SUMMARY REPORT

REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING AREAS

Arms and Arms Control in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
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This report was prepared under a contract with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The judgments expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, or any other department or agency of the United States Government.

Arms Control Project
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Prefatory Note

This study grows out of the interests of the M.I.T. Center for International Studies in both the problems of the emerging nations and of arms control and security policy, interests that converged with those of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the present subject. In the belief that realistic assessment of measures to control arms in the underdeveloped areas must be based in a deep understanding of the political, strategic, military, economic, social, and cultural factors that characterize the regions, we turned for separate regional analyses to those with expertise in the areas concerned.

The study on Latin America was prepared with the collaboration of a team chaired by Professor William T. R. Fox, Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; principal research was carried out by Mr. Constantine Menges with the assistance of Mrs. Shoshana B. Tancer; consultants were Professors Louis B. Henkin, Albert O. Hirschmann, and Ronald Schneider, and Dr. Bryce Wood. The Middle Eastern study was supervised by Professor A. J. Meyer, Associate Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University; principal researcher on the Israel and Arab Middle East section was Lt. William A. Kirby, Jr., U.S.A., and on North Africa, Dr. A. C. C. Hill; other consultants were Professors Carl Brown, Richard Robinson, and Nadav Safran. The sub-Saharan portion of the study was undertaken under the leadership of Professor Hubert S. Gibbs, Chairman of the Department of Government at Boston University, in close collaboration with Professor William J. Newman; other consultants included Professors Edouard Bustin, Jeffrey Butler, Andrew Gyorgy, and Mark Karp, as well as Professor John Montgomery (now of Harvard) and Mr. Michael Kennedy.

While the analyses produced by these groups supplied most of the basic raw materials for the study, the task of distilling and reconciling their separate undertakings--and of formulating general recommendations based upon them--could only be done at the Center, where most of the additional research, as well as a major part of the editorial work, was performed by Miss Amelia Leiss (on loan from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) with assistance by Mr. H. Roberts Coward. Military advisers were Cols. Wesley Posvar and David L. Evans, both USAF. Mr. Richard Hatch assisted with the editing and Miss Lisa Walford served as project secretary.

For the final product, responsibility rests with the M.I.T. Center and with myself in particular.

Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Director, Arms Control Project
REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING AREAS

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SUMMARY REPORT

A. Introduction

This study is concerned with the possibilities, limitations, and prospects of arms control and disarmament for three major underdeveloped areas of the world--Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa--focusing both on arms control measures that might commend themselves to the countries in these areas as being in their own best interest, and those that in our judgment might profitably be initiated or supported by the United States Government.

It is our basic conclusion that the goal of finding better ways to restrict the arms competitions that exist or are about to start in the regions in question belongs very high in the hierarchy of U.S. strategic and foreign policy interests.

We would not rate this interest as high as the U.S. interest in deterring the Soviet Union, or in containing Communist China, or in keeping the areas in question from being absorbed by either of the Communist empires. Neither would we rate it as high as the U.S. interest in finding ways to moderate the larger nuclear arms race. But we would rate it alongside the extremely potent U.S. interest in the successful transition of the developing countries into stable and viable societies; and we would assert that the latter objective is probably unattainable if arms competitions swallow up the precious margin of resources needed for development that so many of them still lack.

We would also rate it as a vital part of the high U.S. interest in reducing the capacity of secondary disputes to erupt into great power war. It should not be forgotten that the more stable the strategic balance in great power relations, the greater the temptation for one of the superpowers to engage in competitive military assistance in areas adjacent to the zones of dominant influence of the other. Thus the potential for intensified arms competition in the developing areas may be growing. A vigorous arms control policy may be necessary in order not to lose ground.

1 This study as originally commissioned did not include possible regional arms control arrangements for the developing countries of Asia. Many of the comments and recommendations in this summary report may be applicable to Asian countries as well, although a detailed analysis of specifically Asian problems would doubtless yield a different set of specific proposals.
It scarcely needs saying that no arms control or disarmament scheme can be expected to materialize in a region, however much the United States may want it, if it is not clearly in the interests of the preponderance of countries in the region. Arms control measures for these reasons may not be possible; they may be extraordinarily difficult to bring about; they may in all events be drastically limited in scope. But their chief meaning is that, in the amorarium of policy measures the United States needs to contemplate to fulfill its interests in both development and stability in these regions, disarming and arms-controlling measures have a serious operational place alongside other basic means of policy, whether economic, political, or military.

B. Latin America

1. Political and Strategic Basis for Arms Control

Armed forces are needed in Latin America principally for the purpose of maintaining law and order and in order to deter and eliminate armed subversion. There is little objective military need for any Latin American state to acquire a military capacity for defense against other states in the region, or for defending the region as a whole against attack. The chief intra-hemispheric threat to security--Castro's Cuba--should continue to be contained as a direct military menace so long as U.S. guarantees, reinforced by both inter-American and universal collective security agreements, remain unambiguous; the indirect threat of Castro-supported subversion, however, is another matter.

The present organization, equipment, doctrine, and self-image of the Latin American armed forces emphasize classical conventional military preparedness. Restructuring these forces to internal security requirements would result in all countries in scrapping useless and costly "prestige" armaments, and in some countries in a reduction of manpower. Building competent internal security forces in addition to existing forces, rather than converting the latter to new tasks, would constitute a severe and unnecessary economic drain. While present military budgets are neither crushing nor spiraling, they are an important economic burden and are larger than the international climate seems to justify.

In nearly all countries in the region, the military establishment is an important element in the domestic political process. The circumstances of their intervention in that process differ from country to country, and on occasion it makes a valuable contribution to U.S. goals. Generally speaking, however, it is in the U.S. interest that stable, competent, and responsible civilian political institutions have an opportunity to develop free from constant threat of barracks revolt and military adventurers. The primary obstacles to any arms control agreements in Latin America grow out of internal rather than international
factors. For the most part, anti-Communist, reform-oriented political groups would favor the allocation of fewer resources to the armed forces; the major group in opposition would be the military establishment.

U.S. military security interests would on balance certainly not be hampered by a program of regulation and limitation of arms and armed forces in Latin America; U.S. political interests would benefit by the continued existence at low levels of both.

2. Recommended Action

a. Indigenous Agreements. It would be desirable if a scheme for arms limitation and regulation were to be formulated by Latin American governments, whether through OAS or in an ad hoc forum, developed either comprehensively or on a step-by-step basis, and consisting of the following principal elements:

(1) Formal renunciation by the countries of Latin America of the right to manufacture, receive, or include among national armaments nuclear weapons, CBR weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction, along the lines of the Five-Presidents' Declaration of April 29, 1963 (by which governments would commit themselves not to manufacture, receive, store, or test nuclear weapons or devices to launch them). However, the United States should not favor any arrangement that in principle affected the right to use nuclear weapons if that ever became necessary, or the right of transit or deployment of U.S. weapons, and in this sense the proposal differs from the usual "nuclear-free" zones notion.

(2) Prohibition by the countries of Latin America of all forms of conventional weapons systems commonly considered to be sophisticated and/or offensive in nature, and irrelevant to their internal security needs. Admittedly different situations involve different security requirements. But examples of prohibited weapons might include: medium, intermediate, and long-range missiles with precision guidance, whether surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, or air-to-surface; jet-powered aircraft other than fighters; heavy tanks; mobile artillery; large warships such as aircraft carriers and cruisers; and submarines.

(3) Quantitative limits set on other primarily defensive weapons, military aircraft, and naval vessels. Again, the question of permitted weapons with particular relevance to internal security requirements might include: small arms and ammunition; personnel carriers; light machine guns; tear gas and other crowd-control equipment; trucks and light tanks; small coastal and river defense craft; helicopters; and light military aircraft for transport and surveillance.
(4) Arms limitations based on the recognition that for most Latin American countries the armed forces are to be used primarily to meet internal security needs. Under this policy a few states would be required to reduce their forces to agreed levels, and virtually all would need to restructure their armed forces to fulfill this function; in addition, there would be some retention of both surplus equipment and trained military reserves for collective security purposes under OAS and/or the United Nations.¹

(5) The signatories to agree not to acquire additional arms production capacity either by new construction or conversion.

(6) Agreements to reduce military budgets and to exchange military information in order to reduce the chances of arms competition based on miscalculation, as well as to promote a climate of greater mutual confidence.

(7) Agreement to demilitarize inter-nation frontiers in the region.

(8) The creation of an Arms Control Inspectorate, perhaps comparable to that of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments, to perform minimum necessary inspection functions.

(9) The countries in Central America to be encouraged to explore the possibility of sub-regional agreements that might go beyond the present measures, or be administered separately.

b. United States Policy

(1) The United States should encourage Latin American countries to seek a comprehensive agreement along these lines. U.S. initiative might be in the context of a larger scheme for reducing armaments and regulating the arms trade in the world at large; but as indicated above, the initiative for a specific regional agreement should come from Latin America.

(2) In the U.S. military assistance program for Latin America--the so-called Alliance for Progress Security Program--prime emphasis is correctly placed on internal security needs.

¹There is need for development of better objective criteria than we now possess for military, para-military, and police forces appropriate and necessary for internal security purposes in various classes of situations--criteria that can be applied to concrete policy problems with some level of consistency and reliability with special attention to the distinctions between counterinsurgency, guerrilla warfare, and other "sublimited" military requirements. It is simply not good enough to say that every case is different, and our own analysis suffers from the absence of such benchmarks.
The remainder should be closely reviewed to conform it to the requirements of arms control as outlined earlier. U.S. influence with Latin American military officers should be used to promote a climate favorable to arms control.

(3) The continued availability of United States power at the service of OAS and the United Nations in the event of overt acts of aggression should be continuously emphasized to Latin America, specifically with regard to any acts sponsored or initiated by extra-hemispheric powers and/or Cuba.

(4) Any agreement among the nuclear powers to prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons or their components into the developing areas (as suggested below for the Middle East) should, of course, be applied to Latin America as well.

C. The Middle East

1. Political and Strategic Basis for Arms Control

The Arab countries of the Middle East arm for three purposes: for internal security, against Israel, and against each other. Israel arms against possible Arab attack. The Western-allied countries, Turkey and Iran, have rather different security problems that are directly related to the Cold War; they are consequently excluded from the proposals for the Middle East summarized below. However, they also have significant problems of internal security.

The Arab-Israeli enmity clearly dominates the security situation in the Middle East, from the standpoint of both regional and possibly world peace. The spiraling arms competition between Egypt and Israel, now involving missiles and perhaps soon nuclear weapons, is probably the only genuine "arms race" in the several regions covered in this study. The competition is essentially futile, since the relative power positions of the adversaries remain little changed; yet if present trends continue, escalation of the race is inevitable, with unpredictable consequences. In the Middle East as a whole, the cost of arms has risen to the arresting figure of $1 billion in 1963, constituting not only a potential challenge to the peace but also a present obstacle to economic growth.

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1 Cyprus has not been included in this study of arms control in the Middle East because, at the time the study was begun, Cyprus was not primarily oriented toward that region. However, its Middle Eastern ties appear to be increasing and it should probably be included in any further analysis of this problem.
In the face of the Arab-Israeli struggle, there is virtually no prospect for any form of area arms control or disarmament initiative from within the Middle East. Measures that are for any reason desirable and feasible must therefore be initiated and carried out from the outside. In specific terms, they might take the shape of agreement among external suppliers of arms and military materiel. Since the United States and the Soviet Union, while not necessarily the principal suppliers, are the chief competitors, a détente between them sufficient for such an agreement is a prime precondition for any significant arms control in the Middle East.

Although initiatives from within the Middle East are not to be expected, there are several reasons why certain limited externally-initiated and carried out arms control measures would be in order, and possibly even accepted—perhaps even secretly welcomed—in the area despite the unpromising environment. Foremost among these are the futility, cost, and increasing danger of the Arab-Israeli arms race. The average citizen might conceivably be as responsive to propaganda for internal and regional peace and progress as he would be for holy wars, forcible unification of the Arab world, or irredentist movements.

U.S. interests in the Middle East, like those in Latin America, call for defending the region against aggression from the outside and preserving as much stability as possible within. It is our appraisal that from the strategic standpoint the Middle East is well worth defending. But in the case of internal disorders there, unless they threaten to upset world peace, the United States is not as concerned with local outcomes and has no truly vital interest at stake apart from the prevention of escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This interest reflects the broader U.S. interest in stability which in turn urgently calls for measures to stop the spiraling arms race in this area.

2. Recommended Action

a. Western-Allied States. Our analysis reveals no alternative for Iran and Turkey, outside of a generalized world-wide disarmament scheme, other than continued reliance on U.S. power, and continued inclusion in the "Forward Defense" category of U.S. military assistance. No specific regional measures of arms control or disarmament are proposed for these two countries (although the inclusion of Iran in a broader disarmament scheme is not ruled out under changed conditions).

b. Arab Middle East and Israel

(1) The principal measures proposed are: joint U.S.-Soviet action to preclude the escalation of the UAR-Israeli arms race to nuclear weapons, and toward the further end of a freeze at current levels of the weaponry and force levels of the principal adversaries in the region.
If limited to the Arab-Israeli area, the first measure could take the form of a joint declaration by the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and France pledging not to take any action to encourage or aid, and to take any action necessary to prevent, the introduction of nuclear weapons or their essential components into the area. It would be accompanied by assurances to the states of support for peaceful programs, and appropriate minimal controls through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These measures alone would not prevent a determined effort in, for instance, Israel to produce a crude but deliverable nuclear weapon. The means of prevention, short of a universally enforceable disarmament program, would consist of a combination of the external ban on introduction from the outside; IAEA inspection of power and research reactors; the ban on weapons testing; and, perhaps most important of all, a solid guarantee by the United States, alone or in conjunction with the other great powers, of existing international borders within the area (see below).

The second measure recommended is an agreement among the external suppliers to keep arms in the area at existing levels, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This measure requires two important preconditions: a guarantee of existing international borders within the area, and removal of foreign troops and bases from affected portions thereof. The suppliers would have to include not only the great powers but additional countries in both Eastern and Western Europe. As indicated later, there might be great merit—including the merit of increased acceptability—if both the non-proliferation declaration and the arms freeze, along with the provision for IAEA safeguards, were part of a larger scheme embracing North and sub-Saharan Africa as well.

(2) The achievement of such a step requires recognition of common interests between the United States and Soviet Union that go considerably beyond their present relationship. Nevertheless its urgency in view of the accelerated UAR-Israeli arms race gives high priority to U.S. efforts to impress the Soviet Union and also Britain, France, and other suppliers with the importance it attaches to these moves.

While there is no attempt here to specify the elements of possible diplomatic bargains involved in achieving the measures suggested, the possibility is flagged of a future trade-off between Soviet agreement to abstain from intervention in the Middle East and, to give two examples only, possible reduction of the U.S. military presence in Iran and Turkey in a way that protects U.S. interests, and a possible post-colonial solution for presently British-controlled Aden and South Arabia.
D. North Africa

1. Political and Strategic Basis for Arms Control

At the present time, the four North African states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya pose a problem more like that of sub-Saharan Africa than that of the Middle East. Geographically and politically, they are remote from the passions and problems of both areas, although through their common Arab culture and outlook they are linked with the Middle Eastern Arab states and are active members of the Organization of African Unity. There are no arms races in North Africa: arms expenditures are modest, and the arms of the four states are in rough balance with each other. At the same time, there are negative forces at work—North African involvement in the affairs of the Middle East through the Arab League, Egyptian ambitions in Libya, Algerian-Moroccan rivalries, Algerian pretensions to military adventures in sub-Saharan Africa in the name of African unity, and Moroccan claims to Mauritania. Out of any of these issues, or others like them, an arms race could develop and North Africa could go critical.

General U.S. political interests in North Africa must be viewed in the larger context of U.S.-Western European relations, particularly U.S.-French relations, since France remains the most involved, interested, and influential foreign power in the region.

For the present there is no urgency for arms control measures in the area as there is in the Middle East, and from the point of view of U.S. policy planning North African arms control might best be regarded in the light of a broader approach to either the Middle Eastern or, more profitably, the sub-Saharan region. At the same time, in view of the potential dangers of disputes within the area taking the form of arms competition, contingent plans for regional controls specifically tailored to North Africa should be developed.

As in Latin America, but unlike the Middle East, there are important initiatives that statesmen in North Africa can themselves take with profit to their own countries and to regional and world peace. These could relate either just to the North African area, or to Africa as a whole.

2. Recommended Action

a. Indigenous Agreements. The states of North Africa should be encouraged to take the initiative along the following lines in averting a future arms race among themselves:
(1) Formal renunciation by the countries of North Africa of the right to manufacture, receive, or include among national armaments nuclear weapons, CBR weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction, whether the manufacture, storing, or testing of weapons, or devices to launch them.

(2) Prohibition by the countries of North Africa of all forms of weapons commonly considered to be sophisticated and offensive in nature and irrelevant to their internal security needs. As suggested with respect to Latin America, and with the same caveats, examples of prohibited weapons might include: medium, intermediate, and long-range missiles with precision guidance, whether surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, or air-to-surface; jet-powered aircraft other than fighters; heavy tanks; mobile artillery; and large warships such as aircraft carriers and cruisers; and submarines.

(3) Adoption of the policy that national armed forces are to be used for internal security only, with appropriate specific limitations as listed with respect to Latin America.

b. United States Policy

(1) As was recommended with respect to the Middle East, the United States should seek international agreement aimed at the prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons. France may be as unwilling to join such an effort as it is to agree to a test ban; nonetheless, the agreement should be sought in the hope that an isolated France (and China) will eventually be persuaded to join it.

(2) As with the Middle East, the United States should seek an agreement among major suppliers of arms that they will not provide to the countries in question sophisticated, offensive, or other weapons not needed for internal security.

E. Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Political and Strategic Basis for Arms Control

Africa south of the Sahara, like Latin America and North Africa, defines its security needs in terms of internal disorders, threats of insurgency, and wars below the level commonly denominated as limited. Like Latin America and the Middle East, it conceives its security in terms of an enemy presence in the region—in this case the complex of white and/or colonial territories in the south. Unlike Latin America, there is no single power that guarantees against major intra-regional conflict; for an indeterminate period ahead the capacity of the former metropoles to intervene will provide the primary counterweight to regional instability.
The over-riding U.S. interest in the region derives from broad national policy purposes rather than from special strategic concerns. These broad purposes include a preference for stability in regions outside direct Cold War involvement; a clear interest in nipping arms competitions in the bud before the multiple quarrels of small states entangle the superpowers in wars not of their choosing; and an urgent U.S. interest in a peaceful and viable solution to the southern African complex of problems. In terms of its goals and interests, the United States has nothing to fear from a truly nonaligned Africa.

A form of tacit arms control already is practiced in sub-Saharan Africa. Lacking indigenous arms industries, the countries of the area are dependent on external suppliers—principally Western—who have refused to supply advanced types of armaments. Exceptions to this tacit control system are the Republic of South Africa with its growing arms industry, and recently increased Soviet and/or Chinese assistance to disaffected or expansionist African states. Since continued arming of sub-Saharan Africa beyond certain levels, even for internal security purposes, could trigger local arms races, it is in the U.S. interest to encourage steps to prevent such an outcome. Because of the nature of sub-Saharan African security needs and the low level, quantitatively and qualitatively, of their arms, many of the familiar forms of arms control would be inappropriate. Furthermore, no measure is likely to be acceptable if it appears to discriminate against black Africa vis-à-vis southern Africa.

Clearly two things must happen before arms control in sub-Saharan Africa is thinkable as a policy. First, as in Latin America, collective security measures in sub-Saharan Africa must become sufficiently predictable and reliable that all states believe protection to be afforded against major external attack and, to the extent possible, against indirect aggression and subversion. Second, so long as African nationalists see no alternative to offsetting the vastly superior armed strength of the white areas of the south other than aid from the Communist countries, the United States will be in no position to influence developments in what could be the most portentous racial struggle of the epoch. A precondition for effective arms control policies is a U.S. decision to develop far more active relations with African nationalist movements and non-Communist leaders in the three sets of areas, and, through appropriate direct and indirect means, to extend economic and military aid of a type that falls within the scope of the following proposals.
2. Recommended Action

a. Indigenous Agreements. Within the framework of the political imperatives referred to earlier, the independent states of sub-Saharan Africa should be encouraged to take the initiative, preferably through a strengthened OAU, to avert a future arms race by:

(1) Formally renouncing the right to manufacture, receive, or include among national armaments nuclear, CBR, and other weapons of mass destruction.

(2) Prohibiting among themselves all forms of weapons commonly considered to be sophisticated and offensive in nature including the categories and sub-categories of missiles, aircraft, and warships listed for illustrative purposes earlier.

(3) Adoption of the policy that armed forces are to be used for internal security purposes only, with appropriate limitations as specified earlier.

b. United States Policy

(1) With sub-Saharan Africa, as with all the other regions, the United States should seek international agreement now to keep nuclear weapons and their components out of sub-Saharan Africa, as well as an agreement among major suppliers of arms that they will not provide to the countries in question sophisticated, offensive, or otherwise prohibited conventional weapons systems.

(2) The United States should as a matter of policy encourage in every way feasible the evolution and strengthening of OAU as a regional security system increasingly able to take on responsibilities for negotiating, administering, and enforcing within the region political and military programs for both the pacific settlement of intra-regional disputes and collective security.

F. Special Recommendations

1. Possible Small Zones of Disarmament

In the course of this study several possible candidates have emerged for local (i.e. less-than-regional) arms control or disarmament. While the detailed elaboration of possible regimes of inspection and administration for these small zones is beyond the scope of the present study, we would flag the following sub-regional areas as perhaps useful for gaining experience with techniques of arms control, specifically techniques of inspection:
a. Central America. Some Latin American countries are so remote from some others, and the terrain that separates from each the effectively occupied parts of many of them is so unsuitable for military operations, that there are instances in which limitations can be accepted by some of the states without increasing the threat to their security from any of the states that do not accept the limitation. The small countries of Central America provide one example.

Supporting this notion is the historical background of efforts by some or all of the countries of Central America to develop an arms control regime among themselves. In 1906 San Salvador (now El Salvador), Honduras, and Guatemala agreed to reduce their military strength. In 1923 the Central American republics went further, adopting a Convention on the Limitation of Armaments that fixed maximum military strength on the basis of "population, area, length of frontier..." Recent efforts by the Central American nations to act jointly in a variety of fields suggest that the idea of a new sub-regional agreement might be worth pursuing.

b. Middle East. Israel and its Arab neighbors have in recent years been treated for crisis management purposes as though constituting a separate sub-region; some of these efforts specifically included measures that could properly be called "arms control."

The United Nations Security Council, in its first major resolution concerning a truce in the 1947-48 Palestine war, called on the parties inter alia to "refrain from importing or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation or acquisition of weapons and war materials." On May 29 the Council, appealing for a four-week cessation of all acts of armed force in Palestine, called on all Governments and authorities concerned to undertake that they would not introduce "fighting personnel" or "war material" into "Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Sa'udi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen." Eight years later the United Nations General Assembly in its Emergency Special Session on the Suez Crisis recommended to all Member States that they "refrain from introducing military goods into the area of hostilities." Other U.S. suggestions for restraints on the flow of arms and

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1 Adopted by the Security Council at its meeting of April 17, 1948.


3 UNGA Resolution 997 (ES-I), November 2, 1956.
materiel into the area have been discussed both privately and publicly, and the matter could arise again on short notice in another crisis.

A sub-regional approach of a rather different sort is the possibility of demilitarization of the West Bank of the Jordan River. Israel has repeatedly stated that it must retain freedom of action in the event of any large-scale movement of troops and military equipment into Jordan, because an attack launched from Jordan could inflict irreparable damage on Israel before the powers or the UN could react. Since any such attack would necessitate the preliminary movement of men and equipment across the Jordan River, the establishment of the West Bank as a demilitarized zone would probably mitigate Israeli apprehension. If the great powers are able to reach agreement on arms limitations for the Middle East generally, they could doubtless also devise a means, either among themselves or through the United Nations, whereby such a demilitarized status for the West Bank could be controlled.

c. Sub-Saharan Africa. Several possible small zones of inspection and arms control in sub-Saharan Africa might be feasible. First, the potential arms rivalry between Ghana and Nigeria could under some circumstances lend itself to a local arms control arrangement. Inspection of the armies of these two countries in terms of time sequences would reveal any significant shifts indicative of an arms race. Such inspection could mainly be confined to budget analysis and to evaluation of plans for future military growth, with standards established indicating when military expansion by one side was occurring in response to military expansion by the other. It should be noted, however, that controls of this type could actually increase tension by raising the rivalry in question to the level of a dispute.

Second is a rather different type of "small zone" inspection, with the cases in question Zanzibar and the border area of Rwanda. The problem here is subversive activity, by its very nature the problem least susceptible to inspection; nevertheless these two areas might provide experience about the ways in which information can be gathered concerning such activity.

Detection of Communist efforts to use Zanzibar as a base for infiltration into East Africa would require a census and on-site inspection of ship movements from Zanzibar to the mainland in order to control arms shipments, as well as the movement of persons from Zanzibar into East Africa. Such inspection would certainly include large shipments from the Communist states to Zanzibar. This inspection could be carried out by the states of East Africa themselves, by OAU or the United Nations, or by African states from outside the area of East Africa. The recent federation of Zanzibar with Tanganyika may make inspection by officials from Tanganyika itself feasible.
Effective inspection of the border area of Rwanda could provide information concerning the movement of refugees and the kinds of small-scale violations arms-control agreements in Africa would be most likely to face. This type of inspection could include both air inspection of movement of large groups, and on-site inspection. It could be carried out by OAU, the United Nations, or the states in which the refugees are found; in all cases, inspection for this purpose would require the cooperation of the states concerned. These states could also provide certain census material on refugee groups and knowledge of their whereabouts and activities. Clearly this effort would also have to include inspection within Rwanda itself concerning the actions and movements of the Rwanda armed forces.

Finally, as the only serious border problem presently facing sub-Saharan African leaders, the Somali dispute with Ethiopia and Kenya provides a case study of the relevance of arms control measures to the region. For the purpose of controlling such measures, two types of inspection would be feasible. Zonal inspection could, with the consent of the countries concerned, give evidence to the outside countries or the United Nations as to whether or not accepted arms control policies and/or agreements were being adhered to. By furnishing evidence as to developments in the border regions, they would contribute to further arms control prospects in the area. At present such inspection on a periodic basis would be adequate; it should, however, be capable of being rapidly increased in times of special tension. For this purpose a roving team of inspectors would be required. It could be composed of neutrals, OAU, or United Nations contingents. While such inspection efforts would have to be carried out under a formal agreement, they could also be applied to various kinds of tacit or informal measures.

2. The Role of International Organizations

The regional organizations that exist at present in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa are, among other things, coalitions or "alliances" whose "objects" lie within the same geographic regions. It is therefore unlikely that the existing organizations could become appropriate instrumentalities for achieving or administering arms control agreements that included both their own memberships and the states against which they are allied.

As regional peacekeeping organizations, the records of the regional organizations are mixed. The Organization of American States has been effective in dealing with low-level inter-American disputes; OAS was not called upon to deal with a major threat to the peace arising exclusively within the hemisphere until the
recent Cuban-Venezuelan dispute. Some of the major Latin American states appear to differ with the United States as to what constitutes extra-hemispheric intervention and a threat to regional peace. The Arab League is too internally divided to be effective among its membership, and too committed in the Arab-Israeli dispute to play a central role either in regional peacekeeping or in regional arms control. CENTO's chief role is defined in Cold War terms rather than in terms of regional peacekeeping. The Organization of African Unity had a promising initial year, but it is too early to reach any conclusions about its long-range potential. Administratively, all the regional organizations are weak.

The role of the United Nations in regional disarmament is likely to be crucial, just as its role in regional peacekeeping to date (with the exception of Latin America) has been crucial. At the moment, the United Nations is the only international organization capable of dealing with the problems raised at the outset of the relationship of regional alliances to their regional objects. In this role, the United Nations may find itself in a position of opposition to the regional organizations. However, there is also a cooperative role that the United Nations can play in regional arms control agreements—the role of guarantor, or of umbrella under which regional agreements may be possible. In this latter role the possibility of the United Nations utilizing the regional organizations as its agents in certain circumstances needs to be given more detailed analysis. The United Nations may also find itself called upon to play a role in disputes between regional systems.

a. Recommendations

(1) The only regional system in which the United States is in a position to have a direct influence is OAS. The United States should make every effort to strengthen the administrative capacity of the organization, by ensuring that it has adequate resources, by encouraging the assignment to it of tasks that will give it administrative experience and increase respect for it among Latin American states, and by examining whether the location of some of its major activities in capitals other than Washington would not allay some Latin American fears that the secretariat is under U.S. domination.

(2) While there are no such direct steps that the United States could take to increase the capacities of the other regional organizations, there are measures that might be useful. Particularly with the Organization of African Unity, the provision of assistance from the OAS secretariat in establishing its offices and procedures might be very valuable for both organizations. In addition, the techniques developed by OAS for handling low-level inter-American disputes may be applicable in the OAU region as well. The United States could
direct some of its administrative training programs specifically to training OAU personnel and encourage the United Nations to do the same.

(3) Finally, there is an urgent need for the United States to examine the complex of issues that are involved in the relationship between the regional and the global approaches to security. Such re-evaluation of regional security vis-à-vis global security should be in terms of both changing strategic and political environments and in terms of the relative roles and capabilities of regional and global security organizations for the tasks of peacekeeping including those arising out of arms control agreement. To date, all U.S. experience has been with relationships between the United Nations and OAS, where historical, geographic, and other conditions apply that do not apply in Africa. A re-examination of the United Nations-regional organization relationship in a broader than OAS context, particularly with reference to the manner in which U.S. policy objectives can be achieved without destabilizing regional systems, would do much to anticipate and even avoid future problems.

G. The Question of a Common United States Policy

1. The Basis for a Common Policy

Obvious differences among the regions have been made apparent in the study. But certain common features have also emerged. Some of them make more difficult the development of a common U.S. policy toward arms control.

Perhaps the most striking similarity among all but one of our regions is the existence of a malignant dispute that, like any cancerous growth, drastically reduces the chances for political health for the body politic as far as one can see into the near future. Cuba in Latin America, the "white redoubt" problem in southern Africa, and the Palestine issue in the Middle East--plus, some would argue, the Ethiopian-Somalian-Kenyan dispute in the Horn of Africa--all these, like the essential struggles between the United States and the Soviet Union over Germany, Eastern Europe, Berlin, and the very structuring of the political future, confound the most imaginatively-drawn plans for ameliorating the arms races in question.

Like the planners of great power arms control, we have sought to "design around" these obvious obstacles. But there is no assurance that if they did not exist or could be made magically to disappear, arms control measures would even then be acceptable. Perhaps if they did not exist arms control measures might not be as important as we believe they are now. But as it is, there are built-in dynamics to regional quarrels and threats which bode ill for the future unless steps are taken to control the process. The very impetus to arm against a third party can itself engender a new and dangerous bilateral arms race--as witness the case of India and Pakistan.
Moreover, there is a signal difference between the key obstacles mentioned. Latin America lives under a potent guarantee of U.S. power, and could even disarm under that umbrella. But the various objectives of armament for black Africa are pursued in the absence of any such firm commitment from a great power. We are suggesting for the Middle East a new great power guarantee, and for all regions a more predictable security system based on a combination of regional organizations, the United Nations, and U.S. power.

Another potential obstacle to a common approach lies in the external orientation of each of the regions. Latin America has a special, almost exclusive relationship to the United States, mitigated only by Cuba's present unholy attachment to the Communist bloc, France's efforts to effect a political and economic beachhead, and traditional ties of sentiment and culture to Spain and Portugal. And Africa, both north and south of the Sahara, has a special relationship with former metropoles, notably the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium.

In the Middle East, of course, apart from Israel's intimate relations with the United States, the Arab states can no longer be said to relate significantly to any single outside source. But Turkey and Iran have called for separate treatment throughout this analysis precisely because of their special alliance relationships with the United States and Western Europe. This situation could of course change with shifting strategic concepts and arrangements. Iran, for example, could "go neutralist" and become part of a larger neutralist bloc in the Middle East and South Asia which in turn might lend itself to a single framework of arms control.

Other connections between the regions suggest at least certain cautions that ought to be observed in any attempts to develop a broader arms control policy for underdeveloped regions generally. One caution stems from the highly sensitive relationship between two of the regions—the Middle East and North Africa. While a package approach to arms control in the Middle East and North Africa may have a superficial attractiveness, in fact the situations are so widely different that a single policy scheme linking the two might be subject to fatal stresses. At the same time, to the extent that any Middle East arms control scheme involved members of the Arab League, all four North African states would of necessity be associated. Furthermore, the proposed arms freeze for the Middle East would be better applied to the whole Arab world plus sub-Saharan Africa. And any arrangements for controlling arms with respect to North Africa might possibly serve as a form of leverage to enhance a Middle Eastern settlement. But it could be very counter-productive politically to seek to use North African arrangements as a means of pressuring the Middle Eastern countries. Finally, we do not believe it would serve either United States interests or the prospects for regional stability if, through arms control negotiations, significantly increased participation of North Africa in the affairs of the Middle East were to be encouraged.
However, in the relationship between North and sub-Saharan Africa it might be highly desirable to take a common approach. One can envisage important arms control steps, at least in principle, as being initiated internally in the region by the countries themselves. A common political framework already links them, at least embryonically (one which has already employed sub-Saharan personnel to mediate a North African dispute). The OAU umbrella might now be opened still further over the continent as a whole, always excepting the UAR whose orientation is preponderantly eastward. And the UAR would be included in some of the measures we have suggested, notably the preservation of the continent as a nuclear-free zone. U.S. policy could well aim at the controlled limitation of all arms to and in both North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, and if the UAR must be exempted from some of the measures in question this does not derogate from the desirability and even urgency of constructive steps with regard to the other two regions.

In this connection, while acknowledging the genuine impossibility of agreements at the present time between Arabs and Israelis concerning virtually any subject and most particularly their security, the United States and other great powers might well utilize the territorial guarantees we have recommended as inducements for Israel and Egypt, as well as others in the area, unilaterally to renounce nuclear weapons in much the same fashion as in other regions it would be done multilaterally.

Finally, while in three of the four regions it was concluded that steps of useful and significant arms control could and should be taken by the countries thereof, in the Middle East this is impossible. There the primary initiative must come from without. Indeed, while there would be obvious value in the various initiatives being taken jointly or at least simultaneously, that may not be possible; the arrangements recommended then should be sought region by region, looking to the time when all others follow the lead of those who have been statesmanlike in showing the way.

If regional arms control were to be sought region-by-region, what would be the criteria by which the U.S. would make choices? Obviously, one criterion would be the priority assigned on the basis of U.S. interests, which might in turn rest on appraisal of the degree of short-term threat to the peace. Another criterion would surely be the extent of U.S. influence in stimulating regional action. In terms of threats to the peace for which arms control would be a remedy, the Middle East probably has top priority, given its potential for escalation to nuclear capabilities. But U.S. influence may be least strong there. The chances for aborting a regional arms race may be greatest in sub-Saharan Africa, where arms levels are relatively lowest. But U.S. influence may be more easily applied in Latin America.

In general, the wisest course would probably be a broad-spectrum approach in which no particular region seemed to be singled out, and in
which universally applicable principles and measures constituted the basis of U.S. policy. Perhaps the most important single reinforcement of the regional approach recommended here would be evidence that the great powers were pursuing with equal vigor measures of arms control applicable to themselves.

2. A Broad Policy for the United States

Except for the Middle East, perhaps the most interesting thing about the regions in question is the early stage the countries are at in anything that might be called an arms "race." If a junior-size, full-scale arms competition is on between Egypt and Israel, and, in a different sense, within Cuba, what is happening in North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and the rest of Latin America can perhaps be described as "arms walks." Indeed, we may profitably think of at least sub-Saharan Africa as the "outer space" of regional arms control, in that it is not yet militarized, many kinds of temptations exist for changing the situation--and no one is quite certain that the Soviet Union has not in fact started the race unilaterally.

It has been said fairly often over the past fifteen years that the great power arms race has "passed the point of no return." Each time the point was newly passed, however, the chances for some kinds of arms control may have in fact improved, on the theory that the seriousness of arms control negotiations is a function of how frightened people really are. It may be more difficult or less difficult to abort a field of growth before it develops; historical evidence is virtually non-existent and one must be at least sobered by the hazards of action in an area so replete with symbols of sovereignty, adulthood, virility, and pride, as is the matter of arms for new, small, or poor countries.

And yet unless one believes with orthodox Marxists in the pre-ordination and inevitability of historical trends, the obligation remains to search for feasible means of altering the tide of events. To be constructive, one must be realistic: perhaps if the Baruch Plan of 1945 had not been so politically utopian the nuclear arms race could have been aborted--perhaps not. Certainly in some instances, notably the Middle East, we have discarded any policy idea that depends on intra-regional cooperation. But in other areas we think it reasonable to urge action.

It is thus recommended that the following overall U.S. policies be considered for adoption, in addition to the separate programs of regional arms control outlined earlier. We believe that these common policies could with profit to all be applied globally, including the Middle East:
a. To take action, through the seeking of formal agreements by nuclear powers and then all other states, for the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons, CBR weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction, including the manufacture, storing, or testing of weapons, and the devices to launch them.

In this study we have formulated for the regions in question proposals toward this end that take the form, first of all, of indigenous agreements renouncing the right of the countries in question to manufacture, receive, or include among national armaments nuclear weapons, CBR weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction. But we have not thereby automatically advocated the "nuclear-free" zone so popular in Soviet forensics. We have been careful nowhere among our recommendations to suggest that the United States ought to forego the right to use nuclear weapons in extremis, or the right to transfer and deploy such weapons, notably in the Western Hemisphere. But our omission is without prejudice to the possibility that in making its larger strategic and political calculations the United States may decide that, to prevent dissemination to others, it must consider restrictions for itself regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of other states in "peacetime." In fact, it may not be possible to press other countries to renounce nuclear weapons without subscribing at least to the concept commonly implied by the label of "nuclear free zone." (The issue of "first use" is clearly a separate one and is not dealt with here.)

The United States must decide with greater finality than it has up to now just how great importance it attaches to its anti-proliferation policy, and how much it would be willing to do in order to press it. The relationship to the European problem is unavoidable. Without entering into the debate, we believe that if the French decision to create a nuclear force made less feasible a comprehensive agreement among the great powers to rebottle the nuclear djinn, the MLF may in fact make it even more difficult, at least in the short run.

This crucial policy issue to the side, if the United States can see its way clear to seeking some or all of the agreements recommended here it will be necessary to provide adequate controls. If international inspection could be agreed to, including such overflight and on-site surveillance as is required, U.S. security needs would be met. Realistically, this is unlikely, and considerable reliance would probably have to be placed on the unilateral capabilities of U.S. and other national intelligence; in whatever combination, the aim of inspection would be to pick up with a reasonably high degree of confidence any development of significant strategic delivery capabilities before it could become an area--let alone a world-wide--threat. What the United States could not favor would be prohibitions on unilateral overflight or outer space surveillance in the absence of effective international machinery.
The principal difficulty might well lie in the relatively rapid quantitative spread of nuclear reactors for research or power production. As we have indicated at several places, it is logical to have the inspection and reporting standards and procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency applied to such agreements, and the policy corollary for the United States Government is a determined effort to improve and enlarge the writ of the IAEA.

One can only speculate upon the lengths to which the Soviet Union would be willing to go to staunch the potential spread of nuclear weapons technology. It abstained on the 1963 United Nations resolution regarding a Latin American nuclear-free zone. On other occasions, however, it has expressed readiness to seek agreements to this end.

To the extent that overseas U.S. air bases in the developing countries have been created primarily as forward echelons of the Strategic Air Command, the issue of bases is inescapably related to the issue of a non-dissemination policy. Some of the recommendations in this report have implied the possibility of trading off Western bases in the Middle East and North Africa if sufficient inducement is offered in return. Without wishing to enter into that complex issue in detail, it would be consistent with a changing U.S. strategic doctrine that increasingly sees mobile sea-based, undersea, and continental missile power as preferable to overseas bases. This has of course been reinforced by evidence of the politically corrosive effect on the Western political position such bases may have locally. Another point is that, while it would be reassuring to keep all such bases indefinitely, the fact is that the trend is steadily to liquidate them and it would be pleasant--just once--to be able to utilize base closings as bargaining counters for something the United States wants before withdrawal is announced. It is at least arguable that, while fully recognizing the reasons for the forward deployment of United States--and other--forces, particularly the U.S. military presence in Europe under present circumstances, at bottom political relationships will not be thoroughly sound until military forces of all countries--the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, Egypt, Indonesia, North Vietnam, etc.--are once more stationed within their own national boundaries.

Whether or not it becomes possible to negotiate a meaningful agreement on the subject of bases, it would seem incumbent upon U.S. planners to consider that it might be worth taking even unpleasant steps to press actively and operationally with an anti-proliferation policy, in the light of the possibly mortal hazards that will characterize a world in which nuclear weapons proliferate widely. When one considers the predictably dramatic drop in the cost of producing such weapons in the relatively near future, it is clear why the seeming lull today is illusory. There can be only one path for statesmanship here.
b. The second broad United States policy which we have recommended be applied consistently in all regions is to seek formal or informal undertakings among the suppliers of weapons to the countries concerned that they will not provide any arms other than those legitimately required for internal security needs. This would bar the sale or transfer of weapons that are commonly understood to be sophisticated, offensive, or expensive, and we have suggested a possible list of both prohibited and permitted weapons.

Such a step, except in the case of the Middle East, would best be taken in conjunction with the initiatives for self-denying ordinances along these lines that we have suggested ought to be taken within the regions. However, even if no such indigenous initiatives prove possible, we would argue that U.S. (and Soviet and other great power) interests urgently require that such steps be taken as lie within the power of responsible outside states, to put a stop to the competitive build-up of arms in these regions to the extent such build-up results from external supply. This step would go a long way toward aborting the still embryonic arms races in developing areas.

It is fully recognized that if such an agreement were reached, the interpretations of "internal security needs" may vary grossly (as they will if GCD ever comes closer.) The United States might well interpret "internal security" as comprehending defense and support of a legitimate government, perhaps even in some cases where such a government may have lost popular support; and the Soviets would doubtless interpret it in the light of a revolutionary doctrine according to which externally-stimulated insurgencies are "wars of liberation" for the internal security of the "people"-in many cases the people being hard-core Communist cadres. One can only repeat here the importance of developing better objective standards for doctrine both as to force levels and military hardware.

Divergent interpretations on any topic are going to inhere in any agreements between East and West for some time ahead. These are reflections of profound and well-known ideological differences. In the present matter, as in other realms of policy, where it seems possible to move the larger struggle to less dangerous and more acceptable levels, we would hold that it is in the interests of the United States to pursue limited and well-defined agreements. An agreement of the sort recommended should be entered into with one's eyes wide open, and in the realization that special responsibility attaches to the United States to take the lead in measures that are so clearly in everyone's interest, even though others may not have the wit to realize it.

The inspection of a generalized agreement, formal or tacit, not to supply arms in excess of internal security needs is possible only through circumstantial evidence; but the evidence of acquisition of wholly inappropriate arms by small or poor countries can scarcely be hidden. We can see no satisfactory punitive device available for infractions. If the agreement is widely violated, it probably is not
recognizably in the common interests of the powers to continue it and it had better be abandoned.

One thing that can be done is to revive the most useful practice of the League of Nations in widely publicizing statistics and other facts about the arms trade. Communications have improved considerably since the inter-war period; there might be few better sanctions than continuous publicity about arms races in places where they do not belong.

3. Regional Arms Control and International Security

The relationship between "disarmament" and "security" is one which has plagued the world since 1945, and before that all through the period of the League of Nations. We are not proposing total disarmament here, either in the sense of world-wide disarmament, or in the sense of total disarmament of the smaller powers. But we are proposing for some countries denial in part of a normally legitimate guarantor of national security; we are recommending for all countries a ceiling on their armed forces, and for many a reduction in present strength (although a surprising number might have to build up capabilities to reach the ceiling). In each case the question of security is bound to arise; in three of the four regions the focus of security concerns represents a very real and even grave threat to peace and security in the area.

The effect of great power disarmament might be to exacerbate their problem. Particularly in sub-Saharan and North Africa the greater the degree of disarmament by the great powers, the greater the likelihood of uncontrollable instability among the countries of the region. The basic implication of this is that, apart from what the United Nations can do, the military forces of the United States and Great Britain, and to a lesser extent of France (and in a different way of Belgium, Portugal, and Spain) represent the only effective external power that can be invoked by the area governments today to aid them in preserving internal order and stability.

The need for such forces of intervention has been frequently demonstrated in recent times, notably in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., the Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, etc.). In the years ahead there will undoubtedly be efforts to build up both regional and United Nations forces for this purpose. What we are suggesting is a program of intensive efforts further to strengthen regional organizations such as OAU and OAS, first of all to sponsor the arrangements proposed here and, second, to help fill whatever vacuums of confidence and of power may be created. We would go beyond that to urge a reconsideration of the whole concept of regional security embodied in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. The world envisaged in Chapter VIII might be surprisingly congenial to the United States in the last third of the twentieth century.
None of this diminishes in any way the importance of the United Nations, both as the primary forum for the pacific settlement of international disputes and, in many cases, the prime agency for carrying out the tasks of peacekeeping that range from the ameliorative and preventive roles of observation and patrol to the real collective security function of opposing or repelling armed aggression. The UN has obvious and unique value in dealing with inter-regional and larger-than-regional matters, including those arising out of regional arms control. The indivisibility of security has also come to mean that thermonuclear war is threatened when local disputes reach a flash point, and this reality tends to overshadow any abstraction about universal involvement. Thus, just as United Nations forces have adopted the practice of using troops of small rather than large powers, so it is desirable to plan arms control-security mechanisms in a way that de-escalates and minimizes the chances of great power collision.

The United Nations and regional security organizations are all relevant to filling gaps left in the security structure of the regions by limitations on their arms. But it should be clearly understood that in fact we have nowhere recommended that which is commonly understood as "disarmament," in the sense of stripping away from these countries such armaments as they now have, as GCD would do over several stages. Our emphasis is upon where we go from here in these areas rather than on undoing previous developments. We are suggesting arms control techniques for the purpose of shaping the future rather than disarmament for dismantling or rectifying the past.

The relevance of a certain minimum level of national armed forces in the security equation is underscored by the fact that when it comes to guarantees that the countries concerned will not be left even relatively defenseless in any regional arms limitation agreement, the final ingredient in the security picture, particularly in Latin America, is the power of the United States, the belief that such power will be used only in the service of justice, and the confidence that it will in fact back up a security guarantee, whether made under the United Nations, through a regional organization, or unilaterally. (As a nonparticipant in the Middle East the United States might in a different but related way find that its own power can also supply the principal backing for a new guarantee of the peace, as a concomitant of externally-initiated arms control.)

For in the end, U.S. power must continue to serve the cause of world peace as far ahead as we can see. Even if important arms control measures come to be adopted by the United States this will still be true. Certainly in Latin America it will remain of paramount importance for U.S. conventional power to be available to reinforce arms limitation measures agreed to by others. It may be no less true elsewhere.
Global total disarmament remains a utopian objective. Even universally-applicable arms control may be too much to hope for at the present. But the steps we have outlined for regional arms control, many of which lie within the present capacity of a few nations to execute, rank in our judgment very close to the urgently needed measures of arms limitation among the great powers as the most feasible and practicable policy steps for this country to take now in the arms field. They give one more reason—and perhaps the most under-valued one of all—for the United States to settle upon an overall arms control and disarmament policy that conforms to the realities of the times, in terms of urgent steps to reverse the course of events, in terms of a believable position on less-than-total disarmament, and in terms of the need as far as one can foresee to rely upon United States national power to lend confidence to a world still without trust.