States of the Nations: Nationalism, Narratives and Normative Change in Postwar Japan

by

James Patrick Boyd, III

S.M. Political Science, 2003

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

B.A. East Asian Studies, 1993

Columbia College

SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
AT THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

SEPTEMBER 2012

© 2012 James Patrick Boyd, III.   All rights reserved

The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic
copies of this thesis document in whole or in part in any medium known or hereafter created.

Signature of Author_____

Department of Political Science

September 5, 2012

Certified by_____

Richard J. Samuels

Ford International Professor of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by_____

Roger D. Petersen

Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science

Chairman, Graduate Program Committee

1

States of the Nations: Nationalism, Narratives and Normative Change in Postwar Japan

by

James Patrick Boyd, III

Submitted to the Department of Political Science on September 5, 2012 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Abstract

This dissertation evaluates claims that nationalism is rising in post-Cold War Japan by first noting the disconnect between existent social science conceptions of nationalism and those needed to examine how nationalism might change in contemporary, peaceful, wealthy, and stable democracies such as postwar Japan. This study defines nationalism as a discourse that constructs and reconstructs points of identification and differentiation that define both a political community (i.e. "nation") and the form of its domain over a modern territorial state. It argues nationalism is best understood as reoccurring "nation-state narratives" that tell the story of how the nation's putative qualities or past experiences define the present nature of its territorial state. Change in nationalism is evaluated through content and discourse analysis of five narratives expressing the relationship between the Japanese people and their state in a sample of elite discourse drawn from the period 1952-2007.

The analysis reveals that references to all five narratives peak in the immediate postwar period and again in the 1980s before declining to lows in the post-Cold War period, which also saw the highest level of contestation over these narratives in the nearly sixty years of the study. In particular, the narrative depicting Japan as an anti-militarist/pacifist nation-state as well as the narrative emphasizing Japan as an ethnically homogeneous nation-state proved the most contested during this period, while the narrative affirming Japan as a democratic nation-state went uncontested. Political struggles over reforming institutions associated with the narratives were found to be the major drivers behind these changes, although characteristics of the narratives, especially the specificity of their normative claims, also shaped this process.

The post-Cold War period is thus one of transition in nationalist discourse in Japan, although the scale of change is somewhat limited. For example, while the anti-militarist/pacifist narrative saw exceptions attached to many of its normative claims, its anti-nuclear components and cognitive claims remained unchallenged. Finally, Japanese nationalist discourse continued to legitimate democracy and was found to shape important electoral reforms, even as it shifted away from more insular and exclusionary forms, which may create space for more open immigration policies moving forward.

Thesis Supervisor: Richard J. Samuels
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

Chapter One: Introduction

One of the most powerful and pervasive political narratives which organizes personal and public stories is that of the relationship between the individual and the nation.[1]

Molly Andrews, 2007

I. A Question of Nationalism

Yoyogi Park, a storied location that once served as the site of the athletes' village during the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, hosted a different kind of gathering on July 16, 2012. Around 100,000 demonstrators assembled on a sweltering day to protest the restarting of two reactors at the Oi nuclear power plant.[2] These reactors had been idled along with Japan's other nuclear power facilities following the meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant caused by the giant tsunami of the March 11, 2011 earthquake that killed nearly 20,000 people. The demonstration, organized under the slogan "aiming for a denuclearized, sustainable, and peaceful society" by a group led by Nobel Prize-winning author and peace activist Ōe Kenzaburō, was one of the largest anti-nuclear rallies in Japanese history.[3]

---

[1] Andrews, 2007, p.76.
[2] *Asahi Shimbun*, 17 July 2012. Demonstration organizers claimed 170,000 were in attendance while sources with the police department gave an unofficial estimate of 75,000.
[3] The flyer for the event and information on the organizing group can be found at the following website: http://sayonara-nukes.org/ (Accessed July 22, 2012).

Walking among the demonstrators, the sociologist and scholar of nationalism Oguma Eiji spotted some foreigners who appeared to be journalists and staff members from foreign embassies. He later told the *Asahi Shimbun* that "it would be no surprise if they saw the confrontation as one between 'an Asian democracy movement' and 'an insensitive authoritarian state.'"[4] Citing similarities with the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States and "Arab Spring" protests in Egypt, Oguma concluded, "I believe behind the protests against resuming the Oi plant operations are a protest against the entire current state of Japan."[5]

There are several aspects of this event that seem to run counter to recent appraisals of changes in Japanese politics and society since the end of the Cold War. Most significantly, many observers of Japan have pointed to a "rise" in Japanese nationalism over this period.[6] These assertions tend to come in two overlapping forms. The first places emphasis on change in the *people*, who are seen to have adopted a new sense of nationalism. This "new nationalism" is generally portrayed as a manifestation of the need of individuals to feel identified with a group in which one can have pride and confidence.[7] It is a "growing nationalism in search of clearer identity and greater self-esteem" prompted in part by the need to "come to terms with history in a way that satisfies the nation's need for pride in its past."[8] The central

---

[4] *Asahi Shimbun*, 19 July 2012.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Pyle, 2007; 2006; Watanabe, 2001; McCormack, 2002; Matthews, 2003; Nathan, 2004; Kang, 2001.
[7] Nathan, 2004.
[8] Togo, 2005, p.23; Pyle, 2006, p.31.

claim is thus that the Japanese are increasingly looking for pride, identity and self-esteem

fulfillment in the relationship between themselves as a people, or nation, and their state. This

change in popular mindset is also often asserted to be generational, with younger Japanese

exhibiting its effects more clearly than their elders.[9]

The second form of the claim that nationalism is rising in Japan places the emphasis on

change in the *state* and its *policies*. These changes are said to reflect both a new assertiveness

among policy-makers driven by "the desire to see Japan assume a preeminent global role" and a

necessary response to shifts in Japan's geopolitical position, particularly in the East Asian

region.[10] These changes are generally located in Japan's security policies and evolving

relations with regional neighbors and partners. Most authors unite these two views by arguing

that this change in state policies is possible only because "it complements a renewed nationalism

among Japanese voters and a fear that a burgeoning capitalist China threatens Japan's established

position as the leading economic power in East Asia."[11] In short, an increase in the importance

contemporary Japanese place on their national affiliation has freed the state to stake out more

aggressive positions in its foreign and security policies.

---

[9] Pyle, 2006.
[10] Matthews, 2003.
[11] Johnson, 2005.

However, it is difficult to reconcile the events in Yoyogi Park described above with these views of post-Cold War Japan. First, the demonstration reflected a broad disquiet with state policies and a far-reaching call for these policies to better reflect the demands of the people rather than those of government insiders or corporate interests. As Oguma argues, just as other movements focused their animus at what they saw as the forces most directly damaging their livelihoods, such as the Occupy movement and the locus between Wall Street and Washington, the Yoyogi demonstrators targeted the "political-bureaucratic-business complex" protecting the status quo in the nuclear power industry, even though their objections extend well beyond these particular government-industry relationships.[12] In this light, it is difficult to see the Japanese people as increasingly satisfied with the overall direction of state policies or as one whose renewed sense of nationalism allows them to more comfortably locate their identity and self-esteem in the current relationship between nation and state.

Second, the event was organized by a peace activist, Oe, who has long opposed assertive shifts in Japanese security policy and linked opposition to nuclear power with opposition to nuclear weapons.[13] This inclusion of anti-nuclear and pacifist claims with calls for the deepening of Japanese democracy and renewed attention to the people's livelihood is

---

[12] *Asahi Shimbun*, 19 July 2012.
[13] Oe is a noted peace activist and prominent member of the Article 9 Association (*kyūjō no kai*), a civic action group to protect Article Nine, the "peace "clause of Japan's postwar constitution. To see Oe link his non-proliferation and anti-nuclear power stances with post-earthquake Japanese energy policy, see Oe (2011).

broadly inconsistent with the picture of a "rising" Japanese nationalism driven purely by the desire for a greater role in global affairs and fear of newly emerging regional threats. Indeed, although nationalism was indeed on display among the Yoyogi demonstrators, the major target of its focus was the Japanese state rather than an external power and the central demand advanced was for the state to honor the fundamentally anti-nuclear nature of the Japanese people by extending its non-nuclear policy from nuclear weapons to nuclear power. This latter claim, in particular, is clearly incongruent with the view of rising nationalism freeing the state to adopt more aggressive security policies. Further, the demand that specific state policies be changed to better reflect the nature and interests of the citizenry belies the view of a fundamental complementariness in recent changes in the people and state policies.

Finally, as Oguma and other observers noted, the Yoyogi demonstration was widely attended by young people.[14] While the great protest movements of the 1950s and 1960s in Japan were driven largely first by unions and college student organizations and then later mostly by college students, subsequent movements had failed to attract as much youth participation. Oguma argues that the return of young people to protest movements is driven largely by their current precarious position in Japanese society, with many unemployed or under-employed and

---

[14] *Asahi Shimbun*, 19 July 2012.

most living less stable lives than their parents did at their age.[15] Whatever the reasons behind

this change, the presence of so many young people at an event broadly condemning state policies

also does not coincide with the view that young people are more likely than their elders to see

their identity and self-esteem demands satisfied by the current relationship between the nation

and the state.   While they may have been expressing themselves in "nationalistic" terms, their

nationalism was not directed at investing more power in the state to better advance their interest

vis-à-vis those of neighboring countries.

Although a single event does not necessarily call into question the "rising nationalism"

view of post-Cold War Japan, examining commonly-cited claims offered as evidence of this rise

reveals the case is far from clear.   For example, longitudinal surveys of the public have actually

failed to show major increases in national pride or love of country since the end of the Cold

War.[16] In addition, although the public has taken an increasingly negative view of China and

North Korea, the percentage of those viewing the US and Russia negatively has hardly changed

and the percentage of the public that views South Korea negatively is now smaller than at any

---

[15] Ibid.
[16] According to the World Values Survey, which asks respondents to rate their level of national pride, this self-evaluation changes relatively little in post-Cold War Japan and is actually less positive in 2005 than in 1990. Compared with the responses from 23 other countries that are also democracies and members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States), Japanese come in last in those positively evaluating their level of national pride and first in negative evaluations. Accessed at: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ (August 31, 2012)

time since the 1970s.[17]   Similarly, claims of the emergence of a new "nationalistic" generation

are undermined by surveys that show younger Japanese are less likely to claim a strong love of

country than their elders.[18]   Further, commonly-cited as acts of "nationalism," Prime Minister

Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine honoring Japan's war dead divided the public and were

promptly dropped by his successors.[19]   Evaluations of recent efforts to introduce more

patriotism in Japan's school curriculum are mixed at best.[20]   The drive to revise the postwar

constitution, which many feel was imposed on Japan by the US, has stalled in recent years.

Finally, many of Japan's recent changes toward more robust security policies began as demands

from the United States.[21]   Policy changes made under foreign pressure are not generally

considered unambiguous indicators of rising nationalism.

In addition, it should be noted that many self-proclaimed nationalists as well as other

observers of nationalism in Japan have a long history of arguing that the Japanese are not

"nationalistic" enough.   As early as the 1970s, Ishihara Shintarō, the renowned nationalist

---

[17]   See Cabinet Office (*naikaku seifu kōhōshitsu*), Survey on Foreign Policy (*gaikō ni kan suru chōsa*), 2007.
Accessed at: http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index.html (August 31, 2012).   For attitudes on the DPRK, see Asahi
Shimbun (1996, 2004, 2005).
[18]   Among both men and women, the younger the respondents, the less likely they were to claim a strong feeling of
love for the country.   In fact, those in the oldest bracket (70+) were more than twice as likely to claim such a strong
love than those in the youngest. See Cabinet Office (*naikakufu daijinkanbō seifu kōhōshitsu*), Public Opinion Survey
on Social Consciousness (*shakai ishiki ni kansuru yoron chōsa*), 2007. Accessed at:
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index.html (August 31, 2012).
[19]   For example, in the waning months of Koizumi's tenure, an *Asahi Shimbun* poll found that 60% of respondents
opposed Yasukuni visits by the next prime minister, while only 20% approved.   *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 July 2006.
See also, Pyle, 2006.
[20]   Kondo & Wu, 2011.
[21]   For specific examples, see Chapter Six.

writer and current governor of Tokyo, argued that there was "a void at the core" of Japan and condemned Japan's materialism and lack of national purpose.[22] More recently, debates over revising the postwar constitution and educational practices have been at least in part driven by an underlying critique that present-day Japanese lack a strong sense of nationalism or patriotism. For example, addressing the Constitutional Research Council of the lower house of national Diet in 2004, Oda Haruto of the Liberal Democratic Party prefaced his criticism of the constitution's preamble for promoting an "unidentified nationality" that failed "to cultivate a healthy sense of patriotism and respect for Japan's unique history, traditions and culture" by first asserting that postwar generations "have a relatively thin sense of the importance of patriotism and Japanese history, traditions and culture."[23] Appearing as a witness at a public hearing in the upper house of the Diet in 2001, the former diplomat and Japan-based educator Gregory Clark observed that, in his experiences teaching young Japanese, they have a "weak sense of identity" and "clearly do not take much pride in their own culture."[24] In this way, many in Japan, especially those who advocate state measures to strengthen the commitment to the nation-state relationship among the populace, view current levels of nationalism as "thin" or "weak."

[22] *New York Times, 22* May 1974.
[23] Oda Haruto, Liberal Democratic Party, Constitution Research Council, House of Representatives, March 18, 2004. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (July 21, 2012).
[24] Gregory Clark, Pubic Hearing of the Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 15, 2001. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (July 21, 2012).

Beginning in Yoyogi Park, the picture painted here of the state of nationalism in contemporary Japan thus questions the simple assertion of "nationalism on the rise." However, it also raises some important questions: How has Japanese nationalism changed since the end of the Cold War? What explains these changes? What do they mean for Japan's politics and policy-making? These are the main questions that animate this inquiry.

II. Approaching Nationalism

Nearly sixty years ago, Delmer Myers Brown began a history of Japanese nationalism by pointing out the troubling contrast between nationalism's importance and the lack of an agreed-upon definition for the term.[25] More recently, Christopher Hood has lamented the lack of methods for measuring changes in nationalism in post-Cold War Japan, concluding, "[T]here is no easy, reliable and accurate method for measuring nationalism and changes in levels of nationalism."[26] Understanding what has happened to Japanese nationalism since the end of the Cold War thus requires first finding a suitable conception of what nationalism is and then adopting of a method that allows for measuring how it changes over time.

This dissertation evaluates the claim that nationalism is rising in post-Cold War Japan by first noting the disconnect between existent social science conceptions of nationalism and

---

[25] Brown, 1955.
[26] Hood, 1999, p.5.

17

those needed to examine how nationalism might change in contemporary, peaceful, wealthy, and stable democracies such as postwar Japan. Rather than treating nationalism as an ideology, an emotional reaction, or the political agenda of a particular group, this study defines nationalism as a discursive process of constructing and reconstructing points of identification and differentiation that define a political community (i.e. "nation") and assert the form of its domain over a modern territorial state. Nationalism is thus a form of discourse best understood as a series of reoccurring "nation-state narratives" that tell the story of how the nation's putative qualities or past experiences define the present nature of its territorial state.

Viewing nationalism in this way has two key consequences. First, it allows one to conceive of change in nationalism in terms of qualitative or quantitative changes in these recurring narratives. These changes may take many forms, including change in a narrative's cognitive claims, which form its core of constitutive assumptions about the nation and the world, and changes in its normative claims, which assert direct links between the nation and the state in the form of demands on state institutions or behaviors. Second, it opens up nationalism to new avenues of positivist inquiry. Specifically, change in nationalism can be measured using the techniques of content and discourse analyses.

This project applies the above insights to measure and explain change in postwar Japanese nationalism, and by extension, to address the question of how and why nationalism can

change in contemporary, peaceful, and wealthy democracies with stable regimes. In the process, it also seeks to better understand why some individual components of nation-state narratives, especially their normative claims, change while others do not.

Why focus on contemporary Japanese nationalism? First and foremost, Japan has the third-largest economy and one of the top five defense budgets in the world, and nationalism has been linked to both its economic and security policies.[27] Second, Japan has an ultra-nationalist past that still shapes its image in East Asia. Indications of change in Japanese nationalism are closely watched by regional neighbors and continue to create difficulties for Japan's foreign relations. Further, East Asia, plagued by arms build-ups, numerous territorial disputes, a lack of regional institutionalization, nuclear proliferation, and a history of conflict, has been cited as the most likely site for great power war in the near future.[28] Against this background, improving understandings of Japanese nationalism, a possible catalyst for such a conflagration, is vital. Finally, although progress has been made in the study of nationalism over the last decade, there have been few empirical studies of nationalisms in contemporary, wealthy democracies with stable regimes in peacetime. Since nationalism played such an important part in the formation and early development of such states, the current tendency to overlook it in contemporary cases seems unwarranted. This dissertation will address this omission by

---

[27] McVeigh, 2004; Samuels, 1994; Trevor, 2001.
[28] Christensen, 1999; Friedberg, 1993-94.

providing a detailed profile of how nationalism has changed in a prime example of this under-examined subset of cases.

The central method employed in this study is the content and discourse analysis of a large sample of political discourse—the speeches and responses given at the Diet inaugural ceremony. This approach is open to certain criticisms. First, nationalism is a broad-ranging phenomenon, and analysis of nationalist discourse does not always do a good job of capturing some forms that nationalism can take, such as short-lived but intense emotional responses to international events that can prompt the populace to emphasize their differences with other countries. To counter this limitation, wherever possible, the results of the content analysis are placed in context and subjected to discourse analysis designed to highlight the sources of changes and uncover the strategies behind the rhetoric. Second, the focus on the discourse of political and media elites invites the criticism of being too "elite-centric" and ignoring broader indications of how nationalism is reproduced in the minds of everyday Japanese. The main response to this criticism is that elite discourse of this kind is worth prioritizing because it is just as likely to reflect the "popular mood" as the attitudes of particular elites when the subject of study is a democratic society with free elections and a free press. In addition, other indicators, such as public opinion polls, are also utilized, especially when considering how narratives can have effects on policy outcomes.

III. Outline of the Dissertation

The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter Two develops a critique of the literature on nationalism that shows how certain theoretical and empirical tendencies prove problematic for the study of how nationalisms may change in contemporary democracies with wealthy post-industrial economies and stable regimes. It then shows how this literature nonetheless provides strong reasons for why this subset of cases should be seen as distinct and why Japan belongs in this group. The chapter concludes by considering common conceptualizations of nationalism and their limitations when applied to cases like postwar Japan.

Chapter Three utilizes the preceding critique of the nationalism literature to develop and justifies a way of examining nationalism capable of both identifying its presence and assessing degrees of its change over time in cases such as postwar Japan. The central assertion is that nationalism should be viewed as a discourse that incorporates competing claims made in the name of the "nation" on the state. The chief form these claims take are "nation-state narratives," oft-repeated stories that establish the "nation" as an historical protagonist, advance cognitive claims about both the nation and the world, and make normative demands on the state. Changes in these stories and the claims they incorporate may thus be viewed as changes in nationalism and explaining these changes is thus the key to understanding how nationalism

evolves in contemporary cases in which both complex economies and democratic governments are well-established.

The chapter then outlines a method for putting this conception of nationalism into practice by applying a combination of quantitative content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis to a large rhetoric sample from a political ceremony especially chosen for its unique position in the nationalist discourse. This allows the examination of both the frequency with which relevant claims are advanced and the level of contestation they evoke among political elites. The chapter concludes by introducing the concepts of narrative change, discursive strategies, and institutional association to generate three hypotheses for why the nation-state narratives may experience declines in prominence over time: banalization, in which narratives achieve broad consensus and uncontested, comprehensive or partial transformations, in which part or all of a narrative is transformed via a process of contestation, and denationalization, in which a narrative is completely contested but not transformed into a new one.

Chapter Four introduces the five nation-state narratives that have occupied central places in the nationalist discourse of postwar Japan—the trading state,[29] organic state,[30] peace

---

[29] Confined to a few small islands with little natural resources, the Japanese people are a trading nation that must rely on their innate abilities (mercantile acumen and technological prowess) to add value to imported raw materials and export in order to survive. Their state and its policies should reflect this fundamental nature. Amaya, 1980; Gao, 1998; Samuels, 1994; Yamada, 2001.

[30] The Japanese people are a single descent-based ("ethnic") nation whose natural bond is symbolized by the Imperial family and manifested in a common moral code and set of religious traditions. They demand that their state and its policies reflect this organic unity. Oguma, 2002a; Befu, 2001; Takahashi, 2005; Hardacre, 1989.

state,[31] civilized state,[32] and democratic state[33] narratives. In doing so, the chapter addresses

the same three issues with regard to each narrative: 1) translations of archetype examples; 2) the

key elements of the narrative, including its naming conventions, related cognitive elements,

normative claims on state policy, and sub-narratives; and 3) the grounds for its inclusion in the

study, including references to scholarly support.

Chapter Five analyzes the aggregate results from the quantitative content analysis of the

chosen rhetoric sample: the inaugural speeches given by prime ministers at the opening sessions

of the Diet and their responses from the leaders of the largest opposition party and editorial

boards of the three largest daily newspapers between 1952 and 2007. The chapter then assesses

the validity of these results by comparing them to the findings of prior scholarship on Japanese

nationalism and politics in the postwar period. This analysis uncovers several key findings,

chief among them the question of why all five nation-state narratives have experienced long-term

declines in prominence over the entire fifty-five year period under review. Two additional

findings of interest are the strong correlation between the prominence scores of the trading and

---

[31] The Japanese people are a peace-loving nation that regrets the actions of the Japanese state during World War Two, mourns its own tragic losses, and vows never again to allow its state to freely use violence as a means of settling international disputes. Their state and its policies should reflect this fundamental nature. Katzenstein, 1996a; Boyd & Samuels, 2005; Yamamoto, 2004; Orr, 2001.
[32] The Japanese people are a highly civilized nation and place great weight on ensuring their cultural and artistic development. They expect their state both to promote artistic endeavors and to guarantee the basic welfare of its people. Yoshino, 1997.
[33] The Japanese people are a "civic" nation that loves freedom and naturally follow democratic principles. Their state and its policies should reflect this fundamental nature. Oguma, 2002b; Kersten, 1996.

democratic state narratives and the relatively low level of prominence of the organic state narrative throughout the period of the study.

Chapter Six applies further content and discourse analysis to address the questions of how and why political elites in Japan changed the frequency and manner with which they referenced the peace state narrative during periods of pronounced declines in prominence in both the 1970s and after the end of the Cold War. This analysis identifies distinctive patterns of change across the two periods. Whereas the peace state narrative declined in the 1970s due to a process of banalization in which its cognitive and normative components went uncontested and its institutional associations broadened, its fall after the end of the Cold War was due to a still ongoing process of partial transformation driven by political struggles to reform institutions commonly associated with specific normative claims of the narrative. The observed changes appear contingent on multiple factors, including the number of institutional associations of individual sub-narratives, the level of specificity of the association between normative claims and state institutions, and the types of discursive strategies employed.

Chapter Seven begins by considering whether the secular decline in prominence among all the narratives in the study is consistent with some form of denationalization. It finds no evidence of denationalization at work. Instead, while the democratic and civilized state narratives have clearly achieved "banal" states during the post-Cold War period, the trading and

organic state narratives joined the peace state narrative in undergoing partial transformations. These transformations have shifted the focus of the trading state narrative from an emphasis on trade to one on technology while the organic state has seen its normative claims regarding state support for the Yasukuni shrine and enforcement of traditional morality strongly challenged.

Next, the strong and positive correlation between the trading state narrative, which specifies the means to improve the economic welfare of the nation, and the democratic state narrative, which focuses on maintaining the political rights of the nation, is considered in view of its significance for theories that link the level of economic security among the citizenry to the level of legitimacy of democratic regimes.[34]   It finds that although this correlation did appear to indicate a mutually reinforcing dynamic between the two narratives during the Cold War, this relationship has broken down in the post-Cold War period, indicating the broad consensus over the democratic state narrative seems sufficient to independently maintain its prominence in the nationalist discourse.

The chapter then concludes by examining the consistently low level of prominence achieved by the organic state narrative relative to other narratives in all periods of this study. Advocated most strongly by the postwar right-wing in Japan, the organic state narrative is

---

[34] The correlation co-efficient here is 0.869.   On the general question of a causal link between the level of economic development and the legitimacy and stability of democracies, see Przeworski, et al. (2000) and Robinson (2006).   With regard to how this issue may be applied to postwar Japan, see Johnson (1994) and Fouse (2002).

perhaps the best known of the five nation-state narratives examined here and arguably has the longest history in the nationalist discourse of modern Japan. Despite the efforts of multiple generations of conservatives in positions of power to promote and institutionalize its components, the organic state narrative persisted at stable but low levels of prominence due to a number of factors, including an adversarial dynamic that developed with the peace state narrative. Since the end of the Cold War, the narrative also saw its cognitive claim of ethno-national homogeneity fall into almost complete disuse.

Chapter Eight considers what some of the changes in the uses of nation-state narratives have meant for Japanese politics and policy outcomes. It finds that the democratic state narrative played an important role in determining both the focus and the extent of Japan's 1994 reform of the electoral system to elect the lower house of the Diet. The chapter also raises questions about the importance of contestation in transforming narrative components by considering if the organic state narrative's claim of ethno-national homogeneity has continued to influence immigration policy. Despite being completely absent from debate, the chapter finds indirect evidence that it remains an unspoken restraint on policy change. Since this claim has yet to be seriously contested in ceremonies such as the Diet inaugural, contestation may thus be a necessary ingredient in the process of transforming narrative components.

Chapter Nine summarizes the findings of this study and considers what they mean for a mid-level theory of change in nationalism in cases of contemporary, wealthy democracies with stable regimes. Viewed as a discourse, nationalism can in fact change in significant ways in such cases. Although cognitive claims appear to be more resistant to change and thus serve as strong foundations for the persistence of nation-state narratives over time, normative claims do in fact see change as their significance for the particular state institutions with which they are associated are debated during the course of political fights over institutional reform. However, the pattern and extent of this change appears to be contingent on the number of institutional associations involved, the specificity of the normative claim on those institutions, and the discursive strategies employed. The overall picture of Japan's nationalist discourse at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century is thus one of gradual rather than radical transformation over a strong foundation of stable commitments to democracy, social welfare, technological development, and anti-nuclear principles. The study concludes with some brief speculation about how future individual actions or international events might alter the present course of Japanese nationalist discourse and thus nationalism.

Chapter Two: Finding Nationalism

'Nationalism' is one of the most loosely used words in the English language, and yet it refers to one of the most potent forces in the modern world.[35]

Delmer Myers Brown, 1955

I. Introduction

Scholars have grappled with nationalism for more than two centuries in a debate that began among philosophers and historians and eventually spilled across all established lines dividing the modern social sciences. Viewing nationalism as an essential ingredient of the modern socio-economic order as well as a central animating force in many costly interstate and intrastate wars, scholars and intellectuals have long debated the definition of the term, the origins of nations and nationalism, and its impact on interstate relations, especially in cases of large-scale war. Although there is much to be learned from this expansive literature, a critical review reveals difficulties in applying its lessons to the problem of how nationalisms may change in contemporary wealthy democracies with stable regimes. This chapter develops a critique of this literature in order to make the case that a new approach to conceptualizing and measuring nationalism is necessary when examining this important subset of cases.

---

[35] Brown, 1955, p.1.

The chapter proceeds in three parts. The next section briefly introduces the conventional approaches to nationalism and identifies the major problems encountered when applying them to cases like postwar Japan. These problems include the use of static and/or overly-generalized conceptions that obstruct the assessment of how nationalisms can change over time and disallow the possibility of that multiple nationalisms may co-exist in a single state over time, a failure to sufficiently examine the processes of reproduction in cases in which initial nationalisms have been long-established, the relatively scarce examination of cases of nationalism in contemporary, peaceful, wealthy and stable democracies in favor of historical cases or cases featuring large-scale violence, and the tendency of scholars to theorize on world-historical time scales that remove nationalism from the realm of particular public policy debates. The third section then shows how the theoretical assumptions and empirical findings of this literature provide good reasons for treating contemporary, wealthy, and stable democracies as a distinct subset of cases and that postwar Japan rightly belongs among this group. The final section then evaluates the relative merits of common conceptualizations of nationalism as an ideology, a movement and an identity, pointing out the limitations of applying them to cases like postwar Japan.

II. Nationalism Studies and Its Discontents

From 1945 through to the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, different paradigms for understanding nationalism emerged around distinct claims regarding its historical origin and path of diffusion, with most of this activity focused on the ultimate goal of developing a comprehensive theory of nationalism. At the same time, scholars of nationalism also expanded the horizon of empirical work to examine cases from areas outside of Europe and North America, especially in the newly de-colonized regions of Africa and Asia. Finally, the disciplinary make-up of the field shifted to include sociologists, anthropologists, area studies specialists, and political scientists, in addition to the continued presence of historians and philosophers, who had pioneered work on the topic. As a result of these developments, especially the new contributions from social scientists, the half-century following the end of the Second World War has been called "the most intense and prolific period of research on nationalism."[36]

The breadth and depth of this output make the postwar period exceedingly difficult to review in brief. Özkirimli helpfully suggests a binary classification scheme, essentialism and constructivism, which are based on differing views of the nature of ethnic and national categories.[37] This classification facilitates the difficult task of summarizing a vast literature while keeping the spotlight on differing views of how nationalisms may change over time.

---

[36] Özkirimli, 2000, p.48.
[37] Özkirimli, 2000, pp.213-219.

Drawing on the work of Craig Calhoun, Özkirimli defines essentialism as the tendency to reduce the diversity of a given population to a single criterion that is elevated as essential to understanding it as a social category. The tendency is usually accompanied by claims that the 'essence' involved is either natural or the inevitable product of history. In addition, the cultural categories so identified are assumed to represent existing groups that can be identified with some specificity. Finally, any single social category, such as nationality, is generally seen to be exhaustive, in the sense that everyone is assumed to identify with one, and mutually-exclusive, in the sense that no one identifies with more than one possibility within a single category type. In other words, everyone is seen to have a nationality, but no one is believed to be able to belong to more than one national category.[38]

The definition of essentialism adopted here refers to the entire family of approaches to nationalism that view nationality as constituted either *in total or in part* by a natural or enduring 'essence' intrinsic to human beings. Depending on the approach, the essential material of the nation may be cultural, biological, psychological or some combination, but usually the centrality of ethnicity and the importance of the emotional ties and feelings of attachment ethnic conceptions engender are emphasized. Essentialist approaches include the socio-biological approach associated with the work of sociologist Pierre van den Berghe, which posits a

---

[38] Ibid., pp.215-216; See also a similar discussion confined to ethnicity in Chandra & Wilkinson (2008).

biological foundation to ethnicity and nationality, what might be called the "provisional primordialist" approach of law and politics scholar Donald Horowitz, which acknowledges the contingent and socially constructed nature of ethnic and national categories but assumes for the purposes of the analysis at hand that they are fixed and unchanging, and the ethno-symbolist approach of sociologist Anthony Smith, which emphasizes the importance of long-enduring ethnic myths and symbols in the creation of nations.[39]

In contrast to essentialist approaches, constructivists stress the inter-subjectivity and contingency of the process of ethnic and national identity formation. In this view, ethnic groups, rather than fixed to some durable core, are viewed "as fluid and endogenous to a set of social, economic and political processes."[40] In the case of nationality, the "meanings (and values) attributed to various constituents of the national culture, that is myths, symbols, and traditions, are interminably negotiated, revised and redefined."[41] Social categories such as ethnicity and nationality are thus neither exogenously determined nor permanently fixed. Rather, they are determined, consciously or unconsciously, by the members of the relevant populations themselves depending on a variety of contingent circumstances. In contrast with

---

[39] Van den Berghe, 1978, 2000, 2005; Horowitz, 1985, 2004; Smith, 1986, 1991, 2005. The classification of ethno-symbolism as an essentialist approach is generally consistent with Özkirimli (2000), Hearn (2006), Breuilly (1996), and Gellner (1996), who included ethno-symbolism in the same category as other primordialist approaches. However, it should be noted that the tri-partite classification of primordialism, ethno-symbolism, and modernism is common in reviews of nationalism studies. For examples, see Smith (1998) and Ichijo & Uzelac, eds. (2005).
[40] Chandra, 2001, p.7
[41] Özkirimli, 2000, p.217.

essentialist assumptions, constructivists argue that individuals can both identify with multiple possibilities within a single social category (e.g. Irish and American) or identify with none, depending on some causal variable to be specified.[42]

Although the introduction of constructivist terminology imported from other disciplines is relatively new to nationalism studies, it is possible to identify scholars whose approaches to ethnicity and nationality fit this description throughout the postwar period. As Özkirimli points out, many scholars conventionally labeled as "modernists" fit this description because they argue that "it became possible and necessary to 'imagine' or 'invent' nations as a result of changing economic, political or social conditions."[43] Understood this way, different constructivist approaches are largely distinguished by the different factors they emphasize in their explanations of the origins of nationalism. These include a variety of structural, ideational and instrumental approaches.

Structural approaches differ in their emphasis on economic, political and cultural variables. Those emphasizing purely economic factors include the modernization approaches of scholars such as the economist and economic historian Walt Rostow, which argue that societies develop or "modernize" by passing through a common sequence of development in which an intermediate stage fosters nationalism, and the neo-Marxist approaches of scholars

---

[42] Chandra, 2001; Chandra and Wilkinson, 2008.
[43] Özkirimli, 2000, pp.217-218.

such as Scottish theorist Tom Nairn and sociologist Michael Hechter, which argue that the

uneven pace of economic development both across countries and within them fosters nationalism

as an undeveloped periphery mobilizes in the face of exploitation from a more developed core.[44]

Structural approaches emphasizing political factors, such as those offered by the historian John

Breuilly and sociologist Michael Mann, reject or de-emphasize economic development as the

central causal force behind the emergence and subsequent change of nationalism and focus

instead on the role of the modern state and the process of state-building.[45]

Perhaps the most influential structural approaches, offered by the anthropologist Ernest

Gellner and sociologist and philosopher Benedict Anderson, argue nationalism developed as a

cultural response to pressures caused by factors such as industrialization, capitalism, the spread

of literacy, and the decline of ecclesiastical authority.[46]   In particular, Gellner emphasizes the

role of industrialization, which he claims requires a level of cultural homogeneity that generated

nationalism as "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national

[cultural] unit be congruent," while Anderson argues that all the above factors opened up a space

for people to see themselves as members of a single nation or an "imagined community."[47]

---

[44] Rostow, 1960; Nairn, 1973, 1975, 1981; Hechter, 1975, 2000. For a modernization approach by a political scientist, see Deutsch (1953).
[45] Breuilly, 1993 [1982], 1996; Mann, 1995.
[46] Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991 [1983].
[47] Gellner, 1983, p.1.; Anderson, 1991 [1983].

Constructivist approaches also include ones that emphasize the role of ideas and ideology. For example, the sociologist Liah Greenfeld finds the origins of nationalism in the emergence of the idea of the nation in sixteenth century England and the manner in which this idea spread throughout the world.[48] This echoes earlier work on the roots of nationalism by interwar historians such as Carlton Hayes, Hans Kohn, and E.H. Carr.[49] Finally, constructivists also offer various forms of instrumental approaches. Found in the work of political scientists such as Paul Brass, who finds nationalism emerging from the power struggles among elites who appeal to people in ethnic and nationalist terms for their own instrumental reasons, and Robert Bates, who argues that joining ethnic and national groups is a rational response of individuals facing competition over the desired but scarce benefits of modernization, especially control of land, markets and jobs.[50]

Although the works cited above have greatly increased understanding of nationalism, certain theoretical and empirical tendencies have proven problematic for applying their lessons to the study of how nationalisms may change in contemporary democracies with post-industrial economies and stable regimes. These tendencies, which can be found among both essentialist and constructivist approaches, include scant attention devoted to contemporary cases in favor or

---

[48] Greenfeld, 1992.
[49] Hayes, 1931; Kohn, 1944, Carr, 1945.
[50] Brass, 1991; Bates, 1974. Bates, 1983.

historical ones, a corresponding lack of consideration given to explaining how ethnic and national categories are reproduced and change over time once established, the use of static and/or overly-generalized understandings of key conceptions such as the nation; the tendency to theorize only over extremely long time horizons, a failure to account for the role of historical context and contingency in the evolution of nationalisms, the tendency assume away the possibility multiple nationalisms co-existing over long periods of time within a single case, bias in case selection in favor of cases involving large-scale violence; and an under-appreciation of how politics, and specific policy debates, relate to the content of national categories and nationalist discourse.

These deficiencies may be attributed to a number of factors, including an excessive focus on the origins of nationalism, problems associated with the pursuit of a universal theory of nationalism, the assumption of a natural link between nationalism and ethnic politics to violent outcomes, and the level and manner of participation from political scientists.

Reviewing the major theoretical contributions of this period, one is struck by their general backward-looking orientation. Of the authors cited above, only a few extend their analysis to the present, and, among these, fewer still choose to examine contemporary cases in their own societies. This tendency is largely attributable to the focus of these scholars on explaining the origins of nationalism. Although understandable, the field-wide devotion to this

question at the expense of other areas of inquiry has contributed to two negative outcomes. First, the proliferation of historical studies of the first appearances of nationalisms in particular regions has to some extent crowded out work on contemporary cases, thereby stunting the development of theoretical concepts and measurement techniques best suited for the conditions found in these cases. Second, focusing the debate on explaining the initial production of national categories has tended to leave questions regarding how these categories are reproduced or transformed once established under-explored. Of course, this is not a problem if the same factors cited as causes of the production of national categories are also responsible for their reproduction and change, but this is an empirical question that can only be answered by further work on contemporary cases.

A second observation about the work of this period is that scholars from all theoretical perspectives generally shared the goal of developing a universal theory of nationalism. Although some, such as Breuilly, declined to take up this mantle, the focus of most other theorists on developing a "general theory" has led to a number of complications that often make applying their work to specific cases difficult and unproductive. Explaining nationalism with a single theory requires concepts to be highly generalized so they may be widely applied across time and space. As a result, fitting them to specific cases can be difficult, especially if the case differs greatly from the contexts of the historical ones used to derive and explain the theory.

A good example of this is the difficulty encountered when Smith attempts to apply ethno-symbolist analysis to modern Japan.[51] In short, he argues that aristocratic elites from the samurai class in combined Confucian and peasant traditions with the dominant myth of the emperor system and to create a Japanese national identity which they promoted through their control of the modernizing Japanese state to gradually transform a politically passive and economically divided ethnic community into a more cohesive, economically centralized and mobilized political community, thus creating the Japanese nation. After World War Two, Smith argues that the emperor system was deprived of its former mystique and position and the foundation of prewar Japanese national political identity was shaken. Although he notes a resurgence of interest in national cultural identity among intellectuals and business elites, he conclude that it remains to be seen if this can serve as a durable basis for a new comprehensive Japanese national identity.

There are several problems with this account. First, Smith's theory is dependent on highly generalized models drawn from work on early European nationalisms as well as hard-to-specify concepts such as "lateral *ethnie*" that do not translate well to Japan's experience. Second, when nationalism began to emerge in Japan, the samurai elite were in fact divided over the meaning of the emperor system. Indeed, opposing forces in the initial struggle that led to

---

[51] Smith, 1991, pp.100-106.

the collapse of the Shogunate and the later Boshin War emphasized these differences as central their causes. Third, as Oguma Eiji has noted, the meanings attached to the emperor system have clearly changed over time, even before World War Two.[52] Finally, deprived of his central myth-symbol complex, Smith has very little to say about how nationalism has changed in postwar Japan.

The drive for a general theory has had other negative consequences. First, it encouraged postwar scholars to theorize on world-historical time scales of hundreds and even thousands of years. Considering the subject across such broad spans of time tends to limit explanations to "big, slow-moving" factors, such as structural (e.g. changes in the means of production, levels of development, etc.) or essentialist variables (e.g. crude rational choice or genetic predispositions) at the expense of other types of explanations, especially human agency, which may play critical roles.[53] In addition, the mere intent of developing a general theory predisposes theorists to discount the significance of social and political contexts and historical contingencies in the formation of nationalisms. As Breuilly and the sociologist Rogers Brubaker have both stressed, the "world of nations" as we know it today could have been very different and thus there is no theoretical justification for disregarding the likely role of historical contingency in the

---

[52] Oguma, 2002a. For an account of how views of the emperor system changed after the war, see Ruoff, 2001.
[53] The phrase "big, slow moving" is taken from Pierson (2003).

development of particular nationalisms.[54] Finally, the requirement to collapse cells inherent in general theorizing tends to discount even the possibility that distinct nationalisms may exist side-by-side within the same state for long periods of time. However, the level of national consensus or contention in any particular case is an empirical matter that cannot be resolved through assumption or definitional fiat.

Another facet of the scholarship of this period is the tendency to focus empirical research on cases involving interstate or intrastate conflict. Found surprisingly in both essentialist and constructivist approaches, this tendency complicates efforts to utilize these approaches in cases of contemporary post-industrial democracies for several reasons. First, the universe of cases has become increasingly drawn from Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, South America and the post-Soviet republics because these are the regions that hosted the most violent conflicts over the last half-century.[55] This has moved the empirical focus of the field from an excessively Eurocentric one to one that largely ignores the post-industrial democracies of contemporary North America, Europe, and Japan. In this way, much of the important theoretical work during this period has been drawn from cases that differ greatly from these contemporary democracies in such theoretically relevant aspects as level of development, regime type, and state stability. Second, cases are selected because the states are

---

[54] Breuilly, 1993 [1982]; Brubaker, 1996, 2004.
[55] Marshall & Cole, 2009, p.6.

experiencing ongoing conflict, a condition that may in and of itself differentiate them

theoretically in important ways from states that have experienced long periods of peace, such as

those in North America, Europe and Japan over much or all of the last half-century.

There are other consequences associated with this shift in the focus of empirical work.

First, it has encouraged some scholars to draw sharp distinctions between the nationalisms of

their home societies in advanced post-industrial democracies and those that are now the main

subject of study in the field.   This has prompted a renewed interest in dichotomous typologies

such as patriotism versus nationalism, and especially civic versus ethnic nationalism.   An

influential categorization derived from Kohn's division of nationalism into "Western" and

"Eastern" variants, the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism underlies the

ethno-symbolist and ideational approaches introduced above.[56]   Civic nationalism, which is

associated with the thinking of Renan and supposedly exemplified in the nationalisms of Kohn's

"Western" countries, particularly the United States, calls for "a community of equal,

rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and

---

[56] Kohn argues that nationalism first appeared in Western countries, such as England, France and the United States, either before or during the formation of their current territorial states.   The nationalism that developed in this region was thus "based upon liberal middle-class concepts and pointing to a consummation in a democratic world society." Kohn, 1944, p.457.   In Eastern and Central Europe and parts of Asia, however, nationalism emerged later under less developed economic and political conditions.   Its initial sponsors were largely intellectuals and members of the lower aristocracy, who fashioned nationalist doctrines centering on cultural, linguistic and putative kinship ties.   Since the envisioned lines of the nation did not coincide with the borders of the dynastic empires of the region, the nation was presented as more of an emotional ideal, rather than the more rational political reality prevalent in the West. Kohn, 1944, pp.329-334; See summaries of the distinction in Smith, 1998, p.182; Hearn, 2006, pp.88-91. For relatively recent examples, see Smith (1991), Brubaker (1992), Greenfeld (1992), Ignatieff, (1993), Kupchan (1995), Zubrzycki (2001) and Williams and Mobrand (2010).

values." [57]   Civic nations are voluntary and inclusive, since they are composed of "all

those--regardless of race, color, creed, gender, language, or ethnicity--who subscribed to the

nation's political creed." [58] Civic nationalism is thus necessarily democratic because it invests

sovereignty in the people.

Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, locates the source of national unity in some set of

ethnic characteristics such as language, religion, and traditions.   It stresses that nationality is a

product of inheritance rather than individual choice: "It is the national community that defines

the individual, not the individuals who define the national community." [59]   Associated with the

writings of Herder and nineteenth century German Romanticism, this form of "Eastern"

nationalism is thus seen as exclusive and adverse to democratic ideals.

However, drawing a sharp distinction along these lines can unnecessarily complicate the

analysis of change in nationalism in cases such as postwar Japan.   As Brubaker has noted, the

distinction is utterly dependant on how one defines the concept of "culture." [60]   As will be seen

in the discussion of nation-state narratives in the next two chapters, if one chose to define the

"culture" attributed to ethnicity in broad terms, all prominent nation-state narratives in postwar

Japan could be considered variants of ethnic nationalism, including one that idealizes the "civic"

---

[57] Ignatieff, 1993, p.6. Renan, 1996 [1882].
[58] Ibid., p.6.
[59] Ibid., pp.7-8.
[60] Brubaker, 2004, pp.136-140.

nature of the Japanese nation in support of the cognitive claim that Japan is a "democratic state."

However, the more narrow understanding of ethnicity utilized here, which focuses on descent-based attributes, excludes many elements others might consider as cultural aspects of ethnicity, and, in so doing, locates most "ethnic" claims in the one narrative whose cognitive foundation is most dependent on this claim.

In addition, it should be remembered that this typology contains moral valuations that sometimes portray the nationalisms of the subject states as normative 'bads' that must be contained, further distancing them from putatively healthy conceptions of 'patriotism' associated with similar styles of politics in post-industrial democracies. This may also work in reverse. For example, scholars studying cases in Africa sometimes treat instances of what might be deemed nationalism in a post-industrial democratic context (e.g. conflict over state control or secession waged by a minority group) as "ethnic" conflict in their case, thus obscuring the connection with nationalist forms of identity politics in developed democracies.

A final observation about the scholarship of this period involves the contribution of political scientists. When political scientists do approach the topic of nationalism, they tend either to focus on its consequences, or, when causes are examined, to shy away from developing exclusively political explanations. As political scientist Patrick Hossay succinctly notes, "Political scientists have displayed more interest in the political consequences of nationalism;

but they largely decline to problematize notions of nationhood as themselves politically-constructed."[61] Political scientist Rogers Smith agrees, asserting that when it comes to explaining the general class of identities that include nationality, "Against what one would think to be their disciplinary self-interest, political scientists have also tended to draw on economic, sociological, cultural and psychological theories rather than formulating explicitly political ones."[62] Although there are exceptions, the tendency to avoid political explanations for the production, reproduction and change of national categories is a somewhat surprising feature of political scientists' contribution to scholarship on nationalism in the postwar period.

The combined impact of the relatively low participation of political scientists and their reticence to employ political explanations in scholarship on nationalism has been an overall under-appreciation of how politics, and specific struggles over state institutions and policies, may affect the content of national categories and thus the points of identification to which large groups of people turn when thinking of their nationality.

III. Casing the Middle Ground

A starting point for the approach taken to nationalism here is the assertion that a general or universal theory of nationalism—one that purports to apply equally to all cases across space

---

[61] Hossay, 2001, pp.165-166.
[62] Smith, 2003, p.12.

and time—is neither possible nor advisable.[63]   As the review of nationalism studies in the preceding section reveals, seeking a single set of explanations or master variables for all time periods and instances of nationalism's existence has created problems, especially for applying the resultant theories to contemporary cases.   These problems are thus both theoretical, as seen in the difficulty encountered in applying Smith's framework to postwar Japan, and empirical, as is apparent when one considers the range in the ideological content of nationalisms across time and space, the not uncommon situation in which competing nationalist ideas and doctrines co-exist within a single political environment for long periods of time, and the relative importance of historical contingency in the development and change of nationalisms in particular cases.

Acknowledging this state of affairs does not, as sociologist John Hall makes clear, imply a counter-reaction "from universalism to complete particularism, from a general theory to national histories."[64]   Rather, it highlights the need to focus theory-building on the fertile middle ground, in which theorists focus on developing concepts best suited for analyzing how nationalisms develop and change in a set of comparable cases that share key characteristics, such as time periods and political and economic structures.   This section focuses on the theoretical justifications for assigning a case to a subset of comparable cases suitable for use in

---

[63] Other scholars studying nationalism share this view, including Hall (1993) and Özkirimli (2000)
[64] Hall, 1993, p.1.

theory-building about nationalism in postwar Japan. The final section will then take up the equally important task of evaluating the utility of three commonly-used conceptions of nationalism (and their operationalizations) for theorizing about how nationalism may develop and change in this subset of cases.

It is argued here that postwar Japan is one of a group of cases that share key theoretically-relevant characteristics but are rarely examined by nationalism scholars. Among the first considerations for categorizing comparable cases is chronological division. Separating cases by time periods is important for several reasons. First, it allows the separation of instances of "first-generation nationalisms," or the first appearances of nationalisms in a particular state or geographic area, from cases in which the time period under examination begins after the original development of nationalism. This is important because there is no *a priori* reason to assume that the same forces that initially give birth to nationalism also serve to sustain, develop or diminish it in latter periods. Second, as is particularly apparent in the chronologies of interwar scholars such as E.H. Carr and Carlton Hayes, the content of nationalist ideologies and movements changes over time, and the order in which new terms and ideas enter nationalist discourse and the manner in which they react to each other can have a significant impact on the trajectory of a nationalism's development. Finally, focusing on shorter time periods (e.g. decades) than those typically examined by scholars pursuing universal theories of

nationalism (e.g. centuries) allows the theorist to examine the content of nationalist discourse and its relationship to political and policy outcomes, areas of particular interest to political scientists.

Although it is essential to consider the history of nationalism prior to the start date of a particular case study, the tendency of those pursuing universal theories to focus excessively on determining origins to the exclusion of subsequent change and development has left many contemporary nationalisms under-studied. This lapse is particularly surprising when one considers that it is the current state of these nationalisms, including contemporary Japanese nationalism, which will have the most lasting impact on global politics in the future. The time period examined here is thus the postwar period, with the focus placed on the second half of the Cold War and first two decades of the post-Cold War era. Although a brief survey of prewar nationalisms in Japan will be provided, the emphasis will be on how new nationalisms became established and changed following the end of the U.S. occupation.

A second characteristic that postwar Japan shares with the group of cases under-examined by nationalism scholars is regime type. The review in the previous section reveals many scholars who draw links between nationalism and democracy. For example, democracy is a key characteristic in Hayes' typology of nationalism and in Carr's chronology of

nationalism's march through time.[65]   For Mann, among other scholars, democratic federalism is

portrayed as a key conditioning variable capable of determining whether the nationalism of a

particular state will be aggressive or mild.[66]   Finally, both Kohn and Greenfeld, to varying

degrees, portray nationalism as a central factor in the spread and development of modern

democracy.[67]   Thus, depending on the theorist, the relationship between nationalism and

democracy can be conceptual, causal or both.

Since adopting its current constitution in 1947, Japan has been a parliamentary

democracy with a symbolic monarchy.   Although occupation authorities interfered in various

ways with the workings of this new regime during the first five years of its operation, Japan

regained its full sovereignty in 1952.   Since that time, it has had regular, relatively free and fair

elections, a private and fairly independent media, an independent judiciary, security forces under

civilian control and a constitution that protects civil liberties such as freedom of expression and

association and prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, creed, social status or sex.

It is a fact that nearly every item listed among Japan's democratic institutions above has

come under criticism for perceived failings.[68]   It is also true that the quality and effectiveness of

---

[65] Hayes, 1931; Carr, 1945.
[66] Mann, 1995.
[67] Kohn, 1944; Greenfeld, 1992.
[68] For examples of scholars who question the quality of Japanese democracy, see Bowen, 2003; Hayes, 2001;
Herzog, 1993; Freeman, 2000; and Pyle, 1996. For arguments placing Japanese democracy with the general range of
Western democracies, see Beer & Maki, 2002; Curtis, 1999; Reed, 1993; Richardson, 1997; and Stockwin, 1999.

these institutions have likely changed over the period in question. However, democracy is always a work in progress, and both criticisms and changes are to be expected. Judged by an absolute standard, Japan's postwar regime meets Samuel Huntington's procedural definition of democracy: Japanese leaders have been selected through free competition in regular and relatively fair elections under universal adult suffrage.[69] Assessed from a comparative standard that includes measures for both procedural democracy and civil liberties, Japan has received a rating of "Free" in Freedom House's evaluation of political rights and civil liberties for all countries and disputed territories around the world since the organization began publishing comparative ratings in 1973.[70] In addition, the range of fluctuation in this measure over the period has been low, with Japan never receiving a score lower than 2 on the 7 point-scale. It is thus argued here that Japan belongs in the subset of cases considered democracies for the entire postwar period.

Economic structure is also often cited by theorists as an important factor when considering nationalism. Carr points to structural shifts in the world economy, from largely mercantilist to more open trade to the "economic nationalism" of the 1930s as key characteristics in his periodization of nationalism, while Kohn cites the initial level of development as an

---

[69] Huntington, 1993, p.7.
[70] Freedom House, 2010.

important causal variable in the development of Western and Eastern nationalisms.[71] Varying

levels of economic development are also central to Narin's "uneven development" and Hechter's

"internal colonialism."[72] Rostow associates nationalism with particular stages in his model of

economic development.[73] Finally, Gellner, Anderson and Smith, the most influential postwar

theorists, while disagreeing on many important points regarding the origin of nationalism,

nonetheless all cite level of development, particularly industrialization, as a central factor in their

theories.[74] The need to control for differences in economic structure in cross-case comparisons

is thus a well-grounded theoretical concern.

The postwar Japanese economy has been far from a static entity. In the early years

after regaining sovereignty, Japan equaled its prewar economic output after being devastated in

the final years of World War Two. The next two decades saw "the Japanese miracle," in which

double-digit annual growth and economic boom became the new norms, a period followed by

two more decades of lower but still relatively high levels of growth and increased economic

influence in the world. This long stretch of widely-shared prosperity then came to a sudden

halt, leaving the Japanese economy largely stagnant in the post-Cold War era. One may thus

---

[71] Carr, 1945; Kohn, 1944.

[72] Nairn, 1981; Hechter, 1975.

[73] Rostow, 1960. Deutsch also cites the increased communication born of economic development as the central building block of his theory of nationalism. Deutsch, 1953.

[74] Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991 [1983]; Smith, 1986.

ask how such variation in economic performance allows for the postwar period to be examined as a single case.

The answer to this question has two parts. First, it is important to emphasize that Japan was a relatively wealthy and industrialized economy at the time it entered into World War Two and after defeat it quickly regained its prewar status in the early postwar years. By 1960, it was among the top quintile among all countries in GDP per capita, a threshold under which it has never fallen in subsequent years.[75] With regard to examining nationalism, Japan may thus be considered a case of a wealthy country for the bulk of the period under review. Second, if economic structure is expressed as the common three-sector model including primary (agricultural and extractive activities), secondary (manufacturing and heavy-industrial activities) and territory (services and information-intensive activities) sectors, then it can be said that the Japanese economy has followed a similar trajectory as that of other wealthy democracies in the postwar period. Although Japan experienced rapid growth in the manufacturing sector during the boom years of the initial recovery and economic miracle, since the early 1970s, structural shifts in the Japanese economy have mirrored that of other rich democracies.[76] As expressed in terms of employment by sector, this pattern includes sharp declines in manufacturing, continued

---

[75] See data from the World Development Indicators database and CIA World Factbook. Accessed at: http://www.nationmaster.com/statistics (September 1, 2012)

[76] See data from the US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Accessed at: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 (September 1, 2012)

long-term declines in primary industries and a dramatic increase in workers employed in the tertiary or services sector.[77]   Since the focus of analysis here is on the latter half of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, it is thus possible to consider Japan as a post-industrial economy, an economic structure in which services represent the dominant sector of employment.[78]   This is also the case with the economies of other contemporary, wealthy democracies.

Another important characteristic that postwar Japan shares with other under-studied cases of nationalism is the relative stability of its regime and state.   As noted earlier, most empirical work on nationalism has focused on cases of regime breakdown or inter-state or intra-state conflict.   While these studies have generated theoretical arguments linking nationalism to large-scale violence and a tendency for nationalism to take a more central place in the public sphere during periods of conflict, they often have little to say about how nationalism may or may not change during prolonged periods of regime stability and peace.

If measured from the return of sovereignty, Japan's current democratic regime has been stable for nearly sixty years.   In addition, with the exception of the peaceful return of Okinawa and other islands by the United States during the first half of the postwar period, the area

---

[77] Ibid.

[78] "Post-industrial" is used here to refer to an economy has shifted from a manufacturing-base to one in which the tertiary sector is the largest employer.   The concept of the post-industrial society originates with Bell (1973).

administered by Japan's territorial state has also remained unchanged during this period. The result of this continuity of regime and state fits postwar Japan into what Michael Billig cites as the most under-examined set of nationalism cases, the "established nations," which he defines broadly "those states that have confidence in their own continuity."[79] There are various ways to specify regime and state stability more specifically. One widely used measure is the State Fragility Index developed by Monty Marshall. By this measure, which covers only the period from 1995 to 2009, Japan has received the lowest rating for state fragility, a score it shares with the countries of North America, Western Europe and Oceania.[80] A different but related measure is the Polity score from the Polity IV database. This measure rates the quality of political institutions in democracies and autocracies for the entire postwar period. Japan receives the highest measure on this evaluation from the mid-1950s to the present.[81] It is thus fair to say that postwar Japan belongs in the subset of cases with stable, reasonably well-functioning regimes in place.

The above arguments support the notion that postwar Japan should be seen as a prime example of one of the most ignored sets of cases in nationalism scholarship: a contemporary democratic state with a stable regime and a wealthy, post-industrial economy. The discussion

---

[79] Billig, 1995, p.8.
[80] Marshall & Cole, 2009.
[81] See Polity IV database. Accessed at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (September 1, 2012). Please note that this high rating also supports the categorizing Japan as a democracy for the entire postwar period.

now turns to assessing which concepts and basic assumptions are best suited for examining how

nationalism may change in such an environment.

IV. Problems with Common Conceptions of Nationalism

Before considering solutions to the problems encountered when attempting to apply the

approaches to nationalism reviewed earlier to cases of contemporary post-industrial democracies,

it is first necessary to point out that different theorists follow differing *a priori* assumptions

about what nationalism actually is as an empirical manifestation.   These assumptions reveal

themselves in both their formal definitions of nationalism and their operationalizations in

casework.   For the most part, theorists characterize nationalism as a general phenomenon in one

of three different ways: 1) as an *ideology*, or system of normative and cognitive beliefs; 2) as a

type of *movement*, or collection action by individuals organized to realize certain political

objectives; or 3) as a form of *identity*, which is usually described as a way of categorizing

oneself and others that satisfies a fundamental psychological need or emotional desire for

viewing the world in this particular fashion.   The problems associated with beginning analysis

with each of these fundamental assumptions about nationalism are considered below.

Nationalism is sometimes viewed as an *ideology*.[82]   Here, ideology is understood as a

system of collectively-held normative and cognitive beliefs about the nation, its relationship to

the state and place in the world.[83]   This approach is grounded in three main assumptions.   First,

nationalist beliefs form a system, meaning that central concepts are interlocking and combine

into a consistent whole.   Second, these beliefs are imparted through socialization processes that

occur through young adulthood in the household, education system and workplace.   In this way,

change in nationalism is by assumption related to changes or disruptions in these socialization

processes.   Third, a uniformity of conviction is assumed among the adherents of a particular

nationalist ideology.   So conceived, nationalism is thus viewed as "the most successful

ideology in human history," one that has captured more adherents than liberalism or even

Christianity or Islam.[84]

This approach can, however, prove problematic.   For one, to assume nationalism is a

system of beliefs with goodness-of-fit between key concepts and internal consistency makes it

difficult for one to allow for the fact that competing, even conflicting, national conceptions can

exist side-by-side in the same state for long periods of time.   Attempting to find a "system," a

---

[82] Examples include Carr, 1945; Greenfield, 1992; Hayes, 1931; Kohn, 1944.
[83] It should be noted that ideology has been variously defined in the social sciences.   The definition used here is drawn from Hamilton: "An ideology is a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote realize, pursue or maintain." Hamilton, 1987, p.38.
[84] Birch, 1989, p.3; cited in Billig, 1995, p.22.

researcher acting on this assumption will tend to ignore inconsistent or contradictory elements and instead focus on what he or she perceives to be the best set of interlocking ideas that are broadly expressed. While the results of such an analysis are not necessarily inaccurate, they will almost certainly be incomplete. Particularly in the context of a stable democracy with a free press and open public sphere, conflicting notions about the nation and its relationship to the state are likely to be widespread. Some of these notions will conflict and there is no need for them to combine into a single consistent whole. In fact, the coexistence of conflicting notions and inconsistencies may themselves by important sources of change in nationalism over time. Those assuming nationalism to be a system of beliefs are thus likely to ignore the variation present in any particular state at a given time. In the case of postwar Japan, for instance, scholars studying nationalism as an ideology almost always focus on rightwing notions of the Japanese nation to the exclusion of conflicting but nonetheless important conceptions that emerged from the left.[85]

Second, conceiving of nationalism as a belief system inculcated only through socialization processes greatly limits the types of explanations for change that can be brought to bear. For example, many scholars argue that leaders make nationalist pleas for instrumental purposes and that these actions often can change the ways receiving publics understand their

---

[85] Takekawa, 2007, p.59.

ethnicity or nationality.[86] Still others describe how adult followers rationally join newly

formed nationalist movements in order to secure places in what they think will be a winning

coalition.[87] Neither of these explanations can be applied if nationalism is viewed as a belief

system because they require a level of autonomy between actors and beliefs. Leaders are able

to promote beliefs in ways they were not previously socialized to and may not even hold

themselves, while followers are able to select or reject these conceptions using rational

calculation. Such autonomy is not possible if nationalism is understood only as beliefs

internalized by pre-adult socialization processes because adult actors are seen as rarely, if ever,

capable of consciously shaping change in their own deeply-held beliefs or those of others. As a

result, change becomes largely a structural affair that privileges exogenous factors such as

international war or regime collapse over the endogenous impact of human agency. To take

this approach thus greatly reduces by assumptive fiat the possibility that human agency,

intentional or otherwise, might affect change in nationalism.

In addition to downplaying the potential role of agency, viewing nationalism as a belief

system obscures the possibility of endogenous change. Assuming *shared* belief often leads one

to assume individuals hold in their minds the *same* interpretations of the nationalism in question.

---

[86] Richard Samuels, in particular, has utilized Claude Levi-Strauss' concept of *bricoleur*—a leader who assembles often heterogeneous fragments of available cultural materials in new ways to legitimate and promote new political understandings—to show how leaders have played important roles in affecting change in the contemporary national identities of Italy and Japan. Samuels, 2003a. See also Brass (1991).
[87] Laitin, 1998; Bates, 1974. Bates, 1983.

As Cruz has pointed out, this is rarely the case.[88]   In practice, nationalists often hold contending

beliefs.   These views may vary across domains (e.g. more cultural than political, more military

than economic, etc.) and may even include disagreements on fundamental questions such as who

is to be included in the "nation" and what is required for national autonomy.[89]   This variation

opens the door for an important potential source of endogenous change: the rhetorical

manipulations of political leaders.   Beginning with the assumption of uniformity of beliefs,

however, encourages theorists to overlook rhetorical politics and leaves them largely dependent

on exogenous factors in their efforts to explain change.

Treating nationalism as a *movement* places the focus on organizations and groups, with

nationalism generally treated as the defining ideological characteristic of these substantive

entities.[90]   This approach has disadvantages that are particularly apparent in cases such as

postwar Japan.   For one, change is viewed as the success or failure of a particular nationalist

movement to achieve its objectives, usually defined in terms of separation from, unification with

or reform of a state.[91]   However, in a case in which the regime and state are stable for the entire

period under review, the only form of change conceivable is state reform, and it is just this type

of change that scholars employing this approach tend to avoid.   Breuilly, for example, examines

---

[88] Cruz, 2000.
[89] McVeigh, 2004.
[90] Breuilly, 1993 [1982]; Hechter, 2000, Van Evera, 1996-97.
[91] For example, see Breuilly (1993 [1982]).

very few such cases and is openly doubtful of the utility of his approach in cases in which state power has already been attained by a nationalist movement.[92]

Another problem involves the overly-generalized conception of nationalism's ideological content adopted by scholars using the movement approach. For example, in the accounts of both Breuilly and the political scientist Stephen Van Evera, nationalism's ideological content is defined as a cognitive understanding that the nation exists and a normative commitment to prioritizing its interests, values and sovereignty.[93] Understood in this way, it is difficult to find a major social or political organization that does not in some way subscribe to these principles in a contemporary democracy with a stable regime. This complication is compounded by the presence of apex organizations, such as large political parties or trade unions, which represent varied factions with differing and often competing objectives vis-à-vis the state. For example, although the Liberal Democratic Party is often viewed as the main political vehicle for rightwing nationalism in postwar Japan, in reality, throughout its existence, the party has consisted of a number of competing factions, many of which roundly reject important aspects of the rightwing nationalist agenda.[94] Thus, even if a more narrow understanding of nationalism is adopted, the internal variations inherent in the large organizational bodies of a contemporary,

---

[92] Breuilly, 1993 [1982], p.9.
[93] Breuillly, 1993 [1982], Van Evera, 1996-7.
[94] Boyd & Samuels, 2005.

post-industrial society can sometimes complicate their categorization as part of a "nationalist" movement.

Another approach is to place the emphasis on nationalism as a form of *identity*. Although this approach has become common place in post-Cold War scholarship on nationalism, it is also apparent in the works critiqued earlier, including that of theorists such as Smith and Greenfeld, who incorporate identity conceptions into what are essentially ideological approaches. Thus, to the degree that the identity approach also emphasizes collectively-held beliefs, it shares the problems highlighted for the ideological approach above, including the tendency to view identity conceptions as composed of interlocking and consistent cognitive and normative elements, the proclivity to underestimate the possibility that agents, such as politicians or opinion leaders in the media, are capable of affecting important change in the ways the nation is understood, and the often unwarranted assumption that identity conceptions are held uniformly among a population of adherents.

In a review of the diverse usages of "identity" in the social sciences, Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper reject the term as "hopelessly ambiguous" for an analytical concept.[95] They argue that identity, particularly in the study of ethnicity and nationalism, is often under-specified, and, as a result, has come to be used in various ways, some of which are

---

[95] Brubaker, 2004a, p.33.

contradictory. They conclude that any term that is widely used both to designate "sameness" across individuals over time or to capture core aspects of selfhood, while also being used to highlight the development of self-understandings as a process or the fluid, multiple and fragmented nature of these understandings, has too many contradictions to fit under a single rubric.[96] This stark contrast is apparent in the differing treatments of identity in the work of scholars reviewed above, particularly in the differences in the way the term is used by essentialists and constructivists. While the former see ethnic and national identity as composed of core, relatively stable and persistent elements that are uniformly shared across particular populations, the latter, to varying degrees, portray them as fluid conceptions that can vary across time and the populations to which they are exposed.

The discussion to this point is not intended to imply that ideology, movements and identity have nothing to do with nationalism or how it changes. Rather, the point is simply that adopting approaches that privilege these elements as analytical starting points imports assumptions that close off matters best left open for empirical inquiry. Thus, for example, instead of initially assuming that nationalist ideology or national identity in a particular case at a particular point in time is best expressed as a single set of interlocking beliefs that are uniformly and deeply held and can only be changed through alternations in the socialization process, a

---

[96] Ibid., p.35.

researcher might begin by looking for competing claims regarding the nation and then attempt to assess how these notions relate to one another, the degree to which they are contested, and what factors, including but not limited to the socialization process, might bring about changes in their content or level of contestation among the populace. The advantages of moving beyond the starting assumptions of the above approaches, especially when studying contemporary, wealthy democracies such as postwar Japan, become apparent once a fourth approach is considered in the next chapter.

Chapter Three: In the Names of the Nation

Nationalism then is not the solution to the puzzle but the discourse within which struggles to settle the question are most commonly waged.[97]

Craig Calhoun, 1997

I. Introduction

The previous chapter reveals the surprising difficulties of applying the concepts and frameworks of nationalism studies to understanding how nationalism may change in a peaceful, stable, and wealthy democracy such as postwar Japan. Utilizing insights from scholars critiquing the nationalism literature since the end of the Cold War, this chapter develops and justifies a way of examining nationalism capable of both identifying its presence and assessing degrees of its change over time in this important subset of cases. The central assertion is that nationalism should be viewed as a discourse that incorporates competing claims made in the name of the "nation" on the state. The chief form these claims take is narrative and in practice may be observed as oft-repeated stories that establish the "nation" as an historical protagonist that makes normative demands on the state. Changes in these stories and the claims they incorporate may thus be viewed as change in nationalism and explaining these changes is thus

---

[97] Calhoun, 1997, p.76.

the key to understanding how nationalism evolves in contemporary cases in which both complex

economies and democratic governments are well-established.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces and justifies the

approach to nationalism adopted here to examine its change in postwar Japan. The key aspect

of this approach is conceptionalizing nationalism as a discursive form with multiple strands that

can change over time, which allows it to be viewed as a set of competing narratives that make

different claims on state power and serve as varying points of identification for their target

audiences. The third section develops a method for operationalizing nationalism by assessing

change in the frequency with which these claims are advanced in specific areas of the public

sphere as well as the level of contestation they evoke among key opinion-makers. The fourth

section introduces the key concepts of narrative change, discursive strategies, and institutional

association and the final section applies them to generate three hypotheses for understanding one

type of change in nation-state narratives, declines in prominence over time.

II. Nationalism as a Discourse

The approach to nationalism adopted in this study treats it as a *discourse*. In general, a

discourse can be understood as "language enacted in time, with an empirical subject, referent and

interlocutor."[98] More specifically, a particular strand of discourse is distinguished by the specific conventions that govern it, including common terminology, linguistic structures, standards for argumentation, and frequently-made assumptions about the world and its problems. Discourses should not be seen as mere "language" or a set of isolated statements. Instead, "they are statements that are enacted within the social context and determined by that social context."[99] Discourses are thus not only conventions of language and the ideas they express but also "institutions and structures, every day practices as well as specialized rituals, all of which constitute social relationships."[100] Through institutionalization and the repetition of daily practice, discourses become rooted in social life and organization and thus a source of legitimacy. It is this grounding in institutions, organizations and practices that thwarts powerful groups from freely creating and altering discourses to suit their interests and goals. Although the powerful can at times use discourse as a tool to further their influence or interests, as Michel Foucault observes, discourses are also "a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy."[101] The need to conserve the legitimacy of the discourse, which at any time is the product of inputs from and past compromises among various sectors of society,

---

[98] Schull, 1992, p.731.

[99] Özkirimli, 2010.

[100] Özkirimli, 2010, p.207. Here, Özkirimli cites a paraphrase of Joan Scott from Roseberry, 1996, p.72.

[101] Foucault cited in Özkirimli, 2010, p.213.

is thus a constraining factor on its manipulation. It is for this reason that discourses represent a tangible, measurable indicator of the status quo of social-constructed reality.

Although discourses do indicate underlying ways of thinking about and interpreting the world and tend to be presented as a set of "common sense" notions, it is argued here that they do not have a comprehensive power to structure and limit thought. Rather, following Joseph Schull, "A discourse is not necessarily prior to and constitutive of individual beliefs. The relationship between the two is rather a matter for empirical investigation, which...demonstrates the possibility of thinking and believing outside of the terms of given discourse."[102] In this view, a discourse is thus "something with which its adherents must contend, rather than a force which subjects them to its implacable 'will.'"[103]

Drawing on the work of Foucault, Craig Calhoun was among the first scholars to argue that nationalism is best treated as a discursive formation, or "a way of speaking that shapes our consciousness."[104] To Calhoun, the elements of this discourse reflects a way of thinking: "'Nation,' is a particular way of thinking about what it means to be a people, and how the people thus defined might fit into a broader world-system. The nationalist way of thinking and speaking helps to make nations."[105]

---

[102] Schull, 1992, p.729.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Calhoun, 1997, p.3. For examples of other scholars who advocate this approach to nationalism, see Özkirimli, 2000, 2005, 2010; Finlayson, 1998; Suny, 2001; and Somers, 1994.
[105] Calhoun, 1997, p.99.

Adopting the discourse approach opens up possibilities for relocating the place of social identity conceptions in nationalism. Billig pithily summarizes his view of the relationship between nationalism, identity and discourse: "To have a national identity is to possess ways of talking about nationhood."[106] In their critique of the use of identity in the social sciences, Brubaker and Cooper argue for the need to break down the concept into three clusters of terms, the first of which they label "Identification and Categorization."[107] Identification means "to characterize oneself, to locate oneself vis-à-vis known others, to situate oneself in a narrative, to place oneself in a category—in any number of different contexts."[108] In addition, Brubaker and Cooper specify nationality as a categorical mode of identification, whereby one identifies oneself or another person "by membership in a class of persons, sharing some categorical attribute."[109] In addition to nationality, identifications with such categories, referred to here as social categories, include race, ethnicity, and citizenship, among others. According to Brubaker, the 'nation' is a categorical term in which one may classify oneself (i.e. identity with) or be so classified by others (i.e. identified as) rather than a collectivity or communal entity, and nationalism is "a particular language, a political idiom, a way of using that word or category."[110] Put succinctly, "nationhood is not an ethno-demographic or ethno-cultural fact; it is a political

---

[106] Billig, 1995, p.7.
[107] Brubaker, 2004a, p.41.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid., p.42.
[110] Ibid.

claim."[111]   In this view, nationalism is therefore a means of political argumentation that seeks to advance and legitimize claims on both its target members and their governing institutions.

Following the above logic, in the context of a contemporary, post-industrial democracy like Japan, nationalist claims might take the form of a demand to reassess or reaffirm the boundaries of the social category known as the 'nation,' for example, by allowing the incorporation of a new immigrant group or alternately emphasizing the legitimacy of their continued exclusion.   In addition, claims might be made vis-à-vis the state, including demands that governing institutions or policies better reflect the character, values or interests of the 'nation.'   As the social category of the 'nation' does not exist outside of the words used to describe it, the approach adopted here treats it not as a category of analysis but rather as the object of analysis.   In this way, nationalism can be viewed as a discourse, an ongoing argument over the boundaries of and meaning for political action of a particular social category.

To differentiate nationalism, or nationalist discourse, from other forms of discourse, it is first necessary to specify what type of discourse it is.   Nationalism is discourse that constructs and reconstructs a social category.   Expanding on the discussion above, categorical identification/differentiation occurs when, after being exposed through language, symbols or rituals, one either identifies with or differentiates oneself from a social category—a set of claims

---

[111] Brubaker, 2004b, p.116.

that the possession of a certain attribute or attributes qualifies one for membership in a specific

social grouping within a larger universe of such possible classification.   Social categories are

thus composed of claims about what constitutes a categorical attribute.   These claims may take

several forms: normative claims, cognitive claims, relational comparisons and social purposes.

Much of the content of social categories is inherently normative and value-laden and

should thus be regarded as idealized rules of social life, or *norms*.[112]   Irrespective of their

impact on thought or action, norms may be analyzed as *words* that can be distinguished by their

structure, content and targets.[113]   First, as linguistic conventions, norms have the formal

structure of a syllogism.[114] Second, norms have three varieties of content.   Prescriptions

demand a state or action.[115]   Proscriptions rule out a state or action.[116]   Permissions declare

that a state or action is neither prescribed nor prohibited, as in the case of a right.[117]   While the

first two varieties are associated with highly exclusive social categories such as nationality or

ethnicity, permissions are more likely to appear in discourses of more inclusive categories, such

as citizenship, although, as will be discussed below, these discourses overlap.   Finally, as with

---

[112] This definition is adapted from Goertz (2003).

[113] This definition is adapted from Goertz (2003) and Kratochwil (1989).

[114] This follows Goertz (2003).   A syllogism is a three-part logical construction beginning with a general proposition (major premise) followed by a specific assertion (minor premise) and then a conclusion that combines the two in a valid statement.   In practice, they are often abbreviated as "if-then" statements in which the "if" is followed by a specific assertion and the "then" by a combination of a general proposition and conclusion.

[115] Examples include "If one's mother is Japanese, one is (should be considered) Japanese" and "If one is Japanese, one eats (should eat) with chopsticks."

[116] Examples include "If one's mother is American, one is (should not be considered) Japanese" and "If one is Japanese, one does not (should not) eat with a fork."

[117] One example is "If one is an American, one may vote in US presidential elections."

all elements of discourse, norms are directed at particular target actors.   In the case of

nationalist discourse, a normative claim will always be directed at one of two possible targets

and sometimes both simultaneously: Individuals that the claimant asserts should identify with

the category being constructed (e.g. "co-nationals) and/or a territorial state (e.g. "nation-state")

over which the claimant demands domain in the name of the same category.[118]

Adopting terminology developed by Gary Goertz, two types of normative claims may

constitute a social category.[119]   First, *ontological norms* specify the existential attributes of

social categories.   With regard to ethnic or national categories, for example, Chandra has noted,

these attributes tend to be "associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent, rather than

those [attributes] adopted voluntarily in one's lifetime."[120]   They may derive from genetic

legacies (skin color, height, hair type, etc.) or from the real or imagined pasts of one's parents

(their religion, place of origin, etc.).   As linguistic conventions, ontological norms often contain

some form of the verb "to be" in their conclusion.   For example, "if one's mother is Japanese,

one *is* (should be considered) Japanese" might be offered as an ontological claim specifying a

categorical attribute for the national category "Japanese." Second, *behavioral norms* assign

standards of behavior that also define membership in social categories.   For example, "If one is

---

[118] Please note that a single normative claim may be directed at multiple targets.   For example, the assertion that if one is Japanese, one should serve in Japan's Self-Defense Force may be simultaneous directed at putative co-nationals to join the armed services as well as to the Japanese government to reintroduce universal conscription.
[119] Goertz, 2003.
[120] Chandra, 2004a, p.11.

French, one speaks (should speak) French fluently" is an example of a behavioral norm that might be presented as a categorical attribute for the national category "French." With regard to national categories, behavioral norms may range from relatively simple claims on putative members of a particular national category to take part in specific ceremonial activities (e.g. sing the national anthem, salute the flag, etc.) to complex claims on the state to pursue policies or take actions that reflect the asserted character, interests and values of the national category in question.

Cognitive claims comprise a second integral element in the construction of social categories. Sometimes referred to as "cognitive models," these claims establish ontological and epistemological frameworks that interpret or "make sense" of social and material conditions by providing "explanations of how the world works as well as descriptions of the social reality" confronting those who identify with the social category in question.[121] For example, a central cognitive component common to all national categories is the understanding that everyone is a member of "a nation in a world of nations."[122] In this way, the very claim to being "Japanese" thus simultaneously places the claimant in a national category while necessarily recognizing the existence of other such categories.[123] As an object of study, national categories are thus

---

[121] Abdelal, et.al, 2006, p.13.

[122] Billig, 1995, p.61; Smith 2001, p.22.

[123] It is for this reason that various "naming conventions" observed in the nationalist discourse, such as the ways of referring to the nation-state (e.g. "peace state," "civilized state," etc.) in the narratives explored in this study, are treated as cognitive components.

distinguished by their cognitive claims to be both exclusive, in that membership in one national

category precludes membership in another, and exhaustive, in that all humans must be a member

of one such category.[124] It is through this cognitive operation, as well as the cognitive claims

about the past discussed below, that national categories attain their claims to "naturalness."

A second type of cognitive claim, sometimes referred to as a "cultural schema,"

presents a narrative account of a past (real or imagined) event or sequence of events, especially

those that are thought pivotal to the social category in question.[125] The account of the past here

is meant to provide a causal model for thinking about and interpreting current and future

developments of relevance to the social category. With regard to nationalist discourse, one

such example is Roger Petersen's account of "Lithuanian martyrdom," a recurring Cold War

narrative in which Lithuanians are portrayed as a small people whose only recourse is to

continue to resist Soviet oppression in order to awaken the West into action. Here, a causal

sequence is established whereby, despite past failures, continued Lithuanian sacrifice leads to

their eventual emancipation, allowing the "dwarf to become a giant."[126] Causal attribution is

thus the essential cognitive element here. Klandermans concludes, "[T]his element [causal

---

[124] Note that Abdelal, et. al (2006, p.11) cite scholarship arguing that relational comparisons (see below) are the
means through which the degree of exclusivity is determined for social categories.   The assertion here is that the
claim of exclusivity is a cognitive component of national categories that relational comparisons may be used to
highlight. For related discussion on this point regarding ethnicity as a social category, see Chandra & Wilkinson
(2008, p.517).
[125] Petersen, 2005, p.132.
[126] Petersen, 2005, p.136.

attribution] is related to the construction of a cognitive schema which comprises causes and solutions for the adverse situation."[127]

A third form that nationalist discourse can take involves comparisons across social categories and has been described as the "discursive formulations of the relations between groups of people that compose social reality."[128]   These comparisons may include such rhetorical conventions as statements about the relative inferiority or superiority (in status terms) of one category in relation to another (priority) and the level of friendliness or antagonism between two social categories (valence).[129]   In nationalist discourse, national categories are generally portrayed superior to all other categories (national or otherwise), and often feature recurring portrayals of "other" social categories, including but not limited to "other" national categories, as allies or enemies.   In particular, the claim of ultimate superiority vis-à-vis other social categories is one of the factors that helps distinguish nationalist discourse from other types of social category-building discourses.

The final convention highlighted here is what has been called "social purposes."[130]   In short, these are goals that are rhetorically attached to social categories.   In discursive terms,

---

[127] Cited in Abdelal, et al., (2006, p.14).   Japanese nationalist discourse abounds with historical narratives that make claims on both co-nationals and the state.   For example, one prominent such convention is the narrative linking of the suffering caused by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the claim that the Japanese nation, and thus its state, have a special mission to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world. See the discussion of the peace state narrative in the next chapter.

[128] Abdelal, et al., 2006, p.11.

[129] Ibid.

[130] Ibid., pp.9-11.

social purposes are often expressed as common sense notions about what the members of the

social category in question want to accomplish together. Rawi Abdelal and his coauthors argue

that social purposes differ from norms in that norms (behavioral) make claims on members to

engage in activities that constitute the social category in question (and thus qualify them as

members), while social purposes call on members to do things to make the achievement of a goal

associated with the category more likely.[131] In practice, especially when examining nationalist

discourses, the more specific the goal, the more difficult it becomes to make this distinction.

This is because the normative claims made in the name of national category construction are

generally presented as idealized notions whose obligations are valued as goals in and of

themselves. To maintain this distinction, the social purposes examined in the case of postwar

Japan are limited to highly-generalized goals such as peace, prosperity, or security. In addition,

it should be noted that nationalist discourse tends to stress the importance of social purposes

such as autonomy, which reflects the discourse's pervasive concern for national independence

and state sovereignty, and status, which reflects its emphasis on the superiority of the national

category over other social categories.

What makes a social category "national" and the discourse that supports it "nationalist?"

As shown in the review of nationalism studies, attempts to define nationalism always encounter

---

[131] Ibid., p.9.

problems specifying the root concept of 'nation.' Some (Van den Berghe) insist on defining the term as a set of objective criteria, while others specify it in purely subjective, voluntary terms (Renan) and still others a combination of both (Smith). The failure of over a hundred years of scholarship to arrive at a widely agreed upon definition suggests the benefit of taking a different path. Following Brubaker, the approach here rejects such attempts to define the 'nation' as an "ethno-demographic or ethno-cultural fact."[132]

Instead, the nation is understood here as the social category (hereafter referred to as a national category) that is continually produced and reproduced via the discourse of nationalism (hereafter referred to as nationalist discourse). In this way, nationalism may be defined by the characteristic features of its discourse. More specifically, nationalism is defined here as *the discursive process in which a social category is continually constructed and reconstructed primarily from cognitive claims about the present and past of the category as well as prescriptive and proscriptive normative claims on the behavioral and existential attributes of both the individuals claimants target to identify with the category and a territorial state over which claimants demand domain in the name of the category. The resulting category is asserted by claimants to be highly exclusive, superior to all other categories, and strongly*

---

[132] Brubaker, 2004a, 2004b.

associated with the social purposes of autonomy and status. In this approach, nationalism, as a

discourse, makes nations, as a social category.

Especially with regard to casework on contemporary, post-industrial democracies with

stable regimes, it is necessary to clarify the relationship between nationalist discourse and the

overlapping discourses of citizenship and ethnicity. These latter two discourses both construct

social categories whose normative claims may also be incorporated in national categories. For

example, Kanchan Chandra, among other scholars of ethnicity, argues that ethnicity is a subset

of the social categories "in which membership is determined by descent-based attributes."[133] In

her understanding, these attributes "are restricted to one's own genetically transmitted features or

to the language, religion, place of origin, tribe, region, caste, clan, *nationality*, or race of one's

parents and ancestors."[134] Although offered here as a categorical attribute of ethnicity, this is

also consistent with the "Japanese mother" syllogism cited above as an example of an

ontological norm used to determine membership in a national category. Similarly, although

Margaret Somers argues that citizenship should mainly be seen as a discourse about "the right to

have rights" that focuses on the rights of membership in a political community and inclusion in

civil society, she also notes that civic discourse can be a "cold instrument of exclusion" to those

---

[133] Chandra, 2006, p.400.
[134] Ibid., emphasis added.

outside the borders of the nation-state as a consequence of its intimate relationship with

nationalism and xenophobia.[135]

The fact of this overlap has been acknowledged at least since Kohn developed the

blueprint for the typology of civic and ethnic nationalism. Brubaker, among other scholars,

argues against the usefulness of this typology as it is entirely dependent on how one treats

culture in making the distinction.[136] For instance, if ethnicity is strictly defined as pertaining

only to descent, then there are virtually no empirical cases of ethnic nationalism. However, if

an allowance is made for ethno-cultural factors, then nearly all nationalisms in the world are of

the ethnic variety. Accordingly, if cultural elements are excluded from understandings of civic

nationalism, the phenomenon is defined out of existence. The key problem is the inherent

ambiguity of ethnicity, citizenship and their relationships with nationalism.

In the approach adopted here, nationalism is neither exclusively civic nor ethnic. The

degree to which the discourses of nationalism, citizenship and ethnicity overlap in any particular

case is left as a matter of empirical inquiry. However, to the extent that distinctions can be

made, Table 1 below summarizes the major differences and similarities among the key

conventions used to specify social categories in the three discourses. Although this does not

---

[135] Somers, 2008, pp.5-6.
[136] Brubaker, 2004a, pp.136-138.

extricate nationalism from the other two discourses, it does provide a guide to assess where their

overlap is most likely to occur.

Table 3.1: Nationality, Citizenship and Ethnicity

Convention	Social Category		
	Nationality	*Citizenship*	*Ethnicity*
Norm Content	Prescriptions, Proscriptions	Permissions, Prescriptions, Proscriptions	Prescriptions, Proscriptions
Norm Target	Individual & State	Individual & State	Individual
Norm Type	Ontological, Behavioral	Ontological, Behavioral	Ontological
Cognitive Exclusivity[137]	Exclusive	Varies	Varies
Cognitive Exhaustiveness[138]	Exhaustive	Varies	Varies
Cognitive	Varies	Varies	Varies

---

[137] This term refers to the cognitive claim that national categories are exclusive.
[138] This term refers to the cognitive claim that everyone has a nationality.

80

Causality[139]			
Relational Priority[140]	Highest	Varies	Varies
Associated Purpose	Autonomy, Status	Equality	Varies

Nationalism may be studied as a discourse in a variety of ways. The approach introduced here focuses on narratives within the nationalist discourse. This emphasis on narratives is explained and justified as follows.

A narrative is a story that orders "events" into an understandable causal sequence. According to Schudson, a narrative is "a story with a beginning, middle and end, with an original state of equilibrium, a disruption, and a resolution, with a protagonist and obstacles in his or her way and efforts to overcome them."[141] Narratives differ from other discursive conventions in that they combine the following elements: 1) defined actors (collective or individual); 2) roles associated with these actors; 3) a putatively causal sequence of events; and 4) a narrator's perspective.[142] The teller of a narrative fulfills the same part as the narrator of a play, including introducing characters and describing events and the characters' responses to them, while all the time presenting normative claims as matters of fact or the judgments of history. Aesop's fables

---

[139] This term refers to the presence or absence of causal attribution through the use of cognitive claims such as "cultural schema."

[140] This term refers to the level of priority assigned the social category in relation to other social categories by discursive conventions (e.g. through relational comparisons, etc.).

[141] Schudson, 1995, p.355; cited in Petersen (2005, p.135).

[142] This understanding of narratives is adapted from Patterson & Monroe (1998, pp.315-6); Somers (1994, pp.616-7). It has also been influenced by Cruz's (2000) concept of a dominant rhetorical frame and Petersen's (2005) concept of a cultural schema.

are examples of narratives, as are many biblical stories (Good Samaritan, Tower of Babel, etc.).

Most importantly for the purposes of this project, narratives are also one of the most prominent conventions used in nationalist discourse.

Social science scholarship on narratives has identified several types, but the focus here will be on "collective" or "public" narratives.[143] Public narratives are "stories attached to cultural or institutional formations larger than a single individual."[144] The most commonly cited public narratives are those that tell the story of a "nation."[145] The protagonists of these stories are collective actors ("the nation") with a common origin and history. The stories often (although not always) begin with the origin of the nation and then proceed to relate the story of how it responded to one or more historical challenges. Nationalist narratives generally conclude with the nation in one of two conditions: 1) an improved position presented by the narrator as proper and admirable; or 2) a worsened position presented by the narrator as unjust and deplorable. Designed to mobilize target audiences around collective goals, nationalist narratives seek to elicit emotional responses. These include pride in the nation's past or ongoing achievements, anger at the nation's past or ongoing mistreatment, and fear that past negative outcomes may be revisited on the nation if it is not sufficiently vigilant.

---

[143] For a discussion of other types of narratives, see Patterson & Monroe, 1998, p.325-6; Somers, 1994, p.618.
[144] Somers, 1994, p.618.
[145] Steinmetz, 1992, p.491.

Sociologists argue narratives help constitute national categories by making cognitive and normative claims on their audiences.[146]   Weaved throughout nationalist narratives, these claims are usually readily apparent to the audience as either the "lessons" of the story or "common sense" notions presented as beyond dispute by the narrator.   In this way, narratives constitute national categories in three ways: 1) they contain/impart cognitive claims about how the world works in relation to the national category, including claims of exclusivity and exhaustiveness and understandings about causality; 2) they contain/impart normative claims specifying the existential attributes and standards of behavior defining membership in the national category; and 3) they contain/impart normative claims on state institutions made in the name of the national category.   Put more colloquially, narratives answer the following questions for their audiences: 1) What is/should be a nation? 2) Who is/should be our nation and what does/should it do?; and 3) How does/should the state reflect our nation?   The third question, in particular, is a prominent feature of narratives defining the "nation-state" and represents the principle rhetorical opening through which national categories are projected onto the institutions of the state.

Three things make narratives a particularly attractive focal point for studying changes in the nationalist discourse of a contemporary democracy like postwar Japan.   First, a single

---

[146] Somers, 1994; Sewell, 1992.

83

narrative can contain multiple aspects of the content of nationalist discourse outlined above, especially the cognitive and normative claims of national categories. In this sense, examining changes in a set of frequently referenced nationalist narratives is an efficient way to grasp how the broader discourse of nationalism may be changing for cases in which open public spheres generate enormous amounts of potentially relevant discourse. Second, nationalist narratives are in essence representations of the national category as a complete short story with a beginning, middle, and end. Brevity thus limits their focus to only a few related topics. This limitation frees the speaker from having to reconcile the story with competing or conflicting elements of other narratives and thus makes the narrative form a likely place to find both inconsistencies and points of contestation within the nationalist discourse of a single state. Finally, the common structure of the narrative form facilitates comparisons across different narratives, even in instances where there seems little in common between the narratives in question.

The discourse approach adopted here differs from the other approaches introduced above in important ways. First, it takes nationalism out of the realm of psychology. Much recent scholarship has argued that identification with a national category is not a single psychological state. This leads to the conclusion that understanding how such national categories change requires first breaking them down into their constitutive parts.[147] To do this, it is necessary to

---

[147] Billig, 1995, p.60; Brubaker, 2004a, pp.42-8; Abdelal, et al., 2006.

explore their concrete manifestations, such as the specific meanings given them as social categories. A discourse is one of the most concrete manifestations of these "inter-subjective" categories available to the social sciences. Discourse simply cannot be the property of a single individual's mind. Instead, it is a set of rhetorical practices that only occur in social space, thus rendering them easily observable and accessible to analysis.

Second, treating nationalism as a discourse frees one from the need to assign normative or cognitive beliefs to actors merely by assumption. Which beliefs are held by particular actors and to what extent they have been internalized then become empirical questions. This move presents several advantages. First, it allows the examination of hypotheses about change that differ on the importance of belief. For example, one could consider how diverse factions may support the same strand of nationalist discourse even though they hold different beliefs and even different interpretations of the discourse itself. Similarly, this approach allows for the possibility that change may emerge from the debates held among nationalists themselves. Freed from the assumption of shared belief, one can explore the possibility of endogenous change by analyzing how actors reformulate and shape nationalist discourse, particularly in specifying how narratives constitute national categories. Even if one assumes internalization is essential for nationalism to affect political outcomes, it seems reasonable to consider the possibility that efforts to reshape national categories may occur during periods in which

nationalist beliefs have yet to be internalized or have somehow failed to reproduce themselves successfully.

Third, recent scholarship argues forcefully that beliefs are less important than public discourse in shaping both social categories and action. For example, referring to social identities, Chandra asserts, "it is the names that we give ourselves, or are given by others, which give our identity a concrete reality and also becomes the basis for social action."[148] Viewed this way, the relationship between national categories and nationalists is transformed. Rather than assuming that internalized beliefs are the primary impetus for social action, the discursive approach views social action as constrained by the rhetorical conventions commonly applied to public discussions of social identities. These conventions are thus seen as placing constraints on how actors may promote their visions of the nation. As Skinner notes, "[T]he problem facing an agent who wishes to legitimate what he is doing at the same time as gaining what he wants cannot simply be the instrumental problem of tailoring his normative language in order to fit his projects. It must in part be the problem of tailoring his projects to fit the available normative language."[149] In other words, in order to be taken seriously, a would-be reformer must show respect for the existing rhetorical conventions of the nationalist discourse. Although

---

[148] Chandra, 2004a, p.3.
[149] Skinner, 1978, pp.xii-xiii.

this does not preclude challenging some of those conventions, it does place limits on the ability

of reformers to push for wholesale change.

Since actors need not "believe" in the conventions of the nationalist discourse to

participate in it, innovation from within the ranks of these participants should be viewed as a

likely potential avenue for change. Although participants may be affected by the need to

respect certain conventions, they are free to think "outside the box" and may thus attempt to

manipulate nationalist discourse in response to concerns or beliefs that have nothing to do with

the discourse itself. In sum, the relationship between discourse and actor is one of relative

autonomy.[150] Actors are limited in their ability to affect wholesale change in discursive

conventions and these conventions are likewise limited in their capacity to constrain the thinking

and actions of actors. Recognizing this relative autonomy opens the door to two forms of

endogenous change that are either ruled out or unnecessarily complicated in other approaches to

nationalism. The first may be called *intentional innovation*, in which agents fluent in a

particular nationalist discourse are able to manipulate its conventions in ways that alter the social

category itself.[151] This form of innovation is constrained by the fact that innovating agents

must draw from the same reservoir of conventions available to potential followers in order to

craft credible alternatives. If innovators depart too far from past conventions, potential

---

[150] The idea of relative autonomy comes from Schull (1992); see also Cruz (2000, p.280).
[151] This technique itself is referred to as *bricolage* by Levi-Strauss. Levi-Strauss, 1974 [1966]; Samuels, 2004.

followers will reject their new discursive formations as unauthentic or illegitimate. In this way, without the intervention of the exogenous factors, category innovation is constrained. The second type of endogenous change, *unintentional innovation*, occurs when national categories change as a consequence of rhetorical conflicts that cannot be attributed to the designs of particular participants.[152] New national categories can thus emerge from the interaction of competing actors struggling to reformulate past conventions into new ways of categorizing the "people" and their relation to the state. It should thus be noted that unintended consequences can be as important in shaping national categories as the best-laid plans of skilled manipulators of the discourse.

Finally, it should be noted that behavioral norms are sometimes excluded or downplayed by scholars studying social categories.[153] This is likely because they see cognitive models or ontological norms as the defining elements of the social categories in which they are interested and fear the inclusion of behavioral norms adds unnecessary ambiguity. This view is rejected here for several reasons. First, while cognitive claims are important in initially establishing boundary lines, a function which can in and of itself shape attitudes toward social action (e.g. attitudes toward those defined as outsiders, views on immigration or minority protection policies, etc.), behavioral norms establish an even more direct connection between

---

[152] This type of endogenous change is discussed in Cruz (2000) and Brubaker (2004a).
[153] Ibid.

some social categories, especially national ones, and social action. Whether aimed at the behavior of individuals, state institutions, or both, behavioral norms do much of the work that fleshes out the categorical place-holders established by cognitive claims and place them in motion. In essence, their role in constituting social categories gives them the symbolic power to legitimate certain actions or to de-legitimate others. Usually presenting behavioral norms as the appropriate actions demanded by the cognitive "lessons" of their narratives, advocates argue violating them is tantamount to denying one's membership in the national category when the target is the co-national or to denying the fundamental nature of the nation when the target is the state. When nationalist narratives affect political outcomes, behavioral norms can thus be essential links.

Second, and more importantly, behavioral norms often carry meaning that ontological norms do not. Ontological norms are often claims about descent-based attributes that, while placing an individual inside a social category, do not necessarily offer a full picture of what that membership means. For example, is the national category "warlike" or "peaceful?" Are "we" "hard-working" or "fun-loving?" These questions cannot be answered directly by reference to ontological norms but can be derived from the behavioral norms embedded in nationalist narratives.

III. Methodology

Viewing nationalism as a discourse with specific characteristics and narratives as its preferred vehicle helps narrow the focus somewhat, but the nationalist discourse of a contemporary, post-industrial democracy like postwar Japan is both broad and deep. For example, one recent work on Japanese nationalism, anthropologist Brian McVeigh's *Nationalisms of Japan*, identified over fifteen different domains of Japanese nationalism, each containing multiple national identity conceptions, for a total of more than sixty recognizable identity categories.[154]

Theoretical considerations and research interests can help reduce this unmanageable number. For example, theorists have categorized two broad types of nationalism, formal and informal: "*Formal nationalism* is connected with the demands of the modern nation-state, including bureaucratic organization and meritocratic ideology, cultural uniformity and political consensus among the inhabitants. *Informal nationalism* is identified in collective events, such as ritual celebrations and international sports competitions, taking place in civil society."[155] As a work of political science, the main interest here is in how nationalism relates to political outcomes, and the focus thus limited to cases of formal nationalism, which place the nexus of nation-state interaction in the policies and structures of the state.

---

[154] McVeigh, 2004, p.5.
[155] Eriksen, 1993, p.1.

Transcribed into the terms of this study, the focus is placed on narratives of national

categories that make at least some cognitive and normative claims on the state. In this regard,

these narratives are best referred to as *nation-state narratives*, as they focus on explicating a set

of demands on the state in the name of the national category. For example, one sub-narrative

examined here builds on the cognitive claim that Japan as "the world's only nuclear-victim state"

(*yūitsu no hibakukoku*) to forward to normative claims on the Japanese state's security policy

institutions: the proscription against the state acquiring/developing/ introducing nuclear weapons

and the prescription for the state to push nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Both

claims target state behavior in the name of the national category. Limiting the focus to

nation-state narratives eliminates more than half of the entries on McVeigh's list of national

categories.

The next obvious move is to try to narrow down the remaining list to the most "salient."

To do this, two types of sources were surveyed. First, works by self-proclaimed nationalists

from across the political spectrum were reviewed.[156] These ranged from Murayama Masao on

the left to Ishihara Shintarō on the right. In addition, the secondary literature on postwar and

---

[156] Abe, 2006; Amaya, 1980; Asahi Shimbun, 2006; Etō, 1991; Fujiwara, 2005; Funabashi, 1991-2; Hatoyama, 1957; Ishihara, 1999, 2006; Ishihara & Morita, 1989; Ito, 2001; Katō, 1997; Kawakatsu, 1997, 2000, 2006; Keidanren, 2007; Kishi, 1983; Kitaoka, 1999a; Kobayashi, 1999; Kobayashi & Nishibe, eds., 2002; Murayama, 1953, 1963, 1995 [1961], 2000 [1986]; Matsumoto, 1995, 1999; Mishima, 1969, 1990 [1966]; Miyazawa, 1997; Nakasone, 1997; Nishio, 1999; Oe, 1981; Okamoto & Tahara, 2003; Okazaki, 2001, 2004, 2006; Ozawa, 2005 [1993]; Tamogami, 2008; Umesao, 2003.

prewar Japanese nationalism was consulted, including works by historians, political scientists, anthropologists and sociologists.[157]   Among those found present in these materials, nation-state narratives were selected for study based on the following criteria: 1) Each pertains to a set of state institutions that exert authority over symbols or objects commonly cited as important in the construction of systems of national identification in the nationalism literature, such as the monarchy or ethnic affiliation, exports and technology, the military and nuclear weapons, social protection and traditional culture, and the constitution and regime type; 2) Each links the national category to the state in a policy-relevant area of interest to political science, such as immigration policy, trade policy, technology policy, security policy, welfare policy, electoral policy, and constitutional practice; and 3) The chosen narratives provide variation in terms of pre-war legacies, with some having longer histories in Japan than others, a distinction that makes it possible to consider if such longevity is a factor in sustaining the narratives over time.

These reviews uncovered five often recurring nation-state narratives that leverage forms of the national category "Japanese" to make normative claims on the postwar Japanese state. Within these five narratives, some may be broken down further into related but slightly distinct

[157] Asaba, 2004; Befu, 1992, 2001; Berger, 1993, 1998; Breen, 2008; Brown, 1955; Bukh, 2010; Clammer, 2001; Corning, 2004; Doak, 1994, 1996, 2007; Dower, 1995, 1999, 2003; Eizawa, 2001; Fukuoka, 2000; Gao, 1998; Gayle, 2002; Hara, 2001; Hashikawa, 1968; Hein, 2008; Ienaga, 1979, 1993-1994; Iida, 2001; Inoue, 2007; Kang, 2001; Katzenstein, 1996a; Kayama, 2004; Kersten, 1996; Kingston, 2004, 2011; Kisala, 1999; Kitada, 2005; Leheny, 2006; Matthews, 2003; McCormack, 2002, 2007; McVeigh, 2001, 2004; Mizuno, 2009; Morris, 1960; Morris-Suzuki, 1998; Nathan, 2004; Noguchi, 1976; Oguma, 1998, 2002a, 2002b; Orr, 2001; Pyle, 2007; Samuels, 1994, 2003a, 2007; Siniawer, 2008; Skya, 2009; Smethurst, 1974; Takahashi, 2005; Tamamoto, 2001, 2003; Togo, 2005; Watanabe, 2001; Winkler, 2011; Yamada, 2001; Yoshino, 1992, 1997a, 1998.

sub-narratives (such as "nuclear-victim state" above). The narratives are summarized briefly

below.

Japan is a *trading state*.[158] Confined to a few small islands with little natural resources, the

Japanese people are a trading nation that must rely on their innate abilities (mercantile acumen

and technological prowess) to add value to imported raw materials and export in order to survive.

Their state and its policies should reflect this fundamental nature. This narrative contains two

sub-narratives, the *merchant state*, which emphasizes the need for trade, and the

technology-based country, which emphasizes the need for domestic technological development.

Japan is an *organic state*.[159] The Japanese people are a single descent-based ("ethnic")

nation whose natural bond is symbolized by the Imperial family and manifested in a common

moral code and set of religious traditions. They demand that their state and its policies reflect

this organic unity. This is the predominant narrative of rightwing politics in postwar Japan.

Japan is a *peace state*.[160] The Japanese people are a peace-loving nation that regrets the

actions of the Japanese state during World War Two, mourns its own tragic losses, and vows

never again to allow its state to freely use violence as a means of settling international disputes.

Their state and its policies should reflect this fundamental nature. This narrative contains two

---

[158] Amaya, 1980; Gao, 1998; Samuels, 1994; Yamada, 2001.
[159] Oguma, 2002a; Befu, 2001; Takahashi, 2005; Hardacre, 1989.
[160] Boyd & Samuels, 2005; Yamamoto, 2004; Orr, 2001.

sub-narratives, the *peace-loving state,* which emphasizes war regret and the need to constrain the state from military pursuits and, the *anti-nuclear state,* which emphasizes the uniqueness of Japan's experience as the world's only victim of a nuclear attack and demands on the state to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons on the one hand and to promote worldwide nuclear disarmament on the other.

Japan is a *civilized state.*[161] The Japanese people are a highly civilized nation and place great weight on ensuring their cultural and artistic development. They expect their state both to promote artistic endeavors and to guarantee the basic welfare of its people. This narrative comprises two sub-narratives, the *cultured state,* which emphasizes the high level of Japanese culture and the need to encourage the state to support cultural exchange, and the *welfare state,* which emphasizes the need for the state to guarantee the basic welfare of its people.

Japan is a *democratic state.*[162] The Japanese people are a "civic" nation that loves freedom and naturally follow democratic principles. Their state and its policies should reflect this fundamental nature.

Although this list should not be considered exhaustive, it captures the major nation-state narratives of nationalist discourse in postwar Japan. It should also be noted all except

---

[161] Yoshino, 1997a.
[162] Oguma, 2002b; Kersten, 1996.

democratic state appear in some form on McVeigh's list of Japanese national identity conceptions.[163]

With a set of national categories and their corresponding nation-state narratives selected, the next task is to develop a means of measuring their change over time. The main methodology adopted for this analysis is a niched approach that uses quantitative and qualitative content analysis on a representative sample of discourse to uncover major trends and developments over the postwar period and then in-depth case study methods to search for the causes of observed changes.

For the purposes of content analysis, each nation-state narrative can be broken down into three constitutive parts. The first, and most obvious, are terms used to name the nation-state.[164] In Japanese, these terms usually involve adding modifiers to nouns, such as "state" (*kokka*) or "founding/basis of a country" (*rikkoku*). "Peace state" (*heiwa kokka*), "technology-based state" (*gijutsu rikkoku*) and "civilized state" (*bunka kokka*) all fit this pattern. A second element are cognitive schema that include assumptions about the world the Japanese nation currently confronts and/or refer to a particular challenge it faced in the past. Although postwar narratives are dominated by allusions to Japan's experiences in World War Two, they also include assertions about the putative origins of the Japanese as an ancient nation (i.e.

---

[163] McVeigh, 2004, p.5.
[164] As noted above, these naming conventions are themselves a form of cognitive claim.

homogenous nation) and the challenges of occupying a resource-poor environment (i.e. technology-based state). The final elements are the norms weaved throughout the narratives, most of which target the state and its policies. Each of these elements was modeled into simple codes, some of which are limited to key-word lists while others are left open for interpretation by human coders.[165]

In addition, codes are included to capture other conventions of nationalist discourse. First, five codes model "social purposes," here understood as the ultimate goals assigned to the nation-state (e.g. prosperity, peace, security, status, and autonomy).[166] Second, other codes cover points of differentiation and images of the Other in order to recover assessments of Japan's relative position vis-à-vis other states (i.e. great power, etc.) as well as perceptions of international organizations, neighboring states (including long-standing bilateral issues such as territorial disputes), and other countries by region. All the draft codes were assembled along with a set of coding rules into the codebook used to train coders to conduct the analysis.

The next step is to find a representative sample of nationalist discourse. Who speaks for the nation and when and where do they do so? Various answers can be given to this question, but scholars studying the construction of national categories tend to agree on at least

---

[165] The individual elements of the five nation-state narratives examined here and their corresponding codes are introduced in detail in the next chapter.
[166] Adelal, et al., 2006.

the following. First, nationalist discourse is largely the domain of "political elites."[167] In

contemporary democratic societies with stable regimes, politicians are the most prominent

purveyors of nationalist discourse, and "top-down" approaches to national category construction

must be considered. However, in democratic societies, "bottom-up" routes to social category

construction may also be observed by examining public debates among national political elites,

as the national categories offered by politicians must pass muster with their constituencies.[168]

In addition, a free press can be expected to vigorously interject itself in such debates, adding key

"non-official" voices, which may also reflect those of leaders from both industry and civil

society. Thus, the discourses of political leaders, from both the government and opposition,

and opinion leaders in the media are vital sources for assessing the status quo of the major

nation-state narratives at even given point as well as how they change over time.

Second, there is broad consensus among nationalism scholars that the most widely

disseminated discourses should receive the bulk of researchers' attention.[169] For example, if

---

[167] For agreement on the notion that elite discourse is the central stage of national identity construction, see Hroch (1985), Art (2006), and Samuels (2003a). My understanding of "political elite" follows the loose definition offered by Putnam (1971, p.651): "those who in any society rank toward the top of the (presumably closely inter-correlated) dimensions of interest, involvement and influence in politics." Although national politicians (both holders of high offices and leaders of political parties) represent the most important component, a country's political elite also includes opinion leaders in the media (editorialists, editors, political reporters, media company owners and executives, etc.) industry (chief executives of major firms, chairmen of peak industry associations, etc.), and civil society (leaders of civil action groups, etc.). This wider definition will be employed in later chapters as explanations for observed changes in national identities are considered. For the purposes of measuring these changes, however, I will focus on the discourse of a more limited range of elites (see the further discussion on this topic below).

[168] Stuckey, 2004, p.8.

[169] For an example of this technique applied, see Hopf (2002). For guidelines of its use in textual analysis, see Krippendorff (2004, p.116).

novels are seen as a relevant discourse, researchers generally select the best-selling ones for review. Fringe groups often generate interesting and innovative ideas, but when they lack a platform to communicate them to wide audiences, it is difficult to argue that their ideas represent anything that approaches either the societal consensus or the key points of contestation. Even among political elites, the "bully pulpits" afforded by high elective office or large readerships/viewerships, are usually necessary to be a major participant in nationalist discourse.

Still, even if limited to the most broadly disseminated discourses of the national political elite, the amount of potential material for review in a contemporary democracy remains staggering. At this point, random sampling is favored by statistical logics. However, as Krippendorff notes, random sampling techniques should only be employed under the assumption that all units are equally informative regarding the issue under investigation, a situation which is far less likely in textual analysis than in survey research.[170] Are nation-state narratives equally likely to appear in all types of elite discourse? The position adopted here is that they are not and that the recognition of this fundamental inequality points the way to a more economical sampling strategy.

To sample discourses most likely to reflect the status quo of postwar Japanese nationalism, a cluster sampling approach is utilized to take advantage of the natural intersection

---

[170] Krippendorff, 2004, pp.113-4.

of institutional interests with the ceremonial nature of politics.[171]   The clusters of elite discourse

were chosen based on *a priori* assumptions about two things: Whose discourse is most likely to

reflect the status quo on national categories (represented by nation-state narratives) at any given

time and when this discourse is most likely to occur on a regular basis.

The institutional interests most relevant to nationalist discourse are attached to three key

positions in the political marketplace: the leader of the majority coalition in the government, the

leader of the minority coalition in the opposition, and the opinion editors of the largest media

groups.   The individuals who occupy each of these posts in a democratic society face certain

incentives when it comes to discussing national categories.

For leaders of the majority coalition (usually a president or prime minister), the

institutional incentives of their position generally encourage caution in their use of nationalist

discourse.   As managers of the majority (both in government and in society more broadly), they

must be careful not to move beyond national categories that are widely shared among the diverse

elements of their coalitions.   As Mary Stuckey has argued about the American presidency, the

demands of managing the majority make them a "repository of a certain amount of cultural

consensus."[172]   This is not to say that particularly creative prime ministers or presidents will not

---

[171] Cluster sampling is a technique employed when units of analysis are considered unequally informative and cannot be easily enumerated.   It involves identifying large clusters of units of analysis and then sampling them randomly, systematically, stratificationally, or completely (census).   See Krippendorff (2004, p.116-117).
[172] Stuckey, 2004, p.8.

try to forge new societal bonds with their nationalist rhetoric, it is only to note that the incentives they face argue against radical departures from the national categories already adhered to by their winning coalitions. This inherent conservatism makes the speech of the holders of these offices important sources of information on the status quo of nationalist discourse.

Leaders of the minority coalition (usually the leader of the largest opposition party in the national legislature), however, face different institutional incentives. They must promote the national categories particular to their minority base while at the same time attack the government for its failure to sufficiently uphold commitments to the national categories that are shared between the majority and the minority. Their speech is thus an excellent source of information on both national categories supported by only a plurality of the electorate as well as those that are most broadly shared across the voting public.

Opinion editors in the largest media groups face a mixture of the above incentives. Unburdened by electoral pressures and driven to distinguish themselves from competitors, they are more likely to entertain alternative or emerging national categories than their political counterparts. On the other hand, opinion editors also want to maximize sales to the public and advertisers, a mission that is at odds with the promotion of national categories that offend the majority. It is thus unlikely that a major media group would adhere for long to a national category that failed to resonate with at least some relatively large segment of the general public.

The end result of these competing incentives is that major media groups are more likely than leading politicians to engage in the trial-and-error search for new national categories but are not likely to sustain efforts to promote those their readers or viewers broadly reject.

Focusing on the discourses of these three institutionally-constrained sets of players is thus one way to capture the contours of a country's nationalist discourse at any one moment in time. However, prime ministers and presidents communicate to the public on almost a daily basis, giving formal addresses, answering questions at press conferences, and issuing press releases and official statements. Opposition leaders likewise generate steady streams of public statements, while a large media group usually offers multiple editorial commentaries every single day. Yet, only a fraction of this enormous volume of speech and text involves rhetoric relevant to the construction of national categories. The vast majority of political discourse deals with the details of policy-making, the mundane aspects of day-to-day governance or partisan contestation. References to national categories are generally designed to provide emotional backing for policy or political positions that are spelled out in far greater detail (i.e. using many more words) than is devoted to the categorical appeal itself. Even in cases where a major purpose of the communication is the refining or redefining of a national category, references to everyday policy matters or political situations will almost certainly outnumber those relevant to nation-state narratives. How does one then find a representative sample of the

rhetoric of the key players in the construction of these categories even though it is obvious that

not all incidences of their political speech are equally likely to be informative?

When prime ministers or presidents reference national categories, they often abandon

the rhetorical role of a leader speaking *to the nation* and instead present themselves as a

surrogate who speaks *for the nation*. It is here when he or she is most likely to transform into

the narrator of a "story of the nation." This rhetorical personification of the nation in the person

of the apex leader most often occurs at ceremonial occasions, such as inaugurals,

commemorations, and annual speeches. The link between ceremonies and epideictic speech

telling "stories of peoplehood" is at least as old as Aristotle, but has more recently been

elaborated on by scholars studying modern political rhetoric.[173] The point is that ceremonial

occasions involving the apex leader are highly likely to prompt the recitation of nation-state

narratives. Even though critics often dismiss this rhetoric as "platitudes," the presentation of

national categories with which none or only a known minority are expected to disagree is exactly

the kind of speech that is most instructive for the purposes of assessing the status quo of

nationalist discourse.[174] Still further, it is likely that the apex leader's attempt to define national

categories will elicit a response from the other key players in the national category construction

game. If so, a "national conversation" results in which government, opposition and media

---

[173] Aristotle, 1952; Smith, 2003; Vivian, 2006; Stuckey, 2004; Carter, 1991; Edelman, 1985 & 1988; Loraux, 1986.
[174] Stuckey, 2004, p.9.

validate, invalidate or ignore competing nationalist narratives. Examining the rhetoric employed in such debates, particularly ones that occur at regular intervals, is one way to isolate the state of nationalist discourse at any given time.[175]

Are there instances of such "national conversations" in postwar Japan? It is argued here that such debates occur on a regular basis, prompted by the highly institutionalized ceremony of the Diet inaugural. These debates involve all of the key players discussed above, and even bring them into face-to-face contact in the days surrounding the inaugural ceremony. But why is this ceremony, more than any other, a good place to look for status quo accounts of nationalist discourse in postwar Japan?

The prime minister opens each session of the national legislature, whether ordinary (*tsūjō*), extraordinary (*rinji*) or special (*tokubetsu*), with an inaugural speech. Since Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952, this has occurred on average nearly two and a half times a year. Diet inaugurals come in two forms: declarations of principles (*shoshin hyōmei enzetsu*) and administrative plans (*shisei hōshin enzetsu*). Declarations of principles are performed at the beginning of extraordinary and special sessions as well as the first Diet session (no matter what type) following the ascension of a new prime minister. They are generally shorter than administrative plans, running around twenty to thirty minutes, and are designed to express the

---

[175] Stuckey (2004) largely relies on this sampling strategy in her examination of the American presidency and national identity, although she also refers to other forms of presidential rhetoric.

general principles that will animate the prime minister's tenure or the reasons for the opening of

an extraordinary or special session. Administrative plans, on the other hand, are given at the

start of ordinary sessions and tend to run about forty minutes. Ostensibly, they are designed to

offer a detailed account of the prime minister's plans for the upcoming Diet session. In practice,

however, they also tend to include significant discussion of political principles, and even a

participant in the creation of these speeches concedes there is little difference in content across

the two types of inaugurals.[176] For the purposes here, both types of speeches will be treated

simply as Diet inaugurals.

The production of a Diet inaugural is a relatively arduous process. The speech is put

together in the prime minister's office (*naikakfu*) with extensive cooperation from other

government ministries. Preparations begin about a month before the date of the speech and

usually involve between five and six meetings of the principals involved: the prime minister;

chief cabinet secretary (*naikaku kanbōchōkan*) and vice cabinet secretaries (*naikaku

kanbōfukuchōkan*), who are political appointees; the cabinet general affairs counselor (*naikaku

sōmukan*), who is usually a secondee from the internal affairs ministry; and a small group of

other career bureaucrats attached to the prime minister's office, including the cabinet vice

general affairs counselors (*naikakufukusōmukan*), prime ministerial secretaries (*shushōhishokan*),

---

[176] Interview by the author, Maekawa Mamoru, counselor (*sanjikan*) in charge of economic policy and finance, prime minister's office (*naikakufu*), 19 January 2006.

and counselors (*sanjikan*) and vice-counselors (*fukusanjikan*) responsible for specific policy areas.[177] The initial drafts of individual sections are typically generated by the ministries with jurisdiction in the relevant policy area and submitted to the prime minister's office for review.

By all accounts, the level of prime ministerial involvement in the finalization of the speech draft has varied dramatically depending on the person occupying the office. Some prime ministers, such as Satō Eisaku and Koizumi Junichirō, appear to have been intimately involved in the planning and finalization of Diet inaugurals, while others, such as Obuchi Keizō, seemed content to accept language generated by ministerial officials.[178] However, the assigning of priorities to topics and the style of presentation are generally determined in the principals' meeting.

Unique among all prime ministerial addresses, the Diet inaugural requires a vote of approval from the full cabinet. Once the principals have an approved draft, it is presented to the cabinet for comment on the day before its scheduled performance. Although major changes at this stage are rare, cabinet members nevertheless occasionally offer suggestions for changes.[179] The final draft is then put before a cabinet vote on the morning of the opening of the Diet session. Following this vote, the prime minister delivers the speech first before a

---

[177] Eda & Ryuzaki, 2002, p.56; Interview by the author, Maekawa Mamoru, counselor (*sanjikan*) in charge of economic policy and finance, prime minister's office (*naikakufu*), 19 January 2006.
[178] Interview by the author, Maekawa Mamoru, counselor (*sanjikan*) in charge of economic policy and finance, prime minister's office (*naikakufu*), 19 January 2006; Asami, 1998.
[179] Ibid.

general session of the House of Representatives and then again before a general session of the House of Councillors later the same day.

Following a Diet inaugural, the opposition parties are allowed an opportunity to respond in general session. Early in the postwar period, these responses usually came during the same session in which the Diet inaugural was delivered. However, over time, it became accepted practice for the opposition to respond during the next general session, which is usually held within three days of the inaugural session. These responses are most often delivered by the head of each opposition party and sometimes run even longer than the prime minister's address. The responses directly challenge points made in the Diet inaugural and also present the general principles of the opposition party in question.

The media also plays a major part in the Diet inaugural ceremony. Concerned with how the media will react, the prime minister holds a briefing for editors and other political and opinion journalists on the day *before* the speech is delivered in the Diet. During the briefing, the prime minister reads through the speech and answers questions for about an hour. Attendees are also provided with a copy of the speech text.[180] Almost without fail, the major media outlets offer editorial responses on the day after the speech. In addition, the major newspapers publish full or abridged versions of the speech. This combination of such

---

[180] Ibid.

prominent editorial and news page treatment has made the Diet inaugural the most covered

prime ministerial address over the course of the postwar period. Although some question the

impact the speech ultimately has on the public, it is impossible to name another regular prime

ministerial address that receives the same level of media coverage.[181]

Focusing on Diet inaugurals is useful for observing changes in nationalist discourse for

several reasons. First, the ceremony brings together all the key players involved in the

construction of national categories cited above. Once the prime minister has delivered the

address, opposition party leaders and the opinion editors of the major media groups are certain to

respond. Other than election day, it is difficult to find another instance in national political life

in which the direct interaction of these actors is so universal. Second, the Diet inaugural is a

ceremony, which, as Aristotle notes, calls for speakers to adopt the "ceremonial oratory of

display," or epideictic speech.[182] The nationalist narrative is an important form of epideictic

discourse and Diet inaugurals are thus likely places to find them. In addition, the inaugural

ceremony is general in nature, with no formal constraints on topics, especially which national

categories or narratives may be discussed. Ceremonies that are held to commemorate events

that are irrevocably tied to particular national categories or narratives, such as the annual

ceremonies commemorating the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are likely to limit

---

[181] For a skeptical view of the ultimate impact of the Diet inaugural, see Eda & Ryuzaki (2002, p.56).
[182] Aristotle, 1952, p.587.

the range of national categories given voice. This is not the case with the Diet inaugural.

Finally, Diet inaugurals are held regularly and often, sometimes three times in a single year.

This has generated a sufficiently large sample of discourse that is relatively evenly dispersed

across time. All of these features make the Diet inaugural an ideal source for assessing the state

of nationalist discourse at a given point in time as well as how that status quo has changed across

the postwar period.

A data set of Diet inaugural discourse was assembled based on the following criteria.

First, texts of the declaration of principles and administration plan speeches of postwar prime

ministers were downloaded from the collection maintained by Professor Tanaka Akihiko of

Tokyo University.[183] This collection was then augmented by incorporating the most recent

inaugurals through 2007, yielding a total of 136 speeches.

The selection process for opposition responses was more complicated. Since each

opposition party usually offers a lengthy rebuttal, including them all would flood the data set

with opposition voices, including those that represent very small portions of the electorate. To

avoid this, the opposition sample was limited to the statement offered by the largest opposition

party during the first general session in which such responses were allowed. This method

---

[183] The inaugurals are reproduced from originals gathered from the National Diet Library. The collection, entitled "Prime Ministerial Address to the Imperial and National Diets (*teikokugikai/kokkainai no sōridaijin enzetsu*), is available online. Accessed at: http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/indices/pm/index.html (July 23, 2012). Please note that several speeches were rejected from this list because they were not directly tied to a Diet inauguration ceremony.

yielded 134 opposition responses, including addresses by prominent opposition leaders such as

Suzuki Mosaburō, Doi Takako, and Ozawa Ichirō.

Throughout the period under review, the primary method of media response to the Diet

inaugural has been the newspaper editorial. Even in today's age of television journalism,

Japan's daily newspapers remain in a class by themselves. The five largest national dailies

(*godaishi*) serve as the flagship vehicles for the five largest media groups, all of which own

television networks.[184] The circulations of these papers are truly gargantuan in comparative

terms. As of 2005, Japan's largest paper, the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, boasted a higher circulation

than the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Christian Science Monitor*, and

New York Daily News combined.[185] The *Yomiuri Shimbun* remains the largest newspaper in the

world with a daily circulation of nearly ten million in 2012, followed closely by the *Asahi*

Shimbun at nearly eight million in 2010 and then by the *Mainichi Shimbun*, with its circulation

of nearly three and a half million in 2011 (a figure still larger than the circulation of the largest

paper in the United States).[186] Not surprisingly, Japan has one of the highest newspaper

circulations per capita (adult population) in the world, more than twice that of the United

---

[184] These media groups are Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Nikkei, and Sankei.
[185] Jōhō Media Hakusho, 2006, p.38.
[186] See current circulation figures available online for Yomiuri at http://adv.yomiuri.co.jp/yomiuri/n-busu/index.html (July 23, 2012); Asahi at http://adv.asahi.com/2011/004.pdf (July 23, 2012); and Mainichi at http://macs.mainichi.co.jp/now/section03/01.html (July 23, 2012).

States.[187]   In addition, nearly 80% of the public say they read the paper more than five days a week and report their combined reading time for morning and evening editions of newspapers is over forty minutes per day.[188]

When considering how to sample media commentaries, there are many reasons to focus on newspaper editorials.   First, there can be little doubt that, especially during the bulk of the Cold War period, newspaper editorials were the most broadly disseminated form of media commentary.   Until the early 1980s, NHK (Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai), a public broadcasting corporation similar to the British Broadcasting Company, was the only television station to offer a regular news program.[189]   It was the mid-1980s before the private television networks began producing news programs that contained editorial commentary on politics.   It should also be noted that the private broadcast networks all have financial ties to the newspaper media groups: Nippon Television Network (Yomiuri); Asahi National Broadcasting (Asahi); Tokyo Broadcasting System (Mainichi); Television Tokyo (Nikkei); and Fuji Television Network (Sankei).[190]   Although financial connections do not necessarily bring with them editorial control, it is difficult to imagine a media conglomerate allowing its flagship newspaper and

[187] See data on circulation per capita (adult population) for various countries on the Nihon Shimbun Kyōkai website accessed at: http://www.pressnet.or.jp/data/circulation/circulation04.html (July 23, 2012).
[188] See data on reading time per day and reading days per week on the Nihon Shimbun Kyōkai website accessed at: http://www.pressnet.or.jp/adarc/data/data01/07.html (July 23, 2012) and http://www.pressnet.or.jp/adarc/data/data01/06.html (July 23, 2012), respectively.
[189] Freeman, 2000.
[190] Ibid.

television commentaries to differ to an extraordinary degree. An editorial from a major daily may thus be viewed as a concise sample of a media group's views. In addition, polling shows that the public places higher levels of trust in newspapers than in almost any other form of media.[191] All things considered, newspaper editorials seem the most logical place to look for the most influential media response to Diet inaugurals.

In gathering editorial responses to Diet inaugurals, only those from the top three newspapers by circulation were selected: *Yomiuri*, *Asahi*, and *Mainichi*. The combined sales of these three papers represented about 80% of the total newspaper market in 2005.[192] In addition, although these papers began the Cold War period offering similar editorial lines opposing the LDP-led government, this changed in the 1970s, when *Yomiuri* adopted a more conservative stance.[193] By the 1990s, the three major papers spanned the mainstream political spectrum, with *Yomiuri* on the center-right, *Mainichi* in the middle, and *Asahi* on the center-left. The selection of these three papers thus helps guarantee a measure of balance in the political orientations applied to criticism of the Diet inaugurals, while at the same time keeping the commentary firmly in the mainstream. Since these papers almost always offer an editorial

---

[191] See polling data on public trust levels in the quality of information across different media types on the Nihon Shimbun Kyōkai website accessed at: http://www.pressnet.or.jp/adarc/data/data01/15.html (July 23, 2012). Newspapers are second (44.1%), just the behind the public broadcasting network NHK (47.3%).
[192] Dentsū Sōken, 2005, p.38.
[193] McCargo, 2000, p.52.

response within two days of the Diet inaugural, employing this selection rule generates 408 editorials, or approximately three editorials per speech.

The results of the quantitative content analysis conducted on the Diet inaugurals, opposition responses and editorials are reported in Chapters Five through Seven. In addition, a detailed explanation of the coding schedule, inter-coder reliability measures and coding rules appears in the appendices. Finally, this section concludes with a brief comment about how the method of analysis used here differs from that of previous works.

The approach to content analysis utilized here is different both from other studies that have used these methods to examine social processes and ones that have specifically analyzed Diet inaugurals. First, the use of complex linguistic algorithms such as those employed by Takafumi Suzuki was avoided because they were found to be underdeveloped for the Japanese language and frankly of questionable value in recovering meaning from Japanese nationalist discourse.[194] The focus here is also squarely on message meaning rather than other aspects of the discourse, such as the modes of presentation highlighted in Moberg's rhetorical analysis.[195] One of the most important distinctions between this approach and those of other scholars using content analysis is the effort to preserve context wherever possible. Most quantitative content

---

[194] Suzuki, 2009. In particular, the author questions the reasoning of limiting comparisons to just nouns. This seems an arbitrary distinction and is particularly distorting when one considers that norms, which are most often expressed grammatically as verbs, are central links between nationalist claims and state policy, the area of nationalism that should surely be the focus of political science inquiries into the subject.
[195] Moberg, 2002.

analyses utilize software that allows the coder to "parachute" into the middle of a text using a key word in context (KWIC) function that shows them a certain number of words on either side of a key word match.[196]   In this instance, the context evaluated is at best a sentence and at worst a mere fragment, with the coder having little or no knowledge of what comes before the selected passage.   As the discourse sample here constitutes a genuine "conversation," in which a prime minister speaks and opposition and media voices respond, all effort possible was made to maintain as much of that context as possible in the coding process.   The use of content analysis software was thus rejected in favor of the more traditional approach in which trained coders read all parts of the speeches and editorials and evaluated each sentence across more than sixty possible codes.[197]   In doing so, they were able to keep the preceding context in mind, coding as a set the prime ministerial speech, opposition response and editorials from each inaugural occasion.   Although taking this approach has had costs in both terms of expenses and time required, it produced a more complete and accurate picture of the nationalist discourse involved in the Diet inaugural ceremony.[198]

---

[196] For an example, see Lyall (2006).

[197] For a description of the various methods of content analysis, see Neuendorf (2002).

[198] This attention to context locates the approach here closer to studies such as Edstrom's simple content analysis of the prime ministerial speeches and Takekawa's discourse analysis of New Year editorials in major newspapers, although neither used coders nor calculated inter-coder reliabilities.   Edstrom, 1999; Takekawa, 2007.

IV. Narrative Change, Discursive Strategies, and Institutional Association

A few additional conceptual and methodological points are in order. First, interpreting change in prominence scores requires a conception of narrative change. "Narrative change" is primarily conceived of here as variance across the two dimensions of content and contestation.[199] Using the results of the content analysis, change in the content of a narrative group (e.g. peace state narrative, organic state narrative, etc.) is measured by change in the relative frequencies of references to the narrative's individual components (i.e. the individual cognitive and normative claims of a nation-state narrative) over time. The relative frequency of a narrative component is the number of references to the component as a percentage of total references to the narrative group. It is thus an indication of how central an individual component is to a narrative group at any given time. The level of contestation is measured by the percentage of a narrative component's total references that are coded as negatively-valued. These two measures can be combined to evaluate changes at the narrative component level over time. Simultaneously comparing change in the relative frequency and level of contestation of an individual narrative component across two time periods yields four categories describing the status of the component in the second time period:

---

[199] This conception of the different dimensions that may change for concepts such as a nation-state narrative is drawn from Abdelal, et. al. (2006).

114

Table 3.2: Categories of Change in Narrative Components across Two Time Periods

	Content (percentage change in component to total narrative group references)		
Contestation (percentage change in negative to total component references)		*Increase*	*Decrease/No Change*
	Increase	Major Contention	Minor Contention
	Decrease/No Change	Major Consensus	Minor Consensus

The categories in Table 3.2 are summarized as follows. A narrative component is understood to be a major point of contention for the narrative in a time period if its relative frequency and level of contestation both rise in comparison with an earlier period. This means that the component has become both more salient in portrayals of the narrative and more contested at the same time. Similarly, a component is a minor point of contention if its relative frequency falls while its level of contestation increases. Here, the component is more contested but is also less salient in portrayals of the narrative. Alternatively, components that see decreases or no change in their levels of contestation in the second time period are categorized as points of consensus, with major points of consensus seeing rises in their relative frequencies and minor ones experiencing decreases.[200]

---

[200] In evaluating change in both relative frequency and level of contestation, the result of no change is categorized

115

Evaluating the content analysis data in this way thus allows one to categorize the changes in all the components of a single narrative for particular time periods as well as to see how the status of these components change over time. Viewed this way, a clear picture of dynamism at the narrative component level emerges. For example, comparing the results of consecutive, chronological five-year blocks for the peace state narrative's normative claim to "restrain war potential" locates it as a minor point of consensus in 1963-1967, a major point of consensus in 1973-1977, a major point of contention in 1983-1987, and a minor point of contention in 1998-2002. In addition, as will be shown in the chapters to follow, this conception of change provides snapshots of the location of all of a narrative's components at particular points in what is the ongoing process of contention and consensus that constructs and reconstructs nation-state narratives. In addition, these snapshots can be useful in uncovering the linkages between political struggles over institutions associated with particular narrative components and changes in the narrative as a whole.

Next, scholars working on the role of discourse and the construction of conceptions of national identity have identified a number of patterns in which participants in nationalist

---

together with decreases both for simplicity's sake and because this result tends to indicate consecutive periods in which the measure remained zero, thus providing a "no change" result but at the lowest possible relative frequency or level of contestation. For example, there is only one non-zero "no change" result for relative frequency scores ("Peace State" between 1993-1997 and 1998-2002) and only one non-zero "no change" result in comparisons of changes in level of contestation for components of the peace state narrative between consecutive, chronological five-year blocks ("Restrain War Potential" between 1998-2002 and 2003-2007).

discourse leverage their relative autonomy from discursive conventions both to respond to perceived efforts to change the discursive status quo and to develop new ways to talk about the relationship between the nation and the state that accommodate their political and policy agendas.[201] Applied to nation-state narratives, these "discursive strategies" generally take four major forms: constructive, transformational, perpetuating, and destructive. A "constructive" strategy is one in which the actor seeks to establish a new nation-state narrative "by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation."[202] Such strategies are observed in the first few postwar decades in Japan, when political elites cooperated to establish and shape newly-emergent nation-state narratives such as the peace and democratic state narratives.

A "transformational" strategy aims to transform an existing nation-state narrative into a one that better matches the "contours of which the speaker has already conceptualized."[203] In its most comprehensive form, a transformational strategy attempts to replace an existing narrative by offering a fully-conceived "counter-narrative" that occupies the same "domain" as the existing narrative.[204] This new narrative challenges the cognitive components of the targeted narrative and likely some or all of its normative claims as well. Since cognitive

---

[201] Wodak, et. al, 1999, pp.33-35; Wodak, 2006, pp.112-115; Allen & Faigley, 1995.
[202] Wodak, et. al, 1999, p.33.
[203] Ibid.
[204] McVeigh (2004, p.9) defines domains as "the various linkages between national culture and political structure" or "spheres of social life (territorial, state, military, economic, cultural, linguistic, racial, ethnic, gendered, etc.)."

components of nation-state narratives tend to contribute elements that form the major premise of

the narrative's normative components, this strategy undermines the legitimacy of these

normative claims and, if successful, would replace the claim with another.[205] For example,

reactionary narratives of the extreme rightwing in early postwar Japan, which manipulated

prewar nationalist discourse to challenge the cognitive elements of postwar nation-state

narratives, such as the democratic and peace state narratives, exemplify this type of

"comprehensive" transformational strategy.[206]

A more "partial" transformational strategy designed to affect change in a nation-state

narrative can take the form of what has elsewhere been called "tinkering."[207] Here,

change-agents focus on altering one or more normative components of the nation-state narrative

rather than transforming the entire discursive formation. Specifically, the focus is on adding an

exception to the minor premise of the targeted claim in order to exempt some sphere of social

action from its proscription or prescription.[208] If successful, the targeted normative claim's

range of coverage is narrowed, but the cognitive and other normative claims of the relevant

nation-state narrative remain unchanged. It is argued in the Chapter Six that Ozawa Ichirō

---

[205] This conception of using the three-part, syllogistic structure (major premise, minor premise and conclusion) of a norm to identify specific types of normative change is borrowed from Goertz (2003).

[206] Morris, 1960; Brown, 1955.

[207] Cruz, 2005, p.23. Please note that Levi-Strauss' conception of *bricolage*, which Samuels (2004) applies to national identity construction, encompasses both transformational and tinkering strategies.

[208] Goertz, 2003.

adopted this strategy when he referenced the "normal nation" (*futsū no kuni*) standard in an effort

to create an exception to the peace state narrative's normative claim proscribing the Japanese

state from using force in international affairs to allow for the contribution of Japanese forces to

United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations (PKOs).   This case is also shown to be an example

of how intentional efforts to change the nationalist discourse can result in unintended

consequences that transcend the original goal of the rhetorical innovation.

A third strategic option available to participants in the discourse of nation-state

narratives is perpetuation, the "attempt to maintain, support and reproduce" the narrative in

question when it is perceived to be threatened.[209]   This strategy typically calls for the adopter to

"refer to controversial events of the past, which may influence the narratives of national

history."[210]   With regard to the peace state narrative in the postwar period, the use of

perpetuating strategies is especially apparent in the response of the Socialist opposition to

Ozawa's transformational gambit cited above.

The final types of discursive strategies are referred to as destructive strategies.   These

aim to "dismantle or disparage" part or all of a nation-state narrative.[211]   What makes

destructive strategies different from transformational ones is their failure to provide a new

---

[209] Wodak, 2006, p.113.
[210] Ibid.
[211] Wodak, et. al, 1999, p.33.

component or narrative to replace the targeted one.[212]   A finding of widespread use of

destructive strategies by participants in Japan's discourse of nation-state narratives would thus

constitute evidence supporting the view that postwar Japan has experienced a general decline in

the salience of nationalist rhetoric.

This section concludes by considering the relationship between nation-state narratives

and state institutions.   First, state institutions are defined as the "formal or informal procedures,

routines, *norms* and conventions embedded in the organizational structure" of the modern

territorial state.[213]   As is apparent here, institutions can be and often are seen either to

encompass or be synonymous with norms, which were defined earlier as "idealized rules of

social life" and are important components of nation-state narratives.[214]   Further, scholars

studying norms have argued that "institutionalization" in the state enhances the capacity of

normative claims to shape political outcomes by creating "a degree of stability and uniformity

which otherwise would be lacking" and commanding the "formal sanctioning mechanisms" of

the state.[215]   They generally describe "institutionalization" as the transformation of a "social"

---

[212] Ibid.

[213] This definition is adapted from Hall & Taylor (1996, p.938, emphasis added). In keeping with Mahoney & Thelen (2010, p.10), this definition excludes the issue of compliance, leaving it as a variable for the analysis of institutional change.   Examples of state institutions defined this way in the case of postwar Japan include the 1947 constitution, laws passed by the Diet, official interpretations of these laws by state bureaucracies, international treaty commitments, judicial rulings, cabinet decisions, and executive orders, among others.

[214] Goertz, for example, sees "norms" and "policies" as synonyms (e.g. foreign policy, Monroe Doctrine, etc.). Goertz, 2003, p.43.   For other definitions of institutions, see Hall & Taylor (1996).

[215] Katzenstein, 1996, p.21.   More broadly, Somers (1994, p.625) also notes that narratives that constitute "identity" are composed of "rules," "practices" and "institutions," and that "[i]dentity formation takes place in these relational settings of contested but patterned relations among narratives, people and institutions."

norm into a "legal" one.[216] "Norms do not float freely in political space," writes Katzenstein of this process in postwar Japan, "They acquire particular importance when they crystallize, through institutionalization, as in the Japanese polity."[217]

If the same normative claims that comprise nation-state narratives can also be "embedded" in state institutions, what does that mean for efforts to understand how these narratives change? The account above would seem to favor the view that incorporating the normative component of a nation-state narrative in a state institution enhances the component's stability and thus the prospects for the nation-state narrative to endure in the nationalist discourse. Although the development of a commonly-cited association between a state institution and the normative component of a nation-state narrative can have these effects, it is argued here that the simple fact of such an association is not sufficient to do so. This judgment is based on the following three observations.

---

[216] Social norms are generally distinguished from legal norms (law) as follows: "Legal norms are created by design—usually through some kind of deliberative process, precisely specified in *written* texts, linked to particular sanctions, and *enforced by a specialized bureaucracy*. Social norms, by contrast, often are spontaneous rather than deliberately planned (hence, of uncertain origin), *unwritten* (hence, their content and rules for application are often imprecise), and *enforced informally* (although the resulting sanctions can sometimes be a matter of life and death)." Hechter & Opp, 2001, p.xi (emphasis added). The approach here emphasizes the italicized regarding the norm's relation to state institutions. More specifically, a norm is here considered legal when a version of the norm from the nationalist discourse is codified in *writing* in the text of a law, cabinet decision, executive order, outstanding court order or ruling, or other regulation (such as standard operating procedures or interpretations of laws by state bureaucracies) that specify the content of a state institution for which a specialized bureaucracy is assigned to enforce compliance.   It should be emphasized codified (legal) norm may be (and is likely) at odds with the content of other versions of the normative claim in the nationalist discourse.

[217] Katzenstein, 1996, p.21. Please note that Katzenstein is not implying here that all or even most social norms make this transition nor that those that do not will not endure or be able to shape political outcomes.

First, as will noted in subsequent chapters, the organic state narrative has by far the lowest number of associations with state institutions among the five nation-state narratives and thus should receive the least stabilizing benefits from such associations. One way to assess narrative stability is to view it as a narrative's level of contestation relative to that of other nation-state narratives. However, on this measure, it is the trading state narrative, whose normative components have far more institutional associations than those of the organic state narrative, that saw the highest level of contestation (as measured by the percentage of negatively–valued references to total references) in cumulative terms for the entire period (the organic and peace state narratives are second and third, respectively) as well as on average across the eleven five-year blocks (the peace and organic state narratives are second and third, respectively).[218] Another way to assess narrative stability is to examine the degree to which its quantity of positive references varies over time. If level of institutionalization is linked to narrative stability, then this quantity should vary less over time the more institutionalized a narrative is. Yet, as shown in Table 3.3 below, the organic state narrative confounds this expectation, proving to be the most stable of the three contested narratives despite its lower number of institutional associations.

---

[218] Calculated for the entire fifty-five year period, the trade state saw the highest level of contestation (6.4%), followed by the organic state (2.9%) and peace state (1.5%) narratives. When averaged over the five-year blocks, trading state narrative is also the highest (6.2%), with peace state (3.5%) and organic state (3.3%) narratives second and third, respectively.

Table 3.3: Standard Deviation in Positive References, Three Narrative Group

% Negative Narrative Group	Standard Deviation
% Negative Organic State	0.7
% Negative Trading State	1.2
% Negative Peace State	2.4

Unit: standard deviation calculated for positive (non-negative) references per 100 sentences across 11 five-year blocks

Second, the content of some normative claims in nation-state narratives are more ambiguous and thus more open to interpretation and contestation over their meaning than that of others. For example, as noted in the next chapter, the claims of the peace state narrative limiting both the acquisition of military capabilities and their use by the Japanese state can be advanced at various points within the spectrum between state non-violence and state non-aggression. This wide room for interpretation thus creates many possibilities for contestation over meaning and thus fights over associated institutional configurations. In this regard, the degree to which a normative claim affords opportunities for interpretation would seem to mitigate the stabilizing impact of association with a state institution.[219]

---

[219] As noted above, "institutionalization" is generally viewed as the process by which social norms becomes codified in formal (legal) or informal practices. However, the flow can also go in the other direction, as an institution (legal norm) may be imposed by an exogenous actor and then become associated with the normative claim (social norm) of a narrative that emerges only later in the nationalist discourse. This is arguably what happened with regard to narrative components for which proponents find justification in specific parts of Japan's postwar constitution, a major formal institution that was drafted with considerable involvement from the United States and ratified and enacted under foreign occupation. To allow for this disparity in origin as well as the fact that most legal norms codify only one version of a normative claim whose content can continue to be contested, and thus exist in different variants, in the nationalist discourse over long periods of time, the term "institutional association" is preferred here over "institutionalization."

Third, once a normative component of a nation-state narrative has become associated with a state institution, it is exposed to the same forces that promote both stability and change in that institution. Indeed, the assumption that the association of a normative component with a state institution will decrease its level contestation and thus help sustain the nation-state narrative in the nationalist discourse is predicated on the assumption that the institution in question remains stable. Although the association of an explicit "validity-claim" such as the normative component of a nation-state narrative is theorized to enhance the binding nature of the associated institution, institutions face pressures for change from various factors independent of ideational conflict, including changes in the domestic power distribution and relevant policy environment.[220] For example, Oros argues that changes in Japan's international environment after the Cold War "necessitated changes in Japanese security policy and practice, despite similar ideas held by most Japanese."[221]

Thus, as exogenous and endogenous factors press for change in such an institution and a public debate ensues, the association with the nation-state narrative will likely be cited in both the perpetuating discursive strategies employed by those opposed to change and the transformational or tinkering discursive strategies adopted by would-be reformers, who may be seeking to reinterpret or even dissolve the association. In this way, assessments of the timing,

---

[220] Kratochwil, 1989, p.55.
[221] Oros, 2008, p.25.

124

causes and outcomes of efforts to reform institutions associated with a narrative's normative components can yield information vital to interpreting the meaning of the a decline in the narrative's prominence over time.

Employing these conceptions of narrative change, discursive strategies, and institutional associations aids in the generation of hypotheses to understand how and why narrative prominence changes in particular periods. The next section uses these conceptions to develop three hypotheses for understanding changes in the prominence of nation-state narratives.

V. Understanding Changes in Narrative Prominence

A central premise of the methodological approach taken here is that prominence scores by themselves cannot generally be interpreted as a rating of a narrative's "strength" (relative level of consensus) vis-à-vis other nation-state narratives in the same period or as a clear indicator of its potential to endure in the nationalist discourse in future periods. Although a decline to zero over a sustained period of time represents decisive evidence of a narrative's break-up as a recurring convention, no such finding is present here. Rather, what prominence scores reveal are changes over time in the degree to which political elites agreed that particular

narratives were worthy of discussion. The reasons behind these shifts in the "focal points of concern" vary, as does their meaning for the narrative in question.[222]

Consider, for instance, the example of a narrative whose prominence score falls while also seeing a large increase in negatively-valued references. Alternatively, how should one evaluate a case in which a narrative's prominence score falls and thereafter remains steady at a lower level with no contestation for a long period of time? How should these instances of declines in prominence be assessed? The answer adopted here is that interpreting changes in a narrative's prominence score requires that they be contextualized. Changes can be placed in context by utilizing the analysis of narrative change outlined above, examining the discursive strategies employed and the status of institutional associations in the periods in question, and considering the change in prominence score as an event in a sequence of events.

The narrative change analysis described above creates a map of the internal changes in a narrative across two time periods. This map can be used to evaluate a change in prominence in a number of ways. First, the location of the cognitive components of a narrative can indicate if the narrative is facing existential threats. For example, if the cognitive components of a narrative, especially the "naming conventions" (*heiwa kokka*, *bunka kokka*, etc.), are all major points of consensus, then an overall decline in the narrative's prominence is unlikely to be

---

[222] Katzenstein, 1996, p.22.

evidence of its impending break-up as a discursive formation. The location of all cognitive elements as minor points of consensus in the context of an overall prominence decline indicates that an opportunity is present for a direct challenge to the narrative. If cognitive elements become points of contention, especially major ones, then a decline in prominence takes on a darker meaning for the narrative's future prospects. If this location persists over consecutive periods, it is likely that the decline in prominence indicates a trajectory toward a break-up of the narrative as a recurring convention and an unwinding of any associations it may have with state institutions.

Second, the location of normative elements of nation-state narratives as points of contention in the context of a decline in narrative prominence is not itself a clear indicator of coming narrative break-up. However, the location of particular normative elements as points of contention, especially as major ones and/or over consecutive periods, does point to a change in the normative component's salience to the narrative and, in cases of sustained periods of major contention, even its continued inclusion in the narrative. This also has implications for the relationship between the narrative and any state institutions associated with the contested normative component, such as the loss of any stabilizing impact provided by the institution if the association is weakened or dissolved. Finally, the location of multiple normative components as points of contention for consecutive time periods during which prominence is continuously

declining should be seen as a strong indication that the narrative is under threat, albeit not one that rises to an existential level regarding its future as a discursive convention in the nationalist discourse.

A second type of indicator useful in interpreting the meaning of changes in prominence is the presence or absence of particular discursive strategies for changing part or all of the relevent narrative during the periods in question. For example, the advance of a major transformational strategy to develop a new narrative occupying the same domain as an existing narrative during periods in which it is experiencing a sustained decline in prominence and sustained increases in contention in its cognitive components and/or large numbers of its normative elements is indicative of a narrative facting an existential threat with poor future prospects of remaining a factor in the nationalist discourse. Likewise, the presence of a destructive stategy targeting an existing narrative facing the same conditions would also call into question is future prospects. However, the presence of perpeuating strategies operating in response to transformational or destructive strategies in this example might mitigate the severity of this judgement.

Finally, as is already apparent from the discussion above, the sequence in which locations in the consensus/contestation quadrants and the presence or absence of different discursive strategies occur matter for assessments of changes in narrative prominence. For

example, consecutive, chronological periods of contention for a normative element is a strong sign that the element's future relationship with the narrative will be altered. A perpetuating strategy outlasting a transformational strategy targeting the same domain across consecutive time periods is evidence of the latter's failure to achieve its discursive goals. The significance of sequence in other ways will be elaborated further in the case study chapters.

The different types of observations introduced above may be applied to develop and distinguish between hypotheses explaining how and why changes in narrative prominence occur and their consequences for the narrative in question. They are chiefly distinguished by their differing predictions regarding observations of their designated causal factors as well as predictions about other aspects of the case, especially those that specify the causal process theorized to be at work, such as "predictions about the events that can be expected to occur, the sequence of those events, and the public and private positions actors are likely to take, as well as many other features of the relevant causal chain."[223] Thus, in practice, comparing hypotheses that make contrasting predictions about the shape of causal processes entails examining not only data on outcomes, but also on "the specific actions expected from various types of actors, statements that might reveal their motivation, and the sequences in which actions should

---

[223] Hall, 2003, p.393.

occur."[224]   To provide concrete examples of use later in the study, three hypotheses that explain

declines in narrative prominence are developed below.

The first hypothesis accounts for the decline in prominence as a consequence of the

successful "banalization" of an existing nation-state narrative.[225]   The argument here is that

once a narrative emerges, is contested, and achieves a certain level of recognition among

relevant political elites and the general public as well as the association of its normative

components with uncontested state institutions, its relative success actually mitigates against its

frequent reference at ceremonies like the Diet inagural.   In short, such a narrative may enter the

realm of "goes without saying" and thus cease to be a frequent topic of debate as a consequence

of the fact that it is largely uncontested, although it remains a well-known option in the toolkit

available to participants in the national discourse.[226]   Viewing prominence declines in this way

yields several predictions.   First and foremost, prominence may decline compared with earlier

periods, but it will not go to zero.   As Billig argues, "Nationalism, far from being an

intermittent mood in establshed nations, is an endemic condition."[227]   In this sense, discursive

formations that reproduce strands of nationalism, such as nation-state narratives, are part of

---

[224] Ibid., p.394.   Due to ontological considerations, especially the likely presence of multiple and persistent interaction effects, the methodological orientation adopted here is one of "systematic process analysis." See Hall, 2003.

[225] "Banalization" is coined from Billig's conception of "banal nationalism" or "the ideological habits"--in this case understood to include nation-state narratives-- through which conceptions of the nation-state are reproduced on a day-to-day basis in places where these narratives have already been established and adherents are reasonably confident in their perpetuity (e.g. stable states with advanced economies in peace time). Billig, 1995, p.6.

[226] Swidler, 1986, 2001.

[227] Billig, 1995, p.6.

everyday life and cannot disappear for long periods of time without consequences. Second, during periods of the decline in prominence, there will be no contestation over either the cognitive or normative components of the narrative in question. Third, political elites participating in the nationalist discourse should not be observed offering transformational, tinkering or destructive strategies vis-à-vis the narrative in the period in which it is experiencing the fall in prominence. Fourth, there should be no evidence of efforts to reform institutions that have come to be associated with components of the narrative during the period of the prominence decline in question.

In addition, although not decisive tests for the banalization hypothesis, the location of the period in question in a sequence in which it is preceded by a period in which there also is no contestation over the narrative and for which political elites eschew transformational, tinkering, and destructive stragies toward it should also be taken as adding support for the conclusion that the narrative has become "banal." Further, since discursive formations are viewed as having extended impacts over time, the absence of reform efforts targeting institutions associated with the narrative's components in the period immediately preceding the one in question should be seen as additional, albeit weak, support for this explanation.

A second hypothesis explains declining prominence over time as due to a "transformation" of all or part of the narrative into alternative components or even a

completely new narrative. When a narrative is wholly superseded by a counter-narrative, it is no longer referred to as an ideal or even viable view of the relationship between the nation and the state and will not endure as a distinct convention in the nationalist discourse. This hypothesis is thus consistent with the following sequence of observations. In the first period, increased contestation over the narrative's cognitive components, the carriers of its naming conventions, internal logics and justifications for its normative claims, is observed and then followed by continuing contestation and a major decline (zeroing out in extreme cases) in the prominence score for the narrative as a whole in the next and subsequent periods.[228] Increased contestation in one or more of the narrative's normative components during the first period followed by a sharp decline in or complete absence of references in the second period, appearing in conjunction with the above pattern, is also expected.

Alternatively, a finding of increased contention confined to a narrative's normative components in the first period followed by a decline in or complete absence of references to these components in the second period is consistent with the partial transformation variant of this explanation. In the context of declining prominence for the narrative as a whole, this

---

[228] The period preceding the beginning of the decline is included in this prediction because the initiation of a transformational strategy is expected to prompt supporters of the targeted narrative to adopt perpetuating strategies in response. This initial combination of the transformational and perpetuating strategies in the period preceding the decline is thus predicted to initially raise the prominence score of the narrative targeted for transformation. A decline in prominence accompanied by continuing contestation is later periods is thus seen as evidence that at least partial transformation is taking place.

indicates that the normative component in question faces the possiblity of either new exceptions being added to its contested normative components or having the contested components excluded from the narrative completely, as well as the corresponding changes in its relationship with any state institutions associated with the contested components. In the case that an exception is added, the normative component will be located as a major point of contention in the first period and then return to some form of consensus in the second. In the case of an exclusion, the component should appear as a major point of contention in the first period and then largely or totally disappear in the second. In either case, however, absent contestation over cognitive elements, declining narrative prominence is not a clear indication that narrative dissolution is in progress.

The transformation hypothesis also naturally predicts the presence of actors adopting particular discursive strategies. As noted above, in the context of declining narrative prominence, these strategies may take two forms. The emergence of an alternative narrative that occupies the same domain as the targeted narrative and runs counter to at least some of its cognitive claims and likely some or all of its normative claims as well is evidence that efforts to affect comprehensive transformation are underway. On the other hand, the presence of "tinkering" strategies that apply new rhetorical standards to reformulate or challenge normative elements of the targeted narrative is evidence of a drive for partial transformation.

In addition to the patterns of increased contestation and declining prominence describe above, the transformation hypothesis differs from the banalization hypothesis in three other ways. First, it predicts the presence of change-agents who are capable individually of engaging in intentional innovation and collectively of affecting unintentional innovation in the nationalist discourse. Second, this hypothesis also predicts the presence of efforts to reform at least one state institution associated with a normative component facing increased contestation in periods immediately preceding and during the decline in narrative prominence.[229] In this way, identifying which actors are pursuing which strategy as well as the orientations of those actors and their strategies toward state institutions associated with the normative claim in question is essential to confirming this hypothesis. Finally, the transformation hypothesis predicts that if changes occur in the relevant state institutions targeted for reform in one period, the association between the institution and the nation-state narrative will be dissolved in subsequent periods in the case of comprehensive transformation, but maintained in the case of partial transformation.

A third explanation, referred to here as the "denationalization" hypothesis, also asserts that relevant nation-state narratives decline in prominence because they are no longer viewed as ideal or viable and are headed toward break-up as discursive formations. However, in this case,

---

[229] The period preceding the beginning of the decline is included in this prediction following the same logic laid out in the previous footnote.

suitable counter-narratives linking nation and state in the relevant domains have yet to emerge to take their places. If confined to a single domain, this may indicate that the domain is becoming "denationalized," or ceasing to be a sphere of social life where participants in the nationalist discourse are concerned about the relationship between the nation and the state. If, however, denationalization is observed across multiple domains, the decline in prominence scores indicate a broad-based decline in nationalist discourse itself and a corresponding weakening of the bond between nation and state. Thus, wider in its implications than the other hypotheses, the denationalization hypothesis can only be fully confirmed by examining the nationalist discourse in multiple domains.

Applying the denationalization hypothesis to analysis of declines in a single nation-state narrative yields the following predictions. First, in contrast to the banalization hypothesis, the fall in prominence of a narrative due to denationalization is predicted to be accompanied by an increase in the percentage of negatively-valued comments directed at both its cognitive and normative components. The requirement that both cognitive and normative components face contestation thus also distinguishes the denationalization hypothesis from the partial form of the transformation hypothesis. Second, although the time frame is unspecified, the prominence score is predicted eventually to reach zero and remain there in subsequent periods, also a prediction at odds with those of partial transformation. Third, although both the

denationalization and transformation hypotheses predict the presence of change-agents who are opposed to the narrative in question, denationalization predicts these agents will adopt destructive strategies and that the periods immediately preceding and during the decline in prominence will see an absence of transformative or constructive strategies, a prediction that distinguishes it from all forms of the transformation hypothesis. Finally, although the denationalization hypothes makes no clear predictions regarding the timing and shape of efforts to reform state institutions associated with normative components of the targeted nation-state narrative, it does predict the association between these institutions and the nation-state narrative will be dissolved in subsequent periods, again at odds with the partial transformation hypothesis.

Chapter Four: Five Nations, Five States, One Country

Of course the question of what 'defines us as a nation' is not a matter of brute fact, but of public narratives, of self-understandings shaped and reshaped by stories. There is a rich repertoire of such storied self-understandings, some very widely shared, others less so, and these shift over time.[230]

Rogers Brubaker, 2004

I. Introduction

Five nation-state narratives—trading state, organic state, peace state, civilized state and democratic state—have occupied central places in the nationalist discourse of postwar Japan. Each narrative depicts a social category that places the emphasis on different links between nation and state by using different combinations of normative and cognitive elements. To understand how the most prominent forms of nationalism—viewed as discourse—change in the unfamiliar empirical terrain of a peaceful, wealthy, and stable democracy, it is necessary first to elaborate on the content of these key nation-state narratives and before considering how they change over time.

This remaining sections of this chapter addresses the same issues with regard to each of these five narratives: 1) translations of archetype examples; 2) the key elements of the narrative, including its naming conventions, related cognitive elements, normative claims on state policy,

---

[230] Brubaker, 2004b, p.123.

and sub-narratives; and 3) the grounds for its inclusion in the study, including references to

scholarly support.

II. Trading State (Merchant State, Technology-based State)

In March 2004, during a routine meeting of a budget subcommittee of the House of

Representatives, the more powerful chamber of Japan's bicameral Diet, then Minister of

Economy, Trade and Industry Nakagawa Shōichi, a conservative member of the Liberal

Democratic Party, was asked to clarify his government's future plans regarding bilateral free

trade agreements (FTAs).   He rose and prefaced his response with the following summary of

Japan's modern history:

> I think the current question is an extremely important one that touches on the foundational
> element, shall I say Japan's fundamental way of life. I think that Japan, since the Meiji
> modernization, with few natural resources, started out by exporting tea and raw silk as
> products for export and importing industrial goods from the advanced countries of Europe
> and the United States; further, although one of the tragic outcomes of the development of
> economic blocks was World War Two, when our nation subsequently got back on its feet, it
> was, after all, through our forefathers' efforts exporting textiles and light industrial products
> while earning what little foreign currency they could.   As a result, we were able to become
> a great trade-based state (*bōeki rikkoku*) with global reach, an economic great power; after
> all, in a Japan with few natural resources, we import from all over the world and export
> excellent products made from the technological skills and knowledge of the Japanese
> people; I thus think that this, rather than a choice, is what we as a country must be.[231]

---

[231] Nakagawa Shōichi, Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Liberal Democratic Party, 7th Sectional Meeting,
Budget Committee, House of Representatives, March 2, 2004.   Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (April 2,
2011).

Nakagawa then went on to declare that Japan had fallen behind other major countries, especially the United States, in negotiating FTAs, and that Japan, in order to continue to exist as a "trade-based country" (*bōeki rikkoku*), should actively pursue opportunities for such agreements in accordance with World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations. Three years later, when asked a similar question in a full budget committee meeting in the House of Councillors, Japan's upper house, then foreign minister and future prime minister Asō Tarō gave a response that differed somewhat on policy, but framed the issue, and the stakes involved, in an identical way:

> Fundamentally, as you know, in Japan's case, because it is not a country with natural resources, in order for Japan to continue as a trade-based country (*bōeki rikkoku*), the present situation is that it is difficult to avoid continuing to rely on the soundness of WTO and its core of multilateral trade negotiations, although there are various types of FTAs and EPAs.[232]

The point here is not to highlight differences in policy but to show how, in the course of routine policy discussions, two prominent politicians approached an international economic issue by first referencing, either in passing or in some detail, what is called here the trading state narrative. In this narrative, purportedly inherent qualities of Japan's people and territory are cited to characterize the nation-state in a way that makes demands on the state to conform to particular norms. First, Japan's territory is confined to a few small islands with little or no

---

[232] Asō Tarō, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 8, 2007. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (April 2, 2011).

natural resources.   Second, the Japanese people as a nation are distinguished by certain innate

abilities, in particular their mercantile acumen and technological prowess.   In combination,

these two cognitive claims are wielded to categorize Japan as a nation-state whose people must

utilize natural gifts to overcome natural deficits.   Specifically, for Japan to survive in a world of

nations with better access to natural resources, its people and state must find ways to add value

to imported raw materials and export finished goods.   This is the crux of the trading state

narrative, which is referred to variously as "trade-based state" (*bōeki rikkoku*), "trading state"

(*tsūshō kokka* or *bōeki kokka*) "merchant state" (*shōnin kokka* or *chōnin kokka*), and, as will be

highlighted below "technology-based state" (*gijutsu rikkoku*).[233]

The act of characterizing the nation-state as a trading state places certain normative

demands on the state in general and government policy in particular.   For one, state legitimacy

is linked to continued or increased access to foreign markets for the nation's exports.   As can be

seen in the example above, in practice, this claim is generally made in the form of calls for the

government to support or pursue improvements in aspects of the international trade system that

maintain or expand access to foreign markets, including such institutions as the General

---

[233] The elements described in this paragraph, including key words, were modeled in the following codes for the content analysis. "Trading State" includes all references to "trade-based state" (*bōeki rikkoku*), "trading state" (*tsūshō kokka* or *bōeki kokka*) and "merchant state" (*shōnin kokka* or *chōnin kokka*); idealized treatments of Japan, its people and/or state as merchants or tradesmen, and note or praise for the abilities of the nation or its members to excel in foreign trade. "Few Resources" includes all references to Japan or Japanese territory being small, insignificant, or lacking natural resources. "Technology-based State" is explained below.

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and numerous bilateral trade arrangements.[234]   Second, the trading state narrative declares that the nation must export to survive and therefore the state is bound to support this fundamental endeavor.   In practice, this may appear as general demands that the government promote exports as well as specific arguments in favor of adopting government policies that will aid exporting industries to expand their sales overseas.[235]   Third, this narrative tends to include demands that the state encourage the expansion of the nation's investments overseas, including direct state involvement. This last claim involves both the use of foreign aid to encourage domestic firms to expand their business overseas and open new trade networks as well as the important role of foreign investment in easing currency appreciation under the floating exchange rates of the latter part of the period reviewed here.[236]

The trading state narrative has an important technological dimension, one which also makes normative claims on state behavior.   Japan is often referred to as a "technology-based

---

[234] This is modeled as "Support World Trade Regime," a code that includes all references to maintaining, strengthening or improving key aspects of the postwar world trade regime, including but not limited to GATT, WTO, individual FTAs, international currency regime agreements, etc.

[235] Modeled as "Increase/Maintain Exports," this code includes all calls for the government to aid in helping exports with the following exceptions: measures included in "Support World Trade Regime" above, measures related to export of domestic technology (knowledge-based assets, intellectual property rights, tacit knowledge about manufacturing process, etc.), which are covered in "Support Technological Cooperation" below, measures to promote foreign sales of "cultural products," which are counted in "Support Cultural Exchange" as is explained below, and measures related to expanding overseas investment for the purposes of promoting exports, which are covered in the next code introduced.

[236] This is modeled as "Expand/Maintain Overseas Investments," which includes calls for the nation to expand its investments in foreign countries, including government programs, such as the Official Development Assistance (ODA).

state" (*gijutsu rikkoku*), or a nation-state that survives through continuing technological achievement.[237] For example, speaking before the upper house in 1978, Ōta Atsuo, a member of the opposition Kōmei Party, declared, "Firstly, this, our country, is referred to as a so-called "country with few natural resources," but after all, it is also said that our country's greatest natural resources are the intellectual powers of the people; I think, for Japan, we must aspire to be a technology-based state (*gijutsu rikkoku*) that applies its human resources to raising the level of its technological capabilities."[238]

In addition to drawing on the same cognitive assertions (a lack of natural resources, a highly-skilled people) that underscore the trade elements above, the link between technology and trade is made explicit, both in the importance of technological achievement in improving manufacturing processes and product quality as well as in the constant need for the technological capabilities to develop new and innovative products that the world's consumers will buy. As Minister of International Trade and Industry Tanaka Rokusuke stated in 1981, "Because Japan is a trade-based state (*bōeki rikkoku*) and, after all, behind the words "trade-based state" are the

---

[237] As a code, "Technology-based State" includes all references to "technology-based state" (*gijutsu rikkoku*), idealized treatments of Japan, its people and/or state as scientists, engineers or technicians, and note or praise for the technological capabilities or achievements of the nation or its members.
[238] Ōta Atsuo, Kōmei Party, 2nd Sectional Meeting, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 31, 1978. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (March 25, 2011).

words "technology-based state," if we cannot win in technological competition, our trade and

future development is in doubt."[239]

The trading state narrative thus places additional normative demands on the state. First

and foremost, the state must strive to protect and nurture the nation's technological

capabilities.[240] In practice, references to Japan as a "technology-based state" are usually

followed by demands that the government facilitate the availability of foreign technology for

indigenization (*kokusanka*), calls for subsidies linked to research and development, and pleas for

more public investment in science and engineering education. For example, following his

words quoted above, Ōta Atsuo immediately demands to know why the budget of the Science

and Technology Agency has not increased as much as the public works budget.[241] Second, a

related normative claim demands that the state encourage technological cooperation with other

countries. Although this may sound too internationalist for a nation-state narrative, the reality

is quite different. In this instance, the "cooperation" called for is almost always the provision

of goods to developing countries whose domestic technological capabilities fall far short of

Japan's. In other words, it is a demand that the government help secure new export markets for

---

[239] Tanaka Rokusuke, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 12, 1981. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (April 3, 2011).
[240] This is modeled as "Improve Domestic Technology," which includes all calls for the government to improve the domestic technology base, including general investments in education and basic research and in specific interactions with domestic firms and foreign countries or firms.
[241] Ōta Atsuo, Kōmei Party, 2nd Sectional Meeting, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 31, 1978. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (March 25, 2011).

the finished goods of Japan's high-technology firms rather than a call for joint development projects or technology-sharing.[242]

As the examples cited above reveal, the trade and technological dimensions of the trading state narrative are extremely difficult to separate in practice and are thus examined as a single narrative group. However, analytically, it is possible to isolate codes that predominately relate to either the trade or the technological dimension. In this way, the trading state narrative may be viewed as two tightly-linked "sub-narratives" (i.e. major narrative components). Codes viewed as predominately related to trade may be treated as the "Merchant State" sub-narrative, while those related primarily to technology may be treated as "Technology-based State" sub-narrative.[243] The purpose of dividing this grand narrative into its two major components is purely analytical: it allows one to see at a glance how dependent the trading state narrative is on its trade and technological dimensions at any given time.

The trading state narrative was selected here not only due to its prominence in postwar nationalist discourse, but also for its relevance to scholarship on nationalism in Japan. In

---

[242] This is modeled as "Support Technology Cooperation," which includes all calls for the government to facilitate the provision of domestic goods with high-technological content to developing countries. This does include calls for joint-development projects or the export of technologies presented primarily as military use, which are covered under a different code "Support International Disarmament." Please note that the term "technological cooperation" can also be a euphemism for negotiating licenses for advanced technologies from the US or Europe, especially during the Cold War period. This latter use of the term would thus be counted toward the code for "Improve Domestic Technology."

[243] For the purposes of this sub-narrative analysis, references to Japan as a "trade-based state" and its variants cited above, "Support World Trade Regime," "Increase/Maintain Exports," and "Expand/Maintain Overseas Investments" are grouped together as the "Merchant State" sub-narrative, while references to Japan as a "Technology-based State" that has "Few Resources," "Improve Domestic Technology," and "Support Technological Cooperation" are grouped as the "Technology-based State" sub-narrative. Each sub-narrative is thus made of four individual codes.

particular, elements of this narrative are central to academic work on "economic" and "techno"

nationalisms, and also relevant to long-standing debates about the role of the postwar Japanese

state in the country's economic development and the origin and effectiveness of Japan's trade

and technology policies.[244]   In addition, this narrative has deep roots in prewar nationalist

discourse and thus serves as an important point of comparison for narratives, such as peace state,

whose prominence is almost entirely a postwar phenomenon.   An important question to ask is

thus whether or not longer pedigree makes a narrative more resistant to changes in either

prominence or content.

III. Organic State

On May 15, 2000, Mori Yoshirō of the LDP, having just taken over as Japan's prime

minister when Keizō Obuchi suffered a serious stroke in early April, rose to make a brief

statement commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the formation of the Diet Members

Conference for the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership (SAS) (*Shintō seiji renmei kokkai*

giin kondankai), a collection of Diet members aligned with the SAS, a conservative political

---

[244] Amaya, 1980; Berger, 1998; Gao, 1998; Heginbotham & Samuels, Johnson, 1982; Koizumi, 2002; McVeigh, 2004; Morris-Suzuki, 1989, 1998; Noguchi, 1976; Okimoto, 1989; Samuels, 1994; Trevor, 2001; Yamada, 2001. Please note that some of these scholars treat the elements identified as part of the trading state narrative as ideologies or policy strategies rather than as nationalism per se, but the claim here is simply that these elements have been central to key scholarly debates about not only Japanese nationalism, but also Japan's modern politics and economy.

advocacy group.   Early in his comments, Mori uttered a phrase that would prove controversial:

"It has now been thirty years since we began our activities around the thought of making our

citizens thoroughly aware that *Japan is a divine country (kami no kuni) centered around the

Emperor.*"[245]   From the mouth of a sitting prime minister, this use of pre-war rhetoric seemed

to contradict the postwar constitutional principles of popular sovereignty and freedom of religion

and elicited criticism from inside the LDP and even Mori's own cabinet, united the opposition

parties in calling for his resignation, and caused major newspapers to openly question his

suitability to lead the country.[246]   Subsequently, Mori made matters worse, first by refusing to

withdraw the comment, and then by referring to Japan using the pre-war term "national polity"

(*kokutai*) in a speech a few weeks later.[247]

Reviewing the context of these comments provides a concise picture of the dominant

nation-state narrative of the postwar right-wing in Japan.   Mori made his original *kami no kuni*

remark at a meeting of politicians aligned with the SAS, the political arm of the peak association

for Shinto religious organizations, the Association of Shinto Shrines (*Jinja honchō*).   According

to the SAS website, the group has five major goals: to build a society that holds the Imperial

household and Japan's culture and traditions in high esteem, to establish a new constitution

---

[245] *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 May 2000 (evening edition). (emphasis added).   *Kami no kuni* may also be translated as "country of the gods."
[246] *Asahi Shinbun* 17 May 2000, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* 17 May 2000.
[247] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 4 June 2000.

based on Japan's history and national character, to establish Yaskukuni shrine as the site of state

ceremonies to honor the spirits of those who gave their lives for the country, to realize an

education system capable of producing spiritually-rich children who can feel hope about the

country's future, and to establish a moral state that the world will both revere and benefit from

its contributions.[248]

While these are the goals of a political advocacy group, they are also demands that state

policy reflect a particular nation-state narrative, one that asserts that the Japanese people are a

common-descent group whose political bond is symbolized by the Imperial family and

manifested in a common moral code and set of religious traditions.[249] This narrative is referred

to variously as "homogenous nation-state" (*tanitsu minzoku kokka*), "divine country" (*kami no*

kuni), and "national polity" (*kokutai*), and is here given the summary term of organic state, as the

nation-state is presented as an organic outgrowth of a pre-existing group whose unquestioned

homogeneity is primarily attributed to common descent as well as to the associated factors of a

common history and collective dedication to unique cultural and religious traditions and

values.[250]   Although, as noted in the previous chapter, the discourses of ethnicity and

---

[248] Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership website accessed at: http://www.sinseiren.org/ (July 19, 2011).
[249] It is interesting to note that foreign scholars have reinforced the notion that modern Japan is a rare case of an ethnically or racially homogenous polity or "true" nation-state, although they sometimes couch this assertion in comparative language.   For example, Edwin Reischauer wrote of postwar Japan that "[n]o other major industrial society has anything approaching the racial homogeneity of Japan." (1988, p.33)   With regard to prewar Germany and Japan, Walker Connor more directly declares that "these two states are among the very few that are ethnically homogenous." (1994, p.41)
[250] The naming conventions described in this paragraph were modeled in the following codes for the content

147

nationality generally overlap in some way and can be said to do so here in all five nation-state

narratives depending on the understanding of ethnicity employed, the organic state narrative is

the only one of these narratives that is completely dependent on a descent-based claims to

uniqueness.

Four key elements comprise the organic state narrative, most of which are referred to

directly or indirectly in SAS's list of goals: the assumption of ethnic homogeneity (i.e. claims of

common descent), emphasis on the unifying role of the Emperor, assertions of spiritual unity

sometimes expressed as historical claims, and appeals to a civic morality that prioritize duties (to

state, Emperor, elders, family head, etc.) over individual rights. First is the assertion that Japan is

a unique combination of people and state in which "ethnic" and "civic" boundaries completely

overlap.[251]   Although this view is neither supported by the historical record nor the reality of

ethnic identifications among groups such as naturalized citizens, Ainu, Burakumin, and

---

analysis. "Japanese as Ethnicity" includes all references to Japan as an ethnic nation-state or the postwar Japanese as a single, homogenous ethnic or racial group of common descent.   "National Polity" includes all references to prewar nationalist rhetoric such as *kokutai* or *kami no kuni* as well as incidences in which words with less prewar resonance, such as "national character" (*kunigara*), are used in ways that evoke a natural organic or spiritual unity indistinguishable from other "national polity" rhetoric.

[251] Broadly construed, the term "ethnic" could be applied to claims related to the conception of the nation advanced in all the nation-state narratives examined in this study.   Here, it is used only to refer to the assertions that 1) the present-day Japanese people share a common biological descent and/or mythical origin; and 2) as a result, share a common spiritual sensibility (e.g. devotion to the Emperor, awareness of and respect for the *kami*) and social values (e..g deference to elders, family authority figures, the Emperor, etc.). Whatever other "ethnic" claims that advocates of the organic state narrative may include in their statements, these two assertions are always either implied or explicitly stated when they claim "ethnic" or "cultural" homogeneity.   In other words, the use of "ethnic" in this narrative is largely congruent with many conservative right-wing manifestations, although it is important to note that claims of common ancestral lineage and shared culture (understood in broader terms) as defining characteristics of the Japanese nation have been made by members of a variety of political stripes over Japan's postwar history, including the progressive left.   Gayle, 2001; Doak, 1997; 2001a. This point will be explored further in Chapter Seven regarding the use of racialized ethnic claims by members of the JSP in the debate over the reversion of Okinawa.

148

Okinawans (who, despite their status as full citizens, still see themselves as ethnic minorities), the ideal of an ethnically homogenous nation is central to the organic state narrative.[252] It was voiced most prominently in 1986 by Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, who, after being criticized for arguing that the level of knowledge was lower in the United States than in Japan due to the presence of ethnic minorities in the former, elaborated on his reasoning as follows:

> "The United States is a conglomerate state of multiple ethnic groups, which has its strengths, but does not make it easy when it comes to education, and there is the case that educational efforts do not reach the entire population. On this point, because Japan is an ethnically homogenous nation (*nihon wa tanitsu minzoku de*), education reaches the entire population."[253]

Although this episode became widely seen a gaffe in which Nakasone insulted Japan's most important international partner, he also received criticism from groups representing self-identified ethnic and religious minorities in Japan.[254] Nakasone's response was instructive. He first allowed that contemporary individuals who identify themselves as Japanese are descended from a mixture of peoples, including the Ainu, who first populated the Japanese archipelago. However, he went on to assert that, over the long history of human occupation of the islands, these inhabitants mixed and became the unique homogenous nation of today. When it was pointed out that he was in fact denying the very existence of minorities in contemporary

---

[252] For work on contemporary ethnic minorities in Japan, see Chapman (2008); Fukuoka (2000); Lie (2001 & 2008); and Weiner, ed. (2009).
[253] *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 September 1986.
[254] For examples, see *Asahi Shimbun*, 13 October 1986 (Catholics), 18 October 1986 (Ainu), and 30 October 1986 (Buddhists).

Japan, Nakasone then retreated slightly on to legal ground by clarifying that he meant only that

there are no internal groups that meet the legal definition of minorities to be protected under the

United Nation's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[255]   The key point here is

the assertion that, whether originally descended from multiple groups or a single founding one,

the citizens of today's Japanese state share a cultural, linguistic and historical homogeneity

because they are the progeny of people who have continuously occupied the relatively isolated

Japanese archipelago since pre-historic times.   In this view, it is this common genetic legacy

that serves as the basis for claims of a level of "ethnic" homogeneity that is extremely rare or

even unique among the populations of modern states.[256]

---

[255] Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, November 4, 1986. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (February 10, 2008).   Article 27 of this treaty reads: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language."   At the time of Nakasone's comments, the Japanese government had declared to the United Nations that no such minorities existed in Japan.   Today, the government recognizes one minority, the Ainu, under Article 27. Lie, 2001, p.93.

[256] The sociologist Oguma Eiji (2002a) has done important work on this narrative. However, his main argument--that "mixed nation" was the dominant nation-state narrative during the Imperial or prewar period but was replaced by the "homogeneous nation" narrative in the postwar period--is heavily dependent on a particular analytical move.   First, he defines "homogenous nation" as the assertions that 1) the "Japanese" have been a unique homogenous nation from time immemorial (the origins story), and 2) the "Japanese" are today a unique homogenous nation (the status quo story).   Second, although he concedes that one might view "homogeneous nation" simply as the status quo story, he argues that defining it that way would make the narrative too broad to analyze. (Oguma, 2002a, p.xxx)   By thus focusing on only the origins story, Oguma is able to show that "mixed nation" narratives, which assert that contemporary Japanese share ancestors in the very distant past with those of neighboring peoples, predominated in the prewar period, when it was in the interest of supporters of expanding the Japanese Empire to assert an (ancient) common ancestry with newly conquered peoples in order to facilitate colonial rule and the domestic support for the imperial project. Yet, changes in the origins story do not always (or even often) correlate with changes in the status quo story.   His own analysis shows that many who he counts as "mixed nation" advocates during the prewar and postwar periods still held on to the notion that contemporary Japanese were an homogenous nation (i.e. the status quo story), whatever their actual origin was in prehistory.   Since any position that does not include a claim of eternal racial purity automatically becomes "mixed nation" in his treatment, this allows him to claim that the "mixed nation" narrative predominated during the prewar period. If, for example, one were to focus instead only on the status quo story, it seems likely that a different conclusion might result, even for the prewar period.   During that period, as Oguma's own research reveals, the dominant discourse may have been

The remaining aspects of the organic state narrative specify individual elements in

support of the above general claim. The most prominent of these is the positioning of the

Emperor as the centerpiece of the union between the people and the Japanese state. In practice,

this takes the form of strong endorsements of the Imperial institution as a necessary unifying

force combining the nation (as an ethnic group) and the state. For example, speaking before

Diet in 1987, Prime Minister Nakasone described the Emperor's role in postwar Japan as

follows:

> At such times (when rebuilding a country after defeat in war), as you might expect, ethnic
> solidarity is most important and a good basis upon which to construct a social order. Here,
> citizens consider together what is needed at the center in order to achieve ethnic solidarity
> and unity. In (postwar) Japan's case, that was of course the Emperor system.[257]

It should be noted that some who advance the organic state narrative go further by

advocating revising Article One of the postwar constitution to change the legal status of the

Emperor from "symbol of the state" to "head of state" *(genshu)*.[258] Although advocates of this

change, such as Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, usually emphasize that it would not alter the

commitment to popular sovereignty, others see it as a reactionary nod to the prewar Emperor

---

"mixed nation" on the origins aspect but appears divided on the status quo aspect. If anything, "homogeneous
nation" notions seem more prevalent on this latter dimension. As noted above, the account of the "homogenous
nation-state" narrative modeled in the content analysis here focuses on the status quo dimension, and thus includes
both assertions that the Japanese are and have always been an ethnically homogenous nation and ones like
Nakasone's above, which only claim a contemporary ethnic homogeneity.

[257] Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, July 17, 1987.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (February 10, 2008).

[258] For examples of this advocacy, see Boyd (2003, pp.102-103).

system.[259]   For the purposes of this study, the emphasis on the centrality of the Imperial

institution, whether viewed as symbolic or otherwise, is regarded as a key underpinning of the

organic state narrative.[260]

A related element of the organic state narrative is the assertion of a spiritual unity

linking the Japanese people and their state.   In the postwar period, claims of this type resonate

strongly with prewar nationalist discourse, especially the rhetoric of State Shinto, the

state-sponsored religion of the prewar period that sought to unify the populace through the

common observance of rituals at Shinto shrines and the worship of the Emperor as the supreme

deity and direct descendent of the sun goddess Amaterasu, the purported common ancestor of all

present-day Japanese.[261]   Although the U.S. occupation authorities and the newly-ratified

postwar constitution abolished state support for religious activities and guaranteed freedom of

religion, the decision to retain the Imperial institution while denying its divinity nevertheless

maintained a space for continued claims of spiritual unity between people and state.   However,

due to the negative association between State Shinto and the war effort in the minds of everyday

Japanese as well as the constitutional separation of church and state, direct appeals to this

---

[259] Kishi Nobusuke, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, March 8, 1957.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (July 21, 2011):"If we only change the word to "genshu" or whatever from
"symbol," which it is now, it is not my thought to expand the Emperor's political mandate, but, from the perspective
of representing the country in international relations, all other countries, including democracies, use a president or
other personage as head of state, so there is absolutely no contradiction with democracy here.
[260] This element was thus simply modeled as a code for positive references to the Emperor, Imperial family or the
Imperial institution.
[261] For an excellent review of the long-term relationship between Shinto and the Japanese state, see Hardacre
(1989).

spiritual unity became both politically and legally controversial in the postwar period.[262]   As a

result, when such appeals are made, they are often couched in references to Japan's history as a

nation-state.   For example, in defense of his *kami no kuni* statement, Prime Minister Mori

explained he was merely "expressing the country's permanent history and traditional culture"

rather than treating the Emperor as a figure of religious reverence.[263]   Nowhere is this

conflation of claims of spiritual unity with assertions of historical continuity more apparent than

in references to the relationship between the postwar state and the Yasukuni shrine.

The facility at the current site of Yasukuni shrine was originally established in 1869 by

the Meiji Emperor to honor those who had died fighting in support of Imperial forces during the

Meiji Restoration.   In 1879, a new imperial decree renamed the site Yasukuni jinja ("Shrine of

the Peaceful Country") and placed it under the direct administrative control of the ministries of

the Army and Navy.   In 1901, all local shrines honoring the spirits of war dead were made

subsidiaries of the Yasukuni shrine, a relationship that was fully institutionalized in 1939, when

the priests of these local shrines became public officials.[264]   Throughout the first half of the

twentieth century, Yasukuni shrine was the only national site in which all the spirits of Japan's

---

[262] Article Twenty of the postwar constitution reads: "Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority. 2) No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious acts, celebration, rite or practice. 3) The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity."
[263] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 17 May 2000.
[264] Seraphim, 2006, p.233.

ever-accumulating number of war dead were enshrined and the primary ceremonial location where the Emperor himself honored those who died for him. According to Shinto practice, individuals enshrined at Yasukuni join to form a collective spirit that reflects the ideal of national homogeneity at the heart of prewar *kokutai* ideology.[265] In this way, Yasukuni became an important symbol cementing the spiritual relationship between the Emperor, the military, whose ranks were filled by ordinary subjects and thus served as a proxy for the people, and the state.[266]

Despite the claim of spiritual unity that Yasukuni embodies, the issue of its relation to the state in the postwar period increasingly came to be expressed using the language of history rather than religion. Following the defeat in 1945, Yasukuni was stripped of its status as an organ of the state by occupation authorities and the enactment of the new constitution with its prohibition of state involvement in religious activities. Rebuilding the link between the shrine and the state thus became a major goal of the postwar right-wing. Right-wing advocacy groups, such as the previously mentioned SAS and Association of Shinto Shrines, doggedly pursued this goal for decades, an effort that initially culminated in an unsuccessful legislative drive in the late 1960s to mid-1970s.[267] To avoid constitutional issues, the supporters of this legislation argued

---

[265] Ibid.

[266] In addition to Seraphim (2006), recent scholarly accounts of the Yasukuni issue include Tanaka (2002a); Shibuichi (2005); Takahashi (2005a); and Breen, ed. (2008).

[267] Powles, 1976; Seraphim, 2006, pp.238-239. Other major right-wing political advocacy groups who have supported official roles for Yasukuni include Japan Association of Bereaved Families (*Nippon izoku kai*), Military

that the use of "shrine" in the site's name was merely an artifact of its long history and thus did

not reflect its current "non-religious" purpose, which was to conduct ceremonies and rituals to

express the citizenry's gratitude and reverence for those who had died in their country's service,

a function similar to that of Arlington Cemetery in the United States.[268]   Thus, as with Mori's

defense of his *kami no kuni* comment above, a rhetorical shift occurred in which matters

previous imbued with a strong spiritual significance were now portrayed as historical practices

and traditions with no religious importance.   It should be noted that this rhetorical move

continues to be utilized today, most recently in the constitutional revision proposal approved by

the LDP in 2005, which proposes to weaken the language prohibiting state involvement in

religious practices by allowing exceptions for "social ceremonies and folk practices," a clear

reference to Yasukuni.[269]

The final element of the organic state narrative is the call for a more thorough adherence

to "traditional" civic morality.   Although the specifics are often left somewhat vague, in

practice, rhetoric of this sort emphasizes that citizens have duties as well as rights vis-à-vis the

---

Pensions Federation (*Gunjin onkyu renmei*), Japan Conference (*Nippon Kaigi*) and the Association to Commemorate the Spirits of Fallen Heroes (*Eirei ni kotaeru kai*).   Shibuichi, 2005.

[268] For an example of these arguments, see Satō Bunsei's comments introducing the bill before the Cabinet Committee of the House of Representatives on May 24, 1971.   Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (July 27, 2011). Incidentally, Satō was a model used in Gerald Curtis's *Election Campaigning, Japanese Style* (1971).

[269] Liberal Democratic Party, 2005. References affirming or encouraging visits by Japanese leaders as well as calls to return Yasukuni to government control were thus counted under the code "Support Yasukuni Shrine" in the content analysis.

state.   These duties include to love and protect the country (territory and state), to respect the

Emperor, and to refrain from allowing individual pursuits to damage the public interest or order.

In addition, the organic state narrative, which offers the family as the natural model for

the state, also incorporates calls for citizens to respect their elder family members.   Although

this last exhortation may seem more personal than civic, it evokes images of the prewar "family

system," in which households (ideally composed of grandparents, their son, and his wife and

children) were treated as the basic unit of Japanese law.   In this household system (*ieseido*), a

usually male head *(koshu)* was given special legal rights over other household members,

including the right to allow or to forbid legal contracts concerning matters such as marriages or

adoptions.   In fact, households were considered the relevant parties in most civil and criminal

matters.   Following the war, a major reform of civic law abolished this system due to its

oppressive impact on women and inconsistency with new constitutional protections of individual

rights.   Although advocates of the organic state narrative in the postwar period almost never

directly call for a revival of this prewar system of social control and institutionalized male

dominance, they often evoke or idealize aspects of it through references to "traditional" Japanese

family morality, particular appeals to filial piety and Confucian notions of respecting and

obeying elders.[270]

---

[270] For more on the prewar family system and its postwar influence, see Garon (1997); Shimizu (1987).

In this way, the morality emphasized in the organic state narrative is one in which the dutiful citizen simultaneously loves, respects and obeys two levels of authority based on familial claims: the state, which rules a homogenous nation of common descent with the Emperor as the symbolic father figure, and the household head, an ideally male figure who plays the same fatherly role in managing the affairs of other family members.[271]

The decision to include the organic state narrative in this study was an obvious one. First, the mere mention of the term "nationalism" with regard to postwar Japan will almost certainly evoke a linkage to at least one element of this narrative. In fact, much of the journalistic and scholarly treatments of nationalism in postwar Japan actually focus either exclusively or at length on this narrative alone. Second, like the trading state narrative, this narrative has strong roots in the prewar nationalist discourse and can thus serve as an important point of comparison in analysis with the other narratives examined here, which have far less demonstrable ties to prewar nationalisms. Finally, it is important to note that elements of the organic state narrative continue to be relevant to the national visions promoted by conservative politicians and right-wing political advocacy groups. For example, Abe Shinzō's "beautiful country" agenda incorporated educational reforms to encourage patriotic education as a

---

[271] References of support for these moral values were counted under the code "Enforce Traditional Values" in the content analysis.

157

compulsory subject as well as measures to facilitate the revision of the constitution at a time

when his party's revision proposal called for the Emperor to be made "head of state."

IV. Peace State (Peace-loving State, Anti-Nuclear State)

In July 2005, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a short fact sheet entitled "60

Years of Progress as a Peace State" (*Heiwa kokka toshite no 60-nen no ayumi*).   The document,

which is directed mainly at Japan's Asian neighbors, begins by linking the country's past with its

present:

> At one time in the past, our country, following a mistaken national policy of colonial
> occupations and invasions, inflicted great damage and pain to many countries, especially to
> the people of the countries of Asia.   Humbly accepting these historical facts and keeping
> feelings of deep remorse and sincere apology in our hearts, throughout the sixty years since
> the end of the war, our country, as a peace state supported by a strong democracy, has
> maintained an exclusively defensive defense policy, has avoided furthering international
> conflicts, and has made the maximum commitment of our national resources to
> international peace and stability.[272]

The fact sheet then highlights Japan's efforts based on the "ideals of the peace state."

These include its "exclusively defensive defense" posture, which refers to the maintenance of

military capabilities at the "minimum level necessary to defend the country" and the banning of

"offensive weapons," the complete absence of the use of force in international affairs in the

postwar period, the maintenance of the defense budget at 1% of national GDP, and the "three

---

[272] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website. Accessed at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taisen/ayumi.html
(August 29, 2011).

158

non-nuclear principles" (a ban against having, producing or introducing nuclear weapons into Japan). The document goes on to list national efforts to avoid the furthering of international conflicts, such as Japan's ban on arms exports and its work as the "world's only victim of a nuclear weapon" to promote disarmament and non-proliferation in the world, especially with regard to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The sheet concludes by referencing Japan's postwar efforts to actively contribute to international peace and stability, including its support for the United Nations, official development assistance programs, especially the controls in place to ensure these funds are not diverted for military purposes, and contributions to international peace-keeping operations.[273]

This fact sheet represents a fairly recent example of the official government-approved version of what is here referred to as the peace state narrative. According to this narrative, the Japanese people are proclaimed to be a fundamentally peace-loving nation that regrets the actions of the Japanese state during World War Two and vows never again to allow its state freely to use violence as a means of settling international disputes. In this way, claims about both the fundamental nature of the nation and its historical experiences place demands on the state and its policies. Although, as will be shown below, there is considerable variation in the extent and severity of these demands across different proponents of this narrative, the essential

---

[273] Ibid.

common denominator is that unique qualities and experiences of the Japanese nation place

restrictions on the Japanese state's conduct of security and foreign policy that do not apply to

other countries and thus distinguish Japan as a "peace state."[274]

Two factors comprise the essential link between the nation and the state in the peace state

narrative. First, the Japanese are asserted to be a uniquely peace-loving people. For some,

this essential quality derives from the rare historical situation of relative isolation in antiquity

combined with the early adoption of agriculture, while others point conversely to the Japanese

nation's "traditional character of tolerance and adaptation," which hones a peaceful outlook by

easing the tolerance and even adaptation of aspects of foreign culture, exemplified by the

long-standing co-existence of Shinto beliefs with Buddhism in Japan.[275] Second, the events of

the wartime period are presented both as a tragic and regretful betrayal of this fundamental

nature and as the recent, shared experience that rededicated the nation to its natural peaceful

pursuits.

References to this correction by historical fire are common and span the political

spectrum. For instance, in 1999, Norota Hōsei, then director-general of the Japan Defense

---

[274] References to Japan as a peace state (*heiwa kokka*) were counted under the code "Peace State." References to Japan as a "nuclear victim country" (*hibakukoku*) or the "world's only victim of a nuclear weapon" (*yuiitsu no hibakukoku*) were counted under the code "Nuclear Victim State." For discussion of this narrative and its element, see Orr (2001); Yamamoto (2004); Berger (1998); Boyd & Samuels (2005).
[275] For an example of the former view of the origin of this fundamental nature, see Oguma (2002a, p.322), while the analysis of New Year's Day editorials by Takekawa (2007, pp.65-66) provides a good example of the latter view.

Agency for the LDP-led, center-right government of Obuchi Keizō, declared before the Diet,

"[I]t is a fact that our country's actions in the last war took a high toll on the citizens of our

neighboring countries and, as a consequence, it is necessary that we remain determined to follow

the road of the peace state and never again go to war."[276]   In the 1960s, the center-left daily

Asahi Shimbun argued in its editorials that wartime experience, especially the atomic bombings

of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were transformative, granting Japan a unique moral authority to lead

in the quest for international peace.[277]   In this, the paper's editorialists argued, the Japanese

people should find a new sense of national pride.[278]

A key institutional referent for the peace state narrative is Article Nine of the postwar

constitution. Article Nine, along with the rest of the postwar constitution, was enacted in May

1947 and has never been amended.   It reads:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people
> forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a
> means of settling international disputes.
> In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as
> other war potential, will never be maintained.   The right of belligerency of the state will not
> be recognized.

---

[276] Norota Hōsei, Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, February 18, 1999. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 29, 2011).
[277] Takekawa, 2007, p.66.
[278] Such references to the wartime experiences and their consequences are thus the essential cognitive schema of the peace state narrative.   In the content analysis, these have been grouped under the codes "War Regret" for general expression of regret for Japan's wartime actions and "Atomic Bombings," for specific references to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and their meaning for postwar Japan.

Appeals to the constitution as the legal manifestation of the peace state narrative are common and span the political spectrum from all corners of the left to what has been called the pragmatic right and even further.[279] For example, speaking before the Diet in 1955, Katayama Testsu, who had become the first socialist to serve as prime minister during the occupation period, lectured then Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō on the importance of Article Nine and the "Peace Constitution":

> We have a state with the great responsibility to secure the peaceful lives of its citizens, ensuring that the calamities (of the war) never occur again, along with the fear and poverty; and from that point, we built a democratic state to realize the people's sovereignty, while at the same time established a peace constitution commensurate with this (new democratic state) and have since progressed as a peace state, the peaceful Japan; it was under this conception, under these ideals, that Article Nine was established.[280]

Although often associated with leftist politics in general and the Japan Socialist Party in particular, this emphasis on the connection between Article Nine and the peace state narrative is also common among those of other political stripes. For example, in 1987, Aoshima Yukio, an independent member of the House of Councillors, addressed Prime Minister Nakasone in a similar way: "In the general citizen's view, after that abhorrent Pacific War, our country began down the new path of the peace state under the "peace constitution.""[281] More importantly, the

---

[279] For an extensive discussion of the place of Article Nine debate in postwar politics, see Boyd (2003); Boyd & Samuels (2005).
[280] Katayama Tetsu, Rightist Socialist Party of Japan, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, March 26, 1955. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 29, 2011).
[281] Aoshima Yukio, Independent, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, May 20, 1987. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 29, 2011).

constitutional foundation of the peace state narrative is also referred to by leaders on the political

right.   One interesting example of this occurred during the debate over Japan's response to the

Gulf crisis in October 1990, when future prime minister and defense hawk Koizumi Junichirō

declared:

> Given the Constitution, Japan has no choice but to pursue an independent pacifist policy
> (*ikkoku heiwa shugi*).   This is the experiment, whereby Japan has been trying to develop
> such a policy as an integral part of its people's way of life for the past fifty postwar years, no
> matter whether the international community understands such a policy or not."[282]

Despite the widespread emphasis of this integral relationship between Article Nine and

the peace state narrative, it is important to note that different proponents of this narrative

interpret the connection in different ways.   Across much of the left during the postwar period,

Article Nine was seen to mandate a doctrine of state non-violence.   In this view, the

constitution forbids the state from participating in any type of war, aggressive or defensive, and

from maintaining any type of military capabilities whatsoever.[283]   For example, during the

public unrest over the Kishi government's efforts to renew the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960,

Suzuki Tsuyoshi of the JSP attacked Kishi's plans before the Diet declaring, "I believe our

country, which just fifteen years ago suffered a calamitous defeat due to the reckless politics of

military factionalism, should move forward by establishing a peace state, a civilized state, that,

in accordance with the peace constitution, abandons all armaments."   He then went on to

---

[282] Quoted in Yamamoto, 2004, p.2.
[283] Boyd, 2003; Shidehara, 1951, pp.210-15; Schlichtmann, 1995, pp.51-3.

declare both Japan's newly-founded Self-Defense Force and the security treaty with the United

States to be in violation of the constitution and this vision of the peace state.[284] In this view, the

peace state can thus neither have arms nor use them for any purpose, even self-defense.

On the other hand, proponents of the peace state narrative on the right, as well as successive

governments from the 1950s to those led by the Democratic Party of Japan today, hold that the

central ideal behind Article Nine, and thus the peace state, is state non-aggression. According

to this interpretation, aggressive war and the possession of armaments for that purpose are

renounced, but the state retains the right to possess military capabilities and to use them as

necessary to preserve its existence as a sovereign entity. This view of Article Nine and the

proper limits of the peace state, therefore, allowed early proponents on the pragmatic right, such

as Yoshida Shigeru and Satō Eisaku, to employ the peace state narrative to argue for an elaborate

set of restrictions on the Japanese state's abilities to maintain and use military capabilities.[285]

Over time, this less extreme take on the relationship between Article Nine and the peace state, at

least as a general principle, became the official position of all postwar governments. So, for

---

[284] Suzuki Tsuyoshi, Japan Socialist Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 31, 1960. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
[285] These restrictions include many of the detailed items mentioned on the MFA fact sheet above, such as the exclusively defensive posture, ban on offensive weapons, 1% GDP ceiling for defense spending, as well as others, such as the ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. For more on these restrictions, see Chapter Six.

example, it was this version of the peace state narrative to which Prime Minister Nakasone

Yasuhiro was referring when he stated before the Diet in 1985:

> The very purpose of protecting the constitution is to make Japan a peace state; however, to
> do this, we must make it at least a country that has the minimum necessary self-defense
> capabilities to avoid tempting foreign countries to invade; in this way, I think of myself as
> the greatest supporter of the current constitution.[286]

Considering these different usages, it is thus important to note that the peace state

narrative, often with the exact same language, was utilized across the political spectrum by

proponents who positioned themselves at various points between the poles of between state

non-violence and state non-aggression. In addition, it should be noted that over the course of

the postwar period, different individuals and political parties shifted their positions on this scale,

usually to move closer to the state non-aggression position.[287] However, the common

denominator uniting all of these usages is the assertion that the qualities and experiences of the

Japanese nation place restrictions on their state's security and foreign policies that other

nation-states do not have. Although these restrictions may range from complete bans to

qualified allowances, the idea that the Japanese state must conduct its security and foreign policy

under a set of unique restrictions is at the heart of nearly all references to the constitution in the

peace state narrative.[288]

---

[286] Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, House of Representatives, Budget Committee, February 5, 1985.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
[287] Boyd, 2003; Boyd & Samuels, 2005; Hook, 1996.
[288] References to these restrictions were coded in the content analysis as follows. First, general references to
Article Nine or the constitution in the context of security policy were coded under "Support Peace Constitution."

The peace state narrative also makes claims on the Japanese state's conduct of foreign policy, although in this area the claims are more prescriptive than proscriptive. For instance, the Japanese state is to conduct its foreign affairs following the principles of "peace diplomacy" (*heiwa gaikō*), a somewhat ambiguous term that generally refers to both 1) the use of every non-violent means available to forward the national interest in dealings with other countries; and, more specifically, 2) the leveraging of Japan's image as a "peace state" to enhance friendly ties with international partners, who will be naturally predisposed to cooperate due to Japan's non-threatening posture. With regard to this second point, especially in dealing with Asian neighbors, publicly expressing regret for Japan's past invasions and colonial occupations in the region is an oft-repeated requirement.[289] For example, in 1998, Kijima Hideo of the Japan Communist Party, in criticizing the Japan's recent foreign policy towards Asia before the Diet, chastised then Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō as follows:

References to special restrictions in the area of personnel, equipment and budget for military capabilities were coded as "Restrain War Potential." These include restrictions on both the type and quantity of equipment, personnel and funding that may be applied to the state's military capabilities. References to special restrictions in the area of the actions the Japanese state may take with regard to the use of force in its international dealings were coded as "Eschew Use of Force." These include references to restrictions on the overseas deployment of military personnel, restrictions on what actions may be taken by military personnel once deployed overseas, and related limitations on the Japanese state's exercise of the right of collective self-defense. In addition, references to Japan's non-nuclear policy (i.e. "Three Non-nuclear Principles) were coded under "Support Non-Nuclear Principles." Please note that only the first code above is a direct reference to Article Nine or the postwar constitution. The other three codes count references to restrictions that may or may not be explicitly linked to Article Nine in the broader context of a particular speech or editorial but are definitely part and parcel of the peace state narrative as a whole.

[289] Due to the ambiguity with which this term is sometimes used and its potential overlap with codes such as "Eschew Use of Force" and "War Regret," references to this proscription were coded as "Implement Peace Diplomacy" only in instances in which the key word *heiwa gaikō* appeared and either referred to the concept only in general terms or specifically mentioned the leveraging of Japan's image as a peace state in foreign affairs.

It is my belief that the starting point of postwar politics is that Japan can only conduct its peace diplomacy (*heiwa gaikō*) in Asia if the cabinet is united around the stance that the country deeply regrets the last wars of invasion and is advancing its diplomacy by strictly adhering to the principles of the peace state.[290]

Finally, the peace state narrative also calls on the Japanese state to pursue peace outside of its borders, especially through efforts to further international disarmament and fight the proliferation of nuclear weapons.[291] The linkage between Japan's commitment to being a peace state and these activities is explicit in this construction. For example, in Diet testimony in 1981, then Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō summed up this normative claim succinctly:

> Both a peace state and the world's only victim of a nuclear weapon, Japan, having experienced the misery of war's calamities and the great tragic sacrifices of those atomic bombings, must face the world and strongly call for the reduction and elimination of nuclear arms.[292]

As with the trading state narrative above, the different components of the peace state narrative deeply intertwined in practice and should be treated as a single narrative group. However, for analytical purposes, it is possible to identify two "sub-narratives" within these tightly-wound components. The first, referred to as the "Peace-loving State" sub-narrative, emphasizes the trajectory from the overall failures of wartime Japan's actions to the "peace constitution" to a "peace state" that is uniquely constrained in its capacity to use force and

---

[290] Kijima Hideo, Japan Communist Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, August 19, 1998. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
[291] References to the assertion that Japan should make efforts in arms control and the reduction of conventional weapons in other countries were coded as "Support International Disarmament." This included references to specific policies such as Japan's arms export ban and efforts to keep official development assistance funds from being diverted to military use. References to the assertion that Japan should contribute to reduce and even eliminate nuclear weapons globally were separately coded as "Support International Nuclear Disarmament."
[292] Suzuki Zenkō, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Concillors, March 8, 1981. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).

167

dedicated to pursuing the reduction of conventional weapons overseas.[293] The second, referred

to here as the "anti-nuclear state" sub-narrative, stresses the connections between the horror and

loss of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan's unique status as the only victim of a nuclear attack, and

its resultant moral mission to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons from the world, both

by refraining from pursuing nuclear weapons at home and promoting nuclear disarmament

abroad.[294] As with the trading state narrative, dividing this narrative into two major

components allows for easy comparisons when considering changes within the narrative group

over time.

The peace state narrative was selected for inclusion in this study for the following

reasons. First, the narrative and its individual elements are often addressed in academic work

on Japan's postwar nationalism and national identity. These include both histories of the period

and work in political science and sociology about analyzing the origin and impact of national

identities on security policy.[295] Second, although pacifism and related thought have a longer

history in Japan, the peace state narrative itself is a creation of the immediate postwar years and

thus provides a contrast with narratives such as those of the trading and organic state, which

---

[293] The "peace-loving state" sub-narrative includes the following seven codes: "Peace State," "Support Peace Constitution," "Implement Peace Diplomacy," "Eschew Use of Force," "Restrain War Potential," "Support International Disarmament," and "War Regret."
[294] The "anti-nuclear state" sub-narrative includes the following four codes: "Nuclear Victim State," "Atomic Bombings," "Support Non-Nuclear Policy," and "Support International Nuclear Disarmament."
[295] McVeigh, 2004; Orr, 2001, Yamamoto, 2004; Seraphim, 2006; Dower, 1999; Oguma, 2002b; Katzenstein, 1996a, Berger, 1998; Samuels, 2007; Doak, 2007.

have deep prewar roots.[296] Finally, it is important to understand how a narrative that repeatedly

calls for state restraint in security policy develops and changes, especially in a region plagued by

nuclear proliferation and ever-increasing military spending.

V. Democratic State

Today, some ten odd years after the war, the democracy that at the time was relatively
unfamiliar to us, has at last spread its roots into Japan's soil. I feel that this democracy
constitutes the spiritual foundation of the new Japan, and it is my intention to defend it, no
matter what difficulties are encountered, and nurture it.[297]

It may come as a surprise to some that the man who uttered these words in June 1959

was Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, a former member of General Tōjō's wartime cabinet who

spent the immediate postwar years in Sugamo Prison as a suspected Class A war criminal.   At

the time of his death in 1987, Kishi was accused by at least one obituary writer of having been "a

reactionary determined to move Japan away from an alien-imposed democracy back towards the

authoritarian state of the prewar years."[298] During his tenure as prime minister, this staunch

conservative called for the abrogation of Article Nine and only six months before making the

above statement had tried but failed to pass a law granting the police greater powers of search

and seizure, a move widely seen as a means of cracking down on political dissent.[299]   That such

---

[296] For a brief account of postwar scholars' efforts to assert prewar roots for pacifism in Japan, see Benfell (1998, pp.14-15).
[297] Quoted from Kurzman (1960, p.373).
[298] Obituary, *The Times*, 10 August 1987; Cited in Kersten (1996, p.199).
[299] Watanabe, 2002, p.590-593.   Although a long-standing supporter of revision, Kish and his interpreter argue that

a leader felt compelled to use his bully pulpit to further what is here called the democratic state narrative is thus indicative of the extent to which even the right-wing "firmly embraced the overwhelmingly popular rhetoric of democracy" in the postwar period.[300]

The democratic state narrative is somewhat different from the other nation-state narratives examined here in that it can be voiced in both universalistic and particularistic ways.[301] Kevin Doak has called this "the problem of democracy and 'identity,' or as it is expressed at times, 'universalism' and 'tradition.'"[302] On the one hand, democracy is portrayed as a home-grown feature of the Japanese nation-state that is deeply rooted in the Japanese people's historical experiences, culture and traditions. In this way, the democratic state narrative depicts a uniquely Japanese form of the regime type with roots that stretch back into the prewar period. On the other hand, democracy is also treated as a set of universalistic ideals as well as a regime type that Japan shares with other countries. In this light, as in Kishi's statement above, democracy is sometimes portrayed as relatively new to Japan, a foreign import (or imposition, depending on the context), and a point of commonality with other

the reporter to which Kishi supposedly made this statement about Article Nine misunderstood his meaning. See Kishi (1983, pp.439-440). On the police duties bill, see Hara (1988, p.245).
[300] Seraphim, 2006, p.45.
[301] All references to Japan as a "democratic state" (*minshushugi kokka*), "liberal state" (*jiyūshugi kokka*) or related variants were coded under "Democratic State" in the content analysis.
[302] Doak, 1999, p.523.

nation-states.[303]   It is thus important to note the democratic state narrative incorporates both

particularistic and universalistic claims.

The particularistic aspects of the democratic state narrative often include the claim of

the historical continuity of the political community across the prewar and postwar political

orders.   Some such assertions are grounded in references to Japan's constitution.   In one rather

extreme example, Yoshida Shigeru, the first postwar prime minister, emphasized continuities

between the postwar and prewar constitutions, even going so far as to state, "I have no hesitation

whatsoever in declaring that the political character of Japan as shaped by the constitution

authorized by the Emperor Meiji is, in the language of the present day, preeminently democratic,

pre-eminently un-militaristic."[304]   Yoshida then concluded that the postwar constitution would

not transform "the political character of the Japanese people" because "democratic government

is not being established for the first time by the new constitution, which does no more than

express again in different words what the country has always had."[305]   Other forms of this claim,

however, locate the continuity directly in the Japanese people, whose love of consensus and

---

[303] It should be noted that the assertion that democracy was new to postwar Japan is historically inaccurate.   As
Dower (2003, p.6) concludes, "What pre-1945 Japan experienced was not the absence of democracy, but its failure."
In this way, as with the trading and organic state narrative, the democratic state narrative has considerable roots in
the prewar period.
[304] Dower, 1979, pp.322-323.
[305] Ibid., pp.324-325.

social harmony and prewar experience with democratic institutions makes them a natural fit for

the popular sovereignty unambiguously granted them by the postwar constitution.[306]

More tempered takes on the particularism of the democratic state narrative usually allow

that defeat in the war and foreign occupation played roles in the development of Japan's

democratic state but nonetheless prioritize the essential contributions of Japan's own history,

culture and traditions.   A good example of this somewhat nuanced approach is offered by Prime

Minister Kaifu Toshiaki's testimony before the Diet in 1990:

> It is true the changes in Japan during the years immediately following the end of the
> war–being defeated in the fight and then choosing the road of the democratic state
> (*minshushugi kokka*)—in a certain sense might be seen as the result of external stimulus or
> foreign pressure (*gaiatsu*).   However, it was we (the Japanese people) who resolved to live
> under liberty and democracy and, in the process of making the continuous and
> single-hearted efforts to build the nation in that direction, although using the word
> "Japanese-style" (*nihon gata*) may be overstating it, I believe we all worked to establish a
> democracy that befits Japan's own history, culture and traditions.[307]

The universalism of the democratic state narrative is expressed in varying degrees.

Perhaps the most expansive is the vision promoted in the early postwar period by the philosopher

Maruyama Masao as *kokuminshugi*, sometimes translated as "civic nationalism" but what he

referred to as "healthy nationalism" (*kenzen na kokuminshugi*).[308] Building on the work of

---

[306] As with proponents of the peace state narrative, advocates of the democratic state narrative thus point to the postwar constitution as a legal foundation for their national vision, especially Article One, which relegates the Emperor to symbolic status and assigns sovereign power to the people.
[307] Kaifu Toshiaki, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, June 4, 1990. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
[308] Maruyama, 1995 [1961]; Doak, 2007, p.206-206.

Meiji-era scholar Fukuzawa Yukichi, Maruyama developed conceptions of personal and social autonomy based on appeals to universal ideals of individualism and explicitly rejected nationalisms premised on ethnicity or other particularistic claims.[309] Although Maruyama was primarily concerned with how the individual retains autonomy in relations with both society and the state, his influence helped make universal appeals to democratic ideals a distinguishing aspect of Japan's postwar nationalist discourse.[310] This can be seen in the numerous instances in which the democratic state narrative is used to introduce ideal models of democracy to justify the more thorough enforcement of democratic principles in Japan.[311] To give just one example, Ueda Kōichrō of the Japan Communist Party, in a 1989 debate over campaign finance reform with Prime Minister Kaifu, began his argument by referencing the democratic state narrative: "Although there is much current debate, as long as Japan is a democratic state based on the principles of the constitution, I think we should realize the ban on political donations from corporations and organizations with the utmost speed."[312]

A final expression of the democratic state narrative occupies a middle ground between the particularistic and universalistic poles. Although perhaps properly viewed as a form of

---

[309] Maruyama, 1963, p.151-152.

[310] Kersten, 1996, pp.231-233.

[311] All references to the need for more thorough enforcement of democratic principles in Japan were coded under "Enforce Democratic Principles." This includes such matters as calls for fairer elections, closer adherence to "democratic rules" "democratic politics," and "parliamentary rules," stricter implementation of "civilian control," and the guarding of individual freedom at home.

[312] Ueda Kōichrō, Japan Communist Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, October 24, 1989. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).

universalism, the exclusionary nature of these claims can approach particularism.[313] For

example, particularly during the Cold War, the democratic state narrative was often employed to

emphasize Japan's uniqueness from its neighbors. In one such common usage, Japan is

asserted to be either the only or the leading democracy in Asia. "Japan itself, as a member of

Asia, has developed as a dignified, superior, rich democratic state," began Foreign Minister

Ōhira Masayoshi in 1964, "I think this is clearly the basis for us to be the guiding post for

Asia."[314]

An additional, somewhat less exclusionary type of claim involves identifying Japan as a

member of the community of democratic states. During the Cold War, this claim was

sometimes made to signal Japan's allegiance to the side of the United States and its allies,

although it was also used to distinguish Japan from the non-democratic Communist Block.

Following the end of the Cold War, this appeal has often been used to emphasize bilateral ties.

For example, in 2006, Nukaga Fukushirō, then director-general of the Japan Defense Agency,

argued that shared values of liberalism and democracy between Japan and the United States

provide a good example for why creating a broader community of democracies in Asia would

contribute to the peace and stability of Japan, the region and the world.[315] In 2007, Prime

---

[313] All references to Japan as a member of the community of democracies, the free world or bilateral identifications with fellow democratic states were coded under "Member of Free World" in the content analysis.
[314] Ōhira Masayoshi, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 4, 1964. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
[315] Nukaga Fukushirō, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 17, 2006.

Minister Abe Shinzō used similar rhetoric of shared values when he reached out to India calling the pair "the two great democratic states of Asia."[316]

The democratic state narrative thus operates, sometimes simultaneously, on both particularistic and universalistic levels. In the former, it establishes a social category in the same way as other nation-state narratives in this study, in this case by emphasizing how the Japanese are a "civic" nation born of a unique history, culture and traditions and thus demand a state that reflects this fundamental nature. In the latter, it appeals to universal ideals to establish a social category that is an "external-origin entity" that, while still doing the work of establishing a necessary link between nation and state, also transcends this link by facilitating identifications, however partial, with the nation-state narratives and resultant social categories of other countries.[317] In this appeal to universal ideals, some variants of the democratic state narrative thus challenge narrow views of what nationalism can be and, in doing so, bear a likeness to what some scholars refer to as "liberal nationalism."[318]

The democratic state narrative was included in this study for several reasons. First, concerns with democracy usually occupy the central place in studies of postwar Japanese nationalism. These include both work that emphasizes the generation and change of

Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
[316] Abe Shinzō, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, February 13, 2007. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 30, 2011).
[317] Kersten, 1996, p.231.
[318] Gayle, 2001, p.7.

democratic aspects of Japanese nationalism and those mainly concerned with the relationship of

nationalism and the health of postwar Japanese democracy.[319]   Second, the democratic state

narrative is also an example of a postwar nation-state narrative with prewar roots, although

perhaps not to the degree of the trading and organic state narratives.   Finally, the universalistic

aspects of the democratic state narrative provide a somewhat unique opportunity to examine a

nation-state narrative that can draw a link between nation and state while still leaving open the

possibility for linkages at even higher levels across national borders.   This aspect allows for

contrast with more purely exclusionary discursive forms, such as the organic state narrative.

VI. Civilized State (Cultured State, Welfare State)

[A]nd still further we went on to build a cultural great power (*bunka taikoku*), a cultured, civilized state (*bunka bunmei kokka*) and, in my view, is this not the constant goal to which we all must aspire?   In so doing, I think the thing for us to be proud of is our people, of course.   Japan's fortune is its people.   Although from now we will see the arrival of the world's greatest aging society, I say, is it not our role to send the world a message by showing it a Japanese society in which the young and old alike can lead fulfilling, vital lives?[320]

The above words, uttered by the LDP's Nukaga Fukushirō in Diet questioning of Prime

Minister Koizumi Junichirō in 2003, references prominently the civilized state narrative,

arguably the most complex narrative examined in this study.   In this narrative, the Japanese are

---

[319] Oguma, 2002b, Doak, 2007, McNeil, 2004, Bowen, 2003; Dower, 1999 & 2003.
[320] Nukaga Fukushirō, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, January 23, 2003. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 5, 2011).

asserted to be a highly civilized nation in the sense that they place great weight on ensuring both

their own cultural development and basic welfare. This fundamental nature of the people must

thus be reflected in their state, generally by prioritizing cultural and welfare policies.[321] The

somewhat unique linkage between culture and welfare in this formulation is explicit. "When I

think of the tremendous amount of work that must be done from here in order to rebuild Japan as

a cultured state (*bunka kokka*), a welfare state (*fukushi kokka*)," said Director-General of the

Home Affairs Agency Aoki Masashi in 1959, "as local governments will actually be managing

the requisite cultural and welfare facilities (of this new state), we must reinforce them and, in

addition, I think, with regard to their ties to the national government, it is necessary to maintain

routine links with them."[322]

The simultaneous emphasis on cultural development and basic welfare is grounded in

both postwar legal developments as well as the prewar origin and lingering ambiguity of the key

term "culture" (*bunka*). Regarding the former, as with proponents of the peace state (Article

Nine) and the democratic state (Article One, among others) narratives, advocates of the civilized

---

[321] General references to the Japan as a civilized or cultured state (*bunka kokka, bunka bunmei kokka*) were counted in the content analysis under "Civilized/Cultured State." Please note the discussion of the ambiguity of the term *bunka* below.

[322] Aoki Masahi, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, March 20, 1958. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 5, 2011). Explicit references to Japan as a welfare state (*fukushi kokka*) were coded in the content analysis as "Welfare State." Although culture and welfare are tightly linked in this narrative, to the extent possible, references explicitly emphasizing one or the other were separated in the coding to facilitate analysis at the sub-narrative level. See the discussion of the "cultured state" and "welfare state" sub-narratives below.

state narrative locate a legal foundation for their national vision in the postwar constitution, in

this case Article Twenty-Five, which reads:

> All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome (*kenkō de*) and cultured (*bunkateki na*) living.
> In all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare (*shakai fukushi*) and security (*shakai hoshō*), and of public health.

Although perhaps less dramatic than the parts of the constitution cited by advocates of

other narratives, Article Twenty-Five nevertheless serves as an central institutional support for

both the link between culture and welfare and the demand that the state prioritize the

advancement of both.   For example, Haseo Yukihisa of the Kōmei Party succinctly declared

before a Diet subcommittee in 1980 that "Article Twenty-Five of the constitution prescribes

'wholesome and cultured living' and makes it a duty of the state (to achieve).   And the nation

(*kokumin*) asks for the realization of the welfare state (*fukushi kokka*) set out by the constitution

without further delay."[323]

A second factor linking culture and welfare involves the origins of the term *bunka*

(commonly translated today as "culture").   Although imported from Chinese during the

pre-modern period, *bunka* did not come into popular use in Japan until the Meiji period, when

pro-Western modernizers dubbed their project of social transformation "civilization and

---

[323] Haseo Yukihisa, Kōmei Party, Third Budget Subcommittee, House of Representatives, March 5, 1980. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 5, 2011).

enlightenment" (*bunmei kaika*) and sometimes used it as an abbreviation of the longer slogan.[324]

At that time, the term was thus strongly associated with the achievements of Western civilization,

especially scientific and industrial development, and more generally with the concept of a

universal trajectory through which all societies achieve progress.   It was not until the 1920s that

bunka came to take on the meaning of the particular values, practices and traditions that

distinguish one society from another.   More specifically, the term became associated with

interest in art, architecture and literature and was seen as a contrast to the earlier emphasis on

material aspects of civilization.[325]

Perhaps as a consequence of these evolving and contrasting usages of key terms, the

phrase *bunka kokka*, which can be translated as "civilized state" or "cultured state," takes on both

universalistic and particularistic forms in the postwar period.[326]   In its universalistic forms, the

term refers to a category of nation-state that has achieved either advanced levels of material

progress or high levels of cultural refinement, especially in artistic fields or on aesthetic terms.

The unifying theme is that such nation-states are able to guarantee a high quality of life for their

people.   In its particularistic forms, however, *bunka kokka* emphasizes unique and superior (as

least in some ways) aspects of a particular nation-state's (in this case, Japan's) material progress

---

[324] Morris-Suzuki, 1998, pp.63-65.
[325] Ibid.
[326] McVeigh, 2004, pp.188-189.   Please note that McVeigh translates these alternatives as "civilized nation-state" and "cultural nation-state."   In the translations here, the fact that the "state" in question is a "nation-state" is implied.

or cultural development, with the implication again being that these features enhance and enrich the lives of its people. In this way, as was the case with the democratic state narrative, the key terms involved in the civilized state narrative exhibit features of both universalism and particularism, but this time with regard to social welfare and culture.

In practice, whether in its universalistic or particularistic forms, the civilized state narrative is regularly deployed to make claims on the state regarding either cultural or social welfare policy. Regarding the former, the term *bunka kokka*, which in this case is perhaps best translated as "cultured state," was defined in 1988 Diet testimony by then foreign minister and future prime minister, Uno Sōsuke:

> A cultured state is a country with many cultural assets (*bunkazai*) and many citizens (*kokumin*) who protect these assets. In addition, I would say that a cultured state is also a country in which there are many citizens who are capable of creating cultural assets, both those handed down from the past and new ones that look to the future.[327]

In this universalistic formulation, cultured state is thus an elite category to which Japan can belong, presumably along with other nation-states. However, "cultured state" is also used in particularistic ways that stress Japan's unique (and sometimes superior) culture and the demands of its nation for the state to foster and protect this valued national asset. For example, the LDP's Yoshida Minoru drew on this vein of the narrative in 1977 when he argued Japan still had far to go in advancing its cultural policies in order to be a "true cultured state" (*shin no*

---

[327] Uno Sōsuke, Liberal Democratic Party, Second Budget Sub-Committee, House of Representatives, March 9, 1988. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011).

bunka kokka), including addressing cultural assets in child education and dealing with the outflow of Japanese antiquities to foreign countries.[328] It was also to this strand of the narrative which Takizawa Kōsuke, an artist-turned-politician, appealed when he complained in Diet debate about the increased use of "strange foreign loan words" (*hen na gairaigo*) and its deleterious impact on Japan's aspirations to be a "cultured state."[329]

Both forms of the narrative are commonly introduced to argue for increases or improvements in the government's educational and cultural policies, especially the budget and operation of the Agency of Cultural Affairs.[330] This agency manages six policy areas with "varying degrees of impact upon national identity formation: religious affairs, copyright, language, arts, international exchange, and the protection of cultural assets."[331] In debates over cultural policy, both the universalistic and particularistic variants are employed and sometimes intermingled. For example, in a 2001 Diet exchange between the New Kōmei Party's Saitō Testuo and Prime Minister Koizumi, Saitō began by asserting that a "cultured state" (*bunka kokka*) that is respected for its unique culture and cultural contributions is the ideal to which

[328] Yoshida Minoru, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, April 4, 1977. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011).
[329] Takizawa Kōsuke, Democratic Socialist Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, February 25, 1985. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011).
[330] These claims are model in two different codes in the content analysis. "Support Japanese Culture" includes all calls for Japan to foster and protect its domestic culture, including both traditional and innovational endeavors in areas such as cuisine, theater, handcrafts, calligraphy, literature, film, music, art and sports, especially Japan's traditional martial arts. This includes efforts to establish or improve national cultural facilities such as theaters or museums , to improve cultural education, to establish and maintain national cultural prizes, and to protect domestic cultural assets. References to cultural exchange (*bunka kōryū*) with other countries were counted under "Support Cultural Exchange."
[331] McVeigh, 2004, p.166.

Japan should strive in the twenty-first century.[332] Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō then

responded to Saitō's subsequent proposal to increase cultural policy spending by declaring his

desire to draft a "cultural budget" (*bunka yosan*) that would "leave Japan in no way inferior to

the world's other advanced cultural countries" (*sekai no senshin bunka shokoku*).[333]

A similar dichotomy of uses can be observed in debates over Japan as a "civilized state,

a welfare state" (*bunka kokka toshite, fukushi kokka toshite*). On the one hand, this narrative is

often utilized to highlight the Japanese nation's demands that its state guarantee basic welfare for

it citizens.[334] For example, testifying before the Diet in 1952, Waseda University Professor

Suetaka Makoto argued that since all members of the nation had suffered for the war effort, "as a

civilized state or a welfare state" (*bunka kokka toshite, arui wa fukushi kokka*), the state had to

honor these sacrifices by guaranteeing a minimum standard of living for all its nation's members,

both soldier and citizen alike.[335] Later in the postwar period, stronger particularistic assertions

were advanced, including some proclaiming a "Japanese-style welfare state" (*nihongata fukushi*

kokka) or a "Japanese-style welfare society" (*nihongata fukushi shakai*), although what exactly

was "Japanese-style" about the patterns of welfare provision in Japan was the subject of

---

[332] Saitō Testuo, New Kōmei Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, May 14, 2001. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011).
[333] Koizumi Junichirō, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, May 14, 2001. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011).
[334] References to improving Japan's social welfare programs, including pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance, family assistance, and support for the disabled were coded under "Improve Domestic Welfare Programs."
[335] Professor Suetaka Makoto, Waseda University, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, December 6, 1952. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011).

debate.[336] The most common assertion in support of this claim drew a link between a purported

preference among the Japanese for three or more generations to live in the same household and a

resultant reduced need for state provision for pensions and elderly care in comparison with that

of other countries.[337] On the other hand, such particularistic claims often sit side-by-side with

references to the welfare state as a general category of a nation-state that guarantees the basic

welfare of the members of its nation. This more universalistic usage occurs most often in the

form of comparisons between Japan's social welfare policies and those of the welfare states of

Europe and North America. In many cases, these comparisons are intended to be unfavorable

to Japan and spur renewed effort to achieve the ideals of the welfare state at home. For

example, Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato told the Diet in 1960:

> [T]he politicians in every country hope to realize a welfare state (*fukushi kokk*a). However, among some eighty countries, only seven or eight have. And these are in Europe and Northern Europe, where social welfare systems took off extremely early. I am therefore moving forward with the goal of building a social welfare state (*shakai fukushi kokka*).[338]

As is apparent in Ikeda's quotation above, it is important to note that although universal

concepts such as progress are referenced and Japan is placed in categories that include other

nation-states, the actual associations being made are to extremely exclusive groups, the small

---

[336] Béland & Lecours, 2008, p.211; Peng, 2006.
[337] See, for example, Finance Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō's comments to this affect before the Budget Committee, House of Councillors, May 14, 1990. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011). It should be noted that this alleged link may be disputed on both positive and normative grounds. See Peng (2006).
[338] Ikeda Hayato, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, December 16, 1960. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 6, 2011).

number of Western countries that have achieved modern welfare states or boast supposedly

highly developed cultures. In this way, uses of the "universalistic" forms of the narrative

actually place Japan in more exclusive company that the universalistic form of the democratic

state narrative and is sometimes accompanied with self-laudatory appellations such as "advanced

country" (*senshinkoku*) or "modern state" (*kindai kokka*). For example, addressing Prime

Minister Takeshita in 1988 to support an exhibit on humor in art at the National Diet Library,

Miyachi Shōsuke of the Kōmei Party argued:

> As our era is emphasized to be one of moving from material to spiritual affluence, I believe
> our government should be actively engaged in this type of humorous art, art more generally,
> and culture as the very proof that we are an advanced country (*senshinkoku*), a civilized state
> (*bunka kokka*)...[339]

As is the case with the universalistic form of the democratic state narrative, the act of associating

Japan with the other nation-states here is always itself at least an indirect form of self-praise as

well as self-definition.

As with the trading and peace state narratives, the different components of the civilized

state narrative are interwoven in practice and must therefore be treated as a single narrative

group. However, for analytical purposes, it is possible to identify two "sub-narratives" in its

culture and welfare components. The first, referred to as the "cultured state" sub-narrative,

emphasizes both the unique cultural achievements of the Japanese nation-state state and the

---

[339] Miyachi Shōsuke, Kōmei Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, February 23, 1988. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (September 5, 2011).

argument for Japan to be counted among the group of states that have achieved high levels of cultural development.[340] The second, referred to here as the "welfare state" sub-narrative, highlights the link between nation and state with regard to the guarantee of basic welfare as well as Japan's place among the relatively small number of countries that have established modern welfare states.[341] Again, the purpose of dividing this narrative into its two major components is to facilitate comparisons when considering changes within the narrative group over time.

The civilized state narrative was included in this study for several reasons. First, aspects of this narrative, particularly what has been called "cultural nationalism" (*bunka nashonarizumu*), have been a continuing area of concern in studies of postwar Japanese nationalism. This includes both work that examines Japan's cultural policies as well efforts to understand the impact of popular discourse about Japan's cultural uniqueness (*nihonjinron*).[342] Second, the

---

[340] The "cultured state" sub-narrative includes the following three codes: "Civilized/Cultured State," "Support Japanese Culture." And "Support Cultural Exchange." Please note that although "Civilized/Cultured State" (*bunka kokka*) is sometimes used in reference to the welfare state, it is here treated as part of the "cultured state" sub-narrative.

[341] The "welfare state" sub-narrative includes the following two codes: "Welfare State" and "Support Domestic Welfare Programs."

[342] Yoshino, 1992, 1997a & 1997b; Befu, 2001; McVeigh, 2004. Please note that "culture" includes various elements in these different treatments, some of which may intrude on aspects of other nation-state narratives. For instance, claims of shared culture (variously defined) have been used by the conservative right to advocate the organic state narrative (see above) as well as by the progressive left to support of a vision of the democratic state narrative Gayle (2001). Similarly, a speaker may cite Japan's status as a civilized state (*bunka kokka*) as justification for enhancing state finance for science and engineering education, a policy which was coded here under the trading state narrative in the content analysis. The coding scheme used here was designed to deal with the issue of overlap as follows. First, in each case , the level of importance of the individual claim to each nation-state narrative, both in terms of the frequency of its presentation as part of the narrative and how essential it is to the narrative's overall story and internal logic, was considered in assigning claims as components of specific nation-state narratives. Second, although nationalist rhetoric is highly ambiguous, coding rules in content analysis require clear, non-overlapping distinctions; it must thus be acknowledge that there is an inherent methodological trade-off between accuracy and (inter-coder) reliability, although the sacrifice of accuracy in this case is deemed relatively small.

relationship between nationalism and welfare policy is a severely underexplored topic in nationalism studies. As Béland and Lecourrs note, "Specialists in nationalism rarely discuss social policy issues."[343] Considering the welfare state link here thus provides an opportunity to consider what factors may alter this relationship. Finally, as with the democratic state narrative, the combination here of particularistic and universalistic usages allows for contrast with the more purely exclusionary discursive forms of nationalism in the study.

Having introduced the key content features of all five nation-state narratives, the discussion now turns to analyzing and interpreting how and why these features have changed over the course of the postwar period. The next chapter will begin this task by analyzing change at the aggregate level, where all five nation-state narratives are considered together.

---

[343] Béland & Lecours, 2008, p.1. The authors also note that a 2001 book commissioned by the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism intended to highlight important avenues of research in the field "overlooks the welfare state entirely." Ibid.

Chapter Five: Five Roads through the Long Postwar

[W]e still have little understanding of the full dimensions of the postwar period as a period of contestation over what the nation is and especially how nationalism should be resituated in the context of the new Japanese state.[344]

Kevin Doak, 1997

I. Introduction

In the more than half-century since Japan regained its independence, Diet inaugurals have taken place an average of nearly two and half times per year. Examining the rhetoric from nearly sixty years of these ceremonial occasions reveals interesting snapshots of the state of nationalist discourse at particular times and provides a broader picture of how enduring rhetorical conventions such as the five nation-state narratives introduced in the previous chapter have persisted and varied in their content. The focus of the analysis in this chapter is the aggregate level, where the five nation-state narratives are viewed in combination. Examining changes at the this level—where the prominence and valence scores of these narratives are considered cumulatively—is vital to mapping the contours of the period's nationalist discourse and uncovering changes that occur simultaneously in other corners of this discursive landscape. In addition, comparing resultant findings to existing scholarship on postwar Japanese

---

[344] Doak, 1997, p.300.

nationalism and politics, other commonly-used measures of nationalist phenomena, and prior expectations provides a check on the validity of the results of the content analysis method employed. Finally, viewing the discourse from the aggregate level also suggests areas that require further analysis, including changes that manifest within individual narrative groups as wells as the linkages between them.

The next section analyzes the aggregate results of the quantitative content analysis of the Diet inaugural speeches and editorials. It then assesses their validity by comparing them to the results of prior scholarship on Japanese nationalism and politics in the postwar period. This discussion uncovers several key findings, chief among them the question of why all five nation-state narratives have experienced long-term declines in prominence over the entire period under review. The third section highlights two additional findings of interest, including the strong correlation between the prominence scores of the trading and democratic state narratives and the relatively low level of prominence of the organic state narrative throughout the entire period of the study. The final section summarizes the major conclusions of analysis at the aggregate level.

The major findings of this chapter include: 1) Nationalist discourse (and thus nationalism) can show dynamism even in the context of a wealthy, stable democratic regime at peace such as postwar Japan; 2) There is a long-term trend toward decline in the numbers of

references to all narratives; 3) The peace state narrative, which is primarily associated with the political left rather than the nationalist right, is the most referenced narrative of the entire period; 4) The trading state narrative is the most contested narrative during the two periods of peak nationalist discourse and received by far the largest total number of negatively-valued references for the postwar period as a whole; 5) There is a strong and positive correlation between changes in the prominence scores of the trading and democratic state narratives; and 6) Despite being sometimes viewed as synonymous with Japanese nationalism, the organic state narrative is actually the least referenced of all the narratives examined in this study.

Before moving to the analysis, a few words about the techniques employed in the content analysis are in order. First, the coding scheme here is valence-sensitive; each code has a positive and negative version. A positive reference is one in which a declarative or imperative statement concerning a relevant cognitive or normative element, social purpose or relative comparison is made without reservation.[345] The presence of a reservation thus indicates a negative valence, and reservations take different forms depending on the type of element modeled by the code.[346] Second, the number of negative and positive references combined is

---

[345] For more discussion of coding for positive references, see Appendix C.
[346] For example, a reservation for a cognitive element usually takes the form of questioning in part or in total the accuracy of the element as a fact or valid observation (e.g. Japan is NOT a country with few natural resources). For a normative element, statements that advocate behaviors for the norm target that violate the norm in question or challenge the validity of the norm in general are coded as negative (e.g. Japan SHOULD acquire nuclear weapons or there is NO valid reason why a country threatened by other nuclear powers should not acquire such capability in defense). The negative versions of other code types are explained in appendices

189

counted toward each code's, and in combination, each narrative group's prominence score.[347]

A prominence score is thus an indication of the extent to which the code or group of codes in question appears in the nationalist discourse. Interpreting the meaning of this score and its changes over time is one of the primary objects of this study. Third, the ratio of negative references to total references is viewed here as an indication of the level of contestation for each individual code or narrative group. Finally, all coding has been tested for inter-coder reliability and found sufficient for making inferences.[348]

II. Surveying the Narrative Landscape

The total number of references for each of the five narratives over the entire period under review is summarized in Chart 5.1 below:

---

[347] The units for prominence scores are "hits/100 sentences," which means that number of sentences containing at least one reference to the code per one hundred sentences examined. This allows for comparisons across time periods in which the number of sentences in the speeches and editorials varies.

[348] Two measures of inter-coder reliability were employed in this study, percent agreement and Cohen's Kappa, with the cutoff line set at .9 for the former and .4 for the latter. For more about these measures and their application, see Banerjee, et al. (1999, p.6), Neuendorf (2002, pp.142-144). Inter-coder reliability scores for each code in this study appear in Appendix C.

Chart 5.1: Total References per Narrative, 1952*-2007[349]

Although aggregate data calculated for such a long period are not necessarily indicative

of the contemporary state of affairs at any given point in time, viewing the narratives in this way

makes three things clear. The first is the overwhelming numerical dominance of the peace state

narrative during the postwar period. Although, as will be shown below, this dominance is

challenged from time to time and evaporates in recent years, it is important to note that in the

period taken as a whole, references to this narrative outnumbered those to others by about

two-to-one for the civilized, trading and democratic state narratives and more than six-to-one for

the organic state narrative. Second, the trading and democratic state narratives share near parity

---

[349] Because the occupation did not officially end until April 1952, there is only one post-independence Diet
inaugural from that year. As the data is organized here into eleven five-year blocks, this single 1952 speech set
was added to those examined for the five-year period of 1953-1957. This is why there are six years in the first
five-year block. This adjustment is signified here and in all subsequent analysis by including an asterisk after the
first year (1952*).

in the middle ground of this frequency distribution. With an important exception, the relative uniformity of their results also holds as a secular relationship that merits further exploration. Finally, perhaps the most striking aggregate finding here is the relative infrequency with which major political and media figures raised elements of the organic state narrative. In this case as well, the comparative rarity of references to the narrative is consistent across the entire period and is thus not a mere artifact of viewing cumulative results.

Before beginning to unpack these aggregated numbers, some initial observations are merited. First, despite the dominance of conservative parties over the Diet and national government for the bulk of this period, the most commonly cited narrative is one most famously championed by the political left. Viewed in contrast to the relative infrequency with which elements of the organic state narrative, the one most often associated with rightwing politics, are referenced, the importance of examining the nationalist discourse associated with the left in order to develop an accurate picture of how nationalism may have changed during this period becomes clear. Second, even in aggregate form, this data hints at the strong and positive correlation between the trading state narrative, which specifies the means to improve economic welfare of the citizenry, and the democratic state narrative, which focuses on maintaining the political rights of citizens.[350] In view of their significance for theories that link the level of

---

[350] The correlation co-efficient here is 0.869 and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). The aggregate

economic security among the citizenry to the level of legitimacy of democratic regimes, this

finding is explored further in Chapter Seven.[351]

Chart 5.2 below summarizes prominence scores across eleven five-year blocks to show

how the frequencies with which the five nation-state narratives were referenced changed over

time:[352]

Chart 5.2: Prominence Scores for Individual Narratives, 1952*-2007

Unit: References per 100 sentences per period

This chart reveals a picture of a dynamic nationalist discourse that has constantly changed

even while taking place within a stable and wealthy democratic state in peace time.   Although

---

data also suggest a similar relationship between the trading and civilized state narrative, although this correlation is smaller at 0.723 and only significant at the 0.05 level (2-talied).

[351] On the general question of a causal link between the level of economic development and the legitimacy and stability of democracies, see Przeworski, et al. (2000) and Robinson (2006).   With regard to how this issue may be applied to postwar Japan, see Johnson (1995) and Fouse (2002).

[352] As each five-year block contains a varying number (between 10 and 14) of Diet inaugural ceremonies and the speeches and editorials associated with these inaugurals vary in length, the data has been standardized as references per 100 sentences.   Since all speeches and editorials were divided into sentences by their authors, using the sentence as the basic unit of analysis proves the easiest means to allow for clean comparisons across time periods.

movements of the scores of individual narratives do not necessary correlate in all cases, the overall picture is one of two "peaks" and two "troughs." The first peak, which occurred roughly between 1952 to 1972, saw the highest recorded prominence scores for all five narratives.[353] In fact, three narratives (trading, peace, and civilized state) registered their highest prominence scores in the entire study during the five-year period between 1958 and 1962 alone.[354] This vibrant period was then followed by a pronounced decline that bottomed out in the period bewteen 1973 and 1977. This five-year block saw the lowest cumulative prominence score for the five narratives in the Cold War era. Prominence scores then began to move upward until they peaked again in the mid-1980s, returning to levels not seen since the 1960s, with the peace state narrative scoring near its highest mark of the entire period. After 1988, however, a second decline began that reached its nadir in the post-Cold War period, when four of the narratives, excluding only civilized state, recorded their lowest scores in the entire study. Although the last five-year block (2002-2007) saw a slight increase in the scores of four of the five narratives, the changes were relatively small.

---

[353] Averaging the cumulative prominence scores for all narratives during these first four five-year blocks yields a figure (18.15) that greatly exceeds the average for the entire period (11.63) and is more than twice the average of the remaining seven five-year blocks (7.90).

[354] The highest score for the organic state narrative came in the next five-year period, 1963-1967, while the highest score for the democratic state narrative came in the previous five-year period, 1952*-1957.

Chart 5.3: Cumulative Prominence Scores, All Narratives, 1952*-2007

Unit: References per 100 sentences per period

The cumulative results in Chart 5.3 above tell the story of a group of narratives that reached

their highest level of prominence in the first two decades of the period and then declined

dramatically only to experience a partial revial in the 1980s that was in turn followed by postwar

lows after the end of the Cold War.[355]   At the aggregate level, this represents a repeated waxing

and waning of prominence within the context of a long-term decline.   Thus, understanding how

nationalist discourse has changed in postwar Japan is partly a task of explaining how and why

these changes took place at the macro level.

---

[355] Comparing the cumulative prominence scores for all narratives for the period 1958-1962, the five-year block that contains the highest such scores recorded in this study for three of the five narratives, and 1973-1977, the five-year block immediately preceding the upturn in the 1980s, shows about a 73% decline. A similar comparison for the period 1983-1987, the five-year block that contains the highest post-1972 prominence scores for three of the five narratives, and 1998-2002, the five-year block that contains the lowest prominence scores recorded in this study for two of the five narratives, reveals a similar drop from peak to trough of nearly 69%.

In accessing the general validity of these results, it should be noted that the timing of the

two "peaks" is consistent with much of the scholarship on postwar Japandese politics.[356]   First,

both political scientists and historians point to the 1950s and 1960s as a period of prolonged

ideological conflict between the political right and left over differing national visions of the

postwar state.[357]   These conflicts touched on virtually all aspects of politics, athough they were

perhaps most prominent in debates over security policy and constitutional revision.   In addition,

other scholars have pointed to the late 1970s through the 1980s as an important period in which

Japan's peaking economic might, increasing military power, and the leadership of Nakasone

Yasuhiro, who perhaps more than any other postwar prime minister consciously attempted to

revise the nationalist discourse status quo, generated interest in reconsidering the relationship

between the nation and the state.[358]   Thus, with regard to the "twin peaks" in prominence scores

witnessed at the aggregate level, the resuts of this content analysis are broadly consistent with

the observations of existing scholarship on Japan's history and politics.

---

[356] The brief comparison between the results of the content analysis and those of existing scholarship offered from here is an example of a check of "criterion validity," or "the extent to which a measure taps an established standard...that is external to the measure." Neuendorf, 2002, p.115.   To the degree that such relevant standards exist in the form of scholarly consensus on the course of postwar nationalism in Japan as well as associated policy issues, they are applied here to evaluate the validity of the content analysis results. However, efforts to develop explanations for the changes observed will follow in subsequent chapters.   For a similar use of existing scholarship to assess the general validity of content analysis results, see Suzuki (2009).
[357] Dower, 1999; Hara, 1988; Ōtake, 2005 [1988], Kataoka, 1991; Katzenstein, 1996; Tanaka, 1997; Pyle, 1992; Berger, 1998, Boyd, 2003; Boyd & Samuels, 2005.
[358] Pyle, 1987; Watanabe, 1994.

The changes culminating in the Cold War lows recorded in the mid-1970s also resonate

with the findings of scholarship on postwar Japan.   In Japan's international relations, the 1970s

were marked by increased stability in the security arena due to such developments as the renewal

of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1970, the emergence of detante in the Cold War, and the end

of the Vietnam war, as well as by increased instability in the international economy as a

consequences of the oil shocks.[359]   Domestically, although the Japanese economy had become

the second largest in the world in 1968, the period of high-speed growth ended during this

decade.[360]   In addition, expenditures related to pensions, healthcare and other welfare programs

began to increase during this period, with 1973 declared the "first year of welfare" due to the

introduction of free health care for the elderly and price-indexing for national pensions.[361]

Politically, the normalization of parliamentary practices and the emergence of a numerically

stronger but more fragmented opposition that despite having increased bargaining power "would

not be able to mount an effective challenge to LDP dominance" contributed to the further

institutionalization of LDP rule and a reduction in partisan conflict across parties.[362]

The 1970s may thus be characterized as a time in which the central focus of politics

shifted away from the past decades' conflicts over defining the new postwar Japan and its place

---

[359] Samuels, 2007, pp.38-59; Berger, 1998, pp.87-123; Nakamura, 1995, pp.213-242; Dore, 1986.
[360] Nakamura, 1995, pp.197-235.
[361] Takegawa, 2005, p.177; Estévez-Abe, 2008, pp.1999-223.
[362] Curtis, 1988, p.35; Estévez-Abe, 2008, p.210.

in the world to quality-of-life issues and the domestic economic situation.   This is perhaps best

exemplifed by the development of national welfare programs and environmental protection

regimes during this period, as well as Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's plan to "remodel the

Japanese archipeligo" by promoting the construction of highways and high-speed rail and the

industrialization of regional areas.[363]

The results of the content anlaysis are generally consistent with these shifts in the

national political agenda.   For example, between the periods of 1968-1972 and 1973-1977, the

prominence score of the peace state narrative fell nearly 78%, a shift that was responsible for

more than 81% of the decline in the cumulative prominence scores for all narratives between

these two periods (and thus the first "trough").   This decline might thus be interpreted as

indicative of a decreased level of concern with issues areas related to the peace state narrative,

including the peace constitution, mililtary procurement, use-of-force restrictions and nuclear

weapons policies.[364]   Across these same two periods, the prominence scores of the trading and

civilized state narratives actually increased (22% and 1%, respectively), while those of the

democratic and organic state narratives also saw declines (31% and 78%, respectively).   In

short, the changes recorded in the content analysis of the five narratives roughly correspond to

---

[363] Masumi, 1995, pp.123-157; McKean, 1981.
[364] Declines in references to the codes for these four components represented nearly 80% of the total decline in references to the peace state per 100 sentences across the periods of 1968-1972 and 1973-1977.

scholarly accounts of this period as one of less concern for issues of history, security and democracy and more focus on the economy and social welfare.

As was the case with the first "trough" in the 1970s, roughly two-thirds of the decline in cumulative prominence scores from their high point in the 1980s (1983-1987) to their post-Cold War low (1998-2002) is attributable to declines in references to the peace state narrative. However, in this instance, the assessment by scholars of Japan's security environment during this period is more ambiguous, with the end of the Soviet threat obviously lessening security concerns on the one hand while the emergence of new threats in the form of China's increased military spending, North Korea's nuclear program, and global terrorism as well as increased pressure from the United States for Japan to play a larger role in the US-Japan alliance raising them on the other.[365]   In addition, although at a glance, the protracted downturn experienced by the Japanese economy during this period might be cited as congruent with the more than 50% decline in references to the trading state narrative from mid-1980s highs, similarly large declines in other narratives do not have such obvious points of congruence in scholarship about post-Cold War Japan.   Understanding the general decline in references to all five narratives during these last two decades (i.e. the second "trough") is thus a major focus of this study.

---

[365] For pessimistic views of Japan's security environment in the post-Cold War period, see Friedberg (1993-94) and Christensen (1999); For a more sanguine view, see Twomey (2000), Lind (2002) and Boyd (2003).

Moving from prominence to valence scores, the picture of the 1950s-1960s, late-1970s-1980s, and the post-Cold War decades as major periods of contestation over the direction of postwar Japanese nationalism is generally supported by the aggregated valence results for the five narratives. Due largely to the particular context of the Diet inaugural ceremony, negatively-valued comments are expected to be relatively rare, and thus their prescence, even in small quantities, should be seen as strong indicators of contestation.[366]

Chart 5.4 below summarizes the aggregated contestation levels for all narratives (measured as negatively-valued references as a percentage of total references per 100 sentences per period):

Chart 5.4: Cumulative Contestation Levels, All Narratives, 1952*-2007

Unit: % of negatively-valued references to total reference per 100 sentence per period

Although these results are generally consistent with the view that the 1950s-1960s, late-1970s-1980s and the post-Cold War years were contested periods in postwar nationalist

---

[366] For further discussion of this point, see the appendices.

discourse, they also raise some new questions. First, the period between 1952-1972 saw very high levels of cumulative negative references in two of the five-year blocks (1952-1957, 1963-1967) but the lowest and third-lowest recorded levels for this measure in the other two five-year blocks (1958-1962 and 1968-1972, respecttively), thus raising the question of what explains the zig-zag pattern in negatively-valued rhetoric during these early postwar decades, a period in which all five narratives registered their highest prominence scorces of the postwar period?[367] Second, aggregate contestation begins to peak prior to the rise of aggregate prominence in the 1970s, with the period 1973-1977 seeing the second highest level of contestation recorded in the study.[368] Finally, a third "peak" of contestation that exceds even that of the immediate postwar decades appears in the period from 1998-2002. Unpacking this aggregated data can provide clues to understanding these deviations from initial expectations.

Chart 5.5 shows the same data for individual narrartive groups:

---

[367] 1952-1957 and 1963-1967 had contestation lelves of 1.7% and 3.3%, respectively, the latter of which exceeds the average for all five-year blocks (2.3%) and was the third highest recorded cumulative contestation level for the narratives in this study. The other two periods (1958-1962, 1968-1972) were two of the three five-year blocks in which negative-valued references were negligible or very small percentages of total references to the five narratives, ranking 11th and 9th highest, respectively.

[368] The contestation from this period (3.1%) was also higher than the average for all periods (2.3%).

Chart 5.5: Contestation Levels, Three Narratives, 1952*-2007

Unit: % of negatively-valued references to total reference per 100 sentences per period

This chart yields some interesting findings. First, the democratic and civilized state narratives are not included here because the former was not the target of a single negatively-valued reference over the entire period and the latter was contested in only one five-year period at a miniscule level (0.8% in 1998-2002). This may seem a remarkable result, but it is consistent with accounts of postwar politics that show how all major players in the Diet and media enthusiasitacally embraced the democratic process from the time of the occpuation.[369] Indeed, as the Diet inaugural ceremony is in part intended to celebrate Japan's democracy and its participants are themselves mostly democratically-elected officials, the lack of anti-democratic agitation is not surprising. Further, as the key components of the civilzed state narrative essentially idolize Japanese artistic endeavors on the one hand and the Japnese

---

[369] Seraphim, 2006; Dower, 1999; Oguma, 2002b.

welfare state on the other, harsh criticism or condemnation seems unlikely within the context of the Diet inaugual ceremony.

Second, Chart 5.5 makes clear that the trading, peace and organic state narratives were the most contested of the poswar period. Although this is consistent with scholarly analysis of postwar politics with regard to the peace and organic state narratives, the degree to which the trading state narrative proved contentious is somewhat surprising, as the components of the trading state narrative are often positioned as the favored vehicles of pragmatic politicians that achieved broad support across the political spectrum.[370] Indeed, Chart 5.5 reveals that increased contestation over the trading state narrative was the main cause of the second "peak" in contestation, which begin just prior to the second overall rise in prominence.

Third, the disaggregated data in Chart 5.5 show that the overwhelming causes of the third peak in contestation seen in Chart 5.4 are increases in negative rhetoric targeting the peace and organic state narratives. As both these narratives experienced postwar lows in total references during the period after the end of the Cold War, this increase in negatively-valued comments means that negative hits as a percentage of total hits reached postwar highs of more than 16% and 19% for the peace state and organic state narratives, respectively. Although neither of these findings is necessarily unexpectected in light of the decade's rightward shift in

---

[370] Morris, 1960; Hara, 1988; Ōtake, 2005[1988], Kataoka, 1991; Katzenstein, 1996a; Tanaka, 1997; Pyle, 1992; Berger, 1998, Boyd, 2003; Boyd & Samuels, 2005.

security policies and the succession of LDP leaders, including Mori, who hailed from the faction

most devoted to organic state rhetoric, understanding the exact nature of these rhetorical changes

as well as the context with which they occurred are essential to explaining how nationalist

discourse changed during this period.

Returning to the aggregated results in Chart 5.3, a final question about change at the

macro level stands out: What explains the secular decline over time across all narratives?

As already noted above, one obvious explanation for the large differences between the

prominence scores of all narratives in the earlier and latter periods emphasizes the foundational

experience of Japan's defeat in World War Two.[371] In this view, the defeat and devastation

fundamentally reworked the nationalist discourse landscape, forcing advocates of existing

nationalist narratives to alter their content to better suit the new political and ideological

environment (as seen in the cases of the trading and organic state narratives) and encouraging

others to endorse new means of linking the nation and the state (as seen in the cases of the peace

and democratic state narratives). Scholarly work on both the ideological history and political

outcomes of the occupation period as well as the first decades following independence provides

broad support for this explanation.[372] In this way, it seems apparent that the 1950s and 1960s

---

[371] Comparing the cumulative prominence scores for all narratives for the peak period of 1958-1962, which contains the highest prominence scores recorded in this study for three of the five narratives, and the low point of 1998-2002, which features the lowest prominence scores recorded for two of the five narratives, reveals a decline of more than 82%.

[372] In addition to authors cited above, Snyder (1991) and Oguma (2002b) strongly emphasize the experience of the

saw unusually high levels of nationalist discourse due to relatively rare historical circumstances for an emerging democracy. However, what explains the continued long-term trend of declining prominence scores in the subsequent periods, especially the years following the end of the Cold War, which saw historical lows for four of the five narratives? Understanding the meaning of this decline in prominance is a central focus of the remainder of this study.

It should be noted that the content analysis results provide some evidence in favor of the broader form of the denationalization hypothesis. In addition to the five nation-state narratives, the Diet inaugurals were also examined for other aspects of nationalist discourse, including social purposes and references to neighboring countries, which may be viewed as a proxy for relational comparisons.[373] Chart 5.6 summarizes these results for the period in question and reveals a strong similarity in the pattern of change among these three elements of nationalist discourse: a peak in the 1980s followed by a steep decline to postwar lows, with only a slight improvement in the last five-year period for narratives and relational comparisons. A similar pattern of long-term decline among different kinds of nationalist discourse is thus consistent with one of the predictions of the broadest form of the denationalization hypothesis.

---

war in their accounts of postwar Japanese national identity construction.

[373] As previously noted, "social purposes" are the ultimate goals assigned to the nation-state, here understood as prosperity, peace, security, status, and autonomy. Relational comparisons are comparisons between Japan and Others, with data on references to neighboring countries (US, USSR/Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan) used here as a proxy. Abdelal, et al., 2006.

Chart 5.6: Prominence, Narratives, Social Purposes & Relational Comparisons, 1968-2007

Unit: References per 100 sentences per period

Desipte the above evidence, however, the picuture of general decline is far from clear.

First, as noted above, two of the nation-state narratives in this study, the civilized and democratic state narratives, experienced secular declines in prominence without facing meaningful levels of contestation, a finding that runs counter to the predictions of the denationalization hypothesis. Second, one would expect such a major change to be reflected in other types of data. However, there is no evidence of such a broad-based decline in nationalist sentiments as expressed in public opinion polls taken over the same period. For example, polls taken by the Japanese government as well as the World Values Survey over this period reveal no major changes in such sentiments as "love of country" and "pride in being Japanese."

Chart 5.7: Do you think your feelings of love for your country are strong, weak or you can't say which (don't know)?[374]

Chart 5.8: How proud are you to be Japanese?[375]

[374] Cabinet Office (Naikakufu daijinkanbō deifu kōhōshitsu), Shakai Ishiki ni kansuru Yoron Chōsa (Public Opinion Survey on Social Consciousness), 2007. Accessed at: http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h18/h18-shakai/index.html (November 10, 2008).
[375] World Values Survey. Accessed at: http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h18/h18-shakai/index.html (November 10, 2008).

In view of this mixed evidence, the position adopted here is that the broader form of the denationalization theory can only be confirmed through a close examination of cases of prominence declines in individual nation-state narratives. A major goal of the case studies in subsequent chapters is thus to understand how and why individual narratives declined in prominence and to determine if this change was the result of banalization, comprehensive or partial transformation, or denationalization. The possibility that different narratives may have experienced a similar decline due to different reasons or combinations of factors is also considered.

III. Different Journeys, Different Questions

In addition to the common decline in prominence across narratives over time, the results of the content analysis also point to a number of puzzles regarding individual narratives that merit further exploration in the detailed case studies to follow. First, one such issue to be investigated at the narrative level is the strong and positive correlation in prominence scores between the trading and democratic state narratives. This correlation is due mostly to a similar pattern of change during the Cold War that breaks down during the post-Cold War years. Exploring this relationship is especially important because it will contribute to the debate over

the ultimate basis of legitimacy for democracy in postwar Japan as well as show how

nation-state narratives occupying different domains may interact over time.[376]

Second, another point crying out for clarification is the long-standing relative weakness

of the prominence scores of the organic state narrative vis-à-vis those of other narratives

throughout the period. The darling of the postwar right-wing in Japan, the organic state

narrative is perhaps the best known of the five nationalist narratives examined here and arguably

has the longest history in the nationalist discourse of modern Japan. In addition, multiple

generations of conservative politicians have continuously striven to promote and institutionalize

elements of this narrative throughout the postwar period.[377] Against this background,

explaining the reasons behind the consistent but relatively poor showing of this narrative over

time is imperative to understanding how narratives may persist for long periods in nationalist

discourse at relatively low levels of prominence. More specifically, the case of the organic

state narrative in the postwar period provides an opportunity to specify the factors that hinder the

elevation of a particular nation-state narrative within the greater nationalist discourse despite the

presence of concerted efforts to do so.

---

[376] Johnson, 1994; Fouse, 2002. For the first eight five-year blocks (1952-1992), which are here used as a proxy for the Cold War period, the correlation co-efficient for the prominence scores of the trading and democratic state narratives is .836, which means nearly 70 % of the variance is in common. This result is also statistically significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). However, during the post-Cold War, represented here by the last three five-year blocks (1993-2007), the correlation co-efficient declines dramatically to .307, which means less than 10% of the variance is in common. This second result is also not statistically significant.
[377] Boyd & Samuels, 2005, 2008.

IV. Conclusion

Perhaps the most important aggregate finding here is that nationalist discourse, an essential manifestation of nationalism, can prove dynamic in the context of a wealthy, peaceful, and stable democratic regime such as postwar Japan. In addition, the analysis shows that major changes may occur at the aggregate level. According to the results here, there are two periods in which the references to all narratives peak, three periods in which measures of contestation peak, and a secular trend toward decline in the numbers of references to all narratives over the entire period.

Among individual narratives, the peace and civilized state narratives the most total references over the period here. The trading state narrative, however, proves to be the most contested narrative during the two periods of peak nationalist discourse and received by far the largest total number of negatively-valued references for the postwar period as a whole. In addition, there is a strong and positive correlation between changes in the prominence scores of the trading and democratic state narratives, although this relationship breaks down in the post-Cold War period. Finally, despite being sometimes viewed as synonymous with "Japanese nationalism," the organic state narrative is actually the least referenced of all the narratives examined in this study. Subsequent chapters further explore these findings by examining how changes occur at the individual narrative level.

Chapter Six: All in the Name of Peace

'What defines us as a nation' at any given moment is no more than a temporary equilibrium in an ongoing argument about what defines us as a nation. Critics of current policies advanced in the name of the nation need to participate in this ongoing argument; they need to tell stories and articulate self-understandings of their own.[378]

Rogers Brubaker, 2004b

I. Introduction

Although the most cited of the five narratives examined here, the peace state narrative exhibits large swings in prominence at various stages in the more than half-century since Japan regained sovereignty in 1952. Of particular interest are the twin declines in this measure in the 1970s and again after the end of the Cold War. Why did the peace state narrative experience its first major postwar dip in prominence in the middle years of the 1970s? Why did this measure reach a postwar low in the late 1990s, falling below the average for the five narrative groups for the first time in the period of this study?[379] What do these changes in prominence mean for the peace state narrative as a recurring convention in political discourse as well as its continuing association with numerous security institutions?

---

[378] Brubaker, 2004b, p.123.
[379] The second postwar peak period of 1983-1987 was followed by steady declines over the next two periods underscored by a decline between the periods of 1993-1997 and 1998-2002 of more than 70%.

This chapter develops answers to these questions. In practice, the main questions to be addressed are how and why political elites in Japan changed the frequency and manner with which they referenced the peace state narrative during the two periods of pronounced decline in prominence. The challenge is thus to develop an understanding of the causes and significance of declines in narrative prominence in different periods.

The answer arrived at here identifies distinctive patterns of change across the two periods. In the 1970s, the decline in prominence for the peace state narrative did not coincide with contestation over its cognitive or normative components, the emergence of transformational, tinkering or destructive strategies targeting the narrative, nor significant efforts to reform institutions associated with the narrative in ways counter to its normative claims. The first major period of decline in prominence for the peace state narrative is thus concluded to fit the "banalization" hypothesis introduced in Chapter Three.

The sources of the decline following the end of Cold War, however, are firmly located in political struggles to alter security institutions associated with the peace state narrative. From the beginning of these struggles in the 1980s, reformers such as Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro launched a sustained transformational effort that would eventually target most of the normative components of the peace-loving state sub-narrative and ultimately lead to exceptions being added to many of them. In this way, both the narrative components and their associated

institutions followed a pattern of change that allowed the associations, albeit in less robust forms, to remain intact. The evidence for this second case is thus most consistent with the partial transformation hypothesis but suggests that the process of transformation is still ongoing.

In addition, the exact pattern of change witnessed in the peace state narrative during this period appears contingent on a number of factors, including the number of institutional associations of individual normative components and sub-narratives, the level of specificity of normative claims' institutional associations, and the discursive strategies employed, especially by those advocating institutional reforms. Finally, the thirty-year time frame of this still ongoing pattern of partial transformation underscores the difficulty of affecting change in nation-state narratives once they have become highly prominent in the nationalist discourse.

The next section begins by establishing a baseline for comparison by summarizing results of the content analysis for the peace state narrative during the period preceding its first steep decline in the early 1970s. This baseline is then completed by analysis of the discursive strategies employed vis-à-vis the peace state narrative during this period and a description of the institutions associated with the normative claims that comprise the narrative. To keep the discussion manageable, the institutions examined here and in subsequent sections are limited to those associated with the most commonly-cited normative claims of the peace state narrative, which include institutions restricting the size and composition of Japan's military, institutions

limiting the uses of this military in international affairs, institutions promoting state involvement

in international disarmament efforts, and institutions governing Japan's non-nuclear policy.

The third section again utilizes the content analysis data to compare this established

baseline with the results for the period 1973-1977, the five-year span in which the prominence

score for the peace state narrative first fell steeply. The speeches and editorials are also

examined to evaluate the discursive strategies of participants and an assessment is made of

changes from the baseline in relevant associated institutions. After also considering issues of

sequence, it is concluded that the linkages between changes in the narrative, discursive strategies

adopted by participants in the nationalist discourse and changes in associated institutions

indicates a pattern of banalization at work.

The fourth section considers the mid-1980s through to the post-Cold War period, with

particular attention given to the patterns of change in content analysis results, discursive

strategies and associated institutions observed in the periods up to and including 1998-2002,

when the peace state narrative's prominence achieved its postwar low. After the Cold War, in

particular, political struggles over security institutions associated with the peace state narrative

became more frequent. In addition, reformers generally sought institutional changes that

exceeded previous assertions of the normative constraints on these institutions claimed in the

peace state narrative. The resulting increased level of contestation over these normative claims

accelerated a process of narrative change that has narrowed the scope of many of the narrative's

normative claims, particularly those associated with the peace-loving state stub-narrative. After

considering the alternatives, it is concluded that the changes in the peace state narrative's

prominence in the post-Cold War period are best described as a partial transformation that is still

ongoing.

The fifth section concludes the chapter by evaluating the domestic and external factors

that shaped this pattern of change after the Cold War and considering what these changes mean

for both the present and the future of the peace state narrative.

II. Constructing Peace: *Heiwa Kokka* through Defeat and Independence

By the time the occupation formally ended in April 1952, the peace state narrative was

already a prominent part of the nationalist discourse in Japan.[380] As John Dower concludes of

the immediate postwar years, "Defeat, victimization, an over-whelming sense of powerlessness

in the face of undreamed-of-weapons of destruction soon coalesced to become the basis of a new

kind of anti-military nationalism."[381] Although grassroots movements promoting pacifist

notions were active from the early postwar years, some of the first major public expressions of

---

[380] The peace state narrative (6.0248) was a close second in prominence behind the democratic state narrative
(7.2671) in the content analysis for the period 1952-1957 and was more than 30% higher than the average
prominence score for all five narratives (4.0373) during this period.
[381] Dower, 1999, p.493-494.

peace state rhetoric came from politicians.[382] For example, the goal of transforming Japan into

a "peace state" (*heiwa kokka*) is mentioned in the inaugural sessions of both houses of the 88th

Imperial Diet in early September 1945.[383] Indeed, one of the first major public debates

involving elements of the peace state narrative took place when the last Imperial Diet considered

the ratification of Article Nine in 1946.[384] During this debate, the head of the Japan Socialist

Party (JSP) voiced strong support for the clause and asked that it be strengthened with a

"declaration of devotion to world peace."[385] After the JSP voted unanimously for the final draft,

its party policy statements "harped on this pacifist theme and attacked Japan's imperialist

past."[386]

Building on the debate over Article Nine, intellectuals crafted early forms of the peace

state narrative from the state non-violence position. In particular, the Peace Issues Discussion

Group (*Heiwa danwakai*), a group of progressive intellectuals formed in 1948 and including

Murayama Masao, was influential in codifying peace state rhetoric by declaring peace to be a

"supreme value" and emphasizing "that it was Japan's unique mission to demonstrate how world

---

[382] For accounts of early postwar grassroots groups and pacifism, see Yamamoto, 2004, pp.40-42.
[383] Duke Tokugawa Kuniyuki, General Session, House of Peers, and Uchigasaki Sakusaburō, General Session, House of Representatives, September 4, 1945. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 3, 2011). The phrase *heiwa kokka* was used in an Imperial Rescript read into the record of both houses of the Imperial Diet
[384] It should be noted that when the JSP voted unanimously in favor of the final draft of Article Nine
[385] Stockwin, 1968, p.33.
[386] Ibid.

peace could be achieved, a mission that fell to Japan as a consequence of its wartime suffering

and "natural" pacifist tendencies."[387]

In concert with these developments on the left, politicians on the right also adopted

peace state rhetoric during the occupation years. Perhaps the most notable of these was

Yoshida Shigeru, who served as prime minister for most of the occupation. In a Diet inaugural

address to the House of Representatives in November 1949, Yoshida began by declaring that the

only path to security for Japan was as an "unarmed state" (*hibusō kokka*) that renounced war and

dismantled its arms as per the new constitution. After severely condemning Japan's wartime

actions as both having "dirtied the nation's history" (*waga rekishi wo yogoshi*) and brought on

"unparalleled calamity" (*kūzen no fukō*) in the loss of so many citizens' "children, husbands and

parents," he stated," "I am certain, as a peace state (*heiwa kokka*), Japan will again obtain its

pride of place in the world."[388] It is difficult to imagine a clearer statement of the peace state

narrative from the state non-violence perspective, and this one came from a sitting prime

minister.[389] In fact, from the time of the Article Nine ratification debate until after Japan's

---

[387] Samuels, 2007, pp.30-31. Although accompanied at times with reasoned arguments about Japan's strategic situation and the inadvisability of conflict in the nuclear age, appeals for "peaceful coexistence" and a call for Japan to assume a security posture of "unarmed neutrality" were essentially justified as normative principles whose time had come to be realized. This had direct and specific implications for the group's positions on Article Nine and national security policy. Hook, 1996, pp.226-41. Murayama made particular efforts to unearth a tradition of pacifism in Japanese culture and history. Maruyama, 1963, pp.290.

[388] Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister, General Session, House of Representatives, November 8, 1949. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 3, 2011).

[389] Dower (1979, pp.378-381) notes that such idealistic statements were invariably accompanied by the pragmatic observation that pacifistic affirmations were necessary to dispel foreign suspicions and hasten the end of the occupation. This was true in the case cited above as well. The address begins by calling for a peace treaty to end

return to sovereignty, Yoshida was one of the strongest advocates of this version of the peace

state narrative, and his control of government during this time also allowed him to popularize

this vision, with all of its stringent implications for constitutional interpretations and national

security institutions, through various channels, including the public education system and

university law schools.[390]

Following the end of the occupation, Yoshida, still prime minster, and his followers,

referred to in Chapter Four as the pragmatic right, continued to use peace state rhetoric, but now

famously tacked toward the non-aggression pole.[391]   For example, when asked in a meeting of

the lower house budget committee in early 1954 if he had plans to establish a committee to study

the possibility of revising the constitution, Yoshida began his response by noting the unforeseen

emergence of Cold War conflicts and then declared bluntly, "Much has changed [since the

constitution was ratified] and it may now be dangerous for Japan, as a peace state (*heiwa kokka*),

to continue without armaments."[392]   It should be noted that, after repeatedly using the term

"peace state" during the occupation in his addresses to Diet general sessions, including Diet

---

the occupation and the quoted statement was uttered to brush aside calls for Japan to consider nuclear power.   The
sentence preceding the one quoted referencing "peace state" reads: "It is disarmament that will guarantee our
nation's safety and well-being and will lead to us again gaining the world's trust."
[390]   See Dower, 1999, p.528; Takayanagi, 1969, p.83.
[391]   Boyd & Samuels, 2005; Samuels, 2007.
[392]   Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, February 1, 1954. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).   As will be noted in the discussion of institutional associations below,
Japan already had "armaments" at this point, having established the National Police Reserve in 1950, the National
Safety Agency in 1952, and Yoshida had already reached an agreement with the conservative opposition Progressive
Party to reform into a military force dedicated to external security at the time of this statement.   Tominomori, 1994,
p.82; Nakamura, 2001, p.124.

inaugurals, Yoshida stopped referring to Japan by this naming convention in the Diet inaugurals following the return to sovereignty.[393]

During this time, however, Yoshida continued to refer to other aspects of the peace state narrative, but now consistent with the state non-aggression perspective. Although he continued to defend the "peace constitution" as representative of the peace-loving nature of the Japanese nation, he now interpreted the "war potential" (senryoku) banned in Article Nine as referring only to equipment and organization capable of conducting modern warfare. In this interpretation, some military capabilities were thus constitutional.[394]

Following Yoshida's rhetorical shift, the main remaining political bearer of the narrative's state non-violence perspective became a group of left-wing socialists led by Suzuki Mosaburō. Having opposed the war and consequently suffered under the militarist regime, many members of the Suzuki faction enthusiastically endorsed Article Nine as a mandate for state non-violence.[395] Also influenced by the ideas of the Peace Issues Discussion Group, the Suzuki faction became the leading proponent of the peace state narrative on the left.[396]

---

[393] For examples of his uses of "peace state," see Yoshida's comments to general sessions of the following houses on the following dates: House of Representatives (November 8, 1949 (quoted above); January 24, 1950,; November 24, 1950), House of Councillors (November 8, 1949; November 27, 1950). Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).

[394] See, for example, see his defense of the "peace constitution as well as his argument that the love for the "peace constitution" and the notion that war was improper would not preclude the nation's youth from defending Japan if attacked. See Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister, General Session, House of Representatives, February 2, 1953 and Budget Committee, House of Councillors, November 7, 1953. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).

[395] Stockwin, 1968, p.36-7.

[396] Heiwa Mondai Danwakai, 1985, pp.54-97; Igarashi, 1985, p.349.

Between December 1949 and January 1951, they incorporated the narrative into the party's

"principles of peace," which, as a consequence, called for neutralism and opposed

rearmament.[397]

Although there was dissent from right-wing factions that culminated in a split in 1951,

the Suzuki faction regained its dominance once the socialists reunited in 1955. As a result, the

party's platform and rhetoric continued to utilize the peace state narrative.[398] For example,

addressing newly-minted Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō for the first time in a Diet inaugural as

head of the now largest opposition party, Suzuki wasted no time in offering a full-throated

defense of the "peace constitution" (*heiwa kenpō*) and positioning this stance as a central

difference between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and his JSP.[399] In later years,

other opposition parties on the left would come to endorse this rhetoric as well.[400]

Although the peace state narrative is commonly associated with the political left, it is

important to note that conservative politicians continued to use peace state rhetoric even after

---

[397] The four principles of peace were; 1) a peace treaty with all participants in WWII; 2) permanent neutrality; 3) no military bases given to a foreign ally; 4) opposition to rearmament (support for Article Nine). Stockwin, 1968, pp.31; 46.

[398] Stockwin, 1968, pp.70-94. It is important to note that concern with status or prestige, the core of Weber's view of nationalism, pervades the statements of those who advocated peace state from the state non-violence perspective. The emphasis here is almost always placed on the Japanese nation's unique mission to spread the lessons of its wartime suffering and realize its inherent peaceful nature.

[399] Suzuki Mosaburō, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, December 2, 1955. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).

[400] After abandoning its paramilitary activities and returning to a parliamentary focus in 1956, the Japan Communist Party began to work with the JSP in opposing the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty. By the 1960s, the JSP, JCP, Democratic Socialist Party (DSP, a right-wing splinter group of the JSP) and the Kōmei Party all supported adherence to Article Nine, opposition to the US-Japan Security Treaty, and reduction and/or eventual elimination of domestic armed forces.

Yoshida left office in late 1954. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 below show the percentage of references made to the peace state narrative for each of the types of source materials examined in the content analysis across the time periods 1952-1955, when only one (December 1955) opposition response was made by the a leftist party (JSP), and 1956-1972, when all opposition responses were made by members of the left-of-center JSP. In both periods, the prime ministerial addresses were made by politicians hailing from conservative parties, albeit their conservatism ranged from Yoshida's pragmatism (6 speeches) to Hatoyama's revisionism (3 speeches) as the leaders of different parties in the first period, and Hatoyama's (2 speeches) and Kishi's (9 speeches) revisionism to Ikeda's (11 speeches), Satō's (21 speeches) and Tanaka's (1 speech) pragmatism as the leaders of the right-of-center LDP in the second period. Although the results show a passing of the torch for peace state advocacy from the editorialists of the three major daily newspapers to the representatives of the JSP, they also show a surprising level of continuity in the degree to which conservative prime ministers were responsible for generating references to the peace state narrative.

Table 6.1: Peace State References by Source

Peace State	1952-1955
Prime Ministerial Speeches (Non-JSP)	18%
Opposition Responses (Non-JSP*)	40%
Editorials	42%

* 1 opposition response from JSP

Table 6.2: Peace State References by Source

Peace State	1956-1972
Prime Ministerial Speeches (Non-JSP)	11%
Opposition Responses (JSP)	74%
Editorials	15%

It should also be noted that no negatively-valued references were made to the peace state narrative in the documents examined here from the Diet inaugural ceremonies between 1958 and 1972, so the vast bulk of peace state rhetoric offered by conservative prime ministers during this latter period was either positive or neutral in tone. For the early 1950s and the period from 1960-1972, this is a somewhat expected result, as the addresses were given either by Yoshida himself or one of his protégés, Ikeda Hayato and Satō Eisaku. Due to the numerical superiority of their members within the party, pragmatic conservatives were also widely known as the "mainstream" during this period.

What is surprising, however, is the degree to which the peace state narrative continued to be positively referenced in prime ministerial addresses even when the office was occupied in the mid-to-late 1950s by "anti-mainstream" "revisionist conservatives," such as Hatoyama Ichirō and Kishi Nobusuke, who had openly sought for the revision of Article Nine to allow for the unencumbered rebuilding of autonomous defense capabilities and a reciprocal security commitment in Japan's alliance with the United States.[401] For example, in announcing his plan

---

[401] For more on the enduring three-way split between pacifist progressives, pragmatic conservatives and revisionist

222

to establish a commission to consider constitutional revision to make the document more in line

with Japan's cultural and social background (*kokujō*), Hatoyama took pains to emphasize his

"firm commitment to the principles of pacifism (*heiwashugi*) and democracy (*minshushugi*),"

and went on to endorse "peace diplomacy" (*heiwa gaikō*) in every Diet inaugural speech he gave

subsequently.[402] Shortly before becoming prime minister himself in February 1957, Kishi

Nobusuke, then acting prime minister for the ailing Ishibashi Tanzan, argued in Diet general

session that because the United States loved peace and democracy it was the ideal ally from the

standpoint of building a "democratic state (*minshushugi kokka*), a peace state (*heiwa kokka*)" in

Japan.[403] He then went on to make approving references to "peace diplomacy" *(heiwa gaikō)*

in five of his nine Diet inaugurals.[404]

The dominance of pragmatic conservatives, the elevation of the left-wing dominated

JSP as the largest opposition party, and the pattern of revisionist conservatives adopting peace

state rhetoric when becoming prime minister all contributed to the high prominence of the peace

state narrative during this period.   As shown in Table 6.3, after narrowly ranking second behind

the democratic state narrative in the first five-year period, peace state was the most-cited

---

conservatives and its role in constitutional and security politics, see Boyd & Samuels (2005), Samuels (2007), and Boyd (2003).

[402] Hatoyama Ichirō, Liberal Democratic Party, House of Representatives, General Session, January 22, 1955; April 25, 1955; December 2, 1955; January 30, 1956; November 16, 1956. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).

[403] Kishi Nobusuke, Liberal Democratic Party, House of Councillors, General Session, February 6, 1957. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).

[404] Kishi Nobusuke, Liberal Democratic Party, House of Representatives, Diet Inaugural (General Session), November 1, 1957; June 17, 1958; September 30, 1958; January 27, 1959; February 1, 1960.

narrative in all subsequent five-year periods and for the first two-decades after independence as a

whole. The prominence score for this narrative exceeded the five-narrative average for every

five-year period and was more than forty percent higher than the combined average for the two

decades.

Table 6.3: Narrative Prominence in Comparison, 1952-1972

Narrative	1952*-1957	1958-1962	1963-1967	1968-1972	Average
Trading State	3.2919	4.9425	3.6684	1.2968	3.2999
Organic State	1.9876	0.8891	2.0010	1.1222	1.5000
Peace State	6.0248	7.4268	4.9309	6.0973	6.1200
Civilized State	1.6149	3.3996	2.5012	2.0823	2.3995
Democratic State	7.2671	7.0084	3.3587	1.6958	4.8325
Average	4.0373	4.7333	3.2920	2.4589	3.6304

Units: References per 100 sentences per period

Table 6.4 shows the number of references to each narrative component as a percentage

of the total references for the peace state narrative group. Not surprisingly, four of the five

most referenced components are normative, with only "war regret" representing a substantial

percentage of references for a cognitive component in this period. As behavioral norms

targeting the state, the normative components of nation-stat narratives are expected to receive

more references due to their direct relevance to day-to-day policy-making. Here, the

components related to Article Nine, including opposing its revision and recognizing restrictions

in the areas of state force levels and the use of force by the state, as well as the normative claims

224

on the state to oppose nuclear weapons combine to represent nearly 80% of the references to the

peace state narrative during this period.

Table 6.4: Relative Frequency, Peace State Narrative Components, 1952-1972

Component	1952*-1957	1958-1962	1963-1967	1968-1972	Average
Peace State	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	1.6%	0.6%
Nuclear Victim State	0.0%	0.4%	2.4%	0.0%	0.7%
Support Peace Constitution	9.3%	7.7%	6.2%	10.3%	8.4%
Implement Peace Diplomacy	10.8%	5.3%	1.4%	2.4%	5.0%
Eschew Use of Force	11.9%	16.2%	10.0%	13.3%	12.8%
Restrain War Potential	30.4%	9.2%	6.2%	21.5%	16.8%
Support International Disarmament	2.1%	7.0%	4.8%	1.8%	3.9%
War Regret	21.6%	11.3%	7.7%	5.8%	11.6%
Atomic Bombings	0.5%	0.7%	2.4%	1.6%	1.3%
Support Non-Nuclear Principles	5.2%	14.8%	27.3%	31.8%	19.8%
Support International Nuclear Disarmament	8.2%	27.5%	30.6%	9.9%	19.0%

Units: % of total references for narrative per period

As for the relative level of contestation over the peace state narrative during its

formative years, Table 6.5 reveals it to be the most contested of the three narratives that received

negatively-valued references in the period between 1952 and 1957. At the component level, the

most disputed were the normative claims to "eschew the use of force" and "restrain war

potential," at 13.0% and 8.5%, respectively, during this first five-year period. However, as

Table 6.5 shows, the level of contestation dropped to zero in the next and subsequent five-year

blocks, narrowly making the peace state narrative the least contested of the three for the entire

two-decade period.

Table 6.5: Contestation Levels, Three Narratives, 1952-1972

Narrative	1952*-1957	1958-1962	1963-1967	1968-1972	Average
% Negative Trading State	0.9	0.0	14.3	8.7	6.0
% Negative Organic State	3.1	0.0	1.2	1.1	1.4
% Negative Peace State	4.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Average	2.7	0.0	5.2	3.3	2.8

Unit: % negative/total references per narrative per period

Perhaps the most notable dynamic here is best viewed by breaking the peace state narrative down into its two sub-narratives, peace-loving state, which links war regret to constitutional principles and restrictions on conventional military capabilities and their uses, and the anti-nuclear state, which links the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to normative claims on the state to oppose nuclear weapons both at home and abroad. The results are summarized in Chart 6.1 below.

Chart 6.1: Sub-Narratives in Motion, 1952-1972

226

The period began with an overwhelming concern for shaping cognitive claims about the meaning of the Japanese state's actions in the wars of the 1930s and 1940s into normative ones limiting the postwar state's capacity to repeat them, especially with regard to the acquisition of conventional military capabilities, although the extent of this constraint was contested. The focal points of concern then began to shift at the sub-narrative level, with concerns for the anti-nuclear state story increasing and then eventually exceeding those of the peace-loving state for the period 1963-1967. The two then switch places again for the five-year period 1968-1972, which immediately precedes the first major decline for the peace state narrative in the postwar period.

The remainder of this section turns to consider the peace state narrative's associations with state institutions in three security policy areas: conventional force capabilities (size and composition) and roles (use of force), international disarmament and nuclear strategies (both nuclear development and nonproliferation policies).[405] As noted in Chapter Four, when political elites name Japan a "peace state" and then reference the nation's wartime experiences to advance a normative claim on the state, they may do so from various positions on the scale between state non-violence and state non-aggression. This means that, depending on the

---

[405] These policy areas were chosen because they track closely with the different normative claims of the peace-loving state (conventional force capabilities and roles) and anti-nuclear state (unconventional capabilities) sub-narratives. It is impossible to cover all the associations between the peace state narrative and postwar security institutions in a chapter-length treatment.

speaker or the period in question, a particular state institution can be associated with the peace

state narrative in different ways.   The idea here is not to make causal claims about the impact of

the peace state narrative on the formation or pattern of change in state institutions during this

period but rather to establish a baseline of institutional associations for comparison with later

periods by cataloging the ways in which state institutions in the above areas of security policy

were associated with the peace state narrative by different participants in the Diet inaugurals,

with particular attention paid to the end-of-period (1968-1972) status of these associations.[406]

Article Nine of the postwar constitution was the first state institution to be associated

with the peace state narrative, especially the components of the peace-loving state

sub-narrative.[407]   The article is positioned as the main affirmation of the realization of the

relationship between nation and state demanded by the peace state narrative.   As noted in

Chapter Four, the protection of Article Nine from formal amendment is thus an important

normative claim of the narrative.[408]

Examples of how this association is made between Article Nine and the peace state

narrative have already been introduced above from the speeches of political elites on the left (the

---

[406] It should be remembered that the focus of this chapter is to understand why the peace state narrative declined in prominence in the 1970s and post-Cold War periods.   Arguments explaining the origins and development of some of the state institutions considered here, particularly Article Nine and its interpretations, have been advance elsewhere.   Boyd & Samuels, 2005; Boyd, 2003.

[407] It is asserted here that Article Nine actually preceded the peace narrative as it is framed in this study.

[408] As per Table 6.4 above, "Support the Peace Constitution" was the sixth most referenced component of the peace state narrative during the period covered in this section, representing just under 10% of total references to the narrative.

JSP's Suzuki above and Katayama in Chapter Four).   On the right, this association was also

made, especially by pragmatic conservatives later in the period.   For example, in the November

1970 Diet inaugural, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku cited "our constitution" (*waga kenpō*) to justify

his call for all international conflicts to be resolved through peaceful means made earlier to the

United Nations general assembly, before going on to refer to postwar Japan as "a grand

experiment (*idai na kokoromi*) due to its dedication as a peace state (*heiwa kokka*)."[409]   Two

years later at the same ceremony, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei was more succinct: "In the

quarter century since the end of the war, our country has sought to develop through cooperation

and reconciliation with international society and by consistently standing firm as a peace state

(*heiwa kokka*) born of the peace constitution (*heiwa kenpō*)."[410]

Although Article Nine has never been amended, it has been the subject of

interpretations by the executive branch, rulings by the courts, and debate among political elites

over its meaning and significance.   These produced a number of institutions limiting the

capabilities and roles of Japan's military in the two decades summarized here.[411]   Some of these

---

[409] Satō Eisaku, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), November, 25, 1970.
[410] Tanaka Kakuei, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), October 28, 1972.
[411] The institutions covered below have elsewhere been referred to as "buffer policies."   Past governments have sometimes augmented necessarily vague interpretations of Article Nine with less ambiguous policy guidelines that provide objective and measurable constraints on state institutions and mitigate the relativisms of the government's interpretations.   In this regard, they serve as buffers between the logical constructions of the interpretation level and the slippery slope of the implementation level.   In doing so, these "buffer" policies exchange over-compliance with the government interpretation for political and operational viability.   Politically, they have helped the government acquire the support of opposition parties as well as the public for particular security policies. Operationally, buffer policies have served to reduce the conflicts between constitutional constraints and battlefield imperatives.   Boyd, 2003.

institutions were not formalized until later in the period or after, but most drew from 1954

interpretations of Article Nine by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), an office supporting the

cabinet staffed by elite bureaucrats with legal expertise on loan from Japan's top ministries.[412]

These set the conditions under which Japan could exercise the right of self-defense under Article

Nine: 1) The country must face an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression; 2) There must be

no other means of countering this act; and 3) The use of force in self-defense must be limited to

the "minimum necessary level" (*hitsuyō saishōgen*)[413] They also defined the concept of

self-defense narrowly so that Japan could not utilize force in any way to resolve international

disputes, defined as any potential conflict not directly related to the defense of national

territory.[414]

These interpretations served as the basis for a number of state institutions limiting the

capabilities and roles of the Japanese military, including a ban on the overseas dispatch of

military forces, increasingly specific understandings of how the military budget should be

limited so as not to exceed the "minimum necessary level" standard, and a ban on "offensive

---

[412] For a detailed discussion of the role of the prime minister, Cabinet Legislation Bureau, and Diet deliberation of security-related legislation in the development these institutions.   Samuels, 2007; Boyd & Samuels, 2005; Boyd, 2003; Nishikawa, 2000; Nakamura, 1991.

[413] Nakamura, 2001, p. 142. The CLB reinforced this position by defining the "right of belligerency" (*kōsenken*) renounced in Article Nine.   In his view, this concept included not only internationally accepted wartime rights, such as the right to seize enemy ships or to govern occupied territory, but also the right of the nation to pursue a wartime strategy of obliterating the enemy homeland in order to prevent any future threat.   The renunciation of these rights thus limited Japan's defensive use of force to the "minimum necessary level." Ibid., pp. 145-6.

[414] For more on the role of the CLB as an institutional constraint on constitutional interpretations and this security policy, see Samuels (2007, p.49-52); Samuels (2004); Boyd (2003).

weapons." Whereas the first two focus on conventional roles and capabilities, the last

institution also has implications for Japan's nuclear posture, although their extent is muted in

government interpretations and statements.

Of the above institutions, the ban on overseas dispatch was one of the few formalized in

domestic law during this period: It was incorporated into laws establishing the Self-Defense

Force (SDF) and Defense Agency in 1954.[415] In addition, the 1954 interpretations sanctioned

the use of force only for self-defense in the narrowest sense—to defend the nation against

attack—and thus constituted a *de facto* ban on Japanese participation in collective self-defense

arrangements.[416] This understanding was fortified in 1960 during the Diet debate over revising

the US-Japan Security Treaty, when the Kishi administration, having adopted the interpretations

unrevised, was forced to deal with their implications for alliance policy. Under Diet

questioning, CLB Director-General Hayashi Shūzō followed the reasoning of 1954 to its logical

conclusion in the following interpretations: 1) "Collective self-defense" is the act of defending

another nation as if defending one's own nation; 2) The activity of engaging in collective

self-defense is understood narrowly as the *use of force* on the behalf of an ally and thus does not

include other types of wartime cooperation, such as the leasing of bases or the extension of

economic aid; and 3) The exercise of the right of collective self-defense, while granted under

---

[415] See Keddell, 1993, p.6.
[416] Kataoka, 1991, p.118-120.

Article 51 of the UN Charter, is denied Japan under Article Nine.[417]   Bolstered by the Supreme

Court's reticence in the Sunakawa decision of December 1959, Kishi and Hayashi adhered to

these interpretations throughout the treaty debate.[418]   The lack of mutuality in the resulting

treaty is thus directly attributable to these understandings of Article Nine.   In 1972, the CLB

repeated that the use of force by Japan on the behalf of an ally under attack by a third party was

unconstitutional.[419]

Interestingly enough, the socialists, who at the time held the SDF itself to be

unconstitutional, were the ones who most often associated the ban on overseas dispatch with the

peace state narrative in the Diet inaugurals of this periods.   For example, the JSP's Asanuma

Inejirō argued that Kishi's plan to revise the US-Japan Security Treaty on more equal terms

would result in the situation where the US demands Japan to send the SDF to defend US bases in

Okinawa in an "unconstitutional overseas dispatch that would be taken as Japan's full

participation in the war effort."[420]   Less than a year later, Katayama Tetsu stated bluntly, "As

long as Article Nine continues to exits, concluding a security treat with another country that, in

---

[417] Nakamura, 2001, pp.181-5.

[418] In the Sunakawa case, the Supreme Court again ruled in favor of the government's interpretation of Article Nine, overturning a district court ruling that the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 was unconstitutional.   The Grand Bench found the right of self-defense was not denied by Article Nine.   However, it also argued that questions of a "highly political nature" (kōdo no seijisei wo yū suru mono), such as the constitutionality of the security treaty, fall outside the authority of judicial review absent evidence of obvious constitutional violations. Maki, 1964, p.305. Maki (1964) provides an English translation of this decision on pp.298-361.

[419] Nishikawa, 2000, p.44. Here, collective self-defense was again narrowly defined as the use of force on behalf of an ally, a position that freed Japan to engage in other forms of security-related cooperation, such as the extension of economic aid or participation in economic sanctions regimes.

[420] Asanuma Inejirō, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural) September 30, 1958. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011)

the name of self-defense, forces Japan to dispatch troops overseas to defend another country and

participate in their war is a clear violation of the constitution."[421]   In 1969, Narita demanded

that Prime Minister Satō promise to the Japanese people that he would never violate the

constitution by engaging in joint military operations with the United States in the name of

cooperation with the United Nations.   The issue was, continued Narita, whether to chose "the

road to conscription and the overseas dispatch of the SDF" or the path of "peace diplomacy"

(*heiwa gaikō*).[422]

Accordingly, the "minimum necessary level" standard was also applied to the overall

size of the defense budget, and the Diet saw vigorous debate over spending levels specified in a

series of five-year defense plans and their accompanying appropriations legislation.[423]

Although an agreement over an exact quantitative standard was not formalized during this time,

spending as a percentage of GNP had steadily fallen from a high of 2.8% in the early 1950s to

less than 1% in the late 1960s, and a consensus began to form within the ruling LDP and the

Ministry of Finance around this figure as an appropriate limit for peacetime defense spending.

In negotiations with China over reestablishing diplomatic relations in 1972, Prime Minister

Tanaka cited this "One Percent Limitation measure to show Japan's defense buildup would be

---

[421]   Katayama Tetsu, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), June 25, 1959. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011)
[422]   Narita Tomomi, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), December 1, 1969. Accessed at:
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011)
[423]   Keddell, 1993, pp.35-52.

restrained."[424]   In testimony before Diet in October 1972 regarding the Fourth Defense Plan,

Tanaka proposed 1% of GNP as the appropriate standard for limiting defense expenditures for a

country under the "constitution's constraint" (*kenpō no seiyaku*) with a policy of "exclusively

defensive defense" (*senshu bōei*).[425]

The understanding that Article Nine made certain weapons unconstitutional actually

preceded the above interpretations, first appearing in Diet deliberations as early as 1952.[426]

Since that time, the government was pressed by the opposition to offer concrete examples of

weapons systems it considered banned under Article Nine's constraints.   Between 1969 and

1971, the government (CLB and Defense Agency) defined "offensive weapons" banned under

Article Nine as weapons whose sole purpose was to inflict "wholesale destruction" (*kaimetsuteki*

hakai) on foreign territory and thus cause other countries to feel threatened (*kyōi wo kanzuru you*

na).[427]   In this way, the government interpretation argued the constitutionality of weapon

systems had to be assessed using both quantitative *and* qualitative criteria.   At this time, due to

this qualitative criteria, the government argued that it was unconstitutional for Japan to possess

weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), intermediate-range ballistic missile

---

[424] Keddell, 1993, p.50.
[425] Tanaka Kakuei, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Councillors, November 10, 1972.
Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).
[426] When forced by tenacious questioning to elaborate on the boundaries of the constitution's constraint on force
composition, Kimura Tokutarō, then director-general of the National Safety Agency, argued that maintenance of
howitzers fell within these limits, while jet fighter technology did not.   Auer, 1973, p. 119.   Although this
statement may have resulted more from the pressures of extemporaneous debate than from careful forethought, it
nonetheless became an important precedent.   Nakamura, 2001, p. 103.
[427] Asagumo, 2005, pp.613-614.

(IRBMs), and long-range bombers such as the B52.[428] Although the contents of this list

changed over time during this period, the conception that some weapons systems were

unconstitutional under prevailing technological and international conditions due to their

particular design and/or capabilities remained.[429]

Again, it was the socialists who most attached these quantitative and qualitative

restraints to the peace state narrative in the Diet inaugurals during this period. For example, at

the January 1969 inaugural, in a standard presentation of the JSP's state non-violence position,

Narita Tomomi declared the SDF to be "clearly in violation of the constitution" and argued that

it is "peace diplomacy based on neutrality and the solidarity born of the patriotic pride of the

citizens" that will ensure Japan's security.[430] Three years later, the same Narita argued that the

quantitative increases in the Fourth Defense Plan would both "exceed the bounds of the

self-defense limit" (*jiei no hani wo koe*) and "give the SDF an offensive character (*kōgekiteki*

seikaku)" that would "threaten neighboring countries." He then went on to liken this policy to

the "rich nation, strong army" rhetoric of the prewar period, reminding his audience how this had

this both harmed the peoples of Asia and left the Japanese nation in a "calamitous abyss." He

---

[428] JDA, 2001, p. 63. It should be noted that the government's understanding of which weapons are banned by this interpretation has changed over the years. Samuels, 2007, p.47.
[429] For example, the contention that jet fighters were banned was dropped during this period. Ibid..
[430] Narita Tomomi, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, January 27, 1969. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).

concluded by calling for the abandonment of the Fourth Defense Plan and the adherence to

"peace diplomacy" (*heiwa gaikō*).[431]

Also associated with the peace state narrative are institutions governing the Japanese

state's promotion of conventional disarmament around the world. Although Japan exported

varies types of weapons and dual-use items employed by foreign militaries after the end of the

occupation, such items were approved for export on an individual basis in a process that drew

criticism from the socialist opposition, which argued that a Japan that could export weapons was

in *de facto* violation of the "minimum necessary limit" standard on force levels.[432] In addition,

Japan had become a member state of Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls

(COCOM) in 1952, which banned arms exports to Warsaw Pact countries, and had also agreed

to restrictions on trade with China that also included controls on weapons sales.[433] Facing

pressure over the backlash over the increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam conducted by Japan's

alliance partner as well as well as related difficulties in negotiating the return of Okinawa, which

was then used as a major staging ground for American operations in Southeast Asia, Prime

Minister Satō responded in April 1967 by weaving together the above threads of arms export

---

[431] Narita Tomomi, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, October 28, 1972. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).

[432] Scholars have documented that the socialists had powerful allies in the effort to limit arms exports, including the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), both of which fought to have scarce resources such as foreign exchange and domestic investment funds directed toward industries outside of defense production. Samuels, 1994; Green, 1995; Oros, 2008.

[433] Oros, 2008, p.94.

policies into the "Three Principles Restricting Arms Exports (*buki yūshutsu sangensoku*), a policy statement declaring Japan would not export arms to 1) the communist countries; 2) countries under an arms embargo ordered by a United Nations (UN) resolution; and 3) countries were either already engaged in international conflicts or appeared likely to do so. Although the first two were covered by Japan's existing COCOM and UN commitments, the third represented a new standard for export approval decisions.[434]

The state's disarmament policies were associated with peace state rhetoric throughout this period. In addition to the interpretation of Article Nine mentioned above, the JSP argued that Japan could promote disbarment around the world by leading by example at home, as "a shining pioneer in total disarmament," thus linking normative calls to restrain domestic force levels with disarmament goals abroad.[435] Following Satō's unveiling of the "Three Principles," LDP prime ministers began to present the issue of promoting disarmament using the language of the peace state narrative. For example, in only his second Diet inaugural after taking over from Satō, Prime Minister Tanaka calling Japan a "peace state" (*heiwa kokka*) with a "peace constitution without precedent in the world" (*sekai ni rei no nai heiwa kenpō*), he immediately when on to assert it to be Japan's duty (*sekimu*) to promote "the creation of a new peace"

---

[434] Samuels, 1994, p.169.
[435] Narita Tomomi, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, September 28, 1961. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).

(*atarashii heiwa no sōzō*) and contribute to "an overarching international disarmament"

(*zenpanteki na kokusai gunshuku*).[436]

A final set of institutions commonly associated with the peace state narrative, especially the anti-nuclear sate sub-narrative, are those governing Japan's nonnuclear posture. The first are interpretations of Article Nine and the ban on "offensive weapons." Although government officials have repeatedly insisted that nuclear forces maintained for the purpose of self-defense are constitutional, these interpretations include the acknowledgment that Article Nine constrains strategic forces in the same manner as conventional ones.[437] Accordingly, with three types of delivery systems associated with nuclear weapons, ICBMs, IRBMs, and long-range bombers, explicitly banned in the government interpretation, no administration explained publicly exactly what a constitutional strategic force would entail.[438] Further, few weapons systems fit the definition of an offensive weapon—armaments whose sole purpose is to inflict "wholesale destruction" and thus threaten other countries—better than nuclear forces. For these reasons,

---

[436] Tanaka Kakuei, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, January 27, 1973. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).

[437] The government argued for the constitutionality of nuclear weapons both before and after the declaration of the non-nuclear policy. In 1959, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke told an Upper House committee, "The Government intends to maintain no nuclear weapons, but speaking in terms of legal interpretation of the Constitution, there is nothing to prevent maintaining the minimum amount of nuclear weapons for the purpose of self-defense." See Auer (1973, p. 123). In 1970, the CLB director-general argued in the Diet that "when it comes to nuclear weapons, there are those that may be maintained, and those that may not...it depends on whether they fall within the limit required to preserve our nation's existence and security." See Nishikawa (2000, p. 41). It is important to note that Kishi's comments included an affirmation of the government's intent to maintain non-nuclear status, indicating his awareness of the controversial nature of the constitutional argument.

[438] The most detailed such explanation provided so far is from the Defense Agency, which stated in 1970 that it was "possible to possess a small-yield nuclear weapon without violating the constitution if it was within the minimum force level required for self-defense and is not an offensive threat to other countries." Hughes, 2007, p.84.

many Japanese have viewed Japan's non-nuclear policy as a logical result of Article Nine's constraints.[439]

Second, in 1967, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku declared a cabinet policy prohibiting the possession, production, or introduction of nuclear weapons by Japan. These "three nonnuclear principles" largely diffused the above dispute over the "offensive weapons" interpretation by establishing clear limits on nuclear policy. Once again, the government traded what it considered over-compliance with Article Nine for political goals.[440] Initially offered in response to opposition pressure in the Diet, these principles were elevated to the status of a Diet resolution in 1971 as part of deal to gain centrist support for the LDP position on the reversion of Okinawa.[441]

Although resolutions, like cabinet policies, are non-binding, two institutions with legal force that are particularly associated with peace state narrative are the Basic Law on Atomic Energy and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The former "establishes that the research,

---

[439] For example, the *Asahi Shimbun* (22 May 1995) included the non-nuclear policy as one of the "results of Article Nine." Cited from a translated version of this article in Hook & McCormack (2001, p.143).

[440] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, The Three Nonnuclear Principles Diet Resolution (*Hikakusangensoku kokkaiketsugi*). Accessed at : http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/gensoku/ketsugi.html (December 5, 2011). Two things should be noted here. First, cost concerns were like important factors in the development of this policy. Prime Minister Satō commissioned a secret government study to examine the possibility of developing an independent nuclear capability. The study downplayed technical obstacles but argued developing nuclear weapons independently would be too expensive. Kase, 2001. Second, the third principle forbidding introduction into Japan "was probably broken during the Cold War." Hughes, 2007. However, as noted above, compliance is not a central concern here.

[441] Keddell, 1993, pp. 44-46.

development and utilization of atomic energy must be limited to peaceful purposes"[442]   In

addition to representing a legal obstacle to potential changes in Japan's nonnuclear stance, the

law also established the Atomic Energy Commission, which is mandated to make policy and

coordinate budgetary issues across all bureaucratic organs relevant to nuclear policy and "defines

its roles as making sure that Japan continues to limit its use of nuclear energy to peaceful

purposes."[443]   In addition, Japan's signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 would result

in a reinforced legal apparatus supporting Japan's nonnuclear posture and significantly enhanced

Japan's efforts to promote nuclear disarmament internationally.[444]

Associations between these institutions and the peace state narrative are widely made

across both the political and media participants in the Diet inaugural debates.   For example, as

early as 1956, in a speech in which he made the pursuit of "peace diplomacy an unshakable

plan," Prime Minister Hatoyama also pledged to advance the "peaceful use of nuclear power" as

a major goal of his administration.[445]   In multiple Diet inaugurals, Prime Minister Satō declared

his commitment to a nonnuclear posture, including his government's efforts to pursue

---

[442] Hughes, 2007, p.88.

[443] Ibid.

[444] The treaty did not acquire legal force until Japan ratified it in 1976, a point discussed in the next section.   In addition, estimates of the level of constraint this places on Japan "vary widely."   Hymans, 2011, p.172.   However, once ratified, it is clear that involvement in this and other arms control multilateral regime later strengthened the institutional position of bureaucrats dedicated to nonproliferation issues within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hughes, 2007, p.74.

[445] Hatoyama Ichirō, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), January 30, 1956.

international nuclear disarmament and the return of a "nuclear free" Okinawa.[446] The socialists,

on the other hand, at first repeatedly criticized the LDP-led governments for failing to take up

their party's call to declare a nonnuclear posture and allowing nuclear weapons to be brought in

to Japan in contradiction with the spirit of the constitution and peace diplomacy.[447] In addition,

editorialists from the major newspaper also criticized the government for allowing visits to

Japanese ports by nuclear-powered (and likely armed) ships while preaching the virtues of the

peaceful use of nuclear power.   If this is a ruse to alleviate that people's "nuclear allergy," then

it is an unforgivable betrayal, declared a *Mainichi* editorial from January 1968.[448]

The analysis so far has established that, in the first two decades after Japan regained its

postwar independence, the peace state narrative was the most prominent nation-state narrative in

this study, was broadly and continuously referred to across the political spectrum, including by

revisionist conservatives who had reasons to oppose some of its cognitive and normative claims,

was heavily contested in the 1950s and then treated largely consensually thereafter, and saw the

ratio of it references increasingly dependent on the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative but ended the

period with roughly equal weight given to its two sub-narratives.   In addition, the peace-state

narrative was associated with state institutions governing both the roles and capabilities of

---

[446] For examples, see Satō Eisaku, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), Marcy 14, 1967; January 27, 1968; January 29, 1972. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).
[447] See for example, Asanuma Inejirō, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural) , November 1, 1957. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 4, 2011).
[448] *Mainichi Shmnbun*, 28 January 1968.

Japan's conventional military as well as the its nuclear strategies by political elites arguing for different positions in the spectrum from state non-violence to state non-aggression. The next section will compare this baseline with the period 1973-1977, when the peace state narrative registered its first major decline in prominence in the postwar period.

III. Flag in the Ground: *Heiwa Kokka* in the 1970s

Although the period of 1968-1972 saw the third highest prominence score for the peace state narrative (6.097) recorded in this study, this figure fell to 1.3451 for the period 1973-1977, a decline of nearly 78%, the largest decline between consecutive five-year periods in the first twenty-five years of the study.[449] In comparison with the prominence scores of the other nation-state narratives, peace state was ranked third behind civilized state and trading state narratives and just above the democratic state narrative. As shown in Table 6.6 below, although its prominence score for the five-year period remained above average for the five nation-state narratives, it was considerably below the average for the peace state narrative to date.

---

[449] The next largest is the 34% decline between 1958-1962 and 1963-1967.

Table 6.6: Narrative Prominence in Comparison, 1952-1977

Narrative	1952*-1957	1958-1962	1963-1967	1968-1972	1973-1977	Average*
Trading State	3.2919	4.9425	3.6684	1.2968	1.5831	2.9565
Organic State	1.9876	0.8891	2.0010	1.1222	0.2381	1.2476
Peace State	6.0248	7.4268	4.9309	6.0973	1.3451	5.1650
Civilized State	1.6149	3.3996	2.5012	2.0823	2.0950	2.3386
Democratic State	7.2671	7.0084	3.3587	1.6958	1.1784	4.1017
Average	4.0373	4.7333	3.2920	2.4589	1.2879	3.1619

Units: References per 100 sentences per period; *Averages are for the period to date, 1952-1977.

However, despite the large decline in both absolute and relative terms, the prominence for the peace state narrative does not go to zero either for the period 1973-1977 or in subsequent periods. On the contrary, prominence actually begins to increase in the next five-year period and then approaches a postwar high between 1983 and 1987. This pattern is in clear contradiction to the predictions of the denationalization hypothesis.

Changes in the relative frequencies of the components of the peace state narrative are depicted in Table 6.7 below. The five normative claims that combined to represent nearly 80% of peace state references for period between 1952 and 1972 continued to amount to four-fifths of narrative references between 1973 and 1977.[450] In addition, three of the four cognitive components in the narrative registered an increase in relative frequency during this period. In particular, references to Japan as a "peace state" and to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and

---

[450] These five normative components for claims opposing Article Nine's revision, recognizing restrictions on state force levels, limiting the use of force by the state, banning the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and promoting nuclear disarmament.

243

Nagasaki saw large increases and combined to represent nearly 13% of total references to the narrative during this period.

Table 6.7: Relative Frequency, Peace State Narrative Components, 1952-1977

Component	1952*-1957	1958-1962	1963-1967	1968-1972	1973-1977	Average
Peace State	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	1.6%	5.0%	1.5%
Nuclear Victim State	0.0%	0.4%	2.4%	0.0%	0.8%	0.7%
Support Peace Constitution	9.3%	7.7%	6.2%	10.3%	5.9%	7.9%
Implement Peace Diplomacy	10.8%	5.3%	1.4%	2.4%	4.2%	4.8%
Eschew Use of Force	11.9%	16.2%	10.0%	13.3%	8.4%	12.0%
Restrain War Potential	30.4%	9.2%	6.2%	21.5%	28.6%	19.2%
Support International Disarmament	2.1%	7.0%	4.8%	1.8%	1.7%	3.5%
War Regret	21.6%	11.3%	7.7%	5.8%	0.8%	9.4%
Atomic Bombings	0.5%	0.7%	2.4%	1.6%	7.6%	2.6%
Support Non-Nuclear Principles	5.2%	14.8%	27.3%	31.8%	21.8%	20.2%
Support International Nuclear Disarmament	8.2%	27.5%	30.6%	9.9%	15.1%	18.3%

Units: % of total references to narrative per period; *Averages are for the period to date, 1952-1977.

There is no contestation of either normative or cognitive component of the peace state narrative between 1973 and 1977. In addition, there was no contestation in the preceding decade. The relative frequency and contestation results are combined in the narrative analysis in Table 6.8 below. The key findings are that, although the narrative as a whole declined in prominence on a period-on-period basis, there was no contestation recorded targeting either cognitive or normative components in either this period or the previous one and thus no components appear as points of contention in Table 6.8. In addition, as noted above, three of the four cognitive components, including both naming conventions ("peace state" and "nuclear

244

victim state"), saw increases in their relative frequency, which locates them as points of major

consensus between 1973 and 1977. These results, especially the absence of contestation, run

counter to the predictions of both the transformational and denationalization hypotheses.

Table 6.8: Narrative Analysis, 1973-1977*

	Content (Relative Frequency)		
		Increase	*Decrease*
	Increase	Major Contention N.A.	Minor Contention N.A.
Contestation **(% Negative)**	*Decrease*	Major Consensus Peace State, Nuclear Victim State Implement Peace Diplomacy, Restrain War Potential, Atomic Bombings, Support International Nuclear Disarmament	Minor Consensus Support Peace Constitution, Eschew Use of Force, Support International Disarmament, War Regret, Support Non-Nuclear Principles

*Based on comparison with previous five-year period, 1968-1972

245

In addition, analysis of the speeches and editorials during this period reveals no evidence of participants in the Diet inaugurals employing transformational, tinkering or destructive discursive strategies toward the peace state narrative during this period or in the preceding five-year period, a finding that again runs counter to the predictions of the transformational and denationalization hypotheses. In addition, of particular note is the increased in the percentage of references generated from the prime ministerial speeches during this period. As Table 6.9 makes clear, the percentage nearly doubled in comparison with the period of 1956-1972, the preceding period for which the right-of-center LDP also continuously held the prime minister's office and the largest opposition party was also the left-of-center JSP. This indicates an increased level of endorsement of the peace state narrative by successive conservative governments and thus helps explain the absence of contestation during this period, as both conservative and progressive forces advanced arguments using the established logics and discursive conventions of the peace state narrative. This finding is also consistent with general appraisals of views of security policy held by the three LDP prime ministers who gave Diet inaugurals during this period, Tanaka Kakuei, Miki Takeo, and Fukuda Takeo.[451]

---

[451] Although among the three, Miki is most associated with "dovish" views on security policy in concert with the claims of the peace state narrative, it has also been noted that the most "hawkish" of the three, Fukuda Takeo, a protégé of Kishi Nobusuke and ostensibly a "revisionist" conservative, nonetheless adhered to security policies in line with the peace state claims during this period. Ōtake, 1988, pp.147-158; Samuels, 2007, p.44.

Table 6.9: Peace State References by Source, Two Periods

Peace State	1956-1972	1973-1977
Prime Ministerial Speeches (Non-JSP)	11%	21%
Opposition Responses (JSP)	74%	73%
Editorials	15%	5%

Table 6.10 summarizes the changes observed during this period to the state institutions associated with the peace state narrative. Most saw no significant changes during the period. However, the 1% of GNP Ceiling and the Nonproliferation Treaty saw increases in their level of institutionalization, both in ways consistent with the associated normative claims of the peace state narrative. The 1% Ceiling, which at previously only attained the status of a policy suggested and approved of by a prime minister in Diet debate, was formalized in state policy by an order of the Miki Cabinet in November 1976.[452] Also in 1976, the Diet ratified Japan's participation in the NPT, thus giving the treaty the force of law.[453] In addition, in February of that same year, Prime Minister Miki "reaffirmed and strengthened" Satō's Three Principles Restricting Arms Exports.[454] Although the status of these principles remained that of an official policy statement, Miki made three changes of note. First, while maintaining the restrictions on exports to the three types of countries in the original principles, he added to this a statement that it was the government's intention to "restrain arms exports to other areas."

---

[452] Keddell, 1993, p.57

[453] Hymans,2011, p.172. For analysis of the added level of restriction the treaty places on Japan's nuclear posture, see Rublee (2009).

[454] Oros, 2008, p.109.

Second, he extended the restriction to also include "arms production-related equipment."[455]

Finally, he infused the new policy statement itself with peace state rhetoric, something Satō had

not done when he announced the original policy before the Diet in 1967. "From the standpoint of

our country as a peace state (heiwa kokka)" is the second phrase following "with regard to arms

exports" in Miki's statement, which then goes on to announce the new areas of restriction as "in

line with the spirit of the constitution."[456] With this restatement, the government's policy thus

simultaneously became both more restrictive and more closely associated with the peace state

narrative.

Table 6.10: Changes in Associated State Institutions, 1973-1977

Associated State Institution	1973-1977
Article Nine (law)	No Change
1954 Interpretation	No Change
Ban on Overseas Dispatch (law)	No Change
US-Japan Security Treaty (law)	No Change
1% of GNP Ceiling	Made Cabinet Order (1976)

[455] For analysis of the importance of these first two points for Japan's arms exports, see National Diet Library, 2011; Oros, 2008.
[456] Miki Takeo, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, February 27, 1976. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011). For Satō's original statement, see Satō Eisaku, Liberal Democratic Party, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, April 21, 1967. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).

Ban on Offensive Weapons	No Change
Three Principles on Arms Exports	Miki Expansion (1976)
Three Nonnuclear Principles (resolution)	No Change
Basic Law on Atomic Energy (law)	No Change
Non-proliferation Treaty (signed)	Ratified (1976)

Based on the assumptions of the model here, association with these institutions, if anything, were a stabilizing force for the peace state narrative during this period, "flagging" its components without serving as sources of controversy that might lead to reevaluation, denigration or the emergence of counter-narratives. The findings on associated institutions thus also do not support the predictions of the transformation or denationalization hypotheses.

Based on the above findings, it is concluded that the decline in prominence in the peace state narrative observed in the mid-1970s is a case of "banalization." The evidence supports the predictions of this hypothesis as follows. First, although the decline is steep, prominence does not become negligible in this or subsequent periods. Second, there is no contestation observed in either the period in question or the periods immediately preceding it. Third, no transformational or destructive discursive strategies targeting the peace state narrative are observed in this or the immediately preceding period. Finally, the only reforms observed in state institutions associated with the peace state narrative during this and the preceding period

are ones that either strengthened the level of institutionalization, the association with the narrative or both. The decline in prominence during this period should thus not be taken as an indication of a decline in salience or of an increased likelihood of the break-up of the narrative as a discursive formation in the future.

IV. Peace Transforming: *Heiwa Kokka* after the Cold War

The peace state narrative saw its second highest postwar peak in prominence in the period between 1983 and 1987. However, this achievement was immediately followed by steady declines of about 40% on a period-on-period basis for the next two five-year blocks and was punctuated by a 70% decline between the periods of 1993-1997 and 1998-2002. Overall, the prominence scores of the peace state narrative fell 90% from the peak in the 1980s to the trough of 1998-2002, the lowest recorded score for the narrative in this study. Is this decline yet another example of the banalization of the peace state narrative? The focus here is on interpreting the decline in prominence in the period 1998-2002, although indicators from both preceding and subsequent periods will also be considered.

The period-on-period prominence declines for the peace state narrative following the second postwar peak are large but not unprecedented in size. However, as shown in Table 6.11 below, these declines do distinguish the period in the following ways. First, prior to 1988-1992,

the peace state narrative had never seen consecutive period-on-period declines in prominence. However, following the peak in 1983-1987, the peace state narrative declined in prominence across three consecutive five-year blocks (1988-1992, 1993-1997, and 1998-2002). Second, the extent of the decline measured from the nearest peak (1983-1987) to the trough (1998-2002), or 90%, is the largest such difference in the study. The previous record on this measure was 82% (between 1958-1962 and 1973-1977). Third, in the period 1998-2002, the peace state narrative fell to fourth place in prominence among the nation-state narratives and registered a prominence score below the average for the five nation-state narratives, both unprecedented occurrences.

Table 6.11: Narrative Prominence in Comparison, 1978-2007

Narrative	1978-1982	1983-1987	1988-1992	1993-1997	1998-2002	2003-2007	Average
Trading State	2.0812	2.2169	1.9779	1.3559	1.0619	1.2279	2.2459
Organic State	0.4186	0.6764	0.1900	0.1427	0.2862	0.3976	0.7590
Peace State	4.7553	6.7886	4.0340	2.3244	0.7018	0.9706	4.1272
Civilized State	2.5113	2.2545	1.3409	1.3457	1.3481	1.7425	2.0215
Democratic State	1.1627	1.5907	1.6315	1.1112	0.8310	0.3742	2.4736
Average	2.1858	2.7054	1.8349	1.2560	0.8458	0.9426	2.3254

Units: References per 100 sentences; *Averages are for the entire period of the study, 1952-2007.

However, contrary to the predictions of the denationalization hypothesis, prominence scores do not decline to negligible levels during any of the periods of the downturn. In addition, following the nadir in 1998-2002, prominence rises in the subsequent period (2003-2007). Although only about a quarter of the narrative's average for the entire study, prominence was

251

higher than the five-narrative average and sufficient to return the peace state narrative to third

place during this last five-year period. None of these findings are consistent with an on-going

process of denationalization.

Table 6.12 shows changes in the relative frequencies of the components of the peace

state narrative between 1978 and 2007. Focusing on the trough period of 1998-2002, several

things are apparent. First, only one of the four cognitive components, the nuclear victim state

naming convention, rose on a period-on-period basis, reaching a level that far exceeded its

average for the entire fifty-five year period. Second, the five normative components previously

observed to be responsible for the lion's share of references to the peace state narrative for the

periods 1952-1972 and 1973-1977 continue to play a similar role for both the five-year period in

question and the entire study.[457] The combined relative frequencies of these five normative

components for period 1998-2002 was 82%, slightly above the corresponding figure for entire

period (77%) and in line with those observed in the earlier periods. Third, one cognitive

component, references to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is not referred to

during this period. Although only the second time this occurred in the study, the significance of

this absence is diminished by the above-average performance of the naming convention for the

---

[457] These five normative components for claims opposing Article Nine's revision, recognizing restrictions on state force levels, limiting the use of force by the state, banning the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and promoting nuclear disarmament.

anti-nuclear state sub-narrative as well as the similarly above-average relative frequencies of the

normative components in this sub-narrative.[458]

Table 6.12: Relative Frequency, Peace State Components, 1978-2007

Component	1978-1982	1983-1987	1988-1992	1993-1997	1998-2002	2003-2007	Average*
Peace State	4.9%	3.2%	7.7%	2.6%	2.6%	0.0%	2.6%
Nuclear Victim State	1.9%	0.9%	0.3%	2.1%	2.6%	1.2%	1.1%
Support Peace Constitution	13.3%	8.8%	16.6%	16.7%	11.5%	20.5%	11.5%
Implement Peace Diplomacy	3.3%	0.9%	1.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.7%
Eschew Use of Force	10.2%	10.5%	16.6%	14.1%	16.7%	20.5%	13.5%
Restrain War Potential	28.8%	32.9%	21.2%	9.4%	5.1%	4.8%	18.0%
Support International Disarmament	11.9%	15.4%	15.6%	9.8%	3.8%	3.6%	7.0%
War Regret	2.8%	2.7%	7.7%	14.1%	9.0%	7.2%	8.2%
Atomic Bombings	1.9%	0.7%	0.5%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%
Support Non-Nuclear Principles	5.1%	9.6%	5.6%	2.1%	14.1%	0.0%	12.5%
Support International Nuclear Disarmament	16.0%	14.5%	6.9%	28.6%	34.6%	42.2%	21.3%

Units: % of total references to narrative per period; *Averages are for the entire period of the study, 1952-2007.

In stark contrast with the 1970s, the period from 1983 to 2007 has seen contestation that

is unprecedented in its level of intensity and protraction at both the narrative and component

level.   At the narrative level, as shown in Chart 6.2 below, the contestation is unprecedented in

that is sustained over six consecutive five-year blocks and reaches the highest level (nearly 16%

---

[458] This component is also not present in the Diet inaugurals held between 2003-2007.   However, the extremely strong performance of the "support international nuclear disarmament" normative component again maintains the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative's relative frequency within the peace state narrative during this time.   In addition, although not examined in the content analysis here, the "nuclear victim state" cognitive component is repeatedly referenced in the Diet inaugurals of the next period (2008-2012), including in prime ministerial addresses by Hatoyama Yukio (October 26, 2009; January 29, 2010), Kan Naoto (January 24, 2011), and Noda Yoshihiko (September 13, 2011).   Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).

in 1998-2002) recorded for this narrative in any five-year period. Previously, the peace state narrative had not been contested for two consecutive five-year blocks and its highest level of contestation had reached just over 4% for the period 1952-1957. With regard to interpreting the meaning of the prominence decline during the period 1998-2002, these findings decisively refute the banalization hypothesis, which predicts negligible levels of contestation in the period in question and those immediately preceding it. They are, however, broadly consistent with the predictions of the transformation and denationalization hypotheses, which both expect increases in contestation to precede and then accompany a major decline in prominence.

Chart 6.2: Contestation Levels, Peace State Narrative, 1952-2007

Units: % of negatively-valued references to total references for the narrative

Table 6.13 below shows that contestation was also unprecedented at the narrative component level in multiple ways. First, at least one of four normative components of the

254

peace-loving state sub-narrative ("support the peace constitution," "eschew the use of force,"

"restrain war potential," and "support international disarmament") was contested in each of the

last six five-year blocks of the study, with one, the claim to restrain war potential, contested in

five of the six blocks.   Second, the level of contestation for each of these components exceeds

its average for the entire study at least once over these three decades.   Finally, the period

1998-2002 saw the second-highest level of contestation recorded for any narrative in this study

and is the only five-block in which four different components are contested simultaneously.[459]

In addition, each of these contested components saw their highest individual levels of

contestation during this period.

Table 6.13: Contestation Levels, Four Narrative Components, 1978-2007

Component (% Negative)	1978-1982	1983-1987	1988-1992	1993-1997	1998-2002	2003-2007	Average
Support Peace Constitution	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.7	33.3	29.4	6.4
Eschew Use of Force	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	46.2	29.4	8.2
Restrain War Potential	4.0	0.5	0.0	13.6	50.0	50.0	11.5
Support International Disarmament	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0	33.2	0.0	3.1

Units: % of negatively-valued references to total references for each narrative component; *Averages are for the entire period of the study, 1952-2007.

The narrative analysis results for the period 1998-2002 are depicted in Table 6.14 below.

This is a picture of a relatively highly contested narrative.   Three of the five normative

components of the peace-loving state narrative are minor points of contention ("support the

---

[459] The highest recorded level of contestation (19.4%) was for the organic state narrative in this same five-year period.

peace constitution," "restrain war potential," and "support international disarmament"), one ("eschew the use of force) is a major point of contention, and the fifth ("implement peace diplomacy") received no references for the second five-year period in a row. In addition, three key cognitive components ("peace state" naming convention, "war regret," and "atomic bombings") are minor points of consensus. Importantly, however, the "nuclear victim state" naming convention is a major point of consensus, and thus went uncontested while representing an unusually large percentage of the narrative's total references for the five-year period.

Table 6.14: Narrative Analysis, 1998-2002*

	Content (Relative Frequency)		
		Increase	*Decrease*
Contestation **(% Negative)**	*Increase*	Major Contention Eschew the Use of Force	Minor Contention Support Peace Constitution, Restrain War Potential, Support International Disarmament
	Decrease	Major Consensus Nuclear Victim State, Support Non-Nuclear Principles,	Minor Consensus Peace State, Implement Peace Diplomacy,

		Support International Nuclear Disarmament	War Regret, Atomic Bombings

The failure to find contestation over cognitive components in this period or the ones immediately preceding it runs counter to the expectations of both the comprehensive transformation and denationalization hypotheses. However, the overall pattern of changes in relative frequencies and contestation observed here is consistent with the predictions of the partial transformation hypothesis, albeit with one important caveat. As Table 6.15 reveals, the prominence scores of all four contested components rise in the subsequent period of 2003-2007. Although these prominence scores remain far below the averages for the period from the second peak, the facts that increases are observed over this period (including in the relative frequencies of both the claims in support of the constitution and eschewing the use of force) and that three of the components (support the constitution, restrain war potential, and eschew the use of force) continued to face high levels of contestation in this subsequent period are indications that the partial transformation is still an ongoing process.

Table 6.15: Prominence Scores, Four Contested Components, 1983-2007

Contested Component	1983-1987	1988-1992	1993-1997	1998-2002	2003-2007	Average*
Support Peace Constitution	0.6137	0.7263	0.3976	0.0831	0.1988	0.4039 (0.4405)
Eschew Use of Force	0.7390	0.7264	0.3364	0.1200	0.1988	0.4241 (0.5447)
Restrain War Potential	2.3046	0.9275	0.2243	0.0370	0.0468	0.7080 (0.8675)
Support International Disarmament	1.0771	0.6816	0.2345	0.0277	0.0351	0.4112 (0.3337)

Units: References per 100 sentences per period; *Averages are for the period depicted, 1983-2007. (Averages for entire period)

Analysis of the speeches and editorials from the peak period in the 1980s until the trough in 1998-2002 show the presence of both transformational and perpetuating discursive strategies. Despite at times appearing to take on broader implications, the transformational strategies observed all failed to directly challenge any of the cognitive components of the peace state narrative, although, over the twenty-year period, they did target nearly all of the normative components of the peace-loving state sub-narrative for exceptions. Perpetuating strategies tended to be employed in response to these partial or tinkering transformational strategies, especially during the first decade of this period by members of the socialist opposition but also afterwards by less experienced opposition parties.

The first transformational strategy, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's call for Japan to become an "international state" (*kokusai kokka*), represents one of the most sweeping, if

sometimes vague, discursive formations in this study. It appears to be a conscious attempt by a single participant in the national discourse to construct a new nation-state narrative. However, rather than the product of a purely constructive strategy, this new narrative combines or touches on elements of the trading state, organic state, peace state and civilized state narratives. For the purposes here, it is best regarded as a transformational strategy, albeit one that either incorporates or attempts to partially transform the components of multiple narratives studied here.

"International State Japan" (*kokusai kokka nihon*) is composed of several components. First, it advances a cognitive claim placing "Japanese identity in a global context": the Japanese have a strong sense of appreciation for the strengths of their own culture and traditions, while also at the same time having an innate capacity for appreciating the qualities of foreign cultures.[460] These inherent traits of the nation are then called on to support a set of normative claims. Among these are the call for Japanese to appreciate their history and culture, especially recent postwar achievements, as a source of pride and a product to be promoted to other nations (and state education and cultural policies to reflect these claims), a demand that the state implement welfare policies that take into account these cultural traditions while following organizational reform and economic policies that are open and responsive to the international

---

[460] Pyle, 1987, p.263.

environment. More generally, the narrative calls on the state to always consider ways to reform

"Japan's institutions to harmonize them with international expectations."[461] For example, as

introduced in Nakasone's February 1984 Diet inaugural address, chief among these were reforms

of the government bureaucracy, including the national rail sector, and the tax and educational

systems, with the intent always being to move away from developmental state institutions to

foster more openness in the economy, society and schools.[462]

The call for Japan to become an "international state" can potentially relate to the peace

state narrative on both cognitive and normative grounds. With regard to the former, while

acknowledging the debt of history in making the nation what it is today, including

negatively-valued episodes such as the Pacific War, this narrative calls on present-day Japanese

"to establish Japan's identity by judging the past achievements of Japan in terms of the universal

nature of world history."[463] Put differently, the narrative calls on the nation to value and take

lessons from its entire history, rather than focusing excessively on recent negative episodes.

---

[461] Pyle, 1987, p.256.

[462] Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), January 25, 1985. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).

[463] Pyle, 2007, p.275. Nakasone's own personal view of the meaning of the war is often obscured in his rhetoric. For example, the following statements precede the quoted line above: "so that Japan may progress toward becoming an international state (*kokusai kokka*), it is important that Japan once again reconsider it identity....After we lost the war, the Pacific War view of history emerged, it is called the Tokyo [War Crimes] Tribunal view of history. The allied countries, acting on their own, made [international] laws, made Japan the defendant, and in the name of civilization, in the name of peace and humanity, judged Japan. History will have to make the final judgment of the justice of those procedures and judgments."

Depending on one's interpretation, this second point could thus be taken as downplaying a key cognitive claim of the peace state narrative—the assertion that the Japanese state's wartime actions were regretful. However, far from questioning this assertion, Nakasone at times seems to confirm it in his Diet inaugural speeches. For example, three sentences after his call for Japan to be an "international state" quoted above, Nakasone traces the nation's present-day dedication to peace and democracy to reflections over the failings of the prewar period.

> After the war, we [Japanese] have deeply inculcated the values and meanings of democracy (*minshushugi*), such as respect for liberty, peace (*heiwa*), fundamental human rights, and legal order, and have worked to put them in practice strongly resolute in the determination to protect and establish them even further based on our regrets over what happened before the war (*senzen no hansei no ue ni tatte*).[464]

In addition, Nakasone's Diet inaugurals are replete with peace state rhetoric. In fact, in his nine Diet inaugural address, Nakasone refers to "peace state" (*heiwa kokka*), "peace diplomacy" (*heiwa gaikō*) or the "peace constitution" (*heiwa kenpō*) in a positive manner at least once in eight of them, while he mentions his own "international state" narrative in the same manner in only six. For example, continuing in the same speech quoted above, Nakasone later refers to Japan as a "peace state" (*heiwa kokka*) and declares:

> Above all, there has not been the slightest wavering in our traditional policy of not threatening neighboring countries militarily, strictly adhering to the three nonnuclear

---

464 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), January 25, 1985. He also makes a near identical point in the Diet inaugural address given on January 27, 1986. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).

principles and civilian control, and, on the basis of our peace constitution (*heiwa kenpō*), maintaining our exclusively defensive defense posture."[465]

Taken in tandem, these observations of Nakasone's rhetorical habits reveal far more nuance to his revisionism, and his call for Japan to become an "international state," than is sometimes appreciated. Despite his life-long pursuit of constitutional revision and public views that Japan should consider going nuclear if certain conditions obtain, Nakasone, particularly as prime minister, not only failed to challenge the key cognitive claims of the peace state narrative but often reinforced them.[466] Noting this pattern earlier in Nakasone's career, the political scientist Soeya Yoshihide argues that Nakasone's rejection of traditional great power aspirations and his embrace of Japan's nonnuclear posture were partially based on his own reflection (*naisei*) on Japan's wars of invasion in Asia.[467] Although this point will be explored further in the discussion of his 1985 visit to the Yasukuni shrine in Chapter Seven, its main relevance here is in distinguishing his approach to the peace state narrative as a partial transformational discursive strategy. Nakasone deploys "international state" arguments to challenge the range of application of particular normative claims in the peace state narrative. This classification is further supported by consideration of the rhetorical techniques Nakasone employed when calling

---

[465] Ibid.

[466] *Asahi Shimbun* 14 October 2006, p.13. The conditions Nakasone cites are "such extreme cases as the United States renouncing the protection of alliance partners under its 'nuclear umbrella' or the complete collapse of the US-Japan alliance." He then argues that the 2006 nuclear test by North Korea "does not qualify as one of these extreme cases."

[467] Soeya, 2005, p.145.

for reforms to two state institutions associated with normative claims of the peace state narrative:

the Three Principles Restricting Arms Exports and the 1% of GNP ceiling on military spending.

The first rhetorical practice of note is Nakasone's explicit insistence that disarmament

and force limitation measures were important and appropriate parts of Japan's foreign policy.

Often framed in the context of East-West relations, he repeatedly called for Japan to play and

active role in promoting disarmament and force level limitations in international talks between

the superpowers.[468]   Sometimes these calls were directly linked to the claims of the peace state

narrative.   For example, after claiming it was only "natural" (*tōzen da*) that Japan avoid

becoming a "military great power" (*gunji taikoku*) and instead adhere to policies such as the

Three Nonnuclear Principles and "exclusively defensive defense" (*senshu bōei*) under its "peace

constitution" (*heiwa kenpō*), Nakasone noted the need to promote disarmament and force

limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States and concluded, "a country like

Japan, which has no nuclear weapons and only the moderate defense capabilities of an

exclusively defensive defense, is able to make such calls for peace and disarmament from the

beginning."[469]   In this way, he both links the policy of encouraging such measures abroad with

their proper implementation at home and positions their promotion as a national mission.

---

[468] The word "disarmament" (*gunshuku*) is used at least once in all nine of Nakasone's Diet inaugural speeches.
[469] Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, February 6, 1984. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).

Second, Nakasone laced discussion of his proposals for reforming state institutions associated with the peace state narrative with declarations of fealty to prominent elements of the same narrative. For example, in his January 1983 inaugural address, Nakasone explained his decision to bypass the Three Principles for Restricting Arms Exports to allow sharing of military-use technology with the United States by first noting additional restrictions that would be put in place to avoid the spread of these technologies to a third country or conflicts with the UN Charter and then concluded: "Therefore, this measure will be implemented in line with our fundamental principles as a peace state to avoid the furtherance of any international conflicts."[470] Continuing directly, he then declared that there was not the slightest change in his government's intention, in the future as well, to adhere fundamentally (*kihonteki ni*) to the Three Principles Restricting Arms Exports. Similarly, in the January 1987 Diet inaugural, Nakasone prefaced discussion of his decision to revise the Miki Cabinet's order setting the 1% of GNP ceiling on defense spending with a repetition, almost to the letter, of the quotation cited above from the January 1985 inaugural speech in which he declared "there has not been the slightest wavering" from the principles of the peace constitution.[471]

[470] Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, January 14, 1983. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).
[471] Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, January 26, 1987. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).

Finally, Nakasone also showed a capacity for rhetorical innovation. For example, in justifying his decision to participate in the joint-development of military-use technology in cooperation with the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program to develop a space-based defense against ICBM attacks, he argued that a program "based on the fundamental principle of eliminating all nuclear weapons from the world" was in perfect agreement with "our country's position as a peace state" (*wagakuni no heiwa kokka tosite no tachiba ni gacchi suru*).[472] Here, Nakasone shifted the normative claim in question from a narrow focus on immediate actions (i.e. restraining exports of military-use technology) to those of a broader mission (i.e. contributing to efforts that might realize a world free of nuclear weapons) and highlighted the congruence of the latter with the principles of the narrative. In addition, perhaps sensing that the novelty of this move might prove problematic for his audiences to accept, he went on to note the potential of the agreement to improve the domestic technological base, a key normative claim of the trading state narrative.[473] In this way, Nakasone justified reform of a state institution associated with the normative claim of one nation-state narrative by asserting a new link between the reform and the normative claim and then "naturalized" this

---

[472] Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, September 12, 1986. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).
[473] Ibid.

novel argument by also aligning the reform with a claim of another, and in this case unchallenged, nation-state narrative.[474]

In a second innovation, he explicitly called on Japan to be an "international state" that will "take responsibility for the world's peace and prosperity as a Japan in the world, with the world, and, still further, a contributor to the world."[475] Here, he inserted the idea of "international contributions" to peace as both a requirement of an international state and a role Japan was expected to play by other countries.[476] He then leveraged these new value standards of the need to meet international responsibilities and expectations in his justifications for his reforms of security institutions. For example, he called for the realization of an "International State Japan" that "strongly promotes world peace and disarmament," thereby linking the "international responsibilities and expectations" claims of his "international state" rhetoric with the normative claims of the peace state narrative.[477] As will be seen below, these rhetorical innovations were repeated by reformers seeking to challenge other normative components of the peace state narrative after the end of the Cold War.[478]

---

[474] This thus appears to be clear example of *bricolage*. Levi-Strauss, 1974 [1966]; Samuels, 2004.

[475] Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, September 12, 1986. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).

[476] Naksone's move here, to be replicated by reformers in the 1990s, is consistent with the pattern observed by David Leheny in which Japanese politicians cite international norms in order to justify changes they want to make in domestic norms and institutions. See Leheny (2006, pp.147-180).

[477] Ibid.

[478] In a sign of things to come, Nakasone comes close to extending this argument to question the normative basis of the ban on overseas dispatch in his last Diet inaugural. After noting the problems created by the Iran-Iraq War for shipping in the Persian Gulf and Japan's dependence on oil from that region, he stated "I think, from the fundamental standing of a peace state (*heiwa kokka*) and fulfilling our role as an international state (*kokusai kokka*),

In this way, despite the broad contours of Nakasone's discursive strategy, at least with regard to his approach to the peace state narrative, it is properly understood as a partial transformational or tinkering strategy. Nakasone emphasized how relevant normative claims are met in his foreign policies, such as efforts to encourage international disarmament, repeatedly asserted his reforms of state institutions associated with the peace state narrative were consistent with its principles, and engaged in rhetorical innovation but limited his targets to normative components.

Viewed this way, the connection between Nakasone's "international state" rhetoric and the tinkering strategies employed by reformers in the 1990s and beyond becomes clear. In 1993, echoing Nakasone's "international expectations" standard, Ozawa Ichirō, a former LDP secretary-general and deputy head of the largest LDP faction (*Keiseikai*) who went on to participate in the Diet inaugural ceremonies as the leader of two different opposition parties, famously called for Japan to become *futsū no kuni*, a phrase which is often translated as "normal nation" but is better understood here as "normal state."[479] He defined a "normal state" as one that behaves in a responsible manner according to the common expectations of other states and

to the extent the constitution will allow (*kenpō no yurusu haninai ni oite*), I want to consider an appropriate form of international cooperation (*kokusaiteki na kyōryoku*) as is possible depending on conditions, and make an appropriate contribution (*ōbun no kōken wo hatashite mairitai*)." Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, July 6, 1987. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).
[479] It should be noted that Nakasone had previously used similarly-meaning phrases that can be translated as "normal state" or "conventional state," such as *seijō na kokka* and *zairaigata kokka*. Soeya, 2005, p.165; Samuels, 2007, p.35.

cooperates with them to resolve shared global problems.[480]   He applied the concept to argue

that Japan play a larger role in actively contributing to international efforts to foster peace and

stability under the auspices of the United Nations.

Ozawa developed this standard largely to challenge the "eschew the use of force"

normative component of the peace state narrative.   This effort emerged from the difficulties he

faced in his attempts to reform the 1954 interpretation of Article Nine and the ban on overseas

dispatch, especially his frustration at Japan's failure to send the SDF to the Persian Gulf in 1990

following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the immense difficulties encountered when he

subsequently managed to shepherd legislation through the Diet allowing the SDF to participate

in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in 1992.[481]   In both cases, Ozawa sought

unsuccessfully to get the government to change the 1954 interpretation to allow Japan to

participate in what he called "international security."[482]   Wielding this new interpretation to call

for reform of the ban on overseas dispatch, he argued that the SDF could be sent overseas to use

force in the service of UN operations.   In this view, since the SDF would be serving under the

command of a multilateral organization, the use of force in this context would not constitute

collective self-defense, which is defined narrowly as rendering military support to a partner in a

---

[480] Ozawa, 2006[1993], pp.104-105.
[481] Ozawa, 2006[1993], p.104; Samuels, 2007, p.91.
[482] Ozawa Committee, 1992, p.57.

mutual defense relationship.[483]   Finding justification for this interpretation in the constitution,

Ozawa argued, "If we 'desire to occupy an honored place in...international society,' as written in

the preamble of the Constitution, we need to decide that active cooperation is required.   And

one form of cooperation we have not yet employed is the dispatch of SDF troops."[484]   As the

1990s progressed, Ozawa continued to support his proposals to reform Article Nine and the

institutions restricting overseas dispatches by referring to lines in the preamble and even Article

Nine itself.[485]

Although "normal state" may be seen as a rhetorical innovation, it is does not represent

anything approaching a "counter-narrative" targeting the peace state narrative.   First, "normal

state" arguments lack any particularistic component.   There is no story linking the unique

nature of the Japanese nation to corresponding claims that its state reflect this nature.   To the

extent "normal state" arguments even pertain to the Japanese nation, it is exclusively through

indirect and external validation, by its state meeting the expectations of other states.   Especially

---

[483] This distinction is important since it maintains the ban on collective self-defense in bilateral relationships, thus preserving Article Nine's capacity to serve as an "entrapment shield" in the US-Japan alliance.   However, more recently, Ozawa appeared to backtracked somewhat from this original approach.   From the other end of the spectrum, Hatoyama Yukio, in offering a more standard revisionist counter proposal, critiqued Ozawa for not being clearer on the collective self-defense question.   See Itoh (2001, p.320).   In 2000, Ozawa's Liberal Party released a constitutional revision proposal that allowed the use of force in cases of 1) self-defense from attack; and 2) UN collective security operations.   However, this proposal lacks specific draft language and is cryptic on the all-important collective self-defense question.   For a critique on this point, see *Tokyo Shimbun*, 18 December 2000.
[484] Chūma, 1991, p.144.
[485] Ozawa Ichirō, New Frontier Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, January 24, 1996.   Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011). In his original formulation, Ozawa proposed that Article Nine be revised by adding a third paragraph to clarify Japan could participate in UN-sanctioned operations and that the SDF be reorganized to fulfill this purpose.   Ozawa, 2006[1993], pp.118-126.

in Ozawa's hands, the concept is applied as a "logic of consequence," one which he almost

immediately justifies through cost-benefit analysis.[486] Second, "normal state" rhetoric is

simply not employed to target the cognitive components of the peace state narrative, by Ozawa

or any other participants in the Diet inaugural ceremonies. For example, as head of the New

Frontier Party, Ozawa's response to Prime Minster Hashimoto Ryūtarō's January 1997 Diet

inaugural address included the following affirmation of a key cognitive component of the peace

state narrative:

> Based on the principles of the UN Charter and Japan's constitution, Japan will only use
> force to protect its citizens' lives and property when our country faces an imminent and
> illegitimate invasion and will never use force or intimidation through force in any other
> circumstances. In accordance with the will of our citizens, we will not accept the
> [state's] use of force as an exercise of the right of collective self-defense. In addition,
> we will absolutely not allow creeping, vague, and expansive reinterpretations of the
> right of individual self-defense to invite military expansion and a *repetition of the
> mistakes of the past.*[487]

Third, "normal state" rhetoric is generally used in concert with references to nation-state

narratives, rather than as a substitute for them. For example, after first introducing the concept,

Ozawa argues that Japan needs to follow its logic in order to continue as a "trading state"

(*shōnin kokka, tsūshō kokka*). Surveying world history, he notes other states that attempted to

operate in a similar way and cites the Venetian Republic as a favorable case that succeeded not

---

[486] Ozawa, 2006[1993], p.105. For the "logic of consequences," see March & Olsen, 2006.
[487] Ozawa Ichirō, New Frontier Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, January 22, 1997 (emphasis added). Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 10, 2011).

only due to its people's mercantile acumen but also because of their military contributions to

maintaining peace in the Mediterranean, its major trading zone.[488]

Use of this standard was picked up by others who sought to challenge the normative

components of the peace state narrative. However, as some scholars have already observed,

these other "normal nation-alists" did not always share Ozawa's policy priorities, especially with

regard to his interpretation of Article Nine and UN-centrism.[489] For example, Watanabe

Tsuneo, a one-time chief editorial writer and current chairman of the *Yomiuri Shimbun* Group,

the media conglomerate that publishes Japan's largest daily newspaper, has declared, "If a nation

is 'normal,' it has a military."[490] However, Watanabe did not agree with Ozawa on exactly

what Japan's being "normal" meant. In particular, beginning in 1994, Watanabe's *Yomiuri*

newspaper developed and promoted a series of proposals to revise the constitution in order to

allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense and thus strengthen military

cooperation with the United States rather than with the United Nations.[491] These ambitions

were reflected in the newspaper's editorial line. When editorializing about prime ministers'

performances during the Diet inaugural ceremonies, the *Yomiuri* repeatedly praised any

movement toward constitutional revision and chided prime ministers who failed to give

---

[488] Ozawa, 2006[1993], pp.105-106.
[489] Samuels, 2007, p.124; Oros, 2008, p.214, fn6.
[490] Samuels, 2007, p.125.
[491] Boyd, 2003; Boyd & Samuels, 2005. For English translations of these proposals, see Winkler (2011, pp.77-80, 94-97, 111-114).

sufficient treatment to the topic in their addresses.[492] In addition, *Yomiuri* editorialists took

clear positions in favor of allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense as

necessary measure for strengthening the US-Japan alliance.[493]

Others who appropriated the "normal state" argument generally agreed with the *Yomiuri*

on the need to challenge the "use of force" restraints of the peace state narrative and also about

which institutional reforms were necessary but differed with both Ozawa and the *Yomiuri* in their

commitment to components of the organic state narrative. In the period up until 2002, the

participant in the Diet inaugural ceremony who most fit this type of "normal nation-alist" was

unquestionably Prime Minister Koziumi Junichirō. As prime minister, Koizumi restarted

Nakasone's aborted visits to Yasukuni shrine beginning in August 2001, a move that proved

extremely damaging to Japan's relations with its neighbors.[494] He also presided over the largest

changes in the institutions governing the overseas dispatch of the SDF since the PKO legislation

was passed in 1992.

Although at first glance this combination might suggest Koizumi had designs on

comprehensively transforming the peace state narrative, the actual discursive strategy he adopted

was far less ambitious. First, despite his continued practice of visiting Yasukuni, as prime

---

[492] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 28 November 1998; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 29 January 2000; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 8 April 2000.
[493] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 8 May 2001; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 28 September 2001.
[494] Koizumi was criticized for his Yasukuni patronage by erstwhile conservative allies, including in editorials from Watanabe's *Yomiuri*. Samuels, 2007, p.124.

minister, Koizumi not only failed to challenge the "war regret" cognitive component of the peace

state narrative, he at times explicitly affirmed it. For example, in a Diet inaugural given a little

over a month after his first prime ministerial visit to Yasukuni, Koizumi declared, "With regard

to relations with South Korea and China, we must build a future-oriented, cooperative

relationship while making clear that our country's fundamental thinking is *to look directly at our

past history, leave behind war and value peace.*"[495] On the sixtieth anniversary of the end of

World War Two, the Koizumi Cabinet issued a cabinet order affirming the Murayama statement

issued ten years before apologizing for Japan's wartime actions to its neighbors and "again

expressing deep remorse and heartfelt feelings of apology."[496] Accordingly, Koizumi never

directly challenged the cognitive components of the peace state narrative in his Diet inaugural

addresses.[497]

Second, in focusing his challenge on the normative constraint on the "use of force" to

justify his institutional reforms expanding the roles of the SDF in international operations,

---

[495] Koizumi Junichirō, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, September 27, 2001 (emphasis added) . Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011). In 2004, Koizumi defended his dispatch of the SDF to Iraq by stating "while thinking within the constitution's framework (*kenpō no wakunai*), we have engaged in debate upon debate about how to harness war regret into actual peacekeeping (*sensō no hansei wo ika ni jissai no heiwa iji ni ikashite iku ka to iu giron*). Koizumi Junichirō, Liberal Democratic Party, Special Committee, House of Councillors, February 9, 2004. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011).
[496] *Asahi Shimbun*, 15 August 2005.
[497] Even though Koizumi continued his Yasukuni visits throughout his tenure as prime minister, he was criticized by the right in much the same way as was Nakasone, who had discontinued his visits. The major complaint against both was the same—neither had challenged the cognitive claims about the war that serve as the foundation of the peace state narrative. Nishio, 2005, pp.225-226; Samuels, 2007, p.121. Interestingly, scholars on the left have also criticized "Koizumi's nationalism" as "more pose than substance." McCormack, 2004, p.43.

Koizumi adopted Ozawa's constitutional argument: he repeatedly referred to the quotation from the preamble of the constitution cited above whenever facing questions on the constitutional justification for his policies. For example, in a Diet inaugural speech given a few weeks after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and in the midst of ongoing negotiations within the ruling coalition regarding the dispatch of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to the Indian Ocean to aid allied operations in the developing war in Afghanistan, Koizumi concluded his address by quoting the above passage from the preamble in full and then stating "we have made this determination clear to the world. Shall we not now face this crisis by giving our utmost as a country to protect the peace and liberty of world's humanity based on the spirit of international cooperation (*kokusai kyōchō*)?[498] In this way, Koizumi, like Nakasone and Ozawa before him, chose a discursive strategy that engaged with the peace state narrative only on its normative grounds.

It should also be noted that Koizumi, among others, also challenged the "restrict war potential" normative claim with talk of introducing spy satellites during this period. In addition, the period also saw contestation over the "support international disarmament" normative claim in

---

[498] Koizumi Junichirō, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, September 27, 2001. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011).

the form of talk of joint development of ballistic missile defense technology with the United States.[499]

Perpetuating strategies are also observed during this period. Although they are readily apparent in the 1980s as the socialist opposition responded to Nakasone's transformational strategy, they are also present in the 1990s, sometimes offered from interesting quarters. For example, in 1987, Doi Takako responded to Nakasone's "international state" rhetoric with a perpetuating strategy easily predicted to emanate from the JSP:

> How can you call a country that drops it limit on military spending, proceeds with military expansion, and creates mistrust and apprehension among its neighbors an 'international state contributing to peace' (*heiwa ni kōken suru kokusai kokka*)? Resolutely proceeding with disarmament is the mark of a Japan that will not make or be complicit in war and the road to becoming an 'international peace state' (*heiwa kokusai kokka*) that will retain trust as an economic country.[500]

However, as the LDP moved into the opposition in the mid-1990s, it is interesting to observe similar perpetuating strategies from the mouths of the leaders of the traditional conservative party. For example, in a 1993 response to Hosokawa Morihiro's Diet inaugural address, LDP President Kōno Yōhei explicitly rejected the call for Japan to become a "normal state" (*futsū no kuni ni naru*) on the grounds that it would violate "constitutional principles

[499] For examples, see Obuchi Keizō, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, January 19, 1999; Koizumi Junichirō, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, January 31, 2003; Hatoyama Yukio, Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, July 31, 2000. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011).
[500] Doi Takako, Japan Socialist Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, February 2, 1987. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011).

meaning the pursuit of national interest by means other than military ones" and also because of

"the fear that *it might lead our citizens again to a calamity in the end.*"[501]   Responding to the

next Hosokawa inaugural, future LDP prime-minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō questioned whether

the Hosokawa administration's coordination with the United States and South Korea over missile

defense issues constituted a violation of the ban on the exercise of the right of collective

self-defense.[502]   The continuity here with the past rhetorical habits of the socialist opposition

thus indicates peace state rhetoric retained at least a measure of its appeal for opposition parties

in the 1990s.[503]

The presence of multiple tinkering discursive strategies amidst perpetuating ones

offered in response immediately preceding and during the period of steep decline in prominence

(1998-2002) fits the predictions of the partial transformation hypothesis and further weakens the

case for balkanization.   In addition, the absence of destructive strategies targeting both the

cognitive and normative components of the peace state narrative without offering an alternative

way of linking the nation and the state within the same domain runs counter to the predictions of

the denationalization hypothesis.

---

[501] Kōno Yōhei, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, August 25, 1993 (emphasis added). Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011).
[502] Hashimoto Ryūtarō, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, September 22, 1993. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011).
[503] Although Kōno was known for his general support for the institutions associated with peace state narrative, especially Article Nine, Hashimoto was not.

Table 6.16 summarizes changes to the previously-introduced state institutions

associated with the peace state narrative observed between 1998 and 2002, with some references

to important changes from preceding periods.[504] The examination of discursive strategies

above has already referenced some of these reforms. Key changes during the period of the

second postwar peak in peace state prominence included Nakasone's 1983 decision to allow the

sharing of military technology with the US outside of the Three Principles Restricting Arms

Exports, his pledge of Japan's participation in the SDI program in 1985, and his 1986 decision to

relax the 1% of GNP Ceiling on the defense budget.[505] In the next five-year period, when

peace state's prominence began its post-Cold War decline, Ozawa achieved the first change in

the ban on overseas dispatch in nearly forty years, although the new so-called PKO law (1992)

attached new constraints that placed limitations on the government's deployment decisions as

well as the actions permissible for SDF participants in UN peacekeeping operations.[506] Finally,

---

[504] Due to space limitations and the large number of changes involved, it is impossible to catalog and consider every change in the institutions associated with the peace state narrative in the treatment here. For a more thorough accounting of these changes, see Samuels (2007, pp.86-108).

[505] It should be noted that Nakasone's decision to revise the Miki-era cabinet order actually generated "breaches" in defense expenditures in 1987, 1988, and 1989 that are so slight they disappears under any rounding operation. In addition, defense expenditures after 1989 have conformed to the 1% of (now) GDP ceiling, even though Japan's GDP grew far slower during this subsequent period. See Green, 1995, p.21; Takao, 2011; p.23. When asked in a 1986 interview to categorize the achievements of the Nakasone administration as either "successful" or "problematic," Fujinami Takao, the chief cabinet secretary in Nakasone's second cabinet, placed the effort to breach the 1% of GNP barrier (and Nakasone's Yasukuni visit) in the latter category. See Muramatsu (1987, pp.312-313). It should also be noted that the actual extent to which Japan has shared military technology with the US has been fairly limited: "[B]etween 1983 and 2005, there were only fourteen cases of formal defense technology exports by Japanese firms to the United States." In addition, Japan also ended up playing a negligible part in the SDI program. See Samuels (2007, pp.90-91).

[506] The centerpiece of these new constraints was the Five Principles. Developed by the CLB based on their earlier interpretation that the SDF could not use force as part of a UN army, these principles require the Japanese government to withdraw its troops at the first sign of hostilities while denying the SDF the right to use force to

277

in the period in which peace state prominence reached its postwar nadir, LDP-led coalition

governments under Obuchi Keizō and Koizumi Junichirō agreed to joint development of ballistic

missile defense technologies with the United Sates (1998), passed the so-called guidelines

legislation (1999), which expanded the role of the SDF under the US-Japan alliance in the event

of a military emergency in the region, established committees in both houses of the Diet to

consider constitutional revision (2000), unfroze measures in the PKO law allowing SDF

participation in peacekeeping forces (PKFs) (2001), and passed the Anti-Terrorism law (2001),

which dispatched the MSDF to the Indian Ocean under more expansive rules of engagement to

aid, albeit from a great distance and in a non-combatant role, the allied war effort in

Afghanistan.[507]

Table 6.16: Changes in Associated State Institutions, 1998-2002

Associated State Institution	Status (1998-2002)
Article Nine (law)	No Change to Text,

accomplish the mission of the UN operation.   Boyd, 2003; Boyd & Samuels, 2005.
[507] The freezing of SDF participation in PKFs was a result of a deal made between the LDP and the small Kōmei Party, which represents the Buddhist lay organization *Soka Gakkai*, in order to pass the PKO bill in 1992. Until undone in December 1992, this PKF freeze kept the SDF from performing such duties as cease-fire monitoring, weapons collection and disposal, and buffer zone patrols.   Passed in May 1999, the three bills that implemented new guidelines agreed on with the US to govern the bilateral alliance committed Japan to provide only "rear area support" (*kōhō chiiki shien*) for U.S. forces in the event of a regional emergency involving Japan's security.   The new SDF roles under the laws included the provision of food, water, and fuel; the transport of material (excluding weapons and ammunition); and medical support. Finally, the Antiterrorism law, passed in October 2001, allowed MSDF ships to be sent to the Indian Ocean to engage in medical, transportation, and refueling activities in support of US-led forces fighting in Afghanistan.   The law also relaxed weapons use restrictions, although these continued to be quite restrictive.   Boyd & Samuels, 2005.

	Diet Review Committees Established (2000)*
1954 Interpretation	No Change
Ban on Overseas Dispatch (law)	PKF Unfrozen, Anti-Terror Law (2001)* Previous Changes (PKO Law 1992)
US-Japan Security Treaty (law)	Guidelines Laws (1999)
1% of GNP Ceiling (cabinet order)	No Change, Previous Change (Cabinet Order 1986)
Ban on Offensive Weapons	No Change? [New force projection capabilities]
Three Principles of Arms Exports	BMD Joint-Development (1998)* Previous Changes (1983, 1985)
Three Nonnuclear Principles (resolution)	No Change
Basic Law on Atomic Energy (law)	No Change
Non-proliferation Treaty (ratified)	Additional Protocol (1998), Previous Changes (CTB Treaty 1997)

*Additional changes in subsequent period (2003-2007)

In contrast to the 1970s, there were many changes in the institutions associated with the

peace state narrative in both this period and those preceding it.   Based on the assumptions of the

model here, associations with institutions targeted for reforms (and thus serving as sources of potential contestation) increase the likelihood that relevant narrative components will be subject to reevaluation, denigration or the emergence of counter-narratives. The finding of a large number of changes to associated institutions thus further frustrates the expectations of the banalization hypothesis. In addition, with the exception of those relating to the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative, all successfully implemented institutional reforms required the adding of an exception to a relevant normative component in order for advocates to maintain the association between the institution and the narrative. However, as was clear in the examples of discursive strategies examined above, those advocating reforms in these institutions continued to associate them with the peace state narrative, both during the process of making the changes and after they were implemented. This finding is consistent with what one would expect to see when a process of partial transformation is at work.

Analysis of data from the Diet inaugurals and changes in associated institutions here thus paints a very different picture than the one observed in the 1970s. Based on these findings, it is concluded that the decline in prominence observed in the late 1990s and early 2000s represents an ongoing process of the partial transformation of nearly all the normative components of the peace-loving state sub-narrative. The final section considers the factors

driving this process as well as what it means for the future of the peace state narrative and the overarching question of the secular decline in all five nation-state narratives.

V. Conclusion

Viewed as a life-cycle model, the changes observed in the peace state narrative over the postwar period might be described as a disputed and uncertain youth yielding to an unchallenged and stable middle age that in turn cedes to a contentious yet tenacious old age. Across these periods, the prominence of the narrative shifted wildly, with the driving forces in this process being political fights over institutions associated with the narrative, first over the creation and early operation of Japan's key external security institutions and then later over their reshaping just prior to and after the end of the Cold War. This section begins by evaluating the domestic factors that shaped this pattern of change, including the presence or absence of associations between the narrative and institutions targeted for reform, the level of specificity of the normative claims in question, and the discursive strategies chosen by reformers. It then considers the role played by exogenous factors, such as U.S. pressure, in this process and concludes by considering what the observed pattern of ongoing change means for the peace state narrative moving forward.

A major argument advanced here is that the combination of institutional associations, characteristics of the relevant normative components, and types of discursive strategies employed played important roles in the changes witnessed in the peace state narrative. First, as noted previously, association with a state institution can be a double-edged sword for a narrative component. If the institution is uncontested, as were many of the peace state's associated institutions in the 1970s, then the link can serve as stabilizing force and can contribute to the process of banalization. However, should associated institutions become the subject of political contestation, fights over their reform can encourage would-be reformers to adopt discursive strategies aimed at changing either the associated component or the entire narrative itself. At this point, the characteristic of the normative claim in question becomes relevant. How specifically is it associated with the institution in question? What level of discretion or room for interpretation do its claims leave for would-be reformers to adopt transformational strategies?[508] The answers to these questions will likely affect the choice of discursive strategy adopted by reformers. If the connection between the normative claim and the associated institution is particularly vague or open to multiple interpretations, then reformers can more easily adopt partial transformational strategies and defenders are more hard-pressed to develop convincing perpetuating strategies in response. If the terms of the association are clearly

---

[508] This point is adapted from the approach to institutional change offered by Mahoney & Thelen (2010).

specified, then reformers have less options and defenders are more easily able to advance their claims. It should be noted that adopting a destructive or comprehensive transformational strategy targeting a prominent narrative can be a costly undertaking for institutional reformers, as it will certainly require an actor both to engage in rhetorical innovation on a large scale and to step outside the conventions of the discursive status quo.

Applying the above discussion to the case of the peace state narrative after the Cold War helps clarify the argument. First, compared with the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative, the peace-loving state sub-narrative has the most normative components associated with state institutions. All things being equal, it is thus more vulnerable than the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative to facing contestation spilling over from an effort to reform one of its associated institutions. Second, the peace-loving state sub-narrative also features components that are more easily open to interpretation by actors seeking to affect changes in its associated institutions than those of the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative. Here, the fact that so many of this sub-narrative's normative claims have from the early postwar been located in a variety of positions in the spectrum between state non-violence and state non-aggression looms large. Reformers seeking to add exceptions to the peace-loving state sub-narrative's normative status quo often needed only look to the recent past to find material to support their claims. Taking these two points together, it is thus neither surprising that the components of the peace-loving

state sub-narrative have faced more contestation than those of the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative nor that would-be reformers of its associated institutions adopted partial transformational strategies targeting these components rather than taking on the more difficult task of targeting the entire narrative with a comprehensive transformational or destructive strategy.

This logic helps explain both the vast differences in the levels of contestation faced by the two sub-narratives and the patterns of change observed in their relative frequencies in the post-Cold War period. While the peace-loving state sub-narrative faced unprecedented levels of contestation in four of its five normative components during this period, the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative faced none at all. In addition, as shown in Chart 6.3 below, during a period of epic decline in the prominence of the peace state narrative as a whole, the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative came to occupy an increasing percentage of the total references to the narrative and even represented a slight majority of the references for the period 1998-2002.

Chart 6.3: Sub-Narratives in Motion, 1978-2007

The points above help explain why certain components of the peace state narrative faced more contestation and change than others and also why institutional reformers chose the types of discursive strategies that they did. Viewed this way, the process of change in nation-state narratives appears a decidedly inward-looking affair, one in which domestic elites innovate at the margins of received conventions in order to legitimate favored positions in political fights over institutional reforms. But what of the role of factors exogenous to this process? Many scholars examining nationalism and national identity focus on images of "the Other" in their explanations of how these conceptions develop and change.[509] What has been the role, if any, of such external factors in producing the pattern of change observed in the peace state narrative?

---

[509] Bukh, 2010; Clammer, 2001.

One recent study of postwar Japanese national identity and society emphasizes the outsized influence of the United States in shaping the development of both.[510] Scholars also point to pressure from the United States as a central factor behind changes in Japan's security policies since the end of the Cold War. In particular, they argue that growing uncertainty in the security environment of East Asia during this period has increased both perceptions of threat and fears of abandonment by the United States, resulting in additional pressure on Japanese leaders to meet demands made by their only alliance partner.[511] Accordingly, experts have cited the alliance as "the mother of all catalysts" when it comes to forces driving change in Japan's security institutions.[512]

The United States' influence is apparent when one reviews the policy debates that led to the changes in institutions associated with the peace state narrative cited above. Although for many of these reforms the U.S. found willing domestic accomplices, especially among revisionist conservatives, most of the above institutional changes at least began their political life as direct or indirect requests from the United States.[513] External factors thus set the stage for many of the domestic political fights that shaped the changes observed in the peace state

---

[510] McCormack, 2007.
[511] Kawakatsu-Ueki, 2006; Samuels, 2007; On the alliance security dilemma between fears of abandonment and entrapment, see Snyder (1984). It should be noted that Midford (2011, pp.146-170) has recently argued that attitudes of the Japanese public may have started to shift back toward fears of entrapment during the last five-year period covered in this study.
[512] Samuels, 2007, p.82.
[513] For a review of the politics of many of these institutional fights, see Boyd & Samuels (2005) and Hughes (2004).

narratives. In addition, participants in these fights looked abroad to craft standards of argument directed at changing specific aspects of the peace state narrative. Nakasone's "international state" and Ozawa's "normal state" are two prominent conventions that call for changes in the peace state narrative justified by appeals to standards from abroad, with the United States as a central role model.

To concede the importance of external factors in generating pressure for reforms in relevant institutions and serving as resources for rhetorical innovation does not require the leap to a purely externally-driven explanation of change. Although domestic political elites may try to reconstruct a nation-state narrative in response to external pressures, as the examples in the previous section show, they do not have a free hand in making changes to these narratives. While external pressures for the reform of security institutions may have served as the initial impetus for the debates involving the peace state narrative, these pressures were mediated through domestic political conflicts that forced individual participants to craft rhetorical strategies in response to a highly prominent narrative closely associated with the institutions targeted for reform. The result has so far been a pattern in which a debate is launched by a demand for an institutional change from the U.S., domestic advocates craft a discursive strategy aimed at narrowly transforming a relevant normative claim to make it consistent with the reform, and a final agreement is negotiated that includes new restrictions not part of the original U.S.

demand but trumpeted by Japanese supporters of the reform as evidence of its compliance with the peace state narrative.

The effort to change the normative claim eschewing the use of force in international affairs is an instructive example of this pattern. First, pressure to override institutional constraints on the overseas deployment of Japanese troops began in earnest with the U.S. effort to assemble a coalition force to counter Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Second, reformers like Ozawa Ichirō cited the "normal state" standard and references to the constitution's preamble to assert that actions taken to maintain peace were in fact consistent with the self-conception of Japan as a peace state. As the ban on overseas dispatch of the SDF for military operations was gradually relaxed first for UN peace-keeping operations and later for joint operations with the United States, new restrictions were created that limited the situations and purposes for which force could be used. Not called for by the U.S., these restrictions were then cited as evidence of consistency with the peace state narrative. The ultimate goal of expanding the sphere of peace was also offered to legitimate the entire reform in peace state terms.

The institutional reforms that coincide with these rhetorical strategies have been cited as examples of a broader pattern of "reach, reconcile, and reassure" in Japanese security

policy-making.[514]   For example, Andrew Oros can see this pattern at work in the decision to

send ground troops to Iraq in 2003:

> [R]each to dispatch the SDF abroad, reconcile this with SDF law by greatly limiting
> rear-area support scope and simultaneously stressing the humanitarian mission of the
> GSDF in Iraq, and reassure the public by limiting the duration of the enabling
> legislation.[515]

These rhetorical strategies and institutional reforms resulted in changes in the normative

claim eschewing the use of force that can be expressed both quantitatively and qualitatively.

As Table 6.17 shows, both the level of contestation and relative frequency for this normative

claim increased in 1988-1992, a period that coincides with the major debates over reforming

institutions governing the overseas operations of the SDF.[516]   In the subsequent period

(1993-1997), both contestation and relative frequency decreased.   This suggests that the

importance of the norm to the narrative initially increased because it became the subject of

contestation and then decreased once the point of contention was resolved.   Contestation and

relative frequency then rose in 1998-2002, again indicating that the increase in importance to the

narrative was fueled in part by a large increase in negatively-valued references to the norm.[517]

However, although coming close, negatively-valued references do not outnumber positive ones

---

[514] Oros, 2008, p.33.

[515] Ibid., p.34.

[516] During this period, Prime Minister Nakasone advocated sending the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to the Persian Gulf to sweep for mines following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War (1988) and the Diet considered legislation concerning the SDF's participation in the Gulf War and its aftermath (1990-1991) and United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations (1992).

[517] This period also coincided with major debates over reforming the restrictions on overseas dispatch of the SDF, including the SDF's role in supporting the United States in the event of a regional crisis (1999), and the dispatch of the MSDF to support anti-terror operations in the Indian Ocean (2001).

during this period. This pattern is thus consistent with a process of partial transformation, in which a norm is repeatedly subjected to contestation by reformers seeking to add exceptions to its range of application while defenders deploy perpetuating strategies in response. Finally, the fact that contestation fell but relative frequency continued to rise in the final five-year period (2003-2007) indicates the emergence of a new consensus, although the continued presence of relatively high levels of contestation points to the strong possibility that the norm will again become a point of contention in the near future.[518]

Table 6.17: Eschew Use of Force, Contestation and Relative Frequency, 1983-2007

Eschew Use of Force	1983-1987	1988-1992	1993-1997	1998-2002	2003-2007
Contestation Level (% Negative)	0.0	1.5	0.0	46.2	29.4
Relative Frequency	10.5%	16.6%	14.1%	16.7%	20.5%

Units: % of negative references to total references; Relative Frequency: % of component references to total narrative references.

Qualitatively, the stricter interpretation of this claim, exemplified by the 1969 quotation cited above from the JSP's Narita Tomomi, namely that the overseas dispatch of the SDF was anathema to the principles of the peace state, gave way to one in which military contributions to the maintenance of peace within certain limits could be offered as evidence of Japan's dedication to this righteous path. For example, the 2005 Ministry of Foreign Affairs fact sheet enumerating Japan's efforts as a peace state cited in Chapter Four includes as its final category

---

[518] The average level of contestation for this norm over the eleven five-year blocks was 8.2%. This period encompassed major debates over institutions associated with the norm, including the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq (2003) and subsequent renewals of this deployment as well as MSDF operations in the Indian Ocean.

"human contributions," defined as "cooperation in peace-keeping, peace-building and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance."[519]   Along with the SDF's participation in various UN peace-keeping operations, the deployment to Iraq is listed as an example of Japan fulfilling this aspect of its peace state commitment.   Although this characterization remains contested, it is undeniable that a shift has occurred in the content of this normative claim, with political elites now regularly citing these SDF deployments as consistent with a state fulfilling the demands of its peace-loving nation.

What do these findings mean for present and future of the peace state narrative?   First, the decline in prominence is partly the result of a decreasing range of application, albeit one confined to the normative components of a single sub-narrative.   More specifically, the peace state narrative is undergoing a partial transformation that has added exceptions to multiple normative components of its peace-loving state sub-narrative, but left its cognitive core, as well as the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative, unchanged.

Second, the peace state narrative, although facing heavier and more sustained levels of contestation over the last two decades than over the previous three, has yet to face an existential challenge.   Despite the possibility that the increase in exceptions to so many of the normative claims of one of its sub-narratives may have opened a space for such a robust threat, to this point,

[519] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website. Accessed at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taisen/ayumi.html (July 28, 2012).

challengers have failed to capitalize on this opportunity and largely continued to present their

demands for normative exceptions in rhetoric consistent with the peace state narrative, just as

Nakasone did in the 1980s.

This pattern has held even for the period after 2000, when revisionist conservatives

enjoyed control of the prime minister's office and the JSP, the traditional carrier of the narrative

among the opposition parties, was no longer a meaningful presence in the Diet. For example,

although Prime Minister Koizumi was able to accomplish the most dramatic change to date in

the ban on overseas dispatch, the dispatch of Ground Self-Defense Forces to Iraq, he did so using

rhetoric that insisted on the deployment's consistency with the normative constraints of the

peace state narrative.[520]

This period also saw the rise (and rapid fall) of Abe Shinzō, the grandson of Kishi

Nobusuke, who came to power in 2006 calling for Japan to become a "beautiful country"

(utsukushii kuni).[521] Despite being the epitome of the contemporary revisionist politician who

---

[520] In Diet inaugurals, Koizumi repeatedly positioned the Iraq mission, both before and after the GSDF deployment, as dedicated to "world peace" or "peace in the Middle East" and bluntly stated that "this is not the use of force." He also assured his audience that Japanese personnel would only be active in "non-combat zones" and would be removed immediately if their safety was compromised. Koizumi Junichirō, Liberal Democratic Party, General Session (Diet Inaugural), House of Representatives, September 26, 2003; January 19, 2004. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (December 12, 2011).

[521] With "Beautiful Country," Abe adopted a constructive strategy, albeit one less expansive than Nakasone's "international state." The term was shorthand for Abe's "nation-building" (kuni zukuri) agenda, which included efforts to 1) to reform the education system to increase national pride and love of country (patriotic education); 2) to revise the constitution to allow a freer hand to use force overseas (constitutional revision); and 3) to conduct a more "assertive" foreign policy (shuchō gaikō). Although 2 and 3 presented challenges to the "support Article Nine," "eschew the use of force" and "implement peace diplomacy" normative components of the peace state narrative, Abe failed to challenge the narrative's cognitive core, despite his views of history expressed prior to becoming prime minister. It should also be noted that his "patriotic education" plank essentially dovetailed with the "enforce

took "a dim view of most accounts of Japan's imperialist past and of the war crimes trials" and

"consistently argued for a revision of what conservatives have regarded as a 'masochistic' view

of Japan's modern history," Abe lost his voice on these matters upon becoming prime

minister.[522]   He refused to visit Yasukuni while in office and failed even once to challenge the

key cognitive components of the peace state narrative during his three Diet inaugural addresses.

Instead, he targeted individual normative components such as Article Nine but failed to offer a

coherent counter-narrative for the peace state narrative.   In short, throughout this period,

participants in the nationalist discourse continued to use peace state rhetoric and to justify

favored institutional reforms all in the name of peace.   The peace state narrative thus does not

appear in danger of disappearing from the nationalist discourse any time soon.

Third, while less prominent relative to other narratives in recent years, the peace state

narrative remains an important convention in Japan's nationalist discourse and will thus continue

to be shaped by debates over reforming institutions associated with its components.   Although

the examples cited in this chapter have focused on changes that limited the range of application

of its normative claims, it should be noted that this need not always be the case.   For example,

the organizers of the demonstration in Yoyogi Park cited in Chapter One are clearly trying to

expand the peace state narrative's proscription against nuclear weapons to include nuclear power

---

traditional values" normative component of the organic state narrative.   Abe, 2006.
[522] Pyle, 2006, p.8.

as well. This can be seen in a number of ways. First, three of the nine main organizers of the

event are also founding members of the Article Nine Association, a civic action group dedicated

to preserving Article Nine and its ideals. Second, the organizers asked participants to sign a

petition calling for an end to the use of nuclear power in Japan that is replete with peace state

rhetoric. It equates those injured by the Fukushima nuclear plant accident with the victims of

the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and states unequivocally that "humanity cannot

coexist with that which is nuclear" (*ningen wa kaku to wa kyōzon dekinai no desu*).[523] Finally,

one of the organizers, Nobel Prize-winning writer Ōe Kenzaburō has explicitly called for this

linkage in print:

> Therein lies the ambiguity of contemporary Japan: it is a pacifist nation sheltering under
> the American nuclear umbrella. One hopes that the accident at the Fukushima facility
> will allow the Japanese to reconnect with the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to
> recognize the danger of nuclear power, and to put an end to the illusion of the efficacy
> of deterrence that is advocated by nuclear powers.[524]

Although the effort to merge opposition to nuclear weapons with opposition to nuclear power

has a long history in postwar politics, the Yoyogi event represents a new chapter in this endeavor.

Considering the rising importance of the anti-nuclear components to the peace state narrative,

this expansion, if successful, could prove central to the narrative's return to the highest levels of

prominence in the future. Thus, even after facing decades of contestation and discursive

---

[523] The petition can be found at the following website: http://sayonara-nukes.org/ (Accessed July 22, 2012).
[524] Oe, 2011.

strategies designed to weaken its relevance to security institutions, the peace state narrative not only endures but also retains the potential to once again become the most prominent story linking the nation to the state in Japan.

A final matter involves the significance of the explanations developed above for the question of why all five nation-state narratives have experienced secular declines in prominence. Although this question cannot be answered by looking at just one narrative, the fact that similar declines in prominence for the same narrative over different time periods generate different explanations seems to strengthen the possibility that different forces may be behind the overall declines in prominence of the different narratives in this study. The next chapter will consider this question in more detail.

Chapter Seven: Stories upon Stories

What is the history of a nation after all but its stories? Numerous stories.   Stories upon stories, like the many surfaces of a nation.[525]

<div align="right">Alexander Kluge</div>

I. Introduction

While the previous chapter focused on a single nation-state narrative, this chapter considers a number of questions concerning the relationships between different nation-state narratives.   None of the five narratives examined here exist in a vacuum.   As they were selected in part due to the linkages they assert between the nation and the state in policy-relevant areas, such as security, trade, technology, education, social welfare, cultural and electoral institutions, it should not be surprising that they are sometimes advanced in concert and other times in opposition to one another, especially in the course of policy debates.   This interaction may affect their level of prominence and even their longevity in the nationalist discourse.   In addition, similar patterns of change in prominence may indicate that different narratives are influenced by the same factors and will eventually share the same fate.   Only by considering the relationships between these "stories upon stories" is it thus possible to answer questions such as whether denationalization is taking place across multiple domains or if changes in the

---

[525] Quoted in Ray, 2001, p.119.

prominence of one narrative have affected the status of other narratives in the nationalist discourse.

The chapter proceeds in three parts. The next section considers whether the decline in references to all five narratives following the end of the Cold War is linked in some way. Such a link might indicate a broader denationalization under way and the movement of Japan toward a post-nationalist political order. However, no such link emerges, and the decline is found to signify different outcomes across the five narratives. The third section analyzes the relationships between the democratic, trading and peace state narratives in the context of their significance for the debate over the sources of legitimacy for Japan's postwar democratic regime. Although both the trading and peace state narratives are correlated to differing degrees with the democratic state narrative, these relationships weaken in the post-Cold War period, and the democratic state narrative assumes a more independent status. Combined with the conclusion that democratic state narrative has become a banal strand of nationalism, this result is argued to bode well for the legitimacy of the regime as a whole. The final section examines the reasons behind the persistence of the organic state narrative at relatively low levels of prominence and points to a reciprocal relationship with the peace state narrative as a factor in this pattern.

II. Complete Banalities and Partial Transformations

The previous chapter found the declining levels of prominence observed for the peace state narrative in the post-Cold War period to be evidence of an ongoing but still partial transformation. However, the aggregate results reported in Chapter Five reveal a broad fall in prominence among all narratives between the 1980s and the years following the end of the Cold War, which saw historical lows in the prominence of four of the five narratives.[526] Aside from the peace state narrative, what do these declines mean for the other four nation-state narratives? Do they also indicate processes of transformation underway? Is there evidence of a general denationaliztion across different domains in which the nation has historically been linked to the state in Japanese nationalist discourse?

This section attempts to address the above questions, albeit with the following caveats. First, it is impossible to examine all four remaining narratives in the same detail as the peace state narrative was in the previous chapter. The discussion is thus limited to the post-Cold War period, with the analysis of summary statistics and different discursive strategies necessarily abbreviated. Second, since the issue of institutional associations is closely related to the

---

[526] As noted in Chapter Five, comparing cumulative prominence scores for all five narratives for 1983-1987, the five-year block that contains the highest post-1967 prominence scores for three of the five narratives, and 1998-2002, the five-year block that contains the lowest prominence scores recorded in this study for two of the five narratives, reveals a drop of more than 70%. The only narrative not to register its lowest prominence score between 1993 and 2007 is the civilized state narrative. However, it should be noted that this narrative did approach its postwar low (1.3409 references/100 sentences in 1988-1992) in the five-year blocks 1993-1997 and 1998-2002, with its second (1.3457 references/100 sentences) and third (1.3481 references/100 sentences) lowest scores, respectively.

question of these narratives' institutional impacts, these are treated together for a sample of the narratives in Chapter Eight.

Although the trading, organic, civilized and democratic state narratives all experienced declines in prominence of nearly 50% or more in the period after 1992 compared with their highs in the previous decade, the degree of these drops varied. For example, the prominence scores of the trading and civilized state narratives only fell by about half (52% and 46%, respectively), while those of the democratic and organic state narratives fell by more than two-thirds (77% and 79%, respectively). In addition, these declines placed the individual narratives in different positions vis-à-vis their prominence averages for the entire period, with the low points of the organic and democratic state narratives both three-fourths below their fifty-five year average and the same for the civilized and trading state narratives underperforming at more modest levels (-33% and -53%, respectively). However, it should be noted that some of these declines are not unprecedented. In fact, three narratives (trading, organic, and democratic state) experienced larger declines between their high points in the first two postwar decades and their low points in the 1970s, a history that distinguishes them from the peace and civilized state narratives, which saw their largest such decline following the end of the Cold War.

Analyzing these shifts using the tools developed in previous chapters, the democratic

and civilized state narratives show strong evidence of banalization across nearly all measures.

First, at no point during or after the declines in prominence did either of these narratives fail to

be referenced. Further, neither faced meaningful levels of contestation either during the 1980s

or the period of the declines following 1992.[527] Finally, there were no incidences in the speeches

of the Diet inaugurals or newspaper editorials in which political elites adopted transformational,

tinkering or destructive discursive strategies vis-à-vis these two narratives from the 1980s

onward[528]. In short, the democratic and civilized state narratives represent the two clearest

cases of banalization in this study.

Understanding the decline in prominence after the Cold War as cases of banalization

does not mean the two narratives were frozen in amber for the last quarter-century. Important

changes can be observed during this period by considering shifts within the narratives

themselves. Such changes in the democratic state narrative will be considered in the next

section. With regard to the civilized state narrative, Chart 7.1 below shows that the relative

frequency of references to its two sub-narratives nearly reached balance for the first time in the

---

[527] As previously noted, the democratic state narrative did not receive a single negatively-valued reference during the entire study. The civilized state narrative went completely uncontested from 1952-1997, received minimal contestation (less than 1%) in 1998-2002, and then went uncontested again in the final five-year period (2003-2007).
[528] The only negatively-valued reference coded for the civilized state narrative was made by Prime Minister Koizumi in February 2002. In a section in which he listed cuts in his 2002 budget, Koizumi listed his "bold overhaul of the healthcare system." However, he not only fails to challenge the civilized state narrative but reaffirms it in his later description of the actual reforms, including a reference to Japan's welfare state as one "of which all Japanese should be proud." Koizumi Junichirō, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, February 4, 2002. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).

period 1983-1987. However, this balance quickly broke down and returned for the next two decades to the roughly one-fourth cultured state and three-fourths welfare state split that was the average for the entire study.

Chart 7.1: Sub-Narratives in Motion, Civilized State Narrative, 1952*-2007

This shift almost certainly indicates yet another "Nakasone effect." In referencing the civilized state narrative, Prime Minister Nakasone tended to give nearly equal treatment to its cultural and welfare components. For example, in one of his first references to the narrative in a Diet inaugural, Nakasone declared, "Standing in the burned-out rubble, liberated from the prewar era in which Japan's military was prioritized and liberty was restricted, Japanese citizens yearned for new values and cried out for a cultured state (*bunka kokka*), a welfare state (*fukushi*

kokka)."[529] In the period between 1983 and 1987, Nakasone gave all but one of the prime ministerial addresses at the Diet inaugural ceremony, and references to the civilized state narrative by the prime minister accounted for 62% of all such references during this period compared with an average of 53% for the entire study. The near equalization of the two sub-narratives in the middle of Chart 7.1 thus appears to be largely the work of a single actor, an achievement that proved ephemeral in the sense that it failed to alter the long-term balance between the major components of the narrative. Following Nakasone's term in office, welfare again returned as the overwhelming point of concern of those citing the civilized state narrative during the Diet inaugural ceremony.

Comparing Nakasone's attempt to reorder the priorities of the civilized state narrative with his coterminous efforts to affect change in the peace state narrative reveals important differences. Although both cases begin with a new prime minister challenging the status quo of usage patterns for a major nation-state narrative, they differ in both means and outcomes. First, Nakasone's references to the civilized state narrative failed to include novel challenges to any of its normative claims. Instead, his call for Japan to become a "robust culture and welfare country" (*takumashii bunka to fukushi no kuni*) worked largely within the existing rhetorical range long associated with the narrative, staking a position that placed the emphasis on cultural

529 Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), December 3, 1982. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).

fulfillment and a distinct "Japanese-style" *(nihon-teki)* welfare provision that centered on the

family.[530] Although the latter points to traditional conservative attitudes about maximizing the

role of the family in areas such as elderly care, Nakasone avoided directly challenging the

normative claim at the heart of welfare state sub-narrative that the state should ensure the welfare

of the nation. This contrasts with the rhetorical approach initially adopted by the newly-elected

Reagan administration, in which a top official directly challenged the legitimacy of the American

welfare state.[531] Second, in the years after Nakasone left office, political elites failed to adopt

his equal emphasis on culture and welfare in their references to the civilized state narrative, and

previously established patterns returned. This highlights the key point that although a single

actor can initiate important changes in the nationalist discourse, enduring change can only be

achieved when political elites in subsequent years adopt these changes and perpetuate their use.

In contrast to the relatively tranquil passages of the democratic and civilized state

narratives into the post-Cold War era, the trading and organic state narratives had far more

turbulent journeys. In fact, on average, the trading and organic state narratives both saw similar

levels of contestation as that of the peace state narrative in the period between 1978 and 2007.[532]

---

[530] Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), December 3, 1982. Nakasone made this call in 6 of his 10 Diet inaugural addresses. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
[531] In a March 1981 interview, David Stockman, then director of the Office of Management and Budget, declared, "I don't believe that there is any entitlement. The idea that's been established over the last 10 years that almost every service that someone might need in life ought to be provided, financed by the government as a matter of basic right, is wrong. We challenge that. We reject that notion." Quoted in Bartlett (2009).
[532] Measured as the percentage of negatively-valued references to total references for the narrative, the average level of contestation over the six five-year blocks between 1978 and 2007 for the trading, organic and peace state

However, as noted above, neither narrative ever recorded a zero-level of prominence. In addition, in neither case were the core cognitive claims of the narratives challenged. Instead, as with the peace state narrative, the contestation was limited to the narratives' normative claims, each of which saw two challenged in the post-Cold War period. For the trading state narrative, the claims that the state should promote the nation's exports as well as its investments overseas were regularly challenged during period (and before), while resistance to the organic state narrative's calls for the state to support the Yasukuni shrine appeared for the first time and objections to enforcing traditional values resurfaced after a long period of quiescence. The combination of these findings thus initially indicates a process of partial transformation at work in both narratives.

As the above developments in the trading and organic state narratives are relevant to questions regarding the former's relationship with the democratic state narrative and the latter's with the peace state narrative, the details, extent, timing, and institutional relevance of these transformations will be explored over the course of the remaining sections of this chapter. However, accepting the provisional conclusion that the post-Cold War declines in the prominence of these two narratives are instances of partial transformations completes the

narratives were 5.17%, 5.19% and 5.79%, respectively.

assessments of the declines during this period for all the narratives in this study. These

conclusions are summarized in Table 7.1 below.

Table 7.1: Understanding Prominence Declines

Narrative	Post-Cold War Period
Trading State	Transformation (Partial)
Organic State	Transformation (Partial)
Peace State	Transformation (Partial)
Democratic State	Banalization
Civilized State	Banalization

The mixed picture provided by these results yields further conclusions. First, there are

no indicators of denationalization, either within a single domain addressed by one of the

narratives or across multiple domains. In other words, despite the advance of globalization and

the potential for increased trans-national ties and post-nationalist thinking during this period,

political elites in Japan did not stop elaborating links between the nation and the state across

these domains. This points to the continued relevance of nationalist rhetoric to policy debates

in these areas.

Second, as one might expect given the various external and internal pressures faced by

Japan following the end of the Cold War, the period can indeed be characterized as one of

transformation in the nationalist discourse. However, although the process is ongoing during this period and some narratives faced higher levels of contestation than at any other time in the study, the transformations so far have been limited in both scope and scale; they have occurred in only one type of component (normative) in just three of the five narratives. Add to these points the absence of clearly-articulated, enduring counter-narratives and the picture of the post-Cold War as an era of "new nationalism" in Japan is further belied.

Third, it is interesting to note that the two narratives with the deepest roots in prewar nationalisms, the trading and organic state narrative, are both highly contested and partially transformed over the course of the postwar era. As the relatively newer peace state narrative also received a similar treatment, the presence or absence of a prewar legacy does not appear to have been a decisive factor in determining the outcomes in Table 7.1. At least for the narratives in this study, longevity in the nationalist discourse thus does not appear to have provided any particular advantage as a bulwark against contestation and change.

Finally, nationalist rhetoric continues to serve as a virtually uncontested source of legitimacy for both Japanese democracy and its welfare state. This situation may of course change in the future, but as of the first decade of the new century, Japanese nationalism continued to place emphasis on democracy and the welfare state as key objects of identification. The next section will elaborate on this point with regard the democratic state narrative.

III. From Trade to Technology in and out of Democracy's Embrace

When viewing how the prominence scores of narratives change over time, it is impossible not to note the tight relationship between the democratic and trading state narratives. Although for the first twenty-five years of the study they repeatedly exchanged the position of which was the more prominent of the two, from the late 1970s onward, the trading state narrative established a lead. Yet, despite these shifts, changes in prominence for the two narratives have tended to move in concert. Chart 7.2 below shows this relationship for the entire period of the study.

Chart 7.2: Prominence, Democratic and Trading State Narratives, 1952*-2007

Unit: Refernces per 100 sentences

The closeness of this relationship can be expressed mathematically in the form of a correlation co-efficient. As noted in Chapter Five, the correlation co-efficient for the prominence scores of the democratic and trading state narratives for the entire period is 0.869. This means that more than 75% of the variance in the prominence scores of these two narratives is in common. The presence of such a correlation may seem unusual, but in fact, all of the five nation-state narratives are positively correlated to varying extents. For example, the democratic state narrative also has strong correlations with the organic (0.686) and peace (0.652) state narratives, and the trading state narrative is correlated with the civilized, peace, and organic state narratives with correlation co-efficients all in excess of 0.6. However, what is unique here is the strength of the correlation between the democratic and trading state narratives. As Table 7.2 makes clear, the correlation between these two narratives far exceeds that of any other pairing and has a higher level of statistical significance.

Table 7.2: Correlation Co-Efficients, Prominence, Five Narratives, Entire Period

	Trading State	Peace State	Organic State	Civilized State
Democratic State	0.869**	0.652*	0.686*	0.449
	Peace State	Organic State	Civilized State	
Trading State	0.694*	0.608*	0.723*	
	Organic State	Civilized State		
Peace State	0.567	0.612*		
	Civilized State			
Organic State	0.299			

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

In addition to the usual caveat that correlation is not causation, it is important to consider what correlations in this instance likely indicate. They simply mean that the number of references (both positive/neutral and negatively-valued) to these different narratives tended to rise and fall in the same direction and in similar proportions over time. Overall, it seems likely that the large number of statistically-significant, positive correlations is indicative of the fact that participants in the nationalist discourse tended to return again and again to these particular narratives whenever periods of concern arose regarding the relationship between the nation and the state and then likewise turned away from their use when these concerns passed. In other words, since these narratives are different, long-standing ways to address the same subject, the nation-state relationship, it should not be surprising that their levels of prominence should change in relatively congruent patterns.[533] However, the correlation between the democratic and trading state narratives stands out even in this company. In addition to the extent of the correlation between their prominence scores, an even stronger correlation exists when only their positive (non-negative) references are considered. Table 7.3 below shows the correlation co-efficients for all narrative pairings when only positive references are considered. At 0.900, the correlation between the democratic and trading state narratives is by far the strongest such relationship; the two share more than 81% of the variance in this measure and the relationship is

---

[533] This may also be interpreted as evidence that the narratives chosen for this study are in fact drawn from a single strand of the broader political discourse and thus are rightly studied together as a group.

statistically significant at the highest level. Both the strength and direction (positive) of this relationship thus indicates that positive portrayals of these two narratives tended to be used with similar frequencies over the years. Put differently, this finding shows that the levels of support voiced on the behalf of these two narratives during Diet inaugural ceremonies moved up and down together, suggesting an affinity between support for one and support for the other in the words of participants.

Table 7.3: Correlation Co-Efficients, Positive References, Five Narratives, Entire Period

	Trading State +	Peace State +	Organic State +	Civilized State +
Democratic State +	0.900**	0.639*	0.688*	0.385
	Peace State +	Organic State +	Civilized State +	
Trading State +	0.677*	0.574	0.563	
	Organic State +	Civilized State +		
Peace State +	0.575	0.673*		
	Civilized State +			
Organic State +	0.357			

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

A final important aspect of this relationship is that it breaks down after the end of the Cold War. For the first eight five-year blocks (1952-1992), which are here used as a proxy for the Cold War period, the correlation co-efficient for the prominence scores of the trading and democratic state narratives is .836, which means that nearly 70 % of the variance is in common.[534] However, during the post-Cold War, represented here by the last three five-year

---

[534] This correlation is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

blocks (1993-2007), the correlation co-efficient declines to .307 and is not statistically

significant, indicating a breakdown in the strong relationship of the Cold War period. Similarly,

if only positive (non-negative) references are considered, the correlation co-efficient is an even

stronger .876 during the Cold War (more than 76% shared variation), but falls to 0.185 in the

post-Cold War period, again indicating a very weak relationship (only 3% of variance in

common).[535]

What accounts for this initial relationship as well as its breakdown in the post-Cold War

period? These questions touch on a debate among scholars over what is variously referred to as

"system support," "system stability," "regime stability," and "system legitimacy" with regard to

democracy in postwar Japan. This concept refers to the general level of support for a particular

regime type as a system of government.[536] In contemporary Japan, "system support" in this

view means the degree to which the postwar democratic regime as a system of government is

understood by all domestic actors (political elites, voters, etc.) to be legitimate.[537]

Although much work has been done assessing democratic legitimacy in postwar Japan,

scholars remain divided over its ultimate sources.[538] Some argue that the legitimacy of Japan's

---

[535] The correlation for the Cold War period is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). The post-Cold War correlation is not statistically significant.
[536] Citrin, 1973; Muller & Jukam, 1977.
[537] For a review of the development of concept of "system support" and tests confirming its appropriateness when applied to postwar Japan, see Fouse (2002).
[538] For examples of work in this area, see Watanuki,(1977); White (1981); Johnson (1982, 1995), Richardson & Flanagan (1984), and Fouse (2002).

postwar democratic regime is in fact strongly grounded in economic nationalism.[539] This view

traces the origins of this situation to the determination by political leaders in the immediate

postwar years that Japan would "regain its national self-respect through economic achievement

and economic leadership," the particular "history of poverty and war in Japan that established

and legitimated Japan's [developmental] priorities among the people in the first place," and

Japan's prewar history, in which the state had aggressively promoted industrialization in an

effort to ward off Western imperialism.[540] The combination of these factors with the

democratizing reforms adopted during the American occupation thus produced a democracy in

which "stability has rested on the ability of the ruling political party to forge a coalition of voters

committed to economic growth and effective management."[541] In short, this has resulted in

system legitimacy based on economic outcomes.

In contrast, others argue that democratic legitimacy in contemporary Japan "is firmly

based in a postwar political culture that rejects a return to the militaristic form of government

that preceded democracy" and that this antimilitarism provides "roots for democratic values that

can aid in sustaining the political system during periods of economic and political turmoil."[542]

---

[539] See for example, Johnson (1982, 1995). Johnson defines economic nationalism as the pursuit of "economic activities primarily to achieve independence from and leverage over potential [international] adversaries." Johnson, 1995, p.105. .
[540] Johnson, 1995, pp.103-107; Johnson, 1982, p.307.
[541] Johnson, 1982, p.317.
[542] Fouse, 2002, p.v.

313

This alternative is grounded in an historical narrative which stresses the linkage between the simultaneous development of the peace movement and support for democracy in the early postwar years.[543] This co-development established the popular understanding of "citizens' control over decisions related to national defense as the bedrock of legitimacy in a democratic state."[544] Democratic legitimacy is thus grounded in what has been called "peace nationalism."[545]

The content analysis in this study can shed new light on questions regarding the long-term sources of support for postwar democracy in Japan. Its major advantage in this regard is in offering a systematic empirical test that allows for longitudinal analysis, a combination not present in the works cited above. However, certain distinctions should be noted. First, support for contemporary civilian control of the military, which is included as an aspect of peace nationalism in the latter view, was coded in the content analysis as a normative claim of the democratic state narrative.[546] Second, prior work testing the relationship between democratic legitimacy and economic and peace nationalisms tends to focus on a narrow set of proxy measures, such as appraisals of the wartime authoritarian regime for peace nationalism or an evaluation of personal and overall economic outcomes for economic nationalism.[547] The

---

[543] Fouse, 2002, pp.18-64.
[544] Fouse, 2002, p.135.
[545] McVeigh, 2004.
[546] Support for civilian control of the military is one of the items coded under "enforce democratic principles."
[547] Fouse, 2002.

314

peace and trading state narratives encompass many more elements of economic and peace nationalisms. Despite these differences, which are largely in terms of operationalizations, it is argued here that the trading and peace narratives provide sound proxies for economic and peace nationalisms, respectively, while and the democratic state narrative can serve as an indicator of democratic legitimacy.

Some of the conclusions reached above touch on the opposing claims of the economic and peace nationalism views. First, the finding that the strongest correlation among narratives in the study is between the trading and democratic state narrative, that this relationship breaks down following the end of the Cold War, and that the drop in the prominence of the trading state narrative during this latter period is due to a process of partial transformation are all consistent with the predictions of the economic nationalism view. However, the conclusion that the democratic state narrative has become a banal strand of nationalism over a post-Cold War period in which Japan has been plagued by economic downturns and underperforming growth rates runs counter to the predictions of economic nationalism advocates, who argue that the stability of the system should be called into question if state-led economic development stalled.[548] Since the peace state narrative is also correlated with the democratic state narrative, the failure of this

---

[548] Such a breakdown would "signal the need for quick surgery and reconstitution of the system. Johnson, 1982, p.317.

prediction might be interpreted as evidence in favor of the peace nationalism view.[549] The

evidence so far thus provides some support for both views.

A thorough assessment of the economic nationalism thesis requires a detailed

explanation of the transformation taking place in the trading state narrative.   The results of an

abbreviated form of narrative analysis on the trading state narrative appear in Table 7.4 below.

It shows the average values for the relative frequencies and levels of contestation for the trading

state's two contested norms over the periods 1978-1992 and 1993-2007.

Table 7.4: Contested Normative Components, Trading State Narrative, 1978-2007

Trading State Normative Component	Average (1978-1992)	Average (1993-2007)
Increase Exports (% Negative)	53.5% (18.9%)	9.0% (18.9)
Increase Exports (Relative Frequency)	8.1% (19.9%)	3.1% (19.9%)
Expand Overseas Investment (% Negative)	11.2% (11.9%)	8.8% (11.9%)
Expand Overseas Investment (Relative Frequency)	36.8% (25.2)	19.3% (25.2%)

Numbers in parenthesis are average values for the eleven five-year blocks.

These results indicate that high-to-average levels of contestation directed at these

normative claims in the first period were followed by declines to below-average levels of

contestation and relative frequencies in the second period.   In the context of the overall decline

---

[549] Although the peace state narrative is correlated with the democratic state narrative in both prominence and positive references at a statistically significant level (0.05 level), it should be noted that the organic state narrative is correlated with the democratic state narrative on these same measures at a slightly higher level.

in narrative prominence across the two periods, this suggests first that high levels of contestation directed at these claims have greatly reduced their significance for the trading state narrative, likely indicating the addition of exceptions to their range of application. Still further, these components represent two of the three normative claims of the merchant state sub-narrative. This suggests that, as with the peace state narrative, not only was contestation limited to normative claims but it was also directed at a single sub-narrative. In addition, as Chart 7.3 below makes clear, the importance of the merchant state narrative in terms of relative frequency fell to unprecedented lows during this period and was overtaken by the technology-based state sub-narrative, which achieved equally unprecedented highs on this measure in the post-Cold War period. The prominence scores for these two-sub-narratives also reflect a similar pattern; in the period between 1993-2007, all the prominence scores of the merchant state sub-narrative are below their overall average, with the lowest score for the sub-narrative recorded in 1998-2002, while the technology-based sub-narrative saw above-average prominence in two of the three five-year blocks that make up this period.

less exclusive since the 1980s and now contained a fair number of members located in Asia. This is also consistent with Oguma Eiji's assertion that an important factor in recent debates over Japan's democratic identity has been the loss of its unique status as the only industrialized liberal democracy in Asia.[553]

Chart 7.4: Relative Frequencies, Components, Democratic State Narrative, 1952*-2007

Meanwhile, during these same time periods, the relationship between the peace and democratic state narratives also exhibited changes. First, as Table 7.2 and 7.3 above show, the peace state narrative has the third-highest correlation with the democratic state narrative over the entire period both with regard to prominence (0.652) and positive responses (0.639). In addition, these relationships are statistically significant, though less so than was the case with

---

[553] Oguma, 2002b, p.816.

less correlated with the democratic state narrative, while the technology-based state sub-narrative becomes negatively correlated.

Table 7.5: Correlations with Democratic State Narrative, Various Periods

Sub-Narrative	Entire Period	1952*-1992	1993-2007
Merchant State	0.904**	0.883**	0.460
Merchant State (Positive)	0.934**	0.920**	0.378
Technology-based State	0.055	0.009	-0.731
Technology-based State (Positive)	0.017	-0.028	-0.731

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

What explains this breakdown between the merchant state sub-narrative and the democratic state narrative? Table 7.4 above suggests that this shift is largely about changing perceptions regarding attitudes toward state efforts to promote exports. Examining the rhetoric itself can be helpful in developing a more detailed explanation. First, in the early postwar decades, speakers tended to connect Japan's exports and trade ties to both the project of improving the Japanese people's livelihood and with Japan's position as member of the free word. For example, during the early 1950s, conservative politicians then in opposition parties repeatedly linked the state effort to expand trade with economic development and prosperity on one hand and Japan's reentry on the international stage as an independent member of the group

319

of democratic states.[550] This would continue in a slightly different form in the 1970s, when

Prime Minister Tanaka declared that "the national policy of promoting trade" had resulted in

Japan "possessing the second-largest economic power in the free world."[551] This new pattern

survived into the 1980s when Prime Minister Nakasone also linked the strengthening of Japan's

trade capabilities with its status as the "free world's second-largest economic superpower."[552]

Following the end of the Cold War, however, participants in the Diet inaugural

ceremony largely dropped this link between Japan's trade and exports and its membership in the

community of democratic states. This is also reflected in changes in usage patterns among the

components of the democratic state narrative itself. Chart 7.4 below shows this in stark relief.

Whereas the claim of membership in the free world represents nearly 10% of references to the

democratic state narrative across all five-year blocks, it never reaches higher than 1.1% in the

period between 1993 and 2007. It thus seems likely that one major reason for the breakdown

between the merchant state sub-narrative (and thus the trading state narrative as a whole) and the

democratic state narrative during this period is a reduction in the association between Japan's

trade promotion and its belonging to the group of democratic states, a group that had become far

---

[550] See for example, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Reform Party (*Kaishintō*), Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, November 24, 1952;   Ogata Taketora, Liberal Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January 22, 1955. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
[551] Tanaka Kakuei, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January 27, 1973. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
[552] Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January 24, 1983. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).

less exclusive since the 1980s and now contained a fair number of members located in Asia. This is also consistent with Oguma Eiji's assertion that an important factor in recent debates over Japan's democratic identity has been the loss of its unique status as the only industrialized liberal democracy in Asia.[553]

Chart 7.4: Relative Frequencies, Components, Democratic State Narrative, 1952*-2007

Meanwhile, during these same time periods, the relationship between the peace and democratic state narratives also exhibited changes. First, as Table 7.2 and 7.3 above show, the peace state narrative has the third-highest correlation with the democratic state narrative over the entire period both with regard to prominence (0.652) and positive responses (0.639). In addition, these relationships are statistically significant, though less so than was the case with

---

[553] Oguma, 2002b, p.816.

trading state narrative.[554]   However, when viewed across the Cold War (1952-1992) and

post-Cold War (1993-2007) periods, these correlations rise but are not statistically significant in

either period.[555]   Thus, although these results provide some support for the argument that

"peace and democracy" were generally linked over the course of the postwar period, they fail to

provide strong evidence that this relationship was more important than the one linking

democracy to the trading state ethos either during or after the Cold War.   The mixed picture that

results of the relationship between the central elements of peace, development and democracy is

thus likely closer to reality than the individual assertions of either the economic or the peace

nationalism view.

A final point that bears consideration regarding the legitimacy of Japan's democracy in

the post-Cold War period is that it may have reached a level of consensus that allows it to endure

without depending on support generated by affinities with other nation-state narratives.   Three

observations point to this possibility.   First, the democratic state narrative's prominence decline

is a clear case of banalization during this period, despite the fact that it has no statistically

significant relationships in prominence and positive responses with the trading and peace state

narratives.   In addition, although the cognitive claim of membership in the community of

---

[554] Both correlations are statistically significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

[555] Whereas its correlations with the democratic state narrative for prominence and positive responses were 0.534 and 0.513, respectively, for the period 1952-1992, these both increased to 0.685 and 0.701, respectively, for the period 1993-2007.   However, none of these are statistically significant.

democratic states declines during this period, the other cognitive claim associated with this narrative, the naming convention of Japan as a democratic state, a claim independent of universalistic or external references, as well as the major normative claim associated with this narrative, the enforcement of democratic principles at home, both increase on average in the post-Cold War period.[556] These changes may indicate an internalization of the focus of the narrative and the establishment of a corresponding independence from external pressures and changes in the international system. Finally, analysis of public opinion in the post-Cold war period has suggested that favorable perceptions of the efficacy of the current democratic system were an important source of support for the legitimacy of Japan's democracy during this period.[557] In this way, multiple measures support the conclusion that Japanese democracy following the end of the Cold War has achieved a strong level of legitimacy that is more independent of alternative sources of support than during any other time in the postwar period.

---

[556] Across the five-year blocks between 1952 and 1992, the average relative frequencies for the naming convention and the norm to enforce democratic principles were 1.2% and 85.7%, respectively. These increased to averages of 6.3% and 93.1%, respectively, for the period from 1993-2007.

[557] Fouse, 2002, p.131. In Fouse's categorical regression analysis of the results of the 1999 survey, he finds that positive perceptions of the efficacy of the Japan's contemporary democratic system is the second-largest influencing factor (Pratt's importance statistic of .193) on support for democratic ideals, narrowly trailing behind negative perceptions of the wartime authoritarian government (.216).

IV. Institutional Incentives, Alternating Champions, and the Enemies of Peace

A third remaining question from Chapter Five regards the steady persistence of the organic state narrative at relatively low levels of prominence throughout the postwar period.[558] In terms of prominence, the organic state narrative scores below average for all periods, holds the lowest prominence score in nine of the eleven five-year blocks, and was the lowest-scoring narrative in this category between 1958-2002. In addition, it saw the second highest level of contestation for the entire period when measured as the percentage of negatively–valued references to total references.[559] Further, the narrative, which experienced its postwar low in total references in the mid-1990s, subsequently saw its level of contestation reach a postwar high of more than 19%, the highest such figure figure for any narrative in the study. With this background, the organic state narrative seems the most likely candidate in the study to face break-up as a convention in the nationalist discourse. Understanding its persistance across the decades is the subject of this section.

A unique aspect of the organic state narrative is its paucity of associations with state institutions in comparison with the other nation-state narratives. One of its components, the cognitive claim of national polity, has virtually no institutional associations during the postwar

---

[558] "Steady" and "stable" are used in this section to refer to the fact that the organic state narrative has the second lowest variance in its prominence scores over the five-year blocks among the narrative studied here: civilized state (0.405), organic state (0.465), trading state (1.506), democratic state (5.878), and peace state (5.919).

[559] Measured as negatively-valued references as percentage of total references over the entire period, the trading state narrative is the highest (6.4%), organic state is second (2.9%), and the peace state is third (1.5%).

period. Efforts to establish such associations with other components, such as the decades-long

drive to return the Yasukuni Shrine to state control, have failed completely. Some successes in

this regard have proven ephemeral, such as the use of the homonegnous nation claim to deny

legal recognition to domestic ethnic minorities, while others have only recently been established,

such as the 2006 reform of the Fundamental Law on Education to introduce patriotic

education.[560] In addition, the drive to strengthen what is arguably the narrative's strongest

association with a state institution by changing the emperor's constitutional status from "symbol

of the state" to "head of state" has yet to produce results, despite decades of effort.[561]

Although the pervious chapter showed that having more institutonal associations guarantees

neither lower levels of contestation (which may eventually contribute to lower prominence) nor

higher levels of prominence, it is hard to overlook the fact that the least prominent narrative is

also the one with the least institutional associations.[562] It thus seems likely that this "outsider"

quality of the organic state narrative contributed to its lower prominence in comparison with

narratives with more extensive institutional associtions.

---

[560] For accounts of the efforts regarding Yasukuni and domestic minorities, see Chapter Four. For an account of the FLE reform, see Kariya & Rappleye (2010).

[561] As will be discussed further in the next chapter, it should be noted that, although not necessarily reproduced in the letter of the law, homogenous nation rhetoric has certainly been prevalent in debates over citizenship and immigration laws, especially with regard to the treatment of Japan's large Korean minority.

[562] Chapter Three demonstrated that the organic state narrative, which has the least institutional associations among the three majorly contested narratives, has the lowest standard deviation in its positive references. A similar comparison shows that the anti-nuclear state sub-narrative, despite having fewer institutional associations, exhibited less standard deviation in its positive references (1.0966) than the peace-loving state sub-narrative (1.8264). The former also faced no contestation while the latter was the target of all of the contestation directed at the peace state narrative.

Nothing in the above discussion, however, precludes the possibility that the organic state narrative's institutional associations contributed to its persistance and stability. Earlier analysis suggests a means of exploring this possibility. In the previous chapter, it was found that the peace state narrative's associations with state institutions targeted for reform by prime ministers did not prevent the relevant normative components from experiencing severe declines in prominence. Reversing this logic, it is possible to assume that the benefits of an association with a state institution accrue more readily to the narrative component when it is defended by the head of state. Viewed this way, it appears the organic state narrative is benefiting from such associations. First, 51% of the total references to the narrative come from prime ministers, not a single one of which is negatively-valued.[563] Next, as Table 7.6 below shows, the majority of references to the three components with the strongest associations to state institutions in the narrative (the imperial, ethno-nationlaist and traditional values claims) all come from prime ministerial addresses.[564] Although the national polity claim at first appears to be an exception -- a component with no institutional association that receives all of its references from prime ministers, this is easily explained as an artifact of its extreme rarity: references to this style of

[563] Opposition responses and newspaper editorials accounted for 31% and 18%, respectively.
[564] Specifically, these institutions include the constitutional role the emperor and the Imperial Household Law, immigration and citizenship policies based on the *jus sanguinis* principle, or inclusion by descent, and a long-standing (since 1958) program of moral instruction in the compulsory education system designed in part to inculcate a sense of public duty and respect for family elders (which has recently been augmented by the introduction of patriotic education through the 2006 revision of the Fundamental Law on Education).

pre-war rhetoric represent less than 1% of all references to the organic state narrative.[565] The

relationship is confirmed by tabulating which components prime ministers typically refer to

when citing the narrative. This reveals that nearly 99% of references to the narrative made by

prime ministers regard the three components with the strongest institutional associations.[566]

Table 7.6: Organic State Narrative Components by Source, 1952*-2007

Component	P.M.	Opposition	Editorials
Japanese as Ethnicity	54%	33%	13%
Emperor	70%	26%	4%
Support Yasukuni	2%	65%	33%
National Polity	100%	0%	0%
Enforce Trad. Values	57%	18%	25%

Next, it appears there may be a complex of institutional incentives behind the pattern of

support and opposition received by the organic state narrative that transcends partisanship.

Table 7.7 shows the percentages of positive (non-negative) and negatively-valued references

from each source over four periods: 1952-1955, when for the most part conservative parties

---

[565] In addition, the two references to this claim are both fleeting and vague. Fukuda Takeo, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, February 6, 1984; Nakasone Yasuhiro, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January 21, 1978. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/(August 17, 2012).
[566] The breakdown is as follows: ethno-nationalist claim (48.2%), enforce traditional values (34.3%), emperor (16.3%), national polity (0.8%), and support Yasukuni (0.4%).

controlled both political positions; 1956-1992, when the prime minister hailed from the center-right LDP and the largest opposition party was the leftist JSP; 1993-1997, when the LDP, center-left and leftist parties exchanged these positions; and 1998-2007, when the LDP regained the prime ministership and the largest opposition party became the center-left Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). What is interesting here is that, with the exception of the first period in the 1950s, the pecentages of positive references coming from each source remain remarkably consistent despite changes in partisan positions. In addition, references by the occupants of the prime minister's office remain positive throughout, even during the period in the mid-1990s when the position temporarily fell out of the hands of conservatives.

Table 7.7: Organic State Positive & Negative References by Source, Various Periods

Source	1952-1955*	1956-1992**	1993-1997***	1998-2007****	1952-2007
P.M.	44% (0%)	54% (0%)	57% (0%)	53% (0%)	53% (0%)
Opposition	24% (0%)	30% (50%)	36% (0%)	31% (80%)	30% (64%)
Editorials	32% (100%)	16% (50%)	7% (0%)	16% (20%)	17% (36%)

*P.M. and opposition are conservatives (except 1 opposition response from JSP); **P.M. is LDP/opposition is JSP; ***P.M. is LDP or JSP/opposition is center-left sometimes including JSP (except 1 response from JSP only); ****P.M. is LDP (JSP left governing coalition after 1 speech)/opposition is DPJ; All figures are percentages; Figures in parentheses are the percentage of negatively-valued references

Still further, with the exception of the period 1993-1997, the opposition party responses and newspaper editorials remain reliable sources of contestation, a fact that does not change,

indeed is amplified, when the center-left DPJ assumes the opposition position after 1998. In this regard, it appears the old adage "where you stand is where you sit" holds true regarding support and opposition for the organic state narrative: the consistency with which actors occupying particular positions have referenced the narrative in the same proportion and valence seems to indicate institutional incentives at work. This may result from the authoritarian nature of some aspects of the narrative, which are favored by those in executive office and opposed by those without such executive authority. At any rate, it seems likely this situation has generated a level of built-in stability, at least at a very low level, that partly explains the overall persistence of the organic state narrative.

Identifying a second factor that may help explain persistence at a low level begins with the observation that a single component represents more than 50% of all references to the organic state narrative for all but the first and last of the five-year blocks. This pattern is not unusual among the narratives composed of five components or less. For example, normative claims regarding ensuring basic welfare and enforcing democratic principles domestically represent more than 50% of the references in all five-year blocks for the civilized and demoractic state narratives, respectively.[567] However, two things stand out with the organic state narrative

---

[567] A single component regularly representing so much of these three narrative's prominence scores is likely due to the fact that their normative and cognitive claims are simply not as numerous or parsed at as fine a level as is the case for the peace state narrative, which has no five-year block for which a single component represents more than 50% of total references, and the trading state, which has only 2 five-year blocks in which hits for a single component make up more than half of its references.

in this regard. First, in contrast to the civilized and democratic state narratives, the "champion" component of the organic state narratives is not always the same and in fact alternates over time.

As Chart 7.5 below reveals, expressions of Japan as a homogenous ethnic nation-state represented more than half of the references to this narrative from the late 1950s through to the early 1980s. The ten years beteween 1988 and 1997 are dominated by referencs to the emperor until the focus shifts to traditional values in the period 1998-2002. However, this breaks down for the last five-year block, when the traditional values claim falls below the 50% mark. How has this pattern contributed to narrative persistence and what does its breakdown mean for the organic state narrative going forward?

Chart 7.5: Relative Frequencies, All Components, Organic State Narrative, 1952*-2007

The pattern of alternating "champions" shows that the organic state narrative failed either to establish a degree of balance in the relative frequencies of its invidual components (as the peace and trading state narratives did) or to feaure a single component that large numbers of participants in the Diet inaugural ceremony referenced continuously throughout the entire period (as was the case with the civilized and democratic state narratives). Since both of these proved successful routes to high levels of prominence for other narratives, it seems likely this anomalous pattern is partly to blame for the organic state narrative's poor performace on this measure. However, this constantly shifting internal dynamic seems to belie the narrative's overall prominence scores, which, while the lowest, are among the most stable among the five narratives. Although random chance might be at work here, another possible explanation is that this pattern reflects the constant efforts of proponents to promote the organic state narrative as a world view and to institutionalize its core components as they conceive them in state policies and institutions in the face of strong opposition. In reponse to this opposition, these supporters, comprised largely of conservative politicians, opportunistically focus on whatever aspect of the narrative they believe most likely to further their cause at any given time. This hypothesis thus predicts that the majority of positive (non-negative) references to the champion component of a particular period will come from the positions controlled by conservatives, who will also not oppose any components of the narrative. If opposition is present, it will emanate from positions

331

outside the control of conservatives and be directed at the other components of the narrative.

Finally, whether or not non-conservatives oppose the champion component is indeterminate, as it depends on whether supporters selected the right component as champion (i.e. the one that most others support in the period in question).

Table 7.8 below summarizes the results of two periods which allow for easy comparisons of these predictions because they both have champions, include some degree of opposition to the narrative, and do not contain changes of government, which would obscure actor analysis.[568] In the first period, 1958-1982, conservatives hold the prime ministership and the ethno-nationalist claim is the organic state narrative's champion, representing on average nearly 60% of the narrative's total references. In the second period, 1998-2002, conservatives again control the executive and the call to enforce traditional values is the overwhelming champion, accounting for more than 91% of the narrative's total references. The two periods combined cover a little more than half of the total period of the study.

---

[568] If the requirement that there be some opposition is relaxed, 1988-1992, when references to the emperor represent more than 50% of all references to the narrative and partisan positions remain stable, can also be analyzed in this way. The period matches the above predictions relating to positive references (92% of which come from the prime minister), although the increased references are largely due to the transition to from Showa to Heisei Emperors.

Table 7.8: Alternating Champions in Two Periods, 1958-1982 & 1998-2002

	Ethno-Nation	Trad. Values
	1958-1982	1998-2002
Champion		
Prime Ministers (Positive)	59%	65%
Opposition Leaders (Positive)	29%	30%
Editorialists (Positive)	12%	5%
Champion		
Prime Ministers (Negative)	0.0%	0.0%
Opposition Leaders (Negative)	0.0%	67%
Editorialists (Negative)	0.0%	33%
Others		
Prime Ministers (Negative)	0.0%	0.0%
Opposition Leaders (Negative)	50%	100.0%
Editorialists (Negative)	50%	0.0%

The results for these two periods provide support for the alternativing champion hypothesis. First, in both instances the conservative-controlled prime minister's office produces the majority of the champion components' positive references. In addition, the executive directs no negative comments to either the champion or any other component of the organic state narrative. Finally, the opposition leader position, which is controlled by the leftist JSP in the first period and the center-left DPJ in the second, is responsible for at least half of the opposition to the other components during both periods. With regard to the first period, the opposition did not direct any negatively-valued comments at the champion, suggesting proponents of the narrative chose their champion wisely. In the latter period, however, both the

DPJ and the major newspaper editorialists do offer opposition to the enforcement of traditional values, a possible indication the component was not a suitable choice to serve as the narrative's champion at that time. These findings are further explored in brief sketches of two periods below.

The claim of ethno-national unity proved the workhorse behind the organic state narrative during the first period. 59% of its references came from LDP prime ministers, who hailed from both the consevative (anti-mainstream) and pragmatic (mainstream) wings of the party, but who all shared affinities for components of the organic state narrative, especially its call for ethno-national unity. It should thus not be surprising that Tanaka Kakuei, considered perhaps to have the most moderate views on issues related to the organic state narrative, was comfortable with rhetoric such as the following statement from a 1974 Diet inaugural:

> The one hundred million of the Japanese nation *(nihon mizoku)*, as a homogenous nation *(tanitsu minzoku)* in an island country, were able to mobilize their energy single-mindedly towards recovery and construction efforts because there were no racial conflicts or religious or linguistic struggles.[569]

It should also be noted that more than a quarter of the positive references to this claim came from the socialist opposition during this period. This should not be surprising, as Kevin Doak has shown that the use of pleas to ethnic unity in efforts by leftists to construct national identity discourses opposed to or independent of the state began in the pre-war period and

---

[569] Tanaka Kakuei, Liberal Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January 21, 1974. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).

continued into the postwar years.[570] In the case of the postwar JSP, claims of ethno-national

unity were almost always advanced in opposition to the U.S. military presence in Japan and its

occupations of the Bonin islands and Okinawa. In particular, JSP officials tended to refer to the

Okinawan people with the evocative phrase *dōhō* (meaning "brethren," "brothers," or

"kinsmen") and peppered their calls for the U.S. to return control of Okinawa to Japan with

colorful language such as "a tragic incident in which the blood of our [Okinawan] kinsmen,

which is bound to our blood, was shed, just as the blood flowed at Sunakawa [a 1957

demonstration against the expansion of a U.S. base outside of Tokyo]," "our [Okinawan]

kinsmen suffering under the rule of a foreign race (*iminzoku*)," and "retstoring our Okinawan

kinsmen to the fatherland (*sokoku*)."[571] In addition, the JSP sometimes utilized this

ethno-nationalist rhetoric in concert with the normative claims of the peace state narrative to

advance such policy stances as opposing the introduction of American nuclear forces into

Okinawa.[572]

In the second period, 1998-2002, the call for a return to traditional values was the

overwhelming selection as champion by an increasingly conservative string of LDP prime

---

[570] Doak, 1996; Doak, 2007, pp.216-264.
[571] Suzuki Mosaburō, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, February 4, 1957; Akamatsu Isamu, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, October 20, 1971;Kitayama Airō, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, July 19, 1971. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
[572] Suzuki Mosaburō, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January 29, 1958; Narita Tomomi, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, December 2, 1969. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).

ministers.   Whereas the first two, Hashimoto Ryūtarō and Obuchi Keizō, hailed from a faction

within the party that had evolved from Tanaka Kakuei's grand faction of the pragmatic

mainstream, the next two, Mori Yoshirō and Koizumi Junichirō, were members of a faction that

could trace its roots back to Ksihi Nobusuke's original band of anti-mainstream conservatives.

Accordingly, Hashimoto did not raise traditional values in his one speech given during this

period, and Obuchi addressed them only in quite general and indirect ways, asking the Japanese

people "to have pride and confidence in the country called Japan" and to pass on "the moral fiber

cultivated over many long years in the workplace, community, and family" as well as "superior

culture and traditions" to the next generation.[573]   In contrast, Mori incorporated these themes

into a critique of the contemporary moral status quo to call on the Japanese to aspire to his vision

of the ideal nation-state, the "spiritually-rich, beautiful state" (*kokoro no yutaka na utsukushii*

kokka), a conception that is broadly consistent with what is termed here the organic state

narrative.[574]   In particular, he called for educational reforms "to nuture love of country and

region, respect for Japanese culture and traditions" as an important means to achieve this ideal

state.[575]   Although not packaging related themes into a single national vision, Koizumi

[573] Obuchi Keizō, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, August 7, 1998; Obuchi Keizō, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January 19, 1999. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
[574] One of the likely precursors of Abe Shinzō's "Beautiful Country" conception, this somewhat vague vision added environmental protection and the fostering of creativity to many of the traditional concerns of the organic state narrative.   Mori Yoshirō, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, April 7, 2000. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).
[575] Mori Yoshirō, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, July 28,

continued the call for "educational reforms to foster human resources capable of making a new country toward which Japanese can feel pride and self-awareness."[576] He also joined Mori in endorsing a major revision of the Fundamental Law on Education to accomplish this lofty goal.[577]

Delivered largely by party leader Hatoyama Yukio, the DPJ addresses during this period at first explicitly endorsed the call for more "love of country" (*aikokushin*) in response to Obuchi.[578] However, Hatoyama soon turned critical of Mori's plans for educational reform, arguing that the problems of Japanese children cannot be resolved by "forcing morality and knowledge on them, destroying education aimed at fostering independence and harmonious co-existence."[579] He then went on to advocate educational decentralization, which would give more autonomy to localities to determine the curriculum, an approach far at odds with Mori's appeal to a single vision of national unity.[580] Thus, although the new center-left DPJ began the period by breaking with the old leftist opposition's stance against calls for increasing patriotism

2000; Mori Yoshirō, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January 31, 2000. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).

[576] Koizumi Junichirō, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, May 7, 2001. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).

[577] Koizumi Junichirō, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, May 7, 2001; Mori Yoshirō, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, July 28, 2000. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).

[578] Hatoyama Yukio, Democratic Party of Japan, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January 28, 2000. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).

[579] Hatoyama Yukio, Democratic Party of Japan, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January 31, 2001. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).

[580] Hatoyama Yukio, Democratic Party of Japan, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, January 31, 2001. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).

and instituting moral education, it soon returned to time-worn modes of resisting the conservative majority. If an example of the "alternating champions" hypothesis at work, it appears to be the variant in which conservative proponents select the wrong champion, and are thus unable to use it to expand the overall appeal of the narrative. Although the narrative's prominence did increase by nearly 39% in the next five-year period, it remained far below (only 52%) its average for the entire period. In addition, the relative frequency of the traditional values claim fell below 50%, and no new champion emerged during this period.

A final possible source of prominence support emerges from the organic state narrative's complex relationship with the peace state narrative. Table 7.9 below lists the largest correlations between the organic state narrative and the other narratives in various measures such as prominence, positive (non-negative) references, and negative references (where relevant).

Table 7.9: Correlations with Organic State Narrative, Various Measures

Narrative	Entire Period
Trading State	0.608*
Trading State (Positive)	0.574
Trading State (Negative)	-.299
Peace State	0.567
Peace State (Positive)	0.575
Peace State (Negative)	0.823**
Democratic State	0.686*
Democratic State (Positive)	0.688*

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Although the organic state narrative is less correlated with the peace state narrative than the trading and democratic state narratives in terms of changes over time in overall prominence (and in positive references in the case of the democratic state narrative), it is correlated with the peace state narrative to a much higher degree in negative references. This means that both narratives tend to face increases and decreases in contestation at the same times and in the same proportions. One possible explanation for this relationship suggests itself immediately: supporters of the organic state narrative overlap to a significant degree with opponents of the peace state narrative and vice versa. In this way, although the two narratives are not positioned as counter-narratives contesting for supremacy within the same domain, contestation over one leads to contestation over the other in a similar dynamic to that of narrative and counter-narrative. For example, Prime Minister Nakasone was both a prominent supporter of many elements of the organic state narrative, including claims in support of the homogenous nation view as well as official visits to Yasukuni shrine. However, he was also a well-known critic of some aspects of the peace state narrative such as the normative claims related to 1% ceiling on defense spending and the arms export ban. In the period 1983-1986, when Nakasone delivered all of the prime ministerial addresses, his use of peace state rhetoric generated only about 21% of its positive references, but 50% of its negative ones. It is thus not surprising that the overlap in his

opposition to the peace state narrative and his advocacy of the organic state narrative encouraged attacks on the latter by supporters of the former, especially in the JSP.

Table 7.10 captures this dynamic and some evidence of its change over two periods, 1958-1992, when the prime minister's office was continuously held by the LDP and the largest opposition party was the leftist JSP, and 1998-2007, when the prime minister again hailed from the LDP, but the largest opposition was the center-left DPJ.

Table 7.10: Organic & Peace State Narratives by Sources, Two Periods

Source	1958-1992	1998-2007
	Peace	Peace
LDP P.M. (Positive)	15%	36%
JSP/DPJ (Positive)	70%	50%
Editorialists (Positive)	15%	14%
	Peace	Peace
LDP P.M. (Negative)	25%	17%
JSP/DPJ (Negative)	0%	13%
Editorialists (Negative)	75%	70%
	Organic	Organic
LDP P.M. (Positive)	54%	53%
JSP/DPJ (Positive)	30%	31%
Editorialists (Positive)	16%	16%
	Organic	Organic
LDP P.M. (Negative)	0%	0%
JSP/DPJ (Negative)	50%	80%
Editorialists (Negative)	50%	20%

These results are consistent with the dynamic described above for the first period. The LDP prime ministers' speeches generate both the majority of positive references to the organic

340

state narrative and a significant percentage of negative references to the peace state narrative, while the JSP opposition produces the majority of positive references to the peace state narrative as well as half of the negative references to the organic state narrative. In addition, neither ventures a single negative comment regarding their favored narrative. Considered as a control, the editorialists generated commentary responsible for roughly the same percentages of positive and negative references for both narratives.

In the second period, however, the results are less consistent with this overlap dynamic. Although the LDP and now DPJ opposition are still responsible for more of the positive references to the organic and peace state narratives, respectively, than any other sources, the DPJ leaders actually generate nearly as many negative references to the peace state narrative as the LDP prime ministers and produce only a simple majority of the positive references to that narrative. The situation of the organic state narrative, however, changes very little, and the control editorialists contribute the same percentage of positive comments and significant portions of the negative ones, although considerably less so with regard to the organic state narrative. The overlap is thus still noticeable but its contours are far less clear than in the previous period.

Despite a blurring of the picture over time, the above analysis provides support for the presence of a dynamic that correlates the negative references of the peace and organic state

narratives due to an overlap between the enemies of one and the supporters of the other. It thus seems likely that this dynamic is partially responsible for the continued persistence of the organic state narrative at low levels of prominence. On the one hand, its adversarial relationship with the much more prominent peace state narrative certainly generated additional negative references from peace state advocates than might otherwise have occurred. This likely served to limit the appeal of the organic state narrative over time, boxing it into a low prominence trajectory. On the other hand, however, these attacks, in addition to inviting counter claims against the peace state narrative, also likely encouraged at least some additional positive references to the organic state narrative in the form of perpetuating strategies. In this way, although grounded in conflict, it seems possible that this overlap dynamic has served as a stabilizing force for the narrative's prominence at low levels.

Having specified multiple mechanisms likely to have contributed to the organic state narrative's peculiar pattern of stability and endurance, this section concludes by considering how changes over the post-Cold War period may affect the narrative's future prospects.

First, although certain institutional incentives seem likely to have reinforced a particular pattern of support and opposition to the organic state narrative with regard to the occupants of the two political positions, there is some question about whether this will continue in the future. Since the period examined here, the DPJ achieved a change of government for the first time in its

existence. Although the data above include two five-year blocks, 1952-1957 & 1993-1997, in which shifting electoral winds switched the positions of left and right with regard to control of either the opposition leader or the prime minister position, the former is the chaotic first few years following the end of occupation and the latter includes a left-right coalition that no doubt muddies the results. Whether the institutional incentives of the past will continue to operate in the same way following the forming of the first DPJ government in 2009 is thus an open question.

Similarly, with conservatives now in opposition, will the "alternating champions" strategy continue to work? In addition to the fact that there was no such champion apparent in the period 2003-2007, there are other reasons to doubt this strategy's continued viability. First, as noted in the second section, the organic state narrative is undergoing a process of partial transformation that has seen two of its normative claims decline in prominence.[581] Table 7.11 shows the average values for the relative frequencies and levels of contestation for the contested norms over the periods 1978-1992 and 1993-2007.

---

[581] Between the last two five-year periods in the study, the call to support Yasukuni shrine declined in prominence by more than 45% and the call to enforce traditional values fell by more than 17%,

Table 7.11: Contested Normative Components, Organic State Narrative, 1978-2007

Organic State Normative Component	Average (1978-1992)	Average (1993-2007)
Support Yasukuni (% Negative)	0.0% (11.9%)	43.6% (11.9%)
Support Yasukuni (Relative Frequency)	21.0% (11.7%)	18.4% (11.7%)
Enforce Traditional Values (% Negative)	0.0% (2.9%)	4.3% (2.9%)
Enforce Traditional Values (Relative Frequency)	15.3% (30.4%)	49.0% (30.4%)

Numbers in parenthesis are average values for the eleven five-year blocks.

Both norms experienced below-average contestation in the first period, but encountered above-average contestation in the more recent period. In the face of this, the relative frequency of the Yasukuni claim declined slightly but remained above average, while the same measure for the traditional values claim increased by more than three-fold against a far milder level of contestation. Despite this relatively strong performance, the fact of ongoing contestation makes both unsuitable to be the next champion.

Could one of the narrative's uncontested components serve as the next champion? Ruling out national polity due to its past record, only the imperial and ethno-nationalist claims remain. Of the two, the emperor seems the most likely, as he finished the study with an

above-average relative frequency and was uncontested for the entire period. In addition, since the largest boom in the prominence of this component occurred during the last imperial succession (1988-1992), it seems particularly well-suited with the next succession likely on the near-term horizon.

In contrast to the emperor, the ethno-nationalist claim experienced a steep decline relative to the other elements of the narrative after its period of ascendancy. Between 1993 and 2007, its relative frequency never amounted to more than 3.2% and ethno-nationalist rhetoric was completely absent in two of these last three five-year blocks. Although it did not face significant challenge in the Diet inaugural ceremony, this key cognitive claim did prove extremely controversial outside of it, as the sharply negative response engendered by Prime Minister Nakasone's use of homogenous nation rhetoric demonstrated in Chapter Four.[582] In addition, other findings from the content analysis point to signs that the severe decline may be irreversible. First, as Chart 7.6 shows, on a comparable basis, the number of positive (non-negative) references to domestic ethnic minority groups, such as the Ainu, exceeded those claiming Japan to be a homogenous nation-state in the period 1988-1992 and remained higher afterward as the latter claim fell to postwar lows.

---

[582] Although coders did not code any negatively-valued references to this claim, the author believes there were in fact two cases in which JSP officials were critical of this notion in their responses to Diet inaugural speeches by Nakasone. See Tanabe Makoto, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, September 12, 1983; Okada Toriharu, Japan Socialist Party, Diet Inaugural (General Session), House of Representatives, July 8, 1987. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (August 17, 2012).

Chart 7.6: Positive Responses, Japanese Ethnicity and Domestic Minorities, 1952*-2007


Unit: Positive refernces per 100 sentences

In addition, as Chart 7.7 makes clear, the overwhelmingly dominant term of address for

the Japanese people used by participants in the Diet inaugural ceremony is "citizens" (*kokumin*),

a word that Kevin Doak has argued distinguishes the civic or political alternative to ethnic

conceptions of the nation in Japanese nationalism.[583]   Combining these findings with the near

zeroing out of references to cognitive claims of ethnic homogeneity and Japan's status as an

ethno-nation-state in the last years of the study leads to a somewhat surprising conclusion: ethnic

conceptions linking the nation and the state are currently in eclipse in Japanese nationalist

discourse.[584]   Whether this situation will change in the future is uncertain.   Given the lack of

open contestation in the Diet inaugual ceremony, it is certainly possible that a new emphasis will

---

[583] Doak, 2007.
[584] It should be noted that not a single prime minister referred to this claim in the years from 1988 to 2007.

be placed on ethno-nationalist conceptions as a reaction to this decline, but, for the time being, it

seems unlikely that the organic state narrative will be able to depend on such claims to maintain

its prominence in the nationalist discourse. Although the consequences of this development

will be considered more fully in the next chapter, it should be noted that this claim had the

highest relative frequency over the period of the study and thus supporters of the organic state

narrative will be hard pressed to find ways to make up for its reduced contribution.

Chart 7.7: Positive Responses, Japanese as Ethnicity and Citizenship, 1968-2007

Unit: Positive refernces per 100 sentences

Finally, the partial breakdown in the overlap dynamic that likely played a major role in

correlating the negative references of the organic and peace state narratives apparent in Table

7.10 above does not bode well for the prospects of this mechanism continuing to sustain the

former narrative. Thus, although the imperial institution may have the capacity to serve as a

primary carrier going forward, there seems little on the horizon to indicate an improvement in

the long-standing pattern of low prominence and much to point to increased instability for this

narrative in the years to come.

Chapter Eight: Narrating Politics

[N]arratives are the lifeblood of politics.[585]

Mark McBeth, et al., 2007

I. Introduction

This study has examined nationalism in postwar Japan by focusing on a single, albeit essential, dimension of the broader phenomenon: nationalist discourse among political elites. This approach differs from treatments of the subject that limit the discussion to right-wing nationalism and then examine changes in the tactics and capabilities of conservative social action groups or the writings of conservative intellectuals.[586] Although important and legitimate subjects of study, these actors influence the overall nationalist discourse from positions outside elected national office and often advance nation-state visions that are far outside the range of debate among political elites. In contrast, this study has attempted to specify that range, measure changes within it, and then assess the meaning and causes of these changes, all the while eschewing the narrow focus on rightwing nationalism. The overarching goal has been to gain a sharper understanding of how the political uses of nationalism, in the form of a particular set of nation-state narratives, have changed over time.

---

[585] McBeth, et al., 2007, p.88.
[586] Winkler, 2011; Morris, 1960.

Such an investigation, however, is incomplete without considering how nation-state narratives have influenced political and policy outcomes. Earlier discussion has shown that reformers seeking to make changes in institutions associated with these narratives have so far avoided direct challenges and instead developed rhetorical strategies that contested specific narrative components or attempted to show how favored reforms were in fact consistent with the overall narrative. Although the endurance of these narratives, the absence of direct challenges to them, and the amount of time and energy devoted by reformers to developing and deploying rhetorical strategies to navigate around or reformulate narrative claims may all be interpreted as indicators of the importance of narratives in policy debates, what exactly are their impacts on political and policy outcomes? More specifically, how has the existence of these nation-state narratives influenced changes in the state institutions with which they are associated? This chapter considers this question in two cases and concludes that narratives did have important impacts on the courses of the institutional changes observed in them.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section develops a framework for thinking about how narratives can shape institutional reforms. This includes considering the limitations narratives place on the ability of political elites to advance certain arguments, the capacity of narratives as tools to rally public opinion in favor of a particular institutional reform, and their role in facilitating coordination among political elites, especially under conditions of uncertainty.

The third section examines the role of the democratic state narrative in the political reform drive of the 1990s that produced a major change in Japan's electoral institutions. The analysis concludes that the wide-spread use of the democratic state narrative by all parties in the debate made it difficult to pursue less democratic solutions, rallied public support in favor of a large-scale reform that deepened Japanese democracy, and helped unite political elites around this reform despite that fact that it ran counter their own electoral incentives.

The fourth section considers the case of a single narrative component, the claim of ethno-national homogeneity of the organic state narrative, which has started to vanish from the lexicon of political elites. Focusing on reform in Japan's immigration institutions, the analysis finds that despite the waning use of this cognitive claim and growing pressure for more liberal immigration policies, it nonetheless continues to limit the scope of institutional reforms. This somewhat surprising result is likely due to the failure of political elites advocating reform to forcefully contest the claim or to offer alternative means of cognition. The final section summarizes the findings of the chapter.

II. Narratives and Institutional Reform

Viewed purely as rhetoric, nation-state narratives, like all public narratives, can serve as rhetorical resources or obstacles, depending on the perspective and intentions of the individual

participant in this discourse. Once having attained high levels of prominence and consensus, they are immediately available both for the construction of emotive perpetuating strategies to counter proposals to reform institutions associated with their normative components as well as material that would-be reformers can refashion to create arguments for limited changes in these same institutions. Such narratives can also become targets of scorn and derision for those seeking their comprehensive transformation in favor of counter-narratives and major institutional overhauls. The accounts of changes in narratives in the previous two chapters have provided examples of most of these types of rhetorical action. But how exactly do rhetorical moves translate into institutional changes? Constructing a framework to show how the nation-state narratives studied here shape institutional change requires synthesizing the literature on the use of narratives in politics with debates over the importance of elite rhetoric and public opinion in policy-making.

Those who argue that narratives deeply affect politics generally start with the claim that narratives are essential guides to social action because they contain elements that guide perception and memory, help one interpret experiences, generate inferences and expectations, and organize action.[587] Specifically, Molly Patterson and Kristen Monroe locate the

---

[587] See for example, Somers (1994) on how narratives are essential guides to social action; Brubaker (2004a) on how "schema" guide perception and memory, help one interpret experiences, generate inferences and expectations, and organize action; Patterson & Monroe (1998) on how narratives shape politics in fundamental ways; Cruz (2000, 2005) on how dominant discursive frames can have causal impacts on policy-making.

significance of narratives for politics in their capacity to help one understand oneself as a "political being" as well as their role in the "construction of political behavior."[588]   In this way, narratives are treated as a tool of cognition that political actors rely on to interpret policy situations and formulate policy preferences.   Narratives can thus affect policy debates (and their outcomes) by helping participants arrive at preferences for what should be done.   Accordingly, narratives are argued to be particularly important in policy debates in which there are high levels of uncertainty regarding what the problem is and/or what will likely be the consequences of various proposed policy changes.[589]

Others find the power of the narrative in politics results from its usefulness as a tool of persuasion.   For example, Sanford Schram and Philip Neisser describe the role of narratives in politics and policy-making as follows:

> Political actors use stories as scripts for engaging in political performances, from lobbying to policy formulation, from mass mobilization to posturing by political leadership. And since it is almost always the case that more than one story can be told to make sense of any particular areas of concern or issue, stories are necessarily not innocuous and disinterested but instead are potentially dangerous and interested. They are critically constitutive elements in shaping political practice and public policy.[590]

Here, stories or narratives are depicted largely as tools of persuasion -- for lobbying fellow elites and mobilizing the public around a particular policy framework -- and the choice of story is

---

[588] Patterson & Monroe, 1998, pp.315-316.
[589] Roe, 1994.
[590] Schram & Phillips, ed., 1997, p.6.

argued to be critical to determining the outcome of the policy debate. Approaches to narratives emphasizing this aspect thus tend to focus on whether there is a "dominant" narrative relevant to the policy problem at hand or whether multiple, competing narratives are available to make the case for different policy approaches.[591] They also argue that the type of political or policy problem involved can be significant in determining the impact of narratives on policy outcomes. In particular, resolutions to policy problems that involve "foundational issues," such as the meanings of key historical events or the "basic ideas and values that guide political communities," are considered most likely to be shaped by narratives because debates over such problems are resistant to the appeals to rationality or science and do not require extensive background knowledge to be understood by either political elites or voting publics.[592]

Research on the relationship between elite rhetoric and public opinion is also relevant to the question of how narratives shape politics. Over the last twenty years, researchers in this area have variously argued that elite discourse and messaging is the dominant factor in public opinion formation, that elite rhetoric has virtually no impact on the policy preferences of the public, and that the relationship is complex and reciprocal.[593] In practice, there are cases in which elites

---

[591] Cruz, 2000, 2005; Bridgman & Barry, 2002; Roe, 1989, 1994.

[592] Art, 2006. See also the discussion of narratives and "wicked problems" (originally coined in Rittle & Webber, 1973) in Mcbeth, et al. (2007).

[593] For the view that elite discourse dominates public opinion, see Zaller, 1992; for the view that elite rhetoric has little impact on public opinion, see Edwards, 2003; for the view that a reciprocal relationship exists, see Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000.

drive public opinion, cases in which elites primarily respond to public opinion, and cases where both occur in some kind of sequence.[594]

As noted in Chapter Three, scholarship on nationalism argues that political elites play leading roles in shaping popular understandings of nationalism, especially in contemporary democracies like postwar Japan. However, this view need not devolve into the crude claim that elites completely dominate public opinion. As even John Zaller notes, the way individual members of the public react to a particular political message is partly a result of their store of "political predispositions, especially values."[595] As these predispositions are accumulated over the course of many years, they are not easily changed by countervailing messages in the course of a single policy debate.[596] Thus, although elite discourse as a whole may chart the course of public opinion on policy matters over the long term, elites are likely to shape their rhetoric in particular policy debates to avoid unnecessarily running afoul of popular predispositions so as to maximize its capacity to mobilize the public around their favored problem-framings and policy proposals. This is even more likely in debates over reforming institutions associated with value-laden popular understandings of the nation and its proper relationship with the state.[597]

---

[594] Schildkraut, 2002, p.518.
[595] Zaller, 1992, p.267.
[596] Edwards, 2009, p.64.
[597] Schildkraut (2002, pp.517-519) makes a similar point about nationalism generally.

The above discussion yields a rough framework for how nation-state narratives can affect institutional change. Viewed as dominant rhetorical frames in particular policy domains, nation-state narratives can place cognitive limits on the participants in policy debates who use them. First, they can limit the field of imaginable possibilities or the "array of plausible scenarios of how the world can or cannot be changed and how the future ought to look," which necessarily limits the range of potential institutional reform proposals.[598] For example, as will be seen below, politicians utilizing the democratic state narrative in a debate over reforming electoral institutions were simply unable to conceive and advance overtly anti-democratic policy proposals. Second, as tools of persuasion, nation-state narratives limit the choice of rhetorical strategies "on the basis of their presumptive realism and normative sway."[599] Although it is possible to directly challenge a nation-state narrative, once one has decided to work within its confines, there are limitations to the degree to which it may be molded to fit particular policy positions, notwithstanding the immense creativity of political elites. This can have real impacts on the specific form of institutional changes. For example, it was only even possible for Koizumi to justify the SDF deployment to Iraq on peace state grounds by citing geographic and weapons-use restrictions and emphasizing its humanitarian and peace-building goals. Without incorporating such restrictions and goals into the mission, he would have had to challenge the

---

[598] Cruz, 2000, pp.277-278.
[599] Ibid., pp.276-277.

peace state narrative directly.[600]   In this way, the most obvious effect of narratives on institutional change are the constraints their rhetorical conventions place on the range and specifics of the policy proposals that can be offered by policy-makers seeking to work within their cognitive and normative limits.

A second means by which narratives can shape institutional change are their capacities to facilitate cooperation among political elites.   Although this can take different forms, such as allowing members of different political parties to conceive of a particular policy issue in similar ways, the general point here is that once different participants in a policy debate utilize the same nation-state narrative in support of their framings of the problem and suggested solutions, they have a established common set of linguistic conventions with which to discuss the problem and a common set of cognitive and normative claims with which to legitimate suggested solutions. This naturally builds momentum towards compromise over the specifics of the final institutional reform.   An example of this effect at work will be offered in the next section.

Finally, narratives shape institutional change through their capacities to mobilize the public around particular reform drives.   Although there are likely limits to the specificity (i.e. "tightness-of-fit") with which a nation-state narrative can be linked with a particular proposal for institutional change, skilled elites can use prominent and long-established narratives to legitimate

---

[600] It would not have been possible, for example, for Koizumi to have advanced an argument to the effect that "even when not under direct threat, a peace state should sometimes go to war."

their favored direction for institutional reforms and gain public support both for themselves and their proposals. In a system of even minimal democratic accountability, nation-state narratives can thus be opportune means for political elites to get a majority of the public to view a favored institutional change as consistent with their predispositions, in this case their shared understanding of the proper relationship between the nation and its state.

Final aspects of this framework involve the conditions under which narratives are most likely to affect institutional outcomes. First, it is argued that narratives, as important tools of cognition, are more likely to have a decisive role in debates over institutional change in which there is a large amount of uncertainty about the nature of the problem, the ultimate consequences of suggested solutions, or both. Second, as tools of persuasion, nation-state narratives are more likely to be have a meaningful impact on debates over "foundational issues," as these have low-information requirements for participants and inevitably involve issues that touch on sets of predispositions already established among both elites and the public, thus creating a strong incentive for at least one side in a policy debate to deploy a nation-state narrative.

Finally, as researchers in public opinion formation emphasize, the presence or absence of contestation over the relevant policy issue can be the key to explain the public's response to relevant elite discourse.[601] Put more simply, the public is more likely to accept a single

---

[601] Zaller, 1992. Interestingly, Roe's narrative policy analysis approach also turns heavily on the presence or

political message when elites offer it in unison than when different elites offer competing

messages. Translated to the framework developed here, this means that a nation-state narrative

is more likely to prove effective at garnering public support for institutional reform drives when

it is deployed by all major elites in the debate over how exactly institutions should be changed.

In this situation, the use of nation-state narratives can create public pressure for change in

general and support for those elites who are most vociferous in their calls for reform, whatever

the specifics of their favored proposals.[602]

Assessing the impact of nation-state narratives on policy-making is a notoriously tricky

endeavor.[603] The approach adopted here has three steps. First, a debate over a specific

institutional reform is examined to see if the outcomes are consistent with narrative claims.

---

absence of contestation (in the form of counter-narratives). Roe, 1994.

[602] The framework utilized here is thus similar to the one suggested by Kuklinski & Segura (1995). Based on a review of the literature on elite rhetoric and public opinion formation, they develop a sequenced and dynamic model of opinion formation and outcome determination in which policy-makers deploy messages that present their favored policy outcomes as consistent with their estimation of the preferences of their constituencies, the public reacts to this messaging by forming preferences regarding the various policy options and communicating them back to policy-makers (via opinion polls, etc.) in a dynamic process that may repeat before a final legislative vote is taken. However, underneath this short-run dynamism is a stable distribution of predispositions among the public ("the public mood") that policy-makers know they cannot change in the short-run and also take into account as they craft their messages. Political elites thus design their messages both to take into account short-run determinants of how their audience will react (level of political awareness, i.e. level of factual knowledge about present political matters, etc.) and long-run determinants (political predispositions or values). While the former can vary over time and issues and even by changed by political messaging, the latter is more stable and resistant to change. Kuklinski & Segura thus argue that some aspects of public opinion formation are endogenous to the particular policy debate at hand while others are exogenous. In such an opinion environment, nation-state narratives appear to be particularly useful tools for persuasive communication as highly prominent ones can be adapted to favor specific policy positions in reasoned appeals to the highly politically aware while also resonating with the predispositions of both the politically aware and the less engaged to build popular support.

[603] Two caveats are in order here. First, the enterprise of this chapter is to assess the plausibility of the notion that nation-state narratives and their components have had meaningful impacts on change in state institutions. A systematic investigation of this connection would require far more than the pages devoted to it here. Second, while a narrative can influence institutional outcomes, the extent of that influence varies and determining the precise value of its contribution is beyond difficult. This is because narratives generally both shape and are shaped by fights over the institutions associated with them.

Third, the content of this debate is examined to see if the narrative was actually used as the above framework predicts. This includes consideration of how use of these narratives may have facilitated elite cooperation and shaped public opinion. Finally, alternative explanations are considered to assess how important the role of the narrative was in determining the final institutional outcome.

The cases in this chapter were selected for the following reasons. First, since the democratic state narrative is uncontested and has achieved banal status in the post-Cold War period, one should expect to see its influence on the outcome of a debate over how to make Japanese electoral institutions fairer. This influence should thus be relatively obvious and fairly significant in determining the final institutional configuration. Alternatively, the case of the ethno-national homogeneity claim and immigration reform is a more difficult test. The finding of evidence that this cognitive claim continues to have an impact on policy outcomes even though it is part of a highly contested narrative and has largely ceased to be voiced by political elites at public ceremonies like the Diet inaugural would provide strong support for the assertion that narratives can matter in shaping institutional reforms. Finally, since neither the democratic state narrative nor the ethno-national homogeneity claim are themselves contested here, the impact of the debate on them is considered to be minimal, thus affording a cleaner view of the route from narrative use to institutional outcome.

III. Narrating Democracy and Electoral Reform

The electoral reform of 1994, which significantly reduced the level of malapportionment in the lower house of the Diet, was part of a series of reforms in Japan's democratic institutions, many of which were realized during the first decade of the post-Cold War period. Other achievements of this broader "political reform" (*seiji kaikaku*) movement included campaign finance reform (1994), which set up a system of public financing for national elections, the non-profit organization (NPO) law (1999), which reduced the barriers to establishing civil society organizations recognized by the government, the information disclosure law (1999), which created avenues for citizens to demand more transparency from government agencies, and a number of judicial reforms (2002), including the introduction of a lay judge system, which opened up the judicial process to ordinary citizens in ways never possible before in Japan. Although each of these reforms has been criticized as insufficient, they have combined to form what one scholar has called a "quiet transformation" in which civil society is strengthened, the rule of law is more strongly established, and democracy is deepened.[604]

Among these reforms, Gerald Curtis has called the electoral reform of 1994 "arguably the most far-reaching political reform in Japan since those introduced during the U.S.

---

[604] Kingston, 2011, p.37.

Occupation after the Second World War."[605] Specifically, Curtis refers to the passage of

legislation in 1994 that converted the system used to elect the members of the lower house of the

Diet from a multiple-member district (MMD) system to a mixed system that combines

single-member districts (SMD) and proportional representation (PR). During the course of a

nearly four-year, on-again, off-again debate over electoral reform, the MMD system was, rightly

or wrongly, argued to be a major contributing factor to the corruption, factionalism and

one-party dominance thought to be behind dysfunction in Japanese democratic institutions.[606]

In particular, one-party dominance was linked to the malapportionment of the electoral system in

that the overvaluing of votes in rural areas advantaged the LDP, which was popular in these

areas, thus leading to a natural reluctance on the part of the ruling party to redraw districts.

Although failing to meet the established goal of limiting the maximum ratio of 2 to 1 in

representation per capita differences across districts, the 1994 election law reduced the ratio to

2.32 in 1996 from a high of 4.99 in 1972.[607] Thus, in this and other measures, the 1994 reform

"significantly alleviated the overall level of malapportionment" and thus reformed electoral

---

[605] Curtis, 1999, p.137.

[606] Curtis, 1999, pp.140-145.

[607] Ibid.,p.161. However, malapportionment in the lower house election system has not improved in the years since. In March 2011, the Supreme Court ruled the 2009 lower house election unconstitutional, arguing that the maximum ratio discrepancy of 2.3 violated the constitutionally-guaranteed equality of all voters. As in previous such rulings in 1972, 1980, 1983 and 1990, the Court let the election results stand but ordered that the imbalance be corrected before the next lower house election.

institutions in ways consistent with the democratic state narrative's normative claim to enforce democratic principles at home.[608]

Positions in the debate over how to make Japan's electoral institutions fairer were often justified by references to the democratic state narrative. For example, in a January 1991 Diet inaugural address, Prime Minister Kaifu began his argument for political reform by referencing the narrative:

> I believe we must realize political reform (*seiji kaikaku*) because political and social fairness is the basis of our democratic state (*minshushugi kokka*). Toward this purpose, it is first and foremost necessary to entrench political ethics. Together with this, it is necessary to reform politics and *the electoral system itself* to realize politics and elections in which there is transparency in political funds, party preferences are not based on money, and the focus is on policy.[609]

Two factors stand out regarding the manner in which the democratic state narrative was deployed in the electoral reform debate. First, the narrative was marshaled by nearly all participants in the debate in support of various positions, including ones in opposition to each other. It was thus cited freely both by members of the ruling party or coalition, the opposition and the media, even when they favored different schemes for reforming the lower house electoral system. A review of the transcripts of the Special Committee on Political Reform, the lower house committee charged with considering electoral reform legislation, provides many instances

---

[608] Horiuchi & Saito, 2003, p.672.
[609] Kaifu Toshiaki, Liberal Democratic Party, Diet Inaugural, House of Representatives, January 25, 1991. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (June 17, 2012, emphasis added).

of this broad-based utilization. For example, Hamada Takujirō of the then ruling LDP prefaced

an argument in favor of his party's proposal for a pure SMD system by stating, "it goes without

saying that, as our country is a democratic state (*minshushugi kokka*), we must consider political

reform from the perspective of which political institutions make our democracy function more

efficiently and on a sounder basis."[610] Two months later, Watanabe Ichirō of the Kōmei Party

used the following words to support his party's plan for a mixed SMD and PR system, "I

strongly believe that this [plan] will serve as the spark for a grand change that will make the

existence of Japan as a democratic state (*minshukokka nihon*) known throughout the world."[611]

During the final intraparty negotiations over electoral reform in early 1994, Prime Minister

Hosokawa and LDP president Kōno Yōhei agreed at least on the stakes: "If bills pertaining to

political reform are not passed, it will leave a wound on Japan's parliamentary democracy that

will be difficult to heal."[612] Although this wide-spread use of the same narrative by actors

taking different positions in a policy debate may seem strange at first glance, it should perhaps

not be surprising given that this particular narrative had achieved such long-standing and broad

consensus.

---

[610] Hamada Takujirō, Liberal Democratic Party, Special Commission on Political Reform, House of Representatives, April 16, 1993. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (June 17, 2012).
[611] Watanabe Ichirō, Kōmei Party, Special Commission on Political Reform, House of Representatives, June 18, 1993. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (June 17, 2012).
[612] *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 January 1994.

Second, use of the universalistic variant of the narrative is widely apparent. Thus, rather than justifying particular reform schemes by arguing for its consistency with "Japanese-style democracy," participants in the debate often argued in favor of their preferred reforms by citing the need to bring Japan's democracy in line with those of other countries around the world. This was particularly true for those arguing that the LDP's long one-party dominance was anomalous and needed to be rectified to revitalize Japanese democracy. For example, in October 1993, Ōuchi Keigo, Minister of Health and Welfare in the Hosokawa cabinet, told the political reform committee, "The MMD system's fundamental problem is, as historical fact reveals, its role in perpetuating the LDP's one-party rule for thirty-eight years. As you know, one does not see another example of this in any other advanced democratic state (*senshin minshushugi kokka*)."[613]   Others appealed to the universal variant in support of specific positions in the debate.   In the same committee a month after Ōuchi's statement above, Takaichi Sanae, then a newly-elected independent, characterized the Hosokawa government's call for electoral reform that allowed the realization of "party-based politics" (*seitō honi no seiji*) as "running counter to the direction of history," as "among democratic states that have already

---

[613] Ōuchi Keigo, Japan Socialist Party, Special Commission on Political Reform, House of Representatives, October 20, 1993. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (June 17, 2012).

become economically wealthy, even the United States, a distancing from political parties is occurring, and this is the current tide of the world."[614]

The case of electoral reform features several of the conditions introduced above favoring the use and ultimate effectiveness of nation-state narratives. First, there was considerable uncertainty as to both the relationship between MMD system to the problems of Japan's political system as well as about the eventual consequences of different reform options. With regard to identifying the source of the problems, the culpability of the MMD system was far from clear. As Curtis notes, other countries have corruption, factionalism, and histories of one-party dominance under electoral systems that are not "even remotely similar to Japan's."[615] Still further, the coalition government under Hosokawa Morihiro, which ultimately abolished the MMD system, was elected under it, bringing an end to LDP one-party dominance. In addition, the ultimate effects on both the party system as a whole as well as the electoral fortunes of individual politicians of the different suggested reforms also involved a great deal of uncertainty. As Curtis concludes, although sometimes oversold by political scientists, the causal implications

---

[614] Takaichi Sanae, Independent, Special Commission on Political Reform, House of Representatives, November 5, 1993. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (June 17, 2012).
[615] Curtis, 1999, p.142. For example, Italy has similar problems with corruption and factionalism and Sweden and India have both experience long periods of one-party dominance despite the fact that their electoral systems are very different from Japan's pre-1994 system.

of different electoral configurations are far from definitive, and electoral system specialists are in fact cautious in their claims about the likely consequences of particular voting systems.[616]

Second, as the examples above make clear, reform of the electoral system was not portrayed as a narrowly technical matter but instead as a foundational issue that involved the fundamental principles of the postwar political and social order. In this way, it most likely touched among established sets of political predisposition among the public. To the extent that such predispositions can be measured, opinion polls from around the time indicate strong attachments to the democratic regime among the public.[617] The use of the democratic state narrative and positioning of the issue as a threat to Japanese democracy can thus be expected to force members of the public to react to the elite messaging by considering this basic predisposition.

The wide-spread use of the democratic state narrative by all participants appears to have shaped the electoral reform debate in multiple ways. First, once everyone agreed to operate within the narrative's confines, it foreclosed the possibility of anti-democratic reforms. Whether this agreement resulted from a cognitive limitation placed on imagined possibilities or the need to work within the normative limitations of one's strategically-chosen narrative, the

---

[616] Ibid.,pp.138-139. For example, see Curtis's account of the claims made by Maurice Duverger about the relationship between plurality systems and party dualism.
[617] Fouse, 2002.

367

democratic state narrative appears to have served as an "obstacle of first resort" to potential

anti-democratic agitation from Japan's political elites. To argue for an explicitly

anti-democratic program would have placed considerable communication burdens on potential

advocates, requiring them to contest or in the very least navigate around a nation-state narrative

with a long history of prominence that had not been strongly challenged by political elites in the

past. This would necessitate the development of new rhetorical strategies and/or

counter-narratives and a broad-based effort to convince both other political elites and the

electorate of the legitimacy of this new way of talking about how the nation should relate to the

state.[618]

The extent of such a reactionary threat during this time is debatable, but several factors

make the emergence of a challenge to democracy seem plausible. First, Japan faced a massive

economic downturn at home and a shifting and uncertain power balance abroad. In addition,

conservative intellectuals had been critical of individual elements of the democratic regime

throughout the postwar period, providing the intellectual foundations for such a challenge.[619]

Finally, as the power of a party that had ruled for a generation was seriously threatened for the

---

[618] As witnessed in the case of the peace state narrative in Chapter Six, the process of merely partially transforming a nation-state narrative can require years of continuous engagement and the adoption of multiple strategies before some success is achieved at the institutional level.

[619] For an overview, see Winkler (2011). In recent example, the mathematician and conservative intellectual Fujiwara Masahiko calls for a shift to rule by a highly-educated, self-sacrificing elite in his best-selling *Dignity of a Nation* (Kokka no hinkaku). See Fujiwara (2005, pp.65-94).

first time in decades during this period, it is not unthinkable that anti-democratic sentiments might have found a voice among members of the LDP. Thus, although appeals in the anti-democratic direction were conceivable during this period, the position of the democratic state narrative as a banal form of nationalism served as a frontline obstacle against the advocacy of such a program among political elites.

Second, the fact that both those favoring stronger emphasis on majority rule (SMD) and those arguing from stronger minority protections (PR) legitimized their claims with reference to the democratic state narrative facilitated the development of compromise proposals, particularly within the members of Hosokawa's coalition government. Indeed, in negotiating the formation of that coalition following the 1993 lower house election, Hosokawa had extracted promises from all participating parties to support an electoral reform scheme mixing SMD and PR elements. Although having just achieved an historic electoral victory under the old MMD system, participating parties nonetheless agreed to put that system's replacement on the top of the new coalition government's agenda. The compromise plan served to unite the new coalition partners, allowing them to differentiate themselves from the LDP opposition. In fact, once electoral reform passed the Diet, policy differences and personal rivalries quickly rose to the surface, exposing the fragility of Hosokawa's soon-to-be short-lived government.[620] Thus,

---

[620] Curtis, 1999, p.116.

to the extent the democratic state narrative facilitated compromise among the coalition partners over how to go about reforming the electoral system, it also played a role in briefly sustaining the first non-LDP government in nearly forty years.

Third, the democratic state narrative's ready availability as a means of legitimatizing proposals for electoral reform of differing types provided political elites a common reference point from which to criticize the MMD system. Once the MMD system was declared by opposition parties, ruling parties and the media alike to be antithetical to Japan's democratic essence, its wholesale replacement, rather than a less dramatic reform such as the redrawing of district boundaries to correct apportionment imbalances, became the only legitimate form of resolution. In this way, the wide-spread use of the democratic state narrative by differently-situated participants in the electoral reform debate served to focus popular opinion on the need to replace the MMD system in its entirety and thus limited the range of reforms that could be considered legitimate. This effect can be seen in public opinion polling from the period. Although the public was initially skeptical about the importance of overhauling the electoral system, they came to support eliminating the MMD system only after having been exposed to elite discourse the uniformly invoked the democratic state narrative to justify a variety of reform packages, all of which abolished the MMD system.[621]   In addition, the public

---

[621] For example, although questions and answer choices are not consistent across polls, support for reforming the

began to link their support for the prime minister with their evaluation of his record in advancing

political reform, especially over the course of the Miyazawa and Hosokawa governments, when

critical debates took place over the issue.[622] Thus, although the shift in the public's views

appears consistent with elite-driven models of public opinion formation, as the debate over

electoral reform dragged on, the public began to demand that political elites deliver on their

rhetoric, thus placing pressure on them to achieve reform.

Perhaps the best evidence in favor of the claim that the democratic state narrative

influenced the outcome of the electoral reform debate is an evaluation of the obvious alternative

explanation.   If politics really is driven purely by "interests and power" rather than processes of

deliberation, then one should clearly observe these factors at work behind reapportionment or

redistricting changes.[623]   In fact, one of the most common explanations for the specific forms

resulting from such reforms is that incumbents or parties in control of the reapportionment

process design electoral institutions to their advantage.[624]   Although various institutional checks

(court oversight, constraints due to structures of other levels of government, etc.) can limit the

---

MMD system grew from 13% under Kaifu to 42% under Miyazawa to a majority 53% shortly after the Hosokawa government took office.   See *Asahi Shimbun*, 2 April 1990; 12 March 1992; 9 September 1993.

[622] Miyazawa and Hosokawa were mirror opposites in this regard.   In March 1992, 33% approved of the Miyazawa government and 56% disapproved but only 3% listed political reform as the Miyazawa government's best point while 15% listed it as its worst point.   In April 1993, these figures had changed little (Approval/Disapproval: 26%/56%; Political Reform Best/Worst Point: 4%/12%).   In November 1993, 70% approved of the Hosokawa government and 12% disapproved but 18% listed political reform as the Hosokawa government's best point while only 3% listed it as its worst point.   As the electoral reform debate approached a climax in December 1993, these figures had changed little (Approval/Disapproval: 60%/21%; Political Reform Best/Worst Point: 17%/4%). See *Asahi Shimbun*, 11 March 1992; 28 April 1993; 10 November 1993; 22 December 1993.

[623] Shapiro, 1999.

[624] Cox & Katz, 1999; Lyons & Galderisi, 1995.

incumbent or partisan bias of new electoral designs, incumbents and parties in powers are generally argued to have strong incentives to use redistricting as a means to perpetuate their time in office or their majorities in the legislative branch.

What is interesting about the electoral reform of 1994 is that this common explanation falls flat whether one looks at initial electoral incentives, the redistricting process or the eventual partisan outcomes in future elections. First, as Curtis notes in his careful account of this debate: "One thing is quite clear: most party leaders and backbench members of the Diet who voted for electoral reform did not do so because they thought it would improve their own or their party's election prospects."[625] JSP members believed that their electoral interests would best be served in the old MMD system, while members of small parties within Hosokawa's coalition government (e.g. Japan New Party, Democratic Socialist Party, Sakigake, Kōmei Party, etc.) knew that the introduction of the new mixed system would place pressure on them "to merge into a larger party with uncertain consequence for their members."[626] In addition, Curtis notes that LDP Diet members also did not see the new system as in their interests, as it would require them to review election campaign strategies with uncertain results.[627]

---

[625] Curtis, 1999, p.139.
[626] Ibid.
[627] Ibid.

Second, despite the fact that politicians in the governing coalition and LDP drafted and passed the law creating the new electoral system, the responsibility of actually redrawing district lines was ceded to a non-partisan commission of academics, former bureaucrats and a journalist. Although the commission was ultimately unable to redraw districts in accordance with the law's requirement limit the maximum difference to 2 to 1, this was due to technical difficulties in meeting all the districting conditions in the new law (such as having at least one district per prefecture, avoiding districts that cross prefectural lines, etc.) rather than as a result of political interference.[628] New district lines were finalized as "an administrative chore, undertaking by experts in the Ministry of Home Affairs."[629]

Finally, viewed from perspective of future electoral outcomes, particularly for the parties of the Hosokawa coalition government, it is difficult to see how this reform proved advantageous. In the first election under the new mixed system in 1996, the JSP was nearly wiped out, winning only a combined 15 seats down from 70 in the last election under the old MMD system. In addition, the only small party from the Hosokawa coalition that was still independent at the time of this election, Sakigake, was also nearly eliminated from the Diet. The remaining small parties had merged into the new opposition Shinshintō, which although

---

[628] Ibid., p.161.
[629] Ibid.

coming in second behind the LDP in 1996, proved a short-lived experiment, dissolving before the end of 1997.

Curtis's seminal analysis of the legislative process that produced the 1994 electoral reform, while not mentioning narratives directly, nonetheless agrees in substantial ways with the above account of the democratic state narrative's impact. For example, he emphasizes that the "political mood" at the time "was not conducive to rational arguments" about electoral reform options.[630] He also notes the emergence of a broad consensus among political elites identifying the MMD system as the problem and favoring its complete replacement.[631] By 1993, he argues that the "popular mood" had solidified in favor of complete overhaul, "robb[ing] the medium-size-district system of legitimacy and mak[ing] electoral reform unavoidable."[632] He concludes that the assertion that the problems plaguing Japan's democracy could only be resolved by comprehensively reforming electoral institutions "was transformed from a debatable thesis to a commonly embraced assumption" during the course of this debate.[633] It is argued here that these shifts in political and popular moods, the loss of legitimacy of existing electoral institutions and the general acceptance of claims about capacity of comprehensive electoral reforms to resolve the problems of Japanese democracy are all consistent with the expected

---

[630] Ibid., p.144.
[631] Ibid..
[632] Ibid.
[633] Ibid., p.145.

impact of the broad use by political elites of the democratic state narrative, an uncontested narrative with a long history of prominence.

IV. Cognitive Limitations, Ethnicity and Immigration Reform

The organic state narrative provides a case of a narrative undergoing transformation in which one previously widely-referenced cognitive component, the claim of ethno-national homogeneity, nearly disappears from the Diet inaugural ceremony following the end of the Cold War. In addition, positive references (and thus the acknowledgment of the existence of) domestic minorities came to exceed ethno-national claims during this period. However, it is important to note that the ethno-national claim did not face significant contestation during this, or any other period, in the study.[634] In this way, although the claim became gradually deemphasized in presentations of the organic state narrative, this cannot be easily attributed to the emergence of a strong opposition to and rejection of the claim among political elites.

What does this unusual combination of disuse in the absence of contestation mean for the impact of this important cognitive component on the institutions and policies associated with it? More specifically, this section considers how changes observed in the uses of the ethno-national claim relate to two recent reforms in immigration institutions and whether this

---

[634] See Chapter Seven for more details on this point.

pattern differs from that observed in the narrative-institution relationship of the democratic state

narratives in the previous section.[635]

In the period between 2004 and 2008, the Diet debated and eventually approved

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the Philippines and Indonesia that offered nurses

and elderly caregivers from those countries the chance ply their trades in Japan pending the

passing of a qualifying exam.   Examining these debates is useful to see how the declining use

of claims of ethno-national unity may have influenced immigration policy.   However, in order

to understand the significance of these debates and the resulting institutional changes, a brief

overview of Japan's immigration and citizenship policies is necessary.

Japan maintains one of the more restrictive immigration and citizenship regimes among

the OECD countries.   For example, Japan's policy of automatically granting citizenship only to

the children of Japanese citizens places it among OECD countries with the strictest citizenship

requirements, including Austria, Greece, and Italy.   Second, the rate at which foreign residents

in Japan seek to become Japanese citizens is extremely low, with only Luxembourg having a

lower rate.   Finally, Japan's immigration and citizenship policies stand out in two ways: They

have produced one of the smallest immigrant populations as percentage of total population (less

---

[635] It should be noted that establishing a strong connection between narrative and institutional change in this case is far more difficult due to the lack of explicit references to the key narrative claim and thus the resulting conclusions, although counter to the initial expectations of the author, are necessarily more speculative.

than 2%) in the OECD and have made Japan the only OECD country working to incorporate

fourth-generation immigrants, who are mostly composed of families of Korean immigrants

(*zainichi*) originally brought to Japan before the end of World War Two.[636]

In addition to the above background, an important demographic reality needs

highlighting. Due to a persistently low birthrate, demographic change has seen the Japan's

working-age population on the decline since 1995, thus creating pressure to import workers in

ever larger numbers. In fact, Japan had already faced labor shortages, initially among unskilled

positions, since the early 1990s.[637] According to a UN report issued in 2000, in order to

maintain the working-age population at its peak size (1995), Japan would need to welcome an

average of more than 600,000 new immigrants per year through 2050, at which time these

immigrants and their descendants would represent roughly 30% of the total population.[638] That

same year, an advisory council to the Obuchi administration released a report calling for "an

immigration policy that will make foreigners want to live and work in Japan" and setting the

goal of "achieving greater ethnic diversity within Japan."[639] Early into the post-Cold War era,

---

[636] Chung, 2010, pp.32-53.
[637] Kingston, 2011, p.172. The population did in fact begin to decline in 2005 as predicted.
[638] United Nations Population Division, 2000, "Japan: Scenario IV." Accessed at:
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/migration.html (August 6, 2012).
[639] Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, 2000, Chapter 1. Accessed at:
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/21century/report/htmls/index.html (Accessed June 24, 2012).

the stage was thus set for a debate on the liberalization of Japan's immigration and citizenship

policies.

Judged from the institutional baseline established above as well as the demographic

pressure to open the system further, scholars have generally viewed the changes in Japan's

immigration and citizenship policies over the last two decade as "*ad hoc*, piecemeal."[640]

Despite a series of immigration reforms beginning in the early 1990s that doubled the foreign

resident population in Japan between 1990 and 2008, the overall increase still leaves foreign

residents representing only 1.74 % of the total population, the smallest such figure among all

advanced industrial countries.[641]   The rate of increase is also far below that required to stabilize

the size of the population and workforce.   In other words, despite new and growing pressures to

encourage immigration, one has to acknowledge that "many things have *not* changed over the

past decades."[642]   As Erin Aeran Chung concludes, "Japan's immigration and citizenship

policies have remained largely unchanged since their institutionalization in the early postwar

period."[643]

---

[640] Kingston, 2011, p.183.

[641] Chung, 2010, p.13; Kingston, 2011, pp.166-167. The reforms included a program that encouraged people of Japanese descent (*nikeijin*) to immigrate from South America (mainly Brazil and Peru), the establishment of a practical trainee program that draws most of its applicants from China, and increases in the number of visas granted to Chinese entrepreneurs in response to the surge in trade with China over the period, among other changes. See Kingston, 2011, pp.171-176.

[642] Morris-Suzuki, 2010, p.245 (emphasis in original).

[643] Chung, 2010, p.174.

In stark contrast to these limited changes in immigration policies, it should be noted that

the activism of foreign resident and minority communities already long-established in Japan

brought them increasing visibility with the general public and yielded some solid institutional

and political victories, especially since the 1980s. In particular, *zainichi* Koreans, having

endured decades of social and workplace discrimination, have become the most

politically-effective of the foreign resident and minority groups in Japan.[644]   In what Chung has

called a "noncitizen civil rights movement," *zainichi* Koreans successfully fought discrimination

in the workplace through the courts, expanded their access to the social welfare system, removed

finger-printing requirements for foreign residency, and lobbied for and received special

permanent residency status not predicated on the requirement of eventual naturalization.[645]   In

this way, foreign resident and minority groups already in Japan have mounted a sustained and

visible challenge to the notion of Japan as an ethnically homogenous nation that has grown

increasingly apparent on the national political stage over the last two decades. During this

period, these groups have focused their efforts on a campaign to obtain voting rights in local

elections. Although still an ongoing endeavor, the movement succeeded in gaining the support

of the New Kōmei Party, which submitted legislation in the Diet to allow such rights six times

---

[644] Morris-Suzuki, 2010.

[645] See Chung, 2010; Lie, 2008.   Although the finger-printing requirement was reinstated for foreign residents as a counterterrorism measure in 2007, it is important to note that special permanent residents were exempt from the requirement, further evidence of *zainichi* Koreans' political clout.

between 2000 and 2006.[646] In addition, the now-ruling Democratic Party of Japan pledged its

support for extending voting rights in local elections in 2008. Thus, this increased political

visibility and the increase in the total number of foreign residents have combined in the

post-Cold War period to challenge the reality behind assertions of ethno-national homogeneity.

The overall picture here is largely one of incremental institutional change in the face of

an increasingly apparent need for reform. How does this picture compare with the pattern of

change in the use of ethno-national claims among political elites in the Diet inaugural ceremony?

It is argued here that it is consistent with the decline in the use of ethno-national claims when

one considers first that this decline was not accompanied by significant contestation. This may

be interpreted to mean that although political elites no longer felt comfortable declaring Japan to

be ethnically homogenous in a forum as wide-reaching as the Diet inaugural ceremony, neither

were they willing to openly contest this notion in that same setting. This is because, while

changes such as the increased political visibility and numbers of foreign resident groups made

the positive assertion of ethnic homogeneity difficult to defend, the idea of "Japan as a

mono-ethnic, homogenous nation persists in the collective imagination."[647] As a result, this

lingering cognitive limitation has thus left Japan "a multi-ethnic society in denial" in which

political elites avoid making sweeping ethno-national claims in venues such as the Diet

---

[646] Chung, 2010, p.111.
[647] Kingston, 2011, p.167.

inaugural but continue to harbor sympathies toward the claim (sometimes vocalizing them in

other settings).[648]

Considered against this background, the debates in the Diet over the EPA agreements

creating work visa programs for nurses and caregivers from the Philippines and Indonesia are

thus natural cases to evaluate the above hypothesis and its possible implications for institutional

change. At first glance, however, the basic facts seem to support a different kind of connection

between narrative and institution than the one hypothesized above. First, at no point in these

debates, which took place in the lower house's Committee on Foreign Affairs and the upper

house's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, did any participant directly invoked the

claim of ethno-national or cultural homogeneity. Considering the ease with which this claim

had previously been used in political discourse as recently as the 1980s and the fact that

immigration is policy area which in any country generally invites nativist rhetoric, this is an

extraordinary finding.[649] Second, in the end, the agreements become law, explicitly positioning

liberalizing immigration controls as a solution to labor shortages. These points suggest a

simple correlation between the decline in the use of the ethno-national claims by political elites

---

[648] Kingston, 2011, p.167. Two political elites who have made such statements in recent years include the then internal affairs and communications minister and future prime minster Asō Tarō, who described Japan as having "one nation, one civilization, one language, one culture and one race" in a ceremony at a museum in October 2005 and the then education minister Ibuki Bunmei, who referred to Japan as "an extremely homogenous country" in comments before a local LDP chapter in February 2007. See *Japan Times*, 18 October 2005 & 28 February 2007. The United Nations special rapporteur on racism later publically challenged the validity of Ibuki's statement.
[649] This also shows that the Diet inaugural ceremony is not the only public political venue in which overt appeals to exclusionary ethno-national claims have become more difficult to make.

and liberalization of immigration institutions. However, when evaluated in detail, the relationship between the narrative claim and the institutional changes appears to be far more complex.

First, although these institutional reforms do liberalize immigration institutions to address labor shortages, they and the other reforms of this period have been criticized as grossly inadequate.[650] The EPAs have failed to attract the even the targeted number of applicants and the entire certification process has been questioned as being too difficult.[651] At this point, it is also almost certain that these specific reforms will have almost no effect on easing the labor shortages in the industries they were designed to benefit. In short, although the EPAs did become law, they do not represent anything like the kind of tidal change one would expect considering the mounting demographic and economic pressures for reform and the sharp decline in the use of ethno-national claims by political elites.

Second, closer examination of the content of these debates reveals evidence that cognitive limitations inherent in the assumption of ethno-national homogeneity persist and appear to continue to limit the scale of immigration reforms even though the claim itself is no longer commonly voiced in public policy debates. Evidence for this view can be found by

---

[650] Chung, 2010, pp.167-172.
[651] Kingston, 2011, p.176-179.

examining the different types of objections that are raised to the legislation, including by those who eventually voted to ratify the final bilateral treaties.

Objections raised to the agreements' extremely modest and targeted relaxation of Japan's restrictive immigration policies generally took the following forms. First, some involved purely technical matters such as whether there was enough oversight in place to ensure immigrant worker were not abused, especially by being forced to accept sub-standard pay and working conditions that might generate market-distorting outcomes. [652] These are understandable with regard to a program such as this, but other objections appear predicated on an unspoken assumption of at least a cultural homogeneity or if not a more broad understanding of ethno-national unity. For example, one speaker raises the fear of immigrants committing crimes while in Japan.[653] This is an example of how the discourse on immigration policy is "shaped by widespread perceptions that foreigners often resort to crime" while Japanese do not.[654] Although this is not supported by national crime statistics, the perception is based on an assumed difference between the high level of moral steadfastness fostered in those raised in Japanese culture and the low levels of those born and raised elsewhere.

---

[652] Machimura Nobutaka, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Liberal Democratic Party, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, November 2, 2004. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/(June 24, 2012).
[653] For example, see comments by Yamanoi Kazunori, Democratic Party of Japan, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, November 1, 2006. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/(June 24, 2012).
[654] Kingston, 2011, pp.167-168.

Other objections to the new visa program centered on issues of language and culture. Numerous speakers questioned the ability of applicants to the program to attain sufficient fluency in Japanese language, especially in the short time frame made available for language learning.[655] One speaker, however, went further, positing a hypothetical situation in which an immigrant worker would be unable to render suitable care to Japanese elderly suffering from dementia because of insufficient language skills *and* an inadequate grasp of Japan's traditional culture (*nihon no dentō bunka*).[656] Here, the complaint moves beyond the issue of language to cite what is presumed to be a more insurmountable barrier, an understanding of Japanese traditions, a move which again appears predicated on an unvoiced assumption of ethnic and cultural homogeneity.

A final indication that underlying assumptions of ethno-cultural homogeneity and the need to protect it remain despite their lack of expression by political elites is revealed in the cost-benefit analysis of some of the speakers in this debate. For example, Araki Kiyohiro of the New Kōmei Party declared to the upper house committee, "Although it is easy to think of making up labor shortages generated by the dwindling birthrate and aging population with foreign workers, I oppose this proposition. This is because I think the social costs (*shakaiteki*

---

[655] For one such example, see Nagashima Akihisa, Democratic Party of Japan, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, November 8, 2006. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/(June 24, 2012).
[656] Araki Kiyohiro, Kōmei Party, Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, House of Councillors, November 9, 2004. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/(June 24, 2012).

kosuto) of this policy are far too many."[657]   Here, Araki expresses a willingness to shoulder the

economic costs of labor shortages rather than pay the *social* costs of attending to them by

bringing immigrants into Japanese society.   Speaking on the topic in a different forum in 2005,

then Prime Minister Koizumi was more explicit about this calculus:

> If [foreign labor] exceeds a certain level, it is bound to cause a clash.   It is necessary to
> consider measures to prevent it and then admit foreign workers as necessary.   Just because
> there is a labor shortage does not mean we should readily allow [foreign workers] to come
> in.[658]

Both Araki and Koizumi thus favor paying the economic price of a shrinking labor force

rather than countenance bringing into Japan anything like the number of immigrants suggested

by the UN report.   When one considers the economic costs involved and the dubiousness of

Japan's other options for dealing with labor shortages, the value system at work becomes

clearer.[659]   In short, maintaining the current level of presumed ethnic and cultural homogeneity

and the social harmony it supposedly produces is more important than avoiding a dire world in

which eventually there will be less than two workers for each person of retirement age.[660]   It is

difficult to imagine that such a calculation could emerge from anything other than a cognitive

---

[657] Yamanoi Kazunori, Democratic Party of Japan, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,
November 10, 2006. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ (June 24, 2012).
[658] Quoted in Kingston (2011, p.183).
[659] It should be noted that, as Kingston (2011, p.181) notes, some "continue to seek refuge in the reassuring scenario
of resolving the crisis through more effective uses of robots, women and elderly workers even though this would
have little more than a palliative impact."   However, this cannot be said of the participants in the Diet debate over
these EPAs, as Foreign Minister Asō Tarō clearly criticized other options, such as robots, as inadequate and, at one
point, declared opposition to such immigration agreements as being the same thing as saying "then go give birth."
Asō Tarō, Foreign Minister, Liberal Democratic Party, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,
November 10, 2006. Accessed at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/(May 11, 2007).
[660] United Nations Population Division, 2000, "Japan: Scenario I." Accessed at:
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/migration.htm (June 25, 2012).

self-understanding built on the assumption of ethnic and cultural homogeneity, even if it is only referred to indirectly.

It thus appears that the objections to the agreements raised by members of all the major political parties derive from a common cognitive conception of Japan as a largely ethnically homogenous nation and the problems this presents for utilizing immigration as a solution to labor shortages and demographic change.   Although, as with the democratic state narrative and electoral reform, this likely facilitated inter-partisan coordination and broad support for the eventual reform, in this case the narrative claim appears to have limited the scope of reform. For example, applicants are required to have work experience in their own countries if nurses and have graduated from a four-year university if caregivers.   More importantly, they must pass Japanese certification that are thought to be difficult for Japanese nurses and caregivers and given only in Japanese language.   Once having cleared these hurdles, including all the language and professional training programs necessary, nurses are only guaranteed three-year work visas, while caregivers receive four-year visas.[661]   As will be explained below, these strict requirements have greatly limited the pool of potential applicants and are a major reason behind the programs' failure to attract the targeted number of applicants as of this writing.

---

[661] Vogt, 2007.

Finally, in contrast with the case of the democratic state narrative and electoral reform, the EPA debates do not appear to have had any effect on the Japanese public's views on the underlying policy issues involved. For example, in two public opinion surveys, NHK found that, while 13% favored increased in the foreign population in Japan, 35% wanted to maintain current levels, and 36% favored a decrease in 1995, these numbers shifted to 10% in favor of increases, 29% in favor of current levels and 42% in favor of decreases in 2003, indicating a cooling of public attitudes toward increased immigration just prior to the start of the EPA debates.[662] Asked if Japan should broadly welcome foreign immigration as a solution to its demographic challenges by the *Asahi Shimbun* in 2010 following the conclusion of the EPA agreements, 26% responded yes while 65% answered no. Although differences in question wording and answer choices make it difficult to compare the Asahi and NHK surveys, they do not indicate politically significant movement in the public's enthusiasm for relying on increased immigration to resolve demographic problems.[663] Thus, in a contrast to the debate over electoral reform, the shift in elite rhetoric observed in the EPA debates (i.e. the exclusion of direct ethno-national applies) failed to influence public opinion in any political significant way.

---

[662] NHK, "Japanese Sense of Exclusivity Rears Its Ugly Head" (*Atama wo motageru nihonjin no 'haitasei'*), 2004. Report is available for download at: http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/yoron/social/page_04.html (August 6, 2012).
[663] *Asahi Shimbun*, 10 June 2010. In particular, the differences in both the affirmative and negative answers across the two polls are likely due to the fact that *Asahi* did not offer respondents a neutral answer choice, while NHK did.

The view that the organic state narrative continues to shape Japan's immigration policies despite declines in the use of the ethno-national claim is supported by the fact the above institutional outcome is not so easily explained otherwise. Recent work on the political economy of labor shortages and immigration policy in high income countries combines analysis of labor supply and demand with the effects of system-level factors such as the relevance of public policy (e.g. social welfare, etc.) to explain the hiring patterns of migrant workers in particular industrial and service sectors. In the case of nursing and social care, relatively high levels of migrant workers are expected in rich countries such as Japan because increased demand caused by demographic changes and the constraints stemming from the sector's public funding arrangements tend to result in working conditions that domestic workers will shun: relatively low pay, difficult working hours, and low social status.[664]

It would be difficult to argue that these conditions do not prevail in Japan's caregiver sector; reduced government subsidies since 2003 have led to low salaries, an annual turnover rate of 20% and more than 500,000 certified domestic caregivers leaving the profession.[665] The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) estimates that Japan will need as many as 600,000 additional nurses and caregivers by 2014.[666] In addition, although health professional

---

[664] Ruhs & Anderson, 2010.
[665] Kingston, 2011, p.176.
[666] Ibid.

organizations will typically avoid characterizing problems in their industry as ones that might be solved by the introduction of migrant workers, the Japanese Nursing Association conceded in 2007 that "Japan is now in the state of chronic nurse shortages in terms of both quality and quantity."[667]

Although the governments and health care industries (sometimes nearly one and the same) of other high income countries have responded to similar pressures by encouraging migrant workers to take these difficult-to-fill positions, Japan has not done so to anywhere near the same extent. For example, while migrant workers made up more than 10% of the health and social care industry in the United Kingdom in 2002, a figure that increased to more than 14% by 2008, migrant workers remain a miniscule percentage of this industry in Japan, even after the implementation of the EPA agreements after 2008.[668] Indeed, although one impetus for the EPA debates came from reports issued by the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Japan Business Federation, the principle organizations of Japan's business lobby, their overall approaches to dealing with declining population and mounting labor shortages was to call for improved productivity through technological innovation and better integration into the

---

[667] Vogt, 2007, p.4.
[668] Ruhs & Anderson, 2010, p.8.

workforce of women and elderly workers, options one critic has dismissed as "pipedreams" that "would have little more than a palliative impact."[669]

Although the major business organizations did call for immigration reform and specifically encouraged the relaxation of work visa requirements for nurses and caregivers, their proposals were extremely limited, focusing on temporary guest worker programs rather than permanent immigration.[670] Even the relatively timid demands of industry were not fully met in the final EPA agreements, which maintained strict certification standards and failed to provide the level of subsidies and applicant support asked for by business organizations.[671] For these reasons, as well as the failure to offer the possibility of permanent worker status, these programs have not even come close to their very conservative goal of attracting 1,000 applicants per country and have so far integrated relatively few foreign nurses and caregivers into the Japanese workforce.[672]

The relationship between the change in the narrative and the change in institutions is thus quite different across the cases of the democratic state narrative and electoral reform and the organic state narrative and immigration reform. In the former, the narrative continued to be

[669] Kingston, 2011, p.181.
[670] Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2003. Accessed at: http://www.jcci.or.jp/nissyo/iken/030612syoshika-teigen.html (August 6, 2012); Japan Business Federation, 2004. Accessed at: http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2004/029/index.html (August 6, 2012).
[671] The maintenance of strict certification standards appears to be a case in which the MHLW prevailed over industry demands and the positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Economy, Technology and Industry (METI), which were both involved in the negotiations of the draft EPAs. Vogt, 2007.
[672] Kingston, 2011, pp.176-177; Asahi Shimbun, 2 November 2009.

positively offered by all parties in the debate to justify policy proposals in ways that facilitated elite coordination and built pressure for reform among the public. In the latter, however, the particular narrative claim ceased to be referred to directly as a justification for policy positions but nonetheless continued to be reflected indirectly in statements objecting to institutional reform in ways that played down the need for more extensive changes and did nothing to shift public opinion on the general issue involved. This seems to indicate that declining references, even the elimination of a long-standing cognitive claim from a relevant policy debate, is not sufficient to undo the cognitive limitations it places on participants in the policy-making process. However, if even claims that are no longer regularly referenced in public debates can exert influence on policy-making, what is necessary to dislodge such a claim, even a fundamental cognitive one, from political debates in a way that ends its influence over policy outcomes?

Although, as will be addressed in the final chapter, the loss of prominence for the ethno-national claim over the last two decades is likely not without consequences for its institutional impact moving forward, it seems doubtful that its underlying influence on immigration and citizenship policies can be diluted without the appearance of meaningful levels of contestation that challenge it as both at odds with reality and normatively questionable. Until exposed to such contestation among political elites, the current state of affairs, in which "Japanese nationality is still commonly associated with Japanese ethno-cultural identity," is

likely to militate against swift changes in current institutions, despite increasing pressures for more liberal immigration policies.[673]

V. Conclusion

The analysis above has attempted to establish that nation-state narrative can and do have real impacts on the outcomes of debates over institutional change. When a narrative has maintained relatively high levels of prominence without facing contestation over long periods of time, such as the democratic state narrative, it can facilitate compromise among elites, help shift public opinion and affect the scope as well as the direction of the institutional reform. In addition, although the near absence of explicit references by political elites in public debate may weaken a narrative claim's potential to shape debates over institutional change in the long run, it does not necessarily indicate the end of its relevance, as seems be the case for the organic state narrative's core cognitive claim of ethno-national unity. In this regard, prior contestation and the construction of counter claims or narratives by political elites may be crucial to significantly change the institutional impacts of prominent narratives and their component claims. This point will be discussed further in the final chapter.

---

[673] Chung, 2010, p.13.

Chapter Nine: Conclusion

Nationalism, which is not qualitatively different from patriotism, is seemingly on the rise. But this is a misreading of the Japanese condition.[674]

<div align="right">Tamamoto Masaru, 2007</div>

I. Introduction

We have come a long way from the sweltering heat of the anti-nuclear demonstration in Yoyogi Park in the effort to identify, measure and explain changes in contemporary Japanese nationalism. While nationalism will ever remain fundamentally ambiguous, its presence is revealed in the stories we tell each other about who "we" are and what this means for the structures of "our" community and its place in the wider world. Born of traditions, political struggles, and human creativity, these stories emerge and coalesce into common patterns that are repeated by a broad range of community leaders, even as the frequency and relative importance attached to particular story elements constantly shift over time. As these stories become attached to our governing institutions, they legitimize them by connecting the institutions with our self-understandings, while at the same time exposing themselves to those who would challenge that legitimacy by revising the stories in ways that can potentially change our self-understandings. Such is the nature of the "dialectical relationship between particular

---

[674] Tamamoto, 2007, p.15.

discursive events and the situations, institutions, and social structures in which they are embedded."[675]

This chapter begins by summarizing the key findings of the study and concludes with an assessment of what these findings mean for the present and future of Japan's nation-state narratives, the state institutions associated with them, and Japanese nationalism more broadly. Specifically, the final section considers the following questions. Will the five nation-state narratives examined here remain at the forefront of discourse on the relationship between the Japanese nation and state? Have the changes observed in the nationalist discourse in the post-Cold War period opened up space for new conceptualizations of the nation-state relationship? What do the findings here say about how this nationalist discourse will continue to shape institutional change in Japan in the future. Finally, what do recent changes in the usages of nation-state narratives mean for Japanese nationalism?

II. Finding Japanese Nationalism

Perhaps the most important finding of this study is that nationalism continues to maintain a footing in the discourses and politics of contemporary, wealthy, democratic societies. Despite predictions it will cease to operate in such societies, nationalism persists in the ways

---

[675] Wodak, 2006, p.112.

members of these societies imagine how they as a group relate to the territorial state in which they live.[676]   The common ways of characterizing this relationship become nation-state narratives, stories that define the nation and make corresponding demands on the state. Through its nation-state narratives, nationalism has continued to be constructed and reconstructed as it is wielded by political elites in policy debates even in the richest, most technologically-advanced, pluralistic societies.

A second finding is that far from being a stable, mono-chromatic pillar, nationalism as viewed through the nationalist discourse of political elites is a vibrant, ever-changing tapestry, with measurable and meaningful change evident even in the case of a stable, mature democracy with an advanced economy.   The content analysis from Japan reveals two periods in which the references to all studied nation-state narratives peak (immediate postwar and 1980s), three periods (immediate postwar (especially the 1960s), late 1970s-1980s, post-Cold War) in which measures of their contestation peak, and a secular trend toward decline in the numbers of references to all the narratives over the nearly sixty years of the study.

Among the individual narratives examined, three showed signs of undergoing partial transformations in which normative components faced contestation and their associated institutions underwent reform.   The peace state narrative, although the most referenced for the

---

[676] Hechter, 2000.

entire period, has nonetheless had the normative claims of one of its two sub-narratives called

into question and their related institutional implications limited over the course of a campaign

waged for nearly thirty years by security policy reformers. The trading state narrative saw a

similar targeted contestation of its sub-narratives portraying Japan as a merchant state while its

depiction of Japan as a country based on technological achievement went almost completely

unchallenged.[677] Finally, despite being sometimes viewed as synonymous with "Japanese

nationalism," the organic state narrative was actually the least-referenced and one of the most

contested narratives in the study.

The changes in the frequency and valence of references to these narratives are

heavily-driven by their involvement in debates over reforms of their associated institutions. As

noted in Chapter Six in the case of the peace state narrative, characteristics of the narrative

appear to have had an impact on these changes. In particular, the fundamental ambiguity

between the non-violence and non-aggression interpretations of the norms in the peace-loving

state sub-narrative allowed would-be reformers of institutions associated with these normative

claims to more easily develop transformational discursive strategies that targeted them, obviating

the need to mount a more extensive, and potentially politically costly, direct challenge to the

narrative's core cognitive claims. In addition, the relatively large number of associations

---

[677] The technology-based state sub-narrative's call to support technological cooperation received negatively-valued comments in the first five-year block (1952*-1957). The sub-narrative then went uncontested from 1958-2007.

between security institutions governing the acquisition and use of conventional military capabilities and the norms of this sub-narrative actually served to increase its exposure to reformers, who simply could not avoid challenging them in order to relax restrictions in this area of security policy. In discussion of the organic state narrative, this point was found to be contingent on the institutional position of the reformers. In the case of the peace state narrative, the prime minister was more often than not an advocate of reform and thus a challenger of the normative status quo. However, in the case of the organic state narrative, where the prime minister served as a defender of the narrative's claims, it was found that the benefits of an association with a state institution accrued more readily to the narrative claim. In addition, this effect appears to be amplified when institutional incentives favor such a defense from whomever assumes the position of the prime minister, regardless of partisan affiliation.

In contrast to the three transforming narratives, the democratic and civilized state narratives have assumed a discursive status equivalent to "banal nationalism." At no point prior or during recent declines in prominence did either of these narratives fail to be referenced or face meaningful contestation. In addition, there is no evidence from the Diet inaugural ceremonies showing political elites adopting discursive strategies designed to counter or undo either of these narratives. Although there are other similar cases, such as the peace state

narrative in the 1970s, the democratic and civilized state narratives in the post-Cold War period are two of the clearest cases of banalization in this study.

The mixture of partial transformation and banalization observed in the different narratives in the post-Cold War period belies the possibility of denationalization, either within a single domain addressed by one of the narratives or across multiple domains. Among transforming narratives, core cognitive claims were not meaningfully contested in the Diet inaugural ceremonies, while contestation of normative claims exclusively targeted individual sub-narratives in the case of the peace and trading state narratives. Alternatively, among the "banalizing" narratives, long-established nation-state narratives remain virtually uncontested sources of legitimacy for both Japanese democracy and its welfare state. The combination of these findings represents decisive evidence that political elites in Japan have continued to rely on these same five nation-state narratives to elaborate links between the nation and the state across a wide set of domains.

We also uncovered relationships among the individual narratives examined here. In particular, the content analysis revealed a complex and changing relationship between the central elements of peace, development and democracy. During the early decades of Japan's postwar democracy, the trading state narrative was closely linked in the nationalist discourse with the democratic state narrative, a relationship which dissipated following the end of the Cold War

(and the beginning of Japan's long period of economic struggle). In addition, the content analysis uncovered a link between negative references to the peace and organic state narratives that is likely due to an overlap between the enemies of one and the supporters of the other. This dynamic is likely at least partially responsible for the continued persistence of the organic state narrative at low levels of prominence.

Finally, in the preceding chapter, an effort was made to show what some of these changes and relationships have meant for post-Cold War politics. Although in the case of narratives undergoing transformations, politics, particularly the contestation generated from debates over reforming institutions associated with the narratives' claims, simultaneously affected narrative content and frequency, there is nonetheless evidence that some transforming narratives continued to impact policy debates during this period. In particular, despite a steep decline in references to the claim of ethno-national homogeneity and contestation over other parts of the organic state narrative, this claim appears to have continued to exert cognitive limitations on participants in policy debates over immigration reform following the end of the Cold War. The evidence that it remained on the minds, if not the lips, of a variety of participants in these debates likely points to the importance of contestation in affecting change in narrative components. Although it is difficult to draw any final conclusions from this one case, the fact remains that uncontested elements of narratives undergoing transformations, such as the

anti-nuclear state sub-narrative of the peace state narrative, can continue to represent major obstacles for those who would seek to affect dramatic changes in institutions associated with them.

Showing the policy impacts of uncontested narratives is somewhat easier. In the case of the democratic state narrative, the lack of contestation and counter-narratives shaped both the direction and the scope of possible institutional reforms. The presence of an uncontested narrative with a long history of prominence in nationalist discourse (as well as relevance to the electoral reform debate) foreclosed the possibility of anti-democratic proposals emerging from those not willing to directly challenge this narrative. The near universal appropriation of the narrative by all sides in the debate over the specifics of electoral reform both shaped the scope of the final institutional changes and facilitated the eventual compromise that was reached. Uncertain about the final consequences, elites across the major parties nonetheless agreed to make a leap of faith and replace the entire lower house electoral system, even though most did not see this change as in their long-term interests. Finally, the consistency with which the democratic state narrative was utilized by political elites generated an intense single-message flow to the public, which responded by gradually endorsing the view that major electoral reforms were necessary to repair Japanese democracy. As public opinion polls began to link progress in this area with popular support for the prime minister, political pressure for reform increased.

III. Post-Modern Janus: Japanese Nationalism in the 21st Century

Nation-state narratives play a vital role in determining how nationalism shapes state institutions and its elements are the most commonly utilized linguistic conventions in the nationalist discourse. For example, Chart 9.1 below shows that the combined prominence scores of the five nation-state narratives regularly outnumber the combined scores of other types of elements commonly cited as objects of nationalist identification, including references to five common social purposes, references to neighboring countries, again viewed as a proxy for relational comparisons, and references to Japan's three outstanding territorial disputes.[678] This is true for every five-year period since 1968 except the first one, when the combined total of references to the narratives was second behind references to neighbors. Although an examination of nation-state narratives in elite discourse does not tell the whole story of nationalism in a case like postwar Japan, it does tell a large part of that story while focusing on its most policy-relevant aspects. So what does the above picture of narrative change and its

---

[678] As previously noted, "social purposes" are the ultimate goals assigned to the nation-state, and the five counted here are: prosperity, peace, security, status, and autonomy. Relational comparisons are comparisons between Japan and Others, with data on references to neighboring countries (US, USSR/Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan) used here as a proxy. Japan's territorial disputes are discussed further below, but here include only outstanding disputes. Please note that Japan's territorial disputes with the United States over the Ogasawara Islands (Bonin Islands, Iwo Island, Chichijima) and Okinawa were coded through their resolutions in 1968 and 1972, respectively. Including references to these disputes for 1968-1972 would raise the territorial dispute figure to 4.4015, which would not change its rank order for this period.

changing impacts reveal about contemporary Japanese nationalism and its likely impact on

politics moving forward?

Chart 9.1: Prominence, Narratives, Social Purposes, Relational Comparisons, and Territorial Disputes, 1968-2007

Unit: References per 100 sentences

The present state of the five nation-state narratives points to several interesting

possibilities for the future.   As noted in the first chapter, many scholars and observers of Japan

have characterized recent changes as potentially dangerous turns to more insular and

exclusionary forms of nationalism.   However, the findings here do not support this view.   First,

the two narratives that faced no meaningful contestation and achieved banalization by the end of

the study are also the only two with universalistic variants.   They both thus incorporate

comparative logics with decidedly international orientations.   In debates over reforming Japan's

democratic institutions, comparisons with the institutions of other democracies were often made

402

to justify favored reforms that, once achieved, have been credited with deepening Japanese democracy. Still further, multiple measures point to a Japanese democracy after the end of the Cold War that is both strongly legitimate and more independent of particularistic sources of support than during any other time in the postwar period.

Similarly, a strong tradition of uncontested appeals to the universalistic variant of the civilized state narrative in Japan has shaped the range of possibilities in the debate over welfare reform.   Although the Koizumi administration was able to enact measures that cut benefits, the overwhelming focus of the welfare reform debate in Japan has been the search for new revenues to shore up existing programs.   In contrast, in the United States, where the notion of the welfare state itself is hotly contested by conservatives and some libertarians as counter to traditional American values and a form of socialism of foreign origin, calls from political elites for fundamental reductions in and even *de facto* dismantling of major welfare programs such as Social Security and Medicare have increased as these programs have faced financial stress fueled by demographic change.

Second, it is the three narratives based on the most particularistic claims that have faced the most contestation in recent years, and, in many cases, the objections raised by domestic political elites echo challenges emanating from Japan's neighbors.   Examples of this pattern include the consistently high contestation over the merchant state sub-narrative in the 1970s and

1980s that coincided with strong criticism of Japan's export-promoting polices from its major trading partners, especially the United States; the rise in contestation over the peace-loving state sub-narrative from the 1980s to 2000s that coincided with calls for changes in Japan's security policies from the United States; and the rise in contestation over the state's relationship with the Yasukuni shrine after the end of the Cold War that coincided with objections from Japan's neighbors, especially China.

Third, even among the components of the organic state narrative, which are most commonly cited as "on the rise," the claim of ethno-national homogeneity has ceased to be a center piece of the nationalist discourse among political elites in Japan. Although, as noted above, it likely continues to influence both thinking and policy-making in important ways, its near expulsion from this discourse seems likely to impact its future eventually. A similar reduction in the use of overtly-racist rhetoric among political elites in the United States since the 1960s provides an instructive example. Although this decline has been somewhat mitigated by the emergence of less overtly racist alternatives, such as phrases like "welfare queen," and the rise of "dog whistle" politics targeting constituencies with racial animus through indirect appeals, it nonetheless coincided with a move away from strongly ethnic conceptions of American national identity and the most broad-based reworking of American electoral institutions to guard

against the exclusion of non-white voters since the early years after the end of the Civil War.[679]

However, in the American case, this reduction occurred in the face of broad-based contestation among political elites. This same level of contestation has simply not yet occurred in objection to the claim of ethnic homogeneity in Japan, a fact that thus calls into question the pace and extent in which Japanese conceptions of nationality can be expected to change in the future.

Early indications are that this change is occurring slowly but surely in the direction of less exclusionary orientation. Immigration proposals originating from the conservative LDP have recently included a plan from former LDP Secretary General Nakagawa Hidenao to admit as many as 10 million foreigners in Japan by 2050 and a call by Kōno Tarō, a recent candidate for the LDP presidency, to move away from ethnically-based immigration policies such as the nikeijin visa program to ones that admit those with needed skills and qualifications.[680] As noted earlier, both the New Kōmei Party and the DPJ have endorsed extending voting rights in local elections to foreign permanent residents. Considering the dominance of ethno-national rhetoric through the 1980s, it is hard not to see these developments as indicators of the beginning of the spread of more inclusive attitudes among political elites.

---

[679] For more on changes in American national identity over this period, see Huntington (2004) and Stuckey (2004). It is important to note that even in the near absence of overtly racist rhetoric from political elites, racism, racial animus, and even racial bias in state institutions, particularly the justice system, continue to be problems in American society.
[680] Kingston, 2011, p.182; Morris-Suzuki, 2010, pp.244-245.

It is thus not at all clear that Japanese nationalism is shifting in a more insular and exclusionary direction. Instead, a move, however gingerly, in the opposite direction appears to be underway. The most stable and uncontested narratives are now the ones including appeals to universalistic cognitive models and norms as well as positive uses of international comparisons while the most particularistic narratives are all currently undergoing transformations that at least in part appear to indicate a level of responsiveness to foreign criticisms. All of this has occurred in the background of a steep decline in the use of claims of ethnic homogeneity, arguably the most exclusionary element examined here.

Another piece of evidence from the Diet inaugural analysis also places recent changes in nationalist discourse in a less threatening light. Chart 9.2 shows the changing frequencies with which political elites referenced five different social purposes (prosperity, peace, security, status, and autonomy) since 1968. As noted in Chapter Three, status and autonomy are the social purposes most closely associated with exclusionary aspects of nationalist discourse, while concerns about security are also commonly linked with xenophobic strands of nationalism. However, these three social purposes are consistently among the least referenced in the Diet inaugural ceremony. In contrast, peace and prosperity are the most referenced in all periods, with peace being the most commonly-cited goal assigned to the nation-state for most of the study, although ensuring prosperity became the primary concern after 1998. Thus, at least in the way

elites are talking to each other and the public about what should be their most valued shared

goals, there is nothing particularly alarming about these results.

Chart 9.2: Prominence, Social Purposes, 1968-2007

Unit: References per 100 sentences

Another way to consider the future direction of Japanese nationalism is to examine how

Japan's territorial disputes with its neighbors are portrayed in the Diet inaugural ceremony.   As

control of territory is central to nearly all conceptions of nationalism, including the one offered

here, disputes over territory, even relatively insignificant island areas, can encourage domestic

political elites to use nationalist rhetoric to support their favored responses.   Japan's

outstanding territorial disputes include the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea (with

China and Taiwan), Takeshima/Dokdo islets in the Sea of Japan (with South Korea) and the

Northern Territories, four islands/islets just north of Hokkaido (with the former Soviet Union

and current Russian Federation).[681]   As shown in Chart 9.3, the Northern Territories dispute is

by far the most referenced in the Diet inaugural ceremony, but the number of these references

has fallen significantly over the last four decades.   In addition, the disputes with China, Taiwan

and South Korea, which have recently made headlines in the media, have historically rarely been

mentioned at all, although references to all disputes increased in the last five-year period.

Chart 9.3: Prominence, Three Territorial Disputes, 1968-2007

Unit: References per 100 sentences

One way to interpret these results is that the dispute over the Northern Territories has

long played a dominant albeit declining role in the nationalist discourse.   Second, territorial

disputes are on the whole becoming more prominent elements in the discourse, with references

to the Senkaku and Takeshima disputes rising above averages for the period since 1968 in the

---

[681] On the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, see Emmers (2010); On Takeshima/Dokdo dispute, see Hyun (2006); On the Northern Territories dispute, see Iwashita (2005).

408

last five-year block but references to the Northern Territories dispute remaining significantly

below average in this final period. Finally, although attention is turning south, the Northern

Territories remain a staple of Diet inaugural rhetoric. In sum, territorial disputes do appear to

be becoming more significant parts of the nationalist discourse of political elites, but the changes

remain mostly within historical norms. This seems to indicate that mainstream political elites

have so far made only muted appeals to these potent symbolic disputes. Whether this pattern

will continue is unclear, but these findings are consistent with the view that Japanese elites have

generally sought "to neutralize this geopolitical consideration and to resist, rather than

exacerbate, domestic nationalist sentiments" raised by the disputes.[682]

If nationalism is not "on the rise" in the way that some scholars and observers of

contemporary Japan have claimed, what can be said about the extent of the changes under way?

More specifically, are the changes observed in the nationalist discourse and associated

institutions indicative of a "Japan unbound," in which a "volatile nation" is on a "quest for pride

and purpose," or is the picture drawn here more consistent with Kingston's characterization of a

"quiet transformation."[683] Although it is difficult not to see the changes observed as evidence

of a nationalist discourse in transition, the action so far has been relatively limited in both scope

---

[682] Emmers, 2010, p.63. Emmers refers specifically to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, but this observation can be extended to the other disputes as well, at least through the time period examined in this study.
[683] Nathan, 2004; Kingston, 2011.

and scale. Transforming changes have occurred in only one type of component (normative) in just three narratives, leaving the cognitive cores of all five narrative intact and unchallenged. In addition, although politicians such as Nakasone Yasuhiro ("international state") and Abe Shinzō ("beautiful country") as well as collections of academic and political figures such as the one brought together by the Japan Forum on International Relations ("maritime nation") have attempted to construct new nation-state narratives, most incorporate elements of the five narratives studied here, all have been extremely short-lived in the nationalist discourse, usually disappearing when their initial advocates depart from the Diet inaugural ceremony, and none has so far been clearly wielded as a counter-narrative in such a setting.[684] All told, with regard to assessments of the degree of change, this hardly seems the stuff of a "great transformation" or a "new nationalism."

However, the clear signs of transition point to a nationalist discourse prone to further change. The fact that three of the most prominent postwar nation-state narratives have simultaneously and repeatedly been challenged over the last three decades certainly indicates a level of openness to new ways of thinking about the relationship between the nation and the state not seen since the early decades of the postwar period. What opportunities do current

---

[684] For more on the "maritime nation" narrative, see the JFIR Maritime Nation seminar (1998-2001) accessed at: http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/special_study/special_studyBefore.htm#e (June 28, 2011)

conditions present to elites seeking to alter or create new national self-understandings featuring

different associations with state institutions? I will conclude by briefly considering how

present and future elites might take advantage of these conditions to alter nationalist discourse in

Japan.

The strong and sustained challenge to the entirety of one of the peace state's

sub-narratives may open space for further transformation. However, I do not think this is

possible without the development of an effective counter-narrative that directly challenges the

entire idea of Japan as a peace state. Despite the long record of rhetorical and institutional

creep in the direction of the non-aggression version of the narrative, reformers continue to utilize

peace state rhetoric and have repeatedly failed to challenge this highly prominent narrative

directly. Although achieving some tactical successes in getting the public to appreciate new

missions for the SDF, these shifts have at best divided the public and for the most part have

proven ephemeral, as the Japanese people retain relatively stable and long-standing

anti-militarist predispositions.[685] In addition, the general attachment to the idea of Japan as a

peace state remains strong. For example, in January 2008, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* polled the

public on what kind of country they felt Japan to be. Respondents were allowed to pick

multiple answers from among nine choices. The results appear in Table 9.1 below:

---

[685] Midford, 2011.

411

Table 9.1: What kind of country do you feel Japan is today?   Please choose from among the choices below the ones that match your feelings.

Military Great Power	2.0	A Closed (Inward-looking) Country	10.1
Economic Great Power	35.9	A Country Trusted by Other Countries	8.4
Peace State *(heiwa kokka)*	59.7	Democratic State (*minshuteki na kuni*)	25.2
Cultured State (*bunka kokka*)	27.2	Autonomous, Independent Country	4.2
Welfare State (*fukushi kokka*)	9.6	Don't Know/No Answer	4.8

Source: *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 13 January 2008

This result is somewhat remarkable when one considers that it was obtained by a center-right newspaper that has been in the vanguard of challenging elements of the peace state narrative.   It also comes after more than two decades of efforts by political elites to transform the peace state narrative to make it less restrictive for security institutions.[686]   This underscores the difficulty of directly challenging a narrative that resonates strongly with the predispositions of the public.

In addition, as noted in Chapter Six, following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant meltdown, peace activists have actively tried to link that accident with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by expanding the peace state narrative's normative claims to include opposition to nuclear power.   Scholars of narratives and other kinds of political messaging

---

[686] It should also be noted that if economic great power is taken as a proxy for the trading state narrative and the results for the answer choices of the two sub-narratives of the civilized state narrative are combined, the results are consistent with the top three narratives by prominence for the last five-year block (2002-2007), although peace state was third rather than first in the content analysis: Peace State (59.7), Civilized State (36.8), Trading State (35.9).

generally agree that interpreting major events, whether domestic or international, in ways that

favor particular narratives and understandings can shift elite and public views of existing

narratives or their components.[687]   Most recently, reformers such as Ozawa Ichiro followed

this strategy by interpreting the international reaction to Japan's response to the first Gulf War to

justify further military contributions to UN operations.   Can it work again on the peace state

narrative, but this time to expand its restrictions on state institutions?   With demonstrations of

historical size becoming more common and political parties forming around anti-nuclear power

positions, such an outcome seems at least possible.

In a recent example, at the ceremony to commemorate the 67th anniversary of the

Hiroshima bombing, Hiroshima Mayor Matsui Kazumi, with Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiro in

attendance, emphasized the similarities of those who suffered from the bombings and those

affected by the Fukushima nuclear disaster, even going so far as to cite one of anti-nuclear power

movement's slogans: "Humanity cannot coexist with that which is nuclear."[688]   In his address,

Noda included a delicately-worded pledge to work to free Japan of its dependence on nuclear

power, while just outside of the ceremony area, protesters gathered at an anti-nuclear power rally

chanted, "Go home, Noda."[689]   Whether this strategy will lead to a reinvigoration of the peace

---

[687] Roe, 1994; Edwards, 2003; Page & Shapiro, 1992.
[688] Matsui Kazumi, Mayor of Hiroshima City, "Declaration of Peace" Augusts 6, 2012. Accessed at:
http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/www/contents/0000000000000/1110537278566/index.html (August 7, 2012.
[689] *Japan Times Online*, 7 August 2012. Accessed at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120807a1.html
(August 7, 2012).

state narrative among political elites is an open question, but what is clear is that Japan is not yet finished with this most important of its postwar stories.

On the other hand, for those who envision the future Japan as a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society, the stage has been set for change. The organic state narrative may fall into further decline if its essential ethnic foundation cannot be reformulated in a way that better comports with the lived reality of large minority and immigrant groups present in Japan. However, it seems unlikely that major movement in this direction, even at just the cognitive level, will be possible without the construction of a counter-narrative that directly opposes the claim of ethnic homogeneity. Fortunately for would-be challengers, such a narrative existed in Japan during the prewar period, the claim that the Japanese are a "mixed nation," a people descended from different groups originally occupying the Asian continent and islands to the south.[690] Although allowing some room for continued claims of contemporary exclusivity, the "mixed nation" story opens up space for present-day Japanese to empathize and develop a sense of affinity with just the groups of people likely to come to Japan should immigration policies by further liberalized.

In the cases of the peace or organic state narratives, the "canary in a coal mine" value of this method of analysis is apparent: Large-scale change will not likely be in the offing until the

---

[690] Oguma, 2002a.

cognitive cores of the existing nation-state narratives are first challenged. Future events, suitably interpreted, may provide the impetus for further changes in narratives and even their associated institutions. However, in the end, nation-state narratives are social constructions in which shared visions of the nation and its necessary programs for the state coexist. Any major changes in institutions associated with nation-state narratives with long histories of prominence in the nationalist discourse will thus be preceded by rhetorical action against their cognitive cores. These rhetorical disputes are thus harbingers of narrative and institutional changes to come.

In a 1975 essay, scholar Tom Nairn dubbed nationalism the "Modern Janus."[691] He selected Janus, the two-faced Roman god who looks to both the past and the future, because establishing links between a nation's past and its future destiny is the function that gives nationalism much of its authenticity and appeal. The adjective "modern" was added to link nationalism to the processes of modernization, particularly industrialization, which Nairn saw as the driving force behind the original emergence and spread of nationalism around the world.[692]

In concluding this account of nationalism in postwar Japan, we should keep in mind that a similar account can be made of nationalism in any number of contemporary, wealthy

---

[691] Nairn, 1975.

[692] More specifically, Nairn sees nationalism as a modern phenomenon that emerged from a dialectical interaction between the peoples of core and peripheral areas generated by "uneven development," the spread of industrialization at different rates in different regions. Nairn, 1975, 1981.

democracies that certainly deserve to be called "post-industrial," if not the more complicated

label of "post-modern." As noted in the first chapter, although the dangers of "rising"

nationalism in Japan are often raised, changes in nationalisms in similar cases, such as the

United States, deserve at least as much scrutiny, especially when considering their capacities to

affect international peace and stability. In these cases as well, nation-state narratives have been

shown to shape national self-understandings in ways that influence policy-making and foreign

relations.[693] Accordingly, postwar Japanese nationalism should be considered neither an outlier

nor a uniquely dangerous phenomenon but rather simply one example of how nationalism shapes

and is shaped by politics in a contemporary, wealthy democracy.

---

[693] For an example in the critical analysis tradition, see Nayak & Malone's (2009) discussion of the significance of the narrative of "American Exceptionalism" for US foreign relations. This narrative asserts that because Americans emerged from a revolution against European tyranny to become the first nation with a unique ideology based on liberty, egalitarianism, and individualism, the American state has a "God-given destiny" to lead the rest of the world according to this worldview, especially to spread liberty and democracy to other countries. Lipset, 1996.

Appendix A: Codebook

Code	Group
101 Trading State	Trading State
102 Technology-based State	Trading State
103 Few Resources	Trading State
104 Support World Trade Regime	Trading State
105 Increase/Maintain Exports	Trading State
106 Improve Domestic Technology	Trading State
107 Support Technological Cooperation	Trading State
108 Expand/Maintain Overseas Investments	Trading State
201 Japanese as Ethnicity	Organic State
204 Emperor	Organic State
205 Support Yasukuni Shrine	Organic State
206 National Polity	Organic State
207 Enforce Traditional Values	Organic State
301 Peace State	Peace State
302 Nuclear Victim State	Peace State
303 Support Peace Constitution	Peace State
304 Implement Peace Diplomacy	Peace State
305 Eschew Use of Force	Peace State
306 Restrain War Potential	Peace State
307 Support International Disarmament	Peace State
308 War Regret	Peace State
309 Atomic Bombings	Peace State
310 Support Non-Nuclear Principles	Peace State
311 Support International Nuclear Disarmament	Peace State
401 Civilized State	Civilized State
402 Support Japanese Culture	Civilized State
403 Support Cultural Exchange	Civilized State
404 Welfare State	Civilized State
405 Improve Domestic Welfare Programs	Civilized State
501 Democratic State	Democratic State
503 Enforce Democratic Principles	Democratic State
504 Member of Free World	Democratic State

Code	Group
601 Economic Great Power	Great Power
602 Military Great Power	Great Power
701 Prosperity	Social Purposes
703 Peace	Social Purposes
705 Security	Social Purposes
708 Status	Social Purposes
709 Autonomy	Social Purposes
804 EU	International Organizations
805 UN	International Organizations
806 Other Int'l Governmental Organizations	International Organizations
807 US Bases	Neighboring Countries
808 Okinawa	Neighboring Countries
809 US	Neighboring Countries
810 US-Japan Alliance	Neighboring Countries
811 PRC	Neighboring Countries
812 Senkaku Islands	Neighboring Countries
813 ROK	Neighboring Countries
814 Takeshima	Neighboring Countries
815 USSR/Russia	Neighboring Countries
816 Northern Territories	Neighboring Countries
817 DPRK	Neighboring Countries
818 ROC (Taiwan)	Neighboring Countries
819 Europe	World Regions
822 Oceania	World Regions
823 Middle East	World Regions
824 Asia	World Regions
825 Central/South America	World Regions
826 North America	World Regions
827 Africa	World Regions
901 Domestic Minorities	None
902 Japanese as Citizenship	None

Total: 63

I. 100 Trading State

● **101 Trading State**

References to Japan[694] as a trade-based state, a merchant state, or a trading state.

● **102 Technology-based State**

References to Japan as a technology-based state, a science and technology-based state, a technology and creativity-based state, science technology and innovation-based state, manufacturing state, state most advanced in a particular technology sector (e.g. information technology, environmental technologies, etc.)

● **103 Few Resources**

References to Japan as a country with few natural resources that is dependent on imported raw materials. References to Japan as having limited resources or limited territory that needs to import raw material from overseas.

● **104 Support World Trade Regime**

References that Japan should or must support, maintain or strengthen the world trade regime (sometimes referred to specifically as components of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO), networks of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), bilateral free trade agreements, currency regime agreements, and other institutions of free trade, etc.)

● **105 Increase/Maintain Exports**

References that Japan should or must expand its trade (exports) and sell its products throughout the world.

● **106 Improve Domestic Technology**

References that Japan should or must improve and promote its domestic technology.

● **107 Support Technological Cooperation**

References that Japan should or must support technological cooperation by sharing its higher technology with other countries.

---

[694] Here, "Japan" refers to any references to the Japanese people, nation, nation-state, or first-person plural references to this collectivity such as "us," "we Japanese," "our country," etc.

419

- **108 Expand/Maintain Overseas Investments**

References that Japan should or must increase its overseas investments.

II. 200 Organic State

- **201 Japanese as Ethnicity**

References to Japan as a homogenous nation-state, single ethnic state, homogenous nation or state, ethnically homogenous state, etc. References to the Japanese people as an ethnic group or as having a similar or the same ethnicity, being of Japanese or Yamato ethnicity, sharing our ethnicity, or as kindred, kin or brethren (in a sentence in which they are also not referred to as citizens).

- **204 Emperor**

References to the Emperor and the Imperial family or household.

- **205 Support Yasukuni Shrine**

References that Japanese leaders should make official visitations to the Yasukuni Shrine. References that Yasukuni Shrine should or must be maintained by the state and/or receive state support.

- **206 National Polity**

References to Japan as a national polity or country with a single national character.

- **207 Enforce Traditional Values**

References that Japan should or must reinforce the morals and values shared among the Japanese people. References that commend these morals and values. The four morals and values to be included are: love of country, love of territory, sense of public duty, and sense of filial duty.

III. 300 Peace State

- **301 Peace State**

References to Japan as a peace state, peaceful Japan, or a state that practices or reveres pacifism.

- **302 Nuclear Victim State**

Reference to Japan as the world's only victim of a nuclear weapon or a nuclear victim country.

- **303 Support Peace Constitution**

References that Japan should or must not revise Article 9 (including references to the Constitution and the spirit of the Constitution in the context of security policy). References to the postwar constitution as the Peace Constitution. References to Article 9 (including references to the Constitution and the spirit of the Constitution in the context of security policy).

● **304 Implement Peace Diplomacy**

References that Japan should or must implement a foreign policy of peace diplomacy or peace and friendship diplomacy.

● **305 Eschew Use of Force**

References that Japan should or must uniquely constrain itself from using force or the threat of force in international affairs. References to specific such constraints (e.g. policy of exclusively-defensive defense, ban on overseas dispatch, etc.).

● **306 Restrain War Potential**

References that Japan should or must be uniquely constrained in its acquisition of military capabilities. References to specific such constraints (e.g. policy of maintaining defense budget at 1% of GNP/GDP, ban on acquisition of offensive weapons, etc.).

● **307 Support International Disarmament**

References that Japan should or must encourage other nations to support conventional disarmament. References to specific such efforts (e.g. the arms export ban, etc.).

● **308 War Regret**

References to regret over or the need for reflection on Japan's actions towards countries it attacked and/or occupied during the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War Two. References to views of history that validate such feelings of regret or support the need for such reflection.

● **309 Atomic Bombings**

References to Japan's experiences of being bombed by nuclear weapons. References to Nagasaki, Hiroshima, atomic bomb victims, etc.

- **310 Support Non-Nuclear Principles**

References that Japan should or must not possess any nuclear weapons. References to specific such constraints (e.g. "three non-nuclear principles," etc.).

- **311 Support International Disarmament**

References that Japan should or must promote nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation around the world, including efforts to stop development and testing of nuclear weapons technology. References to specific such efforts (e.g. support for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), etc.).

IV. 400 Civilized State
- **401 Civilized State**

References to Japan as a civilized state or cultured state.

- **402 Support Japanese Culture**

References that Japanese culture (i.e. arts, traditions) should or must be spread more thoroughly among the Japanese people or within Japan. References that this culture should or must be honored. References that praise or express admiration for this culture.

- **403 Support Cultural Exchange**

References that Japan should or must participate in cultural exchange with other countries.

- **404 Welfare State**

References to Japan as welfare state.

- **405 Improve Domestic Welfare Programs**

References that Japan should or must promote the welfare of either all Japanese people or a significant subset asserted or assumed to part of this collectivity (e.g. the elderly, women, children, etc.) by guaranteeing a minimum standard of living.

V. 500 Democratic State
- **501 Democratic State**

References to Japan as a democratic state, a country of democracy, a free state, a liberal democratic state, a democratic country, a state governed by the rule by law, a law-governed country, or democratic Japan.

- **503 Enforce Democratic Principles**

References that Japan should or must ensure the more thorough implementation of democratic ideals, principles, practices and politics within Japan.

- **504 Member of Free World**

References to Japan as a member of the free world or group of free states or free countries. References to this group of democratic countries. References must include one of the following terms: free countries, democratic state or countries, group of free states or countries, liberal democratic states or countries, states or countries that embrace freedom and democracy, or advanced democratic states or countries.

VI. 600 Great Power
- **601 Economic Great Power**

References to Japan as a great economic power, state or country with or attaining great economic power, 2nd (or 3rd) largest economy, or the world's largest capital market.

- **602 Military Great Power**

References to Japan as a great military power or a state or country with or attaining great military power.

VII. 700 Social Purposes
- **701 Prosperity**

References to Japan's purpose as realizing prosperity for itself, the world, the Asian or other region of the world, and/or other countries. References that Japan wishes for prosperity. References must include one of the following terms or phrases: prosperity or growth, development, recovery, revitalization, re-growth of the economy or increase in GNP/GDP of Japan, the world, a particular region, and/or other countries.

● 703 Peace

References to Japan's purpose as realizing peace for itself, the world, the Asian or other region of the world, and/or other countries. References that Japan wishes for peace. References must include one of the following terms or phrases: peace or peace-making in Japan, the world, a particular region, and/or other countries.

705 Security

References to Japan's purpose as ensuring the security and stability of itself, the world, the Asian or other region of the world, and/or other countries. References that Japan wishes for security and stability. References must include one of the following terms or phrases: security, stability of Japan, the world, a particular region, and/or other countries in the context of international relationships.

● 708 Status

References to Japan's purpose as securing a prominent or high status in the international community of states. References that Japan wishes for such a status. References must include one of the following terms or phrases: maintain, increase, raise, secure, or gain status for Japan or high evaluations from other countries or high levels of trust and respect from other countries as well as the need to avoid becoming an embarrassment or a laughingstock or to invite mistrust from other countries.

● 709 Autonomy

References to Japan's purpose as to be an autonomous (self-ruled, autonomous, independent) state or country. References that Japan wishes for such autonomy. References must include one of the following terms or terms: autonomy, autonomous, having independence, independent (state), on its (Japan's) own accord, its (Japan's) sovereignty, equal relationship (with other states or countries), or not being dependent on, interfered with, coerced by, or succumbing pressure from another state or country.

VIII. 800 Targets for Relative Comparisons

A. International Organizations

- **804 EU**

References to the European Union (EU) or its predecessors, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European Economic Community (EEC), or European Communities (EC).

- **805 UN**

References to the United Nations (UN).

- **806 Other International Governmental Organizations**

References to other international organizations for which states or countries make up the membership such as ASEAN、 NATO、 APEC, etc.

B. Neighboring Countries

- **807 US Bases**

References to U.S. military forces and bases in Japan.

- **808 Okinawa**

References to pre-1972 territorial disputes between Japan and the U.S. (Okinawa, Ogasawara Islands (Bonin Islands, Iwo Island, Chichijima)).

- **809 US**

References to the United States.

- **810 US-Japan Alliance**

References to the US-Japan Alliance (e.g. Japan-US Security Treaty, Japan-US security alliance, etc.).

- **811 PRC**

References to China (People's Republic of China (PRC)).

- **812 Senkaku Islands**

References to the territorial disputes between Japan, China, and Taiwan (Senkaku Islands).

- **813 ROK**

References to South Korea (Republic of Korea (ROK).

- **814 Takeshima**

References to the territorial disputes between Japan and South Korea (Takeshima).

- **815 USSR/Russia**

References to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), the Soviet Union, Russian Federation or Russia.

- **816 Northern Territories**

References to the territorial disputes between Japan and U.S.S.R./Russia (the Northern Territories (South Kuril Island or Kuril Islands), Habomai islets (Habomai archipelago), Shikotan Island, Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island).

- **817 DPRK**

References to North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea).

- **818 ROC (Taiwan)**

References to Taiwan (Republic of China (ROC)).

C. World Regions

Note: To accord with Japanese geographic perspectives, these regions (and the division of countries) were taken from Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs website accessed at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/index.html (August 11, 2012). This division thus differs from other commonly-used conceptions of world regions and which countries belong to them.

- **819 Europe**

References to Europe or a country in Europe excluding Russia and former Soviet Union.

The following countries should be counted:

Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (former Yugoslavia), Bulgaria, Croatia (former Yugoslavia), Cyprus, Czech Republic (former Czechoslovakia), Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany (former West Germany, East Germany), Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kosovo (former Yugoslavia), Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia (former Yugoslavia), Slovakia (former Czechoslovakia), Slovenia (former Yugoslavia), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Vatican City

- **822 Oceania**

References to Oceania or a country in the Oceania region.

The following countries should be counted:

Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand (Niue and Cook Islands), Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

- **823 Middle East**

References to the Middle East or a country in the Middle Eastern region.

The following countries should be counted:

Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel (Palestinian Authority), Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

- **824 Asia**

References to Asia or a country in Asia excluding South Korea, China (Hong Kong, Macau), North Korea, Taiwan, and Japan

The following countries should be counted:

Bangladesh (East Pakistan), Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar (Burma), Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thai, Timor-Leste, Vietnam

- **825 Central/South America**

References to Central/South America or a country in Central/South America.

The following countries should be counted:

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kits and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela

- **826 North America**

References to North America or a county in North America excluding the United States.

The following countries should be counted:

Canada

- **827 Africa**

References to Africa or a country in Africa.

The following countries should be counted:

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'lvoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

IX. 900 Other

- **901 Domestic Minorities**

References to Japan's minorities such as the Ainu, Burakumin, Korean special permanent residents (*zainichi chōsenjin*) as well as foreigners or immigrants living in Japan (*zainichi gaikokujin, nikkeijin imin*)

- **902 Japanese as Citizenship**

References to Japan as nation or state of citizens or the Japanese people as citizens.   References to Japan as a civic nation-state.

Appendix B: Coding Rules

I. Speech Sets

A "speech set" consists of the following documents: (1) a prime ministerial address, (2) an address delivered by the leader of the largest opposition party in response to this prime ministerial address, and the editorials also responding to the same prime ministerial address by Japan's three largest newspapers; namely (3) *Asahi Shimbun*, (4) *Yomiuri Shimbun*, and (5) *Mainichi Shimbun*. There are 136 speech sets in total.

II. Coding Sheets

When coding the speech sets, please save the results in an Excel file, divided into five separate worksheets. These are referred to as "coding sheets." Coders are responsible for sorting out the coding sheets using the Excel file template provided. This process involves the following three steps:

1. Name the Excel file (i.e., workbook) according to the following format: date of prime ministerial speech, name of prime minister, and coder designation, all separated by periods. Example: 1972.10.28.Tanaka.CoderA
2. Make sure that the worksheet names are identical to the names of MSWord files for the documents coded on them.
3. Be careful to input the correct sentence (line) numbers for the relevant document in the first column of each worksheet.

III. Scope of Coding

Unit of Sampling	Speech set	136 (2.5 sets/year)
Unit of Data Collection	Individual speech or editorial	542 documents
Unit of Analysis	Texts	Approx. 50,000 sentences

IV. Categories

Each speech/editorial is assessed sentence by sentence utilizing the content analysis method, and the sentences are classified into 63 (variable) predefined categories or "codes." Please use the following procedure to assess each sentence and then code it accordingly.

The 63 categories defined as "codes" are divided into nine groups (i.e., 100s~ 900s). Numbers in the 100s, 200s, 300s, 400s and 500s represent the components of five nation-state narratives. These include both the identity elements of "cognitive models" or "cognitive claims" and "norms" or "normative claims." Numbers in the 600s represent views on a "great power" status. Numbers in the 700s code five "social purposes," and those in the 800s code factors such as international organizations and neighboring countries for "relative comparisons." Numbers in the 900s are related to references to Japanese as citizenship as well as domestic minorities in Japan.

V. Coding Values (1, -1, 0)

Code "1" : In a sentence, when one or more words falls into a coded category and is judged to refer to this code in a positive or neutral way, input "1" in the relevant code column for the correct sentence number. "Positive/Neutral" means that the author of the speech/editorial is expressing his/her generally positive or nonjudgmental assessment of the content (e.g., the normative claims, cognitive claims, social purposes, and relative comparisons) of the category.

Cognitive claims: When the author has confirmed a core concept, causal connection or historical view, or emphasized its importance, please count it as "1".

Social purposes: When an issue that is, or should be, Japan's objective to be achieved is mentioned, please count it as "1".

Relative comparisons: Count any references to other countries or international organizations or their descriptions as "1", unless judged to be "negatively-valued" as explained below. The mention of a country in this ceremony indicates that the country is attracting attention at the time; it is not necessary for the country to be compared to Japan explicitly.

Coding "1" for normative claims may be more difficult than other types of codes because there are two types of references classified here:
1) General references: These include statements encouraging that a norm be generally followed generally or describing the content of the normative claim (i.e. explaining the rule). For example, the claim that Japan must "support international disarmament" can be expressed as a general statement without reference to a specific policy issue or state action. In such cases, the coding is relatively straightforward.
2) Specific reference: Advocacy of a specific policy or state action made in accordance with a normative claim can be more difficult to code. In particular, knowledge of past policy and political debates may be required to decide whether or not the advocated policy or state action

represents a specific manifestation of a normative claim. In order to resolve this problem, extensive coder training will be offered. This training will include coder briefings on key topics as well as a pilot study in which a small sample of speech sets will be test-coded in coordination with the coding trainer. Although the content analysis method prohibits coding trainers from giving advice to coders on how an individual sentence should be coded in the reliability and main samples, the coding trainer is always available to answer questions about general topics, such as postwar Japanese history or politics. Coders may also use the Internet or other research tools during coding if they feel they lack factual information necessary to make valid coding judgments.

Code "-1": When one or more words are thought to fall in a category and be used negatively in a sentence, please input "-1" in the relevant category column for the appropriate sentence number. "Negative" means that the author of the address/editorial is expressing his/her unfavourable assessment of what the category represents or disagrees with its claims in some way. What "negative" or "negatively-valued" means can differ in each case as details are different for each type of code (i.e., cognitive claims, social purposes, relative comparisons and normative claims).

For cognitive claims, please count as "-1" when the author is rejecting or questioning the core concept, causal connection or historical view inherent to the claim. Examples include:

101 Trading State, 102 Technology-based State, 201 Japanese as Ethnicity, 301 Peace State, 302 Nuclear Victim State, 401 Civilized State, 404 Welfare State, 501 Democratic State, 601 Economic Great Power, 602 Military Great Power: When the author states that Japan[695] is not or should not be represented by the above code, the sentence should be counted as "-1".
* For 602 Military Great Power, when it is stated that Japan should not become a military great power or the author expresses his/her concern, code it as "-1".
901 Domestic Minorities 902 Japanese as Citizenship, 204 Emperor: Code as "-1" when these groups, concepts or persons are presented in a negative light, called into question, or explicitly criticized in any way.
504 Member of Free World: Code as "-1" when relations with other democratic countries are denied, devalued or disrespected, such as in statements to the effect that "Japan is not a member of the free world" or "Japan has not been welcomed into the community of democratic states."
308 War Regret: Code as "-1" statements to the effect that Japan should not reflect on or regret its actions during World War Two or Japan's actions during World War Two were justified.

---

[695] Here, "Japan" refers to any references to the Japanese people, nation, nation-state, or first-person plural references to this collectivity such as "us," "we Japanese," "our country," etc.

431

309 Atomic Bombings: Code as "-1" statements downplaying or denying the importance of Japan's experience as a victim of atomic bombings.

103 Few Resources: Code as "-1" statements asserting that Japan is abundant in natural resources, self-sufficient, or not a "country of few natural resources."

For social purposes (**701 Prosperity, 703 Peace, 705 Security, 708 Status, 709 Autonomy**), Code as "-1" statements asserting that the relevant social purpose is not Japan's objective, should not be set as Japan's goal in the future or does not need to be achieved by Japan. Incidentally, concepts such as "prosperity," "peace," "safety," "status" and "autonomy" are generally accepted as favourable purposes for a political community, however conceived, so they will only rarely, if ever, be mentioned in a negative way.

For relative comparisons, the meaning of "-1" differs depending on the individual codes:

805 UN, 806 Other International Governmental Organizations: Code as "-1" statements asserting that Japan's membership is problematic or useless, calling for Japan to leave the organization, calling for abolishing the organization, or criticizing some specific policy or action taken by the organization.

807 U.S. Bases: Code as "-1" statements asserting that U.S military bases in Japan are unnecessary, should be eliminated or curtailed, increase the chance of getting Japan involved in foreign wars, invite crime, worsen the domestic living environment, are inconsistent with the Constitution, or violate normative claims prohibiting Japan from acquiring or utilizing force in international affairs.

808 Okinawa, 812 Senkaku, 814 Takeshima, 816 Northern Territories): Code as "-1" statements asserting that Japan does not wish the return of disputed territories, that they do not belong to Japan, or that Japan should drop its claim to these disputed territories

810 Japan-US Alliance: Code as "-1" statements asserting that the alliance should be abolished, is unnecessary, increases Japan's chances of becoming involved in foreign wars, is unconstitutional, or violates normative claims prohibiting Japan from acquiring or utilizing force in international affairs.

804 EU, Neighboring Countries (809 US, 811 PRC, 813 ROK, 815 USSR/Russia, 817 DPRK, 818 ROC (Taiwan)), Other Countries in World Regions (819–827):

When the author of the speech/editorial makes a critical remark about other countries or the EU regarding the following areas, please count as "-1":

1. Threats: Country X is presented as a security threat to Japan. This may include a another country's efforts to develop or deploy nuclear weapons, support terrorism, foment domestic insurrection, attack or invade Japan, blockade or physically isolate Japan, etc.

2. Competition: Country X is presented as an economic competitor in trade and technological development or as a opposing party in a trade conflict (treated as a competitor for Japan, "trade conflict," etc.).

3. Dictatorship: If it is noted that Country X is an autocracy, not a democracy, or a country that oppresses its own people (i.e., is not a democratic country like Japan).

4. Complaints: The scope is limited to complaints about the opposing party in a territorial dispute, a country where a crime was committed against a Japanese national or which was accused of participating in or allowing such a crime, a country accused of hampering Japan's autonomy, a country which criticises Japan (when Japan has complaints against another country)

You may find a surprisingly large number of code "-1" for **809 US**. This is because some political elites claim the United States represents a threat to Japan because the U.S.-Japan alliance increases the risk of Japan becoming involved in foreign wars, it is a party in a long series of trade disputes with Japan, it is the site of numerous high profile crimes against Japanese nationals and is often criticized for interfering in Japan's politics and for criticizing Japan.

Coding"-1" is probably most difficult for normative claims for the same reason as discussed above for coding "1" for such claims: There are two types of references:

1) General reference: Code "-1" for references that encouraging the complete violation of a norm or a repudiation of the norm itself.

These are relatively easy to judge as the keywords for the norms are often mentioned and references usually evoke the direct opposite of the normative claim.

2) Specific reference: Code "-1" for references advocate a specific policy or state action that is explicitly contrary to the normative claim or statements that reject the principle behind the normative claim in the course of advocating detailed policy changes or state actions that violate the normative claim as framed in the codebook.

A problem here is that knowledge of policy is often required to assess the relationship between the normative claim and policies and state actions. Information on major policy issues relevant to this study will be presented during coder briefings. However, if further explanation is needed, please contact the coding trainer or re, please either ask me or research the matter on your own.

> Point to note: You may find references that can be interpreted as both "1" and "-1" in the same sentence in the case of specific reference of to normative claims or the 800s codes, which represent other countries. For example, in a reference such as "although the U.S. is Japan's most important alliance partner, its response to the rape of an Okinawan girl by American servicemen was appalling," the first part of the statement mentions **809 US** in a positive manner, while the second refers to it negatively (complaint over bilateral issue).

However, the coding rules here do not allow the same sentence to be counted both "1" and "-1" for the same code. In such cases, code the sentence according to the relevant reference that appears last. Thus, the example above should be coded as 809 (-1).

Code "0" (no relevant category): Do not input anything unless the sentence is counted as "1" or "-1." (This is to save time for coders; "0" will be inserted automatically to blank cells by the coding trainer later.)

VI. Other Coding Rules

Difference between sentence and word "hits": Each coder is responsible for determining which specific Japanese characters in a sentence should be counted as satisfying the requirements for a reference to a particular code, which is here called a "hit." It is possible (and often necessary) to code the same sentence as having hits from multiple codes, but as a general rule, but avoid underlining the same Japanese character in a sentence as counting toward more than one code. However, although it is a general rule that the same Japanese character should not be classified into more than one code, it should be understand that there are some exceptions, especially in the cases of the use of pronouns and indirect references (discussed below). Specific exceptions will be discussed during coder briefings during the pilot study.

Pronouns and indirect references: When what has been coded in a prior sentence is referred to in a later sentence through the use of a pronoun (e.g. "this," "that," etc.) or phrase of indirect reference (e.g." those countries," "that kind of a state action," "all the things I just listed," etc.) the later sentence should also be coded as having a hit for the code in question. However, if the coder judges it is not clear exactly what the pronoun or indirect reference refers to, there is no need to code it again for the later sentence. As a general rule, do not code a pronoun or indirect reference when you are not confident what is being referenced. When a pronoun or indirect reference refers to references coded as more than one code in a prior sentence, count it as hits for all the same codes in the later sentence as well (e.g. "those countries" in sentence 2 referring to "the United States and China" in sentence 1 should be coded as **809 US** and **811 PRC** for sentence 2 as well).

➢ Point to note: When indirect references are used, a single Japanese word may refer to the contents of more than one code. "The U.S. and European countries" *(ōbei shokoku)* or "the countries of the Korean Peninsula" are two such examples. Further examples will be discussed during coder briefings.

434

Filling in the hard copy and submission: Before coding a speech or editorial, print out a hard copy so that you have a record of it. As you code, underline the character or word that corresponds to each code and write the number and value of the code over it (e.g. "305, 1") above it. When you have completed coding the document, write your coder designation (e.g. Coder A, etc.) and the date on the cover of the hard copy before submitting it to the coding trainer.

How to code quotations from or summaries of remarks by third parties (including those cited from speeches, publications or the texts of law, etc.): Do not code passages that are simply direct quotations or summaries of what someone other than the speaker or author said or wrote, unless the speaker or author expresses an opinion of this passage within the same sentence. The purpose of this rule is to preserve as much as possible the author's or speaker's point of view. For example, it is common for opposition party leaders and editorialists first to quote lines from the prime ministerial address in a sentence and then comment on these lines in the next sentence. In such an instance, only code material in the latter sentence, because this is where the speaker or author expresses an opinion or approaches the quoted passage from his or her point of view.

Rhetorical questions: Addresses by opposition party leaders and editorials commonly include a large number of rhetorical questions. In particular, the opposition party leaders often address such kinds of questions to the Prime Minister in their attempt to criticize the government's stance and policies. Sometimes, it is difficult to judge whether a question is rhetorical or genuine. On the surface, both may appear to be simple requests for the Prime Minister to clarify the government's stance, but in fact, the opposition party or the newspaper is often indicating its opposition to this stance or questioning its plausibility through this device. Coders should be careful when coding questions and consider whether they are meant to rhetorical to further a alternative position advocated by the speaker or author.

Appendix C: Notes on Methodology

I. Introduction

This appendix reports the results of inter-coder reliability checks and then expands the discussion of methodological considerations related to this study's coding scheme that were touched on only briefly in earlier chapters. These include the use of open-ended and fixed codes, the treatment of valence and the meaning of prominence.

II. Inter-coder Reliability

Reliability in content analysis refers to "the extent to which a measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials."[696] More specifically, the reliability of concern here is the degree to which different coders arrive at the same judgments when coding the same material. Achieving an adequate level of agreement between coders is important because it provides a degree of validation for the coding scheme. Sufficiently high levels of inter-coder reliability are evidence that the scheme, when employed by different persons, will yield similar results and thus is not something that can only be reproduced by a particular individual, presumably due the person's own idiosyncratic tendencies. Evaluating inter-coder reliability is thus essential in assessing the level to which the "relatively objective (or at least inter-subjective)

---

[696] Neuendorf, 2002, p.141.

437

characteristics" of content have been identified and accurately recorded in studies employing more than one human coder.[697]

Four human coders took part in this study (Coders A, B, C, and D). Coders A and B evaluated all 136 speech sets (1952-2007) for 40 codes including all codes relating to the five narratives (100s, 200s, 300s, 400s, and 500s) as well as codes for great power status (600s), social purposes (700s) and Japan's domestic minorities (901). In a second pass, Coders C and D evaluated 97 speech sets (1968-2007) for 23 codes including codes referring to international organizations, neighboring countries and bilateral disputes (territorial, basing issues, etc.), and references to other counties and world regions (800s) as well as the code for referring to the Japanese people as citizens (902). A subsample of 20 speech sets was coded by both coders in each pair to compare their coding results, representing nearly 15% of the total sample for Coders A and B and slightly more than 20% of the total sample for Coders C and D.[698]

Two coefficients were calculated to assess inter-coder reliability. The first, percent agreement, the number of agreements divided by the total number of measures, is "one of the

---

[697] Ibid.

[698] Although "there is no set standard" for determining the right subsample size for calculating inter-coder reliability, between 10% and 20% of the total sample is one "rough guideline" offered by social science research method textbooks. Neuendorf, 2002, p.158. Please note that inter-coder reliability for the code 902 Japanese as Citizenship was calculated from a subsample of only 5 speech sets (5% of total sample for Coders C and D) due to cost and time constraints. However, since this code was fixed to specific key words and was also the most referenced individual code in the study, the smaller subsample size is not deemed problematic in judging inter-coder reliability in this case.

most popular coefficients" used in content analysis.[699] Although both popular and appropriate

for the type of categories utilized here, percent agreement does not have the capacity to assess

whether agreement is simply the result of chance. A second coefficient, Cohen's *kappa*, was

thus also calculated to assess reliability when the impact of chance agreement is considered.

This coefficient, which ranges from 0 (agreement by chance) to 1 (perfect agreement beyond

chance), compares the proportion of agreement observed with that expected to occur naturally by

chance.[700] The minimum level of inter-coder reliability for a code to be included in this study

was selected for each coefficient. The standard for percent agreement was set at 90% or above,

a level that Neuendorf has noted is "acceptable to all" in the field of content analysis.[701] For

the beyond-chance measure, which is generally "afforded a more liberal criterion," the study

followed the recommendation that a Cohen's *kappa* of .4 or higher is sufficient to guarantee at

least "fair to good agreement beyond chance."[702]

Table C.1 below shows the percent agreement and Cohen's *kappa* values for the

individual codes handled by Coders A and B. All codes tested proved sufficient for inclusion

in the study. Please note that Cohen's *kappa* could not be calculated for two codes (101

---

[699] Neuendorf, 2002, p.149.

[700] For specifics on how to calculate Cohen's *kappa*, see Neuendorf (2002, p.155). All inter-coder reliability measures were calculated using Simstat for Windows.

[701] Neuendorf, 2002, p.143.

[702] Ibid. Banerjee, et al., 1999, p.6. In introducing this standard for interpreting Cohen's *kappa*, Banerjee et al. cite an earlier study by Landis & Koch (1977).

Trading State and 206 National Polity) because neither coder recorded a reference to them in the

subsample tested for inter-coder reliability.

Table C.1: Inter-Coder Reliability Measures, Coders A & B

#	Code	Name	% Agreement	Cohen's *kappa*
1	101	Trading State	100.0	N.A.
2	102	Technology-based State	100.0	0.500
3	103	Few Resources	99.9	0.700
4	104	Support World Trade Regime	99.5	0.602
5	105	Increase/Maintain Exports	99.7	0.647
6	106	Improve Domestic Technology	99.4	0.664
7	107	Support Technological Cooperation	99.9	0.642
8	108	Expand/Maintain Overseas Investments	99.3	0.668
9	201	Japanese as Ethnicity	99.9	0.893
10	204	Emperor	100.0	1.000
11	205	Support Yasukuni Shrine	100.0	1.000
12	206	National Polity	100.0	N.A.
13	207	Enforce Traditional Values	99.7	0.642
14	301	Peace State	99.9	0.833
15	302	Nuclear Victim State	100.0	0.933
16	303	Support Peace Constitution	99.3	0.575
17	304	Implement Peace Diplomacy	100.0	0.750
18	305	Eschew Use of Force	99.1	0.525
19	306	Restrain War Potential	99.0	0.707
20	307	Support International Disarmament	99.7	0.701
21	308	War Regret	99.8	0.711
22	309	Atomic Bombings	100.0	0.800
23	310	Support Non-Nuclear Principles	99.4	0.707
24	311	Support International Nuclear Disarmament	99.2	0.727
25	401	Civilized State	100.0	1.000
26	402	Support Japanese Culture	99.7	0.774
27	403	Support Cultural Exchange	99.9	0.871
28	404	Welfare State	100.0	0.800

29	405	Improve Domestic Welfare Programs	98.4	0.737
30	501	Democratic State	99.9	0.500
31	503	Enforce Democratic Principles	98.1	0.623
32	504	Member of Free World	99.8	0.624
33	601	Economic Great Power	100.0	0.963
34	602	Military Great Power	100.0	0.963
35	701	Prosperity	98.1	0.685
36	703	Peace	98.8	0.836
37	705	Security	99.5	0.797
38	708	Status	99.5	0.748
39	709	Autonomy	99.7	0.749
40	901	Domestic Minorities	100.0	0.965
Average			**99.6**	**0.752**

Table C.2 below shows the percent agreement and Cohen's *kappa* values for the individual codes handled by Coders C and D. All codes tested proved sufficient for inclusion in the study. Please note that Cohen's *kappa* could not be calculated for one code (812 Senkaku Islands) because neither coder recorded a reference to it in the subsample tested for inter-coder reliability.

Table C.2: Inter-Coder Reliability Measures, Coders C & D

#	Code	Name	% Agreement	Cohen's *kappa*
41	804	EU	100.0	0.909
42	805	UN	99.7	0.871
43	806	Other IGO	99.9	0.911
44	807	US Bases	99.7	0.799
45	808	Okinawa	99.8	0.862
46	809	US	98.8	0.892
47	810	US-Japan Security Pact	99.8	0.914
48	811	PRC	99.6	0.914
49	812	Senkaku Islands	100.0	N.A.

50	813	ROK	99.8	0.947
51	814	Takeshima	100.0	1.000
52	815	USSR/Russia	99.8	0.927
53	816	Northern Territories	99.9	0.926
54	817	DPRK	99.8	0.911
55	818	ROC (Taiwan)	100.0	0.976
56	819	Europe	99.5	0.837
57	822	Oceania	99.9	0.958
58	823	Middle East	99.9	0.937
59	824	Asia	99.5	0.935
60	825	Central/South America	99.9	0.865
61	826	North America	99.9	0.714
62	827	Africa	99.9	0.920
63	902	Japanese as Citizenship	96.9	0.884
Average			**99.7**	**0.900**

III. Open-ended and Fixed Codes

The coding scheme includes two types of codes. "Open-ended" codes provide general

descriptions of targeted content that allow the coder some freedom in recognizing whether core

concepts are present. "Fixed" codes provide general descriptions of targeted content but also

include a list of key words with the stipulation that at least one must be present for a count to be

made. Open-ended codes, which are more difficult to implement and represent a cost in

inter-coder reliability, were employed here for two reasons. First, although the focus on

linguistic vehicles helps to demystify and specify different strands of nationalism, the subject

remains inherently ambiguous.[703] In order to capture the full range within which different

advocates employ the same concepts in nationalist discourse, it was necessary to allow coders

the freedom to recognize this variation. Second, this study analyzes discourse over a fifty-five

year period in which both the narrative elements and their medium, the Japanese language, have

changed. In some instances, as times changed, different words came to be used to describe the

same concepts.[704] In other cases, the same words did not carry the same meanings in all

periods.[705] Accordingly, for some elements, it was simply impossible to assemble a list of key

words that was both of manageable length and addressed the above concerns sufficiently.

Open-ended codes were thus the logical solution, especially for normative elements, which tend

to be more complex than the other types of components examined.

Although the inclusion of open-ended codes did lower the overall average for both percent

agreement and Cohen's *kappa* as expected, it did not do so by much. The average percent

agreement and Cohen's *kappa* for the 42 fixed codes were 99.7% and .855, respectively, while

the same measures for the 21 open-ended codes came to 99.5% and .715, respectively.[706] It is

thus argued here that use of open-ended codes enriched the coverage of the coding by allowing

---

[703] McVeigh, 2004, pp.23-39.
[704] One such example is the gradually morphing of the term "technology-based state" (*gijutsu rikkoku*) to the broader "science, technology and creativity-based state" *(kagaku gijutsu sōzō rikkoku)*, a shift whose meaning will be discussed below.
[705] On the changing meanings attributed to the word democracy during this period in Japan, see Oguma, 2002b.
[706] The 42 fixed codes are 101, 102, 201, 206, 301, 302, 304, 401, 404, 501, 504, 601, 602, 701, 703, 705, 708, 709, 901, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, and 902. The 21 open-ended codes are 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 204, 205, 207, 303, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 402, 403, 405, and 503.

coders the freedom to deal with the inherent ambiguity of nationalist concepts and their shifting vocabularies over time without proving overly problematic for inter-coder reliability.

IV. Valence

The coding scheme here is valence-sensitive; each code has a positive and negative version. A positive reference is one in which a declarative or imperative statement concerning a relevant cognitive or normative element, social purpose or relative comparison is made without reservation. The presence of a reservation thus indicates a negative valence. Reservations may take different forms depending on the type of element modeled by the code. For example, a reservation for a cognitive element usually takes the form of questioning in part or in total the accuracy of the element as a fact or valid observation (e.g. Japan is NOT a country with few natural resources). For a normative element, statements that advocate behaviors for the norm target that violate the norm in question or challenge the validity of the norm in general terms are coded as negative (e.g. Japan SHOULD acquire nuclear weapons or there is NO valid reason why a country threatened by other nuclear powers should not acquire such capability in defense). The negative versions of other code types are explained in the coding rules including in Appendix B. The percentage of negative references to total references is viewed here as an indication of the level of contestation for an individual code or group of codes.

444

It should be noted that both declarative and imperative statements without reservations are coded here as having positive valence. Although some coding schemes incorporate a "neutral" valence option for statements that, while lacking reservations, also do not explicitly endorse or advocate for the content in question, this option was rejected here. As the anthropologist Harumi Befu has made clear, in Japan's identity discourse, even declarative statements about the elements of cultural models offered as observed facts "characterize an idealized, desirable state of affairs and carry positive valence."[707] Paraphrasing Befu, the *is* in Japanese nationalist discourse is always understood as *should*.[708] In this sense, when the elements of one of these narratives are mentioned without extensive comment or indications of reservation, it is rightly coded as positive because the very act of citing it in the context of the Diet inaugural ceremony and the national conversation taking place serves to further establish the element as a defining part the nation-state narrative and the social category it helps construct.

V. Prominence

Both negative and positive references are counted toward each code's, and in combination, each code group's prominence score. Prominence is an indication of the degree to which the targeted content was the focus of nationalist discourse and may thus be used to

[707] Befu, 2001. P.79.
[708] Ibid.

assess differences in this dimension between individual codes and code groups. In addition, the units for prominence scores are standardized as the number of sentences containing at least one reference to the code per one hundred sentences examined. This allows for comparisons across different time periods in which the number of sentences in the speeches and editorials and even the number of Diet inaugural ceremonies vary.

However, prominence is not necessarily indicative of the breadth or depth of inculcated beliefs among the participants in the Diet inaugural spectacle or the public at large. Such a correlation is certainly possible in some cases, but is likely a fleeting one. As noted in Chapter Three, discourse is viewed here as a set of language or linguistic conventions with which speakers must contend, no matter the state of their internal commitments or calculus, and audiences will consume this language to varying effects on their own internal belief systems. It is thus not necessary for a single speaker to be either sincere in a particular utterance or consistent in his or her advocacy over time. To account for this, each component code of a narrative is analyzed independently of the others. This means that a speaker or writer may advocate for one element of a particular narrative while roundly rejecting another part of the same narrative in the very next sentence.

Bibliography

Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott. 2006. Identity as a Variable. *Perspectives on Politics* 4 (4).

Abe, Shinzō. 2006. *Utsukushii Kuni he (Toward a Beautiful Nation)*. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū.

Allen, Julia M., and Lester Faigley. 1995. Discursive Strategies for Social Change: An Alternative Rhetoric of Argument. *Rhetoric Review* 14 (1):142-172.

Amaya, Naohiro. 1980. Japan as a Mercantile Nation. *Japan Echo* 7 (2):53-62.

Anderson, Benedict. 1991 (1983). *Imagined Communities*. New York: Verso.

Andrews, Molly. 2007. *Shaping History: Narratives of Political Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aristotle. 1952. *The Works of Aristotle*. Vol. II. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.

Art, David. 2006. *The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Asaba, Michiaki. 2004. *Nashonarizumu: Meicho de Tadoru Nihon Shisō Nyūmon (Nationalism: An Introduction to Famous Works in Japanese thought)*. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō.

Asahi Shimbun. 1996. Zenkoku Yoron Chōsa no Ichiran, 1946-1995: Asahi Shimbunsha Yoron Chōsashitsu.

————. 2004. Zenkoku Yoron Chōsa no Ichiran, 1995-2004: Asahi Shimbunsha Yoron Chōsashitsu.

————. 2005. Nikkanchū Kokusai Chōsa: Asahi Shimbunsha Yoron Chōsashitsu.

Asahi Shimbun, Keizaibu (Economics Section of the Asahi Shimbun). 2006. *Fuan Taikoku Nippon: Kakusa Shakai no Genba Kara (Japan, the Uneasy Great Power: From the Frontlines of an Unequal Society)*. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha.

Asami, Nobuo. 1998. Obuchi Shushō no Enzetsu (Prime Minister Obuchi's Address). *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 11 August.

Auer, James. 1973. *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71*. New York: Praeger.

————. 1990. Article Nine of Japan's Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force 'Forever' to the Third Largest Defense Budge in the World. *Law and Contemporary Problems* 53 (2):171-187.

Banerjee, Mousumi, Michelle Capozzoli, Laura McSweeney, and Debajyoti Sinha. 1999. Beyond Kappa: A Review of Interrater Agreement Measures. *The Canadian Journal of Statistics* 27 (1):3-23.

447

Bartlett, Bruce. 2009. The Party of Medicare. In *Forbes.com*.

Bates, Robert H. 1974. Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa. *Comparative Political Studies* 6 (4):457-484.

———. 1983. Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa. In *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*, edited by D. Rothchild and V. A. Olorunsola. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Beer, Lawrence, and John M. Maki. 2002. *From Imperial Myth to Democracy: Japan's Two Constitutions, 1889-2002*. Boulder: University Press of Colorado.

Befu, Harumi. 1992. Symbols of Nationalism and 'Nihonjinron'. In *Ideology and Practice in Modern Japan*, edited by R. Goodman and K. Refsing. Londong: Routledge.

———. 2001. *Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of "Nihonjinron"*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.

Béland, Daniel, and André Lecours. 2008. *Nationalism and Social Policy: The Politics of Territorial Solidarity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bell, Daniel. 1973. *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*. New York: Basic Books.

Benfell, Steven. 1998. Meet the New Japan, Same as the Old Japan: The History and Politics of Postwar National Identity. In *Paper for the Program for US-Japan Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs and the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies.

Berger, Thomas U. 1993. From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism. *International Security* 17 (4):119-150.

———. 1998. *Cultures of Antimilitarism*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Billing, Michael. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage.

Birch, Anthony H. 1989. *Nationalism and National Integration*. London: Unwin Hyman.

Bowen, Roger. 2003. *Japan's Dysfunctional Democracy*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Boyd, J. Patrick. 2003. Nine Lives: Pragmatism, Pacifism, and Japan's Article Nine, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.

Boyd, J. Patrick, and Richard J. Samuels. 2005. Nine Lives? The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan. *Policy Studies* 19.

———. 2008. Prosperity's Children: Generational Change and Japan's Future Leadership. In *Emerging Leaders in East Asia: The Next Generation of Political Leadership in China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan*, edited by T. Tanner. Seattle: National Burearu of Asian Research.

Brass, Paul R. 1991. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Breen, John, ed. 2008. *Yasukuni, the War Dead, and the Struggle for Japan's Past*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Breuilly, John. 1993 (1982). *Nationalism and the State*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1996. Approaches to Nationalism. In *Mapping the Nation*, edited by G. Balakrishnan. London: Verso.

Bridgman, Todd, and David Barry. 2002. Regulation Is Evil: An Application of Narrative Policy Analysis to Regulatory Debate in New Zealand. *Policy Sciences* 35 (2):141-161.

Brown, Delmer Myers. 1955. *Nationalism in Japan: An Introductory Historical Analysis*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. London: Harvard University Press.

———. 1996. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2004a. *Ethnicity without Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

———. 2004b. In the Name of the Nation: Reflections on Nationalism and Patriotism. *Citizenship Studies* 8 (2):115-127.

Bukh, Alexander. 2010. *Japan's National Identity and Foreign Policy: Russia as Japan's 'Other'*. London: Routledge.

Calhoun, Craig. 1997. *Nationalism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Carr, Edward Hallet. 1945. *Nationalism and After*. London: MacMillan & Co.

Carter, Michael. 1991. The Ritual Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric: The Case of Socrates' Funeral Oration. *Rhetorica* 9:209-222.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2001. Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics. *APSA-CP* 12 (1):7-11.

———. 2004a. What is Ethnic Identity and Why Does It Matter? Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

———. 2006. What Is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter? *Annual Review of Political Science* 9:397-424.

Chandra, Kanchan, and Steven Wilkinson. 2008. Measuring the Effect of "Ethnicity". *Comparative Political Studies* 41:515-562.

Chapman, David. 2008. *Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity*. London: Routledge.

Christensen, Thomas J. 1999. China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in Asia. *International Security* 23 (4):49-80.

Chūma, Kiyofuku. 1991. The Choice is Clear: Diplomacy over Force. *Japan Quarterly* 38 (2):142-148.

Chung, Erin Aeran. 2010. *Immigration and Citizenship in Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Citrin, Jack. 1974. Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government. *American Political Science Review* 68 (3):973-988.

Clammer, J. R. 2001. *Japan and Its Others: Globalization, Difference and the Critique of Modernity*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.

Connor, Walker. 1994. *Ethnonationalism: A Quest of Understanding*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Corning, Gregory P. 2004. *Japan and the Politics of Techno-Globalism*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

Cox, Gary W., and Jonathan N. Katz. 1999. The Reapportionment Revolution and Bias in U. S. Congressional Elections. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (3):812-841.

Cruz, Consuelo. 2000. Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures. *World Politics* 52 (3):275-312.

————. 2005. *Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua: World Making in the Tropics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Curtis, Gerald. 1971. *Election Campaigning, Japanese Style*. New York: Columbia University Press.

————. 1999. *The Logic of Japanese Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Dentsū Sōken (Dentsu Communication Institute). 2005. *Jōhō Media Hakusho 2006*. Tokyo: Daiyamondsha.

Deutsch, Karl Wolfgang. 1953. *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*. Cambridge, Mass.: Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology/Wiley.

Doak, Kevin Michael. 1994. *Dreams of Difference: The Japan Romantic School and the Crisis of Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

————. 1996. Ethnic Nationalism and Romanticism in Early Twentieth-Century Japan. *Journal of Japanese Studies* 22 (1):77-103.

————. 1997. What Is a Nation and Who Belongs? National Narratives and the Ethnic Imagination in Twentieth-Century Japan. *The American Historical Review* 102 (2):283-309.

————. 1999. Review: Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the Search for Autonomy. *Journal of Asian Studies* 58 (2):523-525.

————. 2001a. Building National Identity through Ethnicity in Wartime Japan and After. *Journal of Japanese Studies* 27 (1):1-39.

————. 2007. *A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan*. Leiden/Boston: Brill.

Dogan, Mattei. 1994. The Decline of Nationalisms within Western Europe. *Comparative Politics* 26 (3):281-305.

Dore, Ronald. 1986. *Flexible Rigidities: Industrial Policy and Structural Adjustment in the Japanese Economy*. London: Athlone Press.

Dower, John W. 1979. *Empire and Aftermath*. Cambridge, MA: Council of East Asian Studies, Harvard University.

————. 1995. Triumphal and Tragic Narratives of the War in Asia. *Journal of American History* 82 (3):1124-1135.

————. 1999. The Showa Emperor and Japan's Postwar Imperial Democracy. *Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper* 61.

————. 2003. Democracy in Japan. *Asia Program Special Report, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars* 109:4-8.

Eda, Kenji, and Takashi Ryūzaki. 2002. *Shushō Kantei (the prime minister's residence)*. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū.

Edelman, Murray J. 1985. *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

————. 1988. *Constructing the Political Spectacle*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Edstrom, Bert. 1999. *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to Miyazawa*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Edwards, George C. 2003. *On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

————. 2009. *The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Eizawa, Kōji. 2001. *Kindai Nihon no Nashonarizumu (Modern Japanese Nationalism)*. Sagamihara-shi: Seizansha.

Emmers, Ralf. 2010. *Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia*. London: Routledge.

Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 1993. Formal and Informal Nationalism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16 (1):1-25.

Estevez-Abe, Margarita. 2008. *Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Etō, Jun. 1991. The Japanese Constitution in the Post-Gulf War Period. *Japan Echo* 18 (3):62-68.

Finlayson, Alan. 1998. Ideology, Discourse and Nationalism. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 3 (1):99-118.

Fouse, David B. 2002. The Role of Antimilitarism in Postwar Japanese Political Legitimacy, Political Science Department, University of Hawaii, Honolulu.

Freeman, Laurie Anne. 2000. *Closing the Shop: Information Cartels and Japan's Mass Media*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Friedberg, Aaron L. 1993-94. Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia. *International Security* 18 (3):5-33.

Fujiwara, Masahiko. 2005. *Kokka no Hinkaku (National Dignity)*. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Fukuoka, Yasunori. 2000. *Lives of Koreans in Japan*. Translated by T. Gill. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.

Funabashi, Yoichi. 1991-92. Japan and the New World Order. *Foreign Affairs* 70 (5):58-74.

Gao, Bai. 1998. The Search for National Identity and Japanese Industrial Policy, 1950-1969. *Nations and Nationalism* 4 (2):227-245.

Garon, Sheldon M. 1997. *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gayle, Curtis Anderson. 2001. Progressive Representations of the Nation: Early Post-war Japan and Beyond. *Social Science Japan Journal* 4 (1):1-19.

————. 2002. *Marxist History and Postwar Japanese Nationalism*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.

Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

————. 1996. Do Nations Have Navels? *Nations and Nationalism* 2 (3):366-370.

Goertz, Gary. 2003. *International Norms and Decision Making: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.

Green, Michael. 1995. *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy* New York: Columbia University Press.

Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press.

Hall, John. 1993. Nationalisms: Classified and Explained. *Daedalus* 122 (3):1-28.

Hall, Peter A. 2003. Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics. In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C.R. Talyor. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. *Political Studies* 44:936-957.

Hamilton, Malcolm B. 1987. The Elements of the Concept of Ideology. *Political Studies* 35 (1):18-38.

Hara, Takeshi. 2001. *Kashika Sareru Teikoku (The Visualized Empire)*. Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō.

Hara, Yoshihisa. 1988. *Sengo nihon to kokusai seiji: anpo kaitei no seiji rikigaku (Postwar Japan and International Politics: The Political Dynamics of the Revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty)*. Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha.

Hardacre, Helen. 1989. *Shintō and the State, 1868-1988*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Hashikawa, Bunzō. 1968. *Nashonarizumu: Sono Shinwa to Riron (nationalism: myth and theory)*. Tokyo: Kinokuniya Shoten.

Hatoyama, Ichirō. 1957. *Hatoyama Ichirō Kaikoroku (Recollections of Ichirō Hatoyama)*. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū Shinsha.

Hayes, Carlton J.H. 1931. *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc.

Hayes, Louise. 2001. *Introduction to Japanese Politics*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Hearn, Jonathan. 2006. *Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hechter, Michael. 1975. *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

————. 2000. *Containing Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heginbotham, Eric, and Richard J. Samuels. 1998. Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy. *International Security* 22 (4):171-203.

Hein, Laura. 2008. The Cultural Career of the Japanese Economy: Developmental and Cultural Nationalisms in Historical Perspective. *Third World Quarterly* 29 (3):447-465.

Heiwa Mondai, Danwakai. 1985. Reprint of Basic Texts. *Sekai* Special Issue.

Herzog, Peter. 1993. *Japan's Pseudo-Democracy*. New York: New York University Press.

Hood, Christopher P. 1999. The Election of Ishihara: A Symbol of Rising Nationalism in Japan? *Royal Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper* 7:1-6.

Hook, Glenn D. 1996. *Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Cotemporary Japan*. New York: Routledge.

Hook, Glenn D., and Gavan McCormack. 2001. *Japan's Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis*. London: Routledge.

Hopf, Ted. 2002. *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Horiuchi, Yusaku, and Jun Saito. 2003. Reapportionment and Redistribution: Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan. *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (4):669-682.

Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

————. 2004. The Primordialists. In *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism*, edited by D. Conversi. London: Routledge.

Hossay, Patrick. 2001. Methodological Madness: Why Accounting for Nationalism--and Many Other Political Phenomena--Is Difficult for Social Scientists. *Crititical Sociology* 27 (2):163-191.

Hroch, Miroslav. 1985. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*. Translated by B. Fowkes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hughes, Llewelyn. 2007. Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet). *International Security* 31 (4):67-96.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1993 (1993). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. London: University of Oklahome Press.

———. 2004. *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Hymans, Jacques E.C. 2011. Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to a Japanese Bomb. *International Security* 36 (2):154-189.

Hyun, Dae-Song. 2006. *Ryōdō Nashonarizumu: "Dokdo/Takeshima Mondai" no Seijigaku (Territorial Nationalism: The Political Science of the "Takeshima/Dokdo Dispute")*. 2006: Mineruva Shobō.

Ichijo, Atsuko, and Gordana Uzelac. 2005. Introduction. In *When Is the Nation?   Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism*, edited by A. Ichijo and G. Uzelac. London: Routledge.

Ienaga, Saburo. 1979. *Japan's Last War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931-1945*. Oxford: Blackwell.

———. 1993-94. The Glorification of War in Japanese Education. *International Security* 18 (3):113-133.

Igarashi, Takeshi. 1985. Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan. *Journal of Japanese Studies* 11 (2):323-356.

Ignatieff, Michael. 1993. *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

Iida, Yumiko. 2001. *Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan: Nationalism as Aesthetics*. London: Routledge.

Inoue, Masamichi S. 2007. *Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization*. New York Columbia University Press.

Ishihara, Shintarō. 1999. *Kokka Naru Genei: Waga Seiji e no Hankaisō (Illusions of the State)*. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū.

Ishihara, Shintarō, and Akio Morita. 1989. *The Japan that Can Say No*.

Ito, Kenichi. 2001. Introduction. In *The Vision of The Maritime Nation of Japan: The World Order and the Regional Order*, edited by K. Ito. Tokyo: The Japan Forum on International Relations.

Itoh, Mayumi. 2001. Japanese Constitutional Revision: A Neo-Liberal Proposal for Article 9 in Comparative Perspective. *Asian Survey* 41 (2):310-327.

Iwashita, Akihiro. 2006. *Hoppō Ryōdo Mondai (The Northern Territories Issue)*. Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha.

Jacobs, Lawernce R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2000. *Politicians Don't Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*. Stanford, Calif: Standord University Press.

————. 1995. *Japan, Who Governs?: The Rise of the Developmental State*. New York: Norton.

————. 1995. *Japan, Who Governs?: The Rise of the Developmental State*. New York: University of Tokyo Press.

————. 2005. No Longer the "Lone" Superpower: Coming to Terms with China. *Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper* 105.

Kang, Sang-Jung. 2001. *Nashonarizumu (Nationalism)*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

Kariya, Takehiko, and Jeremy Rappleye. 2010. The Twisted, Unintended Impacts of Globalization on Japanese Education. In *Globalization, Changing Demographics, and Educational Challenges in East Asia*, edited by E. Hannum, H. Park and Y. Goto-Butler. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Kase, Yuri. 2001. The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report. *The Nonproliferation Review* 8 (2):55-68.

Kataoka, Tetsuya. 1991. *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*. New York: C. Russak.

Katō, Norihiro. 1997. *Haisengoron (After Defeat)*. Tokyo: Kodansha.

Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996a. *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kawakatsu, Heita. 1997. *Bunmei no Kaiyōshikan (A Maritime View of the History of Japanese Civilization)*. Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha.

————. 2000. *Fukoku Yūtoku Ron (Rich Nation, Moral Nation)*. Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha.

————. 2006. *"Bi no kuni" Nihon woTsukuru: Mizu to Midori no Bunmeiron (To Make a Japan, The Country of Beauty: A Theory of Civilization Based on Water and Greenery)*. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha.

Kawakatsu-Ueki, Chikako. 2006. The Rise of "China Threat" Arguments, Department of
Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.

Kayama, Rika. 2004. *Puchi Nashonarizumu Shōkōgun: Wakamonotachi no Nipponshugi (Petit
Nationalism Syndrome: The Nationalism of Japan's Youth)*. Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha.

Keddell, Joseph P. 1993. *The Politics of Defense in Japan*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Keidanren, (Japan Business Federation). 2007. *Kibō no Kuni Nippon (Japan, the Country of
Hope)*. Tokyo: Japan Business Federation.

Kersten, Rikki. 1996. *Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the Search for
Autonomy*. London: Routledge.

Kingston, Jeff. 2004. *Japan's Quiet Transformation: Social Change and Civil Society in the
Twenty-First Century*. London: Routledge.

————. 2011. *Contemporary Japan: History, Politics, and Social Change since the 1980s*.
Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Kisala, Robert. 1999. *Prophets of Peace: Pacifism and Cultural Identity in Japan's New
Religions*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Kishi, Nobusuke. 1983. *Kishi Nobusuke Kaikoroku (Remembrances of Kishi Nobusuke)*. Tokyo:
Kōsaido.

Kitada, Akihiro. 2005. *Warau Nihon no "Nashonarizumu" (Ridiculing Japanese Nationalism)*.
Tokyo: NHK Shuppan.

Kitaoka, Shinichi. 1999a. Japan's Identity and What It Means. In *Japan's Identity: Neither the
West Nor the East*, edited by K. Ito. Tokyo: The Japan Forum on International Relations.

Kobayashi, Yoshinori. 1999. Genba no Hei wo Misutenu Chishikijin (An Intellectual Who Won't
Abandon the Soliders on the Ground). In *Kokka to Sensō (The Nation and War)*, edited
by Y. Kobayashi, K. Fukuda, K. Saeki and S. Nishibe. Tokyo: Asukashinsha.

Kobayashi, Yoshinori, and Susumu Nishibe, eds. 2002. *Hanbei to iu Sahō (The Way of
Anti-Americanism)*. Tokyo: Shōgakukan.

Kohn, Hans. 1944 (1948). *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*. New
York: The Macmillan Company.

Koizumi, Kenkichiro. 2002. In Search of Wakon: The Cultural Dynamics of the Rise of
Manufacturing Technology in Postwar Japan. *Technology and Culture* 43 (1):29-49.

Kondo, Takahiro, and Xiaoyan Wu. 2011. A Comparative Study of "Patriotism" as a Goal of
School Eduation in China and Japan. *Journal of Social Science Education* 10 (1):23-32.

Kratochwil, Friedrich V. 1989. *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and
Legal Reasoning in International Realtions and Domestic Affairs*. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Krippendorff, Klaus. 2004. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*. New York: Sage Publications.

Kuklinski, James H., and Gary M. Segura. 1995. Endogeneity, Exogeneity, Time, and Space in Political Representation: A Review Article. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 20 (1):3-21.

Kupchan, Charles A. 1995. Introduction: Nationalism Resurgent. In *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, edited by C. A. Kupchan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kurzman, Dan. 1960. *Kishi and Japan: The Search for the Sun*. New York: I. Obolensky.

Laitin, David D. 1998. *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Landis, R.J., and G.G. Koch. 1977. The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data. *Biometrics* 33:159-174.

Leheny, David. 2006. *Think Global, Fear Local: Sex, Violence, and Anxiety in Contemporary Japan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Levi-Strauss, Claude. 1974 [1966]. *The Savage Mind*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Lie, John. 2001. *Multiethnic Japan*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

———. 2008. *Zainichi (Koreans in Japan): Diasporic Nationalism and Postcolonial Identity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lind, Jennifer. 2002. Pacifism or Passing the Buck? *International Security* 29 (1):92-121.

Lipset, Seymour M. 1996. *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edge Sword*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.

Loraux, Nicole. 1986. *The Invention of Athens in the Classical City*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lyons, Michael, and Peter Galderisi. 1995. Incumbency, Reapportionment, and U. S. House Redistricting. *Political Research Quarterly* 48 (4):857-871.

Mahoney, James, and Kathleen Thelen, eds. 2010. *Explaning Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Maki, John M. 1964. *Court and Constitution in Japan*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Mann, Michael. 1995. A Political Theory of Nationalism and Its Excesses. In *Notions of Nationalism*, edited by S. Periwal. Budapest: Central European University Press.

March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: Free Press.

———. 1998. The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. *International Organization* 52 (4):943-969.

———. 2006. The Logic of Appropriateness. In *Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*, edited by M. Moran, M. Rein and R. E. Goodin. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

457

Marshall, Monty G., and Benjamin R. Cole. 2009. *Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Systemic Peace.

Maruyama, Masao. 1953. *Nihon no Nashonarizumu (Japanese Nationalism)*. Tokyo: Kawadeshobō.

—. 1963. *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*. London: Oxford University Press.

—. 1995 (1961). *Nihon no Shisō*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho.

—. 2000 (1986). *'Bunmeiron no Gairyaku' wo Yomu (Reading 'An Outline of a Theory of Civilization')*. Vol. 1-3. Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho.

Masumi, Junnosuke. 1995. *Contemporary Politics in Japan*. Translated by L. E. Carlile. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Matsumoto, Kenichi. 1995. *Uyoku, Nashonarizumu Densetsu (The Far Right and the Legend of Nationalism)*. Shohan. ed. Tokyo: Kawade Shobō Shinsha.

—. 1999. *"Hinomaru, Kimigayo" to Nihon (The Red Sun Flag, the "Kimigayo" Anthem and Japan)*. Shohan. ed. Tokyo: Ronsōsha.

Matthews, Eugene A. 2003. Japan's New Nationalism. *Foreign Affairs* 82 (6):74-90.

McBeth, Mark K., Elizabeth A. Shanahan, Ruth J. Arnell, and Paul L. Hathaway. 2007. The Intersection of Narrative Policy Analysis and Policy Change Theory. *Policy Studies Journal* 35 (1):87-108.

McCargo, Duncan J. 2000. *Contemporary Japan*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

McCormack, Gavan. 2002. Breaking the Iron Triangle. *New Left Review* 13 (January/February):5-23.

—. 2004. Remilitarizing Japan. *New Left Review* 29 (September/October):29-45.

—. 2007. *Client State: Japan in the American Embrace*. London: Verso.

Mckean, Margaret. 1981. *Environmental Protest and Citizen Politics in Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

McNeil, Frank. 1994. *Democracy in Japan*. New York: Crown Publishers.

McVeigh, Brian J. 2001. Postwar Japan's "Hard" and "Soft Nationalism". *Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper* 73.

—. 2004. *Nationalisms of Japan: Managing and Mystifying Identity*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.

Midford, Paul. 2011. *Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifisim to Realism?* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mishima, Yukio. 1969. *Haru no Yuki (Spring Snow)*. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

—. 1990. *Eirei no Koe (The Voices of the War Dead)*. Tokyo: Kawade Shobō Shinsha.

Miyazawa, Kiichi. 1997. Rethinking the Constitution: A Document Tested by Time. *Japan Quarterly* 44 (3):10-14.

Mizuno, Hiromi. 2009. *Science for the Empire: Scientific Nationalism in Modern Japan.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Morris, Ivan I. 1960. *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Postwar Trends.* London: Oxford University Press.

Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. 1989. *A History of Japanese Economic Thought.* London: Routledge/Nissan Institute for Japanese Studies, University of Oxford.

———. 1998. *Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation.* Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

———. 2010. *Borderline Japan: Foreigners and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Muller, Edward N., and Thomas O. Jukam. 1977. On the Meaning of Political Support. *American Journal of Political Science* 71 (4):1561-1595.

Muramatsu, Michio. 1987. In Search of National Identity: The Politics and Policies of the Nakasone Administration. *Journal of Japanese Studies* 13 (2):307-342.

Nairn, Tom. 1973. Scotland and Europe. *New Left Review* (83):57-82.

———. 1975. The Modern Janus. *New Left Review* (94):3-29.

———. 1981. *The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism Second, Expanded Edition.* London: NLB.

Nakamura, Akira. 2001. *Sengo Seiji ni Yureta Kenpō Kyūjō: Naikaku Hoseikyoku no Jishin to Tsuyosa (Postwar Politics Under the Sway of Article 9: The Confidence and Strength of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau).* Tokyo: Chūōkeizaisha.

Nakamura, Takafusa. 1995. *The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure, 1937-1994.* 2 ed. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

Nakasone, Yasuhiro. 1997. Rethinking the Constitution: Make It a Japanese Document. *Japan Quarterly* 44 (3):4-9.

Nathan, John. 2004. *Japan Unbound: A Volatile Nation's Quest for Pride and Purpose.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Nayak, Meghana V., and Christopher Malone. 2009. American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism: A Critical Rethinking of US Hegemony. *International Studies Review* 11:253-276.

Neuendorf, Kimberly A. 2002. *The Content Analysis Guidebook.* Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Nishikawa, Shinichi. 2000. *Ripō no Chūsū: Shirarezaru Kanchō Naikaku Hōseikyoku (The Center of Lawmaking: The Unknown Agency, The Cabinet Legislation Bureau).* Tokyo: Satsuki Shobō.

Nishio, Kanji. 1999. Japan's Identity: Is Asia One? Is Japan Part of the East? In *Japan's Identity: Neither the West Nor the East*, edited by K. Ito. Tokyo: The Japan Forum on International Relations.

———. 2005. *Kyōki no Shushō de Daijōbu Ka? (will we be alright with this crazy prime minister?)*. Tokyo: PHP.

Noguchi, Yūichiro. 1976. *Nihon no Keizai Nashonarizumu (Japan's Economic Nationalism)*. Tokyo: Daiyamondo Gendai Sensho.

Oe, Kenzaburo. 1981. *Hiroshima Notes*. Translated by T. Yonezawa. Edited by D. L. q. Swain. Tokyo: YMCA Press.

———. 2011. History Repeats. *The New Yorker* 28 March.

Oguma, Eiji. 1998. *Nihonjin no Kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen Shokuminchi Shihai kara Fukki Undō made (The Boundaries of the Japanese: Okinawans, Ainu, Taiwanese, and Koreans from Colonial Rule to the 'Return of Okinawa' Movement)*. Tokyo: Shinyōsha.

———. 2002a. *A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-Images*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.

———. 2002b. *"Minshu" to "Aikoku": Sengo Nihon no Nashonarizumu to Kōkyōsei (Democracy and Patriotism: Nationalism and Publicmindedness in Postwar Japan)*. Shohan. ed. Tokyo: Shinyōsha.

Okamoto, Yukio, and Sōichiro Tahara. 2003. *Ikinobiyo, Nippon (Survive, Japan)*. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha.

Okazaki, Hisahiko. 2001. The Prospects for an Order in Northeast Asia and the Conception of Japan. In *The Vision of The Maritime Nation of Japan: The World Order and the Regional Order*, edited by K. Ito. Tokyo: The Japan Forum on International Relations.

———. 2004. Seifu Shudō no Nashonarizumu hodo Kiken na Sonzai wa Nai (There Is Nothing as Dangerous as Government-Led Nationalism). *Chūō Kōron* 120 (9):50-56.

———. 2006. Aratamete Datsuashinbei no Yūkōsei wo Toku (Once Again Preaching the Effectivness of an "Escape from Asia" Pro-American Strategy). *Chūō Kōron* 121 (12):72-77.

Okimoto, Daniel I. 1998. The Japan-America Security Alliance: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century: Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University.

Oros, Andrew L. 2008. *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Orr, James Joseph. 2001. *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Ōtake, Hideo. 1988. *Saigunbi to Nashonarizumu (Rearmament and Nationalism)*. *Chūkōshinsho*. Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha.

————. 2005 (1988). *Saigunbi to Nashonarizumu: Sengo Nihon no Bōeikan (Remilitarization and Nationalism: Postwar Japan's Views on Defense Policy)*. Tokyo: Kōdansha.

Ozawa, Committee (LDP Special Study Group on Japan's Role in the International Community). 1992. Japan's Role in the International Community: Draft Report. *Japan Echo* 19 (2):49-58.

Ozawa, Ichirō. 2006 (1993). *Nihon Kaizō Keikaku (Blueprint for a New Japan)*. Tokyo: Kōdansha.

Ozkirimli, Umut. 2000. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Palgrave.

————. 2005. *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical Engagement*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

————. 2010. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction Second Edition*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1992. *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Patterson, Molly, and Kristen Renwick Monroe. 1998. Narrative in Political Science. *Annual Review of Political Science* 1:315-331.

Peng, Ito. 2006. Changing Welfare State Culture and Social Policy Reforms in Japan and Korea. Paper read at American Sociological Association Annual Meeting.

Petersen, Roger. 2005. Memory and Cultural Schema: Linking Memory to Political Action. In *Memory and the Second World War*, edited by F. Cappolleto. Oxford: Berg.

Pierson, Paul. 2003. Big, Slow-Moving, and...Invisible: Macrosocial Process in the Study of Comparative Politics. In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Powles, Cyril. 1976. Yasukuni Jinja Hoan: Religion and Politics in Contemporary Japan. *Pacific Affairs* 49 (3):491-505.

Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune. 1970. *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. Malabar, FL: R.E. Krieger Publishing Company.

Putnam, Robert D. 1971. Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of "Ideology". *American Political Science Review* 65 (3):651-681.

Pyle, Kenneth B. 1987. In Pursuit of a Grand Design: Nakasone Betwixt the Past and Future. *Journal of Japanese Studies* 13 (2):243-270.

————. 1992. *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press.

————. 2006. Abe Shinzo and Japan's Change of Course. *NBR Analysis* 17 (4):5-31.

————. 2007. *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*. New York: PublicAffairs.

Ray, Manas. 2001. Growing Up Refugee: On Memory and Locality. *India International Centre Quarterly* 28 (2):119-137.

Reed, Steven. 1993. *Making Common Sense of Japan*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Reischauer, Edwin O. 1988. *The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Renan, Ernest. 1996 (1882). What is a Nation? In *Becoming National: A Reader*, edited by G. Eley and R. G. Suny. New York: Oxford University Press.

Richardson, Bradley M. 1997. *Japanese Democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Richardson, Bradley M., and Scott C. Flanagan. 1984. *Politics in Japan*. New York: HarperCollins.

Rittel, Horst W.J., and Melvin M. Webber. 1973. Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. *Policy Sciences* 4:155-169.

Robinson, James. 2006. Economic Development and Democracy. *Annual Review of Political Science* 9:503-527.

Roe, Emery. 1989. Narrative Analysis for the Policy Analyst: A Case Study of the 1980-1982 Medfly Controversy in California. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 8 (2):251-273.

————. 1994. *Narrative Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Rostow, W.W. 1960. *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rublee, Maria Rost. 2009. *Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Ruhs, Martin, and Bridget Anderson, eds. 2010. *Who Needs Migrant Workers?: Labour Shortages, Immigration, and Public Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ruoff, Kenneth James. 2001. *The People's Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center.

Samuels, Richard J. 1994. *'Rich Nation, Strong Army': National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

————. 2003a. *Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

————. 2007. Securing Japan: The Discourse. *Journal of Japanese Studies* 33 (1):125-152.

Schildkraut, Deborah. 2002. The More Things Change... American Identity and Mass and Elite Responses to 9/11. *Political Psychology* 23 (3):511-535.

Schlichtmann, Klaus. 1995. The Ethics of Peace: Shidehara, Kijūrō and Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. *Japan Forum* 7 (1):43-67.

Schram, Sanford F., and Philip T. Neisser, eds. 1997. *Tales of the State: Narrative in Contemporary U.S. Politics and Public Policy*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Schudson, Mark. 1995. Dynamics of Distortion in Collective Memory. In *Memory Distortion: How Minds, Brains and Societies Reconstruct the Past*, edited by D. L. Schacter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Schull, Joseph. 1992. What Is Ideology? Theoretical Problems and Lessons from Soveit-Type Socieites. *Political Studies* 40:728-741.

Seraphin, Franziska. 2006. *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center.

Sewell, William H. 1992. Introduction: Narratives and Social Identities. *Social Science History* 16 (3):479-.

Shapiro, Ian. 1999. Enough of Deliberation: Politics Is about Interests and Power. In *Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement*, edited by S. Macedo. New York: Oxford University Press.

Shibuchi, Daiki. 2005. The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All the Fuss? *Asian Survey* 45 (2):197-215.

Shidehara, Kijūrō. 1951. *Gaikō Gojūnen (Fifty Years' Diplomacy)*. Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha.

Shimbunsha, Asagumo. 2005. *Bōei Handobukku (Defense Handbook)*. Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha.

Shimuzu, Akitoshi. 1987. Ie and Dozoku: Family and Descent in Japan. *Current Anthropology. Supplement: An Antropological Profile of Japan* 28 (4):S84-S90.

Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. 2008. *Ruffians, Yakuza, Nationalists: The Violent Politics of Modern Japan, 1860-1960*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Skinner, Quentin. 1978. *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skya, Walter. 2009. *Japan's Holy War: The Ideology of Radical Shinto Ultramationalism*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Smethurst, Richard J. 1974. *A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Smith, Anthony D. 2005. The Genealogy of Nations: An Ethno-symbolic Approach. In *When Is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism*, edited by A. Ichijo and G. Uzelac. London: Routledge.

———. 1986. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

———. 1991. *National Identity*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

———. 1996. The Origins of Nations. In *Becoming National: A Reader*, edited by G. Eley and R. G. Suny. New York: Oxford Univeristy Press.

————. 1996. The Resurgence of Nationalism? Myth and Memory in the Renewal of Nations. *British Journal of Sociology* 47 (4):575-598.

————. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*. London: Routledge.

————. 2001. *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

Smith, Rogers M. 2003. *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Snyder, Glenn. 1984. The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. *World Politics* 36 (4):461-495.

Snyder, Jack. 1991. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Snyder, Jack. 1993. Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State. *Survival* 35 (1):5-26.

Soeya, Yoshihide. 2005. *Nihon no "Midoru Pawaa" Gaikō: Sengo Nihon no Sentaku to Kōsō (Japan's "Middle Power" Diplomacy: Postwar Japan's Choices and Design)*. Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho.

Somers, Margaret, R. 1994. The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach. *Theory and Society* 23 (5):605-649.

————. 2008. *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Steinmetz, George. 1992. Reflections on the Role of Social Narratives in Working-Class Formation: Narrative Theory in the Social Sciences. *Social Science History* 16 (3):489-516.

Stockwin, J.A.A. 1968. *The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A Study of Political Party and Its Foreign Policy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

————. 1999. *Governing Japan*. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Stuckey, Mary E. 2004. *Defining Americans: The Presidency and National Identity*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Suny, Ronald Grigor. 2001. History. In *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, edited by A. J. Motyl. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Suzuki, Takafumi. 2009. Investigating Japanese Government's Perceptions of the Postwar World as Revealed in Prime Ministers' Diet Addresses: Focusing on East-West and North-South Issues. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 9 (2):317-338.

Swidler, Ann. 1986. Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. *American Sociological Review* 51 (2):273-286.

————. 2001. *Talk of Love: How Culture Matters*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Takahashi, Tetsuya. 2005a. *Yasukuni Mondai (The Yasukuni Issue)*. Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho.

Takayanagi, Kenzo. 1969. Some Reminiscences of Japan's Commission on the Constitution. In *The Constitution of Japan, Its First Twenty Years, 1947-67*, edited by D. F. Henderson. Seattle: University of Washington.

Takegawa, Shogo. 2005. Japan's Welfare-State Regime: Welfare Politics, Provider and Regulator. *Development and Society* 34 (2):169-190.

Takekawa, Shunichi. 2007. Forging Nationalism from Pacifism and Internationalism: A Study of Asahi and Yomiuri's New Year's Day Editorials, 1953-2005. *Social Science Japan* 10 (1):59-80.

Tamamoto, Masaru. 2001. A Land Without Patriots: The Yasukuni Controversy and Japanese Nationalism. *World Policy Journal* 18 (3):33-40.

————. 2003. Ambiguous Japan: Japanese National Identity at Century's End. In *International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific*, edited by G. J. Ikenberry and M. Mastanduno. New York: Columbia University Press.

————. 2007. Japan's Politics of Cultural Shame. *Global Asia* 2 (1):14-20.

Tamogami, Toshio. 2008. *Mizukara no Mi wa Kaerimizu (Without Self-Reflection)*. Tokyo: Wakku.

Tanaka, Akihiko. 1997. *Anzen hoshō: sengo gojūnen no mosaku (National Security: Fifty Years of Postwar Searching)*. Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha.

Tanaka, Nobumasa. 2002a. *Yasukuni no Sengoshi (The Postwar History of Yasukuni Shrine)*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

Togo, Kazuhiko. 2005. *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945-2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy*. Leiden: Brill.

Tominomori, Eiji. 1994. *Sengo Hōshutō Shi (A History of Postwar Conservative Parties)*. Tokyo: Shakai Shisōsha.

Trevor, Malcolm. 2001. *Japan: Restless Competitor*. Richmond, Surrey, U.K. : Japan Library.

Twomey, Christopher P. 2000. Japan, A Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive Realism To Make Predictions about East Asian Security. *Security Studies* 9 (4):167-205.

Umesao, Tadao. 2003. *An Ecological View of History: Japanese Civilization in the World Context*. Translated by B. Cary. Melbourne: Trans Pacific.

Van den Berghe, Pierre L. 1978. Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1 (4):401-411.

————. 2000. Does Race Matter? In *Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, edited by J. Hutchinson and A. Smith. London: Routledge.

————. 2005. Ethnies and Nations: Genealogy Indeed. In *When Is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism*, edited by A. Ichijo and G. Uzelac. London: Routledge.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1996-97. Hypotheses on Nationalism and War. In *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, edited by M. E. Brown, O. R. Cote, S. M. Lynn-Jones and S. E. Miller. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Vivian, Bradford. 2006. Neoliberal Epideictic: Rhetorical Form and Commemorative Politics on September 11, 2002. *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 92 (1):1-26.

Vogt, Gabriele. 2007. "Guest Workders" for Japan? *Japan Focus*.

Watanabe, Osamu. 1994. *Seiji kaikaku to kenpō kaisei: Nakasone Yasuhiro kara Ozawa Ichirō he (Political Reform and Constitutional Revision: From Nakasone Yasuhiro to Ozawa Ichirō)*. Tokyo: Aoki Shoten.

Watanabe, Osamu. 2001. *Nihon no Taikokuka to Neo Nashonarizumu no Keisei (The Transformation of Japan into a Great Power and the Formation of Neo-Nationalism)*. Tokyo: Sakurai Shoten.

————. 2002. *Kenpō Kaisei no Sōten (The Issues of Constitutional Revision)*. Tokyo: Junpōsha.

Watanuki, Jōji. 1977. *Politics in Postwar Japanese Society*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

Weiner, Michael, ed. 2009. *Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity Second Edition*. London: Routledge.

White, James W. 1981. Civic Attitudes, Political Participation, and System Stability in Japan. *Comparative Political Studies* 14 (3):371-400.

Williams, Brad, and Erik Mobrand. 2010. Explaining Divergent Responses to the North Korean Abductions Issue in Japan and South Korea. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 69 (2):507-536.

Winkler, Christian G. 2011. *The Quest for Japan's New Constitution: An Analysis of Visions and Constitutional Reform Proposals, 1980-2009*. London: Routledge.

Wodak, Ruth. 2006. Discourse-analytic and Socio-linguistic Approaches to the Study of Nation (alism). In *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, edited by G. Delanty and K. Kumar. London: Sage Publications.

Wodak, Ruth, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigi, and Karin Liebhart. 1999. *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. Oxford: Edinburgh University Press.

Yamada, Atsushi. 2001. *Neo Tekuno Nashonarizumu (Neo-Technonationalism)*. Tokyo: Yuhikaku.

Yamamoto, Mari. 2004. *Grassroots Pacifism in Postwar Japan: The Rebirth of a Nation*. London: Routledge.

Yoshino, Kosaku. 1992. *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Enquiry*. London: Routledge.

————. 1997a. *Bunka Nashonarizumu no Shakaigaku: Gendai Nihon no Aidentiti no Yukue (The Social Science of Cultural Nationalism: The Trajectory of Identity in Contemporary Japan)*. Shohan. ed. Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai.

————. 1997b. Cultural Nationalism and "Internationalization" in Contemporary Japan. In *Global Convulsions: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth Century*, edited by W. A. Van Horne. New York: State University of New York Press.

————. 1998. Culturalism, Racialism, and Internationalism in the Discourse on Japanese Identity. In *Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States*, edited by D. C. Gladney. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zubrzycki, Genevieve. 2001. "We, the Polish Nation": Ethnic and Civic Visions of Nationhood in Post-Communist Debates. *Theory and Society* 30 (5):629-668.