WHEN THE PEOPLE ARE THE POLICE: 
THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT OF 
NEIGHBORHOOD SECURITY PATROLS

by

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SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT 
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 
DEGREES OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE 
and 
MASTER OF CITY PLANNING

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF 
TECHNOLOGY

JUNE, 1976

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May 15, 1976

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Submitted to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Urban Studies and Planning on May 17, 1976 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of Bachelor of Science and Master of City Planning.

ABSTRACT

The thesis addressed the issue of stability in neighborhood security patrols (NSP's). In order to identify a set of variables which is sufficient to explain the stability of patrols, variables relating to organizational structure drawn from the work of previous analysts were compared with those observed by the author, related to a community context, on the basis of the degree to which each group is associated with stability. In this thesis, stability is a critical concept and is defined broadly in terms which reflect a recognition of the turbulence of the patrol's environment. The diverse nature of the goals, the types of manpower, and the contexts of emergence of NSP's are shown to make classification of the patrols difficult. This situation is partly a result of the complexity of the community setting in which the patrols operate. Stability, then, a critical test of NSP effectiveness, is seen as being the tendency of the patrol to resist fundamental change. This definition is broader than the one used previously in reference to NSP's -- the ability to survive.

Organizational factors which have been held to impact stability -- leadership, funding sources, structure, membership incentives, and others -- are analyzed, and the lack of consensus over what constitutes a "sufficient" set of variables is noted. Finally, the diversity of the NSP's and the inadequacy of organizational factors to explain stability suggest an analysis from a broader community context.

The research method employed was a single case, holistic study of an NSP. Although the research was conducted in an open-ended, theory building mode, the focus of the research was on the community context. The single case study addressed an NSP in a Puerto Rican neighborhood which had displayed continual instability without ceasing to exist. There were three other NSP's in the neighborhood associated with the same group as the main patrol, so all were examined in order to provide a broader base for the findings than would have been possible by focusing only on the one group.

Questions were formed touching on organizational environments, personal interaction, and NSP's in general. An unstructured interview schedule was devised aimed at examining the behavior of the participants through the use of three determinants: their interests; their perceptions of their roles; and their definitions of the situation. Other inquiries sought the
nature of the NSP's change, and the perceived impact of the variables from the literature. As the research proceeded, an analysis was made of the community variables as they applied to the study -- the status of the NSP in the general scheme of the community and/or sponsor; the relationship between the security technology and the social patterns of the community; and the efficiency of the mechanisms which processed community input. The relation of these variables to participants' behavior was also analyzed.

The variables important to stability were found to depend on the definition of stability used. The ability of NSP's to survive appeared to depend on the presence of a continued funding source. However it was not clear that the money would have as strong an impact as it appeared to without the formal structure to administer it and a mandate from the community which supports the concept of NSP's.

On another level, it was found that the organizational variables could not adequately explain the resource instability and the expansion of the focal NSP, nor the instability of the other NSP's in the neighborhood. For these examples of behavior the community variables presented a more compelling perspective.

Finally, the thesis provides a framework for analysis for the community practitioner to better understand the behavior of NSP's and other similar community organizations which provide alternative services.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Never before have I signed my name to a document where so much of the credit for its production belongs to other persons. First, to all of the participants in the study, I wish to extend thanks for spending hours of their time reflecting with me on the patrols. Bob Yin, as my former boss for the LEAA project on residential patrols, helped me get the study off the ground, and has continually offered valuable comments as the research progressed. My co-worker on that project and fellow student and thesis writer--Toby Radasky--proved to be an always cheerful and insightful companion for me during the early stages of my research. Dee Michæl gets a tip of the hat for lending his artistic talents to the drawings, and my roomates Dave and Julie deserve a commendation for enduring five months of an overdue thesis.

And the Buckles--Len and Suzy--have contributed so much to my career at M.I.T. that it would be impossible to conceive of my experiences as approaching anything similar without their assistance. And finally, of course, without Ed, the tedium of re-writing and editing would never have been truly broken.

Special thanks is due Liz Fenton, for her efficient and conscientious work in typing this paper.

Thank you all.
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INTRODUCTION

These castaways on life's sodden beach were under the impression that I was the first. I was not. I am not an inventive or creative person, I take a cue from the universe, I have never been the first anywhere. Actually, in this case, I was no more than fifth or sixth. I don't say this to be disparaging... A person has to start somewhere.

- Grace Paley¹

The frontier tradition has invaded America's cities. Reminiscent of the boot-straps philosophy of the posses and vigilantes of the Old West, neighborhood security patrols (NSP's) have sprouted all across the country within the last decade. They represent one form of the self-help methods used by city-dwellers to do something about the rapidly rising crime rate.

In Boston, crime rose 22% in the first six months of 1975, a figure that was twice the national average.² Residents of the city have become increasingly frustrated with what appears to be "round-robin" courts and a "revolving door" system of justice.³ Many felt that the police are ill-equipped to handle the enormous task which has been assigned to them.⁴

These developments have coincided with a growing trend toward community control of traditionally centralized services.⁵ Even when virtual control of the city program is impossible, alternative services have been organized which give residents some control over at least the function that the service is intended to fulfill.
The advent of increased citizen initiative has several advantages. A duplication of services may not only displace part of the centralized service, but can also affect the service by setting an example of better performance. Furthermore, the participation of the citizenry has been interpreted to be an end unto itself by some authors who see it as the key to achieving power, authority and influence. It is argued that citizen participation promotes a decrease in social alienation, an increase in a sense of individual worth, and can help to raise the economic status and self-respect of the poor. The concept of small, issue-oriented citizen groups is also attractive because it represents a private, non-bureaucratic approach to a problem.

Thus, it is natural that the NSP's would emerge in response to crime in the form of a local alternative to the established criminal justice system. They represent a challenge to traditional sources of coercion and sanction which makes them particularly interesting to formulators of public policy. Yet even policy-makers with an inclination away from this kind of alternative realize in some cases that the provision of services at such a level can be an inexpensive way to get the job done. Many hope that someday all streets will be safe simply by living up to the Jane Jacobs ideal of the window-watcher-kibbitzer, which may be the most effective and cheapest method around.

Regrettably, there also exist several disadvantages to alternative services. Although they may add considerably
to the "human" side, they are often inefficient in their delivery. Also, when seeking public support and approval, organizers in poor neighborhoods face additional obstacles due to a widespread acceptance of a policy which dismisses grass roots democracy in the "lower classes."  

A special problem of NSP's that has been identified is that they tend to become unstable. In the past, researchers have attempted to explain this phenomenon by looking predominantly at variables which have dealt with the patrol organization and the relationship of its parts to each other. These authors have analyzed the aspects of funding structure, leadership and others. Unfortunately, there appears to be a lack of consensus among the authors as to what constitutes a "sufficient" set of variables. This paper asks if, indeed, those variables have the most compelling effect on NSP stability; and if not, what factors do explain the problem most satisfactorily?  

Already organizational theory has advanced past the limitations of analyzing only the structure and activities of the focal group. Beyond the institutional level there is a variety of perspectives to consider. The individual, his needs, motivation, and values, emerge as a dominant figure in the decision-making process. Subsystems and environments are the most recent conceptual improvements to the literature. The idea of the environment basically argues that the surroundings in which an organization functions will have considerable impact on how the organization behaves.
The environment to the community organization is predominantly, of course, the community. Consequently, this paper suggests that it is the community variables which hold the compelling explanation of NSP stability. The professional community practitioner today is challenged by where to look and what to look for to understand the impact of the community environment on organizations within its pale.\textsuperscript{12} The phenomenon of community decision-making, of the organization's behavior in relation to it, is incredibly complex.\textsuperscript{13} In the realm of the community, business, domestic and political considerations often intermingle.

Nonetheless, several key community variables are outlined at the end of this work which provide a framework for the practitioner to analyze the community. Hopefully, this framework can be of value to policy-makers by aiding them in the prediction of organizational stability of NSP's, and, in the broader sense of organizational behavior.
CHAPTER I

NEIGHBORHOOD SECURITY PATROLS -
THEIR HISTORY AND THE ISSUE OF STABILITY
If you are an historic romantic, or just a little bit corny, you strain to hear the long dead voice of a long forgotten citizen patrolman, singing, "Ten o'clock, and all's well."

But all was not well then, and all is not always well now. The citizen watchmen are with us again, in and out of the city. They range from those in the Jewish Defense League... who respond to threats with a show of force to community organizers who engrave TV sets and stereos in Roxbury with social security numbers; from a federally funded, uniformed Bromley-Heath housing project patrol, trained in first aid and self-defense, to ad hoc civilian patrols that spring up in the North End and Columbia Point. 1

INTRODUCTION:

This chapter, in order to construct an analytic base for the study of neighborhood security patrols, begins by examining the history of vigilante activity in America. The early types have been separated into three periods characterized by the social contexts in which they emerged. The NSP's of today stand alone as many of them seek legitimacy in their operations. Still, several criteria are offered which set NSP's apart from the other current citizen crime prevention activities. Within this definition, however, the reader will find that the diversity in the goals and methods used by NSP's make them difficult to classify, and it becomes clear that each group is as unique as the neighborhood in which it is situated. Following this, the issue of NSP stability is cited as a factor deemed to be critical by previous authors for evaluating the success of the operation. Organizational stability is defined, and then the variables
which have been held to affect NSP stability are reviewed. The chapter will show that there is a lack of consensus over what determines the "sufficient" variables for explaining stability and closes with the suggestion that a broader community outlook is in order.

NSP'S IN HISTORY: Four Contexts of Emergence:

Citizen control of security has played a major role in law enforcement throughout the history of the United States, arising whenever it appeared that the public police were unable or unwilling to perform their jobs adequately. Four periods of vigilante and/or simple citizen patrol activity can be characterized by the contexts out of which they emerged. They are:

(1) 1700's to 1856 - a near vacuum of public law enforcement officers in America's frontiers.

(2) 1856 to early 1900's - the rise of neo-vigilantism of America's developing cities which used the pretext of law and order to preserve the dominant social structure.

(3) 1960's - racial and civil strife throughout America's cities and towns.

(4) 1970's - a rapidly increasing rate of all types of crimes affecting all types of neighborhoods.

For early background, no work better summarizes the historical context of NSP's than R.M. Brown's "The American Vigilante Tradition." In citing 326 cases of vigilante activity in the past 200 years, he separates the activities into two periods. The first type was predominant before 1856, and
emerged to fill the law-and-order vacuum on America's frontiers. The vigilantes apprehended, tried and sentenced the wrong-doers to punishment. The second period, of "neo-vigilantism"\textsuperscript{3} began with the inception of the San Francisco Vigilance Committee in 1856. The Committee and the groups that evolved out of its activities were motivated by political and racial concerns; they used the pretext of order to preserve the existing social structures. Both kinds of groups, however, were examples of citizens assuming a policing role when they felt that government was not performing the security mission as perceived by the members of those groups.

Vigilantism appeared to wane in the 20th century, until a third movement arose in the mid-1960's, among racial and civil disorders in the cities.\textsuperscript{4} The period was characterized by several varieties of organizations. Many of them were self-defense groups, like the Jewish Defense League, or the Deacons for Defense & Justice, who patrolled in Louisiana to protect Blacks from the Ku Klux Klan and unsympathetic police officers. The inner city riots gave rise to groups within intimidated white neighborhoods of the city and nearby suburbs. Elsewhere, Youth Patrols were trying to soothe the tensions between the Blacks and the police in the riot areas. The diverse nature of the aims and make-up of these groups is bound only by the aura of racial and civil strife in which they arose.

It may be presumptuous to cite the decline of the third period after less than ten years, especially when the previous two lasted nearly one hundred and fifty. The most recent groups--
NSP's--however, seem to have their roots in different concerns than those of earlier vigilantes. NSP's are most often collective attempts by citizens to fight the increasing spread of crime-for-profit. Unlike the former vigilante movements, these groups are likely to have legitimate sponsorship and funding. The NSP's of today tend not to intervene, that is, to "take the law into their own hands," possibly as a result of their legitimacy.\(^5\)

To understand the nature of this fourth kind of patrol, it is necessary to look also at the role of private police in law enforcement. Although not as glorious or controversial as horse-thief hangings or street-alley justice, the private guards are often employed by residential groups as part of a neighborhood security patrol. Their importance to this development of NSP's in fact is not surprising, in light of their history. Private police have not always played "second fiddle" to public officers as they do today. During most of the nineteenth century and up until 1924, crimes extending beyond the jurisdiction of strictly local public police were often investigated by the hired guards of Burns, Pinkerton or the Railway Police.\(^6\) In fact, Pinkerton men were known to have occasionally apprehended these criminals and brought them to justice.

As the public police departments developed, however, the role of the private security forces shifted from an investigative to a more guard-oriented function. Also as a result of this shift, private guards began to be used more by wealthy homeowners, individually and collectively.\(^7\) The next stage of development began in the 1960's when the 'in-house' guards (private
guards hired exclusively to patrol for a particular individual or group) began to be displaced by the "contract" companies (private profit enterprises which contract out guards for a fee). \(^8\)

During the last fifteen years the private guard industry as a whole has been undergoing rapid growth mainly to meet the growing demands of the business sector for protection of office buildings and warehouses. This growth may be attributable to a general increase in the rate of reported crime; increased public awareness of crime; the nationwide trend towards professional specialization; special requirements and induced benefits from insurance companies; and the feeling that the public police are already over-burdened and cannot be expected to provide adequate security for private property. \(^9\)

The trend in the private police industry towards guarding private property fits in neatly with the rise of the NSP's. Communities are motivated by many of the same reasons as industry for protecting their property, and with the advent of outside funding sources, private guards should constitute more of the neighborhood patrols in the future.

THE NATURE OF NSP'S: Definitional Issues:

Citizen crime prevention activities have existed in a multitude of forms and have been identified by even more labels. In this section I will present a definition of the neighborhood security patrol which sets it apart from the bulk of these activities. Following this, I will review the diverse traits of NSP's which have made them difficult to classify, and which have made
it a complex task to predict any aspect of their behavior using the tools as outlined by authors to date.

The NSP does not stand alone as a method for citizens to help prevent crime. In addition to NSP's, programs cover the range of Blockwatchers Associations, Escort Services, Radio Watches, Property Identification programs, and Police Community Relations Programs. Determining a means of differentiating between NSP's and these other similar activities then, is necessary if NSP's are to be studied.

Yin presents three tentative criteria for defining NSP's. "Residential Patrols" must perform a "specified patrol or surveillance routine," must be a "part of a citizen or private organization," and the activity must be "directed primarily at residential rather than commercial areas." These criteria will be used to define NSP's in this paper. Yet even with these criteria as a definitional base, several issues remain open. First, does the matter of funding alter the status of a patrol as "citizen" or "private"? Second, must NSP's be composed of volunteer labor? What is properly seen as volunteer labor? Finally, what are the goals of NSP's?

Funding may become a problem when, for example, a neighborhood collective hires private security guards to patrol for them. In practice, some form of outside funding has often been present in NSP's. Equipment has been provided, stipends for gas awarded, or the coordinators and/or leaders have been paid salaries.
A great many NSP's are also "impure" in their mode of manpower. Not all patrols are entirely composed of "volunteers" or hired guards, or hired residents, but may be a hybrid of two or even all three modes; or crime prevention may only be one facet of the group's activities, which might include neighborhood clean-up, emergency aid, or social services, Yin uses a classification based on activities, but has chosen to lump all the patrols that engage in "non-crime prevention activities" into one category, without regard to what those other activities are. Of course, there are some patrols that are composed only of volunteers, and, for example, only patrol in autos looking for criminals. Yet it seems as if all patrols have several "grey" areas, either in make-up, ideology, activities, or content.

An ideological typology was tried by Marx & Archer (1971) who devised a two by two matrix according to relationship to the police. My research with Yin, on the other hand, uncovered no such neat demarcations between supplemental and adversary groups, or between the support or opposition by the police. For example, the "paper goals" of the group may be pro-police in order to gain official sponsorship and/or funding, but the members may continue to monitor the activities of police in the field; or the top brass or community relations component of the police department may be supportive of the group, while the patrolman's association may be openly antagonistic.

Although NSP's might have risen out of a general response to crime, rarely are their specific goals the same, since the events which catalyze each NSP determine the goals and means
which develop afterwards. NSP's will react differently to a dangerous drug problem, a series of purse snatchings or vandalism, auto theft, a rape or murder, gangs, or simply burglaries. The goals of patrols, too, appear to vary with the diverse socio-economic status of the neighborhoods in which they are found, and the varied physical character of the community (e.g., high rises, territory, private property, etc.).

Thus variations in funding, in manpower, and in goals create NSP's of great diversity, ranging from volunteer foot patrols in upper class neighborhoods to hired guards in poor ethnic areas. It is clear that the particular traits of an NSP will be representative of the unique characteristics, needs, and resources of the community in which it operates. Therefore any attempt at classification of NSP's is as complex as the neighborhood itself.

Failing to realize the full significance of the community context of NSP's has led some researchers to make over-simplified assumptions about the patrols. Heidt and Etzioni, for example, hypothesized that an NSP with a close relationship to the police and high visibility in the field would be characterized by "responsible" (or law-abiding) behavior in the field. Yet the organization with the tightest police relationship was the least responsible, and the group which operated with little or no visibility showed no signs of irresponsible behavior. They subsequently attribute the behavior to secondary characteristics; the latter group stayed in line basically due to the particular disposition of its members, and the former behaved irresponsibly.
as a result of the "combination of members' and leaders' interests, inadequate supervision, and attention to public relations goals . . . "18

The point to all this is the following. When attempting to predict or explain an aspect of NSP behavior, a factor that correlates the behavior in one example may not in another. This is because that factor, especially if it relates solely to the organization, will have varying effects depending on the type of setting in which the NSP operates. The nature of the community may be the compelling factor which determines the ideals, goals, and means of the security patrol.

THE NATURE OF NSP'S: The Issue of Stability:

"There's money in law and order," says a Boston policeman in reference to citizen security, 19 and the prospect of large sums of money being made available to the NSP's has brought them to the attention of policy-makers and social researchers. It is in the interests of these persons to evaluate the success of NSP's, and in so doing the issue of stability has been raised as a critical test. The contents of this section begin by defining the concept of organizational stability. A review of the NSP literature exposes a range of variables that have been identified as inducing stability or prohibiting instability. Most of these variables are concerned with the retention of resources as the key to maintaining stability. The reader will find however that there has been a lack of consensus over what constitutes the sufficient factors to promote stability, and that this observation helps to confirm the importance of the community context.
Evaluation of the success of NSP's has focussed around a number of issues: the social contexts in which patrols emerge, the nature of their relationships with the police, their effectiveness, the characteristics and attitudes of the members, and the secondary consequences of their activities.

The issue that surfaces again and again is that of stability. Heidt and Etzioni (1973) cite the major finding of their research to be that "... instability is the central problem confronted by voluntary crime control programs." (author's emphasis). Marx (1971) speaks of "... organizational and operational difficulties... --and the related phenomenon of the relatively short life span which many groups experience." Knopf (1969) dedicated an entire chapter to "The Demise of Youth Patrols", and Sagalyn cites their tendency to be short-lived as a disadvantage to their overall worth; and finally, Yin (1976) presents the importance of analyzing organizational change over time. Most agree that the stability of the groups or lack of it is a critical measure of the effectiveness of the NSP.

The term stability, however, does not carry with it a consistent definition. When politicians refer to an "unstable political situation," they usually mean that a current government, or leader of a government, is likely to fall. A physicist may speak of a "stable state" expecting that no further reactions will occur which might change the state of a substance in an experiment. Psychiatrists might be treating a moody, schizoid patient with an "unstable personality." When applied to organizations, stability relates to the staying power of an organization or subsystem.
to resist fundamental change in its goals, means, or very existence; stability can vary from subsystem to subsystem, or program to program. 

In order to make a fundamental change in an organization some one usually has to make a decision to do something. Even in the case where a program just "fades away," it is the additive result of numerous individual decisions. (This differs from a stable state where fundamental decision-making is not essential). These decisions, however, are really the outcome of the behavior of the person who decides. This simply means that in order to understand why an organization changes, one must know what made the decision-makers decide in the way that they did. So when practitioners refer to the staying power of an organization, they are really just referring to a particular aspect of the behavior of the individuals in the organization.

The definition of stability used in the NSP literature has been narrower than the concept of resisting fundamental change. It has been confined to the ability of the group to survive or to sustain operations. While this provides a working definition it is important to point out the limitations. It sees stability as relating to the continuation of all the activities of an NSP over time. But what of the situation where one component of the NSP might change or fade away? What of the NSP that expands, or changes its mode of operations? It is not hard to conceive that the same tensions and dynamics which surround a struggle to survive as a whole can instead permeate other partial stabilization problems. This is especially true if the NSP continues to exist
due to artificial or extraordinary circumstances, while the "real" struggle for stability manifests itself in the instability of a subsystem. For example, an organization may be operating poorly, and under normal conditions it might naturally curtail or end its operations. But if artificial circumstances continued to assure its survival (e.g., a continual injection of federal funds) the stresses that arose from the poor operations could have the effect of a fundamental change in programs, or personnel, or other sub-systems.

Stability as thus defined includes a wider scope of behavior than has been addressed by the literature. At the same time, however, the dynamics of both situations are similar so that an understanding of one form of stability will certainly shed light on the others.

Each author who has addressed the issue of stability in NSP's has suggested several variables or factors which seem to be important in either inducing stability, or prohibiting instability. Those that were positively correlated with stability were:

1) a formal structure in the organization,
2) a good relationship to the police,
3) a sponsor and/or a reliable source of funding,
4) routinized, dedicated leadership,
5) a crisis that continues to be deeply felt,
6) charismatic leadership,
7) regularized operations,
8) engaging in other non-patrol activities, e.g., socializing,
9) the incentive to receive reduced insurance charges.
Those factors which may impede achievement of continuity include:

1) an ambiguous legal definition,
2) lack of direction,
3) strong commitment requirements,
4) unfavorable politics, or lack of community mandate,
5) the boredom of the surveillance routine.

An element which links most of these factors together is the scarcity of resources, either volunteer manpower or money, and so, much of an NSP's efforts must be directed toward securing continued support for the program from both within and from outside of the community; and we will see that paying guards neither assures the maintenance of unchanging personnel, nor the stability of the organization receiving the services.

Breakdown in organization, lack of funding, and politics are explained as factors affecting stability by Terry Ann Knopf. The first, she explains, was the result of the lack of attention given to the "peace-time" roles of the Youth Patrols. In the absence of crisis, organizational defects became apparent. She also mentions the waning of the enthusiasm of officials who failed to see the group's contribution to better lines of communication and to a prevention of a repetition of hostilities. She claims, "Without the support of city officials, youth patrols could hardly be expected to continue..." One reason that the political support was not forthcoming was traced to the deteriorating relationship with the police. The police were often reluctant
to work with the patrols, especially since some of the youth patrols were originated in order to monitor police activity. Likewise, many of the youths were distrustful of the police, to them a long-standing white symbol of repression. Without this cooperation forthcoming, the political establishment was unable to lend its whole-hearted support.

Sagalyn acknowledges the organizational problem, and the deleterious effect of police opposition, but proffers a few more explanations: First, he claims that the members' intensity of concern over the value of the patrol, an element essential to their continued involvement, is unlikely to be felt over a long period of time. Second, the goal of pure deterrence of crime is difficult to maintain and is likely to lapse into vigilantism. Finally, instability may result from a patrol's very success, in that the routine duties become increasingly less eventful and the members become bored and leave the organization.27 On the positive side, he suggests that the prospect of pay in hired guards adds to their staying power.28

Marx and Archer theorize a great deal about the survival of the 28 self-defense groups they surveyed. They also perceive the need for a solid organizational component, but add that its members must have a "relatively clear sense of direction and a continuing source of support."29 Police opposition is again cited here, and four cases in Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New York, and Pittsburgh (Calif.) are specified, where the antagonism led to the disbandment of the groups.30 Other factors inimical to stability are: (1) an ambiguous legal definition of allowable
conduct which can lead to indecision and frustration in the field; and 2) the "lack of clear community mandate." The latter point is made in reference to self-defense groups and the ideological controversy which often surrounds them. The authors continue, however, that these problems are not insurmountable and can be countered by:

(a) a crisis that continues to be deeply felt, (b) the presence of a charismatic leader, and (c) the emergence of a formally organized group with a continuing source of financial support.

Furthermore, they contend that those groups taking a supplemental attitude toward the police have a better chance of survival than the groups which are adversaries of the police.

Heidt and Etzioni attempted to build upon this work by testing three critical variables against the history of stability in four different neighborhood patrols. They expected the factors of a close relationship to the police, and a bureaucratized organization together with charismatic leadership, to be positively correlated to a stable organization. The results of their case studies, however, did not bear these correlations out. For instance, the charisma of the leaders was shown to be not nearly as important as the continued dedication to the program and strong commitment of time and energy by anyone. Consequently, leaders can change but "organizational mechanisms must be developed to sustain the programs during the transition."

As for the other two variables, the patrol with the tightest police relationship was defunct before the end of the study, and another group "operated for several years with the antithesis of a formal structure--roughly, a primary group--and
had difficulty whenever the membership grew and the structure become more formal."34 Dissatisfied with previous theory, the authors added a few of their own variables which they felt applicable to the situation. They noted that lack of regularized operations can cause a breakdown in morale and loss of predictability and reliability of patrol operations which in turn may lead to "destabilization." Also, the groups that encouraged socializing were seen to be relatively stable, as did those which were actually sponsored by a legitimate organization. Finally, the authors paid considerable attention to the incentives which maintained the involvement of the volunteers. They concluded that,

'. . . it would seem that the most successful organization for such programs is one which aligns members' interests and expectations--i.e., the most powerful incentives for membership--with efficient ways of getting whatever activities they set for themselves accomplished. 35

One final issue of stability of NSP's was their use of hired security guards. The point was made in Heidt and Etzioni that 'pay' as an incentive would add staying power to a patrol. Yet findings in the Kakalik Rand Study36 (and observations in my own research)37 show that the turnover rate of manpower in "contract" companies is high, ranging from 20% yearly with high quality, well-paid guards, to nearly 200% yearly, with low-quality, poorly paid guards.38 This is important for two reasons. First, pay alone (especially nominal pay) can not be considered as a sufficient incentive to get someone to fulfill a security function on a long term basis. Second, in the situation where citizens contract for non-resident guards, the issues of incentive and
maintenance of commitment apply in a different sense from the situation where volunteers or even paid residents are dominant. In the latter case, if the NSP loses its residents as a source of manpower, it is likely that the NSP will come to an end. On the other hand, in the case of hired non-residents, the labor pool is relatively huge; so as long as the fee is forthcoming, the contracting company should be able to supply the manpower, even if the turnover rate is high. Therefore the emphasis in a hired non-resident situation must be on retaining the source of financial support and the approval of the clients. Without the financial support the community would be forced to change to a volunteer mode of resources (if indeed it chose to continue the program at all). Without client approval (but a persistent source of funds) the program is likely to be unstable in that it may often change the type of service, or change companies (i.e. resources) altogether.

To summarize the utility of these hypotheses about stability, three observations are in order. One is that resources, or rather the retention of them, is a near universal concern of major interest, whether the resources be voluntary person-power, hired guards, or money. The second is best stated by Heidt and Etzioni who claim that the factors that they were aware of "seem to be necessary rather than sufficient conditions for the survival of citizen crime control organizations." The third observation is that by and large the factors from the literature deal with the "organizational" aspect of NSP's, that is, the internal attributes of the group which relate to themselves, and just happen to be set in a community, rather than recognizing that the
community aspect may be the **compelling** factor.

Thus, the difficulty and lack of consensus in both classifying NSP's and in determining the "sufficient" variables which affect stability lend further confirmation to a concept proposed earlier; and that is that each NSP is as complex and unique as the neighborhood in which it is situated. Indeed, those "sufficient" conditions for maintaining stability go beyond the organizational perspective of NSP's and necessitate a broader outlook on their community environment.

THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT IN THE LITERATURE:

The preceding pages have dealt with the historical context of NSP's and with the findings of previous analyses of NSP stability. This section will cover briefly some of the intellectual framework for the community context. It is not meant to be a complete survey of the literature by any means. Its purpose is to introduce a bit of the environmental literature and to identify some of the variables found in the community which may affect a community organization.

Politicians always claim to represent the "will of the people" when they vote on issues or introduce bills. Leaving aside for the moment the cynical (or even realistic) views that policy is really made through deals with other politicians and special interest groups, there is a school of thought that says that politicians are somewhat responsive to the electorate. Banfield and Wilson speak of the "unseen presence of voters."

Charles Caudde dissects voter influence into two possible
models; either the people elect a representative who shares their views, or the representative will follow their perceptions of the district's attitudes in order to win re-election.41 In either case there is the assumption that the feeling of a mass of anonymous people will have an effect on the nature of policy and decisions. When one moves, however, to the arena of community services and the reciprocal effect from clientele the model becomes subtle and complex. Where volunteers and bureaucracies abound, there is often no "mandate" from the people as definitive as a vote.42 Programs and services may succeed or fail, or decisions may take a particular course, due to that somewhat mysterious concept of the total community context. The effect will take place whether or not politicians chose to be responsive, but little else about it is understood.

The concept of the community context took on added significance in the planning fields with the recognition that the Hunterian structure of community power pyramids may not be wholly valid. In one study, the Negro sub-community of a large city was described as one without a "genuine power structure," but rather one with "leaders" who were neither "power-wielders," nor "decision-makers."43 Around the same time, organizational theorists began to entertain ideas of an "environment"44 and of "organization-sets."45 In other words, organizations are affected by the behavior of other organizations which share a common concern, and by the characteristics of the setting (or community) in which they operate. Emery
uses the analogy of an organism (as opposed to a physical object like a rock) which survives by importing material into itself from the environment, transforming it in accordance with its own system characteristics, and exporting back other types of material into the environment. In nature a scientist might want to know the mineral content of the soil, or the species of nearby plants. The businessman might be interested in the marketing practices of competing firms, or the nature of the job market in its area. It follows that the community organization, or any group which operates in a community, should be familiar with other organizations, and certain characteristics of the residents. The primary parts of the organization—set of an NSP, for example, might be the police, a nearby planning or improvement council, or a tenant's council.

The question here is that in a situation where "everything depends on everything else" where does one set the boundaries for information gathering? Certain anthropological studies have shown that overlooking the existing social networks can lead to opposition to new programs. In a contemporary case study about a school-community co-ordinator in Detroit, Litwak and Meyer write, "It was believed that the complex of remedial efforts directed at the children...would be frustrated if the families were not involved." Furthermore, Perlman stresses that,

Changes in conditions outside the agency produce pressures, demands, and opportunities that are transmitted to a number of points within the organization.
Thus, it appears that the total community context includes three primary components: 1) the social network and patterns of the constituents; 2) the relationships between the focal organization and other individuals and organizations in its environment; and 3) the efficiency of the mechanisms which transmit the external developments to the focal organization.\textsuperscript{51}

Stability in NSP's is not immune to these factors. In the next chapter I will describe the methods which were used to discover the variables with the most powerful impact on stability. The identification of the above community variables aided me in constructing the interviews which comprised a central component of those methods.
CHAPTER II

THE SETTINGS AND METHODS OF THE RESEARCH
Theses, once written, have a way of imputing order where there was once confusion, and of reflecting logic where originally there was only groping. Although my research methods evolved as my work progressed, I will nonetheless attempt in this chapter to present in an orderly and logical manner the research processes along which my work was structured.

My research was divided into three phases. In the first, I selected the topic of stability and posed several fundamental inquiries as to the nature of NSP's, organizational change and the variables which affect it. The second phase entailed choosing the best approach to researching the topic. In this section of the chapter the rationale is given for electing to perform a single case study and for choosing Area B as the site. The reasons include the transitory state of the NSP, and the existence of other NSP efforts in the same neighborhood. This phase also includes a description of any data-gathering techniques. An unstructured interview schedule is outlined, addressing the more specific issues of the behavior of the NSP in Area B, and its community contexts. Finally, the nature of the private interview and the information which I sought are offered as the reasons for my policy of using pseudonyms in this paper.

The third phase is then devoted to a discussion of the various roles I assumed as a researcher. At different times
I was involved in either a passive or an active capacity as a participant observer. At other times my status as a student, or even as an "expert" on NSP's was dominant. The chapter closes with an examination of the advantages and limitations of my methodology. The open-ended approach, and the size of my interview sample are both discussed.

First Phase: Selecting the Topic.

The inspiration and many of the ideas that are contained in this paper were conceived during a period of three or four months while I was involved in a national survey of neighborhood security patrols (NSP's). The experience exposed a range of issues, only some of which have been dealt with satisfactorily by previous writers. My first task therefore was to select and define a researchable problem of a scope and impact that would be interesting to students of the field. Although initially concerned with the behavior and expectations of individuals and their effect on the behavior of organizations, the focus was narrowed to a particular aspect of organizational behavior—stability.

Instability is a form of organizational change, yet, "... organizations, however defined, don't act, but people within them do!" Hence, I began to look for the determinants which might connect individual behavior to the behavior of a group as a whole. Developed at an intermediate stage of my research, the concepts of individual perceptions of role, interests, and definitions of the situation served as
a framework around which my actual interviewing questions were structured. It was the notion of change and the variables which affected it, however, which suggested the following fundamental inquiries. I wanted to know why an NSP changed (destabilized) and how. I was interested in how that behavior compared with examples from the literature. Also, what variables played a compelling role in the change, and how did they compare with the literature? In other words, were factors such as sponsorship or leadership mainly responsible for the instability, or was it something else? Since community variables were suspected early in the research, how might an examination of the total community context relate to the issue of stability? And finally, if new variables do arise, how might one look at NSP's differently so that these elements would not be neglected in the future?

Second Phase: Choosing the Approach.

A case study of a neighborhood with an NSP in the midst of instability seemed to provide the best opportunity for answering these questions. Rather than viewing a group which appeared already to be stable, studying one which was undergoing significant change would hopefully provide a more effective means to determine the causes of its transitory nature.

The NSP which I chose to study is a hired guard located in public housing, in a Puerto Rican neighborhood called Area B, in a high crime district in North City, a large city in an Eastern industrial state. The housing includes an
elderly high-rise and a rehabilitation project, both constructed under the Turnkey program and both managed by Casas por Puertorriqueños (CPP), the community corporation. Several criteria made this particular NSP attractive for study. There were two unique aspects of the NSP which set it apart from the bulk of the NSP's analyzed previously. It had been in a prolonged state of flux since its inception more than two years ago, but not in the manner most often discussed in the literature. Its ability to survive, i.e., to continue to exist, was not so much in question as was its ability to maintain its resources. This characteristic represents a slightly different sort of instability, although its effect and its causes seem not dissimilar. It is not, after all, only the disappearance of an NSP which influences its effectiveness, but also the more dynamic struggle to survive. Likewise, it should not be surprising to find many of the same dynamics pervading the decisions which led to resource instability or other changes in state. In the case under consideration, management had changed guard companies twice before I entered the scene, once before I left, and was planning a major switch to a new mode of operation in the near future where only neighborhood residents would be hired.

One point made clear in the preceding chapter was the dismal outlook for the longevity of any NSP. However, a second aspect of the NSP's behavior which seemed out of character was that, rather than faltering, the NSP has inspired citizen crime prevention to mushroom into an even more comprehensive neighborhood
effort including social programs and police relations work. These two novel developments could not have been predicted using the variables from the literature. Consequently, I felt that their existence lent further credence to the hypothesis that an overlooked variable, possibly of the community, exists which is crucial to the understanding of the instability.

Soon after I became more familiar with the group, I found a third feature of the neighborhood which presented an added incentive for its study. About a year ago there had been a volunteer lobby monitor in the elderly public housing tower which lasted a few months, then died, although there has since been talk of reviving it; and there was currently an effort underway (although later it, too, failed) to formalize ad hoc patrols which operated on one of the more dangerous streets in the community. I decided then that what was learned from the original case study could be applied to and hopefully confirmed and refined by an assay of the other two.

Having chosen a focal point of research and the site in which to conduct my study, my next step was to determine the appropriate techniques for gathering the data. Since the concept of continuity implies either regular maintenance decisions, or a decision to end activities, (usually arriving after unresolvable conflict has arisen), my efforts were directed mainly at participants who might have some influence or input to the status of the program. These participants
fell into two categories: the members of the organization which actually ran and/or operated the NSP; and members of subgroups or organizations contiguous to the "focal" organization.

In the case of a participant who was deemed to have considerable influence or input in the process, I attempted to gain a finer understanding of his or her context in the general scheme of things by talking with associates, co-workers, and subordinates. My interviews were often informal, over a cup of coffee, or during a break. I also attended several community meetings, and gleaned data from documents, records, and minutes of other meetings. A formal survey design for obtaining residents' opinions was avoided as a component of this study because, aside from the evident difficulty in conducting survey research among a non-English speaking population, there are several drawbacks to survey research for the purpose of this study. First, since the information sought was open-ended, a closed survey would have been inappropriate. Second, a "random" sample in a poor neighborhood in the midst of such a housing transition as Area B was undergoing would have been difficult to obtain. Also I feared that asking a community leader to suggest a "representative" set of residents would produce only a very narrow range of responses. So instead I relied on informal interviews with residents who might drop into the church, or visit the social worker or other community leaders I was with at the time.
Of course, my own interpretations would be warped without an historical and structural view of the organization, but since my interest was only general, I relied on several factual questions in my earlier contacts and on a few reports on the history of CPP.

This type of field research was selected to expose for me the subtler forces involved in the operations of an NSP; for example, where did the support for the operations originate, who occupied positions of influence and how was their influence effected? Which interests of which participants would be served by any of the options under consideration, were there any conflicts here, and finally who or what were the catalysts of change or the stalwarts of stability?

Since my research was aimed at an unknown, or at most slightly perceived variable, my interviews were, by design largely unstructured, especially in the early stages. Each participant had a different role to play, and therefore the course of each interview was shaped by the respondents' role, but the following are the key areas of the unstructured interview schedule:

1. How did the participant describe the patrol and its activities?

2. What was the participant's relationship and/or duties with regards to the planning and implementation of the patrol?

3. What did the participant see as being useful in the patrol, or, what would he/she have done differently?
4. What did the participants see as the crime problem in the area?

5. How did the participant believe that the crime problem could (or should) be solved?

6. What were the roles of the other participants (with whom the interviewee was familiar) in regard to the community and security?

7. Why are residents being hired to replace the Safety Guard Co. employees? Is that a good idea?

8. Why can or can't the elderly operate a volunteer monitoring service during the day?

9. Are the streets/tower/building safer since the guard has been instituted, that is, is there less drug activity, vandalism, and theft? What would happen if the guards weren't there?

10. If there is a problem, complaint, or suggestion about any of the patrols, how is it handled?

11. What was the background of the interviewee? Why was he/she involved in his/her role in the community?

12. What did the participant see as the causes of specific changes in the NSP's?

13. What is, or should be done to protect residents of non-CPP property in Area B?

As my experience grew, so did my comprehension of the community variables. To measure the efficiency of the mechanisms for processing citizen input, I inquired about communication, grievance procedures, and opportunities for citizen
involvement. The status of the NSP's in the general scheme of the community emerged as important, so questions were posed concerning the long-range plans of CPP and the community, consumer satisfaction, and personal theories of community development, change and organization. Finally the social patterns of the community and the way in which they related to the security technology was also investigated.

After each interview I wrote up notes and made additional comments in the margins or in the back of a notebook kept especially for that purpose. In several cases, after reflecting on the interview and contacts with other people, I arranged a second interview with the subject. This was done primarily to give each of us the opportunity to ask the other questions or clarify positions that were not obvious during the first encounter. Many times the second meeting would take on a less formal atmosphere and occasionally I wouldn't take any notes until afterwards.

It soon became obvious to the participants in the process that I was at least attempting to peel away facades and go beneath official images. Unfortunately, it was this very intent to "get at what was really happening", coupled with the nature of my interviews (many were in private) which fueled some opposition to the only tangible requirement of work of this sort. My free access to the participants in the study was in danger of being blocked. Citizen groups, especially those receiving government funding, are especially sensitive to anyone who might jeopardize their standing in
the eyes of their backers. More than one group claims to have been "burned" by just such reports. It is this development that is primarily responsible for my policy of anonymity (all names are fictional) in this text. Another related problem proved to be even thornier than the one above. Aside from insulating the organization from the outside world, I also realized, near the end of the study, that there was a responsibility to protect individuals, who have made statements in confidence, from the other participants who might see the thesis and recognize the various interviewees in spite of their fictionalized names. There is really no adequate solution to this issue, but what I have tried to do is to simply leave out such remarks where they had no direct bearing on my findings, or the presentation of the case study. Finally, I have made every effort to report things accurately, as objectively as possible, and with as much detachment as I could develop.9

Third Phase: Researcher Roles and Limitations.

During the course of my field work, I myself took on several roles, a development the consequences of which have obviously taken on considerable significance for me. When attending community meetings, I would sometimes act only as an observer, not participating in the proceedings.10 At the meeting of the security committee (see case study), however, due to its small turnout, it was difficult not to enter into some of the discussions. It should be mentioned at this point that on several occasions I shared my role with a friend and summertime co-worker who was also writing a thesis at
M.I.T. on citizen patrols in North City. By holding occasional joint interviews we were able to avoid inconvenienting our subjects, and our shared experiences helped as both to better define the scope and direction of our own theses.

In addition to my role as a passive observer, I also participated actively in the efforts of the security committee to formalize the volunteer patrol on Claver Street. It was in this context that I tried to fulfill my ambitions of being an asset to the community group, instead of fulfilling the usual stereotype of the student-researcher who adds nothing to the efforts under examination. I hoped my experience with the successes and failures of other similar groups in the country would be of use to Fr. Billings and Rico (who were leading the undertaking). I also hoped that the increased informal contact would uncover subtle relationships and perceptions that otherwise would have gone unnoticed.

The risks of this level of involvement are twofold. First, the participant-observer must consider the impact that his or her activities may have on the process, and should attempt to identify the instances of and the manner in which that impact is felt. For example, my participation may have had both positive and negative effects on initiating the neighborhood patrol. My presence and interest in patrols may have in one way bolstered the confidence of the organizers and yet, residents of the area may have
resented the participation of an outsider and thus have been less receptive to the organizer's efforts.

The second danger is that of becoming too closely involved with one or more of the participants so that one's own perspective is tilted.\(^{13}\) Although Father Billings won my respect throughout my contact with him, it was with Rico that I spent a great deal of time for a two-week period. Regardless of the differences in our ethnic and social background, our shared youth, college education and willingness to discuss political philosophy led to lengthy "rap sessions", a greater understanding for me of the community, and an incipient form of friendship. On-going interviews with other people, however, lent me varying insights to his role in the community, and, whereas no one's opinion was ever considered gospel, I tended later on to view the things Rico would say in a slightly different light.

Inescapably there are dangers to any approach which looks for something new. To be thorough I could not ignore any of the variables from the literature. Therefore in the chapter on findings, every variable listed in the literature is related to the case study even though some did not apply. This procedure is not without risks, however. First, the program under examination behaved differently than those discussed in the literature; but as I have already remarked, this behavior might simply expose an overlooked set of variables. Secondly, the bulk of the literature has dealt with "volunteer" patrols, and the main patrol in Area B was
a hired security force. So to some extent membership, incentives, and organization took on a different bent. On the other hand, recall that for the large part previous researchers examined groups which may not have fallen into such typologies so neatly, making strict distinctions moot. And thirdly, not all of the organizational variables were easily distinguishable from the community ones, (e.g. the community mandate), so to judge which set better explained the outcomes was not always a clearly defined task.

Participant-observer studies have often taken years of close interaction between the researcher and the subject community; however, due to the time table of this study, I strove to complete the work in a few months. My approach has led to several limitations to this research, especially in the quantity of interviews upon which the findings are based.

For example, among the security personnel, I spoke at length with only one guard, and his supervisor from Safety Guard Co., though two other guards also spent brief moments conversing with me. Contacts with residents too, were limited in number so I concentrated my efforts among those representatives of the community, like the officers of the Tenants Council, who were among the most vocal about issues central to this thesis. My contact with the "uninvolved" residents of Area B was limited, especially because of the language barrier, although on one or two occasions Rico interpreted for me
from the conversations that he was having with residents
during a short poll we took in the neighborhood on feelings
towards security patrols.

Another limitation due to the constraints of time--one
regularly encountered by evaluating on-going programs--was
my inability to witness the final implementation of the pro-
cesses under examination. Although both the resident guard
service and the volunteer patrol were to have begun before the
end of 1975, delays prevented both efforts from coming to
full implementation during the field study. One compensating
feature was that the reasons behind the delay were themselves
not without value to my analysis, and indeed the roles and
definitions of community participants played as great a part
in this non-development, as it would have had development
proceeded on schedule.

A further note concerning the methodology is a reminder
that the study is not meant to be an evaluation of the secu-
rity program in Area B. Assessment of crime prevention act-
ivities has proved to be of constant frustration to criminal
justice planners who are forced to contend with inadequate
police records, misleading crime reporting procedures, and
various classifications of the seriousness of the crime prob-
lem, and of course, a fair determination of when the problem
has been solved.\textsuperscript{14} Rather, this thesis has been an effort
to describe variables that influence the continuing process
of implementation, and to match perceived outcomes with the
expectations of the participants in the study.
A final look at my methods shows that while more than one NSP was studied, more than one neighborhood was not, and it could be argued that the generalizability of my conclusions is thereby limited. Perhaps a more generalizable approach might have been to predict an outcome using the variables from the literature and to compare them with reality. In a sense, of course, this method was implied in my method since the unique aspects of CPP's patrol represented a different outcome than has been considered by most of the literature, i.e., its continuance, its expansion, and its special form of instability were unusual as NSP's go. On the other hand, the lack of consensus on the variables would have made a more rigorous application of formal scientific methods unmanageable. As yet another alternative, I could have chosen other levels of variables entirely (a psychological, or a broader political perspective might have yielded even more compelling results). However, I concluded that the openness of the theory-building approach and concentration on a sociological case study seemed more appropriate to the complex situations offered by NSP's.

In the following chapter I have attempted to present an analysis of my experiences, my perceptions and interpretations, and some facts about the time spent with an NSP in a state of flux.
CHAPTER III

A CASE STUDY OF AN NSP IN FLUX
An old woman came up to me once. She was living in one of the elderly housing projects, and she was Jewish. I remember that because this old woman was so afraid, she said to me, "Leo," she said, "Leo, if you can make my apartment safe for me so that I can get a night's sleep, I'll light candles for you."

- Director of Security,
  North City Housing Authority

Introduction:

Towering above the row houses of North City, stands a tribute to the efforts of a small group of Puerto Ricans who banded together to fight the system. El Torre (The Tower) is the most recent structure in the neighborhood that has been built under the federal turnkey program of public housing and has been transferred to the neighborhood group for management. It is the most recent and most noticeable symbol of community that is determined to plan for and control its environment. It is also a fact of city life that once the buildings are constructed, they and their inhabitants must be protected.

What follows is a description of how the residents have proceeded to protect themselves against crime, and of the factors that have affected their behavior and consequently the behavior of their security program.

This work is really a combination of four case studies, but the concentration will be on the Neighborhood Security Patrol (NSP) in the Tower, a nineteen story building inhabited exclusively by elderly and some handicapped persons.
The other NSP's within the neighborhood were the volunteer lobby monitors who operated in the elderly tower; the Claver Street guard which may be considered as an arm of the focal NSP; and the Milton Street NSP (see Figure 1). All of the study is presented in chronological order, with the exception of the Milton Street patrol. This is contained in a single section since most of its developments were detached from the rest of the story and its isolation makes for a more cohesive presentation.

The events and developments which formed the NSP and the way it operates today seem to cluster around three periods of heightened activity. Thus the case study will be organized to focus on the following topics, reflecting these periods:

- **Background (1965 to Fall 1974):** The Historical and Structural Context of Area B and CPP.
- **Period I (Fall 1974):** The Beginnings of Security.
- **Period II (Spring 1975):** The Open Meeting with the Police Commissioner in Held, and the NSP is Reorganized.
- **Period III (Fall 1975 to January 1976):** A Flurry of Community Crime Prevention Activities are Undertaken, the Elderly Tower Tenants Council is Organized.
- **Postlogue (January 1976):** A Next to the Last Change?
BACKGROUND (1965 to Fall 1974):
THE HISTORICAL AND STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OF AREA B

Altering NCRA's Plan:

The North City Redevelopment Authority (NCRA) had a grand scheme for Area B. They wanted to revitalize the housing stock, and intersperse it with varied institutions and public areas. During the early 1960's the planners were thinking of Area B as a sparsely inhabited slum which should be demolished and replaced with moderate and luxury housing. They also sought new construction of recreational and commercial facilities to service the surrounding areas. At the time, many experts in the field agreed that it was a fairly well-conceived plan.

When the NCRA's Urban Renewal Plan for 1965 finally arrived, Area B had become the "heart of the North City's Puerto Rican Community." The low rents in the area had attracted a large number of first generation Spanish-speaking immigrants, many of whom had all arrived from the same village in Puerto Rico. Because the plan had not anticipated this change in the composition of the community, provisions for relocation were provided, and the result could have been a total dispersal of the community. It was at this stage that strong forces arose to oppose the NCRA plan and led to the creation of an alternative plan.

First, St. John's Episcopal Church, already a major social element in the Puerto Rican community, decided to
take action to prevent the relocation of the community. The Church's executive council assigned a Spanish-speaking seminarian, and two other men, to the parish to aid Father Billings and residents in organizing neighborhood resistance to the plan. As a result of their actions a grass roots group—the Emergency Committee on Housing (ECH) was formed in 1968 and a board of directors was elected at a mass meeting of 500 residents. The seminarian, however, was not a Puerto Rican and so in a search to find a countryman to lead the fight, ECH brought in Emmanuel Ortiz, a community organizer who had worked with Saul Alinsky in Chicago and had numerous relatives in the area. The motto, "No nos mudaremos de la Area B"—We shall not be moved from Area B, was adopted. At this stage the group turned to developing a strategy to overturn the NCRA plan. First the assistance of professional planners and architects was enlisted to change the NCRA plan by actually designing an alternative. Ortiz also used the strong support of his relatives and their neighbors in the community to lobby at area planning councils, to execute rent strikes against the slum landlords, and later to convince a church in another section of town to donate $35,000 of its building expansion funds to be used as seed money for ECH's first development effort.

The thrust of ECH's plan was to put the management of new or rehabilitated housing under community control. The same concerns which supported the development of ECH also fostered the creation of two other groups, which impacted
As of February, 1976, the new hi-rise, the walkway and the townhouse were still in the construction stage.

the work of ECH in a number of ways. The first group is the River Bend Tenants Council (RBTC), an organization oriented towards the welfare of the Black community. It should be noted that Area B has always been an integrated community, with significant numbers of Blacks, Chinese and Whites sharing the neighborhood, and although some members of ECH consider the land to be "Puerto Rican turf", they still pride themselves on the ability to live and work with other ethnic groups. In fact, it was RBTC which supplied ECH's rehabilitation efforts on Claver Street. A firm called Community Development Inc. bought the properties and agreed to renovate them and convey them to the North City Housing Authority. It was also agreed that ECH would manage the buildings, but
that RBTC would participate in tenant selection and the choice of the social worker. It was, in fact, their influence that assured/Claver Street development, which is located on the interface between the Black and Puerto Rican community, a large contingency of Black tenants, and a Black social worker, Ellen Jackson. The forty units on Claver were occupied between April of 1972 and one year from that date.

The second group of relative importance was the Grass Roots Task Force. Its twenty or so members were composed of local social service staff, ECH personnel, and residents of the Area B. Its chairperson, Julia Brown, had been an active resident of Area B for many many years, and in fact has owned the same house for nearly thirty years, a rare feat indeed in a neighborhood which has undergone such vast transitions in the last two decades. The Task Force members took on the challenge of working with the architect on the design for El Torre, but were especially interested in working on the provision of comprehensive social services for the elderly tenants, and the Hispanic community in general. At one point during the planning stages for the tower the Task Force became concerned about their relationship to ECH and asked to become a subsidiary of the larger organization. Julia Brown has remained an influential woman in the neighborhood. She is currently the clerk for a subsidiary board of ECH, and she continues to help with social service delivery.
The early stages of ECH were not characterized by great organizational stability. The major crisis to confront ECH came at the hands of its first executive director. It was reported that Ortiz had become involved with underworld figures in the Spanish community. It was also said that he disappeared, allegedly taking most of ECH's funds with him. Though some people claimed that he felt compelled to leave in order to free ECH of any outside control detrimental to their integrity and success, the incident still left the organization in crisis.

Following Ortiz's departure, Bart Landon and Sue O'Day assumed augmented leadership roles of ECH, although there were several interim executive directors. Bart took on more of the management responsibilities, whereas Sue was concerned with the economic development of the community. Under their leadership ECH changed form. The ECH Developers Corporation (ECHDC) was separately incorporated to oversee the development of housing in the area; and the ECH Developers, Inc. (ECHDI) was initiated to form the management (or landlord) component. Simultaneously, the ECH was incorporated (in 1972) as the parent organization which retained an overview as well as specific responsibilities for human services, economic development, and cultural advancement. The affiliate groups are governed by a joint ECH/DC-DI Board.

Meanwhile, the members of ECH and its Board of Directors were never satisfied with their interim executive directors until they acquired the services of Ms. Ann Rodriguez. Ms.
Rodriguez, a professor at North City College and long active in community organization, became the executive director of ECH in 1973. She began to fulfill the hopes of those who appointed her by discarding the high-powered and sometimes manipulative ways of past directors. Instead she concentrated on helping the community, represented by the steering committee, to function more often as an informed decision-making group.

Under Ms. Rodriguez's leadership the organization took on several new foci: an orientation toward the Spanish-speaking community, both in Area B, and in all parts of North City, a concern for hiring community people on local projects, and an interest in the quality of community services, including security. The first concern is best reflected in the fact that at this stage, ECH changed its name to Casas Por Puertorriqueños (CPP), which means "Homes for Puerto Ricans."

During 1973 the emphasis on manpower development was reflected in the meeting of the CPP steering committee, which was dominated with reports and discussions on negotiations with the United Neighborhood Construction Laborers (UNCL). Striving towards better minority hiring practices by construction companies, as well as encouraging minorities to train themselves in the trade, the UNCL felt that a coalition with CPP was a natural in light of all the construction underway in the Puerto Rican community. The idea was to negotiate with the contractor in order that "people from the community get employment."4 In a neighborhood with nearly 50%
unemployment, (according to Landon) this seemed like a pretty good idea. The commitment to manpower development has significantly contributed to the nature of the NSP, and will be taken up later in this section.

A descriptive piece on the development of an organization does not seem complete without a review of its stated goals and objectives, and CPP has come a long way since its "Alinsky-an" focus on the single issue of housing. Today CPP has broadened its mandate over a range of organizational and community objectives.

The Executive Office became the "policy-research-administration arm of the agency." Its objectives were: "improvement of agency functioning, development of local capability, and provision of needed quality services." A review session of May 1974, identified CPP's basic goals as the attainment of greater community control, and planning which is comprehensive, including the "physical, social and economic components." In the Five Year Report, it is said,

The main purpose of CPP is to implement the means for satisfying the basic human needs of the Hispanic community. CPP programs are aimed at 1) increasing family income; 2) developing awareness of barriers to advancement and the means to overcome them; 3) attaining maximum capability for self-determination; 4) advancing institutions which will enhance the Hispanic community's overall stature; 5) building a stable community; and 6) providing for a physical environment that will complement the social and economic development of the area.

ECH was organized over the issue of housing, and remains the number one long term concern of its members. But as
part of the broadened mandate security became an important issue. Residents, and consequently their CPP representatives in Area B, recognized the pervasive, debilitating effects of crime.

To some extent crime had been an issue from the inception of the group, but only at this stage did security become a formal mandate. As long ago as when the NCRA plan was being devised, for example, some initial ideas called for the "pedestrianizing" of the center of the "Area", that is, to close it off to cars. Potential residents complained, however, that they wanted to park their cars in front of their homes so that they could watch them through the windows. The designers respected the input and changed the plan (see Fig. 1).

For several years the problem of security was viewed mainly as a design consideration; put a street here, include such a lock, or light such an open space. Yet even though crime had been steadily increasing for a decade, it was not until 1974 that the members of CPP seemed to recognize crime as a catalyst for community organization and a forum for citizen participation.
PERIOD I (Fall 1974)

THE BEGINNINGS OF SECURITY

The Crime in Area B:

People in America's cities are worried about crime, and the people of Area B are no different. Officer Joe Forrest, the Community Services Officer of Station #4 in Area B, says his district is the most crime-ridden in all of North City. In his view, the rate has grown since middle and upper class professionals have moved into "the lion's den," and the poverty and high unemployment in the poorer sections (like Area B) makes crime a way of life. There is no safe neighborhood anywhere in his district, he claims, except perhaps the Arab section along Belvoir Avenue, and that's because the residents there, "like the Italians in the Little Italy section, are very suspicious of strangers." Even the Brent Neighborhood Voluntary Patrol (a nearby volunteer NSP) in the higher income area is not effective, he feels, because it does not practice a constant surveillance as part of each resident's everyday routine. Officer Forrest takes a cynical outlook on any citizen crime prevention activity. Aside from his misgivings about NSP's, he is equally skeptical about the approach used by another sample group of residents, who complain to the district captain about the prostitution in the area. Forrest believes that their motivations lie not so much in the physical safety of the neighborhood as they do in preserving upper middle class
appearance and morality.

In Area B two conditions characterize the crime situation and influence the kind of security utilized--vandalism and the presence of a serious drug problem. Vandalism is usually performed by young people. Whether the causes are poverty, cultural conflict, poor family life, or social disorganization, the problem has manifested itself in ruined property and petty theft. The drug problem is of a far more serious nature, and has also shaped the form of security in and around the buildings.

If a stranger were to walk down the one block length of Milton Street within Area B, that person might not think the houses, the condition of the street, or the people who lived there were very much different from any other street in a poor ethnic neighborhood in North City. But if that person looked closer, he or she might notice an abandoned car, stripped of all parts that could be fenced; or the scars left on the wall from a fire which had been set by vandals. Were a conversation overheard between two people, it might be about the garbage that was piling up on the streets, meaning it's time for the residents to get together for the spring clean-up. Another conversation might yield information on the special services at St. John's Church around the corner, or about the welfare cutbacks. But the conversations that have the most impact on these people are the ones that are the most secretive, the conversations that sell and buy hard drugs.
If that stranger heard that, he or she would realize that Milton Street is one of the least safe residential streets in North City.

Everybody who's not a stranger to Milton Street knows of the drug problem, and they also know that practically all of the crime there is directly related to the deals that are made. If prices go up, a purse is snatched or an apartment is robbed. If there is an argument, the result may be violent, like the incident last summer when a little girl was shot in the leg by a stray bullet.

The drug problem in Area B is difficult to address for a number of reasons inherent in drug trafficking itself and its role in the community. For example, the police from Station #4 see drugs as a problem particularly difficult for law enforcement. One pointed out to me that catching a pusher is not as easy as, say, catching a prostitute. In the latter case, a plainclothesman can simply pose as a "John" and, if propositioned, make the arrest. In drugs, complex and tedious stake-outs and undercover work are required. It also became clear that in any police force that considers itself understaffed, it will "scratch where it itches the most."

When residents in one community can get it together to apply pressure, the police will react, and not until then.

The whole issue of drug trafficking in Area B is fraught with opposing interests, perceptions, and reactions. Some residents of course, are petrified that these events take place in their neighborhood. They are afraid for their
families and their properties. One old woman, in fiery Spanish, charged that the Blacks and the Hippies were responsible for selling dope to the Puerto Ricans in order to drive her people out of the neighborhood. Others, like Ellen Jackson, the social worker for Claver Street, take the pragmatic view that drugs are a necessary way of survival in any poverty-stricken city block. Rico Himanez, counselor at St. John's Church, paints the scenario of a young man, out of school and out of work, who hears of an easy way to pick up some fast money, and soon he becomes deeply involved in the business.

Given the fact that most of the Puerto Rican families in the neighborhood are large, it seems as if almost no one is without a relative or close friend who is involved in drugs.

The close family network produces two attitudes toward drugs. To some extent it produces a climate of equality. At the same time, however, it creates the fear of being asked to act as a witness in a drug case. The residents are often afraid to cooperate with the police for fear of retribution, either from the apprehended person, or a relative of the accused.

These kinds of feelings occasionally put the people at odds with the police. Deputy Superintendent McDonald expected all persons to act as the eyes and ears of the police, and to serve as witnesses when the time comes. His goal in
any such situation would be to make as many arrests as possible. Many people, on the other hand, would simply prefer that the "action" be moved elsewhere, far away from their children and their homes. Another perspective was taken by community leaders, who looked to the causes of the problem, and asked that something be done about the scarcity of jobs, or that programs aimed at youth to prevent or rehabilitate delinquents be implemented. Finally, they may indeed be skeptical of the value of prisons, which, as Rico puts it, award "degrees in negative criminology."

The Tenants of the Tower and their Special Needs for Security

The elderly tower on Elmdale Street was opened for occupancy in the fall of 1974. It was a project which was supervised from conception to completion by CPP, under the Turnkey construction and management scheme. As a building which housed elderly and some handicapped, however, it presented a special challenge to those who wished to secure it properly. This section will describe the special security needs of the tenants and some of the courses taken by management to meet them. Although the building was designed to maximize security, additional protection was never doubted as being necessary; consequently, the first NSP in Area B was implemented.

For a number of reasons, the occupants of the tower were easy targets for crime. The people were chosen by the tenant selection committee, which followed a list of criteria
aimed at preventing the relocation and disbandment of the Hispanic community and other residents of the Area. The composition of the building has significant representation from the Spanish, the Blacks, Whites and Orientals. Many of the elderly speak little or no English, which makes for an interesting challenge to tenant organizers. In fact, the varied cultures and languages of the people attending tenant meetings, necessitating frequent translation, led one resident to remark, "It's like the goddamn United Nations here!"

It is, however, the age of the tenants in the Tower that has made them particularly vulnerable to crime. Their regular and predictable social security checks, and their physical infirmities make them prime targets of purse-snatchers, mail-box vandals, and even brazen house thieves.

Not surprisingly, many of the elderly live in a constant state of fear. A significant number live alone. Most of the tenants moved from "shockingly substandard dwellings," and had survived "long years of neglect." Bradley was painfully aware of the people who not only feared the world outside the Tower, but were even distrustful and resentful towards their neighbors. As a result of these conditions, and pleas from the residents themselves, the redevelopment authority gives elderly public housing projects high priority for security. In the original design several hardware devices were included. Each apartment in the elderly tower is equipped with a dead bolt lock, and a solid door that fits
in a metal frame. The front entrance to the building is locked, and there is an intercom system, with a buzzer for the door locks. No names are listed next to the room numbers. The rooms are also equipped with emergency buzzers, which signal the front desk and the management office. These were installed mainly to deal with health emergencies, but are useful as general calls for help. The side door to the stairs has also always been locked, and in a further security effort to prevent unauthorized access to the building, an automatic fire alarm has been installed which can only be turned off with a key belonging to the resident superintendent. Finally, a video scanner that views the entrance and is hooked up to channel '6' of each resident's T.V. is also in operation.

In addition to these security measures, several of the community groups concerned about the residents of Torre tried to alleviate the problems through additional services. The Grass Roots Task Force, which performed most of the early planning for the services, eased the continued planning and delivery over to a provider/coordinator at the Tower when it opened. The services covered the needs of health, recreation, and general counselling. The Claver Street Project also had a social worker, Ellen Jackson. Although the thrust of the counselling was not aimed at criminal-social problems, inevitably instances of drug and alcohol abuse, and fear of and/or anger with one's neighbors would be encountered, so that the service has in some cases taken on a crime preventive nature.
Second, security guards were provided to patrol the new building starting from the day it opened. Ted O'Hara, the Director of Management for the NCHA, had allotted many thousands of dollars each year to CPP to spend on security. In turn, the Director of Security for the NCHA recommended guard service to Bart Landon, the manager of CPP's dwellings, who agreed to use the money for that purpose. O'Hara stresses, however, that the building is "his [Landon's] baby," so it is clear that Bart can use the money in other security-related ways as far as NCHA is concerned. In fact, it is possible that Landon could, with minimal renegotiation, drop the guard service altogether and opt instead for, say, a rehabilitative program aimed at ex-offenders who might live in the projects. But CPP has adhered to the concept of hired guards. What is critical then is that while the housing authority suggested the idea of hiring the guards for which it provides the funding, CPP has the power to use the money in any security-related function as they see fit, and the residents, through CPP, ultimately maintain control over the guards. Thus Area B had its first NSP.

Stationed in the lobby at the desk (see Figure 2) the guard's primary responsibilities were to monitor the entrance of visitors to the building, having them sign in their names and whom they intended to see; and to watch the emergency light console for distress calls. Also, once an hour he was to patrol the halls and stairways of the 19 floor
building, and check the parking lot and environs. The guard

Figure 2

Layout of the First Floor of the Elderly Tower

was uniformed, but carried no weapon. In case of any trouble or a matter he could not handle, he was instructed to notify the police and his supervisor.

Due to funding limitations, two one-man shifts covered only the evening and night hours seven days a week. The daylight hours during the work-week were not included, on the argument that management personnel were in the building. The value of this substitute was extremely limited, however, simply because none of the functions filled by the guard were likewise filled by the management, (except perhaps the role of a nearby figure of authority, which could just as
easily be the resident-manager). The curtains in the manager's office were always drawn closed, thus barring a view of the lobby and the emergency console. No rounds were made or sign-ins required. Consequently, it has long been a desire by the tenants to have day-time coverage seven days a week.

The irony in the tenants' demand for expanded service hours is that no one, not the tenants nor Landon and-company, has yet been satisfied with the quality of service. Many of the complaints have stemmed from observations of the guards in flagrant misbehavior: drinking on the job, acting discourteously or sleeping, or performing illegal acts while on duty (one man stole newspapers from the machine and then sold them to the tenants). The critical problem, however, appears to be that the visibility of the guard is of utmost importance to the tenants. Unfortunately, it seems that the rounds could take the guards anywhere from 30-40 minutes, leaving a substantial portion of each hour without a guard at the door. Thus, each incident of proven misbehavior laid the groundwork for constant suspicion of any guard who, in the conscientious performance of his duties, was away from the desk most of the time.

The reasons why tenant reaction to the guards influenced security policies so strongly relate primarily to the relations of the manager to the tenants. First, while Landon, manager of the housing, was the man who negotiated the security contract and would be the one to break it, he was rarely in the building when the guards were. Therefore, he had to
rely on tenant feedback. He had many mechanisms by which feedback occurred. The social workers, the resident superintendant, also played a major role in supplying feedback. In addition, there was a loosely-knit, informal tower leadership of interested individuals, who would channel their complaints directly to Landon. Thus, the fuel for dissatisfaction existed, as did the mechanism for relaying the information to the "decision-maker," i.e. Bart Landon.

Another crucial link was Landon's own role definition. Long known as a "super-liberal" in North City, he is a firm believer in community control of housing and is further dedicated to the value of citizen participation. He has therefore been unusually responsive to the feelings of tenants. As we will see, in the next eight months he hired and fired a second security company, and hired yet a third in the Spring.

The Lobby Monitors in the Elderly Tower:

One very temporary solution to the problem of extending the visibility of tower guards was to initiate a program of volunteer lobby monitors who would act as watchers for the tower when the guards were absent. The idea was favorably supported by the management, but the actual mechanics of organization and initiative are unclear. Somehow several tenants were found who were willing to devote between four and eight hours a week to the task. Their duties were clearly defined; visitors should sign in the log book, and if there was any trouble, someone from the management office should
be summoned. Yet, the patrol sustained operations for only about two months, and although there has been occasional talk of its revival (with the backing of CPP), nothing has happened.

The problem seems to stem mainly from the transitory state in which the tenants found themselves. Many had been relocated more than once in the past decade. Some had come from a nearby public housing project. Thus, strong bonds of friendship and respect had not been formed. Landon identified a corollary to this. He felt that the previous environments from which most of the tenants came made it difficult for them to relate to their neighbors in a friendly and trusting manner. As a result, the volunteers lacked the respect which could only be earned over time.

They faced other problems as well. Most of my interviewees opined that the monitors turned out to be the big gossips in the building. The fact that they were able to demand the name and destination of each visitor, was felt to invade the privacy of others. (The availability of the log book at other times of the day made this feeling an issue with the hired guard as well.)

Another problem was the tenants' perceptions of the use and abuse of authority by the monitors. Initially, furniture was placed in the lobby so that the residents could gather for socializing. Unfortunately, alcoholism is a problem with some of the tenants and several would "hang around" the lobby, drinking. Occasionally, arguments would break out and things would get pretty rowdy. Complaints
followed that the monitors reacted by being "too bossy."
Julia Brown, former chairperson of the Grass Roots group,
stressed that in the elderly tower the "personality" of the
guard or monitor is crucial to his or her acceptance by the
residents.

In the monitor case the "community" was essentially
the tower. One could say that the emergence of the monitors
so soon after occupancy was "bad timing," that is, the tenants
emphasis was on acclimitization to the building and the new
neighbors; they were as yet emotionally unprepared for sig-
nificant involvement in the other affairs of the tower. In
fact, the tenants' council had not yet held its first meeting.
The mechanism for feedback and resolving conflict took on a
"personal" nature, and the primary relations between the mon-
itors and the tenants became rapidly strained. The volunteers
became discouraged, and their incentives to "remain" (to use
terminology from the literature) disappeared. Eventually,
the effort was abandoned.

The CPP Task Force on Security:

With the advent of the security guards, and an ever
intimidating crime situation, the "second most important
issue in the parcel" was finally recognized as one which
must be dealt with formally by a committee--the CPP Security
Task Force. Its elevation to such a level of concern was
inevitable, given that so many of CPP's members were resi-
dents of the neighborhood, and experienced the threat of
crime every day. And Father John Billings, who became its first chairman, was pastor of the church not even a block away from the scene of the drug dealing.

The motivation to create the committee was twofold, however, In part it was a response to the rising crime, but it was also viewed as a means for organizing tenants. Bart Landon was not alone in his commitment to community organization. The executives of CPP have on occasion been accused of lacking the support of the residents, and therefore, they constantly seek new issues (in addition to housing) around which to organize the people. In a very real sense the Security Task Force can be viewed as one more step towards the total organization of Area B.

This inclination towards widespread citizen participation and organization has been apparent in more than one of my interviews. William Garcia, a member of the ECH-DC-DI Board, remarked once how a shooting on Milton Street in which a little girl was hurt was wasted, from an organizer's point of view, when the incident was not used to rally support for the Security Task Force. Ann Rodriguez, CPP's executive director, outlined for me the development of citizen participation in Area B, and stated her intent to reverse the manipulative ways of the past (which she defended as being necessary at the time) and transform the residents into a more active and educated body. A symbol of this renewed effort was the recent hiring of a professional community organizer. Elsewhere in the community, Rico Himanez has
had a long history of fighting for Puerto Rican rights, and although his politics have mellowed, it is no secret that his interest in security is for him a step towards greater power for the lower classes. And finally, Father Billings sees his role, as a clergyman in the Episcopalian Church, to include organizing the parish around important issues, eventually in hopes of enabling the people to accept the transfer of initiative and know-how.

The early meetings of the group were attended by 10-15 regulars from the neighborhood, including the Tower's resident superintendent, Father Billings, William Garcia, and Sister Joanne, a person who served as a social worker in the neighborhood in addition to performing her religious duties. The issues discussed by the group were varied, including youth programs, community security patrols, lighting, and police--community relations. A North City policeman and resident of Claver Street wanted more programs aimed at youth, including recreational activities. He also mentioned the idea of forming a group of youth "vigilantes" to keep order in the playground at night. The feeling that youth programs would help prevent crime provided at least some of the motivation for the creation of a community-wide cultural program which began in December, 1974. Father Billings and Rico have also continued to work in that vein by encouraging the police-community service officers to reinstitute such ideas as the softball league which operated a few years ago.
In spite of this emphasis on programs for youth, most of the enthusiasm for improvements in the neighborhood derived from the appearance of the newly acquired guards in El Torre. Suddenly, the committee began to talk about a community-wide security force, supported by small assessments from everyone in the neighborhood. (This idea is quickly approaching a reality as Landon, who agreed to act as administrator, and the CPP steering committee are only waiting for the opening of some new construction before the plan is put into effect).

Another facet of the grand scheme for security was also bantered about at early security meetings. This was the plan to organize a security force of people recruited from the community. It was hoped that the neighborhood employees would act more responsibly than guards from private security companies. The community guards would be bi-lingual, and therefore dissolve most of the language barrier encountered by the private guards. The plan was in tune with the push for manpower development, and the citizens felt that they could pay the guards more (as an added incentive for responsibility and dedication) since the middle man would be left out. Also, with the money saved CPP hoped that it could accede to the requests of the elderly for twenty-four hour professional coverage. Over the next nine months five men were chosen from a number of prospects, and were to be employed by the fall of 1975.
The idea of the community patrol also sparked interest in the lighting conditions of the parcel. Jack Reade, a member of CPP's Security Task Force, exclaimed once that patrolling with inadequate lighting is "like walking around with a patch over one eye." Under CPP's auspices then, he began an investigation and found that the agencies responsible for lighting the streets, the playgrounds, the construction sites, and the parks each come under a different authority. He has been working on it on and off for several months now.

A final objective taken up by the group received more immediate attention—to improve relations with the police department. The residents had grown increasingly frustrated with a police department that allowed dope pushers to operate in their streets, were inordinately slow in responding to calls, and maintained an emergency line whose operators could not speak their language despite countless promises to remedy the situation. In regard to the last point—Jesus Baez, the new police-community services officer at the district station—described the process by which when a call from a Spanish speaking person came in, he would be paged, and if he was in, he would be taken away from his other duties in order to translate. The situation has taken on a "Catch-22" character, since the residents, who are often frustrated in their attempts to communicate with the police, have reduced the number of times they call. Consequently the demand seems less, and nothing is ever done. It is the desire to expose problems like these which motivated the resolution to organize an
open meeting with North City Police Commissioner Manetti.

PERIOD II (Spring 1975):
THE OPEN MEETING WITH THE POLICE
COMMISSIONER IS HELD AND THE NSP IS REORGANIZED

Meetings held just once a month can make seasons pass quickly. Thus, an idea conceived in winter is not realized until spring. At this point in time, the open meeting with Manetti was CPP's big organizing issue. Working up from informal, small group discussions to entire block gatherings held with the Security Task Force meetings, the organizers managed to drum up interest and support and a turn-out of nearly 200 residents at the April meeting. The residents came because they had heard that the new commissioner was dedicated to community input. They came because they wanted some no-nonsense answers about the growing crime problem, about Spanish policemen, and about how the police department could help them build a safer community. Deputy Superintendent MacDonald, and Officer Joe Forrest, the Police-Community Services Officer from District Four, were also there to represent the police. Most of CPP's board members were present.

The discourse at the meeting brought many feelings and problems to the surface, most of which have already been discussed. The subject was raised of a neighborhood patrol operated (instead of hired) by CPP and using indigenous manpower. Not unlike other police across the country,
representatives of the N.C.P.D. issued stern warnings against vigilantism. Nevertheless, it was reported to me that Manetti offered to help train the recruits for the service, and offered his endorsement. Promises were also made by Manetti to hire more Spanish-speaking patrolmen and to offer more prompt and higher quality service.

Although the meeting was deemed a success, recent interviews with Forrest, MacDonald and a sector patrolman (all of District 4) led me to believe that though they were present, their views were not well represented at the meeting in the shadow of Manetti. Joe Forrest, for instance, was extremely wary of any group trying to establish a "mini-police department." Despite the residents' cries of alarm, moreover, MacDonald believed that the greatest crime problem in Area B was not drugs, but panic. And the patrolman spoke for many of the sector patrolmen when he said that the language difference between police and residents is only a minor problem, and "we can usually find a kid around who can translate for us. It's the kids who know English." The strength of the dissenting views of these police "subordinates" hindered the fulfillment of the Commissioner's promises in the months to follow.

A New Security Company is Hired; Service is Expanded:

By the spring of 1975, sentiment against the security company providing the tower guards had peaked. The topic was even taken under advisement by the Security Task Force
and a resolution was passed to dispel the company. Thus, Safety Guard was hired to supply the guards. Although charging one dollar per hour more ($4.25/hr. compared to $3.25/hr) their selling points were perceived as increased supervision, and a higher wage (e.g., as a responsibility-inducing incentive) paid to the employees.

At the same time, CPP had reached a decision to expand its service—not only the hours of coverage, but the geographic coverage as well. More NCHA money made available to management enabled them to expand coverage to 24 hours on the weekends (compared to just night-time coverage previously). Also, in a separate transaction, supposedly through a concerted effort on Landon's part, the NCHA awarded CPP about $2,000 per year for security at the Claver Street project. There's not much one can do with $2,000 these days, but CPP was determined to take another step, however small, towards their ultimate security goal of neighborhood-wide coverage. Thus, another guard was assigned to work Claver Street from 8:00 pm to 12 midnight every day, for just the summer. These hours were chosen since this is when there are generally more people on the streets than at any other time during the year. Also supplied by Safety Guard Co., the guard was assigned to patrol the block on foot (or in his car if it was raining). His instructions in case of disorder paralleled the guard's at the tower. One other guard was also stationed nights at CPP's headquarters. These additional guards thereby became part of an expanded NSP. (Contrary to some people's beliefs,
CPP does not gain any insurance benefits from any of these measures, but Landon has recently begun to investigate the options).

This decision to expand service coincided with another development which was to have serious ramifications for the route taken by residents to protect their community. It seems that what was before just a "problem" of drug trafficking, became during the summer an all-out war. Some surmised that a big drug bust in the nearby Public Housing Project chased the scene to Bayside Playground. Others, "in the know," claimed that a new "source" provided a better grade, price, and quantity of drugs. For whatever the reason, the situation became increasingly dangerous in the neighborhood; robberies and muggings increased, as did shootings, one of which resulted in injury to a little girl.

In an immediate response to the surge in street crime, a kind of ad hoc NSP was formed. William Garcia, who lives on Milton Street across from the playground, described how a small group of men reacted in their own informal way. When the street was plagued with hot-rodners, the "boys" would approach the driver at an intersection, en masse, and "suggest" that he slow down, "or else..." The same technique was used to stop someone who had been torching abandoned automobiles. Furthermore, echoing the notion from years ago that residents wanted to keep an eye on their cars, a middle-aged family man on Milton Street described a mutual pact he has had with a few of his neighbors. During almost all hours
of the day, one of them is peering out the front window, watching that no one tries to steal any of their cars.

The increased danger lent a different perspective to the Claver guard as well. It led to a prime example of differing definitions of task. A frequent complaint from Claver Street tenants and especially Ellen Jackson (the social worker) was that the guards "weren't bad, they just didn't do anything." On the other hand, Mr. Jordan, the supervisor for Safety Guard Co., thought that the men performed their jobs well.

My observations, however, support a somewhat more complex interpretation. During the summer the tenants of Claver Street often sat out on the steps of the apartment buildings during the evening hours, and a number of them would drink to pass the time. Meanwhile, there was a great deal of drug activity happening right across the street. Jordan claims the guard was hired to protect the "stoop-sitters" from the junkies and dealers. This was why, when the service first began, a guard dog was included (the dog has since been found to be unnecessary). But Ellen, who had unilaterally (but later with Landon's support) "out-lawed" drinking on the steps, expected the guard to enforce the "rules" of the street. She also expected him to help break up any arguments between neighbors and families. Instead, she complained that he got "too friendly" with the tenants, did not enforce the rules, and one time stood helplessly by during a heated
and near-violent argument on the steps of one building until Ms. Jackson was finally summoned.

These complaints were channeled to Landon through informal telephone contact with his office. Occasionally, though, the tenants' feelings would reach him through a series of primary relationships in the neighborhood. For some reason, however, the Safety Guard supervisor (and therefore the Safety Guard guards) was not aware of the complaints, and as the conflicts were not resolved, they became prominent reasons to change companies in the future.

Not all of the danger was to be found out in the streets, however. For various reasons, some believed to be drug-related, others possibly political, several buildings in the neighborhood were burned. The Captain of the Arson Squad confirmed the rash of fires in that section of North City (although it was obviously a touchy subject for him and he rationalized that fires generally came in bunches). He also observed quite matter-of-factly that church fires have occurred "more than usual", a news item that was treated much more seriously by the local news corps. Needless to say, the latter fact had special significance for Father Billings. An even more critical event for CPP, however, was the destruction by fire of its own headquarters. It was this incident which set the final stage for the Fall activities.
PERIOD III (FALL 1975 TO JANUARY 1976):
A FLURRY OF COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES ARE UNDERTAKEN AND THE ELDERLY TOWER TENANTS' COUNCIL IS ORGANIZED

Fires, drugs, shootings, and muggings; a drive for autonomy, respect and self-improvement; dissatisfaction with police service, an upcoming mayoral election, and a desire for achieving citizen organization, were the issues which dominated CPP when I first made contact with it in early September, 1975. While all of these issues remained active, it was the concern over fire and security which held sway over their work during this period. A "Fire Meeting" was scheduled for mid-September and was to include the Fire Marshall, the police, the arson squad, and representatives from several public interest groups of the area. Minutes from the meeting reflect a growing fear of the people for their physical safety, and a concern of CPP for its property. This fear was well-founded; the Fire Marshall cited 18 fires in Area B since January of that year.

In response to the residents' concern for security from arson and other crimes, CPP, represented by Ann Rodriguez, began the meeting by reviewing its programs and policy. Over the past year, increased amounts of money were spent on security for its buildings, including the installation of a night time guard (from Safety Guard Co.) in their new headquarters, even though no insurance benefits were gained from
such a move. In addition, funds were being raised from the community to set up a reward system aimed at the arsonists.

Feedback from a few of the community members in attendance was also heard. Some complained that investigations of fires took far too long to even begin (the reply was that there is a tremendous backlog of cases, and that fires of inhabited buildings take priority). An interesting chord of discontent was rung by Bill Cott, a resident of the elderly tower, who cited the resistance of the police force to the establishment of a community patrol. Coming from a man who was to play an increasingly important role in CPP's security plans, this statement made clear the potential influence of police attitudes.17

The meeting ended on two notes. The Fire Marshall and Arson Squad Captain made suggestions about the prevention of fires, such as removing debris, securing the buildings, and improving reporting systems. Second, Deputy MacDonald vowed to improve cooperation with CPP, by responding more quickly to calls from the area in return for a list of especially vulnerable lots. In fact, a few days after the meeting, MacDonald met privately with Father Billings, whom he considered to be the foremost community contact, and agreed to station an undercover agent in the neighborhood, especially around the church.

During Fall, 1975, possibly due to the "fire meeting," the police finally began taking CPP's concerns seriously. Police statistics show a purge of the drug scene in late
August and early September, culminating in a number of arrests for possession of narcotics. At the same time CPP improved its political base and thus its potential influence on the police. It organized a huge voter turnout for the mayoral election in support of the incumbent, who won. Thus, with more political clout, the Puerto Ricans could demand Spanish speaking community services officers and in fact got one. (Jesus Baez is a Brazilian who speaks Spanish, but you can't have everything). A "getting-to-know-you" meeting, with Father Billings and Rico, later laid the groundwork for more police-youth programs and a Spanish speaker on the emergency line.

A renewed interest in security also sparked interest once again in a CPP-operated indigenous force. One woman who had a special interest in seeing this change come about was Ellen Jackson. Her conception of what the community expected of her has become an unanticipated argument in favor of hiring residents as guards. She alone operates the social services offices on Claver Street, directly across from the playground. She is a highly independent woman, and enjoys working by herself. On the other hand, she is also not a naive person, and is fully aware, maybe too aware, of the illegal activity that goes on in the neighborhood. She believes that when a security guard stops in for coffee or when a policeman comes by to check on things in the neighborhood, that these visits can be misconstrued by the dope pushers as collaboration with the narcotics bureau. In fact, her fear
reached such a level at one time that she decided to take a few days leave until things "cooled off." Anyway, Ms. Jackson perceives hired residents as less threatening to her relationship with the criminal element, and has made her feelings known to CPP's officers via Landon.

Bart Landon and Ann Rodriguez began to look more earnestly into the idea of hiring residents to perform security functions. They began interviewing more prospects, and sought legal advice on the liabilities of such a venture. In a move instigated by the executive director, (Ms. Rodriguez) her assistant began to look for funding opportunities to help the fledgling program get started.

In this case the most obvious funding source for CPP fell through. CPP contacted the Mayor's Criminal Justice Committee on the assumption that it was the strongest potential sponsor. At one time it had appeared that if CPP could sustain a volunteer patrol, they would be in a good position to receive LEAA funds from the Committee to support their future neighborhood force. As it happened, however, NSP's were no longer "in vogue" with the Committee, and CPP was informed that no funding for this purpose would be available, although an offer was made to work with CPP on other projects. Negotiations were dropped by CPP soon afterwards. This setback had two effects. One was that it contributed to the delay in hiring the residents of the area as guards. It also detracted from the support for the effort to organize a volunteer patrol on Milton Street, which is described in more
detail at the end of this chapter.

At this stage it was clear that CPP's community organizing tactics, primarily focused on security—were beginning to have even broader impacts on Area B. One important event was the organization of the tenants' council in El Torre, with security as a primary interest. In fact, one of their first moves was to appoint a security committee (not to be confused with CPP's security Task Force).

New organizations usually create new networks of leadership, and tenants' council was no exception. Ever since the lobby monitors were first organized, there had existed an informal core of leadership in the tower. Together with Bart Landon they were the main initiators of the Council. Their roles became formalized when a few were later elected officers. Loretta Stone, a black woman, is president. She says she was chosen because "people relate to me well." A Spanish woman is secretary and forms an important link to the Hispanic contingent. (The Chinese are unrepresented. They, more than the other groups, have isolated themselves socially. There are three or four men who can speak English, and end up making all the decisions for the group).

The man who appears to be assuming a leadership role the quickest is Bill Cott, the vice-president and chairman of the council's security committee. Mr. Cott, in his mid-fifties, resides in the facility due to a handicap that requires him to walk with a cane. He appears more educated than many of the tenants, but more important he has long had
an interest in violence and the security problems of the elderly. Currently he is working with a state representative on legislation aimed at reducing the violence in media and at educating children about violence and non-violence in the schools. Bill Cott, like other leaders in the Area, is very concerned about resident participation. Although capable of making all of the decisions on security himself, he has opted to make a dedicated effort at collecting input from the residents. Opinions surface mostly at council meetings, but often also from casual conversations in the lounges or laundromat. In addition, the lines of communication to Bart Landon have now been formalized. Landon claims he holds a continuing dialogue with the officers twice a week, usually concentrating on feedback on the guards, or on other thief-proof strategies for the building. At one time Cott maintained a fairly good rapport with Jordan of Safety Guard, but after an incident where the tower guard was mugged and left his post without a replacement, they have developed a mutual lack of respect for each other.

The emergence of the tenants council has had significant implications for the development of the NSP, and security in general. For one, the tenants had another forum for expressing their fear of crime and their desire for a visible sign of security at all times, i.e., the guard. Thus, the rounds of the guard were shortened considerably, eliminating surveillance of the middle sixteen floors and concentrating on the public areas, the 19th floor lounge, the social service
offices, and the parking lot. In addition to improving the patrol capability of the guards, the new council was instrumental in initiating a number of other security measures. The President of the Council, Loretta Stone, encouraged the social service staff to increase counselling of anti-crime practices. Through tower flyers, and personal contact, for example, she hoped to educate the elderly about the proper use of hardware, and to suggest ways of avoiding purse-snatching. Bill Cott, moreover, took responsibility for improving some of the hardware in the building. When people informed him that others were leaving bricks in the side doors, or lending out copies of the front door key (to ensure confidentiality of visitors as mentioned previously), the council and Landon decided to place a "fire-alarm lock" on the side door and change the front door lock to one which uses an "uncopyable" key. The new furniture which has been purchased for the 19th floor lounge is big and bulky which will make it difficult to steal (simply because it's almost impossible to get it through the doors).

The Milton Street Patrol:

During the Fall of 1975 there was an effort led by the CPP Security Task Force to formalize the ad hoc patrols on Milton Street. Yet despite positive feedback from the street residents and the respected presence of CPP as the sponsor and organizer, the plans as of December have been tabled indefinitely.
The reasons for the aborted plans emerge on two levels. At first glance, the patrols seemed doomed because of their current state of irregularity, lack of police support, and lack of leadership. These factors were submerged, however, by conflicts over the roles of the persons involved, and bad timing in light of broader community objectives.

Ever since the open meeting with the police commissioner last spring, CPP's Security Task Force had remained relatively silent. The turn-out at the monthly meetings was consistently small. When I spoke with Ms. Rodriguez (CPP's executive director) in the fall, she was considering the option to intervene in the Force's activities and "get things going." It was not so much that Father Billings was inactive. His low-key approach had improved relations with the police and firemen and had earned him considerable praise. Ms. Rodriguez, on the other hand, was concerned about the dwindling membership of the force, and the lack of publicity which Billings was able to generate.

Responding to the need to revitalize the committee, Billings initiated a citizen organizing drive in the fall with an NSP as the goal. This was not the first time that the security committee had confronted the issue of NSP's, either. Recall that at the same meeting in 1974 at which the proposal to hire residents with the NCHA money was first discussed, a North City policeman and resident of the Claver Street project, had suggested the formation of a "vigilante" youth patrol. Furthermore, at the tower residents' council
meeting in October, the possibility of the formation of such a patrol was mentioned again. Thus the major topic at the Security Task Force's November meeting was to be the initiation of a volunteer patrol.

The meeting promised to be an important one for security matters in Area B, and recognizing this fact, Deputy-Superintendent MacDonald from Station 4 was in attendance. Unfortunately, probably due to cold rainy weather, the total attendance was low, with only six or seven regular members showing up. As it happened, the people on the block where Billings lives (near to Area B) had just initiated their own volunteer NSP, and what's more, a fairly successful one had been operating for about three years just on the other side of E. 105th Street.

So Billings opened the meeting with a brief summary of the activities of the two other volunteer patrols. One was the patrol in the near-by Brent neighborhood and Billings had a copy of their guidelines which he passed around the conference table as he spoke. Next, it was decided that the Force should conduct a small "straw poll" sampling of residents' attitudes towards this kind of patrol. The sample would be restricted to the homes on Milton street, since this was one of the last major pockets of non-CPP homes, and, running next to Bayside playground, it had been experiencing high rates of crime. The meeting concluded by deciding that following the poll an all-out recruitment of new committee members would be made in order to hold a large organizational
meeting one month later, on December 11, 1975.

The straw poll began on the following Wednesday. As part of the poll, Father Billings, Rico Himenez, Jack Reade, and I visited several homes on Milton Street.18 Father Billings, well-known on the street, would introduce the four of us and ask for the "senor del casa" and then probe for attitudes on the patrol and crime in general. The interest in forming and serving on a volunteer patrol was high, in fact much more positive than anyone had expected, and so raised doubts as to the accuracy or representativeness of the five or six families polled.

Unfortunately, the results of the survey represented the zenith of support for the patrol, and within a month, the support for organizing the patrol which had begun so strongly, vanished.

To begin with, there was no formal organization operating the ad hoc patrols, despite Garcia's title as president of the Milton Street Citizens Organization. Garcia it seems was never able to implement any exceptionally ambitious plans on the street, confining his efforts to an annual spring clean-up, and at one time visiting the police station with demands for better service. (This was only in his capacity as president of the street group, and has no bearing on his fine record with other aspects of CPP and the ECH-DC-DI board). Unfortunately, effective leadership was also not forthcoming from Father Billings. His is not a dynamic personality, and citizen organizing does not appear to be his forte.
The attitudes of the police toward such a patrol were not all that good either. Deputy MacDonald was constantly warning against vigilante groups. The ambiguous legal definition obviously put the members on shaky ground, and they lacked a sense of direction due to their uncertainty as to what kind of patrol to form, what kinds of crimes to be concerned with (e.g., whether or not to fight the dope pushers) and what kind of relationship it should form with the police. Given also that its operations were irregular, and that there was no dynamic leadership, it was not surprising when the idea of the patrol was dropped altogether.

Just the same, I felt that these inadequacies could have been overcome were it not for three other circumstances in the community. The first was the residents' ultimate unwillingness to take part in the activities which an NSP would require. Yes, they were weary of the crime and wanted to do something about it, and when a patrol was suggested the consensus was highly favorable. But, to cooperate with the police and risk retaliation from the accused or even relatives of the accused, was a danger they would not risk. When Officer Forrest and Deputy MacDonald realized that this commitment was not forthcoming, they withdrew what reluctant support they had offered. Remarkably, neither Father Billings nor Rico expected there to be any substantial interest anyway. They characterized the Hispanic people as "emotionally depleted," despite the relative successes that CPP had accomplished elsewhere in the community (or maybe because of
those accomplishments). This attitude could very well have created a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The second and third causes relate once again to general community organization. Garcia explained that the newest developments, a new high-rise and a row of townhouses (see Figure 1) were nearing completion. CPP was gearing up for the big push for occupancy and he felt that to organize at this time was simply a case of "bad timing." Also of higher priority was the plan to initiate the community-wide patrol. In a sense, the Milton Street patrol acted for a while as a political pawn when the CPP officers saw an opportunity for funding from the Mayor's Criminal Justice Committee. However, when the money was not forthcoming, another reason for supporting the volunteer patrol was gone.

The final drawback revolved around Rico's participation in the process. Rico was born in Puerto Rico, but grew up in the U.S. During the sixties he took an active part in several radical movements, including a militant group to free Puerto Rico. Lately, he has used his degree in Psychology to work with some social service groups, and currently operates out of St. John's Church as a community counselor. His acceptance by people in the community is mixed. Just walking with him through the neighborhood has proven to me that he is acquainted and seemingly on good terms with a large number of residents, both Puerto Ricans and Blacks. But in others' eyes he has been described as "anathema." He is a very
aggressive young man, eager to challenge anyone on a personal level. As an example, when we conducted our door-to-door survey, we were sometimes met by demure young women who would only refer us to the male members of their families. Rico challenged them anyway, insisting that they think for themselves.

Perhaps the more significant opposition to his participation came from the leaders of CPP. On more than one occasion I was reminded that "not all members of the task force were acting with CPP's approval." I believe that this stems from an image that the people of CPP are trying to project. In light of their history, i.e., the past alleged contacts with the underworld, Ann Rodriguez in particular is concerned that CPP maintain a respectable front, especially in the eyes of the NCHA. Rico, with his militant background and street connections, is considered a threat to this image. Poor Father Billings is caught in the middle. Although a member of CPP's elected Board, he also sees the role of the church as a redeemer, and insists that Rico's past deeds not be held against him, and so backs him. Meanwhile, the Milton Street Security Patrol has been allowed to quietly fade.

POSTLOGUE (JANUARY 1976):

A NEXT TO THE LAST CHANGE?

For quite some time dissatisfaction with Safety Guard Co. had been brewing. Although the more flagrant mishaps
like drinking and theft were not apparent, and even though the guards were personally befriended by several tenants, other circumstances led to their demise. Not all of the circumstances were the fault of the guards. Some of the techniques which had CPP's approval did not mesh with the social patterns of the community. Also, the lines of communication between client and provider were not always in good working order. One of the problems arose when the "technology", or the "techniques" employed, failed to match the local social network. Without this match, the technology was used inefficiently, that is, with less than maximum impact. In CPP's case, this has contributed to further dissatisfaction with the service and in compensation, guard companies have been changed.

For example, a growing problem in the tower has been vandalism of the common areas. There exists fairly universal consensus, therefore, that a primary rationale for the guard to be stationed at the entrance is to keep uninvited strangers out. As a further precaution, visitors are asked to sign in the log. Consequently, whenever an incidence of vandalism occurs, the guard is usually accused of not doing his job. His job becomes more difficult though, when tenants "buzz" visitors in without first checking them out via the scanner and intercom. Obviously, when he is not there intruders can get in easily, and even when he is, occasional check-ups have proven that the names in the log book were fictitious. I tested this out personally and had no difficulty getting into
the building. In fact, during one visit, another tenant told me if I ever had any trouble, just buzz Mrs. X in a certain room, "She always lets people in." Another problem is that large groups (5-10 people) frequently congregate in the lobby and it is not too difficult to sneak in with a tenant and avoid signing the log book while the guard is pre-occupied with socializing.

Why does this happen? Basically the technology has not been properly matched to the social patterns of the people. In the example of the intercom, many of the tenants can only speak Spanish or Chinese. These people (who lack the benefit of instructions in their own language) and even some English speakers, are unfamiliar with an intercom system, and don't know how to use it. In fact, at one of the council meetings, several complained that the intercom didn't work properly, even though the equipment had been checked thoroughly. Moreover, some had never recognized the need for the intercom or refuse to accept the newfangled inconvenience, or maybe they were just hard of hearing; and so at the sound of the buzzer they automatically let the visitor in.

Concern over private social matters has also played a part. The men and women who hung around the lobby were sometimes referred to as nosy neighbors, or gossips. Other tenants had no desire for the names of their visitors to be recorded for all to see. So these tenants might lend their front door key or give copies of it to several acquaintances so that they would not be identified as visitors.
The lobby sitters represent a significant number of elderly tenants who, due to loneliness, insomnia, or countless other reasons tend to see the guard as someone to socialize with, a sort of captive audience. At one point the crowds in the lobby became too rowdy so the furniture was removed, but now several tenants will still bring down a folding chair to sit on. The extent of their need for this social outlet was evident when an attack dog was instituted with the guard after an incident in which he had been beaten in the parking lot while attempting to apprehend two car thieves. The socializers were extremely intimidated by the presence of the dog, and according to the guard, this was one reason why the use of the dog was discontinued. Whatever the cause or origin of these various social patterns, there is no doubt that they are at odds with the techniques used to screen visitors. The blame, however, is affixed to the guards.

A final cause of dissatisfaction has stemmed from the inability of the clients to keep the lines of communication open with the guard company, as well as with the residents of the community. After all, what good is it to collect complaints if there is no attempt made to ameliorate them?

CPP's ability and willingness to collect information from their environment, especially from the citizens, has always been a cherished boast. In fact, not too many months ago, when the citizen organization component was accused of being slack, the board hired a man whose exclusive responsibility has been community organization and input. On the
other hand, CPP has had its share of communication problems, a deficient mechanism which has played a role in the decision to release Safety Guard, its third security company.

Regardless of its efficiency at gathering community input, CPP has failed at times to relay the information to the guard company and thereby move to resolve the criticism or conflict. An obvious example of this was the ordeal mentioned previously concerning the guard on Claver Street. Jordan (the Safety Guard supervisor) and CPP (i.e., Ellen Jackson and Bart Landon), each held separate definitions of tasks yet failed to ever realize that they differed from the other participants'.

Of course, the "fault" here lies equally with Safety Guard Co. Ever since the incident of the beating of the guard, Jordan has resented Bill Cott, who purportedly acted somewhat callously in relation to the injured guard. (on the other hand, Cott was upset that the door was left unguarded all night). Furthermore, since the reports from the guards each night emphasize the trouble-makers in the building, Jordan doesn't think much of the tenants either. He does rate Landon as "a nice guy", but following the initial closing of the contract, has had little contact with him. Thus, communication is inadequate from both ends.

With the release of Safety Guard Co., CPP contracted with yet a fourth security company, called Best Security Corp. One positive note that has emerged from this change is that CPP appears to be learning from its mistakes. They
have recognized the deficiency in communication, and the differences in definition of task. Consequently they engaged in a series of negotiations which included composing a written set of guidelines for the guards in the field.

The Delay in Hiring an Indigenous Security Force:

The delay in beginning a hired resident security program is a result of two factors. The first is that CPP lacks the facilities and know-how to train its future resident guards. One or two persons have mentioned that Police Commissioner Manetti at one point promised to help train the guards if CPP ever got its program together. Unfortunately, this promise has not been fulfilled. (It's possible that the statement was misinterpreted. Maybe Manetti was merely offering use of the department's film libraries which contain matter on crime awareness and reporting). The other officers with whom I spoke were startled to hear of the promise as well. Forrest thinks the best and only training necessary for the guards is to train them to stay awake on duty. Deputy MacDonald bluntly stated that it is not within the Department's realm of responsibility to train private guards. For whatever reason, it is now obvious that CPP will be on its own. Thus, one motivation for choosing Best Security Corp. was its willingness to hire men from the neighborhood. Later in the year when CPP will run its own service, they hope to pass their savings on to the guards and then, by offering the men higher wages, lure the already-trained personnel away from Best Security.
The other factor that is causing delay is that the leaders of CPP are concerned with many more events and developments than just the hired guards. This is probably true of any sponsor of an NSP. In this case, William Garcia explained that quite a few efforts are holding off until the new apartment and townhouse complex is occupied. This latter, major event will once again spark an enthusiasm for citizen participation and neighborhood goals. So the CPP-operated guards as well as the plan for a parcel-wide security assessment, must wait a few more months.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Span of Operation</th>
<th>Manpower</th>
<th>Money? If yes, Source is Given</th>
<th>Problems</th>
<th>Community Input and/or Action</th>
<th>Other Relevant info.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOBBY MONITORS</td>
<td>Elderly Volunteers from the Tower</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Personality problems in relations between monitors &amp; tenants; it was short-lived due to disenchantment of volunteers.</td>
<td>It operated before the creation of the tenants council, so complaints went directly to social workers &amp; management. There has been recent talk of reviving it.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOWER GUARDS</td>
<td>Hired guards, not from community, young men.</td>
<td>NCHA Security Funds</td>
<td>The guards are not bilingual; there have been too many reports of irresponsible behavior; guards have had difficulty relating to the elderly; none of the 3 guard companies hired so far have satisfied the clients.</td>
<td>The tower tenants' council has a security committee whose members hold regular dialogues with management. The input is taken seriously &amp; usually acted upon.</td>
<td>It is considered to be a prototype for a community-wide patrol, and as a rallying point for increased citizen crime prevention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAVER GUARDS</td>
<td>Hired guards, not from community, young men.</td>
<td>NCHA Security Funds</td>
<td>The guards are not bilingual; social problems with tenants; complaints that guards don't do their jobs.</td>
<td>The social worker, E. Jackson, serves as ombudsman for tenants. Her communication with mgmt. is informal.</td>
<td>It is considered to be a prototype for a community-wide patrol, and as a rallying point for increased citizen crime prevention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Span of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milton Street</td>
<td>Volunteers, young men from the community</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The patrol operates intermittently; there is no formal structure or regularized operations; it has no official approval.</td>
<td>Neighbors discuss the street conditions informally; there was recently an organization effort led by Father Billings of CPP's security task force which failed due to community &amp; personal conflicts.</td>
<td>The drug scene is considered to be responsible for the violent crime on the street.</td>
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CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS
The limiting factor in any analysis of organizations is man's limited rationality; our inability to perceive a multivariable social system in a dynamic state. In an effort to reduce uncertainty to certainty we inject more structure, more clarity in position descriptions and assume that the complex has been simplified. In reality, of course, the complex has not been simplified--our framework has been simplified, but the complexity remains. 1

This chapter represents an analysis of the developments of the Case Study against the backdrop of the issue of stability in NSP's. It is an attempt to determine which variables seem to be the most powerful in explaining why some NSP's achieve stability and others don't. Thus it addresses the questions which were raised in the methodology, though the chapter has been divided into two sections. In the first section, the significance of each factor described in the literature as a determinant of the stability of NSP's is examined. Each factor's effect is described even though it may have been inconsequential to this particular case. The second section discusses the importance of the total community context of the NSP. For purposes of thematic organization of these findings, all of the NSP's in Area B are considered simultaneously under the separate headings of each factor.

As a final preface to the findings, it should be noted that the prima facie observations on the stability of the NSP's in Area B were borne out by the facts of the case study. The hired guard patrol was stable in the sense that it is fairly well assured of its continued survival. However,
the management of its resources, i.e., manpower, has been unstable; at the same time it has behaved uncharacteristically for an NSP in a poor neighborhood in that it has inspired an expansion in scope of the citizen crime prevention activities of its parent organization, CPP.

The behavior of the NSP on Claver Street parallels that of the focal NSP since the Claver set-up is an extension of the arrangement with the guard company which protects the tower. As for the other two NSP's, the lobby monitors were unstable by virtue of their demise; and the Milton Street patrols having never sustained their operations, were thus unstable also.

The distinction between the "survival" definition of stability from NSP literature and the "fundamental change" definition employed in this thesis is important for the following reasons. The first is methodological and was therefore discussed in Chapter II. Briefly, the unique character of the stability of the NSP in this case study provided a base from which to propose that there existed a neglected set of variables which would explain the dissimilarities. The analytic value of the distinct definitions emerges in this chapter. While the internal factors are shown to have considerable merit in elucidating the survival of the focal NSP, they are inadequate for the purpose of explaining the NSP's resource instability or CPP's expanding scope of citizen crime prevention activities. Furthermore, the internal organizational factors, while contributing to
the understanding of the instability of the other NSP's, do not present the compelling explanation. Rather, it is the broader outlook of the community context as described in the second section, which holds the more powerful explanation.

THE FACTORS FROM THE LITERATURE

A continually felt crisis. There is no question that the residents of Area B and perhaps most of that quadrant of North City, possess a general and lasting fear of crime. Among the elderly, the fear is heightened. While this certainly helps to assure that some hired guard will be at El Torre, it seems to have little bearing on the instability of resources experienced by CPP. It is also too general a concept to affect client satisfaction with the guards' performance. Dissatisfaction can be important when it leads to a change in guard companies.

Fear is a classic example of a "necessary" but not "sufficient" element for patrol survival. This is only too evident in the case of the volunteer monitors and the Milton Street Patrols. In both cases the fear was strongly present, but the efforts failed regardless.

A sponsor and/or a reliable source of funding. It is initially conceded that a hired guard was instituted in the tower and on Claver Street because the North City Housing Authority paid for it and will probably continue as long as the NCHA provides the money. On the other hand one should
not be tempted to think that money guarantees a guard. Money can be used to purchase crime prevention hardware of high technology, or can be used to run social programs aimed at potential offenders, or ex-cons. Neither does NCHA money explain the guard at CPP headquarters, nor the plan to expand the guard service by assessing residents in non-public housing, and even those in public housing to supplement the current funds. Assessing public housing residents for security is not so far-fetched. It is currently working successfully at a similar project in New Orleans.

One of the reasons that the guard does remain is simply that the residents, especially the elderly, feel far more comfortable with a human being guarding the doorway, whether or not he or she is proven to be effective. This becomes more evident in light of the continual dissatisfaction with the guards. In spite of a sentiment that "each company is worse than the others," the people just won't be without them. However, the more interesting question of stability in the case of the hired guards lies not in the ability of a guard to exist, but rather in maintaining the same guard company for a reasonable time period. To this question the NCHA dollars add little weight.

Sponsors are generally valued for their community prestige and organizational experience. The NCHA's presence did not really figure in meaningfully in the hired guard situation. And in the other patrols the presence of the well-known and citizen organization-prone CPP was
unable to stabilize the efforts, despite their full support for lobby monitors and at least temporary support for the Milton Street patrol.

**Leadership.** As far as I could discern, there was no "charismatic" leadership in Area B. Certainly there were respected individuals, usually decision-makers in CPP, who, like Landon and Rodriguez, worked much harder than the others. Unfortunately they have become preoccupied with extant projects, or with improving CPP's image outside of the community. This has allowed less time for them to become more involved in citizen organizing.

There was also a set of persons who might be called "reluctant" leaders. This category includes Billings and Stone, two persons who have gained the trust of the residents, and who took positions of responsibility because they felt an obligation. Billings especially faced difficulties in trying to organize a population which perceived his role primarily as a spiritual and social one, not political. Therefore, he attempted to relegate as much responsibility as possible to the residents of the community in instances which would place him in a situation where the conflict in roles would appear. In projects of this sort he placed the majority of his efforts on behind-the-scenes activities and those which dealt with the external community.

Finally, William Garcia, resident of Milton Street and president of the street's citizen's organization, has not been very ambitious with plans of organizing there,
and has confined his efforts to such projects as an annual spring clean-up on the street.

This is not to say that these people were not perceived as leaders by many of the residents. The residents of Milton Street responded well to the initiative of Father Billings, for reasons of trust and religion, and to the presence of CPP which by now is an organization with "routinized" leadership. The tower monitors were aided in their scheduling tasks by the administrative capabilities of CPP management, of which Landon was a key figure. However, it was not any scheduling problem which led to the discontinuance of the volunteer monitors.

In the case of the hired guards, the leadership factor is not really an issue, due to the business nature of the situation. The advantages which accrue from a hard-working leader are fulfilled by the clerks and other paid employees of the guard company. Furthermore, the nature of a contractual agreement with the guard company lends itself more to a "decision-maker" for CPP as opposed to a "leader," charismatic or otherwise.

Unfortunately, charismatic leadership was missing from Area B and it would be difficult to assess the potential effect of such an explosive, individualistic factor. However, where dedicated leadership was present, once again the effects are diverse. In one case the hired manager has helped to sustain the NSP, but in other instances, the presence of such leadership has not prevented instability.
Formal Organizational Structure. CPP had formal goals and objectives, lines of authority, and it was a legally incorporated entity. There was little question of its formal structure. The same has held true with every guard company. The presence of a formal contract for services between CPP and the guards also injected a standard structure to their relationship.

It is difficult to perceive the focal NSP operating in a similar manner without the structure described above. If nothing else, CPP's structure assures the existence of a conduit for the NCHA funds to reach the guard company and thereby secure that the services continue.

CPP also served in effect as the structure for the volunteer lobby monitors (recall that the monitors operated before the tenants' council began). Unfortunately, the monitors did not survive, in spite of the existence of the formal structure. With the eventual creation of the tower tenants' council, more formal structure was "added" to the focal NSP in the town. This structure, however, may have been a factor in leading to the frequent change in guards. By creating a formal structure which represented the tenants, grievances were collected more efficiently and guard companies were dismissed on the basis of client dissatisfaction. (More will be said on mechanisms of citizen input in the second section of this chapter).

Thus, in three cases the presence of formal structure has affected stability in three different ways. In the
first case, it could not save the volunteer NSP from extinction, and in the final case, the injection of more structure may indeed be a factor in creating resource instability.

Lack of structure, on the other hand, was a factor in the Milton patrol, lending it its ad hoc nature. In fact, this was the entire point of Father Billing's efforts, once he realized that such endeavors existed; that is, he wanted to formalize the structure of the patrol--give it an official corps of members, formalize its goals and objectives, obtain official recognition, and create standard lines of authority and procedure. When the efforts of Billings ceased, so did any hopes of stabilizing the patrol.

At best, the factor of structure can be said to have an effect, but the effect will be different in different situations. It appeared to figure predominantly in the case of the focal NSP, and also on Milton Street. It may have contributed to the resource instability of the hired guard NSP. However, it does not explain the demise of the monitors. Therefore the analytic value of this factor is highly questionable.

Regularized Operations. The lobby monitors began with regular hours. However, when the volunteers became disgruntled, the operations "destabilized." This suggests that the "real" question is why did the volunteers become disgruntled? Again, the discussion is reserved until the second part of this chapter.
The Milton Street Patrol also lacked regular operations. Here too, lay a goal of Billings' efforts. Yet in this situation, there was never among the patrollers a pretense of regular operations, as in the lobby monitors. Indeed, Milton's summer operations may suggest a different definition for NSP stability, such as an intermittent structure described by Yin. Therefore, this NSP's failure was perhaps not in its ability to continue in its current irregular state, but rather in its ability to become something else—a formal patrol.

One might guess that hired guards would be the last to be affected by this factor, at least as long as they were performing their jobs properly. However, it was the responsible performance of their jobs which caused the guards to be away from their stations much of the hour. What is more, they were encouraged to make their rounds irregularly so as not to allow a thief to expect a pattern. Unfortunately, in light of past experiences with guards who abused these conditions, and in the context of an elderly clientele which emphasizes the visibility of the guard, dissatisfaction was high. The dissatisfaction was not, of course, high enough to discontinue the guards' service; but the ill feelings caused by irregular operations manifested themselves in the frequent change in guard companies. Thus, irregular operations are another factor which may produce varying results in different situations.
Relationship to the Police. An honest appraisal of this relationship was truly difficult to gauge, at least in terms of labelling it "good" or "bad." What was announced officially and what guided actions did not always mesh. At best, the police could be designated as neutral to the hired guards, in part due to a wish to avoid confrontation with the NCHA. Thus their feelings did not enter into the matter. The lobby monitors were also viewed with neutrality probably because there was no real threat to the police, but even more likely because few knew it even operated. Furthermore, the tower patrols did not operate in the street. This appears to be an important contribution to the police neutrality, since the street is the territory over which police become most defensive, and in which they are most comfortable.\footnote{4} Thus, in the case of the building patrols, the police did not affect stability one way or the other, due to the absence of any input on their part.

The police in relation to the remainder of Area B presented a more complex situation. Station #4 was clearly under attack from the citizens, yet one of the goals of the citizens was to improve the police-community relationship--an uneasy double stance to take. There were all kinds of forces working here: the commissioner officially supported the plan to create an indigenous community patrol; the local police were wary both of the occasional vigilantism of the ad hoc patrols and of the conception of a mini-police
department; the citizens were demanding better service, yet also asking for favors such as training for their proposed guards. Irrespective of these entanglements, CPP's Security Task Force sought the approval of the police department for their Milton Street effort and "officially" they received it. There was no active police opposition, and consequently there was no pronounced negative effect. Consequently, it can at least be concluded that a neutral relationship to the police will have a neutral effect on NSP stability.

**Insurance Benefits.** During the entire period covered by the research, CPP has sought no insurance benefits in return for their employment of security guards. Therefore, this has not been a factor so far in initiating or stabilizing the NSP's.

However, at the conclusion of my research Landon informed me that he intended to look into such benefits in the near future. Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to assume that insurance benefits could encourage the continuity of the guards in years to come.

**Engaging in non-patrol activities.** With the exception of socializing, none of the patrol members participated, as a group, in any non-patrol activities. It is likely that some of the Milton Street Patrol may have helped in the Spring clean-up, but not in their capacity as peacekeepers. And of course, the hired guards performed only those duties for which they were hired. In turn, the people who were engaged in the other citizen crime prevention
activities did not patrol. The lack of this cross-over in activities appeared to have little effect on NSP stability.

Socializing, on the other hand, has also been defined as a non-patrol activity, and it was certainly an incentive for the lobby monitors to volunteer their time. It may, too, have been an incentive for the hired guards or the Milton volunteers to patrol, although my sense of this is less certain. Nonetheless, the socializing of the guards in the tower and on Claver, and the gossip of the monitors, were major factors which led to resident dissatisfaction and ultimately the instability in each case. (Guard companies were changed and the monitors' activities halted partly due to resident complaints.) This effect, then, differs from the assertions in some of the literature which claims that socializing is positively correlated with stability, although the claim that labels it a positive incentive for membership seems well-founded.

**Boredom of the surveillance routine.** There was no problem with boredom reported from the lobby monitors or the Milton patrols. There were, however, occasions when the hired guard was reported to have fallen asleep, presumably due to boredom and/or the late hours. This may have driven some men from their jobs, and was reportedly responsible for the firing of others. It has certainly been the cause of discontent with the guards, and CPP hopes that resident guards will be able to overcome the problem with a greater sense of responsibility to the community.
In this manner CPP expects that some of the discontent with the guards will be mollified, and that the resource instability of the past will be ended.

**Strong Commitment Requirements.** Excessive commitment requirements did not arise as a major factor in the decisions of those lobby monitor volunteers who decided to end their involvement. In fact, several volunteers welcomed the lobby duty as an opportunity to cope with the routine boredom of their everyday lives.

The hired security guards accepted the time requirements for different reasons. The 40 to 48 hours a week provided them with their chosen source of income, other career goals notwithstanding. Some men welcomed over-time opportunities as a way to bolster their income even further. Some of the current and potential Milton Street patrollers were concerned about the time that would be taken way from their families if the NSP were formalized, but the organizing effort never reached a point where the problem was discussed in detail.

Nevertheless, there exists a contrast toward commitment requirements held by the elderly as opposed to the Milton residents. Thus this factor, which has been viewed by the literature as a disincentive for members to continue their involvement, has varied effects on stability depending on other characteristics of the NSP, especially membership data.
Lack of Direction and Ambiguous Legal Definition.

The patrol members of Milton Street were certainly acting within a grey area of the law, if not outside it altogether. The implicit knowledge of their situation urged them to curtail their activities. Yet from an opposite perspective, this sense could have been a major factor in their desire to formalize the operations. They hoped to gain official approval of legal institutions so that they could achieve their goals with more confidence—an interesting twist on the ambiguity factor which has previously been held responsible for a general disenchantment among NSP members with patrol activities, a disenchantment that in the past has lead to destabilization.

The tower patrols did not have as much a problem with legal ambiguity as they did with a consensus of task definition and roles. Were the guards to socialize or not? When was it necessary to call the police or the manager? How authoritative, or "bossy" can one be before causing a personal affront? Who was being protected? The sometimes varying answers to these questions led to dissatisfaction with the services and eventually to destabilization. A clear definition of task and the legal bounds of the patrollers will undoubtedly be an objective in the planning for the expanded guard service.

Two points can be drawn from the above. The first is that a major source of ambiguity can lead to disenchantment—
ment with the patrol and in turn to destabilization. However, the ambiguity can also provide the impetus for the group to better define their activities, thereby stabilizing their existence.

Unfavorable Politics, Lack of Community Mandate.

There has been minimal political action from the city-wide level concerning any of the NSP's in Area B. With the exception of the police commissioner's attendance at the open meeting in Spring, 1975, there have been no visible signs of support, or disapproval, policy statements, or intervention from city officials. This differs considerably from a situation of several years ago when the North City administration intervened quite often in the affairs of community patrols, most notably in one that operated in a black public housing development. The difference between the two situations is that the latter case of intervention took place during a city-wide crisis—the race riots. Therefore the community patrols of that period were embodied in a controversy with implications far beyond the geographical boundaries of their neighborhood, a situation which demanded a policy position from the mayor's office.

Furthermore, it is likely that the deep-rooted social problems and issues of that era also accounted for the ideological conflicts surrounding the patrols as mentioned by Marx. During the sixties such a patrol was seen by some as a symbol against social repression as well as a method to guard the community against criminal assault. Controversy arose over whether or not to work with the system,
how to react towards the police, and even over what brand of political philosophy to embrace.

For the most part, this type of controversy was absent from the sentiment towards the crime prevention-oriented NSP's in Area B. Most residents seemed favorably inclined towards an NSP operating at least in "detente" with the police. There was also little question over which group was accepted as the "legitimate" representative of the community. CPP had solidified its presence if for no other reason than by its control of the Turnkey housing.

Negative politics and ideological conflict may be difficult to settle once they arise. Area B, however, is a good example which at least demonstrates that such controversy does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with NSP operations.

THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT OF NEIGHBORHOOD SECURITY PATROLS

A consideration of the variables from the NSP literature does not render a complete picture of the development in Area B. During the course of my research with the NSP's, other elements relevant to their continuity and behavior emerged. Perhaps overlooked in previous investigations, these variables require an understanding of the community in which the NSP is formed, an understanding which ventures beyond the organizational factors of the "group," and recognizes other participants in addition to the police and the members of the patrol.
The total community context can be a limitless concept. It includes the organizational factors from the literature, the behavior of the sponsor and the police, geographic considerations and much more. It encompasses an intricate network of individuals and institutions, each of which might affect the stability of the NSP in question. In this paper I have been primarily concerned with the participants in the community environment. (See Chart 2 for principal participants). The way in which they respond to each other and to the factors above seemed to provide the more powerful impact on the stability and ultimately the general behavior of NSP's. There are three elements of this response which I have identified by merging my field experience with the intellectual framework of the community environmental literature:

1) The status of the NSP in the general scheme of the community and/or the sponsor;

2) The efficiency of the mechanisms which collect and process community input;

3) The ability to match the technology to the social patterns of the service recipients.

The chapter closes with a discussion of the impact of participant behavior on the stability of the NSP's. By examining the three determinants of interests, role perceptions, and definitions of the situation, a more global perspective is attained. In addition to an application of this outlook to the above three elements, other examples
PRINCIPAL INTERVIEWEES AND THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THIS STUDY

Casas Por Puertorriquenas (CPP) and Area B.

Ellen Jackson - Social Worker on Claver Street.
Bart Landon - Manager of CPP housing.
Ann Rodriguez - Executive Director of CPP.
Father Billings - St. John's Church, Chairman of CPP's Security Task Force.
Rico Himanez - Counselor at St. John's Church, member of CPP's Security Task Force.
Bill Cott - Vice President of the Elderly Tower's Tenants Council, Chairman of the Council's Security Committee.
William Garcia - Vice President of ECH/DC-DI Board, President of Milton Street Citizens' Organization.
Jack Reade - Member of CPP's Security Task Force.
Julia Brown - Former Chairperson of Grass Roots Task Force.
Loretta Stone - President of El Torre Tenants' Council.

North City Police Department.

Commissioner Manetti - North City Police Commissioner.
Joe Forrest - Police-community services officer for Station #4, formerly assigned to Area B.
Deputy Superintendent MacDonald - Station #4.

Safety Guard Company.

Jordan - Supervisor for Safety Guard Co.
Howard B. - Night guard for El Torre.
are given of the relation between participant behavior and NSP stability in Area B.

The Status of the NSP in the General Scheme of the Community and/or the Sponsor.

The general scheme of the community is comprised of two fundamental perspectives. First, the community's long-range, guiding goals have shaped the form of the NSP's in the study and affected their stability. These goals need not be written or formal in order to be prominent or generally accepted, yet their effect can be decisive in either case. 5 I have enumerated three community goals which have had a pronounced effect on the stability of the NSP's. They include plans for greater manpower development, a neighborhood-wide comprehensive security patrol, and the desire to see a fully participating citizenry.

The second perspective looks at strategic considerations of the community. The "timing" of organizational efforts in regard to other local events can affect the acceptance of an NSP into the community. In Area B three strategies affected NSP stability. One involved the plans of CPP's leaders to initiate a stronger citizen organizing effort once the new housing, currently under construction, was occupied. The second was more closely related to the issue of NSP's and involved CPP's search for a funding source with which to operate its fledgling guard force. The third dealt with the effort to organize the elderly at a time
when the tower residents were more concerned with acclimating themselves to their new environment.

The long range plans of CPP have given the concept of security guards a special status in Area B. An emphasis on manpower development has been a continual incentive to hire resident guards and "keep the money in the neighborhood." This condition has been directly responsible for the recent change in guard companies to one which was willing to hire resident guards and "keep the money in the neighborhood." This condition has been directly responsible for the recent change in guard companies to one which was willing to hire locals. It is also in part responsible for Landon's readiness at any time to switch resources once again, but this time to implement an indigenous force operated by CPP itself.

Garcia (ECH-DC-DI Board) and Landon (CPP's Housing Manager) both described visions of a comprehensive neighborhood security force. The guard at CPP has only been the first step. Because it is the first step, Landon may have paid special care to see that residents are satisfied with the concept. If the guard were allowed to fail the long-range plans would face a setback.

The community shares the concerns of these two men. The guard concept is popular, the concern over neighborhood security has indeed spread. For example, there was no official NCHA policy for security guards at a project like that on Claver Street (as there was such a policy for the tower). Therefore, the move to install a guard there, even
if part-time, could easily be interpreted as a further step towards total coverage. The security task force, the trial run of the lobby monitors, and the outgrowth of social programs aimed at crime prevention are all part of the comprehensive security scheme.

Yet there is a third goal that takes on an even broader comprehensive view. All of the CPP personnel with whom I spoke are committed to the ideal of a totally cohesive, educated, politically aware and highly participatory citizenry; in short, one committed to greater autonomy. In a sense, the Spanish in Area B have always been isolated by virtue of their language and culture, and now they want to be self-sufficient. To own and operate a private security force would give them control over an essential part of society, the official source of coercion and sanctions. There is no doubt in my mind that the people who are CPP have a long-term vision of a "self-contained community," where their dependance on the outside world, including the police, is limited. As students and practitioners of community organization, they are fully aware of the political or catalytic worth of the safety issue. Security concerns can build a base of participation. Furthermore, such an organizational goal is double-edged, since a community with a heightened awareness of its own existence will surely be a safer community. In the Roxbury section of Boston it is said,

The most important factor in neighborhood self-defense against crime can't be bought with all the LEAA funds in the country. It's an attitude.
It's the feeling that someone besides you cares when a thief breaks into your house, or cares if you are attacked on the street. It's the feeling of responsibility for the whole community.

A second vital perspective is of a strategic nature. CPP's central strength, already proven in past campaigns, was in housing. It was poor housing which catalyzed the surge in citizen activism of nearly a decade ago. The Villa Unidad is a new group of federally-funded housing which is set to be opened in the coming year. Garcia explained that this opening will produce greatly accentuated interest in community affairs, throughout the community, especially among the residents of the new facilities. He and Landon agree that it is best to delay the plan of the CPP-operated, community-funded security force until the new dwellings are inhabited; thus the decision to hire an interim security company (Best Security) was made before taking the major steps of the plan.

Garcia was also convinced that the impending housing occupancy was in part responsible for the failure of the Milton Street effort to gain momentum. Many of the street's residents were destined to be relocated to the new housing. Most realized that the dilapidated apartment buildings which they lived in would in the coming years be torn down as had other nearby housing. Thus, despite positive response to Billings' straw poll, the residents were looking beyond their current situation to one of better promise and to something more worthwhile to protect. CPP's executive
director, Rodriguez, shared Garcia's perceptions. She felt that even if a successful NSP could be organized, the re-location of some of its members would weaken the group. Too many times have the residents been "organized" by an enthusiastic practitioner, only to have the effort fizzle out after a few months. Therefore it was the feeling of Garcia and Rodriguez that it is better to wait a few months in order to work with a more stable population, and one with a stronger feeling of property.

Another strategical issue dealt with CPP's initial motivations for supporting the organizing efforts on Milton Street. The chance that LEAA money might be available to help run CPP's own NSP was partly contingent on CPP's ability to run a prototype volunteer patrol. Milton Street may have been considered by CPP at one time as the site for this prototype. However, when the money became unavailable, the backing for the Milton patrol may have diminished.

'Bad timing' could also explain the demise of the lobby monitors, as described in the case study. In this case, which occurred soon after the tower was occupied, it was the acclimitization to the new environment which may have pre-occupied the tenants, lessening their concern for community participation. The elderly, many of whom were separated from each other by a language barrier, were getting to know new neighbors, getting accustomed to their new physical environment, and beginning to take advantage of the social services and other facilities which were available. The
lobby monitor effort was simply premature. (Admittedly this was an elderly population comprised of a large number of non-English speaking persons, but it might be interesting to see if this same acclimitization ordeal has a negative effect on CPP's imminent plans.)

Thus, when one analyzes an NSP as an integral part of other neighborhood schemes, one can discover important forces which shape NSP behavior. In this case, the more comprehensive plans and strategies were in part responsible for the continued presence of a hired security guard, yet simultaneously they discouraged maintaining a single company. Additionally, these perspectives lend insight into the destabilization of the Milton Street patrol and the lobby monitors. And lastly, the comprehensive and strategic viewpoints elucidate the motivation behind the continued support for the expanding security scope in the parcel.

The Efficiency of the Mechanisms which Collect and Process Community Input.

All community services possess mechanisms which they use to collect and process citizen or client input. They may be quite informal and unofficial, resulting from everyday individual interactions, or they may be quite formal, taking on the character of public hearings, surveys, or special programs. Furthermore, once the input is collected, it may be processed and responded to efficiently, or just ignored, or the response may fall somewhere between these
two extremes. This section describes two basic kinds of mechanisms which exist in Area B. One dealt with collecting feedback on crime and security in the parcel. The other mechanisms were represented by the instances in which CPP acted as a "broker" for individual initiative on community matters.

In Area B there was a particular characteristic of the decision-makers which formed a crucial link in this "processing" of community input. Landon, Garcia, Rodriguez and undoubtedly most of the other CPP leaders were highly committed to the value of citizen participation. Therefore, as leaders they tended to be especially responsive to citizen feedback. It is perhaps this responsiveness which has resulted in the short-lived nature of the hired security companies; that is, it may have been translated into an over-eagerness to react to the tenants' complaints and respond with the frequent contract changes.

What are the mechanisms which CPP uses to collect citizen input? To begin, nearly all of their employees reside within the parcel boundaries—not so strange for a community organization. But what may differentiate this neighborhood from others is the close primary bonds of the Puerto Rican majority, deriving from extensive family ties as well as from the fact that many emigrated from the same town on the Island. Thus primary ties may exist in abundance directly between the service recipients and the leaders.
In addition to these mechanisms, there developed several formal ones which created channels for resident representatives to supply the feedback to the leaders. Landon met with elderly tower council officials Cott and Stone once a week, a practice which provoked such responses as the curtailment of the tower guard's duties (especially the ones which kept him away from his post). Ellen Jackson acted quite often as an ombudsman for the residents of Claver Street, and maintained a casual phone communication with the management office on Elmdale. Her repeated observations that the guard "didn't do anything" contributed to the decision to dismiss Safety Guard.

At least one important impact is that all of these instruments thus far have made it quite clear to Landon, et al that some form of security guard is desperately needed, and although NCHA money makes the funding of the guards possible (at least for now), the sentiment of the people assures that guards are preferred over other forms of security, (e.g., exclusively hardware or social programs). The flow of feedback also serves as a reminder that those not in NCHA housing also seek protection. When the CPP Task Force sponsored the open meeting in April 1975, the desire and support for a neighborhood-wide system was made evident. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the feedback can help to resolve conflict among the participants by identifying areas of dissatisfaction. (In the past, it has often been client dissatisfaction which has led to the resource insta-
bility). Of course, merely identifying these conflicts does not guarantee that they will be resolved, but surely it is an improvement over a situation where persons may be unaware that the conflict exists at all!

Mechanisms for gathering and processing input from citizens are not the only type which are important. The lines of communication between provider and client are significant as well. Mr. Jordan related to me that after the initial contract was closed, he and Landon maintained only irregular contact. However, communications between Landon and Cott, and between Landon and Jordan were for awhile quite sufficient, at least during the decision to keep the guard away from his post less often, and during another incident when Jordan's decision to use an attack dog was later overruled. To support this communication, occasionally Jordan spoke directly with Cott.

On other issues, however, ideas were not traded (i.e. feedback was lacking) and the result was unresolved conflict and dissatisfaction with services. The most notable example was with the guard on Claver Street. Jordan's conception that the guard was stationed there only to protect the people from dangerous street criminals was significantly at odds with that of CPP (especially Jackson and Landon) who expected equal if not most of the effort to be applied towards enforcement of the project rules, and maintaining order on the street. That Jordan should expect something so different from his men than that expected by CPP, was deemed by Landon
to be "typical of how Safety Guard works and is exactly why we got rid of them." It did not help matters when Cott and Jordan developed a mutual personal dislike for each other, so that communications were further hampered. This breakdown led to the aggravation of less severe issues. Guards socializing too often, or skipping some of their rounds, was not always reported to Jordan, and as a result he failed to reprimand his employees. In the current negotiations with Best Security Company, Landon and Cott have recognized this communication deficiency and intend to include assurances for regular feedback sessions, as well as a written, specific set of guard duties and guidelines for behavior.

The well-founded desires for greater security in the community have taken the form of action mainly through the efforts of a handful of individuals. These people, like Father Billings, Jack Reade, Bill Cott, Loretta Stone, and Ellen Jackson each have a special area of interest in crime prevention. They have the additional and possibly decisive encouragement to act from a citizen organization which is eager to act as a forum or "broker" for their involvement. Certainly Reade's maneuvers on the issue of lighting have been raised in stature when undertaken under the aegis of the CPP Security Task Force. Stone's and Cott's attempts to educate the elderly on security methods would have been difficult without the platform of the Tenants' Council. And of course, the creation of CPP's Security Task Force has been the ideal channel for other residents to orient their
efforts toward security matters. The presence of CPP as a broker for community initiative has buttressed the effect of the goals of the preceding section which were aimed at expanding the scope of citizen crime prevention activities in Area B.

Mechanisms for gathering information and resolving conflict can be efficient, as in CPP's relations with the tenants, or inefficient, as with CPP's relations with Safety First. Yet no hard and fast rule is implied that efficient mechanisms make for stable NSP's. In some cases, an overly responsive (i.e. efficient) group may be the eventual cause of such instability. One might ask how much responsiveness, if any, should be traded if need be to assure a more stable NSP. The answer to this requires more information than is available. In order to weigh the two alternatives, one needs a precise determination of the ills of instability, and of the importance of responsiveness to other organizational objectives. In practice, the answer is a value judgment and lies outside the scope of this paper.

The Ability to Match the Technology to the Social Patterns of the Service Recipients.

Were some altruistic individual or institution to decide to try to increase the protein supply for the people of India, he or she would not suggest that the cows be slaughtered for their high protein content. This would be
an extreme example of a mismatch of the technology to the social patterns of the people.

For the purposes of this study, technology will be taken to mean the methods, skills, techniques or resources used to perform a service or accomplish an objective. The social patterns will be broadly defined to encompass the attitudes, capabilities, and lifestyles of the people. A mismatch, or conflict, between these two elements, will affect the stability of a program when the conflict leads to a fundamental change in the technology employed by that program.

Normally, the technology is more conducive to directed change than are the social patterns of the community. If this is true, then three situations may occur which are of interest to the practitioner. If the technology is at odds with the social patterns of the community, then it may change to lessen the conflict. On the other hand, if the technology remains at odds, then it is likely that a feeling of discontent or dissatisfaction will be generated in the community, or else the technology may operate with reduced effectiveness (in the protein example, few would eat the meat of a sacred cow and the program would be ineffective). The third alternative is that the technology may evolve from the start to suit the community's needs and thus avoid the conflict.

The first situation is evident in the case study in three places. After the incident when the tower guard was beaten in the parking lot, an attack dog was implemented,
but later removed when the residents complained. Essentially, their complaints stemmed from the development that the guard was no longer accessible as a "socializer." Many of the elderly are lonely or have trouble sleeping at night, and therefore often interpret the guard as someone to keep them company. The dogs growled if the residents came too close to the guard, thereby eliminating the guard as someone with whom a resident could have a friendly discussion.

The nature of the people in the tower has also defined for Jordan, the supervisor, the type of personality to station in the lobby. The original guards were reported to have been somewhat gruff, discourteous, and unsympathetic to the needs of the elderly. But the residents of the tower are a special lot. Several are alcoholics and rarely a night goes by without a minor incident or complaint. Police officer Forrest goes so far as to say they're all "kooks." Irrespective of this lack of compassion, the residents present special problems to a security guard, and the two guards with whom I spoke were good-natured, young, soft-spoken, almost meek individuals, although they were firm enough when they had to be. Both men were relatively new recruits, and Jordan, the Safety Guard supervisor, led me to believe that they were hired in order to meet the special demands of an elderly clientele.

The third example of the technique changing to meet the social patterns of the people was the decision to curtail the guards' duties at the tower. The elderly are a people
inordinately fearful of crime, and to combat this mental state the visibility of the guards was crucial. Thus, the guards now spend more time at their station in the lobby.

These three instances are examples in which the conflict between the technology and the social patterns was resolved, and in which lingering dissatisfaction was avoided. This is not always the case. With other aspects of the patrols in Area B, the technology did not always complement the social patterns and peculiarities of the people. The resulting friction has contributed to the recurrent change of resources. Often, the change was a result of scapegoating the guards by the residents and Landon; they blamed the ills of the system on the guards. Nevertheless, many of those ills were derived from the mismatches that follow.

The prime example of this mismatch was the case of the intercom, a security technique which simply was not well-suited to the elderly residents of El Torre, at least without a special educational effort. Another problem developed around the question of whether the guard should socialize to such a degree with the tenants. This issue was raised at both the tower and the Claver locations. The complaint was that this prevented the guard from performing his duties properly. Yet there were never any guidelines for the guards that suggested to them to behave otherwise, and the guard, being stationed out in the open in the lobby was particularly vulnerable to talkative tenants.
In the instance where the technology is performed by people, sometimes the social patterns of the performers does not mesh well with the technology. The most notable example involved the night shift guard. One weekend each month he served with the National Guard, and by Sunday night he is so tired he continually falls asleep on the job, yet Jordan has not replaced him for those times. Sleeping guards have always been a major complaint of the tenants and of Landon. In fact, one of their motivations for preferring resident guards may be interpreted as a move to take advantage of the everyday social pressures of the community, who, as neighbors as well as the protected, might insure that the guard stays awake to save face in front of family and friends.

The final example of mismatches arises from the inability of any of the guards to speak Spanish (or Chinese, for that matter). In a job which comes in close contact with so many Spanish-speaking people every day, this inability to communicate is far too reminiscent of the situation with the police, and presents another motivation for hiring local talent who are likely to be bi-lingual.

Finally, there are two examples in Area B of the situation where the technology has evolved to suit the patterns of the residents. Both examples involve the allocation of resources, an important component of technology, and both explain the intermittent character of some of the NSP's.
In CPP's case the resources are money and manpower. On Claver Street where funding is at a minimum, the people at CPP have efficiently matched this schedule to the times when the people are most often on the streets in large numbers. The residents are simply more likely to sit on their stoops in the cool evening hours of the summer. This is also when they most need the protection. The people on Milton Street until this fall lacked a strong organizing influence, and therefore best matched their propensities for involvement to an ad hoc approach to patrolling. The reason that these two examples have been cited is that they present an interesting challenge to the value of stability. Although neither NSP operates regularly and year round, they do so because a realistic assessment of their resources necessitates it. Just the same, the patrols can be said to exist in spirit during "off" periods, and therefore their "instability" does not have a considerable impact on their effectiveness.

An important thought which emerges from this element of the community context is that all "technology-social pattern" mismatches do not lead to instability. Although all mismatches or conflicts do tend to lead to change, some change may be minor. In CPP's case the fundamental change in resources occurred when the inability to resolve the conflict led to general dissatisfaction with the service.
Participant Behavior. A methodological strain which has characterized the whole of the research has been the concept of participant behavior. This approach, which admittedly leans towards a global theory, is premised on the thought that the behavior of organizations can best be analyzed by understanding the behavior of the individuals of the organization and its environment. It has its roots in literature which touches on behavioral psychology, and organizational and political behavior.

Three determinants of the behavior of individuals interacting with one another have been identified. They provide the underpinnings which link the variables discussed in this work to the behavior of the participants. They are:

1) Interests, or What do I (or the institution) have at stake?

2) Role Perceptions, or, What is expected of me (or the institution) and by whom?

and 3) the Definition of the Situation, or, What is the problem, what is happening here, and why?

The three determinants are not always inseparable, and indeed sometimes merge or incorporate each other. For instance, sometimes the role of the participant is what is at stake, or the interests of the parties may be at the root of the problem. Taken together, they form the basis for behavior.

The presence of these determinants permeates all facets of the case study. The definition of the crime
problem, that is, whether the problem is drugs, street violence, vandalism, public drinking, or rowdy youths, will determine which programs receive emphasis; the fear of the elderly, and their physical infirmities are both definitions of the situation and role perceptions; Safety Guard has a relatively unambiguous interest in profits or at least in cutting costs (although at times they may take on marginally profitable jobs as favors or for the sake of expansion or increased publicity); Jordan, the supervisor, Jackson, the social worker, maintained differing role perceptions of the purpose for the Claver Street guard. The behavior of community leaders is always important. Their perspective of a comprehensive plan for community development and maximum citizen participation is a definition of the situation which has assured continuity of several programs. Their perception of the residents to be a familial, gossipy people encourages them to seek peer pressure as a responsibility-inducing agent for the future indigenous guard.

The relationship with the police abounds with examples of these determinants. Their behavior overall of the aspects of their service is extremely complex, and inappropriate to this analysis; but their response to the violent street crime and heavy drug traffic of Area B follows classic lines. They seek to maintain order and control in the streets. They hope to do so with as little "boat-rocking" as possible. Their emphasis in these matters is strongly on the side of catching criminals and putting them in jail, when this does
not interfere with the above long range goals. The commissioner's approval of NSP's has been forged from public relations considerations and probably political pressure from the mayor's office; but the sentiment of lower officers and even Deputy Superintendent MacDonald, departs from this view. Through a sense of territory and a defense of their role as the sole retainers of the legitimate source of coercion, the lower level police urge residents not to intrude in such a manner, to be content with reporting crimes and being willing to act as witnesses. Furthermore, some of the patrolmen rely on collecting over-time pay, a benefit which is decreased with the advent of an NSP.

The people may contradict these perceptions, definitions, and interests in other ways as well. For instance, residents' definition of the situation leaves them afraid to testify for fear of recrimination. Because of possible family or friendship ties to the drug scene, some simply wish it would be moved to another area.

The above examples have appeared previously, as evidence to support the sundry variables which have already been identified. Yet there have been other notable examples of these determinants, and although they have not fallen so neatly under previous rubrics, they are equally valuable insights to individual behavior which have affected NSP stability in the parcel. For instance not all clergymen in the city have taken such an active interest in community security, but Father Billings believes that it is the
calling of the Episcopalian Church to help organize the citizenry to the benefit of the parish, and then subside as the people take on a more active part. Billings has had a special interest in the arson issue, since an inordinate number of fires in that quadrant of the city have claimed churches. Over the last few years, he has come to be recognized by Deputy MacDonald as filling the role of the only legitimate community liaison. His good relationship with the police at least has lessened friction with the patrol efforts. The action on the part of the police in preventing future fires was based both on their definition of this crime as "serious", and of their respect for Father Billings and his church.

Ellen Jackson has also affected NSP stability with her somewhat special definitions. Afraid of being linked with undercover narcotics police, she prefers having local residents as guards. It is the stranger or hired guard which makes the dope pushers suspicious. Her feelings make a strong case for those who believe that residents who know the neighborhood and are familiar to its inhabitants are better equipped to handle many of its problems.

The quandry surrounding Rico (the church counsellor) represented a situation fraught with various perceptions and definitions, and was a significant factor in the decision of Rodriguez et al, to ask Father Billings to postpone his plans for organizing the Milton Street NSP. Landon and Rodriguez still saw Rico as a radical. They also claimed
to be getting some negative feedback from the residents on his sometimes abrasive and over-confident manner. Rico claimed he was reformed. His organizational efforts were now an "organ of God." Father Billings very strongly believed in the redemption of the Church and backed Rico's presence all the way. Furthermore, Rico posed a threat to CPP's policies, perhaps an unrealistic one, but Rodriguez, Landon and Garcia (who was once a "radical" himself not long ago) reacted to protect their interests. The differences in ideology are not important enough to discuss in detail, but they involved the emphasis on the "lower class poor," that is, the people who in Rico's words, "need the most help."

That such diverse ideological, personal, and theological views can permeate the atmosphere of an NSP only serves to emphasize the importance of an outlook which encompasses the total community context. There may be more elements, or variables, some more specific, others more general, than those outlined in this paper. It is my expectation that an examination of the behavior of the participants, with special regard for the three determinants outlined previously, will help uncover those additional variables.
CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH
The complaint that planners' plans are not effectuated has sunk to the level of cocktail party jokes. Such jokes are usually met with a wry smile and perhaps the added wisdom that failure to carry out the plans is the result of human frailty, irrational politics, and bureaucratic pigheadedness. Only a few might venture to suggest that possibly the style of planning, in which they customarily engage is inappropriate to the medium--the societal context--through which planning has to work.  

- John Friedmann 

To the community practitioner interested in NSP stability, the community context must now become a focal concern. Until now, the emphasis in the literature for stability-inducing factors has centered on organizational facets. Taken without an understanding of the crucial environmental variables, however, these factors are insufficient to explain predict or mold the stability of an NSP.

This chapter provides the practitioner with a framework on which to base his investigation of the community. The framework covers the particular variables of the preceding chapter, yet is open-ended in order to accommodate the complexities of any community. This is followed with a brief discussion of the key concern of NSP's--their resources--and what can be learned about them from this study. The chapter closes by raising some doubts about the value of stability in community organizations.

The community context can aid the practitioner in assessing the suitability of a particular NSP mode in a given community, or in predicting the stability of one already operating. Given the variables identified in the preceding
chapter, the practitioner might therefore ask him or herself the following questions:

a) What other kinds of citizen groups are there in the neighborhood and how have they been organized?

b) Is there an overall plan for organization of the neighborhood or of the sponsor? If so, where does (would) an NSP fit in? How might other objectives of the sponsor affect the implementation of the NSP?

c) What kind of mechanisms, formal or informal, exist to encourage and/or process community input?

d) What is the "organization-set" of the focal organization and what is the nature of the relationship?

e) In general what are the interests, role perceptions, and definitions of the situation of the major participants?

f) What are the social patterns and networks which might affect the implementation of an NSP, or in turn be affected by its technology?

The last question is the most difficult and time-consuming question to answer. To "know your community" is by no means a simple task since the networks are intricate and "the patterns of relationships vary with each problem selected." Furthermore, Emery and Trist have introduced the concept of "turbulence." This refers to the dynamic nature of contemporary environments where individual and collective actions result in unpredictable consequences for any third party (or focal organization). Some may be amplified beyond expectation, and others may attenuate. The complexity and
unpredictability of the community social environment require that the practitioner approach this aspect of planning using an ad hoc and heuristic model. Schon states that "our solutions must... be self-transforming learning systems." 4 Perlman recognizes that the task of relating a service to the environment can be a full-time job, 5 while Friedmann stresses that,

Mutual learning involves a symbiosis of policy analysis and client groups that should go beyond a single interaction and extend to a continuing relationship. 6

The implications for planners is that an accurate portrayal of the community, vital to understanding an NSP's stability problems, is a continuous task whose conclusions may change over time. To expect a community to stagnate once a program has been initiated is to invite instability of that program to occur.

An observation which was noted in the first chapter and has been substantiated in the findings is the crucial position held by an NSP's resources in characterizing its stability. Of primary concern to CPP was the source of money which it used to purchase the other crucial resource: manpower. The focal NSP possessed a reliable source of funding, a formal structure, a sponsor, and a community mandate based upon fear of rising crime. However, a cursory examination of the two other local NSP's reveals that each of those factors, except the money, was also represented in one group or the other, and yet neither was able to sustain
its operations. Therefore, the presence of a reliable and flexible source of funds can be concluded to be an exceptionally strong indicator of continued survival; however, until studies are performed where money is present without the accompanying variables mentioned above, one can assume that only when the financial support is enhanced does it ensure the outcome of survival.

This conclusion should be of good use to policy-makers in the field of criminal justice. Since one of their primary concerns may be the potential funding of a particular NSP, the presence of those four factors should assure the program's continuance.

Unfortunately, the survival of a program does not ensure its stability in the broader sense. In light of the existence of some form of instability in all of the NSP's of this study, serious doubt is raised as to the ability of any NSP to attain overall stability.

This observation necessarily raises the single most important question which has not been answered by this study; that is, "How important is stability?" The literature has linked it with the effectiveness of the group, and I accepted this assumption at the outset of my research. However, certain contingencies in the community might transform an unstable patrol into the most attractive entity possible. This is the case in the intermittent, or ad hoc patrols, which seek to best take advantage of limited
resources by "shutting down" for long periods of time. A summer-time patrol which disbands when it gets cold may only be responding to the patterns of criminals who may also curtail their street activities during the wintertime. What is even more important is the responsibility undertaken by a practitioner who tries to inject stability into an NSP. As noted beforehand, communities change, so why not NSP's? Indeed, the best sign of responsive decision-makers may be that their community organizations, like the community, change over time. Thus, when fundamental changes occur in adaptation to a shifting community, the resulting instability may be a necessary evil essential to attaining a healthy program well-suited to its environment.
FOOTNOTES

Introduction


2 From a WCBV-TV produced documentary called "Crime, The War we are Losing," December 12, 1975.

3 Ibid.


5 See, for example, Howard W. Hallman, Neighborhood Control of Public Programs (Praeger Publishers, New York: 1970), p. 3.


8 Hallman, op. cit.


10 For an exposition on individual interests in collective action, see Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.: 1965) pp. 12, 21, 34.


Chapter I

1 Alan Lupo, "The Do-It-Yourself War Against Street Crime," The Boston Magazine (May, 1973), at p. 39.


3 Ibid., pp. 196-7.


5 This final period is also mentioned in Yin, et. al., Patrolling the Neighborhood Beat: Residential Patrols and Guards #R1912-DOJ (The Rand Corp., Santa Monica, California: March, 1976).

7 See, for instance, Yin, et. al., op. cit. in the description of the Burbank Mews Patrol (fictitious name) in New Orleans, which has been operating in that exclusive neighborhood since the early 1900's.


10 For a complete list of citizen crime prevention activities, see Yin et. al., op. cit.

11 Ibid.

12 Yin, op. cit. uses a typology based on differences in activity as a foundation upon which to build evaluative criteria linked to the outcomes. Though this may well prove useful, I contend that "grey areas" remained a significant problem in application of the criteria to the field of experience.

13 Marx. and Archer devised the following matrix according to relationship to police:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Police</th>
<th>Encouragement or Non-Interference</th>
<th>Opposition or Suppression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Self-Defense Group</td>
<td>Type I</td>
<td>Type II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental</td>
<td>Type III</td>
<td>Type IV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 This refers to my research with Yin, op. cit.


16 See Yin, et. al., op. cit.

Ibid., p. 230.

Lupo, op. cit., at pp. 76-77.

Heidt and Etzioni, op. cit., at p. 211.

Marx and Archer, op. cit., at p. 68.

Knopf, op. cit., at p. 48.


The idea of fundamental change should be separate from the concept of "natural change," that is, all organizations are subject to continuous change, but it is only the fundamental changes which are of interest. For a discussion of "natural change" see, Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organizations (McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York: 1967); also, Schon refers to a "loss of the stable state" in, Donald A. Schon, "Implementing Programs of Social and Technological Change," Technology Review, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass.: February 1971, p. 47.

Knopf, op. cit., at p. 51.

Ibid.

Sagalyn, et al., op. cit. at pp. 46-7.

Ibid., at p. 60.

30 Ibid., at 32.

31 Marx and Archer (1971), op. cit., at p. 68.

32 Ibid.

33 Heidt, op. cit. at p. 216.

34 Heidt and Etzioni, op. cit. at p. 217.

35 Heidt, op. cit. at p. 213.

36 Kakalik, op. cit.

37 This refers to my research with Yin, op. cit.


39 Heidt, op. cit., at p. 214.


42 No "mandate" is ever necessarily permanent, or even real, as one can judge from the drama surrounding the Nixon debacle.


46 Emery and Trist, op. cit., at p. 21.


51 Also included in the community context according to some authors can be the SES of the residents, or a general demographic quality such as "urbanism" or other factors; see Dennis J. Palumbo and Oliver P. Williams, "Predictions of Public Policy: The Case of Local Public Health," in Urban Affairs Quarterly 2, no. 4 (1967), pp. 75-92.
Chapter II


2. I worked during the summer of 1975 on a project with Dr. Robert Yin of the Rand Corp., under Phase I of a National Evaluation Program for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. See, Robert Yin, Mary Vogel, Jan Chaiken, and Deborah Both, Patrolling the Neighborhood Beat: Residential Patrols and Guards (The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.: March, 1976). #R1912-DOJ.


4. These three determinants are explained in more detail in the second phase of the Methodology and also in the Chapter on Findings.


7. This was an occasional problem in the research for Yin. Given only a few days to investigate a group, we relied on the judgment of the patrol coordinator to suggest a member of whom we could ask further questions, but were usually steered to a staunch supporter of the group or someone who espoused only non-controversial views.

9 See Schatzman, op. cit. at pp. 91-92. Here the authors claim that if a judicious (but not critical) interpretation is not preferred, and if only 'nice' things are said about the host and their activities, then the honesty and integrity of the researcher may be subject to question.


11 See Toby Radasky's thesis on NSP's and citizen participation available in M.I.T. archives.


13 See Schwartz, ibid. at pp. 350-352 on affective participation. Also, see Gans, op. cit., at pp. 342-343 on identification.


Chapter III

1 The purpose of this section is not to present in detail the entire history and organizational intricacies of Area B and CPP. That was not what I set out to do. I wanted to gain some general background of the people I spoke to, so that my questions would be relevant, and my interpretations less likely to be incorrect. The information was compiled from four main sources:

a) A pamphlet put out in 1973 by the Housing and Community Research group of a private planning firm which had been working with community development corporations in North City,


c) An interview with a planning consultant who was actively involved in formulating the plan for Area B. Our discussion focused on the development of ECH as a representative group and its successes and pitfalls in organizing a community to fight for the right to a stable neighborhood.
d) Exerpts from other interviews, especially Bart Landon, manager for ECH, Ann Rodriguez, executive director for CPP, and William Garcia, vice president of the ECH DC/DI Board.

For the most part official socio-economic data has been avoided in this research. This was due to the inaccuracy of the data that could be obtained. First, Area B was smaller than the census tract; second, the block-by-block data was from 1970, and due to the rapid development of the community since then, these figures were probably not accurate.

The age of the housing in the neighborhood was widely variant. It ranged from early 20th century row-houses to modern high rise public housing. Of the 408 households under CPP's management, 36% are Hispanic, 20% are Black, 36.5% are white, and 7.5% are Oriental. (From the CPP Housing Register, 1974). From CPP manpower records, 50% of the caseload are laborers, and the others comprise the various trades of the construction industry. Of all persons in Census Tract 705, 51% are foreign stock; 21% of the families earn below the poverty level; 14% of all persons are of the Spanish language. (From U.S. Census, 1970).

An interesting anecdote which illustrates the feelings of the Puerto Rican community took place during the final construction period of the elderly tower. It seems that the flag of Puerto Rico was raised alongside that of the United States, and the event caused a considerable hubbub around the issue of national allegiance and the use of U.S. federal dollars. The flag was later lowered to a position below that of the American flag. The identification with Puerto Rico was also an issue (a minor one) in the composition of a handbook for the tower residents, and in fact the offending statement was later stricken from the pamphlet.

From minutes of meeting between CPP's Steering Committee and the UNCL.


Ibid.

Taken from the minutes of a CPP Review Session of May 13, 1974.

CPP's Five Year Report.

Joe Forrest, NCPD, Community Services Station #4, Interview on December 11, 1975.
10 See Gerald D. Suttles, The Social Construction of Communities (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1972). In it, he cites other authors' theories as well as his own on the "causes" of delinquency.

11 The criteria used, in order of priority, were:

1. applicant who was displaced by the NCRA in order to construct this housing;
2. applicants living in the Area B area
3. emergency cases or transfers on request from the NCHA or from other ECH apartments
4. other residents of North City."

It should be noted that the selection committee chose only from a group of applicants already eligible by NCHA.

12 CPP's Five Year Report.

13 Ibid.

14 Since the monitors lasted only two months, I had no first-hand knowledge of its activities. As a result, some of the factors which guided its behavior could not always be credited to specific people.

15 Minutes of early CPP Security Task Force meeting.

16 The information on the Open Meeting was gathered from second hand accounts. Most of the specifics of the agenda were therefore somewhat vague.

17 Also, it is quite possible that some of the police opposition is instigated by the general disapproval by the patrolmen's union of any development which might decrease extra over-time opportunities.

18 Most of these household interviews were conducted in Spanish. Although I understood little of what transpired, one of my co-interviewers would translate for me as we left each apartment.

Chapter IV


Ibid.

From an interview with Leo Gulinello, Director of Security of the Boston Housing Authority.

CPP was thoroughly entrenched in the community and had many ties with the neighborhood. As there was no other significant community representative, at times the goals of CPP were nearly interchangeable with the goals of the community. When this occurs, I will refer only to the 'community.'

On the other hand, the attitudes and lifestyles of society can be extremely sensitive to changes in technology. Therefore to preserve social patterns at the expense of technology is a value judgment on my part.

It should be noted, however, that the caste system in India is slowly giving way to modern influences. From newspaper accounts, however, slowly is emphasized.


For example, the L.A.P.D. regards its job as "the protection of life and property and the preservation of order through the active repression of crime"; see, Paul Jacobs, *Prelude to Riot: A View of Urban America from the Bottom* (Vintage Books, New York: 1966).
Chapter V


2 Kramer and Specht, op. cit. at p. 17.


4 Schon, ibid., at p. 47.


6 Friedmann, op. cit. at p. 281.
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Yin, Robert, Mary Vogel, Ian Chaiken, and Deborah Both. *Patrolling the Neighborhood Beat: Residential Patrols and Guards*. Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, #R1912-DOJ.

**Articles**


Other Materials


