(ANTI-)LOCALITY AT THE INTERFACES
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation investigates the constraints on referential dependency relations that can hold between epithets and their antecedents under c-command. The initial observation, presented here in (1), is that epithets can be c-commanded by an antecedent, as long as it is not the closest c-commanding element.

(1) a. * Nero₁ thinks that [the damn traitor₁] will be invited to the reception.
    b. OK Nero₁ thinks that they₂ will invite [the damn traitor₁] to the reception.
    c. OK John₁ convinced the panel₂ that [the idiot₁] is smart.

Upon closer inspection, the difference between (1a) and (1b) seems to involve a subject-object asymmetry in the complement clause of think. Similarly, the contrast between (1a) and (1c) suggests that the matrix predicate plays a part in the reduced acceptability of (1a). The first part of this dissertation (chapter 2) concerns the syntax of epithets. I argue that epithets are null pronouns modified by a nominal appositive. This argument is based on two core pieces of evidence: (i) I will present cross-linguistic evidence illustrating that epithets can be syntactically bound by a quantifier (ii) a series of diagnostics from Den Dikken (2001) and Kayne (2005). Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis address the semantics of epithets. Following Potts (2005), I argue that epithets must be evaluated from the perspective of a given individual, the evaluator. In chapter 3, I argue that the difference between thinks and convince (cf. Stephenson (2007)) reflects constraints on the judge parameter in an embedded clause that contains an epithet. In chapter 4, I refine my proposal in the spirit of Percus and Sauerland (2003a), (2003b), and argue that cases in which the judge parameter is shifted to the matrix subject have the property of selecting a de se LF. I argue that epithets that adjoin inside such a de se LF cannot refer to the attitude holder, as the nominal appositive would have to adjoin to an uninterpreted anchor. I derive the (1a)-(1b) difference by arguing that epithets can undergo LF movement from a position within the embedded object to the antecedent in the matrix clause, but not from a position in the embedded subject. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the role of epithets for general theories of locality.
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# Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 11

1.1 The Distribution of Epithet Coreference under C-Command .............................................. 12

1.1.1 The Components of Epithets .................................................................................. 12

1.1.2 Epithets in Relative Clauses .................................................................................. 15

1.1.3 Epithets in Complement Clauses .......................................................................... 29

1.2 Sneak Peek ...................................................................................................................... 31

Chapter 2: The Syntactic Structure of Epithets ........................................................................ 36

2.1 The Distribution of Epithets ......................................................................................... 36

2.2 Evidence for Treating Epithets as Pronouns .................................................................. 39

2.2.1 Evidence from the Previous Literature .................................................................. 39

2.2.2 New Evidence from Quantifier-Variable Binding ................................................... 44

2.3 Epithets as Nominal Appositives with a Null Head ..................................................... 57

2.3.1 The Proposal ........................................................................................................ 57

2.3.2 Arguments for Treating Epithets as Nominal Appositives with a Null Anchor .......... 59

2.4 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 73

Chapter 3: The Role of the Attitude Predicate ...................................................................... 75

3.1 The Overview of the Proposal ....................................................................................... 75

3.2 The Problem .................................................................................................................... 76

3.3 My Solution .................................................................................................................... 86

3.3.1 The Anti-Judge Constraint in a Nutshell .................................................................. 86

3.3.2 Introducing the Judge Parameter ........................................................................... 87

3.3.3 Epithets Have an Evaluator .................................................................................. 94

3.3.4 Attitude Predicates Differ in Terms of the Complement’s Judge ......................... 107

3.3.5 Connecting the Dots ............................................................................................... 109

3.4 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 116

Chapter 4: The Nature of Anti-Locality Effects .................................................................... 117

4.1 A New Problem for Locality: The Subject-Object Asymmetry ....................................... 118

4.2 My Claim: Explaining The Subject-Object Asymmetry ............................................... 121

4.2.1 Introducing the *De Se vs De Re* distinction ....................................................... 121
4.2.2 Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b): The Case for De Se LFs ......................... 123
4.2.3 The Role of Uninterpreted Pronouns in De Se LFs ........................................ 133
4.2.4 A First Attempt based on Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b) ....................... 141
4.2.5 Explaining the Subject/Object Asymmetry – The Final Result ......................... 143
4.2.6 On the Relationship between the appositive and its anchor ............................ 150

4.3 Previous approaches to epithets ............................................................................ 151
4.3.1 Dubinsky & Hamilton ...................................................................................... 151
4.3.2 Reinhart (1983) & Schlenker (2005) ................................................................ 156

Chapter 5: Conclusion .................................................................................................. 168
5.1 Summary .............................................................................................................. 168
5.2 Implications for the Bigger Picture of Locality .................................................... 169

References .................................................................................................................. 173
Chapter 1: Introduction

This dissertation is about *epithets*, a type of DP, for which we can give the following working definition. First, epithets contain noun phrases that are used in a non-literal, ‘emotional’ way. Second, epithets are anaphoric, i.e. they refer back to another DP, or a contextually salient referent. To illustrate, *fascist* can be used as an epithet. In (1a), we see the literal use of *fascist*, referring to a member of a nationalist political group; in (1a), *fascist(s)* is neither emotive nor an epithet. Examples (1b-c) exhibit the emotive use of *fascist*, where *fascist* is used pejoratively, roughly equivalent in meaning to *bully*. They differ with respect to anaphoricity (and stress); in (1b), *some fascist* is not anaphoric (and thus not an epithet); it introduces a new referent and characterises this person as unpleasant. In (1c), an example of an epithet, *the fascist* is anaphoric; it refers to John, who was previously introduced; it is also obligatorily unstressed.

(1) a. *non-emotive, non-epithet*
Mussolini brought the fascists to power.

b. *emotive, non-epithet*
Some fascist asked for you on the phone.

c. *emotive, epithet*
I went out on a date with John. The fascist spent the whole evening interrupting me.

Most examples in this dissertation use epithets like *the idiot*, as these seem to be the most familiar ones cross-linguistically; however, we will see other DPs, like *the teacher* can also be used as epithets. The reader should bear in mind that the non-emotive reading (‘an uneducated person’) is less salient with *the idiot*, than the non-emotive reading of other epithets.

The literature on epithets explores their syntactic properties on the one hand (cf. Lasnik (1976), Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998), Aoun and Li (2000), and Aoun, Choueiri and Hornstein (2001)), and their semantic properties on the other (cf. Hom (2008)). More recent approaches attempt at unifying both their semantic and syntactic behaviours, e.g. Beller (2011), Schlenker (2005, 2007), and Potts (2005, 2007). Most of the work in the literature investigates the
behaviour of epithets in a single language (e.g. English, or Arabic); I am not aware of any cross-comparison research of epithets in different languages. This dissertation explores a particular unexplored behaviour of epithets, namely the possibility of an epithet being referentially dependent on a c-commanding antecedent. I will show that this observation is not just a quirky phenomenon found in English; in fact, we will see that an epithet can be referentially dependent on a c-commanding antecedent in a number of languages, and that that it is more frequent then previously assumed.

1.1 The Distribution of Epithet Coreference under C-Command

1.1.1 The Components of Epithets

There is a dispute in the literature regarding the precise definition of epithets. The common assumptions shared by most, are that an epithet consists of an NP or DP, which is accompanied by a determiner. Furthermore, it is also commonly assumed that epithets tend to be expressive and bear a [+evaluative] feature (often descriptively assumed), which can be positive or negative. The English examples below illustrate these two assumptions. Example (2a) illustrates a case of negative evaluativity (i.e. the speaker does not think highly of John), whereas (2b) illustrates positive evaluation in an epithet. In both examples, the epithet takes the shape of a definite description, i.e. it contains the determiner the.

(2) a. OK Yesterday John bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot.
   
   b. OK Yesterday John bumped into a fan who really loves the great man.

Although it is typically assumed that epithets preferably consist of a nominal component plus a determiner, it seems as though the determiner is in fact obligatory. Consider the Russian example in (3). Russian does not have an overt definite determiner analogous to the English

1 Cf. Aoun & Choueiri (2001), Schlenker (2005), and most recently Potts (2005) and Harris (2009).
2 Cf. Schlenker (2005) for additional examples of this nature.
3 Unless of course, if the language simply does not have determiners; Croatian and Kutchi Gujarati are such languages.
Although Russian does have bare determinerless noun phrases, this strategy does not seem to apply to epithets. In order to derive the correct reading, a proximal demonstrative, ětot⁴ is required.

Russian

(3) OK John₁ ubedil sovet ěto ětot idiot₁ umjon.
John.nom convinced panel that this idiot.nom smart
‘John convinced the panel that this idiot is smart’.

Furthermore, it appears that the determiner that occurs with the epithet must be obligatorily overt. This requirement is illustrated by the Japanese example in (4). In Japanese it is typically assumed that noun phrases are accompanied by a null determiner; however the example in (4) shows that the epithet requires an overt determiner, in this case, sono.

Japanese

(4) OK kinoo John-wa [sono baka-o hontooni aisiteiru] fan-ni atta.
yesterday John-wa that idiot-acc really love fan-dat met
‘Yesterday, John₁ bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot₁’.

The data in (5) shows that Hindi patterns like Japanese; the data replicate the requirement for a demonstrative epithet as opposed to an unmarked epithet.

Hindi

(5) OK Kal Rohit₁ ek fan-se milaa jo ki *(us) bewakuuf₁-ko bahut chahtaa hai
yesterday Rohit a fan-with met.pfv Rel that that stupid-Acc lot want.hab is
‘Yesterday Rohit₁ met a fan who wants that stupid₁ a lot’.

The discussion above suggests that epithets require an overt determiner; however more must be said regarding the nominal part. I would like to point out that in principle, anything or anyone could be an epithet, if the corresponding world view is constructed. For example, the janitor

⁴ Pavel Rudnev (p.c.) points out that in Russian, ětot is not often used anaphorically: typically, the demonstrative tot is used, sometimes to mark coreference with a non-subject.
could refer to an honest, respectable position of employment, or, if we alter the world view, a degrading, low life, dirty occupation. This is true of more subtle epithets, for which examples are given in (6)\(^5\). Another observation that the reader should be aware of is that in order for a noun to be interpreted as an epithet, it must be unstressed. For example, *a dancer*, with regular stress can be understood non-evaluatively. However, if we unstress it, and construct the corresponding world view, then *dancer* can be understood evaluatively (i.e. it becomes an epithet).

(6) a. OK Yesterday John\(_1\) bumped into a fan who really loves the whistle blower\(_1\).

b. OK Yesterday John\(_1\) bumped into a fan who really loves the Naxalite\(_1\).

Other examples of a reinterpretation of regular R-expressions as epithets involve the German Oberlehrer (or Schulmeister) ‘schoolmaster’, which originated as an occupation, but nowadays is mainly used in its epithet reading Oberlehrer (or Schulmeister) ‘pedant’, with the adjective oberlehrerhaft (and schulmeisterhaft) ‘pedantic’\(^6\).

To briefly summarise, I propose that epithets are made up of a nominal part plus an obligatory determiner. In principle, most DP’s can be epithets depending on the world view that is constructed, and the data seem to suggest that they can be positively or negatively evaluated.\(^7\) This dissertation focuses on cases where epithets co-occur with a c-commanding antecedent, and is concerned with how their distribution is constrained in such cases. In the following section I would like to discuss a striking observation made by Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998), namely that

\(^5\) Thanks to Noam Chomsky (p.c.) for these examples.

\(^6\) Thanks to Patrick Grosz (p.c.) for the German examples.

\(^7\) There may be restrictions on more complex DPs used as epithets. Out of the blue, (ii) and (iii) seem less acceptable than (i). Thanks to Martin Hackl (p.c.) for the examples and for pointing this out.

i. OK Have you seen John\(_1\)? The idiot\(_1\) is late again.

ii. ?? Have you seen John\(_1\)? The idiot who forgot the broom in the basement\(_1\) is late again.

iii. ?? Have you seen John\(_1\)? The greatest idiot in the world\(_1\) is late again.

In this dissertation, I propose an appositive structure for epithets, where the idiot has a structure like *he, the idiot*. The examples in (ii) and (iii) indicate that the nominal appositive has to be suitable as a predicate, as in *he is an idiot*, but not *he is a greatest idiot in the world*. In the examples above, one restriction that may hold here is the difficulty of destressing a long phrase.
epithets cannot freely co-occur with a c-commanding antecedent. I will show that this observation can surprisingly, be found in many languages.

1.1.2 Epithets in Relative Clauses

Classical Condition C (of the Binding Theory, (cf. Chomsky (1981)) is a constraint that rules out constructions where an R-expression is coreferent with a c-commanding antecedent, or rather, is referentially dependent on a c-commanding antecedent. Evans (1980) observes that there are several types of relationships that fall under the umbrella term of coreference. He introduces the concept of referential dependency (see also Reinhart (1983b)). Referential dependency holds between two DPs if the meaning of one is dependent on the meaning of the other. For coreference in the broader sense, no such dependency is necessary, as it can be accidental (see also Lasnik (1976)) if both DPs denote the same entity due to the context. Consider the classical illustration of Condition C in (7).

Here, (7a) (where Harry Wormwood c-commands the actor) is ungrammatical, as it violates Condition C (with the intended reading where the actor refers back to Harry Wormwood, i.e. where the actor is referentially dependent on Harry Wormwood). Contrastively, (7b) (where Harry Wormwood does not c-command the actor) is grammatical, as it does not violate Condition C.

(7) a. * [Harry Wormwood]_{i} thinks that the actor_{i} is popular.

b. OK [Harry Wormwood’s_{i} mother] thinks that the actor_{i} is popular.

The difference between referential dependency and accidental coreference is illustrated by (7a) versus (8); example (8) is acceptable under a reading where Harry Wormwood sees an actor on TV without recognising him, and where that actor happens to be Harry Wormwood himself. Here, Harry Wormwood and the actor on TV end up accidentally coreferring (given that both refer to the same individual), but neither is referentially dependent on the other (indicated by different indices).
(8) **OK** [Harry Wormwood]_1_ thinks that [the actor on TV]_2_ is popular.

A classical example of such accidental coreference is illustrated in (9), from Higginbotham (1985), who attributes this type of example to Nancy Browman. The idea is that *he* and *John* corefer in the first sentence in (9), as becomes clear in the following sentences. Yet, this coreference is accidental, and no Condition C violation occurs.

(9) **OK** He put on John’s coat; but only John would do that; so he is John.

(Higginbotham 1985:570)

As we will see, the Condition C obviation effects that occur with epithets involve referential dependencies and not accidental coreference.

First, Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998) observe that epithets can obviate Condition C in certain contexts. One of the examples that they provide contains an epithet in a restrictive relative clause; an illustration is provided in (10). The intended reading is one where the epithet’s meaning is referentially dependent on the antecedent.

(10) **OK** John, ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idiot directions.

(Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998:687)

The above observation is a specific observation about epithets, and not a general observation about R-expressions. This becomes obvious when we contrast (11a) with (11b). As indicated, only (11a), which contains the epithet *the idiot*, exhibits the relevant “Condition C obviation” effect, whereas (11b) still seems to violate Condition C.

(11) a. **OK** Harry Wormwood, ran over a man who was trying to give the idiot directions.

    b. * Harry Wormwood, ran over a man who was trying to give the actor directions.

---

8 Evidence that this is referential dependency rather than accidental coreference is given in chapter 2, where it is shown that epithets can be syntactically bound.
A question that naturally arises here, is why does (11b) not allow for the relative clause to be late merged after Quantifier Raising of a man (cf. Lebeaux (1988))? The answer to this question is that such movement is not unconstrained; for instance, Fox (1999) discusses the examples in (12), which are ungrammatical even though QR should give rise to the LFs in (13).

(12) a. */? You bought him every picture that John liked.
   b. * He bought you every picture that John liked.

(Fox 1999:181)

(13) a. [every picture that John liked] [you bought him].
   b. [every picture that John liked] [he bought you].

(Fox 1999:181)

One possible factor that facilitates QR with late merge is Antecedent-Contained Deletion (ACD). In ACD, illustrated in (14a), a relative clause such as that John expected you would contains an elided VP. Furthermore, the antecedent of this elided VP contains the DP that the relative clause modifies; this is illustrated in (14b), where the bracketed phrase is the apparent antecedent VP for the elided VP. In other words, the VP ellipsis appears to be contained in its own antecedent VP. Authors such as Fox (1999) argue that ACD requires QR, with the result that the elided VP is no longer contained in its own antecedent; this is sketched in (14c).

(14) a. OK You sent him the letter that John expected you would.

(Fox 1999:185)

   b You [antecedent VP sent him the letter that John expected you would <elided VP>]
   c [the letter that John expected you would <elided VP>]2 [you [antecedent VP sent him t2]]

As a result, ACD creates configurations that may involve QR with late merge; this fact is illustrated by the contrast in (15) versus (16). Example (15) involves ACD and is acceptable,
whereas (16) does not involve ACD and is unacceptable; this is an observation that goes back to Fiengo & May (1994). The examples in (11) do not involve ACD, which accounts for the unacceptability of (11b) and leaves the acceptability of (11a) as a puzzle. Observe that the examples in (17a-b) differ from the examples in (16a-b) in the same way; if we replace the R-expression John by the epithet the idiot, the utterance becomes acceptable.

(15)  a. **OK** You sent him₁ the letter that John₁ expected you would.
    b. **OK** You reported him₁ to every cop that John₁ was afraid you would.

    (Fox 1999:185)

(16)  a. ??/* You sent him₁ the letter that John₁ expected you would write.
    b. ??/* You reported him₁ to every cop that John₁ was afraid of.

    (Fox 1999:184)

(17)  a. **OK** You sent him₁ the letter that the idiot₁ expected you would write.
    b. **OK** You reported him₁ to every cop that the idiot₁ was afraid of.

This dissertation focuses on precisely these cases, and other cases where epithets co-occur with a c-commanding antecedent, and is concerned with how their distribution is constrained in such cases. In this thesis I will not provide an analysis for the syntax of relative clauses, but focus on predicates that take clausal complements. Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998) observed constraints on epithets when they co-occur with a c-commanding antecedent; for instance, examples like (18) are ungrammatical. In the remainder of this chapter, I show that this observation is not unique to English, and can be reproduced cross-linguistically.

(18) * Harry Wormwood₁ thinks that the idiot₁ is popular.

Data that involve epithets are typically not evaluated cross-comparatively. The majority of research on the topic focuses on English, Thai and Arabic. Even here, the data have not been
contrasted from one language to the next in a way that allows us to make stronger, cross-linguistic generalisations. The reason for this is as follows. Epithets are an interface issue; they concern syntax, but also have a strong semantics and pragmatics component, due to the evaluativity property they possess; and it is this evaluativity component that contributes to fine grained judgments. In addition to “fuzzy data”, it is imperative that the individual languages’ syntax, semantics and pragmatics be taken into account when constructing stimuli for informants. In this dissertation, I will attempt to provide a cross-linguistic investigation of the distribution of epithets with a c-commanding antecedent, which is why I draw on a variety of languages throughout this dissertation. The reader should bear in mind that there is considerable variation amongst speakers as to whether they accept certain statements with epithets or not. In general, the data that I report are based on surveys that involved multiple speakers per language (where possible), and I focus on data that could be reproduced across speakers, as well as across languages. This is also a good place to point out that some interesting differences between languages emerge, which I will document, but they are not in the focus of this dissertation; for instance, Dutch speakers generally seem to accept a wider range of examples than speakers from other languages – it is a topic for future research to see how this kind of seemingly parametric variation can be explained.

Before I propose an analysis for the distribution of epithets with a c-commanding antecedent, I want to show that examples like (11a) are not specific to English. In fact, the same pattern first observed by Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998) can be found in many languages. In the following overview, I present cases where the antecedent is a pronoun, as Schlenker (2005) claims that these are less acceptable than cases where the antecedent is an R-expression (given in (19a) vs (19b)). What we find is that for most languages, no such difference can be attested, i.e. (19b) is equally acceptable to (19a); however the reader should observe that even in English there is inter-speaker variation (for example, there are speakers who do not get a contrast between (19a) and (19b), and accept both equally well), suggesting that this contrast is subtle.
(19)  a. **OK** Johni ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idioti directions. (= (10))  
   b. How about John?  
     ? Hei ran over a man who was trying to give [the idiot], directions.  

(Schlenker 2005:396)

To start with, consider the Czech data in (20). In this language, epithets in relative clauses can be referentially dependent on a c-commanding antecedent, whether it is a pronoun or an R-expression; this is illustrated by the data given in (20).

*Czech*

(20)  a. **OK** Včera Honza narazil na fanouška, který toho idiota úplně zbožňuje.  
     yesterday Honza bumped on fan who that idiot totally adores  
     ‘Yesterday, Johni bumped into a fan who really loves the idioti.’  

b. **OK** Zrovna jsem mluvil s Honzou. Včera pro narazil na fanouška,  
     just aux.pst.1sg talked with Honza yesterday bumped on fan  
     který toho idiota úplně zbožňuje.  
     who that idiot totally adores  
     ‘Just talked to Johni. Yesterday, hei bumped into a fan who really loves the idioti.’

Languages as diverse as Croatian, Dutch, French, Hindi, Hungarian, Russian and Slovenian behave the same as Czech; the data are given in (21)-(27). Identical to the contrast between (20a) versus (20b), these languages do not draw a difference between an R-expression antecedent and a pronominal antecedent.
(21) a. \(^{70}\text{OK}\) Jučer je John, naletio na obožavatelja koji stvarno obožava tog idiot\(_1\),
adore those idiot
‘Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot\(_1\).’

b. \(^{70}\text{OK}\) Upravo sam razgovarao s Johnom. Jučer je pro
just aux.1sg talked with John. yesterday aux.3sg
naletio na obožavatelja koji stvarno obožava tog idiot\(_1\).
bumped.ptcpl on fan who really adores those idiot\(_1\).
‘Just talked to John\(_1\). Yesterday, he\(_1\) bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot\(_1\).’

(22) a. \(^{70}\text{OK}\) Gisteren kwam Jan een fan tegen die helemaal dol is op de idioot\(_1\),
yesterday met Jan a fan pt who entirely fond is of the idiot
‘Yesterday John met a fan who is really fond of the idiot.’

b. \(^{70}\text{OK}\) Heb net met Jan gesproken. Gisteren kwam hij een fan tegen
have just with Jan spoken. yesterday came he a fan pt
die helemaal dol is op de idioot\(_1\),
who entirely fond is of the idiot
‘Just talked to John\(_1\). Yesterday, he\(_1\) bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot\(_1\).’

(23) a. \(^{70}\text{OK}\) Hier, John est tombé sur un fan qui adore cet imbécile.
yesterday John\(_1\) is fallen onto a fan who loves the idiot\(_1\).
‘Yesterday John bumped a fan who loves the idiot.’
b. **OK** Je viens juste de parler à John. Hier, il est tombé sur un fan qui adore cet imbécile.

'I just talked to John. Yesterday, he bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot.'

---

The examples in (i) and (ii) show that different translations of the same sentence behave the same way in Hindi.

i. **OK** kal John, acaanak ek fan se Takraa gayaa jo muurkh ko sac meiM pyaar karta hai / caaataa hai / pasaMd kartaai hai. 'Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot.'

ii. **OK** John, se abhii abhii baat kii. kal vo ek fan se acaanak Takraa gayaa jo muurkh, ko sac meiM caaataa hai. 'Just talked to John. Yesterday, he bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot.'
b. OK Épp most beszélem Jánossal. Tegnap pro belebotlott egy rajongóba, I just spoke Janos with yesterday stumbled into a fan

  aki szereti az idiótát.
  who loves the idiot

  ‘Just talked to John. Yesterday, he bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot.’

(26) a. OK John včera vstrel poklonnicu, kotoraja bogotvorit etogo idiota. John yesterday met fan.fem who.fem adores this idiot

  ‘Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot.’

b. OK Tolko čto zvonil John. On včera vstrel poklonnicu, kotoraja just now rang John he yesterday met fan.fem who.fem

  bogotvorit etogo idiota.
  adores this idiot

  ‘Just talked to John on the phone. Yesterday, he bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot’

(27) a. OK Včeraj je John naletel na oboževalca, ki res yesterday, cl Johni bumped into fan who really

  obožuje tega idiota.
  loves the idiot

  ‘Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot.’

---

11Again, we find that different translations show the same pattern, given in (i) and (ii).

i. OK Včera Ivan vstrelil fanat-a, kotor-ýj po-nastojaschemu lubi-t idiot-a,

   yesterday, John meet-PST-M fan-ACC who/which-M really love-PRS.3SG idiot-ACC.

ii. OK Tol’ko chto govori-l s Ivan-om,

   only that talk-PST.M.SG with John-INSTR.

   Včera on, vstrelil fanat-a, kotor-ýj po-nastojaschemu lubi-t idiot-a,

   Yesterday, he meet-PST-M fan-ACC who-M really love-PRS.3SG idiot-ACC.
b. OK Ravnokar sem govoril z Johnom.
just talked to Johni.

Včeraj je pro našetel na oboževalca, ki res obožuje tega idiota.
Yesterday, cl bumped into fan who really loves the idioti.

‘Just talked to John. Yesterday, he bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot’

For completeness’ sake, it is worth pointing out that languages that exhibit the pattern that Schlenker (2005) observes, include Flemish, Japanese and Spanish; these data are given in (28)-(30).

Flemish

(28) a. OK Gisteren ei Jef een vrouw gezien da daue stoemerik
yesterday has Jef a woman seen that that idiot
al juire volgt.
already years follows

‘Yesterday, Jefi bumped into a fan who has been following the idioti for years.’

b. ?? Kem just me Jef geklapt. Ij ei gisteren een vrouw gezien da daue
I have just with J spoken he has yesterday a woman seen that the
stoemerik al juire volgt.
idiot already years follows

‘Just talked to Jefi. Yesterday, he bumped into a fan who really loves the idioti.’

Japanese

yesterday John-wa that idiot-acc really love fan-dat met

‘Yesterday, John1 bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot1.’
b. ?? Ima John-to hanasita. Kinoo kare-wa [sono baka-o hontooni aisiteiru] now John-with talked. yesterday he-top that idiot-acc really love
fan-ni atta.
fan-dat met
‘Just talked to John. Yesterday, he bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot.’

(30) a. OK Ayer, Juan se encontró con un admirador que adora a ese idiota. yesterday Juan self met with an admirer who adores to this idiot
‘Yesterday, Juan bumped into a fan who loves the idiot.’

b. ?? Acabo de hablar con Juan. Ayer, pro se encontró con un admirador finished of speak with Juan yesterday self met with an admirer
que adora a ese idiota. who adores to this idiot
‘Just talked to Juan. Yesterday, he bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot.’

I conjecture that this contrast reflects a subtle preference in how speakers utilise pronouns. The idea is that speakers try to introduce evaluative information as early as possible. In the examples in (28b), (29b) and (30b), the deviance is due to the fact that speakers prefer a variant where the first pronoun is realised as an epithet. In other words, Schlenker’s (2005:396) example in (31a), repeated from (19b), is deviant due to a preference for (31b).

(31) a. How about John?
?
Hei ran over a man who was trying to give [the idiot], directions.

b. How about John?
OK [The idiot], ran over a man who was trying to give him, directions.

I assume that this is a universal, but subtle preference, and not a grammatical restriction. The fact that some speakers exhibit this contrast whilst others don’t may reflect variation amongst speakers. This is supported by the fact that in Spanish, some of my informants find the version
where the antecedent is a pronoun, (30b) above, less acceptable than the alternative, (30a), but other informants find both variants equally acceptable. To conclude this discussion, the question should be addressed why Dubinsky & Hamilton’s (1998:687) example in (32a), repeated from (10), does not compete with an example like (32b) in the same way. This seems to be due to the fact that (32b) is marked, as indicated. I attribute the markedness of (32b) to the fact that in (32) John introduces a new referent, which seems to clash with modification by the idiot.

(32)  a. OK John, ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idiot directions.
     b. ? [John, the idiot,] ran over a man (who was) trying to give him directions.

Based on the above data, we can safely conclude that Dubinsky & Hamilton’s (1998) observation for English can be reproduced in many languages. In this section we have seen that epithets in a (restrictive) relative clause can be c-commanded by antecedents outside this relative clause, which they are referentially dependent on, suggesting that they are not subject to Condition C in such contexts, or at least they obviate Condition C. It is worth pointing out, that in the acceptable examples we have seen so far, there is often material between the epithet and the antecedent; for example in (17b), the colleague occurs between the epithet and the antecedent.

One question that arises here is whether we are truly dealing with restrictive relative clauses (as opposed to appositive relative clauses); in other words, we want to know whether the antecedent truly c-commands the epithet (which may not be the case in appositive relative clauses (cf. Safir (1986))\textsuperscript{12}. The examples in (33) and (34) indicate that in restrictive relative clauses, the antecedent does c-command the epithet. We know that the relative clause is restrictive, since the relative clause serves to identify its head noun.

\textsuperscript{12} This is shown by the examples in (i) versus (ii), quoted from Safir (1986:672), which Safir attributes to Luigi Rizzi. The pronoun in the restrictive relative clause in (ii) can be bound by the subject, but the pronoun in the appositive relative clause in (i) cannot.

ii. OK Every Christian, forgives a man who harms him.
The same point can be made by the following examples from Czech, Dutch, Croatian and French in (35)-(38); here, the restrictive relative clause introduces new information that contrasts with the old information provided in the previous clause and serves to determine the referent of somebody. In other words, of the possible people that the subject (Karel, Jan, ...) may have met, the speaker uses the restrictive relative clause to single out the one who really loves the subject.
The first observation presented in this section can be summarised as follows: In many languages, epithets can be c-commanded by an antecedent that they are referentially dependent
on, across clause-boundaries, if they are located in a restrictive relative clause. We now move on
to another observation that will be at the core of this dissertation.

1.1.3 Epithets in Complement Clauses

If we look beyond relative clauses, we find that epithets can also occur in complement clauses,
e.g. with the matrix predicate convince. To start with, I provide a Croatian example in (39a) and
a Hindi example in (40a); in both cases, the epithet is c-commanded across a clause-boundary by
an antecedent that it is referentially dependent on. In the examples under discussion, the epithet
is in a complement clause and its antecedent is the matrix subject. We will see examples from
more languages throughout this dissertation of this nature. What the contrast between (39a) and
(39b) shows us, is that once again, epithets differ from other R-expressions; only the former are
acceptable in such configurations.

Croatian

(39) a. OK Peter1 je uvjerio predstavniка da će prokleti izdajnik1 riješiti problem.
    Peter aux.3sg convinced.ptcpl representatives that will.3sg damn traitor solve problem.
    ‘Peter1 convinced the representatives that the damn traitor1 would solve the problem.’

b. * Bill1 je uvjerio predstavniка da će podvornik1 riješiti problem.
    Bill aux.3sg convinced.ptcpl representatives that will.3sg janitor solve problem.
    ‘Bill1 convinced the representatives that the janitor1 would solve the problem.’

The same observation can be found in Hindi; this is illustrated by the data in (40a) versus (40b).
The epithet vo deshdrohii ‘that traitor’ can be referentially dependent on a c-commanding
antecedent, (40a), but the R-expression vo jamaadaar ‘that sweeper’ cannot, (40b).
We may now be led to believe that epithets can freely occur with a c-commanding antecedent, but this is not correct either. As shown in (41), epithets cannot refer to c-commanding antecedents in the same clause. This is illustrated by the Croatian and Hindi data below.

(41) a. * Peter_{1} je uvrijedio majku prokleti izdajniki_{1}. Croatian
   Peter AUX.3sg insulted mother.ACC damn.GEN traitor.GEN
   ‘Peter_{1} insulted the damn traitor's_{1} mother.’

        b. * Rohit-ne_{1} us desdrohii-kii_{1} maaN-kaa apmaan kiyaa. Hindi
    Rohit-Erg that traitor-Gen.f mother-Gen insult do.Pfv
   ‘Rohit_{1} insulted the damn traitor's_{1} mother.’

Similarly, it appears that the nature of the matrix predicate also seems to play a role. Consider the examples in (42); here we see that epithets are less acceptable in complements to think than in complements to convince. This observation is illustrated by the following examples; example (42a) contrasts with (39a), and (42b) contrasts with (40a).

(42) a. * Peter_{1} misli da je prokleti izdajnik_{1} pametan. Croatian
    Peter thinks that AUX.3sg damn traitor smart
    ‘Peter_{1} thinks that the damn traitor_{1} is smart.’
This dissertation aims at explaining the distribution of epithets in contexts where they occur with a c-commanding antecedent; i.e. I aim at deriving contrasts such as the ones between (42) and (39a)/(40a).

### 1.2 Sneak Peek

This section provides an overview of the core questions that this dissertation addresses. Alongside these questions, I will discuss (briefly) my own approach to the issues at hand. In Chapter 2, I start by discussing a long-standing debate in the literature as to whether epithets are pronouns or R-expressions. This will become crucial later, for whether an epithet is a pronoun or an R-expression will partially determine the locality constraints that apply to it (i.e. Principle B of the Binding Theory\(^3\) if it is a pronoun, and Principle C of the Binding Theory if it is an R-expression). In Chapter 2.1, I outline the controversy present in the literature, and I side with the camp that claims that epithets are pronouns. In addition to various forms of evidence from the literature, I present cross-linguistic empirical evidence of my own in Chapter 2.2, which is perhaps the strongest observation that favours the argumentation that epithets are indeed pronouns: I will show that epithets can be syntactically bound (as opposed to only semantically bound, which is the case with e-type readings) by a quantifier. A first illustration of such quantifier-variable binding is given in (43) (where the assumption holds that speaker B hates artists). Moreover, the binding relationship that we see in (43) illustrates that in the case of epithets, we find referential dependency and not accidental coreference, because the meaning of the epithet is dependent on the meaning of the DP that binds it (here: every artist). One new observation that this dissertation makes is that when epithets appear to violate Condition C, this violation happens in spite of a referential dependency between the epithet and its antecedent, and

\(^3\) Here I refer to Chomsky’s (1981) Binding Theory.
is not due to accidental coreference, which underlies other types of Condition C obviation\(^\text{14}\) (cf. (9) above).

\textit{Russian}

(43) A: Kakuju devušku privjol na prazdnij prijom každyj xudožnik iz tvoego goroda?

Which girl brought to festive reception each artist from your town?

‘Which girl did each of the artists from your town bring to the festive reception?’

B: OK Samo soboj, každyj xudožnik\(_1\) privjol tu (samuju) devušku, naturally each artist brought that very girl kotoraja po-nastojasčemu ljubit često idiota\(_1\) that really loves this idiot

‘Naturally, each/every artist brought the one woman who really loves the idiot’

Having argued that epithets have the properties of pronouns, in Chapter 2.3 I will argue that epithets are nominal appositives that have a null anchor. I draw on diagnostics from Kayne (2010) and den Dikken (2001) which substantiate this claim. This new observation and the argumentation based on diagnostics from Kayne (2010) and den Dikken (2001) give rise to the following question: if epithets are pronouns, why do they appear to trigger Condition C violations at all? This is addressed in Chapters 3 and 4.

In Chapter 3, I introduce my semantic analysis for epithets and argue that they can be treated according to a two-dimensional semantics that is compatible with the views of Potts, (2003), (2005), (2007), Schlenker (2007) and Sauerland (2007); a summary of the basic idea is presented in (44). Consider the answer given in (44a), where the idiot is an epithet referring to Fritz. The analysis I argue for is given in (44b), where the epithet involves a nominal appositive, the idiot, that modifies a null anchor, pro. Assuming (in the spirit of McCawley 1982, Schlenker 2010, to appear) that appositives are interpreted in conjunction with their host clause, I assume that (44b) is interpreted as in (44c), which gives rise to the presupposition (in Schlenker’s (2007)

\(^\text{14}\) I thank Noam Chomsky (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
and Sauerland’s (2007) view) or conventional implicature (in Potts’s (2003), (2005), (2007) view) in (44e) (which contains the evaluative content of the epithet) and the (main) assertion in (44d). I discuss the details in section 3.3.3.

(44) a. Do you know Fritz₁? John just met the idiot₁.
   b. syntactic analysis: John just met pro₁(,) the idiot.
   c. interpretation of appositive: John just met pro₁(,) and he₁ is the/an idiot.₁⁵
   d. assertion: John just met Fritz₁(, and he₁ is the/a (salient) person).₁⁶
   e. presupposition: The speaker/John/a salient person believes that Fritz₁ is stupid.

A prediction that arises from the claim that epithets are pronouns (namely nominal appositives with a null anchor) is that epithets and pronouns should pattern alike in all environments. In other words, they should have the same distribution. However this is not what we see in (45). The data show that when epithets are in complement clauses, they do not pattern like pronouns, but R-expressions (45a)/(45d) vs (45b)/(45c). This raises the following question: If epithets are pronouns, why are they unacceptable in cases where pronouns are acceptable? In other words, we know that R-expressions cannot be referentially dependent on a c-commanding antecedent, which is why (45d) is ungrammatical. Contrastively, pronouns can be referentially dependent on

₁⁵ It is unclear at this point whether a nominal appositive the idiot is interpreted as he is the idiot or he is an idiot. One possible view is that the remains uninterpreted, as in Potts (2003, 2005), so the resulting interpretation is equivalent to the copula construction he is an idiot. By contrast, Aoun, Choueiri & Hornstein (2001) use the variant he is the idiot in their rendering of similar appositives in Lebanese Arabic. We have seen in an earlier footnote that (ii) and (iii) seem less acceptable than (i) (Martin Hackl, p.c.).

₁. OK Have you seen John₁? The idiot₁ is late again.
  ii. ?? Have you seen John₁? The idiot who forgot the broom in the basement₁ is late again.
  iii. ?? Have you seen John₁? The greatest idiot in the world₁ is late again.

This supports the interpretation as he is an idiot versus he is the idiot, as we cannot say *he is a greatest idiot in the world, but we can say he is the greatest idiot in the world.

₁⁶ I consider the possibility that an epithet, such as idiot, also introduces the (vacuous) assertion ‘he is the/a (salient) person’, based on Schlenker’s (2007) analysis of honky; see chapter 3.3.3, in particular (160) and (161). As we will see, this may be necessary to account for statements such as some idiot just asked for you on the phone.
their antecedent, which is why (45b-c) are grammatical. If epithets (as a type of pronoun) can be referentially dependent on a c-commanding antecedent, why is (45a) ill-formed?17

(45) a. * John1 thinks that the idiot1 is smart.  
    Epithet  
  b. OK John1 thinks that he1 is smart.  
    Pronoun  
  c. OK John1 thinks that he, the idiot1, is smart.  
    Pronoun + Nominal Appositive  
  d. * John1 thinks that the teacher1 is smart.  
    R-expression

This core question is addressed in Chapter 3, where I hone in on the distribution of epithets in complement clauses, and focus particularly on the role of the matrix predicate. In order to set the stage for the answer to the question under discussion, consider the English example in (46). Notice that the difference between think and convince (and possibly the presence of the second DP Peter) is relevant for the acceptability/unacceptability of an embedded epithet with a c-commanding antecedent.

(46) a. * John1 thinks that the idiot1 is smart.  
  b. OK John1 convinced Peter that the idiot1 is smart.

Observe that in (46a) and (46b), the antecedent John c-commands the epithet the idiot. If we contrast (46b) with (47), we notice that (47) is also acceptable. However, this is less surprising, as there are contrasts such as (48a) versus (48b), which involve R-expressions that are not epithets, and indicate that the object of convince does not c-command material inside the complement clause.

(47) OK Peter convinced John1 that the idiot1 is smart.

(48) a. * The director1 convinced John that the director1 is smart.  
  b. OK John convinced the director1 that the director1 is smart.

17 See the discussion around (275)-(278) for an explanation of the difference between (45a) and (45c).
In the remainder of Chapter 3, I present my solution, accounting for the contrast between the complement of *think* and the complement of *convince*. The basic idea is that epithets are evaluated from the perspective of a given individual, which I will call the *evaluator*; this seems to make epithets sensitive to the so-called judge parameter, which enters the meaning computation of predicates of personal taste. Importantly, Stephenson (2007) argues that in the case of *think*, the judge corresponds to the matrix subject, whereas in the case of *convince*, it corresponds to the matrix object. To account for the difference between *think* and *convince* with respect to epithets, I argue that when an epithet is in an embedded clause, the antecedent cannot be the judge of that embedded clause.

I refine this proposal in Chapter 4, where I focus on the contrast between (49a) and (49b). More striking than (46), the example in (31) exhibits a subject-object asymmetry in complements of *think*; the data show that if an epithet is in the complement of *think*, it can be c-commanded by its antecedent from the matrix subject position when the epithet is in the embedded object position, but not when it is in the embedded subject position.

(49) a. * Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor₁] will be invited to the reception.  
    b. OK Nero, thinks that they will invite [the damn traitor₁] to the reception.

To account for this subject/object asymmetry, I argue that complements of *think* have a *de se* LF in the spirit of Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b). This entails that a pronoun inside the complement clause that ‘refers’ to the matrix subject is actually uninterpreted. Assuming that nominal appositives cannot attach to an uninterpreted anchor (cf. Demirdache & Percus (2011)), we can thus argue that the epithet must be interpreted in the matrix clause and *LF move* into the matrix clause from the embedded clause, where it is pronounced. In Chapter 4, I pursue precisely this idea and propose that epithets can only move from an (embedded) object position, not from an (embedded) subject position.

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18 For completeness’ sake, it is worth pointing out that *convince* also occurs as an object control verb, which raises the question of whether a verb like *promise* (which also occurs as a subject control predicate) behaves differently. Complements of *promise* typically do not describe a belief state or knowledge state, so it is less clear who would be the judge. Intuitively, *promise* does not differ from *convince* in examples like (46b).
Chapter 2: The Syntactic Structure of Epithets

2.1 The Distribution of Epithets

In addition to the dispute discussed in the previous chapter regarding what epithets are (i.e. pronouns vs R-expressions), there is an additional controversy regarding what types of locality constraints they are subject to. Jackendoff (1969, 1972) observed cases of intrasentential co-reference between an epithet and a non-local NP. Based on examples such as those in (50), he proposed that epithets are a type of pronoun.

(50) a. OK I wanted Charlie, to help me, but the bastardi wouldn’t do it.
    b. OK Irvingi was besieged by a horde of bills and the poor guy, couldn’t pay them.
    c. OK Although the bumi tried to hit me, I can’t really get too mad at Harryi.

Jackendoff (1972:110)

Jackendoff (1969, 1972) suggests that although epithets are pronouns, they have a narrower distribution than pronouns; they can only occur in a subset of environments where pronominalisation can be found (though he does not discuss this claim further, nor state the environments in which epithets are pronoun-like).

Lasnik (1976) argues against such a view, and proposes that epithets are R-expressions. Lasnik’s (1976) reasoning is that epithets pattern like canonical R-expressions, meaning that they resist binding. He observes that examples such as (50) contrast with those in (51) in that the latter are ungrammatical19.

19 Earlier than Lasnik (1976), Postal (1972) also observes, in a brief discussion of Jackendoff (1969), that whenever epithets can occur in the same environment as pronouns, the respective environments lack c-command between the epithet and its antecedent, as shown in (i). However, Postal still maintains the possibility that epithets are pronouns.

    i. *Melvin, claims that the bastard, was honest.

Postal (1972:247)
(51)  a. *John/*He/*The sissy, realizes that the sissy, is going to lose.
      
      b. *John, thinks that I admire the idioti.

Lasnik (1976:11)

Lasnik argues that the contrast between the examples in (50) and (51) is the same contrast that we find between (52a), (53a), (54a) and (52b), (53b), (54b). The examples in (52a), (53a) and (54a) are acceptable, for in these cases the R-expression is free (as there is no c-command). In contrast the bound R-expressions in (52b), (53b) and (54b) which do involve c-command, result in unacceptability (with R-expressions unlike with pronouns). Lasnik (1976) concludes that the behaviour of the epithets is in accordance with the behaviour of R-expressions. Thus he concluded that epithets are R-expressions and subject to Condition C of the Binding Theory.

(52)  a. That Oscar was unpopular was finally realised by Oscar.
      
      b. Oscar finally realised that he/*Oscar is unpopular.

Lasnik (1976:11)

(53)  a. That John is well liked proves that we ought to hire John as public relations director.
      
      b. It surprised John that he/*John is so well liked

Lasnik (1976:11)

(54)  a. That Harry won the race really surprised Harry.
      
      b. Harry was really surprised that he/*Harry lost the race.

Lasnik (1976:11)

In later work Lasnik (1989) developed his claim, and further argued that although epithets are R-expressions, they may also be pronominal, on the basis of data comparison from English and

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Thai. Lasnik (1989) observed that Thai does not exhibit Condition C effects, however the language does appear to observe Condition B of the Binding Theory. Based on examples such as (55), Lasnik illustrates that in Thai, epithets parallel the behaviour of pronouns; they must not be bound in a local domain. Given the empirical scope, Lasnik (1989) concluded\(^{21}\) that given the observations present in English and Thai, epithets are pronominal R-expressions.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(55) a. } & \text{ C} \text{oon } \text{choop } \text{C} \text{oon.} \\
& \text{John} \text{ i } \text{likes } \text{John} \text{ i} \\
& \text{‘John likes John’} \\
\text{b. } & \text{ C} \text{oon } \text{choop } \text{khaw} \\
& \text{John} \text{ i } \text{likes him} \text{ i} \\
& \text{‘John like him’ (where him refers to John)} \\
\text{c. } & \text{ C} \text{oon } \text{choop } \text{?aybaa} \\
& \text{John} \text{ i } \text{likes the nut} \text{ i} \\
& \text{‘John likes the nut’}
\end{align*}
\]

Lasnik (1989:153)

The debate regarding the status of epithets as either (i) R-expressions, (ii) pronouns or (iii) both, has been further probed in recent literature. Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998) challenge the claim that epithets are R-expressions. They observe acceptable examples (given in (56)), where a referent structurally binds an epithet under c-command. Recall that the claim that epithets are R-expressions was based on Lasnik’s (1976, 1989) observation that epithets, like R-expressions cannot be structurally bound by a c-commanding antecedent (see also footnote 19). However, Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998) show that this is not the case. Their (new) data seems to favour Jackendoff’s (1969, 1972) initial proposal that epithets are in fact, pronouns.

\(^{21}\) Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998) point out that in both works, Lasnik (1976, 1989), Lasnik is assuming that epithets behave the same across languages - despite the fact that the two languages under discussion clearly have different locality constraints.
Given the acceptability of the examples in (56), and the fact that the epithet is bound by a c-commanding antecedent, Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998) argue that the constraint that governs epithets cannot be c-command (as originally suggested by Postal (1972)). If it were, we would expect the examples in (56) to be unacceptable. However, given this observation, it is not immediately clear what gives rise to the unacceptable examples given above (Cf. (51)), if c-command is not the relevant constraint. Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998) argue that given the data in (56), the unacceptability of the examples in (51) is not due to Condition C of the Binding Theory, but due to the fact that epithets are *anti-logophoric*; I will come back to this proposal in Chapter 3 and discuss it explicitly in Chapter 4.3.1.

### 2.2. Evidence for Treating Epithets as Pronouns

#### 2.2.1 Evidence from the Previous Literature

We have seen that there is a long-standing debate as to whether epithets are best classified as pronouns or R-expressions. I agree with Jackendoff's original claim that epithets are pronouns; this section reviews some evidence from the literature that favours this claim. In addition, I will also present new, additional arguments that lean towards this view.

First, I would like to discuss an observation from Lebanese Arabic. Aoun & Choueiri (2000) argue that epithets in Lebanese Arabic consist of a rigid structure. This is illustrated by the examples in (57). The example in (57a) illustrates that the epithet *habiile* ‘idiot’ / *fimaar* ‘ass’ consists of a definite noun phrase, which contains an article or a demonstrative. The example given in (57b) shows that it is not possible to use this particular structure for non-

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22 In Lebanese Arabic, the expressive component of epithets is typically negative. Cf. Aoun & Choueiri (2000) for further discussion and data.
modified DP’s or NP’s. (However, Aoun & Choueiri (2000) point out that this structure is not restricted to epithets, but it is also used for modified nouns, as shown by (57c)).

Lebanese Arabic

(57) a. OK ha-1-habiile / maasTuul / fimaar Saami
     this-the-idiot idiot ass Saami
     ‘this idiot/ass Saami’

b. * ha-1- fiakiim Saami / mudiira
     this-the-doctor Saami / director
     ‘this doctor Saami / this director’

c. OK ha-z-zakiyye Nadjia
     this-the-smart Nadjia
     ‘this smart Nadjia’

Aoun & Choueiri (2000:2-3)

The question is how to best analyse the construction in (57a). Aoun & Choueiri (2000) observe that there are two classes of pronominal elements in Lebanese Arabic. The first type of bound variable, ha- ‘this’, functions as bound variables or resumptive pronouns; these are the ones that occur in epithets and have the structure [ha- + NP]. The authors argue that in the example in (58a), where an epithet seems to be bound by a quantifier, it is actually the ha- morpheme that is being bound by wala walad (no boy), and not the nominal plus determiner combined (ha-1-mal?uun ‘the damned devil’). In contrast, the l- ‘the’ morpheme in (58b) is not a pronominal element of the type that can be bound, in other words, it is not a pronoun. This second type of pronominal element can only be used deictically. I will not discuss Aoun and Choueiri’s deictic pronoun further, since they are irrelevant for our discussion at hand; I refer the reader Aoun & Choueiri (2000) for further discussion regarding this matter.
What is important for the purpose of this dissertation is the fact that (58a) involves an epithet %\textit{ha-l-\(\text{mal}\)\?uun} ‘the damned devil’, which is c-commanded by its antecedent %\textit{wala\ walad} ‘no boy’, i.e. it occurs in the kind of configuration that we are interested in. The fact that it must contain the pronoun %\textit{ha-} and cannot occur with the determiner %\textit{l-} indicates that epithets have a pronominal component, at least when they are c-commanded by their antecedent. This can be taken as preliminary evidence that epithets have the distribution of pronouns.

Moving away from the internal structure of epithets and turning to their distribution, the fact that epithets have the distribution of pronouns can be found when we look at the behaviour of NPs and DPs modified by a post-nominal (attributive) adjective phrase (cf. Baker (2003), Radford (2004)). The following data from Alexiadou et al. (2007) illustrate my point: pronouns cannot be modified by such adjectives (Cf Abney (1987), Bhat (2004)). This contrast between definite noun phrases and pronouns is given in (59a-b) versus (59c-d).
The question that arises at this point is whether epithets pattern like the definite description the student, or like the pronoun he. In other words, can epithets be modified by a post-nominal adjective phrase? The examples in (48), which I have constructed, based on the data from Alexiadou et al. (2007), seem to suggest that the answer to this question is no. The examples in (60) show that epithets, in this case the idiot, pattern like a pronoun as opposed to the definite description. The example in (60a) is acceptable under a reading where the manager (being an R-expression) cannot refer to Bill. In contrast, the example in (60b), containing an epithet that is modified by a post-nominal adjective phrase, is unacceptable; the example in (60c) shows that an epithet that is not modified by a post-nominal adjective is acceptable in the same construction, and allows for referential dependence on a c-commanding antecedent. Examples (60b) and (60c) have the structure where the antecedent c-commands the epithet; the same pattern holds in cases where the epithet is not c-commanded by its antecedent, as shown in (61). The data suggest that epithets cannot undergo adjectival modification, and thus pattern like pronouns.

(60) a. OK Billi later discovered a problem that [the manager present at the meeting]k had overlooked the day before.
   b. * Billi later discovered a problem that [the idiot present at the meeting]i had overlooked the day before.
   c. OK Billi later discovered a problem that [the idiot]i had overlooked the day before.

(61) a. OK I just talked to Billi. Yesterday, [the manager present at the meeting]k overlooked this problem.
b. * I just talked to Billi. Yesterday, [the idiot present at the meeting], overlooked this problem.

c. OK I just talked to Billi. Yesterday, [the idiot], overlooked this problem.

Evidence from Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998), Aoun & Choueiri (2000) plus the argument based on Alexiadou et al. (2007), appears to favour the view that epithets are pronouns, as originally proposed by Jackendoff (1969, 1971). In addition to this evidence, recent work by Beller (2011) suggests that prosodically, epithets pattern like pronouns as well. The data in (62) show the prosodic patterning of pronouns; (62a) illustrates a case where there is broad focus, in contrast, (62b) shows that a sentence final pronoun results in the stress shifting to the prefinal word. Finally, when the sentence final pronoun is stressed, Beller (2011) observes that it results in narrow focus; this is illustrated by the example given in (62c).

(62) a. OK [Susan slapped JIM]$_F$

b. OK [Susan SLAPPED him]$_F$

c. OK Susan slapped [HIM]$_F$

(adapted from Beller 2011:1)

Given the data in (63), Beller (2011) concludes that epithets pattern like pronouns with respect to prosody. Beller’s observation can be illustrated by the Ladd example given in (58). Here, we observe a sentence-final epithet (63a), where the surgeon is referred to as the butcher, triggering stress shift, as in (62b) above, which contains a sentence-final pronoun. By contrast, if the stress is on butcher, as in (63b), the only possible reading is a literal (non-epithet) reading of butcher. These observations of Beller (2011) support a view where epithets are (in some sense) pronouns, or at least have the syntactic distribution of pronouns.
(63) How was your operation?
   a. Don’t ask me about it. I’d like to STRANGLE the butcher (butcher = surgeon)
   b. Don’t ask me about it. I’d like to strangle the BUTCHER (butcher = butcher)  

   (Beller 2011:1, attributing it to Ladd 2008)

2.2.2 New Evidence from Quantifier-Variable Binding

In addition to the above evidence that appears to suggest that epithets are pronouns, I would like to present further argumentation, possibly the strongest, for this claim. Since the birth of contemporary Binding Theory (cf. Chomsky (1981)), it is common knowledge that R-expressions must be free, whereas pronouns can be bound\textsuperscript{23}. In the example in (64), the pronoun \textit{he} is a bound variable that co-varies with the quantifier \textit{every man} under c-command. In other words, in (64) the pronoun is syntactically bound by the quantifier. The example in (65) illustrates that an R-expression, in this case, \textit{the man}, cannot co-vary with a quantifier in the same construction, and thus cannot be syntactically bound under c-command. In the remainder of this section, I will show that epithets \textit{can} co-vary with a quantifier under c-command, parallel to pronouns, and not to R-expressions\textsuperscript{24}.

(64) OK \{Every man\}, thinks he\textsubscript{i} is intelligent.
   \hspace{1cm} = For every x such that x is a man, x thinks that x is intelligent

(65) * \{Every man\}, thinks [the man\textsubscript{j}] is intelligent.
   \hspace{1cm} (intended:) For every x such that x is a man, x thinks that x is intelligent

It is important here to control for c-command, as R-expressions can co-vary with some quantifiers (such as the existential quantifier in (67)) without being bound, even if there is no c-command relation; this is illustrated by the example in (66). However, note that this context

\textsuperscript{23} Cf. Reuland (2011) for a complete overview of Binding Theory.

\textsuperscript{24} See also the recent work of Demirdache \& Percus (2011a, 2011b), who also argue that epithets can behave as bound variables in certain contexts.
does not involve syntactic binding (as there is no c-command) and is typical for so-called e-type pronouns, as in (67)\textsuperscript{25}.

(66) Ok [Every woman who loves [a man];] thinks [the man], is intelligent.

\[
\text{For every } y \text{ such that } y \text{ is a woman and there is an } x \text{ such that } x \text{ is a man, if } y \text{ loves } x, \\
\text{then } y \text{ thinks that } x \text{ is intelligent}
\]

(67) Ok [Every woman who loves [a man];] thinks he; is intelligent.

\[
\text{For every } y \text{ such that } y \text{ is a woman and there is an } x \text{ such that } x \text{ is a man, if } y \text{ loves } x, \\
\text{then } y \text{ thinks that } x \text{ is intelligent}
\]

In what follows, I will argue that epithets can be syntactically bound under c-command. This evidence for treating epithets as pronouns (at least for the purposes of syntax) is perhaps the most convincing for two reasons. First, it draws on a broader empirical, cross-linguistic scope than previous arguments. Second, it avoids the following pitfalls: On the one hand, coreference between an R-expression and an antecedent may be possible if binding is blocked\textsuperscript{26}; however on the other hand, an apparent binding (or rather covariance) relationship between a quantifier and a variable can sometimes be established without c-command, e.g. with donkey anaphora. Thus focusing on quantifier variable binding with c-command allows us to eliminate these confounds for the argumentation that epithets are indeed pronouns, and they can be syntactically bound. I will now discuss different examples of syntactic binding that involve a bound epithet.

Turning to languages other then English, in the Russian examples in (68), the DP that contains the relative clause is presented as the answer to a who-question, suggesting that the B response in (68) contains a restrictive relative clause (who really loves the idiot); as the relative clause serves to single out a set of girls, it must be restrictive, for appositive relative clauses cannot be used to identify a referent. In the example, the phrase ètogo idiot\textsuperscript{a} ‘this idiot’ co-varies with the quantifier každyj xudožnik ‘every artist’, which c-commands it, and is thus syntactically bound by it under c-command.

\textsuperscript{25} Another type of example consists of telescoping, where a pronoun covaries with a universal quantifier that does not c-command it; see Roberts (1986).

\textsuperscript{26} This was first observed by Reinhart (1983a).
Further examples from Russian that seem to involve binding of an epithet by a quantifier are given in (69) and (70).

(69) OK každyj artist včera vstretil poklonnicu, kotoraja bogotvorit ètogo idiota
    every artist yesterday met fan.FEM who.FEM adores this idiot
    ‘Yesterday, every artist bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot’

In Russian, example (70a), with the epithet ètot pridurok ‘this idiot’ seems to be equally acceptable to example (70b), which uses a pronoun on ‘he’ in the same place.

(70) a. OK Na prijome každyj professor vstretil kakogo-to studenta-otličnika, kotorogo
    At reception every professor met some excellent student whom
    ètot pridurok kogda-to zavalil.
    this idiot some.time.ago failed
    ‘At the reception, every professor bumped into some excellent student (or other) who the idiot had failed.’
b. OK Na prijome každyj professor vstretil kakogo-to studenta-otličnika, kotorogo
at reception every professor met some excellent student whom
on (kogda-to) zavalil.
he some.time.ago failed

‘At the reception, every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other) who
he3 had failed.’

Other examples that illustrate syntactic binding of an epithet by a quantifier can be found in
Slovenian, (71), and Dutch, (72); here the epithet is also as acceptable in the intended reading as
the pronoun. The example in (71) from Slovenian again shows that the epithet prekleti izdajalec
(damn traitor) is bound by the quantifier vsak član (every member) under c-command,
suggesting that epithets pattern like pronouns - at least for the purposes of syntax.
Unsurprisingly, we see the same thing in Dutch.

(71) a. OK Na recepciji je vsaka profesorica3 naletela na kakšnega odličnega
at reception aux each professor met with some excellent
študenta, ki ga je pro3 vrgla na izpitu.
student who cl aux pro3 failed in exam

‘At the reception, every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other)
who she3 had failed.’

b. OK Na recepciji je vsaka profesorica3 naletela na kakšnega odličnega
at reception aux each professor met with some excellent
študenta, ki ga je neumnica3 vrgla na izpitu.
student who cl aux stupid failed in exam

‘At the reception, every professor3 bumped into some excellent student (or other)
who the idiot3 had failed.’
Examples in which epithets located in a restrictive relative clause are bound by a c-commanding antecedent outside the relative clause can also be found in Czech, as shown in (73a). In Czech, we observe that the variant with the epithet (in (73a)) is less acceptable than the variant with a pronoun (in (73b)). We will see in a moment that this does not jeopardise the general observation that epithets can be bound by a c-commanding quantifier. On the one hand, there are examples that strengthen the intuition that (73a) involves syntactic binding, cf. the discussion of (75) and (76); on the other hand, there are reasons to assume that the contrast between (73a) and (73b) may simply exhibit a subtle preference for simpler forms (such as the null pronoun) when the use of the more complex form (the evaluative epithet) is not contextually licensed. It is not clear why such a preference surfaces more in Czech than in the other data, but I would now like to elaborate on this point, in my discussion of a similar contrast, in (74).
(73) a. Každá profesorka potkala na recepci nějakého vynikajícího studenta, kterého ta kráva vyhodila ze zkoušky. ‘At the reception, every professor bumped into some excellent student (or other) who the cow threw out from exam.’

b. Každá profesorka potkala na recepci nějakého vynikajícího studenta, kterého pro vyhodila ze zkoušky. ‘At the reception, every professor bumped into some excellent student (or other) who she had failed.’

I would like to point out that it seems as though sometimes, ‘weakly expressive’ epithets (as in (73a)) may be dispreferred for pragmatic reasons, as follows. For instance, in Russian, consultants report that (74a) is less acceptable than (74b) even though the two examples have an identical structure. The difference seems to be that (74a) involves the ‘weakly expressive’ etot pridurok ‘this idiot’, whereas (74b) contains the ‘strongly expressive’ etot dolbanyj pridurok ‘this damn idiot’. The contrast between (74a) and (74b) can be explained as follows. Definite descriptions such as this idiot are generally ambiguous between the evaluative epithet reading ‘this person, who I dislike’ and the non-evaluative reading ‘this ignorant, uneducated person’. Only the former reading allows for the Condition C obviation effects that we observed. The contrast between (74a) and (74b) then seems to be due to the fact that damn disambiguates towards the latter reading, which is dispreferred out-of-the-blue. This suggests that the use of a DP as an epithet must be sufficiently motivated (e.g. by the context). Therefore, we should not over-interpret contrasts such as (73a) versus (73b). However, much more research is needed to determine the precise factors involved that give rise to the kind of contrasts between Czech and Dutch/Slovenian that we observed above.
Let me now review further arguments that (73a) can involve syntactic binding of an epithet by a quantifier. It is a familiar observation that quantifiers cannot bind into appositive relative clauses. This observation gives rise to the sharp contrast between (75) and (73b). In (75), we are dealing with an appositive relative clause, whereas (73b) involves a restrictive relative clause.

What is more is that we find the same contrast between (76) and (73a). The parallel of (73a) versus (76) and (73b) versus (75) confirms that (73a) involves a restrictive relative clause and that (73a) involves syntactic binding of the epithet by the quantifier (rather than an e-type relationship). Epithets behave on a par with pronouns with respect to their ability to have bound variable readings when located in relative clauses.
The same contrast between restrictive relative clauses and appositive relative clauses can be observed for Dutch. First, consider example (77), which shows that pronouns can be bound in restrictive relative clauses, (77a), but not in appositive relative clauses, (77b).

As shown in (78), the same contrast can be observed for epithets. An epithet can be syntactically bound by a c-commanding quantifier if it is located in a restrictive relative clause, (78a), but not in an appositive relative clause, (78b).
Bij de receptie is iedere professor, wel een (één of andere) student tegengekomen die de idioot had laten zakken. 'At the reception, every professor bumped into some excellent student (or other) who the idiot had failed.'

b. * Bij de receptie is iedere professor die geniale Jan tegengekomen die met de idioot had laten zakken. 'At the reception, every professor bumped into the genius John who the idiot had failed.'

The same facts can be reproduced for French, as shown in (79) for bound pronouns and in (80) for bound epithets.

(79) a. OK A la réception, chaque enseignante a croisé un étudiant excellent qu'elle avait recalé. 'At the reception, every teacher has crossed one student excellent who'she had failed.'

b. * A la réception, chaque enseignante a croisé ce génie de Jean, qu'elle avait recalé. 'At the reception, every teacher has crossed that genius of Jean who'she had failed.'
A la réception, chaque enseignante a croisé un étudiant excellent que l'idiote avait recalé.

‘At the reception, every teacher has crossed one student excellent who the idiot had failed.’

A la réception, chaque enseignante a croisé Jean le génie / ce génie de Jean que l'idiote avait recalé.

‘At the reception, every professor bumped into the genius John who the idiot had failed.’

Another example where an epithet is bound inside a restrictive relative clause by a quantifier in the matrix clause is given in (81) for German. Notably, in German the pronoun *denjenigen ‘those’ can only be modified by a restrictive relative clause and not by an appositive relative clause*

*Jeder NPÖ-Politiker schickt denjenigen, die den Idioten öffentlich unterstützen, eine Kornblume.*

‘Every NPÖ politician sends a cornflower to those who publicly support the idiot.’

Having thus argued that epithets in restrictive relative clauses can be syntactically bound by a quantifier located above the relative clause, it is worth asking whether epithets can also be bound in complement clauses.

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I thank Patrick Grosz for pointing this out.
Example (82) shows data from Dutch indicating that epithets can be bound in complement clauses. This corroborates the generalisation from above, i.e. that epithets can co-vary with a quantifier, and be bound under c-command. In the example in (82), *die idioot* (the idiot) seems to be bound by *iedere uitvoerder* (every performer).28

\[\text{Dutch}\]

(82) \text*{iedere uitvoerder}_1 \text{ overtuigde het paner ervan dat die idioot}_1 \text{ slim is.} \\
\text{'Every performer convinced the panel of it that the idiot is smart'}

Furthermore, in addition to epithets that are bound in restrictive relative clauses, we also find epithets that are bound inside a complement to a noun phrase in Czech; in (83) and (84), the variant with the epithet (83a) and (84a) is possible, even if it is slightly more marked than the variant with the pronoun, in (83b) and (84b). What is remarkable about the examples in (83a) and (84a) is that the epithet is bound by a negative quantifier, which further supports the view that we are dealing with syntactic binding (rather than an e-type relationship).

\[\text{Czech}\]

(83) a. \text*{žádný člen strany}_3 \text{ se nesnaží zjistit víc o těch pomluvách, že voliči toho idiota}_3 \text{ nenávidí.} \\
\text{'No party member}_1 \text{ is investigating the rumors that the voters hate the idiot}_1.'

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28 Examples like (82) where an epithet can be bound inside a complement clause by a quantifier in the matrix clause are difficult to construe; the null hypothesis is that all languages in which epithets can ever be bound do allow for such constructions in their grammar. However, there are many factors that contribute to acceptability, such as the question of how well a context can be construed, in which it is presupposed, as in (82), that a speaker thinks that all performers are idiots. It is not clear why speakers of Dutch more readily accept constructions like (82), whereas speakers of English do not. In other words, the question that arises here is: What are the properties that are absent in the English translation of (82), but present in Dutch? In order to answer this question, further empirical probing is essential; since this is orthogonal to the questions this dissertation addresses, I will not discuss this issue further, and leave it open for future research.
So far, we have seen that epithets can be bound by a universal quantifier such as *every professor*, in (68)-(82), and we have seen that epithets can be bound by a negative quantifier such as *no party member*, in (83)-(84). Further research is needed in order to shed light on whether other quantifiers can bind epithets. One possible confound consists of the fact that many other quantifiers are plural, e.g. *some/most/few professors*.

Finally, we find that epithets can be bound by an antecedent in the same clause, as illustrated by the Dutch example in (85). Under the present analysis, the possibility of the data in (85) can be explained as follows: In general, an analysis that treats epithets as pronouns predicts that such local cases should be grammatical in a language in which pronouns in possessor position are not subject to Principle B of the Binding Theory. Therefore, we expect such examples to be acceptable in languages like Dutch, English and German, but not in languages like Czech or Russian, which have possessive reflexives.
(85) a. OK [Ieder lid van de PVV], beledigde [de verrekte idioot, zijn moeder] every member of the PVV insulted the damned idiot his mother

‘Every member of the PVV insulted the damn traitor’s mother.’

b. OK [Ieder lid van de PVV], nodigde [de eikel z’n moeder] uit every member of the PVV invited the jerk his mother PRT

‘Every member of the PVV invited the jerk’s mother.’

c. OK Iedere uitvoerder beledigde [die idioot z’n moeder].

‘Every performer insulted this idiot’s mother.’

A question that arises here is the following. Whilst Dutch allows for the examples in (85), the translations into English or German seem less acceptable at first sight. However, this fact seems to involve other confounding factors that are difficult to capture; for instance in English, native speakers report contrasts such as (86a) versus (86b), indicating that own in (86b) fulfills a role in making the epithet more acceptable. The epithet in (86b) would then pattern alike with the pronoun in (86c). As these judgments are subtle, I will not spend much time discussing such local cases and focus on the less local cases, where judgments are much clearer and cross-linguistically consistent.

(86) a. ?* Every boy insulted the bastard's mother.

b. OK Every boy insulted the bastard's own mother.

c. OK Every boy insulted his own mother.

To briefly summarise, the data in this section strongly favour the claim first proposed by Jackendoff (1969, 1972), that epithets are pronominal in nature. More recent evidence from the literature (Aoun & Choueiri 2000 and Beller 2011, discussed in section 2.2.1) seem to reinstate Jackendoff’s claim. My own findings (in section 2.2.2) show that pronouns can be bound by a quantifier under c-command and co-vary with it; in contrast to R-expressions, which cannot. The cross-linguistic data from Russian, Slovenian and Dutch show that epithets pattern like
pronouns, in the sense that they can be bound by a quantifier under c-command. Based on the argumentation from the literature and my own empirical findings, I conclude that epithets, at least for the purposes of syntax, behave like pronouns.

2.3 Epithets as Nominal Appositives with a Null Head

2.3.1 The Proposal

In this section I will outline a series of arguments which favour epithets as nominal appositives with a null head. The structure that I propose is illustrated by the example in (87) below.

(87) \[ [\text{pro} [\text{the idiot}]] \]

which corresponds to \[ [\text{he}, [\text{the idiot}]] \]

To elaborate on the structure given in (87), an epithet such as \textit{the idiot}, given in (88a), would have the same structure as \textit{he, the idiot}, in (88b), and \textit{John, the idiot}, in (88c). The difference between (88b-c) and (88a) is that the NP that is modified by \textit{the idiot} in (88a) is null, whereas in (88b) the NP consists of an overt pronoun, \textit{he}, and in (88c) the NP consists of a proper name, \textit{John} (Note that the fact that the epithet is necessarily unstressed may be related to the fact that the evaluativity is backgrounded, (cf. Beller (2011), and see also Chapter 3).

(88) a. Do you know John? \textit{The idiot} came to my party.

b. Do you know John? \textit{He, the idiot}, came to my party.

c. \textit{John, the idiot}, came to my party.

The idea of treating epithets as appositives is not a new one, and was first proposed by Postal (1972)\(^{29}\). Postal argues that examples such as (89b) and (90b) have the underlying structure in

\(^{29}\) Postal (1972) in a snippet, suggests on the basis of the data in (79) and (80), perhaps epithets are underlyingly appositive constructions. He does not explicitly discuss the appositive structure.
(89a) and (90a). In other words, both epithets in subject position, (89b), and epithets in object position, (90b), consist of a pronoun that is modified by an appositive.

(89) a. OK [I wanted Harry, to help me but he, who, is a bastard, wouldn’t do it].

   b. OK I wanted Harry, to help me but the bastard, wouldn’t do it.

   (Postal 1972:247)

(90) a. OK [I have never met Melvin, but Joan says she has met him, who, is a bastard].

   b. OK I have never met Melvin, but Joan says she has met the bastard,.

   (Postal 1972:247)

Since Postal (1973), others have followed in the same vein (cf. Umbach (2002)\textsuperscript{30}, Potts (2003, 2005, 2007) and Beller (2011))\textsuperscript{31}; however the internal structure of the ‘appositive epithet’ remains controversial. In this section, I will first discuss arguments in favour of treating epithets as appositive constructions headed by a null pro\textsuperscript{32}; then in chapter 3, I discuss the semantics of epithets, which is followed by chapter 4, which discusses how the syntax of epithets interfaces with their semantics.

An example of a nominal appositive is given in (81). Nominal appositives consist of an anchor (in this case the anchor is Poppy) which is the head of the appositive, and the apposition, the linguist and political scientist. These two things combined form a nominal appositive construction.

(91) Poppy, the linguist and political scientist, defended her dissertation in 2012.

\textsuperscript{30}In a similar vein to Postal (1973), Umbach does not go into details about the structure of the appositive, but on the basis of data she suggests that epithets are appositive.

\textsuperscript{31}Beller (2011) inherits the claim that epithets are appositive constructions from Potts (2005).

\textsuperscript{32}I analyze epithets as having the structure pro, the idiot (where pro is the null anchor and the idiot the appositive), contra Potts (2005), (2007) who argues, following Huddleston and Pullum (2002) that epithets have the structure that idiot x/John, where the anchor x/John is a name that can be replaced by a free variable.
While there are authors (cf. Heringa (2011, 2012)), who assume that appositives must have an overt anchor, den Dikken (2001), Kayne (2010) and Taylor (2009) have argued that there are nominal appositives which have a null anchor. Illustrations from Kayne (2005), based on den Dikken (2001), are given in (92). The basic idea is that so called pluringulars or committee nouns that can trigger plural agreement (given in (92a)), actually involve a singular nominal appositive (the committee) with a plural null anchor (the null pronoun THEY in (92b)). Kayne observes that such committee nouns can combine with a floating quantifier all, which a singular antecedent cannot, (92c).

(92) a. **OK** The committee have all voted yes.
    b. THEY the committee have all voted yes.
       (where they is the true antecedent of all in (92a)).
    c. * It have all voted yes.

Kayne (2010:133, footnote 5)

In the section that follows, I will apply Den Dikken’s (2001) and Kayne’s (2010) diagnostics to epithets and argue that epithets are indeed appositive constructions headed by a null pronoun. I will also provide additional argumentation of my own which also supports the main claim I wish to make in this section: epithets are nominal appositives with a null anchor.

### 2.3.2 Arguments for Treating Epithets as Nominal Appositives with a Null Anchor

Den Dikken observed that in British English, certain collective noun phrases headed by a singular noun, trigger plural agreement. He refers to this construction as a pluringular; an illustration from Den Dikken is given in (93b). Example (93b) contrasts with (93a), which is more common in American English.

(93) a. **OK** The committee has decided.
    b. **OK** The committee have decided. *pluringular*
Den Dikken treats the pluringular as an appositive construction headed by a null DP. He provides several diagnostics, two of which I will discuss here. The first diagnostic concerns the various readings that arise depending on whether the committee is the subject of the sentence, or the predicate. Den Dikken's basic idea is that if we place appositives with null anchors into a copula construction, they can only serve as subject and not as predicate. To illustrate the subject/predicate difference, consider the examples in (94). In (94a), a picture of the wall is the subject, whereas the cause of the riot is the predicate.

(94)  a. OK A picture of the wall (= subject) was the cause of the riot (= predicate)

       b. OK The cause of the riot (= predicate) was a picture of the wall (= subject)

(Moro 1997:35)

Den Dikken (2001) argues that nominals modified by appositives can only occur as the subject and not as the predicate. To see how this argument works, consider the example in (95). The example in (95a) has two possible readings, in (95b-c). The first reading arises as a result of the best committee being the subject, whereas the second reading arises as a result of the best committee being the predicate. When the best committee is in subject position, we derive a reading along the lines of they own the best committee. When the best committee is in predicate position, the reading that arises is one where their particular committee is the best one. Note that den Dikken is not concerned with an equative reading (e.g. the best committee is identical to their committee), which may be possible for independent reasons. He focuses on the reading, in which belonging to them is predicated of the best committee (in (95b)), and on the reading, in which surpassing other committees (i.e. being the best) is predicated of their committee (in (95c)).
(95) a. The best committee is theirs.
   
   b. *reading 1 = they have the best committee / the best committee belongs to them
      \[\Rightarrow\] The best committee (= subject) is theirs (= predicate).
   
   c. *reading 2 = their committee is the best one
      \[\Rightarrow\] The best committee (= predicate) is theirs (= subject).

(simplified, based on Den Dikken 2001:30)

In (96a), we have the pluringular example. Parallel to (95a), we may expect two possible readings; however unlike (95a), where both readings are possible, den Dikken reports that one of those readings is unacceptable in the pluringular case. When *the best committee* acts as the subject of the clause, (96b), we derive exactly the same reading as in (95b), and it is acceptable. When *the best committee* is in predicate position in the pluringular, (96c), the expected reading (the same as (95c)) is unacceptable. Given that the second reading is not possible, den Dikken argues that the pluringular is an appositive headed with a null *pro*, for *the best committee* cannot serve as the predicate of the copula construction, in the same way in which a pronoun cannot be a predicate.

(96) a. The best committee are theirs.
   
   b. *reading 1 = they have the best committee / the best committee belongs to them
      \[\Rightarrow\] The best committee (= subject) are theirs (= predicate).
   
   c. *reading 2 = their committee is the best one
      \[\Rightarrow\] * The best committee (= predicate) are theirs (= subject).

(simplified, based on den Dikken 2001:30)

This diagnostic can be applied to epithets, and the results indicate that epithets indeed have the same structure as a pluringular, namely a nominal appositive with a null pronominal head. First, we need to find a way of testing for the two readings. To do so, consider the baseline examples in (97) and (98). These examples show which questions we may use to elicit the relevant readings; we can thus use similar questions in the examples containing epithets in order to apply
the den Dikken diagnostic. In order to elicit the subject-predicate reading, as in (94a), the question in (97a) is introduced. The response given in (97b) illustrates the best committee in subject position, which means that they (a salient group or individuals) own the best committee, or that the best committee belongs to them.

(97) To elicit subject-predicate readings

a. Whose committee is the best committee?

b. [pointing gesture] The best committee (subject) is theirs (predicate).

In order to derive the predicate-subject reading, as in (94b), we again introduce an interrogative, (98a). The response, given in (98b) shows that in the elicited response, the best committee is in predicate position, and derives a meaning along the lines of their committee is the best committee.

(98) To elicit predicate-subject readings

a. Which committee is their committee?

b. The best committee (predicate) is theirs (subject).

Now consider the epithet case. The examples in (99) and (100) parallel den Dikken’s examples, the only difference being, that I have added context and an interrogative to trigger the relevant responses and readings. The example in (99) shows that the epithet the idiot in subject position in a copular construction is acceptable, however, it is unacceptable in the predicate position of a copula, as is illustrated by the data in (100). The results seem to mirror den Dikken’s, who argues that if the epithet is a nominal appositive headed by a null pro, it should not be able to appear in the predicate position of a copula construction: This is exactly what we find.
(99) *Context:* Over there, there’s a man called David. Everyone hates David. David’s the head of the British Nationalist Party (BNP).

_Eliciting subject-predicate reading:_

a. I just met a guy called David. What does he/the idiot do for a living?

b. OK The idiot (subject) is the **head of the BNP** (predicate).

(100) *Context:* I just met a guy called David. He is such a jerk.

_Eliciting predicate-subject reading:_

a. Now tell me: Which of the guests at this convention is the head of the BFP?

b. # *The idiot* is the head of the BFP.

The second argument that can be made for treating epithets as appositives with a null pronominal head stems from plural marking in such constructions. Den Dikken observes that it is possible to have plural agreement outside the committee nouns (e.g. between the finite verb and the committee noun), however the agreement on the determiner inside the noun phrase must be singular. An example from den Dikken in given in (101). He notes that in (101b), we have plural verb agreement, but it is impossible to have a plural demonstrative inside the committee NP; thus Den Dikken concludes that it is not possible for plural to occur within the maximal projection of an overt pluringular; he takes this to motivate the structure where *this committee* is a nominal appositive on a plural null pronoun equivalent to *they*.  

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34 As a control, we can show that it is possible to use the idiot anaphorically. The example in (i) below is an acceptable response to (100a), if the hearer chooses to ignore the question in (100a), and rather addresses the previous linguistic context, given in the context line.

i. OK *The idiot* was just weird? He’s a disaster.

35 The relevant reading in which (100b) is judged unacceptable is one where *the idiot* is used to refer back to David, and unstressed.

36 Note that alternative analyses are conceivable, where the plurality of *this committee* in (101a) is introduced in a higher functional projection of the noun phrase. However, what is crucial for the present purposes is that the analysis of such nouns as appositives with a null anchor directly predicts such mismatches without further stipulations, i.e. we do not need to stipulate that one noun phrase is singular in a lower extended projection whereas it is plural in a higher extended projection.
(101)a. OK This committee has/have decided.

b. * These committee have decided.

(den Dikken 2001:30)

In den Dikken’s analysis, the pluringular variant of (101a) is equivalent to example (102a), which is also a well-formed example. The unacceptability of (101b) follows from the unacceptability of (102b)\(^{37}\).

(102)a. OK They, this committee, have decided.

b. * They, these committee, have decided.

We reach exactly the same conclusion with epithets, as is illustrated by the example below in the German example (103). Here, the epithet *Drecksau* ‘filth pig’ being feminine is intended to refer to a male person (e.g. Fritz); while it can trigger masculine pronoun agreement on *seine* ‘his’, the determiner inside the noun phrase must be feminine, i.e. *die* ‘the.fem’ rather than *der* ‘the.masc’.

(103) Die/*Der Drecksau hat seine Schmutzaesche bei mir liegengelassen.

The.fem/*masc filth.pig.fem has his.masc dirty.laundry with me left

‘The filth pig has left his dirty laundry lying around here.’

We also find similar effects in English for reflexives. This is illustrated by the example in (104)\(^{38}\). In other words, when the anchor mismatches the nominal appositive, we expect to see

\(^{37}\) Another example is given in (i), which is equivalent to (ii) under this analysis.

i. OK The committee weren't particularly friendly.

ii. OK They, the committee, weren't particularly friendly.

The same holds for (iii), which would have the structure in (iv).

iii. OK John introduced me to the committee.

iv. OK John introduced me to them, the committee.

It is worth pointing out that for reasons that we currently do not understand, appositive modifiers on an overt object pronoun are sometimes more marked than modifiers on an overt subject pronoun; this was observed by Postal (1972).
the anchor's features in agreement outside the DP, but the nominal appositive's features inside the DP.

(104) I just met John. The bitch is so full of^OK^ {\text{himself}} / * {\text{herself}}.

It is easy to show that this is not an isolated fact. For German, many examples like (103) can be constructed, which exhibit the same pattern. Some examples are given in (105)-(107), which show that a pronoun with the most recent antecedent das Arschloch 'the asshole' must exhibit the natural gender of its antecedent, rather than the grammatical gender (which would be neuter). Note that under standard assumptions (going back to Reinhart 1983a), we can assume that in each of the cases in (105)-(107) the relevant pronoun is bound by das Arschloch 'the asshole', due to a preference for binding over coreference when the resulting readings are identical, so it is unlikely that the pronoun gets its gender directly from Anna^39. Under my analysis, das Arschloch 'the asshole' has the structure of a nominal appositive with null anchor, i.e. she, the asshole. Therefore, a pronoun will get its gender features from she and not from the asshole.

(105) Gestern habe ich Anna\textsubscript{1} gesehen.
   yesterday have I Anna seen
   'Yesterday I saw Anna.'

   Das Arschloch\textsubscript{1} hat gerade ^OK^ ihre\textsubscript{1} / ^*^ seine\textsubscript{1} Seminararbeit eingereicht.
   the asshole.neut has just her its term.paper handed.in
   'The asshole\textsubscript{1} just handed in her\textsubscript{1} term paper.'

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38 Of course, because in English, adjectives and determiners do not agree for gender, we do not see feminine gender marking inside the DP. Therefore the German examples are more telling.

39 The judgments do not seem to change when we have an elliptical structure, where a sloppy reading is intended, as given in (i). Such readings are generally assumed to require binding, which follows from the parallelism requirement on ellipsis, cf. Sag (1976).

i. 'Yesterday I saw Anna'

   Das Arschloch\textsubscript{1} hat schon ^OK^ ihre\textsubscript{1} / ^*^ seine\textsubscript{1} Seminararbeit eingereicht, und der Otto auch.
   the asshole.neut has already her its term.paper handed.in and the Otto too
   'The asshole\textsubscript{1} just handed in her\textsubscript{1} term paper, and Otto (did) too.'
German

(106) Gestern habe ich Anna gesehen.

yesterday have I Anna seen

‘Yesterday I saw Anna.’

_Das Arschloch_ glaubt, „_OK sie_ / _?es_ ist intelligenter als ich.

the asshole.neut believes she it is more.intelligent than I

‘The asshole1 believes she1 is more intelligent than me.’

German

(107) Gestern habe ich Anna gesehen.

yesterday have I Anna seen

‘Yesterday I saw Anna.’

_Das Arschloch_ hat Peter davon überzeugt, dass „_OK sie_ / _?es_ talentiert ist.

the asshole.neut has Peter there.of convinced that she it talented is

‘The asshole1 convinced Peter that she1 is talented.’

We find analogous facts with a feminine epithet (_Drecksau_ ‘filth pig’) that refers to a male referent. Once again, a pronoun that is bound by the epithet exhibits agreement in natural gender and not in grammatical gender, supporting a view where the epithet has the structure of a nominal appositive with a null anchor: _he, the filth pig._

German


just have I Otto met

‘I just met Otto.’

_Die Drecksau_ hat gerade „_OK seine_ / _?ihre_ Seminararbeit eingereicht.

the filth.pig.fem has just his her seminar.work handed.in

‘The filth pig1 just handed in his1 term paper.’

German


just have I Otto met

‘I just met Otto.’
Die Drecksau glaubt, er / sie ist intelligenter als ich.
The filth.pig believes he she is more.intelligent than me.

'The filth pig believes he she is more intelligent than me.'

The third piece of evidence which supports the view that epithets are nominal appositives can be found in languages with gender agreement on participles. In these languages where epithets are concerned, we see that the agreement tends to be for natural gender. The example in (110) from Slovenian illustrates that the participle agrees for natural gender, but not for morphological gender.

(110) Ali se spomnisti Ivan?
Do refl remember Ivan?
'Do you remember Ivan?'

Tista neumna svinja je odpotovala v Indijo v nedeljo.
that(f.sg) stupid(f.sg) pig(f.sg) is travelled(OKm.sg/f.sg) to India on Sunday.

'The stupid pig (= Ivan) traveled to India on Sunday.'

Finally, the fourth diagnostic is from Kayne (2010), and is concerned with structural relations, in the sense that certain phenomena require an associate (e.g. there-constructions, cf. den Dikken 2001). One such example consists of floating quantifiers, which typically associate with a noun phrase; the relevance of floating quantifiers is observed by Kayne (2010). The examples in (111) illustrate that in non-appositive constructions, the quantifier can float or be a part of the DP. Kayne (2010) argues that in appositive constructions however, although quantifier float is possible, the quantifier cannot be a part of the DP; this is illustrated by the examples in (112a) versus (112b). Kayne argues that (112a) has the structure in (112c), where THEY is a null plural pronoun; the reason for the ungrammaticality of (112b) then consists of the fact that floating quantifiers can be licensed by a pronoun (as in (112c)) but cannot directly combine with a

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40 For Croatian/Serbian, these intuitions could not be reproduced; there, agreement has to be feminine across the board, suggesting that agreement may work differently in these languages.

41 I would like to point out that Kayne (2010) arrives at the argumentation for committee nouns as appositives with null anchors independently from Den Dikken.
pronoun, as shown in (112d).

(111)  

a. The politicians have **all** voted yes. / **All** the politicians have voted yes.

b. The politicians have **both** voted yes. / **Both** the politicians have voted yes.

(112)  

a. **OK** The committee have **all** voted yes.

b. * **All** the committee have voted yes.

c. **OK** THEY the committee have **all** voted yes.

d. * **All** they, the committee, have voted yes.

(based on Kayne 2010:133, footnote 3)

If epithets were regular DPs, we would expect them to pattern like the examples in (111), where the quantifier can either float or be a part of the DP; alternatively, if epithets consist of nominal appositives with null anchors, we would expect to find a pattern as in (112a) and (112b). I will test examples with the floating quantifier **all** and examples with the floating quantifier **both**. In order to apply Kayne’s diagnostic, we need to change our epithet. Throughout this dissertation I have largely been using the **idiot** and the **damn traitor**; this was largely due to the fact that they exist in a large number of languages that this dissertation investigates, and informants find it easier to use the **idiot** or traitor as opposed to the **fool**, the **terrorist**. However, if we were to use the **idiot** for this diagnostic, it is hard to determine whether the epithet patterns like a regular DP or an appositive, for in the case of **idiot**, **both/all** is not possible at all, and in the case of **idiots** (e.g. **both/all idiots**, **both/all the idiots**) **both/all** could simply be a part of the appositive.

Thus, for this example I use scum (which is grammatically singular, but can refer to more than one individual), for then **both/all** cannot be a part of the appositive because **both/all the scum** is ungrammatical due to a number mismatch (**both/all** require a plural complement). The data in (113) and (114) illustrate that quantifier float is possible with epithets, (113b)/(114b) and identical to Kayne’s examples, it appears that the quantifier cannot be a part of the DP,

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42 Of course, this depends largely on the properties of the individual languages.
The data can be easily explained if one assumes an analysis of epithets that I am postulating; namely that in (113)/(114), there is a null pronoun heading the nominal appositive. In examples (113c)/(114c), the epithet cannot combine with the quantifier for the following reasons. If we attempt to insert the quantifier into the nominal appositive, this is not possible due to an agreement mismatch between *all/both* and *the scum*, as shown in (113d)/(114d). If on the other hand, we attempt to attach the quantifier outside of the nominal appositive, we run into the problem that quantifiers cannot modify pronouns directly, as shown in (113e)/(114e); however pronouns can license floating quantifiers, as given in (113f)/(114f).43

(113) a. John, Bill and Jack were here. OK *The scum have voted yes.  
   b. John, Bill and Jack were here. OK The scum have all voted yes.  
   c. John, Bill and Jack were here. * All the scum have voted yes.  

Explanation:  
   d. John, Bill and Jack were here. * They, all the scum, have voted yes. (= (113c), opt. 1)  
   e. John, Bill and Jack were here. * All they, the scum, have voted yes. (= (113c), opt. 2)  
   f. John, Bill and Jack were here. OK They, the scum, have all voted yes. (= (113b))  

(114) a. John and Jack were here. OK *The scum have voted yes.  
   b. John and Jack were here. OK The scum have both voted yes.  
   c. John and Jack were here. * Both the scum have voted yes.  

43 An indication that *the scum* does not license floating quantifiers in a non-epithet (i.e. non-evaluative) reading can be argued for by the following data. As we see from the contrast between (i) and (ii)-(iv), *scum* seems to be singular and does not license floating quantifiers by itself. Thanks to Philippe Schlenker (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.

i. OK *The green scum has been removed from the pond.  
ii. * The green scum has all been removed from the pond.  
iii. * The green scum have been removed from the tub.  
iv. * The green scum have all been removed from the tub.
Explanation:

d. John and Jack were here. * They, both the scum, have voted yes. (= (114c), opt. 1)
e. John and Jack were here. * Both they, the scum, have voted yes. (= (114c), opt. 2)
f. John and Jack were here. OK They, the scum, have both voted yes. (= (114b))

An additional argument in favour of treating epithets as nominal appositives with a null anchor comes from the fact that we only find epithets referring to arguments that are in the 3rd person; this is illustrated by the examples in (115)-(116). We do not find epithets that refer to arguments in the 1st or 2nd person, as illustrated in (117)-(118). This is compatible with a view where the null anchor is a 3rd person pronoun.

(115) a. OK Mary lied to John₁, and [he, the idiot,₁] believed her.
    
    b. OK Mary lied to John₁, and [the idiot,₁] believed her.
    
    (= Mary lied to John₁, and [pro, the idiot,₁] believed her.)

(116) a. OK Mary lied to [John and Bill,₁]₁, and [they, the idiots,₁]₁ believed her.
    
    b. OK Mary lied to [John and Bill,₁]₁, and [the idiots,₁]₁ believed her.
    
    (= Mary lied to [John and Bill,₁]₁, and [pro, the idiots,₁]₁ believed her.)

(117) a. OK Mary lied to me₁, and [I, the idiot,₁]₁ believed her.
    
    b. * Mary lied to me₁, and [the idiot,₁]₁ believed her.
    
    (= * Mary lied to me₁, and [pro, the idiot,₁]₁ believed her.)

(118) a. OK Mary lied to us₁, and [we, the idiots,₁]₁ believed her.
    
    b. * Mary lied to us₁, and [the idiots,₁]₁ believed her.
    
    (= * Mary lied to us₁, and [pro, the idiots,₁] believed her.)
To briefly conclude, the various diagnostics presented in this section show that epithets are nominal appositives with a null anchor. The questions that come to mind at this point is: Do (nominal) appositives and their anchors form constituents or not? Potts argues that Nominal appositives attach at the surface level inside of the DP, (119a). However, McCawley (1981), Del Gobbo (2003), and most recently Schlenker (2010, to appear) argue that the appositive the idiot attaches at a propositional level. Before I present my proposal, I would first like to outline the semantics, as it will have consequences for the syntactic structure of nominal appositives. In chapter 4, I return to this question and show how the proposed semantic analysis bears on the question of constituency with respect to the appositive and its null anchor.

At this point, it is worth re-evaluating den Dikken’s analysis critically. Up to this point, the main alternative analysis is that of Sauerland & Elbourne (2002). Sauerland & Elbourne consider similar facts to den Dikken’s (2001), but argue for a feature-based analysis instead. The idea is that pluringsulars have two types of features that can take a singular value or a plural value: Number (which encodes whether the DP denotes one or more referents) and Mereology (which encodes whether the DP only contains one member or several). In example (120), set is argued to have the feature values [Number: singular] (as we are dealing with one entity) and [Mereology: plural] (as this entity has several members, e.g. the numbers 3, 9, 13 and 21).
Sauerland & Elbourne assume that concord inside the noun phrase can only refer to the Number feature, whereas verbal agreement can either refer to the Number feature or to the Mereology feature. Verbal agreement involves agreement between T and the subject for phi-features such as Number and Mereology. To derive differences such as (121b) versus (121d), which den Dikken also observes, Sauerland & Elbourne argue that agreement for Mereology cannot be established at a distance (which they analyse as covert feature movement), whereas agreement for Number can.

(121)  a. OK A committee was holding a meeting in here.
        b. OK There was a committee holding a meeting in here.
        c. OK A committee were holding a meeting in here.
        d. * There were a committee holding a meeting in here.

(Sauerland & Elbourne 2002:292)

Overall, the two analyses of committee nouns, Sauerland & Elbourne (2002) and den Dikken (2001) cover a similar empirical domain. However, at this point it is not clear how Sauerland & Elbourne’s analysis would account for the missing reading in (96b), which they do not address, or, for the ungrammaticality of (112b), both of which follow from den Dikken’s (2001) analysis. Conversely, Sauerland & Elbourne argue that examples like (122a) argue against den Dikken, as it is not clear what kind of pronoun could be the anchor for the appositive in (122a), as would be required by the analysis in (122b).
(122)  
a. OK Any committee worth their salt are going to have looked into that.  
   \hspace{0.25in} (Sauerland & Elbourne 2002:296)  

b. Den Dikken-style analysis for (122a):  
   THEY, any committee worth their salt, are going to have looked into that.

However, it is not clear that examples like (122) really refute den Dikken (2001), as minimally different examples given in (123a-b) seem (at least marginally) possible in British English, which raises the question of how plural pronouns of this type are constrained to begin with. The reader should be made aware of the fact that in example (123), (123b) involves a pronoun with an appositive, whereas (123a) seems to involve some kind of left dislocation.

(123)  
a. OK I think that any committee worth their salt, they’re going to have looked into that.  

b. OK I think that they, any committee worth their salt, are going to have looked into that.

Given that there are challenges for both types of analyses, we can conclude that the jury is still out on which is correct. For now, it can be said that den Dikken (2001) is an analysis that makes conclusive predictions on the behaviour of epithets, if epithets are analysed as appositives with a null anchor; by contrast, Sauerland & Elbourne’s (2002) analysis cannot be readily extended to cover the behaviour of epithets.

2.4 Conclusion

The focus of this section has been the syntactic structure of epithets. Developing an idea that goes back to Postal (1972), I conclude that epithets are null pronouns that are modified by a nominal appositive. In other words, the sentence in (124b) has the structure in (124a).

(124)  
a. OK Mary lied to John1, and [he, the idiot,]1 believed her.  

b. OK Mary lied to John1, and [the idiot]1 believed her.
This analysis is based on the observation that epithets, like pronouns can be syntactically bound by a quantifier (chapter 2.2), and epithets exhibit several properties that we would expect from a construction in which a nominal appositive modifies a null pronoun (chapter 2.3).
Chapter 3: The Role of the Attitude Predicate

3.1 The Overview of the Proposal

In this section I propose that epithets can be analysed by assuming a two-dimensional semantics (involving a truth-conditional dimension and a non-truth-conditional dimension) (cf. Schlenker (2007), Sauerland (2007b)), and furthermore, by assuming that the at issue meaning (i.e. its truth-conditional meaning contribution) and the evaluativity component of the epithet can be analysed as follows. If we utter (125a), the analysis proposed in chapter 2 entails that the syntax is the one in (125b); i.e. the idiot is actually a nominal appositive with a null anchor pro, and it is this pro that is referential. How does (125b) get interpreted? We can follow Schlenker (2010, to appear) in assuming that the appositive takes scope over the entire clause containing its anchor and is semantically interpreted conjunctively (i.e. the clause containing the anchor is conjoined with a clause in which the epithet’s meaning is predicated of an e-type pronoun coindexed with the anchor); this is sketched in (125c). Although it is vacuous to assume that Fritz is the most salient individual, this will become relevant later (as we shall see); the idea then is that the assertion is as given in (125d). The idea that epithets are presuppositional is motivated by the fact that they do not contribute evaluativity to the at-issue content (cf. Potts (2005), (2007) and Schlenker (2005), (2007)). I provide diagnostics below to further instantiate this claim. For now, I give the presupposition in (125e). We will see the details below.

(125)a. Do you know Fritz₁? John just met the idiot₁.

b. syntactic analysis: John just met pro₁(,) the idiot.

c. interpretation of appositive: John just met pro₁(,) and he₁ is the (most salient) idiot.

d. assertion: John just met Fritz₁(,) and he₁ is the (most salient) person.

e. presupposition: The speaker/John/a salient person believes that Fritz₁ is stupid.

This analysis is motivated by the empirical scope (which will be discussed in the next section); the remainder of this chapter is concerned with the interaction between the role of the verb and the epithet.
3.2 The Problem

In the previous section, I argued that epithets pattern like pronouns. I presented a number of arguments for this claim. In addition to this claim, I presented a series of diagnostics that suggest that epithets are nominal appositives with a null (pronominal) anchor. These two claims predict that epithets and pronouns should pattern alike in all environments; in other words, they should have the same distribution. This is true for local contexts, where pronouns and epithets are unacceptable (presumably due to Condition B); this is illustrated by the English examples in (126). The same prediction also applies to restrictive relative clauses; the examples in (127) show yet again, that pronouns and epithets pattern alike. The examples in (126a-b) and (127a-b) illustrate the direct contrast between an epithet and a pronoun. Given that epithets are nominal appositives, I include the minimal contrast in (126a) vs (126c), and (127a) vs (127c). What is crucial is that (126a-c) pattern alike, and (127a-c) do so as well. Finally, (127d), the example containing the R-expression, is unacceptable, whereas all of the other examples in (127a-c) are acceptable. This is the prediction from treating epithets as pronominal in nature (as opposed to treating epithets as R-expressions)\(^{44}\).

\[(126)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
a.* & \text{John}_1 \text{ likes the idiot}_1. \quad \text{Epithet} \\
b.* & \text{John}_1 \text{ likes him}_1. \quad \text{Pronoun} \\
c.* & \text{John}_1 \text{ likes him, the idiot}_1. \quad \text{Pronoun} + \text{nominal appositive (NA)}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{44}\) A question that naturally arises at this point is whether epithets behave on a par with pronouns if they are in the scope of a focus-sensitive operator, where Condition B and Condition C can generally be obviated, as in (i)-(ii).

\[
\begin{align*}
i. & \text{Only Felix voted for Felix} \\
ii. & \text{Despite the big fuss about Felix's candidacy, when we counted the votes we found out that in fact only Felix himself voted for him. (Reinhart 1983:169)}
\end{align*}
\]

If we construct examples with the idiot and him, the idiot, that are parallel to Reinhart’s example with a pronoun in (ii), these seem to be equally acceptable, as shown in (iii) and (iv).

\[
\begin{align*}
iii. & \text{Despite the big fuss about Felix's candidacy, when we counted the votes we found out that in fact only Felix himself voted for the idiot.} \\
iv. & \text{Despite the big fuss about Felix's candidacy, when we counted the votes we found out that in fact only Felix himself voted for him, the idiot.}
\end{align*}
\]

A possible confound is that null pronouns (which I assume form the anchor for the epithet in the pro, the idiot, construction, cannot be stressed, and epithets cannot be in the scope of only, given that their meaning is contributed at an appositive level.
Note however, that we cannot expect epithets to always pattern exactly like overt pronouns that are modified by a nominal appositive - even though I have argued that epithets are nominal appositives with null anchors. The reason is that not all DPs can be nominal appositives that modify a null pronoun. One generalisation seems to be that elements that are understood evaluatively can be nominal appositives with null anchors, whereas, in general, non-evaluative elements cannot, possibly with the exception of committee nouns (I will come back to this below; the core assumption that I make is that there are different licensors of appositive constructions with null anchors, and evaluativity is one of them, whilst a mismatch between grammatical number and actual number may be another one). On the one hand, we see that (128a) must be evaluative, whereas (128b) can be non-evaluative.

(128)a. pro(,) the idiot(,) has organised a rally. evaluative / epithet
b. He, the teacher, has organised a rally. non-evaluative / not an epithet

On the other hand, examples like (127d) improve if teacher is meant as a swear word, e.g. representing a profession that the speaker looks down on; this evaluativity is necessary for (127d) to improve. This is illustrated in (129); in (129a), teacher is intended to be evaluative (e.g. meaning ‘someone annoying or smart-alecky’; the demonstrative that enhances this evaluative effect). Therefore, (129a) (where John appears to c-command the/that teacher) improves significantly, which is not possible in (129b), where teacher is intended to simply describes a profession. In light of the previous discussion, this means that (129a) can be analysed as involving the/that teacher as a nominal appositive with a null anchor, whereas
(129b) cannot be analysed in this way. Whenever an appositive has a null anchor, it must generally be understood evaluatively (with the obvious exception of den Dikken’s 2001 committee nouns, which do not seem to be evaluative; this indicates that there are different licensors for appositive constructions with null anchors – I come back to this later).

(129) a. ?OK Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really likes the/that teacher.  
 b. * Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really likes the teacher.

Structurally, the difference between (129a) and (129b) is given in (130). In the evaluative case, teacher is used as a pejorative ‘label’, whereas in the non-evaluative case, teacher denotes an occupation.

(130) a. ?OK Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really likes [pro, the/that teacher].  
 b. * Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really likes [the teacher].

We also observe a stress difference (see Beller 2011), as given in (131). If teacher is intended to be an epithet, it cannot carry neutral stress, (131a), but if it is intended to describe an occupation, it can carry sentential stress, as given in (131b).

(131) a. Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really LIKES [pro, the/that teacher].  
 b. Yesterday, John bumped into a fan who really likes [the TEACHER].

The questions that arise at this point are the following: Why is it that epithets consist of a nominal appositive with a null anchor? And why are such nominal appositives with a null anchor generally (with the possible exception of committee nouns) only possible if they are evaluative (i.e. if they are epithets)? The answer to these questions ultimately results from the way pronouns are interpreted, and from the syntax-semantics interface of the appositive construction.
First, let me start by addressing the latter. When an epithet reading is intended, as in (129a), the descriptive meaning of the DP contained in the epithet (e.g. *the teacher* interpreted as a profession) cannot be a part of the truth conditions of the clause. The reason for this is that the epithet only conveys (backgrounded) evaluation, and its descriptive content (e.g. *teacher, idiot, scum, fascist*) merely adds a ‘flavour’ to this evaluation (cf. *I dislike him because he’s a fascist*). The non-truth-conditionality of the epithet is achieved by the proposed structure in (130a), because when the epithet is treated as a nominal appositive, it is shifted to a non-truth-conditional level (Cf. Potts’ (2005, 2007) conventional implicature domain, or alternatively, Schlenker’s 2007 level of expressive presuppositions). Therefore, the epithet does not contribute at-issue meaning, and its evaluative reading is contributed as backgrounded information.

Now I’d like to turn to the first part of the answer, namely the way pronouns are interpreted. This addresses the question of why epithets have null anchors, and why null anchors are licensed by evaluative appositives. Recall that in the case of the evaluative reading of *the teacher*, (131a), the DP is de-accented, whereas in the non-evaluative reading, the nominal part of the DP *the teacher* is stressed, (131b). In the evaluative case, an overt pronominal anchor is not needed, as the stress indicates that the DP *the teacher* isn’t part of the truth-conditional meaning (which is why it does not participate in the computation of information structure at the clausal level). If we assume that English does allow for such null pronomininals in limited contexts, the general consideration comes into play that using a null pronominal anchor is preferred over an overt pronominal anchor; this idea is based on Cardinaletti & Starke (1999), who argue that a null *pro* is always preferred when there is a choice between a null *pro* and an overt pronoun, which they attribute to general economy principles. In other words, the possibility of null pronominal anchors is a consequence of the need to remove the epithet from the truth-conditional level plus the fact that *pro, the idiot* and *he, the idiot* would have identical meanings. Contrastively, in non-evaluative constructions, null pronominal anchors are typically not licensed, because either (i) there is no need for using the more complex [*pro, the teacher*] construction in an example like (129b), as it would have the same meaning as simply *the teacher*, or (ii) the anchor plays a role for which it must be overt (as in *Mozart, the composer*, where *Mozart* introduces a referent).
It thus follows that nominal appositives with a null anchor tend to be evaluative, and epithets are an example of this. However, Den Dikken (2001) argues that committee nouns are also nominal appositives with null anchors; the problem here consists of the observation that epithets have to be evaluative, whereas committee nouns do not have to be evaluative. It is an open question whether nominal appositives with null anchors form a uniform class. It could simply be that the reason evaluativity licenses (and requires) an appositive construction with a null anchor is distinct from the reason why committee nouns can have such a structure. In any case, the Condition C obviation effects that we find with epithets are a direct prediction of treating them as (null) pronouns that are modified by a nominal appositive; future research is needed to determine whether we find Condition C effects with committee nouns as well.

In brief, coming back to the comparison of epithets and pronouns, we can state the following. Nominal appositives with a null anchor must be interpreted evaluatively. This does not seem to be the case for nominal appositives with an overt anchor (e.g. John, the teacher or he, the teacher). For this reason, we may expect epithets to sometimes behave differently from overt pronouns that combine with nominal appositives. The latter should always pattern with pronouns, but epithets may have a more special status; this is indeed what we find. Consider the examples in (132). The data show that when epithets are in complement clauses, they sometimes do not pattern like pronouns, but like R-expressions, i.e. (132a) patterns like (132d) and not like (132c). This is the core problem that I address in the remainder of this dissertation.

\[(132)\]
\[
a. \ * \ John_{1} \hbox{ thinks that the idiot}_{1} \hbox{ is smart.} \quad \hbox{Epithet}
\]
\[
b. \ \hbox{OK John}_{1} \hbox{ thinks that he}_{1} \hbox{ is smart.} \quad \hbox{Pronoun}
\]
\[
c. \ \hbox{OK John}_{1} \hbox{ thinks that he, the idiot}_{1} \hbox{ is smart.} \quad \hbox{Pronoun + Nominal Appositive}
\]
\[
d. \ * \ John_{1} \hbox{ thinks that the teacher}_{1} \hbox{ is smart.} \quad \hbox{R-expression}
\]

The data in (132) immediately give rise to the question: If epithets are pronouns, why are they unacceptable in cases where pronouns are acceptable? This question will be the focus of the remainder of this section. I will outline the empirical scope, which focuses on the distribution of
epithets in complement clauses, focusing on the role of the matrix predicate. The section that follows contains my proposal that explains this empirical scope.

In many languages we find a contrast between the complement of *think* and the complement of *convince*. The former generally cannot contain epithets that refer to the matrix subject, whereas the latter can. This observation is illustrated by the English, Croatian, Hindi, Russian and Slovenian examples given below in (133) – (137) respectively.

(133)a. * John\(_1\) thinks that the idiot\(_1\) is smart.

   b. ?OK John\(_1\) convinced Peter that the idiot\(_1\) is smart.

(134)a. * Peter\(_1\) misli da je prokleti izdajnik\(_1\) pametan.

   Peter thinks that AUX.3sg damn traitor smart
   ‘Peter\(_1\) thinks that the damn traitor\(_1\) is smart.’

   b. ?OK Peter\(_1\) je uvjerio predstavnike da će prokleti izdajnik\(_1\) riješiti problem.

   Peter AUX.3sg convinced.ptcpl representatives that will.3sg damn traitor solve problem.
   ‘Peter\(_1\) convinced the representatives that the damn traitor\(_1\) would solve the problem’

(135)a. * Rina\(_1\) soc-tii hai ki vo desdrohii\(_1\) buddhimaan hai

   Rina think-Hab.f be.Prs.Sg that traitor intelligent be.Prs.Sg
   ‘Rina\(_1\) thinks that the damn traitor\(_1\) is smart’.

   b. ?OK Samir-ne\(_1\) pratinidhiyoN-ko\(_2\) samjhaa diyaa hai ki vo Samir-Erg representatives-Dat explain give.Pfv is that that deshdrohii\(_1\) un-kaa kaam kar de-gaa

   traitor they-Gen work do Give-Fut
   ‘Samir\(_1\) has convinced the representatives that that traitor\(_1\) will do their job’.

81
We can now summarise the problem that the examples in (133) – (137) pose as follows. We have seen in chapter 2 that there are reasons to believe that epithets are pronouns (namely null pronouns modified by a nominal appositive), and this is one of the fundamental claims that this dissertation makes. Yet, in the cases with think, (133a), (134a), (135a), (136a) and (137a), epithets appear to pattern like R-expressions. Do the data that clearly illustrate the contrast that arises between think and convince challenge the view that epithets are pronouns? For instance, if one were to pursue the idea that epithets are R-expressions, one might ask whether the examples in (133b), (134b), (135b), (136b) and (137b) improve with convince, because there is more overt material between the epithet and the antecedent. However, this does not seem to be the case. What we see in (139b), (140b), (141b) and (142b) is that R-expressions in the complement of convince are still ungrammatical. Therefore, if epithets were R-expressions, they should still be unacceptable in the complement of convince. This difference between epithets and R-expressions is shown by the contrasts in (138) – (142) from English, Croatian, Hindi, Slovenian
and Russian (where the acceptable (138a)/(139a)/(140a)/(141a)/(142a) contain an epithet and the unacceptable (138a)/(139b)/(140b)/(141b)/(142b) contain an R-expression).

(138)a. OK John\textsubscript{1} convinced Peter that the idiot\textsubscript{1} is smart.

b. * John\textsubscript{1} convinced Peter that the janitor\textsubscript{1} is smart.

Croatian

(139)a. OK Peter\textsubscript{1} je uvjerio predstavnike da će Peter AUX.3sg convinced.ptcpl representatives that will.3sg prokleti izdajnik riješiti problem. damn traitor solve problem.

‘Peter\textsubscript{1} convinced the representatives that the damn traitor\textsubscript{1} would solve the problem’.

b. * Bill\textsubscript{1} je uvjerio predstavnike da će Bill AUX.3sg convinced.ptcpl representatives that will.3sg podvornik riješiti problem. janitor solve problem

‘Bill\textsubscript{1} convinced the representatives that the janitor\textsubscript{1} would solve the problem’.

Hindi

(140)a. OK Samir-ne\textsubscript{1} pratinidhiyoN-ko\textsubscript{2} samjhaa hai Samir-Erg representatives-Dat explain give.Pfv is ki vo deshdrohii un-kaa kaam kar de-gaa that that traitor they-Gen work do give-Fut

‘Samir\textsubscript{1} has convinced the representatives that that traitor\textsubscript{1} will do their job’.

b. * Samir-ne\textsubscript{1} pratinidhiyoN-ko\textsubscript{2} samjhaa hai Samir-Erg representatives-Dat explain give.Pfv is ki vo jamaadaar un-kaa kaam kar de-gaa that that sweeper they-Gen work do give-Fut

‘Samir\textsubscript{1} has convinced the representatives that that sweeper\textsubscript{1} will do their job’.
In the section that follows, I present my proposal accounting for the contrast between complements of \textit{think} and complements of \textit{convince}. This proposal draws on Stephenson’s (2007) analysis of \textit{think} and \textit{convince}. It is worth pointing out that \textit{think} and \textit{convince} differ in many respects, which means that they do not form a minimal pair: For instance, \textit{think} takes one NP argument, whereas \textit{convince} takes two NP arguments. However, a more minimal pair is hard to construe (at least in terms of different verbs, as most attitude predicates with a single NP argument behave like \textit{think}); I have attempted to construct a more minimal pair that shows the same effect in eliciting examples (143) (from English), (144) (from French) and (145) (from Dutch). What we find here is that an epithet in the complement of \textit{not know} is more acceptable than an epithet in the complement of \textit{know}. As we will see in Chapter 3.3.5, this is predicted by
the analysis that I will propose, as that the subject of *know* believes the proposition expressed in the embedded clause, whereas the subject of *not know* does not.

(143)a. *Nero₁ knows that the damn traitor₁ should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.
b. ³OK  Nero₁ doesn’t know that the damn traitor₁ should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.

_French_

(144)a. *Nero₁ sait que le sale traître₁ devrait inviter Sarkozy aux négociations de paix.
Nero knows that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to the talks of peace
‘Nero₁ knows that the damn traitor₁ should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.’
b. ³OK  Nero₁ ne sait pas que le sale traître₁ devrait inviter Sarkozy aux négociations de paix.
Nero not knows neg that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to the talks of peace
‘Nero₁ doesn’t know that the damn traitor₁ should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.’

_Dutch_

(145)a. *Nero₁ weet dat de verrekte eikel₁ Sarkozy moet uitnodigen voor de vredesbesprekingen.
Nero knows that the damned jerk Sarkozy must invite for the peace-talks
‘Nero₁ knows that the damn traitor₁ should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.’
b. ³OK  Nero₁ weet niet dat de verrekte eikel₁ Sarkozy zou moeten uitnodigen voor de vredesbesprekingen.
Nero knows not that the damned jerk Sarkozy will must invite for the peace-talks
‘Nero₁ doesn’t know that the damn traitor₁ should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.’
To conclude this section, it is worth pointing out that verbs with two DP arguments do not behave uniformly, i.e. the presence of a second DP argument does not automatically make a construction well-formed. In a survey of different predicates, the average judgments were as given in (146). In comparison to the well-formed (146a), example (146b) is judged to be slightly less acceptable, and example (146c) even less so. I will mainly focus on convince (as in (146a)), the reasons for which will become clearer in the following section.

(146) a. OK John₁ convinced the panel that the stupid idiot₁ would get the grant.
    b. ¬OK John₁ told the panel that the stupid idiot₁ would get the grant.
    c. ?? John₁ reminded the panel that the stupid idiot₁ would get the grant.

The following section presents my solution for the difference between think and convince on the one hand, and for the difference between know and not know on the other hand.

3.3 My Solution

3.3.1 The Anti-Judge Constraint in a Nutshell

Before outlining the various aspects of my proposal in detail, I would like to begin by presenting an overview. The basic idea here will be that epithets are evaluated with respect to an evaluator (cf. Potts (2005), (2007), Harris (2009), (2012)). My proposal can be broken down into the following four components. First, I follow Lasersohn (2005), who argues that some utterances must be evaluated from the perspective of a given individual, which he calls the judge (corresponding to my evaluator); in particular, so-called predicates of personal taste (tasty, fun, beautiful) cannot be interpreted without such an evaluator. Second, I propose that epithets are also evaluated with respect to such an individual, as shown in various works by Potts and Harris; this evaluator is typically (in the case of epithets) the speaker of the utterance, but it does not have to be (cf. Potts and Harris (2009), Harris (2009), (2012)). Third, I focus on predicates such as think and convince, introduced in section 3.2, and adopt Stephenson’s (2007) view on the difference between such predicates. Stephenson observes that, generally, in complements of attitude predicates, the contextual judge parameter of the embedded clause (i.e. the index that
encodes the preferred judge/evaluator with respect to which predicates of personal taste in the embedded clause are interpreted) is set to one of the matrix arguments. Stephenson (2007) shows that this is the case with complements of think and convince; moreover, she argues that, in the case of think, the individual associated with the judge parameter corresponds to the matrix subject, whereas in the case of convince, it corresponds to the matrix object. Fourth, to account for the difference between think and convince with respect to epithets, I argue that epithets cannot occur in a proposition that has the epithet’s c-commanding antecedent as the individual associated with its judge parameter; when the judge parameter of a clausal complement that contains an epithet is identical to the epithet’s c-commanding antecedent, the construction becomes unacceptable, for reasons that I explore further in chapter 4. In other words, when an epithet is in an embedded clause, the antecedent cannot be the judge of that embedded clause. This is very much in the spirit of Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998); I come back to a discussion of their proposal in chapter 4. In section 3.3.2, I discuss general background on the idea that some utterances involve an evaluator/judge and a judge parameter. In section 3.3.3, I introduce the idea that epithets are interpreted with respect to an evaluator. Section 3.3.4 discusses the idea that different matrix predicates differ with respect to the meaning of the judge parameter of their complement proposition. Finally, section 3.3.5 connects the judge/evaluator-sensitivity of epithets to the anti-judge constraint on their distribution.

3.3.2 Introducing the Judge Parameter

Standard views on sentence meaning assume that sentences denote propositions, e.g. sets of worlds; in other words, they are interpreted with respect to a world of evaluation (cf. Heim & Kratzer (1998)). I now discuss Lasersohn (2005), (2009) and Stephenson (2007), who assume a Kaplanian approach to meaning (e.g. Kaplan 1989), where a sentence is evaluated according to a world, w, a time, t and a context parameter, c. A set of worlds and situations (which are identified by means of w, t and c) form the intension of a sentence, or, put differently, the proposition. In other words, a proposition is the set of possible worlds and/or situations in which a sentence is true. These basic semantic primitives allow us to derive the truth conditions of a sentence; namely that a sentence or utterance is true if and only if a world (or situation) satisfies the requirements for the proposition expressed to be true in it. Consider the examples in (147).
The example sentence in (147a) denotes the set of worlds where the capital of Germany is Berlin. Note that the actual world, where Berlin is in fact the capital of Germany, is included in this set of possible worlds. In contrast, the meaning of the utterance in (147b) concerns a different set of possible worlds, namely the worlds where Tuebingen is the capital of Germany. In this case, the meaning for the sentence in the actual world would be false, because the actual world is not part of this set. Under such a view, we only need to see what the facts are in the actual world in order to determine whether a sentence is true or false.

(147)a. The capital of Germany is Berlin.

b. The capital of Germany is Tuebingen.

Lasersohn (2005), (2009) points out that the above (somewhat simplified) picture, is at odds with sentences such as those provided in (148); it is not clear whether these sentences can be true or false in an absolute way. Although initially the examples in (148) appear not too different from those in (147), it is unclear how the semantic theory sketched above could derive the truth conditions of the sentences in (148). The reason behind this is because the sentences in (148) are a matter of opinion; although two people may disagree whether Berlin is the capital of Germany (Speaker A may believe Berlin is the capital of Germany, whereas speaker B might disagree), in the actual world the meaning of the utterance in (147a) would still be true, and (147b) false. However with the examples (148), it is hard to see what the meaning of the utterance would be in the real world, because speaker A may think that the cake is tasty, speaker B may disagree, and both would be making a true statement in the actual world. In other words, whether (148a)/(148b) are true or false depends on the perspective from which they are evaluated. We cannot know whether something is tasty without taking into consideration for who it is tasty. Clearly, (148a) cannot be true without such an individual, as it would be too presumptuous (and false) to assume that the cake can be tasty for everybody. In addition to this observation, (148b) shows that in one sentence, there can be two possible individuals for who something (here: the catfood) may be tasty; in this case: the speaker or the speaker’s cat. The most natural reading of (148b) seems to be that the catfood is tasty for the cat and not the speaker; for instance, one can
derive a reading where the speaker thinks the cat food is tasty based on how the cat takes to the food. However, it could also be the case that the speaker actually tried the cat food and liked it.

(148) a. This cake is tasty.
    b. This catfood is tasty.

(adapted from Stephenson 2007:30,39)

Predicates such as *tasty*, illustrated in the sentences in (148), are known as *predicates of personal taste*. Lasersohn (2005) argues that with predicates of personal taste, the information of *who the cake is tasty for* (e.g. in (148a)) is encoded in terms of a contextually assigned *judge* (which I will more descriptively call the *evaluator*). This question, of “who” the cake is tasty for, is reminiscent of epithets; here also we can ask in whose view the antecedent of the epithet is the *idiot*, i.e. who is the evaluator? I will discuss this in the following section (section 3.3.3), when discussing Potts (2005) and subsequent works.

In the remainder of this section, I first discuss Stephenson’s (2007) analysis of predicates of personal taste, and then discuss how they interact with attitude predicates such as *think*. We come back to other attitude predicates in section 3.3.4. Lasersohn’s (2005) proposal for the semantics of predicates of personal taste is that such predicates have an individual parameter, which is known as the *judge parameter*. Thus in addition to assuming a proposition to denote a set of possible worlds that are evaluated against a world of evaluation and a time of evaluation, the proposition is also evaluated against a judge.

I’d like to briefly discuss Lasersohn’s assumptions and outline the underpinnings of the system. Lasersohn (2005) assumes a Kaplan (1989) style view of sentence meaning, where a sentence (a proposition) is a function from world-time pairs <w,t> to truth values. The world of evaluation and the time of evaluation make up a so-called *index*. By adding the judge parameter, sentences are now interpreted with respect to a <w,t,j> index, where w is a world, t is a time, and j is an individual (the judge). Put differently, the judge, j, is the individual whose taste or experience is the belief or opinion being expressed. The denotation of an expression α can now be written as [[α]]^c.w.t.j where c is the context (I will omit this below), and w, t and j are the
world time and judge parameter. The meanings of predicates of personal taste can now be given as in (149).

(149) a. \=[[ \text{fun} ]^{c;w,tj} = [\lambda x. x \text{ is fun for } j \text{ in } w \text{ at } t]\]

b. [[ tasty ]]^{c;w,tj} = [\lambda x. x \text{ tastes good to } j \text{ in } w \text{ at } t]

(Stephenson 2007:34)

As discussed, to analyse such predicates of personal taste, Lasersohn (2005) adds a judge \(j\) to the index; Lasersohn’s judge is the person whose opinion is relevant for predicates of personal taste (the evaluator); the denotations of the sentences in (148) are given in (150). The meaning of \(j\) is provided by the context. In (150a), \(j\) most likely corresponds to the speaker; however, in (150b), given our world knowledge about catfood, \(j\) is more likely to correspond to the cat (though it can, of course, correspond to the speaker).

(150) a. [[ this cake is tasty ]]^{c;w,tj} = 1 \text{ iff this cake tastes good to } j \text{ in } w \text{ at } t

b. [[ this catfood is tasty ]]^{c;w,tj} = 1 \text{ iff this catfood tastes good to } j \text{ in } w \text{ at } t

Stephenson (2007) modifies Lasersohn’s proposal as follows. Whilst (149) assumes that predicates of personal taste are inherently dependent on a judge (which I call the evaluator), she assumes that the judge/evaluator is introduced as a (first) argument of the predicate, given in (151). In this system, the evaluator (which corresponds to the first argument of a predicate of personal taste) is dissociated from the judge parameter. From now on, I will only use judge to refer to the judge parameter, and I will use evaluator for the individual in whose mind something is fun/tasty/etc.

(151) a. [[ fun ]]^{w,tj} = [\lambda x. [\lambda y. y \text{ is fun for } x \text{ in } w \text{ at } t]]

b. [[ tasty ]]^{w,tj} = [\lambda x. [\lambda y. y \text{ tastes good to } x \text{ in } w \text{ at } t]]

(Stephenson 2007:41)
Stephenson (2007) aims to unify predicates of personal taste and existential modals. She makes these modifications to Lasersohn’s system to account for the fact that existential modals more rigidly refer to the current judge parameter than predicates of personal taste, which can be evaluated with respect to a salient individual different from the judge parameter. For this reason, (152a) cannot mean that the speaker thinks that it is a possibility from the dog’s perspective that the dog food consists of table scraps, whereas (152b) can mean that the speaker thinks that the dog food is tasty for the dog. The idea is that the judge parameter in a complement of \textit{think} corresponds to the matrix subject (i.e. the speaker in (152a-b)); whilst \textit{might} in (152a) must be evaluated with respect to the knowledge states of the individual associated with the judge parameter (here: the speaker and not the dog), \textit{tasty} in (152b) can be evaluated with respect to another evaluator that is not associated with the judge parameter (here: the dog). Stephenson (2007) achieves this by making \textit{might} inherently judge-(parameter-)dependent, whereas \textit{tasty} has an open argument slot for the evaluator. I will come back to this in Section 3.3.5.

(152)\begin{itemize}
  \item [(a)] Mary: Wow, the dog really likes the dog food you’re feeding him.
  \item [(b)] Sam: (#) Yeah, I think it might be table scraps.  
\quad \text{(Stephenson 2007:39)}
  \item [(c)] Sam: Yeah, I think the dog food is tasty.
\end{itemize}

Another motivation for Stephenson’s modification of the system is that it allows us to have a uniform analysis for the examples in (153). In (153a), the evaluator argument position of \textit{fun} is filled by a null pronoun, whereas in (153b) it is filled by the PP \textit{for Sam}.

(153)\begin{itemize}
  \item [(a)] The roller coaster is fun.
  \item [(b)] The roller coaster is fun for Sam.
\end{itemize}
\quad \text{(Stephenson 2007:20,25)}

Stephenson assumes that the evaluator argument position of a predicate of personal taste can still be filled by the judge, which however has to be done through a null \textit{PRO}$_j$, with the meaning in (154). Furthermore, Stephenson allows for null \textit{pro}, which refer directly to an individual.
(154) \([\text{PRO}_j]^{w,t_j} = j\)  

(Stephenson 2007:41)

So, the different readings for (155a) (a speaker-oriented reading and a reading that takes the cat as the evaluator) can be derived by assuming that \textit{tasty} combines with \textit{PRO}_j in one case, (155b), and with \textit{pro}\textsubscript{the-cat} in the other case, (155c).

(155)a. This catfood is tasty.

b. \([\text{tasty PRO}_j]^{w,t_j} = [\lambda y_e . y \text{tastes good to } j \text{ in } w \text{ at } t]\)

c. \([\text{tasty pro}\textsubscript{the-cat}]^{w,t_j} = [\lambda y_e . y \text{tastes good to the cat in } w \text{ at } t]\)

(based on Stephenson’s 2007:49 examples (70) and (71))

The difference between \textit{PRO}_j, which always refers to the judge, and \textit{pro}, which freely refers to a salient evaluator, plays an additional role in Stephenson’s system, as she argues that \textit{PRO}_j also interacts with \textit{de se} readings. This is orthogonal to the present discussion, so I will not discuss additional motivations for the changes that Stephenson proposes, but refer the reader to her dissertation, Stephenson (2007).

Stephenson (2007) observes that predicates of personal taste exhibit a particular behaviour when embedded under an attitude predicate like \textit{think}. As an illustration, consider the examples in (156); in these examples, the most salient reading is one where the subject of \textit{think}, namely \textit{Sam}, is linked to the predicate of personal taste; it is in \textit{Sam’s view} that the dip is tasty in (156a), and that the rollercoaster is fun in (156b). A reading where Sam thinks that it is the speaker’s view that the dip is tasty or the roller coaster is fun seems less salient (if not impossible). If the evaluator by default corresponds to the current judge (via \textit{PRO}_j), and the judge \(j\) in a matrix clause refers to the speaker by default, this suggests that the judge parameter in an embedded clause must have shifted (here to the matrix subject).
(156) a. Sam thinks the dip is tasty.
   b. Sam thinks that the roller coaster is fun.

   Stephenson (2007:24)

Stephenson (2007) points out further that with multiple embedding, the predicate of personal taste is interpreted with respect to the subject of the think clause that most immediately embeds it. What the examples in (157) seem to show, is that “when a predicate of personal taste is embedded in an attitude report, the attitude holder becomes the person whose knowledge or taste is relevant” (Stephenson 2007:28).

(157) a. Mary thinks that Sam thinks the dip is tasty.
   b. Mary thinks that Sam thinks that the roller coaster is fun.

   Stephenson (2007:25)

Stephenson thus assumes that verbs such as think shift the judge parameter of their complements, and gives the lexical entry in (158). The idea is that think combines with a proposition p (e.g. the dip is tasty in (156a)) and an individual x (e.g. Sam in (156)), and asserts that in all of the belief worlds of x (which have x as their judge y), p is true.

(158) a. \[
[[\text{think}]]^{w,t,j} = [\lambda p_{<i,t,e>} . [\lambda x_e . \forall <w',t',y> \in \text{Dox}_{w,t,x} : p(w')(t')(y) = 1]]
\]
   b. \[
\text{Dox}_{w,t,x} = \{<w',t',y> : \text{it is compatible with what x believes in w at t that he/she/it is y in w' at t'}\}
\]

   (Stephenson 2007:43)

As a consequence, think asserts that its subject believes in the truth of the complement proposition with the subject of think as the judge. I will come back to the role of think in section 3.3.3, and particularly in section 3.3.4.
3.3.3 Epithets Have an Evaluator

Having outlined the basics of judge-based / evaluator-based analyses, I now discuss epithets from this perspective. The obvious similarity between predicates of personal taste and epithets (that in both cases, there is an individual from whose perspective the predicate or epithet is evaluated) resulted in the evaluator-based approaches being extended to epithets, most recently by authors such as Potts (2007) and Schlenker (2007), which I discuss in this chapter. I will follow in the same vein and also propose that epithets make use of an evaluator argument (though my analysis will differ from Potts 2007 and Schlenker 2007; the differences will be mentioned at the relevant parts in Chapters 3 and 4). Reconsider Stephenson’s entry for tasty, in (159).

(159) \[ [[ \text{tasty} ]]^{\lambda x.\lambda y. y \text{ tastes good to } x \text{ in } w \text{ at } t] \]

(Stephenson 2007:41)

The idea that I pursue is that idiot has the denotation in (160); here, the evaluative component \((x \text{ believes that } y \text{ is stupid in } w \text{ at } t)\) of the noun phrase contained in an epithet is a presupposition, whereas at the level of assertion, the noun phrase simply corresponds to person (or something along these lines).

(160) \[ [[ \text{idiot} ]]^{\lambda x.\lambda y : x \text{ believes that } y \text{ is stupid in } w \text{ at } t \text{. } y \text{ is a person in } w \text{ at } t} \]

presupposition of ‘idiot’

at-issue content of ‘idiot’

The distinction between presupposition and at-issue content that is assumed in (160) is based on Schlenker’s (2007:238) entry for honky, given in (161). In this lexical entry, Schlenker uses the concept agent of c instead of evaluator/judge (where c is a context of evaluation); apart from this difference, (160) and (161) are largely analogous.

Collapsing agent of c with judge / evaluator glosses over a controversy that is orthogonal to the present debate. While the judge parameter, which often correlates with the evaluator, is designed to shift in embedded contexts (e.g. the judge in a complement to think would be the subject of think), the agent of c may (depending on other aspects of the analysis) stay constant, referring to the speaker of the utterance. In this sense, agent of c is not equivalent to judge / evaluator, but this difference is not crucial for the analysis that I propose.
(161) \([[\text{honky}]]^{c,w} \) is defined iff the agent of c believes in the world of c that white people are despicable. If defined, \([[\text{honky}]]^{c,w} = [[\text{white}]]^{c,w}\)

(adapted from Schlenker 2007:238)

A core argument for treating the evaluative component as a presupposition stems from the following observation. Consider the statement in (162a); what we notice is that the evaluative component of the epithet does not seem to enter the truth conditions of the utterance. In the scenario in (162b), the intuition is clear: (162a) is false if the speaker never received an email from John. However, in the scenario in (162c), the intuition is less clear; if the speaker does not think that John is a jerk, it is hard to evaluate whether (162a) is false or true – in a way it simply seems infelicitous. This pattern is typical for presuppositional content (or conventional implicatures in the sense of Potts 2005, 2007).

(162) a. Have you seen John? I just got an email from that jerk.

   b. *Situation 1:*
      
      The speaker did not get an email from John, but the speaker believes that John is a jerk. \((162a) \text{ is judged to be a false statement}\)

   c. *Situation 2:*
      
      The speaker did get an email from John, but the speaker does not believe that John is a jerk. \((162a) \text{ is judged to be neither false nor true, but infelicitous}\)

If we negate the relevant sentence (e.g. by replacing the adverb just with the adverb never), the pattern stays the same, as shown in (163).

(163) a. Have you seen John? I never got an email from that jerk.

   b. *Situation 1:*
      
      The speaker did get an email from John, but the speaker still believes that John is a jerk. \((163a) \text{ is judged to be a false statement}\)
c. **Situation 2:**

The speaker never got an email from John, but still the speaker does not believe that John is a jerk. \( ((163a) \text{ is judged to be neither false nor true, but infelicitous}) \)

Having combined Stephenson’s analysis of predicates of personal taste with Schlenker’s analysis of *honky*, we arrived at the semantics for *idiot* in (160), repeated in (164); the first argument \( x \) is, once again, the one that serves as evaluator. (Note that *stupid* is an abbreviation for *stupid to a salient degree* \( d \), as *idiot* can be used mildly or more aggressively, which I assume involves a smaller or larger degree of stupidity. Sauerland (2007b) assumes something similar for *damn*.)

\[
(164) \quad [[\text{idiot}]]^{wtj} = \lambda x . \lambda y : x \text{ believes that } y \text{ is stupid in } w \text{ at } t. \quad y \text{ is a person in } w \text{ at } t
\]

The analysis of epithets as presuppositional elements is also related to Potts’s (2003, 2005, 2007) analysis of epithets, as summarised by Demirdache and Percus (2011) in (165).

\[
(165) \quad \text{a. } \text{the donkey (an epithet) selects semantically for an individual.}
\]
\[
\text{b. } [[[[X] \text{ the donkey }]]^8 = [[X]]^8.
\]
\[
\text{c. When } X \text{ doesn’t contain a bound variable, } [[X] \text{ the donkey } ] \text{ contributes to}
\]
\[
\text{the common ground the information that the speaker doesn’t think highly of } [[X]]^8.
\]
\[
\text{d. When } X \text{ contains a bound variable, the contribution to the common ground exhibits a}
\]
\[
\text{“projection behaviour” analogous to what we find for presuppositions.}
\]

(adapted from Demirdache & Percus 2011:19)

We can now give examples that contain a noun phrase such as (162). First consider an example that involves the indefinite noun phrase *some idiot*, in (166). The idea is that (166a) has the assertion in (166b) and the presupposition in (166c) (the judgments are even clearer with *some jerk*). This follows directly from (162); as we will see below, nothing hinges on calling (166c) a presupposition; what is relevant for my analysis is that it is not part of the assertion; this can also
be done in terms of Potts’s (2003), (2005), (2007) distinction between at-issue meaning and conventional implicature meaning. The phenomena that I discuss do not bear on the question of whether a separate conventional implicature dimension is needed or not, which is at the core of the debate in Potts (2007) versus Sauerland (2007) and Schlenker (2007)).

(166)a. Some idiot asked for you on the phone.
   b. *assertion*: Someone asked for you on the phone.
   c. *presupposition*: I (or some salient person) believe(s) that this person is stupid.

If we use *idiot* as an epithet (i.e. as a nominal appositive with a null anchor), we need to go a step further and address the process by which an appositive combines with its anchor. We will then see, in section 3.3.4 and 3.3.5, how the apparent locality effects with epithets seem to be connected to constraints on the current judge parameter in a clause that contains an epithet. I assume that appositives are interpreted in terms of clausal conjunction (cf. Schlenker (2010), to appear), i.e. (167a) would have the interpretation in (167b). Given the lexical entry in (162), (167b) would assert (167c) (vacuously asserting that Fritz is a person/somebody), and (167b) would presuppose (167d).

(167)a. Do you know Fritz₁? I just met pro₁(,) the idiot.
   b. *proposed interpretation (Schlenker 2010, to appear)*: I just met pro₁ and he₁ is an idiot.
   c. *assertion*: I just met Fritz₁ (and Fritz₁ is a person).
   d. *presupposition*: I (or some salient person) believe(s) that Fritz₁ is stupid.

At this point, it is worth observing that we have to be careful to control for the difference between the evaluative reading of *idiot* in (164) and the non-evaluative reading of *idiot* in (168).

(168) \:[[ idiom ]\]^w,t₁ = \lambda x . x is an ignorant, uneducated person in w at t
For instance, a sentence like (169a) seems to be ambiguous between the meaning in (169b) and the meaning in (169c).

(169)  a. I just met an idiot.
       b. I just met a person, and I believe that that person is stupid. (evaluative)
       c. I just met an ignorant, uneducated person. (non-evaluative)

A similar question that arises at this point is how to interpret (170a). Whilst (170b) asserts that John is white and presupposes that the speaker does not like white people, it seems that (170a) actually asserts that the speaker does not like John / that the speaker thinks that John is stupid.

(170)  a. John is an idiot.
       b. John is a honky.

It is not clear that the lexical entry in (164) derives the correct meaning for (170a), as the assertion would only be that John is a person. One could pursue the idea that (170a) uses the lexical entry in (168), i.e. (170a) would have the meaning in (171). The evaluativity in (170a) may then arise as a Gricean implicature from (171), in the same way in which (172a) implicates (172b).

(171) John is an ignorant, uneducated person.

(172)  a. Why do you want to marry John? He’s a janitor.
       b. You should not marry a janitor.

Alternatively, one possible modification to the system would be to assume the lexical entry in (173) for the evaluative use, and assume that the presuppositional (or in Potts’s terms:
conventional implicature) nature of epithets arises from the fact that they have the structure of nominal appositives with a null anchor (cf. Potts (2003, 2005))^{46}. 

(173) $[[\text{idiot}]]^{\wedge \text{t}} = \lambda x . \lambda y . x \text{ believes that } y \text{ is stupid in } \text{w at } t$

In Potts's system, a COMMA operator (which is a feature on the appositive NP) shifts truth-conditional meaning (marked by a superscripted $a$ for at issue) to the conventional implicature dimension (marked by a superscripted $c$ for conventional implicature). This is illustrated by Potts's example in (174). Here, the determiner $a$ is uninterpreted in Potts's system, so $a \text{ cyclist}$ corresponds to the predicate $be \ a \text{ cyclist}$. After the COMMA operator applies to $cyclist$, it results in $comma(cyclist)$, which combines with an individual (here: lance) in the at-issue dimension, and the result is the same individual in the at-issue dimension (above the bullet $\bullet$), and the proposition $Lance \ is \ a \ cyclist$ (i.e. $cyclist(lance)$) in the conventional implicature dimension (below the bullet $\bullet$).

(174) Lance, a cyclist,

---

^{46} I would like to point out that Potts (2003), (2005) argues for a multi-dimensional semantics. The reader should bear in mind that this differs from a uni-dimensional semantics in that the expressive can enter the common ground in an alternative fashion. Potts (2003) proposes two semantic dimensions of meaning, the at-issue dimension and the C-I (conventional implicature) dimension. The at-issue content enters the common ground after being acknowledged by the participants of the communicational exchange. The information in the C-I dimension is considered secondary, and not under discussion. It is under debate whether a uni-dimensional semantics can cover the same facts as a multi-dimensional semantics, as argued by Schlenker (2007), who proposes that 'expressive presuppositions' can cover the same empirical ground as conventional implicatures (see also Sauerland 2007).
For my analysis of epithets, an analysis that uses the COMMA operator can be given as in (176), based on the entry in (175). Following Stephenson (2007), I assume that the first argument of such a ‘predicate of personal taste’ is satisfied by a null pronoun, which may refer to the speaker, written as $pro_{\text{the-speaker}}$, see section 3.3.5.

(175) $[[\text{idiot}]]_{w,t}^{x,y} = \lambda x . \lambda y . x \text{ believes that } y \text{ is stupid in } w \text{ at } t$

Following Potts, the idea would be that we have the syntax in (176b) for the phrase in (176a), and at the at-issue level, the phrase will simply refer to the referent of the null anchor $pro_1$, as given above the bullet • in (176c); the contribution of the appositive (i.e. that the speaker believes the referent of the null anchor $pro_1$ to be stupid) will be added to the conventional implicature level, as given below the bullet • in (176c). On a par with Potts I assume that the determiner in a nominal appositive is not interpreted\(^{47}\).

(176) a. $pro$, the idiot,

b. \[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\text{DP} \\
\text{pro}_1 \\
\text{NP} \\
\text{COMMA} \\
\text{D}^0 \\
\text{the} \\
\text{idiot} \\
\text{(to)} \text{pro}_{\text{the-speaker}}
\end{array}
\]

\(^{47}\) The question that this raises is why can determiners such as $a$, $this$, $the$ and $that$ stay uninterpreted in appositives. This needs to be clarified in future research. One possible view could be that the determiners still make their regular contribution, and the fact that they seem uninterpreted is due to the construction that they are in (cf. Aoun, Choueiri and Hornstein (2001) who assume that examples like $he$, $the$ idiot are interpreted as $he$, who is the idiot, identifying the referent with the most salient idiot in the context.)
Instead of (167), the meaning of a statement that contains an epithet would then be as in (177).

(177)a. Do you know Fritz\(_1\)? I just met pro\(_1\(,\)\) the idiot.

b. *assertion*: I just met Fritz\(_1\).

c. *conventional implicature*: I (or some salient person) believe(s) that Fritz\(_1\) is stupid.

It is an open question whether it is better to explain the epithet data in a uni-dimensional semantics (as in Sauerland 2007, Schlenker 2007) or in a multi-dimensional semantics (as in Potts 2003, 2005, 2007); also, to conclude this discussion, it is an open question at this point whether idiot in the evaluative reading should be analysed on a par with Schlenker’s (2007) honky, which in its lexical entry has evaluativity in the presupposition, or whether it is better analysed as asserting evaluativity and combining with a COMMA operator. What argues for an analysis that dispenses with the COMMA operator seems to be examples like (166), repeated in (178), where the presupposition of *some idiot* seems to be that the speaker believes this person to be stupid, whereas the assertion is simply equivalent to *someone*. Under an analysis with the COMMA operator, this use of *some idiot* would also require an appositive structure, which here does not seem plausible, as *he, some idiot* seems ill-formed.

(178)a. Some idiot asked for you on the phone.

b. *assertion*: Someone asked for you on the phone.

c. *presupposition*: I (or some salient person) believe(s) that this person is stupid.
At this point it is worth pointing out that Stephenson (2007) does not discuss nouns that behave as predicates of personal taste. However, whilst Stephenson focuses on adjectives and verbs, it is easy to see that nouns can also be predicates of personal taste. If we consider the examples in (179), indulgence can be analysed as the nominal counterpart of tasty, and pleasure as the nominal counterpart of enjoyable (or fun). Both cases clearly have a reading where they are interpreted with respect to an evaluator (which can be made overt by the PP for Ursula).

(179)
a. This cake is an indulgence (for Ursula).

b. The boat ride was a pleasure (for Ursula).

Furthermore, the idea of analysing epithets as evaluator-dependent entities goes back to Potts (2007), who adopts Lasersohn’s notion of judge. However, Potts (2007) does not give a denotation for an epithet like the idiot, but instead focuses on expressive adjectives such as damn (as in the damn dog), for which he formalises the meaning that he first informally states as in (180), where d is the referent (i.e. the dog referred to by the damn dog) and cj is the judge.

(180) In a context c, an utterance of damn with the entity d as its semantic argument creates a context c’ that is just like c except that it registers that cj regards d negatively somehow.

(Potts 2007)

Recall that my entry for idiot in (160) is based on Schlenker’s (2007) entry for honky in (161).

A question that arises for Potts at this point is how epithets manage to refer to their antecedent. Similar to my own proposal (worked out in chapter 2), Potts (2005) (who does not yet assume a judge-based / evaluator-based approach to epithets) proposes that epithets have the structure of names that are modified by an appositive (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:447–448), as in (181a), where the stupid jerk is an appositive modifier on Eddie. When the name is absent, a free variable is adopted in its place, (181b). Notably, Potts’s proposal differs from mine in that he assumes the structure [the stupid jerk [x25]] and does not assume the structure [[pro], the stupid jerk], which makes a difference in the same way in which the composer Mozart and Mozart, the composer, do not seem equivalent.
An argument against the specific analysis in (181) (as opposed to my own analysis, which posits pro, the stupid jerk) may be that it is possible to say he, the stupid jerk (in analogy to pro, the stupid jerk) whereas it is impossible to say *the stupid jerk he, making it implausible that we find constructions such as (181b).

(181) a. {that/the} stupid jerk Eddie
   b. {that/the} stupid jerk x_{25}

(Potts 2003:232)

Another argument against Potts’s analysis in (181) comes from German, where we find case-marking on the anchor without case-marking on the appositive. The opposite is not possible; this is illustrated by the example in (182)\(^48\). In (182a), Indiana is commonly assumed to be an appositive modifier on the DP der Staat ‘the state’. As shown in (182b), a possible (and attested) genitive form is des Staat-es Indiana ‘of the state Indiana’, here, only the anchor is inflected. In contrast, if we turn to the example in (182c), it is not acceptable for only the appositive to be inflected. A form where both the appositive and the anchor are inflected is also possible, this is given in (182d) (but irrelevant for this discussion).

(182) a. der Staat Indiana ‘the state Indiana’ (nominative)
   b. des Staat-es Indiana ‘of the state Indiana’ (genitive)
   c.* des Staat Indiana-s ‘of the state Indiana’ (genitive)
   d. des Staat-es Indiana-s ‘of the state Indiana’ (genitive)

By contrast, Onkel Otto ‘uncle Otto’ behaves differently. Here, Onkel ‘uncle’ is an appositive that modifies the name Otto. The observed pattern is given in (183); here, only the anchor can be inflected, i.e. only (183c) is a possible genitive form.

\(^{48}\)Thanks to Patrick Grosz (p.c) for pointing this out.
German

(183) a. (der) Onkel Otto ‘(the) uncle Otto’ (nominative)
b. *(des) Onkel-s Otto ‘of (the) uncle Otto’ (genitive)
c. (des) Onkel Otto-s ‘of (the) uncle Otto’ (genitive)
d. *(des) Onkel-s Otto-s ‘of (the) uncle Otto’ (genitive)

What we find in the German translation of a Potts-style example, is that the expressive noun phrase *Idiot* ‘idiot’ can be inflected without inflection on the name; the data are given in (184b). Observe that the opposite is not possible, this can be shown by the examples in (184c). The pattern in (184) is exactly like the pattern in (182), and unlike the pattern in (183). We can conclude that the phrase *der Idiot Otto* ‘the idiot Otto’ actually has *der Idiot* ‘the idiot’ as its anchor and *Otto* as the appositive, in the same way in which *der Staat Indiana* ‘the state Indiana’ has *der Staat* ‘the state’ as its anchor and *Indiana* as the appositive. These facts go against the analysis that Potts suggests in (181); in particular, (181b) would involve *that stupid jerk* as its anchor and the free variable $x_{25}$ as an appositive modifier, which seems problematic in its own right.

(184) a. der Idiot Otto ‘the idiot Otto’ (nominative)
b. des Idiot-en Otto ‘of the idiot Otto’ (genitive)
c. * des Idiot Otto-s ‘of the idiot Otto’ (genitive)
d. des Idiot-en Otto-s ‘of the idiot Otto’ (genitive)

Concluding this discussion, it is worth pointing out that the type of construction that I argue for exhibits a third pattern, where both the anchor and the appositive must be inflected; this is illustrated in (185) and explains why epithets with null anchors always carry full case marking in German. A non-evaluative nominal appositive with this structure behaves the same (cf. (186)).
Naturally, we now expect that a phrase such as *the stupid jerk Eddie*, in which I argued that *Eddie* is an appositive modifier on *the stupid jerk*, can also be an appositive in turn, modifying a pronoun. This seems possible as shown in (187).

(187) He, that stupid jerk Eddie, really thinks that he will win this contest.

Finally, we have seen in section 2.2.2 that epithets can be syntactically bound in many languages. Whilst there is much inter-speaker variation with respect to English data, some speakers accept examples such as (188) (and we have seen that cross-linguistically, the possibility of similar constructions is widely attested).

(188)a. ?? Every boy₁ convinced Mary that the bastard₁ is smart.

b. ?? Every tenant in this house₁ convinced Peter that the idiot₁ is smart.

My proposal can easily account for such constructions, by assuming that (188a) is interpreted as in (189a), with the meaning in (189b).
(189)a. Every boy₁ convinced Mary that pro₁, the bastard, is smart.
  
b. Every boy₁ convinced Mary that he₁, the bastard, is smart.

It is much less clear that the analysis in (181b) can be applied to such constructions, as shown in (190). Neither (190a) nor (190b) seems to capture the meaning of (188a).

(190)a. #Every boy₁ convinced Mary that the bastard boy₁ is smart.
  
b.* Every boy₁ convinced Mary that the bastard he₁/him₁ is smart.

I will not expand further on Potts’s system, for the following reason. Although I adopt the notion of judge (or rather: evaluator) from Lasersohn and apply it to epithets, I assume that the individual who provides the evaluation / the perspective fills the first argument slot of the predicate, very much in the spirit of Stephenson (2007) who proposed this for predicates of personal taste. Turning to my own proposal, which treats epithets as nominal appositives with a null anchor, the question arises of how the epithet’s meaning enters the computation. In (167), repeated in (191), I assume that the nominal appositive that surfaces as the overt part of the epithet is interpreted conjunctively, as in (191b).

(191)a. Do you know Fritz₁? I just met pro₁,(,) the idiot.
  
b. proposed interpretation (Schlenker 2010, to appear): I just met pro₁ and he₁ is an idiot.
  
c. assertion: I just met Fritz₁ (and Fritz₁ is a person).
  
d. presupposition: I (or some salient person) believe(s) that Fritz₁ is stupid.

This idea goes back to Lakoff & Ross (1966), who assumes that (192a) has the interpretation in (192b).

(192)a. The officer arrested Clyde, who was the subject of a long manhunt, before he could strike again.
b. The officer arrested Clyde before he could strike again and Clyde was the subject of a long manhunt.

(Potts 2003:263, attributing the idea to Lakoff & Ross 1966)

Potts (2003, 2005) points out that the main question is where the *and* comes from that seems to occur in the semantics. While he considers possible objections (as pointed out by Ross 1967, Pullum 1979), he argues that coordination is needed in any case to make the semantics work\(^{49}\).

Having introduced my semantic analysis for epithets, the remainder of this dissertation focuses on the apparent Condition C effects that we find with such constructions. As discussed, these are surprising from a perspective that treats epithets as a type of pronoun.

### 3.3.4 Attitude Predicates Differ in Terms of the Complement’s Judge

In this section, I would like to introduce the core asymmetry that is needed to explain the empirical scope presented in the earlier section in this chapter. Given Lasersohn’s judge parameter, and the connection between epithets and predicates of personal taste with respect to perspective, the explanation, which I provide in section 3.3.5, will be reasonably straightforward. To briefly recap, the general observation was that epithets in the complements of *think* behave differently from epithets which are located in the complements of *convince*. The core contrast is repeated in (193).

\[(193)\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{John}_1 \text{ thinks that the idiot}_1 \text{ is smart.} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{John}_1 \text{ convinced Peter that the idiot}_1 \text{ is smart.}
\end{align*}
\]

What we have seen in section 3.3.2, is that Stephenson (2007:42) assumes that *think* and similar predicates obligatorily shift the judge parameter of the embedded clause to the matrix subject.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{49} Potts assumes a non-at-issue conventional implicature analysis. For the classical adjunction analysis of appositives, he discusses the possibility that appositives can only adjoin at the root-level, which would allow for 'wide-scope conjunction' and thus avoid the original problems with a conjunction analysis. For present purposes, this may mean that interpretation of appositives in embedded contexts is restricted to embedded clauses that exhibit 'embedded root clause phenomena'.}\)
This is done by means of lexical entries such as (194), repeated from above. What the reader should focus on is the fact that the variable $y$, which represents the judge parameter of the embedded proposition, is shifted to correspond to the matrix subject $x$, given that $y$ is identical to $x$ in all of $x$'s belief worlds (cf. (194b)).

\[
(194) \text{a. } [[ \text{think } ]]^{w.t} = [\lambda p_{<s,<i,et>}. [\lambda x_e . \forall <w',t',y> \in \text{Dox}_{w,t,x} : p(w')(t')(y) = 1]]
\]

b. $\text{Dox}_{w,t,x} = \{<w',t',y> : \text{it is compatible with what } x \text{ believes in } w \text{ at } t \text{ that he/she/it is } y \text{ in } w' \text{ at } t'\}$

(Stephenson 2007:43, slightly adapted)

In contrast, with *convince*, it is the object of *convince* that becomes the judge of the embedded clause. If we assume Stephenson's lexical entry in (195), *convince* combines with two nominal arguments, the person who does the convincing ($x$) and the person who is being convinced ($z$), and a proposition $p$. Here, the idea is that as a result of the communication between $x$ and $z$, $z$ ends up believing that $p$ is true with $z$ as its judge. In other words, it is the object of *convince* (i.e. the person who is being convinced), who corresponds to the judge of the embedded clause.

\[
(195) \text{[ [ convince ]]}^{w.t} = [\lambda z_e . [\lambda p_{<s,<i,et>}. [\lambda x_e . x \text{ communicates with } z \text{ in a way that causes it to be the case that } \forall <w',t',y> \in \text{Dox}_{w,t,z} : p(w')(t')(y) = 1]]]
\]

(Stephenson 2007:149, slightly adapted)

In brief, we can observe that in (196a), the judge parameter of the embedded clause (*that the idiot is smart*) is shifted to the matrix subject (*John*). In contrast, in (196b), the judge parameter of the embedded clause (*that the idiot is smart*) is shifted to the matrix object (*Peter*). As we will see in more detail in section 3.3.5, this already suggests that the person from whose perspective an epithet is evaluated (the evaluator) does not need to be the judge of the sentence, as (196b) has a reading where it is not Peter (but the speaker or some other salient person) who dislikes John. The difference in grammaticality indicates that epithets cannot occur in an embedded
clause where the judge (parameter) is identical to their antecedent. I elaborate on this observation in section 3.3.5.

(196)a. * John1 thinks that the idiot1 is smart.

b. ʔOK John1 convinced Peter that the idiot1 is smart.

3.3.5 Connecting the Dots

In the following sections we have seen that some propositions (those that contain predicates of personal taste) are interpreted with respect to an evaluator, which often interacts with a contextually given judge parameter. We have also seen that epithets, like predicates of personal taste, seem to be interpreted with respect to such an evaluator, though their evaluator rarely corresponds to the judge parameter. Finally, we have seen that think and convince differ in terms of their judge parameter, and that this difference seems to correlate with the acceptability of epithets. We can posit the constraint in (197); this constraint is similar to Dubinsky & Hamilton’s (1998) Anti-logophoricity constraint (which will be reviewed in Chapter 4).

(197) The Anti-Judge Constraint

An epithet cannot occur in a sentence $s$ if (i) the sentence is interpreted with respect to a judge $j$ that is identical to the epithet’s antecedent, and (ii) the antecedent c-commands the epithet.

Clause (i) of (197) derives the pattern in (198), repeated from above.

(198)a. * John1 thinks that the idiot1 is smart.

b. ʔOK John1 convinced Peter that the idiot1 is smart.

Clause (ii) of (197) seems to be required, given that epithets seem fine in utterances like (199), where the epithet’s antecedent does not seem to c-command the complement clause, (cf. (200)), repeated from Chapter 1.2.
(199) OK Peter convinced John₁ that the idiot₁ is smart.

(200) a. * The director₁ convinced John that the director₁ is smart.
   b. OK John convinced the director₁ that the director₁ is smart.

The Anti-Judge Constraint also makes predictions that seem to follow through on the distribution of epithets in other clausal complements.

First, it is relevant to see how we can detect the judge (parameter) of an embedded clause. Stephenson observes that epistemic modals seem to be judge-dependent too, and they seem to be more rigidly judge-dependent than predicates of personal taste, in the sense that their evaluator has to be the individual associated with the current judge parameter. In example (201a), the belief that rain is possible is ascribed to John (the judge of the complement to *thinks*), whereas in (201b), it is ascribed to Peter (the judge of the complement to *convinced*).

(201) a. John thinks that it might rain on Sunday.
   b. John convinced Peter that it might rain on Sunday.

It is not possible for an embedded epistemic modal to express a belief that is ascribed to someone other than the judge. Stephenson observes that Sam’s utterance in (202) cannot mean that Sam thinks that the dog believes it to be possible that the dog food is table scraps.

(202) Mary: Wow, the dog really likes the dog food you’re feeding him.
     Sam: (#) Yeah, I think it might be table scraps.

(Stephenson 2007:39)

Therefore, we can use epistemic modals to detect who is the judge in an embedded clause. The fact that *might* in (202a) reflects a belief of John’s indicates that the matrix subject is the judge; the fact that *might* in (202b) reflects a belief of Peter’s indicates that the matrix object is the judge. If we now turn to predicates such as *know* and *not know*, we observe the following: in
(203a), we notice that the belief of possible rain is shared by the speaker and by John. It is plausible that the judge parameter of the embedded clause in (203a) shifts to John (see also Stephenson’s 2007:63 discussion of believe). However, in (203b), it is not plausible that the proposition that it might rain on Sunday expresses a possibility with respect to John’s knowledge states, i.e. it seems as though the judge in (203b) cannot be John.

(203a).

a. John knows that it might rain on Sunday.

b. John does not know that it might rain on Sunday.

What we find in these cases is that (at least in languages such as Dutch, English and French), these predicates pattern along the lines of the Anti-Judge Constraint. The Dutch examples are repeated from above in (204). With know, an epithet that refers to the matrix subject cannot occur in the complement clause, (204a), but with not know, this is possible, (204b).

Dutch

(204a). \[ ?^* \text{Nero}_1 \text{ weet dat de verrekte eikel}_1 \text{ Sarkozy moet uitnodigen voor de vredesbesprekingen} \]

\[ \text{Nero}_1 \text{ knows that the damned jerk Sarkozy must invite for the peace talks}. \]

(204b). \[ ?^\text{OK} \text{Nero}_1 \text{ weet niet dat de verrekte eikel}_1 \text{ Sarkozy zou moeten uitnodigen voor de vredesbesprekingen} \]

\[ \text{Nero}_1 \text{ doesn’t know that the damned jerk Sarkozy will must invite for the peace talks}. \]

Examples (205) and (206) illustrate the corresponding English and French examples.
(205) a. * Nero₁ knows that the damn traitor₁ should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.

   b. "OK Nero₁ doesn’t know that the damn traitor₁ should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.

(206) a. * Nero₁ sait que le sale traître₁ devrait inviter Sarkozy aux négociations de paix.
Nero knows that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to the talks of peace

   'Nero₁ knows that the damn traitor₁ should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.'

   b. "OK Nero₁ ne sait pas que le sale traître₁ devrait inviter Sarkozy aux négociations de paix.
Nero not knows neg that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to the talks of peace

   'Nero₁ doesn’t know that the damn traitor₁ should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.'

Another prediction from the Anti-Judge Constraint that is borne out through is that the constraint is local; i.e. if we have an attitude predicate in the scope of another attitude predicate, only the subject of the lower attitude predicate is barred from being an antecedent of an epithet that is contained in its complement. This is shown in (207).

(207) a. "OK Nero₁ thinks that Sarkozy thinks that the damn traitor₁ should attend the peace talks.

   b. * Sarkozy thinks that Nero₁ thinks that the damn traitor₁ should attend the peace talks.

For the initial relative clause example, we can also show that their acceptability is compatible with the Anti-Judge Constraint. Consider the examples in (208). Here, the Anti-Judge Constraint indicates that if John c-commands the idiot / the great man, which I have been arguing for, then John cannot be the judge of the clause that contains the epithet (i.e. the relative clause).
(208)  a. OK Yesterday John bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot.

   b. OK Yesterday John bumped into a fan who really loves the great man.

This seems to be the case, because if we apply the test from Stephenson (2007), we find the contrast between (209a) and (209b). In (209a), the proposition it might be table scraps (where it refers to the dog food) is acceptable in the scope of thinks, because according to Stephenson, the judge of the complement to thinks is its subject (here: our dog). In other words, the possibility that the dog food is table scraps is evaluated from the dog’s perspective. Contrastively, in (209b), the proposition expressed by the relative clause that might be table scraps, which modifies dog food, seems contradictory, indicating that might cannot be interpreted from the dog’s perspective. This means that the judge of the relative clause is not shifted; it is still the speaker, and the Anti-Judge Constraint is not violated. This explains why epithets in relative clauses can be c-commanded by their antecedent, as in (208).

(209)  a. OK Our dog loves this dog food. He thinks it might be table scraps.

   b. # Yesterday our dog devoured the dog food that might be table scraps.

The question is how to derive the Anti-Judge Constraint. Consider first the derivation of an example with a predicate of personal taste. Stephenson (2007) argues that predicates with personal taste can combine with PROj (as their evaluator argument), which picks out the judge, or with a referential pro. Given that the judge j of a complement to think corresponds to the matrix subject, tasty is interpreted from Sue’s perspective in (210); in this example, tasty combines with the current judge via PROj, and thus ends up being interpreted from Sue’s perspective.

(210)  a. [Sue [thinks [[this cake] [is tasty PROj]]]]

   b. [ Sue thinks this cake is tasty PROj ]]^w,tj = 

   = 1 iff V<x,w',t',x> E Doxw,t,Sue: the cake tastes good to x in w’ at t’

   (abbreviated, omitting the intermediate steps, from Stephenson 2007:48)
Contrastively, in (211), *tasty* is not judge-dependent, as it combines with a referential \( \text{pro}_{\text{Sam}} \). Therefore, the judge of the embedded clause, which is Sue, is not identical to the person from whose perspective *tasty* is evaluated (the evaluator).

\begin{enumerate}
\item [(211)\text{a.}] [Sue [thinks [[this cake] [is tasty \text{pro}_{\text{Sam}}]]]]
\item [(211)\text{b.}] \[
[[ \text{Sue thinks this cake is tasty } \text{pro}_{\text{Sam}} ]] \equiv_{w',t'} = 1 \iff \forall <w',t',x> \in \text{Dox}_{w,t,Sue} : \text{the cake tastes good to } \text{Sam} \text{ in } w' \text{ at } t'
\]
\end{enumerate}

(abbreviated, omitting the intermediate steps, from Stephenson 2007:48)

For *convince*, we can derive both readings as well, as given in (212) and (213), simply by adapting the derivations in (210) and (211) for the entry for *convince* in (195). In (212), we have the judge-dependent reading, where the cake tastes good to Mary, whereas in (213), we have the judge-independent reading, where the cake tastes good to someone else, here: Sam.

\begin{enumerate}
\item [(212)\text{a.}] Sue convinced Mary that this cake is tasty PRO\text{I}
\item [(212)\text{b.}] \[
[[ \text{Sue convinced Mary that this cake is tasty PRO}_{\text{I}} ]] \equiv_{w',t'} = 1 \iff \text{Sue communicates with Mary in a way that causes it to be the case that} \\
\forall <w',t',x> \in \text{Dox}_{w,t,Mary} : \text{the cake tastes good to } x \text{ in } w' \text{ at } t'
\]
\end{enumerate}

\begin{enumerate}
\item [(213)\text{a.}] Sue convinced Mary that this cake is tasty \text{pro}_{\text{Sam}}
\item [(213)\text{b.}] \[
[[ \text{Sue convinced Mary that this cake is tasty } \text{pro}_{\text{Sam}} ]] \equiv_{w',t'} = 1 \iff \text{Sue communicates with Mary in a way that causes it to be the case that} \\
\forall <w',t',x> \in \text{Dox}_{w,t,Mary} : \text{the cake tastes good to } \text{Sam} \text{ in } w' \text{ at } t'
\]
\end{enumerate}

If we now consider epithets, what we know is that epithets are generally speaker-oriented (with rare exceptions), (cf. Potts (2007), Harris (2009, 2012)). In particular, for all the grammatical examples of epithets that I discuss, such as (214b), it seems to be the case that it has to be the speaker who thinks that the referent of the epithet is stupid (i.e. the evaluator has to be the
speaker). Even the ungrammatical examples, such as (214a), were evaluated with this reading in mind.

(214) a. * John\textsubscript{i} thinks that the idiot\textsubscript{i} is smart.

b. ?OK John\textsubscript{i} convinced Peter that the idiot\textsubscript{i} is smart.

Therefore, epithets cannot be judge-dependent as part of their lexical entry (in the way in which Stephenson (2007) argues that epistemic modals are judge-dependent); on a par with predicates of personal taste, the individual whose evaluation they reflect (the evaluator) is an argument of the epithet in Stephenson's (2007) sense. Recall the interpretation of idiot in (43), repeated from above.

(215) $[[\text{idiot}]]^{w,t} = \lambda x . \lambda y : x \text{ believes that } y \text{ is stupid in } w \text{ at } t . \ y \text{ is a person in } w \text{ at } t$

We need to have an LF as in (216) and (217), where the first (evaluator) argument slot of idiot is filled by a pronoun that refers to the speaker. Crucially, in (216), the judge of the embedded clause is shifted to John, whereas in (217), it is shifted to Peter. This seems to be what is responsible for the ill-formedness of (216), and the well-formedness of (217). In (216) and (217), the idea is that a null pro that refers to the speaker (pro\textsubscript{the-speaker}) satisfies the first argument slot of the epithet.

(216) * John\textsubscript{i} thinks that pro\textsubscript{i}, [the idiot pro\textsubscript{the-speaker}], is smart.

(217) ?OK John\textsubscript{i} convinced Peter that pro\textsubscript{i}, [the idiot pro\textsubscript{the-speaker}], is smart.

Note that in both cases, we want the contribution of the epithet to be as in (218). The question that underlies the Anti-Judge Constraint is why (216) should be ruled out if (217) is possible. This question will be addressed in the following chapter.

(218) the speaker believes that John is stupid in $w$ at $t$
To conclude this chapter, we may conjecture that the reason (216) is ungrammatical has something to do with the distribution of speaker-oriented pro elements. However, in chapter 4, we will see a different approach to the constraints on epithets, which also covers the contrast between (217) and (218), and sheds new light on the Anti-Judge Constraint.

### 3.4 Conclusion

Chapter 3 explored the idea further that epithets are null pronouns that are modified by a nominal appositive. I focused on constructions in which epithets do not seem to pattern like pronouns and argued that their behaviour seems to be connected to the notion of judge (or evaluator). I introduced Lasersohn’s and Stephenson’s idea that predicates of personal taste involve an individual whose perspective is adopted (the evaluator). I showed that epithets seem to be sensitive to an evaluator in the same way, which typically corresponds to the speaker. I argued that epithets seem to exhibit a ban against occurring in a clause that has their antecedent as its judge. For now, it is unclear how this ban comes about, but chapter 4 sheds light on this ‘anti-judge constraint’. At the end of this section, it is worth pointing out that the role of c-command between an epithet and its antecedent generally reduces to the fact that an epithet’s antecedent only becomes the judge of the embedded clause if it is the subject of the matrix predicate, which entails that it c-commands the epithet.
Chapter 4: The Nature of Anti- Locality Effects

In chapter 2, I proposed a syntax for epithets, namely that they are nominal appositives with a null anchor. This was followed by a semantic proposal in chapter 3 which treats epithets as presuppositional elements that convey that a salient evaluator (typically the speaker) holds a certain negative (or positive) evaluation towards the epithet's referent.

Since the birth of contemporary Binding Theory (cf. Chomsky (1981)), the status of epithets has been greatly disputed (as we saw in chapter 2), and so have the constraints that apply to them. For example, Reinhart (1983a) (who treated epithets as R-expression) argued that Condition C of the Binding Theory was not a part of the grammar\footnote{Recall that the Binding Principles were not construed at the same point in time. Principles A & B were proposed first. Principle C was proposed later in order to account for strong cross over effects. When the syntactic machinery changed and Government and Binding was introduced, strong cross-over could be accounted for. It should be pointed out that Chomsky was the first to question whether Condition C was really truly a part of the grammar, given that strong cross over could be accounted for by the mechanisms present in the newer syntactic theory. Further proposals by Lasnik resulted in Condition C being reinstated as a part of the Binding Theory on empirical grounds.}. Her main line of argumentation was that there are many counter-examples to Condition C of the Binding Theory that concern not just epithets, but most types of R-expressions\footnote{Cf. Heim (1998), and Schlenker (2005) who also follow suit.}. She proposed to remove Condition C from the syntax and propose a somewhat similar, though not identical constraint in the pragmatics; she argues that the relevant constraint should be concerned with the descriptive content of R-expressions, and not the structural and locality configurations, which is the case for pronouns and anaphors.

Since Reinhart (1983a), there have been perhaps two influential interface approaches to epithets: Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998), and Schlenker (2005). I will discuss these approaches below. There are two points I would like to make in this chapter. The first point is that the observations I will present in this chapter (bearing in mind Reinhart's 1983a proposal to remove Condition C from the grammar) beg the following question: What is the division of labour between the syntax on the one hand, and the semantics and pragmatics on the other? In this section, I present a novel observation which suggests that there is a general tendency in some languages for an epithet in subject position to be worse then an epithet in object position; I show that this observation is connected to constraints that are reminiscent of the Condition on
Extraction Domains (CED) first observed by Huang (1982). This observation suggests that epithets are subject to locality constraints in the syntax. In this chapter I present how the semantics sketched above interfaces with the syntactic argumentation that I develop in this chapter; finally, I try to show for epithets that we cannot remove Condition C from syntax, but rather we must try to understand how the locality constraint on their distribution interacts with the expressive properties that epithets possess. The second point I would like to make in this section concerns Reinhart’s (1983a) original claim of proposing a Condition C-like constraint in the pragmatics. In this vein, I discuss Schlenker (2005), a paper that develops Reinhart’s ideas, and attempts to explain Condition C effects through a Gricean maxim which Schlenker calls Minimize Restrictors! In the discussion part of the section, I will show that when we remove Condition C from the grammar, and attempt to explain Condition C effects, Condition C violations and Condition C obviation effects through a constraint in the pragmatics, this constraint is something that looks like Condition C, but is not Condition C proper. This has a number of consequences, which will be discussed along the way.

This chapter is structured as follows. In chapter 4.1, I first outline an observation which suggests that we cannot simply remove Condition C from the syntax. In chapter 4.2, I proceed to show how the subject-object asymmetry can be explained in terms of syntactic constraints that interact with the semantics proposed in chapter 3. In chapter 4.3, I briefly review two proposals which (i) discuss the interaction between epithets, attitude predicates and locality (Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998), and (ii) a proposal which argues that the locality constraint that is applicable to epithets should be semantic and pragmatic in nature (Schlenker 2005). I conclude that these proposals do not provide the necessary means to derive the patterns that I observe.

4.1 A New Problem for Locality: The Subject-Object Asymmetry

In chapter 3, I argued that epithets cannot occur in an embedded clause if the null anchor pro of the epithet is referentially dependent on the current judge; i.e. the judge parameter cannot select the antecedent of the epithet’s pro anchor. This derives the fact that epithets cannot be in the subject position of complements to think, while they can be in the subject position of complements to convince. However, we notice that this constraint only applies to epithets in subject position. A new puzzle arises when we look at epithets in object position.
Looking at different languages, we find that epithets in the complement of *think* are only ungrammatical when referentially dependent on the matrix subject if they are in the subject position, and not if they are in the object position. Examples like the ones that we saw in section 3, where such an epithet is ungrammatical in the subject position of a complement to *think* are given in (219) for English, (219a), French, (219b), and Czech, (219c).

(219)a. * Nero₁ thinks that [the damn traitor₁] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.

(219)b. **Nero₁ pense que [le sale traître₁] devrait inviter [Sarkozy] aux pourparlers de paix.

French

Nero thinks that the dirty traitor should invite Sarkozy to the talks of peace

‘Nero₁ thinks that [the damn traitor₁] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.’

(219)c. * Nero₁ si myslí, že by ten zatracený zrácē₁ měl přizvat Sarkozyho

Czech

refl thinks that sbj.3 that damn traitor should invite Sarkozy.acc to peace talks

to peace talks

‘Nero₁ thinks that [the damn traitor₁] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.’

The data in (219) sharply contrast with those in (220), where the epithet is in the object position. While (219a-c) are ungrammatical, (220a-c) seem to be perfectly grammatical.

(220)a. OK Nero₁ thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor₁] to the peace talks.

(220)b. OK Nero₁ pense que [Sarkozy] devrait inviter [le sale traître₁] aux pourparlers de paix.

French

Nero thinks that Sarkozy should invite the dirty traitor to the talks of peace

‘Nero₁ thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor₁] to the peace talks.’
We find a similar contrast (though the examples differ less minimally) in (221) versus (222). Again, we reproduce the above observation. The data in (221) show an epithet that refers to the subject of think, which is ungrammatical in the subject position of the complement.

(221)a. *Nero\textsubscript{i} thinks that [the damn traitor\textsubscript{j}] will solve [the problem].

\textit{French}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textbf{b.}] \textit{\textasteriskcentered\textasteriskcentered}Nero\textsubscript{i} pense que [le sale traître\textsubscript{j}] resoudra [le problème].
  \textit{Nero thinks that the dirty traitor will solve the problem}
  \textit{Nero thinks that [the damn traitor\textsubscript{j}] will solve [the problem].'}
\end{itemize}

\textit{Dutch}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textbf{c.}] *Nero\textsubscript{i} denkt dat de verdomde verrader\textsubscript{j} het probleem zal oplossen.
  \textit{Nero thinks that the damned traitor will solve [the problem].}
  \textit{Nero thinks that [the damn traitor\textsubscript{j}] will solve [the problem].'}
\end{itemize}

\textit{Dutch}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textbf{d.}] *Jan\textsubscript{i} denkt dat de verrekte eikel\textsubscript{j} het probleem zal oplossen.
  \textit{Jan thinks that the damned jerk will solve [the problem].}
  \textit{Jan\textsubscript{i} thinks that [the damn traitor\textsubscript{j}] will solve [the problem].'}
\end{itemize}

\textit{Czech}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textbf{e.}] *Nero si myslí, že ten zatracený zrádce vyřeší ten problém.
  \textit{Nero refl thinks that that damn traitor solve.pfv that problem}
  \textit{Nero\textsubscript{i} thinks that [the damn traitor\textsubscript{j}] will solve [the problem].'}
\end{itemize}

By contrast, (222) shows an epithet that refers to the subject of think, which is grammatical in the object position of the complement.
(222) a. OK Nero₁ thinks that [everyone] fears [the damn traitor₁].

b. Nero₁ pense que [tout le monde] a peur [du sale traître₁].
Nero thinks that all the world has fear of the dirty traitor
Nero₁ thinks that [everyone] fears [the damn traitor₁].

French

c. OK Nero₁ pense que [tout le monde] a peur [de ce sale traître₁].
Nero thinks that all the world has fear of that dirty traitor
Nero₁ thinks that [everyone] fears [the damn traitor₁].

Dutch

d. Jan₁ denkt dat iedereen de verrekte eikel₁ vreest.
J. thinks that everyone the damned jerk fears
‘Jan₁ thinks that [everyone] fears [the damn traitor₁].’

Czech

e. OK Nero₁ si myslí, že se toho zatraceného zrátce každý obává.
Nero refl thinks that refl that damn traitor.gen everyone.nom fears
‘Nero₁ thinks that [everyone] fears [the damn traitor₁].’

The problem can be stated as follows: The subject and object in a complement to think should be interpreted with respect to the same judge parameter setting, i.e. these contrasts are not predicted by the anti-judge constraint as stated in chapter 3. In chapter 4.2, I refine my proposal to account for these more fine-grained differences. To conclude, it is worth considering other approaches to the distribution of epithets, which I do in chapter 4.3; as we will see, these fare no better than the anti-judge constraint proposed in section 3.

4.2 My Claim: Explaining The Subject-Object Asymmetry

4.2.1 Introducing the De Se vs De Re distinction

To begin this section, it is worth briefly pointing out another connected and problematic phenomenon, which will be relevant for our analysis of epithets, namely de se interpretations of
attitude reports. *De se* attitude reports are a concern because they involve a sense of self-reference to be explained (cf. Lewis (1979), Perry (1979) and Chierchia (1989)). Consider the following example from Perry (1979), discussed in Stephenson (2007). A person called Rudolf Lingens has amnesia. He is lost in the Stanford library. He doesn’t know his own identity, nor does he know where he is. Even if he came across an article in the library where he learns that there is an amnesiac named *Rudolf Lingens* lost in the Stanford library, he might not realize that the individual being discussed in the article is he himself. In this scenario, he could only utter *Lingens is lost in the Stanford library* (and not *I am lost in the Stanford library*). Now consider a contrasting scenario. Whilst *Lingens* is in the library reading the article, he suddenly regains his memory; in this case, he could say *I am lost in the Stanford library*. This is a *de se* belief (attitude) report, as Lingens consciously expresses knowledge that is about himself (i.e. he knows that this proposition involves him). The classical *de se* problem can be stated as follows. If we view propositions as sets of worlds, how do we tease apart these two sets of beliefs? Furthermore, *de se* attitudes are problematic because particular constructions are obligatorily interpreted *de se*, in particular attitude reports involving embedded infinitives and subject control (Morgan, 1970; Chierchia, 1989). Consider the Italian example in (223). In this case, the sentence could only be true if Pavarotti himself utters *I am a genius*. The example could not be true in a scenario where Pavarotti hears himself on the Radio, and, without recognising his own voice, utters *this singer is a genius*.

(223) **Italian**

Pavarotti crede di essere un genio.

Pavarotti believes COMP be a genius.

‘Pavarotti believes that he’s a genius.’ (literal reading: *Pavarotti believes to be a genius*)


In the literature, it is controversial as to whether *de se* LFs also exist for English finite clauses such as (224a), uttered to describe the situation in (224b).
(224)a. John thinks that he is smart.

b. John’s thought: “I am smart.”

In the following section I will introduce Percus and Sauerland (2003a), (2003b), who argue that in English, *de se* readings for examples like (224) have an independent logical form in the semantics. I will adopt this core idea and show how their system can explain the behaviour of epithets with respect to *think*. The crux of the explanation is that when an epithet is contained in the complement proposition of *think*, and a *de se* interpretation is intended, the epithet cannot be interpreted in its surface position — following Demirdache & Percus (2011a), (2011b), I assume that the use of epithets in such construction involves a movement link between the surface position of the epithet and the position of its antecedent; the subject/object asymmetry then follows from the subject/object asymmetry in movement (subjects being islands). In sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, I introduce the Percus & Sauerland system, and in 4.2.4 and 4.2.5, I show how we can derive the subject/object asymmetry in their system.

### 4.2.2 Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b): The Case for *De Se* LFs

Recall the contrast under investigation, repeated in (225). In order to explain the contrast in (225), I now focus on analogous examples from Percus & Sauerland (2003a), which share properties with the examples in (225).

(225)a. * Nero₁ thinks that [the damn traitor₁] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.

    b. OK Nero₁ thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor₁] to the peace talks.

Percus & Sauerland (2003a) discuss the example in (226a), and argue that it can be used to describe both the *de se* belief in (226b) and the *de re* belief in (226c).

(226) a. John thinks that he will win the election.  

    (Percus & Sauerland 2003a)
b. *de se belief*
   
   John thinks: “I will win the election.”

c. *de re belief*
   
   John is drunk and sees someone giving a speech on TV; not recognizing that it is he himself, John thinks: “This guy (on TV) will win the election.”

The question that Percus & Sauerland (2003a) address is whether (226b) and (226c) have the same logical form. Percus & Sauerland (2003b) discuss parallel facts for dream reports. The idea is that (227a) can describe two different situations; it can describe a dream of John’s in which his dream-self wins the election, (227b), but it can also describe a dream of John’s in which he is someone else (in this example: Fred) and Fred sees John winning the election, (227c).

(227)  

a. John dreams that he will win the election.

b. *embedded subject* = *dream self*  *(parallel to de se)*
   
   In John’s dream, the dream-self (John) is giving an acceptance speech at his victory party.

   
   c. *embedded subject* ≠ *dream self*  *(parallel to de re)*
      
      John dreams that he is Fred. In John’s dream, the dream-self (Fred) is watching TV, and sees John giving an acceptance speech at his victory party.

The difference between the (226b) and (226c) is parallel to the difference between (227b) and (227c). In (227b), the embedded pronoun that corefers with John is identical to his dream self, whereas in (227c), it is different from his dream self. Similarly, in the *de se* case (226b), we could say that the embedded pronoun that corefers with John is identical to his belief self (i.e. the individual identical to John in all of John’s belief worlds), whereas in (226c) it is different from his belief self. The main proposal of Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b) is that these two constructions actually have different LFs. To understand this, we need to consider the lexical entry that they assume for predicates such as *think/dream*. Their lexical entry for *dream* is given
in (228a); as we see, *dream* does not combine with propositions, but with properties, and the first argument of the property is satisfied by the *dream-self*. A similar lexical entry can be given for *think* in (228b).

\[(228)\]

\[a. \quad [[\text{dream}]] = \lambda P_{<e,<s,t>} \cdot \lambda x \cdot \lambda w. \text{For all } \langle y, w' \rangle \text{ in } \text{DREAM}_{x,w}, P(y)(w') = 1\]

\[(\text{DREAM}_{x,w} \text{ stands for the set of pairs } \langle y, w' \rangle \text{ such that } w' \text{ is a world compatible with } x' \text{'s dream in } w, \text{ and } y \text{ is the individual in } w' \text{ who } x, \text{ in } w \text{ identifies as himself.})\]

\[\text{Percus & Sauerland (2003b)}\]

\[b. \quad [[\text{think}]] = \lambda P_{<e,<s,t>} \cdot \lambda x \cdot \lambda w. \text{For all } \langle y, w' \rangle \text{ in } \text{DOX}_{x,w}, P(y)(w') = 1\]

\[(\text{DOX}_{x,w} \text{ stands for the set of pairs } \langle y, w' \rangle \text{ such that } w' \text{ is a world compatible with } x' \text{'s beliefs in } w, \text{ and } y \text{ is the individual in } w' \text{ who } x, \text{ in } w \text{ identifies as himself.})\]

Given that complements of *dream* and *think* are analysed as properties, the first argument of which is filled by the *dream-self / belief-self*, we need a way of turning propositions into properties. In the *de se* cases, Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b) assume that this is done by lambda abstraction over the pronoun that apparently refers to the matrix subject. This is illustrated in (229). The pronoun *he* is assumed to be uninterpreted and serve to create an additional argument slot; I come back to this in section 4.2.3. (Note that in (229), as we see below, *John* does not bind or corefer with the embedded subject *he*, but the embedded subject is identified with the belief-self / dream-self of *thinks / dreams*; see (230).)

\[(229) \quad \text{de se LF}\]

\[\text{John thinks/dreams that (he*) } \lambda_2 [t_2 \text{ will win the election}].\]

The meaning of this LF is derived as in (230). Starting bottom up, we start with the proposition in CP₂, *t₂ will win the election*, from which we derive the property in CP₁ by lambda abstraction over the subject of CP₂, which is the trace of the uninterpreted pronoun *he*. In the next step of

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52 The entry on (228b) is based on (228a), as the entry that Percus & Sauerland (2003a) assume, involves the additional notion of *concept-generators*, which is irrelevant for present purposes.
the derivation when *thinks* combines with CP₁, the subject of the embedded predicate *will win the election* is identified with the belief-self. This is due to the fact that it is a part of the lexical entry of *thinks*, that the first argument of its complement is identified with the belief-self. Once the resulting V' is applied to *John*, we derive the meaning that in all of John’s belief worlds, John’s belief-self wins the elections.

(230) *de se LF*

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{VP} & \quad \text{[[ John thinks (he*) } \lambda_2 t_2 \text{ will win the election ]]^g = } \\
& \quad = \lambda w. \text{ For all } <y, w'> \text{ in DOX}_{\text{John},w}, y \text{ will win the election in } w' \\
& \quad \text{ where } y \text{ is John’s belief-self in } w' \\
\text{DP} & \quad \text{[[ John ]]^g = John} \\
\text{V} & \quad \text{[[ thinks (he*) } \lambda_2 t_2 \text{ will win the election ]]^g = } \\
& \quad = \lambda x. \lambda w. \text{ For all } <y, w'> \text{ in DOX}_{x,w}, y \text{ will win the election in } w' \\
& \quad \text{ where } y \text{ is } x’s \text{ belief-self in } w' \\
\text{CP₁} & \quad \text{[[ (he*) } \lambda_2 t_2 \text{ will win the election ]]^g = } \\
& \quad = \lambda x. \lambda w. x \text{ will win the election in } w \\
\text{CP₂} & \quad \text{[[ t₂ will win the election ]]^g = } \\
& \quad = \lambda w. g(2) \text{ will win the election in } w
\end{align*}
\]

For the *de re LF*, Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b) do not assume that the property is derived by lambda abstraction. To create a property from a proposition, they posit a ‘type-shifter’, given in (231). This type-shifter creates a property from a proposition, where the first argument (the x slot in (231)) is vacuous. The reader should be aware that I am using a simplification of the Percus & Sauerland system, which leaves certain aspects of the semantics open. The PROP operator as it stands is a vacuous abstractor. The crucial insight in that *de se* LFs of the Percus and Sauerland type shed light on the behaviour of epithets. Therefore, I will not be concerned with aspects of the system such as the question of the vacuous quantification of the PROP operator. I leave this open for future research, and refer the reader to Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b) for the details.
(231) \([\text{PROP}]=\lambda p_{\text{ss,p}} \cdot \lambda x \cdot p\)

(Percus & Sauerland 2003a)

Percus & Sauerland (2003a) explore two possible *de re* LFs, given in (232). They assume that the relevant relationship between the matrix subject *John* and the embedded subject *he* may be construed via accidental coreference and via binding. However, in neither case is the embedded subject identified with the belief-self.

(232) a. *de re LF with accidental coreference.*

John thinks/dreams that PROP [he$_2$ will win the election]. \[\text{where: } [2 \rightarrow \text{John}]\]

b. *de re LF with binding.*

John \(\lambda x_1 t_1\) thinks/dreams that PROP [he$_1$ will win the election].

The denotation of (232a) is given in (233). Starting in a bottom up fashion again, we create a property from the proposition \(g(2)\) *will win the election* by means of the type shifter PROP, which derives CP$_1$. Next, the verb *thinks* combines with the resulting property, as a consequence of which \(g(2)\) *will win the election* is true in all belief worlds of the subject. In this case, the belief-self does not become part of the embedded proposition; the referent for \(g(2)\) is inserted by means of the variable assignment function (in this case, the pronoun *he*$_2$ has the index 2, which is mapped to *John* by the assignment function). When we combine the V' node with *John* we derive the meaning where John is the individual who will win the election in all of John's belief worlds, but at the same time, the individual who will win the election is not identified with John's belief-self; this is the difference between (233) and (230).
We can also derive the meaning of the *de re* LF that involves binding, given in (232b). The derivation is given in (234), using a Heim & Kratzer (1998) semantics for binding. The first step is the same as above, we create a property from the proposition $g(1)$ *will win the election* by means of the type shifter $PROP$, which derives $CP_1$. Next, $thinks$ combines with $CP_1$; as a consequence of which $g(1)$ *will win the election* in the belief worlds of the subject. In the next steps, the trace of $John$, $t_1$ satisfies the subject argument slot of $thinks$, and by lambda abstraction over the index $l$, the subject of $thinks$ and the subject of *will win the election* end up being co-bound. The resulting predicate combines with $John$, so that $John$ is the subject of $thinks$ and the subject of *will win the election* at the same time. Again, identification of the subject of *will win the election* with $John$ does not involve $John$’s belief-self. This is the difference between (234) and (230).
(234) *de re* LF with binding

**VP**

$$[[\text{John } \lambda_1 t_1 \text{ thinks PROP he}_2 \text{ will win the election }]]^g =$$

$$\lambda x. \lambda w. \text{For all } <y, w'> \in \text{DOX}_{\text{John}, w}, \text{John will win the election in } w' =$$

*where y is John's belief-self in w'*

**DP**

$$[[\lambda_1 t_1 \text{ thinks PROP he}_1 \text{ will win the election }]]^g =$$

$$[[\text{John}]]^g = \text{John} = \lambda x. \lambda w. \text{For all } <y, w'> \in \text{DOX}_{x, w}, x \text{ will win the election in } w'$$

*where y is x's belief-self in w'*

$$\lambda_1$$

$$[[t_1 \text{ thinks PROP he}_1 \text{ will win the election }]]^g =$$

$$\lambda w. \text{For all } <y, w'> \in \text{DOX}_{g(1), w}, g(1) \text{ will win the election in } w'$$

*where y is g(1)'s belief-self in w'*

$$t_1$$

$$[[\text{thinks PROP he}_1 \text{ will win the election }]]^g =$$

$$= \lambda x. \lambda w. \text{For all } <y, w'> \in \text{DOX}_{x, w}, g(1) \text{ will win the election in } w'$$

*where y is x's belief-self in w'*

$$\text{V'}$$

$$[[\text{thinks}]^g =$$

$$= \lambda P_{e, s, p} \cdot \lambda x. \lambda w.$$  

For all <y, w'> in DOX_{x, w}, p(y)(w') = 1

*where y is x's belief-self in w'*

CP

$$[[\text{PROP}]^g =$$

$$= \lambda p. \lambda x. p$$

$$[[\text{PROP he}_1 \text{ will win the election }]]^g =$$

$$= \lambda x. \lambda w. g(1) \text{ will win the election in } w$$

$$[[\text{he}_1 \text{ will win the election }]]^g =$$

$$= \lambda w. g(1) \text{ will win the election in } w$$

In brief, both *de re* LFs of Percus & Sauerland (2003a) give rise to the denotation in (235a), whereas their *de se* LF gives rise to the denotation in (235b). The difference is marked by bold type. The difference between the two denotations ultimately comes down to that fact that (235b), the subject of *will win the election* is identified with John's belief-self. By contrast, in (235a), the subject of *will win the election* is identified with John in the actual world. The idea that I will pursue is that (235a) is only a possible LF when John is not aware of the fact that he himself is the subject of *will win the election* (e.g. if he is drunk and does not recognize himself giving a speech on TV). First, I will review the arguments from Percus & Sauerland (2003a) for the existence of *de se* LFs.
(235)  a. *denotation of think-statement with de re LF*

\[ \lambda \omega . \text{For all } \langle y, w' \rangle \text{ in DOX}_{\text{John},w}, \text{ John will win the election in } w' = \]

\[
\text{where } y \text{ is John's belief-self in } w'
\]

b. *denotation of think-statement with de se LF*

\[ \lambda \omega . \text{For all } \langle y, w' \rangle \text{ in DOX}_{\text{John},w}, y \text{ will win the election in } w' \]

\[
\text{where } y \text{ is John's belief-self in } w'
\]

One alternative way of thinking about *de se* readings (which does not assume *de se* LFs) could be to assume that *de se* readings are a subset of *de re* readings, and that we only have one LF, namely *de re* one as in (232a) or (232b) with a denotation as in (235a) (there is a person \( x \) such that John thinks that \( x \) is smart, and \( x \) happens to be John). Percus and Sauerland (2003a) challenge this view, and argue that in English, *de se* readings for such examples have an independent logical form in the semantics, as in (229) with the denotation in (235b).

Percus and Sauerland (2003a) argue that *thinks* in English can have a separate *de se* LF, based on the fact that (236b) seems to be true in the context described in (236a), even though it should be false if we assume the LF in (232a) or the LF in (232b). The important parts of their argument can be summarised as follows. First, in (236a), there are two people who think that John will win the election, namely John (who thinks "I'll win") and Peter (who thinks "the third candidate will win", which is John). Second, there are three people in (236a) who happen to think (two of them in a non-*de se* way) that they will win, namely John (who thinks "I'll win", a *de se* reading), Bill (who thinks "the first candidate will win", not knowing that this is Bill) and Sam (who thinks "the second candidate will win", not knowing that this is Sam). The last two people, Bill and Sam think these thoughts in a non-*de se* way (i.e. they do not think that their belief-selfs will win). Thirdly, John is the only person who thinks "I'll win", i.e. who has a *de se* belief (meaning that he thinks that his belief-self will win). Percus & Sauerland argue that the true statement in (236b) in the context (236a) shows that there is a separate *de se* LF, as they argue that (236b) should be false if only *de re* interpretations were possible (as there are two people who think that John will win, and there are three people who, partly unknowingly, think that they themselves will win). I now go through the details of their argument.
(236)a. Scenario: A group of drunken election candidates watching campaign speeches on
television do not recognize themselves in the broadcast. John, the only confident one,
thinks “I’ll win,” but does not recognize himself in the broadcast. Bill and Sam, both
depressive, think “I’ll lose” but are impressed by the speeches that happen to be their
own and are sure “that candidate” will win. Peter, also depressive, happens to be
impressed not by his own speech but by John’s.

b. Only John thinks that he will win the election.

(Percus & Sauerland 2003a:234)

The full argument of Percus & Sauerland can be summarised as follows. If we assume a de re
LF, we can either have the pronoun that is construed ‘de re’ accidentally corefer with John, as in
(232a), or alternatively, this pronoun can be bound by John, as in (232b), even though it is still
interpreted de re. The two possible de re readings are given in (237) and (238), based on Percus
& Sauerland (2003a). First, we observe that (237a) is a false statement with the de re LF that
involves accidental coreference, the denotation of which is repeated in (237b); this is due to the
fact that Peter happens to think that John will win the election.

(237)a. Only John thinks that he will win the election. (de re LF and he corefers with John)

b. [[ thinks PROP he will win the election ]]8 =
   = λx.λw. For all <y, w'> in DOXx,w, g(2) will win the election in w’
   (where g(2) = John)

c. presupposes: John thinks (de re) that John will win the election.
   asserts: Bill doesn’t think (de re) that John will win the election, and = TRUE
   Sam doesn’t think (de re) that John will win the election, and = TRUE
   Peter doesn’t think (de re) that John will win the election. = FALSE

Second, we observe that (238a) is a false statement with the de re LF that involves binding, the
denotation of which is repeated in (238b), as both Bill and Sam happen to think (unknowingly, as
they do not recognise themselves) that they will win the election.
(238) a. Only John thinks that he will win the election. (*de re* LF and *he* is bound by *John*)

b. \[ [ \lambda_t \text{ thinks } \text{PROP } he_1 \text{ will win the election } ] ]^g = \lambda x. \lambda w. \text{For all } <y, w'> \text{ in } \text{DOX}_{x, w}, x \text{ will win the election in } w' \]

c. presupposes: John thinks (*de re*) that John will win the election.

asserts: Bill doesn’t think (*de re*) that Bill will win the election, and = FALSE

Sam doesn’t think (*de re*) that Sam will win the election, and = FALSE

Peter doesn’t think (*de re*) that Peter will win the election. = TRUE

Percus & Sauerland’s argument for a *de se* LF is based on the fact that (236b) still seems to be a true statement, which follows from assuming a *de se* LF, as in (239b), repeated from (230).

(239) a. Only John thinks that he will win the election. (*de se* LF)

b. \[ [ \text{thinks } (he^*) \lambda_t \text{ will win the election } ] ]^g = \lambda x. \lambda w. \text{For all } <y, w'> \text{ in } \text{DOX}_{x, w}, y \text{ will win the election in } w' \text{ where } y \text{ is } x \text{'s belief-self in } w' \]

c. presupposes: John thinks (*de se*) that John(‘s belief-self) will win the election.

asserts:

Bill doesn’t think (*de se*) that Bill(‘s belief-self) will win the election, ad = TRUE

Sam doesn’t think (*de se*) that Sam(‘s belief-self) will win the election, and = TRUE

Peter doesn’t think (*de se*) that Peter(‘s belief-self) will win the election. = TRUE

In the remainder of chapter 4, I will use some of the ideas present in Percus and Sauerland (2003a), specifically, I will argue that in line with Percus and Sauerland, *think* can have an independent *de se* logical form; I also assume that this *de se* LF must be used whenever the subject of *think* has a belief that involves that subject’s belief-self. I contrast this with the case of *convince*, where only a *de re* interpretation is possible; I will then show how this analysis can derive the subject/object asymmetry.
4.2.3 The Role of Uninterpreted Pronouns in De Se LF

After arguing that the complement of English *think* can have a *de se* LF, Percus & Sauerland (2003a) argue that such *de se* LF are derived by leaving a pronoun inside the complement CP uninterpreted; as already indicated above, this is the pronoun that apparently ‘corefers’ to the matrix subject. This is illustrated in (241); here, *he* is the uninterpreted pronoun. (241a) is from Percus & Sauerland (2003a); (241b) is a simplified version of the analysis in Percus & Sauerland (2003a), as given in section 4.2.2.

(240) a. John thinks he will win the election.
   b. *de se* LF: John thinks (*he*) $\lambda t_2$ will win the election.

In what follows, I will focus on the notion of such uninterpreted pronouns. The core idea is illustrated in (241). If a sentence like (241a) is interpreted *de se*, the pronoun *he* remains uninterpreted, which Percus & Sauerland (2003a) mark by the asterisk ‘*’. The purpose of using an uninterpreted pronoun such as *he* is for this pronoun to move up, leave a trace, generate a binder operator, and thus turn the complement of *think* into a property. As shown in section 4.2.2 above, what (241c) eventually means is that John *self-attributes* the property$^{53}$ of winning the election in all of his belief worlds (i.e. John has a *de se* belief). It is important, that *he* is not interpreted, and simply serves to create a trace and trigger lambda abstraction (by moving up).

(241)a. John thinks [*he* will win the election].
   b. LF: John thinks (*he*) $\lambda t_2$ will win the election.
   c. [[ thinks (*he*) $\lambda t_2$ will win the election ]]$^8$ =

   $= \lambda x.\lambda w.\text{For all } <y, w'> \text{ in } DOX_{x,w}, y \text{ will win the election in } w'$
   *where* $y$ is $x$’s belief-self in $w'$

   (adapted from Percus & Sauerland 2003a:241)

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$^{53}$ Cf. Quine’s (1982) notion of exportation in belief sentences, mapping a proposition into a property and a *de re* belief.
For object pronouns, Percus & Sauerland (2003a) assume a similar configuration, given in (242). Here, the object is identified with the belief-self of the matrix subject; the derivation is analogous to (230).

(242)a. John thinks [Mary will vote for him*].

b. LF: John thinks (him*) λ₂ [Mary will vote for t₂].

c. [[ thinks (him*) λ₂ that Mary will vote for t₂ ]]g =
= λx. λw. for all <y, w'> in DOXₓ,w, Mary votes for y in w'  
where y is x’s belief-self in w’

(adapted from Percus & Sauerland 2003a:241)

Developing the idea from chapter 3, I propose that the predicates in which the matrix subject is the judge of the embedded clause are the same predicates that allow for such de se LFs. We can thus restate (and derive) the Anti-Judge Constraint in terms of the null anchor: The proposal is that epithets cannot combine with null anchors that consist of uninterpreted pronouns (in Percus & Sauerland’s sense); this idea is based on Demirdache & Percus (2011a), (2011b). Of course this entails that complements of think must (rather than may) take complements with de se LFs in the cases in which epithets are unacceptable. I come back to this later.

For think versus convince it can be shown that this is on the right track. Recall the judgments in (243). If the constraint on epithets is a constraint that epithets cannot modify uninterpreted pronouns, the contrast between (243a) and (243b) follows if (243a) involves an uninterpreted pro* as the null anchor of the idiot, whereas (243b) does not.

(243)a. * John₁ thinks that the idiot₁ is smart.

b. OK John₁ convinced Peter that the idiot₁ is smart.

This seems correct. Reconsider Stephenson’s (2007) entries for think and convince, in (244a) and (244b), repeated from (194) and (195).
If we use the Percus & Sauerland (2003a) notation instead, we can adapt (244b) as in (245a), by analogy with (245a), repeated from (228b). As the complement proposition of convince in (245b) is interpreted with respect to the object DP’s belief worlds and belief-self, a de se interpretation is only conceivable with respect to the object and not with respect to the subject of convince.

(245)  a. $[[\text{think}]]^g = \lambda y. \lambda w. \forall <y, w'> \in \text{DOX}_{x,w}, P(y)(w') = 1$

(DOX$_{x,w}$ stands for the set of pairs $<y, w'>$ such that $w'$ is a world compatible with $x$’s beliefs in $w$, and $y$ is the individual in $w'$ who $x$, in $w$ identifies as himself.)

b. $[[\text{convince}]]^g = \lambda z. \lambda x. \lambda y. \lambda w. x$ communicates with $z$ in a way that causes it to be the case that $\forall <y, w'> \in \text{DOX}_{x,w}, P(y)(w') = 1$

(DOX$_{z,w}$ stands for the set of pairs $<y, w'>$ such that $w'$ is a world compatible with $z$’s beliefs in $w$, and $y$ is the individual in $w'$ who $z$, in $w$ identifies as himself.)

As convince is not interpreted with respect to the subject’s beliefs, a de se reading cannot pick out the subject’s belief-self, which derives the fact that (243b) is acceptable, in contrast to the unacceptable (243a). Naturally the question arises whether a de se reading can be construed with respect to the object of convince. To test this, we have to modify Percus & Sauerland’s scenario in (236), as given in (246). Whilst this context is evidently more difficult to judge, and judgments are hazy, the judgments that I collected indicate that (246b) cannot be true in this context, due to the fact that Mary also convinced Peter that John will win, and it does not matter that she only convinced John to think “I’ll win”. By Percus & Sauerland’s logic, the fact that (246b) has to be false in the context (246a) indicates that there is no de se LF available in (246b). This may be due to the fact that the object of convince does not c-command the complement.
proposition (see chapter 4.2.4 for the idea, proposed in Percus & Sauerland 2003b, that the uninterpreted pronoun must syntactically agree with the antecedent, i.e. the person whose belief-self enters the \textit{de se} interpretation). This is compatible with the fact that some speakers accept the example in (247)\textsuperscript{54}.

(246)a. Scenario: A group of drunken election candidates watching campaign speeches on television do not recognise themselves in the broadcast. Mary talks to each of them. In a long conversation, she convinces John to think “I’ll win”; at the same time, John does not recognise himself in the broadcast. She also convinces Bill and Sam to think “I’ll lose” but she argues that the speeches that happen to be their own are great and makes Bill think “the second candidate” will win (which happens to be Bill though he does not recognise himself), and makes Sam think “the third candidate” will win (which happens to be Sam though he does not recognise himself either). Finally, she convinces Peter that John will win.

b. Mary convinced only John that he will win the election.

(247) ?? Mary convinced John\textsubscript{1} that the idiot\textsubscript{1} will win the election.

We have found that the possibility of \textit{de se} LFs with \textit{think} and the lack of such \textit{de se} LFs with \textit{convince} correlates with the acceptability of epithets in the complements of these predicates. This suggests that the possibility of a \textit{de se} LF with \textit{think} is responsible for the ungrammaticality of epithets in (the subject position of) the complement of \textit{think} that corefer with the matrix subject. In contrast, the unavailability of a \textit{de se} LF with \textit{convince} entails the grammaticality of such epithets in (the subject position of) its complement. The question to be addressed in the remainder of this chapter is how to derive this.

\textsuperscript{54} Similar difficulties in evaluating the relevant examples arise in evaluating (ii) in the scenario in (i). Preliminary intuitions indicate that (ii) is also a false statement in this scenario. Further testing is necessary in this respect.

i. Scenario: A group of drunken election candidates watching campaign speeches on television do not recognize themselves in the broadcast. John, the only confident one, convinces himself “I’ll win,” but does not recognize himself in the broadcast. Bill and Sam, both depressive, think “I’ll lose” but are impressed by the speeches that happen to be their own and end up convincing themselves that “that candidate” will win. Peter, also depressive, happens to be impressed not by his own speech but by John’s and convinces himself that John will win.

ii. Only John convinced himself that he will win the election.
Also, one more assumption that is necessary for explaining this distribution is that think must combine with de se LF's whenever the reported context is one where the actual belief is best characterized as a de se belief. This will be the case in most circumstances, as (248a) is typically understood to mean (248b), and not (248c).

(248)  

a. John thinks that he is smart.

b. John thinks: I am smart.

c. John thinks: That guy on TV who I don’t recognise is smart.

The assumption that a de se LF (where an argument of the embedded proposition is identified with the belief-self) must be used when a de se belief is described is supported by Percus & Sauerland’s (2003b) idea that dream reports that are about the subject’s dream-self also require such an LF. In a situation, in which John describes a dream in which he is Bill, the dream report sentence in (249) can only have the readings in (250a), (250b) and (250d), but not the reading in (250c). Percus & Sauerland derive the unavailability of (250c) from the assumption that the first occurrence of the dream-self in the embedded clause requires movement of the respective he* or his* to derive the ‘de se’-like LF, and in (250c), his* cannot move across he, due to a syntactic superiority violation. See Percus & Sauerland (2003b) for the details. For my purposes I take this to indicate that identification of an argument in the embedded clause with the dream-self or belief-self of the matrix predicate (as Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b) analyse dream and think in parallel) requires such a de se LF (otherwise, (250c) should still be a conceivable de re interpretation – which it is not, as it is unacceptable).

(249)  

John dreamed that he was marrying his grand-daughter.

(Percus & Sauerland 2003b)

(250)  

a. OK  In John’s dreams, the dream-self (Bill) marries the dream-self’s (Bill’s) grand-daughter.

b. OK  In John’s dreams, the dream-self (Bill) marries John’s grand-daughter.

c. #  In John’s dreams, John marries the dream-self’s (Bill’s) grand-daughter.
d. OK In John’s dreams, John marries John’s grand-daughter.

(Percus & Sauerland 2003b)

To summarise this section, I have argued that think must combine with a de se LF whenever it reports on a de se belief (e.g. if we use (248a) to describe (248b)). Furthermore, in de se LFs, the pronouns that co-refer with the matrix subject are uninterpreted, following Percus & Sauerland (2003a), as their only purpose is license a binder operator that turns the complement of think into a property (rather than a proposition), creating the de se LF. And finally, nominal appositives cannot modify null anchors that are uninterpreted pronouns of this type; as we will see in section 4.2.4, this idea is inspired by Demirdache & Percus (2011a, 2011b), who make the same assumption for Jordanian Arabic. For now, we can motivate this as follows. A nominal appositive, such as the farmer in (251a) is interpreted as in (251b), as part of the predicate is a/the farmer; the question is where the subject of this predicate (i.e. he in (251b)) gets its meaning from. We can assume, that it gets its meaning from the appositive’s anchor, which means that the anchor must be interpreted. (See also Potts (2003, 2005), where appositives are analysed as compositionally predicating over the anchor.)

(251) a. John, the farmer, visited the pub.
    b. John visited the pub, and he is a/the farmer.

This derives the Anti-Judge Constraint on epithets for the most simple case. The relevant contrast is given in (252).

(252) a. * John₁ thinks that the idiot₁ is smart.
    b. OK John₁ convinced Peter that the idiot₁ is smart.

The explanation for the contrast in (252) is as follows. Example (252a) requires a de se LF, i.e. the null pro anchor of the epithet is uninterpreted (written as pro*), given in (253a), which makes
(252a) ungrammatical. In contrast, (252b) cannot have a *de se* LF; it must have a *de re* LF, (253b), and is thus grammatical.

(253)a. * John thinks that *pro*, the idiot, is smart. 
   (de se LF) 
   b. ?OK John, convinced Peter that *pro*, the idiot, is smart. (only de re LF)

An prediction at this point is that an epithet in the subject position of *thinks* becomes better if a de re LF is enforced by the context, as in (254). The prediction is that (254b) is acceptable in the context in (254a); preliminary judgments indicate that this is indeed the case.

(254)a. Context: John is completely drunk and does not recognise himself. He sees someone give an election speech on TV, and thinks that this person will win the election. 
   b. John thinks that the idiot will win the election.

Coming back to examples from chapter 3, repeated in (262) from (207) and in (256) from (205), the prediction arises that the unacceptable examples (262b) and (256b) allow (and require) a de se LF, whereas the acceptable examples (262a) and (256a) do not allow for such a de se LF.

(255)a. ?OK Nero, thinks that Sarkozy thinks that the damn traitor should attend the peace talks. 
   b. * Sarkozy thinks that Nero thinks that the damn traitor should attend the peace talks.

(256)a. ?OK Nero doesn’t know that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks. 
   b. * Nero knows that the damn traitor should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.

For (262), it can be shown that this is the case. Using the simplified contexts in (264a) and (258a), given that judgments are difficult as it is, and it is enough for present purposes to control for the coreferential de re interpretation, we notice the following asymmetry. (264b) seems to be a true statement, even though in Sarkozy’s thoughts Nero is not the only one who thinks that Nero should attend the peace talks. Contrastively, (258b) seems to be a false statement. This
contrast is predicted if (264b) allows for a *de se* LF and (258b) does not. If (258b) did allow for such a *de se* LF, (258b) should also be true, as Nero is the only one who believes that Sarkozy will invite Nero’s belief-self to the peace talks.

(257) a. Context:
    Sarkozy thinks: “Nero thinks: ‘I should attend the peace talks’”.
    Sarkozy thinks: “Bill thinks that Nero should attend the peace talks”.

b. Sarkozy thinks that only Nero₁ thinks that he₁ should attend the peace talks. (TRUE)

(258) a. Context:
    Nero thinks: “Sarkozy thinks that I (=Nero) should attend the peace talks.”
    Bill thinks: “Sarkozy thinks that Nero should attend the peace talks.”

b. Only Nero₁ thinks that Sarkozy thinks that he₁ should attend the peace talks. (FALSE)

This indicates that (262b) can (and must) have a *de se* LF, whereas (262a) cannot. The unacceptability of (262b) and the acceptability of (262a) are thus correctly predicted. Future research has to explore whether the same argument can be made for (256); the main issue at this point, which is why I leave this an open question, is that knowledge is much more difficult to describe in a context than thought, i.e. it is not immediately clear what the relevant contexts would be to test for a *de se* LF.

Notice that we have not solved the subject/object asymmetry in complements of think, as the analysis in (241) and (242) does not differentiate between the two types of arguments. I will now outline a first sketch of a solution for this asymmetry in section 4.2.3 and then refine it in section 4.2.4.
4.2.4 A First Attempt based on Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b)

Consider the problematic contrast in (259a) versus (259b). Both examples seem to express a *de se* report, as in (260). This suggests that the embedded clause should (obligatorily) have a *de se* LF. The question is then why (259b) is acceptable if (259a) is not.

(259)a. * Neroni thinks that [the damn traitor1] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.
   b. OK Neroni thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor1] to the peace talks.

(260)a. OK Neroni thinks: "I should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks."
   b. OK Neroni thinks: "Sarkozy should invite me to the peace talks."

Let me first explore if this contrast follows directly from Percus & Sauerland (2003a), (2003b). To account for the facts, one could assume that (259a) allows for a *de se* LF, whereas (259b) disallows for such a *de se* LF. As we have seen in (242), this is problematic to begin with, as pronouns in object position of a complement to *think* can remain uninterpreted, giving rise to a *de se* interpretation. However, for the sake of the argument, let us assume that such an asymmetry can still be maintained. In section 4.2.5 I present the final proposal, which explains the subject/object asymmetry. If this asymmetry was due to (259b) not allowing for a *de se* LF, we could pursue the following line of argumentation. Under the assumption that *de se* LFs are required whenever they are possible, (259a) becomes ungrammatical, but (259b) remains possible. We may implement this by assuming that null pronouns in English must enter an agreement relation with an antecedent in order to be uninterpreted. Percus & Sauerland (2003b) assume such a relation to account for phi-agreement in (261).

(261) a. Intended reading: In my dream, the dream-self was sick.
   b. Possible form: I dreamed [ I* [\lambda t1 \text{ was sick} ] ]
   c. Impossible form: I dreamed [ he* [\lambda t1 \text{ was sick} ] ]

(Percus & Sauerland 2003b)
The idea for deriving the contrast between (259a) and (259b) would then be that such an agreement relation is necessary in order for a pronoun to remain uninterpreted, and move up to a position below the attitude predicate to create a binder operator. We could assume this movement requires an agreement relation between the antecedent and the pronoun, which seems plausible, since de se LFs are only ever created when the matrix subject is co-referent with the pronoun.

To account for the subject-object asymmetry that we observe, we can assume that this syntactic relation is disrupted by an intervening DP due to Relativized Minimality. Therefore, (259a) allows (and consequently requires) the null pro to be uninterpreted, as illustrated in (262a), which in turn makes (259a) ungrammatical. In contrast, (259b) does not allow this, as illustrated in (262b), which means that (259b) must have a de re LF, and no problem arises.

(262)a. (*) Nero\(_1\) thinks that pro*\(_1\), the damn traitor, should invite Sarkozy to the peace talks.
   \[\overline{\text{AGREEMENT}} \Rightarrow \text{de se LF possible}\]

   b. Nero\(_1\) thinks that Sarkozy should invite pro*\(_1\), the damn traitor\(_1\), to the peace talks.
   \[\overline{\overline{\overline{\overline{\text{AGREEMENT NOT POSSIBLE}}} \Rightarrow \text{de re LF}}\}]}\]

This predicts that such utterances with epithets must have a de re reading, and at first sight, this prediction seems to follow through, as the statement in (263b) seems false in the scenario in (263a) (based on Percus & Sauerland's 2003a:234), which one might take to indicate that (263b) does not have a de se reading. However, this can be shown to be problematic, as (263c) also appears to be false in this scenario, indicating that the appositive somehow affects the truth conditions in ways that are currently unclear. In brief, it is not possible to conclude from the perceived falsity of (263b) that (263b) does not have a de se LF, as it could be perceived to be false for independent reasons.

(263)a. Scenario: A group of drunken election candidates watching campaign speeches on television do not recognise themselves in the broadcast. John, the only confident one, thinks “Mary will vote for me,” but does not recognise himself in the broadcast. Peter, who is depressive, happens to be impressed not by his own speech but by John's, and
thinks “Mary will vote for him”.

b. Only John₁ thinks that Mary will vote for the idiot₁.

c. Only [John, the idiot₁]₁ thinks that Mary will vote for him₁.

To recapitulate, the first idea laid out here is that epithets in the subject position of complements of think are unacceptable when referentially dependent on the matrix subject, because their null anchor pro ends up uninterpreted, making a de se LF obligatory. Contrastively, such epithets may be acceptable in the object position of complements of think, because their null anchor pro is barred from being uninterpreted; a de se LF would here be blocked and a de re LF would be required. While this analysis is clearly on the right track, it contains assumptions that are difficult to argue for, and there is no clear evidence to confirm this approach. In section 4.2.4, I refine this analysis by taking a more uniform approach as follows. I assume that (259a) and (259b) both require the embedded pronoun to remain uninterpreted, maintaining that the judgment in (263b) is confounded and we can still have de se LFs even with epithets; the difference is then connected to a separate issue: When can the nominal appositive in an epithet construction combine with an uninterpreted pronoun and when is this impossible?

4.2.5 Explaining the Subject/Object Asymmetry – The Final Result

In section 4.2.4, I outlined a first, ‘naïve’ approach to deriving the contrast between (264a) and (264b). In this section, I propose that the difference between (264a) and (264b) arises from interactions between the LF interface and the PF interface. To be specific, the basic idea here is that in such constructions, movement of the epithet is required by the semantic analysis discussed in chapter 3 and refined in sections 4.2.1-4.2.4. The subject/object asymmetry then follows from the subject/object asymmetry on extraction.

(264) a. * Nero₁ thinks that [the damn traitor₁] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.

b. OK Nero₁ thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor₁] to the peace talks.
Demirdache and Percus (2011a, 2011b) develop ideas from Percus and Sauerland (2003a). They assume that semantic binders only ever arise by movement (in the spirit of Heim and Kratzer 1998). Focusing on Jordanian Arabic, the authors make an assumption similar to what I argued for in chapter 2, and propose that epithets (i.e. the nominal appositive) cannot be attached to a trace (a constraint that they call *[t expressive]). This is similar to my claim in sections 4.2.2-4.2.4, where I argue that the nominal appositive cannot modify uninterpreted pronouns. The core idea that I will adapt from Demirdache & Percus is as follows: I propose that constructions in which an epithet occurs in the location of an uninterpreted null anchor can be ‘saved’ by what they call epithet float – an epithet can be interpreted in a position other than where it is pronounced. Their core example is (265). Note that in Jordanian Arabic epithets occur with an overt anchor, the pronoun ha ‘he’ (see also section 2.2.1 for the same element in Lebanese Arabic). This pronoun corresponds to the null anchor that I argued for in languages such as Czech, Dutch, English, French, and Russian. In (265), which , ha ‘he’ is used resumptively, i.e. it picks up the referent of the NP Xaled.

(265) xaled, fakartu ?innu ha-l-Hmar bi-l-bajat
Xaled you.thought that pro-the-donkey at-the-house
lit. ‘Xaled, you thought that this donkey is at home.’
(‘Xaled, you thought that he is at home, the donkey.’)

(Demirdache & Percus 2011a: example (15b-ii))

In the spirit of Percus & Sauerland (2003a), Demirdache & Percus assume that ha ‘he’ is uninterpreted, and serves to create a binder and a trace. They assume a Potts structure and argue that for the sentence in (265), which has the pronounced shape in (266a), two LFs are conceivable. The LF that reflects the surface position of the epithet is given in (266b); this is ungrammatical, as the epithet modifies a trace, t2, of the uninterpreted pronoun. In contrast, the LF in (266c) involves epithet float, i.e. the epithet is actually in a position where it is not interpreted; it is interpreted as a modifier on the antecedent. They argue that this LF is grammatical; as they define it, epithet float is a process of covert LF movement that derives (266c) from (266a) (rather than interpreting (266a) as (266b)).
(266) a. Xaled, you thought that ha-the donkey is at home.

    b. * LF without epithet float
    * [ Xaled [ (ha*) [ λ₂ you thought that [t₂-the-donkey] was at home ] ] ]

    c. LF with epithet float
    [ [Xaled-the-donkey] [ (ha*) [ λ₂ you thought that t₂ was at home ] ] ]

(adapted from Demirdache & Percus 2011a: example (27b))

Their definition of epithet float is given in (267).

(267) Epithet float

On the way to LF, an epithet’s expressive term can float away from its host pronoun and combine with the pronoun’s “antecedent”.

(Demirdache & Percus 2011b:382)

Demirdache & Percus (2011a, 2011b) motivate epithet float by means of examples like (268a) (which they acknowledge is sometimes called PF extraposition of expressives in English); following Potts (2005, 2007), they argue that (268a) has the LF in (268b), drawing on Potts et al. (2007).

(268) a. That boy left, the bastard.

    b. LF: [[[that boy]-[the bastard]] left ]

(Demirdache & Percus 2011a: example (30a))

My own proposal and data above raise the following question: How is the pronounced position of an epithet (as in (266a) or (268a)) related to its interpreted (LF) position (as in (266c) or (268b)). I follow Demirdache & Percus in assuming that epithet float is a type of movement. The idea that I pursue is that epithets can generally undergo such movement, but this movement is constrained by familiar locality constraints, such as islandhood; I come back to this property of
epithet float at the end of this section. First, let us reconsider the contrast that we want to explain, in (269).

(269)a. * Nero1 thinks that [the damn traitor1] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.

   b. OK Nero1 thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor1] to the peace talks.

I argued that in both cases the structure is roughly the one in (270), where the epithet is a nominal appositive with a null anchor.

(270)a. * Nero1 thinks that [pro1, the damn traitor1] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.

   b. OK Nero1 thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [pro1, the damn traitor1] to the peace talks.

If we assume that both instances of pro must be uninterpreted, given that the complement of think may have a de se LF, we can now pursue a different explanation for the subject/object asymmetry. First, observe that both examples in (271) should be ungrammatical, as indicated, if epithets cannot modify uninterpreted anchors.

(271)a. * Nero thinks that [pro*, the damn traitor,] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.

   b. * Nero thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [pro*, the damn traitor,] to the peace talks.

To be precise, these examples are ungrammatical, as the uninterpreted pro* moves to generate the binder and trace necessary for de se LFs, as given in (272). The idea is (a view I share with Demirdache and Percus 2011a, 2011b), that the nominal appositive in epithets cannot modify a trace, which is why (272a) and (272b) are ungrammatical; see my discussion above (251) for arguments.

(272)a. * Nero thinks pro* λ2 that [t2 the damn traitor] should invite [Sarkozy] to the p.t.

   b. * Nero thinks pro* λ2 that [Sarkozy] should invite [t2 the damn traitor] to the p.t.
The question is now whether *epithet float* can save these constructions. I propose that epithet float can save (272b), but not (272a). I will start with the grammatical example. First, assume that epithets can undergo covert LF movement from their surface position to a position adjacent to the antecedent, as argued by Demirdache & Percus (2011a), (2011b). The idea would be that (273a) actually has the LF in (273b), which is generated by the covert movement in (273c).

(273)a. **OK** Nero₁ thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor₁] to the peace talks.

   b. **OK** LF: [Nero, the damn traitor₁] thinks (pro*) λ₁ [Sarkozy] should invite t₁ to the p.t.

   c. *epithet float of ‘the damn traitor’ at LF:*

      Nero the damn traitor thinks (pro*) λ₁ Sark should invite [t₁ the damn traitor] to the p.t.

Epithet float is also similar to operations proposed by Hale (1975) (see also (281b) below, which is the structure proposed by McCawley 1982). He proposes that relative clauses adjoin in a position other than their surface position, and then move into the surface position that is adjacent to a noun phrase by an attraction rule (which would be the opposite of analysing epithet float as covert LF movement).

The question now arises why we cannot do the same in (274). Again, (274a) would have the LF in (274b); this is generated from the syntactic structure that is spelled out by covert movement as in (274c). The idea is that (274c) should be grammatical if epithet float is unconstrained.

(274)a. * Nero₁ thinks that [the damn traitor₁] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.

   b. * LF: [Nero, the damn traitor₁] thinks (pro*) λ₁ t₁ should invite [Sarkozy] to the p.t.

   c. *epithet float of ‘the damn traitor’ at LF: (predicted to be grammatical, but it is not)*

      * Nero the damn traitor thinks pro* λ₁ [t₁ the damn traitor] should invite Sark to the p.t.
I propose that the difference between (273) and (274) is related to the fact that subjects are islands for extraction, whereas objects are not\(^5\). The core idea is that epithet float in these cases has to move the epithet from the object position (in (273)) or subject position (in (274)). While this is possible in the object case, it is impossible in the subject case.

Note that this analysis does not predict all constructions with pronouns to behave the same way. In example (45) (repeated in (275a) and (275b)), we saw an asymmetry, which may seem puzzling under a perspective that analyses them as in (276).

(275) a. * John\(_1\) thinks that the idiot\(_1\) is smart.  
   b. OK John\(_1\) thinks that he, the idiot\(_1\), is smart.  

(276) a. * John\(_1\) thinks that pro, the idiot\(_1\), is smart.  
   b. OK John\(_1\) thinks that he, the idiot\(_1\), is smart.

However, upon closer investigation, we notice that he in the grammatical case in (275b) and (276b) must be stressed, as in (277a); it cannot be unstressed or even deaccented, as in (277b).

(277) a. OK John thinks that HE, the idiot, is smart.  
   b. * John thinks that he, the idiot, is smart.

This suggests that (277b) is the example that we need to compare to the unacceptable case in (275a) and (276b). The relevant prediction is that (277b) allows for (and requires) a de se LF, whereas (277a) disallows a de se LF; this clearly follows from the fact that a stressed pronoun is interpreted in a way that is characteristic of stressed noun phrases, whereas a ‘de se pronoun’ must be uninterpreted. The following intuitions confirm the impossibility of a de se LF in (277a), and the possibility of a de se LF in (277b). While (278b) seems to be true in the context

\(^5\)The following example further supports my proposal:

(i) OK Nero thinks that Sarkozy should invite the damn traitor’s mother to the peace talks.

Epithet float is only necessary if the epithet would have to combine with an uninterpreted pronoun if it is interpreted in its surface position. However, in (i), a de se LF does not seem possible, indicating that a pronoun in a possessor position may not be uninterpreted. Thanks to Norvin Richards (p.c.) for the example and comments regarding it.
in (278a), reflecting Percus & Sauerland’s original judgment, (278c) appears to be false, indicating that a stressed pronoun cannot remain uninterpreted to generate a de se LF.

(278)a. Scenario: A group of drunken election candidates watching campaign speeches on television do not recognise themselves in the broadcast. John, the only confident one, thinks “I’ll win,” but does not recognise himself in the broadcast. Bill and Sam, both depressive, think “I’ll lose” but are impressed by the speeches that happen to be their own and are sure “that candidate” will win. Peter, also depressive, happens to be impressed not by his own speech but by John’s.

(Percus & Sauerland 2003a:234)

b. Only John thinks that he unstressed will win the election. (TRUE ⇒ de se LF possible)

c. Only John thinks that HE will win the election. (FALSE ⇒ de se LF impossible)

At this point the question naturally arises whether islands interfere with the acceptability of epithets in other constructions; for instance, are epithets barred from occurring in complex NPs or in adjuncts? Given that we have already seen that epithets can occur in restrictive relative clauses, which are generally assumed to be islands, they do not seem to be the barred from islands. However, this is unsurprising if there is the modified pronoun in a relative clause (or other island) does not get a de se construal. If we take a simple case like (279), there is simply no attitude predicate that would introduce a belief-self or dream-self as required to construe a de se LF.

(279) OK Yesterday John₁ bumped into a fan who really loves the idiot₁.

Another acceptable example from English is given in (280), for which similar considerations hold; here, the idiot is in an adjunct island, and its antecedent John is outside of this island.

(280) OK John₁ left because the idiot₁ got bored by the president’s speech.
Furthermore, Aoun, Choueiri & Hornstein (2001) show that epithets in Lebanese Arabic can actually occur more freely in islands than in constructions where the antecedent is not separated from the epithet by an island.

I now return to the question of how the nominal appositive combines with its null anchor, in section 4.2.6.

### 4.2.6 On the Relationship between the appositive and its anchor

One question that I raised earlier in this dissertation is the question of whether the right structure for nominal appositives is the one in (281a) or the one in (281b).

(281) a. \( \text{Potts} \) TP  
    \[ DP \quad \text{is} \quad VP \]
    \[ DP \quad CP \quad \Delta \]
    John (who is) my neighbor

b. \( \text{McCawley} \) TP  
    \[ DP \quad \text{is} \quad VP \]
    \[ DP \quad \Delta \quad CP \]
    John (who is) my neighbor

I proposed in section 4.2.4 that the core problem with examples like (282) is that the null anchor of the epithet must be uninterpreted to generate a Percus & Sauerland (2003a) style de se LF, and that epithets cannot modify null anchors. Thus the example in (282) is ill-formed.

(282) * Nero\textsubscript{1} thinks that \([pro \ the \ damn \ traitor]_{1}\) should invite \([Sarkozy]_{2}\) to the peace talks.

I have further argued that (283a) can be derived by LF movement (epithet float) from (283b), which saves (283a) from ungrammaticality. Notably, (283a) cannot be a grammatical LF (even though it is a grammatical ‘surface string’); as an LF, (283a) would be as ungrammatical as (282). The example (283a) can only be generated by PF movement.
(283)a. Nero1 thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [pro1, the damn traitor] to the peace talks.

b. [Nero1, the damn traitor] thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [pro1] to the peace talks.

The important point is that an LF as in (283a) (which is ungrammatical) and an LF as in (283b) (which is grammatical) clearly differ under a Potts view, (281a), but it is not clear how they could differ under a McCawley view, (281b), given that the nominal appositive would be able to adjoin in the same adjunction sites in (283a) and (283b). This analysis thus strongly favours a Potts view as in (281a).

4.3 Previous approaches to epithets

Now that I have presented my own proposal for the syntactic distribution of epithets, it is worth showing that previous approaches to epithets cannot account for the data that I discussed.

4.3.1 Dubinsky & Hamilton

Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998) propose a view that is a precursor of the anti-judge constraint (which is discussed in chapter 3), but stated in a more loose way. Let me briefly review their proposal; we will see that it does not derive the subject-object asymmetry either. Dubinsky and Hamilton’s (1998) anti-logophoricity constraint is given as in (284).

(284) **Antilogophoricity Constraint for Epithets**

An epithet must not be anteceded by an individual from whose perspective the attributive content of the epithet is evaluated.

Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998:689)

It is worth pointing out that this constraint is phrased more loosely than the anti-judge constraint. The anti-judge constraint posits that an epithet is ungrammatical in a clause that has the epithet’s antecedent as its judge. The idea was that (285a) is ungrammatical, because the semantics of *think* requires John (the epithet’s antecedent) to be the judge of the complement clause.
Contrastively, (285b) is grammatical, because the semantics of convince requires Peter (and not John, i.e. someone who is not the antecedent of the epithet) to be the judge of the complement clause. What is crucial is that the intuitions for (285a) and (285b) hold under a reading where the epithet is speaker-oriented, i.e. it is the speaker of the sentence who thinks that John is an idiot. In other words, even if Mary utters the sentence in (285a), and the sentence is intended to convey that Mary thinks that John is an idiot, (285a) is still ungrammatical; under the same reading, (285b) is possible.

(285)a. * John thinks that the idiot is smart.

b. OK John convinced Peter that the idiot, is smart.

Dubinsky & Hamilton do not tease apart the notion of (i) who thinks that the referent of the epithet is stupid (which in (285a) and (285b) would be the speaker), and (ii) whose mental state embeds the clause that the epithet occurs in (which would be John in (285a) and Peter in (285b)). In this sense, it is less clear what their approach predicts. Let us review the original data that they discuss. Their core data include the examples in (286) and (287), where the antecedent c-commands the epithet. The idea is that the relative clause in (286b) and the embedded clause in (287b) are embedded in a proposition that describes a belief / mental state of the antecedent. In (286b), the epithet is contained in a noun phrase that describes what John was saying; this is not the case in (286a). It is worth emphasizing that Dubinsky & Hamilton do not give a precise definition of their notion of what describes a belief / mental state of the antecedent. In (286b), the idea seems to be that everything in the scope of told is part of John’s mental state.

(286)a. OK John ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idiot directions.

b. * John told us of a man (who was) trying to give the idiot directions.

Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998:688-688)

Similarly, in (287b), the epithet is contained in a clause that describes what John was asking his students for; again, this is not the case in (287a).
(287)a. OK Through an accumulation of slipups, Johni (inadvertently) led his students to conclude that the idiot, couldn’t teach.

b. * Despite an accumulation of slipups, Johni asked his students to conclude that the idioti could teach.

Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998:687-688)

Notably, D&H’s approach is confounded by the fact that all of the ungrammatical examples that they attribute to the anti-logophoricity constraint involve verbs of communication (or at least phrases that indicate a communicative act, such as according to), as in (288).

(288)a. * It was said by John that the idiot lost a thousand dollars on the slots.

b. * According to John, the idiot is married to a genius.

c. * Johni told us of a man (who was) trying to give the idioti directions

d. * Despite an accumulation of slipups, Johni asked his students to conclude that the idioti could teach.

Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998:688)

To understand whether this constraint really works, we need to consider examples with more minimal differences. In terms of the extent to which the embedded clause that contains the epithet is embedded in the matrix subject’s mental state, the examples in (289) differ. In (289a), the embedded proposition should be clearly embedded in John’s mental state in the same way in which it is in (288) according to Dubinsky & Hamilton. In (289b-c), this is much less clear, as denying implies not believing and not saying something does not entail anything with respect to what one believes. Finally in (289d-e), the embedded clause is clearly not embedded in John’s mental state, as not seeing and overlooking entails lack of awareness. As it is stated, Dubinsky & Hamilton’s anti-logophoricity constraint predicts a clear cut improvement in acceptability from (289a) to (289b-e). As indicated, this does not seem to be the case; (289b-e) are still deviant (though they may improve slightly with respect to (289a)). They are nowhere near to the
acceptability that we would expect. This already suggests that Dubinsky & Hamilton’s constraint, which is essentially pragmatic (while the anti-judge constraint is based on the compositional semantics), is not sufficient to derive the facts. Note that in other languages, such as Croatian, Czech, Dutch, German and Russian, the counterparts of (289a-e) also do not show any noticeable differences in acceptability.

(289)

a. John said that $^{\text{OKhe/}}$the idiot had lost a thousand dollars on the slots.

b. John denied that $^{\text{OKhe/}}$the idiot had lost a thousand dollars on the slots.

c. John did not say that $^{\text{OKhe/}}$the idiot had lost a thousand dollars on the slots.

d. John did not see that $^{\text{OKhe/}}$the idiot had lost a thousand dollars on the slots.

e. John overlooked that $^{\text{OKhe/}}$the idiot had lost a thousand dollars on the slots.

This suggests that the property of being a perspective bearer is not sufficient to account for the distribution.

Finally, it is not clear what we expect if there are more than two individuals, as in (290) (an example similar to the cases that I discussed in chapter 3). In an example such as (290a), we may expect that acceptability differs depending on whether John believes it himself and actively tries to convince Mary that he is a great teacher (cf. (290c)) as opposed to unintentionally giving her the idea that he is a great teacher (possibly without believing it himself), see the example in (290b). The fact here seems to be that (290c) is as acceptable as (290b), and (290a) does not differ in acceptability, depending on which reading is chosen. This is a further problem for Dubinsky & Hamilton’s anti-logophoricity constraint, because they seem to predict that there should be a difference in acceptability between the (290b) and (290c) example.

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56 Naturally, this brings us back to the question of why we did find such contrasts in (144) and (145). However, this simply corroborates the insight that Dubinsky & Hamilton’s system is too simple to account for the facts. One clear difference between not say and not know is that the complement of not say may still have a de se LF, in the sense in which (i) seems to describe a situation in which (ii) holds.

i. John did not say that he had lost a thousand dollars on the slots.

ii. John did not say: “I lost a thousand dollars on the slots.”
(290)a. OK John convinced Mary that the idiot was a great teacher.

b. OK Unintentionally, John convinced Mary that the idiot was a great teacher.
   (context: John does not believe that he is a great teacher.)

c. OK John convinced Mary to share his belief that the idiot was a great teacher.
   (context: John believes that he is a great teacher.)

What we do observe is that (290a) is significantly better than (291), no matter whether John actively tries to make believe that he is a great teacher (and thus counts as a perspective bearer) or not. This is one of the contrasts that I focused on in chapter 3 and in sections 4.1-4.2.

(291) * John thought/believed that the idiot was a great teacher.

These facts, which challenge Dubinsky & Hamilton’s view, appear to support a view where epithets are constrained in the grammar (plausibly in the semantics), and not in the pragmatics.

Finally, if we come back to the core data discussed in sections 4.1-4.2, we find that Dubinsky & Hamilton do not clearly predict any difference in acceptability between the grammatical case in (292a) and the ungrammatical case in (292b).

(292)a. OK Nero1 thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor1] to the peace talks.

b. * Nero1 thinks that [the damn traitor1] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.

As Dubinsky & Hamilton’s antilogophoricity constraint is stated, it is not entirely clear what their predictions are for (292). However, in order for them to derive (292), the difference between (292a) and (292b) would have to be that “the attributive content of the epithet is evaluated” from the perspective of Nero in (292b) but not in (292a). It is not clear that this is the case. We have seen that the same contrast surfaces in (293). Again, it is not clear that the perspective bearer inside the complement clause is different in (293a) versus (293b).
(293)a. OK Nero, thinks that [they] will invite [the damn traitor₁] to the reception.

   b. * Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor₁] will be invited to the reception.

In terms of their interpretation, (293a) and (293b) should be roughly equivalent, i.e. there is no reason why the “attributive content of the epithet” should be evaluated with respect to Nero in (293b) but not in (293a). Therefore, it is not clear how Dubinsky & Hamilton could derive the subject/object asymmetry in complements of think that I have discussed.

4.3.2 Reinhart (1983) & Schlenker (2005)

Let us now review Schlenker’s (2005) approach to epithets. Schlenker’s approach is one of the first proposals that truly attempt to unify the semantic properties and syntactic behaviour of epithets with respect to their distribution. However, we will see, once again, that Schlenker does not derive the pattern discussed in this chapter of this dissertation.

As Schlenker (2005) shares Reinhart’s (1983) view of the grammar, which is one where Condition C strictly speaking is not a part of the syntax, but rather pragmatic in nature. Although Reinhart does not address epithets, and focuses largely on proper names and definite descriptions, which we come back to in Chapter 5, if one assumes that epithets are a type of R-expression, and are subject to Condition C, then it should be possible to also extend Reinhart’s view to explain their behaviour.

Reinhart (1983) bases her discussion on the contrast between (294a) and (294b), which illustrate Condition C as we know it. In (294a), her and Zelda can corefer, as her does not c-command Zelda. In (294b), he and Felix cannot corefer, as he c-commands Felix.

(294) a. Those who know her respect Zelda.

   b. He thinks that Felix is a genius.

(Reinhart 1983:164)

Reinhart (1983:166) proposes that Condition C is a pragmatic constraint and eludes to Gricean maxims. She argues that (295a) is blocked by the possibility of (295b), as “bound anaphora […]
is the most explicit way available in the language to express coreference, as it involves referential dependency” (Reinhart 1983:167). Pronouns can be bound, but R-expressions cannot be. Reinhart considers this a type of ‘manner’ maxim.

(295)  

a. He thinks that Felix is a genius.  \( (he \) cannot refer to Felix)  

b. Felix, thinks that he, is a genius.  \( (he \) is bound by Felix)  

(adapted from Reinhart 1983:167)

The obligatory disjoint reading of \( he \) and \( Felix \) in (295a) follows from the reasoning in (296). If the speaker had intended coreference, she would simply have used (295b) instead of (295a).\(^57\)

(296)  

a. \textit{Speaker’s strategy}: Where a syntactic structure you are using allows bound-anaphora interpretation, then use it if you intend your expressions to corefer, unless you have some reasons to avoid bound anaphora.  

b. \textit{Hearer’s strategy}: If the speaker avoids the bound-anaphora options provided by the structure he is using, then, unless he has reasons to avoid bound anaphora, he did not intend his expressions to corefer.  

(Reinhart 1983:167)

Exceptions to Condition C like (297a)\(^58\), in which \( he \) can refer to \textit{Zelda’s husband}, are explained by the examples in (297); (297a) does not mean the same as (297b), in which \textit{Zelda’s husband} binds himself.

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\(^57\) In this section, I attempt to provide the reader with a brief picture Reinhart’s proposal. One should observe that if we remove Condition C from the syntax and adopt Reinhart’s approach, it is not immediately clear how one could account for examples like (i), without stipulating c-command and re-introducing Condition C (both of which appear to be buried in the stipulation \textit{bound anaphora}. Thanks to Noam Chomsky (p.c.) for pointing this out.

\(^58\) It is not immediately clear whether Reinhart’s example should be classified as an exception to Condition C, since identity statements are not cases of referential dependence; (cf. the classic Fregean \textit{morning/evening star} examples).
(297)  a. He is Zelda’s husband.
    b. Zelda’s husband is himself.

(Reinhart 1983:168)

Schlenker (2005) departs from the view of Reinhart (1983) and posits a maxim of *Minimize Restrictors!* instead, which requires definite descriptions to be as brief as possible. While it is not one of the original Gricean conversational maximes, it seems to be based on maxims such as the Maxim of Quantity\(^\text{59}\) (using an R-expression instead of a pronoun may simply be unnecessarily informative). To illustrate, consider the contrast between (298) and (299). The idea is that this contrast is simply due to violations of such a Gricean maxim in (299) but not (298).

(298) \(^\text{OK}\) John, ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idiot directions.

(Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998:687)

(299) \(^*\) John, ran over a man who was trying to give Johni directions.

In order to explain the role of the maxim in relation to the contrast between an epithet (298) and a definite description (299), Schlenker (2005) argues that *John* in (298) violates *Minimize Restrictors!*, as it does not contribute any information that a pronoun (such as *he*) does not contribute as well; this assumes that pronouns are definite descriptions, and a pronoun like *he* is more brief than a proper name like *John*. In the same vein, (298) does not violate *Minimize Restrictors!*, as the epithet contributes evaluative (pragmatic) information, which a pronoun would not. I now review Schlenker’s proposal in more detail, and I will then show that it does not derive the data discussed in this dissertation either.

Schlenker (2005) assumes that there is no fundamental difference between R-expressions, epithets and pronouns; all of these are definite descriptions. Therefore, they should be subject to

\(^{59}\) Schlenker does not explicitly say which Gricean maxim his *maxim of minimization* is based on; Johnson (2012) considers it to be based on the Maxim of Quantity, but it could also be a requirement for brevity, in which case it would be based on the Maxim of Manner. Thanks to Martin Hackl (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
the same constraints (e.g. either Condition C or Condition B of the Binding Theory). He starts by outlining two core questions with respect to Condition C, which he aims to explain. First, there have been several examples in the literature illustrating cases of Condition C obviation with respect to epithets, such as (298), i.e. cases where an epithet is referentially dependent on a c-commanding antecedent. From the perspective of classical Binding Theory (Chomsky e.g. 1981), this should trigger a Principle C violation and give rise to unacceptability of the utterance, yet sentence like (298) are perfectly acceptable. Schlenker asks why epithets can often escape Condition C, and whether it is their expressive component that makes Condition C obviation possible. We have already seen ample evidence for Condition C obviation with epithets.

Second, looking beyond epithets, Schlenker points out that there are a number of examples in the literature where other types of R-expressions do not trigger Condition C violations, (cf. Reinhart (1983a)), Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993). In all such cases, we would expect to find Condition C violations, resulting in the majority of such exceptional illustrations being classified as unacceptable. Schlenker’s own example for such a Condition C obviation is given in (300a), which contrasts with his ungrammatical examples in (300b) and (300c). On the one hand, the difference between (300a) and (300b) is that (300a) contains two 3rd person DPs, whereas (300b) only contains one 3rd person DP and one 1st person DP. On the other hand, the difference between (300a) and (300c) is that (300a) only repeats parts of its antecedent DP’s descriptive content (namely linguist), whereas (300c) repeats all of it (i.e. linguist working on Binding Theory).

(300)a. OK A linguist working on Binding Theory; was so devoid of any moral sense that he;
forced a physicist working on particles to hire the linguist;’s girlfriend in his lab.

b. * A linguist working on Binding Theory; was so devoid of any moral sense that he;
forced me to hire the linguist;’s girlfriend in his lab.

c. ?? A linguist working on Binding Theory; was so devoid of any moral sense that he;
forced a physicist working on particles to hire a friend of the linguist working on
Binding Theory; in his lab.

(Schlenker 2005:387,390)
In order to address the above two observations, Schlenker proposes the pragmatic principle in (301), which states that a definite description the $A \ B$ is well-formed if (i) $A$ can disambiguate the denotation of the description, and thus deriving the standard cases of Condition C, or (ii) if it adds a pragmatic effect, thus deriving some of the Condition C obviation examples with respect to epithets. The idea is that (301) derives Condition C obviation with epithets, as the evaluative component of an epithet has a pragmatic effect, and it also derives Condition C obviations as in (300a) above (with the linguist), as the repetition of parts of the antecedent has a disambiguating effect.

(301) **Minimize Restrictors!**

A definite description the $A \ B$ is deviant if $A$ could be dropped without affecting the (i) denotation of the description, and (ii) its various pragmatic effects.

(Schlenker 2005:385)

A simpler illustration of the principle at work is given in (302), which does not involve Condition C obviation, as the examples in (302) show cases where there is no antecedent for the definite description; the referent for the (green/stupid/round) tennis ball is simply given in the context.

(302)a. **OK** Pass me the green tennis ball! (and not the red one)

b. **OK** Pass me the stupid tennis ball!

c. # Pass me the round tennis ball!

Given the definition of **Minimize Restrictors!** in (301), the acceptability of (302a) can be explained by the fact that the modifier green disambiguates the meaning of the description by picking out a specific tennis ball out of a comparative set; this is similar to the case with linguists and physicists in (300a), which are both 3$^{rd}$ person referents. The well-formedness of (302b) is also explained by **Minimize Restrictors!**, as the adjective stupid contributes a pragmatic effect, in this case evaluativity; this is similar to the case with epithets in (298). The utterance in (302c) is
unacceptable, for the modifier round neither disambiguates nor contributes any kind of pragmatic effect; this is similar to (299) and (300b). It is worth pointing out here that the core idea is that Condition C is part of a much broader range of phenomena, which involve the use of definite descriptions that are larger than they need to be. For instance, in (302c), the round tennis ball is blocked, as the briefer variant the tennis ball should be used due to Minimize Restrictors! This predicts that the ungrammaticality of (302c) should reflect the same type of violation that gives rise to Condition C effects; intuitively it is not clear that this is the case.

Let us now consider the cases where the definite description is referentially dependent on a c-commanding antecedent, i.e. cases of Condition C. (This is relevant as Schlenker aims to have a uniform treatment for Condition C violation and cases that do not involve c-commanding antecedents, as in (302).) The same logic that applies to the examples in (302) also applies to the examples in (303), based on examples such as (300a); linguist in (303a) contributes to the denotation of the definite description by disambiguating it. The acceptability of (303b) parallels the example in (302b), as the epithet idiot contributes a pragmatic effect by adding expressive evaluativity; finally, the ungrammatical example in (303c) can be ruled out by Minimize Restrictors!, for it does not make any kind of contribution to the definite description.

(303) a. OK The linguist, tried to convince the physicist to hire the linguist's girlfriend.

b. OK The linguist, tried to convince the physicist to hire the idiot's girlfriend.

c. * The linguist, tried to convince the physicist to hire the man's girlfriend.

Schlenker's proposal does not focus on the role of c-command between a definite description and an antecedent that it referentially depends on (which is evidently absent in some examples that violate Minimize Restrictors!, such as (302c)). Nevertheless, he does acknowledge the role of c-command in standard Condition C cases such as (304).

(304) a. * He, loves people who admire John.

b. OK [His, mother] loves people who admire John.

(Schlenker 2005:386)
To account for such differences, Schlenker assumes a view where effects that involve c-command are a consequence of top-down sentence processing. I limit the following (somewhat simplified) discussion to simple cases such as *Peter likes himself* versus *Peter likes Peter*.

Schlenker (2005) assumes that contexts contain a world of evaluation $w$, a speaker $s$ and an addressee $h$, and they can be written as in (305a) (based on Schlenker 2005:402). Super-salient entities (e.g. entities that have been mentioned in the discourse) are added to this context in a top-down (roughly left-to-right) manner. So, if Peter is made salient (e.g. by mentioning him), the context (305b) would emerge, based on (305a) (cf. Schlenker (2005:403)).

\begin{align}
(305)a. \quad & c = w^s^h \\
(305)b. \quad & c = w^s^h^p
\end{align}

Two place predicates such as *like* are processed as follows. First, the subject and object are added to the context, and then the relation expressed by the predicate is asserted to hold between the two most salient entities (i.e. the two entities furthest to the right). For a sentence like (306a), this means that the meaning is calculated as in (306b) (based on Schlenker’s 2005:406 example (54); note that Schlenker uses $j(ohn)$ and $m(ary)$ in all of these examples, instead of $s(peaker)$ and $h(earer)$; his example (54) uses the verb *criticize* instead of the verb *likes* that I use).

\begin{align}
(306)a. \quad & [\text{Peter [likes Ann]}] \\
(306)b. \quad & [[ \text{Peter [likes Ann]} ] ]w^j^m^p = \quad \text{(add Peter to the context)} \\
& = [[ \text{likes Ann } ] ]w^j^m^p = \quad \text{(add Ann to the context)} \\
& = [[ \text{likes } ] ]w^j^m^p^a = \quad \text{(apply the predicate to the two most salient entities)} \\
& = 1 \quad \text{iff } p^a \in I_w(\text{like}) \quad \text{(true iff the predicate *like* holds between $p$ and $a$)}
\end{align}

The idea is now that in order to apply a transitive predicate to two arguments that refer to the same individual, the same discourse entity must be added to the context sequence twice (i.e. the two most salient context entities will have to correspond to one discourse entity). *Minimize Restrictors!* is now formulated in such a way that it is more economical to do so by means of a pronoun than to do so by means of a definite description; Schlenker does this by assuming that a
pronoun denotes a negative index \(-i\), which instructs the processing mechanism to pick the \(i^{th}\) entity from the right in the context, and add it again. This is more economical than reintroducing the same entity from outside the present context (if doing so does not give rise to a pragmatic effect and/or disambiguation). The difference between a pronoun and a definite description is given in (307) (an adaptation of Schlenker’s 2005 example (63)) versus (308) (an adaptation of Schlenker’s 2005 example (64)); example (308) is ruled out by Minimize Restrictors!, as (307) is more economical. The core difference between the two examples is bold-typed. In the step from (307c) to (307d), which corresponds to the step from (308c) to (308d), the question is whether we pick out the entity referring to Peter by means of a pronoun, (307c), or by means of a proper name, (308c). As both is possible, (307c) is more economical, and (308c) is blocked by Minimize Restrictors!. Eventually, (307d) and (308d) are identical, and so are (307e) and (308e), but crucially they are derived differently.

(307) a. \[ \text{OK} \quad [\text{Peter [likes himself]}] \]
   b. \[ \quad [[ \text{Peter [likes pro.1]} ]] w^j m^* = \quad (\text{add p(eter) to the context}) \]
   c. \[ = [[ \text{likes pro.1} ]] w^j m^* p = \quad (\text{add the -1}\text{th entity from the context again}) \]
   d. \[ = [[ \text{likes }] ] w^j m^* p^* p = \quad (\text{apply the predicate to the two most salient entities}) \]
   e. \[ = 1 \text{ iff } p^* p \in I_w(\text{like}) \quad (\text{true iff the predicate like holds between p and p}) \]

(308) a. ?? \[ [\text{Peter [likes Peter]}] \]
   b. \[ [[ \text{Peter [likes Peter]} ]] w^j m^* = \quad (\text{add p(eter) to the context}) \]
   c. \[ = [[ \text{likes Peter} ]] w^j m^* p = \quad * (\text{add p(eter) to the context}) \Rightarrow \]
   d. \[ = [[ \text{likes }] ] w^j m^* p^* p = \quad (\text{apply the predicate to the two most salient entities}) \]
   e. \[ = 1 \text{ iff } p^* p \in I_w(\text{like}) \quad (\text{true iff the predicate like holds between p and p}) \]

Schlenker (2005) derives the c-command restriction as follows. If there is no c-command between a DP and its antecedent, then the antecedent cannot be picked out at the point of the
later DP by means of picking out a \(-i^{th}\) entity; this holds because supersalient entities are not decomposed, as given in (309). Consider the following example (based on Schlenker’s example (65)). Assume that Anna is Peter’s mother. In (309c), Anna has been added to the context as a super-salient entity, but Peter has not been. Therefore, in the step from (309c) to (309d), we would not be able to pick out Peter by means of picking out the \(-i^{th}\) entity from the context, because Peter is not yet in the context (sequence), and Minimize Restrictors! cannot apply; therefore, (309) is not in competition with a variant that contains a pronoun. This derives c-command.

\[(309)\]
\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{OK} \ [\text{Peter’s mother [likes Peter]}] \\
\text{b.} & \quad [[[\text{Peter’s mother [likes Peter]}]]w_{j}m = (\text{add }a(nna) \text{ to the context})} \\
\text{c.} & \quad [[[\text{likes Peter}]]w_{j}m_{a} = (\text{add }p(eter) \text{ to the context})} \\
\text{d.} & \quad [[[\text{likes}]]w_{j}m_{a}p = (\text{apply the predicate to the two most salient entities})} \\
\text{e.} & \quad = 1 \text{ iff } a^{*}p \in I_{\omega}(like) \quad (\text{true iff the predicate like holds between } a \text{ and } p)}
\end{align*}

I will now discuss why Schlenker’s approach does not account for the pattern that I discussed.

Schlenker argues that apparent syntactic restrictions are simply symptoms of pragmatic restrictions\footnote{This observation was pointed out to Schlenker by Geurts (p.c.). See Schlenker (2005) for details of the discussion.}. One prediction made by Minimize Restrictors! is that examples containing epithets should always be acceptable, since they make a pragmatic contribution to the utterance. To account for the fact that epithets are sometimes ruled out in the complements of attitude predicates (which Schlenker acknowledges), Schlenker assumes Dubinsky & Hamilton (1998). He discusses examples such as (310a) and (310b).

\[(310)\]
\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \# \text{Melvin, claims that [the bastard], was honest.} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \# [\text{Pope John Paul II}], did not expect that the entire world would mourn [the great man],
\end{align*}

(Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998:686)

(Schlenker 2005:397)
He argues, on the basis of Dubinsky & Hamilton’s findings, combined with observations made by Clements (1975) from Ewe, that if a language in question has a logophoric (de se) pronoun, then that pronoun should be preferred in logophoric contexts (such as in the complement of claim or expect) over non-logophoric variants. Schlenker (2005) points out that English pronouns such as he are ambiguous between a de re reading and a de se reading; he further argues that epithets are de re, and cannot be de se, because they cannot be variables and thus cannot be bound. The idea is that complements of verbs such as claim (in (310a)) and expect (in (310b)) are logophoric contexts, and thus epithets are banned, due to the preference for de se anaphora.

The first problem for Schlenker’s (2005) approach consists of the data that we have seen above. In the examples that exhibit a subject/object asymmetry, there is no reason why the context of the epithet in (311b) should be more logophoric than the context of the epithet in (311a). Similarly, it is unclear that the context of the epithet in (312b) should be more logophoric than the context of the epithet in (312a). In other words, we face the following problem. First, Schlenker’s Minimize Predictors! predicts that epithets are always acceptable, as they have a pragmatic effect; this runs afoul of examples such as the examples in (310) above. To get around this, Schlenker proposes that in logophoric contexts, logophoric de se pronouns must be used, thus blocking epithets, which cannot have a de se reading. While this accounts for the examples in (310) and the ungrammaticality of (311b) and (312b), it does not explain the contrast in (311) and (312), as (311a) and (312a) should be as ill-formed as (311b) and (312b) under such a view.

(311)a. OK  Nero<sub>1</sub> thinks that [Sarkozy] should invite [the damn traitor<sub>1</sub>] to the peace talks.

    b. *  Nero<sub>1</sub> thinks that [the damn traitor<sub>1</sub>] should invite [Sarkozy] to the peace talks.

(312)a. OK  Nero<sub>1</sub> thinks that [they] will invite [the damn traitor<sub>1</sub>] to the reception.

    b. *  Nero<sub>1</sub> thinks that [the damn traitor<sub>1</sub>] will be invited to the reception.

We can now discuss a second argument against Schlenker’s approach. In chapter 2, I presented argumentation for the claim that epithets are in fact pronouns. To briefly illustrate my point
here, we find many cases cross-linguistically where epithets can undergo quantifier binding; that is, true syntactic binding under c-command, as shown by the Russian example in (313). In the example, the DP containing the relative clause is presented as the answer to a who-question. This suggests that the response is a restrictive relative clause; the relative clause serves to single out a set of girls. In the example, *this idiot* co-varies with the quantifier *every artist*, and is syntactically bound by it under c-command.

(313) A: Kakuju devušku privjol na prazdničnyj prijom každyj xudožnik iz tvoego goroda?
your town

'Which girl did each of the artists from your town bring to the festive reception?'

B: OK Samo soboj, každyj xudožnik1 privjol tu (samuju) devušku,
naturally each artist brought that very girl
kotoraja po-nastojasčemu ljubit etogo idiota1
that really loves this idiot

'Naturally, each/every artist brought the one woman who really loves the idiot'

Schlenker argues that epithets cannot have a *de se* reading, based on the assumption that *de se* pronouns must be variables and epithets cannot be variables. However, given that epithets (or rather: the null anchor that the ‘epithet’ nominal appositive modifies) can be syntactically bound, epithets must be able to contain variables, i.e. Schlenker’s argument does not succeed.

In sum, Schlenker assumes D&H and interprets their anti-logophoricity in terms of the assumption that epithets are blocked by possible specialized *de se* pronouns. This does not seem to derive the observed subject-object asymmetry either.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that Schlenker (2005) does observe ‘distance’ effects, but only with respect to the disambiguation cases. His intuitions are summarized in example (314). The observation is that (314b) seems to be worse than (314a), even though the second mention of *the linguist* should still have the same disambiguating effect.
Schlenker suggests that disambiguation is only sensitive to recent antecedents, and therefore, a mathematician I once met at a party does not enter disambiguation considerations in (314b); it is not close enough to the epithet to qualify as an antecedent, and therefore the sentence is already unambiguous enough if the linguist's in (314b) is replaced by his, which blocks (314b). Note, however, (314b) still seems to be more acceptable than (315), indicating that there is still some disambiguating effect left.

(315) * A linguist working on Binding Theory, hired the linguist, ’s girlfriend in his lab.

The distance effects in (314) are reminiscent of what we found in our discussion of convince and the role of the anti-judge constraint, as well as the subject/object predicates in the complements of think. However, given Schlenker’s reasoning, which ties them to disambiguation, we do not expect such effects in the case of epithets. In other words, Schlenker cannot account for the patterns discussed in this dissertation.

As a final remark, it should also be pointed out that findings from language acquisition / learnability challenge a pragmatic approach to Condition C (and Binding Theory more generally). Scholars such as Crain & McKee (1986) and Crain & Thornton (1998) argue that children exhibit Condition C effects at a very early age, before pragmatic inferences are acquired. This raises serious concerns for pragmatic analyses of Condition C effect.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Summary

In this dissertation I introduced an observation originally present in Schlenker (2005), namely that an epithet can be referentially dependent on an antecedent under c-command. In chapter 2, I outlined the controversial status of epithets in the literature; as a point of departure, I observed that it remained unclear whether they should be treated as R-expressions or pronouns. In this dissertation I presented various arguments from the literature, which support the view that they are pronouns. In addition, I provided novel cross-linguistic empirical evidence showing that an epithet can be truly syntactically bound by a quantifier, further supporting the proposal that epithets are pronouns. Based on the insight that epithets are pronouns, I argued that they should be analysed as nominal appositives with a null anchor. This claim was based on diagnostics from den Dikken (2001) and Kayne (2010).

In the remainder of this thesis I focused on contrasts (not previously discussed in the literature), such as (316a) versus (316b), and (316a) versus (316c). The contrast in (316a) vs (316b) illustrates a kind of subject-object asymmetry. In (316a), the epithet is the subject of the embedded clause, which is a complement to think, whereas in (316b), it is the object of the corresponding embedded clause. Furthermore, the contrast between (316a) vs (316c) suggests that the role of the matrix predicate must make some contribution to the ill-formedness, and acceptability of the respective examples.

(316)a. * Nero, thinks that [the damn traitor,] will be invited to the reception.

b. OK Nero, thinks that they will invite [the damn traitor,] to the reception.

c. OK Johni convinced Peter that the idioti is smart.

In order to account for the above contrasts, I proposed that the contrast between (316a) and (316c) is due to the fact that thinks and convinced behave differently with respect to the shifting of the judge parameter in the embedded clause. In the case of convince, the judge parameter is shifted to the matrix object, whereas in the case of thinks, it is shifted to the matrix subject. In
chapter 4, I refined my proposal and argued that the cases in which the judge parameter is shifted to the matrix subject have the property of selecting a *de se* LF; where pronouns in the embedded clause that refer to the matrix subject are not interpreted. The consequence of this approach is that the epithet cannot modify the uninterpreted pronoun. The difference between (316a) and (316b) is that epithets can undergo covert LF movement (epithet float) to the matrix subject position from within the embedded object, but not from within the embedded subject.

5.2 Implications for the Bigger Picture of Locality

To conclude this dissertation, I want to discuss the role of epithets in the bigger picture of anaphora (i.e. referential expressions and their distribution). Given the current debate of the status of epithets and the locality constraints that apply to them, the intention of this section is thus to discuss some of the questions the analysis of epithets presented in this thesis raises for locality, and the notion of Binding Theory.

Epithets (which have the form of *R-expressions*) are elements that do not seem to fit into the familiar Binding Theory of Chomsky (1981). The data in (317) illustrate Principle A: A reflexive (like *himself*) must be locally bound (as in (317c), but not (317a-b)).

(317)  
a. * Harry, ran over a man (who was) trying to give himself, directions.  
b. * Harry, claims that himself, was honest.  
c. OK Harry, is proud of himself,.

The data in (318) illustrate Principle B; a non-reflexive pronoun (*him*) must be locally free (as in (318a-b), not (318c)).

(318)  
a. OK Harry, ran over a man (who was) trying to give him, directions.  
b. OK Harry, claims that he, was honest.  
c. * Harry, is proud of him,.
Principle C of Binding Theory states that R-expressions must remain free, as shown in (319).

(319)  

a. * Harry\textsubscript{i} ran over a man (who was) trying to give the actor\textsubscript{i} directions.

b. * Harry\textsubscript{i} claims that the actor\textsubscript{i} was honest.

c. * Harry\textsubscript{i} is proud of the actor\textsubscript{i}.

If one assumes that epithets are R-expressions, then the data in (320) are surprising because example (320a) seems to obviate Principle C; yet, epithet are subject to a special type of Principle B, requiring them to be substantially non-local. In this sense, (320b) is too local, whereas (320a) is non-local enough.

(320)  

a. OK Harry\textsubscript{i} ran over a man (who was) trying to give [the idiot\textsubscript{i}], directions.

(b. adapted from Dubinsky & Hamilton 1998)

b. * Harry\textsubscript{i} claims that [the bastard\textsubscript{i}], was honest.

(adapted from Postal 1972:247)

c. * Harry\textsubscript{i} is proud of [the idiot\textsubscript{i}].

The special behaviour of epithets raises a general question, namely the question whether the classical Binding Conditions are explanatory at all\textsuperscript{61}. Specifically, what additional assumptions would be needed in order to accommodate for the behaviour of epithets?

In this dissertation, I have argued that epithets are null pronouns that are modified by a nominal appositive, and I have discussed their distribution throughout this thesis. They exhibit graded acceptability that correlates with anti-locality, as in (321), which reflects the judgments found in English and in other languages. At their core, these examples constitute the heart of the vehicle change, (cf. Fiengo and May (1994)). The question that I addressed is the following: If one believes that epithets are pronouns, then why do they appear to respect Condition C in some

\textsuperscript{61} Though it should be pointed out that there is no convincing alternative either.
instances (and vice versa if one believes that epithets are R-expressions\textsuperscript{62})? While I have proposed an analysis for the distribution of epithets, it is these types of data where the line between pronoun and R-expression is murky\textsuperscript{63}.

(321) a. *Nero\textsubscript{1} thinks that [the damn traitor\textsubscript{1}] will be invited to the reception.
   
   b. OK Nero\textsubscript{1} thinks that they will invite [the damn traitor\textsubscript{1}] to the reception.
   
   c. ?OK John\textsubscript{1} convinced Peter that the idiot\textsubscript{1} is smart.

One insight that we get from these data is that a purely pragmatic approach to Condition C effects (as in Grodzinsky \& Reinhart 1993, Schlenker 2005) does not cover the complete distribution of epithets. As we have seen, Schlenker (2005) proposes that epithets should always be acceptable, due to their additional pragmatic content (regardless of the presence of c-command), except in \textit{de se} contexts, where they are blocked by co-existing \textit{de se} pronouns. This approach does not seem to account for differences such as (321a) versus (321b). The data suggest that we need to make reference to syntax in order to account for subject-object asymmetries in the acceptability of epithets.

The present insights have further implications for current theorizing. From the perspective of Sauerland’s (2007a) \textit{flat binding} and Schlenker’s (2005) \textit{Minimize Restrictors!}, there is no fundamental difference between pronouns, R-expressions and reflexives. In each case, we are dealing with a type of definite description. As a consequence, the Binding Principles must be explained without making reference to the notions of \textit{pronoun}, \textit{R-expression} or \textit{reflexive}. One question that needs to be addressed in further developments is whether such an approach can be maintained when we take epithets into consideration. On the one hand, we see that epithets are clearly subject to Principle B – an observation that goes back to Dubinsky \& Hamilton (1998). This is to be expected if epithets are (non-reflexive) null pronouns that are modified by a nominal appositive. The question that we then need to address is whether Principle B is a syntactic constraint or whether it can be explained at the level of semantics. A


\textsuperscript{63} These effects only hold for nominal appositives with null anchors, not for nominal appositives with overt anchors, such as \textit{he the idiot}.
related question concerns the nature of Principle C. As discussed above, a purely pragmatic approach such as Schlenker’s *Minimize Restrictors!* does not seem to capture the distribution of epithets. As this approach is designed to account for Principle C effects and the cases of obviation that we find, the fact that epithets seem to be sensitive to some notion of structural/syntactic locality challenges the idea that Principle C can be explained away in such a manner. The question then comes back to whether we need to assume that Principle C is a syntactic constraint (or a constraint on the compositional semantics).

A related question is whether there are other types of ‘R-expressions’ that pattern like epithets in exhibiting a more fine-grained locality constraint of this type. Given the similar analysis, an obvious candidate would be so-called *pluriculars* (or *committee nouns*). Den Dikken (2001) and Kayne (2010) assume that such nouns consist of a nominal appositive with a null anchor. The question thus arises whether such nouns can obviate Condition C, and further, why it is not possible for *any* noun to obviate Condition C? These are questions that need to be addressed throughout the development of this research program.
References


