THE LIMITATION OF PLANNING ROLE IN SOCIAL REFORM:

A CASE STUDY OF URBAN REMOVAL PROGRAMS IN SEOUL (1967-1972)

by

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ABSTRACT
Planning begins with an attempt to bring upon its environment a particular event or act, one which is socially desirable, but which would not have occurred without such intervention. The rationality, or raison d'être of planning is therefore incumbent upon its ability to achieve defined environmental objectives, in an efficient and effective manner. The efficacy of planning is, in turn, a matter of actualizing the conceptual linkages between the goal and the process by which it is achieved; its deliberateness is thus characterized by the nature of the means to that end.

A persistent source of problems, when planning theory has reached the real environment in the form of "a plan", is the inherently interactive nature of the relationship between the planning system and the planned system (or, object of the plan). Thus, while it is easier to treat the respective positions of the planners and the planned as static, they are, in reality and by definition, dynamic: the planning system acts upon the planned system, and the latter reacts in turn. A critical, but often neglected, variable in any planning process is therefore the unknown variable which represents the planned system's latent reactions; the situations which resulted from the city of Seoul's three programs of squatter settlement removal, in the late sixties and early seventies, are a case in point.

Therefore the dilemma which is posed to planners is to be able to take account of this "human side of planning" in the design and implementation of their projects. It follows that the thesis of this paper is that the dialogic communication process between the planning system and the planned system can be intelligently managed, so as to deliberately shape the future. To do so, the rationality of planning must be reestablished, on the basis of a better understanding of the "purposefulness" of human behaviors in the planning process.

The first section of this paper addresses this problem through a critical evaluation of the logic of the conventional paradigm of planning. This is followed by a discussion of the factors leading to, and the results accruing from, the Seoul city government's attempt (through three substantively different but simultaneous programs) to handle the problems
caused by squatter housing developments. The final section reviews the
implications of these results for planning theory, in general, and suggests
a number of alternative approaches which might have been taken by the city
of Seoul to deal -- with more successful results -- with the problem of
unauthorized residential development.

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1. Introduction

Definition of Problem

There are many ways of explaining a meaning of "planning," through various aspects, such as advocacy, corporate, contingency, comprehensive planning and so on. In any case however, planning always begins with an intent to bring about a particular event or act, in its environment. This means that planning is a human behavior which is directed to the attainment of desired ends, by the application of intelligent human efforts to the selection and execution of means. The rationality of planning, or perhaps the raison d'être of planning, therefore lies in its aptitude for effective and efficient achievement of defined objectives. Furthermore, these objectives differ from the outcome which would have naturally occurred. As Aaron Wildavsky points out, "you do not need a plan to get you where you are going to be."

Planning presupposes changes in its environmental setting. Thus, planning embodies both rationalization of a decision to bring changes, and formulation of a conceptual construct of the linkages between what is to be achieved, and how the changes will occur, in the process of achieving on its setting. Efficacy of planning is, therefore, a matter of actualizing the conceptual linkages between the goal and the process of changing the environment; it involves deliberate efforts to control the process of changes--including its setting itself--in accordance with the conceptual construct of the end-means linkage. The deliberateness in planning is thus to be characterized by the nature of the means to the end.

In theory, the relationship between the end and the means is conceived as a more dynamic one. The costs and/or consequences of a means, or a set of means, in the process of approaching a specified end-result are to be evaluated in relation to the degree of attainment of the end result; the
expectation being that such evaluative information is constantly fed back to reformulate the end-means chain. In this feedback-reformulation process, the deliberateness of an end is evaluated by measurement of the feasibility of the means, in terms of the costs and consequences of their implementation.

In reality, however, the chain of the end and the means can easily be broken in the process of implementing a designed course of action; sometimes, the constraints thereof can be fully understood in the implementation process, and sometimes they cannot. In any case, the control phase is an important factor in maintaining the relationship between the end and the means in the planning processing—in terms of not only the planning system, but also its object. In the planning system, measures of control may be the redefinition of the end-means chain in the level of sub-optimization and institutional arrangements. On the other hand, as the object of planning, it needs to change its behavior so as to adapt to the planned course. However, any setting within which planning takes place has its own capability to be able to accept a planning goal. If we control beyond the zone of goal acceptance, the plan may not be meaningful in terms of implementation, like a blue-print plan. In many experiences of planning that have dealt with the cities in developing countries, more failures or abortions of planning have been reported than have successes. Here, our question is whether there is an inherent limit to the role of planning in a social system; or, how much we can control the process of change, without going beyond a zone of goal acceptance, or social tolerance, of a planning setting.

A conventional planning process assumes that planning, as an object of planning, is given. Therefore, the control is valid and relevant only when planning is conceived fundamentally as one-way channelling of information and/or energy, i.e., from the planning system to the planned system. This
approach is particularly clear in developing countries, where goal intention is very strong. In this type of situation, they have tried to achieve an end whatever the means involved, maybe ignoring dialogic communication between the planning organization and the individual members of the society as an object of planning. It is one of the reasons why many plans in developing countries have not worked, producing such unanticipated results as social upheaval, side effects, and negative effects upon the society. But it is essentially the absence of societal consensus on what ought to be done which has drawn the attention to the "human side of planning." In a time of such environmental turbulence, it is a fair warning that planning should not impose a will of its own upon others, but rather to be a process that mediates individual and social evolution.

Therefore, it is the position of this study that the dialogic communication process can also be intelligently managed, so as to deliberately shape the future. The "humanistic" element in this approach is to be found in the definition of the efficacy of planning, in which the human nature of "purposefulness" is taken into account. Thus, it is the point of departure of this study from the "humanist intimation" of planning approach that the rationality of the efficacy of planning as an intelligent effort to shape future changes in the environment can be reestablished, on the basis of a more critical understanding of the "purposefulness" of human behaviors in the planning process.

Objective and Method of Study

The primary objective of this study is to perform an empirical means by which the relationship between the end and the means is broken, based on the process of interaction between the planning system and the planned system. That is to say, this study is an attempt to see the responses of the planned system, as the planning system takes action. Its analytical
framework is formulated in terms of the interactive relationship between two goal-seeking systems, in a social system's planning process—the two goal-seeking systems being in this case, the planning system, and the planned system as an object of planning. The planning system is defined as a group of individuals who are institutionally organized to plan and control for production of a specified outcome in its environment. This system is internally identical in its institutionally controlled organizational components, their individual purposes being to serve the purpose of the system as a whole. In this case study, the "planning system" is the Seoul city government.

The planned system is an object of planning. It consists of all the variables of the environment that a particular planning system perceives as being both controllable, and necessary to control, in its process of achieving a particular planned outcome. In other words, it is the set of variables in the environment—the "object" of planning—upon which the deliberate control measures and actions of the planning system are applied, to produce the planned outcome. In this case study, the "planned system" consists of urban squatter dwellers, as the object of a program of urban squatter dwelling removal.

In order to see the responses of the planned system as the planning system takes actions, a situation in which it is required that the planning system take different approaches to the same problem. This will enable us to observe how the planned system has responded to each program. I take a case which had dealt with three separate programs aimed at solving the problems caused by urban squatter dwellings in Seoul, Korea between 1967 and 1972.

In the 1960's Seoul city government conducted three separate and simultaneous programs to solve the urban squatter problems; legalization, "citizen's apartments," and relocation. The legalization program legalized the squatter
dwelling on the spot, as they had been. The citizen's apartment program acted to provide multi-storied condominium-apartments on the land where the squatters had previously been located. And the relocation program relocated squatters outside the built-up urban area. Although the first phase of legalization process (that is basically to upgrade squatter community sites) and service program has continued to proceed, with the government's substantial technical and financial assistance, the program was officially terminated within a year of implementation. The explanation offered by the city's decision-makers for the short life of the legalization program was that it could not effectively deal with the new squatter dwellings invasion, in the area in expectation of "legalization."

The citizen's apartment program was more successful than the legalization program, in terms of its duration. In 1969 alone, the Seoul city government constructed 403 walk-up buildings, providing 15,800 dwelling units at a total cost of some 5.1 billion won (U.S. $17 million, or $1,077 per dwelling unit). In spite of the neat appearance of the Seoul citizen's apartments however, the basic quality of the building construction and foundation work was unstable. Many of the apartment buildings developed cracks. As a result, on April 8, 1970, one of the citizen's apartment buildings collapsed down the hillside, killing thirty-three and injuring close to forty persons. The mayor was held responsible and the citizen's apartment program was immediately discontinued.

The relocation program acted to create a new town, for the relocation of families from the inner-city slum and squatter households, in a rural area about 28 km. southeast of Seoul. The scheme took the form of the Kwangju New Town development, which was developed by Seoul city government. Major aspects of the city's physical form, including industrial lots
development, relocation and settlement control, as well as some portion of social welfare measures, were all planned by the city. However, this program failed to solve the basic needs of the transplanted squatter dwellers, and eventually led to a mass social riot against the city government's policies of relocation and settlement control. During the riot four government automobiles and the local police substation were burned, and the Kwangju Field Office of Seoul city government was completely destroyed. Therefore, the government decided to stop transporting squatters to the Kwangju New Town.

Data and information with respect to these cases were collected from three sources. The first source was government documents, such as statistical books, plans, and reports of research institutes. For primary data, an interview method was used. Subjects included city government officials, representatives of squatter dwellers, and professional planners. Among city government officials, an interview with the former Mayor of Seoul city, Hyeh Ok Kim who was an initiator of the three programs, is also included. The final source of information was provided by the squatters themselves.

Organization

The study will be composed of three main parts. The first part is a critical evaluation of the logic of the conventional paradigm of planning. The purpose of this section is to expose the theoretical relationship between the concept of efficacy of planning and the social systems to which planning is directed. The theoretical relevance of this section to the final objective of the study is, of course, in establishing the point at which the efficacy of planning (as conceived in the conventional paradigm) is based on the invalid and/or indiscriminate conception of the planned system, and therefore, that the failures of many instances of social systems planning is logically inherent in the paradigm.
The second part describes the socio-economic and physical characteristics of squatter dwellings in Seoul city, and the process of squatter dwelling formation. This is preceded by a description of general characteristics of the political economy and urbanization in Seoul, which have been related to the generation of squatter dwellings in Korea.

The third part of the thesis attempts to test the interactive relationship between the planning system and the planned system, through the three aforementioned programs. In this section, the details of each program are explained. Subsequently, the deviations of the relationship between two systems are analytically described, and final conclusions drawn with respect to the planned, and planning, systems.
PART ONE - NOTES


2. Planning Process in Social System

A Concept of Planning

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, planning begins with an intent to bring about a particular event or act in its environment. The intent contains the element of "preference" or "valuation" vis-a-vis the event or act to occur, or not to occur, in the environment. Thus, the end of planning is desired, or preferred, to be attained. The end may be merely an acceptance of the result of the ongoing trend, or a proposition that is attainable by changing the ongoing process: in either case if it is planned, the end is desired or preferred to the exclusion of other possibilities.

In order to exclude other possibilities, a degree of deliberateness in selecting the means to achieve the end must be introduced. Planning is neither merely a preference-ordering nor a declaration of intent: intelligence is applied to relate a means, or a set of means, to the end to be attained. The deliberateness in planning is, therefore, to be characterized by the nature of intelligence as applied to the relation of the means to the end.

As the element of intelligence is introduced in the end-means chain, a time lag between the application of intelligence and the occurrence of the end must be admitted. Thus, we can conceptualize a plan, or design, as a "precursor to action", being a component of a more inclusive concept of planning. A "plan" is, therefore, a conceptual construct of the end-means relationship, which is eventually to be translated into an actual process of implementation.

However, as it has become known that the chain of the end and the means can easily be broken in the process of implementing a designed course of action. Sometimes, the constraints of such can be more fully understood in the implementation process; as a result, it is now generally acknowledged
that the design of the ends-means chain need not be a once and for all affair, but a continuous effort throughout the entire goal-seeking process. Thus, we find planning defined as an iterative process of goal-seeking. Thanks to the introduction of cybernetics, the concept of iterative process does not merely mean a "trial-and-error" process, but a more sophisticated management of the process of feedback-and-control.

As the conceptual dichotomy between the conceptual construct of the end-means relationship and the actual implementation thereof has become less and less meaningful, the conceived relationship between the end and the means has assumed more dynamic quality. The costs and/or consequences of a means, or a set of means, in the process of approaching a specified end-result are to be evaluated in relation to the degree of attainment of the end result; and such evaluative information are expected to be constantly fed back to reform the end-means chain. In this feedback-reformation process, the desirability of an end is evaluated by the measurement of feasibility of the means, in terms of the costs and consequences of implementation of the means. Thus, the end-means relationship is not always a hierarchical structure in which the means is selected only to serve the end as given: rather, the two are interdependent, in order to be confirmed of their rationality.

To summarize then, "planning" is understood as a dynamic process of rational goal-seeking behavior, the dynamism of the process being represented by the iterative feedback relationship between designing and controlling the design-implementation, and at the same time, between the end and the means.
Paradigm of Conventional Planning

Thus, in the modern paradigm of planning, the notion of the process of planning is important; and the concept of control (i.e., in a more simplis-tic sense, implementation) is an integral part of the concept of planning. Therefore, it is appropriate to review the means of control, in order to fully understand the concept of planning.

Achieving an end by selecting and controlling the most effective and efficient means, is to mean that a planning system is to have complete control of the outcome to occur. This control is designed in the conceptual relationship between the end and the means. That is, the means is the "producer" of the outcome, or "product", that was conceived to be desirable; control functions to steer the conceived producer-product relationship through the changing environments through time.

When the changing environment is not controllable, the option is either to vary, coping with a variable environment, an object (i.e. the end-means relationship as originally designed) to the extent possible not by redefining the end, or to redefine the end as well as the means. However, as it must be assumed in the pure logic of planning that the controllability, or the degree and probability thereof, of the variable environment is already accounted for in the designed end-means relationship, the options in the steering process cannot in principle include that of abandoning the end itself.

At any rate, the concept of "steering" is thus defined in terms of the constancy between the variable environment and the production functions of the end-means chain is the operational link between the end-means. Hence, the point to be noted for our purpose with respect to the concept of steering in the conventional paradigm of planning, is that the conventional concept of planning is based fundamentally on the "engineering" feasibility
of a particular chain of the end-means, in reference to the environment--
including the planned system. That is to say, the planned system is to be
"engineered " or "steered" through the particular constraints of the
environment.

It is therefore essential, first of all, to understand what is given
of the environmental constraints (including the aspects, or the system,
to which the planning is to be applied) and secondly, to engineer the plan-
ned system, in the most economic way, to bring about the desired end.
The "given" can be virtually anything from the historical trends of popula-
tio size of a city to the market behaviors of the natives of an island in
the Pacific--depending on the recognition of the relevant aspects, or sys-
tems of phenomena, for a particular planning process. Understanding the
givens is to identify the parameters, boundary conditions, or constraints
that determine the range of possible solutions: and it is expected that
the solution selected within the range will induce, or engineer, the planned
system to perform, or to produce, as conceived in the plan. The engineering
objective is of course, to eliminate, or reduce the difference between the
existing conditions and/or performance of the planned system, and the system
objectives as proposed by planning: in the system's parlance, it is to
optimize the real world system by seeking optimization of the conceptual
system.

Whatever the theoretical grounds of validity, and whatever the measure
of reliability may be, if it is to know about the feasibility of engineering,
the object of planning, and the environmental constraints so as to achieve
the outcome as exogeneously contemplated, the image of the planned system
must be said to be "machine-like". That is, the intended outcome is to be
achieved by manipulating the mechanism of change and/or performance of the
object of planning within the given constraints.

An objection may be raised against the above generalization in reference to the directness-indirectness of the control process vis-a-vis the planned object. In other words, a new mode of behavior proposed by the planning system is not directly imposed upon the object; rather, it has the object learn it. This is the kind of approach often observed in organizational development and expounded, in terms of adoption and rejection, by the planned organizations of innovations as diffused by the change agents. As the concept of adoption by the planned system of a particular innovative mode of behavior is conceived to include the receiver collaboration in terms of motivation and involvement, the image of the planned object is not supposed to be machine-like. Hence, the concept of steering may not be quite appropriate vis-a-vis such an object.

Nevertheless, it is certain that the object's motivation is to be generated by the planning; and furthermore, the generation of the motivation is to be specifically directed to the particular behavioral mode, as designed by the planning system. The dichotomous notions of adoption and rejection, not contemplated any other forms of permutation, can only be explained in relation to the engineered motivation specifically geared to a planned outcome. Thus, the only difference, if any, between the more common approaches of direct engineering and this approach is that, if the former is to engineer adaptation of the planned object to new modes of behavior, the latter is to engineer the motivation of the object to adopt the behavioral modes.

This objective section was to explain the engineering approach embedded in the conventional concept of planning. Given that planning is perceived as the producer of the intended outcome in the reality, the notion of steering the planned system, in terms of maintaining a constant relation-
ship between the system and the environment, is an indispensable element in the conventional paradigm of planning. To maintain the constant relationship between the planning system and its environment, it is necessary either to force the planning system, or to control the environment, when the environment is changing; and such a control process is here called "engineering".

As the control is deliberately applied to the planned object—either to adapt to, or to adopt the new behavioral mode as stipulated in the template of the planning system—the planned object is perceived in the image of a reactive machine system. The point here is that the planned object should be treated as the co-producer of the planned outcome, not merely to be engineered toward the outcome as intended by the planning system. This notion is particularly important with respect to the cases described herein, in which the planned object is the urban renewal plan.

It can therefore be concluded that such a concept of control is valid and relevant only when planning is conceived fundamentally as one-way channeling of information and/or energy (i.e., from the planning system to the planned system). Indeed, because of such a conception of planning, the ideology and/or ethic of planning arises as a controversial issue. Therefore, when the co-production process is recognized, the concept of control cannot be defined to be merely manipulated, by the planning system, upon the object to achieve an intended outcome. Instead, it must be defined as intended by the planning system.

**Paradigm of Social System Planning**

The previous section pointed out that conventional planning, having made no references to the differential properties and/or the nature of the objects of planning, does not contain the discriminate measures of efficacy in relation to different objects. As a result, conventional planning efforts
have focused on the planning system itself, assuming that the object of planning—i.e., the "purposefulness", the paradigm of social systems planning, must be reorganized by the concept of co-production.

Here, the meaning of "purposefulness" denotes an act or behavior that may be interpreted as being directed to the attainment of a goal, i.e., to a final condition in which the behaving object reaches a definite correlation in time, or in space, with respect to another object or event. Hence, the goal-directedness is conceivable fundamentally in its relationship with the external world; in fact, the external world provides the reference signal from which the error signals are fed into the system, so that the object reacts to them to maintain the desired correlation with the external world. Therefore, it needs to understand the process of how a purposeful system changes its modes of behavior in relation to changes in environmental conditions.

The directive aspect of living organisms in their goal-seeking behaviors vis-a-vis the environment is, of course, directed by the needs of survival and maintenance as active, self-regulating, reproducing selves. Thus, any stimulus from the environment may elicit an immediate response in terms of what Sommerhoff calls the "back reference period".

The reaction pattern of a human social system is, however, different from that of the individual member. That is, each response to the environmental stimulus is mediated, so to speak, by the complex organization of the behavior-system for self-preservation and self-regulation. In other words, a human social system is the choice-response to a specific stimulus from the environment to the responding system: we call it an interactive choice.

From the point of view of the purposefully responding system, the environment (as changed by a particular stimulus) is a possible choice-situation
which can be transformed into probabilities of choice, efficiencies, and relative values in order for the responding system to seek its own goal. The so-called environmental response function is to be equated with this transformation function of individual human beings and/or social systems and their modes of variance in interaction with particular stimuli. That is to say, that each is an individual transformation function; and this individuated transformation function determines the particular mode of behavior in response to an environmental stimulus. Regardless of whether an environmental stimulus is directed to a particular individual the stimulus may create a possible choice situation for that individual to seize upon to seek its own goal, as far as it happens within the bound of the so-called "life-space" of the individual in question.

As Herbert Simon defines it, "life-space" includes "only those aspects of the totality (of environment) that have relevance for the "needs", "drives", or "goals" of the organism. Thus, any external stimulus that is beyond the bounds of this "life-space" of an individual would not excite a response on the part of that individual. This in turn means that the "life-space" is the boundary of the environmental response function. In short, the individual's environmental response function operates within this "life-space". This is the field within which the systems output is "effective" and, at the same time, the environmental stimulus into the system is affective.

However, as this "life-space" of the total environment is defined by the "needs", "drives", or "goals" of the individual, the environmental stimulus can not be defined as independent of the object on which it acts. Therefore, what is relevant to an organism and its behavior is not simply some external event, or solely some internal state but rather the transaction
whereby certain aspects of the external stimulus are sampled by the organism and matched against selected internal states.

To summarize, an environmental stimulus within the so-called "life-space is a potential choice situation which an organism may transformation into an actual choice of behavior in order to seek its own goal. How an environmental stimulus becomes an actual choice situation for an organism is to be determined by the individuated transformation function. Once a particular environmental stimulus affects the organism with respect to its needs and survival, the organism transforms the stimulus into effective behavior. The individuated transformation function therefore explains the process of transformation of the affective environmental stimulus into effective behavior choice. However, the affectivity of an environmental stimulus is not determined solely by the objective property (e.g. intensity) of the stimulus alone, but by being perceived and/or felt as relevant, or meaningful, by the subject on whom the stimulus acts.

In attempting to relate the above description of environmental response and transformation functions to the concept of "co-production", we are conceptualizing an interaction process between two or more co-producers in which the outcome of goal-seeking behavior of each is transformed by its contact with the other. Thus, the final outcome of such an interaction process is co-produced in the contact-space.

At the same time, we must keep in mind the fact that in strategic interactions the concepts of control and acommunication are very important. Here, in order to produce an outcome based on the interactive process between two systems, it must be assumed that the planned system will interact with the controlling behavior of the planning system as much as it does with the intellectual behavior of planning. However, in a situation which the central power of coercive force is used to overcome resistance, the
the co-production function is expected to be eliminated. Amitai Etzioni explains this situation with the concept of "over-managed". This concept refers to the situation in which the desired outcome is achieved, but in an inefficient manner; and it may be achieved effectively and efficiently, but the beneficiaries do not care what it is.

One system can affect the other system of the output-producing behavior by physically changing the environment, i.e., by producing a specific behavior-output, but also by communicating its intention toward the future. The receipt of communication from the other interaction system affects the receiver's perception of the sender's intent toward future behavior. This, in turn effects changes in the receiver's beliefs of, and attitudes toward, available courses of action, relative efficiencies of the available action courses, and the values of the possible outcomes. Without this communication, each system goes on its own way.

Finally, while we have discussed the concept of co-production in terms of interaction of two or more individual transformation functions, the dynamic process of change, over time, of the interactions between the stimulus and response has not been dealt with. Conceptualizing the changing patterns of response in living organisms to external stimuli over time is possible in terms of 'learning'. The concept of learning incorporates the time-element in terms of purposeful selective function on the part of living organisms on the basis of accumulated experiences of the past-present stimuli-response relationships. In short, learning is the process of changes in the responses with experiences to the external stimuli.

In experimental psychology, the traditional concept of learning refers
to the biological capacity of forming associations between a stimulus and responses. That is to say, learning is to be conceived in terms of identical responses to recurrent stimuli. This pure associationist conception fails, however, to explain the latent learning phenomenon. In the human learning process, human beings build up an anticipatory posture over time, vis-a-vis the particular configuration of the environment. Over time, then, mutually adaptive systems will be able to rely more and more for respective goal-seeking on each other's anticipated responses. Hence the interactive process may be conceived of as mutual anticipating-causing field for goal-seeking. Thus, the interactive process can be conceived of as an anticipating-causing field; for individual interacting systems, internal programs of choice can be designed on the basis of such mutual anticipations. Returning to the concept of co-production of outcome between a planning and a planned system in a social systems planning process, an outcome is therefore coproduced, and conceived to be shared, to the extent that there is a mutual anticipation of each other's goal-seeking behavior sequences.
PART TWO - NOTES


5. Russell L. Ackoff and Fred E. Emery, On Purposeful Systems, Chicago:


9. Ibid., p. 70.


14 Ibid., p. 216.


17 Ackoff and Emery, op. cit., pp. 141-142.

18 Ibid., pp. 143-144.


20 Ibid., p. 366.


22 Lieberman, op. cit., p. 372.

3. Planning Environment

Political-Economic Environment of Korea

In 1961, Korea had a military coup led by Major General Park Chung-Hee. The military posed as the caretaker of a sick nation plagued with social disruption, economic stagnation, political instability, and Communist subversion, with the promise of returning to its own duties of national defense upon the achievement of such caretaking.

After the Park regime took over power, the first action was a revolution of bureaucracy in terms of administrative culture and personnel administration. In 1963, for instance, 40 out of 95 holders of top government posts were occupied by men with professional military backgrounds. In the same year, 36 out of 174 seats in the national assembly were held by retired military figures. Retired military officers were also given 32 of 59 ambassadorial posts. First of all, these people introduced military culture to bureaucracy, with its "target-hitting" mentality. Thus, in every government agencies a planning office was established, which was to formulate a target.

Meanwhile, the Park regime put forward the economic well-being of the nation as the overriding common good. In the name of the nation, it tried to produce economic dynamic by state initiative. The dominant position of the state in the accumulation process was expressed by the concept of guided capitalism: as formally stated in Five-Year Economic Development plan. Given the Park regime's strong commitment to the achievement of economic development, the bureaucracy provided all possible administrative measures to implement plans. With the President at the helm, the
administration dominated the economic development policies of the legislative and judiciary branches. Under this bureaucratic arrangement, economic policies were given top priority and the well-trained technocratic and bureaucratic elites in the state apparatus carried out policies with strong administrative power.

Through the Park regime's strong commitment to the achievement of economic development, and the uninterrupted efforts of technocratic and bureaucratic elites, Korea broke the eternal vicious circle of poverty and underdevelopment. In the period of the first five-year economic development plan (1962-1966), the annual growth rate of the GNP grew to 7.7%. In absolute terms, the GNP of Korea grew 1.4 times, amounting to 3.789 billion won (at 1975 prices); growth in the national income per capita was 1.44 times, amounting to 126 dollars. As time went on, the annual growth rate grew even higher. In the period of the second five-year economic development plan (1967-1971), the annual growth rate was 10.5%, and the GNP had grown up to be 1.64 times, amounting to 6.230 billion. Comparing to that of 1962, it had grown up to 2.3 times. And the increase in national income per capita was 2.1 times, amounting to 266 dollars, which was 3.05 times larger than that of 1962. Accordingly, Korean economy has made the first step toward the "take-off".

Urbanization

As a result of its remarkable economic development, Korea was undergoing
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement Size Group</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OVER 1,000,000 POPULATION</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETWEEN 250,000 AND 1,000,000 POPULATION</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETWEEN 100,000 AND 250,000 POPULATION</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL SETTLEMENTS OVER 100,000 POPULATION</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REMAINDER REPUBLIC OF KOREA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL REPUBLIC OF KOREA</td>
<td>24,989</td>
<td>32,418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OVER 1,000,000 POPULATION</td>
<td>+4,369</td>
<td>+121%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETWEEN 250,000 AND 1,000,000 POPULATION</td>
<td>+416</td>
<td>+3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETWEEN 100,000 AND 250,000 POPULATION</td>
<td>+819</td>
<td>+116%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL SETTLEMENTS OVER 100,000 POPULATION</td>
<td>+5,564</td>
<td>+9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REMAINDER REPUBLIC OF KOREA</td>
<td>+1,825</td>
<td>+6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL REPUBLIC OF KOREA</td>
<td>+7,399</td>
<td>+22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: "Urban"—"shis" plus "eups" — settlements over 20,000 population

rural — "myuns" — settlements under 20,000 population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>URBAN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul Metropolitan Area</td>
<td>2,342</td>
<td>3,424</td>
<td>4,862</td>
<td>6,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pusan Metropolitan Area</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>1,760</td>
<td>2,033</td>
<td>2,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taegu Metropolitan Area</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>1,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daegu Metropolitan Area</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>683</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daejeon Metropolitan Area</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungju Metropolitan Area</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other settlements over 20,000</td>
<td>1,534</td>
<td>1,935</td>
<td>2,303</td>
<td>2,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL URBAN</strong></td>
<td>7,847</td>
<td>9,767</td>
<td>12,386</td>
<td>15,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RURAL</strong></td>
<td>13,655</td>
<td>15,222</td>
<td>16,632</td>
<td>15,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Republic of Korea</strong></td>
<td>21,502</td>
<td>24,999</td>
<td>29,018</td>
<td>31,461</td>
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</table>
GROWTH OF SIX METROPOLITAN AREAS

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Seoul</th>
<th>Busan</th>
<th>Taegu</th>
<th>Kwangju</th>
<th>Taegon</th>
<th>Chonju</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RATE OF GROWTH

- 10%
- 5%
- 0%

POPULATION IN MILLIONS

SEMI-LOG GRID


METROPOLITAN AREAS

- Seoul
- Busan
- Taegu
- Kwangju
- Taegon
- Chonju
the most profound change in its eventful history: transformation from a rural people, dispersed throughout the countryside, to an industrialized urban society, concentrated in a few great cities.

A review of statistics on the population of Korea's major cities, compiled by the Economic Planning Board, provides evidence of the great changes that were taking place. As shown on Table 1, in 1960, 77% of the population of the country lived in rural areas and in small cities over 1000,000 in size. By 1971, the rural areas and smaller settlements had declined and contained only 65% of the population. The big cities accounted for 35% of the total, and there are eighteen cities over 100,000.

Among the large cities the very largest had been growing the fastest. In 1960 the two cities in the over-a-million size group—Seoul and Pusan—had 3.6 million people—14% of the national total. By 1971 Daegu had also grown to over a million; the three largest cities accounted for 8.0 million people—24% of the national total. The fact that the biggest cities grow the fastest is demonstrated on Table 2. Between 1960 and 1971 the population of cities over a million increased 121%, compared to 99% for all large cities, and 29% for Korea as a whole.

Table 3 shows dramatically how Seoul had come to overshadow all other cities. The growing over-concentration of population in Seoul and vicinity is shown in another way on illustration 1, which compares population growth for six metropolitan areas which are made up of the central cities and neighboring eups. The Seoul Metropolitan Area increased from 2.3 million in 1955 to 6.8 million in 1970. The Capital Region not
only was larger than any other metropolitan area at the end of the Korean War, but it had grown more rapidly ever since.

The growth of Seoul and other major cities has of course been at the expense of rural areas, which have sent millions of immigrants to the big cities. Rural numbers increased from 13.7 million in 1955 to 16.7 million in 1966. Since 1966, however, rural areas have lost a million people.

The principal determinants of the pace and patterns of such rapid urbanization were those which were found in other developing countries: the tremendous growth of industry in relation to agriculture and the wide disparities in the quality of economic infrastructure, and cultural amenities resulting in concentration of industry in a few major cities (Seoul and Pusan). Another factor that has been particularly important in Korea has been the rather extreme concentration of quality higher education in Seoul which, with the relatively high social importance of education and the high degree of mobility in Korea, is regarded as one of the major causes of concentration in Seoul. This has added to the normal attraction of the capital city as the seat of political and economic power.

Such a rapid urbanization of Seoul had exceeded its socio-economic capacities and facilities, resulting in serious problems of social and economic absorption for the city and further accentuating the dualistic texture of the nation's economic development patterns.

Dualism in the urban economy exists most markedly in the context of industrial and commercial life. Modern, large scale capital intensive firms using advanced technology coexist with traditional, fragmented small
scale, labor-intensive economic activities such as cottage industries. This dualistic structure of urban economic activities is paralleled by a dichotomy of income patterns. White collar workers in the modern sector have experienced substantial increases in real income while unskilled and semi-skilled workers in traditional labor intensive industries, such as construction laborers, have not increased their real income at a comparable rate. Because of the flood of rural migrants the competition for such jobs is so intense that wages remain permanently depressed. It had been estimated that the work force realized little, if any, improvement in their living standard in recent years: wage increases in this sector have, until recently, barely kept up with inflation.

In such a situation, urban housing had become scarce in quantity, expensive in price, and overcrowded to the extent that doubling-up and tripling-up were commonplace. Coincident with these problems was that of the urban squatter settlements. The low income migrants were blamed for creating communities of "sub-standard" housing; shacks and makeshift shelters which violate public building codes and regulations. Squatters had built their houses covertly on public land on overly crowded sites where they do not usually pay for land or house. The situation was worsened when the squatters who accumulate significant savings began to move out, and lease their houses for profit to the newly arriving migrants. These illegal housing activities further contributed to the influx of rural migrants to the urban centers, causing even greater housing needs for the urban population.

According to the report "Investigation of Illegal Housing in Seoul
City" which was conducted by the city government in 1966, the squatter dwellings had been built at an annual average of 9,648 units from 1962 to 1966. The annual construction growth rate was 3.6%. Since 1966, the increasing pace was faster than that of the preceding period. According to the report, "Re-Investigation of Illegal Housing in Seoul City," 88,990 new units were built in the period from 1967 to 1970, in spite of some measures to remove squatter dwellings. Despite prohibitive policies, then, the growth rate increased almost two-fold, by the end of the sixties.

Characteristics of Squatter Dwellings in Seoul

The definition of "squatter dwelling" differs from one country to another, depending upon the degree of squatter settlement concentration and the definition of housing quality and/or standards.

The most difficult task in the process of defining substandard housing is to clarify the difference between a substandard unit and an illegal unit. Normally the degree of substandardness is measured in terms of qualitative housing standards, whereas illegal housing is defined simply by the absence of a legal title to the property. Generally, the major criterion for determining substandard housing is insufficiency of habitability. A.L. Mabogunje points out⁶ that the first step in measuring habitability is consider the various types of functions that standards are meant to perform in shelter provision. In reviewing the standards for shelter provision, especially in developing countries, he offered a threefold division as follows⁷

1) Space-use and Density Standards
2) Health and Sanitation Standards

3) Community Facilities and Services Standards.

According to him, the first category includes minimum lot sizes, number of buildings per unit area, building bulk per unit, number of persons per room or number of persons per area. The second grouping, technological or performance standards, is intended to define the quality of environment, particularly in terms of the quality of construction, the type of materials that must be used, the quality of services that can be offered, or tolerable levels of toxicity. The third grouping defined the lower and upper limits of the size of population, and the area or distance to be served by particular amenities or community facilities.

However, in Korea the measuring criteria for substandard housing are primarily both physical and legal. The Ministry of Construction (MOC) utilizes criteria which are a combination of qualitative and legal characteristics, as follows:

1) Floor area is less than 7 pyeong (substandard)
2) Illegal housing on public land (illegal)
3) Housing without permission (illegal)
4) Housing with inadequate building materials such as Shacks (illegal or standard)
5) Lacking utilities such as electricity, water, and sewer etc. (substandard)

The criteria used by the city of Seoul are similar to those of the MOC. The acquisition of proper title and building permission are two major legal criteria. According to these criteria, "substandardness" embraces all
illegally built housing. Therefore, the term of squatter dwelling refers to both these categories of housing; i.e., legally and properly titled but substandard housing, and illegally built, improperly titled housing.

The physical condition of squatter dwelling is single-story dwellings. Most have one or two rooms plus a cooking lean-to-built against an exterior wall. The quality of construction varies greatly. Many are rudimentary shacks of scrap materials. Many others are two- to three-room, solidly constructed cement-block buildings with roofing of asbestos tile or even of the red clay tile used on most of Seoul's smaller legal buildings.

Most larger and more visible settlements are of two types: flat land/stream areas and mountain areas. The flatland/stream areas generally house dilapidated single or double lines of shanties, although they may include a few well-built houses. The mountain areas vary: New areas, often located at the tops of mountains, look raw and poor. Older settlements are predominantly small cement-block houses, often with red tile roofs and sometimes gaily painted. Households with a bit more space and money prefer to enclose their houses and tiny patios with high walls.

Virtually all settlements have communal water taps and electric lines, although almost none have indoor plumbing. In well-developed areas, each house has its own latrine; in many settlements, several households or a small segment of the settlement share a latrine. Some of the older, larger, and better developed areas have paved main roads and bus service. In most, however, roads are unpaved and too narrow to admit motor vehicles. Therefore, fire protection is a serious problem,
particularly in settlements where many of the houses have wood and tarpaper, or canvas, roofs.

As was already mentioned, the formation of squatter dwellings in Korea is the result of an imbalance between the immigrants into the city, and the social capacity to accept them, precisely because of the rapid rate of urbanization. Thus, unlike many of the slums of the Western cities, most of the slum and squatter settlements in Korea display the characteristics of the "urban village" as described by Gans. In Western cities, the slum has been regarded as the physical remains of a social disorganization. However, in Korea the squatter dwellings have a real function, as an area of transition. The people in the area bear the characteristics of the so-called "marginal man". In other words, if the immigrant into the city is accepted into the industrial development of the city, the problems of the squatter dwellings may not be serious. After all, it is the population who are not accepted into the industrial development, of which the urban poor and the squatter dwellers, are composed. Therefore, the social characteristics of squatter dwellers are different ones from the poorer inhabitants of Western cities.

A field survey of the social characteristics of urban squatter dwellers identified several common traits. The first of these is that most of the squatter dwellers come from a rural area; an average 87.1% of the total respondents come from a rural area. Even in the rural area, they come from towns and centers of a rural area.

The second shared characteristic is that they are mostly of working age. The median age is in the early thirties; 51% of the total migrant population fall into this age group. Surprisingly, 94.5% of the total migrant population are between twenty and fifty, while the population as a whole between this
age group is 36 percent. Therefore, it has been evident that the migrant squatter communities have provided a constant surplus of manpower that competes for all the unskilled jobs in the city. Seoul entrepreneurs have found that most rural migrants are tough, industrious, conscientious workers. Many companies, particularly those in the modern sector, are primarily concerned with a prospective employee's educational attainments. But small, self-made plant owners, who provide very low wages and on-the-job training, find that recruitment of young people in the villages, or among newly-arrived migrants, is advantageous. This kind of labor demand can be amply met by the "labor pool" in the slum and squatter community.

The third trait is that they are well educated. Less than 3% of the male migrants under the age 45 had no schooling at all. However, 49% had at least some high school education, and surprisingly 21% had some college training, or were college graduates. This means that migrants had high potential for adaptability, adjusting rapidly to urban life.

The fourth is that the migrant's ambition and desire to advance in the urban context appears to be much greater than that of the urbanites. This was evidenced by a report that shows that the rate of home ownership among the migrants in the slum and squatter dwelling areas was higher than the rate of home ownership of the total households in Seoul. The home ownership rate in Seoul had been reported to be 54.7% of the total households, while a survey conducted in a sample squatter community showed that 78.8% of the migrant families own their house, in one form or another. This fact indicates that a large portion of the migrants had been able to find a place to live within their financial means.
Finally, unlike other city residents, the squatter residents' social solidarity was very strong, showing a good relationship with their neighbors.

Therefore, unlike the social characteristics of people of the slums in the Western cities, the Korean squatters provide the rapidly-industrializing cities with very productive labor forces. Although they live in the squatter dwellings, due to the low income status, they are people of high potential for productivity, if an opportunity for such are given. On the other hand, if the opportunities are not given, they can react through collective action against the society. 15

Generally speaking, the squatter area has a function of a station, or shelter, in which the upward social mobility of the migrant, and downward social mobility of others, transpires; a so-called two-way station of social transition. This condition is possible in the situation where rapid industrialization is taking place, and where job opportunities are constantly expanding. Otherwise, the squatter dwellings may be a permanent station in the situation in which they are not relevant stations.

The income level of squatter dwellings was an average monthly 15,166 won, compared poorly to the average monthly income of Seoul's other households (27,820 won). Meanwhile, the squatters spent a large portion of their income for their food and education for their children, while middle income urban households spent a relatively large portion of their income for housing. In some households, they had about a deficit of 10,000 won.
PART THREE - NOTES


3. Ibid.

4. Miyakawa Yasuo, The Development of Manufacturing in South Korea, Institute of Geography, Faculty of Science, Tohoku Univ., Japan, September, 1970.


7. Ibid.


9. One pyeong is equal to 33.058 m\(^2\) and to 35.583 ft. Seven pyeong are approximately equivalent to 249 ft.\(^2\).


15. Ibid., p. 29.
4. A Package Program of Urban Removal of Squatter Dwellings

As Chapter Three pointed out, during the sixties and early seventies the Korean economy experienced a fast rate of growth. However, the fast rate of economic expansion created many socio-economic and urban problems. The concentration of expansion in a few growth poles, including the largest cities and some industrial centers, increased the gap between urban and rural incomes, but also between regions. In 1965, the average monthly income per farm household (6.1 persons) was 9,350 won, compared to a figure of 9,300 won per city wage earner's household (5.3 persons). However by 1969 the figures were 18,150 won and 27,800 won, respectively.

In cities, rapid growth created a shortage of housing and public facilities. Furthermore, these deficiencies gave rise to political and social problems. In order to solve these concurrent problems, the Korean government gradually opened its eyes to the ongoing physical reformation of its cities and national land, and prepared the basic guidelines for a long-term National Land Development Plan (10 years).

In 1966, the Korean government named Hyeon Ok Kim as Mayor of Seoul city. He was the former Mayor of Busan, which is the second largest city in Korea, and where he had conducted Korea's first large-scale urban renewal program. As soon as he was appointed, he replaced two vice Mayors and seven chiefs of bureaus, and announced that 50% of the city's yearly budget would be invested in what he called "Urban Development Projects". This signaled a revolutionary departure from the tradition of municipal administration of Seoul, in which almost all of the total budget had been spent for administrative operational expenditures.

Within half a month of his appointment, the new Mayor inaugurated six pedestrian under-passes and over-passes near the central business district,
extended five major arterial roads from the center into outlying suburbs, and extended water pipelines. The Mayor, however, immediately found out that, whenever his development projects proceeded, there were hundreds of squatter dwellings to be cleaned for the public works to proceed. This was his first encounter with the problems associated with the squatters: and he began to think about a long-range solution for them.²

Meanwhile, in the summer of 1966, hundreds of squatter dwellings alongside the Han River bank were swept away by a flood tide. As a result, about 520 households of squatter dwellings lost their shelters and became refugees.³ In January and May of the same year, two big fires destroyed the Namsan and Sooingdong squatter areas, creating 650 households of refugees.⁴ The main reason of this conflagration was poor urban facilities, such as an insufficient water supply system and poor road conditions to access to the squatter areas; deficiencies which were the object of urban development programs.

These three incidents made the squatter problem a controversial political issue in Seoul, widely dealt with in most of the major daily newspapers in the city. The editors of most of the city's newspapers voiced demands that the government provide permanent legal housing for the squatter-dwellers. Yet, at the same time, most of them appeared to prefer clearance of the squatters, describing as "unsightly scenes" of the city.

Before the national election of both the President and the National Assembly (Congress) in May of 1967, prospective candidates issued statements concerning the squatters. The general tone of these statements supported the "legalization" of squatter dwellings as they were, and criticized Kim's urban policies. Neither were the Mayor's policies supported by budget and urban planning officials: by that time the city government already had a deficit of 87 million won from five of the city's banks.⁵ During this
period, the new Mayor stopped all squatter clearance actions, to make way for public work projects, and ordered his bureau to study the squatter housing issue as a whole.

Before the comprehensive plan was prepared, in 1966 the city government investigated the actual conditions of Seoul's squatter dwellings. According to this data, the total number of squatter dwellings in Seoul city was 136,650 units, 230,000 households, and 1,270,000 persons. The figure of 136,650 units became the new Mayor's target for solving the problem of squatter dwellings. In order to clean unconditionally the new squatter dwellings built after January 1, 1967, the city government enforced registration of all squatter dwellings.

According to this registration, the actual conditions of squatter dwellings were as follows:

### Number of Units by Land Use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Use</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Forestry</th>
<th>River Site</th>
<th>Bank Site</th>
<th>Road Site</th>
<th>Private Land</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136,650</td>
<td>39,923</td>
<td>13,567</td>
<td>4,502</td>
<td>6,167</td>
<td>60,550</td>
<td>11,941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### By Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>before 1961</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136,650</td>
<td>11,824</td>
<td>8,612</td>
<td>7,118</td>
<td>7,330</td>
<td>13,358</td>
<td>88,408</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### By Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Tent</th>
<th>Wood</th>
<th>Simple-frame</th>
<th>Block</th>
<th>Brick</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136,650</td>
<td>4,512</td>
<td>27,964</td>
<td>13,309</td>
<td>88,187</td>
<td>2,678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the basis of this data, the city government prepared three different programs within a comprehensive plan for solution of the squatter problem. This trifold approach was adopted in recognition of the constraints posed by the city government's resources, as well as the effectiveness of various means of control, their being insufficient to deal with a problem of such huge scale within the confines of a single program.

Largely on the basis of the program-cost minimization consideration, 46,000 units of housing were to be legalized; some 14,000 units were to be torn down and housed in the new apartments; and finally, 76,650 units were to be relocated into a new town.

**Legalization Program**

This program legalized existing settlements, thereby improving the housing conditions of the squatters by granting their right to settle on public land, under the following conditions: a) Settlements must be located on land not reserved for military or other critical public purposes, b) settlements must be situated so that roads and other necessary infrastructure may be constructed without undue interference with the city's development plans, c) settlements must be located on a site less than 100 meters above sea level, and d) settlements must have a minimum of thirty houses.

For those settlements that meet these criteria, the process of legalization had three phases. First, community facilities had to be upgraded to meet minimum standards. In particular, main roads were required to be of a minimum width, and storm drainage adequate. Second, all lots in the community had to be at least 89 square meters (27 pyeong) in size, and all houses at least 40 square meters. No house would be allowed to occupy more than 60% of the lot on which it stood. To meet these standards, much or all of the land in the settlements would have to be reallocated, and many or most
houses would have to substantially altered, or destroyed and constructed anew. After community facilities and house and lot size met city standards, residents would be permitted to move to the third phase of the process; purchase of a land title from the city.

Although the first phase of legalization process (that was, basically to upgrade the squatter community site and infrastructure) proceeded with the government's substantial technical and financial assistance, the second and third phases of the legalization program were almost entirely left up to individual initiative. The first agenda that the government had to decide upon was what kind of community facility improvement investment could be best made, to serve not only the squatter area, but also the general public. In cases where the public agency promoted a certain community improvement project, it would contribute materials covering, on average, 35% of the total cost of such improvements. The remaining estimated costs were left to be covered by community households, through their share in cash or in labor. The actual construction was to be left to private firms, through competitive bidding, and carried out under the supervision of a district office. From the point of view that the priority of the city government was to provide the designated squatter areas with access roads, pedestrian ways, and other public utilities, the major aspects of legalization process for the qualifying squatters had been to simplify the procedures for granting house construction permits, and the willingness to sell to private users land originally planned for public use. Nevertheless, the city had never indicated any policy of providing easier credit towards the costs of raising the quality of squatter dwellings to meet the defined minimum standards.

The main reasons for adoption of a program of legalization of squatter dwellings by Seoul city government numbered five: the first was that the
function of planning law was impractical. In other words, public park, forestry, river site, road and bank site zoning plans failed to fulfill their functions, because housing already occupied the areas completely. Even though some of the places were cleared, the place could not recover to its planned function. In this case, it was better to keep it as it had been, rather than to clear the squatter dwellings.

The second reasons was the stabilization of the living base for the poor. If the city government cleared the squatter dwellings, the socio-economic relationship based around the area would cease functioning at that time. Therein lay the necessity of stabilizing the living conditions of the squatters.

The third factor was the condition of the city government's budget. In the case of the clearance and resettlement of the squatter dwellings, the cost was too high. For example, the total costs to clean and resettle one squatter dwelling was 7,200 won. If the number of squatter dwellings to be removed and resettled were 46,000 units, the cost would be about 33 million won. Therefore, legalizing 46,000 units of squatter dwellings, the city could save 33 million won. This cost was for a normal situation; in the case of a large housing development, or an accident, the cost would naturally be higher.

A fourth incentive was reduction of the housing shortage. Without clearing the squatter dwellings, and with the improvement of them, these dwellings could augment the existing housing supply.

The final reasons was that the city government could achieve a goal of a fine sight of squatter dwellings, improving some of them with public facilities.

Therefore, the city government announced that in the first stage,
15,000 units among the total squatter dwellings would be legalized, and 28,794 pyeong of public land would be released from existing zoning restrictions. Accordingly, the city government legalized 11,036 units of squatter dwellings in the first year (1967), providing 17,000-20,000 won per unit for the cost of building materials, such as cement, block and slate.  

However, in the course of implementing the program, several problems emerged. The most important problem was a misunderstanding on the part of squatter dwellers with respect to the intent of the legalization program. That is to say, they thought that the mandate of the legalization program was to approve the existing right to live as it had been, with minor improvements to the dwelling, such as painting an exterior wall. Another problem was caused by the squatter dwellers inability to pay for extra services, such as the cost of land survey, public facilities, and disposal of land. As one can see from the income level of squatter dwellers noted in chapter 3, it was impossible to pay any extra costs except food cost.

Furthermore, it was an election year when the city government prepared this legalization program. Thus, regardless of whether the candidates in the coming election were members of a ruling party or of an opposition party, they all supported the legalization program to gain the political support from the poor. In such a political environment, most squatter dwellers thought that the legalization program was a kind of electional generosity for the poor.

The end result of all of this was increased squatter dwelling construction. During the period of both elections, about 1,000 units of new squatter dwellings per month were built in the area of Haweolgockdong, Seongbuckdong, Jeongneon, and Sae geumjeon.  After the elections, however, the
city government took a form position regarding squatter dwellings. One of the measures taken was to remove the new squatter dwellings by force. The city government organized a special task force for this purpose.

In spite of these measures on the part of the city government, new squatter dwellings were built continuously—like mushrooms after a rainfall—a new unit of squatter dwellings could be built just overnight. There were even some companies which made a business of building squatter dwellings commercially for the poor. During the period of 1967 to March, 1968, 16,159 units of squatter dwellings were built. In response to this situation, the Mayor took another stronger measure: the Building Act was revised to provide that the city government with the power to prosecute the head of a squatter household for a criminal offense, in the case of the violation of the removal order by the city government. The Act prescribes that if a squatter dwelling household violates the rule to keep the city's removal order, the head is liable to serve a prison sentence of less than six months. Consequently, the city government sent a notification to all heads of household of squatter dwellings. The contents of the notification were that, if the head of a household did not remove his squatter dwelling within the term of removal, then he would be criminally charged.

The first reaction against this stronger government measure was the demonstration of the residents of Yeonheedong. They came to the City Hall and asked the Mayor to keep to the terms of the squatter dwelling legalization program. However, the city government rejected their request, by arguing that their squatter dwellings were not subject to the legalization program because they had been built after announcing the legalization program.

In Yeonheedong, which was the first case of implementation of the new removal policy, the Seodaemoon District Office, with the support of a
member task force, removed 390 units of the squatter dwellings in the Yeonheedongsan 82, 66, 65 and 87. Nevertheless, another new 150 units of squatter dwellings were built within two or three days. Again, the Seodaemoon District Office removed the new squatter dwellings, with the aid of police task forces. Such a removal war could be protracted over many rounds of struggles: According to the chief of the City Planning Bureau, wars of this sort extended to 17 rounds in some of the squatter areas.

The removal war of the squatter dwellings, and the demonstration of the squatter people, moved public opinion to criticize the legalization program. Most newspapers had begun to criticize the legalization program openly:

"The most important problem was the announcement of the legalization program of the Mayor........
In light of solving the shortage of housing, the legalization of the squatter dwellings is not economic and in terms of the squatter dwellings the program is not valued............. Although the first responsibility of building the squatter dwellings is in the people of the squatter dwellings. The city government can not avoid the seconds responsibility. In any case, the basic problem is in the shortage of housing, in particular the low-income housing"

Therefore, the city government sought basic and permanent measures
to deal with the issue of squatter dwellings, in relation to the need for low-income housing in Seoul.

Citizen's Apartments

Given the above situation, the Mayor ordered the chief of the City Planning Bureau to build a frame-type apartment as a demonstration apartment valued at W 10,000,000, or W 500 monthly payment, in one area. He also ordered plans for the construction of the 100 units of apartments.

Before construction of those apartments, the city government conducted several experimental apartment projects. Hangang Citizen's Apartments was the first case of the experimental citizen's apartment. The conditions of entering into the apartment was W 500,000 - 700,000 downpayment and W 200,000 monthly payment. These fees were prohibitively expensive for squatter dwellers; therefore, many apartments remained vacant for several months, and the project ultimately failed. The city government had considered another experimental citizen's apartment building which was a kind of half-burden citizen's apartment, without downpayment. In other words, the entering citizen supplied the land and the city government offered the construction cost as a loan repaid monthly. Although 124 households were accommodated in this apartment, it was also too expensive for the squatter people. Therefore, no more than this apartment building was built. After that, the city government built a third experimental citizen's apartment, the so-called "Sky-Apartment." In this case, the constructor financed the construction cost, and then the Housing Bank refunded the money to the constructor. The entering residents paid W 600,000, or labor time equivalent to that amount, before moving into the apartment. After taking possession of the apartment, the citizen paid a monthly payment of W 7,400 towards repayment of the Housing Bank loan. This apartment was also sufficiently
expensive to present a heavy burden on the squatter dwellers. Finally, the city government considered another experimental citizen's apartment; one which would be able to reduce the burden of the citizen to a minimum. The basic idea of the apartment was that the city government built just the structural shell of the apartment; a 'frame-type' apartment; the entering citizen completed the interior construction such as internal walls, finished floors, heating systems, sanitary fittings and cupboards. After the construction of this apartment, most of the citizen's apartments were this frame type of apartment, in terms of the method of the moving and the physical structure.

During the removal war, the city government contracted with Dongjin Architecture Association to design 17 units in Keumwha area, and 2 units in Hyeochang area. But the people of the squatter dwellings in these areas interrupted the research work; completion of basic tasks, such as surveying the land were hampered because of the resistance of the squatter people. Therefore, the builders were forced to work behind the normal housing, or under the mountains. In such a situation, it was impossible to do a geological survey to properly set up a pillar of the apartment. The lack of such a geological survey forced several changes in the location of the apartment. At last, within budget limitations, they were forced to set up a pillar without finding out an appropriate place.

In any case, the city government had started the construction of the citizen's apartment with W 11,660,000 of the net construction cost for a unit according to the design which had been made by the Dongjin Architecture Association. Those apartments had been almost built by the end of 1968. As the construction proceeded, the citizen's group which had rejected the project at the beginning had gradually changed their
attitudes into the direction of cooperation. Consequently, the 450 squatter dweller households which were accepted to move into the apartment had established a self-committee by each Dong, so as to deal with various problems. The function of the self-committee was to confirm which citizen of the squatter dwellings were moved into the new unit, to decide the building unit and the apartment room to be moved into by lottery, and to discuss the fund for interior construction included the cost of the partition of dividing each household, wall of each room, sanitary unit for 10 households, water supply, and electricity. The fund was approximately W 70,000 for each household. However at the time of collecting the fund, only 10% of 450 household had the ability to pay W 70,000 for the cost of the interior construction. An additional problem was raised as to the land of the site. Twenty percent of the total land (80,000 pyeong) was private land, purchase of which should be negotiated with the private owner. In the case of negotiation, the cost had to be added to the new burden for the citizen. In this situation, some of them had sold the allotment card for payments ranging from W 100,000 at the minimum to the maximum W 200,000. The citizen of the squatter dwellings who had sold the allotment card could be building another new squatter dwelling in another area. In response to this situation, the city government regulated the allotment card so as not to be sold within one year. However, this regulation was not effective.

As a matter of fact, even the fund of the interior construction was a heavy burden for the squatter people in the light of their income. A study of the squatter family's monthly income and patterns of consumption preference conducted by Institute of Urban Studies and Development, Yonsei University, shows that median monthly consumption for a family of five persons was W 20,205 while their monthly income was
W 20,457 which explains their life at subsistence level. The survey also shows that the squatter family spends the highest portion of its income for food, the next highest for education. On the average, squatters do not have funds to spend for housing. However, since they are squatters they do not have to pay rent, and their residences are close to the place of work so that they do not pay transportation expenses.

However, living in the citizen's apartment project forced economic and cultural pressures on the squatters by imposing financial burdens to pay off mortgages. Each household must pay W 2,385 monthly over a fifteen year period. It is obvious that the cost of the apartment to the resident over 15 years is far greater than the value of the apartment. Furthermore, the average living cost is far more than it appears. Thus, the initial costs of moving into the citizen's apartment were extremely high, and most of the former squatter dwellers not only used up any capital resources they had, but in a great many cases, they also went heavily into debt.

Therefore, in discussing the cost of living in the apartments, these moving expenses and debts (which did not originally appear in family budgets) should be considered. In other words, if money is desperately needed for education, business investment, etc., a household was likely to have already exhausted its financial resources in order to obtain ownership of the apartment. The study of Kim and Podgursky indicates that 75% of the original recipients of citizen's apartments in two project areas were forced to borrow at interest rates of 5-6% per month (annually 60-72%). Therefore, in some of the projects only 30% of the units passed to outside buyers, while in others perhaps over 70% of the original occupants sold out.
In spite of this situation, the construction of the citizen's apartments proceeded continuously, and the project was completed on February 27, 1968. Based on this experience, the city government announced the citizen's apartment plan: the city government would build 2,000 units of citizen's apartments. After the announcement of this apartment plan, most of the citizens of the squatter dwellings paid attention to future execution. The purpose of the plan was to solve the low-income housing problems through a mutually satisfactory arrangement with the squatter dwellings. The method of the plan was that the city government built the structure shell of the apartment like a frame type, leaving the entering citizen to complete the interior works, without paying any downpayment; that is, as a partnership project between the city government and the citizen of the squatter dwellings. The period of the plan was 3 years. According to this time schedule, in the first year the city government would build 400 units for 18,000 households, the second and third years, 800 units.

In the first year again, the project was divided into two periods; the first half year was 284 units, and the second half year 116 units.

Priorities for selecting the entering citizens were as follows:

1) household which had removed itself from a squatter dwelling in the project area
2) household which had an appropriate property right
3) an exemplary policeman (a household in each unit)
4) even if some had a right, if he sold the allotment card, it becomes invalid.

In accordance with this apartment plan, the city government had revised its whole policy regarding squatter dwellings. That is to say, the target of the legalization program was reduced to half (35,000 units) of the original target, and Kwangju relocation target was fixed 55,000
units (78,000 households). In addition, the task of the citizen's apartments was delegated to the District Office.

When President Park visited the Seoul City Hall on Feb. 19, 1969, he particularly praised the citizen's apartment construction program. At the seminar in which all the ministers, governors, and chiefs of the counties participated, the President also praised the Seoul city government for the idea and implementation of the citizen's apartments.

Most of the Seoul citizens also commented positively on the project. In any case, the higher hill which had been covered with the squatter dwellings had been changed into one covered by high-rise the citizen's apartments; few argued that the change was not for the better.

However, the Mayor, from early August had worried about the building of the citizen's apartment, and the obstacles thereto. There had been serious problems in the apartments, not only in the physical structure, but also in the interior. In spite of the neat appearance of the citizen's apartments, the basic quality of the housing construction and foundation work was unstable. Many of the apartment buildings had developed cracks, although the subcontractor had tried to prevent further cracking by adding a few legs on the precipitous slopes. Housing specialists and architects pointed out the reasons for many of the building construction problems as follows:

First, because the city government wanted to complete construction in a short period, many of the buildings were built hurriedly in cold weather when cement couldn't solidify before freezing. In such cases, the structures became fragile. Furthermore, groundwork done on frozen ground could make the whole building unstable.

Secondly, in addition to construction flaws, many of the buildings could not be built on flat sites; as a result, nearly half of all the buildings were rooted on the ground, but the fronts were left in the air,
supported by thin pillars of 30 cm by 60 cm. It was later found that the pillars were not firmly rooted in the ground. Because sloped areas were usually rocky, the construction companies did not bother to dig the rocky bed to rest the pillars on the surface.

Thirdly, most of the buildings were built with inadequate materials. Iron reinforcement was not sufficient, and the cement and sand combination was not appropriate. The city government allocated 12 million won for the construction of each of the buildings while architects warned that a normal building of that size requires about three times more. Many of the citizens believed that a considerable amount of the construction funds flow into the pockets of the persons in charge of supervision of the construction.

Furthermore, accidents had been taking place in the inside of the apartments, including gas poisoning and leakages from the ceiling. Since the apartments had been built so badly, complementary construction had to be executed. Therefore, on January 24, 1970, the city government conducted a safety inspection of the buildings to prevent the occurrence of a serious accident. According to the results of the safety inspection, 10 units of the apartments, housing 363 households, were sub-standard. Based on the results of the safety inspection, the city government executed repairs. However, the city government could not do basic upgrading because of a limited budget. Meanwhile, the building supervision staff was insufficient to check the schedule of the construction, and enforcement was poor. According to one of the senior officers, one building supervisor had the responsibility for inspecting 46 units of apartment construction.

At the beginning of the construction program, the problem of land for the citizen's apartment was postponed by the approach of the build-now-
solve-later attitude of the city government. In the cases of city-owned land, acquisition was presented as no problem. The only problems were presented in the cases of national government owned land. Using the public park land gave the city government one recourse to due process. The Apartment Management Office asked the Department of Planning of the city of Seoul to rezone the public park land into the residential land, for building of the citizen's apartments. The Department of Planning submitted the item of the change to the City Planning Committee on April 4, 1970; and, after several meetings, it passed. Finally, the city government applied to the Ministry of Construction, and submitted the item to the Central Committee of City Planning (CCCP). The CCP criticized the item as an illegal measure, and noted critically that the apartment had already been built. However, given this very fact, the CCP had to approve the land use as a fait accompli.

In the early morning of April 8, 1970, one of the Whawoo Citizen's Apartments, the 15-unit (total floor space of 330 pyeong) collapsed. The 60 persons (15 households) which occupied the building were buried; 33 persons died, and about 40 persons were injured. Unfortunately, this apartment was one of the 406-unit model apartments built in the last year. Most people thought that this event resulted from a combination of design mistakes, the poor construction, corruption of the public servants concerned, and in particular, an overly ambitious plan. And so, attention was paid to the position of the Mayor.

An outstanding planner, Choog-up Kim criticized the collapse of the citizen's apartment, calling it the logical result of "demonstration administration". Although the purpose of building the citizen apartments was to remove the squatter dwellings and to move the squatter people into the apartments, the demonstration effect accrued from the fact that a lot of
apartments were built on the hill, where they would be highly visible to
city residents. Actually, the powerful construction companies had avoided
building the citizen's apartment because of their unreasonably low construc-
tion budget. Therefore, only weaker construction companies, which were
trying to enter the industry, were interested in the citizen's apartments;
companies which typically do not have enough engineers. On the other hand,
public servants always were interested in the intention of their bosses,
rather than the intention of the citizens. In such a situation, even if
they had tried, the engineer's advice would not have been heeded by the
public agencies. In the case of the Whawoo apartment collapse, there were no
advisory groups in terms of engineering under the Mayor.

The preacher Park, Hyeonkyu, also criticized it in the special lecture
"The Collapse of Whaoo Apartment and Citizen's Interest".

"The style of modernization should not be Whaoo style
as in the case of Whawoo Apartment collapse. The all
the things under the beauty name of modernization had
to be reconsidered again, such as the vertical power
structure by which everyone looks up".

Another planner criticized the housing policy.

"The event was the responsibility of the government which had
not prepared to pay for middle-class of construction company.
The unrealistic cost of the construction which did not
give any profits to the construction companies encouraged
the company to build a poor apartment construction.
Furthermore, the Housing Corporation established for
a low-income housing had avoided the construction of
citizen's apartment and built high class of mansion apartments
and foreigner's housing to make profits. This housing
policy was unbalanced."
However, in spite of such criticism, some of the citizen's still had supported the ambition of the Mayor Kim. In terms of "ambition", Mayor Kim was unequalled, although not all newspapers were sympathetic to his aims.

Meanwhile, with just one year left until the general election, the ruling party worried about the impact of Whawoo Apartment event on urban voter support. During the period of the election campaign, the ruling party normally emphasized urban votes. However, the Whawoo Apartment event endangered urban voting support; the opposition party used this to their advantage, and attacked the ruling party with claims of responsibility for the Whawoo Apartment tragedy. Furthermore, opposition politicians strongly argued that the present government should bear not only the political responsibility, but also the criminal responsibility for the event.

Mayor Kim had been a strong mayor since his tenure as Mayor of Busan city: therefore, all the responsibility for the Whawoo Apartment collapse was placed upon him. After eight days, he offered his resignation to the President, after reporting the situation. The President had not shown any response immediately to his resignation. After looking around the scene of the accident, the Prime Minister called to the Mayor to set up emergency measures for the dead and the injured. It thus seemed that the status of the Mayor would remain to be seen until the immediate problems were solved. However, although his resignation was postponed, and in spite of his brilliant performance in building Seoul city, the public opinion had changed to the disadvantage of the Mayor.
Meanwhile, the ruling party suggested that the Mayor should be replaced. In this situation, the President announced, on April 6, 1970, that the Mayor had resigned. As a result, the city government project of the multi-family blocks of citizen's apartments -- built with the motto of "An Apartment for Each Homeless Household" -- ended as a grotesque fiasco. The catastrophe of the Whawoo Apartments led to the end of the city government's low-cost citizen's apartment program.

2 Hyeon Ok Kim, "Bulldozer Feels Loneliness", Shijeong Yeongu, Volume 4, p. 140.

3 Dongah Ilbo Newspaper, June 27, 1966.


6 Department of Architecture, Seoul City.


8 Ibid., p. 22.

9 Seon Ho Lee, "Outline of Improvement Project of Illegal Housing," Choongang Haenjeong, Vol. 3, No. 9, 1971

10 Ibid.

11 Hoon Rip Park, op. cit., p. 112.


14 One Dongsan contained about 120 households.

15 Hoon Rip Park, op. cit., p. 117.


17 The number gained by an interview.

19 Hyun Doo Park, op. cit., p. 45.

20 Ibid.

21 Seoul City Government, Department of Architecture.

22 Dongah Ilbo Newspaper, April 9, 1969.
5. Kwangju Relocation Program

At the same time the citizen's apartments program was launched, Seoul city government also embarked upon a new town scheme. This was designed to solve two sets of problems. First, it at least to a certain extent, would help solve the "squatters housing" problem, and at the same time, contribute to alleviating the population congestion in the center area of the city proper. The problems caused by congestion in the central area of the city (e.g., traffic jams, insufficient provision of public facilities such as vehicular roads, and pedestrian passage, etc.) had been a topic of public and media conversation since the mid-1960s. And the "squatters" settlements near the center of the city were very often blamed for the overall congestion problems.

Within this context, Mayor Kim had the support of the national government (including the President) of the citywide government, as well as favorable public opinion for clearing and relocating a substantial number of "unsightly" squatter houses from the central area of the capital city. The idea of relocation of squatters into a new town was, however, constrained by two factors: first, the number of squatters in Seoul that the government wanted to have removed was quite large; and secondly, there was a scarcity of capital with which to develop a large resettlement area. To achieve the objectives of the first constraint, the government had to forceably resettle many of the squatters. To get around the problems presented by the second situation, the government attempted to work out a scheme by which the development of the resettlement area would be self-financing. "Forceably" resettling the squatters, somewhere other than in the center of Seoul, was designed to achieve an outcome of the new town development process, such
that the resettled squatters would not come back to Seoul to resquat. The second constraint necessitated use of a funding means outside the bounds of the city government's existing financial sources.

In order to match those purposes, the location should be outside the sphere of Seoul metropolitan area's sphere of urban economic function, but within a distance sufficiently convenient for Seoul to control its development process. According to this principle, the location was to be in an area within 30 km. radius of the center of Seoul, also taking into consideration:

(a) relative land prices, (b) the availability of contiguously open space of approximately 3,500,000 pyeong, and (c) relative costs of development.

Before deciding on the Kwangju area as a location of the new town site, the city government selected three proposed sites. However, the two sites other than the Kwangju area were not accepted for reasons of cost and military defense. The selection and purchase of the location, within the physical limit of the size and distance as noted above, was to look for the cheapest possible site. "Speculation" in the private land market was the main cause of land price increase around Seoul and therefore, that by blocking any information leak of the site-selection process, the city's purchase would gain the benefit of exclusion of the "speculative" price. For this reason, the possibility of using eminent domain proceedings was excluded, for to do so would involve a protracted procedure and a large number of participants (as required by law), thereby precluding effective information control.

Thus, the actual site-selection was undertaken by the Mayor himself with the help of only two other members of his staff -- the Deputy Mayor, and the director of the Bureau of City Planning. It was believed that, not only because of the lack of information on the future development project (the owners, who happened to be mostly farmers, would not be involved in
any speculative buying and selling), but also because a show of authority
would convince the owners to sell only to the city. The initial purchase
move was indeed made swiftly -- in a month in early 1968 -- according to
the tactics contemplated. The same tactics were to be followed in the suc-
ceeding purchase (the staging of purchases was done to match the availability
of financial resources, on the part of the city).

Consequently, in May 1968 the government announced that the Kwangju
area would be the location of the new town. After getting the approval of
the governor of Kyeonggi Province and the site housing business project
from the Ministry, the city government immediately developed the detailed
project plan; one which was mainly based on the clearance plan of the squatter
dwellings. On June 11, 1968, the mayor of Seoul had announced that the city
government would build 3,500,000 pyeong of housing at the site, and remove
500,000 households into the development.

According to the Mayor's announcement, the city government prepared a
large-scale site formation plan, which was implemented during the period
from 1968 to 1973. The settlement was planned to have a population of
350,000 by 1974, i.e. within five years of the initial construction, in
1968. Some 278,000 of the total population of 350,000 were to be relocated
squatters, and the remainder were to be made up of voluntary settlers.

The schedule for relocation and settlement of squatters from the city
of Seoul into the new town was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relocation Schedule of Squatters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The total space of 3,500,000 pyeong was to be distributed to different land use needs in the ratios indicated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use Classification</th>
<th>Quantity (Pyeong)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>1,555,266</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estate No. 1</td>
<td>50,870</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estate No. 2</td>
<td>189,130</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Facilities</td>
<td>942,734</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td>730,660</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>25,870</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>152,000</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>22,204</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,000,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The new town was designed to be primarily a residential city, along with approximately 72 small and medium size labor-intensive light industries.

Industrial Estate No. 1 (the smaller in scale of the two) was to be located near the town center, while Estate No. 2 was located at the fringe of the town. The commercial functions were to be limited to neighborhood shopping, the zone of which was planned alongside the major access roads of the town. All of the residential housing lots for the relocated squatters (278,000) were to be of equal size: 20 pyeong (720 sq. ft.) of single, detached houses. For the voluntary settlers, there was no maximum lot size limitation, only the minimum size of 20 pyeong. 342,291 (11.4%) pyeong of the total residential use land (51.4%), and any portion of the commercial zone land, were to be sold to voluntary settlers, and mixed with relocated squatters. Two public elementary schools, one public junior middle and another senior middle school, were to be built by the government (giving the Education Board will have jurisdiction over the town), and the sites and access roads for two more private middle schools were to be developed.

All of the housing lots development for the relocated squatters, the Industrial Estates site development, all of the public roads including payment, sewers, and water pipelines installation were to be undertaken by the city government at its own expense. For electricity connections, the city government was to arrange a government load to the Korean Electricity Corporation. Removal and relocation of the squatters for the city of Seoul were to be carried out over a period of five years beginning in 1969, according to the schedule as cited above.

Selection of 55,650 squatter-households out of the total of 136,650 surveyed by the city government at the end of 1966 was to be based on three criteria; (1) ownership of the squatters lots, i.e., public or private; (2) the
age of construction; and (3) the quality of construction of the lands on which a public work project is to be implemented in the scheduled year (worst going first). Otherwise, the general principle applied in ordering and selection of the houses to be cleared was a sort of weighted scale of the points for (1) public ownership; (2) recentness of construction; and (3) inferior construction quality, respectively. The first criterion was for the economic expediency of the other public works, which were mostly planned to use publicly-owned lands because of the high land prices in the vicinity of the center of the city. The second was applied to respect the "vested interests" of the squatters: this was believed necessary as a means of securing political as well as economic feasibility of clearance and relocation, since it was anticipated that the longer a resident's tenure in the community, the stronger would be the resistance to clearance. Finally, as it was planned for the city to pay for the costs incurred by clearance and relocation, it was believed to be less costly to pay for demolition of houses of lesser quality construction; hence, the reason for applying the third criterion.

The first actual clearance act was to give notice to the residents to voluntarily clear and move themselves; in cases of non-compliance, the city's special task force was to be called in to demolish the houses. As for non-compliance of relocation into Kwangju new town proper, the Resident Registration Law was to be invoked to deprive squatters of their Resident Registration Cards, returning them only when the family moved into the new town.

On the other hand, the number of clearance and relocation instances was synchronized with the progress of the development works in the new town, especially with respect to the development of housing lots and access roads. Provisions of the so-called "initial accommodation hardships" were also made
in the form of temporary accommodation camps with a daily supply of minimum
food while the relocated squatters build their own houses, for only the
housing lots are to be developed before the squatters are relocated. ⁴
For each unit of legally registered squatter households, 20 pyeong of hous-
ing lots were to be "sold", transferring the title on payment of the full
purchase price. The sale price was not to exceed the sum of costs of the
land purchase by the city, of the particular lot development, and of
ancillary "administrative expenditures, as allotted to the squatter's por-
tion. As it was actually calculated later, the average price was approxi-
mately W 2,000 per pyeong and thus, the average total payment by each house-
hold was approximately W 40,000 for 20 pyeong. The on-going market price
of the land was then four to eight times the city's sale price to the squat-
ters, depending on the specific location of the site. ⁵

The payment was repayable at W 20,000 per year for five years,
starting the third year after occupancy. Hence, residents were given
two years free of payments in which to concentrate resources on the de-
velopment of their homes before beginning payments on the land. Owner-
ship of the land, moreover, would be retained by the government until
the resident had completed his payments. In the case of alternative
parties buying the land from the original settlers, the transaction
would be considered invalid by the city government unless a house were
built on the land. If so, then the land would be renegotiated with the
government at actual market value. This last consideration is import-
ant, as will be shown later considerable amounts of land were sold to
middle class owners and speculators, who were forced to build immediately
on the land to keep their holdings. In large part this was the factor
responsible for the later boom that ensued in Kwangju. Contrary to
the observations of most observers, it was not the original settlers who were building their houses, but rather the middle income families and speculators who had purchased the land from them.⁶

At any rate, since the price of the housing lot scale to squatters was to include the land-purchase costs paid by the city government, selection and purchase cost of the new town location was to be made to minimize the purchase cost so that the low sale price to squatters could be sufficient incentive for them to settle in the new town. That is, the sales price and the legal means of controlling the Resident Registration were planned to be the main tools of the initial phase of the squatter settlement. To ensure longer term settlement stability, job opportunities had to be created within the new town. On the basis of an estimate that approximately 40% (110,000) of the total relocated squatter population (278,000) was to be gainfully employed, an equal number of residents should be provided with employment in on-site manufacturing industries, by 1974, as to be "induced" into the Industrial Estates of the town.⁷

The main means used to induce manufacturers to locate in the new town was to sell land for the price estimated on the same kinds of criteria as applied to the squatter's housing lots, beside the provisions of utilities, e.g., water-pipelines, electrification loans, and access roads, as planned for the town as a whole. The incentive of cheap land prices was believed sufficient, in consideration of the location's proximity to (within 30 km.) of Korea's largest consumer marked -- Seoul -- and the existence of a sufficient and suitable labor force in the town itself.

As for the voluntary settlers and commercial land users, neither positive inducement measures nor particular negative control of the settlement were provided; full reliance was placed on the market mechanism of land pricing, and
the existing zoning and building regulations. That is, the land apportioned to the voluntary settlers and the commercial users was to be sold by the city for the on-going market price; sold to the highest bidders, within the limits (quantitative and qualitative) apportioned to these groups by the overall development plan.8

In our investigation of the decision-making process, it was observed that the single most important factor, perceived by the decision-makers to be constraining the choice of alternatives, was the availability and control-effectiveness of the city's financial resources. As a result, it was decided in principle that project investments were to be financially self-supporting. That is, the expenditures on, and revenues from, the project were to be balanced. For this purpose, a "special account" was established for the Kwangju new town development. As the table indicates, the expenditures for the relocated squatters and the investment of industries accounted for almost 90% (W 5 billion) of the total, while project costs to be borne by the two groups was only about one third (W 2.9 billion) of the total. In order to benefit the two groups so much, the land purchase appropriations that were to be paid to the original land owners had to be limited; the sales of the "reserved land" to the voluntary and business settlers were thus planned to bear the lion's share of the costs, in view of the percentage allocations (approximately 20%) of land to these groups.

The administrative systems of the development process were organizationally dichotomous.9 That is, the city government established the Kwangju Field Office in the area, primarily to deal with the development affairs such as land purchase, site development, public works, inducement of manufactures, and relocation of squatter people. On the other hand, the
government of the Kyeonggi Province also established its own field office in the area, by which the general administrative affairs such as citizen's registration, public health, education, permission of building, and public security. As a matter of fact, the relationship between the two organizations was quite poor.

The development of Kwangju underwent essentially two phases, first from 1968 to 1970, and afterwards during the period of mayor Taek-Shick Yang's administration of the city of Seoul. During the first phase, planning was grossly inadequate and water, sewage and electric facilities were not yet installed, and squatters were forced to stake out their houses and live in tents or makeshift shelters for the first few months to a year. Financial assistance for the construction of houses was non-existent, and because productive infrastructure had yet to be built, employment was not to be had in the area. Moreover, public bus service to Seoul at the time was both infrequent and slow. It was during this period that the largest majority of settlers sold their lands to return to squatting or doubling up with friends and relatives in Seoul.

Clearance and moving of the squatters from the selected areas of the city of Seoul was begun in June of 1969. The Kwangju Field Office records show that, by September of 1969, about 3,000 families or 15,000 former "squatter" population was cleared and moved into Kwangju. This figure is only 500 households or 5,000 people short of the planned number. By early 1970 the number increased to 27,000 population in 4,300 families. The city officials reported no serious resistance to the clearance and /or relocation work, although about one third of the
squatters waited for the city's demolition teams to destroy their original dwellings. The city provided squatters with a means of transportation by which they were allowed to take any pieces of building materials they could manage to salvage, and to be reused in their new housing. As soon as they were moved into Kwangju, 20 pyeong housing lots, a tent for every two families, and a ration of flour were provided by the city for each family.

In the 4-5 month period of 1969, about 2,900 voluntary settlers moved into Kwangju; this is the number identified in the Resident Registration files. The city's field office estimate is that this is about 50% of the total voluntary settlers in 1969.

The first project undertaken, in June of 1969, was the construction of the main access street, and drainage at the center of the town. Along with these works, subdivision of the 20 pyeong housing lots was undertaken. Community wells and sewer drainage connections (of the housing lots to the main drainage) were built. In June 1970, construction of a water system was begun, to produce 4,000 tons of water per day. In September 1970 ground-breaking of Industrial Estate No. 1 for eight plants was undertaken. The access-road to Seoul was still left unpaved; and around the outer-fringe of the new town there was little sign of development activities that needed any action on the part of the city's field office.

During the period after 1970, conditions improved somewhat when transportation facilities to Seoul were improved, the first industries began to operate, and large scale of public works and private construction began to absorb much of the excess labor in the area. By that time, moreover, development began to gain momentum and land values began to
soar. Speculation become wide spread, and those who maintained their lands in the area held or to them for whatever value they could command. However, by that time, the majority of the original settlers had already moved out. It was estimated that roughly two-thirds of the total original population sold their lands to return to the city. On the other hand, during the period of land value inflation, many original settlers also sold their lands for whatever profit was available, and because of the comprehensive controls on squatter that come into effect in Seoul in 1970, squatted on the outskirts of Kwangju, building a house and trying to survive in the economic of the satterlite city. Moreover, the economic activity that was being generated during the later phase of development also began to attract many squatters from Seoul, who came to Kwangju to squat on the outskirts; thus, soon after 1970, a considerable squatter population had begun to develop around the outskirts of Kwangju itself.

In essence, aside from the problems of building a house from literally nothing the primary problems facing the new town development were that of employment opportunities in Kwangju, and the high cost that community incurred due to the limited budget of the low-income household. Although it is not known to what extent squatters were able to profit from their sale of land--to be able to either buy or rent a legitimate house elsewhere--in addition to the large numbers of squatters who rented houses and originally were displaced by removals in Seoul, an enormous number of families are estimated to have been dislocated by the whole process.
However, to understand the real nature of the problem from the viewpoint of the original settler, it is necessary to appreciate the tremendous dislocations and alterations in life style and economy that the resettlement of Kwangju involved. One basic of job security for the squatter is his locational familiarity with the area in which he is working. Hence, his knowledge of the people, institutions and situation of the particular area in which he works, especially since, for a vendor ("changsa"), small salesman, peddler, rear car puller, or A-frame porter such knowledge is intimately related to his chances of business.

These relationships with his area in the form of personal network affect his credibility, chances for credit, and the small face to face exchange that determine the success of a day's labor. Radical transformation of these locational ties can disrupt his sense of locational familiarity as well as destroy the network of relationships that for him are critical to the carrying out of his trade. In central city streamside areas, the importance of the area for the survival of the squatter household was seen to be of paramount importance. The Kwangju program disrupted this whole pattern by making it too expensive for him to commute back and forth, and difficult if not impossible to find work in Kwangju.

Therefore, those who were relocated to Kwangju were already dislocated in the truest sense of the word. Occupational possibilities that remained open to them in Kwangju were basically four fold.

1) try to find out work in industries that were being established there.
2) work in public works projects that were being sponsored by the government

3) try to eke out a small living as a peddler or start a small store, or

4) try to get into the booming construction work that began up to and after 1970

What generally tended to happen in these instances is explained below.

First, because of the initial high population concentration in the area, demand for industrial jobs was much higher than job availability. This had the immediate effect of lowering the prevailing wages for local labor. This situation was also exacerbated by the fact that up to 1970, there were only eight factories located in Kwangju. Moreover, because of the mismatch between the vocational skills possessed by the average low-income resident and those required for industrial jobs, job training was necessary. Those companies who did, soon came to believe that many of the residents possessed neither the skill nor the intelligence to carry out the required functions. Hence, the jobs that the residents did get were usually the lowest paying and most menial of tasks, which was an indirect insult to the intelligence of the resident. It also hampered his sense of personal economic freedom (in which he might be able to go out and get a higher paying but less stable job on his own and avoid the regular, but low paying and demanding job in which he was employed), and resulted in tensions between labor and management. Moreover, those industries that were labor-intensive tended to hire only young girls, being as they were more amenable to more strenuous conditions, more docile, and would accept lower pay.
During the later periods and after 1970 public works projects were begun for the construction of roads and infrastructure as well as the employment of labor in the area. However, the demand for works projects was so high that although the pay was a reasonable 500 won a day, the government was forced to resort to a system of work shifts in order to allow more people to work. Therefore, a normal family head would be able to work on an average of three days a week for which he was only able to earn 6,000 won a month.

Private employment was also revealed difficult by the fact that all low level commercial and tertiary industries were generally located in the same place in the central part of Kwangju area. Hence, there were already too many people trying to engage in the same small scale peddling, and vending activities.

Also, as much of the land was held unoccupied for speculation (often ironically, with houses built but no one occupying them) the actual resident population of higher income families which would have provided the market for commercial activities was not very high. Of the two basic small scale commercial activities (small peddling or "changsa" and porter services) peddling generally being done by the women, and carrying services by the men. As a result, only a few women were able to hold marginal occupation while the men generally remained idle.

Part of the large boom that accompanied the rise in land speculation was the increase in building construction that occurred at the same time. Some observers have pointed to this, in addition to the public
works, as being construction of incomes in the area. However, such con-
clusions ignore the fact that practically all of the larger construction
work (i.e., that which required skilled labor) was being handled by private
construction firms based in Seoul. Smaller construction, such as the homes
of squatters, did not utilize outside labor, as the families were too poor
to afford it and the scale of construction was too small to require exten-
sive labor. Because all larger construction projects were based on out-
side firms, construction workers and carpenters, as well as other skilled
craftsmen, were generally from the outside and worked as employees of the
private firms. Only those who possessed prior skills in construction work
were able to get construction jobs. Private firms could not spend the time
and money to train workers on the spot. Thus, those non-skilled residents
who did get jobs usually received the most menial and low paying tasks,
which like public works and industrial jobs were generally relevant only
to those persons willing and able to accept hard labor and low wages. The
generally prevailing rate of unemployment in the area tended to further
exacerbate the whole process.

The immediate economic result was the inability of the resident fami-
lies to eke out a living in the new environment. If they were to try to
work in Seoul, the transportation costs, on a monthly aggregate basis, were
generally prohibitive. For instance, local bus transportation usually costs
W 60 for a round trip, with the ride taking one and a half to two hours.
On a monthly basis this would be roughly 10,000 won. Others able to afford
it used the express bus which, while faster (taking approximately an hour
to reach Seoul) cost 80 won for a round trip for W 2,400 a month.
Transportation costs, therefore accounted for one-tenth to one-quarter of
the monthly family income, which was too high for most families. On the
other hand, although some families have been able to have the family head remain in Seoul, with other family members working in Kwangju to supplement their income, the general percentage of the population attempting this tended to be relatively low.

On August 10, 1971, 30,000 residents of Kwangju staged a mass demonstration in protest of government policy in the area. Destruction was widespread, resulting in the burning of four government automobiles and the local police substation, and the complete destruction of the Kwangju Field Office of the city government. The complaints of the demonstrators involved the sordid living conditions being experienced by the residents at the time, and the city government policy, which had ignored the reality of the conditions of the area.

Subsequent media investigations into the situation revealed that, at the time of demonstration, Kwangju's total population (120,000 persons) numbered only 42,000 of the original settlers, or roughly one third of the total. Of the remaining two thirds, 21,600 (18 percent) were newcomers, or higher-income people who had bought the land from the original settlers for their own use, and the remaining 56,400 persons (roughly 50%) were those who had moved into the area "illegally". These were primarily speculators who were holding the land for future sales. In all, of the 120,000 persons who had been moved into the area from squatter shacks in Seoul, two-thirds had already left the area, having sold their lands to other parties.

Moreover, while the government had planned to locate 100 industrial plants in the area by 1973, at the time of the demonstration, only seven were in operation, employing 15,770 persons. City records at the time revealed that 40,000 residents of the city were unemployed. Aside from the enormous problems of unemployment, subsequent investigations into the
area revealed that general living conditions for many of the residents were also appalling. Squatters moving into the area generally faced the prospect of having to purchase materials for the construction of their house at inflated prices higher than what was available in Seoul. Most of the families, having previously had their land allotments in order to have money to buy food. In some of the peripheral areas of the city, where temporary tent shelters were constructed, people were suffering from large scale malnutrition and starvation. Many families had somehow managed to survive the bitter winter living in tents with no heat. Deaths were commonly reported.

Although immediate, government reaction to the demonstration, in the face of widespread political criticism, was not without its irony. Remedial measures were essentially the following:  
1) to distribute 2,500 tons of grains to more than 20,000 needy residents to support them until the coming winter is over.  
2) to reduce the provincial government imposed taxes on the residents  
3) to set up several employment guidance centers in the area  
4) to complete the construction of 40 industrial plants presently underway in the area, as well as facilitating in the near future, the construction of roads, piped water, and a sewage system. 

The government also took measures to elevate the status of the Kwangju resettlement area from that of a town, to a city (named Seongnam). At the same time, jurisdictional and administrative functions were turned over to Kyeogi province, the political division in which Kwangju was located. In short, the Seoul city government did its best to eradicate the problem by changing the new town's name and leaving administrative responsibilities to the province of Kyeonggi.
Ultimately, the government decided to stop transporting squatters to the new town because, in their words, "it would only serve to stimulate the outbreak of similar incidents." Consequently, more concern is now being expressed for the stabilization of squatters already existing in Seoul, rather than for their removal.
PART FIVE - NOTES

1 Kwangju Area Development Plan, Korea: The Special City of Seoul, 1968.


3 Ibid.


5 Ibid.


8 Tae Soon Park, op. cit., p. 78.

9 Ibid., p. 75.

10 Kee Soon Park, op. cit., p. 86.

11 Ibid., p. 87

12 Ibid., p. 88.

13 The Korea Herald, August 11, 1971.

14 The Korea Herald, August 20, 1971.
6. Conclusion

We have so far discussed three programs aimed at controlling urban squatter dwellings in Seoul. The objective of this chapter is to review these three programs in reference to the conceptual framework developed in earlier chapters and to suggest these alternative approaches.

In reviewing the three cases, we will begin by observing the squatter dwelling situation after the programs of public intervention; that is, to identify what the results of the program were. In order to do so, we use the comparative or before-and-after method of analysis; i.e., an extrapolative approach which compares the results of the extrapolation of the past trends to the actual situation which existed after the programs. This is followed by a description of the major reasons for the differences between the two results. Finally, we suggest alternative approaches to solving the problems of squatter dwellings, within a given social and economic-political situation.

As was mentioned earlier, when the Seoul city government prepared a package program of squatter dwellings' removal, the target of its goal was 136,650 units, according to the "Investigation of Illegal Housing" conducted by the city government in 1966. In comparison, the "Reinvestigation of Illegal Housing" conducted by the city government in 1970, places the number of squatter dwellings at 187,554 units. Comparing the 1970 figure to the number of squatter dwellings existing in 1966, we find an increase of as much as 50,904 units. However, if we consider the fact that another 38,086 units of squatter dwellings were to have been removed, the number of newly built dwellings was actually even greater. In other words, it follows that 88,990 units of squatter dwellings were built afresh during the period of the squatter dwelling package program's implementation. The result showed
that the rate of increase in squatter dwelling construction for the period from 1962 to 1970 was faster than that of the period preceding it (1962-66). As was pointed out in Chapter 3, during the period 1962-66 the average annual increase of squatter dwellings was 9,648 units, or an average annual increase rate of 10.9%. On the other hand, the average annual increase of squatter dwellings, from 1967 to 1970, was 22,248 units. Comparing it to that of the period from 1962 to 1966 the increase was almost 2.3 times; from an average annual increase rate of 10.9% to one of 16.3%. Even if we consider the removal of 38,086 units of squatter dwellings, the average annual increase from 1967 to 1970 was 12,726 units -- still greater than the 9,648 units of the 1962 to 1966 period.

Without public intervention, what would have happened and how does it compare to the actual, planned result? We may guess the 1970 result from the past trend of squatter dwelling increase, by extrapolating the rate of increase, from 1962 to 1966. Doing so gives us a 1970 figure of 175,244 units. In comparison, the actual number of squatter dwellings was 187,554 units, for a difference of 12,310 units. Consequently, it may be said that, with the public intervention, the number of squatter dwellings increased as much as 12,310 units. Furthermore, the programs had led to a situation of social and political instability, as is evidenced by occurrences such as a mass social demonstration and riot, and the disastrous accidental collapse of the Whawoo Citizen's Apartment, which killed 33 persons. In this case, therefore, the planning had a negative effectiveness in solving an urban problem, rather than a positive problem-solving outcome.

Through observation of these three programs, we can identify the major reason of this negative effectiveness of planning as being the absence of an interactive self-teaching relationship between the planning system, and the planned system. In other words, each system proceeded in its own way, to
maximize its own expected payoff within the choice-situation which was, at the same time perceived as being created and/or controlled by the planning system. Although the planning system did adapt to the external environment, it was not an adaptation in the relationship to the planned system, but rather, a self-correcting adaptation to "hit a target". In other words, the self-correcting adaptation of the planning system functioned to strengthen the internal intensity of the planning system itself, without responding to the planned system; that is, to the rationality of the ends-means chain of the planning system itself, assuming the planned system given.

According to this conceptual framework of planning, the city government tried to solve the problems of squatter dwellings in Seoul. At that time, the only end perceived by the city government, for the problem of squatter dwellings, was to remove them from the visible scenery, using a strong administrative power. In short, the main concerns of the city government were to maximize efficiently the "demonstration effect". In such a situation, the objective of the city government was to achieve the final goal, whatever means to be used. For in a target-hit approach, the most important thing was to fix an exact target: in order to fix the exact target, therefore, the city government conducted the field survey, "Investigation of Illegal Housing in Seoul" in 1966 before the city government planned the three programs. Based on the results of this investigation, the city government fixed the target of 136,650 units of squatter dwellings to be removed. On the basis of this aggregate target, the city government again allocated the aggregate target to create a disaggregate target for each of the three programs: the legalization of 46,000 units, 14,000 units of citizen's apartments; and the relocation of 76,650 units into the new town. The criteria by which the aggregate target was allocated was based on the
physical conditions and locations of the squatter dwellings. For instance, the squatter dwellings which were located on the mountain areas and were visibly ugly, were subject to the program of citizen's apartments. Another example was the legalization program, in which the squatter dwellings had to be located on land not reserved for military or other critical public purposes. As can be seen, most of the criteria favored the concerns of city government, without considering the individual conditions of the squatter dwellers.

On the other hand, the primary concern of squatter dwellers was maintenance of their level of subsistence, rather than improvement of the physical condition of their shelters. According to one research report on squatter dwellings in the city, most squatter residents considered their shelters to be permanent, rather than temporary, dwellings. Consequently, from the squatter dweller's point of view, to remove their shelters meant to remove the basis of their subsistence.

Meanwhile, the city government utilized very strong control measures to achieve its goal. In the legalization program, for example, the city government removed the squatter dwellings by force. However, not only did this measure not work; it inadvertently brought about the "removal war" between the city government and the squatter dwellers. In response to this, the city government took another firm measure, bringing criminal charges against squatter dwellers who violated the order of the city government. However, even in this second approach the result was the same -- squatter dwellers resisted the city government's legal measures. In this case, the squatter dwellers responded to the city government with a social demonstration, invading the office of the Mayor.
Through all three programs, we can observe three things. The first is that each system had a different purposefulness. That is to say, the intent of the city government was to do as good a job as they could of removing squatter dwellings. Meanwhile, the intention of the squatter dwellers was to keep their shelters, to survive at their previous level of subsistence. In fact, the first priority of the squatter dwellers was to make use of job opportunities, and to improve their income level. Their motivations being antithetical to those of the city, the squatters could not adapt to the intention of the planning system, whatever means the city might use. Therefore, from the very beginning the two systems bore different purpose-vectors. In a situation in which the external environment is not shocked, the purpose-vector of each system may stand by potentially. However, when the situation is changed into a turbulent one by an external shock, such as public intervention, the purpose-vector of each system may move to its own direction. In the legalization program, for example, the planning encouraged potential squatter dwellers to build new squatter dwellings. After announcement of the legalization program, the increase of squatter dwellings sped up rapidly. In the case of the Kwangju relocation program, 70% of the original squatter dwellers sold their allotment card (given by the city government), and moved into the inner-city to resquat, because they could not survive in Kwangju area. Consequently, in both cases, the different purpose-vectors of the planners and the squatters could not match, resulting in a so-called "mismatch of life-space."

The second characteristic shared by the programs is the fact that the planning system assumed the planned system to be given. Hence, the basic notion of the planning system was that, if the planning system focused on the internal intensity of the planning system itself (that is, the rationality
of the ends-means chain), then the planned system will follow, as the planning system intended, and the goal would be achieved. However, what the planning system did not recognize was the fact that the planned system is, itself, a dynamic object in the social system. In particular, the problem of squatter dwellings consisted not only of the physical aspect, but also of human aspects which, in turn, involved a behavior pattern, an income level, and a lifestyle. In this case, the planning object is not fixed, but dynamic. Thus human beings cannot help but respond in different ways to external stimuli. Depending on the situation, the planned system itself has its own responsive system -- adopting or rejecting the intentions of the planning system. However, the city government totally neglected to consider any such response from the planned system. Consequently, the city government always developed plans based on its own constraints, rather than on the constraints of the planned system. The major reason of the Wha-woo Apartment's collapse ties into this kind of behavior pattern on the part of the planning system. For instance, in a situation in which the city government wanted to build as many apartments as it could, subject to its own budgetary limitation, construction contractors could not be paid sufficient money to build a high quality of apartment. Therefore, most of the professions expected the result.

The third characteristic which we observe is that in all three programs, there was no learning mechanism in operation. In other words, there was no institutional communication channel between the planned and the planning systems. Without this communication channel, it proved very difficult for the two systems to understand their respective intentions. In the case of legalization program, the intention of the city government was to improve not only the existing conditions of each squatter dwelling, but also the
conditions of the community as a whole. However, the understanding of the squatter dwellers was that the city government approved of the existing squatter dwellings, as they had been, with the exception of minor repairs, such as painting an exterior wall or replacing roofing materials. In fact, this misunderstanding on the part of the squatter dwellers led them to build many new squatter dwellings. In the Kwangju new town program, the direct cause of social rioting was a lack of communication between the city government and the squatter dwellers. As was previously mentioned, the government organization of the Kwangju area had a dichotomous character. That is, the Seoul city government established in the area the Kwangju Field Office, which dealt mainly with the development affairs of the project, such as a land purchase, site development, public works, inducement of manufacturers, and relocation of squatter-people. On the other hand, the Kyeonggi Province also established its own field office in the area, by which general affairs such as citizen's registration, public health, education, permission of building and public security, were administered. As a matter of fact, administrative boundaries placed the Kwangju new town within the jurisdiction of Kyeonggi Province. However, it was the Kwangju Field Office who maintained the real power of management over the town. Therefore, the relationship between the two Field Offices was not very good, and their actions were not cooperative. In this situation, there was no definitive authoritative administrative organization to which the squatter dwellers could offer their views and complaints. Furthermore, each Field Office had proceeded its own profits to maximize to match the development cost. When the original squatter dwellers came into the new town, they received an allotment card with which they could acquire a parcel of land (20 pyeong) with a disposable price of W 500 - 2,000. Since the squatter
dwellers lacked the ability to pay this amount, they were offered a purchase plan by which they could pay the downpayment in 5 years, after 3 years of occupancy. But, most of the original squatter dwellers sold the allotment card to the volunteer settlers at the market value. Then, the Kwangju Field Office reacted to this by cancelling their right on the land, and imposing a surcharge of 8,000 - 16,000 won on the volunteer settlers. Meanwhile, the Field Office of the Kyeonggi province also tried to collect property taxes on the land, breaking the promise of 3 years' tax exemption. The Field Office sent notification of such to the volunteer settlers, warning that violators would be jailed for 6 months. In this one-way communication, the squatter dwellers had no choice but to resist against the government's policy.

These results provide additional support for the conclusion that the planning is not simply an ends-means chain, but more accurately, an interactive process, between the planning system and its environment. Therefore, the planning process is not a once-and-for-all affair, but rather a continuous effort throughout the entire goal-seeking process. As the interactive relationship between a planning system and a planned system is not momentary, but maintained over a period of time, each system takes a co-production of choice-learning-adaptation. And, when the interactive process is recognized, the concept of control cannot be defined to be merely manipulated by the planning system, on the object, to achieve an outcome as intended by the plan/planners.

Accepting this concept of the planning process, we may suggest some alternative approaches which might have been taken, to solve the problems of urban squatter dwellings in Seoul during the time period in question.

The first one is, in theory, to narrow the gap between the intentions of
the planning system and the planned system. As a matter of fact, the city government's goal of solving the problem of urban squatter dwellings was a very broad and general concept. Therefore, there was no "life-space" to be able to accept the goal of each system while in practice, the scope of the intentions of each system need to be specified. Here, the source of failure lay in the city government's treatment of the squatter dwelling problem as an aggregate object. As a result, the city's approach was to adopt a comprehensive plan; one which failed to consider the existing condition of the planned system. In such a situation, the proper approach would be case by case method, depending on the existing condition of each system, rather than a large scale, comprehensive planning approach of the sort which was tried, and failed. By doing so, the criteria by which we divide all squatter dwellings into an object of each program include not only physical conditions but also socio-economic conditions of the planned system (i.e., the squatter community.

The second alternative approach would be to institutionalize a learning mechanism, so as to formalize the pattern of communication between the planning system and the planned system. One measure of this sort is to institutionalize a communication channel through direct participation of a workshop group which includes representatives of squatter dwellers, professions, and public servants. This institutional communication system may protect in advance some unfortunate and unforeseen outcomes, such as a social demonstration and riot.

The third alternative involves indirect ways to improve the existing conditions of the planned system, so as to improve its ability to adapt to the intentions of the planning system. A job training program for squatter dwellers is one example; others might include a community development
movement, etc. Programs such as these, which function to bring the vectors of intent of the planned system closer to those of the planners could by providing them with a commonality of purpose, enhance the potential for the success of a planning policy. By doing so, it would improve the efficacy of planning, per se, within the social system which is, simultaneously, the object and the constraint of its actions.
PART FIVE - NOTES


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