A LOCATION DECISION: THE BOSTON COMMON PARKING GARAGE

by

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ABSTRACT

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by Gary L. Greeson

Submitted to the Department of City and Regional Planning, M.I.T., on May 21, 1965, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in City Planning.

As a case study of the planning expert's role in political decision-making, this thesis examines the history of a major public investment decision—the Boston Common Parking Garage. Planners, in opposing the Garage, played a strictly technical role which was inappropriate to the competitive political environment in which they were operating. And there was some evidence to indicate that the planner working for a governmental agency will favor public action over private action.

The planners were not co-opted to plead the case of any political head or pressure group interest; and studies provided by planners were not used to draw pressure away from the Mayor. It was necessary, however, for the Mayor to compromise planning advice in order to satisfy political pressures. The planners were systematically biased in favor of tangible, quantifiable, predictable criteria of choice. And the planners' rationality, public welfare, and synoptic orientations led to conflict with the Mayor's orientation which was incremental and disjointed. The City Council, however, found the planners' opinions to be useful in performing a watchdog function.

The city planners wanted stability in capital programming—a desire which conflicted with the politician's view of municipal policy. And the planners, in forecasting user demand, favored smaller dispersed garages over a large facility of equal cost (the Boston Common Garage). Finally, the study revealed that planners acting as private citizens could exert significant influence in the political arena.

THESIS SUPERVISOR: JOHN FRIEDMANN
TITLE: Associate Professor of Regional Planning
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts
May 21, 1965

Professor John T. Howard, Head
Department of City and Regional Planning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Howard:

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in City Planning, I submit this thesis entitled "A Location Decision: The Boston Common Parking Garage."

Sincerely,

Gary L. Greeson
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Finally, to my wife, Nancy, goes deepest gratitude for her tolerance, prodding, and typing skill.
I. INTRODUCTION AND HYPOTHESES

A. INTRODUCTION

City planning as a legitimate arm of city government has gained wide acceptance; and its ideological basis is no longer seriously challenged. Federal housing and highway programs have given impetus to the planning movement which is seen as a logical approach to the solution of city problems. Yet planning has failed to influence important decisions in many cities; that master plans often "gather dust" is a common observation.

Recent attacks upon the city planning profession have centered around this lack of influence, this seeming irrelevance of planning efforts to decisions affecting

the physical environment of the city.\(^3\) Planners have been accused of neglecting social issues such as racial segregation, chided for ignoring the political facts of city life, and criticized for using simplistic rationality models.\(^4\) The planner is pictured as a frustrated bureaucrat, operating in an environment that he does not fully understand.

One response to the no-influence problem has been a preoccupation by some leading planners with the organizational position of the planning function in city government. When the second edition of Walker's *The Planning Function in Urban Government* came out in 1950, it touched off a debate which still continues among planners. The debate has been between those who want to retain the independent, citizen planning commission and those who favor some other organizational arrangement—usually some form of staff arrangement attached to the executive office. In fact Walker argued that the independent planning com-

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mission was not adequate for executing the planning function; he said that "planning is one of the staff functions and should be attached to the executive office." His arguments set the stage for the long debate which has turned to the planning commission as the whipping post for planning failure. Neither Walker's data (1937-38) nor the subsequent arguments calling for abolition of the planning commission, however, are convincing. As one experienced planner put it: "if the political leaders of the community, in the council and in the mayor's or manager's office, understand and want city planning, the commission form will work better....If they don't, neither set-up will work." A recent study has substantiated this argument; Rabinowitz found that the organization for planning was an insignificant variable between "effective" and "ineffective" planning communities.

What then is the solution to planners' lack of influence? How should the planner conduct his practice in


a given city at a given time? There are no easy answers. Very few studies have concentrated upon the role of the planning expert in political decision-making. There have been, however, a number of studies of broader community decision-making. Their focus has been the role of various influential people in determining community action. The city planner has been relatively ignored in these studies; at best they only suggest hypotheses about the city planner's role. Despite these studies, there is still some confusion as to who actually governs city politics. Is it a group of elites or a pluralistic system of influentials? Is political power continuously maintained or do different people or groups come to the fore when different issues arise? The evidence is opinionated; and the methods biased. Hunter found a "power pyramid" of about 40 persons in Atlanta, by asking selected influ-


entials about who actually made the important decisions. He was lambasted for using a method which predetermined his findings. But more recent studies, rejecting the elitist theory, have done the same in finding a pluralistic model of influence. By studying a number of "divergent issues," they have also predetermined their findings. By following this literature, the planner can get perhaps a better idea of how "influence" or the "decision process" works. But the implications for his own behavior are not clear.

The present study is proposed to help clarify the planning expert's role in community decision-making. Since the city planner's domain is the physical environment of the city and his avowed expertise is in guiding physical development of the city, a major public investment and location decision has been chosen for a case study

of the planner's role. The Boston Common Parking Garage history was one which brought the city planner into contact with major political forces; and it was in many ways typical of the debate which surrounds public investment decisions. The city planners took a definite stand in the debate—but eventually lost. By examining their role in such an issue (especially one in which their position met with eventual failure), some of the important factors contributing to the planner's influence or lack of influence can be identified. This study should help to provide a better understanding of the planner's position and contribution—an understanding which could increase his influence, so that the planning function can be satisfactorily performed.

B. METHOD

The Boston Common Parking Garage location decision was chosen for an historical study because the case is now old enough to permit the expression of candid opinions by the actors (although not guaranteed). There were many data sources, including: reports, hearings, minutes, newspaper articles, parking studies, court cases, and open-

15. In Boston, similar debate has arisen over highway locations, selection of a NASA Research Center site, urban renewal and other public investment decisions.
end interviews. These were used to determine facts, namely the actual events and actual behavior of the people involved. The interviews also provided opinions, attitudes, reasons for behavior, and information about relationships between actors. Major emphasis is placed upon the actual events or behavior. One major drawback of the historical study is that the memories of the persons interviewed may be questionable; to counteract this, all interviews were checked to see that they jibed with the actual events.

The word planner includes those persons professionally trained or professionally recognized as qualified city planners. It does not include typists, draftsmen, data collectors, or other similar personnel who may work for a planning agency. It does not include members of the lay planning commission. Both those professional planners working as part of a governmental agency and those serving as consultants to the agency are included as part of the study. In testing hypotheses about the planner's role, the hypotheses are meant to apply to both the civil-servant and consulting planners serving the City of Boston. Other city planners who entered the debate over the Garage acted as private parties and were not subject to the normal constraints of a city planner working for a governmental agency. As it turned out, these "other" city plan-
ners played an important role in the Garage's history; and a section will be devoted to this role of the city planner as a private citizen. The hypotheses to be tested, however, are meant to apply only to planners responsible to and paid by Boston's city government.

To ascertain the planner's role, a number of hypotheses were formulated from a reading of works pertaining to the role of the planning expert. The concept of "role" is generally delineated by this set of hypotheses. These hypotheses include: the planner's norms and biases which affect his behavior; the relationship between the planner and other actors; and the planner's position within the limitations of the decision-making or social structure in which he works.16 A role is only partially chosen; in many ways it is predetermined for the planner by institutional, personality, and other constraints. On the other hand, a role is not fixed. Consensus about a person's role in a position may not exist. Thus the role player may, to some degree, define his role through a kind

of learning process whereby expectations among actors are developed.\textsuperscript{17}

C. HYPOTHESES

The first hypothesis is derived from a recently completed work by Rabinowitz.\textsuperscript{18} She concluded that the effectiveness of planning depends upon the planner's adjustment to the pattern of political decision-making in a community.\textsuperscript{19} This same idea was suggested by Daland and Parker; they found that acceptance of planning tended to increase where planning was seen as being "useful" by the actors in policy-making.\textsuperscript{20} Rabinowitz stated this ability to be "useful" in a more general form. She saw a number of roles that planners could assume in different political environments. In a study of six New Jersey cities, she compared the effectiveness of planning with the appropriateness of the planner's role to the political system. She compromised the elitist and pluralistic views of city politics into a political continuum of four major bands:

(1) The Cohesive System—a collection of elites

\begin{itemize}
  \item 18. Rabinowitz, \textit{op. cit.}
  \item 19. \textit{Ibid.} P. 153.
  \item 20. Daland and Parker, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 221.
\end{itemize}
exercise continuing power in directing important community decisions.

(2) The Executive System—"the leadership group is...comprised mainly of public officials and prominent private individuals representing major interests in the city. The chief executive (the Mayor) stands at the center of concentric circles of power."

(3) The Competitive System—"more than one leadership clique exists in competition with others on a continuing basis."

(4) The Fragmented System—"no visible leadership group or groups exist."

The possible roles for the planner were:

(1) The Technical Role—the planner serves as a technician giving advice to a civic elite which is responsible for policy-making and implementation.

(2) The Broker Role—the planner evolves strategies for maintaining coalitions of competing interests; he negotiates acceptable solutions.

(3) The Mobilizer Role—the planner mobilizes resources and disparate interests to create energy in support of change.

The way for the planner to be "useful" or "effec-
tive" then is to find an appropriate role within a political system. In some systems, certain planners' roles will be ineffective. For example, she found the Technician role to be inadequate in the Competitive System. By classifying Boston's political system and the role played by Boston's city planners, another test of her thesis will be completed (and available for comparison with her results).

**Hypothesis 1:** The planner's influence will be determined by the appropriateness of his role to the decision-making environment in which he operates.

The second hypothesis is taken from a reading of Johr and Singer's *The Role of the Economist As Official Adviser*. Based on their experience as expert advisers, they found that economists tended to exaggerate the importance of government measures and to treat private activities as a "negligible quantity." Simon has pointed to the fact that organizational identity may cause a decision bias on the part of an individual. He defined "identification" as "the process whereby the individual substitutes organization objectives for his own aims as the

value indices which determine his organizational decisions. One negative aspect of identification is that it may cause the individual to be prejudiced in his evaluation—especially in evaluating factors outside the organization's realm. Simon listed these reasons for organizational identification:

(1) Personal Interest in Organizational Success
(2) Transfer of Private-Management Psychology
(3) Focus of Attention

For the city planner, this kind of identification could mean a number of things: for example, he might be impatient with private efforts to solve a problem; he might misinterpret private intentions—possibly regarding them as detrimental to the public welfare; he might favor governmental control or operation to private—in order to boost local government power; he might seek to increase his own salary or prestige by getting new functions for his department; he might resent private development decisions which did not have his approval; or he might simply reject or neglect the private point of view. In short, he would tend to favor government action over private action.

25. Ibid. P. 218.
Hypothesis 2: City planners, working for government agencies, will tend to favor government measures over private action.

Several hypotheses can be drawn from Banfield's *Political Influence*, a study of six controversies in Chicago. Banfield was critical of planners for their inability to exert real influence. From a reading of this work, I have drawn the following hypotheses to be tested:

Hypothesis 3: In a location dispute, the planning expert serves as a co-opted intermediary to plead the case of a particular interest or to legitimate the plans of a political head.

Hypothesis 3a: Studies provided by planners are used to draw pressure or criticism away from the political head.

Hypothesis 4: A political decision-maker can never make an important location decision on completely rational grounds. To some degree, he will have to be arbitrary or nonlogical. Thus expert opinion will have to

27. Banfield, *op. cit.*, Chapter 12.
28. See *ibid.*, pp. 268, 277.
29. See *ibid.*, p. 278.
be compromised.  

Hypothesis 5: The planning expert will be systematically biased in his choice of positions in a location dispute. He will favor tangible, quantifiable, predictable criteria of choice.  

Other works have suggested that the city planner's approach to problem-solving and his conception of the public welfare are unrealistic in the political arena. Braybrooke and Lindblom have challenged certain ideals of policy evaluation, many of which would seem to characterize city planning methods. These include such ideals as: (1) using simple priorities or criteria to evaluate policy; (2) using a rational-deductive ideal which they claim represents an ideal of science transferred to the field of values; (3) specifying a welfare function whereby public welfare is quantifiably expressed; and (4) attempting comprehensive analysis in the solution of problems (the synoptic ideal). These strategies of problem solving, they say, are doomed to be inadequate because

30. See *ibid.*, p. 329.  
of multiple, changing, and conflicting values, and because of man's limited problem-solving capacities. The inadequacy and costliness of information, the closeness of fact and value, the open political system, the need for strategic sequences of analytical moves, and the diversity of policy-problem forms are additional reasons why the above ideals will not work in the real world. Braybrooke and Lindblom propose a strategy of "disjointed incrementalist" in the evaluation of policy. This supposedly would be better because it is consistent with actual behavior. Without challenging this proposal, the implication is that city planners will be using methods and ideas which for the most part will be unsatisfactory, and that these ideals will conflict with the realities of the policy-making environment.

Meyerson and Banfield, in a case study of Chicago's public housing efforts, also noted that city planners had a kind of "code" by which the public interest could be determined. They stated:

....The code specified that racial amity and

33. The word conflict, as used here and in the proposed hypotheses, does not necessarily mean that an open fight will develop. It may be taken as merely a collision of ideas. The result of the conflict may be a winner and a loser; or it may simply be neglected planning advice.
integration were very much to be desired, that waste was to be avoided, and that all citizens should be treated with rigorous impartiality, that the values of family, home, and good citizenship should be furthered by public effort, and that public officials should subordinate neighborhood and private interests (particularly, personal ones) to the public interest.

Most important, the code specified that the ends in it were to be regarded as more important than any conflicting ends that individuals might have. 34

This code and the conceptions it employed were considerably different from "the public interest" of the politicians. 35

The hypothesis derived from the above works is:

Hypothesis 6: The rationality, public welfare, and synoptic orientations of city planners will cause them to conflict with political leaders whose orientations are more incremental and disjointed.

A related hypothesis was suggested in Brown and Gilbert's case study of municipal investment in Philadelphia. 36 They also noted a difference in viewpoint between city planners and politicians—in this case due to the preference of city planners for abstract programming cri-

34. Meyerson and Banfield, op. cit., p. 301.
35. Ibid., p. 300.
criteria. This is similar to the rationality orientation above but suggests a more specific reason for conflict. Also their work placed the center of conflict between the Council and the planners.

Hypothesis 6a: The preference of city planners for abstract programming criteria will place them at loggerheads with the City Council which has a more "political" perspective.

Brown and Gilbert also found that the planner's desire for stability in capital programming conflicted with other views of municipal policy. By stability, they meant the desire to maintain a coordinated, six-year program with no abrupt changes. They suggested that the political reality of short-run public pressure tended to be ignored by planners. A seventh hypothesis then is:

Hypothesis 7: The planner will want stability in capital programming. This will lead to conflict with the politician's view of municipal policy which favors government responsiveness to short-run public wants.

Finally, Brown and Gilbert hypothesized that planners, in order to avoid errors in economic and behavioral forecasting tended to recommend a number of small

37. Ibid., p. 208.
projects over large projects of equal cost. And on this account, the planners agreed with the politicians and administrators who were bargaining for influence. Their evidence, however, that city planners favored small projects because of methodological defenses was scanty. They had to distinguish between those projects which were identified with city planning (e.g. urban renewal) and which were pushed on a large-scale project basis to attract support, and those projects which were merely subject to planner's advice and which had no particular identification with planning (e.g. police stations). Yet the hypothesis may have merit. By testing whether the methods of projecting or quantifiably measuring the need for facilities actually led to a number of small projects, an important city planning prejudice may be discovered. In fact, it may suggest that other alternatives are precluded at this level of policy recommendation.

Hypothesis 8: When giving locational advice for projects proposed by other government agencies, if proposed projects require user-demand forecasting, city planners will favor a large number of small projects over a small number of large projects of equal cost.

In the next chapter, the history of the Boston

38. Ibid., p. 288.
Common Parking Garage will be examined to see if the hypotheses are valid. The history will be grouped under headings which might be called "steps in a decision process."
The third chapter will cover any conclusions drawn from the study. And a fourth chapter will include general implications of the findings and suggestions for further research.

To facilitate the reader's reference to the study's hypotheses, they are summarized below:

Summary of Hypotheses

1. The planner's influence will be determined by the appropriateness of his role to the decision-making environment in which he operates.

2. City planners, working for government agencies, will tend to favor government measures over private action.

3. In a location dispute, the planning expert serves as a co-opted intermediary to plead the case of a particular interest or to legitimate the plans of a political head.
   a. Studies provided by planners are used to draw pressure or criticism away from the political head.

4. A political decision-maker can never make an important location decision on completely rational grounds. To some degree, he will have to be arbitrary or nonlogical. Thus expert opinion will have to be compromised.

5. The planning expert will be systematically biased in his choice of positions in a location dispute. He will favor tangible, quantifiable, predictable criteria of choice.

6. The rationality, public welfare, and synoptic orien-
tations of city planners will cause them to conflict with political leaders whose orientations are more incremental and disjointed.

a. The preference of city planners for abstract programming criteria will place them at loggerheads with the City Council which has a more "political" perspective.

7. The planner will want stability in capital programming. This will lead to conflict with the politician's view of municipal policy which favors government responsiveness to short-run public wants.

8. When giving locational advice for projects proposed by other governmental agencies, if the proposed projects require user-demand forecasting, city planners will favor a large number of small projects over a small number of large projects of equal cost.
II. A HISTORY OF THE DECISION

A. THE IDEA IS PROPOSED

The Common Garage proposal has coincided with the long history of parking problems in the central business district. The Garage was first proposed in 1919, when Councilor Henry E. Hagan asked that the Board of Street Commissioners consider the practicality of a "parking station" under the Boston Common. The Board rejected the idea as being too costly. In 1923, J. Edmund Brown of Chelsea presented the Chamber of Commerce a plan for building a "motorcave" under part of the Boston Common. He said it would hold 3,000 cars and could be built for $3 million. That same year, Councilor Hagan again proposed a "parking station" under the Common. He told the City Council: "Automobiles are with us and they are with us

to stay, and we must provide some parking accommodations for them." The following year, Warren E. Locke, a Boston engineer, presented to a legislative committee detailed plans for such an underground garage. In 1926, City Councillor John J. Heffernan requested that the Board of Street Commissioners prepare cost estimates for such a garage. The Board merely resubmitted its skeptical 1919 opinion. Then in 1928, the idea was taken up by the City's Public Works Commission. At a hearing in City Hall Annex in November, 1928, the vice president of the Beacon Hill Civic Association—a civic group destined to battle the proposal throughout its history—"voiced strong protest."

Nothing came of these early proposals, except to bring the idea forward. It remained dormant during the first years of the Depression. But it was not long before the parking problem once again gained attention. In 1933, a private citizen proposed that the city lease land where old buildings were, tear them down, and operate municipal parking spaces at a reasonable charge. The City Planning Board rejected the idea, considering it "inadvisable to compete with private enterprise." In November, 1935,

40. City of Boston, City Council Minutes, April 16, 1923.
41. The Christian Science Monitor, November 1, 1928.
a state legislator wrote the Mayor proposing a garage beneath both the Public Garden and the Common; he proposed space for 30,000 cars at 25 cents each. And in 1936 a city councilor picked up the Boston Common Garage idea and annually presented it to the Council from 1936 to 1939. The Common Garage was conceived as the savior of downtown Boston. Here is the argument presented by Councilor Clem Norton:

Mr. President, the downtown area of Boston pays as much in taxes as all the rest of the city put together. Property values must go down unless the present traffic snarl in our business area is straightened out. Adequate parking areas should be considered. A study should be made into the feasibility of having a parking area, for instance, under part of Boston Common. Objection may be anticipated from historical societies but we already have subways running under the Common. Leading cities are arranging for underground parking. Over 500,000 vehicles enter and leave the downtown area daily and over one and one-half million persons a day enter and leave this section. Big stores and buildings stand to lose out unless adequate parking areas are provided. 43

But the Mayor (Mansfield) was not interested.

When another state legislator, in April of 1937, proposed parking on the Common, he was met by a storm of protest from citizens, Mayor Mansfield, and the Park Commissioner. So the state legislator, Francis X. Coyne of Dorchester,

43. City of Boston, City Council Minutes, December 7, 1936.
modified his proposal and presented a bill to the State Legislature for a garage under the Common. There was, however, only weak support at both the city and state level. Coyne's proposal to the 1937 and then to the 1938 Legislature met defeat; and Councilor Norton continued to be ignored by the Mayor.

The pressure for additional parking facilities in Boston continued, however. The American Automobile Association prepared a study of Boston traffic conditions in 1940 which pointed to increased traffic volumes, decreased mass transit use, and declining property values in the Central Business District.44 The study report recommended that a coordinated plan for express streets and parking facilities be prepared.45 That same year, Mayor Tobin conducted a "Conference On Traffic," which included a report prepared by the Conference's Committee On Off-Street Parking. The study was done by the City Planning Board staff; and it recommended the construction of 3,000 parking places within the next six years, according to a comprehensive plan and financed by the city which would

45. Ibid., p. 7.
sub-lease parking areas to private operators.46 The City Law Department substantiated the legality of taking land for parking, but stated that sub-lease to private operators would be illegal.47 Thus legislative approval was needed for such a leasing plan. So in 1941, Mayor Tobin submitted a bill to the Legislature seeking authorization to sell bonds, regulate rates, and lease to private operators.48 The bill was referred to a Recess Commission and remained dormant until 1946.

The Common Garage was again proposed in 1941 when the Democratic floor leader of the State Senate presented a bill proposing the construction of a $15 million bomb-proof parking garage under the Common. Like the other parking proposal above, this legislation was also scuttled until after the war. Interest in the parking problem was displaced by the war effort.

B. PUBLICITY, CRISIS, AND POLITICAL SUPPORT

In 1945, the Chairman of the Democratic State

47. Ibid., Appendix I.
48. House No. 1636.
Committee submitted a bill to the Legislature to provide parking facilities under the Common. When the Boston City Planning Board was asked by the City Legislative Agent to consider the bill, the Board voted "to oppose House Bill 1337 as written, but that it is not opposed to a feasible plan for underground parking in the Common." The bill was defeated that year by opposition led by Henry L. Shattuck, a Back Bay Republican. The defeat was only temporary, however, since six bills providing for an under-Common Garage were presented to the 1946 Legislature. Also, Boston's large Hearst morning-newspaper, the Record, came out in favor of the Garage, giving it a lot of favorable publicity. The powerful Mayor of Boston, James Michael Curley, filed one of the bills. Author of Curley's proposal was William J. McDonald, a Boston real estate dealer and a close friend of Mayor Curley. Curley filed the legislation without consulting the City Planning Board.

On January 11, 1946, the day Curley filed legislation for the Common Garage, the City Planning Board also had a meeting. Chairman of the City Planning Board, William Stanley Parker, expressed concern regarding the Mayor's stand. After a long discussion reviewing the

49. City of Boston, City Planning Board Minutes: 1945, March 9, 1945.
Board's 1945 vote and the locational disadvantages of the Garage, the Board meekly voted:

That the Chairman be requested to write a letter to his Honor the Mayor asking for an opportunity for the Board to meet with him to discuss the Board's proposals for various public improvements.  

At a second meeting on January 24, 1946, the City Planning Board Minutes read:

It was the sense of the meeting that the Board should withhold any formal opposition to bills, particularly the bills affecting the Central Artery, removal of elevated structure, parking underneath the Boston Common, off-street parking and redevelopment until the Board has an opportunity to talk these matters over with the Mayor and present to him the Board's views. It was also agreed that the Board should adhere to the principle of first things first which in this case is the Central Artery.

The Chairman asked for expressions of opinion from the members on the bills for a garage or parking underneath the Boston Common. The sentiment was not wholly against parking underneath the Common, but for a further and more scientific study.  

Then on February 8, 1946, the Board again discussed the legislative bills for parking facilities under the Common. "The opinion of the members excepting the Chairman, was that no further opposition should be expressed by the Board until a further study of the loca-

50. City of Boston, City Planning Board Minutes: 1946, January 11, 1946.  
51. Ibid., January 24, 1946.
Between February and June, other matters took up the Board's attention. During that time, they voted to approve legislation for off-street parking facilities, and tried to sell the Mayor on the idea of the Central Artery. In June, they approved a letter to the Mayor (from the Chairman) in which it was suggested that the Planning Board and the Traffic Commission be permitted to review and report upon the plans for the Common Garage before final approval was given.53

Meanwhile the legislative wheels had been turning. Opposition to the Garage was expressed by members of the Boston Common Society--an organization of prominent Bostonians to protect the Boston Common from encroachment. For the bills' hearing at the State House in February, about 150 people showed up including a large representation of downtown businessmen. That night, following the afternoon hearing, leading merchants, businessmen, newspaper and advertising representatives, and members of the

52. Ibid., February 8, 1946.
53. Ibid., June 14, 1946.
State Legislature met at the Hotel Statler to hear Timothy J. Pflueger, the architect who had designed San Francisco's underground garage, extol the virtues of the garage and explain why Boston needed one under the Common. The advertising manager of Hearst's Record-American presided at the dinner meeting. The parking crisis was at its peak. A solution was needed. The Boston Common Garage was it. No doubt the parking problem was considered a crisis on that day. "Both meetings came on a day when Boston was experiencing one of its worst traffic tie ups in years as hundreds of big trucks, following the three-day holiday, added to the rapidly mounting congestion in the downtown and market district areas."55 A garage under the Common had become a symbolic solution to the parking problem—a problem which was thought to be one of the main reasons for decline in the CBD. A Boston Common Parking Garage was needed to save the downtown.

Needless to say, the legislation was passed in July. On July 11, 1946, Mayor Curley signed an agreement with Motor Park, Inc. whose head was William J. McDonald, Curley's friend and big pusher for the legislation. The law provided that the garage be built and operated by a

private firm under a 40 year lease whereby the City would get an annual rent of 2 percent of gross receipts. The financing was to be entirely private.

For Mayor Curley, the Garage was a good deal. He pleased the downtown businessmen and paid a friend. The Common Garage was one of those projects where planning advice was not needed. The crisis dictated the solution. In any case, the Planning Board hedged; and a parking study would have only meant delay. There was no time for planning. Even if the Board had voted to oppose the Common Garage legislation, the bill would most likely have passed anyway.

William Stanley Parker, Chairman of the City Planning Board and a professional planner, had obtained Curley's permission to express his opinions publicly; and he did. Parker argued that: (1) private enterprise could not successfully operate the proposed garage, (2) responsibility would fall on the city's taxpayers, (3) the garage would be in the wrong place for relieving traffic, (4) it would attract traffic into the congested areas of Boston, (5) the cost would be staggering, and (6) small,

strategically located parking areas were needed. These arguments were too late and unconvincing.

The Planning Board realized that its influence was weak. In September, 1947, the Board discussed the problem.

"There was a general feeling among the Board members that a report of Off-Street Parking would have been timely and stimulating some months ago, but it would perhaps be inadvisable at this time.

There was agreement as to the need of bringing the work of the Planning Board before the public through the publication of special reports, perhaps two a year.

This was after legislation had passed authorizing the construction of the Common Garage and other parking facilities. The only action taken by the Board was a vote supporting additional off-street parking facilities and a recommendation that the minimum size of a parking lot should be from 10,000 to 15,000 square feet, with maximum space for 600 cars.

The fact that Mayor Curley by-passed the Board should not be construed to mean that he disliked planning. There was free communication between Curley and planning.

59. City of Boston, City Planning Board Minutes: 1946, September 27, 1946.
60. Ibid., July 12, 1946.
director, Thomas E. McCormick. And Curley used the planning staff's advice on other occasions. But the pressure was so strong for the Garage that the Planning Board's advice did not matter; and the need for the Garage probably appeared to be so obvious that expert opinion from the planning staff would have been superfluous.

Since the Board was uncommitted and passive and since expert planning advice was not given to or solicited by the Mayor or Council, many of the hypotheses formulated for this study are not applicable to the 1946 events. The planning staff did not actually perform any of the roles outlined by Rabinowitz—i.e. Technical, Broker, Mobilizer. The planners showed no particular bias concerning private or public action. Nor were the planners used by the Mayor or anyone else to support factional interests. Expert opinion was not compromised, because none was explicitly given.

In relation to Hypothesis 5, the planning director was biased in favor of tangible, quantifiable, predictable criteria of choice. In the 1946 Annual Report of the City Planning Board, the Executive Director (McCormick) listed these reasons why the Common Garage would be unfav-

61. Based on interview with McCormick.
orable: (1) "That a garage under the Common with entrances on Charles street would place it in the midst of an unoccupied area;" (2) "that it would be over a thousand feet distant from the business district;" (3) "that it would be in an area which is now the best served from the point of parking facilities;" and (4) "that it would cause terrific congestion at peak hours on Charles street." These arguments, however, were not based upon a thorough study of parking needs; and they were not introduced until after the Garage legislation had passed. They were included in an obscure annual report that very few people read.

Predictability was involved in that appraisal of the Garage's feasibility had been based upon crude predictions of parking demand and traffic congestion.

The planners did not conflict with political leaders because no contact between the two was made. The fact that Curley did not consult the Planning Board or staff showed that his orientation was toward the political reality of satisfying strong pressure and rewarding supporters (McDonald). His conceptions of rationality and public

62. City of Boston, Thirty-Third Annual Report of the City Planning Board For The Year Ending December 31, 1946, Boston: January 31, 1947. A crude parking study is included in Appendix I; but it was not formally released. It pertained mainly to other parking facilities to be built under Chapter 474, Acts of 1946.
welfare were politically determined. His short-run interests could not wait for a "study" or "advice". The planner was ignored because immediate action seemed necessary. Curley had the support of the City Council. There was no real conflict of views between politicians and planners. The planners' opinion was too late, unconvincing, and noncommittal; so it never really entered the arena (except unofficially through Chairman Parker.)

Hypotheses 7 and 8 do not apply to the 1946 activities. All the hypotheses are tested later in the Garage's history. The City Planning Board and staff did not face the Common Garage issue again until 1954. During the intervening years, however, the Board and planning staff exercised important powers in approving locations for municipal parking garages, as required under the 1946 Off-Street Parking Facilities Law (Chapter 474). The battle for and against the Common Garage remained in the political arena; and the residents of Back Bay and Beacon Hill continued to oppose it.

C. POLITICAL STRUGGLE

Since the turn of the century, Boston's political structure has been dominated by the Irish and Italians--
mainly the Irish.63 Around 1890 the Irish numbers overtook the native Yankee political strength in the City of Boston, so the Yankees turned to the state level for control of city government. From there they imposed a state-appointed Finance Commission to investigate and review Boston activities, and a police commissioner and licensing board also appointed by the governor. Since that time, the Massachusetts Legislature has enjoyed a long history of meddling in Boston affairs. It was 1948 before the Democrats finally gained control of the House, and 1958 before control was obtained in the Senate. Boston's city government frequently had difficulty getting what it wanted from the State Legislature.

In 1909, the Republicans put through a charter making Boston's elected offices nonpartisan and establishing a nine-member elected-at-large Council. This was conceived as a means of increasing Republican strength since the Democrats outnumbered them two to one.64 In 1924,


64. Nonpartisanship has helped the Republicans; whereas the at-large system made it more difficult for them to get people elected.
the Charter was revised to provide for a district voting system with a twenty-two member Council. And in 1949, when reform pressure was high, the Charter was changed back to a nine-member Council, elected at large. The offices have remained nonpartisan since 1909.

The Council is notoriously weak, particularly since the reform charter went into effect in 1951. The old ward system had given each Councilor a constituency to which he was responsible; and he could use his ward as a base for political power. During the 1950's, with an at-large system, some Irish and Italian councilors, who tended to regard local areas as home base, floundered. They faced a Mayor with a city-wide constituency; and they had difficulty assuming the role of statesmen for the city as a whole. The Council was virtually powerless and had no important functions to perform. When a local citizen wanted assistance or advice from his representative, he visited the state legislator from his district.

The Mayor in Boston's nonpartisan system must make a wide appeal. Candidates for Mayor tend to minimize their party connections. They rely heavily on communications media and city-wide interests to gain votes. Curley was a "personality" who had charismatic appeal. Hynes,
who succeeded him, was a reform candidate with broad civic support. Both were Irish. Occasionally, the Mayor may have difficulties with the Council which, if it does anything at all, may take on the function of being the watchdog of the public interest.

Mayor Curley had built a strong organization based upon the ward-style of politics. He had been active in politics for about 50 years and could muster strong political support at both the city and state level when necessary. Hynes had been assistant city clerk and then city clerk during the Curley era. He was, in effect, a product of the Curley machine. Both Curley and Hynes favored the Boston Common Parking Garage. Both responded to pressure from downtown businessmen.

On the other side of the issue were the old Yankee families who saw the Garage as a threat to the hallowed Boston Common—a piece of public land which they wanted to protect for the enjoyment of all Boston citizens.65

65. Their interests were also partially selfish; many of their homes were near the Common.
They were supported by the arguments of city planners, who in the spirit of the public-regarding tradition, gave reasons why the Garage was "irrational." Their political resources were meager, however, because their allies in the tradition, the downtown merchants, had "irrationally" seized upon the Garage as the symbolic panacea of their own problems. To overcome this deluge of political power, the Yankees turned to the courts. In the fifteen years after 1946, blocked in their efforts to overcome the legislative power of the Irish Democrats (who probably would have opposed anything the Yankees were for, as a matter of traditional hostility) and the downtown businessmen, the Yankees turned again and again to the delays of courtroom justice.

In August, 1946, representatives of the Beacon Hill Civic Association, the Boston Common Society, and the Bostonian Society filed petitions in Superior Court. An injunction was obtained. There were three petitions. One petition, filed by Alfred P. Lowell and others, sought

66. Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., distinguish between a private-regarding view of the public interest and a public-regarding view. The former derives from immigrant-group politics which sought special favors for local wards. The latter derives from the middle class ethos emphasizing efficiency and impartiality in government.
to restrain municipal officials from imposing unauthorized financial obligations on the City, and alleged that the proposed use of the Common would be contrary to the terms of certain testamentary gifts that the City had accepted. Another petition, filed by Myron E. Pierce and others, maintained that the City held the land by a gift made in 1634 to the City for use by its inhabitants as a Common and that the City held the land in a trust relation to those for whose use the Common land was provided. And a third petition, filed by Anna C. McCarthy and others, sought to enforce the terms of a 1908 gift by George Francis Parkman who devised the residue of his estate to the City for care of the Common and Public Garden subject to the condition that no part of the land therein would ever be used for any other public purpose. 67

In testimony before the Superior Court, it was revealed that Motor Park, Inc. had only $529.76 in assets. To counter testimony about the assets of Motor Park, Inc., the defendants produced the vice president of the First Boston Corporation who testified that his company was ready to advance five to six million dollars for construction

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67. See Lowell, Pierce, McCarthy, et al. v. City of Boston et al., 332 Mass. 709, 79 NE 2d 713 (1948) for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruling which summarizes the arguments.
of the Garage. Following weeks of hearings, the case was reported to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in January, 1948, with certain findings of fact—almost a year and a half after the Garage legislation had passed. In May, the high court dismissed the petitions and ruled that the City had the right to contract for a garage under the Common, so long as the Common retained its primary use as a public park.

Mayor Curley and McDonald jubilantly said that work on the Garage would begin "right away." The disappointed Yankees said they would go to the U.S. Supreme Court. Meanwhile Curley pressed for legislation which would make the Garage tax-exempt; the bill was approved by the Legislature in June. Construction of the Garage was delayed until plans could be drafted and until the U. S. Supreme Court ruled on the case. In October, the Supreme Court refused to consider the case.

Curley announced in December that ground would be broken for the Garage by the latter part of March. In a last-ditch try to stop it, William Stanley Parker sent a letter to the Mayor (and to the newspapers) criticizing the Garage. Parker contended that the Garage was

too expensive, that it would damage the Common, that financial backing for it was doubtful, and that its location was inconvenient. He reasserted his proposal for strategic sites and mentioned the City Planning Board vote recommending a maximum of 600 car spaces. To this, Mayor Curley indignantly retorted: "Mr. Parker is the only bottleneck that has held up Boston traffic in the past 25 years. Aggressive men have replaced him and they are trying to solve the city's traffic problems with a workable program."

But Parker was right. Difficulty in getting investors plagued the Garage proponents. Back Bay legislators tried to get the tax exemption legislation repealed in the 1949 Legislature; but they were unsuccessful. The Garage's construction appeared imminent if only Motor Park, Inc. could get a commitment for financial backing. Mayor Hynes took office in January, 1950; he was committed to the Common Garage. In his inaugural address, Hynes said: "The construction of an underground garage beneath Boston Common would be an important step toward solution of our parking problem. I intend to use every resource to hasten

the building of this project with private capital, as provided under the law authorizing its erection." On January 27, Motor Park, Inc. told Mayor Hynes they were confident of obtaining required financial backing within three weeks. Mayor Hynes told the company's representatives that if they could not secure backing soon, they should step aside and let other investors come into the picture. Under a contract with the City, Motor Park, Inc. had until July 1 to begin work. It was revealed at that time that Bernard Goldfine, a wealthy textile manufacturer later known for his gifts to presidential aide Sherman Adams, was a stockholder in the firm. Goldfine was involved in getting a Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) loan for construction of the Garage. The head of the National Securities Resources Board (NSRB) was a receiver of Christmas gifts from Goldfine who later testified that the NSRB head was very helpful in getting the RFC loan approval. It was June, 1950, when Mayor Hynes and Governor Dever made a trip to Washington and conferred with President Truman. They sought to impress upon Truman the need for the RFC loan to Motor Park, Inc. so that the private firm could build a bomb-proof Common Garage. They had applied for

70. City of Boston, City Council Minutes, January 2, 1950.
a $12 million RFC loan. Governor Dever claimed that the Garage would accommodate 4,200 autos and could protect 90,000 persons in an emergency. President Truman promised to inquire about the application. On June 30, the RFC announced that it had approved a $12 million loan to Motor Park, Inc. But technicalities over loan requirements remained to be negotiated. By November it was clear that the RFC would require $3 million in collateral before the loan could be granted. Mayor Hynes stated that if Motor Park, Inc. could not deliver, he would seek financial support elsewhere. It was rumored that a large gasoline company was showing interest in the Garage. Mayor Hynes had promised to get the Garage built. If he was unsuccessful, Curley could make political capital of it in the 1951 mayoralty campaign.

In December, 1950, Governor Dever, John Fox (Dever's Secretary), Goldfine, and the counsel for Motor Park, Inc. went to Washington to discuss the project again with President Truman. Goldfine had succeeded the deceased McDonald as president of Motor Park, Inc. Their purpose in Washington was to have the $3 million collateral requirement eased. After the trip, Motor Park, Inc. claimed

they could put up the necessary $3 million, but that difference existed as to the type of collateral. Hynes felt the firm should be given a chance because they had already invested about $500,000 in plans for the Garage. In December, 1950, Hynes said:

I want the garage completed and by private enterprise so that the city can get a fair return (figured at $100,000 a year)....We need the garage. It is the keystone to the arch of our traffic problem. We need it doubly as a bomb-shelter in the center of the city. If this concern can do it, it will save at least a year of time. 74

Motor Park, Inc. was given another extension (its fourth) until March 30, 1951 to obtain financial backing. When March came, Mayor Hynes stated he was encouraged; private investment concerns were showing interest in the Garage. The March 30 deadline was reached. Goldfine said Motor Park, Inc. could not meet RFC terms for a loan. Governor Dever introduced legislation to allow insurance companies to invest in it. And Hynes gave Motor Park, Inc. an extension until July 1 to begin construction; the firm was required to post a $25,000 certified check to be forfeited if the deadline could not be met. Meanwhile, State Representative Gabriel F. Piemonte had filed a bill to

73. At least that is what Motor Park, Inc. claimed.
establish a public authority which would build the Garage.

In April, the RFC announced that it had in effect rejected the loan application of Motor Park, Inc. The agency refused to extend the time limit for posting security for the loan. Backers of the Garage turned to the insurance legislation as the basis for financing. The House rejected the bill by a vote of 127-96 on May 15, 1951. Governor Dever put pressure on the legislative body to change its vote. The next day, the House reversed itself (133-93) and approved the legislation which had already passed the Senate. On June 8, the bill was signed by the Governor. But it was rumored that the insurance companies were no longer interested.

Motor Park, Inc. forfeited the $25,000 on July 1, at which time they were given another extension until September 12 with $10,000 posted. Hynes said they were negotiating with a major oil company and two insurance companies to finance the Garage. But the money was forfeited on September 12; and Hynes gave the firm another extension. There was anxiety at the time over a national steel shortage which would delay construction. No money was posted for this 2-1/2 month extension. It was not met either. Hynes continued to give extensions.
In November, 1952, John Fox, millionaire publisher of the *Boston Post* (which he had just purchased in September), announced that he planned to participate actively and financially in getting the Garage constructed. So Hynes gave Motor Park, Inc. a one year extension. Fox testified later that Governor Dever had brought Fox and Goldfine together on the Garage deal; Fox was formerly Governor Dever's secretary. Mayor Hynes announced in January that he was confident the Garage would be started in 1953. The City of Boston was opposing two bills in the Legislature which would have a public authority build it. Hynes preferred private financing, since it would not cost the City anything.

The Yankee opponents to the Garage had maintained constant opposition. Every year they threatened to or actually filed legislation to hinder or prevent the Garage's construction. In 1953, they sought to repeal the 1946 legislation authorizing the Garage. At every possible public hearing since 1945, they were there to protest. They were never successful, however; they were vastly outnumbered in the Legislature.

In December, 1953, Mayor Hynes refused to extend the exclusive privileges of Motor Park, Inc. to construct
the Garage. He opened the bidding to others, with the reservation that Motor Park, Inc. would have ninety days in which to meet any offer. The Mayor was getting impatient. In January, 1954, he sought legislation which would authorize the City to prepare plans for the Garage and then advertise for construction bids. The Boston Common Society countered with vocal opposition at the hearing and with legislation of their own to repeal the 1946 Act. Both bills, the Mayor's and the Society's, faltered.

All during the year, Motor Park, Inc. continued to drop hints that private financing was imminent. Hynes was skeptical. In early December, 1954, he filed two bills in the Legislature. One was to allow Boston to prepare plans for construction in lieu of possible private financing. The other bill was to establish a public authority to construct the Garage and then lease it. The second bill was similar to a bill which had been introduced perennially since 1951 by Representative Piemonte. Hynes still left the door open for private financing, while pushing for the public authority legislation.

It was late in 1954 that the City Planning Board and its staff became involved in the debate over the Common Garage. It should be pointed out that Mayor Hynes
had already exerted considerable effort on behalf of the Garage; he was firmly committed. It was late in the Garage's development history when expert planning advice was finally sought.

D. THE PLANNER'S ADVICE

Since 1946 the Planning Board had been approving locations for smaller municipal parking garages. And during the early 1950's, its staff had done work on a comprehensive general plan and a six-year capital improvement program. Mayor Hynes, in the first year of his administration, had pressed for these two items in order to qualify for federal funds under provisions of the 1949 Housing Act. In addition, the Planning Board and staff had been involved in discussions of plans for the Central Artery--an expressway to be built along the eastern edge of the central business area. During 1954, the planning staff had been collecting parking data and had begun an effort to formulate a major street plan consistent with the Central Artery. They had collected parking data in connection with the approval of municipal parking sites. In October, 1954, Robert G. Davidson, Principal Planner, obtained permission of the Planning Board to prepare a down-
town parking program showing where additional spaces were needed. By mid-December, the initial draft of the report was completed and sent to members of the Planning Board. It included a recommendation against the Common Garage. The Board deferred approval of the report until January.

During the months September to December, 1954, Councilor Piemonte (the former state representative) requested information from the Mayor about the status of the Common Garage and asked that a master parking facilities plan be developed including a brochure to attract investors for the Garage. The Council, like the Mayor, was interested in parking.

At the Planning Board's next meeting on January 18, 1955, the Board members approved the report for reproduction and distribution. But the first draft had already leaked to the newspapers. Robert C. Bergenheim, city reporter for The Christian Science Monitor, had maintained friendly relations with the planning staff. He scooped the other papers and published the initial report findings.

The staff parking study included data by sub-
district on: 75 (1) the amount of and expected changes in square feet of business accommodations in the CBD; (2) the existing and expected number of person-trips to the CBD; (3) expected increase in traffic due to the Central Artery; (4) expected number of passenger car trips to the CBD; (5) the existing and expected number of passenger cars to be parked, by type of parking facility; (6) existing on-street and off-street parking spaces; and (7) new parking spaces needed. The projected data was for 1965. The report included a map showing a recommended system of 500-car space off-street parking facilities, distributed according to the demand of each district, with the availability of sites partially accounted for. The sites were within 400 feet walking distance of all major parts of the business area; the report stated that this distance was consistent with acceptable walking distances. The report also claimed that the suggested locations were in areas where highest economic return could be expected. The 500-space size of facility was regarded as in scale with the capa-

75. Boston City Planning Board, A Parking Program For The Boston Central Business Area. Boston: December, 1954. This paragraph is taken from the final copy of the report which was not much different from the first draft, except for the Common Garage recommendation.
city of Boston's local streets. According to the report, about 10,000 to 12,000 new spaces would be needed over the next ten years (1955 to 1965). The report also included a time schedule for construction, recommended policy for parking rates (favorable to the short-term parker), and a recommendation for a few elevator-type garages. The report concluded with a discussion of site priorities. Ten sites were assigned high priority (deserving immediate action). Five other locations were given low priority; for these the report recommended a "wait-and-see" policy pending new development or demonstrated demand after other facilities were in operation. The cost of the high priority sites was placed at about $3,100 per space or a total cost of about $13 million. The final copy of the report which had been slightly changed by the Board, concluded with this sentence:

The Planning Board voted to go on record as favoring the construction of a garage under Boston Common in accordance with the provisions set forth in House Bill 1275.\footnote{76. Ibid., p. 19.}

The concluding sentence represented a strange twist of the logic of the study. The area proposed for the Common Garage did not even fall within the defined
central business district. This sentence was a contradiction of the study's analysis of parking demand. It was in fact a rejection of the planning staff's advice. Davidson, who had conducted the study and who wrote the report, made no attempt to fit the Common Garage recommendation into the study. Davidson was not happy with the change; so he merely stuck that one defenseless sentence, which was taken verbatim from Board Minutes, at the end of the report. Bergenheim had caught the planning staff's real attitude toward the Common Garage in his December, 1954, article covering the report's first draft. In the first draft, Davidson had written:

Noticeable for its absence in this program is the under-the-Common garage.

This facility is not recommended because:

1. It is located closest to the Park Square area that is sufficiently served by existing garages.
2. It is too far distant from the major retail area to properly serve it.
3. The construction of other parking facilities in (and nearer) the retail area will provide better service (and decrease the potential use of the Common garage if constructed).
4. It apparently will be more expensive per space than the high priority sites recommended herein....

77. Based on an interview with Davidson.
But Mayor Hynes was pushing legislation for the Common Garage. In late January, 1955, Hynes, Thomas F. McDonough, Chairman of the Planning Board and a friend of Mayor Hynes, and other officials made a trip to Chicago where they looked at a number of parking garages there. One of the garages they looked at was a garage under Chicago's Grant Park. Upon return, McDonough was armed with information to support the Mayor. At the City Planning Board meeting on February 1, 1955, McDonough reported that he had been under pressure from the City Council for the parking report (not yet released) but that the Mayor felt some decision on the Boston Common Garage should be included in the report. 79 McDonough reported that Chicago's underground garage was very successful. After a lengthy discussion of the Common Garage and the proposed legislation, the Board voted four to two in favor of the Garage (three members were absent). 80 Hence the odd sentence at the end of the parking study report.

80. The actual vote was not recorded in the minutes. Bergenheim of The Christian Science Monitor reported that in checking with the individual members the vote was four to two. A check of the absentee members revealed one opposed, one undecided, and one out-of-town. See The Christian Science Monitor, February 4, 1955.
The fact that the Board changed the study report against the planning staff's recommendation probably did not surprise anyone at the time. Relations between the Board and the planning staff were bad. Chairman McDonough, an aggressive Irishman, dominated the Board. He did not respect the technical abilities of the planning staff; and he seemed to feel his judgment was just as good or better than the staff's advice. He was impatient with the planning director, Thomas E. McCormick, who was somewhat timid and stumbling in his appearance before the Board. McCormick was dedicated but was not regarded by the Mayor as the person to handle anything big. He had been on the planning staff since 1930 and had been Executive Director since 1944. There had been virtually no communication between McCormick and Mayor Hynes. Planning information was channeled through Chairman McDonough. The Mayor's failure to use planning (even as well as Curley had) can be partly explained by the fact that McCormick was not sufficiently aggressive.

Two other members of the planning staff were stronger personalities. One was Davidson, Principal Plan-

81. This paragraph and the next two are based upon interviews with members of the staff, the Mayor, members of the Planning Board, and newspaper reporters covering city news.
ner, who had been with the Planning Board since 1950. He was regarded by McCormick as one of the most competent people on the staff. Davidson was most familiar with the parking problem and had been active in preparing the capital improvement program. When McCormick took a six-week sick leave authorized on February 1, 1955, Davidson filled in as Director. While McCormick was resting in Florida, Davidson maintained his position against the Common Garage. Having conducted the parking study, he was highly opinionated. In a meeting in the Mayor's office attended by leading downtown businessmen, the Mayor asked if anyone opposed the Garage; Davidson was the only one who raised his hand. The other planner involved in the parking study was John T. Howard, a consultant to the planning staff. Howard was a leading name in the planning profession and was a planning professor at M.I.T. He advised Davidson throughout the parking study. Howard had been a consultant to the Planning Board staff since 1950. Neither Davidson nor Howard were intimidated by Chairman McDonough.

The morale of the resident planners was low. The staff was largely isolated from the political arena. McCormick represented the staff at Board meetings; and Howard attended when necessary. The problems of the planning staff were presented to the Board a year later in
a report prepared by Howard. The consultant report stated that: (1) there were not enough fully-professional city planners on the staff; (2) the salary rates were too low; (3) the planners had low morale and lacked a sense of accomplishment; (4) there was not enough emphasis on the liaison function of the planning staff to other city departments; (5) better communication with the public was needed; (6) there was a lack of understanding between the Board and the staff; (7) the Board should have relied upon other staff members besides the Director to make presentations before the Board; (8) the Board tended to act promptly on matters from the outside and to therefore defer consideration of studies by the staff; (9) the Board was reluctant to try new ideas on the public or the Mayor, until the Board was convinced they would be accepted. In addition, Davidson was suspected by the Board of having released the parking study to Bergenheim of the Monitor.

Thus the role of the planning staff was Technical. They performed none of the other roles suggested by Rabinowitz. Information leaks to the newspaper, however, were probably used to gain broader attention to their views. But on the whole, their influence was limited to

technical advice given when asked. They were frustrated in their efforts by a politically-minded, unsympathetic Planning Board and a Mayor who committed himself without their advice. The fact that the planners maintained their position against the Garage affected the subsequent history of the Garage. After a review of the Garage's later development is presented, conclusions about the hypotheses will be presented.

E. A PACKAGE DEAL

The political battle for and against the Garage continued. When asked to comment on the Planning Board's divided vote, Mayor Hynes said: "I don't want to get into a fight with the Planning Board, but I want that garage built. Without it the shopping area along Tremont and Boylston Streets won't exist in five years as we know it today. It will be filled with cheap stores...."83 The battle seemed to be picking up. The Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce announced its backing of Mayor Hyne's public authority bill. Prominent Yankees sent letters to the editor opposing the Garage. The executive director of the State Club blasted the Garage; he said: "It's the

biggest lemon since the invention of gold bricks....It's an attempt to flim-flam the public."84 Supporters of the Garage included the Retail Trade Board and the head of Filene's Department Store. They along with Hynes announced that various private interests were willing to invest in it. In May, 1955, Motor Park, Inc. claimed readiness to sign a contract for an immediate start of construction. Supported by leading downtown businessmen, Mayor Hynes announced he would continue to press for the public authority legislation, even though Motor Park, Inc. claimed to be ready. The public authority was conceived as a permissive safety-valve in case private financing did not come through. John Fox, publisher of the Boston Post, disclosed that he had purchased a majority of the stock in Motor Park, Inc. Fox opposed the authority legislation because it would endanger the position of Motor Park, Inc. A battle of newspapers developed. Backing the authority method of financing were the Boston Herald-Traveler and the Boston Daily Record-American. The Boston Post, of course, opposed it. Also, opposing the authority was Senator John E. Powers (D), Senate Minority Leader and announced candidate to oppose Mayor Hynes in the 1955 elec-

tion. Powers and his supporters argued that the authority would only complicate things and weaken the position of Motor Park, Inc. Powers and Fox were joined by the Boston Common Society. By a vote of 20 to 19, Powers sidetracked the bill in the Senate. There were broad hints that former Governor Paul Dever, counsel for Motor Park, Inc., had influenced the voting. After the vote, Mayor Hynes asserted that he was confident Motor Park, Inc. would soon begin construction. Meanwhile, the engineering firm which prepared plans for the Garage revealed that a vehicular access tunnel to the Garage from Commonwealth Avenue would require costly relocation of water mains under the Public Garden. Cost of the tunnel would also be increased, they revealed, due to the fact that two little known laws required that both an equestrian statue of George Washington and the pedestrian bridge in the Public Garden could not be disturbed. The pipelines and vehicular tunnel would have to go around them.

Governor Herter introduced legislation to permit the City of Boston to take land for the Boston Common Garage by eminent domain. The City had asked for the legislation in order to complete a contract with Motor Park, Inc. The land to be taken was a small portion of Common-
This map shows the plans for the Garage as proposed in July, 1955. In addition to the vehicular tunnel from Commonwealth Avenue, the plans called for a pedestrian shuttle-car tunnel leading to the retail district. (Reproduced by permission of Whitman & Howard, Engineers. The above map appeared in The Christian Science Monitor, July 14, 1955.)
wealth Avenue for approaches (including the vehicular tunnel under the Public Garden) to the Garage. On July 8, 1955, the legislation was passed. The City and Motor Park, Inc. reportedly were ready to sign a contract to begin construction within ninety days. Fox publicly released the company's plans; they were very similar to those proposed in 1949. Fox estimated that the Garage would cost $11 million and would hold 3,700 cars.

William Stanley Parker and Henry L. Shattuck asked for a public hearing before the contract was signed. At the hearing, Parker and Shattuck said that court action would be taken to stop the Garage if the contract was signed. They raised two main points against the plans to be followed under the contract: (1) Fifty percent of the Garage would be some four to six feet above the present level of the Common in violation of the 1946 statute; and (2) The 1946 law did not allow concessions within the Garage (Fox's plans included a snack bar, auto lubrication and wash stands, and battery rooms). They raised other arguments against the Garage, including: (1) serious drainage and pipe relocation problems; (2) disturbance of the water table to the detriment of nearby buildings; (3) an ugly open hole and closing of the Public Garden for two
years; and (4) destruction of valuable trees. Parker and Shattuck won a delay in the signing of the contract.

On November 4, 1955, the contract was signed—less than a week before the municipal election. It was revealed that John Fox owned one hundred percent of the stock of Motor Park, Inc. Shattuck and Parker said immediate court action would be started on two points: (1) conformance with the 1946 statute (ground level); and (2) tax exemption of the Garage. They filed a petition in Suffolk Superior Court later that month to test the first point. And on December 9, 1955, three commercial parking garages and a Beacon Hill property owner, Samuel Cabot, filed a petition to force the City to assess real estate taxes on the Common Garage. On December 23, 1955, the Superior Court ruled on the earlier petition, stating that the construction had to be "under Boston Common."86

Motor Park, Inc. had changed its name to Boston Common Garage, Inc. in November. After the court ruling, the firm announced that new plans were in existence to meet the court-ruling requirement. On December 29, Councilor Piemonte, an avowed foe of John Fox, had the Council

adopt an order requesting Mayor Hynes to restrict the proposed Garage to parking and storing cars (no concessions). In January, it was revealed that Socony Mobile Company, Inc. was interested in operating the Garage. Boston Com- com Garage, Inc. introduced new plans in February, 1956, calling for about 1000 fewer cars than the other plans for 3,700 cars. The new plans would have raised the Common level about two feet above existing grade, although the Garage itself would have been six inches below the existing level. The second set of plans failed to get approval by the Boston Park Commission. But Hynes said that construction should start by April 15 or May 1. In April, the Prudential Insurance Company of America was reported set to invest $9,500,000 in the project. On April 30, the Superior Court ruled that tax-exemption under the 1948 legislation was legal. A group of Beacon Hill residents made preparations to take the tax exemption issue to the Massachusetts Supreme Court and to the U.S. Supreme Court if necessary. Hynes began to despair that the Garage would never be built during his term of office (until January, 1960). In June, the Adams, Howard, & Greeley confidential "Report On Staff Problems" was leaked to the Monitor.

87. Adams, Howard, & Greeley, op. cit.
Bergenheim slightly twisted the report's statements and stressed "politics" on the Planning Board. He pointed to the 1955 vote favoring the Common Garage as an example. And Chairman McDonough, head of an architectural firm, was alleged to have political motivations, as evidenced by the contracts McDonough had received from the City. Also, vice chairman Joseph A. Mitchell was mentioned as a special representative of a major advertising firm in the city; Bergenheim's article pointed out that the Planning Board passed on regulations for billboards and that advertising firms rented billboard space from the City. The next year, when McDonough's term expired, he was not reappointed. McDonough found the 1956 publicity "very distasteful" and "very unpleasant to go through."89 In July, 1956, the Planning Board voted to release the consultant report, saying: "The Planning Board agrees in the main with the report and intends putting into effect many of the recommendations in the near future and giving further study to the remaining suggestions."90 Significantly, it was during 1956 that eight members of the planning staff resigned, including Davidson.

In November, 1956, the Massachusetts Supreme

89. City of Boston, City Planning Board Minutes: 1956, June 26, 1956.
90. Ibid., July 6, 1956.
Court ruled tax exemption for the Garage to be legal. The Beacon Hill group said they would appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. Efforts in the Legislature to repeal the 1946 act had failed during 1956. Private promoters of the Garage said they would go ahead seeking approval of plans. Mayor Hynes, in January, 1957, said he would move immediately to have it built by a public authority, if private enterprise could not do it. He also said he would favor a smaller garage, without a vehicular tunnel if necessary. At a public hearing before the Legislative Committee on Cities in February, representatives of the Chamber of Commerce, the Boston Real Estate Board, and the Retail Trade Board testified in favor of a smaller Garage of from 1500 to 2000 cars to be built by a public authority. Appearing in opposition were William Stanley Parker, the President of the Beacon Hill Association (Gail Mahoney), and Representative James C. Bayley (R) from the Back Bay district. Parker offered three amendments and told newsmen that if his amendments were accepted, he might withdraw his opposition to the bill even though he was opposed to the Garage. The three amendments provided: (1) construction below grade; (2) elimination of the vehicular tunnel; and (3) entrance and exit ramps running paral-
lel to Charles Street (as opposed to an entrance and exit requiring turns as provided in plans to date).

In June, 1957, Mayor Hynes gave John Fox, whose Boston Post folded in 1956, ninety days to produce satisfactory plans for the Garage. Also in June, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the tax exemption case. And two downtown stores announced they were closing; their closing re-emphasized the relative decline of the shopping district. Then in August, Frank R. Kelly, Park and Recreation Commissioner, announced he might demand an entirely new set of plans if changes in existing plans were made piecemeal. The City gave Boston Common Garage, Inc. until October 15 to post bond. Meanwhile supporters won in their battle for a public authority to build it. In September, Governor Furcolo signed legislation whereby the City of Boston could establish a separate public authority to finance the Garage. October 15 came; and no bond was presented. Within a few days, Mayor Hynes moved to establish the public authority. The City advertised for construction bids. But the Mayor had to get the City Council's approval to create a Boston Common Authority. The Council decided to have a

92. Chapter 701, Acts of 1957. The Authority was to issue revenue bonds.
public hearing, setting two dates in late November, 1957. The first day, the Council heard arguments for the Garage; the second day—arguments against. Those appearing in favor were: (1) the Executive Secretary of Allied Theatres of New England; (2) the President of the Retail Trade Board; (3) the President of the Boston Real Estate Board; (4) a representative of the Back Bay Association (an association of business firms in the Back Bay area); (5) the Secretary-Treasurer of the Boston Central Labor Union; and (6) a representative of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce. The Council had done its homework; they were out to perform their watchdog function. The questioning was vigorous—especially from Councilor Foley. The President of the Retail Trade Board cited the 1954 parking study, stating that since then only 3,375 of the 12,000 needed spaces had been built; and he erroneously claimed that the study did not take into consideration the Central Artery. He stated, "My feeling is that we need all the garages we

93. This was the only public hearing for which a stenographic record was available. Boston City Council, "Hearing Before the Executive Committee re Acceptance of Act Providing for the Construction and Operation of Under-Common Garage," City Council Chamber, Boston, Mass. First Day: November 22, 1957; Second Day: November 27, 1957.
That seemed to summarize the arguments for the Garage. The proponents were not sophisticated enough in their analysis to distinguish locational advantages or disadvantages.

Those appearing against the authority legislation included: (1) Representative William F. Otis (R) from the Back Bay-Beacon Hill area; (2) Henry L. Shattuck, former Representative and former City Councilor; (3) Charles W. Eliot, a professional planner, appearing as Secretary of the Boston Common Society; (4) Richard Waite, Beacon Hill lawyer who had been counsel in litigation against the Garage; (5) seven citizen representatives of the Beacon Hill residential area; (6) William Stanley Parker, a professional planner and member of the Planning Board from 1923 to 1948; (7) counsel for the Boston Elliot Street Garage; (8) a representative of Motor Mart Garage; and (9) James C. Bayley, State Representative from the Back Bay District. The opponents cited the 1954 parking study and the fact that the planning staff opposed the Garage. They said that planners generally opposed it. The opposition of M.I.T. planning professor Burnham Kelly was also cited; Kelly had testified against the Garage at an ear-

94. Ibid., November 22, 1957, p. 43.
lier public hearing. They used every conceivable argument against the Garage and succeeded in their presentation. The Council was impressed by the opposition and did not approve the legislation. The bill was also hindered by an interest rate which was too low to sell bonds.

On the same day the Council had its first public hearing, a bill to have a state public authority build the Garage was filed. By spring 1958, it was involved as part of a "package" of four public projects. The package deal was the result of side payments necessary to get projects through. The side payments were a means of bringing diverse interests together for the achievement of pet projects. A process of negotiation occurred by which several parties were satisfied. The result: an expenditure package. The package deal that developed in 1958 revolved around William F. Callahan, the powerful Turnpike Authority Chairman. Callahan was influential in the Legislature due to patronage debts built up while Callahan was Commissioner of the State Department of Public Works. He was a highway builder with a reputation for getting things done. He seemed to be interested in

building personal power, as evidenced by this public works package. He was Boston's counterpart to Robert Moses. Others involved in the package were: (1) Robert B. Choate, publisher of the Boston Herald; (2) Governor Furcolo; (3) Anthony N. DiNatale, State Commissioner of Public Works; and (4) Otis M. Whitney, State Commissioner of Public Safety. Choate had been writing vituperative editorials attacking Callahan. Suddenly, the editorials stopped when this deal arose. Under the package deal agreement, the following was to take place:

(1) The Turnpike Authority would be given vast eminent domain powers necessary to extend the toll road into Boston.

(2) Authorization to build a second harbor tunnel would be transferred from the Port Authority to the Turnpike Authority.

(3) A Massachusetts Parking Authority would be established to build the Boston Common Parking Garage.

(4) A three-member private corporation would be set up to construct a new state office building.

Callahan was to be head of the Massachusetts

Parking Authority and the state office building corporation. DiNatale and Whitney were also to be named to the state office building corporation. Choate's interest was not entirely clear, although he had long favored the Common Garage. His critics pointed to the fact that the Herald owned property near the proposed Garage site, and that Choate was having some difficulty retaining the license for the Herald-Traveler owned television station (which Callahan's political power could help save). The package was balanced off against approval of an increased bond rate for the Port Authority, a Republican-dominated project created in 1956 but hindered by a low bond interest rate.

The package deal actually went through. In the first week of October, 1958, Governor Furcolo had all four bills (each part of the package was a separate bill) before him for signing at one time. They were signed as a package. And the Governor signed legislation upping the Port Authority bond rate from 4 to 5 percent. By December, Callahan was named Chairman of the Massachusetts Parking Authority and was "elected" President of the Massachusetts State Office Building Association. Otis M. Whitney became Vice President of the office building corporation;
and Anthony DiNatale became Treasurer and Clerk of the Corporation. Other persons named to the Massachusetts Parking Authority were George L. Brady, chief editorial writer for the Hearst papers, and Frank R. Kelly, Boston Park Commissioner. This package deal, in effect, made the Garage a reality.

Personality difficulties arose in the Massachusetts Parking Authority. Callahan resigned claiming he needed more time for his other responsibilities; and Kelly resigned claiming conflict of interest due to his Park Commission post. Brady became Chairman in June, 1959. John Nuveen Co. agreed to underwrite $15 million in bonds. Brady set the ground breaking for August 1, 1959. The City Council was reluctant to give Brady the land; and Park Commissioner Kelly expressed reservations about the plans. As it turned out the Massachusetts Parking Authority had broader powers of eminent domain than most people expected. On July 30, 1959, the Authority by-passed the Council and Park Commission and took the Common land by eminent domain. Members of the Beacon Hill Civic Association, shaken by this land grab, went to court for an injunction and began circulating petitions for a popular referendum on the Garage issue. The City Council refused
to approve the land taking. On April 14, 1959, the Beacon Hill citizens presented their case in Suffolk Superior Court. On August 20, they filed petitions before the City Council signed by 162 people seeking a referendum. The next day the Superior Court sent the case to the State Supreme Judicial Court. In mid-September, Boston's Corporation Counsel ruled that the referendum vote was not required, and recommended to the Council that no action be taken. In February, 1960, the Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiffs. The Garage had financial backing and was finally free of legal restrictions. Groundbreaking ceremonies were held on March 3, 1960. The Garage opened for business on November 18, 1961. During construction it was discovered that the sacred Common had been used as a dump in the nineteenth century. A scandal followed completion of the Garage. There had been corruption in the handling of the Garage's construction. George Brady, the enigmatic ex-Chairman, left town and has not been seen since. The completed Garage has 1457 spaces; the total cost was $9.6 million. The controversial vehicular tunnel under the Public Garden was not built.

F. A HISTORICAL SUMMARY

To aid the reader in remembering the historical sequence of the Garage's development, a brief historical summary is listed below. This summary may be of assistance in relating the historical decision to conclusions about the tested hypotheses in the next section. The sequence of events was:

1. First proposed--1919.
2. Advocated by various people--1923 to 1945.
3. City Planning Board not prepared to give advice--1945, 1946.
5. Garage tied up in court--1946 to 1948.
8. U.S. Supreme Court refused to consider case--October, 1948.
10. Mayor Hynes committed to Garage--1950.
12. RFC loan application rejected--April, 1951.
13. Insurance companies permitted to invest in Garage--June, 1951.


16. Public authority legislation defeated; John Fox claimed construction to begin right away--June, 1955.


21. Legislation passed authorizing public authority to be established by the City--September, 1957.

22. Package deal approved; state authority to build Garage--October, 1958.


III. CONCLUSIONS

A. HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS

In drawing conclusions about the hypotheses of the study, emphasis will be given to the stance taken by city planners during 1954 and 1955. It was during these years that the planners were most involved and that their position was most clear. Also, the more recent date (as opposed to 1946) is probably closer to the societal conditions of planning today. Thus the findings related to 1954-55 may be more relevant in trying to clarify the planner's role. In order to focus upon the findings vis a vis the hypotheses, each hypothesis will be considered separately. An attempt will be made to combine these findings into more general observations about the planner's role, in the next section.
Hypothesis 1: The planner's influence will be determined by the appropriateness of his role to the decision-making environment in which he operates.

As was pointed out earlier, the planners played a Technical role. Boston's political decision-making environment was essentially competitive. Two studies of Boston politics suggest a competitive system of actors or groups vying for influence in matters that pertain to them. Norton Long has described it as an ecology of games. A number of people or organizations are potentially influential in Boston. They include: (1) business interests; (2) newspapers; (3) labor unions; (4) civic groups; and (5) political personalities. The list of all actors in the system is much longer. In the Boston Common Garage history, the proponents included a formidable coalition of community influentials. The Garage was supported by downtown merchants, civic groups, labor unions, the press, and important politicians. The only real opposition came from Beacon Hill and Back Bay residents, the old Yankee stock. It can be said that the planner in his technical role...

role was not influential. The Common Garage case sustains Rabinowitz's finding. To have been influential, the planner should probably have been a "Broker". If planning director McCormick had been more aggressive, he might have become the Mayor's right hand man. In the early 1950's, Mayor Hynes could have relied upon technical arguments provided by the planning staff. Together with the planning director they might have persuaded the downtown merchants that the Garage was not feasible. Planning could have served to free Mayor Hynes from a burdensome commitment. As it was, the planner's advice came too late and was destined to be ignored. The frustration experienced by the planning staff was the result of the subservient technical role. Leaks to the newspaper represented an attempt to break away from the suffocating relationship between the Planning Board and staff. The sense of accomplishment that McCormick experienced during Curley's administration points to what Rabinowitz found. The technician role may yield results when an elite power structure exists. Curley was a powerful, political boss. He was not as restrained in his use of planning as was Mayor

Hynes.

The technical role was not totally ineffective, in that the parking study served as the basis for parking facilities built by the City. Today, many of the sites recommended by Davidson are occupied by municipal parking garages. But if the planning director had assumed a different role, the planner's advice might also have been influential in the Common Garage decision. Whether or not the reaction of the staff by resigning was better in terms of planning influence is probably a moot question. They had achieved a certain amount of alleviation by leaking news. If they had remained, instead of resigning, they might have eventually succeeded in gaining greater acceptance of planning. Success was not assured, though; and their devious means of influence might have only increased misunderstanding between the Board and staff. In any case, remaining to fight a slow battle would have been a difficult and probably unnerving position for anyone to assume. During 1956, when eight members of the staff resigned, the consultant's recommendations really sank in. The Board was not entirely insensitive to employee needs. The Board had previously ignored low salary rates and had expressed the provincial desire to hire local people. From a low
point in 1956, the Board responded to the resignations and consultant report by hiring a new planning director from Providence. McCormick remained, but was forced into second position. Today, city planning is a vital part of the Mayor's program. Boston's urban renewal program, under Mayor John F. Collins and administrator Edward Logue, has made remarkable achievements. This increased acceptance of planning may have been the result of federal stimulation, or a changing attitude toward the public interest by Bostonians rising into the middle class. Or it may have resulted in part from the planning staff's refusal in 1956 to play a subordinate, passive role.

Hypothesis 2: City planners, working for government agencies, will tend to favor government measures over private action.

There is some evidence to support this hypothesis, although it is not conclusive. Neither McCormick nor the consultant, Howard, expressed any bias toward public construction of the Garage. They simply opposed it, pri-

100. According to Banfield and Wilson's analysis of city politics, as people move into the middle class, they will tend to take on a public-regarding view. See Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., Conclusion, pp. 329-346.
101. Data for this hypothesis is drawn from interviews.
vate or public. Their lack of bias may be explained by the fact that McCormick was not very much involved when the Garage issue arose in 1954, and that Howard was a consultant from the outside. Howard had attachments to two private organizations—M.I.T. and the consulting firm, Adams, Howard, & Greeley. The one planner who showed some bias against private action was Davidson, the planner most involved in the issue. In an interview, Davidson stated that he might have favored the Garage if it had not cost so much. In addition to the reasons against the Garage listed in the parking study, Davidson said he was also against it because he did not consider it a wise investment of city funds at that time. His work on the capital improvement program\footnote{Boston City Planning Board, Capital Improvement Program 1954-1959. Boston: January, 1954.} no doubt influenced his opinion. But since it appeared the Garage would be built anyway, he was opposed to private construction. He felt they would try to cut costs in every way, leading to a bad facility. And he firmly opposed private construction because he said the private concerns wanted to build it on top of the Common. This was actually a misinterpretation of the private view. At no time after the 1946 legislation was passed did Motor Park, Inc. attempt to build it on top of the Common. The
1946 law specifically called for the Garage to be under the Common. Davidson's opinion does not definitely support the hypothesis. The opinion was expressed almost ten years after his involvement in the Garage debate. But distrust and misinterpretation of the private sector was expressed. This view might have been different, however, had the planning staff been able to play a more positive role in coordinating physical development decisions in the City.

Hypothesis 3: In a location dispute, the planning expert serves as a co-opted intermediary to plead the case of a particular interest or to legitimate the plans of a political head.

Hypothesis 3a: Studies provided by planners are used to draw pressure or criticism away from the political head.

Neither of these hypotheses were valid in the Boston Common Garage case. The planners were not co-opted by anyone. They may have been influenced by William Stanley Parker, the former Chairman of the Planning Board. And the parking study was used in arguments by both the opponents and proponents of the Garage. In particular, the opponents were able to exploit the staff's disagreement
with the Board. But in no real sense was the planning staff co-opted; they remained largely independent of interest group pressures. Their position certainly did not legitimate Mayor Hynes’ case for the Garage; in fact they probably caused the Mayor some embarrassment. The parking study did not draw any pressure or criticism away from the Mayor, although Mayor Hynes could have conceivably used it to change his position. To have allowed themselves to be co-opted might have increased the planners’ influence. In being outside the political struggle, the planners’ technical rationality was maintained. The planning staff, however, apparently wanted to pursue a more active role. But due to the constraints upon them, neither were they able to assert themselves effectively nor did any of the main political actors actually seek to co-opt them.

Hypothesis 4: A political decision-maker can never make an important location decision on completely rational grounds. To some degree, he will have to be arbitrary or nonlogical. Thus expert opinion will have to be compromised.

This hypothesis was certainly true from the city planner’s view. Mayor Hynes completely ignored the ration-
al bases for locating parking facilities, when it came to the Common Garage. The expert opinion of the planning staff was compromised for the Common Garage, but not for the smaller municipal garage facilities. Hynes wanted some kind of support from the Planning Board on the Common Garage issue. Through Chairman McDonough he obtained the Board's approval of the Garage and the pending legislation. Compromising the staff's recommendation was necessary from Hynes' viewpoint. The reference in the hypothesis is to technical rationality, which Hynes did not display. But from a different view, Hynes was probably rational. He had to weigh the risk of alienating the downtown interests against allowing the planning staff's recommendation to stand or against following the staff's technical rationality. The political pressure favoring the Garage was strong; and 1955 was an election year. Hynes' job was at stake. It was rational for him to want to be re-elected. In this view, then, Hynes took the logical step of compromising the planning staff's advice. The planning staff probably did not appreciate his delicate position. If they had, resentment because of the report change would not have been so great.

Hypothesis 5: The planning expert will be sys-
tematically biased in his choice of positions in a location dispute. He will favor tangible, quantifiable, predictable criteria of choice.

The reasons against the Garage as given by the planning staff in the parking study report were: (1) closeness to an area well served by existing garages; (2) distance from the major retail area; (3) garages nearer the retail area would provide better service; and (4) high cost. All of these arguments were quantifiable. The parking study provided actual data on how well sub-areas of the CBD were served. The Common Garage distance was well over the 400 feet walking distance from the retail area. Other garages could have provided better service because they would have been where the predictable, quantifiable demand was. And the Common Garage plans at that time would have required costs of about $5,000 per space (according to some estimates) compared with $3,100 per space at the sites recommended by the planning staff. All of these criteria were tangible. Cost and parking demand were predictable. The planners did not account for such intangibles as providing a symbol for the downtown's revival, or enhancing Boston's prestige with a grandiose project. The planners' main data was current and projected
parking demand. Thus the planners' criteria in advising against the Garage substantiated the hypothesis. The planners were in fact systematically biased in their position. The orderly, logical way to select parking sites was to collect facts consistent with rational rules of thought. Quantifying and projecting information were the correct ways to satisfy rational criteria of choice. The Technical role was buttressed by a technician's bias.

Hypothesis 6: The rationality, public welfare, and synoptic orientations of city planners will cause them to conflict with political leaders whose orientations are more incremental and disjointed.

Hypothesis 6a: The preference of city planners for abstract programming criteria will place them at loggerheads with the City Council which has a more "political" perspective.

The first hypothesis was supported by the historical data. The planners' simple criteria and the comprehensive study of downtown parking demand were not adequate for the Mayor. The rational-deductive ideal could not be accepted by the Mayor as the basis for policy toward the Common Garage. The cost (time and money) of information
was not great in 1954-55; but it was a factor in the Board's inability to express an informed opinion in 1946. The public welfare orientation of efficiency and impartiality in government (the public-regarding view) that the planners used in 1954-55 led to conflict with the Mayor's view. Mayor Hynes had to reject the planners' orientation. His orientation was incremental (win re-election) and disjointed (only the Common Garage need be considered at that time; no need for coordination with other city projects). The planners' orientation did not, however, conflict with all political views. The planners' view met the same rejection by the Council during the first part of the Hynes administration (1950-56), while the Council largely backed the Mayor. But during the latter part (1957-60), the Council assumed more of a watchdog function. During that time, the Council accepted the abstract programming criteria as a good basis for criticizing the Mayor's legislation. It should be pointed out also that the Council had virtually no power in the Common Garage debate until they were required to approve the 1957 public authority legislation. Prior to then the planners and the Council were not at loggerheads because neither had much influence. The fact that the Council was elected at large may have forced upon
them a more public-regarding view. The Council members had no wards to please. The Common Garage could not get any one Councilor more votes. The Council was "nonpolitical" in that sense; it differed from the Philadelphia ward-elected Council upon which the hypothesis had been based. Thus in Boston, abstract programming criteria did not lead to conflict between the planners and the City Council.

Hypothesis 7: The planner will want stability in capital programming. This will lead to conflict with the politician's view of municipal policy which favors government responsiveness to short-run public wants.

Stability in capital programming was illustrated by the timing sequence proposed in the parking study. It called for an average construction rate of 1,000 spaces per year for ten years, with a higher rate in the initial years and a lower rate in the later years. The staff had also prepared a capital improvement program for the years 1954-59. The Common Garage was not mentioned in the

program. This was probably due to the fact that private financing of the Garage was expected. Davidson's opposition to the Garage was based partly on the fact that he did not think it would be a good investment, given the state of City finances. In an interview, Howard stated that he favored a stable program, but not at the expense of needed action. McCormick also favored a stable approach to programming. Thus the planners favored stability. But did this lead to conflict with the politician's view of municipal policy, as suggested in the hypothesis?

Yes it did. But due to the planning staff's weak influence, the conflict was not serious. The politician's view easily predominated. The response to short-run public pressure came from the Mayor and the State Legislature. There was no conflict with the City Council's view because it had assumed a kind of nonpolitical role; and it had no real power to meet the pressure (which was not directed at the Council anyway). The city councilor's view thus was distinct from the politician's view presented in the hypothesis. If construction of the Common Garage had been dependent upon inclusion in a stable capital improvement program, it is doubtful that the Garage would ever have been built. The Garage was possible because
political responses were made to short-run public wants. The main political response was made in 1946. Then after it was clear that private financing could not build the Garage, the separate public authority became the immediate panacea. Both in 1946 and in the years 1957-58, the political response was to strong pressure. A stable programming budget could not have met this short-run demand.

Hypothesis 8: When giving locational advice for projects proposed by other governmental agencies, if the proposed projects require user-demand forecasting, city planners will favor a large number of small projects over a small number of large projects of equal cost.

Consider the Common Garage as the executive office's (the Mayor's) proposal. The planning staff's advice against the Common Garage was based upon parking demand forecasts; they favored a series of smaller garages to the huge Common Garage. The costs were to be roughly equal (10 to 13 million dollars). Thus the hypothesis is valid. The preference for smaller projects derives from the analytical technique. It is technically rational to locate facilities convenient to the persons who will use them. The parking study was based upon data collected.
for sub-districts of the CBD. The existing and projected demand for on-street and off-street parking spaces was shown for each sub-district. Sites were then selected to satisfy each sub-district's demand. The concept used was similar to that of the service district used in determining school, hospital, fire station, police station, and playground locations. The method precludes a giant, central facility to serve everyone. Convenience is enhanced by having dispersed facilities. This is not necessarily bad, except that it neglects proper consideration of aspects other than convenience. For example, could a giant parking facility introduce economies of scale? Could it make possible the provision of special services to the parker? Could it actually help the searching parker by giving him only one choice? Could it give the downtown a new attraction? These and probably other considerations tend to be omitted by the demand-convenience method of study. City planners should be aware of this methodological bias; it limits their range of analysis.

B. THE PLANNER AS PRIVATE CITIZEN

Part of the opposition to the Common Garage came from city planners who acted as private citizens. They
were not employed by the City of Boston. This group included: (1) William Stanley Parker; (2) Charles Eliot; and (3) Burnham Kelly. The first two were semi-organized in their efforts; whereas Kelly testified (1955) against the Garage independently. Parker had opposed the Garage since 1946. Charles Eliot was a member of the Boston Common Society and had inherited the role of antagonist from his father. When Eliot returned to Boston from California in 1954, he tried to organize the planners in opposition. Parker maintained a home on Beacon Hill, and thus was identified with the Beacon Hill interests. The other planners were not so closely attached to Beacon Hill, although they supported the Beacon Hill people.

The above planners' opposition was significant. For one, they lent the legitimacy of professional status to the Yankee cause. Arguments generated by the planners were significant in the City Council's failure to approve the 1957 public authority legislation. Second, William Stanley Parker was successful in obtaining an entrance and exit parallel to Charles Street. And third, combined with the Beacon Hill-Back Bay opposition they were influential in preventing construction of the vehicular tunnel under
the Public Garden (the 1958 law authorized construction of the tunnel; but it has not been built).

The planners were of the public-regarding tradition; and their opposition to the Garage was probably consistent with their professional bias, the preservation of open space. The significance of their role was two-fold: (1) professional status was given to pressure group arguments; and (2) the planner was acting as a member of the local community. These two aspects of the planner's role are often ignored. The first suggests that the planner can serve as an agent of political pressure from the outside, in addition to influencing decisions as an employee of local government. The importance of identifying this pressure group role of the planner is that it shows that the planner can be influential in political decision-making, even when planning is ignored internally by city officials. When one speaks of the planner being intimately involved in politics, the perspective should include private as well as public involvement. But public and private involvement also introduces the problem of planners


disagreeing. In the Common Garage case, the planners were all agreed. They were able to put up a united front of professional opinion against the Garage. 108 The planners working for the City of Boston and private planners complemented each other. But what if another group of planners had favored the Garage? They could have introduced professional arguments to support it. If this had occurred, the conflict of expert opinion probably would have nullified the planner's influence. Both sides of the debate would have had supporting professional opinion.

108. One private planner, Sidney N. Shurcliff, refused to join in opposing the Garage. He held back on his opinion until after a report on the proposed Garage had been prepared for the Beacon Hill Civic Association. (See Philip W. Bourne, "The Proposed Underground Garage For The Parking of Motor Vehicles Under Boston Common, And Its Effect Upon The Beacon Hill District," November, 1955.) Shurcliff was instrumental in having the Beacon Hill Civic Association (of which he was a member) authorize preparation of the report. The report concluded that the Garage was not needed as much as strategically located facilities; but it suggested that the Garage might be desirable if parking demand exceeded the Planning Board's estimates. In an interview, Shurcliff revealed that the Beacon Hill Civic Association, after considering the report, voted 110-11 to oppose the Common Garage. Shurcliff was one of the eleven dissenters. Although he may not have opposed the Garage, Shurcliff did not actively support it. Thus the other planners who opposed it were able to put up a united front.

109. This is possible. See Dennis O'Harrow, "The Expert Witness," ASPO Newsletter, Vol. 29, No. 11 (December, 1963), pp. 121-122.
A hypothesis suggested by the Common Garage history is:

Hypothesis: When all participant city planners favor one side in a location dispute, they may serve as an important, private, pressure-group influence. But if planners disagree and take different sides in the debate, their influence as private citizens will be nullified.

The second aspect of the planner's role as private citizen, his action as a member identified with the local community, should be emphasized. The two semi-organized, private planners who opposed the Garage were and have remained residents of the Boston area. They sincerely felt that the Garage would disrupt an irreplaceable, public park. Their strong concern was based upon their attachment to and identification with the City of Boston. It is difficult to imagine this kind of concern coming from itinerant, job-hopping planners. And the fact that the Boston planners were continuous opponents over the years no doubt increased their influence. A hypothesis drawn from the Common Garage dispute then is:

Hypothesis: Movement of city planners from community to community reduces their influence as private citizens in the local political arena.

That planners should have political know-how is
an old maxim. But most planners have not entered the profession to participate in the great game of politics. To suggest that they be politically active as private citizens may be asking too much. One conclusion of this study, however, is that one of the best ways for the city planner to be influential in local governmental decision-making is to exercise his rights as a private citizen. The planner should not be restricted to influence within a governmental agency. If the planner is seriously interested in influencing physical development decisions in the urban environment, he has a private role as well as a public role to perform. The private role may be restricted, however, to communities where the planner is not publicly employed.

IV. IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTED FURTHER RESEARCH

In reviewing the Garage's history and the results of hypothesis testing, a number of more general observations can be made. These observations will relate the findings of the study to its purpose of clarifying the planner's role. They suggest implications for the planner's behavior in a political environment.

One observation based on the study is that the planner should be able to adjust to changing political environments over time. The political conditions for planning can change significantly in short periods of time. For instance, the shift in the Mayor's office from Curley to Hynes brought a reduction in communication flow between the planning director and the Mayor. The Technical role under Mayor Curley was satisfactory to the planning staff
because Curley was interested in getting their advice on certain matters. But Mayor Hynes soon became indifferent to planning. The planning director did not develop close ties with him. For Curley, planning was "useful"; for Hynes it was not. Both Mayors ignored the planners in the Common Garage debate. But in 1946, there was no feeling of frustration on the part of the staff or Planning Board because they had no timely advice to give. By 1954, the Mayor was committed to the Garage. The planners could not have been influential with the Mayor at that late date. Their advice against the Garage was poorly timed. It came long after the Garage had become a symbol of downtown revival. A different role by the planners probably could have influenced Mayor Hynes earlier in his administration; but instead the planners found themselves playing a role carried forward from a different political climate.

A second observation is that the planner should be prepared for crisis situations. One way to be influential is to have planning advice ready when it is needed or when a decision is about to be made. The planning agency was ill-prepared for the political pressure generated by the post-war traffic increase. Their opinion toward the Garage could have been formulated in the early 1940's.
Although Mayor Curley might have ignored the Planning Board and staff anyway, they were nevertheless in no position to exert any influence. There was no time for a "scientific study." The planning staff should have been ready to show where parking facilities were needed, say, during 1945 when the Garage proposal was starting to gain serious attention. Instead, the planner's opinion came out ten years later. This was long after a political response to the crisis had been made. The Garage was always a possibility in the 1950's because the 1946 legislation had been passed.

The dangers inherent in planning methods have also been revealed in this study. The desire for stability, the use of quantification, and user-demand techniques may be "rational" in preventing drastic, stupid projects. But they may also unduly restrain the possibilities of the political system. The hard headed, defensible techniques of planning may conservatively bias the system against large, abrupt, emotion-laden, although interesting changes.

One of the classical roles of the planner has been to inject the longer view, the somewhat utopian frame, into the

\[112\] For a discussion of technical, general-evaluative, and general-inventive rationality in public-service professions, see Alan Altshuler, "Reason and Influence in the Public Service," Manuscript, 1965.
decision-making environment. The planner favors long-run and medium-run changes in the future. He should be aware, however, that there is always the possibility for physical change in the immediate future. And the techniques of the planner's public-regarding rationality should also recognize the need for spontaneity and creativity in the short-run.

This case study has shown the dilemma of the planner seeking to be rational yet influential. The study has indicated that different roles may be appropriate under different conditions. The planner must be politically sensitive, yet technically competent. It is reasonable for the planner to want greater influence. With the increased acceptance of the public-regarding tradition, it is the city planner who will be able to articulate citywide interests. In doing so, he may become an important figure in the political arena. To shy away from politics would be to miss his real potential.

Additional case studies would be useful in further clarifying the planner's role. Research is also needed to discover the planner's attitudes and professional

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motivations. More comparative studies of the planning expert's role in a variety of political conditions could be meaningful. The degree to which identification with a governmental agency affects the planner's behavior might be examined more closely. And finally, some attempt to reconcile planning theory to the realities of politics should be attempted.
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