Israelizing Jerusalem:
The Encounter Between Architectural and National Ideologies 1967-1977

by

Alona Nitzan-Shiftan

B.Sc. in Architecture
Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, 1987

Master of Science in Architectural Studies
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Signature of Author.................................................................

Department of Architecture

August 9, 2002

Certified by.............

Mark Jarzombek
Associate Professor of History and Architecture

Thesis advisor

Accepted by.................................

Stanford Anderson
Chairman, Committee on Graduate Students
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Alona Nitzan-Shiftan

COMMITTEE

Mark Jarzombek
Associate Professor of History and Architecture
Thesis supervisor
MIT

Stanford Anderson
Professor of History and Architecture
MIT

Sibel Bozdogan
Lecturer, Graduate School of Design
Harvard University
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ABSTRACT

The victorious Israeli acquisition of East Jerusalem during the 1967 War set off industrious construction intended to turn a modernist Israeli town and an ancient Jordanian city into “a united (and indivisible)” Israeli Jerusalem. This dissertation questions the reasons and venues for the consequent architectural break with high modernism that defined the built landscape of Jerusalem between 1967 and the first political defeat of Labor Zionism in 1977. For Mayor Teddy Kollek, who aspired to legitimate Israeli rule over Jerusalem on cultural and aesthetic grounds, architects were indispensable agents. However, invited luminaries, like Louis Kahn, Bruno Zevi, Philip Johnson and Lewis Mumford, forcefully attacked Jerusalem’s modernist masterplan in favor of a spiritual and historical theme for the city. Their criticism became the catalyst for a beautification campaign that intriguingly resembled the British Mandate’s “colonial regionalism.” It also inspired younger Israeli-born architects whose quest to create an “architecture of the place” was ambivalently modeled after the Palestinian vernacular. By casting this architecture as biblical, primitive or Mediterranean, these architects emerged as interlocutors who mediated national identity into built and lived environment, culminating in Moshe Safdie’s integration of archeology, the vernacular and technology in his authorized design for the Western Wall Plaza.

Based on structural analysis, archival research and interviews with architects, planners and politicians, as well as the insights of recent literature on nationalism, Orientalism and post-colonialism, this dissertation offers the first critical account of Jerusalem’s architecture during statehood and in light of the prevailing debates in post-WWII architectural culture at large. It argues that modernist architecture geared toward the state’s values of progress and development fell short of expressing the symbolism of the Jewish nation as it emerged in post-67 Jerusalem. In this context, post-WWII architectural theory’s emphasis on Man, community, memory and place helped architects create a symbolic terrain for the mamlachtiyut project that mediated between the new state and its historical “national home.” This “localist” program for Israeli architecture, however, could hardly survive the Palestinian intifadas, during which Israeli architectural historiography retreated back into the modernist origins of Israeliness as yet uncontaminated by the conflict and the Orient. Ironically, the “architecture of the place” rendered transparent the ambiguity of the Israeli national-colonial project.

Thesis Supervisor: Mark Jarzombek
Title: Associate Professor of History and Architecture
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PREAMBLE
A celebrated 1950s poster presents Israel to prospective tourists in a sharply
dichotomized iconography. The scene on the right side of the poster depicts the
architectural gist of a Zionist settlement: cubical white public buildings, identical
horizontal windows, small white residences, red pitched roofs, and a white water tower.
The complex is framed by bright green lawns with ordered cypresses in the back and
foregrounds. Above is a blue sky. This view, the contours of which are intentionally
faded, appears as a dream receding into the calm whiteness on which the name of the new
State, Israel, is printed in bright blue Hebrew letters.

A large figure painted in transparent browns covers the left half of the poster, creating at
once an image and background. It serves as a counterpart to the whiteness on the right.
The figure is wrapped in a thin veil (presumably a tallit—a praying shawl), which gives it
a feminine feel in spite of its engagement in the manly act of blowing the shofar.
Halfway down its veil, the figure dissolves into a light brown depiction of Jerusalem’s
Walls and the Tower of David, sites symbolizing the ancient nation of Judea. The
antiquated edifices form a horizontal continuum with the white buildings on the right.
But, this continuity is interrupted by the transparent veil of the figure in brown, which
delineates a clear vertical border between the whiteness of the Zionist state and the brown
tonality of the Jewish nation.

A Labor Zionist seeing this poster would read the notion of “nation” and “state”
progressively from left to right. The brown figure, (Latin letters spell “Israel” down its
veil,) would represent the Diaspora: the person exercising the Jewish ritual of the high
holidays blows the shofar to open the heavenly gates and allow the Jewish people to ask for forgiveness and redemption. The “redemption” that Jews have longed for, this reading suggests, is, however, no longer a dream. It has come true in the form of a modernist Zionist State. Its fulfillment makes the brown diasporic figure obsolete.

But, once Israel was established, another way to read the poster emerged, one that sees “nation” and “state” simultaneously. Under this view, the brown clad figure with the shofar and the brightly colored Zionist settlement are both inseparably located in “the land of Israel.” This was the position of the mamlachtiyut—literally, kingdomhood—ideology. Significantly, however, the symbols of the ancient nation did not quite manage to fuse with those of the modernist state. The dichotomy within the poster thus came to nourish the impasse of a country trapped, as Adriana Kemp elegantly put it, by “the incongruity between the political space of the sovereign state and the cultural space of the nation.”¹ The architecture of mamlachtiyut was an effort to conceal this rift: it was to be modern and progressive, but at the same time local, authentic and timeless. It sought to cross a white/brown boundary that was not only conceptual, but also political and territorial. The line that separates the Tower of David and the Walls of Jerusalem on the left side of the poster from the water tower and white houses of the settlement on its right is the border that divided Jerusalem between Israel and Jordan for nineteen years. The removal of this border during the war of 1967 transformed Jerusalem into a testing ground where architects interacted with authentic vernacular architecture and timeless historical landscapes for the first time. It seemed as if the architecture of mamlachtiyut was finally celebrating its realization.
During the decade of 1967-1977, however, the widespread support that this project had once enjoyed was already losing ground. The Israeli project, as it is sometimes called, was not only a national enterprise, but also a colonialist one. Hence, the success of the national campaign to consolidate the spaces of the state and of the nation met its colonial complement: the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories that began the process of eroding Israel’s apparent national unity. The seam between nation and state that was laboriously being mended in the 1960s and 1970s gradually unraveled. Ironically, it was the removal of the external border between Israel and Jordan that paved the way for the emergence of an “inner” border between advocates of the “land” and advocates of the “state.” Consequently, a growing suspicion toward an “architecture of the place” by mainstream historians and critics, mainly those affiliated with the Left, destined the architecture of post-’67 Jerusalem to historiographical negligence. In what follows I intend not only to amend this oversight by studying an architectural program that dominated Israeli architectural discourse for at least three decades, but also to investigate the reasons such scholarly moratorium has been installed.²

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² Most of the data for this research is in Hebrew. All names of people and places that were not found in Latin script sources are therefore transliterated.
INTRODUCTION

David Anatol Brutzkos, Upper Līfṭa, 1960s.

Salo Hershman, Gilo, Cluster 11, 1970s.
The landscape we once regarded as pleasant suddenly became shocking in its beauty and mysterious qualities... What are we going to do with this magical city that we conquered, which is not booty, but, rather, our home? Michael Kun, 1967

After the 1967 War, Israel viewed its victorious acquisition of East Jerusalem with both excitement and bewilderment. Admittedly, Israel held the great Temple Mount and the Jewish Quarter, but the physical fabric of East Jerusalem contrasted so heavily with West Jerusalem, that it was not at all clear what the proper approach for this new Jerusalem should be. The complexities compelled Mayor Teddy Kollek to solicit international advice. But the famous Jerusalem Committee that he created, instead of giving the expected green light to the Israeli planner's vision for a united modernist city, criticized the plan's lack of vision. The criticism was so forceful that it provoked a confrontation between advocates of the state planning agencies and advocates of a more contextual architectural vision. Ultimately, the victory was with the latter, but it was not as univalent as one might expect.

In analyzing this history, this dissertation draws on archival material and contemporary literature and press coverage, as well as on extensive interviews made by the author that are treated as both historical documents and ethnographic data. This study for its theoretical voice draws on research in the fields of nationalism, Orientalism, and post-colonialism, since they provoke the type of questions that are at the heart of this study. How, for example, did modern architecture mediate the inevitable tension between the state's civic commitment to all of its citizens and the nation's prioritization of Jewish
heritage? How could a national place be defined when rival national communities contested the possession of the genius loci? How was architecture asserted against “physical planning,” the preferred discipline of the nation-building modernization project? In addressing these questions, this study offers the first critical architectural history of Jerusalem during the years of Israeli statehood as well as of national and international politics within post-WWII architectural culture.

The modernist crisis: between disciplines

In the decade between the ’67 war and the political defeat of the labor movement in 1977, two different conceptions of Israeli nationalism were competing to shape the urban landscape and image of Jerusalem. Each was affiliated with a different school of architectural modernism. The labor movement's convictions, on which the state of Israel was established, were allied with high modernism, functionalism, progress and administrative control. Alternatively, the mamlachi standpoint, which aimed to combine the values of the state with the heritage of the Jewish nation, linked itself to post-WWII developments. It emphasized memory, “man,” community, and place. The conflict between the two positions, though certainly not unique to Israel, did create one of the earliest "crises" in the modernist field. How, why, when and where was the break with high modernism thus implemented? What were the political and cultural forces that underlay this architectural shift? And how did the shift affect the politics of space in Jerusalem?

The Jerusalem story thus provides an opportunity to explore the intense affiliations between power, identity, and image as played out in the overburdened field of Israeli nationalism. Interestingly enough, yet typically, scholarship has tended to devote attention to one or the other side of the equation, but never to the transition itself. Furthermore, recent research on post-WWII architectural culture has focused primarily on the European and North American context. By and large, the nation-states that had just emerged from under colonial rule have been neglected, divulging as a result a Eurocentric disposition toward architecture and urbanism in a reconstructed postwar world.

Of course, there is no shortage of research into this time period in the discipline of Israeli Studies, but there, the emphasis is on the political aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nonetheless, the debate within Israeli Studies raised by the “new historians” has shaken Israeli academia and public opinion, and challenged the old, hegemonic, Zionist narrative. The result has been an opening up of new issues in disciplines as varied as history, sociology, political science, law and geography. The interrogation of the cultural aspects of Israeli society has also taken root and found its home in a relatively

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small, yet steadily growing, branch of critical writing to which this first study of Israeli architecture as cultural production belongs.  

The issues at stake necessitate a careful reading of a recent key collection of essays on late modernism edited by Goldhagen and Legault. They argue that the most distinctive characteristic of post-WWII architectural modernism was its "anxiety." Architects, they contend, were anxious about whether their architecture was adequate for a world altered by positive inventions in science, medicine and media. They were similarly anxious that this world had gone astray: it was too totalitarian, too commercial, too computerized, too global, and its nuclear capabilities had rendered it also too hazardous. "This anxiety," they conclude, "knew no national or local boundaries. It affected the discourse of modernism as a whole." But can such a wholesale psychologizing statement really account for the modernist experience worldwide? Was this "anxiety" similarly distributed around areas of the world that had just emerged out of European colonialism?

I suggest instead that in many postcolonial contexts, modernism and national independence went hand in hand, encapsulating not only national confidence and pride, but even bearing redeeming force. New nation-states that were either geographically distant from the world wars or benefited from their results did not develop the “anxieties” prevalent in Europe and the United States. In like fashion, once established, Israel

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marshaled the campaign of “progress and development” in order to win a place for Jews in the developed world. So confident were Israelis in the modernist narrative that when the international architectural community came to Jerusalem, their criticism was perceived as a direct attack on the principles of the State.

The consolidation of the State in the first two decades of independence, however, was already sewing the seeds of its own decline. Chapter 1 discusses undertakings such as Ben-Gurion’s *mamlachtiyut* project (a hybrid of Statehood and kingdomhood) and his recovery of the Bible as a blueprint for Jewish nationalism, which started to erode the State’s modernist foundation in favor of a more biblicized-ethnicized narrative. Most scholars agree that the resultant vulnerability of the State’s supremacy was critically shaken after the ’67 war. In the words of Zali Gurevitz and Gid’on Aran,

> The Six-Day War brought to a halt the automatic identity between the Land of Israel and the State of Israel. The [pre-’67] torn and divided Land of Israel was resurrected against the intoxicatingly victorious State of Israel. In the words of one of the pioneering settlers, “the war which brought to our consciousness the experience of the Land has caused the experience of the State to disappear as an all encompassing singular experience . . . Israel will no longer be able to conceal the Land of Israel under its wings.” The threat of rupture between “the Entire Land” and the reducing State divulged the dialectical tension between Judaism and Israeliness, and the potential for a cultural war between the two conceptions of Israeli identity…”

According to this view, the ‘historical Land’ of the Jewish Nation suddenly contradicted the previous internationally recognized borders of the Israeli State. To position the debate along these lines, one must assume the existence of two mutually distinguished camps: a political Left, faithful to the state of Israel, and a political Right, identified with the entire Land of Israel. A cultural war was thus inevitable between religious factions.

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which advocated a primarily Jewish nation, and secular sectors, that rallied for a
democratic—rather than ethnocratic—state.8 Using this societal map, leading artists and
architects would most likely be found on the civic frontier.9

While this analysis aids in an understanding of contemporary Israeli society, it falls short
of explaining the urge of secular, Labor-oriented sabra (i.e., Israeli-born) architects to
engage in the criticism of the Modern Movement (or its Labor Modernist counterpart).
Why did modern architects, who were so thoroughly identified with these values,
rigorously challenge high modernism? What drove them to seek an alternative
architectural expression?

In chapter 1, I argue that, prior to the ’67 War, the cultural weight of a secularized Jewish
nationalism within mainstream Israeliness did not yet challenge the supremacy of the
State—on the contrary, the hyphen between “nation” and “state” seemed transparent.
This was the heyday of the mamlachtiyut project, into which a generation of sabra
architects professionally matured. Their criticism of high modernism did not deplore,
however, technology or modernization as such, but focused instead on its failure to
express the notion of place, community, and national belonging. If endless waves of new

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8 For the distinction between democracy and ethnocracy, see: Oren Yiftachel, "Israeli Society and Jewish-Palestinian Reconciliation: Ethnography and Its Territorial Contradictions," Middle East Journal 51 (Fall 1997), pp. 1-16.
9 The inert tension between the ethnic self-definition of a nation and the political-territorial boundaries of the state presently unfolds in the impassionate debate surrounding whether Israel should be a State of all its citizens regardless of religion or ethnicity, or, alternatively, a Jewish State which prioritizes Jewish citizens and reinforces their endangered Jewish heritage. The debate is demonstrated through its polarization: the civic pole on the Left is advocated by post-Zionists who want to normalize the “state.” The primordial camp on the Right is beheld by neo-Zionists who insist on the primacy of the Jewish “nation.” See: Uri Ram, ""The Promised Land of Business Opportunities': Liberal Post-Zionism in the Glocal Age," in The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization, ed. Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled (Boulder: Westview, 2000).
immigrants were to turn into citizens, architects argued, they would need a built environment that would convey and nurture their sense of nationhood. In so arguing, the architects tied the familiar criticism regarding the alienating force of the modernist environment to modernism’s failure to socialize immigrants into a national form. Like their colleagues overseas, sabra architects detested the state’s “housing solutions,” aspiring instead to build “a national home.”

The dissertation explores the consequent transition from “international” to “local” architecture as underscored by a shift in rhetoric from “progressive” to “eternal” values. In advocating this move, postwar architecture helped to articulate the nation in a visual language of the timeless and visionary, rather than a language of the progressive and revolutionary. This dissertation probes the implications of this transition: its impact on architectural discourse in Israel and elsewhere, its usefulness for national purposes, and, intriguingly, its affinities with colonialist projects. The imposing presence of the international community in the planning arena that Jerusalem became further provokes the kinship between inter-war colonial ideologies and the conceptual bedrock of Cold War imperialism.

**Becoming national through architecture**

A state-controlled building market, such as the one operating in post-'67 Jerusalem, is necessarily a “top-down” operation. In it, bureaucratic and professional elites produce

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national landscapes—the dwellings and monuments that cultivate a sense of belonging to a national community, sovereign territory, and common history and destiny. As such, this architecture lends itself to the kind of analysis that pervaded studies of the national phenomenon after the publication of Hobsbawm and Ranger’s groundbreaking *Invented Traditions* of 1978. Benedict Anderson, however, significantly modified the association of “invention” with “fabrication” and “falsity,” suggesting instead a concerted emphasis on the rudimentary and creative practice of “imagining” the nation, as he articulated in his seminal *Imagined Communities* of 1983. Scholars of modern nationalism have established, indeed, that nation-states are not rooted in the primordial and distant past that they claim to possess, but are rather the result of a complex form of social organization that developed to a large extent during the 19th century. In recent years, however, scholars have stressed the limitations of the constructivist foundation on which these theories rely, stressing instead the negotiability of national constructs in the cultural field as well as the practice of other, non-Western forms of imagining the nation.

In architecture, this theoretical framework inspired studies such as Lawrence Vale’s about capital cities, and the essays compiled by Nezar Al Sayyad that explore the forms of domination that architecture produces. Particularly pertinent is Sibel Bozdogan’s emphasis on architecture as cultural production in her persuasive study of the role of

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architecture in the Kamalist Turkish project. Drawing on this research, on cultural studies that permeated the study of nationalism, and on the connection between architecture and anthropology, my more specific interest in the field of nationalism follows a question posed by Etienne Balibar: "How are individuals nationalized, or, in other words, socialized in the dominant form of national belonging?" Shifting the focus to architectural production, I am interested in the ways in which architecture was made conducive to such a process of nationalization. How did the discipline of architecture intervene in defining the nation in the built landscape through its own disciplinary operations? How was the national mandate of identifying individuals, particularly new immigrants, with a new community and place articulated through architecture? In order to understand these questions, I suggest looking at architectural production as a cultural field through which the form and content of national ideologies are negotiated and articulated.

19 This, for example, was a major theme underlying the following collection of essays: Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). See also studies in cultural geography: S. Duncan James and David Ley, *Place/Culture/Representation* (London; New York: Routledge, 1993).
21 Balibar, "The Nation Form," p. 94.
A premise of this study is therefore that architecture, by virtue of its capacity to frame the private domain of everyday life as well as to convey national narrative of state power through bodily experience in space, is a crucial participant in what Lauren Berlant defines as the “National Symbolic”:

The order of discursive practices whose reign within a national space produces, and also refers to, the ‘law’ in which the accident of birth within a geographical/political boundary transforms individuals into subjects of a collectively-held history. Its traditional icons, its metaphors, its heroes, its rituals, and its narratives provide an alphabet for a collective consciousness or national subjectivity; through the National Symbolic the historical national aspires to achieve the inevitability of the status of natural law, a birthright.22

Israeli society did indeed develop such discursive practices in order to “nationalize” a constantly changing population and territory. Its self-imposed mandate was thus twofold: firstly, a majority of new immigrants from various locales and cultures had to be transformed into “subjects of a collectively held history,” i.e., into “a people.” Secondly, a territory that was once Palestinian had to be imagined as Israeli, to be made (in 1948) and re-made (in 1967) into “a national home” that was to be the “natural” extension of the place.

To address the first part of this mandate, national ideologists relied on the common denominator of Judaism—they had to turn a religious practice into a binding ethnicity.23 But how can ethnicity “be produced in such a way that it does not appear as fiction, but as

the most natural origins?” Balibar suggested two venues, namely language and race, which Israeli nationalism, indeed, effectively exploited. The use of modern Hebrew, a language which had been dormant for 2,000 years, was the ultimate symbol of national revival, and led in due course to the emergence of a “Hebrew culture” that portrayed itself as the ultimate expression of nativeness. Similarly innovative was the rendering of race as ethnicized history. While anyone could master Hebrew, only Jews could partake in the national secularization of the Jewish religion, which was translated into an historical narrative, the bedrock of which was the bible (see chapter 1). But, the second part of the national mandate, the naturalization of an Israeli land, proved more difficult. Many obstacles impeded the process of molding the Israeli territory into “a national home” in sync with Hebrew and Jewish history.

In this regard, Greece and Turkey present a revealing comparison for in these places history, ethnicity and architecture were also often negated in an effort to define a sense of place and national identity. According to Michael Herzfeld’s illuminating anthropological account, Greece defined its history vis-a-vis both Europe, of which it aspired to be a cultural cradle, and Turkey, a country whose architectural presence in Greece was conspicuous, but from which Greece tried to distance itself. In so doing,

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24 Balibar defines “fictive ethnicity” as follows: No nation possesses an ethnic base naturally, but as social formations are nationalized, the populations included within them, divided up among them, or dominated by them are ethnicized – that is, represented in the past or the future as if they formed a natural community, possessing in itself origins, culture and interests which transcend individuals and social conditions. See Balibar, “The Nation Form,” p. 96.


26 Herzfeld, A Place in History. Herzfeld studies architecture in a Cretan town as the privileged terrain for the encounter between social time—the unpredictable time of social encounters, and monumental time—the “reductive and generic” time that nation-states require.
Greece strengthened its location on the fringes of Europe by embodying the Western culture's privileged classical heritage rather than the Orient's otherness. Such self-positioning through selective history was performed on the cusp of both the favorable Western border of Europe and the menacing Oriental border of the Middle East. By way of contrast, Bozdogan demonstrates that modern Turkey had to negotiate its national project primarily with respect to its own reputed Oriental past. As a result, its most complex “border” condition was an internal one: the Kemalist modernization project was first and foremost based on the negation of Turkey’s Ottoman past, resulting in a very early implementation of modern architecture as a national style.27

In a similar fashion to Greece, Israel’s "identity" is shaped like a triangle formed by the West (which it claims as its culture), the Orient (on whose prototypical ground it is located) and world heritage (i.e. the desired universalism of Jerusalem). Yet Israel could not easily appropriate its “universal” assets, as could Greece. Following a path more similar to that of modern Turkey, the Yishuv and, later, Israel had to define its national legacy facing inward: its borders were not set only at the country’s physical peripheries, but also and more readily against its Palestinian past. The physical form of the Israeli “homeland” was based therefore on a project of negation and erasure that necessitate a break from a past that was too conflicted.

27 Bozdogan, Modernism and Nation Building.
But once Israel was established, it needed to pacify and habituate this past\textsuperscript{28} in order to create for itself a legitimizing time frame—a national narrative based on the return of Jews to their biblical heritage. If we follow Herzfeld’s course and agree that, “in its extreme forms, [monumental time] is the time frame of the nation-state,” and if, like Herzfeld, we recognize in the permanence of architecture a preferred terrain for fixing such monumental time, then we can see how Israelis faced a perplexing predicament: by 1967, the built landscape of the Israeli nation-state betrayed neither biblical heritage nor a people returning home after 2,000 years of exile. The modernist environment articulated only the values of progress and development alone. Frustrated and eager for revision, Ram Karmi, the influential head architect of the Ministry of Housing, complained that Israeli agencies produced housing solutions that were not the architectural equivalent of the Hebrew language, and therefore were not sufficient for the architecture of a local and historical “national home.”

But should the architecture of the “national home” follow its “biblical heritage” or its “modern architectural tradition”? Should it aspire to divulge “a sense of place” by adhering to local building codes, or should it be on par with “the spirit of the time” of an international progressive front? The complex involvement of architecture with these questions is a theme that runs throughout the dissertation: chapter 1 explains its importance for the national project; chapter 3 examines the architectural tools used to appropriate local sites as historical or universal rather than Palestinian; chapter 5 demonstrates strategies for this appropriation, such as the casting of the Palestinian

\textsuperscript{28}For the different practices developed to negotiate a past that became distant by modernity, see: David Lowenthal, \textit{The Past Is a Foreign Country} (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
vernacular as biblical, primitive or Mediterranean; and chapter 6 investigates a particular case of healing the ruptured past in the design for the Western Wall plaza. This preoccupation with the past (as locality or history interchangeably) indicates the depth of the modernist crisis of institutional Israeli architecture.

In exploring this crisis, I encounter a methodological dilemma: while anthropologists or literary critics can readily demonstrate that the process of negotiated nationalism focuses on the interaction between bureaucratic elites and social actors, the study of state architectural production necessarily focuses on operations located in the domain of professional and bureaucratic elites that must imagine unknown inhabitants. The question is, how can one incorporate the theoretical concern for negotiated nationalism into the study of architectural production? I suggest two venues in which this question can be explored: one engages the “top-down” envisioning of Jerusalem through its projected plans, but emphasizes the failure of these plans to create a unified agenda for the nation-state; the other explores bottom-up processes by focusing on the cultural formation of Israeli-born architects who rose to power through an intricate cultural web.

My primary interest in a top-down scenario lies not only in the ways a nation represents itself through architecture—in the histories and built traditions it appropriates as primordially and authentically its own—but more readily in the incompatibilities between different modes of imagining the nation. It is again through architecture that I am seeking what Goeff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny describe as “the forms of contestation
inside nationalism’s dominant frame.” The competition between different architectural ideologies and bodies of architectural knowledge over the physical form of contested Jerusalem, which I study in chapters 3 and 5, is such a case. It is a lens through which I explore the reciprocity and compatibility (or lack thereof) between architecture and processes of becoming national.

The bottom-up inquiry of local architectural production brings forth another objective of this study: namely, an exploration of the rise to hegemony of an Israeli-born generation of architects. I focus particularly on the ways in which their cultural formation created an ideological screen through which they attained professional knowledge. In discussing the eventual hegemony they achieved over the architectural profession, I explore the mediation of cultural and political power into architectural praxis, as demonstrated in chapter 5. This investigation requires an ethnographic method but strives to invert the usual object of this method: i.e., it suggests looking at the dominant professional discourse rather than at the “natives” as the object of ethnography. This approach also addresses a lacuna in post-colonial studies. While stressing the ambivalence of colonial subjectivity, postcolonial theory deals primarily with the “colonized” appropriation of the “colonizer.” By focusing on the colonizer’s appropriation, I suggest the ways in which

29 Eley and Suny, Becoming National, 29.
31 Post-colonial studies criticized the East/West polarization of Said’s Orientalism as well as the colonizer/colonized dichotomy of colonial discourse, stressing instead theories concerning the ambivalence of colonial subjectivity that were nevertheless focused primarily on the colonized. See: Russell Ferguson, Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures, Documentary Sources in Contemporary Art; V. 4 (New York; Cambridge, MA: New Museum of Contemporary Art; MIT Press, 1990); Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London ; New York: Routledge, 1994).
the colonizer wants to be like the colonized. The Israeli desire to achieve the Arab’s nativeness—which was seen as the ultimate expression of locality—demonstrates this inadequately studied aspect of post-colonial studies.

**Nationalism and the Politics of Israeli Architectural Historiography**

In the first study of Israel’s architectural history, written in 1963, Aviah Hashimshoni argues that it was already possible at that point in time to define an architectural “tradition,” even if it was a decade-and-a-half old. Such a “tradition,” explicates the future author of Jerusalem’s 1968 modernist masterplan, “is based on a rational attitude to planning, on the functionalist school, and on new views regarding the organization of urban life and housing.”32 This architecture, Hashimshoni emphasizes, reflects a “matter-of-factness and lack of pretence.” It expresses “enthusiasm” and “public responsibility,” as well as the Yishuv’s spirit of “collaboration and identification with the material needs of building... Despite being un-crystallized and imperfect in form,” this tradition “was given with honesty, directness, and vitality.”33 In so arguing, Hashimshoni establishes a moral measuring stick according to which modern—more precisely, *neue sachlichkeit* (i.e., matter-of-factness)—architecture is progressive and invigorating. It is a nation-building force, unlike earlier works of Oriental architecture, which Hashimshoni classified as failed “eclectic experiments” attempting to “create an imposed local ‘style.’”34

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33 Ibid.
34 The quotes above are my translations from the Hebrew publication of 1963. An English edition is: Aviah Hashimshoni, "Architecture," in *The Art of Israel*, ed. Benjamin Tammuz, Max Wykes-Joyce, and Yona Fischer (Philadelphia: Chilton Book Co., 1967). The most significant difference between the original and translation is the definition of the term "'inyan'iyut," which resembles the German term *sachlichkeit*, i.e., "matter of factness," (also translated as "the new objectivity") a major trend promoting functional, stripped modernism that was advocated primarily by Hannes Meyer. Meyer taught at the Bauhaus from 1927 to
Hashimshoni’s argument has become the bedrock of Israeli architectural historiography: the evaluation of different periods of architectural production according to their contribution to the author’s political attitude toward the Zionist project. I suggest that almost every retrospective study of Israeli architecture constructed a value system that reflected a position, whether explicit or implicit, in the contest over the tenets of Israeli identity. Following Mark Jarzombek’s proposition for “critical historiography,” an underlying agenda of this study is therefore to historicize the historicist argument itself—to study the ways in which past architecture through its narration as history becomes embroiled in the conditions of contemporary discourse. As a step in creating such a critique, one can register the leading trends of Israeli architectural historiography in the following chart:

1930, and was the master and later employer of Arieh Sharon, Israel’s most influential architect during early statehood. This connection is lost in the English text.


36 Until the 1990s, there were very few books on Israeli architecture. This situation started to change during the 1980s and matured into a very fruitful decade of scholarly production during the 1990s that focused primarily on the 1930s. Academia was one arena for this change due to the emergence of a research center for the study of primarily modern architecture at the Technion under the leadership of Professor Gilbert Herbert in collaboration with Ita Heinze-Grinberg and Silvina Sosnovsky. However, the shift in interest away from the tenets of the localist paradigm toward Mandate period modern architecture was more sharp and striking in other cultural arenas such as important exhibitions, essays in architectural periodicals, scholarly and popular conferences, and criticism in daily newspapers. This shift and its cultural and political context are discussed in Alona Nitzan-Shiftan and Avigail Sachs, “The Return to Zionist Modernism: Re-Constructing Israeli Architectural Heritage in the Early 1990s,” (forthcoming). Currently, the scholarly interest is focused on early statehood, on the project of nation-building and on brutalist architecture. Besides published books and exhibitions, which I cite below, there are a few books in progress. One is Sharon Rotbard’s study of the work of Avraham Yaski, another, by Yaron Turel, is on Yaakov Rechter, and there are two professional autobiographies in progress by David Best and Dan Etan.
In this rough division of the 20th century into decades, the “modernist” periods are evaluated with a positive coefficient while the “Oriental” periods are usually found damaged (or worse, damaging), both aesthetically and morally (see chapter 2). It is a narrative which claims that the Israeli architectural tradition took form during the 1930s, matured between 1948 and 1967, and then started to decline, losing in the process its formal integrity and moral code.

This historiographical scheme is rife with contradictions and blatantly naive. For example, some leading early modernists, most notably Erich Mendelsohn, called on an imaginary Orient as a primary frame of reference. Similarly confusing is the coupling of early statehood sachlich modernists together with their most vocal critics, both of which produced “gray” buildings, but very different architecture. Despite its inaccuracies, this
historiographic scheme is pervasive. It merits, therefore, a short history of its own in light of the theoretical framework presented above.

When Hashimshoni established the Yishuv’s “sachlich-functionalist” architecture as “the foundation for the architecture of the State of Israel,” it was not seen as a choice but as an inevitable progression of historical circumstances. Sachlich architecture was geared toward what was thought to be the rudimentary needs of people regardless of their history, religiosity, ethnicity, gender or social status. Living in simple, elementary modern houses, inhabitants were imagined as “[a]ll people without regard to (race, sex, religion, wealth, social status).” Though Slavoj Zizek reminds us that these were to be the ultimate subjects of democracy, he also notes that such agreement entails “an abstraction of all positive features, a dissolution of all substantial, innate links.” Since people are defined by an abstract framework, which determines primarily what they are not, they are subject, according to Zizek, to “a constitutive lack of any support that would offer the subject a positive, substantial identity.”

37 In the Israeli context, the democratic imagination is restricted primarily to Jews. See: Yiftachel, “Israeli Society.”

38 Slavoj Zizek, “Formal Democracy and Its Discontents,” in Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture, ed. Slavoj Zizek (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 154-170. Zizek defines the subjectivity of democracy as “a constitutive lack of any support that would offer the subject a positive, substantial identity. It is because of this lack of identity that the concept of identification plays such a crucial role in psychoanalytic theory: the subject attempts to fill out its constitutive lack by means of identification, by identifying itself with some master signifier guaranteeing its place in the symbolic network.” (p. 163) For Zizek, this unique content is “The Thing,” which is the organization of enjoyment—the materialization, embodiment of a lack. His compelling argument owes its force to his bold engagement with what is absolute for the subject (rather than the familiar adjectives that characterize 1990s scholarship on identity: “transient,” “shifting,” “precarious,” or “contingent”). In his words: “What confers on the other the dignity of a ‘person’ is not any universal symbolic feature but precisely what is ‘absolutely particular’ about him, his fantasy, that part of him that we can be sure we can never share.” (p. 156) In order to ethically protect this individual domain, Zizek argues for the ultimate enclosure of this
Zizek’s analysis calls to mind the criticism that the European Team X directed at the abstract and repetitive forms of *sachlich* architecture, which Israel, according to Hashimshoni, embraced as a national tradition. If the abstractness of *sachlich* architecture induces “a constitutive lack” rather than a positive identity, then, Israeli architects sensed, such architecture would never turn into “home.” Working for the state and culturally formed as a national elite, they connected the post-WWII demand to tailor architecture to the dimension of “man” with the mandate of including this “man” in a national community. Etienne Balibar reminds us that this mandate cannot be solved by “setting a collective identity against individual identities,” because “[a]ll identity is *individual*, but there is no individual identity that is not historical or, in other words, constructed within a field of social values, norms of behavior and collective symbols.” In the Israeli context, these were the values, conventions, and symbols of the *mamlachtiyut* project that institutional architects wanted to induce through their architectural vocation. Their combined national and professional demand critically challenged the *sachlich* architectural tradition. The consequent crisis into which Israeli architectural modernism fell reminds us that “a collective identity” cannot be “invented” or “imagined” without a complex intervention into the way individuals organize their universe of meaning, their private fantasies and histories.

Indeed, the architecture of early statehood had limited success in habituating new immigrants to the values of the socialist state. Instead of identifying with the “honesty, directness and vitality” of the Labor movement, these new immigrants saw their built

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private domain against the violating force of nationalism. Analytically, however, it is exactly the rules of the game of such “violation” that are at the center of my study.
environment as an expression of bureaucracy and alienation. The resultant “world war” between “functionalists” and “formalists” threatened even to dismantle Israel’s single architectural school at the Technion. The weak hold that the Hashimshoni camp had was sustained only until the international architects of the Jerusalem Committee “wielded a guillotine” over the 1968 modernist masterplan that his team prepared for Jerusalem (see chapter 3). Indeed, during the 1970s, the criticism of sachlich modernism pervaded state agencies, thoroughly changing the orderly modernist landscape that Hashimshoni celebrated.

It is important to remember that despite their adherence to different “traditions,” critics of high modernism during the 1960s and well into the 1970s did not challenge the notion of modernism as a cutting edge, contemporary practice. However, once their program for local architecture matured, their architecture was able to address requirements of nationalism, the nature of which I have discussed above: this architecture could become part of the “national symbolic” of Israeli culture and partake in the cultural practices of the mamlachtiyut. Indeed, it was through architecture that a sense of what Balibar defined as “fictive ethnicity” was imprinted on the landscape of Jerusalem. As a result, the architectural Israeliization of Jerusalem not only represented, but also participated in producing, in Balibar’s words, a sense of “a natural community, possessing of itself an

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39 Balibar, “The Nation Form,” p. 94.
40 The debate was between the followers of Aviah Hashimshoni and those of Al Mansfeld, a modernist architect from a Beaux-Arts background whose most famous building is the Israel Museum in Jerusalem. The struggle culminated in a quest to lay off Hashinshoni’s assistant, Avraham Vachman. Musa Harif, then an architectural student and later a promising politician who died young, organized a Technion-wide strike in favor of Vachman, who turned into one of the most influential professors in the School. Thereafter the school was polarized between academia and the profession that was responsible primarily for studio education.
identity of origin, culture and interests which transcends individuals and social
conditions.  

It was an architectural attempt to devise an authentic Israeli architecture
different from the international architectural modernism. According to Richard Handler,
"the existence of a national collectivity depends upon the ‘possession’ of an authentic
culture.” Hence, Israelis could now say, we are a nation because we have a culture,
because we have ‘Israeli architecture.’

But even in the heyday of this “local” architecture, the question of whether there is “an
Israeli architecture” kept preoccupying the architectural community. In spite of its
overwhelming presence in the built landscape, the new trend never achieved the status of
the consensual “architectural tradition” that high modernism once achieved. The reason
is rooted, I will argue, in the dual nature of the Israeli settler project. As Nadia Abu El-
Haj indicated in her recent study of Israeli archeology, in Israel, “the projects of
settlement and of nation-building developed at one and the same time on a single colonial
terrain.” Before 1967, the project of nation-building took command, succeeding to
conceal its colonial implications. After ’67, the occupied territories started "unsettling"
the Israeli polity, eroding in the process the apparent unity that the national project had
just achieved. With no metropole to recede to, Israeli society retreated into itself, into a
reality that was not yet tinted by an awareness of colonialism. In architectural terms, this
meant a retreat back into the ethos of Labor architectural modernism.

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41 A term used by Abraham Rabinovich, “Planners Under Fire,” *The Jerusalem Post*, December 25, 1970,
p. 20.
The resurrection of Labor modernism during the 1980s severely challenged the sabra experimentation. Most conspicuous in the modernist restoration was Michael Levin and Judith Turner’s seminal 1984 exhibition, *White City: International Style Architecture in Israel*, which restored respect for the neglected and decaying modernist buildings of Tel Aviv.\(^{44}\) *White City*’s celebrated modernism was no longer the only tradition that necessarily committed architects to a modernist “party discipline,” but rather a “style” that was propagated as the “correct” and “authentic” expression of Israeliness. Paradoxically, this inaugural attempt to historicize modern architecture in order to advance its aesthetics in a privatized building market divested modernism of its most important tenet: its definition as a contemporary, non-codified practice capable of assimilating every new condition as part of its ever-changing definition. Moreover, by stripping modernism of its contemporaneous ideology, the new historiography, as Talia Margalit aptly remarked, positioned modernism as one “style” among many competing for attention in a post-modernist culture.\(^{45}\) Nonetheless, Levin’s agenda gained momentum during the first intifada years (1987-1993), during the time of which a constantly growing volume of publications reclaimed the “Bauhaus Style” as the ultimate Zionist vernacular.\(^{46}\) In so doing they put historiography at the forefront of the Israeli

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\(^{44}\) Michael Levin and Judith Turner, *White City: International Style Architecture in Israel*, 1st ed. (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Museum, 1984). The exhibition was curated in 1984 and was shown again during the 1994 “Bauhaus in Tel Aviv” celebrations and the International Conference on the International Style.


\(^{46}\) For consequent writings on modern architecture during the British Mandate, see: Jeannine Fiedler, Stiftung Bauhaus Dessau, and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung., *Social Utopias of the Twenties: Bauhaus, Kibbutz, and the Dream of the New Man*, 1st ed. (Wuppertal, Germany: Meuller + Busmann Press, 1995); Gilbert Herbert and Silvina Sosnowsky, *Bauhaus on the Carmel and the Crossroads of Empire: Architecture and Planning in Haifa During the British Mandate* (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1993); Gilbert Herbert, "On the Fringes of the International Style," *Architecture SA* (September-October 1987);
cultural war.\textsuperscript{47} The political power embedded in this position matured not only into national celebrations of the Bauhaus in 1994, but also into practice: since the mid 1990s, an elaborate preservation apparatus has constantly whitened Tel Aviv’s modernist quarters, advancing, as a result, their skyrocketing real estate values.\textsuperscript{48}

Lately, exhibitions, catalogues and symposia have focused attention on early statehood, trying to recover the most detested period in Israeli collective environmental consciousness. Meticulous and innovative research conducted for exhibitions such as Tzvi Efrat and Meira Yagid’s \textit{The Israeli Project: Building and Architecture, 1948-1973}, rescued rich documents in the hope of demonstrating the vastness and force of the Israeli modernization project.\textsuperscript{49} Consequently, Israel could be re-staged on a global map: if Tel Aviv of the 1930s is prided for containing the largest concentration of modernist building worldwide, then Israel of the 1950s is claimed to be similarly unique as the most planned

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\textsuperscript{49} Tzvi Efrat and Meira Yagid (curators) \textit{The Israeli Project: Building and Architecture, 1948-1973}, Tel Aviv Museum, 2000, is the most important and comprehensive exhibition on early statehood architecture and planning. Tzvi Efrat, Ro’i Kozlovsky, Tzvi Elhayani and Nati Marom did the research for the exhibition and the pending catalogue. Chapters from the catalogue are: Tzvi Efrat, "Size (Godel)," \textit{Studio} 118 (2000). Tzvi Efrat, "Emergency (Herum), Vernacular," \textit{Studio} 120 (2000-2001). Another important exhibition is Miriam Tuvyah and Michael Boneh, eds., \textit{Building the Country: Public Housing in the 1950s} (Tel-Aviv: The Israel Museums forum; HaKibbutz HaMeuhad, 1999). During the year of Israel’s Jubilee, there were two art exhibitions that prepared the ground for the architectural interest in this period. See: Bar-Or Galia, \textit{Hebrew Work} (Ein Harod: miskan leomanut, 1998). Gila Blas and Ilana Tatenbaum, \textit{Social Realism in the 1950, Political Art in the 1990s} (Haifa: The New Haifa Museum, 1998).
country on earth. Simultaneously, however, the various modernist trends of early statehood are presented as a contemporary statement: sachlich modernist landscapes and exposed concrete are celebrated as the signs of the most authentic, rugged Israeliness, that of the Israeli born, of the city, and of local (Zionist) materials. In this new historiography, it is not the white utopia but the besieged country of the 1950s that carries the genetic code of Israeliness.

Intriguingly, this historical ideology is not necessarily compatible with architectural practice; more often than not, it is its opposite. Exhibitions that focus on representing contemporary Israeli architecture, such as the exhibition celebrating Israel’s Jubilee or the Israeli Pavilion in the 1996 Venice Biennale, focus on the local aspects of this architecture. The most popular Israeli architectural periodical, Architecture of Israel, openly contested trends celebrating "gray" modernism. However, allied with neo-modernist trends arising specifically from the Dutch school of Rem Koolhaas and his disciples, the new campaign started to infiltrate an edgy practice, creating in due course a new generational gap. Consequently, Jerusalem—politically contaminated and dangerously poetic—was removed from the curious, scrutinizing eye of the profession.

50 The trends in Israeli historiography correspond to developments overseas. The White City discourse coincided with the establishment of Docomomo (Documentation and Conservation of the Modern Movement) in 1990 and the somewhat contradictory notion of preserving the new. The gray architecture is now in vogue in the context of a worldwide revival of the 1950s and a propensity for neo-modernism.
51 Esther Zandberg, "The Lost Dignity of the Shutters," Ha'aretz Weekend Supplement October 27, 2000, pp. 36-42.
53 David Guggenheim, Israel Visible and Beyond, 6th International Architecture Exhibition, Venice (Jerusalem: Exhibition Catalogue, 1996).
Any understanding of Israeli architectural historiography is necessarily tied to the conflict between Israel and Palestine. But in coming to probe the politics of current historiography, as well as the architectural discourse it informs, my focus is not on the touchy question of whether Israeli architecture is an act of occupation, a predicament that has been only lately addressed. Rather, my focus is on the ways in which the disciplinary discourse, the space in which architecture claims autonomy, as well as the historiographic practice associated with that discourse, is in itself imbued with the politics of the conflict. The conclusions of this study bring this discussion to the historical moment of the Palestinian uprisings and examine the state of Israeli historiography vis-à-vis the inner tensions that the Palestinian intifada provoked in Israeli society.

Jerusalem, as noted, is absent from current Israeli architectural historiography and discourse, but it is the subject of important primary literature. David Kroyanker single-handedly composed the architectural chronicle of Jerusalem—books that are an invaluable primary source for the study. Arthur Kutcher’s The New Jerusalem is a


55 Kroyanker, an architect who intentionally keeps his distance from professional and political debates, was himself an active architect in the Jerusalem Municipality during the period I research. His scholarly career started with the detailed reports he wrote for the Jerusalem Committee on the various aspects of the post-’67 massive building of the city. These were compiled into a book describing the struggle on the image of Jerusalem, which he considered his most important book. The reports, this book and other writing by
similarly valuable and stupendously illustrated account of 1970s architectural debates.\textsuperscript{56} Important studies on the architecture of Jerusalem have appeared in four dissertations: Yasir Saker’s is a phenomenological study of Louis Kahn’s \textit{Hurva} synagogue that argues for the primacy of autonomous architectural procedures over nationalist ideologies in shaping Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{57} Ron Fuchs’s is the first exhaustive and revealing study of the British “colonial regionalism” through the architecture of Austen St. Berbe Harison.\textsuperscript{58} The other two dissertations came out as books during the conclusion of this study with important revisions that are too recent to be equitably addressed. Dan Monk’s is an exceptionally rich study of the history of historical accounts that are made through the immediacy of architecture, rendering sacred edifices as catalysts for the ever-escalating conflict.\textsuperscript{59} Nadia Abu El-Haj has justly shifted her emphasis from “creating the homeland” to the “territorial self-fashioning” of the Israeli historical imagination through archeology.\textsuperscript{60} Her remarkable inquiry into the ways in which the science of archeology partakes in both nation-building and settler projects is an important precedent for this study. However, her focus on (until recently) a consensual practice sheds different light on Israeli society than the one that emerges from a study of the embattled field of architectural production.

\textsuperscript{57} Yasir Mohammed Sakr, ”The Subversive Utopia: Louis Kahn and the Question of the National Jewish Style in Jerusalem (Israel)” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1996).

In spite of the primary role of building in Zionist history, there is no critical historiography of architecture since the founding of the state. Studies such as Hashimshoni’s of 1963,61 Harlap’s of 1982,62 and Elhanani’s of 199863 were written by architects who presented a position within the debate rather than a critical study of it in the larger Israeli context. Michael Levin’s Modern Israeli Architecture64 was published too recently to review, but his earlier work is discussed above. Similarly new is Kenneth Helphand’s study of landscape architecture and the making of modern Israel.65 Although arising from different scholarly disciplines from my own, studies such as Don Handelman and Elihu Katz’s spatial analysis of state ceremonies,66 Zali Gurevitz and Gidon Aran’s study of the Israeli place, Alex Weingrod’s study of communal buildings,67 as well as the articles collected in Grasping Lands,68 form, in my view, an integral part of the study of Israeli built environment and space.

**Methodology**

This research followed an unpredictable route. There is no single architectural archive to which one can turn in Israel. Furthermore, the thirty-year limit on access to documents in

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60 El-Haj, *Facts on the Ground.*
61 Hashimshoni, “Architecture.”
66 Handelman and Katz, “State Ceremonies.”
the official archive of the state has rendered the seventies largely inaccessible. The archives of the Jerusalem Municipality and the Jerusalem Foundation, as well as the library (rather than archive) of the Ministry of Housing, are rich yet inconsistent. A thorough review of contemporary architectural periodicals is what points to a possible direction for deciphering the intellectual labor that was invested in conceptualizing Israeli architecture. But, in accordance with good Zionist tradition, texts were brief, descriptions succinct, and visual materials intended usually to provide only broad overviews. In order to find firm bedrock in this fog, I begun asking several of the leading figures in the professional field for some guidance. This led to in-depth interviews with former head architects of the Ministry of Housing, principals of leading architectural firms, planners of state agencies, politicians and academics. The interviews were not limited to the professional careers of the interviewees, but ventured into their upbringing, their social and institutional affiliations, and their participation in the military and settling aspects of the Zionist project. In many occasions long and multiple interviews have turned into unfolding life stories that revealed the cultural web in which the Israeli architectural profession emerged. Conducted between 1998 and 2001, these interviews therefore served as both historical documents and ethnography. As historical documents the interviews animate archival material and contemporary literature. The ethnography helps me to understand the ambiguities of a generation that followed the Israeli codes of informality, weaving professional networks and conducting casual symposia in private houses and cafes. It is a generation that has run the architectural profession in Israel for nearly four decades, and has a huge impact on it. These interviews have also opened
access to private archives holding rapidly disappearing documents, which provided invaluable sources for this research.

While I conducted this research, I participated in academic and professional activities at the Technion’s school of architecture and the Israeli architectural association (the amuta) as well as in numerous symposia and tours. It was an opportunity for informal encounters with architects and planners that greatly enhanced my more formal interview program. During the research, I was constantly informed by architectural periodicals and architectural criticism in the daily press, where writers such as Ester Zandberg, Ziva Sternhal, Talia Margalit, and Sharon Rotbard are playing important roles in Israeli architectural culture. Finally, the city of Jerusalem—its housing, monuments and careful landscaping—particularly when I was given the opportunity to tour it with these architects, has been the most important ongoing source for this study.

**Chapters outline**

The first chapter of this study starts with an introduction to the Zionist project and examines the exhaustive interrelationship between the “new architecture” of inter-war modernism and Labor Zionism during the British Mandate. It describes the growing incongruity between the project of mamlachtiyut, which attempted to consolidate the modernist state with the Jewish nation, and the modernist architectural landscape, a schism that brought about the joint crisis of architectural and Labor modernisms. Chapter 2 locates this predicament in the historical moment of post-'67 Jerusalem and explicates
the time frame between the war and the first political defeat of the Labor movement in 1977.

Chapter 3 tells the story of the making of Israeli Jerusalem through a “top-down” operation: the production of and debates over masterplans and outline schemes. It focuses on criticism of the 1968 Jerusalem masterplan that advocated a modernist and secular vision for the city by the Jerusalem Committee of renowned international architects who demanded the expression, in three-dimensional form, of the spiritual and aesthetic gravity of Jerusalem. A further comparison of this vision to that of the British Mandate raises questions that stand at the center of chapter 4 regarding the impact of different architectural ideologies on the tension between nation and state, East and West, as well as questions regarding the politics of beauty in Jerusalem. International criticism provoked preservationist and Orientalist approaches, particularly in the planning of the city’s ancient core. But, more readily, the forceful debate surrounding Jerusalem planning ultimately disrupted any attempt to prescribe from above a resolute image for the city.

Chapter 5 focuses on the generation of Israeli-born architects whose architectural program was developed “from below,” from the local field of architectural production. Their assimilation of post-WWII architectural trends through the dense filter of Zionist ideology turned them into architectural interlocutors, and granted them the professional mandate of Israelizing Jerusalem. Their response to both national and architectural sentiments gave priority to local and regional concerns. The chapter analyzes the
complexities of their desire to devise “an architecture of the place” in a country whose vernacular precedents were mostly Arab. The chapter further explores the strategies architects used in order to appropriate the Palestinian vernacular in the quest for a secure Israeli past and a native “national home.” The architectural program of this generation reveals the forces underlining the act of mediating ideologies into built and lived environments, of turning the city into a representation of its sovereign state.

The ideologies struggling to shape Israeli Jerusalem collided in the designs for the Western Wall Plaza by Moshe Safdie, Louis Kahn, Isamu Noguchi, and others, which, although never built, were considered by two ministerial committees. Chapter 6 describes the ways in which each design took a position in the argument over the mamlachti (Israeli) and religious (Jewish) implications of the site and the role that architectural modernism was to play in these definitions. The authorized design, created by Safdie, succeeded in fusing the Zionist narrative of a return to biblical times, the preservation of strategically selected archeology, and the construction of Oriental imagery executed with the cutting-edge technology of prefabricated building. The result, a synthesized representation of a Jewish immemorial past and unforeseen future, tried to heal the ruptured history of the site, yet simultaneously uncovered a controversial desire to enhance Israeli Jewish nationalism at the expense of the Jewish faith.

At the turn of the millennium, neither “Jewish nationalism” nor “Jewish faith” is a popular concept in an architectural discipline still mired in politics that go back to the Labor Zionists. The more vigorous the Palestinian uprising, the more reluctant Israeli
historiography is to explore “an architecture of the place,” reverting instead to the modernist paradigm that was attacked in the 1970s. This study tries to lift this moratorium, because in the inner contradictions of the concept of a “United Jerusalem” lay both the physical blueprint of the embattled city and the architectural credo of the first sabra generation of architects whose prototypical Israeli identity was to be imprinted on the landscape of Jerusalem.
Chapter 1

zionism, Mamlachtiyut, and modern architecture

Michael Kuhn, winning entry, East Jerusalem competition, perspective, 1964.

Moshe Safdie, Mamila complex (under construction), perspectival rendering.
Michael Kuhn, a modernist architect and a sharp critic,¹ whose query about the newly conquered Jerusalem opened this study, won the prestigious architectural competition for East Jerusalem shortly before the outbreak of ’67 war. The highlight of his proposal was the Mamilla Quarter that leads from West Jerusalem to the Jaffa City Gate. In the project’s birdseye view, an array of modernist forms—low- and high-rise, neatly formed rectangular buildings—are composed along a busy main street with elevated walkways and separated circulation systems for pedestrians and vehicles. The street runs across the valley leading to the Old City, which is set as a blank silhouette at the horizon. Soon after the war was over, the project was published in Ha’aretz² and it came, quite predictably, under attack. The desired link to the Old City, Dan Etan commented, resembled a connection between “two cities that belong to two states, and can conduct mutual relationships.” Etan hit the nail on its head: how could a project that endured the city’s division survive the post-’67 unification?

Ram Karmi rooted the project’s shortcomings in the placement of a road where he felt a garden should be located. “A road,” he said, “is an element that belongs to the new, modern Jerusalem; the park in the valley would function as a screen against this modernism, a screen that would change the perspective of everything seen through it.” Moshe Safdie, a major post-WWII architectural protagonist, offered a remedy for this predicament exactly along the lines of this criticism. His design (which is currently under construction), a linear garden that connects a pedestrian street to the re-made green

valley—leads toward the ancient sites while concealing the massive construction and parking surrounding them. As a result the project suppresses and thus disguise the problematic seam between old and new.\(^3\)

These two projects encapsulate the dramatic shift in the architecture of Jerusalem and the discourse surrounding it. This chapter aims to explain the reasons for the failure of a modernist project that shortly before the war had won the prestigious competition to address the architectural requirements of united Jerusalem. In what follows, I explicate the national and architectural context in which such contrasted projects emerged—the first in the Zionist project and the legacy of Labor modernism; the second in the years of statehood and the ideology of *mamlactiyut*. The incompatibility between the two conceptions led to the modernist architectural crisis of the 1960s and 1970s.

**The Zionist Movement**

The Zionist movement evolved in the context of 19th century European nationalism. Its advocates cite rising anti-Semitism as well as the failed emancipation of Jews in European countries as its prime catalysts. The emancipation did not grant Jews civil equality, but instead only served to undermine traditional Jewish law (*halachah*) and religious lifestyle, forcing Jews to redefine their identity in a modern age. One of these responses emerged in the form of a national movement that was established in the late 19th century. The different strands, locations, and philosophies of Zionist activists have

\(^2\) ""East Jerusalem,"" a Symposium with Architects Michael Kuhn, Dan Etan and Ram Karmi," *Haaretz* September 8, 1967.

\(^3\) Moshe Safdie and G. Weil, "Jerusalem Rehabilitation of the Jewish Quarter and the Mamila Project," *Planning and Building Developments* (1978), 24-27.
been, off course, the subject of extensive scholarship that extends beyond this study.\textsuperscript{4} However, it can be stated that the early Zionist movement focused on two dominant ideological strands: the political and the cultural. Inspired by Leon Pinsker and Theodor Herzl, political Zionism saw the pervasive phenomenon of xenophobia as the root of anti-Semitism. Jews, they thought, provoked a 'reasonable fear' of the unfamiliar. The inevitable failure of emancipation was their premise; they believed therefore that a political solution was essential for the acceptance of Jews as being on an equal footing with other cultures. Concerned with the problem of the Jews rather than with Judaism, they did not insist on Palestine as the sole territorial possibility.

Cultural Zionism, on the other hand, led by Ahad Ha-am, took on the identity crisis of modern Judaism. An emancipated and secular Jew, Ahad Ha-am attempted to reconcile his loss of religious faith with a community traditionally crystallized around religious belief. He overcame this apparent incongruity by replacing the cohesive element of religion with the modern construct of nation: religion was now assumed to have an instrumental value in enforcing the essential being of the Jews as nation. Secularized Judaism became the seedbed for Zionist identity. If the original nation was formed in the land of Israel, then its revitalization must take place on that same land.

In contrast, Political Zionism aimed to minimize differentiating features: its goal was to create a nation like any other that existed within a community of nations. Ahad Ha-am

did not believe this total political solution to be feasible, however. His formulation of Cultural Zionism is the result of his anticipation of potential Arab-Jewish conflict under Political Zionism. Rather than laying the foundation for a nation-state, cultural Zionism declared pioneering Jews in Palestine to be the spiritual core for the world’s Jewry.

The 1917 Balfour Declarations, in which Britain openly supported the Palestinian Zionist enterprise, boosted the position of “synthetic Zionism,” led by Chaim Weizmann, Ahad Ha-am’s disciple that incorporated political as well as cultural aspects of the Zionist enterprise. It worked toward a political charter from the community of nations while also advocating Jewish settlement in Palestine and the foundation of cultural institutions for the Jewish renaissance. The campaign to update biblical Hebrew was the definitive sign of this revival. The dictionary of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, who modernized Hebrew, would help Hebrew’s eventual institutionalization as the official Zionist and later Israeli language. For Weizmann and the World Zionist Organization, the socialist sector in Palestine was only one of the Organization’s multiple bodies. However, with growing anti-Semitism in Europe, the Labor party came to dominate Zionist consciousness and action, which meant that the working class was placed at the center of the Zionist project. A grassroots revolution required a drastic change of lifestyle, in which building played a major role. This socialist credo had to be re-evaluated against conventional national paradigms once the State of Israel was established. The balance between socialism and

nationalism in the formation of the Israeli State is still a subject of heated scholarly debate.  

Zionism and Modern Architecture

The 1920s witnessed the evolution of an agreement between Zionist and architectural modernisms. Jews renounced the authority of Jewish law (halachah) and traditional lifestyle; architects broke with the aesthetic authority of antiquity and its dictates regarding architectural form, composition, structure and materials. The identification between the two movements in Mandate Palestine owes its vitality to this parallel formation, which gave to both a revolutionary edge. The consolidation of Labor Zionism in the Yishuv (the Jewish society in Mandate Palestine) and its growing efficacy within international delegates of the Zionist Congress, coincided with architecture in a decade


6 Consider the proximity of the following historical moments of International and Zionist modernism: at the time when Le Corbusier built his famous 1920s villas, when Walter Gropius, Hannes Meyer and Mies van der Rohe were teaching successively at the Bauhaus, and when Ernst May was building his famous socialist housing estates in Frankfurt, Richard Kaufmann constructed numerous modernist settlements for European Jews in Mandate Palestine under the direction of the Land of Israeli Office that Arthur Rupin ran for the Zionist Organization. In 1928, the year CIAM was formed, a modernist scheme won the momentous competition for the Zionist National Institutions Building. The winner, Yohanan Ratner, replaced, in 1930, the famed Orientalist architect Alexander Berwald as the head of the single architectural school at the Technion. In 1932, Hitchcock and Philip Johnson exhibited European modernism at New York’s Museum of Modern Art under the new umbrella of the “International Style.” 1932 was also the year in which Zionist students of Le Corbusier, Erich Mendelsohn and the Bauhaus formed the Tel Aviv Circle, which contributed greatly to the very rapid establishment of “the new architecture” in Zionist circles.


of experimentation and collaborations that eventually took the form of the International Congress for Modern Architecture (CIAM).

During this crucial period, modern architecture was already practiced institutionally in the Yishuv, primarily through the activity of the Zionist Land of Israel Office and its architect Richard Kauffman. By the 1930s modern architecture was the dominant style in the Yishuv.\footnote{For a history of the Modern Movement, see: Giorgio Ciucci, "The Invention of the Modern Movement," Oppositions 24 (1981) pp. 68-91. Eric Paul Mumford, The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928-1960 (Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press, 2000).} I have argued elsewhere\footnote{On modern architecture in Mandate Palestine, see Levin and Turner, White City; Fiedler, Social Utopias; Herbert and Sosnovsky, Bauhaus on the Carmel. For more references, see the introduction to this study.} that the reasons modernism was so attractive for the Yishuv's majority of socialist Jews during the British Mandate emanated from its accordance with the triple negation Labor Zionism advanced. As a socialist movement, Labor Zionism negated the bourgeoisie. As a revolutionary movement, it negated Jewish life in the Diaspora [Fig. 1]. With the advent of the Arab-Jewish conflict in Mandate Palestine, Labor Zionism started to negate the East, the Orientalist characteristics of which were adopted by the previous generation as an appropriate representation of the Jewish revival. This triple negation of bourgeois culture, of the Jewish Diaspora, and of the Orient created the possibility for a \textit{tabula rasa} "free from past memories."\footnote{Alona Nitzan-Shiftan, "Contested Zionism - Alternative Modernism: Erich Mendelshon and the Tel Aviv Chug in Mandate Palestine," Architectural History 39, September (1996), pp. 147-180.} [Fig. 2]

The advocacy of this "traceless modernism" was common among architects who were close to Labor circles: architects who were born, educated and professionally trained in Europe. Members of the Tel Aviv Chug (Circle), for example, who were instrumental in institutionalizing modern architecture in the Yishuv, first arrived in Palestine circa 1920.
from Eastern Europe. These architects integrated into the workers’ circles, which formed the stronghold of Labor Zionism. When they left Mandate Palestine a few years later to study architecture in Europe, their political affiliation with Labor Zionism, as well as their identity as part of the Yishuv, was already established. This identity inspired their pursuit of modern trends in the architectural schools of Vienna, Rome, Dessau and Paris during the late 1920s. Their return to Palestine in the early 1930s was thought to be a return home. In comparison to those architects who first arrived in the 1930s after the rise of Fascism in Europe, members of the Tel Aviv Chug were practically natives.13

Since the 1930s, Mandate Palestine has indeed been a home for renowned European modern architects, such as Erich Mendelsohn, Adolf Rading and Alexander Klein.14 Yet hardly any of these immigrants succeeded in securing significant positions of power in the transition to statehood, nor were they judged equitably by early Israeli architectural historiography.15 Instead, members of the younger generation of lesser known architects, such as members of the Tel Aviv Chug, became the powerful mediators between the triumphant axis of the Bauhaus and Le Corbusier in Europe and the US, and the similarly dominant Labor leadership in Mandate Palestine. Most powerful among them was Arieh Sharon, a student of Hannes Meyer at the Bauhaus and a manager of his projects thereafter, who became the first head architect of the State of Israel.16

12 Julius Posener, "One Family Houses in Palestine," Habimyan 2 (1937).
13 See, for example, the autobiography: Aryeh Sharon, Kibbutz + Bauhaus: An Architect’s Way in a New Land (Stuttgart: Kramer Verlag, 1976). Also see the biography: Ran Sh’hori, Zeev Rechter, Israeli Artists (Jerusalem: Public Council for Culture and Art., 1987).
15 The principle text on Israeli architecture of the period I discuss in this study was Hashimshoni, “Architecture.”
16 Sharon, Kibbutz + Bauhaus.
For Sharon, the Zionist avant-garde always preceded the architectural one. Similarly, the architecture of Sharon and his colleagues was always imbued with a pragmatic version of political Zionism. An “international architecture,” to use a Bauhaus term, accorded with Herzl’s call to see in Jews a nation like any other. The reinforced concrete construction of the local “new architecture” helped undermine the Arab dominance while empowering the call for “Hebrew work.” [Fig. 3] This architecture was clearly geared toward a pragmatic version of Political Zionism rather than the regional dictates of Cultural Zionism, that insisted on grounding the Zionist project in its original Oriental locale.

Although this study discusses primarily modern architecture, it is important to keep the project of negation, on which this modernism was established, in mind. Labor Zionist architects tried to distinguish their architectural position for the built landscape of Mandatory Palestine from that of competitors. The British advocated regionalist architecture—they paid close attention to the Palestinian vernacular and made a case for the revival of Islamic building typologies and techniques. [Fig. 4, bottom] Palestinians also entertained local aspirations, with a historiography that lauded local architecture as distinctively Palestinian-Arab, and with ties to other Middle Eastern bourgeois cultures. [Fig. 4, top] In this context, early Zionist claims to integrate in the Oriental, biblical

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17 This was the title of the famous Bauhaus exhibition in 1923, which marked the transition from the expressionist phase that the school was in at its opening in 1919 to a greater commitment to technology, mass production and abstract design.
locale\textsuperscript{20} were doomed to failure first and foremost within the Zionist context of the Yishuv’s insecure possession of the land and culture of Palestine. When modern architecture replaced so-called Oriental Eclecticism at the end of the 1920s, it gave form to an already developed separatist agenda that was widening the gap between the Yishuv and the Arab society in Mandate Palestine.\textsuperscript{21}

Non-Labor Zionist modernists who tried to mediate between modern and local built traditions risked alignment with a political agenda that would become obsolete by the end of the Mandate period. The example of Erich Mendelsohn, the most important modern architect working in Palestine, illustrates this point. Mendelsohn tried to evade national and cultural boundaries by working with both the Zionists and the British. His architectural engagement with the “Orient” drew on the Palestinian vernacular and addressed cultural Zionist tenets that he inherited from the philosopher Martin Buber.\textsuperscript{22}

But the “regional modernism” that he created was accepted with a grain of salt in Zionist circles. [Fig. 5] While respecting his achievements, the architectural historiography of early statehood judged his oeuvre as a dead end.\textsuperscript{23} Mendelsohn’s connections with the

\textsuperscript{22} See Nitzan-Shiftan, “Contested Zionism.”
British, his Orientalist propensity, and his political support of a bi-national political solution suggested to many that he was not a devoted enough Zionist.24

Reading Mamlachtiyut Culturally

[Fig. 6] After independence, there was a pressing need to create an infrastructure that would under-gird the new nation-state.25 Mamalchtiyut, a project inaugurated primarily by Israel’s first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, sought to shape a modern state, both structurally and morally, while invigorating the primordial essence of the nation. As such, it targeted the problematic hyphen between “nation” and “state,” which many scholars have questioned. Clifford Geertz, for example, points at the ambiguity between civic and primordial sentiments in the constitutions of post-colonial nation-states.26 In like fashion, Walker Connor distinguishes between the political-territorial definition of the state vs. the ethnic self-definition of the nation.27

The mamlachtiyut project took shape in a time of mass immigration that tripled the Jewish population of Mandate Palestine in under a decade. Ben-Gurion’s goal of identifying Jews who came primarily from Europe and Arab countries with the state that was recently established drove him to the bible, which he established as the “founding

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text” and common authoritative narrative of all Jews. Israel was where the bible was originated and only in Israel could its spirit be revived. In his own words:

Only a people living independently in its own land will read with open eyes and intuitive understanding the Book of Books, which was created in that land by that people. Only a generation that has inherited its independence in its own homeland will understand the spirit and soul of its predecessors, who acted, battled, conquered, created, worked, suffered, pondered, sang, loved, and prophesized within that land.29

This credo of renewed ties between new and ancient Jews was propagated in every aspect of statist life, ranging from education to military rituals, and fostered by archeology as well as by numerous field trips to biblical sites. The new version of Israelized Judaism that Ben-Gurion introduced to the political and cultural system immediately after independence attempted to close the gap between civil and traditional religions (reducing also the open breach between Ben-Gurion’s labor movement and new voters as well as between the socialist movement and liberal Jewish donors overseas). More importantly, the biblical-territorial approach, as Anita Shapira describes it, helped Ben-Gurion to fulfill the political and cultural requirements of modern nationalism: conceptualizing a national community of Jews ruling a sovereign state, sharing a common past, concrete (historical) land, and collective destiny. According to Mitchell Cohen this attainment completed the reification of the Zionist socialist movement, turning it into a national movement unified around common symbols of nationhood.30

Mamlachtiyut is habitually translated into statism, emphasizing the dissolution of the socialist institutions of the Yishuv to accommodate the new concept of a centralized state. Linguistically, however, mamlachtiyut is a derivative of mamlacha, a kingdom. It alludes to the Judea Kingdom, and thus to the ethnic origin of Judaism. This emphasis presented a shift from the pre-independence stress on the political act of establishing ‘a state like that of every nation,’ toward the cultural course of Jewish nationalism. The current historical notion of an extreme religious right wing obscures the secularity and transparency of Jewish nationalism in early statehood. Ben-Gurion invoked Judaism not as a religious essence but rather as a means for national cohesion. A.B. Yehoshua, for example, an eminent Israeli writer and a distinguished member of the sabra (Israeli-born) generation, reads in Ben-Gurion’s identity-making a move “from a New Jew to Complete Jew,” in other words, an attempt to invest in the New Jew the cult of primordial Judaism in order to arrive at a more rounded national identity reaching beyond its newness.

31 This view is elaborated in the influential book: Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yihiea, Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). According to Liebman and Don Yihiea, first was statism, a civil religion sanctifying the “state.” The new religion emerged only after, valuing primarily the Jewish “nation.” They define statism as an affirmation of “the centrality of state interests and the centralization of power at the expense of nongovernmental groups and institutions. In terms of symbols and style, statism reflects the effort to transform the state and its institutions into the central foci of loyalty and identification. Statism gives rise to values and symbols that point to the state, legitimate it, and mobilize the population to serve its goals. In its more extreme formulation statism cultivates an attitude of sanctity toward the state, affirming it as an ultimate value.” (p. 84) I suggest, however, that the linguistic origin of mamlachtiyut as well as its cultural practices provoked a parallel rather than sequential emphasis on the prime values of a modern state and a Jewish nation.

32 The culture of the yishuv had already secularized Judaism, revived the Hebrew language and created its own version for Jewish holidays. For the changes Ben-Gurion introduced to this system compare two articles by Anita Shapira: Anita Shapira, "The Religious Motifs of the Labor Movement" and “Ben-Gurion and The Bible,” both in Old Jews, New Jews. For the transition, see also Cohen, State and Zion.

33 A.B. Yehoshua, “From a New Jew to a Complete Jew: Ben-Gurion as an Identity Engineer,” paper presented at the conference: Strochlitz Institute of Holocaust Studies, Haifa University. "New Jews and Old Jews; Following the Book by Anita Shapira," January 29, 1997. Yehoshua added that the term “complete Jew” was not easily understood in Israeli culture because it connoted a religious Jew, an ingredient that never entered the sabra recipe.
“When asked to summarize the identity of the Generation of the State [i.e. sabras who matured into statehood] as a headline,” Yehoshua writes, “it would be: ‘The Meaning of Israeliness as Complete Jewishness.’”

Shlomo Avineri noted that the European models of the New Jew never “immigrated” to Palestine. The second, sabra generation of Zionists was familiar neither with the intellectual origins of the New Jew, nor with the memory of a traditional Jewish home. The sabra, who, according to Moshe Shamir’s seminal novel, *Pirke Alik* (Alik’s Chapters), “was born out of the sea,” was seen as a clean slate ready to assimilate the values of the Yishuv without inner contradictions, yet also with no preexisting intellectual or religious traditions. Ben-Gurion’s cultural-biblical Judaism thus equipped the sabra with a cultural dimension, a history and a territorial rootedness that were hitherto overridden by the triple negation of the bourgeois, the Diaspora, and the Orient that I discussed above.

The sabra had been stereotyped as thorny and tough on the outside, while sweet and sensitive inside. [Fig. 7] The name comes from the sabra cactus fruit that embodies similar attributes. In a region where the sabra delineated Palestinian settlement, such a naming added to the appropriation of Palestinian culture. Ben-Gurion’s biblicization of the land was received as a natural extension of this trend. His campaign prepared the

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ground for quintessential *sabra* like Moshe Dayan, whose famous book *To Live with the Bible* translated nativeness into continuity, crowning the “son of the place” as a biblical descendent.38

The powers of *mamlachtiyut*’s cultural Judaism lay in its claimed transparency. The mandatory writing of “Jew” rather than “Israeli” under the rubric of “nationality” on Israeli identity cards only illustrated the extent to which, for the entire labor-oriented *sabra* generation, the fusion of nation and state was taken as a matter of fact.39 Being Israeli automatically implied one’s Jewish ethnicity and national culture rather than one’s religion. This formation of Israeli national identity created a clear center and periphery in Israeli culture. At the center were secular yet rooted *sabras* of (Eastern) European descent (Ashkenazi). According to Ben-Gurion, they were morally invigorated by their unmediated experience of the biblical place. Destined to be the Yishuv’s heirs, they fulfilled their socialist mission by absorbing large waves of immigration immediately after independence. As natives “of the place,” *sabras* became a mandatory model of identification for new immigrants. [Fig. 8] At the same time, however, they formed an inner circle into which new immigrants had only limited access.40

Most Israeli architects discussed in this study who held significant positions of power in a centralized building market were members of this inner circle, as were the leading artists

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37 Cactus plants were brought to the region in the 19th century and were used by Palestinians to divide plots of land. The short botanical history of this prime regional symbol testifies to the constant process of essentializing history for nationalistic ends that all parties involved in the conflict practiced.
39 This rubric on the Israeli identity card was cancelled only in 2002.
40 A thorough background to this period can be found in: Tom Segev and Arlen Neal Weinstein, *1949, the First Israelis* (New York; London: Free Press; Collier Macmillan, 1986).
with whom they associated. A curator of a major exhibition presenting the work of this generation describes this group of primarily Israeli-born artists as:

people that acquired all their concepts of landscape, climate, society, culture and art here. This assessment can be sharpened for the sake of discussion: they can be described as belonging to the protected inner circle of children of labor oriented Eretz-Yisrael, brought up in youth movements or on kibbutzim – the essence of “the first Israel”, as perceived in the concepts of the 1950’s and 1960’s.41

The inner circle of “the first Israel” (to be distinguished from “the second Israel” of low-income Mizrahi Jews, who were of Arab descent) was the hub of an entire generation of Israeli architects that is closely analyzed in chapter 5.

New immigrants, particularly orthodox Jews, Israeli Arabs, and immigrants of Arab descent, were held outside this inner circle.42 Even devoted Zionists among the orthodox Jews were denied social and cultural entry to the privileged inner circle because they did not comply with its unofficial secular rules. Most clearly left out were Arab Israelis, who could not write “Jew” under the national rubric on the Israeli Identity Cards. The growing power of these groups—particularly that of Jews of Arab descent—gradually undermined the Labor hegemony, eventually defeating it politically in 1977.

Remarkably, both orthodox and Mizrahi Jews contested the Labor movement on the same premises that were originally developed by Ben-Gurion: those of a reified, secularized and sanctified Jewish nationalism. After ’67, however, the (religious) right wing not only

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42 Among these new immigrants, European Jews had better prospects of assimilating into a society aspiring to be Western than did Mizrahi Jews. See: Shlomo Swirski, Orientals and Ashkenazim in Israel (Haifa: Notebooks for Research and Criticism, 1981); Hanan Hever, Yehuda Shenhav, and Pnina Mutzafi-Haler, eds., Mizrahiim in Israel (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 2002).
de-secularized the nationalism of *mamlachtiyut*, but also challenged the authority of the state within the confinement of which it emerged.

**The Architecture of Mamlachtiyut**

The modern architects who were active during the Mandate period and into statehood concerned themselves with heat, wind, light, topography, and the availability of building materials. They not only ignored history and culture, but went to great lengths to erase them in order to legitimize a new “national home” for New Jews. The “new architecture” was a symbolic phase of architectural modernism that projected a socialist society, a national style and a modernizing state long before the bureaucratic and technical state apparatus took form.\(^4\) White, smooth, and repetitive, this architecture symbolized health, hygiene, equality and independence. [Fig. 9] For socialist Jews, this architecture was the “house of the country in which [the Jew] is settling,” an island of Western progress in the midst of a backward Orient.\(^4\)

The transition from the Yishuv to the State was marked by the creation of a massive planning apparatus, the blueprint of which was prepared by planners of the Circle for Reform Settlement, who joined Arieh Sharon once he was appointed by David Ben-


\(^4\) Julius Posener, then a member of a modernist-socialist circle, clarified in 1937 that “the Jew wants to construct here, for the first time in his life, a house of his own, and moreover, this house should be the house of the country in which he is settling.” This request did not merely express an ambition to shelter members of the emerging Zionist entity, but also expressed an aspiration to instill a new national consciousness in the inhabitants by means of modern dwelling. See: Posener, “One Apartment Houses,” p. 1.
Gurion to head the State planning division. Aiming for a rapid and forceful modernization, this project set the framework for new towns to be built all over the country. Faithful to the Labor slogan “from the city to the village,” these small towns were intended to serve numerous agricultural settlements. The State’s earliest plans and the resultant modernization of Israel’s built landscape recently attracted considerable scholarly attention. This first decade of independence is beyond the scope of this study, yet it is important to establish that, architecturally and ideologically, early statist plans stayed in tune with the premises of Labor Zionism.

Take, for example, the book *Physical Planning*, in which Arieh Sharon articulated Israel’s first physical plan. Its array of “local landscapes” includes images of bare, virgin lands and territories already redeemed by the Zionist project. The book argues—with charts, precedents, and prescriptions—that the architectural characteristics of the “new architecture”—rationalist, functionalist, technologically updated, and visually cleansed of classical or oriental symbolism—were thus appropriate for the project of state-building. The ideology of the plan maintained and also further perfected the triple negation of the Diaspora, the bourgeoisie and the Orient, which created a land conceptualized as a *tabula rasa*. Moreover, the modernization project in which this plan was implicated extended the Yishuv’s belief in

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46 For a primary source on this period see: Haim Darin-Drabkin, *Public Housing in Israel; Surveys and Evaluations of Activities in Israel's First Decade, 1948-1958* (Tel Aviv: Gadish Books, 1959).
the transformative power of modern architecture into social engineering. Mass-produced modern environments, united under the slogan kidma ve 'pituah (progress and development), intended to remake en masse a population of new immigrants into New Jews. Subsequent ‘molding’ of Jews from Arab countries to fit this modernist view, based as it was on Western models and built according to the vision of a European avant-grade, further fostered the societal tensions that would erupt in the early Seventies.

The greatest impact of statehood on architecture was its far-reaching complicity in planning, which resulted in a political program for functional and rudimentary housing that administratively produced entire built environments. Architecture moved from a “symbolic” stage of Labor modernism to a “literal” phase of housing on a massive scale. Obviously, neither this bureaucratic architecture nor the high modernism of elite architects who built statist and workers’ institutions responded to the ethnic or to the cultural-territorial aspects of the mamlachtiyut project Ben-Gurion advanced so vigorously. Combining Zionist and architectural modernisms into ideologies that immigrant architects practiced was unlikely to open any venues toward cultural-territorial contextualism. For European architects, “place” was a notion mediated by ideologies that sanctified the negation of the past. As a result, their architecture was geared toward building the state, and ignored the demand of the mamlachtiyut to address the history, ethnicity and place of the Jewish nation.

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The difficulty of consolidating the hyphenated value systems of state and nation in visual, and, more specifically, architectural culture is bluntly illustrated in the celebrated 1950s poster that opened this study. [Fig: title page of Preamble] The poster’s sharply dichotomized iconography splits its pictorial plane into two: a Zionist settlement with white modernist houses, and a figure holding a shofar that embodies in its praying veil the walls of Jerusalem and the Tower of David. This dichotomy illustrates “the incongruity between the political space of the sovereign state and the cultural space of the nation.” The rift between the two disturbs the goals of the *mamlachtiyut* project: consolidating the state and devising for it a secular Jewish culture. Israeli-born architects sensing this incompatibility, articulated it in the language of identity and community. In order to devise a concrete and tangible sense of belonging, they sought an unmediated experience of place. I submit that the architecture of *mamlachtiyut* resulted from the efforts of a generation that grew up in the utopist and abstract white houses on the right side of the poster to foster a rooted national identity by negotiating with the brown figure on the left on issues pertaining to place, history and nation. Chapter 5 of this study explores the complexities of this negotiation and its inevitable inner contradictions: a secular generation that was intimidated by religious aura yet still desired the biblical locale; Hebrew speaking, Israeli-born Westerners aspiring to concretize their nativeness in the East; architects driven by humanistic concerns to “man” and “community” who studied the Palestinian vernacular with admiration, yet neglected to see the people within.

The architectural knowledge required for such negotiation was drawn from a post-WWII architectural culture that put criticism of the Modern Movement at the center of

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50 Kemp, “Borders, Space,” p.17
contemporary debate.\textsuperscript{51} If the founding generation carefully heeded the architects of CIAM, sabras were following architects who brought CIAM to an end.\textsuperscript{52} These were members of the European Team X,\textsuperscript{53} particularly Peter and Alison Smithson,\textsuperscript{54} Aldo van Eyck,\textsuperscript{55} and Candilis, Josic and Woods,\textsuperscript{56} who, like their Israeli colleagues, admired the architecture of Louis Kahn.\textsuperscript{57} Many studied the late brutalist architecture of Le Corbusier with the devotion of Talmudic scholars: they admired its “truth to materials,” bluntness, and response to living experience and vernacular traditions.\textsuperscript{58} The teachings of Americans such as Lewis Mumford,\textsuperscript{59} Bernard Rudofsky,\textsuperscript{60} Jane Jacobs,\textsuperscript{61} and

\textsuperscript{51} The crisis of international and local modernism during the post-WWII period was closely related to the Israeli scene. For example, in 1956, during the tenth CIAM congress, a young generation of architects challenged architecturally and organizationally the premises of the organization. A year later, a young generation of Israeli-born architects confronted their modernist elders during the annual conference of Israeli architects near the Sea of Galilee. The dissolution of CIAM in 1959 by Team X, which emerged as a leading architectural group, coincided with the rise of their slightly younger contemporaries in Israel into professional prominence (chapter 5).


\textsuperscript{53} Alison Margaret Smithson and Team 10, \textit{Team 10 Primer} (Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press, 1968).


Christopher Alexander\textsuperscript{62} would also cross the ocean, invigorating regional trends as well as the return to architecture and the city. Through such diverse post-WWII architectural variants, which I discuss in chapters 3 and 5, local architects came to define the “Israeliness” of the \textit{mamlachiyyut} project.

During the severe economic recession that Israel experienced between 1965 and 1967, architects had time to reassess their vocation, and to further localize international influences. At that point, the younger generation already controlled the traditional herald of the architectural community, the \textit{Journal of the Association of Engineers and Architects in Israel}. They produced special issues on topics ranging from new towns to educational campuses and, of course, on housing.\textsuperscript{63} Against the rather univocal and authoritative voice of this single journal, new periodicals such as \textit{Architektura} (Architecture) and \textit{Tvai} (route, path or delineation) emerged. Architects also wrote in art journals such as \textit{Tziyur ve 'Pisul} (Painting and Sculpture) and \textit{Kav} (Line). The titles and content of such publications signaled a shift from issues of national planning into more specific architectural concerns.

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\textsuperscript{63} The Journal was also called \textit{handasha ve-adrichalut} (Engineering and Architecture). Dan Etan edited a series of special issue that were the outcome of informal close symposia of architects related to the Tel Aviv circle of architects that I discuss in chapter 6. The symposia were recorded and transcribed.
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Despite their growing visibility, members of this generation were considered rebels contesting the state apparatus. To demonstrate their point, they alleged, for example, that Israel’s most productive architect maintained a stock of semi-originals in his office. He would pull them out for every housing commission, altering them for different sites by only adding the required cladding for the appropriate region: stucco for the south, natural stone for Jerusalem.\(^{64}\) On another occasion, the young architects complained to the Ministry of Housing that they got few and scattered commissions. With a bitter sense of pride, they recall the answer that promised them only the number of commissions necessary to impress the honorary guests of the Ministry and that this would be only a few—though all of them were exemplary—projects.\(^{65}\) At this time, this generation was recognized as cutting edge, but not as the major professional force that ran the building apparatus. This situation would change dramatically immediately after the War.

It is important to remember that the influence of the generation under focus—the most dominant in Israeli culture in the last four decades, and the one that won the mandate to Israeliize Jerusalem—is not limited to its architecture. This generation had enormous influence on studio education and a paramount impact on institutional practices.

Consider, for example, the class that graduated the Technion shortly after the ‘67 War.\(^{66}\) It rebelled in order to get the sabra generation as its teachers, and moved thereafter almost \textit{en masse} to practice in Jerusalem. Concurrently, Ram Karmi assembled a team of

\(^{64}\) Interview with Dan Etan, July 29, 1998. Many architects of this generation mentioned in interviews the overwhelming number of commissions that fell into the productive hands of Itzhak Perlstein. Etan remarked that guests from overseas, after three days of touring, felt sorry for the architect of the state, who was probably very tired—this was a bitter criticism of the uniformity of the architects pull and their products.

\(^{65}\) Interview with Dan Etan, July 29, 1998.
young architects in the Ministry of Housing. Two members of this team were heads of
two of the three major architectural schools in Israel at the time during which this
research was conducted, and another three team members are leading one of the most
successful architectural practices in the country. The bold beginnings of Jerusalem’s
post-'67 architecture were thus the foundation of a program for “an architecture of the
place” that, until recently, was hardly contested. For the younger practitioners of this
architectural program, who grew up in a state permeated by the *mamlachtiyut* project, the
“Six Day War,” to which I turn next, was a remarkably formative event.

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66 Interviews with Zeev Drukman (July 23, 2001), Yoram Fogel (July 28, 1998), David Guggenheim (July
Jerusalem is not only a place. It is not just another point on the map. It is not only a capital city. Jerusalem is a concept. Jerusalem is a series of symbols: it is a city one yearns for, it is a sacred city, it is a city of peace, it is a capital city, it is a city of inspiration for writers and artists, it is a symbol for the history of the people of Israel and the connection of this people to its land throughout the ages...There is no point in studying Jerusalem if it is impossible to stand in and around it.

Introduction to a course about Jerusalem.
By 1967, the stress of a two-year recession had been heightened by an anxiety about impending military confrontation. There was doubt, both in Israel and overseas, that the country would survive. In what follows, I unfold the historical events that dramatically turned existential anxiety into an ecstatic euphoria. The chapter reviews the policies that intended to cement East and West Jerusalem, the confiscations that followed, and the dilemmas they provoked.\(^1\) The decade that followed the war, the timeframe of this study, has irreversibly shifted the tenets of Israeli society. Should the architectural production of such a transitional period be classified as modern, or should it be considered, instead, as an early embodiment of the postmodern phenomenon?

**Seizing Jerusalem**

On June 5, Israel attacked Egypt and Syria, countries that had put it under siege. Jordan, misled by Egyptian reports from the Southern battlefield, simultaneously launched its own attack on Western Jerusalem, ignoring Israeli calls for a cease-fire. The eventual conquest of the Old City, and of East Jerusalem the following couple of days, was the climax of a war that lasted six days and became a watershed date in the political history of Israel, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and international politics of the Cold War era. Israel went from being a Jewish David fighting an Arab Goliath to a country of prosperity. The sudden encounter between Arabs and Jews, Palestinians and Israelis, was powerful and confusing. It pitted a State based on Western models against the distinct other against which it was formed.

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\(^1\) For comprehensive accounts of the various aspects of the Israeli unification of Jerusalem, see: Meron Benvenisti, *Jerusalem, the Torn City* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976) and Uzi
Historical accounts portray conflicting emotions guiding the Israeli response to the Jordanian attack. It forced members of the unity government of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to face again the question of Jerusalem, nineteen years after Israelis surrendered the Jewish Quarter to Jordan.² Jerusalem had always provoked an ambivalent reaction in Zionist ideology and diplomacy.³ Its sacredness intimidated the socialists. Moreover, the Jewish inhabitants of the Old City belonged to the Old Yishuv, the antithesis of everything Labor. Zali Gurevitz and Gidon Aran argue that Jerusalem was also unsettling in a deeper sense: Zionism inherited from the Jewish religion the notion of Zion, i.e., Jerusalem, as an idea, a text, a longing. Jerusalem always existed as an abstract entity out of reach—as a subject of yearning, of essential distance. The option of reaching Jerusalem, of concretizing the idea in actual tangible territory, presented itself as an inner contradiction. In Jerusalem, “Zionism was fearing its own fulfillment.”⁴ It may not be surprising then that when Moshe Dayan, the Minister of Security during the war, stood on Mount Scopus overlooking the Old City, debating whether to engage in a battle over it, he pondered, “what do we need all this Vatican for?”⁵

Dayan’s was a foretelling remark. After the war, Jerusalem’s Jewish population was immediately swept up in messianic feelings of redemption. Ben-Gurion’s mamlachiyyut

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³ For the location of Jerusalem in Zionist thought, see: Hagit Lavsky, Jerusalem in Zionist Consciousness and Action (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar le-toldot Yisrael, 1989).
⁴ Gurevitz and Aran, “Al Ha-makom.”
⁵ See: Nadav Shragai, Temple Mount Conflict: Jews and Muslims, Religion and Politics Since 1967 (Jerusalem: Keter, 1995), p.18. During the conference “Six Days – Thirty Years” (Tel Aviv: Rabin Center for Israeli Studies, May 26-28, 1997), Amnon Rubinstein mentioned that in the cabinet the Zionist religious party was the most reluctant to venture into the Old City. The papers in this conference were published in: Susser, ed., Six Days - Thirty Years: A New Look at the Six Day War.
project seemed to have reached its climax. The biblical landscapes, after 2,000 years of exile, were now within reach. Jerusalem became the top national priority for Israel, and consequently for Palestinians whose national demands were not yet recognized by the Labor government. Recent studies focus on the unceasing re-sacralization the city as a result of the conflict, which constantly invests the city’s monuments with the realities of the escalating conflict. In what follows, I review some of the immediate implications of the city’s 1967 unification by Israel on the politics of space in Jerusalem.

Unifying Yerushalayim and El Quds

To set their imprint on Jerusalem Israelis hurried to create irreversible “facts.” Some were insightful, like Dayan’s insistence on leaving the Temple Mount precinct in the hands of the Muslim Waqf. Others were dictated by the urgency to pre-empt international intervention. The legal and territorial unification of Jerusalem, deliberated from June 11-27, 1967, exemplified this trend. The debate concerned the boundaries of the unified city, and the appropriate legal system for their maintenance. Meron Benvenisti, Jerusalem Deputy Mayor, and Rehav’am Zeevi (Gandi), of the Israeli Defense Forces, marked the poles of the territorial logic. Benvenisti was a minimalist, supporting a compact city with clear boundaries that could lend itself to efficient municipal management. Gandi was concerned with the range of cannons in case of a military threat, and argued accordingly for stretched out boundaries that would secure strategic depth. The compromise between the urban and military schools of thought

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turned the thirty-seven square kilometers of Israeli West Jerusalem, the one square kilometer of the Old City, and the seven square kilometers of Jordanian East Jerusalem into the hundred and fifteen square kilometers of the “united city.” Israeli Jerusalem tripled the size of the pre-war city.

The other debate concerned the legal status of occupied Jerusalem: should it be subjected to military rule, which implies temporality? Should it be open to lasting international agreement? Or, rather, should it be permanently annexed to Israel? Prime Minister Eshkol supported annexation. At least six of fourteen ministers objected to annexation due to international pressure: the Geneva Treaty dictated the first option, while world nations seeking political imprint in the area (the United States in particular) supported the second. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested avoiding annexation because “it would plant the seed of violence of future Jihad.”7 The solution to dominion without declaration was found in municipal procedures. Under an adjustment to the Israeli municipal command, the Minister of Interior Affairs could change the boundaries of any given municipality without further investigation. The adjustment was approved by the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) on June 28, 1967, and Israeli law was practically enacted in the “unified city.” [Fig. 11] Israel responded to protests from the UN Security Council by repudiating accusations of political unification or annexation, claiming instead that the Israeli procedure was only an administrative adjustment, merely a technical routine attempting to settle postwar chaos.8

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7 Moshe Amirav lecture at the University of Haifa, April 2, 1989.
8 Ibid.
“Unified City”: Goals

Once this primary goal of unifying Jerusalem was reached, the government could develop a policy based on a set of goals that seemed feasible during the decade in question, but which history has proved to be too ambitious or even misleading. Moshe Amirav has listed these impossible goals, starting with the irreversibility of the unification, which is now practically undone after Ehud Barak’s principal agreement to split the city. A second goal attempted to enforce territorial hold over East Jerusalem. This resulted in an industrious building campaign that encircled Jerusalem with housing estates for the Jews. These estates facilitated the third goal—the Judaisation of the city. However, a fourth goal, developing an economic infrastructure, met with limited success. The quest to rule and supervise the Arab minority was also unsuccessful. In was in fact a disaster. Unlike Arab Israelis of the post-’48 years, residents of East Jerusalem refused the normalization of Israeli rule: they rejected compensation for their confiscated land, they objected to Israeli intervention in their civil life, and they declined participation in the Israeli political body. This greatly helped Palestinians to undermine the sixth Israeli goal: achieving international legitimacy for their rule. With the 1980 official declaration of Israeli rule over East Jerusalem, most foreign embassies departed from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv.

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10 Moshe Amirav, lecture class on post-67 Jerusalem, University of Haifa, Department of Political Science, Spring 1989.

11 Eventually, Jewish immigration to the city found its counterpart in an Arab population seeking employment in Jerusalem’s booming construction industry.
Building the Confiscated Land of East Jerusalem

Perhaps the most irreversible phenomenon in the Israeli campaign to Israelize Jerusalem was its massive construction campaign. Until 1977, Israeli policy focused on building Jerusalem inside its new municipal boundaries, unlike the Likud government’s post-'77 emphasis on settling the larger periphery of Jerusalem with settlements such as Ma’ale Edomim, Giv’at Zeev and Betar. This policy would later weaken the city that between 1967 and 1977 enjoyed an unprecedented budget.13

[Fig. 12] The first confiscation of East Jerusalem land in 1968 attempted to connect the Israeli enclave of Mount Scopus with the northern quarters of pre-'67 Jerusalem, and to Israelize the Jewish Quarter in the Old City.14 The UN Security Council issued a condemnation against Israel, but it did not stop the Israelis from encircling Arab Jerusalem with a housing belt. In so doing, they continued the Zionist tradition of conquering land by means of building irrefutable “facts on the ground,” in this case so that the division of Jerusalem would be made impossible. According to this logic, legal unification is reversible as long as the land of East Jerusalem is not covered with Jewish construction.

External political threats by the UN only succeeded to activate this Zionist instinct.

Immediately following a December 1969 statement by US Secretary of State William

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14 The first January 11, 1968 confiscation was of 3345 dunams, the second smaller confiscation of April 18 that year was of 765 dunams near the pre-'48 settlement of Neve Yaakov, and 116 dunams in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. See Benziman, Jerusalem.
Rogers in favor of “some kind of Jordanian presence” in the united city, construction sped up, roads were paved, and two or three stories were added to the French Hill housing project that was then under construction. More significant was the August 1970 confiscation of an area that was roughly half the size of pre-'67 Israeli Jerusalem and almost three times the area of Arab Jerusalem at that time. Most of this land was split into three housing settlements, one to the north of Jerusalem and two to the south. These settlements were intended to house up to 150,000 inhabitants, starting with six to eight thousand units per year. Against mounting opposition to the plan, Zeev Sharef, the minister of housing, bluntly clarified that Jerusalem remained “an emphatically Jewish city. This is a plan with a Jewish goal. This is a Zionist exhibition.”

Predictably, reception overseas was not favorable. *Time* magazine, for example, announced that “Israel is literally bulldozing its way to Jewish control over the limestone and sand of Jordanian Jerusalem before any peace negotiations can be held.” Less expected, however, was the fierce opposition at home, but for totally different reasons. The hastily drawn up plans, violating the 1968 Jerusalem Masterplan, provoked an unprecedented public outrage. The third chapter of this study unfolds this drama. At this point, suffice is to say that the building activity following the 1970 confiscation matured into the largest concentration of Jerusalem middle class neighborhoods, falsifying the

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16 Ibid, p. 244.
17 Estimates of the prospective and actual building rates change with every interview, book and report. Among the planners the most common recollection is an estimate of a prospective 20,000 units per year, with 10,000 units actually built. For statistical data, see: Israel Kimhi, “Demographic and Economic Development.”
19 Ibid.
earlier prediction that the neighborhoods were slums in the making. These neighborhoods enjoyed a wide Israeli consensus—they were considered an integral part of Israeli Jerusalem until the second Palestinian intifada. The current shelling of Giloh’s houses by Beit Jallah’s gunmen is gradually eroding Israeli self-confidence in the colonization of East Jerusalem.

A Transitional Decade

The war of 1967 created a strong Israel with a “united capital.” As a result, Israel was swept with a euphoria and self-righteousness that shuttered the windows of opportunity for negotiations with Arab countries. This reluctance led to the 1973 war. Its devastating death toll and the economic crisis that ensued greatly weakened the Labor Party, which up until then had been the exclusive ruling party in Israel. The building sector was shaken by the suicide of Minister of Housing Avraham Ofer in 1977, due to alleged corruption. The right wing Likud party swept into power later that year, with Menahem Begin eventually hosting the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat during his historical visit to Israel in November 1977. The great wars and the new hope for peace thus frame a decade that transformed every possible aspect of Israeli society.

20 Consider, for example, a very influential article: Amos Elon, "Building (Destroying!) Jerusalem," Ha’aretz (December 11, 1970), p.9. Elon warned the Israeli public that hasty building will result in "monsters" and in "cries for generations." He predicted that "these housing blocks are predestined to become derelict and wretched in the near future," and that "we might make ourselves present in the entire Jerusalem by erecting a chain of slums around the city."

21 Ofer, who took office in 1974, was closely associated with the Labor Zionist housing project as the long-standing head of shikun ovdim (the Workers Housing governmental agency.) His accusation testified to the vulnerability of the Labor regime.

During this period, the immigrants who had held Israeli leadership were gradually being replaced by members of a younger, Israeli-born generation. Among this new generation were Moshe Dayan and Izhak Rabin, recognized as the heroes of the triumphant 1967 Six Day War. [Fig. 13] Paradoxically, however, exactly when the model of Israeliness that they represented—the goal of the 1950s aggressive melting pot—was gaining power, its political, social and cultural unity started to erode.\(^{23}\) Challenges were accumulating from both Right and Left, with powerful civic movements emerging on each side. While *Gush Emunim* (The Block of the Faithful) cited religious sources to justify their insistence on settling the biblical Land of Israel, *Shalom ‘Achshav* (Peace Now) strove to exploit the full potential of a peace process by returning the occupied territories before a call to war could be legitimized.\(^{24}\) These movements indicated the comprehensive 1970s shift: the original polarization of Left and Right according to socio-economic credo (socialist vs. liberal) had given way to similar polarization along national-territorial issues.\(^{25}\) But the postwar prosperity also deepened the socio-economic gaps and ethnic tensions that plagued the mythical Israeli. Descendents of Arab (*Mizrahi*) Jews, organized in movements such as the Black Panthers,\(^{26}\) were claiming their social and cultural space in a society that was dominated by Labor-oriented *Ashkenazim* (of primarily Eastern European origin).\(^{27}\) At the same time, Arab Israelis were redefining their identity as Israeli citizens vis-a-vis Palestinians of the occupied territories. Some leaders of both

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\(^{24}\) See: Michael Fiege, "Social Movements, Hegemony and Political Myth: A Comparative Study of Gush Emunim and Peace Now Ideologies" (Ph.D., Hebrew University, 1995).


\(^{26}\) The name and symbols were taken from the California-based group that fought for equal rights for African Americans in the US, but there is no other connection between the two movements.

\(^{27}\) See: Swirski, *Orientals and Ashkenazim*. 

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groups joined Leftist movements to fight the growing socio-economic disparity, on the lower end of which their constituencies were located. Of much greater political efficacy was the decisive electoral power the Likud gained by offering Mizrahi Jews a political outlet.

Culturally, Israel was conceived until ’67 as a frontier society besieged by a threatening Arab World. [Fig. 14] Its newfound power and economic prosperity, as well as an increased level of international exchange, opened Israeli culture to international influences while eroding the image of a unified Israel bolstered by an uncontested national narrative. Rock music, theater, and a new Israeli television network (established in 1968) marked the opening of the cultural market. As a result, tensions emerged between the conflicting desires to challenge the myth of the unified nation and to reinforce the entrenched national ideology. These desires often co-existed in the same cultural space. Rebellious architects were eager to embark upon avant-gardist projects, but simultaneously were both seduced by national commissions and trapped by their own formation as national subjects. This dynamic was crucial: architecture, more than other forms of cultural production, was viscerally tied to the Institutions of the State that were centralizing the huge building boom in which they desired a share.

Such industrious building activity required an immediate blueprint for Israeli Jerusalem. This blueprint was drawn mostly during the euphoric days that preceded the October War of 1973 (including the scheme for the Western Wall Plaza that I study in chapter five).
However, structural changes in Israel’s national and municipal planning agencies were taking shape throughout this decade, at the end of which designers were replacing planners in top institutional positions. At the time that these changes were completed, the centralized building market was nearing its end. The new Likud government and its privatization of the Israeli market thoroughly transformed the Ministry of Housing, the traditional stronghold of the Labor party. Under its rule, most governmental housing agencies were privatized and the selection of architects was no longer based on the personal choice of divisions’ heads. As one of Israel’s leading architects Avraham Yaski noted, “It is important to understand that [the Labor’s] Ministry of Housing disappeared! After David Levi [the new Likud Minister of Housing], a totally new Ministry appears. Therefore, I slowly, slowly disappear from there.”

David Levi’s claim to political power was based on a social agenda contesting the discrimination of Mizrahi Jews. By staging Levi in such a socially oriented ministry, the Likud divested Labor from its socialist notoriety, staging it instead as a ruling elite.

The first decade after the ’67 War was, indeed, the last decade of a close collaboration between a Labor-ruled State and a clearly bounded architectural elite. In this short period of time, a new generation of primarily Israeli-born architects won unprecedented power at a relatively young age. The ethnic composition of this architectural elite was typical

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28 That the national television was established on the occasion of the military parade marking the conquest of East Jerusalem shows how a media that opens up Israeli identity is also the one that constantly reinforces that same identity.

29 For a comprehensive account on the Ministry of Housing see: Shadar, The Influence of the Ministry.


31 Criteria according to which I identify the architectural group in power, besides conspicuous architectural commissions, consists of: leaders of the single professional association of architects in Israel; control over architectural publications; architects judging competitions or participating as consultants for disputed
of the Labor-oriented culture that dominated Israeli society. *Mizrahi* or Orthodox Jews, as well as Arabs, women, or new immigrants were all in the minority. The commitment of these architects to modernism differed from that of Israel’s founding generation. But, these architects though they presented internal challenges to the modernist paradigm, did not venture into a postmodern refutation of its theorem.

**Is Jerusalem’s Post-'67 Architecture Modern or Postmodern?**

In fact Jerusalem’s post-'67 architecture does not lend itself to easy categorization. Its tenets unsettle the prevalent stylistic classification to “early”, “late” and “post”-modern architecture. It did, however, evolved out of a growing frustration on the part of both architects and the general public with the repetitive modernist housing blocks that mushroomed in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Israel after independence in 1948. [Fig. 15] “Breaking the box,” however, was not sufficient: it had to be broken in a uniquely Jerusalemite manner. The result was a recognizable style burgeoning in the decade after 1967 that spread from the reconstructed Jewish Quarter to the new housing settlements on the outskirts of the city. Inspired by brutalist and regionalist architectural trends, the stone-clad buildings were broken into small terraced masses that tried to echo Jerusalem’s mountainous landscape. Densely laid out, these buildings typically form projects; architects organizing and participating in public symposia, etc. Most members of the central group I discuss in this study were in 1967 in the second half of their thirties.

32 This is not a statistical fact but a description of the powerful members of the architectural community. Most conspicuous among women were Ora Yaar and Shulamit Nadler, who worked together with their spouses Yaakov Yaar and Micha Nadler. Brazilian David Reznik and British David Best were the only private architects of this generation who were new immigrants during the period I study and achieved similar status to their leading *sabra* peers.

33 Early New Brutalism stressed reverence to materials, affinity between building and man, and inspiration from peasant architecture (particularly from the Mediterranean vernacular). Aesthetically, the trend is known for its brute materials, especially its characteristic exposed concrete. The building that most inspired this trend is Unite d’Habitation in Marseilles, a monumental housing complex by late Le
groups of row houses facing into courtyards. The buildings are thus said to mark “a shift from architecture of facades to architecture of [communal] interior spaces” in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{34} The exteriors of these buildings are covered with rough \textit{tubsa} stone, with the common exception of exposed concrete arches that point to the underlying concrete structure of these complexes.\textsuperscript{35} [Fig. 16-21] The style’s perplexing appearance inevitably provoked the question: Can this body of architecture be defined as modern, or is it a wholesale break with modernist paradigms despite the fact that the architects who created it were modernists?

During the past two decades Israeli architectural historiography has begun to develop its verdict on this architecture, using the term “Neo-Oriental Style” to describe this “promising new direction.”\textsuperscript{36} Often, the use of the arch was thought to be kitschy and banal, even vulgar.\textsuperscript{37} These trends were further condemned as “pseudo-historic creations laden with bogus Oriental motifs and overtones of Herodian, Crusader or mere Pueblo

\begin{flushright}
Corbusier. The first history of this trend by a contemporary critic is Banham, \textit{The New Brutalism}. I further discuss this influential trend in chapter 5.
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\textsuperscript{34} Interview with Amir and Ofer Kolker, July 27, 1998. The Kolkers were deputies to Ram Karmi, the head architect of the Ministry of Housing from 1974-1979. They were part of a large team that Karmi assembled in order to devise strict design guidelines for the entire country. Ofer was responsible for the central region while Amir was responsible for the Jerusalem region.
\textsuperscript{35} Conceptualized as a testing ground, the state allowed architects to build in the satellite neighborhood of Jerusalem morphological experiments that were hailed by the architectural community as cutting edge, revolutionary architecture, but that failed dramatically in the market. These complexes—Tzvi Hecker’s beehive complexes in Ramot and Eldar Sharon’s morphological \textit{casba} in Giloh, are beyond the scope of this study. Both Hecker and Sharon were students and later partners of Alfred Neumann, a charismatic professor at the Technion and a disciple of Le Corbusier. The morphological discourse they advanced pushed modernism to a new frontier that was well published at home and overseas. Eventually, however, the state had to salvage the projects Hecker and Sharon built in Jerusalem by allocating them to the low-income ultra orthodox population, or as temporary housing for new immigrants. For more on this trend, see “Future” in Chapter 6.
\textsuperscript{36} David Kroyanker used this term in his many publications on Jerusalem. The term, however, was already significant in an architectural culture that dismissed the 1920s ‘Oriental Eclecticism’ as practically immoral. For a review of this period see: Kroyanker, “Conflicts Over the City.”
Español structures.”38 To explain this seemingly abrupt shift in Israeli architecture, critics even suggested that architects in Jerusalem suddenly inaugurated “postmodern” trends long before Charles Jencks had contemplated it in his famous “Language of Postmodern Architecture.”39

The classification of this architecture as Postmodern is all too facile and relies upon a handful of stylistic features, while neglecting to take other factors into account. These include the role of the State in the production of this architecture, the oxymoronic socialist-colonialist project that this architecture—like other colonial modernist experiments in North Africa and elsewhere40—articulated, as well as the concurrent architectural trends that inspired this body of architectural production. Even if we doubt, as we should, contemporary Jerusalem architects’ complete commitment to modernism, we are still faced with other essentially modernist phenomena. First, Jerusalem’s post-'67 architecture was a product of a centralized building market that was administrated by the Ministry of Housing. Second, this architecture was complicit in a campaign to produce a collective national narrative with little room for any ethnic or social particularities. Third, the housing projects of Israelized Jerusalem comprise some of the most adventurous social programs in Israeli architecture.

38 Ester Zandberg interviewing Ztvi Efrat, see: Zandberg, “The Lost Dignity.”
39 See: Charles Jencks, The Language of Post-Modern Architecture, An Architectural Design Monograph (London: Academy Editions, 1977). During the conference 50 Years of Planning in Israel at the School of Architecture at the Technion, December 1998, Avraham Yaski, a leading architect of the first sabra generation, and Tzvi Efrat argued that post-'67 Jerusalem was distinctively postmodern ‘before the fact.’ Yaski even suggested that he and his colleagues had already read Robert Venturi’s Complexity and Contradictions and were implementing its message. I could find no evidence in writing for such early influence, nor an agreement between Venturi’s philosophy and the post-'67 architectural project.
40 See Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics of Design.
My propensity to discuss this architecture as “modern” cannot obscure, however, the shaky ground on which both this modern architecture and the Labor regime that sponsored it stood during the decade under consideration. This architecture, undoubtedly, was the architecture of power, yet it was also one of confusion. It enjoyed unlimited resources of land and budget—useful for fast construction—as well as the perplexing architectural mandate of reconstructing an ancient city with a contested history, different built traditions and non-Jewish residents. The result was an architecture that solicited a variety of descriptions: from locally sensitive to fortress or crusade-like; from revolutionary to “collective hara-kiri;” \(^4\) from biblical/traditional and home-like to colonial and oppressive. Indeed, from its megastructures of housing and schools to its careful preservation and orchestrated landscaping, post-'67 Jerusalem architecture exhibited some of the most fascinating, yet at times horrific, projects in the history of Israeli architecture—and, arguably, of post-WWII urbanism.

**The Mamlachtiyut of Jerusalem**

Choosing the term “Israelization” to describe the making of “united Jerusalem” defers from the habitual use of “Judaisation” or “Zionizaton” to portray the Israeli settlement of East Jerusalem. \(^4\) I read the project as more Israeli than Zionist because the emergence of the Zionist settler project in Mandate Palestine did not yet rely on the biblical narrative as its moral bedrock. This was a tenet of the *mamlachtiyut*’s secular Judaism that culturally formed Israeli statehood and legitimized the “Jewish return” to East Jerusalem.

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\(^4\) For similar distinction on which this study draws see: Kate Maguire, *The Israelization of Jerusalem*, vol. 7, *Arab Papers* (London: Arab Research Centre Publication, 1981).
Similarly, the Judaisation of Jerusalem was a demographic rather than cultural goal. It aimed at an ethnic majority of Jews in the city, not at addressing the tenets of Judaism as a religion. In fact, as chapter 6 demonstrates with regard to the Western Wall Plaza, the Israelization of Jerusalem often stood in sharp contradiction to the interests and creeds of various Jewish groups, who saw in the mamlachtiyut’s secular and historicized Judaism a violation of their faith.

Back in 1967, Ben-Gurion tried to impose this historicized Judaism on the city. No longer in a position of power but still revered by his disciples, he suggested tearing down the Ottoman Walls of the Old City, which he considered an obstacle to the meshing of West Jerusalem with its biblical past. Ben-Gurion’s statement foretold the great challenge that the presence of El Quds posed to the architecture of mamlachtiyut. Indeed, after ’67, when the figure in brown in the poster that opened this study took off its mysterious veil, exposing its edifices to the astounded eyes of Israeli builders, the architecture of mamlachtiyut had its greatest and most problematic moments.

The most mamlachi architect of this generation declared that “any architect worth his salt has tried in every period to return first of all to the ideal city – the Jerusalem of walls and towers, which exists in the topography of our minds.” This powerful metaphor mediates between the abstract idea of Zion and its similarly powerful architectural counterpart. The ‘mental topography’ of Jerusalem is taken here as a constant, an ideal that does not change over the years despite succeeding architectural trends or great

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historical epochs. *Mamlachtiyut* architecture, like the post-WWII modernism that inspired it, does not assume for this ideal any prefigured form—it is an idea of form, a principle. This ideal binds together Zion (i.e. Jerusalem) and architecture, which are both granted immortality: Zion by reviving a timeless nation and architecture by returning to primary disciplinary operations. I argue below that this joined quest for immortality bonded Ben-Gurion's *mamlachtiyut* project with post-WWII criticism of the Modern Movement.44

The following chapters unfold the different aspects of these conjunctures between nation and architecture. Chapter 3 examines master plans and outline schemes that attempted to prescribe an image for Jerusalem 'from above,' while chapter 5 analyzes bottom-up architectural operations of a local generation of architects who rapidly gained the power needed to build Israeli Jerusalem. Together with chapter 6, on the controversial design for the Western Wall Plaza, they establish the architecture of Jerusalem as a testing ground for post-WWII criticism of the Modern Movement as well as a manifesto of a sabra generation of architects. In the current political and architectural climate, this manifesto is rarely embraced.

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44 The architects that most influenced the architectural practitioners of *mamlachtiyut* were the late Le Corbusier and Louis Kahn. I discuss Kahn, a member of the Jerusalem Committee, in chapter 3. Le Corbusier's *Ouvre Complete* was treated by devoted architects like a bible. His Unite d'Habitation was probably the single most influential project for sabra architects during the 1960s. Reyner Banham writes of this building, "Without a doubt, it is one of the buildings in which Le Corbusier enters most convincingly into the great and true tradition of architecture as he understands it; the building in which all the rhetorical consonances between modern technology and ancient architecture in 'Vers une architecture' most nearly come true." See Banham, *The New Brutalism*, p. 16. Ram Karmi, who is quoted in the beginning of this paragraph, writes similarly on this building in his recent book. See: Ram Karmi, *Lyric Architecture* (Israel: Ministry of Defense, 2001), pp.54-67.
Chapter 3

ISRAELIZING JERUSALEM: PLANNERS AND PLANS

In 1967, when Israel captured East Jerusalem, it formally attempted to end the only division in Jerusalem’s history. This mission was relegated to teams of physical planners, who were asked to permanently Israelize Jerusalem, to carefully follow the dictum of the day: “Jerusalem built as a city which is bound together firmly.” (Psalms 122:3)¹ Meron Benvenisti, Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem from 1967-1979, had a key role in setting the terms for this mandate. In 2000, after years of public debate, he concluded that certain architects “influenced Jerusalem much more than those who attempted to speak in her name.”² Unlike political activists or businessmen, he explained, they spoke in a language that those in power could not decipher, yet could not resist, because of its cultural and symbolic assets. This was the language architects used for the production of masterplans and outline schemes that constituted *top-down* attempts to Israelize Jerusalem. As official or statutory guidelines, these plans are blueprints for future physical planning projects. Besides the conventional information they must contain, such as land uses, density of the built fabric, transportation systems and growth predictions, they are ideological statements presented in visual form. They articulate strategies for

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¹ Benziman’s report in *Ha’arets*, which follows, depicts the commotion surrounding planning, although Benziman does not indicate the presence of a hierarchy between the multiple bodies and planners:

“The Ministry of Housing has designated a team of architects to plan the restoration of the Jewish Quarter in the Old City. The Ministry for Religious Affairs has recruited architect Schonberger to plan the vicinity of the Western Wall. The university has appointed architect D. Reznik to plan the Mount Scopus area. Architect Miller is an advisor to the Jerusalem Municipality on the planning of a temporary park around the walls of the Old City (the National Parks Authority is entrusted with the planning of the permanent park). The Corporation for the Development of Eastern Jerusalem has selected a plan by architect M. Kohn for the development of the area west of the Old City wall extending to the grounds of the King David Hotel. Now a new decision includes this area in the enclave earmarked for handling by the subcommittee of the District Planning Committee. The masterplan advisory team working with the Municipality of Jerusalem has drawn up suggestions for the immediate planning of several areas in the eastern part of the city, while the Department of Planning within the Ministry of the Interior has drafted its own suggestions for the comprehensive planning of the entire eastern district. Apart from these bodies, the Municipality of Jerusalem itself is involved in the planning of Eastern Jerusalem in its role as the Local Committee for City Planning and through the subcommittee to be established in conjunction with the District Committee to act as an approving authority. Now a new decision calls for the establishment of a joint expert commission by the Municipality and the Ministry of the Interior.” Uzi Benziman, *Ha’arets*, March 1, 1968 (Hebrew).
visual and spatial projection of national, social, economic and aesthetic convictions onto a charted territory.

This chapter focuses on these plans in order to explore the relationship between the politics of architecture and the politics of space and nationalism in post-'67 Jerusalem. Consequently, my interest does not lie in the plans' necessary numbers, schemes and detailed projects, but rather in the cultural-political processes of their production. My goal is to identify the major forces that participated in negotiating the conceptual underpinnings of such plans—in the process, defining Israeli identity by shaping the space and image of the territory in which such identity is being formed. More readily, however, these plans demonstrate incapacity to collectively determine what an official image for Jerusalem should be, a shortcoming that testifies to the instability of post-'67 Israeli identity.

By 1968, the year in which Jerusalem's masterplan was concluded, a modernist crisis had already pervaded both an Israeli culture that sought expression for its symbolic conquest of East Jerusalem and an architectural culture that had recently dismantled its principal modernist organization. In 1970, Louis Kahn, Bruno Zevi, and Lewis Mumford, three of the thirty renowned members of the Jerusalem Committee, criticized the masterplan's disregard for this crisis. Invited by Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek,3 this advisory

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3 Most plenary sessions of the Jerusalem Committee were documented in proceedings that can be found in the Jerusalem Municipal Archive (particularly box 2543) and the Archive of the Jerusalem Foundation (in six uncatalogues boxes), as well as in private archives such as Sharon (1692, 1688). However, despite several indications that the proceedings of the 1970 meeting of the Subcommittee for Urban Planning of the Jerusalem Committee were under preparation, I could not find any completed proceedings besides the final resolution (see appendix). I did find notes taken at a session closed to the public in anticipation of such
committee was given the role of being the “civilizing” power keeping watch over Jerusalem. Ironically, however, the architectural program they advocated for Jerusalem, which was followed in Israeli plans for the Old City area, had strong affinities with the colonial regionalism of the British Mandate that Israelis had hitherto dismissed. They held in common an imagined image of a spiritual, Oriental and universal Jerusalem that lay bare three fundamental issues. One was a burgeoning imbalance between the modernist state and the Jewish nation. The second was a conflation of “East and West” with “Old and New” that divested Palestinians of their claim over Jerusalem’s history. The third was a universalization of “beauty” in Jerusalem that required a break with high modernism.

The Architectural Mandate

As soon as the walls between the two Jerusalems were destroyed and the minefields dismantled, a dichotomized landscape was laid bare. Western Jerusalem, known in Hebrew by its biblical name, Yerushalayim, was built mostly in the 20th century and in a modernist architectural style. It had been a capital city since 1949. Like elsewhere in Israel, the housing blocks of the city’s new neighborhoods were cubic, uniform, and perfectly ordered. More remarkable, however, was the exclusive choice of modernism for civic institutions, such as the Governmental Precinct, the Hebrew University, and the National Memorial. Each of these institutions was set atop one of Jerusalem’s hills,
which spread westward away from the Old City and which were separated from each other by open green valleys. [Fig. Title page top]

In contrast, East Jerusalem, known in Arabic as El-Quds (The Holly), was indisputably ancient. The Ottoman Walls dominated its landscape, and important religious institutions punctuated its picturesque skyline. In spite of its religious significance, East Jerusalem had been denied symbols representing state power. These symbols were located instead in the Jordanian capital of Amman. Modern suburbs were spreading north of the city, allowing the historical center of the city to maintain its Orientalist look that the British had so carefully preserved. Despite Henry Kendall’s efforts, the prospective green belt around the city walls was not always kept, which allowed the urban fabric of the Old City to grow toward the bustling city center outside Dung Gate. As a result, a vibrant link was maintained between the Old City and the downtown of El-Quds. [Fig. Title page bottom]

The two Jerusalems required different methods for managing their built environments. Israeli planners were familiar only with one—a centralized building system that was operated on nationalized land and that produced clean, efficient, and repeated built environments. The grand entry of El-Quds into the heart of Yerushalayim unsettled this modernist dream. It bluntly illustrated, as Benvenisti admitted, that “the Arabs, the desert, the Orient and the spiritual remained in one part, with the more westernized elements in the other.”5 This situation thus presented to Jerusalem’s planners an unsubtle dilemma. Had they enacted in Jerusalem the Israeli modernist building program set in
the years the state was built, they would have deepened the rift between the two cities
they attempted to unite: Yerushalayim, created of “westernized elements,” and El-Quds,
of the “Orient and the spiritual.”

Even more confusing was the pressing need to adopt this Orient as a “home” to which the
Jewish people were to return, either after nineteen years of Jordanian rule, or, more
symbolically, after 2,000 years of exilic absence. Indeed, national movements often
address their constituencies with idioms that impart a sense of familial belonging to a
community too large and a place too abstract to imagine without mediation. In this
fashion, notions such as “family” and “home” were often used in the Israeli context in
order to forge a sense of belonging between diverse Jews and a new State and territory.
The form of “the national home” that Lord Balfour had promised Jews in Mandate
Palestine in 1917 was shaped within the province of the Zionist architectural and
agricultural communities. Since the early 1930s, it was clear that the house “the Jew
wants to construct here, for the first time in his life” had to be a modern house in a
landscape of tilled fields. [Fig. 2] Could this home withstand the 1967 events? If,
according to the modernist architect Michael Kuhn, “this magical city that we conquered”
was “not booty, but rather, our home,” then what should this “home” look like? If
Israelis wanted to contest accusations of colonialism and support their claims for rightful
historical ownership, they had to build with respect to their locality, to build an

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6 For the integration of Benedict Anderson’s notion of Imagined Communities into individual life and social patterns see: Balibar, “The Nation Form,” Herzfeld, A Place in History.
7 In Hebrew, there is one world for “home” and “house”: bayit. The national home is thus ha-bayit ha-leumi.
"architecture of the place." Embarrassingly, for most Israelis, the newly conquered Palestinian habitat felt more readily like "home."

In this context, the Council for the Beautiful Land of Israel, created in 1968, emerged as a forceful civic movement. It stood in opposition to the long-standing Zionist embrace of modernism. Journalist Yehuda Ha'ezrahi, the charismatic head of the Council's Jerusalem Branch, explicated the dilemma clearly and bluntly in 1968:

    The architectural style that took shape in Israel during the last thirty years – if it is at all possible to call it a style – is absolutely unsuitable for the building of New Jerusalem. Should we indeed agree that Jerusalem would be cut into two, as with the strike of an axe: one part ancient, interesting, beautiful – and the other part new and ugly? Such a direct attack on Israeli modernism put Jerusalem's planner Yosseph Schweid in a defensive position. Nevertheless, during the 1968 Symposium on the Image of Jerusalem, while refusing "to dismiss it altogether," even he admitted that modernism "was losing power lately." That "form should also express content" could not, he agreed, be the "only criteria in evaluating the physical environment." Yet, he asserted, modern architecture had to be respected as it conveyed the set of civic values upon which the State of Israel was established. With such statements, the arguments for and against Labor architectural modernism entered a new arena: that of the debate regarding the values underlying Israeli citizenship and national identity.

8 Kuhn, "To Jerusalem with Love."
9 "The Council for a Beautiful Israel, founded in 1968 by decree of the Knesset's Interior Committee, functions as a public non-profit organization in cooperation with governmental as well as public bodies. It is a unique association of volunteers and professionals working together to safeguard, develop and beautify the environment and enhance the quality of life of the people of Israel." See www.israel-yafa.org.il.
New Beginnings

At the time the symposium took place, Schweid, together with the brothers Aviah and Zion Hashimshoni, was racing to complete a new masterplan for Jerusalem. They had been working on this when the '67 war broke out. The war forced them to adjust their plan to accommodate the tripled area of the municipal territory, the boundaries of which the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) approved on June 28, 1967. Meanwhile, the Minister of Housing decided on a new guideline: hoping to possess East Jerusalem not only territorially, but symbolically, he asked the Ministry’s planners to build the new neighborhoods in “Oriental Style.”

Yehuda Drexler, the architect in charge of Jerusalem in the Ministry of Housing between 1967 and 1974, undertook the challenge. Instead of following the Ministry’s tradition of commissioning projects to external architects, Drexler set up a full-fledged architectural office—called the Sho”p team—in the Ministry. This team of talented young architects won the repute of “an architectural commando,” or simply “a pilot.”

The team’s new directions were fully expressed in the housing complex of Ma’alot Dafnah. In it, they separated pedestrians from motor vehicles in order to create a protected sequence of pedestrian streets and squares, alongside which lay long, shadowed

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11 Ibid.
12 The Minister of Housing, Mordechai Bentov, explained on the Knesset (Israeli parliament) podium: “the planning principles are: building in stone, relatively low rise building, within the limits of three stories, in accordance with the neighborhood that border the area under development. Also incorporated are elements of Oriental building such as arches, domes etc; building types are especially adjusted to the topographic condition and the slopes of the sites (terraced building)...The architects and planners are exerting extra efforts to bestow on these neighborhoods an image that accords with the landscape and character of Jerusalem.” See “Planning and Building Methods in East Jerusalem,” Ha’aretz, February 2, 1968. Also: Yehuda Drexler, Interview, September 2, 1998.
13 Yonathan Golani, former head architect of the Ministry of Housing, cited the first expression (interview, May 28, 1998); Dror Sofer, a former member of the team, alluded to the second (interview, July 27, 1998).
arcades. [Fig. 24-26] The architecture of the main street, consisting of elongated, slightly curved buildings, as well as of small clusters of buildings behind this row, was designed to be in keeping with the tradition of stone building. Its foundations were massive: its cubical, three-dimensional modules approximated the size of a traditional room; its structural spans were moderate; and its well-proportioned arches, particularly those along the arcades, emulated, through rough stone cladding, traditional methods of stone construction. Cited inspiration for the complex included vernacular Mediterranean architecture, particularly that of Greece. Yoseph Kolodny, the reputed intellectual of the team, also cited as influences “Candilis, the Smithsons, van Eyck, the Japanese: Kenzo Tange and the Metabolists, Theo Cosby, van der Brook and Bakema... We were after them, we executed something that was very close to what they envisioned.” The resultant architectural characteristics of Ma’alot Dafnah would soon be repeated in the new housing settlements around the city, which required a still larger confiscation of land.

Public Challenges to the Politics of Settlement

After the 1970 Israeli confiscation of East Jerusalem land, architects hastily drew plans for the three “neighborhoods” that were to be built on the newly confiscated land. [Fig.
12] Politically motivated, these projects respect neither the 1965 Planning and Building Legislation nor the dictates of Jerusalem’s 1968 Masterplan. The prospect of building a satellite neighborhood of 20,000 inhabitants on a site (Nebi Samuel), which the Masterplan had mandated to be a rural suburb of 2,000, was not easily accepted. An enraged public crossed political lines in its concern for the natural beauty of Jerusalem. A massive civic movement was consolidated around bodies such as the Council for Beautiful Land of Israel. Committed journalists, experts and laymen persistently demanded the placement of urban and aesthetic considerations ahead of immediate political gains in the form of the rapid colonization of East Jerusalem. The latter, they argued, was a triple sin: it ruined natural resources, sabotaged the image of a contained, bounded city (which the Masterplan advocated), and resulted in a dispersed urban fabric that posed a major obstacle for urban management.

During this crisis, Mayor Teddy Kollek urged the five major planning agencies in charge of the 1968 Jerusalem Masterplan to voluntarily submit their plans for international scrutiny. The reviewers were none other than the elite of the architectural profession worldwide. The occasion was rather unusual. At one end of the plan’s negotiating table were representatives from the Ministries of Housing, Interior Affairs and Transportation neighborhoods” owe their vigor to urban consideration (especially because their connection to the city center was so loose), not to a political refutation of the confiscation itself. During an informal architectural gathering in 1999, for example, architects who refused to build in the occupied territories told me that they did not include confiscated land in East Jerusalem in this category. For Palestinians, however, Israeli building in East Jerusalem has always been a part of the larger project of creating Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank. From the second intifada of 2000 up until the time of this study, Palestinian gunmen have been targeting Giloh, which houses a large middle- and upper middle-class Israeli Jewish population. The making of Giloh into a combat frontier thus challenges, even in Israeli culture, the distinction between “neighborhood” and “settlement.” This challenge should be seen in the context of the changing evaluation of “settlement” within Israeli culture: form the apex of Labor Zionist fulfillment until 1967, it turned into a signifier of Right Wing activity that is criticized by the majority of Labor voters.
of the State of Israel, the Israel Land Administration, and the Jerusalem Municipality. At
the other end were the thirty members of the Subcommittee for Town Planning of the
Jerusalem Committee, including Louis Kahn, Lewis Mumford, Bruno Zevi, Buckminster
Fuller, Christopher Alexander, Philip Johnson, Nikolaus Pevsner, and Isamu Noguchi.
[see appendix] Apparently, state agencies allowed an impressive transparency within
Israel’s politically charged planning apparatus. On the other side, the international group
of professionals had collectively to brainstorm their diverse post-WWII architectural
agendas in order to advocate a coherent vision.

In this heated atmosphere in which urbanism was pitted against politics, and which
newspapers worldwide were closely scrutinizing every move, expectations for the
upcoming convention of the Jerusalem Committee architects were high. But rather than
receiving the professional support that they expected, Arthur Kutcher reported that:

At a hastily called special session, closed to the public, the members of the
Committee expressed their feelings about the plans to the Israeli authorities. Most
of them were enraged by what they had seen. Some of them wept, others were
nearly hysterical, and at least one was taken ill. The officials, who had expected
the usual pat on the back given by such convocations of visiting firemen, were
completely amazed. It had apparently never occurred to them that anyone would
take a town plan so to heart.17

This unequivocal rejection of the plan devastated and confused the Israeli hosts, largely
because the Committee’s discussion examined the conceptual underpinnings of town
planning rather than the pragmatics of implementation. Identifying the malaise of
modernist urbanism in the plan, the Committee meeting turned into a trial (that I analyze
below) against the imposition of the Zionist modernist blueprint on the city of Jerusalem.
Affected by the opinion of the Jerusalem Committee, and already having doubts regarding their role in the impossibly fast-paced settlement policy, members of the Sho”p team decided to rebel against the hasty design procedures of Drexler and the larger Ministry. Timing was working against them. Pressure from the United States to allow a Jordanian presence in Jerusalem was becoming a catalyst for rapid construction, rendering the Sho”p team’s appeal for aesthetic quality, structural innovations and proper urbanism largely irrelevant. With two days notice, the team that made the greatest breakthrough in the architecture of post-'67 Jerusalem found itself irreversibly cut off from the primary provider of architectural commissions in Israel.

Zeev, Ha‘aretz’s caricaturist, dedicated his weekly panoramic skit to the various players in this unfolding drama. “Next Year in (Built) Jerusalem” is a phrase taken from Passover’s *haggadah* that denotes the Jews’ yearning for the sacred city, or, in Zeev’s version, their conflicting longings for a beautiful and resolutely Jewish city. At the center of the drama, Zeev depicts a ludicrous duel between two European knights. On the right is Zeev Sharef, the Minster of Housing, holding a trowel, with which he stacks cubical housing units on the hill of Nebi Samuel (the future site of Ramot), the most feverishly debated building site. Sharef stands composed, rolled plans and a clock under his belt, raising his brows with wonder at the sight of his disquiet rival. Teddy Kollek, his personal friend and political opponent, stands to his left, ready to fight. With

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18 The five rebelling architects were Yoseph Kolodny, Dror Sofer, Amnon Schwartz, Arnoldo Grostein and Ishai Fish. Their rebellion against the Ministry included a protest directed at Yehuda Drexler, who established and headed the team. The rebellion was documented together with the debate over the satellite neighborhoods in: Yehudah Ha‘ezrahi, ed., *The Entire Jerusalem in Its Building: The Story of a Public Struggle* (Jerusalem: The Council for Beautiful Land of Israel, The Jerusalem Branch, 1971).
a broom, a light fixture and a water container under his belt, and traffic signs around his neck, he holds a sword and a shield, his eyes narrow with anger and his extruding lower lip signaling that he is ready to fight over the houses Sharef is stacking. Looming in the background, but central to the composition, is the leitmotif of the fight: the image of Jerusalem, with romanticized domes and minarets nestled in the Judea hills.

The fight is pathetic: while the composed Sharef goes about his business, the furious Kollek cannot move. Heavy chains of “party discipline” hold his feet and arm. Mclusky, the spokesman for the United States State Department, effortlessly cuts the tip of his sword. Demonstrating Israel’s mythological feelings that the world stood united against its interests, Mclusky joins King Hussein and United Nations Secretary U Thant in the upper left corner of the scene. An army of Christian knights, all donning crosses on their helmets to identify them, stands behind the UN building, ready to fight for the city.

Several groups of small figures to Sharef’s right carry banners in his support. Prime Minister Golda Meir leads respected labor ministers on their way to achieve “operation fact,” namely, the manufacture of quick, built “facts” on the East Jerusalem ground. An army of right-wing opposition warriors carries a banner with the slogan, “the entire land of Israel,” as it follows a concrete mixer. Minute and bitter Palestinian residents, and even tinier astonished new immigrants, watch the sweeping troops of soldiers.

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On the left, behind Kollek, members of the Council for the Beautiful Land of Israel, metal flowers in their hands, cry tears over the “Valley of Eternal Crying.” Among them, only Benvenisti, torn with pain, aims a single arrow toward the stacked cubes. In between the mighty dueling figures, a small group stands directly opposite the houses of Nebi Samuel, shooting numerous arrows at them. Visible T-squares betray their identity: they are the famous architects of the Jerusalem Committee. Just below them stands Moshe Safdie, who carries his newly proposed Jerusalem Habitat housing on a silver plate, turning his head toward the five dismissed architects of the Ministry of Housing’s “architectural commando.” Stepping down from the “Hill of Evil Council,” they load their belongings on their T-squares and compasses while being permanently thrown out of the battle.

The story Zeev tells here is a story of top-down planning. If urbanism and politics clash, he suggested, politics will likely win. Civic activism in support of aesthetic values, Zeev concludes, could not allay soldiers combating the demons of historical hostility toward Jews. *Time* agreed in an article on the subject—it was titled “Full Speed Ahead and Damn the Aesthetics.” Did official politics indeed succeed in burying aesthetic considerations? Summarizing recent events, Uzi Benziman’s headline upheld that “The Battle was Lost—But Not the War Over the Beauty of Jerusalem.” The beautification of Jerusalem had turned, indeed, into Kollek’s mission during the decades he held the mayoral office. In this chapter, I argue that Kollek, as Zeev aptly depicted, was burdened by his minute budget, international politics, and party discipline. But as a result, he

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developed an alternate route that promoted cultural, rather than official, politics. Aesthetics played a major role in his scheme, and architects became indispensable agents.

While this chapter is dedicated to the balancing of plans administrated by the dueling couple Mr. Urbanism and Mr. Housing, its main focus is the little arrows, the tears and T-squares of the small groups that translated official politics into the politics of space, identity and beauty in Jerusalem. The discussion below is therefore dedicated to the making of several momentous plans, and the debates they provoked. First is the 1968 Jerusalem Masterplan that encompassed the entire (tripled) territory of “united Jerusalem.” This comprehensive modernist plan was presented as an interim report in 1968 and was published in two impressive volumes in 1972 and 1974. Within Jerusalem’s municipal territory, the government defined a special zone for the Old City and Its Environs, [Fig. 11] for which an outline scheme was submitted in 1970. This plan was published as a representative book—Planning Jerusalem—in 1973. Last, and for the purpose of comparison, is the late British Mandate plan for Jerusalem that was prepared by Henry Kendall in 1944 and was published as a magnificent book in 1948.

A Masterplan for Jerusalem

In 1964, West Jerusalem was a small frontier town, a dead-end capital surrounded by

22 Aviah Hashimshoni, Zion Hashimshoni, and Yoseph Schweid, 1968 Jerusalem Masterplan, vol. 2 volumes (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Municipality, 1972 and 1974). Archival material regarding this plan is in the JMA (box 5215), early reports are also in the Library of the Ministry of Housing.
23 Arie Sharon, Planning Jerusalem (Jerusalem and London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973). Archival material regarding this plans in in the JMA (5197), and the Sharon Archive, mostly about the book (1683, 2084).
Jordanian territories, with a westbound connection to the Israeli mainland. Jerusalem's then-mayor, Mordechai Ish Shalom, wanted to gain land and money to modernize a town that did not yet have a single traffic light. He recruited three wealthy State agencies—the Israel Land Authority, the Ministry of Transportation and the Division of Housing—and called upon them to jointly prepare a new masterplan for Jerusalem. Officials of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, an agency that joined the venture only after the '67 war, contended that the coalition the municipality forged with interest-driven agencies resulted in guidelines that prioritized "convenience and efficiency," stressed "utility" instead of "values" and supported development at any urban cost.

24 Henry Kendall, *Jerusalem, the City Plan; Preservation and Development During the British Mandate, 1918-1948* (London; H. M. Stationery Off., 1948).

25 Yoseph (Yossi) Schweid guided me 'behind the scenes' of the institutional make-up of the plan, (interview, June 12, 2000) I. The Israel Land Administration (ILA) owns the vast majority of land in the country. If a new plan would allow higher building density, then they would be happy to trade land in exchange for increasing land values. 2. The Housing Division, then located in the Ministry of Labor (and since 1961 an independent Ministry) was facing decreasing immigration and a scarcity of land. The division, and, later, the Ministry, was interested in rehabilitating expensive, low-density, urban land for low-income families. "An apartment in exchange for an apartment," dira tmurat dira, was the slogan that brought them into the masterplan coalition. Housing officials also realized that as soon as the 1965 Planning and Building Law was enacted, they were destined to lose the open mandate they had thus far enjoyed. Collaborating with the agencies that would soon restrict their action would work to their benefit. 3. The Ministry of Transportation was next in line. Transportation masterplans were then in vogue. Ish Shalom desired one of the Ministry's reputed scientifically sophisticated and economically updated plans for Jerusalem. A competition for the plan was issued. The winning French team started to work under the supervision of both the Ministry and the Jerusalem Masterplan team.

With three such rich and powerful partners, the Jerusalem Municipality was far less dependent on the Ministry of Interior Affairs, which was directly supervising its municipal actions. For a Labor politician such as Ish Shalom, the independence from a Ministry that was the stronghold of the Religious Zionist Party was a political bonus.

26 See: Eliezer Brutskus, *Jerusalem Masterplan--a Critical Appraisal* (unpublished, 1970). Brutskus was a leading planner in the Ministry of Housing and the brother of David Anatol, who co-authored the *Outline Scheme for the Old City and Its Environment*, in the bibliography of which (in the book form) Brutskus's pamphlet appears under the title above. This unpublished pamphlet was well circulated with the Hebrew title *Around the Planning of Jerusalem*. Brutskus severely attacked the Masterplan not for the quality and technique of its work, but for its content. He would have prioritized Jerusalem's antiquated image over its modern development, he would have created a series of red lines which no planning scheme could cross, and he would have located the Old City off the center of traffic and commerce in order to alleviate its conflict with modernizing forces. He objected to the quest for a dense city, especially the intensification of the existing built fabric. He preferred to devise a moderate urban expansion, which could, he insisted, avoid urban sprawl. He could not understand the reasons for de-intensifying the government precinct by introducing mixed-use functions to the precinct while allowing governmental agencies to venture into the "everyday city." Brutskus was particularly bitter about the excessive traffic system. He also thought that
Ish Shalom desired, indeed, a modernizing project. By establishing an interdisciplinary professional team that would coordinate different agencies and their budgets, he secured unprecedented power for the municipality. He chose his principal planners, the brothers Zion and Avia Hashimshoni and Yoseph Schweid, from the professional and academic establishment of Zionist modernist planning. Zion already had a leading role in Israel’s first ultra-modernist masterplan. Avia, the team head, (and, as stated, the author of Israel’s first architectural historiography), was a professor of architecture at the Technion, where he represented, in the mid-1960s, the modernist-functionalist camp in the vehement debate with architect Al Mansfeld that threatened to dismantle Israel’s single architectural school.

The 1968 Jerusalem Masterplan inherited from its ancestral Zionist plans the logic of an ordered environment, but stressed the benefits of urban form. The goal of the plan was
devolution to the north of the city was already flourishing and should be strengthened, unlike the planned development to the south and the southern secondary business district, both of which he considered hazardous. In the same overall repudiation, he suggested eliminating the central boulevard as well. Clearly, he wanted no less than the commissioning of a totally new plan.

The planners opened an office employing a large multidisciplinary team of architects, planners, geographers, and economists, who ventured into an intensive four years full-time work. Among many of the workers and consultants were graduates of planning schools in the US, who had previously worked in Washington, DC, on questions pertaining to social and ethnic conflicts. They enlivened local urban discourse with new methodologies. The team enjoyed the aura of a unique professional body, whose composite institutional structure prevented the rule of any single interest. The office regularly conducted two sets of meetings with representatives of the different agencies, corresponding to the two hierarchical tiers of ministerial officials. It produced numerous interim reports that testify to the consistency of their approach, which was finally presented in 1968 and was published in Hebrew as two impressive volumes in 1972 and 1974. Those working on the plan still consider it one of Israel’s most impressive planning documents ever. Many of the interim reports, which testify to the consistency of the team’s approach, can be found in the library of the Ministry of Housing. The final document has a much greater degree of visual material, perhaps resulting from the Jerusalem Committee’s criticism. The list of the team members are in Kroyanker, Conflicts Over the City.

In early statehood the national campaign that privileged rural settlement was prevalent. A shift toward urbanity was greatly influenced by the presence of Jerusalem. For the role of the city in Zionist culture,
threefold: national, civic-municipal and universal. The first intended to adjust the city to its role as the capital of the state of Israel. The second was geared toward a pleasant and efficient urban environment. The third committed to respect Jerusalem’s status as a sacred city of emotional significance to a great part of humanity. These goals were translated into a series of well-defined objectives that could be achieved by physical means, such as locating Jerusalem in the larger national setting, improving its infrastructure and transportation systems, defining a clear, bounded, historical core and preserving the landscape that surrounds it. The Masterplan contained detailed physical “solutions” for these objectives.29

While leaving ample room for future development (according, for example, to radial or concentric patterns) the plan detailed several aspects. For example, it proposed six-lane throughways that would connect Jerusalem to the Israeli mainland. [Fig. 28 top] The plan also recommended a densely built, yet carefully bounded, city, and suggested keeping the central business district close to the Old City in order to promote urban activity. The plan recommended that State institutions be intermingled with the urban fabric, in order to bring democratic activity to an everyday setting while reviving the deadly after-hours in the Government Precinct. It also promoted a symbolic boulevard wide enough to host military parades that would run across the capital city and publicly represent the State. Following meticulous research and careful statistics, the plan projected two phases of urban growth for the years 1985 and 2010. [Fig. 28 bottom]

Packed into diagrams and colored maps, these different studies engendered a scientific

When Teddy Kollek became mayor in 1965, he enjoyed the political power he inherited from Ish Shalom but at the same time was reluctant to give away his freedom to maneuver physical planning politically, particularly in the context of the new conditions that emerged after the '67 war. Ish Shalom’s achievement of orchestrating interior politics faded in the face of urgent national projects, such as the settlement of East Jerusalem. The structured planning process of the 1965 law was violated. Kollek even headed the “short-cut” committee, despite his proclaimed guardianship of the Masterplan principles during the 1970 debate. The public started to doubt whether Kollek was strong enough to withstand direct political pressure on a city that was no longer a sleepy capital and regional center, but a city in the midst of international debate.

The Jerusalem Committee

As a mayor, Kollek had limited power in the arena of state politics. But as a shrewd politician and a masterful administrator, he realized that the Israelization of Jerusalem was venturing beyond official politics. It therefore required moral legitimization from the international community. Instead of consulting policy makers, he turned to cultural

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30 Ish Shalom was the representative for Mapai, the ruling Labor party. Kollek represented Rafi, Ben-Gurion’s party after he separated from Mapai. They tied in the elections and Kollek won the mayoral office by way of a larger coalition. See: Teddy Kollek and Amos Kollek, *For Jerusalem: A Life* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978).
31 In order to facilitate the expedient construction of East Jerusalem, the government decided to merge the local and regional building committees. Once Kollek was appointed as the head of the joined committee, his rejection for a dispersed city lost its vigor. Many complained at the time that Kollek was not strong enough politically. He could not fight the government that provided his budget, the argument continued, and could therefore do nothing but rubber stamp grandiose projects.
and spiritual leaders worldwide, calling on “clergymen, architects, artists, politicians, university professors, theologians, sculptors, philosophers, publishers and archeologists”³³ to help supervise the making of Israeli Jerusalem. The result was the Jerusalem Committee, “an advisory council concerned with the beautification and restoration of the city as well as its cultural content.”³⁴

At the first meeting of the Committee in the summer of 1969, Kollek reassured his guests that they were “here because the problem is not ours alone, as residents of the city; it belongs, in a sense, to the entire world, to all those people who are Jerusalemites in their hearts and minds.”³⁵ Kollek undoubtedly knew his audience, who came to Jerusalem for a reason. Carlos Garcia, for example, was quite blunt:

There are some here in Jerusalem who think of this as a Jewish city, and others who think of it as an Arab city. But I would hope that all of this committee’s resolutions and plans would express that Jerusalem is not now, and never should be, the sole interest of any one religious group. It is a universal city, looked to and loved by people of three great world religions, and I hope that her future life and physical appearance will embody this.³⁶

Kollek was prepared for this demand to de-nationalize the city: he tried to convince the Committee that the Judaization of Jerusalem did not contradict its universal status. Accordingly, he invited his guests to participate in a joint civilizing mission (notwithstanding its colonial overtones) of shaping “united Jerusalem.” As far as cultural and spiritual values are concerned, Kollek promised his guests, there is an identity between Israeli Yerushalyaim and universal Jerusalem.

³³ The Jerusalem Committee, a 1977 update.
³⁴ Ibid.
While philosophically deliberating these issues, the signs of Jerusalem’s imminent building boom granted issues pertaining to physical planning a sense of urgency. It was therefore decided to form the Subcommittee for Town Planning. The prominent architects, planners, historians and critics of post-WWII architectural culture who comprised the Subcommittee were already an important source of inspiration for a younger generation of architects in Israel. Their invitation as representatives of a seemingly autonomous discipline, bearers of “uncontaminated” professional knowledge, granted the trends they represented a national legitimization and authority. Kollek took pride in the fact that he’d successfully recruited to his committee most of the architects featured in a Newsweek issue that named the world’s best contemporary architects. Though of diverse persuasions and creeds, committee members were expected to represent the cutting edge of architectural thinking. Eagerly undertaking this cultural mandate, they became arbiters of architecture and urbanism for a city conceptualized as an urban testing ground for the application of post-WWII criticism.

**Criticizing the Modern Movement**

The Modern Movement in architecture was, in a sense, established in 1928 in the form of the International Congress for Modern Architecture (CIAM). It started as an avant-garde movement with technological and social underpinnings that campaigned for rational planning, technological innovation, and bare aesthetics. Its stress on functionalism, mass production, and proper infrastructure, as well as its famous call for the separation of the

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37 Israeli architects followed closely the international debate in which Jerusalem’s guests were prime protagonists in journals such as Architects’ Year Book, Architectural Design, or the bible-like Team X Primer (Alison Smithson, ed.).
city into secluded zones of work, habitation, recreation and transportation, was intended to redeem the 19th century industrial city from its severe urban predicament. During the inter-war period, the abstract and internationalist discourse of the Modern Movement came under attack from nearly all nationalist regimes. After WWII, however, the Modern Movement gained enormous power and led the architectural reconstruction of devastated Europe. It could offer a counterpart to the modernization projects of many postcolonial nation-states, an act that furthered its universal mission.

But, during the 1950s, a younger generation of architects started to challenge modern architecture’s goals. Aldo van Eyck, a prominent Dutch representative of this generation, contended that:

Instead of the inconvenience of filth and confusion, we have now got the boredom of hygiene. The material slum had gone, but what has replaced it? Just mile upon mile of organized nowhere, and nobody feeling he is ‘somebody living somewhere.’ No microbes left—yet each citizen a disinfected pawn on a chessboard, but no chessmen—hence no challenge, no duel, and no dialogue.

Van Eyck’s generation lamented the loss of notions such as hierarchy, community, identity, and place from the well-administrated, yet thoroughly alienating, modernist urban environments. They wondered how to forge an identity between people and place through architectural means. They questioned why modern architecture failed to perform this task, a task that fell within architecture’s traditional province—inhabiting, representing, and identifying people with their physical environments.

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39 Fascist Italy and Kemalist Turkey are famous exceptions.
40 Aldo van Eyck, in Team X Primer, p. 15.
In 1959, just when this criticism threatened to bring the Modern Movement to its eventual demise, John Summerson, a British historian, critic, and late modernist, tried to grapple with the pivotal change modernism introduced to the age-old discipline of architecture. His analysis focused on the shift in the source of authority, which was required by architecture in order to achieve a sense of unity. He identified this radical shift in the move “from the antique (a world of form) to the program (a local fragment of social pattern).”

Past architecture, he argued, asserted its authority by rendering formal relationships between architectural elements. Conversely, in modern architecture, authority derived from an idea of social, political, economic or technological order. These ideas comprised the program, the new source of architectural unity, which Summerson defined as:

a description of the spatial dimensions, spatial relationships, and other physical conditions required for the convenient performance of specific functions.

Note the break: “dimensions, relationships and physical conditions” which were spatially orchestrated in order to perform the social functions which grant the project its meaning, instead of axes, proportions and spatial compositions which were required for a durable harmonious edifice or urban form. The radical change in architecture’s raison d’etre from the realm of classical form to that of the modernist program was congruent with the Modern Movement’s violent break from previous architectural traditions. In fact, Reyner Banham passionately argued, this break was not radical enough. If modern architecture were to follow its own conclusions, it would bring the old traditional discipline of

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42 Ibid.
Architecture to an end, replacing it instead with cutting edge technologies that serve the changing needs of a global society.\(^{43}\)

This was an alarming proposition, because the Modern Movement in architecture, according to its postwar critics (themselves members of the club), was responsible for the sterile and alienating modern built environments that had spread around the globe. In the race to improve the human condition, modern architecture forgot the Man within, his (and it was always his) sense of place and heritage. In order to redeem an impoverished and ugly modernist urbanity, architects turned back to the discipline of Architecture, trying to restore its autonomous values. Architects gradually lifted the modernist ban on revisiting past traditions and started looking at history, the vernacular, and nature to find authoritative architectural guidelines for mediating between people and their places.\(^{44}\)

After the Modern Movement disarmed architects of their traditional tools of the trade, architects could finally enjoy, as Denys Lasdun put it, a "physical awakening." Louis Kahn led the return to ‘Architecture as it has always been’ by invoking timeless architectural principles rather than formal precedents.\(^{45}\) Architects sought similar

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\(^{43}\) For Banham’s first articulation of the limited scope of modern architecture, which he therefore termed “the first machine age,” and opted for a second, more radical modernism, see: Reyner Banham, \textit{Theory and Design in the First Machine Age}, 1st MIT Press paperback ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980).


\(^{45}\) Stanford Anderson, in a recent account on disciplinary memory in connection to the work of Louis Kahn, explains, “Disciplinary memory can seek principles rather than formal precedent. Our relations to earth, sky, fire and water; the myriad ways of defining space and controlling light, of relating materials and structure to all these elements, of establishing systems of order (including disorder) – all this can be sought
timeless rules in vernacular traditions that were dictated primarily by instincts regarding
habitation rather than by rational design methodologies. In this conducive atmosphere, 
ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites) was founded in 1964. The 
founding charter of this influential international organization extended the notion of 
preservation from the single monument to the larger urban setting.

The subject of great interest, these urban patterns inspired architects, such as 
Konstantinos Doxiadis, who founded Ekistics (the Science of Human Settlements). 
Instead of a modernist planning method that projected new cities onto clean slates, 
Doxiadis insisted that the only way to learn about human settlements is to study the 
settlements themselves. Christopher Alexander, whose seminal “A City is Not a Tree” 
Doxiadis republished, raised a humanist criticism against modernist design methodology. 
Instead of creating cities artificially, he suggested emulating the stratification and 
inconsistent built patterns of older cities. This vibrant architectural climate made the 
prospect of advising the building of Jerusalem particularly attractive, bringing architects 
to Jerusalem on a volunteer basis. In all probability, however, the only thing that this

and lodged in the disciplinary memory in architecture.” See: Stanford Anderson, “Memory in 
46 See: Moholy Nagy, Native Genius; Rudofsky, Architecture Without Architects; Smithson, ed. Team X 
Primer.
47 ICOMOS was established between May 25 and 31, 1964. The first article of its Venice Charter, the 
International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites is particularly pertinent 
to the Jerusalem situation: 
The concept of an historic monument embraces not only the single architectural work but also the 
urban and rural setting in which is found the evidence of a particular civilization, a significant 
development or an historic event. This applies not only to great works of art but also to more 
modest works of the past which have acquired cultural significance with the passing of time.
See: The Venice Charter, ICOMOS Website: www.icomos.org
48 Konstantinos Apostolou Doxiadis, Ekistics; an Introduction to the Science of Human Settlements (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1968). Doxiadis was closely associated with Arieh Sharon whom he invited to 
join his interdisciplinary think tank during a Mediterranean cruise. See Sharon, Kibbutz + Bauhaus.
49 Christopher Alexander, “A City is Not a Tree,” Ekistics 23 (June 1967), pp. 344-348.
diverse body of critics fully shared was a common enemy: institutional modernist urban planning.

"Planners Under Fire" 50

Four plans were presented to the Subcommittee for Town Planning of the Jerusalem Committee in December 1970. One was for the Old City and its Environs, a second for the central business district (CBD) of Jerusalem, and a third for the city’s transportation scheme in 1985. The fourth, the 1968 comprehensive Jerusalem Masterplan, intended to serve as a framework in the context of which the other three could be easily understood. As we have seen, it was the Masterplan that became the main target of a stormy and emotional meeting, in which luminaries of the post-WWII architectural scene “tore it to shreds.” 51 Apparently, The Jerusalem Post reported, “the foreign critics were not wielding a scalpel on the Masterplan, but a guillotine.” 52

Kollek frankly admitted his shock. “All of us,” he said, “even the planners, had some doubts about the plan.” Yet, he bitterly added, “the criticism presented was much more devastating than we expected. Anyone who says he likes criticism is a hypocrite.” 53 A week earlier, Kollek had good reason to feel quite differently. During the Second World Congress of Engineers and Architects that was held in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 54 the

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50 The title is taken from: Abraham Rabinovich, "Planners under Fire."
54 Dialogue and Development was the topic of the Second World Congress of Engineers and Architects, which was organized by the Association of Engineers and Architects in Israel (A.E.A.I.) and the International Technical Cooperation Centre (I.T.C.C.). Arieh Sharon coordinated with Kollek the
Masterplan was generally approved. Its authors joined renowned Americans, such as Buckminster Fuller and Philip Johnson, in calling “speculators a danger” that would “undercut the idealism which makes the country and the city unique.” Johnson even concluded “(w)ith a prayer that Mayor Kollek will turn out to be another Pope Sixtus V.”

In response to the Masterplan, he “drew a glittering picture of a New Jerusalem with a central ‘way’ even more magnificent than any laid out in Rome by the builder-Pope.”

Furthermore, he urged, with a patron such as Kollek “handling people with a mastery I’ve never seen anywhere else,” Israelis could exploit the moment:

> Let’s make big plans. You have to dream big. Once, when our country was young and energetic like Israel, we had crackpots who dreamed. We used to be giants in our own land. Now maybe it’s your turn. This is the Israeli century.

If Israelis mastered the art of war that had been hitherto foreign to Jews, Johnson exalted, then they could definitely master another vocation and build their own cities.

Fuller, a revered architect, engineer and philosopher, was similarly eager: “Jerusalem,” he stated, “is at the still center of the revolving forces of history.” It should, therefore, become “de-sovereignized,” a “world-man-territory” of world citizens, a concept that Fuller was already exploring in Cyprus. Kollek stayed aloof. The power of his agenda lay in the strict separation of politics and planning: “This city has to live regardless of

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55 In "Kollek Told to Think Big, to Build Jerusalem Way," Jerusalem Post, December 20, 1970, p. 5.
56 Johnson added: “You can’t compare yourselves with anybody else. Action is imperative in Jerusalem before American sprawl starts dribbling the city out into the hills. It’s your last chance. The land grabbers are near. Jerusalem be great. Everything is favorable. Start now.” Ibid.
58 Abraham Rabinovich, "Idealized Jerusalem' at Engineers Congress," Jerusalem Post, December 17, 1970, p. 8. Richard Meier further reported on Buckminster Fuller’s ideas: “Fuller spoke of synergy, the mystery of mass phenomena and Jerusalem as the center of all magnetic forces, since all humanity is
politics,” he insisted. “What we want are competent opinions on town planning.”

Kollek gave architects the autonomy they desired. Indeed, “(a)ll too conscious of the politically explosive background to their deliberations, the Committee had endeavored to keep to basic planning issues common to all cities and people irrespective of race or creed,” a seeming neutrality I question further below.

What was certainly common to all of Jerusalem’s guests was a distaste with modernist urbanism. Already, at the Engineers Congress, guests such as Canadian Harry Mayerovitch, who came “from cities decaying, from cities which destroy us,” feared that Israelis would “unleash forces over which [they] have no control.” Indeed, the upcoming Committee discussions were saturated with anxiety over the prospect of turning Jerusalem “into a modern, International Style ville radieuse—skyscrapers, massive housing projects, freeway spaghetti, and all.” Amos Elon, the most influential journalist covering Jerusalem’s planning, rightly located the guests’ “critical, bitter and angry comments” in “the deep cultural crisis that the technological society in the West was undergoing. One of its typical manifestations,” he added, was “the crisis of the modern city.” Against such an agitated Western open nerve, the modernist 1968 Jerusalem Masterplan was not very likely to be commended.

somehow related to this site. He entered a caveat against investment by remote speculators, which could undercut the city’s morale.” Meier, “Planning for Jerusalem,” p. 56.

59 Abraham Rabinovich, “Leading World Architects Meet in Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Post, December 18, 1970, p. 5. According to Kollek, only one guest, a Jew from Berlin, refused to visit Jerusalem as long as it was occupied.


61 Harry Mayerovitch of McGill University, in Rabinovich, “Idealized Jerusalem’ at Engineers Congress,” P. 8.


That the Masterplan had ‘no vision, spirit, theme or character’ was the most unified assessment of the plan to which the Committee consented. “We were not given a clue to an aspiration,” Louis Kahn protested. “We were given a problem analysis.” The plan’s method of ‘solving’ Jerusalem’s planning evoked the Committee’s worst fears of architecture’s demise in the face of scientific and administrative operations. In fact, the plan’s preservation list did pay respect to the architecture of Jerusalem’s past, but it was maintained in well-defined historical areas, detached from present life—it formed a kind of reservation for tourists and pilgrims while treating the rest of the city with modernist methods.

A conflict was inevitable: Jerusalem fascinated the international architects who composed the committee because they believed it was impossible to discuss its physical planning in purely functional terms. According to a report in *Architectural Design*, Jerusalem was being “belatedly thrust into the twentieth century, after being dormant for a few hundred years.” The Committee, acting on behalf of “world cultures,” therefore took upon itself the mandate of protecting the city from the biting teeth of modernization, which threatened Jerusalem in particular because of its political importance. Israelis, on their own behalf, were not thrilled to live like cultural relics. Kollek bluntly protested that:

You would like to drive up in big cars but you want us in Jerusalem riding on

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64 Louis Kahn, quoted in Rabinovich, “Planners Under Fire,” p. 20.
66 Yoseph Schweid, one of the Masterplan authors, had already protested, in the 1968 *Symposium on the Image of Jerusalem*, against this attitude. He decided, “with all due respect to the noble sentiments of the large part of the civilized world who sees in this country a possession that needs to be treated as a preserve—we do not see ourselves as living on a preserve. There are landscapes in this country which require museal guard. But our first consideration must be the actual needs of life in this country.” From Avi-Yona et al., “A Symposium on the Image of Jerusalem.” pp. 36-41.
Given these contradictory pressures, how should such a city develop? The Committee contended that, since it was impossible to deny the weight of the aesthetic and spiritual qualities of Jerusalem, the knowledge for its growth had to be sought within the discipline of architecture. The architectural critic Wolf von Eckardt stressed that Jerusalem requires unique skills for translating “poetic-subjective experiences such as sacredness, charm and mystery into architectural design terminology of stone, concrete and asphalt.” Louis Kahn adamantly concluded: “Jerusalem deserved the aura of the unmeasurable.”

For the team who authored the Masterplan, this position was wholly untenable. Secular to the core, they prioritized the symbolic function of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and its operation as a contemporary city. They identified the content of this criticism with the former British colonial attitudes regarding the shape and the image of the city, which they took with a grain of salt. In particular, they dismissed what they considered to be an irrelevant enthusiasm with the exotic Orient, which, to their dismay, fascinated post-'67 Israeli public opinion. How could Israelis, they wondered, prefer insignificant Ottoman edifices over the civic symbols of the capital?

Advocating a vibrant central business district, a massive transportation infrastructure, and a highly dense, yet bounded, city, they intended to foster Jerusalem’s civic values against its religious overtones. Accordingly, their proposed Central Boulevard would start at the

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Hebrew University of Mt. Scopus, go past the Old City, through the city center, and make its way to the Government Precinct and the Western Campus of the Hebrew University, from where it would continue to the national mausoleum at Mt. Herzel. Connecting the most important civic institutions and national monuments of Israel, the boulevard was envisioned as an urban statement declaring Yerushalayim as the capital of the State of Israel.

The ambition for the boulevard collapsed, however, under the weight of mounting criticism. Hashimshoni et al sought the reasons for this rejection in the cultural disposition of their critics: they represented the Christian aspiration for Jerusalem, which expected to find heavenly Jerusalem on earth. Such an aspiration had to materialize in unparalleled beauty and a total absence of profane action or expression. It meant, in Hashimshoni et al’s view, that

the physical planner has to provide a dramatic physical expression to the spiritual values of Jerusalem. He has to physically plan houses, palaces, streets, squares, gardens and boulevards that express “heavenly Jerusalem,” embody her, and glorify and elevate her spirituality.

The attempt to use brick and mortar in order to express spirituality was totally untenable for the plan’s authors. They dismissed it as emotional naïveté, which prevented foreign critics from recognizing Jerusalem’s needs as contemporary city. Thus, they argued in favor of an option which

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70 Hashimshoni et al., 1968 Jerusalem Masterplan, p. 49.
71 The Team did not mention Christianity in particular. However, the notion of “heavenly Jerusalem” is a clear and erroneous reference to Christian tradition, for which heavenly Jerusalem is an abstract notion devoid of corporeal expression.
72 Hashimshoni et al., 1968 Jerusalem Masterplan, p. 11.
recognizes the spiritual value of everyday life, which has to exist by moral vow. This value overcomes the value of the naive urge to tie spiritual life with external material expressions...\(^{73}\)

Intriguingly, they professed that "(t)his view, in the spirit of the Torah which emanated from Jerusalem, guided our city planning work." In other words, they married their choice of modernist planning to the Jewish mistrust of visual monumentality and its emphasis on the sacredness of the every day.

This position was forcefully negated during the 1970 meeting. The international members of the Subcommittee for Town Planning believed that the extension of Jerusalem's prominence beyond the everyday was indisputable. The Italian Bruno Zevi, an influential proponent of organic architecture, a politician, and a zealous Zionist, responded that the "present plan [is] an instrument against Israel. Jerusalem is something more than people living there."\(^{74}\) Clearly agitated, he thundered, "This is collective hara-kiri. Everybody has abdicated. There has been no effort to have a new vision of life."\(^{75}\) Christopher Alexander suggested the rooting of such a vision in the importance of the holy city. He insisted that the "answer to how one makes this a religious city should be present in the morphology of the existing plan."\(^{76}\)

Louis Kahn summarized the session he chaired with an agreement on the necessity of having a theme for the city, a theme which should concentrate (in this order) on religious

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\(^{73}\) Ibid.
\(^{74}\) Tamar Eshel Archive.
\(^{76}\) Tamar Eshel Archive.
center, learning center, capital, and regional center. Notice how the priorities have changed. The capital was no longer the prime objective, only the third in a list of four, with the religious center clearly at the top. Oddly enough, this was also the growing attitude in post-'67 Israel, where the balance between the quests to represent the state and to represent the nation had shifted in favor of the latter.

The discussion constantly conflated national and architectural arguments, oscillating between a stress on Jerusalem’s symbolic properties and the return to Architecture, the age-old discipline with which modernism broke. Denys Lasdun, a prominent British architect, argued that, “Architects today must try to do what the good architects of yesterday would have done had they been in our situation today.” He situated this position in the atmosphere of post-WWII culture, declaring that “[t]his is a time of awareness of new values, new dimensions, physical awakening.”

What Lasdun wanted was for “design” to be a higher mode of operation than the systematic, rational and administrative ordering of space. Consequently, Architectural Design magazine recounted that “the Master Plan report states many correct things (in modern terminology), but seldom establishes a hierarchy of relative values.” The problem, however, seemed to be not so much of hierarchy, but of judgment: did the concept of the Jerusalem Masterplan consist of “values,” or merely “correct things”?

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77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
The criticism of the plan extended to Moshe Safdie’s comment that the two-dimensional town planning maps that applied colors for land uses falsified the multi-layered three-dimensional reality.\(^{81}\) Ari Avrahami added that “(t)he major self-deceptions produced by the master planners are that one can take present-day Western European and American standards, use them for extrapolation in a timespan of 40 years – and call the result ‘future.’”\(^{82}\) Christopher Alexander, noted Italian architect Luigi Piccianto, and others were furious about the road system that had threatened to strangle the Old City, or, according to journalist Amos Elon, to turn ancient Jerusalem into a pictorial “gas station sacred to the three religions.”\(^{83}\) Even Goran Sidenbladh, an architect, planner and head of Stockholm’s municipal planning department, surprised the audience by admitting the mistakes they had made in rebuilding the much-acclaimed Stockholm center. He urged Israelis to avoid massive and naïve transportation plans: “if motor transportation is the problem, change the transportation, not the streets.” The assumption that you can make the city car-accessible for every citizen, he told Jerusalem’s planners, is an expensive and dangerous illusion.\(^{84}\)

Local architects listened carefully to the drama unfolding: professionals they admired

\(^{81}\) Ibid.\(^{82}\) Ibid. Avrahami elaborated the criticism of Lewis Mumford, a revered American urbanist, who could not attend the 1970 meeting but sent a detailed letter that was frequently quoted. In it he wrote: “Let me point to a basic fallacy which this plan shared with too many other contemporary plans: the fallacy of extrapolation. This pseudo-scientific practice consists of taking accurate statistical evidence based on past events as a rational guide to the future. Except in dealing with the briefest time span, say five or ten years, that practice cannot be justified: the future so defined is not the real future at all, but an accelerated and amplified past...” See: Lewis Mumford in Avrahami, “Jerusalem’s Not So Golden Plan,” p. 210.

\(^{83}\) Amos Elon, "Jerusalem as a Gas Station Sacred to the Three Religions," Ha’aretz, December 14, 1970, p. 8. This was a response to the release of the Transportation Masterplan for Jerusalem by the Ministry of Transportation that was prepared in collaboration with the Jerusalem masterplan office.

\(^{84}\) Amos Elon et al., "The Capital's Planners Ignored the Lessons of the Time," Ha'aretz, December 25, 1970, pp. 13, 17. This story reports on and quotes from commentary of different committee members. It also includes the response of Jerusalem's planners.
were tearing the modernist infrastructure of Israeli planning agencies to shreds. Abraham Rabinovich commented that:

It was this confrontation that gave the meeting its special character. The Israelis seated at the rear of the conference hall were clearly impressed by the caliber of the visitors and were waiting to hear what they had to say. There was white-thatched Louis Kahn, a gentle man who couched his visions in poetic terms; Philip Johnson, lanky and sharp-witted; Buckminster Fuller, 75 years old, his incredibly fertile mind embracing the stars and man. 85

The meeting was well-covered in the local press, and the rumors regarding its result brought to the succeeding open session at the Van Lear auditorium a larger crowd than it could possibly contain. It was true that the criticism was confusing, speakers were often inconsistent with each other, and emotions ran high. Yet the message that modernist planning had been rejected was unmistakable: during interviews that I conducted with many Israeli architects, they spoke of this conference usually before the question was raised.

In his comprehensive account of Jerusalem’s unification, the journalist Uzi Benziman insisted that, in spite of the great commotion surrounding the Committee, “(t)he criticism which the assemblers in the Van Lear hall exerted had no practical value. They discussed the actual plans and forgot their ties to reality.” 86 According to Benziman, “Yerushalayim was built with consideration to one value only: enlarging the Jewish presence in the Eastern city.” 87 Indeed, the Committee avoided the heated post-confiscation debate: it did not endeavor to halt politically inspired urban colonization, nor did it put forward any clear blueprint for Jerusalem’s builders to follow.

86 Benziman, Jerusalem, p. 272.
87 Ibid.
But was “the urban fabric of Jerusalem determined,” as Benziman suggested, in “the moment the borders of United Jerusalem were fixed?” Did the Israelization of Jerusalem take its final form with the August 1970 confiscations? Indeed, the decision to build on the periphery of East Jerusalem greatly damaged the bounded image of the city. But, this political decision did not dictate the urban and architectural form of the city’s symbolic core, nor of its vast middle class housing. The Minister of Housing bluntly admitted after the 1970 confiscation that he did not have a vision for the future physical image of Israelized Jerusalem. After the confiscation, many pertinent questions were still open: what type of community should be built? What should be its characteristic urban fabric? How should it be populated? Most poignant were the worries of whether the new neighborhoods could foster in their inhabitants a sense of belonging to Jerusalem and the State of Israel. Would they instead emulate the housing block (the so-called shikunim) that hitherto alienated waves of new immigrants?

In the next chapter, I will analyze architects in Jerusalem as interlocutors who communicated national ideologies into the setting of everyday life. This is the reason for the profound impact of a professional debate, such as the comprehensive deliberation of the Committee, on the Israeli architectural scene—it provided architects with professional tools for performing this mediation. Eventually, I argue, the criticism of the Jerusalem Committee turned into a powerful catalyst for a conceptual and generational shift. It did this in three ways. Firstly, it completely denounced modernist town planning, and

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88 Ibid.
destabilized, as a result, Israeli institutional planning. Secondly, it provoked structural
changes in Israeli planning agencies (most directly in the Jerusalem Municipality, but
also, arguably, in the Ministry of Housing). 90

Thirdly—and most importantly—it had a crucial impact on local architectural discourse
and on the dilemma I have outlined above: Israeli architects and planners were entrusted
with the national mandate of uniting Yerushalayim and El-Quds into one urban entity. If
they were to use the modernist practices they mastered in western Yerushalayim, they
would deepen the rift between the cities they attempted to unite. The question was, could
they evoke the architecture of El-Quds instead? As modern architects, how could they
access this architecture?

The immediate political consequences of the committee’s deliberation fell into the hands
of the Ministry of Interior Affairs. In 1964, Jerusalem Mayor Mordechai Ish Shalom was
delighted to exclude the Ministry from the rich coalition he assembled for the Masterplan.
Following the resolutions of the Jerusalem Committee, Dr. Burg, the present Minister of
Interior Affairs, could announce in the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) that:

89 Uzi Benziman, “The Ministry of Housing Presented the Building Plan for the Confiscated Land in East
90 Most immediate was the recruitment of Nathaniel Lichfield as the head of strategic planning in the
municipality. Lichfield, a renowned British planner, spoke to the committee during the 1973 meeting not
only in proper English but in a language that was tailored to an international audience. Lichfield did not
survive, however, post-’73 Israel. According to interviews, among other reasons it was because the City
Engineer, Amikam Yaffe, was not thrilled to relinquish power to his foreign colleague. After Lichfield left,
the municipality looked for an international figure with little success. In the Committee’s 1975 meeting,
Deputy Mayor Benvenisti therefore presented planning issues in a discussion I elaborate below. In 1977,
Amnon Niv took office as City Engineer. A designer rather than planner, he fit the profile Kollek was
looking for. With his arrival, many professionals who were involved in the preparation of the 1968
Jerusalem Masterplan, such as Yoseph Schweid, Israel Kimhi, and Amikam Yaffe, left the municipality.
An additional body of great significance that was established as a result of the Committee’s
The Interior Ministry will not hesitate to exercise all its moral and legal prerogatives in order to secure a new and different ideological foundation, worthy of the concept of Jerusalem as a capital, with all its historic, religious and geographical implications.91

After clarifying that his Ministry was in defiance of the premises of the Masterplan, which the Ministry had viewed too late to change, "Dr. Burg stated with evident satisfaction that the specific regional plan for the Old City, in which the Interior Ministry had participated, had drawn wide praise."92 The "regional plan" was The Outline Scheme for the Old City and it Environs—a contemporary of the '68 Masterplan. Ostensibly and self-declaratorily, this plan "was prepared in coordination with the ['68] masterplan and its basic conception."93 In fact, the Outline Scheme did not only conflict with the '68 plan administratively, it was based on a profoundly different premise. It advanced a conservative, preservationist approach that was heavily tinted with Orientalism.

According to Meron Benvenisti, such a plan was de facto a political tool, equal to governmental policy, the reason being that symbolic land was scarce. Only politicians, Benvenisti insisted, could play this game, or alternatively, architects who turned into politicians.94 Under these circumstances, Minister Burg’s choice of the Bauhaus graduate Arieh Sharon to head the Outline Scheme was promising. Sharon, the first Head of the State Planning Division and the author of the first statewide masterplan, was powerful

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92 Ibid.
93 Sharon, Physical Planning, p. 135.
94 Benvenisti, interview.
enough to ensure the fulfillment of Burg’s promise for “a different ideological foundation worthy of the concept of Jerusalem.”

But what was this concept? What was its ideological, spiritual, or political orientation, and how should it evolve into urban form? In order to understand the incongruities between the conflicting positions of the Outline Scheme, and the 1968 Masterplan of which it was a part, in the context of contemporary Israeli and international debates, it is necessary to locate both plans within the evolution of modern planning in Jerusalem. As a discipline, modern planning was introduced to Jerusalem by the British Mandate that focused, like the next section of this study, on the historical nucleus of the city.

The Politics of Beauty in Jerusalem Since the British Mandate

The Mandate of the British, who ruled Palestine between 1917 and 1948, was, in the words of the High Commissioner, to care for “(t)he city of Jerusalem, precious as an emblem of several faiths, a site of spiritual beauty lovingly preserved over the ages by many men’s hands.” According to C.R. Ashbee, an Arts and Crafts leader and Jerusalem City Advisor, the distinct quality of the first British town-plan for Jerusalem was “that it isolates the Old City, sets it, so to speak, in the center of a park, thus recognizing the appeal it makes to the world: the City of an idea that need as such to be protected.”

[Fig. 29]

95 Quoted in Shahar Shapira, "Jerusalem's Planning - a Historical Review," in Integrating the Old City in the New City, ed. Council for A Beautiful Land of Israel (1970), pp. 7-15. General Alenbi called on William McLean, the city engineer of Alexandria, to prepare the first Jerusalem plan before the war was over. His famous decisions regarding the Green Belt around the Old City and the required stone cladding are regarded as the foundation of Jerusalem planning. C. R. Ashbee was recruited by Ronald Storrs to serve as Jerusalem city advisor and the secretary of the Pro-Jerusalem Society between 1918 and 1922.
The idea of Jerusalem that stood at the core of British Mandate planning philosophy rested on a long tradition of Orientalist depictions of Jerusalem, the essence of which is described by Daniel Monk:

...the field of planning was assigned the task of restoring not Jerusalem itself, so much as Orientalism’s romantic and anticipatory visions of the (archaeological) redemption of the essential, anterior, Jerusalem...of “Man’s imagination.” Planning was, in Said’s terminology, to “dispatch” Jerusalem to what was presumed to be its authentic terminus, thereby “reviving” an imaginary realm of archaic plentitude within the domain of the plan.96

The British approach extended from landscapes and vistas to the last masonry detail of what Ron Fuchs has termed “colonial regionalism.”97 As a result, their style relied heavily on the Palestinian vernacular, which they documented, preserved and carefully guarded. [Fig. 30 and 4 bottom] Aiming to preserve and sustain, rather than to radically reform, colonial regionalism was obviously incompatible with the Zionist Movement, which upon the independence of the Israeli State saw the Palestinian architectural heritage only as a shabby background against which efficient and hygienic Zionist building could be shown to its greatest advantage.98

The first comprehensive masterplan of the State of Israel, Arieh Sharon’s Physical Planning of 1951, suggested reading the Palestinian/Israeli landscape according to the dimensions of “country,” “people” and “time.” But the “country” of Physical Planning was a land without historical or cultural depth. It was a territory of purely geographical

97 See: Fuchs, "Representing Mandatory Palestine."
98 The Israeli rejection of colonial regionalism was so overwhelming it existed even within Zionism’s own contextualized modernism that was best exemplified in the work of Erich Mendelsohn’s. Mendelsohn’s architectural achievement was largely recognized as a masterpiece. Nevertheless, its local cultural context created a dead end for Israeli followers. Aviah Hashimshoni, the author of the ’68 Plan, clarified this point in his principle architectural history of Israel of 1963. See Hashimshoni, “Architecture,” Hebrew edition, p.
and climatic merits awaiting Zionist fertilization. Its new towns were planned as apparatuses to transform the “people” from a “greatly varied social composition of culture and living styles” into “a uniform creative sector.” The dimensions according to which Sharon’s *Physical Planning* envisioned the Israeli landscape were thus intentionally indifferent to form, history, beauty and “the Orient.” [Fig. 10]

I argue that the post-’67 re-interpretation of these dimensions brought Israeli planning back into the open arms of “colonial regionalism.” That the architect in charge of the new Israeli *Outline Scheme for the Old City and its Environs*, the crown of the so-called “united Jerusalem,” was none other than Arieh Sharon is a subject for further discussion.99 In his new plan, which was lauded by Minister Burg in front of the Knesset, “country” was no longer conceived as a bare territory, but as a three-dimensional display of indigenous architectural production. “People” were no longer were thought of as subject to the interventionist state policies of immigration and re-settlement. They were rather seen as elements of a mosaic composed of different ethnic groups. Most notably, “time” no longer faced an exclusive future. Instead it recalled the words of General Sir Alan Gordon Cunningham, Jerusalem’s last high commissioner, who praised “the [British] efforts made to conserve the old while adding the new in keeping with it, of the process of marrying modern progress with treasured antiquity.”100 He could not have chosen better words to describe the mandate the State of Israel (or more specifically, the

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100 In Kendall, *Jerusalem: The City Plan*, forward.
Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Jerusalem Municipality) would entrust two decades later to Sharon and his team.

This 1970 Israeli plan thus reflected in content and form the tenets of British “colonial regionalism”: its statutory section revived the British idea of a Green Belt around the Old City; it reinforced the rule of stone cladding; and it mandated strict preservation and restoration guidelines. More importantly to our discussion is the form in which this plan was presented—a magnificent 1973 book titled *Planning Jerusalem*. The resemblance of the book to Henry Kendall’s *Jerusalem Plan* of 1948 is striking. For both regimes, the books were planning showcases intended to impress world nations. Both books contained numerous high quality photographs and exquisite illustrations of Jerusalem’s city gates, *suks* and monuments. [Fig. 31] Following British precedent, Sharon’s *Planning Jerusalem* was intended to visually condition both the general public and an audience of prospective designers. The authors’ aesthetic expositions strove to prescribe a picturesque yet “updated” Orientalist city.

Why should Israelis espouse the colonial conception they so adamantly rejected a decade earlier as the preferred paradigm for reconstructing post-'67 Jerusalem? At the heart of this paradox, I suggest, stood the politics of a compelling yet confusing definition of urban beauty. In 1969, for example, Mayor Teddy Kollek invited the Jerusalem Committee’s world luminaries with the following appeal:

> The physical beauty of Jerusalem embodies the universal spiritual truths basic to all faiths and people. To enhance the natural charm of Jerusalem is to make manifest a belief in the love of beauty and the desire for peace inherent in all

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101 This is the year the plan was completed and submitted. It became statutory in 1977.
The notion of beauty, conjoined with history and spirituality, was hitherto foreign to the modernist Zionist discourse. Its appearance on the national stage raised intriguing questions: what is urban beauty, who defines it, and for what purposes? Professional and public opinion varied greatly. The euphoric post-'67 majority favored the oriental beauty of Jerusalem, attaching to it virtues ranging from "cultural-aesthetic values, rich in history and sacredness" to the inducement of "better citizenship and healthier social life." According to this view, the modern architecture of Western Jerusalem, which was built according to the tenets of Sharon's Physical Planning, was a recipe for an ugly city lacking identity as well as historical and spiritual values.

The defenders of Zionist modernism quickly responded. Already, in the first 1969 meeting of the Jerusalem Committee, Bruno Zevi had advised Israelis to avoid the former British colonial "talk about passive respect for the landscape and imitation of old Arab villages and houses." The propensity to return to British Orientalism offended Zevi's most deeply held convictions regarding the revolutionary and dynamic nature of the reciprocity between architectural and Zionist modernisms. He insisted therefore that "[i]t was the glory of Israel to refuse [British ideas] and to develop an architecture which is good by all international standards." Zevi saw no reason to reverse the Zionist break with the British idea of Jerusalem. In the Jerusalem Committee, of which he was such an

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102 First letter of invitation from Teddy Kollek to Lewis Mumford, March 26, 1969, Mumford Archive, The University of Pennsylvania. Similar letters were sent to all members of the Jerusalem Committee.


104 Kollek to Dosh, Jerusalem Archive. This was the reasoning marshaled by the City Beautiful Movement in the US, which was also led by a journalist.

105 Ha'ezrahi, "Policy, Aesthetics," p. 17.

active member, he therefore carried a single yet conspicuous voice in favor of building the Jewish Quarter with architecture of steel and glass.

When the planners of the 1968 Jerusalem Masterplan were attacked by Zevi and his Jerusalem Committee colleagues in 1970, the anti-colonial argumentation was their favorite line of defense: they contrasted the values upon which the State of Israel was established with what they considered outdated British colonial attitudes toward the city:

To our great amazement, it turns out that the British view regarding developing the city’s character struck deep roots in Israel’s public consciousness ... just as the romantic affection that the British (and most Europeans) held for the exotica of the East took root in Israel. The importance of shaping the city’s character as a capital is still only weakly perceived, and a set image has not yet crystallized in public opinion.¹⁰⁷

Hashimshoni, Hashimshoni and Schweid, as we have seen, refuted the changing values attached to Jerusalem’s urban beauty because they thought this new definition of beauty manifested virtues that were neither modern nor Jewish but catered instead to Christian tradition. As such, this beauty was ill-suited for Israeli civic purposes—it did not accord with the role of the city as the Capital of the State of Israel, nor did it comply, the argument continued, with the Jewish sanctification of everyday life.

In opposition to this view, Yehuda Ha’ezrahi, the charismatic leader of the Council for the Beautiful Land of Israel, judged the Israelization of Jerusalem according to international standards, against which Israel had to present Jerusalem as its “business card.” Drawing explicit connections between aesthetics and politics, he reasoned that
turning Jerusalem into “an ugly, secular city” of conglomerated “unsightly blocks” will create resounding political damage. Alternatively, he professed, “if we are able to preserve Jerusalem’s beauty and even enhance it, we will be judged favorably.”

I contend that this was exactly the aesthetic strategy that Mayor Teddy Kollek enacted. Kollek confronted the following dilemma: if “reunited Jerusalem” had continued to manifest the modernist legacy of Israeli Western Jerusalem rather than the allegedly universal idea of the city, it would lose its moral ground for controlling an internationally resonant treasure. If, on the contrary, Israel protected and nourished the Western idea of Jerusalem by following the highly revered planning guidelines of the British, it would assume the role that Britain, with the support of the community of nations, had previously played for three decades—the caretaker of Jerusalem, “a sacred trust.”

I therefore suggest that Kollek endeavored to establish no less than an international mandate to rule Jerusalem—and that this mandate had to be attained in the realm of morals and aesthetics rather than official politics.

Since the Western idea of Jerusalem was embedded in the concept of “spiritual beauty,” Kollek turned to aesthetics as a major legitimizing arena. The Zionist Modernist aesthetics he inherited, however, were ill-suited to this guardianship. Not only did Jerusalem’s modernist planners reject Orientalism, we have seen how they uncompromisingly ridiculed contemporary attempts to build spirituality using brick and

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107 Hashimshoni et al., 1968 Jerusalem Masterplan, p. 49. The planners differentiate between Jewish, Muslim and Christian attitudes toward Jerusalem, the latter being guarded by the British who wanted, according to the materplan authors, to see in Jerusalem an image close as possible to the crusade city.


109 In: Kendall, Jerusalem – The City Plan, Forward by the High Commissioner.
mortar. This apparent incompatibility between the city’s political interests and its institutional architectural practice pushed Kollek closer to the critics of the Modern Movement in architecture, those who eventually became members of the Jerusalem Committee. These critics could provide Kollek and his architects and planners with the knowledge they needed to settle the contradictions between the modern and Oriental Jerusalems; additionally, to appropriate the “old and Oriental” Arab city as part of the “new and united” Israeli Jerusalem.

How and Why to Beautify?

International architects of the Jerusalem Committee criticized high modernism, but avoided dismissing it altogether. This paradox is important to note because by rejecting formal historical precedents, decoration, or particularized religious symbolism, these agents of post-WWII architectural culture still shared a common terrain with Zionist modernism. At the same time, however, their enthusiasm for indigenous environments, for authenticity, and for the poetic aligned well with the tenets of “colonial regionalism,” rendering their architectural agenda pertinent for the universal mission they undertook together with the Israeli rulers—to turn Jerusalem into an international paragon of urban beauty.

Consider, for example, the message of California landscape architect Lawrence Halprin to his Israeli audience during the 1970 meeting. Israeli architects, Halprin complained, follow non-indigenous European urban models. “What is more,” he sarcastically told his hosts, “the model is long gone in the very areas from which you have taken it. You are
copying old-fashioned models.” He then explained the alternative:

More and more the indigenous models you have ignored under your own noses are being studied and emulated throughout the world—the Mediterranean cluster of buildings organized into intricate three-dimensional architectural villages, dense, urban, related to the landscape, inward-turning, environmentally sound—are the patterns that are more appropriate to your own conditions and needs.  

Such international fascination with vernacular architecture had already inspired Israeli architects for over a decade, but since the country was heavily modernized, indigenous architecture was found primarily in deserted Palestinian locales. The “Arab village” became an important paradigm in Israeli architectural discourse (see chapter 5).

However, since Arab Israelis were under military rule until 1966, it was mostly after 1967 that Israelis could freely visit and experience living Palestinian towns and “unspoiled” villages, which were indisputably “of the place” Israelis desired to inhabit. Israeli architects were overwhelmed by “the living, stratified, connected Arab City, the materials and smells which are from here—it all belongs.” Architects sought this sense of belonging in the suks and passages of the Old Cities of Jerusalem and the West Bank.

The intervention of the post-WWII architectural scene helped to structure such experiences, and to translate them into the architectural tools needed to Israelize Jerusalem. The influence of Louis Kahn, who had a special repute in Israeli culture since he was invited to design rudimentary housing there in the 1950s, is an important

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110 Quoted in Meier, “Planning For Jerusalem,” p. 57.
111 After Israeli independence in 1948, Jewish refugees settled in the houses of Palestinians who fled or were expelled during the war and became refugees themselves. In the 1950s, these environments were considered slums. In the 1960s, they became attractive locales for artists. Paradoxically, after the ’67 War, even Palestinian refugees camps became “awesome environments” that inspired architects such as Moshe Safdie. The Israeli appropriation of the Palestinian vernacular is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
112 Ofer Kolker, interview, July 24, 1998.
113 According to Ram Karmi, he and his father, Dov Karmi, were the first to invite Louis Kahn to Israel in order to advise them in the construction of a new town—the Bsar City. Interview, Herzlia, June 8, 2001.
example. In the first 1969 meeting of the Jerusalem Committee, he presented his design for the Hurva Synagogue in the Jewish Quarter, a controversial structure that rose above both the Dome of the Rock and the Holy Sepulcher, and was strongly supported by Teddy Kollek. Many young architects, who revered both Kahn and his design, considered him the leading critic of modernist planning. In 1973, in front of an enchanted Israeli architectural audience, he professed the following uncompromising views:

there should be no difference, I think, between urban design and architectural design; both are architecture—entirely so; and the moment you distinguish between them, you kill architecture. I would abolish twenty-five concepts concerning urban design, but I would never touch a single hair of architecture... I maintain that form has a major relevance to urban planning. It touches the core of things.

This speech was later translated in Hebrew. It was published shortly after Kahn’s death, next to a laudatory obituary, in the *Journal of the Association of Architects in Israel.*

Kahn’s emphasis on design, as well as his inspiration from vernacular or historical built patterns, was crucial: it enabled Israeli architects to appropriate the architecture of El Quds, creating as a result the intermingling of Yerushalayim and Jerusalem that Mayor Kollek desired. Summing up the 1970 meeting, Kahn insisted that “Israel had the spiritual right to consider itself custodian of Jerusalem, but before drastically altering its shape, ‘it should wait for such consensus as comes from all others who consider it their

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114 For a detailed history and phenomenological interpretation of the building, see: Sakr, "The Subversive Utopia." For a virtual reconstruction of the project, see: Kent Larson and Louis I. Kahn, *Louis I. Kahn: Unbuilt Masterworks* (New York: Monacelli Press, 2000). For the urban interpretation of Ram Karmi, who solved local disputes regarding the commission by contacting Kahn and suggesting him as the architect for the project, see: Ram Karmi, *Studio.*

sacred city." Kahn helped Kollek to reach this consensus.

Teddy Kollek recently recalled that “ties with Louis Kahn were based on everybody saying that he is the king of architects.” The two clicked. Kollek himself matured politically under the wide wings of Ben-Gurion, whose Prime Minister office he managed for years—he was considered Ben-Gurion’s right hand man. There was an intriguing parallel between the way Ben-Gurion constructed Judaism as a moral essence running throughout history, regardless of historical upheavals, and the manner in which Kahn articulated architecture as a discipline existing beyond temporal bounds or passing trends. Kollek’s inheritance of Ben-Gurion’s *mamlachtiyut* found its home in Kahn’s quest for eternal architecture.

Close interlocutors, particularly Moshe Safdie and Ram Karmi, mediated Kollek’s espousal of Kahn. Safdie, a disciple of Kahn, became “court architect” for Kollek, who was the disciple of Ben-Gurion. Their quest for an eternal architecture and an eternal nation were bound together in a joint appeal for immortality. Kollek was often referred to as a modern Herod, and Safdie, who discovered in the ancient King a great urban planner, was his preferred architect after Kahn passed away.

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Kollek and Safdie, patron and architect, joined forces to devise a scheme for the Western Wall Plaza, which I closely analyze in chapter 6. The architect Ram Karmi, who first brought Kahn to Israel, supported the scheme against its many opponents:

We are asking, why are we here? The Palestinian problem, et cetera... The most obvious place in which we do not have to explain ourselves at all is this place [i.e., the Western Wall]. Therefore this place awaits a big act. The place is not waiting for a small act—not for housing blocks, not for analysis, not for a Jerusalem Masterplan that is never enacted and other such things.\textsuperscript{119}

Housing blocks, the hallmark of the modernist Zionist project, the analysis, its methodological bedrock, and the 1968 Jerusalem Masterplan, one of the Israeli modernist vision's most impressive documents, were all buzz words for an outdated approach. Karmi, who confessed his direct ties to King David (on that occasion in that site), connected the criticism of the Modern Movement in architecture once more with a quest for an integrative conception of eternal nation and timeless architecture. The political context of this invocation was the historical right of Jews over Jerusalem.

The custody of Jerusalem, however, was not necessarily articulated in the language of a Jewish "right" but more readily in that of a Jewish "duty." Kollek, in front of an international audience, and in English, even ventured to say that Jerusalem ceased to be Jewish after the '67 war and became a world city.\textsuperscript{120} Yet such a statement was contingent


\textsuperscript{120} For example, in an introduction to a photography album about Jerusalem, Kollek wrote: "The moment Jerusalem became one city, it stopped being a Jewish city. It suddenly had a sizable population of Christians and Muslims [sic]. And ever since, we have been going through the process of absorbing this fact, not only intellectually but with all our being. This has been difficult, of course, because religious Jews had prayed three times a day for two thousand years for the return of Jerusalem. It stood for independence and deciding your own fate and not being a minority. It meant everything that Israel means. And yet we all realize that this city embraces both the past and the present." See: Teddy Kollek and Moskin Robert, "Introduction," in \textit{Yerushalayim, Jerusalem, El Quds: City of Mankind}, ed. Cornell Capa (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1974).
upon the assumption that Israeli Jews should watch over the city, and that leaders of Kollek’s stature would protect it best. This understanding restored to Jews their status as a “chosen people,” responsible for guarding the very treasure they initially contributed to world culture. “Our contemporary actions in Jerusalem,” Ha’ezrahi professed, “will make the Jewish nation confront a trail of history.” Accordingly, he continued, Zionism would fulfill its mission only if it were to make a significant contribution to Jewish culture within the framework of an international order.

Paradoxically, it was Archbishop George Appleton who articulated this point without reservation during his plenary address to the Jerusalem Committee in 1973:

> the treatment of Jerusalem will decide, I believe, whether the Jewish people are faithful to their divine calling...To be a chosen nation with a particularity of vocation is a tremendous calling. It’s a tremendous burden and there are many of us in the Christian Church and, I’m sure, among devout Muslims, who would like to be their friends and partners in this great task... God grant that later generations may not weep over the city which we pass over to them.122

This strong statement on behalf of the Christian clergy lent credence to Kollek’s strategic goals: to have the Christian world recognize the role of Israel, and at the same time to undermine Muslim authority by naturalizing its consent.

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121 Ha’ezrahi, “Policy, Aesthetics,” p. 17. More from Ha’ezrahi: “Neither the Arabs, the Turks nor the British will be responsible for ensuring that the Jerusalem of the future, of the next generation and those that follow, will be a spectacular city with cultural and aesthetic values, rich in history and holiness; or if, God forbid, it will be a conglomeration of unsightly blocks and visual representations of spoiled landscape and tradition.”

Chapter 4

ISRAELIZING JERUSALEM: THEMATIC REFLECTIONS

Sharon, Planning Jerusalem, cover.

1968 Jerusalem Masterplan, cover.
The “Outline Scheme for the Old City and Its Environs” was prepared as a statutory section of the larger 1968 Jerusalem Masterplan. But even a quick glance at the book-covers that display the Outline Scheme (top) and the Masterplan (bottom) discloses incongruities between the seemingly complimentary plans. The carefully designed cover of the Outline Scheme book attracts foreign readers with bright red Latin letters—Planning Jerusalem—that crown a 16th century engraving of Jerusalem. No stronger reference could have been made to the city as a visual idea. According to the plan’s authors, the aesthetic code of this idea had to emanate onto the greater modern Jerusalem. In contrast, the 1968 Masterplan book addresses local readership with a Hebrew technical title and a graphic scheme that pays little duties to pilgrims. In it, an inner city is nestled in a larger bounded city. The inner loop encircles two centers that are paired rather than fused: one is historical and is located around the Old City; the other is national and is centered at the Government Precinct of West Jerusalem. The two are aesthetically and symbolically apart.

Obviously, the two plans held opposing views. The first conception was largely praised by the international Jerusalem Committee, the second was shredded to pieces. The committee’s critique, which destabilized the vulnerable balance between the two convictions in Israeli culture, testified to the complex process of situating modernism in both national and architectural cultures. The implications of this predicament could be seen in three crucial debates. One questions the repositioning of the invigorated Jewish Nation vis-a-vis the modernist Israeli State. The second examines the uses of the past, and the conflation of Old and Oriental. The third invokes debates regarding form and
their intriguing connection to the quest for autonomous architectural production in the realm of urban design.

Nation and State

The conquest of Jerusalem complicated the architectural role in the project of nation-building—of transforming the Israeli territory into a “national home.” During the first decade of statehood, the progressivist agenda of Labor modernism ignored the cultural and historical aspects of the contested Israeli territory. But the generation that was committed to mamlachtiyut tried to conceal the tension between a modernist state and a Jewish nation by means of “local architecture.” Architecture built on the seam between modern and local, progressive and authentic could be best celebrated in Jerusalem once architects were able to fully interact with the “genetic code of the place.” But what happened to this architecture of mamlachtiyut after the '67 War? On the one hand, it gained institutional recognition on a grandiose scale. On the other hand, some of its tenets were tinted by the changing political climate: the “merely” professional journey of architects into “the place,” toward the local vernacular and the “Arab village” (see chapter 5), was suddenly entangled with the Right’s claims for the entire Land of Israel. The architecture “of the place” was caught between the secular nationalism of its practitioners and a growing complicity in a colonial project that was validated by romantic or religious sentiments that were foreign to these architects. If, for the architects of the mamlachtiyut project, this situation was confusing, for orthodox modernists it suggested heresy. Strengthening a vulnerable state by constructing

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1 This expression, which is common in the Israeli architectural studio, was used, for example, by Zeev Drukman during a discussion of entries for a student architectural competition that was associated with an ICOMOS conference in Jerusalem in March 1996.
Jerusalem primarily as its capital was therefore an explicit goal of the 1968 Jerusalem Masterplan.

At this key moment of re-forming Israeli national identity vis-a-vis an “Entire Land of Israel” and a “Unified Jerusalem,” the intervention of the international community only added another element in a fundamentally confusing situation. Firmly based in the Western reach toward a “humanistic architecture,” members of the Jerusalem Committee dreaded the older version of uncontrolled modernization. Lewis Mumford, for example, argued for maintaining the city’s “original vision,” which is “not only transnational but transtemporal as well,” coming “out of the remote past and point[ing] to the distant future.” At the same time, he also insisted that “the unification of the city and region of Jerusalem can be achieved only by actively bringing into operation cultural and religious forces that do not come within the province of the municipal authorities.”

Buckminster Fuller, who saw in Jerusalem “the still centre of the revolving forces of history,” further complicated Mumford’s mixture of realism and essentialism. For both thinkers, Jerusalem suggested a refuge from a society gone astray, particularly from a devastating nationalism, which they suggested to dispense with by de-nationalizing Jerusalem for the sake of world citizens. This proposition was previously incorporated into the UN Partition Resolution of 1947 but was persistently bypassed by both Israel and Jordan, who made Jerusalem into a symbol of a national struggle that the architectural contingent of the Committee constantly tried to evade.

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2 Meier, “Planning for Jerusalem,” p. 56.
3 Rabinovich, “‘Idealized Jerusalem’ at Engineers’ Congress,” p. 8.
Mumford's highly regarded yet very confusing message was interpreted in the light of other comments from members of the Jerusalem Committee, who required a timeless vision for the city. Such a vision should be based, the argument continued, on Jerusalem's spiritual and educational qualities, that is, on religious and historical motifs. The resultant demand to thematize Jerusalem was rife with complexities. Such a theme, or narrative, had to be grasped by means of spatial configurations and visual imagery. But whose narrative should Jerusalem’s image represent? The “correct” answer was the universal narrative of the three monotheistic religions. This universal theme had to be internationally determined; this was exactly the reason for soliciting the Jerusalem Committee.

Muslims declined participation in this advisory body. They could not accept such invitation without legitimizing Israeli rule over Jerusalem. In their absence, Kollek solicited experts on Islam. That one of the consultants keeping the interests of Islam was Bernard Lewis, the renowned Orientalist scholar and the future mythical opponent of Edward Said (whose study of Orientalism I discuss below) attests to the shortcomings of this endeavor. The “monotheistic world,” minus its Muslim contingent, consisted of Jews and Christians, whose respective international power was grossly disproportionate.

4 In 1975, Lewis conducted the session on Jerusalem as a center for three religions. After the presentations of Judaism and Christianity, Lewis explained that the circumstances prevent the desirable presentation of Islam by a Muslim, but elaborated on the great traditions of Jewish scholars of Islam. He concluded: “It is therefore a great tradition of detached objective and sympathetic scholarship that the school of Islamic Studies in the university in this city builds, and it is from this university that we draw our pseudo or crypto-Mufti for this evening: Dr. Wilson, who teaches Arabic literature at the Hebrew University and who is the author of a number of writings on the subject.” See: The Jerusalem Committee, Proceedings of Third Plenary Meeting, December 19, 1975, p. 13. This kind of “detached and objective” scholarship came under the attack of Edward Said, who discredited the entire Orientalist school, of which Lewis was a prime member. See: Said, Orientalism. For a response see: Bernard Lewis, "The Question of Orientalism," New York Review of Books June 24, 1982, p. 49-56, reprinted in Bernard Lewis, "The Question of Orientalism," in Islam and the West, ed. Bernard Lewis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 99-118.
When Israel turned to the Christian West for legitimization, it had to accept its idea of Jerusalem as a spiritual site of pilgrimage, a view that accorded with the growing ethno-religious tendencies within Israeli Jewish culture. A negation of a highly modernist city was the only reasonable conclusion, because such modernism would not be able to address the spatial and very unique qualities of the holy city, which were embedded in its Oriental cityscape. According to Louis Kahn, only this route could grant Israel “the spiritual right to consider itself custodian of Jerusalem...from all others who consider it their sacred city.”

With such statements, we arrive at the crux of what Edward Said called “essentialist universalism,” a kind of historicism in which universalism as a value is the exclusive right of its Western members. Israelis were allowed to join this Western club only on the condition of complying with its rules. But for people living in Jerusalem or in the state of Israel, this city was not only holy. It was a civic center, an everyday city, and, more importantly, a city split by two nations. The pressing demand to “thematize” Jerusalem meant that the civic symbolism of the State had to be subordinated to ethno-religious themes. The Israeli State, stripped of its modernist attire, had to symbolize its capital as a Jewish or, rather, monotheistic, center in order to legitimize its cause.

In a country debating its post-'67 national identity, such international criticism clearly destabilized the delicate balance between “nation” and “state” in favor of the kind of sentiments that nationalism had been appropriating from religious systems in order to

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5 Rabinovich, “U.S. Architect Says: Faulty Presentation.”
solidify its message. In so doing, this criticism prompted a problem of great consequence—it compromised the important democratic distinction between State and religious faith. Consider, for example, the detested Central Boulevard. The boulevard indicated to Lewis Mumford that “[t]he municipal authorities have been faithfully carrying out their assigned duties in the spirit of Baron Haussmann, without realizing that it is to Isaiah that they must look for guidance.” Isaiah, whose vision of Jerusalem Mumford contrasted to Haussmann’s Paris, suddenly emerged as the great hero of Jerusalem in its post-’67 incarnation. By way of opposition, the “Central Boulevard,” despite its problems, had offered a civil counterpart to this kind of ethno-religious symbolism. It threaded together the civic centers of the State—the two campuses of the Hebrew University, the Government Precinct, and the National Memorial. In so doing, it created a potential dialogue between the symbolism of the Israeli State and that of the Jewish Nation. Indeed, as seen above on the title page, the 1968 Masterplan featured as its emblem a map that depicts a dual focus: one on the Government precinct as a civic center, the other on the religious center at the city’s ancient core. Such a split symbolic field could be interpreted as an obstacle for the city’s unification. However, had the masterplan been implemented, it could have relieved religious sites from the additional symbolic burden of State power and its ensuing political pressures.

During the Engineers’ conference that preceded the Committee meeting, Philip Johnson had, in fact, wholeheartedly supported the boulevard, in a speech that might explain his

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8 Another example is in the first plenary session of the Jerusalem Committee, when Judge Hayim Cohen confessed his admiration for the prophet who celebrated the city as one would celebrate a lover. Hayim Cohen, “Eternal Jerusalem,” in *The Jerusalem Committee, Proceedings of the First Meeting*, pp. 9-12.
unusual reticence during the Committee’s collective rebuke of this urban gesture. He
called it a “way” that linked revered historical sites and magnificent views. “These
points,” he professed, “will hang like jewels on a charm...between the two mountains.
This could be greater than any other way in the world. What city has so much to
connect? What city has these views along the way?”9 He urged Israelis “that the way be
designed with carriageways narrow enough for the pedestrian to cross easily, unlike the
Champs-Elysees,” and that “(f)ull-grown trees should be planted down a pedestrian path
in the center.”10 Nevertheless, the boulevard’s menacing fascist scale could only be
scarcely concealed. Instead of raising the issue of its civic role the committee focused on
its scale alone.

The Committee urged Israelis to move from “international” to “universally valid”
arquitecture. Ninety years old, Avia Hashimshoni is still deeply enraged by the
Committee’s message because it exhaustively de-legitimized a modernist architectural
tradition with which many Israelis identified. As long as leading modernists, such as
members of CIAM or practitioners of Labor Zionism in Israel, aspired to “international
architecture,” the quest was for a uniformity of the architectural product. Based on the
negation of the past, such architecture anticipated endless frontiers awaiting signs of
progress to unify a modernist space. The alternative quest of post-WWII critics in
Jerusalem for architecture of “universal” significance was different: a diversity of places
was not geared toward a uniform space. On the contrary, its “uniqueness” had to

9 Rabinovich, “Kollek Told to Think Big, to Build Jerusalem ‘Way’,” Jerusalem Post, December 20, 1970,
p.5. Given Rabinovich’s description of Johnson’s enthusiastic comparison between Israeli and American
nationalisms, one might ponder, however, whether Johnson suggested a proper dosage of symbolic
nationalism.
10 Ibid.
conform to a uniform set of values. Such were, in their eyes, peace, spirituality and beauty. These values, however, were not the only ones operating in the contested city.

The Committee’s conceptual outlook neglected to deal with political tensions in Jerusalem, particularly with regard to the evolving calls to make this city a capital for two rival peoples. While other plenary sessions of the Jerusalem Committee raised issues of a political nature, the sessions dealing with planning enjoyed a professional aura, practical edge, and an uncontested credo. As a result, international architects consistently avoided the intricate relations between the city’s image and its representation of the conflict. Eventually, the demand to thematize Jerusalem, that is, to ethnicize the city, left Arab claims unaccounted for while enforcing Jerusalem’s “sanctity” on Jews.

East and West—Old and New

“[T]he process of marrying modern progress with treasured antiquity,”¹¹ as the British High Commissioner phrased it, was the crown of British achievement in Jerusalem, and inspired post-’67 Israelis who followed its course. There is arguably not one single topic in the planning of Jerusalem that was discussed to greater length, the Jerusalem Committee notwithstanding. In the Jerusalem arena of Old and New, there were predetermined sites: the “treasured antiquity” of El-Quds equaled “Old,” while the “modern progress” of Yerushalayim equaled “New.” I suggest that, in this fashion, the contrast between Old and New transcended the irreconcilable rift between East and West, which threatened to split Jerusalem both geographically and culturally.

¹¹ Kendall, Jerusalem – The City Plan. Forward, the High Commissioner.
Through the lens of Edward Said’s seminal book, *Orientalism*, Jerusalem would present itself to us as a typical East-West dichotomy. However, Said staged this as a problem based on geographical distance. Europe, in this account, delineated an Orient that was mute, stagnant, exotic and remote. In it, Europe could identify, by way of contrast, the progressive and moral image of its Occidental self. In Jerusalem, Western knowledge allocated the same dubious position to Arabs, a position which Said criticized, but the geographical distance between ‘Orientals’ and the ‘knowing West’ was nullified. Israel, a settler society with no metropole to retreat into, and its Western advisors had to envision co-existence in one city. In it, the West could no longer ‘know’ the East as its contemporary yet distant opposite Other, but, rather, as its chronologically remote self. Instead of upholding a synchronized East and West, the two were now constructed diachronically, wherein the East was the predecessor, the topoi in which Western monotheistic cultures originated.

Such displacement of cultural into chronological difference is the object of Johannes Fabian’s *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object* of 1983. Fabian argues that “Time, much like language or money, is a carrier of significance, a form through which we define the content of relations between the Self and the Other.” In his anthropological account, the West denied remote and foreign cultures agency in contemporary Time, relegating them instead to Time immemorial, to the Time from which the Western world emerged, but then left behind. From a secured distance, both

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spatial and temporal, the West could order its Others in a Time different from its own in order to create for itself a universe of meaning.

Similarly, I suggest that identifying Old and New with El-Quds and Yerushalayim, respectively, encapsulates the meaning of the relationship between the two urban communities. The dichotomized Time was used to negotiate the cultural difference between Israelis and their Arab Other. Yet, like Said’s, Fabian’s analysis assumes geographical distance. In his account, spatial distance collapsed into temporal distance.

In Jerusalem, while Israelis as well as their foreign advisors were the “here and now,” the Palestinians of El-Quds were not “there,” but rather here, sharing the same city. Therefore, the temporal device of distancing had to be qualified. Rather than a developmental time, time had to be constructed as history.

The role of visual culture in this process was crucial. As we have seen, the idea of Jerusalem was visually encoded. It was translated into the photographs and drawings that filled the pages of Kendall’s *Jerusalem Plan* of 1948 as well as Sharon’s *Planning Jerusalem* of 1973. These, together with the numerous popular albums they inspired, would invoke in viewers the idea of Jerusalem. In a different context, Fabian explains that:

> As images, places, and spaces turn from mnemotechnic aids into topoi they become that which a discourse is about. When modern anthropology began to construct its Other in terms of topoi implying distance, difference, and opposition, its intent was above all, but at least also, to construct ordered Space and Time—a cosmos—for Western society to inhabit…”

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14 For the appropriation of the Palestinian vernacular as the primitive origin of architecture, see chapter 5.
15 Fabian, *Time and the Other*, pp. 111-112.

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Likewise, I would argue, the immense attention to the visual image of Jerusalem—its three-dimensional forms, picturesque skyline and serene landscapes—was understood in opposition to the modern cultural production that surrounded it. The dichotomized Old and New repeatedly invoked this cultural difference, thus creation of temporal distance. This chronology was not required in order to solve Jerusalem’s urbanism, but in order to create “a Space and Time—a cosmos—for Western society to inhabit.” In Jerusalem, whose universal values were constantly called upon, such order was rudimentary. The universal cosmos of the Judeo-Christian culture could confront the location of its origin in Arab topoi only by distancin it to time immemorial—distant from the “now” of Western culture.  

Representatives of Western culture—British, Israelis, or international advisors—divulged, as we have seen, such Orientalist and anthropological biases in their respected accounts. They desired the cultural production of the Orient to be part of their own heritage. But once the Oriental city was cast “as history” against a modern West, the West could appropriate the East “as past” according to its needs—because it was its past. Such an understanding of history clearly camouflages national, political and social aspects of this complex urban entity, in which two contemporaneous national communities had similar yet contradicting claims on this “universal past.” Nevertheless, Israel, as I have shown, tried to accommodate itself to the West in order to legitimize its rule. It appropriated the Orient according to Western depictions into its own political narrative. The contradiction therefore between the desire for a “universal theme” for

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16 A notable exception is the position of Meron Benvenisti as it was articulated during the 1975 plenary session of the Jerusalem Committee, see, for example, the entirety of the 1975 meeting in: The Jerusalem Committee, Proceedings of the Third Plenary Session.
Jerusalem and its architectural reality became apparent once the thematized architecture spilled over to the satellite neighborhoods. [Fig. 33] The combination of the universal theme of the city with its Zionist building apparatus did not leave much room for an Arab share in this “universe.”

This does not necessarily imply neglect. In keeping with its role as moral guardian, the Committee was concerned with the well being of Jerusalem’s Arab population. Teddy Kollek often risked his neck for the Arab population’s well being. Such care, however, was directed at a minority. Talking about Jerusalem’s ethnic mosaic as a multiplicity concealed the reality of two national groups, each consisting of its own diversity, each claiming its own history. The denial of contradiction between Arabs and Jews, Palestinians and Israelis in the making of post-’67 Jerusalem was a striking indication of such shortsightedness, and arguably, its cause.

The collapse of spatial difference into teleology entails a reading of Jerusalem’s antiquity as history, the kind of time that, according to Benedict Anderson, nation-states thrive on, and the kind of past whose usefulness David Lowenthal explores.17 This time of the nation contradicts not only contemporary Arab claims, but also the Orthodox Jewish conception of time, as historical and messianic times are thoroughly incompatible. The discussion of the various designs for the Western Wall plaza (see Chapter 6) therefore extends beyond the national conflict. It demonstrates how different conceptions of time and history dissect the Israeli political body.

17 Lowenthal, The Past Is a Foreign Country.
Form and Beauty

As we have seen, the campaign to beautify Jerusalem was a significant vehicle for legitimizing Israeli rule over the city. The intriguing questions this campaign raised pertained to conflicting definitions of beauty as well as to the power established in defining urban beauty and the purposes for which such definitions were made. Urban beauty, claimed the architectural contingency of the Jerusalem Committee, depended on the capacity to embody the city’s vision in three-dimensional urban form. Therefore, the Committee repeatedly demanded that a three-dimensional model would become the main operative tool for planning Jerusalem, and that an experienced designer would take the lead over discussions pertaining to the city’s physical image (see appendix). These attempts to emancipate architecture and urban design from politics indicated a deep-rooted agenda for the restoration of autonomy to the discipline. The 1975 meeting of the Jerusalem Committee is an excellent example because it put this ongoing controversy between architects and politicians in the most explicit terms possible—a contest over the power to authorize the physical image of Jerusalem.

During this meeting, architects Denys Lasdun, Lawrence Halprin, and Jacob Backema presented an almost unified front against Meron Benvenisti, who, in the absence of a City Engineer, presented the planning philosophy of the city. Benvenisti, the son of a legendary Israeli geographer, a native Jerusalemite, and a student of history, felt he had all the qualities needed to transform Jerusalem. Moreover, he claimed, this was the purpose for which he was elected. Architects, he contended, could define aesthetic values but were incapable of balancing different urban aspects in order to secure the

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18 The Jerusalem Committee, Proceedings of the Third Plenary Meeting.
quality of life of the city’s inhabitants. “[W]e architects are forgetting,” said the mayor of Quito, an architect and politician, in support of him, “that we are only tools, as our doctors in regard to sickness or as lawyers in regard to law-suits.” In this fashion, Benvenisti insisted that compromising between different venues of city planning—transportation, sanitation or design—was the task, or even the call, of the politician rather than the professional. “The way I see the city of Jerusalem in the future,” he firmly asserted, “is based on my personal values... I don’t think that you study that in the University or in a technical institute.”

Planning is political, admitted the architects, and is indeed the politician’s domain. It is the “‘high-pressure planner’ who will be in conflict with your own excellent ideas,” stated Lasdun. However, he and his colleagues urged politicians not to confuse planning and urban design. “As I understand it,” Larry Halprin complained, “there is no guidance on an esthetic, three-dimensional basis of what should be happening in the town of Jerusalem. Now that is, I believe, what I would call ‘urban design,’ the gluing of things together.” A contrast thus surfaced: Benvenisti claimed for himself the role of urban coordinator because, in that role, he saw the power to impose a value system on the built environment. Architects wanted that same role—coordination—for controlling the ‘gluing together’ of different city parts. In order to win their case, they distinguished between administrative and spatial coordination, the latter being their domain, their set of values, their special knowledge for the possession of which one has to attend “the university or the technical institute.”

19 Ibid., December 18, 1975, p. 54.
20 Ibid., p. 12, my emphasis, according to the tone giving to a similar argument during an interview.
21 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
Architects clarified their demand to control urban connectedness through the specifications they prescribed for the desired model. While, for Lasdun, the in-between was “glue” or, rather, infrastructure, for Bakema, this “in-betweenness” was primarily social. It asserted the process of growth and communication between people and communities. Therefore, he insisted that one could study the urban “connectors” only if “the pieces of the mosaic can be seen in total model.” Through this appearance, Bakema expected to study the social backgrounds and prospective living pattern of people in existing and planned neighborhoods.22

Lasdun, in his own, more formal way, wanted to make sure that municipal authorities would not confuse the production of particular architectural projects with the over-arching spatial urban coordination he advocated. He therefore cautioned, “(I)f you set about making a model which shows the plastic nature of the building, the windows, the stone work, the shape of the building, then you are wasting money and wasting time.”23 The control of conventional architectural production did not yet indicate for him that the city was operating under a strict spatial regime. He insisted instead that

What we are talking about...are the spaces in between – and space is a language of architecture; it is trans-national and stands outside time.”24

22 Bakema’s statement in the proceedings was as follows: “You need to know how the in between has to be...you can only discuss the connectors if the pieces of the mosaic can be seen in a total model. And a total model is not only a superficial thing, it is also the appearance to make clear the social backgrounds, of what should be for what, when this neighborhood comes to life now. Because you have now the neighborhoods and in the neighborhoods are people...how do you prepare them in order that these neighborhoods can make clear how their life in time can be developed? See: Ibid, pp. 28-9.
24 Ibid.
In other words, Lasdun demanded that national politicians accept that a professional principle could overrule a political/administrative one because of its indisputable universality. He sharply posited his own set of disciplinary values against the values of national and municipal agencies.

In so doing, Lasdun relied on the rules of the game that the Committee had previously established, most notably in 1973. Demanding a three-dimensional model, the Committee resolved that “[n]o decisions about planning can be made without this visual creativity—without a sense of form, a vision of the future city.”\(^{25}\) That such a demand would be taken seriously was the result, I argue, of Teddy Kollek’s strategy for beautifying the city. As we have seen, the guidelines for such desired beauty complied with Western depictions of Jerusalem, which identified the city’s urban beauty with its unique virtues. Protecting Jerusalem’s beauty and virtue would grant Israelis custody over the idea of Jerusalem, consequently legitimizing its rule over both Yerushalayim and El Quds.

This strategy complicated an already intricate confrontation. The invited international architects and planners experienced the crisis of modern architecture in diverse ways, most evident in the dissolution of CIAM and in problematic modernization projects worldwide.\(^{26}\) The ‘modern architecture’ they were collectively criticizing was hitherto recognized as the authoritative architectural style of the State of Israel, the result of a four-decade old equilibrium between modern architecture and Labor Zionism. The 1968

\(^{25}\) Resolutions of the 1973 Plenary Meeting of the Jerusalem Committee.

\(^{26}\) During the 1975 plenary session, for example, Max Bill complained of the lack of unified criteria that CIAM used to set for issues such as density. See proceedings, December 18, 1975, p. 36.
Jerusalem Masterplan was a typical product of the set of values on which this equilibrium was based. By 1970, when the architects of the Jerusalem Committee severely attacked the '68 Plan, these values were already being ardently questioned. The Committee’s criticism thus destabilized a shaky modernist culture, which was nearing its own crisis, the key dates of which are commonly held as euphoric 1967, the traumatic '73 war and the defeat of Labor Zionism in 1977.

The Committee sent Israeli state agencies a disturbing message. It asked Israelis to examine whether the plan they proposed was indeed in sync with the set of values they were advocating for Jerusalem, and, moreover, with the place it occupied in the largest Zionist project. First, these architects told Israelis, you should define your values. Only then can you prepare a blueprint for Jerusalem. This message was confusing exactly because Israeli values were being fiercely debated at that time. This debate impinged upon the production of the national landscape and therefore upon the conflict with which it was always bound, indeed, which informed it at the outset.

Why, then, did a committee that incited such an uproar have so little impact on the national built praxis? I suggest that the Committee had a momentous impact on Israeli architectural discourse and on institutional restructuring. However, it tried to do something that did not fall within its mandate. It aspired to define for Israelis an alternative set of values. One thing it did was open the wound of modernism for Israelis to dwell upon; another was come up with a ready-made set of values for the city. It is no wonder, then, that hardly any non-Israeli member of the Committee built Jerusalem. I
contend that the Committee’s architectural agenda nevertheless greatly influenced the Israeli scene, but also that Israeli advocates were needed to spread and advance this architectural message through local Israeli culture. Such a local translation was required in order to express in built form the crisis of Zionist modernism, rather than a similar European or American crisis.

By 1977, the date in which this research ends, two distinct designers headed the two agencies most pertinent for Jerusalem’s planning. In 1974, Ram Karmi became the head architect of the Ministry of Housing, a position tailored especially for him. Amnon Niv was appointed Jerusalem’s city engineer in 1977. Both appointments involved a thorough restructuring of their respective planning departments. According to Benvenisti, both Karmi and Niv were architects whose hands were constantly scratched by the designer’s pencil. After years of administrating Jerusalem planning, Benvenisti even admitted, as I noted at the beginning of chapter 3, that “the Karmis and Safdies influenced Jerusalem much more than those who attempted to speak in her name.”

They spoke a professional language that politicians could not understand, yet could not resist because of its powerful symbolism. Such afterthoughts attest to the impact of professional architects on the contested image of Israeli Jerusalem. The subject of the next chapter is therefore the mechanism that won this new generation of local architects the mandate of Israelizing Jerusalem.

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27 Benvenisti, Interview.
As you approach Jerusalem from the valley, the road ascends to a crest overlooking the western hills of the city. Down the slopes, a deserted Arab village hugs the hill, small and larger cubes made of the stone of the mountain: domes, arches, vaults, the harmony with the landscape and the sun. At the summit of the hill is a series of long four-story apartment structures built in the late fifties. They do violence to the mountain. They are foreign, as if imported from some rainy, cool European suburb. (Moshe Safdie)
The 1967 War caught the Israeli planning administration unprepared. Neither its modernist planners nor the politicians who guided them knew how to express architecturally the return to powerfully symbolic, biblical sites. The Minister of Housing simply advised his planners to give the unified city an “Oriental character.” The prefabricated concrete arches that were soon after superimposed on the completed design for the first neighborhood, which was built on recently occupied land, illustrated the confusion.³ [Fig. 34] This situation changed dramatically, however, when a younger generation of architects entered the planning scene. These architects created a coherent architectural image that depended heavily on the readily accessible Palestinian vernacular. [Figs. 16-21] The result bewildered Elinoar Barzaki, the former head of the Jerusalem Region in the Ministry of Housing:

A culture looks for the symbols of its heroic periods and assimilates them in its local architecture, as Italy, for example, relates to the Roman Empire. In Jerusalem, however, the post-'67 architecture of power absorbed the symbols of the conquered rather than those of the conqueror.⁴

Why should Israelis nationalize a contested city with architectural forms belonging to another nation? And what were the mechanisms that enabled Israelis to adopt the

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² See the address of the Minister of Housing Mordechai Bendov to the Knesset: "Planning and Building Methods in East Jerusalem," (see also “New Beginnings” in chapter 3.) Also in Yehuda Drexler, interview, and David Kroyanker, Jerusalem Architecture — Periods and Styles: Modern Architecture Outside the Old City: 1948-1990, (Jerusalem: Keter, 1991), pp. 41-42.
³ The Ministry of Housing was eager to build quickly on land confiscated immediately after the war in order to create a continuous built area between North Jerusalem and Mount Scopus. They therefore recruited completed housing plans that Itzhak Perlstein designed for another site and added to them prefabricated arches in order to provide Eshkol Higths with the appropriate Oriental look.
⁴ Elinoar Barzaki, interview, August 20, 1998. Barzaki studied in Europe during the 1968 events and was recruited by Ram Karmi upon her return to join his team at the Ministry of Housing. She was later the City Engineer of Jerusalem and, at the time of the interview, the head of the architectural school at Tel Aviv University.
Palestinian vernacular, separating it from the culture that produced it in order to create an “Israeli” architecture?

During the 1960s and 1970s, Israeli architects found themselves inextricably bound up in developing crises about modernism. At the same time that architects were questioning the premises of the Modern Movement in architecture, Israelis were becoming more vocal in challenging the modernization project of Labor Zionism, which had campaigned for decades for “progress and development.” This twofold crisis strongly affected a generation of Israeli-born architects, the so-called sabra, who were the first “natives” of the Israeli State. Their emerging critique of both architectural and Zionist modernisms led them to the Palestinian vernacular, particularly to “the Arab village” which had fascinated them for almost a decade by the time post-'67 construction was under way.

This chapter analyzes the journey of Israeli-born architects into the place to which they wanted to belong as well as to the position of power from which they could shape its form. My account starts with an ethnographic study of this architectural generation, and continues to see how their architectural culture dealt with the pressing issue of national belonging in a settler, immigrant society. I then explore the methods used to appropriate the Palestinian vernacular to accommodate the Zionist narrative of the return of Jews to their promised land, a discussion which leads to the ethics of Israeli place-making in art and architecture. In these sets of encounters between architectural and national cultures, we find that architects were neither autonomous, creative professionals working only within the discipline of architecture, nor simply instruments of official power.
In the late 1950s, sabra architects launched a campaign to localize Israeli architecture. They saw in the newly acquired Israeli territories a homeland that was fundamentally different from what had been envisioned by the preceding generation. The founders of Labor Zionism had embraced a modern architecture, which promised a new beginning, a departure from bourgeois or “Oriental” life that they believed had contaminated Jewish life in the Diaspora. Sabra architects claimed that the resultant “international architecture” that was identified with the Israeli State disregarded the Zionist promise of a national home. [Fig. 9]

Architects voicing this criticism, known also as the “Generation of the State,” were committed primarily to professional, rather than political, action. Their cultural formation was strikingly uniform—native born, urban and socialist. [Fig.7] It created an ideological screen through which members of the group assimilated professional knowledge. The subsequent dissemination of this filtered architectural knowledge

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6 Dan Etan, interview, July 29, 1998. Etan pointed out that the preceding generation did not entrust them with political duties but gave them professional tasks. One of the main questions that interests scholars of this generation is the political inefficacy of this generation in comparison to the founders of Labor Zionism. See: Yonatan Shapira, An Elite without Successors, Sidrat Zeman Hoèveh; 3 (Tel-Aviv: Sifriyat Po’alim, 1984). Anita Shapira argues that this generation conformed to the activist message of Labor Zionism and saw in politics a field of verbal articulations rather than accomplishments. She mentions in passing that they turned instead to professional careers. Accordingly, this study questions the political efficacy of their action through “the profession,” see: Anita Shapira, “‘Dor Baaretz,’” in Old Jews, New Jews, pp. 122-154.
7 Not all the protagonists I study were actually born in Mandate Palestine. However, interviews have revealed that the great majority of the group under focus was indeed native-born. Others assimilated to the culture of the sabra at an early age, young enough to study in the appropriate high schools and to participate in the activities of Zionist youth movements, which led to the required cultural path I describe below.
through an intricate cultural and political web established them as leading professionals capable of mobilizing specialized knowledge into the national arena—a process that yielded substantial cultural power.

Most members of this group were born or grew up in Tel Aviv, and attended one of three high schools there during the 1940s. These schools were ideological hubs, cultivating “men of European culture in the East” while investing in them the value system of the so-called “working settlement”—the elite of Labor Zionism. Later, a program of combined military and agricultural training prepared them to take part in the Judaization of Mandate Palestine, and the War of Independence. The group sent to Rosh Hanikrah kibbutz, for example, consisted of six architects, four of whom would build extensively in post-’67 Jerusalem. [Fig. 35] One became an influential professor at the Technion, Israel’s only architectural school, and another the Head Architect of the Ministry of Housing.

According to Moti Sahar, it was a generation that saw itself as “bound with issues of the

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8 The high schools were Tichon Hadash, Gimnasya Herzlia, and Bet Hinuch Tichon. Each of them was a hub for different youth movements.
10 Vachman explains that the format of the hachshara (literally preparation or training) was developed in Europe in order to prepare Zionist groups for settlement. Before independence, the hachsharot were part of the Palmach (a group of elite military units that were the hub for leaders such as Yitzhak Rabin) and intended to combine military service with settlement. This was the model for the post-independence Nahal (Soldierly Pioneering Youth), which was part of the Israeli Defense Force. Architects of the Rosh Hanikrah hachshara, for example, were in the hachshara exactly at the time this transition took place—they were drafted to the Hagana (to which the Palmach belonged) and ended their service in the IDF as the first regiment of the Nahal.
11 In the hachshara of Rosh Hanikrah were the architects Se’adia Mendel, Giora Lofenfeld, Avraham Vachman, Ram Karmi, as well as one who remains unidentified. Their commander was architect Dan Etan.
12 The first is Avraham Vachman, the second Ram Karmi.
nation.” Its architectural members learned from their elders the power of collective effort. By the Sixties they had formed an identity of their own, and set up a circle of sabra architects that met once a month to brainstorm their projects. Although the circle never produced a single written manifesto, it had a very clear agenda that soon covered the pages of Israel’s single architectural periodical of the time, as well as the reports judging numerous architectural competitions, the administration of which gradually came under their control. The principal focus of their work was housing, particularly in the new towns that mushroomed at the territorial periphery of the State after independence. Such was the model housing estate in Beer Sheva, where architects experimented both with the Corbusian megablock and with carpet housing—a low rise and continuous built fabric with shaded passageways and private patios. In Giv’at Hamoreh, white regionalist buildings recreated conventional streets by accommodating

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13 Moti Sahar, phone interview, July 2001. Within this generation, it is important to distinguish between urban members and members of the “working settlement.” According to Avraham Vachman, the urban youth was ideologically inferior, but as a result, urban sabras saw their Zionism as more conscious than that of their generational group in the “working settlement,” who were born into the elite of Labor Zionism and did not have to labor in order “to be included.” Eventually this situation empowered the urban “natives.” By joining the youth movement, Zionist settlement and military service, the urban sabras were incorporated into the Zionist ethos: they were identified as committed to the national cause. At the same time they enjoyed access to the knowledge and private capital of the city, which was out of reach for the rural elite. With the privatization of Israeli culture, the urban sabra could easily take the lead. They had access to higher education, which paved their way to professional leadership and higher socio-economic status. Accordingly, the professional route of aspiring architects of this generation usually (almost entirely urban) involved studies at the Technion, and training in a modernist firm such as that of Zeev Rechter, Arieh Sharon or Dov Karmi, where the owners’ own rebellious sons (Yaakov Rechter, Eldar Sharon and Ram Karmi) would soon transform the firms’ output.

14 The circle’s core consisted of Dan Etan, Yizhak Yashar, Ram Karmi, Ora and Ya’akov Ya’ar, Avraham Yaski and Amnon Alexandroni. Moshe Zarhi and Yaakov Rechter also frequently participated. The circle, however, associated with other architects, whom they often invited to present their work, such as Eldar Sharon, Zvi Hecker, and David Best. Best, together with David Reznik, who belonged to an earlier formation of this group (when he was working with Zeev Rechter in Tel Aviv) were the most influential non-sabras among Israeli architects.

15 Handasah ve’Adrichalut (Engineering and Architecture), the Journal of Israel Association of Engineers and Architects, was the only architectural periodical until the mid-1960s. At that time, Dan Etan edited some special issues for the Journal (see list of issues in the bibliography.) The group of participants, (who were usually associated with the circle) alternated according to the topic. They met to discuss issues such as new housing developments, institutes for higher education, and so forth—issues which preoccupied their generational group. The meetings were recorded and their transcriptions published in the journal.
the slope of the hill into their section. In Dimona, Nazereth, Arad, or in the un-built Bsor City, this group of architects experimented with the new trends they advocated. [Figs. 37-38]

The 1957 conference in Ohalo, near the Sea of Galilee, was a formative moment. Avraham Yaski, a rising young architect at the time, remembers his trembling knees and cracking voice when he challenged his revered elders, the founding generation of Zionist architectural modernism. These elders had brought the “new architecture” of European inter-war modernism to Mandate Palestine. After independence they had incorporated the modern architecture they had previously practiced into a mass-produced housing industry that helped them to accommodate numerous waves of new immigrants. [Fig. 8-10] But the "housing solutions" ignored the cultural diversity of the immigrants.

Furthermore, in the minds of the sabra architects, the architecture of Zionist modernism had failed to create the mandatory sense of belonging between men, community and place. The sabra criticized architects like Alexander Klein for his famous scientific experiments in Beer Sheva (1959-1964), where a team experimented with different housing types, ranging from a kilometer-long housing block (Yaski and Alexandroni) to casba-inspired carpet housing (Havkin and Zolotov). The unrealized plans for the new town of Bsor (1961-1964) generated new ideas that were strongly influenced by the British plans for Hook. Avraham Yaski headed both teams. Other examples of influential experiments are Etan and Yashar’s Victory Housing in Dimona of the mid 1960s (whose name was inspired by the Six Day War immediately after which the housing complex was populated), Yaakov and Ora Ya’ar’s housing and commercial center in Givat Hamoreh (1958-1961), and David Best’s plans for housing quarters in Arad (Yeelim,1961, Avishur, 1965).

In interviews, (for example with Avraham Yaski and Dan Etan,) the date of the conference was uncertain. In Handasah and Adrichalut, however, the 1957 conference in Ohalo is covered in detail as a typical modernist event, in which Ben Gurion tied national and architectural goals: “Addresses delivered at the 31st General Conference at “Ohalo”, March 8-9, 1958”, handasah veadrichalut, March 1957.

Avraham Yaski, interview, August 23, 1998.

This is the preferred period in Israeli architectural historiography (see introduction, chapter 1 and conclusions). For a primary source, see: Habinyan’s three issues from 1937 and 1938. Examples of secondary sources are: Levine, White City; Herbert and Sosnovsky, Bauhaus on the Carmel.

See chapter 1 for a discussion of the period and notes on recent scholarship and exhibitions, such as Efret, The Israeli Project,” and Boneh, Building the Country.
schemes for “existence minimum.” They appreciated the mass housing Klein and his colleagues advised for new immigrants, but insisted that in the process Zionist modernist architects treated the inhabitants of the so-called “shikunim” as objects. Klein’s housing projects were certainly efficient but left no room for “culture,” which is, according to sabra architects, “what makes human beings into a people and society.”

Enthusiasm for vernacular architecture typified the new generational strategy that sabra architects shared with their colleagues overseas. Instead of the modernist will to re-form society, they sought "the spatial expression of human conduct." An unmediated form of this expression could be found, they believed, in indigenous architecture, where life, rather than architects, dictated the form of building. As a result, architects shifted their focus to Man, with structuralist anthropology providing the theoretical ground. In a repeatedly quoted statement, the influential Dutch architect Aldo van Eyck told us that

Man is always and everywhere essentially the same. He has the same mental equipment though he uses it differently according to the particular life pattern of which he happens to be a part. Modern architects have been harping continually on what is different in our time to such an extent that even they have lost touch with what is not different, with what is always essentially the same.

If man is essentially the same everywhere, his environment must be expressed by similar architectural principles. Postwar architectural discourse presented a wealth of mostly primitive examples of this correlation between man and the built places that clothed his

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22 Ram Karmi, Interview, Tel Aviv, July 7, 1998.
23 Jacob Bakema, in Team X Primer, p. 24.
life. This architecture was uncontaminated by Western historical conventions, or by spurious Western progress. Moreover, unlike regional architecture at home, it risked no nationalistic interpretation, no painful memory of pre-war sentiments. The prototypical inhabitant of these environments was a generic Man, whose specific history, culture and politics were ignored in favor of a universal truth regarding the instincts of human habitation.

In the US, architects such as Bernard Rudofsky drew upon the bible and Darwin—the mythical and scientific origins of Western culture—to divest the Modern Movement of its scientific command. Rudofsky's *Architecture Without Architects* of 1964 emerged as a major sourcebook for architects worldwide. It held vernacular architecture as "nearly immutable, indeed, unimprovable, since it serves its purpose to perfection."[26] [Fig. 39] Similarly enthusiastic were Heideggerian phenomenologists who found in vernacular architecture ontological definitions of "place", of being "at home" in the world. The group Atbat-Afrique in Morocco, whose work combined Arab vernacular with modern architecture, [Fig. 40] wrote in their statement of principle that "(i)t is impossible for each man to construct his house to himself. It is for the architect to make it possible for the man to make his house a home."[27]

This was precisely the type of "social ethics" that brought the architectural thinking of the European Team X and the concurrent New Brutalism trend to bear so effectively on the architectural discourse of sabra architects. It suggested new venues for using

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architecture to socialize new immigrants into a national community, and at the same time to connect this imagined community to the land. New immigrants, the sabra generation posited, cannot and should not comply with a modernist immigrants’ idea that is imposed on them in the form of a utopia built in white. [Fig. 8] The sabra generation wanted instead to “transform the Diaspora Jew into a man growing out of the land,” a man whose identity develops as a result of his organic ties to the territory rather than his adherence to an idea foreign to him. Only architecture “of the place” could therefore identify Israelis with the territory to which they wanted to belong, as well as to possess.

*Makom* (Hebrew for place) refers to “the encounter between man and the place where he is.” The notion of *makom* is fundamental to sabra art and architectural discourse because, as Gurevitz and Aran have argued, Israeli Jews did not succeed in resolving the ambiguities of their place: the tension between the text and the territory. The “Land of Israel,” according to this argument, has always been an abstract homeland, an idea, an aspiration the Zionist movement inherited from the Jewish religion. At the same time, however, it was also an actual place, laden with history, authenticity and sacredness. If the founding generation was devoted to “the idea,” the sabra generation embraced the territory itself. The schism between the two constantly disturbed the process of inhabiting the land. Because the idea, according to Gurevitz and Aran, preceded the place, the efforts of sabra architects to substantiate the “idea” in the land were not as spontaneous as they imagined. On the contrary, they were conscious, determined, and ideologically charged—fundamentally different from the effortless “nativeness” that is

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28 Karmi, interview.
29 Dani Karavan in Blas and Tatenbaum, Social Realism.
gained by birthright and direct ancestry.\textsuperscript{30}

This “nativeness” was readily found for sabra architects in Arab culture, whose vernacular architecture, inseparable from the place in which it was created, evinced the rootedness they sought. When Yoram Segal published in the inaugural issue of the journal \textit{Tvai} a cover story on “The Traditional House in the Arab Villages of the Galilee,”\textsuperscript{31} he stressed this unmediated connectness. He saw in the ties of the fellah to his house, which he builds and maintains with his own hands, “a relationship of belonging, of identification, and of strong emotional attachment.”\textsuperscript{32} [Fig. 41] It was precisely this sort of relationship that the sabra architects were seeking.

Like Arab words in Hebrew slang, Arab attire for Israeli youth, or Arab food in Israeli cuisine, the evocation of “the Arab village” in Israeli architectural culture was a protest through which sabras aimed to identify themselves as natives. Ram Karmi, in his recent book, has suggested that “emulating the local gave birth to an empathy toward the lifestyle of the Arabs and the Bedouins, and led to a renewed examination of different identity options.”\textsuperscript{33} Amnon Alexandroni’s caricature of Karmi, wrapped in the kafiah of an Arab Sheikh, illustrates this quandary. [Fig. 42]

By 1965, Karmi had combined New Brutalist tendencies with his sabra identity to

\textsuperscript{30} See Gurevitz and Aran, “al ha-makom.”
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, p. 20.
explain the theory behind his acclaimed multi-functional megastructure in Beer Sheva.\textsuperscript{34} [Figs. 43-44] He portrayed “the Arab village” as a set of formal and functional characteristics conducive to a harmonious built environment and a cohesive community. He saw the Arab village as being “at home” in the region—a sensual place where one could intimately experience space, stone, wind and light. [Fig. 45] Naturally, the Palestinian inhabitants of these villages play little part in the picture. Their presence is at best generic and their communal life is typically Mediterranean.

Karmi’s intention, he explained in reference to his award-winning Brutalist megastructure in Beer Sheva, was to \textit{translate} rather than mimic regional values and molds. In the Arab village, he claimed, he found typologies that accord with the desert—the cohesiveness of the built material, the shaded, ventilated bazaar, the dissolution of the traditional facade into a volumetric play in which the sun sculpts ever-changing shadows. But, Karmi stressed, this typology was not yet part of the Israeli culture which “we” Israelis were so laboriously trying to define. Karmi’s attempt to translate Palestinian architecture is subtle. It is interesting to contrast it to the Israeli Museum, built by the European Israeli Al Mansfeld, which is also modeled on an Arab village. [Fig. 46] Mansfeld drew on the formal characteristics of the village, particularly on its morphological appearance of multiple cubical unites, whose silhouette complement the landscape of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{35} In contrast, Karmi’s architecture hardly resemble the Arab vernacular on formal groungs, but its interior spaces emulated the spatial experience of shaded passages and enclosed courtyards that Karmi considered indigenous. Unlike the

\textsuperscript{34} Ram Karmi, "On the Architecture of Shadows," \textit{Kav} 3 (1965), pp. 55-56.
modernist architecture of Mansfeld, Karmi’s turn to the Arab village precedent intended to evoke the “homeness” of the region.

The wishful nature of such Israeli “homeness” was eagerly debated. The founders of the state insisted that a home for the New Jew be free of past memories—a new beginning on a clean slate. Nearly four decades later, Moshe Safdie contested Zionist modernism with the opposite argument. Observing post-'67 Jerusalem, Safdie delineated a clear-cut dichotomy between the noble Palestinian fellah, who “takes time out from farming to build himself a house,” and the modernized Israeli professor, who “has a house built by a professional architect. The fellah’s house,” says Safdie, “will in all likelihood be the better one.”

Safdie listed issues such as identity, scale, and public space that is both conducive to social life and complementary to the topography, as the human qualities that would make the Arab village of Sillwan a better living environment than contemporary Israeli modernist housing. All these merits depended on a longstanding heritage that the Zionist movement either ignored or erased.

These examples demonstrate the cultural impasse in which Israeli architects were caught. The Zionist revolutionary socialism, which attempted to redeem the country through its modernization, did not accord with their generation. It emerged in Europe, and its sweeping Judaisation of Mandate Palestine intentionally ignored indigenous architecture.

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36 Abraham Rabinovich, a report on Safdie’s talk that was delivered during a memorial meeting marking a year since the death of Yehuda Haetzrachi, former chairman of the Jerusalem branch of the Council for the Beautiful Land of Israel, see: Abraham Rabinovich, “Why Fellah Has Better Home Than a Professor,” *Jerusalem Post* August 8, 1975. Safdie’s call continues a long tradition of enthusiasm for the vernacular
It also operated from top down, locating at the top the Zionist pioneers who “salvaged” a land conceived as tabula rasa. But the sabra approach, turning to an authentic vernacular to build from bottom up, was no less confusing. A genuine national architecture required an unmediated expression of the place, but the search for authentic expression yielded perplexing results: native architecture was mostly Arab.

The Israeli search for an alternative to Zionist modernism in the local Palestinian vernacular was contradictory, given the denigration of Arab culture by the Israelis. In the wake of this contradiction, notions of colonizer/colonized, or Western/Oriental, gave way to the ambivalence of colonial subjectivity. In the wake of Said’s Orientalism of 1978, many studies have demonstrated the Western/Oriental dichotomy in different contexts and locales. For the Israeli context, see Ella Shohat, Israeli Cinema: East/West and the Politics of Representation, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989); Gil Eyal, “On the Arab Village,” Teoria ve Bikoret 3 (1993); and Yigal Zalmona and Tamar Manor-Fridman, Kadima: The East in Israeli Art (Jerusalem: Israel Museum, 1998). Particularly important in this context is Dan Rabinowitz, Anthropology and the Palestinians, Kav Ha-Tefer (Ra’anana: ha-Merkaz le-heker ha-hevrat ha’Aravit, 1998). The criticism of Said’s imposing binary opposition was a catalyst to postcolonial writing on the ambivalence of colonial subjectivity that habitually focused on the incapacity of the colonized to retrieve an “authentic” identity that was not always already entangled in colonial subjugation.

National “belonging”

The Israeli post-independence mission of gathering in the Jewish exiles relied on a small Israeli core, the elite of which were sabra youths, and which absorbed endless waves of

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that was intertwined with modernism and was therefore laden with contradiction. For a seminal earlier invocation of this debate, see Adolf Loos’s “The Architect.”

37 In the wake of Said’s Orientalism of 1978, many studies have demonstrated the Western/Oriental dichotomy in different contexts and locales. For the Israeli context, see Ella Shohat, Israeli Cinema: East/West and the Politics of Representation, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989); Gil Eyal, "On the Arab Village," Teoria ve Bikoret 3 (1993); and Yigal Zalmona and Tamar Manor-Fridman, Kadima: The East in Israeli Art (Jerusalem: Israel Museum, 1998). Particularly important in this context is Dan Rabinowitz, Anthropology and the Palestinians, Kav Ha-Tefer (Ra’anana: ha-Merkaz le-heker ha-hevrat ha’Aravit, 1998). The criticism of Said’s imposing binary opposition was a catalyst to postcolonial writing on the ambivalence of colonial subjectivity that habitually focused on the incapacity of the colonized to retrieve an “authentic” identity that was not always already entangled in colonial subjugation.
new immigrants. *Sabra* architects were deeply involved in the pressing question of how
to nationalize diverse groups of immigrants. How could they be turned, in Karmi words,
"into a people and society?" More precisely, how could architects instill in new
immigrants a sense of belonging—to each other as a national community and to the place
as both individuals and a nation?

Labor Zionism failed to induce a sense of belonging, the *sabras* gathered, because it
endeavored to nationalize new immigrants from above—it expected that immigrants
would conform with an ideal foreign to them. Moreover, Labor Zionism demanded its
new national subjects to subordinate all previous identity to the dictates of the socialist,
independent, healthy and producing New Jew, in whose built environment a rejuvenated,
modern nationality should emerge. *Sabra* architects protested that the resultant modern
dwelling units Labor Zionism provided for new immigrants were identical and
anonymous and therefore highlighted their uprootedness without cohering for them a new
sense of place with which to identify.

Israelis shared this problem with postwar architects overseas. The Smithsons, for
example, manifested that "[t]he task of our generation is plain—we must re-identify man
with his house, his community, his city."38 Similarly, the Israeli architect Dan Etan told
me years later that the kernel of his architectural career was the effort
to make the physical world around us a little more legible for people in the sense
that every building tells its story. We must know to tell this story in a legible way
because only then will people befriend the building. Consequently, walking from

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38 Alison and Peter Smithson, *Ordinariness and Light*, p.32.
one place to the other acquires a sense of destination, significance and direction. One should build things that make people feel good and comfortable with them.\textsuperscript{39}

Etan explains that people could not adjust to the home that modernist Zionism prepared for them because the “story” it told them was too abstract—it was beyond their horizon of meaning. For Etan, only people who felt comfortable in their environment, people whose habitation corresponded to their existing pattern of life, would accommodate, as new immigrants, to their new society. This was exactly the social duty that preoccupied Etan’s generation: how to house the ingathered exiles, how to make them feel at home, how to create a built environment that would induce their formation as ‘a people and society.’ Etan articulated an intuitive understanding that Israeli national identity could not be imposed from above—it had to be negotiated through an interaction with the particular way in which people organize their universe of meaning.

The “social ethics” of New Brutalism pointed to this engagement. Karmi, who was educated in London at the time the group published its first manifestos there, explained that:

\begin{quote}
The Brutalism wanted to touch people as they are, to talk directly about their associations—to touch the soul, the heart. We wanted to achieve in everything the poetic dimension—the dimension of hitting people’s heart, rather than the economic or functionalist dimension of their life. Efficiency was not the sacred goal, but rather human beings...as living things holding emotions and dreams.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

What Karmi learned from Brutalism was the means by which he could intervene in the intimate world of the people he built for. His careful study of people’s associations, of returning to “the way the city is perceived by the senses of human beings” was serving a

\textsuperscript{39} Dan Etan, interview, June 5, 2001, Haifa.
\textsuperscript{40} Karmi, interview, 1998.
purpose. Karmi wanted to turn alienated immigrants into people with the national identity of the *sabra*. “We are planning not only the physical topography but also the mental topography in people heads.”

Here lies the force of this generation: through the postwar architectural focus on man, community and the everyday, they became interlocutors who communicated Zionist ideology and socialist politics into the setting of everyday life. We should note, however, that these architects rarely knew for whom they were building. Their desire to build architecture “from below”—the architecture of everyday life—was rooted in the only reality familiar to them—that of privileged Tel Aviv high schools, youth movements, kibbutzim and military duties, the hub of *sabra* culture and Zionist ideology. Against their modernist forerunners, they wanted to express in their architecture the story of native Jews in the land of Israel, of Hebrew culture and direct encounters with fellow men and nature. In his very recent book, Karmi elaborated:

> If the White Architecture protested intellectual superiority over the backwardness of “those close to nature,” those who do not take part in the universal revolution, then the *sabra* has already assembled parts of the Arab menu into his unique, new customs. In architecture, it was expressed in the Brutalist building of the 1960s. In those years, an opening was widening for a creative and innovative spirituality that drew from the Israeli way of life. 42

Regionalism and Brutalism therefore ruled the day: the principles of native intimacy with the landscape and climate were taken from the Arab vernacular; the blunt concrete of Brutalism emulated the directness and chutzpa of the *sabra*. Despite diverse architectural expression, the 1960s circle of *sabra* architects held in common a critique of modern

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41 Karmi, interview, June 8, 2001, Herzlia.
urban planning, a quest for local architecture, and a focus on “man.” As a result, they prioritized issues pertaining to housing, place, and local materials. More importantly, and in tune with postwar architectural inquiries overseas, they tried to understand what held people together; what the essence of a neighborhood was. A good neighborhood, it was understood, creates a community, and a community becomes part of the place if its architecture communicates locality. Subsequently, members of such community are likely to develop strong ties to the new society. Only then architecture could, as the Team X Primer strongly advocated, “build toward that society’s realization-of-itself.”

For sabra architects, such a statement had a clear-cut meaning—the realization of a state for Jews in the Land of Israel.

Architects of this generation worked mostly in the geographical periphery of Israel, where they experimented with regionalism and Brutalism during the late 1950s and the 1960s. Their architectural convictions matured into a full-scale program after 1967, where they had the opportunity to build an unimaginable volume of housing and institutions, especially considering their young age. Besides the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus and the renovation of the Jewish Quarter, their most impressive presence was in the Ministry of Housing, which largely centralized the building market in Israel. They were particularly instrumental in building Jerusalem satellite neighborhoods on land confiscated in 1970. These communal housing developments betray the new architectural style for Israeli Jerusalem that I described in chapter 2.

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43 Smithson, Team X Primer, p. 3.
When the new position of head architect for the Ministry of Housing was offered to Ram Karmi in 1974, he stopped all ongoing planning projects, brought three dozens or so architects and planners to the Ministry, and embarked on a new nation-wide planning program. Graduates of the 1968 student rebellion in Europe joined teams of social psychologists, sociologists and population experts in helping architects to devise better neighborhoods. The occupants of the new housing settlements in Jerusalem, for example, who were well-mixed according to socio-economic criteria, ethnic background, and age, enjoyed well-planned dwellings conducive of healthy social life. By the same token, they enjoyed overdoses of locality: the acclaimed housing hierarchy was built by means of streets and alleys, gates, arcades and courtyards. Broken masses and arches further communicated a Jerusalemite “sense of place,” which still kept in motion the lessons that architects tried to learn from Palestinian architectural vocabulary in previous decades.

If postwar architectural culture led Israeli architects to emulate the Palestinian vernacular in their search for appropriate Israeli architecture, how did they make this conviction legible for the larger Israeli public? Three strategies were used to Israelize the Arab vernacular: it could be read as biblical architecture, as an uncontaminated primitive origin of architecture, or simply as typically Mediterranean.

“Biblicalizing” the Landscape

After the 1967 conquest of Jerusalem’s Old City, Israeli Jews rejoiced in a metaphorical return home, especially to the Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter, the symbolic centers of the Jewish people. The consequent increased focus on the Jewish Quarter was
exploited by a national strategy to weaken the hegemony of the Arab village over Israeli architecture. If the architecture testified to the continuity of Jewish habitation since biblical times, the new sense of locale could be applied to the surrounding Palestinian villages, whose architecture was perceived as biblical, with the inhabitants as its custodians. The architecture of the Jewish Quarter would prove, in other words, the Jewishness of the place.

Immediately after the war, reconstruction of the city began. A green belt around the Old City—previously a British colonial dream—was envisioned, which would visually arrest the Old City of Jerusalem. The Arab village of Sillwan was included because “its character gives us a good picture of how the landscapes and villages of Biblical times looked...”44 Publications of the army’s educational system45 compared this village to the archaeologically informed open air model of Herod’s Jerusalem, again emphasizing the continuity of ancient building traditions.46 [Fig. 48] Archeology, Talmudic sources, and anthropology validated such convictions. A study of the Palestinian villages in the Hebron hills reported of “a lifestyle which seemed familiar from biblical and Talmudic sources.”47 The author concluded that the “houses, which have remained as they were

45 The publication of the Israel Defense Force, Bamahane, educated for the love of the country. It published stories and detachable centerpieces of images from “the Land of Israel.” Many of these features were compiled in: Irit Zaharoni, Israel, Roots & Routes: A Nation Living in Its Landscape, 1st ed. (Tel Aviv: MOD Publishing House, 1990). (This is a translation of the Hebrew book: Derech Eretz: nofe artemu)
46 The model is an open air 1:50 scale model of the city of Jerusalem during the so-called Second Temple era. It was reconstructed and largely imagined in the absence of accurate archeological data by the archeologist Professor Avi Yona. A recent appraisal of it in a publication dedicated to “knowing the country” is: Gavriel Barkai and Eli Shiler, "A Tour in Second Temple Jerusalem in the Holyland Hotel Model," A Periodical for the Study of the Land of Israel (2001), p. 21-50.
hundreds of years ago, allow us to study and to deduce the private construction of our
time from the ancient private building."^48

**The Noble Savage and the Origin of Architecture**

Endorsed by the Israeli administration upon his return home in 1967, Moshe Safdie
designed the (unrealized) prefabricated Jerusalem Habitat. [Fig. 49] Safdie called the
Arab village site of his project by its Hebrew/biblical name, *Manchat.* "Here," he stated,
"was the prototype, the ancient village, with which any modern development would have
to co-exist."^49 Realizing the absolute dichotomy between the Arab village and the Israeli
superblock, he clearly intended to emulate the former, to contrast an architecture derived
from abstract intellectual premises with one stemming from the primal instincts of
habitation.

The Arab village, untouched by Western sophistication, exemplified for Safdie the true
origin of architecture. To his eyes, even villages of 1948 Palestinian refugees, built with
"fairly limited resources" and devoid of historical depth, were "awesome
environments."^50 They proved for him that habitation was a product of "the
compassionate search for the way people live their private and public life."^51 Safdie
explained his incorporation of advanced methods of construction into this ‘original’
vernacular model of habitation:

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^48 Ibid, p. 51.
^49 Safdie, *The Future of the Past,* p. 27.
^50 Moshe Safdie, *Moshe Safdie in Jerusalem,* A lecture delivered at the RIBA in London.
^51 Moshe Sadie, *The Future of the Past,* p. 29. When developing his inspiration from the Arab village of
Malha, Safdie explicitly refers to "the tree people" as a Darwinian-like explanation of the origin of
architecture. This is a clear reference to the tree people Rudofsky describes in his seminal *Architecture*
I wanted to build something that was wholly contemporary, an expression of life today, but that would be as if it had always been there – a kind of fugue with two instruments, a counterpoint on a remembered melody. Thus evolved the Habitat Israel building system: modular, concrete units, sandblasted to expose the yellow Jerusalem stone aggregate, room sections made out of fiberglass domes, and rotating windows and shutters, all interlocking on the hills.52

‘The remembered melody’ of masses ‘interlocked on the hills’ echoed the Palestinian vernacular. By creating a ‘fugue with two instruments,’ one vernacular and one technological, Safdie’s Jerusalem Habitat could fulfill the Zionist dream: the ancient with the modern, the biblical with the progressive. A further integration of this formula with Ancient Jewish history brought the Palestinian vernacular to the primary site of the Jewish religion: informed by Josephus Flavius, the Roman historian who documented Herod’s Jerusalem, Safdie’s authorized design for the Western Wall Plaza followed his Jerusalem Habitat. It “was akin to an Arab village in the sense that it followed the hill, each unit had its roof garden, and a series of pathways followed the topography intimately.”53 [Fig. See chapter 6]

**Mediterraneanism.**

Indigenous architecture was similarly prevalent in the ordinary housing which defined Jerusalem’s post-’67 vernacular. 1977 saw the publication of Ram Karmi’s essay, “Human Values in Urban Architecture.” Essentially a manifesto, the essay prescribed a list of Mediterranean architectural forms as guidelines for future planning. They intended to help architects to resolve the most pressing question: that of belonging. How could architects establish an architectural language that encourages personal expression but also

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*Without Architects.* Safdie often refers to the work of Rudofsky, with whom he had professional relationship.

52 Safdie, *Beyond Habitat*, p. 216.
defines a vernacular for the national community? Karmi’s reference for such active re-rooting was the revival of the ancient Hebrew language, which addressed biblical origin, kinship, and blood. Israeli architecture, Karmi contended, should connect those attributes to the land.

In different contexts, scholars have termed the strategy Karmi chose for this task Mediterraneanism. He invoked the timeless planning values of Mediterranean architecture as guidelines for a hierarchical ordering of the built environment, from the house to the cluster, quarter, square, street, bazaar, and, finally, to the entire system. Then he compiled a manual of Mediterranean “structural elements,” which should constitute the alphabet of the Hebrew built landscape: the wall, the gate, the balcony and porch, the stairs and threshold, the streets and alleyways. Finally, under the banner of “values,” he discussed the application of the lesson learned from Mediterranean architecture to the present day, advocating such postwar trends as the separation of pedestrians from vehicles and the creation of public spaces in between buildings. [Figs. 16-21, 22-26]

The architectural precedents that Karmi looked to were no longer tied to the Arab village, his prime reference of the 1960s, but to the Old City and Greek villages, on the one hand, and to architects such as Le Corbusier and Safdie on the other. Karmi’s precedents go

53 Safdie, Future of the Past, p. 28.
54 This concept was particularly important in the context of Italian colonialism in North Africa, where architects integrated European and North African built traditions under the banner of the Mediterranean tradition in which Romans had rights of authenticity. For a succinct and illuminating provocation of the term in architectural culture see: Mia Fuller, "Mediterraneanism," Environmental Design VIII, no. 9/10 (1990). For an in-depth study of this phenomenon and its remarkable influence on Italian modernism, see:
back to his architectural training in Britain. The architectural historian and critic Reyner Banham, who was closely associated with Alison and Peter Smithson, chronicled the emergence of New Brutalism. He wrote that at the Architectural Association of the early fifties, where the Smithsons taught and Karmi was a student, a new generation “saw in Mediterranean peasant buildings an anonymous architecture of simple, rugged, geometrical forms, smooth-walled and small windowed, unaffectedly and immemorially at home in its landscape setting.”55 Hence, Karmi’s Mediterraneanism, as well as his earlier enthusiasm for Arab culture, had strong European roots that associated him with the interests such as of Aldo van Eyck, James Stirling, and the regionalism of his friend Kenneth Frampton.56

Politically, the Israeli participation in a larger Mediterranean culture divested Palestinian architecture of its authority over the genius loci, because it was subsumed into a larger geo-cultural realm. It could thus relieve the Israeli architect of the disturbing conflict between admiring native architecture and disregarding the larger Arab culture that produced it. The association with Europe’s cradle of civilization was pacifying and flexible, and could accommodate the early modernism of which Karmi’s father was a major proponent.57

Brian Lloyd McLaren, "Mediterraneita and Modernita: Architecture and Culture During the Period of Italian Colonization of North Africe (Lybia)" (Ph.D., MIT, 2001).
55 Banham, New Brutalism, p. 47.
56 Kenneth Frampton, who studied together with Karmi at the AA and worked in Israel for a while, combined these British regionalist trends with theoretical inspiration from the Frankfurt School. The resultant “Critical Regionalism” turned into one of the most influential texts in late 20th century architectural culture worldwide.
The ethics of Israeli place making

When Karmi moved from the private sector to the heart of bureaucracy, he was making an ideological claim on behalf of the architectural profession for the right to shape the physical image of the State. It was, as Karmi suggests, an attempt to manage the identity of the ‘national home’ bureaucratically. Karmi first distinguished between “building” and “architecture,” and then between “space” (or “roof”) and “place.” His claim was that the extant government buildings fell short of being “architecture” at all, that they were merely a system of “roofs” that failed to create any sense of “place.” He demanded a complete overhaul of national decision-making. Only then, he argued,

...the creation of a “National Home” and of “place” will achieve its legitimacy as an element that represents and reflects, in physical terms, the cultural aspirations of the community and builds the community in its own land, and expresses its physical and spiritual right to, and ownership over, that land. 59

This is a momentous statement. Karmi identified the makom his Israeli-born generation was seeking with the national home Zionism promised. Makom, Karmi argued, is a prerequisite for a national home because only an identifiable Israeli place can provide the moral basis for the ownership over the land. Seeking “the physical and spiritual right to...that land,” was for Karmi at the heart of Israeli place making. “Creating a 'place,'” he reminded us, “is a qualitative, symbolic and emotional process,” a task that architects—rather than planners or bureaucrats—should undertake. Architecture, as distinguished from “building,” “can reflect and represent the cultural aspiration of a

59 Karmi, “Human Values,” p. 44.
community,”—that is, it can create a symbolic place rather than a mere conglomeration of dwelling units. Making the built landscape into a makom was a way to nationalize the territory—a way to Israelize Jerusalem.

Trapped in the Crossfire of Architecture and Politics

During the 1970s and well into the 1980s, the State of Israel and its architects boasted the architecture of “united Jerusalem” in official exhibitions and numerous publications that celebrated locality through housing clusters and various preservation projects. Interestingly, the devaluation of this architecture in Israeli professional consciousness coincided with the first intifada of 1987 to 1993, which staged the Israeli-Palestinian contest over locality. Located in the midst of political tension, the residential neighborhoods in Jerusalem were microcosms of the Israeli reality: they consolidated its Jewish population, and instead of becoming the slums contemporary critics were dreading, they encouraged a social mobility that significantly upgraded the inhabitants of Jerusalem’s low-income housing. At the same time, building on confiscated land undermined the possibility of sharing “locality” with Palestinians. The combination of local architectural motives and the presence of massive bulldozers turned this local “place-sensitive” architecture into the hallmark of the Israeli occupation for Palestinians.

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61 During the fierce debate over the building of Nebi Samuel, later known as Ramot (see chapter 3), Yehuda Drexler convinced Prime Minister Golda Meir to violate the 1968 Jerusalem Masterplan, which recommended building a suburb of 2,000 units on the site of Nebi Samuel, where Drexler intended to build a neighborhood of 20,000 units. His argument was as follows: why not upgrade lower income families that previously lived in frontier neighborhoods instead of settling Jerusalem’s wealthy population in a luxurious suburb. Golda Meir accepted this logic and approved the project. See protocol of the State Council for Planning and Building, the Subcommittee for Principal Planning Issues, The Ministry of Interior Affairs, February 1, 1971 (Courtesy of Yehuda Drexler).
In spite of its successful social program, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict started to erode the architectural reputation of these neighborhoods, whose style, even in Israeli culture, was derogatively coined “neo-Oriental,” “crusade,” or—worst of all—“postmodern.”

The architecture of post-'67 Jerusalem, I nevertheless argue, particularly that of its residential neighborhoods, is a manifesto of the dominant generation of Israeli architecture. The larger-than-life architectural commissions of post-'67 Jerusalem offered architects of this generation a vast testing ground for implementing their architectural program. The unprecedented power that sabra architects exercised during the decade following the '67 War has established them as leaders of the architectural profession in Israel to this day.

The team working on the satellite neighborhood of Giloh, for example, was based in Tel Aviv and had little regard for the national romantic depiction of Jerusalem. Their initial schemes of high-rise buildings or radical row house megastructures in Giloh were intended to evade what they dismissed as “Jerusalemism.” The Ministry of Housing favored instead the so-called “neo-Oriental style,” with its four story stone buildings, arguing that they would suit Jerusalem and also sell better. The head of the team, Avraham Yaski, decided that “if you’re raped, relax and enjoy it,” and tried to compromise between the Brutalist architecture they had previously built, and the stone to which they had now to surrender. [Fig. 50] The rough tubsa stone and the concrete arches are evidence of this drama.
The story Yaski told me was deliciously laden with the contradictions that characterize his generation. After the '67 War, Jerusalem’s architecture was invested with Jewish symbolism and adhered to the colonial rule of stone cladding, evoking as a result a romantic style that embarrassed Yaski’s secular and socialist team. But the condemned romantic Jerusalemism that the Ministry of Housing imposed on his team was the product of their own sabra architectural program: the cluster, the courtyard and the lessons learned from the Arab village and the Palestinian vernacular. Throughout the '70s, Yaski admitted, they continued to explore the city’s traditional neighborhoods in order to find inspirational models for Jerusalem architecture. But nobody noticed the Arab village that was caught between the bulldozers preparing the ground for Giloh and the City of Jerusalem, because “nobody talked about these things in those days.”63 “These things” referred to the Palestinian dispossession, and “those days” were the days of the post-67 euphoria. Yaski honestly admitted that architects, unlike the writers and the artists with whom they associated, were confined to an institutional framework, which eroded their critical perspective.

Does institutional dependency explain the contradictions that the sabra architectural program inherited? Or do we need to look more closely at the Israeli identity that was suspended between Zionist modernism and Palestinian rootedness? This cultural location had a significant effect even on architects and artists who were ardent critics of the Israeli occupation. In a contested territory, the powerful desire of one culture to “belong” to the place, to adopt as their own the physical surroundings and the cultural trappings of that

62 Avraham Yaski, Interview.
63 Ibid.
place, can be, in itself, part of a process of alienating the other. This holds true even for those who recognize the legitimacy of the other’s claim to the territory.

Itzhak Danziger, whose sculptural forms and materials communicated to sabra architects local identity and the essence of the Israeli landscape, led the basic design studies at the Technion from 1955 to his death in 1976. [Fig. 51] Danziger leveled harsh criticism at the Zionist project – not as an idea, but as an expression of a typical modernization process. For Danziger, the East embodied potential resistance to the injury caused by Labor Zionism. The makom (i.e., place) for which Danziger searched for years was found in Palestinian religious sites, many of which were linked to a Jewish past. [Fig. 52] This place was an environment, a landscape, a ritual and an opportunity for connected Israeliness. Connected to what? To Palestinian authenticity that had not yet been “spoiled” by the Zionist project. Danziger’s admiration for Arab culture, as Sarah Hinski insightfully demonstrates, was often incompatible with his commitment to the Zionist cause as his land healing and possessing memorials for fallen soldiers evince.

Micha Ullman, an acclaimed Israeli artist, followed Danziger’s teaching at the architectural school of the Technion. For the 1988 exhibition To the East: the Orient in Israeli Art, Ullman prepared a striking buried house of perfectly ordered residential elements made of iron and earth. The work was situated at the dead end of a gallery dedicated to “the villages hidden from sight,” a dedication which criticized Israeli

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64 For texts by Danziger, see: Mordechai Omer (curator), Yitzhak Danziger (Tel Aviv, Gan ha-taasiyah Tefen: Tel Aviv Museum of Art, The Open Museum, 1996).
blindness to the Palestinian forced exile. Ulman’s inclusion in the category of hidden villages is intriguing despite his obviously critical voice because his own identity was concealed. An earlier exhibition catalog prepared by Yigal Zalmona, the curator of *To the East*, includes signs of Ulman’s identity, defined as “a digging man: farmer-soldier-archeologist.” If one had to define the Zionist equation of displacement, its components would include conquering the land through agricultural, military and historical means, which the farmer, the soldier and the archeologist employed during the process. My interest lies exactly in this ambivalence resulting from dual identity – the artist criticizing the products of the same Israeliness that defines him and his work.

The work of the internationally renowned artist Dani Karavan further demonstrates this complexity. In the same exhibition, Karavan displays an uprooted olive tree, hanging upside-down in the air by its roots. He invokes the olive tree as a Palestinian emblem of rootedness and dispossession, as the same tree had been repeatedly uprooted and replanted. Replanted finally in the museum’s sculpture garden, it became a living document, tormented and charged with the memory of uprooting, exhibition galleries, indoors and outdoors, politics and art.

In a contemporary exhibition, Karavan’s work of the 1990s was juxtaposed with earlier drawings [Fig. 53] under which he wrote:

> In the 1950’s, I painted the abandoned village of Beit-Jiz and Kibbutz Harel—social realism? Since then, my work has been dedicated to peace and tolerance between Israelis and Palestinians, and I plant olive trees everywhere. Is that

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66 Tzalmona, and Manor-Friedman, *Kadima*.  
68 Blas and Tatenbaum, *Social Realism*.  

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political art? Karavan’s questioning is appropriate, and corresponds to the layers of meaning in his works. His early sketches of abandoned villages ignore the ugliness, distress, and pain of the desertion. They arouse instead a certain romantic feeling, a unity of structure and landscape, perhaps even a sense of archaeology. These are the villages that sabra architects, who warmly embraced Karavan long before he was recognized by the art world, referred to repeatedly in the context of the “localism” that they attempted to create.

At the heart of this inability to see the distress that the abandonment of these villages must have occasioned is a yearning to be “of the place.” The very localities that Israeli born artists and architects identify as points of connectedness to a place—the familiar landscape of the abandoned village—are sources of pain and alienation for the former inhabitants. What is more Israeli than an abandoned Palestinian area? What conveys local Israeli ambience more than Ein-Hod, old Jaffa [Fig. 54] or Ein Kerem—all populated by artists who incorporated the abandoned villages into their existence and their lifestyles, and made them as beautiful as can be? The beautification of abandoned areas dulls the pain of the battle. These villages of exile, the heart of Palestinian pain, were transformed by their hands into artists’ colonies or, more significantly, into inspirational models for “local” Israeli building.

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69 Karavan scripted this text in Hebrew as part of his piece in the exhibition. It does not appear in the catalogue.
This predicament indicates a need to examine the founding generation of Israeli *sabra* culture, the generation that today bemoans the byproducts of its yearning for a local, connected Hebrew nativeness that was in many cases constructed on the ruins of the localness of the other. [Fig. 55] In some intriguing way the housing of Giloh, which is now targeted regularly by the gunmen of Beit Jala, may be the most accurate chronicle of Israeli architecture. It brings together the process and the result, the concrete and the tubsa stone, the arches from the former, the prefabricated panels of the latter. This architecture, brutalist while clad with stone and providing communal housing, is both brutal and hospitable. It emerged from a great concern for the integrity of human life in the age of progress and technology. But, having met the specific conditions of a national conflict, it changed its course. Paradoxically, it was exactly the architectural focus on Man that deprived men of the symbolic ownership of their built heritage.
The Western Wall
Towering and imposing
In the narrow street
Now without momentum
Looks like any wall

The clearing in front
Became a wound
In the midst of the well ordained
Crowded agglomeration
Of buildings

To integrate this place
Of extraordinary importance
Into the old city
Remains a problem

(Jerusalem, A city that is Compact Together; William Sandberg, Ariel Winters.)

1 From: Yoseph Schonberger, “Jerusalem—the Western Wall,” in Jerusalem in Building.
Mourning ceremony at the Wall, 1945.

Clearing the Mughrabee Quarter, June 1967.
According to the journalist Nadav Shragai, “each time that anyone sneezes too loudly around the Western Wall precinct, the Ministry [of Religious Affairs’] bureaucrats jump and scream, ‘This is a Safdie plan being sneaked in through the back door!’”\(^2\) Indeed, a day after the June 26, 2001 newspaper headlines announced Minister Rehav’am Ze’evi’s interest in renovating the Wall’s precinct, Hamodi’a, an ultra orthodox newspaper, incited its readers:

Foreboding reports appeared in the media today indicating that [several agencies] are together planning “to redesign the Western Wall plaza.”...The intention [is] to, god forbid, transform the Western Wall - the remains of our Temple and our glory - from an exalted holy place of worship into a “tourist site.” Discussions foresee making the Wall six meters deeper and giving the Plaza a terraced design. They also plan for the rejuvenation of the “Safdie Plan,” which, through considerable work, and the help of god, had been removed from the agenda, preventing the disgrace of the People of Israel.\(^3\)

None of the press releases to which Hamodi’a was responding mentioned Safdie’s 1974 state-authorized design for the Western Wall Plaza, nor its 1982 revised version. Yet Hamodi’a’s forewarning against Safdie’s plan confirms that even the harshest critics of Safdie’s design could no longer view the Western Wall precinct as a *tabula rasa*. Like their secular opponents, the critics always thought of the Wall’s plaza as a design, which—though never built—forever changed the national reading of the Wall. In a place around which constant international negotiations are feverishly held and blood is often shed, Safdie’s project is a phantom presence that attests to the power of architecture.

This chapter is a history of the metamorphosis of an architectural design into a powerful and controversial national symbol, an inseparable component of a national culture and its political reality. The critical position of this project in the transformation of both Zionist

and architectural cultures, as well as the situation of its architect in these transitions, reveals the process of creating an ultimate architectural expression for the *mamlachtiyut* project (a hybrid of statehood and kingdomhood) exactly when a consensual agreement on the national and architectural meaning of this concept was no longer tenable.  

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On June 6, 1967, a day after the Israeli capture of the Old City, Mayor Teddy Kollek gathered representatives of national, municipal and military authorities in order to determine the immediate future of the Western Wall precinct. The assembly decided that the corridor between the Mughrabee Quarter and the Wall was too narrow for a nation to gather and 'meet its past in.' [Fig. 2th title page top] Arieh Sharon, the architectural consultant of the team, quickly drew boundaries for a new plaza. These boundaries necessitated the demolition of the residential quarter. Since the war was not yet over, and most Israeli young men were fighting in it, Kollek called upon the retired head of the Contractors Association, who promptly arranged for the arrival of the required machinery. [Fig. 2th title page bottom] On June 10, bulldozers pounded with a deafening roar upon the Mughrabee neighborhood in front of the Western Wall, their fangs extended and their steel teeth taking bites of the small, meager, densely packed houses and the fences of courtyards and alleys... As houses, domes, arches and the vaults of alleyways collapsed and crashed to the ground, disappearing into piles of rubble, a wide, ever expanding...  

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4 It is significant to note that the project, for which the complete package was prepared in 1974 (the official date given by Safdie), was first presented in June 1973, just before the 1973 war. The war shattered the post-'67 euphoria and was a major catalyst for the disintegration of the unified Israeli identity that Labor Zionism forged.


6 Sharon’s original sketched map, signed on June 10, 1967, is reproduced in Benzman, *Jerusalem*, p. 39.
plaza running the length of the valley appeared through the clouds of dust that covered the area. But the vast new plaza that was once the Mughrabee Quarter took Israelis by surprise. The holiest site for Jews from Titus’s destruction of Herod’s Second Temple in A.D. 70 and the ultimate Jewish anchor in the midst of Islamic and Christian Jerusalem had become an amorphous field of debris and awe-inspiring stones.

Captivated by the possibilities, architects raced to propose designs. First in line were Israeli architects [Fig. 56], who conceded the project to Louis Kahn. Kahn worked out a scheme for the plaza between 1967 and 1969. Isamu Noguchi prepared a proposal in 1970 for the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which complemented work done by the team the Ministry had already commissioned. In 1972, the Jerusalem Municipality and the Company for the Reconstruction and Development of the Jewish Quarter commissioned Moshe Safdie, a Canadian architect of Israeli origin, to design the precinct without prescribing to it a specific program. Safdie’s project entered the national arena in June 1973, at the second plenary meeting of the Jerusalem Committee. Once this international advisory board, which boasted membership of the Western elite of post-WWII architectural culture, approved the project, it became the yardstick against which any future proposal was measured. Despite the 1973 War, which subdued the national

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8 Proposals by Israeli architects were spontaneous and voluntary. In order to resolve a dispute regarding the choice of architecture for rebuilding the Hurva Synagogue in the Jewish Quarter, Ram Karmi conceded the project to Louis Kahn, on whom all parties could agree (Karmi, interview, 1998). Instead of renovating the old Hurva, Kahn suggested a new building on a new site, which he connected to the Western Wall Plaza. For Kahn’s design for the Hurva and the Western Wall Plaza, see Sakr, *The Subversive Utopia*.
9 Yoseph Schonenberg et al., "Planning Research for the Western Wall Precinct," (Jerusalem: The Ministry of Religious Affairs, 1972). When the team published its report, Noguchi’s proposal had already been
appetite for grandiose projects, the government appointed the Shimron Committee in 1974 to determine the future of Safdie’s design. Consequently, the design was presented to the public in a meticulously prepared exhibition and was favorably featured on the nascent Israeli television network during its most popular broadcast. The Minister of Religious Affairs felt that this professional committee of secular architects marginalized the Jewish aspect of the Wall. He therefore appointed yet another ministerial committee to determine the fate of the site. The proceedings of these committees, as well as the ensuing public debate, comprise the basis for this chapter.

rejected. The report does contain, nevertheless, the most comprehensive description of this initial conceptual design.

10 The Committee was appointed by the Ministers’ Committee for the Jerusalem Affairs, headed by the Minister of Justice, Haim Tzadok, who presented the professional mandate of the committee to the public on national TV (see next footnote). The Committee was headed by Erwin Shimron, a lawyer, and consisted of the following voting members: Meron Benvenisti, the Deputy Mayor for Jerusalem planning, representing the Jerusalem Municipality; the archeologist Meir Ben Dov, who dug together with Professor Mazar at the southern part of the Wall, representing the Archeological Commission; architect David Cassuto, the architectural consultant to the Minister of Religious Affairs, representing that Ministry; Architects Arieh Sharon, Avraham Yaski and Yaakov Rechter, representing the Israel Association of Architects. Yehuda Tamir, the former head of the Company for the Reconstruction and Development of the Jewish Quarter, was a permanent observer, and David Tzifroni was the administrator.

11 The program was part of the weekly news (yoman), featured on Friday night primetime television. In it, Safdie explained his project with the aid of his impressive model. The program also featured Minister of Justice Haim Tzadok, who commissioned the Committee, and supporters and critics of the project. The favorable coverage did not obscure the bitter controversy surrounding the project. See Ester Dar, “The Western Wall Plaza,” in Yoman Hashavuah, 1974, The Israeli Television Archive.

12 This was the Conception Committee that was headed by architect David Cassuto, the architectural consultant to the Minister of Religious Affairs. It consisted of the Rabbis Tzimerman, Israeli, Druk and Edri; Professors S. Safrai and D. Fluser, who specialized in Jewish history and thought, the archeologist and professor T. Dotan, and architects David Reznik and Yisha’ayahu Ilan (both of whom appeared in the proceedings as professors). Cassuto was also a member of the Shimron Committee, a fact that was interpreted by Avraham Yaski as a conflict of interest, and was the reason he resigned from the Shimron Committee halfway through. Cassuto, for his part, insisted that the Conception Committee did not undermine the Shimron Committee. Its mandate, he said, was to help the Minister decide whether the project accorded with Jewish law and thought.

13 This Chapter is based on the proceedings of the Shimron Committee and related reports and publications in the private archive of architects Arieh and Elder Sharon; the proceedings of the Conception Committee and related material in the private archive of architect David Cassuto; design reports from the private archives of Y. Schonenberg; the proceedings of the Jerusalem Committee in the archives of the Jerusalem Municipality and the Jerusalem Foundation; and the files on the Western Wall Precinct in the archives of the Jerusalem Municipality and the Department of Holy Places in the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
My first aim is to convey the ways in which Safdie’s proposal emerged as a manifesto for the architecture of *mamlachtiyut*, that is, the Zionism that combined the values of a modernist State with the symbolism of the Jewish nation (see chapter 1). This conventional strategy of nationalism invested in the newly formed national community a shared feeling of heritage and destiny. It therefore required an integrated command of "past," "present" and "future." "Past" refers to the treatment of history and archeology, "present" relates to notions of place, community and urbanity, and "future" conjures up issues of progress and technology. The masterful integration of the three, I argue, was the quintessence of Safdie’s design as well as the target of its opponents.

My second aim is to examine—utilizing these past, present and future categories—the location of both Safdie and his critics in the midst of the modernist crises that inform this study: the two distinct yet closely connected battles over the ideologies underlying both Zionism and modern architecture. The first challenged the hitherto modernist definition of the Israeli State as a social and economic ground for Jews, promoting instead the formation of a national, cultural home for the Jewish people. The second battle took issue with the Modern Movement in architecture, arguing that, whereas it might result in better conditions for people through modernization, it would, at the same time, neglect issues such as history, identity, community and place that, to Jerusalem, were indispensable. Safdie’s proposal for the Western Wall Plaza captured the national imagination because it was the project that emerged as a manifesto reflecting both revisions to Zionism and revisions to architectural modernism.

Interviews complement additional printed material (of books, symposia, periodicals and press releases) which are quoted throughout the chapter.
Safdie’s design, which extends over 60,000 square meters, enfolds the southwestern corner of Temple Mount, reaching to the farthest points of the demolished plaza in front of the Western Wall as well as the area south of Al Aqsa Mosque. [Fig. 57] It thus encompasses a territory that is uneasily split between Israeli secular and religious authorities—the Archeological Commission to the south, and the Ministry for Religious Affairs to the north—both of which were trying to expand their hold toward the wide ramp separating their territories and leading up to the Mughrabee Gate of Temple Mount. On this L-shaped territory, Safdie created a huge metaphorical theater of descending cubes and terraced plazas that revealed his inspiration from Josephus Flavius’s description of Herod’s Jerusalem, as well as from the Oriental vernacular of the city. [Figs. 58-59] The “theater” overlooks the Wall, which gains an additional nine meters by digging and exposing 12 courses of stone until reaching the Herodian Street beneath. The 13-meter wide ancient passageway turns into a praying plaza. Westward and above is ample space for national assembly. Further to the west is a double-height public arcade. The arcade conceals a back road that serves the stores and buildings at the foresight. Three institutions, one of which is the Supreme Rabbinical Court, endow the space with its stately character. This multi-faceted design has unmistakable qualities: it monumentalizes the Wall; it is interwoven into the archeological sites, the architecture of which it incorporates; it is rich in Oriental/biblical imagery; and, finally, it is designed for prefabricated technology. More importantly, it creates fast “facts on the ground:” its planned completion in six years time is one of its propagated merits.
History: Singular or Multifaceted?

What, then, is the Western Wall, and what is the significance attached to it? The Western or Wailing Wall, the *kotel* in Hebrew and the *al buraq* in Arabic, is a retaining wall that supports the platform of Temple Mount or the Muslim Haram Al Sharif. [Fig. 60] The “holy of holies” of the Jewish Temple, it was thought, was built on this platform around the Rock on which Abraham attempted to sacrifice Isaac to God. For Jews, the Western Wall is thus not sacred in and of itself; it is instead a reminder of their destroyed Temple. It is sacred only because Jews believe that the *shchina*, God’s presence, which hovered over the Temple, never left it. In the 13th century, this conviction was made official, making a segment of the Western retaining wall the primary site of Jewish worship and a symbol of yearning for Jews worldwide.¹⁴

The 1967 demolition of the Mughrabee Quarter changed the area in front of the Wall from a four by thirty meter roofless hall¹⁵ into a site roughly the size of Piazza San Marco in Venice. The ensuing architectural challenges were grave. One had to do with the site’s vertical bounds: the new plaza lacked firm elevations beyond the sheer physical structure of the Wall itself. Another established an imagined roof: the proximity of Temple Mount thwarted any attempt to eclipse Islamic monuments by means of tall building. The main potential for greater monumentality lay, therefore, underground—under the cleared area. In other words, in order to achieve greater height, one would have

¹⁴ For a comprehensive bibliography of the Western Wall, see: Goldschmit-Lahmanen, "Bibliography: The Western Wall," in Jerusalem, from "Shivat Zion" to the Expansion out of the City Walls (Jerusalem: Yad Itzhak Ben Zvi).

¹⁵ According to the British map that was prepared after the Wall’s riots in 1929, the area was 3.90 by 30.5 meters. The report and the maps were reproduced in: International Commission for the Wailing Wall, The Rights and Claims of Moslems and Jews in Connection with the Wailing Wall at Jerusalem (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1968).
to dig down. Unfortunately, however, the ground is the site’s most politically unpredictable property, because much of the ground’s rubble and debris accumulated during Christian and Muslim rule over the city. To dig under this site is to invite the imposition of differing and contested histories.\textsuperscript{16}

It is no wonder, then, that architects formed their opinions toward the “past” in various sections of the Wall, each indicating a particular conceptual framework. Their sections treated the triangle that was formed between the ’67 level of the new plaza, the buried section of the Wall, and the underground, thirteen-meter wide Herodian Street, which stood at the foot of Herod’s Second Temple, differently. [Fig. 61] While all proposals agreed that the Herodian level should be uncovered in order to expose the full grandeur of the Wall, the degree of exposure, as well as plans for the archeological substance above Herod’s street, were the roots of deeply held and conflicting ideologies.

At stake were the meanings that different strands of Judaism attributed to the Jewish Exile and to the value of Jewish life in the Diaspora. The Zionist leaders, who inaugurated the \textit{mamlachtiyut} project, reclaimed the bible as the founding text of the nation. They cherished archeology, especially if it excavated material evidence of Jewish hegemony in antiquity, because it animated the Zionist narrative of a nation reunited with

\textsuperscript{16} An example of the value of rubble was given during President Clinton’s last attempt to advance the peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. Since the volume of archeological rubble was a heated subject, Clinton suggested cutting the rubble under Temple Mount into horizontal layers of sovereignty: Muslims would control the upper layer, and Jews the underground. This offer still surfaces occasionally as an operative solution. For contemporary debates over the Temple Mount area, see: Yitzhak Reiter, ed., \textit{Sovereignty of God and Man: Sanctity and Political Centrality on the Temple Mount} (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institution for Israel Studies, 2001); Shmuel Berkovitz, \textit{Battle for the Holy Places} (Jerusalem; Or Yehudah: The Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies; Hed Artzi, 2000); Nadav Shragai, \textit{Temple Mount Conflict: Jews and Muslims, Religion and Politics since 1967} (Jerusalem: Keter, 1995).
its biblical past after 2,000 years of separation. This vision necessitated a negation of the Jewish Diaspora that separated Jews from their land. The Jewish Exile was considered nothing more than a rupture in Jewish history, one that was now “healed” by the foundation of an independent nation-state.

Safdie’s design concretized this mamlachtiyut vision. He planned to uncover the full breadth of the Herodian level so that “Jews praying at the Wall would stand on the actual stones, at the actual Wall of the Second Temple, exactly as Herod had constructed it.” For this purpose, he totally erased the ’67 level, on which Jews had prayed for over half a millennium. [Fig. 62] Yet he had to consider what would happen to the huge volume of rubble and debris underneath. Orthodox Jews feared that it might contain unpredictable Christian and Muslim archeological finds, and were therefore reluctant to authorize the venture without specific guarantees. Safdie pacified the worried rabbis: “[The Mayor] even recommended that a treaty be drawn up... which would declare that no matter what was found above the Herodian Street, it would be removed. It might be documented and photographed first, but it would be removed.”

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19 Ibid., p. 190. There is correspondence on the subject: Safdie summarized the content of his meeting with the rabbis in a “meeting report” dated August 8, 1976. He reported that he promised to consult the mayor about clearing away archeological remains in the area in front of the Wall. In a letter Safdie wrote to the Rishon Letzion, the Chief Sephardi Rebi Ovadia Yoseph on October 18, 1976, he assures him that he consulted Teddy Kollek, who agreed to facilitate such an agreement between all the involved authorities. Jerusalem Archive.
One can hardly imagine a more tangible and concise manner of selecting history in a contained site such as this one. Upon digging, one exposes the traces of history and documents its archeological evidence. Consequently, the historical remnants that postdated the time of the Jewish Second Temple are dematerialized and de-territorialized, i.e., transformed from constitutive components of a tangible site into textual and visual documents, distant from both site and sight. Eliminating material edifices of an unwanted past was necessary for unifying a formative site of collective memory, where memory is forged through the bodily experience of space, place and built form. Once the less-desired past evaporates into Safdie’s proposed theater space (the central assembly place of the Jewish nation), the way is cleared for the archeological race toward the foundation of Temple Mount: the concrete, indisputable presence of the biblical blueprint. When this biblical destination is finally reached, the design does not allocate secluded places for archeology: it uses ancient architecture as an integral part of the present complex. Present and biblical time thus coalesce. In his 1982 revision, which postdated significant advances in the archeological excavation, Safdie was able to lace distant eras into a precise and informed whole.

Working on archeological practices in Israel, Nadia Abu El-Haj describes the ways in which “through the conjuncture of excavation and interpretation, the practice of archeology inscribes the land with particular histories (or historiographies) and identities.” Nadia Abu El-Haj, “Excavating the Land, Creating the Homeland: Archeology, the State, and Making of History in Modern Jewish Nationalism” (Ph.D, Duke University, 1995), p. 192. At the Wall, this practice reached its ultimate manifestation. Meron Benvenisti, for example, bluntly admitted “the hidden assumption on which the status quo rests...If dealing with archeology,” he reminded members of the Shimron Committee, “the ‘freemat’ will be Jewish, the ‘tsipor nefesh’ will be religious.” Meron Benvenisti interviewing Shlomo Aronson, Proceedings of the Shimron Committee, January 28, 1975, p. 58. As a result, one has to remove all physical remains of periods connoting the mythical Jewish exile from the area west of the Wall (to be distinguished from the south, where the Umayyad Palaces were kept).
Safdie’s Zionist articulation of Jewish history alarmed Michael Turner, a former consultant for the site. He lamented that Safdie’s design loses the particularly Jerusalemite trait “in which you walk through history and you feel the entire lineage of Judaism... The six hundred years of the Wall as the Wailing Wall are also an inseparable part of our history,” he professed, and they “should receive a microcosmic expression in this site.” Turner further contested Safdie’s exclusive focus on antiquity. Instead of the desired fusion of the new and the ancient, Turner resorted to Safdie’s design metaphor for conveying his fear of “a theater in which one begs in front of archeological finds.” He was afraid that the biblical Wall, stripped of its two millennia of Jewish worship, might become a single archeological edifice rather than a multilayered, living, Jewish core.

Isamu Noguchi also found Safdie’s singularized history to be suspect. In it, Noguchi thought, the will to connect with the past subsumed the present. Both Noguchi and Safdie were members of the Jerusalem Committee to which Safdie first presented the project in June 1973. During the meeting, Noguchi lamented the “archaistic attempt to make...a fake area of the past when what we are today is not to be denied.” He contended that the “old thing readymade seems to be a little bit unnecessarily complex.” Several years earlier, Noguchi had challenged Israeli colleagues who worked on the site, asking

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21 David Cassuto, ed., The Western Wall, p. 104.
22 Ibid.
24 The Jerusalem Committee, Proceedings of the Second Plenary Session, p. 70.
them, “how can you cancel this huge chapter in history and return to one chapter
alone?”

Noguchi suggested instead a symbolic conception which prioritized the historical
memory of exile. The memory was embedded in the existing physical framework of the
praying plaza, the boundaries of which, under Noguchi’s plan, were left intact. He firmly
rejected the dissolution of the existing confines of the plaza into the newly demolished
space. Accordingly, he constructed the present ground level of the plaza as a ceiling
which hovered over the archeological excavations underneath and created two plazas: one
on top of the other. [Fig. 63] The lower level, consisting of items from the site’s highly
valued, excavated past, was meant to co-exist in his design with the Ottoman level of
exile—the present level. Each level was to occupy a different physical and symbolic
terrain. The Wall would therefore mediate between the two modalities. A stele of stone
would define an intimate praying area separated from the larger plaza, giving worshipers
security from the gaze of the visiting public. The stele, which symbolized the Jewish
people praying in front of the Wall, was anchored in the bedrock. From this bedrock, it
symbolically and physically rose out of the “past” and up to and beyond the “present.”
This, Noguchi argued, would be the ultimate expression of Jewish endurance throughout
the ages.

25 Testimony of Shlomo Aronson before the Shimron Committee, The Shimron Committee Proceedings,
February 10, 1975, p. 49.
26 The description is based on Schonenberg, Planning Research [unpaginated] as well as on Shlomo
Aronson’s report to the Shimron Committee. Aronson said that Noguchi worked in his office, and he
therefore had firsthand knowledge of his project, which influenced him greatly. Consequently, he preferred
looking first for a conceptual direction rather than concrete, final design. See The Shimron Committee
Proceedings, February 10, 1975, particularly pp. 39, 49 and 57.
Noguchi’s conceptual section became a referent for designers who wished to dispute the singular conceptualization of history. Significantly, it was cut parallel to the Wall, focusing on the praying area while stressing the confines of the existing site. It thus emphasized the duality of his solution. Noguchi’s section opposed the concept underlying Safdie’s section, which was cut perpendicular to the Wall in order to stress the unity of Jewish space and history. But Noguchi’s section, which cut through the gigantic stele of stone, maligned him within the Jewish cultural climate, despite his later willingness to dispense with the stele. The monumental stele was interpreted as a reminder of the holocaust, or a mal invocation of the Qa’ba in Mecca. Safdie described his feelings toward Noguchi at the time when Noguchi criticized Safdie’s project during the 1973 meeting:

As he spoke…I saw the image of his model – that great black block of his, rising through the platform in front of the Wall. He spoke of worship and I thought of his pagan altar. I felt my blood boiling. I wanted to scream out, “Your difficulty is in understanding the worship of a god who is not an object, and needs no object by which to be represented... You do not understand the fundamentals of Judaism!”

Noguchi’s work was easily dismissed, indeed, as the work of a gentile incapable of understanding either monotheism or Jewish faith.²⁸ Paradoxically, throughout the debate, only Orthodox Jews separated the personal identity of designers from their professional ideas. They were willing to accept a good design from a gentile as long as it would be judged according to Jewish law. It was, rather, the secular Jewish contingency that insisted on Jewish ethnicity for their designers. For example, Mayor Teddy Kollek’s

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²⁸ I have not encountered any evidence that attributed to Noguchi any of the interpretations that I have mentioned above (besides the metaphor of Jewish endurance throughout the ages). The archeologist Meir Ben-Dov, who worked closely with Moshe Safdie and actively supported his design, reported in his book on the Western Wall that Noguchi intended to memorialize the holocaust in this prime site of Jewish revival. See: M. Ben-Dov et al., *The Western Wall*, 2nd ed. (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1981), (Hebrew) pp. 172-174.
primary objection to conducting an open competition, after numerous requests for one, rested on the fear that a German might be awarded the project. 29

Whose Wall is it?

The decision to choose an ‘ethnically correct’ architect indicated the pressing need to control the image of a site in the meaning of which so many different groups were desperately invested. Demands for the newly possessed Wall were extremely diverse. First and foremost, it was a sanctuary for Jews of different persuasions, as well as a holy place for Muslims. 30 It was also the central assembly point for the state of Israel and, one should not forget, a major tourist attraction. At the Wall, orthodox Jews prayed day and night, crying over their lost temple; soldiers swore allegiance to the State, which memorialized its “fallen sons” there; and Jewish boys and couples celebrated their Bar mitzvahs and weddings. Israeli hosts also honored their international guests with a visit to the Wall, the nation’s most revered symbol. Some of these functions were obviously at odds with each other. The orthodox community did not warmly welcome the celebrity Cabbalist scholar Madonna, nor were they enthusiastic about the orange-lipsticked entertainer Michael Jackson, who insisted on visiting this “spiritual touchstone” with a crowd of photographers, thereby violating the Sabbath. 31

Paradoxically, as long as the Wall was in Jordanian hands, the longings of mamlachi Israelis and religious Jews for it were compatible. The minute it fell into Israeli hands,

29 Teddy Kollek in the Shimron Committee proceedings, September 3, 1975, p. 65.
30 For the Muslim perspective, see: Abdul Latif Tibawi, Jerusalem: Its Place in Islam and Arab History (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969).
the controversy over the *mamlachti* or alternatively, religious overtones of the Wall, erupted. For Itzhak Rabin, then the famed Six-Day War Chief of Staff, this historical moment was the ultimate symbol of national unity. “The paratroopers, who conquered the Wailing Wall,” he told his exultant audience, “leaned on its stones and wept, and as a symbol this was a rare occasion, almost unparalleled in human history.”

Rabin’s troops, however, were representatives of a *State* fulfilling its historical call. According to this view, the Israeli nation-state brought Jerusalem back to the Jewish people, ending their misery. [Fig. title-page chapter 2] The symbol of this secular salvation was the Western Wall, the central assembly place of the State of Israel.

Ram Karmi, arguably Safdie’s most influential contemporary among Israeli architects, best expressed the *mamlachtiyut* worldview: “the Wall symbolizes the place in which I feel direct roots to King David. I can greet him shalom.” As such, he added, it was “the most obvious place” in Jerusalem where Jews do not have to justify their existence against Palestinian claims. Moreover, every ruling nation in Jerusalem’s history has imprinted its message for the city onto its landscape. Therefore, Karmi explained, since “the Six-Day War was a great act” of people who came “to Jerusalem with great spirit and full hearts,” it deserved an architectural expression of no lesser magnitude than people “who thought the message they had for Jerusalem was the most important message in its history.” Modern architecture, Karmi insisted, would not be able to achieve such a symbolic task. It could provide necessary housing solutions for Jewish

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32 Itzhak Rabin on the occasion of receiving an honorary doctorate from the Hebrew University during a ceremony on the Mount Scopus Campus immediately after the ’67 war, June 28, 1967.
refugees, or modernist masterplans for the State, but it failed to impart “a national home,” a place of native Israeliness, the perfect example of which should have been the Western Wall’s Plaza.

For the advocates of *mamlachtiyut*, Moshe Safdie emerged as the right person for the task at the right moment. A former Israeli, an emerging architectural celebrity, and a forceful critic of the Modern Movement, he was located at the crossroads of nation and architecture in search of a concrete Israeli *place*. He proposed to shape the space around the Wall in relation to two sources: one, the traditional vernacular architecture of Jerusalem, and the other, the ancient palatial architecture of King Herod. The first would anchor the “Israeli place,” the other, the place’s history.

Safdie’s interpretation of vernacular architecture was first proposed in Expo '67, where he married Mediterranean architecture with cutting edge technology. The so-called “habitat” was a conglomerate of prefabricated residential units that were stepped back from each other in a manner that emulated the landscape of a mountainous Mediterranean village. This high-rise, secured “village” existed under the slogan “for everyone a garden,” a slogan that promised both the lifestyle of the suburbs and the outdoors of the Mediterranean to North American urban residents.34 [Fig. 64] When Safdie was invited to realize his vision in the Middle East, he tried to further concretize this sense of Mediterranean intimacy in the region. The Jerusalem habitat was intended to be a critical manifesto against the alienating contemporary dwelling of Zionist modernism. Safdie

33 Cassuto, *The Western Wall*, p. 95.
34 See: Safdie, *Beyond Habitat.*
compared the uniform housing blocks of the latter to the picturesque Arab village nearby, to the obvious benefit of the Arab village. [Fig. 49] As we have seen, his search for the “authentic” Jerusalem vernacular, like that of his sabra contemporaries, yielded perplexing results: the preferred models were, for the most part, “Arab.”

Indeed, the community that Safdie envisioned was “akin to an Arab village in the sense that it followed the hill, each unit had its roof garden, and a series of pathways followed the topography intimately.”35 This description accorded with Safdie’s design for the Wall’s plaza. He proposed to house various institutions in a metaphoric “theater” of descending cubes in front of the Wall. [Fig. 58] The orator of this theatrical scene was none other than the Roman Jewish convert historian Josephus. Professor Avi-Yona’s huge 1:50 scale public model of the Judea kingdom that Josephus described [Fig. 48] could further assist Safdie in imagining the desired continuity of the Jerusalem vernacular.36 Fostering such biblical inspiration through lessons learned from the Arab vernacular allocated to Palestinians the role of the custodians of biblical built culture.

For “inspiration in designing Jewish institutions,”37 Safdie sought a precedent similar to the Roman architecture that had inspired his mentor, Louis Kahn, in conceiving his monumental designs. Here King Herod’s architecture became a great revelation. Safdie knowingly sought a thorough revival of Herodian achievements. An architect representing an institutional client for the site supported this decision against critical requests for restraint. “Herod’s wall is a monumental structure, as the size of its stones

35 Safdie, The Future of the Past, p. 28.
36 See Chapter 5.
makes it worthy of being a ‘city of a great king.’ [This stands] in contrast to the ridiculously small stones of Suleiman the Magnificent (of the 16th century), who regarded Jerusalem as just another city in his kingdom.” In order to return Jerusalem to its former glory, the message went, one should avoid the minute Orientalism of the Turks, and evoke instead Jerusalem’s greatest builder: Herod.

Setting such a large Jewish footprint in Islamic and Christian Jerusalem required monumental scale and explicit beauty, which the Safdie project suggested to many. Such agreement was not necessarily in the project’s favor. For some it was too complete, too impressively novel—in sum, too lavish. Others saw it as excessively grandiose, outside of the social and economic scale that Israel had set for itself as a state. Many doubted the possibility of integrating such a huge project into the existing fabric of the Old City. Most poignant was the fear that the new architectural project would overwhelm the Wall. Safdie’s impressive imported vocabulary of postwar architectural culture, as well as his individualistic signature, enraged his critics. They thought it amounted to a timely—rather than timeless—expression for a site that exists beyond temporal bounds.

Here we arrive at the crux of the controversy, as Josef Schonberger, of the Planning Research team that the Ministry of Religious Affairs commissioned, explained:

The Wall is the dearest, most holy, and most memory-laden structure for Jews. It is not the holiest place for Jews—the holiest place is the site of the temple, which

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37 Safdie, The Future of the Past, p. 115.
38 Letter from Head Architect of the Department of Public Works, Mordechai Shoshani, to David Glass, the General Manager of the Ministry for Religious Affairs, April 20, 1975, private archive of David Cassuto.
Jewish law forbids approaching until the condition [tahara] is ripe for complete redemption.\textsuperscript{41}

For Orthodox Jews, making the Wall into the site \textit{par excellence} of Jewish nationhood violated a fundamental Jewish law. This was because the Wall, as Ariel Hirshfeld put it, was "[a] place whose entirety, whose full depth, is made of what is beyond it," a "supra-place and no-place."\textsuperscript{42} At the Wall, Orthodox Jews protected their Jewish faith from national secularization.

Zionists shared the national appetite for archeological excavation with Orthodox Jews because they wanted to affirm Jewish reign over the site. But they firmly refused to fabricate a secular substitute for Temple Mount, as the prominent writer A.B. Yehoshua allegedly suggested they do.\textsuperscript{43} Orthodox Jews thus found in Safdie’s design an extroverted Israeliness, and resisted the incorporation of their institutions into this statist, secular worldview. An Orthodox architect went so far as to claim that if “dos” is a derogatory name for an ultra-Orthodox Jew, “dosneyland” is what Safdie proposed to construct.\textsuperscript{44} [Fig. 65]

It is important to remember that in 1967, Zionist Orthodox Jews were less eager than their secular compatriots to possess religious sites territorially. During the ’67 War, the leader of the Zionist Religious Party asked the government to refrain from conquering the

\textsuperscript{42} Ariel Hirshfeld., \textit{Reshimot 'Al Makom (Essays on Place)} (Tel Aviv: Am oved, 2000), p.13.
\textsuperscript{43} Meron Benvenisti, interview.
\textsuperscript{44} Cassuto, interview, 1996 (when he was the Deputy Mayor of Ehud Ulmart).
Old City. In this light, Orthodox resistance to state control over the Wall’s precinct may suggest their preference for a greater distinction between State and religious faith than that which characterized the pre-'67 Israeli nation-state. More readily, it expresses the discomfort of Orthodox Jews with their status as a religious minority in a State controlled by a Labor majority. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction that the Ministry of Religious Affairs attained over the Western Wall precinct gave the religious community a hold over this prime national resource, which remains under their control to this day.

The Planning Research team that the Ministry of Religious Affairs commissioned prior to Safdie’s exposition clearly suggested that different planners should be involved in building the space. In contrast to Safdie’s eagerness to touch and intervene in historical substance and vernacular forms, this team had neither the desire nor the means by which to articulate an appropriated architecture. The sixteen different options the team suggested for the site evinced their preference for a lengthy design process of weighing multiple alternatives against each other. [Fig. 66] These alternatives examined a program of spatial relationships which would accommodate the functional demands of different groups participating in activities near the Wall. I will later establish the position of the Planning Research team as overwhelmingly modernist.

The origin of Safdie’s counter architectural position went back to Louis Kahn, of whom he considered himself a disciple. Kahn had been invited to design the Hurva Synagogue

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immediately after the 1967 war.\textsuperscript{46} The significance of the Hurva, he suggested, was inseparable from that of the Western Wall. He therefore treated the Hurva and the Wall as a single urban complex, in which, according to his local interlocutor, he reconstructed the primal notion of a synagogue. The Western Wall was the \textit{ark} while the Hurva was the \textit{bimah} from which the prayer is conducted. A pilgrim route connected the two. That the bottom of the dug-out Wall was lowest in the Old City and the Hurva rose above both the Dome of the Rock and the Holy Sepulcher accentuated this relationship.\textsuperscript{47} [Fig. 67]

Other scholars have recently begun to see in Kahn’s remaking of the Jewish Quarter an attempt to predate the notion of a Temple through an architectonic inquiry into the primal form of faith and worship.\textsuperscript{48} In spite of Kahn’s bold, oversized Hurva, he approached the Western Wall with great restraint: at the end of the “prophets’ path” that connected the Hurva and the Wall, he kept a large flat plaza. At its northeast corner, between the Wall and the \textit{machkema}, Kahn delineated a roughly sixty by sixty meter square for excavations. The southern and western edges of the square were moderately sloped down until they reached the Herodian street below and revealed the full height of the Wall.

Kahn similarly called for restraint on Safdie’s part during his 1973 review of Safdie’s project. He conceded that the type of arch Safdie so elaborately used had “a living quality to it,” yet it belonged, he argued, to a different scale. He explained to his former apprentice that

\textsuperscript{46} For a virtual reconstruction of the different phases of the Hurva design, see: Larson, \textit{Louis I. Kahn}. For a scholarly study of it, see: Sakr, \textit{Subversive Utopia}.  
\textsuperscript{48} Sakr, \textit{Subversive Utopia}.  

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It is so very intimate, and you may tire, you see, of the interplay of the arches and finally get very much exhausted...I think it can be done in just a few strokes, and be equally contained in spirit. I think it must be done with the greatest restraint, and not with such exuberance.49

Kahn also criticized the modular transitional system that Safdie used in order to mediate the monumental scale of the Wall and the residential scale of the Jewish Quarter. He argued that such an attempt to subordinate the entire precinct to a unified ordering system would produce an artificial homogeneity. “There is a greater force,” Kahn insisted, “greater, actually, distinction of the transitional, along lines which don’t try to homogenize one theme with another.”50 This criticism targeted the greatest achievement as well as the most controversial aspect of Safdie’s design. Kahn argued that Safdie’s comprehensive synthesis of different periods and themes divested this ruptured site of its intensity. Kahn preferred to exploit these historical ruptures, while Safdie laboriously tried to heal them.

The Future of the Past

Before 1967, the leading national slogan promoted “kidma ve-pituah,” or “progress and development.” Modern architecture was the ultimate mold in which to implement that ideal. When post-WWII criticism agitated the local architectural community, some chose to challenge modernism on its own terms, to further push its cutting edge. Most successful in this respect were the morphologists.51 They looked for geometrical rules in natural forms, and advanced technologies with which to erect these forms artificially.

50 Ibid., p. 70.
They cherished the detailed analyses of D’Arcy Thompson’s “On Growth and Form,” and found in prefabricated technology a means for execution of their vision.

Safdie had been fascinated with Thompson since his apprenticeship in Kahn’s office, where he worked under the guidance of Ann Ting. The use of prefabricated elements garnered for his Montreal Habitat much of its fame. At the Wall, Safdie used this scientific knowledge and advanced technology in several ways. He articulated sophisticated interior spaces constructed from prefabricated elements that he had already orchestrated in his design for the Porat Yoseph Yeshiva on the southwestern corner of the Wall’s site. [Fig.68] He used prefabricated fiberglass domes and rotating windows. [Fig. 69] Moreover, lessons learned from natural phenomena helped him generate the syntax of the entire project. In order to create the “theater” he envisioned, he had to mediate between the strikingly different scales of the Jewish Quarter vernacular and the monumental measurements of Temple Mount. Inspired by Thompson’s analysis of shells, he generated a geometrical scheme of proportions, which was necessary also for the prefabricated construction method he proposed. [Figs. 70-71] The latter assured quick completion, which was in keeping with yet another Zionist tactic of creating fast and irreversible “facts on the ground.”

Commenting on the scale of Safdie’s project, Nathaniel Lichfield, Jerusalem’s Chief City Planner, boasted in front of the Jerusalem Committee, “Moshe Safdie’s work in the...big space before the Kotel is an example of taking the Western Wall and giving it a setting.

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52 D’Arcy Thompson, *On Growth and Form.*
53 Safdie, *Beyond Habitat.*
which is better than the setting [in] which history left it." History might not have been as drawn out as Lichfield implied: it was just six years old. The violence left by the bulldozers that were called upon immediately after the war imprinted the aesthetics of the destroyed Mughrabee Quarter on the Wall's Plaza.

Safdie’s “healing” formulae aimed to bring all the parameters pertinent to his design into the following unifying holistic matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Architectural Device</th>
<th>Source of Inspiration</th>
<th>Material</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Archeology</td>
<td>Stone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Space &amp; Volume</td>
<td>Vernacular &amp; Herodian</td>
<td>Prefabricated Concrete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>Ordering System</td>
<td>Morphology &amp; Technology</td>
<td>Fiberglass Domes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First were the architectural devices: “past” was conveyed through sections, “present” through the articulation of space and volume, while “future” was expressed in the transformative ordering system: the syntax of the entire project. Second were the sources of inspiration: “past” was securely established in archeology, “present” related to Oriental vernacular and Herodian precedence, and “future” engaged the science of natural proportions and cutting-edge prefabricated technology. Last was the composite of materials: “Past” was represented by stone, “present” by prefabricated concrete, and “future” by transparent fiberglass domes.

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Safdie’s message was clear: spectacular integration with no violation. “Old and ultra new – stone and glass,” exulted Mordechai Shoshani, the Head Architect of Israel’s Department of Public Works, “a stylization of typical Mediterranean architecture in modern garb.” “This approach,” he stressed, “employs the best [of today’s] technical and artistic innovations, with no need for kitschy, saccharine elements of eclecticism or imitation.” In other words, Safdie’s project was celebrated by its advocates because it bridged history without disclaiming modernism.

Safdie’s formula succeeded even in processing Islam within its negotiable terms. Landscape experts were invited to implement their knowledge of Persian gardens in order to incorporate them into the Umayyad and Byzantine ruins of the archeological garden. The appeal of Iranian Islam lay in its disassociation from Arab nationalism. As early as the 1930s, in Habinyan (Building), the journal of Zionist modernist architects in Mandate Palestine, future architectural historian Julius Posener denied any connection to Palestinian vernacular architecture while embracing high Islamic architecture in Spain and Iran. In a similar fashion, Safdie’s import of prototypical Islamic gardens from Iran tempered the intimidating claim of Arab nationalism for exclusive possession of Islamic ruins around al-Haram al-Shariff (Temple Mount).

In 1975, Safdie was asked by the government to present his vision to the public in order to solicit feedback on this extremely sensitive project. Many visitors to Safdie’s resultant exhibition told the Shimron Committee, which deliberated the feasibility and

55 Shoshani to Glass, April 20, 1975.
56 In: Safdie in Jerusalem, the RIBA lecture.
appropriateness of the project, about the meticulous presentation of Safdie’s design. Its unprecedented standards overwhelmed the Israeli public.

Among the exhibition’s 1,550 visitors was a fourth-year student of architecture who pointed to major problems. He was worried that the project’s “structural solidification would turn the entire complex into a macro-structure that lacked appropriate expression of differentiated functions.” Unknowingly, he had targeted the notion of megastructure, the architectural premise upon which Safdie had launched his career.

The student also furthered a political insight. Safdie explained that he intentionally avoided a unified, large, leveled plaza in front of the Wall for fear of its fascist connotations. The student suspected that in Safdie’s alternative proposal for, as he called it, “a national-statist scale,” the individual may experience a sense of loss, “I would venture to say, of nationalistic associations.” Seven years later, the Israel Museum asked the former student, David Palterer, to join his mentor, Adolfo Natalini of

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57 Posener, “One Family Houses in Palestine.”
58 Views of the exhibition are in Dar, “The Western Wall,” in Yoman Hashavua, a TV program.
59 Letter from David Palterer to the Advisory Committee for The Western Wall Plaza and its Environs (The Shimron Committee), August 31, 1975.
60 In Reyner Banham’s famous book on the subject, Safdie’s Habitat is arguably featured as the culmination of the megastructure decade. See: Reyner Banham, Megastructure (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976), pp.105-11. While Banham documents the unreserved and all-encompassing enthusiasm progressive architectural thinkers such as Jane Drew expressed about the project, he himself was somewhat reluctant. Its extreme popularity, he maintains, is due to its limited radicality, which Banham promoted in work such as Archigram’s. Moreover, Banham considered Habitat’s ordering system utterly simple and academic (a severe default for Banham), creating an image of romantic and favorable Mediterranean ambiance without revolutionizing the ordering mechanism. In other words, Banham appreciated, yet was skeptical about, the technological aspect, and noticed ahead of time the great representational potential the new system held.
61 Palterer, Letter to the Advisory Committee.
Superstudio, in proposing an alternative design for the Western Wall plaza. Instead of Safdie’s concentration on “both,” Superstudio focused on the “between.” In the context of Safdie’s aforementioned matrix, they ruled out the substances in favor of the frame.

The grid they chose to overlay onto the site was intentionally indifferent to property delineations and religious boundaries. Its infinite web, which covered both Temple Mount and the Wall precinct, lightly materialized only at its intersections. These junctures grew into vertical indicators, which they proposed be understood as a hybrid of a tree, a column and a sign. Near the Wall, these indicators turned into perforated stone pillars, which carried the double platform: the lower one for prayer, the upper for ceremonies. Both levels hovered over the extended archeological zone underneath. [Fig. 72-73]

The modernist grid, Rosalind Krauss suggests, was hostile to narrative and discourse. Superstudio extended this suspicion to history and time. “Flattened, geometricized and ordered,” Krauss tells us, the grid “was antinatural, antimimetic, antireal.” It stated the autonomy of the realm of art. Superstudio’s enactment of the grid’s mute and universal expression helped them to nullify the time-bound constraints of the site. By turning inwards into the world of art, they found refuge from the overwhelming national, religious, material and spatial demands of the site.

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62 The catalogue of the exhibition presents Superstudio as the authors of the project despite the group’s dissolution by this date. See: Metaphors and Allegories: Superstudio Firenze (Jerusalem: The Israel Museum, 1982).
64 Ibid.
Natalini and Palterer proposed a kind of antiarchitecture: their design embodied neither substance nor space—it neither housed specific functions nor reconfigured the entire precinct. The arbitrariness and mechanistic rhythm of the artificial grid intended to permeate “in between” the layers of meaning, which occupied holistic presence near the Wall. Instead of intervening in the meaning of these layers or entities, they sought the fissures between them. Archeology, ruins and memories, as well as private, public, national and religious histories were, for Superstudio, found entities. The autonomous presence of the grid respected the integrity of these entities, and focused on the spaces between them—the metaphorical objects intended to embody this in-between. The resultant array of pillars/columns/trees/signs made present the potential of communicative spaces, intervals that bring together—rather than smash together—edifices and histories.

**International sabra architect and his critic**

Superstudio’s intervention was that of international critics, who had little invested in local culture. In contrast, Safdie negotiated a bi-cultural identity with great skill. On the one hand, Safdie acquired the recognition of an international master—an arbiter of the latest architectural knowledge and beauty—and on the other, he labored to be accepted as an integral member of Israeli culture. In his Jerusalem book, for example, he is pictured in military uniform. [Fig. 74] This image of Safdie helped him to address a culture which considered its military, in which all citizens must serve, to be the ultimate melting pot, and considered military service, therefore, a requirement for cultural legitimization.
Safdie went even further. His family originated in Aleppo, but he was born and grew up in the Northern Israeli town of Haifa. As a child, he was the only Mizrahi (Jew of Arab decent) in his private school class in a country dominated by the European cultural norms of its socialist Ashkenazi regime. As merchants, the Safdies could not survive under the economic restrictions of the Labor regime, and left for Canada when Safdie was fifteen years old. At that time, such a departure was considered a betrayal of the Zionist cause.

In a 1975 interview, Safdie suggested an intriguing cultural twist:

The founders’ generation has difficulties with the Middle East, which found expression in architecture. I think and believe that our generation has fewer problems with the region. My Middle Eastern origin provides me with an entirely different starting point than the cultural bedrock [nekudat motza] of Eastern Europe.

By 1975, Mizrahi Jews had long protested against the dominant cultural norms that were laid by the founders of Labor Zionism. During the first decades of Statehood, leaders of Eastern European origin notoriously marginalized the Arab Jews who immigrated to Israel en masse only after its independence. The accumulated bitterness of Mizrahi Jews greatly contributed to the first political Labor defeat in the 1977 elections. In this context, Safdie’s statement was multifaceted: it capitalized on the Mizrahi sentiment mentioned above while boasting of his superior cultural heritage to sabra colleagues.

More significantly, however, was Safdie’s insistence on the “Eastern European” rather than the “Western” origin of early Zionist leaders, who made it impossible for the Safdies to survive in 1950s Israel. In 1975, when the former socialist allure of the Eastern Block had been dim for years, Safdie’s superior Westerness loomed large.

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65 Autobiographical notes by Safdie are in Moshe Safdie, Beyond Habitat.
Flattered by Safdie’s aspirations for Israeli identity, local architects invited him to join their inner circles. The importance of such an association cannot be overstated. In a meaningful example, Safdie’s singular design for the Western Wall Plaza upset the Supreme Council for Architecture and Town Planning, which demanded an open competition. The outraged Ram Karmi immediately wrote the Council that the project was already commissioned to a member of that same Supreme Council, that is, to Safdie, whose project had been immorally discussed while he was abroad (Karmi did not mention that this was where Safdie actually lived). Insisting that no competition could yield better results, he put an end to local ferment. This example reveals Safdie’s success in becoming part of a top-down institutional ordering of the built environment and at the same time a native able to disseminate his agenda through an intricate cultural web. This unique position won—and is still winning—him the most symbolic projects in Israel.

Safdie’s instant positioning at the center of professional power also identified him with the univocal voice of the late Labor party. (To this day, Safdie is the official architect of the Rabin family and the Rabin Institution.) As a result, the War against his project can be read in the context of identity politics, contesting the confines of the Israeli elite. David Cassuto, for example, the architectural consultant to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Safdie’s bitterest critic, was deliberately conducting an identity contest. An

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67 Ram Karmi, letter to the Supreme Council for Architecture and Town Planning, August 1, 1973, the Jerusalem Archive. Safdie, who got the letter as a Council member, quickly delivered it to Yehuda Tamir, Roni Gloskinos and Teddy Kollek. Yaakov Rechter, a future member of the Shimron Committee, adopted
Orthodox Jew of Florentine origin, he lost his father to the fascists in Italy. In Jerusalem, his widowed mother was killed as a drafted nurse in a convoy to the besieged Mount Scopus during Israel’s War of Independence. He was therefore raised by his grandfather, an acclaimed scholar whose interpretation of the Torah was studied in every Israeli Jewish school. Cassuto himself served in a combat unit, studied architecture at the Technion, and apprenticed with David Reznik, arguably Jerusalem’s most prestigious architectural firm. With such impeccable “national” credentials, he firmly believed his status in Israeli society was secure—until he tried to establish his own private firm. His first commission was immediately refused on the basis of suspected “religious connections.” This formative moment in his career would have an unexpected impact.

The refusing official was Mordechai Shoshani, who presented himself as the architect of the State. While the entire Western Wall precinct was under consideration, Shoshani was already administering Safdie’s design development for the Supreme Rabbinical Court—a significant component of Safdie’s overall scheme. The design of this religious institution triggered a particularly bitter dispute between secular and religious agencies.
over the representational and architectural role of Statist edifices. Cassuto, as the architectural consultant to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, objected to the project because it was too wasteful. He considered it to be excessively lavish. It threatened, he argued, the primacy of the Wall. Shoshani passionately defended Safdie’s project, arguing that

> beyond a building’s character, use, and functional value lie aesthetic and symbolic values – a flag is a piece of fabric, but it is also a value beneath which, and for which, people battle.  

If the Western Wall induced soldiers to wage cruel battle and shed tears of joy at the same time, then, he claimed, the architecture that defines the precinct should be similarly evocative. He complained that the Ministry of Religious Affairs kept hampering Safdie’s progress, risking as a result the chance to contribute an architectural paragon to world culture and Jewish history. He compared Safdie to the genius Brunelleschi: if the latter had failed in the battle against his many small-minded Florentine critics (explicitly referring to Cassuto’s origin), the world would be bereft of its greatest dome. Such evocation of world culture fighting its lesser contenders reflected the ways in which the secular Labor-oriented Israeli elite treated its cultural minorities, Orthodox Jews included. For this reason, the bitter argument between Shoshani and Cassuto—which almost reached the federal arbiter—cannot be read anecdotally. It reflects a genuine competition over the resources of Israeli culture. The way their fight evolved into what Benvenisti has called “The War of the Jews” brings us back to the historical narrative of designing the Wall’s Plaza.

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70 Shoshani, letter to David Glass.

71 This is the title of Benvenisti’s chapter on the Wall in the Hebrew original for his book *The Torn City.*
Debating the Plan

In 1970, the Ministry of Religious Affairs commissioned a Planning Research team for the Western Wall Plaza made up of Yoseph Schonberger, Shlomo Aronson, and Arthur Kutcher (with Michael Turner, Yoseph Schweid and Ehud Mentchel as consultants). The team created an intriguing bond between modernist and Jewish Orthodoxy.

Following detailed functional and visual analysis, they concluded that a full-fledged program had to precede any design activity. This program, due to the significance of the site, would necessarily draw upon religious and philosophical thought and would adhere to functional demands and archeological considerations. Only after such a program was established, they argued, could a multi-step and accumulative design process be undertaken. Instead of a totalizing design, their report suggested sixteen different schemes [Fig. 66] which defined, to use Summerson's terminology, "the spatial dimensions, spatial relationships, and other physical conditions required for the convenient performance of specific" rituals and activities in the vicinity of the Wall.

According to Summerson's definition, the report and its schemes presented a blueprint for a thoroughly modernist program.

When the Jerusalem municipality and the Company for the Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter sought collaboration with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, they decided to commission the Wall's project jointly to Safdie and Josef Schonberger, the head of the

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72 See Schonenberg, *Planning Research*.
73 The personal composition of this team combined an unusual mix of observant Jews (Schonenberg and Turner), Anglo-Saxon new immigrants (Turner and Kutcher) and a sabra landscape architect who studied in the United States (Aronson).
Planning Research team. Eventually, Schonberger learned about Safdie’s 1973
presentation of the project to the Jerusalem Committee from the newspapers. This
oversight alienated the religious community, which was deeply offended and anxious
about its potential marginalization. In retrospect, Kollek’s eagerness to gain international
support and legitimization might have caused him irreversible damage at home. The
former Minister of Religious Affairs, Zerah Verhaftig, who had previously and willingly
negotiated the plan with the secular authorities, retracted his consent, while both Kollek
and Safdie laboriously tried to amend the insult. It was the end of a fragile collaboration
between very different conceptions of Judaism and architecture.

Unlike Schonberger, Safdie did not believe that the rationale of a program could
determine design. His conceptual program evolved as an interplay between the
topography and boundaries of the site, the inner logic of the Zionist narrative, and the
spatial and formal ordering of an archeological uncertainty. More importantly, it relied
on the disciplinary memory of Architecture, on the theater as an urban form. The
program did not generate the resultant image, but was contained in it. According to

74 For a discussion of Summerson’s theory, see Chapter 3.
75 Letter from Josef Schonberger to Moshe Safdie, June 24, 1973, Jerusalem Archive.
76 Kollek wrote to Schonberger on June 28, 1973: “Regardless of what plan would eventually be
implemented on site, it is clear to us that international criticism is expected, along with arguments in the
Security Council and so forth. Therefore, I thought that if we succeed in gaining support for the plan in this
forum [i.e. the Jerusalem Committee], it might help us in all future arguments. I am convinced that all
parties related to the plaza issue would be as interested in it as I am.” Safdie had written Schonberger a day
earlier, portraying the presentation as a last minute decision and lamenting the presence of journalists of
which, he wrote, he did not know in advance. Jerusalem Archive.
77 A letter from the Minister of Religious Affairs, Zerah Verhaftig, to Teddy Kollek, June 28, 1973, copied
to the Minister of Justice, the head of the Ministers’ Committee for Jerusalem Affairs. Verhaftig refused to
accept a plan that was prepared without his architectural consultant. The agreement between the Jerusalem
mayor, the Minister of Religious Affairs, and the Company for the Reconstruction and Development of the
Jewish Quarter in the Old City was based on meetings in August 10, 1971 and May 15, 1972. It was
accepted by all parties but was never signed in full. The agreement joined Safdie and Schonenberg as
Safdie’s position, the *raison d’etre* for such a project cannot stem from an authority external to the discipline of architecture. Architecture has to instead use its own disciplinary knowledge—its memory of architectural precedents and principals—in order to articulate an architectural form which is the *idea* of the Wall.

State officials did not fully evaluate the project architecturally, but they could easily identify the virtues of Safdie’s conception. Safdie’s project monumentalized the Wall; it was interwoven into the archeological sites, the architecture of which it incorporated; it was rich in Oriental/biblical imagery; and, finally, it was designed to take advantage of prefabricated technology. It was, therefore, the ultimate expression of Statist Zionism—it united the biblical past with technological progress and created concrete, fast and beautiful “facts on the ground.”

Safdie presented his model to the public with the aid of a magnifying optical device, which allowed viewers to experience the proposed space without having to conceptualize it in the abstract. As a result, the greatest appeal of Safdie’s project was its capacity to overcome the issue of a program, for which no agreement could be foreseen. If there is no program, it is impossible to contest the conception on which it relies. As the Minister of Justice explained on national TV, the evaluation of this entirely architectural project required experts—that is, professionals who were trained in the discipline of architecture. The government, therefore, relegated the responsibility over the destiny of the Wall precinct to a primarily professional and seemingly unbiased committee. But was it really?

planners for the precinct, and indicated that no plan could be presented in public before all parties had approved it.
During the first meeting of the Shimron Committee, Meron Benvenisti considered the Archeological Commission and the Ministry of Religious Affairs as two separate States with competing territorial claims. According to this logic, six voting members of the Committee were allies of the former State, while only one represented the other.

More intriguing is the assumed professional “neutrality” of the local architectural profession, consisting almost exclusively of secular Ashkenazi men who identified with the mamlahtiyut project. How and by whom were representatives of the profession chosen? In a manner typical of Israeli politics, the Minister of Justice asked Shimron, the head of the committee, who asked the Head of Israel’s Association of Architects and Engineers, who recommended architects “not of this or another strand,” but “of the profession.” The appointees Arieh Sharon, Avraham Yaski and Yaakov Rechter were all from Tel Aviv. One was the architect of Labor Zionism; the other two were leading architects of the Tel Aviv sabra circle and adherents to postwar architectural culture.

The Jerusalemite David Reznik was also invited to take part in the committee, but his appointment was cancelled shortly after he expressed, in a different forum, his preference

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78 The Shimron Committee Proceedings, January 28, 1975, p.11.
79 The Shimron Committee was assigned to review Safdie’s project during a short period in which the religious party was not part of the coalition. At that unusual occasion, the Minister of Justice was also the Minister of Religious Affairs, a Ministry that is the stronghold of the Mafdal (the Zionist religious party). The religious community thought that the Labor movement exploited this window of opportunity to compose a committee that would stress secular national values, in which archeology had a privileged status (see above). From comments made throughout the Committee’s deliberation, it is clear how incompatible the views of the archeologist Meir Ben-Dov and the representative of the Minister of Religious Affairs, David Cassuto, were. Small details inflamed arguments—often petty—between the two. In the Committee’s final statements, Cassuto wrote the single minority opinion objecting to the project.
80 See Shimron’s answer to the question of who chose the appointed members. The Shimron Committee proceedings, July 8, 1975. The head of the Israel Association of Engineers and Architects was Elhanan Peles.
81 See chapter 5.
for great restraint near the Wall.\textsuperscript{82}

It often happened that an expert testifying in front of the Shimron Committee would challenge the identity of its members or its mandate. Professor Shmuel Safrai, for example, an expert on Jewish history, lamented, “the fact that there is no…substantial representation of praying Jews from different ethnic communities, from different trends. Why there is no Jew here who runs to \textit{[tikum hazot]}?\textsuperscript{83} The Jerusalem branch of the Association of Architects challenged the committee with a threefold demand. The association wanted a program and conceptual position, a competition, and a revised makeup of the evaluating team.\textsuperscript{84} Their implicit agenda was to break the Tel Aviv hegemony. Arieh Sharon, shrewd and blunt, quickly engaged this criticism: he hypothesized a scenario in which “the Head would add two or three wise men, one religious man, one archeologist and one Arab, and we, in half an hour, after we are all that smart, will make five guidelines [for the desired program].”\textsuperscript{85} Accustomed to his role as the spokesman for Israeli architects, Sharon did not tolerate the idea of having more than one professional voice for the nation. He ridiculed the demand for fair representation by comparing the prospect of public debate to a similar process in the Soviet Union, where all voices are channeled into one paper, the \textit{Pravda}, which edits

\textsuperscript{82} Reznik had a special status: a Jerusalemite and a Zionist immigrant from Brazil, he took part in the earlier formation of the Tel Aviv \textit{sabra} circles in the 1950s. He apprenticed with Zeev Rechter (the father of Shimron Committee member Yaakov Rechter) from whose practice many architects of the \textit{sabra} generation entered into the profession. Reznik’s own firm became a hub for a younger generation of Jerusalemite architects who were drawn to Jerusalem after the ’67 war. His testimony in front of the Shimron Committee started with his protest against the reversal of his appointment as a committee member, a fact that suggested to him the impartiality of the committee.

\textsuperscript{83} Professor Shmuel Safrai, Proceedings of the Shimron Committee, September 3, 1975, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{84} Letter from Gidon Yeger and Izhak Blat to Irvin Shimron. The letter followed the testimony of Gidon Yeger, the head of the Jerusalem branch of the Association of Architects, in front of the Shimron Committee.
“public opinion” to oblivion. Had Sharon subdued his cynicism, he could have included in the “half an hour” dedicated to “one religious man” and “one Arab” a revealing testimony from “one woman,” “one Oriental Jew,” “one new immigrant,” or even “one from the geographical periphery”—in short, all those groups that were systematically marginalized by the architectural profession.

As with all “transparent” hegemonic discourse, the debate soon confronted “objective” universal professionalism with a claim for subjective sensitivities. During the debate, a Jerusalem architect asked an archeologist, who dug in one of the most nationally biased sites worldwide, whether an Israeli and an American would similarly evaluate the archeology by the wall. “There is a difference in methods,” the archeologist answered, “not because of archeology, not because of being Israeli or American.” The architect insisted: “I think there is a difference in emphasizing what you choose to leave [in the site] or not to leave there. There is a difference between a Jew and a Christian, an Israeli and an American.” The archeologist doggedly replied, “No way!”

Architects at the committee boasted similar unbiased professionalism, which surfaced during the deliberation of the program, or rather, the program’s absence. Sharon, for example, offered yet another scenario: if the Mayor, the Chief Rabbi and the Prime Minister were to decide to lower the ground by the Wall, they would not yet solve the...
problem. “We architects, and here I believe in architecture, should check indeed whether one benefits from such a lowering, if it is at all possible—if it would increase intimacy, enclosure, etc.” Politicians, Sharon therefore concluded, can hardly “determine the central issues with a degree of coherence.” “Three good politicians can say: I really saw in Dubrovnik an entirely livable city, or even an entire living old city! [We] also need life. But then, in reality—how do you do it?” Sharon’s conclusions undermined the efficacy of authoritative guidelines that precede architectural design. In so doing, they claimed for his discipline a mandate of great national consequences.

Avraham Yaski immediately brought this mandate to bear on the debate over the national significance of the site:

In what we discuss here, we seek an attitude for how to design an essentially national monument. And I don’t think there was ever a program for Piazza del Popolo, nor for San Marco, for gothic cathedrals, or for the Etoile in Paris... [National monuments require] a position with a vision, and this vision needs to be expressed. Its programmatic aspect can be summed up in five sentences: a praying place, an assembly place for the masses, and a national visiting site, and with this we almost conclude the saga.

Secular Jerusalemite architects refused Sharon and Yaski’s attitude. Their protest extended the debate beyond the secular/religious divide. They demanded the establishment of “a position regarding the meaning of the Wall” before design is undertaken. “What you expect from the Wall,” they concluded, “is not if it is an enclosed or enlarged [space], but for it to be meaningful for the Jewish people.” Yaski kept insisting, in a manner similar to Safdie’s, that, at times, “the presence of the work itself

89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
can become a means for examining that which you call a program...when you start
analyzing [the project] you are actually touching the basic conception.” With this
statement, Yaski returned the game back to its disciplinary confines.

For Cassuto, the entire premise of Yaski’s speculation was erroneous: “I don’t agree that
this is a national monument,” he contended. “What is it: a nature reserve, a zoo, a place
to come watch?” He was appalled by the prospective sight of “the guys with the peot [the
hairstyle of ultra Orthodox Jews]” standing below as a spectacle for the secular fellows
overlooking them. He reminded the committee, “There are people for whom the Wall is
not a monument but part of their lives...a living thing.”

Modernist and Jewish orthodoxies were uncompromisingly opposed to the mere
possibility of discussing a complete architectural project as a conceptual bedrock for a
national monument. They convinced the Minister of Religious Affairs to form the
Conception Committee, the interim report of which asserted that:

The committee negatively sees any tendency and attitude to turn the Wall’s plaza
into an element or a monument that comes to emphasize only “that which has
passed.” In other words, the Wall is not only an historical remnant—it’s own
importance emanates first and foremost from its being a praying place and a place
to establish the past with hope and in the anticipation of what it encodes for the
future.

Concluding the debate, the new committee delivered a clear message: the conception of a
project like the Western Wall must be decided outside the discipline of architecture.

There was no point in judging whether Safdie’s project was good or beautiful because

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92 Ibid., D12
93 Interim report of the Conception Committee, Ministry of Religious Affairs, March 8, 1976. The private
archive of David Cassuto.
those were qualities beyond its technical mandate. The beautification of the Wall’s precinct, they insisted, would not enhance its virtues, it threatened to change them. Their notion of beauty stood for different virtues, which are neither modern nor Jewish. The project beautified *mamlachtiyut* rather than the Wall, whose virtues lay beyond any contemporary definition of urban aesthetics. Architecture, they exhorted, should humble itself in front of the Wall.

How did the story end?

Well, the controversy hampered the Shimron Committee’s work, which was halted for nearly two years until 1977, losing, in the process, Avraham Yaski, who could not tolerate the parallel Conception Committee. After Safdie exercised his Sephardi Aleppo charm on the Sephardi chief Rabbi Ovadia Yoseph, himself an Aleppo Jew, the authorized approval of the Jewish people was at last secured. As a result, the State of Israel officially approved Safdie’s design. When David Cassuto, the defeated head of the Conception Committee, asked his Minister: “What shall we do?” the Minister of Religious Affairs replied, “nothing.” Being in charge of the site, it was within his power to put the project to rest, yet not permanently. All parties, armed with fortified positions and sealed documents, were ready for a few more rounds in this endless battle.

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*Safdie met Rabbi Ovadia Yoseph and the Chief Rabbinical Council during the period in which the Committee’s work was halted in the absence of collaboration from religious authorities. He sent a report of the meeting to the authorities involved on August 30, 1976. In The Future of the Past, he explains the dynamics of the encounter with the Rabbi, who became a central figure in Israeli culture and politics in the 1990s. See Safdie, “The Council of the Torah Sages,” in The Future of the Past, pp.183-194.*
My fascination with designs for the Western Wall Plaza stems from three sources. First, the debate surrounding the designs creates an opportunity to see how particular architectural designs, as opposed to large-scale planning schemes, can embody very distinct ideologies that are at odds with each other. Second, these debates provide a lens through which I can study the interaction between two vulnerable modernist cultures: a Zionist one seeking new ways to appropriate its newly possessed monuments, and an architectural one contesting the moribund yet almighty Modern Movement.

Third, this interaction, I argue, produced architecture that was not only an instrument of official politics, but, arguably, also the opposite. Safdie’s proposal in particular erupted in full force from deadlocked institutional clashes. Bold, tangible and immediate, it instantly provoked political action culminating in a clash between two ministerial committees that held contradicting architectural positions. Yet more striking is the widely-held assertion, even among the project’s greatest critics, with which this chapter opened: that the Wall can no longer be thought of as a *tabula rasa*. It will henceforth always be conjured simultaneously with Safdie’s design for it, which, though never built, changed the national reading of the Wall.

As in the best of legends, Safdie’s model is waiting, resting in glass boxes, for the kiss of the appropriate prince. The last one to pursue it was Rehav’am Ze’evi, Israel’s Minister of Tourism, who wanted to invest a great part of his Ministry budget in reviving the Western Wall plans. At the Jerusalem municipality, I was told the issue fell under the jurisdiction of the new City Engineer, the former head of Safdie’s Jerusalem office. The
ultra-Orthodox community that published a rebuttal of the initiative found its relief in an unexpected source: Minister Ze’evi, an extreme right-wing politician, was assassinated by the Palestinians whom he had been attempting to collectively transfer from their homeland. While waiting for the next prince, we may ponder the historical circumstances that caused a right wing extremist who advocated mass Palestinian transfer to revive the project of a self-declared left wing architect, who had previously attempted to settle Palestinians on the outskirts of Jerusalem. What does this teach us, indeed, about the meaning of the project for the Wall?95

95 Since the research for this chapter was undertaken, all major Israeli newspapers have released a succinct message regarding a limited competition for the site with a budget of 30 million shekels. No names were mentioned, but the panels of the Western Wall have been removed from Safdie’s complete archive at the Canadian Architectural Collection in Montreal.
CONCLUSIONS

“I believe in the (national) Thing” is equal to “I believe that others (members of my community) believe in the Thing.” The tautological character of the Thing - its semantic void, the fact that all we can say about it is that it is “the real thing” - is founded precisely in this paradoxical reflexive structure. The national Thing exists as long as members of the community believe in it; it is literally an effect of this belief in itself...the whole meaning of the Thing consists in the fact that ‘it means something’ to people.

Slavoj Zizek, Dimensions, p.196

Jerusalem’s architecture is presented in this study as a cultural field in which different conceptions of Israeliness compete for supremacy—for the license to imprint their version of "Israeli identity" on the landscape of an embattled city. A rather early break with high modernism that was urgently and industriously implemented in post-'67 Jerusalem points to the victorious conception—a joint vision based on post-WWII criticism of the Modern Movement and the tenets of the mamlachtiyut ideology. This study has followed the campaign to unite the new Israeli Yerushalayim and the old Jordanian El Quds into a single entity, “the eternal capital of Israel,” one that could become a symbol for the larger attempt to unify the ideals of a modernist state with those of a Jewish nation. This wishful desire for unity was intended to protect the Israeli state - and the architectural discipline - from facing the logic of disintegration whether this disintegration originated from communities of displaced Palestinians or from within Israel’s and architecture’s own increasingly diverse cultures.

The focus on this encounter between architectural and national ideologies is based on the premise that in order to understand the politics of space in Jerusalem, we must consider
bodies of knowledge which are external to the Zionist ethos and the Israeli Palestinian conflict, but that affect their course nonetheless. I therefore presented architecture as neither a mere end to political aims, nor as an autonomous disciplinary operation. Consequently, the subject of this dissertation is not whether architects lent services to the project of Israeli settlement and occupation—an important and urgent topic in its own right. Rather, this dissertation has focused on the double transparency of architectural production, in which architects work out themes from within the framework of their discipline, and yet their actions are thoroughly politicized at the very place where they are most “neutral” and “professional.”

Such was the central debate of post-WWII architectural culture, namely, the criticism of the Modern Movement and its complicity in modernization projects, as well as the return to disciplinary memory, three-dimensional design, place, man, community and identity. This discourse was located in the context of a national project of a settler society that had to constantly re-imagine itself vis-a-vis an enemy Palestinian frontier. In this context, particularly after the ’67 war, Israel had to reexamine its delicate balance between “nation” and “state,” a balance that was logged between two thematic images for Jerusalem: one, highly modernist and secular, the other, picturesque and spiritual. The Israelis entered Jerusalem with the institutional assumption that the first was the obvious choice. But the international architectural community, in the form of the famous Jerusalem Committee, fiercely intervened in favor of the latter. The resultant tenets of Jerusalem’s beautification, a campaign intended to legitimize Israeli rule over the city, intriguingly were in agreement with the visual idea of Jerusalem that the British Mandate
promoted by means of modern planning. This intimate affinity between colonial planning and post-WWII architectural conceptions of what Edward Said called the “essentialist universalism” of Western culture resulted in the “thematization” of Jerusalem according to Western ideas and Israeli politics. This campaign, as sensitive as it tried to be with respect to issues such as land, history and religion, nonetheless left Palestinian national claims unaccounted for while reinforcing—and enforcing—Jerusalem’s sanctity on Jews.

Ultimately, post-WWII discourse helped Israelis to articulate their nation in the language of the "timeless" rather than "progressive," and in terms of "authenticity" rather than "modernization." This conception reached its fullest manifestation in Moshe Safdie’s design for the Western Wall Plaza, where an Herodian idealism, archeological excavation, the Palestinian vernacular and cutting edge technology were all integrated into a vision of Israeli nationalism that was firmly—and yet illusorily—rooted in aspirations for biblical heroism and a modern future.

Similarly changed was the definition of Man. In post-WWII culture, Man by and large possessed a generic identity. He was real, invulnerable, and entertained essential sameness. But when this Man was a new immigrant, when his community had roots in foreign countries, and when his place was a contested territory that he had to conquer and protect through military power, his identity had to take on a host of different and more complex meanings. Local architects, trying to construct for this Man a coherent and
identifiable Israeli “home,” drew on the ethics of New Brutalism, and the nascent regionalism of Team X.

Ultimately, this “model home” intended to house not necessarily the New Jew that Zionists envisioned in Europe, but the personification of this concept in the image of the native sabra: and it is on sabra architects that this study focuses. The model of the native Jew that the sabra embodied, however, was itself the result of an insecure possession of place. Sabra architects defined themselves vis-a-vis a modernization project, which they thoroughly criticized, and a place for which they longed, but whose “genetic code” was defined as Arab once it was juxtaposed with the Zionist project’s strictly modernist path. Analyzing the desire of the Israeli for the nativeness of the Palestinian focused attention on the cultural formation of a dominant professional discourse. Consequently, it subverted both the traditional object of ethnography and the habitual subject of postcolonial studies by focusing on the colonizer rather than the colonized as the primary object of study.

Recently Yoram Tzafrir, a member of this sabra elite identified his generation with the protagonist of S. Yizhar’s novel, The Days of Tziklag, which describes a group of Israeli warriors who conquered the country not only with weapons but also with a bible and a key to plants, seeking traces of biblical sites beneath the broken clay pottery of deserted Arab villages. Touring the country with a pocket bible was so common, Tzafrir explains, because:

There was a yearning for the country, for those who lived in it and left in it the remains of their meager houses, the ashes of their bonfires and their wells. The
longing is naive, it is not touched by the joy of appropriation that took place here after 1967. The past is longing, the broken clay pottery is connection, not a deed of property.¹

This yearning for the country (eretz) and the place (makom) was inextricably tied to a yearning for a secure past—a longing that biblicized the country in its joint search for locality and history. But the past in the Israeli world, as David Lowenthal famously phrased it, turned into a "foreign country." The Israeli settlement project rendered this past not only insecure but tenaciously hostile. As a result, the past had to be constantly negotiated and always re-conquered. The architectural conquest of the Israeli "place" thus stands at the center of this study.

The complexity of this Israeli project was thus fated to simultaneously move in two directions. It advanced a liberating national cause while participating in the oppressive enterprise of settling the land of the “other.” During early statehood, and against the firm political borders of “the besieged country,” the national project, cast as mamlachtiyut, could better mesh a modernist state and a Jewish nation into a unified national form. But once the ’67 war territorially unleashed the spirit of Israeli nationalism, the Israeli state could no longer conceal the ambiguity of its national-colonial practices, even from its own citizens. In architectural terms, this means that exactly when the opportunity to interact with the tangible place for which these architects longed—complete with its history, authenticity, landscapes and built materials—presented itself, the legitimacy of the combined national-colonial project that triggered this architecture started to erode. For two decades, architects continued to build in the localist paradigm despite their

¹ Yoram Tzafrir, Haaretz, (Culture and Literature) “The Confession of a S. Yizhar ‘Convict’,” July 20,
discomfort with its slightly too nationalist “Jerusalemism.” The more severe cracks in this architectural program appeared once the hyphen between “nation” and “state,” the space within which this architecture was carefully located, began to weaken. It happened most profoundly with the onset of the Palestinian intifadas (1987-1993 and 2000-present).

The intifada politically charged the places from which the architects of the 1960s and 1970s derived their inspiration for local architecture. During this intifada period, it was difficult to regard Arab villages as mere landscapes of stone and light, of Mediterranean alleys and squares. They ceased to serve as architectural precedents for Mediterranean and biblical localness. Different kind of stones that were suddenly thrown in Palestinian rather than generically “Arab” villages made the competitors for ownership of the “place” plainly visible. The conflict spread to Jerusalem and the West Bank—the characteristic sites of authentic localness—and made it difficult to find in their vicinity the consensus necessary for casting a national heritage.

Consider, for example, the following impasse. Encounters: The Vernacular Paradox in Israeli Architecture, the catalogue of the official exhibition prepared on the occasion of Israel’s Jubilee in 1998, aimed to cement Israeli architecture into “a permanent dialogue between Arabic architecture and her Israeli cousin: the first—rooted in the vernacular, ancient, and formed by native skills passed from father to son; the second—rich with
knowledge and technology, but struggling to find its connection to the place."\(^2\)

Accordingly, curator Ami Ran (also the editor of Israel’s most popular architectural periodical, *Architecture of Israel*) displayed contextual architecture “of the place”—which he claimed Israeli architects had finally found—in the exhibition. Such a "dialogue" still reflects modernist utopian presumptions.

A couple of years later, in the midst of the second *intifada*, immediately after Palestinians ruined the Tomb of Joseph in Nablus, the falsity of Ran’s wishful Arab-Israeli dialogue (a dialogue on unequal ground) lost the minimal potential it had had for success. In an editorial, “On Neighbors and Brutalism,” he wrote: “It is hard to believe that stone, a traditional building material in this part of the world, has become a weapon [used to destroy] peace. The sudden transformation right before our eyes of skilled craftsmen (casting, plaster and tile artists) into lynch mobs was shocking."\(^3\) Here Ran painfully exposes the collective blindness of the architectural profession, which wanted to appropriate Palestinian material culture and crack its secret code for local connectedness, but also assumed that this could be done through a peaceful exchange. This dissertation is in part the history of the “naive longing” for the place and for traces of nativeness in the built environment. That longing was not limited to the Israelis. It was itself a pervasive European phenomenon. But in Israel it was thoroughly enmeshed in the hard and cruel world of politics.

In light of this escalating conflict and concurrent ambivalence about Jerusalem, Tel Aviv (the first Jewish city and a purely "modern" city devoid of Palestinians and reminders of the Orient) came to be the focus, for Israelis, for calm and nostalgic recollections. The modern age, ironically, has become the "good old days," which means that the "history of modernism" is itself not without historiographic ambivalence. It has become a heritage that allows one to dispense with the menacing immediacy of contemporary Israeli life. On the occasion of the “Bauhaus in Tel Aviv” national celebration in 1994, for example, Michael Levin wrote in the city’s local newspaper:

“The agreement between the aesthetics and vision of the new society and the society’s spiritual rebirth was almost complete. In the realm of architecture, Le Corbusier proclaimed this as the birth of a new architecture, which was more or less creating something out of nothing. In the realm of society, politics and even personal life, the leaders of the Zionist movement and the Jewish yishuv proclaimed this moment the birth of a new society and a new man. This too was the creation of something out of nothing.”

Tel Aviv, the “first Hebrew city” that mythically “grew out of the sands,” was in this discourse a prototypical Zionist settlement. The “nothingness” on which Tel Aviv was founded undergirded the ultimate white utopia: it is a city with no prehistory that is indisputably and authentically Zionist. Paradoxically, in the search to redefine a secure Israeli past, it was the modernist channel, ahistorical by definition, on which the longing for the architectural roots of Israeliness was focused. More importantly, however, this discourse established the foundation of a modernist architectural frontier that ran through Israeli society, separating Tel Aviv from both the Palestinian Other and Jewish nationalism.

The retreat into the modernist origin of Israeliness grew only deeper as the maintenance of normal, everyday life became impossible. *The Israeli Project* exhibition, for example, was a not-so-indirect response to the condition that started the second *intifada* shortly before the exhibition opened. It displayed architecture of the 1950s and 1960s that was, according to curator Tzvi Efrat, “Israeli in the fullest sense of the word, even if it was not born here.” This architecture’s wide distribution during early statehood made it, according to Efrat, into “the pattern of the landscape of the homeland.”6 Ester Zanberg, an influential architectural critic, added: “These structures shaped both the country’s landscape and consciousness during a period when the ‘sanctity of the people’ was not embodied in ancient stone walls and the tombs of pious figures, but rather in purposeful, innovative buildings, secular to the core.”7

Indeed, in the present atmosphere, architecture and building materials are often charged with political and anthropomorphic rhetoric. Ran, who desires an Israeli architecture appropriate for “a society eager for both functional convenience and relevant spiritual content,”8 insisted that “stone has always been a friendly building material,” and “[t]hat is all we’ve got.”9 In contrast, Efrat firmly stated, “the cement is no less local and no less natural than the stone. It is just less traditional, less Arab and less messianic.”10 Stone

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6 Ester Zandberg interviewing Tzvi Efrat in: “The Lost Dignity.”
7 Ibid.
8 Ami Ran, “Introduction” in *Encounters*.
9 Ami Ran, “Of Neighbors and Brutalism.”
10 Zandberg, “The Lost Dignity.”
and concrete are thus positioned at polar ends of the cultural war.\textsuperscript{11} Apparently, this schema confirms the results of recent sociological analysis of Israeli society that shows it to be split between advocates of the democratic state and those of the Jewish nation.\textsuperscript{12}

But the architects who built Jerusalem in stone were an integral part of the “secular to the core” socialist elite of “the first Israel.” Could it be, as Efrat suggested, that these architects “changed colors” a minute after the war? And if they did, how can this help us locate them in the polarized field of democrats against fundamentalists (assuming that people rather than building materials are the bearers of such positions)?

In the attempt to split the architectural career of an entire generation into its concrete and stone periods, I saw an effort to resurrect an Israeli identity not yet contaminated by conflicted Orientalist and religious overtones. This attempt subordinates, however, a comprehensive architectural program that had preoccupied Israeli architects for over four decades with the dictates of the current political situation. Zandberg hit the crux of 1960s and 1970s trends by asking, “what does this desperate desire to blend into the environment stem from?” Efrat responded by rooting this desire in the diversion of practical concern with localness to an imaginary discussion taking place today about to whom history belongs and who owns this place. In the 1950s and even earlier, back in the 1930s, our foreignness in the Levant was regarded as obvious by the ‘Bauhaus’ architects. They made an effort to develop an Israeli identity that was neither biblical nor Oriental...In my opinion, concern with localness after 1967 reflects the release of dark tendencies that are

\textsuperscript{11} By opposing concrete to stone, contemporary critics are rehearsing a Mandate period crusade to identify Zionist building with concrete construction, underlying which was a campaign against Arab predominance in the building market.

fundamentalist in essence and in total contradiction to the non-tempestuous, non-Arabized, healthy logic of early statehood.\textsuperscript{13}

This observation put into sharp relief the question of what is “home” for Israelis and against which frontier such “home” is constructed. Can a home be resurrected that is obviously foreign, a branch of global culture in the Levant? Can new borders be defined for a secular internationalist Israeliness?

A commentator recently reminded readers that 3,000 year ago, after King Solomon died, there was much strife within the Israeli community. The result was the separation between Judea and Israel. Why not, asks the writer, separate Israel once more and establish a new state around greater Tel Aviv known as the Dan Block? Citizens of the State of Dan would enjoy complete civil freedom and no ethnic tensions. Relieved from the financial burden brought on by settlements and a huge security budget, they would enjoy economic prosperity, and would stress education, welfare and culture. “It may sound a like a hallucination,” the writer admits, “maybe, but what a pleasure it would be to hear the sentence, ‘This is Rubi Rivlin from built and glorious Jerusalem which is bound together firmly’ and know that it is some minister in a different, faraway country.”\textsuperscript{14}

This commentary bluntly exposes the current detestation for the city of Jerusalem and begged the question: where are the boundaries of Israeli collectivity, which are defined by the white utopist city and the gray Israeli project, located? Etienne Balibar has suggested that

\textsuperscript{13} Zandberg, “The Lost Dignity.”
the ‘external frontiers’ of the state have to become ‘internal frontiers’ or – which amounts to the same thing – external frontiers have to be imagined constantly as a projection and protection of an internal collective personality, which each of us carries within ourselves and enables us to inhabit the space of the state as a place where we have always been – and always will be – ‘at home’.

The debate indicates a problem within this national program. The external frontiers of the state of Israel, in sharp opposition to the borders of the 1950s besieged country, can no longer be imagined as the internal frontier of a “collective personality.” Nevertheless, the need “to inhabit the space of the state as a place where we have always been” allocates for the history of architecture a privileged position. It can provide an alternative architectural history for the state that does not necessarily intermingle with the messy nation. In like fashion, Efrat explains, “As long as the Mapai [the leading Labor party] utopia survived, solidarity, whether real or imagined, was a supreme value, perhaps even more important than nationalism. It was a sort of survival instinct that forced a clear discipline on architecture as well.”

Indeed, in the current political atmosphere, the imagined collectivity of early statehood would most likely survive better had it dispensed not only with the Orient but with the entire national project, reverting instead to a glorious socialist past of pervasive solidarity.

This past, some would argue, was no less national or colonial. Socialist Mapai established the settler project, Jerusalem included, and the first Hebrew city of Tel Aviv shares a municipal territory with Jaffa, a place that had turned from a major Palestinian...

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15 Etienne Balibar, “The Nation Form,” p. 95
16 See in Zandberg, “The Lost Dignity.”
city into an artists’ colony.\textsuperscript{17} Had the 1968 Masterplan been implemented, Jerusalem might have turned, like Tel Aviv, into a modernist city, with its Old City left as a reservoir of religiosity for international tourists and pilgrims. However, as the Jerusalem Committee illustrated, the international community refused to relinquish its shares in the spiritualizing of Jerusalem. Jerusalem became a test case for the European search for its salvation from its \textit{own} modernity. Concurrently, an alternative powerful program for Israeli national architecture emerged in agreement with the tenets of \textit{mamlachtiyut}. This “architecture of the place,” however, is hardly able to survive the tension between the conflicting pressures brought on by nation-building, a settler society, and international politics.

\textsuperscript{17} For the emergence of Tel Aviv-Jaffa see: Mark LeVine, "Overthrowing Geography, Re-Imagining Identities: A History of Jafa and Tel Aviv, 1880 to the Present (Israel, Palestine)" (Ph.D., New York University, 1999).
Which side is the temporary state?

Figure
daily caricature, 6/17/02.
Illusions of a Separate Peace

Figure

POSTSCRIPT

As I write these lines, a fence is being erected to separate Israel and Palestine. Its corporeal absurdity caught the attention of illustrators on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. In an Israeli caricature, two lively construction workers in blue overalls are lining up huge concrete slabs into a tall winding wall. On the left side of the wall, a mobile crane and extra slabs of concrete are depicted; on the other side, set at a distance, is a silhouette of what is clearly an Arab village: amassed houses, arches and a single minaret. In the midst of the commotion, the worker on top of the wall pauses for a second and asks: "Which side is the temporary state?"\(^{18}\)

This little image captures pertinent symbols: the labor heritage, its activism, and the very Israeli mix of existential insecurity and potent power that constantly and hopelessly creates new "facts on the ground." The new "fact" is the fabricated separation: concrete and activism on the Israeli side, an authentic vernacular on the Palestinian side. Israel, in this and similar images, has happily conceded "locality" and "history" to the Palestinians—it has given up its entire architectural program of "united Jerusalem," eager to find instead a new modernist past of its own. Indeed, the new fence not only separates Israel from Palestine, but also metaphorically pushes apart the dichotomized halves of the mamlachiyyut poster with which this study opened. Four decades of attempts to marry the brown figure with the shofar and Jerusalem's walls to the white modernist settlement and its green lawns have reached an impasse. From the point of view of current historiographical practices in Israel, which have already produced a large body of work on "white" architecture and which is now producing emerging works on "gray"
brutalism, the white Zionist settlement of the poster above seems to have unilaterally divorced the Jewish brown figure. It is no longer interested in a history that is more than a century old.

This entire debate is totally foreign to the American illustrator.\(^{19}\) In the American image, two groups of people are standing in a desolate open landscape, one group consists of lighted anonymous figures; the other of similar, yet shaded, ones. A gigantic razor blade separates these perfectly interchangeable groups. Unlike the Israeli illustrator, who sees his figures from the ground, the American watches them from high above, from the standpoint of world powers that have made this grim territory their preferred playground. The Israeli caricature depicts agency: its figures have profession, character, age, body language and national identity. In the American illustration, the figures are granted none of these characteristics: the figures are faceless, ageless, gloomily staged, and cleansed of identities. These morbid figures are puppets in a play, the direction of which is far beyond their reach. The razor that has grown between them is the embodiment of but one of these arbitrary rules.

As the American illustrator divested Israelis and Palestinians of any free will or control over their conflict, he simultaneously made explicit that identifying features would be necessary in order to confer on his bleak figures the dignity of human beings. Strikingly absent from this illustration is what Zizek calls the (national) Thing. In the Israeli context, it is the ideas, beliefs, symbols, joys and anxieties that drove people and

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\(^{18}\) Daniela, “The Daily Caricature,” Haaretz, July 17, 2002
institutions to create for themselves a set of architectural practices that could constitute 'the real thing'—a built environment which they could identify as their own, as their home. This contextual, Mediterranean, localist architecture, in the tenets of which most practicing architects in Israel still believe, acquired its meaning and power from the fact that “it meant something” that communicated Israeliness. This study is therefore dedicated not only to the question of what the architecture meant and how it looks. More importantly, it is dedicated to the query of how this “meaning,” i.e. the ideology underlying “the architecture of the place,” was constructed so effectively as to become entrenched as absolute truth. It is also dedicated, strangely enough, to the historical paradoxes that ridiculed that truth and the very “something” that it means. That "something," so it seems, is metaphorically situated underneath the arbitrary edge of the gigantic razor blade in the illustration above.

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APPENDIX

Members of the Jerusalem Committee
The Jerusalem Committee: Townplanning Subcommittee, list of participation from abroad.
The Jerusalem Committee: Townplanning Subcommittee, Final Statement, 1970.
List of interviews.
*Hatach* (Section), student publication, 1967: Essays by Ram Karmi and Micahel Kuhn.
MEMBERS OF THE JERUSALEM COMMITTEE

*Mr. Manuel Aguilar
Juan Bravo 38
Madrid, Spain

Mr. Jorge Amado
Rua Alagoinhaus 33
Salvador, Bahia, Brazil

Prof. Jaap Bakema
Posthoornstraat 12
Rotterdam, Holland

*Mr. Geoffrey Bawa
2 Alfred House Road
Colombo, Ceylon

*Sir Isaiah Berlin
Headington House
Old High Street
Headington
Oxford, England

*Dr. Belisario Betancur
Apartado Aereo 3274
Bogota, Colombia

*Mr. Etienne Boegner for Pasteur Marc Boegner
245 Park Ave.
New York, N.Y. U.S.A.

Mr. Heinrich Boell
Hulchstrasse 7
5 Koeln, D.B.R.

Mr. Jorge Luis Borges
Mexico 564
Buenos Aires, Argentina

*Reverend W.G.M. Brandful
Christian Council of Ghana
P.O.Box 919
Accra, Ghana

*Mrs. David Bruce
1405-34th St., N.W.
Washington D.C. U.S.A.

Prof. R. Buckminster-Fuller
P.O.Box 909
Carbondale, Ill, U.S.A.

Prof. Carl J. Burckhardt
"La Bâtie"
1181 Vinzel
Switzerland

Maestro Pablo Casals
Isla Verde K 2-H3
Santurce, Puerto Rico

Lord Chandos
20 Pelham Crescent
London SW7, England

*Justice Haim Cohn
Tchernichovsky 26
Jerusalem, Israel

*Prof. Jaques Courvoisier
Rue du Mont de Sion 4
1206 Geneva, Switzerland

*Prof. Mario Cravo
Rua Garibaldi 556
Salvador, Bahia, Brasil

Prof. Oscar Cullman
17 Helbelstrasse
Basle, Switzerland

*His Eminence Diangenda
L'Eglise Kimbanguiste
B.P. 7069
Kinshasa, Congo

*Prof. E. Rodrigues Fabregat
Agraciada 1476
Montevideo, Uruguay

*Prof. Leon Feldman
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, N.J. U.S.A.

Lady Gaitskell
18, Frognal Gardens
London N.W. 3
England

*The Hon. Carlos Garcia
41 Bohi Avenue
Quezon City,
Philippines

*Prof. Nelson Glueck
Hebrew Union College
Jewish Institute of Religion
Clifton Avenue
Cincinnati, Ohio U.S.A.

Lord Goodman
30 Bouverie Street
Fleet Street
London EC4, England

*Sir Philip Hendy
3 Canonbury Place
London N1, England

Mr. Lawrence Halprin
1620 Montgomery St.
San Francisco, Calif. U.S.A.

Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh
University of Notre-Dame
Notre-Dame, Indiana U.S.A.

Mr. Thomas P. Hoving
150 East 73rd Street
New York, N.Y. U.S.A.

Prof. Arne Jacobsen
65 Svanemjellenvej
Copenhagen, Denmark

Mr. Philip Johnson
Ponus Street
New Canaan, Conn. U.S.A.

*Prof. Louis Kahn
1501 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, Pa. U.S.A.

Mr. Oskar Kokoschka
Villeneuve
Vaud, Switzerland

Prof. Paul Lecatle
60 Rue Francais 1er
Paris 8e
France

*Prof. S. Lieberman
Ben Maimon 28
Jerusalem, Israel
Mr. Jaques Lipchitz
168 Warburton Ave.
Hastings-on-Hudson
New York, N.Y. U.S.A.

Sir Robert Menzies
95 Collins St.
Melbourne,
Victoria, Australia

*Prof. B. Mazar
Abarbanel 9
Jerusalem, Israel

Henry Moore Esq, O.M.
Hoglands, Perry Green
Much Hadham
Hertfordshire, England

Mr. Lewis Mumford
Amenia, N.Y. U.S.A.

Dr. Franklin D. Murphy
419 Robert Lane
Beverly Hills, Calif. U.S.A.

Prof. André Neher
6 Rue Ehrmann
Strasbourg
France

*Dr. Ursula Niebuhr
Yale Hill
Stockbridge, Mass. U.S.A.

*Mr. Isamu Noguchi
3338 Tenth St.
Long Island
New York, N.Y. U.S.A.

*Reverend Dr. R. Ortmaryer
National Council of Churches
475 Riverside Dr.
New York, N.Y. U.S.A.

Mr. William S. Paley
51 West 52nd St.
New York, N.Y. U.S.A.

Mr. John Pope-Hennessy
Victoria and Albert Museum
London SW7, England

*Prof. J. Prawer
Alkalai 6
Jerusalem, Israel

*Rabbi Emanuel Rackman
Yeshiva University
Amsterdam Avenue and 180th Street
New York, N.Y. U.S.A.

Arquitecto Ramírez Vazquez
Avenida de las Fuentes 170
Mexico 20, DF Mexico

The Hon. Ogden R. Reid
Ophir Cottage
Purchase, N.Y. U.S.A.

*Mr. Ernesto Sabato
Santos Lugares
Provincia de Buenos Aires
Argentina

*Dr. Willem H. Sandburg
Keizersgracht 640
Amsterdam, Holland

Rev. Canon. H. Sawyer
University of Sierra Leone
Mount Aureol
Freetown, Sierra Leone

Prof. Meyer Schapiro
279 W. 4th St.
New York, N.Y. U.S.A.

*Prof. Torgny Segerstedt
Rector Magnificus
University of Uppsala
Sweden

Mr. Arieh Sharon
Hayarkon 7
Tel Aviv, Israel

Mr. Ignazio Silone
Via di Villa Ricotti 36
Rome, Italy

*Mr. S.N. Tagore
4 Elgin Road
Calcutta 20, India

Ambassador Marietta Tree
123 E. 79th Street
New York, N.Y. U.S.A.

Prof. Ephraim Urbach
Hatibonim 22
Jerusalem, Israel

H.E. Vittorino Veronese
Banco di Roma
307 Via del Corso
Rome, Italy

*Mr. Edward Warburg
277 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. U.S.A.

*Sir George Weidenfeld
5 Wines St.
Oxford Circus
London W1, England

Prof. Z. Werblowsky
Ha'arazim 4
Jerusalem, Israel

*Mr. Elie Wiesel
239 Central Park West
New York, N.Y. U.S.A.

*Prof. Gaston Wiet
23 Avenue de Bretetville
 Neuilly 92, France

*Prof. Yigael Yadin
Ramban 47
Jerusalem, Israel

*Prof. Bruno Zevi
Via Nomentana 150
Rome, Italy

* attended first meeting
THE JERUSALEM COMMITTEE
Townplanning Subcommittee
December 19-21, 1970

Participants from Abroad

Professor Christopher Alexander
Center for Environmental Structure
2531 Etta Street
Berkeley, Calif. 94704
U.S.A.

Prof. Max Bill
Albulanstr. 39
Zurich 8046
Switzerland

Prof. Werner Duttmann
1 Berlin 19
Westendallee 97F
Germany

Prof. R. Buckminster Fuller
Box 909
Carbondale, Illinois 62901
U.S.A.

Prof. Luigi Gedda
Direttore, Instituto di Genetica Medica
Università di Roma
Piazza Galeno 5
Roma, Italy

Prof. Charles M. Haar
1 Kennedy Road
Cambridge, Mass.
U.S.A.

Mr. Lawrence Halprin
1620 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, Calif.
U.S.A.

Sir Philip Hendy
u/o Israel Museum
Jerusalem, Israel

Prof. Britton Harris
Graduate School of Fine Arts
City and Regional Planning
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pa. 19104
U.S.A.

Mr. Philip Johnson
375 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
U.S.A.

Prof. Louis Kahn
1501 Walnut Street
U.S.A.

Mr. Karl Katz
The Jewish Museum
1109 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.
U.S.A.

Mr. Denys Lasdun
50 Queen Anne Street
London W1M ODR
England

Prof. Roslyn Lindheim
Department of Architecture
University of California
Berkeley, California
U.S.A.

Mr. Harry Mayerovitch
345 Victoria Ave.
Westmount
Montreal, Quebec
Canada

Mr. Richard Meier
Richard Meier & Associates
136 East 57th Street
New York, N.Y. 10022
U.S.A.

Mr. Samuel R. Moses
8610 Thirty Fourth Avenue
Jackson Heights, N.Y.
U.S.A.

Mr. Isamu Noguchi
33-38 10th Street
Long Island City, N.Y.
U.S.A.
Dr. Paul Peters  
Streitfeldstr. 35  
8000 München 8  
Germany

Sir Nikolaus Pevsner  
Birkbeck College  
University of London  
12 Bloomsbury Square  
London W.C. 1  
England

Prof. Bruno Zevi  
Via Nomentana 150  
Rome, Italy

Mr. Robert Zion  
130 Madison Avenue  
New York, N.Y.  
U.S.A.

Prof. Luigi Piccinato  
Piazza Stefano Jacini 23  
00191 Roma, Italy

Mrs. Monica Pidgeon  
Editor, Architectural Design  
26 Bloomsbury Way  
London WC 1 A 255  
England

Mr. Ulric Plesner  
2c Lindfield Gardens  
London NW3  
England

Mrs. Diana Rowntree  
Oak Tree Cottage  
Hexham  
Northumberland  
England

Mr. Moshe Safdie  
1315 Boulevard de Maisonneuve  
West Montreal 25  
Quebec, Canada

Dr. Willem Sandberg  
Keizersgracht 640  
Amsterdam, Holland

Prof. Goran Sidenbladh  
Stadbyggmästarkontoret  
Päck, S - 104 20 Stockholm  
Sweden
We were invited by the Mayor of Jerusalem as a townplanning subcommittee of the Jerusalem Committee, to review a number of plans for the future development of Jerusalem: "The Master Plan 1968, Interim Report"; "A Plan for the Central Business District"; "The Old City of Jerusalem and its Environs, Outline Townplanning Scheme, 1970"; "The Jerusalem Transportation Plan for 1985 (1970)".

We should like to begin by expressing our appreciation of what is much more than a generous invitation but, we hope, a valuable example of international cooperation beneficial to the development of a city with which a large part of the world is concerned. We hope very much that this cooperation will be continued.

We should also like to put on record our admiration for the scrupulous care which is being taken of the many works of art and historical monuments of all nationalities and religions, and of the effort made to incorporate these effectively in the plans.

The very glories of Jerusalem are so many that they make the problems of development unusually complicated. One has only to realise that:

- Jerusalem is a very great spiritual center, important to several great religions.
- Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.
- The inhabitants of Jerusalem form a unique mosaic of diverse peoples and the results are the exceptional appearance of the city, with its synagogues, mosques and churches and its many historic monuments.
- Jerusalem is a creative intellectual center, with its many institutions of religious and secular learning and of culture.
- Jerusalem landscape is again exceptional, not only in its beauty but for its essential significance in the history of three religions.

These strong characteristics of the city magnify and complicate all the normal problems which beset the development of any city today.

The interim plans presented the essential resources for our deliberations. We feel, however, that there are contradictions among the different plans which have yet to be resolved and that in each plan a number of concepts need further consideration. Other essential concepts have not perhaps been grasped.

We believe that some of the weaknesses in the plans which have been noted may be due to administrative difficulties at the center.
In the spirit of mutual confidence which underlay our frank exchanges and with the desire that the best possible plan for Jerusalem should finally be formulated, we make the following suggestions and recommendations:

The Master Plan should be restructured.

The planning process ought to be reassessed.

The collection of data provided in the submitted reports is valuable. We were impressed by the thoughtful and stimulating quality of the propositions put forth, by the wide range of concern. The earnestness which underlies the pursuit is clear to any dispassionate observer. The subcommittee feels, however, without exception, that there has not been sufficient consideration of alternatives, clarification of the basic ideas, nor the exposition of a unified theme. To guide the planners there is need of a set of broad principles of an overall coordination of policies, while the alternatives should be clearly set out.

The physical planners of the city have need above all of a comprehensive vision of it. We agree with those who formulated these plans that the special qualities of Jerusalem call for the most creative efforts from the planning profession; all that has been learned of methodology and the deepest insight into the related sciences have to be brought to bear. What the plan calls for are principles of physical order, a set of planning guidelines so firm that they will directly generate the plan of a great city as it evolves, and so well grounded in functional, social, economic, emotional and symbolic issues that agreement on them may gradually be reached.

In our judgement the first step to be taken in this exceptionally difficult task is to set up a mixed task force composed, on the one hand, of people well versed in the plans and, on the other, of those who can bring dispassionate perspective to bear.

This task force should report directly to the relevant government ministries and to the Mayor and should be given adequate guidelines by which it can review the plans and make recommendations and should be requested to complete this process within six months.

It should feel free to consult with this subcommittee who make themselves available and with any other groups of citizens and professionals which the task force deems necessary.

In specifying the course of action to be pursued in this six-month interval, we recognize the difficulty of formulating in advance and that a great deal of discretion must be left to the task force. We should like to suggest that the members of the present subcommittee submit to the Jerusalem Committee as soon as possible their proposed guidelines or broad areas in which such guidelines can be helpfully formulated.
We assume that since this city is complex and unique, every effort will be made at the national level to overcome the complications and facilitate the implementation of the final recommendations.

In view of the complexities of executing an ideal plan to meet the ambitious goals that the planning of Jerusalem deserves it is recognized that financial grants and aids of considerable magnitude must be forthcoming. It is our hope that the often expressed world concern with Jerusalem will be backed by concrete financial manifestations and generousities.

We believe that a continuous relationship between the subcommittee and the planners of Jerusalem is a useful and, if sometimes frustrating, a rich interchange. It stands ready to constitute itself in any form which is deemed desirable, as a committee of the whole or recognizing that specific tasks can best be handled by smaller numbers, as groups or individuals.

We are much heartened by the willingness of all parties concerned to reveal frankly their innermost concepts about the potentials of the great city, by the reservoirs of goodwill encountered and by a political leadership which is ready to encourage and accept the most advanced townplanning in order to meet the merging problems of the present and the future.

December 21, 1970
**LIST OF INTERVIEWS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date &amp; Place</th>
<th>Profession, Affiliations, and Selected Projects in Jerusalem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amnon Alexandroni</td>
<td>July 31, 01  Tel Aviv</td>
<td>Architect, Tel Aviv. Member of the Tel Aviv Circle, former partner of Avraham Yaski.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meron Benvenisti</td>
<td>June 6, 00   Jerusalem</td>
<td>Historian and Politician. Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem for East Jerusalem (1967-1971) and for Planning (1971-1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elinor Barzaki</td>
<td>August 20, 98 Tel Aviv</td>
<td>Architect. Brought to the Ministry of Housing by Ram Karmi. Former head of the Jerusalem region in the Ministry. Former Jerusalem City Engineer. At the time of the interview the Head of Azrieli School of Architecture at Tel Aviv University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Best</td>
<td>May 25, 01   Givatayim</td>
<td>Architect, Givatayim. Immigrated from Britain. The site architect of East Talpiyot. Head of the Central Business District Plan team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micha Burt</td>
<td>August 17, 01 Haifa Phone Interview</td>
<td>Architect. Professor of Architecture at the Technion. A finalist together with Micahel Meir-Brodnitz in the pre-'67 competition for East Jerusalem (winner: Michael Kuhn.) Was highly commended for military distinction in the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur (1973) War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeev Drukman</td>
<td>July 23, 01  Jerusalem</td>
<td>Architect. Former head of the Northern Region in the Ministry of Housing starting under Ram Karmi. During the interview the Head of Bezalel School of Architecture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Etan</td>
<td>July 29, 98  Tel Aviv May 15, 01 Jaffa June 6, 01 Haifa</td>
<td>Architect, Tel Aviv. Member of the Tel Aviv Circle. Organized and published a series of symposia on contemporary debate in Israeli architecture. Built the social sciences building in the Hebrew University on Mt. Scopus. A commander of members of the Rosh Hanikrah Hachsharah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoram Fogel</td>
<td>July 28, 98  Jerusalem</td>
<td>Architect, Jerusalem. Member of a generation that started practicing after '67. Practiced with David Reznik, and together with Yonathan Shiloni built housing complex in Ramot 02.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>City</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Gogenheim</td>
<td>July 29, 98</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aviah Hashimshoni</td>
<td>June 13, 99</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ram Karmi</td>
<td>July 7, 98</td>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Cassuto</td>
<td>March 1996</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel Kimhi</td>
<td>April 25, 98</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ofer Kolker</td>
<td>July 24, 98</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amir and Ofer Kolker</td>
<td>July 27, 98</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teddy Kollek</td>
<td>March 24, 00</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Occupation and Additional Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yoseph Kolodni</td>
<td>August 10, 98</td>
<td>Architect. Former member of the Sho&quot;p team in the Ministry of Housing and its major intellectual force. Won together with Dror Sofer the competition for the supreme court building on Mt. Scopus. (unbuilt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubert Law Yone</td>
<td>May 98, Haifa</td>
<td>Architect. Professor of urban planning at the Technion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Mansfeld</td>
<td>June 99, Haifa</td>
<td>Architect, Haifa. The architects of the Israel Museum and the winner of competitions for the Jerusalem Municipality building. Also professor at the Technion. After the debate with Hashimshoni became the Head of the Association of Architects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaaakov Rechter</td>
<td>March 2, 01</td>
<td>Architect, Tel Aviv. Associated with the Tel Aviv Circle. Reconstructed Erich Mendelsohn’s Hadassah Hospital on Mt. Scopus. Built hotels and a housing complex in East Talpiyot. A member of the Shimron Committee (on Safdie’s project for the Western Wall.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Reznik</td>
<td>June 20, 99</td>
<td>Architect, Jerusalem. Immigrated from Brazil. Member of early formations of the Tel Aviv circle. Head of Jerusalem’s leading architectural firm. The first architect of the Mount Scopus campus, who prepared with Shmuel Shaked the 1:500 plan of the Campus, and with Ram Karmi and Haim Ketzef the more detailed plan. Build the School of Education. Member of the Conception Committee for the Western Wall Plaza.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moti Sahar</td>
<td>July 01, Jerusalem,</td>
<td>Architect, Jerusalem. Former architect of the Jerusalem Regional Committee at the Ministry of Interior Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phone interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yoseph Schweid</td>
<td>June 12, 00</td>
<td>Architect, Jerusalem. Co-author of the 1968 Jerusalem Master Plan. Author of Jerusalem 1975 Outline Scheme (was not granted statutory validation.) At the time of the interview the head of Ariel College School of Architecture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dror Sofer</td>
<td>May 11, 98, Tel Aviv</td>
<td>Architect. Member of the Ministry of Housing Sho”p team. Won together with Yoseph Kolodny the competition for the Supreme Court Building on Mt. Scopus (unbuilt.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehud Tayar</td>
<td>January 6, 99</td>
<td>Planner. Former head of the Jerusalem Region in the Ministry of Housing. Former Jerusalem City Engineer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>City</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michael Turner</td>
<td>July 23, 01</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avraham Vachman</td>
<td>August 8, 98</td>
<td>Haifa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaakov Yaar</td>
<td>May 15, 98</td>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avraham Yaski</td>
<td>August 23, 98</td>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rina Zamir</td>
<td>July 23, 01</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All architects who are graduates of the Technion prior to 1987 are also planners. Most architects in this list were involved in large scale planning projects.