THE ROLE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE PROBLEM
OF ARMS CONTROL:
The Middle East, Latin America, and Africa

Catherine McArdle
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Center for International Studies
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THE ROLE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE PROBLEM OF ARMS CONTROL
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Throughout the paper the following abbreviations have been used:

FY     Fiscal Year
MDA    Mutual Defense Assistance
THE ROLE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE PROBLEM OF ARMS CONTROL

The Middle East, Latin America, and Africa

One of the most significant yet least studied phenomena of postwar international relations is the emergence of an extensive, ever-growing system of global military assistance. In an age characterized by revolutionary changes in all phases of war and diplomacy primary attention quite rightly has been focused on the more general and radical developments of the time—the uses and effects of nuclear weapons, the development and institutionalization of far-reaching military alliances, the problems and pitfalls of Cold War confrontation. When considered at all, the extension of military assistance by the major powers has been thought of as merely a special case, a secondary manifestation of these larger trends. Yet the nature and scope of postwar military aid programs, particularly those extended to the developing nations, have had significant consequences for the level of world armament and tension, for the balance of both political and military power within states, within regions, and between the major blocs.

The extension of military assistance, to be sure, is hardly a new development. One need only glance over the diplomatic history of the 19th and early 20th centuries to find instances in which powerful nations have provided arms, equipment, training, and economic subsidies to other nations or groups fighting or fearing a foreign invasion or domestic insurgency.

Since 1945, however, military aid has taken on new, more complex and far-reaching aspects. In quantitative terms there has been a tremendous expansion in the scope of such aid directly paralleling the rise in the number
of national entities. In every region of the world, but particularly in the Middle East, in Latin America, and in Africa, more nations are now receiving more foreign military assistance and subsidies than ever before in history.

Qualitatively the postwar changes have been of even greater import. Arms assistance to the developing nations no longer appears to be a highly volatile short- or even medium-term element of national policies. Although, as with economic aid, some changes and cutbacks have been occasioned by political developments, donor states now seem committed to relatively long-term programs of increased formalization and institutionalization. Similarly, the type and range of aid extended has shifted. Assistance programs, particularly those of the United States, now encompass not only the provision of basic materiel and services necessary for the establishment and annual maintenance of armed forces but also the direction and planning of future improvement and development in military capabilities. Third, a major change in emphasis seems to have taken place with respect to the goals of assistance efforts. Few of the developing states are sought as present or potential military allies capable of adding significantly to the armed strength of donor nations against an actual or expected enemy. The primary purpose now seems rather to develop military client states, to build up military-political strongholds through which to preserve or upset regional balances, or to maintain favored regimes against internal subversion or revolt.

In consequence any examination of arms control proposals with respect to the developing areas must take into full consideration the role of military assistance with respect not only to the absolute level of regional
armament but also to the interests and commitments of both the aided nations and the major powers. The attempt will be made here to sketch out a basis for such consideration, to describe the nature and scope of military assistance programs in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, and to suggest the significant problems these programs pose for any future regional arms control arrangements.

I
General Considerations

Before these regional descriptions can be fully understood and interpreted, however, consideration must first be given to some of the significant difficulties and restrictions involved in the study of military aid. The nature and magnitude of these problems are such that great care and circumspection must be exercised in drawing any firm conclusions.

The first and most obvious problem is that of restricted and/or incomplete information. Military assistance has always been the most sensitive area of foreign policy, one in which public announcement and debate have been fraught with grave consequences for both donor and recipient nations. In the postwar era this degree of sensitivity is equally, if not more critical. Even in the West, where the practice of public accountability brings somewhat more information to light, the pressure of competitive co-existence, of "security" consciousness, and of instantaneous global communication all tend to make military assistance one of the most accepted but least discussed national policies.
Secondly, the amount and the type of information available about the five major military aid programs differ widely. Due to annual Congressional review, U.S. military assistance efforts are relatively well publicized and examined. Until recently, however, the amount of yearly grants to individual nations was not made public: the magnitude and nature of aid to certain states is still classified. The British government publishes some specific figures but now summarizes many assistance allocations under two general headings, aid for Commonwealth members and that for other states. Country breakdowns for French and West German military assistance are almost non-existent. Perhaps the most public data is available with respect to Sino-Soviet military aid since at regular intervals the U.S. Department of State publicizes both the amount and type of assistance extended by the bloc. This information, however, is still classified for a period of time, and it cannot always be considered complete.

Even when the precise amount of an assistance grant is known, little can be said with surety about the specific type and characteristics of granted arms and equipment. Still less is (and seemingly can be) known about the relative value or "price" ascribed by the donor nation to various end items or technical services. To take only the best case, the general principles of U.S. pricing policy have been officially reported. In-service equipment is to be valued at its actual production cost (that is, without procurement or warehousing charges) while those end items drawn from "excess" or "obsolescent" stocks are to be priced at their "fair value" (a price "not less than rehabilitation costs and scrap value or
market value if ascertainable.")\(^1\) The valuation of individual equipment, however, is left to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense and is not made public.

A third difficulty of far greater complexity is the precise determination of what constitutes military assistance. There seems little question that the direct provision of military goods and services should be so classified; yet even such aid can have both a military and an economic cast. In recent years the United States has stressed the contribution made to economic development efforts by the use of military grants for "civic action" projects. In the tradition of the Army Corps of Engineers certain equipment and supported forces are programmed for developmental functions, road construction, communications engineering, and public health improvement.\(^2\)

A second component of military aid would seem to be equipment sales or loans, although these two factors are rarely considered in these terms. In addition to their grant aid programs all Western donor states make certain quantities of new and obsolescent equipment available for sale to the

\(^1\) U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, The Foreign Aid Program: Compilation of Studies and Surveys, Study No. 10: The Military Assistance Program (Washington, 1957), p. 1012. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, Hearings for FY 1963, p. 514. (In this paper, Hearings are identified by the Fiscal Year of the program to which they relate. Prior to 1961 the general title was the Mutual Security Act; since 1961 various titles have been used, but the most common is the Foreign Assistance Act or, in the case of the Appropriations Committees, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.)

wealthier or more dissatisfied developing nations. Although available data are minimal, prices reportedly range from those somewhat less than simple production costs to those approximately equal to scrap value plus refitting charges. The more infrequent loan arrangements usually involve little or no costs to the recipient state beyond normal maintenance fees, full ownership and refitting responsibilities remaining with the donor.

Still greater definitional problems arise with respect to certain types of military-tinged economic assistance, provided principally by the United States and the United Kingdom. The first type, generally referred to as "defense support," "budgetary assistance," or more recently as part of "supporting assistance," has been extended to nations that in the donor's opinion "do not have the economic means to support the sizeable armed forces essential to their own and the common defense." Such assistance may take the form of direct subsidies such as the British grant to Jordan, or of a grant-commodity combination (the latter to be resold locally) as in the case of U.S. supporting aid to Turkey. The specific uses of this aid are deter-

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3 With respect to U.S. sales programs, although there are occasional reports in the press, the details and destinations of all sales are classified to avoid "embarrassing" the countries concerned. See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Hearings for FY 1963, p. 618.

4 Ibid.

mined jointly by the donor and recipient and vary greatly from country to
country. Examples culled from U.S. experience are to build roads, improve
sanitation facilities, and to raise the general level of literacy or technical
training, as well as to defray the costs of non-supported troops.

The second and more complex type is that entitled "special assistance,"
in the past a particular characteristic of U.S. programs. According to
official statements aid of this kind is provided for three purposes: first,
to maintain economic and political stability in countries where the donor
nation has strategic political interests; second, to secure access to over-
seas bases; and third, "to provide an alternative to excessive dependence on
Sino-Soviet aid." In consequence the specific uses of such aid have often
been far more related to the economic development efforts of recipients than
to their military capabilities. Examples of aid employment range from the
financing of Congolese and Jordanian imports to the subsidizing of certain
Egyptian and Ethiopian educational programs.

Perhaps all that can be said about such aid forms is that they can and
are subsumed under the general rubric of military aid. It may be true, as
several observers contend, that, particularly in past U.S. programs, the
label "military" has been applied somewhat indiscriminately in an effort to
highlight the urgency of a particular request or to gain greater Congres-
sional and public approval. Also, items such as base support are clearly

6 U.S. International Development Agency (AID), Proposed Mutual Defense
and Assistance Programs for FY 1964, p. 64.

7 Furniss, op. cit., p. 4.
more related to the military programs of the aid-giver than to those of the state aided and perhaps would be better included under the domestic military budget.

However, it also seems clear that a large portion of this aid merely exemplifies the acknowledged principle that in the long run a country's capacity to defend itself against external attack or internal subversion is inherently related to the state and level of its economic and social overhead capital base. Budgetary support may permit a nation to pursue both military security and social development more intensively; road construction and public works may secure both improved military and civil transportation and communication. For analytic clarity and greater public accountability it undoubtedly would be preferable to draw more precise distinctions. Yet the possible military as well as economic implications of such assistance over a period of years cannot be denied, and they deserve consideration here as a significant aspect of military assistance.

Perhaps the most difficult problem of all is to evaluate the effect of military aid upon the recipient nation. Few analytic schemes of any type have been advanced for assessing the role and value of military assistance. Only two of these offer any possibility for rigorous quantitative examination: the models proposed by Charles Wolf, and the broad systems analysis approach currently employed by the Department of Defense.8 Both schemes, however, contain significant limitations stemming from their policy orientation. First, their principal focus is on the value of assistance from the

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8 Jordan, op. cit.
viewpoint of the donor nation; only minimal consideration is devoted to its implications for the aided state. Second, their effective use requires data of a nature and extent not available or appropriate to a general overview of military assistance patterns.

Qualitative analysis even at its best can provide few conclusive answers in this regard. The ramifications of assistance are so complex and the range of possible consequences so great that any attempt at relatively precise estimation becomes enmeshed in a tangle of conflicting conditional statements and highly qualified judgments. Moreover the restrictions of incomplete information concerning both internal and regional conditions make definitive evaluation extremely treacherous, if not impossible.

A few more specific considerations may indicate the difficulties in assessing even the military effects of foreign military assistance. The analyst's first task is to determine the extent to which a given quantity and type of aid will strengthen or improve a national military capability. Before such an analysis can be attempted, he must possess a relatively clear picture of the nature and state of the military establishment in question. Among other factors he must consider its level of armament and equipment, its patterns of training and organization, its condition of physical and morale preparedness.

The analyst then must consider whether aid is or will soon be appropriate to these conditions. Relevant questions might include these three: Can the granted equipment be employed and maintained by national forces given their physical abilities, their present skills, and their capacity
for training in the immediate future? Is this equipment practicable or suitable for the particular environmental conditions? To what extent are additional supporting facilities or equipment required?

Still further complexities exist with respect to determining the impact of assistance on a nation's capacity to counter external or internal aggression. This task is perhaps easiest when the nation is or has been engaged in action, when the effects of assistance are most readily apparent. Even such situations present analytic difficulties. A small amount of assistance at the proper moment may have disproportionately large effects, resulting either from its scale-tipping properties or from its symbolic representation of foreign political interest or commitment.

Assessment of effects in a time of tension or non-action is by far the most difficult. Most simply stated, deterrence after all exists largely in the eye of the beholder, in the "enemy's" estimate of the nation's capacity and will to counter his attack or to inflict unacceptable damage. Moreover assistance as a sign of foreign political commitment again may be a crucial factor. Further, the nature and extent of assistance indeed may exacerbate the tensions it has been designed to meet. It may occasion heightened military build-up by the other side—or allow for further repressive measures resulting in increased internal agitation and disturbance.

Since the nature of these difficulties precludes the possibility of any assessment of the impact of the various military assistance efforts, the attempt here will be limited to a general discussion of the amount and type of assistance provided by the major donor nations to the developing states of the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa.
II

The Regional Role of Military Assistance: The Middle East

Of the three regions under study the area in which postwar military assistance has played the most significant role has been the Middle East, the region bounded on the east by Pakistan and on the west by Egypt. Great power strategic assistance to this area is hardly a postwar phenomenon; British aid to dissident elements of the Ottoman Empire during World War I is just one of the more well-known earlier examples. Three new developments, however, have contributed to the increased importance and magnitude of present military aid. First has been the rise of Arab nationalism, stressing de facto as well as de jure independence, particularly in matters of foreign policy. A second factor has been the emergence or rebirth of intra-regional conflicts and arms races, Arab against Arab, and Arab against Israeli. Most significant has been the third, the desire of both major power blocs to find indirect, non-nuclear means to secure their strategic interests and influence in the area.

All five leading donor nations provide military assistance to one or more Middle Eastern states, the primary efforts being mounted by the United

9 It should be noted that the official definition of the Near East-South Asia area includes several nations not included in this discussion: Greece, Cyprus, India, Ceylon, and in the past, Sudan. According to the definitions used in this paper, the Middle East includes Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sa'udi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen, Bahrein, Muscat, Qatar, and Trucial Oman.
States, the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the United Kingdom. Each aid program will be examined in turn with respect to its historical development, its general policy goals, and its specific country allocations.

**U.S. Military Assistance**

**General considerations**

Since 1945 the largest and most comprehensive program of military assistance to the Middle East has been that provided by the United States. Although not approaching the massive grants extended in Europe and the Far East, U.S. efforts in this area have far surpassed those of any other nation both in terms of the number of states aided and in the magnitude and duration of assistance efforts. It is also to be noted that they have greatly surpassed U.S. programs in both Latin America and Africa.

U.S. aid involvement in this area dates from the immediate postwar period and the first U.S. steps toward assuming Britain's traditional role in the Middle East. Equipment and training aid was provided first in limited quantities to Iran during Soviet occupation of its northern territories, and then in substantial amounts to Turkey in accordance with the Truman Doctrine of 1947. The nature of the early Turkish program in fact foreshadowed many later U.S. programs. Assistance was granted to deter, rather than to meet, external aggression or internal subversion and was concerned not only with modernizing the Turkish army but also with strengthening Turkey's economic base through budgetary assistance and public works construction. In 1951 the number of aided countries was increased to three, with the conclusion of a military assistance agreement with Sa'udi Arabia.
Table I

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT/TRAINING ASSISTANCE
FY 1947-1963

(In Millions of Dollars of Appropriations)

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>15,718</td>
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<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>8,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East and South Asia</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>4,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>*</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>138</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>683</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data not available

** Discrepancies due to rounding, and de-obligation arrangements

### Table II

**REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. DEFENSE SUPPORT/SPECIAL/SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE: FY 1949-1962**

(In Millions of Dollars of Expenditures)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>11,462.4</td>
<td>3,087.3</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>14,903.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>444.3</td>
<td>2,993.8</td>
<td>687.3</td>
<td>565.1</td>
<td>550.1</td>
<td>530.0</td>
<td>293.4</td>
<td>6,063.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Near East and South Asia</td>
<td>830.7</td>
<td>1,528.7</td>
<td>255.5</td>
<td>379.8</td>
<td>341.7</td>
<td>315.8</td>
<td>285.5</td>
<td>3,977.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>322.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>123.7</td>
<td>104.2</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>419.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The greatest expansion of the U.S. Middle Eastern effort came in the period 1954-1958. First, the conclusion of the Southeast Asia (SEATO) and Middle Eastern (Baghdad) defense treaties and bilateral U.S. agreements with the regional Baghdad Pact states brought Iraq and Pakistan within the scope of U.S. aid. As major allies each began receiving substantial quantities of arms and training and military-economic support. In 1956 Afghanistan became an aid recipient, limited amounts of special and training assistance being extended in an effort to provide a counterweight to Soviet military credits.

More significant expansion occurred after the events of Suez. The rising tide of regional tension occasioned increased aid appropriations and shipments for the Baghdad Pact nations and increased assurances of assistance and support for "all" Middle Eastern states under the Eisenhower Doctrine of early 1957. Only a month later Jordan began receiving at first emergency and then continuing support for its armed forces and its economy in the face of border threats and internal disturbances. The events of 1958 resulted in further aid increases for Turkey, Iran, and Jordan. Although the Iraqi program was terminated, another country, Lebanon, was added to the area program.

Since 1958 the basic pattern of U.S. military assistance in the Middle East has changed very little. From 1959 to 1962, some attempt was made to counter Sino-Soviet efforts by extending limited quantities of special assistance to their major client states—Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Revolutions in the latter three states in 1962-1963 led to further small-scale programs of aid and training help.
Country programs

On first examination the specific country allocation of U.S. military assistance seem to reflect a welter of different purposes and programs. One approach to clarity lies in consideration of their relationship to the major policy goals which the United States has pursued in the Middle East since the end of World War II. As in other regions, the paramount U.S. aim has been to secure the area against Soviet or Communist penetration, whether sought by external attack or by internal subversion. A closely related objective has been to promote the internal development and continuance of regimes friendly to the West or, at the very least, to foster the growth of internal political stability and a non-hostile atmosphere. The United States also has tried to encourage the striking of a viable regional balance, to discourage the spread or intensification of regional conflicts, both those among Arab states and those between the Arabs and the Israeli.

Although, as in all areas, there have been some wide divergences between principle and practice, the twelve country programs of U.S. military assistance seemingly can be described and compared in terms of the particular emphasis given one or more of these general policy goals. Four distinct and quite different program types seem evident. The first is exemplified by assistance efforts with respect to the allied periphery states, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran. The primary U.S. purpose here has been to develop and strengthen military capabilities against the "double threat," against direct Sino-Soviet attack and against subversion or infiltration across the
common border. The amount of supporting assistance as well as direct equipment/training grants received by these three nations has been massive, far exceeding that to any other country or group of countries in the area.

Of all, the Turkish assistance program has been by far the largest in terms not only of the thirteen-year total but also of annual aid appropriations. This is hardly surprising in view of Turkey's membership in NATO and its continuing need for substantial allied support to participate effectively in the defense of NATO's right flank. Moreover, in the opinion of many, Turkey is the keystone to Middle Eastern defense. It appears to be the only nation in the arc with at least the potential military and economic capacity necessary effectively to deter or resist direct Soviet attack for any significant period of time.

Equipment and training assistance to Turkey has been directed primarily toward modernizing and strengthening the Turkish armed forces. There have been two distinct phases in the program, the first stressing the development of army mobility and effectiveness. During the years from 1947 to 1957 Turkey received substantial shipments of field weapons, artillery, tanks, trucks, and other motor vehicles as well as significant grants for necessary military training and base development.\footnote{11} Construction also was begun on Turkish


Table III

U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT/TRAINING
ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST
FY 1950-1963

(In Millions of Dollars of Appropriations)

<table>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>434.0</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.085</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>classified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'udi Arabia</td>
<td>classified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,682.7</td>
<td>180.3</td>
<td>179.3</td>
<td>167.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>.010</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Area un-</strong></td>
<td><strong>classified</strong></td>
<td><strong>926.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>138.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>136.4</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>distributed</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>53.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>49.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - less than $50,000.00

Table IV

U.S. SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST

FY 1952-1962

(In Millions of Dollars of Expenditures)

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<td>5.2</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>6.5*</td>
<td>3.0*</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>95.</td>
<td>90.</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>70.</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>82.</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAR Egypt</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.700</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - incomplete data

facilities for the production of small arms and ammunition. Although more limited, some quantities of naval and air force equipment were delivered. Under various agreements Turkey received several World War II vintage destroyers and submarines and an undetermined number of conventional and jet aircraft.\textsuperscript{12}

The second phase of the Turkish program dates from 1957 and includes several significant NATO-directed additions to the continued efforts for army build-up. An unreported quantity of tactical nuclear weapons have been shipped to Turkey, chiefly including the Honest John and other small surface-to-surface missiles. Major aid for Turkish air defenses has been extended in the form of newer attack aircraft, earlier F-86's being replaced by F-104 G's, and of the surface-to-air Nike and Hawk missile systems.\textsuperscript{13} Until recent removal began, Turkey was also one of the two continental sites of a number of Jupiter MRBM's.

Statements made during the Congressional presentation of the FY 1965 aid program, however, indicate that renewed emphasis will be placed on ground force development during the next two years.\textsuperscript{14} Both Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Lemnitzer expressed serious concern over the deterioration of Turkish military capability, largely the result of equip-

\textsuperscript{12} Jane's Fighting Ships, op. cit., p. 219.


\textsuperscript{14} U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearings for FY 1965, p. 88.
ment deficiencies and continuing maintenance problems. Over 60 per cent of the total FY 1965 Turkish program is to be devoted to maintenance costs; the remaining funds will be spent for ground equipment, trucks, tanks, and armored carriers.\textsuperscript{15}

The specific nature and goals of U.S. supporting assistance for Turkey have varied widely. A major road construction project was completed in 1958: U.S. grants played a major role in the building of some 17,000 miles of highway.\textsuperscript{16} A substantial proportion of all grants has been devoted to financing needed commodity and capital goods import. Further specific uses have included the support of agricultural experimentation, hydroelectric projects, public health education, and resource development, especially coal mining.

The Iranian and Pakistani programs have been somewhat different in both purpose and scope. In Iran the prime focus of U.S. aid has been the modernization and strengthening of the army. This has been done, however, more for purposes of internal security than for even relatively self-sufficient defense against external attack and has been carried out in coordination with programs focusing on the Iranian Gendarmerie.\textsuperscript{17} A substantial

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 500.


\textsuperscript{17} U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, The Foreign Aid Program: Compilation of Studies and Surveys, Survey No. 1 (Norman Armour), Greece, Turkey and Iran (Washington 1957), pp. 1204-05.
proportion of total arms shipments has been in the form of ground weapons (including some anti-tank missiles), communications equipment, trucks, and other motor vehicles. In recent years Iran has also received a number of newer aircraft, particularly jets, and some air-to-air missiles.\textsuperscript{18}

Assistance during FY 1965 will be used primarily for continued improvement of air defense capabilities and extensive reorganization of existing ground forces.\textsuperscript{19}

The uses of U.S. supporting assistance in the past were as varied in Iran as in Turkey. The largest portion of aid funds was directed toward financing commodity imports and other forms of direct and indirect budgetary assistance. Under the new policy instituted by President Kennedy, however, this type of aid has been phased out during the past two years.

U.S. aid policy with respect to Pakistan has been formulated in somewhat broader terms in an effort to create at least a potentially effective multi-service capability against external attack on the eastern edge of the Northern Tier.\textsuperscript{20} Pakistan has been tendered large shipments of light tanks, trucks, and communications equipment as well as numerous small arms and conventional ground pieces. Through Britain the United States has also supplied a number of naval vessels, including six refitted destroyers.\textsuperscript{21}


\textsuperscript{19} U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, \textit{Hearings} for FY 1965, p. 90.

\textsuperscript{20} Wolf, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 178.

\textsuperscript{21} Jane's Fighting Ships, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 103.
Major program emphasis, however, seems to have been focused on air force development. Although the specific details of all aid to Pakistan are classified, Pakistan seems to have received at least three major shipments of relatively new jet aircraft, including light bombers and some "high performance" craft. Under the 1961-1962 program delivery was made of an unreported number of air-to-air missiles.

The Sino-Indian border conflict has had some significant consequences for both the nature and magnitude of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan. In an effort to calm Pakistani fears about U.S. military aid to India and to preserve Pakistan's "free world orientation" despite growing rapprochement with Communist China, the United States not only made repeated assertions of continued support through such emissaries as General Taylor and George Ball, but also has programmed increased assistance for FY 1965. The primary focus of the new program will be the improvement of ground forces, both in terms of training and equipment.

From FY 1955 through FY 1961 Pakistan also received a significant amount of defense support aid. Although specific uses varied widely, the primary objective of this aid was to provide budgetary support through the financing of needed imports, particularly commodity goods. Phasing-down and termination of this type of aid was effected during FY 1962 and FY 1963.

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23 Ibid. for FY 1965, pp. 90, 500.
Aid to Jordan, Lebanon, and Sa'udi Arabia represents a second type of U.S. military assistance to the Middle East. The principal goal of these programs is to aid pro-Western or generally friendly regimes in the maintenance of internal stability, particularly with respect to the dangers of subversion and infiltration. Assistance efforts therefore have been quite limited in comparison with those in Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan and have been directed more toward the training of existing forces and the provision of smaller ground equipment.

The largest of the three programs has been that to Jordan, where during the last five years the United States has begun to assume some of the traditionally British responsibilities for military equipment, training, and force support. Special crisis assistance was granted first in 1957 and then on a larger scale in 1958, when King Hussein's rule was threatened by Syria and Egypt. Quantities of small ground equipment were delivered, together with some more sophisticated weapons, including twelve Hawker-Hunter aircraft purchased from Great Britain. Extensive grants also were allocated for budgetary support and the financing of various imports.

Continuing assistance since 1958 has reflected much the same pattern. Direct equipment and training aid has been relatively limited in quantity and has been directed mainly toward army maintenance and gradual modernization. Far larger amounts have been appropriated for supporting assistance and have been used chiefly to finance approximately one-half of Jordan's total foreign imports.24 During the next two years, however, supporting assistance will be

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terminated and cooperative development programs will be substituted.25

The military assistance program for Lebanon has been quite similar in nature although more limited in scale. The crisis of 1958 resulted not only in the landing of 14,000 U.S. troops but also in the extension of financial and special equipment aid. Rushed arms shipments were comprised mainly of small weapons for the then 8,000 man Lebanese armed forces but also included a few aircraft and small naval craft.26 Since 1960, however, Lebanon has received no further supporting assistance and only token amounts of training and equipment assistance.

Very little has been revealed publicly about the specific scope or nature of the program in Sa'udi Arabia since all of the relevant data have been classified since its inception in 1951. Begun at the time of the Dhahran airbase agreement, this assistance is perhaps better described as indirect base support. Official explanation, however, has always been that it is for internal security training purposes, and the program has been continued even after the termination of the base agreement in 1962.27

25 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings for FY 1965, p. 44.


Representative of a third type of aid program is the assistance extended to Afghanistan and Yemen. Here the explicit purpose of aid is to provide "an alternative to excessive dependence on Communist aid." The largest proportion of grants has been in the form of supporting assistance for various requested direct military aid in the past, only limited amounts have been allocated for direct equipment or training services.

Begun in 1956, the Afghanistan program has been the larger and more comprehensive of the two. During the first years, only supporting assistance was granted. Three projects absorbed most of these funds: the establishment of Ariana, the Afghan national airline; the construction of Kandhar civil airport; and the development of a large road system linking Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran.

Direct military aid began in FY 1958 and generally has emphasized training rather than equipment provision. A large percentage of total allocations has been employed to bring Afghan officers to the United States for special military education programs. The primary purpose of this aid, however, is underscored by the fact that, while almost all of Afghanistan's military aircraft and equipment are of Soviet origin, its officers have received intensive flight and air-technical training in U.S. jets and special English language and "military political" instruction.


Aid to Yemen, dating from FY 1959, has reflected the same pattern of supporting assistance although in considerable smaller degree. Only in FY 1963 was an extremely limited training program initiated. All new equipment aid, however, will end in FY 1965.

Although far less clearly, recent U.S. aid to Iraq might also be considered under this general heading. Prior to 1958, Iraq, as a Baghdad Pact member, received significant amounts of direct equipment assistance, largely directed toward the strengthening of its 50,000 man army to meet threats of border forays and internal subversion. After the July revolution the new regime immediately severed all U.S. assistance ties. Small programs of direct and supporting aid, however, were resumed in the early 1960's and have been increased slightly since the February 1963 revolution.

A fourth, mixed type of aid policy has been pursued by the United States with respect to Egypt and Syria. Assistance to these states has been minimal: since 1950 only extremely limited amounts of supporting grants have been extended and almost no direct equipment aid. The scope and character of this assistance has evidenced the conflict between two major U.S. policy goals. On the one hand, the United States has attempted to keep open at least a token support channel in opposition to massive Soviet arms credit. On the other, however, a continuing policy principle

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31 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, The Foreign Aid Program: Compilation of Studies and Surveys: Survey No. 1: (Norman Armour), Greece, Turkey and Iran, p. 1209.
has been to discourage any further intensification of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the time of the Tripartite Declaration in 1950 the United States has at least publicly declared its opposition "to the development of an arms race between the Arab States and Israel" and has generally sought to avoid all but "balancing" involvement.

Assistance to Israel has also reflected the U.S. aim of at least partial regional stabilization. Except during the first year of independence Israel has received virtually no military aid grants in the form of special or equipment support. At various times, however, in an attempt to offset the increased level of Egyptian-Syrian armament, the United States has concluded direct sales agreements with Israel for certain specific weapons. The Kennedy Administration permitted Israel to purchase--at reduced costs--approximately $25 million in surface-to-air Hawk missiles designed for anti-aircraft defense.

Sino-Soviet Military Assistance

General considerations

The second major source of military assistance to the Middle East has been the Sino-Soviet bloc, principal donor states being the Soviet Union itself and Czechoslovakia. Bloc military aid programs in this area are considerably newer than those of the United States and the United Kingdom. Prior to 1953 the bloc evidenced little interest in aid of any


33 *The New York Times*, June 29, 1963
type and maintained a relatively cool and distant approach to particular Middle Eastern states. With the launching of the new Soviet economic offensive, however, new emphasis was placed on aid to the developing nations, particularly the provision of military aid to the more advanced, "politically promising" states. A prime focus of attention was the Middle East, arms agreements being concluded with Egypt in 1955, Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen in 1956, and Iraq in 1958.

Bloc aid programs seem to have differed from Western efforts in several respects. First, Soviet arms assistance generally has not been extended in the form of annual programmatic allocations. Although possibilities for future review and revision exist, most assistance has been tendered under direct bilateral agreements stipulating the provision of a certain quantity of equipment, training, and maintenance assistance over a specified time period. Also, only arms credits have been extended, due with 2 to 3 per cent interest in from eight to ten years. Repayment is not to be in cash but in basic raw materials and foodstuffs.

Perhaps the most significant difference lies in the seeming uniform goals of bloc assistance. All five of the nations aided had repeatedly sought and been refused Western, particularly U.S. aid. At the time Soviet arms were offered each state was also party to a major conflict with

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an important U.S. ally or with a pro-Western Middle Eastern regime. Afghanistan had long been in dispute with Pakistan over Pushtoonistan; Yemen, with the United Kingdom over the West Aden Protectorate. Alarmed by the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact, Egypt and Syria also had just suffered the Gaza and Lake Tiberias setbacks in their continuing campaign against Israel. Iraq's new regime had renounced the royal alliance with Jordan, assistance ties with the United States, and later its commitment to the Baghdad Pact.

Country programs

It is extremely difficult to ascertain the precise scope and nature of Soviet military assistance efforts, since the details of arms agreements are secret and total amounts are officially reported simply as commercial transactions. Western reports of Soviet efforts vary widely as to the value and type of equipment provided. Included in Table V are two estimates; those made public by the Department of State in June of 1961, and those made more recently by an Israeli journalist.

Aid to Egypt has been the most extensive and diversified of all Soviet military assistance. During the first year of the Soviet-Egyptian agreement Egypt reportedly received between $200-$225 million worth of

Table V - A
SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONS
THROUGH JUNE 1961
(In Millions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>955</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,379</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,793</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,092</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table V - B
SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT, SYRIA, AND IRAQ
UNDER AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED 1955-1963
(In Millions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* incomplete data
1 promised, but status unclear

direct equipment aid. Specific end items delivered were alleged to include approximately 150 MIG 15's and 17's, 140 Il-28 medium bombers, 300 T-34 heavy tanks, 2 destroyers, 6 submarines, and a "substantial" assortment of rocket-launchers, bazookas, artillery, and armor pieces. The Suez campaign, resulted in the loss of much of this equipment. Approximately one third to one half of the aircraft and one half of the ground equipment were destroyed or captured.

With few exceptions direct arms aid since 1957 has followed approximately the same patterns. During 1958-1960 Egypt received further shipment of similar or more modern equipment: field weapons, tanks, including some heavier T-54's, W-class submarines, Skoda-class destroyers, and airplanes, a sizeable number being M-17 jet fighters. The most important equipment innovations have come in the last two years with the delivery of TU 16 bombers, MIG 21 supersonic jets, and an unknown number of Soviet-made rockets and missiles, most recently the SA-2 surface-to-air missile.

Perhaps the most significant aspects of Soviet military aid have been those programs designed to develop Egyptian production facilities, aid generally provided under the heading of economic and technical assistance.

37 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, The Foreign Aid Program: Compilation of Studies and Surveys: Study No. 8, (The Council for Economic and Industry Research, Inc.) Foreign Assistance Activities of the Communist Bloc and Their Implications for the United States, p. 73.


Since 1956 the Soviet Union has participated in the establishment of an experimental nuclear reactor and has provided training for Egyptian nuclear physicists in Moscow. Two years ago Egypt's first munitions factory was completed and reportedly it has been supplying arms to both Egyptian forces and to revolutionary groups in certain other Middle Eastern and African states. Recently Egyptian leaders have boasted that Egypt now has the capacity to produce limited quantities of jet aircraft, submarines, and missiles. While some Western doubts exist as to the validity of these claims, it is certain that such present or potential programs would have necessitated substantial amounts of Soviet equipment, technical services, and financial support.

Past Soviet bloc assistance to Iraq and Syria has been somewhat similar in nature, although not in extent, to the direct equipment aid tendered Egypt. Between 1958 to 1963, the Qasim government concluded three two-year arms agreements with the Soviet Union for a total of $370 million in equipment and training aid. Included in the end-item shipments were some 300 T-34 and IS-3 tanks, 100 T-54 tanks, 140 M-17 jets, and 38 SA-2 anti-aircraft guided missile launchers. Over 1,200 Iraqi officers and technicians attended schools and training courses in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, and at East German naval bases.

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42 Heiman, op.cit., pp.9-11.
After the Ba'th revolt in 1963, however, all direct Soviet military aid was terminated, including the provision of training services and maintenance equipment for weapons already delivered. Although some barter trade still exists between Iraq and three Soviet satellites—Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany—it is unlikely that major Soviet assistance would be resumed so long as the Iraqi government continues its drive against Iraqi Communists and so long as the Soviet government continues its assistance and support of the Kurdish rebels.  

Bloc assistance to Syria has been characterized by two stages. Prior to union with Egypt, Syria received equipment credits totaling $110 million, primarily for the purchase of 80 MIG-17 jets, 200 tanks, and sufficient artillery equipment for three regiments. During the Egyptian-Syrian Union, however, Syria was forced to divert much of the more advanced weaponry received, including two W-class submarines, to Egypt.

Equipment deliveries to Syria were resumed in early 1962, substantial quantities of aircraft, tanks, and heavy artillery being made available. An agreement for 1963-1964 assistance was signed, providing for $180 million worth of MIG-21 jets, T-54 tanks, and SA-2 anti-aircraft missiles. It is not yet clear, however, when or if delivery will be made to the new Ba'th regime.

\[43\] The New York Times, September 7, 1963

\[44\] Heiman, op. cit., p. 9

\[45\] Ibid.
Afghanistan since 1956 has been the recipient of increasing amounts of Soviet bloc military assistance. Arms have come from five bloc states; the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have extended the largest credits, with supplementary amounts being supplied by East Germany, Poland, and Hungary.

The primary focus of equipment aid has been the development of an Afghan air capability to oppose that established in Pakistan through U.S. assistance. Under the initial agreement the Soviet Union provided 11 MIG-15's, 2 helicopters, and a "gift" transport plane together with the Soviet personnel necessary to fly and maintain them. During the past eight years the total number of delivered aircraft has risen to 100, of which approximately 70 MIG-15's and 17's are now in operation and being flown by Soviet-trained Afghan pilots.\(^4^6\) Other equipment aid has been chiefly in the form of small arms and artillery pieces.

A portion of bloc economic and technical assistance credits has also been used for military support purposes. In 1956, the Soviet Union undertook reconstruction of Kabul airport and later began construction of a second airfield.\(^4^7\) A continuing program has also been focused on development and maintenance of roads linking Afghanistan's major cities with the Soviet border.\(^4^8\)

\(^4^6\) U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings for FY 1964, p. 65.

\(^4^7\) U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, The Foreign Aid Program: Compilation of Studies and Surveys: Study No. 8 (The Council for Economic and Industry Research, Inc.) Foreign Assistance Activities of the Communist Bloc and Their Implications for the United States, p. 651.

The smallest amount of past Soviet military assistance has been that extended to Yemen under an agreement concluded with the royalist government in 1956. During the first two years the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia provided at least seven shiploads of arms, primarily comprised of tanks, self-propelled guns, and other small field equipment. Relations with the regime, however, became somewhat strained after 1960, and no further arms deliveries were reported.

The Soviet position vis-à-vis the new Yemeni regime is reported to be considerably more favorable. Since the September 1962 revolution there have been repeated reports of new arms shipments provided both directly by the Soviet Union and indirectly through Egypt, and under the new Soviet-Yemen pact, promises of more to come. The Soviet Union also has concluded a major agreement with the new government concerning the construction of a large jet airport near Sana. Long sought by the Soviets, this field reportedly will be designed to allow Soviet aircraft easier access to African and Latin American air routes.\(^49\)

**British Military Assistance**

**General considerations**

The third major source of postwar military assistance to the Middle East has been the United Kingdom. Although considerably smaller in size and narrower in scope, British programs have most resembled those of the United States in the extension of both equipment/training aid and military-economic supporting assistance. Also particularly since Suez, the two

states have pursued similar assistance goals, the strengthening of friendly
governments against both external and internal threat and the preservation
of at least some state of regional stability and balance.

Britain's present role in Middle Eastern military affairs is vastly
different from that which it played in the past. During the 19th century
British aid and forces were used to support and protect the Ottoman
Empire against both Russian expansionism and French imperialism. After
the Turkish Armistice in 1918 the United Kingdom emerged as the paramount
power in the Middle East, the acknowledged protector of the region as well
as the holder of three major mandates. British forces based at Suez and
British military commands in most of the states dealt with all problems of
external defense and any serious internal disorders. Even as progressive
degrees of independence were granted its mandates, indigenous armies gen-
erally were still equipped and trained by Britain and functioned, often under
direct British command, only as police or auxiliary forces.50

Significantly restricted by postwar economic conditions and the rise
of Arab nationalism, Britain at present provides exclusive assistance
only to its traditional protectorates, the small states and sheikdoms on
the Persian Gulf littoral. Moreover, since 1956 all other assistance
efforts--in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey--have been carried out in
coordination with the United States. In the latter three countries, British
aid has assumed an explicitly complementary or supplementary function.

50 John Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism, (New York,
Country programs

The precise details of British military assistance programs are particularly difficult to ascertain, their nature and scope being rarely discussed as openly as similar U.S. efforts. Consequently the attempt here will be only to describe general aspects with particular emphasis on the more publicly-reported post-Suez programs.51

By far the principal recipient of military aid, both pre- and post-Suez has been Jordan, long a major concern of British Middle Eastern policy. British assistance has been extended in two distinct phases. From 1946 to 1956, the United Kingdom was almost the exclusive source of all aid to Jordan, which was beset by economic and military problems resulting from the creation of Israel. Direct equipment and training aid was provided for the strengthened Arab Legion, and increasing amounts of budgetary support for the financing of imports and the stabilization of currency.52 All aid ceased, however, in 1956, when King Hussein severed the aid ties and expelled the remaining British officers from the country.

No further assistance was provided until the crisis of 1958 when Anglo-Jordanian relations were resumed and special emergency aid in the form of troops, equipment, and grants was extended. Although the size of British grant aid is substantially larger than before, Britain now shares almost equally with the United States the responsibility for further strengthening Jordanian forces and providing annual budgetary subsidies.

51 Material for this discussion is drawn largely from House of Commons, Papers, Civil Appropriations Accounts for FYs 1952-1962 and Civil Estimates for FYs 1963-1964.

Table VI
BRITISH MILITARY AND SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST
(In Thousands of Pounds)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>50.</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>576.4</td>
<td>646.</td>
<td>636.5</td>
<td>43.</td>
<td>1,986.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon milit.</td>
<td>15.</td>
<td>20.</td>
<td>33.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultanate milit. of Muscat and Oman supp.</td>
<td>300.</td>
<td>20.</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>477.</td>
<td>290.</td>
<td>290.</td>
<td>1,382.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf Security Force milit.</td>
<td>393.5</td>
<td>451.</td>
<td>578.</td>
<td>648.7</td>
<td>795.</td>
<td>1,092.</td>
<td>3,958.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey milit.</td>
<td>2,170.</td>
<td>439.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,779.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>milit.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>363.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTO supp.</td>
<td>330.</td>
<td>710.</td>
<td>717.9</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>115.9</td>
<td>85.</td>
<td>2,049.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO supp.</td>
<td>300.</td>
<td>413.</td>
<td>485.</td>
<td>40.</td>
<td>40.</td>
<td>50.</td>
<td>1,328.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All military assistance - worldwide</td>
<td>70.</td>
<td>95.</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>118.0</td>
<td>381.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

milit = military
supp = support

Sources: House of Commons, Papers, Civil Appropriations Accounts and Civil Estimates for FYs 1959-1964, II.
Similar crisis assistance was provided to Lebanon from 1958 to 1960. British aid in this respect was explicitly supplementary to that extended by the United States and largely took the form of training and maintenance aid to the Lebanese air force.53

Britain also has extended a significant amount of military assistance to its allies in the CENTO and SEATO Pacts. In recent years, Turkey has been the recipient of several British warships. Some have been provided on loan; others have been directly transferred with major refitting costs borne by Britain. Aid to the CENTO nations in aggregate now takes two forms: supporting aid, principally technical assistance provided since 1958; and direct military aid, begun only in 1963. British support for SEATO member states has been only in the form of technical project aid.

Few data are available about British military aid to a former Baghdad Pact member, Iraq. Under a treaty concluded in 1955, on the same day as the Pact itself, Britain agreed to furnish Iraq with equipment and training for its airforce in return for continued use of certain Iraqi bases.54 Shortly after the 1958 revolution and after the conclusion of the Soviet-Iraqi arms agreement Britain announced that it would continue to provide Iraq with some direct military assistance.55 Neither the precise nature of this aid

53 House of Commons, Papers, Civil Appropriations Accounts and Civil Estimates for FYS 1959-1961, II, Section C.


nor the amount given has been reported. A similar announcement was made after the revolution of 1963, specifically with respect to the delivery of 50 Hawk Hunters promised the former regime. 56

Some British grant aid has also been provided to the oil-rich Persian Gulf sheikdoms, long under the direct protection of British troops. The principal semi-dependent recipient has been the Sultanate of Oman and Muscat, which has been supplied both equipment aid for its British-trained forces and what might be called "supporting assistance" toward the "capital and recurrent costs of the Sultan's armed forces." 57 Substantial aid has also been directed toward the strengthening and improvement of the Persian Gulf Security Forces and of Kuwait's small forces.

Although principally relevant to an earlier era, the role of British assistance in the Arab-Israeli conflict also deserves some mention. During the first phase of the period from 1947 to 1955, British arms assistance in the form both of grants and sales went primarily to Egypt and the Arab states; some newly supplied British arms were used by Arab League forces in 1948. 58

From the time of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 until 1955, Britain and the United States attempted at least in part to play a balancing, restraining role in the context of the Arab-Israeli arms race. Similar or


identical end-items were sold to the two major disputants, as for example, the sale to both countries of two World War II vintage destroyers in 1955.59

Since the time of Suez Britain's role in supplying arms to either Egypt or Israel has been relatively minimal. Israel has purchased some further equipment, including two S-class submarines delivered in 1960.60 There have been no reports of further aid or sales to Egypt.

Other Military Assistance - French and West German

Information with respect to the nature and the extent of French and Western German military assistance programs is extremely limited and in the latter case only recently made public. All that is known is that both nations are providing some amount of military assistance to Israel.

French military aid to the Israelis began in the early 1950's but did not assume significant proportions until September, 1955.61 There is considerable evidence to demonstrate extensive French assistance at the time of Suez and the close coordination of Israeli and French forces, particularly during the Sinai campaign.62 Since 1956, however, available data suggest only that France is the main supplier of Israeli defense equipment, including a number of jet Super Mystères, Super-Cystères, and promised Mirages.63 France is also reported to be aiding Israel in nuclear research and in the development of the thermal reactor at Dimona.

60 Laqueur, op. cit., 221.
61 Jane's Fighting Ships, op. cit., p. 217.
62 Laqueur, op. cit., p. 201
West Germany is reported to be providing only training to Israeli soldiers in Bundesrepublik camps and special centers. A recent statement by a Bundestag member denied that any armaments had been sent to Israel itself and asserted that West German efforts were being carried on with the knowledge and at least qualified approval of the United States and the other NATO allies. 64

At the request of the United States, West Germany has also assumed significant responsibility for assistance to Turkish ground forces committed to NATO. The specific nature of this aid has not been disclosed, although of the $40 million allocated for foreign military assistance during 1962 and 1963, West Germany reportedly extended some $30 million to Greece and Turkey. 65

Note must also be made of non-governmental German involvement in Middle Eastern military affairs, namely, the reported participation of some 24 German scientists in UAR missile-development programs. Pressured by Israeli protests and expressions of concern from other states, the West German government revealed that 500 German scientists and technicians were currently employed by the Nasser government (350 in the aircraft industry and 150 in rocket programs) none of whom were nuclear scientists. 66


65 Ibid., June 8, 1963

66 Ibid., May 5, 1964
Although the Erhard government has repeatedly asserted its non-involvement in this matter, it is now attempting to frame legislation which would hinder, if not prohibit, such individual participation in the future.

III

The Regional Role of Military Assistance: Latin America

Military aid to Latin America constitutes the second largest component of postwar aid to the three developing regions under study—in quantity far less than that to the Middle East, but far surpassing that to Africa. Until recently, however, due to a number of significant, situational differences, the precise role that military aid played in Latin American military affairs was a unique one and almost beyond comparison.

During the postwar period Latin America, long under the exclusive protection of the United States, was largely a backwater of international military relations. In Latin America, unlike the Middle East, any threat of direct attack from outside the region was generally considered a highly improbable event; few of the nineteen republics made any substantial contingency plans or preparations. In comparison to both the Middle East and Africa, the degree of direct intra-regional conflict was also quite limited. Although there were numerous border disturbances, inter-nation disputes, and quasi-arms races, no state prepared on any large scale for local wars. The major military threats in Latin America were those of internal revolt and insurrection. These frequent insurgencies, however, were generally the result of

67 Lieuwen, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
exclusively internal political disputes in which the armed forces themselves often took a leading, partisan part.

Events of the past three years have added new, more comparable dimensions to the role of military assistance in Latin America. The emergence of Cuba, first as a nation substantially aided by the Soviet Union and then as the locale for Soviet bases, has forcefully injected the problems of Cold War military confrontation and competition into the area. Moreover a new aspect of intra-regional tension and conflict is evidenced by Cuba's relations with its neighbors, both directly and by virtue of its position as an exporter of revolution.

Examination here will focus mainly on the long-standing U.S. programs and the changes in scope and extent that these have undergone. The discussion of Soviet efforts in Cuba and through Cuba in the rest of the hemisphere will of necessity be general due to the lack of definite public information. Limited attention also will be given to the role of other aid donors in armament sales to Latin American states.

U.S. Military Assistance

General considerations

By all standards the most significant military assistance to Latin America has been that extended by the United States, for most of the post-war period the exclusive source of all grant aid to the area. Annual programs have been small, generally averaging less than 5 per cent of all U.S. military aid efforts, and have been diffused widely among the Latin
American Republics. Their significance for postwar "arms and politics" in Latin America, however, has been far disproportionate to their absolute size.

U.S. military assistance programs actually date from World War II and before. During the 1920's and 1930's the United States extended arms purchase privileges and military missions to a number of Latin American states in an effort to offset European, particularly Axis, military and political influence. World War II occasioned further U.S. assistance: approximately $500 million was provided to eighteen states in the form of Lend-Lease grants, direct equipment aid, and economic support.68 A special Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) was established in 1942 to deal with broad organizational questions of hemispheric defense, the problems of equipment standardization, and the channelling of American monies.

Despite Truman Administration efforts, the first major postwar programs of aid were not begun until after the start of the Korean hostilities. Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 aid was to be granted to Latin America "in accordance with defense plans which require the recipient nations to participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere."69 Subject to the general coordination of the revived IADB, these


69 Quoted in Lieuwen, op. cit., p. 199.
plans were to provide for the development of collective strength against external attack and internal aggression, for the protection of vital sea lanes and communication lines, and for the availability of strategic bases and access to essential materials. Nations specifically allied with the United States for these purposes were to receive direct equipment and training assistance; all Rio Treaty signatories were to be permitted to purchase U.S. equipment on a reimbursable basis.

From 1952 to 1958, U.S. assistance to Latin America was carried on with little or no change in this general framework. Twelve Latin American nations became eligible for direct equipment aid under bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreements: Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru in 1952; Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay in 1953; and Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras in 1954 and 1955. During the period the United States provided approximately $195 million in diversified equipment and training assistance and transferred some 81 ships to Latin American countries under grants or low-cost reimbursable sales. The principal focus of this assistance was to strengthen and modernize the twenty army battalions, the twenty-one air squadrons, and the assorted naval units which the twelve states had committed for potential hemispheric defense functions.

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In the late 1950's and particularly after 1959, the scope and nature of U.S. military assistance to Latin America underwent substantial change and redefinition. Some revisions were the result of Congressional action. In 1958 the Morse Amendment was passed, placing renewed emphasis on the "hemispheric defense" function of grant arms and equipment and seeking to prevent their use in civil strife or in regional conflicts. More far-reaching have been the decisions of Congress in placing ceilings on military aid funds for Latin America. For FY 1960, appropriations for equipment aid were not to exceed $67 million (the amount allocated in FY 1959); for FY 1961, $57.5 million and beginning in FY 1964, $55 million annually.

Other changes reflected U.S. efforts to secure and demonstrate hemispheric solidarity and strength in the face of the Cuban threat. The scope of the military aid program was extended by special training aid agreements to include the remaining eight Latin American states: Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela.

The most significant changes, however, were those made in the general objectives of military assistance programs in the area. The underlying reasons for these changes, as well as their general dimensions, are perhaps most forcefully set forth in Summary Presentation for FY 1964:

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72 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings for FY 1965, p. 403.
Military assistance programs for Latin America were oriented to hemispheric defense prior to 1960. As it became clear that there was no threat of significant external aggression, emphasis shifted to strengthening internal security capabilities for use against Castro-Communist activities or other internal disruptions or banditry, and to civic action projects designed to further economic and social development. Limited assistance is also given for such activities as harbor defense, coastal patrol, and surveillance.73

Secretary of State Rusk, speaking recently in more qualified tones, also mentioned the effects of "the rapid development of sophisticated weapons systems" and "the change in the world system" on previously-held concepts of hemispheric security.74

Consequent to these goal changes the specific nature of aid programs has changed radically. Concern for internal stability has dictated greater emphasis on developing and equipping small mobile forces trained in counter-insurgency techniques. Equipment provided is now substantially more in the form of small ground weapons, communications equipment, transport vehicles, and small naval craft. Civic action programs are supported by the provision of men, equipment, and training. Since FY 1961 eight new engineering battalions and seventeen new medical units have been established and equipped and have been employed as much as 80 per cent of time-in-service for community betterment projects.75 In total, internal security assistance and civic action


74 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings for FY 1964, p. 20.

75 Ibid., p. 915.
support are said to account for 90-95 per cent of all military aid allocations in Latin America.\textsuperscript{76}

Country programs

As has been suggested above, U.S. military assistance programs for individual Latin American countries bear a far greater resemblance to one another than in the case with respect to the Middle Eastern and African programs. Some distinctions of course do exist: aid is greater to countries with which MDA agreements have been concluded than to those receiving only training assistance and also to countries with large diversified forces than to those with relatively small single-arm military establishments. On the whole, however, the degree of similarity is strong and permits of further general comment.\textsuperscript{77}

Perhaps the most obvious characteristic of military aid to Latin America has been its relatively limited scale, particularly in contrast to that of the Middle Eastern program. Of the nineteen past or present recipients of U.S. military assistance, only one, Brazil, has received over $70 million in aid, and this as a result of a base rights agreement. Five of the twelve MDA allies as well as all of the eight training agreement states

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., Statement by Secretary of Defense McNamara, p. 62.
\textsuperscript{77} Material discussed here drawn largely from U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program for FYs 1952-1961; Jane's Fighting Ships, op. cit.; Mecham, op. cit; and Tomasek, op. cit.
\end{flushleft}
have received less than $10 million in aid. On the whole, over the thirteen year period, U.S. assistance appropriations have averaged 5 per cent or less of total Latin American military budgets; in no country have "local military units receiving U.S. military aid constituted more than 1/6th of total personnel strength."78

Moreover there seems also to have been some effort to maintain a general regional balance in aid grants. States traditionally concerned with each other's military power have not received widely differing amounts of assistance. In the case of Chile and Peru the difference has been only $13 million over the period, although economic factors have resulted in a somewhat greater discrepancy--$25 million--between aid to two present border disputants, Peru and Ecuador.

Further differences between Latin American programs and those in other regions lie in the specific type of aid extended. Supporting assistance has been of minimal military importance in Latin America. No Latin American Republic received defense support; under bilateral assistance agreements each country has been responsible for organization and operational support of those of its forces receiving equipment or training aid. Special assistance has usually assumed the form of emergency non-military aid, as, for example, relief for flood or earthquake damage or temporary budgetary difficulties.

78 U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program for FY 1960, p. 34.
Table VII

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PROGRAMMED U.S. TRAINING PROJECTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1963

(in number of trainees)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Training in the U.S.</th>
<th>Overseas Schools</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>2,518</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>3,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East and South Asia</td>
<td>4,686</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>5,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>3,044</td>
<td>2,642</td>
<td>5,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Training assistance, particularly since 1959, has received special emphasis in Latin American programs. The presence of both military training missions and Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) in a number of countries has been for the purpose of increased local training and supervision. The percentage of Latin American officers and enlisted men participating in special training programs outside their own countries is far greater than Latin America's proportionate share of the military assistance budget. In the early 1960's this disproportion reached a new high, due particularly to expanded U.S. training programs for members of Latin American armed forces. As of March 15, 1964, 21,825 Latin American military personnel
had received training in the Canal Zone; 19,019 in the United States itself.\textsuperscript{79}

A third unique feature of U.S. military aid policy toward Latin America has been the relative importance of direct reimbursable equipment sales. By the end of FY 1959 Latin American countries had been allowed to purchase approximately $140 million of excess military equipment, a quite substantial figure when compared with that for other regions.

With respect to direct sales also some efforts have been made to preserve inter-nation balance. Perhaps the first example of this was the sale in 1951 of two destroyers to each of the ABC nations, long concerned with the level of one another's naval armament.\textsuperscript{80} Similar balanced sales to these three countries were made in 1959.

Turning to the specific programs for the twelve MDA allied states, by far the largest recipient has been Brazil, one of the few Latin American countries with the beginnings of naval and air forces as well as a relatively large army. Assistance to Brazil has been characterized by two distinct phases. From 1952 to 1957, Brazil received relatively small amounts of equipment and training aid, directed principally toward strengthening its naval

\textsuperscript{79} U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, \textit{Hearings} for FY 1965, p. 407.

\textsuperscript{80} U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program for FY 1952, p. 8.
air position vis-à-vis Argentina as well as toward improving its coastal defense capability. Several World War II vintage naval vessels were transferred or sold at low prices; a quantity of aircraft and air training equipment was provided to supplement goods produced locally.

A significant change in the scope and nature of aid to Brazil took place in 1957, after the conclusion of the Fernando de Noronha agreement. In return for providing a missile tracking site, Brazil demanded and received substantial aid increases, in the form of enlarged grants and expanded purchase credits. Since 1957 primary emphasis has again been placed on naval and air equipment. Four destroyers, four submarines, and a number of jet fighters have been directly supplied, and other naval craft and planes have been loaned or sold.

Armament status vis-à-vis other Latin American states has also been a major factor in the provision of military aid to two other coastal defense states, Chile and Uruguay. One of Chile's main concerns has been its relative naval strength with respect to that of Argentina and Peru. In 1951, Chile purchased two destroyers for this purpose, and in 1959 it received two additional destroyers and two submarines under MDA grants.

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81 Tomasek, op. cit., p. 388.
82 The New York Times, February 10, 1957
83 Tomasek, op. cit., pp. 387-89; Campbell, op. cit., p. 121.
### Table VIII

ANNUAL MILITARY SALES BY CLASSIFICATION

(in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>FY53</th>
<th>FY54</th>
<th>FY55</th>
<th>FY56</th>
<th>FY57</th>
<th>FY58</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Support Nations</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>231.8</td>
<td>102.1</td>
<td>100.5</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program (The Draper Committee) Composite Report, Vol. I, p. 142.

Recent programs, however, have been directed more toward the provision of aircraft and transport vehicles and the construction of roads and other social capital projects. Assistance to Uruguay has been somewhat similar in nature but considerably smaller in scale.

Peru and Ecuador have also been the recipients of substantial proportions of all military aid to Latin America. The Peruvian program in fact has been the third largest in size, again with considerable amounts allocated for the strengthening and modernization of naval and air forces.

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Table IX
U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT/TRAINING ASSISTANCE
TO LATIN AMERICAN STATES
FY 1950-FY 1963
(In Millions of Dollars of Appropriation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>121.6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undistributed</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since 1952, Peru has been given a number of naval vessels including three destroyer escorts, four submarines, and smaller coastal craft, and has received an unreported quantity of aircraft and air training equipment beyond the twelve well-publicized F-86's. Aid to Ecuador has been considerably less diversified and smaller in scale due, at least according to official explanations, to U.S. concerns about the inability of its economy to absorb equipment.

The course of military assistance programs in Colombia has been markedly uneven. Relatively large amounts of aid were granted from 1951 to 1953, the period during which a Colombian unit was fighting with United Nations forces in Korea. When it became apparent that U.S. equipment was being used to solidify the rule of strong man Pinilla, however, arms shipments were severely limited in nature. With the restoration of civilian government and especially since the start of the Alliance of Progress, assistance programs were once again resumed and substantially increased in size. In the last two years large sums have been allocated for road construction and other civic action projects.

Similar changes have characterized the aid program for the Dominican Republic. Aid efforts began in 1952 and were greatly expanded after the conclusion of a missile tracking station agreement with Trujillo.

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85 Tomasek, op. cit., p. 386.

86 Ibid., p. 382.
When the use of granted equipment for repressive action against the civilian population became dramatically evident, assistance was first suspended in 1958 and finally terminated in 1960. The overthrow of the Trujillo regime and the establishment of a more democratically-oriented junta brought resumption of aid grants, first on a small scale in FY 1962 and in considerably larger amounts in FY 1963. The anti-Bosch coup in September, 1963 brought still another change; equipment aid was again halted and the 51-man MAAG group withdrawn. Limited assistance of an unreported nature was restored in January, 1964.  

The United States has terminated all assistance to two of the original twelve MDA allies. The case of Cuba is so well known as to necessitate little comment. All shipments of military equipment to the Batista government were halted in March 1958, and an embargo was placed on all private U.S. shipments. Assistance to the Duvalier regime in Haiti at first restricted, then suspended, and finally terminated in late July of this year. Programmed allocations for Haiti have been redistributed among several other Latin American states for civic action programs.

Small and quite diversified aid has been extended to the remaining two MDA allies, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Perhaps the only aspects of note were the efforts at the time of the Guatemalan crisis in 1954.

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88 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings for FY 1964, p. 921.
Nicaragua, under Anastasio Somoza, received increased deliveries of ground equipment, including some tanks and armored vehicles which were deployed along the Guatamalan border. After the overthrow of the Arbenz regime Guatamala's new government received arms for stabilization functions.

Assistance to the remaining eight Latin American Republics largely has assumed the form of shipments of training equipment and the assignment of training personnel. The largest amounts to date have gone to Bolivia, where some of the funds have also been used for road construction and maintenance, and to Argentina, which has recently purchased several submarines and a number of jet fighters.

Soviet Military Assistance

Soviet military assistance has played a major role in the Latin American military situation only since 1960, when large scale aid was first extended to Cuba. Since little public information is available concerning the precise nature and scope of Soviet aid and the arrangements under which it has been granted, only a general comment can be made here.

Prior to the initiation of aid to Cuba, Soviet military assistance efforts in the Western Hemisphere were extremely limited in scope and number. In 1954, after repeated attempts to gain assistance from the

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United States, Guatemala under the leadership of Jacobo Arbenz concluded agreements to purchase an unreported quantity of arms from Czechoslovakia. Approximately 1,900 tons of weapons, reportedly mainly field and small arms equipment, were delivered to Guatemalan ports before the Arbenz regime was forcibly overthrown.\textsuperscript{90} A second Soviet effort came in 1956 when an offer of military purchase credits was extended to Argentina, purportedly in an attempt to divert Argentina from further purchases of British equipment.\textsuperscript{91} Although the offer was rejected, the nature of the proposed Soviet program was significant. Credits were to be extended for the purchase - at lower-than-production costs - of a TU-104 jet transport and an undisclosed number of MIG-15 jet fighters and Il-28 turbojet bombers.

Soviet military assistance was first extended to Cuba during 1960. The Castro government at this time was sorely pressed for the armaments necessary to equip its remobilized army and militia groups. Stocks of U.S. equipment stored by the Batista regime had been exhausted; the steadily deteriorating state of Cuban-U.S. relations as well as Cuba’s growing dependence on Soviet economic assistance gave little promise of immediate or future U.S. military assistance or of the lifting of the U.S. embargo on private shipments. Arms purchases from various European nations

\textsuperscript{90} Mecham, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 446.

\textsuperscript{91} U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, \textit{The Foreign Aid Program: Compilation of Studies and Surveys, Study No. 8} (The Council for Economic and Industry Research, Inc.) \textit{Foreign Assistance Activities of the Communist Bloc and Their Implications for the United States}. (Washington, 1957), p. 715.
were no longer possible since Cuba had been unable to pay for earlier purchases.

Substantive offers of military assistance were made first to Raoul Castro during his visits to bloc countries in July, 1960. According to best reports, at this time the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia offered to provide Cuba with unspecified but "substantial" quantities of MIG fighters, heavy Stalin tanks, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, artillery pieces, and light field weapons in addition to the standard program for training equipment and military technicians. After the rapid acceptance of these offers shipments began in the late summer of 1960 and increased in frequency after new pledges of Soviet military support for Cuba. By December 1960 bloc countries had shipped approximately 28,000 tons of military equipment, valued at $50 million or more, including "sufficient" equipment to outfit and support the newly-increased 45,000 man armed forces and 200,000 man militia.

Equipment shipments to Cuba continued in the same pattern throughout 1961 and the first months of 1962, with only some fluctuations in frequency. Major changes, however, occurred in the spring of 1962 when the first Soviet missiles arrived in Cuba, followed by substantial numbers of MRBM's and smaller surface-to-air missiles.

92 Lieuwen, op. cit., p. 268.
93 Ibid., p. 270.
The supply of more conventional weapons was also increased, largely in the form of anti-aircraft guns, medium and heavy tanks, and field artillery. The ranks of Soviet "advisers" and "technicians" were also expanded, estimates of their total strength ranging between 17,000 and 22,000 men.

The developments of October 1962 need little comment here except to note that Soviet technicians/troops seem to have been in exclusive control of all 500 or more Nike-type missiles, the major portion of the 3,000 anti-aircraft guns, the 100 or more MIG fighters, and the 90 or more helicopters. Throughout the crisis and its aftermath, the involvement of Cuban forces, save on the highest levels, seems to have been minimal.

The precise nature and direction of present Soviet military assistance to Cuba is unclear. No further substantial arms shipments have been reported since January, 1963, and there are reliable indications that significant quantities of the more sophisticated weapons, including advanced missile-radar systems and some missiles, have been removed. The level of Soviet forces has been reduced gradually over the past eighteen months; a recent report estimated that soon only a permanent training mission of 100 men will remain. Although there has been speculation that Cuban forces have or soon will assume operation of the 24

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95 Ibid., August 5, 1963
96 Ibid., April 20, 1964.
97 Ibid., June 27, 1963.
anti-aircraft missile bases, the nature of present control arrangements is still not publicly known.\textsuperscript{98}

Even less information is available about the supply of military equipment and support from Cuba or through Cuba to other revolutionary groups in Latin America. Such Soviet-sponsored aid has been reported to take two major forms: covert material support, largely financial in nature; and special training in guerrilla warfare and subversion tactics, either in special Cuban camps or in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{99} With several notable exceptions, little direct equipment aid is said to have been extended since most armament needs for revolutionary activity can be readily filled on the open market in most Latin American countries.

The most widely publicized case of Cuban "revolutionary export" has been that to Venezuela.\textsuperscript{100} Reportedly, from 1960-1963, more than 200 Venezuelans received special revolutionary training in Cuba, most being members of the Venezuelan Communist Party or of the revolutionary leftist movement of Venezuela. The Betancourt government has repeatedly charged that the recurring terrorist campaigns have been directed and financed from Cuba. Perhaps the most spectacular evidence of Cuban involvement was the discovery of a large cache of rifles, mortars, and submachine

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
guns on a Venezuelan beach just before the December 1963 Presidential elections.101

Other instances of covert assistance and training have not been definitively reported in the public media. Some accounts indicate that between 1,000 and 1,500 persons from all over Latin America received special training in Cuba during 1962. There have also been some indications of Cuban involvement in the 1963 disturbances in Peru--reports of some Czech-made weapons and of the delivery of Cuban monies to the insurgents by courier.

Other Military Assistance

A third major element in the level of Latin American armament is the substantial quantity of equipment sold to the Republics by the European states. Although not strictly considered under the heading of military assistance, these sales have often been made at reduced costs and have been concerned with modern equipment not available from the United States.

The largest source of military sales to Latin America has been the United Kingdom. British sales agreements have been concluded at various times with most of the Republics but have been most frequent with Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Between 1950 and 1959 these countries purchased a total of 114 Meteor jet fighters and Canberra jet bombers, and some 25 odd naval vessels, including two aircraft carriers.102

101. Ibid.
102 Tomasek, op. cit., p. 393.
Coordination of British sales policy with U.S. assistance policies has been slight and at times non-existent. In 1954, at the height of the Guatamalan crisis, British arms were sold and delivered to the Arbenz regime. A similar situation prevailed with respect to sales to Batista during the summer and fall of 1958. Sales to Cuba continued until early 1960, when the United States brought substantial pressure to bear on the United Kingdom and effected the halt of the delivery of fifteen jet fighters promised to the Castro government.¹⁰³

Other major arms-selling nations have been Italy, France, Sweden, and Belgium. On the whole, however, these countries have made only commercial agreements and have not offered significant price reductions.

IV

The Regional Role of Military Assistance: Africa

Military assistance to Africa constitutes the most recent and in some ways the least significant component of all military aid to the developing areas. Paralleling the pattern of African political development, extensive assistance efforts did not begin until the late 1950's and have attained substantial scope only during the last three years. In contrast to programs in the Middle East and Latin America the quantity of aid has been quite limited in terms both of the amounts extended to the region as a

¹⁰³ Lieuwen, op. cit., p. 269.
whole and of the sums received by the various African states. Further, in general, the end items and training service furnished have not been of a large-scale or highly sophisticated nature; smaller, conventional ground and support equipment have been the major elements in all assistance allocations.

In many respects, however, military assistance to the African states has had consequences far more important and far-reaching than considerations of scale and duration would suggest, for the eagerness of the African states to acquire arms as a mark of their nationhood and to achieve regional prominence (as well as to enhance their general international position) has led to increasing foreign involvement in African military affairs, with at least ten nations providing equipment or training assistance. Although relatively low in comparison to other regions, the resulting level of armament had had a profound impact on the African political balance, affecting not only the course of various inter-nation disputes and conflicts but also the outcome of internal political battles and the revolutionary campaigns in the remaining colonial territories.

Within the limits of extremely restricted data, the following discussion of military assistance to Africa will focus on the aid provided by four major "types" of donor nations. Most attention of necessity will be given to the aid extended by the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China, the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the principal former metropoles, the United Kingdom and France. Some note, however, will also be taken of the activities of certain other nations, principally Belgium, West Germany, Israel, Italy, and the United Arab Republic.
U.S. Military Assistance

By far the largest and most significant amounts of military assistance tendered by a single nation appear to be those provided by the United States. Data for a number of countries are too incomplete for exact comparison. Begun in 1953 with the extension of military aid to Ethiopia, the U.S. program steadily increased in scope and magnitude so that by FY 1963 approximately $138 million had been appropriated for fifteen African nations. This amounted, however, to only .004% of the U.S. global aid program. (See Table I). The past two years, however, have witnessed a slight reduction in U.S. efforts, due to the smaller number of states receiving immediate post-independence assistance, and more importantly, to an amendment passed in 1963 placing a $25 million ceiling on direct equipment aid to Africa.104 (See Tables I and X).

U.S. programs in Africa have differed from those in other areas in two respects. From the very first, military aid was officially designated as only for purposes of internal security and stability. This policy was further emphasized in 1963 by a Congressional amendment declaring that military aid not strictly needed for internal security functions was prohibited except in the case of specific "Presidential determination," that is, unless the President explicitly stated such aid was vital to U.S. interests.105 Accordingly the type of assistance extended has been generally in the form of small-scale conventional equipment for ground and support forces. A typical fiscal year

104

105
Ibid.
**Table X**

**FUNCTIONAL BREAKDOWN OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA, FY 1962**  
(In Millions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed charges</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply operations and nutritional surveys</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force maintenance</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spare parts</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attrition</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other consumables</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force improvement</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks, vehicles and weapons</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic and communications equipment</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special programs</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table XI
U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT/TRAINING ASSISTANCE TO AFRICAN STATES, FY 1950-1964
(In Millions of Dollars of Appropriations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>.284</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Lpville)</td>
<td>3.378</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>37.116</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>11.734</td>
<td>11.349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.803</td>
<td>2.027</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>3.645</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.721</td>
<td>2.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.243</td>
<td>1.258</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>classified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.325</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2.476</td>
<td>.515</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>classified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Area Undistributed  4.931  9.6  16.759  11.670

Table XII

U.S. SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA STATES
(In Millions of Dollars of Expenditures)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.919</td>
<td>2.997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Lpville)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.369</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1.301</td>
<td>1.912</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>4.765</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.100</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>.635</td>
<td>2.375</td>
<td>3.200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>15.000</td>
<td>15.000</td>
<td>15.000</td>
<td>14.021</td>
<td>9.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.903</td>
<td>.399</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>30.000</td>
<td>44.847</td>
<td>50.840</td>
<td>40.000</td>
<td>30.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>.650</td>
<td>1.680</td>
<td>2.903</td>
<td>.399</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>19.499</td>
<td>10.000</td>
<td>7.301</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.341</td>
<td>.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>.988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>15.000</td>
<td>20.085</td>
<td>20.000</td>
<td>25.000</td>
<td>10.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

breakdown is shown in Table X.

Within this general framework, however, there have been wide variances in the nature and scope of the aid programs for particular countries. Perhaps the most obvious difference is the substantially larger proportion of total aid grants received by the North African states and Ethiopia. Although a partial explanation lies in the fact that several of these nations have been independent for a longer period, a far more crucial factor has been the fact that each is or was the site of a major U.S. military or scientific installation. The desire of the United States to secure continued access to these bases has led to the provision not only of larger quantities of assistance but also of more sophisticated military equipment and of more extensive training and supervisory services.

Although all relevant data are classified, reports suggest that the largest country programs have been those extended to Morocco and Tunisia, from the time of independence in 1956. Assistance to Morocco, the site until recently of four U.S. air bases and a naval communications center, has constituted the greater proportion and has been characterized by two distinct phases.¹⁰⁶ From 1956 to Fy 1959, only special supporting

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¹⁰⁶ These bases were established in the immediate postwar period under base rights agreements negotiated with France. Upon attainment of Morroccan independence, these were re-negotiated for a seven-year period, scheduled for termination at the end of 1963. In 1960, however, U.S.-Morroccan agreement was reached to return one of the bases to Morocco at that time.
assistance was tendered; under the terms of the renegotiated base agreements Morocco received more than $90 million in aid.\textsuperscript{107}

In 1959-60 an additional program of direct military aid was initiated, focused mainly on the provision of small arms and motor vehicles for ground-force use. Under the impact of changing Moroccan-U.S. relations and the extension of Soviet military assistance, however, the nature of U.S. efforts underwent significant revision. The direct aid appropriation for FY 1963 was greater than the total of all previous end-item and training allocations and provided for the granting of a number of jet and conventional aircraft and increased pilot training services.\textsuperscript{108}

The nature of present and future U.S. military aid to Morocco is somewhat unclear. Although past Congressional and press discussions indicated that large-scale U.S. assistance would terminate with final base-withdrawal on December 31, 1963, Morocco is still receiving aid, being designated in the FY 1965 proposals as one of the African states that must be aided in order to preserve a "free world orientation."\textsuperscript{109}

The only public data available refer to supporting assistance; there are, however, indications of continuing equipment aid as well. Moreover, a


\textsuperscript{109} U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, \textit{Hearings FY 1965}, p. 86.
U.S. pilot training mission is still in Morocco and reportedly will remain for an indefinite period.\textsuperscript{110}

U.S. military assistance to Tunisia has been far more limited in scope and has been chiefly in the form of ground equipment. Although both programs were begun at the same time, the nature of the U.S. commitment in Tunisia was and in many respects still is significantly different. According to reports, assistance initially was granted with considerable reluctance and under threats by President Bourguiba to turn to "other" sources for desired arms.\textsuperscript{111} Despite certain difficulties with respect to Algeria and the Bizerte incidents, significant amounts of equipment and supporting assistance were furnished through FY 1962. The last two years, however, have seen a gradual phasing-out of all but limited training programs, supporting assistance being terminated in FY 1964 and equipment programs in FY 1965.

The beneficiary of the largest amount of U.S. assistance has been Ethiopia, the locale of an important U.S. communications base. Since the signature of an MDA treaty in 1953 the government of Hailie Selassie has been extended a highly diversified program of equipment and training aid, the most varied of all the U.S. military assistance program in Africa. During the first phases assistance efforts focused primarily

\textsuperscript{110} The New York Times, October 20, 1963

\textsuperscript{111} Rivkin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 63.
on the modernization and mobilization of the small Ethiopian Army.
In later years additional grants or interest-free loans have been pro-
vided for the acquisition of a number of small naval vessels and a
few modern aircraft including some F-86 jet fighters.\textsuperscript{112} Supporting
assistance to Ethiopia also has been relatively extensive.

\textit{Libya} has also been a major recipient of U.S. military assist-
ance to Africa. U.S. efforts have stemmed not only from the agree-
ment concerning Wheelus air base concluded in 1954 but also from
certain British-U.S. guarantees offered upon Libya’s attainment of
independence in 1951. Both direct military aid primarily for ground
forces and substantial quantities of supporting and budgetary assist-
ance have been extended.

Assistance to two other states, \textit{Liberia} and the \textit{Sudan}, has been
similar in purpose though not in extent to that tendered these four
states. In Liberia the United States maintains Roberts air base and
has a strategic interest in the port of Monrovia, improved and enlarged
by U.S. forces and funds. Direct military aid did not begin until after
the conclusion of an MDA agreement in 1959 and has largely been in the
form of ground equipment and some small naval craft. A U.S. training

\textsuperscript{112} U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, Hearings for FY 1963,
p. 566. It is perhaps revealing to note that U.S. military assistance to
Ethiopia has been one of the most vehemently attacked aspects of the total
foreign aid program. Perhaps the most tenacious critic has been Repre-
sentative Otto Passman of Louisiana who has uncovered the use of the
7-86's to frighten recalcitrant Ethiopian tribesmen and the expendi-
ture of $3.1 million to convert a seaplane tender into a personal yacht-
flagship for the Emperor. \textit{Ibid.}
mission is also in residence and has begun to assist in the execution of "civic faction" programs.

The Sudan has received relatively large amounts of special supporting assistance in return for the granting of over-fly rights and landing privileges at Khartoum. Little direct military aid has been tendered since such assistance has been furnished by the United Kingdom. As in all of the "base support" states, the U.S. supporting program is being phased down and replaced with more direct development assistance.

Military assistance to the states, of sub-Saharan Africa has been extremely limited in nature and scope. Official pronouncements have repeatedly emphasized that the primary needs of these states are economic not military and have stressed U.S. opposition to increased armament levels and the development of intra-regional arms races. Also, despite repeated African requests, the United States has steadfastly maintained that the main responsibility for free-world military assistance to Africa rests with the former metropole states, principally Britain and France. U.S. programs are conceived of as being "primarily designed to manifest U.S. interest in helping to maintain law and order in volatile situations which threaten the stability of the emerging nations."\(^{113}\)

The specific states to which the United States extends assistance fall into three broad categories, the characteristics of each having

\(^{113}\) U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings for FY 1964, p. 59.
obvious impact upon the extent of aid efforts. The first group are those nations still receiving substantial quantities of military training and equipment aid from their former metropoles, specifically certain of the newer Commonwealth states, many of the French Community members and associates, and the Congo Republic (Leopoldville). Equipment and supporting assistance to this group has been largely supplementary in nature and has been relatively closely coordinated with metropole programs. Ghana and Nigeria exemplify the second category, states that have found metropole aid to be unwelcome or too limited. The United States still provides limited amounts of direct equipment aid to Nigeria; assistance to Ghana ended during FY 1964.

U.S. policy toward the third class of states, the major recipients of Soviet or Chinese Communist arms credits, has varied. Guinea has been granted supporting assistance, but has been refused direct military aid; Mali has received large quantities of equipment and training help for civic action programs as well as increasing support aid. U.S. aid was not offered to the revolutionary government of Zanzibar; the offer rejected by Somalia has not been renewed.

Almost without exception the type of equipment and training assistance provided has been for the development of small ground forces to meet minimal defense requirements. End items furnished have been reported to be principally light weapons, motor vehicles, electronic and communications equipment, and small quantities of liaison helicopter
and transport aircraft.\textsuperscript{114} Requests for more sophisticated weapons have been repeatedly and often denied. To cite only one example, when Nigerian Prime Minister Balewa in 1961 asked for the grant of a jet fighter squadron, Secretary of State Rusk stressed the unsuitability of such equipment for Nigerian defense needs and pointed out that the cost of such a squadron and its annual maintenance approached, if not equalled, the cost of educating five million Nigerians.\textsuperscript{115}

Special mention must be made of U.S. military assistance to the Congo both before and after the withdrawal of UNOC forces. Under the Adoula plan of 1963, the United States has provided only transport and communications materiel and training. Particular emphasis has been placed on air transport equipment, including helicopters, C-47's, and rocket-equipped T-28 fighter bombers. At the request of the Congolese government, the United States has also undertaken the re-equipping of 6 Army battalions, and of the Congolese Police Force, the latter at an estimated cost of $538,000.\textsuperscript{116}

Sino-Soviet Military Assistance

In comparison with that extended by the other major donor nations Sino-Soviet military assistance toward Africa has been relatively

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item \textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p. 1065.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Vernon McKay, \textit{Africa in World Politics} (Chicago, 1963), p. 40.
\end{thebibliography}
limited in scope and magnitude. Africa as a whole did not become an important focus of bloc aid activities until 1958; military assistance did not constitute a significant component of bloc programs until the early 1960's.

The past several years, have witnessed a significant increase in Sino-Soviet efforts. Direct equipment and training help has now been extended to at least eight states and several revolutionary groups. Current reports estimate that total bloc assistance has exceeded $60 million, more than double the estimates given in 1960.\textsuperscript{117} Much of this increase, however, can be attributed to the Chinese-Soviet split which has seriously affected the effectiveness of the Communist effort in Africa.

Sino-Soviet efforts in Africa have been quite similar to those in the other two regions, with only slight differences in emphasis. Assistance has been tendered to those states that have been denied Western aid or have become dissatisfied with the amount received. The largest proportion of assistance has been concentrated in several key states. Such saturation efforts have been designed not only (or principally) to develop client states but more importantly to provide dramatic examples of Soviet generosity and interest.

Further, the form of bloc aid has remained the same. Although relatively more "gifts" of arms have been provided, most assistance has been in the form of credits repayable in raw materials or foodstuffs at a low rate of interest. Significant amounts of economic and technical assistance usually have accompanied or preceeded direct military help and have often been allocated for quasi-military or "supporting" projects.

In Northern Africa, Morocco and Algeria have been major beneficiaries of Soviet equipment and training aid. Under a bilateral agreement concluded in 1961, Morocco received a number of MIG fighters and other advanced equipment, as well as extensive technical and training assistance. Since the deterioration of Moroccan-Soviet relations, first over Mauritania, and then over the Algerian border conflict, no new arms shipments or agreements have been reported.

Soviet aid to Algeria has been more extensive in nature and more continuous in duration. Soviet-made equipment was consistently supplied to the Algerian rebels in their struggle for independence, most frequently via the UAR. In the post-independence period, a bilateral arms agreement was concluded, reportedly involving the provision of six MIG fighters, five helicopters, and substantial quantities of ground arms and equipment.\footnote{The New York Times, October 27, 1963.}

During the last six months of 1963, however, Soviet assistance to Algeria reached a new peak. During the Moroccan-Algerian border dispute,
Soviet tanks, planes, artillery, trucks, and communication equipment reached Algeria by way of both Cuba and the UAR. Although there was only informed speculation as to direct Soviet involvement, the degree of Soviet interest was revealed by the fact that Algeria was one of the three major recipients of the $3 million in new Soviet aid reported from June to December 1963. No further arms deliveries, however, have been reported as of the date of this report.119

Of the sub-Saharan countries, Guinea has been the focus of the greatest and most concerted bloc assistance efforts. Military credits, chiefly Czech and Soviet, have been furnished under agreements concluded in 1958 and 1960, following Guinea's refusal to join the French Community and its failure to secure arms from the United States. Assistance has taken several forms. Over $1 million in direct equipment supplies has been provided, comprised chiefly of ground weapons and vehicles for Guinea's 3,300 man armed forces but with a limited number of MIG 17 jet fighters and transports, and some other larger-scale equipment.120 Substantial training and military-technical projects also have been carried on by the relatively large cadres of bloc technicians. Further aid with military implications has been for the construction of a civil airport and for the development of a national airline.

119 Ibid.

Moreover, in the past Sino-Soviet aid has been channeled by and through Guinea to the rebellious forces in the Republic of Cameroun. Although available data are limited, reports indicate that these forces received not only direct arms aid but also special training in Guinea itself from both bloc and Guinean instructors. To cite but one example, in 1962 the U.S. Department of State alleged that at least one faction of the U.P.C. forces engaged in terrorist activity in Southwest Cameroun had received terrorist and guerrilla training from Chinese Communist technicians based in Guinea.

At present the future of Sino-Soviet aid to Guinea remains somewhat in doubt. The deterioration of Guinean-bloc relations has led to a significant curtailment in all assistance efforts and the withdrawal of a number of technical advisers. No new arms shipments have been reported in a period of over two years and none now seem expected. The country's partial rapprochement with the West and the increasing amounts of Western economic and supporting aid received would seem to indicate that Guinea now is seeking more diversified sources of assistance.

Quite similar to saturation efforts in Guinea was the brief program of bloc military assistance extended to the forces of Patrice Lumumba.

121 Rivkin, op. cit., p. 95.

122 Cited in McKay, op. cit., p. 205.
during the first stages of Congolese independence. Direct aid, particularly during the Kasai campaign, was provided in the form of ground and air transport services and equipment, some quantities of "small arms," and the "advisory" efforts of a number of bloc technicians. More indirect and limited assistance was reported to have been given by Czech officers and technicians serving with the Guinean component of the United Nations force. All formal bloc efforts in the Congo, however, were terminated after Lumumba's capture and imprisonment. There have been numerous allegations of Sino-Soviet assistance first to the Gizenga regime in Stanleyville by way of the UAR and now to Pierre Mulele and the rebels of Kwilu and Kivu.

Perhaps of greatest current importance is bloc assistance to Somalia and the role it is playing in the Republic's recent border disputes with Kenya and Ethiopia. At the outbreak of hostilities, Somalia appealed to the Western nations for assistance, and received an offer of $10-15 million from a consortium of the United States, West Germany, and Italy, on the condition that Somalia accept aid from no other source. Dissatisfied, Somalia then requested Soviet assistance sufficient to train, equip, and field a 20,000-man army. The Soviet Union extended a reported $30 million in arms credits, and arranged for training in

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124 Rivkin, op. cit., pp. 95, 209-10..
Moscow for 65-90 Somali army officers.\textsuperscript{125} Deliveries, however, have been extremely slow and mainly in the form of small items.\textsuperscript{126}

There have also been some scattered indications of Chinese Communist involvement in Somali military affairs. Early in 1963, a Chinese military mission was established in Mogadishu and reportedly furnished training in guerrilla tactics and strategy.\textsuperscript{127} Although at the time of this writing there have been no reports of direct equipment aid, a number of the Chinese-supported development projects are of potential military significance and several interest-free loans have been extended to underwrite Somali expenditures during the border conflict.\textsuperscript{128}

Although far more limited in scale, Sino-Soviet assistance to Zanzibar is also of contemporary significance. Even before the overthrow of the Sultanate, Zanzibari rebels received bloc equipment and training, several of the revolutionary leaders having been trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba.\textsuperscript{129} During the period between the revolt and union with Tanganyika, the new government concluded military aid agreements with both the Soviet bloc (through East Germany) and the Chinese Communists. Reports indicate

\begin{footnotes}
\item[126] Ibid., July 6, 1964.
\item[128] The New York Times, January 20, 1964
\item[129] Ibid., April 27, 1964.
\end{footnotes}
that the Soviets have supplied trucks, artillery, mortars, and anti-aircraft guns, while the Chinese have delivered substantial quantities of automatic weapons, including submachine guns.\(^{130}\) Both have also sent teams of weapons technicians and military instructors, reportedly more than 30 in number.

With respect to bloc programs in the remaining areas, the Sudan, Mali, Ghana, and the Angolan rebels, very little specific information has been publicly reported. After rejecting an offer of bloc assistance in 1956 the Sudan concluded an arms agreement in 1959 and by the end of FY 1961 had received somewhat less than $1 million in military aid.\(^{131}\) Bloc military assistance to Mali reportedly has been on a considerably smaller scale and has been comprised mainly of small field equipment. Under the economic and technical aid program, however, Mali has received some relatively modern aircraft, reportedly twenty in all.

Ghana has been tendered perhaps the largest total quantity of direct and indirect military aid. Equipment aid has been relatively varied in nature and has included a number of newer Soviet-produced aircraft. Development funds have been committed to the construction of a major shipyard and to the development of the national airline, Ghana Airways Corporation.\(^{132}\) Recently some dissatisfaction has been voiced

\(^{130}\) Ibid., April 27, 1964, June 15, 1964.

\(^{131}\) U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, The Sino-Soviet Offensive, op. cit.

with respect to the quality and operation of certain types of equipment acquired from the bloc. Perhaps the most telling evidence of this was the fact that in August of 1963 the Soviet Union agreed to take back at no cost four of the eight Ilyushin-18 planes provided to the Ghanian Air Force in 1960.\textsuperscript{133}

\textbf{Metropole Military Assistance}

The second largest component of military assistance to Africa has been that provided by the three former colonial powers, Britain, France, and Belgium. Most of this aid has been concentrated in the sub-Saharan region, in states that although now independent, have retained military and police ties with their former metropoles. All three nations have extended both direct military, particularly training, aid and some military-tinged supporting assistance.

Of the three, British military assistance has been the most diversified and the best publicized. British aid in a sense predates the emergence of independent African states; to a greater degree than the other metropoles the United Kingdom equipped and trained native forces in all of its dependencies, particularly those on the eve of statehood. At present, in addition to efforts in the semi-dependent countries and remaining colonial possessions, military assistance is accorded to two

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{133} The New York Times, August 25, 1963.}
broad classes of states, African Commonwealth members and nations in which the United Kingdom has long-standing strategic interests.

The largest proportion of British military assistance has been extended to the independent Commonwealth states, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya. Although there have been significant differences in nature and scope, the general pattern of assistance has remained the same. After the grant of independence each has received substantial quantities of equipment and training aid to strengthen new national forces. Barring political difficulties, assistance efforts on a somewhat reduced scale have been continued. Whatever the state of relations with Britain, however, each retains the Commonwealth privilege of sending officers to British military and staff training colleges. 134

Ghana, the first British colony in Africa to attain independence, received substantial assistance until 1961. Together with Canada, the United Kingdom equipped, trained, and provided operating cadres for Ghana's reorganized ground forces and new jet air force. 135 In 1959 some small naval craft were transferred by Britain: several minesweepers, seaward defense boats, and corvettes. British and Canadian officers also held key positions in the Ghanaian armed forces during this period.


### Table XIII

**BRITISH MILITARY AID TO AFRICAN STATES, FY 1959-1964**

*(in thousands of pounds)*

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>not reported</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>220.</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Comm. Milit. Aid: Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>168.5</td>
<td>332.5</td>
<td>681.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>107.</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>600.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60.</td>
<td>250.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Milit. Assistance (general)</strong></td>
<td>70.</td>
<td>95.</td>
<td>98.5</td>
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<td>118.0</td>
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**Sources:** House of Commons, Papers, Civil Appropriations Accounts and Civil Estimates for FYs 1959-1964, II.
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>867</td>
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<td>1,500</td>
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<td>1,733</td>
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<td>874.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>1,100.</td>
<td>1,225.</td>
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Sources: House of Commons, Papers, Civil Appropriations Accounts and Civil Estimates for FYs 1959-1964, II.
The deterioration of British-Ghanaian relations and Ghana's decision to seek other sources of arms aid has had a significant effect upon British aid efforts. Although detailed public information is minimal, reports indicate that direct British and Canadian aid is now considerably more limited in extent and nature. Some training activity is still carried on by Canada, but all foreign officers were replaced by Ghanaian nationals in 1961.136 Supporting assistance for military purposes is also said to have been reduced.

Somewhat similar difficulties have marked recent military aid to Nigeria. During its final steps toward independence Nigeria received relatively substantial amounts of equipment, training, and force support grants. In 1960 a mutual defense agreement was signed providing inter alia for an enlarged direct assistance program, particularly with respect to the new Nigerian air force. Popular opposition and political pressures, however, led finally to the termination of the agreement in January, 1962.137 Some limited British assistance has continued, primarily in the form of specialized training and some sales arrangements.

British assistance continues to the newer Commonwealth states, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya. Little has been reported concerning the exact nature and extent of this aid; presumably it has been subsumed under the heading of Commonwealth military assistance


and has been similar to that first tendered Ghana and Nigeria. Kenya, for example, requested and received immediate post-independence aid to expand its army and establish a small air force and navy. Revolts in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya also occasioned more direct British involvement, British troops and equipment being deployed at the request of the three governments.

Note also should be made of British aid policy to a former Commonwealth member, the Union of South Africa. Although direct aid was extended only with respect to the Simonstown base agreement, British sales to South Africa from 1945-1963 were of substantial magnitude, second only in recent years to those of France. The past year, however, has seen a significant shift in British sales policy. Pressured by the African members of the Commonwealth and by unilateral U.S. action, Britain supported a Security Council resolution of December, 1963 calling upon all states to establish an embargo on all equipment that could be used to manufacture arms. To many observers, this constituted implicit support for an earlier Security Council appeal with respect to all military shipments to South Africa.

Extensive military assistance has been provided to three non-Commonwealth states, Libya, the Sudan, and Somalia, all nations with long-


139 Ibid., January 25, 1964.

140 Ibid., December 6, 1963.
standing British military ties. Of the three, the Sudan, formerly a British protectorate and still a member of the sterling area, has received the largest quantities of direct equipment and training assistance. Through grants and low-cost sales, particularly in 1961, Sudanese forces have been equipped with a number of jet aircraft, armored vehicles, and ground transports as well as conventional small arms and field equipment. British officers and technicians have conducted numerous training and military-technical programs.

The United Kingdom's efforts in Libya date from the establishment of British bases before independence and since 1951 have been closely coordinated with those of the United States. Heavy emphasis has been placed on the training of officers and enlisted men: at least £40,000 has been appropriated annually for British training missions since 1961. Direct equipment aid has been primarily a U.S. responsibility, with Britain contributing some supplementary materiel for ground and naval forces. Somewhat greater sharing has been effected with respect to budgetary support; since 1959 the United Kingdom has granted £3,250,000 annually for this purpose.

Somalia, composed in part of the former colony of British Somaliland, also received quantities of military aid and some military-tinged

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141 Rivkin, op. cit., p. 94.

142 House of Commons, Papers, Civil Appropriations Accounts and Civil Estimates for FY 1959-1964, II.
supporting assistance in the immediate post-independence period. Very little is known about the nature of this assistance except that it now has been terminated.\textsuperscript{143}

British assistance to other African states has been quite limited in scope and has been included under general appropriation for military assistance and training. Only one direct allocation has been reported in the recent past: in FY 1962 £80,000 was appropriated to cover the cost of a "gift of aircraft" to Mali.\textsuperscript{144}

Due to the almost total lack of information, only general comments can be ventured concerning French military assistance in Africa. France's recent efforts have been second only to those of the United States in scope; at present military ties exist between France and thirteen African states. As was the case with recipients of British aid, all of the nations formerly were French colonial dependencies.

The specific nature of the military arrangements has varied according to the status of political relations with France. The seven full members of the Community have received perhaps the most extensive aid, providing for full equipment and training and often the direct services of French commissioned and non-commissioned officers.\textsuperscript{145} Under bilateral

\textsuperscript{143} Rivkin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 90.

\textsuperscript{144} House of Commons, Papers, \textit{Civil Appropriations Accounts} for FY 1962, II, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{145} Rivkin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 99.
agreements concluded in March 1961 the four Entente states also have received not only economic and cultural assistance but also military aid for the establishment of their armed forces.146 Republic of Cameroun and Togo have been tendered assistance under special agreements made in 1960.

Only fragmentary data exists concerning the specific direction of French military aid programs. The framework of the general Union Africaine et Malgache and of the more limited Central African Defense Council seemed at one time to provide for a loose system of mutual defense assistance supported by French cooperation and advisory services.147 One member state, Mauritania, has received increasing amounts of French assistance in consequence of its dispute with Morocco.148 Assistance to the Republic of Cameroun has been oriented particularly toward the requirements of defense against recurrent terrorist attacks launched by rebel forces based in and aided by Guinea.

A similar information problem exists with respect to Belgium's principal military aid program, that to the Congo. The history of past Belgian private and semi-public aid during the Congo crisis is as yet not totally clear and is still far too tangled to permit more than a


147 Ibid.

148 Rivkin, op. cit., p. 93.
general note. Since the final unification of the Congo Belgium reportedly has supplied some quantities of direct aid as one of two nations requested to render training assistance, plans to provide some 200 military instructors in the next two years.  

Other Military Assistance

Five other countries--West Germany, the United Arab Republic, Italy, Israel, and India--have provided military assistance to one or more African states. Although their efforts have been relatively limited in comparison to those of the major donor powers, they have had a not inconsiderable impact on the level of African armament and military activity.

Of the longest duration have been the military assistance programs of Egypt. Principal recipients of this aid have been the neighboring North African states or groups, with the largest proportion being extended to the Algerian rebels both before and after independence. From the very beginnings of the movement Egypt provided direct equipment aid to these forces and established special training courses at its military colleges for rebel officers and men.  

Egyptian efforts also helped secure financial grants from the Arab League, that granted October 1958 totaling L E 12 million. During the Algerian-Moroccan conflict, Egyptian troops and equipment were furnished on an emergency basis.

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amounts of military assistance have also been provided at various times to Tunisia and Libya, the latter in 1959 receiving a limited quantity of air-training equipment and services.\(^{152}\)

The nature and extent of Egyptian assistance to other African states is relatively unknown. Some assistance was accorded the Sudan during the Egyptian campaign to bring that country within its sphere of political influence. Somalia has received direct equipment aid, dating from the period before independence. Reports also have indicated UAR assistance to the Gizenga regime and past aid offers to the various Casablanca states under the now moribund plan to establish a joint military high command.\(^{153}\)

The Federal Republic of Germany recently has undertaken a rather extensive program of military assistance for seven African states, Nigeria, the Sudan, Guinea, Somalia, the Malagasy Republic, Ethiopia, and Libya.\(^{154}\) According to a recent statement all have requested aid to reduce dependence on assistance from the former metropoles and the United States; West Germany, however, has consulted with its NATO allies concerning each request and has operated "always in agreement with the former colonial power and with the United States."

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\(^{152}\) Steinberg, _op. cit._, p. 503.

\(^{153}\) Baulin, _op. cit._, p. 141.

Assistance, budgeted for about $10 million in 1963, has taken several forms. Training missions have been established in each country, the largest mission being established in Nigeria where reportedly seventy West German instructors and technicians were assisting in the build-up of Nigerian air forces. Some African officers have been brought to West Germany for specialized instruction, most notably pilots from Nigeria and naval officers from the Malagasy Republic. Certain of the seven aided states have also received arms credits for the purchase of weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment in West Germany.

Italian assistance has been extremely limited in scope and magnitude. Together with the United States and Western Germany, Italy offered assistance to Somalia in 1963 and was the only one of the three states to have its offer accepted. In May, 1964 Italy concluded arrangements for its participation in the Adoula plan, and pledged training and equipment aid for the Congolese air force.

The assistance tendered by India and Israel has been limited to technical training services. Israel has established pilot training schools in Ghana and Cameroun, and has provided para-commando and medical...

training to the Congolese.\textsuperscript{158} Reports have also indicated that some of Holden Roberto's Angolan forces have received medical training in Israel.\textsuperscript{159} India has provided flight instructors and training equipment to both Ethiopia and Ghana.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., March 25, 1964.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., December 16, 1963

\textsuperscript{160} Steinberg, op. cit., p. 190.