Tactical Urbanism, Public Policy Reform, and 'Innovation Spotting' by Government: From Park(ing) Day to San Francisco’s Parklet Program

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the prospects and impacts of tactical urbanism (TU). While tactical urbanism remains primarily a subcultural movement, it is beginning to gain traction in popular culture in traditionally politically liberal cities, and in some cases, with their respective city governments. However, little data and formal research exists on TU.

I employ a comparative case study approach. This thesis examines the urban legend surrounding San Francisco’s parklet program, as many assume it a result of the TU intervention, PARK(ing) Day. By looking at the process of formalization of the parklet program, the thesis seeks to uncover creative methods of policy reform, for example through “innovation spotting” by local government. I also examine three other TU projects in Dallas, Texas; Brooklyn, New York; and Raleigh, North Carolina.

I argue that tactical urbanism is a play on the physical and political landscape, manifested as a design intervention. While interventions play on the two landscapes—not one—urban tacticians tend to focus primarily on the physical play and miss the opportunities presented by playing off the political and institutional bodies as well. Tacticians that relate their projects to interest groups and government have a better chance to formalize their intervention. Interventions capture these efforts with varying levels of success and sophistication, with each project different in context and texture.

TU poses a host of risks and potential rewards. Like traditional acts of civil disobedience, TU can be very generative, allowing players to pilot projects on a small-scale, minimizing risk and cost. TU can go beyond spotlighting problems to produce solutions. Both are good, I argue, for government and good for would-be innovators in civil society.

Yet with rule breaking comes the risk of going beyond civil disobedience and duty into parochial, special-interest agendas and even vigilantism. To minimize that risk, the field needs some rules of the road, as safeguards in the TU playbook. As of now, TU does not have a code. Developing one is a critical next step, both for urban tacticians and planning research.

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INTRODUCTION

Otherwise known as Do-It-Yourself (DIY), guerrilla, pop-up urbanism and city repair, tactical urbanism (TU) gained a lot of hype in certain circles in the past couple years. It is a play on the physical and political landscape, manifested as a design intervention. Though TU remains a subcultural movement, urbanists, artists, residents, and even some city governments are jumping on the bandwagon. Typically found in traditionally liberal cities, such as New York, San Francisco, or Portland, look carefully and you might notice a pop-up parklet, guerrilla bike lane or garden, or DIY wayfinding signs materializing over night. Some acts, such as PARK(ing) Day, stay within legal confines, while others, such as Walk Raleigh (North Carolina), and Better Block (Dallas, Texas), do not. PARK(ing) Day, and some components of Walk Raleigh, made the leap into formalization. More commonly many others—Better Block and Guerrilla Bike Lane Separators on Bergen Street (Brooklyn, New York)—are in a stage of recognition and response from government. Given the trend, it is likely many more projects exist but never make it to this stage of recognition and response.

Tactical urbanism is highly attractive because it yields a quick, tangible result. There is some debate around TU as an effective and fair vehicle for change. Some claim that the popularity of tactical urbanism is really a public critique expressing disillusionment for dysfunctional city government. “The problem is...the rise of tactical urbanism actually reflects the paralysis of city-wide and systems-focused efforts...the enthusiasm with which we’ve all embraced it is a tell for what we don’t talk about, which is fundamentally broken city governance” (Steffen, 2012). Others think long-term sustainability is the biggest challenge for TU. “The key challenge for tactical urbanism is sustainability; i.e., whether citizens, developers, and civic leaders can effectively collaborate to make permanent change in a way that’s sensitive to, and informed by, a broad cross-section of community desires” (Saitta, 2013). Interventions can demonstrate what the community really wants by informally piloting a project, but these acts are also the physical manifestation of individualistic expression. There is much debate surrounding tactical urbanism’s claim to legitimacy and its ability to institutionalize long-term change in cities. As a burgeoning trend, TU has yet to be thoroughly explored.

The bulk of this research examines the urban legend surrounding San Francisco’s (SF) parklet program as many assume it a result of PARK(ing) Day. By looking at the process of formalization in this case, the research hopes to uncover creative methods of public policy reform. This research also examines three other tactical urbanism projects (“caselets”) in Dallas, Texas; Brooklyn, New York; and Raleigh, North Carolina. I use the primary and secondary case studies to investigate these questions:

**How and under what conditions has tactical urbanism developed?**

**How has government responded to acts of tactical urbanism?** What are the effects of tactical urbanism? Under what conditions does government adopt or otherwise institutionalize TU-originated practices or policies? Under what conditions does TU serve as a catalyst for longer-term and/or scaled-up change?

The case studies flesh out a history of the movement, the results of the TU project, and interviews with key players from each project.
INVESTIGATING THE URBAN LEGEND OF SF’S PARKLETS. FROM THIS?

Figure 1: Rebar’s original PARK(ing) temporary intervention. Photo credit: Scher & Rebar, 2005a.

TO THIS!

Figure 2: Parklet on 3876 Noriega Street, sponsored by Devil’s Teeth Baking Company. Photo credit: SF Planning Department, 2012.
In conclusion, this thesis will provide policy recommendations based on an analysis of the above findings. Based on the results, the conclusion will also give recommendations about the long-term potential of TU as a tool for change.

RESEARCH METHODS

While tactical urbanism encompasses a variety of acts, this research focuses on the recognition process of tactical urbanist interventions by city government. These interventions specifically highlight issues of mobility and public space in the neighborhood.

THESIS METHODOLOGY

This thesis uses the case study method of research to investigate how tactical urbanism developed and how government responded. The case study method is used to explore TU because it is a relatively new trend and not well understood in terms of development and formalization. Little data and formal academic research exists on tactical urbanism; and few instances have been thoroughly studied or chronicled. Creating case studies about this trend helps shed light on decisions made by tacticians and government, how they were implemented, and how/if acts were formalized. Qualitative research serves as an appropriate tool for investigation because of its descriptive qualities. The methodology uses documentary evidence, artifacts, and interviews key actors from different sectors to shed light on the decision-making process.

CASE STUDIES

This section produced four case studies giving life and detail about the history of each project, information about key actors, and the institution(s) giving attention to these acts including details about political engagement, interaction and inspiration. Each has a coordinating level of thoroughness.

PRIMARY CASE STUDY

San Francisco’s Parklet Program, Pavement to Parks (P2P), SF Planning

This case will incorporate the most thorough approach of investigation. Two-stage sampling and multiple methods saturate the case to produce a deep analysis about the genesis of San Francisco’s parklet program.

METHODS

I incorporated a blend of qualitative methods that would provide a more complete understanding given the myriad factors in the case. In case study research it is valuable to use data from a variety of sources to test and cross-analyze the integrity of the narratives, to glean critical perspectives from as many sides as possible.

In January 2013, I went to San Francisco to conduct a site visit to the first parklet by Mojo’s Café along Divisadero Street. There I visited the parklet and walked the site to get a feel for the neighborhood and how the parklet related to the built environment around it. The parklet juts out onto busy Divisadero, but provides enough of a set back that the sidewalk and environment between the parklet and Mojo’s felt more peaceful. The seating directly on the parklet felt calm too. I took photographs to add to my per-
sonal database. Unfortunately Mojo's Café was under construction during my visit, so I was not able to see the café open and how it functioned in relation with the parklet.

My primary data was key informant interviewing with representatives from public sector, urban tacticians, activists, the non-profit sector, small business representatives, and media. In San Francisco, I met most of my interviewees and conducted face-to-face interviews in their own office space. Interviewing them in their professional environments helped inform my understanding of the types of organizations and financial backing of each player. The environment tells a lot about both the informant and their organization.

The purpose of the interviews are to gain an insiders perspective about the history and the origin of the parklet program, and to gauge how influential the tactical urbanist intervention PARK(ing) Day was on the city's parklet program. With the discussions structured to illuminate connections between tactical urbanism activism and the implementation of the project. How the public sector learns of these types of projects, when/why/how government decide a project is worth implementing on their own, and what kind of political support it requires to lift something like this off the ground. The questions I asked revolved around process, implementation, and the relationship between PARK(ing) and the parklets.

The other qualitative methods I used in my research included collecting documentation of activities, such as renderings, reports, and other programmatic information. I also sourced media documentation and reports (news print media, informal news sources, blogs).

INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

The following people graciously served as informant interviewees in this primary case study. As representatives from the public sector, the non-profit sector, small business representatives, media, tactician and activist point of view, their thoughts and perspectives help inform this investigation. (Listed in alphabetical order.)

**Government**

Paul Chasan, Current Manager, Pavement-2Parks (P2P)

Timothy Papandreou, Deputy Director for Strategic Planning, SFMTA

Andres Power, Former Manager, P2P

Ed Reiskin, Director, SF Metropolitan Transit Authority (SFMTA); former Director, Public Works

**Media**

Aaron Naparstek, Founder and Former Editor-in-Chief of Streetsblog

**Non-profit**

Gabriel Metcalf, Director, San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association (SPUR)

Representative from the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition

**Private sector**

Remy Nelson, Owner, Mojo Café; first parklet sponsor
Urban tacticians
Blaine Merker, PARK(ing) Day Creator; Principle, Rebar
Matthew Passmore, PARK(ing) Day Creator; Principle, Rebar

SECONDARY CASE STUDIES
Better Block, Dallas, Texas
Walk Raleigh, North Carolina
Guerrilla Bike Lane Separators on Bergen Street, Brooklyn, New York

Each case represents a different stage of identification and recognition by their respective city governments, which could help illustrate the different phases of recognition. The purpose of analyzing the inner- and outer-workings of these tactical implementations will help illuminate the process of formalization and/or institutionalization.

The scope of these cases is significantly narrower, but they still use a multiple methods approach to illustrate the types of activities taking place in various cities. Sketching out these activities also gives perspective on tactical urbanism and demonstrates Rebar’s PARK(ing) Day is not an anomaly.

The research uses documentation of activities such as renderings, reports, and programmatic information. Media documentation and reports (news print media, informal news sources, blogs) were also used to inform this narrower investigation. I collected some primary data on the Guerrilla Bike Lane. For this case, I asked a friend to take photographs of the bicycle lane on April 26, 2013 to confirm if the barriers were still present.

KEY FINDINGS

- Tactical urbanism is a play on the physical and political landscape, manifested as a design intervention. Each intervention was not a means to an end. In some successful cases the intervention becomes a stepping-stone to create a longer-term solution.

- The long-term success of tactical urbanism appears to depend on the tactician’s ability to engage the interest of the public and the more powerful interest groups in the area.

- By removing the risk factor from government, tactical urbanism works synergistically with the public sector to innovate by public pilot testing.

- Tactical urbanism blurs the lines of participatory planning and civic engagement. It is highly individualistic, but also allows some space for public participation. It has elements of communitarianism but is not necessarily democratic. It engages some civil disobedience tactics, but does not encourage or engage participatory techniques to articulate a message or cause. It has the spirit of “self-help” practices, but risks becoming an elitist movement by representing the very few.

- Tactical urbanism is not defined by expanded participation in official decision-making or deliberative practice but rather by small-scale direct action—shaping outcomes immediately, tangibly, on the ground.
ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS

Introduction: This section sketches the context for the research. It defines tactical urbanism and lays the investigative research foundation for the thesis.

Chapter One: It introduces tactical urbanism along with some fundamental questions about the integrity of the act in terms of public participation and innovation as it relates to city making. This chapter weighs the limitations and contributions of previous research as they relate to tactical urbanism.

Chapter Two: By exploring the three "caselets," this chapter helps determine TU characteristics and provide greater context and texture about the trend.

Chapter Three: This is the heart of the thesis and explores the urban legend around San Francisco's parklets (the primary case study). It uses the primary data and analysis collected to examine the process that took PARK(ing) to parklets. By investigating the process of recognition and formalization of the parklet program, this chapter hopes to shed light on creative practices to reform public policy.

Chapter Four: Key findings, recommendations, summary analysis, and future areas of research inquiry are outlined in this chapter. It also investigates tactical urbanism in two parts: 1) as a long-term sustainable tool for change; 2) the specific impact and influence it had in the San Francisco case and the "caselets."
1. WHAT IS TACTICAL URBANISM?

In the past several years, small "pop-up" changes in the urban fabric have started appearing in cities throughout the United States. In 2011 the term "tactical urbanism" was coined (Lydon, 2010, 2011), and a new trend defined. Other common terms to describe acts of tactical urbanism are Do-It-Yourself/guerrilla/pop-up urbanism and "city repair" (Lydon, 2010, 2011). Tactical urbanism (TU) refers to temporary activities that are both sanctioned and unsanctioned by local government. These projects highlight a need or want in a community, and some of these projects are formalized.

While tactical urbanism remains primarily a subcultural movement, it is beginning to gain traction in popular culture in traditionally politically liberal cities and in some cases with their respective city governments. Identifying the beginnings of a pattern, Lydon and his cohorts—"the tacticians"—published two volumes on tactical urbanism and its uses. In both volumes they define tactical urbanism character:

- A deliberate, phased approach to instigating change;
- An offering of local ideas for local planning challenges;
- Short-term commitment and realistic expectations;
- Low-risks, with a possibly a high reward; and
- The development of social capital between citizens, and the building of organizational capacity between public/private institutions, non-profit/NGOs, and their constituents (Lydon, 2010, 2011).

Lydon's definition includes activities from guerrilla gardening and wayfinding signage, to DIY complete street networks and bike lanes, to micro-entrepreneurs sharing building space, and street vendors and food trucks. This definition of tactical urbanism encompasses an enormous variety of activities that fall under the TU umbrella. Tactical Urbanism Volume 1 and Volume 2 lump all of these ad hoc activities together.

Though an important definition, this thesis argues the other component of tactical urbanism is also about the intangible political dynamics within each intervention. This research pushes a new, more specific definition forward: tactical urbanism is a play on the physical and political landscape, manifested as a design intervention.

In addition to the projects and sources that Lydon identifies, there is also the trend of crowdfunding to sponsor tactical urbanism projects. Crowdfunding sites such as Kickstarter allow independent urban tacticians to solicit funding for their projects. In some aspects, independently funding local projects democratizes project implementation. Today communities have options beyond traditional funding streams, such as public and private grants. Instead groups can create a Kickstarter campaign, get it funded, and use the monies to implement the project.

However, this mechanism opens up neighborhoods to outside funding which sponsor hyper-local niche interventions that may or may not benefit those who live there. In all likelihood Kickstarter campaigns for micro-projects are typically funded by the social networks of the campaign creator, but legitimate is a project that receives most of its funding from non-local contributors?

In fact, these are new iterations of the same questions of legitimacy and process that city government and communities have struggled with for decades: Who decides what and

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¹ As of November 24, 2012 I found twelve tactical urbanism projects that received 100%+ funding to install their projects on Kickstarter.
where projects get implemented? How much input do the people who live with the project have versus the public (or private) body that pays for and implements the project?

TACTICAL URBANISM, CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, + ‘INNOVATION SPOTTING’ IN CITY-MAKING

There is little doubt of the importance of public participation today. It can be a messy process but participation is a critical component of a democracy supporting legitimacy, justice, and efficacy of public action (Fung, 2006). City government and communities have struggled to find the balance on these issues for decades.

One of the most famous examples that led to this struggle was the decade-long fight (1959-71) over the Lower Manhattan Express Way in New York City (Flint, 2009). Post-WWII, federally funded urban renewal programs implemented by top-down planning was the norm. In response, Jane Jacobs led a community-organized movement that ultimately prevented the construction of the urban freeway (Jacobs, 1961). The struggle over the proposed Lower Manhattan Express Way became an infamous example of this deeply flawed system (Flint, 2009). This movement exemplified community organizing in planning and planted the seeds for a bottom-up planning process. It opened the dialogue around public participation and legitimacy in planning.

Over time the transformation in public sector development policy from residents as objects of policy implementation, to residents as engaged and active participants, has only increased (Rohe & Gates, 1985). This change is reflected in the language of the field: “bottom-up planning,” “grassroots activism,” “participatory planning,” “community-based planning” remain popular buzzwords today in the sector. Research also supports this shift: projects are less likely to fail with community buy-in. A process that provides sufficient space for dialogue has other positive effects including personal network development which helps build social networks, and can even strengthen institutional capacity (Innes & Booher, 2004). These networks are a critical component as it helps to build legitimacy for the implementation.

Over the past decade, the field of participatory decision-making witnessed exponential growth (Leighninger, 2012; Nabatchi, 2012). This recent proliferation of interest in civic engagement is driven by a larger frustration that the formal procedures of our democracy are struggling to respond to public demand. “This growth is driven… by the new political conditions facing leaders and managers, and by shifts in the expectations and capacities of ordinary people. In many situations, the old ways of dealing with public problems no longer work” (Leighninger, 2012). The problems facing government institutions—jurisdictions—environment, economic growth, health, social equity—cut across a variety of professional sectors and political and administrative jurisdictions. “Necessarily, the ‘wicked’ character of such public problems recognizes the world in its social complexity, where public decision-making involves so much more than dealing with technicalities” (Christiansen & Bunt, 2012). With the complexity of overlapping systems, decision-making requires more flexibility and input. The proliferation in the field demonstrates that our old methods need a systems upgrade.

The effort to create a more democratic
process resulted in a legal mechanism that causes distrust, disenfranchisement, and conflict rather than cohesion (Innes & Booher, 2004). Public hearings, written public comments on proposed projects, citizen-based commissions such as planning and zoning commissions and boards, advisory committees, and task forces, do not work. “Most often these methods discourage busy and thoughtful individuals from wasting their time going through what appear to be nothing more than rituals designed to satisfy legal requirements” (Innes & Booher, 2004). Thus the negative effects can reflect a public process that is more ritual and tradition, than constructive practice (Briggs, 2003). Our current method tends to divide topics into blocks which pits interests against each other—public versus private, individual versus collective—rather than seeking to identify commonalities to build upon. Once more, “The hearing and public comment processes tend to be formalistic, one-way communication from members of the public to the agency or elected officials... The citizen role is to react” (Innes & Booher, 2004).

These grievances speak to the effort to create a fairer democratic system, that the pendulum swung too far in the opposite direction by giving too much weight to groups that do not represent majority interests—NIMBYism and Neighborhood Boards are often cited as examples (Campanella, 2011). “The public, as many polls have shown, typically believes that government is unresponsive to their concerns or, even more to the point, is responsive to special interests that fund increasingly expensive campaigns” (Innes & Booher, 2004). But tactical urbanism flips this paradigm on its head. Suddenly it is the government and the public’s role to react to a citizen-initiated intervention.

Tactical urbanism provides an outlet to the current debate around methods of public participation. Much of the attraction to tactical urbanism is the immediate gratification of physical change—something implemented, temporary or not. Quality, fairness, legitimacy, and impact are all qualities that might be determined by longevity of the intervention. In short, longevity may imply support. If the project stays, that means the public accepts and it is therefore legitimate; if it goes, it is neither accepted nor legitimate. Whether by public debate or longevity of a piloted TU project, a well-intentioned process is not enough. It must be grounded in a concrete and effective strategy that addresses the larger organizational and project questions (Briggs, 2003). Intention is ineffective if not rooted in a structured system or approach.

One systemized process is through deliberative civic decision-making (Fung, 2006). This process centers around learning, educating and exploring joint interests—“What do we have in common?”—rather than bargaining over issues. “Two features distinguish the deliberative mode. First, a process of interaction, exchange, and... edification precedes any group choice. Second, participants in deliberation aim toward agreement with one another... based on reasons, arguments, and principles” (Fung, 2006).

Consensus building is another process that has its roots in deliberative civic decision-making. “In political theory, [deliberative civic decision-making] has been elaborated and defended as a deliberative ideal of democracy, while scholars of dispute resolution have described such processes as negotiation and consensus building” (Fung, 2006). Consensus building can be used to manage the often unequal listening and grievance process in the conventional public system.

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2 Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY)
Proponents advocate that this method creates the best, fair, stable outcomes, without which projects often result in unfair or unequal outcomes (Susskind, 2006, 2008).

Here is where we begin to see the serious limitations of TU. Tactical urbanism allows no space for group deliberation of any kind. The majority of TU interventions do not have the capacity, nor are designed for a multi-directional interaction beyond asking the public to “react.” In this case, the closest thing to deliberation may be a reaction to the intervention by blog post, Facebook post, or other low-barrier “public” and/or social media source.

As a response to some of the shortcomings to these processes, artistic community-oriented approaches are emerging. The creative spirit of tactical urbanism intersects with these artistic methods. James Rojas facilitates citizen-built models of their city/neighborhood/block using anonymous, random objects to demonstrate and “mine” local knowledge (Rojas, 2010). Candy Chang’s work is at the nexus of tactical urbanism and installation art. She uses the city as a canvas, and develops work that prompts citizen participation. One of her most famous pieces encouraged residents to complete the sentence in chalk, “Before I die,” stenciled on the exterior of a dilapidated, abandoned house in her neighborhood in New Orleans (Chang, 2011). Other creative approaches include Public Question Campaigns led by non-profit groups, such as North End Organizing Network (NEON) and Engage The Power (eTp) (McDowell & Otero, 2011). Public Question campaigns seek to allow anyone and everyone to ask questions that can help shape the public process, as opposed to citizens reacting to preset agendas (McDowell & Otero, 2011). All of these approaches build on the self-help notion that communities know their neighborhood best, and planners must find effective methods to tap into that local knowledge. TU takes this ethos to the extreme when the individual speaks for the community.

These community-oriented activities feed into a growing trend in government innovation in the United States. “What began as a focus on using technology to increase transparency (so-called Open Government) has shifted to focus on citizen participation, participatory democracy, service delivery, leadership practices, and organizational change” (Bason, 2013). Open-source technology uses data made available by government to develop free applications to fill a public need. While these larger democratic issues (citizen participation, participatory democracy, and more) pre-date the Open Government movement, innovators are exploring how technology and public sector data can be applied to these areas. Examples of Open Government projects include open source technology driven applications (Metra Schedules, 2nd City Zoning), Code for America (non-profit), the Open Innovator’s Toolkit (the White House). In this case, the government does not innovate, but facilitates innovation by providing access to the data. “President Obama emphasizes a ‘bottom-up’ philosophy that taps citizen expertise to make government smarter and more responsive to private sector demands” (The White House, n.d.).

Taken from MindLab and Nesta, Figure 3 illustrates the transition to co-production happening more often in the public sector (Christiansen & Bunt, 2012). On the left is the conventional approach, with the citizen impacted by the state, not influencing the state. On the right, the Venn diagram sym-
bolizes the co-production approach in its ideal state with all sectors overlapping and giving equal weight and space creating a completely co-produced result (middle section).

TU creates an emerging relationship between tacticians, the public, interest groups, and government. The influence of interest groups as applied to local government is a foundational power dynamic in politics. Interest groups are often characterized as sources of competition in the back-and-forth power play between citizen and state.

The emerging relationship between urban tacticians and government riffs off the Open Government trend. TU might be seen as a mechanism to publicly source innovation: an individual puts forth an intervention, and the crowd reacts to it. The crowd does not develop it. It is not co-produced.

Tactical urbanism works symbiotically with government because it takes the risk out of the government's hands. Government is notoriously risk-adverse while many in the private sector approach risk as a necessary step to develop new ideas, innovate, and reap the awards. "... If something fails in government, political leaders and staff know they are likely to be questioned about wasting funds. Often the real incentive in government is to keep doing things in the proven and safe way—even if that means better, more efficient methods are never identified" (Kohli, 2011). The public sector is subject...
to many different pressures than the private sector. In TU, the risk lays solely on the individual and if it is a “success”—meaning people like it and the intervention stays put—that creates a much lower barrier to entry for the public sector.

But tactical urbanism takes this one step further with residents bringing self-selected local problems to the forefront of public dialogue by implementing a project that highlights their chosen issue. Much of the energy of TU, and this “self-help” activism, comes from the frustration with our planning process in the United States. For these reasons, TU also shares traits of disruptive innovation. “A disruptive innovation is an innovation that helps create a new market and value network, and eventually goes on to disrupt an existing market and value network... displacing an earlier technology” (Wikipedia, 2013). It is not replacing the formalized public process, nor forcing it into obsolescence, but if the trend continues to grow, it has the power to change the dynamics of the process. Bypassing the system, using subversive measures like TU, is emerging as a new way to get things implemented.

There is a lot of gray area when working out the social construction process between state and society. States do not intentionally sanction illegal activity, but there is some overlap by which each player permits a certain degree of “symbiosis” (Smart & Hezman, 1999). “State law inevitably creates its counterparts, zones of ambiguity and outright illegality” (Smart & Hezman, 1999). Director of San Francisco’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority (SFMTA) expressed a level of discretion in consequence for certain projects as government is likely be more permissive or forgiving if there is no public health or safety issue involved, especially if it is a short-term project (Reiskin, 2013). When these levers of engagement and power do not work, part of the social contract is calling attention to the pitfalls through public discourse, which can involve protest and civil disobedience—which might be expressed by TU intervention.

There are many different forms of protest and ways to engage. Strategic law breaking can be used to promote freedom—an expression of rationality and justice (Scott, 2012). Looking back to the most famous social movements that used civil disobedience as a means of discourse—the Civil Rights movement, the Vietnam War protests, to the Occupy Movement—unlike tactical urbanism interventions, they employed significant community organizing at the neighborhood level, district level, city level and the national scale. These large, famous movements worked with the greater public and used civil disobedience to create a more open system. TU interventions push for change vocalized by an individual, which is by nature a more narrow, specialized push for change. It may or may not help the greater community.

TU differs from what we have conventionally thought of as social movements: collective action, on a broad, mobilized base, to pressure government for change and in the process change public attitudes and norms. Unlike the more “classic” social movements, TU varies greatly in scale, character, and values. Larger scale movements, like Occupy, relied on messaging that spoke directly to the values and beliefs of supporters. This messaging was created in an engaged back-and-forth on Twitter and across other social media networks (Orcutt, 2011). But tactical urbanism only expresses the beliefs of the implementers, which may or may not reflect the beliefs of the community around them.
In TU the demo creates the public discourse, versus Occupy and other social movements rely on community organizing and public protest to create public discourse. Both strains—classic protest and TU—use the public sphere as a building point to engage new supporters and re-energize a wave of momentum to ride.

This action might be an immediate response to a need they see within their own community. The individual gets the job done themselves. Banding together to collectively problem solve has other benefits than simply getting the job done—civic engagement, building social capital, improved personal health and wellbeing (Putnam, 2000). According to Putnam social capital, shorthand for civic engagement (from formal acts like petitions, to informal activities such as family dinners or drinks with friends), is on the decline which impacts our social fabric for the worst (Putnam, 2000). Social capital is shorthand for civic engagement, acts builds community, networks, and can collectively formulate action for the betterment of society (Putnam, 2000).

Indeed, in the first stage of implementation, tactical urbanists seem to be “bowling alone” (Putnam, 2000). Rather than banding together to collectively problem solve, the individual is going at it alone. TU might be another example of a component of the larger decline of civic engagement. However, while implementing the initial stages of an intervention can be a solitary or individualistic act, getting it formalized, or even recognized by the public and government is by nature a collaborative process. A tactician must work with media, the public, and possibly government representatives or elected officials toinitiate the recognition process.

A community that “takes things into their own hands” by acting on their own is not necessarily protesting and/or pushing the state towards a particular outcome. Although tactical urbanism uses borderline devious techniques in the name of civic activism, TU risks veering into the territory of vigilantism. TU effectively straddles both spheres. It can be a powerful form of civil disobedience by civic improvement through community “self-help” activism, or an elitist movement for the individual.

Urban tacticians produce the physical change they want to see, thereby pressuring government to formalize or produce these changes. But how much of tactical urbanism borrows from self-help and community initiated action? Acts that cross the line into vigilantism are those that seek to exclude members in a given area or elevate certain small interest groups. Does this friction actually strengthen society or erode it by developing deeper social factions siloed in their own interests?

As we recalibrate what our values are as a society, our institutions become shaped by, and should reflect the values of society at large. At the local scale, even government representatives—a body dedicated to reflecting the values of the community they represent—are often out of touch with key aspects of community life that remain out of reach in the public sector. Recalibration requires a two-way dialogue stream in order for society to shape institutions and vice versa. This back-and-forth is critical to the social construction process between state and society (de Soto, 2000; Demsetz, 1967). If we look at TU through this lens, the more deviant, unsanctioned activities appear to fit in with society's social contract with the state.
Tactical urbanism blurs the lines of participatory planning and civic engagement. It is highly individualistic, but also allows some space for public participation. It has elements of communitarianism but is not necessarily democratic. It engages some civil disobedience tactics, but does not encourage or engage participatory techniques to articulate a message or cause. It has the spirit of “self-help” practices, but risks becoming an elitist movement by representing the few. When government allows TU, it enables elite crowdsourcing—an individual puts forth an innovation, but the crowd reacts to it. By removing the risk factor from government, tactical urbanism works synergistically with the public sector to innovate by public pilot testing. Tactical urbanism is not defined by expanded participation in official decision-making or deliberative practice but rather by small-scale direct action—shaping outcomes immediately, tangibly, on the ground.

But the real test comes once the project is implemented. Much of the power behind TU lies in its ingenuity to creatively and quickly call attention to a concern. The longevity and change-power lay in the tactician’s ability to use the project to call more public attention to the issue. Planning decisions are usually not about the quick adoption of smart ideas, no matter their origins. As we will see in the next chapters, TU’s long-term, sustained impact on policy and practice depends on the innovator and the government learning to navigate multi-stakeholder, institutionalized processes of democratic deliberation, decision-making, and implementation.
2. TACTICAL URBANISM “CASELETS”

Tactical urbanism (TU) interventions are happening across the country. By surveying a few TU interventions taking place across the nation, this chapter hopes to provide some perspective on the field of TU. These case studies focus on unsanctioned interventions that highlight issues of mobility and public space. I use the following cases as exemplars:

- **Better Block**, Dallas, Texas
- **Walk Raleigh**, North Carolina
- **Guerrilla Bike Lane Separators** on Bergen Street, Prospect Heights Brooklyn, New York

This chapter hopes to highlight and define some of the conditions in which they gain recognition and start the institutionalization process. Rather than government absorbing the project into the public realm, many activities matured in ways that led to new projects and outcomes. Because these interventions continue to evolve, these sketches should be considered as “snapshots in time.”

Much of the information on the caselets focuses on the activists’ account of the project. These accounts create a “political conversation” as carried out through unsanctioned acts, media exchanges, and the formal political process. Awareness of the project is disseminated through a symbiotic relationship between the media and the public. The media primarily relies on word-of-mouth accounts, and the informal observation of use patterns; activists rely on the longevity of their project and media accounts of project offspring in other cities.

Tactical urbanism plays on the physical and political landscape of each city. As we will see in this chapter, the most successful projects use a variety of strategies that feed off the political zeitgeist in their cities. Some projects ride the momentum already taking place, while others foment movement in their city.

**BETTER BLOCK, OAK CLIFF, DALLAS, TEXAS**

**WHAT:** Informal, unsanctioned, activity to redesign block into one with a Complete Streets typology  
**WHO:** Jason Roberts  
**WHEN:** April 2010 – present  
**NOW:** Established non-profit organization and proliferation of Better Block events  
**IMPACT:** Helped implement 28 other Better Block events nation-wide; permanent impact unknown

The Better Block (BB) non-profit uses tactical urbanism techniques to physically demonstrate the possibilities of a walkable, bikable, commercial block. The BB uses the Complete Streets\(^3\) typology—a street design system that dedicates equal priority to all users (National Complete Streets Coalition, 2010). Today the organization is dedicated to supporting interested citizens put on their own Better Block event. As of April 2013, BB helped implement 28 other Better Block events (Open Source, 2012).

BB got its start in April 2010. Over a two day period, a group of 15 citizens—architects, business owners, non-profit leaders, activists, artists, and residents—transformed the 400 Block of North Tyler Street from an auto-centric thoroughfare into one that more closely modeled a complete street (Better Block Admin, n.d.; Moto, 2010). It was promoted as a 2-day “art crawl” that was “part

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\(^3\) Smart Growth America’s National Coalition for Complete Streets dedicate equal priority to all users—autos and NMT modes.  
“[Complete Streets] are designed and operated to enable safe access for all users. Pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, and public transportation users of all ages and abilities are able to safely move along and across a complete street... By adopting a Com-
art installation, part political statement” (Better Block Oak Cliff Art Crawl 2 Promotional Poster, 2010). Go Oak Cliff spearheaded this first tactical urbanist intervention with Jason Roberts (Board Secretary of Go Oak Cliff, and founder of Bike Friendly Oak Cliff), Andrew Howard, and Amy Wallace Cowan (Board Member, Go Oak Cliff) leading the effort. The non-profit organizations involved were Go Oak Cliff and Bike Friendly Oak Cliff. Shag Carpet, a set design group, helped set up some of the exterior landscaping such as lighting and café seating (Roberts, 2010). Cliff Notes bookstore, and pop-up shops such as a gift shop, Wigwam flower shop, a café, and a children’s art store were also part of the intervention.

The 400 Block of Tyler Street in Oak Cliff borders industrial and residential area (see photo below). The original neighborhood framework was built to a human scale. With a streetcar proving service to downtown, Oak Cliff gained popularity in the early 1900s (Ross, 2012). In 1956 the streetcar disappeared, with the post-World War II “White flight” to the suburbs (Ross, 2012; Wilonsky, 2010).

Dallas centered its development around the automobile, and the zoning changed to light industrial on one side, and residential on the other (Wilonsky, 2010). This bifurcated zoning policy created a mismatch in use and changed the residential neighborhood to a high-speed corridor. “Two things occurred that were bad for the area... Zoning changed to light industrial on one side and residential on the other, which means you can’t do live-work developments... [After the streetcar] Tyler and Polk became one-way streets, so you lost 50 percent of the visibility and made it an unsafe high-speed corridor” (Wilonsky, 2010).

But Oak Cliff has benefited from the nation’s renewed interest in cities, experiencing something of a revival. In 2000 the city invested $2.5 million into pedestrian-oriented infrastructure improvements (sidewalks, drainage, and lighting) in the nearby area of Bishop Arts (Ross, 2012). Today Bishop Arts is home to a two-block commercial area comprised of 60 independent small businesses that attract shoppers and diners to a “pedestrian-friendly experience unavailable elsewhere in Dallas” (Ross, 2012).

Today it is an underused neighborhood corridor, with vacant properties, widened streets, and little amenities for residents that lived in the area. The idea for this first Better Block came about in 2009 during the Tyler Street Block Party. Roberts explains: “We had so many people hanging out—around 200—and bands and bike races and an outdoor screening of Pee-Wee’s Big Adventure, but the cops showed up and said, ‘You need to get these people out of street. The streets are for cars, not for people,’ which distills exactly what we’ve been trying to say. The whole thing felt safe. There were people everywhere. The streets were teeming with life, people were buying food—all kinds of stuff. It highlighted the opportunity to take
Activists in the area thought changing the design might produce an outcome that would be more functional for their needs. Roberts “received a nod” from his city council member, and Cowan secured a permit to close part of the street (Ross, 2012). The unsanctioned activity came in the form of remodeling the street. Without permitting, the group temporarily remodeled the block into one with extended sidewalks, a bicycle lane, wall mural, café seating, trees, plants, pop-up businesses, and lighting (Better Block Admin, n.d.). Materials for the project were collected from donors in the area.

The effort physically modeled changes that a reworked zoning policy could achieve. “The project was developed to show the city how the block could be revived and improve area safety, health, and economics if ordinances that restricted small business and multi-modal infrastructure were removed” (Better Block Admin, n.d.). The demonstration publicly questioned zoning restrictions that prohibited the creation of a retail presence. “Part of the problem in this city are zoning restrictions placed on people who want too create, say, outdoor cafe seating or put up awnings… It’s set to light industrial only, and there are restrictions on parking—you can’t open a business without so many parking spaces” (Wilonsky, 2010). The BB “art crawl” demonstrated how a block might transform if government changed the restrictions to more align with the current community who lives there.

While the BB project received media attention—outlets The Dallas Observer Blog Unfair Park, Oak Cliff Blog on the Dallas News.com, and less formal write-ups on transit oriented blogs—and a positive reception from the community and city, it is unclear if BB led to changes in the zoning in this area. City Council member Delia Jasso expressed interest in piloting a Complete Street-type intervention on Tyler Street (between Eighth and Davis) (Appleton, 2010). Jasso also committed her support for the concept, but says she has not had Oak Cliff residents come to her and lobby for these changes made. Jasso explains: “You can show people what it looks like, but then they have to get busy to raise money or advocate for us to put money in the budget.
for it. I support Better Block, but I think there should be more thought put into phase two, which is neighborhood engagement, and phase three, which is funding to make it permanent” (Ross, 2012).

Longtime Oak Cliff resident Jacob Kurtz expressed support for the project, but also observed a mismatch of needs. Oak Cliff is primarily a blue-collar working class community. With families busy working to make ends meet, outdoor cafes and flower shops smack of the complexities of gentrification.

Roberts touches on some of the results of the program. “If you go back to most Better Block projects within a year or two, something in the private space has occurred that wasn’t there before. Often people who started businesses came here because they saw the potential” (Ross, 2012). To be fair, the innovation behind Roberts’ BB intervention was coupling the Complete Street design with commercial activity. The two go hand-in-hand to support each other, but to combine them together in one tactical urbanist intervention is unique. BB’s strength is to illuminate the potential. The next step is working with businesses and government to invest in the area in a real and permanent way.

WALK RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA

WHAT: Informal, unsanctioned, sign-hanging to assist with wayfinding (including walkability indicators) and thereby encourage walking in Raleigh

WHO: Matt Tomasulo

WHEN: January 2012 – present

NOW: Components of Walk Raleigh was adopted into the city’s pedestrian plan; Walk Your City is a non-profit working on a mobile wayfinding app; CityFabric a private business

IMPACT: Components of Walk Raleigh was adopted into the city’s pedestrian plan. However there is no information if the signage makes more people walk.

Matt Tomasulo says he was inspired to create signage when a friend mentioned that it really was not that far to walk from Glenwood South and Seaboard Station in Raleigh (Shrader, 2012). Other reports say he was frustrated with the pace of Raleigh’s adoption of a pedestrian plan (Snyder, 2012). As a result, Tomasulo developed Walk Raleigh as part of his thesis for his master’s in city planning degree. In January 2012, he and a few friends hung 27 signs at three major intersections in downtown Raleigh. Each sign had a QR scan code where people can hold their phones to scan the information and receive a tailored pedestrian route (including distance estimate) via Google Maps.

The project received a lot of coverage from large national and international news sites, such as the BBC and NPR. Walk Raleigh gained a lot of attention due to the novelty of the project—this appears to be the first project of its kind to (at least) garner media attention. While Walk Your City claims to support similar wayfinding sign installation projects, Walk Raleigh is the most famous and garnered the most media attention because it was first. The long-term implications of projects that do not receive attention—for example, the media attention is a critical component that forces government to act—suggest that they might have little on-the-ground impact.

Although Walk Raleigh appeared popular
from the press, Raleigh's city government removed the signage due to posting without a permit. Mitchell Silver, Raleigh's City Planning Director, did not want to punish but rather synergize. “Yes, they didn’t get proper permits, but it shows a level of passion and commitment to a city and encourages walking. We want to work with this younger generation to capture that energy to build a future city they want to see” (Kellner, 2012). A few weeks later Silver met with Tomasulo to discuss a three-month pilot program using Walk Raleigh’s signs on a donation basis. Silver presented the pilot project proposal to Raleigh’s city council, which passed unanimously in March 2012 (Maguire, 2012). In preparation for the vote, Tomasulo also collected 1,000 signatures in support of the signage (Slattery, 2012).

Despite this public showing of support for the project, there is little information about the actual impact of the signage and whether it in fact increased walking. Tomasulo nor others have publicly made steps to measure the impact of the programs. However in December 2012, Walk Raleigh transitioned from a pilot project to a formalized component within Raleigh’s 2012 Comprehensive Pedestrian Plan (Tomasulo, 2013b).

In May 2012, Tomasulo launched a successfully funded campaign, Walk Your City, on Kickstarter. Walk Your City is a non-profit organization that provides open-sourced, guerrilla wayfinding templates for citizens to create wayfinding signage for their cities (Tomasulo, 2012). Since then, over 20 cities have adopted similar Walk Your City projects around the United States.

Figure 6: Tomasulo and friend installing the guerrilla Walk Raleigh wayfinding signage, Photo credit: Tomasulo, 2012.
Walk Your City is also partner to a private business. CityFabric is Tomasulo’s private company created to “Redefine community by stitching together people and places through civic and social innovation, tactics and design” (Tomasulo, 2013a). CityFabric specializes in t-shirts, prints and other accessories with silkscreened maps of cities. Their slogan is “wear you live” (Tomasulo, 2013a). CityFabric appears to financially support Walk Raleigh, Walk Your City and allows Tomasulo to continue to innovate in this sphere.

GUERRILLA BIKE LANE SEPARATORS ON BERGEN STREET PROSPECT HEIGHTS BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

WHAT: Unsanctioned installation of physical separators along existing bicycle lane to reduce vehicles parking in bike lane

WHO: Ian Dutton, neighborhood resident cum activist

WHEN: July – November 2012

NOW: Separators remain to discourage parking within the existing bicycle lane.

IMPACT: NYPD installed temporary dividers along the bike lane, physically preventing automobiles from parking in the bike lane. As of April 2013 they are (still) present and functioning (Makagon, 2013).

On July 19, 2012, Streetsblog reported the installation of a guerrilla bike lane separator on Bergen Street between Sixth Avenue and Flatbush to discourage vehicles—New York Police Department (NYPD) in particular—from parking in the bicycle lanes (Fried, 2012). Local resident Ian Dutton claimed responsibility for installing the intervention, calling it as a “fun ‘suggestion’” to keep automobiles from parking in the path (O’Neill, 2012b). He used leftover Con-Edison construction posts from utility work down the street, which worked until the company needed them for another utility project (Fried, 2012). On July 23, 2012 Streetsblog reported the resurrection of the guerrilla bike lane separators, this time not installed by Ian Dutton. Many took this second effort as a signal that the local bicycle community did not feel safe when cars parked in the bike lane. All in all the temporary separators lasted six weeks (O’Neill, 2012b).

With the press involved, both the bicycle lane users were able to voice their opinions: “It’s hard to use a lane if the NYPD is using it as a parking lot” (O’Neill, 2012a). The police were also given the opportunity to voice their point of view explaining NYPD only parked in the lane when there was no
other option. “It could be because a prisoner needs to be taken in or a stray dog needs to be transported” (O’Neill, 2012a). Both parties used the press to openly express their point of view.

As momentum picked up, Dutton took the issue through the formal process of going to the Community Board 6 and Community Board 8 to lobby for a city-sanctioned bicycle lane divider (O’Neill, 2012b). He explained to the board that fewer vehicles parked in the path when the temporary street median was up, and when it came down other cyclists maintained the lane and resurrected the barriers. “A very simple change to the street resulted in a dramatically safer experience for a great volume of cyclists. It ended up being a giant team effort — it got a really positive response” (O’Neill, 2012b).

The collective activism gained enough attention so the Department of Transportation got involved. In November, in a clever show of streetscape diplomacy, NYDP put up their own barriers along the bicycle lanes as both a sign of solidarity on the side of cyclists, and a straightforward means of discouraging parking in the bike path. “Word on the street is that cyclists can thank 78th Precinct Deputy Inspector Michael Ameri for the barricades, though the precinct’s community affairs office credited the NYPD Barrier Section” (Miller, 2012). While there are still some kinks to be worked out — there is the occasional vehicle still parked in the area — the problem has largely been resolved, according to the “activists” (Miller, 2012).

As of April 2013 the barriers are up, protecting the bicycle lane (Makagon, 2013). Since there is no media follow-up or recent coverage, it is not clear if the barriers have been...
up since November, or they were recently reinstalled now that winter is over.

Under the leadership of Mayor Bloomberg and Janette Sadik-Khan, there has been a huge shift to reprioritize pedestrian-oriented public space and NMT in New York City. Without Streetsblog and the urban planning oriented media sites, little information would be heard about interventions such as these. The attention paid to this dispute appears to be riding the energy of this city zeitgeist as fueled by Streetsblog and other information disseminators.

TAKEAWAYS FROM CASELETS

All projects are unsanctioned and therefore have the “act first, ask for forgiveness later” ethos.

- The founders all had deeper than novel interest in city planning and street design. Some are professional planners or traffic engineers.

- All founders have a physical presence in the area and have been there and plan to stay there for the long term. They have long-term stake in the outcome.

- Constituency building, if it happened at all, was quick and informal. Constituency building appears in the form of longevity of project, or public demand for the project.

- Online presence was a key to expanding public interest. The Internet helped generate enough momentum for outsiders to take notice and, if shut down, ask for it back.

- Catchy branding can be used to develop into something more long-term. E.g. Better Block, or Walk Raleigh.

- Each project is in a different phase of recognition, varying between forming a non-profit, a business, a public debate between public sector interests and departments, and the more predictable model of institutionalizing the program via government formalization. In order for a project to have a longer-term life, formalization by government is not the only outcome.
3. SAN FRANCISCO’S PARKLET PROGRAM

The most famous example of tactical urbanism turned city policy is the San Francisco’s Parklet Program. Urban legend claims San Francisco’s parklets evolved out of tactical urbanist intervention PARK(ing) Day. In spite of the acceptance of this narrative, it is unclear what steps were made to formalize a conceptual art piece within Pavement2Parks (P2P) in San Francisco’s Planning Department. The case of San Francisco’s (SF) parklets demonstrates a full-cycle process of formalizing a tactical urbanism intervention as one critical component of a larger “climate of change” developing within the city. By investigating the process of recognition and formalization of the parklet program, this chapter hopes to shed light on creative practices to reform public policy.

WHAT: The urban legend between PARK(ing) Day and San Francisco’s parklets

WHO: Rebar Inc and San Francisco Planning

WHEN: 2005 - present

NOW: Formalized parklet program in San Francisco Planning’s Pavement2Parks

IMPACT: First parklet on Divisadero in 2010 and in January 2013 there were thirty-eight parklets in existence (P2P, 2013b)

Figure 9: Parklet on 1331 9th Avenue, sponsored by Arizmendi Bakery
Photo credit: Jack Verdoni Architecture, 2011.
SAN FRANCISCO'S PARKLET PROGRAM WITHIN PAVEMENT TO PARKS (P2P)

It's not that one thing sort of marked and became something else; these things actually are happening in the same space at the same time. So the different phases that you're talking about co-exist. And they kind of occupy different pieces of the activist spectrum—they engage different people and it's interesting how they can sort of play back and forth with each other at the same time now that both are mature.

— Blaine Merker, Principle of Rebar; Co-Founder of PARK(ing) Day

Today the Parklet Program is housed within SF Planning’s P2P division. SF Planning’s P2P program is a collaborative effort between the SF Planning Department, the Mayor’s Office, the Department of Public Works, and the San Francisco Municipal Transit Authority (SFMTA). The P2P program “seeks to temporarily reclaim these unused swathes of land and quickly and inexpensively turn them into new public spaces” (Planning, n.d.). While the website specifically denotes the spirit of “temporarily” reclaiming the right-of-way (ROW) for public use, the long-term objective is the permanent reuse of space.

CREATING A “CLIMATE OF CHANGE” IN SAN FRANCISCO

Upon deeper investigation, the evolution of PARK(ing) Day to parklets is more complex than the urban legend would have it. Many different parties held independent and overlapping activities that created a “climate of change” in San Francisco. The climate of change was created by six factors, occurring at overlapping intervals, in rough non-linear phases:

1. The city already demonstrated an active and on-going commitment to improving public space, and the parklets fit with the broader vision.

2. Activists engaged the community and inspired citizens and the city.

3. Civic leaders developed intense non-profit activism around non-motorized transportation and public space in San Francisco.


5. The parklet concept garnered key leadership support in the form of dedicated institutional capacity, continuous “green lighting” of the project, and open dialoguing between departments with overlapping interests.

6. The private sector got on-board and saw the parklets could be a “win-win” opportunity.

7. The media served as a public awareness illuminator and public perception shaper.
1. The city already demonstrated an active and on-going commitment to improving public space, and the parklets fit with the broader vision. The political will was present and different departments in government saw an opportunity for them to gain from. The common challenge faced was a lack of capital to dedicate to the cause.

By the time Rebar organized PARK(ing) Day, the city already demonstrated its commitment to bettering non-motorized transportation (NMT) and public space. In fact, leadership was already taking a pro-pedestrian space approach to projects.

One of the most famous public narratives symbolizing the city’s commitment to NMT was the battle over Valencia Street. Valencia is a major road that runs through the San Francisco and the Mission, one of the largest neighborhoods in the city. The Mission houses a large Hispanic population. It is also home to San Francisco’s “hipster” community—young urbanites, artists, college educated, and typically single in their 20s—which represents a large portion of the city’s bicycle culture.

In the 1990s, the city wanted to turn Valencia into an auto-centric arterial road to connect the central freeway to the Golden Gate Bridge (Fran Taylor, 2006). The SF Bicycle Coalition (SFBC) organized the bicycle community and pushed for an alternative plan that included bicycle lanes on Valencia. This fight lasted for many years, becoming heated enough that the director of the Department of Parking and Traffic at the time, publicly declared “They’ll be bike lanes on Valencia Street over my dead body” (Fran Taylor, 2006; San Francisco Bicycle Coalition, n.d.). In the end, the cyclists won—of which the SFBC claims credit—with Valencia Street becoming a high-use central bicycle lane (San Francisco Bicycle Coalition, n.d.). Valencia was an important win for the cycling community; and today Valencia is a symbolically important street for the younger bicycle generation of urbanists (Metcalf, 2012).

Riding the wind of their success, the next step was to make Valencia more pedestrian friendly. In February 2006, the Board of Supervisors adopted San Francisco’s Better Streets Policy (SF Better Streets, n.d.). “The Better Streets Plan creates a unified set of standards, guidelines, and implementation strategies to govern how the City designs, builds, and maintains its pedestrian environment... the process brings together staff of multiple City agencies to comprehensively plan for streets” (SF Better Streets, n.d.). The San Francisco Municipal Transit Authority (SFMTA), in partnership with other city organizations, began to rethink the public right-of-way (ROW) in accordance to the Better Streets plan.

But it took a lot of time and effort to get to this point. Due to a fragmented political structure, streets in San Francisco primarily stayed the same for 50 years (Papandreou, 2013). The streets of 2005—apart from signature streets like Market Street or Embarcadero—looked like the streets of 1950. Many different departments were technically in charge of the public ROW. The process was decentralized so completely that the process became stuck in its own fragmentation.

It took the mandate of the Better Streets plan for government to seriously examine
the current functionality of sidewalks and the pedestrian realm. “City Hall advocates, members of the public, city agencies were coming around to this idea of, ‘We can really rethink our public rights-of-way’ (Reiskin, 2013). The development of the Better Streets Plan created momentum around rethinking the public ROW to facilitate pedestrian activity rather than funnel automobiles through the city (Papandreou, 2013). These conversations developed concrete outcomes that should be implemented into Better Streets, such as identifying minimum sidewalk widths, lighting types, and sustainable design features like water recirculation. However, the accumulation of these ideas developed into another large capital expense project, which ran head on into the tight fiscal reality of the times.

When the Great Recession hit in 2008, funding evaporated. Though leadership and vision remained, with it included the realization the city might never be able to afford large pedestrian infrastructure investments again (Metcalf, 2012). It was around this time that New York City started experimenting with urban plazas and NMT restructuring (Papandreou, 2013). By this time PARK(ing) became PARK(ing) Day, gaining more prominence and national and international attention. Leaders in San Francisco began to ask how the city could do more projects centered around an informal, incremental, pilot process (Papandreou, 2013).

When Janette Sadik-Kahn (JSK), Commissioner of the New York City Department of Transportation, visited San Francisco, much of the conversation focused around the need to invent inexpensive NMT infrastructure solutions (Metcalf, 2012). New York’s approach steered away from the traditional capital project process and accomplished the basic reallocation of public space with low cost approaches (e.g. paint markers), or political moves (e.g. commandeering the space away from cars) (Papandreou, 2013). “I think it helped broaden our thinking when Janette came and told us what she was doing in New York. There’s a spectrum of ways of approaching this right-of-way transformation, some ways such as the plazas and then the parklets could be done a lot faster and easier and can help sew the seeds for future, long-term permanent work” (Reiskin, 2013). As the U.S. entered this new era of austerity, light, temporary, tested-by-piloting projects grew more attractive as they provided faster results than traditional capital projects that typically took years to come to fruition.

The growing buzz around innovative alternatives to capital projects began to coalesce around the idea of increasing public space with little funds. The process happened “synergistically” between departments where leaders began to seriously consider reallocating excess parking spaces or road space for public space: creating parklets (Papandreou, 2013). “Could we do something that was more cost effective, more dynamic, that was kind of like testing the water of the public because at the end of the day we’re taking away what was seen as an entitlement [parking], a free resource for the public, and replacing it with something that was not exactly what they thought they wanted to or that was potentially viewed as a business-oriented space versus a public-oriented space” (Papandreou, 2013). Parklets were something small, achievable, and potentially very powerful in reshaping public space in a city.

The process hinges on self-selection. Those merchants that want parklets apply and follow the rules, regulations and process
protocol. Those who do not want it, or cannot get sufficient community buy-in to support the application, will not apply. “These parklets are kind of helping us test the water right now and the appetite by the merchants and the public to extend these further out” (Papandreou, 2013).

Opponents of parklets cite the repurposing (or removal) of metered parking as a key complaint. One might assume the SFMTA would also be opposed to repurposing metered parking since it is a revenue source that directly supports mass transit—another agency mandate.

2. Activists engaged the community, inspired citizens and the city: Rebar created PARK(ing) Day.

*I think the PARK(ing) Day project doesn’t get enough credit. It was really an important moment. When I think of this movement that I’ve been part of—the Livable Streets movement—you can trace it back to the advent of the motor vehicle on city streets, the public started pushing against it; you can trace it back to Jane Jacobs; you can trace it to the Earth Day era in the 1970s; but this latest phase of the Livable Streets movement that we’re in now... I actually think that you can trace this phase of the movement back to PARK(ing) Day.*

— Aaron Naparstek, Founder and Former Editor-in-Chief of Streetsblog

In 2005 a group of artists—Matthew Passmore, Blaine Merker, and John Bela, founders of the Rebar Group Incorporated—critiqued SF Planning’s latest master plan. They discovered there was no plan to add green space to the Mission District. In their description of PARK(ing) Day, Rebar writes: “More than 70% of San Francisco’s downtown outdoor space is dedicated to the private vehicle, while only a fraction of that space is allocated to the public realm” (Rebar Group Inc., 2005).

Together the artists brainstormed ways to creatively highlight this missing component in a fun and whimsical way: what if metered parking could be considered a mixed-use space? They researched the legality of transforming a metered parking space, and developed the idea to turn the metered parking into a kind of park. (In SF the user actually rents the space, as oppose to paying for permission to park.) Rather than breaking rules and “asking for forgiveness later”—the modus operandi of tactical urbanism today—Rebar looked for loopholes in the system to exploit. “[W]e researched the code beforehand so we knew that... we were not breaking the law. We knew that we were operating legally... exploiting a legal loophole to... make a point” (Merker, 2013).

In November 2005, the group trundled down to the Mission with a tree, sod, bench, and set up a “park” in parking space the two-hour meter permitted. The cost of materials totaled $200. They got some funny looks from the meter maids and pedestrians, took a few good images, and went on their way. To publicize the event, Rebar distributed images to friends active on the blogosphere, most notably to Matthew Passmore’s wife, Christine, who wrote about the project on the well-known eco-lifestyle blog Superhero Journal. It was branded as a conceptual art piece to increase public green space in the Mission. Within a few days the images went viral, with individuals across the
U.S. contacted them asking how they could replicate it on their own (Passmore, 2013). When the PARK(ing) image landed in Aaron Naparstek’s—founding editor and creator of Streetsblog—email in New York, this photo went viral within the urban planning and civil society communities there (Naparstek, 2013). In one succinct image, Rebar captured the zeitgeist of the times of a movement that both questioned and inspired the re-thinking of the use of automobile space.

In response, Rebar produced materials and entered the speaking circuit to grow the dialogue around issues of public space and automobiles in cities. Rebar developed a free “How To” manual and posted it on their website at the end of 2005/early 2006. Passmore began to speak on behalf of the group to academic conference and other public speaking opportunities. In September of 2006, the artists re-congregated and held an official PARK(ing) Day. In sequential years, PARK(ing) Day continued to garner national and international attention, where it is currently celebrated as World PARK(ing) Day. It is considered a safe and benign way for cities to support citizens exploring a new vision of their city.

Passmore emphasizes Rebar had no long-term vision for PARK(ing) Day, and was more of an experiment to see what the project would do and how the public would respond. In fact, at that time they were not Rebar yet. They were an unnamed group of artists that went to graduate school together. Despite this lack of long-term planning, Rebar recognized the importance of PARK(ing) Day remaining free. More recently Rebar fielded offers from companies—Starbucks to soft drink and automobile companies—to buy the rights to PARK(ing) Day for commercial use (Merker, 2013). Today PARK(ing) Day remains a free and public good with the only requirement attributing credit to Rebar.

The only official government response they received was an offer of support from the Mayor’s Office without making it an official program (Passmore, 2013). The government appeared hesitant about over committing and stifling the creative, whimsical energy that this initiative generated by regulating it.

Through PARK(ing) Day, Rebar modeled what could be done by physically demonstrating “What if?” They created a civic “prototype” to playfully reimagine public space in an urban area. PARK(ing) provided such a broad starting point, it could be easily replicated in other cities for communities to reimagine their own use of public space. But Rebar’s involvement in the production of the first parklet or public plaza in San Francisco ended there (Power, 2013). In their role they figuratively “stirred the pot,” sparked a whimsical public brainstorm, and inspired others in various cities to run with the idea and explore it on their own terms.

3. Civic leaders developed intense non-profit activism around non-motorized transportation and public space in San Francisco.

Residents of San Francisco and the wider Bay Area are legendary for their citizen activism. This legacy gained infamy during the anti-Vietnam War protests at University of California Berkeley, the free love movement along Haight-Ashbury in the city in the 1960s. The history of an engaged public manifests itself in continued action today. “In an age renowned for citizen apathy and for mistrust of both politics and government in America, San Franciscans are, compara-
tively speaking, highly engaged as well as highly tolerant culturally” (Briggs, 2008). The history of liberal, leftist activism continues and filters into many different aspects of daily life—including a robust non-profit activism sector.

In the urban planning and non-motorized transportation (NMT) subsectors, SPUR and SFBC are very strong organizations. The San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association (SPUR) established itself in 1910 as a response to the great earthquake of 1906. The organization self-describes their mission as the promotion of “good planning and good governance” in the city (SPUR, n.d.). Founded in 1971, the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition (SFBC) is a cornerstone of NMT activism in the city. They are one of the most established NMT activist groups and cite the Valencia Street bicycle lanes as a serious accomplishment.

In 2009, SPUR and the SFBC, along with support from New York-based organizations the Project for Public Spaces (PPS) and the Livable Streets Initiative developed the San Francisco Great Streets Project. It would make sense that Great Streets came to be as a result of JSK’s 2008 visit. Even its name, Great Streets, appears inspired by New York’s Livable Streets project—another example of coalition building to advocate for pedestrian-oriented use of public space. The lines and boundaries between Great Streets and the SFBC appear very fluid. Great Streets served as a high-level intermediary that brought together visionaries for higher level buy-in and dialogue (SFBC Representative, 2013).

While Great Streets advocated for many different projects that supported the public and civic life in San Francisco, one of Great Streets primary functions appears to have been a partnership product created to support the emergence of the Parklet program. It was a three-year initiative that ended in 2012. They worked closely with the Astrid Haryati, Greening Director of the Mayor’s Office; spoke with business to listen and communicate ideas about the Great Streets project; and also conducted small research studies (SFBC Representative, 2013). The program had an informal partnership with the Department of Planning; though the strategy was informal, there was a good relationship between the team and the planning department staff (SFBC Representative, 2013).

One of the most serious contributions Great Streets provided was by serving as a public awareness service, gaining public momentum and educating the community about the parklet program. It conducted both a before and after survey assessment of the first parklet on Divisadero Street, in front of Mojo’s Café. “Our [Great Streets] research found that after the parklet was installed, pedestrian activity, pedestrian satisfaction, and the sense of community character in the area had increased” (San Francisco Great Streets Project, n.d.). Quantifying the impact of the first parklet in front of Mojo’s, Great Streets found:

- Pedestrian traffic rose 37% on weeknights.
- The average number of pedestrians increased 13%.
- The average number of people sitting or standing increased 30%.
- Sense of “community character” increased from 80% to 90%.
- Nearby businesses are evenly split between whether they agree the parklet should be made permanent or not (Great Streets, 2010).
In addition to the Great Streets program working as a public coalition service, SFBC continued to work the community, organizing and spreading the gospel of parklets. It was the SFBC that approached Remy Nelson, owner of Mojo Bicycle, about the possibility of hosting the first parklet for the city program. Organizations like SFBC were able to deliver messages to the public that the city was not comfortable expressing. Current P2P Parklet Manager Paul Chasan: “There are tactics that you use from working outside the bureaucracy as an advocate... and there’s things that you do from within the bureaucracy... If I was an insider, that wouldn’t be the same tactics, but it’s all pushing towards the same sorts of goals” (Chasan, 2013). Parties are working towards the same end goals while relaying and distributing the material and content they are most effective at disseminating. Chasan describes this advocacy strategy as one with a “soft touch” (Chasan, 2013). Both the government and civil society remained autonomous entities with their own interests, but the areas where civil society and government found overlapping causes—the parklets a powerful example—created a mutually beneficial and symbiotic relationship.

The movement gained financial support from Silicon Valley. Jonathan Weiner, a successful Silicon Valley entrepreneur who co-founded FinePrint, attended several of these meetings and eventually sponsored programs to support the parklet network. Weiner helped fund the Great Streets program with a $50,000 grant, and later hired Rebar to create a parklet prototype (Metcalf, 2012). Great Streets also worked to educate and inform business owners and residents about the benefits of parklets, and displacement of parking. There was real concern from people that regularly depended on these metered spaces. Parking in San Francisco is limited and becomes a sensitive issue when people perceive it is as under threat. Great Street, Kit Hodges, worked with business owners and talked to them to explain the program and quell their fears about a lack of parking.


[W]e kind of looked around the room at ourselves and said, ‘You know, there’s no reason why we can’t do that here. If she [Janette Sadik-Kahn] can do that on Broadway in mid-town Manhattan, we can do that in San Francisco.’ So, we put together a group of folks to look at plaza ideas, and kind of really lifted right from New York.

— Ed Reiskin, Director of SFMTA; Former Director of Public Works referring to a senior meeting with Janette Sadik-Kahn, New York City Transportation Commissioner

The SFBC organized a speaker series where city leaders that made a dramatic improvement in non-motorized transportation would come and share their experiences and insights. Over the period of a few years, the SFBC brought in a veritable “who’s who” of successful NMT and public space “game changers.” They brought in Enrique Peñalosa (former Mayor of Bogota, Columbia), among others. Like Livable Streets and the NYC Renaissance Campaign, they engaged in high-level city-to-city learning by bringing in former mayors, city planners, and

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34 FinePrint created pdfFactory and pdfFactory pro (FinePrint, 2011).
any successful “game changer” that had a
dramatic impact on the reshaping of public
and NMT space in their respective cities.
A key organizer in both New York and San
Francisco campaigns was Kit Hodge—and
her organizational “fingerprints” and impact
was imprinted in both NY and SF organiza-
tions overall strategy.

In this series of talks, the SFBC led the
charge and organized a trip with Commis-
sioner of the New York City Department
of Transportation Janette Sadik-Khan in
2008—an important city tour of “who’s
who” in the political power spectrum, and
who influences who and what over public
space and NMT. During this visit, she also
spoke with city leaders (mayor, other public
and non-profit) regarding New York City’s
strategic use of incremental change via their
pilot projects. Meeting officials included San
Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom, SFMTA
Director Nathaniel Ford, SF Planning Direc-
tor John Rahaim, Public Works Director
Ed Reiskin, SF Bicycle Coalition leaders,
Rebar, SPURS Director Gabriel Metcalf, and
other civic leaders.

JSK’s visit made a tremendous impact
on civic leaders in San Francisco. Every
single interview conducted for this thesis
research—with the exception of the private
sector because this came later—cited her
visit as a seminal moment (Chasan, 2013;
Merker, 2013; Metcalf, 2012; Naparstek,
2013; Papandreou, 2013; Passmore, 2013;
Power, 2013; Reiskin, 2013; SFBC Repre-
sentative, 2013). This city-to-city learning
helped SF leaders rethink how to implement
projects that were once deemed impossible
without funding. Rather than the more tra-
ditional approach of developing large-scale
capital projects, JSK presented a spectrum of
incremental strategies that add up to serious
improvements.

The P2P website has unmistakable marks of
the influence of JSK’s visit. Right up front
the site announces, “San Francisco’s Pave-
ment to Parks projects are inspired by the re-
cent success of similar projects in New York
City” (Planning, n.d.). P2P brands itself as a
“public laboratory” for the city in partnership
to work with local communities to pilot new
ideas, with some projects eventually becom-
ing permanent (Planning, n.d.).

Andres Power, former Manager for Pave-
ment2Parks, also acknowledges the influ-
ence of Janette Sadik-Kahn’s (JSK) work in
New York City on San Francisco. “We were
sort of, in sort of parallel or slightly behind
the work that New York City was doing
under Janette Sadik-Kahn… testing the idea
of temporary interventions in the public
right-of-way” (Power, 2013). The testing by
piloting, and creating a new development
typology using temporary materials appears
to be inspired by JSK—and perhaps her visit
to SF too. “We were looking at ways to fur-
ther expand the Pavement to Parks program
and we began with a series of plaza spaces,
sort of very similar with what was happen-
ing in New York City and we wanted to
come up with, a development typology that
was quicker to implement and easier to get
in places that perhaps, you know, creating
a plaza was not necessarily the appropriate
solution for the location” (Power, 2013). San
Francisco’s new approach to institutional-
ize a more universally applicable design
typology appears highly influenced by the
city-to-city exchanges that took place in San
Francisco.
5. The parklet concept garnered key leadership support in the form of dedicated institutional capacity, continuous "green lighting" of the project, and open dialoguing between departments with overlapping interests.

"[W]ith Pavement2Parks we said... we’re not designing by consensus, we’re not going to necessarily respond to everyone’s desires, we’re going to listen to the city input but we’re going to make an executive decision and move forward. And we did that because the Mayor’s office, which technically oversees . . . sits on top of all the agencies, was involved. ‘We’ll take feedback and make a decision,’ and not ‘We’ll take feedback and do what you say.’”

—Andres Power, Former Manager, Pavement2Parks on the process of implementing the first parklet

There was a lot of public and political support surrounding the idea of improved public space. After JSK’s visit, this support only strengthened. San Francisco’s Mayor Newsom, already worked in partnership with SF Planning on projects that fell under what Newsom referred to as “green wave” projects (Power, 2013). Newsom’s categorized “green wave” projects as those which took a broad approach to sustainability, which included urban design as a component of urban sustainability too (Power, 2013).

Under this umbrella, Andres Power, former Manager for Pavement2Parks, developed a relationship with Newsom’s administration by collaborating on urban streetscape projects (traditional capital improvement). When the non-traditional ideas of improving public space by reclaiming the right-of-way (ROW) came to SF via JSK, Power championed the P2P initiative. By the time these ideas filtered down the command chain, and key political support already had been gained—from the Mayor’s Office, SF Planning Department, Public Works Department, SFMTA—with everyone onboard with this mission. When leadership in SF Planning empowered Andres Power to lead the charge, the organization dedicated sufficient “capacity” to thoroughly explore the logistics and mechanics of developing a project that fit within the strict criteria of tight budgetary confinements and big public space transformation aspirations.

The beauty of the public plazas and the parklets, and the messaging around them, was that there was something in it for everyone. The SF Planning Department could champion an innovative project that promotes public space—becoming a “culture of yes” (Chasan, 2013). The Mayor’s Office could support its mission for improved environmental sustainability by increasing green space and improving the pedestrian zone. The Department of Public Works could prove new and innovative by re-thinking the use and strategy behind the public right-of-way (Reiskin, 2013). SFMTA could be one step closer to improving the pedestrian network by widening and increasing pedestrian space (Papandreou, 2013). The private sector could use the parklets to attract more patrons. Sponsors of the parklet could attract publicity. The community around the parklet, and those that frequented those neighborhoods, would receive more public space. The non-profit sector and civil society prioritized the project to fit under their domain, making it a success that they could claim as
Figure 10: Building the first parklet in front of Mojo's Cafe. Photo credit: Shaw, 2012.

their own. Everyone took ownership for it at some point in the project timeline.

JSK shared a low cost, and innovative strategy—based around an incremental process—that would allow the city to go forth with these various missions in a time of budgetary tightness. When conversations around these ideas of improving the public space took hold, the political support was already in place—most notably, the mayor’s. Strategically P2P was publicly named as an initiative led by the Mayor’s Office, instead of an individual department. This gave both power and leeway to Power. “We named the initiative as being one that championed by the Mayor’s office as opposed to an individual department which then allowed me to basically sort of steamroll the program” (Power, 2013). While Power did most of the heavy lifting, in terms of day-to-day project management, on the ground strategizing, and overall program implementation, he had key allies that helped him push through the initiative. One of which was Ms. Astrid Haryati, Greening Director of the Mayor’s Office, and a strong Public Works Department (Power, 2013).

P2P’s first project was Castro’s Jane Warner Plaza. Power acknowledges the old adage “you only have one try to do it right” when he talks about the need to put something physical on the ground. “[M]y takeaway was that all we need to do is put . . . put one project on the ground and show that we can be successful and to do it at stealthily as possible so that it just shows up. And we did that… [W]e had to go through, you know, some expedited sort of approval pass, but we really tried really hard to keep this, sort of out of the traditional, sort of, bureaucratic process that sort of revolves around, that’s sort of tied to more traditional projects” (Power, 2013). This process both deviated from conventional processes by collaborating with outsiders, while sticking to norms by incubating in secret for a time period (Kohli, 2011).

In terms of community support, other public plazas were built around sites—such as the Jane Warner Plaza—that were under study and debate for 10+ years. Rather than open the space for a renewed public debate, Power used the past community input and various studies as justification of sufficient public participation. When they needed more current input Power spoke with established neighborhood organizations, in this case the merchant’s association (Power, 2013). The strategy closely followed that of Janette Sadik-Khan where the public plaza would start as a temporary plaza and if the community accepted it, it would become permanent (Power, 2013).

5 Rebar did, however, design the second parklet. Which, after the project was labeled a success, appears to be a lower risk endeavor, with lower risk to damaging the brand or being seen as “co-opted” by the government.
The parklets came after the plazas, with the first parklet going up in front of Mojo’s Café in March 2010 (Roth, 2010). Power is quick to give recognition to Rebar for starting the public dialogue about what else a parking space could be. The parklets were inspired by PARK(ing) Day, but they did not help implement the first prototype on the ground (Power, 2013). Rebar assisted in developing designs for parklets later on, but for this first parklet, they did not contribute to the implementation or push the idea generation process further. Riyad Ghannam of RG Architecture, an architect and member of the SFBC, designed the first parklet pro bono. The SFBC approached Ghannam to design the project, as he was already engaged in issues of NMT and public space being a SFBC member, and with his skills as an architect, he might consider “giving back” to the SF community.

Power acknowledges the real innovation behind the parklet project lay in the innovative implementation process it created. To avoid a dramatically slowed down process, P2P bucked the city’s traditional bureaucratic and decentralized process of designing by consensus and committee, and took a slightly more top-down approach. “[In San Francisco] traditional projects they get watered down because they have to meet every single, you know, design criteria that everyone might have that are often conflicting... because of that it can take years to get anything through sort of the process. And so with Pavement to Parks we said... we’re not going to necessarily respond to everyone’s desires, we’re going to listen to the sort of city input but we’re going to make an executive decision and move forward” (Power, 2013).

Notably most of these types of innovative projects have support from the top political offices and decision-makers—after all, San Francisco is known for cutting-edge policy, innovative policy makers and whimsical and innovative initiatives, especially in the vanguard of environmental sustainability. The communication gap falls short in the lower levels of the political systems—the “street level bureaucrats”—that have the most interaction and become the face of the government. P2P was able to take this approach—effectively strong-arming its way through certain parts of the bureaucratic process—because the initiative was technically housed, and therefore came out of, the Mayor’s Office. Having the mayor’s support empowered Power to “cut through” the process (Power, 2013). The city is most concerned about issues of public safety (Reiskin, 2013), so various concerns and scenarios were voiced to Power. “Every reason why it was a bad idea... was floated and I took that input and designed around that input and got the project done. And now every project subsequently has been eminently easier” (Power, 2013).

The process of design and use of materials was based on the idea of light, temporary and by nature of these two components, cheap. The budget for the first parklet was a mere $5,000 (Power, 2013). Working with RG Architecture, Ghannam designed the parklet and identified material types and sources. Power would then approach the manufacturers of the materials, talk to them about the project, the budget, and ask if they would consider donating the materials for the public good in exchange for some publicity on the on-site parklet signage. All companies said yes, with some as far away as Denver, Colorado donating their decking, including shipping it out to San Francisco and flying their workers out to install
Figure 11: The Parklet-O-Matic infographic is a graphic representation created by SF Planning Departments to illustrate the parklet permitting process (SF Planning Department, 2013).

it (Power, 2013). On a cold and rainy day in March 2010, Power, along with Remy Nelson, volunteers from SFBC and Mojo Bicycle employees completed the installation for the first parklet.

“I think ultimately what’s innovative about that program is the process and the way that it’s able to deliver projects quickly, relatively inexpensively... completely responsive to what it is that people want... whatever it’s use or whatever the design typology is... perhaps it’s a Pavement to Parks installation of, I mean something that I can’t even imagine” (Power, 2013).

As a key overseer of the public ROW, the Department of Public Works (DPW) supported it. Through an ad hoc process, they determined a permit structure and content to ensure it would remain safe for the public and properly maintained (Reiskin, 2013). When they determined the project would be funded primarily with private funds, the DPW established their role was guiding and facilitating the ROW. “And we quickly found... and we were able to do it largely with private money so that the people who wanted it, they... they... we gave them parameters, they put it in, you know, so they installed it, they maintain it, so it was, you know, very little public money or effort required. We were just playing the role of facilitating the conversion of the right-of-way” (Reiskin, 2013).

The DPW took a more active role earlier in the project pipeline. “I was able to play a pretty active role since it didn’t fit into any one specific job section” (Reiskin, 2013). “I mean, what works for us is we had a willing partner who wanted to do it, we was will-
THE PARKLET PROCESS

Parklets are a public space that are owned by the city but operated and maintained by the private sector. Most language is taken directly from the P2P Request for Proposals for Parklets 2013.

- Community Benefit Districts (CBDs), Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), Non-profits, community organizations, schools, property owners, business owners and similar organizations can apply to host a parklet (P2P, 2013a). There are currently 200+ applications on the waiting list (Chasan, 2013).

- Parklets are typically installed on streets of 25 mph or less and set back one parking space from intersections (P2P, 2013a).

- Parklet sponsor pays $1,632+ initially for the space—$791.00 base fee for all applications; $650.00 for up to two parking meter removals (only if meters currently exist); and $191.50 for site inspection before and after installation. ($285.00 Additional base fee for each parking stall beyond the first two; and $325.00 Additional fee for each additional meter removal beyond the first two) (P2P, 2013a).

- All yearly renewals will be charged a $221 flat fee (P2P, 2013a).

- Sponsor submits a design proposal to the city, verifying all safety concerns, etc. (Chasan, 2013).

- Sponsor is responsible for all costs associated with design and installation of the Parklet. Parklets typically cost around $7,000 to $12,000 per parking space, depending on design factors and material choices (P2P, 2013a).

- The sponsor is responsible for costs associated with the removal of the Parklet (P2P, 2013a).

- Hosts are required to provide at least $1M in liability insurance — the same requirement as sidewalk café tables and chairs — naming the City and County of San Francisco as additional insured. Most businesses already carry this insurance; please check with your provider (P2P, 2013a).

- Sponsors are required to sign a maintenance agreement to keep the Parklet free of debris, grime, and graffiti, and to keep all plants in good health. They must maintain the surface of the Parklet daily and rinse out the area beneath the Parklet at least once a week. The Department of Public Health may require them to provide pest abatement beneath the Parklet platform (P2P, 2013a).

- Any movable items, such as tables and chairs, must either be locked down at night or taken inside. All tables and chairs must be different than what you may already be using as part of your business (P2P, 2013a).

- Parklets are free and open to all members of the public to use. Sponsors are responsible for ensuring that there is no table service on your parklet, including placement of condiments or napkins (P2P, 2013a). No smoking, no alcohol permits allowed, no private vending or excluding of citizens byway of vending, etc (Chasan, 2013; Nelson, 2013; Planning, n.d.).
ing to put some money into it, so that’s how those came to be. After that, we turned it in, and this is really where Andres kind of took the reigns and became kind of a program manager, he developed a competitive or kind of a solicitation where we at DPW developed a... criteria working with MTA and Planning and then we did a call for proposals. Just say, ‘Here are the parameters and if you want a parklet’” (Reiskin, 2013).

The SFMTA views parklets as a tool that supports pedestrian activity, which in turn support their mandate to improve walkability and quality of life for the citizens of San Francisco. The very long-term goal for this program is to make the parklets permanent and connect throughout the streets and city. This effort would effectively create a boulevard via sidewalk extensions, creating a wider pedestrian zone. The café load (people sitting) would be taken off the sidewalk and redistributed to the permanent parklet area, freeing up the sidewalk to be used for pedestrian activity (Papandreou, 2013).

While walking is the cheapest modes for the city to manage, expanding the infrastructure to support it is expensive to deliver since it would require widening the roads. “[W]e’ve noticed the utility and the value of that, so wherever we can make more comfortable public spaces, that’s definitely the reason why we support this whole-heartedly... waving any of the revenue that we’re losing on the parking meters” (Papandreou, 2013). SFMTA acknowledges the costs of removing meters are worth the long-term benefits of supporting the parklets.

Figure 12: Parklet in front of Mojo’s Cafe, 639 Divisidero Street Parklet. Photo credit: SF Planning Department, 2012b.
6. Private sector got on-board and saw the parklets could be a "win-win" for all. Now the parklet program is a more mature program facing growing pains with the relationship between business support and public ownership continuing to be stretched.

What is the value of having to maintain a public park if you just don’t make any money off of it...? ... We’re [small business owners] already working sixty, seventy hours a week... When I started my business I said what most people say when they’re starting a business, ‘I don’t want to do this for money,' [and] that’s all true. I do love what I do, I do like my community, and I love being [a small business owner]. It’s totally awesome. I’m not going to say it’s not awesome. And the parklets, just like everything else, is part of your business, it takes up your time, you have to make some money.

—Remy Nelson, Owner of Mojo Café and sponsor of San Francisco’s first parklet

The private sector—in this case small businesses especially—played a critical role in the implementation of the parklets because they fund and care for the parklets. A mutually beneficial agreement was made where the city found that parklets compliment business needs, and business financially funds the parklets, thus serving city needs.

In 2009 a representative from the Great Streets program contacted Remy Nelson, owner of Mojo Café, about the prospect of hosting the city’s very first parklet. Mojo Café was in its fourth year of operation and had garnered a lot of media attention for being the first hybrid café and bicycle shop, right in the heart of the city on Divisadero Street. The location, branding, and user base (cyclists, coffee shop goers) seemed a good fit. In other words, Great Streets engaged the private sector through community organizing and chose an appropriate place they thought would “stick” well. The Great Streets rep put Nelson in touch with Andres Power of SF Planning and they began to work out a way to facilitate and make it happen.

Being the first always comes with more risk than an already established program. Nelson
spoke to the idea of “giving back” to the community that he grew up in. Born and raised in San Francisco, owning a bicycle café, when the idea fell in his lap along with the added responsibility, it still was a risk worth taking.

The first parklet came to fruition through a slightly different process than the current parklets. In a concerted effort to get it done, exceptions were made. Nelson received the space for free, where current parklet hosts pay $1,500-2,000 despite the rule that business is only a host and never owns the space. With the help of the P2P program all the building materials were donated by various companies, WG Architects designed the parklet pro bono, and Nelson, his employees, along with volunteers from the SFBC actually built the parklet (Nelson, 2013).

The most profitable exception to the rule Nelson received was an alcohol license from the state’s Alcohol Beverage Control (ABC). “Since the City never created any legislation to allow the sale of alcohol on a parklet, there wasn’t really any legislation around it... If the ABC had done their homework correctly when I threw this request to them they would have denied it. But since they didn’t really do it right, I have it” (Nelson, 2013). That said, despite the facilitation of goods, materials and processes by P2P, Nelson recognizes that it was not an easy process.

The government partnership appears to be more blithely unaware of business needs than a direct misunderstanding of backgrounds, missions and needs.

7. The media served as a public awareness illuminator and public perception shaper.

Google “PARK(ing) Day and San Francisco’s parklet program” and 20,700 results will appear which link the two events together. In fact, much of the “urban legend” of the parklet program came from the media. The media gave a lot of credit to Rebar linking PARK(ing) to the fruition of the parklet program.

The more in-depth stories and some of the very first reporting on the topic came from Streetsblog San Francisco. Since mainstream media typically does not cover a story until there is an official announcement, a lot of urban planning developments flew under the radar. Simultaneously local media is dying and with it the opportunity for local coverage widened. Streetsblog—founded in New
York in 2005 by Aaron Naparstek—deserves credit for cracking open this niche. The city-to-city learning efforts between New York and San Francisco can be tracked to the first development PARK(ing), but without the blogosphere, and the new urban planning-centric media, it is hard to gauge how much traction an obscure, conceptual art project like this would have received without it.

Streetsblog started in 2006 in concert with the NYC Street Renaissance Campaign, a larger scale advocacy effort, largely credited with starting the public dialogue around the use of public space and reallocation of the public right-of-way (ROW) for non-motorized transportation (NMT) uses (Streetsblog, 2006). The public discussions in New York revolved around protected and isolated bicycle lanes as the idea, reusing and transforming space into public plazas, and reducing space and therefore priority allocated to automobiles. Streetsblog was founded because the mainstream media doesn’t cover these issues. “Ask a person in Brooklyn what they care about, and it’s about their neighborhood” (Naparstek, 2013). Local communities care deeply about these issues, but there was no trusted media source that covered local transportation and planning issues. A newsprint source or magazine couldn’t cover these issues. A blog however, with just a couple people on staff, could very efficiently and competently cover these issues. This effort was also folded into a larger campaign push for better transportation and public space policy during Bloomberg’s re-election campaign, and then second term to start in January 2006. Once the blog existed, in a matter of weeks, it was clear they had an audience. Now transportation planning, even if it is a third tier issue, has a power tool to getting it on the civic agenda (Naparstek, 2013). It was during this activist effort and strategic push that Rebar’s PARK(ing) photo appeared in Aaron Naparstek’s email inbox. In subsequent days, at least 15 different people emailed him this photo. Like any powerful political conceptual art project, PARK(ing) went viral because it communicated all these progress city design ideas and ideals—public space, people-centric cities, NMT, ROW reprioritizing—in one succinct image (Naparstek, 2013). “I mark that the beginning of the Livable Streets movement 3.0 as PARK(ing) Day 2005; where you have this one art project, of some people transforming the street, going out and doing it on their own in a tactical urbanist fashion, not demanding something of government, not holding signs on the steps of city hall, they just went out and transformed the street on their own, with their own resources and using the legitimate rules of that street, putting quarters in the meter. So it was a really powerful image and idea” (Naparstek, 2013). PARK(ing) Day was another vote of confidence for the issues that the Livable Streets Movement advocated for, and also helped Streetsblog gain content.

These types of cross-pollination efforts between San Francisco and New York City helped create a dynamic exchange of ideas which eventually led to tangible changes in policy in both cities.
4. CONCLUSION

Starting from something like PARK(ing) Day to kind of a city-sanctioned pilot, to now a regular permit program [the parklets]... in the course of just a couple of years... you know, things don't often happen that fast... [T]hat says something of the power of that kind of innovation being able to become institutionalized in a good way very quickly.

— Ed Reiskin, current Director of SFMTA, former Director of Public Works, reflecting on tactical urbanism

What is the verdict on tactical urbanism (TU)? Can it be used as an effective tool for change? Or is it a liability or a trendy blip on the radar? The short answer: Yes... with caveats. If used strategically and with awareness, tactical urbanism can be a powerful tool to highlight need in a given area. With each unique TU intervention, nuances vary within each variable—timing, political agenda, leadership, institutional roles and capacity—that when aggregated together ultimately determine the fate of the project.

OVERVIEW

This thesis examined how and under what conditions tactical urbanism has developed, its range, and impact. Chapter 1 reviewed developments in participatory planning, civic leadership and city-making in relation to tactical urbanism. It explored some of the recent academic work around this new trend since tactical urbanism was only defined in 2010.

Chapter 2 surveyed three tactical urbanist interventions (“caselets”) that highlighted mobility and public space concerns in their cities. The research explores how and under what conditions each project developed. Each case—Better Block, Dallas, Walk Raleigh, North Carolina, and Guerrilla Bike Lane Separators on Bergen Street, Brooklyn—was captured in a different stage of recognition:

- **Better Block, Dallas**: Better Block (BB) received enough attention to established itself as a non-profit organization that promotes the BB “method”—a tactical urbanist approach to implementing Complete Street-type design strategies—to residents and neighborhoods nation wide. As of 2013, their project helped to implement 28 other BBs (Open Source, 2012).

- **Walk Raleigh, North Carolina**: The city government is piloting Walk Raleigh’s signage. However there is no information if walking increased after posting the signage. Nor is there information on the impact of the Walk Your City non-profit, or any of the “Walk Your City” spinoffs it inspired.

- **Guerrilla Bike Lane Separators on Bergen Street, Brooklyn, New York**: After back-and-forth between the NYC Department of Transportation, NY Police Department, the District Precinct Deputy Inspector, and residents, police barricade dividers were placed along the bicycle lane to resolve the problem. Media touted a vast improvement in bikability, (though there was no outside source to support this claim). As of April 2013, the barriers are up, protecting the bike lane (Makagon, 2013).

Chapter 3 explored the urban legend around PARK(ing) Day and the San Francisco (SF)
parklet program. PARK(ing)’s approach differed in many regards from the other interventions. Although it exploited legal loopholes, it stayed within the legal boundaries. The intervention was hyper-temporary, lasting only two hours (the limit on the meter). Using this approach, PARK(ing) did not steamroll public opinion. It merely asked, “What if?”

Of all the interventions surveyed, PARK(ing) was the least heavy-handed, least invasive, and the most nuanced tactical intervention. *It was also the most successful.* In the end, parklets became part of San Francisco Planning’s Pavement2Parks program in 2010 (“Pavement to Parks,” n.d.).

However, it would be naïve to conclude that parklets are a direct manifestation of PARK(ing) Day. The parklets came to fruition from efforts on many different levels across government, the private sector, the non-profit sector, and civic activists and leaders. Over the five-year time span—from the first PARK(ing) installation in 2005 to the first parklet at Mojo’s in 2010—different parties focused their efforts on a diversified strategy. These activities overlapped and synchronized with each other. Together these efforts created a “climate of change” in the city. Analysis shows us tactical urbanism was one highly effective tool within a larger arsenal.

**SAN FRANCISCO PARKLETS TODAY**

Today the parklet program enjoys great popularity. With thirty-eight parklets in operation as of January 2013, and the city receiving upwards of 200+ applications per Request For Proposal (RFP) period, the program is growing at a rapid rate (Chasan, 2013; P2P, 2013b). In 2013, P2P published the first free San Francisco Parklet Manual on their website to guide local interests and provide a resource to assist others in establishing parklet programs in their respective cities (P2P, 2013b).

However as the program grows in popularity, applicants and users, new demands and pressures are also applied to the public sector. In short, the program is dealing with “growing pains” (Chasan, 2013). Some of the challenges include: maintenance, management, and private sector responsibility and involvement, such as feasibility of micro public-private-partnerships in small-scale projects. One of the first parklet sponsors recently applied to remove their parklet because the effort outweighed the gain (Chasan, 2013). Some parklet sponsors received citations for mismanagement (Chasan, 2013). Since they are considered a public space, vending or any type of exclusionary tactic on the parklets remains illegal. Other difficulties arise when a business moves or goes out of business. Who takes care of the parklet? Does it stay or go?

It also remains to be seen how the city continues to work with the private sector. There are considerable tensions between the two, with small businesses continually calculating their own cost-benefit analyses. Small businesses buy the supplies; build, sponsor, and maintain the parklet; and take on the liability for the parklet—all without an ownership stake. The parklet must remain public property, and businesses cannot sell goods, alcohol, or control it as their own. With the growing popularity of the program, there is little doubt that businesses see it as a worthwhile investment. Still some businesses, and parklet sponsors, do question if
it is worth the responsibility, liability, and cost in the end.

This tension could pose a challenge for city leaders that see parklets as an incremental approach to building sidewalk extensions. The ultimate goal being a continuous parklet (sidewalk extension) that creates a wider pedestrian zone by placing the “café” load on the outside to free up the sidewalk for improved circulation and walkability. If businesses grow unhappy with the current arrangement, using this micro public-private-partnerships (PPPs) model may not be feasible. The long-term viability of micro PPPs remains to be seen.

Nonetheless, the trend is catching on and parklets are popping up in other cities. Los Angeles and Chicago already fashioned their own parklets, with Chicago calling them “people spots” (Glick Kudler, 2013; CBS Chicago, 2012). They are also extending further east as Boston issued a RFP for parklets in 2012 (Moskowitz, 2012).

EXPLAINING THE FORMALIZATION OF SAN FRANCISCO’S PARKLET PROGRAM

1. Integrate public-private-partnership into small-scale projects. Essentially the private sector funds the parklet program. San Francisco Planning needed the private sector as a serious partner to get this program off the ground. That said the program is facing growing pains—mainly how to make it worthwhile for small businesses to afford them and maintain the spirit of the program. If this reliance on small business private sector funds is a developing trend in the public sector, government might consider other ways to incentivize more private sector involvement into civic improvement projects. As it stands, PPPs at this scale have potential but need to be worked out.

2. Experiment with new process strategies for project implementation. Riffing off New York City’s approach, San Francisco (SF) established their own “incremental process” to implement projects. The city cobbled together their own design and implementation typology to get a quick, sanctioned installation on the ground. Rather than approaching the parklets as your typical large capital investment project and using the traditional public forum planning process, San Francisco started the program by installing one parklet. The city kept much of the project out of the public dialogue, and used previous surveys and established middle-class community organizations—such as merchants organizations, community groups—to interact and get feedback from residents and business owners closest to the first parklet. Then using donated light-weight and low-cost materials, the city installed the first parklet with volunteers and little paid labor. Businesses apply to sponsor parklets through a RFP.

Although P2P did not use the most public planning process to start with, this incremental approach facilitates the establishment of parklets where they are most wanted. Pavement2Parks (P2P) effectively “salted” the city with parklets, and then they flourish and multiply where they “stick.” They will multiply—and perhaps connect into bonafide sidewalk extenders—where they are most wanted and used.

3. Establish mechanisms for frequent peer-to-peer exchange and city-to-city dialogue. Janette Sadik-Kahn’s visit was hugely influential in helping San Francisco
leadership strategize ways to move forward with their own public space and non-motorized transportation improvements. Cities and governments benefit from the sharing and cross-pollination of ideas. Dialogue, face-to-face exchange, and relationship building is a crucial component of this effort.

4. Dedicate sufficient institutional capacity for a project. SF Planning dedicated institutional capacity for P2P. The project needed a “champion” to coordinate with all the various government organizations and interest groups and push the project to a tangible outcome.

5. Projects that can harness the political momentum for their own objectives have a better chance of implementation. A larger conversation rethinking public space and mobility in San Francisco was taking place among city and civic leadership before Rebar debuted PARK(ing) Day. Tapping into the zeitgeist of the city, PARK(ing) Day struck a nerve and became a powerful voice in this conversation.

6. The entire strategy aligned with the election cycle of elected officials. Large capital projects typically do not come to fruition under an elected official’s term. This creates a motivation barrier because their re-election depends on projects and policies established on their watch they can showcase. Politicians are more likely to support projects that are innovative, “cool,” and deliverable within their term. The incremental, somewhat top-down strategy for parklets fit Mayor Newsom’s timeline.

7. Political agendas were aligned. All key decision-makers were on-board with rethinking and reprioritizing the right-of-way. The challenge was not political will, but rather how to implement the changes given the budget shortages.

8. The different parties involved in the project worked symbiotically with each other. Each sector—government, small business, non-profit—had their own agenda, but their work was complimentary. The San Francisco Bicycle Coalition sometimes spoke to concerns from the private sector that SF Planning could not (Chasan, 2013). Though small business had to financially invest in the project, they did because the public good and private gain of the parklet outweighed the cost of investment (Nelson, 2013). Different government agencies had different objectives, but the same goal.

9. Everyone claimed ownership, professional responsibility and took the lead at different points in the process. The parklets came to fruition from group effort. While Andres Power (former Program Manager, Pavement to Parks, SF Planning) was the key coordinator and parklet champion, the project had many other coordinators to push the policies through in their respective departments and organizations.

TAKEAWAYS ON TACTICAL URBANISM

In the previous chapters, we learn that tactical urbanism is both a play on the physical and political landscape, manifested as a design intervention. This section will highlight four broadly defined takeaways for activists, policy makers, and urban tacticians alike.

a. The TU Playbook: breaking down the strategy of tacticians into a 3-step process.
b. Exploring TU as a source of innovation for cities.

c. Who are the tacticians? What does this mean for cities?

d. Highlighting the risks and rewards of tactical urbanism. Does TU need a Code of Ethics?

Each intervention was not a means to an end. In some successful cases the intervention becomes a stepping-stone to create a longer-term solution. However, the long-term viability of tactical urbanism appears to depend on the tactician's ability to engage the interest of the public and the more powerful interest groups in the area. The next challenge is navigating the institutional process and using the different levers of power for positive change.

THE TU PLAYBOOK: BREAKING DOWN THE STRATEGY OF TACTICIANS INTO A 3-STEP PROCESS.

In an effort to breakdown the tactician's strategy, a broad brushed TU playbook might read:

1. Do first.
2. Try to rally public interest through media coverage to build political will.
3. Seek official support.

1. Do first.

The first step of the tactician is to intervene physically with a design intervention (e.g. guerilla bicycle lane, pop-up space, or other). "Doing first" provides a mechanism to feasibly test out physical design ideas. There is a certain genius to piloting. It offers an opportunity to pilot physical interventions in the real world before committing to a serious capital investment. "It's one thing to crunch numbers and come up with a traffic plan; it's another to spend a week trying it in real time, with real people" (Ross, 2012). As TU interventions stand now, there is little opportunity for public input. In fact longevity of the installation is the only potential signal of community acceptance. Despite these limitations, tactical urbanism provides a platform to test ideas before investing considerable resources in making them permanent.

This self-starter, entrepreneurial ethos is closely tied with a results-driven approach and instant gratification of our current time. In an effort to innovate, these solo inventors generally do not trouble themselves to generate public support first. Consensus building or public input is likely avoided because it slows down the process, and/or stymies innovation.

In the tactician’s effort to “get things done quickly” and “bypass bureaucracy,” they eventually come back to government in an effort to formalize their intervention. Ironically these efforts lead to the starting place they hoped to avoid (or expedite) in the first place: the government. In the long run, tacticians cannot “go it alone.” They must learn to work with the institutional and political powers that be to implement long-term stable change.

Tactical urbanism is not a panacea for the dysfunction of government. It has the potential to be sorely misused without proper due diligence before formalizing the intervention. “Due diligence” means going through a serious process that determines community need, want, buy-in, and appropriate use of design strategy—steps that help establish legitimacy of a project.
2. Try to rally public interest through media coverage to build political will.

Online documentation is a critical component of the life of the project. Though tactical urbanist interventions are physically temporary, the life of each project can be greatly extended by online documentation. Social media can be used to promote the project and “catch the eye” of formal media sources too. PARK(ing) benefited from the blogesphere, but really “went viral” because it tapped into larger conversation over public space and non-motorized transportation already happening in San Francisco.

The implementer must devise a strategy that also exploits the political zeitgeist of the city by capitalizing on the “climate of change” already brewing within the city (San Francisco), or calling attention to a lethargic or mired city government (Dallas, Raleigh). Savvy activists learn to listen to others interests and stoke momentum by tying in interests that they hear. They find a way to fit their strategy to work with the momentum, rather than go against the grain. Purists on the other hand, are less flexible in their strategy, which can make their efforts more of an uphill battle.

Rallying public interest through media coverage can generate enough momentum to entice political will.

3. Seek official support

The next (and hardest) challenge is navigating the institutional process. The long-term viability of tactical urbanism appears to depend on the tactician’s ability to engage the interest of the public and the more powerful interest groups in the area.

Strategies to obtain official support vary due to context at multiple levels, including city politics, community interests, intervention approach, and more. Seeking official support differs from official permission. When a TU intervention seeks support in pursuit of formalization, they are also seeking funding. With funding comes support, as compared to permission, which does not imply funding.

This comparative matrix (see Figure X, page X) helps to break down some of the key characteristics and greater context within each case study intervention. The context surround each project is different. Here we can see PARK(ing) was the most successful project, with “success” defined by the formalization of an intervention. Interestingly, it was also the most open-ended intervention. PARK(ing) highlighted the change it wanted to create, but did not prescribe a solution to resolve the issue of a lack of public space in San Francisco. Part of PARK(ing)’s popularity and success may be attributed to its novelty. With the first project launched in 2005, it was one of the very first recognized TU interventions on the map.

Walk Raleigh and Better Block both highlighted a problem in an effort to change policy in their respective cities. Each project prescribed solutions to change their respective environments. They are prescriptive interventions, with Walk Raleigh’s specific locational signage and choice of wording giving the most specific prescribed solution of the two.

Better Block’s intervention worked with business in the area, so there was more community involvement and the possibility for a co-produced prescriptive intervention. Both projects respective impact remain unclear. While components of Walk Raleigh’s project...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCAL VISM VENTION</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>START DATE</th>
<th>LOCAL CONTEXT</th>
<th>HIGHLIGHTING VS. PRESCRIBING</th>
<th>RESULT</th>
<th>DEGREE OF FORMALIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PARK(ING)</td>
<td>Transformed metered parking spot into a temporary “park”</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Rebar developed this intervention in response to a master plan that did not increase public space in the city.</td>
<td>Intervention highlighted a need.</td>
<td>Municipality Parklet Program in SF Planning's Pavement-2Parks.</td>
<td>Formal. Now SF has a formalized parklet program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raleigh, Carolina</td>
<td>Posted guerrilla wayfinding signage</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Raleigh has a pedestrian plan, but it lagged in terms of implementation.</td>
<td>Intervention both highlighted and prescribed a solution.</td>
<td>The city is piloting the signage.</td>
<td>Semi-formal. The city is piloting signage but information is available online.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETTER BLOCK</td>
<td>Complete Street block event</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Developed out of frustration with auto-centric development in Dallas.</td>
<td>Intervention both highlighted and prescribed a solution.</td>
<td>Better Block is now a non-profit.</td>
<td>Recognized but not formal. While the city recognizes the existence of the program, they have not adopted the policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooklyn, New York</td>
<td>Temporary physical barriers to protect existing bicycle lane</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Neighborhood resident was tired of NYPD parking in the bicycle lane</td>
<td>Intervention prescribed a solution.</td>
<td>City intervened and put up police barricades as a temporary barrier—it is still up today.</td>
<td>Semi-formal. Despite the use of temporary nails, the barricades are still present one year later.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14: Matrix comparing all four case studies
were incorporated into Raleigh's pedestrian plan, whether it motivates people to walk more remains unclear. BB's seen its method implemented in 28 cities across the nation and is also now a non-profit, but the overall impact of these events which promote redesigned blocks also remains unclear.

The Guerrilla Bike Lane Separators project is the most prescriptive intervention. There was little room for an open-ended conversation. Cones, and then barriers, were placed to prevent NYPD from parking in the bike lane. In the end it was a fairly simple, focused governance problem between NYPD and the cyclists. The barriers still stand almost a year later— as of April 2013 (Makagon, 2013).

EXPLORING TU AS A SOURCE OF INNOVATION FOR CITIES.

There is an entrepreneurial spirit that runs through many tactical urbanist interventions. TU can serve as a creative way for government to publicly source innovation while minimizing risk. TU works symbiotically with the public sector because it takes the risk out of the government's hands. The public sector is subject to many different pressures than the private sector; and government is notoriously risk-adverse while many in the private sector approach risk as a necessary step to innovate. Government programs—such as the District of Columbia's Temporary Urbanism Initiative, and the public RFP system for SF's parklets (District of Columbia Office of Planning, n.d.; P2P, 2013a)—hint at the possibilities for government to tap into this innovative resource. In TU, the risk lays solely on the individual and if it is a "success"—meaning people like it and the intervention stays put—that creates a much lower barrier to entry for the public sector.

With the potential for quick results and a small price tag, TU is sexy. Since these "light" projects yield quick, tangible results, TU also aligns with the election cycle of politicians. Given the fast results, low cost, and short timeline, it becomes easier for government to invest in these types of low-cost innovation generation programs. However this points to a larger problem of lack of capital investment by government. Large capital projects are resource heavy and do not align with our current election cycle. TU is not a panacea for development woes, and government must continue to invest in capital-intensive innovation programs too.

Bypassing the system by using subversive measures like TU is emerging as another way to get things implemented. For these reasons, TU also shares traits of disruptive innovation. It is not replacing the formalized public process, nor forcing it into obsolescence, but if the trend continues to grow, it has the power to change the dynamics of the process.

WHO ARE THE TACTICIANS? WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR CITIES?

Interestingly, tacticians from these projects were all young (25-35 years), college-educated white men that implemented these projects alone, with little to no public input process taken prior to the activity. It is unclear why TU attracts such activists, or why these activists in particular produce successful activities that attract attention. If TU becomes a new norm to implement strategy, we should be conscious to the extent it articulates, and can amplify, the vision of a race, class, and gender already dominantly

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represented in American society. TU might become another advantage in an already unequal system.

By doing first—and seeking permission or approval later—these tacticians risk crossing over into urban vigilantism territory: taking the law into their own hands, without recourse to lawful procedures. Tactical urbanism brings self-selected local problems to the forefront of public dialogue by implementing a project that highlights a chosen issue. Much of the energy of TU, and this “self-help” activism, comes from the frustration with our planning process in the United States.

If the project does not create public health or safety issues (intentional or not), then TU likely poses less risk for the tactician. In this case, there is reduced risk for the tactician, and the possibility of reward. Gauging risk is complicated because it depends on the government and their level of discretion issue-to-issue. TU may burden government capacity if the public sector faces an uptick in TU interventions and continuously needs to weigh whether to intervene or not.

The intent of each tactician appeared in goodwill. They developed projects to highlight an issue in their community, with the possibility of personal, entrepreneurial success as an added bonus. However all of the activists broke the law (working without a permit), and justified doing so, in the name of civic improvement. But in the pursuit of quick progress, this becomes a dangerous strategy to normalize.

At this point, the larger worry is over the lack of thought and principle behind the action, not the actions itself. Without some mechanism that protects the public, some TU interventions may result in the unintentional infringement of personal liberties. Elected government, as imperfect and often unrepresentative as it is in practice, is still our principal device for aggregating preferences and reflecting ‘public will.’ Our laws work to preserve order, enforce our social contract, and however messy and flawed, work to holds up our democratic values as determined by a public process. To succeed in the long run, tactical urbanism will need to integrate some public input mechanism to build legitimacy.

HIGHLIGHTING THE RISKS AND REWARDS OF TACTICAL URBANISM. DOES TU NEED A CODE OF ETHICS?

Though it is still very much a subcultural movement, tactical urbanism is an emerging trend and we have yet to see how it unfolds elsewhere. Overall tactical urbanism appears most effective when coupled with other tools for change—participatory planning, community organizing, non-profit activism, city-to-city learning, city leadership onboard, and media dissemination of knowledge.

The following matrix (see Figure X) breaks down some of the risks and rewards of tactical urbanism, to illustrate a more complete framework and understanding of TU.

To minimize these negative impacts, tactical urbanism needs a code of ethics. Tacticians could vow to create interventions that seek to improve all social groups in the public sphere; not, as it is now, to do whatever they think is best. The Code of Ethics should take into consideration the risks and rewards outline above. The idea is not to trample or restrict the free and innovative spirit of TU, but to preserve the rewards and minimize the
TACTICAL URBANISM AS A TOOL FOR CHANGE

REWARDS
Creatively highlight problems—and test solutions—to gain the attention of city and civic leadership.

Opportunity to test the genius of piloting.

Government can use TU to publicly source innovation.

Tactical urbanism shares elements of country's tradition of civil disobedience to call attention to a critical need in the city.

RISKS
One person's idea, from one dominant social group, not an idea built on community consensus.

Dangers in testing first and asking questions later.

Unequal voice in public policy.

Despite this high-minded call to action, there is a certain "deviant quality" to these tactical activities.

Figure 15: Matrix comparing rewards and risks of tactical urbanism

NEXT STEPS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

As tactical urbanism is a nascent and diverse field, there is much opportunity to investigate other streams and influences of TU.

TU Code of Ethics. This Code of Ethics should be developed by active tacticians to truly reflect their set of concerns and risks. It would serve as a safe guard for tacticians and others alike, to preserve the rewards and minimize the risks of TU.

Peer-to-peer, city-to-city dialogue. Janette Sadik-Khan's visit to San Francisco clearly influenced city leaders and decision-making. Investigating the power of peer-to-peer dialogues and how they influence change would be a helpful for future programs.

Tactical urbanism and NYC's Public Plazas Program. There also appears to be much cross-pollination between San Francisco and New York City. Although San Francisco created the first parklet, New York City became famous for its public plazas. It is unknown if the Public Plazas Program came out as a response to tactical interventions. There is little written information and no urban legend like SF's Park(ing) associating tactical urbanism and Public Plazas Program. Further research about how New York City developed their Public Plazas Program and process of incrementalism may help improve the understanding of tactical urbanism and innovation spotting by government.

Kickstarter campaigns in TU projects: A better understanding of the influence of outside monies on local projects and tactical urbanism projects is needed. Research exploring the outside funding streams and the influence on local community projects is an important factor to consider that lends itself to future research.
FINAL COMMENTARY

Tactical urbanism is a play on the physical and political landscape, manifested as a design intervention. Tacticians that relate their projects to interest groups and government have a better chance to formalize their intervention. Interventions capture these efforts with varying levels of success and sophistication, with each project varying in context and texture.

Tactical urbanism is not “good” or “bad,” but requires a conscientious understanding of the power and limitations of such a strategy. It blurs the lines of participatory planning and civic engagement. It is highly individualistic, but also allows some space for public participation. It has elements of communitarianism but is not necessarily democratic. It engages some civil disobedience tactics, but does not encourage or engage participatory techniques to articulate a message or cause. It has the spirit of “self-help” practices, but risks becoming an elitist movement by representing the very few.

When government allows TU, it enables selective crowdsourcing—an individual puts forth an innovation, but the crowd reacts to it. By removing the risk factor from government, tactical urbanism works synergistically with the public sector to innovate by pilot testing.

Tactical urbanism is not defined by expanded participation in official decision-making or deliberative practice but rather by small-scale direct action—shaping outcomes immediately, tangibly, on the ground.

In the case studies developed, we learn TU is not means to an end. It is not the tool, but one tool within a larger toolkit—participatory planning, community organizing, non-profit activism, city-to-city learning and peer-to-peer exchange, and the media’s dissemination of knowledge.

Furthermore, interventions that highlight a need have more lasting power than interventions that prescribe specific solutions. It is likely due to increased flexibility and buy-in by adopters if they can make it “their own.”

The multifaceted variables of the zeitgeist in the city also deeply influence the project trajectory. City context, political agendas, leadership are all critical issues that the implementers ultimately have to contend with if they want their projects to succeed.

However, the real test comes once the project is implemented. In the end it the long-term success and change-power of tactical urbanism depends on the tacticians’ ability to engage the public, navigate multi-stakeholder, institutionalized processes of democratic deliberation, decision-making, and implementation.
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BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Mariko Davidson graduated from MIT with a master in city planning in 2013. Her research on mobility, governance, and public policy reform has taken her to cities across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Prior to MIT, she developed dialogue seminars and study tours at the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii. In 2011, Mariko traveled around the world with a surfboard and small backpack. She earned a BA in politics from Saint Mary’s College of California, which included one-year in South Africa researching pre- and post-apartheid politics. She owes her love of cities and loathing of traffic to Hawaii, her home.
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