THE STATE AND LOW INCOME COMMUNITIES
IN A PLANNED INDUSTRIAL CITY:
TWO CASE-STUDIES FROM THE
CIUDAD GUAYANA EXPERIENCE
by
Marisela Montoliu Muñoz
Urbanist, U.S.B., Caracas, July 1979

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Signature of Author

Department of Urban Studies and Planning

Certified by
Professor Lisa Peattie
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by
Professor Donald Schon
Chairman, MCP Committee

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The thesis presents two case-studies that illustrate how a development corporation (the CORPORACION VENEZOLANA DE GUAYANA, CVG, from Ciudad Guayana, Venezuela) approaches, and intervenes in low-income communities in Ciudad Guayana. The thesis addresses issues such as: (a) The way the ideology imbedded in the Guayana Program, started in the early sixties, still keeps shaping the types of decisions assumed by the CVG; (b) how CVG's organizational structure and administrative style are reflected in, and affect CVG interventions in low-income communities, and (c) how CVG conceives the role of community organization and participation within the process of design and implementation of its programs.

The first case-study is the process of relocation of the barrio "Colinas de Unare," located in a supposedly critical area close to the "modern" center of Ciudad Guayana; the process began to take place in April, 1981. The second case-study is an on-going program of training on artisan production given by a CVG team to women in the barrios of Ciudad Guayana since the early sixties. Research on the affected communities' views of the programs ought to be pursued in the future, to complement this study, which is mostly based on institutional reports and interviews.
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INTRODUCTION

The present paper attempts to identify, through two case-studies, the main assumptions, objectives and methodologies that underlie or are utilized by the State in its current interventions in income communities in Ciudad Guayana, Venezuela.

The city, the agency that represents the State in it, and the affected communities present particular characteristics that have shaped the way in which those interventions are given. In the first place, the city, Ciudad Guayana, arose as a planned growth center in a remote region of Venezuela, during a period in which "developmentalism", the ideal of economic growth, and modernization, were the concepts leading government actions. In the second place, the institution representing the State, the Corporación Venezolana de Guayana, is a corporate entity, practically omnipotent in Ciudad Guayana, whose main goal was to realize the developmentalist ideas, partly through the creation of a "city-beauty". In the third place, there were the low income communities, already existing in "the site" when Ciudad Guayana was just an idea in the minds of the planners, and rapidly growing afterwards, as an effect of the Guayana Program itself. They did not fit into the planners expectations, and were considered to be in conflict with the latter's goals. Though this combination of
actors and setting, as we have said, generated state interventions with very characteristic assumptions and objectives, it might be said that the conclusions related to these case-studies could be applied to State interventions in low income communities in other dependent-capitalist urban settings, were similar ideologies and assumptions could exist, possibly in more subtle ways.

The two selected case-studies differ from each other in their time scope and circumstances. The first of them is the case of a quick process of relocation of a barrio growing in a supposedly critical area of the "modern" city (starting April, 1981); the second is an on-going program in artisan production for housewives in the barrios, which has been carried on continuously since the early 1960's, as a part of the tasks of the Division of Social and Cultural Development of the CVG. This contrast will allow us to observe how the institution realize its goals under diverse types of pressures.

All the information used to develop the case-studies comes from the CVG itself. Part of it, specially in the case of the barrio relocation, consisted of internal CVG reports sent by the CVG people working in the barrio, and by people coordinating the program to higher level officials. The rest was collected through interviews to CVG officials in Ciudad
Guayana, done in February of 1983. Due to the fact of relying on a single—and particularly involved—source of information, and even though we have tried to isolate the underlying assumptions, biases and omissions, this analysis might be ignoring issues and data that would have been perceivable or collectable only through direct contact with the community. Additional research would be necessary to develop a more comprehensive picture of the actual circumstances under which the programs are taking place.

The paper begins by providing a brief background on the history of the Guayana Program, of which Ciudad Guayana was a part, and the ideology and assumptions underlying it. Secondly, it goes on to describe the goals, organizational structure and planning/administrative style of the State agency, highlighting the ways in which these elements were adjusted to the assumptions and ideology underlying the program as a whole. Followingly, the two case-studies are described; a "dramatistic", story-approach was chosen, since it would help visualize the actual sequence and complexity of the events involved in the real process. Finally, some conclusions about the implications of CVG interventions are drawn up, and some considerations are made about the need for further research.
I.- THE HISTORY OF THE GUAYANA PROGRAM: IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT INTERVENTIONS

The objective of this chapter is to present a historical framework for the understanding of the two case-studies. Emphasis will be given to (a) the ideological factors underlying the program of Guayana, and (b) the failures of the development strategy and the initial planning process, which generated both the problems that the Corporation has to face today, and a set of constraints for its current actions.

1.1. The ideal of "growth" and "modernization" and the new city

It was during the early 1950's, still under the period of dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez, when the first moves towards the development of the area of Guayana were done. Two American companies, Bethlehem and U.S.Steel, under concessions given by the Venezuelan government, began to exploit two important iron ore deposits--El Pao and Cerro Bolivar--. At the same time, the government, through its national development corporation (Corporación Venezolana de Fomento, CVF) started planning the development of a steel mill and two hydroelectric dams near the confluence of the Orinoco and the
Caroni rivers. These projects were not, then, part of any wholly regional development attempt. They were just means for the exploitation of the extraordinary natural resources of the area, in a relatively disintegrated way, functioning as an enclave, and reverting any possible profit back into the national and international economic centers. The possibility of finding a job in the initial stages of the construction, and in the mines, began to attract the population from the surrounding, depressed areas into the small towns of San Félix and Matanzas (1).

At the beginning of the 1960's, after the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez and a short ruling of a transitional Junta, a new democratic-populist government came into power after elections, bringing a consequent change in the approach to national development, and to the case of Guayana. The new government viewed economic growth and general "modernization" as a basic condition for the improvement of the socioeconomic situation of the population. Thus, together with some shy redistributive measures as the agrarian reform (1960), it decided to undertake major economic programs.

The program of Guayana consisted, then, of integrating the existing projects into a complex development that would not only generate positive effects at the regional level, but, primarily, that was going to push forward the development of the country. It would mean its economic diversification, the
possibility of exporting industrial products, a decline in the
trend of population concentration in the central region (where
Caracas is), and the incorporation of a backward region to the
national process of development (2). All of this would be
reached through the diffusion effects of the concentration of
aluminium industries, steel mills, heavy machinery, electro-
chemical complexes, and plants for pulp and paper production,
all of it in the area of confluence of the Orinoco and the
Caroní rivers, near the sources of raw materials (3). Parado-
xically enough, the national and regional planning agencies
tried to solve the Venezuelan economic problem of an indus-
trial base characterized by "final assembly industry [that]
accentuated import demand without contributing to export
earning of foreign exchange", by directly promoting capital-
intensive activities that would increase problems of un- and
underemployment, would create technological subordination to
developed countries, and would be highly dependent on interna-
tional prices and markets (4). Following the concept of growth
poles, and relying on market forces and on private entrepre-
neurship (national as well as international), it was expected
that such a public investment and natural resources scenario
would attract the private investment needed to propel the
process of economic development.

Social infrastructure was necessary both to satisfy the
needs of the growing population, and to attract economic
activities. Instead of following the traditional approach of closed camps assumed in the oil areas, it was decided to plan a new city.

A team of foreign planners (the Joint Center of MIT and Harvard University) was hired to advise the Venezuelan government. In the early 1960's, Venezuela did not have many professionals in the field of planning, and some of the most competent ones actually refused to participate in the program (5). However, it might be thought that the decision to allocate resources to a foreign team was also due to the belief in the superiority and adequacy of foreign knowledge and patterns, a sort of ideological dependence.

The new city would be located precisely in the lands around the confluence between the Orinoco and the Caroni rivers. Seventy percent of the "developable" lands were baldíos (vacant lands without a known owner) which were declared under CVG's control (6).

The Caroni river divided the "site" for the city into two sectors: The East side, with the town of San Félix (40 to 50 thousand inhabitants by 1963), with a growing proportion of squatter settlements, and the West side, with a very low population density, closer to the main industrial sites (See Appendix 1). The population of the new city would grow from
50,000 people in 1962, to 600,000 in 1980 according to 1963 estimates (7). From 60 to 75 percent of this population would be residing in the West side of the city (Puerto Ordaz). The city would, then, have two functions: In the first place, to work as a site for adequate reproduction of the low and middle-income inhabitants' labor force--in the first economic plans "human resources" were just another input to optimize--:

... Iron mines, hydroelectric plants, and steel mills become useful only when combined with skillful hands and trained minds, constructive human attitudes, and appropriate social institutions... (8). (Emphasis added).

In the second place, it would work as an attraction focus for top officials and investors. Given that one of the guidelines set for the city was to reach a balanced social, economic and infrastructural development (9), some sectors of the planning team proposed a mixed, integrated distribution of social groups in the city. However, the class-bias of some professionals and top officials led them to think that such a mixture would create social conflicts and deteriorate the image of "modern city" thus lowering its power of attraction of investment (10). Both positions, theoretically, influenced the final plan for the city. However, in practice, the areas for lower-income residents included in the plan for the "modern", West sector of the city (Puerto Ordaz) did hardly fit the needs and financial possibilities of the lower-income immigrants. Furthermore, squatter settling was to be directed--and, as much as possible, channeled by means of
"reception areas"--towards the East side of the city (San Félix). The West side became, then, the materialization of the ideology of economic growth and modernization that underlied the program of Guayana.

The early history of the program and the city reflects a predominant ideology that, as we will show through the case-studies, remains basically unchanged, and still guides planning and implementation decisions. As Dinkelspiel points out,

... Betancourt [the President at the time] saw the Guayana as a way to a new Venezuela--a modern industrialized nation freed from colonial status, no longer the treasure lode of foreign oil companies... (11).

In the base of this ideology, we find the assumption that socioeconomic development, or "the goal", is to achieve a high rate of economic growth, and to modernize the habits and social uses of the population, to adjust them to the required pace of growth. Somehow, this official ideology seemed to penetrate down into the socioeconomic structure, so that the whole of population got convinced about the desirability of economic growth through these major projects (12).

The goal of regional integrated development was also "an important piece of the ideology of the new government" (13). It would be seen as a way of redistribution of the resources generated by the oil boom across the country, a way of economically and spatially diversifying the country, by
"sowing the oil" ("Sembrando el petróleo", saying of the President at the moment, Rómulo Betancourt).

Finally, the reliance on market mechanisms and private investment, and thus, the need for reflecting in the new city an attractive image of progress and modernization, was seen by the officials and professionals in charge of the program as necessarily leading to a class- and sectoral-segregated solution.

1.2. The new city: 1960-1980

The evolution of Ciudad Guayana has been extensively documented. The general—and obvious—conclusion is that its economic and sociodemographic development has not followed the expected trends. These results can be partly attributed to the strategy of development itself; to some extent, they can also be attributed to the failures and misinterpretations of the reality during the initial planning process. Thirdly, they are also due to the type of intervention carried on by the State—undoubtedly related with the two former elements—, represented by the CVG. In this section, we will (a) briefly summarize the general characteristics and problems of the city.
today, and (b) explain how the development strategy and the planning process are partly responsible for those problems, and how they pose constraints to current actions of the CVG. This will constitute a framework for the analysis of CVG and its current interventions upon low income communities.

Current characteristics and problems of the city

In sum, the main characteristics of the city, with respect to the plan developed in the early 1960's, are the following (figures supporting these conclusions are presented in Appendix 2):

1. The city has not grown at the speed considered in 1963 (initial) estimates. By April 1980, its total population was 339,820 inhabitants, slightly above half of the estimate for 1980 made in 1963.

2. The distribution of the population between the two sectors of the city is the opposite as expected; San Félix is now the more—and more densely—populated of the two sectors, while it was supposed to receive only from 25 to 30% of the total population.

3. Since the economic linkages which were expected did not take place, and since the attraction generated by the city upon the neighboring, depressed areas was not introduced into the calculations, the socioeconomic profile of the current population looks completely different to what was expected, with a majority of the population being unable to get access to the housing opportunities provided by the State or the private enterprises.

4. The rate of unemployment of San Félix is higher than that of Puerto Ordaz (8.6% and 3.3% respectively, by April 1980). Unemployment in the city as a whole has reached critical levels during certain periods. In July 1968, for example, 18.4% of the labor force was unemployed. This fact is related to the extreme dependence upon unstable
activities, such as construction.

5. Both San Félix and Puerto Ordaz have a high percentage of their population dedicated to service activities (50.0% of the total employed population in San Félix, and 48.3% of the employed population in Puerto Ordaz). Informal activities are an important source of income for poor population, specially in the case of San Félix, where regulations about use of the structures are more difficult to enforce, and where most of the population not absorbed by the formal economy is living.

6. A big percentage of San Félix's housing units are "ranchos" (33.7% of its housing units: 89.9% of the total number of ranchos in the whole city). Puerto Ordaz, on the other hand, has 10.1% of the total number of ranchos in the city, which comprise 7.1% of the sector's total number of housing units (14).

The failures of the development strategy

The program of Guayana was explicitly conceived as a "growth pole", with its growth center located in Ciudad Guaya- na. On the basis of mixed (public-private) investment on a few "motorizing" projects that would generate "linkages", the area was supposed to attract complementary activities, to diffuse economic development to the neighboring regions, and to impel overall national economic growth (15).

John Friedmann justified this strategy of imbalanced growth for the region partly on the base of Venezuela's histo-
rical experience, which he viewed as a result of "choice"—and as a positive one:

... Venezuela has adopted an implicit 'core-region' strategy. This means that over a sustained period Venezuela is investing large sums in the expansion of a few metropolitan regions that have great potentialities for economic growth, and is guiding the spread effects of these investments to areas that are functionally linked with the core region... (16).

Such a concentration was rather an effect of the export-oriented, dependent-capitalist character of Venezuelan economy, which tended to generate accelerated urbanization in the North-central region, increasing social conflicts in the cities, and a center-periphery relation between the "core-regions" and the depressed areas. The same effects could be expected as a result of an "explicit" strategy, given that the general nature of the economy and the system of distribution remained unchanged.

In practice, even though certain industries were attracted to the area, Ciudad Guayana never could generate the expected system of economic linkages, and it became an island, or rather, an economic enclave within the region (17). The city did attract thousands of unskilled immigrants from the neighboring, depressed areas. The capital-intensive character of the industries in Ciudad Guayana impeded the absorption of this growing population by the urban "formal" economy, generating the high unemployment and underemployment rates we have talked about. The spread effects over the space did not take
Friedmann attributes these failures to institutional problems and lack of national integration of the regional strategies (18). Other authors argue that they are due to the fact that the heavy industries—e.g., steel mills—do not tend to create linkages, contrarily to the general belief in the 1950's: On the one hand, they pay high salaries that tend to discourage other enterprises to establish their branches close to these heavy industries; on the other hand, their scale allows them to self-provide many of the services and complementary activities, that would not be demanded, then, from the surroundings (19). However, it has been generally proved that this kind of consequences are mostly due to the inapplicability of growth pole theories under capitalist-dependent conditions: In the first place, because the growth pole theory, as originally conceived by Perroux, was actually divorced from spatial considerations, and thus, its applications to a spatial, regional setting might involve weak assumptions (20). In the second place (and supposing the above is ignored), because the conditions in developed countries, from which the growth pole theory was derived, do not resemble the conditions in an underdeveloped country like Venezuela: Non-hierarchical, primate-city-size distribution of the urban centers, discouragement of vertical integration through the favorable tariff treatment to intermediate inputs (a consequence of
import-substituting, highly protected industrialization). (21).

Thus, in brief, the type of development strategy assumed attracted immigrants and activities ("informal" activities) whose socioeconomic profile diverged from the one considered by the economic strategy applied. This effect was a "given" for the planners of the city, and for the implementing institution; the issue was, then, how would the planners of the city, and later on, the implementing institution respond to the demands they faced.

The failures of the planning process

The planning process for the city was not adapted to the changing needs of the real city. It rather tried to follow, blindly, the guidelines imposed by the economic strategy, that is: (a) creating an attractive, modern city; (b) planning for a population with a socioeconomic profile coherent with the modern industrial structure that derived from the economic model.

The class-bias of some of the Venezuelan professionals and top officials, and the "evolutionist-modernizing" notion held by part of the Joint Center team, are considered two of the causes for this divorce between planning and reality (22).
Some members of the Joint center team have also pointed to the organizational inadequacies of the process, primarily to the fact that most of the team was based on Caracas, instead of on Ciudad Guayana. Even though it was convenient for part of it to be connected to the evolution in national guidelines taking place in Caracas, this centralization of the team implied a big gap between the image held by the planners and the actual situation. Guided by different concerns, and from their diverse viewpoints, the consultants expressed:

...Isolated physically from the real city of the present, and isolated organizationally and conceptually from the political and economic interest groups in which their enterprise had its being, [the designers of the city] tended to leave these out of their calculations and to develop their own lines of work... (23).

...[The interaction between urban development and economic programs] was more visible in Guayana than in Caracas, where the economic development function was obscured by the urgency to find solutions to the urban problems of this rapidly expanding metropolis. Housing and physical planning in Caracas were typically handled in gross ignorance of underlying economic forces... (24).

In sum, this divorce of the planners and designers from reality, together with the idealism involved in the process, generated a very unequal distribution of resources between the two sectors of the city and among the different interest groups of the city. The West side (Puerto Ordaz), the "modern" one, held certain social mixture, but its lowest income housing, as we have already said, was not affordable by most of the low-income immigrants. On the other hand, squatter
settling was prohibited and physically rejected from this side. Reception areas for the poorer immigrants—-all of them in the East side—were insufficient, and this sector, as we showed above, became the one with poorest supply of services, highest level of un- and underemployment, and lowest standards of housing (25).
II.- THE CORPORACIÓN VENEZOLANA DE GUAYANA (CVG)

This chapter briefly describes CVG's history, original goals, internal structure, planning style (including the leading ideology), and main functional problems. All these elements, understood within the historical framework exposed in the first chapter, will help to interpret CVG's motivations and problems in dealing with low income communities in Ciudad Guayana.

4.1. Definition, objectives, area of action

The "Corporación Venezolana de Guayana" is a regional development agency especially created to plan and implement the projects considered by the Guayana program. Its legal status is that of "...autonomous institute, with its own legal personality, and with patrimony different and independent from the National Treasury; it is directly attached to the President's office" (26). It was created on December 29, 1960, through the President's decree #430, which defines CVG's character, scope, goals, and patrimony.

Its objectives were, in sum: (a) To study the available resources in the Guayana region; (b) to study the
hydroelectric potential of the Caroni river; (c) to plan for the integrated development of the region, according to the National Plan; (d) to promote the industrial development of the region, both through public and private sector's actions; (e) to coordinate social and economic functions of other public institutions; (f) to contribute to the organization, development and operation of the needed public services in the region, and (g) to carry on other functions without its area of action, when it is required (27).

The area of action of the CVG--the "Development Zone"--was defined by the presidential decree # 28 (3/4/1960), being much smaller than the natural region of Guayana, South of the Orinoco river. The development zone comprised, roughly, the lands that would be occupied by Ciudad Guayana and the Guri dam on the Caroni river, that is, it just included the areas dedicated to the main development projects of the Guayana program. Later, as the interest for a wholly regional development of the nation grew, and as CVG began to change the emphasis of its function (change which will be discussed below), the area of action of CVG was gradually growing. Currently, it embraces more than 50% of the national territory (28). (See Appendix 3).

The CVG was created as a corporate rather than a coordinating entity, after what Dinkelspiel (29) called "unsuc-
cessful experiences" of the National Development Agency (1945-1948), the Office for Special Studies (1953-1958), and the Institute of Iron and Steel (1958-1960). A corporate kind of solution was selected, according to Friedmann (30), because it would mobilize resources more readily, achieve a decisive coordinate action more easily, hold a more global view of all the diverse elements involved in the Guayana program, and, over all, "underscore the determination of the government to assign top priority to the Guayana program" more easily than a system of coordinated institutions.

4.2. Organizational structure

In terms of organizational structure, the CVG has also undergone many transformations, supposedly related to its changing functions, to the growth and changes in its area of action, and also to the gradual moving of the offices to Ciudad Guayana. Such transformations took place in the years 1963, 1970, 1971, 1979, and 1981. Authors like M.P. García (31), argue that the changes have been rather formal, and not in the contents and objectives originally established.

Its hierarchical organization included in 1981 a Directory, a Presidency, eleven management offices (gerencias) and three divisions (it has not been possible to find information
about the differences between a "gerencia" and a "división"). It is difficult to reach better conclusions about CVG's overall organization only by looking at its organizational charts (Appendix 4). However, it can be noticed that the changes in 1970 included the following facts: The major economic enterprises were not a functional part of CVG anymore, and the Division of Human Resources (today's Division of Social and Cultural Development, important for our case studies) appeared in that year.

4.3. Implications of CVG's administrative and planning style

In the first place, the administrative and planning style of the CVG reflects the character of the program for whose management it was created. As we have said, the CVG was especially created to run a program with primarily national objectives, assumed to be responding to a notion of "public interest" that was represented by the goal of increasing the national rate of economic growth. According to certain authors, an image of political neutrality and nonpartisanship would provide the Corporation with the general popular support needed to carry on its tasks; in fact, this was the type of image and administrative style—a technocratic one—that CVG assumed.
Among the concrete expressions of such an administrative and planning style we find the following: (a) utilization of noncontroversial figures in the institution—that is, officials not explicitly involved with any party--; (b) identification of the CVG and its projects with the "most deeply felt nationalist sentiments of Venezuela"; (c) rejecting projects that only had regional or local significance, since it was thought that identification with such interests would have broken its nonpartisan image; (d) avoiding being identified with particular ministries and its projects, since they were generally related to political parties, and (e) hiring foreign consultants to give "confiability" to the result. Dinkelspiel's conclusions on CVG's administrative style reflect the prevailing ideology within the decision-making bodies:

[The technocratic administrative style] permits the Corporation to reap the benefits that the great popular appeal of modern technology can bestow in a developing country... (32).

... If a public agency can show that its decisions simply reflect the technologically best choice, it stands a good chance of sustaining public belief in its nonpartisanship... (33).

The technocratic style crystallized in a geographic location of the CVG that has in turn shaped its interventions and reinforced the technocratic style: By 1963, most of its offices were in Caracas, the capital of the country, 700 Kilometers away from Ciudad Guayana. A few operational units
were on the site, and the unit of Urban Planning had an office in Ciudad Bolívar, the main city in the Guayana region, approximately 100 kms far from Ciudad Guayana, but most of the planning was done and most of the decisions were taken in Caracas.

Some of the effects of such a distribution of the personnel have been briefly commented on in the former chapter, when talking about the failures of the initial planning process, in which, as we know, CVG was a main actor. It is interesting to extend this point further, since it is related to some of the problems occurring nowadays. Many authors have pointed out that the separation and divergence of approaches between the offices of CVG in Caracas and the people in "the site" have hindered the flow of feedback to improve the planning product in Caracas, and thus, have hindered the product of the planning process from being an adequate support for actions in the site (34). This divergence was felt much more strongly in the site, where it was seen as a "painful inaccessibility to power", while it was seen in Caracas as "exasperating tendencies of particular local interests" (35).

Currently, the CVG has been losing financial control over the subsidiary enterprises--that is, the major national economic projects--which were the concrete expressions of
CVG's national importance, and "justified" its technocratic style. So, the urban and regional development tasks, seen until the 1970's as the "political" side of its role (and which, even though unwillingly, it had to face), have been reinforced (36). Besides that, and probably because of the increasing social pressures generated as Ciudad Guayana was growing, by 1982 most of CVG offices were moved to Ciudad Guayana (37). However, these changes have not necessarily generated a more participatory pattern in CVG's approach and interventions: There is a clear class gap between the planners and the people living in the city, and there is a completely different perception of the reality at different levels within the CVG. Now, the dichotomy Caracas-site has been reproduced in a dichotomy top planners-field workers.

It could be said, from the analysis of the available literature, that the popular and local interests have always been subordinated to what was conceived by a planning elite as the national interests. It was done, however, in a rather implicit way. Now, the shift of emphasis to urban and regional development tasks has taken place parallel to an explicit national policy of creation of formal linkages between the State and the grass-roots, a policy derived from the Christian-democrat doctrine, and which we would say to be making the above mentioned subordination explicit. One of the hypotheses pointed out, though not deeply worked, through the
following case-studies, is that CVG, in its interventions upon low income communities, is directly reflecting the Christian-democrat notion of "popular promotion" which has become one of the guidelines of the Sixth National Development Plan (1981-1985), released by the current Christian-democrat administration. This would mean that the formal nonpartisanship alleged by Dinkelspiel is not being held by the CVG anymore. With respect to CVG's actual relationships to political parties in Venezuela, some authors have commented that they were given only on a personal basis (38); others view that certain sectors were related with, and actually acting according to, that relationship to particular parties, due to particular political conjunctures (39), and some others definitely find a correlation between CVG approaches and the ideology of the party in power at the time (40).
III.- THE PROCESS OF RELOCATION OF "COLINAS DE UNARE"

The following pages present the story and preliminary analysis of a particular intervention of the CVG with respect to the "urban poor" in Ciudad Guayana. The study is on a case of demolition of a squatter settlement located in the area known as Colinas de Unare, in Puerto Ordaz, ordered and implemented by the CVG. Demolition was followed, in this particular case, by the relocation of the affected population.

The account begins in April 1981. There was a well-established population in the area of study, and CVG seemed to have already decided to demolish the "barracks"--as the CVG documents call Colinas de Unare's housing units. This initial decision might, by itself, tell a lot about the kinds of assumptions and values guiding the actions of CVG. In addition, it will be shown how such a decision was implemented, by integrating and controlling a process of community mobilization that began to take place under the threat of the dislocation.

All the information comes either from reports written by CVG members involved in the process, or from personal interviews to CVG officials, made in February 1983. Since no information could directly be collected from the community,
many important points in the interpretation of facts had to be left as hypotheses, until such a direct contact could be made.

3.1. The History of CVG interventions towards squatter settlements

Colinas de Unare is just one case, among many, of land "invasion" and squatter settlement in Ciudad Guayana. For reasons that we have already explained, the city's growth has mainly involved the immigration of thousands of inhabitants from depressed, surrounding areas. The controls established by CVG and other governmental institutions have physically shaped that unexpected demographic growth, creating an imbalance between the two main sectors of the city (San Félix and Puerto Ordaz), and reinforcing even more the contradictions created by the application of the concept of "growth pole" within the economic conditions of a country like Venezuela.

The sector of San Félix, including the old town, and not being subjected to as much control as Puerto Ordaz, received most of the immigrants since 1960. These immigrants came from declining oil areas or from the depressed surroundings. The growth of the sector of San Félix took the form of land "invasions", squatting, sometimes channelled by the institutions through the creation of "reception areas", and
some other times (most of them) without any provision. By 1979, as we have said, 33.7% of San Félix housing was "ranchos". That percentage does not include those old squatter settlements that have undergone a significant physical improvement. All of these cases added together give an idea of the magnitude of the squatting process in San Félix since the sixties.

The section of Puerto Ordaz, on the other hand, has been strongly controlled by the planning and administrative apparatus. It is the "planned" city, it is the "image" of industrial development and progress that Betancourt's government wanted to build. Much fewer squatter settlements took place in this section, due to the open repression against them; when they appeared, they mostly did it in areas where they were protected by difficult visibility. Examples like Castillito (close to the bank of the Caroni river), Los Olivos, and Colinas de Unare (whose growth was dissimulated by dense vegetation around), show it. There have also been invasions in vacant apartment buildings constructed by the National Housing Institute (INAVI), given the delays in their allocation, or the existence of irregular (or regular) elements impeding the access of worse-off sectors to the apartments in those buildings.

The main characteristics of land "invasions" in Ciudad
Guayana have been (41):

a) They are collective: Groups of families, rather than individual families, carry on the invasion process; this guarantees having a stronger bargaining position or a stronger physical resistance in case of facing negotiations with the institutions or actual repression.

b) They are very well organized: The squatting groups plan in advance the process of land invasion and redistribution, in most cases with a strong egalitarian sense. In many cases, there exist maps that guide the invasion, and politicized sectors lead the process. The squatting groups, as we will note below, take advantage of particular political-economic conjunctures that ease or guarantee the success of the invasion. These points help contradict the locally widespread idea that squatter settlements are necessarily disorganized social settings.

c) They are not a constant process, but present "peaks", when certain economic and political conditions are given. The historical moments when invasions have become more frequent and massive are:

-- At the beginning of the development of the city (1960's), when the big attraction for construction labor took place.

-- In the period 1974-1978, under the presidency of the Social-democratic leader Carlos Andres Pérez, when heavy investment was allocated for the construction of
the "Plan IV" of the Orinoco Siderurgical Plant.

-- In electoral years, because the political party in the government, trying to guarantee its persistence in power, avoids any kind of severe conflict with any sector of the population. Land invasions and the political struggle that accompanies them are typical instruments for political manipulation. According to information given by CVG officials, a relative increase in the number of invasions in Ciudad Guayana can be noticed now. Elections will be held in seven more months, in December 1983.

The types of responses of the CVG to these movements have been diverse. Besides the establishment of insufficient "reception areas", attempts to dislodge have been the most common type of intervention. They have been much stronger in the area of Puerto Ordaz. Barrios like Castillito, the oldest in Puerto Ordaz, have been pressured to dislodge without success; the barrio La Unidad ("the Unity") was dislodged and re-took its lands later; relatively recently, a group of families occupying an area destined to industrial uses in San Félix was dislodged without being given any alternative for living. In other cases, a process of relocation has followed. Most of the families in these conditions have been sent to the area of Vista Al Sol (UD-134, UD-135, and UD-136) a peripheral section of San Félix, where they were to be housed either by un-aided self-help construction or by finished housing pro-
vided by the National Housing Institute (INAVI), receiving the land lots through a special rent arrangement with FUNVICA (Foundation for Housing "Caroni") which seems to have been not so successful. In terms of barrio consolidation as a comprehensive intervention (that is, systematic, nonincremental improvements in services networks, communal areas, housing, on the basis of the existing settlement), only one case, besides the one proposed for lower Colinas de Unare, has taken place, and it has also been very recently (1982): The case of the barrio Guaiçaipuro, a small settlement in San Félix.

In summary, Colinas de Unare is a very unique experience in terms of the kind of consolidation and relocation processes to which it has been subjected, while it is one among the many barrios of Ciudad Guayana generated through land invasion. The accounts gathered by means of CVG officials' reports and interviews, will help to have an insight (maybe not a comprehensive one!) into the reasons for that, as well as to build a perspective on how CVG is facing conflict with the "poor" population in Ciudad Guayana.

3.2. The squatting process and the first demolitions

The area of Colinas de Unare (or Cerro Roberto) is located South of Ciudad Guayana Airport, in the South-Eastern
area of Puerto Ordaz, the "planned", West-bank section of Ciudad Guayana. According to the city's plan, it occupies the Development Units #245, #246 and #267 (UD-247, UD-246, UD-267). It is characterized by its relatively higher situation with respect to the lands surrounding it; for that reason, the main water tanks for supplying Puerto Ordaz, and the electric sub-station serving the acueduct were located on top of the Colinas. According to CVG, the fact that Colinas de Unare was assigned such an important service nucleus required that the surrounding area was not given any residential use by the plan of Ciudad Guayana. The area of Colinas de Unare, then, also characterized by the presence of a small natural forest on it, was supposed to stay as a piece of vacant land within the planned section of Ciudad Guayana (42).

However, we have seen how the planning process of Ciudad Guayana, in its underlying character of resources allocator and distributor, ignored and left aside the biggest "client" group of the city, which, paradoxically, the city itself generated: The urban poor.

Since the beginning of the 1970's, Colinas de Unare became a sort of "natural" reception area for immigrants from rural towns or smaller cities, from Venezuela or other countries (Colombia, Ecuador...). These families, searching for
work opportunities that in many cases the city could not offer through "formal" mechanisms, and being absolutely unable to qualify for obtaining housing from the "formal" supply, began to constitute a growing squatter area in Colinas de Unare. As we have said, Colinas de Unare was a vacant space protected, at least at the beginning, by vegetation that hid the houses, relatively near to work places, schools and to the center of Puerto Ordaz, and even though it was not urbanized, the access to two main service sources was fairly easy from the area: As well as the immigrants served their own selves in terms of housing, they improvised connections to the water pipes and electricity lines related to the water tanks on top of the Colinas.

The assumption of their "right to the city" by those unexpected inhabitants brought an imbalance to the planned system. According to CVG officials,

... This situation began to create problems to the flux of water through the Puerto Ordaz acueduct, due to the big number of perforations made in the tubing; the forest area that protects the soil and contributes to the improvement of the environment, also started suffering a significant deterioration. On the other hand, the proximity of the inhabited barracks to the high tension electricity lines, the lack of adequate services -due to the fact that the sector was not destined to residential use-, and the way they provided themselves with water and electricity, constitute a big risk to the 'invaders'... (43).

It seems that these functional problems were not the only ones that the officials from CVG viewed in this case.
The ideology of "progress" and "modernization" imbedded in the Guayana Project arises in other arguments:

...The families that have been occupying the area of Colinas de Unare (...) mainly come from rural areas of Venezuela and other countries. They present behavior patterns which are characteristic of marginal sectors, with low educational levels, inadequate habits with respect to the use of public services, and to the social urban coexistence (...) It is common to find 'conu-cos'(subsistence cultivations) and animal raising (...) This socio-cultural problematic, which does not fit into the phystonomy of a city with an industrial profile, requires the application of certain measures leading to the achievement of social integration... (44) (Emphasis added).

The immigrants' adaptation to the economic conditions imposed by the kind of segregating development of Ciudad Guayana was seen by CVG as having negative effects both on the functioning and on the image of the city. From some indirect references, it seems that CVG began to order the demolition of certain barracks in Colinas de Unare; the rumor of a process of elimination of the barrio grew among the population.

3.3. The reaction of the community

According to the declarations of some officials of CVG, it seems that people in the area were believed to have a negative attitude against the institution, due to "its indif- ference with respect to the solution of the problems of basic services" of Colinas de Unare (45). Once the threat of dislo-
cation and elimination of the barracks began to concretize, the community started organizing itself in a "solidarity movement against the dislocation", gaining the support of other communities and political organizations (46). At that moment, the community did not organize itself around the formal "neighborhood associations" considered by the law, but its leaders seem to have been the persons that later on were recognized as directors of the formal neighborhood associations (47). Though this shift in the attitude of the leaders seems less likely to have happened than a shift in the actual leaders, the available information supports the former hypothesis.

Again, the capacity of organization of the people around the defense of their community could be assumed as a counter-argument to the above mentioned image of disintegra-

tion and marginality that the officials of CVG had about the community of Colinas de Unare. Even though other cases of resistance to dislocation had been faced by the institution, this particular case seems to have looked particularly threatening to it, probably because of the amount of population involved, because of the political potential of the movement, or because of the critical location of the community within the city.

...[The invaders], facing the threat of being dislodged, and being aware of usual procedures in these cases, decided to create their own organizations (...) These
circumstances created an explosive social situation of unpredictable consequences; it required the application of a strategy that could approach the problem in a delicate and precise way, in order to achieve a satisfactory solution for all the involved parties, without creating conflicts or violence, which generally bring about unnecessary and regrettable actions... (48) (Emphasis added).

CVG decided, then, as Pinelly states, to change its strategy and go into the community, to negotiate a solution. Direct contact was established with the neighborhood associations. Two neighborhood associations arose in Colinas de Unare: One was representing the oldest, lowest part of the barrio; the other, represented the higher, most recently invaded lands. The party-affiliation of the leaders and other members of the associations implied a particular political influence in the two different organizations. The neighborhood organization in the oldest area of Colinas de Unare was basically influenced by the Christian Democratic party (COPEI, the party in power), and the more recent, less stabilized section of Colinas de Unare received the influence of leftist groups, and was particularly mobilized around the defense and unity of the community.

The first outcome of the discussions with CVG was a differential treatment to each of the two sections of the barrio. The relatively flat, lower area was to be consolidated in its same location; the higher area was to be relocated.
Evidently, the second type of treatment implied higher economic and social costs for the affected community. Furthermore, the affected community was supposed to be the weakest in the whole area, since it was still in the process of stabilization in Colinas de Unare. In addition to that, this was the population related to the leftist groups. It seems impossible to determine the relative causal weights of those factors, though evidently there is correlation.

In any case, no information about conflicts generated by this first decision has been found. The institution established as a first priority the relocation of the higher area population; the consolidation of the lower area would take place only if there were resources available after taking care of the higher area. This agreement might explain the peaceful acceptance of the differential interventions. Though, if we see it in detail, it just meant that the "COPEI"-group, the lower-Colinas group, was not touched by the intervention, and if it was going to be, it would have been for a sort of intervention that, instead of involving high costs as in the former case, would bring about relatively "cheap" benefits. CVG began, then, to analyze the conditions for the implementation of the relocation process, the subject on which we will focus. The first objective was to develop a diagnosis of the situation, with the input of the formal community organizations. From this point on, the accounts given by the available CVG documents, instead of talking about the original "solida-
rity movement against dislocation", start talking about the neighborhood associations. The attitude of the latter, furthermore, appears to be much more positive towards collaboration with the institution's plans than the above mentioned movement. We could establish a hypothesis: The CVG, in trying to dissolve the threat of conflict generated by a spontaneous, self-generated community organization, began to support alternative, less radical organizations that could ease the process for the institution, both because of being (such an organization) willing and able to get down the possible unrest (since they were part of the community, anyway), and because of having the organizational structure considered in the law for articulation of neighborhood demands.

In any case, CVG established a commission to take care of the process of relocation. Once being set up, it made contacts with the neighborhood organization and decided to carry on a socio-economic survey of the affected population, whose objective would be to provide the information needed about the community in order to proceed with the relocation.

3.4. The socio-economic survey and the definition of concrete goals

The survey was implemented by the members of the
neighborhood association themselves, under the responsibility of two directors of the neighborhood association of the higher portion of the sector of Colinas de Unare to be relocated, and one director of the association of the lower portion of the sector to be relocated, and under the advice of a member of the Division of Social and Cultural Development of the CVG, which had just established an "office" near the area. Fifteen people, all of them members of the neighborhood association, made the interviews. To organize the process, the area was divided in three sectors: Los Tanques (UD-245), and La Congeladora (UD-246), from the higher part of the Colinas, and Los Canales (UD-267), from the lower part. The survey was carried on in the month of June of 1981. It contained questions about: (1) For each member of the family: Name, kinship relation to the head of family, sex, I.D.number, conjugal status, age, educational level, place of birth, nationality, last place of residence (before Colinas), time of being in the city, the region and the country, occupation, place where worked, income. (2) For each housing unit: type, building materials, internal distribution, type of system of water supply, sewage, electricity, tenure of the housing unit, area of construction, area of lot, estimated cost of the unit.

The questionnaire was designed and produced by the Division of Social and Cultural Development of the CVG. In terms of its results, nothing was possible to find through the
interviews and reports, except for the number of occupied and vacant housing units, the distribution of the total population according to the nationality of the head of the household, and the estimated cost of the housing unit. The latter was particularly important, given the fact that Venezuelan Law obligues the government to pay for any improvement (bienhechuría) made to a lot by any settler on it who has to be relocated. Those were the only data published in the two main reports by the coordinator of the project (49).

The results showed that there were 877 inhabited houses, and 60 vacant houses (total: 937 units). From the 877 families, 76.4% had Venezuelan head of household (50). The mean value of the cost of the units estimated by the residents was Bs. 15,975 (51). This estimated cost, declared by the inhabitants of the units, was compared later to an actually professional calculation of the cost. This valuation was made in the month of August, 1981, over a sample of 568 of the 877 inhabited houses. It resulted on a mean cost of Bs. 7,777.50 (52). The difference of approximately 100% between the mean cost estimated by the families and the mean cost resulting from the professional valuation is not explained by pure chance. Devices to prove any hypothesis on why does that difference exist are not available at the moment, but the hypotheses could at least be formulated: (a) The difference is partly due to a bias in the selection of the samples; (b)
the difference is due to differing ways to evaluate the units (e.g., the residents imputed extra cost for transportation, paid labor-aid—which is not unusually received--, or other concepts, or the evaluators used wholesaler costs in their evaluations, while the materials were got by the residents in a way that could have made it more expensive to them—data on the costs of building and buying materials within and without the "formal" housing market would be necessary to have, to make better hypotheses); (c) the residents declared a higher cost, so if an expropriation occurred, the payment for their housing units in Colinas would allow them to cope with the increasing costs of building or renting a "rancho", or getting housing from the formal supply.

The costs assumed for the continuation of the process were those resulting from the professional valuation. That would be the amount of money to be given to the residents in exchange for their housing units, either in the form of cash or of materials to build a new house in the relocation area.

By mid-1981, CVG had already decided on one possible destination of the dislodged population. The insufficiency of available land for the relocation (though the Puerto Ordaz section of the city appears to be quite empty) made of it a very fragmented process, as CVG officials recognize (53). The CVG ordered the preparation of the UD-293 for residential use.
The UD-293 is a piece of flat land, four times smaller than the UD-246, UD-247 and UD-267 together (area of origin of the dislodged population); it is located about 2 kilometers West—that is, farther from the "center" of the city—of Colinas de Unare. Among the reasons that were given in the interviews for the selection of this Development Unit, are: (a) it was an area that was not already commited to any other use; (b) had long been considered, by the Planning and Budget Office of the CVG (OPPU) as a possible area for the reception of immigrants or "poor" population; (c) it is not easily seen from the main road in Puerto Ordaz (the "Avenida Guayana"); and (d) was surrounded by INAVI projects for low income residents, as opposed to Colinas de Unare, that was neighboring the area of "Jardín Levante", a residential area for medium class, mainly occupied by CVG personnel.

The socioeconomic survey helped to establish the magnitude of the requirements for the relocation: 877 families needed a new housing unit. The UD-293 had a maximal capacity of 560 parcels, from which 45 had already been given through the National Housing Institute, INAVI, to families from different areas. So, in the UD-293 only 515 of the dislodged families could be relocated. 362 families were still to be given a place to live. Of those, 51 families decided that they did not want to be relocated by CVG in the UD-293, and that they would rather receive the cost of their expropriated
materials in cash (54). CVG asked for the collaboration of other neighborhood associations of the city, in order to find vacant lots to relocate other families. A total of 200 lots in "irregular" situation (unknown owners, lack of ownership document...) were identified in the area of San Félix; from them, it was known that at least 98 would be ready for occupation by January 1983. That would reduce the deficit to 213 families to be relocated (the figures diverge form one document to another), but that would be in case 98 families would agree on moving to San Félix. In fact, by December 1982, only 20 families had agreed on that. Residents of Colinas de Unare worked, studied, and had already built a social network in Puerto Ordaz, not being willing to move from all those familiar advantages (55).

On July 1981, after having the results of the survey, CVG had, at least, two main tasks to achieve: To find ways to solve the deficit of land for the relocation, and to, somehow, convince 515 families to accept the actual opportunity of relocation in the UD-293, without using any violent method.
3.4. The first training course and the assignment of lots in the UD-293

A good way to convince the population about the possible advantages of relocation was to set an example of what an alternative to the housing solutions in Colinas de Unare could look like. CVG decided to select 15 unemployed young people of the barrio (the selection criteria are not explained), who would be trained in construction techniques through the actual construction of 12 housing units in the UD-293. The families of those 15 people would have the priority for being assigned the finished units. The process of training and construction would last 60 days, and would include the participation of the families of the trained youngsters, under the motivation for "living in a better home than the one they had at the Colinas" (56). Some skilled residents of the Colinas participated as instructors for the course, under the advice of a member of the INCE (National Institute for Worker's Training and Education) (57).

The training process took the expected time, but the weather and some financial and administrative problems delayed the finishing of the housing units. Another 12 youngsters were introduced to the training process, trying to accelerate the construction of the first twelve units and to build an additional group of five housing units. There were also budgetary
and administrative problems in achieving this second goal; so, at the end of the period for the second course (December 31, 1981), the situation was as follows (58):

- Registered participants: 26
- Retired participants: 01
- Finishing participants: 25
- Hours of training: 776
- Finished houses: 08
- Partially finished houses: 08
- Inhabited houses: 16
- Eliminated barracks: 16

As it can be seen, the families moved to the houses even before they were completely ready. One of the twelve first units, which is missing in the account above, was assigned to a member of the community who wanted to experiment with pre-fabricated systems (59).

Through this kind of strategy, the CVG was actually exploiting the value of individual entrepreneurship in achieving the goal of "having a better housing unit" ("better", according to the institution's criteria). We will see that, while the community organizations seemed to have supported the idea of collective solutions, according to CVG documents the institution seems to have looked for the community action through undermining its collective process—which might have implied a more politicized position against CVG—by promoting
individual initiative. Re-taking the first statement of this section, CVG was not only "setting an example", as the institution would argue: It was also penetrating, in a subtle manner, the community organization.

The training course project seems to have had the expected effects on the community, if the neighborhood association is to be assumed as a good representative of it (60). On December 23, 1981, the Directors of the neighborhood association presented to the CVG officials the statement of the residents' interest in being assigned vacant lots in the UD-293, in order to build their own houses. The residents expressed their willingness to design and construct their own type of units, since they did not like very much the models made by the institution (61). The lots were to be bought by the families under certain conditions. In principle, the cost of the barracks in Colinas de Unare would be somehow paid to the relocated residents. As we can guess from the broad difference between the institution's and the residents' valuations of the housing units, there were conflicts in the process of definition of the amount to be paid. The available documents say that very few residents agreed with the institution, but at the end their acceptance was obtained by CVG (62). No details are given on the bargaining process or the reasons for the community to accept, but it could be hypothesized that the lack of bargaining power of the community, due to the lack
of stronger, cohesive, politically clear organizations, together with the manipulation through the formal community organizations, or the community's fear of losing any possible return when expelled from their original barracks, lead the residents to accept the deal. The cost of the land was set between 60 and 100 Bolívares per square meter (1 1982-bolívar = 4.3 dollars; 1 1983-bolívar = 8 to 10 dollars) (63).

CVG documents state that the lots were assigned to those people "who were interested in receiving them". Should that be interpreted as "who could articulate their demands in order to reach the institution", or "who could establish a convenient relation with the neighborhood associations"...? We have seen that only 51 families rejected being relocated by CVG, so there were 826 families that supposedly would need to be relocated. Being aware that they would be dislodged anyway, which family would not be interested in receiving a lot? Possibly, those sectors of the community that still did not accept the dislocation or those that noticed that they would not be able to afford the costs involved in the relocation. Not much on this aspect can be extracted from the documents. CVG established certain requirements of eligibility to provide the lots to the families that manifested their interest; through them, the CVG attempted to avoid certain irregularities in the process of lot allocation. The requirements were:
... a) having been surveyed by the association and the CVG in June 1981; b) having neighborhood relations to other beneficiaries; c) being a permanent resident, together with his/her family, in Colinas de Unare...

(64).

The costs involved in the process of relocation constituted, by themselves, another constraint to overcome, and in fact, they restricted the ability of the worse-off families.

Each beneficiary was given a written certificate of the receipt of the lot, and was required to present a draft of the design of the house to be built, in order to be revised in terms of the standards and rules to follow. A formal contract was signed by the CVG and the National Institute for Worker's Training and Education, INCE, in February 1982, in order to provide training in construction to the residents that were interested in it. The contents and implications of the contract will be presented later on.

3.6. Different alternatives provided to the families to be relocated in the UD-293

The neighborhood associations, as we have said, were interested in a solution as "uniform" (unless it were against equity) as possible for all the members of the community. In
the beginning of the bargaining process, the alternative proposed to the people to be relocated was to give them the worth of their housing unit in Colinas in the form of construction materials for their new houses in the UD-293. Some residents, thinking that this alternative would have administrative difficulties that would delay the process, preferred to receive the worth of their barracks in cash, or, in other words, to subtract that amount of money from the cost of the lot assigned to them in the UD-293. This second alternative, according to the available documents, seemed to be attractive only to the better-off families in the community. The neighborhood association rejected this initiative, since it would mean a differential timing in the solution for the different members of the community. However, the fact that other alternatives already began to function (e.g., the relocation of the families that participated in the first construction training course by CVG...), persuaded the associations to allow for the other alternatives to be implemented.

The resulting alternatives are summarized by Vásquez (65), as follows:

Alternative 1: The cost of the barrack is subtracted from the cost to be paid for the lot in the UD-293, and the beneficiary builds by his/her own means: 164 families.

Alternative 2: The cost of the barrack is paid in the form of construction materials; the beneficiary builds by him/herself
and adds the rest of the materials needed: 103 families.

Alternative 3: INAVI offers a "popular credit" through the delivery of a State-built housing unit or construction materials: 118 families.

Alternative 4: The members of the family participate in courses implemented by the INCE, being then given the resulting housing units to those participants: 88 families.

Alternative 5: The cost of the barrack is paid to the resident in cash: 40 families. ...

In any of the cases, eventhough the family is supposed to receive or have the possibility to build a better housing unit than they had before, the family has to afford a cost that they did not have to think of while living in the Colinas. Besides that, the solution given by CVG did not seem to take care of the petty-commerce existing in Colinas de Unare; if it was included within the structure of the housing unit, at least it would be included in the valuation; if not, it is not clear whether the locals for the "bodegas" would be also paid to the owners (under the condition that they were residents, of course). Another unclear point is the one about finance. It is expectable that CVG would provide convenient conditions to the relocated families to pay the land lot they were being provided with as property. Nothing on that respect is said in the available documents. Anyway, since it is so difficult for a family with scarce resources or unstable sources of income to be granted a loan--unless a particular State program is specially created for that end--the additional costs to rebuild the house and move would be a significant economic problem for the families.
3.7. The elimination of barracks

By March 1982, seventy "barracks" had been dismantled, only twenty of them because their residents were relocated to the UD-293, through the regular procedures considered in the program. The rest were dismantled for reasons different from the "regular" relocation process: Thirty six units were moved to the UD-293 during an emergency situation caused by heavy rain in July, 1981. Two were eliminated because their owners already lived in another unit in Colinas de Unare. Six units were eliminated because it was proved that their owners lived somewhere else in the city. One additional unit was also eliminated because it was built after the survey made by CVG and the neighborhood association; two more were in the same situation, but it is clearly stated in the documents that they were built by "non-Venezuelans". Another three units were eliminated when CVG discovered that they belonged to "non-Venezuelans that had left for their country". From these twenty four barracks in "irregular" situation, one could think that at least eight, one third of them, were dedicated to renting. Though there is not data on this issue, it is known that rental market plays an important role within the so-called "marginal" communities. CVG did not provide any kind of solutions to those families, according to the documents revised (66).
In the second place, the importance given by CVG to the nationality of the members of the family must be highlighted, even though it seems that no differential treatments are applied to the "non-Venezuelans".

In the third place, it is interesting that, besides the few restrictions to the eligibility for relocation at the UD-293, (see quote on page 53, section 3.5) this is the only stage of the process where the criteria for selection of the "affected" or "benefited" families is clearly expressed. The lack of written criteria for the selection of subjects of policy throughout the accounts and documents revised constitutes a very critical point. It might mean both the possibility of arbitrary decisions, affected by particular circumstances and interests, the possible lack of consciousness and objectives of CVG, in relation to non-creation of inequality or unfair results through the process, and the lack of a concrete ground for the discussion with the community. (Of course, on the other hand, having written criteria does not guarantee at all that the process will not be arbitrary, or that the community will have the chance to discuss such criteria).
3.8. The Institutional Frame

The participation of the CVG:

The Corporación Venezolana de Guayana, given its responsibility over the process of urban development of Ciudad Guayana, assumed the task of coordinating the relocation of the community of upper-Colinas de Unare. Many of its "divisions" (in other sources, called "management offices") were involved in the process in one way or another, which meant a certain level of complexity in the decision making and implementation procedures. As we mentioned at some points during the account, administrative and financial problems, generally caused by delays in the process, affected the implementation of certain steps, while creating confusion and distrust among the affected population. According to the documents recently published by members of CVG involved in the process, problems of institutional coordination have appeared also in the last months (67).

The divisions involved in the program were:
1.- Division of Engineering and Construction (DIC): Provided the economic resources for physically developing the UD-293, for paying for the houses to be demolished, and for the implementation of the demolition itself.
2.- Division of Finance and Control (DFC): Provided the support and control in administrative issues.

3.- Division of Urban Planning (DPU): Together with DIC, planned the "physical" aspects in the UD-293 (i.e., lot distribution, services and infrastructure).

4.- Division of Real Estate: Has under its responsibility the administration of the land and infrastructure owned by the CVG in Ciudad Guayana; thus, it was in charge of selling the land lots at the UD-293 to the relocated families.

5.- Division of Cultural and Social Development (DDSC): It assumed the responsibility over all the "social aspects" of the project, such as land lots' allocation, self-help construction processes, community organization and training of the population. According to the documents revised, an inter-divisions committee was created in March 3, 1982, including representatives for all of the above mentioned divisions, and being coordinated by the "chief" of the project "South Airport", within whose limits Colinas de Unare and the UD-293 were (68).

Since in all the available documents the DDSC is presented as having a leading role in the program, the rest of the divisions acting as "providers" of the support needed for the implementation, it would be interesting to add some data on the DDSC goals and functions.
The DDSC, former Division of Human Development, has as its primary goal

... the promotion of social and cultural development of the inhabitants and communities of the region, through the provision of a general and broader access to the benefits of education, culture and information, in order to strengthen human solidarity, to improve social, cultural and political conditions of marginality, and to establish the base for a fairer social order. In achieving those goals, the DDSC has incentivated the people to actively participate in the decision-making processes related to community issues, according to the guidelines established in the VI National Plan... (69). (Emphasis added).

We could describe the DDSC organizational structure as follows. Vertically (hierarchically), it is divided into two units: The Management Unit (Unidad de Gerencia), dealing with administrative and planning issues, and the Assistance Unit (Sub-gerencia), dealing with the implementation of the programs defined by the Management Unit. Each unit is divided into sub-units. The Management Unit has two sub-units: Administration and Planning. The Assistance Unit has five sub-units in charge of implementation of programs developed at the Planning Sub-unit of the Management Unit (Educational Development, Communication and Cultural Development, Social Urban Promotion, Sports and Recreation, and Documentation and Libraries).

The Social Urban Promotion Sub-unit, in particular, is responsible for the "promotion and creation of grass-roots organizations in the marginal communities, with the active
participation of the inhabitants" (70). This sub-unit, as the implementation body, and the Planning Sub-unit (División de Formulación y Control de Proyectos) are the two areas of CVG more closely involved in the two programs considered in this paper, and include the personnel which is in closer relation to the community organizations.

Now that almost all of CVG's offices are in Ciudad Guayana, we could find within this institution two kinds of conflicts in the approach and perception of reality. The first of them is the potential conflict between divisions. Each of the divisions, as their names suggest, view reality from different professional backgrounds, and thus, are "defending" the interests of the institution in different areas of action, and it would not be strange to find conflicts, for example, between the Division of Social and Cultural Development, that has to directly face the communities' demands, and the Division of Real Estate, that has to optimize the economic use of the land and the infrastructure according to the ideal of "new industrial city" under which the institution was created.

The second kind of potential conflict is the one among the different levels of decision-making, that is, between those officials who are "in the office", making the "big decisions" and the planning, and those who are in the field,
who have to be facing the immediate operational decisions every day, and who depend upon the "big decisions" of the former. In brief, this type of potential conflict is what we called in the previous chapter "the reproduction of the old 'Caracas-site' dichotomy".

When such conflicts acquired a critical character (that is what we might think happened in the case of Colinas), the solution was to substitute a more "rational", "objective", "technical" device for implementation (as a private enterprise, supposedly politically neutral), for the possibly too-involved representative of the institution.

Other institutions:

Two other institutions are directly involved in the process of implementation of the relocation of Colinas de Unare: The National Institute of Housing (INAVI), and the National Institute for Workers Training and Education (INCE). As we have said in previous sections, the role of the INAVI was to build certain number of houses, giving easy payment conditions, and to give "popular credits" for the payment of construction materials by the relocated families.

INCE, as we have also briefly commented, advised CVG in
the implementation of the first training course at the UD-293, and, later, signed a contract with CVG, committing itself to provide training to a bigger group of the relocated families.

The contract INCE-CVG was signed in February 24, 1982. Through it, INCE took the responsibility to plan, coordinate and implement the training courses for the future inhabitants of the UD-293 who wanted to self-build their houses. There would be three types of courses: On "cement floors", on "brick walls", and on "plaster application". INCE would take care of buying, transporting, storing and distributing the necessary materials. On the other hand, CVG would pay for the actual cost of the course, would decide the lots that would be subject to self-help construction, would provide for vigilance and the needed emergency costs, and would pay a subsidy of 30 Bolivares/day to each of the participants in the courses, who would also be selected by the CVG, after a process of promotion of the program. The contract did not touch the point of the criteria for the selection of the participants.

As we can see, this program worked as a way for the participants to build their own houses, as a way to get construction skills, and also as a temporary source of income. However, (a) the lack of explicit criteria for the selection of the beneficiaries of the program could, again, mean less control over irregularities in the distribution of such bene-
fits; (b) beyond the possibility of constructing their own house—which, of course, is an important achievement--, there is not any predictable way in which such skills can be profitably applied, except in the informal sector.

The Municipal Council and its special housing agency, FUNVICA (Fundación de la Vivienda del Distrito Caroni), are conspicuously absent in the whole process; they are supposed to have competence on these issues, and, especially, to have a direct relation with the functioning of the neighborhood associations. This absence reinforces the idea that CVG is increasing its emphasis upon urban issues, while, as its powerful and "paternalistic" role has always implied, excluding other important actors (potentially conflictive ones) from the management of the problems of the city.

The neighborhood associations:

The Law of Municipal Regime of Venezuela, promulgated in 1978, considered one form of community organization through which different neighborhoods can formally discuss their problems and articulate their demands to the government. Those organizations, the "neighborhood associations" (asociaciones de vecinos), came to institutionalize the role fulfilled before by the asociaciones, in the middle class "urbanizaciones" and the comités de barrios in low income and squatter-settle-
ments' communities. Their creation also eases the access of government guidelines to the grass-roots, as well as its control over the latter, since the neighborhood associations are, in the end, organizations conceived by the government and acting within the frame of government institutions.

This kind of organization model promoted by the government could fit into what Castells (71) calls "controlled popular mobilization", whose implications will be commented later.

In this particular case-study, as described in the documents, we have noted the sudden transformation of the community organizations from a form that evidenced an open conflict with the State, to one that apparently collaborated with it in the achievement of goals mainly defined by the latter. Two interconnected factors might have caused that: (a) The strategy followed by the State, and (b) the prevailing party-affiliation in the two neighborhood associations.

With respect to the first issue, the former attempt to totally dislodge the population generated an open conflict between CVG and the community, which could overcome the divergence among member's particular interests, and generate a
strong movement. Following this, the CVG changed its strategy, approaching the population, and very probably making use of members of the community clearly tied to the party in power, to achieve a collaborative attitude.

With respect to the second issue (party-affiliation), we saw that there existed a coincidence in that the lower-Colinas de Unare community, being the more physically-stable, was tied to the party in government, and was the one left untouched in the site. The upper-Colinas de Unare, on the contrary, was related to leftist groups and was the one subject to dislocation. How much the decision of dislocation was related to purely technical factors, and how much was it related to the political ties of the two communities, is a first issue. Whether the physical instability, and thus, higher risk to dislocation, made it easy for more radical groups to establish roots in the upper-Colinas de Unare, is a second issue. However, with respect to this, a CVG official stated that CVG had contracted a group called "Center for Popular Formation" (CFP), constituted by community leaders advised by an autonomous institution with progressive orientation called "Centro al Servicio de la Acción Popular" (CESAP), and that this group was in charge of creating the base for community organization in upper-Colinas de Unare. Later, possibly noticing that this kind of organization could get out of hand, CVG stopped the process by ending its contract

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with the CFP. This last element shows a case in which a supposed process of "controlled popular mobilization" can---against government will---be generating an autonomous mobilization; this can be due to government's inability to fulfill by itself the organization process, having to rely on groups that, unexpectedly, might have different aims (like the CFP). Mobilization through the COPEI-affiliates, on the other hand, seems to have been more fruitful to the CVG.

3.9. Some opinions of CVG officials about the development of the program of Colinas de Unare

Besides the way the institution approached the problem and implemented "the solution", the opinions of the CVG members about achievements, failures, and perspectives of the program of Colinas de Unare might help to identify the values, criteria and assumptions that underlie CVG's approach towards the low income communities in Ciudad Guayana. In the following paragraphs, the "good" aspects, "bad" aspects, and recommendations of some CVG officials related to the program are summarized.

"Positive" aspects of the program:

CVG officials place the most important value of the
Colinas de Unare program on its ability to create social integration through community participation. The fact that the initial conflict was channeled and turned into a sort of political "success" for the CVG--since the process was developed with no need of violence--is the major achievement highlighted by CVG officials.

Values such as private property as a base for social security, and "hard" work as the means to acquire the right to live in the city, charged with a sense of conventional morality, were supported as motivations for the participation of the community.

The person in charge of the CVG office at the UD-293 considered that the relocation of the community of upper-Colinas

...Constituted, for those families, one of the most transcendental events in relation to social security, since having their own land lots, provided with social services, stimulates them to build by their own effort a hygienic house, and only then they could feel that their long period of instability has finished... (72).

...What initially was a problem became an interesting experience of urban upgrading [?] through a participatory process of community self-management... (73).

...[This process proves that] applying with good sense the political concept of Community Development (e.g., the convergence of the needs that constitute a social problematic and the genuine attempt of the State to tend the popular demands), adequate solutions to real and felt needs could be reached... (74).

(Emphasis added).
The "negative" aspects of the program, as viewed by the CVG:

One of the critiques of the program was that it was never a consistent, well-organized, continuous process. The chief of the local office of CVG at the UD-293, in one of its reports, stresses this incremental, emergency-character of the program; indirectly, he attributes it to the lack of a fluent communication between levels at the CVG, and to the sudden change of policy of the CVG with respect to the barrio, which generated unexpected demands to the institution. He also indicated that this character makes it very difficult to carry on a full, comprehensive evaluation of achievements (75).

The second critique is related to the administrative inefficiency in running the program. Pinelly talks about (a) administrative rigidity that hinders the implementation of quick solutions in case of emergency; (b) lack of "clever" and on-time decision-making at the adequate levels in the CVG, which had required that many decisions were finally taken "in the field", creating confusion and lack of coordination in the decision-making process; (c) the unexpected and informal participation of INAVI, which ignored all the agreements between the community and the CVG; (d) the bureaucratism and "emotional-bias" of administrative processes at CVG which also damaged the decision-making process; and (e) the irregular
functioning of the inter-divisional committee of CVG. In sum, Pinelly, the person in charge of the program in the field, complains about the absolute divorce from, and lack of support of the "higher" levels of the institution, to his actions and demands. His complaints are mostly oriented towards problems of efficiency of the system above him (again, a reproduction of the feeling of "painful inaccessibility to power" that was mentioned in the case of the dichotomy Caracas-site). However, we could also consider that the nature of the sources of information—official reports—might hide other complaints related to the approach and assumptions of higher levels of decision. Pinelly also notes that the lower-income families were still living at Colinas de Unare in August 1982, and they were being heavily affected by the changes in the area caused by the relocation of their neighbors. Pinelly suggested quick solutions that would be difficult to implement, due to the financial inability of these families.

The director of the DDSC, on the other hand, talked very generally about "political factors involved in the program" as causes of problems.

What was never questioned in the documents or interviews was the base of the concept of participation utilized by the institution: As long as it implied a smooth flow of information on community demands and a certain level of commu-
nity mobilization around specific goals, it was considered an ideal one.

Recommendations:

The main recommendations made by the CVG officials for the future actions of the institution with respect to Colinas de Unare are summarized as follows:

1.- ...[To] reinforce the team dealing with technical and social issues, in order to strengthen the activities of training and socio-cultural promotion, and to stimulate new coexistence habits which are adapted to the requirements of the planned city..." (76).

Again, adjustment of the people to the planning process is the goal. In addition to that, "dis-adjustment" is viewed as an educational issue rather than an issue relative to the segregating, exclusive character of the industrial development of Ciudad Guayana (and the country).

2.- To avoid, by means of physical elimination and prevention, the settlement of new families in the vacant barracks or lots whose former occupants have been relocated (77).

3.- The local official of CVG at the UD-293 showed his preoccupation about the contracting of a private enterprise, in 1982, to manage the technical and social problems that he had been managing until that moment. He recommended to higher
levels of decision at CVG, to allow him to advise the private enterprise, at least until its members could get a complete idea of the history and implications of the program. It is curious how CVG attempted to delegate its responsibility on the program to a private entity, generally viewed in Venezuela as more "objective" and efficient than a government-related institution as CVG.
IV.- THE PROGRAM OF TRAINING IN ARTISAN PRODUCTION OF THE "DEMOSTRADORAS DEL HOGAR"

In contrast to the program of relocation of Colinas de Unare, which was a quick intervention upon what CVG considered as an emergency situation, the program of the "Demostradoras del Hogar" (DH) has been a continuous intervention with long-term goals; it has been part of the actions of the Division of Social and Cultural Development (former Division of Human Development) almost since CVG was founded. The analysis of its goals, methodologies, achievements and changes over time will also help us build an image of the values, criteria and motivations that move the CVG in dealing with the low income population of Ciudad Guayana.

The information mainly comes from interviews with the "Demostradoras" themselves, in February, 1983. This section of the paper, like the one on Colinas de Unare, being only based on institutional data and opinions, does not pretend to be a comprehensive one. Certain "conclusions" will be only hypothetical, their proof depending on further research about people's perceptions of the program.
4.1. General definition of the program

Through the program of the DH, the residents of low income communities in Ciudad Guayana are approached by a team of Social Workers ("Demostradoras del Hogar"), who help in organizing such communities around the search for the solution to certain community problems (which are the ones defined by CVG, sometimes after community request), or around the implementation of certain educational and health programs of CVG.

The program has, currently, four areas:

a) **Health**, through which the participants from the communities receive information about current health programs being diffused in the region or the country;

b) **"Comunidad Educativa"** (Educational Community), a program through which the community of the barrio receives the school building to be managed, maintained and used according to the community's criteria and needs (guaranteeing, at the same time, lower costs for the CVG);

c) **"Asociación de Vecinos"** (Neighborhood Associations), the program through which the neighbors from a certain barrio receive all the information and training needed in order to establish the kind of neighborhood organizations that allow them, through the law, to articulate their demands to different levels of government (we talked about them extensively in relation to the program of Colinas de Unare);
d) **Artisan Production and Handcrafting**, which is, out of all of the above, the program of the DH that directly and explicitly attempts to affect the economic patterns of the families. This program that trains women, predominantly housewives, in the barrios, enabling them to produce certain kinds of goods, is the one to be considered in the present paper.

4.2. Objectives

We have seen, in the case of Colinas de Unare, how CVG officials at different levels could hold conflicting views, due to their different roles in, and closeness to the actual implementation of the programs. Since it was not possible during the visit to Ciudad Guayana to find documents which explained the goals of the program in a "formal" way, it was necessary to find out about that matter through the personal interviews.

For the Assistant to the Director of the Division of Social and Cultural Development of CVG, a person who is related to the definition of the general goals of the Division, and thus, who could have a clear idea of the role of this program within the general process of social and economic
development of the city—as viewed by CVG—the objective of this program was

...to generate additional income for the poor families in Ciudad Guayana, in a direct way (by the production of goods that could be sold), and in an indirect way (by helping in building new patterns of consumption and family organization that would imply economies for the family)... (78).

When asked about the goals of the program, the team actually dealing with the daily implementation of the program answered that the main goal of it was related to the "organization of the community", and that it was a "point of entry for other programs into the community" (79). It is important to note that, either because of different kinds of professional formation, or because of the different perspectives on the program, acquired through a different kind of participation in it, these two different interviewees expressed different goals. They show that, at the "planning" level, the economic benefits are being stressed and publicized, while at the "implementation" level the primary goal would be the creation of an organizational base to introduce other programs. These goals are not necessarily opposed or mutually exclusive; in fact, both could be valid objectives for such a program. However, if the "Demostradoras" do not consider the economic goal as an important one, due to their particular professional formation, or to other reasons, it means that possibly it is not being pushed for or achieved. That does constitute a conflict—-one more—-between what is planned in the offices of
CVG and what is happening in the city. With respect to the expressed goals themselves, we could say that
a) "Generating additional income for the families" would require not only training, but the creation of the necessary production and marketing structure that enabled the participants to actually generate some surplus;
b) The institution seemed to be, again, trying to modify "consumption and organization patterns", supposedly in accordance to implicit values and concepts of what a typical Ciudad Guayana's family should be. Statements similar to this were observed in the documents about Colinas de Unare;
c) Also as in the previous case-study, building the base for a community organization that complements the action of the institution at the grass-roots, is a central goal of the CVG. This reinforces the idea that the institution supports the model of "controlled popular mobilization" as a way to deal with low income communities and to implement programs at that level.

4.3. Outreach method

The outreach method has changed since the program was first implemented. While at the beginning the social workers --then called "promotoras", promoters--entered the communities
through their already established organizations, the neighborhood associations, for example, the method now is to reach the potential participants through direct diffusion, "house by house". The shift from the "collective" approach to the "individual" approach is interesting for the present study. When compared to the Colinas, it reflects the fact that CVG "utilization" of the mass organizations does not follow a general pattern: It seems to depend highly on the particular level of politicization, party-affiliation and type of problem present in each community. Even though it is known that certain community organizations keep collaborating with the diffusion and implementation of the program, one of the interviewees talked about the existence of certain "political" problems in the implementation of the program: A neighborhood association has been in conflict with the promoters of the program (in the UD-123).

Another curious point is that no general diffusion campaign has been carried on. The program has been applied to roughly the same barrios since it was first implemented. One of the possible reasons is that the program has created a certain infrastructure and demand in those barrios, which justify not leaving them; on the other hand, the evident resource scarcity impedes the expansion of the program to other barrios. This could also explain the lack of explicit criteria for the selection of the barrios to be subject to
this program. In some sense, the constraints imposed by "reality" determine both an inertial and a non-systematic functioning of the program.

In the "house by house" promotion of the program, the Demostradoras del Hogar present to the women of the barrio a list of all the available courses; the participants decide on the type of course they would like to attend, and the schedules; the courses are usually given either at the headquarters of a mass organization, in the school of the barrio, or in the house of one of the participants.

4.4. Incidence upon social and economic organizations

Since the end of 1982, the program has been implemented in three different manners, to three different kinds of groups:

- Group A: This group is formed by the "new" participants, those who are taking the courses for the first time; they can be guided either by the Demostradoras themselves or by the so-called "multiplying agents" (MA), who are those participants of previous courses that have acquired certain skills, and are willing to dictate courses to
their neighbors.

- Group B: This type of group is formed by the MA themselves; they receive special preparation that enables them to give courses to other beginning groups.

- Group C: Formed by women that are reached through the schools where their children study. In some cases, instead of reaching the beneficiaries directly, through the "house by house" method, the Demostradoras contact the school organizations, the "educational communities", and prepare courses to be given in the schools buildings to the mothers of the children in those schools.

From the above paragraphs, we have seen that the program has begun to change its own structure by incorporating in its team (under different conditions than those enjoyed by the Demostradoras, however) those outstanding and economically-able participants who manifested their interest in promoting and implementing the courses. The program has also begun to generate certain forms of organization that attempt to transcend the scope of the training courses (this would be consistent with the goals expressed by the Demostradoras). Since February 1982, the MA started organizing themselves, under CVG advise, into the so-called "Comités Femeninos" (Women's Committees); they are composed of eight to ten women by barrio. These "women's committees" organize courses for the
MA, promote the program among the community, establish inter-
relations with other committees from other barrios, and sup-
port other kinds of organizations, generally promoted by CVG,
as well (e.g., the educational committees and the health
committees). We can see, then, how the training programs
become a device for organizing the community "from above".

In terms of the economic organization generated by this
program, it was only in mid-1982 that an initiative was taken
to give some formal structure to the production processes
developed by the participants in the courses. Before that,
only individual participants, supported by their own "entre-
preneurial" skills and their relatively better economic situa-
tion within the community, could start production enterprises.
In mid-1982, an attempt was made to create what is called
"pre-units" of production: Those women that could afford to
do it (and that was actually a condition, since no economic
help is being given to those pre-units yet) joined small
production groups, and began to produce these kinds of goods
that they learnt to produce in the courses. The production
takes place in the house of one of the members of the pre-
unit, with the materials and resources available in their
pockets. Each one of these groups is formed by an average of
five women; there are already eight groups of this sort in
Ciudad Guayana.
In addition to the fact that the production pre-units are not given any economic support by CVG, there is also a lack of preparation in terms of marketing and administration of the production. The first element implies that only those women whose families' economic situation is relatively better-off would be able to participate in the pre-units of production, since these production activities require a certain amount of investment taken from the consumption resources of the family, and, also, are absorbing the labor of the women who are participating in them. The second element implies that the bargaining power of such production units in the market, as well as the surplus that the participants can receive from this process, are quite small. Thus, even though, recently, efforts have been made to give an "economic appeal" to the program through the creation of these pre-units, we could conclude that the program is not really providing the necessary channels for the participants to generate a significant income for their families. This fact is opposed to the goal expressed by the Assistant to the Director of the DDSC of CVG. From what we have said until now, we could conclude that the program of the Demostradoras del Hogar, while attempting to affect the patterns of organization of the community in order to adapt them to the fulfillment of the goals that the institution has, is not providing the participants with instruments to reinforce their economic situation (or it is providing those instruments in a
differential and selective way, meaning that the program could be reinforcing economic differentiations in the barrios).

4.5. Subjects

The goods that the participants of these courses are taught to produce are: Clothes, cakes, design on material, dolls, christmas ornaments, cards, "guajiro"-style tapestry, shoes, ceramics, flower ornaments, Venezuelan dishes, "piñatas", decorated cushions.

The total number of participants for 1980 was 1057, distributed into 51 courses, given in barrios of Puerto Ordaz and San Félix. In 1982, the figures grew to 69 courses given to a total of 1458 persons. In 1982, the figures were: approximately 2300 persons and 93 groups. During this last year, there was a significant increase in the number of participants--even though, as it can be seen, the rate of participants per course decreased; this fact might be due to the introduction of the MA, which made possible the proliferation of courses. The number of production pre-units was eight, involving approximately 40 women. The groups were dedicated to the production of: Cakes (two pre-units), dolls (one), design on cloth (one), "piñatas" (one), ceramics (two), and knitting (one).
The Director of the DDSC of CVG declared that he considered that the courses were not collaborating on the change of the "inadequate food habits" of the families, since the main emphasis in the cooking courses was put on foods rich in carbo-hidrates, a typical problem in Venezuelan diet, and also since the majority of the other products were not basic ones (80). On the other hand, these courses seem to be the ones which the inhabitants of the barrios demand the most, possibly because of lack of knowledge about alternatives. In any case, it can be observed that most of the goods produced are not income-inelastic or basic ones, so its marketing possibilities within the barrios are dubious. Only some of them are supposed to be advantageously produced at such an small scale; however, the lack of adequate connections for the acquisition of the raw materials at lower prices makes it difficult for these potential producers to offer goods at attractive costs. Their only advantage, that is, the particular characteristic of being "unique", hand-made, is affected by the stereo-typed methods that the participants are taught.

4.6. Personnel

The group implementing the program of artisan production of the DH, is formed by one coordinator (Ms. Elina de Rey), a Social Worker, and four "Demostradoras". The prepara-
tion of the latter consist on a special training at the level of high-school in one of the two vocational schools that train this type of professional in Venezuela, and that are located significantly far from Ciudad Guayana. In addition to this team, we have noted already the presence of the MA, which were approximately five by each Demostradora, by February 1983. The Demostradoras, as it has been already said, are not subjected to any kind of training on marketing and administration. CVG made an experimental attempt, contracting a private institution from Caracas (CESAP, Centro al Servicio de la Acción Popular), in order to train them on organizational and administrative matters. However, the contract was terminated; besides the recent creation of the pre-units for production, no further advance has been experienced on that line.

4.7. Achievements

The main achievement the Demostradoras think they have reached, besides the training of several thousand women in the areas the program considers, is "a better level of organization of the community, that enables it to generate solutions for its own problems" (81).

In fact, in a country characterized by the general lack of identification of the communities with the decision-making,
this type of programs at least help the community on knowing some channels through which they might reach such officials. It does not act effectively, however, in the opposite direction, that is, leading the decision-makers to modify their actions according to the communities needs, unless political stability is under risk. This last assertion can be made in view of the lack of communication existing even between different levels within the same institution. Furthermore, if the above possibility of contact of the people with the decision-making mechanisms is only utilized by the latter in order to ease the implementation of pre-established goals of the institution and the system in general--which we have seen is actually what the institution is seeking for, without attaching any negative value to such an intention--these types of programs will hardly have any positive result in terms of generating autonomous social mobilization. This last goal must be searched for from without the government institutions.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS

The relationship between the state and the popular sectors--the low-income, in many cases squatter-settling communities in dependent-capitalist urban centers--has become a critical one, given the increasing size of those sectors and their increasing ability to articulate their demands in a concrete political form. The state's conception of, and approach to, such a relationship has assumed several forms, from one guided by "humanitarian" motivations, trying to improve the living standards of the population without looking at its deeper causes, to one which recognizes the revolutionary--or, at least, conflictual--potential of such groups, attempting to channel and coopt popular experiences in terms of autonomous organization. This paper has presented two cases that illustrate how the relationship state-low-income-communities is taking place in a new industrial city: Ciudad Guayana.

The increasing lack of control of the Corporación Venezolana de Guayana over the major economic programs on which the growth center of Ciudad Guayana was based has determined a shift in the emphasis of its interventions towards its second area of action: The management of the regional and urban settings related to the growth pole, that is, the Guayana Region and Ciudad Guayana. This change means moving from dealing with supposedly nationally-oriented
interests, which by the 1960's were tied to a developmentalist ideal of economic growth and modernization (technocratically considered to be on the "public interest"), to the regional and--specially--local levels, e.g., basically dealing with social issues. For the state, "dealing with social issues" in Ciudad Guayana involves, as a very important component of its interventions, dealing with the growing low income, squatter settlers' sector.

What has the shift in emphasis of CVG functions implied in terms of its interventions towards low income communities? From the case-studies, it seems that it has meant very little in terms of changing the ideology underlying such interventions. The case-studies show how CVG keeps thinking of squatter settlers as traditional, disintegrated rural immigrants whose behavior patterns ought to be changed in order for them to match the dynamics of the modern, industrial city, approach that has been extensively documented against, and whose main counter-argument arises from the observation of barrios in Ciudad Guayana (82). The institutions goals with respect to social development are supported on that subordination of human issues to the requirements of economic growth.

In a system where the state cannot support its actions any more (or solely...) by means of force, the manipulation
of popular organization through its key points (as shown in the case of the Demostradoras) becomes important. As a result, it also seems that that shift towards a more explicit socio-political action has coincided with a slight change in the means to concretize such an ideology: While CVG keeps being a dominant and paternalistic piece within the institutional structure in Ciudad Guayana, it tended to change its clientelistic relationship to low income communities for one of "controlled popular mobilization", in other words, changing the role of the community from being a passive and dependent soliciter, to being an active part in the implementation of the Corporation's goals. This kind of strategy was exemplified in the story about Colinas de Unare. Two factors, the promulgation of the Law of Municipal Regime in 1978, establishing the channels for the communities to articulate their demands at the local level, and the presence of a Christian-democrat government (1979-1984) flagging the policy of popular "participation" in the decision-making, might be related to this new approach.

Castells says about the strategy of controlled popular mobilization that

...[It] expands the hegemony of the dominant class [represented by the state] over the popular sectors, which are organized under the label of "urban marginals". However, the crisis of this hegemony—if it takes place—has much more serious consequences over the prevailing social order than the rupture of the paternalistic linkages of a traditional political machine—
ry...(83). (Emphasis added).

What the perspectives and effects of State interventions would be in the case of Guayana, which form is such an "hegemony" taking, and the likelihood of its crisis, are issues that go beyond the scope of the present paper, and which would be very interesting topics for further research.

After observing CVG actions and criticizing the consistent realization of an ideology that tends to reinforce the inequality in the allocation of resources, one question arises: What could we have expected the CVG to do, that would have implied the achievement of a "better" result? Another question arises: What can we consider to be a "better" result?

According to CVG own objectives and CVG reports, the two studied programs might be considered political successes with some technical failures. The case of Colinas de Unare shows that CVG structure has the level of flexibility needed to absorb community demands and to integrate community organizations into the attempt of achieving the institution's goals. In the case of the Demostradoras, CVG is also channeling the energies of a potentially conflicting sector of the population--the "housewives", those who, in a culture like Venezuelan, have to deal directly with the increasing problems of housing, social services and home economy--into
the creation of social networks that ease the implementation of government campaigns. Improvements, according to CVG members, should take place at the administrative level, and in the relations between different spheres of decision within the CVG (in the case of Colinas de Unare), and in the mechanisms to insure economic efficiency (in the case of the pre-units of production created by the Demostradoras).

However, if the goal is to reach community organizations that really reflect and express the diverse interests within the communities, and to have institutions that are able to provide them with the instruments to prioritize and realize such interests, and that are also able to reach a balance between national and local interests, then the two stories presented here show that CVG is far from reaching—even from considering—that goal. Now, the solution may not even be possible within the general social, political, economic conditions present in Venezuela. What the limits of a system like Venezuela's are, and how much can be achieved through plain reforms, are other "big" issues underlying a study like this.

Finally, with respect to the case-studies, there are some lines of research that should be followed, some questions whose answer can help build a more comprehensive view of
actual CVG interventions and their impacts. In the first place, as we have been saying along the paper, it would be necessary to make field research on how different actors within the affected communities view the development of both programs. From such a research, we might have a completely different image of what the programs have meant in practice. In the second place, it would be interesting to evaluate the real impacts of the programs both in terms of the goals set by the CVG, and in terms of the goals assumed in this paper as desirable (this latter criteria point might need more elaboration). In the third place---at a lower, implementation level---it would also be interesting to observe the performance of the private enterprise contracted by the CVG to deal with the case of Colinas de Unare, and to evaluate its economic, social and political costs.
APPENDIX 1:

Graph 1: Ciudad Guayana: Location

Graph 2: Ciudad Guayana: Sectors of the City and Activities
1) CIUDAD GUAYANA: LOCATION
2 CIUDAD GUAYANA
SECTORS OF THE CITY AND ACTIVITIES

- Housing
- Light Industry
- Heavy Industry

APPROX.: 1 cm = 0.5 km
APPENDIX 2:

Table 1: Ciudad Guayana: Total Population Classified by Age-Groups and Sector (April 1980)

Table 2: Ciudad Guayana: Percentage of the Population 15 Years or Older who are Unemployed and who are Working in Construction (1968-1980)

Table 3: Ciudad Guayana: Type of Buildings by Sectors of the City (October 1979)
TABLE No.1: Ciudad Guayana: Total Population Classified by Age-Groups and Sector (April 1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL*</th>
<th>AGE GROUPS**</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 - 4</td>
<td>5 - 14</td>
<td>15 - 24</td>
<td>25 - 64</td>
<td>65 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL C.G.</td>
<td>Abs.</td>
<td>339,800</td>
<td>58,177</td>
<td>96,611</td>
<td>67,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>17.12</td>
<td>28.43</td>
<td>19.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Ordaz Matanzas</td>
<td>Abs.</td>
<td>98,607</td>
<td>15,764</td>
<td>23,733</td>
<td>18,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>15.99</td>
<td>24.07</td>
<td>18.57</td>
<td>39.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Félix</td>
<td>Abs.</td>
<td>241,213</td>
<td>42,413</td>
<td>72,878</td>
<td>48,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>17.59</td>
<td>30.21</td>
<td>20.26</td>
<td>30.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentage of each sector relative to the total of the city.

** Percentage of each age-group relative to the total in the sector.

Source: Survey of Employment and Unemployment (Households), CVG, DEPI.
TABLE No. 2: Ciudad Guayana. Percentage of the Population (15 Years or Older) Unemployed and of the Population 15 Years or Older in the Construction Sector (1968-1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>% Unemployed Population</th>
<th>% Population Working In Construction Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1968</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1969</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1970</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1971</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1972</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1973</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1974</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1975</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1976</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1977</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1978</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1979</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1980</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE No. 3:  CIUDAD GUAYANA:  Buildings and "Ranchos" by Sector of the City (October 1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector of the City</th>
<th>Total # Buildings</th>
<th># of Ranchos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ciudad Guayana</td>
<td>Abs. 74,088</td>
<td>18,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 100.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Félix</td>
<td>Abs. 48,273</td>
<td>16,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 65.2</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Ordaz</td>
<td>Abs. 25,815</td>
<td>1,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 34.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 3:

Graph 3: Area of Action of CVG: 1960-1969

Graph 4: Area of Action of CVG: 1969-1983
3 C.V.G.:
AREA OF ACTION
1960-1969
(Development Zone)
According to Decrees #72, #92, 1969.

According to Decree 1331, 1975.

According to Decree 478, 1980.

4 C.V.G.:
AREA OF ACTION
1969 - 1983
(REGION GUAYANA)
APPENDIX 4:

Organizational Charts of the CVG

104
Chart No. 2. C.V.G. Organizational Structure 1971.

Source: C.V.G.
Taken from: Garcia, M.P.: La Experiencia de la Guayana Venezolana...
Chart No. 3. C.V.G. Organizational Structure, 1969.

Source: C.V.G.
Taken from: Garcia, M.P.: La Experiencia de la Guayana Venezolana... Caracas, U.S.B., 1983.
Chart No. 4. C.V.G. Organizational Structure 1981.

Source: C.V.G.
Taken from: Garcia, MP.: La Experiencia de la Guayana Venezolana...
FOOTNOTES


8. Ibid., p.7.


14. Definition of "Ranchos" given by the CVG: "Structures generally made from residual materials, built by their


33. Ibid., p.313.


35. Ibid., p.460.


37. The movement of CVG's offices from Caracas to Ciudad Guayana has been a slow and incremental process. Since the beginning of the process, an office of the Division of Urban Planning was located in Ciudad Bolívar, Capital of Bolívar State, and some engineering offices were in Ciudad Guayana. By 1972, the Decree #929 required that all regional corporations had an office in charge of coordinating and planning regional development aspects; CVG established, then, its "ORCOPLAN" (Regional Office for Coordination and Planning) in Ciudad Bolívar (GARCIA, op.cit., p.12). In 1977, the Unit of Urban Planning was finally moved to Ciudad Guayana, but there was a vacuum in its functioning until the personnel of Urban Planning established in Ciudad Bolívar was moved to Ciudad Guayana, a year and a half later (IRNR-USB, op.cit., p.III-14). By mid-1982, most of the offices were in Ciudad Guayana.


39. From conversation with Prof. Lisa Peattie, DUSP-MIT and member of the Joint Center team in 1963, April 1983.


43. Ibid., p.1.

44. PINELLY, Carlos: Informe Sobre Proceso de Reubicación de Habitantes de Colinas de Unare, Ciudad Guayana, CVG-DDSC, Diciembre 1982, p.3.

45. VASQUEZ, Hernán: Internal report on the process of relocation of Colinas de Unare (Untitled), Ciudad Guayana,
46. PINELLY, Carlos: Informe Sobre Proceso de Reubicación de Colinas de Unare, op.cit., p.2.

47. From conversation with María Nuria De Césarís, February 1983.


50. VASQUEZ, Hernán: Proyecto Especial..., op.cit., p.4.


52. Ibid., p.4.


54. Ibid., p.7.

55. PINELLY, Carlos: Informe Sobre Proceso de Reubicación de Habitantes de Colinas de Unare, op.cit., p.2.


57. VASQUEZ, Hernán: Proyecto Especial de Reubicación..., op.cit., p.6.

58. VASQUEZ, Hernán: Internal Report..., op.cit., p.11.

59. Ibid., p.8.

60. The neighborhood associations are the instruments conceived by the Venezuelan Law of Municipal Regime (1978), for the urban communities to organize themselves and express their demands to the Municipal Council of their respective city or urban district. They are directly selected by the community, and formalized through an application to the Municipality, supported by a minimum number of signatures from voters of the particular community.

62. Ibid., p.12.
63. Ibid., p.12.
64. Ibid., p.12.
68. Ibid, p.6.
70. Ibid., p.2.
72. PINELLY, Carlos: Informe Sobre Proceso de Reubicación de Colinas de Unare, op.cit., p.4.
73. Ibid., p.10.
74. Ibid., p.13.
75. Ibid., p.2.
76. PINELLY, Carlos: Informe Sobre Proceso de Reubicación de Habitantes de Colinas de Unare, op.cit., p.4.
77. VASQUEZ, Hernan: Proyecto Especial de Reubicación..., op.cit., p.12.
78. From conversation with Gilberto Rojas, Assistant to the Manager of the Division of Social and Cultural Development of the CVG. Ciudad Guayana, February, 1983.
79. From interview to the Demostradoras del Hogar, Ciudad Guayana, February 1983.
80. From conversation with Dr. Eduardo Castañeda, Manager of the Division of Social and Cultural Development of the CVG, Ciudad Guayana, February 1983.
81. From interview to the Demostradoras, February 1983.

82. See, for example:


CORRADA, Rafael: The Housing Development Program for Ciudad Guayana, Río Piedras, Puerto Rico, Univ. of Puerto Rico, Social Science Research Center, 1966.


PEATTIE, Lisa, and William PORTER: Social Issues in Designing a City, Cambridge, MA, MIT-DUSP, 19_._


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PINELLY, Carlos: Informe sobre Proceso de Reubicación de Habitantes Colinas de Unare, Ciudad Guayana, CVG - DDSC, Diciembre 1982.


VASQUEZ, Hernán: Informe Sobre Proceso de Reubicación de Colinas de Unare, Ciudad Guayana, CVG, 1982?