GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO MIGRATION:
A STUDY OF EMPLOYMENT PREFERENCES
FOR LOCAL RESIDENTS IN BOMBAY

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June 1976
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I. INTRODUCTION

Although ethnic conflict is scarcely a novelty of the last half century, the government's active involvement in ethnic issues is. Governments have never been neutral observers to conflagration between their citizens. But until recently, governments promoted or detracted from the interests of particular ethnic groups more through their inactivity than activity. The designation of a set of policies directed at the educational, health, housing, employment and political status of constituent ethnic groups is a characteristic of only recent times.

In India as elsewhere throughout the world, the employment of 'minorities' is a task which the government has been increasingly disinclined to leave to the operation of market forces. For several decades the Indian government has set special provisions for the public sector employment of underprivileged castes and tribes. More recently sons-of-the-soil movements have also sought governmental sanction for the claim that local persons should receive preference over migrants in both private and public employment. As these claims became vociferous with the formation of nativist, or anti-migrant political organizations in different regions throughout India, the national and state governments began to devise policies extending preferences to local persons.

It would be desirable to locate our analysis of nativist policies in India in the broader framework of governmental responses to ethnic issues. Because the 'native' and 'outsider' groups perceive themselves to be of different linguistic, cultural, or ethnic origins, nativism can be thought of as part and parcel of ethnic politics. But the possibility of borrowing from the extensive literature on ethnic politics in India is limited in this instance.
Studies of ethnic politics in India have concentrated far more heavily on the mobilization of ethnic interests than on the government's reaction. Existing studies offer a rich description of why ethnic conflict arises, of how caste and language groups have organized and of what they hope to achieve; but only sporadic attention has been paid to considering policy options, to explaining why the government reacts the way it does or to assessing the impact of policy choices.¹

In the absence of an existing analytical framework of ethnic policies it might be best to begin by identifying the types of cases involving government policy and nativist claims which exist in India. One major distinction among the different situations in India where nativist agitations are found is the arena in which job preferences are sought: in some localities, the target of nativist claims is employment in the private sector, in others in the public sector. The public sector itself is further divided. In some cases, the contested jobs are in central government employment; elsewhere they are in state or local bureaucracies. In Bangalore, for instance, where the local Kannada-speaking population competes with Tamil and Malayalam-speaking groups, employment opportunities are found largely in central government concerns. In Hyderabad job openings occur almost entirely in the state and local bureaucracies. In Bombay, where the local Maharashtrian population competes for jobs with migrants who have come to the city from other parts of India, the focus of job competition is largely the private sector.

In all cases the formation of nativist policies is subject to constitutional provisions (Articles 15, 16, 19(d), 19(e), 19(f)), which bar discrimination against individuals on grounds of residence or place of birth.² But the absence of extensive judicial interpretation specifying exactly what constitutes discrimination has meant that the formation of nativist policies remains largely a political matter. The arena (private vs. public; central
vs. state) of nativist employment claims is therefore of considerable importance. If the jobs at issue are in central government concerns, nativist policy must be subject to national stipulations about public sector employment. The state government in this case is constrained from legislating or from issuing mandatory directives. A like constraint obtains when the jobs at stake are in the private sector, but here the state government has available more informal means of exerting pressure -- the issuing of licenses, permits, and inspections -- by which it may seek to affect hiring practices. Employment at the state level is of course where state governments may adopt the strongest posture, through formal directives as well as through informal pressures such as appointments or transfers.

In this paper the case of state government policy and private sector employment will be considered. The material for analysis is drawn from the experience of nativist conflict in Bombay. Bombay is of interest for two reasons. First, as elaborated below, it is in Bombay that the most politically organized Indian nativist movement resides. Second, the Bombay case provides an opportunity to study the relationship between political and economic power, since in Bombay the native Maharashtrian community is the political majority but economic minority. While the state bureaucracy and elected bodies are controlled by Maharashtrians, Maharashtrians are conspicuously absent from positions of industrial or commercial importance in the city. The ability of the Maharashtrian state government to impose nativist employment policies on the private sector carries with it subordination of economic to political power. It will be the task of this study to examine the nature and extent of governmental intervention in private sector employment, the motivating factors behind it, and its impact on hiring.
II. NATIVISM IN BOMBAY: SHIV SENA AND THE PRESSURE FOR EMPLOYMENT

Before turning to an analysis of governmental policy, it may be useful to describe the emergence of nativism in Bombay. In 1966, under the name of Shiv Sena (army of Shivaji), a political party was formed to protest the injustices allegedly inflicted on the local Maharashtrian population by 'outsiders'. While the Mahathí-speaking population in Bombay is numerically the largest in the city (42 percent), Maharashtrians have not fared well economically. Gujarati, Marwari, and Parsee communities have dominated the commercial life of the city, and South Indians, the main target of Shiv Sena ire, are heavily represented in clerical and white-collar occupations. The influx of 'outsiders' in Bombay, Shiv Sena claimed, denied Maharashtrians their rightful share of the city's middle-class jobs.

Appealing to Maharashtrian economic discontent, the Shiv Sena contested the city elections in 1968 and won one-third of the municipal seats. In subsequent years the party attempted to expand its constituency by appealing to anti-Muslim and anti-communist sentiments as well. But the party's electoral strength has remained virtually constant; it still holds close to one-third of the seats in the Bombay municipality and has only one representative in the state assembly. In its effort to enter national politics the Sena has failed completely, having been unable to elect any of its candidates to the national parliament.

The nativist issue became politicized originally through a series of exposés published in the Marathi weekly Marmik, now the party organ. In these exposés, lists of the top officers in Bombay's large business establishments were printed in serial, weekly installments. From the surname of the personnel, it was readily apparent that Maharashtrians were represented only in small numbers in managerial positions. Marmik's editor, Bal Thackeray, now the
Sena party leader, included in the weekly issues editorials and cartoons drawing attention to the presumed encroachment of 'outsiders' on Maharashtrian territory.

With the formation of Shiv Sena as a political party Thackeray and the other party leaders developed a series of demands calling for the preferential treatment of Maharashtrians in employment. The demands were not notable for their consistency. At times Thackeray called for the reservation for local persons of 80 percent of jobs in semi-skilled and unskilled positions. At other times, as was evident from the Marmik exposes, the Sena's concerns included skilled and managerial jobs as well. The Sena vacillated not only on the question of which jobs should include quotas of local persons, but it also offered (at least for public consumption) varying definitions of the category local persons. The Sena leadership alternately suggested that 'local' refer to those who lived in Maharashtra for a given period of years, those who identified with the 'joys and sorrows' of Maharashtra, or those whose mother tongue was Marathi. The Sena's actions and statements of the party leadership, taken in their aggregate, made clear that the Sena's real objectives lay in the extension of preferences in all job categories in public and private sectors, to those who were Maharashtrian by mother tongue.

Since its inception the party has pressured businesses to hire Maharashtrians. This pressure is exerted by individual municipal councillors from Shiv Sena as well as through campaigns of letter-writing, telephone calls, visits to company heads, and the demonstrations for which the Sena leadership is well known. Most municipal councillor and shakha (branch) offices keep employment registers, and councillors or party organizers individually urge employers to draw from these lists of job seekers when an opening arises. In addition Sena leaders have used their growing prestige and recognition in Bombay politics to contact businessmen directly, either by phone or letter,
sometimes threatening to create trouble if more Maharashtrians are not hired.

In one instance, now part of Shiv Sena lore, a prominent Sena leader called on an executive of Indian Oil expressing displeasure at the small number of Maharashtrians employed in the firm. The company executive was told, "You are sitting inside the office but your oil tanks are outside." A similar experience is recounted in the visit of several Sena leaders to the executives of Glaxo. According to one Sena leader, Thackeray and a small group of his cohorts were ushered into the office of a Glaxo manager where they immediately asked why so few employees were Maharashtrian. The manager insisted that most employees were Maharashtrian and got out company records to show the Sena leaders where most of the employees had been born. The Sena leader commented, "We told them we wanted to know how many were really Maharashtrians (Maharashtrian by mother-tongue). We made it clear what we meant." There have been numerous other accounts of businessmen receiving visits or calls from Sena leaders, sometimes told by the business personnel with bemusement or disdain. It is apparent that the corporation executives treat Sena emissaries with circumspection.

Sena leaders in addition to making these individual calls on company executives have regularly led demonstrations or processions in front of plants or business offices to publicize the Maharashtrian issue. The Sena’s public processions to the offices of Glaxo, the Fertilizer Corporation of India, and more recently to the State Bank of India gave the desired visibility to Sena employment demands.
III. STATE GOVERNMENT POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT

The merits of extending preferences to local persons have been debated at all levels of government. Some officials in the state government question whether productivity or efficiency in jobs might not be impaired by the introduction of personnel quotas. Some also argue that national integration and inter-ethnic harmony would be weakened under the differential impact job quotas would have on Bombay's diverse ethnic population. But the directives and activities of the state government attest in fact to its fundamental sympathy with nativist claims. To the distress of some Maharashtrian officials, Maharashtra has been portrayed by journalists and other state governments as the state which has pursued nativist politics most energetically.12 Government policy can, however, be divided into two periods. In the late 1960s the state government followed cautiously the guidelines of the central government with respect to the recruitment of local persons. In 1973 the Maharashtrian government assumed a new posture, adopting forceful directives which went well beyond the central government mandate.

Government Policy Prior to 1973. The state government's response to the nativist demands of Shiv Sena was initially cautious and low-keyed. Until 1973 Maharashtrian government policy was operating within the guidelines suggested by the National Integration Council which met in Kashmir in 1968. Accordingly the government advised that preferences be extended to local persons -- those resident in Maharashtra for fifteen years -- in Class III and Class IV government jobs (semi- and unskilled positions). In 1968 the Maharashtrian government circulated a directive to large businesses and government offices in Bombay which read (translated from the original Marathi):

Sir:

The profit from the opportunity for employment made available
because of industrialization in this state is mostly gained by the people from outside this state. You might have had the impression that this type of feeling has been unfortunately spread. This topic was raised in the Vidhan Sabha many times and the speeches of Vidhan Sabha members suggest that such feeling is there.

So the creation of such type of feeling, whether it is just or not will become dangerous from the point of view of rapid industrialization of the state. Because on that account the proper atmosphere for industrialization may not be present. If the local people do have the necessary qualification, it will be profitable to give them preference for the employment in the industry of this state. The interests of the local people are closer to this state and to the industries established here. They will not go for a little profit to another place. So it can be seen that the industries where local people are recruited have a stability on a large scale. Their native places, not being far off, there is less possibility of these people often remaining absent. The simple meaning of this is that the proportion of workers absent will be lessened and there will be an increase in their working capacity. By giving jobs to local people on a large scale, the community nearby will become one with industry. The feeling of responsibility towards that industry will be created in the society and a close feeling for one another will be created. If such type of feeling is created it will be very much helpful for that industry and especially essential in this time of difficulty.

You may be knowing that for the development of industry the feeling of consideration and understanding towards the people around is necessary. There are and may be created many problems in the industry and among the local people. So if the industry and the people in the community around are brought together for reciprocal profit, such type of questions can be easily solved. Such type of relations will be strengthened by making jobs available to local people, and at last it will be helpful in running those industries well. As the worker is not going to ask for the repayment of the loss concerning his staying away from his family, the industrial disputes will be lessened in that proportion and the scale of problems will be narrowed. The problem concerning the houses of the industrial workers will also be lessened in that proportion. In this way the workers community will remain satisfied in large proportion and will not feel strongly that they are far off from their families. At last there will be an increase on large scale in industrial production.

I sincerely request that you take into consideration the profits mentioned above while making the policy concerning appointments. I am sure this will help lessen the ill feeling and the tense atmosphere for industrial progress and profit in the state will be created.

The copy of the statement by the Minister for Industry made in the Vidhan Sabha on July 10, 1967 concerning this subject is attached herewith.
You are requested to let the Government know what you are going to do about it.

Yours faithfully,

M.A. Dhumal
Assistant Secretary Maharashtra Government
Industry and Labor Section

The state government further reminded employers of their obligation to comply with the federal Notification as to Vacancies Act. This law, passed in 1959, requires employers of all but small businesses to notify the government employment exchange of any vacancies. Because a number of employment exchanges make an unofficial practice of forwarding applications of local persons in preference to 'outsiders' the exchanges might become a mechanism for the pursuit of nativist claims. But it is a weak mechanism at best since the 1959 Act merely requires the employer to notify the agency of vacancies rather than to hire from the agency files. The government's reminder to employers of the necessity of informing the exchange about job openings reflected government concern with nativist issues but it was not an action which promised to change the outcome of recruitment procedures.

**Government Policy After 1973.** By 1973 the Maharashtrian Government's position on the employment issue became much more resolute. In a directive to government and business establishments the Commissioner of Industries exhorted employers to set aside a quota in managerial as well as in subsidiary jobs. The directive also broadened the definition of local persons to include not only those who were locally domiciled but also all who were native Marathi-speakers. This marked an escalation in the state government's interest in the nativist cause. When quotas were limited to blue-collar and lower white-collar jobs, the government's policy called for little change: Maharashtrians predominated in lower class jobs although they did not comprise the 80% called for in the earlier directives; and since the quotas were to be applied to
local persons, as defined by residence rather than language, it was likely that many firms could make a strong case that their employment rolls already complied with government stipulations.

The 1973 directive, then, departed sharply from the earlier policy. In an indignant editorial entitled "Parochialism" the Times of India responded:

Like any other state government, the Maharashtra government is anxious to provide jobs to as many people belonging to the state as possible. This is quite understandable especially because they have not always had a fair deal. But this does not justify going towards the other extreme. The government has advised private industrial and commercial employers to ensure that within a year 60 percent of their manager and 90 percent of their subordinate staff should be 'local people'. Thus the earlier stipulation that 80 percent of unskilled and semi skilled jobs should be filled by local people has been modified to include highly skilled and managerial jobs as well.

The term 'local people' has been defined as including anyone who is domiciled in Maharashtra for at least 15 years or whose mother tongue is Marathi. But now the Maharashtra government has also called upon employers to appoint as personnel or administrative officers only those whose mother tongue is Marathi.17

The state's September 1973 directive urging employers to hire personnel officers whose mother tongue was Marathi was in fact legally justifiable on the grounds that the Factory Act of 1948 requires labor officers to speak the language of the majority of their workers; but the governments definition of local persons as those who were either domiciled in Maharashtra or who spoke Marathi was seen by some as contravening the spirit of the constitutional guarantees against discrimination. The considerable anxiety which was aroused erupted in questions raised in the national parliament in March 1974.18

Whether for this reason or another, the Government of Maharashtra in the next month again redefined the term local persons. According to a press release picked up by the Times of India the redefinition dropped the reference to mother tongue, retaining only the criterion of one who has been domiciled.
in Maharashtra.\textsuperscript{19} Despite this retreat the Maharashtra government's policy, in its inclusion of upper-level as well as semi- and unskilled jobs, goes well beyond the central government policy of advocating preferences for only lower-salaried jobs. It remains one of the strongest statements of nativist policies at this level of government.

\textbf{Policy Implementation.} The strength of the Maharashtrian Government's policy depends not only on its pronouncements but also on the degree to which the government is willing to promulgate these policies by the use of incentives and sanctions. Even with the measure of frankness contained in the government's 1973 request, resolutions and appeals would clearly not be effective unless followed up by considerable pressure. The resistance among employers against hiring from local labor pools is quite strong. This derives from several factors. The attraction of recruiting from 'outside' according to some industrialists lies in the fact that particular migrant groups have specialized, traditional skills (e.g. Kamathis in construction, 'Bhaiyas' in special areas of textiles such as carding). According to other employers, recruiting migrant workers is desirable when confronted by a troublesome labor situation. Some argue that bringing in outside groups weakens the cohesiveness of labor and its availability for organization. Resistance to hiring local labor is in some cases specific to the Maharashtrian worker, who according to prevailing belief is less diligent and less eager than other 'outside' workers.

Given such perceptions the disinclination among employers to accede to government appeals is strong and, clearly, is overcome only by forceful application of governmental pressure. State government personnel observe that the government has made only 'appeals' to business and that there is no question of coercion. The sanctions that can be and are applied to unreceptive businessmen represent strong encouragement if not mandatory directives,
however.

In interviews with a large number of industrialists it was eminently clear that government pressures have been intense enough to exact rigorous efforts on the part of companies to follow governmental policy. As one businessman remarked in a comment typical of others, "Now at the very least, when all things are equal, we hire the Maharashtrians."

Pressure from government takes many forms. All sizeable businesses are required to submit a statement to the government showing the linguistic and geographic origins of persons at different levels of work in the company. This information is usually collected by the company (particularly in the case of white-collar workers) at the time of an employee's application. Officially the government's directive encourages employers to hire local persons, those resident in Bombay for fifteen years; but as the following form indicates, the government has attempted to scrutinize the employment policy of a firm with respect to the linguistic as well as residential background of its employees.

(The form reproduced here was received by a manufacturing concern. Accompanying instructions directed that it be returned to the government.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1: SAMPLE GOVERNMENT FORM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sometimes company officials are lax in reporting; the personnel officer from one company claimed to have submitted a form to the government stating that by the company's definition (length of residence) all its workers were Maharashtrian. But on the whole most business management attempts to avoid offending governmental sensibilities.

The costs of irritating state government personnel are considerable, and are particularly high where licenses, permits, or ministerial favors are required. A business intending expansion needs governmental permission. For a water or electricity connection, particularly if expedited, government approval is required. The state government may likewise choose to enforce to the letter the health or safety regulations, thereby penalizing the company for minor infractions.

Such penalties are not often invoked. One manager recounted his inability to secure government permission for plans for a hotel because he could not show that the majority of the laborers were to be Maharashtrian. More commonly it is the anticipation of such sanctions which accounts for their effectiveness. Almost all businessmen interviewed mentioned at least one encounter with the government over the issue of recruitment in which such pressure was informally applied. The following responses, paraphrases of businessmen's comments, are representative:

--The government cannot enforce anything. But it is in our own interests to comply with them as far as possible. The government can create problems for us otherwise. Indirectly we are affected. We may have a licensing problem; or say we want to run a third shift; it's worth while keeping the government away.

Manager of a pharmaceutical company

--Sometimes the government is insistent. For example, when we apply for additional spindles or machines. Once when we applied for power, Government required information from us on the numbers of local persons we employ. But since we were within the rules there was no problem.

Labour and Welfare Officer, Textile Mill
Some years back, the government called attention to the fact that labour officers in the company are not Maharashtrian. We told the government that there were no vacancies. Did they want us to sack the officers at their responsibility? We agreed that future vacancies would be filled with Maharashtrians. This is necessary as it may be a question of our needing facilities, water power, etc.

Manager, rayon factory

The government applies pressure indirectly, when applying for licenses, power, etc. They don't call them Maharashtrians, but rather 'local people.' I had to go there personally; it wasn't enough to send by mail, to make a statement that we would employ 80 percent locals; but they have no check as such.

Personnel Officer, cigarette/cigar factory

The government's pressure, as the above comments illustrate, is generally sufficiently strong to be taken seriously. There are exceptions. On a few occasions, the government's efforts appear more symbolic than real. One such instance is reported by a manager formerly with Hindustan Lever. According to his account, he was telephoned by a minister of the state government who advised him that the company was not employing sufficient numbers of Maharashtrians. The minister then hastily added that he intended to communicate this to the manager publicly, that his constituency demanded this, but that privately he felt that it was the company's own affair whom they hired. This incident occurred in the mid-1960s in the nascent stages of Shiv Sena. From the later accounts of business personnel, this appears a distinct evasion of the later serious pattern of governmental pressure.
IV. MUNICIPAL LEVEL GOVERNMENT POLICY

The active policies pursued by the state government are not replicated at the municipal level. Most of the legislation relating to the position of Maharashtrians considered or adopted in the Municipal Corporation has addressed the psychological rather than the economic interest of the Maharashtrian community. One measure adopted by the municipal body, for instance, called for the alteration of several street and road signs from their erstwhile Hindi and English names to Marathi. Other resolutions aimed at Maharashtrian concerns also involved linguistic reform. These have veered only somewhat less than in the instance of the street signs from concern for Maharashtrian economic prospects. Reaffirming an earlier resolution the Corporation, with Sena approval, announced the compulsory teaching of Marathi as a second language in Bombay schools. This measure had been adopted years earlier and almost all but Gujarati-medium schools had introduced Marathi. Even had the measure been a new one its acceptance would not have materially affected the position of Maharashtrians in Bombay.

Language legislation may, of course, be of much more than symbolic importance. Were the medium of Bombay University changed from English to Marathi, giving advantage in admissions and performance to Marathi-speaking students, the economic status of Maharashtrians in Bombay would clearly be affected. But the language legislation passed by the Municipal Corporation was not of this nature.23

The Municipal Corporation's educational legislation, despite initial appearances, is also not designed to affect the economic position of Maharashtrians. At first, with the support of the Sena, the Corporation issued a regulation requiring that 75 percent of all seats in the three
Corporation-run medical schools be reserved for those who had passed their school matriculation in Bombay City. This law made the earlier requirement of having to pass the college inter-science examination at a Bombay College more restrictive. But as the Sena legislators soon realized, the regulation did not shift the balance in favor of Maharashtrian applicants at all, but rather discriminated both against migrants from out-of-state and against migrants from elsewhere in Maharashtra itself. As one Sena legislator wryly commented, "It is ironic. Our legislation has probably kept out more Maharashtrians from medical school than ever before." 24

Legislation concerning employment is clearly of greater direct importance than education to the future status of Maharashtrians in Bombay. Yet in this area the Municipal Corporation has been mostly silent. One resolution concerning jobs for local persons in the municipal body was proposed by a Shiv Sena Corporator. It read:

In view of the fact that the government of Maharashtra has issued directions that 90% of posts in state government in Bombay as well as government offices in mofussil (outlying areas) be given to local residents, the same should be done for all posts under municipal administration at all levels.25

The last phrase is of particular importance. Although lower level posts in municipal employment are overwhelmingly Maharashtrian, the percentage declines at the semi-skilled and skilled levels. Yet, although the resolution was phrased to refer to 'local people' rather than Maharashtrians, and although its passage would have been no guarantee of implementation, the measure was not even adopted by the Corporation.

Despite the inaction of the elected body of the Corporation there has been, according to several administrative officials, a growing trend intensi-
fied by the Sena's emergence, to give increasing preference to Maharashtrians at higher levels of employment. Some consideration, it is further reported, has been given to requiring fluency in Marathi as a condition of employment. But if such a trend or development is occurring it is happening without the official sanction of the municipal body.
V. GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS: TWO EXPLANATIONS

The attentiveness to nativist concerns paid by the state government, and the resistance of the municipality, can be accounted for by two factors. The first one is ethnic affinity: State government personnel in both the state assembly and the bureaucracy are predominantly Maharashtrian. By contrast the municipal corporation and the municipal bureaucracies are ethnically much more heterogeneous.26

But ethnic ties alone do not guarantee an affinity of political objectives between government and the protesting group. As the 1969 Malaysian riots illustrated, protest may be fomented by one section of an ethnic community against a government in which its own ethnic group predominates. The variation in government responsiveness, then, must be accounted for first by the ethnic character of the government and the group with which it is dealing, and second by the political resources which the parties stand to gain or to lose.

At the state level the government stands to profit in a number of ways by the existence of a nativist political party. The state government can use the threats of violence posed by the nativist group to gain attention or to exact consideration from the central government in interstate disputes: In the Marashtra-Karnataka boundary dispute, an issue around which the Shiv Sena has organized a number of actions, the Maharashtrian Congress government can use the Sena threat to suggest to the national Congress leadership that its position will be jeopardized unless the issue is resolved in favor of Maharashtra, a Congress-dominated state. The state government also stands to gain by the challenge which Shiv Sena poses for the Congress' leftist rivals: This challenge operates at the level both of trade union organization and electoral politics. The Sena is widely viewed by the business community
as an effective force against communist organization of employees, a view which has led to charges that the Sena receives financial backing from Bombay's large industrialists. It is plausible that the Congress party unions are not unhappy at the competition between Communist and Sena unions.

Of even more potential importance to the Congress is the Sena's electoral support. In the 1968 municipal elections it was evident that the Shiv Sena had won much of the support that had formerly gone to the leftist Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti. A political accord with Shiv Sena in national parliamentary elections could be expected to win the Congress large numbers of additional votes. From the Sena's viewpoint too such an accord is attractive, since the party's aspirations no longer include national political office. Furthermore, the Sena has much to gain by the exchange of political favors: The Sena bandhs (shut-downs), morchas (demonstrations), and public protests which are the party's most important means of mobilizing support often turn violent. If the Congress were to insist on the police maintaining public order, the Sena's organization would be clearly impaired. Some unofficial dispensation in exchange for the Sena's electoral support would be of likely appeal to both Congress and the Sena. The possible benefits to be reaped from a Sena-Congress understanding at the municipal level are much more problematic. In the first place the two parties are direct competitors for political power in the municipal corporation. Moreover, the position of Congress in the municipal corporation is much more tenuous than at the state level (where it is virtually unchallenged). The municipal Congress party therefore cannot hope to offer the rewards that attend a strong political position and that would attract an exchange of political support between the Congress and the Sena.
VI. THE CHANGING EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF MAHARASHTRIANS

How has government policy affected the actual economic status of Maharashtrians in Bombay? To begin with a prior question, leaving until later the task of ascertaining causality, how has the economic status of Maharashtrians changed?

Measurement of the economic progress of different groups in Bombay is made difficult by the paucity of published data. Recent census and city-wide surveys do not record the ethnic breakdown of occupational categories. Consequently it is only possible to offer suggestive observations about employment changes. These observations, based on two studies of public and private employment in the city, point to a clear pattern of rising occupational status among middle-class Maharashtrians.

The first study was conducted in 1970 by a group of Bombay students who interviewed 125 managers from 25 Bombay companies. As the following table illustrates, the percentage of Maharashtrian managers hired by these companies has grown steadily over the last two decades, largely at the expense of South Indian and Sindhi personnel.

**TABLE 2: THE RECRUITMENT OF MANAGERS IN 25 BOMBAY COMPANIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mother Tongue of Executive</th>
<th>Hired before 1950</th>
<th>Hired between 1950-1960</th>
<th>Hired after 1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marathi</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (12%)</td>
<td>10 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>9 (56%)</td>
<td>14 (34%)</td>
<td>21 (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Indian</td>
<td>4 (25%)</td>
<td>12 (29%)</td>
<td>6 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Indian</td>
<td>2 (13%)</td>
<td>5 (12%)</td>
<td>9 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>5 (12%)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The percentage of Maharashtrian managers is very low, particularly when cast against the percentage (43 percent) of Bombay's population that is Marathi-speaking; but it is nevertheless striking that the ratio of growth of Maharashtrians recruited to the 25 companies far exceeds that of any other ethnic group.

The trend shown in this manager survey accords with comments by businessmen, employers and academics in Bombay. One faculty member in the Bajaj Institute of Management in Bombay reports increasingly frequent letters received at the school soliciting Maharashtrian graduates or candidates. Company personnel in the interviews cited earlier noted also that the numbers of Maharashtrians recruited in middle- and upper-level jobs had been increasing.

The second study, an analysis of Bombay telephone directories, reveals a pattern of change in the status of the Maharashtrian middle and upper classes consistent with that indicated by the manager survey. In its listing of private firms and government offices the Bombay telephone directory includes the names, positions, and telephone exchanges of a firm or establishment's officers. From the names it is possible to identify quite accurately the linguistic background of the individual and thus to estimate the numbers of Maharashtrians and non-Maharashtrians employed in the firm. A sizeable number of private and government (central, state, and municipal) establishments were selected with a view towards including the largest and best known private firms and government departments. Telephone listings were compared for three different time periods, 1962, 1967 and 1973. The findings of the analysis are reported in Table 3.

The results are unambiguous: the percentage of Maharashtrians employed in high-level positions in both the private and public sectors has risen continuously, beginning before Shiv Sena's emergence and continuing to rise in the years following.
### TABLE 3: PERCENTAGE OF MAHARASHTRIANS EMPLOYED IN HIGHER LEVEL POSITIONS IN BOMBAY ESTABLISHMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLIC SECTOR</th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Establishments: 11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Employees:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962: 398</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967: 677</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973: 672</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and Municipal Government</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Establishments: 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Employees:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962: 70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967: 102</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973: 114</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| PRIVATE SECTOR         | 7%   | 12%  | 16%  |
| # Establishments: 15   |      |      |      |
| # Employees:           |      |      |      |
| 1962: 55               |      |      |      |
| 1967: 68               |      |      |      |
| 1973: 73               |      |      |      |

As is common knowledge, Maharashtrians have been and continue to be represented in the upper echelons of the state government in far greater numbers than in central government offices. It cannot be concluded from this analysis however that Maharashtrians are better represented in central government concerns than in private industries, since the sample of names from private firms included only the higher level officers and is not comparable to the state or central government establishments. But although comparisons between public and private sectors are not possible, it is striking that within each sector the percentages of middle- and upper-class Maharastrians have steadily grown.

Several questions are left open: While the position of Maharashtrians in Bombay seems quite clearly to be improving the data are not sufficiently comprehensive to indicate how much improvement has occurred or to show which precise groups (upper-middle, middle, lower-middle, or lower class) among the Maharashtrian community are making gains.

Perceptions of change among Maharashtrians appear to bear out the signs of change intimated above. By 1970, only four years after Shiv Sena's founding and two years after the party's elections to the municipal council, sentiment was widespread among Maharashtrians that their status in Bombay was improving. As was perhaps to be expected, this feeling pervaded Shiv Sena offices and party meetings. But it also seemed to be a sentiment echoed by the ordinary voter -- Shiv Sena supporter and non-supporter alike.

The exuberance among young workers is a dominant feature of Shiv Sena offices. Much in tone of the "true believer," young Sainiks relate stories of Maharashtrian success. The tales share a common theme. Whether it is the Bank of Baroda, Voltas, Glaxo, or any one of the numerous well-known Bombay firms, Maharashtrians, the account begins, had no opportunities. One Young Sainik with typical enthusiasm related the story of a friend employed at CIBA. The friend had been called along with other Maharashtrian workers to
speak with one of the managers after threats from Shiv Sena leaders. The manager requested their help recruiting Maharashtrians and shortly thereafter more were hired.34

One factor which may contribute to such perceptions is the obvious upward mobility of key Sena leaders. In 1970 for instance, Manohar Joshi, who by his own insistent account was raised in poverty, planned a European vacation -- his first trip outside India. While such meteoric improvements in the style and standard of living are hardly unique to Shiv Sena political leaders, they still help to reinforce the image among Sena party followers that the lot of Maharashtrians is improving.

A distinct exception to such optimism is found within the Communist Party. Most Communist Party leaders and workers are strongly convinced that Shiv Sainiks are strikebreakers, "bourgeois lackeys," and that the Maharashtrians have been offered mere tokenism whose intent is to divide the working class by rewarding a selected few.

The opinion of the ordinary Bombay voter seems to resemble the Shiv Sena account much more closely than the Communist. In a survey of over 450 Bombay voters conducted after the parliamentary elections in 1971, 51.5 percent of the population said that they felt more Maharashtrians were getting jobs than ever before, 19 percent felt that more Maharashtrians were not getting jobs, and 25 percent replied that they were unsure.35

In another question, 14 percent of those asked claimed that they personally knew of people who had found jobs through Shiv Sena. While Shiv Sena supporters who felt prospects for Maharashtrians had improved outnumbered those who did not by four to one, among Congress Party supporters the ratio was two to one. The figures are a compelling indication that among Maharashtrians in Bombay, including those who do not support Shiv Sena, there has been a sense of improving job possibilities.
The manager survey, telephone book analysis, and voter interviews are not a complete sampling. But it is striking that they each accord with the conventional wisdom in Bombay which sees Maharashtrian job opportunities as distinctly improving.
VII. THE CHANGE SEEN IN BROADER PERSPECTIVE

To what extent can the improvement in the job status of Maharashtrians be traced to governmental policy or to Shiv Sena pressure? The chronology of events is revealing: The improvements in Maharashtrian status noted in both the managerial and telephone directory surveys demonstrate that Maharashtrian job mobility began well before the Sena's founding in 1966. Since the two surveys draw on pre-1973 data they also indicate that marked advancement of Maharashtrians occurred prior to the stringent policy measures adopted by the state government in that year.

Could it be argued, then, that government policy and Shiv Sena pressure have been largely irrelevant to the enhancement of job opportunities among middle-class Maharashtrians? Could other factors such as the expanding educational system and the growing 'supply' of educated Maharashtrians, or simply Bombay's growing economy, account for Maharashtrian improvements in recent years?

Educational Expansion. The underrepresentation of any social group in white-collar positions is sometimes attributed to a scarcity of supply. Such an explanation in the Bombay case would presume an earlier shortage, and in the last years a growing pool, of educated Maharashtrians. There has been an enormous growth in the school enrollments in Maharashtra. Secondary enrollment rose from slightly under 2 million to 6-1/2 million students. Between 1963 and 1970, enrollment in primary schools rose by 31 percent, secondary schools by 60 percent. At the University of Bombay alone, enrollment has risen close to 300 percent from 24,000 in the early 1950s to nearly 90,000 students in 1971. Of this growth not all is Marathi-speaking students, and there is in fact some indication that the proportions
of Maharashtrians in higher education may have declined relative to other linguistic groups. The newer constituent colleges built since the 1960s in Bombay seem to cater more to the Gujarati than to other ethnic groups; and in one prestigious Bombay college (Elphinstone) Maharashtrian enrollment fluctuated from approximately 38 percent in 1956 to 21 percent in 1965 and 30 percent in 1975. But even as the percentages of Maharashtrians may have declined, the numbers of Maharashtrians receiving B.A.s grew with the rapid expansion in college enrollment throughout the 1960s.

But it is by no means clear that there has ever been a shortage of educated Maharashtrians. The rosters of the Bombay Employment exchange in the 1960s record a surfeit of educated Marathi-speakers. One account notes that in 1964 there were 15,125 registrants of matriculate or higher educational levels who claimed Maharashtra as the state in which they received their last schooling. Although not all of these registrants would have been Maharashtrian by mother-tongue, even a low estimate of 40 percent (the percent of Maharashtrians in the Bombay population) indicates that there were large numbers of educated Maharashtrians seeking jobs.

Employers in Bombay have claimed that many Maharashtrian applicants lack certain qualities -- ambition or diligence, for instance -- which are often looked for in recruitment. But the figures above indicate that employers would have had little difficulty finding Maharashtrian job applicants with the necessary formal educational qualifications. Although the pool of educated Maharashtrians in the last years has certainly grown, it has never been seriously low.

Economic Expansion. It is a widely recognized maxim that job opportunities for previously underrepresented groups are greatly enhanced in periods of general economic growth. If it could be shown that Maharashtrian
occupational status improved markedly in a period of general recession, it might be possible to identify government pressure as a critical force explaining the change in Maharashtrian status. But such a disjunction between policy and economic forces has not occurred. Instead, as Figure 1 demonstrates, employment appears to have increased throughout the 1960s and early 1970s except for a single brief slump. Although employment in certain industries, most notably textiles, has declined, it appears that white collar job opportunities in other sectors have been expanding.

In addition to expanding job opportunities and the growing numbers of educated Maharashtrians, one other factor has encouraged the success of governmental policy. In 1960 the multilingual state of Bombay was divided into the two states of Gujarat and Maharashtra. Similar to linguistic reorganizations elsewhere in India, the separation of Maharashtra has encouraged the transition to use of the regional language. This development has probably resulted in Maharashtrians facing less of a disadvantage in job recruitment than was earlier the case.

An explanation of the growing proportion of Maharashtrians in middle-class jobs must incorporate a combination of factors. The establishment of a separate Maharashtrian state in 1960 and the accompanying linguistic changes, the expanding economy, and the growing numbers of educated Maharashtrians have all favored the upward mobility of middle-class Maharashtrians. Given these other favorable circumstances, it is virtually impossible to identify the extent to which Shiv Sena pressure and governmental policy are themselves responsible for Maharashtrian advancement.
Figure 1: EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN BOMBAY'S ORGANIZED SECTOR

Employment (thousands)

Year

Source: Diagram S.22 in CIDCO publication on Bombay Metropolitan Region 1974
VIII. CONCLUSION

The task of reducing inequalities between ethnic groups is seen in India as elsewhere as incumbent to a large extent upon government. The case of governmental policy in Bombay provides a particularly good study of governmental response to ethnic conflict in one key situation: that of economic opportunities concentrated in private sector employment.

There are few historical precedents for government attempts to influence private business employment. Governments have traditionally used recruitment into their own ranks or through their own patronage powers to advance the interests of particular ethnic groups. The Irish in Massachusetts some decades ago, and Blacks and other minorities in America more recently, have found employment in government to be an avenue to occupational advancement. But at least in the United States it was not until the 1960s that policies were developed which stipulated that private establishments under contract to government must set goals for the employment of minority personnel.

The Maharashtra government policy on employment appears in some ways more forceful and in other ways weaker than the 'affirmative action' procedures in the United States. While affirmative action calls only for goals to be set and a fair search for minority applicants to be made, government policy in Maharashtra sets quotas which employers must seek to attain. But affirmative action as it affects private institutions under government contract must necessarily comply. Maharashtra government policy by contrast has been formulated as a government directive soliciting but not compelling private business cooperation. In fact this difference in legal status may not be as great as it first appears. The impact of these policies depends as much on their implementation as on the way they are formulated. Just as the impact of 'obligatory' affirmative action measures may be diluted by insufficient
follow-up, the impact of 'voluntary' directives to businesses in Maharashtra may be strengthened by the informal pressures exerted by government through the issuing or withholding of licenses and permits.

The Maharashtra government's response to nativist demands has in fact been very forceful. Prior to 1973 state government policy was relatively tempered. The state government in its communications to both public and private establishments called for a recruitment policy which set a quota for local persons in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. The term local persons was defined as anyone resident in Maharashtra for fifteen years. This policy was in line with the thinking of the central government. (In a number of different statements, central government personnel had indicated that preferences should be extended in lower-level jobs to local residents, where local was to refer to persons domiciled in the region of employment.) In 1973 government policy was strengthened through a further directive which called on employers to extend preferences to local persons at certain high levels as well as in unskilled and semi-skilled positions. In a statement later retracted, the state government also indicated that preferences in certain jobs were to be extended to 'Marathi speakers' as distinct from 'local persons', the designation which had been previously used. Information was also informally conveyed that sanctions, and particularly the withholding of needed licenses, might be applied if business personnel did not endeavor to comply with government directives.

Why should the government have assumed the onus of attempting to influence private sector recruitment practices? Part of the answer lies in the fact that the government in India has always, in part through the issuing of licenses and permits, played some role in private business decisions; precedents clearly exist for the extension of this role to employment decisions. But two other factors served to promote the state government's
attempt at intervention in private sector employment. On the one hand Maharashtrians have predominated in the state government. Ties of ethnicity could be expected to elicit a degree of sympathy among government personnel for Shiv Sena's charge that Maharashtrians were being excluded from economic opportunities in Bombay. Secondly, the Congress government which has dominated Maharashtrian politics stood to gain by responding favorably to Shiv Sena claims. The Sena's endorsement in certain elections and the challenge the Sena posed to socialist and communist unions may have been of some political importance to Congress political calculations. In contrast to the state government, the municipal government has pursued a policy less supportive of nativist claims. The absence of the two factors just mentioned -- the lack of ethnic affinity between nativist and municipal personnel and the tenuous political advantage of cooperation between the Congress and Shiv Sena -- helps to explain the differing perspectives of the municipal and state governments.

The impact of government policy, energetic as it has been, is still unclear. The percentage of Maharashtrians in managerial and upper-level jobs has definitely increased. Surveys of managerial and white-collar employment in Bombay businesses as well as anecdotal information about hiring practices point clearly to the upward mobility of middle-class Maharashtrians. But these figures indicate that this trend began well before the 1973 intensification of government policy efforts, and in fact before the emergence of Shiv Sena in 1966. If government policy together with Shiv Sena pressure has contributed to the advancement of Maharashtrians, it has done so in the context of other supportive factors. The expanding job market in Bombay, the growing numbers of educated Maharashtrians, and the increasing importance of Marathi resulting from the 1960 state reorganizations are developments which have all favored the mobility of Maharashtrians.
Government commitment to Maharashtrian advancement has not been lacking. But the actual impact of this commitment is yet to be demonstrated.
*This study is based on materials collected during a year's stay in Bombay in 1970-71 and during a visit to India in December 1974. These trips to India were funded respectively by the Ford Foreign Area Fellowship Program and by a Ford-Rockefeller grant to the Center for International Studies at M.I.T. for a project on migration policies, of which Professor Myron Weiner is director. The author wishes to thank Myron Weiner and Peter J. Katzenstein for their comments on this paper.

1. Studies which focus on the mobilization of ethnic groups include:
   For a discussion of policy formation, see Das Gupta, op. cit., Chapter VI, and the writings of Marc Galanter on caste and the role of the courts.


3. This conflict is discussed in full in Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, "The Consequences of Migration: Ethnic Conflict in Bombay," doctoral dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1975.

4. The party derives its name from Shivaji Maharaj, the seventeenth century founder of the Maratha empire, who occupies a central place in Maharashtrian history and culture.


6. Prior to his present nativist involvement, Bal Thackeray was a political unknown. He was not active previously in any political party. He was and is still a cartoonist by profession.

7. The notion that Maharashtrian refers to one who identifies with the 'joys and sorrows' of Maharashtra became current in Shiv Sena Speaks and a number of other Sena publications.
8. The Times of India, July 31, 1975, recounts, for instance, Thackeray's anger at realizing "that 95 percent of the so-called Maharashtrians hired by a recently built Western style hotel were only Maharashtrians by domicile and thus not really Maharashtrian."

9. The Sena has also tried to launch some Marathi youth into commercial endeavors by lending small amounts of capital, soliciting such contributions from local businessmen. Sena members have started, for example, "bhel-puri" (snack) carts with these funds.

10. Accounts have been cited of such encounters with International Tractor, Indian Oil, Glaxo, Sarabhai Chemical, Jayanti Shipping Corporation, New India Insurance, Burmah Shell and many other companies.

11. Sena pressure is exerted in varying ways. It is reported that on one occasion Thackeray's sister visited a Godrej showroom to inspect refrigerators for purchase. After looking about, she asked the salesperson to show her a list of the Godrej Board of Directors. Inspecting the list, she remarked caustically that she would never buy a refrigerator from a company that had no Maharashtrians on its Board of Directors. In a story recounted about Indian Oil the Sena Corporator, Manohar Joshi, is said to have telephoned an Indian Oil officer and demanded, "Where are you living ... In what city are you living?..." Joshi then threatened to call a public demonstration (morcha) unless the company considered hiring more Maharashtrians in its recruitment programs. See Times of India, January 26, 1974, p. 1, for an account of the State Bank morcha.


16. The phrasing left inconclusive whether Marathi-speakers referred to those who were Maharashtrian by mother tongue or to those who were proficient in Marathi.


18. See Lok Sabha Debates, Volume 36, Nos. 11-16, 5th series, March 5 - March 13, 1974, Lok Sabha, Secretariat, New Delhi, March 5, pp. 175-193 and March 13, pp. 71-74.

20. These included 35 interviews of 30 minutes to 2 hours in length, 24 of which were conducted by a research assistant, Ms. Ritu Anand of Wellesley College. While not based on a written questionnaire, the interviews covered a common ground. All businessmen were asked (1) particulars pertaining to company size, products, etc.; (2) recruitment procedures for different occupational levels; (3) encounters, if any, with Sena personnel or unions; (4) the nature of pressures, if any, from government concerning recruitment policy; (5) changes, if any, in the percentage of different ethnic groups employed in the last decade. The companies were chosen on the basis of contacts and introductions since it was thought important to maximize the informality, openness and frankness of the interviews. The interviews included a good cross-section of large and small, old and new industries.

21. The executive interviewed is not presently employed in business in Bombay.

22. It is commonly observed that small businesses of less than 50 laborers are mostly exempt from government pressure since the efforts required to keep tabs on recruitment policy for all such firms would be extremely burdensome.

23. Most of the language legislation passed by the Corporation concerns translation of the municipal agenda, journal, and other records into Marathi and the question of which language to use in Corporation debates. The Bombay Civic Journal has included a Marathi section since 1970-71.

24. Interview in the Municipal Corporation Office of Shiv Sena, January 1970. State-financed medical colleges have requirements which do not simply favor Maharashtrian residents over non-Maharashtrian. They cater almost entirely to their immediate geographic region within Maharashtra. The policy of regionalization was recently challenged in the courts and upheld on the grounds that the policy has a rational connection to government objectives. See Decision in Shirang Ganpati Pandit v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1972, Bom. 242, reported in the *Yearly Digest of Indian and Selected English Cases*. Madras: Madras Law Journal Office, 1972, p. 438.

25. Proposal of W. Mahadik, April 10, 1969 (Municipal Agenda, p. 32); in addition, the Corporation has considered but as of 1971 rejected the Sena demand to allocate city market stalls by lottery rather than auction, a change which would benefit Maharashtrians who are at times unable to put up sufficient fees in the auction competition. Thackeray has also sought the adoption of a system where up to 80% of shops would be allocated to Marathi-speakers and the remaining 20% to domiciled persons.

26. The language breakdown in the Corporation is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOTHER-TONGUE OF BOMBAY MUNICIPAL COUNCILLORS</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Corporators</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marathi</td>
<td>57 (44%)</td>
<td>78 (56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Indian</td>
<td>20 (15%)</td>
<td>24 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Indian</td>
<td>11 (8%)</td>
<td>7 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>36 (28%)</td>
<td>25 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7 (5%)</td>
<td>6 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27. Shiv Sena has in fact supported Congress on a number of occasions, most recently in the by-election to the Lok Sabha from Bombay Central Constituency. See the account in the Times of India January 6, 1974, p. 1.

28. Protests of police partiality and Congress concurrence have been levelled repeatedly. In one recent incident, the Times of India reports that "the Bombay municipal Corporation adjourned its meeting on Wednesday without transacting any business to protest against the reign of terror resulting in loss of life and property ... The adjournment motion unanimously accepted by the house said 'the limb of law exhibited partiality in dealing with the situation..." See the account in the Times of India January 31, 1974, p. 1.


30. Interview with Principal Basu, Bajaj School of Management, November 27, 1970.

31. Some names are not readily identifiable. The surname, Desai, for instance, could be either Gujarati or Maharashtrian, as is true of several other names. But when the identification is done by native speakers familiar with Maharashtrian names, there is probably a greater than 85% accuracy. The identification for this analysis was done by two research assistants, both natives of Bombay. (Ms. N. Kanodia and Ms. T.C. Daswani.)

32. The direction of the trend is certainly revealing. Without further data, however, it would be mistaken to conclude from the table that the rate of growth of Maharashtrian employment was higher for the period 1962-67 than for 1967-73. As the number of employees indicates, the listings included many more persons in 1967 than in 1962, suggesting that individual listings were given to lower level personnel. The increased rate of Maharashtrian employment in 1967 may be inflated by the fact that there were more Maharashtrians at the levels of positions newly included in the directory. The 1967 and 1973 listings are much more closely comparable. The percentages are arrived at by calculating the average percent of Maharashtrians employed in each firm. When the numbers of employees are totalled and the percentage of Maharashtrians computed, the trend is identical but in each case the percentage of Maharashtrians employed is a few points higher.

33. Private firms include the names only of top-level officers whereas Government firms list a much larger proportion of their personnel in the directory.

34. Lamington Road Shakha, November 1970.

35. These results are drawn from a survey conducted by the author and Kartikeya Sarabhai in Bombay in 1971. The survey involved interviews with 479 Maharashtrians and an approximately equal number of South Indians living in the city. For details of sample design, etc., see the author's dissertation, p. 108 ff.

37. Mimeo., Education Department, Maharashtra State 1971, p. 2.


40. The comparison included the Junior BA classes of 1956 and 1965 and the First Year Arts and Science classes (day) of 1974-75.

41. This data comes from the active register. Since this register includes only those who have renewed their registration in the previous two months, these figures are generally regarded as an underestimate of those looking for jobs. It is also widely acknowledged that those registered with the exchanges comprise only a portion of the total number of job-seekers. P.A. Nair, op. cit., p. 11.