SPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLDS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF
AGRARIAN CHANGE ON CHINESE
PEASANT WOMEN

by

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Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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ABSTRACT

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Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on May 19, 1989 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Degree of Master of City Planning

In this study, we caution against the use of achievements of "specialized households" in rural China as a sole indication of the success of current rural reforms without differentiating there impacts on peasants living within the specialized household. We propose that in order to understand how current rural reforms are working, we should study the organization of work, mobilization of family laborers, and allocation of labor products within the household. By "decomposing" the household, we can gain important insights into how work is organized and how rural reforms affect the livelihood of women, men, elders, and children within and beyond the specialized household.

To support our idea, we concentrate our study on the impacts of rural reforms on peasant women in specialized households. Based on some secondary information, we find that female laborers are playing a more important role in the current household production system. Having to assume greater responsibility in agricultural production, peasant women have to deal with the dual roles of being good workers and mothers/wives at the same time. Accordingly, their work burden increases.

Moreover, we hypothesize four possible means in which female laborers are mobilized and controlled within the household. We also propose several research questions for future analysis of the dynamics of agrarian change in China.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Chinese rural economy is in the midst of rapid economic change. One of the most important dimensions of the recent reforms has been the reestablishment of the peasant household as the basic economic and social unit. Indeed, the peasant household has virtually replaced the collective as the dominant unit of production in rural China (Zhou and Du, 1986). With the increase of importance of the peasant household, Chinese scholars and officials are focusing their attention on a specific type of households called "specialized households." Specialized households have been able to raise their productivity and household income under the rural reforms, and the Chinese government has publicized their achievements to show the success of the government policy towards development in rural sectors.

The primary goal in this study is show why the use of achievements of specialized household is a poor indication of the success of current rural reform. Knowing the impacts of reforms on a specialized household may not give us any clear knowledge concerning changes in the livelihood of people living within it. We suggest that if we "decompose"

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1 Specialized households are a specific type of rural households that concentrate their labor in specialized agricultural or nonagricultural production. In Appendix A, we give a more detailed definition and description of specialized households and identify some differences between specialized households and other nonspecialized households.
the specialized household, we can gain important insight into how work is organized, how resources are allocated, and how labor products are distributed within the household. By "looking inside" the household, we can then understand the impacts of the rural reforms on peasants, namely women, men, elders, and children. Knowing this will, in turn, help us to determine whether the rural reforms are able to enhance the welfare of peasants in China.

In order to make the study manageable, we will focus on the impacts of rural reforms on female laborers in specialized households. Our principal research question is: To what extent and in what manner does the development of specialized households affect women in those households in agricultural sectors of rural China? We will show that by looking inside the specialized household and by incorporating gender into our analytical framework, we can obtain an improved understanding of the current agrarian changes in China. We will show that this understanding may have important policy implications for future rural reforms and the welfare of Chinese peasant women in the new peasant household economy.

Before we specify our major argument and methods of conducting our research, we will discuss briefly the government's view on how rural reforms have affected peasant women. This discussion will explain why we feel that a study of women's position in the new peasant household
Women in Peasant Household Economy: A Government Assessment

To the government, the increase of the income of the "peasant household" will mean a general increase in the standards of living for all household members. At a national conference on rural work, Wan Li (1984, p. 16), Vice-Premier of the State Council, stated that the emergence of the household production system has improved the living standards of peasants in general. He does not, however, differentiate the impacts of reforms on women, men, elders, and children.

Lou Qiong (1986, p. 167), longtime leader of the All-China Democratic Women's Federation (Women Federation), argues that when the income of households increase, households will be able to purchase durable consumer goods, such as washing machines and electric irons. Lou argues that these consumer goods can lessen the burden of women on household chores; therefore, the increase in household income will improve the well-being of peasant women.

According to Robinson (1985, p. 45), peasants usually reinvest household income in seed, livestock, fertilizers, and agricultural supplies, because male heads of households believe that it is more important to increase economic

2 All-China Democratic Women's Federation is the most recognized government body in dealing with women's issues. Its major function is to publicize and carry out the Party's political direction and campaigns.
returns than to lessen women's burden from onerous household tasks. Accordingly, the increase in household income does not necessarily benefit women unless they are able to decide how income is to be spent in the household.

Apparently, Chinese government officials and some women leaders believe that labor products are evenly distributed between household members, and there is no conflict of interests within the household on how income should be spent. We believe, however, that gender relations within the household are so important to our understanding of agrarian change in China that we should study it carefully rather than assume a harmonious situation inside the household. When Streeten (1979, p. 31) argues against the approach of poverty alleviation by raising the income of the household, he raises the question of intra-household distribution of goods and services. Based on a survey, he states that the increase in the income of heads of households does not necessary benefit women and children in households. Besides, in the existing agricultural household models, scholars do not deny the fact that a conflict of interests exists within the household, and power relations between household members are the major determinant for income or welfare distribution within the household. We will discuss these household models briefly later in this chapter.

Some Chinese officials also recognize the seriousness
of internal conflicts within the household. A survey conducted by a reporter of *People's Daily* (1982, p. 3) on 15 collectives in Guangzu province shows that 241 people committed suicide because of conflicts with their household members, and 66 percent of the victims were women.

Treating the household as a unitary whole has two important policy implications. First, planners and scholars will judge the well-being of members within the household based on the income or the standard of living of the "household" without differentiating the impacts of rural reforms on individual members; therefore, the economic and social impacts of reforms on women, men, elders, and children will be buried under the glorified success of peasant households. We will argue that this approach will not lead us too far in understanding the effects on the livelihood of peasants under this drastic institutional change in rural China.

If government officials think that the rural reforms have increased the well-being of peasants, they will neglect the fact that the institutional changes that were brought forth by reforms have transformed the way that needy people get access to welfare services. This change will demand a new role of the government in providing welfare services to some peasants who are not able to increase their well-being in the new production system. While collectives are playing less active roles in the new peasant household economy, the
government is beginning to favor the notion of "self-help" or "community care" programs that require a certain degree of voluntarism from peasants rather than a formal government involvement (Croll, 1988, p. 85). At the present time, peasant households resume the responsibilities of the welfare for their household members. The welfare of individuals once again depend on household resources.

It is clear that the government is concerned about the level of welfare that needy people received once collectives started to play a less important role in the rural communities. Government officials have conducted a national survey of households that rely on the "five guarantees" (wubao) (Croll, 1988, p. 85). The five guarantees are benefits that collectives guaranteed their childless members in their old ages; these benefits include food, clothing, housing, medicine, and burial expenses (Wolf, 1985, p. 196). After the survey, the government has directed collectives to continue to provide necessary assistance to these households; however, collective funds are no longer sufficient to meet this obligation because farmers retain most of the production surplus under the new production system (Croll, 1988, p. 85). In addition, Davin (1988, p. 144) reports that schools, kindergartens, and clinics are being closed in some of the poorest regions in China, because collective funds are not available. Obviously, there is an urgent need for the government to
reassess how reforms have affected the welfare of the needy people but not to assume that every peasant is better off under the new agricultural development policy.

Second, government officials and planners in China believe that the "household" as a unit of production will allocate their labor resources based on the supply and demand of the "market." As Wan Li (1984, p. 20) argues, with the reestablishment of rural commodity markets, households can now allocate their household labor and resources based upon the "value" of products, and this will promote a more efficient use of scarce resources in the rural sectors. Based on the assertion that the market can allocate resources efficiently, Wan Li argues that China should promote commodity production in the rural economy and rely on the "regulating role of the market" to direct these production. Many Chinese scholars, such as Feng (1983), Wei (1983), and planners in the Department of Policy Study of Shaanxi province (1983), propose that the government should reduce centralized management on agricultural production and control on labor and resource allocation in rural sectors. Under this condition, answers to questions of how household labor is mobilized and controlled will rely on the "market mechanism" that may not be developed fully in rural China at its current stage of development. We suggest that the proper way to understand how labor is mobilized in current Chinese rural economy is to analyze the power relations
within and beyond the peasant household. Based on this idea, we propose an alternative approach to evaluate the Chinese rural reforms.

Decomposing the Specialized Household: An Alternative Approach

The major objective of this thesis is to point out the inadequacy of using the "specialized household" as a unit of analysis for the success of current rural reforms. Chinese scholars and planners argue that the development of specialized households indicates a step forward for the success of the current rural reform. They all believe that the prosperity of these households is mainly because they can adopt their production strategies to the reestablished commodity markets in the rural economy (Wan, 1984; Zhang, et al., 1983).

We, however, propose that new insights into the production of specialized household will emerge if we analyze the new institutional mechanism and power relations by which family labor is mobilized and controlled within and beyond the household. Instead of treating the specialized household as a unitary whole that designs its production based upon the "price signal" of the competitive market, we will look at how the appropriation of family labor within the household may affect and limit the success of specialized households in the new peasant household economy.

We also suggest that without disaggregating the
household, Chinese planners will never be able to identify the equity issues of how labor products are distributed and how labor is mobilized within the household. If we unfold the internal dynamics of specialized households, we will find that female laborers in these households are the major contributors to the increase in household productivity and income. Not only can the skill of peasant women on sideline production accommodate the governmental agricultural development strategies, female laborers can also be mobilized and controlled with ease and at minimal cost because of the subordinated position of females in the male-dominated rural society.

Having to assume greater responsibility in agricultural production, peasant women have to deal with the dual roles of being good workers and mothers/wives at the same time. This bifurcated view of women’s roles in production and reproduction has intensified the burden on female labor, and males are reluctant to share the responsibilities of domestic chores in the household. In other words, although the income level of specialized households has increased, this success may be at the expense of the general welfare of peasant women in the countryside of China. Without changing the gender relations in the rural area, the twin goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to achieve agricultural development and simultaneously to enhance the welfare of peasant women remain contradictory
to each other.

Theoretical Framework

In order to support our argument, we develop a framework that we use to study women's position in the specialized household. One important element in our framework is that we do not treat the specialized household as a "black box"; instead we look inside the household and analyze the impacts of rural reforms on female household members. We argue that the most useful way to understand the changing position of female household members in the specialized household is to analyze three aspects of its operation: (1) distribution of labor products; (2) mobilization and allocation of family labor; and (3) control of decisionmaking power in the household (Hart, 1988, p. 7).

We believe that it is the power relations between genders and generations in the specialized household that determine the sexual division of labor and organization of production in the household. These power relations are defined and limited by a set of implicit and explicit social arrangements--rules, rights, and obligations in the family, marriage, and society (Hart, 1988). These arrangement are constantly modified and redefined by continuous bargaining and negotiation between household members under changing political and economic conditions of the larger economy (Hart, 1988; Guyer and Peters, 1987; White, 1980). In order to understand the formations of these social arrangements
that constitute the male-dominated position in controlling female labor and allocation of labor products, we will have to analyze the bargaining position of women in the specialized household in relation to the larger political and economic structures of rural communities.

In order to analyze the bargaining position of women in the specialized households, we will have to deal with the following questions:

- What were the social arrangements that determined the remuneration, mobilization, and control of female laborers under the commune system?
- How is labor mobilized within and beyond the specialized households in the new peasant household economy?
- What are the employment opportunities outside the household for different household members?
- What are the mechanisms of income distribution and control within specialized households?
- What property rights do different members of the household have? How does control of household assets affect the bargaining positions of household members?
- How does the control of household income, assets, and labor products relate to social and political relations within and beyond a rural community?
community?

o How does the shifting of the commune system to the household production system affect these social and political relations?

o Most importantly, how will our findings help us to understand the dynamics of agrarian change in China? What are the policy implications of agrarian change on the welfare of the Chinese peasant women?

We will try to answer these questions so as to capture and understand the dialectical process of Chinese agrarian change and their impacts on the livelihood of the Chinese peasant women.

We derived the above-mentioned analytical framework from a series of studies on agricultural households. We will review briefly some of these studies here. Although agricultural households in rural China have just moved onto the center stage of policy analysis, many analysts have studied agricultural households in other parts of the world. They include, just to name a few, Evenson (1976), Folbre (1984), Gallin (1984), Hart (1988), Jones (1986), Sen (1983), and Singh, et al. (1986).

The most widely-used theory of labor-power allocation in peasant household economy is "Chayanov's utilitarianism." According to Chayanov, the peasant household is a self-contained unit of production and
consumption, and it will allocate its labor-power according to a set of preferences for consumption to leisure (Harrison, 1975). Neoclassical economists such as Evenson (1976) and Singh, et al. (1986) develop Chayanov's utilitarianism further and argue that a peasant household that tries to maximize the joint utility function of members in the household will allocate its labor-power and resources based upon the price signals in a perfect competitive market.

Criticisms of this neoclassical approach come from two fronts. First, several scholars have criticized the assumption of the household joint utility function. Sen (1983) argues that the consumption and production behavior within the household is determined by negotiation and contract-making instead of market prices. Folbre (1986, p.249) points out the implicit assumption of the neoclassical economists that changes of economic behavior are attributed solely to changes in prices and incomes. Both of them have suggested that analyzing the bargaining power between members in the household is a more useful way to understand resources allocation in peasant household economy (Sen, 1983, p. 374; Folbre, 1986, p. 250).

The second attack on the neoclassical household model is mainly related to its use of the "household" as a unit of analysis. White (1980, p. 3) argues from an anthropological perspective that the household cannot be treated as a unit
that possesses unique characteristics of behavior. He suggests that the most useful way to study household behavior is to analyze the domestic arrangements through which labor is controlled and organized and to relate these arrangements as causes and consequences to the larger social structure (White, 1980, p. 7).

Guyer and Peters (1987, p. 210) caution against the use of the "household" a unit of analysis, and they suggest that the household should be recognized as having variable and segmented structures. The household is variable because it is both the outcome and channel of the changing process of society. The household is segmented because it is stratified and divided according to genders, age, clan, and ethnicity.

In her articles, Hart (1988) shows from the Muda case in Malaysia that the understanding of "the structure and exercise of power at different levels of society" will shed light on the dynamics of agrarian change. Instead of treating the household as a unit of production, she analyzes the connections and interactions between systems of class and gender inequality and illustrates how these power relations define the labor arrangement both within and beyond the households in the Muda region. More importantly, she shows the "mechanism" of how the larger political and economic structures define the bargaining rules between genders and classes and how struggles over the definition of
these rules, in turn, shape the process of agrarian change. In our study, we will apply this emerging framework to study how peasant women in specialized households are affected by the rural reforms in China. Not only may this framework help us to understand how the rural reforms are working, we can also test the applicability of this methodology by studying agrarian change in a context of a socialist country.

Study Design

Following are the issues that we have established in the previous section and which we will discuss in this thesis. First, we indicate some of the important aspects of how female laborers are mobilized and controlled under the commune system. In Chapter 2, we describe the organization of labor under the commune system. We show how labor was rewarded and how women fought against the unequal remuneration system. Besides, we state how women's subordination is connected to the power relations between the State, the production team, and male and female workers in the collective. This discussion will help us to compare the way in which female laborers are mobilized in specialized households.

Second, we show how labor is mobilized within the specialized household in the new peasant household economy. Based on information from case studies of 25 specialized households, we study the allocation of female labor in these
households. In Chapter 3, we show that female laborers are playing important roles in household production and reproduction, and that the work burden on female laborers has also been intensified.

Next, we discuss employment opportunities for household members outside households and mechanisms of how household income and assets are controlled. These studies are critical to our understanding of the bargaining position of members within specialized households. We, however, do not have firm empirical evidence that is related directly to specialized households; rather, we develop several hypotheses based upon some indirect evidence that we infer from the existing literature. These hypotheses are:

- The reason why men can control the income of households is that they are able to control functions of household production involving more interactions within and beyond the village.
- Young women who have better employment opportunities have stronger bargaining power against males' domination than married and older women.
- The subordinated position of peasant women is, in part, because of their inability to possess any property in the rural community.
- The inconsistency of government policies towards women's issues has perpetuated gender inequality
We will discuss each of these hypotheses in detail in Chapter 4. The most appropriate way to test these hypotheses is to examine them in a village with specific social and economic settings. To do this, we would have to interview specialized households and understand the domestic arrangements within and beyond these households that are used as means to control household income and assets.

Similarly, the last three questions that are related to the relationship of bargaining position of household members to the social and political structures within and beyond the village also require field research. Through field research, we can trace some of the relationships between the operation of specialized households and the larger economy by collecting "life histories" of women and men in the village. These life histories will help us to understand how changes in the livelihood of peasants evolve under the rural reforms.

At this moment, without field research, our main goal is to open up the question of the intra- and inter-household dynamics rather than reach any absolute conclusions. We will, therefore, treat this study as a part of a larger investigation of agrarian change in rural China and propose research questions for the future at the end of this thesis.
Chapter 2

PEASANT WOMEN UNDER THE COMMUNE SYSTEM

As the focus of our study is to understand the effects of agrarian change on peasant women in China, we must show how female labor was mobilized and controlled before the new peasant household economy. In this chapter, we discuss the women's position under the commune system.

Under the commune system, the organization of labor (both women and men) was largely determined by the team and brigade leaders. The collective structure with three tiers of management--the commune, production brigade, and production team--had encapsulated peasants into one institutional framework transmitting the economic control and political authority from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to the daily lives of peasants. The peasant household that used to be the major economic and social unit had little independence in terms of decision on production and mobilization of domestic labor.

The tight incorporation of peasant households into the larger political and economic structure had defined and limited the "rules" for negotiations on and struggles for the control of labor products and allocation of labor-power in the rural economy. Conflicts of interest between male and female workers over remuneration and production process are mainly played out at the commune level.
Mobilization of Female Labor

Under the traditional subsistence farming system, women workers were under the control of heads of households (usually the senior male), household heads would assign jobs to female laborer, usually sidelines and domestic chores, because these tasks were perceived as suitable for them in the household. The control of female labor focused on the household level with the government policies reinforcing the male-dominated role in the rural communities. The kinship system, patriarchy, inheritance laws, and other social arrangements that confined women to a lower social status had been explicitly or implicitly accepted by the State as "customary practice," and this, in turn, placed women in a weaker bargaining position than men (Cohen, 1988).

Under the commune system, however, the sexual division of labor took a different form. Masses of female workers entered into production outside their homes. This increase in female’s participation in production was based on two reasons. First, the CCP had promised to promote gender equality during its campaign before the Liberation. The CCP thought that all people should be free from all kind of subordinations in the "New China." For the poor peasants, they should be free from class domination; for women, they should rebel against the domination of male (Andors, 1983). Because the CCP believed (and still does) that the only way to liberate women was to increase women's participation in
the labor force, masses of female laborers were mobilized and drawn into production.

Second, because of the larger water conservancy projects and establishment of manufacturing sectors in communes, labor, once perceived as an abundant resource, quickly became scarce in agricultural sectors. As a result, the labor-power of women was a major target for recruitment in agricultural production. In 1955, Mao pointed out the necessity of women participating in production. In his speech "The Upsurge of Socialism in the Countryside," Mao said (Andors, 1983, pg. 49):

In the case of many localities where production scope has expanded, ....... labor force will become insufficient. This situation is only beginning and will develop year after year in the future.... Women of China constitute a great source of [labor]power. This source must be tapped.

In the Great Leap, when collectivization reached its climax, the mobilization of the female labor force involved 300 million women (Andors, 1983, p. 49). This large increase in women's participation in the labor force had, in turn, modified the power relations between genders in the countryside.

For the first time, women were to work side-by-side with other male workers in the fields. Women were assigned work that was formerly done by men, and they were trained in male skills and performed them with ease (Wolf, 1985, p. 23). This new opportunity for women had challenged the idea
of male supremacy in rural areas, and it also made women realize the value of their labor outside their homes.

In order to allow more women to enter production, the CCP took a big step to "socialize" the household work. Communes transformed most of the domestic housework into socially run large-scale undertakings. In communes, there are dining halls where families can take their meals and nurseries and kindergartens where workers' children are cared for when their parents were working in the fields. Commune tailoring workshops also made clothes and shoes for workers and their families (Andors, 1983, p. 51).

The establishment of all these social welfare facilities was, however, not very successful in freeing working women from their domestic chores. The mess halls had serious problems in efficiency and management. Quality of food prepared by the mess hall was bad, and workers did not maintain a good standard of hygiene there. After two years, the CCP abolished the mess halls but maintained the other facilities (Andors, 1983, p. 51; Wolf, 1985, p. 22). Although most of the domestic chores in the household remained on the shoulders of older women and working women, the establishment of these welfare facilities challenged the idea that housework was primarily women's job. The CCP had proven that alternatives were available, and women did not have to be confined to their domestic sphere.
Unequal Remuneration between Women and Men

Although women did the same type of jobs as men and performed better than men, the remuneration to female laborers, in most cases, was lower than that to male laborers. Laborers in communes were rewarded by workpoints. The workpoint method was a complex remuneration system, and each individual commune had its own way of accounting the contributions of workers in production. In general, a male worker would be able to earn ten workpoints per work day, whereas a female worker who do the same amount of work could only make six (Wolf, 1985, p. 102).

It is important to understand that, under the commune system, workpoints represented the social status of workers rather than material rewards for their labor (Chan, et al., 1984, p. 92). Because the team would provide the daily food staple to peasants and would not distribute cash income to households until the end of the year, workpoints would not have any immediate significance for the survival of the family. Instead earning high workpoints meant that she or he was a good worker, and bad workers would be penalized by being rewarding lower workpoints. Because males believed that females were less productive workers, they would have to maintain the gap of remuneration between genders so as to protect their chauvinism in the rural communities.
Women’s Resistance

Instead of being silent to the unequal pay situation, women workers sometimes confronted their team leaders on the issue in a meeting held by the commune leader. Women workers who were brave enough would raise the issues in the meeting, but the situation rarely changed (Wolf, 1985, p. 102).

The conversation between some woman cadres and Wolf in her interviews in China probably represents very well the situation in the few existing communes in today’s rural China; one of the women cadres said when asked about the unequal pay issue (Wolf, 1985, p. 101):

The decision [on workpoints] has been made [by the team leader] and there is nothing to be done about it. That accountant that you [Wolf] met yesterday works very hard and puts in long hours. All agree, even men, that she should be paid more, but because she is a woman; it is impossible. Last year someone from the county Women’s Federation came out here and argued for half a day that women’s workpoints had to be raised. We did it, but as soon as she was gone, men expressed their anger, and [the team leader] changed it back.

The State, Team Leadership, and Male Workers

This conversation portrayed a very interesting power relationship among the State, the team leadership, and male workers. On the one hand, the state exerted pressure upon the team and brigade leaders to change the remuneration system in their jurisdictions; on the other hand, if the team leader raised the workpoints for women workers, it would challenge males’ alleged superiority and threaten
their bargaining position against women in society. If the team leader did not act in favor of male workers, male workers might withhold their labor. The team leader, therefore, is caught between the State and male workers (Chen, et al., 1984, p. 71). Because the collectivization of the agricultural production required local cooperation, going against the common ideology in the male-dominated rural communities would threaten the success of the State's development policy. When the increase in agricultural production was the first priority among all government development policies, the consequence of not being able to submit the production quota to the State would be far more significant than not carrying out the order from the Women's Federation. Team leaders (usually males), therefore, would not risk their positions for the sake of equal pay for woman workers.

Although female workers suffered from the unequal treatment of the production teams and brigades, they only voiced their discontent occasionally and seldom took action such as a strike or formal protest. There were two major deterrents that stopped women from taking a more active role in the struggle against unequal pay in communes.

First, in the commune, women had very little economic independence even though they worked as wage laborers in the fields. The workpoints that workers earned usually accumulate through the year, and the collective would
distribute cash based on all workpoints that household members earned to heads of households, usually the senior male workers (Chen, et al., 1984, p. 91). In essence, women and other junior members in the household did not have direct control of the income that they earned from collectives, and their livelihoods relied on their corporation with the male heads of households. The alliance that formed between the collective and the male heads of households became a way to discipline female laborers (or even junior male workers) (Davin, 1976). This alliance ensured the subordinated position of female peasants in the household and a disciplined labor resource in the rural sectors of China.

Second, the extreme conservatism of the CCP to alleviate gender inequality played a role in hindering the rebellion of women against the unequal treatment within the commune. When the tension on issues of gender inequality in society intensified, either on the subject of equal pay or social status, the CCP began to worry that the social instability might affect the economic and political development of the country. In order to avoid political disaffection, the CCP would change their slogan from promoting women's emancipation to encouraging women to become good socialists. To be good socialists, as the CCP put, female workers had to leave women's "special problems" aside and concentrate on class struggles in order to
construct a socialist China (Andors, 1983, p. 72). This, in turn, put first priority on economic development and social reforms over women’s issues and undermined the importance of gender equality in Chinese society. Woman activists who continued to fight for women’s liberation would be labelled as nonsocialists because their actions might hinder the stability of society. Being a nonsocialist in China is morally unacceptable and politically dangerous.

Summary

Unprecedented in China’s history, women for the first time challenged the male-dominated society during the 1950s. Although the struggle did not lead Chinese women very far towards emancipation, it showed that women could act collectively if they did not isolate themselves in individual households. On the other hand, the experience of women’s struggle under the commune system demonstrated that the male power was not confined to the household, but expanded to production teams, communes, and even the State; therefore, to understand the power relations between genders and their bargaining positions in the rural communities, we should look within and beyond the household.
Chapter 3

WOMEN IN THE NEW PEASANT HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY

The new economic reforms have affected the way in which peasants structure their lives. The government has delegated the decisionmaking power on agricultural production to the peasant household, and the peasant household becomes a self-contained unit of production with a high degree of autonomy in resource allocation and labor mobilization.

In order to understand how reforms are working, we have to understand first the way peasant households mobilize their family laborers. We gather information from case studies about the operations of 25 specialized households in various regions of China (Nongye Chubenshui, 1984). Based on this information, we will show how female laborers in these households are mobilized, and we will also show that the work burden on female laborers may have increased in the new peasant household economy. Before we start with the discussion of how female laborers are mobilized in the new production system, we first describe briefly some of the important features of the new peasant household economy that are relevant to our study. Besides, we provide a more detailed description of the new economy in Appendix B.
Peasant Household Economy

After the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in December 1978, the CCP has reformulated its rural development policy. There are two main features of the policy that affect directly the organization of work and mobilization of labor in the new rural economy: (1) the establishment of the "production responsibility system" and (2) the promotion of domestic sidelines. The main goal of the production responsibility system is to link reward directly to performance. The CCP dismantled the commune gradually and reinstated the peasant household as a unit of production. The CCP believe that the decentralization of production can simplify the accounting system and allows remuneration to be tied closer to the level of agricultural output of the peasant household (Croll, 1988, p. 78).

Under the new system, the peasant household enters into production contracts with the collective. In the contract, the collective and the peasant household agree upon the type of crops that the peasant household cultivates and the quota that the household has to submit to the collective. The peasant household can retain any surplus over the quota for its own use, or sell products to the market or the State at above-quota prices. This contract system is referred to as "household contract system." Under the household contract system, the peasant household regains
full autonomy on the decision of organization of work, allocation of family laborers, and distribution of labor products within the household (Kelkar, 1985, p. 39). In other words, female laborers in the household are once again under the control of the male head of household.

In addition to the structural reforms of production units, the CCP also promotes the diversification of agricultural production in the rural areas. During the current rural reforms, the government encourages peasant households to expand their sideline production. Under the commune system, activities in sidelines were kept at minimal level; and the production of sidelines acted only as nonstaple food supplies, such as vegetables and poultry, for peasants. When the government reversed its policy, sideline production expanded and became the major source of income for some households in the current rural economy. Female laborers who have the skills in sideline production become major laborers in household production (Croll, 1987, p. 482; Kelkar, 1985, p. 42). The increased involvement of female laborers in household production and the change of power structure in the rural community create a new way in which female laborers are mobilized and controlled in the new peasant household economy.

Mobilization of Female labor

According to an editorial in Women in China (1982), peasant women can now control the arrangement of their daily
production and enjoy the flexibility of allocating their time between housework and farm work in the new peasant household economy. The editor argues that when peasant households become units of production, female peasants can work in the fields during the busy season and turn their attention to housework during the off season. The editor argues that the work schedule is not as busy as under the commune system. Under the commune system, female laborers had to be present in the fields regardless of the amount of work available, and this took away valuable time from female laborers. Indeed, as the editor states, the commune system was unable to utilize fully the female labor-power and created a large amount of surplus labor in collectives.

According to the data from 25 specialized households that we tabulated, 10 of the 25 specialized households (40 percent) have allocated women laborers to domestic sidelines. (See Appendix C.) The primary agricultural activity in these 10 specialized households is the production of grain that mostly involves field work. Men in these households are responsible for the work on the fields, and women take care of all the housework and domestic livestock. Only during the busy season and harvest time do women and children have to work in the fields.

To a certain extent, the information seems to support the argument that women have greater flexibility in allocating their labor. In the 10 specialized households,
women laborers concentrate on housework and sidelines during the off season and provide additional help to men during harvest time. We, however, argue that this information remains inconclusive on whether work burden on women is lessened or intensified in the household production system. To resolve this question, we will have to compare the number of hours that female laborers work under the commune system with the number of hours they work under the household responsibility system. Unfortunately, this kind of study is not available in existing literature. We are, however, able to gather some information about the allocation of labor hours between genders within specialized households under the current system. Although with this information we are unable to verify whether female laborers have to work longer or shorter hours in the new peasant household economy, we can shed some light on the number of labor hours that women and men contribute to household production in specialized households.

Allocation of Labor Time in Specialized Households

Wang, Yang, and Kang (1985) have studied the distribution of labor of peasant households in Hebei province. In their study, they analyze how household members in a typical specialized household in Hebei province arrange their time during the busy season, off season, and middle season in the new peasant household economy, and we illustrate their findings in Tables 1 and 2. In these
### Table 1. ALLOCATION OF MALE LABOR HOURS IN A TYPICAL SPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allocation of time</th>
<th>Busy Season</th>
<th>Off-busy Season</th>
<th>Middle Season</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRODUCTION TIME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Production</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidelines</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMESTIC HOUSEWORK</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEISURE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural activities</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totally Free</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASIC NEEDS (eat &amp; sleep)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. ALLOCATION OF FEMALE LABOR HOURS IN A TYPICAL SPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allocation of time</th>
<th>Busy Season</th>
<th>Off-busy Season</th>
<th>Middle Season</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRODUCTION TIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Production</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidelines</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMESTIC HOUSEWORK</strong></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEISURE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural activities</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totally Free</strong></td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BASIC NEEDS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(eat &amp; sleep)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

tables, we express the allocation of labor hours in terms of the average hours spent on different tasks in a 24-hour work day, and we show the allocation of time by seasons--busy season, off season, and middle season.

We can see from Table 1 that a male laborer in a typical specialized household works an average of 15.3 hours a day in agricultural production during the busy season and 7.5 hours in the middle season. Compare these data with those in Table 2 in which we show the allocation of female labor hours: a female peasant spends the same amount of time in agricultural production during the two seasons. The only difference between the allocation of time between a woman and a man is that a man spends on average 13.8 hours in major agricultural production and only 1 hour in sidelines. In contrast, a woman spends only 12.8 hours in major agricultural production and 2 hours a day in sidelines.

We can see from this analysis that a woman participates actively and contributes the same amount of time as a man in major agricultural production in the household. This result matches with our finding from the analysis of the 25 specialized households that women are not confined in secondary income-generating agricultural production, but they are becoming part of the major labor in the key households’ production.

Another distinction in the allocation of labor hours
between genders in a typical specialized household is in the number of hours allocated to domestic chores. From Tables 1 and 2, we can see a big difference in the amount of time that a woman and a man spends doing housework. A man spends about 1.5 hours on average in domestic chores in all three seasons; but a woman spends on average 2.5 hours for domestic chores during the busy season, 6 hours during the off season, and 4 hours during the middle season. In other words, during the busy season, when a woman and a man come home from a 15-hour work day, a man will be able to rest; however, a woman will have to take care of domestic chores. The contrast is much clearer during the off season: while a man can enjoy his leisure, a woman will have to catch up with the domestic housework that she leaves behind during the busy season. During the off season, a man has about 10 hours of leisure time and a women has only 5 hours--half of a man's. If we add up the hours spent on production and housework, a woman works 8 hours a day during the off season, and a man will only have to work 4 hours a day.

Wang's study has shown that a woman contributes more than a man in the production and reproduction of the specialized household. Although both a woman and a man contribute the same amount of time in income-generating production, a woman plays a far more important role than the man in household reproduction. In general, Wang's finding coincides with other studies of peasant women in current
rural China (Wolf, 1985; Robinson, 1985; Croll, 1988; Davin, 1988). Because men are unwilling to share the burden of domestic chores with women, the increased demand for peasant women’s skills, such as production of livestock and handcrafts, added to their roles on domestic chores puts an additional work load on the shoulders of peasant women.

This coincides with another observation from the 25 specialized household in our sample that women are engaging in the primary income-generating activities. These activities, such as livestock tending, fish-farming, and handicrafts production, were primarily performed by women and have become the major sources of income for these households. In our study, 18 out of 25 (75 percent) specialized households engaged in activities ranging from afforestation and livestock raising to brush manufacturing, and women are the major laborers.

Although we find that women in the 25 specialized households take a very active role in income-generating production, the position of women in these households has not been enhanced. In our sample, none of the men in these specialized households share any responsibility for domestic housework with women. In all cases, women take care of all the domestic chores.

Summary

In essence, based on limited information, we can speculate that the increase in the income of these
specialized households is based on two factors. First, the changing of the government policy on sideline production certainly affects the source of income of these specialized households. Under the rural reforms, the CCP has promoted domestic sideline production and released the price controls on some of the nonstaple agricultural products in the rural commodity market. As the policy of the CCP changes, peasant households begin to shift from grain production to sidelines with ease because of the availability of skilled female laborers in sideline production who can be mobilized without incurring much costs. In China, as in most countries, there is no monetary reward for domestic labor.

Second, the increase of specialized household's income is, in part, due to the extraction of female surplus labor in the new household economy. As households specialized in sideline production, the demand for women labor has been intensified. On the one hand, women have to fulfil their duties as mothers and wives according to the conjugal arrangement in the Chinese society. On the other hand, women are engaging in income-generating production as the major productive laborers in the household. Although the income of specialized households has increased, household members have to work much harder than before (Croll, 1987, p. 482). Especially for female peasants, they have to face the dual responsibilities in the household, and the word "double day" has become a common term to describe the
working conditions for female peasants in the new peasant household economy (Robinson, 1985).

As studies on the agrarian change in the Cameroons (Jones, 1986), mechanization of agriculture in Malaysia (Hart, 1988), and asymmetrical exchange within households in Mexico (Beneria and Roldan, 1987) have shown, poor peasant women have confronted the exploitation of their labor-power and, in turn, shaped the process of agrarian change in their rural economy. These cases have shown that rights and obligations that govern the female roles in the household are not static but can be redefined by women according to women’s bargaining position in the conjugal dynamics.

In Chapter 2, we showed that women were able to act collectively to fight against the unequal remuneration system in collectives. This may be due partly to the political and ideological conditions during the Great Leap Forward when the CCP was committed to achieving gender equality. The CCP encouraged peasant women to stand up against any discrimination. Only after the economic situation of the country worsened, the CCP revised its stance on issues of gender inequality.

Under the new peasant household economy, the question is then what the Chinese peasant women have done or can do to deal with the new social arrangements that intensifies the exploitation of their labor in the male-dominated rural society, and what the new arrangements are that act as a
means of control of the female labor-power. We are, to a certain extent, able to document that peasant women are carrying a heavy burden on both production and reproduction in peasant households, but we have yet to determine whether or not women will rebel against the exploitation of their labor. The inaction of peasant women may be either because they think that they have to sacrifice to keep harmony within the household or that the inter-household competition under the new production system has fostered a sense of cohesiveness among household members. In the following chapter, we will explore the possible reasons for how women laborers are mobilized and disciplined in these specialized households.
Chapter 4

SOCIAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE NEW PEASANT HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY

We will discuss some of the possible social arrangements—rules, rights, and obligations—that are used as means to control family labor and the bargaining process between genders and generations within specialized households. Based on limited information, we argue that there are four possible means of males' control over female laborers: (1) males' ability to control household income, (2) different employment opportunities between household members under the rural reforms, (3) limited property rights for peasant women, and (4) the inaction of the Chinese government and indifference of local cadres towards the issues of gender inequality. These four possible means are based upon some general information rather than related specifically to the social arrangements within or beyond specialized households. Although these means remain as hypotheses, they will act as important clues to understand the mechanisms by which household income and assets are controlled in specialized households.

Control of Household Income

Under the collective system, household heads (usually males) controlled the income earned by individual household members. The production team leaders distributed income directly to the household heads based on workpoints earned by the household members through the year. Davin (1976)
argues that the commune system worked to women's detriment. Although women, as Davin argues, lack their financial autonomy, their abilities to earn income give them a clear value of their labor outside their homes.

In contrast, the distinct income contribution of each member of the household disappears in the new production responsibility system. Because households in rural China usually do not keep a clear accounting of individual contributions to production, rewards to female laborers in the household will be very difficult to determine. In China, domestic labor simply does not receive any payment for their work from heads of households (Fei, 1986, p. 3; Cohen, 1988). In this case, we argue that male heads of households may take this advantage and treat women's work in households as "just helping." In cases of the 25 specialized households in our sample, most of the male heads of households describe themselves as the major income earners in households and put themselves in the position of controlling the income of the household production. (See Appendix C.)

We argue that the strategy of men to control their wives is to keep their wives uninformed of their household income. In most cases, men are responsible for marketing the household agricultural and/or nonagricultural products in towns and cities, which is the major channel to convert household production into cash income. In our study, men in
most of the 25 specialized households are responsible for the accounting, materials acquisition, and marketing of the household production. (See Appendix C.) Because men dominate this function in households, women will have no knowledge of how much household production can be sold in the market. Besides, they will have no idea of the amount of income that their husbands kept for personal use instead of distributing to common funds for households' consumption.

There are two reasons that peasant women cannot emerge as decisionmakers or controllers of household income in peasant households. First, men believe that they should take care of the business outside households, and married women should remain as caretakers inside their houses. According to an old Chinese custom, males call their wives "neiren", which means "inside person", and social contact of married women was to be kept at minimal level (Wolf, 1985). Although this custom has been criticized in contemporary China, it is still socially unacceptable for married women in rural China to go into towns and cities overnight for business purposes. This custom, in turn, assists men in controlling household income.

Second, women have fewer opportunities to receive education. In China, once a daughter is married, she will move into her husband's family bearing her husband's name. She will no longer be the member of her natal family and provide security to her parents. Besides, parents think
that a woman will eventually become a housewife, and they believe that education for a housewife is wasteful and unnecessary. Parents in rural China will, therefore, be more willing to send their sons to school than daughters. In 1982, China had 335.6 million illiterates, and 70 percent of them were women (Kelkar, 1985). This astonishing rate of female illiterates, to a certain extent, indicates the social and economic biases towards women that, in turn, shape the attitude of male supremacy in Chinese society; and the division of tasks within the household is, obviously, not based on the different ability between women and men but a socially and economically constructed discrimination against women in rural China.

Unequal Employment Opportunity for Household Female Members

With the development of rural enterprises, employment opportunities for young women as wage workers have been enhanced. As the employment opportunities for young women outside their homes increase, they are, to some extent, able to break away from the patriarchal familism in rural China. Wolf (1985, p. 94) visited the rural enterprises of two brigades in Jiangsu province in 1981, and she found that women (especially those who are unmarried) are increasingly being employed by the light industries in the rural industrial sector, as shown in Table 3. In the Tianzhuang Brigade, 80 percent of workers employed in the Tailor shop are women, and most of them are between 16 to 25 years old.
Table 3. EMPLOYMENT IN RURAL ENTERPRISES IN TWO BRIGADES IN JIANGSU BY JOB DESCRIPTION AND GENDERS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job location or description</th>
<th>Total Employees</th>
<th>Percent Women</th>
<th>Percent Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tianzhuang Brigade</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel and restaurant</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bike repair shop</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor driver</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailor shop</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloth shoe workshop</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>401</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Zhoujia Brigade**         |                 |               |             |
| Oilcan and dustpan factory  | 130             | 30            | 70          |
| Shoe brush factory          | 20              | 30            | 70          |
| Writing brush factory       | 14              | 71            | 29          |
| Paper box factory           | 22              | 73            | 27          |
| Noodle factory              | 3               | 67            | 33          |
| Handbag factory             | 11              | 64            | 36          |
| **Total**                   | 200             | 40            | 60          |

Similarly, factories that manufacture writing brushes, paper boxes, noodles, and handbags all have 60 percent or more female employees.

Shin (1988) and Fei (1986), in their studies of the rural development in Sunan, have found that more and more young unmarried women are leaving the farm and working in the rural enterprises. Shin studies the age and the gender of workers employed by industries in Sunan. In her study, 26 percent of workers in rural industrial sectors are women between the ages of 16 and 25, and 27 percent are between the ages of 26 and 35. The percentage drops to seven percent for women who are 36 to 45 years old (Shin, 1988, p. 13). Women who are in the age category of 36-45 are usually married and already have children. The reasons for this difference is that enterprises are unwilling to hire married women because they will have to provide nurseries and maternity leave for female married workers. They argue that this will incur higher costs of production in factories (Wolf, 1985). There is no evidence that this discriminatory practice in employment is checked by the government; employment in light industry that is perceived as suitable for females is limited to young unmarried women.

Although rural enterprises will distribute wages of the young female workers to their father or male heads of households, female workers can retain their bonus. This payment from enterprises accounts for almost 25 percent of
the total wages earned by female workers in Sunan (Fei, 1986, p. 4). With money available under the discretion of young women, they are becoming less economically dependent on their households and are less afraid to challenge the patriarchal authority.

Unlike the young women, the married women and older women realize that their employment opportunities outside their homes are limited. Shin (1988, p. 13) shows that females between the ages of 36 to 45 engage mainly in agricultural production in Sunan. Under the new peasant household economy, agricultural activities are carried out mostly in the form of household production, and domestic labor does not receive direct payment from heads of households. Because married and older women do not control any income, they know that they will have to depend on the present and future good will of their husbands and sons; this, in turn, undermines their bargaining power against male domination in the household.

**Males’ Control of Household Property**

In a large household, property relationships still involve traditional elements. Property of a household can be divided into three categories—household property (jiachan), husband-wife property, and women’s property. Household property includes all the household holdings (farming equipments and house) and earnings of members, and it accounts for the largest share of the total property of
Because of the collectivization of all farm property in the 1950s, land is no longer considered to be household property. Peasants, however, are allowed to apply for land as house sites (Zhaijidi) in the village. Only males who are at least 18 years old are eligible (Cohen, 1988). A male head of household usually requests the house site for his son by demonstrating that their present living condition is too crowded. If the village government approves the request, the household will get the house site free. Although the site does not belong to the household, the household owns the right of using the land, and this right usually continues to pass down from father to son.

Gifts and payments given to both the bride and groom during their wedding become the mutual property of the husband and wife; nevertheless, the husband usually controls this property, and the woman has hardly any access to it. The only property that a woman has full control of is the money that is given just to the bride during her wedding (tixi, or tixiqian), and the wealth that the bride brings with her from her natal family (jiazhuang) (Cohen, 1988). After marriage, a woman can keep all this property and money; however, this property rarely accounts for a significant amount of money and cannot, therefore, help the woman become economically independent in the household.

The inheritance of property continues to follow local
and traditional practices that daughters do not have rights to inherit family estates. Although the Agrarian Reform Law that the CCP established in the 1950s has reinstated the property rights of women in China, local governments continue to accept and tolerate the "customary practice" of property inheritance in the locale. Under this system, peasant women are excluded from the application for house sites and the rights to inherit family property. Simply put, there is no opportunity for women to own a piece of property in current rural China.

Government Policy Towards Women's Issues

The way government officials implement the household contract system also reinforces the perception that men should be heads of households. The household head's position is defined by seniority of the male members, and the household head's name symbolizes the family as a whole. In most cases, males represent the household to establish contracts with the government. Some male cadres even believe that women should not be in a position of making decisions for their families, they feel uncomfortable in dealing with women heads of households (Wolf, 1985). To some of the collective accountants and cadres, a household is a unit of accountancy, and the income of household is simply the household property (jiachan) that is controlled directly by the senior male in the household.

This attitude of cadres towards women has, in turn,
legitimatized the dominating position of men in households. From the analysis of the 25 specialized households in our study, we find that, in most cases, men are the members in households who contract production with the collectives. Although men may not necessarily be the major productive laborer in the household production, they have the decisionmaking power in household budgeting and the division of labor within households.

Even the All-China Democratic Women's Federation (Women's Federation), the most recognized government body that deals with women's issues, is not always on the side of women. The Women's Federation was founded in 1949, and its major function is to publicize and carry out the Party's political directions and campaigns. Andors (1983, p. 30) has criticized the Women's Federation that it has been operated as a part of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and it does not have the autonomy to represent the women's viewpoint and interests. Although the Women's Federation is responsible for enhancing female political consciousness and participation, its strategies and policies are conditioned by the CCP's objectives of economic and political development. Changes in the CCP's policy on economic and political policy will affect the ideological context in which women's struggle for gender equality occurs.

With the changes of the CCP's policy toward economic development in 1978, the Women's Federation has established
a new approach to the women's question in China. In the fourth National Women's Federation Congress, the spokeswoman of the Federation, Kang Keqing, laid down the roles of female workers in the coming economic reforms. She outlined the CCP's attitudes and policies that shaped women's position in China, and it defined the secondary and supportive roles of women in the Chinese modernization. The main theme of Kang's speech was that women's major responsibility is in the reproduction sphere, and women should concentrate their efforts on developing a network of child care institutions, public canteens, and household services located in the collective sector (Andors, 1983, p. 152).

Although Kang's statement did not imply that women should return home, her speech reinforced the service role of women for domestic chores and child care in general. She directed the attention of the women's movement to resolve the problems related to class struggle instead of gender inequality in the Chinese society (Lou, 1986). The formulation of this strategy is in view of the economic and political instability of the Chinese economy after the Culture Revolution and the ouster of the Gang of Four in 1978. The leadership after all these turbulent years stressed the united front policy, emphasizing unity for the purpose of economic development. Unity in society required harmonious family development.
After the production responsibility system was fully implemented in the past several years, the economic condition has changed as the new production system has created new levels of unemployment in the rural areas. Some government officials, factory and enterprise management, and scholars advocate that the return of women to the domestic sphere will benefit society and families (Ma, 1989, p. 68). State and collective enterprise management argue that employment of women commits enterprises to provide nurseries and maternity leave for female workers, and this will incur additional costs of production (Robinson, 1985, p. 36).

In the Fifth National Congress of Women, leaders of the Women's Federation such as Kang Keqing (Kelkar, 1985, p. 45) and Lou (1986, p. 166) criticized strongly the idea that women should return home and perform their household duties. They believe that the idea of "female workers go home" will lead to a retrenchment of women's struggle for equality in Chinese society. Although they disapprove of the idea, they do not resolve the basic conflict confronting females--how can women fulfill the dualistic role of being good mothers/wives and workers. This bifurcated view of women's roles has led to intensification of the work burden on women in China, and, more importantly, it reaffirms the traditional view of women's roles in reproduction.

With its self-contradicting strategy, the Women's Federation is unable to help women from being exploited in
the new economic settings. In the countryside, as the central government reduces its authority over peasant households, the influence of the Women’s Federation in the rural areas is also reduced; and its major role has been concentrated on the implementation of the birth control policies of the CCP (Kelkar, 1985). The issue of gender inequality in the rural areas becomes the last item on its agenda because of the contradictory goals between achieving agricultural development and enhancing the welfare of peasant women simultaneously in a male-dominated society.
SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The major question that we raise in this study is whether the Chinese government can really evaluate the current rural reforms based on the success of specialized households. We propose that the "decomposition" of the specialized household will help us to gain important insights into how the reform is working and how it affects the livelihood of peasants in the countryside of China in general and the welfare of peasant women in particular. By looking inside the specialized household, we will be able to understand the organization of work, distribution of labor products, and control of decisionmaking power within the household. The understanding of these household production operations will, in turn, help us to analyze how rural reforms affect the livelihood of Chinese peasant women.

In order to achieve our objectives, we develop a framework to analyze the power relations and bargaining position between genders and generations within and beyond these specialized households. Although we are unable to carry out all tasks that we propose in this study, our analytical framework helps us to raise important questions and formulate hypotheses for further research. In the following, we will first summarize some of the major points and hypotheses that we have made in this study, and we will then propose some future research questions.
Changes in Gender Relations and Organization of Work

The shifting from the commune system to the production responsibility system, as we have stated in previous chapters, has changed the organization of work in the rural areas. The exercise of direct control over female laborers is at a different level in the rural community between the two production systems. Under the commune system, production team leaders had the authority to allocate and reward female laborers. Production team leaders assigned jobs to female workers and determined the amount of workpoints that female workers earned in the fields.

When the government implemented the production responsibility system in 1978, the household once again became a unit of production. The State began to lessen its control over the household production, and the peasant household regained its full autonomy in deciding on its production and allocation of its family labor. Under this system, the male head of household resumes his control over female laborers within the household.

Based on some indirect information, we speculate that this institutional change has led to the increase in the work burden on female laborers. This may be due to the fact that peasant women are playing more active roles in household production because of their skills in sideline production. When the government changes its agricultural
policy, peasant households are encouraged to expand their sideline production, and peasant women become major laborers in this production. At the same time, peasant women have to be responsible for the same amount of domestic chores, and this, in turn, increases the workload for female laborers within the household. This extraction of surplus labor from female workers in specialized households may be one of the major reasons for the success of specialized households in the new peasant household economy. Although, we need to conduct a more detailed time-study on the number of hours that women and men work under the two different production systems, the issue has been raised so many times in writings of Western and Chinese scholars that it should not be neglected in analyzing the current rural reforms in China.

If female laborers are being exploited in the new peasant household economy, we will have to find out how female laborers are mobilized and controlled. We have proposed four possible means. Although these means are inferred from existing literature and need more empirical evidence to verify their validity, they provide important clues for us to investigate gender relations in future field research.

First, we suggest that the reason why female laborers can be mobilized and controlled is because males are able to control the household income. According to case studies of specialized households that we gather from existing
literature, we find that men in these households are responsible mainly for the accounting and marketing of the household production and establishing contracts with the State. This will, in turn, give men the opportunity to have more contact with the rural communities outside households and have full control of household income. In contrast, women who concentrate on manual labor in household production will have no idea of the level of income that their labor has generated. This division of labor inside specialized households may constitute the different bargaining position between genders in these households.

Second, even though the reform created new employment opportunities in the rural areas, women and men of different ages have different accessibility to these new opportunities. This difference may affect the economic independence of individual members and the bargaining position between genders and generations within the household. Based on the study of Shin (1988) in Sunan County, young and middle-aged men are able to engage in some nonagricultural activities such as construction, transportation, and other services that allow them to earn higher income. For young women, they are increasingly being hired in the newly developed light industry in the rural areas. With the increase in the employment opportunity for young women, they are able to establish certain degrees of economic independence in the household; and this, in turn,
may lessen the males' control over their labor in the household. In contrast, the employment opportunities for married and older women outside their homes are very limited, and their livelihood depends upon the household income, which is under the control of male heads of households. Their bargaining positions against the patriarchal familism may, therefore, be weaker than the younger generations.

Third, the Chinese rural society has denied the property rights of females. Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has established the Agrarian Reform Law that reinstates the property rights of females, the allocation of family property in the countryside of China remains the same. Sons inherit all family property from their fathers, and daughters are usually excluded. Because women do not have control over any household property, and their employment opportunity outside their households is limited after they get married, their livelihood will depend on the well-being of their husbands and sons. This will again undermine their bargaining positions against male domination within households.

Lastly, the Chinese government does not have a consistent policy to deal with gender inequality in the Chinese society. After the CCP had taken over China, the State attempted to reform and redefine power relations between genders and generations within households. These
power relations, however, did not change because of the resistance generated from the deeply rooted social attitude towards women in rural China. As a result, social structures that are, to some extent, defined by these power relations remain the same in rural China. Because development requires changes in social and political structures, the rigidity of the social structures in the countryside creates tension between political rhetoric and economic policies of the CCP. To release this tension, the government, in most cases, will concentrate on economic development and put lower priority on the issues of gender inequality. Without the full support from the Chinese government, women subordination perpetuates. Accordingly, females are unable to have full control over their labor.

**Future Research Questions**

We believe that all the above-mentioned issues will remain important in all future analysis of rural reforms in China. Besides, we raise additional questions in regards to the current rural reforms. We think that there are four important issues that deserve our attention in future analysis. First, what is the main purpose for the Chinese government to differentiate specialized households from ordinary households? We suggest that the "creation" of these specialized households may have important implications on the governmental strategies for development in rural China. The Chinese government officials may want to
publicize the achievements of some households under the current rural reforms, and this will enable them to proclaim the success of current economic policy towards agricultural development.

We think that one way to study the success of these specialized households is to understand the intra-household dynamics and power relations and personal connections between these specialized households and the village government. Besides, we should also try to investigate how these power relations are defined and limited by the drastic institutional changes under the current reforms.

Second, we need to study further the amount of work burden on both women and men under different production systems. We need more empirical data to document that the workload for peasants, in general, and peasant women, in particular, is heavier in the new peasant household economy than under the commune system. Not only should we collect the number of hours that peasants work, but we will have to understand how peasants interpret the intensity of their work before and after the new production system was implemented. This information is critical for us to evaluate how rural reforms change the structure of the working lives of peasants and helps us to differentiate the impacts of the rural reforms on the work burden of women and men in the countryside of China.
Third, we should also incorporate the relations between classes, ages, and ethnic groups in the analysis of the rural reforms. These elements are important to the power relations within and beyond the household. Besides, we should study not only these relations within households or the village, but also we need to understand how these relations connect to the larger social and political structures in China.

In order to have a clearer picture of how the rural reforms are working, we believe that we have to deal with all the above-mentioned issues. These issues constitute the web of relations between people, and they are subject to constant changes because of interactions between people within and beyond households under the changing political and economic conditions in the rural economy. To study these dialectical relations in the process of agrarian change is our major challenges in the future.
Appendix A

SPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLDS

In the new peasant household economy, government officials have identified a specific type of households in rural China. They call them "specialized households" (Zhuanye hu). Such households develop out of an expansion of the household sideline production with family laborers concentrating on the production of cash crops farming, livestock tending, afforestation, transportation, services, and other nonagricultural production.

To be a specialized household, the household has to apply to the county government for permission. Different regions have different guidelines for qualifications to be a specialized household. Besides, rights and priorities that these households received differ between regions (Howard, 1988, p. 77). Unfortunately, there is no systematic study on the regional difference of qualifications to be a specialized household. According to a national guideline, a household is qualified to be a specialized household if it meets the following requirements: (1) 60 percent of the household economic activities is in a single specialized production, (2) 60 percent of the household labor force is engaging in that production, (3) 60 percent of the household products or services are sold for commodities, and (4) the per capita household income from the sale of the specialized production is twice as much as the nonspecialized household
in the same region (Howard, 1988, p. 77; Municipal Statistical Bureau of Shanghai, 1987, p. 432).

According to a report from the State Statistical Bureau (1987), there were 3.7 million specialized households in Chinese rural areas in 1986. Although the proportion of specialized households in the total rural households remains small (only 1.9 percent in 1986), the number of these households is increasing rapidly. From 1985 to 1986, the number of specialized households increased by 16.3 percent, and approximately 2.7 percent of the total rural labor force engaged in economic activities of these households.

The number of specialized households within any one region is likely to be higher in the plains and coastal areas where the average arable land per capita is high. Although development has been uneven, the State Statistical Bureau estimated that 53.6 percent of specialized households were located in the densely populated and commercially developed coastal provinces at the end of 1985 (Howard, 1988, p. 79).

The reason that specialized households received so much attention from the Chinese scholars and planners is their high productivity. For instance, in Guangdong, a farmer contracted a 33 mu (15 mu is equal to 1 hectare) fishing pool from a production team; within half a year, the farmer turned the fishery business from an annual loss into a profit of 4,500 yuan (Wei, 1983, p. 18).
Some Chinese scholars such as Zhou (1985) and Wang (1984) have argued that the success of these specialized households is because of the household composition in terms of their family sizes and the education level of household members. Although these studies do not incorporate the power relations in their analyses, they show some of the familial structures of specialized households.

Composition of Specialized Households

Zhou (1985, p. 6) conducted a survey on the number of family laborers in specialized households in eight different counties in Sichuan province. Zhou states that household size is positively correlated with the production level of the household. The higher the number of laborers in the household, the higher its production level. In his study, Zhou finds that specialized households in his sample have a larger number of family laborers than the nonspecialized households, and he concludes that the success of specialized households may, in part, be due to the availability of family laborers in specialized households. We show Zhou’s result in Table 1A.

From Table 1A, we can see that 57 percent of the specialized households in his sample have three or more family laborers in their households. In contrast, only 24 percent of the nonspecialized households in Zhou’s sample have three or more family laborers (Zhou, 1985, p. 6). Similarly, the sample of specialized households that we
Table 1A. NUMBER OF FAMILY LABORER IN SPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLDS AND NONSPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLDS IN SICHUAN PROVINCE--1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of family laborers</th>
<th>One</th>
<th>Two</th>
<th>Three</th>
<th>Four</th>
<th>Five</th>
<th>Six</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialized households*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonspecialized households*</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=182  
* N=1,861


selected in our study have, on average, five family laborers in these households, and this coincides with Zhou’s finding. (See Appendix C.)

Zhou’s finding certainly makes a lot of sense in contemporary rural China where labor is still the major agricultural input in production. Because the idea of hired labor is contradictory to the ideology of classless society in socialist China, the major supply of labor in household production relies on members of the household.

Another interesting finding of Zhou is that more generations live together in specialized households than
Table 2A. COMPOSITION OF SPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLDS AND NONSPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLDS IN SICHUAN PROVINCE--1984

(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generations</th>
<th>One</th>
<th>Two</th>
<th>Three</th>
<th>Four</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialized households</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonspecialized households</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=182  
* N=1,861

Source: See Table 1A.

nonspecialized households. With a larger household size than nonspecialized households, specialized households have a more complex household composition than other households, and the level of complexity will also affect the gender and generation relations in a specialized household. In a "grand" household where several generations are living together, the position of women will not only be determined by gender relations but household hierarchy that is based on seniority in the household.

In his sample, Zhou finds that the percentage of specialized households that have three generations living together is much higher than the nonspecialized households.
In Table 2A, we can see that 34 percent of the specialized households in Zhou's sample are composed of three generations, whereas 22 percent of the nonspecialized households have three generations living together.

Fei Xiaotong (1986), a Chinese anthropologist, has studied the changes of family composition under the current rural reforms. He argues that economic consideration is the major factor that leads to the increase in the number of generations living together in a single household unit (Fei, 1986, p. 3). After the implementation of the production responsibility system, the household became a production and consumption unit. Consolidation of family labor is required for the development of the family enterprises; therefore, even though, as Fei argues, a family with several generations living together may mean a higher chance for family conflict, members are unwilling to divide their family (fenjia).

Educational Level

Many Chinese scholars and officials, such as Wei (1983), Wang (1984), and Wan (1984), believe that the success of specialized households is mainly because of their special skills in agricultural and nonagricultural production, and their specialties are due to the ability of their household members to read and study scientific techniques of production. In the same survey, Zhou also analyzes the educational level of specialized households in
Table 3A. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MEMBERS OF SPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLDS AND NONSPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLDS IN SICHUAN PROVINCE--1984

(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elementary &amp; illiterate</th>
<th>Junior high</th>
<th>High school</th>
<th>Vocational education</th>
<th>University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialized households(^a)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonspecialized households(^b)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) N=182  
\(^b\) N=1,855

Source: See Table 1A

Sichuan. In Table 3A, we illustrate his results and show the educational level of specialized households in comparison to nonspecialized households. We can see from Table 3A that the specialized households in the survey have a much higher educational level than nonspecialized households. Two percent of the 182 specialized households' members received a college degree, whereas none of the 1,855 nonspecialized households' members went to college. Twenty-four percent of the members of specialized household received high school education, and only 12 percent for nonspecialized households. In contrast, 44 percent of the members in nonspecialized households are either illiterate or only have a elementary education, while the percentage
for the specialized households in the survey is much lower. In his study, Zhou also finds that 90 percent of the specialized households in the survey have members who possess certain type of specialties in agricultural production.
Appendix B

PEASANT HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY

The process by which peasant households have become the major unit of production is the reverse of the collectivization of all means of production in the 1950s. Under the collective system, responsibility for production, accounting, planning, and distribution of production shifted to communes, and the government reduced the property base and the production responsibility of individual households (Zhou and Du, 1986).

Despite the encapsulation of the individual household by the collective, peasant households remained as subsidiary production units under the commune system (Wei, 1983). Farmers continued to carry out sideline production, such as vegetable cultivation and domestic livestock raising, on their private plots of farmland that were allocated to them by the CCP; however, the nature of the agricultural activities was mainly subsistence, and the CCP kept the level of such activities at a minimal level (Croll, 1987).

After the death of Mao Zedong, the new leadership initiated a number of rural economic reforms. The objective of the reforms was to increase rural production, improve the management of the rural economy, diversify agricultural activities, furnish incentives to raise productivity, and increase peasants' income (Wan, 1984, Pg. 16). To achieve these objectives, the government gradually dismantled the
commune system and contracted land and production quotas to peasant households. This new form of production and management system is called the "production responsibility system" (Kelkar, 1985, p. 39).

The major goal of the production responsibility system is to reduce the size of the collective and labor group in order to implement a remuneration system that links reward more directly to performance. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes that the major factor that constituted the failure of the commune system was the mentality of "everybody eating in the same iron rice bowl," and this referred to the situation that workers received the same rewards regardless of their efforts in production (Howard, 1988). The CCP argues that, under this circumstance, farmers had no incentives to increase their productivity; therefore, low productivity hindered the development of agriculture in rural China (Zhang, et al, 1983).

When the CCP first implemented the production responsibility system in 1978, the Party did not expect that the new system would increase the autonomy of the peasant household. In contrast, the collective was to remain as the overall production unit and maintain its control on planning, management, and accountancy in all contracts. Besides, the CCP anticipated a gradual implementation of the production responsibility system only to selected areas (Croll, 1988).
The reform, however, turned into an almost total replacement of collectives with household units. At the end of 1983, 98 percent of the land belonging to China's production teams had been contracted out to peasant households (Wang, 1984, Pg. 41). The production responsibility system in one form or another is now prevalent in almost all of China including the richer suburban communes.²

**Household Contract System**

Under the production responsibility system, production teams in collectives enter into contracts with small labor groups and individual households, imposing a set of rights, obligations, and responsibilities for production on both parties. There are a great variety of contracting arrangements. For instance, the production team may assign responsibility to the individual household ranging from individual tasks to the entire production process based upon allocation of lands, with payment negotiated according to the demand of the labor process or according to output³

² Very few western analysts are investigating the reason for this dramatic shift. Scholars and planners in China believe that this dramatic shift resulted from the motivation of farmers to increase their income. They also argue that the emergence of the peasant household as the major production unit is a logical step toward modernization of agriculture in China.

³ The household contract system encompasses a wide variety of forms. A detailed discussion of all these arrangements is beyond the scope of our study.
(Kelkar, 1985, p. 39).

The most common form of the contract system is that the collective in the village contracts out land and output quotas to each household, and it is referred to by its Chinese term "bao gan dao hu" (Croll, 1987, p. 471; Tang, 1983, p. 42). The peasant household will receive land, draught animals, and small- and medium-sized equipment for its production. The collective will allocate land to the household on a per laborer basis. Households do not own the land, but they can cultivate the land for a period of 15 years; and the land is called the "responsibility land" (Croll, 1988, p. 78). All field management from sowing to harvesting and all costs of production including hiring labor and small machineries are the responsibility of the household.

The household contracts to grow specific crops and provide a portion of the harvest to the collective. The household can retain any surplus over the quota for its own use, or sell the surplus to the market or the State at above quota prices (Kelkar, 1985). The CCP believes that the opportunity to earn additional income from selling the production surplus in the market or to the state will induce farmers to increase their productivity.

The development of the production responsibility system as a whole, and the household contract system in particular, has laid the groundwork for the first stage of
the development of specialized households. The household contract system establishes households as production units with a high degree of autonomy. Combining this change with the promotion of domestic sideline production has finally led to the full development of specialized households.

**Domestic Sideline Production**

Policy formulated at the time of the commune system in 1958 clearly imposed limited rights of peasant households to undertake sideline activities in their private plots. Indeed, peasant households depended on their domestic production to provide the majority of their nonstaple food supplies, such as vegetables and poultry. Despite the importance of sideline production to peasant households, the CCP perceived this domestic production to be a contradiction to the communal spirit and attempted several times to limit sideline production (Andors, 1983).

Under the current rural reforms, the CCP has encouraged the diversification of the rural economy. The major goal for the diversification is to create income-generating activities for the surplus labor that becomes much more explicit in the new production responsibility system. The new production responsibility system has revised the old rewarding system by linking rewards with outputs. This revision has led to more efficient use of labor in the fields; therefore, the demand for labor declined significantly, creating a large amount of surplus
labor (Croll, 1988, p. 80).

Creating employment opportunities for unemployed labor is an important and urgent problem. Collectives with surplus labor have, therefore, encouraged peasant households to allocate more and more of their time to domestic sideline production. Consequently, the expansion of the sideline production has broadened the scope of income-generating activities for peasants (Croll, 1987, p. 472). In the late 1970s, the CCP not only legitimized sideline production, but it also actively encouraged peasant households to engage in this production. After the formal approval and encouragement of the sideline production, it expanded immediately.

Croll (1988, p. 80) provides three reasons for the extensive increase in sideline production: (1) the peasant household can provide the labor and simple equipment for the sideline production without incurring large overhead costs, (2) the sideline production can provide peasants with greater supplies of food and consumer goods for subsistence and exchange, and (3) this production can also provide rural industries with raw materials.

In order to provide additional outlets for sideline products and to encourage peasant households to produce a wide variety of goods, the government has reestablished the rural markets and fairs at which peasants can sell and exchange goods, foods, and handicrafts at a negotiated and
agreed upon price according to local supply and demand.

With the opening up of the rural market, the government begins to encourage diversification and specialization of agriculture. Diversification means broadening the narrow emphasis on grain production and develop cash cropping, afforestation, livestock husbandry, and other nonagricultural production in the rural sectors. The CCP has revised its former slogan of "taking grain as the key link" in favor of "the all-round development of agriculture" (Croll, 1988, p. 81).

Specialization means that regions should utilize their resources and develop agricultural activities that are most suitable for their rural economy. A region such as the Yangtze River Delta that is better suited to produce cash crops and fish should specialize in these products for both intraregional and interregional markets. Similarly, within the region, the village government has encouraged a degree of specialization among peasant households. This encouragement has become the major reason for the development of specialized households.

Peasants who have specialties in producing certain agricultural and nonagricultural products begin to concentrate their labor in this production. For instance, peasants who possess special know-how in livestock raising will put all their household labor in production of livestock products. They will then sell their output in the
market in exchange for the daily subsistence crops for their families. This increase in commodity exchange and division of labor in the rural sectors has increased the level of specialization in the countryside.
### Appendix C  Samples of Specialized Households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head of household</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Major production of household</th>
<th>Number of labor</th>
<th>Division of Labor</th>
<th>Total Annual Income (yuan)</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nui Zengqui</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Grain, Cotton, &amp; livestock production</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1. Nui does field work 1. Nui’s wife does housework and rears domestic livestocks i.e. pigs, cows &amp; chickens 2. Daughter-in-law is responsible for cotton production 3. Daughter takes care of the machineries</td>
<td>31,031</td>
<td>Hebei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Zengqui</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Electrician</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1. Li’s father takes care of livestock and fruit production 1. Li’s wife does the housework 2. Li’s daughter-in-law takes care of livestocks 3. Li’s son drives a tractor</td>
<td>11,410</td>
<td>Quinghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xu Yongchang</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Gardener</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1. Xu’s father does the housework 1. Xu’s mother does the housework 2. Xu is responsible for Marketing &amp; Gardening 2. Xu’s wife prepares the flowers’ seeds</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of household</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Major production of household</td>
<td>Number of household</td>
<td>Division of Labor</td>
<td>Total Annual Income (yuan)</td>
<td>Location</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhan Tanglung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Dairy product (Milk)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1. Zhan engages in cattle rearing and cultivates the responsibility land 2. Zhan's two sons work in the collective production team</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Shuimun</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Pig rearing</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1. Yang is responsible for animal feed and market the household production 2. Yang's son cultivates the responsibility land 3. Another son contracts tea production from the collective</td>
<td>14,096</td>
<td>Hunan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xu Caibao</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Pig rearing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1. Xu is responsible for materials acquisition for livestock 2. Xu's two sons engage in cultivate pig feed</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Yuyang</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Duck rearing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1. Zheng's husband is responsible for duck feed</td>
<td>13,300</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gao Shuyang</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Chicken rearing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1. Gao's husband works in the City of Guangzhou</td>
<td>29,800</td>
<td>Guangdong</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tian Duangi</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Duck feed</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1. Tian is a manager and technician in a communal factory 2. Tian's son is responsible for duck feed 3. Tian's father engages</td>
<td>16,300</td>
<td>Shangdong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of household</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Major production</td>
<td>Number of household labor</td>
<td>Division of Labor</td>
<td>Total Annual Income</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wang Shumein</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Brush manufacturing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1. Wang's husband is responsible for material acquisition and accounting</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Wang is in-charge of the manufacturing of brush</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xiong Bingqi</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Grain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1. All male labor engage in field work</td>
<td>23,710</td>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Xiong's wife does the housework</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Shuiguang</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1. Chen engages in tea production</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Chen's wife and brother-in-law take care of the housework</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Chen's father and brother cultivate vegetables</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Chen's mother and sister engage in chicken rearing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhao Yuhu</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Dairy products</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1. Zhao and his sons involve mainly in the production of dairy products</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>Nanjing</td>
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<td>1. Zhao's wife is responsible for housework</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ma Huifang</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Pig rearing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1. Ma cultivates pig feed</td>
<td>7,287</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1. Ma's wife does the housework</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2. Ma's father is responsible for pig tending</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ju Shileung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Honey bee rearing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1. Ju concentrates on bee rearing</td>
<td>12,530</td>
<td>Hunan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1. Ju's wife does the housework and cultivates the responsibility land</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yan Guilung</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Grain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1. Yan and his son engage in field work</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>Shangdong</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Yan's wife is responsible for livestock tending and housework</td>
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<tr>
<td>Head of household</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Major production of household</td>
<td>Number of labor</td>
<td>Man's job</td>
<td>Women's job</td>
<td>Total Annual Income (yuan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wang Quixi</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Livestock breeding</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1. Wang and his son engage in livestock breeding</td>
<td>1. Wang's wife does the housework</td>
<td>37,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pan Shiyang</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Fish breeding</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1. Pan is responsible for fish breeding</td>
<td>1. Pan's wife engages in fish breeding and also does all the housework</td>
<td>15,462</td>
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<td>Fan Chengzhong</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Grain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1. Fan does field work</td>
<td>1. Fan's wife is responsible for housework and livestock tending</td>
<td>18,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhao Shugui</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Grain</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1. Zhao works on the fields</td>
<td>1. Zhao's wife is responsible for housework and pigs rearing</td>
<td>7,868</td>
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<tr>
<td>Li Guangdong</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Grain</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1. Li works on the fields</td>
<td>1. Li's wife is responsible for housework and livestock tending</td>
<td>5,713</td>
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<tr>
<td>Su Jianhui</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Grain</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1. Su works on the fields</td>
<td>1. Su’s wife is responsible for housework and livestock tending</td>
<td>5,625</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chen Qiaowang</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1. Chen works on the field</td>
<td>1. Chen’s wife is responsible for housework and livestock tending</td>
<td>5,625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


*These articles and/or books are in Chinese. All other are in English.*


