
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- check the schedule for revisions
- the identity theory, contd.

Figure by MIT OCW.

the identity theory

- proposed by JJC Smart and UT Place in the 1950s
- a "theoretical identity" water=H₂O heat=molecular kinetic energy
 pain=c-fibers firing ("c-fibers" is just a placeholder for a more realistic candidate)





Figure by MIT OCW.

 the property of being in pain = the property of having firing c-fibers

implies:

- every event of feeling pain is identical to an event of undergoing firing c-fibers (and vice versa)
- so the so-called "type-type" identity theory implies a strong sort of token-token identity theory





orange, not the experience itself

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the experience = such-and-such brain process





the identity theory does not identify the object of the experience with a brain process

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objection: the after-image is orange, but the brain process is not orange so the after-image is not a brain process. (cf. "Objection 4")





Figure by MIT OCW.

"I am not arguing that the after-image is a brain process, but that the experience of having an after-image is a brain process..."




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Kripke's objection

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possible worlds




Figure by MIT OCW.

- "complete stories"—maximal ways the world might have been
- a proposition is necessary iff it is true at <u>every</u> possible world
- a proposition is possible iff it is true at some possible world

the necessity of identity


consider any object o

- o is identical to itself
- further, o couldn't possibly have been identical to something else
- in other words, <u>necessarily</u> o is identical to itself (in every possible world, o is identical to itself)
- do not confuse this thesis with the claim that names or other expressions in natural languages are "rigid designators"
- the necessity of identity is not a thesis about language at all


rigid designators


- take a term 'T' and imagine some possible world w
- consider the questions: "who (or what) is T in w?", and "who/what is T in the actual world?" (or, simply, "who/what is T?")
- if, for every world w, these questions have the same answer—namely, "a certain object o"—then 'T' is rigid
 - n.b. we are ignoring worlds where T does not exist
- if the questions can be read so that the answer to one is "a certain object o", and the answer to the other is "a certain object o*", and o and o* are <u>different</u> objects, then 'T' is not rigid

some possible worlds





Who is the inventor of bifocals in @?B






So, 'the inventor of bifocals' is not rigid





>So, 'Benjamin Franklin' is rigid



identity statements and rigid designators

- 'the inventor of bifocals = the first postmaster general' is contingent
 - that is, expresses a contingent proposition
- 'the inventor of bifocals = Ben Franklin' is contingent
- 'Samuel Clemens = Mark Twain' is necessary
- if 'A' and 'B' are rigid, then 'A = B' is, if true, necessarily true

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read Kripke for wednesday

Figure by MIT OCW.