the Rand Strike of 1922 which led to "an eventual consensus between mining capital and White labor on the job color bar."

The movement for the segregation of Blacks in the urban areas emerged as a reaction to the forces that seemed to threaten the position of White labor. Under these circumstances the struggle against the slum conditions in which Blacks lived became bound up with the campaign waged by White labor against inroads into the job color bar.

Another economic factor which inhibited access of Blacks to housing in inner city locations was the fact that investment in urban
property was very attractive because of the inefficiency of South African agriculture at this time. Since Africans constituted a large group of people with low spending power, it was not financially sound to invest in Black housing. In 1918 the Johannesburg City Council decided on a housing program for Whites that necessitated borrowing £324605 while the expenditure on African locations was to be £65 000.  

It is against this economic and social background that the Transvaal Local Government appointed a commission (the Stallard Commission) in 1922 to recommend a strategy for dealing with the influx of Blacks into the city. The Stallard Commission concluded that:

"the Native should only be allowed to enter urban areas which are essentially the White man's creation, when he is willing to enter and minister to the needs of the White man, and depart therefrom when he ceases to minister."

Translated into housing policy this implied that the number of Africans entering the urban areas should be restricted and that this would minimize expenditure on their locations. The Commission also made it clear that Local Authorities were responsible for the provision of locations under section 147 of the Act of Union.  

These recommendations were incorporated into the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 which had a series of objectives, one of which was to clear Africans out of the mixed residential areas which had grown up in some of the larger towns, notably Johannesburg. The Act vested local
authorities with the sole right of, and responsibility for, providing 27 for the accommodation of Africans in segregated areas. Furthermore, all Africans other than those exempted under the Act, or employees in bona fide domestic service in urban areas, were obliged to take up residence in a location, village or hostel, or in premises specially 28 licenced by the local authority for the accommodation of Africans.

The Act also required every employer of more than twenty-five natives (this included the Union Government and provincial administrations) "to provide or to hire accommodation for the natives in his employment in a location or native hostel or elsewhere subject to the approval and under the control of the urban local authority." 29

The Urban Areas Act represents the first formal stage in the development of absolute Government control of the housing process and of the exclusion of the private sector from the Black housing market. Since private enterprise could not participate in the Black housing process, financing was a major problem confronting the local authorities. In terms of the Native Beer Act of 1908, local authorities were empowered to utilize the profits from their monopoly sales of "kaffir beer" for the erection of houses, schools and other facilities for Africans. Additional funds were raised from tenants' rent and the levy of a 30 licencing fee on certain occupation.

The Urban Areas Act could not stem the flow of Black people into the cities and between 1921 and 1936 the urban African population doubled. This resulted in a very serious housing crisis. J.C. de Ridder writes that
in Johannesburg:

"... one City Council house existed for every estimated twenty-eight Africans living in the city. The rest..... were living in shacks and squatter camps, without water or sanitation."

The movement of the Afrikaners to the city also gained momentum during this period. In 1936 they constituted 44% of the urban white population but in 1960 this had changed to 51%. The major cause of the increase in Afrikaner urbanization during this period was an enormous agrarian crisis brought about by the Great Depression. The Afrikaans urban proletariat was now much stronger and with strikes and political pressure, the white unions enforced a "civilised labor policy" which legally confined the Africans to unskilled jobs and reserved the better paid skilled jobs for Whites only. This discrimination in the job market further prevented access of Blacks to decent living environments.

Before World War II the country was faced by a serious housing crisis. The situation was aggravated by a scarce supply of building materials and a general slowdown in construction. The main reason for this crisis, however, was the institutionalization of a social system which emphasised exercising control over Black people, rather than addressing the quantitative and qualitative aspects of their housing needs.
SECTION 2.4: FROM WORLD WAR II to 1948 - THE HOUSING CRISIS WORSENS - FOCUS on the INDIAN POPULATION

The Black urban housing crisis was exacerbated by a further wave of urbanization brought about by the post-War economic boom. Squatter camps sprang up in the peri-urban areas throughout the country as Africans restricted by official policy and neglected by housing authorities, found their own solution to the problem caused by overcrowding in segregated ghettos. Magubane gives the following description of post-war squatter conditions in the Johannesburg area:

"...thousands of homeless African families took possession of vacant land adjoining Johannesburg; built shelters out of split poles, packing cases, hessian, canvas, paraffin tins, or corrugated iron, and adopted slogans like 'we will die together'".

By 1944 the South African economy had emerged from its reliance on primary production into a fully fledged manufacturing economy and was attracting considerable foreign investment, particularly in the manufacturing sector. As the economy developed, it required European initiative and skill but it was equally dependent on the availability of cheap Black labor. This led to an intense struggle by the Black working class to earn a living wage. Between 1939 and 1945 there were 304 strikes in South Africa, involving more than 50 000 workers.

In 1946, 75 000 Black gold miners went on strike. The Government
response was the introduction of a Bill making trade unionism illegal, and decreeing strikes in certain sectors of the economy a criminal offence.

In spite of these measures, Black urbanization continued and living conditions deteriorated even further. In 1944 the Government appointed a National Housing Commission to deal with housing issues affecting Whites, Coloreds and Indians and a Bantu Housing Board to control housing for Africans. Both bodies were empowered to make loans to local authorities for economic housing schemes or for sub-economic or assisted housing schemes. Sub-economic schemes would cater for families with incomes below limits prescribed from time to time.

These measures had minimal effect in terms of helping to overcome the housing crisis, but it did give the central Government almost complete control over housing matters. The Government would only grant loans if strict conditions were adhered to.

In 1946 the United Party government appointed the Native Laws (Fagan) Commission..... to enquire into the operation of Union Laws relating to Africans who lived in or near the urban areas. One of the conclusions made by the Fagan Commission was that:

"Despite all efforts of municipalities to utilize their powers, they have been unable to control the drift of Natives; nor provide adequately for them once they have arrive in the area... The present
situation, has........been accentuated by the great industrial expansion associated with the war, and the labour requirements of these industries attracting Native to towns."

The Fagan report also argued very strongly that the idea of segregation was completely impracticable; that the rural-urban movement was a natural economic phenomenon engendered by necessity, one which might be regulated but could not be reversed; and that the African population in the urban areas consisted not only of African migrant workers but also of a settled permanent population.

The significance of the Fagan Commission lies in its strong argument for a more humane social policy which would encompass the provision of housing. It also emphasised the fact that Africans in the urban areas could no longer be regarded as "temporary sojourners". The Smuts government was, however, voted out of office before it could act upon the recommendations of the Fagan Commission.

The Smuts government also made an important input into the design of the present South African housing model with the measures that it introduced to control the Indian population. In 1943 Smuts introduced the Trading and Occupation of Land Restriction Act, commonly known as the "Pegging Act." This Act was introduced to "peg" Indian ownership and occupation of property for a period of three years pending further investigation. It also provided for official control of all property transactions between Whites and Indians. The clear
purpose of this measure, Dugard points out, was to prevent Indian penetration into White areas.

When the Pegging Act expired, the Government, under extreme pressure from the electorate, introduced the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act - better known as the "Ghetto Act" - which laid down that property transactions between Whites and Indians in Natal and the Transvaal could take place only as follows:

. Indians could purchase and sell land in specially defined areas. In order to sell property to other races, and in other areas, a special permit was required.
. Indians could lease land owned by Whites provided that they used it for trading purposes only.

Besides narrowing the options of Indians in the areas of housing and commerce, these measures are important because they served as a model for the Group Areas Act which the Nationalist Government introduced in 1950.
CONCLUSION:

The story of Black housing in South Africa up to this historical point, makes it clear that when the Nationalist party came to power in 1948, they inherited a very formidable range of institutional and legislative measures to control the living condition of Black people. These measures are summarised at the end of this chapter.

The direct control measures such as the African (Urban Areas) Act and the Ghetto Act were primarily intended to control Africans and Indians. The Colored group had up to this point, not been subjected to direct political control in the field of housing.

The reasons for these measures are complex but as we have indicated, it has its roots in a social system which relegated Black people to a social position equivalent to units of labor.

As the economy expanded, White labor demanded preferential treatment and the introduction of measures to prevent Blacks from competing for their jobs. On the mines Blacks were even denied access to semi-skilled jobs. They were employed strictly to undertake the lowest level jobs. This of course denied Blacks the financial means that would have given them access to good housing.

The Nationalist government gained political control because it had convinced the White electorate that if Blacks were integrated into the White housing process or the urban economy, they would eventually
gain political power. The solution was therefore to move beyond laissez faire segregation to a much more formidable and pervasive system of segregation. The key elements comprising this system will be analysed in the following chapter.
FIG. 2.1: SUMMARY of HOUSING MEASURES BEFORE 1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME FRAME</th>
<th>MEASURES</th>
<th>IMPACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Settlement to 1880</td>
<td>Social stratification of society</td>
<td>Blacks at lowest end of social hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natal adopts a Native Reserves policy in 1840</td>
<td>Black workers housed in peri-urban areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Curbs on Indians</td>
<td>Start of formal residential and economic discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880 to WW I</td>
<td>The Transvaal &quot;Gold Law&quot;</td>
<td>Blacks denied access to skilled jobs and good housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taxation Laws</td>
<td>Forces Blacks to seek wage employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Lagden Commission</td>
<td>First official recommendation of a policy of complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control measures by colonies</td>
<td>territorial separation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natives Land Act of 1913</td>
<td>Blacks confined to &quot;locations&quot; by legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.3% of the country set aside for Native Reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WW I to WW II</td>
<td>The Stallard Commission</td>
<td>Recommendation: Blacks in cities to &quot;minister&quot; to needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Housing Commission</td>
<td>Local authorities given sole responsibility for provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bantu Housing Board 1944</td>
<td>of Black housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pegging Act of 1943</td>
<td>Central Govt. provides loans for Black housing -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ghetto Act of 1946.</td>
<td>reinforcement of political control of the housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indians confined to special areas to live and trade.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HISTORICAL BASIS for NATIONALIST HOUSING POLICY
CHAPTER 2 - REFERENCES


3. The colonists and South African historians until recent times have pejoratively referred to these people as 'Hottentot' and 'Bushmen'. The anthropologically correct designations are used here.


8. Ibid., p. 75.


13. Ibid., p. 152.

15. Ibid., p. 339.


22. Rich, P.B., op. cit., p. 185

23. Ibid., p. 187.


25. Rich, P.B., op. cit., p. 188


28. Ibid., p. 11.


CHAPTER 3
BLACK HOUSING POLICY under the NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT

INTRODUCTION

Before considering the legislative enactments and the institutions designed by the present Government of South Africa, it is necessary to explain briefly some aspects of the South African political system since 1948 in order to understand how it was possible for the Government to introduce such a rigidly controlled housing system.

Malan's Nationalist government won the 1948 election by a margin of one seat over Smuts' United Party. The Malanites' electoral platform was their new doctrine of apartheid. The concept actually originated among Afrikaner intellectuals during the mid 1930's - a period of extreme economic hardship for the working class Afrikaner. As racial integration speeded up during the war years, Nationalist intellectuals worked hard on building a theoretical base for the apartheid ideology. From 1946 Die Burger, the official newspaper of the Nationalist party, became the "mass ventilator of apartheid theory".

The policy of apartheid as espoused before the 1948 election encompassed:

- turning the Reserves into the "proper" homeland of the African population.
- the provision of separate educational facilities at all levels for all groups.
. segregation of Colored people with regard to residence, amenities, transport, education and politics.
. the restriction of Indians in all ways possible and stepping up of their repatriation.

The strategy for implementing this policy was the design of an institutional system that would enable them to entrench themselves politically in order to introduce their separationist ideology with as little political resistance as possible.

In the 1953 election the Nationalists scored a very decisive victory - out of 156 seats contested they won 94. The Opposition had actually scored more votes than the Government, but this was negated by a system of delimitation which gave disproportionately strong power to the rural constituences where the bulk of the Nationalist voters was located. Since 1973 the Government has increased its majority and in the November 1977 general election, was returned to power with 134 seats. The official opposition held 17 seats.

This majority is crucial because the House of Assembly possesses almost complete influence as the chief seat of executive and legislative authority. Though the four provincial governments exercise a number of important functions, they have very limited autonomy and there is no guaranteed federal division of power as in Canada or the United States.

Furthermore, since Blacks are disenfranchised, the Nationalist
government at this time holds absolute political power. The Government, therefore, did not have any serious problems in passing the legislation we are about to discuss. In the area of housing the Group Areas Act of 1950 was one of the first, and by far the most significant measures introduced by the Government.
SECTION 3.1: THE GROUP AREAS ACT (No. 41 of 1950) and OTHER SUPPORTIVE LEGISLATION

The Group Areas Act is built upon the long succession of segregation measures which we have discussed. These laws were chiefly meant to affect Africans and Indians. As we have indicated, these measures could not counter the flow of people into the cities and when the present Government came to power in 1948, South African urban areas were characterized by a considerable degree of residential intermingling.

What the Group Areas Act set out to do was to extend the principle of apartheid in housing to its ultimate conclusion by restricting each race group to its own particular area as far as ownership, occupancy and trading were concerned.

To this end it vested the Governor General with the authority "whenever it is deemed expedient", to proclaim areas for occupation by members of a specified group, or to declare that "the area defined in the proclamation shall be an area of ownership by members of the group specified therein."  

The process of separating a multiracial society into residential compartments required a "bewildering maze of different categories, each with its own particular rules or restrictions." It is understandable, therefore, that the Group Areas Act is probably the most complicated piece of legislation instituted by the Nationalist government.
It was impossible to implement the final goal of the Act with immediate effect. The Act, therefore, provides for different stages of implementation. Perhaps the least complicated analysis is that of Gwendolen Carter which identifies four categories of Group Areas:

1. **FULL GROUP AREAS** - one in which ownership, occupancy and acquisition of land and premises are restricted exclusively to a single enumerated group. (An enumerated group refers both to individuals and to companies controlled by particular racial groups).

2. **A CONTROLLED AREA** - is one in which immovable property cannot be sold or leased without a permit to a person who is not the same ethnic group as the owner. In controlled areas existing ownership and occupation patterns are pegged.

3. **AREAS DEFINED for OWNERSHIP** - are those in which disqualified owners, that is persons of another race group, may continue to own their properties in the area for the rest of their lives, but may not occupy them. Their heirs however, are given one year in which to dispose of properties to "qualified" persons.

4. **AREAS DEFINED for OCCUPATION** - are those in which occupation is limited to a specified group. "Disqualified" occupants may not be moved for at least
one year after proclamation and must be given three months notice in the case of business premises.

The Group Areas Act has been subject to various amendments and there has also been two consolidating Acts (in 1957 and 1966). At first all Group Areas matters were the responsibility of the Department of the Interior, but in 1962 control was passed to the newly created Department of Community Development. In 1965 the Department of Planning was made responsible for the planning of group areas for Whites, Coloreds and Indians and for permit control until such time as group areas are proclaimed. After proclamation, however, the development of Group Areas and permit control fall under the Department of Community Development. The Department of Bantu Administration and Development is solely responsible for African areas.

The Group Areas Act has without doubt played a central role in the institutionalization of the Black population of South Africa. Before considering its economic and social impact, we could gain some further insights by considering some of the reasons advanced by the Nationalist when the Act was introduced. One rationale which recurred consistently was the argument that complete separation of all race groups was the only way in which cataclysmic racial conflict could be avoided. The elimination of such potential friction would ensure:

"the paramountcy of the White man and of Western civilization in South Africa.... in the interest of
material, cultural and spiritual development of all races."

Government sympathisers also emphasised the non-discriminatory intentions of the Group Areas Act. In his handbook on the Group Areas Act, F.P. Rousseau, law adviser to the Group Areas Board, writes that:

"The basis of the new legislation was the eventual territorial segregation of persons belonging to the various groups, but on a non-discriminatory basis..... In practice it was inevitable that the White group should find itself best off in comparison with the other groups. But that is mainly the result of circumstances, not of discrimination."

When we begin to consider the effects of the Group Areas Act, however, we have to reject Rousseau's assertion of non discrimination. Just in terms of numbers, Blacks have been affected far more adversely than Whites. This is corroborated by the following figures, released in Parliament by the Minister of Community Development, which indicate how many families had been relocated under the Group Areas Act, as at December 1977:
TABLE 3.1: FAMILIES RELOCATED UNDER THE GROUP AREAS ACT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FAMILIES REMOVED SINCE COMMENCEMENT</th>
<th>RESETTLED IN 1977</th>
<th>STILL TO BE MOVED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colored</td>
<td>69 872</td>
<td>2326</td>
<td>15 795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>33 737</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>12 348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: South African Institute of Race Relations.

By this mass removal of Black people, the Act altered the entire racial ecology of South African cities. Where Black people lived would not be determined by market forces but by Government decree. As Maasdorp points out:

"the Government now had total control over all interracial property transactions and occupation of land."

As a result, every city is characterized by a residential structure in which Whites occupy the inner city areas, the urban periphery and the accessible areas around suburban commercial nodes. These White residential areas not only have superior access, they in general, also possess excellent environmental qualities. In the rural towns the configuration is similar - Whites occupy the centre of town and Blacks live in well defined locations on the periphery, but often also a few miles out of town.

Another effect of the Group Areas Act was that it gave the Central
government complete control over the functioning of local authorities in the field of housing. Local authorities were forced to plan and suggest group areas, evidence for and against the proposals being heard by a Group Areas Board in each town. In many cases, however, local authorities had no hesitation in implementing the Act and as Davenport points out, when Group Areas representatives visited towns in Natal and the Transvaal.....

"they were generally presented with proposals by local authorities for the removal of Indian homes and businesses a mile or more out of town, and occasionally for the elimination of Indian homes and shops altogether...." 13

A very significant effect of this Act is the fact that it excluded White capital and entrepreneurship from direct involvement in the housing process and the micro-economy of the locations and townships. In terms of Section 5 of the Act "disqualified" persons were prohibited from acquiring "immovable property situate within that area". This effectively made it impossible to develop any substantial commercial and employment opportunities or comprehensive recreation amenities in the Black townships. There was simply not sufficient Black owned capital. As the following table indicates, the White group enjoys an overwhelming advantage in terms of income.
TABLE 3.2 INCOME BY RACIAL GROUP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Group</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Population</th>
<th>Percentage of Income (Estimates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloreds</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asiatics</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Bureau of Market Research, University of South Africa.

Clearly, therefore, this provision of the Group Areas Act made it impossible for any Black township to become a viable social and economic entity. The most obvious example is Soweto, which is functionally no more than a dormitory, housing over a million people.

The Group Areas Act also had the effect of making the government one of the largest property holders in South Africa. The procedure for the compensation of disqualified persons is set out in the Community Development Amendment Acts No. 42/1967, No. 68/1971 and No. 93/1972. The Community Development Board (formerly the Group Areas Board) has a 30 day pre-emptive right to purchase an "affected property" at an agreed price, but if it does not exercise this right the owner may sell to a "qualified" person.

The Community Development Board has used these powers to amass vast tracts of land which it often sells at exorbitant profits. During the period 1966-1970 the Department amassed property which is estimated to
exceed R100 million in value. Unlike the private sector, the Department does not pay rates on property which it holds. The following table gives some indication of the profits made by the Department of Community Development from the sale of "affected" properties.

TABLE 3.3: SALE OF PROPERTIES BY THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>PURCHASE PRICE (R)</th>
<th>SELLING PRICE (R)</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE INCREASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Riverside, Durban</td>
<td>10 700</td>
<td>18 200</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Riverside, Durban</td>
<td>8 500</td>
<td>14 000</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>47 000</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>11 000</td>
<td>67 000</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pietermaritzburg</td>
<td>45 000</td>
<td>85 000</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset West</td>
<td>6 000</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>1567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rustenburg</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>430 000</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(These properties were purchased from Whites)

SOURCE: Peter Randall, Power, Privilege and Poverty (p.82)

The table also shows discrimination in property transactions. The percentage profit made from White properties is in general lower than the profits derived from the sale of non-white properties.

A brief discussion of the implementation of the Group Areas Act in the Johannesburg area in the early 1950's will highlight some further aspects of the Group Areas Act.
The first point is that Whites refused to live contiguous to Black townships and as their suburbs expanded Black housing simply had to "give way".

Between 1951 and 1954 the Government focussed its attention on the removal of "Black spots", that is, Black residential areas within White urban centers. The "Black spot" which caused them most concern was the area known as "Western Areas" - the three townships of Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare. These townships adjoined the White residential areas of Newlands and Westdene. The Western Areas were established between 1905 and 1912 and they were the only part of Johannesburg where Black Africans could hold land in freehold tenure. Much of the housing was decayed and in slum condition but there were also well built houses, schools, movies, shops and the only swimming pool for African children in Johannesburg.

As the White suburbs of Johannesburg expanded to abut these African townships, the government was being pressured to move the Africans. In 1951 the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, announced that the "Black spots" in Johannesburg must be moved. The Johannesburg City Council agreed to accept the responsibility for removing the "Black spots" if the Government would meet the expense. The City Council's proposals was to build a new township at Meadowlands, eleven miles from Johannesburg. The Council eventually sold Meadowlands to the government.

Which brings us to the second important issue - namely, the refusal
under any circumstances to allow Africans to own land in South Africa. Gwendolen M. Carter writes in this regard:

"Dr. Verwoerd pointed out persuasively (in the Senate, July, 1953) that more land and better facilities would be provided in Meadowlands than existed in the three Native townships. Africans would be able to buy houses there at cost price or rent or build their own. As a 'basic principle', however, there would be no 'ownership of ground'."

Dr. Verwoerd was quite adamant that the maximum right to land that he would permit was 30 years leasehold without the automatic option of an extension. He also pointed out later that a location was not a Native area. It was White-owned property which belonged to a White city council.

The Johannesburg City Council insisted that land owners should be granted tenure in their new locations but the Government would not extend leasehold beyond a 30 year period. Because this lack of cooperation was slowing down the removal process, the Government did not use the Group Areas Act for the Western Areas Removal Scheme, instead it introduced new legislation, the Natives Resettlement Act of 1954 which was not dependent on the cooperation of local authorities. This Act provided for the appointment of a Resettlement Board to undertake the removal scheme - this Board being directly responsible to the Minister of Native Affairs. It was designated an urban local
authority for the purpose of implementing the Group Areas Laws.

In 1955 the Government introduced a 16th Amendment to the Natives 
(Urban Areas) Act 26 to ensure that all the loopholes which resulted in 
the problems encountered with the Johannesburg municipality, were 
closed. This amendment gave the Minister the authority to abolish 
a Native location, village or hostel for reasons of health, safety 
or because regional or town planning required it. Before doing so 
the Minister had to refer the matter to the Provincial Administrator 
and - a public inquiry had to be held.

In 1970 the Bantu Laws Amendment Act removed the stipulation that a 
public inquiry must be arranged. If the Minister ordered a local 
authority to curtail or abolish a location, village, or hostel he would 
fix a date after which no compensation would be paid for any building 
that was erected and after which a Bantu Affair Commission might instruct 
the police to remove any African who, in his opinion, had no permission 
to be there.

The Group Areas Act and its supportive legislation discussed above 
represent the core of the system which controls Black housing. The 
system was virtually made impenetrable by the fact that the Nationalists 
could make use of three further Acts of Parliament to relocate Blacks. 
These are the Community Development Act, the Expropriation Act and the 
Slums Act. In addition to these measures, there are several general 
provisions which are used to deal with incidental issues.
The COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT (No. 3 of 1966) - this law was intended to:

"consolidate the law relating to the development of certain areas, the promotion of community development in such areas, the control of the disposal of affected properties... the establishment for such purposes of a board (Community Development Board) and the definition of its function."

Officially the Community Development Act should deal with urban redevelopment and rehabilitation of those areas which are physically decayed. The Act compels the Community Development Board to work in consultation with local authorities to prevent urban decay and to assist in the rehabilitation of decayed areas. The Department of Community Development is vested with powers to expropriate properties in blighted areas or freeze all further development in such areas until new physical plans are available.

Rehabilitation is often a euphemism for the forced removal of Blacks from inner city areas. The best example of this is the "rehabilitation" of an area known as District Six, located on the edge of the Cape Town central business district. This area had been occupied by Coloreds since 1834, and had an estimated population of 61,000 Coloreds and 800 Whites.

THE EXPROPRIATION ACT (No. 55 of 1965 repealed in 1975) - provides for
the payment of compensation to property owners. This Act serves more as a facilitating mechanism and does not derogate from the provision of any law relating to expropriation by a provincial administration a local authority for the purpose of construction, road maintenance or the provision of other urban services. If the parties involved in an expropriation dispute cannot agree on the amount of compensation, the provisions of this Act will apply.

THE SLUMS ACT (originally No. 53 of 1934 but has been amended several times) - This Act provides that any property may be declared a slum if any building on it fails to meet certain minimum physical requirements or if it is in disrepair, overcrowded or dangerous to health. This law has not been used for large scale relocation of people, but it has been used for dealing with "stray" cases that have managed to slip through the system.

The Group Areas and Community Development legislation represent the nucleus of Black housing policy. These statutes are, however, complemented by a miscellany of other legal provisions and together these constitute an almost complete control system.

For example, the original Natives (Urban Areas Act) of 1923 determined that local authorities provide segregated townships for Africans. In 1954 the Native Affairs Department laid down the general rule that locations should be separated from areas occupied by members of other racial groups by industrial areas or other buffer strips at least 500 yards wide and from all other external boundaries by strips at least 200 yards in width.
Another example is the 1963 Domestic Servants Act which provided that not more than one full-time African domestic servant per private householder would be exempt from living in an African location, village or hostel unless the local authority licensed a particular householder to accommodate more than one. The Act also gave the Minister the authority to declare that no private domestic servant might be accommodated in any "White" part of the urban area. This became popularly known as the "White by night" policy.

A final example - in September 1953 the Minister of Native Affairs announced the introduction of steps to regulate the provision of accommodation for African servants in blocks of flats and other premises such as hotels where White families resided. This was done in terms of an Amendment to the Native (Urban Areas) Act which provided that no owner in a proclaimed area might allow more than five Africans to reside in that building at any one time.

The implementation of this practice had to be delayed, however, because in all the cities and towns there was already a serious housing shortage in the Black townships. Numbers of new hostels would have to be built if the many hundreds of domestic servants and employees at flats and hostels were to be accommodated there.

Any further contingencies which might lead to permanent residence in urban environments were covered by the Bantu Laws (Amendment) Act of 1972 which ruled that:

"A Bantu tribe, community or individual could be
removed from where they lived without any recourse to Parliament, even if there was some objection to the removal."

In order to legitimise this system, the government introduced legislation giving Blacks "control" of the system that its White administration had devised. The Bantu Affairs Administration Act of 1971 transferred "control" over Africans in the urban areas from White local authorities to Bantu Affairs Administration Boards. Davenport points out that these Councils "were never allowed to do more than advise their white masters." The officials of these Boards were employed by the central Government, and all control by local authorities over African townships was legally severed.

The Bantu Affairs Administration Board can be viewed as a "rounding off" of the institutional system that controls Black housing in South Africa. This system is summarized in the following diagram:
FIG. 2.1: THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE of BLACK HOUSING

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

PARLIAMENT

Highest legislative authority; provides own executive institutions; makes laws which provincial and local authorities must administer

THE CABINET

The final authority on housing policy matters; acts upon "expert" advice and recommendations from various departments

EXECUTIVE BRANCH

VARIABLES STATE DEPARTMENTS

DEPT. of COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

. The Community Dev. Board
. The National Housing Comm.
. The Rent Control Board
. The Slums Clearance Courts

DEPT. of BANTU ADMIN. & DEV.

Provides housing in Homelands (Funded by SA Bantu Trust)

THE FOUR PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

. No specific powers in the housing field
. Municipalities are subject to provincial ordinances
. TOWNSHIPS BOARD - approves plans for townships

LOCAL AUTHORITIES

. design/build townships
. provide urban services

BANTU AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION BOARDS

. Have taken over from White municipalities responsibility of providing houses for Africans
. Housing funded by Bantu Housing Board.
All the legislative enactments and institutions which we have discussed had the effect of impeding access of Black people to decent housing environments. Consequently these people began to use their own initiative in order to satisfy their housing needs. It is for this reason that squatter housing has historically been an integral part of the urban system of South Africa. In the following section we turn to an analysis of this issue.
SECTION 3.2: MEASURES to CONTROL the SQUATTER PROBLEM

The squatting problem did not originate under the present government. In 1948, there were thousands of squatters living under all kinds of makeshift conditions on the outskirts of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and other towns throughout the country.

There are several reasons for the severe squatter problem during that period:

- Many people were regularly being evicted from State owned land, often after having lived there for generations, because they had no official title to the land.
- Large numbers of people were forced to squat because of the lack of employment opportunities in the Reserves.
- Some families were deemed surplus to the labor requirements on farms owned by Whites.
- Some of the men found work in the cities but could not take their families with them and were, therefore, forced to leave them in squatter settlements.
- Rapid industrial development after the War attracted people to the city.

It is clear that the policies of the Smuts government and the long history of discrimination in the areas of housing and employment were the major causes of the squatter problem.
The policies of the Nationalist government exacerbated the problem. For example, the Government declared the Western Cape a Colored labor preference area which meant that Africans could not be employed in jobs held by Colored laborers. Large numbers of African workers, therefore, did not qualify to live in the Cape and were "endorsed out" of the area.

The Group Areas Act contributed to the shortage of housing for Coloreds. All over South Africa Colored people were removed from parts of towns and cities that had been proclaimed White. For some years the Government insisted that 80% of new houses completed for Colored occupation in the Western Cape should be set aside for families displaced in terms of the Group Areas Act. These measures forced thousands of families to live in squatter settlements and in 1972 there were 47 Colored squatter camps in the greater Cape Town area.

The squatter problem must have caused some concern in Government circles because it fell outside the carefully designed housing supply and control system. In order to overcome this problem the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 was introduced. The most important provisions of the Act are:

- no person may enter land, remain or reside there without permission of the owner or occupier.
- if a court, after consultation with any local authority concerned, found that people were living under conditions which endangered public health
or safety, it may order any structures to be demolished.

- the collection of fees in connection with the illegal occupation of land or buildings was prohibited.
- the Government could direct any local authority to establish an emergency camp for the accommodation of homeless persons.
- owners of land were to be held responsible for illegal squatting on their land.

These measures ensured that squatters were placed very firmly under Government control. The Government has, on several occasions used the provisions of the Squatting Act to remove people. In 1977, 25 000 Black families in Cape Town were rendered homeless when three shantytowns were burned and bulldozed. Many of the residents were placed on trains and transported to the Transkei homeland, 700 miles away. The homelands are also experiencing a severe squatter problem because it has served as a depot for workers endorsed out of the South African housing system. In 1973, 20 000 Africans were squatting on the outskirts of Ga Rankuwa and some 100 000 near Mobapane in a Tswana homeland to the northwest of Pretoria. The analysis of the homelands in the following section, will indicate how problems such as these have came about.
SECTION 3.3: THE HOMELANDS AS PART OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSING MODEL

Another important institution was added to the South African housing model with the announcement of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 which changed the status of the reserves into homelands or Bantustans. In 1959 the Promotion of Self-Government Act was passed, laying the basis for the "independence" of the Transkei and the other reserves. In 1963 the Transkei was granted self government and in 1976 it gained formal independence.

The following table lists those homelands which have been proclaimed as self governing territories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOMELANDS</th>
<th>PEOPLE</th>
<th>LAND AREA (sq. miles)</th>
<th>DATE OF SELF GOVERNMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transkei</td>
<td>Xhosa</td>
<td>14 178</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bophuthatswana</td>
<td>Tswanas</td>
<td>14 494</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ciskei</td>
<td>Xhosa</td>
<td>3 547</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebowa</td>
<td>Pedi/North Ndebele</td>
<td>8 549</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>2 333</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazankulu</td>
<td>Shangaan/ Tsonga</td>
<td>2 576</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwaqwa</td>
<td>South Sotho</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu</td>
<td>Zulu</td>
<td>12 141</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two further homelands, Swazi and South Ndebele are in the process of creation.

SOURCE: Butler, Rotberg and Adams (p.2) , Dugard (p. 93)
On the surface, the homelands provide millions of Blacks with the opportunity to govern themselves and to satisfy their own housing needs. What it does, in fact, is to remove the residual rights those Africans designated as 'Homeland citizens' may have had in South Africa. To consider the homelands as viable states or economic entities appears to be wishful thinking in the extreme. The homelands are basically poverty stricken reserves serving the White government of South Africa with a pool of cheap labor for its mines, industries, farms and seaports. The homeland citizens, Robertson and Whitten point out, are the same migrant workers...

"who have paid with the destruction of much of their social fabric for the prosperity of white South Africa today."

An important parallel to the homelands policy was introduced by the Physical Planning Act of 1967 in terms of which industries were provided with incentives to locate on the border of the homelands. This meant that South Africa could utilize Black labor without being encumbered by the problem of having to satisfy their housing needs.

In 1969 the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development asked local authorities to take the following propositions into account when deciding on sites for Black townships:

. where a city or town is situated in the vicinity of a homeland, the Africans working in such town should be
FIG. 3.2: THE BLACK HOMELANDS OF SOUTH AFRICA

SOURCE: The Black Homelands of South Africa (p. 2)
Butler and Adam.
accommodated in a township in the homeland.

should the distance between the city and the nearest homeland be too great to make it feasible for the Africans to travel there and back daily, the families should nevertheless be accommodated in the homeland. The workers could live in hostels in the urban area and they would be able to visit their families periodically.

The Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration stated in May 1971 that the planners in his Department had suggested that it should be feasible to transport Black workers on a daily basis between points up to 70 miles apart - or, on a weekend basis between points up to 400 miles apart.

A survey of local authorities undertaken by the South African Institute of Race Relations during 1971 indicated that the above propositions were actually being put into practice. In cities such as Cape Town and Johannesburg the building of family houses had virtually stopped or was proceeding at a much slower rate than was necessary to overcome backlogs or to cater for the natural increase in the resident population. More hostels were, however, being built, sometimes by private employers.

In some towns which are slightly closer to the homelands the survey revealed instances where all the families in a town had to move to a homeland while the workers were to be housed in hostels in the urban
areas. A case in point is the town of Douglas in the north-eastern Cape where families would be moved more than 200 miles to Mothibistat. Married couples who wanted to live together would have to move to a homeland to do so.

The survey also revealed that in towns such as Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg and East London which are officially considered to be within commuting range of a homeland, the building of family housing had been frozen. People were being moved from municipal townships to "towns" within the borders of the homelands.

In addition to these high social costs, the border industrial policy also suffers from other serious disadvantages. Firstly, it has been estimated that it will cost R6000 to create a single job for an African worker. The high cost is due to the fact that generally accepted locational criteria for industries are not taken into account. The second disadvantage is that the homelands do not really benefit Blacks economically. The profits from these industries stay in the White area and (whatever is left of) sub-poverty datum line wages, flow into the black areas. Finally the policy of border industrial development actually inhibits industrial growth and overall development within the homelands themselves by drawing skills and labor away from the homelands.

Clearly, the cost in social as well as money terms is extremely high. This assertion not only holds true for the homelands policy, but applies perhaps even more forcefully to the entire Black housing system. The question that comes to mind is - who pays for this housing system?
SECTION 3.4: WHO PAYS FOR BLACK HOUSING?

One of the major reasons for the failure to provide adequate accommodation for Black people in South Africa, is the opposition of the White voter to the use of general revenue funds to build houses for Blacks. Swanson writes:

"No government could expect to tap the general revenue for such purposes and escape the indignation of its electorate."

3.4.1: FINANCIAL STRATEGIES

South African governments have historically resorted to various indirect strategies to finance the development of townships. For example, in 1951 the Bantu Building Workers Act was introduced with the object of speeding up the provision of housing for Africans in urban areas. Previously the skilled building work had been done by Whites, but the high level of their wages had increased the cost of housing projects and thus the rentals payable and in many instances also the losses borne by the State and local authorities. The Act provided for the basic training and employment of building workers in African townships at lower rates of pay than those stipulated for skilled builders of other races. Africans were also prohibited from doing skilled work on buildings in all other of urban areas.
In 1952 all employers of adult male Africans who did not provide accommodation for them were required to contribute a sum of up to 25 cents a week to a Service Levy Fund which would be used to provide water, sanitation, lighting and roads in African townships. Up to 5 cents out of every 25 cents would be used to subsidize transport services.

The Services Levy Act was supplemented in 1957 by the Bantu Transport Services Act. This Act gave the Department of Transport control of the portion of the services levy which might be used for subsidizing transport and provided that the compulsory contribution from employers be increased to 10 cents per week.

Besides the Services and Transport Levies all employers of African men and women had to pay an initial labor bureau fee of 25 cents as well as 20 cents a month registration fee in terms of the Labor Act of 1972. This Act also gave the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development the authority at any time to declare that the fees would fall away. Instead employers would have to pay a monthly contribution of R2.50 in respect of each African employee. The Act also laid down that self employed Africans outside the homelands should pay contributions of up to R1 a month.

Another regulation which helped to pay for Black housing was the obligation imposed on local authorities, after it became lawful for Africans to consume "European" liquor in 1961, to pay 80 percent of the profits from municipal liquor outlets (as distinct from profits
on "kaffir" beer) to the central Government.

All these contributions were to be paid to the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards. Besides being used for housing and services rendered by the boards in areas under their control, the funds could be used for any purpose which the Minister considers to be "in the interest of the Bantu". These funds could, and in fact, have been used to develop townships in the homelands.

3.4.2: SUBSIDIZED HOUSING FOR AFRICANS

The first subsidized subeconomical housing scheme for Africans was built in 1936. The Government made loans available at 3/4 percent interest rate on condition that the local authority, in fixing the rentals, incurred a loss equal to half of that borne by the Government.

With the establishment of the Bantu Housing Board in 1944 the interest on these loans was raised to 3½ percent. In 1949 the new Government reverted to the basis of granting loans at 3/4 percent interest but allowed local authorities to determine the rentals in such a way that they did not incur any losses.

During 1958 the Government decided that no further subeconomical funds would be provided for African housing schemes because "it was not the task of the state to provide subsidies for the housing of Bantu who are temporarily rendering service in White urban areas." Urban Africans
housing schemes should be self sufficient.

In 1975 the Minister of Community Development said that subecononomic loans for African housing schemes were unnecessary. Firstly, land for the development of African residential areas had to be donated to the responsible authorities by townships developers. This did not apply to residential areas for other race groups.

In addition, most services for the development of African townships were financed from the Bantu Services Levy and from profits on the sale of Bantu beer. Furthermore, semi-skilled labor was used in the construction process so that costs were minimal.

3.4.3: SUBSIDIZED HOUSING FOR COLOREDS AND INDIANS

Housing schemes for Coloreds and Indians in the lower income groups may be provided by the Department of Community Development or, with the aid of loan funds from the National Housing Commission, by local authorities.

Subeconomic schemes cater for the lowest income groups and provide the most basic shelter. The rate of interest to local authorities has varied from time to time. In 1975 it was 1 percent-repayable over 40 years. In 1976 the upper income limit for subecononomic housing was a monthly family income of R200.

Economic schemes cater for families whose incomes are higher but who
FIG. 3.3: FINANCING of COLORED and INDIAN HOUSING


still cannot afford to build their own homes. The rate of interest charged to local authorities was 9 percent in 1975 and the loans are repayable over 30 years. The family income is R400 per month.

In terms of the Housing Amendment Act of 1975, local authorities, when applying to the National Housing Commission for loans for housing schemes, may include the costs of services and recreational facilities. These costs are then computed into the rent paid by tenants. This is one of the lesser known, forms of discrimination. In White housing schemes services are paid for out of local authority
revenue funds which are raised by municipal rates. Coloreds and Indians in economic housing schemes also pay municipal rates and are, therefore, in effect, required to pay twice for the use of municipal services.

The most significant aspect of the financing system for Black housing is that the Government is not called upon to bear any costs at all. Loans are no longer made available for African housing and whatever incidental costs may be incurred, are covered by the various levies which we have described. The Government does provide loans for Colored and Indian housing, but all of this money is recoverable.
SECTION 3.5: SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATION OF THE HOUSING PROCESS

Having outlined the evolvement of the housing problem as well as major legislative enactments that constitute the core of the Nationalists' housing policy, we are now in a position to summarize briefly the housing options that the system provides for the different race groups.

3.5.1: THE HOUSING MARKET

We have not, thus far, discussed White housing because, in general, in terms of our broad definition of housing, Whites do not have a housing problem. The White housing model is presented here purely for purposes of comparison. A small percentage of the White population is housed by the public sector. Prospective White tenants are eligible for loans made available by the National Housing Commission. The hierarchical structure of the White Housing sector is diagrammatised below:

FIG 3.4: THE WHITE HOUSING MARKET

- Luxury private rented accommodation
- Moderate private rented housing
- Economic public housing
- Poor private rental accommodation
- Luxury owner occupied housing
- Moderate private rented housing
- Subeconometric public housing
The important features of this model is the fact that Whites have a variety of choices in housing and that the public sector delivers only two of the seven options available to them. There has, therefore, been very little Government intervention in the White housing market.

3.5.2: THE HOUSING MARKET FOR BLACKS

The housing market for Indians and Coloreds offers much less choice than the White housing market. It is not only more restricted in terms of the delivery system, but also because of the government regulations which we have discussed, which also narrow the options in terms of locational choice. Generally lower incomes also narrows the housing choice of Blacks considerably. Africans are the most seriously disadvantaged group with only two options available—namely, squatter housing and subecononic public housing. The Homelands may be considered as a third housing option although these areas are technically not within the borders of the Republic. Also the option of squatter housing is not officially approved by the Government. The Government is, in fact, very strongly opposed to squatter housing, even as a temporary solution.

The public sector has recently started to become involved in the provision of housing for Africans. This process is, however, still in an infant stage and thus far only a limited number of units have been built. Effectively, therefore, in terms of official policy, Africans are entirely dependent on the Nationalist Government to provide them
with housing.

The housing system for Blacks is diagrammatised below:

FIG. 3.5: THE BLACK HOUSING MARKET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLOREDS</th>
<th>AFRICANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>owner occupied housing</td>
<td>No ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No economic public housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic public housing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private rented accommoda-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>squatter housing</td>
<td>squatter housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sub-economic public housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Homelands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have attempted to delineate the major components of the housing system devised by the Nationalist government of South Africa. Because of its extreme inflexibility, this housing process does not provide Black people with any freedom of choice or opportunity for full personal expression. As our analysis indicates, the process of housing Blacks in South Africa is a model of social and political control rather than one designed to achieve developmental goals.

The Soweto riots which started on June 16, 1976 was a culmination of the resentment of Black people against the inequities to which they were being subjected, not only in housing, but in every facet of life in South Africa. The riots succeeded in eliciting an immediate response from the Government in the field of housing.

On August 14, 1976, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development announced the Government's intention of introducing "a home ownership scheme for qualified Bantu persons in urban residential areas." The Government also introduced legislation which made it possible for "qualified persons" to acquire from the State a "Right of Leasehold issued for a period of 99 years" in respect of property within urban Black areas. This does represent a small step forward from the old 30 year leasehold system.

What is much more significant, though, is the fact that only Africans who qualified in terms of Section 10 requirements, were eligible for
homeownership and 99-year leasehold in the cities. The criteria for qualification are as follows:

- Continuous residence in the urban areas since birth.
- Employed by the same employer for a period of ten years.
- Having lived in the area continuously for a period of fifteen years.

These qualifications effectively continue to deny the "privilege" of tenure to the millions of Black workers in South Africa.

South African capital was also concerned about the economic implications of the Soweto riots. The Transvaal Chamber of Industries presented the Prime Minister with a memorandum recommending improvements in housing, amenities, cultural and commercial facilities and communications in the Black housing areas. The Chamber of Industries made it clear, however, that its primary concern was not the impoverished, ill-housed majority of the Black population. What it demanded, essentially was the development of a strong Black middle class in order to maintain White supremacy. Their report concluded that:

"Only by having the most responsible section of the urban Black population on our side can the Whites of South Africa be assured of containing on a long term basis the irresponsible economic and political ambitions of those Blacks who are influenced against
their own real interests from within and without our borders."

Perhaps the most significant response to Soweto was the establishment of the Urban Foundation in November 1976. The project was initiated by Harry Oppenheimer, chairman of the Anglo American Corporation and the Afrikaans financier, Anton Rupert. The expressed goal of the Urban Foundation was to "improve the quality of life" of urban Blacks in South Africa. After two years the Urban Foundation managed to mobilize R19 million from the private sector. It has also assisted in the development of a wide range of small scale housing and community projects.

Within the context of the policy framework we have described however, initiatives like the Urban Foundation are of relatively minor significance. No significant advances can be made without a dismantling of the institutional system that controls Black housing in South Africa.
## FIG. 3.6: SUMMARY of NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT HOUSING POLICY MEASURES

### Pre-1968, HISTORICAL BASIS for NATIONALIST HOUSING POLICY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>RELOCATION STRATEGIES</th>
<th>THE HOMELANDS</th>
<th>FINANCING SYSTEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Group Areas Act</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Prevention of Illegal Illegal squatting Act.</td>
<td>Bantu Authorities Act - Status of Reserves changed to Homelands</td>
<td>Loans for subeconomic housing at 3/4% interest - to be covered by rentals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Natives Resettlement Act - supplement to Group Areas Act - eliminates need for cooperation with local authorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>16th Amendment - Minister can abolish townships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Department of Community Development plans and grant grants permits for Group Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td>No more subeconomic funds for African housing - Government would only provide loans for Indians and Colored Townships and individuals. Interest: subeconomic 1% economic 9% Rentals also cover cost of amenities and services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Community Dev. Act and Expropriation Act - can be used for relocation purposes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
<td>Physical Planning Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Bantu Laws Amendment Act:</td>
<td>. border industries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>. Tribes can be moved at Minister's discretion</td>
<td>. provides jobs for Blacks who must live in Homelands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 3 - REFERENCES


3. Carter, G.M. *op. cit.*, p. 158


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18. Carter, G.M., op. cit., p. 90

19. Ibid., p. 90

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23. Ibid., p. 97

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50. Peter Randall, (ed.), op. cit., p. 81
51. Robertson and Whitten, op. cit., p. 83
52. All figures used in this section are extracted from Horrell, M., op. cit., p. 77 to p. 82.
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CHAPTER 4

AN ANALYSIS of the HOUSING SUPPLY MODEL as it OPERATES in the
CITY of CAPE TOWN

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this analysis is to highlight the manner in which the housing model operates at the city scale. We have selected the city of Cape Town for the following reasons:

- Cape Town shares many of the problems encountered by cities in developing countries such as rapid rural to urban migration and high population increase rates - 3.37% for Coloreds and 3.78% for Africans. These and other social and economic problems have resulted in a huge housing shortage. In 1972 the population of Cape Town numbered approximately 1.17 million - of these about 700,000 were classified as Colored. At that time the housing shortage for Coloreds was 55 000 homes - about 314 000 persons. This means that nearly half the Colored population of Cape Town is inadequately housed - or not housed at all.

- In recent years there has been considerable focus on the housing problem in Cape Town - particularly the squatter "problem". The Crossroads squatter settlement has been the focus of international attention.
Cape Town has the largest housing construction program in the country. Two new towns, Mitchells Plain (projected population of \( \frac{1}{4} \) million) and Atlantis (expected to house \( \frac{1}{2} \) million people) are now under construction. These "cities" are being designed and built by the two local authorities in their capacity as surrogates for the national government.

As in the case of Rio de Janeiro, the unique and magnificent physical setting of the city tends to sharpen the contrast between rich (predominantly White) and poor living environments.

There is a significant difference between Cape Town and the other major cities such as Johannesburg, Durban and Pretoria. Cape Town has a smaller African population because the Cape has officially been classified as a Colored labor preference area. The difference is, however, largely one of scale, because the physical and social problems associated with Black housing environments are similar in every city.

Our analysis of the housing supply model in Cape Town will take the form of a classification of housing options in terms of the form of tenure. Because of the difference in policy prescriptions for Coloreds and Africans, we shall analyse the two race groups separately.
SECTION 4.1: ANALYSIS of HOUSING OPTIONS for COLOREDS

There are several housing options available to Colored families but most families cannot exercise this choice because of their low incomes. In fig. 3.4 we characterized the supply model as a hierarchy - squatter and subecononomic public housing are located at the base of this hierarchy.

SECTION 4.1.1: COUNCIL RENTAL SCHEMES

The two local authorities, the Cape Town City Council and the Divisional Council of the Cape, are responsible for all government financed rental housing. The intervention of the local authorities into the housing field began in the last decade of the 19th century, but apart from the construction of twenty cottages in Mowbray in 1903, little was done until 1917 when a loan was raised to build 122 cottages in Maitland Garden Village. Flats were built in District Six in 1931. By the end of 1952, there were 4260 rental dwellings under the aegis of the City Council.

The implementation of the Group Areas Act led to an increase in the construction of Council housing. In 1972 the City Council built 2247 new units while the Divisional Council built 1100. In 1977 the two local authorities built 5498 new houses, (see table 4.2).

The Council rental schemes are nearly all located on a sandy, windswept
plain known as the Cape Flats, (fig. 4.1). The Cape Flats is poorly located in relation to the Cape Town CBD and the major metropolitan commercial and employment centres. This area has extremely poor environmental qualities and is poorly linked to the major regional recreation resources for which the Cape has become so well known.

All Council rental units are built according to standards set by the National Housing Commission. The local authorities are expected to follow the standards as set out in the "Manual of Standard Requirements for Master Plans and Township Layouts for Indian and Coloured Communities." These conditions are a prerequisite when applying for NHC funds. The standards mainly cover aspects of physical design such as space, density and building materials, also giving guidelines for open spaces and community facilities. While standards are meant to ensure minimum quality, their rigid implementation, in this case, has resulted in housing that is lacking in adaptability to change in the family cycle, or family size.

The design of rental housing is done by the Technical Departments of the Local authorities before being submitted to the Townships Board and the Department of Community Development for approval. The users have never been asked to make any input into the design process. Once approval is granted the schemes are put out to public tender and contracts are let out to private contractors. The completed units are then allocated to families in terms of a waiting list procedure.

When considering the implications of the housing problem, it is
FIG. 4.1: LOCATION of COUNCIL RENTAL SCHEMES

SOURCE: Low Income Housing Alternatives (p.11)

P. Andrew and D. Japha
important not to lose sight of the social consequences. Each "household" on a waiting list is, not a disembodied statistic, but is, in fact, a unique family:

"Most include a man, his wife and children. Each person is chilled by winter winds and rain, each aspires to warmth and comfort. A few have abandoned all aspirations to human dignity..... and wonder if there is any point in saving for a house for which they might have to wait three years, or five year, or more......"

SECTION 4.2.1: HOME OWNERSHIP SCHEMES

In 1977 Coloreds and Indians earning below R150 a month qualified for subeconomic loans at 1 percent interest, repayable over a 40-year period. People earning less than R540 per month qualify for economic housing at 9½ percent interest over a 30-year redemption period.

Houses in private ownership can be acquired either on the private market or can be bought from a local authority in one of their ownership schemes. Because they are so dissimilar the two supply systems will be discussed separately.

LOCAL AUTHORITY

Local authority schemes share the same locational disadvantages of the rental schemes (Fig. 4.2). In spite of low incomes the present
FIG. 4.2: LOCATION of HOME OWNERSHIP SCHEMES

ATLANTIC OCEAN

HOME OWNERSHIP

LOCAL AUTHORITY

PRIVATE OWNERSHIP

SOURCE: Low Income Housing Alternatives (p.23)
tendency is to build more home ownership schemes.

The decision to build more units for home ownership was not informed by the needs of the population. It was rather, a political strategy designed to help overcome the negative image which both local authorities had acquired in the Black community in the process of providing houses for Blacks.

In 1975 the Cape Town City Council embarked on a huge housing project-Mitchells Plain - which will eventually house \( \frac{1}{4} \) million people. Mitchells Plain is essentially an enormous Colored group area, covering an area of three thousand hectares, 20 miles from Cape Town. for which the responsibility of design and management has been delegated to the local authority.

The initial policy decision was to build only home ownership dwellings in Mitchells Plain - that, is for people earning between R250 and R450 a month. The following income figures show that this decision did not reflect the economic reality:
### Table 4.1: Incomes of Colored Families

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Income Updated to 1976 (R)</th>
<th>Monthly Income in 1976 (R)</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>493</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>493</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>986</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1315</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1644</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1260</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3288</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4110</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From these figures we see that only 15% of the Colored population would qualify as home owners. The City Council was then faced with an unusual and ironic problem - they were unable to sell the houses in Mitchells Plain. In mid-1978 the Council hired the services of a consortium of the three major building companies in Mitchells Plain to take responsibility for the selling of homes in the new town.

The Council also reported in September 1978 that many of the new residents in Mitchells Plain were having difficulty in meeting their repayment commitments and some had been served with eviction notices.
The reasons cited were the increase in unemployment, the increased cost of living and high transport costs because of the isolated location of the new town.

PRIVATE MARKET

The older ownership areas developed privately and more naturally and spontaneously along the suburban railway line and the main road linking the CBD to the Southern suburbs. Now, however, only a few isolated pockets remain since most families have been forced to move in compliance with the Group Areas Act. Thus, relatively few privately developed ownership dwellings are currently constructed and these are mainly on individual sites sold in local authority schemes or in small pockets of infill development in the more established suburbs.

Loans for private housing can be obtained from building societies. However, a very small percentage of private Colored housing is funded in this manner, because:

- interest rates are too high for most consumers;
- the conditions for the granting of loans are restrictive;
- Blacks are generally considered to be bad credit risks.

As a result, building societies do not play a significant role in the provision of Colored housing.
The National Housing Commission makes loans directly to individuals who possess assets either in the form of cash or land to the value of 10 percent of the cost. These loans cannot exceed R11,250 and are made at the current economic rate of interest. An insignificantly small percentage of Colored people make use of these loans.

In 1977 half the Colored population of the Cape Town metropolitan was housed by the government. The rest lived in private housing (32%) or in squatter houses (18%). The ratio of government to private housing is increasing rapidly, however, mainly because of the fast rate of construction at Mitchells Plain. The following table showing the number of houses built in the Western Cape in 1977, reflects this trend:

**TABLE 4.2** HOUSES BUILT in CAPE METRO REGION in 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>COLORED</th>
<th>INDIAN</th>
<th>AFRICAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BUILT BY LOCAL AUTHORITY and DEPT. of COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>5498</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUILT by PRIVATE SECTOR</td>
<td>2555</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*100 units were to be constructed in 1978/79.

SOURCE: South African Institute of Race Relations

This increase in government intervention in the housing process is an intensification of the social policies which we have analysed above. The consequence of these measures is increasing residential segregation and the location of Coloreds further from the developed parts of the
city system. More importantly these policies mean that the energies, resourcefulness and imagination of the people will always be excluded from the housing process. In Cape Town, the two extreme population groups in terms of wealth, squatters and Whites are the only people who do not live in standardized housing and have the opportunity to be involved in the making of their own living environments.

4.1.3: SQUATTING

Until recently, all squatter camps on both local authority and private land were unplanned agglomerations of wood and iron structures. Those on local authority land were serviced with rudimentary roads, bucket toilets and communal water points. Those in private land were without any services other than bucket toilets, with collection by local authorities arranged privately by individuals. These people were dependent on surrounding houses for their water. Backyard squatters used services in the house on whose site they are located.

The capital invested by local authorities in services for squatters is not recoverable from the National Housing Commission because the Government does not recognise such schemes. The finance, therefore, comes from the local authority's own funds at the market rate, and because of the supposed temporary nature of the schemes is recovered over a very short period - less than seven years in all cases.

In addition, service charges are levied for water and refuse and
FIG. 4.3: LOCATION of SQUATTER AREAS

SOURCE: Low Income Housing Alternatives (p. 33)
night soil removals. Squatters on private land pay varying rentals to their landlords and in addition, buy water and pay a service charge for refuse collection. If they have a bucket toilet a further service charge has to be paid for night soil removal.

In 1975 the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Bill was introduced, replacing the old Act No. 52 of 1951. In terms of the new Act anyone living in a wood and iron or a sub standard structure is defined as a squatter, regardless of whether he or she is living there with the consent of the owner of the land or not.

In terms of the new Squatter Bill, all squatters are acting illegally and therefore have no security of tenure. However, there are various grades of semi-legality. All shacks (also referred to as pondoks) erected before 1975 which have been numbered by the local authority are allowed to remain until their owners are offered a house. All other shacks are considered to be illegal. The numbering system has, however, not proved to be an absolute deterrent because economic and political forces leave people with no choice. The demolition of pondoks has, therefore, become an ongoing process.

SECTION 4.2: THE IMPACT of the GROUP AREAS ACT on COLORED HOUSING

Our analysis of the Group Areas Act in the previous chapter revealed that it has been one of the powerful tools used by the South African government to implement its policy of apartheid. The areas in which the various races are legally allowed to live and purchase land in the
metropolitan area are shown on Fig. 4.4 Because of its profound impact on the supply of housing for Colored people in Cape Town, the Group Areas Act needs to be analysed in some detail.

The original Group Area Act was passed in 1950 but it was updated in 1966 resulting in the removal of people from "affected" areas. Up to 1977, 12,500 families had been relocated in Cape Town. Of these 11,814 were Colored, 675 were Asiatic and 11 were White.

These figures provide only a partial picture of the effect of the Group Areas Act because this Act has had a much more wide ranging impact on the housing supply system in Cape Town.

. More than 11,000 housing units, most of them in perfectly habitable condition, have been replaced.
. These houses were generally old and, therefore, rentals were relatively cheap and affordable.
. The houses were usually well located - close to jobs, well established commercial centres and transportation links.
. Because people had lived in the older areas for long periods, often more than 50 years, they had very strong social networks. Upon removal, many of these bonds were destroyed.
. The environmental quality (soil conditions, wind, slope, view etc.) in the older areas was much higher than on the Cape Flats.
FIG. 4.4: GROUP AREAS DELIMITATION

GROUP AREAS ACT
- WHITE AREAS
- AFRICAN AREAS
- COLORED and INDIAN AREAS

SOURCE: Low Income Housing Alternatives (p. 7)
. Because of inflation, the replacement housing was much more expensive and space standards were reduced considerably.

In terms of housing supply, the Group Areas Act has contributed to the overall shortage of housing in Cape Town, since housing resources have had to be used to rehouse people who were in fact previously well housed. The Cape Town local authorities were forced by the government to allocate 50% (later reduced to 25%) of all new housing for the rehousing of people removed under the Group Area Act.

Since most of the land in the metropolitan areas of Cape Town has been zoned for occupation by Whites, and the greatest demand is for land to house Coloreds and Blacks, the Act has also created an artificial shortage of land available for Black housing development. At the same time it has been estimated that there is a current surplus of 40 000 vacant sites in land zoned for occupation by Whites. Thus, the Group Areas Act has created artificial shortages and surpluses, constituting a major obstacle in the way of a satisfactory housing solution.

SECTION 4.3: ANALYSIS of HOUSING OPTIONS for AFRICANS

There is an enormous difference in the housing supply systems for Coloreds and Africans resulting essentially from the very restrictive legislative conditions which control the lives of Africans living in Cape Town.
All African housing is located in the three townships of Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu and are administered by the Cape Peninsula branch of BAAB.

**FIG. 4.5: THE LOCATION of the AFRICAN TOWNSHIPS**

![Location map of African Townships](image)

**SOURCE:** Adapted from Granelli and Levitan, *Urban Black Housing* (p. 14)

Official policy has historically been directed at the removal of Africans from Cape Town, rather than providing them with any form of accommodation which might lead to permanent residence in the city.
In 1926 the Cape Town municipal area was declared a "proclaimed area" in terms of section 12 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act. This meant that all Africans coming into Cape Town were required to register within forty-eight hours of arrival, while all males had to obtain a registered contract of service or a casual laborers' permit.

These measures have not proved to be very successful, however, and since 1921, the African population in greater Cape Town has increased as follows:

**TABLE 4.3: THE GROWTH OF CAPE TOWN AFRICAN POPULATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>1581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>7073</td>
<td>1820</td>
<td>8893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>9944</td>
<td>4216</td>
<td>14160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>24293</td>
<td>10904</td>
<td>35197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>32842</td>
<td>16951</td>
<td>49793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td></td>
<td>65025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>31844</td>
<td>36526</td>
<td>68370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Granelli and Levitan p. 13
         Wilson and Mafeje p. 5

The 1974 figures are official estimates made by the Bantu Affairs Administration Board (BAAB). But these figures should be questioned. Since official policy has always made it very difficult for Black
women to live in the city, there cannot be more females than males in Cape Town. Furthermore, informed sources estimate the "illegal" African population of Cape Town alone to be about 90,000.

The daily lives of Africans in Cape Town are controlled by a complexity of legislation, but as far as housing is concerned, the key law in terms of housing for Africans in Cape Town is Section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act which legislates that...

"to qualify for a family house, both husband and wife must be in the area legally. In order to be considered 'legal' they must either have resided there since birth, or worked there continuously for more than 15 years, or with one employer continuously for ten years."

A single woman may not be the tenant of a family house unless she is the widow of a tenant and has dependent children.

Applications are made to BAAB and no choice of house type, area or location is allowed. The lease is renewed monthly upon payment of the rent and is subject to numerous conditions. The tenant may not, for example, remain unemployed for more than 30 days nor may he leave the site for 30 days without notifying the Township superintendent.

Should a tenant wish to make any additions or improvements to the property, permission must be sought from the Township Superintendent, the BAAB and a local authority's Building Survey Branch. The tenant
must bear the full cost of the work and it is clearly stipulated that the BAAB will not be responsible for any compensation when the tenant vacates the house.

There are two distinct classes of housing:

Family Housing: these are small row houses occupied by families and frequently additional lodgers as well.

Single quarters: bachelors or men living without their families are housed in rooms or dormitories.
finance. It is, therefore, almost impossible to obtain loans or
credit to assist with building work which requires a relatively high
financial input.

4.3.2: SINGLE QUARTERS

In 1974 more than 44% of the total African population in Cape Town
lived in single quarters. About 10% were females, nearly all of
whom were employed as domestic servants and lived in their employer's
servants' quarters on the premises. No accommodation existed for
single women in the townships unless they lived with their parents or
lodged with other families.

The men living in single quarters can be divided into two categories:

1. Those who were born in the area or who have worked
   in the area for more than 15 years (or for 10 years with
   one employer), qualify for permanent residence in the
   Cape Peninsula and are known as "Local" men.

2. The "Contract Worker" whose presence in the area
   depends upon his continued employment with a
   particular employer. These men have only temporary
   rights in the Cape and may only live in single
   quarters. Their home is assumed to be in the tribal
   homeland from which they were first recruited and
4.3.1: FAMILY HOUSING

All family houses have been constructed by the local authority. During the last ten years the only houses built were in Guguletu where 3800 units were erected between 1966 and 1972. Since that date no new houses have been built in spite of a tremendous increase in demand. This has resulted in chronic overcrowding and thousands of people have been driven into squatter settlements - among others the now well-known Crossroads squatter camp.

With the exception of a small proportion of detached and semi-detached houses, all the dwelling units are built in terraced rows of up to eight units in length. At the time of construction it was official policy to attempt to provide accommodation at a cost which was related to the tenant's ability to pay an economic rental. Since incomes were very low, costs were contained by building stereotyped terraced dwelling units and by omitting finishes which were deemed unnecessary. Tenants were given to understand that the authorities would complete the finishing of their houses at a later date, but so far this has not happened.

Not many families are capable of finishing the houses themselves because legislation and policy have also combined to prevent them from acquiring a skill in the Building industry in Cape Town. Also, finance for home improvements is limited to the capacity of the tenant to raise the necessary capital. Since they have no tenure, these families cannot offer immovable property as security for loan
they expected to return to their families upon termination of their contract of employment.

Accommodation for single Bantu workers, both male and female, is scattered throughout the metropolitan area although the bulk is concentrated in the township of Langa. The single accommodation outside the townships consists of quarters for small numbers of employees maintained by their employer. Domestic Servants' rooms are attached to their employer's houses in every White (and some Colored) suburb in Cape Town.

There are four types of single quarters in the townships: hostels, barracks, flats and dormitories. Granelli and Levitan have provided us with the following description of the single quarters in the African townships.

HOSTELS

Most of the single men live in hostels, occupied by 16 men and consisting of six bedrooms, a communal kitchen/diningroom, a small storeroom and ablution facilities. Each bedroom is occupied by 2 or 3 men sleeping on single beds.

THE BARRACKS

These are the oldest single quarters (built in 1927) and consist of two separate complexes. The accommodation blocks, planned in an open "U" shape or a square around an open quadrangle, are made up of large
identical rooms which house 24 or 26 men per room on double bunks built end to end along each side of the room.

**THE FLATS**

These are blocks of four-storey walk-up buildings. Each floor is bisected by a long corridor from which rooms lead off on both sides. Each of the 27 rooms per floor is shared by 2 men. A central washroom containing 4 toilets, 6 showers, a urinal and 2 basins serves each floor.

**THE DORMITORIES**

In line with Government policy, employers have since 1966 been building accommodation for their own Bantu contract workers in the form of dormitories, each housing between 30 and 50 men. The dormitories are all similar in layout. The men sleep on double bunks, positioned end-on to the outside walls, in one large room. Few have any partitions resulting in a total lack of privacy.

The official accommodation available to Africans in Cape Town does nothing more than provide shelter at a most rudimentary level. However, because people have very complex needs, desires and aspirations which the house and its environment should meet and reflect, it is not surprising that thousands of Africans in Cape Town have housed themselves in squatter communities over which they have more control.
SECTION 4.4: AFRICAN SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS

Squatting among Africans only became a "problem" when the government began to enforce the policy of not recognizing Africans' rights to permanent housing in Cape Town. In 1952 only a third of the Africans in the city were housed in officially recognized "locations"; the rest were living scattered through the city and in squatter's camps on the periphery in places such as Cook's Bush, Hout Bay, Elsies River, Kensington and Windermere.

In 1956 the City Council established an "emergency camp" in Nyanga and thousands of African squatters were forced to move there. No houses were provided - they were required to put up their own shelters in a specified area where water and latrines were provided, while their claims to live in town were examined. Those who were allowed to stay in the city were gradually provided with rental housing. Others were compelled to leave the Cape.

The process of destroying "illegal" shacks which has continued since the early 1950's, reached a peak in January 1977 when the squatter settlement at Unibell (estimated population 11,000) and Modderdam were demolished. It has been estimated that 25,000 African squatters in Cape Town were rendered homeless during 1977.

In 1978 the Government announced its intention to demolish the squatter settlement at Crossroads. The camp had been established in 1975 by the Divisional Council of the Cape when it was decided to allow squatters
who were dispersed throughout the Cape Peninsula, to settle in one
diagram

location. In July 1976 Crossroads was declared an emergency camp in
terms of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act. This meant that
the camp qualified for the provision of services such as taps and
high soil and garbage removal.

By 1978 there were 3083 shacks in existence in Crossroads housing an
estimated population of 20000. The residents had established two
schools, a community centre and several churches. Surveys done in
this area reveal that a viable and successful community has been
established. In terms of employment it is found that 81% of household
heads are employed in the formal sector and 11.2% in the informal
sector. Health conditions compare favourably with those in the
Peninsula and statistics show that the crime rate was much lower than
in the established African townships.

FIG. 4.6: LOCATION OF CROSSROADS SQUATTER SETTLEMENT

Crossroads has however, been subjected to continuous pass raids by the police and officials of BAAB. In September 1978, three people, of whom one died, were shot and more than 800 people were arrested in raids undertaken by 600 police.

These raids on Crossroads and the continued threat of housing demolition received national and international attention and condemnation. In response to these pressures, the new minister for Black Affairs announced in November 1978 that plans for the demolition of Crossroads would be set aside indefinitely.

Thus, Crossroads, like Soweto, has become a symbol of Black resistance to the ideology of apartheid.
CONCLUSION:

Government policy dictates that the supply of housing for Colored and Africans is predominantly provided through local authority rental units. These offer no security of tenure and no possibility of enlarging or changing the house to adapt to changes in family needs. The non-recognition of squatters also means that public housing is the only option available to low income people.

Low income people as we saw, cannot afford even the cheapest rented housing which is currently being provided. Assuming that 25% of income is a suitable proportion of income to spend on housing, the majority of Coloreds in Cape Town cannot afford to pay the R25 per month currently required for new housing. The distant location of the new housing developments exacerbates this problem because a higher percentage of income has to be spent on transport between work and home.

As the role of the authorities in the provision of housing has increased it has been accompanied by an increasing powerlessness of the people to play any effective role in the decision making process concerning matters which directly affect their housing. This phenomena is one of the serious problems associated with the provision of mass or public housing in any society. It is more of a problem in South Africa because of the total lack of political power of the Black population.

Paul Andrew and Derek Japha have advanced the following reasons for reconsidering the policy of providing local authority rental housing
for low income people:

. Housing has not been supplied at a fast enough rate to cope with the needs of those inadequately housed, and natural population increase and migration to the cities. In spite of the major building program there has been no change in the housing backlog since 1972.

. Even if enough rented houses are produced, there will remain a substantial percentage of the population who cannot afford the cheapest houses which can be produced at current prices. Furthermore, without subeconimic subsidies for African families, many people are not housed.

. The existing rented housing schemes are unsatisfactory places to live for a number of reasons ranging from high crime rates to physical appearance. People are, therefore, being forced into a system which has already proved to be inadequate.

. Rental housing by its nature has provided no opportunity for occupants to participate in its design and has been particularly constraining in regard to tenant improvements and additions by tenants.
One single housing option cannot possibly satisfy the diverse needs and aspirations of the half million people. A range of environmental and economic choice seems essential.
CHAPTER 4 - REFERENCES


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27. Wilson, M., and Majefe, A., op. cit., p. 5

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29. South African Institute of Race Relations, op. cit., p. 351


31. South African Institute of Race Relations, op. cit., p. 352

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION: SUMMARY and SOME IMPLICATIONS of this STUDY

In conclusion we wish to re-emphasise the issues with which we began this thesis, and to summarise, briefly, the major findings that have emerged from our analysis.

We began our analysis by focussing on a number of different perspectives on the meaning of housing and housing policy. We found that these concepts have acquired a very broad social meaning - and whether one's perspective is Capitalist or Socialist, there appears to be general agreement that housing is the responsibility of the state and has sometimes to be provided as a form of social service.

We indicated that the South African model of providing housing for Blacks was unique. The South African government has assumed the responsibility of housing the entire Black population. This strategy was not motivated by social responsibility. On the contrary, it seems clear that its purpose is to facilitate the implementation of the policy of apartheid by maintaining firm control of the housing system.

We attempted to confirm this hypothesis by framing it within an historical analysis which encompassed the interaction between economic, social and political forces as they evolved over time. The major findings that emerged from this historical analysis were:

. The social system that was established in South Africa
before industrialization was clearly stratified along color lines with Blacks comprising the lowest social strata.

As the White settlers expanded into the interior they appropriated the only sources of wealth, land and livestock, of the indigenous population and gradually turned them into a dependent class of laborers.

The policy of confining natives to "reserves" was introduced in the middle of the 19th century. This was the initiation of "legal" racial segregation in South Africa. The reserves enabled the government to control the Black labor force more effectively.

Indians were brought into Natal to serve as indentured laborers on the sugar plantations. When their contracts expired, they settled in the urban and peri-urban areas where many of them rapidly ascended the economic ladder. This led to the introduction of measures to separate Indians spatially, and to control them politically and economically.

By 1886, when gold was discovered, Blacks had been incorporated into a new social system and had lost their economic and social independence. They were already dependent on the White government for the
satisfaction of their housing needs.

... The discovery of minerals led to rapid urbanization and White and Black labor were brought together in the urban labor market in a spirit of economic competition.

... The mines set a pattern for Black urban housing by accommodating their African workers in special compounds.

... All four provincial governments introduced legislation which confined the Black workers to locations on the periphery.

... The Natives Land Act of 1913 confined Africans to Native Reserves. The Reserves provided a pool of cheap labor for the White controlled economy.

... The wave of urbanization that followed World War I led to the introduction of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 which gave local authorities the responsibility of providing accommodation for Africans in segregated areas. This Act effectively excluded private enterprise from the Black housing market.

... The Depression led to a strengthening of the Afrikaans
urban proletariat - economically and politically. The ideology of apartheid was born during the Great Depression.

The post-World War II period was characterized by a Black urban housing crisis of enormous proportions.

During this period the Smuts government introduced measures to exercise stronger political control over the Indian population. These measures served as a model for the Group Areas Act.

When the Nationalist government came to power in 1948 they removed all laisses faire aspects of segregation and systematically introduced a system that was aimed at bringing about complete territorial separation of all the different race groups.

The key housing policy measure in the Group Areas Act of 1950. We tried to give an indication of the dominant role that the Group Areas Act has played in the shaping of Black living environments.

The Government has never approved of squatter housing because this type of accommodation fell outside the scope of the housing model. The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act was introduced to eliminate squatting.
In the final chapter we used Cape Town as a "case study" in order to obtain a clearer perspective of the policy-in-action. We found that in the case of the Colored community most people lived in local authority, rental housing. We also indicated the disadvantages associated with this form of housing provision.

In the case of Africans we saw that the housing model was, in fact, an overt political control model. Africans in Cape Town have no opportunity, whatsoever, to live in, or to create, decent living environments.

The implication of our analysis is clear - the problems associated with Black housing in South Africa are a direct and inevitable outcome of the model employed by the South African government. This model does not operate in a social vacuum - it is a key instrument in the overall social policy which has been designed to maintain White supremacy in South Africa. It is self evident that Black people can never aspire to live in decent housing environments as long as the national housing policy is based upon an ideology which is fundamentally unjust and inhumane.

Over the past two years a few minor adjustments have been made in the housing process. These changes, as we have indicated, are essentially geared towards a strengthening of the Black middle class, thereby consolidating the position of the White ruling class. Indications
are that the Nationalist government will remain intransigent on the matter of breaking down the monolithic ideological framework. In a recent interview with Time Magazine, the Prime Minister, Mr. P.W. Botha, said that:

"Whites in South Africa want to live in their own communities, and it is their right. We are prepared to grant the right to Blacks to live in their own communities. But we are not in favor of mixed communities. We will not deviate from that."

This intransigence indicates that there will be a continuation of the basic ideology and social policies which have been responsible for the present housing crisis in South Africa.

The only solution to this crisis is for the Black population to work towards the objective of an entirely new social structure - one in which a person's house will not be a political tool, but an enabling device which can satisfy the diverse needs of the individual, the family and society.
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