LABOR AND NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZING
IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING:
SIX ORGANIZATIONS IN HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT

by

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Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

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ABSTRACT

The economic and urban restructuring which transpired 
during the 1980's has important consequences for 
organizations engaged in social change. Labor unions and 
constituency-based neo-Alinsky neighborhood organizations 
and their memberships must adapt to new economic, 
political and social conditions. Research was conducted 
with six organizations in Hartford, Connecticut, to 
ascertain various means by which these types of 
organizations are adjusting to the restructured economy 
and also to compare their practices and examine the 
potential for collaboration between labor and community 
organizations.

Three labor unions with substantial membership bases in 
Hartford, Connecticut: Hotel Employees and Restaurant 
Employees Local 217; New England Health Care Employees-- 
District 1199/Service Employees International Union; and 
United Auto Workers Local 376 and Region 9A; and three 
neo-Alinsky neighborhood organizations that operate in 
Hartford: Asylum Hill Organizing Project; Hartford Areas 
Rally Together; and Organized North Easterners--Clay Hill 
and North End were each observed during the period of time 
from 1987 through 1990. Participant-observation, 
documentary research and extensive interviews were 
conducted.

Labor unions have innovated in the area of new organizing 
through the use of techniques which identify worksite 
leadership and maximize union contact with prospective 
members before employers become aware of unionization 
efforts. Strikes have become increasingly more difficult 
to win and unions have built community-labor coalitions 
and invigorated political action programs in order to 
broaden support for their efforts, especially in strike 
situations. Public policy trends of recent years and 
increasingly sophisticated employer resistance to 
unionization efforts continue to undermine union security. 
New political avenues are being developed by unions in 
response to these developments.
Neighborhood organizations involve participants in numerous campaigns on urban social consumption issues such as crime, education, taxation, housing and local development. These organizations select issues which yield the greatest possibility for organizational success. Participation in partisan politics on the part of these groups is prohibited in by-laws and discouraged by the staff and leadership in order to preserve the role and cohesion of the organizations. The organizations make extensive use of protest and media to orchestrate issues and bring pressure upon local public and corporate officials.

Both types of organizations use similar criteria and methods to identify and cultivate local grassroots-level and shopfloor-level leadership. The two types of organizations have very different relationships to legal structures and processes. Labor unions are constrained by the system of U.S. labor law and must devise methods to circumvent these constraints. Neighborhood organizations are often constrained by insufficient power to achieve their goals and sometimes confined by the methodological limitations of an exclusively local focus.

Successful coalitions between labor and community organizations require attention to and respect for differences in methodology and philosophy. In Hartford, a four year long strike at Colt Firearms by the United Auto Workers Local 376 spawned the formation of the Community-Labor Alliance for Strike Support in which organizational differences became problematic. Subsequently in a local third party initiative, People for Change, other organizational differences emerged and were confronted, both sets of problems involving conflicting organizational processes and different roles and responsibilities of leadership.

Activities in Hartford demonstrate a vitality in local urban politics and also offer examples of innovative responses to economic and urban restructuring. Continued exploration and analysis of localized responses are necessary and provide useful data to enhance and build theory.

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Gary Marx, Professor of Sociology
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The issues and struggles depicted and analyzed in the dissertation have been vitally important to Hartford and its movements. Admittedly, I am not a disinterested observer. These issues of are great concern to me and I have participated in many of the events described here. However, within the analysis I have attempted to highlight questions in a manner which advances scholarship and the movements simultaneously. I hope that I have lived up to the challenge and that others who care about these problems and movements may benefit from my efforts. Of course, despite all of the individuals who assisted me, I must claim responsibility for whatever errors may be found.
INTRODUCTION

On March 11, 1988, tenants affiliated with the Asylum Hill Organizing Project marched into the office of Hartford City Manager Alfred Gatta with bags of garbage. They collected the garbage from a building owned by a notorious slumlord who had recently been given an extension by city officials on court mandated improvements. Two days earlier, members of the New England Health Care Employees-District 1199 took over the office of Anthony Milano, the Director of the State of Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, demanding state action on the nursing shortage in State of Connecticut health care institutions. Throughout the same week on the twenty-first floor of a recently constructed skyscraper in downtown Hartford, in the National Labor Relations Board's Hartford office, an administrative law judge concluded daily sessions in a lengthy trial over a then two year continuing strike by the United Auto Workers against Colt Firearms. Meanwhile, an emerging political organization--People for Change--fresh from stunning successes in local elections, was about to begin a one and one-half day conference to chart its future.

At one level these events are evidence of the variety of activism and popular struggles in Hartford, Connecticut. Hartford offers a rich, interesting array of urban social movements. It is a city plagued with all of the problems experienced in large American cities, but at
a scale small enough to offer the activist a ready arena for organizing and the researcher opportunities for in-depth observations. It contains dramatic contrasts between concentrated corporate wealth downtown and pervasive neighborhood poverty. It has a powerful, highly organized business community and an increasingly sophisticated set of community and labor organizations.

On a somewhat different but related level, Hartford provides a setting in which one can readily examine the effects of economic restructuring and the varied responses of individuals and organizations affected by this restructuring. The economy of the city illustrates the shift of a once-vibrant manufacturing center to a finance, service and real estate driven economy.

What is taking place in Hartford is replicated in other American cities, each with its particular set of forces and institutions, and each with particular outcomes within the general contours of economic restructuring. The process of de-industrialization, the emergence of a large service sector, the resulting patterns of urban development and ensuring political strategies and ramifications—all elements of restructuring—impact millions of lives and entire communities in the United States. Plant closings, large-scale layoffs and the creation of low-wage service sector employment combine to create pressing new social realities. How individuals confront the very immediate changes in their lives as a result of broader social and economic trends is an
important aspect of the restructuring phenomenon. In particular, the organizational responses of collectivities who exist to defend and assist individuals in the throws of such change are key to our understanding of the outcomes.

This dissertation will examine how community and labor organizations in Hartford, Connecticut are confronting the changing economy. The economic restructuring taking place over recent decades has important implications for organizations that attempt to foster social change and presents new conditions to organizations engaged in collective action. Whether in the workplace or in the community, organizations who challenge the powerful interests that benefit from the emerging economic order themselves face profound challenges. The foci of this dissertation are how these organizations understand, interpret and adjust to the changes; how they organize and mobilize existing memberships in the current environment, with an emphasis on what are new techniques and practices; how they coalesce and work together to defend past achievements and foster new forms of social change; and the difficulties and conflicts they encounter in their efforts.

The Emerging Economy

Since the 1970's the U.S. economy has undergone a process of restructuring that impacts workers and communities. Tomaskovic-Devey and Miller (1982) and
Noyelle (1982) describe the phenomenon and assess its implications. Noyelle outlines its contours in terms of three propositions: 1) a new global economy in which U.S. manufacturing is declining relative to a growing service sector, and an increasing division in the labor process between highly skilled workers and unskilled workers; 2) a transformation of American urban economic structures based on service sector growth, and a resulting redefinition of relations of economic dominance and dependence among metropolitan areas; and 3) a transformation of urban labor markets characterized by new forms of segmentation, in turn contributing to and reinforcing the economic restructuring of urban areas.

Bluestone and Harrison (1982) elaborate the conditions which have given rise to this transformation and a number of the results for those who are caught in its midst. Competition and market penetration by foreign companies, the age and inefficiency of many older U.S. plants, the management practices of U.S. corporations and technological innovations facilitating the "hypermobility" of capital all have contributed to the decline of American manufacturing. The resulting displacement and economic insecurity of blue collar workers is associated with a plethora of health, mental health and other social and personal problems. Communities may experience the "ripple effects" of tax base erosion, decline in small businesses and municipal fiscal ills.
As the activities of U.S. corporations become globalized, a new set of producer services has evolved to facilitate these global operations which is shaping the character of U.S. cities. Noyelle identifies an entire range of services necessary for U.S. based multi-national firms: accounting, advertising, law, financial, real estate, consumer and other technical services. These service activities are creating a "new urban hierarchy" in which service-oriented decision-making centers command an economic dominance over production-oriented centers. The three-tiered hierarchy includes cities which are diversified producer service centers (nodal centers such as New York, Chicago, San Francisco and regional nodal centers such as Atlanta, Boston, Dallas), specialized producer service centers (Detroit, Hartford, Pittsburgh and others), and dependent centers (Buffalo, Gary, Worcester and others). Those cities which are able to transform themselves into service centers experience the downtown development boom of office construction, employment creation, new upscale consumer and leisure activities, as well as gentrification and real estate speculation. Those areas which remain production centers may suffer continual economic insecurities of capital flight, unemployment, underemployment, tax base erosion and generally depressed economies. The chart below illustrates this hierarchy.
The Urban Hierarchy  
(per Noyelle, 1982)

Highest Tier: Diversified Producer Service Centers  
- national and international corporate decision-making and finance centers  
- Examples: New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta, Boston, Dallas

Middle Tier: Specialized Producer Service Centers  
- sectorally specific corporate decision-making centers; government and education centers  
- Examples: Detroit, Hartford, Pittsburgh, Washington, D.C.

Lowest Tier: Dependent Production Centers  
- branch plant location, generally undiversified  
- Examples: Buffalo, Gary, Worcester

While within the two upper tiered types of cities manufacturing concerns may continue to operate, the corporate decision-making activities are what define their economies and enable growth and dominance.

Responses to the Emerging Economy

These changes do not transpire automatically and are accompanied by a set of economic and political strategies to mitigate popular reaction and resistance. A general attack on the social wage, increased opposition to unions and a general disciplining of labor and the poor have accompanied the transformation (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1985 and Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). Fisher (1984) characterizes these strategies as a "concerted ideological attack on the 'welfare state' and Keynesian economics." He describes an orchestrated set of corporate and political responses to the problems posed by the changing economy: the theme of an "age of limits", embodied in
budget balancing measures, reductions in social services, taxation policies to enhance corporate profitability, attacks on minority and women's rights.

Tomaskovic-Devey and Miller (1982) identify six objectives of what they term "recapitalization", the basic policy response in the early 1980's of "big business and banking interests", supported by "influential economists and policy analysts", designed to restore American competitiveness and the profitability of U.S. firms:

(1) Reduce taxation on corporations and the well-to-do in order to promote investment and thereby productivity.

(2) Contract the public sector in order to offset the decline in tax revenues, decrease federal deficits, and reduce inflationary pressure.

(3) Increase the role of manufacturing, especially of exported goods, within the private sector.

(4) Reduce inflationary pressures by restraining expansion of the domestic economy and dampening wage increases.

(5) Decrease governmental regulation of business and industry; reduce anti-trust action, especially against export-oriented firms; contraction of environmental, occupational safety and consumer protections.

(6) Lessen macro intervention in the economy and rely more on regulating the supply of money (p.24).

The objectives of this policy of recapitalization are to increase physical capital, i.e., investment in industry, to expand the role of private economic capitalism by reducing the role of government in the economy, and to diminish obligatory support for vulnerable
population groups. These national policies implicitly constitute an urban policy as much or moreso than any explicit national urban policy since the fate of urban centers is heavily dependent on larger economic trends.

On the local level, particularly in the older manufacturing centers of the Northeast and Midwest, municipal financial crises served as the prelude to recapitalization. Conservative solutions which emphasized local fiscal restraint, service curtailment and government inducements to business for reinvestment served to obscure the relationship of structural economic changes to municipal fiscal ills (Tomaskovic-Devey and Miller, 1982).

Recent patterns of economic development find cities, states and regions competing with each other through various tax incentive to gain a share of the growth within the economy (Gordon, 1979). A process of "underbidding" each other through tax incentive schemes such as enterprise zones at state levels and local property tax abatements and deferrals at municipal levels are some of the means by which states attempt to attract industry and cities attempt to attract real estate development. Connecticut was the first state in the nation to enact state-level enterprise zone legislation. Hartford's downtown skyline features a number of new large office buildings which were built with in the past fifteen years with the help of generous tax abatement agreements by the municipal government.

Analyses of the impact of this emerging economy
spell out a number of difficulties for labor and community organizations in confronting these developments. Bluestone and Harrison (1982) detail the problems unions face: demands for concessions in contract negotiations which take on the form of blackmail; impotence in the face of certain plant closings; a general undermining of the expectations and standards of living for workers; declining success of organizing drives in the face of sophisticated employer campaigns against unions. These factors are compounded by the fact that a large portion of the new employment in the service sector are low wage and dead-end jobs which lack union protection. As such, by the latter 1980's the level of unionization of the United States workforce was at a 30 year low of under 18%.

The problems for community organizations attempting to respond to these developments are likewise formidable. Community organization responses to issues such as downtown development vary from city to city, but generally are in a context of minimal resources and power, and often are construed by their targets and opponents as anti-growth. Fainstein and Fainstein (1985) analyze the impotency of community response to large scale redevelopment of the Times Square area in New York City. Mobilization efforts to defend adjacent neighborhood residents' interests which were channeled through "regular" political institutions had only minor impact on the planning process. In a study of Hartford, Neubeck and
Ratcliff (1988) argue that community organization efforts with respect to urban development questions are circumscribed by a set of political and economic factors which limit possibilities for redistribution of urban resources. Public policy leaders and even "enlightened" local corporate leadership make choices in the context of larger economic trends over which they themselves have very limited control. Both the reality and the threat of capital mobility emerge as disciplining forces on community organization initiatives, as well as on labor.

Harrison and Bluestone (1988) analyze new patterns of job creation in the United States. Compounding all of the problems described above are the low wages and salaries of a majority of the jobs created in the 1980's and the increasing use of part-time and temporary labor. Therefore, it is not even a question of whether or not new employment opportunities exist and are being created—they are indeed—it is the nature of the employment and what is feared will be the increasing inequality resulting from this new employment and its dire impacts on urban labor markets, in particular, that are of concern to analysts.

In the face of seemingly inexorable trends, unions and neighborhood organizations are placed in the position of attempting to defend and advance their members' interests. These organizations, in particular, confront the social and human costs of economic transformation and are called upon to mitigate its effects both in an objective and subjective sense. Objectively, the purpose
of these organizations is to represent individuals as workers or community residents. Subjectively, these are organizations to whom individuals turn and expect help in times of uncertainty when they feel that their interests are threatened. Plant closings, strikes over healthcare costs, income loss associated with concessions are but a few of the human issues labor unions encounter; deteriorating public services, displacement associated with new development projects, increasing tax burdens and other issues face community and neighborhood organizations.

The majority of workers in the United States are not members of unions: as stated earlier, under 18% of the workforce is organized and the number is shrinking. Moreover, many communities do not have active neighborhood organizations. There are, of course, other types of organizations who confront the effects of socio-economic change: advocacy groups, social service providers, community development corporations, religious institutions, as well as state and local governments all are involved in developing strategies and policies which respond to emerging social and economic conditions. Issue oriented groups concerned with civil rights, peace or foreign policy matters must pursue their agendas in this context, also. However, where they exist, labor unions and constituency-based neighborhood organizations are among those who penetrate most deeply into the grassroots
level of American society. They attempt to engage individuals in the process of social change by the direct organizing of working class and low income populations to act on their own behalf. These are precisely the populations whose lives are most severely affected by the emerging economy. Moreover, these organizations correspond to two very basic aspects of people's everyday lives—work and community. Developing effective strategies to counter the power of capital and organize on their members' behalf is complicated by a dichotomy in American social consciousness corresponding to these two spheres of life.

The Separation of Work and Community

Labor unions and constituency-based neighborhood groups reflect a dichotomy in American social and political consciousness described by Katzenelson (1981) in his analysis of the urban political terrain:

...The centerpiece of these rules (of urban politics) has been the radical separation in people's consciousness, speech and activity of the politics of work from the politics of community. This subjective division has been such a powerful feature of American urban life that it has been operative even in situations where blue-collar workers live in immediate proximity to their factories (p.6).

He asserts that in the workplace, workers generally respond as labor, but in their communities, working class people define their identity in terms of race, ethnicity and territoriality. In other Western nations, mass-based political parties of the left serve to link these two
aspects of people's lives. However, in the United States, the absence of such mass left parties, the history and present state of race relations, and the nature of the American two-party system translate into a very different set of political realities, most notably a very muted politics of class in the electoral arena. The void created by this absence, particularly in urban settings, has led instead to a politics based on patronage and services.

Katznelson's analysis begins with an account of the gradual physical separation of the workplace and the home in early capitalism, a process which rapidly accelerated during the evolution and expansion of industrial capitalism. Concurrently, with the extension of the franchise, "...two new kinds of links were forged between a developing working class and the dominant class: between capital and labor at work, and between the state and workers where they lived. These links framed much of the class activity for generations to come" (p.42). Industrialization also wrought new forms of social conflict and new imperatives of social control:

Everywhere in the West the state responded in pursuit of order in unprecedented ways. These responses were hardly identical from place to place, but they did always have three constituent elements: the attempt to regulate, and often to proscribe, combinations of workers at the point of production; the use of the franchise to incorporate workers and their leaders into the polity in ways that least threatened social cohesion; and the development of a new nexus of political relationships linking residence communities to government. Collectively, these responses by the state replaced traditional "private" forms of social control with public
authoritative activity. One consequence was the displacement of much of the emerging dynamics of conflict between capital and labor into relations between the state and citizen (p. 44).

Within each industrializing capitalist country, the patterns of social control and the relationships between developing political parties, unions, the church, voluntary associations and other institutions varied considerably. Katznelson argues that in the United States, a pattern was forged in which workers' identification outside of work came to rest on ethnicity and territoriality in contrast to Britain or other European countries. In the British context, workers undergoing the process of industrialization and urbanization tended to "arrive at a coherent presocialist interpretation of class that saw the new society divided along a single class cleavage at work, in politics, and in community life" (p. 52). However, in the societies such as Belgium or Holland, "ethnicity rather than class came to frame political conflicts both at work and in residential areas" (p. 53).

Despite examples of the formation of workingmen's parties during the nineteenth century in the United States, those political parties which endured contributed to the system of "city trenches" in which community life has come to be substantially defined in terms other than class and the financial and industrial elite is insulated from political conflict. In the formative antebellum years of this party system, trade unions developed in a manner
which confined the major portion of their activities to the worksite, "eschewing party activity and political action outside the workplace" (p. 55). Voting and representation were tied to and defined by geography and patterns of residential settlement which reflected ethnic migration.

Nineteenth century ethnic conflicts presented grave challenges to the "unified Anglo-Protestant elite that had governed the older cities into the age of Jackson" (p. 66). Gradually this elite withdrew from governance into the world of business, relinquishing political matters to the developing ethnic political machines: "(t)he residence community became the political forum managed by parties and bureaucracies that were divorced from workplace concerns" (p.67). The political machines rested on social networks experienced in pubs, corner bars, churches and other localized institutions.

While the urban political machine served to insulate financial and industrial elites from political turmoil, it also eventually became the object of reform movements aimed at elimination of the graft and corruption surrounding patronage systems. What Shefter (1985) describes as the "machine/reform dialectic" involves successive reconfigurations of urban political power, alternating between the traditional machine and urban reform movements. Analyzing the New York City example, he observes:

The cyclical pattern characterizing New York
politics during the first half of the twentieth century—the periodic election of reform administrations and the subsequent defeat by candidates who had the support of the city's regular party organizations—can be understood, then, as a process of "serial bargaining." This process of bargaining carried out over time enabled machine politicians to adjust to the demands of (1) business interests that wanted the municipal government to pursue sound financial policies and construct projects they believed were crucial for the city's continued prosperity; (2) new ethnic or racial groups that wanted political recognition; and (3) middle-class professionals and the local allies or newly powerful national forces that wanted to extend their influence over the city government (p.27-28).

Shefter examines the trade-offs and accommodations between these competing interests, culminating in the financial crisis of New York City in the mid 1970's. In this situation, New York's fiscal problems were "resolved" by the reassertion of financial elites into the affairs of urban government. He concludes that the resolution of this crisis was "weighted toward the concerns of creditors—and against the democratic impulse" (p.235), boding ill for the possibility of truly democratic governance of the city.

Neo-Alinskyism

In recent decades, out of the patterns of urban politics analyzed by such authors as Katzenelson and Shefter, a space has emerged for the development of constituency-based neighborhood organizing in cities across the country. Although these efforts are often labeled as "new populism", "Neo-Alinskyism" is the term used by Fisher (1984) to describe the organizations. The reference to Saul Alinsky's model of community organizing
seems to more precisely capture the flavor of these organizations. Fisher characterizes these movements as follows:

The essence of neo-Alinskyism is to develop mass political organizations rooted in neighborhoods, grounded in local concerns, and focused on winning concrete gains. The goal is to advance social and economic democracy, empower people, and challenge power relations within and beyond the neighborhood...All neo-Alinskyite projects employ the ideology of the new populism--decentralization, participatory democracy, self-reliance, mistrust of government and corporate institutions, empowering low- and moderate-income people--and at best see themselves as grassroots organizations working to connect up with the national political process (p. 133-134).

Although Katznelson posits a separation of work and community in American political consciousness, the roots of the "new populism"--Saul Alinsky's models and methods--are informed by labor organizing. Alinsky's background included actual CIO organizing experience in the 1930's and he consciously drew upon this experience to fashion his method of community organizing (see Alinsky, 1946, 1971). However, the neo-Alinskyite organizations spawned during the 1970's and the organizers on their staffs do not necessarily share a prior association with labor. They employ the Alinsky model without the benefit of the experiences which inspired it. Labor organizing and neighborhood organizing, while often focusing on the same target populations, have taken separate paths and gone through separate evolutions.

Neo-Alinskyism is to be distinguished from other more traditional forms of community organizing and from
the types of organizations which were created in the 1960's. It is not advisory, nor is it tied to government funding or services, nor does it necessarily focus on one specific issue. Rather, it is built upon the myriad concerns which arise in local neighborhoods, often very simple in nature, but sometimes extremely complex matters involving municipal taxation structures and budgets, or the practices of financial institutions. Moreover, in contrast to Alinsky's organizing endeavors in which he sought to overcome the gulf between the workplace and the community, the leadership of many of the newer neighborhood organizing networks trace their roots to the era of student activism against the war in Viet Nam. During that era, relationships between the anti-war movement and labor were at best tenuous and most often antagonistic. So, while perhaps seeking similar types of empowerment goals for working class populations, contemporary labor and neighborhood organizing rest on very different methodologies and processes.

**Contextual Distinctions in Labor and Neighborhood Organizing**

Labor unions and neighborhood organizations face serious challenges today, some similar and some quite different, as they confront the changing socio-economic environment. Certain important contextual distinctions between the two types of organizations serve to define the nature of their respective challenges. These are delineated next, as well as the basic common elements in
both types of practices.

Labor Unions: Union organizing is circumscribed by a complex legal framework and unions as organizations are subject to various laws. In essence, the "rules" that govern their activities are not necessarily of their own making, but rather a result of political processes, and these processes are rooted in the configuration of forces during the 1930's which led to the passage of the Wagner Act.

The focus of a union organizing drive is very specific--employees in a particular firm or worksite. The immediate goals are winning a certification election for the right to represent a specific set of workers, recognition of the union as the collective bargaining agent by the employer, and a first contract. Once a worksite becomes unionized, an entire new set of issues are presented ranging from assisting the workers in grievances and arbitrations, to future negotiations, to orientation and education of new members, to activation of members for political action and the entire scope of union activities. When strikes occur, the intense mobilization of workers which is required presents even greater challenges to the organization.

The framework of American labor relations has changed considerably as the economy has evolved. While these issues will be analyzed in more detail in the next chapter, a brief summary is presented here in order to
demonstrate the contrasting contexts of unions and neighborhood organizations.

When the National Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935, the legal parameters outlined in the Act embodied a public policy posture which accepted unions as somewhat legitimate participants in the economy. Moreover, collective bargaining came to be accepted as the preferred method of resolving labor-management conflict. Militant organizing drives preceding World War II and the strike wave following the end of the war eventually forced industrial leaders to accept the reality of unionization and to agree to collective bargaining. Negotiation was preferable to unpredictable and disruptive strikes and rank-and-file actions.

In the post World War II era through the mid 1970's, labor effectively ceded to management the right to control firms' investment and location decision in exchange for union recognition, organizational security, and regular wage and working condition improvements which were tied to increases in productivity. During the early years of this Pax Americana (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982), the McCarthy era helped to quash labor militancy of earlier decades as Communist and radical elements were purged from union ranks, particularly from roles in leadership. Unions were accorded their "seat at the table" as long as their demands remained confined to the wage arena and at least the leadership of the labor movement did not challenge the prevailing ideology embodied in the domestic and foreign
policy of the country (Tomlins, 1985; Montgomery, 1979).

These features of the post World War II system of industrial relations began to unravel in the mid 1970's as the economic shifts described earlier transpired. Organized labor in recent years has lost millions of members as American manufacturing has restructured, closed plants in this country and moved operations to low wage regions of the U.S. and overseas. The threat of capital flight, ensuing demands from employers for concessions, outright union-busing campaigns and a National Labor Relations Board which is characterized by labor as decidedly pro-management all combine to produce an environment in which union growth is exceedingly difficult and many unions fear for their own survival.

Beyond this loss of membership, changes in public policy postures toward unions have also eroded their ability to gain new members. The actions of the Reagan administration during the PATCO strike of 1981 symbolized the new labor relations to a stunned and horrified labor movement. Moreover, even where there is job creation in the service sector, it has yet to translate into expanded membership in unions, although these workers are increasingly becoming targets of organizing drives.

New organizing is also made difficult by the changing nature of both the workplace and the workforce: with more and more employment creation in smaller businesses and with greater numbers of workers who have
limited exposure or previous affiliations with unions, unionization is not necessarily an "automatic" response on the part of workers facing problems. The labor movement is plagued by negative public relations and perceptions.

Neighborhood Organizations: Unencumbered by the complex legal structure which circumscribes labor union activities in the United States, neo-Alinskyite neighborhood organizations are free to employ a variety of methods to achieve their goals. There are no legally proscribed sets of procedures which they must follow. The boundaries of a neighborhood often are not rigid boundaries and there is no numerical majority of 51% which must be won in order to operate within a neighborhood. Moreover, there is no equivalent of a "union shop" for neighborhood organizations--the terms of membership are completely voluntary. Their targets are varied: landlords, financial institutions, political bodies and corporations. However, these organizations encounter the problems of unstable membership bases, restrictions from funders in some cases on certain types of political activities, revolving door staffing patterns and often the inability to effectively harness the requisite power to achieve objectives (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1985). Many neighborhood organizations are relatively young and have not yet thoroughly analyzed their experiences with an eye toward reformulation of their methodologies. Since urban neighborhoods are currently undergoing rapid change in many cities, some analysts call for re-examining Alinsky-
style organizing techniques in order to adapt to these new contours (McKnight and Kretzmann, 1984).

Neo-Alinskyite organizations in various locations may sometimes serve as competitors with other types of community organizations or, in other instances, with political organizations and parties. They are challenged to accommodate local cultures, to factor ethnic and racial traditions into their style of community organizing and to fashion relationships with political leaders and forces. While they enjoy an immense degree of freedom in their choices of targets and strategies and in their relationship to legal processes and structures, they may also experience periodic deficiencies in focusing their work or in maintaining their mobilization capacities. Participants in this form of neighborhood organizing may be pulled in conflicting directions in terms of time and energy to the activities of their churches, their families or other local organizations.

The Exercise of Power: The means by which each type of organization has exercised power reflects other facets of their differences, although new strategies are evolving. In the period following World War II through the 1970's, labor's power was exercised largely in the economic arena with its ultimate weapon that of the strike in order to gain wage increases and other improvements. It generally participated in politics as a partner in the Democratic Party and derived political power by virtue of
its numbers (Brecher and Costello, 1988a). Organized labor functions politically on the federal, state and local levels and is affected by policies set at each of these levels. Yet, given the national framework for labor relations described above which obtained throughout the first three post-World War II decades, labor usually did not have to resort to political pressure and the creation of a favorable public opinion climate to achieve success in individual organizing drives or at the bargaining table.

Simply preserving past achievements, however, has been extremely difficult for organized labor since the mid 1970's. In order to succeed in organizing or in collective bargaining, some unions have opted to invigorate political action programs in all three levels of government and initiate new public relations strategies. In the contemporary climate collective bargaining demands are often difficult to win through withholding labor in a strike situation. Galvanizing public opinion through such tactics as protest and civil disobedience are now among the repertoire of unions in organizing drives and strike situations.

The power of neighborhood groups, on the other hand, generally has been exercised at the level of local politics and often focuses on the realm of public opinion. Their tactics range from negotiation to protest and confrontation. The model of protest set forth by Lipsky (1970) articulates one of their main strategies to
achieve goals: the activation of "reference publics" on the targets of protest through creation of a public opinion climate which calls for the resolution of protest. Within this model, symbolic rewards are sometimes offered which satisfy or appease the reference publics more than the protesters, and in some instances material rewards are dispensed which satisfy the both the protesters and reference publics. Neighborhood groups rely heavily on protest tactics because they generally do not possess sufficient economic power to achieve goals through direct economic pressure, and sometimes their goals may not be of a purely economic nature. The voluntary nature of their membership contributes to problems of defining a cohesive or solid base in the community: protest tactics often help to create the impression of a large unified base.

Mutual Discovery: In recent years a process of mutual discovery has been unfolding between labor and neighborhood organizations in various communities. The experiences vary from city to city and region to region. Often the nature of the local leadership has a great influence on the outcome of the process, but coalitions of trade unions and community and neighborhood organizations are dotting the American landscape (Brecher and Costello, 1988a, 1990). Sometimes in the context of difficult strikes in which labor needs community allies, at other times in the face of devastating plant closings, labor is now reaching out beyond its own ranks to wage its
struggles. Electoral coalitions, as well, are developing and Connecticut offers several important examples which will be analyzed later. These coalitions and alliances constitute a new and emerging means of exercising power and their potential is rapidly becoming recognized by the participants as a necessity in the current political and economic environment. However, unless carefully nurtured, these coalitions can have very tenuous existences.

The organizational contexts described above have distinguished neighborhood groups from unions in the past and, as such, each type organization has operated within its own sphere, employing its own methods. However, as unions implicitly adapt community organizing strategies such as protest to their needs in resolving issues and as labor unions and community organizations form coalitions to advance mutual goals, the question arises as to how similar the activities of the two types of organizations will become over time and if certain aspects of the dichotomy between work and community will diminish.

Commonalities: Despite many differences in the contexts and the frameworks within which unions and constituency-based neighborhood organizations operate, there are certain common elements in their efforts. Both attempt to improve the living conditions of their members or constituents by redefining relations of power in their respective environments. These are the organizations that individuals turn to when they face a plant closing, a property tax revaluation, a gentrifying neighborhood or a
disciplinary action by a supervisor. Both types of organizations must overcome feelings of apathy and powerlessness, and develop a sense of confidence within their members. Both rely on the power of numbers over the power of wealth and to be at all successful, they must harness the collective power of individuals acting self-consciously to achieve goals.

In an introductory essay to Lee Staple's work on community organizing, *Roots to Power A Manual for Grassroots Organizing* (1984), Cloward and Piven eloquently characterize some of the common elements that drive both types of organizations:

...Ordinary people have always been moved to political action in the local settings where they live and work. It is in the local settings that people come together in solidarity groups, where they discover common grievances, and where they sometime find sources of institutional power. What people can do is a reflection of their particular objective circumstances: as workers, they can withhold labor; as tenants, they can withhold rent; as savers, they can withhold savings; as consumers, they can withhold purchases; and, as citizens, they can withhold obedience to the rules governing civil society... Whether people band together as tenants, workers, minority groups members, women, or environmental and peace activists, it is their neighborhoods, factories, housing projects and churches that provide the nexus for mobilization. Terminology should not mislead us. In this respect, community organizing is not different from other efforts to organize popular political power. And that has always been so, no matter the moment in history when popular mobilization erupted (xiv).

Understanding this generic nature of organizing and its operation in the spheres of work and community within the context of social and economic transformation is what motivates this research. The capacities of community
organizations and labor unions to reach and motivate individuals to engage in collective action are important elements in both the processes and outcomes of economic restructuring and are the focus of this effort.

RESEARCH FOCUS

This dissertation focuses on neighborhood organizations and labor unions in Hartford, Connecticut and examines several questions in relation to the two types of organizations:

1) How do the unions and neighborhood groups understand the changing socio-economic environment?
2) How do organizational leaderships articulate the changes to their members and activate their members?
3) What types of changes in their own tactics, especially in relation to organizing, electoral and coalition activities, have occurred in recent years? What models do they draw upon and how do they make choices in this environment?
4) How are their activities similar and different, and which factors facilitate or impede mutual collaboration?
5) How do they understand each other, work together and inform each other across the boundary of work and community?

One of the key conceptual points of departure for this project is Katznelsnlon's analysis of the separation of
work and community in American social consciousness. This separation has implications for American social movements, and in Hartford certain aspects of this separation manifest in the economic and political organizing which takes place, as well as in the character of the organizations that engage in the organizing. Hartford also serves an example of a city in which organizations in both the spheres of work and community are not only active, but also slowly attempting to work together by forming coalitions and engaging in joint activities. Within these contexts, the differences and similarities in their respective models and approaches are not necessarily mutually understood. However, each type of organization confronts various forms of capital, as well as various public policy questions, and occasionally the targets of organizing overlap. Since organizations from both spheres are elements in the political processes responding to economic restructuring, analyzing their methodologies affords a deeper understanding of contemporary political phenomena. In that vane, this research is intended to serve several purposes:

1) to examine the frameworks and the methods employed by labor and community organizations;
2) to present evidence of how labor and neighborhood organizations understand and assert themselves in the process of restructuring in order to defend their members' interests;
3) to assess the implications of their respective
and combined activities within this context for urban politics.

**Field Research With Organizations in Hartford**

Field research was conducted with labor unions and neighborhood organizations based in Hartford, Connecticut, over the period of time between 1987 and 1990. Specific characteristics of Hartford are described in Chapter 3. However, the dramatic contrasts of wealth and poverty within the city, the organizational presence of the constituency-based neighborhood organizations and labor unions, and the access to and familiarity with these groups on the part of the author afforded a unique opportunity to examine the consequences of economic restructuring from the perspective of the inner-workings and logics of the organizations.

The research involved participant observation, documentary research and extensive interviews in order to analyze various dimensions of the organizations within different phases of their work as described below. In selecting organizations for inclusion into the project, the effort was not to obtain an exhaustive sample of labor unions or neighborhood organizations. Rather, the choice was to select organizations who were first accessible and open to the project, and those whose organizational practices would potentially yield models of how socio-economic change is effectively confronted. If not yielding fully developed models, the methods of these
groups at least offer important insights for social change practitioners and an academic audience concerned with the effects of socio-economic transformation.

Three different organizations of each type were analyzed for comparisons of viewpoints and practices within groups. Since there is variation among labor unions and among neighborhood organizations as well as between the two organizational types, these variations are also of interest in order to understand different forms of response to the economic and social environment. These organizations all are among the most "activist" in their respective spheres, yet they each face unique organizational challenges and give different emphasis to various aspects of their work: organizing, electoral, coalitions and other areas. Consequently, although they are all activist and innovative in their approaches, they represent a range of methodologies and choices in terms of pursuing respective agendas.

To help focus the research and to provide a basis of comparison between the two types of organizations, interviews and observations were initially organized around several aspects of each organization's work: the organizing phase, the mobilization phase and organizational maintenance issues. These aspects were selected because they corresponded generally to the underlying concerns of the research and would provide a "handle" to examine how these groups confront distinct problems and issues, many of which have sharpened or
intensified within the context of restructuring. The neighborhood groups and unions all need to attract new members and/or respond to situations in which individuals approach them with specific problems. They also undertake organizational endeavors which require mobilizing existing memberships and, more than simply mobilization of people to attend events, these activities sometimes require individuals to make sacrifices and face serious consequences, as in labor strikes or rent strikes. Moreover, even as the organizations undertake these activities, they must deal with issues of structure, resources and basic organizational maintenance.

As the research proceeded, the distinction between an organizing phase and a mobilization phase in the work of the neighborhood organizations seemed artificial, and therefore when the results are presented in Chapter 6, these two phases are collapsed into one area of work. This point is explained in greater detail in the beginning of Chapter 6. However, the research initially proceeded with the distinctions and categories which are described below. With this proviso, these categories provide the basis for the presentation of findings on Labor Organizing in Chapter 5 and Neighborhood Organizing in Chapter 6.

The Organizing Phase: In the realm of organizing new members, the attempt was to ascertain how each group articulates its goals and philosophies, and how it characterizes the target or opposition in relation to
those philosophies: on what basis it attempts to appeal to new members. Are the targets described in personalized terms or are they described in corporate or institutional terms, or both? Are systemic explanations offered for the behavior of opposition in a context of describing larger societal trends? These questions were intended to discover how organizations view themselves in the social world and what they impart to individuals they hope to attract. Additionally, representatives of the organizations were asked what incentives they thought existed for individuals to joint--material, social or personal rewards. The assumptions and models of organizing were also explored with the intention of discovering how organizations confront legal and resource contraints, and adapt to changing and challenging forms of resistance.

The Mobilization Phase: Questions focusing on the mobilization phase attempted to ascertain how strategies and tactics are selected, how members are involved in mobilizations and campaigns, and in what types of coalitions and electoral activities the organizations engage. All of the organizations have the choice of using routine types of behavior or disruptive behavior in various situations, but in order to use disruptive tactics, certain judgments are made by organizational leadership as to the readiness of members and the reaction of the target, the authorities, the media and the public. Understanding the criteria used by the leadership to make
such decisions generated one set of questions posed to the organizational representatives. Another area of questions focused on how the organizations understood the role of protest—do their ideas conform to Lipsky's model, for example? How are members prepared to take part in such actions? When are routine, less confrontational tactics used? What types of compromises are made and under what circumstances? Additionally, how do the leadership of the organizations transmit their own messages to the membership and what are the ways in which they attempt to steer and guide organizational directions?

All of the organizations participate in various types of coalitions and pursue some type of electoral strategies, even if they don't participate directly in elections. The effort was to understand when the organizations choose to participate in coalitions, what types of coalitions they engage in, who participates from the organizations (leadership or rank-and-file), and what they feel they gain from these endeavors. In terms of electoral politics, the groups were asked if they participate and how they participate, as well as what importance they attach to these activities. Finally, when they engage in coalitions, how do the various styles and models of the two types of organizations confront each other, that is, what features of the other type of organization either facilitate or inhibit coalitions and alliances? These issues of coalition activity are
Presented in Chapter 4.

Organizational Maintenance Issues: Organizational maintenance issues are those issues which relate to the organizations' functioning and involve structure, staff and membership development. What types of internal structures exist within the organizations to develop membership? How is participation encouraged? What motivates already organized members to participate? What types of decisions are made at the various levels of organizations? Another set of questions dealt with the types of external structural constraints that exist and how these constraints are confronted. For example, how do various laws impede or facilitate organizational growth and development. Finally, the area of staffing was explored. Questions here revolved around the role of staff who are hired versus those who are elected. How are unelected staff hired? To whom are staffmembers accountable? How much autonomy do staffmembers have in carrying out their responsibilities? These organizational maintenance issues reflect the logics used within the various organizations to achieve goals, and by comparing the patterns within the different organizations, we can gain additional evidence as to the ways in which they attempt to achieve their goals.

Presentation of Research Findings in the Following Chapters

Having outlined the problems and the research
framework in this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 next offers a brief historical background and reviews relevant literature for both labor organizing and neighborhood organizing in order to locate the issues facing Hartford organizations in a more general context. Chapter 3 provides information on Hartford and an introduction to the specific organizations which are the focus of the research and considers recent analytical work on Hartford.

In Chapter 4, we begin to present the results of the research in Hartford by analyzing several coalition and electoral experiences of the organizations. In that chapter, after listing several examples of coalitions, the work of the Community Labor Alliance for Strike Support, the support group which formed around the Colt strike, and People for Change, a local third political party, are analyzed in depth in terms of why organizations participated and the extent to which they were able to work together. This chapter concerning alliances and elections is presented first so that the reader can reflect upon specific examples during the more detailed accounts of the respective methodologies in the succeeding two chapters. In other words, we will begin at what may be conceived of as an outcome of a set of organizational choices, aspects of methodology that reflect organizational layers and processes which are most apparent in external relationships, and then peel away the layers in subsequent chapters to trace and reveal the
inner-logics of the methodologies and the assessment of the organizations' leadership.

In Chapter 5 on Labor Organizing and in Chapter 6 on Neighborhood Organizing we will analyze the functioning of the organizations within the various organizational phases and features outlined in the previous section (organizing, mobilizing and maintenance/structural issues). We will highlight innovations and adaptations in response to restructuring, as well as unique issues faced in each sphere of organizing.

In our final chapter, Chapter 7, we present comparisons of the two types of organizing and our conclusions. We will attempt to address several areas in the conclusion: implications for theory, implications for practice and implications for the social fabric of the city, specifically conditions and social movements in Hartford.

Throughout the chapters, the focus is on the strategic choices made by the two types of organizations, particularly by their leaderships. Therefore, this is not so much a study of industrial relations as it is a study of choices and innovations attempted by several innovative unions in a changing economic environment. Likewise, this work does not examine the range of alternatives within community organization practice, nor is it a study of community development options, but rather a study of choices and innovations embodied in the particular type of neighborhood organizing practiced in Hartford, again,
given the city's specific social environment. Issues of urban politics are also considered within the specific context. However, what seems to be most generalizable is identified in Chapter 7 as we speculate about the implications of the project.

An overriding concern within the project is how these organizations actually confront the changing social and economic environment within their organizational practices as they themselves attempt to foster change. We attempt to show several ways in which their practices have evolved in recent years and how, in turn, these practices are shaping the processes of change that these groups seek. New organizing methods which facilitate organizational growth and goals are not only important to the groups themselves, but may mitigate certain effects of the economic phenomena previously described. For example, since one possibility of attempting to maintain the living standards of displaced blue collar workers is to unionize the growing service sector in which many of these workers are now finding employment and potentially raise the wage levels in these sectors, the success or failure of organizing in the service sector is instructive. Moreover, unions such as the UAW who once exclusively organized in manufacturing sectors are now targeting the service sector. Therefore, the progress of service sector organizing is important in the process of economic change.

In their communities, these same displaced workers
may require new or different public services or public policies which are advocated by the neighborhood organizations, i.e., tax relief, training or retraining and other employment programs, assistance in the housing arena or other issues. Accordingly, the relationship between the issues and campaigns within the two spheres of organizing is also explored.

We also identify factors that help to explain successes or failure of the groups. Certain factors may be within their control: matters of techniques, internal structures and decision-making, individual leadership. However, other factors related to economic and political processes may not be within their control. Understanding how these factors combine and interact provides further clues as to the potential of organizing activities.

We have also tried to ascertain what are the common elements of organizing within each setting in this current period. As outlined above, the organizing contexts and organizational styles are generally understood to be quite different. Identifying generic elements of organizing provides indications as to where the boundaries of work and community might be penetrated, or perhaps where there are opportunities to fashion joint strategies by neighborhood forces and labor. Joint strategies are not necessarily readily chosen by either type of organization, despite what might seem to be obvious strategic requirements. These issues are also considered.

This research may be most useful to practitioners
who often do not have the option of stepping back and analyzing their work or methodologies. Perhaps by way of comparison to events and processes in Hartford, others may be able to identify new approaches or problems to be corrected. This work can also be useful to those interested in analysis of contemporary social movements and the patterns, processes and issues inherent in urban movements of the 80's and 90's. Hartford is unique in terms of its specific configuration of forces, but part of much larger economic developments. Therefore, these specific experiences speak to larger issues and accordingly, what happens in Hartford may be of interest elsewhere. Perhaps what is most important in the entire effort is that we are exploring social and economic change at a very grassroots, "micro" level vantage point, and have focused on the structures of human action and agency that most directly confront these developments.

Supporting Materials

There are several appendices which consist of materials to augment and support the findings. Training curricula and materials and meeting agenda are provided as examples of the methods and messages imparted to members and participants by the organizations. These are referenced in Chapters 5 and 6. Additionally, a list of meetings and activities which were attended is provided, and a listing of the interviews conducted and the interview outline are attached.
Beyond these materials and activities, important insights were gathered in hundreds of informal conversations, at dinners, at social and political events and in the everyday course of my life during the years in which the research was conducted. The Acknowledgements section provides an indication of the interest, support, encouragement and contributions which were forthcoming in these settings.
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR RESEARCH

The economic restructuring outlined in the previous chapter is often described in global terms: the "new international division of labor", "global restructuring", the "global economy", "urban economic restructuring" and other phrasing. Yet economic restructuring affects local communities and specific industrial sectors in quite distinct and varying ways. A very important ingredient in the outcome of this restructuring is the combinations of responses of those affected: the specific policies of the state; organizational and individual leadership responses; local and/or national political-cultural contexts and traditions; and other types of local or sectoral conditions. Human and economic geographers may express this in terms of spatiality or spatial variations, sociologists or political scientists may refer to local cultural or political variables, and economists detail the specific consequences in regions or industries. What is key is that there is no one outcome, no easily predictable pattern for a given community undergoing economic change:

Depending on the balance of social forces embodied in state policies, the economic development policies of the local and regional state vary from purely capital-serving concessions to more balanced "linkage" development policies where local state officials are able to impose neighborhood and other political conditions on the development process. Concessions of the latter sort have been extracted from the developers by progressive movements in cities such as San Francisco, Boston, Los Angeles and Santa Monica, California, where neighborhood pressure has been an important factor in local
politics...

The crucial variable producing popular responsive policies affecting urban development is the extent to which the networks of ordinary people in households, communities and workplaces can combine to produce forms of organization leading to the effective expression of demands for better neighborhood and working conditions, improved urban public services, and the self-management of their communities. From the Third World squatter settlements...to core country women's organizations demanding childcare facilities, to the progressive neighborhood movements in the United States, to urban social movements in Europe, it is clear that popular praxis matters (emphasis mine). It is an essential element in community politics; and when present, the balance of power within the state, and hence the state role in urban restructuring, becomes more than a matter of capital accumulation (Feagin and Smith, 1987 pg. 29-30).

This research, by focusing on organizations in Hartford, Connecticut, examines different responses within one locality by organizations who confront the effects of restructuring in a number of different settings and contexts, i.e., popular praxis in diverse yet somewhat comparable circumstances. It is quite clear that labor and neighborhood organizations have distinct methodologies. However, their practices, in combination with other forms of popular response, are important features in the local outcomes of economic restructuring. To set the stage for an examination of the neighborhood organizations and labor unions in Hartford, a review of literature relevant to the general context in which these organizations operate is presented in this chapter. Chapter 3 will provide background on the specific local context in Hartford.

Much has been written about the dilemmas of the
labor movement in the Reagan and now Bush era. Neighborhood organizing techniques also have been analyzed, however the focus is often on the limits of their methodologies and directions rather than on external conditions which may serve to constrain their work. We will focus first on the situation of labor, and then on neighborhood organizing.

**CHALLENGES FOR LABOR**

Often an analysis of the current predicament of the American labor movement begins by locating the problems in an unraveling of the New Deal political alignment which produced the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 (NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act) and in the dismantling of the post World War II era "social contract". Barbash (1984), for example, summarizes each decade since the 1930's in terms of labor's situation as follows: "the 1930's ushered in the modern union era and the rebirth of collective bargaining"; the 1940's served to consolidate the gains of the previous decade and to demonstrate that unions "were here to stay." During the 1950's the law and a "resurgent" management were able to slow union growth. In the 1960's unions penetrated the public sector and make progress among white collar workers. During the inflation-plagued 1970's, unions became a target of wage and income policies, and the 1980's is the decade of union retrenchment. He ends this outline questioning whether
the 1980's are merely a cyclical downturn or the mark of a "long-term change in union strategy from offense to defense?" and goes on to assess various options for labor, issues to which we will return later.

The Development of the Modern Labor Relations System in the U.S.

To expand upon Barbash's outline, several points in David Montgomery's essay "American workers and the New Deal formula" (1979) are especially worth considering in some detail. In explaining the implications of the passage of the NLRA in 1935, he comments:

The collapse of the "Coolidge Propserity" in 1929 produced a celebrated surge of trade union and political activity among workers and forced government to assume a vastly expanded role in the economy and in industrial relations. Its new policies fixed the legal and political parameters of workers' control struggles to the present time, but as those policies evolved over ensuing decades, they became less and less beneficial and more and more restrictive for workers. They had three basic ingredients of concern here: state subsidization of economic growth, the encouragement of legally regulated collective bargaining, and the marriage of the union movement to the Democratic Party. (p. 161)

As unions made notable organizing gains in the late 1930's, often through militant and violent strikes, factory occupations and other tactics, power relations in factories and mines changed dramatically. However, as disruptive as these developments were for individual enterprises and industries, there was also recognition of the potential for bringing more stability to American industrial relations through unionization:

The response of the Roosevelt administration and Congress to this militancy involved both major
concessions and a many-faceted effort to steer the organizing activities of workers into channels which would not threaten the economy's basic market and profit mechanisms. For all the hostility exhibited by most business leaders toward the unions which were trying to organize their workers, the idea of some formalized plan of employee representation within the firm had been a basic element of the American Plan of the twenties. Moreover, men as prominent as President Herbert Hoover and Gerard Swope of the General Electric Company had long argued that national unions (under the proper leadership, of course) could help industry reduce price competition and "eliminate waste." The economic crisis and the ensuing efforts of the Roosevelt administration to rescue the economy by stabilizing prices lent special force to this argument. While some New Deal advisers...looked forward to national economic planning by industrial councils in which industry, labor and consumers would all be represented, others...argued that only strong unions could raise popular purchasing power sufficiently to get the economy growing again (p. 164).

The passage of the NLRA in 1935 established the National Labor Relations Board whose purposes included protecting workers attempting to organize into unions against persecution by employers, and conducting elections through which workers would choose their collective bargaining agent with whom employers were legally bound to bargain. Montgomery notes that in its initial years, the NLRB "pursued its assignment vigorously" and facilitated the firm establishment of unions in many basic industries.

Yet, as Montgomery asserts, this "government activity was simultaneously liberating and cooptive for the workers." While the absolute control of the managers was lifted from the working lives of many Americans, "government's intervention also opened a new avenue
through which the rank and file could in time by tamed and the newly powerful unions be subjected to tight legal and political control." After World War II and with the end of the no-strike agreements which had been in effect during the war, the pent-up wage demands of workers exploded into a massive strike wave. In 1946 over 4-1/2 million workers were involved in strikes. In response, during 1947 a set of amendments to the NLRA was passed, the Taft-Hartley Act, and a much more restrictive legal environment for unions began. This act banned sympathy strikes, secondary boycotts, mass picketing (this provision was later repealed) and required elected union officers to sign affidavits stipulating that they were not members of the Communist Party. Additionally, the president of the United States could seek injunctions to order strikers to return to work, and unions were subject to legal liabilities if members struck in violation of written contracts. Subsequent court rulings, Montgomery claims, have "progressively tightened the legal noose around those historic forms of working class struggle which do not fit within the certified contractual framework." His essay continues by providing poignant examples of the increasing difficulties encountered by labor through the 1970's, foreshadowing of the even more serious problems during the 1980's.

Tomlins (1985), in his detailed historical analysis of U.S. labor law and the relationship of unions and the state, generally concurs with Montgomery as he examines
the early years of the National Labor Relations Board activity. While in earlier decades the issue of employee representation had been a "private" matter outside the scope of state activity, the passage of the NLRA "made collective bargaining a matter of public concern, conducted by institutions with statutorily-defined rights and responsibilities within a framework shaped by state agencies. While this represented a major encouragement to collective bargaining, it also represented what was potentially a severe encroachment upon union autonomy" (p.101). The simultaneously "liberating and cooptive" aspects of this arrangement that Montgomery posits are of concern to Tomlins, as well:

...(The Wagner Act's) passage meant that collective bargaining was guaranteed to play a major role in the regulation of employment practices in a wide range of industries. This held out the opportunity of participation in determining the direction of the American political economy which organized labor had been seeking since the turn of the century.

Simultaneously, however, the act reconstituted collective bargaining, bringing this hitherto private activity fully within the regulatory ambit of the administrative state. This had major implication for employees and unions. For employees, it meant that the right to create the institutional structures required for participation in collective bargaining could now be vindicated through public proceedings. The right was to be exercised, however, subject to the state's determination of how the public interest might best be served in the resolution of industrial controversies. ...this would eventually come to mean in practice that the right to organize and bargain could be maintained only so far as the state conceived it to serve an overriding goal of industrial peace (p.147).

Later in his book, Tomlins again discusses this "conditional legitimacy" of unions' status:
...Even before the Taft-Hartley debates, it had become clear that such institutional legitimacy as unions could expect to enjoy in the post-war industrial relations system would be limited to activities which seemed to contribute to the well-being of the corporate political economy...

In fact, the legitimacy of collective activity putatively guaranteed by labor relations law had been conditional almost from the outset. During the debates of the 1930's, proponents of the Wagner Act had stressed, both before and after its passage, that collective bargaining was a means to an end, and that the end was industrial stability and labor peace... By the end of the 1940's it was firmly established as the central pillar of the pluralist consensus which emerged during that decade and which set the terms of the post-war capital-labor-state relationship (p. 318-319).

Just how precarious this conditional legitimacy was would not necessarily become fully apparent for several decades. Several other developments of the late 1940's and early 1950's, however, were quite important in the life of the American labor movement.

First was the pattern of collective bargaining that was established in the automobile industry. The 1948 agreement between General Motors and the United Auto Workers (UAW) is one milestone of the post World War II era of economic growth and industrial relations. Piore and Sable (1984) characterize this agreement as "(t)he keystone of the whole system of (postwar) macroeconomic stabilization." While union membership after World War II did not constitute a majority of the labor force, close to 70% of production workers in major industries were unionized and covered by union contracts. Their wage rates would eventually support a standard of living...
sufficient to fuel a mass-consumption society and the UAW-GM agreement would influence the wage rates in other unionized industries and non-union sectors, as well:

...The (UAW-GM) formula established as the standard for wage setting the long-run, economy-wide increase in labor productivity plus the change in consumer price index; wages, it was agreed should rise by this amount every year. Given that labor productivity adjusted for price changes is a measure of productive capacity, consistent and uniform application of the formula to all wages and salaries would ensure that private-consumer purchasing power would expand at the same rate as national productive capacity. The complex of labor-relations and wage-setting institutions generalized the formula in precisely this way (p.80).

As this collective bargaining system evolved, a number of other important features emerged. Brody (1980) traces how labor conceded more and more of what have become known as "management prerogatives" or "management rights" as the price for regular increases in wages and benefits. Throughout the late 1940's and into the 1950's, in the auto industry and elsewhere this trend strengthened. Commenting on the situation between GM and the UAW, Brody notes:

The company thus defined the terms for dealing with the UAW. The union was accepted as a permanent presence. Benefits would be forthcoming at regular intervals and in decent increments. The essentials of managerial authority had to be left alone.

...Instead of seeking an accommodation that would forestall organization, now the purpose (of GM's strategy) shifted to confining unions within acceptable limits. (p.185-186).

In this process, moreover, the legalistic character of industrial relations also began its entrenchment. Rank-and-file shop floor action and militancy to resolve issues
gave way to a system of contract rules, grievances and arbitrations.

One other key ingredient of the post war era in labor's development was the purging of Communists and radicals from the union movement in the context of the emerging Cold War and the rise of Senator Joseph McCarthy's anti-communist campaign. As Bluestone and Harrison (1982) observe, "management was willing to share the proceeds from economic growth to some extent, but it was absolutely unwilling to concede any control over the process of production to what it viewed as 'radical elements'" (p.136). These purges had long lasting effects, well beyond the demise of Senator Joseph McCarthy's crusade. Montgomery (1979) asserts that these ideological dispositions "served to suffocate political and ideological debate in working-class America", culminating in the George Meany-led AFL-CIO opposing the peace movement of the Viet Nam War era and the presidential candidacy of George McGovern.

Within the parameters described above, labor took part in the economic expansion after World War II through the 1960's. U.S. firms were yet to face the competition from foreign firms which became so important and pervasive in the economic life of country during the 1970's and which continues to the present. Although the growth in unionization peaked quite early in this period--1954 was the peak year with 34.7% of the non-agricultural workforce unionized (Goldfield, 1987)--the gradual decline in union
members did not command the attention it has come to in the 1980's. As private sector unionization began its deline, public sector workers were increasingly becoming unionized. Moreover, throughout this period labor could rely on an expanding "social wage", as Bluestone and Harrison (1982) describe, "that amalgam of benefits, worker protections, and legal rights that acts to generally increase the social security of the working class" (p. 133).

All of this should not lead one to believe that labor easily had its way and that corporate management simply acquiesced to unions' demands. There were considerable numbers of strikes and Goldfield (1987) asserts that U.S. strike rates in the post World War II era were among the highest in the developed capitalist countries. However, as Harrison and Bluestone (1988) document, average family incomes and the standard of living in America were "on the rise".

Recent Difficulties and Problems

Now there is a dramatically different picture. The commentary and analysis of the labor movement in the mid and late 1980's and early 1990's focuses on questions of the survival of the labor movement in an era of rampant union-busting and the lowest level of unionization since the mid 1930's (see for example, Piore, 1986). Kuttner (1986) discusses the vulnerability of the labor movement under the collapse of the post World War II social
contract. Pressures for concessions in the face of vigorous foreign competition and domestic non-union sectors, mass layoffs, a decline in the unionized portion of the workforce, the collapse of industry-wide contracts and the institution of two-tier wage systems are among the developments which place American unions in a "particularly grim" situation. Beyond these issues, labor is publically characterized as "a selfish special interest, retarding industrial innovation, serving only union members rather than the wage-earning citizenry in general" (p. 33, also Piore, 1986). Why these problems concern Kuttner and other progressives is because of the role that he envisions unions play in society, a role that "has never quite received adequate notice in democratic theory". This role is two-fold, first as instruments of industrial democracy facilitating workers a collective "voice" in the workplace, and second as a "prime constituency for a social democratic conception of society, whether that conception was explicitly socialist or reformist" (p. 33).

The disadvantageous position of organized labor described above and throughout this project is the result of the convergence of a number of trends and factors. Miller (1987) presents a quite thorough list and although several of the items he includes have already been mentioned, the entire listing is worth enumerating to envision just how serious the situation is:

-structural changes in the economy shifting
employment from heavily unionized "smokestack" manufacturing to lightly unionized service industries and smaller factories;
-regional shifts in employment, particularly in the manufacturing sector, from the more unionized "frostbelt" to the less unionized "sunbelt", concurrent with resurgent economic development in the North in sectors and firms resistant to unionization;
-high unemployment in older industrial regions, resulting in greater competition among workers for jobs and in employers engaging in concessionary bargaining;
-difficulties for unions in penetrating the "white collar" workforce in the private sector, despite notable gains in the public sector white collar workforce;
-deregulation in highly organized industries such as trucking, airlines and communications, changing the nature of industrial relations in these sectors and resulting in delining union membership;
-operation of parallel non-union plants and worksites by companies with unionized operations (e.g. construction and mining);
-the development and expansion of personnel administration apparatus within firms which, by its problem-solving function, serves to undercut the role of unions;
-employers' use of labor law to frustrate union organization and the concominant rise of anti-union lawyers and consultants;
-increasingly poor results in private sector organizing by unions;
-the "free-rider" problem in the public sector in certain states where unions are required to represent workers who refuse to become union members;
-low levels of unionization in the expanding female portion of the labor force;
-legislation on various aspects of employment (discrimination, health and safety, etc.) which undermines the specific, traditional role of unions in these matters;
-the public impression of corruption within the labor movement.

Goldfield (1987), in attempting to explain the decline of organized labor, reviews many of the arguments presented by Miller and others and asserts that several of these factors are not the insurmountable obstacles they are often assumed to be. He argues, for example, that the
low union density in the South and Southwest of the United States should be separated conceptually from arguments about the difficulty in organizing new members in these regions. He presents data which show that union success rates in parts of the South are comparable to the North. He also reviews research which supports the notion that organizing women workers is not necessarily more difficult than organizing male workers, and in some cases less difficult. Likewise, economic restructuring, itself, does not necessarily preclude new organizing in the more recent growth sectors, particularly if one compares the U.S. situation to other capitalist countries in Western Europe and especially to Canada in which some of the sectors experiencing economic growth are also becoming unionized.

What he does emphasize in accounting for union decline is what he terms the relation of class forces: the trends in U.S. public labor policy, the increased effectiveness of employer resistance and the lack of aggressive organizing on the part of American unions to compensate for membership losses. These trends, particularly the first two, warrant some discussion.

A wide spectrum of authors agree that the system of labor law which once facilitated union organization and growth in this country now hinders that organization, and that political appointments to the National Labor Relations Board during the Reagan administration were particularly damaging to labor's standing. The
"conditional legitimacy" described by Tomlins has been severely undermined as public policy has shifted decidedly against labor. As employers have become quite bold in their attempts to resist new organization efforts and break existing unions, organized labor finds it increasingly difficult to obtain the relief and protection from the NLRB it found in previous decades. Several specific developments serve as examples.

As noted earlier, union-busting has itself become a big industry. Goldfield lists a number of trade associations who have developed vigorous anti-union programs: the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the American Hospital Association, the Associated Builders and Contractors and others (p. 190). NAM established a tax-exempt educational and research arm, the Council on a Union-Free Environment, which provides technical assistance in the field of "union avoidance". Anti-union consulting firms have also formed and are retained by companies to prevent unionization or break existing unions through a variety of methods, some clearly illegal. They carefully design programs within a firm in which an organizing drive is taking place which include psychological profiles of employees, "captive audience" meetings, discharges and transfers of union activists and other forms of harassment. Moreover, once a union files with the NLRB for a certification election, employers attempt to forestall the election by arguing with the union through the NLRB over the workers who will be
eligible to vote, the "unit determination" battle.

Although the firings of unions activists are often found to be illegal and many are eventually reinstated, and although the units involved in elections are eventually determined and elections held, the delays can be devastating to unionization efforts. Goldfield documents the rise in the number of reported unfair labor practices committed by employers from 1950 to 1980, 4472 to 31,281 (p. 196). He also demonstrates that in the period between 1972 and 1984, delays in holding certification elections substantially reduced union victories. For example, if the election was held in the same month as the union filed with the NLRB there was a 53.9% victory rate, within 3 months a 46.3% victory rate, within 8 months a 39.9% victory rate (p. 202).

Goldfield also traces the changes in public policy which have effected union growth. He claims that the passage of the Taft-Hartley in 1947 marked the beginning of such a shift and in particular the provision of the act which grants "free speech" rights to employers in pre-election periods opened the way to the development of the modern union-busting industry. In 1978, organized labor campaigned vigorously for a Labor Law Reform Act which would have eliminated delays in holding certification elections. That act failed in Congress. With the election of Ronald Reagan, the shifts in public policy intensified: his firing of air traffic controllers in the
PATCO strike of 1981 and NLRB appointments were clear signals that labor would face increased difficulties.

Besides these difficulties in the organizing arena, the labor movement has also encountered grave obstacles when it attempts to exercise its power by striking. Employers now are increasingly hiring permanent replacement workers in strike situations and, unless unions can prove that the employer is guilty of unfair labor practices in the context of the strike (which involves lengthy proceedings before the NLRB), striking workers may never regain their previous jobs. Given the defeats in such publicized strikes as that of the paperworkers in Jay, Maine, some commentators are questioning the viability of utilizing the strike option in the contemporary climate of industrial relations (Geoghegan, 1989).

Organized labor is also vulnerable to internal division as transnational corporations make decisions about where to locate or where to continue their operations. Clark (1989) analyzes how different local unions of the same international organization may become involved in the "contests" between the different locations under consideration for industrial sites and, in effect, are pitted against each other. The larger international structure of the union is placed in the difficult position of mediating the contest, a situation not amenable to easy resolution when the stakes involved are so critical to the future financial health and security of not only the
affected workers but entire communities. In Clark's estimation, this type of dilemma owes in part to the prominent role of localized conditions within the American industrial relations system both in terms of the success of union organizing and collective bargaining, as well as in the calculus of corporate decision-making. This dependence upon "inter-community solidarity" as the means of countering the power of capital in such locational disputes and other matters is something that is unique to and a complicating factor in U.S. labor relations.

Directions for the Future

Various remedies are suggested to face these problems. The solutions envisioned span a range of approaches including public relations campaigns, cooperative power-sharing arrangements with corporations, utilization of pension funds for economic leverage, political action, invigoration of organizing departments and massive new organizing drives, mergers among unions to achieve greater power, as well as continued defense of existing achievements and standards through more traditional collective bargaining (AFL-CIO, 1985; Barbash, 1984; Kuttner, 1986, and 1987; Miller, 1987; Oswald, 1984).

There is certainly not unanimity on the directions in which labor should move in the future. While some analysts suggest strategies for unions in relation to specific employers which would emphasize cooperation,
flexibility, employee profit-sharing and ownership, and even accepting concessions in various situations, others conceptualize labor's future as bound up with larger trends and other progressive forces and emphasize new organizing, international solidarity with unions in foreign countries, maintaining and building militancy in existing memberships, and coalition-building in local and national politics. The public relations approach, somewhere between these two perspectives, stresses advertising and marketing techniques such as the "Union Yes!" campaign and also suggests enticements such as low interest credit cards, low cost insurance, pre-paid legal services and other benefits. There has also been a proposal to develop an associate membership category for the AFL-CIO, available to individuals in unorganized workplaces which would feature the credit cards, insurance and other benefits (AFL-CIO, 1985).

There is no one single solution which would adequately address all of the problems faced by the American labor movement and no single option which could apply in all situations. Different unions in different sectors and regions face very different specific problems. For example, while private sector unions confront corporate strategies designed to meet corporate competition, public sector unions may face tax-payer revolts and/or state and local government budget crises. These problems pose different issues in terms of
fashioning responses. Moreover, new organizing drives may require commitments of massive resources, dedicated and tenacious staffmembers to work the drive, as well as a capacity to develop innovative strategies and tactics. The relative importance assigned to organizing varies from union to union, and so the suggestion to launch new organizing drives means different things to different unions. The point being that even in a discussion of how labor should respond in this era of economic restructuring, there are many different possibilities that any single union might pursue.

**Union Leadership Roles in the Midst of These Issues**

While the constraints under which unions operate may flow from any combination of the problems described in this chapter, the subjective assessment of the leadership of a union as to the nature of the problems is another important feature of labor's response. In large measure, the options or directions pursued by a union are very much products of the judgment of its leadership, one area which I address within this research. Schwartz and Hoyman (1984) identify several different requirements of union leadership in the context of modern labor relations: s/he must be able to represent the membership and relate to multiple constituencies such as other union leaders, staffmembers of the union and political elites. The union leader must be technically competent in terms of compliance with laws, knowledge of pension issues, health insurance and a host of other issues, as well as a
competent and astute manager of a union bureaucracy. Union presidents are considered the "chief bargainer" for their unions in important negotiations and may also be significant actors on the national political scene. As is apparent from this characterization, the job of a contemporary labor leader is an immensely complex one.

Schwartz and Hoyman also identify three principle paths to union leadership: the traditional rank-and-file road; rising from within the union bureaucracy; and the route of the "outside professional" moving directly into leadership. Fink and Greenberg (1989) in documenting and analyzing the history of the Hospital Workers Union--Local 1199 (the original union from which the New England Health Care Employees Union District 1199 developed) characterize another type of union leader which applies to various individuals in 1199's leadership, leadership who are political activists and who enter the labor movement to further a left political vision and agenda. To some extent Schwartz and Hoyman's "outside professional" may attempt to capture this type of leadership, but the political activists who have helped to build 1199 and other unions often do so not with a professional motivation, but rather with political motivation and there can be a distinct difference between these two orientations.

Whatever the route to leadership, the path which a leader charts involves choices and assessments based on an
interpretation of contemporary events and trends. This is an area which does not seem to command a great deal of attention in the literature, but which is a rather important aspect of popular response to economic restructuring. A large portion of the research in this project attempts to understand the assessments of union leadership, as well as neighborhood organization leadership, in order to answer the questions of how labor and community forces respond and adapt to new economic and political realities. Next we will review relevant literature in the area of neighborhood organizing.
Within the literature on neighborhood organizing, analyses focus on somewhat different types of issues and problems than those facing labor. There are two very different literatures in which issues of neighborhood organizing are considered: one type, which is highly theoretical, examines urban social movements in relation to class structure and in comparison to other forms of working class movements, while another more practical literature analyzes the organizations, history and various methodologies of neighborhood organizing.

Urban Social Movement Literature

Within the theoretical treatments of urban social movements intense debates have transpired over the degree to which these movements can be characterized as resulting from capitalist relations of production and how they are related to various other forms of class antagonisms within society. Much of the debate revolves around Castell's (1977, 1983) formulations regarding the politics of consumption being autonomous from and containing a different logic than the politics of production. Indeed Katznelsnol's (1981) inspiring work undertakes to reveal how urban social movements, especially racially and ethnically divisive conflicts, result from the class structure of the larger society and ultimately serve to protect and reinforce that structure, that is, how these conflicts function as the "trenches" which protect and insulate class relations. Harvey (1989:126) attempts to
show that the "relative autonomy" of urban politics from the politics of production fits within the "geographical dynamics of capital accumulation and class struggle." Both in terms of the competition between regions and cities for industrial location and the social and political innovation required in the process of capital accumulation, the different patterns of urban politics and consumption are important elements and offer varied options in the continual renewal of capitalism.

Cox (1988) reviews recent work on urban social movements and neighborhood conflicts concerning the relationship of these movements with state structures, and the role of mobilization and ideology within the movements. In terms of relations with the state, Cox situates grassroots movements within a demobilization-mobilization dialectic involving popular demands on the state in the sphere of consumption and the provision of public goods and services:

...grassroots movements in their relation to the state appear to be part of a demobilization-mobilization dialectic: although it is necessary that the state demobilize, it is also structurally incapable of resolving the contradiction in an enduring manner. Remobilization remains, therefore, an ongoing possibility: significantly, this appears to be so whether demobilization takes the form of incorporation into state structures or the types of privatization associated with the Reagan and Thatcher governments, suggesting that the underlying contradictions can be resolved neither with, nor without, the state (p.421).

Cox concurs with the assessment of Fainstein and Fainstein (1985) as to the importance of the ideological content (or
lack thereof) within urban social movements. The Fainsteins note the failure of urban social movements within the context of economic restructuring to articulate an oppositional political ideology analogous to that which emerged during the civil rights movement in the 1960's. Instead, the Fainsteins argue, much of the response which has been fashioned has been based on a localism lacking a coherent political analysis and unifying ideology. This localism has not yet allowed for development of a national political movement or party, yet the Fainsteins hold out that option as a future possibility, however remote.

Delgado (1986) in his work which assesses the experiences of one of the major national organizing groups, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), succinctly analyzes the place of community organizations in the spectrum of social movements:

...Community organizations currently struggle in two arenas: they pose demands for immediate economic improvements, in terms of the distribution of the social wage, and they demand democratic rights and liberties.

Community organizations are the major instrumentalities through which fiscal struggles with the state are waged. They link the provision of collective goods and services to geographically defined class interest; by so doing, they create new avenues for understanding power and inequality. The process of organizing...has demystified the production and allocation of collective goods, and created replicable local organizations that encourage and validate a contradictory system of oppositional behavior (p.213).

Delgado is also concerned with the inherent limitations of
neighborhood organizing, including the constricting localism that the Fainsteins identify, and these issues will be enumerated in the next section.

Fisher and Kling (1989) speculate on the prospects for community mobilization in the 90's and the potential role of Alinsky style organizations. They contend that the "service economy of the corporate central city leads to a different kind of politics of mobilization than does the traditional industrial urban economy, which helps account for the fragmented character of recent movement organizations" (p.205). Moreover, concurring with some of Castells' ideas, they assert that as the urban industrial proletariat "disappears", other sources of identity such as race, gender and neighborhood become the primary mobilizing factors in social movements. They characterize these identities as "constituency-based" identities. The problem then becomes how to move this consciousness into larger social movements which challenge the systemic nature of urban problems:

Regardless of whether urban-focused social movements are about consumption, identity, power, or some combination of these, the linkages between community experience and larger class structures must be made explicit and manifest. Otherwise, protest and organizational movements that may follow will be undermined continually. The possibility for transformative community mobilization remains, we believe, but the political economy and organization of space in the global capitalist city clearly pose unique, formidable structural barriers to the emergence of a coherent and overarching movement (p.206).

They advocate the necessity of both building coalitions
among various constituency groups and engaging in electoral activity. Most important, from their perspective, is the question of ideological organizing, that is, neighborhood organizing which contains an ideological dimension that brings "people to deeper levels of understanding about the character of their political-economic world" (p. 208). Without this element, they contend, community movements will be bound by the "limits of personalized and localized consciousness" and remain very parochial.

The concerns raised in this work by Fisher and Kling, a previous piece by them (1987), as well as Fisher's (1984) book in some sense bridge the two types of literature on neighborhood organizing. These works exhibit many of the theoretical concerns of the urban social movement literature and attempt to incorporate and apply them to the more practical analyses found both in the community organization literature and in the social commentary of the left. We will turn next to these two sources of analysis.

Community Organization Literature and Social Commentary

The Rothman Model

Community organization literature which is utilized in social work scholarship and education characterizes neighborhood organizing as one of several strategies of community intervention. Rothman's model (1979) which is widely accepted by community organization practitioners posits three types of intervention: locality development
which closely resembles community economic development, social service delivery planning which is technical in nature, and social action into which Alinsky style organizing and other social movements fit. Social action is characterized as redistributive in orientation with themes of social justice, equality and empowerment. Neighborhood organizing is one important and enduring example of social action, as well as civil rights, political organizing and trade union organizing.

There are many forms of social movements in which different social dynamics come into play. The challenges which face organizations in the civil rights arena, for example, are different than either of the two types of social movements we will analyze in this project. Moreover, there are different approaches to local neighborhood empowerment--some organizations emphasize economic development to the exclusion of political strategies and vice versa--as well as several variations of neo-Alinsky neighborhood organizing which will be assessed below. While not intending to diminish other forms of local, grassroots initiatives, what is most relevant for this project is a more thorough of neo-Alinskyism and its roots, areas which we will consider next.

Saul Alinsky

Saul Alinsky's original ideas and writings continue to be important to community organization practitioners
since he is regarded as the originator of a unique model of neighborhood organizing. This particular model emphasizes neighborhood residents being organized to act on their own behalf to achieve goals, rather than relying on social welfare agencies and their personnel to do things for the neighborhood. It adapts techniques from CIO labor organizing methods of the 1930's and the radical Communist Party style of neighborhood organizing of that era, both of which were very familiar to and influential upon Alinsky (see Fisher, 1984:50-51). While several biographical treatments of Alinsky (Fink, 1984; Reitzes and Reitzes, 1987) focus on his concerns with democracy and democratic processes, his own writings (1946, 1949, 1971) also demonstrate a deep sensitivity and concern with issues of class, race, inequality and class conflict, as well as democracy. In Reveilee for Radicals (1946) many of the examples and analyses use people in in their roles as workers as a departure point:

Every man and woman belonging to a labor union must be educated to understand that in order to improve their lot, they must grasp the relationship existing between their work in the factory, their union, and every other part of what makes up their whole life. What does it avail the workingman to fight for a raise in pay if this raise is accompanied by increased cost of rent, food, clothing, and medical care?...What does it avail the workingman if his working conditions at the factory are made more healthful but he and his family are still forced to live in disease-ridden quarters?...

When we think of a better life for the worker, we must keep clearly in mind the obvious and true picture of the worker as a living man who votes, rents, consumes, breeds, and participates in every avenue of what we call life...As a consumer he is vitally concerned with all economic elements which tend to exploit him...As a human being he has to...
have a roof over his and his family's heads... As a voter the worker finds that every problem in the political arena is his problem. The welfare of many of the organizations with which he is affiliated, including the labor union, depend upon his active and informed political participation...(p.58-59).

Ultimately, Alinsky viewed community organization as a complement to or an extension of labor organizing:

If the organized labor movement cannot stretch to the broad horizon of objectives, it must then help in the building of a broad general People's Organization whose very character would involve an over-all philosophy and attack. In its simplest sense it would be an extension of the principles and practices of organized collective bargaining beyond their present confines of the factory gate. In this kind of People's Organization the organized labor movement by virtue of its popular constituency would be an essential element (1946:61).

Despite an orientation which seems to incorporate notions of class structure and class conflict in society, Alinsky nonetheless fashioned an organizing model which was explicitly non-ideological, focusing on immediate everyday concerns of the residents of specific neighborhoods. Over time, Alinsky took great pains to distance himself from any identification with Marxism or communism (see Fisher and Kling, 1987), and in Rules for Radicals (1971), while championing the causes of the "Have-Nots" as the basis for organizing, he identifies political relativism as his ideology. This relativism encompasses a constant search for "the causes of man's plight" and a constant adjusting of tactics and strategies toward "those values of equality, justice, freedom, peace, a deep concern for the preciousness of human life, and all those rights and values propounded by Judaeo-Christianity
and the democratic political tradition" (p.12).

Alinsky's first major neighborhood organizing initiative during 1938 and 1939 in Chicago's Back of the Yards neighborhood convinced him that "people's organizations" could be built within local poor and working class neighborhoods which could unite divergent segments of the community in order to redefine power relationships. Conflict and confrontation were employed to unify the neighborhood against designated outside targets. Although the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council (BYNC) eventually succumbed to conservative and even segregationist tendencies (see Fisher, 1984:58; Fisher and Kling, 1987:40), and its present incarnation is no longer viewed as consistent with the Alinsky methods of organizing but rather a more traditional social service agency (Reitzes and Reitzes, 1987:73), its initial successes inspired Alinsky to attempt the model elsewhere. With various adaptations, Alinsky took his model to other cities.

Alinsky's Legacy

The histories of Alinsky's organizing efforts are detailed in his own works (1946, 1971) and by others including Fink (1984), Fisher (1984), and Reitzes and Reitzes (1987), but what is particularly relevant for this project are the connections and influence of Alinsky on the neighborhood organizing initiatives of the 1970's and 1980's. Fisher describes the connections:

...Heather Booth (founder of the Midwest
Academy organizing training center) calls him the Sigmund Freud of modern community organizing. And as Freud and his disciples codified the field of psychoanalysis, so Alinsky and his successors have done with the tactics of populist-style organizing (p.129).

In the early 1970s, the limits of Alinsky organizing were not well known or understood. People active in movements of the 1960s felt a deep need, especially after United States withdrawal from Vietnam, to continue moving the nation toward greater democracy, equality and justice. They were attracted to Alinsky-style strategies primarily based on their perception of what was wrong with the student-based and student-led movements of the previous decade. What they knew of the Alinsky method sounded good, especially the fact that it rejected the revolutionary rhetoric and openly socialist ideology of the late 1960s that isolated students from poor and working people. While many sixties activists thought of themselves as socialists, the seventies seemed to call for a rethinking of traditional left views of how to bring about radical changed in the United States. The populist, democratic ideology of Alinskyism seemed to be a good, if imperfect, place to begin that rethinking (p.132).

While many leaders of the national networks of neighborhood organizations which emerged in the 1970s began their activist careers in the student anti-war and civil rights movements of the 1960s, there were also several who were trained directly by Alinsky and worked in organizations which Alinsky himself initiated. However, as Fisher suggests in the passage above and in greater detail in his book, some reformulations of the Alinsky method took place in order to correct a number of perceived weaknesses. Fisher designates this reformulation as "neo-Alinskyism".

Neo-Alinskyism is characterized as broader in scope than the original Alinsky model. One of the major
concepts which helps focus the work of these organizations is the "majoritarian strategy", that is, an organizational agenda which can appeal to the majority of the population, both the poor and middle income groups, and which retains redistributive and empowerment goals. Fisher asserts that neo-Alinskyite groups:

...work hard to hurdle the weaknesses of Alinsky-style neighborhood organizing in the 1960s which defined and limited itself to a neighborhood, race, or ethnic group--often pitting one oppressed group against another--and which suffered a good degree of isolation in relation to other groups and the political system as a whole (p. 134).

Besides an orientation incorporating notions of social change that go beyond the local community unit, Fisher highlights several other features which distinguish neo-Alinskyite organizations from Alinsky's earlier efforts. The newer groups generally do not require large degrees of foundation support before initiating operations in a local community. They also utilize organizers somewhat differently, moving away from reliance on both the "super-organizer" and existing organizational leaders in a given locale, and instead attempt to develop more indigenous leadership. Moreover, while Alinsky, according to Fisher (1984:135) feared the "facist" potential of large organizations, the national leaders of several neo-Alinsky groups envision the need for statewide and national organizations that can mount national campaigns and relate to a multi-issue agenda.

Critical of the Method

The weaknesses of both the original Alinsky method
and neo-Alinsky organizations have been the subject of various analyses and criticisms, some rather pointed (see for example Miller, 1987; Fisher and Kling, 1987, and 1989; Fisher, 1984; Delgado, 1986). Several consistent themes appear in the critiques:

- these methods do not incorporate a clearly defined analysis of the political-economic context of neighborhood problems and issues;
- these methods lack an explicit ideological stance which would help to place the issues of the local neighborhood into a broader context and analysis;
- the localism and parochialism of the methods severely limit and constrain the potential of these organizations to identify and link up with national social movements;
- the role of the organizer can become problematic, that is, there is the potential for members to come to rely too heavily on organizers and for the organizers to manipulate members especially because they do not explicitly articulate an ideology.

The over-arching question running through all of these issues is undoubtedly that of the lack of an explicit ideology which is critical of the existing political and economic system in the United States. Fisher, Fisher and Kling and the others repeatedly raise this necessity of ideological organizing.
Delgado (1986) raises other issues, as well, which impact the potential of these neo-Alinsky organizations: their ability to mobilize and allocate resources, and to collaborate (rather than compete) with each other and other social movements; their ability to establish a national presence and participate in electoral politics; and the level of external opposition to their efforts, especially in an era of general political conservatism. Moreover, the ability of these organizations to adapt to the needs of women and minorities, increasingly the majority of their constituencies, and to the movements which articulate the demands of these constituencies will also figure in their futures.

McKnight and Kretzman (1984) raise a number of very interesting concepts in their discussion of the need to develop a "post-Alinsky" agenda. They outline the assumptions in the Alinsky model and argue that conditions have changed sufficiently to render these assumptions virtually inoperable. One of the most important assumptions is that within a given neighborhood there are a number of vital organizations which could be drawn together to begin a neighborhood organizations. These organizations include churches, ethnic groupings, political groupings and labor. Another assumption was that an outside target or "enemy" could be identified and become the focus of organizing. This target is conceived of as "(a) visible, and therefore concretely definable; (b) local, and therefore accessible; and (c) capable, and
therefore possessed of the resources and authority to correct the problem." However, both of these assumptions must be questioned today since neighborhoods have changed dramatically since Alinsky began to organize.

First, participation in political parties is diminishing. Second, with the shifts in the economy by which industry has left central cities, industrial unions have undergone shrinkage as well as centralization of operations, and the newer service sector unions have not achieved the type of presence in local areas as did their industrial predecessors in Alinsky's era. Moreover, as second and third generation ethnics have moved out of neighborhoods of origin, the basis of ethnic organizations has changed. Therefore, the local churches remain as the most authentic neighborhood institutions (and even these inner-city churches often come to rely on suburban members for resources) and are indeed the main institutions to which neighborhood groups turn.

The targets of neighborhood organizations are also changing, that is, they are increasingly more difficult to view in local, visible terms. Besides industry, many other institutions such as banks have left inner-city neighborhoods. Those economic entities that remain are often local arms of multi-national corporations:

... Accelerating centralization and consolidation of control across economic sectors have left local managers marginal pawns in the high-stakes games run from headquarters in a few rebuilt downtowns. Effects of economic decisions on neighborhoods themselves are not even a part of the headquarters
calculations. It is in this light that neighborhood conditions are understood as "residual" rather than direct results of capital movement and investment policies (p. 16).

The institutions which remain in the neighborhoods are often publicly funded service agencies, generally overwhelmed by myriad demands and incapable of producing rapid visible results.

In light of all of these changes in the context for neighborhood organizing, McKnight and Kretzman advocate the need for experimentation and innovation in the work of neighborhood organizations. Their suggestions involve community development through economic strategies involving the neighborhood itself, public resources and private resources. They advocate strategies such as housing development, neighborhood cooperatives, community-owned enterprises, as well as pressure for public investment and initiatives in local governance. Moreover, they recognize the need for "insert(ing) locality into the equations by which businesses make decisions", and a national movement to achieve this goal. Expanded uses of laws and regulations such as the Community Reinvestment Act are additional measures to revitalize urban neighborhoods. In summary, the "post-Alinsky" agenda would focus largely on neighborhood economic strategies, while retaining the confrontational options traditionally associated with Alinsky organizing.

In an attempt to build a theoretical approach to neighborhood organizing, Fisher offers several conclusions
which are quite useful here in beginning to summarize this
review of neighborhood organizing:

1) Neighborhood organizing cuts across the political
spectrum: it is neither inherently progressive or
conservative, but rather a method which can be
utilized to achieve goals.

2) Neighborhood organizing develops in historical
contexts that include but transcend local
conditions: while unique at the specific local
levels, these movements are greatly determined by
the national political-economic context. They
develop most readily in periods of profound social
dislocation when either the regulatory power of
social institutions breaks down, or sharp economic
change occurs, either for the better (producing
rising expectations) or for the worse (producing
defensive action) (see also Piven and Cloward,
1977).

3) There is a critical interaction between
neighborhood organizing, national politics and
national social movements: the national government
may respond by repressing, attempting to coopt or
becoming the battleground of struggle. Neighborhood
movements and other national movements generally are
mutually reinforcing, but in some instances may
detract from eachother.

4) The problems besetting neighborhoods demand
political organization and action beyond the
neighborhood level, and therefore, neighborhood organizations need to relate to national organizations.

5) Neighborhood organizing must be built on more than material rewards and incentives: although Alinskyism is based on the notion of economic self-interest as the motivation for participation, since neighborhood organizations do not possess the resources to deliver many material rewards, they must be built around issues of personal development and a sense of purpose beyond individual advancement, allowing individuals to see themselves as part of a larger cause.

6) Neighborhood organizing must provide a galvanizing vision rooted in people's lives and traditions, an ideology which addresses long term goals while attending to immediate needs.

7) Neighborhood organizing requires a balance between organizing, leading and educating: the organizer must be able to bring forward and develop indigenous leadership in an honest, democratic manner. The organizer should neither do everything for the organization, nor manipulate local participants.

8) Political education must be incorporated into neighborhood organizing in order to broaden the assessments of participants. This education should
expose the workings of the political and economic system from a class perspective.

9) Success must be both tangible and intangible: since achievement of objectives is difficult under most circumstances, neighborhood groups must be able to point to rewards and effects which are other than quantifiable and observable, those which develop a sense of dignity, hope and self-confidence among members.

Fisher's critique and analysis suggest his leftist framework and his desire to see the emergence of an explicitly anti-capitalist model of community organizing. Whether or not one accepts these goals, many of the problems he identifies can become issues in building even local community-labor alliances, let alone any type of socialist movement. Localism and a lack of ideological content to neighborhood organizing may lead neighborhood people to see no inherent common interest with members of labor unions. Fisher's concerns therefore are readily apparent in the type of experiences described in the chapter in this dissertation on coalitions and alliances.

Before closing this review of neighborhood organizing, it is important to cover one additional area which is relevant to the study of neighborhood organizations in Hartford. Within this literature, the different national networks of neighborhood organizations are described. While much of Fisher's and Delgado's analyses refer to ACORN, three additional national
networks exist and utilize somewhat different varieties of the neo-Alinsky methodologies. Citizen Action, associated with the Midwest Academy and Heather Booth; the Industrial Areas Foundation, originally founded by Alinsky; and the National People's Action (NPA), associated with the National Training and Information Center (NTIC) are the three other networks. There are different structures, different relationships with local organizations, different positions on electoral politics and different emphases on tactics and strategies among the four networks.

The three neighborhood organizations in Hartford all are loosely affiliated with NPA, the most loosely federated of the networks. NPA, unlike Citizen Action or IAF, neither establishes nor gives direction to local or state organizations. Its major activity is an annual national convention in Washington, D.C., during which time it stages demonstrations or confrontations with various federal departments and bureaucrats. Reitzes and Reitzes (1987) assess NPA as the weakest national network and the least sophisticated in terms of training or brokering national campaigns for reform. They also assert that its local affiliates are "fiercely independent and unwilling to give up any local autonomy and so are hesitant to participate in joint actions" (p.198). Fisher (1984) points out that NPA does not adhere to electoral politics, but rather to the "pressure group model, convinced that electoral participation will undermine the effectiveness
and grassroots nature of community organization" (p.139). This fierce local autonomy and unwillingness to participate in electoral politics both have distinct impacts in Hartford, as will be analyzed in later chapters.

Having reviewed many of the issues facing the labor movement and the questions confronting neighborhood organizations, we will move next to a description of the location of the research and examine the social, economic and political conditions in Hartford, Connecticut.
The City of Hartford, Connecticut is a dramatic and compact example of modern urban dilemmas in the northeastern United States. If one read only such glowing accounts of Hartford's downtown revival as that of Richard Matthews featured in the business travel-oriented U.S. Air Magazine in May, 1988, one would never be able to discern that within its 17.2 square miles reside 136,000 people, 1/4 of whom lived below the poverty level as of 1980. Accordingly, Hartford gained the unfortunate distinction of being the 4th poorest city in the country, using the measure of percent of population in poverty.

While it is the capitol city of the state with the highest per capita income in the country ($21,226 in 1987), Hartford is Connecticut's poorest city with a per capita income of $8,677. Hartford also has the nation's second highest child poverty rate: over 39% of its children live in poverty, many in single parent households headed by women (McCarthy, 1988). Infant mortality rates resemble those of impoverished third world nations, owing in large part to high levels of teenage pregnancy. Lack of affordable housing, soaring crime rates, rampant drug traffic, racial segregation and isolation within the City's educational system and a litany of other compelling problems combine to produce a truly distressed social environment. The 1990 census data are anticipated with a certain amount of dread in
Hartford: many in the city believe conditions have only worsened over the last decade.

This pervasive poverty is ringed by affluent suburbs with a very different social structure. While Hartford's population in 1980 was 33% Black and 21% Hispanic, all but two of its neighboring 37 towns in the Hartford SMSA were over 92% white. Put another way, "although Hartford houses just 19% of the 726,000 people who live in the metropolitan area, it is home to 75% of the area's black population and 80% of its Hispanic population" (Williams, 1988). White households in the region enjoyed an average income of $24,749 in 1980, while Black household incomes averaged $15,812 and Hispanics $12,694 (Williams, 1988).

As stark as the differences between Hartford and its suburbs are, the contrast between Hartford's downtown and its neighborhoods is perhaps even more portentous. Local actors describe Hartford as a "tale of two cities" within one geo-political boundary. Downtown Hartford has exploded with development in the past decade. Gleaming modern skyscrapers, congested construction-clogged streets, fancy boutiques and a bustling Civic Center which hosts home games of the city's National Hockey League franchise have transformed the small rather sleepy commercial district of 20 years ago into a truly thriving regional financial center. Downtown Hartford is the location of corporate headquarters of several major national insurance companies, pre-eminent among them Travelers Insurance and
Aetna Life and Casualty, as well as the defense giant United Technologies. The insurance companies' presence in particular provides the drive and in some cases the financing of the development boom.

DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT

Hartford's downtown skyline was dramatically different in the late 1980's than 10 years earlier. New development in Hartford's downtown has taken place quite rapidly. Between 1980 and mid-1986 over 5,000,000 new square feet of downtown office space was built (City of Hartford, June, 1986). As of mid-1988, a total of 9.29 million square feet of office space existed in downtown Hartford, 1.1 million was under construction and an additional 9.9 million was proposed for development within 5 years (Pazkiokas, 1988). It should be noted that of the proposed projects, not all are necessarily expected to be constructed within the 5 year time frame. However, in the first half of the 1980's, office space more than doubled. While Hartford boasted the tightest market for downtown office space in the country through 1988 (as low as 5% to 7%) (Horgan, 1988), by early 1989 vacancy rates for Class A space rose to over 10%, signaling the beginning of a slowdown in the pacing of office construction.

In a two-part series on development in the city, the Hartford Courant (6/12/88 and 6/13/88) interviewed a number of developers and local officials. The comments of several individuals reflect the general contours of economic restructuring as described in earlier sections of
William Farley, President of Farley Company, a real estate brokerage firm: The real growth started in the late 1970's and right at the decade really started to move... The insurance companies started it, and then the banks followed on somewhat the same track. We've also had three other waves of growth—a series of reinsurance firms, software and hardware people and, in the past 18 months, out-of-state mortgage lenders (Horgan, 1988).

Anthony Caruso, Executive Director, Hartford Downtown Council: The insurance industry in the past several years has exhibited what seems to be an insatiable appetite for space...I guess some developers look at it as if the service industry will continue with business as usual, resulting in their building being leased up in a reasonable period of time. Then there are some that are a little more cautious. (Horgan, 1988).

Caruso's last statement alluded to the impending slowdown in new construction, yet the amount of office space used by the insurance companies in downtown Hartford is still impressive. For example, at the time of the Courant's series, Travelers was cited as leasing 1.25 million square feet in downtown, having added an average of 100,000 square feet each year for the preceding six years. This is all in addition to the relatively large building which the company owns and which is officially considered the corporate headquarters.

EMPLOYMENT

Examining the employment picture in Hartford provides another dimension of the economic change underway in the city. As of 1987, manufacturing accounted for 5.5% of the employment within the city (approximately 8,620
jobs), while the financial/insurance/real estate (FIRE) sector accounted for 30.1% and the service sector for 29.6% (Connecticut Department of Labor). In 1960 manufacturing accounted for 21% of the city's non-agricultural employment. Between then and 1987, approximately 17,600 manufacturing jobs left the city (City of Hartford, 1983 and Conn. Department of Labor). Despite the loss within the City of Hartford, manufacturing jobs increased in the larger Hartford Labor Market Area (LMA) until 1980. For example, 15,000 new manufacturing jobs were created in the Hartford LMA between 1975 and 1980, peaking at 100,400 in 1980. However after 1980, manufacturing jobs steadily left the entire area so that by October, 1988, over 10,000 fewer manufacturing jobs existed than in 1980, totaling approximately 90,000 jobs.

Even before the development boom of the 1980's gathered full steam, employment within the City of Hartford focused more and more in the FIRE and service sectors. Listed below are figures indicating both the number of jobs and percentages of Hartford's workforce employed in manufacturing, FIRE, service and government sectors for 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1980.
Table 1
Selected Types of Non-Agricultural Employment in Hartford

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EMPLOYMENT SECTOR</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>117,780</td>
<td>134,450</td>
<td>124,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mnfcng.</td>
<td>23,100</td>
<td>20,030</td>
<td>11,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRE</td>
<td>28,450</td>
<td>35,040</td>
<td>38,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>21,900</td>
<td>25,690</td>
<td>29,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt.</td>
<td>12,980</td>
<td>20,530</td>
<td>20,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1980

| Total             | 143,180       |
| Mnfcng.           | 12,210        |
| FIRE              | 45,200        |
| Services          | 34,560        |
| Govt.             | 27,720        |
|                   | 100.0%        |
|                   | 8.5%          |
|                   | 31.6%         |
|                   | 24.1%         |
|                   | 15.9%         |

Source: Connecticut Department of Labor

Throughout this period Hartford was also losing its share of the total employment in the labor market area, from 41.2% in 1970 to 34.9% in 1983 (City of Hartford, 1984). Moreover, Hartford residents' labor force participation was less in 1980 than in 1960, during which time the total number of jobs in Hartford increased significantly, as illustrated in Table 2.

Table 2
Hartford, Connecticut

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jobs in Hartford</td>
<td>115,840</td>
<td>134,450</td>
<td>143,180</td>
<td>+27,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartford Labor Force</td>
<td>77,855</td>
<td>71,408</td>
<td>61,688</td>
<td>-16,167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Conn. Dept. of Labor and U.S. Census, as compiled in Hartford State of the City September 1983.
As the development boom took off in the mid-1980's, new jobs were created in Hartford, the largest segment in the service sector. If we look at the number of jobs in several different sectors in Hartford in two year intervals from 1981 until 1987, we can see that manufacturing continues to decline steadily, while the government sector stays fairly constant, FIRE shows modest growth with some fluctuation and service sector employment climbs relatively and absolutely.

Table 3
Selected Types of Non-Agricultural Employment in Hartford 1981 - 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EMPLOYMENT SECTOR</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>140,160</td>
<td>144,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mnfcing.</td>
<td>12,450</td>
<td>10,130</td>
<td>9,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRE</td>
<td>43,850</td>
<td>45,680</td>
<td>42,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>34,260</td>
<td>36,760</td>
<td>41,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt.</td>
<td>21,050</td>
<td>20,780</td>
<td>21,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total            | 156,050| 148,580  | 154,750  |
| Mnfcing.         | 8,620  | 7,540    | 6,930    |
| FIRE             | 47,000 | 55,800   | 61,800   |
| Services         | 46,130 | 54,000   | 59,900   |
| Govt.            | 23,600 | 26,200   | 27,600   |

Source: Connecticut Department of Labor

If we combine the information from Table 1 and Table 3, we can ascertain that during the 1980's employment growth and contraction in the selected sectors can be summarized as follows:
Table 4

JOB CREATION: CITY OF HARTFORD
(Selected Sectors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>CHANGE 1980-87</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total net change</td>
<td>+12,870 (all sectors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>-3,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRE</td>
<td>+1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>+11,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>+880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Connecticut Department of Labor

Service sector employment accounted for 90% of the net job growth in Hartford between 1980 and 1987. Employment projections in a 1985 report for the United Way of the Capitol Region listed janitors as the fastest growing occupation in Hartford, followed by office clerks, secretaries, sales clerks, nurses, waiters/waitresses, cashiers, nurses aides/orderlies, accountants & auditors, and bookkeepers, respectively. Not surprisingly, the top 10 growth occupations all fit within the contours of the growing service economy. The fastest declining occupations included teachers (at all levels, including college and preschool), carpenters, sewing machine operators, heavy equipment operators and other skilled trades (United Way, 1985).

The Hartford LMA also experienced substantial job creation in the 1980's. Again, the service and FIRE sectors led the way in job creation:
Table 5

Job Creation: Hartford Labor Market Area
Selected Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>CHANGE 1980-87</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>396,200</td>
<td>473,900</td>
<td>(net)+77,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>100,400</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>-9,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRE</td>
<td>60,300</td>
<td>76,700</td>
<td>+5,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>74,600</td>
<td>106,900</td>
<td>+40,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>53,800</td>
<td>62,800</td>
<td>+9,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Connecticut Department of Labor

So by the late 1980's, manufacturing was not a significant part of the City of Hartford's economic base. However, it was still significant, but declining in the larger labor market area. Hartford was once home to numbers of large factories such as Fuller Brush, Royal Typewriter, Underwood Typewriter and others which employed thousands of workers. Well before the beginning of the 1980's many of these concerns had closed, moving operations to the southern U.S., overseas or simply ceasing operations. Royal Typewriter Company once employed over 3000 people. It moved operations to England in 1972. The Underwood Typewriter Plant in Hartford closed even earlier in 1968, throwing close to 2000 workers out of their jobs. Underwood had been purchased by the Italian concern Olivetti and became known as Olivetti-Underwood. After several years of maintaining the Hartford plant, the company decided to consolidate its operations and eliminate this local operation. While the Underwood plant was demolished and a massive new
development project is now sited on the property, the Royal factory lies vacant currently and is one of the next prime sites for developers.

The largest manufacturing concern in the area, the Pratt and Whitney Division of United Technologies located in neighboring East Hartford, still employs some 8,000 to 10,000 people and supports a supplier network which includes local companies. For the foreseeable future, orders for jet engines both from the Defense Department and commercial airline carriers will keep Pratt's production levels quite high.

The growth in the insurance sector over the past several decades reflects the diversification of the insurance industry which is now involved in a vast array of financial activities from real estate development to pension fund management and a myriad of financial services. These companies have deep historical roots in Hartford. Several have existed in the city since colonial times when merchants involved in insurance underwriting formed Connecticut's first insurance company in 1810, the Hartford Fire Insurance Company--today a subsidiary of IT&T. The Aetna Insurance Company was founded in 1819. Other companies were formed in the 1850's and 1860's, including Travelers in 1864 ("A City Built on Risk, 1986).

Throughout the twentieth century the insurance companies have sponsored large construction projects that have had far-reaching impacts in terms of shaping Hartford's physical and economic growth. Earlier their
own expanding workforces and office space requirements drove the construction of office buildings, as well as the development of housing for their employees. In recent decades they have played a role in all phases of Hartford's development. For example, Aetna financed the construction of the Hartford Civic Center. Aetna and IT&T, the parent company of The Hartford Insurance Group, financed the adjoining Sheraton Hotel. Yet, even the insurance companies are undergoing their own restructuring in an attempt to become "leaner". Between 1988 and 1989, Travelers eliminated 1100 jobs in an attempt to cut its costs by 40 percent ("More Job Loss at Travelers", 1/30/89).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Hartford's recent political history reflects both the growing political organization of the city's African American and Puerto Rican communities, as well as the increasing needs and claims of the population on a fragmented city government. The structure of municipal government is an odd hybrid of reform and tradition. Since a charter revision in the 1940's, the structure of local government consists of a nine member City Council elected at-large with three seats reserved (per State Statute) for a minority party; a city manager who serves as the city's chief administrative officer and who is selected (and dismissed) by the City Council; and an
elected mayor whose position is largely ceremonial. Numerous commissions and authorities also exist with their own spheres of power and influence such as the Redevelopment Authority and the Zoning Board of Appeals.


The African American community in Hartford has achieved some notable electoral successes during the 1980's. In 1981, Thirman Milner was elected mayor, the first popularly elected Black mayor not only in Connecticut, but in all of New England. While the mayor's post is not vested by the City Charter with a significant degree of power within the city government, the mayor does preside over Council meetings and is highly visible in the city. The symbolic importance of electing a Black mayor served as a milestone of racial pride for Hartford's African American community. To the rest of the city and
the region, his election signaled the advent of a different power equation in the city.

After two successful re-election bids but with a growing frustration from the limitations of the office, Milner chose not to seek re-election in 1987. The person he urged to seek election to replace him was successful and another "first" took place in Hartford. Carrie Saxon Perry, a Black woman who had served several terms as a State Representative, was elected Mayor in 1987. Her election drew national attention of both the major media and numerous national Black organizations.

The City Council is the city's policy-making body. Since the Democratic members have an effective "lock" on 6 seats, they control the setting of policy goals and directives. However, the City Manager has a wide range of discretion in carrying out policy initiatives, particularly in budgetary matters, and is the individual to whom City departments are accountable. Within this setup, there is a certain ambiguity of accountability that is quite apparent to the citizenry. Community organizations or people with individual grievances sometimes take their concerns to Councilmembers, at other times attempt to call upon the City Manager, or may go to see the Mayor.

Throughout the 1970's one individual amassed a great deal of power on the Council in the position of Deputy Mayor. Nicholas Carbone, widely celebrated as a
progressive policy leader (Clavel, 1986), set the tone for Hartford's city government. He is credited with bringing together the public and private forces which began initial "revitalization" of Hartford. The position of Deputy Mayor, the leader of the Council selected by the majority party caucus, came to be regarded as the most powerful elected position in Hartford.

By 1979, Carbone's political hold was unraveling and he was defeated in a hotly contested Democratic primary. After a chaotic two years in which the position of Deputy Mayor was held by a maverick conservative Democrat, Robert Ludgin, who forged an alliance with the three Council Republicans to maintain a voting majority, a degree of relative calm was restored in 1981. Rudolph Arnold, a young, progressive Black attorney who had served on the City Council for the previous two years, was selected by the Democratic Caucus as Deputy Mayor. Here was another Hartford "first" which placed the substantial power of the position of Deputy Mayor in the hands of a Black person. Arnold was highly regarded in the city by most sectors as extremely competent, intelligent and possessing a demeanor with which many groups could interact. However, until 1989 the members of the "part time" Hartford City Council are only paid $4,000 annually for their services. (A 1989 referendum raised the renumeration to $15,000). Arnold found it difficult to develop his private legal practice and meet the heavy demands on his time that Council duty and the Deputy Mayor position required. In 1983 he chose
not to seek re-election.

From 1983 until 1989, the Deputy Mayor position was held by Alphonse Marotta, a former state employee union official from Hartford's heavily Italian South End. He did not harness the degree of power that Carbone did, nor was he as highly regarded as Arnold. In 1989, the Deputy Mayor position was assumed by Councilmember I. Charles Matthews, an African American and an attorney for United Technologies.

In 1987 a new entity entered the political arena in Hartford. People for Change (PFC) constituted itself as a combination third party and community coalition. The group emerged from a battle for "linkage" waged by community organizations in which they pressed for some form of tax on downtown development to benefit the neighborhoods, and from dissatisfaction on the part of labor unions for the Council's inaction in the lengthy strike at Colt Firearms. A number of forces joined in the coalition effort, including the Puerto Rican Political Action Committee, women's and gay rights organizations. Taking advantage of the state statute which guarantees minority party representation on the Council of three seats, PFC ran a slate of three individuals for City Council as a third party in the November, 1987 Municipal Election and captured two seats. Their goal was to forge an alliance with other progressive Council members in order to pursue a reform agenda. They were aided in their
electoral quest by disaffected Democrats and the technical assistance of the Legislative Electoral Action Program (LEAP), an organization formed to provide technical assistance to progressive candidates. Marie Kirkley Bey, a Black woman who was a respected neighborhood leader and Eugenio Caro, a Puerto Rican community activist were elected in the November, 1987 election.

As the Puerto Rican community began to realize its political potential, its political leadership attempted to redefine their client status with the Democratic Town Committee of Hartford and develop a measure of independence from the existing machine. In the mid 1980's the Puerto Rican Political Action Committee was formed. The Puerto Rican PAC, as it is called, brought together a number of elements of leadership in the Puerto Rican community from education, social service, business and the ranks of street level activists. The organization attempted to screen candidates and present its choices to the Democratic Town Committee for inclusion on the Democratic tickets. In 1987 when the PAC's choice for the City Council slate was ignored in favor of a less popular choice, the PAC threw its energy into the People for Change campaign which accepted onto its slate the individual endorsed by the PAC, Eugenio Caro.

Even though the City Council is elected at large by the voting public, the Democratic Town Committee attempts to "balance" the six person slate it puts forward through an equation which allocates positions based on
geographical, racial and ethnic mix. Typically through the 1980's the slate's composition has included:

- Two African American candidates, at least one of whom is from the politically active Blue Hills neighborhood in the predominantly African American North End of the city;
- One Puerto Rican candidate who is envisioned as representing the entire Latino community, regardless of geographical dispersion;
- One candidate, who heretofore has been white, from the West End neighborhood—a liberal racially mixed, but predominantly white professional enclave—viewed as the "white liberal" of the Council;
- Two South End candidates from what remains of more traditional white working class areas of the City, one of whom is usually Italian and the other usually Irish.

Since the endorsed Democratic slate generally survives primary challenges, and opposing slates in primary contests mirror the composition of the endorsed slate, the "ruling" Democratic caucus on the City Council is built upon this equation of territory, race and ethnicity. Female candidates are able to fill the slots if they also conform to the racial, ethnic and territorial equation. Therefore, Hartford periodically has African American and Puerto Rican women as Councilmembers, as well as women of Italian, Irish and other national descents.
Interestingly, ideology is only an explicit factor in the selection of one of the six candidates, the West End candidate. The range of ideologies among the Black members of council have been fairly wide in the past decade, from the Black business perspective, to overtly pro-corporate perspectives, to a more redistributive social service/legal service perspective.

The Democratic Town Committee is organized by State Assembly districts, of which Hartford has seven. There are potentially seven local Town Committee elections to fill the 54 person committee. Each Town Committee district endorses a candidate for State Representative. The city has two State Senatorial districts, and the Town Committee members who reside in these two areas meet to endorse State Senate candidates.

The composition of the city's delegation to the Connecticut House of Representatives can also potentially generate intense contests, but these are localized within each of the seven districts. For example, from the early 1980's through the November, 1988 election, Hartford sent to the Capitol a delegation which consisted of 3 Black representatives, 4 white representatives, one of whom is known as a West End liberal, and 1 Black State Senator and 1 white State Senator. Puerto Ricans grew more and more impatient with their lack of representation, given the fact that Hartford has one of the largest (in relative terms) Puerto Rican populations of the continental United States.
The City of Bridgeport, Connecticut, had been electing a Puerto Rican representative for several years—the only Puerto Rican State Representative in Connecticut—but Hartford had not. The 1988 elections saw Hartford's Puerto Rican population organize intensely, resulting in Puerto Rican candidates winning primaries in two districts and going on in November to take two of the seven seats. One of the victories was expected and the other was a surprise to the entire city. One victorious candidate replaced a white person and the other replaced a Black person. So in 1988, the City's delegation included two Black people, two Puerto Rican people and three whites in the State House and continued with one Black and one white State Senator. All are Democrats.

People for Change was the inspiration for the campaign of one of the victorious Puerto Rican representatives, Juan Figueroa who represents the City's Third Assembly District. Figueroa, as an activist in the Puerto Rican PAC, participated in the 1987 PFC City Council campaign effort, and spearheaded an effort to take control of the Third District Town Committee through the vehicle of "Democrats for Change" (DFC). DFC constituted itself as the "arm" of PFC that would work formally within the Democratic Party. Figueroa's campaign was built on the technical expertise of People for Change and LEAP's methods of voter registration, targeting, and extensive telephone and door-to-door canvassing. He successfully challenged a several term incumbent in the Democratic
primary, and went on to an easy victory in November.

COMMUNITY ACTIVISM

By the latter 1980's the locus of community activism in Hartford revolved around constituency-based neighborhood organizations who derive their models and techniques from the Alinsky tradition of community organizing and fit squarely within the neo-Alinsky framework outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. Throughout the 60's and 70's various civil rights, local civic and anti-poverty organizations exerted influence as forces of activism. However, the formation of the neighborhood organizations and their subsequent successful development served to formalize and to some extent institutionalize neighborhoods as the basis of activism and these organizations in particular as the vehicles for that activism within the city.

The oldest of the three organizations, Hartford Area Rally Together (HART), formed in 1975. It defined its sphere of activity--its "turf"--as the southern half of the city, an area which was and remains predominantly white. However, that area also has a substantial Puerto Rican population, and in recent years has seen the settlement of more Blacks and a growing Southeast Asian population. Original financial backing for HART came from the Catholic Church's Campaign for Human Development. In recent years HART and the two other neighborhood
The southern half of the city contains a number of distinct neighborhoods. For planning purposes, the City of Hartford has designated eight residential and one commercial/industrial neighborhoods. HART's neighborhood designations do not match exactly those of the City and it does not organize in the public housing projects in the southern part of Hartford. However, six areas are formally represented in HART's Board of Directors, as well as an areawide senior citizens organization. In its early years HART appealed mainly to white homeowners. Later it attempted to set up an organization under its umbrella specifically for Hispanics since that population was greatly increasing within HART's turf. After a problematic history, that organization eventually folded into HART's neighborhood based organizations.

In the later 1980's, HART began to achieve a much more integrated membership, including Black and Puerto Rican leadership. Although it is still predominantly white in terms of members, leaders and turf, it is a much different organization than when it was founded, especially in terms of how it is perceived in the rest of the community. In its early years, there was curiosity and some suspicion on the part of other neighborhoods in Hartford as to what an organized South End would mean for the distribution of resources, services and power. Its
organizing methodology consisted of setting up block clubs and a dedicated team of organizers was very successful in establishing over 30 such block clubs in the southern part of Hartford. Other neighborhoods began to look at HART's example as something to emulate. Two other organizations formed in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

Organized North Easterners--Clay Hill and North End, ONE-CHANE, is the product of a recent merger of two organizations. Clay Hill and North End, CHANE, has existed in one of the most impoverished areas of Hartford from 1979 until 1988 and employed elements of the Alinsky model utilized by HART, as well as the more traditional civic association model. Its turf included an area with severe poverty, large run-down public housing projects, massive welfare dependency and every poverty-associated problem of modern America. The population is almost entirely Black and Puerto Rican. CHANE, itself, grew out of loosely organized local neighborhood groups who came together around specific concerns. It received start-up funds from three insurance companies and later came to secure United Way and other types of funds. Organized North Easterners, ONE, operated more as a small scale community development organization in an adjacent area with some degree of homeownership, and a few sections of more middle income level populations. There are also large public housing projects in the Northeast neighborhood. The impetus for ONE came from those residents with relatively higher incomes in this
neighborhood who were struggling to hold on to their homes and maintain a decent standard of living. In 1988 the two organizations merged, forming ONE-CHANE and attempting to build on both previous organizations' models.

Neighborhood organizing in ONE-CHANE's turf is some of the most difficult and challenging in Hartford, or, for that matter, anywhere else in the country. Families in some of these neighborhoods have suffered long term poverty, and many of those who remain in the area have limited resources and limited opportunities for mobility.

Asylum Hill Organizing Project (AHOP) formed in 1983. Its turf is much more confined than HART's or ONE-CHANE's, but it operates in a dense, spottily gentrified, but mainly poor neighborhood. Asylum Hill is one of the highest crime areas in Hartford, notorious for drug trafficking, transiency, prostitution and other street level problems. It is integrated, but mainly African American and Puerto Rican, and has a significant elderly population. Absentee slumlords have been a major problem in the neighborhood and this area has also suffered more condominium conversions than other areas in Hartford. Asylum Hill is also home to Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company, Connecticut Mutual Insurance Company, St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center, St. Joseph's Cathedral (Hartford's only Catholic cathedral) and a number of other old established churches. The churches
assisted in AHOP's early development.

The Asylum Hill neighborhood has an interesting history. During his residency in Hartford, Samuel Clemens lived in this area which at the time was an artistic and literary enclave, and his former residence, now known as the Mark Twain House, is one of Hartford's major tourist attractions. Today, the presence of two major insurance companies, and Aetna in particular, gives the neighborhood a strategic importance which AHOP takes advantage of in its work.

Since 1983, AHOP's work has incorporated tenant organizing, building block clubs, development of neighborhood-wide coalitions on crime and other issues, work with local youth and seniors, and a host of other issues. AHOP absorbed a social service center into its control and launched a housing development arm.

Other smaller neighborhood based organizations exist in Hartford, but the "Big Three" have the most stable resource bases, larger staffs and greater recognition and track records than any of the others. HART, AHOP and ONE-CHANE are all members of a statewide network of neighborhood groups, United Connecticut Action for Neighborhoods (UCAN), and also participate nationally in the National People's Action (NPA), one of several national organizing networks. UCAN also provides technical assistance and in some instances supervision of organizing staff for its member organizations.

There is also an affiliate of the national Citizen
Action network in Connecticut with a presence in Hartford, the Connecticut Citizens Action Group, CCAG. For a period of time CCAG worked to establish local neighborhood based chapters and one existed in Hartford in the Blue Hills neighborhood during the early 1980's. It ceased functioning within several years and CCAG adopted a different organizing model with more of a statewide focus.

The three neighborhood organizations do command a presence in the city in terms of public decision-making and in some cases have been able to negotiate with private corporations over the impact of their policies or plans for the neighborhoods. These three groups are certainly the most grassroots based of any major local organizations and among the best organized. In Chapter 7, we will examine in some detail various aspects of their methodologies, how they attempt to amass and wield power, and also analyze the outcome of several of their campaigns and other efforts.

THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN HARTFORD

Hartford has a tradition of active labor unions, although the decline in union membership nationally is reflected in the city. Still, close to 90 different union locals are currently affiliated with the Greater Hartford Central Labor Council, the local AFL-CIO body, representing between 25,000 to 28,000 workers in the Hartford region. Since Connecticut is geographically small and the unions involved in Hartford and the
surrounding area operate on a statewide basis, it is useful to describe some of the larger unions in the state to better understand the context for the Hartford area labor movement.

The Connecticut State AFL-CIO consists of approximately 650 union locals and 170,000 members (Remez, 1990). Two of the internationals with the largest statewide memberships include the International Association of Machinists (IAM) which represents workers at the four United Technologies Pratt & Whitney Division plants in the state, UTC's Hamilton Standard Division and at several other employers in the state, and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) which represents a significant number of public employees, of whom a large portion are employed by the State of Connecticut. The United Auto Workers (UAW) has represented thousands of workers in a variety of concerns in the state since the 1950's, but in recent years has experienced a significant decline from 28,000 in the early 1970's to less than half that number today through plant closings and layoffs. Although affiliated nationally with the AFL-CIO, the UAW in Connecticut was not affiliated with the State Central Labor Council or the local labor councils until 1990, after several decades of independent status. Several other unions are not affiliated with the State AFL-CIO body: the largest are the Teamsters locals in the state. In the Hartford area, a reform minded
leadership has taken over one of the more sizeable Teamster locals in the state.

Two service sector unions are among the most active in organizing new members: Hotel and Restaurant Employees (HERE) and the New England Health Care Employees Union-District 1199-SEIU. Aggressive, dedicated staffs of these unions possess a missionary zeal for their work and impart a militancy to the entire labor in the state, yet receive substantially lower salaries than the staffmembers of other unions. 1199 has over 15,000 members in Connecticut, approximately 9,000 of whom are employed by the State of Connecticut. It also represents the largely minority and women workforces at a number of nursing homes, community based mental health clinics and local hospitals throughout Connecticut. In the early 1980's, 1199 made headline news by striking over 15 nursing homes at once, using protest tactics and garnering support from elected officials and civil rights organizations in the effort. In 1986 it waged a 4 month strike at Waterbury Hospital. HERE has led several major strikes at hotels, the most recent a three month struggle in 1988 at the Hartford Sheraton, and has also used protest tactics and large support rallies to call public attention to the plight of its members.

One of the most significant issues in recent years for the labor movement in Hartford and in Connecticut, more generally, was a strike of over four years duration at Colt Firearms with plants in Hartford and West
Hartford. In January, 1986, over 1000 workers walked off the job after working 10 months without a contract. They are members of UAW Local 376, an amalgamated local which is one of the largest UAW locals in Connecticut and which represents workers at over 20 different shops. The Colt membership is the largest block of members in Local 376. Shortly after the strike began the union leadership met with the President of the Greater Hartford Labor Council and launched a strike support effort, the Community Labor Alliance. The Alliance continues to this day—having organized periodic rallies, having sponsored fundraising activities, having met with elected officials and other strike support related activities during the Colt strike. Other strikes in the area have also been assisted by the Alliance. This strike and the strike support effort will be analyzed in more detail in later chapters of this dissertation, but clearly for labor in Connecticut and for other sympathetic forces, the Colt strike is a symbol of the harshest corporate treatment of workers in the era of economic restructuring.

Many of the 1199 and HERE members and former Colt strikers live in the very neighborhoods that are the turfs of AHOP, HART and ONE-CHANE. 1199 has hundreds of West Indian and African American members, mainly women, who live in the North End of Hartford. Every street in the Blue Hills neighborhood has 1199 members residing on it. HERE members, as well, are the people who fill many of the
service jobs in the restaurants and hotels in the thriving
downtown, but who could not afford an overnight stay in
the rooms they tend. They too live in Hartford's
neighborhoods and are in large numbers Black and Latino
residents. The former Colt strikers are a diverse group,
but they do include Black and Latino Hartford residents.
In fact, some former Colt strikers (now back working at
Colt) are Black workers with as much as 35 to 40 years
seniority--some of longest held and heretofore most
lucrative factory jobs for African Americans in Hartford.
There are Puerto Rican former Colt strikers with 15 to 20
years seniority. There are Black former strikers who
previously worked at Underwood or Royal, and then went to
Colt when these factories closed.

While one could expect to find the membership of
many other area unions living in Hartford's neighborhoods,
these three unions have been selected for inclusion into
this project for several key reasons. First, they were
open to the work, they were familiar and accessible to
the author, and they are concerned with analyzing their
struggles. Second, as illustrated above, they represent
workers who live in the neighborhoods in which the neo-
Alinsky organizations operate and in some cases their
members are active in HART, AHOP or ONE-CHANE. Third,
they each face different aspects of the phenomenon of
economic restructuring and are required to fashion
responses to the problems they encounter. In their
various ways, all three unions are known in the area as
aggressive defenders of their members' interests. However, there are distinct variations among the three and these different patterns are useful to understand if one attempts to ascertain just what are the different responses to economic restructuring.

RECENT ANALYTICAL WORK ON HARTFORD

Two recent analyses of Hartford are useful to review in setting the stage for this project. Hartford is one of four cities analyzed in Clavel's *Progressive City* (1986) which examines progressive policy initiatives and progressive policy leaders in the municipal arena in the U.S. Neubeck and Ratcliff (1988) analyze the balance of forces in the relationship between the corporate development sector and community groups within Hartford in struggles over the course of local development.

Clavel's work on Hartford centers on the policy initiatives of former Deputy Mayor Nicholas Carbone as an example of progressive activism within municipal government. Clavel's focus is somewhat different than the concerns of this project. However, since his work has become fairly widely known, several comments are worth offering both as an alternative to Clavel's depiction of Carbone and the socio-economic context of Carbone's "progressive" innovations, and to help further explain the context for the emergence of the neighborhood movements in Hartford.

While there is no question that as a political
entrepreneur Carbone was incredibly resourceful and worked tirelessly to carve a path for Hartford which would lead to economic revitalization, there are two questions which must be asked to gain a fuller picture. First, and most obviously, why was he defeated in 1979? Second, who really gained from the type of innovations he initiated? One can offer an alternative argument to Clavel's that the pattern begun under Carbone of resting Hartford's future on the fate of its downtown is precisely what created the grievances and conditions to strengthen the development of the neighborhood organizations.

Clavel explains Carbone's defeat in terms of the perception in the electorate of Carbone as a "benevolent dictator"—a person with a misunderstood vision—too confrontational to the suburbs, too dictatorial in the policy-making arena, not fully trusted by the emerging neighborhood forces nor by the corporate community in the city. While all of these are plausible, there is another substantial factor which Clavel largely ignores that, having lived through and participated in the election in which Carbone was defeated, I feel best explains the defeat of Carbone. That factor is the politics of race, and it involves the emerging leadership within both the Black and Puerto Rican communities, but at that time more particularly in the Black community, and the way in which Carbone dealt with this community in his capacity as the head of the Democratic Party machine in Hartford.
If Carbone was perceived as dictatorial, I would argue that this perception was most damaging to him within the Black community where there was a widespread impression that only Carbone's hand-picked candidates--individuals whom he could control--would surface as nominees of the Democratic Party. Black leadership with independent bases of support found it difficult-to-impossible to obtain party endorsements and had to resort to primary battles. Carbone-picked incumbants might win by less than 50 votes in primaries, but if they won nonetheless, they were tied to Carbone and his machine. As Black political strength developed, primaries for the State Representative posts in particular became hotly contested races between those Black politicians tied to Carbone and those who were more independent. Given the geographical and racial-ethnic schisms existing in the city, Carbone's geographical base in the city's South End was in and of itself enough to raise suspicions on the part of North End residents, and his resistance to the more indigenous leadership deepened a sense of resentment in large segments of the African American community. This resentment was successfully exploited in the 1979 primary election and although he lost throughout the city, it was in the North End where the margin of Carbone's defeat was greatest.

For purposes of this project, what is relevant is that Carbone's defeat opened up a different era of politics in Hartford in which there was no single strong
policy advocate with the staying power of Carbone. The development arena grew to have a type of self-propulsion of which neither the Council members nor the neighborhood groups could grab control. City Councilmembers in subsequent years sometimes endorsed neighborhood demands, sometimes reneged on promises, sometimes were openly hostile to neighborhood organizations and shifted positions with the shifting political sands. Given a lack of strong leadership and the changing commitment to issues on the part of city politicians, a greater role could develop for the neighborhood organizations, both as a counter influence to the political machine and as a mechanism for asserting neighborhood claims.

Besides Carbone's behavior within the Democratic Party, questions emerged as to who exactly would benefit from the downtown revitalization that Carbone was attempting to orchestrate. In the mid to late 1970's no one in Hartford envisioned the volume of development that would occur in the next decade, but even then some of the plans celebrated by Carbone generated opposition: Clavel describes the furor created by the proposal for a "skywalk" which would link the Civic Center to nearby office buildings and retail outlets with enclosed elevated walkways. City residents found this plan offensive—a tangible example of the contempt and the fear on the part the commuters for the city residents who could necessarily be avoided by the skywalk. The downtown development
proposals also involved tax abatements and deferrals for developers, another source of anger in the neighborhoods who were already burdened with the highest property tax rates in the entire State. Carbone's defense of such strategies was that developers needed some enticement to develop in the city and when the tax breaks expired, new sources of revenue would be added to the city's grand list.

These issues reverberated in Hartford city politics well beyond Carbone's tenure and indeed were the very issues which gave rise to the linkage struggle and the eventual formation of the People for Change political party. The new era of development heralded by Carbone as the means to solve the city's problems has only created more problems in the minds of community activists: a squeeze on available affordable housing, displacement of poor people through gentrification, conversion of housing to office space and outright demolition of housing, as well as traffic and congestion never before experienced in Hartford.

Carbone can hardly be held personally responsible for all of the consequences of development so odious to Hartford residents. The majority of development described earlier in this chapter occurred well after he left office and the scope of the 1980's projects, unvisionable during Carbone's tenure, far surpasses any of the discussions and planning of the 1970's. However, the very dynamics he helped to set in motion remain a major source
of tension in Hartford politics today. It is interesting that after his political defeat he, himself, eventually became a developer (some in Hartford have said of him that from being a "part of the solution" he switched to a "part of the problem"), having to appear before the City Council for approval of plans, modifications, etc. Were he still on that Council, he might be taking some of the stands advocated by the community forces attempting to influence the nature of development. The major question to Clavel, then, remains that of what constitutes a "progressive city", and if the subsequent developments within a city might help to retrospectively analyze whether or not an actor such as Carbone really championed progressive alternatives or not. Hartford's population is poorer in the late 1980's than during Carbone's era. The development boom he helped to initiate has not solved the city's problems.

Neubeck and Ratcliff's interests coincide much more directly with some of the questions of this dissertation. Their case study of Hartford is included in an anthology edited by Scott Cummings, Business Elites and Urban Development (1988). They analyze the roles of the various actors in the development arena and a number of issues which have surfaced in in recent years relating to development and the distribution of city resources. They attempt to show how the corporations and specific corporate leaders involved themselves in the reshaping of
Hartford and to what extent neighborhood forces could exert pressure to influence outcomes.

As they began their research, I was involved in preliminary discussions and shared materials with them to help identify recurring themes and issues. One issue that I feel is quite instructive which both they and Clavel focus on is the history of a corporate sponsored "think-tank", Hartford Process. Hartford Process existed in the 1970's under several different organizational personality incarnations as a private sector planning organization which undertook several controversial projects. Nicholas Carbone interacted with Hartford Process, sometimes agreeing, sometimes in vehement disagreement, and, as Clavel described, he used it as his own educational instrument.

Neubeck and Ratcliff recount the history of Hartford Process's plans for a Rouse-inspired new community in rural eastern Connecticut which would house the Hartford residents to be displaced by new development in the central city. None of these plans were acted upon by city planning bodies, the City Council, or any municipal authority. When reaction to the plan both in the rural community which would be the site of the new development and in Hartford's North End was overwhelmingly unfavorable, the scheme was abandoned and Hartford Process set its sights on less grandiose projects.

At one point a "confidential memo" offered by a Process staffmember to its board of directors was leaked
to the public and another huge outcry occurred. The memo detailed a set of plans for downtown development "predicated on a geo-political strategy" which included managed population mix of racial and ethnic groups, curtailing of Puerto Rican migration to Hartford, gentrification and marshalling of resources to protect remaining middle class neighborhoods in Hartford. The city's Puerto Rican community was particularly offended by the memo and held a demonstration that formed a human chain around the Civic Center during its first months of operation.

Hartford Process is one example of elite behavior in Hartford. Neubeck and Ratcliff chronicle a number of other examples of the high level of activity on the part of the insurance companies and major banks to maintain their dominance in the development arena. The ability of the neighborhood forces to influence such events is somewhat varied, according to the authors. They argue that the neighborhood forces can at best check the most offensive consequences of development (the skywalk), but cannot harness the requisite power to substantially impact the course of development. Only minimal concessions are occasioned granted to community organizations, and when the battle lines are really drawn, as in the linkage issue, the corporations have the ability to "circle the wagons" and hold out for their position.

Neubeck and Ratcliff offer little cause for optimism
that the neighborhood organizations will be able to counter the adverse effects of recent development in the city. Although I greatly admire the quality and insights of their study, it does not include any focus on the role of organized labor in the development arena or with respect to how corporate elites react to the demands of labor. For that matter, Clavel never mentions organized labor and what type of relation Carbone had with the unions in Hartford. Perhaps because the city's largest employers in this period, the insurance companies, remain totally unorganized, labor does not seem an important part of the equation.

In terms of this research project, I would suggest that since labor as an organized force is one of the most obvious casualties of the era of economic restructuring, since unions in Hartford have historically maintained a presence in city affairs, and, moreover, since unions are integrally involved in many of the important coalitions in local politics, they must be included in a full analysis of responses to economic restructuring. Even in their relatively weakened state in Hartford, they are still an important part of the equation.

My purpose is also somewhat different from that of Neubeck and Ratcliff. It is not that I substantially question their conclusions--I ask different questions. My purpose is to go into the organizations and find out how they evaluate events and make decisions in this era of restructuring, rather than to analyze recent patterns of
development and the roles of elites.

These two works do substantiate that events and developments in Hartford merit attention and analysis. The stories of the organizations who help shape these phenomena likewise merit such attention.
ALLIANCES, COALITIONS AND ELECTORAL ACTIVITIES

Coalitions and electoral activities locally in Hartford and statewide in Connecticut are engaging scores of organizations in an array of agenda and activities. Indeed, the issue coalitions and electoral alliances in Connecticut are attracting national attention in activist circles and among analysts of progressive social movements (see Shapiro, 1986, and Brecher and Costello, 1988a, 1988b and 1990). Coalition work represents a merging of resources of different organizations, and issue and electoral coalitions are one set of responses to changing social and economic conditions faced by the organizations. In some instances these are new types of activity for organizations and in other instances engaging in coalitions represents a shift in emphasis within an organization.

All of the organizations upon which this research is focused work with numerous other organizations and engage in various forms of alliances and coalitions. However, the purposes and methods of engagement are different for each organization. They likewise have varying involvement in the arena of electoral politics, both as individual organizations and within electoral coalitions. Once involved in functioning coalitions, each organization's representative then confronts styles and methods different from his/her own and must decide how to work with others. The outcome of this type of work produces varying results, some of which are lasting and some more ephemeral. After
a brief overview of recent coalition efforts in Hartford, three features of the coalitions will be analyzed in this chapter: rationales for involvement, experiences of working in coalitions and outcomes of the work. This analysis is based on interviews with organizational leaders, observation and participation in several of the coalitions.

RECENT COALITION EFFORTS IN HARTFORD

A variety of coalitions have emerged in Hartford in recent years ranging in focus from single issues to strike support to electoral initiatives to information-sharing in character. They have a quality of building upon and reinforcing each other in the sense that as members of different organizations become more familiar with each other and the work of the different organizations, they are more able to call upon each other for various types of support and assistance. A sampling of coalition activities is listed below. These specific examples include issue-oriented and electoral coalitions in which elements of both the neighborhood organizations and unions are either directly or indirectly involved.

Issue Coalitions include:

The Linkage Coalition: Initiated by the neighborhood groups after several years of work in a larger committee, and achieving support from several unions, this coalition lobbied the Hartford City Council to adopt a policy of taxing downtown development projects in order to generate funds for housing and job development. The issue came to a head in 1986 and even though the Democratic majority on the Council at the time had run for office on a pro-linkage platform, they voted down the measure.
Along with financial and business interests, the building trade unions lobbied heavily to oppose the effort, causing tremendous alienation on the part of the neighborhood organizations toward labor.

The Community Labor Alliance (for Strike Support)(CLA): In January, 1986, when 1000 members of UAW Local 376 struck Colt Firearms in Hartford, the union and the Greater Hartford Labor Council initiated this effort. Neighborhood organizations and other unions, as well as political leaders, segments of local clergy and other activists participated in scores of CLA-sponsored activities throughout the lengthy strike. Other unions have come to the CLA for strike support and other forms of assistance.

Anti-Crime Coalitions: Each of the neighborhood groups expends huge efforts demanding increased police protection to deal with ever-rising crime rates. For the first year of the Colt strike, police resources were deployed in force to the picket line. The union local, the Community-Labor Alliance, several neighborhood organizations and other community organizations came together to demand reduced police deployment at the strike and redeployment into the neighborhoods. The effort was partially successful in reducing the number of police at the Colt gate, but the neighborhood demand for better police protection continued. More recently, in 1988 and 1989, the neighborhood organizations have formed a coalition demanding the assignment of police foot patrols to neighborhood beats in Hartford. They formed the coalition specifically to counter the Police Department's strategy of pitting one group against the other as they all simultaneously made similar demands.

Grassroots-Labor Forum: In 1987, the President of the Greater Hartford Labor Council initiated monthly meetings with the neighborhood organizations to share information on respective activities. The effort was undertaken to open lines of communication after the divisive linkage battle.

Two examples of electoral coalitions include:

Legislative Electoral Action Program (LEAP): LEAP was initiated in 1980 as a statewide progressive electoral coalition comprised of political action committee representatives from over 20 different unions, consumer, women's, environmental, civil rights and community organizations. LEAP has a full time staff, makes political endorsements, trains campaign works and marshalls resources to assist
candidates. It has an impressive track record of developing successful campaigns for Connecticut State Legislative office seekers. LEAP-backed State Senators and State Representatives have formed the Progressive Caucus in the State Legislature and attempt to coordinate the promotion of a progressive agenda within the Legislature. Region 9A of the UAW hired its first director to help develop similar coalitions in other states in the Northeast and the model is being successfully implemented in New England and elsewhere.

**People For Change (PFC):** As described in the previous chapter on Hartford, PFC emerged out of dissatisfaction with the Hartford City Council both on the linkage issue and its response to the Colt strike, as well as generally perceived ineptitude. PFC constituted itself as a third party and ran a slate of 3 candidates in the 1987 race for city council. It sought to replace the three Republicans on the 9-member at-large council whose election has been guaranteed by a state statute prohibiting political parties from nominating slates to fill more than 2/3 of the seats on at-large bodies. PFC secured resources from LEAP in its 1987 campaign. In 1988, PFC activists formed Democrats for Change (DFC) and worked within the local Democratic Party structure to achieve a more reform-oriented Town Committee. PFC ran a second 3-person slate in 1989. In both elections two of the three candidates won election to office.

One additional example of coalition activity is important to include:

**UAW Region 9A-sponsored "Working Together and Winning--A Progressive Policy and Coalition Strategy Conference"** held at the Walter and May Reuther Family Education Center at Black Lake, Michigan from September 13 to 18, 1987. The regional leadership of the UAW in New England chose to use their biannual week-long training session at the Black Lake facility to hold this conference for both UAW members and invited guests from other unions, community groups, women’s and peace organizations and progressive elected officials from throughout New England, parts of New York and Puerto Rico. The UAW paid lodging and travel expenses for all of the several hundred participants. Another similar conference was held in November, 1989.

There are other coalitions in Hartford which have brought together even more diverse groupings than those
listed above, and in some cases one or more of the six organizations upon which this research is focused participate. Examples include Jesse Jackson's presidential campaign in 1988, a coalition supporting a school desegregation lawsuit in Connecticut, a campaign to extend health insurance to uninsured, senior citizen issue coalitions and other coalitions currently or previously in existence.

Within the activities of the coalitions described above, the models and practices of unions and the constituency based neighborhood organizations have confronted each other in both obvious and subtle ways. These experiences are analyzed below, drawing heavily on the Community Labor Alliance and the People For Change examples, beginning with the respective rationales for involvement in coalitions.

RATIONALES FOR INVOLVEMENT

Although there are many different forms of coalitions and alliances, generally an organization enters such an effort because on its own it cannot achieve a particular goal. Therefore, a coalition effort is a tacit recognition of the limits of each organization's individual capacity. Coalitions may also serve to mediate potential conflicts among members, i.e., they can be a forum for working out competing interests and claims. For example, among other activities, the AFL-CIO--the largest coalition of labor unions in the country--serves both to
marshall the collective resources of its member unions in such areas political action and to mediate disputes between unions. Through its highly formal organizational structure, it mediates jurisdictional contests in the areas of organizing new members and it sanctions violators. When unions affiliate with the AFL-CIO, they simultaneously strengthen the collective voice of labor, gain certain benefits they cannot achievable individually, and agree to abide by various rules and procedures.

For many unions, participation in the AFL-CIO is their major coalition activity. The AFL-CIO operates on national, state and local levels with varieties of activities at each level. Throughout the post World War II period up to the mid 1970's, many unions found this form of coalition activity sufficient. Segments of the labor movement participated in the civil rights movement and the anti-Viet Nam war movement, and several unions framed their organizing drives as extensions of the civil rights movement (significant examples include the United Farmworkers and the Hospital Workers Union-Local 1199--see Fink and Greenberg, 1989). As a whole, the labor movement did not often reach out beyond its own ranks, however. Periodically lobbying coalitions or strike support coalitions drew labor participation, but generally these activities were within the realm of routine union activity and did not generate controversy either within or outside of the labor movement. But as the framework of industrial relations began to change in the 1970's some
unions began to look outside of labor's ranks for assistance (see Brecher and Costello, 1988a, 1988b, 1990). In Hartford, this general pattern also obtained and the coalition work of recent years represents new directions for the segments of the labor movement involved.

Since the onset of the Reagan era and particularly in recent years, coalition work is becoming recognized as much more important for labor's agenda. Perhaps the massive mobilization in September, 1981 for the Solidarity Day demonstration in Washington, D.C. can be seen as the beginning of the new era--the exact date or year may be arguable--but the 1980's witnessed a new pattern of coalition-building across the entire country (Brecher and Costello, 1990). In the Hartford area for example, Region 9A of the UAW has experienced a severe decline in membership due to plant closings. When the Colt strike began in 1986, it immediately decided to call for a strike support coalition, realizing that without community support, the strike effort would be nearly impossible. In concert with the Greater Hartford Labor Council, whose president wanted to both support the strike effort and develop stronger ties with community organizations, the Community Labor Alliance was launched.

Some of the first groups sought for participation were the three constituency-based neighborhood organizations, AHOP, HART and ONE-CHANE. The labor leaders were impressed with the organizing abilities of
the neighborhood groups and recognized their grassroots base in the community. The labor council president also realized that the posture of the building trades unions in the linkage issue created an immense public relations problem for labor. Potentially this negative image could impede new organizing drives and create a pool of replacement workers in strike situations: neighborhood residents who had never been union members and who would harbor resentment against unions. Moreover, both numbers of Colt strikers and, as it turned out, replacement workers lived in the neighborhoods that the three organizations claimed as their "turfs".

So for unions in certain situations, organizational interests translate into forming alliances and coalitions. Unions who may be vulnerable to plant closings, concessionary bargaining which forces difficult strikes and a general climate of union-busting often choose to look outside their ranks for support. However, neighborhood organizations may not feel that same degree of vulnerability and, in Hartford they tend to approach coalition efforts more instrumentally in terms of specific tactical choices rather than as a larger strategy for survival. Being younger as organizations, not having felt the same type of assault in recent years as unions have, and having very different bases of membership all creates a different sense of the importance of coalitions on the part of the neighborhood groups. These organizations face the constant challenge of issue by issue organizing and
mobilizing. They have no equivalent of a "union shop" and any issue may draw new constituents into the work of the organization. However, since the terms of membership are completely voluntary, a major amount of organizational resources are devoted to these base-building activities. Coalition work may dilute an already tenuous base and drain resources and loyalties.

The neighborhood groups are also drawing on a much shorter history of experiences and traditions. Whereas in the labor movement, the concept of "union solidarity" exists and despite many obvious inter-union rivalries is a value orientation that is used to mobilize support activities, the neighborhood organizations have a much less defined and historically developed sense of mutual support. By nature and definition they are turf oriented and center their activities around a localized geographical area. This concept of "localism" (Fisher, 1984) as a value or organizing principle can also contribute to a more limited value being placed on coalitions, except in situations when other neighborhood organizations are working simultaneously on similar issues.

The other unions in this study attribute a different meaning and significance to coalition endeavors than the UAW does and echo some of the same kinds of concerns as the neighborhood groups in relation to coalitions. Both 1199 and HERE engage in coalitions and utilize outside
supporters in strikes and organizing drives, but they place more emphasis on their respective internal strengths and capacities to win on issues. Leadership of both HERE and 1199 feel that the major function of their organizations is to develop their capacities in the workplace to empower workers to take on employers and that coalition work is somewhat secondary. 1199 leadership attributes a great deal of importance to the work of various coalitions because of the low level of unionization in this country and the need to join with other organizations to achieve various goals. But their president also posits that the further away the union goes from "shop floor" issues, the more potential there is for division among the membership. HERE leadership would rather see union members active in union activities than in broader coalitions for many of the same reasons that the staff of the neighborhood organizations articulate.

In its history, 1199 has made extensive use of community allies, framing many of its organizing campaigns in the 1960's and 1970's as extending the civil rights movement into the economic arena, particularly as it organized health care settings where large numbers of Blacks and other minorities were employed. When it began to organize in areas of the country outside of its original New York City base, it often relied on coalitions to buttress its campaigns. Currently in Connecticut, 1199's organizational capacities and its militant reputation afford it the ability to choose more
selectively the coalitions in which it will involve itself.

While both 1199 and HERE generally do not face the problems of capital flight (a hospital doesn't relocate to Taiwan and hotel sites are selected because of expected levels of business), they do face the problems of representing workers in industries that are subject to complicated and fluctuating financial problems. The crisis state of the U.S. health care system places a particularly difficult burden on a union which has many members in the lower paid jobs of the industry. Hotels and especially restaurants change owners and managers frequently. And neither union possesses enough power in their respective industries to shut down significant portions of the industries, as for example the UAW has with domestic auto producers. In the healthcare sector, public opinion backlash is also a factor when 1199 considers strategies. Therefore, even though they are more selective about their involvements, allies and coalition efforts do occupy important places in the struggles of 1199 and HERE.

One of the differences between their approaches and the UAW's is the use that is made of coalitions like the CLA. When HERE members struck the Hartford Sheraton in 1987, the union did come to the CLA for support and assistance. However, they came to the meetings with more or less set plans for rallies and other support.
activities, rather than to develop such plans. The CLA was not the place where they engaged in planning, rather it served as a ready-made network of union and community activists. In this sense, HERE made quite different use of the CLA than did the UAW.

The rationales for political involvement are likewise quite different for the different organizations. Unions in Hartford have historically participated fairly routinely in electoral activities, generally within the Democratic Party, although occasionally some unions have endorsed Republican candidates. Both the UAW and 1199 are extremely active in politics, especially in LEAP which is attempting to develop a progressive presence and direction within the Democratic Party. In the case of 1199 which represents state healthcare workers as well as workers in state-regulated health care settings (hospitals, nursing homes and private non-profit subcontractors with the State of Connecticut), political involvement in state legislative contests is seen as critical to potentially winning better contracts and working conditions. Political campaigns generate more enthusiasm among the 1199 membership than other forms of coalition work, according to the leadership, because members see quite clearly the connection between who is elected to office and policies that affect them on the job. 1199 also participates vigorously in elections for the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives and was the major force among labor for Jesse Jackson's 1988
presidential campaign in the Hartford area.

Through its Community Action Program (CAP) Councils, the UAW's involvement is local, statewide and national in scope since they are highly affected by policies formulated at all levels of government. The immediate past Regional Director of Region 9A which includes New England, parts of New York and Puerto Rico was a member of the Democratic National Committee for many years as well as the President of LEAP, and the UAW in the area has a strong tradition of activism within the Democratic Party. Their leadership feels that political involvement is essential to the goals of their union.

HERE's political involvement again seems to resemble the neighborhood organizations in that they tend to not get heavily involved in elections, but do maintain access to officeholders and politicians. As with other forms of coalition activity, they attach more importance to their internal capacities and issues than to deep involvement in electoral campaigns. While they do issue endorsements, they do not participate in LEAP or PFC on an on-going basis due to resource and financial limitations. They did decide to launch a voter registration drive in 1989 and believe that at points in the future they may become more involved in electoral activities if they clearly feel that their interests would be served.

Neighborhood organizations, as organizations, are not involved in electoral politics because much of their
funding depends upon their non-profit, non-partisan status. Entering the arena of electoral politics would jeopardize this important resource base. The three neighborhood groups in Hartford have secured funding from the United Way of the Capitol Region, an unusual accomplishment for Alinsky-style organizations. However, there is another important element of their lack of participation in electoral politics. Many of the fulltime staff of these organizations are committed to an anti-electoral stance for their organizations. They feel and explicitly articulate as a principle of their methodology, that neighborhood organizations are more effective if they remain outside the electoral arena, holding public officials accountable from an independent base. They do not want their organizations to be viewed as partisan or as a political stepping stone for political aspirants. Moreover, they want to avoid the internal tensions that might result from engagement in electoral politics, especially at the local level. Races for municipal office can come to resemble hand-to-hand combat, with candidates devoting huge amounts of time to canvassing neighborhoods on a house by house basis. Divisions within a specific neighborhood over who to support would potentially translate into divisions within the neighborhood organization.

The neighborhood organizations can produce a climate where office-seekers emerge who seek to represent the views of the neighborhood organizations, as was the case in the
People for Change experience. What is done once this political climate is created is quite beyond their direct control: they may or may not agree with the directions pursued by political groupings who attempt to articulate their issues within political campaigns. Moreover, the existence of a political organization like PFC tends to dilute their raison d'etre: now there are politicians, from the ranks of neighborhood organizations, attempting to work through a political party to achieve the same ends as the neighborhood organizations. However, the Hartford neighborhood groups are moving toward developing methods of exploiting PFC officeholders for their own ends, without having to cede any organizational ground to the PFC political organization or participate directly in it.

EXPERIENCES IN COALITIONS

Coalitions indeed produce environments in which the different styles and processes of the two types of organizations confront each other, and differences in the nature of the respective issues in each arena become apparent. Both in the Colt strike support effort through the Community Labor Alliance (CLA) and the electoral experiences of People for Change (PFC) several of these differences led to certain tensions in the functioning of the coalitions. Some of the issues surfaced in only one of the coalitions and others surfaced in both coalitions. The problem areas tend to be inter-related and, taken in combination they represent some of the more obvious
difficulties which result from attempts to combine the different methods employed by the respective organizations. They are described below in detail, the Community Labor Alliance first, and then People for Change.

The Community-Labor Alliance and the Colt Strike

In the CLA, during the initial months of the strike, meetings were held on a weekly basis with as many as 30 to 40 people attending. Members of several unions, community organizations and the three neighborhood organizations attended. Initially the participation of the neighborhood groups was constant, then became sporadic and eventually ceased, although they remained available for specific strike support activities. Conversations with neighborhood organizers revealed a number of issues which probably contributed to the declining participation of the neighborhood organizations in the CLA. These have to do with agenda formation, decision-making processes, leadership roles and definition, relationships to legal processes, models of how to apply pressure and exert power, and the question of "ownership" or stake-holding in an issue.

Agenda Formation and Decision-Making Processes: When neighborhood organizations decide to organize themselves into coalitions, as was the case in the Linkage Coalition, a set of steps is usually followed in which the
first actual meeting is preceded by careful negotiations to insure the equal participation of all organizations. No single organization can dominate: meeting sites and chairpersons are rotated. Agenda items involve concrete planning and task assignments. Decisions are arrived at through a process of consensus development—a gradual unfolding of agreement through discussion without the use of voting on issues through parliamentary procedure. These issues of process are as important as the substantive issues which necessitate the coalition's formation. This task-orientation and consensus development method is quite different than the way in which the CLA operated and continues to operate.

Within the CLA a tacit understanding developed that the UAW had the ultimate authority in decision-making on issues related to the Colt strike. During the strike the UAW leadership was quite receptive to suggestions and planning from non-UAW members, but if the union leadership felt that a particular suggestion conflicted with its overall approach, that plan would not be adopted. Other unions who have come to the CLA for support in strike situations likewise hold "veto power" over suggestions or plans developed in the meetings. The decision-making is somewhat informal and consensual and, as is the case with the neighborhood organizations' coalitions, does not involve formal voting. However, the specific union whose strike or issue is being discussed must be supportive of any plans undertaken with respect to its issue.
The major portion of the agenda of the CLA revolved around the Colt strike during its 4 year duration. In the first year of the strike, there was a sense of urgency about carrying out plans. However, as time passed, a sense developed among the participants in the CLA that meetings would go on for the indefinite future and the sense of urgency to accomplish tasks within a short timeframe diminished. Some plans were never thoroughly followed through to conclusion. This indeterminancy likely frustrated the neighborhood organizations who engage in coalitions with a much more immediate and instrumental orientation.

Definition and Role of Leadership: One major difference between the two types of organizations is the definition and use of leadership within each type of organization. Elected union officers are generally the full-time functionaries of the union and are constitutionally vested with the authority to make and execute many types of decisions. The actual titles may vary—president, business agent, secretary-treasurer—and the internal structures of different unions vary, but there are clearly elected, full-time union officials. Even rank-and-file groups who might be opposed to existing leadership work within this framework. However, the full-time staff of neighborhood organizations are not the elected leaders—they are usually hired by the organization's board of directors which consists of
volunteer citizen leaders. Citizen leaders from the respective neighborhoods are elected to the positions of president and other offices at annual neighborhood congresses, but they often are employed full-time elsewhere and participate in the neighborhood organizations as volunteers in their leisure time. So when the full-time staff of these organizations are contacted about specific plans or actions, they generally check with the elected citizen leaders and work through planning committees to make decisions. The leadership of the neighborhood groups can therefore be described as shared to a great extent between the staff and elected leaders. Within the CLA experience, this situation led to some frustration on the part of the labor participants when they attempted to involve the neighborhood organizations and were not able to get ready responses to requests for assistance or participation.

Relationships to Legal Processes: A critical difference between the two types of organizations that impacts coalitions is their respective relationships to legal processes and attorneys. Much of modern labor relations is bound by laws, precedents and legal interpretations. In the Colt strike, the UAW pursued a legal strategy in which they sought to have the strike designated as an unfair labor practices strike by the NLRB. This strategy involved the union filing charges with the NLRB alleging unfair labor practices on the part of the company, the NLRB conducting a trial before an
administrative law judge on the merits of the charges, and if the union prevailed, the NLRB would order reinstatement and backpay for the strikers. The point of this strategy is to prove that the company caused and/or prolonged the strike by their illegal actions. An unfair labor practices strike is afforded a different legal status than an economic strike. In an economic strike, one in which workers strike over wages and/or working conditions without formally alleging unfair labor practices on the part of the employer, there is no legal guarantee of reinstatement. Replacement workers who are hired during the strike may be retained by the company once the strike is over, unless a settlement mandates otherwise. But in an unfair labor practices strike, the NLRB may mandate reinstatement and backpay for the strikers.

This brief outline of the unfair labor practice strike strategy does not begin to describe the legal complexities, the lengthiness of the process and the ways in which employers can and do respond. In the Colt strike the company hired replacement workers, offering them permanent jobs—a strategy that polarized the situation and complicated their position in the NLRB trial, particularly in the event of a union victory and a mandate from the Board to reinstate the strikers. It had also filed unfair labor practices against the union, alleging picket line misconduct. Although in 1989 Colt Industries decided to sell the Firearms Division, it was still liable
for backpay if the UAW won the trial and this liability figured significantly in the final sale of the company.

The way in which this all affected the activities of the CLA was that the UAW leadership did not want to pursue any strategy which would jeopardize their ability to win the case at the NLRB. Therefore, in many instances, they opted to check with legal counsel before pursuing particular strategies. If a demonstration at the home of the president of Colt Firearms was planned or if civil disobedience was discussed, the specific implications of the plans were checked with attorneys. And even in situations where labor law itself was not specifically involved, such as demonstrating in front of the home of the president of the Firearms Division in suburban Vernon, Connecticut, lawyers were utilized in finalizing plans. The union leadership was not opposed to militant or innovative tactics, but only if these tactics did not jeopardize their larger "game plan".

Neighborhood organization members and staff have a real aversion to such reliance on lawyers: they are much more able to create their own rules, and their activities are not circumscribed by laws and legal procedures in the same ways that unions' activities are. They try at all costs to avoid ceding any degree of control to such an outside force as a court, except where absolutely necessary as in the case of rent strikes and certain tenants' issues. They experienced frustration at the UAW's reliance on the opinions of attorneys.
Applying Pressure and Exercising Power: One interesting example of the ways in which the logics of the two types of organizing confront each other developed in the CLA around several demonstrations at the home of the former president of Colt Firearms Division, Gary French, in 1986 and 1987. The first demonstration took place in July, 1986, and was organized as a children's vigil with children of the strikers and supporters delivering pleas to French to settle the strike. Several subsequent demonstrations during that summer focused on the plight of the strikers and urged French to intervene to settle the strike. French, himself, did not participate in negotiations. Instead, the Vice President for Labor Relations represented the company in formal negotiations and until the publicity surrounding the demonstrations at his home, French was not featured in press accounts of the strike.

The plans for the demonstrations were formulated within the CLA. Consensus developed within the group to take the strike beyond the picket line and negotiations to the home of Colt's president for obvious symbolic reasons and in order to refocus the situation in more personal terms on one individual, Gary French. The object was to make French the target and the tactics borrowed heavily from Alinsky-style methodologies typically used against slumlords.

The intentions of the CLA were to hold a number of
activities at French's residence and elsewhere in his local community. However, these intentions were interrupted in the Fall of 1986 when French went to court to invoke a 1947 Connecticut Statute which barred picketing at company officials' residences during labor disputes, unless the residences were adjacent to worksites. The CLA had been aware of the statute but characterized the demonstrations as vigils rather than picketing, and the UAW was prepared in any event to challenge the constitutionality of the law. In October, 1986, an injunction was issued barring demonstrations at French's home. The UAW engaged legal counsel to appeal the injunction to the Connecticut Supreme Court and in May, 1987, the statute was declared unconstitutional. Between September, 1986 and June, 1987, all plans for similar demonstrations were put on hold. After the Supreme Court decision, French served notice that he was going back to court to obtain punitive damages and an injunction barring demonstrations at his residence, this time basing his actions on invasion of privacy.

During the interim between the May, 1987 Supreme Court decision and the court date for the second injunction, late July, 1987, the CLA and the UAW considered various alternatives. Since during that approximate 2-1/2 month period no injunction was in effect barring demonstrations, they were free to hold one. The UAW entered into a series of meetings with the Vernon Police Department to work out a set of guidelines for
demonstrations. A draft agreement between the UAW and the Vernon Police Department was shared with the CLA on June 10, 1987. The discussions at that meeting and at the subsequent CLA meeting of June 17, 1987, illustrate some of the divergent models and logics between the union leaders and neighborhood organizers.

The neighborhood organizing viewpoint emphasized the tactics of keeping the target (French) guessing as to the next actions, not playing into the hands of the company or French by holding the expected demonstration, and also not submitting to externally determined rules (the UAW-Vernon PD agreement). Other types of actions aimed at French were suggested. The discussion at the June 10, 1987 meeting emphasized that by submitting to an agreement with the police, other organizations in the future may be forced into similar agreements against their wishes. Moreover, the argument went, such an agreement ceded power and control over to an outside force. The point was to keep control of the situation within the CLA and to keep French off-balance. Several unionists outside UAW 376, and one UAW 376 staff member agreed with this viewpoint. Another UAW 376 staff member, himself an attorney and party to the negotiations with the Vernon PD, argued that the draft agreement actually stretched conventional legally defined conditions of demonstrating in residential areas. Still others argued that since the effort had been made to overturn an unconstitutional law, the group should
exercise its hard won right to demonstrate. The majority of the UAW leadership at the meeting took the position that holding demonstrations at French's house would show the union's strength against the company and boost the morale of the strikers. Since the UAW was in the process of preparing for the NLRB trial, the leadership was both eager to take advantage of the victory, but cautious about pursuing any strategies or tactics which might damage its credibility with the NLRB.

At the June 17th meeting of the CLA, a lengthy plan was presented for a campaign to pressure Gary French with the premises that he could make the decision to settle the strike and that with enough pressure on him as an individual, he would make that decision. While the general contours of the plan were accepted by the group, acceptance by some participants was based on the view that any publicity would be helpful in swaying public opinion in favor of the strikers and that such activities would boost sagging morale of the strikers after 18 months on the picket line. Community organizer Rick Kozin and labor organizer Steve Thornton (who also had extensive community organizing experience), both of whom fashioned the plan, believed that this strategy could ultimately win the strike.

These discussions underscore the differences in the styles and logics of organizing in the two arenas. The UAW in the Colt strike was pursuing a legal strategy from the outset, conducting this strike within the context of the
legal parameters defined by labor law. The UAW leadership felt that by carefully building a compelling case, the NLRB would have no choice but to find in favor of the union. The UAW was playing by rules—the conventions of American labor law system—to which it felt there were no alternatives. Faced with the opportunity to hold the Vernon demonstration, there was an inclination to enter into negotiations with the police department over the terms and conditions of such a demonstration. The experience of the union and the manner in which it conducted its business lent itself to such a method of problem-solving.

In contrast, the neighborhood organizing model is not dependent upon legally defined methods of resolving disputes as was the UAW's in this situation. Neighborhood organizers do not have faith in legal strategies as means to ultimate victory and caution members about relying on such strategies. Moreover, since the targets of these groups often are individuals, strategies can be built upon the premise that pressure upon one individual can be sufficient to achieve success. The plan to pressure French did not conform to any externally created rules, and control of the situation rested with the CLA and UAW. If it could be successful, the strategy would be an innovative way to approach a strike. However, the locus of activity would be moved away from the industrial setting and into the larger community.
The UAW was receptive to the plan presented on June 17, 1987, even though its overall strategy was clearly bound to labor law. Several factors might explain this receptivity. First, the UAW recognized in the beginning of the strike that it would be lengthy and require the imaginations and resources of forces beyond its usual base to maintain the effort. It also saw this strike as part of the nation-wide effort to bust unions and believed that other unions and community groups would realize the stakes involved and could be rallied to its cause. It was open to innovative strategies, as long as final decisions rested within the UAW.

Second, in pursuing a legal strategy, the UAW had to hold back its members on the picket line from directly physically attacking the strikebreakers. Should its members engage in overt violence, the NLRB case would be jeopardized. However, the animosity toward the company and especially the strikebreakers had to find expression and the president of the company made a perfect target. Pursuing French could offer a means of venting anger for the strikers. Some of the tactics could actually be fun for the strikers and afford a little comic relief.

Third, this could provide an opportunity for publicity. The human terms of the strike as expressed in the original children's vigil created negative publicity for the company and sympathy for the strikers. If carefully planned and executed, the campaign to pressure Gary French would not necessarily endanger the other
strategies the union was pursuing.

In this situation, the union's agenda and the neighborhood organizing methods could converge, despite the very different ways in which each type of organization perceived the opportunities and had typically operated previously. For the union, this would be one more method of attempting to win a very difficult strike.

Ultimately, very little of the Gary French campaign was actually implemented. As other issues arose and as the work required to implement the plan appeared too complex and time consuming, enthusiasm for it dwindled. However, a demonstration was held at the home of Gary French before the July 1987 court date. It was orderly, the union cooperated with the police, and French's second attempt at an injunction and punitive damages failed. During the summer of 1988 yet another demonstration at French's home took place upon the conclusion of the lengthy NLRB trial.

Ownership of Issues and Stake-Holding: One final, very important aspect of the CLA experience and the participation of the neighborhood organizations in the effort has to do with the sense of "ownership" of an issue. While understanding to a certain extent the importance of the strike, the neighborhood groups perceived the strike as the UAW's issue or labor's issue—an important issue, but not their issue in the sense that they embraced the linkage struggle as their issue. They
did not embrace the strike as a community-wide issue with implications for the entire area, as did other unions in the region. Since the backgrounds of their staff have little familiarity or involvement with unions and most of the citizen leaders have limited experience with unions, the implications of a strike are not readily apparent to neighborhood organization activists. Over the course of the Colt strike, many began to see commonalities between their neighborhood work and labor's mission in the workplace, but they found it difficult to devote scarce resources, particularly human resources, to the strike support effort.

**People For Change**

Different issues surfaced in the launching and subsequent development of People for Change (PFC) in terms of neighborhood and labor forces coalescing. In this case, the decision-making issue arose, but almost in reverse from the CLA. Additionally, the lack of ability of neighborhood organizations to participate contributed to certain difficulties. Differences in perception of the purpose of PFC, and differences in the type of participation on the part of organizations also make for complications in building a long term agenda. These issues are analyzed in more detail next.

**Decision-Making Processes Revisited:** The initial convenors of PFC in early 1987 included the immediate past-president of one of the neighborhood organizations,
other individuals who had been active in the linkage issue, as well as several labor leaders and activists in other arenas. They initially met to discuss participation in the upcoming City Council election that year (1987). The first meeting produced no conclusions or strategies except to continue to meet and to expand the number of participants. For several months meetings took place which considered and debated different strategies, all the while with new participants entering the process.

Debate focused on whether to work within the Democratic Party and primary the incumbent Democratic Councilmembers or to run a slate of independent third party candidates, and on how many candidates should run. This was a very lengthy and tedious process. Eventually the group settled on the third party strategy, but it was uncharted territory for everyone involved. No one wanted to move too quickly and risk alienating a segment of the evolving coalition. So rather than putting many matters to a vote early on and generating polarized voting blocs, the discussion and the process dragged on.

Union leaders experienced some frustration with the indecision and constant rehashing of issues: they were used to being able to come to a decision, vote and move forward with a plan of action. While the convening chairperson drew upon the consensus model of conducting meetings (which is also used by women’s organizations and other groups as well as by neighborhood groups), the large
amount of attention devoted to process issues did not make for efficient use of time or resources. Once the group came to a decision and the slate of candidates was selected, then process issues ceased to be very important and a campaign mode of operation took over.

PFC's electoral campaign was managed by an experienced campaign manager from the LEAP staff. Precise voter targeting, voter registration campaigns, extensive telephone and door-to-door canvassing, constant fundraising activities and large numbers of volunteers devoting hundreds of hours all were coordinated by a team of LEAP-trained activists and/or staff members. The campaign mode resembled more of a command structure than the participatory, loosely coordinated coalition of the previous six months and some resentment developed among the several PFC convenors at the terseness and technocratic nature that prevailed in the campaign office. The organization had gone almost from one extreme to another.

When the campaign was over and PFC had won two of the three seats it sought, it had to accomplish several tasks simultaneously: putting in place a mechanism to work with the two Councilmembers, developing its own structure, and furthering its political goal of electing progressives to local office. These tasks revealed several other problematic issues discussed next.

Perceptions of the Purpose of the Coalition and Types of Participation: After the election, to deal with
the issues of process and structure, the previously loosely organized coalition constituted a Steering Committee with representatives from participating unions and other organizations who had been active in the coalition, and from geographical areas in the city corresponding to State House of Representatives districts. This structure helped to formalize and define the organization. Moreover, since the three neighborhood organizations could not formally participate, the geographical representatives would hopefully be able to bring to PFC some of the localized issues and sentiments that the neighborhood groups were pursuing. Steering committee meetings were open to anyone to attend, but only formally elected or designated representatives could vote.

When the group coalesced in 1987, even though it decided to go forward with a third party effort for the Council seats, there was also sentiment to work within the Democratic Party to attempt to change the nature of the Democratic Town Committee, thereby creating opportunities for more progressive candidates to win endorsement for slots on Democratic tickets. The leadership of PFC, i.e. the Chairperson and Co-Vice Chairpersons, attempted to define an organizational path of development which included three aspects of work for the group: as a coalition, as a third party and as activists within the Democratic Party. The balance between these three roles was delicate and lent itself to different interpretations.
Some elements saw the PFC effort mainly as a means of changing the balance of forces within the Democratic Party, particularly through attempting to change the Town Committee, and viewed the third party route as a more temporary tactic. For example, the UAW participant (now the Regional Director for Region 9A) saw this direction of work as extremely important and thought that the third party effort should eventually assume less importance. Since he and his union devoted a great deal of its political action apparatus to Democratic Party work and the UAW leadership was quite committed to maintaining a role in the Democratic Party, the third party option was less important. Once PFC activists constituting themselves as Democrats for Change ran a slate in a Town Committee district, won the district and went on to play a key role in unseating the incumbent Town Committee Chairperson, the UAW had a sense of "mission accomplished" and was less concerned with the development of a strong third party apparatus.

Other participants in PFC placed more emphasis on developing a permanent, left-progressive third party both because they felt the need for such a political party exists and because they wanted to establish a more permanent force which would redefine debate within Hartford and pull the city's Democrats to the left. People with this view included several labor activists, Puerto Rican Political Action Committee members and other more left-oriented community activists.
1199's continued participation presented different issues. Their president maintained that 1199 endorsed the PFC slate in the 1987 election, but that did not mean that it had "signed on" to the organizational work of PFC permanently. Staff members and a number of rank-and-file members were very active in the campaign, performing many hours of volunteer campaigning. The 1199 office was used as election day headquarters of the group and many subsequent meetings took place there, but unless there was rank-and-file support for formally signing on, 1199'ers who participated would be participating as individuals, not on behalf of the union. A formal resolution on the part of the union's Executive Board to participate as a member organization was never brought up for a vote.

This position is quite consistent with 1199 President Jerry Brown's views on coalition work, that is, that elections rather than coalitions generate more enthusiasm among members. 1199's interests may be better served by its more active participation in LEAP since LEAP has a statewide focus, consistent with 1199's organizational breadth, and the specific local politics of Hartford are generally less important to the specific needs of the union.

Other union activists participate in PFC as representatives of their unions, with varying degrees of interest in the affairs of PFC on the part of those unions. The neighborhood organizations, as detailed
above, do not formally participate, and over the short history of PFC many of the activists from their ranks have become less active in the group. While the two members of the City Council attempt to represent the interests of the neighborhood organizations, PFC-sponsored initiatives at the Council do not rally the neighborhood groups. All of these developments have served to redefine PFC. The different degrees of participation on the part of the organizations who initially had been involved and the issues which commanded PFC's attention have focused its energies in the direction of continually reasserting its political presence and of contending with its minority party status. For some organizations with pressing agendas of their own, it has become less of a priority. The 1989 Council elections presented even more challenges to PFC which will not be elaborated here, except to state that one of the two PFC Councilmembers, Marie Kirkley-Bey, decided to run with the Democratic Party slate prompting even more discussion and redefinition within PFC. In 1989 as in 1987, two of the three members of the PFC slate won election--an African-American woman and the incumbent Puerto Rican male PFC Councilmember.

OUTCOMES OF COALITION EFFORTS

The CLA, PFC and several other coalitions described in the list at the beginning of this chapter in numerous ways are rededefining issues, creating new demands on local government and certainly redefining politics in Hartford.
Looking at the Colt situation provides one example. Without the CLA, much of the support for the strikers might not have been cultivated. Moreover, the strike experience contributed to the impetus for PFC.

Despite all of the problems analyzed earlier, the UAW leadership and strikers were extremely gratified with the degree of support for the strike achieved by the work of the CLA. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were raised for the strikers' hardship funds. Political leaders were forced to take positions on the strike. Dozens of rallies, mass pickets and a civil disobedience action of 45 union, political, community and religious leaders (the "Colt 45") kept the strike in the public focus. Police brutality on the picket line in the early months of the strike prompted marches to City Hall. While during the latter part of the 50 month long strike there was less activity than in the first year, CLA meetings continued taking place several times a month. Even after the strike ended once the union and other investors participated in a purchase of the company, the UAW and other organizations continue to meet and support other strikes in the area.

Redefinition of Public Issues

Besides providing material and moral support for the strikers, one of the major functions of the CLA was to place the issue in the public arena by calling for different forms of government intervention in the situation and for different organizations to take public
actions and stances to support the strike. After the AFL-CIO launched a national boycott of Colt Firearms products, several state and local governments passed resolutions pledging not to buy any Colt Firearms products until the strike was settled. In Connecticut, the State Legislature passed a resolution on the second anniversary of the strike calling for a negotiated settlement and curtailment of military contracts for Colt until a settlement was reached. The debate in the State Capitol focused precisely on whether the State should intervene or take a position in a "private" labor dispute. The campaign to halt Pentagon contracts for the M16 rifle with Colt gained support in different parts of the country and the union maintains that this campaign indeed caused Colt to lose its lucrative M16 contract and ultimately put the Firearms Division up for sale.

Shifting the matter of the strike into the public arena for public action also eased the way for the UAW to contribute to the launching of PFC. The UAW leadership expected support from the Democratic Party both in Hartford and statewide in its battle with Colt. Particularly when the Democratically-controlled city government in Hartford did not embrace the strike as a critical issue and did not take supportive actions in such areas as complaints of police abuse, the UAW leadership became eager to take on those politicians. And in concert with other groups who also had strong grievances with local Democratic officeholders, the UAW's concerns would
become part of a new political agenda which placed issues previously deemed private affairs into the public domain.

This redefinition of issues for public attention is one consequence of organizations' responses to economic restructuring. And the process of redefinition, itself, generates controversy, as experienced in the debate within Connecticut State Legislature. However, many politicians do respond and do embrace issues such as the Colt strike as important to the general welfare. The civil disobedience action, the "Colt 45" sit-in in May, 1986, included three Democratic State Representatives and a Republican City Councilwoman. One of the three State Representatives, Carrie Saxon Perry, later became Mayor of Hartford (the city's first Black woman mayor, as described in the chapter on Hartford earlier), and continued attending strike support functions and adding her name to various appeals on behalf of the strikers. During her first term in office, another lengthy strike began by the professional jai alai players in Hartford and at 14 other frontons across the country (two others in Connecticut, one in Rhode Island and 11 in Florida). Mayor Perry responded to the situation by meeting with the players and their families early in the strike and offering to help in whatever way should could. She has been involved in rallies, meetings with other government officials and other activities on behalf of the jai alai strikers and in 1990 came to 1199's assistance in a bitter strike at an
area nursing home.

The Linkage Coalition whose work culminated in 1986 with the defeat of ordinances that would have established a linkage policy in Hartford also served to redefine the public agenda, and like the inaction in the Colt situation, anger over that defeat fueled the People for Change effort. The demands of the Linkage Coalition—an exaction fee on downtown development which would be used to create affordable housing and provide job training—generated resistance along the same lines of argument as the Colt resolution generated in the General Assembly, that is, that intervention in the private market was not an appropriate role for government and would create a bad business climate. The Linkage Coalition, the CLA, PFC and other coalitions, among other functions, all attempt to redefine the public agenda and hence, redefine what is appropriate for government action and intervention.

Creation of Demands on Local Government

Besides attempting to redefine what is an appropriate political agenda, developments like the CLA, PFC and other coalitions serve to aggregate and articulate the claims of groups and individuals who are affected by economic restructuring to local government. In other words, municipal government and state government are called upon to mediate the effects of economic restructuring. Local government is more accessible to individuals than other levels of government, even though
it has the least power to intervene in the economy and change or mediate economic trends. However, local people tend to know the individuals who sit on the City Council and the small number of City Councilpeople in Hartford provides a very personal and familiar environment for local politics. (In fact, one informal measure of success of an activity on the part of any neighborhood groups is the number of Councilmembers who attend the activity. One to four in attendance is only moderately successful, but five or more means that the Council is really listening). Within this personalized environment, local residents attempt to exert demands upon the government. The presence of the neighborhood groups and the coalitions gives organization to such demands.

Several specific examples of the creation of new demands on municipal government are illustrated by PFC's work at the City Council. Every year the Council fashions a budget for the City. The process involves the City Manager presenting a detailed budget proposal to the Council, the Council deliberating and making adjustments to this proposal, the Council then voting on these adjustments, the Mayor reviewing the budget with the power to either veto or accept the Council's version, and then formal adoption by the Council. The deliberations of the Council take place within party caucuses. Not surprisingly, the decisions of the Democratic Caucus are generally adopted since the Democrats' six vote bloc prevails. Whatever debates go on among Democrats are
within the private caucus and they emerge as a "united front".

PFC's first city budget experience in 1988 included a detailed review of the budget with the two Councilmembers and PFC activists, and the fashioning of a series of proposals to modify the budget. In both years of PFC Councilmembers' first term, the city faced the problems of declining state and federal aid, rising costs and the possibility of raising property taxes in order to pass a balanced budget—or cutting the City Manager's budget proposal in order to achieve a balanced budget. In 1988, PFC presented alternatives which would not cut essential services or cause municipal layoffs and would come very close to a balanced budget. PFC members knew that their proposals would not receive serious attention by the Democrats, but decided to take the process seriously and be on record as having presented a sound alternative. Several measures they suggested that were not passed during the budget process were later adopted, since the manager and other Democratic councilmembers found them to be attractive and sensible. One such proposal was the creation of an "infrastructure disruption fee" assessed upon firms whose construction projects disrupt traffic and other city functions.

In 1989, PFC decided to take a different approach to the budget process. Realizing that many hours had been expended in the 1988 process with no immediate returns,
PFC activists decided to launch a campaign known as the Neighborhood Power Campaign several months prior to the budget process which would culminate in an alternative budget proposal. This budget alternative would not be based on line-by-line review, but upon a set of political priorities articulated through a series of community meetings under the auspices of the Neighborhood Power Campaign. Specific proposals would be based broadly on the concept of linkage in different forms, all aimed at exacting new taxes and fees from corporations and developers.

The above ideas were presented and discussed at the community meetings. PFC activists expected that most of these proposals would not be passed by the Council, but would provide the basis of the 1989 campaign. Within the package of 24 budget resolutions were 5 which specifically dealt with concerns of labor, four of which revolved around issues that surfaced in the Colt strike and the jai alai strike. These included:

- a resolution to bill Colt Firearms and the jai alai fronton owner for the cost of police services at the picket line;
- a resolution to bill any firm involved in a strike 75% of the cost of police services at the strike;
- a resolution to recoup the costs of police services at the Colt strike from Colt Industries upon the sale of the company;
- a resolution requiring replacement workers in
strikes to obtain licenses from the city at the cost of $99, renewable annually;
-a resolution establishing a code of conduct for firms who enter agreements with the City for development and commerce in which the firms must remain neutral in union organizing drives.

None of these resolutions were passed. What is interesting is that the same council previously passed several resolutions billing Colt for the cost of police services, but Colt ignored them. Many of the Democrats on the Council had enjoyed labor's support and endorsements in prior campaigns.

These defeated resolutions were attempts on the part of PFC to inject issues into municipal government policy which would help to defend labor's interests. The resolutions attempted to embody solutions to the problem of union-busting as it manifested in Hartford during the Colt strike. During their first term, PFC Councilmembers also introduced other resolutions which assisted unions, several specifically focused on municipal unions, without success. PFC used this record during the 1989 campaign to generate support within the labor movement and was successful in obtaining endorsements and volunteers from a number of unions, some who had not been very involved in PFC's 1987 campaign. However, these new types of claims on city government flow from the conditions in which labor finds itself as a result of economic restructuring,
conditions that concern the activists of PFC.

**Emergent Forms of Political Alignment**

PFC can be seen as a direct result of the political inaction on the part of local Democrats in areas which deeply concern and affect local people both in the workplace and in their neighborhoods. It is an attempt, however difficult and however effectual, to create a new alignment in local politics in Hartford.

In one sense PFC's greatest accomplishment is that it has forced the Democratic Party in the city to refocus direction. PFC is responsible for shifting the debate in the City Council and in city politics more generally, unseating a powerful incumbent Democratic Town Committee Chairperson, providing an opening for new forms of political participation on the part of the city's large Puerto Rican population, and providing crucial resources in the election of a progressive Puerto Rican state legislator. It also is providing a vehicle for incorporation of specific demands of labor, the demands of the gay rights movement and is attempting to develop new African American political leaders. While its success in winning votes at the City Council is perhaps its least stellar accomplishment, the climate of politics in Hartford has been changed considerably by its presence.

Another important example of the changing political alignments in this socio-economic environment is that of LEAP. Although it operates on a statewide basis in
Connecticut, LEAP also has considerable impact in Hartford. A number of large and influential unions participate in LEAP as a means of furthering their political goals and in the course of their participation are drawn into issues beyond the usual agenda of labor. These unions also have a presence in Hartford and many of them are involved in PFC. LEAP's assistance to PFC in the 1987 campaign was essential to the successful election of two PFC candidates.

As with PFC, the reaction to LEAP on the part of the more traditional Democrats is a measure of its success. LEAP earned the enmity of the state's governor, William O'Neil, through its association with O'Neil's Democratic challengers in past gubernatorial races. It has provided a highly competent independent base of resources and personnel for many of the most progressive Democrats in the State Legislature and has forced the Democratic Party statewide to accommodate a large progressive bloc. LEAP-backed legislators helped to pass the Colt Resolution in 1987 at the legislature. They waged an extremely complex and difficult battle in the 1989 session to avoid massive cuts in State services, in spite of a serious budget crisis. And, through the UAW, the LEAP model is being "exported" to other states in New England and beyond.

Besides animosity and suspicion on the part of the mainstream Democratic Party machine, LEAP also became a source of controversy within the top leadership levels of the AFL-CIO. Elements of the Connecticut AFL-CIO who were
tied into the State Democratic Party attempted to bring pressure from national AFL-CIO leadership to bar participation of local labor councils in LEAP. They attempted to portray LEAP as under "Communist influence", a McCarthyite tactic that was no longer convincing. When local labor council presidents refused to succumb to the AFL-CIO's pressure, the national leadership abandoned their attempts to bar participation in such organizations (see Brecher and Costello, 1990).

CONCLUSIONS

Coalition work is producing results and achieving new significance in the repertoires of the organizations in this research. Yet the importance attributed to this work varies greatly from organization to organization, and the neighborhood groups generally seem to come to such work rather reticently. For the unions, the theme and value of solidarity opens a door in the direction of participation in coalitions, despite suspicion from conservative state and national leadership elements about specific coalition formations. But among the neighborhood groups, their inherent turf orientation and the human resource demands of other types of issues seem to contribute to an inability to fully embrace coalitions, even though some staffmembers realize the intrinsic value of coalitions. However, all of these organizations do engage in coalitions, sometimes with grand results,
sometimes with minimal results.

Perhaps the process of working together, both casually and occasionally or more intensely, does help to break down barriers. Awareness of each other's respective organizational agendas and priorities helps to create new ways of thinking and behaving. To be specific, in the summer of 1989, HART members became concerned about high density residential development in neighborhoods of the southern part of the city which featured one, two and three family dwellings. Developers began to buy parcels of land in the middle of these quiet residential blocks and erect large multi-unit condominium projects. HART members issued a call for a moratorium on all development in several specific residential zones for 120 days in order to have the city government conduct impact studies and to allow HART more time to develop this issue into a larger campaign. In the past in Hartford, opposition to such a call could be expected from the Building Trade Unions (a significant grouping within the Greater Hartford Labor Council) who previously had taken positions that ran counter to neighborhood organizations' demands. However in this instance, the President of the Labor Council who had been meeting monthly with neighborhood organizations for close to two years in the Grassroots-Labor Forum listed in the beginning of the chapter, came to a HART meeting on June 7, 1989, to say that since the proposed moratorium did not impact construction projects which employed union labor, the central labor council would
remain neutral on the issue and not speak in opposition to such a construction moratorium. The significance of this action was probably lost on most of the HART members in attendance, but it did represent a relatively new type of relationship between labor and community forces.

Recognition of the validity of the neighborhood organization's agenda meant in this instance that elements in the local labor council felt that it was important to be supportive of and not to alienate a neighborhood organization such as HART. They were beginning to see beyond a narrow version of self-interest that is often attributed to labor.

One important difference between the two types of organizations that can be somewhat problematic in terms of the mutual understanding required in coalition work is that of the difference in the nature of the targets of the respective organizational campaigns. Both labor and neighborhood organizations present claims and demands against corporate interests, but these corporate interests are involved in different sectors of the economy and derive profits in very different ways; manufacturing, service industries or real estate involve quite distinct profit mechanisms.

The trend of investment moving away from manufacturing and into speculative urban real estate development is part of the phenomenon that Harrison and Bluestone (1988) describe as the Casino Society and it
means that labor and neighborhood organizations are involved in different social and economic processes. Sometimes their targets may overlap—a downtown development project involving a new hotel may bring together neighborhood organizations demanding jobs during construction and in the finished project with a labor union such as HERE that is interested in organizing the workers in the completed hotel. Something similar to this scenario has developed in New Haven, Connecticut, and potential for such a situation exists in Hartford. Often plant closing threats in a community can bring labor and neighborhood forces together, but such a scenario has not developed in Hartford. It seems that until the targets of a particular union and a particular neighborhood group exactly overlap, the opportunities presented by the other methods of organizing will not be fully understood or utilized by either type of group.

The experiences described in this chapter show how the some of the assumptions in neighborhood organizing and in the labor movement confront each other in coalition activities. Different logics are employed and strategies and tactics are built upon different premises. However, as different as the organizations are, the differences are not insurmountable if both sides desire to work in coalitions and can engage in the art of compromise. Much depends upon how any single organization assesses its individual capacity to achieve a particular goal—if it knows it cannot "go it alone" then it attempts to work
through coalitions.

Coalitions, specifically electoral coalitions, can become mired in the "trenches" of urban problems as Katznelson (1981) illustrates—in-fighting, ethnic and racial rivalries, and turf-oriented sparring. PFC is still too young for a comprehensive evaluation of whether or not it will suffer such a fate, but LEAP has a very successful record of defining an agenda and not succumbing to a great deal of organizational in-fighting. Its staff members have devoted extraordinary attention to insuring that LEAP does not become mired in such problems and it will only take on major projects agreeable to all participants. LEAP has certain weaknesses (in the estimation of LEAP activists) with respect to minority participation, but in general its member organizations have come to agreement in terms of working together for commonly defined goals.

Two of the unions of this project, the UAW and 1199, have a very direct attachment to electoral politics and participate in a myriad of political activities. The other, HERE, has had minimal participation up to this point, but is gradually moving in the direction of more involvement. When the governor is the "boss", as is the case with 1199, the union must engage in an interesting balancing act counterposing the need for access to political officials through formal and informal means with the need to demonstrate strength through militant tactics.
and be taken seriously by the same officials. Therefore political involvement on the part of 1199 is considered very important by the union leadership. The UAW's inherited tradition of political involvement and the individual involvement of many of its leaders in the Democratic Party focus that union's efforts into many forms of political action.

All of these political involvements delineate the deepest distinctions between the neighborhood organizations and the unions. The union with the most experience in coalitions with the neighborhood organizations, the UAW, has the greatest difficulty countenancing this distinction and cannot understand the lack of even desiring political involvement by neighborhood group leaderships. The neighborhood organizations have very little recourse at this stage in their development to pursue political action, even if their leadership wished to. This gulf is one of the more serious barriers for more permanent alliances between the two types of organizations, given their present understanding of each other and the philosophies of their respective leaders.
LABOR ORGANIZING

In the late 1980's one of the most important events for the labor movement in Hartford was undoubtedly the Colt strike. Simultaneously as a highly publicized issue, a rallying cry and ultimate victory for the labor movement and community allies, a point of comparison for other unions, or an example of the meaning unions still have and the sacrifices individuals are still willing to endure—at least in the case of the 800 strikers involved—the Colt strike took on very public and important proportions in the Hartford area. Just as analyzing the experience of the strike in terms of examples of coalition-building in the previous chapter yields some insights into the problems of unions and community groups attempting to define a commons agenda, the strike can also serve as a departure point for examining labor's own practices in more detail.

In this chapter, we will analyze how unions, specifically those upon which this research is focused, are adapting their practices to cope with a very difficult environment for their continued growth and survival. Given that the Colt strike in many ways represents a true clash of the "old" labor relations with the "new climate", a number of questions are suggested which will be incorporated into this section. For example, what types of assumptions, if any, were involved in the strategy of the UAW as it entered and sustained this strike? Do unions generally need to be able to amass resources
sufficient to withstand a strike of several years duration in order to preserve past achievements? What types of alternative strategies might exist to the unfair labor practice strike pursued by the UAW and under what conditions can alternative strategies be successful? Given that the organized workforce has shrunk considerably and "staying unionized" is increasingly more difficult, what types of strategies guide new organizing drives and the work with existing memberships?

For purposes of organizing and focusing the research, we attempted to think about the work of unions in terms of three segments or phases: organizing (new members), mobilizing (or working with existing members on issues pertaining to their particular situations and needs) and organizational maintenance issues. Within these three phases certain issues undoubtedly overlap, however the distinctions are useful as a starting point in structuring the discussion. The analysis presented here is based on several types of sources: interviews with union leaders and other staff members of the UAW, HERE Local 217 and 1199 New England-SEIU; observation of a variety of union meetings, rallies, other events and home visits to workers; printed and written materials published by the unions, and accounts and/or coverage in books, periodicals and newspapers; numerous informal discussions with union members and staff.
ORGANIZING NEW MEMBERS

Several aspects of organizing new members are being both refined and redefined in the environment of restructuring. We will examine these developments by looking at five aspects of organizing: first a brief overview of who these unions organize; then a new model of organizing developed by one of the unions—the Blitz; next the organizing campaign process; the issue of recognition strikes; and lastly at the place of organizing within the overall framework of the union.

The Pool of New Members

One question to consider regarding organizing new members is who is being organized. For the UAW, organizing is wide open in the Hartford area in terms of the industries and types of workers they attempt to organize. Since very little of the auto industry exists in Connecticut, historically the UAW has organized manufacturing concerns in other industrial sectors in the area—precisely the industries who have moved operations out of the region. In fact, the UAW leadership estimates that the union has lost at least half of its membership in the region since the early 1970’s. Currently, the UAW organizes in virtually any industry from which interested workers approach the union. Within the New England states included Region 9A, recently organized workers include public employees on Cape Cod, maintenance workers at the University of Hartford and cafeteria workers in East Lyme, Connecticut’s school system who are employed by the
Marriott Corporation. This is in contrast to HERE and 1199, both of whom continue to organize generally within the industries which their respective names suggest: hotels/restaurants, including cafeteria workers in public institutions and colleges; and the entire health care industry from mental health and retardation group homes to public employees in the health fields.

New organizing is taking place, however, within the context of erosion of existing membership bases for many unions. While the UAW experiences economic restructuring through the phenomenon of capital flight in the manufacturing sector, the other unions are not immune from analogous problems in their industries. HERE faces the issues of restaurant and hotel closures and "downsizing". During the time in which this research was underway, two of Hartford's major hotels closed, the Hartford Hilton and the Summit Hotel, and HERE lost 300 members. Union activities in both of these former establishments were observed for this research. Even in the healthcare field, 1199 is experiencing the merging of Hartford's Mt. Sinai Hospital, in which several departments are organized by 1199, with St. Francis Hospital, a totally unorganized hospital. Economic restructuring therefore affects all of these unions and their organizing strategies must accommodate this reality.

**New Organizing Models: The Blitz**

While one of the major methods by which the UAW
adapts to changing conditions is to organize in services and other areas in which they traditionally not been involved, HERE and 1199 adapt by maximizing the organizing they do undertake. Part of what is involved in this is the ability to move in and out of organizing situations rapidly and only continue drives where success seems more likely or possible. Both 1199 and HERE have adopted models referred to as "the Blitz" or the 1,2,3 method respectively, in which at several key points relatively early in the drive the unions assess their strength and decide either to continue or halt the drive. Both make extensive use of home visits and/or one-to-one meetings with workers in safe environments where they can feel comfortable discussing their concerns. The UAW also uses similar methods in some of the organizing drives it undertakes.

The Blitz model developed by 1199 is a particularly interesting one and has been used quite successfully in organizing nursing homes of approximately 120 workers in urban areas and has also been applied to community based mental health facilities in Connecticut. HERE's similar 1-2-3 model is used in small- to medium-size hotels, however the pacing is sometimes slower than the Blitz. These models were developed in response to both the increasingly sophisticated and virulent anti-union campaigns of employers and the delays encountered during the course of organizing drives as employers stall the process at the NLRB. The Blitz attempts to maximize union
contact with the workers before the employer discovers that the union has been approached and essentially compresses the timeframe of the initial stages of how organizing drives were conducted ten to fifteen years ago. It involves several key factors early in the campaign: speed, leadership and motivation.

The essentials of the model are as follows. The union is called by one or more workers at a workplace where sufficient interest in unionizing exists to prompt the contact. Within less than one week's time after the union is initially contacted, the union organizer(s) attempts to meet with workers--generally through the home visits--who are identified by other workers as leaders, holds initials meetings to ascertain the degree of interest among these leaders in establishing an organizing committee, holds an organizing committee meeting, and then assesses the potential for a successful campaign. This assessment rests both on the anticipated response and resources available to the employer to fight the union, as well as on the capacity of the workers to organize.

Leaders are defined very simply: people who other people follow. The leadership quality can be social in nature and unrelated to particular worksite issues or it can be tied very specifically to the workplace. The key criterium is that a leader has influence over others. Organizers estimate that there is roughly a 1:5 ratio of leaders to the rest of the workers in a given worksite.
Speed, specifically in reaching leaders, is very important in the early stages of the campaign for several reasons, the most obvious that the union wants to reach the maximum number of people before the employer catches on. The goal is to identify leaders in the first three days and have time with these leaders in order to "innoculate" them against employer propaganda and anti-union arguments. Organizers realize that during this first week of the campaign the employer will undoubtedly find out that the union has been contacted, but the effort is to maintain a degree of secrecy and keep control of information and the pacing of organizing within the union's province as long as possible. Employers may try to dissuade leaders from continuing their participation in the drive or else work eroding support among non-leaders, whatever methods most effectively stymies unionization.

Other dimensions of the speed issue relate to both union resources and worker motivation: the union does not want to invest limited resources in losing campaigns and therefore the determination must be made quickly as to whether sufficient motivation exists among the workers to sustain and win a campaign. The organizer bases the assessment on a number of questions: is there sufficient anger at the employer and intensity about the desire to organize? Do leaders feel this anger very personally, not necessarily "for" others, but for themselves? Is there unity or division among the workers? Will the leaders accept responsibility and take on tasks to move the effort
Whether workers will take on tasks is critically important in an organizer's assessment and is a key factor in determining whether or not to continue the campaign. The tasks and responsibilities that workers are asked to assume do involve degrees of risk and do test commitment, and yet organizers are trained not to prematurely ask workers to do things for which they are not prepared or which could frighten them away from the campaign. For example, workers may be asked to set up meetings with co-workers, to begin to persuade co-workers as to the benefits of organizing, to obtain lists of workers' names, addresses and telephone numbers, or other tasks which are necessary in the campaign.

The first concrete test of the workers, particularly the leaders, is the attendance at the initial organizing committee meeting--are leaders there and have they brought others? Is approximately 70% of the workforce represented? If there is insufficient attendance and/or representation from different work areas, the union may at that point pull out of the effort with the proviso that if events in the future generate greater degrees of interest in organizing, the workers should recontact the union. In these instances an organizer may remain in communication with some of the key activists from the workplace. If the campaign does proceed after this key point has been reached it generally moves all the way to a collective
bargaining election, although very occasionally the union will pull out just before an election if the prognosis is particularly grim.

If there is sufficient attendance and motivation evidenced at the first committee meeting, then a "card rally" is set for a few days later. At this rally (which is actually an expanded and more spirited committee meeting) organizers play a key role and entertain questions, attempt to develop a sense of unity of purpose among all of the various groupings of workers, detail what employer reaction is likely to be--the anti-union tactics that workers can anticipate--and pass out union cards. One of the things that organizers caution in these meetings is that it may be necessary to strike to gain union recognition. They attempt to be very frank about the potential hardships ahead in such campaigns, but also show what workers stand to gain. Workers from institutions which are already organized may speak at such meetings and attest to the kinds of changes in the work environment which unionization makes possible.

The workers then have approximately 72 hours to distribute and retrieve signed union cards, cards which state that the signer authorizes the union to represent him/her. Once these cards are back to the organizer and if at least 70% of the workforce has signed, some type of demonstrative action takes place in front of the employer demanding union recognition. In the vast majority of cases, the employer refuses recognition by a show of union
authorization cards and the union then petitions the NLRB for a collective bargaining election.

**After the Blitz: Aspects of the Remainder of the Campaign**

Although the majority of organizing drives eventually go before the NLRB, the union resists ceding control of the timeframe and scheduling to an outside entity as long as possible. Once the NLRB is petitioned, the process of unit determination must take place and the employer has available and often uses many opportunities to stall the campaign. At this point the "blitz" aspect of the organizing drive is over. A hearing must be held to determine the unit size and then an election date is set.

Generally the election takes place at least a month later if there is minimal disagreement between the employer and union in determining the unit. If there is disagreement, then several different appearances before the NLRB can be required and the process may drag on while enthusiasm for the union among the workers can die. The union at this point may attempt to circumvent the process by threatening to strike even before an election is set if the employer's tactics are terribly obstructionist. Even if the situation does not deteriorate to that extent, the union's major task, specifically the job of organizer, from this point on is to maintain enthusiasm and support for the union among the workers. This is also the point where the role of consultants or attorneys engaging in the modern union-
busting strategies promulgated during recent decades may become more prominent.

Unit size can be very important in the success of organizing drives. During the 1980's, NLRB decisions regarding appropriate unit size for purposes of conducting elections stipulated larger units, inclusive of many different groups of workers, an arrangement which puts employers and, in 1199's case, specifically hospitals at distinct advantages. 1199 maintains that as many as eight distinct groups of workers with distinct interests may exist at a typical hospital and unit determinations should reflect these divisions rather than the larger units for which hospital managements argue. After these decisions, 1199 and other unions attempting to organize hospitals had very few successes and 1199 began to focus its organizing energies on smaller healthcare institutions such as nursing homes and group homes. The union's probability of success is much greater in organizing smaller, more cohesive groups of workers.

During the crucial period of time between filing a petition at the NLRB and the date of the collective bargaining election the degree of responsibility assumed by the organizing committee is most critical. Training for organizers emphasizes that the organizer must not take on all of the tasks and responsibility in the campaign, that is, take on the role of the "best organizing committee member", but rather mete out tasks so that workers essentially organize themselves with guidance from
the organizer. In turn, organizers spend time training the organizing committee on how to keep the campaign moving forward and what to expect from the employer.

This pre-election period is a very likely time for workers to be fired or harassed and for union-busting consultants to be retained by employers. Appendix A is a description of their tactics as outlined by a former management consultant. Organizers chronicle a wide range of tactics they confront in organizing drives. One that is used by union-busting consultants is the firing of supervisors, either to instill fear in the entire workforce or to appease workers who dislike a particular supervisor. Sometimes consultants develop and use psychological profiles of workers during an anti-union campaign. In smaller workplaces where the workers may be a more cohesive group, these tactics may not be as effective as in larger multi-site situations: workers in the more personalized work settings seem to be best able to withstand the anti-union campaigns. However, certain consultants boast extremely effective records specifically against 1199. Moreover, the employer's response to the unionization attempt always has the potential to create fear among the workers, and this fear at the possibility of losing one's livelihood is not at all unfounded (see Goldfield, 1987).

Part of the 1199's training for workers in the context of organizing drives consists of preparing them
for what they can expect as the employer's response. There are any number of tactics the employer may attempt. One is to portray the union as an outside third party that will complicate future relationships between the workers and the employer. Another is to admit that some things have been done incorrectly in the past and to ask for another chance.

The cost of union dues is emphasized, often with graphic illustrations such as the equivalent amount of groceries to a year's union dues. Divisions among the workers along racial and ethnic lines may be exploited or fostered. Movies about past 1199 strikes are often shown, with the intent to portray 1199 as a violent union. If the workforce is predominantly Black, the union is characterized as a Jewish communist union. If the workforce is predominantly white, the union is characterized as a Black militant union. (In the case of HERE, employers characterize the union as mob-controlled).

One of the union's response is to develop outside support by respected political, religious and community leaders—often the Black clergy. However, 1199 has faced situations recently in Southern states where employers have countered by retaining a group of Black ministers from different Southern cities who will travel to worksites where union drives are underway and preach anti-union messages.

Many of these activities took place in the past within captive audience meetings during the workday,
sometimes leaving patients unattended. However, employers are now emphasizing the "one-on-one" (or two- or three-on-one): meetings with individual workers where two or more supervisors interrogate or scream at the worker, usually within eyesight or earshot of other workers. It is often against all of this that workers have to decide whether or not they want a union.

While the organizer is employed full-time to do his/her job and is involved in campaign after campaign, the workers at an individual workplace are attempting to unionize more often than not for the first time, in response to the individual employer or supervisor or working conditions. As is pointed out by Piven and Cloward (1977), workers don't experience "class struggle", they experience the unfairness of a particular employer. They call the union because of their specific circumstances. What the organizer does, especially by way of warning the workers about all of the various devices used by employers, is to show the workers how their specific circumstances fit into overall patterns of labor relations. So while the employer is characterized and responded to on the basis of his/her individual behavior, s/he is also characterized in more general terms as a "boss", behaving like bosses behave. In this sense, the organizers quite consciously convey a picture of adversarial class relations in society and believe that it is important to do this in the course of organizing in
order to motivate and strengthen the workers' resolve.

The Recognition Strike

Another feature of contemporary organizing involves what is called a recognition strike, alluded to above. While every aspect of labor relations has become exceedingly difficult in the past decade as outlined in Chapter 2, obtaining a first contract after a successful organizing drive is one of the most formidable tasks facing unions. Recall in Chapter 4 that we described the difference between an unfair labor practice strike and an economic strike—essentially a distinction based on legal status with legal implications. The recognition strike can be either: it may or may not involve unfair labor practices, but it usually takes place as a result of failed negotiations for a first contract after workers vote for unionization in an NLRB supervised election. In rare instances, the union may call a strike when the employer refuses to agree to an election.

If the union can document unfair labor practices in the course of the negotiations for the first contract and then strikes, it will file charges with the NLRB asking the Board to charge the company with unfair labor practices. If these charges are sustained by an administrative law judge after a trial, the judge may order the reinstatement of the workers. However, a recognition strike without any allegations of unfair labor practices is an immense gamble: once the workers walk out the employer's door, they may be out forever if permanent
replacement workers are hired. Even those unions who eschew heavy reliance on legal strategies pursue this route to hedge against the very real threat of permanent replacements.

All three of the unions in this research have at various times found themselves in strikes over union recognition and in most instances attempt to transform the strike into an unfair labor practices strike. During this process union members and any outside supporters tend not to use the term "recognition strike" either in public—to emphasize that the employer broke the law and to strengthen the case before the NLRB—or even in private—to boost the morale of strikers who may be reassured by the legal protection implied in the term "unfair labor practices" strike.

One example of this strategy is the strike by professional jai alai players which began in April, 1988. The International Jai Alai Players Association (IJAPA) declared a strike in order to gain union recognition and soon after beginning the strike approached the UAW for affiliation. Three jai alai frontons operate in Connecticut (others are in Rhode Island and Florida) and the IJAPA leadership was based at the Hartford fronton. The UAW Region 9A leadership was willing to take risks with this group of strikers who were very inexperienced with issues of labor relations, and shepherded the process of affiliation through the UAW hierarchy. Assuming the
players were successful in their attempt to unionize, once the strike was finished the UAW would gain several hundred new members in an entirely new industry for the UAW, professional sports. When IJAPA formally became affiliated with the UAW, the Regional leadership began to shape the strike strategy into an unfair labor practices strategy. Accordingly strikers and supporters ceased referring to the strike as a recognition strike. The strike remains in effect as of this writing, now more than two years later.

The Culture of Organizing

Perhaps one of the most critical variables in the whole area of organizing the unorganized is the degree of importance attached to this aspect of work by the union and how the organizational philosophy incorporates new organizing. 1199-New England Vice President for Organizing, David Pickus, refers to this as the "culture of organizing". 1199 has historically devoted a great deal of resources to organizing new groups of workers and frames the issue of organizing not simply as a means of obtaining larger membership rolls for the union itself, but also as a political question of empowering the working class in general, and health care workers in particular (see Fink and Greenberg, 1989). 1199's New England staff is organized to accommodate this mission through its officer structure which includes a vice president for organizing, and its staffing pattern which includes an organizing team of at least three "field organizers", those staff members assigned to organizing
the unorganized. Field organizers may also be asked to participate in organizing drives of national importance to the union and assume temporary assignments on the West Coast, in the South or elsewhere.

HERE Local 217 likewise places a heavy emphasis on organizing new members and has reorganized its staff in recent years to enhance its organizing capacity. Before the reorganization, staff members did both new organizing and work with the existing membership, "internal organizing" in HERE's terms for this work. Now there is a clearer delineation of work, and individuals have primary responsibility for one or the other, "external" or "internal" organizing. The emphasis on organizing by HERE has yielded some notable successes in the area: HERE Local 217 was the key force for organizing Yale employees in New Haven, who once organized, chartered new locals with the international union.

The UAW in this region has five staff members of the regional apparatus assigned to new organizing and locals may also undertake organizing drives. New organizing is assuming a more prominent role for the UAW, and, as noted in the beginning of this chapter, this is among groups of workers not previously considered UAW targets for organizing.

Probably more than anything else, organizing the unorganized in this era requires a capacity to constantly refine and reassess techniques and strategies.
organizers--many only in their 30s and 40s--reminisce about organizing techniques of as recently as 15 years ago when the organizer would begin a drive by distributing leaflets to workers at shift changes in front of a facility. Any interested workers would be asked to join an organizing committee, authorization cards would be handed out continuously and once approximately 65% to 75% of the workforce had signed cards, the workers and the organizer would march on the boss and demand recognition. All of this was much more public and much less precise than contemporary practices. Organizing was not easy then, but it is excruciating today, given managements' new techniques, the manner in which labor law is currently interpreted and enforced, and the difficult climate for unions generally. Therefore, the importance attached to organizing the unorganized and the tenacity of the union leadership in maintaining the "culture of organizing" in the midst of the very drastic changes in the organizing environment are quite important to sustaining and enhancing capacities for growth and empowerment.

MEMBERSHIP MOBILIZATION

At a time when they are besieged by the external challenges discussed in earlier chapters, the requirements and demands on trade unions in satisfying membership needs are innumerable varied and complex. Indeed for each employer, for each industry, for each sector of the economy, strategies and tactics must be devised and
constantly reformulated as even newer problems present themselves. Certain types of problems are totally internal to specific worksites, while others are more generalized problems of the current labor relations environment. In the several years that the unions in this study were observed, they collectively confronted quite a wide range of issues:

- industrial restructuring and resulting contraction of firms' operations;
- foreign competition;
- mergers and acquisitions;
- managements beset on breaking the union in specific worksites;
- plant closings;
- demands for concessions from employers in the context of collective bargaining;
- the specific problem of rising health care costs, from both the standpoints of healthcare consumers and workers in the healthcare industry;
- fiscal crises of both state and local governments that employ particular groups of workers;
- publically regulated industries and resulting bureaucratic entanglements;
- privatization of public services;
- economic swings in consumer leisure spending;
- regional and local economic development patterns and shifts;
- local, regional and national political climates;
-cumbersome legal processes in the NLRB bureaucracy;
-divergent philosophies and ideologies within the trade union movement as to the most effective ways of confronting the problems;
-lack of understanding within the larger community of the role and mission of organized labor;
-the relative ease in replacing union workers with nonunion workers during strikes.

There are still more issues but this list alone illustrates some of the diversity of problems faced by the unions. All of these issues require analysis, action and varying degrees of membership involvement and mobilization if there is to be any hope of successful resolution for the members' benefit. Several strategies and techniques pursued by the unions in dealing with this problematic environment will be analyzed next. These include shopfloor or worksite issues and power relationships, union viewpoints as presented in organizational media and other activities which educate membership, external relationships with other unions and in political processes, strikes and corporate campaigns. While some of these topics are very similar to issues covered in the last chapter on alliances and coalitions, in this chapter we will attempt to deal with them not from the standpoint of the functioning of coalitions, but rather from the standpoint of how labor functions, makes choices and takes action.
Shopfloor/Worksite Issues

All three of the unions must develop among their rank-and-file members the capacity to deal with worksite issues and confront employers, usually the first level of supervisors, on a daily basis without the assistance of union staffpeople or perhaps initially even a union steward. This is the most basic form of empowerment afforded through unionization. There is generally an apparatus of stewards (or "delegates" as 1199 refers to them) and some type of shop committee. This level of organization is truly the lifeblood of the union and makes the difference between a workplace in which workers feel a sense of and can exercise power or one in which worker apathy and disorganization reign.

Various training activities are undertaken by the unions to develop the leadership skills necessary to function on the shopfloor level. All of the unions seem to be experimenting with new activities and training formats. One method which is used fairly regularly by the unions is a workshop setting with simulations and role playing. Workers are given a concrete situation to react to and assume different roles in the situation: typically the boss, the worker(s) and the steward. At a HERE training session in June, 1988, this format not only yielded knowledge about specific useful techniques, but also helped to foster a sense of comradery among the workers—another very necessary component of successful shop committees.
One of the handouts in the HERE 217 training session is attached as Appendix B and is an excellent synopsis of the way in which that union approaches on-the-shopfloor problem-solving. This outline of the steps involved in handling a grievance was devised to train stewards, but also demonstrates several other principles of unionism which are emphasized by HERE 217. First and foremost is the issue of developing a "fight", i.e. "getting the victim to fight" and "pushing people to win, not whine". Implied in this theme and throughout the outline is that the steward does not do "for" others, but builds the workers' collective capacity to confront issues. Careful preparation and anticipation of the employer's reactions is obviously another area which is emphasized. Finally, fairness for the workers involved and future implications of any problem resolution are also themes.

1199 frames the question of shopfloor activity in terms of worker power and unity. It has developed a training module for organizers and rank-and-file leaders, "Our Role As Organizer", which is outlined in Appendix C. This module is offered periodically to joint groups of organizers and active members from various facilities. The three objectives of the training as stated in the outline of the module are:

1) to teach that the source of workers' power is their united action:

2) to teach that an organizer's job is not to solve
problems, but to lead workers into struggle so they learn from their experience that their power comes from their united action;
3) to introduce principles and concepts to help leaders think, plan and function as organizers.

To accomplish these objectives, a number of role playing scenarios take place which train participants how to approach grievances, chapter-building and other union activities, keeping in mind the goal of building power and unity. One other important theme which applies to 1199's approach to the entire range of union issues is that of the union being an "instrument of workers' power" rather than a "service organization". This theme also helps to explain 1199's aversion to reliance on attorneys and legal procedures, and more generally, how it distinguishes itself from other unions who do envision their roles more as that of service organizations. This type of content in union-sponsored training activities is geared toward developing the capacity for militance and activism among organizers and members.

Although the unions want to develop the capacity of the workers to handle problems and empower themselves, the leaderships do not necessarily envision every issue developing into a major confrontation. They are interested in instilling in the employer a "healthy respect" for the power of the unionized workers so that the employer has to think of the implications of his/her decisions and actions vis a vis the union. This means that
workers may have to exercise their power dramatically on a periodic basis, but not over every single issue. In other words, the union's "threat" to disrupt worksite activity is an important means of maintaining or exerting power.

Shopfloor leadership and organization is critically important during intense labor-management conflict. In the Colt Firearms situation, prior to the beginning of the strike in January, 1986, the UAW members at Colt staged what they call an "in-plant strike" for nine months after the expiration of their previous contract in April, 1985. During this time, a virtual underground existed in which the shop committee coordinated job actions and kept track of employer violations of labor law in an effort to build a case for later legal action. As antagonisms deepened between the workers and the management, simultaneously the anger and resolve which would propel and sustain the workers during the eventual four year long strike was also developing.

Developing Membership Power and Strength: Media and Messages

Quite a range of membership development activities are undertaken by the three unions. One important aspect of this process is the ideological or philosophical orientation and message that the union leadership wants to impart to the membership. Several different means transmit organizational points of view: various conferences, conventions, and printed material all deliver
messages which are viewed as "ammunition" for workers in their workplace and their communities as they confront issues and struggles. Indeed, one the UAW's national monthly publications is entitled "Ammo" and consists of a regular series of small, pocket-sized pamphlets on a variety of subjects from trade deficits to plant closings to the effects of pesticide use in agriculture.

Publications and Printed Materials: The UAW international headquarters issues a myriad of attractive, professionally-produced publications geared toward political and community action. For example, a 52 page booklet entitled "Labor Economics '89" was published for the UAW Leadership Institute by the International's Education Department. The material in the booklet covers economic trends and projections, budget and taxation policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations, the state of Black America, the state of the U.S. auto industry, the trade deficit and other economic topics. Many charts, graphs and illustrations help in supplementing the written analysis which is simultaneously factual and dramatic in its implications for auto workers, and which draws upon much of the industrial restructuring literature referenced in earlier chapters of this dissertation.

Another similarly prepared publication, "Political Strength for Future Security A UAW Action Agenda 1989" offers the legislative and political program under the auspices of the Community Action Program (CAP) Department and was distributed at the February, 1989 CAP Conference
in Washington, D.C. This publication contains similar material to the Labor Economics publication, but also includes more detailed information on Congress and the UAW's political strategies. These types of booklets are often found in literature racks in union hall lobbies and are distributed to union activists who participate in different UAW activities. Additionally, the international union's monthly magazine "Solidarity" is sent to every member's home and the topics covered in this publication likewise span a range of union issues, economic and political topics, as well as cultural and leisure topics.

The perspectives within these UAW publications may be described as solidly within the liberal-left Democratic Party realm, emphasizing an economic interventionist role for government through such measures as the development of industrial policy. However, there is also an emphasis on economic justice for segments of the population beyond the UAW membership alone, especially minority and urban populations, and a concern for workers' lives beyond the workplace in political and community activities, and even in recreational and leisure endeavors.

1199 publishes a smaller quantity of materials, but its publications have likewise been attractive, very easily read and infused with themes of economic justice and struggle. Its recent merger with the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) has meant the cessation and/or reorganization of the union's national
publications, but the New England district continues to publish several of its own newsletters and brochures, including a 10 issue per year newsletter which is mailed to each member's home.

Publications from HERE 217's international union are nowhere near as prominent either in its activities or its Hartford office as are those of UAW or 1199 in their respective operations, but the local itself issues periodic newsletters and produces especially poignant brochures and leaflets during contract negotiations and strikes. Local 217 and the Yale University Locals 34 and 35 issue a "tri-local" newsletter periodically and the three locals also engage in joint undertakings such as training sessions and leadership meetings. However, the presentation of the union's organizational point of view to its members seems to come much more through meetings, training sessions and the work of the organizers on an individual and small group basis than through written or published materials.

Ideological Messages at Conferences, Conventions and Other Activities: Union conferences, conventions and regular assemblies or meetings are also key opportunities to convey organizational viewpoints. The themes of speeches at such events are noteworthy and the oral transmission of union messages is an especially important medium because among the three unions' memberships are many people with limited formal education, people who speak limited English and read virtually no
English, as well as people who are not necessarily accustomed to a great deal of reading. Therefore, speeches or oral presentations at union activities may be a primary method of obtaining information for these members, and oral and slide or video presentations may indeed be the most effective media for transmitting content and themes to many union members. In fact, after realizing the problems of adult illiteracy and its prevalency among lower paid healthcare workers, 1199 leadership in Boston considered launching a literacy project in the late 1980's.

Two interesting examples of these presentations are from 1199's seventh national convention which was held in Hartford in December, 1987, and a similar presentation at a delegates assembly in Hartford on December 2, 1988. Both came from then-Executive Vice President for Organization, Robert Muehlenkamp and featured a rather sophisticated radical political-economy orientation. The latter presentation employed the medium of a narrated slide show. The written handout which accompanies the slides is included as Appendix D. (The handout consists of printed copies of most of the slides).

Muehlenkamp's accompanying oral narrative offers an analysis of shifts in the economy, the ideology and policy-orientation of the Reagan administration and the implications for workers, specifically healthcare workers, with the conclusion that unionization is the most impor-
tant vehicle to address the problems. Far from being simplistic in orientation, in order to buttress its main argument, the presentation offers comparisons of unemployment rates and social welfare spending in different Western countries with varying degrees of union strength.

Despite the valid problem of ensuring that the majority of 1199 members who hear such a presentation will comprehend it in its entirety and remember its fine points, it is a genuine attempt at distilling complicated material for use by average workers and arming them with sophisticated arguments. More fundamentally, the presentation represents the type of analysis which informs 1199's praxis and the message its leadership attempts to impart to members.

Within its meetings, conferences and union literature, 1199 regularly invokes the memory and words of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. who participated in 1199 campaigns during his life, and it also maintains a relationship with Coretta Scott King. The 1987 convention kit contained a tape cassette of two of King's speeches, one of which was delivered at an 1199 function in March, 1968. Inasmuch as this union often characterizes its mission as a type of extension of the civil rights movement into the economic sphere, locally and nationally it allies with various civil rights organizations, as well as with coalitions and organizations concerned with American foreign policy.

In recent years 1199 has cultivated a relationship
with Jesse Jackson and was one of the only national labor unions to endorse him in his 1988 presidential campaign. Many of the Jackson campaign themes have been incorporated into the 1199 repertoire. During Jackson's campaign stops in Hartford, 1199 leaders and staff were integrally involved in organizing and moderating rallies.

In April, 1987 1199's national leadership bucked the AFL-CIO's objections and joined in the sponsorship and mobilization for a national demonstration in Washington, D.C. against U.S. policy in Central America and Southern Africa. An emphasis on activism and social justice is quite pervasive in most of 1199's activities and publications, consonant with its left-wing heritage (see Greenberg and Fink, 1989).

Many of the organizers on the staff of HERE Local 217 likewise are from activist backgrounds and they also view their work as extensions of social movements, including the civil rights and women's movements, as well as community organizing. Union issues are often framed to members as questions of power and the results of class- or power relationships in the larger society. Efforts to ally their union issues with larger civil rights issues were evident in the 1988 Yale University labor negotiations.

As noted above, Local 217 leadership helped to build and now works collaboratively with the Yale University unions, HERE Locals 34 and 35. Local 217 also has significant membership in New Haven, as well as in
Hartford. When the Yale locals were on the verge of a strike at the university in 1988, one of the strategies they opted for was to invite Jesse Jackson to come to their assistance and speak at a large community support rally on the Yale campus. Jackson, of course, benefitted from his appearance: through this activity Jackson was able to cultivate a relationship with one more segment of the labor movement and secure the support of these unions in his presidential campaign. The relationship of civil rights and labor issues was also stressed when Local 217 struck the Hartford Sheraton in 1987 by garnering support from Hartford Mayor Carrie Saxon Perry who in her speeches at the various rallies stressed these themes.

The UAW regional organization is able to draw upon the prominence and the resources of its parent international union in delivering an organizational point of view and one facet of its regional educational apparatus is to take advantage of the international's facility in northern Michigan, the Walter and May Reuther Family Education Center at Black Lake, Michigan. Every year UAW members from different locals within Region 9A take part in the educational programs offered at Black Lake which constitute the formal UAW national educational programs. Educational programs are also offered by the Region 9A office. However, there are also the more informal ideological and educational avenues, including the speakers at various meetings and rallies, particularly
in the political activities of the CAP Council.

During the Colt strike, national UAW speakers who were featured at the major local rallies from International President Owen Beiber to the late International Secretary-Treasurer Raymond Majerus consistently emphasized progressive social democratic themes similar to those in the union's various printed materials. As one would expect, the speakers would decry the corporate greed of Colt and other union-busting employers and the tedious NLRB processes, but also they would recount the need for national solutions to economic problems consistent with the policies outlined in their publications, as well as the necessity of political involvement of the strikers and their allies.

The UAW message is not framed in as radical a rhetoric as is 1199's perhaps, but it does draw upon and distill the industrial policy literature of the mid 1980s which has become familiar to graduate students in the political economy or industrial relations fields. Again, how much of the written material the average worker may comprehend is difficult to estimate, yet many Colt strikers who were active in union-sponsored events during the strike were quite capable of articulating the relationship between their experience and the national political-economic climate.

Estimating the Impact of Union Messages: The Colt strikers are a segment of UAW Region 9A's membership who
relied heavily on the support and resources of the union structure beyond the local level from both the regional and international levels of the organization. The union was an organization paramount in their lives and, regardless of their level of union participation before the strike, as a group they developed an intense loyalty to the UAW. This loyalty found expression in the media coverage afforded the strike, for example, a Hartford Courant Northeast Magazine article of August 27, 1989, "Shot From Guns" (Brodner, 1989) which recounted the stories of individual strikers. One might therefore expect that these strikers would either share or absorb and adopt many of the ideas or themes which are prominent in UAW publications and articulated by UAW leadership. Proving such an assertion is difficult. However, we may derive some preliminary notions on the opinions of the strikers from a research project undertaken by Marc Lendler in 1989 on the changing authority structures in the lives of the Colt strikers. Part of his research involved a survey administered to 253 strikers in the spring of 1989. The survey was administered randomly to strikers who attended one of the weekly membership meetings during April, 1989. At these meetings, strikers received their $100 per week strike benefits and were brought up to date on strike-related events.

The answers to several of Lendler's questions regarding political participation reveal a high percentage of respondents who voted in the 1988 presidential
election, 87%, and of those who voted, 92.6% voted for Dukakis. This compared to a statewide poll of Connecticut union members conducted by the University of Connecticut's Institute for Social Inquiry in which 55% of respondents (N=106) voted for Dukakis. When asked to assess Reagan's presidency, 71.5% of the Colt striker survey respondents felt that he was a "poor" president, 22.2% felt he was "only fair", while only 5.0% felt he was a "good" president and 1.3% felt he was "very good". Although these results are not surprising given the strikers' experiences, they do demonstrate a consistency with the themes emphasized by the UAW in its various media.

The survey results also suggest that involvement in the strike stimulated new and greater levels of political participation among some of the strikers. Respondents reported an increasing level of contact with government officials during the course of the strike as compared to before: 36.9% reported that they had written or spoken to a government official once or twice during the strike; 12.2% reported they had such contact "many times", with 50.9% reporting they never had contact with government officials during the strike. This compares to 20.1% reporting one or two contacts with government officials before the strike, 7.5% reporting many contacts and 73.4% never having contact with government officials before the strike. The combination of the union leadership's guidance and urging, coupled with what became obvious
necessity during the strike—the pursuit of political avenues—most likely produced these results. However, Lendler’s survey provides some indication that the rank-and-file strikers and their union leadership’s assessment of the situation were shared.

Political Strategies, Membership Mobilization and External Relationships in Pursuit of Goals

The unions upon which this research is focused employ a variety of strategies to achieve their goals. Rallies, marches, picketing, lobbying, civil disobedience, targeting of specific public officials, and other techniques are utilized. Many strategies can be predicted: all of the unions establish picket lines during strikes; all three hold rallies and call upon other unions to attend and contribute financially to strike efforts; all three interact with political officials on their respective issues. Yet in certain instances, these unions have used rather bold tactics, both in terms of the risks union members were willing to take and the possible outcomes which might result from the actions. Several dimensions of the various strategies are analyzed below in order to understand both the rationales and the impact of strategic choices, as well as how these might be considered innovations which attempt to meet the current challenges these unions face.

The Use of Protest: In a number of situations, the unions used protest tactics in a manner which corresponds
to Lipsky's (1970) model of protest described in the introductory chapter whereby "reference publics" are activated on protest targets. However, protest was also utilized as a means of exerting pressure on the targets directly. For example, in the spring of 1989, 1199 was involved in contract negotiations with the State of Connecticut for 7000 state healthcare workers. The negotiations would eventually be resolved through binding arbitration, but leading up to that point, the union leadership wanted to facilitate membership participation and present a militant, determined stance to the State's negotiators. Accordingly, the union sponsored several demonstrations in the area around the State Capitol building and state office buildings in Hartford. During one demonstration, the 1199 members blocked traffic and sat down in the middle of a busy intersection in front of the Capitol. In another, they burned a copy of the State's last contract offer which was being submitted to the arbitrator as the State's final position.

In these instances, the union was attempting several things simultaneously: maintaining the membership's vocal involvement and participation; exerting pressure on the state bureaucracy; however, not altogether alienating the Governor who might ultimately insert himself in the negotiations with favorable results for the union. This delicate balancing finally resulted in an arbitration award that the union considered acceptable.
The UAW conducted several marches at the State Capitol directed at the Governor during the course of the Colt strike. One march called on him to use his office to bring the two parties together for negotiations. Governor O'Neil had intervened in other strikes, but generally when the possibility for a settlement was at hand, for example, at an 1199 strike at Waterbury (Connecticut) Hospital in the fall of 1986. He apparently perceived no such possibility in the early months of the Colt strike and, moreover, had an antagonistic relationship with the UAW regional director at the time, John Flynn. Flynn was very active in Democratic Party politics but in leadership of the rival, more liberal faction associated with LEAP. The UAW leadership felt that O'Neil's lack of involvement until much later when the company was being sold stemmed from these political differences and, accordingly O'Neil became a type of ancillary target in the strike.

In public statements, UAW leadership constantly challenged O'Neil to help settle the strike. In 1989, another demonstration took place at the State Capitol after the union discovered that the State of Connecticut continued to purchase weapons from Colt for its law enforcement personnel, despite a national AFL-CIO sponsored boycott of Colt Firearms and a Connecticut General Assembly resolution urging the pentagon not to purchase Colt products until the strike was resolved. These demonstrations were readily attended by strikers who had grown very critical of and felt great animosity toward
O'Neil for perceived inaction on their behalf.

The UAW and 1199 enjoyed very different relationships with the Governor during his tenure in office. 1199 often held demonstrations at state offices and, in fact, once conducted a sit-in at the Department of Mental Retardation central office which resulted in arrests. However, O'Neil, himself, was rarely the target of the demonstrations. Rather it was the Legislature, Commissioners of various state agencies, the Budget office, and other targets—not the Governor, personally. This enabled the Governor to intervene and "fix" certain situations at the 11th hour. For example, O'Neil's intervention just before threatened strikes at community mental health and mental retardation facilities which subcontracted from the state produced settlements instead of strikes in 1987 and 1990.

1199 leadership attributes O'Neil's cooperation to the fact that he knew, based on experience, that 1199 would strike if it needed to and therefore he respected the union's threats, as well as its power. Moreover, 1199 members work in state agencies and in organizations which received state funding, worksites which, if struck, would wreak havoc for the state bureaucracy and bring criticism to the leadership of state government. In contrast, the UAW's relationship with O'Neil was not nearly as complex: except for the jai alai players, UAW members did not work under O'Neil's direct or indirect chain of command, and
therefore his action or inaction in the Colt strike remained confined to that one situation, without the lasting implications which his actions with 1199 might signify.

While HERE 217 has few occasions to make the State government or the Governor a direct target in their various struggles, they utilize the resource of protest very much in the vane of Lipsky's model in the course of organizing, negotiations and strike activities. During one set of negotiations with the Hartford Sheraton Hotel, union leaders sat in and were arrested at the main entrance to Aetna Insurance which holds part interest in the hotel. The banks and insurance companies headquartered in Hartford seem especially averse to demonstrations taking place in front of their buildings and the use of such a tactic by HERE does not go unnoticed by corporate officers who potentially can influence the process of contract negotiations at the hotel.

Political Channels: Besides protest, the unions also engage in more "routine" political action to pursue objectives. This area has been discussed in previous sections, however, in short it can be stated that leadership of all three unions believe that political involvement is necessary in the course of their agenda.

HERE is substantially less active than either 1199 or the UAW and is not affiliated with LEAP. The UAW is thoroughly committed to political action and strongly endorses the LEAP model to the point of helping to expand,
financially back, and cultivate the model in other parts of the country.

1199 is likewise heavily involved in both political action and LEAP, although its New England president cautions against over-involvement in political work at the expense of basic shop activities. However, in pursuit of any specific union goal or in the course of solving any particular union issue, 1199 regularly uses political channels, mobilizing members to contact and lobby public officials, and turn out in en masse for hearings and other public meetings. HERE likewise mobilizes members to lobby, attend hearings and other similar events. Both the UAW and 1199 have full-time lobbyists among their staff, while HERE does not assign any staffperson that exclusive role.

Inter-Union and Intra-Labor Movement Relationships: The last area for discussion under the topic of strategies to achieve goals is that of inter-union and internal labor movement relationships and how these relationships facilitate or impede goal attainment. This can be analyzed both in terms of the formal organizational structures and relationships which exist within the labor movement as well as the norms or values which are articulated as labor movement values and in a sense serve as standards by which actions and behavior are evaluated. The example of a strike situation is a useful illustration.

Unions in the area who are conducting strikes often
contact either the Greater Hartford Central Labor Council or the Connecticut State Labor Council, or both. As their names suggest, these bodies are federations or coalitions of unions and are local and state arms of the AFL-CIO organization. Individual union locals or their various statewide organizations affiliate to these bodies and pay per capita dues based on membership levels. However, if a union is not affiliated with the AFL-CIO nationally, they cannot affiliate with local and state labor councils. Conversely, a union may affiliate nationally with the AFL-CIO, but not with the local or state levels of organization. This was the case with the UAW in Connecticut, who, until 1990, did not affiliate with either the Connecticut or Hartford labor councils even though its International union is affiliated nationally with the AFL-CIO.

Once a striking union contacts a local labor council, various things can happen from monetary collections to mass picketing or rallies which are attended by other union members to contact with public officials or other tactics. If the labor council participates in any existing community-labor alliance, that body may be approached. The activities during the Colt strike which are outlined in the previous chapter are clear examples. Unions expect such assistance because it is articulated as part of the raison d'être of such councils. Moreover, the norm or value of labor solidarity motivates participation and such slogans as "an injury to
one is an injury to all" are often seen on the placards or buttons of participants. Union members from other locals who attend or contribute to these efforts do so both to help fellow unionists and because they want to count on reciprocal assistance if they go on strike.

Besides strike support, state and local labor councils may be called upon to provide assistance during organizing drives and they also engage in community service and political action programs. Political action activities sometimes generate controversy and division when different unions back different candidates vying for the same office. Although the following example took place before the timeframe of this research, it is painfully remembered by many labor activists and demonstrates some past division among the three unions in this project.

In 1982 when Connecticut's Republican Senator Lowell Weicker was being challenged for re-election by liberal then-Democratic Congressman Toby Moffett, 1199 and the UAW both vigorously backed Moffett while HERE backed Weicker. The AFL-CIO was so divided at its annual convention in which political endorsements are made that the Weicker forces were able to block the body from making any endorsement in the race. The 1990 gubernatorial race in Connecticut in which Weicker ran as an Independent against the liberal Democratic Congressman Bruce Morrison and conservative Republican Congressman John Rowland produced
another no endorsement policy by the AFL-CIO, but with a different configuration of forces. In 1990, 1199 chose to back Weicker, despite the endorsement by the rest of the LEAP forces, including the UAW, of Morrison. That endorsement was greeted with great disappointment by other liberal-left forces (Bass, 1990).

Besides working through the AFL-CIO, unions also approach each other on an individual basis for support and attempt joint strategies with specific common employers. For example, both HERE 217 and the UAW-affiliated IJAPA have members who work at the jai alai fronton in Hartford. During the course of the IJAPA strike, although the HERE 217 members have a no-sympathy strike clause in their contract, various information has been shared and sometimes joint strategies developed to deal with state gaming agencies who regulate jai alai. However, even more coordination could have been attempted had both sides agreed. This is one small example of how various unions work with each other. Other examples include pension coordination and pay equity projects among state employee unions in which 1199 participates, as well as a range of community services activities.

Within this span of inter-union contacts there are many points of contention and sometimes the disagreements or rivalries become quite intense. This is especially true of contested elections for AFL-CIO offices or floor fights at conventions on controversial resolutions. Additionally, the division within the Democratic Party
between the more conservative faction and the progressive LEAP faction also serves to divide the labor movement in its political activities.

One manifestation of these divisions related to continued AFL-CIO support for the Colt strike during its four year duration. Throughout the strike the UAW was not affiliated with the Connecticut State AFL-CIO and when rallies were set or fundraising appeals circulated, occasionally complaints would be heard at labor council meetings over giving continual assistance to a union which was not part of the AFL-CIO in Connecticut.

The internal labor movement divisions which are most significant in terms of this research are those which revolve around overall philosophy and vision of unions and the labor movement as a whole. The three unions of this study are among the activist unions which embrace both a larger, progressive social mission for the labor movement and an active, aggressive role for individual unions responding to the contemporary climate of industrial relations. This brings them not infrequently into conflict with the more conservative elements of the AFL-CIO.

Strikes and Corporate Campaigns

Risks and the Unfair Labor Practice Strike: There is probably nothing more risky in this era for unions than a strike. As described earlier, a strike over economic issues alone is exceptionally difficult to win.
Increasingly, unions are using the strategy of filing unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB against companies they strike. The intent is to transform economic strikes into unfair labor practices strikes in order to legally protect strikers' jobs from being filled by permanent replacements if the charges are sustained through an NLRB trial. However, this strategy also involves risk: there is no guarantee that a union will win its case in the trial and the timeframe involved usually is quite lengthy. The NLRB trial in the Colt strike took over six months to conduct and the decision was not rendered until more than one year later.

The Lockout: An auxiliary aspect of the legal route of the unfair labor practice strike which sometimes helps to enable strikers to receive unemployment benefits involves the strike being designated as a lockout. Generally after some length of time on strike, the union makes an offer to return to work under the terms of the previous contract. If the company refuses, the union appeals to the state labor department to have the strike declared a lockout. In the case of a lockout, the workers who are refused by the company from working may be eligible for unemployment compensation and the amount of the unemployment benefit is generally greater than any union's strike benefit. Such a turn of events generally strengthens the case of the union with the NLRB since the union can claim that by not accepting the workers back, the company was not bargaining in good faith, an unfair
labor practice. This strategy was pursued successfully during the Colt strike and in some of the 1199 strikes.

Replacement Workers: One of the most critical factors which makes strikes so difficult in recent years is the ease with which replacement workers have been hired. Winning a strike by setting up a picket line and expecting to halt production or service provision because no one will cross the line is now a virtual illusion for many segments of the labor movement, especially in situations where strikers are not engaged in highly skilled work.

Besides the capacity of firms in the manufacturing sector to move production activity to other sites, struck companies may take advantage of firms who recruit strikebreakers from other states, rendering the concept community solidarity meaningless. Moreover, since the labor movement has undergone significant membership erosion in the past decade and unionized worksites have ceased operations in many cities, large segments of the workforce—particularly younger workers—have no experience with unions and lack an understanding of the ethos of the labor movement around strikebreaking. Companies can exploit this situation quite readily. Another example from the Colt strike demonstrates this phenomenon.

Colt Firearms had approached the City of Hartford for Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds to
assist in modernizing the Hartford plant before the onset of the strike. The company refused, however, to guarantee job slots for Hartford residents in exchange for the funding. The UAW supported the City's insistence on jobs for Hartford residents. However, once the strike began, Colt began recruiting replacement workers from among Hartford's unemployed and underemployed populations, particularly in the African American and Puerto Rican communities, the very residents the City wanted Colt to hire under the terms of the CDBG funding. The City decided to hold up any approval for CDBG funds until the strike was settled. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the union and the Community Labor Alliance were simultaneously approaching the neighborhood organizations and urging them to educate their constituencies about the issues of the strike. These constituencies included many individuals who had no experience with unions and simply saw an opportunity for employment.

The Corporate Campaign: Since it is so difficult to win a strike on the picket line alone, besides the strategy of the unfair labor practice strike, unions are also embracing what has become known as the corporate campaign. The term was first associated with the methodology of a particular individual, Ray Rogers, who worked with the J.P. Stevens boycott and Hormel strikers. It is now used more generically to refer to a strategy which attempts to discredit the struck company within the larger community and which also targets the company's
financial base of support through such tactics as boycotts, attempting to halt third party payments or government funding and contracts, pressuring the company’s financiers, clients or customers, and amassing political pressure on the company to settle, and other similar activities.

The previous chapter discussed in some detail many activities undertaken during the Colt strike which conform to this outline of the corporate campaign strategy and will not be repeated here. However, both 1199 and HERE also employ this type of strategy in the course of their strikes of recent years. 1199 members at Kimberly Hall Nursing Home in Windsor, Connecticut, just north of Hartford, began a strike on February 14, 1990, which remains unsettled as of this writing in late 1990.

The union leadership and the Kimberly Hall members knew that this strike would be exceedingly difficult: the home is the only unionized home of over 30 owned by the Genesis Corporation and the corporation seemed determined to break 1199. The union had completed negotiations with 29 nursing homes during the winter of 1989-90 and this was the only home which would not settle for the same basic pattern accepted by the other 28. Several workers crossed the picket line and replacements were also hired. The union leadership quickly decided to attack on as many other fronts as possible besides the picket line. State legislators were contacted; Hartford's mayor convened a
Citizens for Justice for Kimberly Hall Strikers Committee; other Genesis homes in the area were picketed as well as shopping areas near these homes were leafleted. Legislators in Pennsylvania, where Genesis corporate headquarters are located, were sent mailings about the strike. The union also pressured the State Health Department to closely monitor health standards in the facility. During the summer of 1990, 1199 decided to take down its picket line and await the results of the NLRB trial. While to date the strike remains unsettled, these are the types of tactics which the union feels it must employ to attempt to win.

Buyouts and Employee Ownership Options: The settlement of the Colt strike was fashioned upon a unique set of circumstances which were never envisioned in the early years of the strike. As the strike wore on and the union's demands to halt Pentagon contracts until the strike was settled actually took the form of the Defense Department awarding a contract for the M16 rifle to a competitor, it became clear that Colt was experiencing financial hardship. In April, 1989, Colt Industries announced that it was putting the Firearms Division up for sale. The union first pursued a strategy of developing a proposal solely on its own for an employee ownership plan, but was later approached by an investor, Anthony Autorino. He asked them to consider a joint plan with other private investors and the State of Connecticut who would be involved through the investment of pension funds. After
months of extremely complicated negotiations, the deal was consummated in March, 1990.

The new company which emerged, Colt Manufacturing Company, signed a collective bargaining agreement with UAW Local 376, who also would have 11% interest in the company. The settlement included raises and health benefits which would be fully paid by the company, two unsettled issues in 1986 which incited the strike. A $13 million settlement of backpay was agreed to by the union, with $10 million to be awarded immediately and $3 million in three years, assuming the new company would be profitable. This backpay award is the largest in the history of the National Labor Relations Board.

The union takes immense pride in the settlement, something many even in the labor movement in Connecticut never expected to see. The model of part ownership by the union members, public pension fund involvement, and private investment will undoubtedly be studied and perhaps replicated elsewhere if appropriate factors converge. However, the entire venture is tremendously risky: first there is the problem of resecuring Defense Department contracts in the era of new patterns and levels of defense spending. Next is the issue of the movement for greater gun control. Since its opening, Colt Manufacturing has been embroiled in controversy over the sale of modified assault weapons to the public and has attempted to maintain production of its Sporter rifle in the midst of
the call for the banning of such weapons.

There is also the critical issue of former strikers working with the former strikebreakers who were kept on the payroll of the new company. Shopfloor interaction between these two groups during the first few months of operation of the new company has been tense. Add to this the readjustment of workers who have been on a picket line, outside the regimentation and authority of factory operation for four years, as well as some division between different groups of former strikers and the prospects for success of the new company become uncertain. Even though the strike is formally settled and the new company employs the former strikers, the effects of the strike will continue for a number of years as this new company cautiously carves out its existence.

Brinksmanship: In some situations, unions find themselves using brinksmanship strategies to attempt to achieve settlements. Both 1199 and HERE are often the subject of media coverage with a theme of "it's down to the wire" before threatened strike deadlines at worksites such as hospitals, group homes, hotels or the jai alai fronton, respectively. HERE in 1987 faced the possibility of strikes in three downtown Hartford hotels whose contracts had been negotiated purposely to expire at common deadlines so that the pressure of prospective strikes at major hotels for business clients would induce settlements. Last minute settlements were obtained with two of the three hotels and a four month strike ensued
at the Hartford Sheraton.

1199 has used a brinksmanship approach in combination with pattern bargaining very publicly in recent years with both its nursing home division and its private sector/community based mental health and retardation division. Its 29 separate nursing home contracts have been negotiated to expire at roughly common deadlines, as have contracts for 14 private sector mental health and retardation facilities and group homes. One of the key factors for both divisions is that the employers in each division rely on reimbursements from various state agencies. As mentioned earlier, the union leadership knows that the state can ill afford the chaos which strikes in a large number of either nursing homes or group homes would bring and the union therefore enjoys a decided advantage in such negotiation scenarios. Both in late 1989 with the nursing homes and in the summer of 1990 with the group homes, the union faced the prospect of strikes in over a dozen facilities at once. In both situations state funding was guaranteed and strikes were averted in all but one nursing home, Kimberly Hall, and in all of the private sector mental health and retardation facilities.

Both sets of negotiations were preceded by large spirited membership meetings of the respective divisions of 1199 where union members voiced overwhelming support for the strike option, if necessary. The meeting of private sector workers even included clients from group
homes for the retarded, providing a poignant scene for the media of the closeness which exists between the workers and their clients and the concern the workers experienced in feeling forced to consider striking. As a healthcare union, 1199 regularly attempts to highlight quality-of-care issues, i.e. staffing patterns, in its public relations efforts surrounding strikes or potential strikes, however the media does not always feature this aspect of situations.

The gamble with this brinksmanship is that the tactic may force a union into an impossible strike like the Kimberly Hall situation, and eventually it may lose. In situations faced by HERE where no state funds are involved, strikes may either eventually close down an establishment such as a restaurant or may result in the end of the union shop at the site. In recent years 1199 has endured several strikes at nursing homes which ended in the facilities being closed by the State or closing due to problems with financing. The unions feel that occasionally this may be a very unfortunate necessity if they are ultimately to have power to improve conditions for their members at other institutions.

Summary: Membership Mobilization

The centerpiece of any union's work is what is done to involve and serve its membership. The articulation of a union's mission and the philosophies and strategies which inform and guide its activities are critically important aspects of how workers experience union
membership. Within the labor movement the distinction between those unions who envision their role as one of empowerment and those who define their role as providing a service to members is becoming a basis of deepening division. In varying degrees, I would assert that the three unions being studied in this project fall on the empowerment side of the dichotomy, however, as analyzed in this section, their risks and challenges are still formidable and they do suffer significant defeats nonetheless.

Empowerment in this instance may be interpreted in a number of ways: these unions all attempt to organize unorganized workers and are devising the new methodologies described in the first section of this chapter, forging models that other unions are also adopting. These unions also pursue as vigorously as possible raises in wages and improvements in working conditions during collective bargaining and will still go on strike as a last resort, rather than capitulate to terms they consider unacceptable. They will employ protest when necessary, and also participate in electoral strategies which are not failsafe. Perhaps most of all, they can be characterized as unions with leadership who are willing to take significant risks to advance their members' interests.

Many of labor's struggles are no longer able to be won on the basis of the union's own internal resources but require coordination with other unions, community forces.
and the formulation of political strategies. These three unions are each attempting to fashion strategies to meet the difficulties of the contemporary labor relations environment through methods such as unfair labor practice strikes, corporate campaigns, the Colt buyout, new training activities for members in tackling shopfloor issues, the use of protest and political leverage in bold manners and the other examples analyzed here. The next section will continue to explore how the unions innovate by examining organizational structural and maintenance issues.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND MAINTENANCE

Various aspects of the organization of a union may promote, hinder or in some other way influence how the union accomplishes its goals. In this section several dimensions of organizational structure will be analyzed. First, the organizational structures of the three unions will be described, not merely to list the details of structures, but to consider how these structures facilitate goal attainment. Next, the issues of union mergers and affiliations will be analyzed. Third, staffing patterns will be considered, again, with the purpose of revealing how these patterns relate to mission and goals. Finally, the important issue of leadership will be explored.

Organizational Structures

There are many common aspects of union structures:
stewards, other officers and full-time functionaries, some type of worksite-based level of organization and, except in the cases of local independent unions, some form of affiliation with a larger national/international structure. However, there are also significant variations in structures which afford different models of accountability, degrees of centralization or decentralization of authority and activity, and degrees of membership participation in union affairs.

The UAW in Connecticut consists of approximately 15 different union locals which are part of the regional apparatus of Region 9A. The Constitution of the International Union spells out various details of how union locals are to be organized, among them officer structures, various financial and election procedures and certain mandated committees. Within these constitutional provisions, however, each local has a great deal of autonomy in how it runs its affairs, and locals may adopt their own by-laws. Strike actions require the sanction of the International in order for strikers to obtain strike benefits and other forms of support.

The UAW's regional apparatus is an extension of the international organization headquartered in Detroit, as is the role of the Regional Director, who is referred to interchangeably as an International Executive Board member. Regional Directors are elected in regional caucuses at constitutional conventions which take place every three years. The regional apparatus is not
envisioned as another layer of organization to which locals affiliate which then affiliates to the International: rather the regional apparatus is the International union and therefore, the Regional Director can be a pivotal actor in certain situations in terms of the direction of the union. In spite of the autonomy of UAW locals, who at times may remain aloof from the regional apparatus and carry on their affairs without much consultation, the Regional Director has important authority especially around strike matters. The situation in Regional 9A in the beginning of the Colt strike vividly demonstrates this issue.

When UAW Local 376 struck Colt Industries in January, 1986, the Regional Director of 9A at that time was E.T. "Ted" Barrett. The president of the local at the time was Phil Wheeler. Wheeler and Barrett had differed over a number of years, particularly over Barrett's leadership style, his notions of membership participation, and the degree of assistance offered to locals by the Regional office. Although the strike at Colt received the sanction of the International union, Wheeler did not expect more than minimal assistance from Barrett in what he knew would be a difficult and lengthy strike. In order for the strike to have better chances for success, the effort would need the full backing of the Regional Director to obtain the full resources of the International, including access to the International's
legal, research and public relations divisions, as well as the capacity to make the strike a national priority of the union.

The constitutional convention of the UAW was set for June of 1986. Early in the year, Region 9A CAP Director John Flynn announced his candidacy for Regional Director. Local 376 endorsed Flynn and participated in Flynn's successful campaign for the position, a campaign which emphasized the need to assist the Colt strike. Once elected, Flynn, who had less experience with negotiations and other shop issues than in the political action sphere, appointed Wheeler as Assistant Regional Director. The Assistant Regional Director position would assume greater prominence under Wheeler's tenure than was the case in previous administrations due to his experience with the more technical aspects of trade unionism, aspects which were often the basis of calls for assistance from union locals. Wheeler felt that from his new position he could provide greater assistance to the strike effort than as the local president by marshalling support both within the region and the International.

In 1989, Flynn retired and Wheeler ran for Regional Director. After minimal initial opposition, Wheeler handily won unanimous election. He has continued to carry out Flynn's political action agenda along the LEAP tradition and directed the process of union involvement in the buy-out of Colt and the end of the strike. Had Flynn lost the 1986 bid, the entire course of events which
culminated in the end of the Colt strike might have transpired in a vastly different direction without the crucial support of the International union, and high levels of tension might have existed between the Local 376 and the International. In this instance, the backing of the Regional office was critical and the change in regional leadership was an important factor in the eventual settlement.

One other feature of UAW structure which exists in almost every other international union is that there are two types of union locals, locals which represent workers in only one shop or one employer with several sites, and amalgamated locals which represent workers at different employers, generally smaller workforces. This affords unions "economies of scale" in dealing with smaller workplaces or those where the workforce is undergoing reductions. In situations where a workforce has been reduced significantly, a local which was chartered for one worksite alone may merge into an amalgamated local to maximize union resources.

The district structure of 1199 in New England resembles one large amalgamated local in that there are no separate union locals. Rather, each worksite has a separate chapter but without the autonomy and constitutional or legal status of the locals of the UAW. The major unit of organization within 1199 historically has been the district level and this is the only level
below the national level set forth in the constitution of the National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, AFL-CIO which was in effect until the merger with SEIU. There is a district-wide executive board comprised of rank-and-file members who are elected by worksites.

The district structure traces to the time when 1199 was a local of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union (RWDSU) and the membership was entirely within New York City. As the union grew outside the metropolitan New York area, the old Local 1199 subdivided, but into districts which were still technically divisions of the local. The merger with SEIU will require certain types of reorganization and the district structure of 1199 will likely be modified, although exactly what will emerge is not yet totally defined and may not be for several years.

The district structure affords maximization of certain resources such as organizing and support staff, office and technical functions, educational programs and other central functions. It also offers a more centralized authority structure which can be important when dealing with employers. It would not make sense, for example, for each large state institution to have its own local and bargain separately for salaries and other matters when the personnel structure is one statewide system for all comparable state institutions. Likewise, the success in nursing home or private sector contract negotiations would be much more difficult with separate locals in each facility. Each chapter, however, does
ratify the contract which is negotiated with its individual employer. One major benefit of the district structure, therefore, is the greater level of coordination.

Critics of such union structures maintain that large amalgamated organizations may be less democratic than smaller locals, that leadership in these centralized structures possess inordinate power, and that the large union organizations may become bureaucratic. 1199 in New England has grown dramatically in membership over the past 15 years, especially after winning the right to represent State of Connecticut health care employees in 1978, and has had to develop an organizational structure to accommodate this growth and the ensuing complexities of serving members in the State bureaucracy.

Fifteen years ago the entire district staff of 1199 in New England could meet around a kitchen table and organizers did all of the different tasks required by the union. Now there close to 40 people on the district staff with distinct divisions of responsibilities. Union leaders maintain that the size and structure need not interfere with union democracy if the membership is activated to maintain involvement in union affairs and if the leadership stays in touch with the wishes of the members. Since 1199 in New England became a separate district of the National Union, during district elections the offices of president, vice presidents and secretary-
treasurer have not been seriously challenged. However, slots on the Executive Board which are filled by active rank-and-file members are sometimes contested.

HERE's structure in the Hartford area combines elements of both the UAW and 1199. Local 217 is an amalgamated local with members in Hartford, New Haven, other Connecticut cities, Rhode Island and parts of Massachusetts. When the Yale workers were organized, separate locals were chartered in order to effectively serve the concentration and specific needs of the membership at that institution. Local 217 has a staff which varies from 5 to 8 people, assigned to work either on internal organizing in several different geographic areas or to new external organizing. External organizing is sometimes undertaken by a team of Local 217 and Local 34 organizers, an example of the cooperation between 217 and the Yale locals. As with 1199, each different worksite has its own union committee and "house" meetings of stewards are held monthly at the various worksites.

These different structures afford different degrees of autonomy for the union organization at the worksite level which in and of itself is neither positive or negative. All three unions are tending toward larger units of organization. Even within the UAW, most new organizing results in the newly organized members joining an existing amalgamated local rather than being chartered as a new local. Within both HERE and the UAW, new locals are chartered generally at large employers such as Yale or for
new types of workers with unique issues such as the jai alai players. However, college maintenance workers at the University of Hartford who recently organized with the UAW became part of UAW Local 376. Likewise in HERE with Fall River (Massachusetts) Inn workers who organized in 1988 and became members in Local 217. If there is any trade-off to be made, both union resource issues as well as the issue of strength in numbers tend to out-weigh issues of autonomy. The tendency toward larger units of organization also is manifest in the patterns of mergers and affiliations engaged in by these unions which will be examined next.

Mergers and Affiliations

The patterns of mergers and acquisitions of corporations have been the subject of much analysis and scrutiny in recent years. Concentration of capital and ever increasing monopolization of the economy are among the outcomes of these economic activities (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982, and Harrison and Bluestone, 1988). Among certain sectors of the labor movement, in order to increase their power and consolidate and maximize resources, a somewhat parallel or analogous process has begun. Although nowhere near as rapidly propelled as the activities of corporations, unions are deciding that there are major advantages in new combinations. Certain mergers and affiliations unimaginable within the labor movement as the Reagan era began are now either
accomplished or under consideration: the Teamsters reaffiliated with the AFL-CIO, and the American Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association are cautiously discussing a possible future merger. The unions of this study are likewise involved in such developments.

Mergers: As has been mentioned several times in this text, 1199-New England's parent union, the National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, formally merged with Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in 1989. To be technically more accurate, most of the National Union merged with SEIU, as will be detailed below. This merger followed several years of dramatic internal dissention and division within the national union as the problem of succession to the founding president of 1199, Leon Davis, unfolded with as many twists and turns as an afternoon television soap opera. In the end essentially three factions of 1199 existed: the New York membership--the union's original base which had grown to 70,000 members by the late 1980's--which remained affiliated with RWDSU; the faction of the national union associated with Henry Nicholas, based mainly in his home district of Philadelphia and Eastern Pennsylvania, which eventually merged with the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME); and the faction which took leadership from the New England district and its president, Jerome Brown, and National Executive Vice President Robert Muehlenkamp, roughly 3/4 of the
National Union, which merged with SEIU.

In 1989, each district of the National Union conducted a membership vote to determine whether that district would affiliate with either AFSCME or SEIU. The question of merging with another union became a consideration of the National Union as organizing grew so difficult in the 1980's and the resources of the National Union shrank substantially after losing the New York membership. The National Union was chartered by the AFL-CIO in 1984, while the New York members remained affiliated with the RWDSU following the lead of their president at the time, Doris Turner. Turner had been the heir apparent to Leon Davis, but increasingly deviated from the direction which the rest of the national leadership sought for the union and eventually was voted out of office after a corruption scandal. Fink and Greenberg (1989) detail this fascinating and unfortunate history through 1988.

In the midst of this dissention and fracturing of the membership and their loyalties, National Union leadership came to the realization that merger was the only method of survival and the Brown-Muehlenkamp-led faction looked toward SEIU as a union which would be able to absorb the 1199 tradition and methodology most successfully. SEIU's organization is based on large amalgamated locals, similar to the HERE 217 model, and with various modifications will be able to accommodate
1199's membership and structure. A health care division of SEIU is being established and much of the former leadership of 1199's National Union will have leadership responsibilities in that division. As of mid-1990, many of the details are not yet formulated, but the general direction is as described here.

It should be noted that predating the timespan of this research, a union with a similar heritage as 1199's, District 65 Wholesale and Warehouse Workers Union, also once a district of the RWDSU, affiliated with the UAW. The union now refers to itself as District 65 UAW. Under Barrett's leadership of 9A, District 65's involvement in UAW affairs was minimal. Since Flynn's tenure and continuing under Wheeler's, District 65 is becoming integrated much more fully into the regional apparatus. The other example from the UAW of a merger is that of IJAPA, discussed above.

Affiliations: The earlier section on internal labor movement relationships noted that the UAW prior to 1990 had not been affiliated with the AFL-CIO in Connecticut for several decades. Although affiliated in other New England states, there was resistance in Connecticut among segments of UAW members, particularly those active in the CAP council. This was partially based on the issue of finances and the dues which the UAW would be required to pay to the AFL-CIO, which would of necessity come from funds previously directed to the CAP Council. There was also resistance to participating in AFL-CIO Committee on
Political Education (COPE) procedures and endorsements and losing the independence of the CAP. After several years of discussions and negotiations, and upon the completion of the Colt strike, the UAW did reaffiliate. Again, the notion of coordinated activities of a more fortified state labor movement led the UAW to reaffiliate. The UAW will be an important factor in statewide labor council elections and will have a substantial impact on future directions of Connecticut's labor movement.

These examples of mergers and affiliations arise out of both specific organizational circumstances, and what is becoming more apparent in the larger labor movement as the need to consolidate and coordinate resources and activities. This pattern is something that will merit close attention in the future to see what is successful in terms of accomplishing new goals and what tends to merely create larger but no more effective organizations. One factor which may be a useful indicator of the utility of such mergers is the amount of new organizing which is facilitated by the new arrangements: will mergers indeed result in new resources sufficient to underwrite major organizing drives, or will the larger unions merely limp along and face continued membership erosion?

**Staffing Patterns**

The variations in union structures also involve variations in the nature of full-time functionaries, as well as different officer structures and different models
of accountability. For example, HERE Local 217 has an elected President who is rank-and-file activist, but does not work full-time as a union functionary. It also has an elected Secretary-Treasurer who does work full-time for the union and hires and supervises other full-time staff.

The UAW Region 9A headquarters is located in the Hartford suburb, Farmington, Connecticut, and houses the Regional Director, Assistant Director, International Representatives, a regional CAP Director and Retirees Director. There are sub-regional offices in Boston and New York City. International Representatives are hired and assigned duties by the Director. Typically they are assigned to functions such as new organizing, education with locals, staff assistance to locals during negotiations, strikes and other matters. The total Region 9A staff consists of approximately 15 to 20 people, depending upon vacancies or extended leaves of absence.

UAW locals may also have various full-time officers, as well as officers who remain in the shop. For example, UAW Local 376 has a President who works in the union office on a full-time basis, a Vice President who is a Colt worker, a Financial Secretary who works in the union office full-time, a Recording Secretary who remains in the shop. The finances of individual locals determine how many full-time union functionaries may be maintained on the union local's payroll.

1199's structure in New England includes elected officers of President, Secretary-Treasurer, six Vice
Presidents, several elected organizers and additional organizing staff who are hired by the officers. Organizers work on one of several teams whose delineation is based on sectors of the membership: state workers, other hospital workers, nursing home workers, private sector health and mental health and retardation workers, and new organizing. There are area offices in Rhode Island and Massachusetts where the membership is smaller and staff members in both places cover a variety of functions. Each chapter is serviced by an organizer and organizers typically have a number of worksites with which they work. As mentioned earlier, this structure is highly centralized in comparison to many other unions.

One very important distinction between the UAW Regional staff and the staffs of 1199 and HERE is that the International Representatives who work in the 9A office have a staff union for themselves which bargains with the regional leadership over salaries and other working conditions, and can also challenge the actions of the regional director through a grievance procedure. Such an arrangement is extremely controversial within the labor movement. 1199 leadership is vehemently opposed to staff unionization and maintains that since 1199 staff also all hold 1199 membership, unionization of the staff would be unionization against oneself. HERE staff likewise is not unionized.
Leadership

One factor in how these unions meet challenges is extremely unquantifiable, that of individual leadership qualities and the phenomenon of leadership charisma. Charisma in this instance includes the knowledge, judgment, honesty, dauntlessness and commitment which foster membership confidence and trust. In all three organizations, certain unique qualities of one or more leaders have immense impact on the ability of the union to wage and win struggles.

Certainly within the UAW, one would have to recognize Phil Wheeler's leadership in this light. The tenacity of the Colt strikers was in part attributable to their willingness to follow his direction and their faith that ultimately he would fashion a way out of their dilemma. By some estimations the strikers came to rely too heavily on him, expecting miracles.

Wheeler is a self-taught union leader who worked at Colt and spent 18 years as President of Local 376. Union staff members relish relating stories of how he knows labor law so well that he directs the union lawyers to pursue strategies the lawyers themselves are unable to conceive. However, Wheeler is also extremely amenable to suggestions from forces outside the UAW, as was the case in the Colt strike. Wheeler is relentless in pursuit of the goals he believes are appropriate for the union and there is also a very pragmatic aspect of his leadership that can engage in the minute technical details of very
specific plans. Though not formally schooled in radical political-economy, in many ways he conforms to Gramsci's notion of the organic intellectual, an individual who rises to leadership from the ranks of the working class.

The leaderships of 1199 and HERE Local 217 come from different backgrounds and origins, as activists who entered the labor movement from a political commitment to social change. The generation of leadership in both of these unions today traces to the social activism of the 1960's combined with concrete experiences under the tutelage of many older activists who helped to build their respective unions. 1199 New England President Jerome Brown "apprenticed" with retired 1199 President Leon Davis; HERE 217 Secretary-Treasurer Henry Tamerin and other 217 staff with Vincent Sirabella, currently the Organizing Director of HERE's International. Other leadership in both unions emanates from rank-and-file activists, but also largely from the ranks of former student, community, civil rights and women's movement activists from the movements of the 1960's and 1970's. What distinguishes many of these individuals from their more conservative contemporaries in other unions are both their more radical ideologies and sense of purpose for the labor movement, and their personal commitment and efforts, often long hours for relatively modest salaries.

Through the 1980's, 1199's accomplishments and methodology have served as yardsticks for many other
unions and union activists in the area. The collective talent of its staff is impressive and has fanned out into other areas: its former Secretary-Treasurer is currently Deputy Labor Commissioner in Connecticut; a former Vice President is currently a State Representative; a current Vice President is Secretary-Treasurer of LEAP. Moreover, in the midst of the dearth of new organizing of the 1980's, 1199 New England maintained its commitment to organizing the unorganized and achieved greater success in their organizing endeavors than most other unions. And despite some crushing defeats, 1199 has been known as a union that will "fight the good fight." How this leadership will come to be regarded after the 1990 Weicker endorsement may alter substantially.

These very unique sets of leaders influence their respective unions quite distinctively: from Phil Wheeler has come the carefully conceived of unfair labor practice strike strategy and the Colt buyout; from Jerry Brown and his colleagues have come bold, militant actions both in strikes and contract negotiations, and new standards of public employee unionism; from Local 217 has come militancy and determination to take on some of the most powerful downtown corporate interests in Hartford and organize extremely difficult and transient worksites. The presence of these various actors has an almost serendipitous quality: it is difficult to imagine the various successes of these unions without these specific leaders in their specific roles. In this sense the unique
or charismatic leader is most definitely an important factor in understanding how these labor unions fashion strategies in the contemporary economic period.

CONCLUSIONS

In many ways the challenges these unions face in the contemporary labor relations climate feel to their leaderships as changes in the of degrees of difficulty they have always encountered. Employers have become more brazen in their tactics to curb unions' power, but they have always resisted unionization. The unions therefore have had to become more steeled in their own determination. Some of their tactics are more of a "last resort" type--using the NLRB to win strikes, participating in a buyout of a company--strategies they would not have pursued if winning a strike on a picket line alone was still in any way a possibility. Other tactics involve more sophisticated use of activities they have historically involved themselves in, but which today are more strategically important in their work. An important example is political action and attempting to insert themselves more deeply into political processes by participating in organizations such as LEAP or People for Change, as well as enhancing their own internal political action capacities.

One of the most difficult areas for the unions today is organizing. In the contemporary climate organizing the
unorganized requires more careful selection of worksites, refinement of targetting and identifying worksite leadership and more intense preparation with the organizing committee. Besides developing the appropriate models or techniques such as 1199's Blitz or HERE's 1-2-3, the unions are also challenged to devote sufficient resources and structure their organizations in such a manner as to facilitate organizing. All have assigned specific personnel to this function and/or reorganized their staffing patterns to accommodate new organizing.

The major problem that the unions face is what was identified in the literature, reviewed in Chapter 2: the system of labor law in the United States no longer facilitates worker organization. The NLRB has ceased to be a vehicle to ensure workers' rights, but instead is itself a battleground. Its processes are lengthy and cumbersome, a factor which alone can dampen organizing potential and which also is exploited by employers as they attempt to stall organizing drives. NLRB processes also tend to prolong any strikes which are being adjudicated through NLRB trials, and especially if companies are operating with replacement workers, the union strikers are placed at a distinct disadvantage. Employers flagrantly violate labor law with a type of impunity that the lengthy processes of adjudication allow.

As labor's power has eroded at the labor board, so has its power with employers and its respect in the community. Accordingly, what has functioned in the past
as a community solidarity ethos which mitigates against strikebreaking has also seriously eroded. Unions are trying to recapture community support by developing corporate campaigns and attempting to place their particular struggles with employers into larger community contexts through such vehicles as community-labor alliances.

Responding to these developments requires membership involvement and cultivation. These unions engage their shopfloor and worksite leaders in training exercises to prepare them for shopfloor issues. The memberships hear organizational points of view which are critical of corporate power, but the range of ideologies varies among the three from the UAW's more social democratic themes to HERE 217's and 1199's more radical articulation of class relationships. Beyond the themes which are stressed in organizational activities and publications, opportunities for involvement are afforded in public events such as rallies, hearings and political action, and sometimes disruptive tactics are employed.

Leadership and structure are important aspects in terms of effectiveness in modern unionism and vary among the three unions in this study. 1199's centralized structure affords coordination but vests a great deal of power in district leadership. HERE 217's amalgamated structure similarly affords resource maximization. The autonomy of the UAW's locals offers opportunities for
different patterns of interplay between "layers" of the union, and the Regional Director, similar to 1199-New England's President or HERE 217's Secretary Treasurer, has great influence over the course of union issues.

Finally the individual qualities of the leaders, themselves, significantly shape the directions of the unions. Based on the different experiences and standards of judgment used by their respective leaders, these three unions take somewhat different paths toward their goals of membership empowerment. Each provides an interesting example of contemporary unionism and are observed with great interest in Connecticut's labor movement as well as the larger movement for social change.

At this point in their history, the types of adjustments these unions are making to accommodate the present labor relations climate to some extent resemble a "treading water" approach--an attempt to simply hold on by whatever means are available--and in other instances provide some new models of membership empowerment. Yet, some of their struggles have to be logged in the "loss" column.

To return to the Colt strike and the questions raised in the beginning of this chapter, it appears ironically that at a time when the system of labor law seems to be failing unions quite miserably, use of these laws is one of the only major avenues which remains available to unions in a number of situations. Another important avenue is the attempt to recreate a public opinion climate
which is more supportive of unions, ultimately leading to legislation which is more supportive of unionization. Toward this end the community-labor alliances, political action and other extra-organizational activities, simultaneously with an activated, involved and adroit membership are important tools and strategies for union survival and growth. These strategies and tactics by no means assure success—these three unions still lose strikes and elections as do other unions—but they tend to be among the more creative unions and employ and exhaust a wider range of options in the course of their struggles.
Neighborhood organizers in Hartford take great pride in the degree of community organization which exists in the city. In many cities, one or several neighborhoods have some type of community or neighborhood organization, but most of the city remains unorganized. In Hartford, the opposite is true: most areas are within the "turf" of one of the neighborhood organizations, residents can call upon the organization and this arrangement encourages more organization. Not all of the various groups or associations follow in the Alinsky or neo-Alinsky tradition, but the three largest, Asylum Hill Organizing Project (AHOP), Organized North Easterners-Clay Hill and North End (ONE-CHANE), and Hartford Areas Rally Together (HART), in some measure each trace their methodology and philosophies back to the Alinsky legacy of block-level organizing, bold confrontational tactics with public and corporate officials, and the garnering of tangible, specific victories.

The three Hartford-based organizations have existed long enough to each evolve along distinct paths, according to both the needs of the different neighborhoods in which they function and the orientations of the respective staffs and local neighborhood leaders. These evolutions, how and to what extent they embody responses to economic restructuring, and what constitutes the salient issues for neighborhood organizing will be analyzed in this chapter. The comparisons to labor organizing will
then be offered in the final chapter.

As profiled in the introductory chapter, the logic of neighborhood organizing as it exists in most locations and particularly in Hartford is quite different than the logic of labor organizing. Consequently, this analysis will emphasize somewhat different facets of the neighborhood organizations than those of labor unions discussed in the previous chapter. Moreover, all of the categories of the previous chapter will not be utilized here, but rather those which most appropriately capture the essence of neighborhood organizing. Accordingly, comparisons of the two types of organizing will feature most important aspects of each type of organizing and not be of a point-by-point nature.

The first way in which our treatment of neighborhood organizations will differ from the labor unions is that instead of separating the organizing of new members and the work with existing memberships into two distinct segments, these two categories will be collapsed into one. This is because for the neighborhood organizations, there is no formal membership status based on legally defined procedures such as elections, no payment of dues as a condition of membership, and virtually no method to distinguish in any given neighborhood members from non-members. Essentially, there are only active participants in issues and campaigns undertaken by the organization. Therefore, organizing new participants and maintaining the
interest of the old participants is in reality one activity, with leadership development receiving a great deal of emphasis. Moreover, because the work with participants is that of continual organizing, organizational structure and maintenance issues have even more to do with the life of the organizations and take on even greater importance for the neighborhood groups than for the unions, as we will attempt to demonstrate. This analysis, in the previous chapter, is based on in-depth interviews, examination of written materials, participant-observation of numerous events of the respective organizations, and scores of informal conversations with staff and participants.

ORGANIZING AND MOBILIZING

Neighborhood organizing in Hartford has realized many achievements and its success has led to a type of institutionalization. To understand the development and methodologies of the three organizations, we will analyze who participates and the issues which are focused upon, how the organizing is effected, the organizational points of view and philosophies, and the manner in which the issues addressed by the groups embody responses to restructuring.

Participants and Issues

When one thinks of community activism, there is often a mental picture of the 1960's with militant young people demanding a share of resources and inclusion
in public decision-making. The activists of Hartford's neighborhood organizations, however, are a very different set of actors than those in the picture from the 60's. Issues addressed by the organizations such as crime and health care attract property owners, small business people and senior citizens. Education-related matters draw in parents, many of whom are young single mothers. Tenant rights and housing issues bring a range of individuals to the groups. Participants may be motivated as much by fear as by the desire to upgrade one's living standards.

In earlier chapters, we discussed the socio-economic conditions in Hartford and pointed out that while widespread poverty exists in the city, there is variation among neighborhoods in terms of degrees of poverty. These variations are sometimes manifest in the work of the neighborhood organizations both in relation to who participates and the nature of the issues addressed. For example, ONE-CHANE operates in the northern part of the city, an area with large concentrations of public housing (although ONE-CHANE refrains from organizing in public housing where active tenants organizations have been in existence for many years), and whose population is almost exclusively African American and Puerto Rican, many of whom are very poor. HART operates in the southern part of the city which contains the remaining enclaves of white ethnic groups, a surging Puerto Rican and Latino population, increasing numbers of African Americans and
Asians. Although poverty exists in HART's turf, many of its neighborhoods are relatively better off than those of the other two organizations. So while HART activists attempted to stop the establishment of a "Chucky Chicken" fast-food/convenience store in order to preserve the character of a neighborhood during 1989, several years earlier ONE-CHANE activists attempted to extract commitments for jobs for area residents from the developer of a Burger King franchise who opened a restaurant in their neighborhood.

In the early years of the respective organizations, a great deal of effort went into establishing block-level organization, the block club. Staff organizers spent much of their time going door-to-door, talking to residents, attempting to ascertain what issues were important to these residents. Efforts were then made to bring residents together to discuss problems and define courses of action. This was and remains a slow, painstaking process. And although it is still employed by the organizations in some situations, they now have sufficient histories and track records to vary their methods. Accordingly, HART now works more directly with the churches in its neighborhoods, establishing contact with their clergy and, through these clergy, the parishioners. The organizations also make extensive use of the large mailing lists they have amassed over the years, augmented by telephone contact, as a method of organizing. Furthermore, now many community residents approach the organizations with
problems rather than wait for an organizer to come to their neighborhood.

Within the organizations there are different task forces, committees and other on-going formations which devote efforts to specific issues. The individual activists may change over time and various dimensions of the issues may alter or evolve so that these committees, themselves, look quite different from year to year. As an illustration, AHOP has been dealing with the issue of crime essentially since its inception. In the period of approximately 1987 and 1988, AHOP activists from the group's anti-crime committee defined the issue around the demands for more police officers in the neighborhood, redeployment of police from the Colt picket line to the neighborhoods, and the deployment and full staffing of police foot patrols. By 1990, with the crime-drug nexus producing an escalating public safety crisis, the crime issue took the form of debate over whether to call the Guardian Angels into the neighborhood, and a different group of individuals were involved than those from two to three years earlier.

One of the prominent methodological aspects of these organizations is the definition of issues into very specific and tangible demands which can be fought for and won. Organizers characterize this as turning a problem into an issue: a problem may be something extremely general or global, but an issue is something specific
around which a group can organize. One of the roles of the organizer is to help a group delineate an issue or set of issues from a larger problem. Issues must be amenable to actions in which the organization articulates one or more demands. Hence the crime issue becomes defined in terms of a demand for foot patrols.

Besides being able to win a victory, another objective of this methodology is that over time the neighborhood activists should develop more sophisticated analyses and be able to tackle more complex issues. This type of growth in analytical ability occurred within HART's anti-crime committee. When it became apparent that foot patrols alone would not provide any ultimate solution to crime, participants in the anti-crime committee began to consider the issue from a more systemic perspective and developed a comprehensive anti-crime proposal which combined drug education and treatment options with youth recreation programming, community policing and other crime control measures. It was through the process of working on the issue with very specific demands that the need for this broader perspective became apparent to participants and, moreover, that comprehensive measures were the best methods to possibly address crime.

Most issues remain at a more simplified level of analysis, however. Unless participants stay with issues over an extended period of time—several years, as illustrated in the above example—there is a need on the part of the organizations to distill issues into
"winnable" items. Moreover, when neighborhood residents are approached by or call upon organizers, often the concerns they articulate are of a very parochial, local nature: the street light that isn't working, the potholes in the road, the lack of traffic control signs, the overflowing dumpster down the street, etc. Developing the capacity of neighborhood residents to move beyond the "street-light and pothole" stage requires a great deal of effort by organizers and considerable lengths of time. And, if this development is achieved with one group of activists, still newer participants are being recruited into other organizational endeavors so that simplified issues are always a part of the organizations' agenda.

The issues addressed by these organizations are generally issues of social consumption, often expressed as conflict within the service delivery system of the local state. In many instances organizational activity revolves around local public bureaucracy: pressuring the city government to take action against landlords of abandoned buildings or to enforce building codes; pressuring the school board to allocate more supplies to schools; lobbying the City Council to maintain services involving items such as garbage collection from small businesses or to adopt particular forms of property tax relief; and, of course, pressuring the police department to deal more effectively with crime control.

At other times specific individuals in the private
sector become targets: slumlords, bank officials, or a hospital's community relations representative. However, even though the targets may be based or operate within the private sector, pressures brought to bear on them may often be orchestrated through municipal agencies: if the slumlord won't accede to the demands of the tenants who are organized by one of the neighborhood organizations, the tenants will then approach various municipal agencies to take action in the situation or eventually take the issue into the judicial system. Although as detailed in the chapter on coalitions, the neighborhood organizations attempt to avoid reliance on the legal system or attorneys if at all possible.

As mentioned earlier, the participants vary with the issues. Organizers characterize self-interest is the key motivation for participation and view their job as tapping that self-interest. Many older homeowners, on fixed incomes, Black and white, participate in order to preserve a standard of living which they perceive as rapidly slipping from their grasp. Younger participants who, in effect, are the indigenous leaders in their neighborhoods are also found in the activities. Sometimes very specific issues generate participation: tenants who have nowhere else to turn in dealing with problem landlords or small business people who are attracted to the organizations because of the crime issue. There are also individuals who contact an organization with a specific type of request for information and become drawn
into the group's work. This was how one former president of AHOP was introduced to the group, by inquiring about summer youth employment options for her children. Certain services provided by the organizations do function as incentives to draw people to the groups and these will be described later in this chapter. However, through participation in the organizations, the growth of "other-centered" behavior is envisioned and initial self-interest may be transformed into broader concern and involvement in the larger community.

Processes of Neighborhood Organizing

An entire process of leadership development and consensus formation through group decision-making precedes any appearance of activists from the three organizations at a public meeting. Several elements of the process include the leaders, the organizer, the planning activities and the choices of strategy and tactics.

Leaders: Neighborhood residents or other participants in the organizations who develop into leaders are key to the success of any group endeavors. Similar to how union organizers define what constitutes a leader, neighborhood organizers define leaders as people with constituencies and credibility with their constituencies. Leaders need not be the loudest, the most articulate or best-liked person in a group. What is important is that leaders motivate others to participate and themselves take on tasks and responsibilities, including the very mundane
work the organization must engage in: preparing the leaflets, calling other participants, setting up meetings, and other similar activities. In many situations it is important for leadership to be collective in nature, especially among low income constituencies where problems of survival and every day living may erupt into major impediments to participation.

Organizers describe a type of testing process for emerging leaders in which, based on having developed and maintained followings, they assume responsibilities which prove their reliability and stamina. However, there is also extensive leadership training the organization engages in, some of it in actual workshop sessions and some on a one-to-one basis between organizers and leaders.

Leadership training focuses on organizational requirements such as how to approach neighborhood residents to discuss issues, techniques to mobilize people, how to run meetings, how to make issues appealing to organizational constituencies. Training also involves analytical tasks such as strategy development, analysis of power relationships in order to determine targets' pressure points, and techniques of presenting issues to the media and broader public. An extremely important element in the entire range of training activities is the development of personal confidence on the part of the potential leaders. The issue of how participating in the organizations facilitates personal empowerment of women
and people of color, in particular, is something that arises in any discussion of neighborhood organizing with organizers or leaders.

The one-on-one work with organizers is often the most intensive type of leadership training. Organizers describe a process in which they may eventually develop a very collegial relationship with the neighborhood leaders, engaging in mutual give-and-take in deciding upon strategy and tactics. The organizer's role, therefore, is also extremely critical to the success of the organizations.

Organizers: The role of the organizer in neighborhood organizing is multi-dimensional. S/he must be both a catalyst and a manager of action, as veteran Hartford neighborhood leader and now organizing consultant, Alta Lash of United Connecticut Action for Neighborhoods, Inc. (UCAN) characterizes the role. Organizers must have many of the same qualities as leaders--credibility, integrity and an ability to inspire confidence and action--but must also know how to step back and allow the leaders to lead. There can be a thin line between prodding or challenging a leader and directing the leader or the rest of the group, something an organizer is essentially prohibited from doing either formally by the organizations or implicitly in the ethos and models which inform the groups' practice.

The power of neighborhood organizers to potentially manipulate situations or individuals is sometimes voiced as a methodological criticism of the entire project of
Alinksy-style neighborhood organizing (see Chapter 2). The criticism is leveled because the neighborhood organizations claim to be democratically controlled by neighborhood residents and other participants who are supposed to set directions, not the organizers. Yet, often just at a moment when a meeting may be turning in one direction, an organizer can inject a comment or suggestion which can turn the meeting in an entirely different direction. The suggestion may be quite subtle, but it still can change the discussion substantially. These types of interjections occurred at several meetings which were observed during this research project.

Organizers counter the criticism by maintaining that neighborhood people will not be convinced or manipulated into taking actions for which they are unprepared and will not come back to the organizations if they feel they have no control over organizational direction. Organizers assert that it is their job as organizers to provide suggestions or stimulate discussion of different options, that it is their role to provide a menu of possibilities in a given situation and assist neighborhood residents in working through these choices. They are also the people who must be able to come up with new strategies when setbacks or defeats occur.

The development of individuals into competent organizers may take several years and is a process built upon the trials and errors of on-the-job training. A
great deal of subjective assessment is required where there is not necessarily a right or wrong way to proceed, but rather a more or less effective way which may not be known in advance. There are formal workshops or training sessions for organizers, but much of their development comes through supervision and consultation with their directors or consultants such as the UCAN staff. Moreover, effective use of one's personality is another facet of the job of the organizer, that is, capitalizing on individual strengths and assets and feeling comfortable in the organizer's role are also important to successful organizing.

The Process of Planning and Orchestrating Issues: The orchestration of an issue campaign involves several stages of planning by organizers and leaders, at each stage broadening the amount of participation by interested neighborhood residents. A typical scenario is as follows, based specifically on observations of an AHOP senior group taking up the issue of crime. Generally initial discussions take place between an organizer and one or two leaders to chart a preliminary course of action. Then a planning committee is assembled ranging in size from 6 to 10 people to affirm the direction and take responsibility for specific tasks. The individuals who chair the planning meetings spend a great deal of time with organizers in constructing the agenda. Very little is left to chance and these meetings have a fairly fixed format with detailed lists of what must be done. Appendix E is
the agenda of a planning meeting for an AHOP Seniors group which was working on the crime issue in 1987 and demonstrates the detail of such an agenda.

If after routine contact is made with local officials by a committee from a neighborhood group through telephone conversations or in person, and their requests on a particular issue are met with inaction, one likely strategy is to organize a community meeting in which someone with authority in the issue (e.g. a city official) is invited to answer questions or respond to demands. There is a standardized agenda used in most of the community meetings—accountability sessions, as they are often called—which is both straightforward and very helpful in keeping the meeting focused on the intended objectives. There is great potential for these meetings to get distracted into tangential issues and it is important for the leader to have such an agenda to keep the larger group on track. The agenda outline is as follows:

Introduction

Statement of the Issues: Background and/or Facts

Presentation of Demands

Response from Guest(s) (the guest may then be asked to leave)

Discussion of Necessary Next Steps

This agenda format is used both by leaders and groups who are experienced, unified on an issue and adept at asserting demands, as well as with leaders and groups
who are not particularly well-organized or articulate, each type having been observed during this project. With the more experienced groups, the organizers play a minimal role and stay totally in the background. With the less experienced leaders and groups, the organizers tend to assert themselves at key points to keep the group focused and help move the meeting along.

Despite all of the careful planning, sometimes spontaneity reigns and totally unanticipated actions take place at meetings. One such event was observed on August 6, 1987, when AHOP's Housing Coalition met to discuss what steps to take next in dealing with a recalcitrant landlord who refused to properly maintain or take action to stem drug dealing in his buildings. As tenants related horrifying stories of fires in the buildings, intimidation by drug dealers and absolute refusal on the part of the landlord to make repairs, anger and outrage among the rest of the meeting participants grew. The plans to take the landlord into court or attempts to find buyers for the buildings seemed too remote—the group felt the need to do something at that moment.

On the agenda were items which suggested having local police and state officials with jurisdiction in housing and banking tour the buildings and see firsthand the disgusting conditions the tenants were enduring. The group decided that rather than wait until the future for such a building tour, they would go to the police station that night and demand that the police take action on the
drug dealing. A call to a local television station was made to obtain media coverage of the action, especially to have a public record of the police department's response. The group which included several small children piled into AHOP's vans and several individuals' cars, drove to the police station, met with the night sergeant and voiced their complaints.

The sergeant attempted to placate the group by stating that he would have officers look into the problems, but also presented various reasons why little had or could be done. This further angered the group and even the otherwise low-profile organizers entered into the heated discussion. A television news crew arrived and filmed some of the interchange which appeared on the 11 p.m. news.

In this instance, no immediate effects occurred as a result of the spontaneous action, but there was a type of emotional release for the group and the tenants could at least feel that they had supporters and had in some measure exerted themselves. Moreover, the media coverage helped in the continuing orchestration of the issue. Eventually--much later--the landlord sold the buildings.

Spontaneity may also lead to situations where events get out of control for the organization. On August 1, 1990, HART's tax committee called a meeting in a South End church to discuss the property tax revaluations which had taken place over the previous year. Homeowners were in...
the process of paying new, substantially larger tax bills and complaints were being heard all over the city. At the HART meeting one of the city's tax officials was present to answer questions and discuss the various options for tax relief which were available to residential property owners. Several residents whose English-speaking abilities were limited started screaming at the official and grew so impatient that they rushed the podium and attempted to wrestle the microphone from the HART president who was chairing the meeting. Although the president held her own and kept physical control of the microphone, the meeting decorum was never fully restored.

Most of the meetings held by these organizations proceed as originally intended, more often characterized by solid planning and sometimes a tenor which seems almost rehearsed. A frequently employed tactic involves some type of guerilla theater skit or a satirical presentation to a public official of items symbolic of the issue at hand. The opening paragraph of this dissertation recounts AHOP delivering uncollected garbage from a slumlord's building to the Hartford City Manager's office. (This is the same slumlord who was the focus of the sortie to the police department described above). During the linkage struggle in 1986, the organizations presented the City Council with a skeleton which was missing its spine--an attempt to dramatize what they characterized as the spinelessness of the Council in acceding to the corporate community by voting down the linkage proposals.
Satire and comedy are used effectively by the groups to make various points for the public, but also to reduce fears on the part of neighborhood residents. Organizers maintain that if residents can feel a degree of humor and lightheartedness in some of the events in which they participate, fears of participating and speaking out may also diminish in the lighter atmosphere. In Hartford, the effective use of humor has evolved over the history of the three organizations, fueled by the skills and wit of various organizers, but this tactic is recommended in many national training workshops and in manuals or books on neighborhood organizing such as Si Kahn's, Organizing A Guide for Grassroots Leaders (1982: p.196).

One of the most formidable requirements in an issue campaign for the neighborhood organizations is determining new tactics or next steps in difficult struggles. Winning is very important, not merely in and of itself, but also in maintaining the interest and involvement of neighborhood residents. Therefore, choices of strategies and tactics are critical not only to organizational effectiveness but also to continued participation, and are analyzed next.

Choices of Strategies and Tactics: A number of considerations figure into decisions on strategies and tactics. We will discuss several: the issue of unpredictability, the use of media coverage, personalization of organizing targets, the use of
confrontation and anger, and the interplay of the groups' campaigns with politics.

Unpredictability: One rule of thumb of neighborhood organizers is to maintain unpredictability. The object is to keep organizing targets off balance and unable to plan in advance responses to the actions of the groups. One of the major advantages the neighborhood groups hope to achieve is maintaining greater control in media coverage through the elements of surprise and unpredictability. They want to be able to set the tone and not allow the target any opportunity for advance preparation, but rather place him or her in the position of scurrying to fashion a response to surprise tactics. This raises another key ingredient in the organizations' issue campaigns, media coverage.

Media: Media coverage coupled with the element of surprise support Lipsky's (1970) model of protest as a very apt description of how the neighborhood organizations fashion strategies. If one accepts staged actions such as the guerilla theater skits mentioned previously as protest, as well as protest with a genuinely angry flavor, then it is possible to view a large portion of the public actions of the neighborhood groups as attempting to activate the targets' "reference publics", and media coverage as a critical component of such a strategy. In Hartford, the neighborhood organizations receive a great deal of media coverage of their public activities.

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Personalizing the Target: In as many instances as possible neighborhood organizers prefer to personalize a campaign and single out one individual as a target. Rather than deal with an entire corporation such as a bank, a particular bank officer or representative is held accountable. Likewise with city bureaucrats or elected officials: individuals who have the power to make decisions or take actions are made the specific targets. On the one hand this helps concretize the problem for neighborhood residents--anger can be directed to a real human being. On the other hand, even if s/he initially resists, the target may eventually tire of the attention and succumb to the group's demands. Recall in the chapter on coalitions that during the Colt strike it was the suggestion of a neighborhood organizer in the Community Labor Alliance to specify the president of Colt Firearms as the target of a protest campaign.

Confrontation and Anger: Often it may appear that organizations in the Alinsky mold rush to confrontational tactics, that there is a penchant for confrontation on the part of these groups. Indeed, to this author, one of the most striking aspects of their work which helped to inspire this project is the way in which through participation in these organizations, neighborhood people without a great deal of experience in public affairs come to the point where they will boldly confront a corporate or public official. Yet, in reality, confrontational
situations are not as routine for these organizations as one might expect, despite the groups' reputations and the ever-present threat which is felt by local politicians and corporate officials that such tactics could be used.

Before any of the neighborhood organizations' committees or other formations arrive at a point where they undertake a confrontation, they generally attempt more routine methods of ameliorating their problems. They will patiently call a city official and set up a group meeting which may be conducted quite civilly. If they achieve the desired end, then the organization claims a victory and the group can move on to other issues. However, the kind of stalling tactics which may be employed by bureaucrats or the indifference which a group may meet even from elected officials can be used by organizers to kindle anger. Under other circumstances, without the opportunity to work in such an organization, anger might not ever be cultivated or put to any strategic use, and individuals could become cynical about the possibility for change. But these organizations slowly exploit the anger as a motivational force in their campaigns. Leaders are also schooled in the use of anger as part of issue orchestration.

Organizers assert that it takes an incredible amount of disregard and neglect to get ordinary people angry enough to engage in confrontation with public officials, that such behavior is not generally within their experience. So, at a certain point in the campaign,
organizers sense that the residents are "ready"—sufficiently fed up—and begin to engage the anger to generate a confrontation. Understanding when this point is reached by a group is something that organizers learn to recognize through experience and it involves a very subjective assessment on the part of the organizer.

Interplay with Politics: Even though these neighborhood organizations do not engage in partisan politics through such vehicles as political action committees, they are constantly approaching elected officials. They do, therefore, command a distinct presence in local politics. Sometimes they will attempt to put a politician on the spot and demand a commitment in a public forum to a specific position or a particular vote. At other times they meet with officials in more private settings to discuss issues or jointly develop strategies in a very cooperative manner.

In certain instances, the strategies surrounding the work of the neighborhood organizations with elected officials are hard to decipher or may appear to be something totally different than what is actually transpiring. An example of this phenomenon took place on April 19, 1989 at a HART meeting on property taxes. It was held at the Legislative Office Building during the middle of a legislative session which was embroiled in revenue and spending problems. Various state budget proposals were being debated, as well as several plans for
property tax relief which would have to be passed by the State Legislature as enabling legislation and then be available for municipalities to implement. The HART meeting was attended mainly by residents from the deep South End of the city, most of whom were retired or did not have children in the public school system, and was intended to focus solely on the issue of residential property tax relief. Among the elected officials in attendance were one of Hartford's two State Senators, William DiBella, and former Deputy Mayor Alphonse Marotta.

HART was putting forth a demand for a certain form of residential property tax relief under consideration at the time which was known as the Homestead Exemption. The meeting was to be conducted with the standard accountability session agenda: a statement of the problem, a media attention device, a demand delivered to elected officials, time for short responses from the officials and concluding statements from the individuals running the meeting. Much of the meeting proceeded according to the plan, for the most part moderated by a Trinity College professor. The media device was the display of a long string of postcards with messages of support for the Homestead Exemption from Hartford residents while people in the audience chanted "Our relief is tax relief."

When it came time for the officials to respond to the group's demand, State Senator DiBella entered into a long explanation of the larger fiscal crisis that the state government was experiencing. He was Co-Chairperson
of the Legislature's Revenue, Finance and Bonding Committee and at that particular time was deeply involved in the crafting of a tax package for the State's next fiscal year. His answer encompassed the need for overall tax reform and restructuring, including support for the institution of a state income tax, a proposal which the Governor firmly opposed and vowed to veto. In the midst of his detailed and technical explanation he introduced the possibility of a newly conceived property tax relief measure in the form of a cap on effective taxation of residential property. He emphasized that property tax relief was one item of several which were being considered in the entire situation and stated his support for some type of property tax relief.

The new proposal DiBella mentioned was just being designed so HART had no opportunity to formulate a position on it, nor did it have any information available for the meeting participants. Moreover, HART was not participating in any of several coalitions which were demanding the creation of a state income tax to provide a more equitable alternative for taxation than the former 7.5% and now 8% sales tax in the state.

After his sobering presentation on the state budget crisis, DiBella left the meeting to return to a Legislative Leadership Caucus and was unavailable for any questions. To this observer, the introduction of a entirely new proposal seemed to inject a measure of
disorder to the meeting and as well as throw the moderator off balance. Next, Deputy Mayor Marotta proceeded to give his views on the matter of tax relief, a confusing presentation which only muddled the issues further. He ended with the exortation to the group to attend the City's budget hearings which were scheduled for a week later and demand that the Council hold the line on spending. He spoke of the "education people" who would be requesting more funds for education, in effect, setting up the education budget as a target for taxpayer discontent. (ONE-CHANE was simultaneously organizing to demand additional resources be allocated to under-staffed and resource starved schools in the northern part of the city). HART members then entered into a question and answer/discussion session during which time all semblance of order disappeared. Finally, after conferring with the organizers, the moderator of the meeting re-established order and ended the session by stating that HART would organize for the City budget hearings and demand property tax relief and holding the line on city spending.

As stated above, it appeared to this observer that DiBella's introduction of the new tax relief proposal at the meeting caught the planners of the meeting by surprise and that they later lost control. However, in a subsequent discussion with HART's director, he stated that he was pleased with the outcome because DiBella could use the fact that constituents were demanding tax relief in negotiations with other legislative leaders. This meeting
and the demands of the group were actually part of the orchestration of the property tax relief issue and HART had previously discussed the strategy with the key individual in the legislative scenario, DiBella.

Marotta's interjections were actually quite extraneous to the strategies being developed by HART's tax committee, although his message about education spending did seem to have strong appeal to the people at the meeting. If taken seriously, the Marotta message could have actually been dangerous to HART's relationship with one of its sister organizations, ONE-CHANE. That it seemed to motivate a great many of the people attending the meeting to return for future actions was particularly ominous, given the racial differences between this group and ONE-CHANE's educational activists, most of whom were African American.

The point of this description is that the strategy being employed by HART was not at all apparent to the rank-and-file meeting participants or even to interested observers. Of particular concern is how such shrouded strategies are reconciled with the claim of participatory democratic control of the organizations by the neighborhood residents. In this case, it seems that the more sound judgment of the staff and tax committee's leaders rescued the specific meeting and the overall issue campaign from succumbing to the demagogic appeal of a politician such as Marotta.
Organizational Messages and Media

Leadership of the neighborhood organizations articulate the philosophies and/or ideologies which inform their work in somewhat amorphous or vague terms. They project a highly pragmatic approach to the pursuit of goals and incorporate several general concepts such as the explicitly stated themes of empowerment and participatory democracy, and the implicitly embraced principle of localism. Whatever ideologies organizers hold are more or less private, that is, organizers will refrain from interjecting viewpoints stated in ideological terms, especially those which may reflect a leftist perspective. Privately, many of these organizers do hold radical and/or even socialist beliefs, but these are separated from the work of the organizations. Part of this separation flows from the methodology employed by the groups and part from funding considerations. Moreover, the written materials produced by the groups tend to focus on specific issues and do not offer a philosophical or ideologically oriented analysis. These dimensions of the groups and their implications will be analyzed in this section.

Empowerment and Participatory Democracy: While an argument can be made that the existence of the neighborhood groups serves to discipline and channel discontent into manageable patterns (analogous to characterizations of modern unionism as disciplining labor), the individuals who establish, staff and assume leadership in the organizations do so with very sincere
desires to affect change and redefine power relationships in local communities, with great personal effort and sacrifice. Most often the rewards for participation are not of a monetary nature, except perhaps when an issue involves taxation and participants expect to save money on tax bills, or pressure is exerted on a bank to provide low interest loans. The staffs of the organizations earn very modest salaries and the neighborhood people who participate all are volunteers.

The theme of community empowerment therefore appears to have resonance and motivate participation, especially when it builds upon and combines with the different types of self-interest which exist in the neighborhoods. Certainly the existence of HART since 1975 is one indication of both the appeal of neighborhood organizing in the community and the tenacity of the organizers and neighborhood leadership.

Article III in AHOP's by-laws which defines the organization's purpose helps to illustrate how the mission of community empowerment is conceived:

Article III Purpose

Section 1

The purpose of AHOP, as a non-profit community organization, shall be to establish an organization whereby the various age, ethnic, racial, and economic groups within the neighborhood can come together and address their concerns through a democratic process.

Section 2

AHOP shall be the uniting vehicle whereby the
community, as a whole, can work together to improve the quality of life in the neighborhood.

AHOP shall, through its member groups and the Board, organize and mobilize residents in the neighborhood, empowering them through a process of democratic decision-making and direct action to address particular issues affecting the quality of life in the neighborhood.

AHOP shall, through its member groups and the Board, develop and implement service delivery programs that strive to strengthen the bonds of community and create a healthy functioning neighborhood. (By-Laws, 5/87).

How this is interpreted and what is meant by empowerment takes many forms. On one level, the simple act of participating in a neighborhood issue by attending a meeting can be conceived as empowerment in that by their attendance, residents are taking an interest and a role, however minimal, in community affairs. That the organizations hold meetings on community issues means that local government or private interests often have to factor the responses of the neighborhood groups into their plans for the respective neighborhoods. Achieving such an effect is considered by the organizations to be an indication of success in the process of empowerment.

Besides participation and "watch-dogging", empowerment encompasses tangible improvements in the community, as well as avenues for more intangible effects such as personal growth and development. In relation to actual physical development, all three neighborhood organizations have been involved in the housing arena: AHOP established Hill Housing, Inc. in the late 1980s; HART along with several other organizations helped to
establish the Broad-Park Development Corporation in the early 1980's (although it has at times experienced differences with the corporation over its direction and priorities); and ONE-CHANE's staff functions include housing development. All three hold periodic housing fairs to help disseminate information on home ownership opportunities. Any new housing which is developed both fills a very dire need in and of itself, and also tangibly demonstrates the worth of the organizations for the neighborhoods' improvement.

The avenues for personal development have been mentioned in the earlier discussion of leadership, but it should be emphasized here that growth on very subjective and personal levels by individual participants simultaneously builds new local leadership, cultivates organizational loyalty and contributes to greater overall organizational effectiveness. Moreover, as other community residents watch their neighbors undergo this personal empowerment, and as new indigenous role models emerge in the neighborhoods, the organizations' stature is often enhanced in the process. Organizers point to the development of local leadership as a very important component of community empowerment.

Notwithstanding criticisms of the neighborhood organizations in which they are characterized as being led and, worse, manipulated by staff (see above), it can still be argued that they do provide people at the grassroots
level of communities opportunities for participation in political and economic developments. The claims that they build structures of participatory democracy can be examined both in terms of internal processes and external effects.

Internally, formal control is exerted by neighborhood residents through the annual election of members of the organizations' boards of directors and the process of selecting organizational priorities. Priorities are theoretically set at the annual congresses where participants are asked to vote for the issues they feel are most important for organizational attention from a list of potential issues. The items with the highest votes are then taken up by the board of directors and the various committees for development of plans and campaigns.

Obviously, many other issues arise during any given year, but the priority list is used as a guide or indication of what is most important to area residents. Neighborhood residents also exercise control over the organizations' respective agenda simply by demonstrating interest or disinterest in particular issues through indicators such as meeting attendance and follow-through on group decisions. If there is a lack of interest, the organizations will not expend resources to pursue an issue.

The creation of avenues for increased participation by residents in larger community decisions is another effect of the organizations' existence. Separate from
any questions of internal organizational democracy, building these avenues is perhaps the more compelling motivation for organizers and is what they envision in formulations of participation in decision-making, that is, community input into those decisions which affect community life. In regard to these external effects, the organizations attempt to counter both government insensitivity or incompetency and the power of private corporate interests in the community. This function or mission is not necessarily articulated in strong ideological or conceptual terms, but more by flavor of the groups' day-to-day activities and the tenor of the issue campaigns which they organize.

In discussions with organizers and executive directors of the three organizations, it is often difficult to elicit an articulation of the mission or function of their groups in more detail than the very general framework of empowerment and participatory democracy. Due to the myriad demands on them, they necessarily function on very practical levels and are preoccupied with day-to-day operations and the need to build the capacities of the organizations. They tend to view many questions solely in organizational terms, not in larger contextual terms. In fact, having opportunities to do so is sometimes considered a luxury for which they don't have time. However, one dimension of their organizational frameworks which is often implicitly
incorporated into discussions of methodology is the "localist" dimension which will be addressed next.

The Localist Influence: In relation to neighborhood organizing in Hartford, localism involves several aspects of the groups' functioning. In its most basic manifestation, it often involves characterizing problems as being in large part locally created, but more importantly, amenable to locally produced solutions. Moreover, localism influences organizations to select those issues for action which are more amenable to local solutions and not the more difficult regional or national issues or problems which affect community life. It also fosters an orientation toward very specific geographic areas, and tackling only those issues which exist within the organization's specific turf, sometimes to the detriment of other neighborhoods or turfs. For example, when neighborhood groups demand that police deal with prostitution in a given neighborhood (a frequent demand in parts of Hartford), often the problem simply gets displaced into another neighborhood, not eliminated, and sometimes the new location is in another organization's area.

While this localism is beneficial for building the capacities of the neighborhood organizations, it can be limiting in terms of developing the analytical capacities of participants. It may also deter individuals from participating in other types of organizations which do attempt to deal with larger systemic issues.
The localist orientation also helps to explain the reticence on the part of the organizations' staff to encourage participation in coalitions--such formations take their activists outside the local organizational boundaries and into different, expanded arenas with different goals or varying models of organizing. Moreover, building alliances as a means to improve the general climate in which they function is not a goal in and of itself for the neighborhood groups. Rather, as discussed in the chapter on coalitions, alliances or coalitions are approached more instrumentally with specific ends in mind. The localist orientation contributes to this tendency.

Another dimension of how localism functions relates to national elections and specifically the Jesse Jackson campaign of 1988. Even beyond the issues of restrictions in by-laws or from funders on partisan electoral activity, as well as the staffs' philosophical objections to participation in such activity, the localist orientation also tends to somewhat discourage participation or else ignore these elections which effect the national climate. So while the Jackson campaign grew to a fervor in Hartford, the neighborhood organization activists were absent from this significant social movement in the city. Their leadership might argue that aside from questions of by-laws and funding such elections are beyond the scope of the organizations. Yet sitting out such a broad
mobilization within the community may be to ignore an important opportunity for the organizations to interact with local residents.

Finally, a localist orientation may serve to diminish or underestimate issues of racism and race relations in general. Biased attitudes which are verbalized by neighborhood residents or behavior which reflects bias are dealt with on an ad hoc basis by organizers, sometimes confronted and sometimes ignored. The assumption by organizers is that over time, in the process of working on issues, participants of different racial and ethnic backgrounds will come to recognize their common interests, and racist ideas will gradually subside and eventually wither away. Unless championed by a particular organizer or director—in most cases a person of color—racism is not dealt with as an issue in and of itself, or as an impediment to unity as many labor organizers characterize it. While all of the fulltime staff members sincerely personally deplore racist ideas and behavior, the model of neighborhood organizing which is embraced in Hartford does not explicitly factor race or racism into its methodology.

In the case of ONE-CHANÉ where the organization's active participants are almost entirely African American and Puerto Rican, the challenge is to prevent cleavages between these two groupings. Racism on the part of whites is not the major problem which ONE-CHANÉ encounters due to a lack of white participation. There are times when ONE-
CHANE participants who are Black or Puerto Rican may show resistance or lack of enthusiasm at working with groups or individuals who are white. However, within both AHOP and HART where there is significant white participation, the issue of racism or instances of racist behavior can impede efforts. None of the organizations would ever absorb an overtly racist group or block club under their umbrella.

Newsletters and Printed Material: The three organizations do not publish a great quantity or variety of materials. There is a notable lack of analysis within their various publications, as mentioned earlier. What is distributed to neighborhood residents usually are more detailed accounts of what they might read in the local newspaper. So it is not a strong conceptual or ideological message that gets transmitted into the community from the three organizations, but instead a list of accomplishments and sometimes chronologies of events surrounding a given issue.

HART's newsletter, "HART Times", is published several times a year and recently went to a typeset format on newsprint from a hand-typed format on 8-1/2 by 11 inch paper. The change in format improves and professionalizes the appearance of the publication. As mentioned, the articles report activities and developments on issues and offer very little analysis, even on those issues in which the organization is deeply involved. However, many of the articles are written by the neighborhood residents who are
active on the respective issues, offering them another avenue for participation in the organization.

AHOP's activities are reported in a newsletter, "Asylum Hill Ink", published approximately six times a year by the community organization Asylum Hill, Inc. which collaborates with AHOP on many activities. Asylum Hill, Inc. has existed in the neighborhood since the early 1970's and in many respects has been overshadowed by AHOP, although the two organizations have now developed a cooperative relationship. Asylum Hill, Inc. receives funding from Aetna Life and Casualty, and Connecticut Mutual Insurance for general operation expenses and funds from the city and state governments for the operation of employment programs. The newsletter coverage of its own activities and those of AHOP are so intertwined as to blur much distinction between the two groups. The articles are even shorter than those in HART Times and are more of a community calendar format. In mid 1990 AHOP established its own newsletter and plans to publish several issues each year. ONE-CHANE at this point has no regular newsletter but periodically mails groups of fliers which announce different events and mobilizations.

All three organizations receive substantial coverage in the several weekly and bi-weekly community newspapers, as well as in Hartford's one major daily newspaper, the Hartford Courant. Occasionaliy the organizations are featured on the community access cable television station in Hartford, although they have not yet made routine use
of this media outlet a feature of their organizing.

Although their own publications are not necessarily their strong assets at this point, the groups seem to be moving slowly to improve formats and expand coverage. However, any analysis of problems or issues takes place not within the newsletters but rather in the context of the on-going work in the communities and within meetings and planning activities where the time is set aside for such assessment. So unless one is an active participant in a committee, on the board of one of the groups or in the various informal communication networks which exist both in the neighborhoods and within the organizations, it is difficult to ascertain their deeper assessments or evaluations of the issues.

**Neighborhood Issues and Economic Restructuring**

Depending upon the specific agenda at hand, the issues of collective consumption which are addressed by the neighborhood organizations may or may not be immediately related to issues of economic restructuring. To the extent that any concern of urban neighborhood residents can be placed in the context of the current stage of development of the economy, one could say that the issues of the neighborhood organizations are a consequence of that development, that these organizations confront the local manifestations of national economic growth and trends. So, for example, if the crime and drug problem can be described as derived from a configuration
of larger national economic forces in which the lack of opportunity for economic advancement of the poorest segments of society leads to involvement with crime and drugs and, further, that this lack of opportunity is traced in part to the problems of the contemporary segmented urban labor market, then one might attempt to argue that there is a relationship between such issues and economic restructuring, albeit a secondary or tertiary effect.

However, if one is looking for a closer mapping of neighborhood organizations' issues to specific stages in urban economic development, then it is more difficult to delineate such relationships or demonstrate cause and effect between economic restructuring and an increase in a local problem such as crime. For instance, it unlikely that one can ascertain that the closing of a particular factory coincides directly with an increase in crime or drug trade in the area where the factory once stood or where the former workers of that factory live. Problems such as crime and drugs may emanate from economic and social inequality, but once unleashed, take on dynamics of their own.

In some senses, many of the issues addressed by Hartford's neighborhood organizations in the late 1980's and the beginning of the 1990's do not appear to be as directly related to economic restructuring as the issues which were important earlier in the decade. Public outcry over questions such as who reaps the benefits of downtown
development substantially diminished by 1989 as the pace of that development in Hartford slowed considerably and many ambitious plans of developers were interrupted or halted. In fact, in mid-1990 by one account in the *New York Times*, Hartford's downtown was dying (Johnson, 1990). Despite the fact that a local research organization, Citizens Research Education Network, conducted a study (1990) which calculated the revenues linkage would have brought into city coffers had it been adopted, the neighborhood organizations did not embrace the report's findings as the basis of any new linkage campaign. What has consumed much more of the neighborhood organizations' energies are questions of state and local taxation, municipal budgets, resources for education and, as mentioned throughout this chapter, the crime/drug problem rather than demands for linkage.

There is an obvious relationship between the general economic health of the city, the region, the local taxbase and many of the questions faced in the neighborhoods--whether, for example, municipal budget shortfalls result from the revenue loss associated with capital flight or failed condominium projects--but the ways in which these issues are perceived, defined and experienced by neighborhood residents and organizations tend not to highlight such connections. Rather, more recently, issues tend to be addressed as distinct or isolated problems, with less emphasis on corporate power or advantage and
more on the practices of the local government.

There are several consequences of the neighborhood organizations' methods of framing issues, especially in terms of cultivating coalitions with labor. Indeed, the same issues facing the neighborhood organizations face labor union members as they experience community life in Hartford and the surrounding region, since union members are obviously residents of local communities, including Hartford. However, most of these problems are not presently within the scope of work undertaken by unions.

Conversely, since neighborhood issues are not immediately derived from specific problems of industrial relations as experienced in workplaces, they do not appear to be problems with common origins to those of labor. Therefore, coalescing with labor, or developing analyses of community issues which emphasize any common roots of neighborhood problems with those of labor unions are not necessarily either obvious conclusions or necessary strategic choices for neighborhood organization activists. In other words, the manner in which neighborhood activists tend to conceptualize and experience their struggles does not necessarily lead them to see or to seek commonalities with union members who experience economic and social insecurity arising from a changing economy. This is one more reason why the building of coalitions and alliances between labor and community organizations is often difficult.

Having considered a number of important dimensions
of neighborhood organizing methods and participants in Hartford, we will turn next to issues of organizational structure and maintenance. These features also bear heavily on the potential and accomplishments of the neighborhood organizations.

**ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND MAINTENANCE ISSUES**

The purpose of the following discussion of several organizational dimensions of the neighborhood groups is to highlight how issues of structure, leadership and organizational process affect goal attainment. As in the discussion of structural questions in the previous chapter on labor unions, the effort is not to simply describe structures but rather to consider how they facilitate or impede community empowerment. First we will assess several specific structural features of the groups, then move to discuss the issue of leadership and staffing cycles within the organizations, and finally analyze the spinoff effects and new organizations created by the presence and efforts of the three neighborhood organizations.

**Structures and Processes**

All three of the organizations have similar structures: a board of directors, elected at an annual community congress, whose members come from the constituent units or block/area clubs which function under
the auspices of the organization or, in some cases, individual community activists whose membership on the board enhances its capacity. For example, AHOP's board of directors includes members from several localized units (groups which cover several square blocks), churches within the Asylum Hill neighborhood—even though most of the parishioners live outside the area, the AHOP seniors' group, and the AHOP youth group, among other representatives. In AHOP's case, this arrangement helps to maintain support and involvement by the churches, despite the fact that large percentages of their respective congregations live outside both Asylum Hill and even Hartford.

The boards of directors hire the executive directors and the executive directors hire other staff members. There are the typical additional sets of officers besides presidents: various vice presidents, secretaries, treasurers, etc. The boards meet specified numbers of times each year and consider organizational priorities and the progress of various issue campaigns. As with many community boards, much of their work is quite routine, however there are occasions when controversy arises and dissention results. For example, during the years that the neighborhood organizations were observed for this research, the AHOP board asked one executive director to resign due to his inability to effectively facilitate grassroots organizing.

These structures do afford community residents
formal control over the organizations. The board members represent ranges of issues, constituencies and organized segments in the respective areas of Hartford. However, the bulk of the work of the organizations takes place in the various issue committees, local block or area committees and task forces rather than at the board level of the organizations or in the board meetings.

The annual congress which each organization holds is a very important feature of the groups' functioning. ONE-CHANE and AHOP hold their congresses in the spring and HART's takes place in October. Hundreds of hours of collective work go into the planning and organizing for these events. This organizing attempts to tap and mobilize every possible constituency and every single participant from the entire scope of each organization's work. Staff, leadership and, very often, UCAN consultants involve themselves in the preparations through various committees. Tickets for very low prices (one or two dollars, including dinner) are sold to attract participants. Tickets are distributed to and sold by as many organizational activists as possible in order to broaden participation and insure attendance. Program books with advertisements from local businesses and politicians are also produced for the congresses. Numerous different roles and tasks are assigned to dozens of people so that responsibility and ownership of the event is shared.
The congresses are usually held in a facility such as a school auditorium or cafeteria and tend to attract several hundred people. Typically the agenda includes introductions of various officers of the organization and moderators for the day's event, reports from planning committees, reports from issue committees regarding accomplishments during the past year, some type of accountability session with local public officials on one or more current issues, presentation of a slate and election of officers, and voting on organizational priorities. In many congresses the group breaks into several different issue workshops which also may include some discussion or "mini" accountability session with public officials. If the congress is held on a weekend afternoon, the dinner takes place at the end or, if it is held during the evening, at the beginning of the event. There is often entertainment such as performances by youth groups or church or senior citizens' choirs based in the local institutions within the organization's turf.

There are several ironies in relation to these congresses. For organizations who trace their methodologies to Alinsky's confrontational tactics, the gatherings tend to be very free from conflict or dissention. Moreover, for organizations who claim to foster participatory decision-making, the congresses are so highly orchestrated and the agenda so tightly controlled that few substantive decisions are made. For example, a slate of officers and executive board members
is offered by a nominating committee and in the seven different congresses which were observed during the course of this research, there were no challenges or competing slates. (The October 1990 HART Congress which was not observed did, however, have a contested election, but this was considered a rarity). The slates that are presented are very broadly representative of the different constituencies and groupings within the organizations, so that the officers and board members who are elected very adequately reflect the ranges of activism and viewpoints within the organizations. But all of the real decision-making in this regard is done before the congresses, themselves, take place.

To further illustrate, the accountability session portions of the agenda are very well rehearsed in these events as is the case with other types of accountability sessions. In fact, in the 1989 ONE-CHANE congress, the moderator actually prevented participants from really taking on a police department representative on the issue of crime control and police response to community needs: when several participants began to debate with the officer, rather than let the encounter escalate, the moderator "pulled in the reigns" so to speak, called the meeting back to order and moved on to the next part of the agenda.

What these congresses do accomplish is the development of a deeper sense of community among the
participants, especially a sense of pride in the cumulative yearly achievements of the organizations. The congresses also serve as a reminder to elected and other public officials of the potential power of these groups to present claims to the government and of their power to organize and accomplish their goals. Particularly at HART's congress which takes place in the peak of campaign season for local elections in alternate years, politicians flock to meet the several hundred concerned active residents and sometimes office seekers openly pander to the crowd.

Despite the fact that the format and outcomes of the community congresses vary little from year to year, the organizations continue to expend the energies to recreate the annual events. For the leadership, particularly the respective staffs, the congress becomes in some measure a test of both their organizing capabilities and the general coherence of the organizations. A great deal of importance is attached to gross attendance figures and, in fact, one of the program evaluation measures submitted to funders is numbers of individuals who attend the various organizational events and mobilizations, the most important of which is the annual congress.

Staffing, Leadership and Organizational Cycles

One thing which characterizes the work of the neighborhood organizations in Hartford is a type of cycle effect of their work and leadership. There are definite ebbs and flows of activity within the organizations,
especially publicly noticed or reported activity, and this phenomenon can be partially traced to staff and leadership turnover. The turnover is both intentional and unintentional in nature.

Elected neighborhood based leadership is mandated by the respective by-laws to change minimally every two years, that is, a president may serve a maximum of two one-year terms. Often a person serves a single one-year term as president. One of the consequences of this turnover is the dilemma of what to do with past presidents: these are individuals who usually have undergone intensive training and development to become leaders, to whom the organizations have devoted considerable amounts of resources—particularly in the form of staff attention, and who, at the end of one or two years of concentrated activity and energy, no longer have a very important organizational role to fulfill.

Several past presidents remain on the boards of directors, but eventually most of these individuals tend to drift away from the organization. Several have gone on to play important roles in the community in other capacities: an AHOP past president, Marie Kirkley-Bey went on to become active in politics and was elected as one of the first People for Change council members; Ron Cretaro, a former HART president, was the first chairperson of People for Change; and Alta Lash remains closely tied to neighborhood organizing as one of UCAN's two staff members.
who provide technical assistance to the neighborhood groups and other organizations. Yet these examples tend to be the exceptions. Often by the time five years have elapsed, a person who was once president is no longer active within the organization in any capacity. This was noted by several organizers as a problem which should be addressed, but somehow does not ever get on any organization's agenda.

The issue can have even more ramifications as it relates to staff and staff turnover. Although by the end of the 1980's the salaries for organizers employed by these three groups were in the mid-twenty thousand dollar range, it is a very demanding job in terms of hours, energy and concentration. It is often difficult to fill vacancies and individual organizers can suffer burn-out if they don't develop pacing and coping mechanisms, and/or adopt a long-term perspective on the nature of and potential for change. The job can easily strain family life.

Beyond these issues, there are various ways in which cooptation away from neighborhood organizing and toward assimilation into the local power structure can occur. Talented organizers become recognized by both their allies and their organizing targets, and the targets generally have enticements of jobs and higher salaries available to offer. While more obvious examples of cooptation of organizers are rare (an organizer taking a job with a bank around which the neighborhood group developed a campaign,
for example), organizers and directors have ended up in positions such as Trinity College's community relations official or with for-profit housing development concerns. However, many organizers who leave the groups' employ do end up in other human service or non-profit organizations.

What results from this turnover is a type of cycle of organizational capacity and effectiveness. It takes several years for new staff and new leadership to develop the full potential of the configuration of organizational resources which combine at the beginning of any given cycle. Kevin Kelly, AHOP's first director, was quoted in a Hartford Courant article (Romash, 1987) specifically on this trend: "(i)t's not unusual for community groups to go through cycles. You need to build, maintain, rebuild, maintain." Moreover, once the groups reach a peak of organizational capacity, if the key actors start to remove themselves from the situation, the groups' effectiveness can rapidly diminish.

In the late 1980's this phenomenon occurred in Hartford. All three organizations experienced tremendous staff turnover: each changed directors at least twice and organizer turnover was even more pronounced. The set of directors of the three organizations during the previous several years--each a very talented individual in his own right--had achieved a very collaborative relationship and were able to guide the organizations to function in mutually-complementary ways. The collective departure
AHOP's Kevin Kelly, HART's Mike Allison and ONE-CHANE's Eddie Perez over a relatively short time span effected significant changes for each individual organization as well as for their collective functioning. HART seemed to have the most developed organizational infrastructure and the greatest ability to maintain momentum. Its two executive directors who served in the late 80's (one continues into the 90's in the position) provided a great deal of continuity for the organization. However, AHOP had to totally reconstruct its apparatus and rebuild its organizing capacity with an almost entirely new staff. As of the beginning of the 1990's, ONE-CHANE is taking on more and more community development functions and while still involved in organizing, is placing less organizational emphasis on neo-Alinsky methods.

Another aspect of the organizational effectiveness cycle involves what one veteran organizer described as a certain type of limit or set of limits to the scope and reach of the organizations. Rick Kozin, who held organizing positions at HART and ONE-CHANE before moving to Nebraska to continue his organizing career, observed that there may come a point when the organizations are at such a peak of activity and effectiveness that the logical next steps involve the groups, themselves, actually creating the goods or services that they demand (a prime example being housing) or filling the elected positions of municipal government to be able to determine more neighborhood-oriented public policy.
In Hartford, given the particular set of constraints in funding with supporting organizational by-law provisions which preclude direct sponsorship of partisan political activity, community development has been the more available route. Of course, one of the major stimuli for People for Change came from the failed linkage campaign waged by these neighborhood organizations and specifically from several of their key community leaders, but the organizations as entities could not officially sponsor or participate in People for Change, as has been discussed earlier in great detail. The neighborhood organizations, therefore, have in several different manners pursued development options, and also some degree of social service provision. These "spinoff effects" are analyzed next.

Mergers and Spinoffs

The neighborhood groups in Hartford have both absorbed other entities and created new organizations in the courses of their respective histories. Before examining these developments, it is useful to consider certain incentives for participation offered by the organizations and analyze the spinoffs with respect to how they follow from these incentives and address those needs which motivate residents' participation in the first place.

Incentives and the Context for Spinoffs: Certainly one of the greatest needs in the City of Hartford is
affordable housing, a constant reference throughout this project. And, as mentioned earlier, all three organizations engage in several different housing related activities. Besides helping to create housing development corporations, they also provide different forms of information to area residents. The housing fairs which HART holds make representatives of lending institutions and housing service organizations available to help first-time home buyers find their way through the maze of programs, processes and paperwork associated with the purchase of a home. The provision of this service helps establish HART's worth to a segment of the population who may not yet want to storm City Hall and who are introduced to HART through this very tame, but helpful activity.

In the area of social service provision, AHOP's unemployed group, Communication Development Employment Council (CDEC) evolved from direct action and advocacy to a more traditional job training, job readiness and referral service. AHOP was able to facilitate this shift through its relationship with Asylum Hill, Inc. which administers a state-assisted job training program. AHOP's ability to refer interested individuals to the program also functions as a type of incentive for involvement with the organization.

Beyond the more general attraction to the organizations due to the intellectual or political appeal of the concept community empowerment, these services do stimulate interest and participation. In AHOP's case, the
board of directors and its most recent executive director are deeply committed to ensuring that grassroots organizing continue to be the definitive feature of the organization. HART is also firmly established in the organizing tradition as its defining characteristic. As alluded to above, the character of ONE-CHANE is in flux as of the early 90's, but there will most likely continue to be an organizing component, regardless of whether development activities eventually dominate the group's activities.

Mergers and Acquisitions: While not an extensive list of mergers, two of the Hartford neighborhood groups in their current form represent combinations of previously separate organizations. ONE-CHANE is the merger of the neighborhood association-type ONE, whose programs included development and social services, with the more neo-Alinsky oriented CHANE. However, CHANE also undertook housing development projects prior to the 1988 merger since a constituency interested in development activities existed within the group throughout its early history. That the organization's priorities are somewhat in flux as of the early 1990's around the question of the relative emphasis on organizing or development is not a totally unpredictable phenomenon.

AHOP has a rather complex set of arrangements with other organizations. In its early years it absorbed an independent social service organization in Asylum Hill,
the Hill Center, and now continues to provide a number of social services once provided by this center, but with a distinctive grassroots organizing flavor or orientation. AHOP's nine to ten member staff include the director, two to three organizers, two support staff, and four service program staff. The building which housed the Hill Center now houses AHOP.

Asylum Hill, Inc. (AHI) mentioned above in the section on newsletters collaborates with AHOP on employment programs and other activities such as the newsletter. AHI together with the Hill Center and five area churches constituted AHOP's initial sponsoring organizations in the early 1980's.

Spinoffs: Due to the pressing need to acquire local apartment buildings in order to maintain them as affordable units, AHOP created a housing development organization, Hill Housing, Inc. AHOP is the sole member of the corporation's board of directors so that Hill Housing is in all respects a subsidiary of AHOP. AHOP's first director, Kevin Kelly, became Hill Housing's first director.

Besides this direct spinoff, AHOP helped to create a local child care center in cooperation with a local church and the Hartford Region YWCA whose main branch is located in Asylum Hill. AHOP also maintains a cooperative relationship with a local soup kitchen, Loaves and Fishes, shares information and referral resources and jointly coordinates a small emergency relief fund with the
Finally, as of mid 1990, AHOP is in the intermediate stages of developing a new, larger community center which will accommodate a broader range of activities in Asylum Hill than is currently possible in AHOP’s present building or in combination with other organizations and the local churches.

HART was instrumental in creating the Broad-Park Development Corporation, referred to earlier. Although it is in communication and works with dozens of organizations throughout the southern half of Hartford as necessary, HART, itself, has been less active or directly involved in facilitating new local organizations than has AHOP.

These patterns do illustrate the fact that neighborhood organizing in Hartford is built upon other local neighborhood based organizations and can be instrumental in creating new community-based institutions. The spinoff effects are not simply other organizations, but also different or new social processes in the neighborhoods and the city.

CONCLUSIONS

It is difficult to imagine what the social and political landscape of Hartford would resemble without the presence of the neo-Alinsky neighborhood organizations. The concerns of the residents and the issues which these groups address certainly would still exist and find some manner of expression or give rise to some form of
organization. What is interesting in Hartford is the particular pattern of grassroots organization which has evolved through the presence of AHOP, HART and ONE-CHANE.

Clearly these organizations have provided opportunities for popular participation in local developments and avenues for popular expression. Their activities have helped to demystify government processes and social issues for grassroots neighborhood residents. They have also been able to protect neighborhood residents from certain aspects of the deterioration of urban life and communities underway in older northeast cities. However, that process of deterioration continues to erode the social fabric of Hartford and elsewhere as the 90's begin: in September of 1990, one more study detailing one more dimension of the city's poverty was released. This report dealt with childhood hunger and estimated that approximately 75% of low income families with children under 12 years old either experience hunger or are at risk of hunger in their households (Hispanic Health Council, 1990).

In the face of such poverty and with the needs of the population so dire, the efforts of the neighborhood organizations may resemble someone plugging a leak in a dam with one finger, only to have a new leak spring up elsewhere. The constraints of both methodology and insufficient power or resources tend to compound the difficulties in addressing local problems.

Methodologically, the localist orientation fosters a
propensity to absorb "anything that moves" in a particular turf. For AHOP and ONE-CHANE most things that move are moving in a redistributive direction, with goals of social equality and a continuing strong role for local government in solving social problems. However, in HART's larger geographical area, many different things move in conflicting and sometimes outright contradictory directions, placing HART as an organization in the position of mediating conflicting set of demands. HART's significant constituencies of older homeowners and small business people (many of whom live outside Hartford and operate businesses or own property in the city) raise demands for lower taxes and reductions in municipal spending which come into conflict with other constituencies' demands for greater levels of services, especially in the areas of education and public safety. This is a delicate situation for the organization, both with respect to internal coherence and external relationships with the other community organizations. Moreover, to add to the complexities within this entire mix, the issue of race relations is always under the surface but tends to be minimized by the organizations.

Victories for neighborhood organizations are very hard fought in most instances, especially in dealing with landlords or the local municipal bureaucracy. Often success has to be measured in small doses, in very incremental units or steps, or in a group's capacity to
prevent further erosion of the quality of life in an area. They are often successful in forcing powerful interests to pay attention to their presence and demands, but may not always possess sufficient power to significantly alter the overall direction of development in a given neighborhood. Nonetheless, through the years they have become quite adept at working through the maze of zoning boards and city departments to attempt to forestall some plans. However, when these groups do have the opportunity to create their own institutions, housing development corporations or day care centers, a deeper sense of organizational accomplishment and power is achieved.

By building upon other local institutions such as churches, small service organizations or neighborhood improvement associations, these neighborhood organizations have achieved a presence and attained a level of power for neighborhood residents. That power tends to be rather elusive and fluctuates with the cycles of organizational effectiveness which the groups experience, but in Hartford's mix of conflicting and competing interests, these groups do command responses. Individual leadership has played a significant role in each organization, however, the cycle effect of changing leadership makes for a measure of discontinuity, as well.

There are times when the work of the neighborhood organizations has a great deal in common with that of labor, but often this is not the case. Common roots of problems experienced by labor and neighborhood
organizations are not necessarily apparent and alliances with labor are not automatically sought by the neighborhood groups. In the final chapter, we will move on to compare the work of the two types of organizations and offer the conclusions to this research.
COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Vice President for Organizing in 1199-New England, David Pickus, describes his approach to potential members: he tells them that he is not a salesman, he is not selling encyclopedia, he is offering a vehicle for them to help themselves and if they want it, they will have to work to get it. Perhaps less eloquent than the Frederick Douglas statement regarding power conceding nothing without a struggle, but an apt assessment of the work of his union and, I would add, that of the other organizations studied in this research.

Many implications flow from an analysis of the work of these organizations, particularly in the context of economic restructuring. First there is the issue of comparison: as this research was in its beginning stages a question sometimes surfaced from colleagues about "comparing apples and oranges". Was it possible or appropriate or even necessary to compare labor organizing and neighborhood organizing since on the surface they are such a very different set of activities. Having undertaken and approaching the conclusion of the project, I believe that there are a number of worthwhile points to be drawn from such a comparison, and that it is an appropriate line of inquiry. Particularly for researchers who explore and attempt to analyze the impact of economic restructuring on communities and workplaces, and who might wish to consider why it is so difficult to fashion cohesive responses to these developments, this project can aid in formulating
Comparing the models and methods of work of neighborhood organizations and labor unions might also lead down a path which asks if they can collaborate and why this could be be important. If it is important in terms of providing vehicles for people to confront and participate in social and economic change, then it would be useful to consider the problems and issues in such collaboration. Beyond issues for the specific organizations involved, there are implications for the wider community and how life is experienced in urban areas, how the fabric of community is affected by the work of these organizations.

Finally, there are implications for future research and theory which can flow from this analysis. While this work has not been set forth in highly theoretical terms, this research is relevant to certain areas which are under discussion and being debated in recent urban studies literature, including the important question of whether there is still life within urban politics.

To deal with these questions, this final chapter is organized into three sections. The first section will compare the two types of organizing and will deal with one set of questions that framed this project: in what ways are the practices of the two types of organizations similar and different. The second section will present several conclusions to the research and will be concerned with how these two different forms of social movements impact the
contemporary social, political and economic environment, both separately and in their joint activities, as well as the prospects for alliances between them. The third section will outline various implications for future research and practice and consider several different questions which might be suggested from the work.

COMPARISONS

There are a variety of points of comparisons between the neighborhood organizations and the labor unions that were observed in this project. Three broad categories will be discussed in this section: one kind of comparison involves organizational processes or methodologies, and structures. Another encompasses how each confronts the power of external forces and amasses its own power. Finally, there is the issue of outcomes from the work of the two types of organizations, both for individuals who are members or participants and for the larger community or society.

Organizational Processes, Methodologies and Structures

If both kinds of organizations help individuals learn how to stand up and confront powerful actors or forces, they each use somewhat different means to achieve that end. Some of the differences are extremely obvious, others are more subtle, and yet, there are some similarities, as discussed in the analysis which follows.

One of the basic and most apparent differences between unions and the neighborhood groups are their organizational structures. Neighborhood organization
participants are volunteers who can come and go and the organizations are constituted to accommodate these conditions. Unions consist of dues paying members who, in extreme cases, can sue the organization if they feel the union has failed to properly represent their interests, much the same way the client of an attorney or physician can sue for malpractice. Such lawsuits rarely happen. However, the different structures are reflective of these different bases of membership and participation. In effect, unions have a legal accountability to their members. Inasmuch as the neighborhood organizations are non-profit corporations, they are accountable to funders and boards of directors, but their accountability to the people who participate in their activities is somewhat indirect.

Both build their overall structures from organized activity at the base: the neighborhood organizations serve as umbrellas of local block or area level formations or special constituencies such as seniors citizens; and specifically in the case of amalgamated union locals, the union organization is built upon shop committees in each worksite.

While maintaining communication between the base and the organizational center is very important in each case, there are several other levels of organization within labor unions which may be important factors in goal attainment. In the case of the Colt strike, the regional office of the
UAW played a pivotal role and the change in regional directors was very important in the eventual outcome of the strike.

Leadership is also very important in neighborhood organizing in terms of guidance for the organizations in achieving their goals, but changing that leadership is somewhat easier for these groups. When AHOP's board of directors felt that one executive director could not adequately fulfill his responsibilities, they asked him to resign and did not have to mount an election or take their request to a higher level of the organization to accomplish the change.

There are also basic differences in structure between the neighborhood groups and the unions with regard to what types of officers and committees are necessary or mandated. In fact, the UAW constitution specifies several committees locals must establish. The three different unions in this project also differ structurally from each other, while the neighborhood organizations have essentially similar structures.

Generally the leader of a union has the title of president, business agent or, in some cases, secretary-treasurer, and is vested with the authority to make many types of decisions about the organization and its activities. Moreover, upon assuming the respective position, this leader typically works as a full-time union functionary. Within the UAW, the shop chairperson in large plants often also works full-time as a union functionary.
within the shop, handling grievances and other union matters. This arrangement is quite different than in the neighborhood organizations where the president is a volunteer and the executive director is the highest full-time functionary. The issues that may arise from such differences are discussed in detail in the chapter on coalitions but briefly restated, this arrangement means that neighborhood group executive directors tend to share leadership with and refer back to their boards and presidents before taking action or making many kinds of important decisions.

All of the organizations attempt to increase their numbers and expand their influence. The tendency toward larger amalgamated organizations exists in all three unions, as well as patterns of mergers with other locals or international unions. Larger organizations afford more power and leverage, both with employers and in the political arena. The neighborhood groups enlarge the scope of their work in two ways: initiating more constituency groups, block clubs, and other activities, and diversifying their functions through acquiring social service organizations, assuming housing development responsibilities within their staffs or creating spinoffs. So while unions increase their power by new organizing and joining with other unions, neighborhood groups, who can't enumerate a membership on the basis of people who pay dues, increase their power by building capacities and sometimes absorbing
other smaller organizations.

One very striking difference in the processes of the two types of organizations is in the role of the organizer. The role of the labor organizer in dealing with members or potential members is directive, that is, the organizer conducts the meetings and has clear responsibility for its direction. In numerous situations in which the three unions were observed, organizers fulfilled their roles by constructing the agenda and assigning tasks which had to be undertaken. Rank-and-file members may at some points run meetings on their own, but the organizer is in essence a link to the rest of the union.

Within the neighborhood organizations, the organizers play a more facilitative, consultive and less directive role. Neighborhood residents or one of the group participants conduct the meetings. As was discussed in the chapter on neighborhood organizing, the organizer tends to inject him/herself only at critical moments in order to clarify a situation or set of options, or to suggest something which may be overlooked by others in attendance.

What is similar in the role of the organizer in both types of organizations however, is that s/he does not perform tasks which are required to advance the organization, but rather facilitates the members and participants assuming responsibilities and accepting assignments. Both kinds of organizers look for similar qualities in potential leaders, including this willingness to accept the goals and tasks of the organization and to
take responsibility on oneself for the process of empowerment.

For unions, there has been a fairly large distinction between what is required in organizing new members—the various laws and processes which circumscribe an organizing drive—and much of the rest of their work. Work with existing memberships is similar to new organizing in terms of the goal of members taking on responsibilities and learning how to organize themselves, however, organized worksites present a different set of issues and problems, often of incredible complexity. After the struggle to get the union's "foot in the door" is over, staying in the room is difficult and must be negotiated and renegotiated. In the era of overt union-busting, staying organized is coming to resemble new organizing in terms of what may be required of members. In some instances it is more difficult: the four year long strike at Colt was more challenging to sustain than are most union organizing drives.

All of this is said to contrast the challenges inherent in different phases of unions' work with that of neighborhood organizing where such ready demarcations do not exist. Rather, work with the participants in the neighborhood organizations consists more of a developmental process in which over time participants strengthen their capacity to take on increasingly more difficult issues. However, there is greater latitude for the neighborhood group participants to set their own goals and agenda than
for union members who cannot necessarily anticipate and certainly cannot control what employers might do. Moreover, unionized worksites can be decertified: the workers can vote to do away with their union and unionized status. For a neighborhood organization, participation in a given area may dwindle, but residents do not have an option of formally voting the organization out of existence.

While there is an observable cycle effect of organizational capacity and leadership effectiveness within the neighborhood organizations which flows from the models and methodologies employed by the neighborhood groups, there was not an analogous process observed among the labor unions. Perhaps because the tenure of office among many of the leaders of these particular unions has been quite lengthy, and due to the fact that union offices involve full-time employment with consequently more incentive for individuals to remain in the position, the same type of effect could not be observed.

In the most significant instance of a change in union leadership among the unions in this project, that of UAW Local 376 and Region 9A, one prominent leader, Phil Wheeler, did not leave the organization, but instead moved up within the UAW hierarchy. His expertise and influence were not lost to the organization but actually extended. UAW Local 376 did experience some disruption upon Wheeler's departure, but the individual who assumed the presidency, Robert Madore, remained in close consultation with Wheeler.
until eventually he also became a regional official. Even with this quite significant leadership shift within the UAW, there seems to be more continuity within the three union organizations than among the neighborhood groups in terms of overall organizational stability during leadership change.

For the labor unions, a rich and varied labor history exists which informs and helps to guide their work. Each of the three unions situates its work within either its own traditions or this more general history. Certain facets of the unions' practices resemble traditional practices of political parties, and indeed even democratic-centralist, Leninist parties. For example, within the UAW, the triannual constitutional convention is defined as the highest body of the organization, similar to Leninist organizations. In potential strike situations, once a vote is taken to begin a strike, all members are expected to honor the picket line whether or not they voted in favor of the strike.

For the neighborhood organizations there is not an analogous history or tradition to which participants and leadership relate, save the localized tradition within Hartford over the span of years of the three organizations' existence and a very general reference to Alinsky. Although the various national organizations and networks which were described in Chapter 2 are beginning to define a history of neighborhood organizing, and scholar-activists
such as Fisher and Delgado are beginning to analyze its effects, the Hartford organizations tend not to relate to these national developments or situate themselves within a larger national history or tradition. However, one might argue that the Hartford groups broadly incorporate New Left models of participatory-democratic organizational style, combined with elements from the Catholic left, of which the founders of HART were a part.

Both organizational styles carry the potential for manipulation of membership by leaders, but both have various checks and balances. Both also offer a wide variety of opportunities for participation by grassroots people and/or rank-and-file members. Each confronts power with different kinds of strategies and tactics, and this is discussed next.

Strategies and Tactics: Confronting Power and Wielding Power

There are important differences in the contexts within which choices of strategies and tactics by the two types of organizations take place. The strategies and tactics employed by the unions and neighborhood organizations are fashioned to meet specific situations and problems. For unions, the issues and goals have tended to be quite specific: winning a collective bargaining election, winning a particular grievance, negotiating a contract, and so on. However, during the increasingly hostile climate of the 1980's, labor had to respond to a more generalized challenge. Yet, large segments of the
labor movement were ill-prepared for the task, having become accustomed to the legitimacy afforded labor in the post World War II era. To compound the problem further, the worksite issues, themselves, grew more difficult in the hostile climate.

The neighborhood organizations were born and/or grew to maturity in this national context of political conservatism, attacks on the social wage and decreasing federal commitment to the social welfare state and to urban concerns. Much of their methodology was formulated within this climate and was devised in a manner which did not rely on any legal structure for legitimacy. In Hartford, the neighborhood organizations' development transpired in a way that was largely separate from other social movements, building their capacities almost from scratch, with some assistance from local religious organizations. Neighborhood organizations, like unions, concerned themselves with very specific issues, but not at any real cost organizationally: neighborhood organizations have not been the target of the same type of assault as unions have and have not had to be as introspective about what they must do to confront a hostile external climate.

One obvious factor in strategy decisions by all of the groups in the research is that choices reflect the desire to win an issue or struggle. However, definitions of success may vary, as well as what are perceived as obstacles to success. There are still the very specific
issues for the unions, as there are for neighborhood groups. A particular grievance or the installation of a new traffic light at a specific intersection may both involve a fairly specific target and often a relatively small group of people can achieve such victories.

In the more complex questions, the definitional problems may cloud the issue. For example, although the union eventually won in the Colt strike, questions were often raised throughout the strike and even in the euphoria of the settlement as to whether the victory was commensurate with the costs, especially in human terms. Union members outside the UAW, as well as parties outside the labor movement voiced this concern. For the UAW, success in the Colt strike had to be defined and was realized in stages, first largely focusing on winning the case at the NLRB, setting the stage for the eventual backpay award, participation in the buy-out, and the strikers going back to work. However, success at each step along the way did not guarantee success at the next phase, and victory had to be eked out of the incredibly arduous process.

By way of contrast, 1199 has opted to fold strikes in various situations based on what its leadership perceives as the costs in terms of union resources, the potential for success and the capacity of strikers to persevere: despite all of their efforts in the Kimberly Hall strike of 1990, 1199 decided to await NLRB action and halt all other strike activities.
Neighborhood organizing, drawing heavily on Alinsky's ideas, readily emphasizes "winnable" struggles and immediate, specific victories or results in order to both demonstrate the worth of organizing and maintain interest and participation in the organizations. The leadership of these organizations like to be able to point to very specific results as proof of their group's viability. Complex issues such as linkage are far more difficult to win and since the linkage defeat of 1986, the neighborhood groups have become more circumspect about all-or-nothing battles. As difficult as issues such as housing or crime may be, limited or incremental successes may be achieved which can be claimed as victories by the organizations.

A common feature to both types of organizing is that most successes are built upon mobilizations of members or participants. Organizers in each organization spend large quantities of time insuring turnout to events or actions at city hall, the state legislature and other locations. Both types of organizations also strike a balance between confrontation and compromise, not opting in every instance for confrontation, but with the threat or "insurance" of their organizing capacities which can produce large, boisterous and disruptive crowds, when necessary.

The question of the "insurance" for the organizations which derives from their abilities to mobilize also points to another common feature for all six groups. Besides defining success in terms of winning issues or campaigns,
success also becomes defined as building the capacity of the particular organization in question. Hence 1199 may be willing to see a nursing home close during a strike rather than agree to concessions which would undermine its power against other nursing homes in the future. Likewise, AHOP leaders and staff would rather not have the Guardian Angels come into their turf to deal with crime and in so doing both undermine group consensus within AHOP due to the surrounding controversy, as well as create an alternative organization in Asylum Hill. They describe this phenomenon as not being "organizational", meaning that it does not build organizational capacity for AHOP.

Labor organizers emphasize that employers hold immense power over workers by virtue of controlling livelihood and incomes, something they contend is unparalleled in community or neighborhood organizing. The only comparison they might entertain is that of landlords' power over tenants or financial institutions' power over people who face the loss of their home. But since the major focus of unions' work revolves around workplace issues which are directly related to the maintenance of people's livelihoods and incomes, there is always great potential to evoke the enmity and wrath of employers and often serious risks for union members who are vocal and outspoken. In most neighborhood organizing scenarios, there is not an analogous risk factor.

Building power among union workers necessarily requires building the confidence among workers to confront
their employer. Therefore, specific victories over relatively small issues are important in union work as well as in neighborhood organizing. However, it is difficult to remain at this more simplified level of confrontation because eventually contract negotiations arise and the intensity of conflict elevates substantially. Neighborhood organizations have more choice as to how and when to escalate a struggle and may choose not to engage participants in heightened confrontation if they are at a disadvantage. However, this may lead to a perception of the organizations as weak or bluffing.

Perhaps the most important set of differences between the two types of organizations in terms of using and confronting power is in the interaction with laws and legal procedures. The chapter on coalitions highlighted these differences in relation to how they impacted the functioning of the Community Labor Alliance during the Colt strike—the types of frustrations experienced by neighborhood organizers in conforming with the UAW's reliance on attorneys.

Beyond the use of legal strategies to win strikes, another dimension of this difference may be understood in considering how unions relate to legal and legislative reform: in 1990, for example, unions began lobbying the U.S. Congress for legislation which would outlaw the hiring of permanent replacement workers during strikes—an attempt to enact and rely upon a law to overcome a disadvantage
unions currently suffer. This type of goal, the passage of national legislation, is something which could deeply affect the three unions in this project. However, such an activity is also something totally beyond the scope of the neighborhood organizations, both in terms of how they view their mission and what they would commit themselves to accomplish or be a part of accomplishing. Yet, the reforms which unions most require are national in scope in the main: they are part of a set of national conditions which are played out in local settings. The inherent localism of neighborhood groups' operations and the issues which they embrace make them loathe to take on such campaigns.

In another example of the impact of law on unions, 1199-SEIU awaits a decision in 1990 as to whether the U.S. Supreme Court will hear an appeal of a ruling favorable to the union with regard to unit determinations in hospital organizing drives. The union hopes that the court will refuse to hear the case and allow a lower court ruling to stand which specifies smaller units. The outcome of this case will have long-lasting implications for the fate of hospital organizing by all unions in the healthcare arena and will likely set precedents for organizing in other sectors.

Neighborhood organizations are more able to take advantage of public relations-oriented strategies, creating impressions through the media and using tactics as protest to gain leverage. Institutions, banks, or individual public officials are generally very concerned any about
negative publicity which neighborhood groups can generate. Unions also use these tactics, but they may not produce results as readily for labor as for neighborhood groups. Colt, Genesis Corporation and other employers were or are content to live with bad publicity in order to break their employees' unions. This is one more factor in why unions pursue legal strategies and legislative reform.

Incentives and Outcomes

Incentives: People join and participate in both types of organizations for a number of reasons. In the case of unions there are definite material issues which serve as incentives to organize: low pay, poor working conditions, unfair supervisors, lack of benefits and so on. However, union organizers cite another type of incentive or motivation of a more intangible nature: the desire to be treated with dignity. Especially in the case of the low paid service workers who 1199 and HERE consistently target in organizing drives, but also among the UAW's existing membership and in its new organizing, the quest for dignity on the job is a very crucial factor. In fact, 1199 uses the slogan "Work With Dignity" on buttons, posters and in other printed materials.

In nursing home organizing motivation often comes from the owner—perhaps a young white male entrepreneur—who treats grown women workers more than twice his age, many of whom are African American, West Indian or Latina, as if they are children incapable of exercising any
independent judgment or making decisions. Likewise among hotel managers and even university administrations, as the UAW has discovered with its members who are maintenance workers at the University of Hartford. Organizers maintain that the desire to be treated with respect and dignity on the job is the most powerful factor in union organizing.

Similar to neighborhood organizing, much of the motivation to unionize emanates from immediate self-interest, although a self-interest which arises from worksite issues. In settings which have been unionized for some time the fervor which sustains new organizing may not be present in the workforce, but the need for an ongoing organization to defend employees' interests is generally evident to a segment of the workforce who participate in and sustain the organization. Although there is always the potential for antagonism between workers and their supervisors or employers, many workers do not relate actively to their union until some type of crisis erupts or a contract has to be negotiated. The three unions observed in this project attempt to deal with these classic "free-rider" issues by providing opportunities for involvement by their membership in a wide range of activities from political action to union training sessions to conventions and even charity walk-a-thons. UAW Region 9A sponsored two walk-a-thons to raise funds for local homeless and anti-hunger organizations in 1990.

By creating avenues for involvement in both worksite and larger community issues, as these unions attempt to do,
they are also diversifying the benefits of membership. While many labor unions are experimenting with membership benefits such as low interest credit cards, pre-paid legal services, low cost insurance and other consumer services, the unions in this research focus less on what some of their leaders consider gimmicks and more on the difficult challenges of organizing and meeting existing members' needs.

Neighborhood organizations build participation upon the self-interest which manifests in community problems and issues. Because these issues can sometimes be less obvious or easier to ignore than worksite issues, participation in the groups' campaigns may have to be cultivated more deliberately. Since there is no vote required to establish the organization, non-involvement rather than pro- or con-sentiments becomes the problem. A small group of people may initially raise an issue, but a wider audience generally has to be developed and activated in order to sustain an issue campaign. Different incentives may need to be offered to familiarize and accustom neighborhood residents to the benefits of participation. Social service provision and housing development are among the incentives and benefits offered by the groups.

However, analogous to the quest for dignity on the job, many individuals are motivated to participate in neighborhood organizations because the groups offer an opportunity to defend the community against speculators,
crime and government excess or transgression. Community empowerment themes do have appeal. Even though the organizations eschew electoral politics, they function as quasi-political entities by aggregating and presenting claims upon the government and the local state, in particular.

In brief, then, incentives for joining and participating in both the unions and neighborhood organizations have two bases: tangible, material benefits, and issues of individual and collective empowerment. The outcomes of both types of organizational agenda reflect these two tendencies and are discussed next.

Outcomes: The outcomes of the existence of the labor movement are so numerous and complex that it is ludicrous to attempt to proffer a generalized list. Labor history offers myriad insights into a more generalized understanding of history; labor relations influence many social processes beyond the workplace, itself. However, the three unions of this research have had important specific impacts in Hartford in recent years, and particularly on the movements for social change in the area.

From the experience of the Colt strike has come an entirely new level of recognition by many local forces of the impact of labor relations on the community at large. It was the strike which generated mutual interest on the part of the labor and the neighborhood organizations never previously evidenced. Especially with the eventual victory
of the strikers regaining their jobs, the potential of unions was demonstrated to some members of the community who never before paid attention to labor issues.

There are trade unionists who believe that a strike of such duration tends to dampen enthusiasm for new organizing and can have an overall negative effect for union efforts in the area in contract negotiations as well as in organizing. Quantifying this assertion is quite difficult: how does one measure something which did not occur because of the strike against those events which actually did occur. However, it is interesting to note that it was during the midst of the strike that University of Hartford maintenance workers approached the UAW to organize. The UAW leadership asserts that the maintenance workers' interest in organizing developed because the Colt strikers and the union served as examples of workers defending themselves.

The activities of HERE and 1199 also help to demonstrate that people can and do stand up for themselves against employers and, more importantly, deserve to treated with respect on the job. In the case of 1199 and its state employees, new standards of public employee unionism are being defined. 1199's progress in collective bargaining with the State of Connecticut sets the pace for over one dozen other unions who deal with the state government, this author's own university faculty union included.

Effective union techniques serve as examples in
arenas other than the workplace. Organizing drives involve very specific tracking of supporters and opponents. Techniques from organizing drives have been adapted to electoral work and have helped LEAP and People for Change effectively garner and mobilize support. People for Change and LEAP are themselves key examples of the impact which unions, working with other forces and sharing resources, can have in a community and through the efforts of the UAW and other forces are being replicated in other locales.

These types of community effects have to be weighed against the tremendous obstacles which unions face, both in Hartford and nationally, and how these problems become perceived by the public. Setbacks of the labor movement are very public affairs, in both the local and national context. For example, when the UAW lost a major campaign at Nissan in 1989 in Smyrna, Tennessee, it was highly publicized in every major national media outlet. Little was mentioned about the company's hiring procedures in which workers who would potentially support unionization were systematically screened out of the applicant pool. However, when the UAW won elections at Mack Truck in South Carolina in 1988, or at Freightliner, a subsidiary of the German firm Daimler-Benz, in 1990 in North Carolina, publicity occurred within labor and left publications, but hardly anywhere else. Locally, the closing of two downtown hotels in Hartford has been attributed in some accounts to labor costs which derive from unionization. These events
and the media coverage surrounding them can lead to perceptions that unions are no longer necessary or relevant, or that they are such risky propositions that organizing is not worth the gamble and that unions eventually put firms out of business, anyway.

Union leaders and organizers face all of these issues when they approach a new group of workers in the beginning of a campaign or when they start a new round of contract negotiations. Their role in interpreting events and trends to members and potential members is critical in producing the next set of effects which will impact the workplace and the community. The union internal education activities and union-produced media are therefore very important in shaping responses among rank-and-file members who can communicate ideas to wider segments of the community and who also may need philosophical or ideological strengthening and preparation in order to tackle their own issues.

Whereas sometimes the outcomes and effects of the unions' work have implications beyond the confines of the specific worksite—wage patterns or legal precedents may be established through certain local developments which influence the prospects for other unions in other areas, the outcomes and effects of the neighborhood organizations' work tend to be more localized in nature and often can be readily demonstrated. The leadership and participants of these groups point to very specific effects: physical
changes in neighborhoods, housing rehabilitation in particular buildings, specific policies adopted by the city government. In neighborhood organizing there is not the constant fear of losing financial and material resources among participants which inhibits organization as is the case in labor organizing. The major obstacle is apathy more so than the fear inherent in labor organizing, and the challenge for neighborhood organizers is to confront and overcome this apathy.

One important effect of the neighborhood organizations in Hartford is the cultivation and development of new local leadership. While as organizations the three groups have to confront the issue of maintaining involvement of past presidents and other former leaders, this problem does not diminish the fact that a large number of individuals from the grassroots have learned how to make government and other institutions more responsive to community needs and have gone on to participate in other dimensions of community life. Not every past president becomes a city council member as has Marie Kirkley-Bey, or the chairperson of People for Change as Ron Cretaro became, but neighborhood organizing was the springboard for their emergence and for others' development into community leaders.

The capacity of the neighborhood organizations to safeguard neighborhood interests is very important for city residents. Developers and city officials do have to factor the response of these organizations into the plans which
they construct for the city. There are some difficult issues for the neighborhood groups, however, when the question of taxation arises and different constituencies within the same organization can offer competing sets of demands.

The neighborhood organizations' work is often seen and felt locally, specifically and concretely. The labor unions' work is not necessarily experienced so visibly, except perhaps during strikes and in the large public events which attend the strikes or other occasional issues. What this points to is an asymmetry in attempting to compare the two types of organizing. There is not a neat line which divides social life down the middle, with the world of work on one side and life in the community on the other.

Both types of organizing produce beneficial results for members and participants, but they are not necessarily analogous in many respects. For example, the phenomenon of union-busting is a part of contemporary labor relations, but there is really no equivalent in neighborhood organizing. The relative freedom to operate enjoyed by neighborhood organizations means that they rely on different techniques than labor unions, although we have seen where there are some similarities. What both do offer is the opportunity and the training to defend oneself and one's co-workers or neighbors, as well as the potential for individual and collective advancement. As we conclude this
research, we will consider these and other features of organizing in the two arenas.

CONCLUSIONS

These next considerations involve how the labor unions and neighborhood organizations can and do work together and inform each other, and how they impact contemporary social, political and economic phenomena as they confront the effects of changing economic conditions. We will also discuss issues which are specific to Hartford and those which are more generalizable.

Capacities and Opportunities for Collaboration

To start with, I would assert that there are no objective reasons which should prevent both types of organizations from working together. That is, except for the electoral area which will be commented upon later, differences in structure and organizational practices or traditions do not constitute insurmountable barriers. Rather, it is really a question of how open the leadership of the respective organizations are to forging alliances, how necessary they perceive alliances and coalitions to be in achieving their goals, how tolerant they are of alternative methodologies and ideologies, and how they approach external relationships in general.

Kip Lockhart, the President of the Greater Hartford Labor Council, and Phil Wheeler, former President of UAW Local 376 and now the Director of UAW Region 9A, both feel that coalitions are critical to the future of the labor
movement and in different ways each factors coalition work into their respective organizations' agendas. 1199-New England President Jerry Brown and some of the HERE leadership give somewhat less credence to an overriding importance for coalitions, although other leadership of the organizations do consider such work very important. The neighborhood organizations are even less inclined to enter coalitions unless the purposes coincide unambiguously with organizational goals.

In order for the two types of organizations to collaborate, there are several areas that would warrant consideration in any joint undertaking. Before any substantive decisions are attempted, there needs to be clear mutual understanding of the respective organizational processes each group adheres to in order to avoid simple misunderstandings and so that unrealistic expectations do not arise. The groups cannot be pushed to take actions in specific situations for which they do not have adequate preparation. The organizational differences must be respected, even if they seem non-sensical to the respective "outsiders". It also seems that the best possibilities for collaboration are in starting with small projects which build trust and help to acquaint the different actors with each other. Larger projects may result after people from the different organizations know each other, not as a result of an abstract notion about the general desirability of coalitions.
Something which potentially builds respect and empathy between the organizations is to participate in each other's mobilizations. When HART leaders, for example, can witness 1199's vocalism and militancy, or when HERE's members can support AHOP's tenants groups, then the common bonds are built. In Hartford, these simple acts of attending other organizations' activities are very difficult to effect: inertia can result from inflexibility in individuals' schedules, lack of sufficient mutual interest, or lack of making the support of other groups' activities the priority of any given organization. All of these factors are important in the success of collaborative efforts.

Subsequent questions then arise as to whether it is important that the two types of organizations work together, and moreover, if they do indeed inform each other or perhaps merely potentially complement each other as forms of social movements. First, based on all of the observations of this project I believe that in order even to achieve their own goals, it can be very important for them to work together, if for no other reason than neither type of organization on its own can address the totality of issues and problems in their members and participants' lives, problems which for so many individuals overlap. For example, low paid workers in insecure employment also are likely to inhabit the worst housing in a locale, and the problems in both arenas can compound and reinforce each other. At this stage, however, it is unlikely that the
unions in Hartford are going to devote huge amounts of energy to housing-related issues, even though the union leadership may recognize the severity of the problem. Joint projects between unions and neighborhood organizations around housing issues would certainly be welcomed by housing advocates and one of the local housing advocacy organizations is attempting to facilitate dialogue between unions and community development corporations, including AHOP's subsidiary, Hill Housing, Inc. But any cooperation is in its embryonic stages and will not see fruition for a considerable amount of time.

Healthcare accessibility and affordability is another area in which it would make sense for both types of organizations to collaborate, given that many recent strikes have focused in large measure on who will bear the burden of healthcare coverage, and the most pressing concern for all of the neighborhood organizations' seniors groups is healthcare costs. Some initial efforts at coalitions on healthcare are underway in Hartford, but there is room for much more collaboration. Employment creation would also seem a natural point of mutual concern, but only minimal joint efforts have ever been undertaken. Progress in developing mutual agendas comes slowly, having to overcome mistrust and reticence at sharing resources, human and otherwise, especially on the part of the neighborhood organizations.

As we highlighted in Chapter 4 on coalitions, at this
point it seems that the labor unions have a more apparent need for cooperation from the neighborhood organizations in such matters as strike support and occasionally in organizing drives, but there are also less obvious ways in which the neighborhood organizations could benefit from labor union support. For example, in the Fall of 1990, as a result of an emphasis on education-related issues within AHOP's work in particular, but also among the other groups, a school bonding referendum on the November ballot became a priority of both HART and AHOP. Their lack of previous organizational involvement with electoral campaigns led them to overlook some of the obvious steps which might have made their task easier, but they did make a general request to the labor movement to support the bond questions. Much more cooperation could have been achieved, especially since the unions do participate routinely in electoral work.

**Crossing the Boundary of Work and Community**

One of the central concerns in the framing of this project was whether labor organizing and neighborhood organizing inform each other, or, it might be added, potentially inform each other across the boundary of work and community. That is, do the two forms of organizing provide any insights or models which the respective other form can or does draw from? As the work progressed, I began to reconsider the question in terms of how these two forms of organizing might complement each other, rather than necessarily inform each other. First, we will consider where there are possibilities to inform each
other.

The greatest similarities seem to be in how both forms of organizing identify and cultivate leadership, engage frustration and anger to serve meaningful purposes, and attempt to confront and redefine power relationships in their respective environments. The dissimilarities in organizational structures, relationships to legal processes and ability to control agendas and timing with respect to issues or campaigns serve to distinguish the organizations. Moreover, within labor organizing ideology can be an important tool and if a union chooses to incorporate ideology, there is space within the methodology. Despite some risk for the organizations, leftist ideological organizing is a specific option, and both 1199 and HERE 217 incorporate it into their work. Within neighborhood organizing, specifically in Hartford, but also elsewhere, no space has been created for explicitly ideological approaches to the work, much to the concern of analysts such Fisher or Delgado whose work is reviewed in Chapter 2. Then there is also the issue of partisan electoral work—one of the greatest barriers to collaboration—as well as the very different funding bases and very different types of accountability. Given all of this, where might there be room to inform each other?

From the experience of this research, it does not seem that at this point in their respective histories the two types of organizing explicitly do inform each other,
except within references to Alinsky's original vision and his inspiration for neighborhood organizing from labor and the CIO. When mutual interest does manifest, it is generally of a very instrumental nature and not an attempt to learn from each other. However, it would seem that there could be exchange, the most fruitful areas being precisely those strategies and tactics which are the most distinct from one another and those where the type of power which is being confronted seems to be the most different.

By devling into each other's logic and methodologies, various new options for both types of groups could be developed. Labor could benefit from more of an appreciation of how to operate outside of externally imposed legal constraints, or for those unions who are already so inclined, from consideration of new tactics to include in their repertoire. Neighborhood organizing could benefit from learning how, without surrendering autonomy, to use legal means more effectively to achieve their ends and how to use legislative reforms to forge social change. Such exchange could certainly be accommodated within the Alinksy vision and could easily be incorporated into labor's thrust toward more outreach. Several examples of dialogue over methodology between the neighborhood groups and unions have occurred in Hartford: two workshops on organizing in the arenas of work and community were held, one in June, 1986 and another in September, 1989. However, any lasting effects of these efforts are difficult to estimate. Attempts at collaboration still tend to be of an
instrumental nature, that is, geared toward specific issues and specific ends.

Given all of the afore-mentioned issues, it might be more appropriate then to suggest that the two types of organizing and types of organizations complement each other's work. However, first it should be emphasized that there are many more considerations in studying social movements than either the sum of these two types of organizations' activities or their separate enterprises. So while they may be seen to complement each other, they also complement other movements, as well. This also relates to the point raised earlier that there is not a symmetry between labor and neighborhood organizing: first that they are not necessarily equivalent or of equal weight in terms of processes or outcomes, but also that the two do not add up to one whole and that other forms of social movements complement the combination of their efforts. However, there are several aspects to consider with regard to how these two movements do indeed complement each other.

First, both focus on quality of life issues in their respective environments and on material outcomes. Income, employment, housing, public service provision and their various other concerns all combine to affect standards of living in given communities, in this case Hartford. The impacts of both labor and neighborhood organizing do result in specific consequences for the community and help shape the fabric of the community. Second, the ways in which
individuals learn to confront their conditions—their landlord or employer or elected official—also impact the quality of life, but in a more intangible fashion. With varying degrees of success, these two types of organizations offer people hope that they can sometimes change conditions, that their efforts and collective will can be a factor in power equations. Moreover, the notion of empowerment—a process of people gaining control over their lives—can be a powerful motivation and the work of both types of organizations offers genuine avenues to achieve degrees of empowerment.

Empowerment, itself, may have to be understood as meaning different things in each sphere, experienced in quite different ways and evaluated using distinct criteria. It could be argued that each form of organizing takes a very dissimilar road toward a goal which each conceives of as empowerment, something which may sound or appear similar, but in actuality is not mutually equivalent. Moreover, empowerment may also need to be understood as much as a process or condition(s) to be attained as it is an outcome: more input into the course of community development, less intimidation in the workplace—each of these very qualitative and involving both the "what" and the "how" in the respective organizing arena.

The different meanings and outcomes which empowerment embodies may flow from both the different logics of the organizing in the two arenas and the different social dynamics that give rise to organizing in each sphere.
For specific individuals, problems in one or the other--the workplace or the community--may be more compelling. However, workplace relations and conditions in neighborhoods and communities, in combination with other factors as well, coalesce to produce the living standards and the possibilities for different styles of life for individuals, families and the larger community. The specific social processes which produce the outcomes in both spheres may or may not be closely related, but the resulting conditions constitute what is experienced in a community. It is in this sense that the achievements of the two forms of organizing come to complement each other.

**Confronting Economic Restructuring**

The preceding three chapters on coalitions, labor organizing and neighborhood organizing each have analyzed the varieties of ways in which the organizations impact social, political and economic phenomena in the context of economic restructuring. Certain things that they do are examples of refining techniques to meet more extreme conditions, for example, the Blitz model of labor organizing. Other activities create new forms of community-controlled services and development: AHOP's spawning of Hill Housing, Inc. or HART's housing fairs. However, there are other activities which present new demands and new claims on government and in effect begin to redefine the public agenda.

The Community-Labor Alliance (CLA) transformed the
Colt strike into a public issue and forced public officials to take positions on the issue, recasting the strike from the status of a "private" matter between employer and employees to a community-wide issue with community-wide implications. People for Change has attempted to take this process further by pressing for new types of local government action and intervention which support the needs of union members and neighborhood residents and their organizations, and also the demands of civil rights, women's, gay rights', homeless advocacy organizations and others. Whereas labor has historically been active in the political arena, People for Change attempts to sharpen the involvement and redefine the nature of how issues are articulated and addressed. Its success has been limited in terms of winning votes within City Council deliberations, but it has certainly been able to recast political debate in Hartford.

There are various ways in which certain unions are beginning to carve out other new forms of community involvement for their memberships which are based on the joint status of union membership and community residency. Although the New York organization of 1199 was not specifically examined in this research, one example from its work which was related by 1199-New England staff is most interesting. 1199 in New York is working with the teachers' union, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), to develop lines of communication between the teachers and 1199 members who have children in New York's public
schools on matters of mutual interest. The initial approach is made unionist-to-unionist/parent or vice versa, thus highlighting a common status in order to break down mistrust and facilitate greater parental involvement in the schools. It was the UFT who approached 1199 and other unions to begin this project.

Certain impacts of the work of these organizations in this economic period could be described as perhaps inevitable, that is, a union would be expected to fight a plant closing or negotiate for wage increases and improved working conditions. In that sense, the question arises as to what is new about their responses in this time period versus the pre-1970's onset of restructuring? From this research, I would argue that one of the most important factors has to be the ability of labor leadership to understand emerging trends, assess situations and forge new courses of action, albeit risky ones. The innovations in Hartford which have been described here are in large part due to this capacity among the respective union leadership.

In the case of the neighborhood organizations, their entire, relatively brief histories have been built upon taking risks and cultivation of new grassroots leadership. The choices that the organizational leadership--professional staff and neighborhood residents--have made also flow from the combination of their analytical abilities and their visions for their respective communities. There has been nothing inevitable in their
work, it has been based on their judgment and choices, and they have defined their courses of action.

Conditions in Hartford Compared to Those Elsewhere

The observations above lead to one of the final discussion points of this research, the issues which are unique to Hartford and those which are replicable or more generalizable. The obvious point that the events and developments in Hartford are a result of the city's specific history with its specific institutions and particular individual organizations and leaders does not need a great deal of elaboration. However, certain patterns within the events in Hartford do seem to conform with larger trends. These include strike support coalitions and, more generally, community-labor coalitions which arise from strikes, capital flight and other issues once thought to be labor's province which now are seen as affecting entire communities. Brecher and Costello's anthology (1990) documents and analyzes the experiences of such coalitions over the past decade, including a brief account by this author (Simmons, 1990) of several issues in Hartford coalitions, as assessed in Chapter 4. Electoral coalitions are also viewed as part of the "emerging alliance" of labor and community forces upon which Brecher and Costello focus, and People for Change (PFC) and LEAP are indeed being used as models from which other locales can extract various lessons.

One area which is truly unique to Hartford and which may not be replicable elsewhere is the governmental
framework in which People for Change emerged. That it arose as a possibility is largely a product of several specific structural features of Hartford's municipal government: the at-large city council elections, the size of the city council at nine members, the Connecticut statute which mandates minority party representation. Other factors which gave rise to PFC are perhaps found more readily in other cities: disaffected Democrats, labor activists, frustrated community forces, and under-represented communities of Color. Also, as was discussed in Chapter 4, the option of creating a third party was viewed differently by the various forces involved, some seeing it as a worthy goal of a more permanent nature and others seeing it a tactical decision for the specific situation. The third party option may or may not be seen as necessary or possible in other municipalities.

There are regional differences in economic conditions and huge sectoral distinctions in terms of dominant industries that shape and influence the response of forces in different cities which are analogous to Hartford's organizations. There are also different local traditions and differences in the way unions are regarded by community forces in various cities. If, for example, labor has been more integral to community issues and local politics than in Hartford, then perhaps the problems encountered both in the CLA and PFC may not be so prominent.

Many of the examples in this dissertation were drawn
from the experience of the Colt strike. This was certainly a unique strike, especially in its conclusion. But if it was unique, it had regional and even national implications. To begin with, the work of the CLA would have been important whether the strike was won or lost. Given that the union was able to persevere and win, the CLA's efforts have been hailed as exemplary on a national basis by the UAW and other labor organizations. The determination of the strikers has likewise been hailed nationally. However, there have been other strikes of both larger and smaller proportions which have not resulted in the ultimate success of a union victory, but which have involved the same degree of sacrifice and community solidarity. Labor and community forces can look to these experiences for lessons, as well as the Colt strike. Certainly the efforts of the Jay, Maine paperworkers come to mind: on numerous occasions, they participated in Colt strike support activities and their accounts of their strike support activities seemed to often surpass the efforts of the CLA.

One area which has been emphasized in this analysis is the role of neighborhood organizations vis a vis electoral work, specifically their refraining from partisan participation. This has been traced to two factors, methodological considerations and funding considerations: some neighborhood organization staff members vehemently oppose partisan electoral participation and all of the organizations are expressly prohibited from such participation within bi-laws in order to conform with
funding restrictions. Whether other neo-Alinsky organizations in other cities share in this orientation or are similarly constrained by funders may impact the directions of local political initiatives and indeed national electoral developments. Moreover, the general disposition toward coalition work may vary greatly among different neo-Alinsky organizations and national networks. Hartford's organizations happen to take the particular stances described in Chapters 4 and 6, but other organizations may view coalitions much differently and the coalition work in their communities may proceed much more easily.

One of the things which I would argue is the most generalizable is that individuals do look for avenues to respond to problems in their workplaces and communities and also look for ways to express their grievances and frustrations. Whether they find the more constructive outlets of the unions and neighborhood organizations that are available to the respective constituencies in Hartford depends a great deal on labor and community leadership in their particular area. With all of their limitations and despite all of the setbacks and defeats, Hartford's neighborhood organizations and labor unions, specifically those in this study, provide the city with leadership who are willing to innovate, take risks and aggressively work to move their memberships and participants toward the elusive goal of empowerment.
The activities of both forms of organizing have important impacts on the Hartford community, both qualitatively and quantitatively, both subjectively for individuals who participate and objectively for the conditions in the larger community. They are not necessarily equivalent, but in combination they offer their members and participants greater possibility for control over their lives, and that possibility is all that they promise.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH, THEORY AND PRACTICE**

This project was intended as an exploratory effort to document and analyze organizational responses to economic restructuring in the arenas of work and community and to do so by examining labor and community organizations in Hartford, Connecticut. It was not intended to test one specific theory but rather to use the insights of numerous authors as the context for the inquiry. However, some of the developments highlighted in this research may either have theoretical implications or speak to emerging debates in the urban studies literature.

**Recent Theoretical Work and Relationships To This Project**

One of the ways in which I believe this research helps to build knowledge is in its focus on organizations within a specific locale. Typically, case studies of economic restructuring focus on industries, regions or cities, but not on labor or community organizations in reference to their specific adjustments and adaptations to the socio-economic environment. However, authors such as
Smith and Tardanico (1987) call for an examination of the microstructures of social, economic and political life as an essential component in our understanding of and ability to adequately theorize about economic and spatial restructuring. They argue specifically for consideration of the household unit and household activities as "basic elements of group and class formation in any social system" (p.100). I would suggest that collectivities such as neighborhood organizations and local labor unions are also among such microstructures at a level immediately above or outside the household unit. Moreover, I would also assert that much of their analysis and concern for the adaptive strategies of low income households is transferable and applicable to the neighborhood organizations and labor unions:

Even when popular movements are weak or non-existent, knowledge about the political significance of the interplay between work and residential arrangements is vital for evaluating the latent political interests and capacities of the urban working classes. Such interests and capacities must be taken into account as we consider the consequences of state and business policies; the options of powerful interests, such as government officials, party organizations, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors; and the potential outcomes of social, economic and political crises. In light of the everyday networks of low-income people, their role in urban politics directs attention to this question: To what degree, and how, does the interplay of relations to workplace, household and neighborhood influence their political interests and capacity for political action? (p. 102).

In concluding their analysis, they specify a research agenda which addresses both global and local level
questions and includes the following local level issues:

1) What social networks are created within, between and outside households by the income-producing and culturally reproductive activities of the urban popular classes?

2) What cooperative and conflicting social interests are generated by such networks, and what resources can be mobilized on behalf of the various interests?

3) How do such networks, interests and resources interact with the organization and control of production as well as with the structure and policies of the state to promote or impede work-based and community-based political action? (p. 106).

My research begins to address these kinds of questions at a level of social organization outside the household, but still quite within the grasp of the "urban popular classes" referenced above. I have specifically attempted to identify adaptive strategies of the two types of organizations and some of their implications for local politics in Hartford. While these strategies were explored in detail in Chapters 5 and 6, several findings begin to offer insights which may speak to the concerns of Smith and Tardanico.

First, within the range of factors that are important in shaping patterns of organizational response are the judgment and strategic choices made by organizational leadership, areas which I have given considerable attention. These choices of leadership are informed by individual experience, organizational traditions and ideological preferences, and are certainly within the realm of the contingent, that is, they are not necessarily predictable or pre-determined. Such factors
are not often separately considered in the discussion of popular response to restructuring and may be useful to explore in much greater depth in the future in relation to other organizations.

Another consideration involves the emerging strategic patterns identified in this research in which, despite a very inhospitable climate for such demands, labor has attempted to redefine many of its issues--particularly major strikes or plant closings--into public issues and demands with community-wide and regional implications. Local and state levels of government are called upon to mitigate the effects of problems heretofore considered "private" matters between employer and employees, and not the responsibility of government. In other words, labor is in a sense attempting to socialize its struggles in terms of redefining both public discourse and public action in relation to the consequences of contemporary economic issues. While their efforts may not necessarily often be successful, that these issues surface in the public arena and that labor sometimes succeeds to any degree seems to demonstrate that popular praxis does matter and can create new options in certain situations, despite the immense obstacles. Future theoretical work may profit from more systematic considerations of these and other similar patterns, as well as unsuccessful efforts.

With respect to another theoretical area, within the
pages of Urban Affairs Quarterly of March, 1990, a debate or discussion seems to have arisen between Gottdiener on the one hand and Clarke and Kirby on the other over themes and conclusions of Gottdiener's The Decline of Urban Politics (1987). At the core of the controversy is the question of whether a genuine urban politics can or does exist given both the historical evolution and juridical limitations of authority of the local state, especially in the context of economic and political restructuring and the emerging global urban hierarchy.

Gottdiener's work was not a consideration in the formulation of this project: the date of its publication occurred well into the time that this research was proceeding. However since his conclusion regarding the demunition of urban politics seems to represent a trend or, if not a full-blown trend, at least a resonant theme in urban studies literature, my research may have some relevancy to the debate, or the debate to this research.

First, I should state that Clarke and Kirby's critique seems to me a convincing one, summarized particularly well in their invoking the metaphor of Mark Twain's comment upon reading his own obituary that reports of his death were "much exaggerated." Urban politics may be greatly constrained or circumscribed and participation may have greatly contracted, yet it seems hardly accurate to announce its demise. My research highlights a number of examples of a very animated local urban politics in Hartford, in which the contests and policy debates do
translate into discernable issues for the local electorate
and citizenry, despite all of the constraints upon local
government. However, what seems more relevant to this
project than the debate, itself, are several references
and concepts employed by Clarke and Kirby in buttressing
their arguments. They comment:

Deducing local political change from spatial
configurations or economic logic leaves huge
silences about the people affected by economic
transformation and their varying responses to these
changes. An alternative interpretation of global
economic change (from Gotttdiener's) emphasized the
destabilizing effects of changing investment and
migration patterns for communities and households
(Feagin and Smith, 1987a: 24). Is this deathly
local silence that Gotttdiener anticipated in the
unfolding logic of capitalist development, or does
it signal the lag in political development and
institutional change that so often characterizes
momentous economic transformation? Obviously, we
argue for the latter... [emphasis mine]

Many of the researchers in this field echo
Gotttdiener's somber view of the increasing
constraints on local politics but are informed by a
view of history that is less equifinal and linear
than his approach. In consequence, researchers
allow for contingent local responses and hold open
the possibility that these same structural
conditions that Gotttdiener interprets as sounding
the death knell of local politics also contain the
seeds of future political change. Harvey's (1987:
280) view of emergent flexible accumulation
processes, for example, allowed for contingent local
responses and "new paths of social change,"
including resistance and empowerment of worker and
community groups. As he put it, the deconcentration
and decentralization accompanying these new
processes create a political climate "in which the
politics of community, place, and region can unfold
in new ways" (p. 279). M.P. Smith (1987: 244) also
was optimistic that this era of fiscal austerity,
wage cuts, productivity measures, sectoral
restructuring, and privatization may, nevertheless,
offer grounds for overcoming historical cleavages
between community and workplace. (p. 401).

Later in concluding their critique, Clarke and Kirby refer
to their conception of cities as "contested areas shaped by economic agents and political actors" (p. 407). I believe that while not specified in the above language and conceptual framework, what I have been focusing upon are just such contingent outcomes of economic restructuring and the forces at the grassroots level of a city which influence and shape the outcomes. Local developments in Hartford indeed offer new ways in which social change can and is unfolding, and these trends do seem to correspond to the "lag in political development" which Clarke and Kirby argue characterizes economic transformation.

This research raises more questions than it answers in many respects. Perhaps because I am not aware of any other studies focusing specifically upon organizational response to economic restructuring within a particular locale which could have used as a model for this effort, I was left with such an immense disjuncture between the complexity of the theories which informed the project and either a space in which to situate the findings or a method of analysis of equal or near theoretical complexity. These findings seem to beg for incorporation into a larger, more complex theoretical framework. While I am not at this point offering such an analysis, I can identify several areas which the research might speak to, particularly in light of the two areas from recent literature identified above.
Many in sociology and political science attach a great deal of importance to adequately emphasizing human agency and historical contingency within social theory in order not to fall into the trap of overly economic-deterministic analyses. Both Smith and Tardanico (1987) and Clarke and Kirby (1990) build their arguments around such notions. Moreover, Gottdiener's work emphasizes the need for greater attention to the nature of the local state. These three concepts, human agency, historical contingency and the local state all seem to be interacting in new or different ways during this period of economic transformation and more attention seems to be required as to the concrete choices and adaptations of individuals and their organizations. Yet how to adequately theorize the micro-level responses—the actual patterns and manifestation of human agency—is still an open and, it seems to me, under-emphasized area. Perhaps this research can provide some specific examples for consideration in future theoretical considerations.

Implications for Future Organizing

Several patterns identified in Hartford through this research involve attempts by labor and community organization forces to come together and bridge the gap between workplace and community. However, even though an event like the Colt strike wrought financial hardship for those involved, these patterns were observed during a period relative economic growth within the context of restructuring, the mid- to late 80's. As the research was
concluding and both a recession and state budget crisis of immense proportions were looming, and with additional anticipation of a local municipal fiscal crisis, it is quite possible that the patterns of coalescence during the 1980's may be altered substantially in the 90's as the very participants in these coalitions come into competition with each other over scarcer and scarcer resources. Within these developments, choices and assessments by organizational leadership will be of paramount importance to the outcomes.

It seems to me an open question as to whether under these conditions the coalitions between labor and community forces will strengthen or deepen, no matter how desirable this might be as a goal for increasing the potential of local movements for social change. If the coalition efforts can remain at the present level and not diminish, then some lasting results may have been created during the 1980's. But a true assessment needs to include consideration of how lasting the coalition efforts are. I am cautious in light of the constraints for neighborhood organizations within their methodology and philosophy, and, moreover, because the leadership of several labor unions seem not to attach sufficient importance to such endeavors, save for perhaps the UAW, to commit the resources or give over organizational prerogatives to a coalition. Perhaps if there were more common organizational processes and targets, or more similarity
in the obstacles faced by the organizations, lasting coalitions would be easier to construct. Given these issues, the dichotomy between community and workplace continues, but perhaps the chasm is not as deep as it once was.

It is likely that in many cities local electoral activities will command greater energies, but in a new mode akin to the People for Change effort either within or outside of the Democratic Party. I have outlined the reasons why an actual third party may not seem appropriate or possible for other cities, but insurgent electoral formations or groupings are forming and have formed, breathing life into the moribund urban politics Gottdiener decries. One problem inherent in Hartford which could develop elsewhere in such efforts is that they depend in large measure upon activist unions. The resources of these unions will probably become more strained during the 90's unless they can organize large numbers of unorganized workers. In a recession, this is exceedingly difficult and as a result, insurgent electoral efforts that are dependent upon these unions may suffer, although they may not falter entirely. In cities other than Hartford, more open neighborhood and community organizations may play a greater supportive role in such electoral efforts.

I would also speculate that the ability of unions to organize in the immediate future will have wider implications. A reinvigorated labor movement, particularly with respect to its organizing capacity, could animate
other social movements and transform the specific issues of labor into issues with broader appeal. Organizing drives, as well as strikes or plant closings, can be developed in ways that involve many segments of a community and raise a variety of ancillary issues with civil rights, civil liberties and other relevant equity implications. If larger sections of the labor movement take their lead from the activities of the unions examined in this research, then such a revitalized labor movement may begin to accomplish the mission it proports to champion, empowerment of workers. More likely, there will be some significant segments of the labor movement who will attempt to organize the unorganized, but other segments who will be incapable of rising to the occasion.

Neighborhood movements offer great potential as a method of ameliorating urban problems, but here again, the important factors of leadership judgment and capacity to re-evaluate models and assumptions will figure prominently into whether or not these organizations live up to their promise. In Hartford, the problems of the city seem to become more and more entrenched and complex, and the neighborhood organizations are faced with confronting these difficulties without necessarily devoting sufficient effort toward re-analysis of method. Perhaps in Hartford, as elsewhere, a type of plateau has been attained in neighborhood organizing which may require reformulation from the national organizing networks, although
disseminating any such conclusions or consensus will be difficult, given the often resistance of local organizations to outside advice.

To Conclude

To conclude, these activities and movements need to be examined more thoroughly and factored into theoretical formulations of economic change, and the participants, themselves, need to scrutinize the methodologies and assumptions of their organizations. I would offer no easy advice in either endeavor since the unfolding of urban social change rests on so many indeterminate and distinct issues. I have attempted to explore and set forth several areas which I feel are important for such future considerations. Hopefully the experiences in Hartford have provided insights for developing deeper knowledge about the important changes underway in American cities.
SUPPORTIVE MATERIALS
### ABBREVIATIONS USED IN DISSERTATION AND APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHOP</td>
<td>Asylum Hill Organizing Project (neighborhood organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1199</td>
<td>New England Health Care Employees, District 1199 - Service Employees International Union (labor union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HART</td>
<td>Hartford Areas Rally Together (neighborhood organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERE</td>
<td>Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees, Local 217 (other locals of the same international union identified by local number) (labor union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEAP</td>
<td>Legislative Electoral Action Program (electoral coalition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE-CHANE</td>
<td>Organized North Easterners - Clay Hill and North End (neighborhood organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>People for Change (third political party in Hartford)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAW</td>
<td>United Auto Workers; referring both to Region 9A and Local 376, as specified (labor union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCAN</td>
<td>United Connecticut Action for Neighborhoods (technical assistance organization for neighborhood organizations)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
Grassroots - Labor Forum refers to monthly meetings for information exchange between unions and neighborhood organizations, initiated by the president of the Labor Council (see Chapter 4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Union</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/17/87</td>
<td>AHOP</td>
<td>Mike Gorzach, Organizing Director (through 1988, now Executive Director) and Kevin Kelly, former Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/13/87</td>
<td>UAW</td>
<td>John Flynn, former Regional Director and Phillip Wheeler, Assistant Regional Director (1986-89), now Regional Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/11/88</td>
<td>AHOP</td>
<td>George Jefferson, former Organizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/22/88</td>
<td>UAW</td>
<td>Phillip Wheeler, Assistant Regional Director (1986-89), now Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/12/88</td>
<td>HERE</td>
<td>Robert Traber, former Organizing Director and Connie Holt, Organizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/10/90</td>
<td>HERE</td>
<td>Robert Traber, former Organizing Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/20/88</td>
<td>HERE</td>
<td>Connie Holt, Organizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/20/88</td>
<td>UAW</td>
<td>Charlene Block, Organizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/13/88</td>
<td>HART</td>
<td>Nancy Ardema, Executive Director through 9/88 and James Boucher, former Organizer (through 9/88), now Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/26/88</td>
<td>HART</td>
<td>Nancy Ardema, former Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/27/88</td>
<td>HART</td>
<td>James Boucher, Executive Director (as of 10/88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/3/88</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rick Kozin, former organizer with HART and ONE-CHAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/27/89</td>
<td></td>
<td>Greater Hartford Labor Council: Kip Lockhart, President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/11/89</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>Jerome Brown, President, New England District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/2/89</td>
<td>ONE-CHAN</td>
<td>Patricia Wrice, former Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/19/89</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>David Pickus, Vice President for Organizing, New England District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/27/90</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>William Myerson, Education Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/27/90</td>
<td>UAW</td>
<td>Robert Madore, Assistant Regional Director (as of 1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/2/90</td>
<td>UCAN</td>
<td>Alta Lash, Staff and Organizing Consultant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SOURCES OF DATA:
LIST OF ACTIVITIES ATTENDED RELEVANT TO DISSERTATION

1986

The following meetings and discussions took place during the proposal phase of this effort and augmented discussions with the dissertation committee.

3/12/86  Discussion with Richard Ratcliff, Sociologist
5/23/86  Discussion with Rick Kozin, Community Organizer
6/18/86  Community and Labor Organizing Workshop at the University of Connecticut School of Social Work
10/11/86 Discussion with Cecilia Bucki, Labor Historian
10/16/86 Discussion with Kenneth Neubeck and Richard Ratcliff, Sociologists

The meetings and activities listed for the years 1987 through 1990 were attended after the committee's approval of the topic and the research formally began.
1987

6/17/87   AHOP Meeting with Mike Gorzach, Organizer
6/19&20/87 LEAP Issue Conference - Middletown, Conn.
6/22/87   AHOP Observation of Participant attending City Council
7/27/87   AHOP Planning meeting--seniors on crime
8/6/87    UAW Meeting with John Flynn, Reg. Dir.
8/6/87    AHOP Housing Coalition Meeting
8/25/87   AHOP Crime Meeting
9/13-18/87 UAW Black Lake Conference
9/24/87   HERE Pre-strike support meeting
10/10/87  HERE Strike Support Rally
10/18/87  HART Annual Congress
11/20/87  HERE Strike Support Rally - Hartford Fire Ins.
12/9/87   1199 National Convention in Hartford
12/10/87  1199 National Convention - Demonstration in solidarity with Colt strike at NLRB office

On-Going Meetings-1987

CLA & Colt-related Meetings & Activities:

Major Issues & Events: January Rally for Anniversary of Strike, International Women's Day Event for Women Strikers; Demonstration at Corporate Headquarters in New York, 4/1/87; Legislative Reception at State Capitol for Legislators, 5/27/87; Trial of Phillip Wheeler on strike-related charges, June, 1987; Vigil at Gary French's home, 7/14/87; Rally to mark NLRB Trial opening, 9/27/87; Holiday Food Baskets Fundraising, NLRB Trial Opening (after delays) 12/8/87.

Dates of Meeting attendance: 1/6/87; 1/14/87; 1/21/87;
1/28/87; 2/11/87; 2/18/87; 2/25/87;
3/11/87; 3/25/87; 4/8/87; 4/15/87;
5/13/87; 5/20/87; 5/27/87; 6/2/87;
6/17/87; 6/24/87; 7/8/87; 7/22/87;
7/29/87; 8/17/87; 8/12/87; 8/27/87;
9/9/87; 9/23/87; 9/30/87; 10/14/87;
10/28/87; 11/18/87; 12/16/87.

PFC Meetings, Activities and Campaign

Dates of Meeting Attendance: 3/3/87; 3/30/87; 4/21/87;
5/5/87; 5/16/87; 5/18/87; 5/26/87; 6/3/87;
6/8/87; 6/15/87; 6/23/87; 7/6/87; 7/20/87;
7/24/87; 7/27/87; 8/12/87; 8/25/87;
9/22/87; 9/29/87; 10/6/87; 10/22/87;
10/27/87; 11/19/87; 12/15/87.

Grassroots--Labor Forum Meetings: 4/20/87; 6/2/87;
6/30/87; 7/23/87; 8/31/87; 10/5/87;
11/9/87; 12/2/87.
4/22/88  HERE Meeting with Rob Traber, Organizing Dir.
5/15/88  AHOP Annual Congress
6/7/88   UAW Meeting with Congresswoman Kennelly on Colt
6/18/88  HERE Training Session for Union Activists
8/16/88  HART Meeting with Nancy Ardema, Exec. Dir.
10/21/88 HART Annual Congress
12/2/88  1199 New England Contract Conference
12/7/88  HART Barry Square Meeting to decide priorities
12/13/88 HERE Summit House Committee Meeting
12/14/88 HERE Sheraton House Committee Meeting

On-Going Meetings-1988:

CLA & Colt Related Meetings and Activities: Major Issues--
NLRB Trial, January Rally on Anniversary
of Strike; Work With Jay Maine Strikers,
Corporate Greed Rally in concert with
other strikes, Jai Alai Strike Support,
Vigil at Gary French home, Holiday Fund
Drive.

Dates of Meeting Attendance: 1/20/88; 1/27/88; 2/10/88;
2/24/88; 3/9/88; 3/30/88; 4/13/88;
4/27/88; 5/18/88; 5/25/88; 6/8/88;
6/15/88; 8/3/88; 8/10/88; 9/21/88;
9/28/88; 10/19/88; 10/26/88; 11/9/88;
11/30/88.

PFC - Meetings, Activities and Campaigns

Dates of Meeting Attendance: 1/20/88; 2/10/88; 2/22/88;
3/11/88; 3/12/88; 4/12/88; 5/9/88;
5/17/88; 5/24/88; 6/14/88; 6/21/88;
7/26/88; 8/9/88; 8/23/88; 9/27/88;
10/11/88; 10/25/88; 11/1/88; 11/15/88;
12/13/88.

Grassroots-Labor Forum Meetings: 1/20/88; 2/23/88; 4/6/88;
5/4/88; 6/1/88; 9/21/88; 10/19/88;
11/21/88; 12/21/88.
1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting/Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/9/89</td>
<td>HERE Meeting of Hartford Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12/89</td>
<td>HERE House Visit with Rob Traber, Organizing Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/13-14/89</td>
<td>LEAP Northeast Area Conference, Framingham, Mass.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/19/89</td>
<td>HART Meeting on Future Organizational Direction Survey of Participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1/89</td>
<td>HART Meeting of Parkville Residents on Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/9/89</td>
<td>ONE-CHANE Annual Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/19/89</td>
<td>HART Meeting on Taxes at Legislative Office Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/27/89</td>
<td>HART Meeting of Parkville Residents on Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/21/89</td>
<td>AHOP Annual Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/3/89</td>
<td>ONE-CHANE Leadership Training Session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/7/89</td>
<td>HART Meeting on Development Moratorium with President of Labor Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/23/89</td>
<td>HART Meeting on Unemployment Issues/Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/14/89</td>
<td>HART Meeting with Jim Boucher, Exec. Dir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/20/89</td>
<td>HART Annual Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/23/89</td>
<td>ONE-CHANE Meeting with Patricia Wrice, Exec. Dir. and Jay Schmitt, Organizing Dir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/29/89</td>
<td>1199 Meeting with Nursing Home Division Members on Contract Negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/12-17/89</td>
<td>UAW Coalition Conference at Black Lake, Mich.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**On-Going Meetings-1989**


1990

1/13/90  1199 House Visit with Pearl Granat, Organizer
2/24/90  1199 Support Rally for Kimberly Hall Strike
3/15/90  1199 Organizer Training Session, Pauling, N.Y.
4/21/90  1199 Support Rally for Kimberly Hall Strike
4/22/90  ONE-CHANE Annual Congress
5/6/90   AHOP Annual Congress
6/20/90  1199 Meeting on Mt. Sinai -- St. Francis Hospitals Merger for Union Members & Community
6/30/90  1199 Meeting of Group Home Division Members on Contract Negotiations
8/7/90   Meeting with Marc Lendler, Political Scientist

On-Going Meetings-1990 (through middle of year)

CLA & Colt-related Meetings & Activities:
Major Issues & Events: Buy-out finalization & return of strikers to work; Kimberly Hall strike; Greyhound strike; Corporate Greed Rally; University of Hartford contract negotiations; Holiday Funds for Jai Alai strikers and Greyhound strikers.


PFC Meetings, & Activities
Dates of Attendance: 1/2/90; 1/23/90; 2/7/90; 2/13/90; 3/8/90; 3/13/90; 4/17/90; 5/1/90; 5/14/90; 5/18/90; 5/19/90; 6/12/90; 7/10/90; 8/1/90; 8/14/90; 9/18/90; 10/9/90; 10/16/90.

OUTLINE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ASKED OF UNION AND NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATION LEADERS

Below are the questions asked in the initial interviews with leaders and officers of neighborhood organizations and unions. These were adapted to the respective organizations. With some individuals, specific areas such as organizing or coalition work were expanded upon in subsequent interviews. All organizations' leaders and/or directors were asked questions about these following general aspects of their work.

Mission and Philosophy:

How does (organization) perceive the issues facing the area or your members?
How do you see your organizational mission?
How have you arrived at your perspective?
What is being done by (organization) to get your message into the neighborhood? to the rank-and-file?

Targets of Organizing:

Who have been some of the major targets or foci of your work? (For unions:) Who are the firms and employers that you deal with, the types of industries and has this changed over recent years?
What kinds of resistance do they offer to your demands and to what do you attribute their resistance? (for unions) What kinds of variations are you finding in employers' responses to contract demands and organizing drives?

Participation:

What is done to motivate the residents/members to get involved? Are there some methods that are more effective than others? what are they? what are incentives for people to participate? What about those who benefit but don't participate--how is this dealt with?

Models:

On what models and/or views of organizing (labor relations) do you base your work? Could you give examples? (for unions) How do you view organizing in the total picture of your union activities? At what point do you decide to use confrontational approaches and how do you view the function of these actions? How do you prepare members for these actions? What are the factors upon which you base decisions on strategy and tactics? What about legal maneuvers--does this strategy take control away from your hands? (to unions) To what extent do you rely on labor law and to what extent and how do you attempt to circumvent the law?
Coalitions and Electoral Work:

What types of coalitions are you involved with? Which specific coalitions? On what basis do you decide to participate? Who participates on behalf of the organization? How are people prepared to represent the organization within coalitions? How do you assess these experiences in terms of furthering your goals?

Could you describe your involvement in electoral politics. What is the basis of your decisions in this area of work? Do you sponsor issue sessions with candidates? What about members who get involved on an individual basis -- does their experience in (neighborhood groups) guide their involvement? -- (to unions) what about members who favor candidates the union does not endorse?

Decision-making processes:

What decision-making processes are used and what structures exist in the organization? What factors go into decisions by members to become active? How is conflict handled? What avenues for leadership development exist?

Staffing:

How is staff hired and what are the means of accountability? How much autonomy do staff have? What types of training avenues exist? (to unions) What is the relationship between officers and hired staff?

Constraints:

What would you describe as the major constraints that you face? How do you circumvent them?

Experiences with other type of organization:

What types of experiences do you have with (unions) (neighborhood organizations)? How would you compare what you do with what they do?
APPENDIX A

AFFIDAVIT OF MARTIN LEVITT, FORMER MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT

The attached text was presented to the National Labor Relations Board in Cincinnati, Ohio, in relation to a case involving the Ohio District of 1199-SEIU. Levitt's signed testimony was presented in lieu of an appearance in the case and was offered as a description of management practices, specifically under the direction of union-busting consultants, during union organizing drives.

In a telephone conversation with Mr. Levitt on December 9, 1990, he described his current activities as an advisor to labor and as president of a foundation he has established since leaving the "union-busting" field, his "former field", as he refers to it. The foundation is called the Justice for Labor Foundation. Much of his current work involves lecturing at universities and colleges, consulting with labor unions, and lobbying government to regulate union-busting. He has also appeared on numerous television and radio programs, including "The Today Show", an upcoming segment with "20/20", and has been featured in numerous newspaper articles.

Levitt will have a book published in late 1991 by Crown Publishers, entitled A Dirty Business: Confessions of a Union Buster. A motion picture based on his experiences and his ultimate "turn-around" is being produced for HBO and will be aired in mid to late 1991. He eagerly seeks avenues to share his experiences and discuss the abuses inherent in union-busting consultation.
AFFIDAVIT

My name is Martin Le'vitt. I reside in Lafayette, California, at 1208 Vacation Drive, my phone number is 415-947-3900. I have been a union-busting consultant for almost twenty years.

In 1969, I joined a firm in Chicago, Illinois, by the name of John Sheridan Associates. John Sheridan, who prior to forming his consulting firm was an organizer with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, was the first firm in the country that focused on, as it's specialty, the campaigns against union organizing that utilized the first line supervisors as the principle weapon to defeat the union.

It was John Sheridan Associates that really pioneered the transition in anti-union campaigns from a series of on-going mass captive audience meetings and letters to the very specialized and individualized campaign that we called very early on simply "Different Strokes for Different Folks", where we used the supervisors on specific assignments to campaign with each of their individual employees in a "one on one" manner based on those peoples strengths and weaknesses and over all profiles. The thinking behind this new "one on one" theory was that you could identify the individual reasons for each employee supporting the union, develop an individualized campaign to convince him to vote no and them by isolating them from the support of their co-workers and making them face the power of their supervisors and the company, time and time again, put the maximum psychological pressure on them to break their spirit and change their vote.

The Sheridan Firm revolutionized that concept and several Sheridan Partners at the time, left John Sheridan to form a firm in the early 70's known as Melnick, McKuen, and Mickes, later to change their name to Modern Management Methods. The 3M Firm, in the late 1970's, grew to be the largest and most successful of its kind in the country. They took the Sheridan techniques and made them the standard operating procedure for the entire union-busting industry, and those "one on one" strategies continue to be the M.O. today of the thousands of practitioners that now smash unions.

When I joined Sheridan in 1969, I joined him because three of his partners and about five of his associates had left him to form their own firm called 3M. I left Sheridan in 1973 and joined 3M. In my case it was not that I was dissatisfied with Sheridan, I wanted to move to California, and 3M was willing to move me to California; Sheridan was not. 3M was really the firm that refined the Sheridan Techniques, the overwhelming "one on one" campaign as the key to success in smashing a union drive or smashing a union. I stayed with 3M until late 1975, at which time I chose to go out on my own and I formed what I called the Human Resources Institute which I operated until 1987 and which came to be recognized as one of the pre-eminent firms in the country, just carrying on those same techiques. It's important to note, that alongside of my own career in that industry, dozens and dozens of other Sheridan and 3M people also went out on their own and formed...
firms. Even today, where you have approaching 10,000 people practicing some form of union-busting, 90% of them or better use the Sheridan/3M techniques - use the supervisor and use the whole "one on one" onslaught as their primary M.O. And it has proven, without a doubt, to be the most effective way to smash a union. Unfortunately what it leaves in its wake because of the barrage on people is very often irreperable in a variety of ways.

I ran over 220 campaigns, where I directed the strategy or was the primary. I backed up probably another 100 or so. I was personally involved in well in excess of 300 anti-union campaigns. I don't think there was a union in the country that I didn't come up against at some point. During the 70's, 1199 was probably as much an opponent as any other combination of unions and most of the clients, especially during my Sheridan and 3M days, were health care facilities. Some of the larger ones very early in my career would have been the Henry Ford Hospital in Detroit, Baptist Hospital in Tennessee, and the Houston Medical Center. As far as my own track record, out of the more than 300 campaigns, I was involved in five campaigns where the union was successful in the election. Out of those five, only two of those ever went to contract. The others went to surface bargaining and union destruction through other channels, with continued use of the "one on one" even post election to continue to battle the union and discredit the union and do everything I could to the union. When intensive "one on one" campaigns are used, the success rate for companies is at least 98%, 99% for first campaigns.

Today, I am educating labor as well as government on the treachery and terrorism that is the reality and substance of union busting - that the intensity in which a campaign is waged, the individual warfare on people, can do damage not only to people's working lives, but to their personal lives. Because a union-buster-thinks-nothing of setting up an employee under false pretenses once they have an awareness of that individual's profile, if that's what it takes to destroy the union efforts. So I left really in largest part because of the victims. I just couldn't deal with it anymore. On a very personal side, I discovered that I was an alcoholic and went through a treatment Center in Minnesota, a place called Hazeltown. And it was really there that I opened my eyes not only to myself but the damage that I had done, and my industry had done, and part of that 12 step program is to make amends to the people you have harmed. So a big part of what I'm doing now, is that continuous pursuit of amends.

The key to the success of this technique was first establishing absolute control over supervision which was turned over to the consultant by the Chief Executive or Chief Operating Officer of the Company. That person made it clear to supervisors that the anti-union campaign was going to be the number one priority at the establishment for as long as it lasted. And that it would be a daily event and nothing, even if it was patient care in a health care facility, would be more important than that supervisor's involvement in the campaign. Once that control was turned over to the consultants and it was made very clear to management who was in charge, the supervisors were then required to give to the consultant as much individual and personal information as requested on each worker.
The way we've worked over supervisors, and I mean worked over in the literal sense of the word, was initially to get everybody in management together in what we called a "Kick off Meeting". And this meeting would involve every member of management, whether they supervised proposed bargaining unit employees or not to make it very clear that the campaign was a crisis to the company, probably the biggest crisis that the company ever faced, that it was a declaration of war by the union, and that nobody in management was going to be excused from participation in the campaign whether they directly supervised eligible voters or not. It would be the number one priority in the company for its duration and anybody in supervision or management that did not follow the directions or orders of the consultants would in fact not be doing their jobs and would be dealt with accordingly. So the supervisors very quickly became hostage to the union buster and the union buster's role.

The "one on one" is so overwhelming, so stress filled, so intensive, that it wears down people to their breaking points. It is designed specifically to make people give up a commitment they hold dearly. Given the 99% success rate of "one on one" campaigns, it clearly works.

There was no regard for labor law, not only because a rerun would just as easily be won, because by the point of the next election, the people had been so worn down, their spirit so broken, that they felt it was almost useless to go through a campaign again, but also a lot of consultants did it because they wanted the extra billing. There was no regard for labor law because the penalties for violating labor law were a slap on the wrist and we told supervisors and management at the onset of a campaign that although we would work within the guidelines of the labor law, we weren't that concerned about breaking it and breaking it routinely. I don't think there's a union buster in the country that can lay claim to not breaking a law regularly in a campaign. You try not to get caught, but you do what you have to do because you know that 90% of the penalties are going to be nothing more than putting up a notice, or facing a re-run election that you'll win anyway. We used to call the notices wallpaper. All they did was acknowledge that we did something and promised not to do it again. So we alwway had blatant disregard for the law, although we would assure our clients that we were going to be law abiding, and only break the law if it was critical to succeed.

We told supervisors that we were going to abide by the law and work within a legal framework but at the same time, we instructed them that when they were communicating to their employees they would do it one on one so that if they got carried away and stepped over the line, there would obviously be no witness to that irregularity. We didn't scare them into fearing the law, we just simply let them know that the law was there, and we would do our best, which was a blatant lie, to work within its framework. But the law would not stand in our way.

We had a theory that in any non-union situation, the percentages usually went 10-80-10, that you'd always have 10% of a work force that was pro-union and would be pro-union no matter what, be it their heritage, something in their history, or whatever. You had 10% on the
other end that were just anti-union for whatever reason and nobody was going to change that. You had 80% that either favored or disfavored the union for different reasons. They wanted it for protective reasons, economic reasons, lack of recognition reasons. The feeling was that although you could attack the union in general, which is part of the campaign through letters and speeches and captive audience meetings, if you couldn’t get to the individual and identify that particular person’s strength, weakness, and commitment to the union, you could not ensure success. So the "one on one" process, the "Different Strokes for Different Folks", in theory, really started in large part to develop individual profiles on people, to find out what it would take with that individual, using the supervisor who was the first line of power and control over that individual, to put personalized pressure on to change that person’s mind. And when I say pressure, there is nobody in this field that can succeed without seeing to it that the campaign is a daily, stress-filled event. The supervisor must be doing something "one on one" with all of his subordinates, every day, whether there is a "Dear Fellow Employee" letter being distributed, whether there is a small group meeting, or some other prop that may be put up like the display in groceries that would be bought with the equivalent of one year’s union dues, but whatever the props were, the tools, they were the blanket, they were not the real arsenal or ammunition. That was the unending, private one on one work.

The way the "one on one" campaign was waged, after the kick off meeting, after the supervisors clearly understood that the consultants were in charge of the campaign, that the campaign was the number one priority of the company, the consultant would develop, with the supervisors, profile charts on each employee in that particular department, and those profiles would consist of very general information, the person’s disciplinary record, the person’s work record, work habits, whatever we could find from their personnel file and elsewhere. When we developed the charts, the chart would have the employee’s name, their date of hire, their age, the amount of their last increase, general information. I would have little boxes for rating them on their union strengths or union support, off to the right. There would be plenty of writing room and on almost a daily basis, we would call the supervisors into our office, one on one, for the purpose of going over their people, and this was a daily ritual. What did the person say that day, who did the person have lunch with, who did the person ride to work with, was the person wearing a union pin, or was the person wearing some company prop. We would rate these people with a plus, question mark, or minus. A plus was being for the company, and so on. We would challenge the supervisor, if the supervisor tried to convince us that the person was anti-union and deserved a plus, we would ask a supervisor if he would bet his paycheck on it. We were very stingy with pluses. We forced that supervisor to convince us in every way, shape, or form, that that person was going to be a no vote.

Every supervisor was responsible for his or her respective department or a subgroup of their department. Every day they had to report to us how their people would vote if the election were today. We made them report everything, when the person went to the bathroom, personal
habits, if they picked their nose with their right index finger. The supervisors with the more labor intensive departments, or the more pro-union departments, obviously saw us more, sometimes twice or three times a day. Because along with this information that we would be drawing on a daily basis, and the information we drew from personnel records, we also had our clients secure for us credit information on each employee, criminal investigations, we got into their sexual preferences, we got into the strengths of their family, any substance abuse problems. We needed to know every possible vulnerability on every individual worker. As the supervisor would come in and we would update the charts every day, at the same time we would have "Dear Fellow Employee" letters going out, that we exclusively wrote, that we called tools for supervisors to engage in daily dialogues. This would take away their excuses such as - how can I talk to this employee again today. I just spoke with him yesterday. I would explain you have to discuss this letter with him. We explained that the letter itself is not going to win the campaign, it is how you "work it."

We forced supervisors to violate friendships. I would force them to take family members and force personal appeals. I would use any personal leverage possible to change a vote. Many supervisors had close personal relations with their subordinates. And if a supervisor was not delivering a majority of votes from his list - or what I called precinct - I would go so far as to force the supervisor to call in any personal favors - if I lent you some money or anything else, if my kid babysat for your kids or whatever. I've told supervisors to say "You and I have been friends for a long time and I know this union is right for you and will probably improve things around here - but if I don't get your vote, I'm out of here, and I've got three kids to support."

I forced them where there was a personal repore to make it personal. The supervisors were told from opening day that if an election occurred, on election day the employees would not be voting for or against the union, they'd be voting for or against management and specifically the individual supervisor. So I made it clear that any vote the supervisor couldn't deliver, was a slap across his face. It was a statement by that employee that he was not good, that he was ineffective. I forced this on the supervisors in an ego fashion, and a personal fashion. If the personal pitch didn't work, I let a supervisor know it was on him, it was his responsibility. Whatever was necessary to change a person's mind was used.

If we knew that an employee had some kind of personal problem we would attack that personal problem. We would go after that person's credibility. We would circulate a false, reputation-ruining rumor throughout the facility on a pro-union person and then have the supervisor reinforce that one on one. The whole campaign was individualized to every employee. No two employees heard the same words from their supervisors.

If supervisors were not relentless on a daily basis, and if we got wind of it, we would call them into the office and make it clear to them that a big part of our role was to assess the effectiveness of
supervision, and we had a responsibility to report that to our clients, the President, or the CEO. So that if you're not talking to everybody, every day, with what I'm telling you to say, you're not doing your job. In my opinion, the victims of this kind of campaign were not just the unit people who received the barrage - equal victims were the supervisors. I would say a majority of the supervisors that I worked with, and all my former colleagues worked with, did not want to do what we instructed them to do. They were forced to do it. Many of them, because they are not unintelligent people, knew that on occasion they would be breaking the law, knew on occasion that they would be hurting somebody's personal life, ruining somebody's marriage, destroying something. But the very fear of their own job security became so intense that they would execute for us no matter what. And I don't think a supervisor ever got away with deceiving us. If they kept repeating the same responses from some of the workers, I knew they were not "working it" hard enough and would challenge the supervisor. Some supervisors would "protect" some of their workers. In that case, I would give him a specific assignment. I would give him two or three sentences to go out and say to someone, very controversial and very hard hitting remarks. When he went out, I would tell him, he had to report to me within one hour. When he left, I called in the supervisor's supervisor to also go out and talk to the same person, and discuss the same issue, forcing confirmation of assignment. It was my method of cross-checking. If I found out that the supervisor did not carry out their assignment, we could put the fear of God into them. In some cases, supervisors would be disciplined, transferred, or even discharged. Usually you didn't have to go that far. They usually got the message.

What ever we had to do to individual employees to set them up and wear them down, with the wearing down process being the most effective, we would do it. Short of that ten percent of the staunchest union supporters, the daily harassment, the relentless daily onslaught, would get most employees to want to eventually forget that union drive ever happened. We made sure they were most interested in simply ending the tension and the conflict. If you make the process of organizing a union difficult and stressful enough most workers will give up. We told supervisors at the beginning we knew we were going to be successful when employees were sick and tired of hearing about it, and they were sick and tired of talking about it. And we kept that promise. Except the things we made them talk about and forced people to listen to, the stress that it imposed on people, probably damaged the health of a lot of people. I mean it was relentless - the same subject, the same message, the same implied threats, over and over daily, coming from people who have a lot of power over your life after time it breaks anybody down.

We routinely would create issues, meaningless unit issues, to delay the whole process and force a hearing, to delay the vote for weeks. We needed time to get the supervisors properly trained. Plus time was essential to wearing people down - making them feel the effort was too tough and futile. I don't think I ran a campaign in my twenty years where the election happened sooner than three months after the petition, or longer. That usually gave us at least four months to do our work. The more time you had to wear these people down and break
their spirit, the better. We had to break the obvious momentum that
the union had at the point of filing the petition, because that's when
the showing of interest and support was at its peak. Besides,
attacking the union as an outside, disinterested third party, as a
dues collecting machine, that they can only survive by keeping
conflict alive, and hitting dues, fees, fines, assessment, we
emphasised the whole futility surrounding collective bargaining. A
very standard approach was showing the contract before being
negotiated, as being a blank sheet of paper, as comparing negotiations
to horse trading, claiming that employees can get more, or they can get
the same or even less than they had before the negotiations. That the
union is a self interest group and will trade away employees
benefits to win union security, bulletin boards, union shop and
checkoff, and on and on. When we showed contracts from competing or
similar organizations, we rarely showed the entire documents, we
simply cut out those clauses that were clearly less than what existed
at the client institution and showcase those. I don't think we ever
showed a complete document whether it be union bylaws, LM-2's or
whatever. Part of the motive is to get the union on the defense and
keep it on the defense.

We always gave hope, which always led and proved to be false hope. We
always had to convince supervision and then their employees that
things were going to be changed for the better without the union. If
we found little things we could change after the midway point of the
campaign, we did it - we fixed the microwave, put new tiles in the
bathroom, painted the walls, etc., little fix-its we called them, but
we would do these things very subtly. We did a lot of staging, a lot
of drama, a lot of surface things, they were smoke screens to conceal
where the campaign was really being fought and won, and that was in
the trenches, in this relentless, every day "one on one" beating up of
employees by supervisors.

We would sometimes use dirty tricks. We would plant company property
in an employee's car and then have it discovered by supervisors, or
plant drugs in an employee's locker, or call the employee's spouse and
suggest they were not at a union meeting, but having an extramarital
affair, or start rumors about flattened tires, broken windows, and
"union vandalism". We went as far and to whatever degree necessary to
win. Because to win, we had to divide to conquer. We would study the
demographics, early in the campaign. If we had to pit black against
white, or old vs. young, or educated vs. non-educated, we would.
Playing up racial divisions was very standard. All that is going on.

But none of this was the key. The key was the day in, day out, "one
on one" campaigning of supervisors. Making sure that poor supervisor
- who had no choice - spent every day relentlessly "beating up" on
their subordinates. We had some supervisors who were such "ass-
kissers" they saw doing well in this campaign as their road to
success. They became obsessed. They almost got off on the thrill of
victory.

Once anybody pro-union changed their mind, we would put that word out
through the supervisors to try to create a snowball effect. Towards
the end of the campaign with virtually every supervisor, spending
virtually all their time campaigning against the union - we could put out any piece of information or rumor we wanted instantly - which of course the union could not duplicate. We would use rumors about people being gay, sexual affairs, really anything, some pretty raunchy things to win.

The essence of our success was every day getting the reports from supervisors and sending them out, like a puppetmaster, again, and again, and again. Without this, the success rate of union busters would be cut in half. It is more effective than any other combined events that might include blatant discharges of pro-union employees, threats of closure and moving, granting increases in wages and benefits, or any other grandiose acts, fall short of potency when compared to the effectiveness of the "one on one". But unfortunately, the human tragedy that comes out of it because of the destruction of real spirit, and sometimes person due to the onslaught is tremendous.

The real ruse in peddling union-busting, because now it is being sold door to door, is that union-buster will come in and improved the company. He feeds on the ego, ignorance, and fear and very often the greed of the perspective client. He lets the client know that he's a blessing in disguise. He can improve the quality of work, improve the image of the company, make the company a kinder and gentler company, take the supervisors and turn them into leaders and communicators, and make them a management team. A lot of employers will buy into that believing that is going to be how the whole process is run. But the union buster knows better. He knows that it is just a marketing tool, that it's not going to change and improve conditions, if anything, things will go back to the way they were, or get worse because of the loss in credibility, the loss in trust, the polarization, division, and a variety of other factors. So that is a ruse, but it's standard M.O. as far as a marketing and sales tool of the union buster.

I swear the foregoing is true.

Martin Levitt   Date

Notary Public
APPENDIX B

HERE LOCAL 217 TRAINING MATERIALS
FROM JUNE 18, 1988 WORKSHOP
Solving Problems on the Job: Preparing to Win

1. Getting the “victim” to fight
   a) pushing people to win, not whine
   b) know about time limits and how to file a grievance

2. Organizing and investigating
   a) talk to other stewards and committee people
   b) get good members lined up
   c) get other people interested (who? how?)
   d) get all the facts, especially the ones that hurt us
      i) the grievant’s whole story
      ii) background information from other workers
      iii) information on past practices, contract language and side letters from stewards, members or staff. Request information from the employer, if you need it.
      iv) Was the grievant treated fairly?
      v) Was everyone treated the same?
      vi) How will the union be affected in the future if we agree to this?

3. Prepare to meet with the boss
   a) plan your argument
   b) bring in members and stewards. Let them know what the meeting will be like. Make sure they know what to say and what not to say. Plan it out.
   c) think about some kind of action before the meeting that would let the company know everyone feels strongly about the grievance
   d) let all members know what you are doing before and after you meet with the boss

4. Meeting with the boss
   a) keep control of the meeting
   b) stay united
   c) caucus if necessary
   d) keep good notes

5. Confirm settlement in writing

6. A good settlement
   a) What would be a good settlement to this problem?
      i) Does it seem fair? What do the members who are involved think? What do people with a little distance from the immediate fight think?
      ii) Does it solve the problem for the future or set us up to do better the next time the problem comes up?
      iii) Can we do any better?
b) how to get it
   i) regularly discuss “What would be a good settlement?” with the involved stewards and grievants. Know and agree on what we want before we talk to the boss. Build a consensus in the group, so that if one person is being unreasonable, everyone else can help organize them.
   ii) be prepared for what the company might offer. Talk through possible offers with the grievants and stewards beforehand.
   iii) think about what will move the company to agree to a good settlement sooner rather than later. If they seem to want to settle but can’t figure out what offer to make, feed them one. If they need a face-saving way to concede, provide it!
   iv) but never, ever cut a deal with the boss without consulting everyone involved and building a consensus about what to do beforehand. No matter how good the settlement is, arriving at it alone with the boss without people knowing about it will come back to haunt you. You’re not Perry Mason, you’re a steward. If you work without your team, sooner or later you will be isolated and lose your effectiveness.
APPENDIX C

NEW ENGLAND HEALTH CARE EMPLOYEES DISTRICT 1199-SEIU
TRAINING MODULE "OUR ROLE AS AN ORGANIZER" OUTLINE
OUR ROLE AS ORGANIZER

**Premise:**

The ideas in this program are taken from the union's experience organizing the unorganized, applied to an organized worksite setting.

The program is based on the premise that each management has a plan to weaken and destroy the union. Only by thinking and functioning as organizers can union leaders defend and strengthen their union at each worksite.

**Goal:**

To teach union leaders to think as organizers.

**Objectives:**

1. To teach that the source of workers' power is their united action.
2. To teach that an organizer's job is not to solve problems, but to lead workers into struggle so they learn from their experience that their power comes from their united action.
3. To introduce principles and concepts to help leaders think, plan and function as organizers.

**Class Format:**

Arrange class into small discussion groups of five (5) to twelve (12) depending on size of the group.

**Materials Needed:**

Flip chart, tape, markers

Handouts:

1) What makes the boss give in?
2) Grievance Handling - 101 Guides for supervisors
3) Can they do that?
4) Greivances and unity: Who do you talk to first?
5) How would you handle this?
6) Which grievance is more important?
7) Picking your fight
8) "The three gottas"
9) Building the chapter
10) Agenda "Our role as Organizers"

**Introduction:** - 20 Minutes

Welcome group, have class introduce themselves (name, job, facility), write down "Goal" of program, go over agenda and housekeeping (lunch, breaks, smoking, etc.)
I. Discussion: Their Power, Our Power - 15 Minutes

Tell group that the issue of power is the central theme of the entire program.
- Ask group: What is the source of management's power? What gives management power? List responses: in-charge, authority, hire and fire, ownership, $, law

- Ask groups: What is the source of workers' power? What gives us power? List responses: Unity, each other; we do the work, can't run place without us

Some will say that the union gives workers power, or the contract gives us power. Probe a little to draw out what is the power behind "the union" or the contract.

- Ask: What would happen if any of you as individuals tried to increase your pay or benefits or staffing levels? Answer, nothing. Only by acting together do we have power. We do the work.
- Ask: Who is connected with your chapter who does not do the work? Some will answer the boss, supervisors. You may ask them to look more closely at the union. Sometime later someone will answer the union organizer.

The point is the workers have power because they can affect the running of the facility. Staff cannot. The boss does not care if the organizer doesn’t show up for work.

Post their power, our power responses on wall for future reference.

II. Discussion: What we do - 20 Minutes

- Ask group: What are some of the things we do as union leaders? Have each group make a list. List responses: Represent workers; educate about union, rights, etc.; enforce contract; run the union at chapter; file grievances; spokesperson with management, etc.

Ask: Is it enough just to file grievances and enforce the contract or must our role be broader? Why?

- Ask: What's the most important problem our members face on the job? Answer: Understaffing. What's your contract say about staffing? Nothing or very vague.

Does this mean we don't fight understaffing, because it's not in the contract? What do we do? Ask for experiences and examples on fighting for proper staffing?
III. Discussion: What makes the boss give in? - 30 Minutes

Handout: "It's the last night of contract negotiations. What do we want to have in place by the last night of negotiations to convince management to give us a fair contract." Have people discuss, choose among themselves a reporter, and list.

Unity, communication, goals, demands, deadline, plan of action, etc. Post responses.

- Ask: If this is what we do to get the boss to give in when we negotiate a contract, what about getting the boss to give in during the contract? Is it the same? Or different? Answer: The same.

Conclusion contract is a "snapshot" of what we had the power to force the boss to agree to in writing at that moment.

Therefore, what can happen during contract? Answer: We can lose power, or gain power.

IV. Discussion: What's a grievance? - 30 Minutes

- Ask group: Answer: Any unjust act, practice or condition by management.
- Point out that key words are any (broader than contract) unjust (not everything management does is unjust) and by management (a dispute between two coworkers is not a grievance).

Let's see how management views the grievance procedure?
- Handout: Grievance handling: 101 Guides for Supervisors?
- Ask groups to discuss and pick a couple of favorites. "Don't settle grievances on the basis of what is fair? Don't live quietly with bad contract propositions?", etc.

Conclusion: Grievance procedure is not a neutral court of law, but rather another battlefield of power struggle between workers and management. Management will do whatever we let them get away with.

Handout: "Can they do that"

Therefore, we have to view grievances as a way for us to exert our power. How? By using grievances to increase our unity.
The first question you should ask yourself when there is a grievance -- how does this grievance affect members' unity. How can I handle the grievance to increase members' unity. Write down and post.

Handout: "Who do you talk to first?" (grievance involves two workers fighting over a job). Have small groups discuss, report back.

Conclusion: We should talk first to the worker who management offered the job to, so as not to allow the grievance to divide workers.

V.

Discussion: What's the Union? Instrument of workers' power or service organization? - 15 Minutes

Have small groups discuss, report back. Answer: Instrument of workers power. Refer to posting of earlier discussion. Source of workers power, what makes boss give in, etc.

But too often, our problems and inefficiencies stem from working as representatives of service organizations, rather than as organizers.

- Ask: How do you feel when you're real busy and a member comes to you with a big problem? Answer: "Oh no!, not now." Right?

Conclusion: Do we celebrate problems as opportunities or shun them as interruptions of our schedule.

VI.

Discussions: Our goal: Solve problems or lead workers? - 55 Minutes

- Ask: How many have heard this? "Solve this problem for me. After all, that's what I pay dues for".

How does that make you feel? Crummy, angry, etc.

That's because our goal, as organizers, is not to solve problems:

Write Down: Our goal is to lead workers into struggle, so they learn from their experience that their power comes from their collective action.

Handout: "How would you handle this?"

Situation can be handled by either going over supervisor's head, filing a formal grievance, or mobilizing members to confront supervisor. Object is to have groups think about the situation as an opportunity to organize to carry out "our goal".
Ask: Is it better to try to win grievances with our supervisor, or is it better to try to win with the Dept. head or administrator. Where do we have more power? Answer: At the supervisor level. That's where the workers are, the source of our power. Supervisor has to "live" with us.

Handout: Is every grievance as important as the next? If not what makes one grievance more important than another? Discuss exercise, report back.

Conclusion: Those grievances which provide opportunities to lead workers into struggle are more important. In other words, we have to pick our fights.

Handout: "Picking your fight" (the object of the exercise is to choose the grievance in which you can involve a lot of members and which you have a good chance at winning.

VII. Organizers and Leaders - 30 Minutes

- Handout: "Which phrase most closely defines the role that the organizer should play in the chapter?

Write and Post:

a) leader of workers
b) technical advisor to workers and their leaders
c) leader of rank and file leaders

Have small groups discuss. Report back. Answer: leader of rank and file leaders. One person can't possibly lead an entire chapter.

VIII. What's a leader? - 30 Minutes

- Ask: small groups to list what a leader looks like. List responses (smart, hard-working, outspoken, etc.).

- Ask: Can a drug dealer be a leader? Can a racist be a leader? Can a quiet person? A stupid person?

Conclusion: The only useful definition of a leader is someone who has followers. Our view of a leader is who we would follow or who agrees with us. If we try to pick the workers' leaders we will fail. Our challenge as organizers is to get the leader on the union program and the others will follow.

- Ask: how do we identify leaders? Answer: ask workers, observe, test. E.g., who organizes the softball game? Who do people gravitate to at lunch? Who should I talk to?

- Ask: Go around the room and ask people, are you a leader?
IX. **Leaders and Work Areas** - 40 Minutes

- We know that a leader is someone who has followers.

- Ask: but who are these followers? Where do they work? Can a leader lead an entire shift? Or all shifts on a given ward, wing, or unit? Or can a nurses aide lead a nurse? Or housekeeper lead a nurses aide? What about our delegate structure of 1 to 25, does that work?

- Conclusion: Every chapter is made up of "work areas". (write and post work area) A work area is the **smallest group** of workers that relate to each other on the job with one leader, usually no bigger than about five. We must identify the leaders and the work areas to be successful.

- Exercise: Hand out flip chart sheets and ask people to draw their work area. Post a couple and discuss, illustrating the various points about work areas.

X. **Who do you represent?** - 20 Minutes

- Ask: How many of you know who you represent? Know how many? Their names? And their faces? Their work schedules? Their home phone?

The Union’s going to have a rally at the facility. How many of your people show? At the State Capital?

What happened to the others?

Ever have **nobody** at the rally?

If you don’t know exactly who you represent fall into the "everybody syndrome" e.g., "everybody’s coming", and maybe it’s the 2 or 3 people you talked to.

You alone cannot lead 25 people, but if you ID the leaders of each work area, recruit them, you’ll have much more success and our bosses won’t be able to take the union from us.

Otherwise, we set ourselves up to fail, and then we blame the workers. It’s up to us.
Evaluating a chapter - the 3 gottas - 15 Minutes

- Ask: How many of you have an area in your chapter that is really weak? Why is that? List responses: Point out it's not the water or the air. In order for workers to organize three things must exist.

Handout: 1) workers' grievances, not ours; 2) expectations that things can change; 3) leaders involved early and committed to see the fight through. Write and post.

Conclusion: We can use these points to help evaluate what's missing in an area where there is no union.

Building the chapter - 40 Minutes

- Handout: Case study, have small groups discuss and come up with plan.
- Go over each plan with an eye towards the "three gottas".
WHAT MAKES THE BOSS GIVE IN?

"It’s the last night of contract negotiations. What do we want to have in place by the last night of negotiations to convince management to give us a fair contract."
DON'T admit to the binding effect of a past practice.
DO evaluate any political connotations of the grievance.
DON'T permit misconduct by the union representative.
DO command respect from union representatives.
DON'T relinquish your authority to the union.
DON'T forget the union is sometimes politically motivated.
DO hold your grievance discussions privately.
DON'T settle grievances on the basis of what is fair.
DO use grievance settlements to reinforce your relationships.
DON'T make mutual-consent agreements regarding future action.
DON'T live quietly with bad contract propositions.
DO use the grievance meeting as another avenue of communication.
DON'T concede to implied limitations on your management rights.
DO control union activity during working hours.
DON'T discuss grievances of striking employees during an illegal work stoppage.
DON'T settle a grievance while in doubt.
DON'T refer a grievant to a different forum of adjudication.
DO demand that proper productivity levels be maintained during processing of incentive grievances.
DO support your industrial engineers during time-study and standards disputes.
DON'T negate management's right to promulgate plant rules.
DO compete with the union for employees' loyalty.
DO understand and apply the fundamental principles of psychology.
DON'T inconvenience production operations to facilitate grievance handling.
DO maintain records of matters relevant to your labor relations situation.
DON'T fail to keep employees advised as to where they stand with you as their supervisor.
"Hey! They're lighting their arrows! ... Can they DO that?"
GRIEVANCES AND UNITY

Third shift nurses aide Sally Jones comes to you and says she requested a transfer to an open position on 1st shift, but management gave the transfer to nurses aide George Edwards, who has less seniority.

Sally has worked as a nurses aide for five years, while George has only three years seniority. The contract states that when more than one employee requests a transfer "management shall transfer the most senior employee with the ability to do the work".

You decide to pursue the grievance. Who do you talk to first?
HOW WOULD YOU HANDLE THIS?

Your supervisor is one who ignores workers’ grievances and delays dealing with them, expecting the workers to give up or "get over it". The workers are steamed up by the supervisor’s failure to resolve one of their complaints after promising that the situation would be corrected right away.
WHICH GRIEVANCE IS MORE IMPORTANT?

1. A member is suspended a week for patient abuse.
2. Management changes work schedules on a unit.
3. A member says she is being harassed by her supervisor.
PICKING YOUR FIGHT

The Situation:

You are trying to strengthen the Union in a weak area. After talking with members, you identify four issues of concern, although most members are reluctant to do anything about it.

Below are the problems. Which one should you work on first?

1. UNDERSTAFFED: There are not enough staff to provide quality care.

2. NO INPUT IN PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING: Workers' ideas are not considered.

3. FAILURE TO POST SCHEDULES: In the past, work schedules were posted two weeks in advance. Now workers get very late notice of schedules.

4. SICK LEAVE WARNINGS: A few employees are routinely written up for sick leave abuse.

Why do you think this is the best answer? 

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
"THE THREE GOTTAS" - for evaluating a Chapter

In order for workers to organize three conditions must exist.

1. Perceived grievances - The workers must have issues they are concerned about, not our issues.

2. Expectations for change - The workers must believe or have hope that their efforts will make a difference.

3. Leaders committed early - The leaders of workers must be involved early and committed to seeing the fight through to the end.
BUILDING A CHAPTER

Exercise #3A: Background information on _______________________

_______________________ is a 300 bed hospital located in ____________________________. It has been unionized for 15 years. There are 500 members including RNs, LPNs and service and maintenance. The contract includes a Union shop provision and economic standards are OK. The workers have never had to strike and the Chapter isn’t at all active in the Union. On paper, there are 15 delegates, but in reality only 2 delegates really function (1 nurses aide and a cook).

The RNs and aides are at odds with one another on a regular basis and the boss has played off this division successfully.

You are the third organizer to be assigned in the last three years and, frankly, some workers are cynical about how long you’ll be around.

Unfortunately, no one on staff seems to be able to give you any more information than what you’ve just read and the files for ______________________ were in someone’s car and the car was stolen.
Exercise 13B: Background on Golden Arches

The contract at Golden Arches Nursing Home expires in a year. You, the Chapter President are concerned because the home has just been bought by a big chain, that has fought the union at other homes.

The Chapter is in fairly good shape, except for 3rd shift nursing and dietary. Dietary has no delegate and 3rd shift nursing has a delegate who doesn't function.

You want to get the Chapter in the best possible shape in anticipation of tough contract negotiations.

Your organizer is off on an organizing drive five hours away and some of the other delegates are anxiously demanding that "someone from the union office" come in to help.
APPENDIX D

WRITTEN NARRATIVE ACCOMPANYING SLIDE PRESENTATION BY
ROBERT MUEHLENKAMP

"HOW WILL THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY AFFECT US
IN 1199 NEW ENGLAND?"

PRESENTED DECEMBER 2, 1988
How Will The Country's Economy Affect Us

In 1199 New England?

A Slide Presentation

by

Robert L. Muehlenkamp
Director of Organization

Delegates Assembly
Hartford, Connecticut
December 2
1988
UNIONS MAKE THE DIFFERENCE

IDEOLOGY

refers to ideas and beliefs that tend to provide moral justification for a society's social and economic relationships. Most members of a society internalize the ideology and thus believe that their functional role as well as those of others is morally correct and that the method by which society divides its produce is fair.
SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS

Problem: Need Capital for New Plants, Equipment

Solution: Take from Working Families
Give to Wealthy and Corporations


REAGANOMICS

1. Reduce Workers' Income

2. Major Tax Cuts for Rich/Tax Hikes for Workers

3. Cut Social Spending/Increase Military Spending

4. Massive Budget Deficits

It's No Accident!
Although it is hard to imagine workers' wages in the United States falling to the levels in Brazil or Korea, some American executives seem determined to close the gap. "Until we get real wage levels down much closer to those of the Brazils and Koreas," said Stanley J. Miheleck, Goodyear's executive vice president for production, "we cannot pass along productivity gains to wages and still be competitive."

---

### Hourly Labor Costs for Production Workers in Manufacturing As a Percentage of U.S. Labor Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor
U.S. AVERAGE GROSS REAL WEEKLY EARNINGS, 1947-1987

1977 dollars

Year


Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY DECADE

Percent

1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s

Source: Labor Research Association
True Rates of Unemployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Invol Parttime</th>
<th>Discouraged Workers</th>
<th>BLS Unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Economic Policy Institute

Workers Who Work for a Wage

1984 by Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Range</th>
<th>Number of Wage Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below $7,012</td>
<td>37.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$7,012-28,048</td>
<td>59.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above $28,048</td>
<td>16.9 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Current Population Survey
Growth and Destruction, 1979–84

Totals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Below $7,012</th>
<th>$7,012–28,048</th>
<th>Above $28,048</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.65 million</td>
<td>3.84 million</td>
<td>-0.44 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Current Population Survey

LABOR COST VS. TOTAL BUDGET
FOR ALL CONNECTICUT HOSPITALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Labor Cost %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'82</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'83</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'84</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'85</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'86</td>
<td>62.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'87</td>
<td>62.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Included Physicians and management costs.
GROWTH IN JOBS BY TYPE

1979-1987

Percent Change

Total  Full-Time  Voluntary Part-Time  Involuntary Part-Time

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

1983 MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS

Males

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>$458</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>343</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>307</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Females

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>$315</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>295</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>261</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERCENTAGE BLACK OF WHITE MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME

1945-1986

Source: Victor Perlo, Economics of Racism

REAGANOMICS: TAKE IT OUT ON THE MOST VULNERABLE

- 35% of Working Women: Below Poverty Line
- 77% of Poor: Women and Children
- 25% of Full-Time Working Women: Earn Under $10,000
- 6% of Full-Time Working Women: Earn Over $30,000 (Versus 25% for Males)
FEMALE-MALE WAGE GAP: UNCHANGED FOR 50 YEARS

Women's Wages as a % of Full-Time Male Wages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERCENTAGE FEMALE OF MALE FULL-TIME MEDIAN EARNINGS 1970 vs. 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1970*</th>
<th>1980**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures from Italy and West Germany are from 1968. France, 1964
** Figures for Great Britain, Italy, France and West Germany are from 1982
REAGANOMICS

2. Transfer Wealth by Changes in Tax Laws:

a) At the Federal Level

b) At the State/Local Level

TAXES UNDER REAGAN:
CHANGES FROM 1981 - 84

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>After Tax Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $10,000</td>
<td>+ $  60.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000 - $15,000</td>
<td>+ $ 296.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000 - $20,000</td>
<td>+ $ 521.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,000 - $30,000</td>
<td>+ $ 883.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,000 - $50,000</td>
<td>+ $ 1,656.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,000 - $100,000</td>
<td>+ $ 3,593.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100,000 - $200,000</td>
<td>+ $ 8,524.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$200,000 - +</td>
<td>+ $ 25,695.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Winners in the 1987 Corporate Tax Ripoff Contest:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>1987 taxes paid ($ millions)</th>
<th>% tax rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merrill Lynch</td>
<td>$0.47</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chase Manhattan</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell Oil</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Paper</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSX</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Income Tax Rate on Worker Making $25,000 in 1985: 19.8%

Source: Citizens for Tax Justice and Labor Research Association
CORPORATE TAX SHARE

Corporate Taxes as % of Total Federal Tax Receipts

NATIONWIDE STATE & LOCAL TAXES IN 1985
As Shares of Family Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V, 15%</th>
<th>Top 5%</th>
<th>Top 0.7%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>85 INCOME</td>
<td>$7,564</td>
<td>$17,848</td>
<td>$27,266</td>
<td>$38,853</td>
<td>$57,701</td>
<td>$161,341</td>
<td>$527,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Tax</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Tax</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Tax</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL TAX</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Citizens for Tax Justice and the Institute on Taxation & Economic Policy
The "Terrible Ten"
States Taxing Their Richest Taxpayers
At Half or Less the Rate on Middle-Income Families

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Rich Rate</th>
<th>Middle Tax Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The "Filthy Fifteen"
States Taxing Their Richest Taxpayers
At Less than Half the Rate on the Poorest Families

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Rich Rate</th>
<th>Poor Tax Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Citizens for Tax Justice and the Institute on Taxation & Economic Policy
CONNECTICUT TAXES IN 1985
As Shares of Family Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income (INCOME)</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V,15%</th>
<th>Top 5%</th>
<th>Top 0.7%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$11,376</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$26,156</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$37,791</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$52,457</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$78,767</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$227,094</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$742,110</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Citizens for Tax Justice and the Institute on Taxation & Economic Policy
REAGANOMICS

3. Reduce Social Spending
   Increase Military Spending

CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT SPENDING 1982-85

Military Spending

UP

$116 Billion

DOWN

$167 Billion

Social Spending
WINNERS & LOSERS
FEDERAL SPENDING FROM 1982-88
(After Inflation)

Percentage Increase/Decrease

Military

-42% -52% +28% -20% -14% -11% -4%

Education

Community Development

Mass Transit

Employment & Training

Housing

Chart measures how much spending has changed as a result of federal budget policies from fiscal years 1982-86.

Source: Jobs with Peace Campaign

SOCIAL BUDGETS VS. MILITARY CONTRACTOR AWARDS

$ billions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Contracts</th>
<th>Social Program Budgets 1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>McDonnell Douglas</td>
<td>Child Nutrition $7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$7.7</td>
<td>Training/labor $6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Dynamics</td>
<td>Energy $4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$7.0</td>
<td>Pollution control $4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electric</td>
<td>$5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockheed</td>
<td>Mass transit $1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$3.7 Consumer/worker safety $1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Marietta</td>
<td>United Technologies $3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Technologies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: DOD; OMB Budget FY1989.
NATIONAL DEBT
OVER 200 YEARS

Source: Labor Research Association
Question: What did they do with the money?

**Answer:**

1) Profits soared  
2) Executive pay soared  
3) Billions went into merger mania  
4) Investments abroad soared

**General Electric**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Profits</th>
<th>Wages of Production Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>$7.44 Billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>$9.02 Billion</td>
<td>$5.9 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>$10.0 (estimate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Workforce</th>
<th>Sales per worker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>404,000</td>
<td>$65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>295,000</td>
<td>$130,000 (estimate)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Profits at Four Mass. Nursing Homes 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Beds</th>
<th>Profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pleasant Manor, Attleboro</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>$418,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-union Beverly home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1199 Organized Homes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridgewood Court, Attleboro</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>179,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spruce Manor, Springfield</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-74,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodridge Home, Brockton</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>158,697</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Profits are based on reported profits plus 75% of management fees, which the Mass. Rate Setting Commission says are hidden profits. Does not include other hidden profit schemes.

### Total Nursing Home Profits for Mass. in 1985

$36,704,458 - - an 80% increase since 1932
Change in Profits, Investment, Dividends, Employment & CEO Pay
For 44 No-Tax Companies, 1981-84

Source: Citizens For Tax Justice

Corporate Mergers & Capital Spending

* Including off-balance, off-equity, & related

437
REAL RESULT OF REAGANOMICS:

- Most Unfair Distribution of Wealth in the 20th Century
Share of Net Assets Owned by The Top One-Half of One Percent Of the U.S. Population 1922-1983

IDEOLOGY

refers to ideas and beliefs that tend to provide moral justification for a society's social and economic relationships. Most members of a society internalize the ideology and thus believe that their functional role as well as those of others is morally correct and that the method by which society divides its produce is fair.

UNIONS MAKE THE DIFFERENCE
Union Density in the United States, 1935–1980


Percent Union by Country
1970-85

441
### CORRELATION OF UNION STRENGTH WITH ECONOMIC POLICIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong union</th>
<th>Moderate union</th>
<th>Weak union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment rate, 1980-81</strong></td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average unemployment, 1965-81</strong></td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product, 1980</strong></td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of GNP spent on social security and welfare programs</strong></td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income inequality: the higher the number, the larger the disparity in income between the top 20 percent, the rich, and the bottom 20 percent of the population, the poor</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: David R. Cameron, professor at Yale University, conference paper presented October 1982.

---

### UNION/NONUNION HOURLY WAGES AND BENEFITS, 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Wages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonunion workers $13.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union workers $13.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WAGES FOR UNION AND NONUNION MEN AND WOMEN 1988

Median Weekly Earnings

Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor.

PERCENTAGE FEMALE OF MALE FULL-TIME MEDIAN EARNINGS 1970 vs. 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1970*</th>
<th>1980**</th>
<th>% Working Women in Unions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures from Italy and West Germany are from 1968. France, 1964
** Figures for Great Britain, Italy, France and West Germany are from 1982
APPENDIX E

PLANNING MEETING AGENDA
ASYLUM HILL ORGANIZING PROJECT
SENIORS GROUP

JULY 27, 1987
AGENDA
July 27, 1987

CHAIRPERSON: Gladys Gallagher

I. WELCOME
   A. Who is here?

II. INTRODUCTION
   A. BACKGROUND
      1. SAAH taking lead on this issue
      2. What we have done in the past when we organized
   B. REVIEW OF LAST MEETING (See other side)
   C. STRATEGY OF A LARGER MEETING

III. DECISIONS TO BE MADE TODAY
   A. PRIORITIZE ISSUES
      1. What is our bottom-line demand
   B. WHO WILL TAKE PIECES OF AGENDA AT LARGER MEETING?
   C. WHO SHOULD WE INVITE TO A LARGER MEETING?
      1. Public Officials?...Who?
      2. How will we invite these guests?
   D. ASYLUM HILL CRIME MEETING...DATE?...TIME?...PLACE?
      1. Who will make arrangements?

IV. DETAILS FOR ORGANIZING THE MEETING
   A. HOW DO WE GET THE COMMUNITY INVOLVED?
      1. Flyers?
      2. Phone calls?
      3. Press Release?
      4. AHOP Mailing?
      5. Posters?
      6. Other ideas?
   B. WHO WILL CHAIR THE MAJOR MEETING?
   C. SHOULD WE INVITE THE MEDIA TO THE MEETING?
   D. SHOULD WE INVITE ANYONE ELSE?...Representatives from other organizations
   E. OTHER

IV. NEXT PLANNING MEETING
   Date?/Time?/Place?

V. OTHER
SENIORS FOR ACTION IN ASYLUM HILL
SAAH ISSUES COMMITTEE

THE SAAH CRIME COMMITTEE MET ON JULY 9, 1987, AT THE IMMANUEL CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH AT 10:00AM. THE COMMITTEE DISCUSSED THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CRIME PROBLEM IN ASYLUM HILL. THE COMMITTEE HEARD AN UPDATE ON THE NEW "ASYLUM HILL CRIME LINE". THE COMMITTEE HEARD A REPORT ON WHAT OTHER NEIGHBORHOODS ARE DOING ABOUT CRIME. THE COMMITTEE HEARD TESTIMONY ON INCIDENTS OF CRIME FROM THROUGHOUT ASYLUM HILL.

IT WAS THE CONSENSUS OF ALL THOSE PRESENT THAT THE SAAH CRIME COMMITTEE SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN ASYLUM HILL AND ADDRESS THE CRIME PROBLEM TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND TO DEMAND A RESPONSE TO OUR CRIME CONCERNS.

THE AREAS OF CONCERN WERE:
MORE OF A POLICE PRESENCE IN ASYLUM HILL TO DETER CRIME...FOOTPATROL!
BETTER SECURITY IN SENIOR BUILDINGS
BETTER POLICE RESPONSE TIME
MORE FUNDS FROM THE STATE FOR POLICE
MORE EDUCATION OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING OURSELVES
MOVE PANHANDLERS OUT OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD
CRACKDOWN ON AETNA EMPLOYEES PARKING IN NEIGHBORHOOD
CRACKDOWN ON CRIMINALS
BETTER RESPONSE OPERATORS IN POLICE DEPARTMENT
CHANGE DISTRICT LINES FOR POLICE RESPONSIBILITY IN ASYLUM HILL

THE PLANNING COMMITTEE PRESENT TODAY WAS ESTABLISHED TO ORGANIZE AN ASYLUM HILL NEIGHBORHOOD MEETING TO ADDRESS OUR CRIME CONCERNS TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND GET ACTION.

WE ARE HERE TODAY TO FORM A STRATEGY AND PLAN THIS MEETING.
PLEASE FOLLOW THE AGENDA AND PARTICIPATE.
Map of Hartford with City Planning Neighborhood Designations and Neighborhood Organization Boundaries

VITA

LOUISE B. SIMMONS

814 Capitol Avenue
Hartford, CT 06106
Tel. (203) 232-0111

EDUCATION:


RELEVANT EMPLOYMENT AND EXPERIENCE

University of Connecticut School of Social Work, 1980-Present

Lecturer in Social Work and Director, Urban Semester Program - Directs all facets of undergraduate urban internship program; teaching responsibility for two weekly seminars on urban issues; administrative responsibility for placement and supervision of student interns; liaison with faculty, administration and agencies. Graduate level teaching experience in MSW program in areas of politics and urban policy. Work with Community Organization Sequence to develop Urban Policy Center with labor and community organizations.

Coordinator of Projects, Center for Human Resource Planning and Utilization.

Assist Center Director in proposal writing, grant administration; supervise statewide Title XX training needs assessment; participation in research design and implementation of projects.


Assistant to the Director of Field Education; Administration of Graduate Social Work Field Education Program for 300 full-time students; coordinate with faculty, agencies and students.


Organizing Coordinator: Coordinate organizing of the chapters of the college consumer advocacy organization; supervision of student projects.


Consultant in training project "Hispanics in Lawrence (Mass.)" sponsored by Mass. Dept of Social Services.

MIT Department of Urban Studies Community Fellows Program, 1984.


Boston College Social Welfare Research Institute, 1983-84.

Research Assistant on study of social and economic dislocation of laid-off autoworkers in Southeast Michigan, sponsored by U.S. Dept. of Transportation.
PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS


with Joan Fitzgerald, "From Consumption to Production: Labor Participation in Grassroots Movements in Pittsburgh and Hartford." Urban Affairs Quarterly. forthcoming, 1991, Vol. 26, No. 4. (June)


Panelist and Guest Lecturer in numerous settings on civil rights and community-labor alliance topics.

PROFESSIONAL AND COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES


Citizen Research Education Network, Member, Board of Directors, 1989-Present.

Community Labor Alliance for Strike Support, Steering Committee Member, 1986-Present.


People For Change. Steering Committee Member, 1987-Present.
Hartford Community Mental Health Center, Member, Board of Directors, 1980-1987.

Connecticut State Federation of Teachers, Executive Board Member, 1979-1980.


Coalition for Human Dignity, Steering Committee, Member, 1980-1982.

Friends of the William Benton Museum of Art, Member since 1980.

AWARDS

United Auto Workers International Union Douglas Fraser Community Service Award, Recipient, April, 1990.

Marion Davis Scholarship Fund Recipient, 1984 through 1986. (now the Putter-Davis Scholarship Fund).
REFERENCE LIST


Education Department. 1989. "Labor Economics '89."
