TENANT MANAGEMENT: CAN IT SUCCEED AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
TRADITIONAL MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN BOSTON PUBLIC HOUSING

by

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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a study of tenant management as a potential alternative to traditional housing authority management strategies in urban family public housing. The history and the current national debate around the issue of public housing residents taking over management at local developments is discussed to set the framework for assessing tenant management's viability as a management model.

Three cases of cities where tenant management has been implemented: Boston, Jersey City, and Washington, highlight some of the model's potential benefits. Tenant management is found to be a model that cannot work at every development. Eight pre-conditions are identified should be considered in considering a specific site for tenant management: 1) residents need to want to manage, 2) residents need to be dissatisfied with current management at the site, 3) there needs to be organizational potential among residents at the site, 4) there needs to be at least one leader with the potential to manage, 5) the local housing authority needs to be supportive of tenant management, 6) there needs to be money available for technical assistance, 7) a tight community fabric at the site is a positive sign, and 8) the commitment of funding for necessary physical repairs at the site will facilitate tenant management.

As a result of the study, tenant management was found to be a preferred model at sites which satisfied the pre-conditions. Five Boston developments were tested as to their respective potential. It was recommended that tenant management be implemented at one of the five developments.

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I. INTRODUCTION

"Simply because we are poor doesn't mean we don't have pride, respect and dignity. Simply because we are poor doesn't mean we don't want our children to grow up like other children.

Believe me, poverty doesn't take those kinds of things from you. Unfortunately, public housing has taken those things away from my people because they no longer have pride. They no longer have self-esteem and self-worth. They are people who have given up on everything and everybody, and the system has done that through welfare, through public housing and through food stamps by making them feel ashamed to use those programs simply because they happen to be poor.

At Cochran, we didn't just change the buildings, we changed the attitudes and the behavior of the people. We put back into people self-respect and self-esteem, the things that everybody needs to make them feel like they are worth something, and we did it through resident management. And we did it without money or support from the authority."

-Bertha Gilkey, Director, Cochran TMC, St. Louis, HUD Conference, July, 1984

More than two million of the lowest income persons in this country live in public housing. Although it was not the original intent of the public housing program outlined in the Housing Act of 1937, most central city public housing now provides unsafe, unhealthy, and undesirable living conditions. The level of neglect and deterioration in public housing magnifies symptoms of poverty like unemployment, crime, drug abuse, teenage pregnancy, and an overwhelming sense of powerlessness, despair and hopelessness. Since the 1960s when public housing became the so-called "housing of last resort" for the American poor, federal, state and local policy-makers have generated an almost endless stream of policy initiatives and demonstration projects aimed at improving those conditions in public housing. Prominent among the current strategies is
the idea of tenants taking over management of responsibilities and even owning their units. This idea is being promoted by a broad spectrum of progressives, tenants, by conservative Reagan administration housing officials, and some local housing authorities (LHAs).

The idea of tenant management emerged not as a public policy strategy designed to reverse the downward trends of poverty and powerlessness, but rather arose in the late 1960s and early 1970s from within public housing developments, from tenants themselves, and out of the popular notion that empowerment of poor people needed to be part of any anti-poverty strategy. In 1971, the Boston Housing Authority signed a five-year contract with residents of the Bromley Heath development in Jamaica Plain, turning over all management responsibilities. In 1976, a National Demonstration Project, funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), instituted tenant management at seven developments around the country. The experience of these and other tenant-managed developments has been varied, as outlined below, but has been strong enough to suggest that not only can the model be replicated elsewhere, but that it can be part of an integrated strategy to reverse some of the devastating trends affecting the lives of public housing residents.

The idea of tenant management has gained new currency in the 1980s, in a new HUD demonstration project which will involve six new cities. The demonstration project, which is being managed by the National Center for Neighborhood
Enterprise (NCNE), was announced in July, 1985 and will be financed initially by a $1.9 million grant from the Amoco Foundation. NCNE President Robert L. Woodson, in announcing the new initiative declared, "This multi-city demonstration will build on the dramatic success of public housing resident management corporations that have reduced crime and welfare dependency and, at the same time, created jobs for residents." (NCNE press release, July, 1985) The NCNE listed three phases of its demonstration project in its November, 1985 proposal: training, economic development and homeownership opportunities.

The idea of poor people managing their own housing, which was considered radical only ten years ago, is now getting widespread consideration. The Reagan administration, for reasons discussed below, has embraced the idea; tenant organizations have proposed it; and locally the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) is considering seriously contracting our management responsibilities to tenants at some developments. This study will seize this historic opportunity to take a closer look at tenant management of public housing by 1) studying the history and experience of TMCs nationally, 2) briefly discussing the national debate around tenant management, 3) looking more closely at cases of tenant management in Boston, Jersey City and Washington, and 4) testing the viability of tenant management against measures of management efficiency and effectiveness.

This thesis will document that tenant management is a viable model for providing efficient housing management, and
for empowering public housing residents. It will also determine the circumstances or pre-conditions which would make a development a likely site for tenant management. Using that list of pre-conditions, five large Boston developments with management problems: Mission Hill, Charlestown, Orchard Park, West Broadway and Franklin Field will be evaluated in terms of their potential for tenant management.
II. WHAT IS TENANT MANAGEMENT?

"If the tenants aren't completely in control it's not worth it. Our new contract stinks, the Rochester Housing Authority tells us when to go to sleep at night. Boards should never get in a situation where the housing authority can tell you what to do. You need a strong Board and a good contract to take over and manage."

- Doreatha Gayden, Tenant Manager, Ashanti Development, Rochester, November, 1985 interview

Tenant management is defined in this thesis as the situation in which management responsibilities are contracted out to an organized group of residents. In most cases the management and maintenance positions are held by tenants. It is not considered tenant management in the case in which the LHA hires tenants to key management or maintenance staff positions at local developments. The key distinction is whether it is the LHA or the TMC which has the contractual responsibility to manage, and therefore the right to hire and fire.

What separates tenant management from housing authority central management is that there is a contractual handing over of management duties by the LHA to the TMC. The TMCs vary in structure from case to case, but do include some corporate entity representing tenants, and a codified democratic decision-making process. In almost every case of tenant management all management, maintenance, and rent collection responsibilities are turned over to the TMC. Direct accountability for delivery of management and maintenance flows from the residents to the TMC, either directly or through a Board of Directors.
One difference between TMC and LHA management that is important to consider is that the former requires a decentralization of management functions at the TMC site. Management provided by LHAs to local developments usually consists of centrally trained and supervised staff placed by and accountable to central LHA administrative staff. Tenant management requires significant restructuring of LHAs involved. Some observers of tenant management argue that the extent of decentralization becomes almost as important in assessing the model's viability as the effect of tenants becoming managers. (Kolodny, 1983; Area Director interviews, 1985) The fact that TMCs plan, implement, and make decisions on site management and maintenance delivery at the local development is critical to the definition of tenant management. In cases in which management functions remain centralized at the LHA and residents are involved can be called tenant participation but not tenant management.

While tenant management provides a decentralized and lessened LHA role in management it does not eliminate that critical role. LHAs retain ownership of the developments and remain accountable to HUD and to local administrations for the condition of the housing stock. In different cases of tenant management LHAs retain responsibilities in rent collection, accounting, purchasing, payroll, hiring and firing of maintenance personnel, specific maintenance tasks, eviction proceedings, union negotiations, and modernization, among other tasks. LHAs retain different responsibilities in some cases because they could perform them more inexpensively and
efficiently, and in others in order to maintain control in areas where they doubt the TMC's capabilities. (Kolodny, 1983)
III. WHO WANTS TENANT MANAGEMENT?

"Within each urban and rural community there are indigenous strengths and resources. One of the most valuable resources is the grassroots organization, which can be used in redesigning and implementing strategies that will work to eliminate problems in each community. Policies based on local approaches, where the beneficiaries play a key role in the social and economic restitution of their own communities, can replace ineffective maintenance programs that produce dependency. Organizations that owe their origin to local initiative and spirit are much more likely to be successful in addressing the needs of low-income neighborhoods."

-Introduction to HUD conference on resident management of public housing, July 1984

This rhetoric promoting tenant management could easily have been spoken by a tenant leader, a radical housing advocate, or reform-minded bureaucrat. That it was delivered at a HUD conference by a conservative Reagan administration spokesperson illustrates the range of actors advocating for tenant management. The variety of objectives and self-interests among advocates of tenant management is as great and as wide-ranging as the variety among those actors. Constituencies with shared self-interests, like tenants and LHAs, as well as ideological groups on the left and right, are often divided on the issue of tenant management. The breadth of the public policy debate and the convergence of sharply divergent ideologies and self-interests on one public policy alternative warrants discussion and a breakdown of some of the issues in that debate.

For tenants the opportunity to manage offers both increased control over their lives and the opportunity to replace a housing authority management system which they may
judge unsatisfactory. For LHAs tenant management has frequently provided a convenient way to relieve themselves of unwieldy management situations in developments in extremely deteriorated condition. A tenant leader in St. Louis commented, regarding the LHA attitude there, "they were happy to wash their hands of us; the attitude was 'you want it, you can have it,'" (Coney interview, Nov. 1985)

In other cases the interest of the LHA can be traced to a liberal or pro-tenant attitude of one or more local official. Tenant leaders at Bromley-Heath cite a combination of the "hand-washing" goal and the genuine pro-tenant attitude of then-Administrator Ellis Ash as the BHA's goals in supporting tenant management at that development. (Bromley-Heath interviews, Nov. 1985) An additional goal which has been prominent in accounting for LHA willingness to turn over management responsibilities has been the availability of external funds which can provide relief to over-extended LHA budgets. The Amoco Foundation funding of the current HUD demonstration project is clearly providing a strong incentive for new interest among LHAs.

The current national administration's goals are far different from those of the officials who promoted the original 1970s demonstration project. The goals center not on empowering poor people, but on reducing the federal role in housing them. The NCNE demonstration proposal cites tenant management as the first step in a process which will lead to eventual tenant ownership of public housing units. A more complete analysis of the proposal for tenant ownership of
public housing units will not be part of this thesis. It is however worth noting that tenant ownership relieves HUD and the federal government of responsibility for continuing to subsidize those units, and there is evidence to indicate that this administration is not adverse to budget-cutting by eliminating the expense of low-income housing.

The idea of tenant management has not been endorsed universally by all public housing tenants. Not all tenants want to be managers and many have voted to keep the headaches and responsibilities of management in the hands of the LHA. For example, in 1969 residents of Columbia Point in Boston rejected the opportunity to manage themselves before Bromley-Heath residents took up the challenge. Another case of tenant disinterest involved a TMC in Hawaii which returned management to the LHA after two years of tenant management that most judged to have been effective. (Diaz, 1979)

It is by no means a universally accepted truism that tenant management is preferable to other management models, and there has been continuing debate on both sides. Some of the arguments in favor of tenant management are: 1) poor people should be actively involved in solutions to local problems and should not have to rely on the professionalism of outsiders, 2) tenants understand those problems and management issues first-hand and are therefore best equipped to deal with them, 3) tenants taking responsibility for management will instill a greater sense of power and control over their lives, and help reverse the cycle of poverty and despair in the development communities, 4) managing would give tenants a
greater stake in their living environment, leading to a safer more cohesive community, 5) homeownership by public housing residents is the ultimate goal for which tenant management is the first step, and 6) where traditional management has failed LHAs have nothing to lose by turning management over to residents.

The opposite side of the public policy debate includes tenants as well as housing authority officials, progressives as well as conservatives. Some of the arguments against tenant management are: 1) it creates conflict for TMCs between the role of manager and the role of tenant organizer and advocate. (According to a TMC leader at Bromley-Heath, "When we took over management I had to evict people I had known and lived with all my life.") (Hailey interview, Nov. 1985); 2) tenant management is more costly than central management, 3) its success is often dependent on one or more charismatic, skilled leaders, and the TMC is doomed if that individual moves on, 4) tenant management can't work in every situation, 5) tenant management merely relieves LHAs of problems which they are usually responsible for creating without necessarily solving them, 6) TMCs tend to be cliquish, undemocratic and unrepresentative of the rest of the resident population, and 7) tenants are only interested in the most efficient management model, and as long as the work gets done, empowerment and control are not important.
IV. TENANT MANAGEMENT: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

"HUD, the Housing Authority and the city did everything they could do to discourage us because it was the institutional, professional attitude then that poor folks, tenants, should be managed, not managing. The other attitude is the big brother attitude, that we are going to take care of all of you. You see where we are today? That comes from them taking care of us.

It is those kinds of attitudes and those kinds of directions of Congress that have gotten us in this mess. Don't take care of me. Give me training and the skills, and I will take care of myself. Teach me how to fish because the day you are no longer around, I will be able to feed myself. As long as you fish for me, I will continuously depend and wait on you to feed me; and that is what we are asking today. We are asking today to be able to control our own destinies. We are not asking for any more than anyone would ask for, to be able to make our mistakes, suffer our fates, deal with our consequences but at least be able to say, 'we did it!'"

- Bertha Gilkey
July, 1984

Tenant management has its roots in the movement to empower poor people in the 1960s. Its early history provides an interesting departure point when considering tenant management as a policy option for the 1980s during an administration and period where empowerment is no longer an idea in good currency. The original vision and goals of tenant management in the early 1970s included the sixties ideology of empowerment as well as the practical management needs in cities like St. Louis, Boston and Newark. Although the political winds currently blow differently than in the 60s and 70s, within public housing developments the original dream of tenant management has not been completely forgotten or abandoned by the tenants who live there.

The political climate of the 1960s gave rise to the unrest and organizing which paved the way for dramatic change
in the relationship between those with power and those without, and between tenant and landlord. Organizations like the Office for Economic Opportunity (OEO), the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) and the National Tenants' Organization (NTO) trained poor people to form protest organizations to gain greater power and control over issues affecting their lives. (Cuyahoga MHA, 1984) Through organizing efforts and more spontaneous urban unrest in poor black neighborhoods, residents and minorities were demanding solutions which provided power and control.

At the same time public housing had become the home of the poorest in American society. This had not been the original goal for public housing, which was legislated in the Housing Act of 1937 as a public works activity to provide jobs and housing for middle-class Americans temporarily displaced by the Depression. In fact, by the early 1960s the quality of the public housing stock had declined so sharply that developments were often referred to as "vertical slums." (Diaz, 1979) At the same time, the population in public housing had shifted to the poorest and mainly welfare-dependent, and to a higher percentage of black and minority residents. For example, from 1963-1970, the non-white population in Boston public housing increased from 13.5 to 37%, and the percentage of tenant households on public assistance rose from 56 to 75%. (BHA Task Force, 1973)

The federal response to the changing character of public housing in the early 1960s mainly focused on increasing operating and rent subsidies to alleviate growing financial
problems. Meanwhile the growing unrest around welfare reform and civil rights led to increased activism within public housing. In 1967 HUD issued a directive dealing explicitly with tenants' rights. In 1968 the agency developed a program for the modernization of public housing which provided funds for physical rehabilitation and called for extensive resident participation. HUD specifically suggested the creation of resident modernization committees. At the same time HUD issued guidelines which encouraged LHAs to contract out management services to private firms and included guidelines which called for tenant involvement in management decisions. (Diaz, 1979)

In the same year, 1968, public housing tenants in St. Louis launched a crippling rent strike out of which tenant management was born. The strike left the LHA bankrupt and rendered it unable to manage the largest family developments. This forced the authority to become more receptive to the concept of tenants taking a more active role in management. Authority staff saw the idea of tenant management as a way to maintain the peace while relieving themselves of a troublesome management situation. The relationship between LHA and tenants had deteriorated beyond any conventional resolution. The activism and negotiating skill of tenants during the strike suggested to public officials that both the desire and the potential to manage could emerge from the tenants themselves, given some support and assistance. (Kolołdny, 1983)

When an agreement was finally reached in mid-1969, it included drastic changes in LHA management responsibilities.
In addition to a new rent structure, tenants won the institution of a Tenant Affairs Board (TAB) to take part directly in the formulation and implementation of LHA policy. A contract between the LHA and tenants called for shared management responsibilities with the Authority responsible for personnel, budgeting and finances, and rent collection. In 1973-74, the LHA signed formal contracts creating TMCs at three St. Louis family developments supported by grants from HUD and the Ford Foundation. (Diaz, 1979)

On the Cochran TAB was Bertha Gilkey who emerged as the earliest and most articulate spokesperson for tenant control of on-site management. Gilkey continues to head the Cochran board and travels around the country training public housing residents in tenant management skills. She recalls that in St. Louis, "the Authority had just blown up the Pruitt-Igoe development in 1973 and in 1974 they were going to blow Cochran up. We had to convince them that we could manage it and they threw their hands up and said 'go ahead, its all yours.'" (Gilkey interview, April 1986)

The seeds of tenant management which were planted in the late 1960s included the selection in 1968 of the Bromley-Heath development in Boston as recipient of $565,000 in OEO funds to explore the feasibility of tenant management. The five-year contract executed in 1971 between the BHA and the Bromley Heath TMC was the first example in which a TMC gained almost total independence from an LHA. As in St. Louis, Bromley tenants provided much of the impetus to take over management. Bromley was also a situation where the LHA had clearly failed
in its management tasks; the development was in "deplorable condition" (Hailey interview, 1985), and tenants felt tenant management was a means of reversing that situation. In both St. Louis and in Boston the failures of local housing authorities combined with the movement toward poor people taking power over their own lives led to tenant management.

Two other experiments in tenant management warrant inclusion in its brief history leading up to the national demonstration project in 1976. A brief attempt at tenant management in Washington D.C. involved a private realty firm Shannon and Luchs. In 1968 the LHA turned over management responsibilities at two family developments to the firm, which in turn advocated inclusion of tenants in management decision-making and the hiring of a resident manager. The LHA was lukewarm to tenant management and the experiment ended at the end of a two-year demonstration period when tenants voted to leave management to the private firm rather than taking it upon themselves. (Cuyahoga MHA, 1984)

Another experiment in Hawaii also lasted less than two years. A TMC at the Koolau Village development near Honolulu, was formed under HUD's Management Improvement Program in 1974. While the TMC's management efforts were, by all accounts, successful, they ended when the federal funding ended. Tenant apathy and the departure of two key members are cited as the main factors in its failure. (Cuyahoga MHA, 1984)

In each of these cases external financial support was critical to the development and continuity of the TMCs. The need for technical assistance and training and the long
transition period required for transfer of management responsibilities required money. In each case LHAs didn't have the resources to fund that expensive transition. (Kolodny, 1983) Acquiring financial autonomy was critical to TMCs in asserting some degree of independence from LHAs. The early years of tenant management were characterized by hostility and mutual mistrust between LHAs and TMCs. To survive in those years TMCs had to be autonomous, had to do it without the support of the local authority, and in most cases with no assistance from local public officials. Gilkey asserts that, "most TMCs are set up by the housing authority to fail. In St. Louis out of six TMCS only two have survived because the others did not have the ability to go outside and hustle for money. We've survived because we knew we had to do it ourselves and we went out and hustled." (Gilkey interview, April, 1986)

That the St. Louis and Boston TMCs not only survived, but had success in reversing the decay and hopelessness in what had been some of worst urban housing conditions at the time, gave the model greater national currency and spawned the national demonstration project in 1976, managed by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC). The MDRC selected seven sites in six cities: Rochester, Oklahoma City, New Haven, Jersey City, Louisville and New Orleans. Sponsored and funded by HUD and the Ford Foundation, the project was designed to test the viability and cost-effectiveness of tenant management. A key component of the project was the evaluation after three years by the MDRC. Near the end of the
three-year project, HUD renewed the funding for two years, and contracts with LHAs were renewed at the four sites where the TMC survived. (Diaz, 1979)

Oklahoma City dropped out in the early phases and New Haven signed a contract with its TMC but also dropped tenant management within two years. Only one of the two Jersey City tenant management sites stayed with the project. Each of these aborted TMC efforts have been attributed to internal LHA problems, conflicts and resignations and not to an unwillingness on the part of tenants. (Kolodny, 1983) In three of the four surviving TMCs the training and transition period resulted in signed agreements by the end of the initial funding in mid-1979. All four -- Ashanti in Rochester, B.W. Cooper in New Orleans, Iroquois Homes in Louisville, and A. Harry Moore in Jersey City -- renewed management contracts with LHAs without the continuation of special funding in 1981. (Kolodny, 1983)

In Louisville, the Iroquois Homes situation was unique in that it has been the only example to date of a TMC taking over a development that was not troubled. The Louisville LHA director promoted tenant management and in 1976 selected the Iroquois Homes development because it was the newest, in the best condition, had a strong resident council, and was the city's only majority white development. (Downs interview, Dec. 1985) The Rochester, New Orleans and Jersey City experiences all involved troubled sites, but ones with strong resident organizations and leadership.

The MDRC evaluation in 1979 fell far short of endorsing
tenant management as a federally or locally-initiated policy option. It concluded that tenant management was feasible and worked fairly well at some sites but that it could not be expected to succeed at every site, or even at most sites. The MDRC also concluded that overall tenant management was not a significant improvement over traditional public housing authority management, and that it was more costly. (MDRC, 1979) However, the project did launch four TMCs which are still active today, and whose success, as judged by their survival and in the evaluation literature (Cuyahoga, Kolodny, Diaz), lends credence to the notion that tenant management is a viable management option, not just an isolated phenomenon.

To bring the story of tenant management through the end of 1985, involves new TMCs at developments in St. Louis, Newark, Washington, and Jersey City. Newark's Stella Wright development is an interesting case in that, as in St. Louis, the impetus came from a rent strike. Part of the strike's resolution was the signing off of management responsibilities to tenants in 1978. (Diaz, 1979) Both the St. Louis and Jersey City experiences are informative as cases in which there have been more than one tenant-managed development under the same LHA. The Kenilworth-Parkside development in Washington was the latest development to embark on tenant management in 1982, and is unique in its ability to date to operate more cost-effectively than had been the case previously. (Wilson, 1984) Residents of Lakeview Terrace in Cleveland expect to sign a management contract to form a TMC at that troubled development in 1986 or 1987. The new
NCNE/Amoco Foundation demonstration project will likely add TMCs to developments in Denver, Houston, Minneapolis, Chicago and Tulsa, as a first step toward eventual tenant homeownership. (Inge interview, Nov. 1985)
V. NATIONAL TMC MODELS; A BASIS FOR CASE ANALYSIS

Tenant management has been attempted at different sites and under very different circumstances in U.S. public housing. The experience in three cities will be considered more closely than the others, Bromley-Heath in Boston, four developments in Jersey City, and Kenilworth-Parkside in Washington D.C. These three cities have been selected as good ones to study the models and experience according to the specific questions listed below. They were also chosen based on their convenience for primary data collection.

A comparison of the different TMC models will provide the basis for drawing conclusions about the viability of tenant management as a management option in public housing. If tenant management is judged to be viable the conditions required for successful implementation of that option with any likelihood of success will be determined. Finally, those pre-conditions will form the basis for assessing the potential for tenant management at five large Boston developments.

The important questions for assessing and comparing cases can be divided into three categories: historical, internal management, and external effect. The historical questions assess the factors leading up to tenant assumption of management responsibilities. These questions provide the key to determining what the pre-conditions were which allowed tenant management to work at the sites studied. The internal management questions assess the actual TMC performance against real estate management measures. The external effect category
considers mostly by-products of tenant management not directly related to real estate management like job creation, supportive service programs, and harder to measure factors like community spirit and pride. These two sets of questions are most relevant to the overall assessment tenant management's viability as an alternative to central LHA management.

The historical category for case analysis includes the following questions:

1) What were the local circumstances which led to tenant management? In many of the cases, tenant management got its start in the worst developments, at the initiative of tenants, and with an external funding source playing a key role, but there have been exceptions.

2) What kind of relationship has there been with the LHA? How supportive has the LHA been of the TMC and how has that relationship developed over time?

3) What condition was the development in when tenants assumed management responsibilities? Was there an upgrading by the LHA before the contract was signed or agreed to in the contract?

4) What is the level of grassroots resident participation at the development? Has turnout been high or low at resident meetings?

5) What role have key individuals played in the formation and continued viability of the TMC? The history of tenant management has in many cases centered around key individuals in leadership roles with the TMC. How important is it, then,
to have a skilled, sophisticated, charismatic leader at the head of a TMC? In most of the cases, the TMC is identified with one such charismatic leader, like Mildred Hailey at Bromley-Heath, Bertha Gilkey in St. Louis, or Kimi Gray at Kenilworth-Parkside. Could those TMCs survive without that key individual? Can one or more persons be found to assume that role, and if so, how can they be identified?

The internal management category includes the following questions:

1) Is tenant management more costly? What changes in the TMC model would make it less costly? Conventional wisdom says that tenant management will always be more expensive than central management because of the training and consulting costs and the costs of setting up a decentralized operation that can't take advantage of economies of scale.

2) What level of management efficiency has been achieved at the tenant managed development? It is critical in evaluating the effectiveness of TMCs to look at the internal measurements by which any management model would be judged. Management effectiveness is often difficult to measure but data which document the effectiveness of rent collection, work order turnaround, and occupancy rates will be compared. This question will be discussed specifically in chapter nine.

The third category for case analysis, external effect, includes the following questions:

1) What kind of supportive services, job training and economic development programs have been promoted and implemented by the TMC? One of the prominent claims made by
each of the tenant managers interviewed and in the writings of advocates for tenant management is that the TMC experience results in improved living conditions beyond mere functions of management. These external factors include job creation, improved service delivery, decreased welfare dependency, improved security, and stronger and more cohesive sense of community.

2) Is the community safer or less safe under tenant management? Has the level of crime, drug use, and vandalism decreased or increased noticeably with tenants managing themselves?

3) Is tenant ownership of units being considered as the next stage? This is the case at Kenilworth-Parkside and Cochran. Tenant leaders claim that the prospect of ownership provides an incentive for residents to work toward increased rent collection, reduced costs, and diminished vandalism and crime at the development. (Gray interview, March 1986; Gilkey interview, April 1986) Given that homeownership is an important component of the current national tenant management demonstration project, its potential impact on tenant management will be considered.

Finally, when discussing the experience of different TMCs, it is important to establish an operational definition of successful tenant management. This thesis will ask three questions to determine a specific case of tenant management's success or failure. First, does the TMC survive over a period of years? This question is even more useful to define failure in situations where the TMC does not last. Second, how well
does the TMC perform according to traditional measures of management efficiency like rent collection, vacancy reduction and workorder turnaround time? Success would likely include better performance on these measures as compared to management at the site before the TMC and against other developments in the same city. Third, what external benefits have occurred as by-products of tenant management? Successful tenant management, according to this thesis, not only needs to satisfy the first two questions, but must also demonstrate some level of job creation, service provision and change in residents' feelings about themselves, their neighbors, and their living environment.
VI. BROMLEY HEATH: A BOSTON CASE

"As public housing tenants, we need to be in control of our own lives, and at Bromley Heath, we all feel more power because of the TMC. And we do a better job."

-Mildred Hailey
Executive Director, Bromley-Heath
TMC, Nov. 1985

Bromley-Heath is both the oldest existing TMC, and the one in which tenants have the greatest amount of autonomy from the LHA. Bromley-Heath is a local example of success as measured against the three sets of criteria outlined above. The TMC has survived for 14 years and provided a model of both internal and external management effectiveness which other cities have attempted to replicate. It is an interesting case to examine because of that success and because Bromley's experience in Boston can inform the question of tenant management's potential for success at other local sites.

Bromley-Heath combines three developments with a total of 1088 units spread over 25 acres in the Hyde Square neighborhood of Jamaica Plain in Boston. Of the 1088 units, 645 are occupied by approximately 2,000 persons, of whom 81% are black, 18% Hispanic and 1% white, 49% under the age of 18, and 80% single parent households. The 10 seven-story and six three-story buildings which make up the development are in a changing neighborhood with mostly old multi-family private housing stock. The surrounding neighborhood is of mixed racial composition, which currently consists of 36% White, 30% Black and 42% Hispanic residents, though recent trends indicate that the majority of replacement buyers and renters
in the neighborhood are Hispanic. (Bromley-Heath Fact Sheet, 1985)

According to the Bromley-Heath TMC's own chronology of events the first significant event leading to tenant management was the passing of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 which made money available by establishing OEO. In 1967 Ellis Ash, the BHA Administrator, submitted a proposal for tenant management to OEO which was funded the following year. Columbia Point, a family development in Dorchester, was first considered for the pilot program, but tenants voted not to participate. (Bromley-Heath Fact Sheet, 1985)

According to TMC Director of Communication and long-time resident David Worrell, "Ellis Ash was a liberal administrator and may have genuinely wanted to help tenants, but his Board was controlled by (then-Mayor Kevin) White." White was not considered a friend of public housing tenants. According to Worrell and other accounts of the TMC's inception Ash was able to sell the tenant management idea for two reasons: he had raised the money from outside sources, and the developments under consideration, Columbia Point and Bromley-Heath, were afflicted with some of the worst problems in the city. Both were communities with high crime and vandalism, many vacant and substandard units and with a predominantly black population. (Worrell interview, Nov. 1985) According to TMC Executive Director Mildred Hailey, "Ash was the only one in the city who cared about us at the time. The mayor, the city, and the BHA department heads and staff had the attitude of let's do anything as long as we can wash our hands of these
In 1972 the TMC received a direct grant from OEO and BHA/TMC negotiations led to a signed contract which took effect January 1, 1973. The TMC took over complete management responsibility for the three developments with Mildred Hailey as Housing Manager and Anna Cole as Chairperson. (Bromley-Heath TMC, 1984) As the TMC enters its 14th year with both Hailey and Cole in the same leadership positions it is important to consider the significance of the roles played by those individuals in the development and maintenance of the Bromley TMC.

In the case of Bromley-Heath, Mildred Hailey's role has been particularly pivotal. According to TMC Director of Operations Steve Vadnais, "There would be no TMC without Mildred." (Vadnais interview, Nov. 1985) Since the early days of the TMC Hailey has taken a public and visible role at its head. Interviews with some of the ten TMC Board members confirms the impression that the Executive Director has, through a combination of charisma, charm, presence and political and personal skills, been critical to the TMC's development and continued operation. The importance of one skilled and charismatic individual as a central force in making tenant management work is by no means unique to Bromley-Heath, as evidenced by Bertha Gilkey's role in St. Louis and the presence of at least one such leader in the developments where tenant management has survived.

Could tenant management have survived at Bromley-Heath without Mildred Hailey? This important question is difficult
to answer. Opinion among those tenants involved in the TMC in its early stages almost unanimously support the notion that without Hailey there would be no TMC. (TMC interviews, Nov. 1985) Hailey insists, "My role has always been as that of a facilitator; I have been able to transfer leadership skills to others. We had to develop, though. We took this over in a bad climate where the BHA didn't care about Bromley-Heath." (Hailey interview, Nov. 1985)

A brief analysis of the debate around this question leads to the conclusion that the TMC could not have survived its early years without Hailey or another leader with her skills and energy. The importance of Hailey or of any single leader diminishes over time to the point where the TMC's survival today does not depend on any one leader. This question is considered further in the cases discussed below.

What have been the other ingredients for the success and survival of the TMC? It has only been very recently, according to Hailey, that the TMC has received any amount of support from the BHA, so clearly it has survived on its own and due to circumstances existing within the development. According to Hailey:

"The key ingredient which we had was that tenants have to want it, really want it and be willing to work hard and take responsibility. Also we were fortunate in that we already had a strong core of leaders, a good atmosphere with strong family ties, and a tight community which holds it all together." (Hailey interview, Nov. 1985)

The level of cohesiveness among Bromley tenants she describes most likely applies mainly to the top tenant leadership active in the early 1970s.
There is clear evidence that the existence of a visible, skilled set of leaders, in a cohesive community, in which, according to Hailey, "we were selfless, and there was no one involved for personal gain, and we didn't fight among each other," was critical to the TMC's success. Bromley TMC leaders consider the tightness of the community as critical to the development of an effective leadership cadre even before tenant management at the site. Clearly if any group of residents had resisted the leadership of those who took over management responsibilities they would likely have failed. "We could never have done it without the fact that people living here really wanted it to work," says Hailey. (TMC interviews, Nov. 1985)

That cohesiveness has been described by other observers as almost an insularity and cliquishness which may have allowed for successful, albeit autocratic management, but which has also left those leaders open to criticism that the organization is top-heavy and undemocratic. Hailey's response to that criticism is to state that, "We have never denied that it was a clique, but that clique has always made room for one more." She adds, "People say I play favorites, but when we took over people had no hope in this project, and as long as people can take pride in the community I don't mind the criticism." (Hailey interview, April, 1986)

In terms of survival the Bromley-Heath TMC has clearly been a success. How successful has it been by the internal management criteria? The results are sketchy, due in part to the fact that the TMC keeps its own records on rent
collection, maintenance, and compiles other management data which the BHA compiles and publishes for all other developments. The TMC is guarded with its data and the numbers are difficult to compare with those of the BHA both because they may have been compiled to give the most favorable impression of TMC efficiency and because the categories and data-collection are not always equivalent. Both BHA Area Director Dorothy Griffith and Vadnais at the TMC maintain that data would not indicate dramatic improvements over BHA management and that the TMC should be judged according to other criteria. Griffith, who acts as BHA liaison to the Bromley Heath TMC, claims that it costs the BHA about 1-5% more to manage at Bromley-Heath than a BHA-managed family development of the same size. (Dorothy Griffith interview, Oct. 1985)

The slight increase in expenditures at Bromley-Heath is counter-balanced by the level of external benefits in evidence at the site. TMC leaders point to these benefits first when asked to define the level of their success at Bromley-Heath. "We took the wholistic approach from the very beginning," says Hailey, adding, "We brought in job referral and training, a daycare center, the health center and then negotiated for the TMC. We measure our accomplishments in the changes in people more than in management and bricks and mortar." (Hailey interview, April 1986)

How does Bromley-Heath perform according to the external effect criteria like job-creation through economic development and level of supportive services available at the development?
The management corporation alone provides jobs for more than 30 tenants; others have been provided at service agencies which have been established on-site. (Bromley-Heath fact sheet, 1985) Those agencies, which deliver necessary services, include a community center, a health center, a day care and infant day care center, and Hispanic center. According to Hailey, "I measure our success in managing according to the quality of life we have been able to create. We now have more people working, more going to school and a strong community spirit because we have done it ourselves." (Hailey interview, April, 1986)

The TMC is also implementing a modernization effort which will repair some of the physical and structural damage of buildings and bring currently-vacant units on line. This work has been long overdue according to TMC staff and leaders, who claim they should not have signed the original agreement with the BHA without the money or commitment to bring the housing up to code standards. According to Hailey, when residents signed the management contract there were "more then 4,000 broken windows, tons and tons of garbage, and a boiler plant that didn't work." (Hailey interview, April 1986) "We were stupid," says Worrell, adding, "We thought we knew what we needed better than the BHA but even with that knowledge we took it on without knowing what we could and couldn't do. We should have made sure the BHA brought the units up to code; instead we had to try to do it without the additional money." (David Worrell interview, Nov. 1985)

The group of TMC leaders all strongly supported the
notion that aside from the mistake of postponing modernization, the 14-year experience with tenant management has been overwhelmingly positive. Several independent studies have reached the same conclusion. (NCNE, Diaz, Cuyahoga, Kolodny) TMC leaders at Bromley-Heath have succeeded according to all three criteria for success outlined in this thesis and according to the "wholistic" criteria specified by the resident manager.
VII. JERSEY CITY: FOUR CASES OF TENANT MANAGEMENT

"We saw how residents turned things around at A. Harry Moore, but most people here were still skeptical. We had lots of problems, but figured we might as well give it a shot. We managed to pull together and make it work. If we didn't have the TMC, the Housing Authority would have big problems. Managers don't care about residents; they can leave at 4:00. We understand the problems because we live here too."

-Catherine Todd
Board Chairperson
Montgomery Gardens TMC, Dec. 1985

In Jersey City, like St. Louis, and unlike Boston, more than one attempt has been made to institute tenant management at a local public housing development. Two developments, A. Harry Moore and Curries Woods, were part of the 1976 MDRC Demonstration project. The TMC at A. Harry Moore provides a model ten years later of successful tenant management while Curries Woods failed in its efforts to get tenant management off the ground, due mostly to tenant disinterest. A third, Montgomery Woods, signed a management contract in 1979 following on the visible success at Moore. A fourth, at Booker T. Washington, signed a management contract with the Jersey City Housing Authority (JCHA) in late 1985 and is now getting off the ground.

One key difference in Jersey City from both the St. Louis and Boston tenant management experience, was that from the outset the JCHA and its Director, Robert Rigby, encouraged and lent support to tenants' efforts to exercise more control in the management of their developments. The ten year experience has been described by tenant leaders as mostly one of mutual trust, cooperation, and a management partnership between tenants and LHA staff. The impetus toward tenant management
came from a new progressive LHA administration need to take some action to deal with its most troubled developments along with increased internal capacity and interest of resident leaders in those developments. Also the support of the Jersey City mayor played a role in giving that initial momentum toward funding and implementation. (Rigby, 1981)

As was the case in St. Louis the intense degree of deterioration and hopelessness in Jersey City public housing demanded some intervention. In Jersey City's case tenant management became the final policy choice due mostly to the timing of the MDRC Demonstration Project. The decision to try tenant management followed intermediate agreements between the LHA and residents on strategies to address that deterioration at specific sites.

With the LHA/tenant relationships constant among the four cases Jersey City is interesting given that two developments developed a strong cooperative management model and another failed to get off the ground. The Jersey City case has been documented in excellent studies conducted by Rigby and by Columbia University researcher Robert Kolodny. The following discussion draws from those studies and from interviews with tenant leaders and with Rigby during a visit to the four Jersey City developments.

The situation which the JCHA faced in 1973 when a new set of administrators led by Rigby took over was one which the new director describes as one of "rancid site conditions, a bankrupt authority, and hopelessness." (Rigby interview, Dec. 1985) In a 1985 paper on tenant management as an approach to
salvaging troubled public housing, Rigby writes:

"The task confronting the JCHA's newly installed administrators seemed quite clear. Site conditions must be changed for the better or the developments will further deteriorate and ultimately be abandoned. Traditional expenditure and design approaches were not feasible options. More important, it seemed clear that even if typical renewal options were available, they would have been insufficient."

(Rigby, 1985)

According to the report, Rigby chose two strategies in 1973 which eventually led to tenant management: 1) the turnaround would involve informal social and behavioral changes at the project level which would not require money and which could not be destroyed by vandals, and 2) this approach could not be implemented throughout the authority so that any progress would have to be made development by development and even building by building. In 1974 the JCHA decided to focus its mostly non-monetary resources toward turning around the A. Harry Moore development which was "in by far the worst condition and facing possible demolition," according to Rigby. (Rigby interview, Dec. 1985)

A. Harry Moore (AHM) is a family development of seven 12-story brick buildings on 10 acres with 662 units of 1-4 bedrooms. Tenants were predominantly very poor (all JCHA tenant households have incomes below 80% of the area median), Black, single-parent, female headed households with an average of three children, most of whom had welfare as their primary source of income. (Rigby, 1985) Rigby describes the situation at AHM before action was taken as follows:

"By 1973 site conditions were rancid. Ten of the site's 14 urine-stenched elevators were inoperable and had been for almost half a year. Deteriorated utility systems
resulted in chronically erratic services. Public spaces, such as hallways, stairwells and building lobbies lay vandalised and debris ridden, an engulfing state of squalor. Approximately 20% of project apartments had been permanently abandoned, with vacancies increasing at a rate of almost 15/month. Crime and vandalism were the behavioral norm; fear and hopelessness, the pervasive ethos."

(Rigby, 1975)

The turnaround effort began with a series of meetings between AHM tenants and JCHA staff. The JCHA, in those negotiations, agreed to refurbish one of the seven buildings and in exchange tenants in the building would organize to monitor the area to maintain the improvements. The JCHA, in an effort to sustain and broaden its rehabilitation and resident organizing efforts, looked for external money and was able to procure funding from the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs (DCA) Housing Demonstration Program. The DCA awarded the JCHA $121,000 in May, 1974 as one of six housing management demonstrations statewide to try new approaches to public housing management in low-income high density projects. The JCHA applied the relatively modest grant amount to extend its efforts already underway at AHM and Curries Woods. (Rigby, 1982)

An important element of the DCA grant in the evolution of tenant management in Jersey City, according to Rigby, was that it provided for continued funding for a tenant organizer at AHM. The organizer worked in each building to develop a system for residents to protect the refurbishing efforts from vandalism and their buildings from drug use and crime. The effort developed lobby monitors, building captains, tenant leaders, and most importantly an organization of tenants
committed to making the development a better place to live. (Rigby, 1982) The level of organization was critical to both considering tenant management in 1976 and to its success at AHM and Montgomery Gardens. Kolodny, in his study on AHM, writes,

"To begin with, they (lobby monitors) provide a task around which people can organize and reorganize when activity begins to wane, and they are a symbol to the outside world that the residents care about their buildings. But beyond this, the elements of the building organizations -- floor and building captains -- create a basic structure which can be embellished. With the assistance of an organizer or through an evolutionary process, tenants can begin to expand their focus to include other activities. (Kolodny, 1976)

By 1976, according to the Rigby study, conditions had already changed at AHM. Leadership had emerged, a resident organization was taking more and more day to day responsibility at the development and security and vandalism problems had decreased. All that remained was for tenants to take a greater role in actual management of the site. (Rigby, 1982) Tenant dissatisfaction with LHA management combined with JCHA awareness of the success in the St. Louis experience had Rigby thinking of ways to increase the resident role in management. The problem of how to implement that greater role was solved in early 1976 when HUD announced the MDRC national demonstration project, and Jersey City signed on for AHM and for Curries Woods.

Clearly the initiatives taken by the JCHA and by residents at AHM were critical to the eventual decision to implement tenant management at the site. The transition was possible because those JCHA approaches directly involved
residents. The linkage between refurbishment efforts and tenant organizing allowed leadership to develop and emerge among AHM residents. This emergence of leadership was another important component of the transition toward the recognition of an increased internal capacity at the site. Finally the transitional period of 1973-76 led to the establishment by necessity of a working relationship between the LHA and residents which involved rights and responsibilities on the part of both.
Table 1: Comparison of Site Characteristics at 3 Jersey City Tenant Management Sites in 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>A.H. Moore</th>
<th>Mont. Gardens</th>
<th>Curries Wds.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of buildings</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of apartments</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year occupied</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apt. density/acre</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancy rate</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Prnt.</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. Pers per apt.</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rigby, 1982

The process by which CW became the second tenant management demonstration site follows almost exactly that at AHM. The outcomes were however much different; the CW Board resigned 16 months after assuming management responsibility before a contract was even signed with the JCHA. CW, with seven 13-story buildings on 10.6 acres, and 712 units, was JCHA's largest development. Physically AHM and CW were almost exactly the same and in similar condition at the time of the start of the demonstration. Two key demographic differences between the developments were that CW had a much higher percentage of white households (57-14%) and a higher
percentage of households headed by an elderly person (41-11%) (Rigby, 1982) (see table 1)

Like AHM the turnaround effort at CW started with refurbishing and organizing efforts in two buildings. Those initial organizing efforts generated results according to Board Chairperson Catherine Smith. Tenant patrols, lobby monitors and elevator operators were working throughout the site until the DCA money ran out. (Smith interview, April 1986) Smith maintains that at the point in 1976 before the money ran out, leadership at CW was strong and stable, but that when that grant ended and the JCHA proposed management, "all hell broke loose." The former Board chairperson recalls that:

"They (JCHA) had no choice but to offer us tenant management because our tenant council (UCC) was strong. When it was first proposed we thought it was a good idea -- people were saying, 'we can do a better job.' Then all these big people, consultant types came in and did away with the UCC. We wanted to keep what we had.

At the same time, Curries Woods was still in transition. There was a rapid turnover of the population. Another factor was our relationship with the Housing Authority. We were very suspicious of them, when we needed to be partners. There sure was no partnership there. The entire Board eventually resigned. The new Board failed, but it was not just because it was a bad Board. Things were happening here which the Board had no control over, like whites moving out and blacks moving in."

(Smith interview, April 1986)

In May, 1974, one month after the DCA-funded organizing program accelerated, the residents in the two buildings at CW went on a "quasi rent strike" to win commitments from the Authority and salaries for the lobby monitors. According to Smith, "tenants became disenchanted working hard on patrols where they were not getting paid." (Smith interview, April
The "strike" ended before legal action was initiated by the JCHA but an acrimonious and adversarial relationship was established between residents and the Authority. (Rigby, 1982)

Rigby gives a slightly different account of the failure at CW. In his 1982 report, Rigby writes that the JCHA efforts through the DCA grant were generating far less in enthusiasm and results than those at AHM. Rigby recalls that the level of participation in resident capacity-building and organizing activity at CW was low and that progress had been made by 1976 mostly in the area of social services. The JCHA Director recalls that, "the Authority's support of, or rather concession to, the (CW) Tenant Council's targeting an at-large, social service effort had failed to create even a semblance of the organizational building blocks generated by AHM's lobby-monitors." (Rigby, 1982) Even though the JCHA Director felt that CW lacked the leadership or organizational capacity of AHM, and though tenant interest in taking on management was far less than at AHM, the JCHA's application was submitted and approved to make CW the seventh site in the MDRC national demonstration.

At the time, the JCHA's rationale for the application was two-fold: 1) conventional management at CW had proven completely ineffective and unsatisfactory to residents, and 2) that given responsibility to manage residents would by necessity form a strong organization as well as a cooperative partnership with the JCHA. (Rigby interview, Dec. 1985) The failure of tenant management at CW is attributed by Rigby and
Kolodny to the lack of interest and participation of
development residents. The hostile relationship with the LHA
is also cited by JCHA and residents as a key difference
between the CW and AHM experience which had an impact on the
very different outcomes.

Leadership turnover at the CW Board was another major
destabilizing factor, with more than 70 residents serving on
the Board during the demonstration period. Finally, there was
more commitment among leadership as well as among residents to
make tenant management work at AHM than at CW, and that may be
the single most critical difference between the two.
According to Smith: "A. Harry Moore is across town but it
might as well be on the other side of the world. It is a
whole different set of people over there. They were
consistent; we never got our act together." (Smith interview,
April 1986)

The initiative which resulted in tenant management at
both AHM and CW came mostly from the JCHA, and its new and
progressive executive director. AHM resident leaders
expressed dissatisfaction with central management and then
embraced the idea of tenant management, but the idea really
came from Rigby, whose awareness of it came out of the St.
Louis experience. Reverend Robert Blount, who was Board
chairman when the TMC got started and has been Resident
Manager since 1981, remembers that, "We knew we could do a
better job of managing than the Authority, but we could never
have gotten started without them giving us a push, getting us
into the training program, and then providing support."
The two other Jersey City sites in which residents have taken on tenant management built directly on the successful experience of AHM. At Montgomery Gardens (MG), the Authority's third high-rise family development, resident leaders had been understandably advocating with the JCHA since 1974 for the same kind of organizing and refurbishing campaign that had been turning things around across town at AHM. In building design the 462-unit site, with six 10-story buildings, is almost an exact duplicate of AHM. The populations of the two sites also mirror each other except for MG's slightly larger number of households headed by an elderly person. (Rigby, 1982) (see Table 1)

The conditions before tenant management at MG were similar to those at the other two high-rise sites in 1974 with a few exceptions. While, according to Rigby, "the interior and exterior public spaces were devastated," MG had a less than one percent vacancy rate, the rate of serious crime was lower, and "except for the acutely deteriorated physical appearance and condition of the site, other indices of residential distress were relatively low." (Rigby, 1982)

MG residents were enthusiastic, organized, and ready to make a commitment for the refurbishment effort, according to both Rigby and residents. The JCHA, on the other hand, was involved in conflict at CW in late 1974 and early 1975, and was reluctant to interpret this enthusiasm at MG as organizational potential. (Rigby, 1982) In this case the residents took the greater share of initiative. MG residents
presented the JCHA a plan for building-by-building organizing, lobby-monitoring and refurbishing, which the Authority agreed to proceed with.

Although MG was not included in the MDRC demonstration resident leaders expressed interest in tenant management and confidence that they would make it work. In late 1977 the JCHA and the MG tenant organization agreed to initiate tenant management independent of the national demonstration. A TMC Board was elected in February and a staff was hired in May of that year. TMC staff training was completed in February, 1979 and the contract signed on October 31 of that year was almost identical to that signed by AHM residents more than a year earlier. (Rigby, 1982)

At MG the Board hired the tenant organizer, Lillian Howard, to be the Site Manager. Also a resident, and former building captain, Howard remains the site manager in 1986. She recalls:

"I knew how the Housing Authority worked and how to get things done from my experience as community organizer. We knew we could manage more effectively. My staff is working all the time; we're not gone at 5:00. We got the halls repainted, floodlights put in, security in lobbies, and new entrances. We did it with the Authority's best wishes, but it was my role, and those of other leaders that made it work."

(Howard interview, Dec. 1985)

With Howard and Board Chairperson Catherine Todd still in key leadership roles, MG provides another model of effective tenant management. While the experience at MG has not been the subject of the volume of research that AHM has inspired, Rigby and the tenant leaders interviewed have verified that the TMC has succeeded against the three criteria outlined above. MG
differs from AHM in the degree of initiative taken by residents in the earliest stages and in the less advanced state of deterioration that existed at the site. MG residents as well as JCHA staff also had the opportunity to learn from both the success of AHM and failure of CW.

The 314-unit Booker T. Washington (BTW) development will formally become the fourth Jersey City site to undertake tenant management when a contract is signed with the JCHA sometime in 1986. It will be the first low-rise TMC development and though it is much smaller than the three high-rises tenant leaders hope to follow the same cooperative management model as those which they have observed at AHM and MG. According to the tenants' association President Frances Charles, who is training to become the site manager:

"We have had many problems with management, and they still exist today. We were able to get $2 million for site renovations, and fortunately we have a strong tenant council so we can always tell the Housing Authority what we want. And once we have a signed contract, they will have to listen. We still need to build confidence among tenants here that tenant management will work."

(Charles interview, Dec. 1985)

It will be interesting to follow the BTW management experience given some of the differences in size and density. If Charles' assessment of the organizational strength and capacity of the tenant association is correct there will likely be a third TMC success story in Jersey City.

What then were the pre-conditions for success or failure at the three Jersey City TMC sites? The conditions which set up the failure of tenant management at CW are clearly linked to the historical questions. The commitment of residents and
turnover of leadership on the Board and relationship with the JCHA were key factors.

The role of individual leaders in the respective TMCs again warrants some discussion. Rev. Blount clearly commands the respect of the residents of AHM. After spending two hours with Rev. Blount in and around the site, that respect was evident, as was the fact that he is a tireless and committed worker. Howard and Todd at MG have also been active, well-respected, hard-working leaders for years, and have played significant roles in the success of that TMC. A key ingredient in both beyond mere personal skills is the depth of organizational and Board experience of the leaders. According to Rigby, that experience and the low turnover of leaders at AHM and MG, compared to high leadership turnover at CW were critical factors in making two survive and one fail. (Rigby interview, Dec. 1985)

Both TMC sites have measured high on traditional management performance indicators on both a before and after basis as well as in comparison to other Jersey City sites. Both AHM and MG have held vacancy rates at or below 2%. AHM's vacancy reduction has been particularly dramatic; vacancies are down from 20% in 1974 and 8% in 1976. Both sites have reduced the number of apartment repair workorders remaining unfilled at the end of the month from the 150-300 range to the 20-40 range. Both have reduced the number of households delinquent in rent payment for more than 30 days from a 20% level to a 3-9% range. (Rigby, 1985)

The turnaround at the two sites is equally dramatic on
external, social indicators. Major crimes against people and property have remained at or below city-wide averages and well below other low income neighborhoods without public housing. At AHM this represents a reduction in serious crime from three times the city-wide average in 1974. The internal capacity for employment, economic development and independent fundraising have also increased at both sites. Some of the programs instituted by the TMCs include: senior citizen dinners, community trips, summer recreation and food programs, job training, and neighborhood enterprise development. (Rigby, 1984)

Finally, both AHM and MG hold monthly well-attended tenant meetings to exchange information, air complaints, and review problems. These meetings, which do not take place at other Jersey City developments, are important to sustain communication and foster participation and tenant ownership of internal management responsibility. The most intangible and hard to measure indicator is the sense of power, community and confidence within the tenant population at the two developments, one of which (AHM) faced possible demolition eleven years ago. That collective sense of pride and self-worth which was absent before tenant management at both sites is cited by Rigby and tenant managers as one of the primary arguments for its duplication at BTW and elsewhere. (Jersey City interviews, Dec. 1985)

With three developments managed by residents Jersey City has replaced St. Louis as Exhibit A to make the case for tenant management. It has worked at two large and troubled
sites and failed at another. The result of that failure at CW is as telling as the success at AHM and MG in documenting the effects of residents managing. According to former CW chairperson and current resident Catherine Smith, "I'm very sorry tenant management didn't work here. Had it worked I'm sure we would be much better off than we are back with the Authority. Today we are in very bad shape." (Smith interview, April 1986)
XIII. THE CASE OF KENILWORTH-PARKSIDE

"People talk about public housing residents as though we're somehow different from everybody else. The only difference is we're poor, poor, poor. But we're no different. Doesn't everybody want to control their own destiny? Doesn't everybody have dreams? Well, here at Kenilworth we're about making our dreams come true."

- Kimi Gray
Board Chairperson, Kenilworth-Parkside, Washington (Cohn, 1985)

Kenilworth-Parkside, a 464-unit family, low-rise development in the northeast corner of Washington D.C., is the most recent case of a tenant managed development. It contrasts with both the Bromley-Heath and Jersey City cases in a number of interesting ways. Besides being a low-rise development and smaller than those in Boston and Jersey City, its TMC has emerged in a much different political climate. Like both, it is another typical before and after success story of a troubled development turned around by the efforts of a TMC. Unlike the three previously-discussed cases residents at Kenilworth-Parkside (KP) are actively discussing tenant ownership of units there. For that reason the development has become the jewel of the Reagan administration's eye and is frequently cited by HUD officials and conservative spokespeople as a prototype of local control which should be replicated elsewhere.

The KP TMC, like those in St. Louis, Boston and Jersey City, grew from widespread discontent among residents over shoddy housing conditions at the site. According to Resident Architect Michael Price, "We were tired of having no heat or
hot water for three years. We got organized and met with the
(Housing Authority) Director, the Mayor, and asked them to let
us give managing a shot, since things couldn't get worse."  
(Price interview, Dec. 1985) Tenant leaders were able to
propose tenant management on the heels of the successful and
by then, stable TMC operations in Boston, St. Louis and at
some of the other demonstration sites. Housing authority
officials reluctantly agreed that they had nothing to lose and
sponsored a two-year training program in 1980. A formal
management contract was signed in March, 1982 and a Resident
Management Corporation was established.

The story behind the establishment of tenant management
in KP seems to duplicate those in the previously discussed
cases. The initiative to manage did come from resident
leaders within the development. In this case the LHA agreed
to provide training without access to earmarked funding from
an external source like HUD or the Ford Foundation. The
political climate in the early 1980s was also clearly
different from that in the 60s and 70s. Programs like VISTA,
OEO, and Model Cities, which sought to address poverty and
powerlessness through organizing and empowerment were in the
early 1980s falling victim to the so-called "Reagan
revolution."

HUD, during the Reagan administration, has made public
housing one of its budget-cutting targets. Officials in the
department speak in nothing but glowing terms, though, about
the tenant management effort at KP, and in 1984 rewarded the
development with a $13.2 million grant for renovations. In
In his 1984 State of the Union address, President Reagan singled out Kenilworth-Parkside as a model for the future in solving problems in public housing. One of the sponsors of a homeownership demonstration project based on that model is conservative Representative Jack Kemp. The model included an opportunity for residents of KP to purchase their units and the development has signed on to HUD's national demonstration project to encourage homeownership of public housing units. (Gray interview, March 1986)

Timing and location have combined to put the KP TMC in a brighter national spotlight than its predecessors. By the three criteria of this thesis and as assessed by liberals as well as conservatives, the TMC at KP has been an enormous success. It is an interesting case because it is the most recent and because it has attracted so much national attention from all sides of the ideological spectrum. That attention is a result of KP's success, the ability of its charismatic and articulate Board Chairperson Kimi Gray to promote that success, and of the fit between KP residents' desire to control their housing and HUD's interest in unloading public housing units.

Support from HUD helped KP leaders build the TMC effort in the early stages when the District of Columbia Housing Authority (DCHA) was providing only limited support. The DCHA did have enough interest in tenant management to enter into the original agreement, but according to TMC leaders, it has only been recently with the hiring of a new Director, Madeleine Petty, that the relationship has been positive.
The 1982 management contract gave the TMC all responsibility for rent collection, building maintenance, tenant selection, accounting, and policy decision-making. "The only time we need to deal with them (the DCHA) is for money," says Roy. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to discuss the KP situation with DCHA staff who either expressed ignorance or an unwillingness to comment.

The results on internal management indicators have been dramatic, particularly in fiscal management and rent collection. (see Table 2) It is rare in urban public housing for rental receipts to cover development operating costs but under tenant management KP has reached internal self-sufficiency. The per unit monthly rental receipts at KP increased by 60% in the first year after the TMC took over, and increased another 28% in the second year. (Marshall, 1984)

The TMC was at the same time successful in lowering operating expenditures while increasing the level of on-site services. Table 2 breaks down rental income and operating expenditures for the final year of LHA management and the first two years of tenant management at KP. The figures are per unit per month and were not available for 1982. Administrative costs at KP declined more than 60% in the first year of tenant management.
TABLE 2 - Income and Expenditures before and after tenant Management at Kenilworth-Parkside

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conventionally Managed</th>
<th>Tenant Managed</th>
<th>9/81</th>
<th>9/83</th>
<th>9/84</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operating Receipts</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental Income</td>
<td>$60.14</td>
<td>101.00</td>
<td>130.52</td>
<td>(+60%)</td>
<td>(+28)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operating Expenditures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>17.48</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
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<td>7.77</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ordinary Maintenance</td>
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<td>54.73</td>
<td>59.69</td>
<td>(-26)</td>
<td>(+9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-routine Maintenance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Marshall, 1983

Ordinary maintenance, including day-to-day upkeep expenditures declined by 26% when tenants took control. Both the administrative and maintenance costs increased by less than 10% from the already lowered levels. Utility costs increased 26% in the TMC's first year, and stabilized in the second year. The initial year increase can be attributed to inflation and a higher occupancy rate. (Marshall, 1984) This experience with utility costs contrasts with the general experience in urban public housing where utility costs make up a significant percentage of operating costs, and are often overwhelming.

The fiscal success of the TMC is due primarily to three factors: the significant decrease in the vacancy rate, greatly
improved rent collection efficiency, and the increased income of development residents, resulting from more job creation. The factors all relate directly to tenant management and what TMC leaders claim is both the increased effectiveness of residents collecting rent from other residents and the greater willingness of those residents to pay on time for greatly improved living conditions. (Roy interview, Jan. 1986)

On the expense side the TMC manager claims that the incentive for fiscal responsibility is greater for residents managing their own development than for a housing authority. (Roy interview, Jan. 1986) The money that is saved one year can be pumped back into the local budget instead of becoming part of a city-wide operating deficit. The change is due partly then to the decentralization of accounting and partly to education and training of residents who learn that things like lower demand for routine maintenance and energy conservation benefit them individually as well as the project as a whole. (Gray interview, March, 1986) This attitude of collective responsibility and self-interest is a definite by-product of tenant management, and is not frequently the prevailing attitude at large urban public housing developments.

It is the external by-products of tenant management at Kenilworth-Parkside that have gained the most national attention and which tenant leaders choose to highlight as the TMC's major accomplishments. Programs that have been initiated and run by the TMC involve education, economic development, day care, education, and others which add
significantly to the sense of pride and attachment to community experienced by KP residents. These programs, according to resident leaders, are as important as the management-oriented changes in changing the physical and psychological state of the development. Kimi Gray expresses the greatest satisfaction in these external management achievements:

"The Housing Authority deals in bricks and mortar only. We say if you don't serve residents, they don't serve you. Supportive service programs are as important as the day-to-day operations here." (Gray interview, March 1986)

According to Gray the most important supportive service program at KP actually started in 1974 -- the "College Here We Come Program." The program, which Gray refers to as "the mother of all other programs," provides GED, remedial and college-level tutoring for residents along with assistance with applications, financial aid forms, and access to local universities. Gray claims that between the start of the program and fall of 1985, 487 students have been sent to college or university from the development. (NCNE, 1985)

The TMC in 1982 contracted with the DC Department of Employment Services for a job training program. The program provides training from building maintenance staff in plumbing, electrical work, painting, plastering, and minor repairs to youth in the development. Other economic development programs initiated since tenant management include a resident-managed thrift store, a clothing store, an on-site snack bar, and a beauty parlor. These enterprises are ones which not only create jobs for residents, but also fill important community
needs. The supermarket, for example, is the only place within a two-mile radius of the development where fresh produce and meats can be purchased. (Roy interview, Jan. 1986)

Supportive service programs initiated by the TMC include two day care centers for pre-school children, a health care center, family counseling, legal services, and a mini-employment agency. The day care centers, which were the first initiative of the TMC after the contract was signed in 1982, serve 25 children each, and are an excellent example of how supportive services, economic development and job creation, and management efforts are interdependent and feed on each other. Providing on-site day care provides employment directly to eleven staff at the centers, and indirectly by allowing a parent using the day care services the ability to work instead of staying home with the child. The enhanced earning potential and subsequent income of these residents in turn enhances the TMC's rent collection efforts.

The final extension of KP residents' vision of change at the development is a cooperative homeownership program which will allow residents to actually own their units. The ownership issue in public housing raises many interesting questions which will not be considered in this thesis. The important questions in the KP case are: 1) How has the possibility of ownership affected the level of management success?, and 2) Whose vision was it that has been implemented at the development and who have been the critical actors in determining its course?

Homeownership of units, as promoted by HUD in its
national demonstration project, has been enthusiastically embraced by KP residents. "Homeownership is our ultimate goal," says Gray, who claims, "Residents understand that we're going in that direction and it provides motivation to go out and get employment and keep the rents paid up." Gray envisions a cooperative at most of the site, but insists, "we will never have 100% ownership, since we want to leave rental units available for those who can't afford to own." (Gray interview, March 1986)

The prospect of owning one's apartment may be a useful carrot or incentive to public housing residents, and one which makes a development easier to manage by residents. The evidence is less than complete in the KP case and the results of the ownership experiment will prove interesting both to inform policy analysts on that program and to shed light on the efficacy of tenant management as a transition to homeownership. The early success of the TMC at Kenilworth suggests that the skills of the resident managers, initiation of programs, and changed atmosphere within the community have been more important to the tenant management effort than has been the prospect of ownership.

It is interesting that the vision and goals of resident leaders at KP and those of Reagan administration housing officials seem to have converged. The idea of tenant ownership came from HUD, not from residents at the development. Without the national demonstration it is unlikely that KP residents or any public housing residents would be able to initiate any type of ownership program. It is
important to consider here because the model of tenant management being encouraged by HUD in 1986 is one which will lead directly to eventual ownership of units by residents in Denver, Houston, Chicago, Kansas City, Tulsa and Minneapolis, as part of the current national demonstration project.

A final question which emerges again from this case, as it did in the previous ones is that of the importance of the key individual in making tenant management work. According to Mabel Roy, "there would be no resident management without Kimi Gray." (Roy interview, Jan. 1986) The role of Gray as the articulate and charismatic Board chairperson is still significant at KP and was clearly pivotal in the original formation of the TMC. Gray has now become a national spokesperson for tenant management and even for tenant ownership. Other KP leaders have expressed doubt that the development would have considered any type of ownership were it not for her enthusiastic support and advocacy for the program. (Roy interview, Feb. 1986)

Gray argues that for tenants to take over management, "you do need charismatic leaders, but it is never just one individual." She adds, like Hailey, that, "we train leadership here, we get all the information around and never hoard it or sit on it." (Gray interview, March 1986) Again, it seems that the role of one or more charismatic, highly skilled and respected leaders is critical to the initial phases of negotiating tenant management. This individual role is more significant, the less support the tenants receive from the LHA and the importance of that individual declines over
time with the increased capacity of the TMC and the local resident community.

At Kenilworth-Parkside, the tenant management effort in only four years, has achieved a level of stability and success beyond the expectations of anyone involved. KP's success provides evidence that tenant management is not merely a policy solution for large developments. KP's experience also confirms that a TMC can emerge and survive in the political climate of the 1980s and without the support of a national demonstration project involving multiple sites.
IX. HAS TENANT MANAGEMENT BEEN AN EFFECTIVE MODEL?

The experience in Boston, Jersey City and Washington, provides some strong evidence that tenant management is a viable management model for residents of public housing. This chapter will consider the set of conventional management questions in greater detail to explore further the issue of the viability of tenant management. It is this set of questions dealing directly with real estate management which is considered most critical to its acceptance as a management model by LHAs, housing analysts, and public officials.

Critics of tenant management frequently cite its high costs and its failure to improve on LHA management performance. Eugene Meehan, in his discussion of the St. Louis tenant management experiment, argues that the TMCs have failed to manage better than the LHA. Meehan cites the negligible improvement in vacancy reduction, in rent collection, and maintenance delivery compared to LHA-managed developments as evidence that TMCs do not offer a model for more effective management. (Meehan, 1979)

The amount of hard evidence and data on TMC management performance in the respective cities is limited. In each situation the method of data collection, LHA management and accounting, and circumstances are different, so it is difficult to make comparisons or draw conclusions from those data. This chapter will consider each measure of management efficiency by considering the data which are available as well as ways in which the TMC model has or can address those
discrete management functions.

1) **Budgeting and Fiscal Management** — Two questions are critical to consideration of this management function: Is tenant management more costly and in what ways does the TMC model provide more fiscally efficient management than traditional LHA management? Tenant management has generally been more costly than central management for three reasons: 1) the lengthy transition period and training and technical assistance costs, 2) modernization, refurbishing and upgrading costs that often are necessary at developments making the transition to tenant management, and 3) the increased cost of additional site personnel usually required by TMCs. This thesis will argue that TMCs can be at least as efficient as LHAs in fiscal management and that as long as costs are the same or even marginally higher, that tenant management should be judged according to the other internal and external criteria.

The most complete data that have been collected on the cost of tenant management were compiled by the MDRC from the seven demonstration sites. The study concludes that tenant management is more costly. That conclusion, though, considers only those seven sites, three of which failed to get a TMC off the ground, and considers them only in the start-up years when the costs are highest. (MDRC, 1979) It is likely the numbers would be different if the study had considered more stable later years when start-up costs are not factored in. Also, the MDRC merely documents the increase in expenditures without considering the cost-effectiveness of those increases. This
thesis argues that in each case the initial increase in expenditures is justified considering the local return and that over time the TMC can move more easily toward financial self-sufficiency.

The MDRC determined the incremental cost of tenant management at each site by determining the pro-rated cost under LHA management, adding a HUD inflation multiplier for each of the three years, and subtracting the total from the actual amount spent on tenant management at the site for the three demonstration years. By this accounting method A. Harry Moore in Jersey City is projected for three years at $4,156,000, which is $651,000 less than the amount actually spent. The incremental TMC cost by this methodology at AHM, is 16%. (MDRC, 1981)

At Curries Woods, the second Jersey City demonstration site, the increased cost was 18%. At both Jersey City sites, technical assistance costs were relatively low since the LHA participated directly in the training process. More than half the increase in cost at the sites went for personnel on site and in the central office. (MDRC, 1981) Again, these data reflect the costs of the three years of the demonstration, July 1, 1976-June 30, 1979. Those years do not correspond with actual takeover of management by the TMC with a signed contract in every case.

The highest incremental cost of the seven sites was recorded at Ashanti in Rochester. The nearly 30% increase in costs is attributed at Ashanti to personnel costs, particularly an increase in security staff, shifting early
from the special demonstration budget to LHA payroll. The other incremental cost increases, according to the MDRC methodology, were 22.6% in New Haven, and 13.5 percent in New Orleans. The MDRC could not report cost data from Louisville since that LHA did not break down costs for its individual projects, or from Oklahoma City, where tenant management was dropped in early 1978. (MDRC, 1981)

Of the seven demonstration sites, the one with the most up-to-date fiscal data is A. Harry Moore in Jersey City. For that development the evidence indicates that cost increases decreased for each year after the initial demonstration phase and that revenues increased to defray those costs. At Bromley-Heath, the concrete financial data is unavailable, but BHA Area Manager Dorothy Griffith estimates that the TMC there spends slightly more than the BHA spends at a development of comparable size. (Griffith interview, Oct. 1985) The continued increased cost of the Bromley TMC can be partly explained by the amount of external programs and services available at that site compared to others in Boston. The Kenilworth-Parkside development in Washington D.C. provides recent evidence to support the proposition that tenant management can be a cost-effective management model in which the TMC can both reduce costs and increase revenues. (see Chapter 8)

A critical component of a TMC's takeover of budgeting and fiscal management is the decentralization of those responsibilities. The institution of project-based financial management provides an incentive to save. Under LHA central
management that local incentive to save does not generally exist since costs are aggregated and any savings at one site will likely be a cost overrun at another. Decentralized tenant management or decentralized LHA management would allow local managers to roll savings into the next year's budget or into other programs or expenses. An additional argument for greater resident involvement in budget issues is that those who live at a site can much more efficiently set spending priorities for a development.

The additional cost of tenant management is much less of an issue in cases where external money is available to cover the costs of training and technical assistance. In the demonstration cases, as well as at Bromley and Kenilworth, federal and private monies were raised to meet the transitional expenses. It must also be noted that in most of these cases LHAs were dealing with their most seriously deteriorated, troubled developments, so that they could have expected higher costs to improve conditions regardless of management type. If the additional cost corresponds to additional supportive service and job creation at the site, this thesis would argue that the cost-effectiveness at those sites should be measured in both the increased revenues generated and the quality of those programs.

2) Rent Collection -- The other side of cost is revenue, and the success collecting rent is critical to a development's fiscal and psychological well-being. Rental revenue losses cause reductions in routine maintenance and LHA failure to efficiently collect rent can signal residents that the
Authority will tolerate other activities outside normally accepted activity, like vandalism and crime. (Fuller interview, Feb. 1986) There are two ways performance of this management function can be improved: regular collection of delinquent and current rents and increasing the amount of collectible rent. There is evidence to indicate that TMCs can perform more effectively than LHAs in both areas.

The MDRC report concluded that there was no noticeable effect in the three years at the demonstration sites on rent collection. The report cites an increase of average monthly rent, and rent collected at three sites, A. Harry Moore, New Haven and New Orleans. (MDRC, 1981) Of the four sites where the MDRC study failed to find an increase in rental revenue, two failed to survive. The other two, Louisville and Rochester, realized greatly improved rental revenue in the years following the MDRC study period.

The data available on rent collection are by no means comprehensive but do indicate strong performance by TMCs. At A. Harry Moore from 1978-82, the average per-unit rent collected increased from $74 to $108, a 47% increase, compared with a 40% increase at other Jersey City sites. Delinquency had been reduced in 1982 from 15-25% to under 5%, which was lower than for other JCHA developments. (Rigby, 1985) At Iroquois Homes in Louisville, 96% of rent due was collected by the TMC, compared to less than 95% by other city sites. At the New Orleans B.W. Cooper development, rental income was increased more than 100%, from $67,000 a month in 1978 to $178,000 a month in 1984. (Hundley, 1985) At Kenilworth-
Parkside, the increase in rental revenues is even more dramatic. The per-unit monthly rent more than doubled from $60 to $130.50 from Sept. 1981 to Sept. 1984.

There are a number of reasons why TMCs should be able to raise a higher percentage of rental income due than LHAs. One reason, cited by TMC staff, is that as residents themselves they establish better relationships with other residents. The TMC/resident relationship contrasts with the often adversarial LHA/resident relationship in which residents are more likely to test the limits of the rent collection system. Another is that improved morale and improved living conditions that have been by-products of tenant management at troubled sites provide more of an incentive to pay rent to residents of those sites. Tenant management has also provided access to employment opportunities through job training, childcare, and economic development programs which have led to decreased unemployment and welfare dependence, higher incomes, and as a result higher rent rolls.

3) Tenant Selection/Eviction -- Much has been written about the so-called "problem tenant" in public housing communities. Vandalism, drug trafficking, and crime have been as critical to the breakdown of those communities as deteriorating bricks and mortar. In Boston, developments like Mission Hill, Orchard Park, and Charlestown, where vandalism and crime are most widespread are considered the most troubled by BHA staff. (Fuller interview, Feb. 1986) While the roots of these problems are most likely found in poverty, joblessness and poor housing conditions, the short-term
management response is to improve tenant selection and make it easier to evict those tenants causing the problems.

Both tenant selection and eviction are management tools which can be critical to the livability of a community. Poor tenant selection has been cited as the cause of deterioration at BHA developments, like West Broadway in the late 1960s and 70s. BHA area managers list the inability of the Authority to evict "problem tenants" as one of the most significant management problems at BHA-managed developments. (Area Director interviews, Oct. 1985)

It is easier to document the case that TMCs can more effectively perform eviction than it is to make the case for TMC tenant selection. For one, most LHAs have maintained responsibility for tenant selection, either because they have been unwilling to share or give up that responsibility or because tenants have not wanted to do it. None of the demonstration TMCs participated in tenant selection and even the Bromley-Heath TMC has left that one task to the BHA. The one exception has been Kenilworth-Parkside, which has assumed all management responsibilities including tenant selection.

Tenant selection is a function which raises a number of sensitive issues. In some cases, there are strict legal requirements for how to maintain waiting lists and fill vacancies. In others, tenant selection opens the opportunity for favoritism and abuse of power by whoever controls the process. Another issue is one of selecting higher income working tenants over more needy lower income persons. This income-mixing strategy might prove particularly tempting to
managers in a newly-renovated development. The experience at other rehabilitated developments does suggest that residents are more likely to admit only the highest-income applicants with the best records. (Area Directors interview, Oct. 1985)

The record shows that in TMC developments the moveout rate is much lower so that tenant selection becomes mostly an issue for reoccupying vacant units. While this is far from the most critical management function, I would argue that it is one that would be enhanced with a greater degree of direct tenant participation. This is particularly true in tenant-managed developments where the residents who best understand community needs are also taking responsibility for maintaining the quality of life in that community. It is equally important that the TMC not be able to exercise complete discretion and that a strict set of written selection guidelines be negotiated with the LHA and adhered to by the TMC.

TMCs attempting to evict a family must go through the same legal process as an LHA. That process can be very difficult and time consuming. TMC staff can be more effective than LHA staff in identifying "problem tenants" because they have much closer contact with the community and due to the increased level of tenant organization and communication in tenant-managed developments. (Hailey interview, March 1986) Also residents in that community are more likely to monitor activities in their buildings and neighborhoods than in LHA-managed developments, which will result in speedier eviction of residents involved in crime, drugs or vandalism. (Friend
interview, Oct. 1985)

4) Maintenance delivery -- This management function has the greatest impact on how residents feel about their living environment in public housing. Issues of filling emergency and routine workorders are mentioned most frequently by residents at BHA developments who are asked to discuss management problems at their developments. (Mission Hill, Charlestown, Orchard Park, West Broadway, Franklin Field interviews, March 1986) One of the greatest challenges for the landlord is to keep up with maintenance demands heightened by vandalism and the demands of old stock, heating, electrical and plumbing systems.

How then, can resident managers improve on the often poor performance of LHAs in maintenance delivery? There is limited evidence that TMCs have performed better than LHAs in cities with tenant-managed sites but it is inconclusive. At A. Harry Moore there are data to support that notion: in the last four months of 1981 the TMC completed 9.41 workorders per day compared to 8 by the closest competitor in Jersey City during the same period. In 1982 the AHM TMC also performed far better than any other family site in the number of incomplete workorders outstanding with 0 for six straight months. (Rigby, 1984) At the Louisville TMC site, 96% of routine workorders were completed in five days or less compared with 93% for large family developments as a group. (Kolodny, 1983)

The amount of hard data on maintenance delivery at the other TMC sites is sketchy at best. The MDRC evaluation concludes that the demonstration sites performed worse than
before the TMC on maintenance but the same problems with the study apply as mentioned above. One must also consider that the transition to tenant manager often involved a complete restructuring of maintenance staffs and hiring of residents who required training.

Another key factor in TMC maintenance delivery is that, as in any situation where management functions are contracted out, the TMC maintenance staff is not tied to union guidelines and job titles. For most LHAs and definitely for the BHA, union job titles and wage restrictions can define both the level and type of staffing at local developments. The constraints imposed by the maintenance staff unions at the BHA has led to inefficient maintenance delivery, according to BHA area managers. (Area manager interviews, Oct. 1985) For TMCs or any private manager, the absence of unionized staff can mean more staff per level of resources, and a distribution of skills and experience geared more directly to the particular needs of the specific site.

The effectiveness of maintenance delivery and lower worker turnaround time are tied to more than just the efficiency of the staff. According to Bromley-Heath Operations Director Steve Vadnais, "Here the staff is constantly in touch with the most urgent maintenance needs, because they are residents, and live with the same problems." (Vadnais interview, Nov. 1985) The other side of the proposition that management staff can better relate to tenant needs seems to be true also. Residents relate to and empathize better with TMC staff, as evidenced by the fact that
tenant complaints and demand for services is lower at Bromley than at other BHA developments and much lower at AHM than at other Jersey City developments. (Rigby, 1984)

5) Occupancy/Vacancy Reduction -- This is as much a function of overall Housing Authority policy as it is a management issue. It deserves brief mention here since a site's success in reducing vacancies and in occupying units has been mentioned prominently in much of the TMC literature and because the occupancy level is tied directly to project income. Also the vacancy problem is one to which LHAs throughout the country are seeking policy interventions to alleviate. In Boston, BHA Administrator Doris Bunte has made the reduction of vacant units in family public housing as one of the main priorities of her administration. (Hall interview, Dec. 1985)

The MDRC evaluation gives the TMC sites high grades on both vacancy reduction and on turnaround time to occupy units. It is difficult in this case, however, to make the connection between TMC management performance and reduction of vacant units. The latter often depends on a commitment of modernization money by the LHA or an external funding source. Also, in cases like Bromley-Heath in which the TMC was unable to substantially reduce vacancies, it is often due not to TMC failures, but to an inability to raise external funding. (Worrell interview, Nov. 1985)

The success in reducing vacancies at A. Harry Moore illustrates another factor which argues for the increased effectiveness of TMCs in this category. According to AHM
Resident Manager Rev. Blount, "We pulled the whole community together to make our project a better place to live. No matter how much money the Authority gave us before (tenant management) it didn't matter because the property would be destroyed and no one wanted to live there." (Blount interview, Dec. 1985) Increasing development occupancy, which in turn increases the rental revenue, is tied to factors related to the collective feeling of pride in community and improved desirability of units in that development. Those factors are difficult to quantify and document, but as discussed in the case studies, they are ones which often follow tenant management.

6) Conclusions -- When breaking down management effectiveness into its component parts, one can argue that tenant management can be more effective in each individual category. Each discrete function, however, is dependent on every other variable and outcome. Vacancy reduction increases rent collection which can add to maintenance staff and reduce turnaround time. Just as important as success on the above management functions to TMC performance are the external functions like job training and development, security, and service provision.

The TMC track record on many of the external variables has been documented in the case studies. The achievements in Boston, Jersey City and Washington at increasing tenant employment, improving security and delivering supportive services give ample support to the notion that TMCs can succeed against those criteria. Again, these performance
criteria are dependant on others, and are most dependent on
the commitment of residents to make a comprehensive assault on
conditions at the development. This is not to say that
similar results could not be achieved by LHA management. In
the three cases studied however, the TMC sites succeeded in
areas where LHA management had failed at those sites and in
other comparable sites in the same city.

One additional criterion must be factored into the
equation. That criterion, which is cited by Kolodny and in
the MDRC study, is the extent of tenant satisfaction with
tenant management. The MDRC survey of tenants at
demonstration sites found general satisfaction with the TMC
performance. Kolodny's study of the demonstration sites and
Jersey City, Rigby's of Jersey City, Struyk's of St. Louis, in
addition to the Cuyahoga Housing Authority and NCNE reports
all mention resident satisfaction and pride as important
outcomes of tenant management.

The level of satisfaction, pride, sense of increased
power and hope among residents in large urban public housing
developments is difficult to accurately measure. This thesis
will nonetheless assert that the attitude transformation is as
important a by-product of tenant management as any of the
measurable management performance outcomes. This assertion
derives partly from the social and organizational principle of
self-help which says personal and organizational development
is tied to people working together to improve their own lives
as opposed to being dependent on others, and partly from the
case evidence.
The comparative evidence of sites which succeed and sites which fail (like A. Harry Moore and Curries Woods) demonstrates that it is communities which unite, avoid divisiveness and show individual and collective initiative and hard work which can manage themselves. Likewise, first-hand observation of tenant-managed communities in Boston, Jersey City and Washington leaves one with the strong impression that residents of those communities feel great pride in having succeeded in self-management in a more livable environment. It is an interesting chicken and egg question of which comes first, the pride and initiative, or the tenant management effort. The answer, I would argue is that both are true: there needs to be some organizational capacity before tenant management can work and tenant management will develop organizational skills, pride, and self-worth among residents.
X. PRE-CONDITIONS FOR TENANT MANAGEMENT

Tenant management is a viable management option for public housing. The model should not be applied at every public housing development in every city, however. Even the most ardent advocates of tenant management from Mildred Hailey to Robert Rigby argue that it can't work everywhere. The failures at Curries Woods, New Haven, Oklahoma City and Hawaii, along with tenant disinterest at Columbia Point confirm this viewpoint.

The critical question becomes then, where should tenant management be implemented? This thesis will identify the most important pre-conditions or circumstances which one should look for when considering a site for that option. This list of pre-conditions for tenant management will then be used to determine the potential for tenant management at five Boston developments.

The pre-conditions for tenant management are:

1) Tenants at a local development have to want to take over management responsibilities. Not every tenant needs to enthusiastically embrace the idea. There does need to be a commitment from at least a core of active leaders willing to take on greater responsibility. In cases where tenant management has worked, like Bromley-Heath, A.Harry Moore and Kenilworth-Parkside, leaders have cited the strong desire that existed from the outset. Conversely, in the cases where tenant management has failed to get off the ground like Hawaii, Curries Woods and Columbia Point, it has generally
been attributed to tenant apathy.

This is probably the single most important pre-condition for tenant management. There are ways to overcome almost any other obstacle. In fact, there have been cases to support exceptions to almost all the other pre-conditions listed below. The idea that residents of all public housing developments want to manage or be managed by other residents has been proven to not be the case. Even in cities like Jersey City and Washington where there are developments with proven management track records, residents in other sites have preferred to leave the responsibility to the LHA. Tenant management requires hard work and responsibility which not all public housing residents are willing to assume. Where that unwillingness exists, tenant management can never be an option.

2) For residents at a development to have an interest in tenant management there needs to be a high level of dissatisfaction with LHA management at the site. This is closely related to the first pre-condition. If residents are happy with conditions and with management and maintenance delivery it is highly unlikely that they will be motivated to take an additional burden on themselves. In most of the cases this dissatisfaction has been readily apparent and loudly articulated at sites in extremely poor physical condition.

3) There needs to be a certain level of organizational and managerial potential among tenants at the development considering tenant management. In most of the cases studied a well-organized and active resident organization played a
significant role in the negotiations to take over management responsibilities. In the St. Louis, Jersey City and Washington cases, the level of organization was used as an explicit argument for transition to management. Signs of organizational strength and capacity include attendance at meetings, participation in elections, success of projects planned and implemented, and low turnover of leadership. The Curries Woods failure, for example, has been linked to a high turnover of leadership and resident apathy as evidenced in low meeting turnout. In other cases, like Bromley-Heath and Kenilworth-Parkside evidence of strong local organizational capacity can be found in the level of supportive service programs initiated and managed by the resident organization.

4) There needs to be at least one leader capable of taking the lead role in the TMC. In every successful case there was one or more highly skilled leaders as well as an active tenant organization to take the lead in the TMC. Mildred Hailey, Kimi Gray, Bertha Gilkey, Rev. Blount and other tenant leaders have been absolutely instrumental in initiating and maintaining tenant management at their respective sites. In the case of Hailey and Gray a strong argument can be made that without them tenant management would not have gotten off the ground at Bromley or Kenilworth. In looking at potential sites it is important to identify one or more persons among existing strong leaders with the desire and potential to be managers. I would suggest that residents with the desire to manage can be trained the requisite skills even if they lack a proven leadership track record.
5) There needs to be some interest on the part of the LHA in turning over management to tenants. There does not, however, need to be a mutually supportive relationship between the LHA and residents for tenant management to work. For the two to even reach the negotiating table to discuss a contract however, there does need to be interest and a willingness on the part of the LHA to give up some of its control.

The willingness to give up management of some sites is the first thing to look for from LHAs. Many LHA administrations have not been willing to consider the option. The second aspect which would be important is whether the LHA is actually committed to the idea of tenant management so that its staff will work with and provide support to resident managers. TMCs in Boston and St. Louis have done well without that support but the circumstances in both cases were unique. Any set of residents which tries to manage without a supportive and cooperative LHA relationship could survive but would have two strikes against it before it got up to the plate.

6) Because there is a transition period of at least 1-2 years before tenants are able to assume all management responsibilities there needs to be money available for technical assistance. In most cases funding is not available from fiscally constrained LHAs so an outside source is critical.

7) The fabric of the community at the local public housing development can provide a good indicator of the viability of tenant management at that site. It is hard to
define what that fabric consists of and even harder to measure it. The term "fabric" as it is used in this thesis refers to the dynamics within the community which cause residents to be closely knit and work together or to fight among themselves. Factors like cohesiveness, relative lack of personal divisions and conflicts, low turnover and lengthy average tenancy periods of families, have all been mentioned as factors which have helped make tenant management work. It is certainly difficult to imagine any group of people experiencing problems living with one another being able to take responsibility for managing themselves within that community. It is my guess that this factor will prove critical in eliminating developments from consideration where there has been divisiveness, in-fighting and conflict among tenant leadership or even residents at-large.

8) The development needs to either be in decent physical condition with most units ready for occupancy, or plans need to have been approved and funded in advance of tenants signing a management contract. The evidence is by no means conclusive on this factor. In fact some BHA staff have argued that tenants would have a much higher success rate in planning and implementing modernization strategies than the authority has experienced. (Area Directors interviews, Oct. 1985)
XI. TENANT MANAGEMENT IN BOSTON: RECOMMENDATIONS AT FIVE SITES

In an effort to shift gears from the theoretical to the practical application of tenant management as a potential policy option for local public housing developments, the above pre-conditions will be assessed at five specific sites. The five Boston family developments: Charlestown, Mission Hill, Orchard Park, West Broadway, and Franklin Field, were self-selected and by no means represent the only BHA developments where tenant management could succeed. They have been selected because they represent a cross-section of Boston developments in terms of neighborhood, racial/ethnic composition and stage of modernization plans. The five include four of the largest BHA developments, and all have experienced management problems, and have active and well-organized tenant task forces.

Each development fits at least one of the local pre-conditions for tenant management. The fifth pre-condition, LHA willingness to turn over management responsibility will be assumed for each development. That willingness has been expressed by high-level BHA staff even though it has yet to be put to any real test. This analysis will also assume that funding for tenant management will be available. Each of the five study developments has been suggested by BHA staff as a potential site for tenant management. The presence of one tenant-managed site at Bromley-Heath would likely increase the chances for success at a second site since support and technical assistance would be close and readily available.

The conclusions for each site are based mostly on
interviews with BHA staff and local task force leaders. At each development the chairpersons of the tenant organization was interviewed. Whenever possible local organizers and management staff were also interviewed. For the purposes of this thesis and to facilitate open discussion of sometimes sensitive local management issues, persons quoted will not be cited by name. Table 1 provides some comparative information about the five developments:

**TABLE 3 - Characteristics of Five BHA Developments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Occupied</th>
<th>Yr. Occ.</th>
<th>Racial Comp.</th>
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<td>1149</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1940</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2)</td>
<td>Mission Hill</td>
<td>1023</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>1949</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3)</td>
<td>Orchard Park</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>1942</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4)</td>
<td>West Broadway</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>531</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5)</td>
<td>Franklin Field</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>1954</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

Source: BHA, 1986

1) **Charlestown**  -- The Bunker Hill development in Charlestown, with 900 occupied units, is the second largest development in Boston. It occupies a large section of a small, white rapidly-changing low-income white community. The private housing surrounding the development is attracting higher-income professionals into rapidly appreciating property. Before this recent gentrifying trend, the
neighborhood had been populated by poor, white, Irish families. The population of the Charlestown development continues to match the former characteristics of the surrounding neighborhood in spite of a recent small influx of Asians and Blacks.

According to BHA and task force staff at Charlestown, residents have always identified strongly with the entire local neighborhood which included private housing residents. Development residents participated in force when the neighborhood organized against urban renewal in the 60s and against bussing in the early 70s. The changes in the surrounding private housing are significant in that they have facilitated the need for residents to organize and focus on issues at the site, and because they have instilled new fears in residents. According to one top task force leader:

"The changes around us are very sad. Beacon Hill is popping up all over Charlestown. We've all lost lifetime neighbors and friends; they get offered so much money they have to leave. It makes us wonder, how much will be left in Charlestown? When is it going to be our houses that get sold off? "We are not going to become another Columbia Point. There is no avenue we won't take to protect our homes and make this a better place to live. We have a strong Board and we work together."

(Charlestown interviews, April, 1986)

The insularity and feeling of being threatened by the outside both defines part of the fabric of the Charlestown community and has been a factor in the development of a committed and active tenant organization. The make-up of the community seems to at least minimally satisfy the seventh precondition. Task force members interviewed claim the community is tight and consists of mostly long-term residents. Evidence
on this point is somewhat sketchy however, given the limited number of interviews and the claim of one BHA on-site staffperson that there exist two factions on the task force. (Charlestown interviews, Nov. 1985)

The strength and depth of the task force seems sufficient to satisfy the third pre-condition. The task force has been well-funded and currently employs two full-time organizers. Meetings have been held regularly and are well-attended. The top leadership demonstrates the experience and following to suggest managerial potential. Three leaders have been active in their respective roles for more than four years. The task force meets monthly with the local manager and those leaders interviewed displayed understanding of local management issues. (Charlestown interviews, April 1986)

Resident leaders and BHA management staff agree that a number of management and maintenance problems exist which demand looking at different management models. Those problems include some which are common to large public housing developments. According to a HUD management study, any number of units over 275 is too many for to efficiently manage. (Jones, 1979) Problems unique to Charlestown include security and crime at one side of the development, vandalism of vacant buildings, and maintenance delivery. (Charlestown interviews, April 1986)

On the surface Charlestown seems like an ideal prospect to become Boston's second TMC-managed development. It should not be considered further because it fails to meet the first and most important pre-condition. Charlestown residents don't
want to manage. At least the top leaders are dead-set against the possibility. This lack of interest is due mostly to overall satisfaction with the current management, as opposed to other sites where the second pre-condition is met.

According to one resident leader, "We like (the current manager). We work with them and are very happy with the way things work now. We meet with (the manager) every week and touch base on nearly every important issue." Another added that while the task force currently was pleased to participate in some things with management staff, "we refuse to take part in eviction proceedings." Another leader added, "things have really improved around here; maintenance has improved to about 99% efficiency." (Charlestown interviews, April 1986)

The main obstacle to tenant management at Charlestown is the current level of satisfaction with local management. An important component of that satisfaction is the level of participation of residents in some management operations. Another aspect of resident reluctance to change the way things have always been done there is the fear alluded to earlier. This fear of change and of "becoming another Columbia Point" seemed beneath the surface of most of the discussion with Charlestown residents.

2) Mission Hill -- This development is located in a Roxbury neighborhood in which much of the residential private housing was razed in the 60s to make way for several hospitals and medical facilities. With more than half the units currently vacant and with some of the worst crime and drug problems in Boston it is considered the BHA's most troubled
development. For several months in late 1985 and 1986 the BHA administrator set up an office at the development and made Mission Hill the BHA's number one priority in terms of staff and financial resource allocation. Funding has been approved to bring all vacant units on line. When that work is completed Mission Hill will be the third largest family development in Boston with more than 1000 occupied units.

The extent of the problems at Mission Hill makes it a much different situation than at Charlestown. Residents are intensely dissatisfied with LHA management and maintenance delivery and there is at least some indication of a desire among task force leaders to take on those responsibilities. "Put me down as someone who will manage this place," said one task force leader, adding, "tenants could definitely do a better job managing than (current management staff). You've got to just put your foot down and do it." (Mission Hill interviews, Feb. 1986)

The list of resident complaints about management and maintenance at Mission Hill is long and includes problems with security, crime, maintenance, eviction of "problem tenants", and complaints about specific staff. (Mission Hill interviews, Feb. 1986) The level of dissatisfaction is strong enough to easily satisfy the second pre-condition. That dissatisfaction is also expressed by BHA central and on-site staff. In May, 1986, the BHA was seriously considering major management reforms at the site, related both to the size and unique characteristics of Mission Hill. (BHA interviews, April 1986)

One of those characteristics of Mission Hill is the mixed
racial composition of the development which is approximately two-thirds Hispanic, and one-third Black. There is a long history of conflict and divisiveness within both the Task Force and the overall development. It is that history which makes the potential for tenant management at the site extremely problematic when considering the community and the organizational potential.

The racial divisions are more serious at Mission Hill than at any other Boston development. According to a BHA central management staffperson every staffing and policy decision at the development is made taking this sensitive issue into consideration. (Area Director interviews, Oct. 1985) The task force by-laws state that there must be two co-chairpersons, that one must be Black and the other Hispanic, and list specific percentage quotas for the rest of the organization. All meetings are conducted in both Spanish and English. According to one leader, "There has always been lots of resentment and lots of jealousy here. Certain people are always fighting each other. We can't agree on anything; there's too much divisiveness." (Mission Hill interviews, April 1986)

Clearly, Mission Hill fails to meet the seventh precondition for tenant management. The community is intensely divided unlike those in which tenant management has succeeded. This division would make it extremely difficult for a TMC to manage even given the presence of some experienced leaders with a desire to manage. The level of conflict within the task force makes it difficult to judge favorably its
organizational potential. Tenant management would almost certainly worsen the already serious divisions within the Mission Hill community.

3) Orchard Park -- Five years ago this was one of the BHA's most troubled developments. (Area Directors interviews, Oct. 1985) Recently, however, there have been signs of change at the development. In 1984 a new task force was elected and residents attended meetings and became actively involved for the first time in several years. Security and crime problems which have plagued the development have diminished and a new sense of hope and optimism is apparent among task force leaders. (Orchard Park interviews, March 1986)

Orchard Park is also one of the BHA's five largest family developments. It has almost exactly the same number of occupied units as Bromley-Heath. It is located in the Dudley Square neighborhood of Roxbury which has been a low-income mostly Black neighborhood. The neighborhood is currently the focus of the city redevelopment agency's plans to invest in new office and commercial development and may soon be in transition. The potential for neighborhood changes and the BHA promise for modernization funding at the site also contribute to the new sense of optimism among Orchard Park residents. According to one task force leader, "We still have our problems here, but things are turning around. Orchard Park just isn't as troubled as its reputation." (Orchard Park interviews, Jan. 1986)

The development seemed to be a likely prospect for tenant management due to a new and energetic set of task force
leaders and a cohesive relatively conflict-free community at a site with a history of management problems. Orchard Park fails to meet at least three of the pre-conditions however. One strength of the task force is also its greatest weakness in thinking of it as a potential TMC. Its youthful energy is partly due to inexperience. All but one member of the task force were elected for the first time in 1984. At sites where tenant management succeeded TMC leaders were long-term community leaders. According to one task force officer: "I don't feel we're near ready to take on (management) responsibility. We're just getting organized as a tenant group." (Orchard Park interviews, April 1986)

Also, even though there has been a long history of dissatisfaction with management at Orchard Park, those attitudes have changed in the last two years. According to one leader, "We now have one of the best managers we've had in a long time. Things are getting pretty stable, and we're even starting to see some progress on the drug problem." (Orchard Park interviews, April 1986) Resident leaders at Orchard Park do not want tenant management, partly due to satisfaction with current management and partly due to lack of confidence in their own ability to manage.

4) West Broadway -- This South Boston development is another of the BHA's five largest family developments. Its population, like that in the surrounding neighborhood of multi-family private housing, is poor, white and mostly Irish. The South Boston neighborhood and the West Broadway development have benefitted politically from the attention of
the Senate President and since 1983 the Mayor. Those political connections have been used skillfully by West Broadway resident leaders to gain funding for local organizing, supportive service programs and modernization at the site.

At first glance West Broadway seems like an ideal candidate for tenant management. The community is relatively stable and free of the divisiveness of Mission Hill. The development has one of the lowest turnover rates in Boston. According to one task force leader, "Most people here have lived here a long time. Some even go back 30 years to when they built the place. We hardly see any new tenants and we don't have problem tenants so there is no need for cause evictions." (West Broadway interviews, April, 1986)

The well-funded tenant organization has paid strong dividends by allowing a deep, strong and powerful tenant organization to develop. The task force includes some of the most visible, experienced and skilled leaders in Boston public housing. The co-chair of the task force is also president of the city-wide organization of Boston public housing tenants. Two West Broadway residents have been leaders on the Task force for more than 14 years. In interviews with BHA staff and with leaders at other Boston developments when, the subject of tenant management was raised a common response was, "check out West Broadway," based on the reputation of local leadership.

Those same leaders, when asked about taking more responsibility for management, gave two strong reasons why
West Broadway would also not be a likely site for tenant management. Like residents at Orchard Park and Charlestown, West Broadway leaders are relatively satisfied with management at the site and don't want the burden of managing themselves. According to one prominent leader, "We don't have too many problems. We've been lucky; even though the managers change so much, we've gotten along with all of them."

Even though West Broadway resident leaders are experienced and skilled enough to suggest strong TMC directors and staff, those leaders simply have no interest in managing. Expressing the same sentiment as Charlestown leaders, one West Broadway leader insisted, "we don't want to get into evictions. Confidentiality is important and it's just not our business." Also leaders expressed the attitude that even though there was little conflict or in-fighting at present, a TMC would lead to a conflict situation. One leader commented, "Managers would have more enemies than friends." Another added, "Poor people are always fighting each other. It is hard to see somebody getting somewhere when you are getting nowhere. The attitude would be 'who the hell is she to tell me what to do when her kids do such and such.'" (West Broadway interviews, April 1986)

The West Broadway task force does have more input and hands-on participation in management at the site than at any other Boston development except Bromley-Heath. Task force members by contract are responsible for judging transfers and relocations. This participation is both a blessing and curse in considering West Broadway for tenant management. While it
has provided leaders with management experience it has also
co-opted leaders to a level of satisfaction both with local
management staff and with their level of involvement with
that staff.

5) Franklin Field -- This development is smaller than the
previous four. It occupies a low-income, mostly Black
neighborhood of Dorchester. Franklin Field was selected as
one of the study sites because its well-organized and vocal
task force has actively expressed its dissatisfaction with
site management and because it is currently the focus of BHA
redevelopment funding. The resident displeasure with current
BHA management at the site led to the task force formation of
a tenant maintenance committee and the drafting of a
management plan in 1984.

The Franklin Field Management Plan, prepared by task
force members and endorsed by BHA staff, sets out specific
standards and procedures for management and maintenance
delivery. It requires the active participation of residents
in the hiring and firing of personnel, in tenant selection and
eviction, and in setting budget priorities. The 40-page
document includes a set of resident responsibilities or
community rules, and a plan for tenant orientation sessions.
It also outlines a set of preventive and corrective
maintenance procedures, occupancy standards, new rent
collection guidelines, and a revised eviction policy.
(Franklin Field Management Plan, 1984)

This thesis will recommend that the BHA turn over
management to a TMC at Franklin Field according to a
timetable in which implementation of the management plan serves as a transition to tenant management at the site. This recommendation comes with some reservations about the likelihood of a TMC's success, but is made for two reasons. One, resident work in preparing and beginning the initial stages of implementing the management plan sets in motion a useful transition toward tenant management. The assumption of additional responsibility short of actual tenant management is similar to the Jersey City and St. Louis situations. Second, Franklin Field satisfies the eight pre-conditions for tenant management outlined in the previous chapter.

Task force leaders and staff at the development acknowledge that the management plan, if it is successful, could lead to eventual TMC management at the site. One leader commented, "Our work on the maintenance committee is not really like being a TMC. We talked about it but we needed some experience first. We do have a right to managing our own development. Management here has been lousy for years." (Franklin Field interviews, April 1986)

While there is not evidence of widespread resident interest in taking over management at Franklin Field, the expression of interest by top leaders seems sufficient to satisfy the first pre-condition. The second, dissatisfaction with current management conditions, is clearly met at the site. According to one task force leader, "We've had managers here who don't care. I think we should manage here, because you need someone who cares. Mildred Hailey over at (Bromley-Heath) is a darn good manager, and it could be just like that
here." (Franklin Field interviews, April 1986)

The organizational potential at Franklin Field is evidenced by resident work on the maintenance committee and in preparing the management report. The fourth pre-condition is less obviously satisfied. There are a few visible task force leaders who conceivably could fill the role of resident manager, but none with the level of experience and leadership skills of a Mildred Hailey or a Kimi Gray. There is enough potential and desire among the few relatively inexperienced leaders to take the chance that those skills will emerge through the training process and initial managing experience.

Modernization funding has been committed to Franklin Field, so the only remaining pre-condition to consider is the somewhat elusive one considering the fabric of the community. Here again the call could go either way. Some leaders mentioned divisions within the community while others claimed a strong level of cohesiveness built on years of struggle with the BHA. The conclusion here is that there is not enough evidence to exclude the otherwise strong potential for tenant management at Franklin Field based on community considerations.
It is clear from the above analysis of five Boston developments that a combination of very special circumstances needs to exist to even consider tenant management at a local public housing development. Even if those circumstances exist there is no guarantee that they won't change or that other factors won't lead to a negative outcome. Tenant management represents a tremendous amount of work for residents, but can also provide new hope and opportunity at previously-troubled developments.

It is important to understand clearly the tremendous burden and potential which tenant management represents since it is currently being promoted and implemented in seven new cities. In six of the cities, tenant management is being promoted as a transition to eventual tenant homeownership of units as part of a new national demonstration project. That the concept of poor people managing their own living situation is being embraced by the conservative Reagan administration should serve as both a window of opportunity and as a warning flag to residents in cities considering the model. At least one advocate and practitioner of tenant management from the sixties finds no inconsistency in Reagan and the Right's support. According to Bertha Gilkey, "I call it peopleism not Reaganism. It just makes so much sense. They (conservatives) believe in self-sufficiency and local control and we just believe in the same thing. As poor people we need to do more than just talk. We need to go make it happen." (Gilkey
interview, April 1986)

Tenant management will not solve the many problems in troubled central city public housing developments. In the 25 years since the first TMC/LHA management contract was signed at Bromley-Heath in 1971, less than 20 TMCs have survived. At those developments, however, the results, some of which have been documented above, have been dramatic enough to suggest that tenant management can provide significant remedies at developments in which certain pre-conditions, as listed above, are satisfied.

It can be argued based that TMCs perform traditional management functions more efficiently than local housing authorities. The benefits of tenant management go well beyond the day-to-day repair of property and collection of rent which TMCs must perform. The collective and individual empowerment of public housing residents in Boston, Jersey City, Washington is reason enough to recommend tenant management at additional sites. TMCs' capacity for developing a renewed hope and optimism in what Bertha Gilkey calls, "the urban jungle" of urban public housing, and for promoting supportive services further suggest its implementation at developments where the pre-conditions are found.

The most important legacy of tenant management may be that the success of TMCs has proven that poor people can manage themselves. Not only have poor and minority residents managed, but they have also succeeded where professionals and bureaucrats have failed. Developments in St. Louis, Boston, and Jersey City faced demolition when LHAs turned over
management to residents. Residents in those cities not only escaped the wrecking ball, but succeeded in implementing economic development programs and supportive services designed to assist tenants with limited or no access to jobs and escape from welfare-dependency.

One lesson for developments and LHAs which will not consider tenant management is that there are intermediate steps short of actual tenant management which can improve local site management. Those intermediate steps can involve an increased resident role in specific management tasks or a better organized resident group holding LHA managers better accountable on delivery of services. In either case the critical element is active resident involvement in site management short of actual tenant management.

Another significant result of tenant management that is not often mentioned in the literature is the development of leaders and spokespersons among the very poor residents of public housing. TMC leaders like Mildred Hailey, Kimi Gray, and Bertha Gilkey travel around the country speaking out on behalf of public housing residents' right to self-management and self-improvement. It should be mentioned that every TMC leader cited in this thesis is Black, and that all but Rev. Blount are women. Black women have had limited access to positions of leadership and power in this country. Tenant management has provided a rare avenue to develop leaders and spokespersons among Black women.

For all these reasons it is important that public housing residents and housing authority staff around the country look
closely at local sites for evidence of potential for tenant management. The original goals for tenant management, which included the empowerment of low-income residents must not be forgotten during a time when the Reagan administration is promoting the same policy approach with different goals in mind. Following this prescription won't have a great impact on the livability of urban public housing, but should mean additional local success stories for the 1990s.
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