

**Spatialities of Conflict:  
Identity and Exclusion in Jerusalem and Johannesburg**

by


Anna E. Premo  
B.S. Urban Studies & Planning  
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SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF URBAN STUDIES AND PLANNING IN PARTIAL  
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# **Spatialities of Conflict: Identity and Exclusion in Jerusalem and Johannesburg**

by

Anna E. Premo

SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF URBAN STUDIES AND PLANNING  
ON MARCH 15, 2012, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
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## **ABSTRACT**

Many cities the world round are known as sites of conflict. They have historically excluded portions of their populations through modification of the physical form of the city, among other mechanisms. These physical forms remain after the policies that formalized the conflict are overwritten, creating a residue of conflict. This thesis seeks to determine how the exclusion perpetuated by urban form alters the experience of the city through examination of individual perceptions of Jerusalem and Johannesburg. The two case studies have vastly different histories and current conditions, but each provides a window into a different portion of the process of shaping a city through exclusion. Cognitive mapping is the main mechanism for analysis, and it illuminates subtle differences in conceptualizations and perceptions of the two cities among different demographics. By examining conflict through the lens of the individual, finite recommendations can be made for organizations wishing to bring together multiple demographics in such a context of exclusion.

Thesis Supervisor: Diane E. Davis  
Title: Professor of Urbanism and Development

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

ANC: African National Congress

CID: City Improvement District

CMM: Central Methodist Mission

JDA: Johannesburg Development Agency

JMPD: Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department

MEET: Middle East Education through Technology

PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization

SAPS: South African Police Service

URCV: Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence

ZAR: Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiik

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

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## CHAPTER 1: An Introduction to Exclusion



*When will the world admit that Israel is an inhuman bitch?*

*--Palestinian resident of Jerusalem*

*Whenever you keep quiet about something it means you don't want it to change.*

*--South African resident of Diepsloot, a township in Johannesburg*

Conflict is an unfortunately common element in the histories of many cities. Whether the conflict be between colonizers and original inhabitants, rulers and residents, citizen and citizen, it reaches far beyond the exchange of harsh glances and words. Indeed, conflict greatly influences urban form, shaping cities at both the level of daily life and a scale much greater than the individual. The feature that truly typifies conflict cities is exclusion, and as such urban forms are created in a way that excludes a certain demographic. As conflict resolves, however, these urban forms remain, continuing to serve as spaces and forces of exclusion.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nora R. Libertun de Duren's thesis titled *Growth and Poverty in the Urban Fringe: Decentralization, Dispersion, and Inequality in Greater Buenos Aires* provides insight into the influence that political

## ***Research Objective and Question***

My interest in conflict cities is rooted in my involvement for the past three years with Middle East Education through Technology (MEET), a Jerusalem-based organization that uses computer science and business education as a means of bringing together Israeli and Palestinian high school students, and my work in and about Johannesburg over the past year with the Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence (URCV) project.<sup>2</sup> During my first two-month stint in Jerusalem working for MEET, it became increasingly apparent that the organization was framed in such a way that only the commonalities between the two groups were in focus. No one was allowed to speak a language other than English, since that's the common language—any exception to the aptly named “English Rule” had to be approved by the program director, and infractions were met with severe repercussions. Current events and the conflict were only to be discussed in moderated forums that were scheduled once or twice throughout the summer, and instructors were advised to steer conversation in a different direction whenever the students began discussion such matters on their own. Although this focus on commonalities bothered me, MEET also seems to be a relatively successful organization. While participants in MEET generally agreed that the English rule was helpful, many were of the opinion that language is a part of identity and did not think that they should have to suppress it. I thus began to wonder whether different conceptualizations of identity had an effect on how people experienced not only

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structures and policies had on the land and inequality within the city long after the dictatorship under which they were created was gone.

<sup>2</sup> For more information on MEET, see <http://meet.mit.edu>. For more information on URCV, see <http://www.urbanresilience.org>.

organizational spaces, but cities in general.

During my time in Johannesburg, identity was also the focal point of many discussions. Questions of identity were especially prevalent among foreign nationals who were often split between two places: one that they had been forced to leave for political or economic reasons, and one into which they were finding it nearly impossible to integrate. What was most surprising in Johannesburg was that the identities at the crux of much of the violence and conflict within the city are of South Africans and foreign nationals, rather than the expected racially based identities of blacks and whites. This shift in conflict is due largely to a combination of nationalist campaigns of the post-apartheid era that have bound together South Africans and the huge influx of legal and illegal migrants. The South African government has invested a substantial amount of its finances into the construction of a national architectural narrative that overwrites its history of oppression, as well as into unifying its population through the arts, culture, and sports.<sup>3</sup> While the South African population may be slowly coming together, estimates of the foreign-born population within the city of 3.9 million people range from the official 14% calculated from the 2007 Community Survey to the 50% quoted by numerous public officials.<sup>4</sup> It is this pairing of identities based on nationality that is the focus of the Johannesburg case study in this thesis, for it is the contemporary conflict of the city and

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<sup>3</sup> Federico Freschi, "Postapartheid publics and the politics of nationalism, identity and the rhetoric of community in the decorative program of the new constitutional court, Johannesburg," *Africa Today* 24:21 (Winter 2007), 27-49; Loren Kruger, "Theatre, Crime, and the Edgy City in Post-apartheid Johannesburg" *Theatre Journal* (2001), 223- 252.

<sup>4</sup> Solidarity Peace Trust, "Desperate Lives, Twilight Worlds: How a million Zimbabweans live without official sanction or sanctuary in South Africa" (31 March 2010); Centre for Development and Enterprise, *Immigrants in Johannesburg: Estimating numbers and assessing impacts* (August 2008).

yet it is fueled by the history of exclusion that the city supported. Since identity appeared to be at the crux of issues of exclusion in both Jerusalem and Johannesburg, I began to wonder how much of the situation in cities with explicit exclusion is parallel.

In researching conflict between demographics, it has become abundantly clear that the formation of identity is complex and convoluted and riddled with subtleties, and that identities of all demographics are tied to the physical spaces in which they live.

The concept of identity is informal and imprecise, yet it is largely what drives this conflict. It is not simply a conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, between foreign nationals and native South Africans – in the cases of Jerusalem and Johannesburg, alike, the major demographics are comprised of a gradient of identities. “Israeli” is a term that applies equally to a Hasidic Jew, an atheistic Jew by ancestry, and even an Israeli Arab; “Palestinian” applies to Christian Palestinians, Muslim Palestinians, Palestinians living in the territories, and Palestinians living in Jerusalem alike. Likewise, “South Africans” are comprised of large parts black South Africans, white South Africans, and Indian South Africans, who all have very different histories and lives; foreign nationals in Johannesburg are comprised of migrants from every African country, as well as many expatriates from Europe, North America, and other continents.

<sup>5</sup>It is, however, identity and its associated dynamics that are the basis for conflict, with subordination of one collectivity based on some characteristic of social division at its

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<sup>5</sup> The official website of the City of Johannesburg cites the demographic breakdown as follows: Black Africans account for 73 percent of the population, Whites account for 16 percent, Coloureds account for 6 percent, and Asians account for 4 percent.

core.<sup>6</sup> An understanding of how identities are translated to a physical space is therefore integral to an understanding of the conflict, in general.<sup>7</sup>

This thesis examines exclusionary urban form and its effect on social dynamics, mobility, and perceptions of rights within a city. It seeks to gain an understanding of the political actors, institutions, and practices that structure exclusionary urban form, and to discover to what extent historical legacy's physical form and contemporary policy are responsible for the exclusion found in conflict cities. Ultimately, comprehensive knowledge of the exclusionary forces will lead to the ability to make recommendations for how to structure more inclusionary, pluralistic urban form within this context. The two case studies used are Jerusalem and Johannesburg because both are centers within their respective regions and are cities known for and at least partially built during conflict between demographics.

In the two months I've spent in Johannesburg and the six months I've spent in Jerusalem I have seen glimpses into cities undeniably fraught with conflict that are still filled with residents who somehow hope for change. I will obviously not be solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or remedying the xenophobia and racism that run rampant in

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<sup>6</sup> Nancy Fraser, *Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation* (Stanford University, 1996).

<sup>7</sup> Dan Bar-On, Emda Orr, and Shira Sagi, "Social Representations in Use: Israeli and Palestinian High School Students' Collective Coping and Defense" *Papers on Social Representation* (Vol. 9, 2000), 1-20; Herbert C. Kelman, "The Interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian Identities: The Role of the Other in Existential Conflicts" *Journal of Social Issues* (Vol. 55, No. 3, 1999), 581-600; Herbert C. Kelman, "The Political Psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: How Can We Overcome the Barriers to a Negotiated Solution?" *Political Psychology* (Vol. 8, No. 3, 1987), 347-363.

Johannesburg, but it is within my abilities to examine their histories and current situations and see what specific changes can be made in the policies, practices, and institutions in the context of a conflict city. The question that this thesis seeks to answer is: How is the exclusion that typifies conflict cities perpetuated by urban form and what effect does this exclusion have on the daily experience of the city, itself?

The answer lies in the research into and analysis of the different approaches to formulation of identity and subsequent use of space. Exclusion is here defined in both social and spatial dimensions as the process of making opportunities and portions of the physical space of the respective cities difficult or impossible to access. The social dynamics and spatial logics that govern individuals of all involved demographics will be used to determine what factors impact individual perceptions of and mobility within the city.

That the two cities are at different stages of their conflicts, with Jerusalem being still very much entrenched in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Johannesburg being well over a decade into its post-apartheid era, has the potential to make them great comparative studies. It is also possible, however, that the research in this thesis will show that conflicts between demographics cannot be parallelized, indicating that the formulation of policy generalizable to all conflict cities is an impossibility.

## ***Methodology***<sup>8</sup>

This thesis uses cognitive mapping and interviews as the major mechanisms for analysis. Pairing cognitive mapping with interviews is a very powerful research tool: the resultant maps are used both for comparative analysis and as a catalyst for the dialogue that should follow with the individuals who drew them. The maps also provide simultaneous insight into the physical and social structures of the city and it is by speaking with people there in the city, living their everyday lives, that a comprehensive picture of the city can be created – without that, nothing can be accomplished.

## **Why Jerusalem and Johannesburg?**

Because of its existence as the spiritual and historical center of three of the world's major faiths, Jerusalem is considered by many to be the center of civilization. It is an ubiquitous name in paper headlines and news tickers cited as the center of the world's most intractable conflict. It is the unavoidable setting for the clash between two indomitable peoples: the Israelis and the Palestinians. Both convinced that the land is rightfully theirs. Both with a subset of their population convinced that their existence hinges on the other side's nonexistence. Innumerable attempts have been made at reconciliation, at compromise, yet peace proves ever elusive. Perhaps, then, the key lies not in guiding and mediating dialogue between the two parties, but in understanding

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<sup>8</sup> See Appendix 1 for more detail on how participants were selected and the general process for interacting with said participants.

how their identities relate to the physical space they both occupy. Also essential to choosing Jerusalem as a case study for this thesis is the settlements where many Palestinians live in the occupied territories. These settlements are vastly different from surrounding Israeli neighborhoods in terms of both mobility and infrastructure.

Johannesburg perhaps more than any other city in Sub-Saharan Africa is poised for tremendous economic growth.<sup>9</sup> It is the economic hub of the region and has enormous social capital that is growing by the second, especially since its metropolitan region expanded to include Soweto in 2002. Although many parts of Soweto are among the poorest in all of Johannesburg, its population is approximately 1 million residents and its economy is gradually recovering from the curtailing it suffered during the apartheid era. Despite Johannesburg's potential economic strength, over a quarter of the population is unemployed, there is income inequality, and approximately one fifth of its residents live in abject poverty.<sup>10</sup> Johannesburg is known as the "City of Gold," both for its literal origins in the gold-mining industry and for the opportunities that it purportedly offers, but currently so much of the city remains insular and inactive. This stunting of growth is in no small part due to the physical residue from the apartheid era, but to be able to effectively reverse it requires an understanding of the linked spatial and social dynamism that defines the Johannesburg of today. This physical residue takes the form

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<sup>9</sup> The World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012 ranks South Africa 50th overall – the highest ranking out of all sub-Saharan countries – thanks to its large market size, accountability of private institutions, and goods market efficiency, among other factors. Perhaps most indicative of its potential for growth is the incredibly high rating of its financial market development (4<sup>th</sup>), showing that outside investors have confidence in South Africa's financial market. Where the country falls behind is its poor infrastructure, tensions in labor-employer relations, and business costs of crime and violence.

<sup>10</sup> Official Website of the City of Johannesburg, 2011.



of townships, or kasies, which are peripheral areas of the city reserved for non-white residents. Townships are known for having poor infrastructure, overcrowding, and few economic opportunities.

Both cities are of incredible importance within not only their respective countries, but regions. They are also both sites of a prolonged history of conflict between demographics. The conflict within Jerusalem is straightforward in terms of its main actors: the Israelis and the Palestinians. The conflict within Johannesburg, however, has shifted since its entrance into the post-apartheid era, and is now largely an issue of xenophobia and exclusion aimed towards foreign nationals. Perhaps most important is that in both cases the form of the city has been radically altered to parallel policies of exclusion.

### **Areas Chosen within Jerusalem and Johannesburg**

In Johannesburg, I conducted interviews and cognitive mapping exercises within the CBD. The title of CBD is actually a bit of a misnomer at this point, since in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century there was a huge trend of disinvestment in the inner city as middle-class residents left due to a combination of overcrowding and racial dynamics. Today the CBD is perceived to be one of the most dangerous areas of the metropolitan area, but is most comparable to the area of Jerusalem in which I conducted my research. In Jerusalem, the area of the city that served as the setting for my research is in the

geographic city-center and has a history as the economic center of the city. I obviously cannot draw conclusions about the entirety of either city from the research I did in the city-center, so it is important to here note that this thesis is examining how individuals experience the city-center and what implications, if any, that experience has for the greater metropolitan region.

## **Cognitive Mapping**

In order to address the research question posited, this thesis relies heavily on cognitive mapping exercises. These maps help to determine how people relate to the physical spaces in which they live and interact with others. They also demonstrate the differences among demographics in terms of mobility, use of the city, and perceived right to the city. This cognitive mapping component offers a subjective and qualitative understanding of how different demographics understand the physical spaces of Jerusalem and Johannesburg.

How people relate to physical space was assessed through use of cognitive mapping exercises, inspired by Kevin Lynch's research and use of cognitive mapping to determine the relationship between a city's value and its spatiality.<sup>11</sup> Maps convey both information about physical geography and information about how perceptions of places and relationships play out in physical space. Cognitive maps, or internal spatial

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<sup>11</sup> Kevin Lynch, *A Theory of Good City Form* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1981).

representations, are stored memories used to guide travel that rely on information and reflect internal manipulation of spatiality.<sup>12</sup> By having people draw their cognitive maps of an area, perceptions, interpretations, and manipulations of the space are illuminated, or at least hinted at. It was thus appropriate to include a cognitive mapping component in this thesis to provide insight into how residents of Jerusalem and Johannesburg currently understand and use the physical space of their cities.<sup>13</sup> The importance given to cognitive mapping is largely based in how experiences are embedded in a person's psyche, resulting in physical spaces triggering associations and certain neural pathways even after conditions of the space have changed.<sup>14</sup>

Within Jerusalem, the participants in this exercise were Israelis and Palestinians with sixteen participants altogether, evenly split between the two key demographics. The participants in this exercise in Johannesburg were from a larger range of nationalities, including South African, Zimbabwean, Mozambican, and Congolese, and there were thirty participants altogether. Out of these thirty participants in Johannesburg, fourteen were South African – including black, white, and Indian participants – and the other sixteen participants were foreign nationals. All participants were asked to spend five minutes drawing a map of their respective city, making sure to identify key landmarks, neighborhoods, and streets. These three words were chosen specifically because if

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<sup>12</sup> Reginald G. Golledge, ed., *Wayfinding Behavior: Cognitive Mapping and Other Spatial Processes* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

<sup>13</sup> Juval Portugali, *Implicate relations: society and space in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict* (Springer, 1993).

<sup>14</sup> Amanda J. Barnier, John Sutton, Celia B. Harris, Robert A. Wilson, "A conceptual and empirical framework for the social distribution of cognition: The case of memory," *Cognitive Systems Research* (2007); Howard Eichenbaum, "The hippocampus and declarative memory: cognitive mechanisms and neural code," *Behavioural Brain Research* 127 (2001).

heeded, they could lead the participant to draw a map at the level of the street, the neighborhood, or the metropolitan area. No further clarification was given as to the boundaries of the city, a desired scale for the map, how the map should be laid out, or about what the map should be centered. The resultant maps were examined for inter- and intra-group similarities and differences, and the findings were used to explore how identities of the different demographics play out in the physical spaces of Jerusalem and Johannesburg.

## **Limitations**

One significant limitation of cognitive mapping is that its success depends heavily on how the exercise is presented. In order for the maps to be valuable in this study, there could be no mention of specific places – no examples given of what a “key place” might be, for then without a doubt that “key place” will appear on the participant’s map, whether or not it is actually included in their cognitive representation of the city. There could also be no further explanation of what comprises a “map of the city” – by saying something as innocent as “You know – the streets you walk on,” the participant’s mind is almost invariably brought to the level of the street, eliminating the possibility of a map on the level of the greater metropolitan area of the city.

In Jerusalem, this limitation was merely something to bear in mind. I had previously conducted cognitive mapping exercises and Kevin Lynch cautions against these very



sorts of inadvertent taintings of results in the essay “Reconsidering *The Image of the City*,” and so I knew that word choice was of the utmost importance.<sup>15</sup> In Johannesburg, however, it was often the case that I was not the one presenting the exercise to participants. While many residents of Johannesburg speak English, it is not uncommon for a person to have limited command of the language or none at all. Throughout my research in Johannesburg, therefore, I was accompanied by a good friend and great language proficient, Reymond Mapakata.<sup>16</sup> In addition to speaking English, Reymond also speaks Shona, Xhosa, and Zulu, which enabled him to translate for me when participants were uncomfortable or unfamiliar with English. It was thus necessary that Reymond and I discussed in depth not the exact wording – that was not information I could provide in Shona, Xhosa, or Zulu – but the fundamental ideas behind my choices in wording for the exercise instructions. It was a bit nerve-wracking to be so dependent on another person to deliver such a crucial part of this exercise, but Reymond and I spent much time conversing about my research; by the end of my time in Johannesburg, he seemed to have as good a grip on it as I do.

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<sup>15</sup> This essay is contained within *City Sense and City Design: Writings and Projects of Kevin Lynch*, edited by Tridib Banerjee and Michael Southworth.

<sup>16</sup> Reymond is a 29-year-old Zimbabwean immigrant. He came to Johannesburg in early 2007 because he could no longer find work to support his wife and two children in his village outside of Harare. For the first few months of his life in Johannesburg he lived and slept on the streets in Berea. He has been arrested and beaten by both the SAPS and JMPD for not having the proper papers, never mind that the reason he lacks the proper papers is because they were taken from him by the police. Today he lives in the Central Methodist Mission with approximately 2,000 other foreign nationals and works on and off for a number of local businesses, earning ZAR40 for a day of handing out pamphlets. He goes many days without working, however, and is still struggling to earn enough money to live off of, let alone to send back to his children in Zimbabwe.

## CHAPTER 2: Conflict, Transnationalism, and Identity



*Netanyahu is just another Kony.*

*--Palestinian resident of Jerusalem*

*I grew up in town because I was too naughty to live in a township.*

*--black South African resident of Johannesburg who grew up in Hillbrow*

Conflicts are infuriatingly complex, and their solutions consequently infuriatingly evasive. In both cities, conflict involves far more than a simple argument between two sides—it dates back throughout the histories of the cities and is a central part of the identities of residents. One can imagine that any sort of solution will thus need to look to the communities that have formed as a result and in spite of this protracted conflict and figure out how to rebuild them in such a way that they seamlessly include and involve members of the other side. In order to suggest any new interpretation of or solution for the conflict, it is thus necessary that an understanding be first garnered of what exactly

conflict entails, how identities are formulated, and the spaces in which these interactions occur.

### ***Conflict as an Urban Force***

Cities do not simply spring out of the earth fully formed. Their forms are planned and debated and are perpetually being altered, thus the physical form of a city is an amalgamation of the conditions at the time of construction of each of its components. In the case of cities that are largely constructed during conflict between demographics, the physicality reflects the policies of exclusion. Inequities in control over policy formation and land distribution are very much mirrored in how a city is constructed, and even after the control shifts the spaces that it constructed remain.<sup>17</sup> The unnatural urban form is a result of exclusionary policies is not a rare one, and can be found in many cities the world round, as well as in the two cities that are the focus of this thesis (see *Figure 1*).<sup>18</sup> The spatial separation between demographics in turn encourages social separation, which manifests itself in the individual and collective psyches of all demographics.<sup>19</sup>

If infrastructure and service provision are a gesture to the public of government concern and awareness, it is no wonder that people in all areas of the city feel abandoned by their government and turn to violence rather than preconceived, governmentally

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
<sup>17</sup> Scott Bollens, "Comparative Research on Contested Cities: Lenses and Scaffoldings" *Crisis States Working Paper Series No. 2* (2007).

<sup>18</sup> Nora R. Libertun de Duren, "Planning a la Carte: The Location Patterns of Gated Communities around Buenos Aires in a Decentralized Planning Context." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 30(2): 308-27. 2006.

<sup>19</sup> Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen, *Globalizing cities: a new spatial order?* (Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2000).

approved paths to affect change. Areas that are perceived to be at a far distance from the city-center and that have a weak relationship to the State are often stigmatized and violence is often perpetuated due to the lack of State-sponsored response. In certain cases, however, the State is distrusted to such an extreme level that its response is unwanted and the community generates an intentional distance between itself and the State. The formation of linkages among communities and people is essential for the city to operate as a whole, rather than as a collection of fragments, and the formation of linkages between those communities and the State is essential for the city to operate without violence.





**Figure 1. Population density versus distance from city-center.**

The graphs above show the population density versus distance from city-center in four megacities. Paris exhibits the negative exponential gradient implied by the standard model of a megacity, while Brasilia, Cape Town, and Johannesburg all depart from this model. In the cases of Cape Town and Johannesburg, the atypical density gradient is a direct result of the townships constructed during apartheid, while in Brasilia it is largely due to the favelas.

Source: Alain Bertaud, *The Spatial Distribution of Population in 48 World Cities: Implications for Economies in Transition* (17 Dec. 2003).

### ***Viewing the Conflict through a Transnational Lens***

Transnationalism is generally understood to be a social movement that extends or goes beyond national boundaries, but it is more than that. It is a system of ties, interactions, exchange and mobility that often renders community identities tied to locality outmoded.<sup>20</sup> Although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often portrayed as a wholly unique situation, it is riddled with elements of transnationalism that allow for a different and more generalizable framing. Transnationalism is relevant to the conflict in terms of fully grasping both Israeli and Palestinian identities and the media's involvement, and in turn facilitates the comparison between Jerusalem and Johannesburg.

The transnational identity of Israelis is rooted in its existence as both a secular state and a religious homeland. Because of its existence as the Jewish homeland, millions of Jews the world round identify with and consider themselves to have some stake in the physical territory. There is thus within Israel a dichotomy of transnational and national claims to the both the space and the country's identity.<sup>21</sup>

The Palestinian identity is somehow perversely transnational in that Palestinians live in what is recognized by the international community to be Israel, and yet that is not the country with which many of them identify. Rather, Palestinians identify with a country

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<sup>20</sup> Steven Vertovec, "Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (Vol. 22, No. 2, 1999), 447-462.

<sup>21</sup> Oren Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy: land and identity politics in Israel/Palestine* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Steven Vertovec, "Transnationalism and Identity" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (Vol. 27, No. 4, 2001), 573-582.

whose very existence is contentious, which is rather atypical of transnational identities.

Steven Vertovec created a helpful division of transnationalism into six subsets:

Out of these six subsets into which transnationalism is divided, the Palestinian identity aligns with four of them: "Construction of 'Place' or Locality," "Mode of Cultural Reproduction," "Types of Consciousness," and "Social Morphology."<sup>22</sup>

"Construction of 'Place' or Locality" could be more aptly titled "Reconstruction of 'Place' or Locality" in the case of Palestine, since Palestinians see the territory that they occupy as theirs already, but they must re-lay claims to it. "Mode of Cultural Reproduction" is evident in both their arts and the way that their language has slowly made its way into Hebrew slang. "Types of Consciousness" is appropriate because it appears to be the antithesis to how the Palestinians live, for they are essentially placeless and although they have multiple identifications, they lack a legitimate one. Lastly, "Social Morphology" seems closest to their situation, especially because it calls into question the definition of state.

One important fact to be aware of is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is heavily monitored at all times by the media. Yet as is the case in all protracted conflicts, stories in the global media regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict suffer from "media fatigue" and a very small percentage of events since the second intifada in 2002 have actually

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid. The other two subsets that the Palestinian identity doesn't jive quite as well with are "Avenue of Capital" and "Site of Political Engagement." Although the latter sounds like a good match for the Palestinian situation, upon further examination while Palestinian questions can really be discussed in a transnational framework, they are oftentimes excluded from such discussions on the basis of their lack of statehood, rendering Palestine ineligible as a true physical site of political engagement.

been reported.<sup>23</sup> This lack of reports results in an incomplete understanding in the rest of the world of the actual on-the-ground situation and how bad the Palestinian living conditions have become in the occupied territories. There is thus a disconnect between the outsiders' perceptions of Jerusalem and the actuality, and for a city to function well the two must be aligned.<sup>24</sup> It is also valuable to note that when negotiations covered heavily by the media took place, such as Bush's "Road Map" and the Geneva Accord in 1993, there was a significant drop in fatalities.<sup>25</sup> Even though Bush's "Road Map" was ineffective and fizzled out quickly, it still seemed to have some sort of deeper impact on both the Israeli and Palestinian populations.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict exists in a unique liminal spatial context in that the identities of both Israelis and Palestinians are tied to one piece of land, and yet Palestinians lack an internationally recognized home. By framing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of transnationalism, new layers emerge within the two groups' identities that are unexplored by members of the two collectivities. These layers can be dissociated from the mutual exclusivity of the currently accepted identities that are very much tied to strictly national spaces and a physically bounded conception of the state.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Philip A. Schrodt, Deborah J. Gerner, and Ömür Yılmaz, "Methods Meet Policy: Transnational Monitoring of Israel-Palestine Conflict" *International Studies Perspectives* (Vol. 6, 2005), 235-251.

<sup>24</sup> Julian Beinart, "Image Construction in Premodern Cities" *Imaging the City: Continuing Struggles and New Directions*, ed. Lawrence J. Vale and Sam Bass Warner Jr. (Rutgers Center for Urban Policy Research: 2001), 3-32

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Sami Khalil Mar'i, "The Future of Palestinian Arab Education in Israel" *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Vol. 14, No. 2, Winter 1985), 54-73.

The parallel between the Jerusalem and Johannesburg cases in terms of transnational identity lies with Johannesburg's immigrant population. Although the contexts are at odds, with Palestinians being originally from Jerusalem and foreign-nationals being by definition from somewhere other than Johannesburg, both demographics have a similar transnational component to their identities. Immigrants have become a significant part of the Johannesburg population, both in terms of pure percentage and also effects on social, economic, and urban dynamics. The context for this increase in immigration is a Johannesburg that has set out to create a new national narrative to promote a strong sense of national pride within South Africa. The government has both built new public buildings and converted former symbols of oppression, such as the jail where Nelson Mandela was imprisoned, into symbols of unity.<sup>27</sup> In doing so, however, foreigners have become increasingly marginalized from and excluded by nationals in Johannesburg. Much of the current conflict between the two groups stems from competing understandings of identity, nationality, and the physical space they share. The two groups also set forward competing ideas for the future of South Africa, which further puts them at odds.<sup>28</sup>

Immigrants come from various African countries to South African in search of opportunity with refugees from Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia,

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<sup>27</sup> Freschi, 2007.

<sup>28</sup> Landau, 2006.

and Angola as the major groups of migrants.<sup>29</sup> There is little evidence that these groups are involved with criminal activity, with much more documentation of groups from Nigeria and Lesotho as perpetrators of crime. The Nigerians live more in the urban areas and the people from Lesotho are based more in the mines. In 2006, there were approximately 550,000 foreigners living in Johannesburg, which grew to approximately 700,000 by 2008 in response to the influx of Zimbabwean migrants.<sup>30</sup> 2008 saw a spike in xenophobic violence throughout Johannesburg in response to this migration, which is significant not only in terms of sheer deaths, injuries, and severity of the violence, but also in that it speaks to the tremendous potential for much further, more widespread violence with the concurrent influx of immigrants and their scattering due to such violent events. The ever-widening rich-poor gap, high unemployment rate, and the remarkable lack of housing citywide, all only further fuel the anger and violence towards immigrants, since immigrants are cheap, easily exploitable labor that the Whites of South Africa are eager to employ, in turn creating a huge rift between them and the African nationals.<sup>31</sup> The majority of this violence is perpetuated by black South Africans against black foreign-nationals, which is only logical because the majority of migrants live in nearly all-black areas of Johannesburg. White South Africans, however, are just as guilty of xenophobia and the vast majority that were interviewed for this thesis who worked in the city-center blamed foreign nationals for the high rates of crime and violence. The results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Institute for Security Studies within the past

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<sup>29</sup> CIA. *CIA World Factbook: South Africa*. 2010. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html> (accessed March 16, 2011).

<sup>30</sup> "Immigrants in Johannesburg—perceptions and reality," *Center for Development and Enterprise*, 24 August 2008. Accessed May 14, 2011. <[http://www.cde.org.za/article.php?a\\_id=321](http://www.cde.org.za/article.php?a_id=321)>.

<sup>31</sup> Bearak, 2008.

decade supported information from other sources about the rampant xenophobia in Johannesburg, showing that 63% of people polled blame foreigners for crime in the city with negligible variation in response based on the race of the person being polled. The results of this poll are interestingly juxtaposed with the information that foreigners are more likely to be victims than nationals in every category of crime surveyed.<sup>32</sup> South Africans lack faith in the criminal justice system, which is fraught with corruption, and so sometimes resort to seeking retributive justice, themselves, which often plays out as violence against immigrants and refugees.<sup>33</sup>

Overall, one of the greatest problems facing immigrants and refugees within Johannesburg is the lack of and the need for support services for victims of violence. There is already an incredible dearth of support services for victims of violence provided to South African nationals, so it is no surprise that those available to immigrants and refugees are practically nonexistent. Instead, immigrants and refugees receive support from churches and self-made and led community groups. Oftentimes, these same churches and community groups are the source of basic services and infrastructure that the government does not provide to the informal settlements where the majority of immigrants and refugees live. Immigrants and refugees comprise an unfortunately large subset of the victims of crime in Johannesburg because they are marginalized from sources of social, economic, and urban power, and will not be fully assimilated into the

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<sup>32</sup> Ted Leggett, *Rainbow Tenement: Crime and Policing in Inner Johannesburg* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003).

<sup>33</sup> Graeme Simpson and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, *Crime and Violence: The Need for Victim Support in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 1997).

city without a redefinition of national identity that does not rely on exclusion and othering.





**Figure 2. Map of Johannesburg and its surrounding neighborhoods.**

The key feature of this map is its depiction of the major roads surrounding Johannesburg. The N1 and N3 highways create a ring around the city and it is on these highways and the other major roads shown that the shared taxis travel. It should be noted that this map, along with many others, does not extend to Soweto in the west, which is a significant part of the city. Most maps of Johannesburg, in fact, do not include Soweto as part of the city or its metropolitan region since it was not officially incorporated into the city limits until 2002.

Source: [http://cybercapetown.com/Maps/images/jhb\\_suburbs.gif](http://cybercapetown.com/Maps/images/jhb_suburbs.gif)

## ***Identity Formation***<sup>34</sup>

While policies of exclusion are officially made and institutionalized at the level of the government, the city itself and the ramifications of such policies are experienced at the level of the individual. Within a city, citizens are the major stakeholders and they must have a common identity, feel empowered, and be proud—they must need the community to flourish and have an interest in seeing it grow.<sup>35</sup> In the case of both Jerusalem and Johannesburg, the conflict exists between identity groups within a single space. Contact between sides does not preclude or reduce violent interactions, and it is situational context that most affects the result of these interactions.<sup>36</sup> Perhaps the main reason that this conflict is so intractable is that it is rooted not exclusively in history, but also in the very identities of the two populations involved. Organizations and programs that seek to facilitate discussions between the two sides often work with high school students, and these students have formed their identities entirely within a time of war. They have come to accept war as the status quo, and thus see peace as a threat to the stability that they have built in their lives.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Richard D. Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and David Wilder, Eds., "Social identity, intergroup conflict, and conflict reduction," *Rutgers series on self and social identity* (Vol. 3, New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press, 2001), 187-212.

<sup>35</sup> Alan Kay, "Art and Community Development: The Role the Arts Have in Regenerating Communities" *Community Development Journal* (Vol. 35, No. 4, 2000), 414-424.

<sup>36</sup> Kelman, 1999.

<sup>37</sup> Bar-On, Orr, and Sagi.

Residents of both cities root their identities in their nationality, and when a conflict is identity-based, everyone affiliated with each of the identities is automatically involved.<sup>38</sup> In the case of Jerusalem, it is a conflict primarily defined as being between Israelis and Palestinians, although there are conflicts within each of those groups. Because of this heightened engagement, members of both sides see war as completely justified in order to achieve national independence.<sup>39</sup> They are not simply entangled in a conflict that affects them personally, but in a conflict that affects the outcome and possibly the survival of their entire nation. In Johannesburg it is increasingly a conflict between South Africans and foreign nationals, although racial tensions certainly still exist. Within the inner city, white South Africans are a huge minority and the main conflict that plays out is among residents and workers, who are predominantly black South Africans and foreign nationals.

A problem in the construction of both Israeli and Palestinian identities is that a significant subset of both populations conceives of their existence as mutually exclusive to that of the other side. The causes of such a conception are two-fold: firstly, both sides tie their identity so closely to the land that they see any threat to their territorial claims as a threat to their identity, and secondly, that they are convinced that the other side is bent on their annihilation. The strong link to the land is due to a long and intricate history of both populations: both people originate from the same place and both people have been

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.; Louis Kriesberg, "Mediation and the Transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" *Journal of Peace Research* (Vol. 38, 2001), 373-392.

<sup>39</sup> Bar-On, Orr, and Sagi.

persecuted and have nowhere else they can go if they face persecution again. This zero-sum formulation of their identities makes it impossible for negotiated solutions to even be considered, since they are each convinced that the other side is bent on their annihilation. It is only when the enemy image is differentiated and a transcendental one is created in its stead that negotiations will be able to occur.<sup>40</sup> This mutual exclusivity of identities does occur in Johannesburg and the tie to the land itself is not a main factor in the identities of Johannesburg residents. Rather, it is the built environment that is embedded in the identity of Johannesburg as a place of exclusion and residents associate certain areas, such as the townships, with exclusionary policies and a lack of freedom.



### ***Summary***

Based on this literature, it is apparent that conflict in cities such as Jerusalem and Johannesburg is complex not only in its facts, but also in its framing. To even begin to comprehend it, an understanding must be achieved not only of its roots, but also of the communities and identities that have developed in its wake. People are misrepresented and marginalized and sometimes even bent on the destruction of those with whom they are in conflict. Inevitably, though, people from both sides of the conflict must interact and spaces must be crafted in which they can do so.

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<sup>40</sup> Kelman 1987; Kelman 1999.

## CHAPTER 3: Jerusalem and Johannesburg in Context



*Shit happens and there's nothing you can do to prevent it, but it shouldn't be a continuous way of life.*

*--Israeli resident of Jerusalem*

*We can't be too sentimental about gentrification.*

*--white South African resident of Johannesburg*

To be able to understand a city is accomplished through an understanding its past, and Jerusalem and Johannesburg are no exception. In both cases, the conflict as it stands today is vastly different than it was even a decade ago. The cities and actors are constantly changing, as are the residents, but it is a process of evolution rather than simple replacement. Each decision is based in the past, and so it is to the past that this thesis now turns.

## ***Jerusalem***

The history of the conflict and of the region, in general, is extensive, but most components of the conflict as it stands today—especially those surrounding identity—stem from events decades in the past. It is also essential to recognize that different actors frame the conflict in vastly different ways.

## **History<sup>41</sup>**

The foundation of the conflict dates back thousands of years, but much of the contemporary conflict stems from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century with the beginnings of Zionism, a self-deterministic Jewish movement, and an escalation in Arab nationalism. Officially established in 1897 and led by Theodore Herzl, the Zionist movement started in Europe and sought to establish a Jewish homeland in what was then Palestine as a response to the persecution of the Jewish people and increasing anti-Semitism in Russia and Europe. The World Zionist Organization and Jewish National Fund joined forces in encouraging Jews to migrate to and settle in Palestine and funding purchase of land, but this immigration was met with resistance from the Arabs already living in Palestine. Palestinian nationalism stemmed out of the already prevalent sentiment of Arab nationalism in the region as a direction reaction to Zionism, and established a rival self-determinism that hinged upon the nonexistence of a sovereign Jewish state in what was still Palestine.

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
<sup>41</sup> This section is draws on many sources, most notably: Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994); Charles Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with documents*. (New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 6th edn., 2007); Norman G. Finkelstein, *Image and reality of the Israel-Palestine conflict* (Verso, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., 2003); and James L. Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine conflict: one hundred years of war* (Cambridge University Press, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., 2005).

By 1914, the Jewish population in Palestine had nearly doubled the approximately 30,000 Jews living there at the beginning of the Zionist movement, and with the 1917 British defeat of the Ottoman forces in the Palestinian region came the controversial Balfour Declaration, which was essentially a promise to the Jewish people that a homeland would be created for them in Palestine. Palestinians of course reacted to this declaration with much skepticism and opposition, for they saw it as Britain giving away land that wasn't theirs to give. Under this British mandate, however, Jewish immigration to the region increased due to the rise of anti-Semitic movements in Europe and by 1926, 90,000 Jews were settled in the region, further threatening the Palestinian nationalism and self-determinism. As a response to this increase in Jewish migration in the 1920s, members of the Arab population of Palestine began to use violence against Jewish residents. The Jaffa riots of 1921 were the first major riots against Jews in Palestine, and were followed most notably by the 1929 Palestine riots; both of these riots resulted in major loss of life and further escalated tension in the area and violence on both sides.

Between the 1920s and the end of World War II, a number of one- and two-state solutions were proposed, but ultimately in the aftermath of the Holocaust and World War II the most popular was the UN Partition Plan. This plan recommended the division of the region into three parts: a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an international zone that included Jerusalem. While the Zionists accepted this plan, Arabs both in Palestine and

in surrounding Arab states rejected it and began carrying out attacks against the Jewish population in the region and consulates of nations that supported the plan. As British evacuation of the area progressed, so did the prevalence of violence, but one day before the expiration of the British Mandate on May 15, 1948, David Ben-Gurion announced the establishment of the State of Israel, founded on secular tenets of equality to all inhabitants.





**Figure 3. Map of Israel and Occupied Territories.**

This map depicts Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Important to note is how Jerusalem is located right on the border with the West Bank, one of the Palestinian Territories.

Source:  
[http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle\\_east/conflict/images/israel\\_map.gif](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/conflict/images/israel_map.gif)

This declaration of statehood catalyzed the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which ultimately resulted in Israeli victory and annexation of territory beyond the original borders proposed in the Partition Plan. Palestinian refugees from the war were not allowed to return to Israel or to most of the neighboring Arab states, resulting in thousands of them living in refugee camps, which have remained intact and populated to the present day. Although most Palestinians remaining in Israel after the war were granted Israeli citizenship, up until 1966 they were subject to martial law and still suffer a fair amount of discrimination at the hands of the Israeli government and general Israeli populous.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established in 1964 on the same principles of self-determination and right of return that Zionism was founded, and has largely taken the place of a sovereign government for the Palestinian people. The Six-Day War in 1967 and subsequent Israeli victory resulted in an expulsion of the PLO from Israel to Lebanon, from whence they began launching attacks on the northern Israeli border, and the peak of Palestinian-led terrorism was the Munich massacre that occurred during the 1972 Munich Olympics.

1973 brought the Yom Kippur War, launched against Israel by Egypt and Syria, which ultimately ended in a ceasefire and participation in the 1978 Camp David Accords by the Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, which established a peaceful border between the states. Continuation of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip culminated in the First Intifadah of 1987, which entailed

terrorist attacks targeting Israeli citizens and a state of daily violence. In the aftermath of the First Intifadah and the Gulf War, Israel and the PLO began negotiations through the Oslo Peace Process in 1993, which ultimately resulted in the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the autonomous government structure of the Palestinian population and mutual recognition of the two governments and their respective rights to exist.

A string of assassinations, summits, peace talks, and further terrorism again culminated in the Second Intifadah in 2005, which was another period of intensified violence with thousands of Israeli and Palestinian victims due to riots, attacks, and raids led by both sides. In an effort to reduce Palestinian attacks, Israel began construction of the Israel-Gaza Strip Barrier in 1994 and the West Bank Fence in 2002, which only further divided the two populations in a very tangible and symbolic way. Hamas has continued to gather strength even through today, and overtures by President Obama have yet to be successful in wooing either party to reignite the peace process.

## **Framing**

The complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lie not only in its history, but also in its framing. In the literature reviewed in preparation for this thesis, there emerged three main ways that the conflict is framed: as an exercise in mediation, as a discussion between equals, and as an extension of the human rights movement.

In the first framing, two main types of mediation exist: traditional and problem-solving. The former uses a powerful party with leverage to mediate the discussions, and the latter uses a convening party to facilitate and guide discussion about the conflict.<sup>42</sup>

Unfortunately, exclusive use of either type of mediation has proven ineffective, and so different combinations of the two are tested with each new round of negotiations.<sup>43</sup>

Use of the second framing seems pervasive, as most negotiations seek to balance the asymmetry between Israelis and Palestinians.<sup>44</sup> This framing is essentially a subset of the first framing, since in both cases the interaction includes Israelis, Palestinians, and an outside party. In actuality, though, such attempts at framing the discussion as one between equals are interpreted by Palestinians as denials of the striking inequalities that exist in everything from power dynamics to knowledge production to political representation. While Palestinians are keenly aware of this asymmetry, it is often overlooked by outside parties, and both the existence and neglect of this asymmetry are indicative of the larger issue of Palestinians not being true members of the state of Israel or having any representation in what is purportedly a democracy.<sup>45</sup> This framing seems both the least effective and the least desirable because it refuses to acknowledge the reality of the conflict.

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<sup>42</sup> Kriesberg.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Mitchell, Prakash, and Shohat.

Lastly, there is the framing of the conflict in terms of the human rights movement. In this framing, an impediment to successful negotiation emerges that is often otherwise overlooked. Namely, the human rights movement operates under the assumption that rights will be granted by states to their citizens, yet Palestine is not a state.<sup>46</sup> Much of the discourse has to do with self-determination and respect for boundaries, neither of which applies to Palestine, and because of Palestine's lack of statehood, Palestinians are a stateless people whose rights are seemingly no one's priority. Furthermore, since much of the discourse on the conflict is conducted in state-centered venues, Palestinians are unable to participate. Unless the conflict is framed in such a way that allows for Palestine and Israel to have a common agenda and be on a level playing field, negotiations will never meet with success.<sup>47</sup>

### ***Johannesburg***

The Johannesburg of yore was polarized. It was filled with blacks and whites. With Africans and non-Africans. With "backwards" and "cultured" peoples.<sup>48</sup> But Johannesburg is now a first-world city striving to divorce itself from its past. It is the economic hub of sub-Saharan Africa and site of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Although its origins are steeped in controversy and founded on practices of racial segregation that

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
<sup>46</sup> Hajjar.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Categorization of native Africans as backwards is not a personal opinion, but rather a historical opinion held by many foreigners living in Johannesburg. See DB Allen's "Race, crime and social exclusion: A qualitative study of white women's fear of crime in Johannesburg" for a significantly more colorful portrayal of blacks in this city.

were condemned internationally, today it brands itself as a heterogeneous, integrated city.

Present day Johannesburg is a city of gray areas, and it is integrated culturally, economically, and racially. In many spaces, however, this integration is merely physical, and the spatial integration of the city does not extend to the more abstract concepts of identity and community. It is this disconnect between the physical reality of the city and its intangible workings that result in the violence that has made Johannesburg famous not only for its gold rush, its man-made forest, and its climate, but also for its crime- and murder-rates.



### A brief history of Johannesburg<sup>49</sup>

The urbanization of Johannesburg began in 1886 with the discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand (a low range of hills in South Africa). People the world round migrated to

<sup>49</sup> This history is pieced together from the following: the Official Website of the City of Johannesburg (<http://www.joburgnews.co.za>); G.A. Leyds. *A History of Johannesburg*. Johannesburg: Nasionale Boekhande (1964); and Keith Beavon, *Johannesburg: The making and shaping of the city*. Pretoria: University of South Africa Press (2004).

this formerly small, prospecting settlement of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republijk (ZAR), and tensions between foreign immigrants and the ZAR government eventually erupting in 1899 with the South African War. The war ended in 1902 with the British annexation of the ZAR, leaving the ZAR population placeless, unemployed, and ultimately destitute. 1910 brought about the Land Alienation Acts, resulting in rural blacks being forced to seek employment in mining hubs, and 1948 brought about further displacement of blacks with the Group Areas Act. This act forcibly moved blacks out of inner areas of Johannesburg and into Soweto, but since the mid-twentieth century both inner-city Johannesburg and many of its suburbs have become increasingly integrated and multiracial, especially following the end of apartheid in 1993.

Within mere years of its establishment, Johannesburg became one of the most important cities of Sub-Saharan Africa. Even the decline of the mining industry did not halt Johannesburg's growth. Instead, industries such as the financial sector have grown significantly, attracting an increasing number of South Africans from rural provinces as well as foreigners from neighboring African countries. The significant economic disenfranchisement of black South Africans that resulted from the apartheid era, combined with the country's high urbanization rate led the small mining town to become the crime capital of South Africa.<sup>50</sup> Crime and violence became most prevalent in the

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<sup>50</sup> Central Intelligence Factbook, South Africa, accessed January 22nd, 2012. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html>; Ingrid Palmary, Janine Rauch, and Graeme Simpson. "Violent Crime in Johannesburg," *Emerging Johannesburg: Perspectives on the Post Apartheid City*, by Richard Tomlinson, Chapter 7. New York: Routledge.



inner city in the 1980s following white flight and subsequent disinvestment from what is still known as the CBD, and much of the area became and remains an urban slum.

### **Defining spatial logics**

The physical layout of Johannesburg seems at first rather straightforward with its typical gridded mega-city structure, complete with surrounding ring-road. Once you go beyond the inner-city, however, it veers vastly away from typical with high density townships located at intervals around the city from 15-35kilomteres outside its center. Its spatial organization is still more complex, and depends largely on distances from and relationships to the state.

### *Distance*<sup>51</sup>

Distance from the state can be either quantitative or qualitative. Quantitative distance is a mere matter of the physical distance from the city-center and its governing bodies and seems to have minimal effects within the city. Qualitative distance, however, is a matter of affiliation and perception, and has much more bearing on violence within the city.

Violence is not specific to the suburbs of Johannesburg. In February 2011, for instance, workers protested in the Library Gardens of the Central Business District because they felt that they were being unfairly treated and compensated.<sup>52</sup> While the strike was mostly

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<sup>51</sup> Diane E. Davis. "The Power of Distance: Rethinking Social Movements in Latin America." *Theory and Society*, vol. 24 no. 4 (August 1999): 589-643; Loren B. Landau. 2006. "Transplants and Transients: Idioms of Belonging and Dislocation in Inner-City Johannesburg," *African Studies Review*, Volume 49, Number 2, (September): 125-145.

<sup>52</sup> For more information on the events of the strike, see the news24 article titled "Strike Violence in Johannesburg CBD."

contained, four workers were injured by police-fired rubber bullets, intimidation was reported, and approximately 65,000 workers went on strike until a compromise was reached. Although in this instance the police perpetrated the violence, they did so in order to reestablish control over workers who had fallen out of the sphere of government influence while remaining very much in the physical center of the city.

Within Johannesburg, the physical layout does not match the spatial organization, and it is perhaps in areas where the two are most dissonant that violence emerges most prominently. In neighborhoods that are physically proximate to the city-center but have an incredibly far perceived distance from the state in terms of economy, culture, services, or communication, violence is often used as a mechanism to compensate for the gap.

### *Relationship to the State*

The relationship of different areas to the State is a key factor in their levels of violence, and is largely wrapped up in the concept of identity. Within Johannesburg, there are homogeneous spaces of people who mostly share a common identity such as race that is unrelated to the State, and there are heterogeneous spaces of people with different identities centered around a common tie to the State.

Fear of high levels of heterogeneity seems to be a common theme in the history of Johannesburg, beginning with the migrants avoiding the natives and ZAR settlers in the

gold rush of 1886, continuing with apartheid, and persisting today with the lack of association among ethnicities and classes. While there are myriad migrants from rural areas of South Africa to Johannesburg, their identity as a South African seems to help them integrate into the city. Many of Johannesburg's residents migrated into the city from other countries and self-identity as migrants, rather than assimilating into the urban fabric. As such, there are many pockets of migrants throughout the city that are home to nationalities ranging from Ethiopian to Zimbabwean to Nigerian, and residents of such pockets create their own hierarchies, institutions, and systems largely independent of those of the established government.

The areas of Johannesburg most known for pervasive and consistent violence are almost entirely outside the immediate political sphere of the State, but exist in the very center of the city. These spaces are abandoned and excluded socially, financially, and institutionally, and have a weaker relationship to the state. There is very little government investment in these areas and institutions have all fled outside of the historic CBD, leaving these areas with little more than a reputation for crime that keeps out most residents of the city and its metropolitan area. Hillbrow, perhaps the most well-known of Johannesburg's inner-city neighborhoods, illustrates wonderfully the difference between quantitative and qualitative distances. Its claim to fame is its high levels of population density, unemployment, poverty, and crime, and most recently it was

featured in the news for the forcible eviction of tenants of one of its buildings despite the existence of a high court order preventing such action.<sup>53</sup>

While the decline of Hillbrow and its emergence as a center for violence within Johannesburg can most certainly be illustrated in terms of its relationship to the State, the squatter settlement of Ramaphosa is an even clearer example. Ramaphosa, located a few kilometers southeast of Johannesburg's CBD, is home to tens of thousands of the three million Zimbabwean refugees estimated to be living in South Africa, and although Zimbabweans comprise the largest portion of the country's immigrant population, the government all but ignores the needs of the refugees living there. In 2008, xenophobic violence broke out throughout Johannesburg, beginning in Alexandra and eventually spreading to Ramaphosa, resulting in the death of sixty-two people and the displacement of thousands.<sup>54</sup> Despite the horrors of this violence, the government did little to ameliorate the immigrants' situation, and it was instead churches and community-based organizations that were the most organized and helpful in providing much needed aid. In February of 2011, the xenophobia that normally lurks under the surface in Ramaphosa came out in the open in the form of threats to shop owners. Police claim to have everything under control, but few changes have been observed in the police presence in the squatter camp, or lack thereof.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Alex Eliseev. 4 Jan 2011. Hillbrow police 'in contempt of court.' Eye Witness News (<http://www.eyewitnessnews.co.za>).

<sup>54</sup> Barry Bearak and Celia W. Dugger. "South Africans Take Out Rage on Immigrants." *The New York Times*. 20 May 2008.

<sup>55</sup> "Police on Alert in Ramaphosa." allAfrica.com. 1 Feb 2011.

The antagonism towards Zimbabwean immigrants is one example of many in which nationalism served as a hindrance to cooperation, due to a lack of a national identity that includes migrants. There is a distancing between locals and migrants because of the lack of a common identity through which they can relate to each other and to the State. No matter how well-organized communities are, and many migrant communities lack organization altogether, if they exist outside of the governmental sphere, they will not be able to gain political voice, and it is the lack of such a voice that often catalyzes violence.<sup>56</sup>

It has been posited that South Africa has a culture of violence with acts that are seemingly without motive stemming directly from the apartheid system, and violence seen today is largely a manifestation of the current conflict between South Africans and foreign nationals.<sup>57</sup> From the start of European invasion, the access to the wealth from the gold boom was restricted from the indigenous people.<sup>58</sup> Firstly, political violence seemed to be the language of change, then access to good education was limited to the majority of the population to keep them oppressed, also marginalized people had to struggle for a voice, and finally, migrants were encouraged to keep the supply of labor plentiful and cheap. Additionally, Johannesburg attracts people in search of opportunity, but it rarely fulfills their dream. Many young disappointed people then fall into a life of crime. Furthermore the built environment of many apartments and absentee owners

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<sup>56</sup> Nancy Fraser. 1990. "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy." *Social Text*, No. 25/26: pp. 56-80.

<sup>57</sup> Palmary 2003.

<sup>58</sup> Freschi 2007.

facilitate criminal activity. Added to that, the population is transient with many young, single people who are away from home and overcrowded; this leads to the anonymity that makes criminal activity more attractive.<sup>59</sup>

While the origins of aspects of contemporary violence in South Africa are certainly embedded in sociopolitical structures and practices in place under apartheid, it is important to note that the end of apartheid and formation of a new government created new social, economic, political, and demographic conditions which have, in turn, inspired new forms of violence.<sup>60</sup> Although Johannesburg as a whole is known for an abundance of crime and violence, there is actually wide variation in the amount, severity, and type of crimes occurring in the various townships. The types of crime that happen with the most frequency are common assault, common robbery, and car-related crime, followed by illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, drug-related crime, and murder.<sup>61</sup> As is to be expected, Johannesburg Central is the leader of almost every category of crime, with Hillbrow in a close second. What is most interesting about this breakdown by township and crime type, however, is that many townships lack consistency across the categories. Alexandra, for instance, is in the top quartile for almost every category save common robbery, in which it's nowhere near the top. In fact,

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<sup>59</sup> Harrison, Kirsten. "Falling down the Rabbit Hole: Crime in Johannesburg's Inner City." *Development in Practice*, 2006: 222-226.

<sup>60</sup> Ran Greenstein and the Community Agency for Social Enquiry, *The Role of Political Violence in South Africa's Democratisation*, Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry (2003).

<sup>61</sup> Statistics on car-related crime were unfortunately not included in the data from the Institute for Security Studies and were unavailable elsewhere for the same year. Information on car-related crime can be found in Antoinette Louw, Mark Shaw, Lala Camerer, and Rory Robertshaw's article from February 2008 in *Monograph No. 18*, titled "Victims of Crime in Johannesburg."

yearly statistics from 2001-2007 show that while Alexandra consistently has high rates of murder, common assault, and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, its common robbery rate is consistently around 200 cases per 1,000, which is quite low when compared to other townships that have comparable crime rates in the other categories.<sup>62</sup> In most townships, murder, common assault, and common robbery, and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition seem to be roughly correlated, while both drug-related crime and public violence appear to lack a strong relationship with any of the other categories of crime.

To better understand the current crime trends within the city, it is perhaps useful to put it in the context of the factors leading to increased levels of crime, as defined by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, which include:

- poverty and unemployment deriving from social exclusion, particularly among young people;
- dysfunctional families with poor parenting, domestic violence, and parental conflicts;
- social valuation of a culture of violence—where violence has become sanctioned as a normative vehicle for the assertion of power or to attain change in a society or community;
- easy access to facilitating factors in violent crime, such as firearms, alcohol, and drugs;
- discrimination and exclusion deriving from sexist, racist, or other forms of oppression; and
- degradation of urban environments and social bonds.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> “Crime Statistics 2007: Gauteng,” Institute for Security Studies, accessed May 12, 2011, <<http://www.issafrica.org/cjm/stats0707/gauteng.htm>>.

<sup>63</sup> Original document is the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime’s 1997 *Crime Prevention Digest*. This list of factors, however, is from “Violent Crime in Johannesburg,” written by Ingrid Palmary, Janine Rauch, and Graeme Simpson.

The first factor of poverty and unemployment deriving from social exclusion stems from the tradition of social, economic, and urban exclusion that continued into the post-apartheid era of South Africa with the marginalized groups of women, youth, and immigrants. Those groups within Johannesburg that are most marginalized also obviously have the most restricted access to employment opportunities and the city, in general.<sup>64</sup>

The second factor of dysfunctional families, largely in townships and other overcrowded areas of the city, mostly stems from the first, due to the shifting family dynamics that accompany heads of families having to work more and in some cases relocate in order to earn enough income to adequately support their spouse and children.<sup>65</sup>

The third factor of social valuation of a culture of violence is a product of Johannesburg's history of violence as both a constant condition of daily life and a tool used by small, radical groups to affect changes that the government is not bringing. Through apartheid, South Africa has a culture of violence begetting violence. The Sharpeville shootings by the government in 1960 resulted in the formation of a more militant resistance group.<sup>66</sup> This was an example of negative resilience. Consequently, violence was used by both the government and the resistance to bring about changes;

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<sup>64</sup> DB Allen, "Race, crime and social exclusion: A qualitative study of white women's fear of crime in Johannesburg," *Urban Forum* 13:3 (2002), 53-79.

<sup>65</sup> Ingrid Palmay, "For Better Implementation of Migrant Children's Rights in South Africa," *UNICEF* (2009).

<sup>66</sup> Belinda Buzolli and Peter Delius, "Radical History and South African Society." *Radical History Review*, 1990: 13-45.



helping to institute the culture of violence in South Africa. An article by Tom De Bruyn provides insight into whether or not the current safety policies of the Johannesburg city government successfully address what he identifies as the seven key elements that encompass “safety.” These include: freedom from danger; freedom from fear; systemic violence and othering; social identity; and socio-spatial exclusion. He finds that the government’s “safety” framework generally does not recognize freedom from fear and danger as important components, and instead focuses mostly on crime prevention.<sup>67</sup> Such a lack of attention paid to freedom from fear and danger are indicative of the larger issue of general acceptance of fear and danger as constants in daily life within Johannesburg.

The fourth factor of easy access to facilitating factors in violent crime is largely a product of the ease of legally obtaining firearms and the lack of government presence in or regulation of lower-income areas and informal settlements.<sup>68</sup>

The fifth factor of discrimination and exclusion deriving from sexist, racist, or other forms of oppression is directly linked to and explained in the first factor.

The sixth and final factor of degradation of urban environments and social bonds is an especially relevant one in Johannesburg. With the ever-present marginalization and

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<sup>67</sup> Tom De Bruyn, “Policy, fear and systemic violence: a review of the Johannesburg context,” *Urban Forum* 13:3 (2002), 80-98.

<sup>68</sup> Jaclyn Cock, “The Link Between Security and Development: The Problem of Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa,” *African Security Review* 5:5 (1996),

segregation within Johannesburg along racial, national, and economic lines, social bonds are increasingly exclusionary and serve to further divide the city. Poor South Africans are perpetually victims of poor services and bad environmental conditions, which are very much related to their physical location within the city and occupation of areas with fewer natural resources and government-provided infrastructure. Conversely, over the past two decades there has been a significant rise in the popularity of “fortified enclaves” in the form of gated communities, which are almost exclusively occupied by wealthy South Africans.<sup>69</sup> Increasingly, Johannesburg is becoming a divided city shaped by a post-Fordist spatial order and splintered by patterns of identity-based Fordism, all within the context of increasing government decentralization.<sup>70</sup>

The struggle for a voice is perhaps the most difficult and important one of all, and the fight against social and economic inequalities can be seen most easily in conflicts of marginalized communities.<sup>71</sup> Apartheid resulted in a collapse of social capital, comprised of institutions, relationships, and standards of social interactions within a society.<sup>72</sup> Furthermore, the change to democracy from the apartheid system compounded the problems that the poor and marginalized face and the marginalized groups, such as women, young people and migrants, still lack economic power.

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

<sup>69</sup> Jo Beall, Owen Crankshaw, Susan Parnell, “Victims, Villains and Fixers: The Urban Environment and Johannesburg’s Poor,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26:4 (December 2000), 833-855.

<sup>70</sup> Jo Beall, Owen Crankshaw, and Sue Parnell, *Uniting a Divided City: Governance and Social Exclusion in Johannesburg*, (London: Earthscan Publications, 2002).

<sup>71</sup> Palmary, 2003.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER 4: Experience of the Individual



*Learn to choose your battles.*

*--Israeli resident of Jerusalem*

*Mostly I decide to keep quiet and disappear from this place.*

*--Zimbabwean resident of Johannesburg*

To obtain a clear picture of how exclusion, identity, and urban form are linked, it is necessary to examine how individual residents experience the city. In order to do so, the current conditions of Jerusalem and Johannesburg must be explored and the mindsets of residents of both cities must be discovered. The former can be found through literature and news articles, while the latter is a bit trickier. In this thesis, cognitive


mapping is the chosen tool for uncovering how individuals' mobilities differ and how they think of their own rights to the city.

### ***Living in Present-Day Jerusalem***

The "HomeLessHome" exhibition at the Museum on the Seam, located less than half a mile north of the Old City in Jerusalem, provides insight into the contemporary conflict of spaces through its examination of the blurring and redefinition of spaces as a part of the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict.<sup>73</sup> Most interesting is the exhibition's framing of the conflict in terms of pluralism and a search not for a way of equalizing or neutralizing Israelis, Palestinians, and their respective identities, but of enabling them to coexist while retaining the elements of their identities that are in opposition. This framing speaks to an emerging quest of organizations today, which is to explore how both groups' identities can be translated to physical space in such a way that they can occupy the same area without exclusionary forces.

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<sup>73</sup> "HomeLessHome." *Museum on the Seam: Socio-Political Contemporary Art Museum*. 4 Chel Handasa Street, Jerusalem, Israel, 91016. Visited July 2010. Relevant themes of the exhibition include the ephemerality of the Palestinian situation (Peter Belyi's "Danger Zone," Katarzyna Jozefowicz's "City," Dana Levy's "Disengagement," and Hema Upadhyay's "Where the Bees Suck, There Suck I"), the idea that a charged space can be redesigned and reused as a more neutral space (Alicia Framis's "Welcome to Guantanamo Museum—Recycling"), the common feeling of being cast out that both Israelis and Palestinians share at the core of their identities (Sliman Mansour's "I am Ismail"), and the dichotomy that exists between the strong and the weak, the oppressed and the oppressor (Anne-Marie Schneider's "Code-Barre," Eyad Baba's "Gaza," and Philip Rantzer's "4 Cages").



**Figure 5. Maps of metropolitan and greater Jerusalem.**

It should be noted which portions of Jerusalem are dominated by Israelis and which by Palestinians, as well as the general layout of the neighborhoods, as these features both tell of the current state of the conflict in Jerusalem and give further insight into the significance of the cognitive maps in this thesis. The top map shows the division of Israeli (blue) and Palestinian (yellow) areas, as well as the Separation Wall (here referred to as the Ma'ali Adumim Wall), which is conspicuously missing from the cognitive maps drawn by both Israeli and Palestinian participants. The bottom map clearly shows the layout of the neighborhoods surrounding downtown Jerusalem.

Sources:  
[http://www.poica.org/editor/case\\_studies/jerusalem\\_wall\\_07.jpg](http://www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/jerusalem_wall_07.jpg)  
 and  
<http://www.israelstarnews.fr/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/cartequartiersjerusalem.jpg>

The reality of present-day Jerusalem is not such a far cry from the Jerusalem of half a century ago when Israel was declared a country. While the policies of exclusion that enforce the separation between Israelis and Palestinians have evolved – in some ways making the exclusion more lenient and in others making it more stringent – the fact remains that the majority of Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem still actively avoid interaction. For many, it is simply a matter of habit. Israelis and Palestinians occupy many of the same spaces, but each of them is owned, usually in a very literal way, by one side or the other. The current layout of Jerusalem is such that the Palestinian neighborhoods that do exist outside of the territories are islands within a sea of Israeli neighborhoods, limiting their movement throughout the area.

### ***Living in Present-Day Johannesburg***

Present-day Johannesburg is different in countless ways from the Johannesburg of even a few decades ago. Unlike Jerusalem, where the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians is ongoing, the conflict within Johannesburg has shifted significantly from the conflict that originally earned it classification as a conflict city. Discussion of its current conditions, therefore, must be quite a bit lengthier than that of Jerusalem.

Johannesburg is known today as both the crime and rape capital of the world, and while the nicknames are pithy, their sentiments are grounded at least to some extent in

reality.<sup>74</sup> Any story of Johannesburg is thus also a story of crime and violence, for crime and violence are an unfortunately intrinsic part of the city's identity.

Johannesburg has a tradition of excluding marginalized groups from access to social power, economic power, and general amenities of urban life, largely rooted in its exclusion of blacks during apartheid.<sup>75</sup> With apartheid came very strict control of access to public spaces, an increase in the inequalities between wealthy and poor areas, ghettoization of townships in which black people resided, and disparities in service provision and quality in black versus white townships. Spatial segregation of the city along racial lines was one of the most obvious components of apartheid, but the segregation of the city along racial lines also played out politically with reduced, and in some cases nonexistent access to the State.<sup>76</sup>

Although racial segregation in South Africa began during colonialism, it wasn't until the introduction of apartheid as official government policy with the 1948 election that internal resistance and violence became prevalent. While the South African anti-apartheid movement led by Nelson Mandela made a name for itself because of its dedication to peaceful protest, many other groups and movements did not subscribe to the same theory of non-violence. The ANC Youth League was a primary force in the opposition

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<sup>74</sup> Beauregard Tromp, "Crime capital of the world tries to clean up its image," *The Independent*, August 24, 2002, accessed May 1, 2011. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/crime-capital-of-the-world-tries-to-clean-up-its-image-640791.html>; "South Africa's rape shock" *BBC*, January 19, 2009, accessed May 1, 2011. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/258446.stm>.

<sup>75</sup> Beavon, 2004; Palmary, 2003.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*


and strongly advocated a radical nationalist program that involved strikes, boycotts, and civil disobedience, which sometimes led to violent clashes with the State.<sup>77</sup> As a response to the uprisings and protests occurring throughout the 1950's, the government imprisoned anti-apartheid leaders and banned opposition to apartheid, in general. One of the most well-known violent events during apartheid was the Sharpeville massacre of March 21st, 1960, in which the Pan Africanist Congress, an offshoot of the ANC, led a demonstration against pass books during which 69 people were killed and 186 people were injured by the police open-firing on the crowd.<sup>78</sup> After this event, the ANC created its own military wing and began to support guerilla attacks, including bombings, murder, and sabotage. Although reforms to apartheid legislation were proposed and passed, they did little to quell the very vocal opposition, and even the multi-racial democratic elections of 1994 did not and could not reverse the damage that decades of apartheid had wreaked on the city. Apartheid left behind a legacy of segregation, exclusion, and violence that Johannesburg has yet to overcome.

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<sup>77</sup> Saths Cooper, "Political Violence in South Africa: The Role of Youth," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* (Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 1994): 27-30.

<sup>78</sup> Philip Frankel, *An Ordinary Atrocity: Sharpeville and Its Massacre*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).





**Figure 6. Tourist map of Inner-City Johannesburg.**

This map shows the streets and purported “main attractions” of inner-city Johannesburg. Important to note is Hillbrow in the north, which is home to tens of thousands of foreign nationals in derelict hijacked buildings.

Source: <http://mappery.com/map-of/Johannesburg-Map>

## ***Results of Cognitive Mapping***<sup>79</sup>

The results from the cognitive mapping exercise were unexpected. Based on preliminary research into identity formulation and its link to urban form, it was expected that the main differences between demographics in conflict would be the landmarks and neighborhoods of the city that participants identified. This hypothesis was based in the idea that people's cognitive maps consist of the places with which they are most familiar, but it quickly became apparent that there were far more complexities at work than imagined.

### **Jerusalem**

Maps that were drawn by Israeli participants almost all included neighborhoods surrounding the city-center, some up to five miles away. While the maps drawn by Israeli youth did feature some key landmarks such as the Givat Ram and Mount Scopus campuses of Hebrew University, the Central Bus Station, the train station, and the Kotel, the scale was on the order of the metropolitan area. The centering of the maps was also uniformly about the Old City. It is important to note that Givat Ram, Ir Ganim, Malcha, Gilo, Talpiyot, Moshava, Beit HaKerem, Ein Kerem, and Ramat Eshkol are areas with a majority Israeli population; Ramallah, Shuafat, and Beit Tsafafa, are areas with a

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<sup>79</sup> The results of the cognitive mapping exercise are qualitative and rely heavily on an understanding of the layout of Jerusalem and Johannesburg, which can be gleaned from *Figures 2, 4, and 5*. Additional cognitive maps can be found in *Appendix 2*.

majority Palestinian population; and expatriates largely dominate the German Colony, the Greek Colony, Mamila, and French Hill (see *Figure 7*).

The differences among the maps drawn by different demographics in both Jerusalem and Johannesburg were not in the landmarks or neighborhoods that participants drew, but in the scale and centering of their maps.<sup>80</sup> Participants that were selected for this exercise had all lived in the city-center for at least two years out of the past decade and at the time of the exercise went into the city-center on a daily basis, at a minimum. The instructions given to all participants were the same, and they were each asked to spend a minimum of five minutes drawing a map of their respective city, making sure to identify key landmarks, neighborhoods, and streets.

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<sup>80</sup> The different scales encountered are defined as follows: level of the street is defined as a map that features a single street, level of the neighborhood is defined as a map that features a network of streets or landmarks, and level of the metropolitan area is defined as a map that features a collection of abstracted neighborhoods.



It is also important to note that there were no significant variations in maps drawn by participants based on age or the location where the drawn of the map actually occurred. Minor differences that appeared among maps drawn by Israeli participants included combining into the Old City and the city-center and including Palestinian neighborhoods. These small distinctions are very much related, for while the Old City is home to many landmarks integral to the Israeli identity, it is largely an Arab-dominated area residentially. The shift is thus in the inclusion of Arab neighborhoods in the definition of the city, with the Old City becoming a part of the City-center, rather than simply adjacent to it, and areas such as Ramalla beginning to appear as part of the city. After talking to participants, it became apparent that those who had drawn maps that exhibited these variations had frequent, if not regular interaction with Palestinians.

All of the maps drawn by Israeli participants featured explicit boundaries around the neighborhoods they chose to include. While some participants did draw neighborhoods with majority Arab populations, many of the spaces in between the neighborhoods drawn are comprised of neighborhoods with majority Arab populations. While the maps largely featured the Old City and City-center at their center, they also lacked inclusion of neighborhoods to the east of their chosen center, for neighborhoods to the east are almost exclusively Palestinian-majority. These omissions could be intentional, but perhaps more likely is that they are simply not spaces of the city that are familiar to or used by the Israeli population.

Israelis have mobility to move throughout the entire metropolitan region of Jerusalem, but have no reason to go to Palestinian-dominated areas interspersed between the Israeli-dominated neighborhoods, and especially not to the Palestinian areas in East Jerusalem or beyond checkpoints. The Jerusalem of Israelis is one with few Palestinian neighborhoods and no checkpoints, which is again understandable since the economic center of the city does not lie in such areas.


Maps that were drawn by Palestinian participants were almost all on a much smaller scale and included little more than the Old City. This difference in scale was completely unexpected, but logical. While there are Arab neighborhoods scattered throughout Jerusalem, they are all carefully constructed and planned to have the feel of being within Israel, rather than independent communities or territories.<sup>81</sup> The Old City, on the other hand, truly does have a sense of belonging to everyone and is the place freest of the oppressed-oppressor dynamic that dominates other Palestinian-inhabited areas. It is therefore logical that Palestinian participants view Jerusalem and the Old City as one and the same, since the Old City is the only portion of the city where they feel welcome and in control. Most Palestinian participants also centered their maps about the Dome of the Rock and did not extend their maps beyond the boundaries of the Old City. The centering of the maps about the Dome of the Rock indicates a religious framing of their

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<sup>81</sup> Philip Misselwitz and Tim Rieniets, *City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism* (Birkhäuser Architecture, 2006).

understanding of the city and an identification of that symbol of Arab culture and unity as the most dominant and powerful part of the city. (See *Figure 8*)

As was the case with maps drawn by Israeli participants, there were also minute differences in maps drawn by Palestinian participants who had frequent interaction with the other side. These differences included centering their maps about the Church of the Holy Sepulcher instead of about the Dome of the Rock and including one or two streets outside of the Old City. This shift in centering is indicative of a shift away from centering about the Arab identity at the exclusion of secular forces. The inclusion of streets outside of the Old City, however, parallels the inclusion of the Old City in the City-center and of areas of Palestinian majority in Israeli participants' cognitive maps.



**Figure 8. Cognitive maps of Jerusalem drawn by Palestinian participants.**

These maps are all drawn by Palestinian participants. Their scale is much smaller than that of the maps drawn by Israeli participants and is limited to the Old City. In all maps, individual landmarks are the focus and few roads are depicted. The centering about the Dome of the Rock or the Church of the Holy Sepulcher was also a repeated feature among many of the maps drawn by Palestinian participants. An artist who lives in East Jerusalem, which is not here depicted, drew the particularly beautiful map featured at the top in far more than 5 minutes.




That the maps were invariably drawn at the level of the neighborhood, as opposed to the level of the metropolitan area as was the case with Israeli-drawn maps, indicates a wholly different conceptualization of the city. Palestinian participants excluded the territories, the wall, and the Palestinian-majority neighborhoods from their maps of Jerusalem – all features that were expected to appear. Rather than focusing on the areas of the city to which they were forced to move, on the features of the city that were created to limit their mobility, or the neighborhoods that were mere islands in an Israeli-dominated landscape, the Palestinian conceptualization of Jerusalem is simply of its core. The Old City is home to most of what makes the city sacred, and it is the place where coexistence is the closest descriptor for the mode of living. Of course, Israeli soldiers still patrol within the Old City and there are occasional altercations between them and Palestinians within the walls of this portion of the city, in general the Palestinians are able to move freely throughout this area. How both Israelis and Palestinians think of Jerusalem appears to be very much linked to freedom of mobility, which unfortunately is defined largely along nationalistic lines.

## **Johannesburg**

Prepared by the results from the cognitive mapping exercises conducted in Jerusalem, it was expected that similar differences would arise within Johannesburg among the maps of different demographics. Since so much of the conflict these days within the city is between South Africans and foreign nationals, the hypothesis going into the mapping


was that the starkest differences would arise between these two demographics, especially with regard to scale and centering. To some extent, this hypothesis was accurate.

Four main categories arose out of the maps collected: maps drawn at the level of the street or neighborhood with no important landmarks (*Figure 9*), maps drawn at the level of the street or neighborhood centered about a place of residence (*Figure 10*), maps drawn at the level of the street or neighborhood centered about transit (*Figure 11 and Figure 12*), and maps drawn at the level of the metropolitan area (*Figure 13*). Similar to the cognitive maps produced by participants in Jerusalem, those produced in Johannesburg differed among demographics. The demographics represented in this study were Mozambican, Congolese, Zimbabwean, Ghanaian, Nigerian, and South African, and each demographic had unique patterns that developed in the maps produced. The starkest differences in scale were largely between foreign nationals and native South Africans, with foreign nationals drawing maps at the level of the street and neighborhood, and maps drawn at the level of the metropolitan area being drawn by native South Africans. Surprisingly, though, while Mozambican, Congolese, Zimbabwean, Ghanaian, and Nigerian participants largely drew maps similar to those drawn by others of their nationality, maps drawn by South African participants fell into two very distinct categories. While all maps at the level of the metropolitan area were drawn by black, white, and Indian South African participants, many black South African participants drew maps at the level of the street.





**Figure 9. Cognitive maps of Johannesburg with no obvious centering.**

The style of these maps is common in their scale at the level of the neighborhood and dearth of meaningful centering. Some of the maps that fall into this category included many landmarks, as shown in the map in the lower right corner.




**Figure 10. Cognitive maps of Johannesburg centered around home.**


The main features of these maps are their scale at the level of the street and their centering about the home of the participants who drew them. While at first glance the centering of the top map seems to have religious significance, it is important to here note that the participant who drew this map lives in the CMM with approximately 2,000 other refugees. In the bottom map, the flat that the participant drew is his particular place of residence.



**Figure 11. Cognitive maps of Johannesburg centered around transit.**

These maps are drawn at the level of the neighborhood and are centered about taxi ranks. Both maps are drawn by participants who commuted into inner-city Johannesburg each day from townships 10-25 kilometers away.





**Figure 13. Cognitive maps of Johannesburg at the level of the metropolitan region.**

These maps are drawn at the level of the metropolitan region. They were all drawn by South Africans who commute into the city-center on a daily basis and who have lived in the city-center for a minimum of two years. The participants who drew these maps are all of different races.

The differences among maps drawn at the level of the street or neighborhood are significant. The maps centered about a place of residence are indicative of a life that is largely based at home, often correlating to unemployment. Participants that drew maps centered about transit fell into two categories: commuters who drew their point of entry into Johannesburg on a daily basis and foreign nationals who drew their point of entry into Johannesburg from their country of origin. For the participants who based their maps on their commute into Johannesburg, the points of entry were different taxi ranks.

For the participants who based their maps on their travel to and from their country of origin, the points of entry were bus stations and Park Station, the city's train station. What is particularly interesting is that commuters who were traveling into the city-center from a township in the Johannesburg metropolitan region drew only the city-center at the level of the street or neighborhood, while commuters who were traveling into the city from a suburb drew maps at the level of the metropolitan area and drew little more than a small dot or skyline in the corner to indicate that the city-center even existed.

The final distinction that appeared among the maps was that a certain level of abstraction and emotional connectivity appeared in maps that were drawn on the level of the metropolitan area that did not surface in maps drawn at the level of the street or neighborhood. These maps explicitly featured "Home" as a landmark and included other places with personal ties such as "Work," "School," and "Church." While maps drawn at



the level of the street or neighborhood often included the homes, places of work, schools, and churches of the participants, they were not labeled as being of significance to them personally.

The findings from the maps drawn by participants in Johannesburg have implications in two categories: the different experiences of South Africans and foreign nationals within the city, and the potentially similar experiences of South Africans of different races within the city. Firstly, the fact that only South African participants drew maps at the level of the metropolitan area, although participants of other nationalities did in fact travel outside of the city-center, indicates that it is not explicit use of the city that dictates how individuals define it. The distinguishing characteristic of those participants who drew maps at the level of the metropolitan area was that they lived in the suburbs. Foreign nationals, on the other hand, largely lack the resources to live in suburban areas, instead residing in townships and the city-center, itself.

Those participants who lived in townships and visited the city-center with the same frequency as the participants from the suburbs still drew only the city-center, pointing to some fundamental difference between townships and other areas outside of the historical CBD. Townships are symbolic of the forced relocation of black South Africans during the apartheid era, done in order to exclude them from the city that the white South Africans wished to use. It might thus be the case that townships, while physically

well within the bounds of the city, are still considered to be a separate place entirely, while the city-center is the land of opportunity from which they were barred.

Those participants who lived in the suburbs, on the other hand, drew maps at the level of the metropolitan area and downplayed the city-center, even though it was an integral part of their daily routine. For these participants, it could therefore be postulated that they live in the suburbs because the city-center is a place they no longer consider the center of opportunity or life within the metropolitan region. Rather, it has shifted from the white-dominated economic center to the black-dominated center of crime and violence, with economic investment shifted north to Sandton.

The other finding from this exercise in Johannesburg is that white, black, and Indian South Africans alike drew maps at the level of the metropolitan area, although 2 of the 6 black South African participants did draw maps at the level of the street or neighborhood. It is perhaps the case that those South Africans who are able to move not just outside of the city, but to a suburb – not a township – seek to distance themselves from the city-center. To them, the city-center and townships have become little more than a gateway into the rest of metropolitan region and the opportunities that it has to offer.



In both Jerusalem and Johannesburg, the demographics in question had clearly different definitions of the city. The main factors that shaped these differences seemed

to be the history of the city and mobility, although the contexts of the two cases are vastly dissimilar. These factors are directly related to the past and present conditions of the conflict, with the historical conflict dictating which areas of the city are not included in the maps and mobility showing how the present-day conflict has shaped different demographics' uses of the city.

## **CHAPTER 5: Maps and Conversations**

The process of collecting the cognitive maps was informative in three main ways: in what the participants drew, in what they did not draw, and in what they said. The experiences of collecting the maps, however, were different in the two cities. The participants who drew the maps were different in terms of economic situation and living conditions, which in turn affected their experiences of the cities.


In Jerusalem, the participants were largely students in their late-teens to mid-twenties. 80% of them have participated in MEET, meaning that they are familiar with people of the other side. These participants were chosen because they have moved throughout the entire city, meaning that both the Israeli and Palestinian participants have traveled to neighborhoods with a majority population from the other side and have a common knowledge base of the physical structure of the city. The cognitive maps they produced would therefore not be limited by a dearth of knowledge of areas dominated by members of the other side, and any participant that did not include such areas would have made a choice not to do so, be it conscious or not. The economic situations of these participants ranged from lower-middle income to high income and they had all completed secondary education, though some did not continue to tertiary.




The participants who drew maps in Johannesburg led largely different lives from the participants in Jerusalem. Almost all of the foreign nationals lived in a hijacked building, on the street, in the CMM, or in another equally substandard place of residence. Many of the foreign nationals and South Africans, alike, had not completed secondary education, although some of the younger participants were beginning their studies at local universities. Most participants were unemployed, self-employed with occupations such as dreadlocking, or employed part-time by local businesses. The majority of participants earned between 0 and 50ZAR per day, although much of the earnings of foreign nationals was sent as remittances to their families in their countries of origin. These participants were chosen because they are the people who live and work in the inner-city, since the economic center of Johannesburg has moved north to Sandton.

Because the participants were so vastly different in the two cities, it is nearly impossible to use the maps they produced to compare the experiences of the two cities as between equivalent situations. Rather, Jerusalem and Johannesburg are seen as case studies of cities with urban forms that perpetuate the practice of exclusion. The exclusion itself takes different forms entirely in the two cities, with the exclusion in Jerusalem being very much formalized, while the xenophobic exclusion of South Africa permeates the city but is not explicitly institutionalized. The urban forms, too, are dissimilar, with portions of Jerusalem being actually off-limits to some Palestinian residents, while in Johannesburg all residents are technically free to go anywhere in the city. Jerusalem is very much a city of boundaries, while Johannesburg is a city of mobility. When looking at the maps


from the two cities, however, the differences of scale are surprisingly similar. In Jerusalem, all Israeli participants drew maps at the level of the metropolitan region and all Palestinian participants drew maps at the level of the street or neighborhood (*Figures 14 and 15*). Although all residents of Johannesburg have the ability to move throughout the entire metropolitan region, all migrant participants, as well as some black South African participants, drew maps at the level of the street or neighborhood (*Figures 16, 17, and 18*).





**Figure 17.**  
Cognitive map of  
Johannesburg  
drawn by white  
South African  
participant.

This map is drawn at the level of the metropolitan area. The participant who drew this is white, commutes into the city-center on a daily basis to do volunteer work, and lived in the CBD for four years.



**Figure 18.**  
Cognitive map of  
Johannesburg  
drawn by black  
South African  
participant.

This map again features the streets of inner-city Johannesburg, even though the participant who drew it lives 15 kilometers west of the portion of the city here depicted.



There were three major differences in the maps drawn in Jerusalem and Johannesburg. Firstly, the maps drawn of Jerusalem by Israeli and Palestinian participants were far more focused landmarks than those drawn of Johannesburg. Palestinian participants, in fact, generated what could be considered tourist maps – showing the destinations for the average visitor to the Old City, rather than any of their day-to-day locations. Shops, homes, and schools were rarely found in the maps drawn by Palestinian participants, indicating that they consider Jerusalem to be separate from their quotidian routines. Jerusalem is something sacred, something set apart from the mundane. It is wrapped up in meanings and conflicts that go much beyond the experience of actually living in the city, even though the conflict and daily life occupy the same space. The identities of the Palestinians are tied to a conflict that is seemingly ungrounded in their daily lives in Jerusalem, making it difficult to interact with the Israelis, whose ideas of Jerusalem are far more based in the day-to-day experience. While maps of Johannesburg did include some landmarks, they were almost all of shops and bars and places of residence, rather than of any sort of tourist-attraction. The landmarks included were spaces of daily life, meaning that the conflict that exists within Johannesburg are very much integrated into the daily routine. It could be hypothesized that if this same exercise were to have been conducted during the apartheid era, the maps generated would have been much more similar to those from Jerusalem, for spaces and places and buildings take on meanings much larger than their daily functionalities during such a conflict.

Secondly, streets featured very prominently in most of the maps drawn of Johannesburg, while streets were rarely included in maps drawn of Jerusalem. This focus on streets and shops is indicative of a different lifestyle – a lifestyle that takes place almost entirely on the street. People work on the street, meet their friends on the street, and sometimes even live on the street in Johannesburg, giving residents an understanding of the city grounded in its physicality. In Jerusalem, on the other hand, the spaces of the city are far more insular. Not as much of life occurs on the streets and the streets do not form the same sort of connective tissue. Rather than tying together a singular vibrant city, the streets connect isolated pockets of activity.

Thirdly, the idea of state-led justice was depicted in many of the maps drawn of Johannesburg, while neither the state nor justice were anywhere to be found in the maps of Jerusalem. This prominence of the courts throughout maps of foreign nationals does not necessarily implicate the success of the judicial system or its failure, but it does indicate that the judicial system is of great importance. In speaking with many of the residents of Johannesburg, the general sentiment was that the judicial system had failed them thus far, but that they desperately wanted to be able to depend on and trust the system, as well as the government as a whole. In the maps of and the conversations about Jerusalem, alike, the State was rarely more than an abstract force, not tied to any particular physical structure in the city.

## CHAPTER 6: Residues of Conflict

*RIP to all the Palestinian children who died today.*

*--Israeli resident of Jerusalem, following the February 16<sup>th</sup> bus crash*

*Understanding each other is more important than any equipment you have around you.*

*You need to make people feel at home, not angry all the time, not scared.*

*--Zimbabwean resident of Johannesburg*

This thesis explores multiple facets of conflict and the implications that they have in the context of a city. It seeks to understand how different demographics interact with and think of the city, and what influences the discrepancies among them. This final section is thus an attempt at synthesizing the literature, conversations, and maps that have been amassed throughout the research and pulling out common themes that lead to recommendations for reducing exclusion in such cities.

### ***Physical Residues***

In both Jerusalem and Johannesburg, it was apparent that maps fell into two different categories in terms of scale: those that were drawn at the level of the street or neighborhood and those that were drawn at the level of the metropolitan area. Maps drawn at the level of the street or neighborhood could indicate either that the participant lacks familiarity with the metropolitan region of the city or that the participant simply does not consider the metropolitan region to be part of the city.

While Israelis and Palestinians neatly fell into these two camps of scale, the split was not so straightforward in Johannesburg. It was thus necessary to deduce what characteristic divided participants in Johannesburg who drew maps at these two different levels. After sifting through memories and interviews, it became apparent that in Johannesburg the distinguishing feature was mobility, not nationality.

The participants who drew maps at the level of the street were those who relied on the semi-public transportation system of the city, comprised of shared taxis and buses. 83% of the participants also had low incomes, often being no more than ZAR40 on a given day, which tied them to this style of mobility through the city.

When examined further, the distinction between Israelis and Palestinians can also be framed as one of mobility, rather than purely of nationality. Israelis have much greater freedom of mobility than many Palestinians, since movement of Palestinian residents of Jerusalem is largely limited through a system of checkpoints and permits.<sup>82</sup> Some of the cognitive maps in this thesis were drawn by Palestinians who had freedom of movement throughout Jerusalem, while others were drawn by Palestinians who lived in the territories and required proper permits to move about the city. Nevertheless, all Palestinians drew maps at the same scale, indicating that while the difference might very well be tied to mobility, there is more involved.

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<sup>82</sup> Palestinian nationality and citizenship is far from straightforward and there are different levels of citizenship that correspond to different freedoms of mobility through the city of Jerusalem and country of Israel, in general. Some Palestinian residents of Jerusalem therefore have the same level of mobility through the city as Israelis. For more information, see *Palestinian Nationality and Citizenship: Current Challenges and Future Perspectives* by Asem Khalil.

Since in both Jerusalem and Johannesburg there were participants who were familiar with and frequently moved throughout the metropolitan region, yet did not include the region as part of their map of the city, point to a definition of the city limited by a combination of accessibility and history. As stated in Chapter 4, some participants who commuted into the city-center of Johannesburg did not include the townships where they resided in their maps. Townships are places to which black residents of the city were forced to move when the white residents of the city demanded that they leave the CBD during the apartheid era. Thus while they are technically part of the metropolitan region, they remain both a physical and mental mechanism of exclusion. Physically, they alter the city form such that much of the housing within the metropolitan region of the city is provided far from the city-center, preventing many residents of lower income from accessing the opportunities of the inner city. Mentally, the townships serve as a constant symbol of a history in which certain residents of the city were intentionally, explicitly kept from what was then considered to be the actual city: the CBD. In Jerusalem, not a single participant drew any of the Palestinian territories as part of their map, indicating a similar lack of acknowledgment of the places that were created for the purpose of keeping them out of what is considered to be the actual city.

Conversely, the participants who drew maps at the level of the neighborhood in both Jerusalem and Johannesburg are those who have both a freedom of mobility throughout the entire region and a more personal, emotional connection to the city. Perhaps it is because these participants have more security in their situations, in terms of

employment and residence, that they are able to form connections with the spaces of the city. It is also possible that they are able to form these connections because their relationships with the spaces of the city have not been predefined for them, as for many other residents whose place of living was chosen for them.

The physical residues of conflict within Jerusalem and Johannesburg are most visible in the continued limited accessibility of the two cities for certain residents, which has every thing to do with mobility, and in the mental definitions of the city, which do not include the areas of the city to which residents were forcibly relocated.

### ***Possible Extension to Organizations***

The institutions and organizations within Jerusalem and Johannesburg are far from parallel. In Jerusalem, there are institutions and organizations for Israelis, institutions and organizations for Palestinians, and institutions and organizations that seek to bring Israelis and Palestinians together. The former two categories are by far the majority and perpetuate the exclusion within the city. This last category, however, is comprised almost entirely of new institutions and organizations, and seeks to provide spaces for interaction between the two sides. As demonstrated by the results of the cognitive maps in this thesis, frequent interaction between the two sides does impact how residents think of and interact with the city. A shift towards such an institutional and organizational structure would thus be beneficial in reconciling the two sides' concepts and uses of the city.

Following the apartheid era, many new institutions and organizations in South Africa were formed to function within the newly formed democracy. These newly formed institutions and organizations thus cater to the essentially new citizens of South Africa – the black South Africans and the foreign nationals that constantly stream into the city. Institutions and organizations of the New South Africa are largely divorced from associations with the historical conflict of apartheid, but a significant portion of them cater to groups defined by nationality, resulting in a lack of integration. Pursuing the creation of new and restructuring of old institutions and organizations to work with multiple demographics has the potential to catalyze a redefinition of spaces within Johannesburg. Such a redefinition could in turn divorce these spaces from their histories that preclude their inclusion in many residents' conceptions of the city.

At the outset of this thesis, it was obvious that Jerusalem and Johannesburg are two very different cities. Though both are sites to conflict between demographics, their histories and their current states are vastly divergent. Jerusalem is still very much entrenched in the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, while the conflict in Johannesburg has shifted from the racially based one of apartheid to a more nuanced conflict between South Africans and foreign nationals. The question was thus whether the two cities were simply at different points on a similar track or on two wholly separate tracks altogether.

Through the cognitive mapping exercises, the differences that arose were not solely between nationalities. Rather, they were on more fundamental levels of mobility, economic situation, and history, indicating that perhaps the issues of exclusion are not present solely in conflict cities. Mobility, economic situation, and history all fit under the umbrella of accessibility – mobility applying obviously to the ability to physical access areas of the city, economic situation applying to the ability to access opportunities within the city, and history applying to the ability to access areas of the city without negative connotation. Indeed, it might be the case that conflict cities are merely on a track with all other cities, but at an extreme end of the spectrum when it comes to issues of accessibility of the city.

In order to address issues of exclusion within these cities, increasing accessibility for all demographics is essential. In the short term, this enhancement of accessibility can be accomplished through an amelioration of public transport systems. In the long term, however, it is the much more difficult issues of othering and xenophobia that must be dealt with. The physical form of the city cannot and should not be reconstructed, but it must be redefined as a space of inclusion, rather than a mechanism for exclusion.



## Communities as Organizational Context

Within any sort of governance, it is too often the case that there is concession and compromise among legislative bodies, but almost no integration.<sup>83</sup> It is also commonly the case that a minority or outside group that has little stake in the community defines the needs of the community and participatory mechanisms introduced into governments often manage to empower only those with loud voices.<sup>84</sup> Furthermore, the values of those people who comprise governing bodies are often put into question, and trust is key in the cultivation of a cohesive community and can be easily lost or broken.<sup>85</sup>

The role that social capital plays in community development is pivotal. Social capital is understood to be a link between individuals and organizations that requires trust, reciprocity and mutuality, shared norms of behavior, shared commitment and belonging, formal and informal social networks, and effective information channels. While social capital can be bonded within an organization, or bridged between organizations, too much of either can subvert a community, rather than benefit it.<sup>86</sup>

All too often in community development, one culture is prioritized over another, framing development as a process of getting the “culturally backwards” in step with the rest of

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<sup>83</sup>Herbert Kaufman, “Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration” *The American Political Science Review* (Vol. 50, No. 4, 1956), 1057-1073.

<sup>84</sup>Su Braden and Marjorie Mayo, “Culture, community development, and representation” *Community Development Journal* (Vol. 34, No. 3, 1999), 191-204.

<sup>85</sup> Kaufman; Alan Kay, “Social Capital, the Social Economy and Community Development” *Community Development Journal* (Vol. 41, No. 2, 2006), 160-173.

<sup>86</sup> Kay, 2006.

the population in question. It is thus the unfortunate case that community development programs typically seek to alter behavior and values to better match those of the intervening people or organization.<sup>87</sup> Any organization that fosters the idea that a population is “backward” and in need of redirection also destroys any amount of trust that the involved community had in them. Education of a population also regularly turns into manipulation, again breaking their trust.<sup>88</sup>

The introduction of an organization into a community also might be entirely counterproductive if executed without information about and input from the community. It is quite possible that outsiders shift cultural dynamics, thereby throwing the relationships—the foundation—of that community off balance.<sup>89</sup> A comprehensive understanding of the community must be reached prior to entering it, for oversimplifications and understatements can prove detrimental to any sort of developmental project.

## **Organizations as Spaces for Interaction**

There are very few built spaces within Jerusalem or Johannesburg that are entirely neutral, so organizations that wish to work with the demographics in conflict must create their own spaces that both exist in the physical space of the city and transcend the

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<sup>87</sup> Braden and Mayo.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

charged spatial context. Currently existing organizations that work to bring together residents of different demographics must thus be researched to determine what factors are most important in this process of successful neutralization of these inherently charged spaces in order to facilitate interaction between the two sides. The spaces in which interactions do occur can be divided into three categories: spaces that focus on differences between the two sides, spaces that focus on commonalities between the two sides, and spaces that focus on the identities of the two sides in their entirety.

A major difference between Jerusalem and Johannesburg is the existence of organizations that seek to bring individuals together from the demographics involved in the conflict. In Jerusalem there is no dearth of organizations that attempt to mediate negotiation and facilitate discussion between Israelis and Palestinians. If anything, there's an overabundance of them. But be it because they are partisan or under-staffed or too short-lived or misguided or under-funded or any number of other equally plausible reasons, none of the organizations that exist seem to have met with true, overwhelming success. One commonality between seemingly all organizations is that they focus on the interactions, themselves, rather than on the space in which they occur.<sup>90</sup>

Nevertheless, the spaces in which interactions do occur can be divided into three categories enumerated in the Introduction of this thesis: spaces that focus on differences between the two sides, spaces that focus on commonalities between the two sides, and spaces that focus on the identities of the two sides in their entirety.

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<sup>90</sup> Lisa Hajjar, "Human Rights in Israel/Palestine: The History and Politics of a Movement" *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Vol. 30, No. 4, Summer 2001), 21-38; Kriesberg, 2001.

In organizations that focus on differences between the two sides, the separate identities of the two sides are the cornerstone to all interactions. They seek to highlight the variance between the two sides in hopes of enabling better understanding and acceptance of their unique identities. Programs and organizations that choose to utilize this model often seek to represent both sides equally, however, which further infuriates the Palestinians who see it is a misrepresentation of the reality of the conflict.<sup>91</sup>

Organizations that have structured themselves around this focus more successfully have done so with the goal of fostering of awareness of the differences in opportunities afforded to the two groups. In doing so, they have avoided equating Israelis and Palestinians and asserting that the two exist in equal conditions. The mutual exclusivity by which they both define themselves, however, remains intact in this focus, for in speaking solely to their differences, common opportunities afforded to both groups and forums in which they can coexist are simply not discussed.

The organizational model that focuses on commonalities between the two sides is the most popular among organizations working with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and was chosen as the model for MEET, the inspiration for this thesis. It seeks to eliminate attention to disparities between Israelis and Palestinians and look instead to their common humanity. In the case of MEET, this feat is mainly accomplished through strict

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<sup>91</sup> Timothy Mitchell, Gyan Prakash, and Ella Shohat, "Palestine in a Transnational Context" *Social Text* (Vol. 21, No. 2, Summer 2003), 1-5.

adherence to the “English Rule,” which states, as can be expected, that English is to be the sole language of communication. Subtler measures can be seen in the gentle steering of discussions away from culture and religion; the deeming of hummus, pita, and sandwiches as the sole foods neutral enough for consumption; and the population of party playlists, for better or for worse, with exclusively Western music.

In general, organizations that choose to structure themselves around common identity formulation are seeking to create a common forum for discussion between Israelis and Palestinians free of the vestiges of their respective mutually exclusive identities. An unfortunate consequence of such structuring, however, is that the differences in the Israeli and Palestinian situations are never truly acknowledged. While an understanding of their common humanity may be accomplished, there remains a question as to whether or not they have at all furthered the knowledge of the other side and understanding of the conflict that are most likely necessary in order to scale their goodwill to the greater population.

The category of organizations that focuses on the two sides in their entirety emphasizes the unassuming overlap that exists between Israeli and Palestinian identities. Certainly they have their similarities and their differences, but the focus in this approach is their identities in their entirety. Although this method is least common of the three and therefore the least data exists about it, in all likelihood employing it would involve displaying and sharing all aspects of the identities of the two sides—organizations

would strive to have the sides teach each other to understand how and why they differ and marvel at the unexpected ways in which they are similar, all in the larger framing of their identities.

While in some ways this focus is the most appealing because of how all encompassing it is, it also presents the most difficulties due to its large scope. Whereas both a focus on differences and a focus on commonalities look only at certain components of Israeli and Palestinian identities, a focus on the entirety of both groups' identities requires that a foundation be laid in which both identities are comprehensively taught and discussed. To focus on the identities in their entirety, both groups must be well acquainted with both identities in their entirety, which is no easy feat. Such an approach would most likely take a significantly longer amount of time to do well than the other two foci.

While there is a dearth of organizations with the explicit mission of bringing together people from multiple demographics in Johannesburg, there are myriad organizations that band together members from a single one. Such organizations also create safe spaces for people of any nationality – the spaces simply aren't overlapping.<sup>92</sup> The key to a successful organization trying to work in a context of conflict between demographics might thus be to locate it in an area that either lacks or has been divorced

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<sup>92</sup> While in Johannesburg, many of the people with whom I interacted were Zimbabwean refugees. As such, I visited a number of different organizations with which my acquaintances were affiliated, but each of them was specific to Zimbabweans. There was an organization for disabled refugees from Zimbabwe, an organization for young Zimbabweans wishing to get the funds to attend university, an organization for Zimbabweans wishing to gain vocational skills, and so on. Although all of these Zimbabwean refugees interacted with people of other nationalities on a regular basis, their closest circles were invariably from their native country.

from negative historical connotation, to structure it around identities that can coexist, and to strive for equality of social, spatial, and economic mobility.

What can be taken from the cognitive maps of this thesis is the areas of overlap between demographics, for it is in these areas that organizations seeking to work to bring together demographics in conflict should operate. In Jerusalem, the Old City and City Center are the only places that both Israeli and Palestinian participants included, and it is therefore in the Old City or the City Center that organizations should locate themselves. While the majority of places within these two areas are affiliated with one side or the other, there are certain unaffiliated places that would be ideal for such organizations, including the YMCA and the French Hospital. In Johannesburg it is also the case that the city center is the only place that appeared on every participant's map, though obviously at different scales. As in Jerusalem, organizations working with multiple demographics in Johannesburg should situate themselves in common areas in the city center. What is different about Johannesburg, however, is how prominently the government and the law figured into residents' conceptualizations of the city. Because of this significance, organizations should locate themselves in places known for their role in the achievement of justice, such as the South Gauteng High Court or the remodeled Constitution Hill. For community development and growth to occur with multiple demographics in contexts such as these where one or more populations are explicitly excluded from the opportunities of a city, the conflict and its solution must both be tied to the space in which they occur.

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## **Appendix 1: Fieldwork Process**

While the methodology for collecting cognitive maps and interviews was detailed in the first chapter of this thesis, how participants were selected and how I interacted with these participants was not.

Participants were selected by different processes in the two cities. In Jerusalem, everything related to this process was fundamentally different because I was not actually within the city, having instead to conduct my research remotely. Fortunately, I had many connections to residents of the city through my involvement with MEET for the past three years. I thus contacted my Israeli and Palestinian students, friends, and colleagues to generate these maps and to put me in touch with other residents of Jerusalem who they thought might be interested. These interactions were conducted via email, which ensured that instructions given to each participant were identical.

Participants were all between the ages of 18 and 35, lived in the Jerusalem metropolitan area, and went into the city-center regularly. After a participant submitted a map, I was able to follow up with any questions I had, again via email, but had limited abilities to conduct full interviews


In Johannesburg, I was actually in the city conducting my research for a month. While some of the participants who drew maps were people that I had met during my work for the URCV project a few months prior, most were acquaintances introduced to me through Reymond. Since Reymond has lived in nearly every corner of the city and is a

very friendly sort of person, he has friends in every corner of the city of every nationality. His network was valuable for both my own safety and also my research. Because Reymond knew people on every street – often important people within the community – I was able to travel throughout the city-center to areas where many residents of Johannesburg do not feel comfortable and speak with those people who do live and work there. The interaction would typically begin with Reymond introducing me to the participant in his or her native language, and then transition to me explaining why exactly I was in Johannesburg and a bit of what my research was about. After speaking with the prospective participant for a few minutes, I would present the cognitive mapping exercise, explain the directions, and ask if he or she felt comfortable completing the task. Frequently participants would ask Reymond to repeat the instructions in their native language, which I was sure to prepare for by taking the first couple days of my trip to Johannesburg to explain to him in great detail how the directions should be given, the rationale behind it, and the general purpose of the research. After the participant completed the map, I would sometimes ask some clarifying questions, and then would generally use the map as a starting point for discussion of their life within the city.

## Appendix 2: Cognitive Maps

**Figure 19. Cognitive map of Jerusalem drawn by Israeli participant.**

This map is drawn at the scale of the metropolitan area, as were all maps drawn by Israeli participants, and is centered about the Old City. It does not distinguish between the Old City and the City-center, and includes Ramalla – a Palestinian territory. The participant who drew this map has interacted regularly with Palestinians for the past three years.






**Figure 20. Cognitive map of Jerusalem drawn by Israeli participant.**

This map is at the level of the metropolitan area, but lacks a clear center. It is important to note that Old City and the City-center are two distinct areas.




**Figure 21. Cognitive map of Jerusalem drawn by Israeli participant.**

This map is again at the level of the metropolitan area and is centered about the Old City and City Center. It is important to note that Old City and the City-center are two distinct areas. Also interesting is the inclusion of the participant's house in Talpiyot.




**Figure 22. Cognitive map of Jerusalem drawn by Israeli participant.**

This participant chose to take a more humorous approach to the exercise, but still importantly chose to draw a map at the level of the metropolitan area. The map appears to be centered about a bar, and this particular map includes more landmarks than seen in most maps drawn by Israeli participants.




**Figure 23. Cognitive map of Jerusalem drawn by Palestinian participant.**

This map features the Old City, as did all maps drawn by Palestinian participants. It is centered about the Church of the Holy Sepulcher and includes a few roads outside of the Old City. The participant who drew this map has had regular interaction with Israelis over the past two years.




**Figure 24. Cognitive map of Jerusalem drawn by Palestinian participant.**

This map also features the Old City and is centered about the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. The participant who drew this map has had regular interaction with Israelis over the past eight years.



**Figure 25. Cognitive map of Jerusalem drawn by Palestinian participant.**

This map features the Old City and is centered about the Dome of the Rock. It is entirely comprised of landmarks, as was common among the maps drawn by Palestinian participants. The participant who drew this particular map is an artist and spent far more than the 5 minutes typical of other participants.





**Figure 27. Cognitive map of Johannesburg drawn by Indian South African participant.**

This map is unique. It features the neighborhood where the participant lives, which is not gated, although the map makes it seem to the contrary. It also depicts the Johannesburg CBD as a skyline in the distance and Monte Casino. The participant's school, home, church, and local shopping center are all depicted. The male and female symbols denote male and female secondary schools, respectively.








Figure 28. Cognitive map of Johannesburg drawn by Nigerian participant.

This map is comprised solely of streets. It has no obvious centering and is located in Hillbrow, which is where the participant works and resides.




**Figure 29. Cognitive map of Johannesburg drawn by Zimbabwean participant.**

This map is at the level of the neighborhood and is centered about the CMM, which is where the participant resides. Although the participant regularly travels outside of the CBD, this map does not extend much outside of a few blocks beyond the CMM. The participant who drew this map does not have a full-time job, but works on a daily basis for various shop owners and filmmakers.




**Figure 30. Cognitive map of Johannesburg drawn by Zimbabwean participant.**

The participant who drew this map enters and leaves Johannesburg through Park Station when traveling back and forth between South Africa and Zimbabwe and has lived in Johannesburg for four years.




**Figure 31. Cognitive map of Johannesburg drawn by Zimbabwean participant.**

This participant lives in a flat in downtown Johannesburg and has lived in the city for twelve years.



**Figure 32. Cognitive map of Johannesburg drawn by South African participant.**


This participant lives in Alexandra and commutes via shared taxi into inner-city Johannesburg daily. He has lived in Johannesburg for 55 years.






**Figure 34. Cognitive map of Johannesburg drawn by Mozambican participant.**

This participant lives in Hillbrow and has been a resident of Johannesburg for six years.




**Figure 35. Cognitive map of Johannesburg drawn by Zimbabwean participant.**

This participant lives in inner-city Johannesburg and has been a resident of the city for seventeen years.




**Figure 36. Cognitive map of Johannesburg drawn by Zimbabwean participant.**

This participant lives in the CMM and has been a resident of Johannesburg for four years.




**Figure 37. Cognitive map of Johannesburg drawn by black South African participant.**

This participant lives in Diepkloof and commutes via shared taxi into inner-city Johannesburg every day. She has been a resident of Johannesburg for 53 years.



**Figure 38. Cognitive map of Johannesburg drawn by Indian South African participant.**

This participant lives in the south of inner-city Johannesburg and has lived in the city for thirty years and was the only one to create a story, rather than a map of the physical space.








**Figure 41. Cognitive map of Johannesburg drawn by black South African participant.**

This participant lives in a suburb of Johannesburg and has been a resident of the city for 33 years. She grew up in a township of Johannesburg, lived in the inner-city for six years, and currently commutes into the city daily for classes.



**Figure 42. Cognitive map of Johannesburg drawn by black South African participant.**

This participant lives in a suburb of Johannesburg and has been a resident of the city for 30 years. He grew up in a township, lived in the inner-city for two years, and currently commutes into the city daily for work.

