BLACK HOUSING IN SOUTH AFRICA: REALITIES, MYTHS AND OPTIONS

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is primarily based on three statements, the first a reality, the second a statement of policy and the third a declaration of intent.

THE REALITY
In order to keep pace with the growth in population over the period 1980 to 2000, more than four million houses will need to be built. In addition, in 1983 the housing backlog was estimated to be approximately 700,000, with the major shortages being experienced by Blacks. (Sutcliffe, 1986)
This amounts to approximately 550 houses per day for the twenty year period.
At present the building rate is below 20 units per working day. (Kentridge, 1986)

THE PRESENT POLICY
In 1982, the Minister of Community Development, Pen Kotze, announced that the state will no longer provide built housing units. Instead, our first priority will be to ensure that land and infrastructure is made available to all persons who can, with their own financial resources, those of their employers, financial institutions and other private means, accept responsibility for the construction of their own houses. (Dewar, 1983)
Furthermore state-provided rented accommodation will, only be built for welfare cases and for people earning less than R150.00 a month.
Even here a substantial cutback is implied. To quote the Minister,
As far as housing for the poor is concerned, the Department will STILL CONSIDER making funds available for housing projects for people earning less than R150 a month. [emphasis added] (Dewar, 1983)

THE DECLARATION OF INTENT
Clause 9 of the Freedom Charter states,
There Shall Be Houses, Security and Comfort.
All people shall have the right to live where they choose, to be decently housed and to bring up their families in comfort and security;
Unused housing space to be made available to the people;
Rent and prices shall be lowered, food plentiful and no one shall go hungry,

... Slums shall be demolished and new suburbs built where all have transport, roads, lighting, playing fields, creches and social centres;
... Fenced location and ghettos shall be abolished, and laws which break up families shall be repealed.
Each of the above two statements in turn begs a related question:

Of the present policy - how and why did it come about? What are the present responses and how effective are they?
Of the declared intention - how can it be fulfilled?

In essence, this thesis addresses these questions.

Thesis Supervisor: Julian Beinart
Title: Professor of Architecture
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Each of the above two statements in turn begs a related question:
Of the present policy - how and why did it come about? What are the present responses and how effective are they?
Of the declared intention - how can it be fulfilled?

In essence, this thesis addresses these questions. But before this is attempted it is appropriate to analyze the latter two statements in the light of the former. While it is true that government involvement in the provision of housing is a relatively recent development and that people have for centuries catered for their need for shelter through their own efforts and resources, equally true is the fact that most governments have become involved because the provision of housing can be used very effectively to suit the needs of those in power. South Africa is an unsurpassable example of this.

What has happened in South Africa is repetition of the classic tale of the hare and the tortoise. The reality as shown by these estimates has outstripped the ability of the government to effect the desired control as expressed in its political ideology. So daunting is the situation that the present regime has resorted to burying its head in the sand hoping that by some miracle the problem will sort itself out. The incompatibility of the present policy with the harsh reality is so glaring that it can at best be said to be a result of gross irresponsibility. How on earth will it be possible to make even the slightest impression on the colossal backlog without state interventions is incomprehensible. Just how irresponsible has been the attitude that has lead to the crisis is typically illustrated by a statement by Stoffel van der Merwe, Deputy Minister of Constitutional Development. According to the Minister the entire province of Natal has a squatter population of about 156 715. The Durban City Council estimates that some 500 000 squatters live on land under its jurisdiction alone. This does not
include land immediately adjacent to the city but under the control of the Kwa Zulu bantustan, in which the bulk of the squatter population resides. (S. A. Institute of Race Relations - Social and Economic Update; 3rd Quarter 1987)

While it is the aim of this thesis to steer clear from any alignment of thought with a political ideology or movement it is not to say that the ideas expounded here are in a political vacuum. It is not within the scope of this thesis to speculate on political alternatives.

As for the Freedom Charter, it has been common criticism that this is a vague document. This is undeniably true but what can be said of the Charter is that it is a manifesto and therefore should be judged as such. To analyze it as one would a constitution is to purport or misjudge its intention. To take the Charter literally could conjure meanings that distort its message. Liberals and other non-South African "experts" have drawn many such misconstrued conclusions from it. It could for instance be said to connote nationalization of property;

Unused housing space to be made available to the people;
Another common conjecture is the wholesale demolition of existing townships;

Slums shall be demolished . . .
None of these are explicitly clear, however a safe assumption implicit in the Charter is that state intervention in the control and supply of housing will be necessary.

As said earlier the charter is a manifesto, not a constitution. Its contents should be taken as intentions rather than policy.

As a point of clarification, in South Africa the term "Black" is generally held by the people to be a reference to all population groups with the exception of those classified White. The former reference (Black) would apply to; those classified ethnically by the present regime, i.e. Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho, Tswana, . . . ; those who have their origins on the Indian sub-continent; and the so-called Coloureds which is split into Cape Coloured or Other Coloured as per the Populations Registration Act.

In this thesis the term Black refers to the indigenous population only, as it is with this group that the problem is most acute. This however is not to say that
the so-called Indians and Coloureds do not suffer a similar fate. The housing shortage is as problematic for these groups as it is for Blacks. There are thousands of "Coloureds" and "Indians" living in similar conditions, as "squatters" in "slums". The terminology used herein is purely for expediency. Otherwise it would be an impossible task to wade through statistics that have been split into three parts, three racially separate segments in any one area, three or more separate administrative bodies and mechanisms and three separate housing budget allocations. In addition the thesis is confined to the situation of urban Blacks, specifically those in townships within "white areas," i.e. those areas not within the boundaries of the bantustans.

To establish a clear understanding it would be best to take the worst and most pressing case. The Black ethnic group as a whole is by far the largest and with the present economic structure as it is, also the poorest.

The first chapter will provide a brief overview of the, pre- and post-apartheid imperatives behind present day housing policy in South Africa. It will analyze the influence of these forces, viz; political (colonialism and apartheid) and economic (capitalism) and will show how these have become manifest in Black housing. The chapter leads the argument that South Africa has a housing shortage of crisis proportions because: the present policy is in actual fact geared towards never being able to reduce the inequity let alone redressing it; housing policy is in its entirety a tool of politics and economics; and the primacy of politics and economics is deliberately biased to the detriment of the black majority.

Chapter two will be an analysis of the recent attempts made in trying to alleviate the predicament. It will show that the reforms on the pretext of goodwill and equality have, in fact, been manipulated to exacerbate the burden on those already deprived.

In refuting the present policy and the reforms, chapter three makes the point that the only means of redressing this inequity is if housing policy is regarded as part of an overall strategy of social development and therefore should be formulated and implemented accordingly. Furthermore South Africa, unlike any other country on the continent or for that matter in the Third World, has the capacity
to undertake a transformation/change of its development policy, of which housing is a part, from its present politico-economic bias to one that makes equal, if not primary, the issue of social development.

The fourth chapter proposes a means through which such a strategy may be implemented in the provision of housing.
CHAPTER ONE

THE REALITY

INTRODUCTION

Black housing in South Africa is influenced primarily by a combination of two forces; capitalism, brought about by the British colonial conquest and apartheid, the political ideology of the present neo-colonial regime. The result of this union has been the subjugation of the indigenous majority and the consequent unequal development. This chapter is an analysis of the manifestation of these forces in the provision (or the lack) of Black housing, the outcome of which is the present predicament. The chapter is not intended as a comprehensive history of Black housing. Rather its intent is to focus on certain events that precipitated the present predicament. These are:

- Colonialism, British imperialism and the creation of reserves
- The era of segregation and the establishment of the first locations
- The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 and its subsequent amendments and consolidations
- The era of apartheid and the creation of the townships
THE LEGACY OF COLONIALISM

Colonialism as it is known today had its beginnings in the maritime trade of the 1600's. The fundamental concern during this period was the procurement of supplies and goods primarily on the basis of barter. In South Africa mercantilism dates to 1652 when the Dutch East India Company set up a refreshment station for its merchant fleet. This initial step of colonial expansion was largely confined to the coast but the arrival of the white settler population resulted in a shift in policy. Through coercion and subjugation of the native population the settlers moved inland, seeking and gaining control over large areas of land.

With British annexation of the region in the mid-nineteenth century the nature of colonial expansion by the process of dispossession took a new turn. It was no longer a question of control over land only but a control over labor as well. For as long as the Black population occupied land that afforded a means of subsistence, wage labor and the cash economy were unattractive. To create the necessary labor supply on the White farms the Black population was forced into infertile and overcrowded reserves. Subsistence, without entering the labor market was therefore impossible.

Later, when diamonds and gold were discovered and the demand for labor rose to new height, the earlier mercantile basis began to change and new forms of imperialism began to emerge. Driven by the imperatives of capitalism and the discovery of minerals in the interior it was essential that these areas be directly controlled and administered.

At the same time however, these colonies were not to be liabilities. It was expected that they should meet the costs of their own services and administration from internally-generated revenues but it was obvious that the small White population would be unable to bear the cost of the investment and in fact were unwilling to do so. For this purpose the native population was coerced even further into the money economy. The existing hut taxes were increased and new levies such as grazing and dipping fees, dog licences and licences for chopping trees were imposed on the remaining rural population as a means of formally creating a migrant labor supply. Under colonial
administration the local economy was an extension of that of the metropolitan economy. Both production and its associated infrastructural needs such as railways, ports, roads, banks and health and welfare services were primarily to serve the interests of the colonial power and the expatriate population. The nature and location of the infrastructure was informed by needs other than those of the native population. When on occasion colonial policy made mention of social needs, it was invariably an act of paternalism, the most obvious being the “civilizing mission”. As Joseph Chamberlain said of the “duty” of the British as colonialists,

We develop new territories as trustees for civilization, for the commerce of the world.

(Mac Pherson and Midgley, 1987; 65 citing Mair, 1984; 2)

As will be seen, the colonial age is over only in name. Many of the precepts of this era are, in one form or another, still in place today. Some have undergone a process of refinement while other have become more blatant in their bias.

THE SANITARY SYNDROME AND THE CREATION OF LOCATIONS

The vigorous imposition of taxes on the population in the reserves as a means of providing labor on the White farms led to an unanticipated flood of job seekers and resulted in an oversupply of labor. In a desperate search for employment the rural population turned to the urban areas where soon enough they were gathered into what were called locations, these being the urban counterparts of the rural reserves.

By the early 1900's all three major towns, Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg had a sizable Black population at its fringes. This created a stir amongst the Whites that the towns were being “invaded” by Blacks and that some form of control was needed. In Cape Town the outbreak of bubonic plague in 1901 triggered a renewed cry for relocating the Black migrants into a controlled area. On the pretext of isolating the spread of the disease, Blacks were forcibly removed to a site 8 kilometers (5 miles) from the city. The residents of this emergency camp were however never allowed to return to the town even after the danger had passed; instead Uitvlugt became a permanent settlement and set in motion a pattern that was to be duplicated throughout the country. Only when White
employers protested that their laborers were too far away was a rail link built between the location and the city. This, the first of many such locations, was ironically sited on land that was originally selected for a sewage disposal works.

The location at Uitvlugt [now Ndabeni] was surrounded by a six foot high fence patrolled by an inner and outer guard. The main accommodation consisted of five large dormitories sleeping 500 men each and 615, eighteen by twelve foot corrugated iron lean-to's without floors each accommodating at least seven persons.

(Beavon, 1982 citing Saunders, 1978)

It is somewhat ironic that there were fewer plague deaths among the Black population than among the Whites, yet it was only the Black people, except for those dock workers confined to barracks, who were forcibly removed.

Another bubonic plague outbreak, this time in 1903 in Durban, prompted a reaction similar to that experienced in Cape Town two years earlier. The authorities responded by passing the Native Location Act (1904) which resulted in the establishment of the Depot Road barracks. However a lack of finance at the time prevented the establishment of a formal location. It was only in 1908 that a way was found to raise the necessary revenue. This was the infamous and sadistic Native Beer Act of 1908, commonly known as the “Durban System”. This act enabled a municipal trading monopoly from the sale of traditionally brewed beer. It was revenues from such beer sales that later bankrolled the building of townships throughout the country. It is ironic that one of the few means of solace in the squalid conditions of the locations resulted in the vicious circle of more locations. In Durban the first location was established in 1915 at Baumannville.

A year later in 1904 yet another bubonic plague outbreak, this time in Johannesburg, gave the authorities the pretext to move the entire population of the “coolie” location in one night to Klipspruit, 20 kilometers (12 miles) south of the town center. Once more it was the “sanitary syndrome” that came to the rescue of the beleaguered White population. Yet each time a location was established on the pretext of health and sanitation, it was on or near a refuse dump or sewage disposal works. The new location was from its very beginning a slum much worse than the one it replaced.

Corrugated iron shelters, in some cases rainwater tanks cut in half were provided and remained in use for the next thirty years.

(Beavon, 1982 citing Lewis, 1966)
As in Cape Town the White employers were soon complaining that their Black labor was too far removed. Consequently when Johannesburg's first formal township (as opposed to location) was built in 1918 it was considerably closer to the town yet sufficiently distant from the outskirts. Needless to say, Western Native Township as it was called was built on a levelled refuse tip.

While the economic and political reasons for these so called slum clearances is clearly apparent, the entire exercise was not without its racial overtones. There is evidence to suggest that slum clearance was prompted by the fact that the slums of the 1920's had taken on a multi-racial character and it was feared that this would foster a kind of social intimacy which eventually eliminated race consciousness. (Beavon, 1982 citing Welsh, 1971)

The provision of Black housing however, for at least the first quarter of the 1900's, was largely sporadic and confined to clearing "plague spots", and
occasionally a reluctant attempt to establish a formal municipal location. Local authorities preferred to accommodate the male worker in the cheaper compounds, barracks and hostels. Family housing was never really considered on the municipal agenda as it was far more expensive. Thus the creation of these locations in proximity to the White urban centers was not a result of a desire to live in such environments but out of the need to live close to the source of employment, a need created by coercion. Built or rather demarcated on an ad-hoc basis and at the beck and call of the White population were these places with no name or identity - the locations.

THE NATIVES (URBAN AREAS) ACT OF 1923

By the 1920's however, the government realized the need to co-ordinate the control of the Black population on a national level. In 1922 the Stallard Commission report stated,

The Native should only be allowed to enter into the urban areas . . . when he is willing to enter and administer to the needs of the white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister. (Browett, 1982; 19)

The following year (1923), the Native (Urban Areas) Act was promulgated. Under this law, Blacks were regarded as temporary urban residents permitted to live in the designated areas only if gainfully employed at all times. The unemployed and the economically inactive were repatriated to the reserves. These rural reserves were thus not only labor reservoirs and the means of cheaply reproducing the Black labour force, but were also the dumping ground for surplus Blacks no longer required by the White economy in the urban areas (Browett, 1982).

This initial Act instituted some of the most important principles of urban policy which are to this day still existent in some form or another. They are:

- A control of influx into the towns
- The establishment of Black townships - a responsibility of local authorities
- The self-financing of the townships facilities and amenities
- The preclusion of land purchases by Blacks in the urban areas
- The refusal to grant any further political rights other than those exercised through consultative bodies
For capital the Act meant:
- Lower wages
- Minimal (indirect) capital expenditure on welfare, i.e. health, education, housing
- The creation of a reserve labor force within the designated Black areas
- The distribution and direction of labor into the various sectors of the economy

The period prior to 1948 was characterized by an absence of a concrete housing policy for Blacks. Other than the fact that the races were to be kept separate, the policy, for what it was worth, was ineffective in the sense that it provided very little housing. This was largely due to "passing the buck" from local authority to the state and vice versa. In the meantime the Black population in the urban areas was increasing to the extent that migration outstripped any effort to control the tide of job seekers and in 1946 Blacks formed the majority of the urban population (Browett, 1982; 20). For the most part however, the building of locations by the local authorities as required by the 1923 Act was hampered by the reluctance of the local authorities to burden its White ratepayers with the cost of Black housing. The central government on the other hand refused to accept responsibility as it regarded the urban Black as the responsibility of the employer. This state of affairs continued through the Second World War until 1948 when the United Party government of Smuts in its inability to resolve the "Native policy" lost the election to the National Party. The new Malan government immediately set about a systematic and comprehensive tightening of control over the movement of Blacks.

THE TOWNSHIP - A CREATION OF A POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

For the new government the issue of Black housing was fundamental to its ideology, yet as Browett points out, In general, the policy measures adopted were neither original nor revolutionary when seen in the context of earlier coercive and discriminatory legislation or of the norms and mores of white South African society. What distinguishes the apartheid legislation is that the previous ad hoc segregationist measures were amended, supplemented and combined within a political ideology that has been pursued with a single-mindedness of purpose. (Browett, 1982; 20)
Thus a singular purpose was all that was needed to change the shape of Black housing. The first step in Nationalist government strategy under Minister of Native Affairs, Verwoerd was the elimination of the numerous “black spots” on the periphery of white cities. Bloch and Wilkinson identified four major items of this grand design by which the problem was supposed to have been solved.

- a restructuring of the provision of state housing which more directly linked the formulation and implementation of African housing policy to the program of apartheid;
- the legislative resolution of two key issues in the crisis, around which a great deal of conflict had developed: the use of African artisans on “Native housing schemes” to reduce building costs and the transfer of at least some of the overall cost of providing accommodation to the employers of African labour;
- the development of the concept of the “modern” African township and of the techniques and methods which enabled its “scientific” application to the problems; and
- the implementation of “site and service” schemes on a large scale in order to hasten the achievement of “full control” over the urban squatter population. (Bloch and Wilkinson, 1982; 23)

Indeed part of the reason for the neglect of Black housing especially in Johannesburg before the 1950’s was the refusal of industry and commerce to pay higher wages or to directly subsidize their employees' housing needs. Another problem that seriously inhibited the use of local authority funds for Black housing was the fact that the city tax base was severely limited.

The large mining companies contributed relatively little to municipal finances because mine land, in particular was not taxed. (Lea, 1982; 210 citing Stadler, 1979; 116-7)

A key point of contention however was the question of finance. The issue was a complex three-cornered conflict of interests.

- The state wished to pass a part of the cost of housing the urban Black onto employers. In this way it was hoped that capital would reduce its demand for labor and consequently stem the influx.
- Capital on the other hand was adamant that the provision of housing was a “national problem” and that their only responsibility was a fair wage.
- The local authorities argued that the burden of financial responsibility for Black housing should not be passed onto them and their White ratepayers.
Eventually a compromise was reached with the passing of the Native Services Levy Act (1952). The Act imposed a levy on the employees of Black labor. This levy was used by the local authorities to finance the laying of the basic infrastructure services in housing schemes.

The embedding of migrant labour in the economic structure conferred benefits upon all major interests which possessed a political voice in the State. For urban employers it meant that labour was kept cheap, unorganized and rightless, that overhead costs were kept to a minimum, and the formation of an urban proletariat was restricted. For White workers it provided the security of membership of a labor elite. (Rogerson, 1979; 327)

For capital the migrant worker as a single hostel resident was the ideal labor unit.

... some of the mining houses have made the point that if the migratory labor system were to be abolished, it would cost five times as much to house Black workers and their families on the mines as it presently costs to house the men in compounds without their families. (Smith, 1982; 29)

Figure 2 Concrete bunks in mine compounds: the cheapest possible means of accommodation. (South Africa the Cordoned Heart - photograph by Ben Macleman, 1986)
As stated earlier one of the most lucrative forms of revenue that enabled this extensive building activity was the Natives Beer Act. The surplus revenue from the municipal monopoly on beer sales was to be allocated to social, recreational and other welfare facilities in townships. Municipalities however constantly used the funds from this account for balancing the capital costs of construction and for interest and redemption charges on loans. Morris (1981) citing Lewis gave the profits for 1964-65 in Soweto as R5,2m (Morris, 1981; 83). By contrast in August 1966 the government housing loan made available to Johannesburg thus far in 1966 was a mere R260,000 (Morris, 1981; 80).

The 1962 Bantu Beer Act specified the use to which profits derived from the sale of beer could be used; up to two thirds to make up losses or to balance the Native (Bantu) Revenue Account and the remaining one third to be spent on welfare, social and recreational amenities. At the same time the law prohibiting the sale of liquor other than Bantu Beer in the townships was changed and municipalities were again granted a monopoly. Profits derived from this were used thus: 20% to be spent on social, recreational amenities and welfare and the remaining 80% to be paid to the Department of Bantu Administration for use in the “general interests” of Blacks. In 1976 this was amended so that 80% (previously 20%) was earmarked for the provision of amenities.

The table below illustrates the extent to which beer profits bankrolled the building of the townships:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board area</th>
<th>Income as % of total revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Rand</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Tvl</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Tvl</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Tvl</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highveld</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peninsula</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>NCape</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drakensberg</td>
<td>66</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1  Profits from Bantu Beer Sales (Morris, 1981)
In 1952 the amendment to the Urban Areas Act which introduced the infamous Section 10 provisions was, until its abolition in 1986, one of the most strictly enforced means of control. Under Section 10 of the amendment, the right to live in a White area was restricted to those:

- who were born there;
- or having continuously and lawfully resided in the same area for at least 15 years;
- or who had worked, with the necessary permission, continuously for the same employer in the same area for at least 10 years.

Also, the Act limited the duration of a work seekers pass to a maximum of 72 hours. The stringent qualification requirements of Section 10 of the Act effectively eliminated the residency rights of the majority of the urban Blacks. This Act in magnifying the system of the migrant worker resolved the "problem" to the advantage of the White minority both politically and economically.

But what of those who were fortunate enough to escape this net. Those thousands who did so "illegally" were herded and trucked with their dismantled shacks and possessions to the bantustans. The "legal" residents were to be accommodated in the aforementioned "modern townships". For this purpose the state accorded the National Building Research Institute (NBRI) with a mandate to produce an "adequate shelter" and "properly planned Native townships". The primary research objectives were, a clear idea of the physical forms that such shelter and townships would take and the "technical" means by which they could be implemented. The final outcome of this research was a series of standard dwelling unit designs that conformed to the minimum standards both physically and spatially. On a larger scale it also recommended the most efficient township planning layouts.
Figure 3  A family, with possessions packed, makes the move to a bantustan.  
(South Africa the Cordoned Heart - photograph by W. Schwegmann)

Figure 4  "The vast unstructured, undifferentiated carpet" - Soweto. (Morris, 1981.)
The grand design was now almost complete. Beginning with dispossession of the land, then forcing the rural population to seek employment, first on the White farms and later in the burgeoning industries and finally stripping away everything but the privilege to serve, the migrant worker became a dehumanized entity. Of Black labor a National Party Member of Parliament said,  
They are only supplying a commodity, the commodity of labour . . . it is labour we are importing and not laborers as individuals. 
(Smith, 1982; 30)

By the early 1960's most of the black spots, particularly in the Johannesburg area, had been cleared. Spurred by an ideology that promised a solution to the "problem" of the urban Black, the state, between the years 1948 and 1962, built an average of 11,386 houses per annum. What emerged were thousands upon thousands of small houses in sprawling rows in numerous townships, all based on the notion that they were temporary shelters for the transient urban Black who would one day return to live in the ethnic reserves. The townships bear no
resemblance to the form of Third World cities in general and of Africa in particular. They are simply dormitory areas for Black labor working in the White city and unlike the White dormitory suburbs they are not because of the residents choosing.

By the mid 1960's the idealist zeal was coming to terms with reality. The frenzied building activity of the fifties slowed down to 5,227 houses for the years 1968 and 1969. By the early 1970's, it was apparent that the dream of grand apartheid was unattainable. The provision of housing between Whites and Blacks became even more disparate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Whites (%)</th>
<th>Blacks (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>30.7</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2  Housing Expenditure - Department of Community Development (Morris, 1981)

On average there is one formal dwelling for every 17 people in 31 African townships in the PWV area. In one township, Bekkersdal, there is one formal dwelling for every 39 people (South African Institute of Race Relations Social and Economic Update, 4th Quarter, 1987). In contrast, white housing stock in 1987 was oversupplied by 27 387 units. At the same time the Minister of Housing A. Venter announced that R77,4m was spent on white housing, largely in the form of subsidies (South African Institute of Race Relations Social and Economic Update, 3rd Quarter, 1987).

The intention of the government is perhaps best summed by the following: During the 1960's it was actually stated government policy to maintain austerity in these townships in order to encourage Africans to identify with the 'homelands' rather than with the 'white' urban areas.

(Moller, 1978)
INTRODUCTION

With formal township building activity at a complete halt the South African government entered a new phase in the provision of urban Black housing. This was typified by certain concessions which in reality, as the chapter will show are mere cosmetic changes in strategy - MYTHS.

At a time when capital was seemingly becoming impatient and embarrassed with the brashness of apartheid it will be seen that the collaboration has in fact become even more cosy. Just as the British tutored the Boer regimes in the art of exploitation so to under the direction of capital, apartheid assumed some degree of sophistication. This chapter deals with the following:

- The establishment of the Urban Foundation
- Self-help housing
- Tenure “reforms”- the 99 year leasehold
- The big housing sale
- Orderly Urbanization
- Privatization
MYTH ONE
THE URBAN FOUNDATION AND "THE QUALITY OF LIFE"

In the aftermath of the Soweto riots of 1976, a Businessmens' Conference was held on the subject of the "Quality of Life in Urban Communities". Out of this conference arose the Urban Foundation, a non profit organization that had the backing of many of the major national corporations, banks and most especially the Anglo-American Corporation (A.A.C). The Urban Foundation was the brainchild of Harry Oppenheimer the chairman of the Anglo group. In understanding the reasons for the establishment of the Urban Foundation it is therefore necessary to detail the role of Anglo and its outwardly liberal relationship with the Black majority. As the largest private employer of Black labor, Anglo was particularly susceptible to events such as the Soweto unrest. Oppenheimer recognized that if Anglo could be seen to be a highly visible and vocal critic of the worst aspects of apartheid, its standing amongst its workers and its critics could be enhanced.

The immediate impact of the Urban Foundation was overwhelmingly positive. Its mere establishment was seen as a giant step towards reform. For a government that had for so long kept a tight fisted rein over providing services to the urban Black, the move seemed to relinquish much of the dearly held control. Closer examination however reveals that the purpose of the Urban Foundation is not inconsistent with the prevalent National Party thinking. In fact there have been numerous attempts by the government to pass some of the cost of housing and township development on to the larger employers of Black labor. In the past the reluctance of employers to involve themselves financially in the provision of these services was due to the fact that they did not wish to contribute to the State's general revenue over which they had no control. Hence the only real change from past policy was that the government allowed the employers autonomous control over contributing and allocating their own funds. By demarcating the political parameters the government took the "sandbox approach". For as long as the Urban Foundation operated within the confines of the stated policy, real control was still firmly in the grip of vested interests.
Contrary to opinion, Oppenheimer's views have been entirely compatible with the status quo. While a Member of Parliament in the Opposition he believed that,

There were very good grounds for discrimination in South Africa. There were different backgrounds and the legitimate right of the white worker to have his standard of living protected.

(Rand Daily Mail, 22 June 1957)

Referring to power sharing, he believed that eventually this should occur but, ...without running the risk of destroying the white leadership. If a situation develops in which the natives can take the final decision in a matter, it will only bring complete chaos.

(Johannesburg Star, 6 Aug 1957)

Above all, said Oppenheimer,

what we should not do is to put uneducated people, still in a semi-barbarous state, in charge of a developing country like South Africa...We do not need to go in for some kind of head-counting democracy - which in the long run will turn over the government of the country to blacks who will be just as nationally inclined as we whites...we must build up a self-respecting Native middle class as the greatest guarantee against lawlessness and Communist agitation. (Johannesburg Star, 6 Aug 1957)

Twenty years later these views came to fruition with the founding of the Urban Foundation. At the time Oppenheimer prophetically said, “reform is the true conservatism”. For the present regime this has become their policy dictum.

In recognizing the need for reform in order to restore stability and safeguard conditions for capital it was necessary that the Urban Foundation concentrate its efforts on a highly visible expression of inequality. Housing was singled out for such attention even though it was hardly the main cause of the 1976 unrest. This however was not surprising as property ownership has been recognized as the source of political stability and the preservation of capitalism. The declared objective of the Urban Foundation is;

To promote and co-ordinate involvement by the private sector in the improvement of the quality of urban communities within the Republic of South Africa on a non-political non-racial basis.

[italics added] (Lea, 1982; 207)

Davies (1981) in examining the role of the Urban Foundation identifies three covert purposes;
• an organizational role designed to mobilize large-scale capital in defence of its interests at a time of apparent crisis;
• an ideological purpose aimed at encouraging the adoption of free enterprise values within the urban Black communities as a counter to the growth to socialism;
• an attempt to create an urban Black working class and additionally, give concrete expression to the ideology of free enterprise. (Lea, 1982; 207)

The track record of the private sector (including the Urban Foundation) in the supply of housing to urban Blacks speaks for itself. During the eight year period 1975-1983, at a time when the rhetorical fervor was at its peak, the private sector provided a paltry 2000 houses. Of total private sector financing only 1% was channelled to Black housing (Penny, 1985; 32).

Today, some ten years later, though this was apparent much earlier, the reality has proven that to measure a black man's satisfaction in terms of his x Rand per month pay rise and his recently purchased 51/9-type house (on leasehold), as the Urban Foundation has done, will not fulfill the requirements of "quality of life". In retrospect it is somewhat strange that capital in South Africa had, after a little over a 100 years, suddenly realized that its workforce would also aspire to a "quality of life". Over the last century, the economic principle in South Africa has been the greatest good for the smallest number. Economic growth measured in terms of GNP or per capita became the primary criterion in terms of which well being was defined and thus, in terms of which decisions were made and planning was undertaken. It is to this end, quantity and not quality, that capital normally aggregates.

Throughout his life the black man in the urban area has been confronted by the dominant objective reality of the white man, the history of white dominance and supremacy, the social institutions and power structures and even the architecture; all of these being to a certain extent inconsistent with the world of black sub-cultures, the lack of opportunity to fashion his own fate and, environmentally, the place where he lives. How do these factors affect the black mans' assessment of his quality of life? How does he perceive his present urban environment? Or is housing not a particularly important facet of his overall assessment of his quality of life? These were not the questions addressed by the
Urban Foundation. Instead it plunged into a public relations campaign, the purpose of which was to defuse any further problems and to deflect legitimate grievances.

But quality of life is inconceivable if there exists apartheid which insists upon attempting to negate the power of urban culture in creating a unique society. White capital on the other hand will have to realise that a quality of life cannot be achieved by the pretense of philanthropy, it is an inherent and spontaneous act that is inevitable given the rights and privileges.

**MYTH TWO**

**SELF-HELP HOUSING**

In the mid 1970's a great revelation came unto those organizations and authorities concerned with urban Black housing; this was the concept of self-help, sites and services and sweat equity. The last of these was after a few years dropped from the vocabulary (but only the vocabulary) for obvious reasons - it had become unpalatable even for the most hard-headed. For a regime that had previously behaved with the tact and finesse of a class bully, self-help was a “scientific” solution to the “problem” of housing its Black “citizens”. This “scientific” approach meant that the autonomy which self-help apparently embodies is in fact illusionary in that the decision making is limited to the physical process of self-build. For bourgeois liberals it was a “humane” means of providing a form of shelter. The accent of self-help was a move away from the bureaucratic administration boards which controlled the provision of housing. The idea seemed to restore control over the availability of a house through participation in its production. Self-help apparently was infinitely better than the anonymous wait list which after several years produces a key to “house xxxx” that could be anywhere within one's specific ethnic area of a township.

This was the scientific and romantic notion of a concept that was in fact already tried in the 1950's in South Africa. Only then it was regarded as a temporary solution, for the government, at the time, lacked the necessary insight to see its scientific value. The idea was revived in the 1970's by the Urban Foundation. In 1983 the Urban Foundation published a manual “Guidelines for Self-Help Housing” of which it was said by J.H. Steyn the Executive Director,
... one of the most important publications in South Africa in recent time. (Urban Foundation, 1983; 5)

Steyn went on to say that the Urban Foundation regards the acceptance and recognition of self-help by the state as a "significant policy change" and a "breakthrough" that "is the consequence of concerted effort by the Urban Foundation and other organisations over a number of years." (Urban Foundation, 1983; 6).

This recognition is embodied in a circular from the Department of Community Development which states,

Individuals and organisations providing housing will *unfortunately* have to accept that they will in future not be able to rely entirely on the Department and Local Authorities to finance all low cost housing projects, but that they will also have to make a contribution. . . [italics added] (Urban Foundation, 1983; 14)

How this seemingly apologetic statement could be construed as a virtue is inexplicable. How can one see merit in an organization that apparently showed the way clear for the government to withdraw from its obligation to provide housing?

The Urban Foundation's first foray into a self-help project was at Khutsong in the Transvaal. The project however failed to meet the needs of at least 30% of the applicants. The average cost of a house was R4000 but the limit to the administration boards loan was R3000. In addition a deposit of 10% was required and the interest was at Building Society rates. The administration board, a government agency had assumed the role of a capitalist lending institution. Moreover the houses cannot be purchased which means that the loan, deposit, interest payments and the monthly installments are not recoverable through equity. (all figures from: Urban Foundation, 1983; 83-91)
It should be noted however that the problem with self-help is not with its broad concept although it is debatable whether such a concept in its entirety is at all feasible. Rather the argument here is to do with its application in the South African context or theoretically in the context of under-development and inequality. The inclination to over-generalize about the potential of self help irrespective of the wider social and economic constraints is evident in the changing policy decisions regarding urban shantytowns. Whereas at first, opinion was that these were pits of abject poverty, the inhabitants of which would be better off if compelled to go back to where they came from, later opinion characterizes these settlements as constituted by dynamic and creative people who are able to solve their own problems with very little outside help.

Marxian writers have been most critical of self-help projects. Rod Burgess (1979), is cited by Hardiman and Midgley as claiming that one of the reasons for
implementing self-help housing projects in developing countries may well be that,

they would increase the sale of building material produced by
capitalist enterprise, . . . and finally integrate land presently held
illegally by squatters into capitalist land markets.
(Hardiman and Midgley, 1982; 28)

Another similar opinion is that of Wolfe (1981) cited by Mac Pherson and
Midgley.

Such approaches says Wolfe, must force the mass of poor people
into a subordinate “parallel economy” which both allows and
enables the dynamic “modern” sector to advance even more
vigorously, freed of most of the costs and threats of mass “critical
poverty”. The poor majority must accept minimal improvements
in their own conditions, but must work to support services that the
State provides for others. (Mac Pherson and Midgley, 1987; 200)

Other non-Marxian writers have also expressed criticism and have questioned
the motives of institutions such as the World Bank. Drakakis-Smith suggests
that the increased availability of World Bank funds for self-help projects could
easily be regarded,

as a concerted effort by the capitalist sector to short-circuit the
aspirations of the urban poor, thereby averting a possible threat to
the present unequal economic system. (Drakakis-Smith, 1981; 146)

The self-help concept is based on the premise that all non-conventional housing,
i.e. primarily squatter, is a normal response to housing shortages and indicative
of the determination, effort and ability which the urban poor invest in order to
improve their life in urban areas. The basic flaw in this argument is that it is
based on the fact that the unequal distribution of economic and social resources
which gives rise to squatter settlements is normal. Such an argument by virtue
of its acceptance of a gross inequality is immoral in the extreme. Self help
programs not only perpetuate but consolidate the inequality. Perhaps a parting
question which will undoubtedly put the issue to rest is: to what extent does
increasing support for these approaches represent a desire on the part of the
government to extend and deepen its control of otherwise potentially
threatening uncontrolled growth?
MYTH THREE
THE 99 YEAR LEASEHOLD

The tenure status of the urban Black has been the most controversial aspect of housing policy. For a government whose answer to anything pertaining to the rights of Blacks has almost always been an emphatic "no", the issue of tenure has surprisingly been a wavering "maybe, maybe not". The tenure status prior to the 1923 Urban Areas Act is unclear but there were a substantial number of Black owned freehold properties. An example of this was Sophiatown near Johannesburg, established in 1905 as a private leasehold development. The original leasehold restrictions were later amended, so that by 1934 all but 37 stands were held freehold. The 1923 Act however precluded freehold tenure from all local authority controlled locations and finally in 1954 freehold rights, from public as well as private townships, were withdrawn.

With respect to leasehold rights, a 30 year leasehold was introduced in 1951. However, in 1968, during the bantustan development phase the granting of leasehold tenure in the townships was stopped. Furthermore various means to reverse this status were introduced.

- Leaseholders could not bequeath their house to heirs.
- Local authorities were urged to purchase Black owned houses as they were placed on the market or fell vacant through the death of the leaseholder. These houses were then let on a tenancy basis.
- There would be no compensation for improvements.

Thus from 1968 until 1976 Blacks in "white" urban areas were without any form of secure tenure. As stated earlier freehold rights were withdrawn in 1954.

In 1976 the 30 year leasehold was re-introduced and in 1979, largely as a result of efforts by the Urban Foundation, the government relented and 99 year leasehold rights were issued. The Foundation had lobbied for freehold status but this was rejected by the Minister responsible. But this new development, a move that was nonetheless welcomed by capital was little more than a return to conditions in the 1950's. In fact the reasons for the re-introduction of the 99 year leasehold rights were no different from those of 1951. In both cases it was the implementation of sites and services schemes that necessitated the granting of
these concessions. The table below illustrates the chronology of the laws implemented.

Table 3 Summary of Freehold and Leasehold Tenure

As in 1951 the new 99 year leasehold was a means by which the self-help policy was given legitimacy. Quite obviously the success of self-help housing strategy is dependent on a commitment on the part of authorities to guarantee a more secure form of tenure. Thus the granting of this right was an essential pre-condition for the introduction of self-help. Furthermore, as stated previously, the introduction of the leasehold rights was necessitated by the pressure from building societies who in expecting to provide the required finance in turn pressed for greater security for their loans.

This new dispensation was hardly convincing considering the government's history of vacillation. In the first year of implementation of the legislation (from April 1979 to February 1986) only 155 individual leasehold titles had been registered (Lea, 1982; 205). By March 1982 only 1727 leases were registered (Wilkinson, 1984; 22). The scheme was beset with problems.

- The registration of the lease required surveys, conveyancing, etc. The cost of these had to be borne by the leaseholders, most of whom could hardly put together the required deposit.
The question of inheritance was not clear. Would heirs who happened to be "citizens of a bantustan" be eligible to occupy the house they inherit considering the fact that they would not qualify under the terms of Section 10 regulations?

Contrary to the rhetoric, building society funds were difficult to come by. The small loans were an administrative burden, and the building societies insisted on standards that could not be met by most of the existing houses.

Generally the process was complex, bureaucratic and time consuming.

By the end of 1987, some eight years after leasehold rights were legalised 46 070 leases had been registered. (South African Institute of Race Relations - Social and Economic Update; 4th Quarter 1987)

Further exacerbating this poor response was the fact that the existing monthly rental was substantially lower than the monthly payments for purchasing the house. For most who lived a hand to mouth existence the long term benefits of ownership were as remote as the period of tenure. Capital as usual identified the problem as a market distortion due to state subsidized rentals and not as a result of the low wage. With failure imminent new moves were already underway to ensure the policy's survival. This quite obviously meant applying the stick - rentals would have to be raised to more realistic levels to reflect their true market value in comparison with the cost of home ownership. An astounding fact is that in Soweto site rentals per square meter, under the 99 year leasehold, are higher than the property rates in White upper middle class suburbs such as Norwood. (R1.14/sq.m. per year compared with R0.64/sq.m. in Norwood). (Morris,1981; 133)

The issue of tenure is, classically, indicative of the government's tendency to shoot itself in the foot. Had the politicians had the far sightedness of the business community, the course of Black housing may well have been quite different. The inability of the Urban Foundation in convincing the authorities to grant freehold status at the outset sealed the fate of the organization. With these restrictive conditions it was unable to muster greater support for its program of establishing a free-market system in Black housing.
MYTH FOUR
THE GREAT HOUSING SALE

In March 1983 the government announced its intention to sell, over a period of twelve months commencing July 1983, half a million houses. Of these almost 340,000 were in Black townships. The houses were to be sold to holders of Section 10 rights under the 99 year leasehold. Piet Koornhof, the then Minister of Co-operation and Development stated categorically that the government had "no intention whatever" of granting urban Blacks freehold land tenure (Rand Daily Mail, 4 March 1983). Nonetheless once again the business community burst forth with elation. Boet Viljoen, a past president of the Association of Building Societies said that the scheme, may go down as the most important sale concluded anywhere in the world . . . (Rand Daily Mail, 5 March 1983)

The houses were priced according to the following formula:

\[
\text{original cost} + \frac{\text{original cost} \times \text{building price index}}{2}
\]

In addition it was announced that prospective purchasers earning less than R450 a month could apply for Government loans at interest rates ranging from 5% to 7%. Those earning more than R450 per month would also be financed provided they produced proof that they were unable to raise the necessary finance in the private sector. The interest rate in this case would be 11,25%.
(Rand Daily Mail, 21 May 1983)

Incentives in the form of discounts were also available.

- Discounts for cash purchase, i.e. funds raised individually or from employers or through the private sector (not applicable to those receiving a government loan):
  a 25% discount for houses priced above R2500
  a 30% discount for houses priced below R2500
- Discounts for length of occupancy:
  a 5% discount where a purchaser has occupied the house for at least 5 years
- Discount for prompt response:
  a 5% discount to purchasers who buy within the period July 1983 and June 1984 (1 year)
Thus a buyer may be eligible for a total discount of up to 40%. While the discounts certainly are generous, it is obvious that few would qualify for more than 10%. The purchase structure is a sort of double edged sword especially for those unable to raise the finance without state help. In accepting subsidized interest rates, one loses the discount. Thus only the relatively affluent and those employed in senior positions in the private and public sector could take advantage of the offer. For those in the private sector however, it meant an obligation to the employer.

In addition to the purchase price and the interest charges, buyers were faced with other additional costs:
- a fee for the right of leasehold ranging from R100 to R500
- transfer and conveyancy costs that varied according to the price of the house
- costs of installing electricity and water meters
- land survey fees averaging R65

The government launched an extensive public relations campaign. In meetings with prospective buyers the director of the sales team of the Department of Community Development, Johan Kruger implored, “Buy, because you'll never get a chance like this again”. He went on to point out that those who bought within the time period could re-sell the houses at a profit but warned those who did not wish to buy that they would face “drastic” increase in rentals when the offer expired. Those who could not afford to buy would, as stated earlier, be eligible for state loans but would forfeit the cash discount. The fate of those poverty stricken and for those who could not project their financial position as far forward as the loan period the future was bleak. The implication of this was clear. A failure to recognize this new right to involve oneself in the benefits of the “free market” meant applying the stick.
Imagine buying a four roomed, State built house for as little as S80. Or a five roomed house for between S12 50 and S18 00.

It's happening right now — in South Africa.

MEETING THE HOUSING CHALLENGE

South Africa's urban Black population is expected to rise from 9 million currently to around 20 million by the turn of the century. It is estimated that an additional 4.9 million housing units will have to be provided to accommodate this phenomenal urbanisation.

The housing challenge is being met by both the Government and the private sector. Government initiatives are directed mainly towards providing the machinery and support for self-help building projects, while private enterprise provides loans, subsidies and guarantees.

THE FUTURE — BETTER PROSPECTS FOR ALL

A recent survey indicated that 82% of all employers were prepared to provide their Black staff with assistance to buy their own homes.

South Africa
Houses for sale:
$16 000 and less

The facts on housing present only part of the picture. Many aspects of South African life have changed — and are changing at an ever increasing rate. The future is exciting because we have the people, the dedication and a buoyant economy to enable us to keep on providing opportunities and improving the quality of life of all our people.

Because South Africa is a microcosm of so many of the world's sensitivities, it is often a contentious subject. If you are faced with a decision regarding South Africa, make sure you have all the facts.

For more information, simply complete the coupon below.

Thus the scenario was set for the "great sale" averaging 1,370 houses a day. By the end of 1983 only some 1400 sales were recorded (Wilkinson, 1984; 29). By March 1984 only 5914 houses were purchased (Hardie and Hart, 1986) and by 1985 less than 10% of the saleable stock had been sold. The Urban Foundation estimated that at that rate it would take 12 years to sell all the units. In September 1987, more than four years since the beginning of the sale campaign, the National Housing Commission revealed that 17.3% of the housing stock in
Black townships had been sold. (South African Institute of Race Relations Social and Economic Update, 3rd Quarter 1987)

At this point it is convenient to ask what was the purpose of this gesture. Clearly the government was having a massive cash flow problem and in line with the policy that each race group should, as far as possible, provide its own funding, the townships were by no means viable in generating sufficient revenue. As noted in the previous chapter the income generated from the sale of sorghum beer was being phased out and an important source had thus been stopped. Initial capital was required to finance the impending autonomous township community councils and in addition it was necessary to establish a flow of rates and service levies for the functioning of these bodies. A perhaps much more overt reason is that the government wished to “depoliticise” Black housing by distancing itself from the provision of shelter and by ceasing its role as the landlord.

The Marxian critique of home ownership is well known through classical treatise such as Engels - The Housing Question - as well as through the writings of many contemporary Marxian analysts. A salient point however is brought up by Wilkinson (1984) and Mabin and Parnell (1984). Both refer to the “re-capitalization of capital” or the “re-commodification of housing” as identified by Harloe (1981). Wilkinson argues that home ownership is actively promoted by capital, as it is in its interest to have an input into a field from which it was deprived by apartheid politics. Those to gain are:

- property capital and exchange professionals, e.g. estate agents, surveyors etc.
- building capital seeking alternative forms of investment
- capital invested in the production of building materials
- capital invested in consumer household durables

But perhaps the final word should come from those who were faced with the decision - “to buy or not to buy”. In a survey conducted by Hardie and Hart (1986) many of the respondents questioned the period of tenure and were suspicious as a result of past experience of the governments frequent recantation. Others identified bureaucratic bungling and hidden costs not explained initially while some perceptively questioned issues such as default of payment and inheritance. Many of the respondents were puzzled by the claims of profit as a result of re-sale
or market appreciation. Blacks it seems do not take to capitalism as anticipated. What they did see however is the pure economic logic of the cost of owning versus the cost of renting. "I thought that if I bought I would pay less. But, I am paying more," said a respondent regrettably.

MYTH FIVE
ORDERLY URBANIZATION

For just over forty years the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945, more commonly known as the Pass Laws regulated urbanization in South Africa. Under this law all Blacks were subject to a direct system of influx and movement control, through their carrying pass books. Residence and work permits were entered into these books and all Blacks had to produce the books on demand. In July 1986 the government repealed this Act, in a gesture that apparently meant a freedom of movement that was last enjoyed by Blacks before the turn of the century. Even Section 10 (the amendment of 1952) of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act was scrapped. In its stead the government introduced a seemingly racially neutral strategy called "orderly urbanization". Orderly urbanization on face value seems to project a strategy not uncommon in most parts of the world. However in the South African context the operative word - orderly - conjures sinister motives. Order on the part of whom?

Of all the laws that curtail the movement and settlement of Blacks those that have drawn the strongest criticism have been: the Pass laws, the Section 10 regulations, and the Group Areas Act. If reformed apartheid were to abolish some if not all of these, its program of change would gain enormous credibility. However with the vast plethora of laws that supplement and reinforce these principal Acts already on the statute books, it was possible to repeal those laws that are most visible without any loss of control. Notwithstanding the overarching piece of legislation still intact, the Group Areas Act, control is still retained through already existing legislation. For instance while the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 and the Slums Act of 1979 are to be partially repealed, certain provisions from these Acts will be incorporated into the new Housing and Development Bill. Also local authorities have their own by-laws that enforce slum clearance and prevent squatting. Thus the position remains virtually unchanged from the time of the "sanitary syndrome" of the early 1900's
or the "slum" clearances in Cato Manor, Western Native Townships, Sophiatown and District Six.

Of far greater significance however are the new measures that are embodied in the principles of orderly urbanization. These are:
- regulating urbanization by way of the availability of approved accommodation or approved sites
- social differentiation both within regions as well as within residential areas
- industrial and residential deconcentration
- privatization of the social basis of reproduction

Approved accommodation/approved site
The parliamentary White paper on urbanization states "that occupation should be used as a deliberate measure to promote orderly urbanization . . ." and that "new arrivals in urban areas must obtain an approved accommodation/site" prior to arrival. Hence if approved sites or accommodation are unavailable, influx into urban areas is effectively controlled. Also the limited availability of approved sites nearer the cities and the ready availability of such sites in more distant settlements ensures that poorer Blacks will always be living at considerable distances from cities.

Furthermore, despite government assurances that the days of forced removal have passed, the new policy justifies such action in the future,
In the interest of planned development, the effective management of urbanization or in aid of an improvement in their own living conditions it will sometimes be necessary for individuals and groups to move. However, all such moves will always be negotiated with the individuals and groups concerned.
(White Paper on Urbanization, 1986; 7)

The subsequent coercive removal of Blacks from Crossroads to Khayelitsha and numerous other cases where Blacks have been prosecuted for trespassing indicate that it is business as usual for the bulldozers.

Social differentiation
Paragraph 4.3.9 of the White Paper states that,
In view of the unique conditions and difficulties which exist in the different regions of Southern Africa, a regionally differentiated
approach should be followed in the planning and management of urbanization. (White Paper on Urbanization 1986: 8)

The implication of this directive with regard to housing is a class stratification as a result of residential differentiation not only between different regions and races but also within the same race group as well. The issue of differing housing standards is repeatedly emphasized in several clauses.

Figure 8  Controlled slums. The first infrastructural "service" - the police surveillance cameras.
(The Urban Foundation, 1985)

The policy has in fact shifted little from that pursued in the 60's and 70's, only then the future slums were to be located in the bantustans. Today with the bantustan policy in tatters the future slums are to be contained within predetermined areas on the periphery of certain metropolitan regions. In essence the policy creates a form of controlled slum development. On the other hand by heavily subsidizing housing for Black civil servants, not as part of a policy but of
renumeration, the government is able to use the strategy to favor political moderates and gradually tempt radicals to toe the line or be marginalized. Thus by creating social differentiation in housing in existing better located townships it is made certain that proximity to the cities is only available to the relatively well-off.

Deconcentration
Whereas previous policy pertaining to industries and consequently the location of jobs and houses concentrated on decentralization either within the bantustans or around its borders, the new strategy in transcending these previously proclaimed territorial divisions is geared towards a "deconcentration". This in effect means the relocation, through indirect means, of the larger pools of unskilled labor from areas such as the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging cornubation (PWV). Paragraph 6.10.4 of the White Paper is specific in this regard. The rationale is that highly urbanized regions such as the P.W.V. provide relatively few unskilled jobs and are expensive to live in by virtue of the higher service standards and higher cost of living. By discouraging the concentration of labor intensive, low skill industries in these areas and encouraging their location in the less urbanized regions the social costs of reproducing labor is lowered, as these production areas could offer lower wages, lower standards of services and a lower cost of living.

Thus orderly urbanization is infinitely more sophisticated than the previous policies in its implementation. With respect to housing, "occupancy" or ownership of a house or site has gained unprecedented importance in as much as it has become the physical equivalent of the pass book. Whereas previously the most coveted right was the permission to be in a certain area (Pass Law) the new "concession" equates this right with a physical house or site. At best the strategy is no more than the clearing away of excess legislative baggage. Reformed apartheid can do without the direct means of control when indirect means would suffice. Reformed apartheid can do without laws "for good measure".
MYTH SIX
PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALISM

In this year's (1988) Budget speech Minister of Finance Barend Du Plessis committed the government to a program of privatization and deregulation of state owned services and industry. In alluding to Neil Kinnock's (leader of the Labor Party in Britain) reference to Margaret Thatcher's "selling off of the family silver", the minister said,

If the sale of the family silver produces income generating assets whereby that family is put on the path to greater prosperity, then by all means let the silver go. (Financial Mail, March 18, 1988)

It is most likely that amongst the first of these parastatals to be sold off will be Escom (Electricity Supply Commission), Posts and Telecommunications and SATS (South African Transport Services - includes railways and South Africa Airways). This coupled with the government's withdrawal from direct involvement in the provision of Black housing indicates a pronounced shift in government policy.

Furthermore, the divestment of the South African subsidiaries by American multinational corporations and their subsequent sale to White management or White owned South African conglomerates like the Anglo-American Corporation reinforces this shift. While American companies, as a result of world attention and as a means of deflecting criticism, undertook certain social programs, even as token gestures, the new owners have no such commitment.

Proponents of laissez-faire philosophy argue that state intervention in economic and social services should be kept to a minimum. They believe that government involvement dampens creative urges, stifling initiative, ambition and the striving for self-betterment which has been the prime reason for the economic ascendancy of the Western, capitalist nations. Such intervention it is argued requires the creation of a parasitic bureaucracy which inevitably is cumbersome, inefficient, consumes scarce productive resources and taxes.

In taking this point further, laissez-faire ideas call for a privatization of social services. Health, education, housing and other social services, they claim, should be treated no differently from private consumer goods and like these
goods, should find their price on the market. The argument goes that this would create a sense of responsibility instead of dependency and permit freedom of choice. Individuals will be free to purchase the services required to suit their needs. By freeing the state from the responsibility of social welfare, the belief is that more resources will be made available for productive investment and thus for the creation of a prosperous society. An even more hardline attitude calls for voluntary organizations to assume the responsibility for the disabled, the destitute aged and destitute or orphaned children. Thus hand in hand with this philosophy is a gamut of pension schemes, medical and personal insurance and private education all geared to creating a market for service oriented corporations.

With respect to housing, proponents of laissez-faire philosophy ask if in fact there is a need for a housing policy. Within this philosophy the provision of housing by the state is particularly susceptible to attack. It is capital intensive and has a lengthy implementation period from design and planning through construction to maintenance and repair. Moreover housing unlike health or education is eminently suitable to the mechanism of supply and demand.

The evidence in the first chapter indicates that this philosophy was dominant during the colonial period. During the apartheid era beginning in the late 1940's the idea underwent a strange mutation. The state became vigorously involved in the provision of social services; an altruistic gesture for the minority White population, a means of control for the Black majority.

The prime purpose of the gargantuan civil service in South Africa has been to create employment for the poorly educated urban boer who would otherwise have been at the mercy of business and industry that was at the time almost exclusively under the control of English speaking Whites. The making of Meneer van der Merwe - Civil Servant must surely rank as one of the best examples of artificial job creation. Now with the Afrikaner civil servant safely in the middle class strata the job protection that the parastatals provided can be dispensed with. Hence the move towards privatization. The era of reformed apartheid beginning in the mid 1970's indicates a return to this philosophy. Nonetheless it should be noted that this doctrine was never entirely abandoned.
for its concomitant development policy with its inherent bias towards capital accumulation was an ideal model for the continuation of economic control.

In pursuing this liberal line of thought into economic development and planning the primary goal, quite obviously, is to increase the rate of economic growth as rapidly as possible. Such growth, it is assumed, would not only improve the economy but would result in a significant improvement in the social welfare of the masses. In support of this view is the historical experience of the Western nations which as a result of industrialization and rapid economic growth transformed their subsistence economies and thereby brought the bulk of their populations into modern wage employment where they earned incomes far higher than their predecessors.

Most economic development plans emphasize the need for industrialization mainly on a scale requiring massive capital investments and the application of modern technology. Investments of this kind would, it was argued not only bring about high rates of economic growth but, by creating wage employment, draw surplus labour from the rural subsistence sector and increase the numbers of people earning cash incomes. Furthermore the effect of this would be self multiplying in that wage employment would result in surplus income and therefore a demand for more manufactured goods and modern services. (Little mention was made of the fact that this would also result in the continuing impoverishment of the rural sector.) While economists were quick to point out that such plans had a social spin-off as well, it was clearly a peripheral issue that was in reality regarded as a drain on national resources. Only economic planning was to provide the means by which social need could be met by individuals themselves.

While it is a fact that South Africa, in pursuing a policy of economic development has created an economy unparalleled in Africa, its benefits have almost entirely been reaped by the White minority. In South Africa the failure of this policy as far as Blacks are concerned is ironically of its own doing. With capitalism and politics playing off one against the other in keeping the majority in check, it was inevitable that either one would eventually yield to pressure.
When the mining houses and industrialists began attracting labor on the platform of future economic prosperity for those prepared to work, they found a government more than willing to regulate the flow of labor and direct its reproduction. This meant that they could keep more of the profits as the demands of labor were quite successfully being kept in check by means other than the market. Since labor was only allowed to organize itself in the late 1970's each time a concession was made by the government it was seemingly at the behest of capital. Now, with some of the more successful strike actions it was capital that baulked at what was increasingly becoming a volatile situation slowly slipping out of control.

It was inevitable that the responses by the two arms of control would at some stage become uncoordinated. The impact of the laws that were instituted to coerce a labor market was underestimated to the extent that it generated a flow too large for the mines and industry to absorb and when the demand for labor was at a high level capital found the government lagging behind in its programs for housing; a case of one being unable to keep pace with the other.

Thus by having a government ever so ready to wield the stick, capital was quick to realize that it could dangle the carrot from a relatively safe distance and not be in danger of losing it. Each time the stick was applied, the carrot instead of moving further away as one would expect was getting enticingly closer, yet never close enough.

In general economic development plans have failed to come up with the promises of prosperity. While it is true that apartheid has distorted the situation in South Africa it is nonetheless difficult to imagine the conditions being any better otherwise. Du Plessis' vague references to future prosperity (with prosperity being divided on racial lines one is tempted to ask - who's prosperity) and the increasingly toughening attitude of companies to its workers and their unions all indicate a pronounced shift to laissez-faire philosophy. Present conditions on the other hand seems to point in another direction. Economic development policies thrive in conditions of inequity. To say that it will eventually bring about equality is a contradiction in terms. The survival of its very principles requires a privileged minority and a contained majority. The fact
that the racial conditions in South Africa are ideal for its growth merely adds another dimension to the problem.

If there is a singularly clear message it is undoubtedly the fact that economic growth is not necessarily synonymous with development. The present predicament in South Africa debunks the entire theory. What it is in reality is the “development of underdevelopment” (Frank, 1967; 1969).

CONCLUSION

Liberal analysts in South Africa have constantly been at odds with neo-Marxians arguing that the latter, in addressing the housing question invariably propose options or solutions that are reactionary. Leftist or neo-Marxian analysts on the other hand point out that the hypotheses advocated by liberals are designed to operate within the confines of the present system, albeit with a few reforms and hence cannot effect radical change. This thesis in refuting the liberal argument makes the point that the reforms are by their nature and circumstance responses to crises and, as such, are therefore also reactionary.

However the difference in these responses is that while one calls for a clean break, the other espouses an evolutionary process that instead lurches from crisis to crisis and in the final analysis is still dependant on the effectiveness of the political and economic forces in minimizing or curtailing the required change. While both schools of thought agree on the aspect of political change, the differences are mainly about the degree of economic change that would be necessary or acceptable.

On the other hand the view held by neo-Marxian writers is that social problems cannot be solved while capitalist values are permitted to prevail. Since capitalism is antithetical to welfarism, social development programs are likely to achieve nothing more than token reforms which neither challenge the fundamental causes of social inequity nor adequately treat their manifestations.

Furthermore neo-Marxian writers believe that the provision of selective social services is a capitalist plot to suppress discontent while in fact promoting the diffusion of capitalism (Burgess, 1979). Others contend that the provision of
social services should be opposed as it impedes the development of capitalism which is a necessary stage in the eventual development towards socialism (Warren, 1979). Burgess supports his argument by his claim that self-help housing policies actually increase the sale of building materials produced by capitalist enterprise and integrate land presently held illegally by squatters into capitalist land markets.

As can be seen from this the views even within a given philosophy can vary greatly. However they do have some strong common characteristics. Social development, they believe can be useful only if capitalism is overthrown and replaced by the collective ownership of the means of production and the allocation of resources solely on the basis of need (George and Wilding, 1976). They also believe that the overthrow of capitalism would not only result in equality and social justice but provide the resources required to eradicate poverty and provide a comprehensive range of social services.

The chapter reveals a pre-determined path for the future of the urban Black. The entire strategy begins with the co-option of the private sector not only in providing employment but now in "providing" the social services as well. The implementation of self help strategies by the concerted effort of seemingly altruistic bodies then provides a solution at a minimal cost to White South Africa. The 99 year leasehold, seen in this perspective was a slight hiccup in the strategy for which a resuscitation in the form of the great sale was implemented. The vigor with which this was pursued was an indication of things to come. The great sale was the penultimate attempt at creating the ideal middle class, politically moderate, capitalist urban Black.

Of greater long term significance was the fact that the establishment of a "free market" situation and ownership would be the first step in stabilizing the township population economically as well as politically. By driving a wedge between those who could buy and those who could not, it is possible to neutralise the stable "insiders". Furthermore by establishing a "free market" the burden of responsibility for obtaining "approved accommodation" is shifted to the individual. In failing to gain access to such accommodation the individual has only himself to blame.
In the final step of orderly urbanization the location of approved sites in places far from the big White metropolitan areas such as at Mafikeng, Umtata, Inanda, Onderwacht or the Winterveld means that as the poorer urban Black is lured into the free market, eventually selling his house to make a quick buck, he finds himself being allotted an approved site much further away. In these new controlled ghettos he starts once again to self-build a new home and purchase new household commodities without realising that he has been forcibly removed not by the bulldozer but by the mechanisms of capitalism.
CHAPTER THREE

OPTIONS

INTRODUCTION

The first chapter has established the failure of the paternalistic impositional style of South Africa's social policy pertaining to Black housing. The analysis in the second chapter illustrated the paucity of the methods used in improving the delivery of housing, these ranging from a deft re-shuffling of legislation in a manner that replaced the hated passbook with the requirement that necessitates ownership or tenancy of a “legal” place of abode, to liberal approaches that promote home ownership. In dealing with this issue it is clear that the roots of the problem are embedded deeply within the overall politico-economic ideology and its concomitant development policy. Efforts that skirt around this fundamental issue do not address the problem but are merely ad-hoc attempts at dealing with the symptoms.

Having answered the first two questions as posed in the introduction of this thesis, i.e. how and why did it (housing crisis) come about and secondly what are the present responses and how effective are they, this chapter will analyse critically some of the possible alternatives towards achieving an end to the present predicament. Clearly, dismantling apartheid will not solve the problem. Re-organizing or re-structuring a housing policy that would basically remain within the overall framework of an economic-biased development strategy would also not solve the problem. Housing policies cannot be viewed in isolation they are inextricable parts of overall development strategies and any review of housing policy should be within this context.
THE UNIFIED APPROACH

In an effort to transcend the barriers set by predominant world ideologies the United Nations advocated a middle of the road proposal that viewed social development as inseparable from economic development and furthermore that they should be considered concurrently and not in tandem.

(United Nations 1971)

While the report dealt quite adequately with identifying the problem and the desired goals it lacked detail beyond the theoretical level about how these may be achieved.

But while the experts regularly drew attention to the needs to end the compartmentalization of economic and social planning, they gave little practical guidance to planning organizations concerning the implementation of this new approach and particularly as it affected training needs, organizational responsibilities and professional roles. (Hardiman and Midgley, 1982; 5)

Furthermore it still relied on the application of economic efficiency criteria when formulating social policies, a fatal flaw that would have recreated the very problem the approach was expected to solve.

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Some aspects of the unified approach have been incorporated into the development policies of many social democracies, particularly in Western Europe. It is not surprising therefore to find that such a concept is increasingly gaining favor especially amongst the progressive analysts in South Africa. The argument goes, that in order to prevent a mass exodus of White expertise South Africa would have to remain in the orbit of capitalism. The policy would however call for a massive injection of capital into social services. The idea at first glance is appealing but it must be remembered that the conditions under which social democracy has operated in Western Europe are absent in the South African context.

Firstly, the devastation of the Second World War reduced the economic disparity amongst the population to an extent that almost everyone was starting off on an equal footing. Secondly, the population was largely educated and was therefore
able to sweep out the shattered pieces of previous rule, as in the case of West Germany, and start anew. Furthermore the Marshall Plan was implemented with no strings attached. This was quite different from the development aid packages currently being handed to the Third World. However the crucial flaw in applying the concept of social-democracy is that it does not adequately and substantially redress inequality. Social democracy is not a response to inequality. This concept is workable only in the absence of substantial political and economic disparities and in the presence of the appropriate institutional and attitudinal conditions.

AFRICAN SOCIALISM

Black Africa has for over a generation proclaimed its commitment to the socialist path of development, however a common characteristic thus far is the gap between rhetoric and reality. A common criticism has been that socialism in Africa is nothing but delusion, doomed from its inception by the absence of the necessary material conditions upon which to build. Africa's colonial legacy has ensured that these material conditions could not exist for some considerable time, even a generation since the wave of independence. The limitations imposed by colonialism under the conditions of dependency and neocolonialism gave rise to attempts in finding another way forward. The record of these attempts is a valuable lesson for the future. There have been some remarkable, dynamic innovations in certain spheres and some hopeless disasters in others.

Understandably, various schools of thought on “African socialism” emerged in the 60's at a time when many African countries were gaining independence. An often raised question has been whether “African” socialism is a legitimate concept; whether socialism is “scientific” or not socialism at all. At one end of this ideological spectrum were those who argued that African socialism was a unique ideology, basically socialist in its origin, content and orientation but appropriately modified to meet the peculiarities of Africa and the effects of colonial rule. At the other end of the spectrum were those who asserted that there was only one socialism and that was “scientific socialism” exemplified by the writings of Marx and Lenin. Those who belonged to this latter school of thought maintained that African socialism was nothing more than a bourgeois
attempt to Africanise the colonially established capitalism. Kwame Nkrumah has this to say of African socialism (after his overthrow in 1966):

Such a conception of socialism makes a fetish of the communal African society. But an idyllic African classless society (in which there were no rich and poor) enjoying a drugged serenity is certainly a facile simplification; there is no historical or even anthropological evidence for any such society. I am afraid the realities of African society is somewhat more sordid. (Munslow, 1986; 27)

Despite the enunciation of “African Socialism”, Tanzania's economy in 1966, several years after independence, was still firmly rooted in the inherited economic structure. Before independence the characteristic most significant in Tanzania's economic structure was the inherent conflict between the aims of the colonial power and those of the African population. After independence this conflict translated itself into a divergence of the aspirations of peasants and workers on the one side and the emerging dominant classes on the other side. These two forces, imperialism and internal class struggle, led the country further away from its goals and consequently forced a reassessment that laid the groundwork for a more determined move towards socialism. However the reaffirmed commitment to socialism embodied in the Arusha Declaration did not result directly from this conflict but from a recognition that Tanzania could not increase economic well-being and financial independence while continuing as a neo-colony.

President Nyerere's conception of socialism was largely based on his conclusion that traditional society in Africa was socialist and that modern African society should renew these traditional systems.

When we say that Tanzania is aiming at building “African Socialism”, we mean that we intend to adopt the same attitude in the new circumstances of a nation state which is increasingly using modern techniques for economic production.

(Nyerere, cited by Resnick, 1981; 49)

Nyerere saw the main contradiction in Tanzania as a conflict between the inherited institutional structure and the goals of the ideology. His premise for Ujamaa was based on the assumption that the colonial background and the socio-economic policies pursued during the colonial period were such that they neither resulted in creating a substantial domestic bourgeoisie nor in totally
undermining the traditional African socio-economic and political institutions. It was also clear that models of socialist development adopted by largely proletized and heavily industrialized countries such as the USSR are, due to a lack of these material conditions, inappropriate in the current African context. Hence Nyerere concluded that reconstruction should be based on the traditional African institution of the extended family and not on the class struggle.

Thus Tanzania's concept of socialism (Ujamaa) differs from the "scientific socialism" of Marx in the sense that it is conceived of as an outgrowth of traditional communalism. It stems from the traditional system of co-operation and solidarity in "sharing what you have with your kinsfolk" as Nyerere called it. Ujamaa, then started with a belief that the characteristics attributed to the traditional communities would be the pillars on which to build modern socialism.

Tanzania's efforts to attract foreign investments and manpower to implement the First Five Year Development Plan were generally unsuccessful. To the contrary the country was losing capital. In recognizing this failure it was realized that nationalization would be an economic necessity in an effort to control the economy, boost internal resources and to direct the country's future development. This was subsequently announced in the Arusha Declaration.

The major aims and objectives of the Arusha Declaration were: equality; elimination of exploitation of man by man; a classless society; a development of all the people; self-reliance and peoples' participation in affairs which affect their daily lives.

Being a poor country, Tanzania was faced with a dilemma not uncommon to many Third World countries. Development programs require finances which, if unavailable locally, need to be raised externally. This in turn entails dependence and inevitably a return to the very conditions that led to the struggle for liberation and independence. Nyerere summed up this paradox thus;

We are trying to overcome our economic weakness by using the weapons of the economically strong - weapons which in fact we do not possess. A poor man does not use money as a weapon.

(Nyerere, cited by Mohiddin, 1981; 85)
Hence the Declaration was highly critical of demands for money both on theoretical and economic grounds and made the point that money is not the sole basis of development and that on practical grounds, the country simply did not have the funds available.

Economically, self reliance was the only realistic strategy for an agriculture dominated, extremely poor country with very few industries, small markets and little natural resources. Having nothing to attract foreign investors, who would in any event dominate development and thus undermine independence, and little possibility of development via industrialization, the option for self reliance, if any development was to occur at all, was fait-accompli. Self reliance was therefore a pragmatic acknowledgement that development be based on what Tanzania actually has and not on what may be forthcoming.

The Declaration also made the point that in a country predominantly peasant and agriculturally based the wealth of the nation is produced in the rural areas yet modern amenities and services are concentrated in the urban areas. The result is the exploitation of the peasants by the city-dwellers. When loans acquired from foreign countries to build these costly services are paid back the finance for this repayment is usually derived from the sale of agricultural goods produced by the peasants.

During the first few years after the Declaration Tanzania's progress was remarkable. Between the years 1967 and 1973 there was a steady growth rate of 2.7% which was only minimally under the rate of population growth (Watzal, 1982; 9). The peasants, workers and much of the leadership within the ruling party placed great faith and optimism in the ideology and in the guidance of Nyerere.

The people were enthusiastic trusting and willing, the leadership was at least willing to try. The initial years since the Declaration were promising yet the country was still unable to wrest itself from dependency. There are numerous reasons for this - the country was affected by a prolonged drought, the massive rise in the oil price in the 70's created havoc with the country's balance of payments, the border war with Uganda, the support of Frelimo in the fight against colonialism in bordering Mozambique and the attempts to help Zambia
extricate itself from dependency on Rhodesia were burdens of no small measure. However in this thesis it is necessary to examine only those problems that relate to the ideology itself.

At the outset the very conceptual basis of the ideology raises a number of questions and poses problems. Firstly it over-idealizes the traditional form of the community. It has been argued that the attributes of communality and sharing were in fact a direct result of low production and insecurity. For example the lack of dependable storage facilities was probably the main reason for sharing perishable goods. The notion was “co-operation for survival” (Dore and Mars, 1981; 230), not necessarily co-operation as a norm.

Secondly, traditional society while based on mutual respect was also strongly hierarchic. Patriarchy was the common form of authority that was based on honor and service. With the emergence of socialism the concern for decision making was passed from the community and its elders to the larger more powerful state and its political leaders. Bureaucracy eroded this responsibility and created new tensions of interference and alien authoritarianism.

Thirdly, as in most other Third World countries “Development from below” had become a favored phrase in the language of development policies. The strict interpretation of this concept however is quite different from what has become common practice. Development should occur AT the bottom, projects need to be initiated FROM the community and the movement of surplus must be FROM the community. Unfortunately much too often the idea is turned around, development FROM the bottom is not development AT the bottom. Rather it implies that the benefit filters upwards as does the notion of project initiation FROM below. Similarly surpluses should flow TO the communities rather than FROM the communities. Tanzania had fallen victim to this reversal of an otherwise sound construct.

But not all the lessons to be learnt from Tanzania’s pioneering ideology are from its problems and mistakes. Firstly, development from below can occur if there is a sufficient devolution of power. Secondly, it is also possible to combine certain national values into scientific ideologies. However these values should not form the backbone of the ideology, rather they should be supplementary.
Thirdly, capitalist claims that its institutions are a necessity for development is a myth. For instance, nationalization of the financial institutions, provided they are efficiently managed, will create no dislocation or a run on the economy. Most importantly no government or party can effect socialism for the people, nor can people be directed toward it indefinitely without seeing the eventual benefit of their sacrifice. If this happens people will not discard those individualistic characteristics that prevent them from acting collectively but will retain them as protective devices against what they will see as a coercive and alien force.

Having analysed the ideological basis of the Tanzanian experience and making note of its specific and generic problems it would be useful at this point to abstract an appropriate development strategy.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY
an appropriate development strategy

The renowned Brandt Report, of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, in defining development said,

"Development never will be, and never can be, defined to universal satisfaction. It refers broadly speaking, to desirable social and economic progress and people will always have different views about what is desirable. Certainly development must mean improvement in living conditions for which economic growth and industrialization are essential. But if there is no attention to the quality of growth to social change one cannot speak of development." (Brandt report, 1980; 48)

Julius Nyerere the former President of Tanzania in conceptualising development in the context of the Third World said,

"... for the truth is that development means the development of the people. Roads, buildings, the increase of crop output and other things of this nature are not development; they are only tools of development." (Nyerere, 1968; 59)

If the concept of development is a concern for the conservation, production and reproduction of resources presumably for the benefit of humankind social development must therefore be primarily a response to inequality. Hence it is obvious that the issue of social development is one that cannot avoid value
judgements. The question which must immediately be asked is; from where is one to take these value judgements about what constitutes improvement and what does not. The development process and its concomitant policy making has by convention and perhaps tradition always been the decision of governments; therefore should one look to it for pronouncement regarding desirable improvements? With the present condition notwithstanding the obvious difficulty with this however, is its inherent circularity. How can one assess what governments do if one uses the criteria they themselves produce? How can relevant, appropriate policies, dedicated to a reduction of inequalities and privilege, be implemented by those who are seeking to maintain the status quo? These are obvious and fundamental dilemmas facing those who work within systems which they seek to alter. What is needed is some sort of independent measure with which to judge both stated intentions and actual actions or inactions.

Social development theory is in many ways diametrically opposite liberal laissez faire philosophy. Advocates of social development reject the belief that individuals themselves are responsible for their welfare and that any problems or deprivation they may face is due to a failure to meet their own needs through their own efforts. The real cause of most of these problems they argue is to be found not in the individual but in the external forces imposed on society as a whole. Consequently any remedial action taken must be at a societal or national level. This however does not deny the role of local communities and other organizations which collectively can make a major contribution towards ameliorating the social problems but that the magnitude of the problem requires a larger more comprehensive effort.

Social development is fundamental to any discussion of strategies and policies but has been more often than not misconstrued or worse defined relative to dominant thinking in developed countries. There is no attempt to define the concept of its true meaning but simply as an assumption of the rightness of dominant lifestyles and socio-economic forms. In a world run on the principles of economic development theory it is not uncommon that any references to social development will be measured in terms of economic criteria. This means that the issue is presented from a position of weakness as no amount of justification will be considered adequate to warrant state expenditure. That the
issue cannot always be explained in quantifiable statistical forms further exacerbates this problem.

At best social development in the First World has been regarded as being concerned with the formulation and implementation of narrowly specific programs to meet special social needs such as those of children, vagrants, the handicapped and the elderly. On the other hand in the context of oppressive or dictatorial regimes the concern has primarily been that of crisis intervention or one of reaction to actual or possible threats to social order.

Proponents of social development argue that it cannot be conceived of as peripheral or residual to the imperatives of politics and economics nor should it be reactive to the ill-effects of economics and politics. Rather social development is related to all those facets of life which constitute the culture of a society. Without a proper linkage in the context of the meaning of the enhancement of life, it attracts no support and remains foreign to the culture of the underdeveloped and underprivileged.

For state intervention to be meaningful governments must formulate and implement appropriate social policies based specifically on the needs and circumstances of their society. This task requires the participation of those with political authority (local, regional and national), administrative responsibility as well as technical expertise.

In implementing social policy principles governments will need to ensure that every sector operates on the basis of these principles. Furthermore it is necessary that the activities of all sectors relate with each other for if the relevant sectors are in conflict with the basic philosophy of development and operate on contradictory or differing principles the chances of translating statements of social policy into action are limited. In implementing social policy it is essential that the multi-dimensional character of inequality be recognized. It would be erroneous to assume that the sectors other than that for which planning or policy is being made are in order; that they are sufficiently developed. Unless urban housing policy is genuinely part of an overall strategy which is concerned with the needs of the majority it cannot succeed.
There are several ways in which social development and social policy objectives may be implemented. First national planning bodies should be established to the point where they are able to influence not just the allocation of resources but the actual pattern of policy formulation in the relevant sectors. However such a strategy is not without its problems.

Unless central planning is balanced by and rooted in vigorous democratic self-management and control, the rise of new forms of inequality and domination cannot be avoided. (Kuitenbrower, 1976; 15)

On the issue of central planning Kuitenbrower goes on to say, While central planning is indispensable to the balanced development between people, regions and sectors (so as to gradually overcome uneven development), such policy can only be sensitive to peoples' needs and potentialities if it is imbedded in a continuous process of consultation from the base upwards. . . Those who plan from the center and higher units can only be sensitive to the needs and potentialities of the local people if they are accountable to them and to a movement which is trusted and actively supported by most people. (Kuitenbrower, 1976; 16)

The most effective means to ensure that policies reflect the principles established for development will be firstly to place the formulation of those policies in the hands of those that would translate them into action; and secondly to promote public knowledge and participation in the implementation process. An informed involved population with real rather than illusory control over the process of social development is the surest way to control the direction of policy making and program implementation. (Mac Pherson, 1982; 189)

For meaningful development to occur effort on the part of both government and the governed is required. By this it is meant that development objectives must be achieved by efforts from both the top down as well as the bottom up. The struggle against apartheid has brought about an increasing awareness of collective efforts by communities especially the youth. The formation of street committees is a case in point. While the objective of these committees is politically oriented other community organisations have been formed as a result of financial needs. Examples of this are the numerous mutual aid societies (stokvels) in existence in the townships.
Any new development policy should harness these efforts into a structured program that allows meaningful participation. To this end the focus of the thesis turns to two concepts. The first a top-down policy of social development and the second a bottom-up policy of community participation.

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

Another concept that has had the consistent support of the United Nations as well as an enthusiastic and long sustaining interest from most theorists and politicians is community participation. This perhaps is its virtue as well as its weakness. The nature of community participation is such that it could quite easily be claimed to be compatible with several ideologies and beliefs.

The United Nations defines community participation as,

The creation of opportunities to enable all members of a community and the larger society to actively contribute to and influence the development process and to share equitably in the fruits of development. (United Nations, 1981; 5)

and that community participation requires the voluntary and democratic involvement of people in;

- contributing to the development effort
- sharing equitably in the benefits derived therefrom, and,
- decision-making in respect of setting goals, formulating policies and planning and implementing economic and social development programs.

The question of state provision for welfare arose for the first time as an issue during the colonial period. Colonial rule, wherever it was imposed, set in motion forces of change which transformed the traditional economies, the social institutions and the social relations. Colonialism not only resulted in the collapse of many of these systems, but brought with it foreign problems with which these pre-existing structures could not cope. This dislocation of economic and social structures and the rise of new demands for labor caused the decline in the ability of the family clan or tribe to provide the required support as in the past. There is no doubt that this social disruption was profound.

However colonial governments were primarily concerned with the maintenance of stable conditions for trade and agriculture and mineral exploitation. Social
welfare objectives were a low priority. The authorities were content to let the church, missionaries and voluntary organizations cater for the social needs with minimal provision from the state itself. In its dealing with the social problem the concern was with containment rather than contentment.

While community participation may indeed be the most democratic means of providing social services it is not without its problems. Most proponents of community participation while in agreement with these definitions argue that genuine community participation is unattainable in the presence of existing power structures. They charge that government, being a centralized and bureaucratic organization, is unresponsive to the problems and needs of individuals, it stifles initiative, weakens local self-reliance, undermines community solidarity and subverts local leadership.

While these allegations may indeed be correct, community participation unfortunately tends to be romanticised. The notion that the deprived will always form a united and cohesive front is not always true. Differentiation in status and income are just as prevalent as in other groups. Another myth is that ordinary people have an excess of free time and that they have a greater concern for the well being of others.

Furthermore, a fact that is not acknowledged is that the state is today a major provider of social services. Expensive and sophisticated services such as hospitals colleges and universities cannot be provided without substantial state support. Self-reliance is workable and most effective on a personal and family or clan level. Today's urbanized societies operate on principles that make reliance on the larger community necessary and inescapable.

While the proponents of community participation are undoubtedly correct in identifying the problems of central authority the strict adherence, by some amongst them is utopian; government cannot be willed away and its presence and influence is inevitable and must be conceded. In fact, the very idea of state welfare is based on egalitarian and humanistic ideals and collective responsibility.
However attempts to examine the relationship between the state and community initiative are few. If governments in whatever form are here to stay the all important question that should be addressed is; can a balance between state and community participation be found and if so is it possible to create a workable relationship between them.

In dealing with these issues it is obvious that the powers vested in the two parties involved needs to be conducive to a workable relationship, in that a certain devolution of power by the central authority is essential. The balance of power has to be such that the subordinate party which will undeniably be the community leadership, should have sufficient recourse and judicial protection. A major problem in decentralization is fiscal responsibility. Real decentralization can only occur when local decision making bodies have control over the allocation of financial resources. Since they are usually unable to raise sufficient funds to meet their needs, they are dependent on external sources and thus subject to external control. This however can be minimized by an allocation criteria based on social need and population but the fact is nonetheless clear; reliance on some sort of central authority is inevitable.

One possibility that could minimize these problems is the intervention of an impartial intermediary such as voluntary, non-profit organizations. These organizations have gained considerable support as they are more likely to promote authentic forms of participation than the state. Unlike the state, these organizations are claimed to be dynamic, flexible and socially concerned. They are not inhibited by bureaucratic rules and regulations and are not accountable to indifferent superiors and corrupt politicians. It is also argued that they are more effective in promoting community participation because they are innovative and adaptable. Politically too, they tend to be progressive.

Despite the obvious advantages of such organizations it cannot be claimed that their involvement has been faultless. Bureaucracy and inflexibility is not necessarily a character trait of public organizations alone. It is a problem that has more to do with size than affiliation. Many voluntary organizations, especially the larger ones, function bureaucratically and use formal procedural rules to carry out their tasks. While the management of such organizations is not beset with indifference they are normally controlled by dominant personalities who
tend to over-assert their influence thus defeating the purpose of participation. Many are run by middle class individuals whose views are liberal and paternalistic rather than radically egalitarian.

A major drawback of non-government organizations however is their inability to redistribute resources. Voluntary agencies may be able to allocate considerable resources to a deprived community but they are seldom able to shift resources between groups. This, of course, is due to the fact that they have no mandatory mechanism for transferring resources from the wealthy to the needy. Statal organizations on the other hand are empowered and can redistribute resources to deprived communities.

Despite the various shortcomings in the community participation approach, it has been favored by almost all concerned. While those on the right applaud the idea of self reliance they are not quite as enthusiastic about the collectivist rhetoric. Those on the left also hold varied opinions from cautious, qualified approval to outright rejection.

For the idea to be workable the limits of community participation needs to be recognized and accommodated. It should be recognized that it can fail not only because of antipathy or subversive efforts of the state but because of problems in the community. Flagging morale, differences of opinion and lack of motivation are unavoidable even amongst the deprived. The idealism and rhetoric needs to be tempered by a more accommodating pragmatic approach. However improvements in levels of living and access to social services are of little significance in societies where individual freedoms are suppressed. It is only when they are liberated from these oppressive forces that human beings are able to utilize and enjoy the benefits of material progress.

**SOUTH AFRICA'S FISCAL POLICY**

Hence this thesis proposes that South Africa has the capacity to undertake a transfiguration of its development policy, of which housing is a part, from its present politico-economic bias to one that makes equal if not primary the issue of social development and that genuine development can only take place if the present inequity is redressed.
At this point it may seem as if the alternative suggested is utopian, further reading will reveal that it is tempered with realism and experience. No theory or idea is without its limitations; to recognize these limitations forces a compromise that makes them workable. It should be noted that the argument in this thesis is not with the discipline of economics as such. Rather it is its translation and dominance in development policy that is in question. Indeed any development policy must take cognisance of financial resources. This begs the question; is social development financially feasible in South Africa.

THE BUDGET

How serious is the South African government in alleviating the Black housing shortage?

- The Financial Mail in its summary of the state budget for 1986 reported that of a total expected expenditure of R37,57 billion, the total allocation to Black housing was R311 million (0,83% of total expenditure). By contrast the cost of propping apartheid via defence spending was R5,12 billion (13,7% of total expenditure). Financial Mail, March 21, 1987)

- In 1987 the Development Bank of South Africa estimated that the Black housing backlog was 1,1 million units. In the same year the Minister of Housing, A. Venter stated in parliament that the oversupply of White housing was 27,378 units. (South African Institute of Race Relations Social and Economic Update, 3rd Quarter 1987)

- Of the 1988 budget the Financial Mail reported that the allocation for Black Housing, i.e. for land purchases, upgrading and the provision of serviced sites amounted to R106 million (0,2% of total expenditure) It should be noted that the government has ceased the provision of housing units, funding is now limited to the provision of serviced sites and for upgrading. By contrast defence expenditure was R8,2 billion (15,2% of total expenditure). (Financial Mail, March 18, 1988). A mere 1% decrease in the defence budget could have almost doubled the allocation for Black housing.

Considering these statistics the question is somewhat rhetorical.
While this observation may be superficial in that there is no analysis of the growth rate or the GNP which in recent years has been disappointingly low, it should be remembered that the prime cause of this is apartheid. Divestment, boycotts and embargoes have had an effect on the economy in that imports and exports have been more expensive as a result of the devious means through which products are obtained and sold. In 1986 P. W. Botha conceded that between 1973 and 1984 South Africa paid R22 billion above the regular price for crude oil. According to the Shipping Research Bureau the real extra cost of buying crude oil on the black market since 1979 has been $20 billion over the market price (West Africa, 11 July 1988). The political unrest, the state of emergency and the strikes and stayaways has had an adverse effect on the economy. For the first time in its history the Johannesburg Stock Exchange closed its doors to trading on the 27th August 1985. The South African rand which a few years before traded at $1,20 to the R1,00 plunged to 38 American cents to the Rand. South Africa has devoted an unprecedented amount of its revenue to propping apartheid and its war machine. Between the years 1975 and 1985 South Africa's military spending has increased by a mind-boggling 800% (West Africa, 11 July 1988). It has been forced to develop a cost ineffective arms industry and has a bureaucracy that is probably the most burdensome anywhere.

Yet South Africa has become the economic force it is at the expense of the majority of its people. The promised prosperous future of economic development has no time frame, for most it may never happen. Policies based entirely on principles of economics can self-destruct or collapse as a result of revolutions. History is littered with examples that prove this. On the other hand a policy based on social development cannot be easily altered, for once in place the inertia will tend to correct any bias.
CHAPTER FOUR
IMPLEMENTING THE OPTIONS

INTRODUCTION

Having led the discussion on the determinants of housing policy, i.e. development strategies, this chapter will focus on the implementation of these strategies in the provision of housing.

Housing in South Africa can be categorized into five typologies:

- rural housing
- urban informal settlements
- existing townships
- the development of vacant inner city enclaves
- new towns

While none of these categories should be dismissed, all being important in their own right, this thesis will concentrate on two of these as a means of demonstrating how the development strategy may be brought to bear on the provision of housing. The categories under discussion are the existing townships and the development of inner city enclaves. The latter comprising of expropriated land presently under government ownership, interstitial zones under the jurisdiction of the respective local authorities and disused mining land owned by the mining corporations.
THE TOWNSHIPS AND THE CURRENT RENT BOYCOTT

A study conducted by the Center for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Natal in 1978 in the township of Kwa Mashu revealed that some of the major grievances of the residents questioned were a discontent with the township administration, insecure tenure and high rent and service charges.

(Refer Table below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of respondents mentioning problems concerning:</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>community administration</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crime</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transportation</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>housing</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>education</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>community facilities</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Bantu Council</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medical services, ambulances</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sanitation, drains, stormwater, refuse collection</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>roads</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
* multiple responses

Table 4  Grievances and problems of residents in Kwa Mashu (Moller, 1978)

Respondents expressed their frustration thus:

The clerks in the place are just ornaments. If you happen to be unknown to them, you rot for hours on end. (waiting)

and

The problems facing the Kwa Mashu community are all deliberately caused by the management here. They are purposely caused just to have us cracking our heads. They are means of humiliating us. (Moller, 1978; 12)

When respondents were pressed to identify specific grievances against the community administration, an overwhelming majority cited the issue of rentals. (Refer Table overleaf)
percentages of respondents mentioning: *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>rent</td>
<td>46,7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- fluctuation in rentals</td>
<td>26,0</td>
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<tr>
<td>- high rentals</td>
<td>20,7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>night raids</td>
<td>22,7</td>
<td></td>
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<td>residential security</td>
<td>27,3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- eviction on account of arrears</td>
<td>9,3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- eviction of widows</td>
<td>9,3</td>
<td></td>
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<td>- indefinite residents' status</td>
<td>8,7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>communication between residents and administration</td>
<td>10,9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- degradation, inconsiderateness on the part of clerks</td>
<td>6,2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- unapproachability of administration</td>
<td>4,7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* multiple responses

Table 5  Grievances concerning community administration  (Moller, 1978)

It is therefore not surprising that one of the biggest challenges facing township authorities presently is the ongoing rent boycott more especially in Soweto but also occurring sporadically in other townships throughout the country. The boycott which first began in September 1984 in Sebokeng and Sharpville spread to Soweto in 1986.

The rent strike which at first began as a response to increased rents and utility bills, has taken on a pronounced political dimension. It has also become a symbolic means of protest against the state of emergency and the presence of security forces in the townships.

The rent boycott which has spread to fifty four other black townships (other than Soweto) involving four million people is one of the most sustained acts of civil disobedience since the Defiance Campaign of the 1950's. (Boston Globe, February 18, 1988)

So fervent has been the resistance to eviction that on August 22, 1986 a clash between residents and police in Jabavu, a section of Soweto, resulted in about 30
deaths. The government for its part has tried several tactics ranging from evictions to propaganda. Dozens of billboards have been erected showing cheery families gathered in front of idealized homes. "Housing is a bargain. But bargains have to be paid for," the signs proclaim. Other means resorted to by the authorities have been the removal of the front door of the houses of 'delinquent' residents and "deacon action" - a system of door to door collection. Further enforcement is planned via the Promotion of Local Government Affairs Amendment Bill, tabled in Parliament in June 1987. The bill if approved bypasses any court action by residents and compels employers to appropriate on behalf of the local authorities sums from the pay packets of those employees whose rental and service charges are in arrears. A similar proposal was withdrawn last year after an outcry from both unions and organized business. The new proposal it is claimed is different in that it now applies to all races and not just Blacks (Financial Mail, June 12, 1987). The impertinence of this "democratic" gesture does not go unnoticed.

Residents generally feel that they have paid for the houses many times over and that the dwellings should now be given to the tenants. Furthermore they cite the fact that the local authority has never maintained the houses and roads; services such as street cleaning are non-existent. The sentiments expressed by rent strikers such as Poulina Njikelane, 88, is a common statement amongst township residents.

I've lived here since 1959. All the painting, I've done. You see this pretty terrace? My husband built that terrace. They should give this house to me, I feel I have paid for it many times over.

(Boston Globe 1988).

Dr. Nthato Motlana of the Soweto Civic Association suggests that the best solution to the rent boycott was for the state to give the people the homes they have been renting for so many years, and then negotiate more realistic service charges. Other notable researchers such as Dr Graeme Hardie, formerly of the Human Sciences Research Council - Environmental Studies Division concur with the suggestion. (personal communication). The New York Times reports that calculations by university economic researchers show that it would cost the state about $300 million to give the country's 500,000 Government owned houses to Blacks. (New York Times Feb. 18, 1988)
Considering that the “big sale” is a miserable failure the option seems to be a feasible one. However, as attractive as it may be, the option has three fundamental problems. Firstly, the solution takes no account of the repercussions of such a move with respect to those residents who have already purchased houses. Secondly, the plan like most others is a stop-gap solution, it does not project any long term proposals. Thirdly, it does not recognize the common bond inculcated amongst the residents as a result of the boycott.

Any proposal that does not take these issues into account will be a lost opportunity towards achieving a meaningful change.

A solution that is compatible with the development strategies of social development and community participation and one that adequately addresses the abovementioned problems is co-operative housing. It is proposed therefore that all existing government owned black housing be turned into co-operatives.

It should be noted that a concept similar to co-operatives, the block share, has been in existence in South Africa for some time though only amongst the White population. Its popularity is limited for obvious reasons. Co-operative living is of little benefit to a relatively affluent group whose way of life is highly individualistic. However, as stated earlier the notion of co-operatives is not based on a romantic ideal of communal egalitarian living. Rather it is a move that capitalizes on the efforts of a people who have rallied together for a common cause.

The first step in implementing this plan may well be the recognition of existing community groups or civic organizations as interim trustees of all state owned residential land within the townships. In townships where such organizations are non-existent or insufficiently organized, steps should be taken towards establishing a legitimate democratic body for this purpose. The significance of this step is that it will in effect acknowledge the tenure rights of the future members of the co-operative. The second step would be to hold in escrow all current rental payments, until such time (pre-determined) that a permanent co-operative society is formed. These funds would then be handed to the society for allocations they may see fit. The administration of the townships, for the
purpose of expediency, during this interim period should be headed by a joint committee of present administration officials and the leadership of the community organization. The third step would be the immediate implementation of a training program for members of the co-operative and a program for the establishment of the co-operative societies. These should be conducted by universities, research organisations and non-profit organisations with grants from the state and local authorities.

The structure and operations of co-operative societies has been well documented, hence details need not be explained here, the deficiencies however require attention. The letting and the speculative sale of houses in a co-operative are two such aspects for which an adequate solution has yet to be found. An even bigger problem is that of key money paid to unscrupulous officials or to the seller. Present opinion is that these problems cannot be completely eliminated, the best that can be done is to minimise its occurrence.

The proviso that a dwelling could be sold only to the co-operative at a fixed price with an allowance for improvement has been an effective means of minimising speculation. Controlling letting on the other hand is somewhat more difficult as a shortage of housing will induce the creation of an unofficial exploitative rental market. It is however possible to implement rules that act as deterrents. For instance subsidised home improvement loans should only be given to those who have continuously lived in their homes for a certain period of time. By letting a home, the member forfeits his/her right to the subsidy. However controlled letting should be allowed in that a house may be let only to a person on the official waiting list. In this way the incidence of exorbitant rentals may be brought under control. Another effective means of preventing speculative selling or letting is to encourage a system of exchange instead. The exchange system could operate on a local as well as a national level.

In order to distinguish those houses that have already been purchased, and will inevitably be interspersed amongst the rented stock, those within the co-operative should have ownership of the house but only the use of the land. The land will be owned jointly and in perpetuity by all residents who will be members of the co-operative. In implementing this solution, two major obstacles are solved. The first being that there is a distinction between freehold
purchasers and second the enormous problem of registration of title deeds and the survey of individual lots is dispensed with.

It is obvious that the implementation of this proposal will depend on state finance for at least the first few years. The eventual goal however should be for self-reliance especially in the administration of the co-operative society and the maintenance and repair of the neighborhoods. This however will not include community facilities, clinics or schools and day-care centers which will be state subsidised.

A means by which greater participation and interaction between the race groups could be induced is by a system of linkage or "twinning". By this it is meant that upper income residential areas within the metropolitan area in which the township is located could be linked by joint community projects undertaken to promote racial harmony and co-existence. The possibility of allocating a percentage of the rates and taxes paid by the affluent "twin" directly to the coffers of the corresponding township/neighborhood should be given consideration.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF VACANT INNER CITY ENCLAVES

While the solution to the rent boycott is a progressive step and one that will be the beginning of a process to reverse the effects of reformed apartheid it does not directly address the housing shortage as it deals with an already existing and occupied housing stock. However such a step has obvious advantages. Perhaps the most important is that it would facilitate the all-important process of legitimate institution building and participation. Dealing with the people of the present is practice for dealing with the people of the future.

South African cities are characterized by a curious anomaly that is a result of apartheid spatial planning policy. The physical manifestations of the policy are the vast vacant pockets of land created by the forced removal of established Black communities. To this day these scars remain as though cursed, never to be built upon but to be silent reminders of a mad ideology. Cato Manor is now a sea of lush sub-tropical vegetation. District Six bears the ghostly remains of homes crushed by apartheid's bulldozer. Former residents are sometimes seen on some sort of pilgrimage, contemplating the remains where the hearth of their family
home once stood. Some have philosophically wished that it remain this way - a barren, desolate monument or rather a mausoleum to a once vibrant community. The Department of Community Development has partially rebuilt Pageview, not for its original residents but for low income Whites. Haunted by its legacy, most of the newly built houses remain vacant.

Figure 9 District Six, circa 1970. (Western, 1981)
Figure 10  District Six, circa 1974. (Pinnock, 1984)

Figure 11  District Six, circa 1976. (Western, 1981)
Cato Manor, District Six and Pageview are but three of the most controversial and conspicuous examples of the Department of Community Development's vast holdings of expropriated land. But expropriated land is not the only vacant land as a result of apartheid. In addition the Group Areas Act required not only a separation of the races but the creation, in the absence of natural or man-made barriers, of vacant buffer zones in between.

Considering the legacy of forced removals and notwithstanding the comments of urban geographers and urban planners that South African cities are underurbanized, the logical conclusion would be to re-instate these vacant scars with the residential settlements that once existed. In fact there have been several reports about the government's willingness to declare District Six and possibly Pageview as "grey areas," i.e. areas in which mixing of races will be allowed. Shell Oil as well as Total, the French oil corporation, have attempted to propose a multiracial development for District Six as a gesture of "goodwill". The final result of such a proposal is not difficult to imagine even though the allocation procedures have not been decided upon. The few token low income Blacks will eventually be induced, by the market and possibly other means, to sell. The gentrification in this case will be quick and effortless and within a few years District Six will be permanently lost to those who have the legitimate right to it.

While expropriated land and the buffer strips may indeed form the bulk of vacant land in close proximity to the city the situation particularly on the Witwatersrand is quite different. The expansion of the cities in this arc beneath the gold reef has meant that mine land with mineshafts now abandoned, dot the outer and mid-city landscape. These valuable pieces of real estate, still in the ownership of the mining companies, will under present conditions probably reap profits in excess of that extracted from the earth. Hence the Witwatersrand where the housing shortage is the most critical has an additional reservoir of land for future growth.

At this point the question that arises is; should vacant land having a potentially high market value be utilised for residential development? Could not this value be optimised with the profits being used to subsidise housing? The point is valid if seen from the perspective of pure economic development. But to marginalise residential development does not always make good economic sense. The ill-
The effects of suburbanization are being increasingly felt in many cities worldwide. Perhaps the precedent that is indicative of what may be the rule rather than the exception is Nicaragua's "Urbanizaciones Progressivas". The strategy is based on discounting the requirements of cost recovery and land cost for the very poor.

With respect to land ownership, Clause Four of the Freedom Charter states, THE LAND SHALL BE SHARED AMONG THOSE WHO WORK IT! Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger; . . . Although the Freedom Charter has a clear socialist orientation the stated intentions could hardly be judged as Marxist. There is no direct call for nationalization.

While most hardline Marxist states, even in Africa, have resorted to the nationalization of land and property as the first step in the attack on the housing shortage, evidently claims that nationalization of all housing would solve the problem are unsubstantiated. To the contrary nationalization has not been as successful a means of redistribution. In many Eastern European countries party officials, civil servants and celebrities now occupy the suburban villas once owned by the bourgeoisie.

Another alternative pursued by many socialist countries has been legislation that encourages sub-division of existing larger houses by permitting increased ground densities. Frequently however, little attention was paid to the provision of amenities and services resulting in a densely crowded and shoddily built or altered housing stock. That the most rational way to proceed would be to demolish high-quality houses rather than squatter settlements to break the vicious circle only underlines the depths of the dilemma.

Many countries with socialist orientations in fact have been selective about nationalization. Expropriation is a problem in the sense that it would threaten the government's support from a significant portion of the population. On the other hand cash compensation at market prices for expropriated land is financially inhibitive. Often nationalization and subsequent reprivatization of former large land holdings is frequent practice. In this way the government can
build up popular support particularly in conditions where redistribution is necessary. This seems to be consistent with Nelson Mandela’s view on nationalization. Of the Freedom Charter he said it, is by no means a blueprint for a socialist State. It calls for redistribution, but not nationalization, of land; it provides for a nationalization of mines, banks and monopoly industry, because big monopolies are owned by one race only, and without such nationalization racial domination would be perpetuated despite the spread of political power . . . nationalization would take place in an economy based on private enterprise. (Karis and Carter, 1977; 787)

Similar statements were made by other ANC executives such as Thabo Mbeki at the recent Dakar meeting. There have also been numerous assurances that homes of individuals will not be nationalized.

Although these statements should not be construed as policy in the light of the present political uncertainty they could be held as a guide since they constitute opinion that is by no means exclusive to the Freedom Charter or the ANC. Indeed the present South African government, specifically its Department of Community Development, with the exception of some of the socialist countries, is reputed to be one of the largest landowners in the world. Hence a future government that inherits this stock of land together with the temporarily nationalised vacant land holdings of the mining companies particularly on the Witwatersrand would provide an “inexhaustible” supply of vacant land in close proximity to the cities.

How then should one proceed to obtain a satisfactory solution? There seem to be three possible solutions.

• allow informal settlements officially or by turning a blind eye
• take the multinational corporations by their espoused philanthropic proclamations with sufficient safeguards to prevent eventual gentrification
• embark on state sponsored mass housing projects in the nature of those of the 50's and 60's
• a combination of the above

Clearly the first option is the least desirable not only morally or even aesthetically but more especially because such settlements do not optimise on
density. On inner city sites this is crucial. Perhaps a combination of the second and third option is the most expedient. But whatever the choice state involvement in mass housing is essential.

As stated earlier the financing of such projects is the responsibility of the state. It is also possible that the private sector especially the larger corporations be induced to assume joint responsibility. However the idea that employers provide direct financial assistance in the form of loans, subsidies or employee housing estates is as stated earlier, a myth. Employee housing in the form of the singles, mine compounds has an indelible stigma amongst Blacks. Furthermore as Engels, in his classical treatise on workers housing argued that housing provided by employers restricts choice, mobility and binds the worker to an invisible one-sided contractual commitment to service.

A possible solution is to re-enact the old Native Services Levy Act of 1951. By contributing to a fund rather than to an individual worker, the problem of the “invisible contract” is eliminated.

Perhaps an innovative way to provide for the running costs of these projects and an aspect worth exploring is the integration of work place and housing, not only in the form of mixed use developments but rather one that is akin and common to non-western societies. This is the integration of informal home-based business and industries. The survey by Valerie Moller on the needs and problems of Kwa Mashu township residents reveals some interesting responses (See table below).
Aside from the aspirations to professions the largest number of respondents wished to pursue occupations that afforded them independence, i.e. own businesses, probably ranging from fully fledged shops to stalls and kiosks. Women overwhelmingly responded positively to work opportunities from their homes. An appropriate response to these aspirations could be the development of a local “third sector” economy between the informal and formal sectors. Co-operative organizations would be perfectly suited to the development of this potential. Residents would have not only a place to stay but a place where aspirations may be realized.
Through the process of nationalisation and reprivatization the state will be able to bring about a more equitable distribution of vacant inner city land. This together with state owned land could then gradually be parcelled out to cooperatives. As pointed out earlier developments based on the principles of cooperative societies offer the most democratic means of participation in a communities needs. They galvanise groups into action and ensure control not only during the initial stages of the project but throughout its life span. The crucial difference between the new housing and the proposal for the existing townships is that of resident selection. However once this has been accomplished and the housing built the administrative structures would increasingly resemble those in the townships.

By reprivatizing land not to individuals but to co-operatives, it would be possible to “socialize the cost of the land”. In a situation where the landlord is a cooperative, rent, fees or whatever fiscal mechanism used can be “socialised”, in
which case it is possible not to establish a direct link between the construction of houses or apartments and the rent or fee collected from the user. This is to say, cost recovery and affordability are eliminated as criteria. The distribution of housing may then be allocated according to need and the fee or rent based on the ability to pay.

Those that have languished on the artificially created housing wait lists while living in shacks or sharing a single room with several others have an unquestionable right to housing. Those that were forcibly removed have an inalienable right to being re-housed in those areas from which they were evicted. To the end of 1976 an unaccountable number of Blacks have been spatially disqualified. In Durban alone it is estimated that on the basis of the 1951 population 67% of the Black population was forcibly removed. By contrast, in all South African cities only 0,2% of White families were relocated as a result of the Group Areas Act (Maasdorp & Humphreys, 1977). The state has a duty to provide “approved accommodation” but not on land where poverty and inequality will persist and be perpetuated. The scars of apartheid that mar South African cities need to be healed by those who have suffered the most.
CONCLUSION

This thesis in its progression through the history and the present direction of the urban Black housing question has attempted to follow what may be called a "natural process" in addressing what is termed the present predicament. With the Freedom Charter as a guide, and together with the facts and figures of the reality the thesis argument makes the point that the problem lies not in the delivery of housing for if this were the case self-help, for instance, would certainly have been a viable solution. Neither does the problem lie in the housing policy for, as the second chapter has shown, reformed apartheid has put into place many of the requirements that are characteristic of a healthy means of providing housing. The existing housing stock is being given away at bargain prices, freehold tenure has been reinstated, the pass laws have been repealed so that the Black population is, according to official opinion, at will to move and the free market has been in operation for the first time.

The thesis identifies the problem in the development policy. While the Freedom Charter regards housing as a right, reformed apartheid regards it as commodity and covertly as a privilege for the co-opted few. There is no denying that the problem is of a crisis proportion and the thesis argues that South Africa is in a position to undertake a program of mass housing. Having established this the thesis goes on to suggest the means by which the development strategy may be deployed to best advantage, this being largely a counter argument to the present trend.

In advancing the options for a development strategy, those analysed thus far all indicate certain deficiencies in differing degrees. Economic development theory asks that to get a "slice of the cake" one has to produce a "bigger cake". What proponents of this theory fail to spell out is the crucial question - how big should the cake be? While social democracy may be an attractive and viable solution the absence of the material conditions, i.e. equality which is a basis of social democracy makes it an unattainable alternative, at least for the present time. Similarly the concept of African Socialism as pursued in Tanzania failed as a result of the enormous gulf between the objective and the reality. Despite the
best of intentions and theories, Tanzania was unable to break loose the shackles of the global capitalist economy to which it was hopelessly reliant. However on an ideological and theoretical level the case of Tanzania is a lesson worthy of close consideration. The temptation to draw parallels with the experience in parts of Africa in particular is great. However in general, the parallel is valid only in the broadest sense in that most of Africa was at one stage under colonial rule and even during this period the differences are easily identifiable. The extent of industrialization and mining in South Africa are unmatched elsewhere in Africa. The migrant labor system has its tentacles not only within South Africa but also in neighboring states and even in countries as far north as Malawi. Also capitalist and white interests are most pronounced in South Africa. At the same time the Black population is also the most politicised with a much larger proportion of a working class.

For Tanzania the major problem was the fact that it did not have the financial resources to attack the inherited structures frontally or all at once, nor was the leadership willing to allow the country to become the client state of an advanced socialist nation. The problems therefore had to be dealt with in a sectoral approach and in increments that were intangible. As had been stated earlier, the population and its leadership understood the problems and did more than try to meet the challenge under the circumstances, but exhortions alone cannot sustain a peoples morale and determination.

The Tanzanian experience revealed some fundamental requirements without which the basic social needs including those of housing will remain unfulfilled.

- An absolute necessity is a direct, frontal, all encompassing social development strategy. The housing problem or any other insufficient social need must be seen not as an isolated sector but as part of an over-arching inequitable system which requires a comprehensive solution. Tanzania for reasons in some ways beyond its control failed to accomplish this.

- Capitalist economic principles under conditions of inequity cannot redress underdevelopment but would in fact exacerbate it. In recognizing this, Tanzania undertook to nationalize land and certain strategic industry and institutions. Though a necessary step, nationalization on its own, does not lead to socialism or self-reliance. In the case of Tanzania, nationalization to a large extent resolved the contradiction between foreign and local control of
the economy in favor of the latter. Socialism however requires, in addition, a change in the control of the means of production. In Tanzania this change occurred in name only. The parastatal bureaucracy assumed the role of the former corporate management and rendered ineffective the workers self-management program.

- While centralized plans and co-ordination is indispensable there must be at the same time a sufficient devolution of power that allows for community participation which in turn must be accompanied by an adequate fiscal allocation. In the case of Tanzania the injection of funds in community programs was insufficient due to the country's poverty.
- Without a working class vanguard the pursuit of social change and equality becomes nothing more than institutional and policy changes. In many cases in spite of nationalization the force that are necessary to drive and guide the change are absent.

The objective in the latter part of this thesis has been to abstract an appropriate development option and as the next step to suggest some means within which housing policy may be implemented. The nature of the problem has, perhaps for the better, precluded the possibility of drawing parallels from other situations. The approach was to look at the evolution of the existing policy and with this in mind advance some alternate means of addressing the problem. The experience of Tanzania is used largely on a theoretical and ideological level. Chapter three argues that a strategy of selective sectoral transformation cannot bring about an equitable reconstruction. In conditions of gross inequity such as exist in South Africa any development strategy must necessarily be towards redressing this imbalance.

The final chapter avoids a prescriptive housing policy. Rather it attends to the means by which an appropriate development strategy may be implemented in ways that contribute to eliminating or reducing inequity and in addressing the present predicament. It argues that for those who have been forcibly deprived the state has an inalienable and incumbent duty to provide adequate housing.

The irresolvable dilemma faced by a capitalist state in the provision of housing is the ever present need for intervention for the purposes of reproducing labor within the constraints imposed by the material condition of capitalist production.
on the one hand and the need to see to the well being and welfare of its people on the other hand. That South Africa has been able to sustain the present imbalance without a serious challenge for so long is an indication of the brutality of the system. The fact that even the most sophisticated ploys have now come to nought is an indication of the final throes of a policy, the mechanism of which has wasted away to the extent that even more oppressive force is required to administer the dosage of reform.

Perhaps the fact that puts the struggle in South Africa apart from any other is the fact that in denying genuine political participation the working class and their labor unions have assumed an added political dimension. Hence an ideology that assumes the working class to be politically naive and unenlightened of the aims of capitalism, privatization and re-commodification are hopelessly erroneous. Organized labor is increasingly assuming not only the voice of the work force but also of communities.

Home ownership, the trump card of capitalism is no guarantee for stability. Alan Mabin makes the point that,

Someone who owns a house is supposed to have greater security than someone who rents. But a default on bond repayments reveals just how thin that security is when the title reverts to a building society; while someone who lets out the rooms of a house in Soweto always has the money to pay the whole or most of the rent . . . In conditions when 'home owners' find it hard to make ends meet, let alone make bond repayments, private property in housing does not necessarily enhance stability, security, or a sense of commitment to the principle that houses should be owned by their occupants. (Mabin, 1983; 5)

If in this thesis there is a singularly clear message it is the fact that the provision of housing is more dependent on need than the imperatives of politics and economics. State involvement in housing provided it is in the interest of the social well-being of all people does not necessarily mean authoritarianism. Rather it is a commitment to people in need of housing. In situations that call for re-distribution the role of the state is indispensable. Housing should not be contingent on total cost recovery or profit but on social returns. Access and distribution of scarce resources such as land needs to be equitable and where this does not exist, the priority must be to make it so. South Africa is at the threshold
of a new direction. Having exhausted all the efforts that deny the legitimate rights of the majority, the status quo is reduced to making contingent plans. The timing for a new democratic grand plan has never been better.
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