TOWARDS A
CRITICAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND PRACTICE
FOR ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING

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Submitted to the Departments of Architecture and Urban Studies and Planning on August 9, 1974 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of Master of Architecture in Advanced Studies and Master of City Planning.

The intention of the thesis is to critically investigate the senses in which architecture and planning have participated in the historical forms of social order. This investigation helps to provide a basis for architects and planners to transform the class domination of the liberal social order, and in doing so resolve their own crises.

The thesis makes and attempts to justify the following argument, assuming a class analysis of history and society as well as a dialectical materialist epistemology:

1) Since the origins of liberal society, the architectural and planning project of unifying and "rationalizing" the environment has failed. This failure has created a crisis of professional theory, practice, meaning and survival.

2) The crises of architecture and planning derive primarily from the crises of the liberal social order of which the professions are an element. The resolution of the professional crises is then possible only with the transformation of the liberal social order.

3) The professions, to resolve their own crises, must then participate in the project of social transformation. Four central tasks are involved: a) the creation of a non-dominating communal social order; b) the creation of an appropriate epistemology and knowledge as an instrument of critique and critical action, grounded in a normative theory of the self; c) the creation of whole and unalienated selves; and d) the creation of a critical architectural and planning practice which participates in the project of social transformation.

4) The modes of professional participation involve: a) a major critical investigation and revaluation of professional history, theory, ideology and practice in terms of its relation to the social whole, and b) critical transformative
action on personal and professional levels in the public world.

A critical history of architecture and planning theory and practice in relation to the structure of the major social forms is first presented. The history traces the connections between architecture, planning and the social whole, in order to understand the meanings of present and future professional theory and practice. This history concentrates on the way in which each social order has resolved the general human problems of creating a legitimated social order, an epistemology and way of knowing, forms of self and consciousness, and the environmental concretization of social relations.

The nature and crises of the dominant liberal epistemology is then examined, and dialectical materialism is shown to be the general form of a necessary resolution to the epistemological crisis. Finally, the conditions of a critical knowledge and practice for architecture and planning are presented, along with specific projects for architects and planners who are committed to develop a critical epistemology and practice leading towards a liberated society.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To translate a set of vague feelings into a defined position which counters conventional wisdom is possible only with a great deal of intellectual and emotional support.

This was given in abundance by Stan Anderson, Julian Beinart, Hans Harms, Tunney Lee, Alexander Tzonis, and Brad Yoneoka. Mac Morikawa, Bill and Jane Southworth, and my advisor Tom Nutt have spent hours working over and talking about earlier drafts. I especially thank Shoukrey Roweis, who first validated my feelings about the problems of architecture and planning and pointed me towards the critical social thought and action which is the basis of this thesis. The ideas of Professor Thomas Unger of the Harvard Law School were very important in my ordering of the history.¹

An earlier paper written with Richard Telford was in effect a preliminary and highly condensed version of this thesis. Richard was particularly responsible for the section on modern planning history which was adopted in the thesis. Of course, I am responsible for all the thesis' faults.

Finally, my wife Aviva has been a most patient and supportive "thesis widow."
Evil demands
'Only the systematic substitution of the abstract for the concrete'
Jean-Paul Sartre
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The crises of liberal society

Consciousness and thought are essential elements of human action. Unlike the action of most other animals, human action presupposes intention and choice since beyond elementary genetic programming since the sources of human action are not biologically determined. The very lack of genetic programming allows thought to yield a variety of alternative responses to the fundamental issues of human life, responses reflected in the variety of social forms through history. When within each social form a consensus of value and meaning exists (whether freely-chosen or imposed by domination), consciousness and action is not problematic. The value bases of action are not in question, the basic range of alternative modes of living have been chosen, and the thinking out of patterns of action has been accomplished. Consciousness and thought in this situation applies essentially predetermined and unquestioned general values and solutions patterns to specific choices to be made. The centrality of intention, value and choice to action is often forgotten; the dominant form of social order and consciousness becomes reified as a dense and solid natural fact, ceasing to reflect its true status as a human choice.

But while liberal society as an alternative has become an apparently "natural" given fact, clearly a consensus of value and meaning does not exist today. The public world appears contradictory and confused, violent and incomprehensible. Many feel that they are the pawns of social and economic forces be-
yond their control, while the traditional democratic political mediations between individual and society have lost their effectiveness and meaning. There is a contradiction between personal values and needs and the public world which seems not to be a comprehensible society of interacting human beings but an independent force operating with its own alienating logic. The traditional social bases for valuing and meaning, the participation of the whole self in a multidimensional life incorporating but not restricted to work, are discredited as a value and a potential. The institutional basis for community is destroyed as human beings compete against each other on the labor market, while reaping commodity benefits from their labor which have no communal content and can be only individually experienced. The whole self, which is possible only as an integration of autonomy and community, is in the absence of community, fragmented, alienated, split. The liberal world, like the self, is experienced as partial, fragmentary, immaterial and unreal. The world becomes unreasonable, without apparent sense or rational intent other than in the restricted connection of means to unquestioned ends; the social map of a comprehensible reality in earlier social forms is gone, the abstraction of commodity fetishism and money substituting for the lost or unattained concreteness of integral human beings living within a unified society.

The experience of the reality of class domination contradicts the liberal ideal of the dominance of isolated private interests; the experience of the conflict of role and class con-
contradicts the liberal ideal of the freedom to choose one's role; the experience of depoliticization and political alienation contradicts the liberal ideal of representative democracy; the experience of gross inequalities in the distribution of wealth and opportunity contradicts the liberal ideal of the classless distribution of benefits according to merit. In these and many other ways, the liberal social order represents historically the most extreme distance between the unity of self and community which, as will be shown, is a central need of the self.

Fundamental to this thesis is the assumption that the contradictions and alienations of liberalism are a consequence of the domination of capitalism, seen not only as a particular form of economic relations, but as a definition of social relations and the self which isolates and alienates all the elements of society while denying the intersubjective basis of individual development. Community, the public world, presupposes the autonomous individual just as the individual presupposes community. The one defines the other through social interaction. Yet capitalism creates in its very structure the illusion that the individual exists essentially independent of the larger community. The individual is then reified as a commodity, an isolated object, and community becomes a fantasy.

Acute isolation, while rationalized as individualism, in truth is symptomatic of a profound loss of social coherence and intersubjectively constituted meaning—a deep alienation from
both self and society. The quality and content of human interaction is subordinated to the sphere of instrumental problem-solving action. Meaningful human relations collapses in the loss of consensual meaning, making an intersubjective construction and comprehension of a coherent map of social reality impossible. 1

The failures and crises of architecture and planning

The professions of architecture and planning, being constituted by liberal society to construct shelter and allocate societal resources, share in the crisis of liberalism. Whether consciously or not, architects and planners personally experience the societal fragmentation as their personal alienation as well as their inability to realize the professional intention of creating a unified and rational environment. The personal needs for wholeness and the professional intention of rationalizing the environment, in contradiction to the inability to realize either a personal or environmental unity, is felt in professional work as a failure and crisis of practice which puts the very meaning of architecture and planning in question. The failure can be characterized in three ways: 1) the failure of architects and planners to make the environment into a unified and intentional whole; 2) the failure of the rationalizing intent of architecture and planning to become societal norms by being instituted as a value by the major social powers; and 3) the failure of architecture and planning to comprehend with its own theory and methodology the
source and therefore resolution of its crises in the nature of the liberal social order.

The ineffectiveness of architecture and planning practice is the direct evidence of its function as servant and ideologue of capitalism and the liberal social order. A rationalized environment is possible only in a social order which, unlike liberalism, does not continually fragment the environment as a normal function of its operation. "Liberal policy makers (architects, planners), technocrats and social engineers have common goals: stability, continuity, neutralization and conflict avoidance, through specific interventions" -- goals incompatible with any comprehensive social/environmental rationality.

The failure of the professions to comprehend their situation is no accident:

Technical and scientific culture and competence... clearly bear the mark of a social division of labor which denies to all workers, including the intellectual ones, the insight into the system's functioning and overall purposes, so as to keep decision making divorced from productive work, conception divorced from execution, and responsibility for producing knowledge divorced from responsibility for the uses knowledge will be put to. 2

Unreflective practice inevitably serves the ruling class, and as evidenced in the current professional crises contains the seeds of its own destruction. This thesis claims that the professional's failure rests in their lack of reflection on the nature of the capitalist system of social organization which informs thought as much as it does daily practice. Basic social issues are perceived then as aggregations of technical
problems. Technical problems are solved by technical means, so these means are generated and solutions proposed within a dominant but fundamentally unthought consensus of meaning—the consensus a consequence of taking the existing social, economic and political organization as a given and natural order.

Within this consensus of meaning, the crises of capitalism are perceived at a secondary level as aggregates of localized, largely unrelated fragmented crises, such as the "urban crises", the "transportation crisis", or the "housing crisis." Professionals are then educated and dispatched to put out these localized crisis fires. But crises are inherent to and a consequence of that larger socio-economic organization, capitalism. The ensuing multiplicity of specialized meanings serves to mask the real crisis at the fundamental level, which is that class conflict is real and objective; there consequently cannot be a societal consensus of value and meaning within the capitalist mode of production. The dominance at the secondary level of the fragmented perception of localized crises in public consciousness is a mystification which ensures that the dominant social consciousness will be fragmented and liberal crises perceived as localized. Then the society awaits only the intervention of some new technique to "solve" the crisis and, most important, never discovers the source and nature of the domination and alienation which conditions their lives.

The personal origins of the thesis: I came to understand the need for critical reflection and then to write this thesis
through a series of professional and educational experiences which led me to search for a progressively deeper basis for the grounding and legitimation of architectural and planning practice—a basis which this thesis attempts to provide. I relate my particular story in the belief that a widespread commitment among architectural and planning professionals to a critical understanding of their personal and professional situation is necessary to end their failures and alienation. But this commitment is only made after one suffers personally the contradictions and alienations of one's self and practice. This experience is the precondition of a commitment to critical understanding and action (theory and praxis) which is a necessary response to the personal and professional situation.

I entered architecture school in 1961 out of a long-time fascination with both the aesthetic and constructional aspects of building. My undergraduate education alternately stressed the aesthetic/intuitional and methodological aspects of design. But common to both approaches was the concern for an entirely internal order, within the bounds of architectural discourse, unrelated to any human meaning other than through the conventional architectural concerns with scale, efficiency of construction and circulation, and visual pleasure. Like a number of the more recognized class members, I graduated with a primary concern with visual design and order. Yet somewhere I had absorbed a tentative and unarticulated awareness of the class basis of liberal order and thus chose to work for offices which
had some commitment to working for the dominated classes as well as to "good" visual design. Linking these two commitments was my belief to some degree in the "moral efficacy of design" which underlay modern architecture—the doctrine that "good" design and the provision of a higher standard of physical facilities would improve people's lives. In various offices I design attractive bank interiors; tried to bring down to a comprehensible scale facades of fifteen-story housing blocks for the elderly whose location and high density the architect had no control over; worked on an "experimental" project which would place low-income black children in dormitories to sleep away from their parents because children's bedrooms within the individual apartments would be too expensive; designed community buildings and housing which would provide some subsidized apartments for blacks wanting to move out of the inner city to the suburbs.

But in my perception the rewards of doing this work were mostly in seeing designs I had worked on being built as attractive visual objects. The traditional assumption of the "moral efficacy" of design for me proved false—the projects in no important sense transformed the lives and socio/political status of the people they were designed for. The bank had a more pleasant facade while its intents and purposes remained unchanged; the housing blocks in no significant way dealt with the isolated conditions of the elderly in liberal society; the "experimental" low-cost housing on reflection was a grotesque
example of the impact of economics as a determination of the quality of people's lives; the community facilities and suburban housing became not a spearhead for black entry into the suburbs but an attractive setting for predominantly lower-middle class suburban locals.

I conceptualized the lack of personal meaning in the projects I worked on as a failure of my knowledge about the psychological relations of wo/men and environment. If such relations were known, meaningful environments could be designed. But there was no time or money within the economically-bounded world of office practice for the wo/man-environment research which I thought was necessary.

Then, believing still in "moral efficacy", I entered the advanced Masters programs in architecture and planning at MIT in 1971 to try to find a grounding for a so-far elusive environmental meaning. Deliberately leaving the object-orientation of my earlier education and practice, I studied fields which dealt with the human processes in wo/man-environment relation: architectural psychology and sociology, social science "user-needs" research techniques, community theory, semiological and linguistic analysis of architectural form and symbolism, as well as standard planning subjects which escaped the limitations of a visually-oriented education. While more human and process oriented, the fields were similar to object design in treating processes as unrelated to any larger context, yet such relation is the precondition of meaning. The present state of
architectural psychology and sociology essentially only reverses the object-orientation of conventional architecture---instead of the architectural object being the prime locus of reality and concern, now the individual psychology or group sociology is substituted. The crucial relation of the individual or the group to the social whole, which is the precondition of meaning, is largely ignored. Community theory (such as in Mumford, Geddes, and the community sociologists) provides little insight into the means of reconstituting community in liberal society; semiological and linguistic analysis discusses the mechanics of how form and environment mean but again does not deal with the reasons for the lack of meaning in liberal society; standard planning approaches (including urban economics, urban politics, urban transportation and land-use issues) either take the given institutions of the liberal order as basically unproblematic or at least accept them as a condition of practice. The problem of meaning is not addressed.

These criticisms are only later formalizations of what I first felt as a profound emptiness in the material which, whatever its intellectual merits, I could not relate to. The entire realm of what architecture and planning theory and practice had to say about meaningful environment was to me not even right or wrong, but just in some primitive sense incomprehensible, an objective babble. If architecture and planning had nothing to say to me, how could I justify making environ-
ments. I felt this alienation from what architecture and planning was saying as a personal crisis, a personal failure, to which my friend Shoukrey Roweis responded:

I really think that you misconfigure—to-yourself the meaning of your alienation. It is not—as you put it—a personal or idiosyncratic failing or incapacity. The reverse might indeed be true: you refuse to acquiesce to a life devoid of purpose/encounter/dialogue/meaning. (This is a healthier reaction than that of) those who either rationalize their smooth integration or act as if the search for meaning is meaningless.

ALIENATION IS NOT INSIDE US; IT IS THE DOMINANT SICKNESS OF 20TH CENTURY SUBJECT/OBJECT RELATIONS.

This realization was the key to understanding why my attempts to find meaning within the internal practice and study of architecture and planning had failed, and the beginning of the study which lead to this thesis.

My attempts to find meaning within the internal practice and study of architecture and planning had to fail, for the understanding and resolution of the crises of meaning and effectiveness in architecture and planning is possible only in relation to the resolution of the crises of the social order which the professions derive from and serve. More than any internal structure, the mediations, the connections between architecture and planning and the social whole are crucial.

The thesis as a critical project

The fundamental question is: what shall architects and planners do, given the failure and alienation of their practice? Impeded practice reflects back to practice's complement, thought. But the disciplines of architecture and planning, by
virtue of their instrumental nature, do not have within themselves the conceptual resources to deal with problems perceived in their own practice. Professionals must escape the limitations of their own perceptions, theory and practice to understand their function in the operation of the social totality. This is a project of critical reflection, critical in the sense of describing, explaining, and uncovering the unreflected premises of professional practice and theory. The critical project, the project of this thesis, must uncover the assumptions which the dominant professional practitioners and theorists have made about the nature of the world they dealt with; understand these assumptions in light of an analysis of that world with tools which escape the limitations of professional understanding; and understand the genesis of those assumptions in the processes and structure of the society the professions serve.

The epistemological base

The choice of a mode of knowing for the critical project is crucial, for knowledge is indistinguishable from the form of self, society and practice. The critical search for the basis of a unified self, society and environment must rest on a method which can comprehend those elements as interrelated elements of a totality, going beyond the analysis of fragmented social elements. This thesis then is based on dialectical materialism, an epistemology which takes human beings and human
meaning as the subject of action and history, and recognizes self, social order and social products (including architecture and planning) as human constructions which derive from human meaning, choice and intention. Dialectical materialism is uniquely capable of dealing with reality as a totality of interrelated meanings rather than as a fragmented collection of analytically-understood logical or causal relations. This view is the polar opposite of the dominant liberal instrumental epistemology (termed scientific epistemology or Positivism) which holds that reality is located not in concrete human choice and intention but in our ideas about the world. This is an attitude which facilitates the dominant class making its definition of reality the legitimated mode of knowledge and consciousness for the entire society. Dialectical materialism finds a grounding for reality, beyond any idealistic definition of truth, in the concrete processes of human life, and its definition of the nature of the self as revealed not in theory but in history.

As expressed by Marx:

The question of whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

-Max: Second Thesis on Feuerbach (1845)

Marx expresses the fundamental concern of this thesis with the practice of architecture and planning as well as the form
of knowledge in its unreflected premises. Theoretical rationalizations derived independently of the realities and urgencies of everyday life and social relations have proven, as the thesis will show, totally inadequate as a basis of practice.

In its commitment to reveal the connections and wholeness behind the apparent fragmentation of reality, dialectical materialism is an epistemology of the project of social liberation and transformation. Class domination is maintained only through the fragmentation of self, consciousness, community, environment and this fragmented state is taken as the definition of "normal" liberal reality. To reveal the connections between the fragments then is an inherently critical and radical act which destroys the illusion of the absoluteness of liberal reality.

The transformative project

Like the epistemology it is based on, this thesis addresses "not a question of theory but a practical question," the intention of social transformation. The professions can only realize their ideals of creating meaningful and unfragmented environments if the institutional basis for a whole, unfragmented society exists. Professionals then must find ways of participating in the creation of the institutional basis of a whole society and resolving the social alienations of subject and object, self and society, which I had first realized as alienations in myself.

At the economic level, this project means the creation of
a socialist economy in which wo/men collectively determine what and how they produce and receive what they need; at a political level, wo/men must be able to collectively control the public decisions which govern their lives; at the level of social order, a community must be created in which each person is recognized not as an abstract role-occupant but as a whole being, unafraid of the social interaction (intersubjectivity) which is the necessary condition of the development of self and society; at the level of the self, the conditions must be established where needs of the self for both autonomy and community can be realized; and at the level of epistemology, a knowledge must be created (in its general form termed dialectical materialism) capable of comprehending the alienated nature of the liberal self and liberal society, and the class domination from which self and society derives.

The intention and argument of the thesis: The thesis is situated within the general program of transformation just described. The intention of the thesis is to investigate the senses in which architecture and planning have participated in the historical forms of social order. This investigation gives architects and planners a basis for transforming the class domination of the liberal social order and in doing so resolve their own crises.

The thesis makes and attempts to justify the following argument, assuming a class analysis of history and society, as well as a dialectical materialist epistemology:
1) Since the origins of liberal society, the architectural and planning project of unifying and "rationalizing" the environment has failed. This failure has created a crisis of professional theory, practice, meaning and survival, and is characterized in three forms:

   a) The failure of architects and planners to make the environment into a unified and "rationalized" whole; b) The failure of the rationalizing intent of architecture and planning to become societal norm by being instituted as a value by the dominant class; and c) The failure of architecture and planning to comprehend with its own theory and methodology the source and therefore the resolution of its crisis in the nature of the liberal social order.

2) The crises of architecture and planning derives essentially from those of the liberal social order of which the professions are an element. Then the resolution of the professional crises is only possible through the transformation of the liberal social order.

3) The professions, to resolve their own crises, must participate in the project of social transformation. This project involves four central tasks:

   a) The creation of a non-dominating communal social order through critical theory and practice.
   b) The creation of an appropriate epistemology and knowledge as an instrument of critique and critical practice, grounded on a normative theory of self.
   c) The creation of whole and unalienated selves.
   d) The creation of an architectural and planning practice which aids in the social project of
transforming the domination of liberal society. Fundamental to this practice is the recognition that the meaning of architectural and planning products is not as aesthetic or instrumental objects but as concretizations of human meanings and social relations.

4) The modes of professional participation involve: a) a major critical investigation and revaluation of professional history, theory, ideology and practice, in terms of its relation to the social whole; and b) critical, transformative action on personal and professional levels in the public world.

The structure of the thesis: In order to understand the meaning of the architects' and planners' situation today, the thesis critically investigates both the practice and theory of architecture and planning in relation to the social structure, epistemology, and forms of self of the major historic social forms.

Section II is a critical history of architectural and planning theory and practice. The meanings of architecture and planning as elements in the social order are investigated in their development through time, as the only means through which the origins and meanings of the current professional crises can be understood.

In Section III, the scientific/Positivist epistemologies of the liberal social order, as well as their impact on architectural and planning theory and practice, are described and critiqued: Dialectical materialism as a resolution to the crises of liberal epistemology will then be presented in its unique nature as a critical knowledge which in its very structure im-
plicates practice as a necessary part of knowing. The conditions of a critical knowledge and practice for architecture and planning are then presented.

Section IV discusses specific projects for architects and planners in developing a critical epistemology and practice leading towards a liberated society.

Section V includes a bibliography and notes.

General Notes

1) On reading the thesis as a whole: A central contention of the thesis is that the crises of liberal society and architecture and planning are characterized by alienation and fragmentation of consciousness, self, community and professional practice. This fragmentation can be understood only from a point of view which posits the possibility of these elements being unified in a non-alienated social order. This point of view has been described as the liberative intent of dialectical materialism. The thesis then is committed to describing the totality of which all social elements now fragmented are parts, in the belief that the only truth is in knowledge of the whole. Likewise, the thesis cannot be understood until it is read completely: the argument of the thesis is not completed until the end. Terms, concepts and arguments such as the ideas of "totality", "meaning", and "self" which may be initially unfamiliar or unclear should be well defined and gain meaning in a number of contexts, through a formal definition in the body of
the text, or in a note. Often, assertions will be made which will be left as such until a later point when they are justified. This is done because to fully explain and justify each assertion at the moment of introduction would disrupt the flow of the argument and create more confusion than clarity.

The reader then is asked to make a certain "suspension of disbelief" until the end of the argument, which is the end of the thesis.

2) The use of notes: Notes are used in the conventional way, as: a) citations for quotes; b) clarifications and elaborations of points made; and c) examples supporting general assertions. Clarifications and examples were placed in the note section when they seemed too specific or general in context of the argument at a given point. But in many cases it would be fruitful to read the notes along with the main text.
Section II:

A CRITICAL HISTORY
OF ARCHITECTURAL AND PLANNING
THEORY AND PRACTICE
IN RELATION TO
THE MAJOR SOCIAL ORDERS

PREFACE

STRUCTURE OF THE HISTORY

A THEORY OF THE NATURE OF
THE SELF

THE PROBLEMS OF ORDER,
METHOD, SELF, AND
ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING

HISTORY

THE TRIBAL/medieval SOCIAL
ORDER

THE ARISTOCRATIC SOCIAL ORDER

THE LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER

THE POST-LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER
STRUCTURE OF THE HISTORY

Introduction: In the Preface, the intent, structure and assumptions of the history will be discussed.

The history attempts to portray the social totality in which architectural and planning practice participates and from which that practice gains its meaning. It is based on a dialectical materialist conception of reality and history which holds that the truth is in the whole. "It is irrelevant to ask whether the (historical) concepts, categories and relationships are 'true or false'. We have to ask, rather, what is it that produces them and what is it that they serve to produce."¹

The truth of architectural and planning practice and products is therefore to be found only in the meaning of its interrelationships within the totality. The history then presents the major conditions which simultaneously affect and are affected by architectural and planning practice during the major forms of social order.

Formal organization: A fundamental contention of the thesis is that social theory and practice, and thus architecture and planning within it, are based and derived from the nature of the self of which various social forms are manifestations. Contrary to mechanical materialists who claim that the self is derived entirely from particular historical conditions, this thesis takes the particular historic manifestation of self and society as a result of the interplay between concrete histor-
ical conditions and characteristics of the self which are constant through history. This attitude is elaborated in the following section on A Theory of the Nature of the Self. The final portion of the Preface, The Problems of Order, Method, Self, and Architecture and Planning, will identify each major historical period as a resolution to the problems common to all history of social order, method of knowing, the self, and architecture and planning.¹

These problems will be described in general and then in terms of the several resolutions of each problem through history.

Following the Preface is the History. It is divided into separate discussions of the resolutions of the problems of order, method, self and architecture and planning in the four major historical periods: tribal/medieval, aristocratic, liberal, and post-liberal social orders. The discussion of each period is divided into separate considerations of the "four problems". Within each period, elements are emphasized which are central to the argument. These are particularly the periods' origin, evolution and decay, its social, economic, and political forms and institutions, the dominant consciousness and nature of the self, the dominant epistemologies, and the theories, processes, products and practice of architecture and planning. These elements will not be dealt with in a rigid order, but will be outlined in a manner (hopefully) appropriate to their content.
The organization and content of the history reflects a) the intent of this thesis to be a basis for liberative practice, and b) the assumption that architecture and planning can only resolve their crises through understanding the mediations between their practice through history and the historical social forms from which they derive.

Each historic form is then presented primarily in terms of its resolution of the polarities of the **ideal** and the **actual** - the ideal being an unalienating and therefore non-dominating social totality, the actual being the degree of class domination which each social form represents.

As a basis for understanding the mediations, the issues of social order, method, forms of self, and architectural and planning practice must be separately presented before their interconnections can be traced. This format reverses the usual dominance in architectural and planning literature of internal professional histories, supplemented by a short discussion of the general "historic context", which merely perpetuates the illusion that the meaning of architecture and planning can be understood primarily within its own terms.
Introduction: Each form of social life is based on specific modes of the self which are the fundamental grammar of social life in history. These modes are mediated in specific ways to the social whole, to constitute definable forms of the self characterizing each social order. While for Marx history is a succession of class conflicts which provide the motor force for historical change, this thesis holds that beneath class conflict lies the needs of the self. In their continued irresolution (at least since the end of the medieval period) these needs provide the most radical source of historical instability and will be the foundation of the dissolution of the liberal order. Further, a definition and understanding of the nature of the self provides the only normative basis for the critique and elimination of domination. The basis for the refusal to accept the destruction of the self in liberal society can only be in a theory of the self which holds that there is a need for wholeness which the society cannot meet.

The relations of the self: The self can be understood in relation to the natural world, to other selves, and to history.

Self to the natural world: Wo/men's selves become defined in the interrelations of determinism and choice, necessity and freedom, the natural world and culture. Lacking a full genetic definition, wo/men must determine (or complete) their own nature, thus standing apart from the natural world,
their consciousness the subjective experience of indeterminacy. The fundamental human experience as revealed by consciousness is the inescapable separation of self from the world, subject from object. Thus, all human beings mediate behaviour through consciousness and reproduce the gap between themselves and the natural world in an internal separation and dialogue. This dialogue is called reflection, the subjective relationship between internal subject and internal object (the subject making an object out of himself) in which actuality is dissolved into the possibility of seeing alternative modes of existence. Meaning is the relation between the internal dialogue and its external expression/realization. This relation is inherently ambiguous for meaning always has a double reference - in simultaneously being subjectively felt and objectively observed. In knowing wo/men, the objective manifestation of human action cannot be separated from subjective meaning. Action is not an end separated from the means and neatly separable from the self, but rather the result of human intention and meaning. The fundamental experience of wo/men's subjectivity in relation to the natural world is the terror of its non-human strangeness. Work and knowledge are in part attempts to humanize nature as forms of practical activity; they allow a relation with the natural world on human terms by creating a "second" nature. Yet, particularly in the liberal fetishism of commodities, the products of wo/men's labor acquire their own life. Wo/men then relate to their own
work as a substitute for human relations rather than as a means to reduce the distance from the natural world.

Further, all knowing changes both wo/men and the natural world. The development of Western thought has been through an increasing abstraction from sensuous concrete reality. As thought gained in the power to control and predict, the natural world became a means for human ends. Thus the more wo/men understand nature through instrumental rather than contemplative knowledge, the greater gulf there is between social reality and the ideal of natural harmony which humanizes nature and naturalizes wo/men.¹

Self to others: The fundamental human experience in relation to others is individuality, initially felt in the irreducible fact of having a separate body. One achieves and maintains individuality, acquiring subjectivity and consciousness, only through the struggle to win the approval of one's own being through the other's recognition and validation. Self and other are mutually defining; one cannot exist without the other. Our language which distinguishes between self and society obscures the mutually necessary aspect of each. This definition of the self constitutes the fundamental critique of the utilitarian concept of the self as monad which defines and legitimizes alienation in liberal society. Yet the obverse side of the struggle to be known is the fear of being known. With the exception of love and community, all knowledge is the struggle of a subject to assert control or domination over
the other, whether the other be the natural world or a human
being. Thus wo/men's greatest need is also their greatest
fear. Human communication oscillates between the terror of iso-
lation (schizophrenia) and the terror of engulfment (domination).
The struggle to be known is also the fear of being known: the
struggle to dominate is the fear of domination.

The reconciliation of the demands of individuality and
sociability (autonomy and community) take two basic forms -
domination/submission and love. Domination is a resolution of
the terror of nature and the other by holding power over it.
Yet, as the constant transformation of Western social forms
attests, the solution of class domination can never be stable
or satisfactory. What the dominating and dominated both require
of each other is recognition of their true humanity which can
only be denied in a coercive relationship. Further, this rela-
tionship is unstable because the dominated need to regain
their humanity, which necessarily implies overthrowing the
dominator by social revolution. Then for social orders based
on class domination, history is a succession of class conflicts
which are stages of wo/men's attempts to realize societies free
of domination. This permanent crisis of the self and social
instability will end only with the realization of the ideal
of the reconciliation of the demands of autonomy and community
in a non-dominating society. This reconciliation takes the
form of the ideal on the personal level of true (undominating)
love, and on the social level of universalized community (as
well as a socialized economy and democratic political form). On the personal level, human beings are secure in their individuality yet accepted as whole people rather than as fulfilling a partial role. On a societal level, universalized community is a social order not structured through a division of roles bound by abstract law, but as a community of whole human beings linked by shared values. In Buber's terms, the I-it relation becomes the relation of an I to a Thou. The community is universal because only then could a total and undivided community of shared values be realized.

The ideals of love and universalized community are the synthesis of fact and value, since ideal and real are unified. The ideals are also the synthesis of the double reference of meaning; both subjective and objective aspects are linked in the unity of fact and value.

Self to history: The meaning and potential of the individualized and collective self is defined by and manifest through history. Yet only portions of the self's potential are defined and developed within any historical order, as only portions of any person's capacities can be manifest during a lifetime. History is an unfolding of the forms and stages of the development of the self. The ideal of the self in history is universality, the full unfolding through times of its powers. Yet the fate of the self is its necessary particularity. Then the potential of the self is as much a reality as its particular manifestation in history to date.
Conclusion: The central problem and ideal of the self is its reconciliation with history, other human beings, and the natural world. History is the record of the successive modes of that reconciliation, each form of social life being based on modes of the self which are history's fundamental grammar. The two fundamental modes of that reconciliation are the personal and the political. Love, art and religious worship are personal modes which, if idealized, yield the illusion that the individual can resolve the problem of the self regardless of society. Architects and some planners have to a great extent attempted a personal and aesthetic reconciliation which, as the History will show, has failed.

Yet the hope of a solely political realization of the unity of the self runs the risk of totalitarianism. Personal autonomy is collapsed into the collective, and with that collapse the self is destroyed. For Unger, the moral problem of the self is the reconciliation, yet the simultaneous maintaining the existence of the poles of existence—facts and values, the personal and the political, intention and realization, autonomy and community. The reconciliation must occur within the tension and limitation of the self being only partially realized in a lifetime, needing to maintain its separation from the world yet being united with it.
THE PROBLEMS OF ORDER, METHOD, SELF, AND ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING

Introduction: The tribal/medieval, aristocratic, liberal, and post-liberal social orders are the four major historical contexts in which the self has taken form and architecture and planning have functioned. Each form can be conceptualized, for purposes of this thesis, in terms of four issues of which each social form is a resolution: the problem of order, the problem of method, the problem of the nature of the self, and the problem of architecture and planning.

Far from being idealized concepts, the "four problems" are categories which arise from the central crises of liberal society itself. These crises, in their continued irresolution, are the central descriptors of liberal reality. The use of these categories in examining history is directly intended towards understanding the origins and meanings of the present crises in light of achieving a non-alienated communal social order. ¹

THE PROBLEM OF ORDER

The problem of order is the problem of how society is possible, and the nature of social bonding between individual selves. The social order must resolve the contradiction of the self's need for autonomy and community which is at once the greatest source of and threat to social order. The social and economic organizing principals which have operated through history are discussed below.
**Typology of social and economic ordering principles:**

The principles of social ordering within the major periods Western social orders are the principles of a) estate; b) class and c) role.

a) **The principle of estate**, describing the order of post-egalitarian primitive societies and medieval societies. The entire society is ordered into social groupings between which there is little or no mobility. The estates are not necessarily hierarchically distinguished by power, but are distinguished by function. Social bonding is through the internalization of shared values.

b) **The principle of class**, describing the order of the aristocratic societies and with role, the ordering principle of liberal society. Class societies are ordered by a hierarchical control of power or of the means of producing wealth. In contrast to the estates, there is more inter-class mobility in which inherited or acquired wealth becomes an important factor in determining class position. Social bonding is formalistically through law, and actually through class domination.

c) **The principle of role**, describing, with class, the order of liberal society. Work is accomplished through a division of labor which creates multiple roles. Society is an association of role-occupants who achieve their position through merit rather than through class. The social bonding is the doctrine of self-interest which theoretically leads to
a harmony of interests.

Forms of social bonding:

a) Doctrine of legitimacy, describing the social bonding of the primitive and medieval societies. The basis of social bonding is the internalization of shared values which are consensually validated. Individual ends are not random but directed to maintaining the social whole. Likewise, consciousness is that of community, the individual an organic part of the whole social order. Every means to some extent an end, so the means/ends and fact/value distinction are inter-penetrating, inseparable. Rules are not an instrument of class domination and an abstract device for the resolution of conflicting interests, but the expression of social consensus.

The limitation of the doctrine of legitimacy is its inability to accommodate change or to explain the necessity of rules.

b) Doctrine of self-interest, the basis of liberal society in the representation of liberal social theory. Social order is held to be the harmony of individuals pursuing their own self-interests. Means are radically separated from ends, human conduct determined not by consensus but by the choice of means to secure given ends. Thus the organic relation of fact and value is broken. Rules or law, rather than the affinity of sentiment, are the links between human beings.

The limitation of the doctrine of self interest is its inability to explain the basis of social coherence. Indeed,
coherence in liberal society derives and can be explained only in terms of the domination of class and role. Domination as the true source of liberal social coherence is discussed in Section II, The Liberal Social Order, the Problem of Order.

Typology of economic forms: The major economic forms encountered in the history are those of a) reciprocity, b) redistribution, and c) the market. These forms are correlated with social relations of equality, estate/class structure, and liberal instrumentalism.

a) **Reciprocity** is the form of exchange in societies where power is held roughly equally and the population is sufficiently small that face-to-face encounter is possible. The exchange, while one of material goods, is regulated by law, ritual and custom which keeps such an economic act within the framework of social relations. A gift of a portion of one’s crop is a form of exchange which is rewarded not by an equivalent material value, but social credit and approbation necessary to keep the giver in good standing in the community. The meaning of the gift is not primarily as a material transfer but as an interpersonal transaction which maintains and reinforces the social bond.

b) **Redistribution** is an extension of reciprocity in which material production is exchanged through the mediation of an administrative agent. Production is collected at a central point and then redistributed in the form of gifts to the producers on the basis of need. The redistribution process is
ceremonial, symbolizing and assuring the dominance of the social over the economic function.

Common to both reciprocity and redistribution is the primacy of the social over the economic as well as the proscription of economic gain as a motive of production and exchange. Such economic systems are run on non-economic motives.

As long as social organization runs in its ruts, no individual economic motives need come into play: no shirking of personal effort need be feared; division of labor will automatically be ensured; economic obligations will be duly discharged; and, above all, the material means for an exuberant display of abundance at all public festivals will be provided. In such a community the idea of profit is barred: haggling and haggling is decried; giving freely is acclaimed as a virtue; the supposed propensity to barter, truck, and exchange (the notion of classical economist Adam Smith which justifies the market as the basis of society) does not appear.

Paleolithic, feudal, medieval and to some extent aristocratic societies have all been based on some form of reciprocity and redistribution. The generality of these principles and their seeming independence of the particular social form may be accounted for by the social dominance over the economic function. Only with the market principle does the flow of influence reverse a market exchange system demands a market society.

c) The market economy is the one economic form which does create, and is dependent on, a specific societal institution, the market system. In its logic as the regulative social mechanism, the market economy must dominate and transform all other social institutions. The existence of the market
economy is predicated on the creation of a new form of the self, which produces and exchanges not because of intrinsic human need or the intrinsic value (use value) of the product. Rather, the economic motive, which becomes the motive of social existence, is that of economic gain. Market economies thus exert a corrosive effect on the unity of social order as will be shown in the history of the primitive and medieval social orders in Section II.

**Typology of dominant forms of consciousness:** Every form of social life is composed of dominant and subordinant forms of consciousness. No single individual can encompass the total scope which this "ideal-type" of consciousness defines. The forms of consciousness are an interplay in history between sociability and individualism, community and autonomy.

a) **Communality** is the dominant consciousness of the primitive and medieval social orders in which the individual is recognized as a whole person under the unity of an encompassing model which is religious in origin.

Indeed, the concept of the "individual" in the modern sense does not exist in primitive and medieval societies. While the person is subordinate to the social place s/he holds, this place is not seen as a coercive limitation but as a function of a consensually-legitimated order. The soul or spirituality is the ordering element of the personality, defined by a religious mapping of reality as articulated in the "divine model".
b) **Instrumentality** is the dominant consciousness of the liberal social order. The person, individuated from the social whole, is the subject of history and society. The relation between individuals, and within consciousness, is the instrumentality through which other women and the natural world are instruments (means) of the individual's purpose (ends). As the prime reality is that of the single individual, social relations are experienced as essentially artificial and necessarily held together by the abstract form of law. Social bonds are precarious because every communication with others is a threat to autonomy. Individuals are organized in society through the principle of role, which embodies only that part of the individual which serves as a means to capitalist ends. The liberal self then cannot become whole, the supposed autonomy created by role-organization contradicted by the lack of social value given to the extra-role dimensions of the person. The instrumental reason of capitalist imperatives then becomes the ordering element in the social definition of the self, the self's consciousness and self-definition.

**THE PROBLEM OF METHOD**

Introduction: The problem of method is the problem of how self and society knows and defines itself. As the definition of human beings is not fully genetically determined, the consciousness deriving from the gap between the given and
the indeterminant is a necessary and constant human construction. The only basis for consciousness to operate is with the knowledge of the subjective and external worlds. This knowledge is indistinguishable from the forms, constraints, and way of knowing—in short, the method. Therefore, a consciousness and knowledge of the problem of method, of epistemology, is of crucial importance in the transformation of self and society through personal and professional practice.

In this thesis, the major epistemological concern is the generation of a form of knowledge adequate to comprehend the social relations, meaning and consciousness of a non-dominating society. Unlike dominant Positivist rationalism, such knowledge is not a causal derivation but a method of knowing which sees the subjective and objective unified by meanings rather than causal sequential relations. Causal relations imply a means and an end. Unities of meanings implies the relationship of self and consciousness with the world, the continued quest of the self for completion and unity, the elimination of the gap between means and ends. The unity of consciousness with the world, the unity of the subjective and the objective, lies in the fact that everything social leads a divided existence—at once an actual phenomena in the world and an intention. Meaning is the relation between inner intention and outer manifestation.¹

The outer, "objective" world cannot be known without understanding the meaning of the persons who intended it. Like-
wise, we cannot understand the intention without understanding the outside world with which the self wants unity. At the core of existence there is no distinction between fact and value. But realization is impossible without a method capable of simultaneously uniting the inner and outer, consciousness and actuality, ideal and real, in a unity of meaning rather than as a causal sequence.

**Modes of knowledge:** The general modes of knowledge through Western history have been:

a) **Knowledge derived deductively from a unified immanent or transcendent cosmology.** Truth is revealed by a "divine model" rather than acquired from the study of concrete reality; the dominant form of knowledge in the primitive/medieval social order.

b) **Knowledge derived from the study of the natural world:** Truth is reached through the analytic procedures of natural science as applied to studying natural facts and processes. Natural science becomes under liberalism the dominant basis for studying human reality in the social sciences. Like the liberal society which it serves, social science takes natural and human reality as meaningful only as fragments of a whole, useful only as instrumental means to the ends of domination and profit.

c) **Knowledge derived from the study of uniquely human qualities of meaning, consciousness, and intentionality.** Termed dialectic materialism, this knowledge is not just anoth
logical form. Its use implies the existence of a society in which the human qualities it can comprehend become the dominant concerns of the social order.

THE PROBLEM OF SELF

The problem of the nature of the self can be understood as in the particular resolution in a given social order of the self's location along the range of autonomy and community, freedom and domination. Further, the meaning and potential of the self is developed through history. The particular balance of autonomy and community can be understood only in relation to the self-comprehension and perceived potentiality of the self at a given time. For example, only with the Enlightenment did women begin to perceive that the definition of the self was not an eternal given, but a historical project of self-determination.

THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING

The functions of the design and construction of environment as well as the allocation of resources have existed in all societies. (The terms "architecture" and "planning", while in themselves not existing throughout history, refer in this thesis, unless specified, to the general societal environmental-"rationalization" and resource-allocation functions.) Architecture and planning will be shown in the History to have three constant characteristics: 1) the project of environment "rationalization", or the deliberate ordering of the environment, at any scale; 2) the necessity for architectural and
planning practice to be allied with the dominant social power for the rationalizing project to be realized; and 3) the meaning of architectural and planning products as objectifications of human relations, as distinguished from object relations.

As the meaning of architecture and planning practice and products is in their relation to social meaning and social relations, the problem of architecture and planning is not the secondary issue of the success of architectural/planning products in solving their technical or symbolic tasks. Rather, the problem as defined in this thesis is the primary issue of the adoption of the project of environmental "rationalization" by dominant social power. The project, for example, of present architecture and planning fails to the extent that it is not adopted as a value by the ruling class.

In the central relation between architectural/planning practice with social meaning and dominant power, it is crucial to understand the mediations between architectural and planning products and the social whole. This understanding creates a vocabulary and discourse about these products which escapes the discourse of object-relations which so dominates professional practice and scholarship.

The dominant liberal modes of understanding contemporary and historical architectural and planning products parallels the nature of liberal society: the products, like people, are taken as self-contained objects or processes to be understood
in terms of their formal properties. For example, buildings are seen as solutions to functional or aesthetic problems, as "built sociology" or as signs and symbols of cultural meanings. Understanding buildings is a task of "object analysis" in which the building is seen to contain its own references, and therefore can be understood substantially independently of its origin in the social totality. The emphasis in this kind of analysis is on the properties of the architectural or planning product rather than the social meanings it embodies.

But to understand architecture and planning as a social practice, their products must be understood as a concretization of human labor, consciousness, and social relations. The truth of architecture and planning products then lies in their embodiment of the social relations that produced them and not in their independent formal qualities. This is a dialectic materialist position, which denies that architectural and planning products have any reality independent of the human meaning from which they derive—the product turns us back to its constitution by wo/men. Formal qualities of the products of course still exist, but the meaning of these qualities is transvalued and transformed when understood in their derivation from the meaning of the social totality. The products can therefore not be seen as the fetishes which so much modern criticism takes them for—inanimate products which are as real and alive, perhaps even more so, than the human beings who produced them.
THE HISTORY
summary chart of the social orders
THE TRIBAL/MEDIEVAL SOCIAL ORDER
THE ARISTOCRATIC SOCIAL ORDER
THE LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER
THE POST-LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER
The following chart displays in a summary fashion some of the major characteristics of the social orders discussed in the History. The chart must be read with great caution: its danger is the illusion that its categories and descriptions appear to be more real than the interrelations and meanings which constitute the human world from which the chart derives. Only when the categories and descriptions are considered in their evolution and interrelations with the social whole, can they be truly understood. Nonetheless, the chart, given this caution, should provide an initial overall sense of and guide to the History.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL ORDER</th>
<th>ECONOMIC FORMS</th>
<th>MODE OF KNOWLEDGE</th>
<th>CONSCIOUSNESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRIBAL/MEDIEVAL</td>
<td>reciprocity/redistribution</td>
<td>deduction from divine cosmology</td>
<td>communality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARISTOCRATIC</td>
<td>mercantile capitalism &amp; colonial plunder</td>
<td>conflict bet. divine and scientific knowledge</td>
<td>transitional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
<td>market</td>
<td>scientific method &amp; instrumental rationality</td>
<td>instrumentality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST-LIBERAL</td>
<td>ideal: socialism</td>
<td>dialectical materialism</td>
<td>simultaneous existence of autonomy and communality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>actual: highly centralized monopoly capitalism</td>
<td>increasingly instrumental rationality</td>
<td>instrumentality dominant at all human levels, from psyche to polity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL ORDER</td>
<td>SOCIAL GROUPING</td>
<td>SOCIAL BONDING</td>
<td>LEGITIMATION OF POWER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIBAL/ MEDIEVAL</td>
<td>egalitarian/ estate</td>
<td>legitimacy</td>
<td>'divine model'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARISTOCRATIC</td>
<td>class</td>
<td>church/state domination</td>
<td>divine authority embodied in monarch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
<td>ideal: role</td>
<td>harmony of interests</td>
<td>bureaucratic 'neutrality,' 'democracy,' 'freedom'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>actual: class/role conflict</td>
<td>class domination</td>
<td>commodity fetishism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST-LIBERAL</td>
<td>ideal: universalized community</td>
<td>communal legitimacy</td>
<td>democratic determination of value and ends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>actual: deepening class domination including increased labor hierarchicalization &amp; stratification</td>
<td>class domination as the content of consciousness</td>
<td>commodity fetishism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Order</td>
<td>Integration of Architecture and Planning with Dominant Power</td>
<td>Professional Consciousness</td>
<td>Success of Project of Environmental Rationalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal/Medieval</td>
<td>Total: until late medieval period</td>
<td>Communality: no distinct identity until late medieval period</td>
<td>Total: environment integrated totality within a unified society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristocratic</td>
<td>Strong: patronized by church &amp; state</td>
<td>Transitional: some conflict between aesthetic and patrons' imperatives</td>
<td>Partial: environment differentiated large-scale unified expressing patrons' power, &amp; undesigned areas for masses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Weak: environmental rationalization not major instrument of domination</td>
<td>Instrumentality, alienation, meaninglessness</td>
<td>Failure: rationalization not a major instrument of domination-design and planning mainly instruments of commodity consumption and localized entreprenuers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Liberal</td>
<td><strong>Ideal:</strong> Total: rational environmental order and resource-allocation as important elements of non-alienated society.</td>
<td>Communality: design and planning function integral element of social praxis</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Actual:</strong> Indeterminate: dependent on role of environment as instrument of domination</td>
<td>Indeterminate: survival of project of environmental rationalization and rational resource-allocation in question.</td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction: The historical section begins with a discussion of the first and last major social orders in Western history (non-Western primitive tribes are included) which placed human development and interaction above the imperatives of economic interests and class domination which characterizes liberal society. The central intent in the discussions of the tribal and medieval orders is the portrayal of the mutual definitions of self and community as a non-dominating unity/totality from which architecture and planning practice took their meaning.

The tribal/medieval social orders share four fundamental attributes:

a) **THE PROBLEM OF ORDER**: A fixed social structure was either egalitarian or based on the principle of estate. While the estates differed in function, social place and eventually power, the power differential was restrained so that it did not become exploitative.

b) **THE PROBLEM OF METHOD**: Knowledge was deductively derived from an eternal and divine cosmological model of the world (called the 'divine model'). While the content of the model differed between societies, the source of that knowledge was divine, inherent in the earth ('immanent') or located in the heavens ('transcendent'). Rationality meant the correspondence of human knowledge to the divine model (or map of reality). The world, as defined by the model, was
transparent to understanding.

c) THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF: The self was defined in relation to one's social place in the communal order which in turn was subordinate to the authority of the immanent or transcendent divine model. Self, society and cosmology were then a mutually defining and mutually necessary unity.

d) THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING: Architecture and planning took its definition and meaning from its participation in the social unity rather than from its current position as an isolated social practice. Until the development of the Gothic cathedral in the later medieval period, architectural and planning practice were not distinct elements of the division of labor and were subsumed under the authority, communality and legitimation of the divine model.

THE TRIBAL SOCIAL ORDER

THE PROBLEM OF ORDER AND SELF

The earliest human groups establishing patterned physical settlements on the land were the Neolithic tribal or clan societies. Neolithic tribes, succeeding the nomadic Paleolithic hunting and food gathering cultures, ceased their dependence on hunting. They domesticated both themselves and nature through the commitment to place, agriculture, and family.

The village, in the midst of its garden plots and fields, formed a new kind of settlement: a permanent association of families and neighbors, of birds and animals, of houses and storage pits and barns, all rooted in the ancestral soil, in which
each generation formed the compost for the next.¹

The material base of the early villages was a labor-intensive agricultural production requiring a strong communal organization. In the earliest villages, the land was the source of all life and acquired an immanent sanctity—village members seemed scarcely separated from nature itself. The tribal consciousness was the continuity of self and nature, the complete absorption of self to the social and natural place it occupied. The principle of reality was in the sanctity of the natural world itself. The order of society paralleled the observed order of the natural world. Work, partaking in this order, was an integrated and natural part of life. There was no division of labor or dominance of commodity production which would later fragment power, consciousness and society. The content of consciousness, itself a manifestation of men's separation from the natural world and the world of others, was as close to being at one with the natural world by social order has achieved. As such, arrangements of social life were seen not subject to human will but in accordance with the perceived natural order. Reverence for nature, born both in its attribution as an immanent divinity as well as in the primitive technology precluded the modern consciousness of nature as a resource to be dominated or exploited for independent human purposes. This consciousness would only occur after authority, whether sacred or secular, became transcendent and did not inhere in
the earth itself.

Members of the early villages did not have specialized functions and held roughly equal power; there was, for example, no special priesthood. Each clan member underwent a life that was itself a kind of ritual of identification, participation, sacrifice and sanctification. The social bonds were communal, non-hierarchical. Legitimation was consensual. There was thus no institutionalized domination of one by the other, and as history barely existed and for millennia there was little social change. Innovation came slowly, for primitive societies generally believe that the scope of human knowledge is foreordained by supernatural power and that the original stock of ideas could and should not be expanded, questioned or altered.¹

The expansion of primitive societies brought about an inevitable division of labor and goods exchange. But the meaning of primitive and bourgeois goods exchange are opposite: goods exchange in primitive societies took the form of gifts which always were reciprocally given (beyond any utilitarian meaning). The exchange united separate individuals and built social relationships. Exchange then is an eminently social act compared to bourgeois transformation of goods into commodities and their exchange for private gain. In the totalistic correspondence of the consciousness, activity and environment of everyday life to the model of explanation and meaning of the world, the actual was identified with the
ideal. This identity was essentially religious. The primitive immanence of sanctity in nature was for Durkheim the prototypical form of religion, rather than a particular form of it.

In the tribal order, fact and value, the real and ideal, consciousness and actuality, the sacred and the earthly were all essentially unified, a polar contrast to the antimonies between the elements of existence in the liberal world. The elements of existence were, in tribal societies, unities. But such unity must be understood in relation to the everyday experience of hardship, risks of hunger and death, and the insecurity in the face of natural forces which a primitive technology could not control. Thus nature may have embodied as much terror as wholeness, only adding to the stress of potential societal disintegration of any consensually-legitimated society due to the loss of consensus or the incursion of strangers.

THE PROBLEM OF METHOD

The epistemology, the formalization of the social unity and knowledge, embodied a form of reason and explanation as vital and convincing as is the scientific epistemology to liberal society. The differences between tribal and scientific knowledge were not the 'truth value' of each. Rather, each epistemology was based on two different, but not unequal, logical systems. Explanation, for all societies, is founded on the ability to create an ordered representation of reality, a hypothetical picture of interrelated facts and
perceptual experiences whose nature and behaviour is communally accepted.

The material base of the tribal epistemology comprised the qualities of nature and the human body, the process of reproduction, and the need for a knowledge both effective in the world and to give meaning to the tribe as the social unit. As the most central elements of the society's life, these qualities were given a divine status and authority inherent in the world itself. Tribal knowledge was then embodied in a divine model which then became to a greater or lesser degree the explicit basis for village design, as will be shown in the next section.

For the modern Positivist, tribal epistemology could only be a myth, having perhaps efficacy but not truth value. The Positivist demands a verification of truth not in common meaning but ultimately through the conformance of truth statements with empirical reality as tested through 'objective' scientific procedures. The tribal epistemology gained its verification through another but scientifically proscribed truth test - the communal consensus of meaning in terms of a conformance with the divine model. The structure of the divine model was a communal patrimony, seen as given not by man (in case of science) and therefore problematic and mutable, but inherent in the nature of reality itself.
THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING

The design of primitive villages: If modern architecture and planning suffers as an alienated and fragmented activity in a correspondingly alienated society, the design of primitive villages stands as an historic instance of the deep integration of design activity and environmental meaning within the life of a relatively whole communal and unalienated society.

While there was a great variety of primitive village designs (due to the small population, limited mobility, and isolation from outside influences of most primitive villages) several common themes emerged:

a) Land was commonly held - a precondition to the possibility of the environment reflecting and serving a communal consensus and meaning.

b) Social relations rather than the liberal imperatives of a formal physical ordering were the major determinants of building form and placement. The meaning of such environments was as an expression and mediator of the particular village's social relations, and not through analysis of the environment's physical form in itself.

c) The primitive religious cosmology or divine model, and not any modern form of functionalism, was often the basis for determining building shape and overall village organization. The divine model was manifest through the use of such symbolic devices as orientation, the circle, and the
establishment of a building or void at the village center. But the divine model can be understood only in terms of human relations.

Looking closer at the use of the pre-rational man-made environment we find a tight relationship between the articulation of the human activities and the creation of the discrete unities which make up the man-made environment. We observe not only individual activities contained, schematized, but also the manner with which an individual contacts another individual. Thus, besides the eliminating of conflict and the hindering of aggression, pre-rational (primitive) products function positively, they lead individuals to recognize a common element behind each own separate experience; they reduce the separateness of experiences, transforming them into a collective conscience. Each expression of divine model, the universal generator of pre-rational products, is merely the abstract, condensed, representation of permissible or prohibited interactions between individuals. It is a code of possible interactions determining ultimately the power relationships between individuals. In other words, it is society, conceived in its broadest and deepest definition.

d) As the primitive societies barely changed over time, design developed through protracted 'unselfconscious' process which was not differentiated as a distinct intentional cultural enterprise assigned to the specific roles of architect, planner or builder.

e) An overwhelming necessity of primitive societies was survival in harmony. Social disputes thus had to be constantly mediated. While of course every society must maintain an internal order, the essentially classless primitive societies required a consensual unity rather than one born of class domination of liberal society. The physical
environment was made into an instrument of that consensual unity, through being a communicator of signs and a signifier of concepts and the world order. These environmental cues then functioned to reinforce social cohesion through educating the collective and individual consciousness to commonly-held values and norms and social mappings.

"The taxonomic ordering of space was an important environmental signifier which resolved the tensions between individual realization and communal bonding. Each particular subgroup had a determined portion of space assigned to it: in other words, it was necessary that space in general be divided, differentiated, arranged, and that these arrangements be known to everybody." ¹ Unlike the class societies ² the early primitive taxonomic environment represented differentiation of function, but not of power. ³

The agricultural cities: The agricultural cities took a physical form manifestly different from the tribal villages, but contained essentially similar social relations. Through the process of a quantitative linking of clan to clan, a colonization by social affinity of relatively self-sufficient, socio-natural organisms, ⁴ some dispersed primitive villages combined into agricultural cities. The city's hierarchical organization was a response to the increased population, a scale of agricultural production, specialization of labor, and a consequent centralizing religious and
administrative function which then transformed the early tribal communities' egalitarian structure.

Yet before the Spanish conquest, kinship ties did not decompose into a class society based on the private ownership of territory and social wealth. While administrative, religious, military and trading functions in particular became separated out from the total stream of work and social heirarchies developed, the major clan characteristics of the tribal village survived. The agricultural-city societies were hierarchically structured federations of clans which owned land communally. The economic base was the cultivation of land on a scale unprecedented in the village communities.

Where scarcity and survival were not major pressures, there was little to harass the individual intellectually or economically. Existence was subject to divine favour, and a man fared much as did his fellows. Large as some towns were...the sense of community was strong. Freedom of thought, individual liberty, personal fortunes, were nonexistent, but people lived according to a code that had worked well and continuously for centuries. An Aztec would have been horrified at the marked isolation of an individual's life in our Western world.

Tenochtitlan, the urban capital of the Aztec society, resembled a modern urban center with major religious structures, spacious plazas, palaces and administrative buildings. Its physical separation of the public religious and administrative structures from the dwellings appears to reflect a modern class/stratified society of class domination. But in fact, the city was "very likely a grossly oversized pueblo
The apparent physical similarity to twentieth century cities belies the radically different social base. Here, as with the primitive clan villages, social relations rather than the formal physical design are the key to understanding the meaning of the society and its physical planning.

The discovery of the plow, new forms of hardy grains and the use of domesticated animal labor reduced the material need for labor-intensive clan organization. Yet the clan persisted as a social form far beyond its technological justification.

The clan form remains the most stable form of human association thus far developed. Perhaps no institution following it fostered as deep a sense of solidarity, mutual aid, and supportive comfort to the individual. Owing to their natural basis in kinship ties, clans proved to be the most intimate and perhaps satisfying social forms devised by humanity. Accordingly, the clan tended to perpetuate itself against compelling social forces that easily overwhelmed or drastically altered other forms of human association.
Introduction: As with the primitive social order, the key factor in the following discussion is the unity of the various elements of the medieval social order as an integrated totality in which architecture and urban form participate and derive their meaning. Contrasted with the medieval order, the unity of the primitive societies does not pose as difficult a problem of explanation. Their characteristics remained stable over a great period of time. But the medieval order transformed at a much more rapid rate and took at different periods different forms which cannot correspond to common explanation in all respects. Nonetheless, such a common explanation is used in this thesis in order to illuminate by an assertion of the unity of the medieval period the fragmentation and meaningless of the liberal order and architectural and planning practice within. The following discussion then takes the medieval order as an "ideal-type" representing what was common and general in medieval societies. Two stages of medieval development are chosen to best illuminate the meaning of architecture and planning as social functions: 1) The medieval town: As a social context for a discussion of the medieval town, the social order is portrayed at the point where the medieval town had achieved its legal freedom from the feudal institutions and religion was an integrated part of communal practice (c. 11th to 13th centuries). The "ideal-type" feudal town discussed is not a trading town, nor a garrison town established for colon-
ization, for these were established for specialized purposes. Rather, the town is portrayed as the more general case which contained all social functions in a balance where the maintenance of unified social relations dominated the economy. This town as an "ideal-type" is the very model of a communal society (see definition) which cannot be reproduced today but serves as an important historic instance of social institutions and practices built on the dominance of human, rather than capital, relations; 2) Medieval Architecture: The social context for the discussion of medieval architecture is the later period of French national consolidation (12th to 16th centuries) in which Gothic architecture first developed. Though conventionally taken as the quintessence of medieval architecture and religious ethos, the Gothic cathedral will be shown to embody a split between church and state power which eventually led to the dissolution of the medieval social order. Paradoxically, the greatest development and perfection of the cathedral itself as a formal unity was simultaneous with the splitting of the sacred and secular elements of the medieval social unity.

THE PROBLEM OF ORDER AND SELF

Introduction: Out of the decay of Rome, Christians founded the invisible prototype of the medieval city, the new capital of the heavenly city and the civic bonding of the communion of saints. Christianity triumphed primarily because its expectation and embracing of radical evil could embrace
the negativity of the disintegrating Rome and make of it the basis of a new social legitimation. Suffering and social chaos had meaning; the poor would inherit the earth. But this meaning could be achieved only by positing a coherent order whose origin was above the chaos. Thus the primitive immanent divinity was relocated to heaven; God resided transcendent in the heavenly city.

The medieval institutions: The new medieval society as a religious unity was embodied in the key medieval institutions of the Church, the city as a corporate body, the guild, and the market.

1) The Church: "The immanent social bonding of economy, production and political order were subsumed under the universalized aegis of the Church. Remaining the one viable unifying institution at the dissolution of the Roman empire, the Church served as an organizational model for all levels of life. These included the events and rituals of everyday life, political contracts and land disposition, and the universal cosmology from which personal meaning and social legitimation were derived.

The Church then represented an ideal which suffused everyday life in many respects. Church membership was practically obligatory, and until the Sixteenth century excommunication was the greatest of punishments, meaning the exclusion from society as such. The fundamental political division underlying all other allegiances were the parish and the diocese, the center
of a village or neighborhood. The form and model for later taxation was the Church tithe; Church officials comprised an important segment of the population and absorbed much of the tithe funds into the widespread construction of Romanesque and Gothic cathedrals, churches, monasteries and such new public institutions as hospitals, almshouses, and schools. At the height of Christian influence, the Universal Church gave all communities a common purpose; but the unity so achieved fostered rather than suppressed diversity and individuality. "The main business of (the) community was not trade, however eagerly the merchants might, as individuals, be concerned in amassing a fortune: its main business was the worship and glorification of God. At point of death, if not in the midst of his proud, grasping, crafty, domineering life, both merchant and lord would remember that obligation in disposing of his property." 1 The transcendent theology of Christianity impacted the vulgar everyday world in every aspect of life, but no more so than in its universalization of the values of the monastery. Abstention, prayerful withdrawal, the practice of the awareness of inner self in relation to the transcendent spiritual source became an ethos and for some a practice of everyday life.

2) The city as a corporate body: As the medieval town was united spiritually as a corporate body under the divine authority of God, its citizens were united politically and socially as a free corporate body responsible to itself.
Gradually the corporate/social entity of the town acquired an identity and set of political, economic, and cultural rights and interests which sharply distinguished it from the surrounding countryside. This was a new phenomenon in urban history. In no previous society had all members achieved political freedom without the support of a slave class. The towns won this freedom from the feudal monarchs and monasteries who found it to their political and economic advantage to foster town growth. For example, the town represented to the feudal lords a free standing army and a new source of revenue and town building became one of the major industrial enterprises of the early Middle Ages. The towns' initial political authority came from a contract (the city charter) with the feudal powerholders. Citizens eventually won rights to hold regular markets, coin money, have a local legal system, bear arms and the like, endowing the towns with most of the rights of what would become sovereign states.

To exist one had to belong to an association—a household, manor, monastery, or guild. There was no security except through group protection and no freedom that did not recognize the constant obligation of corporate life. One lived and died in the identifiable style on one's class and one's corporation.

3) The Guild: The secular corporate order was institutionalized in the guild. Originating as a religious fraternity under the patronage of a saint, the guild never lost the characteristics of brotherhood, service, and mutual aid. With the growth of the medieval craft economy, the guilds became both craft and merchant workshops and unions,
while still maintaining a high level of public concern and service. While there was a distinction between craft and merchant guilds, membership in each was interchangeable, at least in the early medieval period. In the crafts guilds, there was a formal hierarchy of master, journeyman, and apprentice. Yet the hierarchy was more like that of teacher to students who in early town development could reasonably expect to become masters themselves. Indeed, the university at its inception was a craft guild aiming at vocational education.

The guilds became essentially associations of equals, free citizens who, whatever their specific function, (craftsman, merchant, journeyman) felt that labor was not servility but an integral and meaningful part of life; "to labor is to pray." 1

The medieval unity of labor and life was institutionalized in the workshops which were often integrated with the dwelling— an arrangement which remained the dominant pattern of production until the imposition of the factory system at the beginning of the Nineteenth century. The open structure of the medieval family itself embodied the social relatedness of the guild and workshop by incorporating into the family household such other groups as relatives, unrelated workers, domestics, apprentices and journeymen.

4) The market: Until the emergence of bourgeois commodity production, the medieval economy functioned through
a barter exchange of hand crafted goods produced primarily for use rather than as a means of capital accumulation (described by Marx as use value as distinguished from capitalist exchange value of products). The goods exchange was through the economic and spatial institution of the market which served (along with the rituals of the Church, obligations of citizenship and the guild) to bind the medieval city into a social unity. But in its scope and barter form, goods exchange was deliberately restricted so as not to overwhelm interpersonal communication as a cultural system. ¹

THE PROBLEM OF METHOD

The world, in the consciousness of the medieval wo/man, was transparent to understanding. As a social order based on a divine model, the world in its fundamental structure appeared given and not subject to human will. One's place in the cosmos and in society was clear and forordained. The individual group and communal consciousness predominated over the reality of the individual, whose social position was clearly defined within a structure of estates and the divinely-based social map of reality. Knowledge was deductively derived from the divine model.

In the 13th century, the bishop and the monk, the knight and the craftsman believed firmly --though each to the measure of his capacity—that nothing exists in the world which does not come from God, and derive its sense and sole interest from its divine meaning. The medieval conception of truth was fundamentally different from ours. Truth was not what can be proved, but what conformed to an accepted revelation. Research was
not conducted to find truth, but to penetrate more deeply into preestablished truth. Neither originality nor the study of Nature counted for much. 1

THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING

**Introduction:** Consonant with the medieval resolutions of the problems of order, method and self, the architectural and planning functions were vehicles of a substantially unified social purpose and meaning. Such unity is in strong contrast to the alienation and fragmentation of the liberal social order. The study of medieval architecture and planning provides an example and a hope of a practice which gains its meaning from its integration within a totalized society.

**The city design:** Common to most medieval cities were the enclosing wall, the town center, the division of the town into precincts, and the limitation of town growth. Together, these almost institutionalized design elements constituted a physical ordering integrally related to and supportive of the social unity.

1) **The Wall:** The wall was the defensive container of the medieval corporation. While first an extension of the monastery or fortress, the wall had particular psychic meanings beyond being used to define the territory and political order of the medieval city.

The wall was valued as a symbol as much as the spires of the churches; not a mere military utility. The medieval mind took comfort in a universe of sharp definition, solid walls, and limited views: even
The political, cultural and economic distinction between outside and inside, country and town, were very great. Only the new institutional power formation of the nation and national and international-scale trade was able to dissolve the distinctions so strongly symbolized and enforced by the wall.

2) The center: As the center of the primitive village was the symbolic locus of the community, the center of the area bounded by the medieval walls was reserved for the major communal institutions, the church, market place, and sometimes the town hall combined to give the center place an intensive meaning as the locus for face-to-face human relationship. While contemporary resurrections of the medieval plaza (e.g., the Boston City Hall plaza which is in part derived from the Medieval plaza at Siena, Italy) may reproduce the form of the original, the communal content of medieval social relations cannot be reproduced in an alienated (liberal) society.2

3) The division of the town into precincts: As small as the medieval towns were (town sizes were generally limited to no more than forty thousand, the size of Fifteenth century London; Paris, Venice, Milan and Florence were rare exceptions with populations over 100,000) the identity of the territory enclosed by the wall was further defined by
its being divided into quarters—the basis of modern parishes. Each quarter had a degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency, often containing its own church, provision market, and water supply. The quarters represented a natural functional differentiation achieved without deliberate planning. The merchant's quarter, for example, naturally grew up around the city gate, the clerical precinct around the church or monastery. The division into precincts was one means of breaking down the scale of the whole city so that face-to-face social relations could occur as a normal part of everyday life—the precondition of the foundation of a communal society.

4) The limitation of town growth: The town's unity as a communal social order was reinforced by limiting town growth through several physical and material means. Natural limits to growth were set by the limitation of water supply and food production as well as distances of efficient transportation and communication. Socially-set limits were defined through rules defining the use of land. As a communal stewardship and trust not subject to market forces, land disposition was through communally-controlled political and legal mechanisms. City ordinances and guild practices controlled settlement. When open space within the city was filled, the wall would then be extended to incorporate more territory, or new towns would bud off. Communal control of city scale and growth is the assertion of social values over the environment. This control is, of course, in strong contrast to the generally uncontrolled development of liberal American urban areas derivin
from the free operation of capitalist imperatives which destroy rather than encourage community.

5) The planning function: Some city development occurred without deliberate planned decisions (as in the functional differentiation of city quarters) and some decisions reflected deliberate planning (such as the decision to start a new town). But until the Baroque period the planning function was not assigned a specific social role. This lack of role-differentiation indicates that urban decisions were made within the context of a societal consensus which maintained the primacy of the social and spiritual order in making urban-related decisions.

Medieval architecture—the Gothic cathedral: The Gothic cathedral was the quintessence of the architectural expression of the medieval ideal. Even more than the form of the medieval city, the cathedral reflected both the taxonomy of the divine model and a design and construction practice guided more by a unified cultural ideal than by a specialized professional ethic. ¹

It is the meaning of the Gothic cathedral as a social product, rather than as a formal architecture construction, which is of concern here. Indeed, the major formal Gothic elements (the flying buttress, pointed arch, rib vaults, and the basilica plan) had existed in the previous Early Christian and/or Romanesque styles. The particular use and recombination of these elements in the Gothic cathedral was motivated f:
less by technical considerations than in being a vehicle for erecting an image of the power that the Church had attained over Medieval spiritual life.

The context of the meaning of the Gothic cathedral had shifted from that of the medieval town described earlier. While the town as a whole represented a unity in which Church was not radically separated from secular affairs, and the religious experience suffused everyday life as a communal experience. But in the particularly French origin of the Gothic cathedral, religious experience had become an individual encounter with the deity. While religion still suffused the everyday world, the Gothic cathedral developed into an expression of a purely transcendent relation of the sacred and the secular. The cathedral became the city of God brought to earth, existing within but separate from the everyday world. The formal history of the Gothic cathedral was the progressive etherealization of inert structure. The stone walls of earlier Christian architecture became at the height of the Gothic almost entirely glass, through which the profane exterior light was transmuted into the light of God within. Parallel to the transformation of light, the progression through the length of the complexly articulated Gothic basilican plan metaphorically brought the worshipper from the profane everyday world into the body of Christ and the Church. The cathedral became a visual equivalent to the Godly presence—a compendium of the unity of all knowing under God.
as a visual encyclopedia for wo/men who could not read words but only the meanings of carvings and stained glass. Then the cathedral became a unity of intellect and belief, an "interior all spirit and an exterior all intellect. For inside the cathedral we cannot and are not meant to understand the law governing the whole. Outside we are faced with a frank exposition of the complicated structural mechanism." 1 The cathedrals embodied an extreme separation of the environment into the sacred and secular which reflected the growing political separation between church and state.

The workshops: The technical and aesthetic sophistication of the cathedrals was achieved with skills which neither clerics or craftsmen alone, who had previously been responsible for church construction, could achieve. Master masons emerged from the anonymous guild craftsmen to act as designers and directors of workshops responsible for cathedral construction. As the designer gained an identity in history, so did the workshops. They became detached from the town-based guild structure to work at various locations, developing recognizable regional architectural identity. With the workshops developed artistic individuality.

Artists would frequently ensure lasting fame for themselves by carving their own portraits or inscribing their own work. This positive recognition of the individuality of the master is a marked characteristic of the later Middle Ages. It is symptomatic of the new state of mind that was to replace the traditional idea of works of architecture, sculpture and painting as spontaneous works of communal and almost anonymous crafts-
manship—an idea that was finally to produce the self-conscious artist, recognized by himself and the world for his personal achievement. This state of mind was to inform the new era in the history of the West—the Renaissance and modern times.

Conclusion—the dissolution of the medieval order: The medieval town attained in its highest moments a balance between churchly and secular power in which the Christian ideal suffused the everyday life and consciousness of the population. The balance and human freedom reached in medieval times was based on the political freedom the medieval town's citizens, a relative balance of power between social estates differentiated more by role than by power, a strict physical, political, and economic separation of town from surrounding country, and a balance between secular and Churchly power. The equilibrium between these social elements was delicate. As power differentials developed, the medieval community dissolved. Conditions were then laid for the centralized state power, a secular rationalism, capitalist economics, and class domination which characterized the Aristocratic and then liberal social order.

The dissolution of the medieval order will be briefly discussed in terms of two essential corrosive agents—the growth of a trading economy, and the conflict of Church and state. The meaning of the Gothic cathedral in terms of these developments will then be presented.

1) The dissolution of the medieval economy: The main medieval economic activity was handicraft production, the pro-
duction of objects for use as opposed to the capitalist produc-
tion for profit. Medieval production was strictly regu-
lated against profit-making and competition, forming an inter-
nal economy which was largely severed from external trade and
acting as in primitive societies as a force of social unifica-
tion. But while the original medieval productive and social
relation made little distinction between merchant, master and
apprentice, the need for mutual cooperation in building a pio-
neering social order diminished. Production and trade expanded
under a growing guild monopoly, generating capital beyond sus-
tance needs which accrued to the growing burgher (bourgeois)
class. The non-exploitative relations of medieval social estat
(differing mainly in social role) was transformed into a class
system based on the hierarchical distribution of class power.
A growing exploitation of both town and country worker was
the origin of the working class of liberal society. External
production and trade monopolies overcame the traditional limit
on trade and production through bypassing the guild-controlled
monopolies. On a national and international scale, the grow-
ing capitalist enterprise demanded a large-scale political and
economic centralization which the sealed medieval urban con-
tainer resisted. The competition of external trade with
the internal medieval economy was a major element in the de-
struction of the medieval communal social order. Economic ac-
tivities which were within the walls a means towards social
unity became with the advent of the bourgeois a means towards
individual privilege and class domination--the destruction of community.

2) **The dissolution of the harmony between Church and state:** The growth of the economic sector of course challenged the dominance of the Church over medieval life, but the Church itself worked to contradict the very premises of its spiritual authority. The Church was founded on the radical postulates of poverty, chastity, non-resistance, humility, and support of the poor and downtrodden as equal to society's most highly-placed in the eyes of God. Yet the Papacy denounced as heresy St. Francis' dream of complete etherialization, emancipation from permanent possessions which bound the spirit, and the belief in communal sharing of possessions. The Papacy lost its spiritual authority and universalism through nepotism, corruption and materialism.

3) **The dissolution of medieval architecture as an expression of the social unity:** As a part of the Church's material expansion, a heavy investment in cathedral building was encouraged, representing the "power drive, wealth-encrusted ego,...and ultimately, the walled city, that ego's greatest collective expression." Then while the cathedrals were formally designed to express an extreme etherialization and spirituality, their social meaning was as an expression of the destruction of the medieval unity--an increasingly materialized Church set in competition with private bourgeois and state power. In fact, the behavior and aspirations of
both Church and secular interests were increasingly similar and materialistic, contradicting the traditional medieval ideals of secular and spiritual community. It could be justly said that the degree of true Christianity achieved in the medieval world was in inverse relation to its architectural materialization.

The Gothic cathedral is the first of a number of instances noted in this thesis of the incompatibility of the ideals expressed by architectural form and the social reality which is its material base. The cathedral builders' claimed to represent and promulgate through their work the kingdom of God on earth. The Modern Movement would claim its forms as the only architecture appropriate to the machine age. These claims were severely contradicted by the class conflict and domination which was the reality of the society from which the architecture sprang. In this context, the idealization represented by the cathedrals which could justify the separation of churchly from secular values are severely suspect as a mode of knowing and representation. ¹

We must agree with Mumford that "when we admire the surviving outward form, we must not forget the persistence of the inner trauma--the trauma of civilization itself, the association of mastery and slavery, of power and human sacrifice." ²
THE ARISTOCRATIC SOCIAL ORDER

Introduction: The Renaissance and Baroque phases which comprised the aristocratic social order were transitional periods between the relative personal and class equality of the primitive/medieval orders and the class domination of the liberal era. In the Renaissance and Baroque, architecture and planning first emerged as separate practices and were first assigned distinct social roles (the head of the Medieval workshop remained master craftsman even though he designed) in support not of communal values but of class power.

The dissolution of the Medieval unity left its constituent elements, the aristocrats, bourgeoisie and the Church, in a flux which consolidated into a social order markedly different from the Medieval structuring of roughly co-equal estates.

THE PROBLEM OF ORDER

The central problem of the new social order was to find solutions for the problems of order, method and the self in a time when the dominance of the sacred model of the world had lessened, and a new secularism was rising among the estates.

The emergent social order was a strongly hierarchical class structure under the domination of sacred and secular centralized monarchs. Pope and king assumed divine legitimation for their power over an increasingly secular society which defined itself not through the divine model but in the acquisition and expansion of wealth and power. As the
medieval barter economy turned into a capitalist money economy, the idea of limit, balance and order was replaced by the imperative of the expansion of all social sectors: power, economy, population, social control, territory. The means of expansion and consolidation of power were largely war, economic expansion, political and trade domination.

THE PROBLEM OF METHOD

Capitalist expansion and centralized control demanded a new form of knowledge. The divine model was useless to a social order which required not an explanation of meaning and world order, but ways of controlling and exploiting natural and social forces. Therefore the metaphysics which ordered a heavenly world gave way to the ideology of power, mathematics, accounting, science, engineering and the perspectival ordering of space—all abstract forms of knowing which in their abstraction are very effective in ordering the material world for efficient control.

THE PROBLEM OF SELF

The medieval self was absorbed into a social place within a non-problematic system of estates which appeared as a natural given order. The dissolution of this system upset the medieval social mappings and made the structure of given social places unstable. The problem was resolved by the organization of the aristocratic power structure into dominant and dominated classes, destroying the previous medieval community. The communal deification of God was replaced by the deification of man, at
first in general, but later in the person of the monarch. Wo/men's selves and relation to the social whole became mediated and defined through the abstract hierarchical structure of class domination.

THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING

The problem of architecture and planning is both the establishment of a basis for making design decisions and the legitimation of the design enterprise within the social order. Within the consensually legitimated medieval society, design took its place in the world order. But in the aristocratic society, the design function separated out into distinct professions. Architecture and planning then became problematic, open questions to be resolved through theory and practice rather than through the derivation of form and legitimation from pre-given models of tradition or cosmology. This situation then was the origin of design theory and the consciousness of design and planning as distinct activities.

Problematic was not only the basis of design decisions but the relation of the design activity to dominant power. It will be shown that from the Renaissance on, a gulf opened between the conditions of practice in relation to dominant power and design ideals as articulated in a project of design theory which increasingly took on a life of its own. This is an early symptom of the more general social separation of the actuality of alienation and domination from the self's ideal of the reconciliation of autonomy
and community. The increasing abstraction of design theory and the designers' awareness of the nature of social domination was a form of alienation: the designer retreated into an artificial and abstract world of historicism, mathematics, and perspective in avoidance of the domination of the new society which was as untenable as necessary in order to practice architecture and planning.

Conclusion: The Aristocratic social order will be discussed in terms of its two major periods in which architectural and planning practice attained distinctive identities—the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Italian Renaissance and the Seventeenth (and Eighteenth) century Baroque.
THE RENAISSANCE

Introduction: The earliest major social formation of the aristocratic age was the Italian Renaissance. In medieval Florence, where the Church traditionally did not dominate the culture as it did in other towns, commercial princes such as the Medici first created in the Fifteenth century the material basis for an essentially secular culture.

THE PROBLEM OF ORDER AND SELF

Politically, the early Italian Renaissance did not represent a radical break with the medieval order. The relatively egalitarian medieval urban social relations were transformed into the Renaissance secular ideal of the political city, a political democratic/representative organization and a set of citizen obligations.

"For the Italians of the fifteenth century, every city had in itself something of that supreme, absolute, ideological-historical-political reality which was the (Roman) Empire - it was more than a city, it was a state 'in nuce'."¹

It is most truly said of the Renaissance that men's internal (as opposed to exploitative) powers were deified. Michaelangelo, was probably the first person to be called divine, in recognition of his genius.

During the Renaissance, on the first wave of the bourgeois advance, social relationships were still relatively transparent, the division of labor had not yet taken the rigid and narrow forms it was to assume later, and the wealth of the new productive forces was
still stored up as a potential within the bourgeois personality. The newly successful bourgeois and the princes who collaborated with him were generous patrons. Whole new worlds were then open to a man of creative gifts. Naturalist, discoverer, engineer, architect, sculptor, painter, and writer were often combined in one person, who passionately affirmed the age in which he lived and whose fundamental attitude was summed up in: 'What joy it is to be alive'.

The deification of man was embodied in the doctrine of Humanism.

The basis of humanist culture was the conviction that God was not so much the beginning as the end of human power and knowledge. Power and knowledge, although no longer attributed to revelation but nevertheless aimed at a consciousness of the divine, had their origin in man, that is to say in reason and in history. This essentially secular, middle-class urban culture lay at the roots of the humanist concept of the city.

THE PROBLEM OF METHOD

The natural and human world, emerging from the divine metaphysics, lay open as a new field of knowledge and action, a new reality. Man could then become the measure of all things. The human and natural worlds were opened to study through a new epistemology which, though developed in a comparatively democratic culture, laid the methodological basis for later absolutism and class domination of the baroque and liberal eras. During the decline of the medieval institutions, the cosmological model was increasingly at odds with the realities of a corrupted Church and the ascendent bourgeois. The model could be a basis neither for the factual and practical knowledge which the bourgeois required nor a source
of valuing. The Renaissance scientific epistemology responded to this contradiction in several ways:

a) The analytic method of gaining knowledge from natural and social reality replaced the medieval derivation of knowledge from the eternal cosmological model. Truth was not to be deduced from its location in the divine model, but was to be induced through scientific methodology from the facts of the real world itself.

b) To be true, the facts of the world and the method used to determine them had to be universally applicable, as was the divine cosmology which the method replaced. Then knowledge became abstracted from the specific situations in which it arose and was universalized. The Renaissance social order, for example, was seen to parallel the natural order, and thus the particular social order was hypothesized as a universal.

c) Knowledge then became dissociated from particular interests. But as the principle of reality was in the world itself if knowledge was universalized, then what was known seemed to be a given, unproblematic and unquestionable with no gap admissible between actuality and an ideal situation. Thus fact and value were separated. There was no provision within the methodology for determining value or an ought. This function was left to the increasingly discredited Church. Consequently (and while the term 'separation of fact from value' implies that value is possible to determine in some
non-scientific quarter) value became identified with fact. In describing how Renaissance princes did operate, Machiavelli implied that they should so operate.

d) In the collapse of the ought to the is, what was allowed as reality was reduced to the compass of the method of knowing. 'Man was the measure of the world.' He could literally admit as knowledge only what could be measured through the abstract and atomistic scientific method.

Experience was progressively reduced to just those elements that were capable of being split off from the whole and measured separately: convention counters took the place of organism. What was real was that part of experience which left no murky residues; and anything that could not be expressed in terms of visual sensations and mechanical order was not worth expressing. In art, perspective and anatomy; in morals, the systematic causality of the Jesuits, in architecture, axial symmetry, formalistic repetition, fixed proportions of the Five Orders, and in city building, the elaborate geometric plan.

THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING

Introduction: The Renaissance designers were the first professionals to face the post medieval problematic of architecture and planning in a social order with no consensual legitimation. The theory and practice and social position of the designers is discussed in terms of the position of the Renaissance designer as a professional, design theory and practice, the ideal city, and a short critique which pits the professional self-representation against the social meaning of professional production.
The Renaissance designer as professional: The class position of the Renaissance designer was a most important mediation between the Renaissance epistemology and its impact on design and planning.

The designers' position resulted from a split in the urban middle class between merchants and craftsmen. A new merchant elite developed, assuming cultural and political control of the Renaissance city-states. In practice the split was reflected by a hierarchical distinction between the liberal and mechanical arts, in turn practiced by the designer and worker. The designer was now triply abstracted—from any basis for his work in a divine cosmology; from the unity of thought and execution; and from the functional and class unity of designer and builder. Correspondingly, the builder lost his function as a designer to constitute a subordinate social class. Here originated the distinction in design between professional and working classes, and thus the basis of all future professional identity.

The designer became an exemplar of the 'Renaissance universal man' answerable to his own genius. Yet paradoxically, he was materially obligated to his sponsors, the dominant princes of Church and state who held particularized power. The paradox was reproduced on the epistemological level in the contradiction between a universalized humanism and the origin of humanism in a particularistic society.

The contradiction was resolved only by ignoring the
particular societal origins of thought. A universalized theory, philosophy, mathematics, aesthetics, and personal will became the basis for design theory and practice. The preconditions were then set for the elevation of particular design imperatives (aesthetic, historical, mathematical, functional, intuition) independent of their relation to the social totality as the generalized foundation of design, decision making and legitimation.

**Renaissance design theory and practice:** The central problem for Renaissance designers was in finding a secular but authoritative basis for making design decisions. This problem paralleled the central social problem of discovering a secular legitimation and basis for the unity of society and the unity of self. (These issues in their continued irresolution constitute the contemporary crises of design and social order.)

Design theory and the creation of theoretical designs were important means in formulating a basis for design practice. Indeed, with the exception of a few Greek and Latin authors (notably Vitruvius), design theory as an activity independent of practice originated in the Renaissance. The major Renaissance theoretical approaches which still inform design theory and practice were historicism, perspective and proportion, the design of ideal cities, and the postulating of the visual as the basis of design.

1) **Historicism:** The Renaissance is commonly characterized as a rediscovery of man through the
interpretation of the classical past. The authority of the past was arrogated through aesthetic reinterpretation and some scholarly research to the validation of the authority of the Renaissance city-state as the legitimate agent of power. Designers also sought valid authority for their work on the basis of the imputed authority of the "Justness of Noble" classical architecture which did not run 'after the Whims of the Moderns'. The classical world appears as 'a realm of beauty and perfection' which no contemporary design product could achieve. Historicism, then, is an admission of the separation of the ideal from the actual which Alberti realized as emerging as the dominant consciousness of his time. The ideal for historicism is then sought in the design product, not the historic totality in which the product originated.

2) **The visual as the basis of design:** As the design product was abstracted from its historic context, the Renaissance designers abstracted from the product itself certain formal elements independent of their symbolic meanings. "The vocabulary of antiquity was employed in the service of an entirely original style of spatial organization" in which space, volume and concern with the purely visual abstracted from other meaning reference became the subject of design. Visual patterns, Alberti maintained, could be 'very noble in themselves'. Their significance was in 'their composition, their putting together'. In other words, the formal internal organization of the design product without reference to a wider system of meaning constituted its validity,
judged by an 'innate mechanism' in the mind of each designer or user of buildings. Yet forms cannot have an innate meaning, since form is derived from human meaning and practice. Renaissance design could be perceived as 'pleasing objects' only in their lack of connection to a critically-understood social totality.

For example, an important part of the Renaissance architect's production was the design of patrician palaces. For Alberti, the aim of the palace's design, its harmonious proportion and fineness of proportion, was to express the social prestige of the family - prestige understood as being based on the family's 'cultural values' rather than the force used to attain the family's position. Alberti expresses the naivete of the Renaissance architects' relation to power which was to typify the architects' consciousness and action to the present. It is precisely the relation of 'cultural values' to domination which is a leitmotif of all aesthetic practice, far more honestly recognized by Machiavelli than by the designers themselves.

Design products, as pleasing objects, express the form of the new society of individual concentrations of power. Design products are not any more means of communication of a cohesive community. They are signifiers of power grasped. (Consequently, beautiful products are not valuable in what they are, but in what they represent. When man possesses them he grips neither the object nor the beauty of it. What is delicious for him is not the ornaments, the proportions, the materials. It is the power he holds to dominate other men.)
3) **Perspective and mathematical proportion as the basis of design:** Major Renaissance disciplines for ordering space were perspective and mathematical proportion. Both significantly related to the newly-individualized Renaissance man who, with perspective, became the subject on which the physical world focussed. Proportion mathematically related that world to human physical dimensions. The architectural ideal of the Renaissance was the Church in which all is balance, delicacy and order. Its mathematized spatial geometry allows the human being to understand the entire church from one position through his perspectival eye - a house of man rather than the medieval house of God.

Yet, in two senses, the balance of the Renaissance architectural ideal was an artificially-constructed reality. First, the sensation of an ordered, timeless and universalized world belied the dynamic, particularistic and increasingly hierarchical Renaissance society. Secondly, the universalized unity which the Renaissance ideal church represented was not the product of a consensual ethos, but the creation of designers who held their own particularistic class position as the servants of dominant societal power.

4) **The ideal city:** The disjunction between power and form in the consciousness and actions of the Renaissance designers is nowhere more marked than in Renaissance city design. In terms of urban design, there was no Renaissance city, only the minor renewal of certain portions of
the medieval city. The major force shaping the Renaissance city was the need to construct defensive fortifications. As the Renaissance developed, towns started preying on each other with local and mercenary armies in the effort to increase the flow of wealth, trade and political power. With the introduction of explosives, towns had to construct new walls as a matter of survival, at great expense and social effort. The engineering function became predominant in town design.

While developing fortifications, engineers also designed 'ideal' cities. Far from serving the critical function of some later utopian plans, the ideal cities were largely geometrical formalizations of the city as a military machine, an "armored coffer full of precious objects." Yet for their designers, the ideal cities and fortification plans were perceived as primarily design problems. The delicate 'humanistic' architecture was contained by massive defensive and offensive city walls - instruments of the aggrandizement of power and wealth. The ideal city, "always originated at the behest of an absolute ruler - a sovereign. It was founded on the desire for power, and the desire for power inevitably translates itself into the potential of war."3

Conclusion: At least in the popular image, the Renaissance represents a short state of historical innocence, a period in which scientific and humanistic knowledge, self-realized individuality, and the values of the city as a proud
political entity were developed in a climate of patrician generosity. The designers flourished through the development of their individuality, in support of high cultural values of the enlightened nobility. Yet this view mystifies the domination which created the material basis for such culture, as well as the real meaning of the environment in symbolizing and reinforcing power.¹

Renaissance design theory (historicism, the meaning of the visual, perspective and proportion, the ideal city) looked everywhere except at the social origin of its own practice for the meaning of architectural and city form. The universalistic methodological base of the theory avoided confronting the particularistic and historic domination which underlay the class position, consciousness and work of the designers.
THE BAROQUE:

Introduction: The Baroque, dating from app. 1600 to 1750, was the period of triumph of centralized absolute political and economic power. The medieval estates had represented no great disparity in privilege, while classes of the Baroque were widely separated in power and wealth—the origin of the 'upper, middle and lower classes' in the modern sense. Above the society was the absolute monarch, who personified the emergence of the state as an organ of social bonding above the body of society. The Church became secularized and the secular power took on the divine mantle. Pope and prince shared a preeminent concern with aggrandizing power and wealth through war and mercantile capitalism.

THE PROBLEM OF ORDER AND SELF

A key to understanding the Baroque social order is its relation to capital accumulation. Capital is inherently expansive and can be accumulated in two ways. Essentially pre-existing wealth can be exploited through 'favorable balance of trade', taxation, interest, land rent and the like. Alternately, wealth can be created through the exploitation of labor and commodity profits. The Baroque state used both means through its monopoly of rent, the booty from foreign conquest, domestic and foreign colonialization, the monopoly of special production privileges, and taxation. Yet emphasis was on the exploitation of pre-existing wealth. This practice
was reversed in the liberal era, for while such exploitation appeared limitless and expansive, sufficient wealth could not be produced to flow to the whole society and must therefore be restricted to the few - the upper classes and the monarch. What resulted was an extreme disproportion of social wealth and the seeds of the destruction of the Baroque society in the resentment of the lower classes. Indeed, "there was only one desirable station in (the) despotism; it was that of the rich." ¹ The rich were the only class which could live the courtly life, the consumption of existence and the Baroque cultural ideal.

Further, the appropriation of wealth by the state required unprecedented military, legal, administrative and economic social control. "The two arms of this new system are the army and the bureaucracy: they are the temporal and spiritual support of a centralized despotism." ² Control was effected through discipline, the universalized expression of particularized interests, predictability, order, uniformity, and hierarchy. These qualities characterized the major social systems of the Baroque, (having common interests and great interdependence in the production and acquisition of wealth and power).

THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING

Introduction: Architecture and planning were important instruments of control for the absolute papal and political monarchs; absolute political and economic control
deman'ded the absolute control of space itself.

City building was no longer, for a rising class of small craftsmen and merchants, a means of achieving freedom and security. It was rather a means of consolidating political power in a single national center directly under the royal eye and preventing such a challenge to the central authority from arising elsewhere.... Other towns either stultified or subordinated.

Principles of Baroque design: A central principle of the Baroque was the unity of an inherently limitless expansive economy with a highly-controlled hierarchical social order. This imperative was reproduced in four interrelated principles of Baroque design: perspective, the dialectic of dynamism and stasis, space as a reflection of the Church's decline, and space as military control.

1) Perspective: While first utilized in the Renaissance, the full potential of perspective was applied to ordering entire cities only in the service of the comprehensive power of the Baroque monarchs. Perspective has the dual quality of focusing on the individual while extending from the individual into space along infinite linear lines of sight. Perspective was thus a powerful tool of the Baroque planners' attempt to make comprehensive physical unities. The Baroque use of perspective placed centrality and infinity into a special unity, controllable at the center yet infinitely expandable. The medieval center of church market and/or town hall became the Baroque monument, palace or star-shaped plaza, with lines of sight
embodied in grand avenues leading to and radiating from the center. Space was reduced to measure and order, embracing the extremely distant and the immediate, traversed through time and motion. In Rome, avenues were cut between religious monuments, while in Paris, avenues were cut between palaces, plazas, and the new institutions of the aristocracy. In both cases the intention was the same. The web of power engulfed the medieval/Renaissance social orders. Likewise, the web of streets and stars was literally overlaid on the medieval/Renaissance town.

Besides rebuilding existing medieval and Renaissance cities, Baroque authorities established entirely new towns to garrison armies or house royal residences. For example, Versailles was established outside Paris by Louis XIV, the sun king, to house his court and residence. Versailles was both the terminous of major perspectival avenues (analogous to the individual to which the perspectival lines converged) and the point from which a system of spatial domination and control of the landscape issued. The control of infinite space symbolized infinite power. Similarly, Bernini's colonnade at St. Peters would symbolically embrace the population of Rome with the power of the Church.

2) The unity of dynamism and stasis: The Baroque unity was also the unity of dynamism and stasis, freedom and control. The apparent dynamism of movement along
the avenue was terminated by an expression of centralized power. "All movement is around fixed points. It is a union of the opposites of order and freedom. The order is absolutely firm, but against it an illusion of freedom is played." This order is clearly manifest in the design of the Baroque church. The typical ideal and static centralized church of the Renaissance became in the Baroque a dynamic oval, a unity of centrality and directionality in plan and experience.

3) Space as a reflection of the Church's decline:

Whereas all through the Renaissance spacial clarity had been the governing idea, and the eye of the spectator had been able to run unimpeded from one part to another and read the meaning of the whole and the parts without effort, nobody, standing (in such an oval church) can understand of what elements it is made, and how they are intertwined to produce such a rolling, rocking effect. Why did architects and artists so fervently strive to deceive and create such intense illusion of reality? What reality was the Church concerned with? Surely that of the Divine Presence. It is the zeal of an age in which Roman Catholic dogmas, mysteries, and miracles were no longer, as they had been in the Middle Ages accepted as truth by all. There were heretics, and there were sceptics. To restore the first to the fold, to convince the others, religious architecture had to both inflame and to mesmerize.

The interiors of these churches attempted to create a comprehensive sensual unity of architecture, painting, sculpture, and motion, the illusion of the infinite. The goal of sensation, beyond legitimating the church power, was a leitmotif of Baroque upper-class culture as a whole. Sensation is of the given moment, and the princes of state and church
wanted to eternalize the present. This is an existential impossibility, yet at the same time an attempt at the legitimization of the given order. Such an historicism, ironically co-existing with the Renaissance/Baroque concern with antiquity, presages the essentially unhistoric liberal conception of time and history. The legitimation of particularistic dominance is to make it appear infinite, universal, and eternal.

4) Space as military control: Spatial control meant military control. The forces which conquered the Baroque colonial possessions in order to appropriate economic and political power also kept the lower classes in their 'place'. Broad new avenues were so well-suited for efficient mass movement, the display of royal power and upper-class pomp. But the avenues also were designed to assure easy observation and firearms control of dissidents; cannonballs have straight trajectories and therefore can't be shot down twisting medieval streets. The confluence of social, spatial and military order was no accident but a simultaneous set of necessities.

Conclusion: the abstraction of power: The legacy of the Baroque for the liberal era is presented in terms of the abstract Baroque resolutions of the problems of order, method, self and architecture and planning used to establish and legitimate Baroque class domination.

THE PROBLEM OF ORDER

1) The abstraction of personal power: Personal
power was maintained through impersonal institutions. The Baroque bureaucracy, the law, and the military were abstract devices to exercise domination through the appearance of neutral function and efficiency. These institutions, when the monarchy was deposed as a form of power, remained as central to the liberal exercise of domination.

2) The abstraction of money: In the Baroque, the medieval barter economy was supplanted by a money economy. This development involved the beginnings of a major transformation in social relations. Barter economy involved a daily, face-to-face encounter which proved an important means of medieval social bonding on the level of everyday life. But the replacement of barter by money as a means of exchange meant the beginning of the substitutions of the more abstract process of money exchange for human relations.

THE PROBLEM OF METHOD

3) The abstraction of thought: Starting with the aristocratic era, scientific analysis began to replace religious truths as the legitimated mode of knowledge in secular society. The validation of science was based on the power of science as an instrument to explain and dominate nature and man, producing wealth, power and social control.¹

4) The abstraction of the legitimation of power: Validated knowledge became increasingly abstracted from its origins in the concrete world. Reality was determined to originate in some abstract, ideal world of the mind. This is
idealism, in which the origin of knowledge is not in material reality but in concepts. Beyond the realm of personal verification, idealism was then used as an instrument of power to validate its own authority. Idealised concepts such as the 'Divine Right of kings', 'Absolute Rule', and the 'State', were presented as actual. Yet the real lives of human beings as individuals and societal members were treated abstractly.

THE PROBLEM OF SELF

5) The abstraction of the self, bound by a class structure, from wholeness: Individuals in a class society live not within the social whole but within a distinct social grouping differentiated in wealth, power and opportunity. Relations between classes became conflicts. The self became a problem because it could not within its class, become whole. While perhaps able to lead concrete inter-subjective lives within a class, membership in the whole society is denied to women, whether in dominating or dominated class. Both classes suffer, for the master and slave define each other. The lives of the Baroque upper classes in Baroque courtly society show the impossibility of leading a meaningful existence on the basis of power and wealth alone, isolated from a social whole. Being an aristocrat in a narrow social class may have been more a condemnation than a blessing.

THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING

6) The abstraction of Baroque city design: The forms of Baroque city design were abstract, conceptual and
generalized - their content the result of the imperative of control and display rather than a response to the diverse needs of diverse classes. "The institutions of the city no longer generate the plan; the function of the plan is rather to bring about conformity to the prince's will in the institutions." Typically, such Baroque devices as the square, the star, radiating avenues, and deliberate visual containments and releases were imposed regardless of (and abstracted from) the natural topography or existing social structures. Appropriately, many Baroque city planners were primarily bureaucrats serving the monarch, or military engineers (who also wrote the chief Baroque town planning treatises).

The imposition of the abstract Baroque schemes of visual order were possible only through the highly centralized monarchical authority, who in their power could abstract themselves and the design they authorized from the rest of life.

The palace; the exchequer; the prison; the madhouse - what four buildings could more completely sum up the new order or better symbolize the main features of its political life. These were the dominants. Between them stretched the blandly repetitive facades; and behind those facades the forgotten and denied parts of life somehow went on.

7) The abstraction of the Baroque designer: The Baroque city was "an essay in formal scenic design; a backdrop for absolute power" and the social/military drama that was the aristocrats' daily life. Indeed, some planners and architects were also scenic designers. Baroque buildings and cities were created as purely abstract visual unities: never
was the visual given so much autonomy in governing a wholly-designed world. This totalistic design is paradoxically the most aesthetically and professionally liberated from all but formalistic internal concerns, in a sense the dream of many Twentieth-century designers. Yet this liberation was achieved only through its sponsorship by a centralized despotism.
THE LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER

Introduction: The central intent of this section is to show the elements of the liberal social order (its community, economy, polity, forms of knowledge, the self, environment, architectural and planning theory and practice) as fundamentally alienated and fragmented — a condition which is the normal consequence of the operation of the capitalist institutions.¹

The concept of alienation is a major 'unit-idea' of Western thought and descriptor of liberal reality.² The idea is inherently critical, because an alienated reality can only be known in relation to a presumed ideal unified reality.

The idea of alienation has had a critical function in presupposing a conception of the essential unity which must be restored... For both Plato and Hegel, failure to maintain the necessary harmony between Psyche, Polis and Cosmos results in an alienation of the natural unity of knowing and doing. ...The idea of alienation has always been an assessment of the contradictions between given states of human experience and an Ideal or more fundamental reality.³

The essence of alienation that the ideal "whole has broken up into numerous parts whose interrelation in the whole cannot be ascertained... whether the part under examination is man, his activity, his product, or his ideas. The same separation is evident in each."⁴ Alienation then is not a psychological malaise, although alienation is certainly felt personally. Rather, it is a consequence of the structural separation of self and society, wo/man and environment, the knower and the known, the liberal institutions and the people
they govern. Each term of the relationship is mutually necessary, for alienation is a relationship: self can be alienated only if society is.

A more concrete understanding of alienation comes from examining its operation in the relation between the ruling and dominated classes. Capitalist class domination was secured through the institutionalization of certain property and social relations as the basis of capitalist decision-making mechanisms. These mechanisms operate to maintain class domination through necessarily denying the realization of human needs and potentials.

"Alienation occurs when the implicit or explicit institutional decision-mechanisms do not reflect the needs... criteria of the individuals whom the outcome affects. Insofar as this is true...individuals are 'alienated' from the social object (be it physical object; a social role as worker; citizen, soldier, etc.; another individual; an element of culture, or himself) which is the outcome of the institutional decision."2

To the extent that the liberal order is the domination of the capitalist (or ruling) class, that order is a total alienation.

The central experiences of the self in the liberal order describe the nature of that order itself: the extreme separation of the ideal from the actual, the experience of the arbitrariness and transitoriness of values and moral
belief, instrumentalism, alienation, and the meaninglessness of everyday life.¹

Liberal society as a total alienation is the polar opposite of the medieval unity. While the medieval moral unity and social authority was legitimated under a divine cosmology, class domination is the only basis for liberal social bonding. While medieval knowledge and truth was derived from a divine model, the liberal scientific epistemology allows no valid knowledge other than derived from analytic scientific procedures; while the medieval social map of reality was transparent, the liberal reality appears obscure and meaningless; the medieval self as defined in relation to a human community became in liberal society, radically alienated from even the potential of communal relations. Architecture and planning, once an organic part of the medieval consensually legitimated social whole, are consigned in liberal society to rationalize fragmentary parts of a fragmented whole.

These extraordinary characteristics of the liberal society were achieved through revolutions of social order, method, and the constitution of the self which totally transformed the Western world. The liberal order was a resolution to the crises of the post-medieval societies. In the most general terms, these crises were the problems of finding basis for a social legitimation in terms of value, morality and knowledge, in the absence of the transcendent divine
model. The Aristocratic order substituted the divinity of the earthly monarch for the authority of God. Theoretically, the monarch was legitimated as the only person in the society with access to divine knowledge, and therefore access to the means of resolving social crises. Such knowledge was transmitted by the monarch to the society below. This ideal construct, as a basis for social and moral order, fell apart through the increased involvement of the bourgeois and aristocratic class in capitalist economics. The divine authority of the monarch was further eroded by the growing success of science in explaining and controlling the natural order. This success lent weight to the scientific claim that valid knowledge came only from the methodological study of the natural order, rather than from the deductive receiving of divine knowledge.

Capitalism and science became then the forms in which the post-medieval crises of social order, and moral legitimation (the problem of order), and knowledge (the problem of method) were resolved in the liberal social order.

THE PROBLEM OF ORDER

Introduction: Two interlocked revolutions initiated the liberal social order: the political and military ascendancy of the bourgeois class over the aristocracy and the transformation of state-controlled mercantile capitalism into a privately-controlled capitalism whose imperatives were
the basis for the bourgeois social order.

While the nature of the aristocratic class determined the tone and economy of the aristocratic order, the structure of laissez-faire capitalism itself became the most powerful influence on the liberal social order. This can be seen in the relation of each class to its economic form.

Aristocratic wealth poured into the Baroque capitals from colonial and local conquest, taxation, trade, and some commodity production. These sources fed a mercantile economy which operated under strong social and economic restrictions. But while the state controlled the economy, the potential of capitalism was barely exploited. A relatively narrow economic flow was absorbed by the aristocrats, leaving a great disproportion between the wealth of a very few and the relative poverty of the masses. The wealth accumulated through mercantial capitalism was squandered by the aristocrats on courtly life and on the construction of cities as a background for the courtly drama. Capital was not invested or accumulated in a way that it could grow and reproduce itself. Strong social hierarchies therefore had to be maintained in order to channel and restrict the available wealth to the few at the top.

The liberal era, on the contrary, was the triumph of the more populous bourgeois class, which adopted the rhetoric of the universality of man's rights to life, liberty and property as a weapon against the aristocratic particularity
of power. A more populous class required a more productive material base. This was achieved by withdrawing the traditional political restrictions on capitalism. Liberal society has become largely derivative of the internal logic and imperatives of capitalism.

The capitalist imperatives: The capitalist system has two major imperatives: the generation of profit and the capitalist control of all social elements.

1) The generation of profit: Liberal capitalism is a tool for the infinite expansion of wealth. As discussed previously, aristocratic wealth was strongly limited by its investment in non-productive objects. Liberal capitalism overcame this limit through continually reinvesting wealth so that it could reproduce and enlarge itself; profit became the only basis on which new production could be initiated to create new profit and new wealth in a theoretically, never-ending cycle. Every element of the natural and social world was then a potential source of profit. The traditional integrity of nature, human lives, community, and wealth itself (as in the Baroque hoarding of precious objects) was fragmented. Only those elements and qualities of social and natural reality which were useful in the productive/profit cycle were defined as values. Therefore nature was valuable only as a source of land rent and raw materials; human beings were redefined as useful only as labor and commodity markets; wealth was valuable as a means to create more wealth through interest and reinvestment.
The abstract value of money became more real than the material base of nature, self and society from which money derived. The enduring meaning of the natural and social world, the springs of previous human stability, became literally dematerialized as impediments to the constant capitalist process of perpetually converting all social elements into profit, which in turn is reinvested. When production is not for the sake of serving human need but for profit, what is produced is immaterial.

Further, the traditional meaning of work and the exchange of goods and services was transformed. While in the tribal/medieval barter economies work and goods exchange was an instrument of social bonding, the only rewards and meanings of work under capitalism were money and commodities—both abstract transformations of the concrete processes of work and social relations.

Beyond the alienated nature of the capitalist work process, money and commodity-acquisition as the major meaning of work was an important element in the destruction of society as a community of social relations. The value of money and consumption can only be individual and not communal. The meanings of concrete social relations and the concrete qualities of the human and natural world was then replaced by the abstract value of money.

2) The capitalist control of all social elements: In order for all aspects of life to be made
instruments of commodity production, all aspects of the liberal social relationships had to come under capitalist control, which functioned to both force people into the capitalist system and to quell the natural resistance to domination. ¹

In face of continual resistance (as seen in such diverse phenomenon as the counter culture, urban riots, individual pathologies such as drugs, crime and mental disease, deliberate work slowdowns or sabotage, vandalism, etc.) capitalism must exert a continual effort to maintain its control - these efforts become an institutionalized part of everyday life. The following paragraphs discuss some important means for social control, finishing with a discussion on the liberal efforts at a social legitimation of class domination.

Some important imperatives of capitalist social control are:

a) The flow of wealth to the dominating class: The greatly increased wealth of laissez-faire capitalism did not equalize the general level of wealth in liberal society, but was channeled to the bourgeois who either owned or controlled the means of production. This is one form of class domination, in which wo/men are alienated from control over the value of what they produce.

b) The market in labor: Class domination was assured only if control over the generation and distribution of wealth could be restricted to the dominating class.
Thus all members of the society must be subject to a market in labor which restricts them to being an instrument and not an owner of the means of capitalist production. The market in labor further tends to lower wages and therefore maximize profit. Wages are determined through the market, not by a social rationality based on need but through creating a competitive pressure which often makes the mere holding of a job, rather than its reward, the basic achievement.

c) Hierarchicalization and stratification as instruments of social control: The natural human resistance to domination constitutes the class conflict basic to liberal and other class societies. The resolution of class conflict had to be in favor of the ruling class, so fragmentation of the working classes became an important instrument of social control.

The working forces were hierarchicalized and segmented into many fragmented groups distinguished by status, reward, opportunity, education, race and sex. Among the functions of this fragmentation were: to create the illusion that human rewards are possible within the system by climbing up the hierarchy; to create a secondary industry and labor force which could absorb the fluctuations of the business cycle through periodically entering and leaving the economy (businesses succeed and then fail, workers are employed and then unemployed) while leaving the dominant industries and labor force relatively stable; to create intergroup competition
and antagonism which prevents consciousness and action against the ruling class only possible through a unified movement. Wo/men were alienated from the potential of a unified community.

d) **Commodity fetishism as an instrument of social control:** In order to survive, capitalism had to justify its structural, social and human domination. This justification could only be in terms of the output of capitalist production. Commodities and money were instituted as the prime life-values of liberalism, able to satisfy human needs in the absence of the primary need-satisfaction which only human relations could provide. Given this meaning, objects and the money to pay for them therefore became fetishized, in the sense of assuming human qualities and having a magical power to satisfy human needs.

The desire and valuing of commodities was inculcated through education, socialization, and the capitalist reward structure. Commodity fetishism then became a dominant consciousness which represses the realisation that primary need satisfaction can only come through in a society which values and institutionally maintains the primacy of human autonomy and community over the imperatives of the productive system. To the extent that wo/men are possessed by commodity fetishism, they are alienated from the potential of becoming whole human beings. Relation to commodities cannot substitute for human relations.
The capitalist institutions: The imperatives of capitalism have become determinant in the liberal social order in the form of the capitalist institutions:

1) Private ownership of the factors of production (land, labor and capital) as well as private control over the productive processes. This control is necessary in order that the proceeds of production will accrue disproportionately to the owners.

2) A market in labor, by which a) the worker is prevented from owning his own means of production which would compete with the profit of the capitalist, and b) the worker is forced to sell his labor on the competitive labor market. The wage is determined by supply and demand rather than by need. The worker is forced to relinquish control over what and how he produces, in exchange for money.

3) Markets in land and essential commodities. Use and distribution again are determined essentially by the highest bidder, rather than by a social determination. These institutions yield the maximum production and profit only when they totally dominate the entire productive process and social relations. Then a description of capitalism is to a great extent a description of the nature of liberal society itself. Capitalism then cannot be understood only as an economic system within the large liberal society, for it is a productive organization which makes nature, human activity, and wealth itself into marketable commodities in the service of class domination. Social relations, the
formation of the self and consciousness are all elements of a totalized organization of productive and social relations. As the capitalist institutions are alienated, capitalism is an alienated totality.

"The operation of its basic institutions reduces all aspects of social life - equality, justice, work, technology, commodities, community and environment - to their instrumental role in maximizing commodity circulation and reproducing the social division of labor and control."1,2

The legitimation of liberalism as a moral order: The claim that capitalism is an alienated class domination has been justified in terms of the structural imperatives of the capitalist system. This domination can be understood also in terms of the concept of legitimacy. Each social order must be organized on the basis of a power distribution and assumptions about the nature of the human and natural order which are legitimated, or affirmed and seen as good or right, by most members of the society. Legitimation does not necessarily imply a classless society, but only that all social groups affirm common meanings which unite the social order. For example, the tribal/medieval and aristocratic eras possessed in the ascendent stages of their development a framework of coherent social relations and meanings, though this framework was not uniformly democratic. Power in these societies was legitimated as a moral order. As legitimation has occurred throughout history, it seems to be a
human necessity—as an ideal to which the society collectively aspires, a justification for the distribution of power, wealth, and role, and as a map of the world which gives meaning to individual lives. Even with the collapse of the medieval divine model, the despotic monarchs of the Baroque era took on the trappings of divinity because the social order required a moral order which naked domination could not provide.

But the secular liberal order could not legitimate itself on the basis of a revealed authority or plan. The Church and the aristocracy which claimed such legitimation were corrupt and defeated. The secular substitutes of the Enlightenment—the notions of universalized rights to life, liberty, and property—were idealisms which could not have the force, let alone the political reality, of a society organized under the divine model. The problem of legitimation for a secular liberal society spurred a great deal of theoretical activity among liberal social thinkers. Four general schemes of legitimation were proposed:

1) The theory of the state held the state as the agent of public interest for a society otherwise lacking an agent. The state would be the source of authority and community in social order of conflicting private interests. The contradiction in this theory is that private interests cannot generate the basis for a public interest.

2) The theory of the harmony of interests (the
basis of Utilitarianism and classical political theory) held that competing individual interests would reach social harmony through the normal operations of self interest. The accretion of private advantage became the public good. This legitimation clearly was refuted by liberal history. The continuing lack of sufficient and adequate housing and transportation for all citizens is a function of the domination of private and particularistic interests in America.

3) The theory of shared moral values was an attempt by Durkheim and other social theorists to create a basis for shared values and the public good in a moral discipline. This was a purely idealist hope to create values in the vacuum of the structural absence of shared values in capitalist society.

4) The theory of democratic pluralism is a recent effort to legitimate capitalism and liberalism which underlay the advocacy planning and some social programs of the 1960's. The failure of these attempts reflects the failure of the capacity of the theory to comprehend the meaning of the many apparent interests in America. These fragmented interests are less the manifestation of individual and diverse origins of the American population than the result of the structural fragmentation which derives from the underlying class domination. In terms of power distribution, American society does not consist of a plurality of interests.¹

¹These solutions are all mystical responses to a mystical
problem. One cannot answer the problem (of legitimation) because it is wrongly defined.\textsuperscript{1} There cannot be a social and consensual legitimation of liberal society, for the social structure emerged not through social consensus, but through domination.\textsuperscript{2}

Legitimacy, inherently a social act, cannot be achieved in a society in which conduct is determined by individual ends ('individual' is used here in the sense of single persons as well as fragmented class interests). Yet every social order must justify its existence as moral. Therefore, the capitalist imperative of commodity production and consumption became liberalism's legitimation, the evidence of the goodness of the liberal order.

The 'virtue' of capitalism is that it 'delivers the goods' in terms of individual commodities. Hence the cultural system of corporate capitalism must, and does, induce the (true or false but essentially verifiable) that nearly any subjectively felt need can be met by some form of goods-and-services consumption. If your life is empty, earn more money and experience 'the good life'. \textellipsis If you feel you are nothing, at least you can live through your belongings.\textsuperscript{3,4}

The moral value of liberalism and capitalism is therefore experienced only in the purely individual act of consumption.

The contradictions of bureaucracy and role allocation:
Legitimation of capitalism as a moral order is inherently contradictory and therefore an artificial and unstable resolution. This artificiality characterizes the liberal form of the distribution of power (bureaucracy) and social tasks (the
conflict between role and class) as well. Bureaucracy was instituted as a form of administering power which evaded the centralized despotism of the aristocratic monarchy. Therefore the bureaucracy was constructed to serve 'general' public interests, as a neutral agent with no interests of its own. The guide to bureaucratic action was law, a formalized and depersonalized expression of social relations which again replaced the despotic personal rule. But while the bureaucracy was formally committed to act as a neutral agent of abstract law the members of the bureaucracy, and the bureaucratic organization itself have particularized interests. Thus the bureaucracy is in contradiction and appears as an artificial form of power distribution and administration.

The liberal process of the allocation of societal tasks had a similar origin and suffers similar contradictions. The principle of role was a reaction to the strong aristocratic class distinctions whereby one's place and work was determined largely by birth. Liberal role allocation on the contrary was through meritocracy - one's ability determined what one did. The principles of role has not overtaken class allocation - rather, the two are in conflict. While a person has a certain freedom in moving within the available roles of the division of labor, strong constraints are exerted by the class-based limitations to autonomy. Thus the ideal of the capitalist legitimation of personal autonomy is in contradiction to the experience of class domination. The liberal social construct
of power and role-allocation are experienced as artificial and contradictory. Social life is structured through a power whose moral authority is unrecognized, for the authority is one of domination. "The fundamental moral experience is that of the arbitrariness and transitoriness of moral beliefs."¹ Every communal bond is seen as a threat. "The nature of modernity has disintegrated into a series of unrelated forms of social life. All communal bonds are seen as oppressive, and therefore have no legitimacy."² Human interdependence in liberal society is very great, mediated through a complex division of labor and role structure. Yet simultaneously, the human being is most isolated from the possibility of a social whole in community. Self, power, morality and community are alienated in capitalism.

**Utility as a source of value:** As the interests of capital are dominant, usefulness or the utility to these interests became the prime source of value in liberal society. Utility took on a particular form: a commonsense definition of utility is the usefulness of some means to a given and determined end; for instance, a person is useful in producing an object, and the object is useful in serving some function or end. But capitalist interests are primarily in the continuing and unending expansion of production for profit. The end of production, the object produced, was made subordinant to the production process.
As attention turns to the use and function of things, it is withdrawn from their stable and structural aspects, from their object-ness. The social world as a world of objects thus tends to sink into subsidiary awareness. Objects then become interpretable as mediators of consequences. ... One effect of a utilitarian culture is that the established cultural mapping of objects, as a socially shared order of reality and value, tends to be attenuated, with the result being that traditional definitions of objects have less power to impose themselves on person. There is diminished certainty about either their reality or value.¹ ²

In the utilitarian world, there was a severe attenuation of the moral sphere. The dominant concern became rationality. As a dominant cultural trait, evaluating actions and objects in terms of their use shifted attention away from their intrinsic worth, making cognitive calculation rather than moral judgement the dominant standard of evaluation.

Utilitarianism's focus on consequences engenders an increased concern with the sheer potency of objects as a way of achieving desired outcomes independent of the moral dimension. It is thus not simply that utilitarianism fosters a concern with cognitive judgements as distinct from moral evaluations, but that cognitive judgements themselves come to center on judgements of potency.... To know what is, is to know what is powerful; knowledge is power, when knowledge becomes a knowledge of power.³

The liberal world represents a shift from the traditional moral dimension of the object world (good-bad) to the dimension of power (strong-weak, effective-ineffective). The potency of means replaces the valuation of ends as prime concern. "This radical loss of values...occurs almost
automatically as soon as wo/man defines himself not as the maker of objects...but a maker of tools to make tools who only incidentally also produces things. In Durkheim's terms, the utilitarian culture is disposed to a moral normlessness or anomie. Wo/men are alienated from the uniquely human practice of determining the ends of their actions in terms of a determination of the good.

The separation of fact from value: The separation of instrumental thought and rationality from morality is also the separation between fact and value. The dominant mode of instrumental rationality (positivism) has made this separation the hallmark of its methodological rigour. The liberal social and epistemological systems thus feed each others' incomprehension of any but liberal premises. Liberal society and the dominant mode of knowledge and valuing then become a totalized system which, like the architectural and planning professions, does not possess the critical ability to realize its nature and limits. The fundamental values and structure of liberal society are then not open to public discourse, leaving only the given and unquestionable social fact. Fact is separated from value under capitalism not only because of the nature of production, but because the public democratic evaluation of liberal facts would pose a severe threat to capitalist rule, and therefore could not be tolerated. In the absence of public discourse (a collective process of determining how society is to realize human needs as the social prior-
ity--by definition a political act) the given society, the fact, appears as the only possible reality and therefore the only possible value. Liberal society is thus experienced as fundamentally unquestionable; wo/men are alienated from the potential of a collective determination of the social order.

THE PROBLEM OF SELF

The definition of the self under capitalism is the reciprocal of the artificiality, fragmentation and alienation of the liberal social order. As the imperatives of profit and social control define the structure of liberal society, so they define as valuable only those portions of the self which are of utility in fulfilling these imperatives. The sole meaning and value of human beings was defined in their usefulness as workers and consumers. As the form of value in society is commodity and capital, as defined in the market place, the form of value of the self became utility. What wo/men had in common was not a participation in a social whole, but their labor and purchasing power whose value itself is defined on the market, rather than through a societal consensus. Participation in this market was made compulsory. Wo/men, not owning their own means of production, were thrown on the labor and commodity markets to sell and buy their only socially-legitimated values. The major socializing agents (including family, school, media, the reward structure) became oriented towards developing only those individual qualities which are
socially defined as useful. Increasingly, more and more of the self became defined in terms of capitalist market imperatives until the critical capacity, that reserve of the self which exists apart from the socially and psychologically valued and given is almost extinguished.

For Marcuse:

"Under new forms of domination, the human object has changed. Men now come to consciousness in a milieu which has profoundly changed the socialization process: there is now a pre-formation of the ego, a decline of critical powers and an immediate identification of the individual with his society and its collective ideals. Social control has penetrated to a new 'depth' level of consciousness and symbolic communication is universally reified."

The self in capitalism parallels the fragmentation and artificiality of the society—in short a deep alienation from potential and wholeness. The dominant consciousness of self is instrumentalism, individualism, and work as a distortion of self. Role, which fully defines the self in terms of the public world, can only be a partial realization of the self, which is however condemned to function within the socially-legitimated constraint of role—a partial definition whose intrinsic meaning is obscure and reward is largely through the abstraction of money and commodity. But the human need for commodities is limited in relation to the nature of the self, while the capitalist need to produce is limitless. It is then inherently irrational to posit commodity production as the goal of society. The dominant social purpose has then but
limited reason. The purpose is not the intention of a consensual or democratic reasoning of human beings, but the imperative of a dominating class which becomes socialized as the dominant consciousness of all classes.

Caught in a web of imperatives not of his/her own making, the individual must exist in capitalist terms but for obscure reasons not legitimated by their being responses to fundamental human needs of both autonomy and community. Everyday life thus is experienced as a kind of madness—an activity for purposes obscure but yet compelling and necessary for survival. The partial self becomes defined as the real self, since the needs of the whole self cannot be met. The quality of human and indeed the content of human interaction is subordinated to the sphere of instrumental problem-solving action. Symbolic interaction collapses in the loss of consensual meaning, making an intersubjective construction of a coherent map of social reality impossible. Society is then experienced as essentially
meaningless.

No/man has literally been recreated in social and psychic function as an instrumental means to serve capitalist ends. This redefinition of human meaning is perhaps the most revolutionary outcome of the bourgeois revolution.

THE PROBLEM OF METHOD

Introduction: The problem of method was resolved in the liberal social order in the form of the epistemology and methodology of natural and social science. The following section will show how science, in its formal structure and as an instrument of capitalist domination, had profound connections to the structure of alienated liberal society. The understanding of these connections forms the basis for the understanding of the instrumental rationality of twentieth-century architectural and planning practice.

The development of natural science since the bourgeois revolution will be traced in light of the connections of science to the larger society. A short discussion of the separation of fact and value in instrumental rationality follows. Finally, the origin of social theory and the theoretical consciousness as well as the epistemological conditions for the rise of distinct professional practices will be presented.

The development of natural science: While there was some scientific work accomplished in the Renaissance, science did not become a major cultural force until the Enlightenment
of the later aristocratic period (c. 1700 to 1789). Indeed, from approximately 1450 to 1650, the fear of witches in Europe was at its height. But science then developed as a major factor in the ascent of the liberal order. The following discussion treats central aspects of natural science which had the greatest impact of modern consciousness and social order.

1) The connection of scientific knowledge and social power: Bacon, at the dawn of scientific development, saw that through the inductive method a Great Renewal would occur, a complete new start in science and civilization. He posited a scientific utopia, the New Atlantis, in which men created a perfect society through their knowledge and command of nature. Bacon made no sharp distinction between pure and applied science. The practical usefulness, or utility, of science became the proof that it was true knowledge.

The military, economic and political utility of science was quickly proved. The usefulness of science was first realized in navigational aides, cartography, artillery and the steam engine which had the initial impact of strengthening the sovereignty of the state through military advantage. Science was then used to create the instruments of industrialization which multiplied the power of bourgeois capital. Politically, the universalized nature of scientific truth implied a universalized community, independent of the limitations of natural boundaries. This characteristic of the new science was adopted by the emergent bourgeois class as a tool in their
challenge of the particularized power of the absolute monarchs.

Then the military, economic and political power of science was recognized at its inception. One of the earliest liberal ideologies was the doctrine of future history as unimpeded social 'progress' through the development of science and industry. The practice of science was quickly institutionalized in periodicals and scientific associations, to which both scientists and the bourgeois belonged. The bourgeois' absorption of science became the core of what would later become the generalized form of liberal consciousness and practice affecting all people.

2) The alienation of men from certain knowledge of the world:¹ Galileo's invention of the telescope demonstrated to all 'with the certainty of sense perception' that there were natural realities which the senses could not touch without the fabrication of instruments, an instrumentalism. "Instead of objective qualities...we find instruments, and instead of nature or the universe—in the words of Heisenberg—man encounters only himself."² This separation of appearance from reality led to Cartesian doubt as the basis of modern science. Given doubt, no previous knowledge on the basis of any form of certainty, whether metaphysical (as with the divine model) or from the senses could any longer be absolute. The only certainty was doubt itself and the knowledge that all knowing comes not through revelation but through man's own making, through the use of instruments. The Cartesian method of securing certainty against doubt was preeminently exercised
through mathematics, the most purely human instrument. Through its abstraction from everyday 'common-sense' experience, mathematics was the tool by which man while earth-bound was able to reach the objective Archimedean Point outside of the earth. The laws of the motion of earth and the universe were mathematically stated as universal truths. Contrary to revelation, the evidence of the senses and even human rationality, the most fundamental scientific universal truth had been established through the most abstract and man-made instrument.

Reason (the eyes of the mind) as well as the sensual vision of the eyes had proved inadequate to a reality which only the interference with and searching behind appearances, could reach. Previously men had assumed that humans were capable of receiving the truth and that what is true will appear of its own accord (revelation). Now two nightmares would haunt the modern age: that the reality of the world and human life is doubted, and that wo/men could not trust their senses and reason.

The Cartesian solutions to the problem of the basis of certain knowledge was "to choose as the ultimate point of reference the pattern of the human mind itself which assures itself of reality and certainty within a framework of mathematical formulas which are its own products...All real relationships are dissolved into logical relations between man-made symbols."¹ Wo/men then were alienated from certain knowledge of the real world and from knowledge of themselves. The authority of past civilizations of antiquity dissolved. The physi-
cal universe not only did not present itself to the senses, but was literally inconceivable in terms of pure reasoning. Then, paradoxically, science vacated the public world into a "two fold flight from the earth to the universe and from the world into the self". Knowledge of the external world could only be with reference to an absolute Archemedian position outside of the earth (for example, absolute space or absolute time). Knowledge of the internal world could be of the mind processes themselves, but not of the sense impressions. As a reflection of the scientific consequences of Cartesian doubt, philosophy became concerned with either the epistemological basis of scientific knowledge (philosophy of science) or a radical subjectivity (e.g., Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, the phenomenologists) in which philosophers became the scientists of the mind. In both philosophical positions, the everyday public world was abandoned as unreal. These positions were the epistemological reflection of the two forms of abstraction from the social totality which are the only alternatives open to the self in liberal society: the retreat to the self and individualism (privatism, individualism, the family, psychology, behaviourism, mystical subjectivity) or idealistic abstraction from everyday social relations (liberal law, the ideology of 'democracy,' and the 'welfare state', professionalism, bourgeois education and scholarship, the bureaucracy, etc.) Such abstractions were posited as the legitimated social reality, in order to obscure the particularistic interests of class
domination. All forms of abstraction abandoned the communal and public realm of human relations whose existence is the precondition to an unalienated life.¹

3) The dominance of means over ends: As wo/men could only know what they made themselves, the paradigmatic method of acquiring scientific knowledge became the experiment—an attempt to reproduce the processes through which objects come into being in the hope of being able to 'make' nature itself. The object of science, and then of history, became not the static fact but the developmental processes of reality. The concept of being was replaced by the concept of process. Human beings themselves were discovered as the product of history rather than of an eternal plan or idea. The dominance of process in scientific and historic thought was a reversal of the traditional dominance of ends over means, the epistemological parallel of the capitalist valuing of the expansion of the productive process rather than the objects created by that process.

The dominance of means over ends became the separation of the given fact from the possibility of valuing. Positivism, the current dominant scientific instrumental epistemology² adopted this separation as a methodological principle and as such is the rationality of capitalism.

Instrumental rationality: Positivism became the instrumental rationality of liberalism as distinguished from the value rationality of earlier social forms. Once the deducing
of revealed truth, rationality now was severely restricted to the calculation of the effective means to achieve limited ends in the service of infinite production. The ultimate expression of instrumental rationality became present technocratic thought, in which every problem of choice is presented as if it were only an issue of finding the means to an end which itself is unquestioned. In the absence of a consensual community and therefore a social basis for valuing, instrumental rationality was the only form in which thought and choice could appear rational.

The restriction of rationality to an instrumental form parallels the scientific rejection of human sense and even reason as a means to truth. This, I hold, is not a limitation of "reality" or human capacity to know, but a limitation of method. Scientific epistemology, because it does not incorporate the unique nature of human existence in its methodology, cannot be the basis of a society in which not class domination but human beings determine the conditions under which people live.

Social theory and the theoretical consciousness: The radical separation in liberalism of fact and value, means and ends, the real and the ideal, has been the spur to a theoretical and class consciousness substantially unprecedented in previous history. Only theoretical consciousness will be discussed here, because it is the general form of the specific project of liberative architectural and planning theory in the liberal era.
The collapse of the divine model and the bourgeois revolution launched a crisis of legitimation which stimulated a great variety of theoretical activity, including modern political and economic theory, sociology, aesthetics, architectural and planning theory. This thought emerged in a transitional period where the most advanced minds were aware of the collapse of the consensual social map and the gulf between fact and value which accompanied the rise of capitalism. Reality was seen as problematic and fragmented—a situation intolerable to the self which can be realized only in a non-fragmented environment. In the separation of self and world, consciousness arose in the form of theoretical activity to attempt to fabricate a coherent map of social reality. The theoretical attempts were both practical and psychic necessities as well as a necessary element of the legitimation of liberal power.

As scientific knowledge yielded power to act on the natural environment, the theoretical construction of the social world (in the largest sense representing all specifically human reality) was a basis for finding or acting to create meaning out of a fragmented and problematic environment.

The theories' relation to the liberal social order paralleled the reaction of the self to liberalism—alienation or resignation.

1) Alienation: Marxist dialectical materialism was the most profound and comprehensive social theory which derived from a conscious alienation and revulsion at the emergence of capitalism.
2) **Resignation:** In the West, the dominant social theorists resigned themselves to the capitalist institutions. The characteristics of the liberal order were then reproduced in the subject, content and methodology of liberal theory. Liberal fragmentation reflected in theory became the parceling out of the social totality into theoretically and professionally distinct fields of study (economics to the economists, social relations to the sociologists, the self to the psychologists, the nature of the city to urbanists and planners, architecture to the architects, etc.).

Liberal fragmentation was further made into a methodological principle of research and experimentation. Truth was to be gained through the fragmentation of social wholes into their constituent parts which then could be examined individually and in interconnection. This examination could only be within the fragmented division of subjects and labor which each research field represented.

Each field developed its own picture of the world and held its particular subject as a "prime cause"—economics saw the world as economically motivated; architecture and planning theory and practice maintained the traditional belief in the moral efficacy of design, and so on. Such fragmentation was epistemologically justified in that the breaking of wholes into parts was seen as the only means to "objective" truth. But the social meaning of this fragmentation was that it both served the practice of the ends of instrumental rationality and
prevented the discovery that the liberal totality is a class domination.  

**Conclusion:** The problem of method is intimately linked to, if not identical with, the problem of social order—a linkage which constitutes a closed circle in which method legitimates the liberal social order which in turn is the client of the practitioners of method. To break through this closed circle a method and practice is necessary which can comprehend the truth of liberal society through a knowledge of the totality. The ability to change a society (and the practice of architecture and planning within it) is predicated on a synoptic understanding of the society which only a totalizing method can provide (The basis of this method is discussed in Section III).

**THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING**

The following section is the history of the successive forms of liberal professional practice generated in the continual failure of the professions to close the gap between their intention of creating a coherent environment, from the fragmentation which capitalist imperatives continually spawned.

The architecture and planning of pre-WW I laissez-faire capitalism will first be presented. Then the rise of the Modern Movement in architecture and planning, as well as its contemporary successors, will be discussed. Following is a history and critique of American planning. The discussion of planning in the modern period is restricted to America, for planning practice there took forms which are not generalizable.
to other nations due to the particular development of American politics and economics.

ARCHITECTURE IN THE EARLY LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER

Introduction: The development of architecture under early capitalism shared in the crises of the legitimation of the society as a whole. As liberal society did not possess an authoritative basis for social bonding and knowledge, architects had to create a basis for making design decisions by reconciling the authority of ancient architectural models with the new capitalist imperatives. What resulted was a many-faceted attempt to close gap with the new social reality through theory and practice.

The conditions and constraints of architectural practice in early liberalism will be presented as a series of crises which led to the neo-classic style as well as the theoretical attempt to find a meaningful and "rational" basis for design. These developments will be shown to merely perpetuate the fundamental crisis of architecture as a meaningful and effective practice in liberal society.

The crises of architectural meaning and practice: To understand the meaning of architectural practice under capitalism, the distinction in theory and practice between means and ends is reintroduced. Capitalist production process (means) grew to dominate the products (ends) of the process. The ends or values in capitalist society were essen-
tially impossible to establish, since they only served to generate profits which continued and expanded the process of capital generation.

As far as homo faber was concerned, this modern shift of emphasis from the 'what' to the 'how', from the thing itself to its fabrication process was by no means an unmixed blessing. It deprived man as maker and builder of those fixed and permanent standards and measurements which prior to the modern age have always served as his guides for his doing and criteria for his judgements... Man began to consider himself part and parcel of the two superhuman, all encompassing processes of nature and history, both of which seemed doomed to an infinite progress without ever reaching any inherent telos or approaching any preordained idea.

The liberal order then posed two major tasks for building activity: the provision of utilitarian structures to serve the production and consumption process, and the creation of an architecture as a symbolic expression of bourgeois values and power, an element in the fabrication of the bourgeois culture. These tasks could not be accomplished by either the received architectural heritage of classical design, or by the neoclassical architectural theory and practice which was developed in the Nineteenth century. The failures of the received and developed architecture of the early liberal period were the result of a series of interlocked crises of the meaning and existence of the professions which, since the building tasks and the success of the professional responses have not essentially changed, continues until the present. These crises are 1) the crisis of the separation of architecture and engineering; 2) the crisis of architecture as an instant bourgeois culture.
1) The crisis of the separation of architecture and engineering: In 1747, the distinction between utilitarian building and symbolic edifice was formally institutionalized. With the establishment of the first engineering school distinct from the architectural academies, "engineering became liberated in 1747 from the socio-cultural imperatives of symbolic built form. From now on, it could develop its full utilitarian potential, untrammeled by symbolization." This split from architecture only increased the distance between architecture and construction which was initiated in the medieval workshops and the Renaissance. For example, the Renaissance architect and theorist Alberti took "built fabric as primarily an immaterial signifier." Design was seen as an ideal form (such as in the Renaissance ideal city or the system of ideal proportions governing particular buildings), divorced from its realization in particular materials. The engineers, on the contrary, embraced the potential of the new nineteenth century materials (iron, steel, glass, and concrete) and used them in utilitarian structures on an unprecedented scale required by capitalist production and consumption.

(Engineering's) triumphant technique not only outstripped the performance of traditional materials and methods, but also afforded a more explicit form of structural expression, a form in which appearance was penetrated to reveal process. In a metaphorical sense, this may be seen as stasis being permeated by process, for while the traditional object of architecture was to remain static, that of engineering had begun to exert itself as a dynamic force. From now on, architecture looks to engineering for much of the substance of its symbolization.
The Crystal Palace of the 1851 Great Exhibition in England embodied the contradictions and meanings of engineering construction as a cultural object. The building, of the eminently industrial materials of steel and glass, was far more related to railroad and greenhouse construction than to the traditional building types. Notably, its designer was not an architect, but a gardener and designer of conservatories.

The essence of the Crystal Palace resided in its fabric as a process, its combination of pane, sash bar, louvre, gutter, beam, truss and column to be endlessly repeated and rearranged just like the components of the railway system to which it was directly related. Paxton's Palace was infinitely extendable and capable of limitless permutation.

The building represented a reversal of the traditional order of ends and means, in which the "how" of its construction took precedence over the dematerialized "what" of its steel and glass framework. Yet, this materialization of the production process in a "dematerialized" structure contained the fruits of the essential end product of production, the instant culture of consumption—wholesale kitch.

2) The crisis of architecture as instant bourgeois culture: Divorced from engineering, architecture's role was the servicing and symbolization of bourgeois culture as an end, as distinguished from engineering's direct utility to the production process as a means.

The crisis had three aspects: a) the struggle to find a stylistic accommodation to bourgeois cultural imperatives;
b) the weakening of the architectural project due to the increase of domesticity and the loss of the public sphere; and
c) the theoretical struggle to find a basis for design decisions in the absence of a unified social order.

a) The struggle to find a stylistic accommodation to bourgeois cultural imperatives: As a stylistic enterprise, Nineteenth century architects had to evolve a theory and practice which would distinguish bourgeois architecture from that of the ancien regne. Consonant with the liberal ethic, the profligacy, corruption and tyranny of the courtly life was rejected by abandoning the Baroque and Rococo style of the aristocracy.

The Louis XV or rococo style mirrored the spirit of the age with pat truth, through using the same forms that had served to evoke a spiritual response in churches. The playful elegance of rocaille ornament—the lightness and sensuous abandon with which it curls and froths over walls and ceilings, glittering and sparkling like a fireworks display—was taken to be a flagrant symbol of the gay abandon and unbridled voluptuousness of the lives of the aristocracy. 1

but

the bourgeoisie, so recently risen to power, were intellectually incapable of fostering a new philosophy which (like Christianity in the Middle Ages) could find expression in an original architectural style. The first and essentially materialistic preoccupation of the bourgeoisie was with the reorientation of society. Men no longer sought in art a unique symbol of their own society or felt bound by one accepted rule of taste. The associational values of the individual were the only remaining guides by which to judge architecture, and styles were borrowed from the past whenever they seemed to correspond to the ideals of the revolutionary age, hence the eclecticism of the nineteenth century. 2
The liberal architects of the Enlightenment inherited an architectural vocabulary and syntax which was regarded as universal and unchanging, based on the authority and legitimation of ancient and ideal models. Architects using these models were not confined to a canon of rules but were free to interpret and select within the bounds of then-existing historical knowledge. But the "natural and inimitable laws of architecture" deduced from Roman monuments, Vitruvius or contemporary works, were not inherent in nature but were attributes of culture and history. The Enlightenment 'Reason' denied this universality through historical and archaeological study, upsetting the classicist premises and thereby ending the movement. "From the moment that it was scientifically defined, classicism became an arbitrary convention and was transformed into neo-classicism."¹ Neo-classic historicism was an architectural parallel to the scientific shift from revealed to analytically-based knowledge. Historical and archaeological research, rather than the classicists' idealized reconstruction, determined what the classic models were. The previous paradigm of architectural practice, the freedom of interpretation of the individual artist within a unity of style, collapsed. The architects' freedom became limited to choice of styles to be reproduced with historic/scholarly faithfulness.

Neo-classical historicist architecture provided "through its pluralism of style that range of necessary fantasy for
those emerging classes who would have otherwise been bereft of style and who, in any event, irrespective of their status, lacked a fulfilling socio-cultural arena within which to reify and exercise their status and imminent power."

The function of historicist architecture then was primarily as bourgeois fashion which need not have a structural basis. Architecture as historicism made its peace with increasingly utilitarian building requirements by becoming a decorative appanage, a veneer applied to a basic utilitarian building shell. This accommodation between utility and fashion was a constructed metaphor of the professional relations between engineer and architect in early liberalism.

b) The weakening of the architectural project due to the increase in domesticity and the loss of the public sphere:

In the last analysis the overall crisis suffered by architecture after its mid-18th century divorce from engineering turned as much on the initiation of comfort and domesticity and on the flowering of social intercourse, as it did on those transformations progressively effected after 1750 in the basic means of production.

As Hanna Arendt has written, "The astonishing flowering of poetry and music from the middle of the eighteenth century until the last third of the nineteenth century, accompanied by the rise of the novel, the only entirely social art form, coincided with a no less striking decline of all the more public arts, especially architecture, is sufficient testimony to a close relationship between the social and the intimate."
disintegration of the public realm and the loss of community was a powerful force in the rise of the theoretical consciousness, social theory and Utopian thought under liberalism.

c) The theoretical struggle to find a basis for design decisions in the absence of a unified social order: Paralleling the rise of liberal social theory, a body of architectural theory developed in early liberalism from a conscious recognition of the great gulf between architecture and liberal society. This theory was on one level an implicit critique of neo-classical architecture as inadequate to the liberal era. But the neo-classical appropriation of ancient and classicist forms was an essential precondition to later theory and practice, for the appropriation of multiple styles isolated (perhaps even more so than classicism) their form from its original cultural meaning. The classic signifiers of social cohesion and communality had been transformed by architects and their bourgeois clients into an entirely different meaning: the expression of accumulated individual wealth and power as objects to be hoarded. While the forms of the historical styles were appropriated, their social meaning and content as deriving from a particular historic context was eviscerated.

The meanings of visual forms, in precapitalist societies an expression of communal and metaphysical values, became located in privately owned objects whose public content and meaning derived to a great extent from their values as signi-
fiers of individual power. The liberal architectural obsession with the "pleasing object" (or forms in themselves) derived from the practice and consciousness of the makers and owners of form, who refused to recognize the individual power these forms were created to embody.

But whatever the meaning of the architectural object dressed in classical forms, the early liberal theorists perceived that a bourgeois architecture could not be a purely stylistic resolution, but had to be relevant to bourgeois needs which on a functional level engineering had so well fulfilled. Architectural theorists then appropriated the capitalist imperatives of "reason," "utility," and "efficiency" as the criteria of a new architecture. The major early liberal architectural theories will be presented and critiqued below.

1) Perrault's distinction between culture and utility: The isolation of cultural meaning from physical form in the liberal era was recognized in the early distinction made by the French architect Perrault (1613-1688) between cultural meaning and the utilitarian/scientific parameters of design. In this recognition, Perrault posed the possibility that architects might in their own practice hope to reverse the liberal evisceration of the cultural meaning of forms. Architects might define their task as designing by rules governing visual appearance or "Beauty" which derives, not from a divine model or the imitation of nature (the two theories which underlay, in Tzonis' term, primitive/medieval "pre-
rational" design in contrast to the Enlightenment's "rational" design) but from a system of rules of "Custom" which are the exclusive product of society. In other words, Perrault distinguished architecture as a uniquely cultural production whose meaning must be determined within the meaning—system and power distribution of the culture as a whole.

Perrault's approach aimed at a rational, sociologically oriented theory of visual order. He suggested that architecture belonged to the category of the man-made world as fashion and manners. All three, to him, formed networks of social communication, or as we would say today, they belonged to a semiotic system. Perrault showed that architectural forms have no innate value, but that their value is determined in terms of the social use, like currency, in terms of their potential effects. Therefore, the function of visual forms is to attach artificial value to design products, where no value existed before, by rendering them into a shape dictated by the power structure of society... (Aesthetic judgements are then) possible only by referring the subject to a 'use' system, with the use system in its turn depending on a larger system, the 'way of living' given the fact that at every period a different organization of social structure exists, 'an entirely different game is played' by society. 1

Perrault's fundamental distinction between cultural ("Arbitrary objectives") and utilitarian/scientific ("Positive objectives") was not adopted. 2 Rather, the guiding theory for most architectural theoreticians became based on the ancient Vitruvian formulation of architecture as "Accommodation, Handsomeness, and Lastingness". Translated into modern terms, the building must resolve aesthetic/visual qualities with technical, structural and functional efficiency. Vitruvius was reformulated into the idealized notion of "form
follows function". This became the basis of the new design theory which would by the twentieth century be the ideological basis of avant-garde architectural practice. "Form follows function" both confused the "arbitrary" for the "positive" values and vice versa, while collapsing one into the other. The notion could have no other epistemological base except either an idealism shorn of all cultural meaning ("the pleasing object") or instrumental rationality ("structuralism" and "functionalism") which in its scientific or pseudo-scientific specificity of means-ends priorities again had no concrete cultural meaning. When a design is shorn of its specific cultural meaning, it becomes an excellent vehicle for the universalized mystification of particularized class power and domination. Thus design at this point was prevented from becoming a critical practice which engendered personal and class consciousness. The notion of "form follows function" could have no basis other than in a universalized or particularized metaphysic essentially unrelated to the culture which gave rise to it. "Form follows function" was a mystification of the domination which it served and symbolized.

ii) **Structural efficiency**: Rejecting a cultural interpretation of architectural meaning, architectural theorists and designers were in crisis, having twice lost the theoretical basis for their practice. First, the cultural meaning of the divine model as grounding for social and architectural order was destroyed through the advance of science
and the bourgeois. A succeeding model of Alberti's--form as primarily an "immaterial signifier" of an ideal form--lost meaning with the institution of scientific epistemology (which rejected such idealism) as a model of cognition and as a material force. "Reason", as an almost metaphysical category, became the ideal of Enlightenment revolutionary culture. This "Reason" was manifest in scientific, economic, political and architectural theory and practice.

The impact of the ideal of "Reason" in architecture was first in the theory of structural efficiency, or "Mechanicks". For Eighteenth-century theorists, this "rational" efficiency became not only an optimizing of the use of materials and labor, but the standard of "beauty" and "utility", a universally accepted panacea for building design. Perrault's Arbitrary Value, which he considered the essence of architecture, was overthrown and "Positive Value" made the definition of "rational" architecture.

Structural efficiency being the essence, all extraneous was to be eliminated. "The small peasant hut" of Rousseau's natural man became the "justification, the abstract model, and often even the physical prototype of rational architecture. This notion was not a new form of historicism but an a-historical ideal to thinkers for whom the past was a "history of crimes", an obstacle which could not be a prototype for the future. The oppression of the current age was to be lifted by "returning to the a priori premises of human nature."
Where man is "noble," "simple," "gentle." His humble hut, which is "strong," "solid," "beautiful," with "unity," "symmetry," and "simplicity" should serve as the model for architecture.

Tzonis makes several observations on the meaning of structural efficiency:

a) The position was paradoxical in terms of actual Eighteenth and Nineteenth century practice which it defined. The aim of the rationalists was not a true structural efficiency in the engineering sense of the term, but rather the erection of the ideology of structural efficiency as a means for achieving visual harmony. Further, a great number of architects ignored such scientization and were obsessed with ornament. "This paradoxical situation is very useful in revealing the actual forces guiding the development of Twentieth-century architecture, the real forces behind the apparent ones."¹

b) The value of efficiency is a saving of material goods and labor, increasing the material utilities in the universalized Enlightenment sense available for men. But in fact capitalism basically increases channeled material utilities to capitalists, and thus architectural efficiency could not be to the generalized benefit. Rationality employed for universalized ends became irrational in the context of the benefits of rationality accruing to the few.²

c) The value of efficiency and the critique of ornament reflected a shift in the holding of wealth from the land and
mercantile returns of the aristocratic class to the accumulation and multiplication of wealth of the more dynamic bourgeoisie. Ornament signified concentrated power in the body of the neo-classic design object, a power which itself could not be multiplied for accumulated. But capital was a means for multiplication, accumulated through saving, of which the architectural ideology of structural efficiency was one form.

d) Finally, structural efficiency in its ideological sense gave the architect the feeling he was working for the general benefit, for the powerful and the oppressed. As an ideology, it linked the architect to the rest of the societal processes and served as a good conscience.

In summary, structural efficiency was essentially an ideology, a symbolic rather than a material intent without a method of effecting functional issues in design. The crisis of bourgeois design was not resolved and the practice of architecture was not reconciled with the building tasks of liberal society which engineering was so effective in handling. In response, an ideology of functional efficiency, the rationality of use, was then developed.

iii) Functional efficiency: Like the structuralists, the functionalists were concerned with a metaphorical utility in contrast to the literal instrumental utility of the engineers. But functionalism (perhaps because the ideology emerged after the consolidation of the bourgeois/industrial revolution) did not incorporate the structuralists' im-
plicit critique of bourgeois culture in a desired return to "natural" pre-capitalist man. While the structural theorists reacted to liberalism with alienation, the functionalists reacted with acceptance/resignation. "Contemporary culture not only made sense to the functionalists, it was taken for granted. For this reason the question of a priori human principles seemed irrelevant to them...The nature of man was to be found in the deformed human product of the nineteenth century market economy."¹ Society was taken as unproblematic and the alienation of the human subject of that society went unquestioned. The self defined in alienation from others became the subject of functional design. The functionalists referred to what they considered the individual's social needs but did not see those needs as imposed by society.²

Functional efficiency was identified with "utility," "beauty," and "morality," which in turn was identified with "wealth," "benefit," "pleasure," "goodness," and "happiness." Two applications of these virtues were developed which were significant for modern architecture and planning and still pervade its practice: the metaphor of the building as machine, and the belief that architecture had a moral effect.

iv) The building as machine:

Design is not some curious contortion of form, or some superadded atrocity, but it should rather be conceived as the fitting of means to ends in the production of works which are good each in their own order. ³

Design decisions should thus be based on the ends the
building is to fulfill, as defined by a building program. The
model of the perfect fit of means and ends towards a programmed
purpose was the most direct producer of utilities, the machine
which in turn was modelled on nature itself.

Look around the world...you will find it to be
nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an in-
finite number of lesser machines...All these various
machines, and even their most minute parts, are ad-
justed to each other with an accuracy which ravishes
into admiration all men, who have ever contemplated
them. The curious adaption of means to ends, through-
out all nature resembles exactly though it much ex-
ceeds, the productions of human...intelligence. 1

Having reconceptualized nature as a machine, there was
no need to search for an ideal "natural man" and his "peasant
hut" in mythologized history. Neither historical knowledge
nor a model of man was of utility.

v) Architecture as a morality: Architecture (and planning) had always reinforced the power of the domi-
inant class. But Enlightenment thought declared the univer-
sal rights of all men. In truth, this doctrine represented
only the rights of the bourgeois class, but it did serve as a
critical ideology, which animated a considerable amount of re-
volutionary and reformatory activity opposing both monarchical
absolutism and the human and environmental destruction of the
industrial cities.

"The new Rationalism permitted (architects and planners)
to pick up the compass which had fallen from the divine hand
and to proceed in the search for private schemes for the per-
fection of humanity." 2 The historicist architecture of the
Nineteenth century was imputed with moral qualities which could inculcate democracy (Thomas Jefferson's Greek style), restore Catholic values (Pugin's Gothic revival), or exemplify the Protestant Ethic (Ruskin, Gothic revival). The sponsors of such schemes were wealthy bourgeois of a generation still possessing a social responsibility while living in a new age which had no institutional or structural basis for social concern. The benefactors acted on their own to build asylums, hospitals, worker housing and the like for the urban poor who would otherwise have posed a social threat. Architecture and therapy conjoined as an element of social control which still animates, on many levels, architectural ideology. An early publication of the Boston Prison Society stated:

> there are principles in architecture, by the observance of which great moral changes can be more easily produced among the most abandoned of our race...there is such a thing as architecture adapted to morals; that other things being equal, the prospect of improvement in morals depends, in some degree, upon the construction of buildings. 1

**Conclusion:** Both structural and functional efficiency became identified with a particular interpretation of "utility," "beauty," and "morality," in which the visual appearance of efficiency rather than its actual presence was stressed. This apparent contradiction is resolved with the understanding that:

the aim of both the structural and functional efficiency approaches is not material but social. Both express efforts to create the smallest and densest con-
centration of power in society, the latent objective for the rationalization of architecture.

The structural/functional doctrines impacted Nineteenth century neo-classical architecture in their rejection of Baroque excesses for a more restrained academic historicism, imputed with structural, functional or moral qualities. These ideals of course reflected the utilitarian and more imperatives of bourgeois society. But they could not be fully realized through a neo-classic veneer or an architecture of past styles.

The Nineteenth century architects who did seriously attempt a structural/functional approach were still caught in the past. "Ornamentation," for Ruskin, "is the principle part of architecture." Sullivan tried to make of the skyscraper an empathetic image of the standing man. Perret, who pioneered in the use of reinforced concrete structural cage, felt constrained to apply traditional decoration to his innovative buildings. The great architectural works of such men were attempts to find some aesthetic logic and coherence in the requirements of the new commercial building types. But the form of such characteristically Nineteenth century building types as the skyscraper, the warehouse, the department store, and the railroad station was predominantly dictated by a functional and economic utility which the architects could only clothe with a decorative veneer. Classicism was inadequate to the inherent limitlessness of capitalist pro-
duction. In coming to terms with capitalism, architects had to come to terms with the meaning of their work being the production of utilities—a task for which the moralism and historicism of the neo-classical architectural theory and practice could be no basis. Neo-classicism held that there is a distinction between architecture and building, beauty and utility. Yet architectural culture did not embody a method or intention which would actualize the distinction in the social world.

Architecture was then cut adrift from the important problems of its time: the artists, who should have been concerned with the aims of architectural production, instead elaborated on imaginary problems in prudent isolation; the engineers, concentrating on the means of realizing their productions, became the means to capitalist ends.

Some observers of the time summed up the architects' situation well:

Flaubert: "Architects--all imbeciles--always forget the ladders"

Viollet-le-Duc: "In our time, the budding architect is a boy of fifteen to eighteen...who for six or eight years is made to make plans of buildings which usually have only distant connections with the needs and habits of our own times, and which never have to be made practicable."

An anxious académicien in 1866: (by giving too large a part to scientific and technical culture)"the whole body of architects would finally be supressed, since it appeared simply to duplicate that of civil engineers."
**Planning in the Early Liberal Social Order**

**Introduction:** The origin of modern town planning was in the response of first the paternalistic bourgeois, the Utopians, and then state bureaucrats to the chaos and squalor of the early industrial city. Bourgeois planning then was distinguished from the planning of the Renaissance and Baroque in three ways: i) While the Renaissance and Baroque client of planning was the aristocracy, the liberal clients were private capitalists and the state; ii) While the Renaissance and Baroque planning subject was the aristocratic city, the liberal planning subject was the industrial city; iii) While the Renaissance and Baroque planning intent was primarily either military or the spatial symbolization of power, liberal non-Utopian planning dealt with making the industrial city into an efficient capitalist utility while correcting its worst excesses.

**Early history of capitalism:** Early liberal planning must be understood in relation to the early history of capitalist development which initially produced not the industrial city and industrial technology, but a revolution in traditional agricultural social and productive relations. This revolution and its transformation into the growth of the industrial city will first be discussed. Then, the Utopian and bureaucratic planning responses to the problems of the industrial cities will be presented.

1) The revolution of medieval agricultural social
relations: It is a commonplace that the growth of the cities was a consequence of or was simultaneous with the industrial revolution. But urbanization and new technology was only a later stage of capitalism; the earlier history of capitalist development was based on a revolutionary transformation of the social relations and technology of medieval agricultural and crafts production, which resulted in the putting-out system and the related enclosure movement.

a) The putting-out system: Much as the United States now uses foreign labor, medieval peasants became a means for capitalists to escape the urban guild restrictions and merchant monopolies. Peasants were organized into a decentralized family manufacturing system which produced cloth at home from raw materials supplied by the bourgeois, who then picked up the finished cloth and sold it at a price which undercut the prices of the medieval towns. The putting out system then contributed to the dissolution of the medieval order.

b) The enclosure movement: It was found that agricultural production was less profitable than the sale of wool. Thus massive quantities of agricultural acreage traditionally held in common under the feudal land system was appropriated and enclosed by the bourgeois as grazing fields for sheep. This enclosure precipitated a major restructuring of medieval social relations, as peasants were dispossessed from their traditional communal life-forms and property. The brutal upheaval of the peasants was the precondition of the
industrial revolution and the formation of cities which required a mass laboring class and commodity markets.

The agricultural revolution preceded the industrial revolution. The content of both is misrepresented if understood as the result of new technologies. The revolutions were rather the reorganization of medieval social relations to facilitate capitalist class domination. Capitalism is defined then, not by technology or by the existence of urbanization, but by its social relations.

The industrial cities were established only when greater markets, production efficiencies and social controls were necessary which the social and productive relations of the agricultural revolution could not provide. Once started, urban growth was phenomenal. In 1800 the population of London was less than a million people. By 1850 population had doubled, and by the turn of the century, it quadrupled. In 1750, one fifth of England's population was urban, but at present the ratio is reversed.¹

2) The industrial city: The first population of the industrial cities were the masses of dispossessed agricultural villagers and tenant farmers who worked and were housed under intolerable conditions.²

A moral blight, with its rampant debasement of family ties, sexuality, human solidarity and dignity, followed doggedly in the wake of urban blight. ...population began to soar at a dizzying tempo despite pervasive malnourishment, appalling working conditions, and incomparably bad and unhygienic living conditions in the congested hovels.³
This situation was the normal result of the operation of the capitalist imperatives of class domination and economic expansion.

The industrial city then was the physical embodiment and instrument of the revolutionary new capitalist social relations. As human beings became defined as their utility to the production/consumption process, the city became primarily a production and consumption utility. The laissez-faire capitalism of the first industrial period was reflected in the anarchy of uncontrolled city development and growth which existing governmental institutions had no means to control.

Several imperatives moulded the early spatial development of the industrial city:

a) The absorption of unprecedented population and production facilities — a task which destroyed all previous social structure and urban physical boundaries.

b) The need for great quantities of housing — which was met by speculative builders who produced cheap, shoddy, cramped and unsanitary housing at very high densities.

c) The construction of industrial facilities — which were located with no regard for functional separation, pollution, and the like — thus disrupting the medieval pattern of natural functional zoning.

d) The spatial expression and differentiation of liberal social classes through the rise of new, sharply differentiated central and peripheral slums, expensive
residential districts, suburbs, and industrial zones spatially separated out urban functions and social classes which had previously been interweaved within a defined spatial limit and social whole. This differentiation was the spatial equivalent of the imperatives of a complex class structure and division of labor, coupled with the need for social control.

Yet the industrial city reflected also a certain decline in the importance of spatial symbolization. The Baroque city was a physical embodiment of upper-class wealth and power, as a stage set for display of aristocratic power and the exertion of military control. Capitalists, on the other hand, gained their power from a wealth which was created through constant accumulation and reinvestment. Thus money was not to be spent on the 'nonproductive' public realm and public symbolization of wealth. Communication channels (the railroad, motor roads, canals, the press, telegraph, telephone, etc.) supplanted space in its traditional role of the bearer and symbolization of culture information and social control.\(^1\)

The two responses of city planning: The anarchy and blight of the industrial city stimulated the birth, about 1830, of the first town planning in the modern sense.\(^2\)

The economic and social changes which produced the inequalities of the first decades of the nineteenth century and the changes in political theory and public opinion meant that these disparities were no longer accepted as inevitable but were regarded as obstacles that could and should be removed.\(^3\)

The two planning responses, Utopian Socialism and
bureaucratic city planning, corresponded to the reaction of
the self to the liberal order—alienation or resignation.
The Utopian Socialists in their alienation from the new order
posited and built totalistic ideal communities in which human
relations could be made whole again. The bureaucratic planners,
resigned to the capitalist order, worked to 'rationalize' the
urban excesses and dysfunctions through incremental forms.
The Utopians and bureaucratic planners shared several charac-
teristics: Both movements were strictly remedial in character,
reflecting a time lag between the event and the planning
action by which it was supposedly controlled. Both movements
started as a critique of the given and believed in the use of
Enlightenment Reason. But the Utopians ended up as failures,
prisoners of their own method, while the bureaucratic reformers
became institutionalized through their absorption in to the
state planning process.

1) The Utopian Socialists: Engels portrays the
task as the Utopians saw it:

Society presented nothing but wrongs: to
remove these was the task of reason. It was neces-
sary, then 'to discover a new and more perfect
system of social order and to impose this upon
society from without by propaganda, and wherever
it was possible, by the example of model experiments.
These new social systems were foredoomed as utopian.
The more completely they were worked in detail, the
more they could not avoid drifting off into pure
fantasies.1

An optimistic Enlightenment rationalism was at the base
of Utopian Socialism. For Robert Owen,
A new era must commence; the human intellect, through the whole extent of the earth, hitherto enveloped by the grossest ignorance and superstition, must begin to be released from its state of darkness...

For the time is come when the means may be prepared to train all the nations of the world - men of every color and climate, of the most diversified habits - in that knowledge. ¹

The Utopians believed in 'progress' and the process of historical change. Theory animated reality, Man was reasoning animal, using reason as an instrument to break down the obstacle of social inequality and to scientifically determine a priori the proper environment for human behaviour. Faulty Reason and not class domination was seen as the source of social inequality and urban blight.

This Enlightenment notion is at the core of much contemporary architectural and planning thought.

Consider man, his needs, tastes, and active inclinations in order to determine the conditions for the system of construction best adapted to his nature. Man can be defined as the sum of a series of psycho-sociological constancies admitted and inventoried by competent people.²

These 'competent people' were the paternalistic Utopian Socialists themselves, who postulated ideal societies based on what they saw as the universalized qualities of man. This in itself had been done in other societies (such as the Christian ideal of the city of God). But the Utopians united their theory and practice in the project of realizing an Enlightenment 'City of Man' by building their utopias. These were seen as universalized prototypes of social organization,
efficient production, and standardized housing. Yet whatever their internal social structure, the origin of these utopian community designs was not democratic but paternalistic, giving the lie to the Enlightenment claim of the universality of man and hence his democratic equality. In a sense each Utopian designer became his own god.

The physical form of these communities which was designed as an integral part of the Utopian schemes was yet subordinant as a formal organization with its own imperatives to the social purpose of the plan. A caption on a presentation drawing of Robert Owen's New Harmony community read: "An association of two thousand persons formed upon the principles advocated by Robert Owen" with the name of the architect below Owen's in much smaller type.

While making sometimes acute critiques of the Capitalist social relations, the Utopians used an idealist Enlightenment epistemology which was methodologically incapable of revealing that social relations were not dictated by the degree of Rationality, but by the power of class domination. Only a materialist epistemology and critique could uncover the Capitalist reality.

The Utopians condemned themselves to misconstruing the motive forces behind the phenomena of capitalist society they intended to reform. The more elaborated the Utopians made their plans, the more fantasy-like they became.

The Utopian planners were the first to develop such
planning concepts as the spatial continuity of voids, the
importance of air, light and greenery, and the functional
organization and differentiation of the city which were
absorbed as basic principles of standard planning practice.
But the utopian communities and their social relations for
the most part neither survived nor made an impact on Capital-
list society except as a brief historic episode and ideal.

In order to be able to effectively act on a society to real-
ize human freedom and equality, the Utopians required a mode
of knowledge and analysis adequate to the Capitalist reality
and to the intent of critical action. This realization was
a basis of the virulent critique of the Utopian Socialists
by Marx and Engels, who realized the futility of idealistic
efforts at creating a priori a new total society as a response
to capitalist domination. The Marxian epistemology (dialec-
tical materialism) is appropriate as a basis for
comprehending capitalist reality because it can reveal
history as a developmental process of social forms and the
self. This development is not a realization of a static and
eternal Enlightenment Rationality, but the interplay and
conflict of class interests. (History, for Marx, is a suc-
cession of class conflicts). Fundamental resolutions of the
symbols of capitalist domination of which the Utopians so
despaired could come not through the application of Rational-
ity, for the implication is that the society is irrational.
In fact, the industrial society was highly
rational from the capitalists' point of view - the city's physical and social chaos was a structural result of the free operation of capitalist institutions. This 'rationality' capitalism will not give up without conflict, or, for the Marxists, revolution.

Despite their generous and imaginative liberative visions, the Utopians failed in their analysis of liberal society and lived up to their worst caricature. The word 'utopia' literally means 'no-place', which was virtually the only location in space and time where Utopian communities could be founded.

The Marxist critique of the Utopian Socialists did not lead to a planning movement. Though the Marxists possessed the most trenchant critique and analytic tools of all students of capitalism, they abdicated the critique of specifically urban issues after discrediting the Utopian Socialists, for a political/economic critique of the capitalist system as such. This was done in the belief that only through a general class revolution could specifically urban problems be dealt with.

From that time onwards, political theory almost always tended to disparage specialist research and experiment, and attempted to assimilate proposals for partial reform within the reform of society generally. Town planning on the other hand, cut adrift from political discussion, tended to become increasingly a purely technical matter at the service of the established powers. This did not mean, however that it became politically neutral; on the contrary, it fell within the sphere of influence of
the new conservative ideology (in France, England and Germany). This was the explanation for the uncommitted and dependent nature of the main experiments in town-planning after 1848, behind which loomed the political paternalism of the new right.¹

The Garden City movement, founded by Ebenezer Howard in 1898 was the final major realization in 19th century city planning of the Utopian and reformist ideals. The rationally planned physical environment was to be strongly distinguished in form from existing industrial cities in the interests of health and social harmony. The physical means of realizing the Utopian intents were primarily an abundance of open space, low density and the limitation of physical expansion in order to maintain the purity of the isolated and self contained optimal community. Given these limits, the natural population growth of the Garden City was contained by the budding off of excess population and the establishment of further new communities. Like the Utopian Socialists, Howard's movement was a response to the squalor of working class slums. However, Howard, unlike the Utopians, was also concerned with maintaining existing social relations. He thus appropriated the Utopian ideal of new physical community to the interests of the established order and social management rather than co-operative liberation. From the Garden City onward, the ideal of a physically manifest critical social utopia became reduced to the physical utopia of an agrarian ideal with Capitalist social content.

From the New Town of Letchworth in 1903 to Radburn,
New Jersey in 1928, the greenbelt towns of the New Deal to their vulgarization in the numberless post-war suburbs, as well as the latest manifestation in the contemporary new towns, the Garden City ideal remains a powerful force in city planning. It combines the liberal ideology of individualism and private property, the American agrarian ideal, and the hierarchical segmentation of the labor force - the creation of segregated communities of homogeneous socio-economic groupings which implicitly reinforce racial and ethnic segregation as well as the fragmentation of class consciousness.

2) Nineteenth century bureaucratic planning:
   a) The constraints on state planning: The failure of conservative political consolidation of the European revolutions left the city planning function largely in the hands of state bureaucrats. This development was one aspect of the linking of state and planning functions which became fully developed after World War II. The state both established the legal, economic and political foundations of urban planning, and then assumed urban planning responsibility for such public issues as sanitation and transportation.

   But city planning became at best a partial rationalization of isolated elements of the urban system. To understand why this continues to remain the case involves seeing the constraint to any form of planning and government intervention.

   Classical liberal economic and political theory held that
capitalist economics functioned best with no controls other than the totally free operation of the market itself. The market constituted the "hidden hand" which automatically reconciled the inherent capitalist contradictions of requiring security, stability, and continuity in the socio/economic climate on the one hand, and a risk-taking competitiveness on the other. Normative social patterns then arise which legitimize the standard that each individual and class of individuals has the absolute right to self-aggrandizement, profit-maximization, and individual initiative. Government interference with this theoretically self-regulating system was seen as a dangerous intervention with the economy and individual rights.

"Government competition with private enterprise and institutionalized planning (was) considered the most dangerous interventions in individual freedom and a strong violation of the normative patterns." But a minimal level of planning was necessary to "help to conceal the contradictions between stability and adaptive dynamics" (the simultaneous needs for capitalist security and growth). Planning was therefore tolerated in the following decentralized forms:

1) Private planning action to maintain one's own social and economic security in the accumulation of property and capital.

2) Public planning action within a democratic process of decision-making: environmental, administrative and security
concerns.

iii) Free investment planning action to increase profits and control over labor power.¹

But these forms of planning were restricted to isolated elements of the society. The state itself was basically passive, reacting to capitalist imperatives and mediating class conflicts when necessary.

b) Early state planning: Urban legislation which the state passed was concerned with such public issues as sanitation and housing. These areas were not dealt with adequately by private interests and, if unresolved, to undermine capitalist stability and growth.

The origin of modern bureaucratic city planning was then coincident with the establishment of state authority over urban issues and the definition of the city as a legal political entity. But even at this early stage, the incrementalism of the planning effort and government control contrasted with the growing power and centralization of state economic and political planning. This is indicated in the state's early participation in labor and welfare legislation which served capitalist interests by institutionalizing the labor market. The English Reform Act of 1832 reapportioned the Parliament seats to increase urban representation relative to the rural areas, thus putting political representation in line with economic and social realities. The first effective law limiting the working hours of children was instituted in 1833. The
old Poor Law (Speenhamland) which guaranteed all citizens a certain level of sustenance was abolished, forcing all potential workers onto the wage market and consolidating the expropriation of workers which started with the enclosure movement. In 1835, elective municipal administrations were established to be responsible for all state intervention in housing, roads, drainage, sewage, and later, planning. This state action was part of what was termed the city reform movement. But in fact, the reforms did not deal with the forces which caused the urban blight and only brought the medieval-based industrial city into line with economic and social realities.

The first wave of town planning reform was spurred by problems of sanitation, disease, refuse disposal, congestion, and transportation, which required a centralized administration since they effected the city as a whole. In spite of its individualistic ideology, liberalism generated the state as an instrument of centralized administration in a society which had no inherent principle of social cohesion except instrumentalism. The planning administration's "point of departure was sanitary problems, but the point of arrival was a complete programme of town planning," since sanitation reform involved control over drains, housing, road and park design, sewer and paving standards, etc. In 1875 and 1890, the English Housing of the Working Classes Act consolidated sanitation and popular housing laws into a municipal instrument for
controlling minimum housing.

A second wave of reform was promoted by the immense popular pressure for improving unacceptable living conditions. Reform was seen as the only alternative to even more intense social conflict. For example, the lack of public open spaces is regretted because,

if the lower orders have not places where they can engage in sport and keep their mind engaged in matters of that kind, it is the very thing to drive them to Chartism (socialism). 1

Subsidized housing laws resulted from this state concern. In addition, a number of private "morally"-motivated benefactors erected workers' housing.

The convenience and cleanliness of a man's lodging have a greater influence than might be thought on the morality and well-being of the family...If we can offer...men clean, attractive houses...he can learn to value that feeling for ownership which Providence has instilled in us all, shall we not have solved one of the most important problems of social economy? Shall we not have contributed towards strengthening the sacred bonds of the family and rendered a true service to this class so worthy of concern to our workers and to all society? 2

The largest of the housing settlements erected in response to this sentiment were modeled on the designs of the Utopian communities. Their geometric and technical town-planning aspects were adopted, but the social, political and economic content eliminated. The designs were "utilized by the paternalistic reformists precisely to conserve the social balance threatened by the Revolution." 3

City planning then originated as a collection of special-
ized private and bureaucratic efforts to respond to specific urban problems. Gradually the nature of the problems and the rise of the state as an institution of societal planning stimulated a coordinated effort in dealing with the city. Planning became the affair of bureaucratic technicians, a new class composed primarily of civil servants distributed through various city departments and committed to instrumental and incremental practice.
MODERN ARCHITECTURE

Introduction: The relations of city planning and architecture to liberal society are similar. Both architects and planners operated at a great distance from the central socio/economic processes of the evolving bourgeois society. Architects split from the socially effective practice of the engineers by the mid-eighteenth century, and city planning a part of a weak state system attempting to regulate the industrial towns. By the Twentieth century, the professions furthered their alienation from the social whole through an increasingly internalized theory and practice in the crisis of attempting to close the professionals' gap with a constantly transforming capitalist society. As the professionals have shown little critical understanding of their situation, this crisis has been perpetuated until the present.

This section will first describe the transition in architecture from the neo-classical to "modernist" model.¹ This will in turn be presented and critiqued, as will be several forms of theory and practice which followed modernism's decline.

THE MODERN MOVEMENT

The transition to Modernism: The political and economic conditions for a massive and institutionalized commodity manufacturing were set by 1870.

Two men have been supreme in creating the modern world: Rockefeller and Bismark. One in economics, the
other in politics, refuted the liberal dream of universal happiness through individual competition, substituting monopoly and the corporate state. 1

The available architectural response, historicism, had by 1890 become a complete failure in light of the emerging building tasks and technologies of corporate capitalism. In city planning, the existing stock of legal and spatial controls were inadequate to the burgeoning cities which existing Baroque compositional methods could not order. The growth of suburbs, transportation and communications networks made the potential of physically ordering a city increasingly problematic.

The first response to these crises was an architectural/aesthetic/city planning avant garde (Art Nouveau, Jugendstijl, Garnier, Howard, Soria, Berlage, the Italian Futurists) which either glorified crafts technology or idealized industrial values. In either case, the avant garde failed to either appreciate or significantly affect the problems and potentials of their time. The romantic and individualistic "proud but fragile tower of the 19th century bourgeois culture collapsed"2 with Lenin's seizure of the Winter Palace in 1917 and with it the belief in the total goodness of industrial production and consumption. The mass production and consumption of commodities before the First World War became the mass production of death and consumption of men.

It is the German and Russian experience this time to arrive at 'an architecture degree zero' (a cultural break in which the traditional cultural system is totally vitiated, resulting in a black whole
so to speak within which an unforseen sociocultural complex begins to accrete). and the difference of their respective attitudes to this experience is of significance in itself. Industrial production, now disrupted and in many instances totally destroyed by the war, creates an austere objectless world, a cultural hiatus wherein men hitherto overwhelmed by the nightmare of industrialization, may briefly speculate on an alternative condition. Bourgeois professionalism momentarily loses its cultural hold. Art now arises into the ascendant as the potential embodiment of unalienated value.

Then, in Russia, immediately after the Revolution, a cultural "degree zero" was achieved—a genuine break in history coming with the sudden end of the bourgeoisie. The Russian workers' Soviets promised a genuine disalienation of all men. Production, which had hitherto been determined by the imperatives of capital, could now become the instrument of the whole society. This meant that all objects could now be resemanticalized—new meanings corresponding to the democratic/unalienating social ends could now be attached to objects. Objects were to be the servants of a new order of social relations. Artists abandoned their previously specialized callings and participated towards the ideal of a totality of design (the unity of theatre, cinema, art, architecture, the design of everyday objects) as servants and creators of a unified and unalienated society. Culture became itself a space of public appearance, in partnership with the political and economic formative elements of Soviet life.

(Art) advocated the social determination of the environment as the very substance and meaning of human culture. It implied a continuum of objects reduced to their non-fantasized significance, to their intrinsic meaning in relation to society as a whole.
This integration of art and life through a resemantization of physical form (imbuing form with new definitions of meaning) and the creation of a proletarian unalienated culture was a central ideal which was assimilated and transformed into the Modern Movement in architecture and planning. But in the transformation, the totalizing and de-alienating intent of Revolutionary design was lost. What remained will be described and critiqued in the following section.

The nature of the Modern Movement: The Modern Movement succeeded the late Nineteenth century avant-garde as a response to the crisis of neo-classicism in meeting the demands of an industrialized bourgeois society. The avant-garde was the last product of an optimistic age when the virtues of productivity and Rationality were seen as unbounded, a movement which attempted through verbal and visual manifestos to universalize an essentially individualistic viewpoint. This was an aesthetic response to a deep ambivalence about industrialization and liberal society whose impact outstripped the meaning and potential of aesthetic solutions in attempting to link the environment to new economic and political situations.

The Modern Movement appropriated the aesthetic prejudice, the isolated social position and the sometimes polemical stance of the earlier avant garde. But through its less equivocal acceptance of technology and emphasis on the method of problem solving, the Movement attempted a more real relation to liberal social and economic forces.
it was an operative choice which became a theory only later and then only partially. Polemical statements of the early period would be contradicted as the Modernist architects confronted political realities. Thus it is difficult to characterize the Movement in a concise manner, but some characteristics are common to its several periods and many personalities.

1) The professional position of the Modern Movement designers: The Modernist architects had to legitimize their own existence through finding a basis for making design decisions which would accomplish several purposes: establish Modernist social utility vis-a-vis the obvious import of engineers and city planning bureaucrats; insulate the designers from the vicissitudes of unstable political and economic circumstances; and bridge the widening gap between aesthetic consciousness and an increasingly commodity-oriented bourgeois society. The strategy was to first dramatize the crisis of environment and society, and then to show that the crisis could be solved only through the designers' methods:

Society is filled with violent desire for something which it may obtain or it may not. Everything lies in that: everything depends on the effort made and the attention paid to these alarming symptoms... it is a question of building which is at the root of social unrest today...architecture or revolution. 1

What was in fact a crisis of architects and planners in a "para-professional parasitical role" 2 was transformed through Modernist rhetoric into a societal crisis which could be re-
solved only through the participation of Modernist designers. Yet their position as builders was at the periphery of the profession which itself was secondary to the builders and engineers in impacting the built environment. Early Modernist work then was largely experimental, theoretical and speculative, linked to society through manifestos, exhibitions, polemic and few actual projects. The Modernists constituted a second avant garde movement. Only in the mid-thirties did the Modernist design paradigm come to dominate "high architecture".

2) The Modernist reading of social reality: The Modernists' generally characterized the moving force of society as a technological determinism. Social reality took on for them the attributes of capitalist production and technology, based on the participation of universalized masses with basically the same needs in mass production and consumption. Thus universalized and rationalized design solutions could be achieved through design research and development parallel to industrial and scientific enterprise. That class or cultural differences were fundamental to capitalist society was barely realized.

3) The professional task: The task of the design professionals was seen as ordering the fragmentation of the physical world through a new design process appropriate to industrialized society. Inherent in this view is the old Utopian/Enlightenment notion of the capacity of designed en-
vironment to affect human welfare and create a healthy and moral social order. The Modernist avant garde combined Utopian ideals with an implementation strategy more realistic than that of the previous avant garde. But both movements felt their own philosophical positions to be the complete answer to the relation of man and society. The original avant garde fell apart after the revelation of World War One that the boundless Enlightenment Reason could produce death and destruction as well as the hopes of an idealized and totalized future. The Modernists then appropriated Enlightenment rationality, but on a far more limited scale.

In 1926, for the first time, Le Corbusier no longer said that the new architecture should be subjective or objective, immanent or transcendent, but that it must be such and such a thing: it must have 'pilotis, a free plan, free facade, and even roof terraces and lengthwise windows. Future experience was to decide whether or not these standards were appropriate ones. The basic fact remained that architects were coming to the heart of the matter, that is, they were recognizing that there existed an autonomous and limited field, within which precise choices must be made. Only in this way could the new architecture find its correct cultural position; its task was not to provide a general backdrop but to carry out one of the practical actions—that described by Morris, i.e. the modification of the physical scene—necessary to the organization of modern society. The relation of between the partial responsibility and general responsibility was still to be defined (and never was); but the discussion on architecture became less tense, judgment gave way to judgments of degree. 1

Society then was seen as unproblematic if not vastly promising. Modernist designers had enough difficulty in trying to survive and in determining a proper physical order without being concerned with the nature of the order it was serving.
Le Corbusier: 'let us keep abreast, personally, of the forms of current development, but I beg of you, do not let us concern ourselves here with politics and sociology. These two phenomena are too infinitely complex; there is also the economic aspect, and we are not qualified to discuss these daunting problems before a public gathering. I repeat, we must remain architects and town-planners, and on this professional terrain must make known to those concerned the possibilities and needs of an architectural and urbanistic order.

Mies Van der Rohe: 'Our age is a fact: it exists completely independently of our yea or nay, but it is neither better nor worse than any other. It is just a fact, which has no value in itself. For this reason, I shall not persist in attempting to explain this new epoch, to point out its proportions or to lay bare its supporting structure. But let us not underestimate the matter of mechanization, typification and standardization. And let us accept the changed economic and social relationships as an accomplished fact.

Fact is separate from value, critique is irrelevant. Modernism abdicated the Utopian critique to rationalize design according to the "accomplished facts of the liberal age." Instrumental rationality would be its own authority. When the best solution was to be found independent of political considerations, the professional then would bring the solution to the appropriate political authorities, whoever they may be. (Mies van der Rohe remained in Nazi Germany until 1937.)

Before the incontestable, incontrovertible claims of the modern schemes, appropriate authorities will emerge. But let us repeat the chronology of events: when the technicians formulate what they must, then the authorities will appear.

4) The Modernist method: For the Modernists, rationality was perhaps the one constant among all the political
and economic vicissitudes of the industrial era--the one value which remained after the First World War. While the optimistic Enlightenment rationality had died, a more limited and controlled version still appeared as the best basis for modern design. The scientific experimental method then was appropriated as the necessary paradigm of the Modernist method in that the modern age posed complex and ever-changing design problems which could not be resolved through the pregiven stylistic formulas and aesthetic approach of the neo-classic and avant garde movements. Such ideology was to be renounced in favor of a close attention to the particular problem and its best solution, the resolution of ends and means. In short, this was the traditional utilitarian functionalism. Complex design issues were dealt with by breaking down complex wholes into discrete problems which were individually studied and then recombined. The problem of the city became defined not in broad ideological terms but as the investigation of its "four functions" (living, working, recreation and circulation); the elements of modern design were listed by Le Corbusier not in stylistic terms but as the concrete elements of the pilotis, roof garden, etc.

But while the "research" was on particular and (as the Modernists saw it) de-ideologized issues, the problems of the industrial age were common to all people and nations. The solutions to particular problems should be, at least as an ideal type, universally applicable in modern nations. The Mod-
ernist's particularistic method was universalizing. Urban research became defined in terms of such generalized issues as the minimum adequate dwelling, the nature of collective form and city districts, the fitting of object design to universalized industrial processes, and the like. Each particular project was not only a design in itself, but a part of a larger urban totality which circumstances did not allow to be immediately constructed. In this totality, the Modernist method attempted to unify art and life, the hand and industrial processes, the house and the city. The entire built world was a continuum subject to a control and rationality through design, in which each particular element was only a part. A number of Le Corbusier's projects (including the Marseilles Block and the Pavillion of the L'Esprit Nouveau) were only built fragments of a projected continuous urban fabric.

The Modernists saw themselves as connected with the serious and deep problems and potentials of the industrial age. The rewards of their efforts would be in the future. Creation is a patient search (Le Corbusier) by many designers/urbanists who, cooperating under the Modernist paradigm, would collectively evolve the best solutions.

5) The Modernist visual vocabulary: A corollary of the problem of method was the problem of generating a new visual grammar and syntax. One of the failures of neoclassicism was its classical visual vocabulary, inadequate to the industrial age which for the Modernists (as well as the earlier
avant-garde) demanded its own appropriate visual expression. An architectural "degree zero" point was reached which the analytic method was used to surpass.

Previous to Modernism, art existed as a world of a priori rules to which art owed its dignity and substance as a separate representational activity in opposition to productive processes. The new Modernist vocabulary represented an integration of art with production. The key to the integration was, in the artist Kandinsky's terms, the inner eye which penetrates behind the hard shell of appearance to the very heart of things. The analytic method was used to reach behind the sharp boundary between appearance and reality (so characteristic of liberal society) to separate the pure essence of visual appearance from its manifest form. Through analysis, the fundamental forms of which all manifest form is composed was to be reached.

The purified and abstract forms spoke of the universalized and abstract bourgeois power, as the particularized classical ornament represented the personification and individualization of aristocratic power in the monarch. Similarly, the aristocratic perspective which focussed vision on and from the individual was transformed by the Modernists to the abstract Cubist simultaneity of vision, in which space and form was abstracted and perceived through time and movement. Wo/men the subject of vision and form were eclipsed.

Modernism then felt itself equipped to deal with the problems of liberalism through a rational methodology and
a visual vocabulary appropriate to the machine age. These tools could overcome the failures of the environment, since it was a lack of methodology, rationality and imagery which caused the environmental crises which Modernism addressed. Design then substitutes for political action. Totalizing design solutions could integrate the disparate and fragmented cities, through unifying the arts with industry, the hand with the mind, social dissidents, with social order, the functions of the city, wo/man with the potential of the industrial age.

6) Modernism Illustrated--the Voisin Plan: Perhaps the most powerful illustration of the Modernist premises was the 1925 Voisin Plan of Le Corbusier for Paris. In the plan, the heart of Medieval Paris was to be ripped out and replaced by an enormous abstract organization of sixty-story cruciform towers, set in a rigidly geometric rectilinear grid of elevated expressways traversing a vast green space. The tower in the park was Corbusier's attempt to reconcile the productive demands of the city with the Utopian ideal of residence in the country, previously articulated in the physical form of the Garden City and now brought to the metropolis and made vertical. But while Le Corbusier appropriated the ideals of the Garden City, he inverted the essentially romantic content of that movement in his audaciously rationalist vision of the new industrial city which concretized in a strong visual formal organization the as-yet un-objectified organization of corporate capitalism (as distinguished from the earlier indus-
trial city based on a laissez-faire capitalism). The Voisin plan was a realization of Le Corbusier's general program of rational planning and synoptic organization of the city as a macro-unity of production, modeled on the organization and social relations dictated by the giant corporations. The city was a means of organizing society as an efficiently programmed productive unity, an instrument for controlling and reproducing the labor force. Architecture and planning would be the means for adapting the masses, disinherited from their traditional social relations and the specificity and human scale of the precapitalist environment, to the "new spirit" of the "healthy" human and social organism of corporate capitalism. But Corbusier's dream of the renaturalized man, existing in relation to the sun and the wind and the trees in his bureaucratic tower pigeon hole contradicted the very human product which capitalism demanded. The human subject of Corbusier's plan was in fact the alienated and bureaucratized twentieth century worker.

Corbusier consistently ignored or misread the socio-economic forces which created the problems he tried to address and in doing so participated in the very reproduction of the socio-economic organization which is responsible for the human suffering which it was his intent to eradicate. This misreading allowed him to promulgate totalistic solutions, the image of the new modern city, which were then overlaid in toto on the previous medieval-based city. He chose to "demolish
the existing chaos or start afresh on a new site\textsuperscript{1} as Capital-
ism overlaid with equal radicalness the previous social order.

Parallel to the bureaucratic planners' adoption of Utop-
ian planning ideas, the Voisin plan adopted Garden City ideals
but did not and could not incorporate the Utopian critique of
liberal domination. The Utopian formal ideals were adopted
while their content was denied. The Voisin plan was then per-
fected expression of advanced capitalist tendencies towards order
and centralized social control. It became the prototype in de-
sign and implementation for the urban redevelopment, central
city design and high-rise structures that particularly charac-
terized post-World War II design. Towers for the rich built
on urban renewal land as well as high-rise ghettos derive from
the same model.

7) Modernist planning: The planning ideas of the
Modernists followed from their general intents and methodolo-
gies which took the problem of environmental design as a con-
tinuity from the scale of the chair to that of the city; the
smallest apartment was in some senses an exercise in urban de-
sign. Corbusier's Voisin plan represented one end of the Mod-
ernist spectrum: the ideal of the totally rationalized and in-
tegrated city. The plan was of whole cloth, a radical alterna-
tive to the given apparent urban confusion and the early cap-
talist city. But the plan's strength as a coherent image was
also its weakness. Such a total scheme could only be imposed
by a centralized authority which controlled if not owned most
urban land. This was clearly not the case even with growing monopoly capitalism, so any planning schemes would have to be implemented as phased, incremental projects within the city. Hence the Modernists (particularly Gropius) defined a taxonomic methodology of designing elements of the whole city, and implementing the results as conditions permitted. Yet this incrementalist approach was based on a primarily visual culture, and the greatest urban whole which the modernists could deal with was the district. As a sub-part of the whole city, the district was to contain, as did the medieval quarters at a much smaller scale, institutions and facilities for a limited number of people. The multiplication of districts would comprise the city. This notion is also the essence of many forms of neighborhood planning to date and is the physical designers' contribution to finding an intermediate physical unit between the city as a whole and the individual dwelling. But the incrementalist planning was severely limited in two senses: it required coordinated planning in a liberal society which can accept such planning mechanisms only with difficulty, and it assumed a givenness of place which later city developments (e.g., transportation as a determinant of city form, Melvin Webber's notion of the spaceless city, etc.) would vitiate. Further, as the Modernists recognized, large scale public ownership of land and effective planning legislation is necessary for any large scale planned physical reconstruction. Thus, the Modernists contributed little except
a simplistic physical ideal to city planning. Paradoxically, the need they recognized for public land ownership and planning law is possible only in a society which is committed to at least limiting capitalist domination. The Modernist architectural and planning principles were then most extensively used in Britain and the Scandinavian countries, where some degree of socialism and class equality had taken hold.

A critique of the Modern Movement: If seen in the most generous (and perhaps least historically specific) light, several aspects of the Modernist movement seemed to hold some hope of resolving the professional crises the Movement faced. Stated principles involved: at least a verbal commitment to a rational functionalism; the derivation of building form from the use it was to serve; the commitment to unifying the environment through a method which broke through the stylistic paralysis of neo-classicism; the commitment to collaborative and cumulative research on building problems; the limitation of the designers' task to concrete problems dealt with free of a pre-given ideology; the unification of man, society and environment in a non-fragmented whole environment; the claim (at least by Gropius) that architecture is essentially built sociology, and some emphasis on social processes; the attempt to find an architecture for all wo/men independent of class; and the identification of building and object production with the industrial processes which might yield less expensive and more adequate facilities for everyman.
Yet another reading of the Modernist text yields an entirely different picture: the prime intent of the Modernists was the creation of another architectural style which could both save the architectural/planning profession from its neoclassic impotence and provide a proper image for the machine age. Corbusier made the connection between the engineering efficiency of ships and locomotives and the visual efficiency of the primary forms which he made the elements of the new style (termed the "International Style"). For Modernism as a style, the visual qualities of the newly-made "elementalist" plastic vocabulary comprised a visual efficiency. This functionalism was realized through the "arbitrary postulate that there is an intuitive visual comprehension of any functional or structural efficiency." Thus the functionalism and rationality of the International Style were only the appearance of function rather than function itself. Well before the beginning of the Modern Movement, Nineteenth century engineers and the American Indians and colonists even earlier had been truly functional builders.

For the American designer functionalism meant, and still means, building as economically and as technologically as possible, with minimum consideration of personal or esthetic principles. To the diaspora architects (the European architects who came to America after Hitler overtook Germany) functionalism meant pure ideology, visualizing self-evident truths of ethical, esthetic and social Weltanschauung. What Germany admired most during the 1920's was pure Kantian non-empirical idealism.
That the Modernists' did not make any significant use of new technology undermined their claim to functionalism. At the very moment of the early triumphant examples of International Style architecture (e.g. Le Corbusier's house at Garches, 1927) Buckminster Fuller designed an early prefabricated demountable totally industrialized mast house which made the fullest use of the advanced technology of the day, making the International Style architecture functionally and technologically primitive by comparison.

Then a central part of the modernist practice was the creation of the traditional architectural product: architectural style which gave visual expression to the dominant ethos, power and social relations of the society.

The legitimate achievements of Modernism, its increased freedom of design response to functional problems and the commitment to analysis and research, were eclipsed by the social roles which Modernist architecture and planning were constrained to play. By the mid-1930's in Europe, Modernism became the dominant stylistic influence in "high" architecture and developed some basic building prototypes (notably the skyscraper). But Modernism failed to accomplish its central intent of rationalizing the environment through planning and design. This failure was not the defect of style or method. Rather, the failure was in Modernism's epiphenomenal relationship to the central imperatives of capitalism, which created the very fragmentation the Modernists attempted to rationalize.
The Modernist legacy: The following elements of the theory and practice of the Modern Movement are among those which strongly influence the internal professional organization and self-representation of contemporary architectural and planning practice.

1) The perpetuation of the neo-classicist crisis of the meaning and social role of architectural and planning practice, through the failure of the Modernists to comprehend through their ideals, programs, methodology, style, and practice their true relation and meaning in society as servants of capitalist interests.

2) The perpetuation of the separation of architecture and planning from construction and engineering, leaving the designers at the edges of the societal processes, as irrelevant as were the neo-classicists.

3) The belief that the architectural and planning professions, within their own terms of practice and knowledge, (though the professions may incorporate sociology, psychology, etc.) are capable of generating total solutions to the problems of built environments at all scales—the professionals alone being able to make the essential determinations of standards and design. This notion was a severe misrepresentation of the reality of sources of environmental decision-making and as such simply perpetuated the professions' marginal status.

4) The Modernist collapse of the critical and reflective base of the Utopian movement into the domination of the given.
The Utopians had, to some extent, provided an alternative to architecture's traditional societal role in concretizing dominant power interests but with the collapse of the implicit Utopian critique architecture was confirmed as a hermetic and self-defining practice of a visual culture.

5) The origin of the notion that with technology and methodology a new architectural or planning practice could be a solution to the crisis of built environment and social relations.

6) The decline of the Utopian tradition of comprehensive social/physical solutions. This occurred after the Modernists' wholistic projects, such as the Voisin plan, were made impossible to realize in encounter with political reality. The subsequent adoption of a strategy of incrementalist reform militated against any conception of ends in the presence of incrementalist/instrumentalist means.

7) Art, in its alienation as a meaningful activity in bourgeois society, remained one of the few arenas in which a resolution of societal fragmentation and meaningless could be achieved. The Modernists' attempt to unify art and production (institutionalized in the Bauhaus, the first design school teaching modernist principles and the prototype of contemporary architectural/design education) collapsed the critical potential of art into an alliance with industry. The traditional critical and expressive "use value" of art was totally transformed in the service of commodity production. A beau-
tiful teapot or a beautiful building in capitalist society inevitably became "resemanticized." Style no longer had a primarily symbolic or aesthetic meaning, but became a major visual utility in encouraging consumption.

8) The establishment of the scientific epistemology as a method of research and design. The Modernists established the taxonomic process of separation of elements from a whole as the basis for a rationality which could operate only in the connection of means to given ends. Thus the "minimum dwelling" was exhaustively researched through "rational" methods without questioning why such a dwelling is necessary.

Conclusion: Modernism was the first major architectural/planning movement which existed outside the traditional integral relationship between design and societal power. Itself a product of the capitalist social fragmentation, Modernism attempted through its internal resources alone to create a total reconstruction and de-alienation of its practice and the environment. This project was based on the severe mystification that confuses symptom for cause. It is not lack of rationality, technology or appropriate symbolism, but rather the capitalist institutions which cause environmental fragmentation which a formally unified environment could not affect. The failure of the Modernist program shows that design cannot be a substitute for political actions in reforming environmental or social relations.
The Modernists, and to a great extent the designers who followed them, were prisoners of their method, of their conception of the real world. They were blinded to the source of real utility in design, to the meaning of the environment as an actor in social relations, to the meaning of art, and to the means of effective action in the world in relation to power.
POST-MODERNIST ARCHITECTURE

Introduction: On the collapse of the International Style, the practices of architecture and planning as a formal symbolic project (as distinguished from the utilitarian engineering and planning which had been a continuous practice since the origin of the industrial towns) separated into more specialized and modest disciplines. Architects restricted themselves to building design independent of a larger conceptual and urban context. The attempt to physically order the fragmented environment as a whole was given up, as was the critical Utopian project of creating an environment embodying new more humanized social relations.

Architectural Mannerism: The hermetic visual and symbolic content of the Modernists was absorbed by an elite group of architects who, given the failure of utopian social visions and a unitary architectural style, could only work to develop individual architectural languages. Hence, the leaders of this architectural culture (Mies, Saarinen, Kahn, Rudolph, etc.) were mannerists working within the Modernists' legitimation of the visual and symbolic as the architectural project without retaining the Modernists' practice of relating design to some social vision. The elite architects worked (and continue to work) within the small social space left in each liberal generation to evolve ever-new fashions, non-critical styles of architectural high culture from which the rest of the body of architects pattern their own work. Man-
nerist practice was legitimated by such architectural historians as Giedion and the early Scully. They portrayed architecture as the working out of various idealized "spirits of the age" (technology, space/time, architecture as the embodiment of the existential human act, etc.) rather than as a concrete expression and servant of the interests of domination. The architectural mystifications were then perpetuated through the reification of architecture as an art form somehow independent of and commenting on the very forces which it served.

Architecture as an art form in a commodity culture becomes itself a commodity, not an independent critical sphere of reflection and symbolization. The mannerists' hypostatization of the architectural product as an individual object and withdrawal from reflection on the social conditions of that object's existence is analogous to the human beings in capitalist society. Made an object whose wholeness is fragmented, they inhabit (like architectural and planning practice) the consumerist world of advanced capitalism, alienated from and largely ignorant of the socio-economic imperatives which condition them. The consumerism and object fetishism which mannerist design represents are phenomenon of advanced capitalism which both create markets for industrial growth and provide hypnotic substitute gratifications for the lost community and self implicit in capitalist organization.

Technological Utopianism: Parallel to the new mannerism was the amalgamation of the nineteenth-century functionalist
engineering tradition with a sort of utopian futurism. A technological utopianism resulted—an attitude (held by Fuller, Soleri, the metabolists, Archigram and others in various forms) that serious urban and international-scale problems (resource scarcity, unequal resource distribution, growth, overpopulation and even war) could be resolved through design and the use of new technologies as well as in Fuller's case, the "comprehensive rational allocation of physical resources". Technological utopians perpetuate the fallacy of the belief in the primary power of design (in the forms of fetishized object and technique) to solve serious problems which, while defined as technical and functional, are in fact consequences of the capitalist socio-economic system itself. To be sure, some of the technological utopians hold encompassing social visions, but these visions are individually-developed constructions, reflecting with the Mannerists the fragmentation of consensual meaning and practice. The influence of these "new utopians" has been mainly ideological and periferal to the dominant mannerist architectural practice.

Contemporary approaches: By the early 'sixties, the Utopian claims that design had significant moral and cultural relevance to the larger society was reduced to a mannerist sectarianism whose practice was the production of consumption commodities. A number of architects realized that architectural as a cultural force and belief system had lost its meaning.
A serious and self-conscious rethinking of the premises of architectural practice and theory was then undertaken from a variety of viewpoints which will be briefly described and critiqued in the following section. Such attention is important, because while no particular approach has become a dominant paradigm, each holds the attention of some of the "leading edge" professionals, forming some part of present and future professional consciousness and practice. While diverse in content, the directions have in common a reaction to both the failure of the Modernists and mannerists as well as the search for a new basis for valid design. The failures are the taking of the social totality as unproblematic, and the belief that the proper design and design rationality can unify environmental fragmentation and create meaning out of the meaninglessness of the liberal social order.

Like those they supplant, these approaches fail because of their misreading of social reality originating in the professionals' separation from power in the early industrial age.

The efforts to find a new basis for design took two general directions: 1) the project of recognizing existing environmental meanings and creating new meanings in order to reinstate architecture as a legitimated cultural system; and 2) the attempt to create a non-visual functionality through the rationalization of design.

1) The project of recognizing existing environmental
meanings and creating new meanings: This project has been explored in the a) effort to constitute a consciously understood language of architectural meaning, and b) the effort to make the meanings of everyday life the basis of a valid architecture. The work of Peter Eisenman and Robert Venturi will be examined as prime examples of these approaches.

a) The architectural semantics and syntax of Peter Eisenman: A few architects have become concerned with reconstituting a meaning for architecture by understanding the way that architectural forms in themselves participate in creating meanings. This is accomplished through trying to create a semantics and syntax of form through the use of formal geometric schemes, the use of themes from architectural history, and the making of architectural form analogue to language structure through the use of semiotics, Chomskian and post-Chomskian linguistics, and structuralism. As a leading example of the use of these approaches, some work of Peter Eisenman will be presented and critiqued.

Eisenman creates a purely formal language with no meaning referent other than the organization of the architectural elements themselves and rationalized by his appropriation of extra-architectural concepts. His efforts attempt to go to the roots of pure architectural meaning, assuming that meaning in a general sense can be reinstated and rediscovered for architecture solely through the internal relations of architectural elements. It is paradoxical that Eisenman responds to the loss
in architectural meaning which arises from a growing alienation from and power in the world by becoming resolutely hermetic in the attempt to find sources for meaning within the field which has already failed him. Eisenman's work is another form of the belief that loss of meaning in architecture can be rectified through a (now consciously investigated) language of design. Formal models such as Structuralism are only analogies and not the reality from which all analogies derive. Eisenman repeats the common contemporary assertion of modes of thought as reality which already failed the Utopians, Technological Utopians and the Modernists. Eisenman looks for new ways of perception, of seeing the world, assuming that the solution to the problem of meaning lies in seeing the world in terms of new homologous structures, an analogical system. This project is a form of reification—the concrete content of the world, its reality as lived and the socio-economic relations through which men and women perceive and define their everyday life and its meaning are reduced to non-specific and a-historical abstractions. Analogical conceptual models are developed as ways of mapping the world independently of its specific socio-historic context and of the class and power relations among people which determine that content. Practice is then defined as a mode of thought. The locus of action is discovered in a universalized abstraction which is then realized as a commodity of consumption. Habitation in some of Eisenman's work is secondary. The architectural
project no longer has use value as a home. It is not even a "machine for living" but an objectified abstraction, a concretized mode of thought.

b) Robert Venturi's Las Vegas: If Eisenman takes architecture as a hermetic text to be decoded and interpreted in built form, Robert Venturi reads the architecture of everyday life as a cultural document exhibiting the manifest preferences of consumers in a democratic society. Meaningful architecture for Venturi is not to be discovered in the realm of aesthetic abstractions but in the commercial vernacular of the roadside strip. Venturi implicitly suggest that the crisis in architecture is merely a consequence of its elitist separation from the ordinary environment and its illegitimate and aristocratic assumption of the mantle of high art. The solution then, the source of meaning in architecture, is what Venturi reads as the unitary or consensual meaning of pluralist democracy as manifested in the "undesigned" environment. "Main street is almost allright". Meaning is not to be found separate from what we perceive. Essence and appearance coincide in the objective manifestation of built form. The ideal is collapsed to the real. Value judgements have no reference in the contest of the given. Venturi, like Mies, presumes not to pass judgement on his era. Rather, he points to what he finds in the built environment and states that it is neither good no bad, but that it exists - by definition, what he finds is our contemporary meaning. Yet ironically, Venturi's concern
with "pop" culture is another version of high art - a highly self-conscious and mannerist contortion of vernacular architecture. His concern is in fact the revitalization of meaning in high architecture through appropriating the content of contemporary popular culture - his definition of our present ethos - as the "new industrial age" was the contemporary ethos for Corbu and the International Style. Corbusier and Venturi differ in that the earlier capital accumulation phase of capitalism which was Corbu's content has by Venturi's time become a commodity-consumption economy. The severity of the classic Modernist forms, reflecting the scarcity mentality of capitalist accumulation, is succeeded by the Las Vegas formal flamboyance of commodity waste.

In effect, Venturi participates in the reproduction of the commodity culture through his fetishization of market relations of exchange within an architectural program. He ignores the mediation of capitalist social relations and institutional constraints which determine the consumer preferences which he implicitly takes as innate or as exogenous to the contemporary capitalist mode of production. That is, Venturi suggests that the people do want the world we see. He neglects the fundamental social relations and institutions which mediate between some given notion of human wants and needs, and their presumed direct objectification in the perceived man-made world. But in a dialectic materialist view, objective preferences are not innate, nor are they independent of the mode of production.
They are in fact specific to socio-historic circumstances in turn is defined essentially by the social relations or production in terms of class and power.

In making his work a manifesto for the creation of a new style of high art, Venturi's "pop art" continues the insular tradition of the culture of architecture. In this tradition, the architect/planner takes his program from some perceived social context which is misread and finally ignored. Venturi, like Corbu, does not speak of objective conditions but only of their epiphenomenal manifestations, whether they be the roadside strip and the television antenna or the organization of the machine-age city and the steamship. This level of understanding fails in taking the world as given, in terms of its images, and making the images the basis of practice.

2) Non-visual functionality through the rationalization of design: Such efforts as Eisenman's and Venturi's were pitifully inadequate to deal with the environmental and social problems which attained enough urgency to be conceptualized as the "urban crisis": housing, transportation, the destruction of the ecological balance, of privacy, of community, and the like. Two prominent architectural responses to the continuing urban and professional crises emerged as a) the conceptualizing of the design product as a process, and b) the study of man-environment relations.

a) The design product as a process: Like a rerun of the state of the neo-classical architects, their modern
descendants "could not offer any solution. Their answers were always 'inadequate', 'unrealistic', 'irrelevant', dominated by the superstitions, the taboos and the obsessions of the visual order." As the architects' visual rationality/functionality had failed in terms of contemporary problems, a non-visual and at times non-spatial rationality and scientificization of design was proposed. This approach took the urban crises and the crises of the design professions as the result of inappropriate methodology and a lack of true rationality in the design process. Environmental design was then redefined as "a multi-dimensional organization described in terms of exclusively empirical and rational theories." The priority of design as a visual ordering which only incidentally contained processes was reversed to a concern with the processes contained in space.

In *Community and Privacy* by Chermayeff and Alexander, the design product was no longer seen as a building: rather, the design product "is an interacting pattern of building and activities, a complex of physical fabric and its use." These interactions are so complex that they tax the designers cognitive capacity beyond its limits. Therefore a better and stronger logic is necessary. A number of architectural and planning techniques were then used sometimes with computer aid in the mathematical formulation of basic urban and social processes. Yet the environmental crises were not resolved. The new process rationalism suffered the same fate as visual
rationality. The apparent irrational environmental fragmentation of liberal society stems from a rationality of capitalist imperatives of a different order than the visual or process variety which are under designers' control.

b) Man-environment relations: Besides the rationalization of design, visual rationality was also reversed in the study of the psychological/behavioral relations of man and environment through environmental psychology and sociology. This effort does not answer the substance of the previous criticisms of Eisenman, Venturi, or the process rationalists. But it has decisively moved away from the limitations of the insular architectural cultural system to focus on the human being as subject. Primary concepts used are "human needs" in interaction with the "environment". It is the misfit between the two, born of the lack of scientific knowledge of their relationship, which is posited as the source of the failure of meaning in architecture and planning. The problem, then, is posed in terms of the lack of psychological and sociological knowledge which it is the project of theory and research to provide.

"Man-environment relations" is no different than Venturi or Le Corbusier in accepting the culturally-given world as unproblematic, excepting the perception of misfits between the environmental and human poles of that world. As such, this field does not possess a critical base. The solution, rather than being aesthetic, is now essentially technical and dependent
on psychological and sociological knowledge translated into design, which is still maintained as the solution to human needs. This construct does not countenance that "human needs" themselves are, as defined in man-environment relations, historically and culturally constituted. Neither does the construct distinguish between fundamental and culturally-generated needs. The problem which man-environment relations perceives is generated not by an environmental misfit but by a fundamental contradiction between objective needs of the self (previous to and not generated by the consumer society) and the alienating social order. Any increase in psychological knowledge will not resolve the "misfit" without being linked to the realization that it is power and not knowledge which is the more fundamental force moving society. Knowledge of the psychological sources of the misfit will not mean power in society to rectify that misfit without regard, understanding and acting on the structural contradictions of advanced capitalism. Thus, while breaking out of the more narrow aesthetic culture of architecture, man-environmental relations perpetuates the fallacy that a design solution to the failure of meaning in architecture and planning is possible independent of dealing with the fundamental societal contradictions which generated that failure.
Introduction: The early history of American city planning parallels the European responses to the problems of the industrial city. Private benefactors first dealt with such issues as housing, sanitation and poverty; local governments then established the legal framework for the city planning function. But, particularly in terms of Europe's greater political and economic socialization, American capitalism and social relations took distinct forms which created a unique context for American planning. This section is therefore devoted to the history of specifically American planning.

The Utopian and Baroque traditions played some role in providing physical and administrative models for planning practice (e.g. the Utopian garden cities and Baroque-influenced comprehensive designs in L'Enfant's Washington, D.C. and Burnham's and Bennett's Chicago plans). But the essence of American planning history is the growing alliance of planners and government as an element of the integration of state and private interests into what is termed in the thesis the "state-capital planning system." The following section describes and critiques the evolution of this alliance from the pre-governmental stage, zoning, the city planning commission and comprehensive planning through the Federal housing programs, incremental planning, and finally the advocacy movements. Each of these movements was developed in response to the inadequacy of preceding planning practice to rationalize the environment.
Each movement will be shown to merely perpetuate the problems it tried to "solve" through an abstract and inadequate understanding of the causes of urban fragmentation and unjust allocation of resources.

The stimulus to city planning in America: The discussion starts with the three characteristics of the American industrial city which led to the development of city planning.

1) Like its earlier European counterparts, the Nineteenth-century American city was a factory camp, a machine for the production and capital accumulation whose elements, (excepting the ruling-class housing and public ceremonial structures) conformed to strict criteria of economic efficiency - the least expended for the maximum productive return. Hence, disease, poverty, slums, pollution and unrestrained and destructive competition between capitalists was rampant. But at a certain point, these symptoms worked against profitable exploitation and required some form of ameliorative action.

2) The great influx of immigrant populations necessary to man the factories gradually gained control of city politics, Thus the previous White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant capitalist regimes were forced out of their political dominance.

3) The newer emigrants became economic competitors of the WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) capitalists in the
building and ownership of slum property. Given the rampant exploitation of slum housing, property values and fiscal return became uncertain. Landowners therefore needed protection against the early free-market exploitation.

The ruling classes then moved to reinstate political, economic, and ultimately social control through the creation of a new set of public institutions which a) stabilized the land market for upper-class benefit through zoning and comprehensive planning; b) circumvented ethnic control of urban land and related politics through the establishment of planning boards; and c) created public markets for private capital as well as socialized the costs of private capital through such programs as subsidized housing and transportation.

These responses then were essentially instruments of class conflict through which the dominating classes established a new political, economic and legal framework at all levels of governance to both control city growth and outflank newcomers who wanted to play the urban exploitation game. The following discussion treats the developmental stages of American planning primarily in terms of its service of class domination.

Early planning: Before the 1920's, city planning was for the most part carried out by private benefactors and civic improvement associations run by local business interests. The "city beautiful" and "city efficient" movements as
well as the reformers of housing and poverty and sanitation were motivated by a mixture of moral repugnance at the conditions of poverty, a realization that some rationalization of the city processes was necessary to maintain and generate profits, and the need to establish ruling class control over urban life. Distinctly missing in these early movements was any realization of the origin of poverty, disease and poor squalid housing. In class domination the Utopian critique had vanished, replaced by an understanding of urban problems through moral and technical analyses which led to the technical and legalistic resolutions of sanitary regulations, building and zoning codes—the Utopian legacy of the efficacy of ordered environment as a moral force united with a legalistic/bureaucratic approach to urban problems.

**Zoning:** Zoning was one of the earliest legal instruments for controlling urban development, and became the single most important tool in the planners' kit for many years. While it may appear to counter individual interests, zoning in fact stabilized and increased property values.

The real object of promoting the general welfare by zoning ordinances is to protect the private use and enjoyment of property and to promote the welfare of the individual property owner. In other words, promoting the general welfare is a means of protecting private property. 1

Most state enabling legislation for local zoning regulations included a requirement that zoning be articulated in terms of a comprehensive plan. Some private firms, notably
that of Harland Bartholomew, developed a large and extensive practice as a result of these regulations, but the effect of those comprehensive plans which were actually drawn up was generally slight. Zoning became an end in itself subject to the local particular interests of time and place; any land use conflicts not settled by zoning boards were usually resolved in the courts. In effect, land use planning, to the extent that it existed at all, was largely performed by non-planners—sanitary and civil engineers, local businessmen, zoning lawyers, and judges who served the interests of real estate firms and middle and upper class property owners.

The city planning commission and comprehensive planning:

The next stage in the institutionalization of planning came under the Hoover Administration: the preparation of two documents—the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of 1924 and the Standard City Planning Enabling Act of 1928, which suggested the legal nomenclature for states to give their cities the right to zone and plan.

While the Zoning Act only formalized existing legal technique, the city planning document marked a new step: a call for local appointive city planning commissions to prepare a plan which would guide and accomplish a coordinated, adjusted and harmonious development of the municipality and its environs which will, in accordance with present and future needs, best promote health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity, and general welfare as well as efficiency and economy in the process of development.
The city planning document marked in several respects a very significant step in the development of the planning function and profession:

1) **Political/economic impact:** The planning commission was established by WASP capitalists to regain political and economic hegemony threatened by the immigrants. Through its deliberately depoliticized non-elective structure, the commission could make public policy decisions essential to capitalist interests (such as land use and capital investment) independent of a political constituency. The commission was an instrument of capitalist control of the city level which presaged later depoliticization on state and then federal levels.

2) **Professional impact:** The commissions established the parameters for the practice of the American planning profession, whose organization, the American Institute of Planners, was established in 1917. The role of the commission and the planner working under commission authority was to work for the generalized (and abstract) "public good", independent of the "evil influences" of "venal" city hall machine politics (but responsible to the particularized interests of the planning commission). Thus, the planner was defined as working above politics and particular interests, while his legally-defined position was created to serve partial interests. The planners' tools became those which served given interests, so planning epistemology naturally became instrumental rationality which fits means to pre-given ends.
3) The impact of the comprehensive plan: The Hoover guide mandated the planners' product as a comprehensive plan of a set of complexly interrelated urban functions, neatly separated in space, and prescribed by rigid physical and legal restrictions. The plan reflected a belief in the moral efficacy of built form, a belief in the power of legal and "rational" controls over the city's anarchy, and a concern for prosperity. In short, the plan was a version of the Protestant reconciliation of morality with gain, an instrument abstractly defined through exclusively legal and technical measures as a totalitarian plan which nonetheless did not deal with the human and political realities which were the plans' true subjects. The abstraction of the plan derived in part from the planners' non-involvement and the commissions' insulation from the politics of the city. Yet this insulation was a significant factor in the planners' failure to achieve the comprehensiveness the Hoover guide intended. Planners, in their separation from policies, were at a disadvantage in playing the city game and were unable to become a significant force in city ordering. The real control of city forces, in spite of planners' ministrations, continued to remain with market preferences and short-range advantage. Constrained politically and economically, the city planner had to practice as an incrementalist technician while defined as a comprehensive urbanist. His rationality, defined in the two dimensions of the plan, was taken as a value in itself. As the urban problems were defined as only techni-
cal, so were the means for their resolution. Questions of meaning and of social relations were obviated by the planners' very charge to see the city as an abstract totality in which competing interests and human meaning were lost through the abstract technical filter.

Urban planning as an element of the state-capital planning system: American city planning history until the Depression largely took place in a climate in which the state and the planning function had a relatively minor impact on the operation of capital enterprise, and the social order. But the pre-Depression reconciliation of the contradictory needs of stability and growth broke down with both economic collapse and labor conflict. Major state intervention ("state" refers to particularly the federal governmental level) originated at this point.

Pressured by organized masses, the state functioned as mediator in daily conflicts working out certain compromises. As a non-organized group, libertarian (or now conservative) American capitalists responded with a wave of anti-interventionism (anti-dirigism). But the technological innovations, the increase in production, the concentration and centralization of capital and the strong organization of the working classes generates a permanent fear among capitalists of a 'general crisis' and the end of capitalism. In the absence of any automatic guarantee of order, stability and its maintenance becomes the major concern of the state apparatus and capitalists, resulting finally in the United States in a collaboration-organized monopoly capitalism. Factories and whole industries consolidated into large corporations, trusts and monopolies in order to reduce personal risks, price competition, and other high insecurities while maintaining economic continuity and high rates of profit. 1,2

The relation between capitalists and the state was trans-
formed with increasing monopolization, the concern for a stable political and economic climate, and the increasing need for capital (for research and development, profit subsidies, the establishment of transportation and utilities infrastructures beyond the means of any single corporation, etc.). The state, along with science and technology, became a major and integral partner of capitalism in (what is termed in this thesis) the state-capital planning system. This system overcame the early liberal American antipathy towards centralized control.

Long and short-range planning, which is essential for effective intervention, becomes the most important element for governing the political and economic processes with their continual changes and expansions, and for maintaining the power of the state and the profits of private capital...the state (took) action to intervene and indirectly control the desperately needed stabilization and maintenance of the economic cycle.

The functional goals (of the planning system) are: to provide for the regulated, organized market conditions; to implement long- and short-range programs for the absorption of surplus capital while maintaining the existing class structure and the finance aristocracy; to provide conditions for stable economic growth; to encourage the development of system-adapted planning partners; and to take action against every appearing crisis or recession with all available means—including armed intervention in foreign countries.

The ideological goals of state-capital planning are: to provide a psychological rationalization for the new economic order; to avoid any kind of open conflicts; to provide for the maintenance of the bourgeois-democratic value system and the existing class structure

Instrumental science now became the most important factor in production. Social control, the control of vast productive human and material resources, and the continual development of technologies, were an integral part of capitalist stability and growth. Instrumental rationality and planning became the
dominant form of knowledge and consciousness of monopoly capitalist society. The means of control were no longer face-to-face intersubjective human relations, but the technocracy, experts in instrumental rational techniques who serve capitalist imperatives. The planners took their role definition and consciousness from their function. Democratic participatory decision making was of course proscribed, for society was essentially a totalized productive machine into which human beings were fit. What democratic determination of public policy did exist in America disintegrated into democratic myths of ideological "secondary arguments" taken from the "treasure box of the democratic value system,"\(^1\) to obscure the actual concentrations of power which inevitably depoliticized popular control.

The human implications of the resultant monopoly capitalism and depoliticization are appalling. To touch on but one area, the problem of self:

The philosopher and psychoanalyst R.D. Laing states that in order to maintain the atrocities of the modern capitalist world, it is necessary for men to destroy their capacity to see clearly what is around them and hide from the horrors which they commit and are forced to commit. The ease with which people can delude themselves about the true character of the world comes from the split between the inner and an outer self. The inner self of a 'normal person is usually greatly concealed even from himself—and is seen only imagination, fantasy and dreams. The outer self, which Laing calls the 'false self system', is the person's active personality. People's actions in the outer world are for the most part mechanical and so they do not feel a need to attach or destroy an alien reality within themselves. The person's well-exercised social personality engulfs his total system and so he loses his critical potentiality. True possibilities for him to spontaneously manifest in action a personal definition of whom or what he wishes to be cease to exist.\(^2\)
The state-industrial planning system has become the nation's largest and most powerful planning agency. Its power derives from the unity of planning with the state-industrial political and economic interests. Any sort of planning which runs counter to the direct instrumental interests of capital as represented in the planning system becomes severed from power. Such "counter-planning" is therefore in a crisis of legitimation and survival whose resolution must lie in considering the total planning system and the interests it serves, as well as the particular reasoning for using planning as a tool. The use of urban and social planning as a basis for making urban-related decisions, as opposed to political or market decision-making mechanisms depends on at least two factors: the attractiveness of capital investment in such specific urban commodities as housing and land (the city is just one more arena for potential profit); and the relative effectiveness of planning, political or market decision-making in guaranteeing stability and profits.

Another element in the choice to use planning is the historically changing scale of capital investment. In early capitalism, the city was the major locus of investment. With increasing centralization and monopolization, capitalists have turned to the regional, national and now international scale, leaving the smaller petit-bourgeois capitalist to control the vacated areas of investment and control. The significantly powerful levels of planning have correspondingly shifted from
Federal housing programs: The involvement of urban planners with the federal intervention in private enterprise was in the federal housing programs. Previous to the 1930's, private developers were primarily responsible for housing construction. But during the Depression, Federal funds became the only source of capital; government housing programs and the FHA were then established, both of which were geared to maintaining the economy and supporting real estate interests. With the legitimation of government intervention in the heretofore private realm, the housing movement then turned to the advocacy of public subsidy and the production of low-cost housing which was not initially advantageous to developers of FHA mid- and upper-income housing. But paralleling the operation of the private housing sector, Federal intervention did not pose the problem of providing adequate housing in terms of the institutional structure of liberal society. Rather, the problem was seen as merely an issue of technical adjustments resolvable within the context of public policy. The extent that the housing movement has been successful in winning actual production of low-cost housing since the passage of the Housing Act of 1937 is a consequence of a coalition with various private interests who discovered that public subsidy housing could be profitable.

With the passage of the Housing Act of 1949, housing interests were joined with the longstanding professional ideology of comprehensive planning. This legislation gave explicit recognition to the fact that housing is a problem of the urban
environment as a whole. As such, any solutions to the housing problem must be posed in terms of the whole spatial fabric of the city. The Act was a strong stimulant to the planning profession. It required a comprehensive plan, and in the amendments of the Housing Act of 1954 required a "Workable Program" for slum clearance and urban renewal, including the provision (Section 701) of government funds for planning. The long years of professional agitation for comprehensive planning were now legitimized, sanctioned and funded as national policy. Of course, there was very little net addition to the low income housing stock as a result of the housing programs \(^1\), nor was there much effective comprehensive planning. Slum clearance merely established new slums elsewhere in the city. Urban renewal was taken over by downtown business interests, producing some magnificent skylines and civic centers and a large private and public profit, but no solution to social problems and urban squalor. What the federal housing programs did accomplish, coupled with an extensive highway building program, was the vast extension of the traditional city territory into the suburbs through housing loan and loan insurance programs to middle and upper income citizens. These programs created a vast housing industry and profit potential as well as the rapid spread of uncontrolled suburban development. Most importantly for capitalism the programs produced a housing commodity with attendant services which would involve the money of great numbers of people for long periods of time (twenty and forty-
mortgages were common) feeding, by contract, the capitalist accumulation mill. ¹

Incremental value-free planning: Ironically, it was at the apotheosis of comprehensive planning that the theorists of city planning began to doubt its efficiency. Martin Meyerson, in an influential article in the Journal of the American Institute of Planners in the late 'fifties, noted that the theoretical long-range plan was inevitably never realized, and that city planning actually practiced in the short range of immediate concerns. Meyerson suggested that planners accept and involve themselves with the real world of market forces which are the ultimate determinants of urban growth. However, he suggested that planners still had an important function in building what he called the "middle-range bridge" in programming municipal capital budgeting in a free market economy. It was the function of the planner to prepare an analysis and presentation of alternative policies for the allocation of municipal resources. The planners' role, then, was to lay out a decision matrix for elected officials who presumably embodied and articulated the goals of the electorate. Implicit in this idea of planning is the notion of the planner as a value-free technician defining specific problems and alternative technical solutions over time. Meyerson proclaimed the end of comprehensive planning and its implicit utopianism. The world must be taken as given. Reality is only a nonproblematic positive fact rather than a socio-economic construct to be ana-
With the increased social concern of the 1960's, the range of social problems was perceived to include more than housing and spatial disorder. City planners, as the comprehensive urbanists, re-examined the definition of their profession as the rational ordering of land uses in a physical plan. The Wetmore Report to the American Institute of Planners in 1964, recognizing that poverty is a multi-faceted problem with which planners should be concerned, recommended that city planning must not simply concern itself with land use. Rather, planning must emphasize the interrelationships of social, economic, and political forces which constitute urban activity and urban life as a whole. As spatial relations were downgraded, the new socially-oriented city planning was defined in terms of social and policy planning. The Wetmore Report established the legitimacy of social and economic planning within the profession. While the ordering of spatial relations was by no means to be ignored, planning now took as its major province of activity the allocation of societal resources of which land use planning was an integral, though perhaps minor, aspect.

Contemporary planning, then, recognizes the social, political and economic matrix of the city and its problems. But these problems, and the array of alternative solutions, are not posed in structural terms but are defined as localized and technical malfunctions or maladaptions of some evolving and basically benevolent "post-industrial service society". Dahl
and Lindblom, in an enormously influential book published in 1953 (Politics, Economics and Welfare), can be taken as the major theorists of the ensuing pervasive ideology of technical rationality and incremental "problem-solving" manifested in most contemporary planning theory and practice.

The possibilities for rational social action, for planning, for reform—in short, for solving problems—depend not upon our choice among mythical grand alternatives but largely upon choice among particular social techniques. 1

Fundamental problems of socio-economic organization, with their political implications, are reduced to discrete problems isolated from that socio-economic base. For Dahl and Lindblom, the only "pertinent questions turn on particular techniques." 2

The general requirements of any system of social control devolve upon the more particular requirements of political-economic control which in turn are reduced to prerequisite techniques. "Planning is an attempt at rationally calculated action to achieve a goal." 3 Goals in a pluralist democracy are presumed to be articulated and determined through the voting process, in the election of responsive and responsible public officials. Beyond the establishment of social goals, "the analysis of prerequisites is a scientific, not a moral, inquiry." 4 This is the solution of technocrats, who, by definition, are technicians taking values determined by others and applying the most efficient means to those value-ends through scientific "value-neutral" methodology. Technocratic attitudes toward planning practice are clearly manifest in
such planning methods as statistical decision theory, systems analysis and simulation modeling and cost-benefit analysis. All of these techniques may be generally characterized as "systematic think for social action."

Bertram Gross, suggesting that the social revolution has already taken place in the transformation of advanced industrialization into the first service society, views the social conflict of the 'sixties as only a political maladjustment to this "revolution". He states that "the forging of tools for description, measurement and prediction is the most basic challenge confronting social scientists and planners who choose to deal with societal change."¹

A more comprehensive elaboration of planning in these terms has been developed by Herbert Gans:

By planning, I mean a method and process of decision-making which includes the proper formulation of problems which the city needs to solve (or of the goals it wishes to achieve); the determination of the causes of these problems; and the formulation of those policies, action programs, and decisions which will deal with the causes to solve the problem, and will do so democratically without undesirable financial, political, social or other consequences. ²

Again, Gans takes the existing order for granted as non-problematic and not relevant to the planners' concerns:

In order to deal with their crucial problems, the cities will need not physical plans or comprehensive plans but plans that deal with specific problems and their causes and that result in policies, or policy guidelines, action programs. ³

Implicit to this argument is that the causes of urban problems will be found to be specific to cities themselves and not
inherent in the socio-economic structure.

Critique of incremental and comprehensive planning: Incremental and comprehensive planning share an abstraction from the forces generating the fragmented reality which planners try to order.

Incrementalist practice is based on the Positivist assumption that it is impossible to understand or operate either analytically or predictively on the social totality. Reality appears to pose a series of discrete problems which derive from apparent immediate causes. The incrementalists then abstract their definition of planning problems from the totality from which they derive and participate. If knowledge proves its truth in its application in the real world (a position common to Marx and the Pragmatists), the incrementalists reading of social reality has proved to be false in light of their failure to rationalize urban decision-making.

The particular failure of the comprehensive planners is their assumption of reality as an abstract totality which gains its comprehensiveness precisely to the degree that it withdraws and abstracts from the reality of everyday life. Law and taxonomic physical planning are then taken as adequate to order that complex reality.

This critique has been of the abstract epistemology which in part defines the comprehensive and incrementalist movements. The abstraction is the result, as is bureaucratic organization itself, of the mystification of the specificity of class inter-
est through the abstract guise of a universalized epistemology, ideology, and practice. The gap between the mystification and the reality of private interests must have been apparent to the framers of such documents as the Standard City Planning Enabling Act of 1928, the FHA, and other instruments of class domination. But the planning profession took their definition in the mystification—planning became the exercise of technical rationality in the service of efficient and "just" allocation of "scarce" resources. The ends of practice were determined by the client and/or the subject of planning, but not the planners. The placing of the locus of value outside of the profession contradicts the planner's claim to be a professional. For is it not the very definition and history of the professional to exist outside (at least to a degree) the claims of market concerns to stand for some notion of human values vis-a-vis the market and the state? The planner's abdication of responsibility for asserting value then places him, to that extent, in the role of pure technocrat. In pretending to deal with problems of resource allocation, planners effectively serve only to legitimate the existing allocation of societal resources. (A crucial indication of this statement is that the absolute gap during American history between the power and wealth of the ruling and dominated classes has been constant or widening, in spite of planners' ministrations and the general increase in absolute wealth over time in this context.) Planning essentially has no content; the allocation is essentially pre-given, based
on class and power relationships. Claiming that the professional task is only to devise alternative means to achieve externally-given goals, planners define themselves in their methodology as purely instrumental. Society is seen as a mechanically-functioning natural order, with the planner keeping the machine in tune, rationally. By reducing basic socio-political concerns to discrete technical problems requiring technical expertise, planning serves to depoliticize basic class conflicts over the allocation of societal resources. The planning profession inevitably serves the interests of the dominant class through the management of resources, since the social goals to which planning responds are determined within the constraints of the existing socio-economic systems. Consequently, they reflect the dominant power of the ruling class. The planners' presupposition of technical rationality and value neutrality is fraudulent—pure ideology masking by its apparent rationality the fundamental irrationality of the interests it serves. As Daniel Moynihan observes,

Urban policy must have as its first goal the transformation of the urban lower class into a stable community...(1) and social peace is the primary objective of social policy. 2

The planning profession is characterized by two pervasive failures:

a) The failure to realize its stated professional ideals of extending its particular forms of rationalism and methodology as societal norms in dealing with the social and physical en-
vironment. This has been a failure of professional effectiveness. The substantial political and economic imperatives which condition and relegate planning as useful only when other market or non-market methods of securing profit and power are not effective. The federal planning mechanisms originated only when private capital could not finance its own operation during the Depression. One study notes that at present, "land is now being allocated through political conflicts rather than by a market to whose operations all groups could consent,"¹ or by any planning process.

b) The profession's failure to realize its function in serving the interests of domination: Given the misreading of its real utility in rationalizing capitalist interests, the profession has represented itself as a practice generally above special interests, working toward the "general good." This self-misrepresentation, a false professional consciousness, (I would claim) is a major barrier to the possibility of planning's contribution towards the creation of a truly public good.

Advocate planning: The professional failures have been realized by the advocate planners. In the last several years, a number of professionals realized that the practice of architecture and planning had been inextricably linked to the values of the dominant interests. A solely aesthetic or technical conception of the professional task was a deceptive myth which legitimated practice which served the interests of class domi-
Such professionals came to see that people are the true subject and source of meaning in their practice. The professional task was redefined as the process and product of forming a physical and social environment which at minimum does not contribute to any form of domination, and at best can contribute to human liberation. This is a project not of forming yet another aesthetic style, intellectual construct, or problem-solving technique, but of finding liberative forms of professional practice in the world of everyday life.

An early form of this new project developed in the mid and late 'sixties as the advocacy movement. Advocacy assumes the pluralist model of democracy, in which the allocation of societal resources is determined not by class domination but in the political market place of competing interest groups. It was assumed that the urban poor had not been able to effectively compete in the decision-making process simply because they were not professionally represented in the realm of power where decisions concerning societal resources are made. Power was seen to be transferable from one interest group to another through democratic means. The "voice of the people" would be heard if articulated in the technical discourse of architectural and planning professionals.

The advocates assumed that the translation of their community clients' interests into the technical and problem-oriented realm of the decision field would engender effective representation in the process of allocation. To the extent
that technique is knowledge, and knowledge is power, technique in the interests of the poor would enable their effective participation in the decision making process with the advocate architect/planner sitting at the table.

Like their professional colleagues downtown, advocates believed that technique and knowledge (the domain of professionals) could activate societal change. While actively participating in the political process (in itself a major conceptual breakthrough for planners and architects), advocates effectively practiced within the same constraints of technical rationality which define the profession as a whole. The clients may have been new to the profession, but professional practice was essentially the same. As it turned out, the advocates were unsuccessful in initiating programs themselves. The best they and their community clients could do was to resist the initiatives of the dominant interests. The advocacy movement was important, however, in providing a field of action and a model of meaning for architects and planners (as well as their community clients) who recognized the interest base of their practice and thus chose sides and acted with and for their clients in the public world.

Inherent in the notion of professional advocacy is the participation of the poor in the determination and articulation of their own interests; a community acting for itself. Citizen participation developed not only as a political process within the constraints posed by the prevailing ideology of
ethnic and interest group politics, but was also encouraged as a form of immediate user participation in the process of planning and design. The articulation of user/community needs would enable the planners and designers to be more sensitive to community requirements. In practice, however, the professionals were faced with an enormous conceptual and cultural gap in their confrontation with poverty. Their task required that the community's all-encompassing assertion of poverty and the demand for a comprehensive resolution of that condition be reduced to discrete and manageable problem-sets within a concomitant array of alternative technical solutions. Hence, the professionals emphasized the primacy of participatory methods which are designed to be highly goal-oriented towards problem-solving, set within the professionals' stringent time limits and work schedule.

These techniques involve the assumption that community needs can be meaningfully disaggregated to discrete alternative preferences defined as specific problems and their solutions. As such, participation is an effective method of co-optation. At one level, community members are involved in working for their own interests, leading perhaps to a local environment more responsive to their needs and life styles. Yet on the more fundamental level, their participation is an acceptance of the problem definition and set of resources determined by the dominant interests in society. Community members, through participation, are thus caught in an ambiguous and contradic-
tory situation. Their involvement creates hopes and diverts fundamental questioning on the part of the poor of the structural determinants of their societal position. As Herbert Gans said, the issue is to "restructure the decision-making apparatus so that citizen participation can be increased without leading to a total breakdown in decision-making." Citizen participation serves to stabilize potentially dissident social classes by involving them in "the political process" and by incorporating them in an apparent effort to make the planning and design process more responsive to their needs. Planners and architects participate in this cooptation by appropriating and reducing the enormous needs of the urban poor to the realm of technical problem-solving and localized instrumental action. While the professionals' intent was to introduce the poor into the realm of political decision-making in the allocation of societal resources, they have in fact often served to depoliticize real class conflict and social action.

Conclusion: Advocacy was perhaps the only professional movement to take seriously in a non-paternalistic way the project of redistributing opportunity and resources to the dominated classes. The advocates realized that this redistribution would never occur as a gift, but must be achieved through political action in which the dominated poor must act to achieve their own ends (this in distinction to "social policy" planning which is a new form of paternalism and social control). But the advocates' implicit critique of obvious inequalities
suffered by the poor did not extend to a critique of the structural domination which generated the inequality. Only through such misunderstanding could political action be seen as the vehicle to substantial resource redistribution. The advocacy movement while having a liberative intent perpetuated the failures of the earlier professional movements to realize the interests they served. A critical understanding of the professionals' role continues to be the precondition of the resolution of their failures.

Postscript: Liberal society as a total alienation: Both in conclusion of the present section on the liberal social order and in anticipation of current forms of alienation described in the next section on the Post-Liberal social order, a schema of liberal society as a total alienation follows. Alienation is defined in its general form as the separation of the individual subject (whether it be the person, class, or community) from control over the conditions which affect and determine its existence. Alienation in liberal society includes the following general forms, which will be presented in terms of the problems of order, method, self, and architecture and planning.

THE PROBLEM OF ORDER

1) The alienation of the individual subject from control over the fundamental institutions which govern its life.

2) The alienation of the individual subject from control over the ownership conditions, process and product of its labor
3) The alienation of the individual subject from the determination of the distribution of its income.

4) The alienation of the individual subject from ownership and control of the forces of production.

5) The alienation of the individual subject from a morally legitimated community, through the definition of private interests rather than any form of collective concordance as the basis of the social order. As such there is no basis for community under capitalism.

6) The alienation of the individual subject from control over the substantive political mechanisms which govern its life (depoliticization).

THE PROBLEM OF METHOD

7) The alienation of the individual subject from a critical, non-instrumental knowledge and consciousness and therefore the possibility of a moral choice over the contents of its consciousness and definition of the self, and forms of existence.

8) The alienation of the individual subject (including the professional, scientific and educational practitioners of method) from the constitution of a non-fragmented totalistic knowledge, theory, and environment.

THE PROBLEM OF SELF

9) The alienation of the individual subject from the possibility of the realization of the mutually-necessary relation between self and community, therefore defining the alienated
self as "real" and "natural".

An individual is alienated from himself or herself in the strict sense that the criteria according to which individual capacities are developed derive from patterns of social activity in contexts (work, community, environment) whose structure and development in turn do not reflect the aggregation of individual preferences, and hence do not reflect the individual's development needs. Rather, these criteria are based on profitability and maintenance of capitalist control. Since culture is the generalized embodiment of daily life—i.e., is the concrete set of values, norms, ideas and ideologies validated through social activity—culture is itself alienated in capitalist society.

THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING

10) The alienation of the individual subject from a non-exploited natural/ecological environment encountered as a value in itself to be respected and preserved.

11) The alienation of the individual subject from the land and structures of the humanly-constructed world seen as the matrix and facilitator of a communal, non-alienated life.

12) The alienation of the individual subject from a architectural and planning consciousness, theory, and practice towards the creation of a non-alienated environment.

These particular alienations encompass the whole of human and natural reality: work, community, the self, environment. To the extent that the liberal social order is governed by capitalist institutions, liberal society is a total alienation.
THE POST-LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER

Introduction: The liberal social orders of the Western world (not to mention the traditional and revolutionary societies, such as Japan or Red China) have failed to overcome the internal contradictions of the structure of liberalism and capitalism which preclude a stable resolution of the problems of social order, method and self. Science and capitalist imperatives are the dominant ideals as well as actuality of liberal society. But they have failed to create (in theory and practice) a meaningful legitimation of the liberal distribution of power, a coherent map of social reality, or a basis for moral decision and action.

The contradictions of the liberal order are generating the preconditions if not the actuality of (for want of a better term) a "post-liberal" social order. The nature of this emerging order will be dependent of the dominance of one of two principles currently operating now within liberal society: either an extension of the ideal of democracy (and human rights) to be a true political/moral basis of a communal society or the extension of the reality of liberal instrumentality to create an even more repressive and centralized domination. Whether community or domination prevails is perhaps the deepest issue of our time. "The moment of greatest hope is also the moment of greatest fear. There is everything to gain, and everything to lose."2

The following discussion of the post-liberal social order
order first presents the unresolved liberal contradictions, and then argues that the formation of a communal non-dominating society is necessary for a stable resolution of the problems of order, self, method, and architecture and planning.

THE PROBLEM OF ORDER

Two factors are predominant in the failure of the liberal order: 1) the inability of capitalist production to infinitely expand, and 2) the failure of liberal premises of social order to generate legitimated authority and value.

1) The limits of capitalist production: The "higher standard of living" promised through capitalist production could never be achieved by the entire population. If benefits were to be distributed equally, within the United States, it was materially impossible to put a Cadillac in every garage. Now it is increasingly difficult even to put a chicken in every pot. The system is being strained not only through population growth but through the national and international "revolution of rising expectations" causing a demand for an equitable and international redistribution of resources now hoarded by the few. Increased national and international demand for food and commodities is an important factor in the current economic and political havoc of rising worldwide inflation and consequent political instability. The "prosperity" and commodity consumption which was the sole legitimation of capitalism is now severely threatened.

Corollary to the limits of commodity production is the
ecological limit being reached through the exploitation and pollution of nature, such factors as the limitation and exhaustion of natural resources, the physical poisoning of the environment, the approaching limit of atmospheric heat and other natural reactions to industrialization may pose the first and most absolute limit on industrial expansion and commodity production (which is the basis of capitalism).

2) **The failure of liberalism to generate legitimated authority and value:** There can be no basis in a society of individual ends and non-consensual class domination for a socially legitimated authority for several reasons: a) the conflict of role and class; b) the contradictions of the bureaucracy; and c) the inability of individual interests to be the basis of a social whole.

a) **The conflict of role and class**: The liberal attempt to substitute the principle of meritocratically-allocated role for the domination of the aristocratic principle of class leaves role and class still in conflict.

b) **Contradictions of the bureaucracy**: The allocation of power in liberalism is not through an informal community of shared values but through the impersonal bureaucratic administration of a social order unified by abstract law. While the bureaucracy was established (in part) to, through its abstract neutrality, escape the personal domination of the ruler, it has become another form of domination whose abstractness conceals the concrete interests it serves.
The inability of individual interests to be the basis of a social order: Liberal society has further failed in its inability to establish a morally-legitimated social order. In a society of individual interests unified only by class/role domination and abstract law, there can be no basis for consensually legitimated moral order or ends. There is then a great moral ambiguity reflected in the current social and individual pathologies (crime, mental disease, drugs, anomie, privatism, militarism, etc.). The ends of society are reduced to individual "needs" which are created and recognized only to the extent that they can be fulfilled by commodity production. Thus "capitalism does not satisfy many needs. This should be obvious from the fantastic, overwhelming subjectively-felt need-deprivation of the mass of Americans."\(^1\)

The liberal pathologies and failure to create a consensual social order results in a continuing fragmentation of society, self, nature and environment. The conflict of class and role can never be resolved, for both forms of organization involve the class domination. The bureaucracy in itself cannot overcome its internal conflict between impersonally administered authority, and particularized interests. A moral social order cannot derive from society as the collection of individual or particularized interests.

The social order as a community is a necessary response to these conflicts.\(^2\) Class and role as principles of social
order take the human being as fragmented, engaged in the dialectic of domination and submission. The only resolution of the conflict is the ideal of community, in which each human being is recognized as a whole person, not the occupant of a role or class but a being whose right to fulfillment is not subordinated to the right to gain. This recognition is made into the fundamental principle of the communal social order. Self and society, fact and value, are then reintegrated. Societal domination is not to be feared, and the dialectic of autonomy and communality is resolved—the community committed to the recognition of both the need for autonomy and the constitution of the self through social relations. In this definition of community, the theory of society is based on the theory of the self as a seeking for the unity of the resolution of the needs of autonomy and community.

Community is further a resolution to the inability of the capitalist process to generate ends for moral action and a moral social legitimacy. When commodity production and profit is elevated to dominate all other social processes, the only value and end can be the optimizing of production itself—yet production is a means with no inherent ends, and the society's ends collapse to the instrumental concern for means. But production, when integrated within a communal commitment to human and thus social wholeness, becomes an instrument of human ends which are then not impelled to be servants of private or class profit. Community means then the recovery of
self, society, labor and its products, environment, nature, from their alienation in liberal society. Wo/men are free then to determine their needs and their nature independent of the artificial definitions and imperatives of class domination. The determination of societal ends is once more a social process wrested from the imperatives of class domination--the 'public realm' is restored. The communal social structure is not a given but a continual public determination of ends and values through social interaction and the democratic process. In this process of self-determination, people recreate their society, their mode of consciousness and knowledge, their selves and their environment. In spite of the limits on capitalist expansion, monopoly capital is increasingly concentrating its power in linkage to a centralizing and depoliticized state. Capital and state planning mechanisms are increasingly effective in making fundamental political, military, economic and social decisions independent of popular control. But new forms of community and personal consciousness are emerging as reactions and alternatives to the irresolvable conflicts of liberalism. In the United States, these include various religious and secular intentional communities, the growing consciousness of racial, ethnic, sexual and class-based minorities, social revolutionaries and the counterculture. Internationally, emerging third and fourth world nations are claiming a share of world resources and political independence which is straining present power and resource allocation.
Such communist nations as China, Cuba, and Yugoslavia are developing social forms in which there is at least the structural potential of communal and democratic determination over societal means and ends. Important for this discussion is not the great differences between these examples, but their common existence as alternatives to the forms of domination and fragmentation in Western societies.

THE PROBLEM OF SELF

Community is the necessary precondition for resolving the problem of the self. In liberal society, the self can react only with alienation or resignation to a social order which denies the whole self's need for both autonomy and community. Community gone, the self becomes an alienated and instrumental ego, exacerbated by the experience of the social world as a domination rather than as a necessary sphere of the self. A number of social critics (notably the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School—Marcuse, Horkheimer, Habermas) note the capitalist impact on the very formation of the psyche. Human beings are educated, virtually from birth, to define themselves as alienated and instrumental functionaries of a production/consumption commodity society. The self then splits into its socially acceptable and socially repressed parts, reproducing in the psyche the alienation of the liberal social order.

The dominant consciousness in liberal society is of the self as instrumental, alienated, fearful of social domination, and distorted in the everyday life of work and social inter-
action. But in a communal order, society represents not domination but the necessary social complement of autonomy. The antagonism in liberalism between the fear of isolation and fear of domination is reduced to its existential minimum. There is but one frightening alternative to the reconstitution of the whole self in a community of mutual recognition as whole beings: the further fragmentation, alienation and instrumental formation of the self. The nature of the liberal self is not basically a psychological problem for the unity of the self is achieved only in relation to a unified society. As the alienated self derives from the normal operation of the capitalist/liberal institutions, the resolution of the problem of the self is ultimately a political act aimed at transforming capitalist institutions.

THE PROBLEM OF METHOD

The problem of order and self are intimately connected with the problem of method, the way of knowing social and personal reality. Throughout the thesis, dominant method has been shown to reflect and serve the interests of the dominant class. If this method forms the content of the dominant consciousness, it is then difficult or impossible within its terms to conceive of an alternative to the given social order. As Positivist epistemology is now the dominant method, social consciousness reflects its procedures. Positivist epistemology is capable of dealing with only logical (rationalist) or causal (historicist) relations. Both logics are relations of sequence—
the way one element acts on or causes another through time. The logics are instrumental rationalities, dealing with the choice of the most efficient means to a pregiven and unreflected end.

Positivism's instrumental rationality or rationality of means reverses the traditional philosophic of value rationality or the reasoning without ends as the dominant intellectual project of the time. Positivism then does not possess the methodological tools of value rationality. Instrumental rationality is then the epistemology of class domination.

An unalienated communal society requires not an instrumental but a value rationality, a way of knowing which can comprehend the specific qualities of self and community, whose truth is as a community of meaning, the unity of subjective intention and objective social realization, fact and value, consciousness and actuality, autonomy and community. The psychic and methodological conflict between subjectivity and objectivity so characteristic of liberal society is resolved only to the extent that observer and participant both share a common experience and interpretive knowledge—a situation attainable only in a communal society. The resolution of the problem of method then is inseparable from the creation of a communal society where shared experiences and meanings are possible. The method of such a society must be able to comprehend a social order as a totality rather than a sequence, a simultaneity of interrelated and evolving human beings and
meanings—not a set of logical categories abstracted from the whole and then reordered through a series of linear relationships. Human subject cannot be analytically separated from object, for meaning and experience has a double reference in being equally real to both subject and observer—both share in a common meaning. Only in the extreme Positivist separation of fact and value could an instrumental rationality operate on "fact" independent of its meaning in the social totality and thereby define knowledge as "objective" and "value-free".

The epistemology of a communal social order must be based not only on a theory of society as a totality of interrelated meanings but on a dialectical materialist theory of history. Only on a materialist basis can human beings regain their status as the subject of history, which occurs not through the evolution of an ideal (idealist/rationalist) or historically-grounded (Hegelian/biological evolutionist) universal rationality or biological mechanism, but through the conflict of particular class interests. The recognition of the materialist basis of society and history restores knowledge to its origin in history and social relations.

The problem of method, of the human knowledge of human reality, is crucial to the realization of self, communal society and a liberative architecture and planning. If method is not based on a theory of the self as a necessary unity between autonomy and community, then the self is condemned to its present "normal" alienation. If method is not based on the distinction between natural and a human reality which demands a
unique methodological recognition of human meaning and consciousness, then wo/men are condemned to see themselves and be seen as instruments of abstract capitalist imperatives. The ideal of the unity of meaning is then collapsed into the reality of domination. If method is not based on a dialectical materialist theory of history as based on social transformation through the conflict of class interests, then reality is seen Positivistically as essential ahistoric, eternal, given, and unchangeable. Wo/men are condemned to the present. If method takes the built environment as a collection of aesthetic or functional objects and relationships, the meaning of the environment as a concretization of social relations and interests is lost. The practitioners of architecture and planning are then condemned to perpetuate the visual/functional culture which only serves to perpetuate class domination.

The method, the mode of knowledge which is based on the requirements of a communal society is dialectical materialism. Its structure and meaning as a knowledge of specifically human reality, as well as a knowledge for architecture and planning within the human community, will be explored in the following section.

THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING

The architectural and planning professions in liberal society have been shown to be in a crisis of their theory and practice. This crisis is born of three failures: the failure to rationalize and unify a fragmented environment; the fail-
ure to ally with and become an element of dominant political/economic power; and the failure of architectural and planning theory and practice to comprehend its role and meaning in supporting class domination.

If the professions continue to be unaware of the basis of their crises, they will become further implicated in the unthinking and technocratic instrumentalism which abdicates the traditional definition of the professional as committed to human values independent of the interests of class domination (the original professions were law, medicine and theology).

Alternately, the professionals must realize that their power to rationalize the environment and realize the traditional commitment to human welfare depends first on critical self-reflection and action on a professional and personal level and then the existence of a social order committed to the dominance of human needs. As this social order does not now exist, the professionals must participate in its creation. They must further critique the instrumental and visual rationality (the dominant epistemologies of current practice) which in part prevent the realization of the social origin and meaning of architectural and planning practice and products. Only when engaged in such critical reflection and action intended towards a transformed social order can the professions become a truly social practice serving human needs. This practice derives its meaning as an expression of an emerging consensual social unity. Specific elements of the professional liberative project will
be discussed in the Conclusion Section.

Conclusion: a summary of the argument for a communal society: The preceding study of liberal society leads to the conclusion that the crises of the liberal resolutions of the problems of order, self, method and architecture and planning cannot be resolved within the liberal social order, but only through the creation of a communal society. This society is based on a theory of the realized self as the necessary unity of subjectivity and objectivity, autonomy and community. The unity of subjective intention and objective realization is meaning. Community is defined as a unity of individual meanings grounded in shared definitions and common determination of the nature of the major elements of social existence, possible only in a society free of class domination.

THE PROBLEM OF ORDER: The institutions and structure of the social order are collectively and freely determined, independent of class domination, in the service of human needs and freedom rather than of capitalist imperatives. Collectively determined, the society is necessarily the product of a collective meaning.

THE PROBLEM OF SELF: The self is realized only as a unity of autonomy and community. This unity is the precondition of a meaningful existence, and is predicated on the existence of common meaning on which community is based.

THE PROBLEM OF METHOD: The form of knowing for a social order of unified selves is methodologically and intentionally committed to specifically human reality as the seeking for meaning, the unification of subjectivity with a non-dominating objectivity. The method then comprehends subject and object, intention and realization as equally real and meaningful in defining reality. There is no "objectivity" independent of human intention and meaning.
THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING: The professional theories and practice derive not from their definition as an instrument of capitalist intentions, or in alienation from them. Rather, they derive from the common meanings of the communal society.

The problems of order, self, method, and architecture and planning are then interdependent and inseparable: the resolution of one is impossible without the resolution of all. The social order itself cannot be unalienated without being composed of whole selves for which the communal society is a precondition. The unity of self and society is in turn inseparable from being realized through consciousness and the method of knowing. Finally, architecture and planning can realize an unalienated/unfragmented environment only when continual fragmentation is not generated by an alienated society.
Section III:

TOWARDS A CRITICAL EPistemology AND PRACTICE FOR ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING

CRITIQUE OF POSITIVIST EPistemology

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AS A CRITIQUE OF POSITIVISM AND CAPITALIST DOMINATION

TOWARDS A CRITICAL EPistemology AND PRACTICE FOR ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
Introduction: In light of the argument for the necessity of a communal society, a critical knowledge (termed dialectical materialism) is a condition of the resolution of the present contradictions of the liberal resolution of the problems of order, self, method, and architecture and planning. Unreflective practice inevitably serves the ruling class and contains the seeds of its own destruction. Knowledge and the act of knowing will alone not change the social order, but is an essential component of praxis.¹

In the following sections, a more formal epistemological grounding than has so far been presented will be laid for a critical architectural and planning theory and praxis. A presentation and critique of Positivist epistemological theory will show the necessity for a dialectical critical theory to resolve Positivism's "crisis of reason". This theory, dialectical materialism, will then be presented. Finally, the theory will be extended as the basis of a critical epistemology specific to architectural and planning knowledge and practice.
CRITIQUE OF POSITIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY

Introduction: The Positivism of the social sciences, the epistemological strain which underlies much current "rational" planning and architectural problem-solving efforts, emerged from both earlier scientific epistemology and the socio-political conditions following the French Revolution. The intimate connections between Positivism's formal assumptions and its value-laden origin and social function must be shown, in view of the Positivist's claim that their methods are "objective", if not value-free.

This section then sketches the historic origin of Positivism, presents its formal epistemological rules, and then evaluates these rules in terms of their meaning in supporting class domination. The contradictions within the Positivist programme are then shown to underlie the Western crisis of reason as well as contribute to the failure of recent social action based on Positivist logic. A dialectical materialist critique is then claimed to be necessary as a resolution to the epistemological problems of Positivism, as well as a necessary component of action aimed at ending class domination.

(Positivism) resonated an emerging structure of collective sentiments, in which the world was seen to need new mappings because the moral commitment to the traditional social maps had been weakened, while the prestige of science was growing. Positivism was a response to the moral uncertainty and moral exhaustion of the Restoration, the restoration of the Bourbon king Louis XVIII after Napoleon's defeat. It sought to escape from the Restoration stalemate between the nobility and the middle class. Against the clash of
right against right, Positivism affirmed the propriety of an amoral response to the social world: it stressed the value of knowledge about society and universalized this moral escape by transforming its amoral method for making social maps into a moral rule. 1

The positivists rose "above" the struggle of both the bourgeois and the nobility, while being closer to a middle-class utilitarianism.

(But) to the degree that the middle class withheld active support, the Positivists had little choice but to be 'above the struggle.' Not wishing and not forced to choose among alternatives, what Positivism made sacred, therefore, was not the map itself but the rules for making it, a methodology. In this distinctive way, Positivism was a social movement that uniquely stressed the possibility of living in the world without a map with the use only of a method and the sheer information it produced. 2

The term "Positivism" had the twofold meaning that men should base their map-making on the scientific methods, but at the same time should advocate a specific form of society. This imperative was articulated in the sociological Positivism of Comte as a religion of humanity, but this "map" did not win acceptance. The Comtian faction then gave up the effort and "became increasingly concerned with the methodology of map-making rather than the map to be made. In relation to the Positivist's own aspirations, modern 'value free'... (epistemology and methodology) is the anomic adaptation of Sociological Positivism to political failure in which pure knowledge or the methodology of map-making tends to become an end in itself." 3

The Positivist apoliticism lies then in the failure of the middle class politics to develop a coherent image of the
new social order. Positivism also reflects the human and professional alienation from society. "Objectivity is the compensation men offer themselves when their capacity to love has been crippled...On this level, such objectivity is not neutrality, but alienation from self and society; it is an alienation from a society experienced as a hurtful and unlovable thing."¹

The rules of Positivism—a critique: Divorced from the project of social reconstruction, Positivism became a collection of rules and evaluative criteria for determining what statements about the world constitute valid knowledge. By these "neutral," "objective" and contentless criteria, traditional social theory had no scientific status as knowledge, for that theory was based on a value rationality which assumed a theory of human nature and the good.

Positivism is formally expressed in the following four rules:

1) **The rule of phenomenalism.** There is no difference between essence and appearance.

2) **The rule of nominalism.** It cannot be assumed that any insight formulated in general terms can have any real referents other than individual concrete objects. Scientific abstractions, such as the notion of a triangle which itself is an ideal concept, ultimately refer back to empirical reality.

3) **The rule that value judgments and normative statements have no cognitive value.** The only grounds for our making value judgments are our own arbitrary choices.
4) The rule of the unity of the scientific method. The methods for acquiring valid knowledge are essentially the same in all spheres of reality. Thus the method of natural science is the only valid method for knowledge in the human social sciences.

Any metaphysical (extra-empirical) bases for the justification of truth or power were eliminated by rules one and two which countered the sacred and secular aristocrats' metaphysical claim to political authority with the demands for a "factual," "objective," and "scientific" knowledge. Thus the bourgeois used the Positivist epistemological critique of metaphysics to validate its own claims to power.

Further, the claim that value judgments and normative statements have no cognitive value divorced knowledge (and the professionals who acquire and use that knowledge) from politics and morality, the human world. Valid knowledge was rather claimed to originate in another sphere. In Karl Popper's formulation, there are three spheres of reality: 1) the ordinary world of tables and chairs; 2) the world of the consciousness of these ordinary things; 3) the world of objective knowledge existing independently of human consciousness. For Popper, and by extension for the Positivists, valid scientific knowledge lies only in the third abstract world. But this world is apprehended through the application of a natural-science methodology in which the unique human attributes, consciousness, subjectivity, and intentionality are vitiated; the rule of the
unity of scientific method defines natural science knowledge as the epistemological basis of knowing human as well as natural-science reality. Then, as natural science was institutionalized by the bourgeois in an effort to control and dominate nature, the human sciences were used to dominate wo/men. Positivism became the basis of the dominant modern social sciences—political science, economics, sociology, behavioral and psychological psychology, as well as instrumental architectural and planning practice.¹

Positivism can now be understood as the epistemological correlate of capitalist social relations which treat unique human qualities as of marginal value at best. The value of wo/men in capitalist society is calculated in their utility as producers and consumers—an objective and subjective definition of human worth which to be made a social/psychic reality requires class domination. Therefore human beings are to be treated as objects of the natural world, alienated from their subjectivity and having only those needs which can be met by the imperatives of capitalist production. This view, in epistemological and social terms, is a profound abstraction and destruction of the self which defines as the only legitimated reality only what capitalism values of the natural, human and social reality.² Human labor and consumption become the abstracted reality of the person; profit and social control become the abstracted reality of the social order; exchange value becomes the abstracted quality of the natural and built
environment; a nervous system—environment interaction becomes through a biological reduction the abstracted relation of the human whole to the natural social and built world. The Positivist epistemology, as an abstraction from the human and natural totality, is then perfectly suited to the understanding and instrumental manipulation of human beings valued as abstractions.

This has been a harsh evaluation of Positivism, one taking literally its anti-metaphysical bias and its notions of what can be understood about human beings. Perhaps the most radical Positivist formulation was Wittgenstein's, who said that "of that which we cannot speak (in logical terms) we must be silent," thereby denying as valid knowledge the whole range of human meanings and intentions which cannot take a logical form.

This is not to deny that the Positivists themselves have not in some cases denied the universality of their methods, allowing the meaning of human phenomenon without requiring that they must assume a form testable as propositions for their truth or falsity. Yet in the radical version which predominates under capitalism,

(Positivism) has an entirely different cultural meaning. It is an attempt to consolidate science as a self-sufficient activity, which exhausts all the possible ways of appropriating the world intellectually. ... the realities of the world—which can, of course, be interpreted by natural science, but which are in addition an object of man's 'existential curiosity', a source of fear or disquiet, an occasion for commitment or rejection—if they are to be encompassed by reflection and expressed in words can be reduced to their empirical properties. Suffering, death, ideological conflict, social clashes, antithetical values of any kind—are all declared out of bounds, matters we can only be silent about, in obedience to the principle
of verifiability. Positivism so understood is an act of escape from commitments, an escape masked as a definition of knowledge...Positivism in this sense is the escapist's design for living, a life voluntarily cut off from participation in anything that cannot be correctly formulated. 1

Positivism as a valid knowledge of the totality becomes the totalizing reason of capitalism. It penetrates both instrumental and intersubjective spheres as the only rational methodological principle and accounting of reality.2 Progress, process and value are defined as quantitative (better housing, less crime, more convenient transportation) while the qualitative meanings (housing, crime, transportation as aspects of a historically-contingent, interest-bound totality) go unquestioned.

The crisis of Positivist epistemology: The contradictions within Positivism's claim to objective knowledge reflect the crisis of Western knowledge itself3 which was initiated with the aristocratic/bourgeois destruction of the certainty of medieval transcendental metaphysics. Given the inadmissibility of all human belief and experience that is not verifiable through natural scientific methodology, all that is specifically human was reduced to an animal and biological level. "The world of moral values collapses along with the alleged eternity, 'objectivity,' or autonomy of aesthetic values."4 But even in its Positivist reduction, scientific truth could not assume a transcendental, absolute status--a failure of a Positivist ideal which precipitated a crisis of modern know-
ledge's claim to an absolute objective knowledge. The central contradiction in Positivism's claim to objectivity is that in fact Positivism is a normative attitude, constituted by human beings who set rules on what is admissible as "knowledge," "science," "cognition," and "information." These norms are not "objectively" grounded in anything but cultural values.

This claim is justified in an analysis of the act of induction. Induction from empirical data was the original basis of the scientific method, starting with Francis Bacon. The scientist collected data, found a pattern, hypothesized a law, and tried to confirm that law empirically. But hypotheses could never be conclusively verified, for the one single exception always invalidates the law. Karl Popper thus reformulated the meaning of verification: a law or hypothesis could never be verified, but it could be shown not to have been falsified.

Yet this formulation does not solve the problem of the truth value of scientific statements. As Hume stated the issue, the logical problem of induction is whether one can be justified in reasoning from instances of which one has experiences to instances of which one has no experience. In Hume's terms, there is no absolute grounding, but only a belief which justifies the induction.

Contemporary responses to the problem of induction have, in asserting the "conventional" nature of scientific hypotheses, if anything, weakened the absolute grounding of truth. The
Conventionalists state that currently valid modes of scientific knowledge are held as a matter of convention. For Thomas Kuhn, a "normal science" or paradigm dominates scientific practice in a given period. The paradigm is replaced only when sufficient disproving evidence accumulates to corrode and overcome its defenses.

Therefore, scientific truth in the views of some leading contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of science does not have an absolute grounding. Truth has been shown to be able to be determined only through the negative affirmation of falsification, within a paradigm which is not "objective" but a consensual and cultural construction by human beings and as such subject to change. While the distinction was made earlier in this thesis between the human and natural sciences, the "objectivity" of the natural sciences themselves has been shown to be a human construction. The crisis of Western reason, in its inability to find a grounding for truth independent of its reality as a human construction, is not resolved by classical Positivism or any of its sophisticated successors.

The epistemological failure of Positivism was paralleled by the failures of its applications as instrumental rationality. Ironically, Positivism has been used to deal with the very negative effects which in part derive from its use in both military and social control in the first place. The early American defeats in Viet Nam were dealt with by McNamara's systems reorganization and the application of more advanced technology.
As the basis of social control, instrumental social science was the epistemological base of Federal legislation (particularly in the 1960's) concerning urban renewal, housing, education, social services, civil rights, economic development and other areas. These programs were intended in large part to contain and stabilize the reaction to the normal operation of capitalist institutions which threatened the existing balance of class power and hegemony. The degree of these programs' failure is also the failure of their epistemological base of instrumental rationality which, in its lack of reflective capacity, masks and can not deal with human meaning and intention. This failure is also experienced in the current crises of a number of the social-science related fields including sociology, political science, economics, psychology, and architecture and planning. These crises are symptomatic of the crisis of Western reason itself and point to the need of severely questioning the adequacy of Positivism or instrumental rationality as a basis for knowledge and action.

As a people we seem to be involved in a pathological syndrome which reacts with new technical levers to moral and social unrest (law and order); with violence to any opposition (national security); and with a repressive authoritarianism to open up communication about the ends, ideals or goals of our civilization... We conceal this reality from ourselves by generating scientific rationalizations that simply define the normative issues as beside the point and reorganize for a more effective instrumental control of the situation. We avoid a public re-examination of the standards for political judgment... The American political, economic and military institutions, and now the scientific (and I would add archi-
tecture and planning) community have been integrated into this societal avoidance pattern. The naive scientism of our technocratic guidance system appears to be the emergent cultural element that promotes and conceals this delusory behaviour. We are wedded to an instrumental concept of reason, whose one-sidedness blocks our capacity to recognize the sociocultural significance of our acts and lowers our ability to act intelligently in novel situations.

The necessity of a dialectical materialist critique: Positivists protest the meaningless of metaphysical aspiration and certainty derived from direct experience. Yet men have always sought a metaphysical certainty, an autonomous realm of reason, value and meaning independent of animal needs and the empirically given. If this aspiration is not dismissed as meaningless, a realm of intention and knowledge must be admitted which derives from the uniquely human. This human knowledge of intention and meaning, a value rationality, must be granted a consensually-legitimated status and reality in the world which scientific knowledge now enjoys. If wo/men cannot know themselves as unique and potentially whole human beings, they are condemned to know themselves through Positivism (whether as a formal logic or as the dominant consciousness of everyday life) as instruments of some abstract imperative as meaningless as it is compelling. This situation, at the core of liberal reality, is a severe destruction of the entire human world of intersubjectivity and the full range of cultural mediations between self and society of language, symbolism, environment, and a communal institutional framework. The increasing scale of capitalist domination has overrun the traditional extent of
technical instrumentalism. In Habermas' formulation, there have always been two societal systems, "purposive-rational action" and "intersubjective communication." Purposive-rational action is the sphere of work, of instrumental goal-oriented action, of domination over nature. Intersubjective communication is everyday life, culture, the constitution of the self through interaction with others. While these two social "action-systems" have characterized every culture, only under capitalism has the traditional dominance of intersubjective communication been reversed, the goals and self-representation of technical rationality becoming the content and consciousness of intersubjectivity. (This formulation parallels the earlier discussion on the emergence of economics to dominate all other social systems in the liberal social order.)

The dominance and failures of instrumental knowledge and the liberal society makes a critique of Positivist rationality, especially its use in architectural and planning theory and practice, urgent at the present. The "truth" of Positivist social theory seems less and less to fit the reality the theory claims to define. The critique of instrumental knowledge is undertaken not only as an epistemological project, for the Positivist rejection of the validity of specifically human knowledge reflects the same rejection in the social and personal consciousness and action of capitalist society. The restoration of the uniquely human as a valid epistemological base requires the critique and consequent transformation of the con-
sciousness, institutional structure and action of the liberal social order. The critique of epistemology then is the critique of the social order and the interests it serves; the transformation of knowledge and consciousness is inevitably a political act.

The critical knowledge of human reality is dialectical materialism, which will be presented in the following section.
Introduction: Capitalism and its Positivist epistemology are predominantly abstractions and therefore alienations of human reality and needs. Dialectics above all is a mode of knowing which restores that alienated human intention, needs, and action as the subject of knowledge and history. The history of dialectical materialism as a critique of domination will be followed by a discussion of its formal characteristics and meaning as the epistemology of a dealienated communal society.

As an orientation, Lenin is quoted on dialectics as concrete knowledge:

...the dialectical method—in contradistinction to the metaphysical (Positivist or formal logic) method—is nothing more or less than the scientific method in sociology, which consists in regarding society as a living organism in a constant state of development (and not as something mechanically concatenated and therefore permitting any arbitrary combination of individual social elements), the study of which requires an objective analysis of the relations of production that constitute the given social formation and an investigation of its laws of functioning and development.

...Formal logic...takes formal definitions, and is guided exclusively by what is most customary, or most often noted...we get an eclectic definition which points to various sides of the object and nothing more. Dialectic logic demands that we go further. In the first place, in order really to know an object we must embrace, study, all its sides, all its connections and 'mediations'. We shall never achieve this completely, but the demand for all-sidedness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity. Secondly, dialectical logic demands that we take an object in its development, its 'self-movement',...in its changes. ...Thirdly, the whole of human experience should enter the full 'definition' of an object as a criterion of the truth and as a
practical index of the object's connection with what man requires. Fourthly, dialectical logic teaches that 'there is no abstract truth, truth is always concrete.'

The concern with epistemology in this thesis has been predominantly as it reflects and affects social relations. As Positivism was presented as the mode of knowledge of capitalist domination, this discussion of dialectical materialism will emphasize its meaning as a critique of capitalism in the name of human freedom from class domination.

Dialectic materialism was developed by Marx and Engels as a necessary part of their intention to understand and transform capitalism. The project of knowledge and its methodological formalization in dialectical materialism they saw not as an abstract end in itself, but as a necessary moment in revolutionary praxis, the project of transforming capitalism into a society of human freedom. Unlike Positivism, dialectical materialism openly acknowledges its allegiance to particular interests in uniting knowledge with action in the world, theory and practice, fact and value as mutually necessary components for realizing a liberated society. Knowledge was not taken as a neutral and abstract, but as an intentional activity of human beings, whether for domination or for liberation. Truth then could not be determined when abstracted from human intention and action, nor was there truth in the Positivist's ahistorical view of the world as a collection of timeless static categories. Rather, reality was seen as constantly in transformation through...
human practice. Thus,

The question whether human thinking can reach objective truth is not a question of theory but a practical question. In practice, man must prove the truth, that is, actuality and power, this-sidedness of his thinking. The dispute about the actuality or non-actuality of thinking—thinking isolated from practice—is a purely scholastic question.

-Marx: Theses on Feuerbach #2

For dialectical materialism, philosophy ended with Hegel, who linked the ancient ideal of human freedom with the modern discovery that women evolved through historical process. There was nothing more to do but to act in the world to realize that freedom.

The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, to change it...(Theses #11) (to a) human society or socialized humanity. (Theses #10).

Philosophy became in dialectical materialism a theory of social praxis towards liberation. Theory was seen as a necessary guide to action for two reasons. First, the origin, developmental processes, and potential futures of the society must be understood in order to act. Secondly, theory is necessary to pierce through the deep mystifications of the individual and social consciousnesses of capitalist society.

When men (in bourgeois society, subject to the dominant consciousness and Positivist epistemology) lack a critical understanding of their reality, apprehending it in fragments which they do not perceive as interacting constituent elements of the whole, they cannot truly know that reality. To truly know it, they would have to reverse their starting point. They would need to have a total vision of the context in order subsequently to separate and isolate its constituent elements and by means of this analysis achieve a clearer perception of the whole...(which
men now) perceive as dense, impenetrable and enveloping. (Men) must decode a coded concrete situation. 1

The historic development of reason as a critique of domination: The intent of the critique of domination is as old as the Western concept of reason, deriving from the perception that apparent, empirical appearance of the everyday world masks the reality beneath. Reason in classical Greek philosophy is the seeing of the invisible in the visible, the essential in the appearance. The revelation of truth requires a reflective negation of the appearance of reality. "Thinking is, indeed, essentially the negation of that which is immediately before us."2 The dwellers of Plato's cave could turn towards the sun only after realizing, through an act of negative reasoning, that the shadows they took for reality were a mystification due to the domination of conventional perception. Reason then, in the classical philosophic tradition, is basically a critique of conventional mystification of appearance, which then releases a changed praxis, or action. 3

But, in the development of liberal society,

The critical basis of the identification of reason and freedom was lost, and a conformist skepticism characterized the development of modern rationalism. The more reason triumphed through technology and natural science, freedom in man's social life was de-emphasized. Philosophical rationalism reconciled with the irrationality of the prevailing social relations only through reason and freedom becoming only individual internal realities. 4

Knowledge and reason became identified with the procedures of strict science (first developed in the natural sciences and
now appropriated by the social sciences). The experimental scientific method became the model for all rational activity, and human activity/social science was conceptually patterned on the natural science model instead of being seen as a unique sphere of existence with its own appropriate mode of understanding. There was then a growing cultural regression in which social values and norms were replaced by technical rules which mystified the social world. Beyond being a crisis of reason, this regression was a crisis of human subjectivity itself beneath the more apparent cultural crisis in which the bourgeois attempted to fabricate a culture. The very meaning of being a person was transformed.

The nature of the dialectical materialism in its meaning as a response to these crises will be approached through a study of some of its formal characteristics.

The formal characteristics of dialectical materialism:
The nature of dialectical materialism will be further discussed by presenting some of its formal characteristics: a) in epistemological terms; b) in distinction to formal Positivist characteristics; and c) in relation to the class origin of both dialectics and Positivism.

1) The materialist basis of consciousness and knowledge: Dialectical materialism holds that consciousness and knowledge derives not from our ideas of reality, but from the human life-processes revealed in (material or concrete) history and everyday life. Positivism to the contrary lo-
cates reality not in the objective material world but in ideas about that world, claiming that nothing exists apart from our ideas about reality. Ideas are, for the materialists, abstractions, and the abstraction of reality is the very definition of capitalist domination. The materialist claim that there is an objective world then establishes on an epistemological level the hope and possibility that beyond the abstract liberal definition of social reality there is an unalienated reality which corresponds to wo/men's needs.

2) History as a process of development through class conflict towards freedom: Dialectical materialism holds that the meaning and truth of facts is not in their existence as static entities but only as part of a process of development.

The dialectic represents the counterthrust to any form of positivism (which) from Hume to the present day... has been the ultimate method of verification... To Hegel, the facts in themselves possess no authority... Verification rests, in the last analysis, in the process of development, to which all facts are related and which determines their content. All realities pass unto others, as each major social form has emerged and passed into the succeeding form. Dialectics then reveals the negation at the core of reality, every given fact being not static and eternal but containing its own negation or non-being within. This negation describes and is contained in the contradictions between special class interests, or class conflict. For example, the medieval social order as a fact contained its negation in the emergent bourgeois class which
contradicted the dominant class and eventually overthrew it. The contradiction between the bourgeois and medieval social orders was then essentially a class conflict which for Marx is the motor force of history. But the transformation of history is for Marx not blind or endless but has a telos or end in the progressive development of human existence through class conflict towards human freedom. The transformation of all forms through negation and conflict towards the realization of human freedom is the energy of nature and history, the inner structure of all being and the fundamental end of all human intentionality. Thus,

To comprehend reality means to comprehend what things really are, and this in turn means rejecting their mere factuality. Rejection is the process of thought as well as of action. While the scientific method leads from the immediate experience of things to their mathematical-logical structure, philosophical thought leads from the immediate experience of existence to its historical structure; the principle of freedom.

In distinction to the transformational nature of dialectic thought, the Positivist universe is static and non-historical—essentially a machine whose structure is to be analyzed and exploited but whose motive-force is unknown. Positivism cannot explain the historic origins, transformations, or futures of the reality it inhabits, let alone its own origins or development; its own methodological objectivity as a universal method is contradicted by its inability to be objective about itself.

Positivism then is the epistemological form of the dom-
inant consciousness of liberal society—that liberal reality, the given, is the only possible reality because there essentially is no history—only permutations over time of particular responses to capitalist imperatives. And if there is no history, people cannot realize their potential and freedom to create other social forms responsive to their needs.

3) **Truth is in the whole:** The process of development to which all facts are related and which determines their content can be understood as a totality of interrelationships. Only when the interconnection of the historical totality is known can there be knowledge, and can there be meaning. The meaning and reality of a self, fact, or object has been shown to be achieved only in relation to the mutually necessary and mutually defining whole. The self is a necessary unity of autonomy and community. A fact can only be validated in the context of its origin in human valuing. An object, such as a building, has meaning only as an expression of human intention and relations. The whole then gives meaning to the parts, which are particular determinants of the whole.

The relations of self, fact and object to the whole are relations of **meaning**, of the correspondence of human intentionality to its realization in the world (whether manifested as the self, in the facts that wo/men determine, or in the objects that they create). The understanding of meaning requires the understanding of the human intention along with its manifestation in the world. The truth is then located in the
simultaneous existence and relation of intention with realization, not in Positivism's logical relations which exclude simultaneity and can understand truth only in relation to one term of the human meaning at a time. Intention for Positivism means an objectivistic psychology (e.g., behaviourism) while realization means a literally mindless (intentionless) empiricism. But for dialectics, self and society, theory and praxis, intention and realization, the real and ideal are seen as mutually necessary and mutually defining. The reality of each term is in its relation to the other.

The Positivist atomization of the human intentional totality serves an important purpose in class domination. Valid knowledge is defined to be reached only through the atomization and abstraction of reality. But while all thought is an abstraction, Positivism severs thought from the context of its origins in the conditions of historical existence, change and development. Parallel to the condition of human beings and architectural/planning production in liberal society, ideas are abstracted, separated and then in this alienated form defined as real. Concepts such as "society," "justice," "democracy," "equality," "human rights," and the like, are such contextless abstractions which nevertheless are used to mask the concrete relations of class domination from which these ideas derive. Only by preventing consciousness of the whole (institutionalized in Positivist epistemology as well as a rigid division of labor and class stratification) can the con-
flict between class interests be obscured to maintain capital-
list hegemony.

4) **The logical basis of dialectics:** For dialectics, any reality incorporates and implies its opposite or nega-
tion. Logically stated, A and B simultaneously exist as a to-
tality. The existence of a dominating class implies the exis-
tence of a dominated class, the existence of the suburb implies
the ghetto, the existence of the building-object implies its
social relations—one term of the existence cannot be under-
stood in separation from the other. But the logical basis of
Positivism is the law of the excluded middle—if A, not B. If
self, not society, if building, not the social relations it
represents. A and B cannot interpenetrate or be simultaneously
related. There is no overarching category in which the two
qualities or quantities are united simultaneously. Through
such logic, society can be divided into separate realities to
be studied by correspondingly separate fields, the links be-
tween them having far less power than their coherence as indi-
vidual fields. This view is the very model of the "rational"
or "political" or "economic" self-interested alienated wo/man
of classic liberalism. Fundamental opposition between societal
elements, linked through their contradictions, are then unrecog-
nizable by bourgeois thought.

**Conclusion:** Beyond a short description of formal bases of
dialectic materialism in relation to Positivism, the preceding
discussion has focused on the strong interrelation of epistemology and class interests and supports the materialist premise that ideas or philosophies (in this case epistemologies) do not derive from universalized and abstract ideas applicable to all women as the Positivists would have, but from particular class interests. Dialectical materialism openly announces its allegiance to the liberation of the dominated classes; Positivism, as a liberal instrumental epistemology, mystifies its equally-strong connection to capitalist interests.

The commitment of dialectical materialism is activated in its being a critical mode of knowledge which comprehends and anticipates a reconciliation through theory and practice of the liberal contradictions and alienations. In this sense, dialectical materialism is the epistemology of the future communal social form in which the resolution of the problems of order, method, self and architecture and planning lies. Through its critical uncovering of the potentials of freedom underlying present domination, dialectical materialism is the tool which makes possible a consciousness and theoretical guide—the precondition to action in the public world necessary for the transformation of the liberal order.

At the core of the reconciliation of dialectics is the restoration of human beings to their true nature as the subjects of history (a recovery of the alienated person from capitalist domination). All the products of society, its ideas, its institutions, its economy, its art and architecture, are
manifestations of human intentionality and action—not the operation of autonomous and reified structures which assume an alienated identity independent of the human beings who produced them. Architecture and planning products can then be realized as concretized social relations, economy as the exchange of the products of human activity, etc. Self and society, knowing and being, theory and praxis, fact and value are integrated in a historical project of human beings realizing their freedom by continually going beyond their given situation in a reconciliation of the actual with the ideal. Totalization is necessary because in this constant going beyond the given, human intentionality is always part of observable action. One knows human beings only through the realization of the intended ends of their acts and projects, not just knowing the acts and projects themselves. Thus the cultural order is irreducible to the natural order and Positivism cannot comprehend human reality (Sartre).

Dialectic thought is a tool for analyzing the world of facts in terms of its internal inadequacy. Dialectic thought invalidates the a priori opposition of value and fact by understanding all facts as stages of a single process—a process in which subject and object are so joined that truth can be determined only within the subject-object totality. All facts embody the knower as well as the doer: they continuously translate the past into the present. The objects thus 'contain' subjectivity in their very structure. For Hegel, nothing is real which does not sustain itself in existence, in a life-and-death struggle with the situation and conditions of existence. Reality then is the conscious or unconscious process in which that which is becomes other than itself.
Introduction: The purpose of this section is as a bridge, linking the discussion so far to the level of the specific contemporary issues of a critical epistemology and practice for architects and planners in the final conclusion section.

Critical practice is first characterized as a project of self and society to recover human freedom through the transformation of self and society. As such, professionals must see themselves first as persons and members of the whole society, before they can commit themselves to a liberative professional practice. The general necessity of a liberative practice through praxis is described actuated through a critical method. The conditions and necessity of a contemporary critique are stated in relation to the potential of transformation and the probable limits of a current critique. Finally, the arena for critical practice is described as the world of everyday life in which architectural and planning products are important "need-mediating mechanisms."

The project: The professions of architecture and planning, as social facts and practices, are now moments of the totality of domination. Like the liberal self and social order, the architectural and planning process and product are alienated as instrumental and static fragments whose reality and meaning as the products of human intention is suppressed. Thus architecture and planning is not seen in moral terms as a moral
practice, a concretization of particular choices made in freedom about the relations between human beings.

But when the professional's obsessive concentration on object-relations is irradiated by the understanding of the totality of human relations and meaning in which their products participate, professionals can be brought back to themselves and their freedom. At this point they become moral, for they recognize their products as choices, the expression of a particular social resolution of the problems of order, method, self, and architecture and planning. Professional practice can then become the dealing with environmental issues of the human community rather than the servant of some idealized and abstract necessity, whether it be aesthetic, behavioural, economic, or any other form of efficiency. The recovery of moral choice and freedom through critique in theory and practice undercuts the domination legitimated by abstraction—the definition and content of liberal society. Realizing the potential of freedom and the realization of the wholeness of self and society, wo/men can see the potential of meaning in their lives and practice and thus embark on the project of realizing that meaning and freedom. Realizing that professional practice is a moment of the social whole, the present project of self, society and the professions is to recover human freedom in the simultaneous creation of a non-dominated self and non-dominating society. Wo/men embark on the project as human beings and as professionals through the critique and negation
of the given in the creation of new forms of self and society. Wo/men then can assume some control over their lives, ending their alienation and recovering their own humanity and the humanity of those they serve from the mystification of a history and social order which reduces human relation to object relations, intersubjectivity to commodity exchange.

Praxis: When realized in the world, the project is a praxis, or practice intended towards human liberation. Only as committed to the general project of liberation will professionals realize their specific professional projects of creating environmental totalities from the present fragmentation.

If men produce social reality (which in the inversion of the praxis turns back upon them and conditions them) than transforming that reality is an historical task, a task for men...To no longer be prey to the (force of oppressive reality that absorbs those within it and thereby acts to submerge men's consciousness), one must emerge from it and turn upon it. This can be done only by means of the praxis; reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it. 1

The practice towards liberation is motivated at the core by the self searching for a wholeness which can only be realized through a unity with a communal social order. Professionals, like everyone else in liberal society, are now the players of fragmented roles; they will not be motivated to attempt a liberative practice until, understanding their suffering from personal and professional contradictions and alienations, they realize themselves as whole human beings indepen-
dent of societal role and class definition. Architects and planners can then discover their grounding as linked to the common interests and struggle of all people for a transformation of self and society, from the totalization of domination to that of freedom. Once professionals have realized their fundamental mutuality with others as a person, they can begin to search for ways to use their particular environmental concerns as an instrument of the general project, a mode of relating to a liberative totality.

The necessity of critical knowledge: A practice which seeks the liberation of what has remained unconsciously, the hidden humanity beneath the dominating totality, cannot itself be unconscious. The thrust of the historical section of this thesis is that unreflective practice can only serve the interests of domination. The process of recovery of humanity is possible only through the critique, which uncovers in self and society the hidden potential of freedom. The critique further uncovers the processes through which domination originated and is perpetuated, as well as the contradictions it spawns and the means through which it may be overcome. Self and society do not change by fiat, but through the oppositions of human beings who refuse to remain alienated. This opposition however only develops when wo/men are conscious of their domination.

Reification is the necessary immediate reality of every person living in capitalist society. It can be overcome only by constant and constantly renewed efforts to disrupt the reified structure of existence by concretely relating to the concretely manifested contra-
dictions of the total development, by becoming conscious of the immanent meanings of these contradictions for total development. THE STRUCTURE CAN BE DISRUPTED ONLY IF THE IMMANENT CONTRADICTION OF THE PROCESS ARE MADE CONSCIOUS. 1

Thought is a form of reality, of the very fibre of action. The liberal and Positivist disjunction between thought and action is false. The duality for dialectical materialists between thought and reality is overcome with the understanding of the self and history as a process constantly totalizing itself, reaching beyond, a projecting from the given to the future. "Reality is not--it becomes--and to become, the participation of thought is needed." 2 Consciousness is a necessary, indispensable and integral part of that process of becoming. Liberal thought in its atomization prevents consciousness of the structural domination of the liberal totality. Therefore mass resistance born of the consciousness of common interests is avoided. 3

Critical knowledge is not the imposition of an exterior or transcendental value as the basis of a critique such as the liberal definitions of man or any aesthetic or functional ideology. Critical knowledge rather is born of the discovery within the object of understanding of the hidden core of its meaning. For the professions, this discovery is of the architectural/planning products' embodiment of human relations, as well as the professionals' role in perpetuating domination. These discoveries act as both a dialectical contradiction/opposition to the conventional definitions of professional mean-
ing, as well as an internal, immanent critique of professional practice. The practice of architecture and planning as the creation of reified objects and processes will not end with such a critique. But if professionals are motivated by a search for wholeness and dealienation, they must first realize in consciousness their alienation and then in their praxis be guided by knowledge as a necessary component of action. To create consciousness and knowledge is a task of critique.

The present project of critique assumes a particular meaning and form, because of the nature of knowledge and consciousness in contemporary liberal society. Scientific and technological knowledge has replaced labor as the central form of value in capitalist society.\(^1,2\) It is no longer the material/physical conditions of production itself (e.g., the filth and squalor of the industrial city) but the practice and epistemology of technical rationality which is the major form of contemporary domination. Science has become the "form of life", the definition of truth, of industrial societies. The formal laws of Positivism and the total alienation of contemporary capitalism are mutually defining. Thus, for the Critical Theorists (such Frankfurt School critical theorists as Horkheimer, Adorono, Marcuse, and Habermas), the critique of instrumental reason itself replaces Marx's critique of political economy as the contemporary mode of critical praxis.\(^3\)

"The unleashing of technical rationality is perceived to be the most decisive of all forms of domination of men by men,...for
their integration into the universal context of delusion is so inclusive that even the most serious efforts of liberation run the danger of confirming and stabilizing the existing power structure."

Instrumental rationality has penetrated to the interstices of everyday life. Not only the productive process itself is involved, but every act of cognition and life, its culture, language, intersubjectivity, values and the very formation of the ego itself. Capitalist rationality is now only complete when affecting all life-processes. A contemporary critique must then deal with and transform not only the capitalist institutions (which was the prime concern of the later Marxist critique) but also the transformation/retotalization of consciousness, the self, and culture itself.

The critical method:

Critical social theory begins with the position that a codified scientific method is an inadequate foundation for the validity of truth claims...Social facts are approached in critical theory from a cultural perspective not neutralized by research techniques which may themselves conceal our prejudgments of the data. Social inquiry begins from and returns to the immediate.

The critical method then involves two basic processes, totalization and negation of the given. While defined separately, these are both components of a knowledge which sees truth residing only in a complete understanding of the human world.

1) Knowledge as a totalization: As Lenin says, "in order to really to know an object we must embrace, study, all its
sides; all its connections and 'mediations'...(as an) all-sidedness...the whole of human experience should enter the full 'definition' of an object." Thus truth cannot be abstract, idealistic, deriving from conceptions of reality, but from the concrete reality itself. The totalizing process is an analysis of the given historical situation seen in all its aspects as a totality in which the "object" of analysis can be understood only in its relation to the whole—itself not a static state but a development and becoming through time.

2) Knowledge as a critique and negation of the given: Implicit in the totalizing process is the assumption that the given is epiphenomenal or a mask hiding an underlying reality. The critique then, the act of dialectical reasoning, is not a criticism in the conventional sense but a method of uncovering the reality beneath appearance. As the apparent is not the real, a negation of the given is necessary to reach reality.

A dialectical critique then uses a negative reason to pit an apparent reality against its hidden social meaning as an element of a dominating totality. The realization of the contradiction between appearances and social meaning is resolved in the direction of at least a theoretical consciousness which then can lead in the direction of human freedom inherent as a value in the critique project itself. By contrast, positive reason, or Positivism, takes the given as reasonable, as real. It defines and collapses the essential to the actual, the underlying reality to the given. Hence, Positivism cannot see social reality as a mystification. The task of positive reason is only
to determine efficient means to ends whose origin, value and meaning it is methodologically incapable of dealing with. The end of positive reason is control; the end of negative reason is human liberation.

The historical section of this thesis is a critique in that it a) attempts to totalize the meaning of architecture and planning by relating their internal histories to their determination by the institutions of each social form, and b) attempts to reveal the real behind the apparent by contrasting the professionals' internal self-representations with their social function and meaning. The contradictions revealed by contrasting these two views of professional reality is an immanent critique of the professional self-representation, which then opens up the question of how the contradiction can be resolved.

The assumption of the critical project is that knowledge has the power to reveal to men their true condition which then will lead to emancipation, a position identical with the theory of psychoanalysis. The reconciliation between theory and practice, subject and object, the actual and ideal then is a central concern of the totalizing effort. Critical practice anticipates a transformed social praxis which it itself cannot effect but of which it is a necessary element.

The alienated condition of a contemporary critique: At present, there is not, at least in the United States, the immediate possibility of a mass transformation of consciousness
or the basic liberal institutions. In this situation a totalized critique has to be a practice separate from a broad-scaled social realization. The critique must then be carried out in a necessarily alienated state. Presently, the project of critique will most likely not be assumed by the working classes (conventionally defined). While Marx addressed his critique to the impoverished proletarians whose labor was the form of value in his time, the professionals as the instruments of instrumental rationality administer social power and value. Architects and planners must therefore conduct their own critique.

Everyday life as a terrain for liberative practice: The previous discussion has argued that the resolution of the liberal problems of order, method, self, and architecture and planning ultimately lies in the necessary transformation of the basic capitalist institutions (as the private ownership and control of the factors of production and the productive process, the markets in labor, land and essential commodities, income determination on the basis of the market-dictated "returns" to the owned factors of production). But such a transformation will be reached only with the creation of a widespread consciousness of alienation and powerlessness. This consciousness is built only on the revolutionary recreation of everyday life. "Concrete goals must be focused on the immediate control of our lives."¹ There are several reasons for the concentration on the transformation of everyday life, particularly for archi-
tectural and planning practice:

1) The origin of consciousness in everyday life: Practice towards liberation is motivated at the core by the most intimate and concrete experience of alienation in the search for wholeness. Thus, the concrete experience of an alienating everyday life, and not the abstract appreciation of the structural constraints on freedom, is the origin of the intention to personally and professionally transform personal and social reality.

   Everyday life is the realm of what capitalists claim is the satisfaction of human needs. To the extent that needs are not satisfied, contradictions and thus consciousness appears. "The crucial observation is that (the claim of capitalism that any subjectively felt need can be met by some form of goods and services consumption) is open to the every-day, phenomenal, critical testing by worker and citizen. The dialectic of consciousness thus lies in the phenomenology of every-day life, and revolutionary strategy must make this its organizational principle."¹

2) Everyday life as an arena of non-political transformation: "The revolutionary movement is basically a social movement of which politics is but one dimension...Indeed, the major contradictions in modern capitalism occur not in the political sphere, and cannot be corrected through political remedies...The political is merely one arm of a complex social structure composed of elements which must develop their revolutionary consciousness through their own internal dynamics."² Thus archi-
tects and planners as practitioners within everyday life are legitimately first concerned with the transformation of their own practice.¹

3) The necessary transformation of culture as a need-mediator in everyday life: Culture, as experienced in everyday life, is the mediator between the "species needs" of human beings (such as described as the problems of order, self, and method) and the resolution of those needs in a particular social order. Thus under capitalism, it is essential that human beings are taught through the cultural definition of reality to value and "need" only what is required and can be produced by capitalist imperatives.² The institutionalization of these imperatives becomes the structure of everyday life and social relations—the reality from which wo/men's norms, values, ideologies, personality, interests, hopes, and cultures derive. Everyday reality in its pervasiveness appears given, natural, "real," and commonsensical; but in fact this reality is the need-mediating construction of a particular and highly unnatural order. In Gintes' words,

   a) society creates needs through the effect of capitalist development on everyday life; b) mediates the transition of these needs into overt preferences and motivations by means of a set of commodity fetishist cultural instruments (empirical beliefs); and c) supplies the objects of these overt preferences. ³

4) The transformation of architecture and planning as need-mediating mechanisms in everyday life: An important role of architectural and planning practice is in creating need-mediating environmental objects and processes whose impact is subjectively experienced in everyday life. The environment is a concretization/objectification of social relationships, a
need-mediation deriving from capitalist imperatives. For example, Americans are taught to desire a home in the suburbs for its "life style" benefits. But the social fragmentation and isolation that home represents is an instrument of social control. Americans are taught to admire "great" skylines and architectural monuments, but such structures symbolize and are a product of class domination. Americans are taught that designers and builders produce environments, but this professional specialization also embodies an alienation of individuals' from control of their surroundings. The impact, consciousness and contradictions of environmental mediations is first generated in everyday life.

5) The concentration of architectural and planning activity at the level of everyday life: Architectural and planning decision making in America for the most part does not operate at the level of fundamental capitalist institutions at which the state/industrial complex operates. Rather, the professions' impact is in the reinforcing but not structuring of those institutions; architecture and planning function at the secondary decision-making level of everyday life. Thus the following section on the liberative projects for architectural and planning knowledge and practice concentrates not on the transformation of fundamental capitalist institutions but on the environmental issues of everyday life with which professions conventionally deal. Work on this level is a precondition to more fundamental change.
Section IV:

CONCLUSION

PROJECTS FOR A CRITICAL
EPISTEMOLOGY AND
PRACTICE FOR
ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING

CONCLUSION
Introduction: This section outlines specific projects that architects and planners committed to the general project of social critique and liberation can realize within their role as professionals. The necessary personal commitment of the architect and planner as person and professional is first discussed. Specific critiques of the structural elements of the profession are then outlined, followed by the potentials and dialogic nature of a liberative practice and finally some remarks on the critique and practice of professional education.

The Projects:

1) The personal project of the architect and planner: The professionals' project of contribution to the construction of a non-alienating social order begins with their recognition of indivisibility with others. Architects and planners must participate as whole persons as well as role-occupants with all other human beings in social transformation which restores the human being as the subject of self, society and history. The professional is deeply implicated in his subject, and the subject/object distinction inherent in his socially-defined role is fundamentally false, a form of alienation. This realization has two immediate implications.

   a) Epistemology: Professional epistemology and knowledge must be totalizing and dialectic, since a knowledge of meanings rather than of abstract reductions can be the only basis on which any sort of environmental, personal and societal
unification can occur.

b) Practice: The professional and client must create a situation in which both can speak and work with each other free of the domination of false authority, in full recognition of each others' freedom; this situation is called dialogue. (Frere). The professionals, normally in a position of authority, have a strong responsibility to show others their own freedom while realizing their own. The alternate can only be for either professional or client to dominate each other. As a dialogue, the professional working situation is a microcosm of the future free society.

The professionals' knowledge of the world is deeply implicated in and cannot be separated from knowledge of themselves and their position in the social world. Further, knowledge changes the knower as much as the known, so reality is constantly in transformation.

The character and quality of such knowing is molded not only by a man's technical skills or even by his intelligence alone, but also by all that he is and wants, but his courage no less than his talent, by his passion no less than his objectivity. It depends on all that a man does and lives. In the last analysis, if a man wants to change what he knows, he must change how he lives; he must change his praxis in the world.

Professionals must accept the hazard and potential of all knowledge which becomes an internal and mutual awareness rather than an abstracted knowing. The professionals' self, practice and role-identification may change into presently unidentifiable forms as a result of his practice—forms which challenge more
secure but alienated distinctions between professional and client, design subject and design object.

2) An internal critique of architectural and planning practice: The architectural and planning professions, as distinct social practices serving the creation of the world of everyday life, must conduct a multi-phased internal critique. Unreflective practice has inevitably served the interests of the ruling class.

a) Critical history of architecture and planning: Truth is only in the totality, composed of elements interconnected in a constantly transforming process. Therefore time is the necessary ground on which the past, present, and future of architecture and planning practice must be understood. The history of architecture and planning theory and practice must be retotaled in the service of liberative intention. (See introduction section for a fuller discussion on the meaning and necessity of the historic retotalization). This involves among other elements:

1) the use of an epistemology which is capable of dealing with the social/environmental totality. The epistemology involves dialectical materialism as well as an as-yet unformulated phenomenological epistemology of the built-world, capable of apprehending the specifically environmental meanings of everyday life (see the following discussion on a critique of the epistemology of architecture and planning).

ii) the totalization of architectural and planning theory and practice as part of the social whole. The history in this thesis is meant as a necessarily sketchy, abstract and abbreviated example of such a totalization. Involved are: an articulated theory of the self and social
order; a liberative intention; an examination of all the factors of the internal theory and practice of architecture and planning in their relation to the totality: a critique of existing modes of architecture and planning history in light of a liberative intent.

iii) A special emphasis on deciphering the secret, the hieroglyph which is hidden within the formal structure of conventionally understood architectural and planning objects and processes. The key of course to deciphering the secret is the understanding that the objects and processes are embodiments of social relations. I see this insight and project as having a tremendous impact on conventional perceptions of the meaning of form and formal structures, corroding the fetishistic formal concerns and thus making possible a realization of the necessity of dealing with architectural and planning products as a direct response to social relations. The project I have termed "critical object-analysis."

b) Critique of the professional structure: The professions' internal organization and structural relations to the society are highly determinant of their products, and therefore must themselves be subject to critique. Important factors of professional structure include: occupational role definitions, career structures, educational requirements and process, power distributions, socialization methods, required personality characteristics, professional subcultures, reward systems and relations (mediations) to other social structures. These factors at present generally reflect the more general social hierarchization and fragmentation at the professional level. Thus the domination the professions are ideally committed to eliminate is reproduced within the professional organization itself.
c) Critique of the political economy in relation to architecture and planning: This project, not the focus of the thesis' historical section, is a historical critique of the relation of the primary political, economic and social capitalist institutions in themselves and in relation to architectural and planning issues. This project is necessary in order for the professionals' break out of their idealistic sleep to confront the political and economic forces which determine their practice. Only with his knowledge can they begin to act effectively, through a realization that they must become political actors.

d) Critique of the epistemology of architecture and planning: An important focus of the thesis is the demonstration that the epistemology used by architects and planners establishes the limits and potentials of their practice. Indeed, epistemology is only the formalization of our method of knowing which is inseparable from our perception of reality. Thus the method is a totality itself. There is no such thing as an epistemological vacuum, or objectivity. We cannot escape existing and knowing within an attitude which then defines us, our practice, and our reality.

Two urgent epistemological projects for architects and planners are i) the need for a critical and specifically human knowledge, and ii) the need for a specific knowledge of the built-world.
1) The need for a specifically human knowledge:
The specifically human critical knowledge is in the most general sense dialectical materialism. But this knowledge is at present more an attitude towards reality than an elaborated systemization of methodology, procedures and theories with which to investigate and participate in reality. The knowledge then is still in the process of being born and formed and elaborated. Architects and planners then cannot adopt a ready-made epistemology and methodology, but must participate in its creation. As has been discussed, the urgency of finding a non-Positivist basis for human knowledge is underscored by the failures of recent social and economic policy planning,¹ based on an instrumental Positivism. These failures in part demonstrated the inadequacy of Positivism as a way of knowing social reality and acted as a stimulus to the social sciences in their turning to a dialectical model.²

11) The need for a knowledge of the built-world:
Recent architectural and planning thought has been involved with ways of knowing the specific interactions of man and environment and environmental meanings which sociological and psychological research did not deal with. Most work so far has appropriated the non-wholistic and non-critical Positivism. Necessary is an understanding which can comprehend the environment not as a collection of analyzable objects of specific interactions, but as the totality in which these objects and interactions participate. In this totality (called by Manoff the built-world),
...we nihilate any distinction between...us and our environment, for the situation is neither subjective or objective, but a relation of being between the two in which both are comprehended fully as all that they can ever be at that moment.

We are what we are...as subjects of an environment, as the embodied choice of some among its possibilities, as the closing of its particular openness. (We must) replace the study of architectonic objects with that of the processes by which they become such for use, by which and through we intend them in our praxis, mean them and assert them as both the product and foundation of reality.

We return to architecture seeking the modes of our own performance by which architecture becomes what it is for us, study the ways we are with architecture and experience it, how we have a world that is ours in common. 1

Here wo/men are again made the subject of environmental existence, recovering their being from its displacement into the architectural fetish-object. 2

Knowledge of the "built-world" differs from current environmental psychology's emphasis on either the "subjective" or "objective" relations of wo/men to environment by asserting that any relations can only be understood as a relation of meaning and intention, a unity of the subjective and objective. Psychological/sociological research techniques then become at best a part, a moment, of a totalizing environmental knowledge.

3) A practice for liberation: The precondition of architects' and planners' practice for liberation is that they take seriously their alienation and to some extent recover their own needs and intentions from the generalized critical sleep of society. Professionals then see their responsibility not only to technically implement and advocate for the immedi-
ately-expressed environmental needs of the everyday world. This world is precisely the locus of a dominated and therefore repressed consciousness; dominated, people cannot realize their real needs and take socialized needs as essential. The project is first to bring to consciousness the repressed needs and mystified structure of societal domination, which then constitute the contradiction of the given everyday reality (this is the critical method). With consciousness, wo/men recover the potential for realizing their freedom.

The commonly-defined professional project of service through problem-solving is then necessary but radically insufficient as the basis of a liberative practice. The professional project is also educative, a leading-forth of human beings from their alienation to realize their own repression and therefore recover their potential to achieve freedom and a moral existence. The context of professional practice must be within a theory of action which relates action to liberative intention, and this theory-making is a constant process growing out of and guiding action.

The mode of non-dominating professional practice must be participatory and dialogic. Through dialogue, men are freed "from the thralldom of silence and monologue" of human relations in the alienated everyday world. This world is then made problematic, not accepted as a given but questioned in its every natural, cultural and historical dimension. Given this profound questioning, a systematic doubt, it is first possible
to see the world's domination for what it is and thus change it. This process of questioning in everyday life means the unity of theory and action. The generation of critical theory is a constant and necessary function in everyday life.

There can be no separation of critical theory and participatory struggles on the level of both social and personal existence. To restore spontaneous free existence...on the societal and personal level...is to regain a sense of totality and the capacity to begin anew. Ultimately the critical consciousness is manifest in its acts, and in its readiness to reflect on them. Critical action and reflection inscribe an ever-renewable circle that cannot be stopped arbitrarily or adequately expressed in a formalistic theory. Indeed, if critical theory is ever to become a force for change, it must do so by transforming our consciousness about the developmental tendencies of both societal and personal processes. 1

But with the lack of a widespread social movement, an incrementalist strategy towards social change "seems tactically to be appropriate to safeguard the continuation of revolutionary theory and action until time for a united front will come." 2 This incrementalism is unlike current planning "incrementalist" strategy and theory making in that it is based on a long-range critical intention of social/institutional transformation, as well as a constant theoretical and practical activity in light of that intention. Each particular architectural/planning problem is an opportunity for its being redefined in terms of the whole. Consciousness may therefore be increased, while the problem resolution may be aimed at achieving an incremental degree of freedom which cannot be reversed ("non-reversible" action).
The dialogic relation of the professional and client is itself an important means to raise consciousness, a micro-cosmic model of the non-dominating relationships of the communal society. In a dialogic relation, the professionals work not for but with their clients in terms of mutuality, respect, communality and ultimately love. Love is the only form of relationship in which the mutual needs of autonomy and community are reconciled, through the professionals and clients acceptance of each other as whole persons, rather than as instrumentalities or role occupants. Through the dialogic encounter, the professionals and clients lose some of their role-identity and therefore become more humanized. Indeed, the professionals may eventually hope to eliminate their role in specific situations, by giving others their power rather than hoarding it—educating their clients to assume power over the environment and their lives themselves. Clients can then gain both competence and their own meaning and power. In the dialogic encounter, both professional and client are transformed.

4) Critique and practice of professional education: University departments of architecture and planning are presently significant socializing agents and research arms of the professions and capitalism. Yet while the universities generally perpetuate unreflective comprehension of professionals to the next generation, they are relatively free zones of consciousness in the society and could be important foci of liberative and critical practice.
Presently, university departments of architecture and planning are generally structured around a single or pluralistic ideology which perpetuates within professional education the larger society's tactics of domination: as with democracy, many viewpoints may be tolerated as long as they do not threaten fundamental capitalist institutions.

Some departments concentrate on single ideologies of technocratic (SUNY Buffalo) or visual (Princeton) rationality; the critique of instrumental rationality is a critique of their curriculum. But in some schools (notably MIT and the University of California at Berkeley) a more complex critical problem is posed; such schools embrace no dominant 'paradigm' but offer many approaches. While such educational 'pluralism' opens the possibility of critical dialogue within a university community, the departments (at least at MIT) represent a delicate balance of simultaneous but non-interacting approaches. While appearing to be the most intellectually honest response to what the schools read as an indeterminant social/professional situation, pluralism in fact represents a value statement that no common determinable value (at least for the present) is possible. Pluralist departmental structure is parallel to the supermarket, whose diversity of (educational) products for 'sale' belies their common origin in (and effective support of) a non-critically understood capitalist order of domination. Any critical intent to understand and determine the ends and values to which the variety of approaches are means is eliminated from
the educational agenda. The lack of dialogue then trivializes each approach's claim to validity and administratively serves to stabilize or "keep the peace" between departmental factions. Students are left as best they can to fulfill (if they are so inclined) the critical function themselves. More often, the critical consciousness is not awakened.

Critical knowledge can develop only when serious alternatives confront each other. Dialogue may be fearful and threatening, but it is far more dangerous for the universities and society to avoid such dialogue, to avoid the exercise of a value rationality. The universities educate problem-solvers but cannot comprehend and therefore begin to resolve the basis of the problem.

The dominance of pluralism or any single visual/instrumental rationality is a reproduction in the university of the general social hierarchization and specialization, specifically designed through its fragmentation to prevent critical consciousness. Organized as such, the university then tacitly denies the possibility of human beings collectively determining common values as the basis of a non-dominating communal social order. The university thus perpetuates alienation.

If the universities are to emerge from their particular non-critical sleep, they must engage in a moral education, educating for a value-rationality as well as an instrumental problem-solving rationality. The transformation of the universities becomes an important part of professional liberative
practice. In this education it is crucial that an academic division of labor does not occur to the extent that architectural and planning theorists/critics/philosophers develop independently as the practitioners of a specialized subfield which does not touch the consciousness and practice of people "in the field."

I believe that the current situation of architectural and planning education in most universities is a serious abdication of the universities' intellectual and moral responsibility and potential. The transformation of the universities becomes an important part of professional liberative practice.
CONCLUSION

Underlying this thesis has been the theory of the whole self as the necessary reconciliation of the simultaneous need for autonomy and community. The whole self is possible only with the simultaneous possibility of developing individuality and the existence of a non-dominating communal social order in which the value of self is recognized by others not as instrumental role-occupant but as a whole person. Then the possibility of an unalienated self is dependent on the realization of an unalienated world, possible to the extent that observer and participant, self and society share a common experience and meaning—in short, a non-dominating community of shared meanings. The problems of order, method, the self, and architecture and planning are then inseparably linked. A non-dominating social order is predicated on a shared communal knowledge of specifically human meanings, possible only when human community poses not a threat but a realization of the self. Architecture and planning in turn can be liberative only when they participate in the creation of a non-alienated society. The resolution of one problem is inseparable from the resolution of all; the nature of consciousness is inseparable from the politics of social power.

This totalizing understanding, in which the realization of the freedom and potential of one element of social reality is inseparable from the realization of the social totality, is the basis for answering the questions which motivated this thesis:
what is meaning and architecture and planning; what is the human relation to form and environment; what is my personal relation to the professions and to the world, and why do I feel so estranged from both?

Meaning in architecture and planning can exist only when professional theory and praxis is integrated into the societal project of transforming capitalist institutions, for the possibility of an ordered and meaningful environment is dependent on the existence of a non-dominating society. Human relation to form and environment can be meaningful only when both terms of the relationship, human beings and environment, originate in and are agents of meaningful social relations (meaning defined as the correspondence between inner human needs and their realization and objectification in the social world). Otherwise, forms exist in their presently alienated condition as a fetishized reality independent of human relations, and meanings, while human beings exist in their presently alienated role as instrumental tools of abstract capitalist imperatives.

My felt alienation from the professions and from others was, to a significant extent, a reflection of an alienated social order in which community is seen as a domination rather than a fulfillment and professional practice seemed to reproduce alienation despite its best intentions.

A liberated architectural and planning theory, epistemology and practice are then indissolubly linked to and dependent on a theory, epistemology and practice of a liberated society which at base is grounded in a theory of the nature of the
whole self. The theory and practice of architecture and planning is the theory and practice of human beings seeking their own freedom and the freedom of others.

Then as persons and professionals, architects and planners must "analyze and question the existence of the (professional) subject and (professional) object, their roles, function in society and relations to each other. Radical professionals gradually begin to question their concepts, their methods, the image of the profession, their professional and practical training, their own value systems, and those of their clients. They see that purely 'rational'...methods, removed from a broader context, do violence to people. In view of this, they abandon their former 'natural' acceptance of given structural imperatives."¹

Since the middle ages, the theorists of architecture and planning have failed to ground their theories in any adequate conception of the experienced socio-historical world and a reflection on the professionals' place in that world. The idealist philosophic positions underlying the practice of modern architecture and planning are separate from the world and invert the real relationship between thought and reality. It is not new problem-solving techniques or methodologies that will change the world. The resolution of the multiple crises of the present is not in the magic intervention of some new technique, but in structural change of basic social institutions. This thesis then offers no technical solutions. Its
involvement with epistemological method is not in terms of knowledge as a technique, but as a form of critical consciousness, as a means to uncover the need and potential for personal and social freedom and wholeness repressed in liberal society. As Kuenzlen suggests, architects and planners committed to a liberative practice must instead engage in a thorough-going examination of the world in which they live and act. This is a process of critical activity and self-reflection in the context of the perceived realities of one's personal and professional everyday life.

A result of this linked critical action and reflection is the realization that the social life world is a human creation. The dominance of a given form of self, consciousness, social order, knowledge, architecture and planning is a human choice among alternatives in an open field of human freedom and potential. The given is not an idealized absolute. Critical action and reflection recovers the possibility of moral choice among alternate forms of knowledge, thought, and potentially, action. The realization that the social life-world is a human creation is the beginning of freedom, of the possibility of choosing the way we live, and of showing others their own freedom.

In taking seriously their feelings that something is wrong in "normal" reality, architects and planners can take themselves and their practice seriously. Their alienation and meaningless can, on reflection, be understood as an expression of con-
flicts on all levels of existence whose resolution is dependent on the creation of community. For the professionals, as for all human beings, the solutions to the problems of order, method, self, and architecture and planning must be through participating in the historic project of the transformation of society. This thesis is a moment in the search for a grounding for a liberative practice towards that end.
NOTES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

SEE BERGER & LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY.

AS WILL BE SHOWN LATER, THE FRAGMENTATION OF SHARED INTERSUBJECTIVE MEANING IS A SYSTEMATIC CONSEQUENCE AND FUNCTIONAL ELEMENT IN THE MAINTAINENCE AND PERPETUATION OF CAPITALISM AND LIBERAL SOCIETY.

KUENZLEN, PG. 87

GORZ, 'TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE CAPITALIST DIVISION OF LABOR' IN TELOS, NO. 12 (SUMMER, 1972), PG. 30

THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION IN STATING THAT THIS KNOWLEDGE MUST BE CREATED OR SEARCHED FOR, AND YET NAMING THE GENERAL FORM OF THIS KNOWLEDGE AS DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM. MANY ASPECTS OF ITS FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY HAVE YET TO BE WORKED OUT, AND CHANGE WITH THE CHANGE IN HISTORICAL CONDITIONS. PHENOMENOLOGICAL ASPECTS IN PARTICULAR ARE VERY MUCH AN OPEN AREA OF METHODOLOGICAL EXPLORATION. FURTHER, ANY EPISTEMOLOGY IS NOT ONLY OBJECTIVELY LEARNED, BUT MUST BE ABSORBED AS THE DOMINANT CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF AND SOCIETY. THE SEARCH FOR A LIBERATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY IS THEN ALSO THE PROCESS OF ITS BECOMING A DOMINANT CONSCIOUSNESS.

SECTION II: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF ARCHITECTURAL AND PLANNING THEORY AND PRACTICE IN RELATION TO THE MAJOR SOCIAL ORDERS


THIS SECTION LARGELY RECOUNTS MY UNDERSTANDING OF PROFESSOR UNGER'S PRESENTATION ON THE NATURE OF THE SELF.

YET NATURE REMAINS THE GREAT UNIVERSAL IN CONTRAST TO HUMAN PARTICULARITY. THE UNITY OF THE NATURAL WORLD IS PERHAPS THE GREATEST SOURCE AND CONSTANT EXEMPLAR OF THE IDEAL OF NATURAL HARMONY AND THE POTENTIAL OF A UNIVERSAL HUMAN COMMUNITY.

BUBER, MARTIN, I AND THOU

This statement is a refutation on a historical scale of the positivistic acceptance of the given as fully defining human nature and potential.


UGER

THIS TYPE OF CRITICISM CAN BE SEEN IN MANY ARCHITECTURAL HISTORIES (SEE GIEDION OR SCULLY), ARCHITECTURAL MAGAZINES (E.G. ARCHITECTURAL RECORD) AND PLANNING JOURNALS (E.G. ANY ARTICLES DEALING WITH THE FORMAL PROPERTIES OF MODELS, PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES, ETC.).

1 Fraser, Douglas, Village Planning in the Primate World, New York: George Braziller, 1968, pg. 9

The functional or visual/aesthetic rationality of modernist architecture is an example of formal imperatives. See Section II on modernist architecture.

2 See Section III, Towards a Critical Epistemology, Everyday Life.

3 For example, primitive cultures with widely different social forms have all arranged their buildings in parallel rows.

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Tzonis, Alexander, Towards a Non-Oppressive Environment, Boston, I Press, 1972, Pg. 36

The generic method of environmental ordering was an arrangement of the elements of the natural environment to reveal the relationships of the divine model. This was accomplished through a taxonomic, or classifying, process. For the Dogon of Africa, the taxonomy was realized in relations of contiguity, the connection of objects, spaces, buildings and land with each other. In a modern perspective, the taxonomy was an ordering of things which relieved the anxiety stemming from the unpredictability, inconsistency, and confusion of the natural environment. But in face of the great variety and complexity of taxonomic arrangements, the 'anxiety' perspective is an inadequate explanation. Rather, the great variety of arrangements reflect the correspondingly great distinctions between the social relations of the various societies.

3 See Christopher Alexander on unselfconscious design in his Notes on the Synthesis of Form, cited in the bibliography.

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Finley, The World of Odysseus, quoted in Tzonis, op. cit., pg. 36

2 See Section II, Baroque and Liberal Architecture and Planning.

3 Examples of tribal design: The design of the Mbuti and Dogon tribes of Africa will be used as examples of village design as an integral part of the social totality.

Social relations as the basis of village design—the Mbuti: The Mbuti pygmies of the northeastern Congo are a surviving paleolithic (Stone Age) clan of hunters and gatherers. The clan is a
COMPOSITE OF OVER A DOZEN PATRILINEAGES WHICH JOIN AND LEAVE THE BAND AT WILL. HOLDING THE BANDS TOGETHER IS THE NEED FOR COMMUNAL EFFORT IN KILLING GAME AND COLLECTING WILD VEGETABLES, YET THE PRINCIPLE OF COOPERATION IS ARTICULATED NOT AS AN ECONOMIC NECESSITY BUT ON RELIGIOUS AND MORAL GROUNDS. THE CALM OF THE FOREST IS USED AS A MODEL OF ETHICAL HUMAN BEHAVIOUR WHICH PROSCRIBES AGGRESSIVE OR SELFISH ACTS.

THE MBUTI CAMPS FOLLOW NO PREDETERMINED DESIGN PRINCIPLE LINKING A SACRED OR SOCIAL IDEAL WITH A PARTICULAR PHYSICAL FORM. YET, SEVERAL DESIGN 'RULES' ARE FOLLOWED, EXPRESSING THE CURRENT FEELINGS BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF THE BAND. THE ORIENTATION OF THE OPENINGS OF THE HUTS ACTS AS A SOCIAL SIGNIFIER. IF THE OPENING FACES ANOTHER PERSON'S HUT, FRIENDLINESS IS EXPRESSED; IF THE OPENING IS FACING AWAY OR IF THE HUT IS MOVED SOME DISTANCE FROM ANOTHER PERSON'S HUT, DISPLEASURE IS EXPRESSED. THE PHYSICAL/ENVIRONMENTAL EXPRESSION OF SOCIAL RELATIONS ACTS AS A SIGN WHICH STIMULATES COMMUNITY ACTION TO HEAL THE SOCIAL BREACH.

HUTS ARE NOT ORIENTED TOWARDS A PARTICULAR GEOGRAPHIC DIRECTION WHICH RELATES TO A DIVINE COSMOLOGY. RATHER, HUTS ARE GENERALLY PLACED TO DEFINE A CENTRAL PLACE WHICH SIGNIFIES THE SOLIDARITY AND AUTHORITY OF THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE. SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE MBUTI EGALITARIAN SOCIETY, THE CENTER OF THE CAMP IS NORMALY VOID, SIGNIFYING A COMMUNAL AUTHORITY. BY CONTRAST, THE TYPICAL BOURGEOIS/LIBERAL DESIGN PLACES A MONUMENT OR MAJOR STRUCTURE AT THE CENTER OR FOCUS OF MAJOR SPACES, SIGNIFYING A HIERARCHICAL CLASS-BASED AUTHORITY.

INDIVIDUAL MAN TO THE TOTAL UNIVERSE.' (IBID., PG. 27) As the physical environment is an embodiment of the divine model, so in ideal form are the relationships and activities of the Dogon people. The natural, man-made and interpersonal environments are united, all societal elements, mutually consistent and interrelated, as defined by an immanent divine model.


2 The persistence of the clan is one of many instances noted in this thesis in which social relations dominate and precede technological innovation. This is a position contrary to the common technological determinism of current positivist instrumental thought. The position is developed by Steven Marglin in What Do Bosses Do?, publication of the Harvard Institute of Economic Research, 1971.

Bookchin, op. cit., pg. 14

2 The separation of the source of truth and value from the earth itself (medieval society was not the earliest instance of this separation) was the radical precondition for the explosion of the medieval unity into atomized individual social fragments. The result was the utilitarian man of liberal society whose only social bonding was the harmony of individual interests, as defined by liberal social theorists. As God did not inhere in the earth itself, the earth could be exploited for gain. When the divine source of unity and meaning was not of the earth, the unity of self and consciousness had to encompass heaven and earth, the sacred and the profane. The breach between the two established the possibility of women splitting their selves, a portion of which could be sold on the labor market. This split became the human content of liberal society.

Mumford, op. cit., pg. 268

74 1 IBID., PG. 269

75 1 A sense of the range and corporate unity of the medieval citizens is given in this description by Albrecht Durer of a procession in Sixteenth-century
'I saw the procession pass along the street, the people being arranged in rows, each man some distance from his neighbor, but the rows close behind the other. There were the goldsmiths, the painters, the masons, the broderers, the sculptors, the joiners, the carpenters, the sailors, the fishermen, the butchers, the leatherers, the cloth-makers, the bakers, the tailors, the cordwainers—indeed, workmen of all kinds, and many craftsmen and dealers who work for their livelihood. Likewise, the shop-keepers and merchants and their assistants of all kinds were there. After these came the shooters with guns, bows and crossbows, and the horsemen and foot-soldiers also. There followed the watch of the lord magistrates. Then came a fine troop all in red, nobly and splendidly clad. Before them, however, went all the religious orders and the members of some foundations, very devoutly, all in their different robes.'

See Section II, The Post-Liberal Social Order, discussion on Habermas' distinction between the purposive-rational and symbolic-interactional societal systems.


See Section II, Postscript: liberal society as a total alienation

Historic conditions for the development of the Gothic Cathedral: Gothic architecture originated in thirteenth century France, reaching a spiritual depth and ascendancy unhampered by the political struggle which racked Germany over the investitures issue. France was then able to achieve an independence of church and state never achieved in Germany, a freedom which set the climate for the most intensely spiritualized consciousness and architecture of the medieval world. Gothic architecture stemmed also from a change in the meaning of Christianity. The Germanic form of Christianity of the Tenth through Thirteenth centuries (from which derived the Early Christian and Romanesque architecture which preceded the Gothic style) was for the common man an aloof force keeping evil at bay which would otherwise overwhelm the world. The Christian deity was an object of awe and terror, whose protection from evil forces was achieved only through sacrifices and gifts of money and land to the Church. In turn, the Church was seen as primarily a


82 1 PEVSNER, OP. CIT., PG. 93


85 1 MUMFORD, OP. CIT., PG. 319

86 1 SEE SECTION III, CRITIQUE OF POSITIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY, THE CRISIS OF POSITIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY

2 MUMFORD, OP. CIT., PG. 328

89 1 THE TERM 'PROFESSIONS' HERE DESIGNATES THE ARCHITECTURAL AND PLANNING FUNCTION AS A DISTINCT SOCIAL ROLE, RATHER THAN THE INSTITUTION OF THIS PRACTICE IN PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND LAWS REGULATING PRACTICE.

91 1 ARGAN, GIULIO, THE RENAISSANCE CITY, New York: Braziller, 1969, PG. 22
1. Michaelangelo's design of Renaissance fortifications as well as St. Peter's speaks for itself. The unity of both efforts might have been seen by Michaelangelo as the inherent fascination of the technical and aesthetic problems of both Church and fortifications as design issues, as well as their common princely/Church sponsorship. If so, such a conception of the unity of an artist's effort must have over-ridden the consciousness of the inherent contradictions between aggrandizing war and spiritual perfection.

2. The development of science is discussed in detail in Section II, The Liberal Social Order, The Problem of Method.
THE TERM 'LIBERAL' HAS SPECIFIC MEANINGS AS USED IN
THIS THESIS. UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED,
A) 'LIBERAL' REFERS NOT TO THE POLITICAL LEFT,
AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE 'CONSERVATIVES.' RATHER,
'LIBERAL' REFERS TO THE ORIGINAL LIBERALS WHO WERE
BOURGEOIS AND PETIT-BOURGEOIS CAPITALISTS,
LANDOWNERS AND PROFESSIONALS. THESE GROUPS WERE
ORIGINALLY ANTI-EQUALITARIAN AND SUPPORTED LAISSEZ-
FAIRE COMPETITION AND TRADE. THE 'LIBERAL' SOCIAL ORDER
WAS FOUNDED ON THE BASIS OF BOURGEOIS CLASS DOMINANCE
AND NOT THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND JUSTICE
WHICH THE TERM CONNOTES TODAY.
B) 'LIBERAL' IN THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION IS
SOMETIMES USED INTERCHANGEABLY WITH THE TERM 'CAPITALIST.'
BUT THE TWO TERMS HAVE DISTINCT MEANINGS: 'LIBERAL'
IS THE GENERIC TERM USED TO DISTINGUISH THE PRESENT
WESTERN SOCIETIES FROM THEIR MEDIEVAL AND ARISTOCRATIC
PRECURSORS. 'CAPITALIST' IS A FAR MORE PRECISELY-
DEFINABLE TERM (SEE THE DISCUSSION ON THE CAPITALIST
INSTITUTIONS IN SECTION II, THE LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER,
THE PROBLEM OF ORDER) REFERRING TO THE PARTICULAR FORM
OF PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL RELATIONS DERIVING FROM
THAT FORM OF PRODUCTION WHICH DOMINATES WESTERN
SOCIETY. TO CALL 'LIBERAL' A DESCRIPTION OF THE SOCIAL
FORM AND 'CAPITALIST' THE FORM OF THE LIBERAL ECONOMIC
SYSTEM IS A SERIOUS MISREPRESENTATION. IN LIBERAL
SOCIETY, THE 'ECONOMIC SYSTEM' IS TOTALIZING, DETERMINING
ALL SOCIAL RELATIONS WHICH HAD IN PREVIOUS SOCIETIES
BEEN INDEPENDENT OF THE SPHERE OF PRODUCTION. FOR
THIS REASON, 'CAPITALISM' CAN BE SUBSTITUTED AS A
MORE DESCRIPTIVE AND TECHNICALLY CORRECT REFERENCE
THAN 'LIBERALISM' TO THE DOMINANT WESTERN SOCIAL ORDER.

2 See Schroyer, Trent, Alienation and the Dialectical
Paradigm, Michigan: University Microfilms, Inc.,
1969

3 IBID., PG. 260

4 Ollman, Bertell, Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man
in Capitalist Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1971, PG. 135

113 1 See Section II, The Liberal Social Order, The Problem
of Order

2 Gintis, Herb, 'Activism and Counterculture' in
Telos, number 12, St. Louis, Washington University
Department of Sociology, 1972, PG. 45
On the level of the social order, class conflict has characterized all class societies; on the level of the self, deviance or pathology, alienation or resignation are basic responses.

See Section II, A Theory of the Nature of the Self

The concept of commodity fetishism allows a crucial insight into the meaning of architectural and planning products. The hypostazation of these products as real, the subject of an elaborated aesthetic and functional rationality independent of human relations, is a form of commodity fetishism. The building, the district, or the plan now assumes human qualities and is to be designed with an integrative unifying intent. Yet the human occupants and users of these products remain the same fragmented and alienated beings.

Gintes, op. cit., pg. 45

It is an intention of this thesis to establish a point of view outside the closed capitalist totality through uncovering its structure and posing alternate forms of its evolution. From a critical perspective, the dominant consciousness that the capitalist totality is a necessary reality can be altered, freeing peoples' potential for choice and self-determination.

However in any particular political situation, there may be several fragmented interests competing on the same or similar hierarchical levels—e.g. as in the struggle between poor whites and blacks for community control of housing and schools.

Paraphrased from Unger lecture, Feb. 6, 1974

This statement is supported through the historical study of the origins of capitalist appropriation of land, destruction of family, and dissolution of community of medieval Europe (see Dobb and Polanyi). Further, the domination and subsequent alienation and loss of community have become central 'unit-ideas' or themes of Western social thought (see works of Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Marx, Marcuse, Schroyer, Gintes, etc.)
This morality was instituted through the Enlightenment's valuing of progress, and the Protestant ethic of wealth as evidence of good works. Progress and wealth are of course still central values, as expressed in the contemporary form of commodity fetishism.

These ideas are derived and paraphrased from Unger

Paraphrased from Unger


There may be a connection between the dematerialization of objects under capitalism and the emphasis of the Modern Movement in architecture on transparency as a stylistic principle. See Section II, The Liberal Social Order, The Modern Movement.

Gouldner, op. cit.


See Section III, Critique of Positivist Epistemology.

An alternate system of critical knowledge, dialectical materialism, is discussed in Section III

Of course, value decisions are constantly being made on all societal levels. But these decisions must assume the givenness of the fundamental capitalist institutions.

The bourgeois of the early capitalist period defined themselves vis à vis the feudal and aristocratic classes as useful, valuable in terms of what they did rather than what they were: 'The middle class demand for usefulness was above all an attempt to revise the bases on which and hence the groups to which the public rewards and opportunities would be open.' (Gouldner, op. cit., pg. 64)

Schroyer, op. cit., pg. 265

Unger
Meaning is defined as the congruence between the ideal (the realization of self and social relations in terms of a comprehensible whole) and the actual experienced reality.

This argument is derived from Hanna Arendt in *The Human Condition*, op. cit.

Positivism is deliberately termed 'instrumental' to distinguish it from some of the most advanced twentieth-century scientific thought which is deeply dialectical and totalistic—e.g., the idea that energy can neither be created or destroyed but only changes its form. It is not claimed here (although the argument could be made) that the positivistic strain of the scientific method is itself a deliberate reflection of the interests of domination. But the method and social structure share the same principles of the separation of fact and value. Therefore the method, in its use by professionals, validates the claims of capitalists that liberal society, as a fact, is independent from value. The dominant form of knowledge, independent of the manifest intentions of its practitioners, is then strongly linked to the support of dominant social interests.

Note on class consciousness: The same separation of fact and value which stimulated the formation of theory has stimulated a class consciousness specific to if not unique in the liberal social order. Certainly the members of other class and estate-based social orders realized the nature of their social organization. The uniqueness of modern class consciousness is in its derivation from unlegitimated class domination.

A second origin of modern class consciousness was that the traditional unit of social interaction changed in liberal society. While the individual, family, or extended family was the basic social unit in earlier orders, the class and mass of people became a fundamental liberal social subject. This
FACT WOULD BE MORE APPARENT, BUT DELIBERATE SOCIAL HIERARCHICALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION OBSCURES THE CLASS UNITY BETWEEN APPARENTLY DIVERSE SOCIAL GROUPS.

AVOIDANCE AND PREVENTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LIBERAL TOTALITY CAN BE SEEN AS A STRATEGY TO AVERT A GENERALIZED CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE GREAT CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN LIBERAL CLAIMS AND LIBERAL REALITY. GENERALIZED CONSCIOUSNESS IN TURN IS THE PRECONDITION TO MAJOR SOCIAL CHANGE. THE LIBERAL CLAIM TO SATISFY HUMAN NEEDS THROUGH COMMODITY CONSUMPTION IS CONTRADICTED BY THE SUBORDINATION THROUGH CLASS DOMINATION OF HUMAN NEEDS TO THE NEEDS OF CAPITAL—A CONTRADICTION WHICH IF MADE CONSCIOUS WOULD BE POLITICALLY EXPLOSIVE. THE CONTRADICTION WOULD CONSTANTLY THREATEN TO UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITY OF CAPITALISTS WHO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION OF LEGITIMACY ONLY THROUGH THE POPULATION BEING ABLE TO CONSUME OR HOPE TO CONSUME A CONSTANTLY HIGHER STANDARD OF COMMODITY AND SERVICE (THE CURRENT WORLDWIDE INSTABILITY OF MAJOR GOVERNMENTS—THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, FRANCE, GERMANY, ENGLAND, ITALY, GREECE, AND OTHERS— IS STRONGLY AFFECTED BY THE WORKING CLASS'S INABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN COMMODITY CONSUMPTION, DUE TO WORLD-WIDE INFLATION.).

THIS ARGUMENT IS DERIVED FROM FRAMPTON, KENNETH, 'INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE CRISSES IN ARCHITECTURE' IN OPPPOSITIONS 1, NEW YORK: THE INSTITUTE FOR ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN STUDIES, SEPTEMBER, 1973, FOLLOWING ARENDT, OP. CIT.

ARENDT, OP. CIT., PG. 280
FRAMPTON, OP. CIT., PG. 61
TZONIS, OP. CIT., PG. 67
FRAMPTON, OP. CIT., PG. 63
IBID., PG. 65
CICHY, OP. CIT., PG. 364
IBID., PG. 366
BENEVELO, LEONARDO, HISTORY OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE, VOLUMES 1 AND 2, CAMBRIDGE: M.I.T. PRESS, 1971, PG. XXVII, VOLUME 1
FRAMPTON, OP. CIT., PG. 69
2 The problem of bourgeois culture is still unresolved. The bourgeois solution has been basically fashion in such cultural products as clothes, automobiles, interiors, and architecture. Fashion by definition is indeterminant, time-contingent, and thus constantly changing. These are precisely the qualities of commodity production, the consequence of the difficulty if not the impossibility of determining finite ends and values for an inherently limitless process.

3 Frampton, op. cit., pg. 69

4 Quoted in Frampton, pg. 69

151 1 Tzonis, op. cit., pg. 56

2 The evisceration of historical content of the appropriated forms parallels the liberal social and scientific substitution of the dominance of the individual for the social realm.

153 1 Tzonis, op. cit., pg. 57

2 Perrault's thought can be interpreted as the attempt within architectural theory to reverse the fragmentation of communality and the 'public space' in liberal society. His theoretical attempt failed probably because architectural theory and practice cannot itself put together communal and cultural meanings which are structurally fragmented in the social order.

155 1 Tzonis, op. cit., pg. 69

2 Voltaire

3 Tzonis, op. cit., pg. 71

156 1 Ibid, pg. 75

2 Such irrationality presages the paradox of the contemporary architect and planner who uses rational methods for maximizing utility in an irrational system which does not permit general, cross-class welfare.

158 1 Tzonis, op. cit., pg. 78

2 Much current social and environmental psychology research also does not understand the derivation of the 'human needs' which the research defines. As such, the research is a contemporary form of functionalism.

3 Lethaby, Design and Industry, quoted in Tzonis, op. cit
Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, quoted in Tzonis, op. cit.


Quoted in Sorkin, ibid.

Tzonis, op. cit., 82

The distinction between culture and utility is paralleled in the contemporary distinction, as articulated by Habermas, between intersubjective and purposive-rational action systems in society. See Habermas, Jurgen, Toward a Rational Society-Student Protest, Science, and Politics, Boston: Beacon Press, 1971, Ch. 6

Benevelo, op. cit., pg. XXXII, V. 2

Ibid., pg. 120

England was the first nation to become industrialized, followed by the continental states. National political consolidation was an important indicator of the rate of urbanization; parliamentary democracy was established as the political instrument of the English bourgeoisie in 1688, while Germany would consolidate into a nation only in the nineteenth century.

The conventional liberal interpretation that workers in early capitalism were grouped in factories and the industrial cities because of technological demands has been disproven by Steven Marglin in 'What do Bosses Do?', Harvard Institute of Economic Research, 1971. A major factor governing early urbanization was the imperative of social control of hierarchically-distinguished classes.

Bookchin, op. cit., pg. 58

Baron Haussmann's nineteenth-century reconstruction of Paris on first glance appears to follow the typical Baroque city plan of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries. But while Haussmann's broad avenues did serve the purpose of display and social control, they also constituted a distributive system for commodities and information which served the new requirements of capitalist production. A Baroque-based visual order serving a non-Baroque system of social relations is an example (along with the variety of primitive social orders using the same generic village plans and the appropriation of
CLASSICAL ARCHITECTURAL FORMS IN THE RENAISSANCE AND NEO-CLASSIC ARCHITECTURE) OF THE NECESSITY OF UNDERSTANDING THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL MEANINGS WHICH FORM AT A GIVEN TIME EMBODIES; HAUSSMANN USED THE VISUAL/SPATIAL FORMS OF A PREVIOUS SOCIAL ORDER TO EMBODY A DIFFERENT CONTENT OF SOCIAL RELATIONS.

While in the Nineteenth Century pre-liberal planning methods were applied (the Baroque or neo-classical ceremonial form of L'Enfant's Washington D.C. plan and Burnham's 'City Beautiful' plans; the British residential pattern; and the colonial checkerboard scheme), modern town planning was the dominant method.


2 Choay, ibid., quoting Le Corbusier; pg. 98

173 1 Benevolo, *Origins*, op. cit., pg. XIII

174 1 See Section II, *City Planning in America, Urban Planning as an Element of the State-Capital Planning System.*


176 1 Ibid., pg. 12

177 1 Benevolo, *History*, op. cit., pg. 48

178 1 Ibid., Report of the Health of Towns Commission of 1846

2 Ibid.

3 Benevolo, *Origins*, op. cit., pg. 147

180 1 The terms 'Modernist,' 'Modern Movement,' and 'International Style' are used interchangeably.

181 1 Benevolo, *History*, op. cit., quoting Bertrand Russell, pg. 377

2 Frampton, op. cit., pg. 70
MODERNISM AS A STYLE WAS RECOGNIZED EARLY IN ITS DEVELOPMENT BY H.R. HITCHCOCK IN _THE INTERNATIONAL STYLE_, 1932

It would be interesting to study the human meaning of the Modernist transformation of the Renaissance individual-based perspective into the space-time vision of modern architecture and planning.

Perspective itself succeeded a medieval, communal-based visual field. With space-time, the focus of perspectival lines of sight was shifted from the static Renaissance individual, but was not reconstituted into a communal vision. I would suspect that the very way that liberal women see is an alienation from self and communality.

211 2 IBID., 95

3 See Webber, Melvin, 'The Urban Place and the Nonplaced Urban Realm', in Explorations into Urban Structures, Melvin Webber, et. al., Philadelphia: 1964

4 Tzonis, op. cit., pg. 97

217 1 Goodman, op. cit., quoting a court ruling, pg. 151

221 1 Kuenzlen, op. cit., pg. 12

2 Stability and social control are not the only reasons for the rise of monopolies. In standard Marxist economics for example, the Law of the Falling Rate of Profit dictates that to maintain a constant profit level, production must expand and production costs must be lowered (See Sherman, Howard, Radical Political Economy: Capitalism and Socialism from a Marxist-Humanist Perspective, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972, pg. 371) The development of capitalist production entails both the expansion of the productive enterprise under the control of increasingly centralized authority, and the intensive use of science and technology to both create new products to sell and lower the costs of production by eliminating increasingly-expensive human labor.

222 1 Kuenzlen, op. cit., pg. 13

223 1 IBID., PG. 13

2 IBID., PG. 21

225 1 See O'Connor, James, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973; and Yoneoka, Brad, Term paper for Professor Vittorez's class in Regional Economics, Fall, 1973 at M.I.T., 1974 (unpublished)

2 While profits are generally quite attractive for developers, suppliers, contractors, investors and financial institutions, there is some long-run uncertainty for investment in the field. This uncertainty is due, among other reasons, to the use of the housing industry by the national government as a means of economic stabilization, of which the current housing moratorium and industry-wide recession is an example.

226 1 See Engels, Friedrich, On the Housing Problem
To the extent that the housing movement was taken as a serious response to social problems, it appropriated the myth that design is a more or less fundamental determinant of human behaviour. This idea was associated with the later ideology of the 'culture of poverty' which, it was suggested, is reproduced under conditions of environmental disorder. In turn, this disorder is reflected in the disordered lives of the urban poor. While the merits of the notion will not be debated here, the 'culture of poverty' ideology did serve to legitimize profit-taking by the housing establishment; such ideas are in fact functional to the socio-economic system which produces and continues to reproduce the conditions of urban squalor. Housing, while necessary in an absolute sense, has not in itself even approached dealing with the systemic forces which condition its practice.


Ibid., pg. 5

Ibid., pg. 20

Ibid., pg. 171


Ibid., pg. 240, my emphasis

Ibid., pg. 243

The original professions were medicine, law, and theology.


Ibid., pg. 39

Erber, op. cit., pg. 243, my emphasis

Gintis, op. cit., pg. 48

There is no connection between the construct of a 'post-liberal' social order and such ideas in good currency as the 'post-industrial' society and the 'end of ideology' (C.F. Daniel Bell, *The End of*
The conceptualization of the conflict between role and class was presented by Unger.

A recent example of the conflict of role and class is the New York City teachers' strike. The principle of meritocratically-allocated role (of the members of the teachers' union who achieved their position through their qualifications and merit as teachers) was challenged by the principle of class (the right of black communities to exert control over their schools, including the substitution of black for white teachers: using class or race as an important criterion).

This section is derived in part from Unger's presentation on the nature and meaning of community.

Praxis is defined as theory and practice intended towards the creation of a liberated society.
BOURGEIOS THOUGHT DEFINES IN ITS OWN TERMS THE ENTIRE UNIVERSE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND DISCOURSE. AS BUT A SINGLE AND PARTIAL EXAMPLE, A FEDERAL DECISION TO FINANCE OLD-AGE HOUSING ASSUMES A UNIVERSE OF DISCOURSE IN WHICH THE ELDERLY ARE NON-FUNCTIONING MEMBERS OF THE SOCIETY, OBJECTIVELY DEFINED (AND THUS STIMULATING A SELF-DEFINITION) AS SOCIALLY USELESS. THE ELDERLY ARE THEN HELD TO BE BEST HOUSED IN SEPARATE AND SPECIALIZED FACILITIES. THIS DEFINITION OF THE MEANING OF THE ELDERLY IN LIBERAL SOCIETY THEN SETS THE CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH THE ELDERLY, THEIR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATORS, ARCHITECTS AND PLANNERS ARE CONSTRAINED TO OPERATE.


IN ITS CONTEMPORARY FORMS, POSITIVISM EVEN ABSORBS RECENT PROCESS CONCEPTIONS OF REALITY. FOR EXAMPLE, SYSTEMS THEORY AND DYNAMIC TIME-BASED PLANNING METHODOLOGIES DEAL WITH CHANGE AND PROCESS, THE CONCERN OF CRITICAL DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM, WITHOUT BECOMING A CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIAL MEANING OF ITS SUBJECT.

KOLAKOWSKI, OP. CIT., PG. 205


AN EXAMPLE OF A FUNDAMENTAL PARADIGM SHIFT IS THE SUPPLANTING OF NEWTONIAN BY EINSTEINIAN PHYSICS. AT THE LEVEL OF MIDDLE-RANGE PLANNING THEORY, COMPREHENSIVE PHYSICAL PLANNING SHIFTED BY THE 1960'S AS A MAJOR EMPHASIS IN PRACTICE AND EDUCATION TO A CONCERN WITH NON-PHYSICAL SOCIAL AND URBAN POLICY PLANNING-A PARADIGM AT ONE LEVEL WHICH ITSELF IS BEGINNING TO SHIFT BACK TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS.

SEE GOODMAN, OP. CIT. (ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING); GOULDNER, OP. CIT. (SOCIOLGY AND SOCIAL THEORY); SHERMAN, OP. CIT. (ECONOMICS)

268 2. Engels, in *The Dialectics of Nature*, sees dialectics as applicable to not only the human but the natural world as well. Conceivably, evolutionary scientific theories and even systems theory could claim that they are dialectically based. Such fundamental laws of modern physics as the identity of all forms of matter is a dialectical concept. But beyond noting these examples, I will not enter the argument as to whether and how the natural world can be seen dialectically; this thesis treats dialectical materialism as a knowledge of the uniquely human sphere.

269 1 See Habermas, op. cit., ch. 6

2 Section II, The Liberal Social Order, the Problem of Order


272 1 Ibid., quoting Lenin, pg. 117

2 Dialectical and materialist philosophies have separately had long histories, from Plato and the earlier Greek philosophers to Hegel and Feuerbach. Marx and Engels, however, first joined the two philosophical streams into a dialectical materialism.


2 Hegel

3 The dialogue of psychoanalysis is a model of a liberating critical reasoning, in Habermas' view.


276 1 Ibid, pg. 27

277 1 The term 'class' used here in relation to the medieval social order refers loosely to both medieval class and estate relations.

2 Marcuse, op. cit.

278 1 See Ollman, op. cit. on the philosophy of internal relations, ch. 3
273 2 **Intentionality can be manifested as the form of the self, in the knowledge that women determine, or in the objects that they produce and create.**

282 1 Marcuse, op. cit.

293 1 This view is the content of standard architectural and planning histories (see Fletcher, Sir Banister, A History of Architecture: On the Comparative Method, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961; and Scully, op. cit.); positivist technocratic theory (see Dahl and Lindblom, op. cit.) and methodological scholarship (see DMG Journal and the Journal of the American Institute of Planners).

205 1 Freire, op. cit., pg. 36


2 2 Ibid., pg. 204

3 The intentional liberal atomization of understanding reflects the truth of Engel's comment that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made and isolated things, but as a complex of processes and interconnections (my paraphrase).

303 1 Citizen opposition to urban renewal is an example of the generation of consciousness through the experience of contradictions. Urban renewal was first justified (at least partially) in terms of object-relations; the environment would be 'cleaner,' more 'attractive' visually. These were externally-fabricated ideologies which masked the real justification of the function of urban renewal in asserting ruling-class control over valuable urban land. The reactions of the dominated classes removed from home and community pierced through the ideology of object-relations by asserting the human reality at its core. This reaction was an immanent critique, inherent in and emerging from the dynamics of class conflict rather than from the external ideology erected to mystify the true interests of domination behind urban renewal.

2 2 Habermas, op. cit., ch. 6


289 1 Ibid., pg. 133
However, practice is fraught with paradox. Radical transformative architectural and planning practice can only take place within a wider societal intention to critical social change, such practice may, like that of the Frankfurt School of critical theory, be restricted at present to theory. Engagement may only affirm the validity of the repressive society (c.f. Kurtz, Stephen A., WASTELAND: BUILDING THE AMERICAN DREAM, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967, pg. 116) for Wellmer (WELLMER, OP. CIT., pg. 132), the progressive rationalization of societal processes have only resulted in the progressive domination of wo/men.

Wo/men must be organized as a stratified yet homogenized labor force; must not control the productive process or the products of their labor; must see their alienation from self, community and environment as natural and right; must be educated to accept commodities as substitutes for human needs which can only be satisfied through a unified community; etc.

SECTION IV: CONCLUSION

Two such critiques are made in Master's theses by David Weinberg (M.I.T. 1974) and Frank Lewinberg (M.I.T. 1973). See also Gordon, op. cit.


Manoff, Robert, M.C.P. THESIS (M.I.T. c. 1972)
Another epistemological project is the attempt to apply linguistics and semiology to the structure of built form as a sign system—how the formal construction of the environment communicates meanings. Whatever its value, this approach is another form of object analysis which through its formal concerns eludes the process through which human beings create meaning through their encounter with built form in a subjective-objective unity. Further, the linguistics/semiology approach is inadequate to a liberative intention if it rests with description and is not critical.

Freire, op. cit., Ch. 4

Schroyer, op. cit., pg. 34

Kuenzlen, op. cit., pg 110

Insight of Alexander Tzonis

Kuenzlen, op. cit., pg. 97
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