A THEORETICAL PROPOSITION
IN THE STUDY OF
USER-GENERATED ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

by
Yoshiaki Morikawa
B. Arch., University of Houston
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Signature of Author ........................................

department of Architecture

Certified by ........................................
Thesis Supervisor

Certified by ........................................
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by ........................................
Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Students

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the phenomenon of user-generated
environmental change. User-generated environmental change
refers to those activities in which the users shape the
parts or pieces of their physical environments. Specifically
examined is the motivations of the users in this particular
activity; what things or situations influence or engender
the users to act upon their environments?

The method for the study is primarily through library
research into various cases of user-generated environmental
changes as well as into literature concerning behavior in
the physical environment.

Particular social psychological phenomena are defined
as conducive to the user's behavior; namely, the concepts of
alienation and anomie, and of identity. The relationships
between these concepts and this activity are examined both
through a careful review of the concepts and through analyses
of the documentations of user-generated environmental changes.
Through this theoretical study a hypothesis is proposed:
Some user-generated environmental changes occur as a result
of the user being confronted with an alienating or an anomic
condition.

Another question is then posed concerning what this
proposition might imply for the practice of environmental
design. It is argued that the practice must be directed at
solving the cause rather than the consequence of the problem
(of alienation). Also suggested is the need for critical
examinations of the prescriptions in currency or in develop-
ment in the field of environmental design so as to better
understand the issues involved.

Thesis Supervisors:
William A. Southworth
Lecturer in Environmental Psychology

Hans H. Harms
Lecturer in Architecture
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: USER-GENERATED ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

1. General Background

The recent emphasis in the field of environmental design that, as a profession, it must be responsive to people (i.e., users) and its practice must be socially responsible may be attributed in part to the social and political awareness generated in the 1960's. The effort to design the physical environment more accommodating to the needs, aspirations, and life patterns of the users stimulated developments of studies of the ways in which people behave in the physical environment. In this way the environmental designers and the social scientists discovered each other. Together, they developed an inter-disciplinary field of environmental studies —more specifically, environmental psychology-sociology— which in many design schools today is recognized as one of the important subjects for education of the prospective designers.

Almost in parallel to the vigorous empirical research in environmental studies and the related areas, the environ-
mental designers engage themselves in developing various design methods, environmental programming techniques, computer applications to handle the sets of complex information pertaining to the users, and technological innovations of building systems that can be readily handled and manipulated by the users as their needs evolve and change over time.

Indeed, any designer who is concerned with creating a non-oppressive, democratic, and humane environment would spend his energy trying to understand more about and learn from the people who actually use and must live in (or live with?) the physical environment he designs. But at the same time, there is a dilemma that is quite problematic to the designer: While it takes time to accumulate and develop systematic knowledge in environmental design, the designer is demanded to plan or prescribe solutions for the immediate problems. We need more and better housing that 'works,' but we do not know how to design such housing. Yet, we do need housing, so we design housing without much guarantee the it will 'work.' We need more schools, new communities, new cities..... How does one resolve this dilemma?

Developed along with the concern for responsivity is the practice of environmental design itself, which led to a search for alternative models of the professional-layman relationship. Some came to emphasize participation of the
There developed a notion that the designer is to provide 'situations' through design of the physical environment wherein the users can 'take over' the process in shaping the environment by directly acting upon it. This idea of pragmatic participation of the users in the process of environmental development and of the designer as a provider of 'frameworks' (i.e., 'situations' in a more physical term) has been quite attractive to the author as an alternative mode of practice and for its potentiality for democratization of the process—who manages and rules the physical environment. Apparently, I am not the only one nor the first (nor perhaps the last) in this line of thought. This idea is manifested, for instance, in the technological development of buildings that can be easily manipulated by the users as they inhabit them.* However, the underlying assumptions of this (what appears to be) pragmatic resolution of the dilemma need to be examined.

The idea seems to assume, first, the nature of responsive environment; i.e., implicit in the idea appears to be that the less the designer provides, the more responsive the environment. Second, and more specifically, the idea implies that the user best knows what he needs and desires. Third, the user 'should' participate in the process of environmental development. Fourth, the user 'can' partici-
pate in the process. And fifth, the idea does partially reject the traditional paternalistic model of the professional-layman relationship, in which (the paternalistic model) the designer shapes the user's physical environment even to the extent of selecting furnitures, what paintings or sculptures to be put at certain places, etc., and expects little from the user. It is a partial rejection of this paternalistic model in that the professional in this model still acts as a provider—the ideal model might be the user's total control of the process, i.e., depersonalization of environmental design. The four assumptions or implications (second through fifth) related back to the first broad assumption in the nature of responsive environment. That is, these four assumptions compose a condition conducive to making our environment responsive.

While this concept of 'user take-over' and of designing and planning for and with the users in the process of environmental development are attractive, these modes of practice are not yet common. However, as suggested earlier, the current emphasis indicates a direction toward wider user-involved and 'self-help' technology in recognition of the present, still undeveloped, "low grounding of design rationale" toward making of responsive environment. Yet, the assumptions inherent in this particular emphasis, which are discussed above, demand a more careful examination of
this practice. For instance, with regard to the role of
the designer in this effort, it is necessary to acknowledge
that the profession of environmental design will continue
to exist within the present context.\footnote{This in turn implies
that there are certain limitations in user-involvement as
such in the process of environmental development. On the
other hand, this trend can be seen as a value imposition
of the designer onto the user; it is another form of paternalism.
That is, although the designer feels that the user
'should' and 'can' participate, the user may not feel the
same way and feel forced into something which they do not
wish to get involved at all.}

Thus, all this implies that although the user-involvement
idea is good and well in intention, the basis for this
practice requires a lot more substantial knowledge of the
user's ability, capacity, and motivation for involvement
in the environmental development process. (I am not here
referring to the decision-making process of the political
and negotiative nature, but more specifically to the process
of direct user participation in the physical shaping of the
environment.) Such knowledge is necessary in order to
achieve a delicate balance in the planning, design, and take-
over process; for it could provide some clues on how much
or to what extent the professional ought to contribute in
the process of design toward realization of truly responsive
environment.

2. Purpose of the Thesis

A need for a careful examination of the assumptions to better understand the nature and the meaning of responsive environment reminds us, however, of the dilemma which I have briefly discussed earlier. The dilemma, it seems to me, is really the heart of the problem that confronts the field of environmental design. The problem is that the environmental designer as an active, professional member of society must and is expected to act, and there is no solid theoretical or philosophical basis for practice. Of course, one hears of so-called "design theories," but they are most often narrow and precludes many factors and possibilities. For example, the assumption of the user-involvement, as discussed earlier, is that the user 'can' participate. But this assumption can be easily challenged on the ground, in the case of a commercial building design or a office building design, that some users have less say than other users. Can the janitor, both socially or politically and psychologically, participate in the process of environmental development of the office building with the president of the company? Does the so-called "design theory" for making of responsive environment take this sort of factor into ac-
The field of environmental design is in need of some philosophical base which does not preclude, among other things, that which may be playing a significant role in the makings and uses of the physical environment, and which understands its position or role in the social, political, or ideological processes of society. It needs to sit back and retreat from the all-too-common manifestation of the "traditional praxis in pragmatic eclecticism." The practice of environmental design, no matter how well intended, could result in something quite different from the original intention. The enormity of the problems and issues inherent in the practice requires extreme caution and a clear world view (Weltanschauung) before one can begin to prescribe solutions and act. One needs to have a clear sense and understanding of the 'problems' or issues before he acts upon them. Yet, developing a clear world view cannot be achieved over-night; it might take one his life-time or more to arrive at any clear, comprehensive view. This thesis is a part of the process toward that clear view. It is a retreat from the pressures of prescribing solutions, and attempts to see what the issue or the problem may be.

For the reasons stated earlier, I shall examine one aspect of the 'user take-over' activity, which I shall in this thesis call 'user-generated environmental change': motivations of the user in this particular activity; what
things or situations influence the user to change the physical environment the way he does? People do generate changes in their physical environment, but why do they? When we know the why's of this phenomenon of user-generated environmental change, we can then begin to constructively contribute to making our physical environment truly responsive in dealing with the how's. In this sense this thesis attempts to critically analyze the assumptions underlying the current emphasis and the prescription in environmental design.

In this attempt to understand the motivations or conditions behind this phenomenon of users generating physical or visual changes in the environment, I have explored the literature concerning behavior in the physical environment, especially in the cases of user-generated environmental change. In this preliminary research, there have been many references made to the need for control by the individuals of parts and pieces of the environment, which (the factor of control) led me to hypothesize that those users 'do things' to their physical environment as a result of the lack of control—alienation; i.e., the concept of alienation seemed to be involved in, or associated with, user-generated environmental change as a motivating factor. But I have also found that there are many meanings associated with this concept, which necessitated an extensive examination of the
concept of alienation. Understanding this phenomenon becomes crucial and a prior matter in this exploration into the study of user-generated environmental change.

3. An Attempt at a Definition: Questions

By user-generated environmental change I refer to those activities in which the users (i.e., laymen vis-a-vis professionals) shape their physical environment by themselves. For instance, people painting the walls, putting up fences, adding rooms to a house by themselves with their own labor, etc. There are also what may be considered 'negative' or 'destructive' sorts of user-generated changes such as vandalism of places, graffiti on the walls, etc. What is it that makes people, the users, do these things to the physical environment? What are their motivations?

One can think of some reasons conducive to the phenomenon. E.g.: existential needs, the person erects a shelter because he has to house himself; utilitarian efficiency, the person enlarges or adds a room to accommodate some or a large piece of furniture he has gotten; economic, the person does these things by himself because he cannot financially afford someone else to do them; and so on and so forth. While these reasons for environmental change are quite important and most definitely taken into consideration in
design as a fundamental 'needs,' in this thesis I look for more obscure and 'hidden' phenomena behind this particular behavior in the physical environment.

Robert Sommer, who is engaged in raising people's environmental awareness (which is another subject of emphasis in the field of environmental design today), regards user-generated changes in the physical environment as signifying or symbolic of a particular psychological phenomenon; the concept of identity:

Sometimes a design fits so tightly that it leaves no room for individual or group expression of identity. Even when there is consultation with users beforehand, a design may not allow for user inputs afterwards. This may be appropriate for a timeless monument which is supposed to express a given moment, but it is unsuitable for buildings which are supposed to fit people's needs and support their activities. Not only must a building respond to changing circumstances, social as well as technological; it must also permit people to express their individual and collective identities. When we fail to do so, we may see user inputs in the most elementary sense of direct environmental action.7

With regard to the kinds of 'negative' changes such as graffiti, Ronald Gross not only agrees with Sommer but encourages it. In exploring the reaction to and the meaning of the "graffiti epidemic" in New York City today:

The graffiti is an example of an instrument for the individual to assert his identity or personality and therefore we should not repress it.8

Two questions arise from these assertions: What is identity?; and how is identity developed?
Identity may be defined as a sense the person has of his own self-hood, i.e., his own awareness of who he is and what he is. There are various theories concerning how the person acquires a sense of identity. It is elaborated by some social psychologists in role theory, symbolic interactionism, etc. Briefly, the person acquires his identity through the social roles (e.g., father, child, teacher, student, employer, employee, etc.) he plays in his group, and especially through interaction with others by communicating with them. To communicate, one uses symbols or language common to others with whom he develops his self, identity. Some environmental psychologists find the use of the physical environment to this purpose; i.e., people use the physical environment as a symbolic or communicative means in developing a sense of identity. People do things to the physical surroundings to have it reflect, enhance, or negate their ideas of themselves.

Karl Linn, during the course of his "search for a humane environment," contends that the users become "alienated from their physical environment if they are unable to leave their personal imprints on their immediate surroundings. Relegating human beings to the role of passive spectators in their environment threatens their mental equilibrium, and robs them of the opportunity to assert their authority, to develop mastery over their places of
habitat." Linn suggests here a case or a hypothesis that if the user is unable to assert his identity onto his environment, he is alienated; such an environment is alienating to the users. If that is the case, does the user remain passive and alienated, or does he break out of the frustration and act upon the physical environment? If so, then what allows him to take action this time?

In 1967 at M. I. T. a group of architecture students "spontaneously rebelled against the constraining environment of their drafting rooms" and erected a series of mezzanines. These students were not assigned to do this in their architectural studio studies by any means. It was generated by them, the users of the environment. What is it that engendered this environmental change? The participants in this activity attribute some factors to the cause: Aside from it being "triggered by a lack of space";

......common to many...is a general feeling that the immediate environs and the physical/administrative policies of MIT (indeed many parts of our great society) are unresponsive to us as human individuals, moreover are often oppressive, unreasonably narrow, constricting our actions, denying our moral right to participate in matters which affect changes in our environment, truly in matters which affect the course of our lives.

One of the participants in yet another and similar activity which took place in the following year at M. I. T. is in agreement:

......it has something to do with personal control
of environment, with what is your interest in it
and what goes on in it. These statements by the users who generated changes in the
physical environment do support the hypothesis that some of
user-generated environmental changes occur as a result of
the user being confronted with an alienating condition.
These students were alienated from the environment. However,
in their statements there is little suggestion that they
were seeking identity as such with their environment or
with themselves. They suggest something other than identity
in general or the physical environment per se, which is
conducive to alienation; namely, their inability to "parti-
cipate in matters which affect" not only their environments
but the course of their lives. They suggest that they are
alienated from not having any control over what goes on in
and around their lives. Is this condition of alienation
the same as that in which the user is unable to act upon
their environment? That is, does alienation result when
one cannot control the matters which affect his environment
and life, which are a necessary precondition for him to
achieve or maintain his sense of identity? Is a significant
part of one's identity achieved when the person has (a sense
of) control over his life? Put another way, is there any
relationship between the concept of alienation and the
concept of identity, as it has been suggested? Further,
and more fundamentally, what is alienation? How is alienation engendered? Is there any relation between the phenomenon of alienation and user-generated environmental change? These are additional questions of concern for the thesis.

Let me attempt to be a little clearer in summary: We have discussed the various reasons or conditions conducive to user-generated environmental change, e.g., existential needs, utilitarian efficiency, economic, etc. We have also discussed user-generated change as related to a particular psychological concept of identity; people use or do things to their physical environment to develop their sense of identity, but this is only one of many ways or things that contribute to this personal development. Then, a notion that the user is alienated when he is unable to use his environment for this psychological purpose has been presented. Another view that user-generated environmental change occur as a result of not identity per se but of a need to control was put forth. These last two views pose a question: Is alienation a part of the identity problem, or is it something else? This leads us to a task of carefully examining the phenomenon of alienation. What is alienation, and how is it caused? What are the conditions conducive to alienation? (The latter is discussed in detail in Appendix.) Once we understand this phenomenon of alienation better, then we need to see if it relates to the
idea of user-generated environmental change, and, if so how.

In the chapter that follows, Chapter Two, I shall discuss the experiences of alienation from the individual's (the user's) point of view. During the course of discussion on alienation from this social psychological perspective, attempts to examine the links between user-generated environmental change and various experiences of alienation will be made. Also discussed will be the relationships of alienation to the concept of identity, as this question has been posed.

In Chapter Three, I shall elaborate on these relationships of alienation and behavior in the physical environment by systematic analyses of the documentations of user-generated environmental changes.

In the last chapter, Chapter Four, the implications of the findings will be discussed. Specifically, the causes of alienation will be examined for the reason that we must get at the causes, rather than consequences, of the problem if we are committed to making our life and environment truly responsive and humane.

In the Appendix, various approaches to the cause of alienation, especially the Marxian analogy and the Durkheimian concept of anomie (or social alienation), are further discussed in detail. The reader may find it useful to go
through this Appendix to better understand the nature of the problem which shall be discussed in Chapter Four.
The priority of the study now becomes more of a careful analysis of the phenomenon of alienation. When we understand the phenomenon well, we can then see if there are grounds for making causal relationships, if any, between user-generated environmental change and alienation. We can also clarify the vague connection which has been suggested between the concept of identity and that of alienation in relation to the aspects of the physical environment.

What is alienation? Melvin Seeman in his article, "On the Meaning of Alienation," presents a definite, empirically "measurable," and organized view of the phenomenon of alienation into five basic modes or types: powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement.*1 Although there are numerous debates amongst social philosophers and social scientists concerning if alienation is an objective (i.e., social) or subjective (i.e., psychological) phenomenon, in this chapter I shall discuss the types of alienation, as put forth by Seeman.²

* The footnotes and references for this chapter are found in page 92.
1. **Powerlessness**

This view of alienation as the sense of powerlessness is perhaps the most dominant when one talks of alienation. It originated in Marx's concept of man, especially in view of the worker's condition in capitalist society. (See Appendix for a detailed discussion.) The worker is powerless "when he is an object controlled and manipulated by other persons or by an impersonal system, and when he cannot assert himself as a subject to change or modify this domination. Like an object, the powerless person reacts rather than acts. He is directed or dominated, rather than self-directing."³

The sense of powerlessness, according to Seeman's definition, is the "expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behavior cannot determine (or control) the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcements, he seeks."⁴ The person feels powerless when he senses little or no significant ability to control the results he desires. The M. I. T. students who built mezzanines in their studios manifested, as it has been stated, their desire to control their education and the world around them by their very action of changing their physical environment.

2. **Meaninglessness**

To continue with the Marxian view of the worker's condi-
tion, for the worker his work seems to be meaningless for the reason that "bureaucratic structures seem to encourage feelings of meaninglessness. As division of labor increases in complexity in large scale organizations, individual roles may seem to lack organic connection with the whole structure of roles, and the result is that the employee may lack understanding of the co-ordinated activity and a sense of purpose in his work." When the worker needs to mind only his 'own business' as division of labor increases in complexity and scale, what results is a decline in the "capacity to act intelligently in a given situation on the basis of one's own insight into the interrelations of events."6

Thus this mode of alienation is characterized by a "low expectancy that satisfactory predictions about future outcomes of behavior can be made." The person senses little or no significant "ability to predict behavioral outcomes" when he has no clear understanding of the events in which he takes part, when he does not know what he should believe in and why he should behave precisely in some way and not otherwise. The students at M. I. T. who generated environmental change do mention their feeling of meaninglessness, especially in their education.9 They have found their course of education, over which they have no control, to be meaningless and, to gain some meaning and therefore some sense of control, they have acted upon their physical
environment.

3. **Anomie/Social Alienation**

This derives from Durkheim's description of a social condition following breakdown in the moral structure of society. (See Appendix.) Modern sociologists generally describes this condition as that in which there is no consensus between means and ends in the societal process or social structure. The social norms "regulating individual conduct have broken down or are no longer effective as rules for behavior." Anomie is a state of confusion, insecurity, and normlessness. According to Durkheim's account of social development, change -- technological vis-a-vis social -- tends to occur progressively, and as change occurs the social norms (i.e., the moral structure according to Durkheim) that hold the social organization together must also change. When there is a contradiction or conflict between the development and social norms or moral rules, the condition of anomie or normlessness results. Seeman defines this condition from the individual's point of view as "high expectancy that socially approved behavior are required to achieve given goals." That is, as society develops and more wealth it accumulates, the goals of the individuals in society also become higher. But the social norms or moral
rules that are supposed to regulate behavior are slower in development or in change than the goals. Thus there results the condition of anomie in which the individuals must turn to socially illegal means to attain those goals. We all at one time or another heard an expression: 'People change slow.' This is so when we compare it with the accelerating rate of change of technology and its achievements.

Most of us know, as a result, that in some cases we have to use illegitimate means to attain certain goals or ends. One has to have, for example, a 'connection' to get into a certain social group, social organization, or a company for a job. Robert K. Merton in his "Social Structure and Anomie" lists five methods of adapting to the 'demands' of society in the condition of anomie to achieve those demands and the goals it prescribes: conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion. One often has to conform to whatever means available to achieve certain ends. If one does not wish to conform, he must innovate new means to achieve them. In the United States, one might say, this situation of anomie is so wide-spread that deviant behavior or the uses of illegitimate means have in some cases become 'folk knowledge' or commonsense. (One criminologist recently declared, in rethinking the delinquency problem, that because it is society that is sick radical non-intervention --to cure the problem at the root--
is needed. Those who neither conforms nor innovates to 'survive' or 'exist' in such a condition may simply retreat or isolate themselves. This leads us to another mode of alienation, which Seeman calls "isolation."

Isolation is alienation of the person from the dominant aims and values of his society. Some of Merton's adaptation 'mechanism' to the condition of anomie -- specifically, innovation, retreatism, and rebellion -- may fit into this category. The intellectuals and the counter-culture people, for example, are isolated: The intellectual who detaches himself from the social values and claims to be 'objective' and 'value-free'; the person in the counter-culture commune is isolated and alienated from the dominant social values and norms. They are apart from and not of society, although they are in it. The isolated individuals "assign low reward value to goals or beliefs that are typically highly valued in the given society." 14

Let me elaborate on the thesis which Merton has put forth here on the five adaptive 'tools' or means to the condition of anomie. Then, I shall examine the activity of user-generated environmental change that took place at M. I. T. to see if there is any relationship between that particular activity and the concept of anomie.

Merton specifies two important social and cultural
elements: culturally defined goals, purposes, and interests; and culturally defined means, regulations, and controls to achieve or attain those goals. The latter is called "institutional" means or norms.\textsuperscript{15} As it has been stated, when there is a contradiction, a conflict, or no consensus between these two elements the social condition becomes unstable and there develops a condition of anomie. In this condition of anomie, some activities originally perceived as instrumental (however illegitimate by the culturally defined ethical standard) to achieve the goals are transformed into self-contained activities. That is, these practices rationalize themselves; they take on their own meanings and 'power.' "Lacking further objectives," Merton asserts, the "original purposes are forgotten and close adherence to institutionally prescribed conduct becomes a matter of ritual. Sheer conformity becomes a central value."\textsuperscript{16} Under an anomic condition, the technically most effective and practical means to obtain the aspirations, the goals, becomes "typically preferred to institutionally prescribed conduct."\textsuperscript{17} When this practice becomes wide-spread, it becomes accepted and valued for its own sake. One of the accepted means that has its own value in society is conformity.

Innovation is another culturally accepted means under this social condition of anomie. Innovation is a response
which occurs "when the individual has assimilated the cultural emphasis upon the goal without equally internalizing the institutional norms governing ways and means for its attainment."\textsuperscript{18} The hard core radical would probably see this as a cooptive mechanism of the intrinsically evil, unworkable social system, because innovation, although it involves rejection of the culturally defined institutional means, is accepted by society as a value and supports the basic beliefs of and in society which is, as they see it, controlled by a certain group of 'power elites.'\textsuperscript{19}

Ritualism is the case when the individual totally rejects the cultural values or goals and yet still accepts the institutional norms. As Merton writes, "it involves the abandoning or scaling down of the lofty cultural goals of great pecuniary success and rapid social mobility to the point where one's aspirations can be satisfied. But though one rejects the cultural obligation to attempt 'to get ahead in the world,' though one draws in one's horizons, one continues to abide almost compulsively by institutional norms."\textsuperscript{20}

But when one rejects both the cultural goals and the institutional norms, he totally isolates himself. (Retreatism is the complete opposite of conformity, in the sense that the latter is in congruence with both the goals and norms.) Merton describes the process the individual goes
through to get to this point of retreatism through the series of "defeats" after having first assimilated both the cultural goals and norms: "The conflict is resolved by abandoning both precipitating elements, the goals and means. The escape is complete, the conflict is eliminated, and the individual is asocialized." 21

When a group of individuals get together and create anew different way of life after having gone through the process of 'tune in, turn on, and drop out,' we have what Merton calls "rebellion." We see this phenomenon commonly today in the counter-culture communes. Rebellion "involves a genuine transvaluation, where the direct or vicarious experience of frustration leads to full denunciation of previously prized values....." 22 Merton goes on to distinguish rebellion from the Nietzschean term of "ressentiment" which involves no "genuine change in values," while the former "condemns the craving (for the fundamental value) itself." 23

Merton asserts these five modes of adaptation occurs when "anomie or cultural chaos supervenes." 24 These five phenomena play structural functions of social system in which there is little or no co-ordination between the goals it prescribes and the institutional means to attain them.

Now, was there a condition of anomie involved in engen-
dering environmental change at M. I. T.? There has been a suggestion that it was a protest, a kind of rebellion.

The building of the mezzanines constituted on one hand a vindicative strike at the institution's policies, an insult to Establishment architecture and education, while on the other hand demonstrates our eagerness and ability to work long hours at our own expense to accomplish tasks which we feel worthwhile, to help our ailing environs.25 Rebellion, as it has been defined, does not apply to the causation of user-generated environmental change. (At least from the documentation available, it is questionable whether the students were motivated with a specific aim "to introduce a social structure in which the cultural standards of success would be sharply modified..."26) If it was rebellion the students would have dropped out -- they would have rejected the fundamental value itself associated with the culture. However, there is a relation to innovation, another one of the five functions of, or adaptation modes to, the condition of anomie. The students seem to have "assimilated the cultural emphasis" or the basic cultural values that are preached throughout the culture, in the educational institution, in the architectural profession, etc. -- e.g., racial equality, freedom, etc. What they rejected is a particular mode of professionalization process (i.e., architectural education) and the practice of Establishment architecture into which they felt they were being molded. This rejection of the institutional norms led them to generate environment-
al change as a manifestation of their discontent. Parenthetical-ly, after the environmental change took place the administration bowed to implement certain changes in the educational structure. 27

We have so far discussed three experiencial types of alienation and the relationships of user-generated environmental change to each of them. Let us now turn to another type, self-estrangement.

5. Self-estrangement

Self-estrangement is perhaps the most extreme form of alienation. Karl Marx in his "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844" describes this condition:

......in his work...(the worker) does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other expulsion exists, labor is shunned like the plague. External labor, labor in which man alienates himself, is a labor of self-sacrifice, of mortification. 28

When work engenders self-estrangement, it does not encourage unique abilities, potentialities, or personality of the
person. He is not free, not involved with his work, nor with his own self.

This type of alienation often touches upon the concept of identity. The relationship of the concept of identity and alienation has been, in the last chapter, questioned for its vagueness. In fact, this relationship was one of the reasons for investigating the phenomenon of alienation.

Identity has been defined as an idea the person has of himself, of his own self-hood. If, however, the person becomes aware of a discrepancy between his ideal self and actual self, he may face an 'identity crisis.' In this sense, "to be self-alienated...means to be something less than one might ideally be if the circumstances in society (or in his life) were otherwise...." One loses his identity or self-hood. But how does one develop contradictory selves? How could there be an ideal self and an actual self in the person? How one develops a sense of identity has been briefly discussed in the last chapter: The person develops an awareness of who he is by interacting with others, and to some of whom he may develop a strong attachment or liking and wishes to be like them. These people are for him "significant others," who influence his behavior and his development of his own 'self-image.' Thus, his image of his self, his idea of what kind of person he is, is decisively influenced by what others, especially significant
others, think of him. Their attitudes of approval and of disapproval affect, if not determine, his ideal self-image and also make him become aware of his actual self-image.31

Another explanation for the loss of self, the loss of identity may be found in the role theory: A social role is a 'slot' into which people fit, e.g., mother, child, student, physician, auto mechanic, etc. The role carries with it certain duties and functions in a group or in society, and with them responsibilities. But when there occurs a condition wherein the role does not satisfy the individual's own needs and he becomes alienated from the role, he becomes irresponsible.32 Moreover, because the role is an important factor in acquiring a sense of identity, because an identity with the role equates realization of one's self --e.g., 'I am an architect,' 'I am a teacher,' 'I am a mother,' etc. -- alienation from the role becomes characteristic of self-alienation, of 'identity crisis.'

This situation corresponds to both the worker's condition as it has been described and the condition of anomie. Ruitenbeek, for example, elaborates on the relationship of the latter to the problem of identity, in which he also talks about "role confusion."33 He asserts that in the "dynamic society" such as ours of high industrialism and high mobility, where the human environment is reduced to a series of fleeting contacts with strangers or near strangers,
man can no longer find security in the continuity of his environment. In this situation, identity is endangered, for it is bound to reflect the discontinuity of the social environment; a man living in so mobile a world will be less sure of himself and of others than a person in more stable surroundings. Ruitenbeek goes on to illustrate how an anomic condition renders the human relationship impermanent and how "those who engage in them are increasingly apt to experience a fragmentation of their identity."  

Thus, the person out of touch with others is also out of touch with his own self. As C. Wright Mills writes: "In the normal course of her work, because her personality becomes the instrument of an alien purpose, the salesgirl becomes self-alienated..... Men are estranged from one another as each secretly tries to make an instrument of the other, and in time a full circle is made: One makes an instrument of himself and is estranged from It also." The person out of touch with the essence of his self conceives of himself as an intrinsically meaningless, utilitarian means toward certain goals or rewards. He is "other-directed," to borrow the term from Riesman. The person learns that "nothing in its character, no possession he owns, no inheritance of name or talent, no work he has done, is valued for itself, but for its effect on others....." The person works not for the work nor for himself, but for
money which can buy him an automobile or a house in the suburb; he is self-alienated.

Seeman defines this mode of alienation as "dependence of the given behavior upon anticipated future rewards, that is upon rewards that lie outside the activity itself." 39

We have in this section come across the relationships of the concept of identity to the concepts of anomie and of self-estrangement. Ruitenbeek argues that identity is a matter of personal problem in a condition of anomie, accompanied by "industrialization, urbanization, the growth of wealth, the decay of tradition, the retreat from public concern and deeply held personal relationships, all the characteristics of a society that says it is based on individualism and thwarts the expression of individuality..." 40 Thus, according to Ruitenbeek, the identity problem is caused by the condition of anomie in society. 41 Another argument presented is the relationship between self-estrangement and the loss of self-hood, the loss of identity.

The question posed in the last chapter, when the case of user-generated environmental change at M. I. T. was presented, was: What is 'alienation' when one cannot assert his identity to his physical surroundings? Obviously, as Linn has suggested, it is alienation or estrangement from that physical surroundings. Although it has been suggested
that it is unlikely that the person loses his identity if he cannot assert his imprints to the physical environment, that very environment, however, can become very much a part of him if it is used for the purpose of, or if it plays a function of, his identity development and/or maintenance. This is perhaps the reason why people have their 'own' places about which they can claim, 'this is me!'; and when they go out to downtown or some place with which or in which they have no intimate or personal associations, they describe those places as, indeed, 'impersonal,' 'depressing,' 'cold,' 'alienating,'.....

If the individual regards the physical environment as a 'tool' of identity development (consciously or subconsciously), or if the individual identifies his self with the physical environment 'matter-of-factly,' then the complete loss of his essential self may result (as in the materialistic process analogy of objectivation-objectification and alienation-reification\textsuperscript{42}). The person identifies himself with the cold, alienating environment and he himself comes to possess those characteristics, self-estranged. Erik Erikson, in a recent article in the "Washington Post," notes that "identity is a person's sense of being at one with himself and with his surroundings."\textsuperscript{43} This poses a great danger in our age when "semi-alienation has become an established expectation in a mass society."\textsuperscript{44}
I have jumped a little. Another question is still remaining: Assuming it is not so hopeless, what might the users do to these alienating environments? Do they refrain from it all and remain passive and alienated (as I speculated)? Despite my speculation, it is, as in any case, difficult to generalize an answer to this question. However, there are some examples, including the case at M. I. T., which suggest that at one time or another the frustrations break out. Yet, the cause of the frustration is hard to pinpoint. Whether or not the frustration is from the reason that the person cannot identify with the environment— he cannot leave his personal imprints on the environment—is yet unknown and one can only speculate on this matter.

The relationships that have been developed through examination of the various modes of alienation and the case analysis of the student-generated environmental change at M. I. T. do suggest, however, that the dominant cause is not environmental but social, or political if you will. Some of the activities in which the user does things to his physical environment are a manifestation of the user's alienation from the social process. The user who cannot identify himself with the physical environment associates it with the alienating or anomic condition of society. Because the environment is something in which and with which he must live, he attempts to make it his 'own' or into an environ-
Can he achieve an identity with the environment and still be alienated? As the term alienation has been referred to in this particular instance -- alienation from the physical environment -- he is not alienated from the environment as long as he identifies himself with it in positive terms; it becomes part of him. (This is precisely the danger of self-alienation through the physical environment; one is not aware of his alienation even if he becomes critical and negative.45) Whether or not identity with the environment eliminates alienation from the social process and/or from his own self is doubtful. (Although I have in the preceding paragraphs, especially in page 36, stressed the relationship of the concept of identity development and the role of the physical environment, just how or how much significance this relationship has in the development and maintenance of identity is unknown.)

Now, to relate all this to the student-generated environmental change at M. I. T.: Were the students self-estranged; were they seeking identity with their environment, to be specific?46 There is an indication that they did not identify themselves with the dominant "Establishment architecture and education," which implies that they had some different ideas. The ideas were, in a sense, trans-
lated into mezzanines with which they came to identify themselves. For them, the original condition of the drafting rooms manifested the things with which they did not identify.

So, here again, there is a relationship. It was an awareness of the conflict between the ideal surroundings and the actual ones that played a role in generating this environmental change.

To summarize, we have discussed in this chapter the meaning of alienation by analyzing it in four modalities: powerlessness, meaninglessness, anomie or social alienation, and self-estrangement. The person is powerless when knows or believes his activity will fail to yield the results he seeks; he feels meaningless when he has no clear understanding of the events in which he takes part, when he does not know what he should believe in and why he should behave precisely in some fashion and not otherwise. Normlessness is a situation in which the person encounters contradictory role expectations and is compelled to behave in a socially unapproved way to achieve the purposes; isolation is estrangement of the person from the dominant aims and values of his society. Under the condition of anomie, five adaptive methods develop: conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion.

Also related to the concept of anomie is the concept of
identity. In a socially fragmented, uncohesive, anomic condition, the individual has difficulty identifying himself with his role(s) and with the constantly changing environment, whereby he develops an 'identity crisis.' The identity problem as loss of self in turn is linked with the concept of self-estrangement, another type of alienation, which is the individual's estrangement from his self, the feeling that his own self and its abilities are something strange, not his.

We have seen certain relationships between these concepts of alienation and anomie and of user-generated environmental change. The user who feels powerless or meaningless does things to his physical surroundings—in the case of the M. I. T. students, awareness of powerlessness seem to have followed that of meaninglessness. There have been also an element of anomie involved: innovation. The environmental change at M. I. T. manifested, moreover, the use of the physical environment to reflect the students' identity with an alternative mode of architectural practice and education.

Let us now examine more cases of this particular activity in the physical environment.
CHAPTER THREE
ALIENATION AND USER-GENERATED ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

In this chapter the documentations of user-generated environmental changes are examined, specifically to seek and test the validity of the relationships (of alienation to user-generated changes in the physical environment) constructed in the previous chapter. I do not pretend to present new first hand research. The cases presented are documentations of those environmental changes by others (architects, planners, social scientists, and the users). Consequently and because the first hand raw materials are unavailable, this study heavily relies upon the accounts of the authors of these documentations.

1. A Theoretical Proposition: Hypotheses

Let me first restate the proposition on the relationships of alienation and anomie and of user-generated environmental change.

The proposition is that some of the changes the user makes in his physical environment are a result of the user being confronted with an alienating condition in which he
is or feels powerless, meaningless, and/or self-estranged (i.e., threatened of his sense of identity); such changes also occur in an anomic condition in which the user is compelled to conform or ritualize, innovate, retreat, and/or rebel. Let me put this in the form of questions:

1) Do some of user-generated environmental change occur as a result of the user having or sensing little or no significant ability to determine or control the results he seeks in the matters that concern him?

2) Do they occur as a result of the user's little or no significant ability to predict outcomes of the situation he is in? That is, does the user do things to the physical environment when he is in a situation about which he has little or no sense of understanding?

3) Or, are they a result of the situation in which the user becomes aware of 'crisis' or loss of his identity, i.e., self-estrangement?

4) Does the user do things to the environment because everybody else does it, and because it is accepted as a 'good thing' to do?

5) Do the users, who hold low reward value to goals and beliefs of society generate changes in, or act upon, the physical environment?

With these (closely related) questions, let us examine the documentations of user-generated environmental changes.
2. Analyses of the Documentations

a) Quartiers Modernes Fruges, Pessac, France.

The case we examine here is documented by the French architect Philippe Boudon with his sociologist colleague: "Lived-in Architecture."*1

Le Corbusier, one of the great 'master' architects of the twentieth century, was commissioned to develop, design, and get built his ideas of architecture as a "machine to live in" by Henry Fruges in Pessac near Bordeaux, France. The Quartiers Modernes Fruges was a "laboratory (where) Le Corbusier would be able to 'put his theories into practice and carry them to their most extreme conclusions.'"2 Thus, in 1926 some fifty houses were built in Pessac. In 1967, forty-one years later, Boudon conducted a study of the extraordinary transformations the inhabitants made to these houses. The houses were built according to a basic standardized unit of reinforced concrete to which windows, doors, staircases, and mechanical equipments of equally standardized sizes were placed. To these houses the inhabitants of the Q. M. F. (Quartiers Modernes Fruges) have added extra rooms, garages, pitched roofs over flat roofs, flower pots, trellises, fences, walls, doors, gates, paints, etc. The large windows have been made smaller, some walls have been

* The footnotes and references for this chapter are found in page 93.
removed, and so on and so forth.

What were the motivations of the users? What elements or factors were involved in engendering these incredible changes? Boudon suggests a cultural phenomenon as one of the significant attributes: the traditional dwellings of the region, "lean-to house" and the "country house." In these dwellings conversion is a frequent feature, and the people in the Bordeaux region tend "to regard this type of structure as ideal" and as "normal." Le Corbusier, albeit not by intention, provided houses with open, free, and simple plans. The users, who regarded conversion in dwellings as a normal phenomenon, obviously took advantage of such layouts, as Boudon notes:

Le Corbusier's design lent itself quite readily to simple alterations, which allowed the Pessac houses to be brought more or less into line with the traditional lean-to house. By erecting a partition wall the occupants could --and in many cases did-- build a corridor running along one side of their houses, thus creating the really essential feature of the single-fronted lean-to house.

Aside from these physical environmental changes being a cultural phenomenon, there is a functional element of anomie. With regard to the large windows that have been made smaller, Boudon notes that this very act was based on the users' assessment of what a window should look like (as in the case of what an "ideal and normal" house is supposed to be), but this very assessment is based on the
"established standards of taste." He demonstrates, moreover, that some of these changes were due to the "conservative thinking" of the region in general, which, in some cases, "had developed into conformism." For example, one of the inhabitants wanted to have a "large bay (window) built on overlooking the garden 'as is customary nowadays' ...." So, this user plans to introduce physical change in her house by putting a large bay because everybody else does it, because it is a thing to have just as everybody else has it. There seem to be much "inherent conformism," as Boudon puts it, involved in many of these activities (of conversion) at Pessac. It is recognizably a grave challenge to contend this normally accepted phenomenon as a function of anomie or social alienation. But this conformism, while it means harmony, also implies 'obedience' and contradicts autonomy, self-governance. Anomie, as it has been defined, is indeed a cultural phenomenon and implies a breakdown of the value system. Conformity can be regarded as, in a critical term, a cooptive mechanism of the culture; it rationalizes itself.

Was there any indication of powerlessness as a generating factor of environmental change at Pessac? One of the residents, when asked about ideas about his house: ".....We-all-of-us-always-have-our-own-ideas! We want our own house, don't we! for ourselves...and we want it the
way...the way we want to have it!"13 This user obviously has observed many conversions that have taken place at Pessac and feels change is necessary:

As I told them...do it for yourselves, don't convert anything for your children because, no matter who moves in when you leave, whether it's your children or strangers, they're bound to pull something down. They won't like things the way they are. You've put the door there, they'll want it over there! You've closed up a wall to make... they'll build a door in it or else knock it down to make a larger room (and that's happened before now): there are houses down there, the people took out a large partition wall, made a large kitchen and thought it was absolutely marvellous...and now, huh...the good man has put the partition back, so that the kitchen's the same size as it was before, in order to make an extra room for one of his children...you see?...people will always make changes...there's nothing 'amazing' about it. No...any house, no matter how well designed it might be, will never completely suit the family that goes to live in it... There's always something that needs to be changed. It does no harm...and it's good for trade... I've lived here for twenty years now and I've seen it happen time and again; there are houses which have had three or four different owners, and they've all pulled down something or other and then rebuilt, each according to his taste...it's a way of life...14

Although it is hard to determine from the documentation on the individual experience of powerlessness because there is no account of the social context of the users in the documentation, it is obvious that these users have always been able to do anything they wish to their houses. The first question on the sense of powerlessness, therefore, does not apply for the very reason that these inhabitants do have the power to control as far as the environmental matters
are concerned; from the documentation, it appears that the environmental changes generated by the users at Pessac are not a result of them being confronted with an alienating situation. They have the power and the ability to control or determine the matters which concern them to the ways of their houses. Although the hypothesis posed in the form of question (if the users were having little or no significant ability to control when they did things to their surroundings) does not directly apply to this case, the importance of that ability to control is very well manifested in the quote of the user and the activities themselves. As one woman proudly talks of her husband who "has made thirty-six different designs."\(^{15}\)

How about the question (2), the sense of meaninglessness? There is an interesting account of this factor and its consequence. Boudon notes that the Q. M. F. district has been called the "Moroccan" district.\(^{16}\) He finds "the heart of the matter" in the fact that "the occupants found the terraces (which was a design feature of the house by Le Corbusier) quite meaningless and, since it was imperative that they should have a meaning, they made this comparison with Arab architecture," thereby making Le Corbusier's 'international' style 'regionalized.'\(^{17}\)

This notion of meaninglessness applies better to the question (3); the concept of identity. Boudon states:
For them objects could not exist in their own right, they had to evoke other objects and so enter into a meaningful context. The important thing about this evocation of Arab architecture on the part of the occupants of the Q.M.F. was their apparent need to identify with a specific country or specific region a type of architecture which they insisted on regarding as alien because they found it strange. It would, of course, be quite a simple matter to find alternative meanings for Le Corbusier's architecture. The description of the Pessac houses... as 'Fruges cubes of sugar' (—Fruges owned a sugar factory—) was, in fact, an attempt to do precisely that... 18

This concept of identity, although it is not directly linked with the identity-self-estrangement hypothesis as I have put forth, perhaps has something to do with the activity of user-generated environmental change at Pessac. Even though they have identified these houses with a particular style of architecture and a region, the houses as physical objects and as their own shelters were still foreign and alien in their appearances and even the features. Could it be that there developed in their minds crises about their senses of own identity? A woman (who does not live in the Q. M. F.) declares, "To my mind, the sort of building that would suit this place would be a big house with a four-sided pitched roof." 19 A resident in the Q. M. F. who did not like the house, especially the appearance, at first but nonetheless liked the layout of the interiors and moved in, tells: ".....and as for the outside, well, you know, we had it repainted, had it done up, it really was very good...hm..."
you know, it was the prettiest house in the district in '42..." 20 Another resident actually did put a pitched roof over the terrace. 21 Could it have been that there was a threat to their identities when they were motivated to do the things they did to their houses -- they did it to the point where the house was the prettiest in the district? All through the process of making transformations to their satisfaction in their house, they gradually developed a strong identification with it -- they did it to the point where they "got used to it and then (they) liked it. (They) liked it very much." 22

The fourth question, the relationship of conformity and physical changes at the Q. M. F. has already been discussed. There is no hint in the documentation on the relationship of retreatism and rebellion to user-generated environmental change, which is the fifth question.

In summary, the case of the Q. M. F. indicates that there are elements associated with the concept of alienation and the concept of anomie involved in user-generated environmental change.
b) Western Native Township, Johannesburg.

Western Native Township was built when some two thousand houses were constructed to house fifteen thousand Africans between 1918 and 1931, five miles away from the city center of Johannesburg in South Africa. Almost all houses consisted of two rooms, verandah, approximately three hundred square feet of enclosed space; made of un-plastered bricks and corrugated iron roofs; had no bathroom, no separate kitchen, no ceilings, no internal doors, and no direct services, i.e., no individual water-supply nor electricity. No one could own a house in the Western Native Township, but the tenants were allowed to modify their houses.

Some forty years later Julian Beinart, conducted a study of what had transpired in this township. Changes the tenants made in their physical environment are as dramatic as those at Pessac, if not more so. Categorically, there have been three types of environmental changes. First in the category is very few in number but most, shall I say, expensive: the users added up to three rooms; installed electricity, ceilings, concrete floors, plastering, and tiling; and the money spent for these alterations amounted as much as up to five times the cost of the original house -- these were done at the cost of the tenants. Second category consists of adding rooms to the back of the house and
in some cases electricity — these were operated by the municipality but the rent was increased. The last category is the most common alteration: this consists of only changes to the front and street-facing facades of over eighty percent of the houses; the "front verandah was either partially or completely enclosed and the front wall plastered." 24 Most of these changes (in three categories) were accompanied with most extraordinary and incredible wall decorations of symbols, images, and colors, which "often completely transformed the appearance of the house and the street onto which they faced." 25

Motivations of the users for making these changes are examined by Beinart. It has been found that these environmental changes were engendered, firstly, as a result of the utilitarian and existential needs: "the acute need of extra space" triggered closing of the front porches, which further led to reconstruction of the whole front facade of the house. 26 At the same time, Beinart notes that the original condition of the house was so incomplete and lacking any quality that "it demanded some initiative action from the tenant." 27 Other reasons mentioned are: "to indicate certain kinds of status, to display religious denomination, to mark territory, even to show political affiliation," to bring luck, identity, individuation, etc. 28 Further, speculation on the cause of certain types of changes are made:
the answer seems to lie partly in the nature of the community, and partly in the way people copied from one another. My experience in Western Native Township suggests that the decorations spread in the community as a result of the emulation of certain pace-setters, both as a desire for conformity and as a result of competition.  

Beinart goes on to compare his study with a similar aspect in Herbert Gans' study of the "Levittowners," in which Gans suggests that "conforming and copying occur more frequently than competition, mostly to secure the proper appearance of the block to impress strangers." Beinart is in agreement that conformity was a stronger factor than competition, but argues that the Western Native Township residents were not engaged in a search for sameness. Gans also makes a point that the suburbanites prefer heterogeneity and "aesthetic diversity."  

We have previously discussed the phenomenon of conformity. Gans correctly notes the function of conformity as a social control mechanism, especially to secure, in this case, the proper "appearance on the block, mainly concerning lawn care."  

The residents of the Western Native Township are severely oppressed, powerless, non-white Africans. The racial segregation in South Africa is well-known. They are not even allowed to own their houses in the Western Native Township. Moreover, as Beinart states, "after twenty years of effort by the inhabitants to maintain Western Native
Township as a viable community, the City Council were again contemplating a political decision: one which would this time destroy the community and disperse it to various positions outside the now-grown city.\textsuperscript{35} These users are powerless; they can but sense no ability to control any result they desire. The frustration of the Africans in South Africa are illustrated in Beinart's concluding quote of Anthony Sampson:

\textit{.....but some say that 'nearly every African speaks of the intolerable frustrations in the townships, the consciousness that there must be, before long, a massive explosion. They can sense it in the packed buses and the trains, the barometers of African opinion.....'}\textsuperscript{36}

They are the people who cannot, are not allowed to, own even their own places of residence. They can only modify the houses they live in, not to 'own' territory\textsuperscript{37}, but to "mark" territory. Is this not a case where environmental change was caused by the users' sense of powerlessness?

Is there not also a relation here to the sense of meaninglessness when the users have no ability to control, thus predict, that they can stay another day in the houses that they do not own?

\begin{quote}
Identity through environmental action, poverty, and general struggle has been developed. When the Municipality refused to compensate for the improvements the tenants made:
\end{quote}
One of the officials showed some understanding of the problem when writing in a memo: '...It must be remembered that the sentimental value of their houses is really more important than the intrinsic value...' A resident of twenty years in WNT understood it much better: '...originally we were handed these houses in their base and barren constructions and structures, in consequence of which all of us started from scratch, plastering, pounding the floors and pulverizing the walls, as well as applying some paintings...this incredible decision of 'penalising' the Natives against compensations is that WE HAVE MADE USE OF THE GROUND AND DERIVED COMFORT OF THESE IMPROVEMENTS. 38

While the general concept of identity -- the attachment of the residents to the physical environment they have created through transformations, and through struggles with the authority-- applies here, it is also possible to speculate on whether or not the users were self-estranged, or more specifically, whether or not they were confronted with 'identity crisis,' which engendered them consequently to act upon their environment. One could establish a relationship here similar to the one in the case of the Quartiers Modernes Fruges: The Africans, the tenants of the Western Native Township were confronted with contradiction or the difference between their tribal environments from which they came and the alien, oppressive, urban environment of the city into which they came. The identity they had developed in their tribal environments were thus at a loss in this totally new situation. This led them to do things, certain things to their new environment. Some, for instance, have
"suggested that 'these (--decorations on their houses--) are our traditional drawings and white people do not know anything about them' or 'I wanted to show typical Tswana design.' One Tswana woman even claims to have been sent back to the reserves specifically to learn the designs..."^39
There are others who seemed to want to adjust their identity to the urban life: "One resident...says that she specifically 'wanted something that would look modern instead of the decorations we do on the farms.'"^40

There is more to this: where Beinart notes, "...the houses of WNT are imagined versions of houses in white suburbia --decorated WNT houses were called 'Parktown,' after the wealthiest suburb in Johannesburg-- decorated with all the intensity necessary to make a shelter live up to a dream."^41 The (forced) users of the Western Native Township clearly had ideal self-images modelled after something which they were not.

......It is one thing to wait until you can achieve your goals, it is another to know you can never achieve them. Then you have to compress your frustrated ambitions into what you have now and you make your possessions look like those you will never possess.^42
Thus, certain environmental changes were generated when the users of the environment either consciously or subconsciously perceived 'crisis' or estrangement of their identity which had been developed through their interaction with
their tribal environments from the new, alien environment with which they were confronted. The users also decorated their houses to have them reflect their ideal self-images against their actual ones. These users, at least some of the residents of the Western Native Township, were engendered to make changes in their places of habitat as a result of self-estrangement of their senses of identity.

It is difficult to examine the fourth or fifth questions in this case of user-generated environmental change (although I have touched upon the fourth question in discussing conformity), since it involves a number of multicultural, tribal elements which are unknown. It would require an extensive, thorough understanding of all those intricacies inherent in any culture.

At any rate, this particular case does suggest that the users' condition of alienation—powerlessness, meaninglessness vis-a-vis racism and oppression—especially from the world outside their Township in the city has played a significant role as generating force of environmental action. When people are alienated, when they are frustrated, when their activities seem meaningless, and when they become aware of their condition, the condition of alienation in an oppressive system, they act rather than stay passive and alienated. The physical environment which surrounds them
day to day becomes subject of their frustrated (and alienated?) "energy release." But when their action becomes threatening to the oppressive system, confrontation results. The example we discuss next illustrates just such a case.

c) People's Park, Berkeley.

There are few documentations or studies of this particular case of user-generated environmental change which became a social, political, and environmental issue across the country, and inspired a slogan, "Let a thousand parks bloom." A brief chronology of the People's Park is in order:

The story begins with a small piece of land a few blocks from the Berkeley campus. Several modest residencies had been built there. In 1967 the University of California administration perceived that the character of the surrounding neighborhood was deteriorating, and, despite protests from the community, purchased the land for one and three-tenths million dollars and tore down the houses. The University had no immediate plans to build in the area, and the vacant land became an untended parking lot, full of pot holes, old beer cans, and weeds.

By spring of 1969, the street culture in Berkeley was becoming increasingly vocal and militant. Its ranks had been swelled by young people who had come into the San Francisco Bay Area for the "Summer of Love" and remained. The street people were developing a spectrum of neighborhood institutions which emphasized participation, sharing, impulse expression, and the expansion of consciousness.
Out of this came Switchboard, a community telephone information service, and the Free Store, where used clothing was collected and given away, free clinics, communes, underground papers, and other things that seemed new at the time. Almost everything had its counterpart in other places or at other times, but in 1969 they seemed to fit together into a particular life style.

As summer approached, the Berkeley street people became concerned with the deteriorating physical environment around Telegraph Avenue. The same creative impulses that had gone into the free clinic and the free church began to focus on the vacant litter-strewn lots in the area. People asked why these vacant lots could not become parks—not the typical manicured lawns and neat rows of trees that are maintained by the city, but different kinds of parks created and maintained by the neighborhood itself. Leaflets and notices in underground papers announced that park development activities would begin on April 20.

Many people from the surrounding area, including mothers with children and retired people who wanted to plant something with their own hands, joined in the activity. It has been estimated that almost one thousand people a day were involved in this project. Design students as well as professional landscape designers and architects in the area contributed labor, expertise, and equipment for bringing in soil and planting shrubs and trees. Governor Ronald Reagan viewed this activity as a threat to law and order and so did several members of the University Board of Regents. Although the students voted overwhelmingly to keep the land as a park, their votes could not eradicate the powerful pressures upon the Chancellor of the University of California to reclaim the land. At 3 a.m. on May 14, 1969, University employees and Berkeley police
posted 'No Trespassing' signs around the park. Early the following morning, police moved in with rifles and tear gas, and an 8 foot high wire mesh fence was constructed around the site. Several days of disturbances ensued involving students, street people, police and National Guardsmen.

The life of the People's Park in Berkeley is very short. The generating force of this kind of activity had been evolving during the 1960's, especially in the late 1960's when this environmental action actually took place. It was in time of many social and political upheavals: assassinations of a President of the United States, two black leaders, a U. S. Senator who was a Presidential candidate; formations of socio-political groups, the S. D. S., the Black Panther Party, the Y. A. F., and many other groups, both right-wing and left-wing; ghetto riots in the cities; the Viet Nam war; campus riots; the riot at the Chicago Democratic Convention in 1968; many arrests and many trials; the rise of the counter-culture; the Peace Movement; and so on and so forth.

Berkeley has been a site of many such upheavals as a progressive college town. The Free Speech Movement was triggered there in 1964. The Counter-culture Movement always looked at what was happening in this San Francisco Bay Area. In fact, when this People's Park incident came on the news, the reaction was: "Berkeley is at it again."
The rise of the New Left intellectuals and the student culture as well as anarchist groups, etc. were the most vocal social critics, and much social and political consciousness was generated, especially among the young generation. There were reports that the once popular engineering schools were losing their students to the now popular social science and humanities schools. Rebellion, in the exact term Merton uses, was common place as the rise of the counter-culture communes indicate. The frustrations of the young, the generation gap, the Uncommitted\textsuperscript{45}, the frustration of the middle class life, all these were explained in many ways. Among them were the concept of alienation and that of anomie, the subject matters of this thesis. The theme of "Power to the People" signifies the understanding and awareness of the sense of powerlessness in general.

Subsequently, the need for participation, involvement, community control, came to be much emphasized. Along with this came the Ecology Movement, the Population Explosion, and a concern for the quality of the environment. All these put together form the general context in which the People's Park was developed—as a conception, as an action, as a confrontation, as a tactic for social change, and in the end, as a learning process.

This particular case of user-generated environmental change is comparable to that of the M. I. T. students which
we discussed earlier. Perhaps, if one conducts an inventory interviewing those who were involved in this activity he would find many factors and motivations of the users. Some probably joined the activity because it was a 'cool thing to do,' because it was 'in' to get involved or to rebel against the authority. But the most dominant and over-riding force in the making of the People's Park was a concern for change --change of the way of life, how we relate to one another, how the political process works, how the people should control their own lives and their own environment.....

A muddy, rutted piece of land stood vacant in the center of our community for over a year, we listened while University committees, community groups, and others proposed the building of a park. We heard the University protest that it had no funds, that studies would have to be made, committees formed. Finally, we took the land. We tended it, loved it, planted trees, grass, and flowers on it, made it into People's Park.

We used the land. We hadn't tested and analyzed the soil. We planted things and they grew. We hadn't run a feasibility study. We had enough labor, freely given, to build the Park. We had no budgets. We found the money and materials we needed in our community. We had no organization, no leader, no committee. The Park was built by anyone and everyone and we, all of us together, worked it out.

We were told we hadn't filled out the right forms, hadn't followed the correct procedures, hadn't been responsible, hadn't been patient. We had asked the wrong questions, and built a beautiful park.

It was an incredibly good feeling, building that Park. In this country of cement and steel cities, better suited for its machines than for its people, we made a place for people. At a time when only experts and committees, qualified and certified, are permitted to do things, we did something ourselves, and did it well. For all of us, hip and
straight, the Park was something tangible that we had done, something that drew our community together. The Park was common ground. People's Park existed for a little more than a month. On 'Bloody Thursday,' the day fence went up around People's Park, we took to the streets. The fence stayed up, although the Chancellor supported a park, the University professors supported the Park, the student body voted for the Park, the City Council asked for the Park, and 30,000 people marched through the streets.

People's Park now stands empty and guarded. The Park died, the idea that created it lives. Let a thousand parks bloom! 46

People's Park manifested the antithesis of the "old culture" of the authority that "tends to give preference to property rights over personal rights, technological requirements over human needs, competition over cooperation, violence over sexuality, concentration over distribution, the producer over consumer, means over ends, secrecy over openness, social forms over personal expression, striving over gratification, Oedipal love over communal love, and so on." 47 It also reversed and demystified the 'theory' of planning in favor of, and by the practice of, spontaneity. There was little planning, little organizing, but there were people who somehow shared the same feeling, the feeling of alienation.

This user-generated environmental change posed a great threat to the authority, for it proved right the antithesis of the Establishment and what is more, it represented, physically, socially, psychologically, and politically, a case
of user-generated 'social change' -- change to eliminate alienation.

3. **Summary and Conclusion**

We have in this chapter examined cases of user-generated environmental changes to see if there are grounds upon which the theoretical proposition put forth holds. In the case of extraordinary transformations carried out by the residents of the Quartiers Modernes Fruges in Pessac, we have found that there were phenomena of conformity, identity-self-estrangement, and the general feeling of the users that people should change their own houses, coupled with the regional tradition seemed to have contributed to engendering environmental changes, among other factors of influence.

At the Western Native Township in Johannesburg, the tenants did things, most dramatic things to their environment. Again, the concept of identity-self-estrangement, the sense of meaninglessness, and most convincingly the sense and the reality of the users' powerlessness manifest their roles in the users' motivations and the cause of environmental change.

The case of People's Park at Berkeley in 1969 tells us how the authority, the powerful and oppressive system per-
ceives and reacts to what it considers a threat when the people take on action rather than remain passive and submissive to it and alienated from the environment that surrounds them.

All the cases studied, to restate, do suggest that some user-generated environmental changes are associated with the concepts of alienation and anomie—the sense of powerlessness (in the case of Q. M. F., the sense of, and existence of, control) and that of self-estrangement/identity are consistently evident throughout all these cases. The users who feel (and in most cases are) powerless in the matters that are of concern to them and yet not in their control do things to the physical environment. They see such environments as meaningless for the reason that they do not respond to their needs. In some cases they regard such environments as symbolic of the alienating structure and condition: Sometimes the users do beautiful things to their physical environment in order to have it reflect their individual or collective self-images of themselves. But in other occasions, they may destroy such environments as we see in the ghetto riots when "a throng of furious blacks in Watts (or Harlem, or Detroit, or Baltimore, or Washington, D. C., or...) riot, loot and burn, destroying square blocks of ghetto 'property.' They realize their lack of control over their communities and lives." 48
While there are many more reasons and factors involved, some of which are mentioned earlier, it is important to recognize alienation as one motivating and causal factor in some user-generated environmental changes. These changes are characterized by their scale, they are of small, human scale and are easily handled by the users; they are less 'professional' or less 'esoteric' in appearance; and spontaneous, incremental, and perhaps accidental when they occur. The next step or direction from this theoretical proposition, as put forth in this thesis, might be to more systematically analyze: who the users are; what type(s) of changes they make, how they do; when they do; and how much or to what extent they do, the why-they-do being based on the hypothesis of this thesis. Co-relating all of these to alienation factors (if alienation is "measurable") could provide us with an important empirical information; user-generated changes in the physical environments as indicators of the condition of life and community.

Meanwhile, it is equally important to see what this proposition implies to the practice of environmental design.
CHAPTER FOUR

IMPLICATIONS

What do the relationships of the concept of alienation to user-generated environmental change imply for the practice of environmental change? This is the question asked in this chapter.

1. Dealing with the Causes or the Consequences?

Le Corbusier, when he was developing the concepts for design of the Quartiers Modernes Fruges at Pessac, had an idea on the standardization of building components: "Standard components are letters; with those letters, and in a particular way, you have to spell out the names of your future house owners."¹ He also said, after a visit to see what had transpired at Pessac: "You know, it is always life that is right and the architect who is wrong....."² Recognizing that the users have to, and often do, alter the physical environment in which they inhabit, the current emphasis in environmental design and the practice of pro-

* The footnotes and references for this chapter are found in page 99.
viding frameworks which can be subjected to the energy release of the users do seem justifiable. In fact, Boudon asserts the Le Corbusier's Pessac project as being quite successful in that "it facilitated and, to a certain extent, even encouraged" the user participation in the shaping of their places of habitat. In conclusion to "The Process of Urban Participation," Beinart notes:

.....the Western Native Township brand of participation was and is not a singular activity. The form it took was indeed unusual and approached that of a communal art, but each culture will find its own method, each with greater or lesser artistry. What is important is not this artistic content -- worthy though the celebration of this undoubtedly is-- but the existence of participation and its recognition by physical designers, (be its symptoms the scribbles on ghetto walls or the painted letter-boxes of suburbia). The participant has to modify, often destroy, what the professional has made; to make his environment viable, he has to subvert master plans, discompose formalism and complicate dull and puerile orders. The designer has a limited relationship with the object he makes; the user has to live with it and make it fit, cope with it as it decays, and change it as he himself changes.4

But he also warns that the environmental designer "must be careful lest we fail to understand the true relevance of the results of the kind of participation..... We should not, placing the high value on choice which we do, expect physical environments which deny such choice, nor should we be proud when societies which we have allowed to remain enclosed, immobile and frustrated, attract us with the physical artifacts that they have produced as a result of
these very conditions."5

It has been questioned earlier whether or not it elimi-
nates or reduces user's alienation if he acts upon the phy-
sical environment (p.38). It certainly must release the
user's frustrated energy. But, since the root of alienation
is in the social sphere, since the cause of user-generated
environmental change lies partially in the user's alienation
from the social process, frustration is bound to occur from
time to time. In this sense, to provide the user with an
environmental framework to which and within which he can
release his frustrated energy may be regarded as an energy
diversion. (Such energy itself becomes alienated for the
reason that the user is throwing it away into something
which is not of an intrinsic concern to him, especially if
the physical environment, the physical condition into which
the energy is released responds by being 'submissive' and
'manipulable' to the user.) It can become a sort of a
vicious cycle, and such a solution --providing a physical
framework or "support"-- is cooptive of the user's energy.
It diverts his concern.

Of course, one can argue that the environmental de-
signer's job has to do with creating the physical environ-
ment and that it is naive to expect that environmental
design can solve social problems. This argument is equally
cooptive; if it does not deny one's responsibility to his
social role, it denies one's individual right to be himself—we must recognize here the effects of anomie and
self-alienation (i.e., conflicting role expectation, etc.).

If alienation plays a part in engendering user-participation in environmental change, and if we agree that
alienation is the problem, then we must seek to solve that problem. Some of user-generated environmental changes
occur as a consequence of the user being confronted with these conditions. The problem is not the consequence but
the cause of the condition. Alienation is a social rather than a psychological problem at its root. (See Appendix
for a further discussion.)

2. The Dilemma

But how can one deal with the cause of alienation, or anomie? Marx asserts it is a function of (or phenomenon
associated with) capitalism, private ownership. Durkheim contends that anomie will be resolved with further perfec-
tion of the social division of labor with an agency of moral authority. The latter almost sounds like an argument
of the status quo, which does not recognize the fact that capital 'capitalizes' on the anomic (and forced) division of
labor and profits from it; i.e., division of labor functions for centralized control. 6
Edwin M. Schur, a criminologist, asserts that it is society that is sick, and "radical non-intervention" to its criminal problems may be one way to cure the sickness. This is similar to the argument of many radicals. Igor S. Kon, for instance, contends that the task of the Marxist sociologist is to reject "utopianism and romanticism... for concrete social criticism, in which revolutionary negation enters as an element of a constructive program of activity."

An environmental designer would probably ask how this principle of dialectics is possible in environmental design. Giancarlo de Carlo would say it is possible in the dialogues with the users. But in most cases the users are rarely identified beforehand, for example in the case of public housing (except by some abstract, sociological, and categorical data of the prospective users, an awareness of this fact might have led the designers, in some cases, to 'provide' user-manipulable 'frameworks' so as to thereby acknowledge individual differences of each user in such an information). What is needed, then, is some mechanism whereby the users can be identified at the beginning of the planning and design process.

Another revolutionary practice might be to design as oppressive an environment as possible so as to make the condition worse, with hope that the users would rebel and start
generating not only environmental change per se but social change.

But, taking into account of all the other factors conducive to the causation of environmental change by the users, the designer perhaps ought to provide frameworks in which the users can 'do his own thing.' Yet, this does not solve the problem of alienation. It is even doubtful if the users want to do anything at all to their physical surroundings, as Hamberg reminds us: "Contemporary planners and architects ask how people can gain more control over their environment and have searched for designs which permit or encourage the individual to interact with his environment, supplying, for example, sliding walls. But these contributions on the part of architects answer the issue only partially. And inherent contradictions impede a full-scale response. People who wish to control their environments very likely lack that sense of control in other areas of their everyday lives. And just because they are seldom autonomous, they experience difficulty in relating independently to their environment. In other words, the problem adheres to others, and solutions will not be fully effective unless similar efforts are made in other areas of social and environmental life. As a young British architect has observed:

'It is pointless for us to design buildings with
partitions that can be moved, to permit freedom of expression, when our whole educational development is one that teaches us that we cannot control our environment. Most people would never dream of affecting the built environment, or of planting trees themselves in the barren piece of 'keep off' grass outside their house. Not till kids in school can tear their buildings to bits every term and re-erect it to their own design, can we see people really expressing themselves in their building.' (Tom Wooley, "Architects, Buildings, and People," ANARCHY, No. 97, 1969, p.69.)

One is still tempted to hope that perhaps through environmental design, letting the users have a sense of control might lead to a growing awareness of their needs for more control and action. The residents of the Q. M. F. were, because they had the power of control, aware of this need, although only in the matters that concern their houses and immediate environment. (It is unknown whether or not they were aware of the need for control in other matters such as work.) The participants in the case of People's Park not only manifested their needs for control and 'power to the people' through environmental action but also learned, it is fair to say, the heart of the issue: social change and the need for better strategies for change.

This thesis has presented, I should like to believe, a view that it is necessary to be cautious in what we do in practicing environmental design. It suggests the underlying problems associated in the assumptions of the current and prescribed emphasis in environmental design. And it suggests
to us the need for more critical examinations of the prescrip-
tions and the pragmatic manifestation in environmental
design. Environmental design 'problems' can only be relevant if they see, include, and address themselves to social issues. The practice must not diverge from the concern for the fundamental issue of social change, of de-reification.*

* For the definition of the term reification, see Footnote 42 of Chapter Two; also see pp.36-38.
Aside from the two schools of thoughts that are mentioned in Chapter Two -- the Marxian concept of alienation and the Durkheimian concept of anomie (or social alienation) -- there are others who claim that alienation is an individual psychological aberration rooted in one's mental order and that it can be cured through psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, etc. There are also those who propose that alienation is part of the 'human condition,' the universal phenomenon, among whom Dostoevsky, and more notably such existentialist thinkers as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Camus, and Sartre. Indeed, alienation seems to be universal phenomenon today when some social scientists list diverse social groups as being alienated: e.g., the multitudes of both blue collar and white collar workers who find their jobs monotonous and degrading, the juveniles, bureaucrats, women, the blacks and other minority groups, youth, old, the prejudiced, etc.

The psychoanalysts (or psychiatrists) claim that man's 'drives' are subverted by his society and this subversion places him in an antagonistic position to his society.*

* The footnotes and references for Appendix are found in page 100.
In this antagonism he comes to distrust others and his society and becomes alienated and incomplete. The psychoanalytic notion of alienation has to do with repression of man's 'drives.' When the person does not repress his drives, when he freely expresses himself and his desires, he is no longer alienated nor incomplete. A problem in this proposition is that if it is society that subverts the individual, obviously there is a problem on the part of the society. For if the individual goes through an analysis or a therapy and adjusts himself so that he can freely express himself, there occurs eventually more conflicts between him and the society which tends to force him to repress them. It is either society (i.e., all individual members of society) that needs to go through this transformation or the individual needs to be adjusted so as to 'fit' into his society—he has to learn how to repress his inner feelings 'successfully.' In the latter case, however, "if psychiatry merely helps the patient adjust to a sick society so that he can function in it, it only moves him from one kind of sickness to another."\(^2\) This obviously does not solve the problem. We must examine the social context within which these psychological disorders are engendered, as I have briefly suggested in Chapter Two.

The basic text for a comprehensive view of the social
The basis of alienation is the early manuscripts of Marx: "The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844." It is important to understand those who influenced Marx before we proceed to discuss his concept of alienation.

The dialectical mode of thinking, developed by Hegel, is one of the important foundations in Marx's philosophy. It is a way of advancing thought through the development of contradictions and their resolutions. Thinking, according to Hegel, is the "negation of that which is immediately before us." This is the basic system of Hegel's philosophy of history: Change evolves through series of contradictions and develops through the stages of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; ideas are derived from previous ones by examining their limitations and contradictions, negating until a more embracing one is reached.

Hegel also wrote on the phenomenon of alienation and "(employed) the term to denote the alienation of consciousness from the individual, the subject viewing himself as the object, so that the entire objective world is nothing but the 'alienated spirit,'" and saw man's history as that of alienation. But his writing was so abstract that it intrigued many 'Hegelians' of the nineteenth century, among them Feuerbach. Feuerbach saw Hegel's system (of history) as a generalized form of theology and asserted that the "search for truth, in particular for truth in
religion, must lead beyond Hegel's abstract 'Absolute' to man in his relation to nature."7 ("Absolute" here essentially connotes the realm of pure thought as derived through dialectics.) Feuerbach further argued that religion as well as theology was a product of man, reflecting man's state. This is true on the basis that man is the starting point of history. It is man who created God, and it is man who makes Him the creator and the ruler of the world. Thus, Feuerbach observed that the more man puts into God, the less he retains. This externalization of man's subjective consciousness, i.e., of his "essential properties, of his properties not as an individual but as a species,"8 creates God. Therefore, "religion is a form of alienation of man from himself, a self-alienation, which destroys his appropriate fulfillment as a 'species being' and lets it exist only as an illusion, in an imaginary world of God and heaven,"9 which is alien to him. What was unacceptable to Marx was Feuerbach's idealism.10 Feuerbach "as a philosophic idealist...believed that alienation would be overcome through the thought process, through the influence of ideas or ethical striving."11 This thought is quite similar to that of psychoanalysts in that both believe alienation can be cured. To Feuerbach, Marx's criticism was that "the object, reality, what we apprehend through our senses, is understood only in the form of object or contemplation; but
not as sensuous human activity, as practice; not subjectively.... Feuerbach wants sensuous objects really distinguished from the objects of thought; but he does not understand human activity itself as objective activity." Marx saw the cause of alienation in social relationships, i.e., the condition that is more concretely material such as law, politics and economy.

The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather, it is a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production.

Marx thus emphasizes material conditions of life process and labor as the basic causal forces of alienation and the history of man. He regarded ideology as a rationalization of economic position (i.e., political economy) of the ruling class, and interpreted history primarily in terms of a series of class struggles.

Capitalism, private ownership, according to Marxian thought, brings about the condition of alienation, first, because work under such a condition serves merely the profit of the owner and not the interest of the worker: "It is
true that labor produces for the rich wonderful things —
but for the worker it produces privation. It produces
palaces — but for the worker, hovels. It produces beauty
— but for the worker, deformity. It replaces labor by
machines, but it throws a section of the workers back to a
barbarous type of labor, and it turns the other workers
into machines. It produces intelligence — but for the
worker stupidity, cretinism."15 Second, under this condi-
tion, the worker becomes victim to forces which he can
neither control nor understand. Under this condition, work
ceases to be the expression of the 'creative, human powers
of the worker.' The products created by his work acquire
an independent power and rule over the worker, just as in
the Feuerbachian analysis of religion.

The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth
he produces, the more his production increases in
power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper
commodity the more commodity he creates. With the
increasing value of the world of things proceeds
in direct proportion the devaluation of the world
of men. Labor produces not only commodities: it
produces itself and the worker as a commodity —
and this in the same general proportion in which
it produces commodities.

This fact expresses merely that the object which
labor produces — labor's product — confronts it
as something alien, as a power independent of the
producer. The product of labor is labor which has
been embodied in an object, which has become
material: it is the objectification of labor.
Labor's realization is its objectification.* In
the sphere of political economy this realization

* For the definition of the term objectification see Foot-
note 42 of Chapter Two; also see pp. 36-38.
of labor appears as loss of realization for the workers; objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation.\textsuperscript{16}

Thus, the worker feels powerless; his work is out of his own control, is meaningless; and he is estranged from his work, his essence, and therefore from his psyche and his selfhood.\textsuperscript{17} He does not experience himself as an active agent, as the bearer of human powers. He is alienated from these powers, his aim it to sell himself successfully on the market. His sense of self does not stem from his activity as a loving and thinking individual, but from his socio-economic role... he experiences himself not as a man, with love, fear, convictions, doubts, but as that abstraction, alienated from his real nature, which fulfills a certain function in the social system. His sense of value depends on his success: on whether he can make more of himself than he started out with, whether he is a success. His body, his mind, and his soul are his capital, and his task in life is to invest it favorably, and to make a profit of himself. Human qualities like friendliness, courtesy, kindness, are transformed into commodities, into assets of the 'personality package' conducive to a higher price on the personality market.\textsuperscript{18}

Thus, as it has been stated earlier (p.34), self-estranged person sees himself as a means, as a 'tool': "Since self-estranged activity is a means to an end rather than an end in itself, the satisfaction is in the future rather than the present; and the tone of feeling approaches detachment rather than involvement."\textsuperscript{19}

It is understandable why the do-it-yourself fad or the self-help trend in hobbies, in gardening, in 'cooking from
the scratch,' in carpentry, and in fact, in building industry (which is the phenomenon that motivated me to undertake this study) have developed when the work at factory or office is out of control of the individual.  

But again, as I have argued earlier, it is not a solution to the problem; it is only a superficial and partial answer.

If the root of the problem (of alienation) lies in private ownership of the means of production, as Marx contends, then it follows that freedom from alienation requires a fundamental transformation in this sphere.

The more common and accepted view of the cause of alienation sees industrialism and division of labor (about which Marx, too, was concerned) as the problem. The one who closely studied these phenomena is Durkheim, who has developed the term anomie.

Emile Durkheim, a student of social organization (and a founder of empirical sociology), was interested throughout his life-time in the forces that hold a society together or tend to disorganize it. In "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life," he studies the contribution of religion to social cohesion; his "Division of Labor in Society"
analyzed two basic types of social solidarity—mechanical and organic—and introduced the concept of anomie, which he later perfected (empirically) in the study of "Suicide." 24

One of the important works related to that of Durkheim is Ferdinand Tonnies' "Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft," 25 which dealt with the differences between the traditional and modern societies. In a Gemeinschaft (i.e., traditional or communal society) people feel they belong to each other because they are of the same kind; they are kin and cannot freely renounce their membership, which involves emotional meaning for the group as well as for the individual. In a Gesellschaft (i.e., modern associational society) the major social bonds are voluntary and based on the rational pursuit of self-interest; it weakens traditional bonds of emotional involvement among the members and encourages rationality and division of labor.

Durkheim did not agree with Tonnies' theory of Gesellschaft and argued that "the life of a large social aggregations is just as natural as that of small groupings. It is no less organic and no less internal. Outside of these purely individual actions there is a collective activity in our contemporary societies which is just as natural as that of the smaller societies of previous ages. It is certainly different; it constitutes a distinct type, but however different they may be, there is no difference in nature between these two varieties of the same genus...." 26
To prove his point, Durkheim defines two types of social solidarity: mechanical and organic. Mechanical solidarity refers to a social cohesion based upon a homogeneity of values and behavior, strong social constraint, and loyalty to tradition and kinship; it applies to small societies (as in Gemeinschaft) characterized by a simple division of labor, very little specialization of function, and very little individuation. Organic solidarity refers to a type of social solidarity based on the interdependence of a very large number of highly specialized roles, involving a complex division of labor that requires the cooperation of almost all the groups and individuals of the society.

The important point in Durkheim's theory is that while there is little individuation in the traditional social order, individualism that developed in the modern order is a moral phenomenon. That is, while mechanical solidarity in the traditional society is based upon the strong moral consensus of the "conscience collective," individualism, which is a product of the development of society, connotes a morality of cooperation. The values and beliefs composing moral individualism emphasize that each man should develop his talents and capacities to their fullest extent: "In the same way as the ideal of the less developed societies
was to create or maintain as intense a shared life as possible, in which the individual was absorbed, our ideal is constantly to introduce greater equality in our social relations, in order to ensure the free unfolding of the socially useful forces."\textsuperscript{27}

Moral individualism comprises beliefs and values, but these are far more diffuse in form than those embodied in the moral consensus characteristics of the traditional social order. The developmental process from traditional to modern industrial society involved institutional changes, which have fundamentally transformed the basis of social unity and which have involved the progressive displacement of mechanical solidarity by organic solidarity. Durkheim contends that organic solidarity is the essential basis of the modern order, and goes on to argue that organic solidarity is still in transformation, i.e., it is not yet actualized. When this moral rules of modern society is inadequate, anomie results. It is the contention of many Durkheimian social scientists that such is still the case today -- the condition of anomie.

Durkheim has recognized that with the progressive division of labor and modernization, more wealth is accumulated. But in such a condition there is a great need for an effective moral structure because "morality has the function of limiting and containing that too much wealth so
easily becomes a source of immorality. Through the power of wealth confers on us, it actually diminishes the power of things to oppose us. Consequently, it lends strength to our desires and makes it harder to hold them in check. Under such conditions, moral equilibrium is unstable: it requires but a slight blow to disrupt it."²⁸ According to Durkheim, if society creates and extends "human faculties," it must at the same time make them concrete and realizable, which requires that they be ordered by moral regulations. This is the fundamental idea put forth by Durkheim on the concept of anomie. It is recognized that the biological needs of man are limited, and therefore physical pleasure cannot increase indefinitely. But in the case of the needs and desires of a spiritual kind, which are derived from the benefits conferred by society, it becomes a different story. It is possible, for instance, that the more wealth and riches one accumulates, the more dissatisfied he becomes, for the horizon of his ambitions expands.

This is why those at the very top of the hierarchy, who consequently would have nothing above them to stimulate their ambition, could nevertheless not be held at the point they had reached, but would continue to be plagued by the same restlessness that torments them today. What is needed if social order is to reign is that mass of men be content with their lot. But what is needed for them to be content, is not that they have more or less but that they be convinced they have no right to more. And for this, it is absolutely essential that there be an authority whose superiority they acknowledge.
and which tells them what is right.... And since in our hypothesis these needs are limitless, their demands are necessarily without limit. For it to be otherwise, a moral power is required whose superiority he recognizes, and which cries out 'you must go no further.'

Contrary to the common notion that the division of labor in itself engenders anomie, Durkheim made it clear that it is an "anomic" division of labor and a "forced" division of labor that are conducive to the phenomenon.

The anomic division of labor occurs when extreme specialization is accompanied by a decline in communication between persons performing different functions. Instead of being drawn together by mutual dependence, i.e., organic solidarity, individuals are separated and isolated from each other by lack of understanding and narrowness of perspective. This meagerness of communication results in a lack of clearly defined rules regulating the interrelationships of persons isolated in their specializations.

.....contrary to what is often said, the division of labor does not produce these (degrading) consequences because of a necessity of its own nature, but only in exceptional and abnormal circumstances. ..... The division of labor presumes that the worker, far from being hemmed in by his task, does not lose sight of his collaborators, that he acts upon them and reacts to them. Then he is not a machine which repeats its actions without knowing their meaning, but he knows that they tend, in some way, towards an end that he can see fairly distinctly. He feels that he is of some use. For that, he need not embrace vast portions of the social horizon; it is sufficient that he perceive enough of it to understand that his actions have an aim beyond themselves. From that time on, as specialized and uniform as his activity may be, it is that
of an intelligent being, for it has direction, and he knows it. 30

The forced division of labor, on the other hand, occurs when individuals are compelled to take on occupational roles which they do not like and to which they are not suited. Durkheim regarded caste and social class system as the principal cause of forced division of labor. Custom or law prevents persons from the lower classes from performing certain functions even if they have the ability. According to Durkheim, this is the primary source of class conflict.

Where Marx has perceived that class struggle occurs as a result of economic inequality between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and the history of man as a series of these class struggles (and alienation of labor), Durkheim saw it (class struggle) as a result of the lack of moral regulation (in the case of the anomic division of labor) and of the existence of the hereditary transmission of property (with regard to the forced division of labor). 31

Durkheim argued that "anomie is not the experience of an alien institutional order. It is a problem of the meaningfulness of the actor's goals and situational chances which under conditions of institutionalized scarcity leads to non-normative but subjectively meaningful responses of revolt, ritualization, and alienation." 32 He believed that there must be a strong moral structure incorporated in the
industrial order of society and that rewards be distributed according to the natural inequalities of individuals. The natural inequalities are "internal" inequalities of capacity and aptitude, which are, according to Durkheim, ineradicable. "External" inequalities such as property inheritance, etc. can and will become dissolved with the further development of the division of labor: labor must be divided "in such a way that social inequalities exactly express natural inequalities....."33

Having more closely reviewed both Marxian analogy of alienation and the Durkheimian concept of anomie, it becomes both easier and more difficult to cope or to better understand the nature of the problem. The Marxian analogy tells us that the problem lies in the private ownership, in capitalism. The Durkheimian theory of anomie tells us that the problem is rooted in the breakdown of the moral structure of modern social and industrial order. While the former proposes the socialized ownership of the means of production and of property as a precondition, a prerequisite, toward emancipation of man; the latter suggests an agency of moral authority as a solution to the problem of anomie. The shortcoming with the latter is that (if not too positivistic) it can be manipulated by various ideologies; it can, for instance, be accommodating of the theory of the status quo.34
FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES
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CHAPTER ONE

1. See, for example: Neil Pinney, TOWARD PARTICIPATORY DWELLING DESIGN, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Community Projects Laboratory, 1972. In its forward: "The study on which this volume reports was undertaken as an attempt to work towards a possible new base and method for design and to explore a direction whereby shelter could be made more responsive to the constantly changing immediacy of user's needs. With modifications, the method could be applied not only to housing but to architecture in general." See also: N. J. Habraken, SUPPORTS, New York, N. Y.: Praeger Paperbacks, 1972.


3. As the profession of environmental design serves not (only) the individual clients but mostly the corporate and public clients, it will continue to exist unless a radical transformation in the socio-economic and political structure occurs.

4. There seems to be no clear definition of "design theory" as such. I am referring here to those attempts such as C. Alexander's pattern language, etc., which are more or less design "methods" rather than "theories." If one looks at the catalogues of architectural schools today, he is bound to find courses titled "design theories." These so-called "theories" usually have to do with physical or spatial (i.e., architectural) factors and do not take into account other factors such as social, economic, or political. See, for example, arguments presented to the designers by: H. J. Gans, PEOPLE AND PLANS, New York, N. Y.: Basic, 1968; Maurice Broady, PLANNING FOR PEOPLE, London: Bedford, 1968.


6. Economic reason is far more complex than the simple way I describe in this thesis. It is very much related to alienation, but in this thesis little attempt is made to discuss this matter or relationship.


CHAPTER TWO


2. Seeman categorizes anomie into "normlessness" and "isolation." In this thesis I treat the two under "anomie/social alienation."


4. Seeman, OP. CIT., p.784.

5. Blauner, OP. CIT., p.22.

7. Seeman, OP. CIT., p.786.

8. IBID., p.786.


10. Seeman, OP. CIT., p.787.

11. IBID., p.788.


15. Merton, OP. CIT., pp.365-367.


17. IBID., p.368.

18. IBID., p.375.


21. IBID., p.386.

22, 23. IBID., p.389.

24. IBID., p.393.


29. Seeman, OP. CIT., p.790.

30. This term is coined by George Herbert Mead.

31. C. Wright Mills, after Charles Horton Cooley, describes the development of self-image; cf. Cooley, OP. CIT., and Mills, OP. CIT.


34. IBID., p.96.

35. IBID., p.97.


42. Objectivation is the process whereby human subjectivity embodies itself in products or objects that are available to oneself and to other people as elements of a common world. Man creates his world by objectivating himself, his intentions and abilities in the products of his activity. Objectification signifies the moment in the process of objectivation in which man establishes distance from his own producing activity and its product, and makes of this product and his own activity the object of his consciousness. It describes the way in which man perceives the world he has created. Alienation here connotes a process by which the unity of
the producing and the product is broken. The product appears to the producer as an alien facticity, as an independent power confronting man no longer as the product but as the condition of his own existence. 'In other words, alienation is the process by which man forgets that the world he lives in has been produced by himself.'

Reification means the moment in the process of alienation in which the characteristic of thing-hood becomes the standard of objective reality. When nothing is accepted as real unless it has the properties of a thing, a material.


45. Herbert Marcuse, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN, Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1964, p.11: "...the concept of alienation seems to become questionable when the individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have it in their own development and satisfaction. This identification is not illusion but reality.

46. I have here discarded the definition given by Seeman on self-estrangement. This does not mean, however, that his definition is wrong; it is just that it becomes extremely complicated and difficult to use the definition to examine the relationship of alienation to user-generated environmental change. For instance, if we ask if the activity of environmental change was an entity in itself or if it was caused by motivation for something other than the physical results, an answer to this question becomes mixed up with another concept of, or type of, alienation. For we have related the M. I. T. case with innovation (which is a function of anomie), and in this regard it can be inferred as having been caused by motivation of attaining not only the physical result—we must remember they were architecture students— but also change in the educational policies. For the reason or assumption that self-estrangement is a threat to identity, self-estrangement is used or defined in this respect, also to avoid a confusion in this intricate concept.
CHAPTER THREE


2. IBID., pp.2-3.

3. IBID., p.16, pp.87-92.

4. IBID., p.91.

5. IBID., p.92.


7. IBID., p.91.

8. IBID., pp.80-81.

9. IBID., pp.81-82.

10. IBID., p.81.

11. IBID., p.82.

12. This concept of anomie will be studied in detail in Chapter Four. Appendix


14. IBID., p.117.

15. IBID., p.115.

16. IBID., p.89.

17. IBID., p.90.

18. IBID., p.90.

19. IBID., p.90.

20. IBID., p.89.

21. The resident who built up the pitched roof is not identified in the documentation. Generally, building up of pitched roofs was more common in Lege than in Pessac. See illustrations 1-11 and 41 in IBID.
22. IBID., pp.88-89.


25. IBID., p.51.


27. IBID., p.51.

28. IBID., pp.51-52.

29. IBID., p.52.


31. Beinart, "The Process of ...," OP. CIT., pp.52-53. "On the contrary," Beinart argues, "their decorations were a reaction against the sameness imposed on them from outside." Moreover, "while Levittowners could move out when they could afford it, Western Native Township residents could not. It is one thing to sit and wait until you can achieve your goals, it is another when you can never achieve them. Then you have to compress all your frustrated ambitions into what you have now. As a result you make your possessions look like those that you will never possess, and you do this myth with all the intensity necessary to sustain such a myth."


34. Gans states that conformity exists "because people are dependent on their neighbors," for the "mutual need to preserve property and status values" among others. (p. 179.) For instance, although demands for conformity "sometimes require a difficult compromise between individual and group standards, when it comes to lawn care..."
...most people either have no hard-and-fast personal standards, or they value friendly relations more. Since the block norms and the compromises they require are usually worked out soon after the block is occupied --when everyone is striving to prove he will be a good neighbor-- they are taken for granted by the time the block has settled down." (Gans, IBID., p.177.) Merton suggests that such conformity is a necessary phenomenon or a control mechanism for a (social group) to avoid anomie. "Since the range of alternative behaviors permitted by the culture is severely limited, there is little basis for adapting to new conditions. There develops a tradition-bound, 'sacred' society marked by neophobia. (There are) societies which maintain a rough balance between emphases upon cultural goals and institutionalized practices, and these constitute the integrated and relatively stable, though changing, societies." (Merton, OP. CIT., p.367.) What develops is, as mentioned earlier in Chapter Two (p.26), that conformity becomes accepted for its own control value. As Gans notes, "Everyone knows it is social control and accepts the need for it..." (Gans, p.176.) If one still argues that conformity functions to avoid anomie, a type of alienation for the individual's psyche, he may be dismissed as an advocate of cultural anarchism, especially when everyone recognizes the need for it. But nonetheless, we must be aware of its function. What kind of life or culture it might be like without conformity, i.e., without anomie, remains to be unknown, at least to my knowledge.

36. IBID., p.207.
38. Beinart, OP. CIT., pp.196-197.
39. IBID., p.203.
40. IBID., p.203.
41. IBID., p.198.
42. IBID., p.198.
43. This expression was used by Beinart.
44. The chronology that follows is quoted from Sommer, OP. CIT., pp.1-2.
   For a more detailed account of the series of events concerning People's Park, see: Alan Copeland (ed.),
45. See: Kenneth Keniston, THE UNCOMMITTED, OP. CIT.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Quoted in Boudon, OP. CIT., p.35.
2. IBID., p.2.
3. IBID., p.114.
5. IBID., pp.56-57.
7. Schur, OP. CIT.
APPENDIX

1. This is more or less the argument presented by Freud in his tragic view of civilization. See: S. Freud, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor, 1958; Gerson, OP. CIT., pp.148-149.


3. Karl Marx, OP. CIT.

4. The dialectical approach may be traced back to the ancient Greek philosophers. Hegel is, however, responsible for its major development in the modern era. See: Herbert Marcuse, REASON AND REVOLUTION, Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1960.

5. IBID., p.vii.

6. Igor S. Kon, "The Concept of Alienation in Modern Sociology," SOCIAL RESEARCH, Volume 34, No. 3, 1967, pp.507-508. The brief summation of the history of the term alienation is well described by Kon: "In the Middle Ages it implied a definite degree of mystical ecstasy in man's communion with God. Later the Protestants, beginning with Calvin, understood the term as spiritual death, as estrangement of man's spirit from God by virtue of original sin. Rousseau speaks of the alienation of the individual's natural rights in favor of the community as a whole which results from the social contract. The romanticists dwell on the individual's alienation from others. Hegel employs the term to denote the alienation of consciousness from the individual, the subject viewing himself as the object, so that the entire objective world is nothing but the 'alienated spirit.' With Feuerbach self-alienation of the human substance is represented as the prime source of Christianity. Marx meanwhile turns to a socio-economic analysis regarding the employee's alienation from the means of production as the derivative of private ownership and the social division of labor. Developed parallel to the philosophical concept of alienation was the psychiatric concept implying the mental affection that makes a person irresponsible."
7. Dirk J. Struik in his Introduction to Karl Marx, OP. CIT., p.16.

8. IBID., p.16.

9. IBID., p.16.

10. Marx was equally critical of Hegel's philosophy of history, for it "presupposes an abstract or absolute spirit, which develops in such a way that mankind is only a mass which carries this spirit, consciously or unconsciously. Hegel assumes that a speculative, esoterical history precedes and underlies empirical history. The history of mankind is transformed into the history of the abstract spirit of mankind, which transcends the real man." Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, THE HOLY FAMILY: cited in Erich Fromm, MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN, New York, N. Y.: Ungars, 1961, p.10.


12. Karl Marx, "These on Feuerbach": cited in Fromm, OP. CIT., p.11.


14. Marx wrote: "Political economy starts with the fact of private property, but it does not explain it to us. It expresses in general, abstract formulas the material process through which private property actually passes, and these formulas it then takes for laws, i.e., it does not demonstrate how they arise from the very nature of private property. Political economy does not disclose the source of the division between labor and capital, and between capital and land. When, for example, it defines the relationship of wages to profit, it takes the interest of the capitalists to be the ultimate cause, i.e., it takes for granted what it is supposed to explain. Similarly, competition comes in everywhere. It is explained from external circumstances. As to how far these external and apparently accidental circumstances are but the expression of a necessary course of development, political economy teaches us nothing." from "Estranged Labor," THE ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, OP. CIT., p.106.
15. IBID., p.110.


17. This concept of self-estrangement is, as it has been explained before, not quite same as the one I have used in the hypothesis on the relationship of alienation and behavior in the physical environment. I have used self-estrangement as denoting an identity conflict, the relationship of which is discussed in pp.31-37.


20. Cf. Gerson, OP. CIT., pp.149-151; LeRoy, OP. CIT., p.3.

21. Paul Blumberg, for example, in his study of alienation and participation, which (the latter) is increasingly recognized and accepted as a positive way of humanizing the workers' condition, concludes that there "is hardly a study in the entire literature which fails to demonstrate that satisfaction in work is enhanced or that other generally acknowledged beneficial consequences accrue from a genuine increase in workers' decision-making power. Such consistency of findings, I submit, is rare in social research."


27. Durkheim, quoted by Giddens, IBID., p. 7.


29. IBID., p. 177.

30. IBID., p. 179.


33. Durkheim, OP. CIT., p. 182.

34. LeRoy, OP. CIT., p. 4.
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