THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAVANESE ECONOMY:
A SOCIO-CULTURAL APPROACH

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INTRODUCTION

History, generally, consists both of a series of major events—wars, reigns, and revolutions—which, whether or not they shape it, at least mark major changes in its course; and a succession not of dates, places, and prominent personalities, but of general phases of socio-cultural development. An emphasis on the first aspect in writing history, economic or any other kind, tends to present historical change in terms of a series of bounded periods, more or less distinct units of time characterized by some special significance of their own: they represent the Triumph of Liberalism, the Dominance of Napoleon, or the Time of the Crusades. On the other hand, the second approach, sometimes called social or cultural history, sees historical change as a relatively continuous social process which shows few if any sharp breaks. Rather, it displays a slow but patterned alteration in which, though developmental stages may be discerned when the entire course of the process is viewed as a whole, it is nearly always very difficult, if not impossible, to put one's finger exactly on the point at which things stopped being what they were and became instead something else. This sort of change, or process, defines not so much the temporal dimensions of history as the formal, or structural, dimensions: the period approach distributes concrete events along a time continuum where the major distinction is earlier or later; the socio-cultural
approach distributes forms of organization along a time continuum in which the major distinction is prerequisite and outcome. Time is a crucial element in both; but in the first time is a thread along which specific happenings are strung, in the second time is a medium through which certain abstract processes move.

Four such processes are crucial in the Javanese case: the changing forms of ecological adaptation to the environment on the part of the peasantry; the development of workable authority relationships between the ruling and the ruled; the specific pattern of growth which urbanization has followed; and the ideological factors, most especially religious, in terms of which these processes have taken place and by means of which they have been regulated. After a brief summary of the major periods in Javanese history, offered as a chronological framework within which to place the less specifically time-tied developments, a discussion of these four processes and their relations to one another will be presented.

Under the rubric of ecological adaptation we shall be concerned mainly with changes in the relationships between land and labor, for the peasant the two factors of production of most immediate importance. We shall attempt to show that there has been a shift from an economic contest in which labor was in short supply to one in which land is in short supply, without labor therefore becoming, in any simple way, superabundant. We shall try to show that adaptational patterns have, in the past one hundred years, shown a tendency towards rigidification which has now nearly reached its absolute limits.
The problem of political authority will be viewed as one centering around the legitimization and symbolization of differences in social status and upon that basis establishing stable forms of government. The growth of a marked class-chasm between peasantry and gentry and the steady solidification of differently ordered systems of social stratification within each of the two groups will be seen to pose a problem of political integration which, in the pre-colonial period, was never more than partially solved. The development of a modern administrative bureaucracy by a conversion of the gentry into a class of civil servants by the Dutch and the failure of sharp class conflicts to develop within the village system under conditions of declining welfare and skyrocketing population brings this sequence up to the present.

The analysis of urbanization will focus around the distinction between the inland castle towns and the north coast bazaar towns. The cultural homogeneity, isolationism, and agrarian ethos of the former will be contrasted to the heterogeneity, cosmopolitanism, and mercantilism of the latter, and the typical sorts of social relationship associated with each will be outlined. The more modern development of smaller towns scattered about the countryside will be seen to be primarily a result of increasing comprehensiveness of colonial administration, but to be composed of elements from both major types of city and of urbanized rural elements as well. The modern period also witnesses the transformation of the large castle and bazaar towns into huge metropolitan centers, traces of their originally distinctive
character remaining, nevertheless, quite apparent.

The religious patterns discussed are the aboriginal "animism" of the mass of the population; Hinduism, which appeared shortly after the time of Christ and had its primary impact upon the gentry; and Islam, which swept through Java in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries on the heels of a great international trade expansion. The two "conversions" will be correlated with the economic and political developments previously described and an attempt will be made to relate the beliefs of animism, Hinduism and Islam to types of social integration. The form which these religious traditions have taken in recent history, where they have persisted as variant emphases within a population nominally ninety-five percent moslem, will be discussed as reflecting the general theme of the paper: the necessity for seeing economic development as part of a broader process of social, political, and cultural change.
I. A Chronological Outline

The history of Java, as the history of Indonesia generally, may be separated into three main, relatively isolable, sequences. The first sequence consists of the development of Hindu-Buddhist and, later, Moslem kingdoms out of a tribal Indonesian background as a result of political and economic contacts between India and Indonesia in the first centuries of the Christian era. The second concerns the impress of European colonial rule on the islands and the increasing encroachment upon native political power which followed upon it. And the third, still in its initial stages, has seen the rise of nationalism leading to a revolution against colonial rule and the establishment of the present independent Republic.

Direct documentary knowledge of the tribal period in Java is lacking so that, in fact, this period lies not in history but in pre-history. From archeological and comparative evidence we may infer that population density was very low everywhere, that slash-and-burn shifting cultivation of rice began quite early and remained dominant for some time even after the introduction of irrigated crop and fallow methods, and that root and fruit crops played a greater role in the economy than they do now, but any sort of dated and detailed chronology is impossible. By the time the first Indians arrived--the earliest temple inscription is about 400 AD--regionally localized states of some minimum degree of development must almost certainly have existed at various points in Java, scattered chiefdoms which formed the growing points for later large scale political developments.
Whether the carriers of Hindu culture\(^2\) to Indonesia were merchants or priests is still under discussion, but the first hinduized "states," one Shivaite (the first Mataram, usually dated around 730 AD) and one Mahayana Buddhist (Shailendra, ca. 780-870) are found not along the coast but inland in Central Java near where Jogjakarta lies today. These earlier kingdoms—if they were single kingdoms—which left behind them carved stone temples of an almost purely Indian style, were succeeded in time by the development in eastern Java of states whose fused Shivaite and Buddhist art styles show a less purely Indian, more indigenous, form. This development, which included the kingdoms of Kadiri (1050-1220) and Singhasari (1220-1300), came to its climax in Madjapahit (1294-1478), a kingdom which, at the height of its power, commanded respect and exacted tribute from all of Indonesia.\(^3\)

But, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there occured a sudden expansion of international trade through the whole of Asia, stimulated, ultimately, by the dawning age of exploration in Spain, Portugal, Holland, and England, which shook the economic, political, and religious foundations of the hinduized states. From the northern tip of Sumatra at Acheh, the western-most point of the Indonesian archipelago, a great sea-street runs down through the narrow straits of Malacca, the tranquil Java sea, the sea of Flores and the Banda sea to the famous spice islands, the Moluccas, to the east. Along this narrow ocean corridor, bounded on the northern side by the Malay peninsula Borneo and the Celebes and on the south by Sumatra, Java, and the Lesser Sundas, a great polyglot horde of traders, pirates, and
political adventurers sailed in search of profit and diversion and, to serve them in both respects, a series of ports sprang up on both sides of the passage: Bandjermasin in Borneo, Macassar in the Celebes, Acheh in Sumatra, Bantam, Djapara, Tuban, Grisik and Surabaja in Java became busy semi-independent commercial centers, the most important of them being the south Malaya city-kingdom of Malacca, the entrepot, emporium and toll house for the entire expansion.4

The Madjapahit aristocracy struggled to keep this mercantile flourish within their administrative grasp, to maintain their hold over the various coastal bazaars and so add trade profits to agricultural surpluses as the economic basis of their political domination. But, although branches of the Hindu aristocracy thrust themselves into the midst of the commercial hubub of these market towns, Madjapahit was unable to move away from a very personalized form of military despotism to a more stable type of civil administration; and so the spectacular but essentially flimsy East Javanese kingdom collapsed, setting the stage for Java's second religious revolution. This was the coming of Islam. In 1414 Malacca converted and Muhammad's creed began to spread eastward along the coasts of Sumatra and Borneo. Soon the traders in the north coast Javanese ports were predominantly Moslem and, following them, the local aristocracies began to convert too, rejecting both the political and religious ascendency of Madjapahit. By 1450 there was a north-coast Moslem kingdom in Java at Demak and by the end of the sixteenth century Hinduism, as an official state religion, had nearly disappeared from Java.
Demak, Java's first important Moslem kingdom, struggled to control the inland rice bowls in order to strengthen its political position along the coast, but in 1582 its most important interior province, again called Mataram and, as the first Mataram, centered in the Surakarta rice basin of Central Java, revolted and turned the greater part of the Javanese economy and society inward once more, toward an agricultural and away from a trading orientation. But by now the Europeans had begun to arrive in force: the Portuguese captured Malacca in 1511 and in 1619 Jan Pieterszoon Coen, Holland's great empire builder, founded Batavia (now Djakarta) on the north coast near the Western tip of the island, initiating the Colonial Period. The rest of the history of the pre-colonial states is a dreary tale of steady contraction under Dutch encroachment until, in 1955, the mortally weakened Mataram is divided into two tiny make-believe states, Surakarta and Jogjakarta, which persist as powerless, static caretakers of the old court religious and aesthetic traditions until they are absorbed, at the close of the Revolution, into the new Republik Indonesia.  

The Colonial Period consists, from the economic and political point of view, of a series of attempts on the part of the Dutch to realize a commercial profit on Java, to make of the island a stable source of export crops for which attractive international markets existed. The Netherlands was never able, particularly after the most industrially developed part of the country, Belgium, broke away in 1830, to develop a manufacture export economy comparable to that of Britain, and so the interest of the Dutch in "the Indies" remained
predominantly mercantalist to the end. The stimulation in Java of extensive markets for industrial goods, it was feared, would lead only to increased British (or, later, Japanese) influence, and so the penetration of rational Western forms of economic organization, insofar as it took place at all, was almost wholly on the side of production, and then only in the agricultural sector. Such an extreme constriction of the range of contact between the Dutch and Javanese economies, or, more properly, between the Indonesian and world economies, could only be maintained by a firm welding, on the Dutch side, of the political and the economic, and a continuing isolation, in the Javanese side, from the direct experience of the play of international economic forces. Java's products were allowed to come into the world economy, but not Java's people.

The outcome was what has been called a dual, sometimes, taking the Chinese control of distributive trade and small-scale money lending into account, a plural economy. In the export sector, there was administrative capitalism: a system in which the suppliers of capital, the Dutch, regulated domestic prices and wages, controlled output and dictated the process of production. In the subsistence crop sector there was family-unit agriculture, a little home industry, and some petty domestic trade. As the first expanded, stimulated by rising commodity prices, the second contracted; land was taken out of rice and corn and put into tobacco, indigo, sugar, or coffee. As the first contracted, responding to collapsing markets, the second expanded, and the peasant attempted to make up a lost money income, which was not
so great in any case, by increased production of self-consumed food. With perfect flexibility such a system would seem rather less disorganizing to the traditional native economy than the more direct methods of other colonial governments; but the very monopolistic nature of economic organization on the dynamic European side made a certain stickiness inevitable. Not only did a booming export market tend to compress the subsistence sector beyond realistic limits, but the ability of Dutch economic leadership to respond speedily to changing market conditions was constrained by the weight of financial conservatism. The tendency was to maintain inadequate policies to the point at which insolvency (aided, usually, by administrative corruption) set it, at which point the export sector would collapse almost entirely, leaving the (steadily increasing) native population to pick up the pieces as best it could.9

Dutch colonial history, consequently, was marked by a series of politico-economic devices—the most important of which were the East India Company, the Culture System, and the Corporate Plantation System—by means of which the European side of the dual economy was to be more efficiently organized toward the production and marketing of export crops, and the native side was to be better protected against the disruptive effects of this large scale commercial agriculture. But, as each device entailed a deeper penetration of native life by Western enterprise than the one it replaced, it actually made it more, rather than less, difficult to isolate native life from the economic forces with which such enterprise deals.
The first of these devices, the East India Company, was founded in 1602 as a state-supported far-eastern trade monopoly with a large degree of autonomy—"a state within a state"—in order to counter the active competition of the other European powers, Portugal, Spain, and England, trading in the archipelago. At first, the Company was interested only in the spice trade and in acquiring, also through trade, whatever other export products might be carried to Europe (or other parts of Asia) at a profit. Its initial impact in Java was, therefore, almost wholly confined to the north coast ports. But trade follows the flag, and the Company soon became interested in gaining political control over the sources of supply of the goods upon which its profits depended. By supporting, militarily and economically, one or another candidate in the persistent succession struggles which plagued the conspiracy-ridden harbor kingdoms, the Company gradually extended its power to administer the north coast economy in its own interests. First, special price trading monopolies and freedom from trade taxes, then delivery contracts of goods specified as to type, price, and quantity, then direct rights to tax returns upon which the native kingdoms rested (i.e., to tribute): step by step the Company reduced the Sultans and their staffs to the position of native administrators in Company service, useful mainly for their traditional religious and political hold on the common people.

From the coast, the Company moved inland, repeating the process and destroying the power of Mataram, the last important native state. Freed of checks either from the Dutch Government, which had very little
knowledge of its inner workings, or from indigenous political powers, the Company soon became both uneconomically exploitative and spectacularly corrupt. Following its downfall (it was dissolved in 1799, after several decades in receivership, by the newly established Napoleonic government of Holland), there was a brief five year period of British rule, Britain occupying the islands as part of her war against Napoleon, under Thomas Stamford Raffles. Raffles, a visionary free trade liberal, attempted to introduce elected village governments, individual land tenures and money land taxes in the hope of stimulating domestic economic growth and establishing markets for British exports. But this interlude soon was but a memory, for the Dutch, restored to power, introduced, in 1830, their second major program to turn Java into the world's most profitable plantation: the Culture System.

In essence, the Culture System was but a more effective extension of the economic policy of the Company, a deeper penetration of the Dutch administration into the details of native economic life. Now the Government was not only to determine policy decisions—i.e., production controls and price levels—while leaving their realization to the native royalty and its administrative staff, but was to become directly concerned with planning the actual business of cultivation. The peasant was obligated, in lieu of land tax, either to plant certain export crops on his land (in theory 1/5; in practice, as much as he could bear) as dictated by the Government or, less commonly, to work on Government plantations for a similar percentage of his time. Much
of Java thus became one large Government agricultural concern manned by forced labor.10

At first this was an extremely profitable venture, but in time it followed the Company through the dreary process of corruption, exploitation, and insolvency, and it was abandoned in 1870, following an outburst of popular indignation in Holland as a result of lurid exposés of its seamier side. The Culture System, although it lasted by forty years,11 had a profound effect on Java. It led to the strengthening and rationalization of the native bureaucracy, through whom the program was largely administered. It introduced the peasant to new export crops and more effective forms of intensive agriculture. It stimulated population growth tremendously, because a labor tax on land means the higher the labor to land ratio, the less the per capita tax.12 And it also managed to achieve the seemingly impossible task of making land-ownership an unwanted burden in a peasant society, thus reversing the trend toward individual tenures, stimulated by Raffles, back toward collective forms of ownership. But most important, it stereotyped the traditional Javanese methods of land use and prevented the effects of Western contact from leading to an agricultural revolution.

With the passing of the Culture System there came to the Indies what is usually known as the Liberal Period. It was, however, liberal only in a rather academic sense. It was a shift, on the side of the Dutch domestic economy, mostly as a result of the competitive need for more scientific types of planting and crop care than could be
accomplished under the Culture System method, from the use of the organs of Government for the production of export products to the use of private firms to the same end. On the side of the Indies, the change was rather less apparent, for not only the differences between the Government and the large private corporations which soon grew up only minor--so from the point of view of the peasant he was still faced with a European monolithic concern--but there was little serious attempt to extend the economic principles of liberalism to the native sphere, nor where the large plantation-corporations more than marginally interested in stimulating native demand for Dutch goods.

But some of the moral principles of enlightened liberalism were extended to the native realm, partly as a result of the humanitarian reaction to the excesses of the Culture System, partly because the isolation of native life from forces disruptive of it was becoming progressively more difficult and so demanded more complex techniques: keeping the native nativer began to become a full-time job. Laws preventing alienation of native lands, labor protection and fair rent ordinances, anti-usury laws, improved medical care and, to a lesser extent, increased concern for native education, all appeared at this time. Liberalism, and the large plantation-corporation period which grew out of it, was thus in actuality a new form of mercantilism, an attempt to perpetuate the dual economy; the Government attempting, with varying degrees of success, to act as a kind of umpire restraining the corporations and protecting the peasants. It was, in sum, but a third major device to make of the Indies a profitable source of exports.
It was, too, the most direct, the most deeply penetrating, of the devices; for now the average Javanese came into increased contact with the world of Dutch capital. Javanese labor was transported, more or less voluntarily (though Government-enforced penal sanctions often guaranteed the worker's part of the bargain for the employer), to Sumatran tobacco plantations, oil refineries, and tin mines.\textsuperscript{13} Large sugar concerns began to rent land from the peasants by means of a system, similar to that of the Culture System, in which the peasant gave for a money rent payment one-third of his wet-rice land (usually a different third each year) to the plantation to plant sugar on and grew what he wished on the remainder. Coffee, rubber, tapioca, and other plantations were set up on previously uncultivated lands rented from the Government, drawing its largely seasonal labor force from the villages, and many Javanese began to get non-agricultural jobs—chauffeurs, servants, tailors—to serve the increased flow of Netherlanders come to the Indies to make private fortunes.\textsuperscript{14}

But, again, though the initial phases were auspicious, the picture of increasing profits was again marred, first by turn-of-the-century revelations of the horrors of plantation life in Sumatra, and then, in 1929, by the great depression which more or less destroyed the international commodity markets upon which the new prosperity was dependent. But, even more important, the progressively intensive penetration of the West, first the Company, then the Culture System, and then the Plantation Period, began to work on the native body politic leading
to a re-awakening of indigenous political leadership and ultimately, the structure of Colonial Government crushed by the Japanese occupation of the East Indies in the second world war, to the disappearance of the Dutch, in the political sense, from the scene altogether.

The rise of nationalism was a result of the ultimate failure of the Dutch policy of isolating native society from international economic and political currents. Despite the theories of indirect rule to which they were attached, the Dutch did not so much protect Javanese society against disruption from Western introduced changes as they prevented it from adapting freely to such changes. During the Colonial Period, the position of the aristocracy was stabilized and transformed into a rational civil bureaucracy, but the higher level offices, and with them all policy decisions, were kept in European hands. The Chinese middleman was strengthened and Javanese trade, even domestic trade, stunted. Javanese agriculture became increasingly intensive and diversified, its productivity increased through more efficient farming practices and improved irrigation; but, as the native population was unable to participate in the more extensive forms of agriculture, this increasing efficiency was at the same time an increasing inflexibility in the forms of adaptation. Native population was stimulated so that a sparsely settled island turned into one of the most densely crowded areas of the world, a fact which led, among other things, to increased stability of settlement, fractionization of landholdings and—probably—to a declining level of welfare. But perhaps the most important result, from the economic point of view, was the
weakening of the Javanese sense for economic rationality:

Moreover, Dutch rule damaged not only the social structure but the mental outlook of the people. When reforms were agitated after the fall of the Company, it was often alleged that the Javan had no wish to better himself and, if paid more, would only work less. Yet on the first introduction of coffee, the crop spread rapidly so long as cultivation was remunerative. But the Company found it more profitable to resort to forced labor, compulsory cultivation and arbitrary destruction that to depend for produce on the law of supply and demand; the bitter experience of two hundred years dulled the economic sense of the people and, after living for two centuries in a land where the laws of economics did not run, it is not strange that they ceased to recognize them. Thus the economic life of the people was not merely stunted by the suppression of all economic activities but agriculture, it was also vitiated by the nullification of economic laws.16

The increasing pressures of Western penetration led, then, ultimately to violent reaction on the part of the native population. After about thirty years of growing nationalist agitation—in the form of religious groups, trade unions, political parties and anti-foreign movements—a declaration of independence from Dutch rule was proclaimed on August 17, 1945 by Ir. Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta, now President and Vice President of the Republic. There followed a series of armed clashes between British and Dutch troops and the Republicans, leading, in 1950, to a withdrawal of the Dutch from the archipelago and a transfer of sovereignty to the native Government. Economic policies in the post-colonial era have not developed far enough to be certain what form they will finally take, but the leaders of the new Indonesia are publicly committed to a turning away from the near-exclusive export orientation to a more balanced type of economy and to rapid economic growth, evidently in the form of sharply increased
industrialization. Internal security problems, serious balance of payments difficulties, lack of skilled technicians for both economic and political posts, and the inherited rigidities of the still quite "pluralistic" economy have, however, prevented any great amount of progress toward these goals.
II. Patterns of Ecological Adaptation

The two factors of production which are—and always have been—of primary importance within the peasant economy are land and labor. In the pre-modern stages of Javanese history—up until the time of the Culture System—labor was in short supply, and evidently progressively so, for each new form of land-use introduced into the island—tropical forest root crop gardening, shifting cereal agriculture, terraced wet-rice growing—demanded a more intensive application of labor, more man-hours of work per given unit of land. Since the Culture System and the population explosion which followed it, land has been increasingly in short supply, in the sense that increasing output by bringing new units into cultivation has become nearly impossible. Paradoxically, however, labor has not therefore become simply superabundant within the village context. It remains, to a degree at least, in short supply, in the sense that, additional land being unavailable, capital being relatively primitive and serious organizational innovation being largely impossible within the given, traditionally sanctified, productive pattern, an increase in labor intensity is almost the sole means of increasing output and any noticeable reduction of labor input is likely to have depressing effects on production.

This fact implies at least a partial disappointment for those theorists who envisage a solution of Java's economic problems through a
simple transfer of hordes of "underemployed" workers from agriculture to industry without reducing agricultural output. It points to the existence of a socially stereotyped productive process in which the genuinely undersupplied factors are capital and organization; one in which a steady process of labor intensification, a process slowed but not halted by an increasing shortage of land, has led to a situation where the structural rigidity in the demand for this factor has become very great. So great, in fact, that, despite the obvious existence of "structural underemployment" (a term which merely implies that the analyst can conceive of an entirely different, economically—but not necessarily sociologically—feasible productive process which could produce the same output with less labor), the existence of "concealed unemployment," in the much broader sense of there being workers who, without any change in the pattern of agricultural exploitation, can be wholly transferred to non-agricultural occupations with little or no effect on agricultural output, is much less widespread than is usually supposed. Such concealed unemployment does exist, most especially in the towns, where the population overflow from the countryside has tended to settle in small pools of semi-idle urban poor. But it is easily overestimated because the labor-absorbing capacity, and, pari passu, labor-demanding capacity, of Javanese agriculture and, to a lesser extent, of the Javanese urban occupational system, tends to be underestimated. The problem is not simply one of quantitative
factor inputs, a shortage of one implying a surplus of the other irrespective of cultural, psychological, and technological context, but of their qualitative relations as determined by such a context.

To understand Javanese agriculture one should imagine a long line of workmen transporting sacks of potatoes from farm to market by passing them along a line, each worker covering, say, one-quarter mile. No one is doing very much work and no one is very specialized, but if someone is dropped out of the line, the number of sacks passed per hour goes down (assuming no reorganization of the work process, no addition of capital and ignoring possible saving from the elimination of a transfer point), unless the workers either walk faster, carry more sacks per trip or work longer hours. If we assume, further, that work patterns are also traditionalised so that this will not occur, then an output drop is inevitable. If, however, another workman is added (to the original line), it becomes possible to increase output, though there is a small efficiency loss due to the addition of another transfer point.

If, however, the time comes when potato production at the supply end of the line—the "land element" in this model—has reached its maximum output, addition of new workers to our transport line will reduce output per worker, tending to push wages, considered as a fixed per cent of output, down toward subsistence. In such a case, total output per hours—now at a maximum—is maintained but the addition of a new worker means all workers work less and assumes therefore that although workers will not be willing to
walk faster or carry more sacks or work longer hours they will be willing to walk slower or work shorter hours or carry less sacks. This assumption is easily enough made, based on the common notion in well-integrated societies that any man in the community has a natural right to work and a place must be made for him, even if it means declining welfare for others. If, further, we assume that this whole process occurs slowly over an extended period of time—moving from a situation where additional labor means additional output and rising welfare to one where it means constant output but decreasing individual returns—then we can see how each new labor pattern will slowly crystallize into being the "normal," culturally expected one. Or, rather, that in a situation of increasing labor supply and constant output workers will characteristically be willing to restrict their own efforts to let a new man into the line, but characteristically unwilling (i.e., unable) to expand their efforts again if a man is removed from the line. There is a kind of downward ratchet effect in which a productive process becomes addicted to labor: the more it uses the more it needs.

This peculiar Alice-in-Wonderland world, where people will work less hard, but not more; where they will allow other workers to reduce their own real income through a progressively disfunctional form of feather-bedding; and where output stays the same but labor patterns grow steadily more complex, may seem a simply irrational fancy, but it is in fact a model of the type of situation toward
which the Javanese economy has moved in its process of development. As a model, it is a polar type, and the Javanese situation is still far from being this rigidified. But the direction is apparent and can be demonstrated. There has been a succession of modes of land use each growing out of its predecessor and each demanding more labor for its effective application, a succession which did not stop as land grew scarce but continued, stimulated by an increasing population and constrained by a traditionalized inability to alter radically the basic form of ecological adaptation. Put another way, there has been steady progress toward higher "natural" nutritional densities, toward a narrowing of the gap between underpopulation and overpopulation.

The earliest form of land use in Java was one still practiced in many areas of Melanesia, Central and South America, and Africa--tropical rain forest cultivation of starchy root and fruit crops. These root and fruit crops--yam, taro, banana, breadfruit--most of which seem to have developed on the Asian mainland, were probably grown with only a minimal amount of clearing. They were supplemented at an early date by millet and, probably by dry rice; but despite the advantages of easier storage and greater food value associated with cereals, the new arrivals must have had little effect on the Javanese economy: in the absence of iron tools, the cultivation of cereals, whatever their botanical superiority, has little advantage over root crop cultivation. This earliest form of land use was, thus, a kind of jungle gardening, a small scale root and cereal
horticulture in which scattered and only moderately cleared family sized plots, often deep in the sunless forest, were sporadically cultivated, much as among certain contemporary tribes in the South American Amazon.

The introduction of iron for hoes and axes did not so much alter the form of the neolithic regime as intensify it. From the pattern of small clusters of "freely migrating" root and primitive cereal growers scattered rather randomly throughout the tropical rain forests, emerged a pattern of wide-spread shifting agriculturists moving within more rigorous migratory cycles. Larger clearings were made, family plots being contiguous with one another rather than isolated; a more thorough destruction of the forest cover took place; and grains, which drain the soils of their nutrients more rapidly than the starchy roots, came to dominate the latter. As a result, this form of land use interfered more seriously with the natural balance between growth and decay in the tropical forest areas—where soils are poor in any case—and exposed the land to the serious leaching effects of the warm equatorial rains.

In favorable cases, the impact of slash-and-burn techniques upon the ecological equilibrium of the tropical environment is minimized by the shifting of fields every year or two, returning to used fields only after a space of from six to twenty years; and in such cases the pattern is usually adaptive. It may turn maladaptive, however, in two ways: by an increase in population which demands old plots be recultivated too soon; or by an extension
into a too arid environment where the more deciduous forests have a much slower recovery time and where clearing fires are likely to get out of hand and burn off great stands of timber. In either case, the result is the same. There occurs an evolution through progressively more open forests composed of light-loving, fire-resistant trees ending, if the process is not checked, in the replacement of the cover altogether by the notorious alang-alang savannah grass which has turned so much of Southeast Asia into a green desert.19

Iron-age slash-and-burn, which is still the dominant mode of land use in almost all cultivable areas of Southeast Asia where wet rice agriculture is impractical due to low temperatures, very low soil fertility and/or serious irrigation problems, thus tends on the one hand to demand a greater input of labor, because clearing, planting, weeding, and harvesting are now carried out rather more seriously and systematically, and on the other hand to limit sharply both the maximum density of the population and the possibilities of extending cultivation into less tropical environments. Mature shifting cultivation regimes, ones in which an adaptive ecological balance has been found, tend to have narrow margins between under- and over-population.

In most environments, then, slash-and-burn tends to support just about as many workers as it needs, and needs just about as many as it supports; it takes a good quantity of labor to practice the regime very economically at all, but if you get much more than
the minimum necessary, the environment may be rather quickly over-driven. In such a situation, a high development of labor-exchange and cooperative work patterns tends naturally to occur, because what labor there is must be manipulated with maximum flexibility and applied with maximum efficiency within the ecological unit. And, indeed, most modern slash-and-burn cultivators today show a well-integrated complex of such cooperative and exchange work patterns, as well as a marked tendency to demand that everyone—chiefs, priests, women, and children—get out and work in the fields.20

With the introduction of terraced wet-rice cultivation—again from mainland Asia—the constricting social and economic logic of slash-and-burn was escaped, for this mode of land use, though it demanded as high or higher minimum labor inputs, had an intrinsic capacity to absorb increases in such inputs, the absolute limits of which seem not to have been reached even today, except perhaps in Japan. This was true because wet-rice terracing involved a form of cultivation in which the given environment was not merely accepted and exploited, merely adapted to, but one in which the environment was rather radically made over, a new ecological context created instead of merely a new adjustment to an old context. And the working out of the implications of this revolutionary change in man-environment relations took place only slowly over the course of centuries as the Javanese found more and more ways to increase output by a more careful attention to the details of cultivation.
then toward the sea as the necessary skills were built up; although the deltas themselves seem to have been uncontrollable until the Europeans introduced concrete dams, metal storage tanks, and mechanical water gates late in the nineteenth century. The process was not one, merely, of progressive elaboration of irrigation methods, but other technical and social factors played a part in this whole development: the introduction of the ox and ox-drawn plough, the perfection of transplanting techniques, the development of various strains of rice for special ecological situations, and so forth.

The whole process may be seen as one in which a revised relationship between man and his environment is first sketched in rather broad and general strokes in the highlands, where only a few of the more obvious possibilities inherent in the new relationship are realized, and then a progressive filling in of details as the pattern moves down into the lowlands. There occurs a series of technological innovations (with which we may include such "social" innovations as more elaborate exchange work systems, corvee patterns, and forms of tenancy), which take place within the given mode of land use, and each of which acts to increase the number of man-hours needed to work a given unit of land, so that the irrigated rice pattern is becoming more intensive and extensive at the same time. These innovations—when seen in broadly social terms—are then not labor-saving but labor absorbing. Though per-capita output steadily increases—wet-rice cultivation is among the world's most productive forms of agriculture—the demand for labor increases
and each new field, in a theoretical sense, demands a greater addition to the labor force than the previous one to maintain it in efficient operation.

In time, extensive exploitation became more and more difficult as the best land came under cultivation and so long as intensification was able to continue there occurred a kind of ecological revolution in which fields became more and more carefully worked in a manner almost semi-horticultural. But, soon, intensification, given native resources and technology, began to near its limits too. At this point—one at which land runs out and per capita income begins to fall due to a fall in the marginal productivity of labor—one would perhaps expect either another revolution in the forms of land use (which would imply a revolution in social outlook as well) or a stabilization of population growth. But what occurred was, rather, a rigid stereotyping of the traditional pattern and a great growth in population. This curious and seemingly maladaptive occurrence we can—at least in part—attribute to the impact of the West upon Javanese economic life.

By the time of the introduction of the Culture System in 1830, the pattern of Javanese agriculture in its modern form was, for all intents and purposes, set. Those areas where it was technically feasible (with native techniques) had been brought under wet-rice, called sawah in Java. The old root, fruit, and dry cereal horticultural pattern persisted in the form of house
gardens—called *pekaran*-but, except for a few areas in the western end of the island, iron-age slash-and-burn (*ladang*) had disappeared. In unirrigable areas, too dry for slash-and-burn but more fertile than tropical forest areas, a merging of *ladang* and *sawah* techniques brought into existence a crop and fallow system—often in terraces to preserve top soil—in which cereals and roots were planted in the wet season and the land unplanted in the dry, a mode of land use called *tegal*. When the Dutch came they provided a whole bundle of very advanced techniques from their own intensive farming background—irrigation works, new crops, improved tools; they actively encouraged the use of them to further involve the traditional ecological pattern; they "protected" the Javanese from Western social and economic ideas; and they introduced the plantation pattern of extensive, capital intensive exploitation of "waste" land (i.e., land inaccessible to indigenous techniques) for an international market, which pattern they largely reserved to themselves.

The result was that a productive process—already one involving rather higher population densities, particularly in the great river areas, than we are used to in the wheat-centered West—due either for stabilization, or, if new technical elements had come in a less overwhelming form as they had in the past, for revision, was given a new lease on life and, from the point of view of welfare, seriously overdriven. Better irrigation increased the proportion of *sawah* to *tegal* while plantation agriculture pre-empted lands into
which the tegal pattern might have spread. New crops diversified agriculture but did not change its form, for they were adapted to the intensive sawah type of exploitation, as though the Western grains and legumes were being poured into a rice mold. Centralized irrigation systems stereotyped the nuclear village settlement pattern and fixed the residential to cultivated field ration irrevocably. Population, stimulated by a reappearance of rising marginal returns for labor (due both to the new techniques and to artificial reasons, such as the labor tax on land of the Culture System period), expanded, leading to a fragmentation of land holdings and terrace units, disappearance of any unworked land as people pushed into even very marginal areas that were left open to them, and an overcrowding of villages to create rural living conditions Jay has characterized as almost suburban in nature: great masses of people living in one territorial unit, most of whom have but sporadic and superficial relations with anyone outside their immediate neighborhood.26

All this involved a further intensification of agriculture from which, once accomplished, there was no retreat. Sawah terraces were pushed up the sides of mountains, where their narrowed form meant a return to the ploughless cultivation of the earliest stages, though in an infinitely more painstaking horticultural pattern. Land fragmentation had a similar effect, because as the edge of the terrace must always be worked with a hoe, the smaller the terrace the less advantageous the use of the plough (mechanization in such
a context is, of course, even less likely to prove economic; at least with present Western technology). Travel between scattered plots also means a greater drain on labor, as do more complex irrigation schemes where temporary spillways, mud-and-sticks water gates and feeder canals are always being constructed, repaired, or removed.

Double cropping has become almost universal. Sawahs are planted in the dry season with corn, legumes, spices, and the like—many of them Dutch introduced—the crops often carefully interlocked in time, so that a new one is planted between the stalks of an old one not quite ready for harvest; or a seed bed is being prepared while the old crop is being harvested (rice seeds are usually pre-germinated in home nurseries to save time in the seed beds). Even the terrace walls are planted and pekarangan house gardening has become miraculously intensified too, there often being three layers of crops growing at once: the high fruit trees, the medium bean plants, and the underground roots. The more fertile tegals are cultivated all year round, rather than in a crop and fallow pattern, often leading to increased erosion. Ever more careful weeding, stricter planting methods, and less wasteful harvesting all have played a part in the process. If the earliest wet-rice stage was a broad outline sketch, and the time of the Hindu and Moslem states (and of the Company, when the Dutch impact was still relatively light) saw a filling in of solid detail, this last period, beginning with the Culture System, is marked by an over-ornamentation, a roccoco
elaboration of agricultural detail which threatens to overwhelm the entire structure. 27

At first, the increased returns from intensification more or less offset the rising population, but shortly, perhaps by the beginning of this century, the second limit on the marginal efficiency of labor was reached (though population continued to increase), leading to a situation of near-absolute, rather than merely relative, decline in welfare, the last stage in our sack-passing model. Wet-rice cultivation, after centuries in which, although it demanded high and increasing labor inputs, it had produced surpluses above the subsistence needs of its workers—surpluses which could be applied to supporting a non-cultivating elite—now was approaching the pinched-in situation characteristic of slash-and-burn from which it had originally offered an escape; one in which the minimum number of people necessary to work a field was beginning to approach the maximum number who could live off of it.

By now the situation has sharply altered from the early stages, for land is now in marked short supply. And the labor exchange patterns, originally evolved in response to a need to move workers around flexibly enough to maintain output, now tend to turn more and more toward tenancy patterns; patterns defining traditional rights not merely in terms of control over labor but of access to land. As I have said, the growing shortage of land and the increasing population has not led to a simple quantitative super-abundance of labor in relation to the technical agricultural process (though,
in this century, such a simple quantitative super-abundance has begun to appear: even in over-crowded Java one still encounters situations where labor shortages—due to geographical, seasonal, or social rigidities in labor mobility play an important role.28

Thus, these complex labor patterns are now at once important both in mobilizing labor and in distributing land rights: the crucial economic problem for the peasant is still to get labor and land together in the correct amounts, only now it is not only labor which proves "scarce" (to call the scarcity "artificial" merely begs the question) and somewhat difficult to manipulate, but land as well. Money tends to get absorbed into the same structure, being but a new technique for adjusting land and labor to one another, through such mechanisms as land-renting, wage-work and so forth.

But, in the absence of a genuinely open and fully rational market in either land or labor, its liberating effect is sharply limited and it provides but a slight—though highly valued—element of flexibility within a very rigid and stereotyped productive process.29

This stereotyping is not merely technological, for the ecological involution has been matched by an involution in the rural value system: the adaptation of the Javanese peasantry to their environment must not be seen as a merely technical matter, but as a productive process organized in terms of cultural values. The evolving patterns of land-labor manipulation are not only modes of adaptation, but statements of the "correct" way in which production should be organized and its returns distributed;30 and these "oughts" have operated
so as to keep both labor and land inputs and agricultural output fractionated, to keep them from becoming very concentrated in any one group, class or individual. By continuing and re-emphasizing traditional values stressing the right to work, historically defined "fair shares" for labor and a deep-going reluctance to sell land to outsiders—values which must date from as far back as the slash-and-burn days—the peasant has made certain that no effective labor saving innovations would get a foothold in his crowded social economy.31

In the last four or five decades, somewhat desperate tendencies toward breaking out of this socio-economic strait-jacket have become more apparent, particularly in the more monetized areas. At the top of the village ladder there has been some attempt to consolidate holdings, to employ wage labor more flexibly and less tradition-ally, and to resist demands either for one's own labor or for granting access to one's land to others. At the bottom, there has been a greater willingness, even eagerness among the really destitute, to accept wage work, some attempt to make a living in non-agricultural endeavors, and a good deal of urban migration in search of work—though the towns have rather little to offer in this respect. In such a context, money comes to be seen as the promise of economic flexibility by the more prescient; but, as I have indicated, its ability to bring about such flexibility is sharply limited by the narrow range of rational markets in all the factors of production. In general, the picture still seems to be one of
a rural economy whose capacity to carry its population still has not reached its absolute limits (even though marginal labor productivity must be almost zero\(^3\), which not only supports but demands great inputs of labor, and which is prevented from changing not only by its earlier agricultural investments but by the deeply engrained value system of its members.

It would be incorrect, finally, to attribute this disfunctional rigidity, this super-saturation of the socio-ecological pattern, simply to the evils of colonialism—China and Japan should warn us against that. The problem is actually one of intensive contact between a technically quite "advanced" economy and a technically "backward" one; and, more than that, of the particular form that contact has taken. Circumstances alter cases, even within Southeast Asia: witness the large estates and indigenous baronial landlord class of the Philippines; the nearly even bi-racial split in Malaya between simple Malay subsistence farmers and fishermen and commercially sophisticated Chinese businessmen and plantation workers; or the small-scale Burmese commercial rice grower in the grips (at least until recently) of Indian moneylenders—none of which have exact parallels in the Javanese case, the difference being at least partially traceable to differences in contact experiences.\(^3\)

The only result which seems inevitable—though, hopefully, temporary—in such sharp contact situations is serious ecological maladaptation and social strain; the peculiar pattern which develops varies.
But the Javanese outcome does indicate that a rice-based economy, which implies high "natural" population densities, to which industrialism comes as a pattern borrowed from another civilization rather than as an indigenously developed innovation, may need to adopt a program of agricultural reform quite different than those which proved necessary prior to successful industrialization in England, Germany, and (though the outcome is perhaps still not wholly clear) Russia; a hypothesis which finds some support in the Javanese experience. 34
III. Patterns of Authority

The developmental history of authority relationships in Java reflects the developmental history of ecological adaptation just traced. The persistent theme in the earlier periods, prior to the final establishment of Dutch sovereignty throughout the island, is a struggle for control over labor, not over land. But, in the Colonial Period, there is a steady shift toward an increasing importance of land rights (which are still labor rights as well) in authority relations, to the point where one recent observer can note that "land rights are the major form of currency in unequal social relations." The transition is marked by an increasingly sedentary village pattern, an increasingly bureaucratized governmental structure and a shift from a personalistic form of political integration, based on magical ties between leader and follower (as well as on military terror), to a more impersonal one, based on territorial considerations.

The earliest stage of Javanese political development—that characterizing the neolithic root gardeners—is lost in the mists of prehistory. On the basis of a distributional analysis, Ralph Linton has described these groups as having very weak political leadership of any sort, "rule being by family heads in a sort of oligarchic arrangement, with, perhaps, nominal chiefs whose powers were mainly advisory."
Judging by contemporary slash-and-burn groups, somewhat stronger political leadership must have emerged in the subsequent stage, though the inability of slash-and-burn to support a non-cultivating elite limited development here too. Present day shifting cultivators in Borneo, Burma, and Sumatra often show, nevertheless, a fairly strong chiefly leadership within single villages and the development, through marriage alliances among separate chiefs within a region, of an embryonic ruling class.37

The further concentration of population correlated with wet rice growing tended to lead to an increased power for the tribal chiefs within a more stable and sedentary (but by no means completely so) village pattern by permitting the production of greater surpluses as grist for the political mill.38 Thus emerged a form of political structure still characteristic, under later accretions, of village organization in the wet rice regions of Malaysia today—as the more intensive patterns of rice cultivation are but specific elaborations of an originally generalized form of land-use, so the complex, sedentary, over-crowded villages of modern Java are but descendents of a more generalized type. The best examples of this ancestral political form are, perhaps, the so-called barangay units as they were encountered in the coastal regions of the Philippine Islands by the first European explorers.39

A barangay is a small group of people living in one area, growing wet rice and following, usually, a single leader. They are either his kinsmen, his slaves, or his economic dependents (who may, of course, have slaves of their own), i.e., the group is composed of a dominant group of bilaterally related kinsmen with a head whose position is
usually semi-inherited, plus a group of people, some of whom also may be bilaterally related to one another, who have, voluntarily or involuntarily, come more or less into permanent relation with it either for practical or mystical reasons. The basis of a barangay is, thus, not so much territorial as personalistic. Whole barangay will often move for economic, military, health, or even religious reasons; and men (or groups of men) can, to a degree, leave one and join another.

The elaborate systems of labor exchange, carried out largely in inter-familial terms, already mentioned as necessary to insure mobility of this all important resource within the ecological unit are present. Further, rank has now become attached to a traditionalized difference of perquisites within the village organization, which perquisites are essentially rights over the disposition of labor. The leader has certain rights to personal corvee, natura head taxes figured in terms of man-days of work and so forth. His family, secondary leaders (often heads of competing families struggling for dominance) and successful warriors have certain similar but less extensive rights. Common dependents have labor obligations to the village generally and to its leadership in particular but they have, also, a right to a certain inalienable percentage of their own labor, which they apply to village land. Slaves (usually war-captives) or parasitic hangers-on have few rights at all, except for a certain maintenance from their masters.

Here, then, is an explicit institutionalization of the fusion between control over labor and political status: authority is defined in terms of traditionalized rights to draw from the labor pool incorporated in the barangay.
After the rise of the barangay (or some other, similar, unit), Javanese political history splits into two sequences. On the one hand, the increasingly endogamous chiefly class becomes stronger and individual chiefs begin to gain some measure of leadership control over others by means of bravery, wealth, kinship alliances, and mother wit, leading to small regional chiefdoms, some of them growing eventually into the larger city states of the Hindu period. On the other hand, village political development continues, increasingly segregated from the elite in spatial as well as social terms, as the sort of structure characteristic of the barangay solidifies and becomes elaborated within the developing ecological context already outlined. So there develops an authority problem not only within the village, but within the supra-village ruling class. And the adjustment of these two systems of political power to one another—the establishment of stable authority relations between town and country—becomes a persistent concern for both the gentry and the peasantry.

The supra-village political leaders, the emerging kings, needed, on the one hand, to collect around themselves a personal administrative staff of specialized priests and warriors—the one to sanctify their authority and the other to enforce it—and, on the other hand, to tie as many of the barangay-type village units to themselves as they could in order to support this staff in the style to which it becomes increasingly accustomed. They must, in short, gain some share in the traditionalized distribution of labor rights within the village, or, as labor rights and political authority are fused within these local
units, they must share in the sovereignty of the village chief. From the king's point of view, his authority problem is to hold his staff loyal to him (which is, in part, dependent upon his being able to support them), and to gain the allegiance of the local chiefs so that he can share in the labor resources of their villages. From the chief's point of view, his authority problem is to resist, so far as possible, external drains on local labor (for this is a direct drain on his own sovereignty), while still providing his village members with sufficient military (and religious) protection against external threats to their security. Between any particular king and any particular chief (or village council), there arises a bargaining relation in which the strength of the former lies in his military and religious power and the strength of the latter lies in the labor resources of his village.

The early political history of Java consists, then, of a competitive struggle between nascent religio-political centers for the adherence of the various still not entirely sedentary barangay-type local units, which latter may be seen as traditionalistically bound packages of labor. The so-called states were not territorial units, but loose congeries of villages tied to a common urban center for military and religious reasons—we shall deal with the religious element later—each urban center competing with others for ascendancy. Whatever degree of hegemony prevailed depended not on the administrative organization of extensive territory under a single king, but on the reputations of various kings to mobilize and apply an effective striking force with which to sack and burn rebellious villages or rival kingdoms. Insofar as the pattern was territorial at all, it consisted of a series of concentric circles of religio-political power.
spreading out around the city-state capital, as radio waves spread from a transmitter. Thus the closer a village to town the closer its ties (i.e., the weaker its bargaining position) to the king; and, conversely, the greater the development of the urban ruling group--priests, soldiers, nobles, and king--the greater the strength and the greater the effective range of its circles of outward spreading power.

So arises, gradually by fits and starts, the still crucial split between what the Javanese traditionally call negara, which means, roughly, the central government, and what they call desa, which means village. The distinction is one between an urban-based system of power and a village-based one, relations between them being in terms of a mutual adjustment in proportion to their relative strength. Although the latter was always subordinate in the sense of being always the weaker party in the relationship (at times, particularly between the fall of Madjapahit and the rise of Mataram, many villages were, most likely, independent of any negara at all, thus returning to the pre-kingdom situation), the relation was not a simple hierarchical one, but rested on a division of sovereignty--i.e., control over labor--between two semi-independent political systems. Consequently, to trace the further evolution of authority relations after the rise of the kingdoms and the split between peasantry and gentry, it is necessary first, to outline the development of such relations within the desa-village; second, to describe their development within the urban-based bureaucratizing central government; and, third, to set forth the changes in the form of politico-economic relations between these two socially and spatially separated institutional loci of government.
The village was, for its part, radically affected by the three interdependent factors whose operation of the ecological level we have already seen as leading to a solidification of the originally loose-woven and flexible patterns: the progressive intensification of agriculture, contact with the West, and the spectacular population growth. The progressive intensification of agriculture led to an increasingly sedentary settlement pattern, for it implied a progressively heavier capital investment in land improvement, such as irrigation systems and terraces, so tying the peasant more firmly to his land and destroying the barangay's original mobility. Villages grew larger, not only because of the increased population, but because of central government pressures for more easily manageable administrative units, particularly during the Culture System period when the direct subservience of the desa to the negara was at its greatest. And all three factors together brought about the development of patterns expressing authority relations in terms of land rights to supplement the traditional patterns expressing them in terms of labor rights, the two sorts of pattern then fusing to the point where differential access to land, labor, and authority came to be reflected in a single system of social relationships.

In these developed, sedentary villages, political status now came to be defined in terms of land tenure. The "core villagers," as they are sometimes called, who were usually considered to be descendants of the village's founders, were held to be proprietors of the land which they "owned" in common. Often the irrigated land (sawah) was rotated every year among the group of core villagers, less often the unirrigated land (tegal) as well (house gardens--pekarangan--seem always
to have been individually owned. As time passed, particularly as the anti-landholding pressures of the Culture System relaxed, the individual core villagers came to hold fixed plots of sawah in perpetuity which, though they could pass them to their sons, they could not otherwise alienate, while tegal became, in many cases, simple personal property. 

If the villager died without issue, emigrated, or committed a serious crime against the community, his communal land returned to the village. The village then allotted it—in an open meeting of all the core villagers—to someone else, usually someone who had lived for a long time in the village, held house land, but had no communal rights (no individual could, in general, have more than one share in such land). In addition to this land, there was land, usually a somewhat larger parcel, often a very much larger parcel, set aside for the use of the village chief. Other such parcels were set aside for other members of the village government and, sometimes, for special uses such as support of mosque officials, payment for those who worked on village public works, and so forth. Thus there grew up a system in which class standing, essentially a ranking of families, was based on landholding. At the top was the village head, below him the other village officials, then the holders of village-owned sawah, then the holders of tegal only (in some cases village owned, in most cases not), then those with pekarangan only, and then those with nothing—people who, like the hangers-on of the old barangay days, merely boarded with others.

Labor patterns expressing intra-village authority differences did not disappear however: obligations to work on village public works was
correlated with the type of landholding, and labor obligations to village chiefs persisted until the Dutch insisted upon their abrogation toward the end of the nineteenth century. But more than this, the elaboration of share-crop tenancy patterns within a productive process in relation to which both land and labor are in heavy demand is essentially a means by which rights over land and labor can be fused. The tenant's share is fixed, more or less traditionally, not in the sense of a return for his contribution to the output, but in the sense of an inalienable right to a certain percentage of his own labor, the rest of it belonging to his superiors; and the owner's share in a continuation of the rights of a higher status individual in the labor of a lower one.

If the situation were one of a free land and labor market in a condition of an over-supply of labor, then one would expect a growing concentration of landholding, a falling of the price of labor toward subsistence, a sharpening of class antagonisms between a class of large landlords, and a swelling of the landless proletariat. But, though landlessness has indeed markedly increased, though returns to labor have indeed fallen, this marxist bifurcation has not occurred. Concentration of landholding has not markedly increased but rather decreased as holdings have fragmented; the real per-unit returns to landholders have not radically increased in proportion to the real per-unit returns to the holders of labor; and the landless have not lost their bargaining power because, as I stressed above, labor has not become as simply superabundant as a cursory glance would make it appear. The landholder still needs the laborer almost as much as the laborer needs the landholder.
Again, a genuinely alienated and politically disinherited agricultural proletariat has, no doubt, begun to appear in this century, especially in the plantation areas; but the capacity of the village economy to absorb an increase in population through an intensification of agriculture has been matched on the political level by the ability of the status structure to adapt to a more complex pattern of social differentiation by means of a more carefully and subtly graded authority continuum. We might call this development—metaphorically—a kind of "intensification" of the class ladder, for what happens is that a few broad distinctions are replaced by a multiplicity of smaller ones. The growth of land-renting in money terms, of individual ownership, fragmentation and sale of land, and of wage labor, as well as refinements in the tenancy system have all tended to further this "intensification" rather than to break down the system and lead to a simple two-class opposition between haves and have-nots. In an extreme case, but not necessarily a rare one, one piece of land, less than an acre in size, might have an owner, a renter, a major tenant, a subtenant, and a wage worker all drawing shares of its output, which shares though they are unequal are not radically so, a situation reflecting, also, the authority relations between those participating in this common land-labor pool; their participation being carefully regulated in social terms, as I have pointed out, to prevent any sharp concentration of rights, and so of political power.

Turning now to the supra-village system of power, the negara, we see a similar "solidification" process taking place under similar
pressures. After the fall of Madjapahit and the relatively brief period of political and commercial efflorescence on the north coast, the great inland kingdom of Mataram managed to build the most stable pre-colonial administrative bureaucracy. By so doing they stabilized, also, the circular waves of power pattern characteristic of their predecessors. The "kingdom" was divided into three concentric circles: the negara, the capital palace-city itself (which was located in what is now the Jogjakarta area); the negara agung, the "large (big, great) negara," which comprised the area surrounding the capital as far out as the king had firm control; and the mantja negara, "outside the negara," which included areas where his power was enough respected to earn him a certain quantity of tribute, but over which his administrative control was weak or non-existent.

The higher status members of the King's staff were still confined to the negara proper—they had to spend each night within the palace—and were divided into an "outside" and an "inside" section. The "inside" section was concerned with regulating the court-city itself (i.e., as police, financial advisors, ceremonial leaders, etc.), the "outside" section with treating with the villages in the negara agung. The members of the staff fell into one of two—rather antagonistic—groups: either they were members of the king's family (figured bilaterally four generations up and down) or of the emerging bureaucracy, which, though its members bore titles according to rank and tended to be succeeded in office by their sons, was staffed with non-relatives and headed by the prime minister, a man whose power nearly equalled, sometimes exceeded,
that of the king himself. Thus, the administrative staff tended to be characterized by an inherent conflict between the emerging bureaucracy, the individual offices of which, for the most part, were hereditary in different families, and the king's family (which, with the number of the king's wives, was always quite large), with the king, as head of both, trying to harmonize them.

The "outside" administrative staff, divided into various functional and areal departments, had graded ranks, the lower officials being permitted to sleep outside of the capital. This bureaucracy was confined in its activities entirely to the negara agung; the mantja negara was ruled by a set of semi-independent princes, most of whom had donated daughters to the harem of the Mataram king, who more or less ran their own bailiwicks, their own little negara, in their own way. As a matter of fact, many of the higher officials of the bureaucracy ruling the negara agung seem, judging from their titles, to have formerly been such semi-independent princes in the area and to have been subjugated by Mataram, the symbol and guarantee of their subservience being residence in the Mataram capital. Thus the border marking the end of the negara agung and the beginning of the mantja negara seems to have been dependent upon the degree to which the Mataram king could, militarily or economically, induce distant princes to offer not only tribute to his court, but themselves.
but themselves.

The Dutch moved in on this system from the north coast. First they reduced all of the semi-independent princes and then they attacked Mataram itself. Victorious, they initiated a dual administrative system—usually miscalled indirect rule—which consisted of a native civil service with a Dutch civil service alongside of (and on top of) it. The independent princes were left nominally in charge of their areas, but a Dutch civil servant was put next to them as an "older brother"—he was called a Resident, his Javanese "younger brother" a Regent—to pressure them "gently" in the directions determined by Dutch policy. Mataram was forcibly divided into two separate states, Jogjakarta and Surakara and split along the grain of its administrative weakness: the bureaucracy was pried out from under the king's control—initially by making the prime minister responsible to the Company, ultimately by severing the connection between the king and his staff entirely—leaving the king and his family free to cultivate the arts, religion, and a genteel politesse, to which the new civil bureaucracy, still semi-hereditary, could continue to look, in part, for a style of life model but not for orders. The negara was now but a cultural center; the political center was first the kumpheni, after its fall the supermen.55

This form of government continued up to the time of the Japanese occupation: a rationally organized dual bureaucracy ruling in territorial terms, or at least appearing to do so. The old hierarchy of native officials, somewhat simplified, was preserved but graded in terms
of descending territorial range of responsibility, rather than according to the number of villages under their control—thus completing the shift from personalistic to territorial integration. But, as in the **desa** case, the definition of authority in terms of territory (i.e., land) did not remove the personal (i.e., laboristic) element, but merely fused it with the new pattern; the personalistic tie between leader and follower persisted only slightly dimmed. Since the Revolution, when the **guberneran** became the **pemerintah** and the Dutch half of the bureaucracy disappeared, access to the bureaucracy has become easier and the social composition of the political elite has altered somewhat as new roads to power and status—most crucially education—open up beside the traditional one of descent. But, judging from the prevalence of complaints by Indonesians of what they call **bapakism** (literally, "father-ism") in the civil service, by which they mean a tendency toward personalistic rather than "businesslike" ties between department heads and their employees, the old patterns of authority have not, as yet, entirely disappeared.

Turning, finally, to **negara-desa** authority relations, to the distribution of power between rather than within these two loci of government, we see, once again, a similar evolution. In the earliest kingdom period, the main duty of the village to king was corvee, king's work as it was called, either for public works, such as roads or temples, for military service as foot soldiers, or as agricultural workers producing food for the king's court. This work was but the king's share in the village labor pool, in which the chief, various
other local officials, and the mass of the villagers themselves also had certain rights. The exact proportions of these different claims to labor depended upon the relative power of the village and the court, but the distribution tended to become traditionally fixed in the more persistent kingdoms.

By the time of Mataram, although the tie between king and village was still personalistic, the claims on labor had begun to be expressed in terms of land rights. The originally vague claim of the partially migratory barangay to the general territory it occupied and of the early city-states to the territory around their capitals developed into a dual notion of who owned the land. On the one hand, the villagers regarded the land, now no longer a free good though still rather abundant, as theirs by virtue of the fact that their ancestors had settled it, or, at least, that this fact permanently guaranteed their right to use it. The king, however, regarded all land within the kingdom—even in the mantja negara—as his by divine right, given out in loan to the peasants who were working it.58

These two theories of land rights were not so much in direct opposition as they appear; they represented merely the intersection of different perspectives, the peasant notion of village independence and the king's notion of universal sovereignty. A peasant could hold both that the land was his and that it was his king's with little intellectual strain. It was his because his forefathers had cleared it and no one could prevent him from working it; it was the king's by divine right, and so the king had a right in a share of its output. Perhaps the best analogy to this situation are those Christians who believe in personal
private property but yet believe all things belong ultimately to God and so dedicate a portion of their personal property to Him as a symbolic acceptance of His ultimate sovereignty over all things. As the king, as we shall see, was viewed as a god, the parallel is not entirely inexact; though the peasant's contribution could hardly be said to be voluntary.

Out of this dual land-ownership theory grew the so-called appanage system. In the appanage system the land of each village was considered divisible into five parts (land was first measured in the Demak period--i.e., about 1525--just prior to the rise of Mataram\(^5\)). One-fifth of the land was allotted to the villager who acted as the king's tax collector in the village. In the simplest case this was the village head himself, but in many villages, particularly those near the capital where the king's strength was relatively greater, the king appointed whichever village member would pay him most for the opportunity in advance, often after prolonged bargaining with several petitioners. In fact, the area allocated to a tax collector did not always, again especially near the court, coincide with village boundaries so that a tax collector might be awarded two villages or one and a half, or even one-half. Where the village head and tax collector were different individuals, the village head had to make his claims for support, for a share in the village land, directly against the peasants, and his position was necessarily weakened.

Of the remaining four-fifths of the land, half was given as appanage to the king, half reserved to the villagers. The king's half was converted into rice--half the harvest of the peasant's land--and seems even sometimes to have been converted into money (Spanish reals), though this was most probably not very common. Thus the king's share of the land
was 2/5 (really 3/5, if you count the tax collector's appanage), though
in poor land areas he sometimes only got 1/4 or 1/5. Originally, too,
the king ignored non-rice crops, leaving those wholly to the peasant;
but after 1743 he took 1/3 of them, too. Thus, once more, was control
over land and over labor fused into a single pattern reflecting the
structure of authority.

The king's appanage rights were then, in part, distributed both
to members of his family and to members of the bureaucracy as payment
for their services and as the price of their loyalty. But because
authority, land rights, and labor rights were so wrapped up together,
this was actually a division of his sovereignty among his dependents,
an exact reverse of the situation, as Furnivall has pointed out, in
feudal Europe:

When a ruler granted a district or a village to a dependent,
he did not transfer either the people or the land as so much
property, but he transferred part of his sovereignty. Later,
when the Dutch made grants of land, the people went with the
land, but that was a European idea; formerly under native
rule the land went with the people. The social tie was strictly
personal and in no way based on land; in feudal Europe a man
was liable to service because he held land, but in Java a man
held land because he was liable to service, and this pseudo-
feudalism was in fact the direct contrary of feudalism.

Again, the Dutch moved in on the system from the north pressing
Mataram in tight around its capital and awarding the king's appanage
rights to private Chinese, French, English, and Dutch entrepreneurs
who thus became sovereigns over clusters of villages, drawing for them-
selves the 2/5 negara share and paying rent for the privilege of doing
so to the Company. Some of the Dutch entrepreneurs after a while decided
that it would be more profitable not merely to take 2/5 of the rice crop
output, but to claim 1/2 of the land of each of their subject peasants and require them to grow specified cash crops on the entrepreneur's half, leaving them free to do as they wished with the other half. Later, when the Company went under and the excess of the Chinese and Dutch petty sovereigns became too flagrant, the Culture System continued this same practice in the name of the Colonial Government. Thus the Culture System, far from being a new invention of Dutch administrators, was merely the continuation of old negara prerogatives under a new, foreign sovereign. In many ways, the more modern practices of the sugar companies, renting 1/3 of the peasant's land each year for sugar, was only a further refinement of the same system.

But, as Mataram's territory contracted and the Dutch appropriated more and more of the island's agricultural surplus, the king's administrative staff had increasingly to be paid by salary rather than appanage, and incorporation into the Colonial Government as a civil service completed this transition. Thus, the growth of a genuinely landed aristocracy, a rural gentry, was inhibited, in the first place, by a political system based on personal ties rather than land ownership and by the need of the kings to keep high staff members within the palace; and, in the second place, by the transformation of the king's personal staff into a salaried bureaucracy. Even today there is no rural gentry of any strength in most of Java, though civil servants often own and let out to tenants (still on a half-half basis) an acre or two of village land. But, as population has grown, the village agricultural surplus has shrunk and the bureaucracy--now expanding by leaps and bounds--is today supported mainly by heavy taxes
on what is left of the largely foreign-owned export sector of the economy and by a growing government deficit, while the domestic agricultural sector of the economy goes largely untaxed.
IV. Patterns of Urbanization

Java, a frank—if somewhat uncouth—Portuguese explorer wrote in the sixteenth century, is like a mother pig: to the south is her bony razor back (by which he meant the arid, limestone dominated, largely harborless southern coast), in the center is her soft rice-plain underbelly, and in the north are her teats, from which her substance is sucked. Accordingly, the earlier phases of urbanization in Java are marked by the growth of two types of towns: the castle towns of the river valley interior and the bazaar towns of the north coast maritime region. The castle towns were, as we have seen, the capitals of the early kingdoms (the negara), administrative, aesthetic, and religious centers for the villages within their sphere of influence; while the bazaar towns were trading stations, commercial and shipping centers along the southern edge of the Malacca to Spice Islands sea street. In the succeeding phases of urban development, interstitial "secondary" and "tertiary" towns spring up among these two "primary" types, which secondary and tertiary towns are loosely integrated composites of elements from each of the primary types and from the villages. In the most modern stage, the north coast ports develop into cosmopolitan "great cities" which, though they are the political and commercial centers for the entire island, are almost as much oriented toward the outside world as toward their own hinterlands; the castle centers become inland provincial capitals with
a persisting, but perhaps declining, cultural influence. And some of the secondary towns become somewhat specialized economically, though this process has not gone very far. 66

The earliest hinduistic temple remains—for example, those on the Dieng plateau which are above the range of effective wet-rice agriculture—probably represented pilgrimage sites, empty towns of the sort we know from the Maya. 67 Such "towns" may not have been true urban units in that, except for a few priests (some dwellings have been excavated in Dieng), probably no one lived in them and they were used only periodically for worship purposes by people farming the slightly lower valleys nearby. However that may be, as temples were constructed in the lowlands, we can assume that those politically responsible for them lived around them, that the chief who would be king had built himself some sort of capitol, be it only an ostentatious elaboration of the traditional village chief's house, and that, consequently, a true town had begun to develop.

At this stage, the difference between a village and a town would not be sharp: contrasts in dress, housing, or general style of life would still be relatively small. In time, however, there would develop the kind of town we know from Madjapahit and Mataram, one in which the castle—the political capitol—not merely dominates the town but is the town. The castle walls now enclose the temples, the craft workshops (where such arts as puppet making, lost wax textile dyeing, and ceremonial spear and dagger casting are pursued), the barracks of the military
leadership, the royal rice graneries, the residences of the high administrators and princely nobility, and, as the center, the king's chamber and harem. Here, though a few common people may gather outside the walls, the distinction between urban gentry and village peasantry has now become quite sharp. Within the walls of an enclosed politico-religious urban unit occurs a fluorescence of art, mysticism and political organization quite foreign to the traditionally organized village. Against the "little tradition" of the countryside arises the "great tradition" of the towns. 68

The isolation of the earliest of these states in the interior of Central Java must have made them culturally rather homogeneous and self-contained, but as the later Eastern kingdoms—Singhasari, Kadiri, Madjapahit—moved down the Brantas towards the sea, this homogeneity and segregation from the outside world was progressively lost; and with the rise of the port kingdoms themselves (Surabaja, Demak, Tuban, etc.) it disappeared almost altogether. The shifting of the economic center of gravity away from the inland rice areas toward the north coast was connected, on the economic level, not only with the development of greater technological skill in irrigation, but with a reaching out of the expanding ruling class to control another, non-agricultural form of wealth: international maritime trade.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries East Asian trade steadily increased in importance, though it had been of significance since the time of Christ at least and busy port towns seem to have existed, particularly in Sumatra, even before the arrival of the hindus. 69 The
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stimulus toward expansion appears in the main, to have come from the
-growing demand for Asian goods in the commercial centers of Renaissance
Europe. Over a trade route which Schrieke has traced as running from East
Asia to Cambay to Aden to Cush to Alexandria to Venice, the spices,
textiles, ivory and jewels of Asia flowed toward Europe and some of the
luxury goods of Europe flowed back (trade within Asia was, of course,
lively too). It was a trade which rested, as van Leur has emphasized,
not on bulk transactions, but on the transport of rare commodities in
small amounts at high profit margins—he calls it, aptly, international
peddling and quotes Gibbon: "the objects of oriental trade were splendid
and trifling." It was a commerce in the objects of conspicuous display,
not, for the most part, of subsistence—a world-wide traffic in the symbols
of political domination and class superiority. The Hindu style of life
was now set off with the baubles of China, Arabia, and even of Europe;
and in Venice and Genoa spices from the East Indies graced Doge tables.

With the weakening of the early maritime kingdoms of Sumatra and the
expansion of rice cultivation on Java, the growing inland states of the
latter island made their bid to get a political strangle hold on this
trade. For a time, Madjapahit succeeded, Javanese shipping—mostly within
the archipelago—flourished, and the north coast ports grew rapidly in
size. Presently, however, these expanding port kingdoms shook themselves
free of Madjapahit domination and there came to exist a series of inde-
pendent or semi-independent bazaar city-states stretching along the edge
of the Java sea from Bantam in the West to Panarukan in the East. Here,
around "Asia's Mediterranean," grew up a kind of Far Eastern Levant:
Countless markets, lying isolated from each other and varying greatly from one another in structure. A few hundred bahar of spices, a few thousand bags of pepper, a few hundred packs of cloth, a few dozen carges of porcelain, a few dozen picul of wood products on each market. An international trade of person-to-person haggling and retail sales with hand scales or via the town weigh-house or the government toll house, carried on in the periods when trade was concentrated in the towns because of favorable winds and the harvests there. When the traders were gone and the money brought along had been put to use or spent, trade came to a standstill. 

Mercantilism thus replaced agrarianism as the economic ethos and a whole new way of life appeared. Oriented outward toward the sea, toward movement rather than stability, toward cosmopolitanism rather than isolationism, this was a far more dynamic kind of culture than that of the self-absorbed inland kingdoms. Further, this culture was not simply Javanese but international. Though Javanese sailors and traders played an important part in it, particularly in the earlier states (there was a large Javanese colony in Malacca, the most important bazaar state of all), the main local carriers of this expanding culture were the Malays of West Indonesia and Malaya and the Macassarese and Bugis of South Celebes. And from outside the archipelago came Gujaratis, Tamils, Chinese, Arabs, Turks, and ultimately, Europeans. The result was the growth of what might be called the "mosaic" pattern of urban life of the sort particularly common in the Middle East. The port cities were composed of a set of ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods, each more or less politically and socially self-contained and largely concerned with the intricacies of cut-throat commerce, relations among the separate groups being almost wholly economic and being carried out
in a form of bastardized, "market" Malay in which the only really important phrases were "how much?" and "too much!"

But in addition to the bazaar element, the castle element was present too, representing the attempt of the rice-supported native aristocracy, originally in the name of Madjapahit, later as independent princedoms, to gain political control over the trade. The bazaar cities seem to have consisted of a walled castle-estate, modeled on the inland cities, in which a king—sometimes several in a kind of collegial arrangement—resided, surrounded—outside the walls—by various neighborhoods, each of which tended to be composed of traders of a single nationality: Chinese, Gujeratis, Arabs, Malays, etc. These neighborhoods possessed a kind of extra-territoriality, being directly ruled, insofar as they were ruled at all, by a "captain" chosen from among them. The bazaar cities were thus not unified political entities at all: there was no simple sovereignty but rather a balance of power among merchant princes from various religious, racial, and national groups. The castle-dwelling king attempted to establish his pre-eminence, not only directly by controlling the trade of his own national group, the Javanese, but by mobilizing rice surpluses from villages under his control further inland; but his relation to the more important foreign traders was not as lord to subject but as merchant to merchant. To mediate between the groups there grew up, not only a fairly complex commercial system based on written contracts, letters of credit, and rational accounting, but also a group of go-between officials such as the shahbandar, a sort of market administrator, or the mantri, a kind of politico-economic emissary, jobs as often as not held by foreigners.
Dutch hegemony along the coast did not alter the basic structure of the bazaar states—a Dutch neighborhood, often called the "new town" and rather maladaptively designed in imitation of the towns of non-tropical Holland, was simply added to the rest and the headquarters of the Company built large enough to dominate the castle—but the Javanese role within these states declined radically in importance. Large-scale Javanese trade collapsed almost entirely under the resurgence of inland agrarianism, the diversion of much of the trade to ports in Borneo and the Celebes, and the reduction of local kings to lackeys of the East India Company. The main beneficiaries of this turn away from trade by the Javanese were, in addition to the Dutch, the Chinese. Even before the European incursion, the Chinese, who had been trading to the archipelago since before the time of Christ, were perhaps the most important foreign group in the bazaar states, often living within the castle walls, advising the local king, and maintaining close commercial ties with merchants in China. Asiatic, but bound neither by the ritualistic constraints of Hinduism or the legalistic ones of Islam; economically skilled and marvellously adept at political fence-sitting; tightly organized and industrious to a fault; and, perhaps most important, possessed of a calm sense of their own cultural superiority to both the Dutch and the Javanese, they were Java's most successful "marginal men." As such, the Dutch soon found them indispensable as intermediaries between themselves and the native population, fulfilling economic and political functions Europeans could or would not fulfill themselves.
As the bazaar city-states weakened, Mataram arose inland, marked by an aggressive agrarianism, a sharp hostility to trade as both foreign and degrading and a firm resolution to re-purify and re-vitalize the castle-city negara ruling tradition.79 It was as though these castle kings, princes, priests, and soldiers had been tempted by the glitter of international trade, had abandoned their quiet isolation and religio-aesthetic purity to reach out into an essentially foreign environment to grasp this trade and, having had their fingers badly burned and their pride severely damaged, were now retreating in bitter regret amid avowals of "never again." But when the Dutch, having consolidated their hold on the north coast, turned toward the interior of the island to destroy Mataram, they brought much of the bazaar rabble with them. Resident Chinese (many of them born in Indonesia) began to trade in the interior courts and to rent captured appanages from the Company, thus initiating the development of the wholesale-retail distributive apparatus they still control in Java, an apparatus transferring commercial crops from Javanese hands to Dutch ones as well as, to a much lesser extent, imported goods from Dutch hands to Javanese ones. Pious moslem petty traders, the remnants of the once powerful Javanese trading group, along with Arabs, also penetrated the hinterlands in search of small profits here and there in the countryside, travelling half-way across Java for a few cents gain and bringing trade not only to the inland towns but to the villages as well: dagang, the Javanese word for trade or (as wong dagang) trader, still also means "foreign" or "foreigner," as well as "wanderer" or "tramp." Thus, the north coast came to the
interior, and what had begun as an effort of the rice kings to dominate the foreign trade economy ended with a penetration of that economy into the agricultural basins themselves, an addition of the bazaar or pasar (the native word for market) element to the negara and desa elements in the Javanese social structure.

Actually, the pasar or market element added another kind of bond between negara and desa besides that already described; for, although its main locus remained in the towns, and continues to do so today; it touched at least lightly on even the most isolated villages. The traveling peddlers going out from the market centers stimulated village trading (and, consequently, the rise of at least part-time village traders) both in cash crops and in the products of small village home industry—textile weaving and dyeing, brick-making, cigarette manufacturing, bamboo-wall weaving, coconut-oil making, basket weaving—setting up a rural-urban relationship not focused around differential political rights to labor, around inequalities in military and religious power, but around the more equalitarian, every-man-for-himself implications of hand-to-mouth commerce of the small volume, rapid turnover, speculative sort. The first kind of town-country bond, that stated in terms of class and unequal political authority, remained strong, of course, and tended to shape the second, newer sort of linkage in its image. But, although they were of the towns, the quasi-foreign Javanese traders and, most especially, the genuinely foreign Arab and Chinese traders could not really take on the status trappings of the mobility. And so there came into existence a whole range of rural-urban types of relationships varying between the
negara and pasar poles, a set of social, economic and political ties within which the formal, personalistic, and hierarchical emphasis of the king to follower relationship and the informal, impersonal, equalitarian emphasis of the peddler to peddler relationship varied in their relative strength.

The almost purely political relationship between the noble turned civil servant and the common peasant represented the one extreme; the almost purely economic relationship between Chinese storekeeper and Javanese buyer (or seller) represented the second. The first involved a refined dialogue of genteel indirection, a subtle expression of the rights and duties incumbent upon different positions in a sharply hierarchical status structure; the second was carried on as a direct (though not necessarily frank), down-to-earth, dollars-and-cents dialogue between two people more or less explicitly out for their own advantage, each of whom suspected, correctly, that the other would deceive him if he could. The social interaction between noble and peasant was carefully regulated in terms of a complex status etiquette which emphasized the delicacy of the emotional relationship between the participants, an etiquette which permeated all aspects of their behavior, even the linguistic, constantly stressing the greater religious, aesthetic, political, and social standing of the civil servant in relation to the peasant. The Chinese-Javanese relationship lacked this hyper-concern for the correctness of speech and behavior and for emotional niceties almost altogether; and there was little acknowledgement of cultural superiority on either side: the Chinese considered the Javanese peasant a credulous
and unlettered lout, ridiculously easy pickings for a clever businessman; the Javanese thought the Chinese a narrow, materialistic foreigner with little interest in the higher things of life, hardly advanced over the animals.

These, however, were the extremes: most of the rural-urban social relationships were a fusion of the two. They were not merely political ties and not merely commercial ones, but something of both. Luxury goods associated with the courts—particularly, fine textiles—tended to be hawked in a manner quite similar to the way in which the civil servant governed (and often by the wives of the civil servants), the economic element being muted by a context of complex politesse. The Javanese urban peddlers, though much readier to sacrifice cultural form to economic substance than either the peasants or the aristocrats, were still not as completely insensitive to the demands of tradition as the Chinese or Arabs could be. On the village side, there arose a group of half-time traders and small handicraft manufacturers who, though still basically peasants, were able to free themselves to some extent from traditional constraints and represent their fellows in the world of the market, if not to the Chinese directly, then at least to the native trading class in town. Later, when displaced peasants began to drift into the towns to seek work as coolies, small craftsmen, servants, and so forth, a similar mixture of peasant ideas of "proper" interpersonal behavior and the commercial ethic occurred. Thus, there developed an urban occupational structure in which individual roles varied in their political negara (or desa) element and their commercial pasar element, according both
to the sort of occupation involved—civil servant, trader, coolie—and the social and cultural status of the individuals occupying them—Chinese, Javanese aristocrat, peasant; the two being rather highly correlated.

Town development proceeded, as the Colonial Period wore on, in terms of a crystallization of this generalized occupational structure: again a progressive solidification and rigidification of an originally loosely integrated pattern. The increased population, the greater complexity of political administration and the burgeoning of commercial activity all stimulated the growth of secondary and tertiary "feeder" towns at junctures in the evolving transportation network, which towns were composed of elements from negara, desa, and pasar pressed together in rather haphazard fashion. The lead in town development seems commonly to have been taken by the negara (or, more exactly, guprmen) element, by the steadily rationalizing bureaucracy cutting deeper and deeper into the peasant mass. When the Dutch began to remake the indigenous aristocracy into a civil service they placed the head office of the whole apparatus in Batavia, a city they had largely built themselves, turned the major castle towns and bazaar towns into provincial capitols and transformed the seats of the old independent or semi-independent secondary princes into sub-provincial regional capitols; but they soon found that this loosely woven urban structure was too coarse a net for their increasingly detailed administrative purposes. Stimulated by such evolving governmental functions as those for supervising forced crop programs, for collecting taxes, for protecting and servicing Dutch
business men and their enterprises, for controlling crime, repairing roads and improving irrigation facilities, and for keeping the government ear somewhat closer to the ground, the civil service was forced to differentiate and decentralize further, setting up branch district and sub-district offices every twenty miles or so (the density varied, of course, with the population density) around the countryside, and around these branches the new secondary and tertiary towns crystallized.

The placing of a branch office of the bureaucracy in a village resulted not in an establishment of a rural gentry—it was too late for that, and besides the policy of rotating civil servants among towns made it more or less impossible—but in the transformation of the village into a town, a removal of it from the desa realm into the realm of the negara. The district or sub-district office established, the pasar people came next, assured of government protection. Chinese-stores soon lined the main roads, a native market, dominated by the roving Javanese traders was set up (commonly, the towns in one area would form a rotation cycle, each holding a market on a different day of the five-day week, the traders moving about from one to the next), the small craftsmen—tailors and carpenters mostly—would begin to appear. The town pattern tended to be determined in terms of these various components. In the center of town, facing a wide square and shaded by a huge banyan tree, was the ranking civil servant's home and office, surrounded by the homes and offices of other government officials (e.g., the head of the government pawnshop or the operator of the government salt monopoly) and whatever (if any) Dutchmen lived in the town (e.g., as
supervisors of nearby plantations, sugar factory managers, railroad directors, etc.). Along the main street(s) the Chinese lived in their dim warehouse-like stores, while the native traders lived, along with the Arabs, around the mosque, in the so-called kauman or moslem quarter. Inside the blocks formed by the cross-cutting rectangular street grid (the towns are almost always, especially in the lowlands, perfectly squared off), behind the more imposing houses of the civil servants, the Chinese and the richer traders which faced out to the streets, the village people turned urban proletariat lived in bamboo huts. These enclosed living areas, bounded by the back walls of the more well-to-do, were called kampongs (neighborhoods), had a good deal of internal integration, and were, if effect, an attempt to maintain something of the closed-society village atmosphere in the towns, to provide an element of rural solidarity in a haphazardly urbanizing environment.

The building up of such an urban pattern was, once again, a process in time and, once again, the process tended to take an involutional form as the pattern became super-saturated, as a social form designed to contain moderately high population densities was forced to absorb enormously high ones. At first there would be only a district and/or subdistrict office, two or three Chinese stores, the majority of traders would be non-residents, merely passing through on market days or every month or two as a stop on a wide-swinging circuit, and many, if not most, of the village type people would continue to farm for at least part of their income: a loose urban structure capable of expansion in any one
of several directions and even of serious change in form. As the effects of the colonial policies on the villages began to be felt toward the end of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, the civil service grew in size (and its social composition grew more heterogeneous), its functions proliferating under the pressure of an increased governmental concern for native welfare. At the same time, the growth of Java's export economy as the large plantations appeared led to an increase in the number of traders and to a decline of the itinerant pattern: markets came to be held every day rather than weekly in most towns and the majority of the traders began to settle down permanently in one town or another, often setting up Chinese-type retail stores, small factories (cigarettes, garment making, etc.), or become craftsmen of one sort or another--barbers, tailors, bicycle repairmen, etc. And the approach of the rural social structure toward its population limits drove more and more displaced villagers into the towns looking for work as servants to the Dutch or the civil servant class, as laborers for the Chinese or Javanese businessmen, or as marginal craftsmen or petty traders.

Here again, then, was a mature pattern where one would expect either stabilization or serious structural change, but again neither occurred, perhaps in part because certain modes of response were automatically denied the Javanese within the colonial plural-economy set-up; in part because the prior rigidification of village life implied a reduction of possibilities for change in the urban sector as well, and in part because the unavoidable influences from the West came too rapidly for
smooth adjustment in any case. After 1920, the urban population growth rate seems steadily to have increased in relation to the rural population growth rate, a tendency culminating in the time of the Japanese occupation and in the post-revolutionary period, when the movement of people into the towns took on serious proportions. Thus, the logic of the tremendous population growth, from which they had been in part shielded by the remarkable labor absorbing powers of the villages, caught up with the towns and reproduced in them the kind of labor-swollen social system characteristic of the rural sector.

The more strictly urban part of the increased town population, that stemming from the internal growth of the negara element of the population itself, has been absorbed into the government bureaucracy which has expanded into an enormously over-staffed monstrosity; but with the shift of the basis of recruitment from descent to education, individuals have increasingly been able to move from desa or pasar backgrounds into negara occupations. The bureaucracy and the educational system (also enormously expanded) are locked in a self-perpetuating circle of distention in which the second produces more and more diplommed graduates which the latter is forced to absorb. Consequently, the embryonic rational bureaucratic element which seemed to be appearing before the second world-war, the increased incorporation of Western ideals of efficient and impersonal public administration into the ethics of many of the leading civil servants, had been almost lost in a criss-crossing of agencies and offices, a spreading of the work-load ever more thinly through the whole structure, and a proliferation of meaningless
activities designed to give people something to do—a situation which naturally leads to a lowering of morale and a marked decrease in administrative efficiency. 87

In the commercial sector, the flooding of former village people into trading activities, as well as a growth in population of the urban trading group itself, has led to an intensification of commercial activities almost exactly parallel with the intensification of agricultural activities in the rural sector: more people have been employed to produce the same output (i.e., handle the same flow of goods) by dividing the whole work-load into smaller and smaller tasks. There arises a multiplication of middlemen, an extremely individuated patterns of trade with maximum competition, maximum division of labor, minimum volume, and minimum margins of profit, within which any tendency toward more highly organized forms of economic activity—large stores, more rationally organized factories—gets drowned, because when labor is so cheap, entrepreneurial efforts, at least those of the sort designed to cut costs by making labor more efficient, are not likely to lead to much advantage. Similar processes have occurred in the more proletarianized sectors where each town has twice as many carpenters and four times as many tailors as it can profitably employ.

Once again, it would be a dangerous half-truth to pronounce all this "concealed unemployment" and to assume that all that was needed was industrial growth into which the excess labor could be drawn. As in the rural case, the absorption of so much labor into a political bureaucracy or a distributive apparatus does something to these structures
which makes a simple withdrawal of the labor again somewhat difficult. Granted that a pattern of civil administration is somewhat more amenable to reform, is less inherently resistant to change, than a pattern of ecological adaptation, where previous commitments get more directly embodied in a concrete and functionally specific technical structure, it is nevertheless true that the only reason why it would prove tremendously difficult to cut down the number of Indonesian civil servants is not merely that it would lead to tremendous political reactions (which if there were alternative employment for them it might not do), but that the whole administrative structure in some sense now needs all these people in order to be able to operate with even as little efficiency as it does.

The "drain off" theory not only assumes that people who leave the bureaucracy will be those least needed there (the opposite seems more likely: the more vigorous and imaginative are likely to leave for new fields than the passive and security oriented), but also that in a situation where its personnel is decreasing the bureaucracy will "naturally" reorganize in a more efficient manner. But, actually, increasing efficiency with a smaller personnel implies a whole revolution in the manner of doing business which a mere transfer of labor is not likely to effect. Instead of twenty people coming late to the office, working slowly and leaving early, you may find you have ten coming late working slowly and leaving early with (though this reduction in numbers might bring a few marginal savings, and would certainly ease the strain on the government budget) an even less adequate work output.
A similar argument can be developed for the distributive apparatus. If the thousands of small marginal traders reaching into every nook and cranny of Javanese town and village life are to be replaced, some more extensively organized system will have to be developed which will be able to get the natively produced cash crops out of peasant hands and manufactured goods into them. Considering the fractionization of the peasant sector into thousands of individual "owners" of village output, this would not, on the fact of it, be an easy task and it is just possible—one cannot be certain—that the development of large-scale, laborsaving commercial organization implies similar reforms on the productive agricultural end. In the manual labor "proletarianized" sector, especially where labor unions support rigidities in the allocation of labor, the same kind of inflexibility appears. In a sense, a modern industrial plant implies a modern agriculture, a modern political bureaucracy and a modern commercial system, and they all imply a revolution in social organization and cultural outlook which, despite appearances, may be rather further from occurring today in Java than they were several decades ago.

There is an important, if only partial, exception to this picture of rigidification, and it occurs in the major cities. One particularly revealing characteristic of the more recent stages of the urbanizing process in Java is that a great flow of urban migration is now not to the small and medium sized towns but to the larger cities, the former castle towns, and bazaar towns. One reason for this may be that the economic structure in these larger cities, containing as it does a
comparatively greater amount of medium industry and a much more highly developed commercial life (as well as more government offices), is still not so completely overdriven as that in the small towns, the situation is more open and flexible. One might say that the point of maximum flexibility of the three types of system—the village, town and city—the point at which given access to Western economic patterns they might most easily have made use of them, occurred serially in time. For the agricultural sector the crucial period seems to have been around the time of the Culture System when a more extensive organization of agriculture would have been much more easily accomplished than it could be now. In the smaller towns flexibility does not seem clearly to have disappeared until toward the second and third decades of this century, and so, compared with the countryside, the more labor intensive patterns are perhaps even today not so deeply set, so resistant to reform.

In the case of the cities, the rapidity of the population increase—three or fourfold in twenty-five years—means that the social and economic structure of these metropolitan areas has not been able to readjust so as to absorb all this excess labor; perhaps even had the increase been spread over a longer period it still might not have been able to absorb it. In any case, Java's population will soon be too great, if it is not already, to be wholly absorbed anywhere through an intensification of existing work patterns and so the problems of the cities are likely simply to get progressively worse. Foreign observers of the Indonesian scene who take comfort from the relatively higher level of well-being which seems to exist in Java's villages and towns as compared
to her major cities, usually fail to realize that this comparative well-being has been bought at the cost of a tremendous rigidification of an essentially mal-adaptive pattern, the evil effects of which have simply been transferred to the cities; that (relative) rural calm has been bought at the expense of urban unrest.
V. Religious Patterns

To form a picture, however dim, of the earliest stages of religious development in Java, we must, once more, turn to Ralph Linton’s reconstruction of the basic stratum of Southeastern Asiatic culture. After reviewing the distribution of “marginal” cultural elements among “isolated, culturally conservative groups [speaking languages of the Malayo-Polynesian stock] in remote Indonesian islands and in the mountains of Southeast Asia, ŽLinton describes the religion of the pre-cereal root-crop gardeners as showing:

. . . deep respect for ancestors . . . a belief in the existence of dieties who control the forces of nature [but who] are remote . . . and uninterested in human affairs. Local spirits of limited power and uncertain disposition are numerous and to be placated by small offerings . . . and all the marginal groups are characterised by an extreme development of the concept of taboo, so that the individual is surrounded by innumerable supernaturally sanctioned regulations, most of which have no recognized social significance or ethical connotation.88

In the succeeding stage, the slash-and-burn cereal cultures, there emerged a rather sharply warlike ethos—one which persisted in the high valley irrigators—centered around head-hunting, ritual canibalism and human sacrifice. These patterns all no doubt existed in the pre-iron age root culture period as well. But, in the slash-and-burn stage, they came to a kind of florescence; with rank dependent upon war-making ability, bravery, and wealth; with well-organized and planned head-hunting parties based on persistent feuds; and with the growth of a religious system in which the notions of taboo and mana get focused on the shrunken heads of the murdered or sacrificed victims, the heads then being seen as spiritual
sources of fertility, personal power and good health. This militaristic florescence was, evidently, in part stimulated by the increased competition for land within which to rotate fields implicit in the slash-and-burn method of cultivation.

In the more sedentary barangay stage, when the status differences established on a military basis in the slash-and-burn period began to crystallize and become connected, also, to control over agricultural surpluses, ritual feasting, also an old pattern, grew more important.

The feasts, which were seen as protective devices to ward off attacks from the very populous spirit world, were graded in size and elaborateness according to the status of the feast-giver within the community, the ability to be generous naturally reflecting the traditional scale of labor rights already discussed. The feasts thus played an economic, political, and religious role all at once. Economically, they made possible the efficient consumption of larger animals—goats, oxen, etc.—which, once killed, were difficult to store, and provided a flexible food distribution mechanism in a small group. Politically, they legitimized and symbolized the individual's status and general prestige (or lack of it), as well as emphasizing, behind the differences in power, the social solidarity of the ecological community. Religiously, they assured a state of spiritual well-being, made for right relations between the seen and the unseen worlds.

Again, we cannot be certain to what degree of complexity the indigenous religious systems had come when hinduation began. Both the "megalithic" remains of Eastern Java and the complex cosmologies
of Polynesia suggest that the wet-rice groups may have shown notable advances in religious sophistication in pre-hindu times. But, in any case, the coming of the Indian religions seems to have been closely associated with the rise of supra-village political units: Hinduism made kings out of chiefs, towns out of villages, and temples out of spirit houses. It brought not merely a spiritual revolution, but a political, aesthetic, and economic one as well. The transition from the sort of self-contained politico-economic integration characteristic of the traditionalistic barangay to the type of fragile despotism which marked the early kingdoms was, as we have seen, one of the most important social changes in all of Javanese history, for it represented the rise of civilization on the island. And it was this transition which Hinduism first projected, then legitimized and finally, at least to a degree, stabilized.

In the barangay, authority—the power to command labor—was distributed among members of the community according to fixed rules of custom, in terms of a religiously supported social order which was regarded as having existed from time immemorial. Both leaders and followers, high status people and low ones, were encased within this sacralized cake of custom and the exercise of personal will, rational decision, and even simple force was contained within the narrow limits of the received ideas of social usage. Into such a context, Hinduism seems to have come as a force liberating political leadership from the bonds of tribal custom. It seems likely that the initial social effect of the Indian religion was to free a few of the more successful leaders
of petty linked-barangay states from the traditional control over their powers of decision; to broaden the effective range of their arbitrary will and to extend the laboristic base of their power. The new creed, whatever its spiritual attractions, not only permitted a wider scope of political integration, but it provided the symbolic justification for the formation of a socially segregated ruling elite above the mass. "The Indian priesthood was called eastwards... for the magical, sacral legitimation of dynastic interests and the domestication of subjects, and probably for the organization of the ruler's territory into a state."94

Insofar as this sort of analysis ignores the spiritual element and tends to give a view of religion as but a mask for material motives it is inadequate, but the spiritual transformations within individuals converting to Hinduism in fourth or fifth century Java are obviously rather more difficult to reconstruct than the social results of such conversions. The emerging supra-village elite, projected beyond the world of the closed village society into a context where traditional religious belief offered little guidance would, in any case, seem to be logical candidates for a revised view of the nature of the divine-human encounter; and such people would be likely to find a religion consecrating social status distinctions in terms of a diminishing flow of spiritual power streaming from a divine king down through progressively less exalted orders of society attractive. It was, in fact, the Hindu idea of the divine king96 which was the religious innovation of central importance in the liberation of political leadership from traditional
constraints. For the notion that the ruler was an incarnation of a god (or, through mystical exercise, in continual contact with the divine) lent to him that aura of being outside the realm of everyday secular routine which Weber called charisma:

The term "charisma" will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers of qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader.97

"In traditionally stereotyped periods," Weber wrote, "charisma is the greatest revolutionary force."98 So, too, in Java. The chiefs who would be kings claimed a divine mission in terms of Hindu cosmology, declaring themselves free of the customary limitations on personal power. They asserted their own political wills against the conserving hand of a centuries old tribal tradition in terms of a dual reputation for extraordinary military prowess and for divine inspiration, which qualities were, in fact, mutual proofs of one another: the kings held their followers to them by a guarantee (which was at the same time a threat) of protection against rival depradators, the demonstration of their ability to do so being regarded as the evidence of their divinity, as a demonstration of their inability to do so was of its absence. The anxieties over a loss of contact with the divine stimulated by the abandonment of animistic village religious forms were absorbed into an ecstatic mysticism which re-established that contact on a more direct, if less secure, basis. And this more direct form of contact was reflected in more absolute forms of political authority--the carefully detailed
customary prescription of rights and duties of the barangay was abandoned and replaced by an arbitrary personalistic determination of the limits of hierarchical authority. Political ambition and spiritual ambition were identified: sovereignty went to him whose contact with God was most direct.

With this sociological view of the meaning of hinduisation for Java, van Leur's argument that it was not Indian merchant-colonists but Brahman priests, professional Indian soldiers and court artificers who mediated the south asian civilization to Indonesia seems quite coercive. The early empty towns—if that indeed is what they were—must, in their purity of Indian style, have been the products of an almost wholly non-Javanese group of sacerdotal specialists serving a multiplicity of petty political leaders in a kind of priest-client relationship, hinduistic consecration of mystico-political ambition being exchanged for material support. As the native political leaders grew strong enough to maintain their own priests on a full-time basis, to bring capitol and temple into a single social unit and fuse the military and religious foundations of their power into a unified administrative staff, the Javanization of the Hindu aesthetic style proceeded steadily. By the time of Madjapahit, when the castle-city state reached its mature form, the official artistic style was as much (or more) Javanese as Indian. The Javanization of Hindu art, which has usually been interpreted as the "reassertion of local genius" against an oppressive foreign influence seems, in fact, to be a reflection of the increasing success of hinduization (in the more total sense of the word) rather than a breaking loose from it. It reflects the progressive stabilization of religious
and political power within the ruling class, which comes to look more like an independent bureaucracy than a personal staff to the king, and the development of a genuine urbanism with true towns. This re-traditionalizing process—what Weber called the routinization of charisma—proceeded only a certain distance however: the ecstatic, magical, politically arbitrary element remained strong, leaving the states intrinsically fragile.

In any case, the new traditionalization was largely an urban phenomenon; the village maintained the older form of social organization (though there was much assimilation of reinterpreted Hindu symbols into that relatively unchanging structure). At the center of a loosely organized congeries of small, scattered, semi-sedentary villages, there slowly grew up a complex court culture in which mysticism, aestheticism and militarism fused to form an aristocratic tradition which persists, to a degree, in the Javanese upper classes of today. The king's castle, which, as we have seen, comprehended the entire town, became not only an administrative center, a military base, but the symbolic reflection of supernatural order. It was a squared-off "heavenly city," constructed according to the ideas of Hindu cosmology in which "harmony between the empire and the universe is achieved by organizing the former as an image of the latter, as a universe on a smaller scale."102 The building of the Hindu-Javanese capital as such a microcosm was in keeping with the charismatic form of political integration: at the center was the divine king, his throne symbolizing the holy mountain of Meru, seat of the gods; and the buildings, roads, city walls and even, ceremonially, his wives
and personal staff, were deployed quadrangularly around him according to the direction of the four sacred winds. Not just the king himself, but his regalia and his castle were shot through with charisma. The castle was the magical wellspring of the kingdom (in a sense, it was the kingdom) and, as Heine-Geldern has pointed out, he who—often after meditating in the wilderness—captured the castle, captured the whole empire, grasped the charisma of office, and displaced the no longer sacred king.

Thus, the negara-desa contrast was one not only of town vs. village, or elite vs. mass, or soldier, priest and administrator vs. peasant, but also one of the mystically accomplished vs. the spiritually unrefined. Within the negara spiritual excellence was correlated with political eminence. Magical power, mystical understanding and governmental authority flowed outward and downward from the king through the descending ranks of his staff, draining out beyond them into the spiritually and politically residual peasant mass. The circular "radio waves" of power spreading out away from the city capital, in terms of which the sovereignty of the aristocracy was asserted against the distribution of politico-economic rights solidified in village tradition, were religious as well as military. The inherent instability of this situation has already been stressed: the absence of a rural gentry, on the one hand, and/or of a genuinely independent, self-contained literate bureaucracy, on the other, meant that the culturally transforming process involved in Hinduism was only partial and the pre-colonial negara and desa remained, to a certain extent at any rate, in different worlds.
When the castle moved into the bazaar it found an even less receptive medium through which to transmit its waves of charismatic power; the cosmopolitan, mercantile, restless individualistic atmosphere of the north coast pasar was not very conducive to magico-military government.

In the first place, by the sixteenth century only a minority of the foreign traders were Hindus and Buddhists—most were Moslems from the Middle East or Northwest India or were Chinese—and so claims to sovereignty in terms of Indian cosmology had little meaning for them. Secondly, the military ingredient of authority was not as much sea power as land power, and the land-based Javanese kings and princes could not hope to control the seas against people who had been maritime for the whole of the Christian era: they had to bargain agrarian wealth (rice) and land power (military control of harbors) against maritime wealth (trade goods) and sea power (military control of the trade lanes). Further, the high degree of geographic mobility on the part of the traders tended to make their tie to any one harbor king but temporary and, hence, superficial, while the semi-extraterritorial nature of the various ethnic neighborhoods meant that any simple political community did not exist. For a political integration you need a moral consensus and in the pre-Islamic bazaar states ethic agreement, insofar as it existed at all, tended to be limited to the rules of the economic game.

The Javanese rice lords who would be merchant princes were, thus, in a peculiarly difficult situation. Looking inland, they needed to maintain their power of charismatic attraction to keep control over
rice surpluses; but, at the same time, they were struggling to break loose from Madjapahit domination. Looking outward, they wanted to gain some sort of hold over the polyglot citizenry in the bazaar cities for whom their claims to divinity had only an ethnological significance and, later, they wished to strengthen Indonesian solidarity in the face of European intrusion. Thus, when the West Indonesian Malays began to go Islamic and, following them, some of Javanese traders, the Javanese princes were able to effect an at least partial and temporary solution of all four of these problems by themselves converting. The adoption of the creed of Muhammad gave them a common religious tie with the majority of the Asiatic traders (the Chinese, again, being the major exceptions), symbolized the solidarity of the "East" as against the "West" (the first Europeans being mainly Portuguese, the earliest phases of Western contact brought a Far Eastern re-enactment of the cross and crescent struggle), expressed and legitimized their rejection of Madjapahit political claims, and, by carrying over divine king theories more or less unchanged into the Islamic idiom, it enabled them to maintain their hold over the peasantry. From the point of view of the Javanese gentry, conversion to Islam was a handy solution to a complex of political problems. Or, if not an actual solution, a projection of such a solution; a symbolic statement of a new form of indigenous political integration which could contain negara, desa, and pasar within one single whole.

But the conversion of the Javanese gentry was a following consequence, not a motivating cause, of Islamization in Java. It was the migrant traders, rather than the agrarian princes for whom Islam came as a
genuinely revolutionary form of religious orientation. For the gentry, the marxist view of religious conversion as a mask for politico-economic motives seems appropriate enough. Gentry religious orientations did not really change: he who had been hindu king was now moslem sultan; but the correlation of mystical accomplishment and political status remained unimpaired, and neither the egalitarian, the scholastic, nor the puritain implications of Islamic doctrine had much effect on it.

For the traders and sailors, however, Islam played a role similar to that Hinduism had played earlier, but in a new context. As Hinduism had served to liberate petty local chiefs from traditional bonds so they could appeal to a wider audience than their own self-contained agricultural group, so Islam, borrowed from the Gujarati and Arab traders, served to set free the maritime cultures of Indonesia (the most prominent being the West Indonesian Malays rather than the Javanese) from their local habitats and make them "international."

Despite van Leur's arguments to the contrary, the expansion of trade in the archipelago did bring a radical change in Indonesian social structure. Where the relatively small flow of trade previous to the fifteenth century was, for the most part, either wholly foreign (much of it bypassing all except Western Indonesia entirely) or wholly local, the enormously enlarged flow of trade subsequent to the appearance of the age of exploration in Europe not only brought many more foreign traders into Indonesian coastal towns for increasing lengths of time, but brought the whole of the Indonesian maritime culture—till then largely confined to fishing and local trade or piracy—into the worldwide
mercantile economy. The international commercial expansion led to a complementary Indonesian expansion, Malay language and culture spreading throughout the islands, coating each coastline with a new way of life. This growth of a genuine Indonesian trading culture modeled on international lines was at first contained within the hierarchic hinduistic framework by the military domination of Majapahit; but in time it could no longer be so contained. The period of the bazaar states saw an expansion of trade coupled with a fragmentation of political power; a re-creation, in a sense, of the urban conditions within which Islam had first arisen and taken hold:

It is significant for the Muslims' outlook on their community that the shouldering of certain educational and cultural obligations is not considered a primary requirement of the body politic. The absence of the government house from the list of the indispensable characteristics of a town would suggest at first blush that the Muslim town is perhaps not to be understood as a body politic at all. In any event, it is not (what the polis was) an autonomous association of citizens...[The Muslim town] constituted not a closed corporation, a share in which defines the citizen, but merely a functionally unified, administrative entity with a more or less stable complement of settlers or inhabitants.107...The ancient political interest in the community, the classical ideals of city-oneseness and of the clarity of architectural (and administrative) design have been replaced by a dominant religious interest, by ideal of quarter or group loyalty, by the desire to shield the family group from dispersal and contamination and by the concept of government as an outside agency with which one no longer identifies but which one rather wishes to keep at arm's length from the spheres of one's personal and familiar life.108

The full-fledged Muslim town (Muhammad himself was born in "the most highly developed urban community in contemporary Arabia" and "the appeal of his message was in large measure due to its appropriateness..."
to the urban situation")(109), Von Grunebaum points out, has two focal
points: the mosque and the market. He stresses what I have called
the "mosaic" aspect of the integration of such a town:

In its business district (and in a sense in its "official"
section—mosque and government buildings—as well) the unity
of the town is apparent; the arrangement of the residential
districts reflects the separatist tendencies at work within
it. For the unity of the Muslim town is functional, not
civic. In their newly founded cities the Arabs would settle
by tribes, each tribal quarter to be complete with its own
mosque, bath, and as a rule its own market. In Baghdad
Persians and Arabs lived apart from the beginning, in Samarra
Muqtašī saw to it that the natives of Fergana and the
Turks occupied separate quarters without direct contact with
the Arab population, in Tlemcen the tension between the
"autochthonous" Hadri and the descendants of the Turkish
janissaries the Qūlūghī, has remained alive to this very
day. Not infrequently, the individual quarters are walled
and their gates locked during the night to counteract the
insecurity of the town which is, after all, due in large
measure to the perennial interquarter animosities . . . .
The loyalty of the townsman belongs to his family group and
after this to the ethnic or denominational unit which shares
his quarter. The tolerated minorities occupy their own sections
of the town, with the Jews, for better protection, frequently
living in the immediate vicinity of the government area.
The occupants of the several quarters will meet typically
but in market and mosque . . . . 110

To this sort of social context, whether in the Middle-East, in
India or Indonesia, Islam, with its simple ritualism, its lawyer-teacher
centered legalism and its strong communal emphasis is particularly well
adapted. Mosque and (pre-capitalist) market are a natural pair in the
sense that the far-flung, small-bulk speculative commerce the second
implies creates the kind of social experience (and the kind of social
man) to which the teaching of the first seem especially relevant and the
social forms in which those teachings are cast especially well designed.
The spiritual equality of all men in the face of the absolute majesty of God, the common community of all who live under His explicitly revealed, humanly unquestioned and utterly comprehensive laws, and the ethical universalism in terms of which true believers are obligated to treat one another would seem more congenial views of the relation between this world and the next for peripetetic peddler buying and selling in many markets, among many sorts of people, under all kinds of political order; much more congenial than a theory holding a particular local administrative bureaucracy to be a spiritually graded hierarchy culminating in a fusion of the divine and human at its apex. For Hinduism's attempt to sacralize a political community built around inequalities in military power, Islam substituted an attempt to sacralize a commercial community, built around commonalities in economic motivation.

The sociological center of the Islamic idea lies in its conception of umma Muhammediyyah—Muhammad's community. Defined by a common adherence to Koran, Hadith, and Law (the symbolic affirmation of which is the Confession of Faith: "There is no God but God and Muhammad is his Prophet"), the umma is neither a mystical nor a territorial community, but a ritual-legal one:

So it became the task of the community to evolve a comprehensive pattern for a life under God, covering every phase of human existence from conception to burial and eliminating any distinction between the sacred and the profane aspects of life by making every instant of it religiously relevant and requiring ritualistic perfection for the performance of any action whatsoever. In this manner behavior was stereotyped to a point, but the whole of life, down to its
most repulsive detail, was given the supreme dignity of religious significance... it is the quest for the correct life that stands out as the supreme motive of the Islamic experiment; it is the conflict between this life and the exigencies of this world (frequently personified to the pious as lawless rulers, hypocrites and heretics) that largely dominates the internal history of Islam.112

In the bazaar states of northern Java, as in many of the other cities along the great oriental trade route, this kind of community came finally to dominate, although just at the point at which its victory over the Hindu conception of social organization seemed assured European incursion broke its growth. Religiously centered around the koranic scholar, who as both lawyer and teacher was responsible for its orthodoxy in the absence of any ecclesiastical hierarchy or churchly organization whatsoever, it tied together Gujarati, Arab, Malay, Bugis, and Macassarese into a common ritual community independent of national origin—"such is the atmosphere within which the muslim lives, a citizen of the umma Muhammadiyah but a mere resident of his town."113 It was, in fact, the tension between the inherited customary law of the separate national groups and the international, universalistic Islamic law—between adat and hukum—which was, as it has been everywhere in the Islamic world, the chief ideologically dynamic factor of the pasar culture.

The locus of the impulse to Islamization lay then, not in the agrarian aristocracies, but in the merging trading class which it served to liberate from local maritime traditions. The gentry changed its religious orientations little if at all; their conversion was a matter of political prudence.
It was a desperate attempt to hold both pasar and desa to their leadership, to project a new social and political unification under their domination. Whether, had not the Dutch come, they would have succeeded eventually is unclear. They would have had to continue the development toward a literate bureaucracy, of a sort similar to China's, develop some sort of a rural gentry, and yet to have maintained enough flexibility to contain an expanding trade economy—-not an easy task. In any case, the Dutch did come, the north coast states were crushed and the three religious traditions associated with desa, negara, and pasar persisted only loosely related to one another, though coming into more and more intimate contact as the economic involution of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries drove town and country closer together.

Through all the changes just described village religious patterns were never fundamentally transformed. When their kings became hindu, the peasants became, nominally, hindu; when their kings became moslem, they—even more nominally—became moslem. Many of the symbols, ritual patterns, and beliefs of the two imported traditions seeped down to the villages (as some village traditions "seeped up" to the towns) and did, indeed, alter both the phraseology and the particular quality of the rural religious system. But, essentially, the pre-hindu structure remained intact, solidifying and intensifying as village life in itself solidified and intensified. Rural religious beliefs continued to be concerned
with the symbolization both of the inherent mutual dependence among "legally" independent family groups living in the same wet-rice growing community and with gradations of, first labor, then land-and-labor based differences in political status.

The ritual feast, whose food is offered both to the spirits and to one's neighbors, remains the religious center of village life to this day, petitions to hindu gods and goddesses and moslem koranic chants having been added to its animistic core for style. The feasts are clustered around points of passage in the human life cycle, around seasonal recurrences in the yearly round and around residential integrations (the neighborhood, the village as a whole): they form a sort of universal social joint, fitting the various aspects of social life and individual experience together in a way which minimizes uncertainty, tension, and conflict. Such a feast is always held by one family, to which usually eight or nine geographically contiguous families (represented by their male heads) are invited. The women of the host household cook the food, which is served in individual bamboo-leaf dishes. The male head of the household sits with his guests in a circle in his "living room," there is a burning of incense for the spirits, a formal announcement by the host of his reasons for giving the feast and a koranic chant. Each of the guests then hurriedly consumes a few handfuls of food, begs to be excused, and returns to his own household to share the sacralized food with the remainder of his family.
The basic ritual unit of the village is, then, the household—a man, his wife and his children, sometimes another close relative such as a sister, mother-in-law and so forth. The religious community in the village is not a supra-familial one, not an organic, individual-swallowing collectivist one in the narrow sense. Even in the one important village-wide ritual the family is not dissolved into a superordinate mass.

The so-called "cleansing of the village" (of evil spirits) annual rite is but little more than a simple compound of separate familial feasts. Each family prepares a basket of food at home, the male head brings it to the grave of the village founder, the ceremony is held, a little of some other family's food is eaten by the male head, and then he carries it home to share with his own family. There is no common kitchen, no village-wide ritual organization to carry out the ceremony; only the food of separate, self-contained, kitchens exchanged among geographically conjoined families. The Javanese peasant, who has so often been seen to be a featureless cipher swallowed up in his social whole, actually holds himself rather aloof from it, keeping his thoughts to himself and willing to give others only what tradition assures him they are going to give, in some form, back to him. This is a kind of "familistic individualism"—as such patterns have been called elsewhere—the encounter between human and divine is not one between individual worshiper, amid other individual worshipers, and God(s), but between family(i.e., household), amidst other families, and God(s). The households are like so many windowless monads,
their harmony pre-ordained by a common adherence to a single, age-old, tradition.

That this pattern reflects the social organization of village life is apparent. Such a reciprocal feasting pattern is able to express both the ultimate solidarity of all village members—sacramental communality is an almost worldwide religious rite of social communion—and the differentiation among the separate social units, in this case families. Food has always been the chief form of consumable wealth in the Javanese village, as in any peasant village, and, consequently, its distribution has tended to be a direct symbol of differences in rights within the village labor-land-authority pool. The entanglement of feasting patterns with labor-exchange systems, with land-rights and with noblesse oblige political patterns has meant that the involutional processes already traced in their development has been reflected in a similar process in religious patterns. Although good descriptions of the details of Javanese village religious life in the pre-modern period are lacking, it seems certain that from the use of feasts as traditionalized "payments" for traditionally owed field labor, to their use as expressions both of equality among core villagers and of differences between core villagers and village leaders on the one hand and "foreign" hangers-on on the other, to the present situation in which the small gradations in status are subtly reflected in their incidence, size and personnel—through this whole developmental process these simple little rituals have reflected the growth, maturity and ossification of Javanese village life.
As for the gentry, the negara element, the colonial period saw a similar development, but in this case there was a tendency for the tradition to split in two. As the pasar culture crumbled under European impact, Mataram turned in upon herself and produced a religious and artistic renaissance, an outburst of cultural creativity in which the Hindu-Javanese arts (dance, shadow-play, textile design) and religious practices (fasting, meditation, numerology), now in nominally Islamic guise, were brought to their highest point of perfection. It was "a byzantine epoch when the young Javanese court etiquette and the young Javanese court language attained their completion and polish." Great epics relating Javanese dynastic history were composed, new dances were created through the dramatization of traditional mythical themes, mystical poems of great beauty were written in newly invented poetic forms—in aesthetic terms the Mataram period is perhaps the high point in Javanese history. The reduction of Mataram by the Dutch to a powerless museum piece dampened the creative fervor but nevertheless served to accentuate the emphasis on aesthetics and mysticism even further by severing political concerns from court life. There developed a hot-house court culture which labored to perpetuate the more hinduistic form of world-view among the newly emerging bureaucracy, the members of which tended to look to the Central Javanese nobility for cultural leadership.

But in the north coast areas, the situation was rather different. Culture System and Liberal Period prosperity enabled the Dutch—who by now had become aware of the unhealthful effects of sluggish canals,
narrow streets and small windows in the tropics—to move out into spacious suburbs on the edge of town (though their expanding commercial enterprises—banks, plantation companies, shipping concerns, factories—remained centered in a financial section of the city). Once there, they developed a kind of culture which, as it was a mixture of Dutch bourgeois and Javanese gentry patterns, Wertheim has called mestizo. It was a manorial style of life, complete with country house, extensive "rice-table" banquets and great staffs of servants. Though the Dutch were its most accomplished practitioners, the whole of the social elite in the port cities—which included rich native-born Chinese, the higher ranking of the Indo-European mixed-race group and the top layers of the native civil service—followed it also, as best they were able. Thus, there arose, within the gentry, a group of Dutch educated, Dutch speaking, Dutch imitating "cultural middlemen" mediating foreign patterns to their countrymen; something of a contrast to the group of inland court-city nobles, caretakers, and connoisseurs of the old Javanese (nee, hindu) traditions, who tended to be sceptical, at best, of the advantages of European culture.

Thus, to an extent, the old cultural homogeneity of the gentry was lost. On the one hand there were what Robert Redfield, following Toynbee, has called the intelligentsia, that group of people who have learned cultural patterns alien to their community, who "have learnt the tricks of the intrusive civilization's trade so far as may be necessary to enable their own community, through their agency, just to hold its own in a
social environment in which life is ceasing to be lived in accordance with local tradition and is coming more and more to be lived in the style imposed by the intrusive civilization upon the aliens who fall under its dominion.\textsuperscript{119} On the other hand, there were what Redfield calls the literati, those persons enclosed within a culture which has become a civilization and "who carry it forward into a more systematic and reflective phase."\textsuperscript{120} The distinction is far from absolute; most gentry had—and have—something of each aspect in their makeup.

Finally, we turn to the recent history of the more Islamic pasar culture. As the Javanese-traders turned inland to become itinerant back-country peddlers, following the decline of native controlled international trade in north Java, they extended their somewhat more vigorous Islam, not only to the small secondary and tertiary towns where pruistic moslem quarters soon grew up around the mosques, but, ultimately, to certain village elements as well. Richer peasants, small handicraft factory owners and the emerging village trading class, particularly, found themselves attracted to a somewhat more moslem view of things.\textsuperscript{121} The Islam of these groups was rather impure from an orthodox point of view; merely the usual feast-centered rural religious systems under a fairly transparent moslem veil. But, in time, the rural umma became something of a distinctive group, aligned with the urban traders in their common emphasis on the superiority of the Islamic religion, opposed to
them in their more syncretic view of what the content of that religion actually was.

The institutional nucleus of this rural Islamic group was not so much the mosque as the koranic school. Such schools were constructed on a modified monastic pattern. The students—young bachelors, anywhere from ten to thirty years old—lived in dormitories, cooked their own food, and, usually, worked in the fields of the koranic teacher (or some other well-to-do supporter of the school) as much as half of their time; sometimes even small handicraft industries—textile dyeing, garment making—were attached to the schools, in which the students would work. The method of "study" was very ritualistic and formalistic; it consisted mostly of the "teacher" chanting and the pupils "echoing" arabic texts neither could understand. As for the teacher, he was commonly a hadji—i.e., a man who had made the pilgrimmage to Mecca—and so was not only rather extraordinary from a religious point of view, a sojourn in the holy city making one a scholar automatically in the eyes to the villager, but usually at least somewhat well-off economically. Around the koranic school, then, Muhammad's rural Javanese community developed, its contact with the urban community growing more intimate as time passed, population grew and secondary and tertiary Javanese towns become more numerous.

Thus, as this century began, there were apparent on the Javanese scene three main religious traditions—one having its major social referent
in Javanese village life, one in the urban aristocracy turned bureaucracy, and the third in the commercial trading group. But, despite my didactic segregation of these traditions from one another for the purposes of exposition, they have never been wholly isolated from one another, but rather have formed part-elements within the sort of cultural tradition Redfield has called compound: one in which, though the part-elements maintain the major outlines of their own identity, they participate in a broader pattern of cultural process in terms of which they interact with one another. Elsewhere, I have compared the gentry and peasant traditions to etched mirrors, each dimly catching a distorted reflection of the other, and one may add the trader tradition as a third, complicating, mirror. This house of mirrors image seems appropriate: village religious patterns have syncretised Islam and Hinduism into their aboriginal animistic outline; gentry religion leaves space for spirit beliefs and time for Moslem ritual; and the Islam, even of the pious urban traders, does not prevent a belief in native curing techniques or impose a rejection of the values of mystical contemplation. Behind the three traditions lies a common, dimly sensed, consensus, as behind the separate social sub-systems lies a broader, total social system. No more than the fact that America is largely divisible into Protestant's, Catholics, and Jews, does the trichotomous patterning of religion in Java imply an underlying social or ideological disunity.

Nevertheless, the three religious variants have remained, in part, distinct from one another: none of them has absorbed any of the others
to any great extent; none of them has become noticeably dominant over
the rest; nor have they dissolved into a common belief, despite the
growing strength of nationalism as such a solvent ideology. The
involution of Javanese social structure under the impact of population
growth, Dutch intrusion, and agricultural intensification has, however,
brought them into increasingly direct confrontation, particularly in
the towns, where, not so closely indentified with their social contexts
as they once were (there are now pious moslem civil servants whose
fathers were traders, prosperous businessmen who have not lost the
aristocratic world-view of their civil-servant fathers, petty traders
who maintain an essentially village outlook on life, etc.), they show
signs both of internal reformation and of a working out of new forms
of relation to one another, perhaps even of a shifting of the social
bases on which they rest. The peasants come to town attempt to adjust
the village religious pattern to urban conditions; the small Javanese
traders and businessmen intensify their Islamic self-consciousness;
and the civil-servants, teachers, and white-collar workers attempt
to combine literati and intelligensia patterns into a new elite way
of life.

The thrusting of these three kinds of people into a common urban
melting pot has tended to increase the individual Javanese's sense
of differentiation between social context and religious commitment.
One can no longer assume a person's world-outlook to be an automatic deduction from his social position. And, as this distinction comes clear, the terms which the Javanese use to indicate the three socio-cultural variants which we have been describing—abangan, for the village pattern; prijaji, for the elite pattern, and santri for the purist moslem pattern—come to have a more explicitly ideological, less social-structural significance. But at the same time, the attempt to restate these religious value-systems becomes an attempt to restate the whole social form of the society.

The restatements so far have been—like the changes in economic and political aspects of Javanese society already discussed—but tentative at best. For the santris, the rise of Islamic reformism in the first and second decades of the century within the urban trading group represents such an attempted restatement; but its future remains in doubt, the energies of its protagonists having for the past two decades been almost wholly absorbed in practical day-to-day political problems, as have those of almost all Indonesian intellectuals. In some of the prijaji-dominated political parties—both before and after the Revolution—there has appeared something of an attempt to reconcile the intelligensia and literati patterns with one another—to make East meet West—and the growth of socially-conscious mystic sects in the towns may prove of some significance in this regard. Abangan flirtation with marxism evinces similar, perhaps more ominous, stirrings. But one can hardly predict the outcome. All that is
certain is that, as they have in the past, these various religious patterns focus around the crucial contrasts and commonalities within Javanese society, reflect both the unalterable events of Java's history and the at least partially pliable possibilities of her uncertain future.
VI. Conclusion

Economic development within any society rests, in the first instance, on the quantity and quality of the factors of production—land, labor, capital, and organization—available to the society and on the growth of flexible markets in each of these factors by means of which they can be shifted efficiently among specific economic employments. The extent and excellence of a nation's resources, the size and skill of its labor force, the scope and complexity of its productive "plant," and the distribution and value of entrepreneurial abilities among its population are only one element in the assessment of its capacity for economic growth; the institutional arrangements by means of which these various factors can be brought to bear on any particularly economic goal is another. The barriers—to put the problem the other way round—to economic growth in such a region as Java is not merely the severe shortage of certain resources (e.g., cultivable land), the lack of industrial disciplines among her population, the primitiveness of her capital equipment or the poverty of her people's economic imagination; but the rigidity with which such resources, skills, equipment, and creativity that she does possess are locked into a fixed, stereotyped, pattern of employment. It is for this reason that economic development in "underdeveloped" areas implies much more than capital transfers, technical aid, and ideological exhortation: it demands a deep-going transformation of the basic
structure of society and, beyond that, perhaps even in the underlying value-system in terms of which that structure operates.

The extent to which such a transformation may prove difficult has, I hope, been indicated in the foregoing analysis. The overdriving, not just of the economy but, in a sense, the whole society in Java by the events of the past one hundred years suggests how deeply involved in broadly social and cultural factors any proposal for economic change in Indonesia must inevitably become and how resistant such factors are likely to be to such proposals. In Java, "modern capitalism," in Weber's sense of that term, has come, and is coming, not as a slowly evolving, indigenously produced innovation, contained, regulated, and supported by the gradually transforming social and cultural forms within which it arose, but as a diffused pattern from economies infinitely more advanced than her own and without the socio-cultural context within which it is set in those economies. The contact with this pattern and with these economies, mediated as it has been in terms of such a special political form, has led not to an increasing relaxation of traditional constraints, a "rationalization" of social forms, but to an intensification of them. It is an unhappy fact that Javanese society was probably in many ways more open to structural change in the first decades of the nineteenth century, more ready to permit the kind of (relatively) tradition-free operation of narrowly economic aims, interests, and motivations characteristic of the
West, than it is now, when cultural conservatism, and overblown population have become so mutually supportive of one another. But economic history does not run backwards any more than does history generally, so that a society which has missed favorable opportunities for change in the past cannot go back and try again: Java will have to make the transition to an industrial economy, if she makes it at all, with all the disabling rigidities she has inherited from a century-long delay in agricultural, political, urban, and even, religious reform.

All this is not mere pessimism, although there is clearly a good deal in the Javanese case about which one may rightly be pessimistic. Rather, it is an attempt to point an academic moral, a moral perhaps most neatly stated in Bergson's aphorism that there is nothing in the present but the past. This is an historian's exaggeration; but it is true that a completely synchronic view of society, culture, and economy leaves one at the mercy of accidents which have already happened. Gross, quantitative, aggregative approaches to the problem of economic development in underdeveloped countries, cast in a wholly contemporary dimension and carried on in the absence of a concrete understanding of history, culture, and social structure, are likely to be only misleading. It will not do to speak airily of "concealed unemployment" unless one is more specific about just where it is concealed—in town, city, or countryside, in which classes, in what sort of occupational, political, and religious groups—and how it
came to be concealed there. Discussions of capital transfers mean little in the absence of some sort of discussion of through what kind of men the transfer is to be mediated, what sort of institutions might regulate its distribution, what sort of cultural traditions determine its mode of employment; and these are all partially historical questions.

Historical and scientific analysis form a double perspective in terms of which it is possible to give social facts a semblance of three-dimensional reality absent in a merely chronological or merely theoretical approach. Panofsky, the art historian, seems to me, as a matter of fact, to have portrayed the relation between the historian and the scientist with almost perfect clarity:

When we call the connoisseur a laconic art historian and the art historian a loquacious connoisseur, the relation between the art historian and the art theorist may be compared to that between two neighbors who have the right of shooting over the same district, while one of them owns the gun and the other all the ammunition. Both parties would be well advised if they realised this condition of their partnership. It has been rightly said that theory, if not received at the door of an empirical discipline, comes in through the chimney like a ghost and upsets the furniture. But it is no less true that history, if not received at the door of a theoretical discipline dealing with the same set of phenomena, creeps into the cellar like a horde of mice and undermines the groundwork.133
1. Java is, of course, but a region, perhaps the most important region, within the national state of Indonesia. The limitation of this analysis to Java means that, from the point of view of an analysis of Indonesian economic development, it demands supplementation in the form of consideration of the "outer islands"—Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, and the Lesser Sundas—and of Indonesia as a single unity.

2. In Indonesian scholarship the term "hinduism" has traditionally been employed to refer to all of the various Indian religious forms—Brahmanism, Shivaism, Buddhism—which diffused to the archipelago, as well as to combinations of them, and it will be so employed here.

3. The classic work on the hindu period is still Krom, N. J., Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis, Den Haag, 1931, though some of his theoretical formulations have been questioned. A shorter and more popular version may be found in Stutterheim, W. F., Het Hindoeisme in Den Archipel, Groningen, Den Haag, and Batavia, 1932. A brief English description is given in Vlekke, B. H. M., Nusantara, A History of the East Indian Archipelago, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1945, from which the above dates are taken.


7. One partial exception to this generalization was the stimulation of a market for Dutch textiles which seems to have had an inhibiting effect on native handicraft textile industry. See Wertheim, W. F., Effects of Western Civilization on Indonesian Society, New York, 1950, p. 5.

8. For the "dual" economy approach, see Booke, J. H., Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies as Exemplified by Indonesia, New York, 1953. For the "plural" analysis, Furnivall, op. cit.

9. For an example of how a retreat to a more heavily subsistence-oriented economy led, during the 1929 depression, not to "natural readjustment" but to declining welfare, social rigidification and increased rural indebtedness, see Van der Kolff, G. H., The Historical Development of Labor Relationships in a Remote Corner of Java, New York, 1936.

10. At its greatest the Culture System only occupied 5 per cent of Java's cultivable land. (Dobby, E. E. G., Southeast Asia, London, 1950, p. 238.) But as this was, for the most part, the best land; and as the forced crop system was not applied to the same land every year, the impact of the system was much greater than it would appear from this figure. In any case, it is the labor element, which was then in short supply, not the land element which is important; and the great majority of Java's population seem to have been caught up, in one way or another, in the Culture System.

11. Actually, though the System is usually considered to have been formally abolished in 1870, many of its practices persisted into this century, and it was not until 1915 that a law was passed forbidding forced cultivations. Furnivall, op. cit., p. 183.

12. Toward the end of the period population was increasing at a rate of 33 per cent a decade! (Dobby, op. cit., p. 239.) The increase as a whole was from six million in 1830 to nine and a half million in 1870. (Furnivall, op. cit., p. 136.)

13. The development of industry in Holland and the increased world demand for industrial raw materials at this period, shifted Dutch interests away from consumption crops producing Javanese economy to the outer Indonesian islands where the less developed state of the wet-rice economy and a lower population density permitted a more extensive pattern of raw material exploitation. But the low population also meant that workers had to be drawn from Java to staff the new concerns with unskilled labor. See Wertheim, op. cit., p. 5.

14. The greater proportion of the service, retail and smaller wholesale businesses were, of course, in the hands of the Chinese. After the combination of Dutch monopoly and Mataram's disdain for commerce crippled the Javanese trading sector, the Chinese became increasingly powerful. Under
the Company they were allowed, for a consideration, to rent whole villages as semi-sovereign landlords. Under the Culture System certain monopolies—pawnshops, opium, slaughtering, salt, etc.—were leased to them by the State. And in the Corporate Plantation period they were allowed for the first time to move freely in Java's interior, soon getting a firm grip on the developing domestic trade channels and effectively hindering the growth of a strong middle class. For descriptions of Chinese activity in Java, see Cator, W. J., Economic Position of the Chinese in Indonesia, London, 1961, Parissi, V., The Chinese in Southeast Asia, London, 1961, and Weijer, N. J., The Chinese in Indonesia, unpublished manuscript at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

15. For a full description of the rise of nationalism in Indonesia, see Kahin, G. Mof., Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca, 1963.


17. The voluntaristic language of the model is also misleading. It is not, of course, a simple change in the conscious motivation of the workers which is involved, nor, as some (e.g., Boeke, op. cit.) have argued, of a basic incapability of certain racial or cultural groups to think in economically rational terms, but, as we shall see, an alteration in the whole form of the cultural and technological pattern of production, of the socially-structured process of production.

18. For the sequence of land-use patterns in Southeast Asia and a discussion of their implication for social and economic problems, see Felser, K., Pioneer Settlement in the Asian Tropics, New York, 1945. Dooby, op. cit., includes a similar discussion. For a general discussion of the relation between types of land-use and social forms see Forde, C., Habitat, Economy and Society, London and New York, 1934, especially Part IV.

19. Felser, op. cit., states that 18 per cent of the land in the Philippine Islands is covered with slash-and-burn as a result of shifting cultivation. The same author also reports a Dutch Government study in Indonesia which held slash-and-burn adaptive as long as the population was less than 150 per square mile and held that the shifting cultivator with a five-person family needed 2 1/2 acres a year shifted annually in a ten-year cycle. For a discussion of the relations between climate, population density and shifting cultivation in Burma which emphasizes native understanding of these factors, see Leach, E. B., Political Systems of Highland Burma, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1954, pp. 21ff.

21. Van der Veer, K., De Rijstcultuur in Indonesie, sGravenhage, 1949. For contemporary examples of this simpler highland form of irrigation, see Barton, R., Ifugao Economics, Berkeley, 1922 or Hutton, J. H., The Angami Nagas, London, 1921. The idea that the sort of terracing one finds among the Ifugao and Angami implies an immediate social revolution and demands large scale organization and complexity of political development is an error, as the cultural similarities between these groups demonstrates (see Leach, op. cit., p. 27). It is complexity of work task, not mere quantity of it which is the crucial variable in this connection, and the building of dramatic terraces such as those of the Ifugao, while they may take much time and labor are actually not so very much more demanding technically than the slash-and-burn regime. Such forms of irrigation, which demand only simple spillways and terraces, may be built up slowly, piece by piece, over the course of centuries. It is only in the lowland basins, where problems of flooding, draining, transport of water over extended distances of level land and wide seasonal variations in water supply are met, that the need for highly complex social organization is felt. Wet rice agriculture should be seen to develop smoothly through increasing levels of complexity and intensification as any other sort of cultivation, not to be inevitably an advanced system.


23. It might seem that innovations such as iron and ox-pulled ploughs would be labor-saving. Taken in isolation—in that a man can cut down a given number of trees faster with an iron ax than with a stone one—they are. But seen as but parts of a change in the whole manner of exploiting the land they are not. Iron stimulated an agricultural regime—slash-and-burn—which demanded more not less labor than the neolithic horticulture it replaced and along with the ox and plough came such more labor-demanding techniques as complicated terracing, transplanting, more careful weeding and so forth. Of course, certain innovations may have reduced labor demands for short periods, but when the curve is smoothed, the direction is clear: it is toward higher typical nutritional densities, not lower ones. Agricultural innovations, as industrial ones, must be seen not as isolated changes but as elements within an evolving productive pattern.

24. The concept of "involution" is from Goldenweiser, A., "Loose Ends of Theory on the Individual Pattern and Involution in Primitive Society," in Lowie, R. H., ed., Essays in Anthropology Presented to A.L. Kroeber, Berkeley, 1936. "The application of the pattern concept to a cultural feature in the process of development provides, I think, a way of explaining one peculiarity of primitive cultures. The primary effect of pattern is, of course, to check development, or at least to limit it. As soon as the pattern form is reached further change is inhibited by the tenacity of the pattern. . . . But there are also instances where pattern merely sets a limit, a frame, as it were, within which further change is permitted if not invited. Take,
for instance, the decorative art of the Maori, distinguished by its complexity, elaborateness and the extent to which the entire decorated object is pervaded by the decoration. On analysis the unit elements of the design are found to be few in number; in some instances, in fact, the complex design is brought about through a multiplicity of spatial arrangements of one and the same unit. What we have here is a pattern plus continued development. The pattern precludes the use of another unit or units, but it is not inimical to play with the unit or units. The inevitable result is progressive complication, variety within uniformity, virtuosity within monotony. This is involution. A parallel instance . . . is provided by what is called ornateness in art, as in the late Gothic. The basic forms of art have reached finality, the structural features are fixed beyond variation, inventive originality is exhausted. Still, development goes on. Being hemmed in on all sides by a crystallized pattern, it takes the function of elaborating. Expansive creativeness having dried up at the source, a special kind of virtuosity takes its place, a sort of technical hairsplitting. . . . Any one familiar with primitive cultures will think of similar instances in other cultural domains." The phenomenon is not limited to primitive cultures however, as Goldenweiser himself insisted, and it is not always due to a simple loss of creativity on the part of the pattern bearers, but on a lack of opportunities for change, for an expression of creativity which exists.

25. But it remains the dominant form of land use in the outer islands of Indonesia where the lack of the kind of volcanic replenishment of the poor tropical soil one finds on Java makes wet-rice growing uneconomic in most areas.

26. Jay, Robert, in forthcoming study on village life, has described this process in detail for a small area in east-central Java where it occurred somewhat later than it did in central Java proper.

27. Even commercial agriculture did not, for the most part, lead to the use of less labor in the subsistence economy, for it interpenetrated and interlocked with the subsistence pattern so neatly, either through planting cash crops on native land (first as a forced-labor tax, later in a compulsory, or semi-compulsory, renting system), or through hiring day workers from the immediate area around the plantation on a temporary piece-work basis. As a result, the creation of a genuine agricultural proletariat was minimized. Commercial agriculture merely absorbed labor as it was temporarily not needed in the peasant economy and so did not drain it away from the countryside, but, rather, stimulated rural population growth.

28. See Jay, op. cit., for some examples.

*This will be a volume in Modjokuto: A Study of Town and Village Life in Modern Java, Center for International Studies, MIT, 1956.
29. For the high peasant valuation on cash, see ibid. Variations in farming success often seem to rest on variations in access to money, by means of which the farmer can take advantage of the few flexibilities still remaining in the system.

30. In non-moneyed share-crop or cooperative labor patterns, of course, the organization of production and distribution are regulated by a single structure.

31. Some examples of the operation of such values include the obligation of a man with a relatively large amount of land not to work all of it himself, even if able to do so, not to work it entirely with wage labor; but to allow kin, political dependents or poorer neighbors a chance to share in its cultivation. Contrariwise, such a man is expected to permit others to use his labor on their fields, even though he has no personal economic reason to do so. The "fair shares" idea means that even the most moderate form of "Taylorism" in the direction of agricultural labor is very difficult of accomplishment; even in the most highly moneyed areas, for example, meals are still provided workers. The reluctance to alienate land to outsiders (it is forbidden by law to alienate it to foreigners) tends, of course, to prevent the development of large landholdings.

32. It is sometimes argued that if the marginal productivity of labor is near zero, that implies labor may be withdrawn from a productive process without a fall in output. This does not necessarily follow. If a unit of labor is added to a productive process without adding anything to production—put there simply because there is nothing else to do with it and its owner must subsist—it is possible that the process may nevertheless alter its structure, after a period, in order to assimilate this "redundant" labor that a withdrawal of it again will now cause a fall in output, at least until the system re-adapts, which may be quite awhile if the process is more "used" to expanding than contracting its labor element. Again, the addiction metaphor seems appropriate: the marginal increase in pleasure from increasing your already large dose of heroin may be almost infinitesimal and in any case transitory, but the decrease in pleasure which will result, after a fairly short time, from taking this increment away again may be overwhelming.

33. For an excellent discussion of two such contrasting cases see Furnivall, J. S., Colonial Policy and Practice, A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India, Cambridge (England), 1948.

34. See the discussion of the relation between the rationalization of land taxation, commercialization of agriculture and politically directed economic development in Meiji Japan in Buchanan, N. and Ellis, H., Approaches to Economic Development, New York, 1955, pp. 175ff.


37. For a good description of such a system see, Hose, C. and McDougall, W., The Pagan Tribes of Borneo, London, 1912.

38. Again, the process was a gradual, not a sudden one. The simpler highland irrigators often show very weak political leadership. See Barton, R., Ifugao Law, Berkeley, 1919.

39. For the barangay see Kroeber, A. L., Peoples of the Philippines, New York, 1928. Reconstructions of political forms in the prehistorical period are, of course, necessarily hypothetical, and the postulation of a barangay type of pattern as the ancestor of the Javanese village is but an informed surmise. Today, there appear to be, in general, two main types of social organization in Indonesia whose relation to one another is obscure. Unilineal systems, commonly with ranked lineages in terms of the so-called asymmetrical connubium (i.e., one-sided cross-cousin marriage), are found in Sumatra and East Indonesia; bilateral systems, of the sort here described, also sometimes with ranked lineages, but of the "ambilateral" sort, are found in Borneo, Java, and parts of East Indonesia (as well as in all of the Philippines and most of Malaya). Thus, the postulation of a bilateral group for Java, which, despite the claims of some Dutch scholars, shows no traces of unilineal organization today, seems reasonable, if more or less unprovable. For a thorough review of the whole distribution of forms of social organization in Indonesia, see Ter Haar, B., Adat Law in Indonesia, New York, 1948.


41. The chronological sequence of temple sites seems to follow the hill to valley wet rice progression rather closely. The earliest finds are the temples of the Dieng Plateau, a high mountain valley in dead central Java, dated about 750AD. Next, from about 800 to 900, come the great Buddhist temple of Barabudur and, after it, the Shivaist Prambanan group, both in the Progo river area near Jogjakarta. This is followed in the East by a progression down the Brantas river towards the sea, with Singhasari, Kadiri, and Madjapahit following each other both in time and in advancement towards the coast. See Vlekke, op. cit.
42. "It required the city to bring [the peasant] into existence. And those surviving primitive peoples who do not live in terms of the city are not peasants... The peasant is a rural native whose long established order of life takes important account of the city." Redfield, R., The Primitive World and Its Transformations, Ithaca, 1953, p. 31.

43. In Max Weber's more technical terminology this is a transition from patriarchalism (or gerontocracy) to sultanism: "The most primitive types of traditional authority are the cases where a personal administrative staff of the chief is absent. These are 'gerontocracy' and 'patriarchalism.' The term 'gerontocracy' is applied to a situation where so far as imperative control is exercised in the group at all it is in the hands of 'elders'... 'Patriarchalism' is the situation, within a group, which is usually organized on both an economic and kinship basis, as a household, authority is exercised by a particular individual who is designated by a definite rule of inheritance. The decisive character of both is the conception which is held by those subject to authority of either type that this authority, though its exercise is a private prerogative of the person or persons involved, is in fact pre-eminently an authority on behalf of the group as a whole. It must, therefore, be exercised in the interests of the members and is thus not freely appropriated by the incumbent. In order that this shall be maintained, it is crucial that in both these cases there is a complete absence of an administrative staff over which the individual in authority has personal control. He is, hence, still to a large extent dependent on the willingness of the group members to respect his authority since he has no machinery to enforce it. Those subject to authority are hence still members of the group and not 'subjects.' But their membership exists by tradition and not by virtue of legislation or a deliberate act of adherence. Obedience is owed to the person of the chief, not to any established rule. But it is owed to the chief only by virtue of his traditional status. He is thus on his part strictly bound by tradition." But the development of an administrative staff by means of which the chief can enforce his personal will marks a crucial point of political transition: "With the development of a purely personal administrative staff, especially a military force under the control of the chief, traditional authority tends to develop into 'patrimonialism.' Where absolute authority is maximized, it may be called 'sultanism.' The 'members' are now treated as 'subjects.' An authority of the chief which was previously treated principally as exercised on behalf of the members, now becomes his personal authority, which he appropriates in the same way as he would any ordinary object of possession. He is also entitled to exploit it, in principle, like any economic advantage—to sell it, to pledge it as security, or to divide it by inheritance. The primary external support of patrimonial authority is a staff of slaves, coloni or conscripted subjects, or, in order to enlist members' self-interest in opposition to the subjects as far as possible, of mercenary bodyguards and armies. By the use of these instruments of force the chief tends to broaden the range of his arbitrary power
which is free of traditional restrictions and to put himself in a position to grant grace and favors at the expense of the traditional limitations typical of patriarchal and gerontocratic structure. Where authority is primarily oriented to tradition but in its exercise makes the claim of full personal powers, it will be called 'patrimonial' authority. Where patrimonial authority lays primary stress on the sphere of arbitrary will free of traditional limitations, it will be called 'sultanism.' The transition is definitely continuous. Both are distinguished from primary patriarchalism by the presence of a personal administrative staff. Sometimes even sultanism appears superficially to be completely bound by tradition, but this is never in fact the case. The non-traditional element is not, however, rationalised in impersonal terms, but consists in an extreme development of the sphere of arbitrary will and grace."


45. Negara, literally, means "capital city," "palace," "state," or "country," thus reflecting the notion of the city as a kind of spring-like source of supra-village (and so, in part, alien) political authority. (See Juynboll, H. H., Oudjavaansch-Nederlandsche Woordenlijst, Leiden, 1923, p. 310; Pigeaud, Th., Javaans-Nederlands Handwoordenboek, Groningen and Batavia, n.d., p. 309.) As control over the "negara" central government shifted hands, the name applied to it tended to shift accordingly, reflecting changing political realities (though the court-cities continued to be called negara): kampen in the time of the East Indian Company; gunopen after the rise of the Dutch East Indies dual civil service, and peunerintah (a Malay word) for the present Republican government. Pusat, a more colloquial (Malay) word commonly used to refer to the Government means, literally, "center."

46. The common view of Dutch scholars is that the sedentary, ringed-in village is indigenous in Java, but my view follows that of Furnivall:

"In Indonesian [i.e., pre-colonial] times settlements must usually have been small, far-scattered and impermanent. Doubtless each settlement was jealous of encroachments over such land within its sphere of influence as it required for cultivation, grazing or fuel, but a very small area would suffice its needs even for shifting cultivation. . . . There must have been large areas wholly unappropriated and open to new settlements. . . . At any time an epidemic or some other unfavorable portent, would induce a settlement to move its quarters; there was an abundance of waste where it could settle and there were no surveyors to delimit boundaries. Similar conditions obtained long after the arrival of the Hindus, and, when the Hindus gradually asserted rights of sovereignty, they were more concerned to increase the number of their dependants and followers than to draw rent
from the land. . . . Not until Dutch rule began to stabilize conditions, can there have been any steady tendency for land to acquire a value apart from the man who cultivated it. As land became valuable and population grew, settlements would become more numerous and nearer, and the inhabitants would tend to be more jealous of encroachment, so that the territorial village would come into existence. . . . The process probably started under Hindu or Hindu-Javanese rule, but was not general until after the coming of the Dutch, when for the first time the village as a territorial unit became "a moral organism with its own government and its own land at the disposal of its inhabitants." Netherlands India, op. cit., pp. 12-15. Except for the fact that the village must have been a "moral organism" even when it was not sedentary and that it now seems doubtful that Hindu immigrants ever simply asserted rights of sovereignty" over Indonesians (see below), this view seems accurate; and Furnivall's emphasis on pax nederlindica as playing an important role in stimulating population points up another important factor involved in Western contact.

47. The terms for such core villagers differ over the island: kuli, kuli ketjen, gopol, etc. For a general review of village land tenure systems in Java, see Ter Haar, op. cit.

48. The rotation system still persists, however, in many Javanese villages today.

49. Partial exceptions to this generalization are found in the eastern and western ends of Java. The involuted sawah-dominated type of agriculture here being emphasized finds its climax in the center of the island, and the further one moves toward either the eastern or western tips the more it tends to thin out, leaving somewhat more room for consolidation of landholdings. In general, the landscape types of Java are three (see Dobby, op. cit., pp. 216ff.): (1) a generally limestone dominated southern coast which, in addition to having almost no good protected harbors, is rather arid and infertile; (2) a series of young, active, and basic volcanoes which in the west break off into a generally hilly and uneven countryside but in the center and east of the island rise straight up out of the great alluvial plains which compose the great rice bowls of Java—Solo, Madura, Kediri, and Malang; (3) a northern coast composed either of relatively swampy alluvial terraces or, in the east, of limestone platforms, and marked with several easily navigable ports. Climatologically, the island becomes drier as one moves east; beyond the Madura plain a quite pronounced dry season, in the time of the Southeast monsoon (April to September), appears, but in the west the climate is more evenly tropical with heavy rain in all months. Land use patterns are, naturally, related to this distribution of landscape types. Plantation agriculture is strong in the colder west (tea, pepper, tobacco, quinine) and the drier east (sugar, coffee), where capital requirements for productive cultivation tend to be higher than they are in the easily irrigated, volcano-fertilized
center (roughly the region between Purwokerto and Kediri). The peasant economy in the West is heavily dominated by rice, often almost to the point of monoculture, the east increasingly by maize, while in the center one finds a highly diversified agriculture with a nice balance between wet and dry season crops. Highlands in all regions are marked by truck-gardening for Western-type vegetables—cabbage, squash, even potatoes. In the chalky, infertile south much of the cultivated land is still in root crops, particularly in that Javanese symbol for cheerless poverty, cassava, the "wooden root." In the east, there is a marked emphasis on livestock raising; in the west, slash-and-burn persists in a few isolated areas. But, despite this diversity, it is still the highly intensified and marvellously diversified agriculture of the center rice basins which is both the type-model and the dominating element in Javanese agriculture; the ideal pattern toward which the other forms of agriculture are oriented and in terms of which they are conceived.

50. It is possible, of course, for absolute unit returns to both to have dropped, and this seems to be what has happened, with labor returns falling only slightly faster than land returns. Imagine an acre of irrigated land which in the barangay period yields an output of 100 while absorbing the labor of four men. Assuming no return to land, which is a free good, and ignoring costs, each worker will get a return of 25. Next, suppose the same land worked somewhat more intensively with five men, for an output of 120 and, as land has come to be a little tighter, assume the owner of the land, who most likely will be one of the workers as well, get one-half of a laborer's share as his return. Each worker will then get an output of about 22, the landowner will get about 11. If there is further intensification, the proportions will change in the same fashion. Assume the same land, one labor share to the owner of the more valuable land, nine workers and an output of 180. Each worker will get 18; so will the landholder. Finally, in the more modern case, an output of 200, 17 workers and one and one-half shares to the landholder, gives about 16 to the landholder, 11 to the worker. Here, the shares of both are falling.

51. But, as already emphasized, the plantations, because of their close interlocking with the seasonal and structural demands of the subsistence economy, their tendency to minimize, so far as possible, the revolutionary implications of their own form of economic organization for Javanese patterns of adaptation, tended neither to create nor absorb such a wholly proletarianized class; to tear them out of their social context to the degree larger commercial concerns seem to have done elsewhere.

52. For a description of the evolution and administrative organization of Mataram see Rouffaer, op. cit., upon whom the following summary is largely based.
53. There were areas outside his control altogether; i.e., other kingdoms, and no doubt areas of overlap and conflict with those kingdoms. Mostly they were seaport kingdoms, from Bantam in the west to Surabaja in the east, but in time the Dutch reduced the western ones, Mataram the eastern ones, so that by the time of the Company Mataram and the Company itself were the only two sovereign "kingdoms" left. On the political history of the struggle between Mataram and other kingdoms of this period, see Schrieke, B., op. cit., pp. 80ff.

54. For a discussion of the political function of the king's harem in a state very much similar to this, see Leach, op. cit.: "The size of the palace and the number of the prince's wives was (and is) more or less proportion to the political influence of the [Shan or Burmese] prince." p. 216.

55. For a review of the changing status of the "native rulers" in the Colonial Period, see Schrieke, op. cit., pp. 169ff.

56. "Both [Java and the outer islands] were divided into [Residencies]; 22 in Java and 17 in the Outer Possessions.... In Java two Residencies Solo [i.e., Surakarta] and Jogya, were composed of Native States, and the rest were wholly Government Lands. In the Government Lands each Residency comprised a certain number of divisions under European Assistant Residents, and Regencies Native Regents; the Division ordinarily coincided with the Regency and there were four to six of each in a Residency. The European staff of a Resident comprised his Secretary, Assistant Residents and Controleurs, usually one Controleur (Inspector) for each Regency; all these belonged to the European Civil Service. The Regent, directly under the Resident or under the Assistant as his representative, but not the Controleur, had a staff consisting of his Patih, Wedanas and Assistant Wedanas; all these belonged to the Native Civil Service. Each Regency comprised three or four Districts under Wedanas, and each District three or four Sub-districts under Assistant Wedanas; a Sub-district contained typically about fifteen villages." Furnivall, Netherlands India, op. cit., p. 258. Thus there were two parallel bureaucracies, the bottom part of the European one overlapping the top part of the native one, the crucial juncture between them being in this area of overlap, i.e., between the petty prince turned Regent and the Dutch Resident (or Assistant Resident). Since the Republic, this structure has been largely maintained with Indonesians occupying all the offices.

57. Radja karja. See Rouffaer, op. cit.

58. Thus the term for the land held in common by all the core villagers, as described above (usually bumi kongsen or sawah kongsen) was interchangeable with the term bumi radja (king's land) or sawah dalem.
("inside land"—i.e., land belonging to him who lived in the inside of the castle), for it was the same land, the idea being that the king and peasant went half and half shares on it. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Furnivall, Netherlands India, op. cit., p. 13. It needs to be noted that Mataram kings only had appanages in the negara agung, not in the mantja negara. The semi-independent princes had their own appanages and merely gave tribute to the Mataram king twice a year. The officials of the "outside" administrative staff often bore titles linguistically derived from the number of bau of land (1 bau equals 1.7 acres) they held in appanage (1,000, 100, 50, 25, 12, 4, 2). Rouffaer, op. cit.

61. This was not an increase in the burden of the peasant. In the original system 1/5 of the land was the tax-collector's appanage and the rest of the land was split half and half (maron) between peasant and king, making 2/5 of the total to each. Ibid. Of course, the individual Dutch and Chinese could and often did try to force more land away from the peasant, as did the kings themselves. Gonggrijp, op. cit., quotes a sardonic peasant proverb: "In the daytime everything we have belongs to the king; at night everything we have belongs to the thieves."

62. A partial exception occurs in the immediate Jogjakarta-Surakarta area, near where the Mataram capital used to be located. When the Dutch lopped off the outer areas of Mataram, the appanage holders and tax collectors were concentrated in the smaller region around the capital, leading to a heavy pressure on the peasants and a multiplicity of cross-cutting land-rights to the point that one village would often be divided up among four or five tax-collectors to squeeze what they could out of it. See Rouffaer, op. cit.

63. For an illuminating analysis of the contrast between landlord-tenant relationships within the village and between village and townspeople, which reflects the desa-negara opposition, see Jay, op. cit.

64. Java being only part of Indonesia, it is possible, of course, to tax enterprises in the outer-islands to support Javanese civil servants, and, indeed, the necessity to do so has led to some sharp regionally-based political conflicts in republican Indonesia.


66. For an approach to urbanization similar to the one employed here, see Redfield, R. and Singer, M., "The Cultural Role of Cities," Economic

67. For the Maya, see Thompson, E. and Redfield, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

68. For these terms, see Redfield, R., "The Social Organization of Tradition," The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. XV, 1955, p. 14. Urban and rural culture are, of course, in part distorted mirror images of one another and there is a constant "metabolic" interchange of elements between them. See the discussion in Foster, G. F., "What is Folk Culture," American Anthropologist, Vol. 55, 1953.


70. Ibid., p. 15.

71. Ibid., p. 95.

72. Ibid., p. 319.

73. Ibid., p. 138.

74. Ibid., p. 259.

75. Schriekle, op. cit., p. 28.

76. Wertheim, op. cit.

77. Schriekle, op. cit., pp. 49ff.

78. See Meijer, op. cit., p. 6.

79. For Mataram anti-trade ideology, see Vlekke, op. cit., p. 105.

80. For a description of the role of home industry and petty trade in village life in the early part of this century and before, see van Doorn, C. L., Schets van de economische ontwikkeling der afdeeling Poerworedjo, publicatie no. 18, Vereniging Voor Studie van Koloniale Maatschappelijke Vraagstukken, Weltevreden, 1916.

81. Trade in the interior was not, of course, totally absent before the pasar penetration, either in the village or in the towns, for trade is an almost universal social phenomenon. We have already pointed out that north coast trade of a largely local and traditional sort existed before
the great expansion of oriental trade, under the political control of the
earlier harbor kings (especially those of Sumatra); similarly, even more
localized, small-scale trade, on a largely customary barter basis, no
doubt existed prior to the sixteenth century in Java's interior. The
addition of the pasar element did, thus, not create trade, but universal-
ized it; it linked the various areas of Java with one another in commercial
terms, creating a common domestic okumene as the growth of the north
coast commercial society had brought Java into the international okumene.
After the downfall of Javanese trade in the international sector and the
near-monopolization of large-scale East Indian export/import commerce by
the Dutch, the function of the pasar element--Chinese, Arab, and Javanese
traders--seems to have been to tie the local markets together into a more
or less unified network and link that network to the international market
(in part: the great volume of the pasar trade has always been entirely
internal--i.e., to the Dutch. The local trade of the interior seems, as
elsewhere in Southeast Asia, to have been carried out to a remarkable degree
by women rather than men, perhaps because they had more time for it.
(It also seems likely that the role of women in petty trade has increased
rather than decreased as the whole distributive apparatus has swollen
under the pressures of increasing population, etc.) Thus there were two
main aspects to the market system which evolved: a largely local trade
(though the goods traded were not necessarily local), in which both men
and women participated, but women played a particularly important role;
and an inter-regional trade mostly pursued by men (moderately, some women
engage in this kind of trade, but they are commonly wives of male traders),
the former increasingly set in the context of the latter.

81a. Native Indonesian-born Chinese, the so-called peranakans, did,
however, often attempt to copy the style of life of the Javanese gentry,
at least to a degree. See Meijer, op. cit., pp. 8-9. The singkeh (or
totok) Chinese--i.e., those born in China--made no such attempt.

82. In the Javanese language there are, to over-simplify, two main "levels":
high and low. Many, but not all, morphemes have different forms for each
level. The high level is used by an inferior (in this case, the peasant)
to a superior (the gentleman), while the superior will reply in the low
language. Usually, a Chinese and a Javanese (of whatever rank) will both
speak the rough, coarse, informal low language to one another. For a
fuller discussion, see Geertz, C., volume on religion in Modjokuto, in
Modjokuto, op. cit. (forthcoming).

83. After the final abolishment by the Colonial Government of the so-
called "ghetto-system" by which the Chinese were confined to certain
towns and had to have passes to travel about the interior in 1919 (the
system had been quite laxly enforced for several years before that),
some Chinese did begin to settle in the villages. After the Revolution,
during which there were many Chinese massacres in the small towns and villages, the Chinese in the villages moved into the towns and, as yet, have not, with a few exceptions, returned to the villages. Most commonly, Chinese use Javanese urban or rural traders as intermediaries when dealing with Javanese peasants.

34. Batavia, now Djakarta, is something of an extreme case in the Javanese urbanization pattern. Unlike the other coastal cities it was not very large or powerful when the Dutch made their headquarters there under Coen (it was then called Jacatra) and in any case, the Dutch seemed to have burned the old town down first. As a result the town, now city, has continually felt less influence from Javanese culture of any sort than any other city on the island, being, socially and culturally, something of an Indonesian equivalent of the Chinese treaty port.

35. It should be noted that while there are often Arabs in Javanese markets, there are almost never any Chinese. For a description of a market in a contemporary Javanese town, see Dewey, A., volume on the market system in Modjokuto, op. cit. (forthcoming)

36. "The 1920 census showed that 6.63 per cent of the population of Java lived in 'towns.' According to the 1930 census, 8.7 per cent lived in 102 places 'having more or less the appearance of towns,' while in those places regarded as 'towns' for the purposes of the 1920 census 7.63 per cent of the population was then found to be living. Of these, 3.75 per cent, that is almost the half, lived in towns of more than 100,000 inhabitants. Thus the urban population was growing at a still faster rate than the total population of Java." Wertheim, op. cit., p. 43.

37. See Fagg, D., in volume on sociography of the town in Modjokuto, op. cit. (forthcoming) for a description of the present state and mode of operation of the government bureaucracy in Java.

37a. Wertheim, op. cit., p. 43.


40. Sometimes one finds quite formalized feasting systems within which people (i.e., kin groups) may move up and down the status-ladder in terms of their feast-giving abilities, the internal political struggle being
reflected rather directly in the feasting pattern. See Chabot, op. cit., where this sort of pattern is fused with a bride-price system in a bilaterally organized society. For a particularly well described system of this sort—but unilineal and in Burma—see Stevenson, H. N. C., The Economics of the Central Chin Tribes, Bombay, 1943.

91. The reference here is to the finds in the Jang Plateau in the Argopura mountains, the stone monuments of which are large enough for them to have been pronounced Hindu when first discovered, although it was later established that they were pre-hindu and probably in some way related to "pagan" stone monuments elsewhere in Malaysia and, perhaps, Oceania. See Heine-Geldern, R. F., "Prehistoric Research in the Netherlands East Indies," in Schrieke, ed., Science and Scientists in the Netherlands East Indies, New York, 1945, for a description of these finds, but Heine-Geldern's own "megalithic" hypotheses should be regarded with caution.

92. Van Leur, op. cit., whose critiques of the sociologically unrealistic "colonization hypothesis" of Krom and others (i.e., that the Hindu states were formed by Indian merchant-colonists asserting sovereignty over the "primitive Indonesians," later allowing some Indonesians to intermarry with them as the supply of Indian colonists dwindled) have provided a badly needed corrective to the somewhat over-simple views of his predecessors, nevertheless tends to oppose the over-estimation of the scale of the earliest Javanese kingdoms, which the traditional historians attributed to Hindu creativity, by a similar over-estimation of them, which he attributes to native Indonesian creativity. In arguing that the development of Indonesian states was a local one in which Hinduism—brought by priests more than traders—acted to legitimize the political aspirations of an emerging political elite, van Leur is almost certainly correct; in arguing that the earliest Indonesian states had reached very high levels of complexity, comparable to contemporary Indian developments, he seems to be on much shakier ground—projected there, perhaps, by his zeal to disprove the colonial myth of the endless apathy, passivity, and lack of creativity of the Indonesian.


98. Ibid., p. 363.
99. Van Leur, op. cit., p. 103. Less coercive in his argument that these Indian aristocrats were brought to Indonesia by Indonesian kings who themselves sailed to India in search of them. As I have already pointed out, such a view of the scope and size of the earliest Indonesian states seems highly unrealistic and one would perhaps do better to look to the internal dynamics of the Indian society of the time (particularly in relation to the struggle between Buddhism and Brahmanism for dominance) to find the main motive power for the Hindu-Buddhist expansion.

100. In part such pilgrimage sites must have been under the control of certain political leaders, but such control seems unlikely to have been exclusive, to have prevented access to the shrines by other political groups. The need for religious and political integrations to be co-extensive is belied by such inter-political cults as Chavin in Peru, Classic Maya, and the Holy Roman Empire of medieval Catholicism as well as by such pilgrimage sites as Mecca (both before and after the rise of Islam) and the Vatican City. The identification of temple finds with single political groups is one of the factors (another is the reading of myths intended to celebrate a glory as much wished for as possessed) tending to lead to an overestimation of the size of Hindu-Javanese states. Finally, it ought to be noted that, although the tendency here has been to regard the highland temples as earlier, this is not so in all cases; e.g., in East Java where highland temples sometimes represent products of kingdoms actually centered in the lowlands.

101. Wales has pointed out that the "Javanization" of the various elements did not take place at the same speed. Ornamentation and secular relief figures changed more rapidly than did sacred figures and the architectural composition as a whole. See Wales, The Making ..., op. cit.

102. Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State . . .," op. cit.

103. Ibid. For the so-called mantjapat organization of administrative staffs on Mataram ceremonial occasions (four high functionaries in each major direction and king in center, etc.) see Bouffafa, op. cit. This pattern did penetrate the rural sector to a degree where villages were sometimes laid out in relation to one another in this manner—one in each corner and the chief one in the center. See van der Kroef, op. cit.

104. Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State . . .," op. cit.

105. Not, of course, that the kings and princes had no navies, but rather that maritime skills were not the main element in their power, or in case, that they had to compete with Malays, Bugis and others whose maritime histories were much older. What seems to have existed was a situation in which a warship and a trading vessel were difficult to tell apart, where what was piracy to one man was merely an exercising of legitimate rights.
to tribute and taxation by another, what was smuggling to one was honest pursuit of trade free of political interference by another, etc., and in this politically fragmented situation it seems likely that the harbor king's main advantages were their military control of the harbors and their rice surpluses, rather than their naval skills.


108. Ibid., p. 149.

109. Ibid., p. 142.

110. Ibid., pp. 147-148.


112. Von Grunebaum, op. cit., p. 4. To the earlier description of the Hindu microcosmic city-state compare this: "Perhaps the greatest difficulty in the way of the new Arab countries is the necessity to overcome rapidly the traditional Islamic concept of, and attitude toward, the state as such. Islam never developed the idea of 'the State as an independent political institution,' which has been so characteristic of classical and Western thought. 'In Islam the State was not a community or an institution, but the totality of those governed, umma... As a result the Oriental State had no conception of citizen in the modern sense.' Government was not everybody's business nor even that of a privileged class. Participation in executive power was, in the public mind, as haphazard and accidental as were, apart from taxation, the contacts of individual and government in general." Ibid., p. 73.

113. Ibid., p. 144.

114. For a more extensive description of the place of ritual feasting in contemporary village life in Java, see Geertz, op. cit.

115. The fact that Islam came to Indonesia largely from India meant that the mystical elements in it were already rather stronger and that it was more hinduistic than the middle-eastern version, making the conversion of Islamic doctrine to Hindu belief easier.

117. Wertheim, op. cit., p. 35.

118. Ibid, p. 36.


120. Ibid.

121. Actually, it was not quite so simple as this. The Islamic emphasis within certain sectors of the rural community was a result not only of contact with the travelling traders, but of a relatively heavier direct influence of Islam on the rural areas of the north coast region during the bazaar-state flourescence, of the "return" of traders to agrarian occupations after the collapse of Javanese trade and many other factors.

122. Another element within these schools was Sufi mysticism. Secret brotherhoods were often formed within the schools by the students, various mystical regimes being practiced; sometimes an entire school would devote itself predominantly to sufism and old men—former students in such schools—often formed mystic brotherhoods of one sort or another. Such mysticism could hardly be said to have been absent in the towns, but its center seems to have lain in the countryside.

123. Each moslem who can afford it is obligated to make the pilgrimage (hajj) at least once in his lifetime; if he cannot afford it, he is excused.


126. Geertz, op. cit.

127. What this system is, is not entirely an unproblematic point. Whether it is the society of Central Java, where the economic, political, and ideological patterns I have been discussing are found in their more fully developed form; whether it is the island of Java as a whole, including the somewhat variant Sundanes of West Java and Madurese of East Java and Madura; or whether, as Indonesian nationalism argues, the whole of
Indonesia must be considered a single unit--this is a moot question. I would as soon leave this question open (with a note that a genuine Indonesian society could hardly be said to be more than embryonic at the moment), with another reminder that my discussion is more comparable to a discussion of, say, the American South than of America as a whole--except that Java's role in the general Indonesian context seems to me to be both greater and of a totally different quality than that of the South in the US.


129. Perhaps Herberg's concept of a "transmuting pot" (op. cit., pp. 34, 50. Herberg borrows the concept from George Steward) would be more appropriate: because here, too, what may ultimately emerge is not a colorless, deracinated mass man--such a man being, perhaps, but transitional everywhere--but a new type of Javanese for whom the various elements of his cultural tradition will not disappear, but take on a changed meaning.

130. For a further description of these patterns in a contemporary Javanese town and a discussion of their relationship to economic patterns, see Geertz, C., "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town: Some Preliminary Considerations," Economic Development and Cultural Change.

131. For an approach to economic analysis in terms similar to these, see Parsons, T., and Smelzer, N., Economy and Society (forthcoming).

132. "It is only in the modern Western World [Weber was writing before the First World War] that rational capitalistic enterprises with fixed capital, free labour, the rational specialization and combination of functions, and the allocation of productive functions on the basis of capitalistic enterprises, bound together in a market economy, are to be found. This involves the capitalistic type of organization of labour, which in formal terms is purely voluntary, as the typical and dominant mode of providing for the wants of the masses of the population, with expropriation of the workers from the means of production and appropriation of the enterprises by security owners. It is also here that we find public credit in the form of issues of government securities, the legal form of business corporation, the issue of securities, and financing carried on as the business of rational enterprises, trade in commodities and securities or organized exchanges, money and capital markets, monopolistic associations as a type of economically rational organization of the production of goods by profit-making enterprises as opposed to the mere trade in them." Op. cit., pp. 279-280. It might be questioned whether all these items are
essential to "modern capitalism" in the purely economic sense, but it seems agreed that most of them characterise developed economies under any sort of political regime, "socialist," "free-enterprise" or whatever.