GHETTO DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES: AN EVALUATIVE ANALYSIS

by

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The central focus of this study concerns an evaluation of various methods that have been utilized to provide for structural improvements in the social, economic and political conditions in depressed inner-city communities. This process is referred to as "ghetto development".

After examining the broad range of definitions of development and projecting scenarios of "developed ghettos", the direction of the discussion turns to defining types of development agents or entities that execute development programs. Of those investigated, the study identifies community-based agents that emerge from circumstances within ghetto communities as the most viable and effective tool for inner-city reconstruction.

The remainder of the study concerns an evaluation of alternative resource organization patterns (defined as unbalanced and balanced growth strategies) that community-based agents employ as a means of obtaining over-all objectives. Towards this end, two organizations are scrutinized in case studies. The emphasis of the analysis concerns the relative advantages and disadvantages encountered while employing either unbalanced or balanced growth strategies.

Although the case studies cannot provide extensive enough information to determine whether one development technique is uncategorically better suited for all development agents and ghetto communities than the other, it does provide insights into their relative effectiveness with very specific situations and thus a context for viewing the larger number of activities taking place in the field.

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Introduction

"Within the Black community at this very moment are dozens of proposals, scores of ideas, all focusing on the basic question of what are the most promising techniques for bringing about substantial improvement in the position of Blacks in this country. Whites have a variety of ideas, and Black folk even more. Reputations and careers are built on this very topic. Presumably some of them have merit. All of them cannot because many of them are mutually exclusive or proceed from mutually contradicting premises. But in the absence of any remarkable wisdom as to which are more promising and which are less, one is constrained to sample them all..."

--Julian Bond

Of the full range of proposals and ideas concerning what direction the minority populations in this country should take, this thesis examines one set of issues, centering on the urban situation. In recent years, a great deal of attention has been given to finding the means of solving the problems of the nation's central cities. Typified by their high concentrations of minority populations and depressed social, economic and political conditions, the "inner-city" areas have been the subject of intense discussion and debate. A series of questions remain unanswered, concerning the causal factors behind their formation; the reasons for their seemingly unwillingness
to "go away" (despite the allocation of billions of dollars in remedial action programs); and above all, what must now be done to improve the lot of the people who dwell there. Alternative suggestions are plentiful and diverse - spanning from plans that call for immediate dispersal to plans calling for an all-out reconstruction effort. In this study, I plan to investigate issues surrounding recommendations that call for the latter plans.

The notion of "inner-city reconstruction" (referred to as "ghetto development") implies a host of things to different people. For example, the center city business sector may envisage an effort that strengthens and expands the economic base of the community; whereas the Black politician, contrastingly, designs a plan that will increase community cohesion and provide for greater political solidification. Thus, it is essential that the concept be clearly defined from the beginning. In the first section, the problems of defining ghetto development are discussed at length. From this discussion two things are accomplished. First, a definition is proposed that reflects my perspective. Secondly, an evaluative criteria is constructed for analyzing specific development methods.

The central focus of the thesis concerns alternative techniques that community-based development agents utilize
for fulfilling the task at hand. In Chapters III (3) and IV (4), I define "development agents". Further, two types, alien and indigenous, are characterized. These are entities that execute development programs. I refer to them as counter-type agents because they originate from opposing forces and circumstances. The alien type is derived from conditions outside of the ghetto. The latter emerges from conditions inside such communities. I have assumed that the Alien Agent is an ineffective tool for obtaining development objectives; and it is discussed only to provide a more dimensional interest for reviewing the Indigenous Agent.

After defining what ghetto development entails and characterizing the types of entities (or agents) that execute development programs, in Chapter V (5) certain techniques of development are presented. More specifically, the techniques under investigation concern the manner in which Indigenous Agents organize themselves - their organizational structure and resources - to obtain the goals of ghetto development. As shown, this is a critical determining factor in whether or not the agent can maintain itself as well as capably perform the tasks that await it. I refer to the process as balanced and unbalanced growth strategies. In employing the unbalanced growth strategy, the agent organizes its energies and resources to engage
in a singular activity or project. In turn, this project is utilized as a generation to stimulate over-all development goals. Correspondingly, when employing the balanced growth strategy, the agent organizes resources to engage in a number of diverse activities or projects as a means of providing for ghetto development. Briefly, the central question of the thesis is which of these perspectives on growth strategies is best suited to the tasks awaiting Indigenous Agents.

Naturally, time and resources constrain me from attempting to come to any universal conclusions as to whether community or Indigenous Agents are apt to be more successful when selecting the unbalanced over the balanced strategy, or vice versa. What I am looking for, however, is to gain some insight into which of the two strategies tend to be more suitable. Towards this end I plan to make a comparative analysis through reviewing two case studies. One involves an analysis of a community-based agent that has utilized the unbalanced growth strategy; and the other is an analysis of one that has utilized the opposing method, the balanced strategy. In order to strengthen the validity of the study, I have chosen to review agents who function in relatively similar situations. The first, the Tenants' Development Corporation (TDC) is based in the South End of Boston. This organization started its
activities in the late 1960's protesting inadequate housing conditions of Blacks and poor residents in the area. After a long and enduring protest movement, the corporation was given the tools required to develop its own housing. It has used the activities in that area as the primary generator of comprehensive ghetto development. Roxbury Action Program (RAP), the second agent, is based in the Highland Park district of Boston's Black community of Roxbury. This organization initiated its program around the same time that TDC began its actions. RAP also started out in response to inadequate housing conditions. After establishing its independence from the American Friends Service Committee, it embarked on a development program consisting of a number of diverse projects as its means of effecting comprehensive change.

Thus, the thesis provides an opportunity to examine two community-based development organizations - one choosing the unbalanced strategy over the balanced growth. The primary question concerns which organization has proven to be more effective in producing improvements in their respective community. Again, the evaluation will not provide all of the answers concerning growth strategies, but it can allow me to draw some conclusions on what happened in two very specific situations.
FOOTNOTES


2 Economists studying the problems of development of underdeveloped nations have generated a theory of balanced and unbalanced growth strategies. Although my concept of ghetto development encompasses more than purely economic development, for lack of better terms, I have chosen to borrow these. The concept will be explained in more detail in the thesis. (For more information see: Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven, 1958), Chapters 3-4; P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe", Economic Journal, 53 (June-September, 1943), 205; Ragnar Nurske, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (Oxford, 1953), Chapter 1).
SECTION ONE

Introduction

The foremost important step in carrying on a meaningful discussion of ghetto development is to define the subject. The term "ghetto development" implies action - and calls for a host of conflicting goals, policies and programs. The central intent of the first section is to construct a definition of ghetto development that can reflect the broad range of definitions that development strategists have proposed, as well as one that can serve as the criterion on which the organizations in the case studies can be evaluated.

In the first chapter, entitled "The Problem of Definition", I review the full range of definitions of ghetto development. These definitions speak to the strategies of development, or the means of accomplishing development objectives. I have arbitrarily chosen to categorize the definitions into three basic strategies. The strategies are distinguished from one another from the emphasis their authors have placed on either the social, political or economic conditions in the ghetto; and stress they have given the importance of formulating policies and programs designed to remedy one of those conditions, as opposed to the others.
In the second chapter, entitled "The Developed Ghetto", I first highlight the differences between the three strategies. This is done through projecting scenarios, on what reconstructed ghettos would look like - socially, politically, and economically - should each of the three strategies be utilized as the exclusive basis for a development effort. Secondly, I propose my own views on ghetto development; and present a fourth scenario forecasting the new community that would result should this strategy be put to work and used as the basis of all development activities.

The presentation in Section I is designed to accomplish two things. First, I have attempted to point out the significant opposing views that presently exist in the field. Secondly, I have pointed out where the opposing views merge and have suggested my perspective on the correct route to building a viable community from ghetto areas.

As mentioned, the thesis analyzes and evaluates the activities of two development agents. The primary objective of the first section is to establish an evaluative criterion. One that is both sensitive to the three perspectives in the field as well as to my own position on what ghetto development activities should entail. It is within this context that the organizations examined in the case studies will be evaluated.
CHAPTER I: THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION

Perhaps the most difficult task in undertaking a study of ghetto development is to pinpoint a definition that adequately reflects the conflicting views of those involved in the field. Any attempt to implement a development strategy that encompasses all possible alternatives would immediately come to naught. This is because some objectives inherently conflict with others. Thus, it would be entirely impossible to generate development activity through utilizing such an approach. Before attempting to define ghetto development, some comment is due on the two words themselves.

First a "ghetto" has traditionally referred to a segregated community of Jewish persons. Such communities were typical in European cities prior to the close of World War II. As a result of its common usage during the civil rights movement of the late Fifties and Sixties, the term has been expanded to also describe: "A quarter of a city in which minority or cultural groups live, especially because of social, legal or economic pressure".

There are a series of problems encountered when attempting to determine what constitutes a ghetto and what criteria should be used in judging whether a particular urban area can be identified as such. Though these issues
are interesting and important, they lie outside of the central focus of the thesis. However, it is appropriate to mention some of the more common factors that indicate ghetto conditions are prevalent in a given community:

1. Large concentration of racial minority populations, usually Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and/or those of Mexican descent;
2. Disorganized political conditions, characterized by under-representation of constituents in the main political processes, inadequate political organizational structure and minimal control over infra-structure facilities and the delivery of public services;
3. Depressed economic conditions, characterized by low incomes, high unemployment rates, poor housing stock, inefficient tax base and relatively slow commercial and industrial activity yielding low capital gains; and
4. Depressed social situation, characterized by lack of community cohesion and high crime rates.

For now, "development" should be seen as a cluster of activities designed to alleviate or eliminate some or all of the above type of conditions. Some strategists would argue that all activity operating against undesired
conditions should be considered a part of the over-all ghetto development strategy. Others, of course, would hold that few activities presently taking place could be identified as such. In any case, a conditional factor that most would agree on is that the activity should be designed to remedy causal factors as opposed to merely attacking observable symptoms.

After examining the full range of definitions of ghetto development proposed by the strategists, I have found it useful to classify definitions according to three basic strategies. This chapter presents an overview of the definitions; and classifies them according to whether social, political, or economic development factors are placed at the heart of the over-all strategy.

In the first category, termed the "Collective Effort Strategies", I examine definitions that emphasize social aspects of development and stress the importance of creating a new social order within the ghetto communities. The mode of development is seen as one whereby all socio-economic classes within the ghetto participate in the development effort on an equalitarian basis. These definitions demand programs that allow the "grassroots", or poor, as well as middle-class ghetto residents to share the responsibilities of decision-making and management of affairs. The poor as well as the wealthy should share
in the benefits the community might accrue as a result of development activities. I have termed the second category the "Nationalist Strategies". I point out definitions that stress the importance of gaining political control over all the institutions of the ghetto. In this case, the primary issue is perceived as a racial struggle between powerless Blacks and powerful whites. I refer to the third category as the "Black Capitalist Strategies". The definitions reviewed here emphasize the economic aspects of development. Development is seen as a process of creating and expanding black business enterprise through corporate investments in ghetto communities.

It is important to point out that the strategies do not oppose one another in absolute terms; nor are they mutually exclusive. Rather, each of the strategies recognize a need for comprehensive development plans encompassing social, political, and economic objectives. The distinctions between them are made on which of the three objectives holds the center stage of attention in the over-all program. Through drawing distinctions along these lines, I have attempted to shed light on the full myriad of difficulties involved in defining the terms - ghetto development.
"The Collective Effort Strategies"

The Collective Effort Strategies are those that emphasize the social aspects of the ghetto environment over either the political or economic aspects. The proponents call for policies and programs that can enhance the lower-class of the ghetto and given them in a collective manner, the reins of political and economic power. Rather than reconstructing ghetto areas in a manner that is similar to other more viable communities, the proponents of this strategy propose radical social transformation. They stress the importance of allowing ghetto residents, regardless of socio-economic class, to participate in the development process; and to share equally in the responsibilities of community, as well as in the benefits that accrue from redevelopment. The need for a collective effort, as the basis of ghetto development is suggested by Thomas Vietoriz and Bennet Harrison in their essay "Ghetto Development, Community Corporations and Public Policy". The economist emphasizes a development process that will build community ownership and control over the social, political and economic ghetto institutions:

"For us, 'ghetto development' refers to an over-all social and economic transformation with a large increase in the diversity of higher economic and institutional functions which ghetto residents are capable of sustaining, matched by a decisive improvement in the cohesion of the ghetto community (in other words, we are talking about institutional
binding and not merely increasing the per capita income). Specifically, we envisage the creation of a number of 'inside jobs', acquisition by the community of assets both inside and outside the ghetto, a substantial expansion of existing black businesses (particularly through cooperative forms of ownership), the large scale transfer of ghetto property to ghetto residents and community qua community, emphasis on the promotion of pre-vocational skills and training within these ghetto enterprises, and local control of community political institutions such as schools, police, health facilities..."2

Vietoriz and Harrison call for an "over-all social and economic transformation" of the urban ghetto community. Beyond calling for the more orthodox programs, e.g., job creating and training, expansion of Black enterprise, acquisition of ghetto property by ghetto residents, etc., they suggest a certain mode under which development should take place. Among other things, the development must build social cohesion, as opposed to merely increasing per capita income of the residents. Moreover, the definition calls for development strategies that will provide for community or cooperative ownership of the end product (and the processes towards reaching those goals). This definition depicts a development strategy that would allow the ghetto community to be reconstructed from a process that is quite unsimilar to the method in which the country's communities have traditionally either developed or have been renewed. Also, the emphasis of community ownership of development ghetto is again unlike the ownership patterns that presently exist in viable urban communities.
Blaustien and Faux have also stressed the need for collective effort development. In their documentary *The Star Spangled Hustle*³, after making a sweeping indictment of ghetto development programs initiated under the Nixon administration, the authors point out:

"Community development corporations represent poor and minority people trying to pool their talents and resources to create economic opportunities for themselves and neighbors. They do not represent investors trying to maximize their return on their investments..."⁴

As in the former case, Blaustien and Faux propose broad development programs. Here they indicate that government and private enterprise must hold:

"...thus, there is a limit to the amount of funds that they (poor and minority) can raise in their own communities from outsiders for business ventures. Therefore, they have to turn to the federal government...and other charitable institutions for sources of capital..."⁵

A more radical perspective of the collective effort strategy is presented in the works of Black socialist Earl Ofari. After bitterly attacking both the nationalist and Black capitalist approaches, Ofari provides his own definition of ghetto development:

"Planned economic development and control are crucial for the building of some types of Black community institutions...Traditional business enterprise, as has been shown, is simply not the vehicle...reorganization of priorities demands
that...energies of the 'grassroots' Black masses must be organized and channeled. Credit, capital investment, as well as income distribution can be equalized only through some mode of planned sharing...business cannot be run, either by individuals or corporately for the benefit of a few...they must be community controlled and operated...The production, distribution, and marketability of goods...vital decision-making processes must be expanded to include the full range of Black participation..."6

Ofari's comments vividly depict the more radical perspectives of the collective effort strategy. Development is seen as a process whereby the residents of the ghetto (that is the poor and minority residents) are given the power to control the economic and political activities of their communities. The masses in a socially egalitarian way maintain control over the developed ghetto.

Opponents of the collective effort strategy dismiss its more radical provisions on the grounds that they lack a pragmatic basis. They argue that by utilizing a collective effort approach, important modifications would first have to be made in the larger political and economic institutions in which the ghetto functions. Further, they point out that the American power structure simply lacks the flexibility required to allow it to accept principles and arrangements that basically contradict the foundations upon which it has been constructed. Further, some other opponents question the ability of the "masses" to carry out the role of full control in that they lack the knowledge
and skill to do so. More criticisms of the cooperative strategy will be forthcoming while discussing the nationalist and Black capitalist strategies of ghetto development.
"The Nationalist Strategies"

The Nationalist Strategies emphasize political problems in the ghetto over either social or economic problems. The proponents of this strategy point out the necessity of gaining political independence from the white power structure as the means of achieving social and economic freedom for ghetto communities. Here, the correct development strategy is one that transfers political power from the hands of whites to the hands of Blacks.

Emerging from the civil rights movement of the Sixties, Stokely Carmichael became one of the first contemporary advocates of a nationalist development strategy. Carmichael likened the Black community to an "internal colony". In their documentary Black Power, Carmichael and Hamilton analyze the ghetto situation as one where Blacks have little control over the daily events shaping their lives:

"The black community perceives the 'white power structure' in very concrete terms. The man in the ghetto sees his white landlord come only to collect exhorbitant rents and fails to make necessary repairs while both know that the white-dominated city building inspection department will wink at violations or impose only slight fines. The man in the ghetto sees the white policemen on the corner brutally manhandle a black drunkard in the doorway... he sees streets in the ghetto lined with un-collected garbage and knows the powers which could send trucks to collect the garbage is white. When they don't, he knows the reason: the low political esteem in which the black community is held..."
Nationalist oriented Peter Labrie also emphasized the control aspects of ghetto development. While refuting Kain's ghetto dispersal theory, Labrie depicts the nationalists' strategy towards development:

"To remove these constrictions does not imply a large scale displacement and removal of ghetto blacks to the suburbs... the problem then is one of creating conditions which remove the political and economic constrictions on existing ghettos and encourage their inhabitants to assert themselves in the control and management of their community environment. Such control and management are at the very heart of the black struggle to achieve a wholesome and decent life..."9

Unlike the proponents of a collective effort strategy, the nationalist approach assumes that the social and economic arrangements inside of the ghetto are basically functional and viable. The central problem is to remove white political controls which prevent the social and economic institutions from functioning in the interest of ghetto constituents. The following passage reflects this view:

"Ghetto rebuilding is seen as a process already at work in efforts by black community groups to attain control over various governmental business and educational activities within ghetto areas. The proposals for rebuilding consist simply of recommending long-range organizational forms towards which these efforts should be directed if blacks are to attain control over their community environment..."10
Numerous forms of utilizing a nationalist strategy for ghetto development have emerged throughout the years. Some have been a response to Carmichael and Hamilton's Black Power; others have evolved quite independently from that approach. One method that is receiving more attention is promoted by the Honorable Elijah Muhammad and the Black Muslims of America.

The Black Muslims have implemented economic development programs in a number of urban ghetto areas. Although the long-range objectives call for complete geographic, political and economic separation from the United States, their ghetto development strategies are designed to bring immediate benefits to members, as well as other ghetto residents.

In Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau defines political power as "the psychological control over the minds of men". Indeed, the most significant achievement of the Muslims has been their ability to instill the political concept of Black nationhood into the minds of their membership. The concept of nationhood has served as the primary motivating force behind their economic development program.

The Muslims perceive the Black population in the country as a nation. Thus, depending upon the population's location (either urban or rural), each individual
has certain tasks to fulfill in developing the "Nation of Islam". Briefly, their development strategy combines an agricultural base that produces basic goods; and an urban market to distribute and market the goods. Ghetto development, among other things, is seen as a process of encouraging and strengthening the agricultural-urban market system. The process provides jobs, as well as services and goods, while at the same time increases the assets owned and controlled by Muslims (and therefore the Black community).

To indicate the necessity for political independence, the Black Muslims refuse to accept financial or other support from whites. All of the capital that has been made available for their economic program has been generated by members of the Nation or from donations given by the Black community. In this manner, the Muslims have stressed the importance of rebuilding communities.

Overall, the Muslims plan to develop parallel institutions that provide Black communities with an entirely separate governmental institution. They hold that Black Americans must reject all aspects of American or Western society and embrace the Islamic Religion (as applied to their distinct situation).14
The Muslims' approach to ghetto development has received attention from all quarters. The successes of the Nation of Islam, through utilizing a self-help, self-determination approach has generated new interest in from various development strategists. The usually conservative Black Enterprise magazine remarked:

"In recent years, the Muslims have compiled a record of economic achievement that has won grudging respect even from critics who previously dismissed them as anti-white separatists. The Muslim philosophy has not changed, but their fortunes have...Today their financial holdings, though modest, demand a new assessment."16

Despite favorable comments given their economic program, the Muslims' approach has been rejected by many development strategists (that both support and oppose the nationalist perspective). First, it is argued, that the theocratic power structure on which the Nation of Islam functions denies personal freedom to members (which includes a denial of democratic procedures - the Nation's activities). Secondly, the Muslims are accused of holding a Black racist position against whites; and ultimately seek physical confrontation with the American power structure.

The collective effort development strategy attacks the nationalists on the grounds that it accepts or at least condones the present socio-economic structure. They point
out that nationalists only desire to place institutions that exploit ghetto residents into the hands of Blacks (and not necessarily the Black masses). Earl Ofari criticizes Carmichael and Hamilton's work Black Power on those grounds:

"According to them (Carmichael and Hamilton), any merchant operating in the Black community should be prepared to "reinvest" 40 to 50 percent of their profits in that community. They are apparently prepared to allow merchants who are busily engaged in the economic blunder of the Black community to keep up their activities as long as they agree to share a certain percentage of the spoils with the Black community...

Carmichael and Hamilton, by their giving approval to the present structure of ghetto economics, i.e., the merchants' exploitation of Black workers, reveal a certain unawareness regarding basic capitalistic economic practice..." 

Beyond the attacks launched by collective effort development strategists, the Black capitalist architects also denounce the nationalist perspective. Black capitalist protagonists maintain that the nationalists attempt the impossible. The urban ghetto cannot be politically or physically separated from the over-all American structure. Programs designed to do so are impracticable because they fail to recognize the need to include the resources and experienced government and private enterprise in the reconstruction of the ghetto. Moreover, they argue that the "ghetto problem" is not a problem either caused or shared by Blacks alone. Rather, the
ghetto problem is an American problem; and can only be solved through activities that include the efforts of all concerned. Moreover, that solution is part of the larger political process and not adrift from it.

The nationalist strategy differs from both other perspectives in that it emphasizes necessarily a racial issue over all other factors. Ghetto development is seen as a process where the chief task concerns the political struggle of Blacks to gain full control of matters effecting their lives and environment away from the hands of whites.
"Black Capitalist Strategies"

Black Capitalist Strategies emphasize economic considerations of the ghetto environment over social or political factors. Ghetto development is defined as a process of formulating massive amounts of capital in the nation's ghetto economies. Proponents of this strategy call for policies and programs that will significantly strengthen and expand the Black business section of the ghetto community. Through accomplishing these ends, the ghetto economy can be integrated into the national economic structure; and Black businesses can then provide the resources of over-all ghetto development.

Proponents of the Black capitalist effort have called upon government and private enterprise to make special provisions for the urban ghetto which would stimulate its economy and ultimately provide access to the mainstream economy. Unlike other ethnic groups, they point out that the Black community, for a number of reasons, was never given the opportunity to awaken its economic potential and compete in the mainstream system. Social critic Harold Cruse points out:

"The Black economy idea is neither myth nor concrete reality. The ingredients exist and merely await skillful organizational use and application. America is a nation that abounds
in many myths and many realities. The greatest myth is that of democratic capitalism. Minorities could not have won their way into different levels of economic status if it were not through some form of group economics - either capitalistic or cooperative. Some added group politics (the Irish), and others even used group crime (the Mafia), and its reward as the key to economic respectibility. The American Jews could not have won their way into the economic power they now possess if not through various forms of group solidarity. For reasons too numerous to explain here, the American Negro, especially in New York, has failed to learn and practice his economic group responsibilities in the promised land of the North. 19

The Black capitalist strategy is one of pragmatic economies, as opposed to more idealistic programs that demand radical shifts in social and political power arrangements or requires Black communities to separate from the mainstream national operations. Schuchter emphasizes the pragmatism of the Black capitalist strategy:

"The pragmatic question for blacks should become, 'How can the current maldistribution of income and economic power in American society be remedied without seriously infringing on the prerogatives of the supercorporations, the ideology of the business system and the rewards of more privileged groups in the economy?' 20

The Black capitalist strategy calls upon Black enterprise to carefully examine the political situation (as it exists) and exploit that situation, wherever possible, for economic advantages. The key requirement in this approach is to increase the flow of capital into ghetto communities in order to make Black enterprise a more
viable institution. Only after the risks of investment can be reduced, can such areas be made profitable for further investment. Strong Black enterprise will provide the necessary medium to create desired changes in the ghetto environment.

The thrust of the Black capitalist argument is simply that ghetto development is the process of providing a means of rebuilding the central city economy by reinforcing and expanding Black enterprise. Once developed, Black enterprise can then provide jobs, and profits to alleviate the critical political and social ailments in the community. Theodore Cross defined Black capitalism as follows:

"...The strategy which argues the creation of new jobs and profit centers inside ghetto area. The program also seeks to transfer the ownership of ghetto businesses from whites to Black control, at the same time building in the ghetto new banks, insurance companies, production and service facilities. Today Black capitalism is an insignificant economic force in America."21

An important feature of the Black capitalist strategy for ghetto development is that present capital in the ghetto simply cannot compete with the massive capital assets of private enterprise. Urban planner Arnold Schuchter presents a vivid description of this problem:
"Most blacks grow up on what can be described as a pre-capitalistic society within America. Disconnected from the American business system and environment, their understanding of the workings of white American capitalism probably is not much greater than their knowledge of Communism in the Soviet Union. At the same time, even without much understanding of the economic workings of American society, black militants realized the virtual impossibility of radical economic and social changes in American capitalism in the foreseeable future, such nationalization of supercorporations, redistribution of concentrated wealth, or redirection of the main flow of national economic activity away from market forces toward priority social areas..."22

It has been argued that the reasons behind the relatively insignificant involvement of the Black community in the larger economy stems from historical and contemporary racial discrimination, as well as economic exploitation by white government and private enterprise against Blacks. The Gary Black Political Convention's mandate spoke to those issues charging:

"The economic impoverishment of the Black community in America is clearly traceable to the historic enslavement of our people and to the racist discrimination to which we have been subjected since 'emancipation'. Indeed, much of the unprecedented economic wealth and power of American capitalism has obviously been built upon this exploitation of Black people."23

The argument continued that those who have been responsible for such discrimination and exploitation through either design or neglect, must now "pay" for their past actions. Urban economist Robert Browne carefully outlines the basic reasons and objectives of the demand for reparations to the Black community:
1. To punish (or expiate) the white community for the sins of slavery committed by its ancestors and oblige it to pay retribution to the descendants of slaves;

2. To provide the black population with restitution for the unpaid labor of its slave ancestors;

3. To redirect to blacks that portion of the national income which has been diverted from blacks to whites as a result of slavery and post-emancipation racial discrimination;

4. To provide the black community with the share of the national wealth and income which it would by now have had if it had been treated as other immigrant communities were, rather than enslaved.

My list is illustrative rather than exhaustive, and there is some overlap among some of the suggested objectives. ²⁴

Although the supporting ideology of the Black capitalist position can be traced far into the annals of American history, the decade of the Seventies has generated a number of new leaders and programs along these lines. Black capitalist proponents have adopted numerous strategies for both receiving and utilizing reparations for development purposes. Seemingly, three basic designs have been formulated:

1. Direct transformation of capital to Black enterprise;

2. Transfer of presently white controlled corporate assets to control by Blacks;

3. Government intervention aimed to assist and expand existing Black enterprise.
In a shocking demonstration before the large racially integrated Grove Church in New York, civil rights militant James Foreman delivered the "Black Manifesto", addressed to "The White Christian Churches and Jewish Synagogues in the United States and All Other Racist Institutions". Prepared by the National Black Economic Development Conference held in Detroit in April of 1969, the mandate called upon the churches to deliver a sum of $5,000,000,000 in reparations to the Black community for participation in the continuing exploitation and discrimination of the Church against the Black community. Also, the Manifesto called for a number of agencies to be established to deliver the funds to urban ghettos, as well as poverty-stricken regions of the rural Black South.25

The Manifesto signaled the initiation of a trend on the part of the Black community to solicit reparations from the white community to pay for racial discrimination and to provide needed resources for capital formulation in minority communities. From this point, the demand for reparations took on various forms calling for programs and activities that would develop the ghetto.

One interesting proposal on reparations suggested by Richard America, called for the strategy of literally transferring a representative percentage of white corporate assets to the hands of Black businessmen in the community.
America presented the proposal in an essay entitled "What Do You People Want?" The rationale behind this approach is summarized here:

"The belief in the myth of rugged individualism; the espousal of Black individualism while forgetting the history of public support for whites special economic interest; the general ignorance of U.S. history - these attitudes...are vividly held by whites...The establishing and nurturing of small businesses, now being undertaken on an increasing scale, does not satisfy the need for significant economic independence and self-determination...only large enterprises will satisfy that requirement and they take a long time to develop.

All large businesses in the United States, with the exception of two or three, are owned and operated by whites. If relative economic parity is to be reached in one generation, some must be transferred to Blacks..."26

America makes himself quite clear, contending the strategy which provides the most direct route of Black participation in the over-all economy would be to change the hands of some corporate power from white to Black. Though some considerations have been given to this approach, neither the government or the private sector has taken significant steps towards adapting policies of this nature.

The conservative era of the Seventies, characterized by the Nixon administration, reviewed the major domestic spending of the poverty programs sponsored by the Kennedy-Johnson administrations and vehemently attacked many of them on the grounds that they failed to produce significant
change in the urban ghettos. Further, the Republican administration seemed to advocate a new role for government.

Rather than direct intervention, the government should use its powers to bridge the gap between corporate America and the ghetto. The object of the new approach would be to encourage corporate investment in the inner-city, as opposed to merely continuing to spend federal dollars on poverty programs. A number of leading militants from the civil rights movement perceived the new federal direction as a potential new means of constructing a Black capitalist effort. Among such men was Roy Innis, Executive Director of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE). In a white paper entitled "Separatist Economics: A New Social Contract", Innis presented his and the views of CORE on how the Black community should work with government and private enterprise to create new opportunities in ghetto communities. In critiquing Innis' position, Blaustien and Faux remark:

"Innis thinks that black ghettos such as Harlem were in many ways similar to underdeveloped countries. But since the ghettos lack political boundaries that would permit them to protect their own industries, they needed to create special protections to assure the loyalty of black consumers and to assure that the profits will be used in the best interest of the black community...

Why should the white establishment help blacks attain independent power? Innis' answer: 'Enlightened self-interest on the part of those who hold real power in society'. Not liberal politicians, or the
labor bosses...but the corporate businessmen, who have a greater stake in avoiding racial warfare...”28

The proposed new coalition between the government, Black capitalist and the American corporate structure would be needed to provide the capital to develop ghetto communities. Through initial corporate "risk" investment, aided by government incentives, resources would be available to solidify and expand Black enterprise. The profits made from the reinforced enterprise could be used to strengthen the economy of the ghetto as a whole, and make it even more profitable for corporate investment (by removing risk). Thus, an upward spiral effect would take place that would eventually evolve the ghetto economy into the mainstream economic system.

The opponents of the Black Capitalists Strategies contend that the expansion of the ghetto's business sector is simply not enough to create the kinds of changes required to improve community life for all ghetto residents. Further, they argue that the Black Capitalist approach ignores important political and social considerations operating both inside and outside of the ghetto structure that must be modified before or during the redevelopment process.

Some opponents condemn the new relationship that Black
Capitalists have proposed between Black enterprise and the national corporate structure. That relationship is viewed as an alliance in which Black enterprise will be given a greater portion of profits (accumulated from exploiting the Black community) in exchange for allowing white business to gain a greater economic hold over the urban ghetto. Moreover, opponents content that Black Capitalist Strategies will only create greater internal conflicts within the ghetto by significantly increasing the gap between the Black middle-class and the larger, less fortunate lower classes. Such factionalisms, it is argued, will inadvertently destroy all vestiges of community social cohesion and political unity.
Conclusion

The definitions of ghetto development I have reviewed speak to strategies of development. These strategies have been categorized into three distinguishable perspectives; each emphasizing one aspect of the community - either the social, political or economic - over the others. Correspondingly, the definitions call for a different set of goals, policies and programs reflecting the most important objectives of a particular strategy.

An interesting question arises. What kind of community would result should ghetto communities select only one of the three strategies and utilize it as the exclusive basis of a development effort? That is, how would the various aspects of community life be characterized? In the following chapter, I examine this question. I have constructed scenarios on what the reconstructed ghettos might look like if any one of the three strategies gained universal acceptance and was utilized as the basis for a nation-wide ghetto development effort.

The scenarios do not reflect ideal communities. Rather, they reflect what I consider to be "unbalanced" reconstructed ghettos, in the sense that the strategists have ignored what was occurring in other aspects of the community environment while concentrating their energies on improving one condition. Following, I present my views on a viable developed ghetto.
FOOTNOTES


2 Ibid, pp. 29-30.


5 Ibid., p. 181.


8 Ibid., p. 9.


10 Ibid., p. 98.


16 Ibid., p. 23.

17 S. Carmichael and C. Hamilton.

18 Ofari, p. 88-89.


22 Schuchter, p. 137.


25 The "Black Manifesto" is published in its entirety in A. Schuchter, Reparations, pp. 210-219.


28 Blaustien and Faux, p. 49.
DISCLAIMER

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CHAPTER II: THE DEVELOPED GHETTO

In this chapter, I present my views on what constitutes the correct route to reaching the Developed Ghetto. I also project a scenario that illustrates the social, political and economic characteristics of the transformed community. This scenario indicates what the ghetto should look like after my version of a development effort obtains all of its goals. The scenario also depicts what I consider to be a balanced combination of the three strategies outlined above.

Before presenting a picture of the desired Developed Ghetto, I first construct three other scenarios designed to portray exaggerated versions of Developed Ghettos. These scenarios are pessimistic forecasts, projecting my perspective on what would happen should only the provisions of one strategy - either the "Collective Effort Strategy", the "Nationalist Strategy" or the "Black Capitalist Strategy" be used as the exclusive basis of a development program implemented on a national level. The purpose of presenting them is to point out the crucial fallacy in implementing strategies that emphasize one aspect of development while failing to give equal consideration to the others. The scenarios illustrate the kind of Developed Ghetto that development efforts are not attempting to build.
The Developed Ghetto Via the Collective Effort Strategy:
Scenario I

The thrust of the development effort had been to radically improve the social characteristics of the ghetto. Now all aspects of community life evolves around insuring every resident political and economic equality. The egalitarian qualities of the Developed Ghettos throughout the nation stand as a model for the communities that surround them. All social and economic classes have been destroyed. Residents have equal status, equal wealth and they collectively participate in the decision-making processes and management of community affairs. Before the great transition there had been social disorganization and a lack of a sense of community. All that has passed now - but the architects of the new social order have paid a heavy price for the egalitarian society. Residents have been stripped of all vestiges of personal freedom; and economic poverty runs rampant. Yet the community functions as one.

The political machinery functioning within the ghetto before the transformation has been abolished. In its place, the community has restored a form of pure democracy similar to that found in ancient Greecian times. All citizens are required to meet daily at the public forum to participate in the community assembly. Here, the
laws and policies of the Developed Ghetto are formulated through a non-representative-pure democracy process. The political clout of the new community is weaker than before. This is primarily because of the inefficiency of the political system and the poor leadership of the administrators of law. The development strategists had insisted that the only fair selection procedure was one that afforded every resident an equal opportunity to administer political affairs. Thus, leaders and representatives were chosen by drawing lots. Each year the names of all adult members of the community were submitted at the assembly; the first ten persons whose names were drawn at random would serve as the governing council. All were considered qualified. The banality of the over-all system impedes the ability of the community to influence and compete in the national political structure.

Individuality and non-conformity are viewed with adamant distaste. Persons who fail to participate in the political process are banned from the Developed Ghetto. Perspective newcomers from surrounding communities are barred entrance if they refuse to submit to the will of the collective.

Though the wealth of the Developed Ghetto is distributed on an equal basis, there is little to share. Businesses representing national corporate interest have
fled the area rather than submit to the new economic policies implemented by the strategists. Most persons having professional and technical skills have also left.

During the development effort, the ghetto economic structure had been modified to reflect the new order of things. Community residents and institutions were required to turn over their properties and other assets to the public treasury. Now what little wealth there is has been redistributed to all residents. Development strategists decreed that all workers, regardless of the nature of their task should receive equal amounts of pay. Moreover, new employment laws require employers to hire perspective workers on a first-come basis, regardless of the skills they possess. The policies had been designed to eliminate every possibility of employment discrimination based on socio-economic position or differences in abilities. Further, privately owned businesses are prohibited. Residents are not allowed to engage in any activity that might bring personal gain. For these reasons, the area's enterprise has faltered and it fails to provide either goods or services for the community. Employment opportunities are also scarce. Yet the unemployed receive equal benefits with those who can find work.
The Developed Ghetto has created a new life for community residents. There are no class conflicts, social strife is non-existent and all persons are eager to share their few possessions equally. Yet despite the egalitarian qualities of ghetto existence, life is more difficult than before the transition. Those who acquire useful skills and can afford the costs usually leave in search of more prosperous places. Those who resent the loss of personal freedom and individuality also flee; few are willing to pay the price that the classless society demands...
The Developed Ghetto Via the Nationalist Strategy:
Scenario II

The nationalists had won their hard-earned struggle. It had been decreed: all white citizens should evacuate ghetto areas; simultaneously, all Blacks and other non-white citizens had been ordered to return to and remain in territories under control of the new Black government. All efforts in the Developed Ghetto have been concentrated on establishing a separate political system. Before the transition, the ghettos had strived to participate in the over-all political and economic structure. The attempt had failed. Now the Developed Ghettos have to support their separate political base and its community from its newly constructed economy. The "dark nation" consists of a loosely connected string of city-states. All traces of the former white masters have been removed. Two nations - one black, one white - exist side by side, each within the geographic boundaries of the other. The boundaries of both are patrolled by armed guards; each keeps a wary eye on the other while attempting to overcome the problem of survival.

The transition period had been a difficult one. The strategists had planned to maintain the same type of political machinery that had existed when whites moved
freely through the ghetto communities. However, damaging conflicts emerged between political parties and communities over what direction the Developed Ghettos should take. Many residents argued for a re-unification with the white power structure. Opponents insisted that the dark nation must forge a new path. Various parties continuously attempted to upset the democratic processes. The transitional phase had almost brought on a civil war. On an over-all basis, the Developed Ghetto presented a united front against the white political structure. But internally, political turmoil was rampant; and social cohesion non-existant.

Ultimately, the military was forced to take control of the government. Through their regime, the voices of opposition and dissent have been silenced. The Developed Ghetto's political structure denies the community residents the freedom of expression and thought that they once enjoyed prior to the transition. Economic conditions within the Developed Ghetto have also taken a turn for the worse. During the transitional period, the nationalists had seized control of all properties and assets formerly controlled and operated by whites. The plan, of course, was to turn the commercial and industrial activities over to Blacks. Cumulatively, the expertise of professional and technically trained residents was sufficient to operate
the newly acquired enterprise. However, serious problems have resulted from shortages in raw materials required to produce the goods and services that meet even minimal basic needs of the Developed Ghetto's residents. Communities having access to such commodities are forced to sell them to other ghettos at exorbitant prices because of the scarcity of supplies and the costs involved in transporting them through the white communities. In addition, economic activities have also been hindered as a result of inadequate communications networks, power shortages and the lack of other basic infra-structure facilities due to the white power-structures' decisions to sever the delivery of such services to the Developed Ghettos.

The tremendous economic difficulties confronting the Developed Ghettos have resulted in serious enough problems to endanger the very survival of the new political system. The military-controlled government simply cannot deliver goods and services to residents at a level that even resembles the inadequate supplies available before the transition. Residents are hungry; they lack ample clothing. The housing stock continues to deteriorate. The costs of political independence has included the loss of personal freedom and deprivation of the basic necessities of life. There is talk that the Developed Ghetto must negotiate with the white power structure; others argue that existing resources should be mobilized to wage war against
the external powers that continue to oppress the Developed Ghettos through their economic sanctions...
The Developed Ghetto Via the Black Capitalist Strategy:  
Scenario III

All energies of the development effort had gone towards strengthening and expanding the ghetto's economic base. During the transition, ghettos had amassed large amounts of capital required to advance the extent of their commercial and industrial activities. That objective had now been actualized. Now the economic structure of the Developed Ghettos throughout the nation have become firmly embedded into the greater economic system. For the first time in American history, Blacks are producing goods and services inside these communities at margins that easily allow ghetto enterprise to compete with nation-wide business corporations.

Within the Developed Ghettos a constant state of full employment is maintained. The annual employment averages are better than averages found in communities surrounding the ghettos. The Black middle-class has achieved new heights in affluence. All has contributed to the progression of the national economy. Major corporations that had once shied away from establishing businesses inside ghetto areas now plead for the opportunity. Business is booming. Everything has been achieved through the sacrifices that have been made by the growing lower classes of the Developed Ghettos. Their blighted position has
deteriorated to an even worse state than before the transition.

The strategists of the grand design have turned back the time clock - the community environment is now similar to what had existed during the era of the nation's capitalist expansion. This had been done to simulate a climate within the Developed Ghettos similar to the type of society that existed at the turn of the century. The purpose, of course, was to re-create an atmosphere that could serve as a spawning ground for bountiful economic growth and development. Through their policies, the strategists have attracted major corporations to invest in the ghetto economy and have also increased the profit margins of the once-faltering Black enterprises.

The masses of ghetto residents, the workforce, has been stripped of all labor rights common to the day and age. Development programs have been designed to create a large pool of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. For example, the average work day has been increased from eight hours to twelve. The rights of workers to unionize, child labor laws and work-safety regulations have been abolished. The strategists have imposed ceilings on permissable wages at levels far below the national average. All has been done to attract labor-intensive businesses into the community and to reduce the overhead costs of Black enterprise.
In effect, the new laissez faire policies operating inside the ghettos have produced the impetus necessary to formulate massive sources of capital in the once economically depressed community.

The strategists have also been forced to deny ghetto residents consumer protection provided populations outside its boundaries. First, residents are required to purchase only those goods and services produced by businesses operating within the ghetto. Further, all laws regulating the quality of manufactured goods have been abolished. Investors are thus allowed to sell their sub-standard stock to community residents at costs far above prices that even quality stock can sell for in communities outside the ghetto. In addition, residents are discouraged from taking legal action against producers distributing faulty or dangerous products. A new era of "let the buyer beware" is prevalent.

Though the life of the Black middle-class has improved tremendously, the lower classes suffer. Rigid "work-fare" laws have been imposed. Unemployed men, women and children are ordered to report to community labor camps each day. There, all, excepting the most aged, the crippled, and the maimed, are forced to work on projects consisting of the lowest type jobs. The unemployed who fail to report to the camps, in light of the tremendous
new employment opportunities made available, are refused even minimal forms of public assistance.

The poor have also felt the brunt of the new anti-crime policies. Severe crime prevention tactics have been introduced to keep the streets safe for legitimate business. The community police have been invested with new authority to take all necessary measures against criminals. Those arrested, usually members from the lower classes, are given minimal due process rights; and when convicted are sentenced to long and harsh punishment.

The strategists' policies have destroyed the little social cohesion that existed before the transition. Residents feel that opportunities exist for those who are aggressive enough to take them; and the most important policy for acquiring wealth and status is that each man must go for himself.

The Black middle-class looks down on the poor with disgust. They blame the poverty-stricken masses for creating their own condition by failing to take advantage of the prosperous times. The upper-class has taken an enlightened perspective of the new society. Some members have gone so far as to establish private charitable foundations to assist the poor. Many feel that the time has come to implement new social reform programs to improve the conditions of the masses...
The Need For A Balanced Perspective

No doubt the three strategies of development, outlined in the previous chapter, when removed to their most pronounced state, would present as a whole, conflicting perspectives on the Developed Ghetto. The projections I have forecast in the above scenarios reflect the appearance of transformed communities, constructed from the extreme provisions of each strategy. I reiterate the fact that the illustrations have been presented to point out why I feel it is important to define development in a manner that gives equal emphasis to the social, political and economic aspects of community life.

Until now the discussion has emphasized the points of conflict between various strategies. Before continuing it is only fair to point out where the diverse strategies merge. Obviously, none of the scenarios presented thus far reflect the development strategists' conception of the Developed Ghetto. Rather, the definitions reviewed in the previous chapter, on which the scenarios are based, represent the depths of their search for viable solutions to the burdensome and complex problems confronting a specific segment of the urban center's population and institutions, referred to as "the ghetto".

I plan to present a fourth scenario on the Developed Ghetto. This projection represents my views on what the
ghetto should look like after the reconstruction effort has been completed. Moreover, it describes, in my opinion, the type of community that the strategists (despite their many disagreements) are in actuality attempting to define and construct. I define ghetto development in the following manner:

First, the need for development implies that something is not developed or is under-developed. I submit the "something" is the fact of the social, political and economic systems of the ghetto which collectively comprise the structure of the community. It is because the systems of the structure are "under-developed" that problems and undesirable conditions arise. For example, the under-developed economic system means that there is an inefficient tax-base in the area; unemployment is high; the businesses are faltering; and the infra-structure is not supported, etc. Ghetto development is aimed towards alleviating such problems through developing, improving and strengthening the systems (that is, the over-all dynamics of economic events taking place inside of the ghetto). Moreover, I contend that all three systems must be developed. To develop only the economic system is "economic development" but not ghetto development. To develop the political system is "political development", not
ghetto development, etc. The intent of "ghetto development" is to improve on each of the systems and develop them to the point that the problems and undesirable conditions in the community stemming from under-development are remedied.

I would contend that ghetto development activities must be evaluated on the basis of whether or not they can provide for comprehensive positive change. Within this framework, development agents can be comparatively evaluated on their ability to deal effectively with improving the full three systems of the ghetto structure. The "ideal" or most effective agent is one that meets those requirements. Minimally, the agent must be able to improve (or develop) at least one system, without exasperating conditions in another system. The ineffective agent is one whose activities fail to improve or strengthen any of the systems - social, political or economic - and yet at the same time manages to impair the existing conditions in one or all three. As mentioned, the development agents analyzed in the case studies will be evaluated by this criterion.

I will now present the fourth scenario of the Developed Ghetto. This projection reflects a transformed community resulting from an implementation strategy designed to
improve the full three systems of the ghetto and thereby provide comprehensive change in the over-all environment.
The Developed Ghetto Via Balanced Strategies:
Scenario IV

The Developed Ghetto has resulted from a carefully planned and skillfully executed series of policies and programs. Each realm of community life, the social, political and economic, have been developed in a manner that has improved the existence of all community residents.

The social aspects of the community are different from before the transition. It is not a classless society, but all of the socio-economic groups have contributed to the effort in some way; and all share in the benefits of the task. Residents readily identify with community and actively participate in public affairs. Some members of the Developed Ghetto have more wealth and wield greater power and influence than others, but few residents are denied the basic needs required to live decent lives.

The crime rate in the community has been greatly reduced since the transition. Wide-spread rehabilitation programs have been implemented to assist the problems of drug addiction and other conditions that had led to many members of the community's survival through illegal activities. Residents have taken a harsh stand against community and outside perpetrators who continue to endanger the well-being of the Developed Ghetto.
Politically, the Developed Ghetto wields more political clout than ever. Nationally, the ghettos have remained part of the American political processes. But the larger power structure has recognized the legitimate right of the Developed Ghetto to participate on a more equal basis in the political decision-making processes affecting the national interests and policies. Internally, the community power structure has won the authority required to control political factors affecting the lives of its residents. Public services in the Developed Ghetto, such as schools and police, have been placed under direct community control.

The Developed Ghettos do not win all of their political battles against the government or surrounding communities. The primary improvement that has taken place is that they are now in a stronger position to bargain and compete for their own vested interests. The political base has been strengthened and solidified. The new communities have demanded the respect and gained the power required to force the nation, as a whole, to be responsive to its problems and needs. For example, racial discrimination and strife has not ended. But in the new society, persons engaging in discriminatory activities are considered criminals. Violators are quickly brought to justice and given severe penalties.
The economic character of the Developed Ghetto has also changed dramatically. Outside investors are allowed to invest in the area, but their businesses are carefully scrutinized by the community to insure that economic exploitation and discrimination are at a minimum. Also, residents are encouraged to engage in private business as well as collective ventures. Masses of capital have not been formulated overnight. The process is an on-going one. Yet, in the Developed Ghetto, the collective and individual wealth has significantly increased since days gone by.

During the transitional period, the strategists had introduced programs to uplift the over-all educational qualifications of the community. Residents, old and young, were offered new opportunities to learn relevant skills and professions. Families were provided adequate incomes while the heads of households and children engaged in relevant work-study programs designed to increase skills. The process has been a slow and costly one. But now national corporations invested in the community because its people held the kinds of skills that business and industry demand.

The ghetto economy remains tied to the national economic system. White enterprise is allowed to operate inside the ghetto communities; and Black enterprise outside. The entire business sector has been charged with the
responsibility of using a portion of its profits to contribute to the collective good of the community. Correspondingly, it is also allowed to accumulate reasonable profits for itself.

The Developed Ghetto is similar to other viable communities. There is a greater sense of social cohesion. Political conditions have been improved to the extent that the community now had the ability to effect change and the progression of things, as do other communities. Economic conditions are far from perfect. But now, all residents have been given opportunities to learn professional training and skills required to allow them to make decent incomes; and engage in meaningful work. There are wealthy residents as there are less wealthy ones. But poverty and blight no longer run rampant through the lives of the people. Many things still need improvement, yet...
SECTION TWO

Introduction

Thus far I have examined the kinds of communities that ghetto development efforts might be designed to create; and identified one that reflects what I believe to be the most viable type of Developed Ghetto. The means of achieving that goal involve two issues: the development agent that can bring about the Developed Ghetto and the development techniques available to that agent.


Chapter V examines two techniques of development (which I refer to as "growth strategies"). I review the theories behind "unbalanced" and "balanced" growth strategies; and point out foreseeable advantages and disadvantages these opposing theories present to community-based development agents.
CHAPTER III: COUNTERTYPE DEVELOPMENT AGENTS

From my perspective, ghetto development activities are executed by one of two types of development agents. By "development agent", I refer to an entity possessing an organizational structure, resources and a decision-making mechanism, one that intentionally sets out to improve the over-all social, political and economic systems of the ghetto environment. I refer to the first type as the "Alien Agent". This is because it emerges from forces and circumstances that rest outside of the boundaries of the ghetto community; and the resources of such agents are also controlled and supervised from that point. The second type is the "Indigenous Agent", the community-based operation. It is the countertype of the former in that it emerges from forces inside of the community; and correspondingly, the development resources are controlled and supervised by ghetto interests. As mentioned in the thesis introduction, our central concern is with the community-based organizations, the Indigenous Agents. I believe, however, that in order to fully understand the issues confronting its operations, it is essential to first point out the characteristics of its countertype - and show how they have failed to be successful tools for inner-city development.
First, the fundamental similarity between the agents is that both implement development activities designed to improve the ghetto structure. Beyond this similarity, they are mutually exclusive in every respect. The Alien Agent intervenes into the systems from points outside its structure (it introduces development activities into the community as a result of circumstances occurring outside), whereas the Indigenous Agent emerges from the ghetto. In other words, development activities are stimulated from circumstances from within its structure.

The two development agents necessarily use countertype approaches because the entities themselves originate from opposing sets of circumstances. Here it is appropriate to mention that because of their unique circumstances, they have encountered significantly different experiences while implementing development programs. Moreover, as a result of their countertype positions, each agent possesses certain advantages and constraints not shared by one another. These matters are examined in specific detail later on in the section. Right now, my immediate intention is to trace the origins in which they are conceived.
"Origins of the Alien Agent"

First, I suggest that government and private enterprise (including corporate charitable foundations and some private concerns) serve as the source of the Alien Agents. I refer to these parties collectively as the "traditional power structure" because they direct and govern the affairs of the nation. As urban ghetto areas are part of their domain, the traditional structure legitimately functions to regulate all activities within it. As well, it distributes resources to all communities and provides various services. When conditions warrant, this structure may introduce programs explicitly designed to improve the over-all systems of ghetto areas. The implementation mechanism is the Alien Agent. Its programs and activities of development are authorized by the traditional structure; and the resources required for the action are controlled by that source. This will mean that the initial decision to intervene, the decision-making processes and the resources of activities are all determined by the governing structure - the alien source.

The initial decision to engage in activities is dependent upon a number of things. Most often, forces within ghetto communities have used their influence to pressure the power structure to do so. Sometimes action
is initiated as a result of pressure exerted from different points within the structure. In other cases, the power structure (or a member thereof) initiates action from its own desire to remedy problems in a part of its domain. In any case, the important factor is that development activities emerge from the "will" of the power structure. It possesses the legitimate resources and thus the power to intervene.

The key distinguishing factor of this approach is that the ghetto is only indirectly involved in the event. This is because the resources of the effort are controlled by the traditional power structure. Therefore, action takes place with or without the approval of the community. Decisions can be made without community approval. Moreover, the action is carried out by an agent with or without community participation. On all fronts, the Alien Agent holds the option to either permit or deny the community a role in the development program. Thusly, the entity executing the development program is an Alien Agent because it is created by forces outside of the community; and the resources required for action also come from that point.
There have been numerous development activities introduced into inner-city communities from this type of approach. I submit that such efforts have failed. Two examples of government-sponsored development activities that were in effect, Alien-type intervention models are: the "War Against Poverty Program" sponsored during the Johnson years. The second program is the Boston Urban Rehabilitation Program (BURP), sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Both efforts are classic examples of Alien intervention programs that failed.
"Alien Intervention":

A. The War Against Poverty

It has been argued that the singular most important event shaping government domestic policies since the late Fifties has been the occurrence of the non-violent civil rights movement, led by Dr. Martin Luther King. Billions of dollars have been spent by federal and other levels of government, as well as private enterprise, in an attempt to solve conditions highlighted during the movement that were perceived as short-comings in the American political, economic and social structure.

The central contention of that movement's protagonists was that government, particularly the federal echelons, should directly intervene on behalf of its under-represented constituents (at that time, Blacks) to remedy certain discriminatory practices in the South; and thereby serve as the chief catalyst for social reform. As the civil rights movement in the South erupted into the "long hot summers" in the urban centers of the North, government was again called upon to bring relief to dismal conditions experienced by minorities and the poor.
For whatever reasons, the federal government supported by the American people recognized the call for action; and assumed the responsibility of providing new welfare for the disadvantaged. The legal intervention initiated from events during the Kennedy years, evolved into the poverty program in the Johnson years. An example of intervention during the Kennedy Administration is the dramatic showdown between federal and state sovereignty. Political scientist, James Sundquist reminds:

"In May, 1961, Robert Kennedy dispatched 600 United States Marshalls to Alabama to protect the 'freedom riders' after they had been attacked by mobs in that state. A year later, federal marshalls escorted James Meredith when he registered at the University of Mississippi and troops were sent to put down riots on the campus... Suddenly, in the late Spring of 1963, in Birmingham, it became clear to the President, to the Congress, and the nation at large, that they could not wait for an endless series of local decisions, produced only by agony in the streets...across the South. The Negro cause demanded, and justified, a sweeping national decision that would settle the question of equal rights for all cities, for all regions, for all time." 1

President Kennedy legitimized his decision to take direct federal intervention based on a reluctant precedent set by the Eisenhower Administration in the "Little Rock, Arkansas Affair". The federal government intervened directly into the domain of state and local government in order to assist the lacking position of Southern Blacks. Although this action cannot be defined as a ghetto development
effort (in that the issues were focused on the South and the intent was not really to improve, comprehensively, the total Black community), it is mentioned here because in part, it served as a significant new precedent for the mode of a ghetto development effort later taken by the Johnson Administration. As Sundquist points out, mostly through agony in the streets, Blacks produced the conditions which allowed the federal government to intervene into the community. However, other than creating the situation, the Black community was not involved directly into the intervention activity. Rather, that activity had its origin outside of the community. Furthermore, resources were controlled by that outside force.

The creation of a series of anti-poverty programs, such as the Office of Economic Opportunity and its Community Action Program, was an example of direct intervention affecting the urban centers of the North. Although not explicitly defined as such, the War on Poverty, designed to "break the poverty cycle" was in effect an attempt by an Alien Agent (this time the federal government) to impact in a comprehensive manner, the social, political, and economic systems of the ghetto structure. As Sundquist points out:
"The urban ghetto had become, indeed, the crucial testing ground of the President's conception of his Great Society...there all of the programs designed by the activists...would undergo their trial by ordeal and succeed or finally fail. The urban ghetto had become the central challenge, in the nation's domestic affairs, to every element of the political community - to the intellectuals, who must analyze the problems and develop the solutions..."²

In addition, the strategy of the effort was to simultaneously attack a number of diverse problems. This would be done, of course, through organizing the resources of the effort into various programs aimed at remedying a broad spectrum of social, political and economic problems. For example, the Office of Economic Opportunity would provide new economic advantages to minorities and poor; the Community Action Program (CAP) would facilitate the amelioration of the political situation of the ghetto; the Head Start Programs would improve educational opportunities, etc. The target was, indeed, the over-all ghetto environment. The intent was to attack the so-called "poverty cycle" at as many points as possible until the cycle was finally broken (or within the terminology we have used, the ghetto environment was developed). George Shipman comments on this strategy:
"Remedial action based upon this view of poverty aims at breaking the cycle (of poverty) at as many points as possible; the breaking of the cycle permits escape. Because basic causes and acquired attributes resulting from over-exposure to poverty are interlocked, a broadly proportioned, even random strategy is acceptable. Targets of opportunity are as effective as pinpointed remedial steps. Given sufficient resources, the breaking-up of ghettos, the development of broad employment, the stimulation of motivation and aspiration, the encouragement of self-organization and of problem-solving efforts can be counted upon to build towards a cumulative effect."\(^3\)

Not only was the effort in the form of direct outside intervention, but it was also designed to improve the environment through a multiple program approach.

Unlike the intervention during the Kennedy Administration, the "War Against Poverty" did not require that the residents set the stage for intervention. Federal legislation accomplished that. But, the residents did have to participate in the development processes. One of the important policies of the program, termed "maximum feasible participation of the poor", called upon the development agents to include residents in their affairs. This was especially the case with the CAP programs:

"In addition to involving the poor in staff positions, the Community Action Programs have, usually under prodding of OEO, sought to increase participation of the poor at the level of advisory councils, which, with varying degrees of responsibility, the choice and implementation of programs..."\(^4\)
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The impetus, however, for intervention was derived from outside of the community. As such, the federal government controlled the resources required for program implementation. Residents were allowed to participate because it was the government's policy and not the fact that residents had the right to participate. Moreover, participation by the poor did not mean they could direct the activities. Or control the resources.

The "maximum feasible participation" policies created a series of fundamental problems in the poverty program, particularly with the community action program effort. Nathan Glaizer sums up the rationale behind the CAP strategy:

"Ideologically, the Community Action Program is based on the analysis of what ails the poor. The analysis asserts that it is not their obvious material lack which is the heart of the problem. It is their lack of power. The vote does not give them power, because it needs education, money and time and social and organizational skills to organize the vote and the poor do not have these. The balance is to be redressed by community organization. The effect, it is hoped, will be...through the increase of power to change the pattern of rewards and services distributed by public agencies...it is designed to evoke a distinctive response in each community...it is a grand design, not simply of democracy at work, but of democracy trying to stimulate the response that makes it work better..."
However, by attempting to increase the political power of the poor or the ghetto residents, the action was also upsetting the political calm in municipal governments. Inevitably, the federal government found itself in a predicament. On one hand, it was representing the interests of the poor's struggle to make government more responsive to their needs; and on the other, it was weakening its own position that rested upon the support of municipal government, particularly in the big cities. Eventually, forced to capitulate to organized political machines, the ghetto residents became embittered by what they saw as a double-cross. Commenting on the program's top administrator, Sargent Shriver, Andrew Kopkind pointed out:

"Community Action is dying in Shriver's office. Big city mayors are allowed to consolidate their control over local programs. In Mississippi... last year's segregationists are this year's moderates, and they are commandeering the anti-poverty projects to keep an upper hand over restless Negroes. The disinterested outsider can sympathize with Shriver's administrative problems, for the political pressures on him are enormous. But the poor owe him no special considerations; he is bucking under and they are sore."  

Saul Alinsky's essay entitled, "The War on Poverty - Political Pornography", vividly sums up the position that the poor in the nation's cities grew to hold when the government was ultimately forced to make a decision that it could not represent the poor at the cost
of losing the support of the organized political machinery of city governments. More than anything, the poor felt betrayed and questioned the very intent of the government's initial intent in introducing the effort:

"The anti-poverty program was publicly launched in the wrappings of nobility of purpose and yet with a certain dedication that smacked of sanctimoniousness. Unless there are drastic changes in direction, rationale and administration, the anti-poverty program may well become the worst blunder and boomerang of the present administration...Today the anti-poverty program is emerging as a huge political pork barrel, a wielding of anti-poverty funds as a form of political patronage. Its disguise as a war on poverty is thin and clumsy. The use of this kind of money for this purpose is particularly repulsive..."^7

In this instance, failure was the outcome of efforts to improve the urban ghetto through activities originating from outside of the community; and where resources were controlled and distributed by the government. Poverty had not been eliminated, the ghettos remained unimproved and the poor were left even more alienated from the greater society than before. In their study of the poverty program, 'A Relevant War Against Poverty',^8 Kenneth Clark and Jeanette Hopkins conclude that the primary reason for the failure stemmed from who controlled the purse strings of the effort:
"When one seeks to speculate about the reasons for this general ineffectiveness, a number of factors emerge. Foremost among them is the fact that the community action programs attempt to bring about regulated changes in the conditions of the poor by organizations financed by federal and local governmental agencies controlled by elected or appointed political officials. The factor of political control is inevitable; it is not likely even in the most effective of these programs that political and governmental officials will permit any type of program or any degree of intensity of community action program which would directly or indirectly threaten the maintenance of their own political power...The federal government's instrument of power in influencing community action programs has been money. Appropriation has made possible the establishment of programs, the indirect control of programs, and the curtailing of programs..." 9

The authors go on to conclude:

"The goal of obtaining meaningful, sustained, and positive changes in the conditions of the poor would seem to require the identification, development, and use of techniques through which the latent power of the poor is mobilized on their own behalf without interference of government..." 10
B. The Boston Urban Rehabilitation Program

The second example involving a development effort emerging from outside of the community and where the resources of the development activities were not controlled by inside forces is the Boston Urban Rehabilitation Program (BURP). The program was sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The intent of the effort was to attack one problem in the Boston Black community of Roxbury - the housing conditions.

The BURP effort was initiated from the desire of HUD to indicate to important national political figures that massive rehabilitation of inner-city housing stock was feasible and that an attempt to do so could be carried out in an efficient and expedient manner. The program was planned in haste and in a cloak of secrecy. For a number of reasons, HUD saw the necessity of involving as few persons as possible in the planning stages. The foremost being of course to keep the prices of the area's housing stock from sky-rocketing, due to speculation. In any case, the Roxbury community was not informed that the program was in the making nor were they involved in the initial planning stages.

When publicly announced by Secretary Weaver, the Black
community adamantly opposed its implementation. Even though the program would provide critically needed adequate housing for large numbers of disadvantaged families in the area, it was rejected from the stand-point that the community had not been allowed to participate in its formulation.\textsuperscript{12} HUD may not have recognized the far-reaching implications that a program of this magnitude would have on the over-all environment, but the community leadership and residents did. They argued that implemented effectively, the program could favorably impact the entire area. It could mean community ownership of significant assets; new employment opportunities for the areas unemployed; expansion of community Black enterprise; and increased community cohesion and improvement of the social environment.

The pressure exerted by the community forced HUD to initiate a second planning stage. This time the community would be involved in the program's formulation and implementation. The initial initial of HUD to indicate that inner-city rehabilitation could be accomplished swiftly was obviously lost. In addition, there were additional costs resulting from having to re-draw program plans. Beyond that, HUD, while trying to aid the community, had managed to increase its alienation from the more powerful forces that govern its domain. In his political analysis of the BURP effort, Langley Keyes points out:
"One of the clearest flaws in the BURP model was that it provided no means of communication with those who would be most effected by the program - the tenants themselves. Nor did it tap those Roxbury organizations whose programs included a concern for housing by seeking their advice or requiring their services..."13

The failure of BURP was not that the program failed to rehabilitate housing - this was ultimately accomplished. The failure was the process itself. Direct action - non-participatory action, sponsored by forces outside of the community - prohibited necessary communications between residents and sponsors. Because of this, the architects of the effort had failed to realize that a venture of this nature could potentially serve as a tool, positively impacting more extensive aspects of the ghetto environment. In this instance, outside agents, because of their lack of insight into the over-all concerns of the community, failed to serve as effective agents of intervention. Again, the processes of development failed because of the source of its emergency; and of who controlled the resources of the effort.
Concluding Comments on Alien Methods of Intervention

The above examples illustrate the sort of failures that government has experienced when attempting to formulate and execute intervention action designed to develop ghetto communities. Needless to say, there have also been some limited successes resulting from these efforts. Beyond this, the question arises, what has been the rationale behind these attempts? I think that the foremost reason goes back to the events taking place during the civil rights movement of the Sixties. It is only fair to emphasize the fact that the leaders of the Black community in time of grave crisis called on the federal government to assist them in impossible situations. The conflict in the South concerned civil rights - a matter over which the federal government had final word. And, because of its willingness to favorably respond (when all other legal apparatus ceased to function properly), the Black community turned to Washington for assistance. Secondly, the greatest wealth of resources and expertise was concentrated in the hands of forces outside of the ghetto. Indeed, it was because depressed urban communities had so few resources that intervention was required in the first place. Finally, it was the responsibility of government to respond to the blighted conditions of the urban central cities. Once the
Black community successfully gained the government and the nation's recognition of its extensive problems, the country had a moral and legal responsibility so binding that it had no other alternative but to lead the struggle for community improvements.

Naturally, the second question that must be addressed is why did these efforts fail? Particularly in the case of "the War Against Poverty", the federal government had attempted to unleash its own power against itself. This conflict of interest inevitably led to internal strife between the different levels of government. Though political considerations warranted this, an effective approach in the South, the powerful Democratic political machines of the urban cities presented a whole other problem for the Democratic President. If nothing else, "the War Against Poverty" effort exposed the depth of the ghetto's problems and the fundamental modifications in the national power structure ghetto development demanded. As Clark and Hopkins pointed out - the kinds of changes ghetto development required - changes in deep-rooted social, political and economic power relationships between the ghetto and the outside - suggests that those outside forces cannot be called upon to do the job that development required; and that action and resources of development must emerge from inside the community.
Finally, by controlling the resources of development, despite the approval or disapproval of the indigenous residents, the government ultimately determined what the ghetto community wanted and needed. But, as in the case of the BURP effort, the halls of government (with its ivory tower-educated analysts and planners) oftentimes misunderstood the problems and the needs, and thusly misinterpreted what action was required.

In that these efforts have failed, the question becomes, can the ghetto, with all of its special problems, do a more effective job than the former agents of intervention? And, further, what methods should they seek to accomplish their ends?
"Origins of the Indigenous Agent":

In my discussion of the Alien Agent, I suggested that government and private enterprise (the national corporate structure) collectively control the traditional power structure. These parties function to regulate the national activities, including the affairs of the ghetto. Along these lines, I also suggest that there are activities taking place within the ghetto that can be classified as functioning independently of the traditional power structure. These activities serve exclusively the interests of the community. Examples of organizations involved in such activities include neighborhood associations, civic groups, ghetto business organizations and civil rights agencies. These agencies are operated and controlled by indigenous populations and/or institutions. Although their resources may come from outside of the community (from the private sector, government, etc.), the organizations supervise the resources and direct them towards matters and projects of their own concern. Their collective activities create an "informal power structure". Necessarily, it functions as an advocate of community self-interest in that it is the power of the community.
The informal power structure holds a subordinate position to the traditional power structure. As mentioned above, the rightful role of the latter is to regulate the affairs of state (which include governing the affairs of the ghetto). This also implies that it is responsible for providing for the welfare of the ghetto community. For example, when problems arise too large to be handled by the residents of the community, then, via the informal power structure, they must exert pressure on the traditional one to impel it to intervene and utilize its resources to remedy the situation. The community, however, is not in the position to force the traditional structure to take action. Moreover, even if it should succumb to community pressure, it holds the option to fully execute the remedial action. It also reserves this option because it controls the resources that action requires. The informal power structure cannot select the course or extent of intervention unless the traditional power structure allows it to do so. Neither can it participate in solving the problem without first obtaining the approval of the governing structure. The obvious example of this power arrangement between the two structures is the case of the BURP effort mentioned above. The community could not automatically involve itself in the program. First, it
had to pressure the formal power-structure to allow it to participate. Even then, participation did not mean the right to control the program (by either independently administering operations or by directing the development resources). The role of the community in the BURP program was fully dependent upon the position given it by the government.

The community has traditionally held the subordinate position; and remains dependent on the governing structure to solve its problems. The only recourse to changing this position is to have the community solve its own problems. To do this, it must acquire the legitimacy and resources that problem solving demands. Within this context, if the community wishes to implement its own programs designed to improve the over-all structure of the ghetto, it must first acquire those two things. There have been situations where this has occurred. The organizations in the case studies, Tenant Development Corporation and Roxbury Action Program, are the "results" of two inner-city community's decision to solve their own problems (as opposed to expending its energies and resources to attempting to force the governing structure to solve ghetto problems for them). As I plan to show in the following chapter, the task of acquiring those things is indeed an arduous
one. First the community must gain the legitimacy to develop (or improve the community) from the traditional power structure; secondly, it must acquire the resources to do so. But only a little of each can be acquired from the formal structure. In the following chapter, we will examine those problems the community encounters while attempting to gain the initial legitimacy and resources from the ghetto and then developing more resources as well as the community systems, from that point.
FOOTNOTES


2 Ibid., p. 286.

3 George Shipman, Designing Program Action Against Poverty (University of Alabama Press, 1971), p. 44.


7 Ibid., p. 172.

8 Clark and Hopkins.

9 Ibid., p. 249.

10 Ibid., p. 251.


12 Ibid., pp. 48-55.

13 Ibid., p. 83.
CHAPTER IV: INDIGENOUS INTERVENTION FOR Ghetto DEVELOPMENT

As noted, Alien Agents are basically conceived from the "will" of the traditional power structure. This is because it holds the legitimacy and has the available resources to simply execute remedial action in the community whenever it chooses to do so. This is not the case with the Indigenous Agent. The latter must acquire legitimacy and (at least) the initial resources from the governing structure in order to develop the community. I submit that the community power structure must successfully progress through a "conflict" stage against the traditional structure that enables it to conceive or create an Indigenous Agent. Furthermore, the objectives of "conflict" and "ghetto development" are wholly different from one another; and the transition from one stage to the next is the most critical factor in determining how effective the Indigenous Agent can become while attempting to improve the ghetto environment. First, the "conflict stage" is examined in more specific detail; then analysis is made of the problems it causes when the Indigenous Agent must progress to "develop" the community it functions to serve.
"The Conflict Stage"

It is during the conflict stage that an initial stimulus for action occurs. A "proto" indigenous agent or protest group emerges. This group serves as the catalyst for moving the community through conflict required to acquire resources. Ultimately, this group becomes the development agent.

Initially, there must be defects in the ghetto environment which cause residents to take action. Usually those most affected by the conditions constitute the initial group demanding the change. Although there may be a number of undesirable conditions affecting residents, it is only one which serves to stimulate action. For example, residents who live in severely inadequate housing may be confronted with a multitude of problems. However, it is the severity of the housing problem that causes residents to protest.

The identified problem is perceived by the residents as one of such magnitude and dimensions that its solution requires action that cannot be provided by the individual resident (or for that matter, the group of residents responding to the problem). For example, the problem might be the "lack of jobs in the community" or "high
crime rates", etc. Obviously, problems of this nature are of proportions exceeding the capacity of the individual resident.

The residents' action will manifest itself in the form of protest. The members of the protest group will call upon the traditional power structure to remedy the situation, simply because this is the conventional channel in which community problems are solved.

The entire stage is similar to Saul Alinsky's "community conflict model". The first task of the protest group must be to develop a strong neighborhood association. The objective of the organization is to seize all vestiges of community power for the purpose of combating the power structure. This objective is reached through providing sources of conflict. The group must heighten the awareness of distinctions between community interest - and opposing outside interests. The program is issues and crises-oriented in that there is no formal planning of either action or policies of the movement. Typical tactics employed by the organization against the traditional power structure (or members thereof) include demonstrations, boycotts, establishing picket lines and other forms of legal and extra-legal activities protest action. The power that arises from community cohesion stemming from the community's recognition of
undesirable conditions provides the force required to impel the traditional structure to relinquish its position. 2

The protest group solicits the support of the community through the informal power structure. In doing so, it accomplishes two things. First, it mobilizes the forces of the community; secondly, it begins to construct a legitimate base allowing it to be recognized as part of the informal structure.

The usual intent behind taking this action is to build a force that can pressure the traditional power structure to address the problem. However, depending on a host of variables (stemming from such matters as the particular community involved, the issues at hand, former protest against the traditional power structure, the actual problem stimulating the protest and the protest group itself), the primary emphasis may shift away from the actual problem over which the protest was initiated. The new direction demands that the traditional structure relinquish its right to execute remedial action; and more important, the protest groups'demand that it be given the right to control the resources required for remedial action.
In a few instances, the traditional structure recognizes the demand and relinquishes its position to the protest group. In most cases, however, the structure refuses to do this. Depending on the specific conditions, the protest group may retract its demand or instead continue to pursue that direction. Should the latter take place, the group attempts to prepare the community for conflict.

It should be pointed out that the struggle is not an all-encompassing one in the sense that the protest group even advocates complete political control. Rather, the objectives of the conflict focus on very narrow matters. For example, if the problem stimulating the effort concerned high crime rates, then the ensuing conflict converges on gaining the control of resources for executing remedial action in that particular area. Or if the conflict concerns a poor educational facility, then the objective is to acquire resources required to provide alternative schools, etc.

The most well-known example of this process taking place is the "Woodlawn Organization Two", based in Chicago. This community group, led by Alinsky, held the center of attention during the War Against Poverty years for its militant position not only against poverty, but
also against the program itself. Alinsky felt that the means to build true community power was to point out the problems in the anti-poverty program to the community and utilize the adversion to the program as the basis for building a strong community coalition. The objective of the organization was to seize power in the community; and utilize the collective power to battle the power structure and demand change.

For a short period of time, the "community conflict model" received considerable support. Similar efforts modeled after the Woodlawn Organization were established. However, the concept of "protest for change" proved to be only half of what was needed; the other part consisted of protest groups successfully transforming into development agents. Frank Riesman strongly criticized Alinsky's theories on the grounds that the model attempted to build power for power's sake. And what the community poor were really interested in was what things power could potentially bring. Clark and Hopkins also criticized the model and point out:

"Conflict...does not necessarily mean that the poor will succeed in bringing about the desired changes. Even a direct confrontation of power can be aborted and evaded and the energies of the poor dissipated through resilience, shrewdness, skillful parrying, intransigence, and the marshalling of superior power on the part of local political and government apparatus..."
Norton E. Long, professor of politics at Brandeis University, is also critical of another aspect of the Alinsky conflict model:

"The Alinsky formula assumes some kind of bootstrap magic by which individual neighborhoods can solve their problems through an almost Mao-like belief in the magic of efficacy of unaided human will. It seems doubtful in the extreme whether local communities can make up for an inadequate national growth rate and in many, if not most cases, the local economy is a reflection of factors beyond its individual control. The Alinsky model may thus lead to profound conservatism in practice in which radical slogans and rent strikes serve as a substitute for coordinated programmatic national action. Neighborhood organization without adequate theorem may produce no more than piecemeal noble gestures..." 8

First, it is not until the point where the traditional power structure capitulates, and relinquishes its authority, that the protest group acquires the legitimacy (and initial resources) to execute specific remedial action on its own behalf. When the community has acquired these things, only then is the Indigenous Agent conceived. More often than not, the protest group becomes that Indigenous Agent, in that the traditional power structure turns over limited resources to the group; and recognizes its right to formulate and administer its own program action for the community.
Whether the new development agent can expand its activities from one area to serve an agent capable of implementing an over-all ghetto development program presents another set of problems (as Long suggests). Furthermore, its ability to accomplish these things will depend on how well it can meet the arduous task of transformation. By transformation I refer to its obvious need to modify its organizational objectives from the business of protest to that of development. As the following discussion indicates, this is the most critical and immediate business at hand.
"From Conflict to Development: The Critical Transition"

At the point where the protest group acquires its hard-earned position as Indigenous Agent, the organization must then transform its objectives from that of "protest" to that of "development". The organization must modify two basic aspects of its character. First, it must reorganize its administrative structure; and its relationship to the community at large. Secondly, the agent must establish economic linkages and political linkages with outside forces, i.e., the traditional power structure.

**Organizational Transformation**

By "organizational transformation", I refer to the important changes that must be made in the former protest groups' internal administrative structure and its relationship to the community. An organization involved primarily in protest action will have a different design from one concerned with ghetto development. The issues are as follows:

A. Modifications in the Administrative Structure

Typically, before the transition, the organization's structure is characterized by its informal and disorganized manner. First, the membership is one that is
suited best for protest activities. The protest group solicits as many new members as possible. This is important because its strength lies in the support it gains from the over-all community. Also, mass "manpower" is required for participation in strikes, boycotts, etc. The intensity of the conflict will usually determine the size of the group. Secondly, the decision-making process of the group is highly informal. Decisions are made by group consensus. Oftentimes, in fact, one or two "charismatic" community leaders are responsible for holding the group together and providing direction.

Effective development efforts require a new type of organizational structure. First, the organization needs to become more selective in soliciting members. The most beneficial will be those who possess the skills that can aid in the development process. For example, attorneys, business managers, architects, etc., will be more beneficial to development effort than merely amassing large numbers of members with no particular skills. Even more important, the group requires a highly formal decision-making process that the former process of group consensus simply could not provide. Specific persons need to be held accountable for designing and executing the development program. Overall, a clearly defined decision-making process is essential; one that can readily synthesize sophisticated and technical
materials in order to make wise decisions on available alternatives. In addition, the organization will require a leadership beyond that which charismatic leadership offers. The organization must develop a permanence and independence that transcends that offered by individuals.

Changes in the hierarchal structure and inter-relationships of the organization will be forthcoming. Such change may cause additional problems. First, if the organization formerly had few skilled or professional members and new members are solicited, they may be taking power positions held by the older members. This causes conflict. The charismatic leadership might resent moves to replace the talents he offers with an administrative officer.

Should the organization fail to make the required changes in membership, it will remain dependent upon outside technical support. This could potentially threaten the independence of the organization and no doubt would increase the operating costs due to the need to "import" outside skills. Moreover, unless the organization acquires the professional expertise, the progress of the development effort may be slowed down.
B. Modifications in Relationships Between the Administrative Structure and the Community

This variable concerns changes that result from the new position of the former protest group and the larger community. Again, the success of the effort will in part depend on how well the transition is made in this area. The three primary areas of concern are: the policy-making process; identification of the "community"; and the mechanism of communications between the agent and the community.

During the protest stage the policies of the group were pre-determined simply to meet the objectives behind the protest. The protest group could afford to define the ghetto community in loose and very abstract terms, i.e., anyone who might live in the area and support the purpose of the protest. Also, communication - that is, the information between the protest group and the community at large - was elementary. For example, the flow of information was one-directional in that it emulated from the protest group to the community residents. All that was required was that those residents have some general understanding of the issues of protest and that supporters know when and where protest action would take place.
Ghetto development requires a change of relationships on all three counts. First, the development agent would have to determine what group (really specific individuals) would define the policies of the organization. Ideally, the organization would find policy makers from a broad spectrum of various groups, classes and perspectives (with the added criteria that the selected policy makers had the available time to involve themselves in activities and had some ability to set good policies). Secondly, the agent needs to establish a more defined concept of what particular group or groups it represented. Who would be the most direct beneficiaries of its labors; and who could it call upon for support. The broadly perceived "community" permissible (and desirable) for protest action would be inadequate for development activities. Finally, the communications between the group and the community require modifications. The flow of information need be two-dimensional in order to disburse information as well as receive it. Moreover, the nature of information diffused would change. Now more technical information would be distributed in an attempt to keep the community informed of plans and programs. For example, the agent would have a more difficult time explaining the complicated provisions of a housing development program to potential tenants than it would urging an ill-housed group of tenants to strike
against slum landlords. Or it would be more difficult to
find out what type of housing needs existed, as well as
what they desired, than to determine whether they were
distressed about high rents or inadequate building
maintenance.

The process itself held some dangers. The
development agent would need to learn to listen to policymakers representing the community as opposed to telling
the community what moves it should make against the
adversaries. Moreover, policy decisions would become more
difficult to come by simply because of the much broader
span of alternatives development might lead the agent into
any one of numerous directions. Further, communications
would be more difficult to maintain on all fronts.

Failure to progress through the required trans-
itions would result in a number of problems. First, by
failing to adequately provide a well-defined policy-
making mechanism, the agent would not have a clear direction.
Continuous shifts in orientation would mean that the
agent would remain issue and conflict-oriented rather than
learning to execute a well-formulated and planned response
to the issues at hand. Finally, the failure to construct
an adequate communications network would cause the
community to become alienated from the development agent.
This could lead to the community either actively or passively withdrawing its support for the effort; thus, defeating the central purpose of the initial conflict.

**Economic and Political Resource Linkages**

In part, the success of the agent's experiences in "getting its house in order" will determine its ability to maintain and expand its base of support outside of the community. Because of the obvious lack of resources within the community for investment and in development, particularly at the outset, will primarily depend on the amount of resources it can muster from such sources. The critical difference being, of course, that now internal forces control the resources of intervention. Economic and political linkages refer to the ties the indigenous agent establishes with the traditional power structure to carry out activities and to expand the domain over which it controls the resources of the ghetto development. The primary considerations of each are outlined below:

**A. Economic Resource Linkages**

Beyond establishing legitimacy, the primary objective of the "proto-development agent's" conflict is to gain control of the resources of intervention, traditionally controlled by the power structure. The success of the protest
group climaxes when it gains control of such resources. Typically, however, the resources are meager and only cover the minimal costs required to perform some specific task (over which the formal power structure has relinquished its position to execute development activities). For example, the resources might be expressly allocated to the agent for the purpose of developing a manpower training program or for establishing a community-based school. In addition, resources are usually provided for only some pre-determined time after which the agent must either generate its own capital or solicit resources from another outside source. Thus, the agent must develop a means of becoming self-sufficient and expanding its base of operations. Obviously, the long-range intent would be to generate support resources within the community. The attainment of that goal, however, is dependent upon its ability to find the initial investment resources.

Another related point concerns the agent's ability to locate technical and professional assistance required for the development effort. During the protest stage, as shown, the type of expertise required is of a different nature than that which is essential for development. The quality of expertise acquired will effect the success of its endeavors. Naturally, the higher the quality of resource skills acquired, the more equipped the agent will
be to reorganize its structure as well as to execute its development program. However, quality expertise could potentially be the most costly expenditure item. Thus, through economic linkages, the agent must locate quality expertise at the lowest possible costs. For example, the agent may solicit the support of colleges and universities that can voluntarily supply technical and professional skills. Again, long-range goals will be to develop such supportive services from within the ghetto community, but the agent must first get the programs initiated to reach that goal.

B. Political Linkages

Following the conflict stage, the new development agent finds itself in a peculiar position. Up to the point where it has successfully managed to control the resources, the indigenous agent has actively engaged in conflict with the traditional power structure. It has also sought to alienate the ghetto community from outside forces with the purpose in mind of gaining greater support for the conflict against the traditional power structure. However, once it has succeeded in forcing that structure (or member thereof) to capitulate, then the agent must attempt to rebuild cooperative relationships with its former adversaries. This is primarily because of the need to maintain and expand economic
linkages. The power structure, after all, holds the bulk of resources that can potentially serve the purpose of development (until that time when the agent can generate its own).

The transformation process requires the agent to re-establish its political linkages with the outside forces. Again, its success, in part, its ability to survive on its own and determine the direction of intervention is dependent on how well the political ties are maintained. In addition, through accomplishing these ends, the agent reinforces its legitimacy as a rightful development organization. The extent to which it can reinforce its legitimacy through such linkages will determine its ability to extend its base of operations. The successful agent must recognize the precarious circumstances surrounding its emergence; and carefully proceed, with the alternatives of seeking expansion through cooperation as opposed to reverting to protest conflict states on which it was founded.
FOOTNOTES

1 Saul Alinski, "From Citizen Apathy to Participation", Paper presented to the Association of Community Councils Convention, October 1957, Chicago, Illinois. (For additional information see: Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals ((Chicago: University Press, 1945)).


4 Riesman, p. 5.

5 Among the most well-known programs - Peoples' War Council of Syracuse, New York; the Harlem Youth Opportunities Council; and Father Groppi's Youth Group in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

6 Riesman, p. 7.

7 Clark and Hopkins, p. 242.

CHAPTER V: DEVELOPMENT TECHNIQUES: UNBALANCED AND BALANCED GROWTH STRATEGIES

Previously it has been argued that Alien Agents, despite the vast amount of resources at their disposal, simply cannot forge the kinds of "system" changes in the ghetto structure that development requires. Blaustien and Faux point out, however, community development is poor people pooling their resources together and attempting to improve their lot.¹ The central question becomes, given the minimal resources available to the Indigenous Agent, how can it substantially impact the over-all environment?

As I suggested earlier, the "need" for development efforts implies that something in the ghetto community is not developed or is under-developed. I have defined those under-developed factors as the social, political and economic systems of the structure. Given the severity of their financial constraints, I suggest that Indigenous Agents must follow either one of two principle routes in obtaining over-all development - either an Unbalanced or Balanced Growth Strategy.

By "Growth Strategy", I refer to the techniques of development. Economist Albert Hirschman proposes that there are two basic methods or means of development that
under-developed countries can utilize. One route consists of expanding (or maturing) one sector of the economy and this in turn stimulates further growth in other sectors. This is "Unbalanced Growth". By concentrating on the first sector and using all available resources to impact positive change here, these changes will in turn produce more change in other sectors. In the second route, "Balanced Growth", the country attempts to simultaneously develop all sectors of the economy at once. The rationale is, of course, that the various sectors are intricately interwoven and under-development in one sector impedes growth in others. The only way the cycle can be broken is to develop each sector at an even pace.

From my perspective on ghetto development, the economic system is only one of three that must be improved upon, thus differing in some respect from the economists' conception of development. However, for lack of better terms and an accepted theory, I take the liberty to attempt to define ghetto development in the same context as Hirschman's theory of unbalanced growth strategies and balanced growth strategies. Therefore, through employing an unbalanced growth strategy, the Indigenous Agent organizes all energies and resources into one project or activity. It uses this project not merely to impact change
in one area, but rather also intends to effect change in all three systems of the structure.

Unbalanced Growth

Here the underlying assumption is that one area or activity that can stimulate or generate comprehensive change exists. The agent must identify such. George Shipman, professor of political sciences at the University of Alabama, comments on the objectives of this approach:

"As usually the case with (such) efforts at socio-economic change, the impact does not appear to result directly from intervention. Rather, the intervention action program produces change inducing influences which in turn are expected to generate the sought-for change. It is the change-inducing influences that are the outputs of the program system, the products of productive activity..."6

Another assumption is that growth need not take place at an equal pace through all of the realms. Rather, some areas may be more advanced than others. In fact, Hirschman suggests that it is when imbalances occur in the economy that new opportunities exist for inducing additional growth.7

Beyond the obvious requirement of initial investment resources (which will be discussed later on), the primary requirement is that the agent find some project that can serve as a starting point for developing the various aspects
of the economy. The project need not stimulate growth simultaneously. However, it must at least stimulate growth in one of the three realms of the ghetto system. For example, the project selected might be aimed towards developing the economic system. Profits derived from this area can then be utilized for reinvestment in social development. The social development may in turn, stimulate greater social cohesiveness which will lead to developing the political realm, etc.

The most feasible project is one that can stimulate growth directly in a number of areas, which will increase the inducing of influences that are the outputs of the project activity. For example, the project might stimulate some growth in the economic sector while at the same time stimulate growth in one of the other sectors, either the political and/or social sector. The crucial point is, however, that the project does not have to allow for each of the sectors to develop at an equal pace.

**Balanced Growth**

This perspective holds that the above method is totally unfeasible or is at least, a less effective manner of producing over-all development. This is because the
general state of under-development existing in the area, the perspective holds, impedes the progression of any one area beyond a limited scope. Thus, the agent cannot develop the economic realm unless it also develops, equally, the political and social realms. Within the context of purely economic development analysis, the following example would apply:

"a shoe factory - which gets underway by itself in an under-developed country - is likely to turn into a failure; the workers, employees and owners of the shoe factory will obviously not buy all of its output while the other citizens of the country are caught in an under-development equilibrium where they are just able jointly to afford their own meager outputs. Therefore, it is argued that to make development possible, it is necessary to start, at one and the same time, a large number of new industries which will be each others' clients through their purchases or workers, employees and owners..."

In the above case, the crucial inter-connections between the various sectors of the economy forbid one project from developing and generating development in other sectors. Therefore, the best strategy is one that allows for simultaneous development. Within the context of ghetto development, as has been defined, the three sectors or realms - political, social and economic - are intricately inter-connected and progression of one demands that equal progression be taken in other realms. Therefore, the best strategy is one that allows for simultaneous
development to take place. From this there exists a need for the development agent to engage its resources and energies in diverse projects and activities in order to develop the three systems in a balanced manner.

The principal requirement for implementing the balanced growth strategy (again, beyond initial resource needs) is that the agent accurately select diverse action which can, in fact, allow for development to occur in the three realms at an equal pace. If the agent fails to identify such project and employment resources and energies there, then it jeopardizes the successfulness of all of the projects and in obtaining the ultimate development objectives.

The Indigenous Agent finds itself in a difficult situation at the time it acquires its initial development resources. As pointed out earlier, the newly-conceived agent is only involved in one particular activity - that which the initial problem stimulating the conception of the agent concerned. Yet, in order to become an effective development agent, it must acquire the capability of impacting comprehensive improvement on the three realms of the ghetto structure. To do this, the agent can decide to continue to concentrate on the single activity and utilize the unbalanced growth strategy, or, instead, the agent can consciously expand its base of operations by
seeking to engage in diverse activities, and thereby employ, the balanced growth strategy. There are certain hazards associated with employing the former strategy, namely whether or not the initial activity (leading to the emergence of the agent) is one that can stimulate unbalanced growth—particularly in light of the unplanned and disorganized manner in which the agent became involved in the area. On the other hand, there are other risks involved in attempting to expand the base of operations and employ a balanced growth strategy. These potential risks and strengths are examined in the analysis of Indigenous Agent presented in the final section.
FOOTNOTES


3 Ibid., pp. 50-73.


7 Hirschman, *Strategies of Economic Development*, p. 73.

8 Ibid, p. 51.
SECTION THREE

Introduction

The case studies on the Tenants' Development Corporation (TDC) and the Roxbury Action Program (RAP) are presented in Chapters VI (6) and VII (7) respectively. The central focus concerns the relative advantages and problems that each organization has encountered during its transformation from "protest" to development; and their ability to meet comprehensive ghetto development objectives, particularly in light of their choice to employ an unbalanced (TDC) or balanced (RAP) growth strategy.

The Chapters are broken into three parts. The first examines the community in which the organization is based, its emergence as a development agent and the transformation process from protest to development; the second outlines the intended plans for reaching comprehensive development objectives; and the third is an evaluation of its program structure and ability to meet those objectives.

Chapter VIII (8) is the conclusion on the case studies. Based upon the above analysis, I present my views on which of the opposing strategies, balanced or unbalanced, is best suited for the arduous tasks that confront the Indigenous Agent.
CHAPTER VI: CASE STUDY - TENANTS' DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

PART I

Background Information:

A. The South End Community

Tenants' Development Corporation is based in the South End of Boston (see Map 1). At the turn of the century this community was one of the residential areas for Boston's upper-middle income families. The elegant single home rowhouses were among the best constructed in the East.

Since that time the South End declined rapidly, as whites moved to the suburban ring and Blacks came into the central city. With this influx, the fine homes were broken into multi-family dwellings or converted into rooming houses.\(^1\)

Currently, a dramatic change is taking place in this community. It is now distinguishable by its unusually extensive racial, ethnic and socio-economic mixture. Ten to fifteen years ago, the area was predominantly Black; and more recently, mainly single whites and Hispanic populations have migrated into the community. Moreover, in the last few years, young white professionals are moving
into the area to reclaim the rowhouses as single family dwellings. Also, real estate developers, recognizing a growing market, are purchasing and rehabilitating the rowhouses to create luxury apartments. At the same time, the poor and minority populations are being pushed from the South End as landlords charge exorbitant rents. The result is that the community is one in transition.²

B. The Emergence of Tenants' Development Corporation

The events taking place leading to what is now TDC began in the spring of 1967. At that time the United South End Settlements³ (U.S.E.S.) employed a Black community organizer to work with poor tenants in the area and organize them to strive for better housing in the community.

Under the leadership and direction of Ted Parrish, the movement gained momentum, particularly among Blacks in the area. Parrish helped the organization prepare itself and the community for a major battle against the absentee slum landlords. South End Tenants' Council (SETC)⁴ sought and received the assistance of the Boston Legal Assistance Program (BLAP).⁵ Upon thoroughly investigating individual cases, BLAP decided to litigate on behalf of the organization's tenants against a number of landlords. However, the legal machinery proved to move too slowly for the anticipations
and frustrations of the tenants. SETC decided the time had come for more direct action. It called for a community-wide rent strike against landlords who failed to keep their housing in safe and sanitary conditions. In addition, the organization began to concentrate the thrust of the protest against one landlord, Joseph Mindick. Although Mindick maintained considerable holdings throughout the South End, he lived in a better section of Boston, in the predominantly Jewish Mattapan. The fact that Mindick was of the Jewish faith came to play an important factor in the course of events.

During the spring of 1968, while the tenants and landlords were locked in a stalemate of cross-litigation, in an unprecedented move, the Massachusetts Rabbinical Court of Justice offered to intervene into the matter and arbitrate a final decision between the conflicting groups. Mindick, a strong supporter of his faith, immediately agreed; and SETC, recognizing the potential sanctions the Court could place against any Jewish members found "guilty", decided to allow the Court to arbitrate.

After ten official meetings and four weeks of arbitration, the Court ordered Mindick to paint and plaster apartments, repair plumbing, cover floors and put new locks on all the doors. Further, the Court established
a process that would allow both tenants and landlords to bring their grievances and disputes to a final settlement. Also, the Court ruled that if Mindick decided to sell his properties, then SETC should have the first option to buy.  

The South End had also been designated as a Boston Urban Renewal project area. The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) was in the process of locating developers to rehabilitate the worn rowhouse buildings that predominated the community. Because of the resources the Authority had available and its connections with the Housing and Urban Development Department, SETC (with the assistance of BLAP and the Rabbinical Court) entered into negotiations with the BRA. On August 11, 1969, Hale Champion, Authority Director, announced that an understanding had been reached between the tenants' association and the city. The understanding - that SETC, through a development corporation (later to be named the Tenants' Development Corporation) would become owner, redeveloper and manager of twenty buildings located on scattered sites throughout the area. The Rabbinical Court had ordered Mindick to sell his properties to the BRA; and in turn, that agency would re-sell the properties at "write-down" costs to the development corporation. In addition, the BRA would assist TDC in applying for a guaranteed rehabilitation loan through HUD 236 rent subsidy program of the National Housing Act.
The process had been completed; SETC had waged a successful battle against the local government authorities and the landlords. TDC was to be established as the development arm of the organization.9

C. Program Objectives

The primary objective of TDC has been to purchase, redevelop and manage low income housing for poor and minority households in the South End.10 In doing so, however, the organization has attempted to positively effect the over-all community environment through its activities in this area. In this manner, TDC serves as an Indigenous Agent, utilizing the "unbalanced" growth strategy as a means of ghetto development.
Evaluation of Transformation Stage (In Light of Choice of Growth Strategy):

A. Modifications in the Administrative Structure

Before the development stage, the organization enlisted active support from a broad range of different types of residents in the area. It solicited and received the membership of poor and minority tenants. Also, many persons from the middle class segments (such as homeowners and university students) identified with the struggle and gave SETC full support.

Presently, the number of persons actively involved with the organization has dwindled to a mere handful. Mainly this is the result of the limited role that membership holds. The TDC general body is now a very loosely organized group which only comes together once a year to select the corporate board of directors. 11

Previously, the decision-making process was poorly defined. For the most part, leadership was vested in one person, Ted Parrish. Decisions were made informally by group consensus. But now all of this has changed. The corporate board of directors is the executive mechanism. Where the organization had once been dependent on their charismatic leader for direction, when Parrish left, the
ADMINISTRATIVE CHART

TENANT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
board filled the resulting power vacuum.\textsuperscript{12}

As executors, the board of directors, in effect, serves as the administrative structure. (See Chart 1.) This arrangement exists for a number of reasons. First, the organization did not possess the financial resources required to employ its own full-time professional staff. Secondly, TDC has been able to utilize the services of a nonprofit housing consultant firm (which carries out much of the day-to-day business).

The effectiveness of this administrative arrangement has been minimal; primarily because it only functions on a part-time basis. In that there is no full-time staff, board members meet bi-monthly to decide the course of the day-to-day operational matters. These stringent time constraints force the board to spend the majority of its time dealing with crisis situations; thus, it has not had the time to address the broader development issues in a sufficient manner. Some members feel that the present arrangement makes the corporation overly dependent on outside professional and technical assistance.\textsuperscript{13}

I believe its utilization of the unbalanced growth strategy has hindered the organization's ability to develop an effective and responsive administrative mechanism. Because of their decision to concentrate on one activity,
board members have felt that, with minimal assistance, they could handle the business at hand (on a part-time basis). The importance of developing a full-time professional staff has been played down; and placed far down on the priority list. Had TDC been involved in more diverse areas from the outset, the board may have more readily foreseen the problems that would arise as a result of failing to establish a strong administrative structure.

B. Modifications in Relationship to the Community

The board also serves as the policy-making mechanism (which ties TDC to the greater community). Membership includes tenants, professional housing developers and community leaders. Over-all, the mechanism is much more carefully structured than it was during the conflict stage.

TDC has identified one particular segment of the community as the group the organization represents and functions to serve. These are the poor and minority families of the South End, particularly those ill-housed; these residents are the primary concern of the organization. However, TDC has had a more difficult time in attempting to designate any specific location in the community as the "target area". This is because the transition taking place in the South End has fragmented neighborhoods. Some
RESOURCE LINKAGES

TENANT DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION
consist exclusively of either middle-class or poor residents, whereas many are comprised of market racial and socio-economic mixtures. As a result of this factor, TDC perceives the "ghetto community" as a scattered and transient one.

Formalized communications between TDC and the community are non-existent. The organization has not made an assertive effort to keep area residents informed on development activities or future plans. In addition, it failed to ascertain community needs and desires from the perspective of the poor and minority populations. The lack of adequate communications between TDC and residents has hindered the agent's effectiveness in meeting development objectives. At this point, it is fair to point out that TDC has no concrete perspective on how well its programs are operating to meet their anticipated ends because the failure to construct a two-dimensional information network.

C. Resource Linkages

TDC has established two very important economic resource linkages: The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Although many others have assisted, these two organizations have made the bulk of development resources available. In addition, TDC has also made an important technical linkage.
The Greater Boston Community Development Corporation, Inc. (GBCD), a nonprofit housing consultant firm, provides (at greatly reduced costs) essential services to the organization.16

Because the corporation has maintained good relationships with outside organizations (such as the BRA and HUD), it has reinforced its own position as a developer and could potentially expand its base of operations. Moreover, as a result of these political ties, it has gained even greater assistance.17

Although the organization's resource linkages are strong, they are not diversified. Because TDC has been involved, exclusively with housing activities (as opposed to multiple projects), it has developed substantial linkages for such operations. At the same time, TDC has not sought to expand the types of outside resources. Because of the limited scope, the corporation has become too dependent on too few outside resources. (See Chart 2.) Should the anticipated in-flow of funds be abruptly terminated, the organization would collapse as a result of its inability to function on its own.18
PART II

Ghetto Development Objectives

Although not precisely stated in the terms used below, the following comments speak to the intended goals of the development agent to accomplish over-all social, economic and political development.

Social Objectives:

1. To provide the community with greater social stability by rehabilitating new homes for those groups who would otherwise be forced to move out of the area;

2. To neutralize social conflict between various racial, ethnic and socio-economic classes that detract from social cohesion;

3. To create a more stable home environment for poor and minority families and thereby reduce the symptomatic social problems of crime and other social deviant behavior.

In accomplishing these ends, the organization will have forged structural changes in the modifications in the over-all social environment of the South End community.
Economic Objectives:

1. To increase the collective wealth of poor and minority residents through the acquisition and redevelopment of significant amounts of residential holdings;
2. To stimulate new demands on the business sector of the ghetto economic system by utilizing the goods and services of that sector for all phases of housing development activities;
3. To increase employment opportunities for ghetto residents.

Through the above activities, resources will circulate more fluently through the community before filtering back into the greater economic structure. In effect, the economic system of the ghetto will have been substantially expanded and improved.

Political Objectives:

1. To enhance the political position of the South End's poor and minority populations, indirectly, through improving the social and economic conditions of the area.
Although housing development activities will not generate direct political improvements, the progressive cumulation of economic and social wealth will then in turn generate political position of these groups.
PART III

An Evaluation of Program Effectiveness:

A. Social Development

The TDC effort thus far has failed to generate substantial improvement in the social structure of the South End. In part, the reason stems from a lack of adequate resources to impact change on a massive scale. There are other reasons behind this failure, however, not related directly to financial matters. The most important fault is that the agent failed to make certain that the intended social aims stimulated as a result of housing development were in fact taking place.

In a number of situations, TDC found itself working against its own social development goals. A typical example of this problem occurred during the construction phase of the first rehabilitation project. Here, TDC failed to maintain close contact with tenants who been temporarily relocated from their homes so that the construction work could be carried out. Rather than exploiting their rightful opportunities to return to their homes and neighborhoods once the rehabilitation was completed, many tenants as a result of confusion and misunderstanding caused by poor
communications simply left the South End in search of new homes. Thus, in this instance, TDC contributed to the same type of social instability it was attempting to combat.

In another case, the TDC housing effort stimulated social discord in the South End, as opposed to eliminating some of the social conflicts between various racial and socio-economic groups. While planning the second project, South End Tenants' Houses II, TDC had failed to gain adequate insight into the needs and desires of neighborhood tenants. When it announced plans to rehabilitate a large structure for occupancy by large families, many residents in the particular area protested the plans on the grounds that there were already too many children in the neighborhood. Then an opposing group of residents complained that the former group represented the interests of white middle-class; and were simply attempting to keep large minority families out. Before long, the neighborhood was torn into two opposing camps; each accused the other of racial bias and displaced class interest. The pure negligence of TDC to discover beforehand what residents desired caused considerable discord between different socio-economic and racial groups.

For the most part, the business of housing development and management has been too demanding for the
agent. As a result of this factor, it did not take time to examine how the effort was affecting social conditions and determine whether its housing development program was accomplishing social goals. In this sense, TDC could not improve social conditions, not so much because its program design was inaccurate, but rather because it failed to provide for adequate follow-up.

B. Economic Development

The organization has been confronted with a series of critical problems while attempting to utilize its housing effort as a means of generating economic development. The problem stems primarily from the fact that housing development is in itself a business enterprise and therefore certain conflicts arise between the goals of developing successful housing projects and those of expanding the community's business sector. The very survival of TDC is dependent upon the success it experiences in housing development. Necessarily, the agent has had to operate under budgetary and fiscal constraints similar to those in any business in order to remain financially sound.

First, TDC assumed that by creating a demand for goods and services produced by minority enterprise it could stimulate business expansion. The business sector would
simply have to increase its productivity to meet the increased demand. The problem has been that the demand for goods and services has been so great that the community sector has not been able to meet it. Therefore, TDC has been forced to turn to outside businesses to handle its larger demands. For example, the first project called for rehabilitation of twenty rowhouse buildings (consisting of 100 units). TDC could not locate a minority general contractor that was large enough to handle the job. The same problems occurred when it attempted to locate minority sub-contractors. Most were simply too small to adequately service 100 units; thus again, the agent was forced to turn to outside enterprise. This problem has not been solved. In the second project, the agent has also turned to a large company to serve as the general contractor. In fact, the effort involved so much capital that TDC could not locate a minority bank in the area possessing enough to finance the government-insured project loan.

In most cases, demand has simply been too great for the supplies local minority enterprise could even hope to produce. In situations where they could, another set of problems cropped up. Because of their smaller size, many ghetto businesses could not offer their goods and services at prices below (or even equal to) those of white companies.
On a number of occasions, TDC has been forced to choose between providing fiscal benefits for its housing interests and assisting the Black business sector. For example, TDC decided to employ the services of a minority fuel company over a number of larger white companies who could have supplied oil to the housing project at substantially lower costs to the agent.

On the other hand, the TDC effort is contributing to some long-range improvements in the economic structure. First, properties of significant value are being acquired and redeveloped in the interest of the poor. These holdings can serve as leverage for attracting additional investment resources in the South End. Secondly, South End Tenants' Houses II (nearing initial closing) is a limited dividend venture and will generate capital for TDC that can also be channeled into future investments.

Currently, TDC housing efforts are not impairing the community's economic structure. The problem is that for all the energies being placed into the effort, it is not generating expansion for the community at maximum potentials. As a result of creating too great a demand on the community business sector, TDC finds itself supporting big business more extensively than the former sector.
C. Political Development

TDC has not generated political development through the housing effort (nor has it attempted to do so). The organization is a nonprofit tax-exempt corporation. Direct involvement in political activities would, of course, jeopardize the housing development projects and in turn the survival of the agent.

Because the organization has chosen to concentrate its resources on housing alone, it has simply had to hold off on improving the political situation until the point where returns in the economic and social realms are great enough to generate political improvements for the South End's poor and minority populations. Thus, the agent, through utilization of the unbalanced growth strategy, is currently failing to impact political conditions.
FOOTNOTES


3. U.S.E.S., United South End Settlements; this nonprofit social welfare agency was established to assist the needy in the South End. (For additional information see: Keyes, The Rehabilitation Planning Game, pp. 50-52, also see: Charles Fraggos, "A Settlements' Role in Community Development", a paper presented at the Conference on Social Welfare, May 26, 1965, Atlantic City).

4. SETC, South End Tenants' Council, established in 1968, this organization served as the initial protest group. Currently, SETC functions to provide social services to the area's tenants.

5. BLAP, Boston Legal Assistance Program, arm of Office of Economic Opportunity functioning to provide free legal services to the poor.

6. Ruth Gelmis, "The Bitter Blacks and Five Rabbis", Look Magazine, April 1, 1969, pp. 43-44. The Rabbinical Court function as arbiters of disputes and as interpreters of Jewish law. There are about 12 such Courts in the United States.


The relationship between SETC and TDC has never been clearly defined. Legally, TDC has been established as a separate corporation by the State of Massachusetts and operates as such.


The By-Laws stipulate that the board will meet annually to select the directors. It is only rarely when TDC's general body meets. For example, the body has not assembled during the last year.

Interview with Patrick Clancy, March 13, 1973. Mr. Clancy is a consultant to TDC Development Committee.

Members interviewed expressed this concern; that the corporation needed to develop its own resource mechanisms.

The only exception to this fact is communications between TDC and TDC's tenants.

The organization has not attempted to correspond with the greater South End population through newsletters, public communications, meetings, etc., since the protest period.

Greater Boston Community Development, Inc. (GBCD) is a nonprofit development firm. The organization (formerly South End Community Development), has been involved with TDC development since the beginning. GBCD can offer less expensive services to nonprofit community-sponsored housing ventures.

For example, after TDC received tentative designation as developer of the first package by the BRA, the corporation received support it needed to develop the rehabilitation plans (at no initial costs).

Presently, TDC generates no resources capable of sustaining operations. The limited dividend South End Houses II will provide such funds in the future. Until that time, the corporation is wholly dependent on outside funds.
19 TDC was able to employ the services of a joint venture between a well-established white contractor and a much smaller minority company. Most funds for the venture went to services provided by the former firm.

20 The corporation attempted to locate a bank in the New England area (excluding New York), but was unable to locate one in the state or the immediate surrounding areas.
CHAPTER VII: CASE STUDY - ROXBURY ACTION PROGRAM

PART I

Background Information:

A. The Highland Park Community

Roxbury Action Program (RAP) is based in the Highland Park area. This physically attractive area (one of the few "green belts" left in the city), is tucked away in a hilly section of Boston's "Black" Roxbury.

The community is primarily residential. The racial make-up is predominantly Black (approximately 80%); and residents have mostly low (and some) moderate incomes. The housing conditions are exceptionally blighted. It is referred to by some as a "soft housing market" because of the relatively low value of the stock. Many buildings, though solid, are abandoned and damaged extensively by vandals. In part, the community has been stagnant, experiencing little economic activity or residential development.

Although there had been efforts by residents to revitalize Highland Park (prior to RAP's entrance), these efforts were to little avail. The greatest fear in the
community had not been that the area would not experience revitalization, but rather the concern is that once development begins, the processes would be out of their hands.¹

B. Emergence of the Roxbury Action Program

The present RAP operations emerged from a rather unique set of circumstances beginning in 1964. At that time the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)² decided to sponsor a program in the Black community that would function to assist residents with housing problems. That agency was named the Roxbury Action Program.

The RAP office was housed on Blue Hill Avenue (a main artery in the heart of Roxbury). The agency equated its activities to that of the civil rights organizations operating on Blue Hill Avenue at the time. The Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) and others were all based on the "storefront strip". This was the height of the civil rights movement; things were starting to happen in Boston.³

For a two year period, the RAP staff, headed by George Morrison, functioned to improve landlord/tenant relations. During this time, staff members, through their
experiences, came to the realization that their approach
was not a viable method for solving the problems of the
community. Moreover, they concluded that AFSC (a white
sponsored organization) could not direct programs designed
to ameliorate the conditions of the minority community.
Thus, in 1967, the RAP staff approached the parent organiza-
tion and demanded that a new relationship be formulated.
RAP, under the exclusive direction of a Black community
staff, should move to solve the problems in the community
on its own.4

After over a year of negotiations with AFSC, the
agency agreed to grant RAP its "independence" and provide
resources that would enable it to carry out "ghetto develop-
ment" efforts. In June of 1969, the new RAP proposed a
development program that identified the Highland
Park area of Roxbury as the most feasible location for a
model Black community.5 In effect, an outside agent
agreed to legitimize an indigenous group and provide it
resources for development purposes.

C. Program Objectives

The new RAP, under the leadership of Mr. Morrison,
relocated its base of operations into Highland Park. The
objective was to develop and execute a plan of action that
could provide for social, economic and political development
of the small community. To these ends, the organization announced a comprehensive area master plan.6
Evaluation of Transformation Stage (In Light of Choice of Growth Strategy):

A. Modifications in the Administrative Structure

Before the development stage, RAP solicited support from the over-all community; the primary issue at hand - poor housing. The organization served as a mediator between tenants and landlords, striving to pressure the latter group to repair its stock and rent safe and decent housing. Today, RAP continues to seek the active support of the community; and, more important, it provides opportunities for residents to become directly involved in the program.

RAP already possessed an organized administrative structure. The transformation involved making it more suitable for the new business at hand. Towards these ends, the organization solicited persons with development skills to serve on its staff. Because of financial constraints, however, staff members initially handled two or more areas of development.

The administrative structure's decision-making mechanism has not changed dramatically. Mr. Morrison, who has led the agent towards self-dependency, continues to steer the direction of activities.
On the whole, RAP has developed an efficient and effective administration. No doubt, part of its success stems from the fact that it already possessed one that facilitated the primary task of re-orienting its direction from "civil rights" type work to community development. The selection of a balanced growth strategy did not make this task easier. However, because the programs were diversified, and in that many required community participation, RAP was careful to re-design the structure in a manner still conducive to community participation. In this sense, the balanced strategy helped in creating an effective mechanism.

B. Modifications in Relationship to the Community

From the on-start, the organization has been faced with a delicate situation in deciding who should set policies for the effort. On one hand, it represented all of Roxbury. On the other, the project target area was Highland Park. RAP did not "emerge" from Highland Park in the usual sense of the word; rather it "embraced" the area. In order to make the "marriage" more real to life, the agent not only shifted its office to the area, but also requested staff members to reside in Highland Park. Thus, the first to be involved were the most recent indigents of the area. Secondly, in order to place itself under the guidance of the over-all Black community in general, and Highland Park in
particular, RAP selected its Policy Committee from both areas, though most members of the committee lived in Highland Park.

Beyond drawing the geographic boundaries of the community, the agent has been hesitant to identify any specific segment of residents as the one it represents and functions to serve. To this end, programs have been established that will involve various segments, individually, as well as the community as a collective.

RAP also faced the problem of developing a communications network. At the point when it moved to the area, direct inter-communications were naturally at the "zero" level. It embarked on a hard-publicizing campaign to inform residents of its presence and plans.

The organization has been successful in developing a strong responsive relationship with the greater community. Many residents identify and participate in the various activities and programs. The selection of a diversified program approach has assisted the agent in building the required strong connections with the residents, particularly in that it directly involves citizens at the decision and policy-making level.
C. Resource Linkages

The major economic resources for RAP has been the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). Without these funds, RAP could not have become a reality. Beyond this major source, the organization has moved in diverse directions seeking financial assistance. It has developed a number of housing projects. The sources for the efforts have included HUD, MHFA and private investors. Moreover, RAP has turned to another group of agencies for assistance in the various projects. Basically, the resource policy has been to emphasize development in those areas where outside investment funds can be found.

RAP has also developed excellent technical and professional resource linkages. Working especially with various universities and colleges in the area, the organization has attempted to tap all available professional and technical assistance. Some of the resources include Harvard University, M.I.T., as well as assistance from a number of well-known law and architectural firms.

RAP's economic resources are its political resources. The organization has embarked on a carefully guarded and well-planned course to reinforce its position as a
RESOURCE LINKAGES

ROXBURY ACTION PROGRAM
community developer; and expand its base of operations. Its relationship with AFSC and universities, such as Harvard and M.I.T. has helped to strengthen its political position and, through association, lessened its own "risk factor" that potential investors normally take into account before deciding to invest in the central city regions.

RAP has profited from employing the balanced growth strategy in attempting to build resource linkages with outside sources. Because it intends to execute diverse programs, the number of potential sources has been expanded. Rather than depending on only the AFSC, it has attempted to off-set the potential weaknesses in that arrangement by finding other resources that balance out its dependency. Moreover, the agent has also moved to generate income inside of the community that can serve as the foundation for more self-reliant effort.
PART II

Ghetto Development Objectives:

RAP has initiated a series of projects designed to improve the over-all Highland Park environment. RAP's objectives are outlined as follows:

1. To organize the Black citizens of the Highland Park area politically, economically and culturally to develop a wide base of cooperative and individual housing ownership;

2. To promote and support the economic self-development of groups and individuals in the community in cooperative efforts;

3. To provide through education and training, the opportunity for participation in community development by those who have the most to gain in salvaging the neighborhood – the residents. 11

Current programs12 to meet the above goals are as follows:

Housing Redevelopment

Including the acquisition and rehabilitation of neighborhood properties. The organization has rehabilitated and now manages 60 units of low and moderate income housing.
This has been accomplished through three projects (RAP-UP I, II, and III). The next project (in planning stages) will include new as well as rehabilitation work.

Business Development

RAP has initiated an exterminating company that now services greater Black community. In addition, plans are rapidly nearing completion on the establishment of a drug store in the area.

Transportation Planning

The organization has also been involved with the Boston Transportation Planning Review concerning the Southwest Corridor. The main interest in this has resulted from potential impact new transportation projects would have on the Highland Park area.

Community Organization

RAP has initiated a community organization program that consists of a systematic effort to make a house-to-house visit with residents. The process is an on-going one in that organizers have developed a dialogue between RAP and the community. This process has to be utilized to gain a more in-depth understanding of problems the area is encountering, as well as to gauge the effectiveness of RAP's efforts to impact improvements.
Other Activities

Until recently RAP has provided a draft counseling service and is now in the process of developing a community library. In addition to this, the organization has established a center for the community, the Marcus Garvey House.

Through executing the above programs, RAP has attempted to launch a direct attack on the social, political and economic defects in the Highland Park environment. The resources of development have been organized to give immediate attention to each of those three realms.
PART III

An Evaluation of Program Effectiveness:

A. Social Development

The RAP effort has been successful in impacting noticeable improvement in social conditions of the area. First, through continuous communications (on a person-to-person basis) with residents, RAP has been able to instill in many citizens a new sense of hope and pride in their community. Further, the agent has created a new climate where residents believe that the community is in control of the development effort; and that RAP functions of their behalf, as well as under their guidance.13

Naturally, not all has been perfect. The agent has also generated considerable conflict between Blacks and whites in the area. For example, at one point white residents in the so-called "Fort Hill" area of Highland Park protected their neighborhood from outside "intruders", i.e., RAP, with armed guards (primarily to protest what they considered to be interference into their affairs). Not until very recently has social and racial strife begun to subside in the community. Secondly, RAP has, on occasion, raised resident's anticipations that marked improvements would
take place to a point beyond that which they could realistically satisfy. In doing so, the agent has alienated some residents from its program. On an over-all basis, however, these shortcomings are far out-weighed by substantial social improvement the agent's effort is providing.

B. Economic Development

RAP's economic development projects have not substantially impacted economic conditions in Highland Park (although they have provided limited new opportunities). First, the housing programs together involved the rehabilitation of only sixty units. Though helpful, these efforts obviously have not remedied poor conditions in the area's market; nor has community ownership of the properties provided immediate and direct economic gains to residents. On the other hand, the three projects have been small enough to be readily handled by the minority business sector and thereby creating reasonable new demands.

Also, the agent has successfully established a management component currently servicing the units. In this sense, the housing programs have assisted the economic system of the community. Moreover, because the projects are limited dividend, RAP is accumulating at least some of its own investment resources.
The business development program has only initiated two enterprises - the exterminating company and the community-inspired drug store. RAP has not accumulated adequate capital requirements to launch a massive expansion of the area's almost non-existent minority business sector. At present it is difficult to see where the agent will ever generate enough capital to do so. Furthermore, the feasibility of its policy to impact structural improvements through sponsoring minute businesses is questionable.

RAP has provided new employment and training opportunities for community residents. Whenever possible, RAP has attempted to employ indigenous populations in its program. Also, the small businesses do provide jobs. In addition to sponsoring academic scholarships to deserving students, the agent actively encourages staff members and related employees to expand their skills through further training.

Although inadequate resources have tended to constrain major economic achievement, the RAP model is effective. Slowly, the agent is stimulating economic expansion, accumulating investment capital and seeking means of becoming fiscally solvent.
C. Political Development

RAP has been able to muster some positive impact on political conditions in Highland Park. Because of its nonprofit tax-exempt status, the agent has not been able to initiate or support overt political activities. It has been able to move around that obstacle. Mainly, the agent speaks of "cultural development". Particularly in a predominantly Black community, cultural matters have strong political undertones. For example, RAP's "Marcus Garvey Community Center" symbolizes cultural achievement as well as suggests a particular political perspective; and the Black Nationalist flag waving over the agent's business office is certainly a sign of political involvement.

The primary improvement in this area has been RAP's success in increasing the political clout of the community when negotiating with other communities or the city government, etc. For example, it is highly improbable that any outside individual or group could initiate development activities in the area without receiving prior approval by RAP. While the major thrust of development has been to improve the community's competitive power on an internal basis, there is still much work to be done to improve the political organization of residents.
FOOTNOTES

1 Interview with Mr. Robert Perry, May 2, 1973. Mr. Perry is Program Manager of RAP Housing Component.

2 American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) is a nonprofit organization sponsored primarily by resources of the white private sector. The committee functions to assist various groups and government agencies.

3 Interview with Mr. Lloyd King, May 2, 1973. Mr. King is Associate Director of RAP.


7 King Interview, May 2, 1973.

8 King Interview, May 2, 1973.

9 Lincoln Study, p. 4.

10 King Interview, May 2, 1973.


12 Ibid., pp. 3-6.

13 For example, the decision to open a community drug store came primarily as a result of a community meeting where residents identified this as a need above other businesses.
CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION ON CASE STUDIES

Before responding to the question of which growth strategy, unbalanced or balanced, has proven to be a more effective tool for the agents analyzed in the case studies, it is first important to comment on some factors not directly related to growth strategies, but have potentially effected the ability of the agent to meet comprehensive objectives. The two primary factors concern the differences in the South End and Highland Park communities; and in the origins of the development corporations.

First, the South End area is much larger in size (see Map #3), both geographically and in population; and therefore, a relatively greater amount of resources and energies are required to meet development objectives. Also, the racial and socio-economic mixture of that community has made the task of ghetto development more difficult than in Highland Park (if for no more reason than the greater complexities involved in defining the "community" and in selecting a specific "target area"). For TDC, the problem has been further exasperated by the continuous movement of populations to and from the area.

Secondly, although TDC and RAP emerged from a similar situation, the specific circumstances behind their emergence has been different. Mainly, TDC experienced a
much more intensive conflict stage. The organization was forced to involve itself in protest action in order to persuade outside forces to relinquish their roles to the tenant group. TDC followed a more precarious route to becoming a development agent. Many significant events directly affecting the course of things happened by chance; and there was less time to plan or organize the development program. On the other hand, RAP, also emerged from conflict, did so from more moderate and less uncertain circumstances. In addition, the agent had greater opportunities to carefully plan and design its program.

As a result of these factors, I submit that TDC was confronted with a more formidable task while attempting to obtain development objectives in the South End community. However, even taking these matters into consideration, I contend that the choice of growth strategies has had a significant impact on the agent's relative effectiveness on impacting comprehensive improvements in their respective communities. Furthermore, I have concluded that the balanced growth strategy proved to be the better choice. Before discussing the basis of this finding, I should first examine why I believe that TDC's decision to employ an unbalanced strategy served as a disadvantage.
TDC made too many invalid assumptions when employing the unbalanced approach. In the first place, the notion that the ghetto economic system could be readily expanded through creating a huge new demand simply failed to hold up under trial. Secondly, the belief that housing development (in itself a business enterprise) could be utilized to single-handedly improve the greater ghetto business sector without monetary trade-offs was also wrong in that there were basic conflicts between "TDC" and "community" interests. Moreover, the agent learned through a trying experience that even when positive changes could be indirectly generated through stimulating changes in one particular realm, it is essential that the agent make certain that the planned improvement does in fact take place. In addition to all of these things, the unbalanced strategy made too few demands on the agent to force it to construct an efficient development program delivery system. With these remarks, it is appropriate to examine how the balanced strategy has been more effective.

RAP gained some important advantages in employing the balanced strategy. Above all else, diversified program action significantly increased the agent's ability to involve a broader level of residents (with varied interests) in the development activity. Furthermore, project diversification also enlarged the number of potential resource
linkages; and thus, afforded RAP with more advantages to
develop a self-reliant base of operations. Principally,
for these reasons I submit that the balanced strategy
has been better suited to the needs of the Indigenous Agent.

Before closing, however, the question arises, is it
necessary that the Indigenous Agent develop the three
systems (social, economic and political) simultaneously
and at an equal pace, in order to enable it to bring about
comprehensive development? I would respond - yes and no.

Looking back, it seems ludicrous to even suggest that
TDC has accomplished nothing. Particularly in light of the
fact that the organization controls millions of dollars
in real estate (and in the immediate future will acquire
millions of dollars more); or in realizing that the agent
is currently in the process of accumulating substantial
amounts of (self-generated) investment capital. And not to
mention, of course, that as a result of its action, the
living conditions of at least three hundred households in
the South End have been dramatically improved, simply by the
availability of low-cost decent homes TDC has developed.
Thus, plainly, the organization has made some improvements
through employing the unbalanced strategy.
Alternatively, the Roxbury Action Program, despite its successes, has not, to this point, fully "developed" the systems of the Highland Park community. Economic and physical blight remain much the same. Social and political improvements are noticeable, but by no means all-encompassing. The critical advantage the organization holds is that as a result of its decision to involve itself in diverse projects designed to address all three realms simultaneously, it has tremendously expanded the limits of what it can accomplish. For example, the efforts towards improving the social aspects of the environment has contributed to its success in involving community residents in program activities; in turn, increased community involvement has helped the agent develop its political clout; in turn, its strengthened political position has expanded opportunities for further economic investments that stimulate more growth, etc. ... This process continues, with advancements in one realm helping the agent forge development in other realms - thereby providing unlimited potentials for ultimately reaching maximum growth. I submit that it is in this sense that the balanced growth strategy offers more advantages to the Indigenous Agent.

Based upon the development organizations analyzed in the case studies, I contend that although the unbalanced strategy does not obstruct the ability of an Indigenous Agent
to create some improvements in the over-all ghetto structure on a comparative basic, this method does in fact impede the agent's success in building an efficient program delivery system; and in bringing about comprehensive change in all three systems. Moreover, I conclude that the balanced growth strategy is best suited for community-based development efforts as those investigated above. Although through selecting this strategy the agent will not necessarily experience success in either building an efficient program execution process and/or provide for over-all development, the strategy does increase the agent's potential of obtaining success. Through a well-planned and skillfully executed development program, the Indigenous Agent, applying this model, can more readily impact all three systems of the ghetto environment. More briefly, the Roxbury Action Program has accrued significantly greater benefits through employing the balanced growth strategy (in its attempt to develop the Highland Park community), than did the Tenants' Development Corporation through its utilization of an unbalanced growth strategy to impact the South End area.
During the Seventies there has been a shift in perspective and a re-evaluation of government and the national corporate structure's role in designing, directing and controlling the purse-strings of local community development efforts. The Nixon Administration has recently introduced and supported legislation such as the proposed "Self-Determination Act of 1971" and the pending "Better Communities Act". These proposals, if enacted, would place billions of dollars in the hands of the local communities for the express purpose of executing development programs. The rationale behind the recommendations is that communities should spent time and resources on meeting local needs and producing results, as opposed to merely attempting to meet the demands of Washington in order to receive revenue. The availability of new funds will offer new opportunities to the ghetto development agents, as well as problems of another nature.

In light of these new developments, community-based agents such as those analyzed in the case studies are in actuality from a by-gone era where mass community protest movements and intensive urban unrest served as the spawning grounds for community-based operations. In this sense, it is impossible to intentionally re-create the climate or circumstances from which TDC and RAP emerged.
Currently emerging programs such as Circle Associates of Boston and the Bedford Stuyvesant Corporation in New York have avoided the "conflict" route. In doing so, they have also escaped many problems related to the transition from "protest" to "development". These agents have begun their activities from a more sound political and economic base than in the past.

Greater funds and easier accessibility will serve as a stimulus for more ghetto communities to engage in program action. This, in turn, should expand the variety of alternative techniques implemented to improve conditions in the central cities. Through a new trial and error process, those more effective programs can be identified.
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