To 'Sylve', with love and gratitude
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks go to professor Stanford Anderson who has been a source of ideas and a creative stimulus to me; to professor Julian Beinart for reading the draft; to Olga Michelis; to Suzanne Ehly. This work has been made possible, in part, with the help of an 'Alexander Onassis Foundation' scholarship.
Taste: A Commentary on its Genesis, Nature and Claims

by

Panos Kokkoris

Submitted to the Department of Architecture on July 8, 1980, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Architecture in Advanced Studies.

ABSTRACT

In the first section, taste, along with parallel phenomena linked to form and symbolism in general, is discussed in relation to the fundamental device of the reason-feeling dichotomy. The dichotomy's internal possibilities of significance and basic ways in which these have at times affected esthetics are traced. Examples are used which range from ancient Greek philosophy, via the 18th century, to Wittgenstein.

The latter's gradual evolution from a position of unyielding separation of rational, valid knowledge from fantasy and the 'unspeakable', towards an increasingly unified view of language and conceptualization as phenomena rooted in wide social contexts, serves as the point leading into, as well as the basic idea underlying, the second section. Accordingly, issues relevant to a 'game' notion of taste are brought forth, such as the continuity (as opposed to any clearcut and schematical division) of experience and of the processes of perception and conception; the idea of utility, convention as an indispensable means of obtaining knowability, communicability, and persistence of our mental constructions, either scientific, or esthetic, or religious, etc.; prejudice, appearing as an ineluctable factor underlying our arguments; or, the phenomenon of esthetic polarities, being the result of fundamental traits (or 'rules') of the 'game'. Juxtaposed to these issues is the theme of the autonomy of art and taste, chiefly as it was propounded by Kant.

Genuine autonomy is disputed in the ends of the second and in the
beginnings of the third section, and it is by way of this disputation that the game notion is resumed. This time, in a more extended sense, i.e. as centering upon the search for order in the conceptions of nature. The implication of this for a commentary on the phenomenon of taste is that, whatever the techniques appropriated and the results sought, whatever the specific biases of art, form-giving, and form-appreciating at different times, a possibility of unification may be presented. That possibility results from considering the general ground of perception and conceptualization, i.e. the tendency to effect an ordering of experience whatsoever. However, by unification, nothing of the sort of a smoothly functioning though artificial and forced generalization is meant. On the contrary, what is implied is an attempt to visualize, in the sphere of formal systems, what Michel Foucault calls a 'discursive unity'. That is, a discourse unified not by virtue of any consistency or continuity reigning over it, but rather by virtue of clashes, contradictions, discontinuities, which may nevertheless have a common locus. In terms of form, conceptions of orderable nature are taken to formulate such a common locus of diverse formal systems, and the hypothesis is brought forth of a possibility of 'discursive' unification of formal and esthetic incompatibilities, on the grounds of subtle threads that link them with integral epistemologies or world-views.

Thesis Supervisor: Stanford Anderson
Title: Professor of History and Architecture
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## section i
THE REASON-FEELING DICHOTOMY

| Theoretical Possibilities of the Dichotomy | 2 |
| The Dichotomy in Ancient Greek Philosophy | 8 |
| The Pythagoreans: Feeling 'Domesticated' by Reason | 14 |
| The Precariousness of a Reason-Feeling Harmony. Democritus and the Sophists | 20 |
| The Dichotomy as Contradiction. Plato | 36 |
| 18th-century Classicism | 44 |
| Hume | 58 |
| Feeling Vindicated | 60 |
| Loos and Kraus | 62 |
| Wittgenstein and Logical Positivism | 66 |
| The English 'Politeness' | 74 |
| Towards a 'Game Theory' | 82 |

## section ii
THE NOTION OF GAME

| The Continuity and Homogeneity of Experience | 98 |
| Utility | 102 |
| Conventionalization | 120 |
| Prejudice | 122 |
section iii
THE NOTION OF GAME CONTINUED: SEARCH FOR ORDER IN THE CONCEPTIONS OF NATURE 208

Universality vs. Relativism 208
Subjection to 'Authorities' 222
The Search for Order 232
Duration, Orientation, Morale 240
Nature as Form-Moulder 244
Perrault and Laugier 260
Pre-Classical Epistemology 266
Classical Epistemology 278

QUA EPILOGUE 304
section i
THE REASON-FEELING DICHOTOMY

In a sense, the progress of mankind might be estimated in terms of the progress of analysis. I try to imply this, that the unfolding of history has been marked, among other things, by a gradually increasing tendency towards efficient separation. Separation of men, according to distinctions of courage, venerability, power, skill; of classes, according to birth, freedom, granted or acquired privilege; of objects according to the respective place they supposedly held in the surroundings of men, with regard to usefulness, value, therapeutic properties, desirability entailed by scarcity, or curiosity aroused by lack of knowledge and familiarity; so that if one turns to any stage of human history and looks at any of its levels - power relationships, administration, production networks, scientific achievements, the formation of relationships based on notions such as morality, justice, respect, etc. - one is likely to encounter the same formal arrangement: a deployment of separate entities, either horizontally or vertically, in a hierarchized system - the criteria applied for the separation as well as the subtlety and the detail attained by the mechanism of separation notwithstanding.

It is not only with respect to the manipulation of a community, a society, a state, or man's needs for self-preservation (food, defense, shelter, etc.) or of the objects that surround him, to the existence
of which he has to adjust his own existence, that the force of separation has been exerted. It has equally powerfully permeated man himself as an individuality, and has turned that in him which lies over and beyond his visible body and functions, namely his sensitivity, his perceptive abilities, his pains, joys, decisions, thoughts, dreams, fears, visualizations and remembrances, into one of its proper domains. It is as though mankind would not rest content with exerting its dissecting formations upon society or the world of objects only. Analysis had to interfere with the mind too.

Thus a model was created to which, or to variations and modifications of which man has so ardently adhered throughout history that it has ended up as one of the most basic, elementary and supposedly infallible notions: the reason-feeling dichotomy. This formidable model has been used exhaustively by the great majority of thinkers and philosophical schools, and has appeared as a major normative or explanatory element in virtually every epistemology, religion, "Weltanschauung" in general; but, probably its most pre-eminent abode has been the realm of art and, consequently, that of esthetics. I find it extremely difficult to conceive of a single argument about art or any other situation in which there is room for questions of beauty, taste, esthetic considerations and the like, which won't proceed or eventually end by resorting steadily to feeling, on the grounds that feeling, as opposed to reason, supposedly provides such issues apparently not liable to precise description and
explanation with a legitimate sphere in which to exist. In addition, it is concerning not only the esthetic appreciation and evaluation of artistic products and other objects, but also, and principally, art as creation that feeling has been persistently adduced as a general concept shedding more or less light on it.

It appears thus, that analysis as a tendency peculiar to human evolution not only brought about the reason-feeling dichotomy as a result of its application to man - the result of the 'anatomical' dissection of his 'soul', so to speak - but was in turn supported and furthered by it, in the sense that the dichotomy was used as a criterion for separation of and demarcation between domains. In other words, the dichotomy certainly resides in man's 'inside', but nonetheless, at the same time is made to turn towards the 'outside', to ponder on it and to collect information about it.

The above general remarks suffice, I think, as the ground for the formulation of two basic questions, the discussion of which will be the task of this section. These concern:

1. An examination of the theoretical possibilities of the reason-feeling dichotomy as a concept. More specifically, what has been the meaning sought for by means of it? What are the implications underlying it? What has been aspired at which made it necessary for the dichotomy to appear? What have been the relative values attributed to each part of it? Have these been stable or did they
alternate? To what extent has the dichotomy been made into a polarity - its constituents being viewed as incompatible - and, alternatively, in which cases has it assumed the status of a unity - a reconciliation of the constituents being thought of as possible?

2. A general retracing of the role played by the dichotomy in the realm of esthetics by discussions of representative examples. More concisely, the above two questions refer to 1) the dichotomy as a tool, rooted in man for the demarcation between and individualization/characterization of objective realms, and 2) the appliance of the dichotomy in one such realm, that of esthetics.

THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES OF THE DICHOTOMY

One might start by asking what is meant by reason and feeling respectively. It is obvious that there is no fixedness and unequivocality here. At a first glance, reason may connote a mundane level of common sense; that is, it may serve as a selective label for and characteristic property of all those actions, decisions, thoughts, explanations and beliefs upon which the greater part of a regular practical life depends. On the other hand, it may signify a more highly valued though more or less ellusive authority, conceived of as belonging either in man or impersonally in nature, an authority which bears legislative power, i.e., which imposes necessity upon things. In the third place reason may be viewed as a combinative force partaking of both man and nature, by means of which as a
sine qua non condition, these entities can, ideally, deontologically co-exist. As regards feeling, it may just mean sensing states of equilibrium or disequilibrium in our organism, which depend upon the interaction of this organism with its environment, for instance, feeling of pleasure, pain, fatigue, respiratory difficulty, etc. However, by feeling one may also understand an office, granted a unique position in our mental make-up, by which things which appear mysterious and irreducible to 'reasonable' explanations are customarily administered. To develop a third possible meaning for feeling, one has only to extend the previous notion so as to make it characteristic of parts of the objective reality outside us. In this sense, our 'subjective' feeling of obscure experiences made to harmonize with the 'objective' realm of 'feeling', or to put it differently, that of 'spirit', may be viewed as a deep source of knowledge.

It follows that the fields of experience which are to be subsumed under either feeling or reason, and thence the objective territories proper to be administered by their respective authorities, vary accordingly with the differentiations of their meanings. Therefore we may think of a distribution-separation in which reason is supposed to deal with those things that are unanimously seen, touched, sensed in the immediate vicinity of man and about the existence and nature of which no dispute is likely to be raised; whereas those other problematical, awesome, unknowable things occurring both at a level of uncontrollable privacy but also, probably, at one situated
It has sometimes been said that what we feel is always something existing here and now...whereas what we think is always something eternal,...existing everywhere and always... If we compare the flux of feeling to the flow of a river, thought has at least the relative solidity and permanence of the soil and rocks that make its channel," Collingwood, R.G., "The Principles of Art", Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 158-159.
outside the authoritative limits of public perception and agreement are declared the denizens proper of feeling. Such a scene would be organized upon this variation of the model. Reason and the immediate, the comprehensible, the explicable. Feeling and the ungraspable, the mysterious, the elusive. Or, there might be a separation according to which feeling would be declared pertinent to the realm of the immediate, the transient, the realm addressed chiefly to our senses, whereas reason would be thought of as rising higher than this, capable of establishing or discovering immutable realities by which, then, we would have to abide. Such a variation of the model might be 'coded' as follows: Reason and the permanent, the necessary, the universal. Feeling and the fluid, the contingent, the particular. Incidentally, it seems that this specific interpretation of the reason-feeling dichotomy is one that has achieved great credibility and relatively greater persistence than other alternatives. In addition, to sketch a third possibility, we may conceive of both reason and feeling addressing 'elevated' realms, apparently transcending the territories of either common sense or immediate sensation, claiming jointly higher knowledge and order though of a different kind each. In this case the level of the 'beyond' does not yield to either of the two exclusively, but is shared by both, nonetheless made into a double-faceted whole. I will presently have several opportunities to explain why I tend to believe that such a posited co-existence-yet-dichotomy of reason-feeling in one and the same territory, however diversified this may be (the diversification
providing the apparent ground for such a parting within a single whole); why such an ambivalent balance is precarious, unstable and tending to dissolve into either the first or the second alternatives given above, i.e. into a constellation wherein the beyond is commended either to feeling or to reason.

What, as a corollary of the above going discussion of the various meanings and territories of experience possibly attributable to reason-feeling respectively, seems to me worth bearing in mind is the following supposition, namely: that in general, reason and feeling appear in a state of antagonism. Such a state involves either a mood of mutual exclusion - the one side claimed, as it were, legitimate, the other illegitimate - or a mood of adoption, taming/‘domestication’ of the one by the other, through achieving a sort of allegiance. Exceptionally, a conciliation, harmonization may be effected, its possible rootedness and stability notwithstanding.

THE DICHOTOMY IN ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY

In their various views about art and related ideas - the aristic process, the effect of art upon people, its purpose, ‘criticism’ of art etc. - the Greek philosophers made ample use of the reason-feeling dichotomy. Throughout their discussions virtually every possible meaning for the parts of the dichotomy, as well as virtually every possible realm of experience correspondent to them, may be
encountered. For instance, here is an account given of the position occupied by the dichotomy in archaic Greece:

Two streams appeared in Greek religion; one of them embodying a spirit of order, clarity, and naturalness, the other a spirit of mystery... The Olympian religion, humanist and adaptable, conquered Greek poetry and sculpture... This religion permeated the art of the Greeks... Mystical religion is less noticeable..., at least as far as poetry and sculpture are concerned. Music, however, served that religion and was therefore interpreted in accordance with its spirit. But Greek mystical religion was chiefly revealed in philosophy and through philosophy it influenced esthetics. While one stream of early esthetics was an expression of philosophical enlightenment, the other was an expression of mystico-religious philosophy. 2

This being a very general distinction it may nevertheless serve us as a framework wherein adjustments, modifications and variations of the dichotomy might find their proper place. From the first 'stream', for example, we may extract or anticipate such possible implications as the following:

The 'order, clarity and naturalness' refer to a version of rationality, tamed, so to speak, and made subservient to the requirements of well-organized secular life. It could be viewed as what has been referred to above as common sense.

However, these properties, if extended and granted a certain autonomy
of existence, if made to reflect universal necessities, readily connote transcendent spheres, and assume an austerity of the mind felt when we encounter deep and perennial questions as those of the existence and nature of the universe and of man.

To take the diametrically opposite interpretation, this 'enlightenment' might also imply a more or less exclusive confidence in the immediacy and indisputability of the things sensed, as opposed to the endless regress involved in the thing thought. Contrasting to the above possible interpretations of the 'enlightened' branch of archaic Greek religion (the immediate, either 'reasoned' or 'felt' and the beyond, given in a status of confident, 'ordered', 'clear', and 'natural' intelligibility), the mystical counterpart brings forward that meaning of feeling which has been presented above as properly transcendent: the beyond, awesome and incomprehensible by reason; a realm whose manifestations can be vaguely conceived only by our irrational faculty of feeling.

It is in this context of potential richness of the reason-feeling dichotomy as a concept indispensable to the manipulation of nature and man that, among the Greeks, art was given explanations as to its nature as an activity, as to its purposes; as to its perfection; as to the aspects of man it properly affects. In addition, it is by virtue of the general instability of a reason-feeling equilibrium that gradual transformations, reformulations and redistributions of the exegesis of art occurred, thus often rendering its alternative
3 Ibid., p. 28
versions utterly incompatible. But, to be sure, beneath the most part of this expanse of diverse explanations of the problem of art there can be witnessed a stable common ground, besides that of a certain historical continuity and successive influence, i.e. the practice of separation. So, "poetry", it was thought, "thanks to divine inspiration, gives knowledge of the highest order; it leads the soul, it educates men, it is capable of making them better. Art, on the other hand, does something quite different: it produces useful and sometimes perfect objects." Presumably this account of poetry, as opposed to 'art', or the rest of that which more or less we nowadays understand by the 'arts', is not exactly the same as the one given before whereby 'poetry and sculpture' have been associated with 'enlightened' religion. Poetry here comes closer to incomprehensible mysticism, seems to resist 'order', 'clarity', and 'naturalness', (at least to some extent) and recalls of music, since it is actuated by 'divine inspiration', although not completely, since it 'gives Knowledge of the highest order'. It is as though that part of the 'beyond' claimed by reason (knowledge) has been brought very close to that claimed by feeling (inspiration).

THE PYTHAGOREANS: FEELING 'DOMESTICATED' BY REASON

Indeed, such a rapprochement appears to underly the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, whose foundations betray an equivocal character,
being scientific on the one hand, and religious-moral on the other.

For the Pythagoreans the whole world could be reduced to a sort of elaborate mathematical construction. This conviction was given rise to by two discoveries. The first was that a \textit{prima facie} qualitative phenomenon such as musical harmony, was, in essence, based upon the purely numerical ratios 1:2;2:3;3:4. The second was that the 'right' angle... was connected with the purely numerical ratios 3:4:5 or 5:12:13 (the sides of rectangular triangles). These two discoveries, it appears, led Pythagoras to the somewhat fantastic generalisation that all things are, in essence, numbers or ratios of numbers; or that number is the ratio (logos = reason), the rational essence, of things, or their real nature.\textsuperscript{4}

It is interesting to trace the grounds on which this 'fantastic generalisation' proceeded so as to take hold not only of objects at large but also animate beings, and eventually abstract properties and states of mind.

The main application (of the theory) was to plane figures, or shapes, or 'Forms'. These were believed to be characterized by the appropriate sequence of numbers, and thus by the numerical ratios of the consecutive numbers of the sequence. In other words, 'Forms' are numbers or ratios of numbers. On the other hand, not only shapes of things, but also abstract properties, such as harmony and 'straightness' are numbers. In this way the general
Tatarkievicz, op. cit., pp. 86-87
theory that numbers are the rational essences of all things is arrived at.

To facilitate the comprehension of the abrupt leap from 'shapes' to 'abstract properties', we should bear in mind that the reduction of forms to numbers could be effected only by means of substituting a diagram constituted of dots for the contours of the shape, or for the entire expanse of the form. In such a way the form or shape could be represented by a certain distribution of computable dots, the distribution nevertheless resembling the figure it was derived from. Therefore, "it seems probable that the development of this view", i.e., that even abstract properties are numbers "was influenced by the similarity of the dot-diagrams with the diagrams of a constellation such as the Lion, or the Scorpion, or the Virgo. If a Lion is an arrangement of dots it must have a number. In this way Pythagoreanism seems to be connected with the belief that the numbers, or 'Forms', are heavenly shapes of things". Now in such a conception of the universe brought under the sweeping power of reason, number is the fundamental principle, the common nature of all things. However, besides number, viewed as a fundamental, yet crude form of affinity, things in this rationalized universe are brought together, made to co-exist consistently by virtue of another force, i.e. harmony. Harmony is itself, according to the above argument, "a mathematical, numerical disposition, depending on number, measure, and proportion". It is the number par excellence, one might assume, and it parallels, complements number in being "a property of the
Ibid., pp. 86-87. The original meaning of the word *cosmos*, i.e. universe, was 'order'.
Thus harmony effects an extension of the meaning of the concept of number (as a *raison d'être* for the widest range of things in the universe, considered individually), by introducing a sense of the *raison d'être* of all things placed in a consistent scene/setting, characterized by compact togetherness and mutual collaboration. It is due to the workings of harmony, therefore, that different, dissimilar elements are brought into a ruling condition of unity.

As far as human activities are concerned, the above had the following consequence: Human creations, not only artistic ones but human behavior generally, can secure their endurance within the universe only insofar as they possess harmony, i.e. unity of parts on the one hand, and number, measure and proportion on the other. For since the whole range of existence is confined within that realm exclusively and absolutely dominated by harmony and number, i.e., reason, how could it be possible for anything to exist in defiance of these sovereign properties without condemning itself to topple down into chaos? This is the image of a perfectly functioning and strictly regimented system perpetually going on, to which admission is granted solely upon satisfaction of the most demanding stipulations of conformity, whereas what fails to meet them is a leftover, evil, false, 'ugly and useless'. Now it is important that the following fact be stressed, namely that all this does not constitute an esthetic theory at all. On the contrary, it is pure epistemology,
See below, section iii.
and at most, moral theory. Harmony, number, proportion, measure, regularity, symmetry were not originally aesthetic prescriptions (in the sense we tend to understand the term today); they had no such meaning. They were thought of as mere instruments contributing to cognition, i.e., the search for truth, as well as to the search for the morally good. Viewed from this angle, then, qualities such as the above which for centuries have been supposed to be the somewhat magical keys to an arcane world of warranted beauty, assume a simple and comprehensible function, being consistent elements of an integrated epistemology or world-view. Nevertheless, this epistemology provides for the possibility of the canon to which Greek morphology was subjected, especially in architecture. Yet, these forms, "the permanent, canonical forms of Greek architecture... objective, impersonal, and inevitable", may perfectly be considered but as a declaration of obedience, an act of compliance with the 'masters' of the universe, as a prudent option securing existence, survival, and endurance, in brief, participation in the impeccable and ruthless vehicle of the perfectly functioning system, the vehicle of the good. By adopting all the above mentioned properties, the Greeks could feel "as if (their) architectural works followed eternal laws independent of the individual and of time". "Symmetria signified proportions which are not invented by artists but are a property of Nature. Seen in this light, art was a species of knowledge".

28
8 Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
This, so far, is the scientific 'half' of Pythagorean philosophy. Its starting point being the reducibility of shapes to numbers, it extends to essentially all things liable to experience, art, among them, occupying a conspicuous position. This, therefore, seems to be underlying what has been quoted above, i.e., 'art...produces useful' (not only in the utilitarian sense, but also in the sense of being compatible with the universe/number, as opposed to the 'useless' which is destined to vanish in chaos) 'and sometimes perfect objects'. In all events, art, according to this viewpoint, appears not to be expected to produce properly 'esthetic' objects (in the sense the word might have for us), i.e., begetting deep but, as to their knowability, elusive impressions and effects in man. Art as object, man as creator/producer, everything in the universe, have hereby been brought together under the implaccable power of reason.

It is strange that this absolutist system, so inflexible and harsh, excluding and utterly indifferent to any exception, digression and protestation, glorifying the precision of the natural number, was able and willing to accommodate and harmonize with what would appear to be its extreme opposite: mystical religion, chiefly expressed in music. Yet, even here, harmony supplied the necessary link. For music, due to its standing as a chief source of 'number', could be considered the harmony of the universe. It is as thought a modification of harmony in general is presented here; a harmony not impersonal anymore, embedded in and being an "objective property of
9 Ibid., p. 81.
10 Ibid., pp. 81-82.
11 Ibid., pp. 81-82.
things". This appears to be a harmony 'personified' so to speak, enlivened, capable of being communicated sensibly, as opposed to harmony as an abstract property, which is liable to being discovered intellectually. In brief, this is a compellingly manifest harmony. Music is thus brought under the rational system of number and harmony. But so are its effects upon the soul; for since music as well as the soul belong in the same harmonious universe, they can be made to correspond: "Sounds find an echo in the soul, which responds in harmony with them. It is as with a pair of lyres: when we strike one, the other standing nearby will respond."

It follows that music may be thought of as a 'likeness' (omoioma) of the psyche, "the 'sighs' or expressions of character". By way of this assumption, it was possible to reconcile two domains which apparently were utterly incompatible, namely, the domain of a rational universe on the one hand and that of spiritual mysticism, obscurity and awe as reflected in the tradition of Orphic mysteries, on the other. According to that tradition, music and gesture were believed to be endowed with 'cathartic', or purificatory, properties, i.e. with potentialities of elevating the soul, of assisting it in achieving a state of exaltation, occasionally releasing it from the painful constraints of the body in which it had been imprisoned due to sin. Such occasional excursions into bliss could not anymore, under the spell of the Pythagorean rapprochement between the comprehensible and the incomprehensible, or rather the domestica-
tion/subjugation of the latter to the former, afford allusions to traditional mysticism, or involve explicit acknowledgements of the
12 Ibid., pp. 81-82.
unknowability of catharsis. Music would thenceforth have *ethos*. Under this label, both its purificatory effects upon the soul and the resulting revelation/knowledge could be selected. After all the Greek term properly denoting the effects of music upon the soul, i.e. 'psychagogia', meaning, freely, the treatment or the guidance of the soul, implies precisely the domestication, rationalization, of the realm of transcendent feeling. One may here recall the similar account of poetry, quoted above, in terms of 'divine inspiration' and 'knowledge of the highest order'.

Therefore, in relation to the present discussion of the reason-feeling dichotomy, we may consider Pythagorean philosophy as an instance of a demarcation of the objective world as well as of human nature in which reason is ruling, an appropriate due having been given to feeling nonetheless, but only after its peculiar properties have been translated into, filtered through, those of reason. Art, both as to its 'cognitive' and 'spiritual' aspect is in this manner made comprehensible and given the character of an instrument. It concerns, both as creation and effect, the secular life of men: it relates to their practical activities and problems, but at the same time it constitutes a middle term between this earthly level and that of the eternal and the necessary, a step leading from the former to the latter, thus partaking, in a sense, of both. In this manner, lastly, the beautiful is made identical to, interchangeable with, the good. Granted the general traditional Greek tendency not to speak of beauty in any exclusive 'esthetic' sense and the
concomitant constraints imposed upon any possibility of a freely existing beauty, I think that we may discern in Pythagoreanism an attempt at harmonizing reason and feeling, whatever the conditions under which feeling enters this alliance; that is, an attempt at effecting a genuine balance between two mental forces sharing a common territory.

THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF A REASON-FEELING HARMONY. DEMOCRITUS AND THE SOPHISTS

That such a sought after balance of the reason-feeling dichotomy, at least as far as its relevance for artistic issues is concerned, was precarious, may be indicated by the subsequent course of philosophizing on art (i.e., 5th and 4th centuries B.C.). Utility, as a fundamental criterion of evaluation appears to be gaining irresistible impetus during this period. But it is not the same 'purified', rationalized, founded-in-number, abstracted utility we have encountered above. Its meaning is definitely coming close to the common-sense one, implying immediate practical solutions to urgent problems. A mundane content is assumed by the term. It might be said to have a 'biological' sense. This idea comes as a reflection of that branch of the Ionian school which was characterized by "materialism", "determinism", and "empiricism" and of which Democritus was the chief exponent. For him, art was dependent upon, its operation/enactment being in principle confined within the
13 Ibid., p. 89.
14 Ibid., p. 90.
15 Ibid., p. 90.
16 Ibid., pp. 90-91.
limits of imitating, nature: "We have been the pupils (of the animals) in matters of fundamental importance". However, imitation here is used "not in the sense which this word has in 'choreia', not in the sense of the actor's imitation of feelings, but as following nature in its methods of action." Thus, it is not only building, or weaving, which might be thought of as having been derived from imitating beavers and spiders respectively, but even culinary art, "by which food is prepared, ... (imitates) ... the digestion of nourishment by organisms." Art in this context, especially the useful arts, though still definitely attached to reason, is likely to be drawn towards a merely functional, as opposed to teleological, conception. As to the arts that provoke pleasure, i.e., poetry or music, they were likely to be dealt with by way of a hedonistic approach. Inspiration in them would be still acknowledged, but not 'divine' or at any rate due to a supernatural cause. Inspiration was made to refer to a state of "inflamed spirit", this inflammation being in turn explained as a "mechanistic stirring of the senses" due to "mechanical action".

Such innovatory arguments parallel those of the Sophists who succumbed to a bias for the particular, the empirical, the relative as opposed to the construction of omnipotent frameworks of the general and the universal. They introduced a definite distinction between useful and pleasurable arts, giving a sensualistic definition of beauty, as being merely that "which gives pleasure through
hearing and the sight". Even this, moreover, could not be irreversibly identified since such a possibility would be in contradiction with the fact that "In Thrace tattooing is regarded as an 'ornament', but in other countries it is a punishment for convicts". For beauty, along with "laws, political systems and religion", is "relative and conventional"; and this relativity, a fact manifested by the diversely paid tributes to beauty in different milieus, was considered grounded in the need that each thing ought to be imbued by the particular 'beauty' suiting its intrinsic nature. As opposed to the notion that beauty "depended on an accord with eternal laws", the Sophists opted for a concept of beauty whereby it was made to depend "on adjustment to individual conditions". Thus the previous beautiful-good, applicable to, and attestable in virtually everything, was fractured plurally, the result being the dissociation of the beautiful from the good, of the useful from the pleasant, and of the many particular beauties suitable for their own individual purposes from each other. Indifferent to what might possibly underlie the surfaces of things and any form of the immediate to which they adhered, the Sophists urged to vindicate, with regard to the effects of art upon man and society, not any variations of the reason-knowledge-good motif, but illusionism, i.e. admission of any falsity, imprecision, incorrectness, 'lie', so to speak, either in form or content for the sake of the overall immediate impression provoked. "Gorgias...said of tragedy: '(it is) a deception in which the deceiver is more honest than the non-deceiver,
If, in passing, we adopt provisionally a division of artistic activities, as far as their purpose is concerned, into "representational art" and "magical symbolism", the one viewed as making allusions to the workings of the intellect, i.e. cognition generally, the other as invoking action on the part of the beholder, whereby these two different states in the subject may be described as characterized by "overdistance" (i.e. a psychological factor causing the reaction of the subject to the situation presented to the suspended and hence to result in a mental experience), and "underdistance", (i.e. a psychological factor causing the spectator to react actively), respectively, then a possible interpretation of the phenomenon of the "esthetic illusion" appears, in relation to the tacitly invoked pair of reason and feeling/action (or better, in this connection, instinct), as a point of equilibrium between overdistance and underdistance. Kris, E., "Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art", N.Y., 1967, pp. 48 ff. In this context then, Gorgias' illusionism might be 'read' as referring to a representational art whose aim, however, has been stripped, by and large, by any sort of intellectual content, and charged, instead, with an exclusively sensual one.

See above p. 18.
and the deceived is wiser than the non-deceived'. By way of this sketchy exposition of the 'esthetics' of Democritus and the Sophists, we may retrieve that distinction which we made our starting point as to the discussion of the reason-feeling dichotomy in ancient Greek philosophy. It is obvious that their arguments fall readily under the category of 'enlightenment', and offer grounds for that particular interpretation we made of reason, and feeling as both addressing the realm of the 'immediate', i.e. the "immediate, either 'reasoned' or 'felt'". Before proceeding to the next step of our argument, however, we should try to state definitely why that phase in Greek philosophy - the late Ionian philosophers and the Sophists - makes it clear that the Pythagorean sort of union between reason and feeling is a very 'volatile' one. Indeed, reason (in its commonsensical guise) and feeling (on a sensualistic level) co-exist, as we have seen, both in Democritus and the Sophists. But theirs is a coexistence which claims no unifiability. It is a neutral co-existence occurring as an inevitable state between dissociated, different things. Reason claims its own realm of experience, feeling its own, no conflict threatening this neat demarcation of possibilities of mental states as well as of objective domains. The only internal commotion one might possibly discern in such a conception/constellation of the reason-feeling dichotomy, would be one caused by a sort of repulsion felt towards any attempt at bringing forth inklings of a higher, more abstract reality than that acknowledged by the 'enlightened' system. In a sense, it is
19 Popper, op. cit., introduction and Chapter 2.
probably because things are left unquestioned as to any possible
ultimate essences or causes they might hide, that any possibility
of omnipotent unification is out of the question. Yet, this disso-
ciation, separation, this 'spreading-out' of diversified territories,
and this prompt acknowledgement of their diversity does not pre-
suppose/imply a state in which reason and feeling are conceived as
inimical to one another. Certainly, the 'immediate' may be thought
of as incompatible with the 'beyond, but at least, one may forget the
'beyond' and rest content with the 'immediate' in which room for
both reason and feeling is amply provided. One can in this system
dispense with the need to feel fortified against a threatening
adversary. Just ignoring him may equally do. Thus, we will have to
hold recourse to Plato in order to select one more theoretical
possibility of the dichotomy, i.e., one whereby reason and feeling
are declared irreconcilable, and trace its effects upon the conception
of art.

THE DICHOTOMY AS CONTRADICTION: PLATO

To consider the ways in which the dichotomy enters his specific
views on art, one should preferrably bear in mind as a background
Plato's related theories of "anamnēsis" and of "Ideas". According
to the first, the human soul is considered omniscient prior to
birth. Only then is absolute knowledge conceivable: knowledge,
that is, of "the essence or nature of a thing rather than of a
20 Ibid., p. 10.
particular historical fact. This theory "in some measure grants to
each man the possession of divine sources of knowledge" for "In
being born we forget; but we may recover our memory and our know-
ledge, though only partially: only if we see the truth again shall
we recognize it. All knowledge is therefore re-cognition, recalling
or remembering the essence of true nature that we once know".20
Now the realm which monopolizes that absolute knowledge, the realm
of 'essences' and 'true' nature, made knowable to man prior to his
birth, is the realm of 'forms' or 'ideas'. This is a sphere of
reality which stands in apparent contrast to the reality of life on
earth, and of which the latter can at most yield weak reflections.
Such a twofold conception of the universe bears significant similar-
arities to the Pythagorean one, however more intransigent it appears.
In fact it derives a lot from the latter, a basic borrowing being
"the so-called Table of Opposites', based upon the fundamental distinc-
tion between odd and even numbers". This contains "such things
as ONE/MANY, ODD/EVEN, REST(BEING)/CHANGE(BECOMING), DETERMINATE/
INDETERMINATE, SQUARE/OBLONG, STRAIGHT/CROOKED, RIGHT/LEFT, LIGHT/
DARKNESS, GOOD/BAD". When transferred to the Platonic theory of
'ideas', the 'table' could have the following meaning:

the 'good' side of the table of opposites constitutes an
(invisible) Universe, a Universe of Higher Reality of
the Unchanging and Determinate 'Forms' of all things...
while the visible world of change and flux in which we
live and die, the world of generation and destruction,
21 Ibid., p. 78.


23 Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., p. 131.
the world of experience, is only a kind of reflection or copy of that Real World. 21

For Plato, then, there was in accordance with the above, a clear distinction between art and beauty, art being identified as "imitation and representation of Nature", and beauty as having "a moral character identified with the good, or a mathematical character identified with geometrical proportions". 22

Presumably art occupies a place within the confines of the empirical, the earthly world, whereas beauty belongs intrinsically in the realm of 'ideas'. So far, with regard to Plato, there are certain elements which we may single out: A resuscitation of a higher, transcendent sense of reality; a return to the notion of unity between beauty and goodness; a conviction that man's furthest aim is cognition or re-cognition of 'ideas'; a definite deprivation of art from any claims to beauty, itself an 'idea'. The last two points may serve us as the springboard from which to touch upon a further distinction, this time between the arts. Plato allots a distinct status to the poet, his function viewed as involved in soothsaying, inspiration, cathartic effects, irrationality in general, as opposed to the artists-craftsmen who proceed according to definite practical rules. In 'Io' he admits that "The God seems purposely to have deprived all poets, prophets and soothsayers of every particle of reason and understanding, the better to adapt them to their employment as ministers and interpreters." 23 However,
24 Popper, op. cit., p. 10.


26 Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., p. 122.

27 Ibid., p. 122, p. 133, n. 28.
even this acquiescence in irrationality, does not amount to an
acknowledgement of poetry's accessibility to the realm of ideas.
It rather insinuates "a sharp distinction...between divine
inspiration - the divine frenzy of the poet - and the divine
sources or origins of true knowledge... Plato grants the inspira-
tion to poets but denies to them any divine authority for their
alleged knowledge of the facts".\textsuperscript{24} So that poetry, however dif-
ferent from the other arts, is still attached to the domain of
transient reality, unable to transcend the limitations of being a
species of imitation. And, it is not only that the arts, including
poetry, are thought of as taking "over the grand primary works from
the hands of nature, already formed, and then...(modelling and fa-
shioning)...the more insignificant...'artificial'...simulacra",\textsuperscript{25}
i.e., as being characterized by "their imitativeness (and)... the unreality of their products";\textsuperscript{26} but imitation, furthermore,
which, when departing from reality is a lie, whereas when remaining
truthful to it is, at most, a superfluous replica, may generally
stir the passions and "jeopardize our betterment."\textsuperscript{27} It is on the
grounds of such assumptions that "we have then, a fair case against
the poet and we may set him down as the counterpart of the painter,
whom he resembles in two ways: his creations are poor things by
the standards of truth and reality, and his appeal is not to the
highest part of the soul, but to one which is equally inferior.
So we shall be justified in not admitting him into a well-ordered
commonwealth, because he stimulates and strengthens an element

29 "Laws", 889A, quoted in Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., p. 137, n. 40

30 Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., p. 125.
which threatens to undermine reason".28

So, we may come to the following interpretation of the reason-feeling dichotomy as it underlies the above views: Reason is the sovereign ruling over the venerated realm of 'ideas', the realm exclusively possessing goodness, beauty, truth, knowledge. Apart from that lies the realm of empirical reality, in which man is cast adrift. Two alternatives ultimately present themselves to man in that inferior domain: The first is to cultivate reason and in this way to ascend gradually to higher spheres, thus claiming back his original omniscience. This can be effected in a plurality of ways, as the 'well-ordered commonwealth' implies: The way of philosophy, the way of morality and goodness, the way of love, or even the way of those "arts which really produce anything of genuine worth...(i.e.)...those which lend their aid to nature like medicine, husbandry, gymnastic".29 The second alternative is yielding to "imitation (which) is only a game, though no doubt a charming one...a frivolous occupation dragging men away from their sublime duties";30 indulging in the immediate which is the imitative arts' effect upon feeling. This second alternative and the related submission to feeling, either in a low, sensualistic sense, or in a high, spiritualistic sense of 'divine frenzy' represents in the last analysis an obstacle blocking the way to the 'ideas'. The arts, particularly liable to either the base 'frivolity' or the elevated 'madness' of feeling, are one of the chief substantia-
31 Ibid., p. 123.

32 Ibid., p. 125.

33 Collingwood, op. cit., p. 49. To trace that alternation in the evolution of Plato's views by way of which poetry, from a state of admitted 'divine irrationality' was drawn into a state of deprecation, is an issue relevant to a discussion of taste to which I intend to return in section iii.
tions of the second alternative and the only way to restore them to the worthy order of reason, is to imbue them with "moral utility", i.e. "a means of molding the character and of forming an ideal state", and "righteousness", i.e. make them "suitable, accurate and just, without deviations". Thus it was that Plato, diversely modifying his views reached a conception of art (in relation to both its effects upon the emotions, and its intrinsic affinity to reason) which became capable of eliciting interpretations such as the following:

Dissatisfied with the art of his day, he wanted art to abide by tradition. He has been called the first 'classicist' because he was the first known thinker to advocate return to the art of the past.

Or,

What Plato wanted to do, was to put the clock back and revert from the amusement art of the Greek decadence to the magical art of the archaic period of the 5th century.

I think that by way of this reference to several basic ancient Greek notions on the theory of knowledge and art, we are able to gain some insight concerning the relative values and corresponding realms of experience that it has been possible at different times to ascribe to reason and feeling. We have obtained some under-
standing as to how flexible the dichotomy is as a theoretical instrument for analysis.

Reason as the faculty proper in man which ought to be guiding his activities so as to attune them to the objective realm of reason, hidden in and beyond sensible reality; feeling as a peculiar 'modification' of reason, made subservient to it and to the single aim of getting to know that higher reality; art as a rational instrument of cognition; or, reason considered as a mere practical common sense, not partaking of and indifferent to anything transcendent, similar to, though more sophisticated than that of the animals; feeling, thought of as equally wanton and secular, 'teasing' the senses; lastly, feeling, either in the latter sense, or in a solemn 'mystical' one, made into the threatening adversary of an austere rationality which is now considered the exclusive property that ought to underly all 'legitimate' manifestations of life and man, from the practical level of the immediate to the unattainable level of eternity and the 'ideas': These are but some of the possible meanings with which reason and feeling have been at times endowed. They represent, nevertheless, basic and persistent alternatives that can be encountered in numerous instances throughout the history of thought.


36. Ibid., p. 162.
The eighteenth-century discussions on art and esthetics, partly because of the retreat to antiquity via Winckelmann and the beginnings of archaeology, partly because of the persistence which traditional Greek notions assumed by virtue of Aristotle, and partly because of the seizure of 17th-c. science, i.e., Cartesian rationalism, exerted upon the learned circles, present such an instance. It is an instance of open conflict between the parts of the reason-feeling dichotomy. On the one hand, Mengs, as the apostle of reason, brings forward advocacies that declare "absolute beauty" as residing "only in Greek statues", as "justified in the divine transcendent idea", and as "manifested in circular form and uniform coloring". Such notions, vindicating a bias for rationally sought abstraction and ideals, are opposed, on the other hand, by the protesting voices of inchoate Romanticism. Hamann's metaphors of the garden which "is more ancient than the ploughed field", and of "painting...(which is older) than writing", serve as allusions to the conviction that the senses and passions precede understanding - and thus deserve greater veneration; and are coupled by Herder who held that "the natural man paints what he sees as he sees it, live, potent, monstrous, in disorder or in order". Both proceed on a line analogous to that of Vico who "freed himself from Cartesian rationalism", protested against a philosophy preoccupied exclusively with nature, a philosophy inevitably ensnared in "abstractions that cannot provide a
Ibid., p. 162, and Lowith, K., "Meaning in History", The University of Chicago Press, 1949, ch. VI.
foundation for a concrete science", and pleaded for "a philosophy and a history of humanity" based on a concept of human nature "not fixed by physical properties"; such a theory contains the seeds of a reaction against the "neo-classic 'idea'" as well as of a primitivist esthetic "without need for any transcendency", with the imagination presiding over reason. 37

HUME

An analogous need to emancipate beauty and the appraisal of art from the yokes of either transcendent or conventionalized reason has also been partly felt by Hume. I say partly because in Hume one may discern a variety of worthy insights related to esthetics to some of which we will refer subsequently. His "Of the Standard of Taste" begins and is more or less based throughout on the assumption of a clear distinction between sentiment and judgment. As far as matters of taste are concerned, sentiment (aroused, caused by the object at hand in the subject, the beholder) is and should naturally be the relevant office in man to refer them to, since sentiment, hidden deep in man's individuality and self-sufficient, is unassailable, irreducible to anything beyond itself. Thus, it is in principle right and real. This immediacy, and autonomy of feeling is brought into contrast in relation to the judgement of understanding, which, since by its nature must depend for its truth upon a standard, i.e. empirical reality, is

liable to error and much less certain than sentiment. Furthermore, the affirmation of this distinction and the establishment of sentiment as the reliable legislator of taste is both preceded/underlined, and followed/enforced by these basic steps: beauty is severed from any species of knowledge/cognition/truth whatsoever, art is disqualified as an instrument of cognition guided by the intellect, and consequently, the beautiful is not anymore thought of as embedded in objects and constituting one of their properties; for "no sentiment represents what is really in the object...Beauty is no quality in things themselves". 38

FEELING VINDICATED

To take an example of the above turn of mind carried to its extremes, though a much later one, let us hold recourse to Merleau-Ponty's essay "Eye and Mind". 39 Feeling, in this case, is intransigently brought into contrast to reason not only in connection with esthetics and taste, but also with regard to cognition, comprehension, conception and perception of things in general. A genuine validity is claimed for feeling, (in the particular guise of the imagination), with regard to these tasks, while reason-understanding is implicitly declared impotent, confounded in conventional apparatuses of habitual trains of thought and thereby blind as to the live reality of things. A "mystical", (so to speak, but nevertheless possible of becoming felt), affinity between things is posited,
by virtue of which this live reality can be revealed to the searching senses coupled by the imagination. This might be understood as man's possibility of coming to a state of sensory union with the external world; the "manifest visibility (of things) must be repeated in the body be a secret visibility". The power of vision, far from being thought of as referring to a sterile, mechanical process producing "representations", i.e. "copies" of reality, that are subsequently relegated to the understanding which conducts the task of "rethink(ing) the constitutive relations of things", is here conceived as sufficient for a total discourse with the visible world. This visible world, in turn, implies something much wider, deeper, potential, fluid, and primeval, than "a picture or a representation of the world, a world of immanence and ideality...in itself,...matter" which the understanding cannot help fabricating. This visible world is that which becomes manifest to a "prehuman way of seeing things", i.e. to a vision not subject to the convenient but artificial assumptions and classifications of the understanding concerning, depth, relative position, color etc., which could further be described as the way in which, as it were, things "see" each other as in the case of an "empty interior...'digested' by the 'round eye of the mirror'", or "the painter's way". The latter, exemplary of the role ascribed to imagination/feeling in a penetrating perception/conception of things, is one of minute "interrogation" of things, which starts anew time and again. Therefore by way of the outcomes of such "interrogation" the painter's is a continuously "fascinated"
vision which results in "revelations to others (because the others do not lack what he lacks...)", namely, the distorting lenses of the understanding. It is in this way that feeling, (vision, along with movement, touch, a "prehuman" sense of space, the feeling of one's living organism amidst other living organisms) may be elevated to the position of an all-encompassing faculty, begetting cognition, through properly attending to the immediate and elusive, supposedly of a much higher quality than that attained by the limited "technology" of the intellect.

LOOS AND KRAUS

The threshold of the 20th century will now be adduced as a last though significant instance of the vicissitudes of the reason-feeling dichotomy, still welded into a formula of separation, whereby, however, none of the parts is being deprecated. It is a demarcation between reason and feeling in which the desire to give each its proper - but different - due is involved. Furthermore, this is an instance of preoccupation with the proper nature, meaning, corresponding territories of experience, boundaries of reason and feeling respectively, shared explicitly by the majority of intellectual and cultural fields.

"Adolf Loos and I", said Karl Kraus, "have done nothing more than to show that there is a distinction between an urn and a chamber

41 Janic and Toulmin, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

pot and that it is this distinction above all that provides culture with elbow room. The others, those who fail to make this distinction, are divided into those who use the urn as a chamber pot and those who use the chamber pot as an urn". Three possibilities appear here. The "urn" standing for the work of art, art in general; the "chamber pot", for the utilitarian object, practical necessities and "facts"; and the blurredness of their confusion, a confusion which had a devastating sweep in fin-de-siècle Viennese estheticism, in both its bourgeois-taste-aspect, crazed by fashion based on fake ornament, and its elitist offspring, the Secession whose self-defeating purpose "to challenge popular and academic taste...succeeded merely in transforming the contemporary views about ornamentation" and in curing "the symptoms, not the disease". For Loos, it was chiefly a matter of bold and unequivocal separation between art and craft instead of mingling them destructively under the auspices of the presumably pseudo-concept "applied art". The latter, and its concomitants, in terms of the cultural habits (fashion etc.) it imposes, the manufacturing processes and materials it calls forth, and, which is most important, the disproportionality between human labor involved (qualitatively and quantitatively) and corresponding sales value it inevitably entails when contesting the far more efficient mechanical production, proves disastrous for the economy of the state as well as impinging upon the cultural advancement of society; and for absolutely no conceivable reason, since "The vegetables (that)...the 20th-c. man...likes are simply boiled in water and then served with a little
melted butter. The other man" i.e. one who, contaminated by obscurantism, still lives potentially in the 18th c., in spite of the actual year being 1908, "doesn't enjoy them until honey and nuts have been added and someone has been busy cooking them for hours". Thus, "one man accumulates savings, the other one debts". Similarly, "the producers of ornament must work twenty hours to earn the wages a modern worker gets in eight".43 By way of such consideration, Loos came to determine the artifact as addressing a pragmatic "use here and now"; on the other hand the work of art is made "for all men everywhere". The first is "conservative" because it has to abide by the "present forms of life", and "serve (men's) comfort". The second is "revolutionary" because it "aims at edifying men's minds by refocusing their attentions from the dullness and drudgery of everyday life into the sphere of fantasy and spiritual values...(and) wants to tear men from their comfort".44 The first implies a version of pragmatic rationality attached to the exigencies of the practical and the "immediate". The second is properly administered by feeling, here a feeling solemnly venerated as the exclusive vehicle of the "beyond".

Closely akin to these are Kraus' notions, prime among which stands a firm and ardent adherence to the "'origin' of all values". In connection with his opinions about sex and women (both "centers" of abuse and distortion in the hypocritic late-Habsburg Viennese milieu) we may trace his account of reason and feeling, an account which, moreover, bears great relevance and is central to the many
diverse issues that concerned him.

He...maintained,...that 'rationality' is the distinguishing characteristic and exclusive property of the masculine, and 'emotion' that of the feminine...He did not exalt the rational element, but rather considered it as having a purely instrumental function in putting order into our activities... ...The emotional essence of woman is not wanton or nihilistic, but is rather a tender fantasy, which serves as the unconscious origin of all that has any worth in human experience. Herein lies the source of all inspiration and creativity. Reason itself is merely a technique, a means by which men obtain what they desire. In itself it is neither good nor evil, it is merely effective or ineffective. Reason must be supplied with proper goals from outside; it must be given direction of a moral or aesthetic type. The feminine fantasy fecundates the masculine reason and gives it this direction. The source of moral and aesthetic truth is, thus, the unity between feeling and reason; these two are complementary sides of one and the same coin. Yet fantasy remains the guiding element since, without proper feeling, without a sense of the value of things, reason becomes an instrument which makes the evil man only more effective in his male-factions. Kraus' point, then, is that the feminine is the source of all that is civilizing in society.45

But even more important than, and as a condition presupposed in their unity, reason and feeling had to be affirmed/alleged, each for its own part, as referring to entirely different realms. "The sphere of values", to which feeling alone can have access, "is altogether distinct from the sphere of facts", or of reason.
46 Ibid., p. 89.
Thus, in order to challenge what they consider the sovereign evil of their cultural milieu, i.e., mistaking the "urn" for the "chamber pot" and vice versa, with its many manifestations (on the level of art we have already hit upon two of them, i.e. popular taste and the estheticism of the artistic elite; a further one has been "the feuilleton, in which imagination runs riot with the facts", crucial for Kraus the journalist) and effect a resuscitation of the "origin of all values", both Kraus and Loos opted for, and undertook a "'creative separation' between the sphere of reason (.fact) and that of fantasy(.value)". 46

WITTGENSTEIN AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM

The above cases are but two explicit and articulate statements of a basic problem that was urgently felt by almost all branches of science and philosophy of the period. This problem essentially relates to the question of the extent to which language, or the many artificial systems of signs with the help of which man can communicate the proceedings of his mind (thoughts or emotional states), comprehend and explain the physical phenomena etc., supposedly fabricated on the basis of man's receptivity of messages from the external world (i.e., senses and sensations) can be thought of as reliable, as doing justice to the things communicated or the phenomena explained; in other words, it relates to the questions of whether language in general, "scientific" or "ordinary", 74
47 Ibid., p. 118.
48 Ibid., p. 184.
49 Ibid., p. 196.
can be trusted as a never-failing mechanism of transformation of actual facts into communicable signs and furthermore, to the question of whether such a truthful mechanism can effectively address all possible facts or part of them only, i.e., the question of its range of potentialities; and it leads to the grim suspicion that "language cannot express what is most real; this is something which remains forever private in the depths of the person's subjectivity".47 It is in this context that Wittgenstein can be viewed as a key, who, in his "Tractatus logico-philosophicus" affirmed that "All philosophy is critique of language" (4.0031), and who is said to have been much influenced by, and respectful of, Kraus' personality. Wittgenstein's "Tractatus" is such a critique, by whose means a "'logical scaffolding'" is constructed, "capable of modeling the whole world and, so, of furnishing the logical structure of all description.....By introducing names into this general system, we could then apply it to reality. The result would be ordinary language".48 By using the strict formality of neo-positivist propositional logic and applying it to language (as possibility of genuine description of the real world) it became possible "to show how far ordinary factual or descriptive language can legitimately be thought of ... as getting its literal, straightforward meaning", and consequently, "to underline the ethical point that all questions about value lie outside the scope of such ordinary factual or descriptive language".49 Another account that has been given of such a formally austere and logically implacable construction of language so as to make it legitimately

capable of description of the world, according to the postulates of propositional logic, arrives at the same concession as to its narrow scope:

At best, human thought is but a tiny, grammar-bound island, in the midst of a sea of feeling expressed by 'oh-oh' and sheer babble. The island has a periphery, perhaps of mud-factual and hypothetical concepts broken down by the emotional tides into the 'material mode', a mixture of meaning and nonsense. Most of us live the better part of our lives on this mud-flat; but in artistic moods we take to the deep, where we flounder about with symptomatic cries that sound like propositions about life and death, good and evil, substance, beauty, and other nonexistent topics. So long as we regard scientific and 'material' (semi-scientific), (i.e. that which is brought by means of what has been referred to as 'ordinary factual language'), thought as really cognitive of the world, this peculiar picture must stand. And as long as we admit only discursive symbolism as a bearer of ideas,...without the elements at least, of scientific grammar, conception must be impossible.50

So, then, Wittgenstein's famous work does nothing other than re-state in strict terminology and formalism what has already been Kraus' and Loos' deep conviction: the inevitability of a "radical separation of facts from values",51 i.e., of reason from feeling. So it is, furthermore, that "the Tractatus, is in fact...only half a critique. The ...'second part, that is the important one'" has not and could not have been written, since it consists in of the "unspeakable". And, finally, the
Tractatus becomes an expression of a certain type of language mysticism that assigns a central importance in human life to art, on the ground that art alone can express the meaning of life. Only art can express moral truth, and only the artist can teach the things that matter most in life...

...The Tractatus is..., by intention a polemic against the kind of rationalism that...shackles the human spirit. This rationalism had been the result of a failure to distinguish the legitimate sphere of rational speculation from that of fantasy.52

So far, we have been dealing with examples which to a greater or lesser degree demonstrate a will to separate reason from feeling, regardless of whether this separation is characterized by a permissiveness assigning to both a validity as capabilities and as territories of experience, or, instead, by an exclusiveness more or less ruling out the one and elevating the other to the status of monopolist of anything valid. However, the possibility either at best, of a harmonization-union of reason and feeling, or of a neutral co-existence, or even, of a promiscuity marking their relations has already been pointed out. Germs of this possibility of bringing together and interlocking reason and feeling, no matter of what kind this bringing-together is, must have been observed in the discussion, eg. of Kraus' ideal union of the two. It is with two examples of this possibility that the rest of this section will be concerned.
The English "Politeness"

It seems to me that the contribution to the discussions on taste, philosophy of esthetics, and art, by English thinkers chiefly but not exclusively in the second third of the 18th century, provides us with a striking instance of this possibility, which I would tend to designate the "politeness" of English esthetics. I think that the term "politeness" implies and at the same time reveals the then apparently dominating mood of not only acknowledging different values to reason and feeling, but also, of cautioning not to deprecate either of them, and furthermore of being determined to allow enough room for both in one and the same domain: that of esthetics and valid art. Specific, insulated, as it were, compartments could be formed by partitioning boldly the general and large field of applicability of good taste, and some of them would be readily commended to reason, others to feeling; as is here shown by William Mason.53

Whilst classic rules were suitable for houses,
shun we here
By those to form our ruins. Much we own
They please, when by Pannini's pencil drawn,
Or darkely graved by Piranesi's hand.
But the builder of classic ruins in England
builds but a splendid lie

And it was not just a matter of houses versus ruins; architecture in general and gardening; different classes or types of buildings;
Thus Hughe drew "a parallel between the classical writers and Spenser, and between Roman and Gothic architecture. 'In the former there is doubtless a more natural grandeur and simplicity; in the latter we find great mixture of beauty and barbarism, yet assisted by the invention of inferior ornaments; and though the former is more majestic in the whole, the latter may be very surprising and agreeable in its parts.' In 1725 Pope compared Shakespeare to a Gothic monument 'more strong and more solemn', even if less elegant and less 'glaring' than modern', i.e. classical "architecture"; or Walpole, in his "The Anecdotes of Painting", contrasted the pointed arch to the circular, the first considered as an improvement upon the latter, and as importing 'a thousand graces and effects, magnificent yet genteel, vast yet light, venerable and picturesque'. In Venturi, op. cit., pp. 164, 165.

different assemblages or ornaments or architectural elements; differently "spirited" or "disposed" arts; such was the scope of distinctions and contradistinctions that were assumed so as to achieve a credible applicability of this specific variation of the reason-feeling model.

"Lord Kames, for example, who disliked symmetry in gardens contended nevertheless that in organized bodies comprehended under one view, nature studies regularity, which for the same reason ought to be studied in architecture". Regularity along with "simplicity", "harmony" and "unity", which may be roughly construed as what at the time was believed to be the quintessence of Classical, 'rational' architecture, could, and should, in a sense, get along with "richness", "power", "complexity", and "combination of the greatest extremes", -the analogous quintessence of the Gothic-, since, after all, "both", complexes of properties, "are founded in essential and indestructible principles of human nature". Along similar lines, numerous comparisons were commonly drawn between species of "regular" and "irregular" art, aiming at vindicating both, while excessive care was taken not to encroach on one of the categories (eg. feeling), equipped with criteria proper only to the other (eg. reason): "if you judge Gothic architecture by Grecian rules you find nothing but deformity, but when you examine it by its own rules the result is quite different".

The entire mood of "politeness" which held reason and feeling

59 "Of the Standard of Taste", in loc. cit.

60 Ibid., p. 17.

61 Such a "true judge" moreover "is observed, even during the most polished ages, to be rare a character: strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character", Ibid., p. 17.
together in a state of promiscuity, might be thought of as exemplified in statements such as this, which, spiting the endurance and unanimously acknowledged validity of the classical, the rational, the regular "do...admit, that a well chosen irregularity is most pleasing". On a more theoretical level the "politeness" is exemplified, in a sense, by Hume, who assisted in restoring feeling to a foundation of taste, but, on the other hand, was in great pains to counterbalance it by a sort of counterpart; a rational "compass", so to speak. This counterpart, implied by the term "standard", was not reason throughout, but rather a rationalistic process natural to, and necessary for taste, by virtue of which feeling could become cultivated so as to attain a plausible validity and soundness and avoid arbitrariness when confronted with art. Towards this goal, feeling was increasingly confined within a narrow space surrounded by conditions, stipulations and prohibitions. Feeling should not be contaminated by prejudice as to that upon which it is supposed to issue a judgement of taste; it should be founded on a sound state of the mental faculties as well as on perfectly healthy sensory organs; by way of these basic presuppositions, it should progressively ascend, through practice and exercise and through the help of comparisons, to the attainment of delicacy and good sense.

All these precautions, as well as the confession that by feeling, or sentiment, as the basis of, and authority on taste, something far from the feeling or sentiment of anybody is meant, but alone that of "a true judge in the finer arts", leave too little untouched of the natural spontaneity and immediacy of feeling.
It may be thought that they amount to something very akin to reason and its corresponding rules of falsity and righteousness.

**TOWARDS A "GAME THEORY"**

What I comprehend as emerging out of this "polite" promiscuity of reason and feeling, as its message, so to speak, is a profound uneasiness. A sense of instinctual discomfort caused by a felt inefficacy of intellectual, analytic "tricks", such as reason vs. feeling, to render a convincing account of real processes, situations, feelings, thoughts, phenomena in general, whose internal complexity, detail, reciprocality, continuity and unlimited reducibility to further and further factors and possible explanations outweighs by far the simplificatory nature of the intellectual "tricks". An implicit acknowledgement, that, however well our categories be elaborated, however scrupulous their formulation so as to encompass as great a quantity of hues and variations of reality as possible, there is a certain level beyond which reality keeps going, and at which the potentialities of our separations and demarcations stop; that, past that level things develop and exist in a "real" state of promiscuity, or rather continuity which does not lend itself to analysis. It is an acknowledgement that suggests an abandonment of analysis with its bipartite, tripartite, or multipartite divisions, regardless of what is placed in each compartment of the schema thus produced, and taking over of
synthesis, of conceptions of unities and continuities instead of separations and independent domains. It is perhaps an implicit plea for that union aspired at by Kraus -reason and feeling being two sides of the same coin- although that view was still inextricably subject to the tactics of separation. It is not, however, a proposal to resume anything of the sort of the Pythagorean fusion, which, besides being as we have seen not a fusion based on proper equality of the terms involved, is inextricably rooted in the analytical habit of conjuring up pictures of the universe and its domains by way of intellectual abstractions. At any rate, it is likely to promote a frame of mind, which, with regards to the understanding and manipulation of reality, would abstain from any invocation of transcendence whatsoever; which, as to the ground of its interpretations of experience and man, would, rather than postulating reason and feeling as a prime, dominant criterion, turn towards the factual way in which things form themselves and towards the interactions between them and man: The use of a thing, the fact of the emergence of this use, the pragmatic criteria that bring it about or prevent it, the conditions under which it is made possible, all these factors rooted in actual experience, substituted for the non-empirical intellectual devices.

This re-orientation is what in fact took place in Wittgenstein's philosophical course following the Tractatus. In his "Philosophical Investigations" he had given up any intention at neatly separating spheres of experience with respect to the formal potentialities of
language. His deep concern was still with the extent to which some-
thing may be thought of as knowable and expressible; but he sought
"some alternative way of indicating how language does operate",
feeling that questions about how it ought to operate, however
plausibly answered, remained indifferent to reality.

"Rather, some way...(had to)...be found of bringing into the open
the human contingencies...presupposed in the adoption of our exist-
ing categories and concepts. In this way, the central philosophi-
cal problem with which Wittgenstein had been concerned throughout
drove him away from all questions about syntax and formal semantics,
and into...(the)...area of 'pragmatics' and 'psychologism'". Being,
then, in this "area", it was inevitable sooner or later, to admit

that the applicability or inapplicability of some...category
or concept depends, in practice, always on previous human
decisions, and that these decisions have become 'second
nature' to us, for one or both of two distinct reasons.
Either, the choices in question were made long ago in the
development of our culture, and (no occasion having arisen
for challenging them) their outcomes have been preserved
within our conceptual traditions ever since; or, alter-
atively, the practice of using an expression in our con-
ventional way, rather than in some conceivable alternative
way, is drilled into us so early in life that, until some
unforeseen contingency compels us to reconsider it, we
cease to think twice about it; or, most commonly, the
conceptual feature under discussion reflects choices taken
at forgotten branch points in conceptual development,
which are both ancient in terms of cultural history and
early in the development of the individual's habits of

speech and thought. 62

We are in this way driven towards a conception of the world outside us, and a tentative manipulation of it, which, while not necessarily dispensing with demarcations such as those discussed above, tends to observe actuality from a much more immediate standpoint, and take its spontaneity, naturalness, or even blindness and arbitrariness into due consideration. With respect to the hereby acknowledged continuity and inseparability, arbitrariness, contingency, or absurdity and inexplicability, instead of being banished to a clearly bounded "sea of oh-oh and sheer babble", or being thought of as the offspring of unguided, unfertilized reason, they are considered necessary elements in our relations to the world. Or, for instance, with regard to what are the factors of good art, of the beautiful, or the factors of pleasure resulting from its presence, and related questions, the possible answers, instead of being monopolized by either reason, or feeling, or instead of being dissected into parts in order to receive appropriate treatment by both, are now governed by a totally different pre-occupation: "it is not only difficult to describe what appreciation consists in but impossible. To describe what it consists in we would have to describe the whole environment". 63 Thus emerges the notion of the "game", ("language game", or "architectural game", "religious game", "esthetic game", etc.) generally, by which a context of actuality is meant, within which the play of the perennial interaction between man and man, and man and nature is performed according to rules that are
ceaselessly produced and abandoned only to be readopted and modified, in the best possible agreement with immediate needs and circumstances. In the next section the notion of "esthetic game" will be touched upon, as an improvement upon the notion of the reason-feeling dichotomy.
section ii
THE NOTION OF GAME

This heading obviously alludes to Wittgenstein's idea of "Language games". Nevertheless, a parallel between the sense in which I understand it and Popper's idea of "piecemeal social engineering" might be drawn. What is implied by the above phrase is roughly this: It is impossible either to get to know the causes of, or, consequently, to foretell, the directions/orientation that a society as a complex structure will take in the future. It is, in other words, impossible to acquire such knowledge totally and absolutely. Any posited, assumed, placated devices such as historical laws, a priori factors, etc., upon which such knowledge might be made to depend, are but dangerous simplifications. Societies as wholes move in a sphere of their proper reality, unattainable by either our explanatory constructa, or regulatory and directive inventions. However, as far as the task of improving social life is concerned, there is still one hope: to face situations and events, trends and classes, as being individual cases which may be tackled patiently and gradually, their interdependence nevertheless being taken into consideration, as opposed to any conception of them as being stably fixed into an irreversible schema granted absolute validity. So, instead of devising such schemata of social organization and evolution, and forcing reality and contingency to conform with them, one is more to the point if he considers that which he is faced
with, selects the more urgent elements out of it, hierarchizes priorities, and proceeds to tentative solutions liable to re-adjustment and elaboration. Hence "piecemeal social engineering" is juxtaposed to "holism".

This parallel should not make one think that in this section I intend to propose anything like a "method" appropriate to either interpreting or constructing esthetics. Not at all. The comparison was made solely by virtue of a certain affinity I discern between the need felt by Popper to abstain from grandiose systems claiming absolute validity in the field of sociology, and an analogous need in the field of esthetics. I simply intend to provide samples of how a way of seeing the phenomenon of taste presents itself, in accordance to which taste is nothing more or less than a particular "game" played within the scope of a greater "societal game"; to show, as far as this is possible, that this game acquires rules whose validity is unlikely to be found in any sort of transcendental spheres but rather lies upon the grounds of mere optimum choice in respect to present problems -biological, psychological, social, economic; these problems extend, in fact, over a very wide, practically ungraspable, surface; that as a consequence, the "game" is and can be played insofar as the rules are made known to the participants, i.e. that it is a conventional game. Then, I intend to bring forth a doubt: Is taste conventional and acquired throughout, or is there any opening through which claims of autonomy might creep in? Or, in the last analysis, how is it that claims on its
autonomy have at times been aroused, in spite of its more or less apparent foundation, dependence, upon needs, usages and potent but imperceptible interactions?

THE CONTINUITY AND HOMOGENEITY OF EXPERIENCE

The gods did not reveal, from the beginning, All things to us; but in the course of time, Through seeking, men find that which is better. ...........

But as for certain truth no man has known it, Nor will he know it; neither of the gods, Nor yet of all the things of which I speak. And even if by chance he were to utter The final truth, he would himself not know it; For all is but a woven web of guesses.65

This account given as to the possibility, (or, rather impossibility) or knowledge might be readily invoked as a corroboration for the notion of esthetic game. However, in a sense, it could not, since it presupposes the existence of absolute knowledge, its unattainability notwithstanding. (A similar view, at once corroborating and vitiating taste, or knowledge, or language etc. as essentially being "games" has been expounded in Berkeley's epistemology; which assumes the existence of both an "apparent" and a "real" world, the former being, at best, liable to empirical explanation and manipulation of its phenomena by way of formal, convenient, intellectual tools based on hypotheses (and in this 102
66 Ibid., ch. 6.

67 Collingwood, op. cit.
consists the "corroboration" of the "game" notion) but resisting any attempt at disclosing innate causes, which belong (and this constitutes the "vitiation") in the latter, inaccessible to anything but (perhaps) piety. Nevertheless, to such formulations which incept the taking of the step towards a concession of the full reality of the "game" but do not accomplish it for want of sufficient emancipation from the usual categories of the transcendental, Collingwood's conception of the processes of perception and expression, might be juxtaposed as a view favoring indivisibility both of human faculties and of experience. More specifically, according to this view, a "ladder", so to speak, is posited, along the length of which the faculties, from mere sensation to reason, are arranged as consecutive and interdependent steps. The starting point being the commonsense distinction between "real" sensations and "imaginary" ones, "real sensations" or mere sensory impressions constitute the first step. These refer to something momentary, passing away, being in a state of continuous flux but are, nevertheless, emotionally charged. It is exactly this possibility of emotional load of mere sensations that accounts for the following possibility, that of attention (i.e., consciousness) being addressed to, focusing upon them. By way of this act of attention/consciousness possibly picking up mere sensations, we move into the next step: Feeling as imaginative idea, as opposed to feeling as mere sensation, is in fact the latter (after an act of attention has been exerted upon it) transformed from something that is sheerly, automatically felt and lost, to be immediately
Ibid., p. 223
replaced by something of the same sort, into something stabilized, solidified, domesticated by consciousness. Thus, we have feeling-impression, or mere sensation, or "real" sensation, and feeling-idea, or "imaginary" sensation (the latter seized by consciousness, the former momentarily existing) as the two first steps of the 'ladder'. From the moment that the second step is effected, it becomes possible for a third to emerge. It arises out of a very specific need, namely, one founded upon the fact that "Imagination", (i.e., the second step), "resembles feeling", (i.e., the first), "in this, that its object is never a plurality of terms with relations between them, but a single indivisible unity: a sheer here and now". And this is quite natural, since its material is mere sensation unified and blurred, irrespective of the fact that it has been "stored". The third step, then, is the understanding whose material are the contents of the imagination, i.e., imaginative ideas, (or imaginative feelings) and whose function is to establish relations between them, as well as to refer them to the past, the future, other possible ideas of the imagination, or hypothetical ones; in other words to construct elaborate frames, the nodes of which are, as it were, the ideas of the imagination, the connecting rods, on the other hand, the relations between them, and to demolish and to reconstruct them according to criteria of truth and falsity, or conformity to planned purpose, etc. Finally, the fourth step is reason, which relates thoughts, i.e., acts of the understanding, in the same way that the understanding relates ideas of the imagination. Thus, reason apart, there exist "three
69 Ibid., pp. 212-213. The above sketchy exposition is a free rendering of chs. VIII, IX, X.

70 Ibid., pp. 109, 110, 111.
stages in the life of feeling. First,...bare feeling, below the level of consciousness. Secondly,...feeling of which we have become conscious. Thirdly,...feeling which, in addition to becoming conscious of, we have placed in its relations to others". Therefore, as a first consequence of this view, with regard to the present argument, I would point out the assertion that the material with which our faculties operate is homogeneous.

In addition, feeling, which is used in a broad sense so as to encompass perception and conception, is here considered intrinsically linked to its expression. For instance, to have an emotion, is, roughly, to have it in an inchoate, unintelligible form. In this form, it is disturbing, irrespective of whether it is a pleasant or unpleasant one, but merely due to its unknowability and incomprehensibility. It is in this sense that expressing this emotion by means of language in general, which might equally mean speech, gesture, drawing, etc., i.e., finding a comprehensible outlet for it, is accompanied by relief, a sense that things are being settled, becoming understood. Nonetheless, it is exactly this bringing about of intelligibility, fundamental to expression, that involves a presence of consciousness. Thus a second intrinsic link is implied, this time between expression and the 'upwise' procession and stabilization of experience from the lower to the higher steps of the 'ladder'. This, however, does not mean that expression, as a dynamic movement from incomprehensibility to comprehensibility
71 Ibid., pp. 229 ff.
72 Ibid., p. 229.
necessarily accompanying feeling, is to be identified with the overall process of perception. Certainly, this is not the case since expression is said to go along with feeling, and feeling as has been stated, may exist on any of three different levels, not only on all three simultaneously, or exclusively on the third, i.e., that of intellectual relationships, somehow considered the 'culmination' of the preceding ones. Accordingly, there can be three levels of expression. I will briefly present them so as to have the question of this second link clarified. Expression may and does accompany feeling at a level where it is still crude and unprocessed, i.e. the first 'step' of the 'ladder'. Collingwood labels it "psychical expression" and is as automatic and pre-conscious as the organism's function of receiving sensory messages, because its linkage to the corresponding feelings is equally automatic and preconscious. It is the case of the immediate connection between pain (feeling) and grimace (expression), which "is in one way like that between a sensum and its emotional charge...; The two things connected are not two distinct experiences, but are elements in one indivisible experience", made manifest in being expressed.

Every kind and shade of emotion which occurs at the purely psychical level of experience has its counterpart in some change of the muscular or circulatory or glandular system which expresses it. Even men, whose sense of smell is so feeble, can discover that certain emotions in their fellow men occasion peculiar...

74 Collingwood, op. cit., p. 225.

75 Ibid., p. 238.

76 Ibid., p. 244.
scents by causing glandular discharges. To an animal whose sense of smell is so accurate as a dog's, I suppose there is a 'language' of scent as expressive as the 'language' of involuntary facial gesture is to us.73

Expression and accompanying feeling at the level of the second 'step' of the 'ladder', is termed "imaginative expression" and is distinct from "psychical expression" in the same sense that an "idea of the imagination" is distinct from an "impression of the senses", in that it involves an interference of consciousness, and is thereby self-conscious, however inarticulate. Language in its first stage, i.e., before "adapting itself to the requirements of the intellect",74 is an instance of it. "Imaginative expression" as a result of its being involved with consciousness, attention and the concomitant focusings upon the details of the sensory field, or in other words, as a result of its object occupying a far wider spectrum of emotions (ideas of the imagination) than sheer momentary impressions, is, although inarticulate, much more multiple than "psychical expression". "Thus the imaginative experience creates for itself, by an infinite work of refraction and reflection and condensation and dispersal, an infinity of emotions demanding for their expression an infinite subtlety in the articulations of the language it creates in expressing them".75 Since "the expression of emotion is not, as it were, a dress made to fit an emotion already existing, but is an activity without which the experience of that emotion cannot exist",76 "what then, do we mean when we say
77 Ibid., p. 238
that the artist finds expression for an emotion hitherto unexpressed?" 77 What is meant, Collingwood answers, is the follow-
ing: An emotion belonging to the conscious level, i.e., an idea of the imagination, has two facets, is of a dual nature: on the one hand there is its "material" aspect, consisting in the "psychic matter" of the emotion, i.e., its constituent impressions, or transient sensa emotionally tinged; on the other, there is the "formal" aspect being the new form that has been given to the above matter by consciousness, (i.e., an act of attention), i.e., the stabilization and domestication of the sensory impressions. The latter facet, as opposed to the former, (which is amendable to automatic "psychic expression"), is the one which needs to be given its proper expression and it is this expression which is simultaneous to the formation in the consciousness of the emotion.

This, then, is the meaning of the assertion that expression adheres inextricably to feeling and, at the same time, to the feeling's bringing into consciousness. That is, the link between expression and feeling apart, it is a matter rather of the link of imaginative expression to consciousness, than of expression, general, to consciousness, since expression may exist pre-consciously ("psychic" level), but also at a level above mere consciousness, which is its third level, at which it is adapted to the needs of the understanding, and at which it issues in language proper.
Ibid., pp. 224, 246.
Therefore, we may infer that this view provides us with two parallel and inseparable 'ladders'. Along the first experience is transformed into feeling. Along the second feeling is expressed. Neither can exist independently of the other. And here it is that we may extract an element crucial to the 'game' argument. So far the discussion of Collingwood's views of the mechanism of perception/expression has centered upon the premise of continuity of experience, and of the successive stages/strata of feeling-perceiving-expressing. It is this reducibility of the one stage to the other, (if one considers the 'ladder' process 'downwise'), and inversely, this building up of each successive layer-step on the basis of the previous one (if one looks at the 'ladder' upwards) that constitutes a basic characteristic of the 'game' notion. By virtue of this, elaborate Constructa of the 'game', (things, images, concepts, practices, manners, habits, etc.) brought about by and situated at one of the higher 'steps', might be found to be ultimately reducible to the 'biological'/ 'natural' immediacy of the lower levels. It is in such a sense that dance has been considered the "mother of all languages" and bodily expressions as valid languages i.e., in the sense that the organism's total receptivity and responsiveness (i.e., roughly speaking, feeling and expression) to experience may be thought of as formulating a total bodily language to which vocal language stands as mere part; after all, vocal language is but movement of bodily parts, lips, tongue, throat, lungs; all these being considered
79 Ibid., pp. 230-231.

80 "Sight of someone in pain, or the sound of his groans, produces in us an echo of his pain, whose expression in our own body we can feel in the tingling or shrinking of skin areas, certain visceral sensa, and so forth". Ibid., p. 231.

81 A somewhat similar view with respect to the social sciences, especially liable to a 'game' methodological treatment, is expressed by Popper when he says: "It is...obvious...that we cannot see and observe our objects before we have thought about them." Popper, "Poverty of Historicism", op. cit., p. 135; also Scruton, R., "The Aesthetics of Architecture", Princeton University Press, 1979, pp. 23 ff, for an attack on what Scruton labels "constructivism".
as elements of an elaborate system of "expressive gesture" whose origin undoubtedly lies in the various forms of "psychic expression". If, furthermore, there exists an attested strange "contagiousness" of feelings at the psychic level, even in the case where communication of the feeling by speech or individual experience of it are lacking, as e.g., in the case of spreading panic; a contagiousness possible merely on the grounds of the communicability of the feeling by its "psychic", automatic expression, how much more possible might an analogous contagiousness, or to put it differently, a communal 'obsession' be at the level of 'naturalized' feelings, or even thoughts, where communicability is further enforced by conscious processes? (Granted that such 'obsession', or habituation through reciprocal reference from one individual to the other, has its ancestry in the above "psychic" contagiousness). Thus, this theory, the excursion into which is rewarding, both avoids any stepping into transcendence, and does justice to the 'naturalness' of the game notion by not postulating a priori conceivability or directability of our mental formations since nothing is felt until expressed in a manner that involves summoning up and close interaction, reciprocal reference of all our organic/mental capacities.
A hint of this has already been given in the first section; discussion on Democritus and the Sophists.

UTILITY

The above considerations make way for the idea of utility: utility conceived in its broadest possible sense including both mere usefulness or propriety of an object with respect to its purpose, as well as a sense in which utility refers to selective adaptation to a milieu. This might be thought of as referring to an organism's adaptation to his biological-ecological-natural surroundings; or to a concept, practice, activity, habit being formed so as to serve its claim in the best possible way; or, to man's natural tendency to attune himself to the circumstances, these circumstances ranging from apparent ones, as e.g. need for food, to the most subtle and imperceptible, such as a need to employ his faculties of sensing, feeling, perceiving, conceiving in convenient and rewarding manners, avoiding superfluities, as far as this is possible. From such a standpoint, positing utility as an all-pervading natural network underlying as necessary condition all existence, and thence, experience, even "obedience to God or reason can originally recommend itself to a man as the surest and ultimately least painful way of balancing his aims and synthesizing his desires". Utility comes forth as a consequence of the above discussion in virtue of that possibility of further and further reducibility until a mere organic level is reached. Such a level is very akin to biological considerations about evolution of organic forms according to principles of organization based, among other things, on natural selection, adaptation, "equilibrium with the prevailing forces of the environment..."
84 Ibid., pp. 96 ff.
85 Ibid., pp. 100, 132.
Gravity, for instance, is in itself a chaotic force;... But the result is not chaos, because matter arranged in some ways is welded together by the very tendency which disintegrates it when arranged in other forms. Natural selection is, then, one of the forms of this generalized utility. Architectural style, for instance, may be considered as a remote echo, a higher and more sophisticated reflection of this fundamental function:

Various forms arise by mechanical necessity... These are perpetuated by a selection in which the needs and pleasures of man are the environment to which the structure must be adapted. Determinate forms thus establish themselves...(and)...the line of use, by habit of appreciation, becomes the line of beauty.

This, very schematically illustrates a process fundamental to the 'game' notion from the lower and necessary, to the higher and conventional.

CONVENTIONALIZATION

It is this process which is in fact essential to the assertion that the social give-and-take serves as the furnace, as it were, in which language, as an intrinsic need in man, becomes elaborate, articulate, conventional, so as to be transformed from its crude form, in which it is "a vocal actualization of the tendency to see
reality symbolically" into that "complicated and refined...form in which it is known today". Utility in this generalized sense, then, and the 'ladder' model, may account for the conventionalization of human activities. To pick up religion as an example, the origins of religious rites have been thought of as possibly lying in self-releasing, self-expressive, spontaneous movements and sounds. These acts have probably undergone a gradual process of schematization, conventionalization, and fixation by way of which they were elevated to the status of signifying something communicable. From the private world of the individual they are transferred to the public world of the community: "But soon the outburst becomes a habitual reaction and is used to demonstrate, rather than to relieve, the feelings of individuals". Something self-expressive, becomes logically expressive: a transition from a "sign of the emotion" to a "symbol of it". The unifiability (in that it exists solely as a whole) and uniqueness (in that it cannot be resumed, repeated, re-performed) of the first, is contrasted to the second which involves "an articulation of feelings. The ultimate product of such articulation is not a simple emotion, but a complex, permanent attitude" revealed through formalized, conventionalized gesture. In this context, then, religious rite ends up by being a "disciplined rehearsal of 'right attitudes'... Yet", the meaning of the convention, deeply rooted in "the exigencies of current life" to which "emotional attitudes are always closely linked..., is in this cryptic form...recognized". This recognizability is brought
analogous account of the factor of social contagiousness, is rendered for instance in Freud, S., "Totem and Taboo", N.Y., e.g., "We have interpreted the power of contagion which inheres in the taboo as the property of leading into temptation, and of inciting to imitation", ibid., p. 46.

about both by the gradually established convention-symbol and by the factor of contagiousness: "Religious rejoicing is bound entirely to set occasions, when the God-symbol - which probably is always there, tucked away into its shrine - is brought forth and officially contemplated. Even this is not enough; someone leads the shouting and makes a demonstration of joy; gradually the feeling develops and delight seizes the congregation."87

PREJUDICE

Karl Popper somewhere gives an account88 of the prehistory of Newton's theory of dynamics which I believe is highly relevant to our 'game' argument, and specifically, to the related issue of gradual éloignement of concepts, precepts, ideas etc., from their initial matrix of immediate interaction with material reality, i.e., the issue of conventionalization. The basic idea underlying his story is that "it is historically false to believe that Newton's dynamics were derived from observation". For Copernicus, who had already prepared the ground for Newton, placed "the sun rather than the earth in the center of the universe" as a result of a new interpretation of old and well-known facts in the light of semi-religious Platonic and Neo-Platonic ideas. The crucial idea can be traced back to the sixth book of Plato's Republic, where we can read that the sun plays the same role in the realm of visible

things as does the idea of the good in the realm of ideas. Now the idea of the good is the highest in the hierarchy of Platonic ideas. Accordingly the sun... (since)... it was to be given pride of place... (since it)... merited a divine status in the hierarchy of visible things, then it was hardly possible (for it)... to revolve about the earth. The only fitted place for so exalted a star was the center of the universe.

This is a striking illustration of that dominant element of the 'game' notion, in virtue of which a more or less ineradicable conception, a preconceived idea, a pre-sentiment, situated ideally in a line of continuity leading back to increasingly elementary interactions of man's organism and sensitivity with experience, becomes the sturdy ground of our assumptions and conventions. "This becomes clear if we remember that most of our scientific theories originate in myths." And it is not only myths or religious beliefs that play this role: "at no stage of scientific development do we begin without something in the nature of a theory, such as a hypothesis, or a prejudice, or a problem - often a technological one-...".

'CAPRICE'

Our 'games, then, more or less remotely grounded in the immediacy, organicity, essential/natural utility and necessity of the inter-
This phenomenon appears to bear a similarity with the psychoanalytic idea of "autonomization" of an activity in the life of the individual; by which is meant something of the sort of a gradual estrangement of an activity initially brought about as an immediate reaction to a "psychic conflict", as an attempt to resolve it, and directly connected to it, from the "psychic conflict" considered the source, the generating ground of the activity. Thus, the activity, at "increasing distance from direct reaction to the traumatic experience, distance from immediacy of discharge", become eventually "detached from the original conflict which may have turned interest and proclivity into the specific direction", Kris, op. cit., pp. 29,30.
action between our sensible selves and experience, move gradually into conventionality and eventually, *vis inertiae*, step into a sphere of seeming autonomy in which any sense of origin is lost sight of. In that sphere, the phenomenon presents itself of the emergence of all sorts of strange variations to already established motifs, of abrupt shifts, alternations, rise and fall of successive doctrines, theories, concepts, phrases, all these occurring with no apparent justification, accompanied by no explicit awareness of a foundation upon which to be based, and brought about in the absence of any actual, observable need. In that sphere there reigns the image of a pageant of strange, uninvited, more or less absurd and uncontrollable thoughts, acts, decisions or habits that tend to redirect the 'game' towards unforeseeable destinations, almost in defiance of its rules, based on utility and fundamental necessities. It is as though that part of the 'game' actuated on the upper levels-steps of the 'ladder' tends to a certain degree of independence of the remainder; to release itself, as it were, from the constraints dominating the whole, and to posit its own rules for itself. And, in fact, this seems to be roughly the case. But this does not constitute a defiance of the rules of the 'game'. It is actually one of its essential principles, in fact another way of coming to what we have referred to as lack of any *a priori* predictability or directability of its future course. However, at least as an *a posteriori* measure, it has been suggested that an estimation might be possible, of
92 "The Poverty of Historicism", op. cit., p. 149.

93 Ibid., p. 147 and Gombrich, E., "The Logic of Vanity Fair", in Paul Schilpp, ed. "Karl Popper", 2 vols, The Library of Living Philosophers, vol. II, p. 926. Gombrich gives a hint with regard to the question of how this phenomenon insinuating unforeseeability into the 'game' can, in the last analysis, appear even in "closed" societies where, presumably, the degree of attachment to principles purporting natural and organic necessity and utility is greater. He states that this game of deviation from the norm for the sake of prestige may commonly be institutionalized and ritualized in such societies, in defiance of all rationality, i.e. at the expense of expenditure of goods and resources, possible alteration of local ecological balance etc.; "yet it is hard to see how the individual, caught up in the situation, can avoid these unintended consequences of his bid without foregoing the necessary prestige", "...Vanity Fair...", in loc. cit., pp. 927, 938. After all may we not take such elaborate and sophisticated 'irrationalities', as essentially springing from fundamental and natural traits of the human character?

94 Ibid., pp. 928, 929.
"the deviation of the actual behavior of people from the model behavior", i.e., that which can be determined on the basis of the element of potential rationality, "using the latter as a kind of zero co-ordinate". An instance of the nature of these, as it were, self-legislative acts of the 'game', occurring at its conventionalized levels and arising out of no conspicuous need, or utility, etc. might be discerned in "the way...in which competition" founded in "intentional human actions", "leads to unintended consequences", in, say, the field of economy or that of fashion. "All we need...is the assumption that departure from a norm will arouse attention. Given the desire of a member of...(a)...group to focus attention on himself, the rational means for that purpose are therefore at hand". Such moves of the game are intrinsic characteristics of it, though they evince an outer surface or rationally articulated irrationalities. However "foolish" the fashion "game", for example, may be "it does not preclude rationality on the part of the players. Nevertheless, "whatever rationalization we may be able to produce for our habit of shaving, to bearded nations or periods this fashion must surely look...unnatural and excessive... In all these matters some departure from the norm of apparel and appearance must at first have drawn attention for its rarity"; whereby, "fashion can be described in terms of rarity game". So, in such cases, we may discern two agents: the initiator of a fashion, or the departure, or the shift, or, generally, the novel move apparently unjustifiable by the rules of the game, on the one hand; and the public on the
Ibid., pp. 928, 929.
other, before which two alternatives are placed: Either to discard the move as "an improfitable eccentricity", which we may term the 'opponent-trend', or to emulate it, adopt it and assimilate it to the normal behaviour which, on the other hand, may be viewed as the 'follower-trend'. We might say that these two agents form a sort of dialectical relationship, in the sense that if the disposition of the public tends toward following and adopting the move, induced by a desire similar to that of the initiator, aiming at attracting attention, then the more this disposition gains impetus, (i.e., the more the 'follower-trend' is actuated) the more the "original purpose" of the move "will be defeated", since the move will thus become assimilated, widespread, established, and no attention will anymore be aroused in its presence. Consequently, "leaders of fashion will have to think up a new gimmick", but on the other hand "the opponents of the" (eventually established) "fashion will discover to their chagrin that now it is they who are conspicuous in the rarity game, they attract unwelcome attention by their refusal to fall in".95 This potential changeability and imminent possibility of re-orientation constitutes, with regard to the fashion 'game', an illustration of that general possibility of deviation which the above cited "zero co-ordinate" purports to estimate. It is obvious that such a model cannot be stable and permanent. It is as contingent and fluid as the game it supposedly provides a standard for. In fact, any move, which is subject to the 'measurements', so to speak, of the "zero co-ordinate" model as long as it
Ibid., p. 931. Also Goodman, N. "Languages of Art", 1976, p. 80, "Since metaphor depends upon such transient factors as novelty and interest, its mortality is understandable. With repetition, a transferred application to a schema becomes routine, and no longer requires or makes any allusion to its base application. What was novel becomes commonplace, its past is forgotten, and metaphor fades to mere truth". And figure 2, p. 82.
is still a mere "intentional human action", upon the condition that it becomes an "unintended social repercussion", 'eats up' the model, eliminates it, or rather forces it to shift into a new position and to assume a new constellation. It is by virtue of this peculiar characteristic of the model/move, or public/initiator relationship that I have termed it a dialectical relationship.

Rarity of a move for the sake of resulting attention, i.e., a propensity towards 'showing-off' is not the sole 'rule', or 'principle' engendering such unexpectable shifts chiefly at the higher levels of the 'game's' hierarchical schema. Another factor is "inflationary debasement (which) usually takes its departure from the need for increasing emphasis... Here", i.e., in respect of language, "the process of inflation...has more than a superficial resemblance to the debasement of currency. Words originally coined as the rarest tokens of exceptional emphasis rapidly sink down to the small change of the advertiser and the school boy's slang... 'Large'" (in a corresponding example of a tooth-paste, advertised in three sizes, 'large', 'jumbo', and 'mammoth') "has come to mean the smallest".96 This process readily reminds one of the transformation experience undergoes as it becomes increasingly processed by the successive steps of the 'ladder' hierarchical schema, i.e., as it becomes variously used, so to speak, by the game. It was conceived by Fritz Mauthner in a manner similar to the previous one: "The cultural languages of our age are...sick, rotten to the

core... The languages of sophistication have all developed through metaphorization and have all become childish as the meanings of the metaphors were forgotten".97

In the face of this potential imminence of inflationary metamorphosis of a language game two general attitudes emerge which, driven to their extremes appear as licentiousness, on the one hand, brought about by and in turn furthering a broad scope of choice effected by coining new words, and restraint on the other, adhering to tradition. So on the one hand there is an approval and adoption of neologism, analogous to the 'follower-trend' discussed above with regard to competing exhibitionism, and on the other hand there is a wish for the already existent to persist; an intention to safeguard it against corrosive neologism; a "purism" which preaches a restricted, "closed", unrenewed language.98 The first attitude tends to produce a shift of the 'zero model'. The second tends to keep it where it is.

These possibilities of changing the direction of a game, and its rules, thus forcing it insidiously to assume a new formation/constellation, being but examples of a great number of possible factors of change, are crucial to the phenomenon of stylistic evolution.
CONFLICT

When examining the stages which the enterprise of creating form (of architecture or of the city) has gone through one gradually realizes and is finally struck by the frequency of reappearance of ideas, preferences, and formal elements which, at a first glance, have been thought of as left behind, buried in the past, definitely and irreversibly obsolete. All the more so, when such recurrences are attested in periods other than those in which a revival or revalidation is generally taken for granted, e.g. the Renaissance; that is, in periods which, on the contrary, are generally assumed to cherish the seeds of 'modernism', to effect a digression from the hitherto maintained continuity, to constitute a bold clash with the past, thus changing essentially the course and direction of history. With regard to such periods, and in defiance of any ordered and neatly 'packed' expectations on the part of the observer, such recurrences undermine a felicitious state of certainty that would be most desirable concerning the process of re-tracing the already accomplished course of events. It is such recurrences that shed the scene with perplexity and incomprehensibility. And contrariwise to what might be hoped at first glance, i.e., that recurrences of already witnessed and known ideas, deeds, situations are likely to facilitate a relatively smooth systematization of the successive historical scenes deployed before the observer, this does not appear to be the case. Several reasons, by virtue of which an overwhelming complexity is involved in this apparently simple phenomenon are
100 It might be effected for reasons of propaganda, or as justification for political or other innovations/alternations. For instance, Collins' account of the establishing of Greek Doric forms as the official style in America immediately after the Revolution, as closely related to the republican fervor of the period, Collins, op. cit., p. 88. And Gombrich, E., "Renaissance and the Golden Age", in "Norm and Form", Phaidon, 1978.
responsible for this.

Firstly, it has been claimed, and now certainly constitutes for us an indisputable reality, that "the experience of the repeated event is not the same as the experience of the original event". Repetition cannot escape novelty. Thus (the care with which repetition is brought about, its precision notwithstanding) it is intrinsically contaminated by the seeds of novelty. The replica is not anymore what it causes to re-exist. This essential factor of changeability necessarily bestowed upon a repetition, a recurrence, demonstrates how a good deal of perplexity emerges in the observation of seemingly manageable recurrences. Moreover, a recurrence may at a certain time be the outcome of a more deliberate and conscious decision, whereas, at another moment it may have been already completely effected before its presence has been clearly noticed. The relative degrees of consciousness, in the presence and under the surveillance of which a recurrence comes about is another powerful diversifying factor. Both a 'conscious' and an 'unconscious' recurrence are brought about amidst an entirety of circumstances which are unlikely to bear any similarity to those having originally circumscribed the object of the recurrence. Whereas a 'conscious' recurrence is conceivably brought about on the basis and for the sake of issues more or less extraneous to the object undergoing alteration, i.e., to the stylistic game, on the other hand, a more 'unconscious' recurrence, indicates the many levels, interconnections, interactions,
the complex grid of interdependence operating between the many aspects of a certain society, or more specifically, between the many fields of its intellectual life, so that if one (or a number) of these aspects undergoes an alteration, a re-orientation (not at all necessarily towards the past), a response on the part of another aspect may be elicited, and this response may in turn 'unconsciously' (i.e., not proceeding towards the accomplishment of a prefixed objective) incorporate an unexpected revalidation of past forms. The contamination of repetition by change, the purposive distortion of either the 'original' or its resumption so as to make an inflexion towards each other (usually for the sake of justifying the latter) seem plausible, the recurrence brought about surreptitiously by conditions having no direct connection with it, the continuous alteration of circumstances, in spite of the apparent permanence of certain forms, an alteration that, at bottom, renders the permanence insignificant; all these form a body of factors that causes our initial hope at mastering the endless succession of forms by an act of simple catalogizing ('Greek' periods, 'Roman' periods, etc.) to collapse. Neither does some certain comfort come from another direction, i.e., fixing definitely diverse scenes of formal constellations, and hierarchizing them according to an unequivocal schema of advancement, because the recurrences are nevertheless present, conspicuous, and impelling the observer to attend to them. One is therefore, so to speak, confronted with a hermaphrodite situation, including at once persistence and renewal.
Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 75-76.
Commenting upon the same phenomenon of stylistic change and, hence, upon the possibilities we might have of rendering reliable accounts of it, Kaufmann stated the impotence of what he terms the "apex view" of history, i.e., the simplificatory approach treating the succession of styles as though they were distinct species, and accordingly classifying them using as dominant criterion merely formal similarities or differences. Such a view would tend to pack together formal or stylistic incidents on the one hand and their possible recurrences in the subsequent course of history as though they were more or less identical. But the reliability of the "apex" method is jeopardized by the fact that the single forms have a certain persistency. Or, to put it the other way round: man does not forget completely the forms his ancestors have devised. There have always been 'revivals', and there always will be. There is, however, a great difference between the Gothic and the Gothic revival. There is another, deeper-rooted and deeper-going change besides the periodic appearance and re-appearance of forms, namely, the change in the inter-relation of the parts - or, in what I propose to term the system. It is the system change that makes the difference between Gothic and Gothic revival, between Roman and Renaissance architecture, and so forth.

Although here the "system" implies the constellation of a specific phase of the game, it does not refer to the multitude of circumstances that surround, and interact with, style but rather to the stylistic game in isolation, i.e., its forms and the manner in which they are
102 See above, conscious-unconsciousness recurrences, pp. 142 ff.

103 "The Logic of Vanity Fair", loc. cit., pp. 934, 935.
Accordingly, the idea of safeguarding a specific game from the corrosive effects of the emergence of precedents/potential overthrowers, has been described as essential to the formation of taboos. "Totem and Taboo", op. cit., ch. II.
intermingled. However, he somehow modifies this narrow account by holding that systems are indicative of the "general mental attitude" of a period, and thus extends it. Although forms are contingent to the prevailing system, "forms and system, however, become antagonistic when forms of an earlier system recur in a later one because of some new scholarly interest in them, or for some other extra-artistic reason". It is thus a matter of warfare, as it were, between the system and the potentiality of emergence of 'uninvited' forms; a state of alertness in which the system has to exist continuously, so as to safeguard and maintain its existence. But since the system itself consists of, harbors, all those inconspicuous factors threatening to undermine its balance, we are again facing the idea of unpredictibility of the 'game' and the 'follower-trend' or 'licentious neologism', vs 'opponent-trend' or 'restrictive purism' picture. The second part of this relation-picture, seems partly to base its workings and attitudes toward sticking to an immovable tradition on a fear of creating precedents that might contingently develop into the grounds for future alterations and substitutions. "'Do not start things, it must not become an institution'. The 'it' which is to be avoided is...the emergence of a new tradition which will exact the repetition of an act or a favour which was intended to be taken in its own right. The link between this problem and that of inflation is obvious".
104 "The Logic of Vanity Fair", loc. cit., p. 942.

105 "Norm and Form", op. cit., p. 83.

106 Ibid.
Therefore, we come to the issue of polarized camps, the emergence of polarities as mutually repulsive attitudes towards the same thing, which is one further characteristic of the game notion. It is directly connected to the phenomenon of the changeability of the 'zero' constellation of the 'game'. Polarities may emerge when it comes to decide upon the adoption or not of a 'new' at the expense of an 'old', when both are considered worthwhile and especially when the 'old' is "charged with emotion". In a sense, the entire history of styles and taste may be viewed in terms of such emergent polarities, which, for a moment, appear to dissolve into a sort of stability and unanimity, only for the latter to be re-brought after a more or less short rest into a relation of militating duality, juxtaposed to a new adversary. An early instance of acknowledgement of such a polarity, is provided by Vitruvius who condemned "the license and illogicality of the decorative style fashionable in his age", which was characterized by an entire mood of indifference towards the rational possibilities that could be derived from a careful observation and attentive imitation of Nature and reality.

But those subjects which were copied from actual realities are scorned in these days of bad taste. We now have fresco paintings of monstrosities, rather than truthful representations of definite things. For instance, reeds are put in the place of columns, fluted appendages with curly leaves and volutes, instead of

pediments, candelabra supporting representations of shrines, and on top of their pediments numerous tender stalks and volutes growing up from the roofs and having human figures senselessly seated upon them; sometimes stalks having only half-length figures, some with human heads, others with the heads of animals. Such things do not exist and cannot exist and never have existed. Hence, it is the new taste that has caused bad judges of poor art to prevail over true artistic excellence. For how it is possible that a reed should really support a roof...or that roots and stalks should produce now flowers and now half-length figures? Yet when people see these frauds, they find no fault with them, but on the contrary are delighted and do not care whether any of them can exist or not. 107

This is a manifestation of the uneasiness of the system, or established norm, when threatened by 'the precedent'. It is significant to note here that the protesting voice comes from the side of a norm which had been founded upon the conception of art as imitation, or craft; a norm whose validity rested upon the practicality and naturalistic plausibility of the moves it allowed; a norm in the centre of which lay the pre-occupation with decorum, propriety or fitness of an object or form, with respect to its own existence or its probable use. In other words it is significant to relate this protesting voice advocating adherence to utility, (a fundamental characteristic of the 'game,' as we have seen), to the fact that in many cases - though probably not in the specific one just discussed - the threatening new move is the result of technical progress 108 which too, is based on utility. In this sense it has
Ibid.

It is also interesting to observe in this connection that the fact of technical innovation, which is directly involved in the concept of utility, and hence, the rootedness of the 'game' in practicality and the necessary interactions of man with his environment, in the form in which it was caught up and applied to art in the Renaissance, progressively caused art to move farther and farther away from its medieval dependence upon the guilds and closely-knit social context. From that point onwards, "the artist had not only to think of his commission but of his mission." As a consequence art, made more or less independent of the material bonds of craftsmanship, came to be thought of as "a demonstration, an intellectual problem-solution" and ended up in becoming "a revolution which has its martyrs who produced art for art's sake in increasing isolation from public demand." "Norm and Form", op. cit., pp. 3, 8, 10.


been maintained that technical innovations have in repeated instances offered the stimuli, formed the grounds for a transition from a constellation/organization of the game around a propensity towards the schematic, to one bearing increasingly naturalistic traits. This picture of a path leading to increasing degrees of naturalism, formed by virtue of technical innovations, could serve as a possible interpretation for the shift from archaic to classical Greek art or from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance.

Let us consider some further instances of polarity. It has been stated that "it can...be argued that the Neoclassic style...found metaphysical justification in Kant's Critique of the Esthetic Judge- ment, for there are indications enough to show that the philosopher of Königsberg wrote that work as if the Neoclassic were the ultimate art". Indeed for Kant,

in painting, sculpture, and in all the formative arts...the delineation (Zeichnung) is the essential thing; and here it is not what gratifies in sensation but what pleases by means of its form...that is fundamental for taste. The word 'Zeichnung' is used to refer to a drawing, sketch or design in the sense of presentation of figures or shapes by means of lines (rather than by color masses or planes). In other discussions of form, Kant speaks explicitly of figure and shape...as being what we are to contemplate or judge in the experience of the beautiful.

In connection to this quotation one can hardly fail to recall that...
113 de Saisselin, op. cit., p. 1.

114 Ibid., p. 4.


117 Ibid., p. 147.

118 For instance, Holt, op. cit., on Ingres, p. 37.

119 Pevsner, op. cit., p. 195.

120 Ibid., p. 207.
Neoclassicism, besides being formed on "the belief that history was governed by eternal rules... (and that it was) a compound of natural and moral law", ended up by becoming, in the beginnings of the 19th c., an "eminently teachable style", dominated by merely technical rules, and at its best, expressing a "sort of material beauty, which excluded the impression of divinity. This fault... (being)... one of feeling and not of science." To rectify this flaw was one of the main concerns of the early Romantics who posited quests for 'genius' in art, as opposed to strict rules, and disputed the primacy of 'design' over 'coloring' by discarding the former as "mere deftness". This was reflected in the well known ruthless war waged by the "draughtsmen" against the "colorists" and vice versa. Now, the fact that Neoclassicism, which was partly incited by a virile and "heroic" reaction against the academic "flippancies" that dominated early 18th c. official art, became gradually reconciled with Academic institutions, served "to satisfy the vanity of princes", to be eventually accused "in spite of its divine descent" as "the mercenary servant of the profligate great", has been considered a "whim of history". By a similar "whim", so to speak, was Cezanne 'destined' to play a role analogous to that of adolescent Neoclassicism, this time attacking 'Neoclassicism academized' and its doctrines, and laying out the way for a good deal of 20th c. approaches to art and form, still extant. But it is not without significance for this argument that Cezanne, in spite of his pioneering attitudes, "perceived a geometric form underlying
121 Holt, op. cit., p. 524.


123 See note 105.
the confusion of nature, found a confirmation for it in Kant's esthetic theories, and insisted that "good studies made after nature...is the best thing". Nevertheless, he sought the "natural law" by a completely different way than that of Neoclassicism. Early 'chaste' Neoclassicism and late 'perverse' Neoclassicism, 'medievalizing' Romanticism and Academicism, all deeply rooted in the past, while at the same time (either by means of consonances or dissonances) giving way to Cézanne, who, in turn, was to be superseded by later alliances and hostilities; hostilities that, in general, similarly separate "Munch from Braque, Raoul Hausmann from Mondrian, Haring from Mies". All these movements and individuals, generally distributed into two opposing camps, fighting for the 'less' and the 'more absolute' respectively, and asserting the righteousness of their tenets by monotonously claiming, each for his part, exclusive and due attendance to truth, genuine progress, validity, etc.; where less and 'more-absolute' might be thought of as importing the same meaning as the 'non-classical' and 'classical' distinction referred to above.

DEPENDENCE

In such a way it becomes a most natural phenomenon that taste operates according to schemata of repulsion and attraction, that it becomes divided into 'neat packages' opposing each other. Criteria are readily formed proper to each of the polarized camps and it is
upon conformity of a work with these that it is declared acceptable; if, on the other hand, no such conformity appears, the work is rejected, its value notwithstanding. Bearing in mind, then, the above discussion, one might say that the separations and mutual exclusions which we encountered as various manifestations of the reason-feeling dichotomy may now be considered but offshoots brought about by the nature and internal workings of the 'game'. Instead of being absolute categories or criteria of validity, they are rather contingent possibilities potentially contained among the many possibilities/directions that the 'game' may at any moment assume. Moreover, it becomes clear that, by virtue of the polarizing forces which create the 'packages', appreciation and evaluation of art, far from being something objective or infallible, tends rather to acquire the nature of relative "recruitment", in the sense that it praises or disparages a work of art or an object in general not with respect to any esthetic properties it might supposedly possess, but on the basis of its mere availability to serve the cause of either of the "warring camps".

By accepting and flattering 'conformist' cases and making them appear as corroborations of the standpoint of any of the 'taste packages', evaluation-"recruitment" effects an increase of their respective territories. On the other hand, by censuring and excluding 'non-conformist' cases, it assists in keeping each of the camps pure, fortified against possible contagion which might threaten to under-
mine their cause and integrity. All these possibilities, however, removed from the lower levels of the game, which, as we have seen, are based upon more determinate principles, do not nevertheless exist in total defiance of, or isolation from them. For example, how else could this sense of evaluation as recruitment be interpreted than as an instance of utility? On this sophisticated level, apparently independent of the material constraints of practicality, natural existence and selected use according to the best possible adaptation to a purpose, these same constraints in fact reappear, with the sole difference that their matrix, or context, is not man and his basic needs, or the production of strictly utilitarian objects, but the establishment and preservation of a particular constellation of the 'upper levels' of the 'game', or of what Kaufmann refers to as the "system". Consequently, along with this 'rediscovery' of the fundamental role of utility in the apparently arbitrary or wanton manifestations of the 'game', goes the possibility that taste is something dependent upon conformism with an already established set of notions (or, alternatively, with an attitude in the state of becoming), with a group, with a 'camp' generally. It involves pre-ideation, prejudice, some kind of factor assumed to be valid as criterion, according to which it is directed. And this is clearly illustrated by examples of how people predisposed favourably towards a work, on the grounds that they assume it as fitting into an already established 'package' of taste, are disillusioned as soon as they realize or become informed that the
125 Ibid., pp. 948, 949, 950; and Goodman, op. cit., pp. 99ff., ch. III, "Art and Authenticity".
work is a forgery. Favourable attitude is not based upon the work itself but upon a pre-existing idea that it is a work by such-and-such a master; and this pre-existing idea is not formed autonomously but by means of gradual interactions and convergence of a great number of factors which do not have any direct connection with the esthetic merit or shortcomings of a work, as such.  

Utility, prejudice, dependence: These are the basic 'laws' of the 'game', that appear and re-appear in diverse guises throughout the various levels and manifestations of the phenomenon of taste. At least, this is what emerges as a plausible hypothesis out of what has been argued so far. However, it is not accepted unanimously, and obviously so, because such a thoroughgoing concession on the part of the 'players', the participants in the 'game', would have immediately rendered much of its richness barren. If such an awareness existed, an awareness, to put it very simply, that taste is but a 'game', no fervor, or eagerness or assiduousness, at least in the sense we encounter such attitudes, would characterize its pursuance. No polarities would probably exist. A mood of resignation and utter indifference would most likely prevail. It is in this connection, therefore, that we have to look at a different view, namely that taste is not a 'game', that it is not based upon the above mentioned factors, and that, far from being centered upon questions of optimum choices, best possible uses, processes of conventionalization and transformation, initial theories and predis-
positions, showing off tendencies and solicitation; that far from being situated in a sphere of relativity wherein all possible contradictions are, by its nature, allowed, and in fact invited, to emerge, it is properly autonomous. Or, to avoid unyielding extremes, it will be a question of a view postulating that autonomy exists (or ought to exist) and reigns (or ought to reign) over taste, if not in its entirety, as a phenomenon, at least over a specific aspect of it; that there can be a sense in which, all 'game' considerations apart, one can speak of taste as though it was a totally independent and autonomous 'universe'. Let us see how such a view can be reached.

IS THERE AUTONOMY?

According to Panofsky's conception of the function, nature and aim of a work of art, the argument may go thus: "a work of art is not always created for the purpose of...being experienced esthetically". Whether, however, mere "delectatio" or some usefulness as well be the ends of art, "a work of art always has esthetic significance". This, if extended, means that every object, irrespective of its being a work of art, a tree, or a machine, can be experienced esthetically, on the sole condition that one attends to it "without relating it, intellectually or emotionally, to anything outside itself". To clarify this, Panofsky uses the example of a tree that, if
looked at from the point of view of an ornithologist, or that of a carpenter, certainly won't be experienced esthetically. However, fortunately, the manifold interpretations, dispositions, and utter confusion (as to what the right attitude towards a thing should be) that, most likely, might have originated in such a contemplation of objects, conditioned at will, is avoided. For "a man-made object" at least, "either demands or does not demand to be so experienced, for it has what the scholastics call 'intention'". And it is precisely this "intention" which foreshadows whether the object should be experienced "practically" or "esthetically". For example, if "I choose...to experience the redness of a traffic light esthetically, instead of associating it with the idea of stepping on my breaks, I should act against the 'intention' of the traffic light".

The phrase "instead of associating it", transfers us smoothly to the next distinction. The "practical" objects "may be divided into two classes: Vehicles of communication and tools or apparatuses. A vehicle of communication is 'intended' to transmit a concept", while "a tool or apparatus...to fulfill a function" (which function, in turn, may be the production and/or transmission of concepts). But strangely, not only practical objects, but also works of art "belong in one of these two classes". Therefore, "a historical painting is, in a sense, a vehicle of communication...the Pantheon...an apparatus; and Michelangelo's tombs of Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici are, in a sense, both". Obviously, a work of art can
only "in a sense" be either vehicle of communication or apparatus, since "the interest in the idea (i.e. the concept to be transmitted or the function to be fulfilled) is balanced, and may be even eclipsed, by an interest in form". Let alone, with connection to this duality, Panofsky's ascertainment that since "the element of 'form' is present in every object without exception" no exact location can be effected of the point at which objects abandon the realm of the "practical"/concept to enter that of the "esthetic"/form; that the identification largely depends on the "intention" of the creators, and thereby that no guiding principle can be established for a clearcut characterization of the objects; what interests us here is the introduction of another level at which formal organization may be conceived. A level, within the context of which, the form of an object and our mode of attending to it appear to be absolutely free from any dependence, any restriction, or expectation at fulfilling whatever kind of function, for the reason that no explanation or reduction to some other, more concrete and familiar plane is provided for the phrase "an interest in form". All the more so, since this interest - seemingly irreducible to something more 'down-to-earth' - is virtually uncontrollable and unpredictable, deprived even of the convenient identification-device of "intention", embedded as a quality inherent in the object (i.e. either concept or function), which is of no use any more, being operational only on the preceding level of 'pre-esthetic' experience. Now this "interest in form" seems to be exposed to the whims of a vague "intention of the creators", or to the arbitrariness of the viewer (in the case
Both in the sense Panofsky ("Iconography and Iconology", in ibid.) refers to it and in the 'ordinary' sense.
the creator's "intention" fails to be communicated to the viewer, for one reason or another). This abstract level is one where that which has been mentioned above and might be referred to as 'formal function' which is presumably closely linked to the subject-matter or content and hence to communicable concepts, of more or less immediate grasp, is excluded. This puzzling "interest in form" is not raised because of that which the form, however well or inadequately, represents, implies, imparts. It is a 'disinterested' interest, to use a Kantian term, like the one implied by Panofsky in the example of the tree. Immediately after this apparently 'hopless' statement, that the "interest in form" is raised of obviated according to the "intention" of the creators, Panofsky offers a solution to the problem:

The 'intentions' of those who produce objects are conditioned by the standards of their period and environment. Classical taste demanded that private letters, legal speeches, and the shields of heroes should be 'artistic'...while modern taste demands that architecture and ashtrays should be 'functional'.

Irrespective of the lurking danger that may have caused the former to result in "fake beauty" and the latter in "fake efficiency", we are suddenly offered here a vague though plausible solution. By resorting to the "standards of period and environment", by which, obviously, something very similar, if not identical to 'taste' is meant, Panofsky relegates that ultimate, abstract "interest in form"
to the realm of such sociological phenomena as social convention, the persistence of tradition, the impacts of innovation, the versatile role played by fashion, superstitions, and furthermore, legislation, economic stratification and hierarchy, systems of production, etc., for justification. Thus, what originally appeared to be an absolutely autonomous "interest in form", now turns out to be something dependent, attached to the orbit of social vicissitudes. It might have certainly claimed some kind of universality, nevertheless within the limits - spatial or temporal - of a culture; but viewed as a whole throughout history it has been as relative as so many other notions and interests. It may be asserted that Kant's esthetic theory is pervaded by similar conceptions. At the same time, however, it departs decisively from what has been stated so far. Whereas "interest in form", in Panofsky as well as in the course of this argument up to now, has only been treated as a mere portion of the multitude of possible 'functions', or relations of the formal organization to those attending to it, even though a distinct one since it has been considered, so to speak, more 'elevated' than the others; in Kant, it acquires prime importance. Throughout his "Critique" one repeatedly encounters the distinction between mere gratification of the senses and pleasure in the beautiful. It is exactly the latter that forms the cause and the theme of his work. Thus, in the first place, "an esthetic judgement is contrasted to a cognitive judgement in which a representation is related to a concept", as well as being contrasted to sensual
indulgence; "empirical rules or criteria of taste can never serve as \textit{a priori} laws by which our judgement of taste must be directed". This makes quite clear the difference between the preceding classifications and what we are going to face in the following lines: This "empirical rules or criteria of taste" might perfectly be substituted for Panofsky's "standards of period and environment", or for all that which has been discussed above as pertaining to the 'game' notion. Obviously, here, we are leaving behind what up to now has seemed to be the farthest extreme, and turning towards something even more 'pure' and 'intact', implied by the phrases "\textit{a priori} laws", and "our judgement of taste must be directed". Indeed, for Kant, judgement of taste or esthetic judgement, i.e. "this is beautiful", makes sense only insofar as it is, and must be, universally valid; and it is exclusively upon this condition that we have what is termed a pure judgement of taste. "A judgement of taste is pure insofar as it is made on the basis of contemplation of the form of the object and not on the basis of pleasure taken in sensation alone", for the latter may be relative, in the sense that a sensation which for one person is pleasurable, for another may be repulsive as is e.g. the case with the taste of the palate, smell or touch. In addition, a pure judgement of taste must be disinterested, and this is definitely not the case with sensuous pleasures, which incite a desire for possession of the objects associated with them, and are thus potentially charged with notions of interest. But it is not only with the pleasure grounded in sensations that interest emerges. Pleasure in the presence of the good also presupposes and begets interest. Thus neither is the judgement "this is a beautiful something" a pure judgement of taste because it refers not to "free" but "dependent" beauty, 176
129 Kant, op. cit., p. 44.

130 Ibid., pp. 45, 46.
by which that it involves 

a concept of the purpose which determines what the thing is to be, and consequently a concept of its perfection.

Therefore the judgement of taste proper is distinguished from any exertion of the faculties of the mind in which concepts - having to do with what an object is, i.e. cognition, or what it ought to be, i.e. teleology, or with questions of whether it is good, either in itself or for some purpose - or interest (due to the sensual pleasure an object probably begets, or due to its goodness or usefulness), are involved. The judgement of taste is not cognitive, nor teleological; the pleasure felt in the presence of an object the statement of which is carried out by such a judgement, is not sensuous pleasure, nor the pleasure of good; "of all these three kinds of satisfaction", i.e. the pleasant, the beautiful, and the good, "that of the taste in the beautiful is alone a disinterested and free satisfaction". 129

The fact that the satisfaction in the beautiful is disinterested, free, independent, makes for a partial justification for the assumption of its universal validity; it "implies...a ground of satisfaction for all men." 130

Another reason for assuming universal validity of the judgement of taste is the fact that men quarrel about matters of taste, do not show indifference when their judgement is opposed and have a peculiar inextricable tendency to expect, necessarily, agreement with it. Granted the posited universality of the judgement of taste

what are we to presume from this except that beauty is to be regarded as a property of the...(object)...
131 Ibid., p. 123.
132 Ibid., pp. 31, 45, 46.
itself, which does not accommodate to any diversity of persons or of their sensitive organs, but to which these must accommodate themselves if they are to pass any judgment upon it? And yet this is not so since the slightest interference of any property of the object, would render the judgment a cognitive one.

For a judgment of taste consists in calling a thing beautiful just because of that characteristic in respect of which it accommodates itself to our mode of apprehension. 131

The implication of this is that the postulated universality of the judgment of taste is not an objective one. The pleasure in the beautiful being merely "a feeling in the subject as it is affected by the representation" of a thing, its "determining ground can be no other than subjective", and hence, the judgment of the beautiful is subjectively universal. 132

Still, however, the above adduced reasons for taste's universality are anything but adequate. For if the judgment of the beautiful is to be pushed, with regard to its proper nature, deep into the subjectivity of man, in reference to what is its communicability, let alone its universal validity, to be sought? A judgment in general is conceived by Kant as an act of thinking the particular as contained in the universal. The following two points are crucial here 180
for the clarification of the above stated problem: First, that in such an act of subsumption, the imagination and the understanding are closely related and co-operate. The imagination brings into consciousness the representation, appearance of a thing, which the understanding is responsible for 'classifying', so to speak, or for providing with a concept, this process being brought about in accordance with the understanding's *a priori* principles. Secondly, that, precisely, the existence and application of a concept is necessarily involved in this act. This might otherwise be referred to as the understanding's bringing unity, by application of a concept, over the manifold of the intuition (or representation) brought in by the imagination. Now if knowledge exists about the universal (i.e., concepts, provided by the *a priori* principles of the understanding), then the judgment is "determinant", which is the case described above. If however, only the particular is known, no definite law or concept being present for its subsumption under the universal, the judgment is "reflective". Its function is still "to establish the possibility of...(the)...systematic subordination ...of...empirical principles under higher ones", but, towards this goal, since it is unhelped by any determinate concepts or laws of the understanding, the laws are supplied by the judgment itself.

In order to obtain some insight as to the nature of these laws, there must be pre-supposed *a priori* the possibility of an overall unity potentially governing the particularities of experience which must thereby be capable of becoming connected into "a whole of experience". 182
133 Ibid., pp. 15-23.
This a priori unity is the principle of nature's purposiveness for our faculties. "The...(reflective)...judgment has therefore...in itself a principle a priori of the possibility of nature" i.e. of the possibility of comprehending nature in a unified and organized way,

but only in a subjective aspect, by which it prescribes not to nature..., but to itself...a law for its reflection upon nature... If then, we say that nature specifies its universal laws according to the principles of purposiveness for our cognitive faculty, i.e., in accordance with the necessary business of the human understanding for finding the universal for the particular which perception offers it, and again of finding connection for the diverse...in the unity of a principle, we thus neither prescribe to nature a law, nor do we learn one from its observation...we only require that, be nature disposed as it may as regards its universal laws, investigation into its empirical laws may be carried on in accordance with that principle.133

With the help of this consideration we may now understand how Kant means the universality of the judgment of taste, which is obviously a reflective judgment, no definite law being provided for it since any implication of concepts in it is excluded. Therefore the effecting of unity of the manifold of the intuition (representation of the imagination) of a thing by the understanding which is necessarily requisite of judgment in general has to be visualized here unassisted by, free of, any concept whatsoever. The common locus of judgements, either logical or esthetical, their
134 Ibid., p. 129.
135 Ibid., pp. 120-121.
136 Ibid., p. 78.
common principle, i.e. the conditions under which they are possible, is "the accordance of...imagination (for the intuition and comprehension of the manifold) and understanding (for the concept as a representation of the unity of this comprehension)", in the case of logical judgements, or lacking a concept as in the case of the judgement of taste, "the subsumption of the imagination itself", by which the representation of an object is given, "under the conditions that the understanding requires to pass from intuitions to concepts". In other words, the common locus is "the reciprocal activity of the imagination in its freedom and the understanding with its conformity to law", which is, in the case of the esthetical judgement, provided not by any concept, but by the subjective principle of nature's purposiveness for our faculties. "The purposiveness" of the judgement of taste "has its ground in the object and in its figure, although it does not indicate its reference to other objects in accordance with concepts (for a cognitive judgment) but merely has to do in general with the apprehension of this form, so far as it shows itself conformable to the faculty of concepts", i.e. understanding, "and of the presentation...of them", i.e. imagination, "in the mind." This purposiveness may be thought of as purposiveness without purpose, just as the understanding conforms to law, without any apparent law whatsoever being present. Therefore it can be labeled a "more formal purposiveness" in respect of both the form of the object being referred to the subject, and the "formal (element)
137 Ibid., p. 63.

138 Ibid., pp. 57, 58, 64, 65.
in the representation of a thing", which is "the agreement of the manifold with a unity", and which, if the unity is underdetermined by a concept, "gives to cognition no objective purposiveness whatever. For since abstraction is made of this unity as purpose (what the thing ought to be), nothing remains but the subjective purposiveness of the representation in the mind of the intuiting subject". Thus the subjective principle of nature's purposiveness for our faculties, is, in the case of the judgment of taste, a mere subjective formal purposiveness. It does not have anything to do with the object's qualitites but with the liability of their forms to be thoroughly comprehended and ordered by our faculties; and the pleasure in the beautiful, accordingly, is the "consciousness of the mere formal purposiveness in the play of the subject's cognitive powers", when the subject disinterestedly reflects upon "a representation through which an object is given"; it is "the feeling (...)internal sense) of that harmony in the play of the mental powers". Crawford gives the following account of the above:

What Kant terms the 'free play of the imagination' (to which he ascribes a productive role, i.e. 'the author of arbitrary forms of possible intuition', and not a reproductive one as if it were subject to the laws of association) thus can be viewed as the spatial and temporal ordering in the imagination of perceptions, the relating of parts...to each other in a variety of ways to determine whether a relatedness, a purposiveness of form, can be apprehended...(i.e. whether such a relation can result which, by virtue of this very achieve-
139 Crawford, op. cit.
140 Kant, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
141 Ibid., p. 83.
ment of harmony, will incite a feeling of pleasure)... In cognitive perception this synthesis (i.e. such tentative successive acts of assembling the parts) is determined by rules; concepts determine the unification and the cognitive judgment is thus determinate. In esthetic perception...this synthesis is not determined by empirical rules or concepts, and hence it is free to relate the parts in whatever way it can to obtain a synthetic unity of the manifold...Thus, the purposiveness of form in objects considered as to their beauty is merely subjective, in the sense that it is the purposiveness of an arrangement of the manifold of intuitions (appearances) by the intuiting subject through the joint efforts of the imagination and the understanding.139

Pleasure is achieved when such an ordering is attained that the cognitive powers are in harmony; i.e. they reach a state beyond which there is nothing to pursue, and thus they tend to maintain the status of interaction attained. In this stage "it is as if the object being contemplated were designed for our cognitive faculties", and this capacity of the object to appear thus, essentially contributes to its formal purposiveness, or else, "designedness", "rule-governedness". This latter point is expressed by Kant when he says that "natural beauty (which is independent) brings with it a purposiveness in its form by which the object seems to be, as it were, pre-adapted to our judgment, and this constitutes in itself an object of satisfaction".141

This conception, then, of the judgment of taste based upon and fulfilling the conditions for cognition in general, although no
cognition is carried out by it; by referring to a state of mind in which the imagination and the understanding reach a harmonious equilibrium with regard to a representation of an object being 'processed', 'administered', reflected upon i.e. with regard to a form's liability to be comprehended as a unity, (which is nothing other than this harmonious equanimity attained by the mental powers); is what justifies the claim for universality of the judgment of taste. For it is founded upon the conditions of cognition in general, which are necessarily universal, because otherwise no communication between people would exist. More specifically, one aspect of the universality of the autonomous subjective judgment of taste may be thus explained: namely, its universal communicability. And it is this that underlies the fact that we seek other people's agreement with our judgments of taste.

However, there is a second aspect of the judgment's universality which makes for the fact that, besides expecting agreement, we impute our judgment of taste to everyone as though it was a duty. It is a question in other words, of the universal validity of the judgment of taste apart from its universal communicability. Kant's explanation of this latter kind of universality is crucial to the issue of the autonomy of taste; because, although none of the factors that have been discussed so far and which point to that autonomy is damaged by this explanation, yet, in a sense, that independence of taste (at least within the confines of man's subjectivity) is transformed
142 Ibid., p. 39, note 2.
143 Ibid., p. 139.
144 Ibid., p. 141.
into a state of dependence upon, or more specifically, state of attachment to, or co-existence with, both interest and concept. For Kant, men's fervor when it comes to matters of taste can only indicate an interest bound with it, the esthetical judgment's freedom from interest notwithstanding. However, this is not a contradiction, because, "A judgment upon an object of satisfaction may be quite disinterested but yet very interesting, i.e. not based upon an interest, but bringing an interest with it". And this is doubly true. Firstly, because interest in the beautiful can be possible only in society as a result of man's sociability, i.e. inclination to communicate, which is a "property belonging to humanity". In this sense "we cannot escape from regarding taste as a faculty for judging everything in respect of which we can communicate our feeling to all other men, and so as a means of furthering that which everyone's natural inclination desires". Secondly because "to take an immediate interest in the beauty of nature", as opposed to that of art, and "(not merely to have taste in judging it) is always the mark of a good soul". For the man who perceives the beauties of nature with admiration and love, "it is not merely the form of the product of nature which pleases him, but", also, "its very presence", i.e. its existence, in the relation of man to which interest inevitably enters. Man is interested in the existence of the beautiful forms of nature. This second interest in the beautiful is aroused by the fact that in the contemplation of it, by means of the purposiveness of nature, we come to a concep-
145 Ibid., p. 84.
146 Ibid., pp. 143-144.
147 Ibid., p. 149.
tion of nature which transcends that of a "purposeless mechanism"; we come to a conception of it "as belonging to something analogous to art", which is that which was mentioned before as "designedness" and "rule-goverdness". Hence, "our admiration for nature, which displays itself in its beautiful products as art, not merely by chance, but as it were designedly, ... as purposiveness without purpose. This latter, as we never meet it outside ourselves, we naturally seek in ourselves and, in fact, in that which constitutes the ultimate purpose of our being, viz. our moral destination." It is thus an interest in what we assume to be nature's lawfulness without law, or designedness without design, between which and the a priori laws of reason based on the concept of freedom (the laws of the morally good, and the corresponding interest in it), an analogy is drawn. It is this lawfulness without law pervading nature, which accounts for referring this second, a priori interest (as opposed to the interest due to sociability, which is an empirical one) to the beauties of nature exclusively and not to those of art, in which a design, a definite purpose, viz. aiming at our satisfaction, is obviously involved. Art is to be elevated from this constraint of design, i.e. from the limits of either dependent beauty or mere sensuous pleasantness; in other words, art is to be purely beautiful only if it becomes "free from all constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere nature... Nature is beautiful because it looks like art, and art can only be called beautiful if we are conscious of it as art while yet it looks like nature." This, in
148 Ibid., pp. 157-158.
brief, constitutes the introduction of interest in the discussion of taste which, as it appears, adumbrates a relegation of the judgment of taste for its explanation to the realm of reason according to the concept of freedom i.e. morality.

This move, by which taste will be made subject to an authority, is made much more explicit if we consider how, in addition, concepts enter upon the discussion of the beautiful. Genius, as the faculty of producing beautiful art, (as distinct from merely judging it) consists in that union of imagination and understanding wherein, the imagination, unlike its being in a state of subjection under the concept of the understanding (cognition), is "free to furnish..., over and above that agreement with a concept, (unsought) abundance of undeveloped material for the understanding, to which the understanding paid no regard in its concept", thus "esthetically enlarging", so to speak, the concept, by occasioning more thought "(which indeed belongs to the concept...)...than can be grasped or made clear". But that which the imagination is here purported to bring about, is an esthetical idea, i.e. a representation of the imagination for which no concept can be offered. By bringing such an idea into the mind, the imagination somehow induces a strife towards "something which lies beyond the bounds of experience", i.e. unattainable, in the same way that an adequate presentation for a rational idea, (which is a concept of reason for which no representation of the imagination can be offered), is unattainable. The esthetical idea,
149 Ibid., pp. 82 ff.
then, can be thought of as a presentation of a rational idea.

Therefore we witness here an instance of rapprochement of taste in the beautiful, to reason. A second one, we observed earlier, via the analogy between interest in the beautiful in nature and that in the morally good, which is based upon the rational concept of freedom. Parenthetically, I mention here a third such instance offered by Kant when discussing the sublime which he relates to the inadequacy, inability of the imagination to accord with the understanding when faced with certain representations characterized by "boundlessness"; i.e. to its inability to grasp the manifold of the representation, for which nevertheless unity is required by the understanding: The sublime then, for Kant, consists in nothing other than the emergence of an awareness of reason's imperative for absolute unity, which is transcendent (i.e. impossible in experience) and reveals the superiority of humanity over nature. Hence the feeling of sublimity involves a transition from an esthetic feeling to the utmost purpose of man: morality according to the rational concept of freedom. But we should not forget that this rapprochement has been implicitly present throughout Kant's argument, with regard to the fact that the grounds of the judgment of taste are those of cognition in general; And although it is not based upon concepts of understanding, which are determinable "through predicates of sensible intuition which can correspond to them", it is nevertheless based upon a concept, which makes for its possibility as well as the possibility of
150 Ibid., p. 184.
151 Ibid., p. 185.
152 Ibid., p. 186.
153 Ibid., p. 185.
all mental operation whatsoever. This is "the transcendental rational concept of the supersensible, which lies at the basis of all sensible intuition", and which "cannot be theoretically determined".\textsuperscript{150} This concept of the supersensible is that which, in the form of purposiveness "underlies the object (and also the subject judging it) regarded as an object of sense and thus as phenomenal";\textsuperscript{151} in which sense it is termed "the supersensible substrate of phenomena".\textsuperscript{152} It is also that which provides us with the possibility of feeling pleasure as a result/manifestation of instances of this purposiveness, i.e. of the harmonization of our faculties before a representation of nature purposive for them, (i.e. for that very harmonization).

The judgment of taste is based on a concept (viz. the concept of the general ground of the subjective purposiveness of nature for the judgment); from which however, nothing can be known and proved in respect of the object, because it is in itself undeterminable and useless for knowledge. Yet at the same time and on that very account the judgment has validity for everyone..., because its determining ground lies perhaps in the concept of that which may be regarded as the supersensible substrate of humanity".\textsuperscript{153}

This idea of the supersensible, i.e. as the supersensible substrate of humanity, bearing the possibility of becoming aware, via the feeling of pleasure, of that accomplishment, consummation, that attainment on the part of our mental powers of a state of self-
154 Ibid., p. 191.

155 Crawford, op. cit.
sufficient harmony, is the same thing as "the principle of the purposes of freedom and of the agreement of freedom with its purposes in the moral sphere". It is ultimately on this account that we intransigently long for agreement in matters of taste, "because we have a right to expect moral sensitivity in other human beings".

In the case of Kant's argument, then, we follow a gradual transference of taste from a totally free and autonomous state, to one in which it is made dependent upon reason, morality and freedom. Certainly, it is not a case of giving up the claims to autonomy of taste with respect to any authority outside the individual. It is, however, a case of giving it up and resigning taste for the beautiful to the guidance of an authority inside the subject. And this nuance, however well articulated and orderly fitting into Kant's philosophical schemata, nevertheless escapes them and realy becomes an acknowledgment of taste's dependence in general; an acknowledgement of the beautiful's inability to exist or betray itself to man on its own, absolutely and exclusively.

If the beautiful arts are not brought into more or less close combination with moral ideas, this... fate must ultimately be theirs.

namely, degenerating into indulgence in, and excluding everything but
156 Kant, op. cit., p. 170.
157 Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., V.I., p. 125.
the matter of sensation (charm or emotion), which has only
to do with enjoyment; this...makes the spirit dull...
and the mind, on account of its consciousness of a dis-
position that conflicts with purpose in the judgment of
reason, discontented with itself and peevish... They
then serve as a distraction, or which we are the more
in need the more we avail ourselves of them to dispense
the discontent of the mind with itself.156

One can hardly fail to recall in this connection Plato's indictment
on sensuous gratification as "dragging men away from their sublime
duties",157 as well as to recognize that this statement of Kant's
is but a splendid description and criticism of the phenomenon of
inflation discussed above. In this light the idea of autonomy of
taste can be very plausibly thought of as constituting but a speci-
fic move in the 'game' of taste tending to delineate its own terri-
tory surrounding and fortifying it, in which not all 'taste'
whatsoever, but only a polarized conception of it can reside.
158 Popper, "Conjectures and Refutations", op. cit.
Kant's critique and the preoccupations inherent in it concerning universality and autonomy are, in a sense, typical of the revolutionary phase which the theory of knowledge went through during the Enlightenment. The latter's dominant themes had been centered around questions such as, How is knowledge about the world possible? What are its extents? How can knowledge be verified? How is truth to be distinguished from falsity? To what degree can knowledge be acquired by man autonomously, no authority besides his own capacities imposing upon him what knowledge is to be? To what degree is knowledge one and the same for everyone and past which point does it become (if at all) relative? The character of those enquiries might be reduced to and expressed by a few key-words: Universality, relativity, subjective, objective, truth, error.

UNIVERSALITY VS. RELATIVISM

On the one hand, that part of the philosophy of the Enlightenment which stems from Descartes based its answers to the above questions upon a sweeping belief in the innate power of human reason. Knowledge was derived from "intellectual intuition of clear and distinct
159 Ibid., Introduction.


161 Popper's "Open Society...", op. cit., Vol II, Ch. 11, on Aristotle's conversion of the Platonic 'initial' Idea into a 'final' cause. Also, Hussey, op. cit.: Perfectibility as an "immanent force working in the refractory medium of matter towards the highest perfection of form", p. 52.
as well as from deduction; accordingly, science could proceed reliably, upon the condition that it operated in compliance with the simple laws of the intellect, which were considered immutable. Truth and universality of knowledge were thus secured and by the same token final decisions, it was hoped, could be made upon the puzzling problems of taste and beauty, insofar as the judgment of the beautiful would be made into a species of intellectual judgment. For final truth ought to exist, it was thought, concerning esthetic issues, just as it exists with respect to scientific ones, and the only possible means of attaining it could be, presumably, the simple and immutable laws of reason. Such was the esthetic program of Rationalism. With the help of Aristotelian notions it reached the point of conceiving the beautiful as being a property of the objects of nature from which it only had to be extracted by imitation. However, that which upon being imitated would bring forth true beauty was not any part of the natural objects indistinctly, but their "general and immutable elements", as opposed to the "accidental accretions of time and the world. The 'nature' to be represented in art...(meant)...an essence or the ideal of a kind imperfectly realized in empirical reality". Thus art assumed the responsibilities of the 'Maker', restoring nature to its 'original' (or 'final') rectitude and perfection. In addition, Rationalist esthetic notions, in their eagerness to accord beauty of natural objects as well as their stable and perfect essences with simple, immutable, and pure lawas of reason, professed that such
162 Funt, op. cit., pp. 23-24; and Merleau-Ponty, in loc. cit. on Descartes' "Dioptrique".


things should be sought after only in such properties of the objects as could be grasped by reason simply, immutably and purely, and begetting no equivocality. Such a property was, for example, an object's figure thought of as residing in the object proper, being thus one of its essential traits, available to clear intellectual intuition, and conformable to the laws of reason, viz. geometry; whereas color was something elusive, unstable, accidental, and moreover transmittable through vague feelings of the sense. Thus it could not partake of true beauty. The latter was exemplified empirically in the works of the great masters as well as in certain objects possessing 'unity in variety', 'proportion', and 'propriety'. Nonetheless, whatever its empirical manifestations, the validity of beauty, it was believed, "must lie rather in the necessary nature of things". Therefore, a link had to be found between such formal distributions, or impressions as 'unity in variety', etc., on the one hand, which were thought of as making beauty manifest, and the innate ideas of reason, on the other. For only then could the former be said to be true and necessary vehicles of beauty. This link, meant to validate Rational esthetics once and for all, was the same as that supplied as a proof for the necessary truthfulness of the intellect with respect to knowledge in general. It was Descartes' "Veracitas Dei": "What we clearly and distinctly see to be true must indeed to be true; for otherwise God would be deceiving us." Consequently, in a way similar to that by which, if an idea is generated so as to be compatible with the laws of reason, not to
165 Funt, op. cit., pp. 26, 27.
166 Ibid., p. 29.
contradict them, to accord smoothly with them, and finally become unreservedly admitted by them, it cannot but be true, (the guarantee concerning the reliability of this process being God's truthfulness); a form received with approval by our 'introspection' cannot but be beautiful. "But a 'Cartesian esthetic thus seems necessarily founded upon theology". On the other hand, this philosophical trend, seeking absolute universality based upon a theologically safeguarded homology between innate forms of reason and immutable truths of reality, was somehow challenged by the other part of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, i.e. that which stemmed from Bacon. According to this, sensation is substituted for reason as the exclusive generator of knowledge. We have slightly touched upon the consequences Empiricism brought to bear upon esthetics when briefly discussing Hume, in the first section. Beauty, as we saw there, was transposed from being a quality characteristic of the object to being a feeling in the subject. It thus appeared to merge into the relativity of individual, unassailable feeling. "Esthetic judgement has, to be sure, become subjective, dependent upon individual feeling, and yet neither Dubos nor Hume is thrown into sceptical despair concerning the possibility of making valid esthetic judgments. The stability of the esthetic judgment is in fact seen to surpass that of the rational judgment"; and indeed so, for while it is possible for entire philosophical systems to wane and fall into oblivion, this is not at all the case of what has always been honoured as beautiful:


Though many ages have elapsed since the fall of Greece and Rome, though many changes have arrived in religion, language, laws, and customs, none of these revolutions has ever produced any considerable innovation in the primary sentiments of morals more than in those of external beauty.  

Subjectivism and relativity were obviated by resorting to an ultimate guarantee as to the reliability and consistency of sensation, similar to the Cartesian 'Veracitas Dei'. Popper has called it 'Veracitas Naturae', and it consisted in the conviction that "Nature is an open book. He who reads it with a pure eye cannot misread it. Only if his mind is poisoned by prejudice can he fall into error". This immediately reminds us of Hume's postulation of corrective conditions so as to render, eventually, the verdicts of the sentiment universally valid. Therefore, not only nature's truthfulness, but also a stipulated "uniformity of the Nature of man" is adduced in order to vindicate sensation as the fundamental source of knowledge. It is this uniformity which accounts for the assertion that sentiment "marks a certain conformity or relation between the object and the...faculties of the mind", or that "some...forms or qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric are calculated to please, and others to displease". If this 'calculation', pre-existing, as it were, the rise of sensation by the objects (or the exertion of its power upon them), fails to produce the expected (known from observation and previous experience) effect, then this is because the 'organ' of the sensation is defective.
171 "Conjectures...", op. cit., p. 4.
172 Funt, op. cit., p. 32.
173 Ibid., p. 32.
So it is that the two branches of the philosophy of the Enlightenment by different ways come to very similar conclusions as to the possibility of universally valid knowledge. Be it either reason and its laws, the conformity of which to nature's essential perfection is guaranteed by God, or sensation, whose truthfulness is guaranteed by the necessary adaptation of a uniform human nature (or 'internal fabric', or 'internal sense') to a veracious nature; "the differences between classical empiricism and rationalism are much smaller than their similarities". For, does not this sense thereby become an a priori sense, a sense whose existence and uniformity is maintained at the cost of discounting the differences in the pronouncements it delivers?... Furthermore, (since) the internal sense is held to be capable of judging not only perceptual objects but moral virtue and abstract theorems, it...is more akin to classical reason than at first appears. That which occasions pleasure to the internal sense upon being perceived is, in fact, discovered by Hutcheson to be the same uniformity in variety so much evoked by classical reason".

Also, with regard to the question of how such occasional agreements between 'internal fabric' and certain qualities or arrangements of objects can be elevated to the status of universally valid standards concerning a true and impeccable appreciation of the beautiful, "Hutcheson resorts to a divine guarantee similar to that of Descartes". Thus, both philosophical systems, in spite of a certain
As regards the 'specific kind of man' mentioned here, it appears to be the empiricist correspondent to the 'generalized' and 'typical' object, exclusively 'capable' of beauty, which was advocated by the rationalists. As Hume expresses it: "I must consider myself as man in general, for although from the universal structure of man, there are qualities which necessarily occasion pleasure, this universal nature may become so buried beneath artificial accretions, beneath such a wealth of customs, prejudices and other social perversions, that the proper pleasure will not be roused. Thus it is only when we consider the abstract 'natural' man that the sought for universality of pleasure, beauty or interest is to be found", quoted in Ibid., pp. 22, 83.
Empiricist basis for beauty as something subjectively sensed and not objectively embedded in things, converge, in the last analysis, towards a common, 'quantitative' conception of esthetics, according to which "the values that go into the work of art" (which is, presumably, but selection of the proper objects and imitation of them) are viewed "as pre-existing the work itself".  

It is obvious that Kant, as we have seen, considerably advances the conceptions outlined above. Instead of placing beauty, as one of their intrinsic qualities, in certain objects, or rather, certain forms those objects might ideally acquire if they were not resisted by the contingencies of reality, he declared it to be a subjective feeling of pleasure in toto. Instead, on the other hand, of making concessions to statistics by succumbing to the contingent validity of empirical observations concerning the degrees to which men (or rather a very specific kind of man, i.e. Hume's 'true judge') usually became attracted by certain kinds of forms, formal arrangements, or art, he elevated his subjective feeling of beauty to a level of validity, very akin to that of the intellectual and the moral judgment. He avoided confusing the judgment of the beautiful either with the judgment concerning the perfection of an object, which was the goal chiefly aimed at by Rationalism, or the feeling of sensuous pleasure, which was, by and large, the direction followed by Empiricism. And while his predecessors could not attain the aspired at universal validity of the esthetic judgment unless they - implicitly
See above p. 154.
or explicitly - imposed compulsory selection upon the objects of nature and art or fabricated a special kind of man, (while, i.e., for them true beauty was the 'product' of a sort of private interlocution between a very special kind of man and a very special class of objects), Kant was able to attain universal validity simply by obviating the trap of necessarily considering it founded upon objects and making it into a universal validity based on subjective grounds. Thus he made it possible, avoiding toilsome distillations of 'essential properties and perfection' of objects, or equally toilsome and doubtful trainings of 'true judges', for every man to encounter, feel the pleasure of, the beautiful in the contemplation of the form of any object whatsoever. His essential contribution, in other words, lay in the fact that he could gather the fragments of both Rationalist and Empiricist esthetics, synthesize them and place them, so to speak, in the single whole of man's individuality.

SUBJECTION TO 'AUTHORITIES'

However much Kant's esthetics differs from those of the 17th and 18th centuries, nevertheless important similarities may be traced. For instance, he succumbed to the same distinction between figure, or 'delineation', and color, as the rationalists before him, and favoured the first as exclusively importing beauty whereas he somehow deprecated the second on the grounds that it is supposedly
177 Kant, op. cit., p. 61.
178 See above p. 58.
179 Kant, op. cit., p. 78.
addressed to mere sensuous pleasure. In another instance, he seems to depart decisively from the tenets of Classicism: "Hardly anyone will say that a man must have taste in order that he should find more satisfaction in a circle than in a scrawled outline, in an equilateral and equiangular quadrilateral than in one which is oblique, irregular, and as it were deformed, for this belongs to the ordinary understanding and is not taste at all". It follows from this that 'design', 'symmetry' and 'regularity' are needed only in cases such as that of a building, in which perception is not free but essentially enacts a cognition, as qualities facilitating the comprehension of the whole with respect to its practical purpose. However, this departure from rationalist esthetics with its adoration of regularity etc. as esthetic panaceas, is complemented by bold concessions to 'empiricist' taste as it was actually realized:

But where only a free play of the representative powers (under the condition, however, that the understanding is to suffer no shock thereby) is to be kept up, in pleasure gardens, room decorations, all kinds of tasteful furniture, etc., regularity that shows constraint is avoided as much as possible. Thus in the English taste in gardens or in bizarre taste in furniture, the freedom of the imagination is pushed almost near to the grotesque, and in this separation from every constraint of rule we have the case where taste can display its greatest perfection... All stiff regularity (such as approximating to mathematical regularity) has something in it repugnant to taste; for our entertainment in the contemplation of it lasts for no length of time, but rather, in so far as it has not expressly in view cognition...
Ibid., pp. 79-80.

"Conjectures...", op. cit., p. 15.
or a definite practical pleasure, produces weariness. On the other hand, that with which imagination can play in an unstudied and purposive manner is always new to us, and one does not get tired of looking at it. 180

This much as regards examples of similarities between Kant and Classical esthetics on a practical level, (i.e., concerning not the philosophy of taste but its applications). A further crucial similarity, on a purely theoretical level this time, is revealed through the fact that Kant becomes eventually ensnared, though in a far more subtle manner, in the same, seemingly unavoidable confines that beset Classical philosophy. I refer to the confines which are imposed upon total freedom and autonomy of knowledge, taste, or anything concerned with the human optentialities, when recourse to any kind of authority whatsoever is held. Just as for the Rationalists and the Empiricists - in spite of their fundamental hatred of authority in general - a substitution of new authorities, i.e. the impeccable powers of the intellect and the senses respectively, for the inveterate ones (e.g. medieval scholasticism, the church, the authority of tradition) became inevitable, "perhaps because they felt that" otherwise "subjectivism and arbitrariness", 181 would dominate; so Kant was irresistibly driven towards establishing authorities responsible for the exertion of taste and made it, as we have seen, into something ultimately dependent upon the maxims of reason and morality, or even, in a sense, upon the general concept of nature. Now whatever the conception/interpretation/explanation of these maxims by each of the
As an example, morality for Kant was intrinsically related to the self-legislative power of reason, whereas Hume based it entirely on utility. "It appears that there never was any quality recommended by anyone, as a virtue of moral excellence, but on account of its being useful or agreeable to a man himself or to others". "It is supposed that no greater eulogy can be given to any man than to display his usefulness to the public and enumerate the services which he has performed to mankind and society. What praise, even of an inanimate form, if the regularity and elegance of its parts destroy not its fitness for any useful purpose.'... For what other reason can ever be assigned for praise or approbation?"


philosophical systems concerned, whatever the relative positions they
had separately occupied in each of them, the essential point that
should be borne in mind here is that Kant's esthetics, as composing
into a single unity the incomplete elements of the esthetics of the
Enlightenment, effected and at the same time was based upon a syn-
thesis of the authorities those had disjointly invoked.\(^{182}\)

This synthesis of diverse views as well as of the authorities that
are presupposed in them into a coherent system wherein things can
be finally reduced to a limited number of principles, reminds me of
Worringer's analysis of 'abstraction' and 'empathy' (considered the
two fundamental psychic dispositions or essential 'artistic volitions'
which, as explanatory categories are generally capable of rendering
accounts concerning the meaning of all art). I would like to refer
here parenthetically to his argument (not, however to its content
but to its formal deployment, so to speak). Abstraction is generally
considered to be that psychic feeling, or mentality, or 'zeitgeist'
which has at times been characterized by a mood of uneasiness as re-
gards man's relation to the world; i.e., by an instinctive fear
caused by man's feeling of being lost in the universe, the bewildering
world of phenomena. "We might describe this state as an immense
spiritual dread of space...a kind of spiritual agoraphobia in the
face of the motley disorder and caprice of the phenomenal world".\(^{183}\)
Such a mood commonly induces a severe transcendental religion. On
the other hand, empathy is characterized by "a happy pantheistic
184 Ibid., pp. 14-17.
185 Ibid., pp. 131 ff.
186 Ibid., p. 45.
187 Ibid., p. 127.
188 Ibid., pp. 23 ff.
relationship of confidence between man and the phenomena of the external world." 184 Whereas the former, as artistic principle, orientates art and esthetics towards forms that look like those of inorganic matter, unconditional and necessary, towards that which may be thought of as eternal and unchangeable, towards, that is, inert, rigid, crystalline forms, so as to 'de-organicize' the organic and thus liberate it from its finiteness; 185 the latter, on the other hand, involves pleasure taken in the organic forms of nature. Thus a deep chasm separates abstraction from empathy, the tendency to the inorganic and the organic respectively, which, however, in the course of Worringer's argument appears to be bridged in several instances. For example, it is asserted that empathy and abstraction "are antitheses which, in principle, are mutually exclusive. In actual fact, however, the history of art represents an increasing disputation between "them". 186 Or, that "all artistic creation", its being motivated by abstraction or empathy notwithstanding, "is nothing else than a continual registration of the great process of disputation, in which man and the outer world have been engaged, and will be engaged, from the dawn of creation till the end of time." 187 At all events, these opposites may be ultimately brought together, synthesized, so as to constitute but differing manifestations of one and the same principle, i.e. man's fundamental "impulse of self-alienation." 188 By virtue of this ultimate and irreducible authority, the urge to abstraction, on the one hand, may be construed as alienating oneself from the reality of the world as a whole...
and transferring oneself to an ideal, absolute, eternalized world. Empathy, on the other, is but alienating oneself from himself by means of a resignation to the 'pulse', as it were, of the natural world.

THE SEARCH FOR ORDER

Thus, it appears to me that what may be deduced from the example of Worringer's argument as well as from the previous discussion of Kant with reference to Classical philosophy, is the following point, namely: That the ultimate reduction of taste into a limited number of fundamental concepts; its ultimate resignation to the guidance of a few 'authorities' or supposedly universal maxims, regardless of whether these are reason, or morality, or sense, or nature, or the impulse of self-alienation, etc., implies the common anxiety springing from the need to "break out from the straitjacket of a drab world of realities", and illustrates, in a sense, the attempt to resolve this anxiety by discovering, establishing, and justifying a convincing order. In this manner it is possible for us to resume the 'game' notion, the 'game' played here being that of seeking conceptions of both nature as well as human activities and potentialities that are governed by a plausible order. In the beginning of the second section I implied that 'taste' is a 'game' played within the context of a wider, 'societal' one. At this point we may establish the search

191 Quoted from Gita May, "Diderot et Baudelaire", in Funt, op. cit., p. 87.
for order as the wide context, or general undertaking of which the 'societal game' and its variations are partial manifestations. Viewed, then, as succumbing to, and dependent upon, the requirements of this ultimate mission, taste, or the search for proper form, i.e. form that is significant, meaningful, beautiful according to a pervasive order, becomes apt to be explained as the enterprise whose aim is "to renew one's sensibility towards one's environment", at any time and by any means. Art, it follows, cannot be explained in any other way than as endlessly striving to create and propagate "a coherent system in the human scale substituted...for the inhuman and indifferent order of the universe". Diderot, to whose theory of esthetics this approach was central, and of whose thought the previous quotation is a typical example, may, in this connection be adduced, on the grounds that he offered an over-inclusive system, as a connecting link bringing together that which has been stated in the beginnings and in the ends of the second section. Both Collingwood's 'ladder' and Kant's implicit but persistently present premise, i.e. the quest for unity, for meaningfulness, for an understanding of nature not as sheer, blind mechanism but as purposive art, are in a sense present in Diderot's conception of man and nature. For him the work of the artist is akin to the hypotheses of the scientist, in that both aspire at a synthesis through active, creative steps. They start, in a like manner, from scattered data, which alone can bear nothing but incomprehensibility as to what nature, its laws, its causality are, and strive towards relatedness. Their
193 Ibid., p. 40.
194 Ibid., pp. 61, 62.
common purpose, or rather, mission, is to form a "whole which illuminates the course of our experience...to gain knowledge and satisfy human needs". This mission may at once involve moral implications - the illumination of our experience - as well as notions of utility - human needs. For perception, upon which this mission is founded, and of which the search for order (and formal order as a specific branch of it) is the essential responsibility, "for Diderot, is not the pure and immediate apprehension of simple ideas, but rather the final stage of a complex process", including reasoning, understanding, elaboration, modification, attention, and selection, "by which simple sensation is transformed into conscious experience". As to those acts, or exertions, of our mental faculties which are involved in perception and contribute to the search for order, they are undoubtedly rooted in the materiality of nature, of our organisms and our fundamental needs. Our habits of thought, understanding, judgment, spring from a close interaction of our needs with the tentative, experimental, artificial expedients we devise in order to meet them. This close, 'organic' interaction between man and nature brings about our notions of "order, arrangement, symmetry, mechanism, proportion, and unity... The understanding having been defined by these notions, it conceives its universe in terms of them". By way of such notions an idea of the beautiful form, in compliance with the search for order in the experience of nature, is arrived at, according to which "'I call beautiful outside me everything which contains in itself that which is capable of
195 Ibid., p. 89.
196 Ibid., p. 91.
197 Ibid., p. 105.
198 Ibid., p. 92.
evoking the idea of relationships in my understanding; and beautiful by relation to me, everything which evokes this idea". This distinction between two 'beautifuls' refers in fact to the distinction between "...the forms which are in the object and the notion I have of them...". This has its roots in Diderot's theory of perception which, as we may have probably felt already, resembles that of Collingwood's in many respects. The basic idea underlying it is that experience merely sensed, i.e., 'crude', 'unprocessed', is continuous and indivisible. Only through selecting distinct 'packages' out of it and isolating them from their immediate vicinities (and this is the task of perception); only, that is, by means of breaking "up this continuity and...establishing relationships of significance between selected elements" does it become possible for "man, up to a point, though never ultimately...to raise himself above the world stream to a relatively stable comprehension". But perceptual relationships are somehow dependent upon the fact that a predisposing, a preparatory ground exists for them in the objects of experience. "While relating, Diderot emphasizes, is an operation of the understanding, nevertheless relationships have their foundations in things. Thus we can draw a distinction between the relationship itself and its foundation in the thing, or between relationship and arrangement". On these grounds, then, Diderot justifies all mental activities, i.e. perception and conception in general, and the right pursuance of form, i.e., the creation and appreciation of the 'beautiful', in
199 Ibid., p. 93.
200 Kris, op. cit., pp. 50 ff.
particular, as essentially being founded upon the search for order and intelligibility; and ascribes to them the role of transformers of experience, since "relating requires that certain elements be separated from" the continuum of reality "and be referred directly to one another, while suppressing that which exists between".199

DURATION, ORIENTATION, MORALE

In this search for order, which is intrinsically linked to deeply rooted and perennial anxieties, formal order, or activities in general that are related to form-giving, play a decisive role. One of the "functions", or missions, to employ the term we have used before, which "representational techniques fulfill", is "the preservation of that which vanishes". Representations "persist, control time, and overcome its passage. In this there is magic". This, for instance, has been one of the interpretations of prehistoric cave drawings as far as their purpose is concerned.

The painting in itself, the transposing of what one could call the passing reality into the eternity of pictorial representation, may have been meant to produce some magic effect on the object. The tribe was there to see what the medicine man had painted. For them, for their eyes, it was made to commemorate and anticipate the fight with the prey, to show them what they had in mind as a memory of the past or as a vision of the future.200
A tendency to organize the sensory field into groups and patterns of sense-data, to perceive forms rather than a flux of light-impressions, seems to be inherent in our receptor apparatus just as much as in the higher nervous centers with which we do arithmetic and logic. But this unconscious appreciation of forms is the primitive root of all abstraction, which in turn is the key-note of rationality. Thus the latter's roots can be traced down to the "elementary functions of our eyes and ears and fingers. Mental life begins with our mere physiological constitution"; Ibid., p. 89.

For instance, metaphor, which may be given rise to by the need to symbolize, to give conceivable form to a thing for which a name does not yet exist. On the 'synaesthesia' of the language of early childhood, and on what is termed the 'vegetative stage of thought', both as cases in which the 'demand' for symbols, forms, words, etc., to express things felt and primitively thought outweighs the actual 'supply', whence recourse to the device of metaphor is persistently held, Langer, op. cit., pp. 123 ff and 128 ff; also Goodman, op. cit., chs. I and II. A bias for metaphor was expressed by Diderot too: "It is the child and the savage for whom signs have not yet become conventional labels, whose relations with the world and whose expressions of those relations are most vivid. The same is true of the foreigner speaking an unfamiliar language. He is thereby reduced to something like the condition of a child. 'They are forced to say everything with a very small quantity of terms, which constrains them to place some of them very happily'". Funt, op. cit., pp. 164, 165. Also, see below, pp. 266 ff.

One such fallacy has been minutely described and criticized by Popper and it consists more or less in hastily adopting ideas and conceptions that superficially appear useful and adapt to our task of ordering or to the kind of order we may have already envisaged. "For if we are uncritical we shall always find what we want; we shall look for, and find, confirmations, and we shall look away from,
So, by importing duration, form and the enterprise of form-giving effects a sense of ordering. This ordering, moreover, is not something that occasionally occurs by means of contingent acts of form-giving, or symbolism. It is the outcome of a basic need, as it were 'biologically' ingrained in man. Its fulfillment, its satisfaction, refers continuously to one and the same thing, i.e. "man's ceaseless quest for conception and orientation", which is in turn activated by "fear,...the driving force in human minds,...which begets an impuruous demand for security in the world's confusion". The need for orientation and morale, then, may be viewed as the basic force actuating symbolism, form-giving in general. Whatever the labels we are to attach to it (duration, eternalization, unification, regularization, etc), whatever the tools man may select as appropriate for the accomplishment of this ineluctable task, whatever the errors he may commit or the fallacies he may propagate in the course of pursuing it; and, finally, whatever the results he may beget at different periods and places ('classical', or 'non-classical', 'autonomous' or 'dependent', 'reasonable' or 'irrational'), that which matters is exclusively the satisfaction of the need.203,204 It is in this context that Collingwood refers to the magical rites of primitive societies which precede warfare or woodcutting and to the nature of the belief in such rites, as follows: "This belief does not imply that the enemy is defeated or the tree felled by the power of the magic as distinct from the labour of the 'savage'. It means that, in warfare or woodcraft, nothing can be done with morale;
and not see, whatever might be dangerous to our pet theories. In this way it is only too easy to obtain what appears to be overwhelming evidence in favour of a theory which, if approached critically, would have been refuted", "Poverty of Historicism", op. cit., p. 134. Also p. 136, on the "permanent ghost of essence"; Langer, op. cit., pp. 154 ff, for a discussion on the fallacious transferrence that may be easily carried out from the expressive power, or virtue of symbols, into physical power; i.e., the fallacious belief that symbols, or "idols" in particular, are "centers of action", Kris, op. cit., pp. 48 ff.).

205 Collingwood, op. cit., p. 67. In a like manner, Fritz Mauthner estimates this need for morale and the relevance symbols may have to its fulfilment, which he terms 'logocracy': "'The Emperor Marcus Aurelius sent lions into battle along with his soldiers, against a barbaric tribe. Members of this tribe had never seen lions so they asked their leader what these animals were. This leader, who 'knew the significance of names and words', replied: 'These are dogs, Roman dogs'. Upon which they proceeded to treat them like dogs: They beat them to death with their clubs"", in Szasz, op. cit., p. 49.
and the function of magic is to develop and conserve morale; or to damage it". 205

NATURE AS FORM-MOULDER

Having indicated that, perhaps, the most principal motive that actuates virtually all the 'games' that can be conceived and played by man (science, production, society, art, religion, magic) is the search for order; which seemingly permeates everything from the level of mere physiology to those levels characterized by arbitrariness and caprice, mentioned in the second section; which, as the fundamental rule of the 'game', opens up diverse ways by which we may retrieve the basic notions we have encountered before, e.g. utility, the convention-alization of symbols, the reciprocality between persistence and renewal in the enterprise of form-giving, the volatile relationship between tradition and innovation, the phenomenon of polarities, etc.; having, in other words, reached a point at which we may plausibly establish a link between section II and the search for order conducted with the help of a few concepts, a prime position among which is occupied by nature; it now seems tempting, from this standpoint, to claim an affinity between the task of comprehending the vicissi-tudes of architectural form and theory and that of seeking 'discursi-ve unities', in the way the latter is conceived by Foucault:
Perhaps one might discover a discursive unity if one sought it not in the coherence of concepts but in their simultaneity or successive emergence, in the distance that separates them and even in their incompatibility; which directly gives rise to the question: Should the principles of the individualization of a discourse not be sought...in the different possibilities that it opens for reanimating existing themes, of arousing opposed strategies, of giving way to irreconcilable interests, of making it possible, with a particular set of concepts, to play different games?

Far from implying that I have the slightest ambition to carry out a sketch of an 'archaeology of architectural form and theory' in the rest of this work, I am nevertheless deeply impressed by this possibility of 'playing different games with a particular set of concepts', and the intense persistence with which it has probably constituted a basic trait not only of formal theories, esthetic preferences and doctrines, but of most of human thought and activity in all times. It seems to me that this possibility is to be held largely responsible for the ambiguous phenomenon of 'renewal, yet recurrence' (mentioned in section II), and on this basis I am going to discuss an example, borrowed from the esthetic/architectural/civic 'upheavals' of the period grossly confined between the ends of the 17th and the middle of the 18th century. More specifically,
I shall consider it against a constant background, namely, its relations to conceptions of nature. It is nature, as a seemingly indispensable context of reference that, in the following discussion, is going to assume the role of the single concept which gives rise to diverse 'formal games'. It is with regard to this ever-recurrent reference that the intrinsic validity of the 'formal games' as such will be questioned; in addition, with regard to the fact that not a single 'nature', but numerous ones have at times been adduced as the ultimate legislator of 'formal games'. If it was possible even for 'natural games', i.e., various, diversified ideas, notions, and prejudices about what is to be meant by the concept 'nature', to be invented and elaborated, fixed according to subtly interlocking rules so as to produce the effect of a convincing consistency, thus making it possible for our hindsight to view them all as relative utterances, how much more relative the 'formal games', based upon and legislated by already relative conceptual systems, must have been? This is the core suspicion-question that gives rise to these thoughts. To sum up, let us dissect this general question into two more specific ones:

* How is it that an account may be given of a certain period, or trend formative of tastes and forms, as 'modern', 'pioneering', 'progressive', 'enlightened', 'redeeming' the sins of the past, when it appears, in many of its aspects, contaminated by conservatism and inability to emancipate itself from these very sins?

* How it is that two different periods or trends formative of
tastes and forms, can be inimical towards each other (no matter whether they are contemporaneous or not) when, at the bottom, we discern the same, or very kindred preconceptions underlying their aggressive battlecries?

It must be emphasized that I do not mean to assert that nature is the only concept in relation to which several 'formal games' have been and can be played. However, although it shares this role with a number of other realms, as has already been indicated (e.g. science, reason, morality, history, the human body), it nevertheless appears broader than most of them, able to encompass them, though this fact does not deprive other concepts of the possibility of enacting independently the wanton setting up of a 'war' waged in their name. But being broader, more general, and thence, more abstract, the concept of nature is, and must often be defined in relation to other, more specific, graspable and malleable realms.

Therefore, succumbing to this requirement, arising from the peculiar character of the concept 'nature', I will have to touch upon themes such as science and history, since it is with the help of these that nature is capable of being moulded into many 'natures'. In this sense, then one could consider the following argument as based on the hypothesis of this possible hierarchy:

***Diverse formal systems (justified on the grounds of)

**Diverse conceptions of nature (issuing from)

*Diverse epistemologies and historical (or non-
See, for instance, Plekhanov's account of dialectics in his foreword to the second Russian edition of Engels' 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of Classical German Philosophy', Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1976. Popper offers an opposition to this in 'What is Dialectics?', in "Conjectures...", op. cit.
historical world-views (trying to scan
and discover the reality of nature, man,
the world).

With the help of such a schema, we may easily discern the extent

to which contradictions threatening the veracity and stability of
an entire theoretical edifice at the first level (formal systems)
can be imminent, provided that a flaw, or inconsistency, or omis-
sion has insidiously crept in at any of the other levels. Or again,
such a schema could facilitate the understanding of how a number
of mutually repulsive formal systems can be nothing more than the
indirect offspring of a single though many-faceted epistemology
or world-view; for, whereas with respect to an explanatory system
even the embodiment of almost mutually exclusive counterparts, made
to harmonize, however arbitrarily, for the sake of a no matter how
far-fetched explanation, may be generally acceptable, a formal system
is likely to provoke disquietude and confusion when it accordingly
assumes many facets. Now in the course of this work some inklings
as to the plausibility of this schema may be said to have presented
themselves already. In the first place, we may relate it to the
discussion of Pythagoreanism (section I). The Pythagorean system,
firstly, provides, I believe, a lucid illustration of how, what
can be a posteriori evaluated as an esthetic theory or doctrine,
initially stems from an all-encompassing world-view. Secondly, it
is an example of an epistemology that comprises (in a state of more
or less harmonious unification) the germs of what (in the process
For instance, Alberti's conviction that "since man, nature, and mathematics are all parts of the same whole, man has only to use mathematics to understand and control nature"; "On Painting", tr. J.R. Spencer.

"Conjectures...", op. cit., pp. 4, 5, 6.
of transition from the epistemological level to that of particular conceptions, and ultimately to that of formal systems) may be eventually developed (the original unification thus becoming gradually lost, the original constellation becoming progressively unrecognizable, in the course of this downward infiltration towards the other two levels) into two extreme opposites: An insistent attachment to strict rules, rational canons, on the one hand, and an orgiastic introspection and unbounded fallacious fantasy on the other. Thirdly, as regards the search for valid form according to the search for valid order, it is the remote progenitor of such of what has persisted up to our century via a rehabilitation it underwent during the Renaissance. In the second place, Platos' philosophy presents a peculiarity which may be readily adduced as a partial justification for the adoption of the schema. This peculiarity refers, in a way different to that of Pythagoreanism, to the possibility that the third level (epistemologies and world-views) might intrinsically bear of causing incompatibility and dislocation to befall the other levels. It is the possibility of a metamorphosis, the end points of which might eventually assume the function of mutually repulsive, opposite extremes. It is the possibility of the transformation of an 'optimistic' epistemology into a 'pessimistic' one, a sort of epistemological dictatorship, an authority charged with the duty of "pronouncing upon, and laying down...what is to be manifest truth".

It is indeed in Plato that we...
210 Ibid., p. 11.

211 Collingwood, op. cit., pp. 46 ff.
find the first transition from an optimistic to a pessimistic epistemology. Each of them forms the basis of one of the two diametrically opposed philosophies of the state and of society: on the one hand an anti-traditionalist, anti-authoritarian, revolutionary and Utopian rationalism of the Cartesian kind, and on the other hand an authoritarian traditionalism.  

It is the latter (excluding 'almost all men' from the benediction of ever encountering the truth) as opposed to the former (granting literally everyone the inborn right to truly know) that made its first appearance in the 'Republic', to culminate eventually in the 'Laws'. In the third place, we might suppose that this scheme underlies implicitly some of Kant's discussions on taste with regard to its practical applications. We have seen how Kant, concerning different instances equally favoured different formal systems and 'games'. As a result of the broad scope taste was granted by his epistemology, and furthermore, as a result of the synthesis he effected (and metamorphosis, to a degree) of apparently divergent trends of the esthetics and philosophy of the Enlightenment, it became possible for both 'symmetry', 'regularity', etc., and licentiousness bordering on the grotesque to co-exist in the vehicle of valid formal order. Perhaps it is only with the help of such a schema that one can somehow come to terms with the very strange fact that, Kant, in praising English gardens and 'bizarre taste', while having already decisively and irreversibly departed from most of the justifications and notions of 18th-century taste (i.e., sensuousness, associationism, 256
picturesqueness based on charm or emotion, in other words, all conceptions of the beautiful or attractive form that involved one or another sort of concept, purpose, interest, or gratification of the senses) partly reverted to them.

So far, my purpose has been to provide some hints in favor of the schema put forward above, and therefore to support the argument that, basically, formal systems may emerge as more or less immediate outcomes of epistemologies and world-views, and that epistemologies and world-views may not only harbor concepts liable to fall under contradictory categories after having been reflected, 're-incarnated' as parts of formal systems, but may even oscillate from one general position to another totally incompatible with the initial one. Of the latter possibility, the Platonic polarity: 'progressivism' vs. 'authoritarian traditionalism' has been adduced as an example. Moreover, both Platonism and Pythagoreanism, apart from hinting at the relationships of the posited schema, are of great importance because, by virtue of their ingenuity which secured them a stubborn persistence, they were often to be plagiarized and usurped, not in their full scope (which they retained to some degree no later than the Renaissance), but in the form of scattered and meaningless, mute fragments. Whereby, they were to be, consciously or not, brought forward as justifications for the realization of diluted, 'second-hand', and more or less impotent 'rational progressivisms', 'authoritarian traditionalisms', or 'irrational and divine
mysticisms', most of which appear (to a greater or lesser degree) to be contaminated by what had originally been largely absent, i.e. relative esthetic preferences.

In brief, my purpose has been to formulate a background juxtaposed to which, contradictions, ambivalences, and equivocalities that characterize various moments in the enterprise of creating architectural form (especially since the ends of the 17th century) could be coolly viewed as more or less deprived of inexplicable myths and mysteries; a background in relation to which my example will now be discussed.

PERRAULT AND LAUGIER

Although Claude Perrault, as early as the ends of the 17th century had contributed a great deal to the demystification of the alleged validity of proportion with regard to the attainment of beauty; more especially, to the demystification of the belief that perfect beauty depended upon a single and uniquely 'catalytic' set of proportions which only had to be discovered; thus anticipating later developments not only in architecture and aesthetics but also in epistemology and philosophy; the Abbé Laugier, writing a full 70 years later, in spite of giving his predecessor his due by calling him "a great man", came up with conclusions and theoretical solicitations that seemingly ignore those of the later. So that,
whereas Perrault, demonstrating a fine ability to discern and evaluate, would claim the existence of two sorts of beauties in Architecture... those that are founded on solid convincing reasons, and those that depend only on prepossession and prejudice; by beauties founded on convincing reasons I understand such as cause buildings to please everyone, because their worth and value are easy to be known, such as are the richness of the materials, the grandeur and magnificence of the structure, the exactness and neatness of the performance, and the symmetry, which denotes that kind of proportion which produces an evident and remarkable beauty:... that correspondence the parts have one with another, on account of the equality, and parity of their number, their magnitude, their situation, and their order,... a thing very obvious and the effects thereof such as we can never fail of discovering;

the second sort of beauties being elicited by custom, and a connexion which the mind makes of two things of a different nature, for by this connexion it comes to pass, that the esteem, wherewith the mind is prepossessed, for some things whose value it knows, insinuates an esteem, also, for others, whose worth it knows not... This principle is the natural foundation of belief, which is nothing else but an effect of prepossession, by which the knowledge and good opinion we have for him who assures us of anything whose truth we are ignorant of, disposes us to make no doubt of it;

proceeding to provide as an example of the operation of the

214 Ibid., p. iii.


216 However, in a 'sociological', so to speak, sense, they belong to different periods. Laugier may be placed in that general trend of polemics and protestation, which appears in the middle of the 18th century, and which pleaded for 'correction' of the attitudes of the 'petite manière' that had become dominant in art and architecture in the period following the ends of the 17th century; Leith, "The Idea of Art as Propaganda in France 1750-1799", University of Toronto Press, 1965.
'connexion' the fact that, as a result of good faith in the "merit of the court", fashionable tastes for courtly speech and courtly dresses arise "though these things have nothing in themselves positively amiable";\textsuperscript{213} all this being nothing other than the product of his fundamental belief in the falsity of the "opinion of those, who imagine that the proportions, which ought to be observ'd in Architecture, are certain and invariable";\textsuperscript{214} Laugier's reply, on the other hand, would be:

It is to be hoped that some great architect will undertake to save architecture from eccentric opinions by disclosing its fixed and unchangeable laws... What is art, if not that mode of expression (manière) which is based on clear principles and is carried out with the help of unchanging precepts?\textsuperscript{215}

One is struck by the degree of acuity which seems to separate the 'statement' from the 'reply' by an unfathomable gap; he is likely to wonder whether it can be possible for a later (and hence, presumably more 'modern', 'developed', and 'enlightened') view to topple over those very obstacles which, naturally, a former, open-minded one should have, once and for all, abolished; and finally, to ask how it is that two men roughly belonging to the same 'enlightened',\textsuperscript{216} 'rationalist', 'progressive' epoch and considered as representing it could have produced such formidably incompatible utterances? And yet, though the incompatibility nevertheless remains, I believe that, according to the schema proposed above, and compared

218 Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 88, 128.
in relation to the epistemological background of the period as well as with regard to contemporaneous conceptions of Nature deriving from the epistemological dicta, one may gradually become less seized by the peculiarity, and that, thence, the incomprehensibility may gradually diminish.

PRE-CLASSICAL EPISTEMOLOGY

Towards this goal, one has to bear in mind the basic trait of thought and reasoning, which, structured as a firm epistemology, affected almost all spheres of knowledge, from science and religion to practical medicine, in the Renaissance. The key-instrument upon which the entire epistemology was based was the rich notion of 'Similitude'. It enacted a role strikingly similar to that of Pythagorean harmony and Platonic proportion, i.e. "reconciling things that are hostile", and "binding things together". Indeed, it was by virtue of similitude, that it was then possible to conceive of the world as orderable, as a common locus of an endless series of different yet mutually attractive, collaborating, and potentially unifiable things.

Four chief types of similitude, that were expressly used as methodological instruments in pre-17th century conceptualization, may be discerned:
219 Foucault, "The Order of Things", op. cit., p. 18.

220 Ibid., p. 19.

221 Ibid., p. 23.

222 Ibid., p. 23.
• "Convenientia": operative on the ground of factual proximity. By virtue of this proximity properties can be transferred from one to the other of the contiguous things, their dissimilarity and unrelatedness notwithstanding.219

• "Aemulatio": a convenientia freed from the constraints of geographical proximity, able to form an immense system of "questions" and "answers" on the part of the things.220

• "Analogy": combining both convenientia and aemulatio and assuming a power by virtue of which "all the figures in the whole universe can be drawn together",221 and

• "Sympathy": the sovereign type;

it is an instance of the Same so strong and so insistent that it will not rest content to be merely one of the forms of likeness; it has the dangerous power of assimilating, of rendering things identical to one another, of mingling them, of causing their individuality to disappear and thus rendering them foreign to what they were before. Sympathy transforms.222

Similitude as a tool for creating order usually aims at pairing man, his members, his basic behavioral traits as well as his products with aspects of the natural universe that lie beyond himself and his artificial world. "Man's body is always the possible half of a universal atlas". The relationship may be reciprocal, i.e. man questioning nature with respect to the order he and his objects contingently possess, as well as boasting for 'his' order, in the manner of which that of nature may be traced. Man, the artificial
objects; those objects deployed within the limits of, so to speak, 'human' or even 'earthy' scale; the 'sublime' natural universe; all three entireties seen under the light of these reciprocal and potent similitudes: This is the essence of the man/microcosm/macrocosm triad.

Nature, the entire universe was then thought of as a 'book' which only had to be read by man. The truths hidden in the 'book', however, were not immediately conspicuous ("in order to exercise our wisdom (God), merely sowed Nature with forms for us to decipher"), but had to be discovered with the help of signs. Signs were the devices by means of which a functional, ethical, etc., affinity, a resemblance, concealed and buried as it were, was to become manifest. Once the sign was noticed, the raison d' être of things could be rendered comprehensible. But how was one to know that anything, this or that, a stone or a fruit, was trying to signify something? To convey a deep and desirable meaning? How were signs to be discovered and identified as such? By visually resembling what they were a sign for; to a greater or lesser extent, by being a visual model of the thing singified. In fact, we can visualize this method (overwhelmed by the omnipotent and ubiquitous similitude) we are presented with as follows: Two things are intrinsically attracted to each other by sympathy or analogy, i.e. by resemblance. This resemblance is hidden; it has to be discovered. A sign, a mark is purposed to give a hint; belonging to one of the two things, the sign is nothing
Ibid., pp. 26, 27.

Herrmann, W., "Unknown Designs for the 'Temple of Jerusalem',
by Claude Perrault", in "Essays in the History of Architecture",
Fraser, ed., p. 143.
other than a resemblance, a likeness of the other. We are dealing here with two resemblances, one of an 'external' and one of an 'internal' nature. These, in turn are linked together by a third resemblance, an analogy (in the ordinary sense) which effects the transference from the visual (or external) affinity/resemblance to the internal one, or that which constitutes the essential affinity between the properties or natures of the things involved in the attraction. This was the system of signification by which the world could be impeccably communicated to man. 223

It now seems to me worthwhile to turn to an example of how it was possible for this epistomology to reign over and permeate architecture: When, in early 17th century, it occurred that the ancient temple, chiefly mentioned in theological writings of ancient Jewish origin and referred to as the object of prophet Ezekiel's vision and as subsequently described by him, should be reconstructed, the Jesuit father Villalpando embarked upon the task; his reasoning was subject to the following analogies spiting any restrictive evidence: The temple described by the prophet could not have been other than that of Solomon; since the latter was a forecast, a model of the Christian Church to come, the symbolism inherent in this prophecy might with impunity outweigh its actual appearance: Designed by God, i.e. having been a perfect building, it could not but have been fashioned in accordance to the Classical style, the only capable of perfection, and, whereby, emanating from God. 224
Taylor, R. "Architecture and Magic", in Fraser, op. cit., p. 90.
Not only therefore did he invest his building with a Classical appearance, but sought to demonstrate that all its dimensions, as given in the Holy Writ, concurred with the doctrine of Vitruvius. He thus converted the Temple into a kind of test-case to prove the basic compatibility of Christian revelation and the culture of Classical antiquity, a point very much at issue at the time... The idea that Classical architecture provided the only acceptable style together with the blind cult of Vitruvius are manifestations of the same attitude of mind that led men at this period to an uncritical acceptance of Hermes Trismegistus, Zooraster, the Chaldean Oracles, the Orphic hymns, the sayings of Pythagoras...as being the repositories of an ancient wisdom going back to the beginnings of time. 225

It is significant that in this context of tracing the 'convenientia' of things, not only is the scripture distorted so as to fit the later and totally unrelated, in historical terms, emergence of Classical architecture, but also, Vitruvius, the source of information about the Classical orders, is deformed, twisted, and arbitrarily interpreted in such a way as to be made to approach the sphere of theology. Thus, the inclination of things towards a common locus, a single cosmological view capable of offering explanations, is mutual. Nothing remains where it is, waiting for the other to approach it:

Vitruvius himself supplied the ideal example of this twofold approach...in seeking to combine theory or innate gift and practice or acquired art, so that he deals with every facet of architecture from the common-
226 Ibid., p. 89.

places of building technics to astrological cosmology. But if there were some like Alberti and Daniele Barbaro who felt that it was necessary to discount astrology as tending to lead into a domain of doubtful validity, it is equally plain that for other men like Cardanus, Luca Gauricus and Lomazzo the Roman theorist's chief claim to immortality was as a Magus.226

These strange effects and notions are dictated by the infinitely overwhelming potency of the epistemology of similitude, which can be grossly viewed in this context as the Christian adaptation of the basic features of Pythagoreanism and Platonism. It is this epistemology which elsewhere has been charmingly condensed thus:

The letter teaches what we know
Anagogia what we hope is so;
Faith's confirmed by allegories,
Conduct's shaped by moral stories.227

It is this that Perrault indicted as precariously founded upon absurd "connexion", "belief", and "custom". Thus, as far as his plea in favour of the substitution of a rational theory for an irrational, refutable one is concerned, he is no doubt justly granted the reputation of a 'reformer'. As yet, however, the argument in favour of a possible reconciliation of Perrault's and Laugier's pronouncements remains incomplete. I will therefore have to discuss some fundamental characteristics of the "Classical" epistemology which succeeded that of the Renaissance, so as to assert eventually that, despite their
differences, both opinions merely functioned as 'reflections', translations at the level of formal systems, of various not so incompatible aspects of a unified epistemology.

CLASSICAL EPISTEMOLOGY

In contradistinction to the naively, though in a somewhat awesome manner, unifiable Nature, "Classical" epistemology, partly because of the numerous phases of development it underwent during the 17th and 18th centuries, partly because of the many epoch-making contributions made to it by a number of most admirable thinkers, partly because of the fact that by virtue of the initial impetus given to it by Bacon and Descartes it was inevitably led to experience repeatedly growing disquietudes, with the result that it had to be continually in a state of fervent search for compensation, verification, revaluation, justification, and compromise; presents a highly diversified and enriched system. A system in which, due to its character, germs of what would later develop into clashes and radical disagreements could find an appropriate incubator.

Firstly, "Classical" epistemology was characterized by an irresistible attraction towards taxonomy and representation. Representation is what succeeded signature in the search for truth and knowledge about Nature. Taxonomy is what replaced the tightly packed, intrinsically organic world of similitudes - organic, in the sense that the
'essential' nature of anything could, however unlikely this might seem to us nowadays, be referred to and identified with the 'essential' nature of practically everything existing outside it, by way of endless chain-reactions of similitude, so that it could ultimately be viewed as a quasi-indistinguishable part of an extremely coherent whole; where parts and whole would be subjected to the same law: Sympathy. So, this organic world of sympathies, (wherein each element/part/individual possessed its inevitable, impeccable and essentially relevant sign-mark, so that by way of a cautious 'reading' of it everything concerning the element could be conveyed to man), was substituted by the colorless, insipid, neutral (in its assiduousness to exclude every possibility of resuscitation for the supressed similitude and its concomitants, i.e., prejudice, arbitrariness, fallacy) and artificial world of taxonomy. Taxonomy, as opposed to the former absolute prevalence of the "Same", was basically preoccupied with locating and establishing diversities and with classifying observable objects according to subtle, hardly discernible gradients of magnitude of differences. These gradients were not concerned with anything like the essential individuality of the objects, or with their innate qualities. On the contrary, precisely because it was through such essences and qualities that similitude might insidiously reappear, the gradients were obsessed with fragments of explicit, conspicuous formal appearances reducible to lines, patterns, shapes and bearing no meaning whatsoever. Structure, i.e. the sumtotal of a definite number of such fragments
This sweeping need for comparing, discovering differences, relating and classifying according to them is, in a sense, reflected in Diderot's thought: "Meaning develops from the context of relationships established, and the larger the context of relationships into which we are able to integrate an element the more complete our understanding becomes. Every being requires others for its comprehension. Thus ultimately 'there is only a single great individual: it is the whole'"; in Funt, op. cit., pp. 95, 96. This gradual reduction to the 'whole must not be thought of as something similar to the pre-Classical unifiability due to 'magical', or 'mystical', necessary resemblance. It apparently alludes to the necessity of constructing an order of comprehensibility so as to compensate for the loss of, and replace the pre-Classical picture, largely based upon theology and divine providence. Nevertheless, a thread of continuity between the two might be traced since "the deeper sense then in which art, for Diderot, imitates nature is in its use of the inherent affinities of things for the creation of unified structures, the principle upon which all organic existence rests"; Funt, op. cit., p. 132. See below, note 238.

which an object, an animal, a plant may possess, as a category, a device for collecting/nominating/ordering in "a squared and spatialized development",228 bypasses the nature of things and sets out to master them by means of their formality and by formalizing such formalities. Unlike the previous system in which

each species identified itself by itself, expressed its individuality independently of all the others: it would have been perfectly possible for all those others not to exist, since the criteria of definition would not thereby have been modified for those that remained visible,

the system of the Classical period, defining things through arbitrarily imposing upon them something (geometrical elements) totally indifferent to their 'interiors', is, as a result, merely comparative, generally untranslatable to something more meaningful, live, 'magical' as it were, than lines and patterns.229 For it, "an animal or a plant is not what is indicated - or be -trayed - by the stigma that is to be found imprinted upon it; it is what the others are not".230 This is a radical transformation occurring at all levels, of the individual, society, the world. It seems to be what characterizes a state of things amidst which "diverse groups...in...a society...can no longer agree on the meaning of God, life, and Man...unable to decide unanimously what is to be understood by sin, despair, salvation or loneliness", whereby things, concepts, notions, tend to become "more bare of content, thinner, and more
231 Mannheim, K., "Ideology and Utopia", Harvest, p. 17.

232 "The Order of Things", p. 43.

233 This refers directly to what has been discussed in the beginning of this section, i.e. the ardour exhibited by Classical philosophers for universality and genuine truth of knowledge, taste, etc., possible in principle by virtue of simple mental tools rooted in everyone, as opposed to the universality and order imputed by tradition and the church.

234 This quest is concisely formulated by John Dennis: The great Design of Arts is to restore the Decays that happened to... Nature by the Fall, by restoring order. The Design of Logick is to bring back Order to our conceptions...of Moral Philosopohy to cure the Disorder in our Passions". From 'Essay on the Operas after the Italian Manner', 1706, in Hussey, op. cit., p. 53. Also, ibid., p. 113: "Nature in her primitive state was chaotic. Only with the assistance of art and intellect could she be made beautiful, regular, fruitful".


236 Becker, op. cit., p. 55.
formal".\textsuperscript{231}

Secondly, however unjust to the wealth of Nature such superficiality might seem to us, there was a definite and useful aim, hidden behind it: To render it possible for things to "be analysed, recognized by all"\textsuperscript{232} by means of a simple, lucid, 'technical' language, based on representation.\textsuperscript{233} That would only secure a mutual understanding, and appease the disquietude caused by the apparent disorder in which Nature presents herself prior to any organizing undertaking called forth by man.\textsuperscript{234} Such an initial possibility of Nature, i.e. Nature untouched by men's ordering enterprises is governed by "an order which, in relation to the great network of taxonomies, is nothing more than chance, disorder, or turbulence".\textsuperscript{235} Thus we are confronted with a split. On the one hand there is Nature ordered: carefully displayed on the surface of a table, into which everything can smoothly slip and fall into its appropriate place, yet a Nature meaningless and formal. On the other hand, we have Nature as is immediately perceived: lively, rich, promising, moving, yet turbulent and ungraspable. This opposition was perfectly in line and keeping with an age-old tradition: "In earlier centuries the ideal image of nature was, as one may say, too ghostly ever to be mistaken for nature herself. Nature herself had hitherto seemed to common sense untractable, even mysterious and dangerous, at best inharmonious to man".\textsuperscript{236} How was the Classical age to achieve an acceptable compromise between these extremes now that it was so deeply immersed
237 Ibid., p. 29.
in and preoccupied with the problems of Nature?

Towards this reconciliation, the Classical period was seemingly obliged to recoil to territories it actually disliked. It appeared that it would inevitably have to adopt the notion of Diety, which at once plans the universe as well as all that is going to happen thus fixing the entire space and time on an unalterable line. This notion, however modified and attenuated, was very much approaching past periods and their (already condemned) world-views. The minds of the "Classical age", despite the prevalence of reason, scepticism, science, were suspects of being nearer the Middle Ages, less emancipated from the preconceptions of medieval church thought, than they quite realized or we have commonly supposed. 237

Although they denounced Christian philosophy and the fear of God, they respected with awe the "Deity"; having stultified the belief that the universe was created in 6 days, they were enchanted by the belief that it was a beautifully articulated machine designed by the Supreme being according to a rational plan as the abiding place for mankind... They denied that miracles ever happened, but believed in the perfectibility of the human race. Obviously, the disciples of the Newtonian philosophy had not ceased to worship. They had only given another form and a new name to the object of worship: having denatured God, they deified Nature...with eyes uplifted,
Ibid., pp. 49, 63. However, while the manner of the 'Same' was gradually being overridden by that of the 'Other', "the forces of nature and life (were) refusing to let themselves be reduced either to algebra or to dynamics, and thus (preserved), in the depths of Classicism itself, the natural resources of the non-rationalizable". Foucault, 'The order of Things', op. cit., p. 55. The Utopian Socialists may be plausibly adduced as such instances of the non-rationalizable; especially Owen and Fourier. Owen's 'parallelograms' might appear to invite an interpretation as exercises on the microcosm/macrocosm theme. Such an interpretation could be supported, however indirectly, by the very name 'New Harmony' he gave to the abortive attempt to apply his theories, by his own declaration that in the settlement of New Harmony "the whole should bear a resemblance to a part", Benevolo, L., "The Origins of Modern Town Planning", MIT press, 1978, and by the possibility of a latent inclination toward mystical religion throughout his life which he nevertheless developed explicitly in his old age. Manuel, F., and Manuel, F., "Utopian Thought in the Western World", Cambridge, Mass., 1979. With regard to Fourier, moreover, it has been stated that "the analogy between the psychological world and the Newtonian physical universe, this new version of the ancient comparison of the microcosm with the macrocosm, could not be driven farther". Ibid.

"The Order of Things", p. 155.
contemplating and admiring so excellent a system, they were excited and animated to correspond with the general harmony.238

Thus, in order to reconcile the synchronic and formal nature of the taxonomic table with the implacable evidence presented by actuality, which resisted any ordering intervention, and pointed to the fact that, against the artificial Nature of order, rationalized, mathematized, and arbitrary, there also exists an historical Nature involved in constantly transformed constellations of equilibriums, disequilibriums, the unresolved that becomes resolved only to fall again into a state in desperate need of resolution; and that this Nature cannot be ignored; It was claimed that

the entire continuity of nature resides between an absolutely archaic prototype, buried deeper than any history, and the extreme complication of this model as it is now possible to observe it...in the person of the human being. Between these two extremes there lie all possible degrees of complexity...like an immense series of experiments.239

This consists, in fact, in taking an abstract table of representations and, despite its synchronic quality, in turning it into a kind of history, a simultaneous tabulated history, between the extreme ends of which, one can see not only all that which exists at the same time as he, but also all that has pre-existed, and in addition, occasionally, the basic lines along which all is going
240 Ibid., p. 155.
to exist thereafter. In such a table, moreover, wherein both synchro-
nic and diachronic categories are being pressed and made to
lose a great deal of their actual meaning, "far from disturbing
the order of things, (bizarre forms) contribute to it. It is
only, perhaps, by dint of producing monstrous beings that nature
succeeds in producing beings of greater regularity and with a more
symmetrical structure".240

This contrast brings forth a last essential characteristic of
Classical epistemology, namely the curious unity in which relativism
and the absolute have been interwoven. The absolute and the univer-
sal, the precise and the immutable, i.e. the essence peculiar to
God's ingenuous design, which pertains to all the manifestations of
the universe from the admirable 'suspension' of the stars to the
inescapable line of human perfectibility, can be best revealed and
appreciated in relation to anomalies. Thence, "bizarre forms", often
reaching the limits of the offensive, could be equally valued as
the 'universal', the unchangeable. In this context, apart from the
fact that the monster justifies the normal, remnants from the past
(fossils, for instance) illustrate, justify and legitimize the work-
ing of the Divine plan towards the goal. In them, man recognizes a
remote self, and acquires assurance in terms of the comfort, which
is produced by an attestation of the continuity from the archaic,
the 'origin', to the perfect: "The fossil, with its mixed animal and
mineral nature...like so many plaster statues, fashioned one day and
As a consequence, neutrality of criticism emerges: "The historian can ignore the norm and look at the succession of... styles without bias... approach the varieties of past creations much as the botanist approaches his material, without caring whether the flowers he describes are beautiful or ugly, poisonous or wholesome...", but only with respect to "...certain recognizable morphological characteristics such as the pointed arch... and the rocaille... These terms could safely be applied stripped of their normative connotation". Gombrich, "Norm and Form", op. cit., pp. 86, 87. This is in some aspects the approach Kaufmann labels the 'apex view'; see section II, pp. 146 ff.

Becker, op. cit., p. 87.

Ibid., p. 92.

Ibid., p. 100.
dropped the next in favour of a more perfected form... is the privileged locus of a resemblance required by the historian of the continuum". History, roughly speaking, was accordingly conceived of as a table of relative particulars out of which, after the disagreeing parts have been cancelled out, thus leaving possession of the table to the common elements, the immutable nature of man, i.e. that which consists in his continual ascent towards perfectibility, would come to sight. Lest we reach a state in which "we have no common model for ourselves", "history must be written by philosophers in order to disengage from the facts those useful truths that will 'lead us to a knowledge of ourselves'". Such a program for a History-table demanded, according to Montesquieu, that

The task of the philosopher-historian (be)... to note the ideas, customs, and institutions of all peoples and all times and in all places, to put them side by side, and to cancel out as it were those that appeared to be merely local or temporary: What remained would be those that were common to humanity. From these common aspects of human experience it would then be possible, if at all, to discover, as Hume put it, the 'constant and universal principles of human nature'.

If this program bears an extraordinary similarity to what Foucault describes as the "Method" in Classical Natural History ("instead of selecting, from the totality described, the elements - whether few or numerous - that are to be used as characters, the method
"The Order of Things", pp. 141, 142.

Becker, op. cit., p. 104.

"The Order of Things", pp. 139 ff. Also, Funt, op. cit., pp. 83, 84 for a discussion of the two alternative ways by which the 'natural man' could be reached: either by deduction, i.e., as the 'civilized' man without his 'accidental' accretions, or inversely, by induction, i.e., as the sum of the properties found common in different societies.

Stylistic categories, in greater or lesser compliance with Classical epistemology have been largely treated by post-17th century esthetics as though they were 'natural classes', as different and as fixed as the species of animals were believed to be. Gombrich, "Norm and Form", op. cit., pp. 81, 82.

For the gradual establishment of tabulation and classification in the sphere of man's behavioural traits and especially of his sexual manners, Foucault, M., "The History of Sexuality", Vintage, 1980, Vol. I. "The Middle Ages had organized around the theme of the flesh and the practice of penance a discourse that was markedly unitary. In the course of recent centuries, this relative uniformity was broken apart, scattered and multiplied in an explosion of distinct discursivities which took form in demography, biology, medicine, psychiatry, psychology, ethics, pedagogy, and political criticism", pp. 33, 34.
consists in deducing them stage by stage" although they have inverse aims (establishing common loci in the first case, establishing differences in the latter), then what for Diderot ought to be applied in the making of History, i.e. an abstract, non-empirical idea of the just and the unjust, according to which an evaluation of facts, actions, and persons could be brought about (instead of trying to extract out of the latter's diversity and multiplicity, the essential principles of human nature), recalls what Foucault describes as the "System" of Classical Natural History, i.e. applying abstract, irreducible, arbitrarily selected formal categories as criteria for diversification and the classification of the multiplicity of objects. Be that as it may, what seems plausible is that the attempt at such a History was subject to the same epistemology which governed the examination of Nature and of man. The "Table", arbitrary and relative representation, the 'enlightened' goal of an easy communicability, the relativity of particular entities along with the universality of the 'Ascent', the 'origin' and the 'perfect', history as the permission granted to apparently unrelated episodes, often incompatible with each other, to enter a well-ordered classification for the sake of the potential unifiability underlying them: How are all these to be of help in resolving the Perrault-Laugier tension? I believe that in relation to the above sketched epistemological traits, both men's attitudes do fall under the same 'period'/'category'.
This touches upon the conflict, typical of the 18th century, between "return to the original, the primitive, and dialectical advance... Two opposite lines of thought are present, often in the same individual; the one symbolized by the cult of the native savage and that of antiquity, the other by the Encyclopédie, the spirit of optimism and progress". Closely interlocking with the above was, as a consequence, the distinction between "those disciplines which are dependent upon the accumulation of knowledge, and are hence progressive, and those which are not: the sciences and the arts", Funt, op. cit., pp. 58, 59. Kant too made the latter distinction. While he considered science as based upon definite rules and thence communicable; from which it follows that science (the difference between great inventor and servile imitator notwithstanding, since it is a mere difference of degree, because they can both know) fosters, furthers towards perfectibility and propagates the knowledge of mankind; "art", he maintained, "stands still at a certain point; a boundary is set to it beyond which it cannot go, which presumably has been reached long ago and cannot be extended further". Kant, op. cit., p. 152. A synthesis of origin and end had been longed for by Karl Kraus too. In a poem by him titled 'Two Runners':

'Two runners run the track of time,
Reckless the one, the other strides in awe,
The one, from nowhere, wins his goal; the other-
The origin his start- dies on the way.
And he from nowhere, he that won, yields place
To him who ever strides in awe and e'er
Has reached his terminus: the origin.'

Quoted in Szasz, op. cit., p. 55.
I have previously ascribed 'modernism' to Perrault, on the grounds of his radical opposition to former trends of thought. Why should Laugier, eagerly aspiring at universal principles and in spite of the traditionalism this aspiration seemingly implies, not be thought of as praising, exemplifying the equally 'modern' notion of 'origin/perfection' at the level of formal systems? The origin being his 'primitive hut', perfection, on the other hand, his infallible Classical architecture.\(^\text{251}\) Perrault, by ruthlessly attacking the pursuit of subtle proportions, pleaded for efficacious communicability, for everybody sharing and understanding, for beauties capable of pleasing everybody. But was Laugier not actually pursuing the same goal when speaking of "clear principles" and "unchanging percepts"? If Perrault adopted a relativistic theory of taste and formal validity, thus exemplifying, representing and potentially implying at that level what Classical epistemology had brought about at the level of conceptions of Nature and at the level of History, i.e. tabulation of differences by gathering them under equal terms within a totally relative catalogue; Laugier, viewed in this light, is likely to have done more: He both made his view of architecture fit the origin/perfection notion thus endowing it with the Classical absolute, and at the same time far from neglected Classical relativism, selection of different particulars, and displaying them in a spectacular table. With Laugier, the translation of the "Table of Natural History, or of the Historical "Table", at
The same attitude is present in architecture as well, in the same period. For instance, this text which accompanied an architectural drawing of 1767: "On présente ici sous les yeux des personnes studieuses, le Plan, la Coupe, et L' Elevation d'une ROTOnde, ou EGLISE d'une composition nouvelle, afin d'exciter de plus en plus, et réveiller l'attention des Amateurs pour l'Architecture. Qu' il seroit à souhaiter, qu' une semblable 'Eglise fut executée à Paris! Il ne manque plus à cette capitale qu' un morceau dans ce genre, pour réunir dans cette grande ville, toutes les beautés en Architecture des Grecs et des Romains", in Harris, J., "Le Geay, Piranesi and International Neo-Classicism in Rome 1740-1750", in Fraser, op. cit., figure 16.

Laugier, op. cit.

In this he anticipates Sitte, who, almost one-and-a-half-century later would justify his strikingly similar indulgence in civic estheticism by strikingly similar postulates: "...However, major plazas and thoroughfares should wear their Sunday best in order to be a pride and joy to the inhabitants, to awake civil spirit, and forever to nurture great and noble sentiments within our growing youth...", "City-Planning According to Aristic Principles", p. 92.
the level of a formal system may be thought of as having materialized in his vision of the city.252 By likening the city to a forest, he proceeds to encourage the application to urban design of all sorts of diversifying devices, in the same manner that the design for a garden should by all possible means avoid declining into a boring uniformity. "I imagine a great avenue, very wide and straight, lined with two or four rows of trees; it ends at a triumphal arch, similar to the one I have described; from there one enters a large place formed by a half-section of a circle, or an oval of a polygon; several streets extend fanlike from it... and all with a vista of a beautiful work".253 On the model of "Nature", numerous diversified species enter his 'civic Table', a, nonetheless, ordered table. But within the limits of this order, virtually all sorts of indulgences are enthusiastically admitted. He speaks of irregularity, variety, bizarre forms yet orderable, shocking and yet pleasant. In spite of his initial fury to justify his proposals for urban reform on the grounds of practical effects in the Paris of his day (traffic problems and the like), he ends up his spectacular presentation of 'urban fireworks' by pronouncing the aesthetic value of "sensational composition", by admitting that his dreams are more or less references to a pleasing scene, as distinct from utility, and by relegating his "scenes" for approval to the conception of nothing other than the compelling command to create a legendary and glorious Capital, and to present a visual image of this Capital in accordance to the associations of it awakened in the minds of potential visitors.254 "However, one
255 Leith, op. cit., Ch. 3, "The Encyclopédie on the Utility of Art"; also, Hume, "...Morals...", op. cit.

256 Laugier, op. cit.

can pursue the useful without neglecting the agreeable and must remember that a project which tends to give strangers a grand idea of our nation and attract them in great numbers, is a project not without utility. 

Thus Laugier is as 'modern' as Perrault if one considers his relativistic views of the city, his respect for the origin, his belief in perfectibility (to those that might have his "project" inapplicable he would answer that men would only have to start them optimistically, and that time, in the sense of pre-destined "perfectionement", would take care of the completion) and also the fact that with him, aesthetics of the environment, as nothing other than a remedy against boredom, began to assume the possibility of a powerful wanton existence, indifferent of any ostentatious justification, a possibility suggested in a systematic and concentrated form. Finally, Laugier is essentially 'modern' because by "reducing the city itself to a natural phenomenon", as Tafuri claims, he "shows an understanding of the preeminently antiorganic quality of the city." Although this statement might at a first glance appear ambiguous and absurd, (how can a natural phenomenon have a preeminently antiorganic quality?), it can nevertheless be an instance for recalling what has been said above about how 'arbitrary' Classical espistemology abolished the 'organic' Renaissance one. According to the account given of the sense in which 'organic' has been used, one can see how Laugier's preeminently 'Classical', 'tabulated', 'relativistic' city, its picturesqueness notwithstanding, is a
Or, rather, of the 'organic' pre-Classical conception of nature. Laugier’s resignation to "chaos, disorder, and a wild variety in the general layout", (Banham, R., "Theory and Design in The First Machine Age", Praeger, 1978, p. 252) might be compared to Piranesi’s "Carceri" with their tremendous, awesome dimensions and "great variety of non-architectural objects which visualize space by their contrasting directions and different levels... These objects produce a 3-dimensional impression but they are far from forming a unified whole... The elements act against each other; each is a menace to all. It is a pandemonium of hostile forces; disorder and uproar are regnant. Thus the objects visualize and, at the same time, decompose space... the concept of unified and integral space has gone... The Baroque cycle has come to its end. Its way has been from bodies to space, from space to chaos". And yet, Piranesi’s "idol is that nebulous 'truth' which he, like so many others, believed to be attainable by copying nature". Kaufmann, op. cit., ch. IX, 'Giambattista Piranesi'.

Such a case, it may be held, is offered by the 'Gothic' formal 'game' which was being persistently played, at least in England, roughly in the period between the middle of the 18th and the second half of the 19th century. It had been given rise to by two general conceptual systems which appeared successively and which may be viewed as utterly contradictory in many respects. On the one hand, the Picturesque largely owes its existence to the Classical epistemology, discussed above, as well as to the new socioeconomic conditions that befall England as the concomitants of the advent of the 'machine age'. On the other hand, Romanticism and Revivalism stemmed, to a considerable extent, in the opposition to both the superficiality/formality of the Classical tabulation and classification and the increasing de-humanization brought about by the new economy and productive processes. Whereas the first had been optimistic and forward-looking ("Burke and the 18th century generally", may be seen as "newly discovering a park full of terrible woods, precipitous hills, and bottomless lakes", and turning towards them with pleasant astonishment, (Hussey, op. cit., pp. 55, 56)) the second was solemnly reverting to the past, seeking reform in art, society,
model not of the actual, 'organic' Nature herself, but of the fabricated world of an 'artificial' Nature, possessing order founded in convention. Nature as form-moulder, conceptual systems emanating from epistemologies, religions, world-views, being in turn 'manufactures' of ideas about form; Numerous formal or conceptual games being played by a limited set of concepts; Inversely a single formal game being called forth as justification for diverse and contradictory sets of concepts; Surreptitious transformations and 'betrayals'; A Concept, or a form, or a 'taste', or even an epistemological segment, being rendered meaningless and shallow, deprived of richness and of organic context; Nature ordered v.s. Nature intact; An endless series of contradictions, fallacies, stubbornly persisting in what might seem to be merely an endless succession of jargons and stagesets. It would certainly be fascinating for one to try to grasp the nature and necessity of all these. Would he not then be most likely to become, sooner or later, overwhelmed and terrified by the dreadful possibility that, whereas

"logic (and thence, all of man's constructa) was formerly visualized as something outside us, something existing independently, which if we were willing, could take us by the hand and lead us into the path of truth, we now suspect that it is something the mind has created to conceal its timidity and keep its courage, a hocus-pocus designed to give formal validity to conclusions we are willing to accept if everyone else in our set will too"?260
ethics. Yet, both currents, to a greater or lesser extent claimed Gothic forms to be their repository of validity; and, their difference notwithstanding, somehow constitute two stages of the same development towards Romanticism (Hussey, op. cit., p. 17; Collins, op. cit., p. 39). So that it might be said that, if the Picturesque, during the 18th century, used the Gothic in a 'romatic' and literary (rather than thoroughly visual or strictly ethical) sense for its implementation, in virtue of the suggestions, associations, ideas, 'stories', or 'sensations' it aroused (stories or sensations having to do with the 'crusades', 'gloom', 'sublimity', 'desolation', etc., indistinctly); the second phase of the 'Gothic game', i.e., 19th-century Romanticism, adopted, swallowed up, and furthered (a fact which, however, it did not usually acknowledge) picturesque traits and vestiges (Hussey, op. cit., pp. 150 ff). Also, for instance, Pevsner, N., "The Genesis of the Pictureque", in "Studies in Art, Architecture and Design", Vol. I, Thames and Hudson, London, 1968; Harris, E., "Burke and Chambers on the Sublime and the Beautiful", in Fraser, op. cit., Williams, R., "Culture and Society", Doubleday, N.Y., 1958; Williams, R., "The Country and the City", Oxford University Press, 1973; Macleod, R., "Style and Society: Architectural Ideology in Britain 1835-1914", London, 1971; Stanton, P., "Principles of Design vs. Revivalism", in J.S.A.H., October 1954, Vol. XIII, No. 3.

Becker, op. cit., p. 25.
QUA EPILOGUE

If taste (as well as the activities related to it, i.e. form-giving and form-appreciating) is a 'game' (and there are good reasons to consider it thus, as the foregoing pages try to show), then any visualization of 'orthodoxy' whatsoever seems to be futile and nonsensical. My purpose throughout this text (or bias, to be more consistent with its essential attitude) has been centered upon the conviction that there can be no irreversibly valid prescriptions or doctrines concerning taste. Instead of exclusiveness and censure, inclusiveness and a mood disposed towards non-fanatical but active understanding of diverse alternatives presents itself as much more preferrable and realistically adjusted to the basic requirements of the 'game'. This does not at all mean that we ought to, or even could, elevate ourselves above the role of participants in it to that of its arbiter. In other words, it does not imply that we might ever emancipate ourselves from bias and prejudice. What it does imply is that we might possibly keep on having our preferences and our justifications for them, while at the same time being aware that, perhaps, other preferences and other justifications can possess a raison d'être peculiar to them.

Making comparisons, staging experimentations, giving way to
unfamiliarity and the unforeseeable, indicate a turn of mind that would probably exploit actively the basic traits of the 'game', instead of merely yielding to its dynamics. Probing diverse attitudes and approaches, shifting consciously from one to the other, reverting to old ones only to depart from them after a while, might beget an over-all picture wherein the dictum 'de gustibus non est disputandum' would reign, though crucially modified so as to exclude the unyielding stubborness that is readily associated with it, and engender, instead, a complex, flexible discursivity. We may refer to such a picture as a 'de gustibus non est disputandum' 'tamed' and 'civilized', made to come to terms with the possibility of its antithesis. Or, as a disposition epitomized by a 'why not?', though a 'why not?' resulting not from bigotry, insolence and ignorance, but from a deep awareness (and a bitter one) of the limits of our capacities, sensibilities, justifications, insights, preoccupations, and creations.