SOCIAL CHANGE AND CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT

IN MODEL CITIES

by

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B. A., Wellesley College (1966)

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER IN
CITY PLANNING
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
June, 1968

Signature of Author

Department of City and Regional Planning, May 17, 1968.

Certified by Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by Chairman, Department Committee on Graduate Students

Archives

M.A.S.S. INST. TECH.
JUN 27 1968
ABSTRACT

SOCIAL CHANGE AND CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT IN MODEL CITIES
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Submitted to the Department of City and Regional Planning on May 17, 1968 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of City Planning.

The thesis examines citizen involvement and some of the possibilities for its operation within the framework of the national Model Cities program. "Social change" is used as an introductory idea, since citizen involvement is one possible means to such change.

The Demonstration Cities legislation of 1966 called for "resident participation," which could in practice vary greatly from city to city. The legislation's "process" goal of citizen participation was in potential conflict with its "product" goals of efficient programs. This conflict, and the program's built-in time constraints, would be important in determining the kinds of citizen involvement really feasible for Model Cities.

As a pattern for discussion, an analytical framework for citizen participation is proposed. The major aspect of this framework is the suggestion that citizen involvement can serve a number of different purposes or functions. It can function to attain community mobilization, access to decision processes, political learning and power, and to promote policy or program achievement by the citizens themselves.

Two more aspects of the framework are the structural and informal context for participation, and the modes or tactics for its operation. This discussion framework is then used to analyze two case examples of citizen participation, in Boston and Cambridge Model Cities programs.

In Boston, citizen action centered around the Neighborhood Board, an elected resident body that was officially parallel to the City's own Model Cities agency. This study shows that emphasis in Boston was placed on the policy and program-achievement functions of citizen involvement, despite the fact that some of the other functions were critically needed by the community. Unless these other functions could be pursued also, the prospects for Boston's Model Cities program were dim as far as meaningful citizen involvement was concerned.
In Cambridge, Model Cities designers made a deliberate decision to devote initial planning months solely to developing the process of citizen participation. My analysis indicates that this decision amounted to emphasis on the political learning and power-building function of citizen participation. It succeeded in establishing some important resources for continued participation. In future months, the focus would shift toward the achievement function, which was likely to encounter problems.

In conclusion, there are some important common lessons that arise from the Boston and Cambridge experiences. One of these involves the fact that in both cities the various functions of citizen involvement were all needed to varying degrees; however, the Model Cities program tends to pressure for emphasis on the achievement function. That emphasis seems to endanger the chances for any degree of successful citizen involvement of any kind.

Another common element is the importance of explicit recognition that citizen participation has different functional possibilities. Here, the role or orientation of the involved professionals is likely to be especially important.

One more of the lessons has to do with the difficulties of the achievement function. In order for residents to operate here with any degree of success, careful preparations and professional guidance are of utmost concern.

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CHAPTER I: Introduction and Methods

The purpose of this thesis was to look at some reasons for having citizen involvement in a government-sponsored program such as Model Cities, and to describe the process as it has emerged so far in two different Model Cities' cases. I have included the notion of "social change," as a broader-scale phenomenon under which both citizen involvement and Model Cities can be included. Social change is therefore used here as a contextual introduction to the body of the thesis.

By "social change" I mean any process of changing the terms by which societal goods are allocated. This implies changes in the larger institutional set-up, changes in group influence and relations with the institutions, and also changes in individual feelings of potency and capabilities to use opportunities.

Such social change can come about by chance, but it can also be encouraged by consciously directed effort. The question is how, and where, such efforts can be made. I have assumed that efforts at urban social change are inevitably related to politics and community power, and that for these reasons the phenomenon of "citizen involvement" can be a key social changing element.

My approach, then, was to investigate citizen participation and its manifestations in Model Cities. For this purpose I used an analytical framework that considered three major aspects: the functions of citizen involvement, the structural and
informal context for it, and the working modes or tactics used by participants. The suggested functions of citizen participation stem from social change ideas, but are presented as operative reasons for having citizen involvement in any locality. These are more fully described in Chapter II, along with the other two aspects of the framework.

Model Cities as a setting for citizen participation is considered in light of its objectives, as well as its constraints. A major consideration was the potential conflict between two objectives: the speed of planning and implementation of effective programs and developing a workable process of responsible citizen participation. Although the two are not necessarily incompatible, program efficiency is generally associated with expertise and central autonomy, rather than with citizen participation and drawn-out consensual processes. Still another consideration was the constraint of time, which contrasted sharply with the huge spectrum of concerns included in the legislative framework.

These considerations, and the analytical framework suggested earlier, are then applied to case examples, to see whether it is possible to carry out any of the proposed citizen participation functions under Model Cities. In the concluding chapter I also reassess the analytical framework itself, in terms of its relevance to real citizen participation processes.
Some final comments are in order about the process of observing what went on in Boston and Cambridge Model Cities programs. Observations for this study were made only up to the fourth or fifth month of the official "planning year" for both cities. My main purpose in describing Boston and Cambridge as examples, was to indicate two of the many actual Model Cities operations, rather than to compare them. Also, since the entire observation period was devoted to substantially different kinds of activity in the two cities, direct comparisons on the grounds of substantive accomplishment were not particularly valuable.

The method of observation further inhibited direct comparison, because it was admittedly lopsided. I observed the Cambridge scene as an outsider, getting most information second-hand; in Boston, I observed and also participated, getting much more first-hand information, as well as more personal impressions. Accordingly, I finally chose to devote more space and attention in this thesis to the Boston program, and to include a less elaborate description of Cambridge operations, as a means of adding perspective to the whole. The final comparisons that I felt could legitimately be made involved the citizen participation functions relevant to each city, some of the ways in which they were pursued, and their chances for "success."
CHAPTER II: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: WHY AND HOW

1. The Purposes of Citizen Involvement

The call for "citizen participation" usually refers to giving people the opportunities to become interested and involved in action that influences their own living environment, in terms of "community action" endeavors. The most recent Federal mandate for this kind of involvement came in the Model Cities legislation, but the theme arises as well in other government programs, and in non-government endeavors. The first question I wish to raise in this thesis is, why have citizens "participate?" in any such programs, which could conceivably be carried out without their direct involvement?

The immediate response to "why have citizens participate?" includes a number of reasons, based on our societal values: People are held to be rational, and capable of knowing and expressing their needs and wants. They have a right to determine their own life conditions if they can. They are entitled to have a say in determining modes of government expenditure. They may have needs that can be met by available resources if only those needs are expressed. In short, "citizen participation" is part of the democratic mode of allocating societal resources.

Even so, citizen participation is but a very general term that has been used to refer to a variety of purposes and processes. I propose to define a number of possible
functions that citizen involvement might fulfill, depending on specific situations and needs. The term citizen "involvement" will be used interchangeably with "participation" using representation in the broad sense to refer to the fact that any process of involvement "represents" or embodies various segments of any entire possible universe of participants. Each different kind of participation has different standards of "success," and different operating emphases.

The type of citizen representation that usually first comes to mind is that intended to fulfill a function that I shall call "program achievement." This kind of participation is oriented toward structuring, initiating, or designing programs according to the desires expressed by those who will be affected, or according to the desires expressed by at least some of those who will be affected. In order to have a citizen involvement process that can fulfill program achievement purposes, there must be existing access to policy-makers, resources of information and material inputs, and legal or institutional means for program legitimation. Only if these necessary conditions are present can citizen participation take on program achievement as a primary purpose.

This program-achievement function is likely to involve issues of "representation" in the narrow sense, of exactly who and how are legitimate representatives in the actual structuring and design of programs. The fact that a group is organized and happens to rise from within a community, does not mean that it represents (in the narrow sense) any or all legitimate
community interests. Ideally, there could be a fluid situ-

ation where the program achievement function is available to

a number of participating groups to pursue a plurality of in-

terests. Melvin King, director of Boston's New Urban League,

notes that:

\[1..It \text{ is not a question of which groups }
\text{represent a community. The more groups }
\text{we get involved in solving a variety of }
\text{problems, the more problems we can get }
\text{solved. This country was founded on com-
petition...}^1\]

Thus, if citizen participation has as its purpose pro-

gram achievement, the question of specific representation is

likely to arise. Conceivably, the leaders or program achievers
could be volunteers, coopted community people, elected people,
or so on. This is but one of the operational problems in ful-

filling the program-achievement function. The other outstand-
ing operational concerns center around making sure that the nec-

essary conditions for this function are existing and can be sus-
tained. Those conditions have already been named as access to

policy, information and other resources, and institutional le-
gitimizing necessary to actual implementation.

The definition of "success" for citizen participation of

the program-achievement type is just what it says: program a-
chievement. This could be achievements in terms of the sort of

program under consideration -- that is, the "program" might

be a construction program, a welfare program, the establishment

of a community organization, or so on. This kind of citizen

\[^1\text{Melvin H. King, "The Poverty War: Progress or Illusion,"}
involvement is successful when the people to be affected by the program are reasonably assured of getting what they need and desire.

The citizen involvement function of program achievement is really a rather high-order function, that requires a number of prior conditions. Other citizen involvement functions may be necessary first, in order to establish these conditions. Thus, a second possible citizen-involvement function is what I call "access attainment." Citizen representation whose purpose is access attainment is oriented toward opening the channels for influencing ultimate policy makers. It is likely to be a matter of getting the right community people in the right place at the right times, and keeping them there long enough to make community influence an effective input to eventual policy formation by whoever makes policy.

Citizen involvement functioning to attain access has its own operating emphases. It should seek to tap any or all potentially interested or influential community groups, and establish communications whereby the right groups can know where and when "access" is possible. The leaders, or access-attainers, are probably likely to be more adept if they have many contacts in, and pipelines into, various parts of the community, as well as a pipeline to City Hall or wherever the decisions are really being made. Such people would be likely to be community activists already, leaders of existing organizations, or so on.

"Success" here is gauged in terms of the connections that can
be made and sustained, between interested community groups and the relevant policy-making sources.

Still another functional kind of citizen representation may be necessary before or during the attempts at access-attainment. This is the citizen-involvement function of "mobilization and interest arousal." This function is aimed at spreading the word in the community, making people aware of their common problems or desires and the potentials for finding solutions. Operations here involve communications of a public relations nature, mobilizing community groups and individuals on a variety of interests or issues. Leaders, or mobilizers, are ideally able to act like public-relations men, arousing hope and enthusiasm in all possible quarters. This kind of citizen involvement is "successful" if it makes people aware and encourages their active commitment; the more people aware and the more committed they are, the more "successful" the process.

Another function of citizen representation, which could go on simultaneously with or independent of the other functions, is "political learning and power-building." This is a two-pronged function. The learning part concerns people in the community, and their learning to perceive and use political opportunities. The power-building part extends to finding or creating openings in the existing power structure. Operationally, the function is to build up community feelings of potency and familiarity with political tactics. At the
power-structure level, the operative tactic is to make the community *visible* as a politically potent or influential or influential force. The community's credibility in this sense will largely depend on its political learning and capability of being mobilized. Citizen participation leaders here might well be politicians; they must be politically adept and some sort of charismatic quality would probably be an ideal asset. The "success" of this citizen participation function is gauged in terms of the political impact it can exert. This might be in terms of program achievements, but what I have primarily in mind, is a political impact in terms of a new community power position -- for instance, a community-run "little City Hall", or a community representative to a city council or city agency.

Thus, citizen representation might serve a number of different functions: program achievement, access, mobilization, political power-building or learning. The function appropriate to a locality would depend on that locality's foremost needs, and the larger political context. Success is of a different sort for each function, and the operating orientation for citizen participants is also different.

2. Tactics and Working Modes of Citizen Involvement

Citizen involvement has a number of possible functions, and the exact reasons for having such participation vary accordingly. Beyond these basic functions, however, are the questions of just how participation can come about, and
the tactics and working modes that seem to be the most important points to look for in any specific cases.

Citizen participation must start with some impetus or organizing effort. There are general considerations that can be made for all the possible kinds of participation. For instance, a problem in any case is likely to be disinterest or apathy; people in the community must think action has real chances for success.\(^1\) Agitation and conflict tactics are sometimes important in this sense, since they can give the people a basis for hope that by fighting together they may score some successes. The existence of issues, things that people care about, is also important, although conceivably the issue that can stir interest could be of various dimensions. Still another ingredient to continuing interest might be some visible results. Saul Alinsky, for instance, works for small victories along the way to bigger ones, to aid a sense of "solidarity and elan."\(^2\)

Over and above these initial needs to arouse interest, there are a number of general aspects that can characterize a sort of descriptive context for citizen representation. These fall roughly into two categories: structural or formal elements, and informal elements. Structural characteristics of particular importance will be the formal provisions of power and resources given a citizen group. In a government program this includes votes, vetoes, money, staff, or so on.

\(^1\)Charles E. Silberman, "Up from Apathy--the Woodlawn Experiment", Commentary XXXVII (May, 1964), p. 55

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 56.
The most relevant informal features can cover a wide range, from citizen capabilities to broad social and political conditions. The average residents' capabilities to "participate" successfully will depend on time, experience, and the skills needed for the particular citizen-involvement functions to be performed. Unlike the political and other professionals with whom they will have to deal, the community people lack resources for organized activity of this kind: their time is taken by jobs, and they may also lack money for transportation or baby-sitting. They may not have a necessary psychological orientation toward planning for the future; they certainly do not have the technical or political skill that the professionals have spent years developing. And so, the thing for community organizing is to work out a feasible, yet politically significant role for the residents. Over time, increasing familiarity with power might well make resident-participants more adept at amateur politics. Haggstrom observes that when people in poverty neighborhoods become involved in successful social action in their own behalf, "their psychological orientation does extend over a greater period of time, their feeling of helplessness does lessen, their skills and activities do gradually change." And, in any community, there are likely to be some individuals already experienced in professional political or technical capacities.

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Another informal element to consider in all cases is the existing political situation, in terms of attitudes and commitments and openings in and around the formal political structures. Conceivably, initial encouragement by the political powers-that-be may spur residents to positive action or cynicism or hostility. Long-run effects, once organization has begun in the community, are another area for conjecture: can or will the political powers keep up with rising community demands? Can or will they tolerate a new power -- or be overwhelmed by it?

The general context for citizen participation can thus be described by looking at structural and informal political resources and capabilities. Another whole area of concern, however, is tactics and working modes. In fact, many descriptions of citizen participation processes emphasize tactics, rather than the functions of participation as I have done. Tactics are usually described in terms of possibilities along a range of increasing citizen responsibility or control. At the low end of the range are citizen advisory boards, then perhaps, groups with some power to initiate or veto. Continuing along the range, groups could cooperate in decision or design with official powers. Further along, they could take more responsibility for design and control, up to a point where the citizen group makes all final decisions or designs.

This sort of range characterizes citizen groups who
are playing a political power game **inside** or in cooperation with the existing political powers. Still another dimensional possibility would be for a citizens' group to play an *outsiders'* game of conflicting or competitive operations. This happens, for instance, when a community group hires an advocate planner to design a program to oppose or replace a government program. The *modus operandi* or political game which a group chooses to play, will depend on its needs, and the opportunities (structural and informal) that lie in the existing political system.

Once they have chosen or begun a mode of operation, a group must still have some focus or substance to operate on or around. These could be key substantive issues, or specific organizational tasks; in short, it could be some manifestation of the reasons or needs for **having** citizen participation. The importance of having focal issues arises from their nature as mobilizing and organizing forces. The absence or lack of focus on such matters may make citizen participation more diffuse and less capable of "success".

The available or potential resources for citizen representation arise from the structural and informal context, but resource use is a tactical matter that can greatly determine ultimate success or failure. In terms of citizen participation, resource use and deployment can be described in terms of **five themes** that are likely to emerge in the participation process. These are:
A) **A division of labor.** The use or non use of tactics to divide labor or responsibilities is especially important where there are a number of topics of concern. And, it is perhaps most critical where the citizen representation **purpose** is program-achievement. It is likely to be related to the existence or non-existence of focal issues, since labor can only be divided where tasks can be specified and differentiated.

B) **The use or role of professionals:** Professionals, in staff or advisory capacities, can aid citizen participation if citizens are willing to accept their involvement. Professional aid, however, is likely to be useful or most useful only if the professionals are aware of the relevant citizen participation **functions**, the real reasons for having citizen involvement in any particular situation. He should be able to act as a translating medium, bringing information or encouragement to the citizen group in terms relevant to their needs.\(^4\) For instance, if program achievement is the main purpose, he should bring in relevant data and examples. If political power-building is the purpose, he should be a broker of political trade-off's and exhortations. If mobilization is the purpose, he should provide public relations advice.

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\(^4\)Reverend Michael Groden, St. Joseph's Church, Roxbury, interview on March 9, 1968. Father Groden has worked with various community groups in his area of Roxbury, and is currently spearheading a cooperative apartment development for low- and moderate-income families.
C) **Use of community organizations.** The use of existing community organizations involves determination of who would be interested in what aspects of participation. This will depend on exact issues, and on the relevant citizen participation purposes. As noted earlier, for instance, citizen participation serving access and mobility functions might do well to include any and all local groups. If the function is political power-building, the strongest groups must be included. For program achievement, the program-oriented groups would be the ones to include.

D) **Visibility and communication.** These aspects are important also in all citizen involvement functions. Again, the best emphases or tactics will depend on the relevant function that is to be performed. Visibility and communication are critical on two levels: in the community, and at or in the larger political power structure.

E) **Power.** The use and perception of power is tactically important in all the citizen involvement functions, although it is most explicit in the political learning and power-building function. Power use and perception is something to be learned by experience, and the better the learning, the better the chances that a group will be able to use its potential powers. More than any of the other thematic items, learning about power is greatly dependent on time.
Thus, citizen involvement not only has various functions, but also a vast number of possibilities for tactics and working modes. Major items to consider in analyzing a participation process include the descriptive context of structural and informal elements. Other items for analysis are the exact "power game", or operational mode going on, and the existence or lack of focal issues. Finally, there are the five tactical themes involving resource use and deployment. In the next chapter, I shall discuss the additional context of Model Cities as a framework for citizen involvement. Finally, in successive chapters, all these considerations will be used in analyzing the Boston and Cambridge experiences with citizen participation in Model Cities.
CHAPTER III: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE MODEL CITIES LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 aims to solve some of the human urban problems, by a "total environment" attempt to orchestrate resources for improving physical, economic, social and political conditions. "Model Cities" (MC), as it has come to be known, reflects an implicit assumption that enough cities have problems similar enough to each other, that a national program can be designed to aid them, if it is sufficiently comprehensive and flexible. The legislation, and the guidelines established by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), articulate some goals, operational objectives and standards for action. Included among all these are "citizen participation" components.

The major goal, solving some "human" problems of urban life, is to be implemented in "Model Neighborhoods" of a predominately residential character, being "at least in part, hard-core slums" with concentrations of low-income families. The present duration of the program includes a one-year planning phase and a five-year implementation phase.

1United States Congress, Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 (Public Law 89-754); also Department of Housing and Urban Development, Program Guide to Model Neighborhoods in Model Cities, December 1966, revised December, 1967; also H. U. D. Community Demonstration Agency Letters #1, 2, 3 (HUD 1967, DIR 3100. 1,2,3, October-November 1967)

21966 Guidelines, Ibid., p. 6.
This main goal is supported in legislation and guidelines by at least two major operational objectives. One such objective is to establish broad-scope and effective programs; the other is to delineate the real priorities and needs of the people in the Model Neighborhoods. It is this second operational objective that opens the way for citizen involvement in the program.

Accordingly, the Model Cities legislative framework for citizen participation consists of a number of standards and suggestions intended to include citizen participants. It does not, however, distinguish among different reasons for, or functions of, having citizen participation. One could gather that the main purpose for citizen involvement was visualized to be delineating people's real needs and priorities. This, however, is so general that it could apply to any of the different purposes of citizen involvement discussed in the last chapter. Generality can be an asset, if the program does provide enough opportunity to apply the general framework to specific local needs for citizen participation.

In general then, it is useful to describe the legislative openings for citizen involvement in Model Cities. The legislation requires that a city demonstration program be of sufficient magnitude to provide "widespread citizen participation in the program." The original Hud guidelines stated that:

3Demonstration Cities Act of 1966, Op Cit., Section 103 (a) (2).
- Public, private, and neighborhood participants should work together in analyzing neighborhood conditions and goals;
- Planning should be done "with the people";
- The CDA should provide a "meaningful role in policy-making" to area residents.4

These standards, however, are capable of wide interpretation; in fact, taken alone, they allow the kind of local latitude that has helped to dilute the impact of "citizen participation" components in the anti-poverty programs. In the latter there have been wide differences between legislative promise and practical reality: representation of the poor on policy boards has often been only symbolic, providing real involvement for only a few; those participating have often lacked any real constituency capable of exerting effective pressures; active participants have, in many cases, been drawn only from the upper strata of the community.5

Although these difficulties are endemic to any community action attempt; stricter legislative guidelines might help. The situation for Model Cities is somewhat improved by HUD's revised Guidelines and performance standards. These require development of the means of introducing residents' views in policy making, through some organizational structure that:
- Embodies neighborhood residents in program planning and implementation;

41966 Guidelines, op. cit., pp. 11-14, 36.

5Sherry Arnstein, "Citizen Participation--Rhetoric and Reality:; draft memo for staff discussions, Department of Housing and Urban Development, March 27, 1967.

6Community Demonstration Agency Letter #3, op. cit., "Performance Standards for Citizen Participation".
- Has a leadership composed of "persons whom neighborhood residents accept as representing their interests";
- Has "clear and direct access to the decision-making process of the CDA so that neighborhood views can influence ... decisions";
- Has sufficient information, and for a sufficient amount of time, to be able to react knowledgeably and initiate proposals;
- Is provided with some form of professional technical assistance.

Ideally, programs would combine operational efficiency with real citizen participation to develop an effective plan. In practical terms, however, the objectives of effective programming and resident participation are potentially in conflict: the broader the arena of "participation", the more difficult it may be to develop polished, comprehensive programs.

And, if we consider "effectiveness" in the sense of resource allocation, it seems obvious that "people's" judgements can differ from "expert" ones — there will be inevitable problems, both over who can judge what's best, and who should judge what's best. Even if residents are influential enough to succeed in pressing their wants, there is no guarantee that their wants are equivalent to their needs. Thus, at their worst, the two objectives are mutually constraining. On the other hand, at their best, they might succeed in reinforcing each other: real program achievements can encourage effective participation, which can in turn, lead to new successes.

Looking at MC as a vehicle for the various possible types of citizen participation, we can spot a number of critical constraints and potential difficulties which recall the
elements discussed earlier. The way in which community action is initiated, and the participants' use of power and resources, are in large part shaped by the MC program per se. First, there are the built-in constraints of a Federal program, setting limits on time and money. The first such round of constraints was the time deadline for submitting proposals by May 1, 1967; the second round covers the planning year under way in 1967-68. In fact, the pressure for some kind of visible progress comes well before that year is through, in anticipation of Congress' appropriations scheduling which begins in May for the coming fiscal year. A coincidental pressure is added for each locality by virtue of the fact that appropriations for the next phase, implementation, are to be made on a competitive basis. As Federal spending continues to be strained by war costs, some cities who have gone through the whole planning year could find further funds sharply decreased or possibly curtailed completely. The citizen participation process exacerbates these pressures in two major ways. It makes planning and decision-making more complex and time-consuming. And, it raises the potential irony of raising community expectations and hopes in face of decreasing availability of funds.

The time and money constraints are formalized in the program requirements. Within twelve months after approval of the initial planning grant, each city must submit a number of specified documents. One of these is a "first-year action program in full detail", to contain among other things, a
description of each planned activity in terms of affected population, specific content, costs, funding sources, and so on.\textsuperscript{7} But, since each local program is over-seen by a HUD regional office, it is possible that the time constraint can be adjusted to meet the needs of particular cities. So, the required statements may vary with respect to "precision and refinement."\textsuperscript{8} And, in a less formalized sense, the fate of programs in individual cities may depend largely on the good will and orientation of the Federal administrators.\textsuperscript{9} A city that can make a good case for itself may be able to concentrate on some program aspects at the expense of others, and structure its planning and action programs according to local needs even if they do not coordinate precisely with the Federal guidelines for submitting certain kinds of programs at certain times.

Another set of challenges is related to the matters of residents' capabilities and their best feasible role for participating in MC programs. Although the MC standards enumerate minimal requirements, the actual substance of citizen involvement can vary enormously. Variation enters with the way in which participating residents are selected, and the attitudes taken toward them by their own community as well as by local professional and political participants. The required "clear and direct access" to decision-making can vary in manner and

\textsuperscript{7}Community Demonstration Agency Letter #1, op. cit., Model City Planning Requirements", par. 2.1.2-2.1.7, and par 5.3.

\textsuperscript{8}Ibid., par. 2.3.

\textsuperscript{9}Bernard J. Frieden, class lecture, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February 9, 1968.
effectiveness, depending on how decision resources are distributed and used. On this score, the provisions for time, information, and technical assistance to residents may be necessary ingredients, but still not sufficient for resident influence. In practice, residents might end up working at any point along a whole range of possible influence: consenting to plans, negotiating or bargaining with city politicians and professionals, joint planning with them, taking full control of part or all of a plan. What really happens in any locality will depend on the structured arrangements, official and professional attitudes, and residents' capabilities and attitudes. In other words, community action under MC will have the same complexities as elsewhere. Here, too, there are the added necessities of Federal time and monetary constraints, but also the potential benefits of well-administered Federal guidelines.

A related and equally critical dimension is the local orientation to process and product as two distinct kinds of activity. "Process" refers to the development of effective resident participation; by "product", we refer to the development of concrete programs. In other words, concern with "process" would be appropriate especially where the functions of citizen participation are to mobilize and arouse interest, or to build political learning and power-bases. "Product" emphasis would be most important if the major function of citizen participation is to structure program achievements.
Those who design and initially influence a local MC program could conceivably emphasize either process or product, or both, and remain within appropriate legislative realms. Similarly, the participating residents could opt for either or both. This choice of emphasis need not be a conscious one, or even one perceived by any of the parties. Nonetheless, the success of the citizen participation that actually emerges may in great part depend on taking the appropriate orientation to process or product. Ideally, Model Cities' success depends on both process and product, and the optimum strategy is one that develops concrete MC programs at the same time as it establishes the kind of citizen participation functions appropriate to local needs. Thus, the residents' feasible role must be found in some balance or trade-off between process and product.

Another critical element mentioned earlier was the narrow-sense "representation" aspect of any community action program. "Representation" in this narrow sense refers to the kind of citizen involvement whereby specific interests are represented in program design and achievement. MC guidelines explicitly require a structure including resident leadership composed of persons whom residents "accept as representing their interests". This is one means of assuring that at least some neighborhood interests are represented, but it does not stipulate how: by election at large? by appointees of neighborhood groups? And, as noted earlier, creating a truly "representative" group may be virtually impossible. Although well-intentioned,
this "guideline" could conceivably foster costly obstructions, diverting everyone's attention to an intra-community battle to determine the "true" representatives.

Finally, the general local political context for resident action in MC should be considered. The focal point here, is the role of city government in a program initiated and administered by the Federal government. Earlier Federal-city programs have been administered along agency lines, so that different city departments tended to have links with different Federal ones. These links fostered inter-agency constituencies; local elected officials such as the Mayor could be bypassed, and practically speaking, over-ruled. And, the inter-agency competition and lack of coordination that takes place anyway at local and Federal levels is further exacerbated.

The MC program differs from others in that it attempts comprehensive coordination of all relevant agencies at all government levels, and centralized local control is vested in city hall. The precedent for this Federal turn toward the elected local officials was the Green Amendment to the 1967 Anti-poverty Bill. This measure required a city hall to take charge of all local community action programs, either by running the programs itself or by choosing a private agency to do so. In effect, then, the mayor's office can no longer be by-passed by local agencies running Federal anti-poverty programs. This is such a turn-about that opponents of the Amendment called it "bossism", a real concession to big city mayors. 10

If one side of MC politics thus puts power back into the mayor's hands, it also tempers that power. Since cities must compete for funds, each city must be able to prove the merits of its case, by coming up with effective programs and some kind of citizen participation arrangement. Assessing local programs is done at Federal regional and central offices; MC gives enough leverage to regional officers to encourage cities to deal through them, and regional administrators can thereby keep at least some watch on each locality.

Another side of MC politics is the relationship between city governments and resident participants. MC is at least partly structured to stress needs of low-income groups, as voiced by those groups. For instance, proposed MC areas had to be fairly large, one reason for this being that in a larger area there was more likely to be stronger local political weight behind residents' desires. Also, MC performance standards make the city government responsible for insuring that administrative and organizational structure provides for effective citizen participation, with residents "fully involved in policy-making, planning and the execution of all program elements."11

In effect, MC tries to steer a felicitous course between local city government control and citizen participation. And there is still another potential problem: successful citizen participation, as evidenced by the success of the program to date.  

11Community Demonstration Agency Letter #3, op. cit.
participation raises a competitive power base which constitutes a natural threat to any present power-holders. Anticipation of this turn of events can dampen even the most enthusiastic local politician, who may hope to use MC to his own and the community's advantage, but must also fear its' getting out of hand.

In summary, the MC objectives of building effective programs and delineating people's real needs seem to have the potential to be either conflicting or mutually reinforcing. The aspect of delineating needs is a direct invitation to citizen participation, although there is no distinction made among the various possible purposes of such participation. MC community action, in addition, will labor under program constraints of time and money. And, although there is guaranteed access to some of the channels and resources for decision-making, practical outcomes will depend on residents' abilities to use these opportunities, and the ways in which they are extended in the local program. It will also depend on all parties' orientation to process and/or product; and on the way "representation" in the narrow sense is handled; and on the local political context in general.

All of these factors will combine to shape citizen participation in a different way for each locality. And, since citizen action has different purposes, it remains to be seen whether or not a locality can visualize the purposes needed locally, and then integrate that sort of citizen involvement into its' Model Cities operation.
CHAPTER IV: MODEL CITIES UNDERWAY -- THE BOSTON PROGRAM

Citizen participation has a number of possible functions, any or all of which could be undertaken by a city as part of a Model Cities program. The huge variety of program concerns in Model Cities tends to make "policy/program achievement" the most obvious function for citizen involvement, but as I have pointed out, that function may often be practicable only after the access, mobilization, and power-building have been begun. Boston's Model Cities operation is a good illustration of this dilemma. Within the Boston Model Neighborhood, there were needs for access and the other functions as well -- but the overwhelming emphasis was placed on a policy/program achievement function nonetheless. This came about as a result of the general Model Cities framework in Boston, which established the residents' Neighborhood Board as a body whose job was to formulate policy and programs.

In describing the Boston scene, I am not attempting a comprehensive study of all the local MC matters. Rather, the concern is with whatever seemed directly relevant to citizen participation in terms of its appropriate functions and chances for "success" in fulfilling those functions. The description begins with background material about political and professional renewal experience in Boston, then moves on to a discussion of the Model Neighborhood's character and needs. Next, the structural and informal aspects of Boston's Model Cities set-up is brought out as it concerns citizen involve-
ment. Finally, the study turns to modes of working operation; and resource deployment in terms of the five themes suggested earlier, and an assessment of the chances for successful citizen participation in Model Cities.

1. Boston Model Cities' Heritage and Inception

The Boston MC program had emerged as a remarkably open one, in terms of official desires to extend communications and resources directly to people in the Model Neighborhood. This condition did not come about overnight. It came from a combination of long years of redevelopment experience, alert community leaders, and a Federal MC proposal deadline that propitiously coincided with major shifts in the unique political system that is Boston's.

The story of Boston's redevelopment experience is an elaborate one that can barely be summarized here. However, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) is relevant here because it established much of the context for citizen participation in Boston programs. That context can be described by a brief review of the three aspects of the BRA story. First, there was the fact of BRA emergence as a power structure and

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1For instance, see these theses involving various aspects of BRA experience: Nancy Rita Arnone, "Redevelopment in Boston: A Study of the Politics and Administration of Social Change," Department of Political Science, M. I. T., PhD (February, 1965); Langley Carlton Keyes, Jr., "The Rehabilitation Planning Game: A Study in the Diversity of Neighborhood", Department of City and Regional Planning, M.I.T. PhD (January, 1967); Dwight E. Flowers, "Neighborhood Renewal in Context: Project Impact in Adjacent Areas", Department of City and Regional Planning, M. I. T., MCP (June, 1967).
and catalyst for change and community involvement. Second, there were the public reactions to urban renewal, and the resulting mobilization of resident interests. Third, there were the residents' "mandate groups" officially included in BRA operations. These three aspects of experience helped to condition the structural and informal setup that was to emerge for citizen participation in Model Cities.

The first aspect was BRA emergence as a power structure and catalyst for change. This began with the election of John Collins as Mayor in 1959. Collins had chosen urban renewal as the keynote of his administration. Together with Edward J. Logue, who had already acquired a magical renewal reputation in New Haven, Collins succeeded in fashioning a new and comprehensive framework for Boston's planning and renewal. Collins and Logue incorporated the old Planning Board into a restructured Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), with full authority to propose and implement renewal programs, designing long-range plans and comprehensive capital improvement programs. The BRA emergence has been aptly characterized as a dynamic catalyst of change, injected in a political-bureaucratic system previously habituated to low performance and loose integration. Logue was not only an efficient technician and expert grantsman, but a political pragmatist and a man of action; with Logue as its Development Administrator, the BRA's new functions could be carried out with a forceful combination of

\[2\] Arnone, Ibid., pp. 253-5 and passim.
efficiency, political and technical skill.

Logue's style of operation was a compendium of innovation, skill and resources, and the capability to use all three to political advantage. The BRA rapidly became Boston's largest, and probably most active, agency. Projects and action were quick to emerge; by 1963, Boston had risen from 17th to 4th in the amount of Federal money reserved for individual city's renewal efforts. BRA successes, in turn, lead to the emergence of a new political pattern in Boston. Nancy Arnone described this pattern in terms of three focal elements of a new power structure:

(1) The BRA itself, with resources of money, and technical and political skill;

(2) Mayor Collins, a "transition" figure between old-style politics and modern efficiency, who, at the outset was able to avoid direct conflicts and still maintain his power to legitimize outcomes;

(3) A business and financial elite willing to back efforts to get money and action into the Boston scene.

With this impetus, Boston's renewal program was well under way by the mid-1960's.

By then, however, the serious problems of urban renewal had emerged in Boston and residents were mobilized in reaction. The powerhouse strength and rapidity with which projects were begun could not be matched in project completion. Areas that had been rapidly cleared, could not be so rapidly rebuilt, and the Federal programming for separate "planning" and "execution" phases exacerbated the lags between present reality and future.

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3 Ibid., p. 58.
4 Ibid., p. 258 and passim.
promise. Low-income residents, having daily survival troubles anyway, got the worst end of a situation over which they, of all groups, had the least control. Dislocated, facing empty or rubble-filled lots where once there had been friends and familiar places, residents' reactions were often bitter and cynical. In many areas, physical renewal came to mean human removal, and the BRA name signified an inhumane bulldozer.

Almost by virtue of its very efficiency, the BRA had fallen into disrepute in many quarters. Redevelopment had become a focus for controversy, a subject for major political conflicts and public anxiety. In Roxbury, part of which constituted the Washington Park renewal area, reaction and controversy erupted in 1966. At a community rally, residents voiced resistance to BRA "tactics" and dislocation; in the non-renewal sections of Roxbury, conditions were worse than ever and dissatisfactions stronger than ever.5

For Mayor Collins, who had been its champion, renewal was now a political liability. The public could clearly be mobilized in response to renewal. Collins' bid for a Senate nomination in September of 1966 was rejected by the voters, the largest anti-Collins vote occurring in and around Washington Park.6 Collins turned to tend his political fires, and Logue was left to hold the renewal fort alone.

In short, by 1967 the BRA experience had brought the most critical urban renewal issues to Boston. In the process, a new

5Flowers, op. cit., passim. Flowers makes an elaborate and convincing analysis of urban renewal effects on adjacent areas, showing that the Washington Park project was the cause of rapidly intensifying social and economic problems in the surrounding adjacent areas.

6Ibid., pp. 103-108.
power structure was established in the BRA, but it had to deal with rising community reactions and resident involvement in official processes. Thus, the city officials and also the residents were learning that citizen involvement could take various functional forms: it could obstruct, mobilize, even wield solid political power.  

There was also the third aspect: The BRA's official use of citizen participation in a public planning operation. A structured role for citizen participation arose from the necessity of mobilizing support for urban renewal projects, and Collins' expectation that "planning with people" would be part of any renewal process. Thus, even prior to public hearing, a citizen "mandate team" would negotiate with the BRA to work out a plan suitable to its area's needs. Langley Keyes explained that,

...No public hearing would be held on the...plan until the mandate organization has given its formal public assent to the plan. The mandate group legitimizes the renewal plan for the neighborhood and provides the formal arena within which differences of opinion can be resolved and conflict neutralized.

Keyes goes on to comment on the importance of having a mandate team that includes representatives of all interests influential enough to mobilize local support for or against renewal. In other words, the BRA lesson was that there are ways to plan with people, and that the way to get good results is to make certain the right people are planned with. Furthermore, the exact "result" being aimed at determines, in large part, who the "right" people are. The original mandate group for Washington

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7 For example, see Keyes, op. cit., pp. 498-502, and passim.

8 Ibid., p. 83.
Park would have been "right" had the only important result been the physical changes in Washington Park itself; in overall terms, however, the target result probably should have included satisfactory provision for the dislocateses — and accordingly, the mandate group should have included an advocate of their interests from the first.

All this had transpired in Boston when the Model Cities opportunity arose early in 1967. To make application in time for the May deadline, an area of sufficient need had to be defined and the elaborate "proposal" (a bureaucratic requirement) written up. The greatest physical and social needs in Boston were still in all of Roxbury and also the South End, but these easily constituted 20% of Boston's population, and the Guidelines made 10% the maximum. Accordingly, the two portions already designated as renewal areas, Washington Park and the South End, were deleted, leaving a doughnut-shaped Model Neighborhood with Washington Park as its center and the South End as one outside border. Adjacent portions of Jamaica Plain and North Dorchester were added to make a 2000-acre doughnut. These added a larger white population, bringing it to 47% of the MN total of 62,000 people. The MN overlapped portions of 3 of the eleven city poverty target areas, and partly bordered the Jamaica Plain code enforcement area. Although formally excluded, Washington Park was having serious social problems and it was anticipated that it would share in the overspilling benefits of MC social programs.
In essence, Logue had milked the Federal MC resource possibilities for all he could, maximizing the area and population, and hoping to stretch at least some benefits to the 25,000 people in Washington Park. Hopefully, also, having a large area meant that the most precarious sub-areas were included, at least in part mitigating the bad spill-overs that came with smaller project areas in urban renewal. The large population might swing political weight for or against an administration; its very size and diversity would certainly complicate the "resident participation" aspect. Since Logue was also a potential candidate for Mayor in that Spring of 1967, he must have especially weighed these potential liabilities and anticipated some means of swinging them in the right direction.

The mayorality race, in which Logue was to be only one of eighteen candidates, provided the backdrop for the way in which the Boston MC proposal received its final formulation. This general political backdrop was especially opportune for new citizen involvement, for two reasons. First, the political situation was in a fluid state, ripe for openings and shifts of power. Second, the community had residents willing and able to take the initiative and bid for power at the right time.

The fluid political situation revolved around Collins' decline in popularity. The coming November elections for Mayor were already being eyed by a whole range of hopefuls, including along with Logue, several members of the City Council and the School Committee. Boston politics went on as usual, with people jockeying for position against the backdrop of ethnic enclaves
and equally ensconced bureaucratic enclaves. Now, however, there was added incentive for making a good, or at least not a bad, public showing on any important issues. One such issue was the whole ghetto problem, Roxbury being the center of especially controversial aspects in school policy and urban renewal. Since Model Cities was one way of exhibiting a sincere effort to solve some of the ghetto problems, members of the City Council in this election year were interested in helping Boston to be one of the prestigious chosen cities. Although the substance of the MC proposal was being prepared by the BRA and ABCD (Boston's antipoverty agency), City Council would have to pass on the application, and it was likely to be interested in quiet negotiation on any controversial matters that might dilute the beneficial aura of the official proposal.

Thus, on April 2, when the MC proposal was ready for Council approval and submission to Washington, a community conference was held in what was to be the MC area, for the purpose of resident review of the proposal as written by BRA and ABCD. Residents were aware of the political opportunities, and readily "participated." Inspired by the efforts of Thomas Atkins, an influential community leader, and Reverend Donald Campbell of Jamaica Plain, participants at the conference focused their attention on the proposed mechanisms for community participation. This was covered in the ABCD draft by a provision for citizen advisory meetings to "react and recommend with respect to planning." Although this was well within the Guidelines format,
it was not sufficient as far as the Campbell-Atkins forces were concerned, and the other conference participants agreed. Accordingly, the conference voted to appoint a steering committee, to study "alternative models for a citizen-planning body."^9

A second conference was convened on April 19, and residents voted approval of their own citizen planning scheme. It called for an 18-member Neighborhood Board (NB) to be elected from the MC area, with three members from each of six neighborhoods. The Board was to have its own funds for staff or other work, and some key powers: to initiate as well as review MC plans, and to exercise a line veto in the finished plan.

The final step was the City Council hearing on the MC proposal. After the initial hearings, there came a day-long deliberation in the Mayor's Office, involving City officials and a neighborhood group headed by Atkins. Council finally approved the MC proposal with the community conference version of citizen participation included. In its resolution, the Council also provided for a minimum sum of $35,000, to be given the Neighborhood Board; this was a means of assuring a set amount for the Board in the likely event that the Federal appropriation to Boston would be less than the total requested amount of $250,000.

Now Boston was ready for action. The Board elections were held in August, drawing more than 12% of the community to the

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polls. By November, Boston had a new mayor in Kevin White. In a close race, White had defeated Mrs. Louise Day Hicks, a vociferous proponent of the "neighborhood schools" concept that favored keeping all children (including black ones) close inside their own neighborhoods (including slum ones). White pledged to give people and their problems the highest priority, and close on the heels of his election came Washington's approval of Boston's MC bid.

2. The Model Neighborhood and the Relevant Functions of Citizen Participation

The aims of Boston's MC proposal reflected the whole range of physical and social needs for which the legislation was intended. The point of the whole thing, especially "citizen participation", was to make the city livable for people, to make agencies and opportunities relevant and responsive to the people's needs. This had been a leading theme at least as early as the community conference, at which BRA staff members expected that residents could "begin to participate", and "define 'community control'". The real enormity of the task, however, becomes apparent in looking more closely at the character and needs of the proposed Model Neighborhood: The kind of citizen participation or representation relevant to Boston's MC can be discussed after a brief description of the area.

Ibid., p. 2. The same report further notes that 12% "compares favorably" with regular city election turnouts, and is significantly higher than the rate for "war on poverty" board elections.

The MN doughnut included some of the worst Roxbury areas along with some more transitional adjacent sections of town. A statistical comparison of the whole MN with the whole of Boston describes a situation of massive poverty and decline in the MN. On the other hand, conditions vary widely among the sub-areas.

Numerical population figures are rapidly outdated by the pace of events, which have caused large population shifts and accelerated physical decline in some sections over the few years just prior to MC beginnings. As Flowers had indicated, much of the change could be attributed to the urban renewal activity in Washington Park and the South End. The most "disadvantaged" portion of Washington Park's population moved southeast to what was to become MC Area 6, and parts of Area 5, accelerating the gradual southeastward shift of Boston's black people which had been going on for years. The renewal dislocates were largely low-income, lacking organizing or unifying social institutions, bringing along a corresponding range of social problems. Some of these also moved northward into lower Roxbury, which was already experiencing an influx of "undesirables" who had fled the South End's skid row. Lower Roxbury accounted for MC Area 3, and parts of Area 2.

These pressures accentuated and complicated the existing differences among all the sub-areas which were to become part of the Model Neighborhood. As the Proposal stated, in the area finally chosen,
...there is the opportunity for real racial harmony on the one hand, and, on the other, the chance that without a strong effort to improve conditions, the area will deteriorate so badly that increased interracial tension could conceivably result.²

A brief characterization of the physical personalities of the neighborhoods conveys the impression that the Proposal understated its case, to say the least. Jamaica Plain, comprising Area 1, had a mix of stable, attractive, middle-income residences, and a growing number of low- and no-income accommodations. Part of Area 1 was in a code enforcement area, indicating the need for less-than-renewal improvement of substandard housing and facilities. It teetered on potential "deterioration, rapid racial change and property abandonment unless there is considerable effort to stabilize the area."³

Area 2 was even more heterogeneous. It had stable areas, but also some of the worst of physical conditions; there were vacant and rubble-strewn lots, buildings in various stages of abandonment and decay or destruction, empty and deteriorating places of business and residence. The Madison Park sections, in Areas 2 and 3, were similarly physically blighted, and contained some of the most dire poverty in the city. Also in Area 3, there was Orchard Park, a large housing project whose stark institutional character contrasted sharply with the scene of delapidation and abandonment surrounding it.

²Office of the Mayor, City of Boston, Application to the Department of Housing and Urban Development for a Grant to Plan a Comprehensive City Demonstration Program, April 27, 1967, Part II, B, p. 2.

³Ibid., p. 5.
Area 4, like Area 1, boasted attractive middle-income sections threatened by potential deterioration and rapid racial overturn. Areas 5 and 6 were also mixtures, housing many of Boston's upwardly mobile middle-class blacks, as well as many of its most poverty-stricken, including the renewal dislocates. Grove Hall - Blue Hill Avenue, a busy service and commercial section, boasted a number of antipoverty organizations and community service groups, many of them uprooted from Washington Park.

As in the physical environment, the social environment and community activity varies greatly from sub-area to sub-area. Before going into these differences, it is possible to characterize the MC area in general as having a vibrant community life. With a population larger than many small towns, the "Neighborhood" could and did possess literally hundreds of organized groups interested in the civic, social, economic, cultural, and recreational life of the community. The April, 1967 conference had been no mere collection of residents, but rather a gathering of 300 residents representing local organizations. Over and beyond the outside-sponsored groups abounding in the MN, there were over sixty black self-help groups that had been formed over the last few years alone. To mention only a few: there was "Operation Exodus," which as one of its activities, bused over 950 black children from Roxbury to other school districts in 1967-68; Circle Associates, a group of young black professionals interested in joint entrepreneurial
ventures; Grove Hall Community Development Corporation, an umbrella organization for a number of agencies undertaking the renaissance of an exceptionally deteriorated 35-block area.

This community activism can be the basic strength of "citizen involvement" in a government-sponsored program such as Model Cities. As a resource in this sense, the kinds and degrees of interest and activism vary greatly from sub-area to sub-area in the Model Neighborhood. This variation reflects some of the social and economic differences that exist among sub-areas as well. In other words, in these terms, the sub-areas are differentially conditioned for the possibility of involving existing groups or individuals as participants in Model Cities. Similarly, the functions of citizen participation appropriate to these conditions also vary from area to area. These differences can be seen in a brief look at the active groups and the elected Board members in each area.

Area 1 had strong church and civic organizations, group activity being largely dominated by the large proportion of white homeowners living in the area. As part of Jamaica Plain, the Area was also in the Jamaica Plan APAC territory. This APAC was one of the more active, well-organized APACs in the City. Conceivably, it would have been able to organize a number of community interests to work on different Model Cities tasks. Two of the Area 1 Board representatives also reflected organizational ability and political dexterity. One of them, Reverend Donald Campbell, had been a prime mover in organizing
the April Community Conference. A second was an experienced City politician, having served on City Council and in various political appointeeships. The third Board member, an active union man, had mainly union and fraternal organization experience.

Area 2 was as mixed socially as it was physically. The active organizations included long-established settlement houses, newer neighborhood improvement organizations, and an even newer Lower Roxbury Community Corporation. As Model Cities got under way, a Harvard University-sponsored group, Urban Field Service, was working to organize Area 2 to respond to Model Cities. This activity was being worked out under the legitimizing sponsorship of Area 2's Board members. These three people all had experience based in community-betterment organizations. One was active in the New School, a vigorous black self-help operation. The other two: both served on the Roxbury Community Conference for Urban Renewal; one was also an experienced social service worker, and the other served on APAC and as president of a neighborhood association.

In Area 3, the dominant focus for group activity was in the two housing projects -- even though dominating, however, this was weak, as far as activism, organization, and mobilizing ability was concerned. Project residents had weak tenants' organizations, and non-project residents of the Area had little if any social connection with them. In fact, the three Area
3 Board members were all residents of the larger project. All three had group organization and action experience, but at different scales: one was the project tenants' association president and also on APAC; another was active in Head-start, and in health and neighborhood improvement groups. The third was involved in youth activities and a consumer's organization, and was a social service employee.

Although all the Area 3 representatives were concerned to represent their Area, their natural orientation and most numerous contacts were toward project people and project concerns. Non-project people in Area 3 lacked direct representation, and seeing to their interests would depend on the three Board members' willingness and abilities to extend their own connections outside the projects.

Area 4, one of the "transitional" sub-areas, similarly had a number of organizational activities including a large number of improvement organizations. For instance, the Dorchester-Roxbury Line Improvement Association aimed at combatting blighting influences beginning to enter from adjacent areas experiencing the influx of the black lower-class. Area 4, however, had less of the self-help activism found in the poorer, blacker neighborhoods; the people seemed less community-politics oriented. The Board representatives from Area 4 reflected this apolitical tendency, at least as far as Model Cities was concerned. One was an officer of the Line Improvement Association, a second, a member of another neighborhood
betterment group, and the third, listed no group activities at all. This contrasted abruptly with the lists of organizational activities in which Board members from other sub-areas were involved. And, Area 4 was one of the two sub-areas where the three Board members ran unopposed in the Board elections.

In Area 5, a number of new community forces were taking shape, mirroring the mix of forces arising in the area as poor blacks began to enter from Washington Park. Along with the in-migrants had come most of the social and civic organizations that had served them. There were also in Area 5, new economic and business interests forming community development corporations, among them, the Grove Hall group. These were of great potential power, since they were being organized by skillful and influential young community professionals. Still another aspect of Area 5 activity were the militant "black power" groups beginning to use the area as a focal point.

The Area 5 Board members reflected this activism of various kinds. All had been active in urban renewal or neighborhood improvement groups; one was a member of a newly organized business-entrepreneurial group. Activities of the three also reflected part of Area 5's social composition: two were college-educated and both active in innovative educational ventures; the third had some post-high school education and had taught courses in the U. S. Army. These middle-class type activities are representative of a part of Area 5; the growing numbers of
low-income, less-educated inmigrants are a different part of the Area's population.

Area 6 activities and representatives, as in Area 5, reflect predominantly middle-class backgrounds and not the lesser-endowed portions of the population. Organizations include neighborhood betterment groups similar to those in most of the sub-areas. As in Area 4, there is less political and community activism, and the three Board members were not opposed by any other candidates in the August elections. All three work at skilled professions; one of them, M. Dániel Richardson, was college-educated and active in broad-scope organizations including N. A. A. C. P. and the American Friends Service Committee. Since Richardson was elected Board chairman, I shall be mentioning him again later.

Thus, the six sub-areas were so varied that "citizen participation" was relevant in very different ways for each sub-area. In all the areas there were active groups, but they differed as to the nature of their concerns, and the sector of the community involved. The Area 1 APAC, and the Area 2 Urban Field Service, for instance, were potentially capable of organizing or involving their whole sub-areas. On the other hand, the Area 3 and Area 4 Board members would have more difficulty involving their whole sub-areas. In Areas 4, 5, and 6, problems centered around using and involving the diversity of groups working simultaneously in different areas of concern.

Still another manifestation of sub-area differences was
in the original slate of candidates for election to the Board. Two sub-areas, 4 and 6, each had only three candidates for the three Board seats; in each of two other sub-areas (3 and 5), there were four people running for three seats. Areas 1 and 2, on the other hand, each had a total of five candidates. Similarly, in the voting turnout, Area 1 had the highest percentage of people coming out to vote; in the no-contest sub-areas, the percentage of people voting was far below the Model Cities area average.

In other words, then, for each sub-area, Model Cities "representation" should have had different functions. Where all or much or a sub-area could be organized and involved, as in Areas 1 and 2, the relevant kind of representation could conceivably be "program achievement", or at least aim in that direction. On the other hand, in the Areas such as 4, 5, and 6, where group interests were working in many different directions, the relevant kind of representation was first of all in the "access" sense. In these sub-areas it was of first importance that as many of the different groups as possible be brought into the Model Cities communications network, so that the most interested and influential could gain access to the processes of design and decision. Still another kind of representation was most relevant in Area 3, and to some degree in Areas 4 and 6 also -- this was representation functioning as a "mobilizing" force, to arouse diverse interests, and include them in the Model Cities concerns.

For the Model Neighborhood as a whole, still another
function of citizen involvement was the most relevant. This was "political learning and power-building". People in the whole area needed to be effective, and to feel effective, and Model Cities could be one vehicle for building that condition. This need in the Boston Model Cities area was especially critical, due to residents' deep dissatisfactions, and the potential for violent riots or demonstrations. In the spring of 1967, while the professionals in City Hall were drawing up the MC proposal, Roxbury had been a focal point for smoldering anger that centered especially on city welfare and education conditions. Dr. John Spiegel, analyzing Boston along with five other large cities, found that during that Spring, Roxbury was among the highest in terms of residents' "discontents." In June, the group Mothers for Adequate Welfare (MAW) was conducting a sit-in at the Grove Hall welfare office, the day was hot, there was confusion, sudden anger, and then a riot. In retrospect, the Boston Globe pinpointed the basic cause of the riot on the absence of communication between the community and City Hall. At the time, police response was quick, and Spiegel believes, "excessive." To say the least, residents were more angry than before and feelings continued to smolder.

White's election brought some possibilities of change to

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4 Carl M. Cobb, "Expert Says Roxbury Smolders," The Boston Globe, March 12, 1968, 27:6. The article summarizes a lecture given by Dr. John Spiegel, Director of the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University. Dr. Spiegel observed the conditions in Boston, San Francisco, Dayton, Akron, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh; beginning in the spring of 1967, he kept up with events throughout the explosive summer.


6 Cobb, op. cit., citing Spiegel.
the scene. Spiegel, looking at Roxbury again early in 1968, saw a "marked change" in people's attitudes toward the city administration. There was still suspicion, but also a "wait and see", half-hopefulness toward White. At the end of March, MAW once again raised its grievances, and this time found a more satisfactory city response. Mayor White met with the group at a Roxbury Welfare office, and spent the day talking over their complaints. And, Thomas Atkins had been elected to the City Council. Thus, communication has begun and the "marked change" may lead to a more workable situation all around. On the other hand, there remain ample reasons for residents' anger. Conditions continue to be bad, relationships with City Hall are delicate, progress is slow, the situation remains volatile. If citizen involvement through Model Cities is to "succeed," it must function to provide communications and feelings of real community political effectiveness.

Thus, for the MC area as a whole, the prevailing reason for having citizen involvement centers around the functions of large-scale mobilization and political effectiveness. Since community mobilization is so important, it may be instructive at this point, to compare the MC resident participation frame-

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7 Ibid.

8 All the research and much of the writing for this thesis was done before the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King on April 4, 1968. Although racial violence erupted in major cities, the Boston scene was one of relative calm, due largely to the Roxbury community leadership and Mayor White's willingness to cooperate. As Mayor's Aide, Barney Frank noted, "Last year, Tom Atkins was clubbed and arrested. This year he's coordinating efforts at Police Headquarters." (Quoted by The Boston Sunday Globe, April 7, 1968, 18:5)
work with the kind of resident organization used by Logue's BRA for urban renewal projects. Although urban renewal has physical aims and MC's a combination of physical, social, and economic ones, the importance of citizen participation as a mobilizing and legitimizing force is common to both urban renewal and Model Cities.

As noted earlier, Logue's "mandate groups" served a specific mobilizing function, and were composed of a certain type of residents — those whose influence would be critical to mobilizing support or opposition to an urban renewal plan. As in the Washington Park episode, an initial miscalculation as to where influence could be mobilized could lead to trouble later on. And, the mandate group approach automatically ignored groups or individuals who might be affected, yet could not muster any "influence". In addition, the mandate group was typically composed of people representing or controlling rather well-established community organizations. Thus, in Washington Park: Freedom House, a civic organization of over a dozen years' experience, whose Board included "some of the most influential Jewish and Negro leaders in Massachusetts." ⁹ In Charlestown: SHOC, a new and looser organization, nonetheless firmly established in a broad grass-roots movement. ¹⁰ And, in the South End: USES, a seventy-year old settlement house organization having connections with a number of community organizations. ¹¹

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⁹ Keyes, op. cit., pp. 379-80, and passim.

¹⁰ Ibid., passim, especially pp. 277, 457-9.

¹¹ Ibid., same pages and also pp. 140-44, 152-3.
The MC Neighborhood Board as a group represented almost the antithesis of the "mandate groups". Its members lacked organized or easily-mobilized constituencies, and they possessed varying degrees of political-type influence and dexterity. In a sense, the Board should have been serving a "mobilization" function, yet it lacked these very ingredients that enhanced the mandate groups' ability to mobilize interest and support. Most critical of all, unlike members of the mandate groups, Board members did not have at their immediate disposal, organizations or regularized networks for communicating with the elements they were supposed to represent. The mere "exposure" to community pressures, that came by virtue of their community membership, did not make up for a lack of organized networks to channel those pressures.

Still another point was that the MC area was far larger and more diverse than any one renewal project had been.\(^\text{12}\) The economic and racial differences among MC sub-areas was reflected in the Board's composition and in individual members' orientations. In fact, if "community pressures" were regularly channeled to Board people, the differences and divisions would make comprehensive policy-making even more complicated and delicate than it already was.

\(^{12}\) The Largest renewal project, the South End, covered 616 acres and a total population of slightly over 33,000; by contrast, Model Cities' is 2000 acres and involves a population of 62,500.
3. The Structural and Informal Powers for Citizen Involvement

The administrative organization for Boston's MC effort incorporated a number of opportune elements for strengthening citizen involvement. It sought to take advantage of the MC framework for city agency coordination, the experience and skill existing in BRA and ABCD, and the recognition that the community role can be an important one. All revolved around two basic organizational bodies: the Model Cities Agency (MCA) and the Neighborhood Board.

The MCA was the official city agency responsible for Boston's MC planning and execution, serving as the "Community Development Agency" indicated in the MC Guidelines. Based on the suggestion in the original Boston proposal, the MCA was an autonomous agency, directly responsible to the Mayor and having the authority to direct all city functions in the MN. This multi-functional authority was a direct response to the MC mandate for coordination of city agencies, and required a special act of the State legislature. The only major city agency which the Mayor was unable to incorporate in the MCA was the School Committee, notorious in Boston for its divided membership and consequent inability to improve the deteriorating school situation. With this exception, the MCA could act almost as a small city hall for the MN, and in fact, it was comparable to the fifteen "little city halls" being developed by Mayor White for other parts of the city. It could also be seen as an expanded
version of Logue's staff system, in which each urban renewal area had its own decentralized field staff in a project headquarters under a project director. This was a functional allocation and communications set-up appropriate to the urban renewal range of activity; similarly, the MCA represented a functional set-up appropriate to its far more comprehensive range of activity.

White's appointee to head the MCA was Paul Parks, a man with well-established political power bases in the Roxbury community and in City Hall. He was a civil engineer by profession, and an Officer of the Boston NAACP, and had a convincing and dynamic way in front of public groups. The fact that he was also black, may have symbolized the Mayor's good intentions with respect to Roxbury, since the position of MCA head was one with high visibility to the community, the city, and the Federal overseers. On the other hand, it would be naive to assume that Parks' race assured either his capacity to help all elements in the community or his popularity with different groups in the community. Parks' ties were in Roxbury's upwardly mobile middle-class. One could conjecture, however, that on the basis of his political acumen, Parks knew a good political resource when he saw it, and that resource may well have been in the influence of the entire rallied black community, if it could be rallied. His working philosophy included a desire to promote community action; he told the residents that they, too, must play in the game if they hoped to get some results.
The MCA, by way of its multi-functional character, possessed the resources officially loaned it by other city agencies. With respect to resident concerns, the most important of these were probably the BRA and ABCD connections, since both agencies were directly concerned with working with resident groups. The BRA experience with "mandate groups" and citizen interest made it aware of the potential resources and delicacies of resident involvement. It would be willing, but probably cautious, to work with residents in Model Cities. In initial planning stages, the main BRA link was in the person of Edward Teitcher, a specialist in housing and the man largely responsible for conducting the BRA's Community Renewal Program study of the Roxbury GNRP.

ABCD's role in Boston's MC began by virtue of its community-action orientation as Boston's official Poverty Agency. Although the Green Amendment had put ABCD potentially under the Mayor's thumb, White had announced that he would make no decisive changes before 1969, so ABCD operated in 1967-68 much as before, in working through and with citizen groups. In Model Cities, there were three levels of ABCD involvement. In addition to the staff level, there were research and information resources to be extended to MC participants, and there were the Area Planning Action Councils (APACs) simultaneously operating in the three poverty target areas that overlapped with the MN. These were the primary citizen involvement mechanisms.
An APAC had the task of deciding what poverty programs its neighborhood needed, and then instituting and controlling them. Program possibilities included everything from Headstart and teen lounges to credit unions and cooperatives. The main point was that APACs were always controlled by a majority of elected low-income residents of the neighborhood. APAC delegates also comprised half the central ABCD board of directors. Even so, however, funds going into the APACs were limited, there were divisions over its use, and there was often a neighborhood antipathy to the antipoverty program and these its local arms.\(^1\) Although there was in the APACs, a potential "to establish city-wide coalitions that could bring their united effort to bear on some of the common issues", so far there had been more independence and division than unity.\(^2\)

Model Cities protagonists faced probable contact with the three APACs overlapping the MN, by virtue of the formal ABCD connection and the MC mandate to coordinate with existing groups, but also by virtue of the fact that the APACs were there and were conducting activities similar to MC concerns. Since the APACs were neither all united nor totally independent, "cooperating" with them was likely to be complicated and

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\(^1\) For example, see article by Melvin H. King, Boston Globe, op. cit., and the article by George Bennett, ABCD Director, ibid., p. A-34.

\(^2\) King, ibid., p. A-35.
delicate at best. Thus, for the MCA, the various links with ABCD were inevitable and of mixed potential, requiring complex maneuvering if any real advantages were to be hammered out for the MN.

The other basic organizational structure in Boston's MC was the Neighborhood Board, modeled according to the format set up by the April Community Conference. Structurally, the Board constituted a parallel power to the MCA; neighborhood agency and city agency were to be jointly responsible for working out an official MC plan. This represented a real coup for the community in terms of administrative framework, and Boston had drawn attention as the only Model City in the country to have a major policy-making body composed solely of elected neighborhood representatives.

In addition to the Board's own funds and structural position, it was strengthened by its veto power over any final plan. If the Board and MCA could not agree on any item, it would have to be hammered out by negotiations among one Board designatee, one MCA designatee, and a representative of the Mayor.

In philosophy and orientation, there were key informal power commitments to building a meaningful role for the Board, and through it, the neighborhood. When the original proposal was drafted, it was anticipated that the process of resident participation would be developed along with the development of the MC programs themselves, and this philosophy has carried over into
the initial planning stages. Parks, backed up by Mayor White's pledge to aid "the people" was one city administrator who could and did publicly inform the community that, "I will do it with you, but I don't intend to do it for anybody." He regularly included Board representatives in major negotiations and often directed inquiries and offers of resources to the Board rather than handling them in the MCA office. He also viewed the Board's veto power as a potentially strong lever, and it was to his agency's advantage to emerge productively with the Board rather than against it at the end of the planning period.

The existence of structural and informal opportunities for representative neighborhood participation did not, however, insure their best use. How they would be capitalized on, would depend greatly on the Board's members and their capabilities in terms of time, attitudes, connections, personal influence and power.

The Board's chairman, M. Daniel Richardson, was a political figure of some influence, although younger and less well-established than Parks. He had been active in the community and served as Director of Community Organization for the Roxbury Federation of Neighborhood Centers; his full-time job was as a consultant for a leading Boston urban planning firm. Another

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3 Andrew M. Olins, BRA, interview on January 9, 1968

4 Paul Parks, in a speech at a public meeting held by the Model Neighborhood Board for Area Three, Girls' High School, Roxbury, March 31, 1968.
facet of Richardson's activity was his association with the United Front, a highly-politicized black militant group that arose in the aftermath of Martin Luther King's death. His additional activities, however, included an established liberal group, the American Friends Service Committee, as well as the NAACP. Like Parks, Richardson was in a highly visible position, although the basis of his leadership function rested not so much with the Mayor's backing as with the Neighborhood Board's confidence. It was Richardson who most often engaged in major negotiations along with Parks; in fact Richardson's position was a delicate pivotal one between the Board and the Agency, and he continually turned to the Board for approval, suggestions, and discussion.

The other seventeen Board members had a wide diversity of experience and orientation. Almost all had worked in community groups, and often in more than one at a time. Most of their leadership experience had been in specifically oriented organizations; few, if any, had had exposure to the huge range of concerns comprehended by Model Cities. They were elected representatives, but in fact, seemed mainly "representative" in the sense of comprising a random sample of people active in community affairs -- few were held directly responsible to any specific, organized constituency, other than the general geographic areas from which they were elected. In fact, for each sub-area, citizen representation bore a different kind of relevance, and this was reflected in the characteristics of
elected Board members, as noted earlier. All, however, shared a common structural position as "volunteers" in the MC bandwagon. This meant that Board work had to be eased in alongside regular jobs, family, and other community affiliations; The only monetary recompense was for small travel or babysitting expenses.

The Neighborhood Board, although officially "parallel" to the city's MCA, actually occupied a mediating role midway between the neighborhood and the City. This arose from the nature of its explicit responsibilities of organizing and informing the community, as well as from its elected, but voluntary, membership. It was supposed to be able to reach up to City Hall and at the same time reach out to the neighborhood, where it theoretically would be exposed to community pressures and thus serve as a medium for translating them into policy.

Organization from the Board down, for reaching out into the community, was not specified by the original Community Conference proposal, but was left to the Board itself. In weekly meetings that began immediately after their August election, the Board members hammered out a framework for these communication and general policy-making functions. They organized three standing committees, each having several members, so one Board member was likely to serve on two committees.

The Public Information Committee was to focus on communications with the neighborhood, and was initially organized

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5Ibid.
along the six-sub-area lines. This was intended as a way of discovering the information problems and resources unique to each of the six, which have wide social, economic, and political variations. The Program Planning Committee was concerned with the loosely defined task of discovering and developing program ideas. Finally, the Federation of Organizations group was to begin the "monumental task of bringing all existing organizations in the area together so that their resources might be brought to bear" on MC planning. As suggested at the April Conference, the object was to set up a confederation of all interested agencies, community groups, and businesses, to "advise and inform" the Board.

In other words, then, the structural and informal provision for citizen participation were sometimes highly specified in advance, and at other times, left for development. Structurally, the Board was specifically parallel to MCA, but organization downward was not structured in advance and this imposed great burdens on Board members.

Another structural difficulty was the "volunteer" nature of the Board, which hampered Board members' capabilities to operate under the tight time constraints.

Informally, there were once again assets as well as problems for successful citizen participation. On the side of assets, there was officials' willingness to include citizens, and also the BRA and ABCD cognizance of resident group importance.

6 Neighborhood Board, op. cit., p. 3.
But, there were difficulties due to the different sub-area needs, and the fact that different sorts of "representation or involvement were relevant to each. These different sorts of representation needs would all have to be met under the same overall MC framework, yet were not accounted for in the structuring except insofar as different Board members were elected for each sub-area.

4. The Neighborhood Board as a Working Body

The well-intended organization and philosophy for citizen action had to be played out in the reality of a dynamic environment of people, events, and conditions. Focusing on one body of participants, the Neighborhood Board, I shall look at its capability to function in the real world, as it began work during the first several months of the planning year. The Board's "success" would depend on several things, including the structural and informal setup already described, but also the Board's nature as a working body. This involved the kinds of functions the Board's "citizen representation" should have fulfilled, and its actual capabilities to function. Functioning depends on the use and deployment of resources, which we can characterize by way of the five operating themes mentioned earlier.

We have mentioned the Board's character as a volunteer body. Perhaps a better descriptive term was its "amateur" status. This is not to ignore the fact that individual members
could and did possess varying types and degrees of expertise; rather, it connotes the circumstance that the Board as a body was a sort of formalized residents' interest group, possessing administrative and power-manipulatory abilities only insofar as they might have been possessed by chance by individual members. The Board was designed for the purpose of pursuing community interests, and for that reason, was bolstered with powers to initiate, to veto, to have some financial independence, and the option to seek professional advice. Nothing in that design, however, could insure the Board's actual capacity to use the powers and to be able to administer and monitor the huge variety of concerns comprehended in Model Cities.

Another major operating difficulty was the fact that the kind of representation relevant to one sub-area was not likely to be the most critical one to the next — yet all representatives would have to work in some common mode for the Board to operate as a body. Granting that there are different kinds of representation, it is nonetheless necessary to look at the Board as a whole working body, since as a body, it possesses both structural and informal resources and existence. Because it existed as a body, it could have functions as a body, beyond the different representative functions of its members.

The working functions of the Board centered around it's nature as a mediating body between the Neighborhood and the City. These functions fell into two categories: mobilization, requiring communication with the neighborhood, and policy —
program achievement. In the Boston setup, these could have had a number of possibilities. Communication could have contributed to large-scale mobilization of community-interested groups and individuals. At the least, communication should have run in both directions between Board and community. It could have had at least two levels: issue and action. In "issue communication", the Board would inform the community of issues and facts, and the community would inform the Board of preferences and desires. In "action communication" there would be a two-way transmission involving resources needed for concrete action: Board would inform community of tasks and resource needs, and community would respond in terms of men and materials capable of performing the jobs.

The other kind of function, policy and program achievement, necessarily related to communication, but actually would have taken place mainly within the Board. Using community and other preference inputs, facts, and potentials, the Board would formulate its own substantive policy positions. This would, in turn, contribute an ability to initiate programs, as well as an ability to make consistent response to program or policy ideas initiated by any other group, such as the MCA, or even a group from within the community. In practice, this function could have ranged from comment on MCA plans, to real initiation, design, and decision on programs.

These functions were the sort of action and decision that the Board probably should have been taking. Actually, the
Board's job in terms of these "functions" existed only insofar as there was substance to be fed into the whole setup of Board-with-powers-and-functions. For instance, communication: in the issue aspect there had to be issues of some kind to gather facts and desires about; in the action aspect there had to be definite tasks requiring the use of specific kinds of resources. For policy formation, the case was similar — there had to be problems or potentials specific enough that a policy position could be defined for them. Otherwise, the Board either had nothing to do, or had to make work for itself.

Immediately after its August election, the Board had its first substance to work from, since it had to figure out how to organize itself. This was substantive in the sense that there were definite choices to be made as to the best deployment of Board energies. It involved discussion of real alternative ways to organize, from which emerged the formation of the three standing committees.

The three-committee structure, was in effect, aimed at the very tasks of communication and policy-formation, and for that reason was a potentially valuable framework. On the other hand, all three committees had a very broad scope of concerns that required complex administrative organization or orientation. The task of the committee on Federation of Organizations potentially involved over 300 formal community organizations, as well as any other interested groups. Program Planning had to face the myriad of social, economic, and physical possibilities of
MC itself. Public Information had the job of setting up a two-way dialogue with over 62,000 people, many of them either hostile or apathetic to government-sponsored "progress". In each case, the Board was capable of an intelligent "amateur" job, but the scope of the tasks too often required an exacting professional administrator's skill.

Thus, for instance, the Confederation committee from the start held a continuous round of small group meetings in all areas, contacting people on a face-to-face basis -- but in an urban complex of 62,000 this was a slow way to "confederate". A professional organizer or administrator might have been able to use existing community organizations under Board auspices in order to accomplish the same task more efficiently.

Similarly, "program planning" involved the gathering of information and also the talent to know what information, and how much, was useful. It was easy to be diverted by detail and lose the main thread. These difficulties are all likely to arise when people are confronted by a vast range of unfamiliar subject-matter, but they are less likely to mislead a professional who has run the course before.

In addition to these considerations, the Board's policy-formation function was irrelevant unless there was at least some potential for making that policy effective or influential. The Board was a potentially powerful and visible political body, which could have asserted its "community representative" status to push programs or policy that were vital to the community,
but otherwise negligible to City policy-makers. This, however, required a conscious perception of potential power, and a willingness to play a political power game with its possible risks and rewards.

In other words, the Board's capabilities to use resources to fulfill its functions suffered from the outset by virtue of the Board's amateur character. Even more basic problems arose from the fact that the different sub-areas needed different sorts of "representation." Also, the Board as a body had to fulfill still other representative functions by virtue of its structural position as mediator between city and neighborhood.

As a citizen representative body, then, the Board had a number of operational functions. How work was actually done, and resources deployed, could be characterized in terms of the five operational themes. As mentioned earlier, these were: the division of labor, the use of professionals, use of community organizations, visibility and communications, and perception and use of power. After seeing how these themes emerged, it will be possible to review and assess the Board's abilities to perform its many functions.

The first theme involves a possible division of labor among all the MC participants. Where citizens merely advise or consent, labor division is not problematic, but Boston had gone far beyond the Guidelines provision that citizen representatives merely be guaranteed "access to channels of decision
making." Boston MC had in fact, vested a responsibility for channels and decisions in the Neighborhood Board. In doing so, it created two decision-making bodies (Board and MCA) without, however, specifying what kinds of decisions were to be made where. By formal provision, either body can veto the other; both must eventually agree on all policy. Still, different kinds of policy could have been the particular concern of one group or the other. Certain areas or functions could have been allocated for initial policy formations, to be brought to joint conference later on. This would have been efficient, given the number and variety of MC concerns.

No such division of labor was specified at the outset, and during early planning stages neither the Board or the MCA explicitly claimed full responsibility for one realm of policy. There were a number of possible reasons for this mutual hesitation to clearly divide labor "efficiently". First, there were benefits for both bodies in "joint" consideration of any topic or issue: wishes of all parties could be considered well before last-minute confrontation, information resources could be shared, and political blame could be shared if there were opposition from other quarters. In terms of the politics of compromise, which may well have been the kind of politics desired by both sides, these were all good reasons for sharing labor.

Another point with respect to labor is that sometimes it does not seem to be divisible. This was particularly true of
the kind of concerns in MC; adequate housing was eventually a function of employment, was a function of training, was a function of environment, was a function of housing. This kind of circularity, however, was just what made a division of labor desirable. If anything was to get done, its parts would have to be separated enough to allow some concentration and formulation of alternatives, then the whole might have been knit together.

Still another consideration in dividing the labor in Boston was probably the desire to develop process and product simultaneously. For this reason alone, political delicacy aside, the City professionals and officials might have hesitated to impose a mode of labor on the Board. If this was the case, any initiative toward a division of labor would have had to come from the Board itself. In fact, both groups made overtures in this direction, but stopped far short of a complete task allocation, at least in early planning stages.

The Board made overtures toward a work division in one functional area, housing. It designated five specific housing aspects with which it was particularly concerned and for which it would take responsibility. The CDA was amenable, and would continue to share the relevant resources it could offer. This was the only area, however, in which the Board took such initiative, and all other MC concerns remained everyone's immediate concern, all during the first months of planning.
The CDA for its part introduced a "work program" framework, which made a systematic break-down of MC concerns into "milestones-tasks-costs-staff". The result, covering the tasks to be done in each program component, was a way of putting the jobs down in black and white for all to see and discuss. It was not, however, any kind of division of tasks between Board and MCA, for two reasons: the "staff" specifications always included both Board and MCA staff, and there was no sequence of priorities which could have pointed up any urgency for either group to take immediate responsibility.

The sharing of almost all labor meant that nobody would be explicitly excluded from different program aspects, but it also meant that the Board would continue to labor under the unfamiliar burden of a very broad scope of concerns. This brings us to a second theme, the possibilities of professional staff hired specifically to aid the Board in its work. The $35,000. earmarked for the Board's use was at least partly intended to finance some professional staff, but in early planning stages the Board hesitated to begin cutting into this resource. It was also difficult to anticipate just what sort of professional would be needed, since technician, administrator, community organizer, and more talents could conceivably have been useful. Although they were willing to discuss probably staff needs, and began soliciting applications, by April of 1968, no final action had yet been taken. Thus, from August till well into April, the Board functioned without any professional staff of its own.
The lack of their own staff raised definite difficulties for Board members, especially in light of the number of topics with which the Board was concerned. Members were obliged to fulfill their own staff functions, including the gathering of information, answering and making inquiries, reading all mail and literature — in short, the absence of staff forced the Board to do all its own screening and organizing, since no professional was on hand to perform the mediating role we suggested earlier in this study. The Board was thus trying to perform several gargantuan tasks at once: communication with 62,000 people, policy formation in at least a dozen areas, and all the related screening, organizing, and data-gathering at the same time. Although the Board could and did accept voluntary staff aid, there was no one responsible for orchestrating all these efforts. In effect, every volunteer-staff offer that the Board accepted, added another constellation to the vast galaxy of people and interests it was already trying to monitor.

In addition to the hiring of staff and the coordinating of volunteers, there remained a third sort of human resource available to the Board. These were in the existing community organizations, the subject of our third theme. From the outset, it was anticipated that the numerous community groups would be a means of spreading citizen involvement and also a valuable asset in terms of human energies and experience. The original Community Conference had suggested that community groups be
used in these ways. As one Conference participant phrased it,

...Our neighborhood has taken its own survey. We know pretty well what the people in our area want. I think most neighborhood associations and organizations in the community are that way.

The way I see it is for all our associations and organizations to have some kind of representation on a board that will have the power to control what goes on in this program.¹

It was clear that the main working Board could not have representatives of several dozen organizations, but the Conference suggested that these be organized into a federation to advise and work with the Board. The Board's response in August of 1967 was to form the Federation Committee.

From the start, however, that committee was likely to be plagued by problems of equity and representation. An early invitation to a powerful group might, in effect, close channels to other groups; and in a community of 62,000, choosing a truly "representative" mandate group was clearly unrealistic. Short of organizing another mass conference, the committee could and did start by contacting individual groups. The committee, wishing to contact existing organizations and also the interested unaffiliated, felt it best to begin by holding small meetings around all the MC areas. This was probably one way to avoid turning over the whole works to any one or few powerful organizations, but it was not the quickest way to

¹ Riddell, op. cit., quoting Ralph Smith, chairman of the Lower Roxbury Community Council
confederate a working body. Individual Board members were usually active in several organizations, and so might have immediately tried to pull them in, but either these efforts failed or were never made. Most likely it was the latter, since there seemed to be a general philosophy that Board work was separate, a duty to all residents in an area and not a position to be used for singling out specific groups to the exclusion of others. Thus, the one-by-one approach was a practical one in light of the Board's orientation; it was, however, impractical in light of the realities of short time and huge scope of concerns.

A plan was made for organizing the gradually accumulating contacts into a functional working system. The Federation committee worked out a system of eight sub-committees; seven of these would each be concerned with a functional task area, and the eighth would serve to coordinate the others. The sub-committees were to be manned by members of interested community organizations, or interested individuals. The problem, however, was the time needed for such a system to get under way. In April, a good seven months after its inception, the Federation group was still trying to contact any and all interested community elements, in order to begin to form the sub-committees. If MC program plans were to be due in September, not much time remained for the task groups to be formed.

In the meantime, organized community groups could wonder if they were ever to be included. The strongest and most
energetic of these were likely to wonder the most. As late as March, the leader of an active umbrella organization was reportedly waiting for the Board to respond to his offer of valuable aid, and wondering why the Board appeared instead to be turning to extra-community groups like universities. The Board's gradualism thus was straying into critically sensitive areas with influential community people, a particularly dangerous game to play in Roxbury's volatile situation.

The Board was either unaware of the dangerous consequences of its actions, or else knew of no other way to do their job. In the incremental way, the Board continued to attempt to include community groups where possible. From the Board's perspective, there probably seemed to be little substance in which the groups could be involved. Since the first year was for "planning", the Board's functions could sometimes seem to be totally empty, there being no immediate issues to be subjects of communication or policy specification. One example of an opportunity seized did come in March, when Board members did invite interested groups to a meeting with representatives of the Boston Welfare Department. The purpose of the meeting was a substantive one, to pass on some general information about income maintenance programs. Although this was potentially a major MC consideration, this was the first opportunity at which some of the groups that might be interested had been gathered for any kind of discussion. The groups represented included all three APACs, the New Urban League,
even a housing project tenants' organization -- people that should indeed, have been talking together about the possibilities of MC programs.

The fourth theme, visibility and communication, is similarly woven in with all these situations and events. Visibility is a necessary condition to communication, and both items were difficult for the Board during the early planning period. The visibility condition was a problem in two senses. First, the Board was often invisible at the city level, despite its official status as parallel power to the MCA. Although its existence and importance were recognized by the Mayor and MCA, other city agencies were not so well aware of the Board and tended to make their MC contacts through Parks. An example of this, was the Welfare Department, which became actively aware of the Board only when the latter requested the Department's cooperation for the income-maintenance information meeting. Other city agencies may have remained similarly unaware of the Board's significance if they were never directly contacted and invited in.

A second kind of invisibility was that at the community level. Many community residents did not really know what "Model Cities" was, or what its Neighborhood Board might do. Even those who had some idea that MC existed were not always aware of how or why they should contact Board members. Conditions varied from area to area, but almost nowhere was there clear cut visibility, or regular communications going on.
The Board hoped to work on these matters by holding public information meetings in each area. At an area meeting at the end of March, visibility and communications were clearly major problems, as demonstrated by several aspects of the meeting. First, the audience was not at all certain of what Model Cities was; this was sensed by Parks, who was present and able to make an explanatory speech. Second, there had clearly been a lack of adequate public information about the Board and its activities, and some community people who rose to ask questions seemed to perceive the Board members as an almost alien "establishment". Thus, one person complained that the official Board headquarters was not even in the MC area, and asked why the Board could not "hang out" where more people could find it. Board members explained that their office had been donated and that they could be reached by phone, but an unmistakable bristle of dissatisfaction remained with the audience. Another resident asked how the community could respond -- what could they do and who could they go to?

The visibility-communications problem had three dimensions. One was the Board's limited capability to do its own public relations work, which could have been alleviated with professional aid. The second difficult dimension was the Board's apparent hesitancy to take on any controversial roles that might automatically draw attention. This seemed largely a function of the personalities of Board members, and the fact that the period observed was merely the beginning of planning.
The third aspect was the old problem we have already mentioned in respect to the Board's functions; if there were no substantive issues, then there seemed to be no functions to perform, and no subject-matter to communicate. In reality, the problem was not so much a lack of issues as a lack of focus on specific issues. The Board wished to communicate all things to all people, but could not pay enough attention to any one thing at a time to evolve a specific issue or policy question.

Moreover, involving the community as decision-makers, (rather than merely informing them) also required some substance to work from. For example, in the South End urban renewal project, director Dick Green was famous for his "walk through" method of planning with people. Green never just walked through and gathered ideas; he brought with him a proposed plan, which was continually discussed, rediscussed, and modified.

We come now to a final theme which has been implicit throughout our discussion. Namely, the perception and use of power. By "power" I mean the resources, both personal and material, which can be used to influence the actions of men or the course of events. For the Board, there were a number of resources of this nature: the formal power provisions, the critical ghetto situation which could make public and officials sit up and take notice, the officials and professionals committed to aiding the Board, the neighborhood as a whole or elements in the neighborhood. These resources are relevant
insofar as they could be used, and their use first required perception, either consciously or unconsciously. For instance, neighborhood pressure was a potential source of great power, but would have had to be rallied to any cause.

The neighborhood resource would have had to be tapped by or for the Board, but the other three resources were closer at hand. Their use could have arisen directly from within the Board. That is, in their interactions with officials and in their own policy action, the Board could have applied pressure by virtue of its formal powers to initiate and so on, and by virtue of the attention which officials would have had to render.

Using these powers was inevitable if the Board was to take any action, but there were different degrees of pressure with which they could be applied. These degrees depended on the kind of political "game" the Board was willing to play, and could play, in the given circumstances. Conceivably, for instance, they might have tried "militant pressure politics", pressing hard for specific demands and using their veto and neighborhood pressure threats as means to control of all MC matters. At the other extreme, they might have played "co-operative consent politics", using power resources only as a means of making their views heard and their consent solicited.

In fact, during the phase observed, the Board followed a middle road, which I could call the "politics of conservation."
This seemed to involve an implicit recognition that eventually it would be important to take strong stands, but that in the meantime, power should be conserved by taking non-belligerent, cooperative attitudes. This was my own observation; it was never an explicit Board strategy, but rather seemed to characterize the Board's use of power.

For instance, immediately after their August election, the Board did not choose to assert specific preferences or positions, but instead, went to work on the organization and information tasks that confronted them. When Parks was appointed to head the MCA, the Board was not consulted and some members might have recommended other men had they been asked--still, the Board did not choose to raise questions or even to issue any statement of support or doubt that might have been picked up by the press as well as the Mayor's office.

During the next few months, the Board did begin to take stands on emerging issues. It indicated some priority areas of housing policy. And a stronger stand was taken on the matter of a neighborhood survey. This had been proposed through the MCA by BRA and ABCD staff, as a means for meeting some Federal requirements and developing programs. The Board saw the survey as an opportunity for training and using neighborhood workers and for public relations purposes. Perhaps most important, was the symbolic significance of a detailed community probe, which could either be done by "outsiders" or by direct neighborhood sponsorship. Thus, although the MCA
staff was anxious to proceed and could have efficiently done so by itself, the Board impressed its demands and was given a piece of the action. The Board would do interviewing and hiring of survey personnel, with the aid of the MCA professionals' recommendations. And, the Board would participate in deciding the exact nature of the survey. It was questionable whether these controls would have been granted the Board without their expressed interest. Clearly, the survey might have been designed and begun more quickly without the Board maneuvers.

In fact, during the first planning months, the only opportunities for a strong power assertion might have often seemed too minor for the Board to make a stand. The prevailing mood seemed to be that only a limited number of real power plays could be carried off by the Board during the planning year, and that accordingly, the times for making the attempts should be chosen wisely. Behind this mood, there was probably a reasoning that official ears could only be bent so far and that the Board dared not press its luck by seeming unreasonable and overdemanding. Another reason could have been a feeling that cooperation or compromise might be equally, or more, productive than hostility or competition. And, cooperation was not so likely to produce bad feelings, and official or extra-community power reactions.

On the other hand, by playing "power conservation" the Board may have been heading toward half a pie when it could
have gotten three-fourths. There was also the more dan-
gerous possibility that if and when the "major issue" a-
rose and the Board wanted to take a stand, it could have
found its conserved power depleted by virtue of disuse —
power that has not been demonstrated is not always credible.

5. Summary: The Functions of Citizen Participation
and the Chances for Success

Citizen participation in Boston had a history of re-
newal experience that had indicated its various functional
possibilities and some modes for operation. When Model
Cities came along, the political setting was one in which
neighborhood residents were able to seize the initiative and
demand a major role for a Neighborhood Board. Although dif-
ferent sub-areas had very different citizen participation
needs, all were given similar treatment by inclusion on the
Board, where the explicit and emphasized citizen involvement
function was policy-and-program achievement.

In the process, the sub-area needs for access, mobili-
zation, and political learning and power-building had to be
met as side issues to the central concern of policy-program
achievement. By April of 1968 some of the difficulties in the
sub-areas faced potential relief. Access and power-building,
were possibly to be pursued in Area 1 by the Jamaica Plain
APAC, and in Area 2 with the aid of Urban Field Service. The
sub-areas needing mobilization and political-learning work
could still be aided by the hiring of professional staff for
for the Board, particularly a public relations expert to begin communications with 62,000 people. All the sub-areas could be aided by the addition of professional administrators; access, mobilization, and program achievement would be enhanced by someone with the explicit job of directing the right human and material resources to the right policy-and program-makers. In April, the Board was beginning to make serious moves toward the staffing action that it probably should have taken much earlier.

The discussion of sub-area needs was only a brief one, and most attention in this study was placed on the Board as a whole, which was trying to perform a policy-and program-achievement function. Nonetheless, that function could not bear much chance of success unless the sub-area's needs for access, mobilization, and power-learning/building were supplied simultaneously. The chances of "success" in these functions seemed dubious in the first part of the planning year, since the potential relief measures mentioned above would solve only some of the problems, and this only if the relief measures were actually taken. The greatest problem areas were in communications and visibility, mobilization of residents' interest and the organization and use of those interests.

In fact, my definitions of "success" for the various citizen-participation functions were focused on a successful end-state. Along the way, it is possible of course, to have degrees of progress or potential success. So, the various
citizen participation functions for the sub-areas might yet make progress. This will depend greatly on the Board members' capabilities to continue and expand communications, especially with the community individuals and groups who now possess rising prestige and power. That power consists especially of the young black professionals who are now involved in various entrepreneurial ventures, and possess skill, political influence and some financial resources. Their groups are the young community development and housing corporations, business and investment contacts, and so on. It is this power which could "save" Model Cities -- bringing these groups and individuals in would automatically aid sub-area needs for interest mobilization, access and power-building. This element, coupled with a Neighborhood Board staff adept at public relations and communications, could greatly increase the chances for successful citizen involvement in Model Cities.

Turning back now to the Board as a whole, what were its chances of potential success in the function of policy- and program-achievement? In a sense, the whole could be defined as the sum of its parts, and I could say that overall Board success can exist only insofar as the various sub-area citizen-involvement needs are met. This is one side of the picture; the other side is a look at the Board as a body with its own "achievement" function. In addition to the problems of communication and inclusion of powerful community elements, the policy/program achievement function was foundering on the
problem of specific focal issues and tasks.

The lack of focus on specific issues could be still corrected as soon as those issues came before the Board for definite policy and program decisions. The critical dimension was whether those issues would crystallize soon enough, before community groups lost heart and lost interest, and before the Board forgot its structural and informal power resources and they fell in disuse. Issues did exist, and the beginning of a remedy would be to crystallize and push the issues into specific decisions and tasks to be executed by specific people — particularly the Board, as the primary resident vehicle. One way of accelerating a focus on issues would be to begin discussions from staff—prepared memos oriented toward specific policy or program formulations. Another step would be to make a very specific division of labor, placing definite responsibility for certain kinds of decisions in certain places. This could include a division of labor between Board and MCA. It could also include task delineations within the Board, and these lines of responsibility could be extended from the Board to other community participants. The point is to place specific responsibilities in definite places, so that actions and decisions can be taken and the appropriate parties held responsible.

All this assumes that the parties involved are willing to take responsibility for decisiveness — this is a critical assumption, and is probably true of the different participants
to varying degrees. The Board's cautiousness in seizing power initiatives could be an indication that it is not willing to take responsibility for decisiveness. If so, then the "Neighborhood Board" is an empty designation — it would be incapable of fulfilling any of the purposes for having citizen participation in the first place. Since the Board members are obviously devoting time and effort, it is reasonable to assume that they could be encouraged and made very much aware of their responsibility for decisiveness. This could be done in at least two ways: from within, by the encouragement of a staff professional; and from the community, by the pressure of involved community groups pushing for action wherever they are interested.

If success can be pursued along these lines, the various functions of citizen involvement may yet be performed under Boston's Model Cities framework. That framework, however, poses severe constraints in terms of short time and vast program concerns. In the next chapter I shall discuss another attempt to use the Model Cities as a framework for real commitment to citizen involvement.
CHAPTER V. A Different Perspective—The Cambridge Program

The Boston Model Cities process seemed to be in danger of bypassing some citizen participation functions of first necessity, particularly amid the pressures of constrained time, and program complexity and scope. The possible participation functions were given different relative emphases in Cambridge, where the Model Neighborhood comprised less than half the area of Boston's and had less than one-fourth the resident population. In Cambridge, as in Boston, there was probably more emphasis on citizen participation than in any of the other Model Cities in the nation. Here, however, the direct comparison ended. Cambridge's particular context, and the Model Cities process built and emerging from it, must be reviewed in terms of its own unique needs and potentials. Only after doing this will I return to look at both cities to see if there are any common lessons or legitimate comparisons to be drawn.

Accordingly, I shall briefly describe the picture that emerged in Cambridge over the first months of the planning year. My purpose in describing the Cambridge program was to broaden the perspective for looking at Boston and at Model Cities in general. Once again, the proposed analytical framework will be used, looking at citizen participation functions, structural and informal setting, and working operations.
1. The Relevant Functions of Citizen Participation in Cambridge Model Neighborhood

The relevant functions of citizen participation in the Cambridge MC framework arose from the existing conditions and also from a history of past experience with community action. A brief description of the MC area will lead into discussion of the kinds of resident representation that seemed to be the most important.

Cambridge's Model Neighborhood was composed of two adjacent areas officially designated Neighborhoods Three (N3) and Four (N4). Both were in East Cambridge, located close to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; they were criss-crossed by several major cross-town arteries, and either one of the proposed routes for the massive "inner-belt" expressway could cut a 300-foot wide swath through the Model Neighborhood. Two types of industry were scattered in and around the area. On one hand, there were prestigious new research-oriented complexes, represented by Technology Square and a new N.A.S.A. Electronics Research Center. On the other hand, were some older, nineteenth-century type industrial activities. Both kinds of industry had their influence on any residential neighborhood space and character. The older industries had their nuisance activity and the newer "clean" industries had a well-financed eagerness for space. The search for space was shared in by M. I. T. and by a large student population as well.
In this setting lived the 3,567 families who constituted the "residential population" toward which MC was oriented. They were mainly low- and moderate-income people, and the housing stock in which they lived was aged and running down. For several years they had watched more and more of the low- and moderate-rent housing undergoing transition to student housing, and more and more neighborhood space being threatened by the industrial and educational and highway developers.

The area also had the typical range of "slum" social problems; its rates for unemployment, welfare recipients, crime and juvenile delinquency arrests, were all higher than city averages. The Model Neighborhood was a home for people who were often poor and ill-housed. It was not, however, a racial ghetto. Rather, it was a combination of ethnic groupings and native stock, all sharing the problems of "little people" being pressed for space by the giants around them. Negroes constituted just slightly over five percent of the population, and there were larger minority groups of Italians, Irish and Canadians, and a scattering of Polish, Scandinavians, Germans, and others. In all, foreign born or first-generation foreign
stock made up 48% of the Model Neighborhood population.\footnote{The break-down in terms of foreign stock as a percentage of the total Model Neighborhood population is:}

These ethnic groups played a large part in determining the structure of social relationships in the area. In fact, in terms of social relations there were several well-defined "neighborhoods" contained within N3 and N4. In N3, there was a distinct difference between Roosevelt Towers (the housing project), and Wellington-Harrington (WH), the latter being largely white and containing the various ethnic enclaves. When N3 was designated an urban renewal area, the Towers were excluded, leaving only the WH section. This put further strain on the psychological barriers between the neighborhoods. On the other hand, N4's population was racially integrated, and often were of lower income than the people in WH. In N4, there were two housing projects, as well as the "neighborhood" composed by St. Mary's Catholic Parish.

\begin{itemize}
\item Italian 8%
\item Irish 6
\item Canadian 5
\item Polish 3
\item United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, Sweden—each 1% or less. Other foreign stock — 13%.
\end{itemize}

Total foreign stock, 48% (18% foreign-born, 30% first-generation)

To give an idea of absolute numbers, Total Neighborhood Population is 15,000. Of these, Negroes number 840, or 5.5%.

All figures obtained with the aid of Nancy Howe, Planning Board, City of Cambridge. Figures were derived from 1960 census data; however, since that time ethnic groupings have remained, and have been increased by the addition of a growing Puerto Rican group.
These conditions in the Cambridge Model Neighborhood called for a certain combination of functions for citizen participation and representation. The pressures for space and competition by outsiders meant that resident representation should be oriented toward program achievement—designing and implementing policies and programs for neighborhood preservation, which was the most critical area need.

On the other hand, however, the diversity of social types, and relations precluded the formation of any natural united front which could be "represented" for program achievement purposes. Thus, another kind of representation was a necessary first step: representation that would serve the functions of mobilization, and political effectiveness. The diverse neighborhood groups would have to be mobilized to fight together, and their united efforts would have to be politically effective.

In fact, the past experience with community action in Cambridge Model Neighborhood was of the sort that could lead to citizen involvement for the purposes of mobilization and political effectiveness. A description of this experience begins with a few especially vigorous organizations. These groups were most often organized by outside sponsors, but had since been dominated by neighborhood residents.

The 1960's had seen a real evolution in citizen participation in N3 and in N4. Action during the early part of the decade had generally occurred either under the aegis of neighborhood settlement houses, or small neighborhood residents' groups.
The settlement houses' approach to citizen involvement was characteristically gradualist, which emphasized "the fact that reaching and involving the people is a long, slow process." 2 In the small resident-organized groups, involvement was more direct, but still limited. These associations were usually concerned with limited, concrete objectives such as new traffic lights or street repairs, but gradually they were evolving in orientation from one-street to larger neighborhood concerns. 3

This slow evolution of citizen participation was accelerated by a few significant events: urban renewal, the War on Poverty, and the inner-belt controversy. Urban renewal came colorfully onto the scene in N3 in 1963, when the Cambridge Redevelopment Authority (CRA) presented its Donnelly Field Project for citizen approval at a mass meeting. The citizens, already feeling the pressures for space, and aware of Boston's growing renewal difficulties, denounced the plan for at least two reasons. They were against "renewal", and, as they had not been consulted, there were several unacceptable components in the plan. City Council ordered the CRA to re-appraise its own approach, and real citizen participation in


3 Ibid., p. 83.
urban renewal was born in Cambridge. The City hired a community organizer to help shape an autonomous citizens committee capable of responding to all neighborhood improvement plans.

The committee, including citizens both pro- and con-renewal, evolved into the Wellington-Harrington Citizens Committee (WHCC). It launched a neighborhood clean-up campaign, established the basis for neighborhood-wide leadership, and eventually decided renewal was necessary. In cooperation with CRA and the City Planning Office, WHCC produced a new renewal plan, presenting it first to residents and finally, to the City Council. Thus, by May of 1965, urban renewal had spurred a new scale and mode of citizen activity, concerned with a whole neighborhood and working with city professionals. 4 WHCC did not have control, or even always a strong voice, but it was nonetheless now an institutionalized residents' advisory board.

Meanwhile, a second impetus to resident action came to N4, with the War on Poverty in 1964. In Cambridge, as elsewhere, local agencies were vying to become the official "community action agency" for receiving and disbursing the new funds. 4

The most likely Cambridge candidate was Cambridge Community Services, (CCS), an umbrella organization for about fifty private social agencies. Other groups objected that CCS lacked support of others, and that a new and different agency-image was needed. Accordingly, OEO created for Cambridge a new, semi-public autonomous agency, the Cambridge Economic Opportunity Committee (CEOC).

CEOC was based on the proposition that people must play a part in designing and executing programs, and for this purpose, it established neighborhood planning boards. One-third of each board would be representatives of public agencies, one-third of private agencies, and the remaining third was to be a Planning Team of residents elected from the neighborhood. Along with this, new citizen involvement framework, CEOC introduced a new orientation to social change. Instead of the settlement-house gradualism and change-of-attitude tactics, CEOC would be aimed more at stimulating structural and institutional changes, in private and public agencies as well as in the response capability of the residents themselves.

N4 was one of the first neighborhoods to get CEOC action, and the residents on the Planning Team began to get experience with neighborhood programming and structured Federal projects. Gradually, over a three year period, the role of the residents' Team grew into one of deliberate control of

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the N4 neighborhood board. This came about as the residents became familiar with the politics of administration and of their own neighborhoods; they were gradually able to gain support and votes from key members of the rest of the board.

There was also action in a non-governmental context, for instance, in N4's confederation, the Committee of Organizations, Blocks, and Individuals (COBI). COBI got its start in 1966 for the purpose of combining individual and group efforts in order to produce its own physical plan for the neighborhood. Professional aid was provided by the Cambridge Corporation, a development corporation interested in bringing Cambridge's rich institutional resources to the service of residents. COBI, with the Corporation's aid, made concrete progress in small projects. Even more important, it began to develop into an organized, unifying action structure potentially capable of involving residents on a broader scale than before. Its very name emphasized its broad and varied base of support; its key leaders were Planning Team members, but in COBI they had the makings of grass-roots power.

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6 James Donavan, CEOC Staff Director, interview on February 28, 1968. An anecdote illustrates the degree to which control had been taken by early 1968: The neighborhood had been given a $50 million Federal grant for a new health center. In discussions, a City Hospital representative noted that "citizen participation" was being anticipated. The N4 Planning Team captain quickly and vigorously pointed out that in Cambridge, "We don't 'participate' — we control!"
Still a third impetus to resident action was sparked by the "inner-belt" controversy. The inner belt was an as-yet uncompleted part of greater Boston's highway system, designed decades earlier to create a belt for traffic flow around the city. One of the still-unconstructed parts was to go through Cambridge, cutting a wide swath through several areas including N4. An ad hoc group of citizens, many of them N4 people, united in a Save Our City (SOC) group to oppose the inner-belt location. In a battle lasting several years, and still going on at this writing, the belt was successfully delayed — due in large part to the pressure and publicity exerted by SOC.

Thus, even before Model Cities had rolled around, there had begun significant patterns of mobilization and power-building via citizen action in N3 and N4. N3 had the WHCC and also a CEOC Planning Team comprised of Roosevelt Towers people; in N4 there was the strong N4 Planning Team, and COBI. All around, there was SOC. There were, as well, the outside resources related to them: Harvard University and M. I. T. had begun to notice "the people", and Cambridge Corporation was providing valuable encouragement to grass-roots involvement. And, there was a new man at the Mayor's side in City Hall. Justin Gray had been hired to fill a new position as City Manager for Community Development. Gray's job was "to develop imaginative ways" for using the conglomerate of public-and private
sector resources that might be applied to meet community problems. Gray was not only a man with innumerable contacts and technical expertise, but someone willing to work with, and listen to, the people.

2. The Structural and Informal Powers for Citizen Involvement

The politicians in Cambridge City Hall were not particularly prepared for the kind of innovative action possible through Model Cities, but the setting was ripe for strong resident initiatives. In the city government, a council-manager-weak mayor system, there was dissension and infighting, City Council with regular splits and divisions. Later during the MC planning year, divisions and difficulties were to focus especially on the selection of a new city manager, but this would merely be a continuation of the infighting that had gone on for a long while.¹

¹ For example, at the City Council meeting on March 11, 1968, Counselor Daniel J. Hayes charged the "majority of five" with "fiscal insanity" in their dismissal of the former City Manager. Counselor Thomas H. D. Mahoney read a statement noting the number of applications received for the post, and noted that, "This is a most convincing answer to the prophets of gloom..who predicted that we would not attract properly qualified applicants because of the political climate of Cambridge, a climate they did their best to create...." (As related in the Cambridge Chronicle March 14, 1968, 1:6.)
Still another potential for an active residents' opportunity was the Model Cities program itself, and the financial funding incentives it offered to any City government.

On the city professional side, Gray and his staff were interested in Model Cities, but at first preferred to wait for the second round of applications, expecting to be better prepared to bring MC to Cambridge later on. When it became apparent that there might be no "second round", Gray snapped into action to prepare the lengthy required proposal, in time for the May deadline. With his experience and Washington connections, Gray had a good idea of what would make a winning proposal. This he could and did construct by assembling a huge volume of professionally-prepared position and policy papers on aspects suggested by the Guidelines. This was "playing the game" on paper, but Gray and his staff had a slightly different orientation in practice. Their informal position was that substantive planning and policy-making could come only after citizen determination of its wishes and its role in the process. Accordingly, the paper proposal was prepared efficiently but hastily, with an as yet unofficial staff commitment to bring citizens into the process where real policy was concerned.

By April 24, the official proposal had been prepared and awaited Council approval. In the meantime, however, citizen involvement had already begun informally. Early in April, there had been a state conference for MC information purposes,
and along with Cambridge officials and professionals went representatives from the WHCC, COBI, and the CEOC Planning Teams. The activists in these resident groups were also keeping track of Model City events in Boston, and when the Boston Community Conference made its demands, the Cambridge residents were inspired to press their own. Accordingly, on April 24, when the Council convened to discuss the proposal, residents were there, too, en masse. Since residents' approval had to accompany the official proposal, Council postponed its own decision while the residents met. The Council's incentive to listen to the residents could have been largely based on Model Cities' potential for eliciting prestige and Federal funds. It was reasonable to play the Federal game, even to the extent of showing some deference to these activist residents.

Off by themselves behind closed doors, the residents hammered out their own position while Council waited. Finally voting support of the proposal, they stipulated three conditions for citizen control, to become part of the formal model cities structure:

(1) the CDA, responsible for all MC planning and execution, would have a resident majority, to be chosen by popular vote;

(2) all MC plans would be "for the benefit of the present residents" of the area;

Janet Rose, interview on March 19, 1968. Mrs. Rose was president of COBI and chairman of the N4 Planning Team as well. Later, she headed the volunteer Drafting Committee.
(3) any final MC proposal would be subject to veto by referendum vote of all residents in the MC area.

City Council concurred, and Cambridge was on its way.

The setting for resident action thus had arisen from Council's recognition of Federal funding opportunities, but also from some structural and informal commitments to resident involvement. One was the orientation of Gray and his staff, and the other was the responsibility demanded by the residents themselves. On Gray's side, commitment to citizen participation included a conviction that meaningful participation could come about only where there was also real development of residents' political capabilities, their dexterity in making decisions and carrying out policy as part of an institutionalized political structure. Thus, residents had to be prepared for any responsibilities they were to assume, and during the ensuing months, Gray devoted his energies to this proposition.

The planning year was to begin on December 21, 1967, and Gray had secured Federal approval to devote the entire first three months of it to the development of a process of meaningful citizen involvement, developing the functions of mobilization and political learning and power-building. Every day spent concentrating on "process" would mean one less day for planning any "product" achievements, but the feeling was that three months at least, must be spared to make certain the process was as citizen-controlled as possible, given the constraints on time. If, at the end of the planning year,
Cambridge emerged with even one program, and a really workable process, it would be enough.

The Federal administrators had shown great interest, and a willingness to go along, and plans were laid for a three-month process development phase. In those first three months, the residents themselves would constitute a Drafting Committee to organize the CDA as the basic citizen action group. The Committee would spend three months hammering out the details of CDA membership, scope, and responsibilities, learning as they went along the political ins and outs of being public agents.

All this, however, could not begin before the planning year, and in the meantime, Gray worked to find the best means of forming the Drafting Committee itself. By December, there had been discussions with relevant area professionals, including those from the Cambridge Corporation, social service agencies, CEOC, and CRA. In a series of meetings, Gray explained the emerging plans for, and reasoning behind, the formation of the Drafting Committee. Basically, the plan was to hold a mass public meeting in January, and there to solicit volunteers to make up the Committee.

From some, there was opposition to this procedure. Since the Drafting Committee was to specify the exact composition and responsibility of the powerful CDA, the Committee's membership could determine the nature of citizen involvement.
for the entire planning period. There were some feelings that the established neighborhood leaders should be chosen, instead of having a "volunteer" mechanism that could include any resident; this was probably related to a fear that during these months of waiting the activist neighborhood leaders were growing impatient and suspicious of City Hall. Other advisors objected that a mass meeting vitiated real "discussion," and feared that only the usual leaders would volunteer, since there was no "issue" to bring out newly interested people.

Gray, pressed for time, but nonetheless determined to avoid co-opting or choosing only "established leaders", successfully held out for the volunteer mechanism. If established leaders were impatient, they could volunteer; if anyone else were remotely interested, he could volunteer also -- there was no time to be spent beforehand trying out issues to see if a new leadership pattern might emerge. The basic issue was that Model Cities was here, and something had to be organized quickly; hopefully it was being organized in a way that gave citizen involvement some chance of success.

The Drafting Committee was formed in January, including all who had volunteered at open neighborhood meetings held for that purpose. The number of volunteers came to forty-six, and they were a widely varied group of people, although most were low-income. They included several nuns from neighborhood churches or convents, housewives, workers, old, young, those experienced in community groups and those not so experienced.
As chairman they elected Mrs. Janet Rose, a community activist and one of the "established leaders" whose interest in MC had been anticipated. Mrs. Rose was president of COBI, an N4 Planning Team member, and had been one of the most active residents in the MC proposal stage the preceding April. Familiar with the ways of power, the need for community control, and the problems of working with people, even Janet Rose would have a difficult job in leading so many volunteers to decide so much in the short time allotted them.

These matters, then, formed the structural and informal context for Cambridge Model Cities' citizen participation. The Model Cities' opportunity, the city political situation, and professional and resident attitudes had all entered in. The formal power provisions would be carried out or not, according to the volunteers' capabilities to deploy the resources potentially available to them.

3. The Drafting Committee as a Working Body

The reasons for having a Drafting Committee were two-fold. First, it was to develop a process of effective citizen involvement, and second, it was to develop an organizational product, the CDA. In terms of the possible functions of citizen representation, these reflected the needs of a Model Neighborhood. The development of process was, in fact, basic to kinds of representation oriented toward mobilization and community power-building, which were primary needs in Cambridge
MC. The development of the CDA would constitute the representative function of eventual "program-achievement", which would be Cambridge's very next need.

Both the working accomplishments of process and product would be necessary prerequisites to activity during the remainder of the planning year, and their development in this earliest planning stage would be critical to the whole program. The citizens would be playing an "in-group" power game in which their control could be both initiation and design, but whatever they did, design would become the only operating basis for Model Cities. The existence of the whole program would depend on their accomplishments.

This situation necessitated a delicate balance for any professional guidance of the process; thus the 'operating theme' of the professionals' role was crucial. The participating professionals could not allow themselves to guide so much as to pre-empt resident responsibility and learning, but they would have to provide enough orientation for the residents to come up with a definite CDA organizational structure at the end. The ground-rules for the professional role were summarized in Cambridge's official proposal:

...It is fundamental...that model neighborhood area representatives should be deeply involved from the very onset of the planning process. Since these representatives will have a major voice in establishing the administrative and policy characteristics of the Model Cities Agency, it is inappropriate to attempt to solidify these in advance—which would, in effect, be contrary to the goal of
substantial citizen participation and control.\footnote{Cambridge, \textit{Highlights...}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 45.}

Accordingly, Gray's staff did sketch some guidelines for the Committee to follow only if it so desired, based on the administrative machinery suggested in the official proposal.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 43-4.} This envisioned a CDA Board composed of assorted representatives, a majority of them elected from the neighborhood. The Board would be the principle policy-making body, while responsibility for fiscal and administrative detail would rest with the City Manager's office. The Board's powers and duties would probably include basic policy-making and setting of priorities, coordination of other participating groups, and maintaining communication with residents and private agencies. The CDA could also oversee the use of planning funds, and develop criteria for any eventual neighborhood referenda on the plan. A professional city staff, such as Gray's, could be responsible for actual planning of programs, according to policy as set by the Board.

These guidelines would give the Drafting Committee something to work from, but left much of the substance open to debate. In other words, it provided substantive focus while still giving the residents a meaningful role. The Committee would still have to write its own draft ordinance to create the CDA, designating its size, composition, method of election,
powers and responsibilities. The draft ordinance would then be voted on in a neighborhood referendum, and if approved, then placed before City Council for action. At that time, with much of the planning year having gone by, and citizens interested and informed, Council would have to take action or else risk seeing Cambridge Model Cities dissolve for lack of organization and citizen approval. Any components vetoed by the Council would be re-negotiated with the Committee.

Thus, the process began, and continued in a series of meetings held several times per week for three months. For its own purposes, the Committee decided to learn to use parliamentary procedure, and also adopted ground rules requiring a two-thirds majority of those present to approve any item. This meant some long sessions to hammer out acceptable proposals. And since most meetings, were in fact attended by thirty or so of the members, approved decisions regularly reflected at least half the votes of the entire body.

During this period, the five "operating themes" of resource use and deployment could be traced in the Cambridge experience. I have just mentioned one theme, in discussing the role of the professionals in Cambridge. The necessity to orient resident participants, without imposing, was apparently recognized in practice by the various professionals involved.

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3Rose, op. cit.
These included staff made available to the Committee by Gray and his office, by the CEOC legal assistance office, and by the Cambridge Corporation. At the end of three months, most of the Committee members felt the staff had played a useful role, making themselves available for reference, but never pushing their own points of view. 4

Another operating theme was the matter of dividing labor and responsibilities. This can be related to the substantive focus placed on CDA organizational matters. This was the Drafting Committee's explicit task, and one that could be handled by the Committee as a group, especially since guidelines had been provided. Thus, this "labor" itself was not a major difficulty in need of further division or delineation during the drafting period.

The theme of "use of community organizations" was notable in Cambridge for its absence during the drafting phase. Since participants had all volunteered as individuals, their membership in any other groups was not a direct concern. In fact, the intention here was to have citizens as representative of "citizens", and that intention was maintained in the Committee's independence of other community groups.

Still another operating theme was the use and perception of power. This could be related to all of the possible.

4 Ibid.; Mrs. Rose observed that the professionals were also going through a learning process, and that "the most significant ones were those willing to listen, and learn from the people."
functions of citizen involvement, but is particularly relevant to the function of political learning and power-building. This function had already been under way in Cambridge citizen experiences, and it evolved even further for those on the Drafting Committee. It can be described in terms of the two separable elements of power-learning and power-building.

The Drafting Committee experience in power-learning was demonstrable in at least four ways. First, organizational mechanics, such as parliamentary procedure turned out to be useful and acceptable, even though many of the volunteers had not had such experience before. Other groups, such as the Planning Teams, adopted parliamentary procedure for their own purposes after seeing its value in the Committee's operation.

Second, participants became engaged in thinking out the implications and consequences of policy items, and tracing them back to their basic purposes. For example, there was a realization that in establishing resident voting procedure, an apparently innocent qualification like "English-speaking" could leave out much of N3, obstructing the basic purpose of the whole election as a means of insuring a voice for all residents.

A third sort of development in learning to use power in different ways was in individual bases for decision-making.

5. Ibid., The themes were suggested in conversation with Mrs. Rose, but their interpretation is my own.
At first, people tended to vote in loose neighborhood blocs; in fact, there was some fear that sharp inter-neighborhood divisions would prevent any work being done, and there were also long-standing rivalries between COBI and the WHCC. By the end of the three months, however, the potential splits had not emerged. Rather, people were voting on issues, instead of along neighborhood lines. There were several possible explanations for this. Committee members had volunteered as individuals, and thus were not representatives of any interests but what their own consciences might dictate. There was a psychological pressure of constrained time, as well as one in the fact that residents had originally asked for such a set-up and if they failed to get things going, MC would founder by no fault but their own. There was the past experience in all neighborhoods of working with, and building up some trust in, the professionals from Gray's office, CEOC, and the Cambridge Corporation. Even so, the individualistic voting orientation could not necessarily have been predicted and really emerged only at the end.  

The fourth sort of power-learning was in the kind of area-wide interest and consciousness evoked in some participants, especially those who had had only limited experience in community groups before. For instance, after serving on the Committee, two nuns were moved to run for neighborhood

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6 Ibid. For example, Mrs. Rose told of her own surprise and philosophical satisfaction when at a last meeting, her own neighbors voted against a position she herself had championed.
Planning Team positions — something which nuns had never done before in Cambridge.

A product emerged from the Committee, as well, and it would constitute an input to the functions of power-building and mobilization. By the second week in February, the Committee had made enough headway to hold a "Model Cities Constitutional Convention" for all area residents, in order to report on their work so far. Here, incidentally, also arises the operating theme of visibility and communications. The Drafting Committee asked the Convention for approval of the recommendations it had devised so far, and also asked for "permission to continue to meet to discuss and draft the remainder of the ordinance" for its eventual submission to area referendum. And, the Committee extended an open invitation to all residents of the area to participate as members of the volunteer group.

The substance so presented to, and approved by, the Convention participants dealt mainly with the CDA's composition, and defined MC voting eligibility for area residents. Here was the beginning for Community political power-building within the Model Cities official CDA structure. The CDA board would have twenty-four members, two-thirds of them elected neighborhood representatives, and one-third non-residents. The non-residents were to be representatives of eight specified

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Residents' Volunteer Drafting Committee, Model Cities Convention, mimeo pamphlet, February 10, 1968.
interests, including one each for five city agencies, one for all Cambridge academic institutions of higher learning, one for all area businesses, and one for all area non-profit organizations. Many of the Committee members felt the educational institutions, businesses, and nonprofit organizations were "lucky to get any representation" on the CDA. Since these were not given any voice in the drafting process that was probably a reasonable observation.

By April, the other matters of CDA organization had been worked out, and the draft ordinance taken to the area people for their approval. Once again, the theme of visibility and communication was prominent. The committee determined that a convention would not do, since the whole CDA organization was too vital a matter to leave to voluntary attendance at a convention. Accordingly, the community referendum was conducted on an intensive face-to-face basis. Copies of the draft ordinance and a summary were delivered to each household during the week preceding the vote. The referendum itself was then conducted door-to-door, with canvassers visiting every household to record residents' votes. If approved, the ordinance would next go to City Council for final action.

The final ordinance as submitted for referendum included the provisions approved at the February convention, and also a delineation of CDA functions and responsibilities. These followed in general the originally suggested guidelines, with some innovations that the Committee felt to be particularly
important aspects of community power-use. One such aspect for instance, was provision for impeachment and recall. Any CDA Board member could be impeached by a majority of the Board, or could be recalled by a public referendum. The residents intended that by these mechanisms either the Board or the community would have a means of assuring the answerability of each individual Board member. And, all Board meetings were to be open ones. Also, the Board's capability to concentrate on policy decisions was enhanced by the fact that fiscal detail could be the City Manager's task, and that the City staff professionals would be responsible for implementation yet still answerable to the Board.

The Drafting Committee phase did serve the functions of mobilization, political learning, and power-building, even though it had taken up much of the planning year. A basic question, however, could be raised as to its value with respect to two aspects of community power-building: what, or who, did the volunteers really represent? And, how was the rest of the community ever involved, and what were the prospects for their becoming even more or less involved later on? Both these aspects revolve around the old matter of forming the Drafting Committee. There is, however, an even more basic matter. Namely, what was the good of spending valuable time to develop a process and political capability directly involving only a small proportion of residents?

There is evidence to demonstrate that the commitment to
such a process was worthwhile, and that these questions can be answered in light of that evidence.

The first area of possible doubt involved the Committee members, and the fear that they really represented nobody, or else only a very limited group of somebodies who built power not necessarily of the "community" type. Let us briefly examine the volunteer mechanism by which they were brought into the Committee. This mechanism ran the risk that there might be potentially interested people, whose interest was, in fact, not aroused in time, due to lack of information or awareness about Model Cities. In the December preparations, it might have been possible to go through neighborhoods, testing for interest by raising potential issues and giving general information. This was a reasonable approach, but was not promising for the particular neighborhoods involved, for two reasons. First, it is a maxim of political behavior that only a small proportion of community members are likely to rise to the fore as active participants in community action endeavors. This alone, cannot justify lack of effort to

8 For example, Robert Michels' well-known "iron law of oligarchy" describes the phenomenon whereby a small proportion of the members of any group tend to play active dominating or organizing roles for that group. Contemporary works on the subject of community political power indicate similar themes; for example, see Polsby, op. cit. Even Saul Alinsky, noted for his "power" approach to community action, considers it an excellent showing if as much as 2% of a community becomes activist even on some major issue. (Alinsky, in a speech at Ford Hall Forum, Jordan Hall, Boston, December 17, 1967).
increase the interest of others, but considered along with Cambridge's time constraint, it made the "volunteer-at-meetings" idea more understandable.

A second point, particularly relevant to Cambridge, was that much interest and publicity had previously been given community action of various kinds, so that one could assume that most people possibly interested in involvement had at least known of the activists and possibilities that had been given publicity the preceding April, and again in the fall when the award had fallen to Cambridge. The difference between being aware and being willing to do preliminary work is the one that separates most people from any kind of volunteer action. For instance in N4 there had been little interest in participating in planning before COBI got some action going; when they finally opened a tot-lot, it was occasion for sudden enthusiasm, and a carnival-like dedication attended by some three hundred residents. In other words, although many may be interested by results, only a relative few can be drawn by the work that must be done first. During the drafting, the Committee continually solicited more volunteer participation, and there was not much response.

What, then, was the good of involving a few citizens in an ordinance-drafting process, when at least some more might have been drawn by more concrete action on programs or issues? This was, in effect giving lower priority to mobilization functions, and more emphasis to political learning and building. In Cambridge, the leading justification might well
have been that the drafting experience actually developed some crucial cadres of a community-based political system, in which mobilization would have a role later on. One such cadre were the leaders, such as Mrs. Rose, who by virtue of the Committee experience developed the capabilities to think and act on a community-rather than neighborhood scale, and to use political and organizational power in a framework relevant to the governmental political structure which the community would have to confront in order to ever make gains.

A second "cadre" was developed among the Committee members who were less the "leader" type. Their experience girded them for a second-order elite role, which fulfills a number of political functions in a fluid system: these are the people who know the real issues and the leaders first-hand, and can perform a mediating role between them and the mass of people. They pass information in both directions, and may be a source of new leadership in time.

In these ways, the Drafting Committee did develop important community assets. Although some potentially interested people were probably by-passed at the beginning, the process was possibly the most productive one in the short time available. It was the resultant, insofar as the time allowed, of an open political arena, in which the most active move to the top.

One question must still be considered. That is the proposition that by virtue of the Committee's visibility and
experiences, the volunteer leaders were raised to power positions which new or potential leaders would be unable to challenge, even in other community activities. These citizen participants might actually have been obstructing "access attainment" for others. In support of this proposition, one could point to the Planning Team elections held in N3 and N4 during March of 1968. In N4, four out of five newly elected Team members were also Drafting Committee activists; in Donnelly Field, two of the four new seats went to Committee people. However, the bulk of evidence indicated that access was not being blocked for others. The Drafting Committee people formed no monolithic "elite" by any means. In the Planning Team elections they ran against each other, and some were among the losers. More basically, the Drafting Committee was a temporary body; if they wished to be elected to the CDA, individual Committee members would have to go back to seek support from their own neighborhoods.

Finally, there was the possibility that ex-Committee members, by virtue of their recent visibility and power experience, would have a better chance than others for winning election to the CDA. Even granted this situation, there is the point that when constituted as a CDA, the group would form a focal point for competition. Other community groups or individuals would know exactly who to watch, and who to use as a target, an elite to bargain with, or a tool for pushing specific interests. The recall mechanism could aid
them in securing Board answerability.

We had also raised another aspect of the value of the Drafting Committee process, in light of the larger community which was not directly involved. How was the time spent on drafting of active relevance to them, and would they become involved directly later on? We have indicated a view that the Committee did establish some political resources of community value. Even though there was to be less time remaining for program planning, the programs that would eventually emerge had a good chance of reflecting real community needs and desires, by virtue of this newly developed political capability. This was particularly important in Cambridge, where the community had previously been cast in a defensive position vis-a-vis industrial, governmental and institutional giants.

There were, too, prospects for the direct mobilization and involvement of more neighborhood people. The drafting phase emphasized organizing, and the beginning of efforts to "get the word out," by holding open meetings, the February convention, and the April referendum. In the next phase, completing the planning year, the size of the involved population could grow for at least two reasons. First, the sixteen CDA

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9 Robert Gustafson, Office of Community Development, City of Cambridge. Telephone interview on February 28, 1968. The themes were suggested by Mr. Gustafson, and their interpretation is my own.
residents were to be elected from sixteen separate districts, each representing an average of just over 220 families. Hopefully, they would be able to carry on regular dialogue with these relatively small constituencies, and small discussion groups could be formed for each. Second, the program planning would involve people's lives, and as it became more concrete, so also the degree of interest and involvement could rise.

There are related matters of attitude and expectation also. Previous to the drafting phase, there was a wide range of resident attitudes toward citizen control: some welcomed it and wanted more, others felt that the neighborhood people were not sufficiently experienced and knowledgable.\textsuperscript{10} It was likely that such a range of views still existed in April of 1968, but the Drafting Committee's emergence with a product must have drawn some doubters closer to the optimistic end of the spectrum. Expectations are a closely related matter. We have noted that people tend to become more visibly involved when there are some concrete achievements for them to enthuse over. In Cambridge, up to two or three years before Model Cities, the people had learned not to expect much, to distrust City Hall and "improvement" programs. But, since that time, at least four visible achievements had bolstered their hopes.\textsuperscript{11} Perhaps one of the best testimonies to resident

\textsuperscript{10}Donavan, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{11}Rose, op. cit. The "four achievements" were: two tot-lots, one low-income rehabilitated house saved from the Polaroid Corporation, and commitments for a new neighborhood-staffed health center.
optimism was on the night of Washington's approval of the Cambridge MC proposal. On that night, neighborhood enthusiasm burst into a huge party, where there were spontaneous nominations for MC area police and fire chiefs, and talk of cordoning off the area. On that night at least, there was a contagious feeling of potency, a consciousness of the Model Neighborhood as a very special physical and social entity. 12

4. The Potential for Program Achievement

Cambridge MC had taken a gamble on spending three whole months to focus on some participation functions that I had originally suggested as possibly necessary conditions to the "higher" function of policy/program achievement. Although there was evidence that the initial functions had indeed had good beginnings, there was still a potential price to be paid during the ensuing months of the planning year. That was the shortened time span for coming up with the MC programs, fulfilling that eventual "achievement" function.

Gray had successfully gained Federal permission to use time in a way deemed suitable for Cambridge. Still, there was the statutory planning year to be reckoned with, at least because of the necessity of being able to get new appropriations when they were due to be made. And, more fundamentally, there was the essential purpose behind MC, that improvements be made

12 Donavan, op. cit.
in people's living situations. If Cambridge had chosen to first develop an effective process, by concentrating on the first-necessity participation functions, the value of that process would emerge in its effect on substantive achievements later on. Accordingly, I shall speculate briefly on the issues and problems that were likely to emerge when the CDA would begin to formulate policy and program.

The most pressing problem for Cambridge Model Neighborhood residents was preservation of residential space and environment. Some means of securing this would have to be taken, then could come solutions to the vanguard of slum problems like housing, health, and services. The preservation problem would depend greatly on delicate negotiation of two kinds. One kind was negotiation between the residents and the outside interests like industry and educational institutions. A united community front, backed by the CDA structure, would be capable of bargaining with the nonresident giants, where smaller resident groups would have only dubious influence. The other kind of negotiation would be intra-neighborhood. The plurality of interests likely to exist in any community was increased in the MC area by the difference in races, and ethnic differences. The very different resident neighborhoods would have to cooperate in order to present enough influence to save the whole. The operating theme of possible divisions of labor could also enter here, and could be an aid where interests on different issues made division possible.
Although neighborhood differences did not cause problems during the drafting phase, they were more likely to come to the fore in policy discussions in the CDA. This was because policy would involve matters much closer to the residents' lives. A good example would be in the area of housing: since housing involves the possibility of racial integration, WH and N4 residents could be likely to seek very different priorities and prefer different program approaches.

Still another set of potential difficulties surrounded the structural aspects of the CDA, and this again involves the division-of-labor theme. One of the first, and continuing, CDA tasks would be to determine its own role and scope in action as issues came up. Although given a structural role as policy-making body, the CDA would have to develop that role by choosing how much control it would exert over specific issues. For instance, the WH urban renewal project would still be in execution stages — the CDA would have a structural right to oversee any renewal activities, but could conceivably use this power in any way, even to turn major responsibility over to the WHCC.

A closely related matter would be the division of responsibilities. CDA had been given power to determine "policy", while the City Manager would see to fiscal and administrative detail, and the Gray or other staff to "planning" detail. In effect, policy execution could also become policy determination,
thus usurping the CDA role. One crucial factor here, would be the CDA's ability to keep on top of important policy items and their implementation -- this was where the political learning from the drafting stage could really pay off.

Another of the operating themes suggested earlier was the use or involvement of existing community groups. This is directly related to another potential CDA difficulty in program achievement: the problem of divergent interests and dissatisfaction that would possibly arise from community elements who were not even indirectly represented in the Drafting Committee, and who were given only token representation on the CDA. These were the business interests, social service groups, and institutions. It could also apply to a major group so far lacking much direct representation: the moderate-to-middle-income families in the area. Their lack of representation in the process thus far had been more by virtue of circumstance than anything else. It stemmed from the fact that in the MC area, most citizen action experience over recent years had come for low-income people, through the poverty programs and the settlement houses. It was also low-income people who predominated in COBI. The major exception to this trend was the WHCC, but that committee numbered only fifteen and served largely in an advisory role. If the CDA turned out to be similarly weighted by low-income interests, the more moderate-income groups, businesses, and so on, could find themselves on the short end of policy questions of all
kinds.

Still another of the five suggested themes arises again when considering the CDA program-achievement potentials. This is the use or role of professionals working with residents. One critical factor here would be city professionals' willingness and ability to work in line with real CDA intentions. Since the City Manager was yet to be named by City Council, his role and effectiveness remained open to speculation, aside from the fact that he would be responsible to the Council and its ups and downs. More optimistic predictions could be made for the other professionals involved, if they could continue to earn the same kind of trust as that vested in Gray by the Drafting Committee members. All these considerations would apply as well to the matter of possible differences or communications gaps between the CDA residents and the eight CDA technical-professional people.

5. The Chances for Successful Fulfillment of the Citizen Participation Functions

The Cambridge Model Neighborhood was characterized as ethnically diverse, with sharp social differences among neighborhoods within the whole area. Despite the relatively small population, these divergencies had tended to preclude the formation of any sort of a united community front, even though such a unified effort might have been the way to
preserve the residential neighborhoods from outside encroachment. An eventual citizen participation function would be achievement of preservation programs, but the first relevant functions would be those of mobilization, and political learning and power-building.

The past several years had witnessed the beginnings of citizen involvement that functioned to mobilize, and to teach and build political power. Action was restricted to small issues and block-or/small-neighborhood concern, but nonetheless there had been some concrete successes. With impetus from the antipoverty program, and from interested professionals, some of the citizen groups had moved toward real control of some programs and projects that affected their own neighborhoods.

When MC arose it was perceived by many, as a means of further developing resident control. Bolstered by Gray's orientation and some particularly alert residents, the MC proposal was submitted in the limelight of real citizen involvement. Further developing the structural and informal context for that involvement raised further potentials. There was the question of "choosing" resident participants, settled in the first phase by the voluntary Committee arrangement. And, even more essential, there was the drafting phase commitment to the non-achievement functions of participation, particularly political learning and power-building.

That commitment to process was a gamble in terms of
the time used up for process, would show its tally later on as the CDA worked to form substantive policy and program. Difficulties here could be anticipated in light of neighborhood differences, the delicacy of necessary negotiations to preserve the neighborhood, the essential good will and abilities of professionals working with the CDA residents. And, there was a likely possibility of competing community interests arising with each issue. The themes of dividing or delineating labor, and using community groups, would come to the fore.

In all this, I can see some distinct indications of progress toward some of the citizen participation functions. The central one is that in a community desperately in need of effective unity in order to fight its dragons, there arose the makings of mobilization, and a real political power structure for use in that fight. There was also the potential danger that another participation function would, however, be obstructed. This was access attainment for some community elements.

If the system can be maintained as an open one, it will also include channels of influence for these competing intra-community interests: they may be able to use the CDA as a target or a sounding board, or even as a vehicle for promoting special interests. The provisions for open meetings, recall, and referendum all aid in this respect, but do not guarantee that the system will remain open. There is a
danger that as deadlines draw near, the pressure for "product" will be so great that "process" will be forgotten in the shuffle, and the larger part of the resident community lost with it, at least as far as direct participation is concerned.

Another danger is that the CDA itself could become immobilized and ineffective, by virtue of noncreative public criticism, or CDA in-fighting. This is critically dangerous to the policy-and program-achievement function, which must eventually succeed in meeting the Neighborhood's teetering preservation problems. The CDA residents face a difficult task in balancing two necessities. One is the need to continue and increase mobilization, to drum up enough community interest and support to make a sound case in matters of preservation. The other necessity is that in arousing broad interest it also serve the function of access attainment. It must be able to recognize, negotiate and work with, the divergent intra-community interests that are likely to arise. And, all these necessities must actually be well begun within the time allotted by the national MC conditions.
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS

This study has ranged from a general citizen participation framework, to the Model Cities setting, to specific case descriptions of the citizen involvement in Model Cities. In conclusion, after a comment on what the Model Cities program tries to do, I will turn to some comparisons between the Boston and Cambridge experiences.

The Model Cities legislation aimed at several things, but at least two of the outstanding objectives were potentially conflicting. These were the aims to develop products, on one hand, and processes such as citizen participation, on the other hand. The possible conflicts between these aims were further complicated by the vast scope of policy and program matters, and the constraints of limited time and money. These complications tended to emphasize the product aims. Thus, even though all my suggested functions for citizen participation were possible in Model Cities, the one most likely to be emphasized by circumstances was policy/program achievement.

Looking at the Boston and Cambridge experiences during the first months of Model Cities, it was obvious that each had developed in light of the unique context of each city, even though both were oriented toward resident involvement to an extent unmatched by other Model Cities. However, the contextual differences between Boston and Cambridge cannot be
overemphasized, and any comparisons must be made in this light.

One of the most basic and obvious differences was that Boston's MC area was mainly a black ghetto, and a volatile one at that; Cambridge's MC was a mix of slum and declining areas, with a number of ethnic enclaves. In 1968, the difference between black slums and white ones was perhaps more critical than ever before, calling up two whole different worlds of social, economic, and political significance.

A second distinction was the sizes of the two MC areas. Boston's contained over 62,000 residents and covered 2000 acres; Cambridge's had 15,000 residents on 800 or so acres, much of which was occupied by industrial and research activities. The quantitative contrast in population makes also for substantive differences in all matters such as communication, mobilization, power, program scope and complexity. That is, working techniques appropriate to one MC area would be questionable in the other; similarly, there would be a difference in the kinds of processes or products that could be realistically expected in either place. A discussion of these parametric divergencies due to scale alone would be a good subject for another thesis.

Still another distinction that should be emphasized was in the political settings for the two Model Cities. In Boston, there had been a long history of renewal politics to go along with a history of city political enclaves, reformers,
and counter-reformers. These were prelude to the election of Mayor White, a "new breed" politician who followed the Collins "transitional" administration. White was a potentially strong figure who would have to balance off a diversity of competitors, but had a good chance of building a City Hall power base to do so. Model Cities was his "baby", something that could help make or break his solutions for the black ghetto crisis.

In Cambridge, on the other hand, the political context involved a relatively weak mayor, and a potentially strong but ever-divided City Council. Model Cities' strongest backers in the city governmental framework were the professionals, rather than the politicians. And, the political power vacuum in City Hall occasioned a possible opening for a neighborhood-based political power, if one could be developed.

These were but a few of the most essential distinctions between the Boston and Cambridge situations. Keeping these in mind, I shall examine some common elements that arose from the shared situation of trying to promote resident participation in Model Cities. Once again, the analytical framework followed in the body of this thesis will be used as a pattern for discussion.

I suggested several possible functions for citizen participation: mobilization, political learning and power-building, access attainment, and policy- and program-achievement. The need for all these functions was present
with different emphases in Boston and Cambridge Model Neighborhoods. In Boston, different subareas of the Neighborhood had different participation needs for first priority—in some, mobilization was critical, while in others it was access or political learning and building. As a body, however, the Boston Neighborhood Board concentrated on achievement functions, subordinating or ignoring the subarea needs. On the other hand, in Cambridge the functions of citizen participation were explicitly separated in time. The first three months were spent on developing a citizen participation process that seemed to be aimed mainly at a political learning-and-building function. The next phase of operations would be more likely to emphasize achievement, and possibly mobilization, functions.

Successful functioning was limited in both cities, but there were some interesting points for comparison. First, both needed mobilization of resident interest and activity, and this function proved difficult for both. Failure to mobilize seemed a greater threat in Boston, where the Neighborhood was larger and more volatile, and where Board energies seemed to become more and more diffused as time went by. In Cambridge, mobilization efforts seemed less complicated and in better chance of some success. In passing, one could point to the contrast between election turn-outs in the two Model Cities. The Boston Board election in August of 1967 drew
some 12% of the eligible Model Neighborhood voters, while for the Cambridge CDA referendum in April of 1968 votes were intensively solicited and 33% of the whole Neighborhood population cast ballots.

The political learning and power-building function was also needed in both cities, but received much more explicit attention in Cambridge and seemed to be succeeding there in several ways. Perhaps in order to be sustained, this function need continual reinvigoration and some focal attention. During initial months, the high-points of resident involvement in the two Model Cities indicated that reinvigoration was occurring in Cambridge but not in Boston. That is, the high point for Boston community political action was in the April 1967 Conference, and it seemed to decline steadily after that. In Cambridge, however, one high point came in that same April of 1967, and still another in April of 1968 with the referendum. The reasons for these differences could lie in several factors: Boston MC's larger population, Cambridge's explicit commitment to developing participation, Cambridge's delineation of tasks and timing.

The access attainment function turned out to be problematic for Boston and also Cambridge. In both cases access was not made readily available to some important community elements, and their being left out of initial planning stages constituted some threat to eventual success of the Model Cities programs. The excluded groups in Boston had
important community political and professional leaders, among them the increasingly powerful black militants. The excluded groups in Cambridge were largely middle-class interests, both business and social. A key issue for both cities would be how to include these groups and avoid any obstructions they might put before Model Cities. In this respect, Cambridge's situation seemed more promising: Cambridge middle class interests could benefit themselves by Model Cities participation, while Boston's black militants might see more benefit for themselves in Model Cities obstruction.

Finally, the policy/program achievement function was major to the Model Cities idea itself. Boston's Board had begun to experience the difficulties of fulfilling this as a citizen participation function, and the Cambridge CDA would probably have similar difficulties. The structural settings in the two cities exerted different sorts of pressures in this respect, however. In Boston, there was a Neighborhood Board and MCA both responsible for achievements; conceivably, even a complete Board failure in this function could be compensated by some MCA progress. In Cambridge, however, the CDA (with its residents' majority) would be the only body responsible for achievements; its failure would mean the failure of Model Cities for Cambridge.

Still another aspect of my analysis dealt with the structural and informal contexts for citizen involvement. Comparisons here could amount to a complete reiteration of both
case studies. It is particularly notable, though, that in both Model Cities, resident participants were included on major decision-making bodies and had a determining voice. Resources were formally provided in terms of staff and funding. And, in both cases there was informal commitment by officials, to making citizen involvement an effective part of Model Cities. A critical factor in this respect was the priority placed on that process-oriented commitment relative to the other kind of Model Cities aim, which was product-oriented. If key officials and professionals placed priority on product, as appeared to happen in Boston, the citizen participation functions of first necessity could be ignored and doomed to failure or very limited success. On the other hand, official and professional recognition of process for its own sake could prove to be a critical ingredient for the success of all the citizen involvement functions.

Working modes and tactics involved some elements that were important in Boston and Cambridge. Perhaps the most central one was that of substantive issues, and the focus or lack of focus given them. "Issues" are significant if they arouse interest, and it is this characteristic rather than the objective "size" which is important. Significant issues can be important as communicating and mobilizing forces, and also as structuring forces that help delineate tasks and priorities. To be significant in these ways, it is not enough for issues merely to exist; they must be focused on,
and made specific and relevant enough so that they stand out against all other concerns. In Boston as well as Cambridge, a focus or lack of focus on issues made important differences in both mobilization and structuring. Thus, the existence of focal issues was a key factor to the success of two participation functions, mobilization and achievement.

The importance of issues as aids to the mobilizing function was manifested similarly in the two cities. First, in the proposal-submission stage, residents of both places were mobilized by the focal issue of resident control. Second, in later months, the lack of focus of "significant" issues fostered situations in which relatively few people were mobilized to action. For Boston, this occurred whenever the Board wanted to rouse community interest in general "planning"; for Cambridge, it was the case with ordinance-drafting, which was not a significant "issue" for most community residents.

The importance of focal issues as task delineators is especially significant with respect to the program-achievement function. When there were issues specific enough to delineate roles and tasks, resident groups in both cities worked well and there were good chances for program achievement or policy achievement. Without such focal issues the residents' energies were unguided and time-consuming, and design or decision was not so likely to emerge. Thus, the Boston Board handled its first tasks well, when these involved substantive issues of organization. As the issues of concern became
more and more diverse and less well-focused, the Board found it increasingly difficult to operate in a productive manner.

In Cambridge, on the other hand, the Drafting Committee was faced from the start with a whole set of structured and specific issues, and managed to deal with them all in an organized fashion, leading to the achievement of a CDA formula. The Cambridge CDA was destined to face a greater dispersion of issues, and would have some of the same sorts of problems which had already begun for Boston’s Board. Nonetheless, the three-month experience in learning the uses of power, plus the added pressure of passing time, may yet help promote the issue-focus that the CDA will need.

Another item that comes under working modes and tactics was the idea that resident participants would be playing some sort of political power game, whether consciously or unconsciously. Where Boston’s Board was playing a sort of "conservation politics," Cambridge’s resident activists were aiming further over toward the resident control end of the range. In Cambridge, the residents’ perceptions of power and its uses seemed to be more explicit, perhaps because of the openly stated emphasis on "process". In either city, it would remain to be seen what sort of power games would finally turn out to be effective or not in promoting residents’ needs and wants. In Boston, in the immediate aftermath of the Martin Luther King assassination, new "black power" forces
were rising and could have great impact on the future disposition of power in Model Cities.

A major tactical dimension not yet discussed in this thesis is time: success may only be possible over long periods of time, allowing the explicit working out of the functions of citizen representation and the necessary resource deployments. In this wise, citizen participation in Model Cities suffered from the outset. The legislative setup placed severe constraints on time, and simultaneously called for unprecedented scope and comprehensiveness. Under these circumstances, citizen representation could be successful only in a limited sense, depending on local abilities and on participants' use or perceptions of time. Federal administrators could possibly be convinced that they should consider particular cities' needs and temper the time constraints accordingly, but on the local scene the participants' perceptions of time as a constraint would still be an important part of their work. Resident participants in both cities seemed to leave most of the concern with "time" and deadlines up to officials and professionals. Still, residents were aware of constraint, and had to work within the allotted time. In this sense, Cambridge's setting apart of the first three months was probably an aid to residents' work. They had a definite job to be done in a short, easily visualized, span of time. In Boston, on the other hand, both task and time seemed less well-defined, the time extending over a longer and therefore hazier period.
Finally, working tactics included the five themes involving resource use and deployment. One was division of labor, or some delineation of tasks. Model Cities' very scope made this a necessity when it came to policy or program achievement—this was evident in Boston and would arise in Cambridge also. As mentioned above, wherever tasks could be delineated it made operations much smoother.

A second theme was the use or role of professionals, already mentioned here in connection with the various citizen participation functions and their success. In Cambridge, the explicit concern with political learning and power-building probably made professionals much more aware of these needs and possibilities. In retrospect, the explicit approach seemed more advantageous, since it encouraged professionals to provide definite task guidelines, and probably also reminded them to maintain continuous communication with the residents involved.

Another theme in resource use was the setting for communications and visibility. As to communications downward into the community, Boston's large MC population made face-to-face communications impractical, while in Cambridge they were likely to be more effective. There was also the aspect of visibility of resident participants from above. In Boston's highly bureaucratized city government, the resident Board was visible only by virtue of its connection with the MCA (unless Board members would take continual initiatives to draw official attention). In Cambridge, with a
relatively weak governmental apparatus, the residents' group could be made highly visible with the aid of publicity and a professional like Justin Gray.

The two remaining themes dealt with using existing community groups, and using and perceiving power. These, too, have already been mentioned in this chapter, in connection with the functions of access and political power-building. In fact, all these themes and functions tie together in any number of ways. One way is to see them as parts of Model Cities' over-all vigor as a program. That vigor or viability in part depends on a group's ability to sustain power, if necessary by including other strong groups or else by obviating any threats posed by them. Where citizen participants are doing the invigorating and trying to maintain power, their relationship to other citizen groups is critical, especially if those groups are potentially or actually powerful ones.

Cambridge and Boston Model Cities shared the circumstance of stemming from the same national program. If any general policy lesson emerges from the differences and commonalities, perhaps the major one is the importance of administrative flexibility at the Federal level. It should allow for different local needs in the functions of citizen involvement. For example, the legislative scope and constrained time lead to concentration on the achievement function in Boston, even though the various Model Neighborhood subareas needed very different citizen-involvement functions. Cam-
bridge was able to work within the framework of the political learning and power-building function which was actually its greatest initial need—but much of this came about through Gray's boldness and his determination to mold Model Cities to local needs.

Time constraints should delineate definite periods for purposes of appropriations, Federal oversight, and general prod to organized action. However, those time constraints should also be flexible enough to accommodate special needs, and the development of processes that will be critical later on.

Delineation of issue areas is already encouraged by the Guidelines, but there should be ways for a city to take specific substantive focuses early in the program. One way to accomplish this would be to give block-grant "program implementation" funds from the start, with the requirement that they be used during the planning period.

Finally, there is the potential conflict between the legislative objectives calling for process and product. If a program like Model Cities requires citizen involvement, it should do so with the recognition that such involvement has many possible functions. The functions necessary and appropriate for any one city should be possible under the program. That is, there should be realistic chances for successful participation of the sort needed locally; otherwise, "citizen participation" is only a meaningless catch-phrase. Model
Cities as it now stands does not allow enough time and latitude for full development of the local participation functions, except perhaps in the unique instance of Cambridge, where the legislative program was actually manipulated and bent to local needs. However, real encouragement to citizen involvement would be possible in Model Cities even though it may enjoy only limited "success." The key seems to lie in administrative oversight that recognizes the diversity of purposes possible in various citizen involvement processes.

Once again, then, I stress the importance of administrative flexibility. City professionals and administrators be encouraged to give explicit priority to first-necessity functions of citizen participation, by lenient funding and timing provisions. Also, the community "representative" formula should not be allowed to seal off or discourage competition among several community interests or groups. Interest and power are tied to issues, and different groups must be included according to the issues at hand.

In concluding, some comments are in order about the usefulness of the analytical framework proposed and followed in this thesis. That framework had three aspects: the functions of citizen involvement, the structural and informal context, and the operating modes and tactics.

The most useful of these aspects seemed to me to be the proposed citizen involvement functions. All the suggested functions seemed appropriate to the needs of both
observed cities, although the order of their importance varied according to local circumstances. I had also implied a hierarchy among the functions, in which the lower-order functions could be necessary conditions to successful operation of the higher ones. Thus, mobilization and political learning/power-building were lower-order, or of first necessity; then came access attainment and finally policy/product achievement.

The case studies suggested some further comments on this functional hierarchy. The two first-necessity functions still seemed to be necessary conditions to an eventual achievement-function success. But, the access-attainment function fits less well into a hierarchy. It could better be seen as part of another whole dimension for citizen participation, rather than as one of a hierarchy of functions. As an element of different dimension, it could describe which groups are given or denied access to the citizen involvement process itself, and through that process are able to gain further access to the real sources of power.

The policy- or program-achievement function also deserves further comment, since it naturally receives emphasis in an operation like Model Cities. In both the observed cases, the achievement function had only begun to be attempted by resident participants, and there were many potential difficulties to eventual success in this capacity. This raises the possibility that the achievement function is too
difficult for citizen groups to attempt, or that at least they must be carefully prepared and guided, and given ample time to fashion those achievements. Here, the role of the professional may be a key factor once again. He must be willing and able to take on the long task of building people's capabilities to make policy and program decisions.

A second analytical aspect was the structural and informal context for participation. My framework made this aspect into a catch-all for a variety of relevant factors, but provided little systematic basis for analyzing them. A fruitful line of inquiry might be to more carefully delineate key structural and informal elements, and make evaluations of their relative influences on citizen involvement.

My third aspect for analyzing was operational tactics and use of resources. More attention might have been paid to the idea of the citizens' "power game" and position along a possible range of controls. As to the deployment of resources, five specific themes were suggested, and these appeared to be highly relevant in both case studies. Depending on the most-needed participation functions, different themes came to the fore. Any or all of these thematic elements could be used as the focal point for observing citizen participation under way.

\[1\text{Emphasis on the difficulties of program achievement, and the related role of the professional, was suggested in talks with Professor Bernard Frieden. The interpretation is my own.}\]
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