

24.09 Minds and Machines

spring 2007




Figure by MIT OCW.

- check the schedule for revisions
- the identity theory, contd.

the identity theory

- proposed by JJC Smart and UT Place in the 1950s
- a “theoretical identity”
water= H_2O
heat=molecular kinetic energy
pain=c-fibers firing
 (“c-fibers” is just a placeholder for a more realistic candidate)




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


- the property of being in pain = the property of having firing c-fibers

implies:

- every event of feeling pain is identical to an event of undergoing firing c-fibers (and vice versa)
- so the so-called “type-type” identity theory implies a strong sort of token-token identity theory

the experience vs. the object of
the



experience



Figures by MIT OCW.

the object of the experience is colored
orange, not the experience itself

the experience = such-and-such
brain process



Figures by MIT OCW.

the identity theory does not identify
the object of the experience with a
brain process

objection: the after-image is orange, but the
brain process is not orange
so the after-image is not a brain process.
(cf. “Objection 4”)






Figure by MIT OCW.

“I am not arguing that the after-image is a brain process, but that the experience of having an after-image is a brain process...”





Figure by MIT OCW.



“There is, in a sense, no such thing as an after-image or a sense-datum, though there is such a thing as the experience of having such an image”


Kripke's objection

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Photograph of Saul A. Kripke.

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Book cover for Naming and Necessity by Saul A. Kripke.

propositions

false : true



possible worlds




Figure by MIT OCW.

- “complete stories”—maximal ways the world might have been
- a proposition is necessary iff it is true at every possible world
- a proposition is possible iff it is true at some possible world

the necessity of identity

consider any object \circ

- \circ is identical to itself
- further, \circ couldn't possibly have been identical to something else


- in other words, necessarily \circ is identical to itself (in every possible world, \circ is identical to itself)
- do not confuse this thesis with the claim that names or other expressions in natural languages are “rigid designators”
- the necessity of identity is not a thesis about language at all

rigid designators

- take a term ‘T’ and imagine some possible world w
- consider the questions: “who (or what) is T in w ?”, and “who/what is T in the actual world?” (or, simply, “who/what is T?”)
- if, for every world w , these questions have the same answer—namely, “a certain object o ”—then ‘T’ is rigid
 - n.b. we are ignoring worlds where T does not exist
- if the questions can be read so that the answer to one is “a certain object o ”, and the answer to the other is “a certain object o^* ”, and o and o^* are different objects, then ‘T’ is not rigid


some possible worlds

the inventor of bifocals




- Who is the inventor of bifocals in @?
- B

the inventor of bifocals




- Who is the inventor of bifocals in W_1 ?
- B
- Who is the inventor of bifocals in W_2 ?
- C (a person other than B)

the inventor of bifocals




➤ So, 'the inventor of bifocals' is not rigid

the inventor of bifocals




- Who is Benjamin Franklin in @?
- B
- Who is Benjamin Franklin in W_1 ?
- B (ditto W_2 , etc.)

the inventor of bifocals



➤ So, 'Benjamin Franklin' is rigid

the inventor of bifocals



identity statements and rigid designators

- ‘the inventor of bifocals = the first postmaster general’ is contingent
 - that is, expresses a contingent proposition
- ‘the inventor of bifocals = Ben Franklin’ is contingent
- ‘Samuel Clemens = Mark Twain’ is necessary
- if ‘A’ and ‘B’ are rigid, then ‘A = B’ is, if true, necessarily true

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


Figure by MIT OCW.

- read Kripke for wednesday