TEMPORARY VERSUS PERMANENT
CITYWARD MIGRATION:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

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TEMPORARY VERSUS PERMANENT CITYWARD MIGRATION:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES*

I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the developing world the larger cities are growing rapidly, and everywhere this growth is fed in part by migration from the countryside and smaller towns. But the nature and meaning of the cityward movement varies greatly. In most of Latin America the great bulk of migrants to the cities have left the countryside permanently. They may move on to different cities, and they may return to their place of origin to visit relatives and friends, but few come back to rural areas to stay. In contrast, much rural-to-urban migration in Africa and parts of Asia is temporary. Migrants come to the cities for a few years or for a working lifetime. But they retain close ties and active interests in their home place. Often they leave part of their immediate family there. If they own land or a house in the countryside, they cling to it; if they do not, they often try to acquire rural property or build a retirement house against the day when they return home. They are short- or long-term sojourners in the city.

These facts are well-known, although the intercontinental contrasts

*This study was initiated while I was associated with the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University. Most of the work was supported by a grant from the Population Council of New York and was carried out at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars of the Smithsonian Institution. I would like to express my appreciation to all three institutions and to my colleagues and the staff at the Harvard and Smithsonian Centers for their support, assistance, and intellectual stimulation. I would also like to thank the close to two dozen scholars who commented on an early draft or sent me additional information on their own research. Their help has contributed greatly to this study.

A revised version of this monograph appears in Economic Development and Cultural Change, 24:4 (July 1976), pp. 721-757. The most substantial revisions concern the role of urban employment conditions as a determinant of temporary or permanent migration.
may surprise those scholars who have concentrated on one region only. But the causes and the consequences of the contrasting patterns of migration are important, and remain largely unexplored. People who regard themselves as sojourners in the city will seek different kinds of housing, demand fewer amenities and services, behave differently with respect to making friends and joining organizations, use accumulated savings for different purposes, and respond to different political issues and candidates than will people committed to the city as their permanent home. Therefore, where a large proportion of in-migrants regards their stay as temporary, patterns of informal and formal urban social organization, the nature and degree of demands on urban government, and even the physical development of the city will be affected. This will hold whether or not most of the migrants who expect to return to their home places in fact do so. As long as they plan to return, their intentions will shape their behavior in the city.

This monograph explores, in a preliminary manner, the impact on urban growth and structure of varying degrees of permanence or impermanence in cityward migration. It first assembles evidence of the great variation in patterns of migration in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The probable causes and consequences of temporary versus permanent migration are explored in the third and fourth sections.
II. VARIATION IN THE PERMANENCE OF CITYWARD MIGRATION

THE SPECTRUM OF TEMPORARY TO PERMANENT MIGRANTS

Throughout the world those who come to the larger cities from small towns or rural areas cover a spectrum ranging from the short-term visitor for business or pleasure to the permanent in-migrant committed to making a new life for himself in the city. Short-term visitors are not appropriately classified as migrants into the city. Nor, for the purposes of this discussion, are seasonal or shuttle migrants seeking temporary construction jobs or other unskilled urban work to augment meager agricultural incomes.

Among the migrants who settle in the city for a time, perhaps the most short-term category are "target migrants." Such migrants come to the city for a limited period, though longer than a season, in order to accomplish a specific purpose. Until recent decades many of the migrants in sub-Saharan African cities were target workers seeking to accumulate money for brideprice or taxes owed, and planning to return home when they had achieved their goal. Completion of education may also be a "target" for temporary in-migrants. In many developing nations secondary schools are few and poor outside of the largest cities. Middle- and upper-class rural and small-town families often send their sons and daughters to the cities to complete secondary school and possibly university. Target migrants may stay in the city for several years, but by definition they intend to return to their place of origin once their purpose in the city is fulfilled.

The same is true of migrants who come to the city not to pursue a specific, limited, single-shot goal, but as part of a lifetime pattern of movement between countryside and city. Such a pattern differs from shuttle
or seasonal migration in that each stay is longer and is usually linked to changing pressures and opportunities of the migrants' life cycles rather than to seasonal shifts in rural employment requirements. The pattern has been described by a number of writers, especially students of East Africa.¹

A typical life history might be as follows: A young man who has completed his primary education moves to the city. There he stays with friends or relatives for a few years and earns cash to meet his own immediate needs and future marriage payments as well as to help pay younger siblings' school fees and contribute to general family funds. The city also offers him excitement, freedom, and variety compared to village life. However, when the migrant wants to marry, he will return to his home place. If he has access to land or alternative ways to make a living, he will stay for a time. Later, growing pressures for cash to build a house, buy or improve land or stock, and pay school fees and taxes may drive him back to the city, leaving his wife in charge of the home plot. On this second trip the migrant may again stay in the city for several years, visiting his family as often as distance and costs permit, and perhaps bringing his wife and/or children to stay with him in the city during the slack cultivation season or school holidays. An older son who succeeds in finding a place in secondary school

might stay with his father in the city during the school year. After a few years the migrant may feel his interests at home need more constant attention. He may also have obligations to his aging parents or to other relatives which lead him to return home. One or more further cycles may follow. Eventually he will return to the country home permanently, either because he can afford to retire, or because he has lost his city job and finds increasing age a serious barrier to finding new employment. By this time his oldest son or sons may be in town, providing an alternative source of cash for family needs. Moreover, the family and lineage obligations of an elder may require his presence in his home place.

From the standpoint of the extended family rather than the individual migrant, this pattern of migration forms a "rural-urban pool." At any given time some members of the family are in the city earning money while others remain at home to cultivate communal or individually held land and attend to other family interests. The rural base represents a permanent safe-haven for those in the city who become ill, elderly, or unemployed. Individual members of the family move back and forth between country and town so that different family members are in the city and the country at different times. A recent study in Kenya compared men from one rural district roughly 200 miles from Nairobi who were living in a neighborhood in Nairobi at the time of the study, and a sample matched for age, education, and family status who were living in the home district at that time. The average number of years of urban experience of the two groups was nearly identical.²

²Weisner, op.cit.
The pattern resembles LePlay's "stem family" which he described as common in nineteenth century Europe. It is also similar to patterns still found on a small scale among migrants, perhaps particularly from Appalachia, in the contemporary United States. 3

Moving still further across the spectrum from short-term visitor to committed urbanite, many migrants leave their home places in search of greater economic opportunities in the city, but plan to retire to the countryside. This is common in both East and West Africa, as well as the Indian subcontinent.

In contrast to various types of temporary migrants, part of the incoming stream arrives in the cities committed to stay. Some of these are voluntarily, perhaps eagerly, exchanging one way of life for another they regard as better or more promising. Others are committed to the city in a negative sense. For personal, economic, or political reasons they cannot return to their home place, whether or not they welcome the change in life style and life prospects offered by the city.

Finally, the flow of migrants into any city also includes many who


Lisa Peattie has described a similar situation to the author. In Monroe (Michigan) there are two carton factories employing many workers from the rural environs of Knoxville, Kentucky, and Tazenell, Tennessee. The same factory job might be held by several members of the same family in succession. During the summer both plants closed for two weeks to permit everyone to "go back home." Substantial numbers of Appalachian migrants to auto factories in Wayne (Michigan), Chicago, and other north-central cities also may move back and forth between the country and the city several times during a lifetime but remain committed to their rural places of origin.
are undecided as to how they will stay and whether they will eventually
return to their home place. The undecided are not merely a residual category:
their flexibility may make them behave in ways which are predictable and
differ from the reactions of migrants with firm intentions to stay or leave.

**INTENTIONS VS. ACTUALITY**

Clearly migrants' intentions to stay in the city or to return home are
not always realized. Plans may change, and even stable plans may not be
realized. Some who hope to stay a long time or permanently may fail to
find jobs or may dislike the city and decide to return home. This is
sometimes called the "failure flow." Others may change their minds and
return to their place of origin not because of their own "failure" but
because of unexpected problems or opportunities, for example, a parent's
illness, or the inheritance of land. Conversely, some migrants who in-
tended to return home may later decide to stay in the city. And some who
have planned consistently over many years to return home when they retire
may postpone too long and be caught by death in the city. Actual return
migration may be larger, smaller, or (by coincidence) the same as planned
backflow.

Nevertheless, at any given moment, it is possible in principle (though
costly in practice) to ask all adult nonnatives in a specific city how long
they plan to stay and to put together a fairly precise picture of the pro-
portions who are short-term sojourners, longer-term migrants, committed to
stay, and undecided. Migrants' behavior in the city with respect to housing,
social contacts, voluntary organizations, political interests, use of savings,
and many other matters is determined by their intentions and expectations.
about staying versus leaving, regardless of whether or not those expectations are later realized. For both scholars and policy makers, therefore, the distribution of intentions within a migrant population is at least as important as actual retention and return-migration rates. Furthermore, if cityward migration is gradually becoming more permanent in a particular city or country, current intentions may be both a more accurate guide to current behavior in the city and a better predictor of eventual settlement patterns than retention and return-flow data based on past migration patterns.

INTERCOUNTRY DIFFERENCES

At the level of individuals and groups, migrants' intentions to stay in or leave the cities are an important factor affecting their integration into the urban society and economy. This would be true even if the distribution or "mix" of short- and long-term migrants moving into all cities were roughly the same. In fact, however, the permanence of cityward migration varies substantially among nations. These contrasts in the permanence of migration are a partial explanation for variation in the patterns of urban growth and the impact of urbanization in different countries.

The most widely available index of nonpermanent migration is the sex ratio, that is, the number of men per hundred women in any particular city. This is available for far more cities, and is more accurate, than most other forms of demographic data in modernizing nations. Census enumerations in cities are usually more comprehensive and accurate than in more remote areas, and data on sex are much more reliable than age (in populations where large numbers are illiterate and keep no records) or occupation (which is notoriously difficult to classify).
Where men substantially outnumber women, as in most of the cities of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, a large part of the explanation usually lies in a pattern where large numbers of single men migrate to the cities but return home to marry, and/or married men go to work in the cities for long or short periods but leave their families at home. Both patterns are associated with nonpermanent migration. If men merely move into town in advance of their families, bringing their wives and children to join them later, the discrepancy between men and women would be much less marked, unless in-migration has been increasing sharply in the years just prior to the census.

Table 1 suggests the sharp differences in sex ratios among cities in different regions of the developing world. The imbalances show up particularly strongly where separate data are available for migrant and native populations, as for the Indian cities.

### Table 1

**RATIOS OF MALES TO FEMALES: MAJOR CITIES IN DEVELOPING NATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Males per 100 Females</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LATIN AMERICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago, Chile</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1960 sample of households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogota, Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1964 census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Migrant)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico City (D.F.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1960 census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Migrant)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima, Peru</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1961 census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caracas, Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1961 census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Migrant)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Males per 100 Females</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi, Kenya</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>1962 census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total African population (excludes Europeans and Asians)</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>1962 census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinshasa, Congo</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>1955-7 National Sample Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis, Tunisia</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1967 Statistical Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo, Egypt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1966 census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Delta-born migrants)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1960 census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Upper-Egypt-born migrants)</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>1960 census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEAR EAST</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul, Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>1965 census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Migrant)</td>
<td>143</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOUTH AND EAST ASIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi, Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1961 census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Migrant)</td>
<td>147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi, India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>129</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant population</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban migrants</td>
<td>136</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural migrants</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay, India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant population</td>
<td>186</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban migrants</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural migrants</td>
<td>197</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras, India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant population</td>
<td>109</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban migrants</td>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural migrants</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 (continued)

RATIOS OF MALES TO FEMALES: MAJOR CITIES IN DEVELOPING NATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Males per 100 Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AND EAST ASIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcutta, India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant population</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban migrants</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural migrants</td>
<td>195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1960 census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(municipal area)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul, Korea</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1970 census</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sex ratios are a proxy for temporary migration, but tell us nothing about the "mix" of types of nonpermanent migration in different cities and regions. For this we must turn to more direct but less widely available data, such as surveys of migrants' intentions, census or survey data on actual return flows to rural areas, and statistics on out-migration from the cities (which include but are much broader than return migration). Such evidence is examined for each major region below.

AFRICA

As the high sex ratios for African cities suggest, cityward migration in sub-Saharan Africa is heavily temporary. In a few countries attitude surveys on migrants' plans provide direct evidence on the distribution in African cities of short-term, medium-term, working life, and permanent migrants. Data from the two most extensive such surveys are shown in Table 2. Several smaller surveys conducted in other countries confirm the general findings of the Kenyan and Chadian surveys—that only a fraction of the
Table 2

**URBAN MIGRANTS' PLANS TO STAY IN OR LEAVE THE CITY:**
**THREE CITIES IN GHANA AND EIGHT CITIES IN KENYA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent Planning To:</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Stay permanently</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Return to home place when they retire</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Return when they have reached some specific goals or within five years</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. When earn enough money</td>
<td>(10.8)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. When complete job or education</td>
<td>(4.8)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. &quot;Soon&quot;</td>
<td>(6.6)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. &quot;When needed at home&quot;</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Uncertain about future plans</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*a* John C. Caldwell, *African Rural-Urban Migration: The Movement to Ghana's Towns* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1969), adapted from Table 8.3, p. 188. The survey was conducted in 1962-1963 and includes adult men and women.

*b* Henry Rempel, "Labor Migration into Urban Centers and Urban Unemployment in Kenya" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1970), Table 5.7, p. 87. The survey was conducted in late 1968 and includes male migrants between the ages of 15 and 50 who arrived in the cities in or after 1964.
migrants are committed to the cities. The higher proportion of Kenyans planning to stay permanently in the city probably reflects the concentration of younger men in the sample, compared to the broader cross-section of recent and long-term migrants of both sexes in the Ghanian sample.

How reliable are survey data as indications of migrants' true expectations? Leonard Plotnicov argues that survey evidence regarding intentions to return home may express nostalgia and conform with prevailing custom and are not a reliable guide to migrants' true expectations, much less a predictor of their future behavior. Unless migrants are sufficiently successful in the city to build a retirement house and to meet continuing demands for gifts and money from rural kinsmen, they are likely to find their return to the village marred by suspicion and hostility. Migrants know this, but are reluctant to admit their doubts.

Undoubtedly there is a good deal to Plotnicov's argument. His observations will apply to growing proportions of migrants as education and urbanization spread in sub-Saharan Africa. But recent anthropological and sociological studies in rural areas indicate that rates of return are still substantial. This conclusion is strongly implied, for example, by the study cited earlier of two groups of men from the same rural district.

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5 If the Ghanian data are viewed as representative of the mix of migrants entering the cities from the time of arrival of the earliest among them, then the proportion of temporary migrants is understated. The short-term sojourners will have left the cities before the survey was conducted.

of Kenya. Although one group was living in Nairobi and the other in the home district at the time of the study, the average number of years of urban experience for the two groups was approximately the same.\(^7\)

The rural component of the Ghana survey discussed above offers more systematic evidence on actual rates of return. The sample was drawn so as to represent different areas of the country with distinct migration characteristics in approximate proportion to their populations. As Table 3 demonstrates, even among young people in their twenties, more than a quarter of those who spent some time away from the village had returned to stay by the time the survey was taken. As one would expect, higher proportions of the older people had returned, but over the years additional members of the younger cohorts will also return. Studies in Nigeria report similar findings.\(^8\) In short, in West Africa and still more clearly in East Africa, an expressed intention to return to one's place of origin still usually reflects an honest expectation, rather than a customary or conventional response which diverges from unvoiced expectations.

There is, however, a clear and strong trend toward greater permanence. Ross cites sex ratios for Nairobi falling from roughly five adult men for every adult woman in 1948 to 248:100 in 1962.\(^9\) In the late 1920's Kinshasa (then Leopoldville) had roughly 360 men for every 100 women. The ratio fell precipitously to 160:100 during the depression years (probably reflecting large-scale movement back to places of origin), then vacillated between

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\(^7\) Weisner, op.cit.

\(^8\) Caldwell, op.cit., p. 197, citing Ejiogu, 1968.

175:100 and 200:100 until 1955. In the late 1950's, however, the proportion dropped to roughly 125:100.\textsuperscript{10} It seems likely that a patchwork pattern will emerge over the next few decades, with migrants from certain tribes and rural areas becoming more and more committed to the city, while other tribal groups or areas will cling to temporary patterns.

Table 3

**RETURN FLOWS TO RURAL CHANA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage of Village Age Group:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons: (^a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever long-term absentees (^b)</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently long-term absentees</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanently returned from long-term absence</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returrrees as % of Long-Term Absentees (^c)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Persons belonging to rural households examined in the rural survey.

\(^b\)Absent for more than a year (includes persons visiting village at the time of survey.)

\(^c\)Calculated from but not included in Caldwell's Table 8:6.


In Egypt and Turkey past migration patterns probably resembled those of contemporary Africa, but current patterns have moved far in the direction of permanence. Janet Abu-Lughod suggests that during the medieval era Cairo, then the largest city in Europe and the Mediterranean, attracted a large "floating population."

In but not of the city, this population drifted cityward seasonally or periodically to flee oppressive taxation or to take advantage of expanding demand; it dispersed when epidemics or violence threatened to ravage the urban centers, or when opportunities dictated a changed set of imperatives.11

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries patterns of temporary migration were still dominant; and even by 1947 migrants from the delta of Lower Egypt were still somewhat weighted toward males, with a ratio of 112:100. But by 1960 male and females were evenly matched among migrants from the Delta to Cairo.12

Migration from Upper Egypt traditionally included a still higher proportion of men separated temporarily from their families. In 1947 Cairo had 403 males from Upper Egypt for every 100 women from that area. By 1960, however, the ratio had fallen to 129:100.13 A study of one group from this region, the Nubians, traces a shift over a century and a half from fairly short-term, single-shot sojourns to working life migration and eventually to a permanent commitment to the city (despite continuing ties to Nubia). An early nineteenth century account of Nubians claims:

12 Ibid., p. 170.
13 Ibid.
Great numbers of them go to Cairo, where they generally act as porters and are preferred to the Egyptians, on account of their honesty. After staying there six or eight years, they return to their native wady.14

Rural census data testifies to the continuing pattern. In 13 sample districts (nahias) which in 1960 accounted for roughly a quarter of the population of lower Nubia, masculinity ratios for eight censuses from 1882 to 1960 ranged from 43 to 63 men for every 100 women. Presumably the ratio among working age adults was still more strongly unbalanced.15 The conventional wisdom regarding Nubian migration patterns as of the 1960's reflects a shift from the moderately short-term single-shot pattern mentioned in the earlier historical account to a pattern of working life migration:

[T]he Nubian male is [generally thought to be] a migrant laborer spending much of his working life in the city, and toward the end of his life span returning to the village to die. As a migrant laborer, he is believed to leave his wife and younger children in Nubia, coming to the city only because of the failure of the land to support the indigenous population, and returning to the village every year or two for visits. It is supposed that when he comes to the city, he continues his village relationships through the media of his village associations located in the city. Through the associations he is continuously supplied with news concerning the happenings in the village, and by means of the ... association he carries out his special obligations in regard to the events of the life cycle...16

But when these impressions were tested against the testimony of Nubian heads of households living in Cairo (surveyed in 1961-1962), the movement toward a permanent commitment was clear. Most of the 747 respondents had their nuclear families with them in the city, visited Nubia only once in ten years, and generally "maintained their center of life in the city."17

15 Geiser, op.cit., p. 169, Table 1.
16 Ibid., p. 168.
17 Ibid., p. 169.
In parts of Turkey, also, migration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries probably resembled today's patterns in sub-Saharan Africa. In the Black Sea region shifting trade routes, government restrictions on wood cutting, the exhaustion of the soil, and finally a series of earthquakes forced an ever-larger part of the rural population into "gurbetçilik," or a "search for work in strange lands."

The men from the region took jobs as chefs, drivers, porters, menial workers, first, in the nearby towns, then further and further.... In the Republic the people from the Black Sea area supplied a major part of the manpower which built the railroads in the Eastern part of Turkey. Many went to Istanbul and held their jobs for generations. For instance, Zihni Yılmaz, the former... headman of the village of Yeniöl, claimed that gurbetçilik began in the region some 120-150 years ago. He recalled that two of his grandparents went to Istanbul and found jobs there at the Sultan's court... one as a boatman and another as a porter. Zihni's father eventually would replace one of them at a time to allow them to return to the village. The jobs were thus kept in the family. ... Gurbetçilik had become a permanent way of life and created its own values and customs. Men would work several months outside the village in order to earn enough to feed their families in the village. They would return to rest and reproduce, and while in the village would receive special respect and care as bread providers but also as hardship sufferers. However, many did not return home at all for without care they became ill and died in far away places.

During the early 1950's Turkey's economic growth accelerated sharply and opportunities for continuous employment expanded accordingly. Many of the gurbetçi then settled in Istanbul and brought their families to join them.

Small-scale attitude surveys among migrants in Istanbul and Ankara support the impression of a shift toward commitment to the city, but also

reveal remnants of the older notion of the village as a permanent haven. Hart, Karpat, and Suzuki each studied working-class migrant neighborhoods in Istanbul. An overwhelming majority (95% of Hart's and 70% of Karpart's respondents) stated categorically that they had neither plans nor desire to return to their villages to live. \(^{19}\) Suzuki's study used anthropological rather than survey techniques, but his descriptive account of migrants from Eastern Antolia tallies with the survey findings of Hart and Karpat for different groups of migrants. \(^{20}\) More detailed questions in Karpat's study (unfortunately not paralleled in the other studies) suggest a lingering sense of "village as haven." More than 90% of Karpat's respondents had relatives in the village, and 31% of the men sent remittances. \(^{21}\)

But only a minority of the migrants cited family concerns as the prime reason for their interest in the village. Many returned to look after property; 86% owned houses and three-quarters owned land, although the land was poor and the plots often small. \(^{22}\) The very fact that they held on to this property suggests a reluctance to commit themselves entirely to the city. Some suggested that they might want to start a business after saving money in Istanbul; others thought of the village as a possible haven in case of an

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\(^{19}\)C.W.M. Hart, "Peasants Come to Town," in (Turkish) Economic and Social Studies Conference Board, Social Aspects of Economic Development, Report of a Conference in Istanbul, August 1973 (publisher and editor(s) not shown), p. 65; Karpat, op. cit., pp. VI/19, 12.

My estimate of those in Karpat's sample with no plan to return to their home place is based on his data (p. VI/12) for married men, married women, and single men and women weighted by the proportion of each in his total sample.


\(^{21}\)Karpat, op. cit., pp. VI/4, VI/9.

\(^{22}\)Ibid., p. I/28.
economic crisis or as a possible place of retirement. Roughly a quarter—a not insignificant proportion—gave responses along lines implying the possibility of returning to live in the village in certain circumstances.

Simple census data for the major Turkish cities support the impression that migration included a substantial temporary component, at least in the not too distant past. The 1965 census counted 117 men for every 100 women in Istanbul. The sex ratio for migrants alone was 143:100. In Ankara the ratio of males to females in the total population was 126:100, and in Izmir a more evenly balanced 108:100. For migrants alone, of course, the ratios would be higher. Yet still more recent statistics show that women move from the countryside to urban areas as frequently as men. It may be that the unbalanced sex ratios for the populations of the major cities reported in the 1965 census reflect past patterns of heavily male moves from rural areas, although rural-to-urban migration has recently become more balanced.

SOUTH ASIA

In India and Pakistan most rural-to-urban migration traditionally has been temporary. Census data show sex ratios in some Indian cities comparable

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23 Republic of Turkey, 1965 Census, Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population, Table 17, pp. 159-60.
24 The ratios are not precisely comparable. The data for Ankara cover the population over six years of age, while for Izmir and Istanbul the entire populations are covered. Excluding very young children reduces the masculinity rate of Ankara relative to the ratios shown for the other two cities. The ratios for all three cities presumably are considerably higher if one focuses solely on adult migrants.
25 Republic of Turkey, Census of Population by Administrative Division, Table 06, p. 53, and Table 35, p. 340.
to those of sub-Saharan Africa. Data from the 1958 Indian National Sample Survey is particularly interesting because it provides ratios not only for the total and migrant populations of major cities, but also distinguishes between migrants from rural and urban places of origin. (See Table 1.) Bombay and Calcutta receive almost twice as many male as female migrants from the countryside. The ratio is also high in Delhi, but drops to a more evenly balanced 113:100 in Madras.

Sample surveys of particular neighborhoods supply some of the details which census data can only suggest. For example, a survey of 523 migrant workers in Bombay in the early 1950's found that most had been in the city for many years; the average stay was 21.5 years. Two-thirds had their wives and children with them, although originally almost 80% had come to the city alone. But almost all retained close ties with their home place. Two-thirds claimed to own both land and a house in the village (presumably usually joint family property). An equal proportion sent remittances regularly. Seventy percent visited home at least once a year, and one in eight went home to help with the harvest. More than 90% hoped to return eventually to their villages. The pattern of working life migration is clear.

There is no way of knowing how typical of an entire migrant population a comparatively small sample drawn from a single neighborhood may be.

28 Ibid., p. 70.
29 Ibid., p. 72.
30 Ibid., p. 81.
31 Ibid., p. 83.
However, in the case of Bombay a combination of published data and specially prepared tables from the 1961 Census of India includes much more detail than is usually available on the scale of out-migration and the characteristics of the out-migrants and permits us to infer that a high proportion of all moves out of the city are in fact return migration.

Out-migration from Bombay between 1951 and 1961 was heavy relative to in-migration: 1.2 million persons born outside of the city entered during the decade and 478,000 nonnatives left. Departures were particularly common among those who had stayed only a few years in the city and among those 35 years and older. Out-migration was also proportionately higher among migrants born in neighboring states of Maharashtra and Gujerat, rather than from more distant places. From more detailed data on age, sex, occupation, duration of residence, and destination of out-migrants, Zachariah concludes that the outflow is largely composed of six categories:

1. visitors to the city
2. government servants and other workers on transfer of service
3. mill workers and other unskilled laborers returning after 10 to 15 years of service in the city to take up the cultivation of ancestral land
4. retired workers going home
5. wives and children of low-income workers who decided to bring up their children in the cheaper and more congenial villages
6. those who came to the city looking for work but who failed to find suitable jobs.

The study does not estimate the relative importance of these categories. For our purposes, however, the first category should not qualify as "migrants" at all. The third, fourth, and fifth explicitly represent return migration. The sixth category, those who failed to find work, is probably mixed. Such

33 Ibid., p. 339.
migrants might move back to their place of origin or on to other places. In view of India's social organization it seems a fair guess that many returned home. (M.B. Deshmukh's study of "floating migration" in Delhi, discussed later in this paper, suggests conditions under which low-level laborers who cannot find steady jobs in the cities may move on rather than returning home.) Only the second category, "government servants and other workers on transfer of service," clearly represents out-migration which is not return migration. Government administrators and executive officials accounted for only 0.86% of all migrant workers in Bombay; nongovernment directors, managers, and working proprietors (only some of whom would be subject to transfer) accounted for an additional 2.51%.34 It seems reasonable to conclude that the second category is small relative to the others. Therefore, in the case of Bombay, the great bulk of out-migration is in fact return-migration. Moreover, the return flow includes persons fitting into the short-term, long-term, and working-life categories. However the data permits neither an estimate of the relative size of these groups nor a more precise description of the patterns embraced in the "long-term but not working life" category.

In India, as elsewhere, there is evidence of a long-term trend in the direction of permanent migration. But in contrast with sub-Saharan Africa, the trend is extremely slow. Sex ratios for Bombay from 1872 to 1961 are shown in Table 4. The figures show little trend, but Zachariah concludes from a more detailed examination of ratios by age and duration of residence that in-migrants during the 1950's were more evenly balanced between men and women.35

34 Ibid., p. 272.
Table 4

MASCULINITY RATIOS OF MIGRANTS AND NONMIGRANTS IN
GREATER BOMBAY, 1872-1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Males per 1000 females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>1,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>2,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>1,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>2,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,810</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zachariah, op. cit., p. 114, Table 6.1. All data originally from the Census of India, 1872 through 1961.
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE FAR EAST

Moving east to Thailand, aggregate demographic data suggest little temporary migration into the cities. The Bangkok municipal area, including the city of Thonburi, is close to evenly balanced with 104 men for every hundred women. Moreover, the ratio for migrants alone is almost as balanced: 105:100.36

Nevertheless, seasonal and short-term migration are common in the country at large, and part of the movement into Bangkok is also short-term. Migrants from the Northeast in particular are likely to come for indefinite but not prolonged periods. Male migrants from census regions III and IV, which together constitute the Northeast, outnumber women from these regions by 127:100 and 170:100 respectively.37

Some of the temporary migrants from the Northeast follow patterns similar to that described in studies of East African cyclic migration. Textor gives a detailed and fascinating account of Bangkok samlor (pedicab) drivers from the Northeast. Roughly half of the 9,000-plus samlor drivers licensed in Bangkok as of October 1954 were from the Northeast.38 The great majority of these men left their families at home. In Bangkok they usually stayed with kinsmen or friends from their home village.39 While they undoubtedly enjoyed the novelty and glitter of the metropolis, most were eager to save money and tried to send regular remittances home, often in care of a returning friend. After they returned to the Northeast, they

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37 Calculated from ibid., Table 6, p. 23, and from data on p. 44.
were likely to use much of the savings to build or improve on their houses, or to buy land or livestock. Many shuttled to Bangkok repeatedly.}

While Textor concerned himself only with the samlor drivers, the high sex ratios among migrants from the Northeast suggest that many in other occupations follow similar patterns. Northeasterners constituted 15% of total migrants located in Bangkok at the time of the 1960 census. Since Northeasterners have a high turnover rate, they almost surely constitute a substantially larger fraction of the total flow into the capital during any stated period of time, for example, the previous five years.

Data from pre-World War II Taiwan suggests a pattern of widespread working-life migration. Here as elsewhere, young people aged 15 to 30 were the most mobile, but a second peak in age-specific migration rates occurred among men and women in the over 60 brackets. Indeed, during the 1920's migration rates among the older groups were as high as those among young adults.

When the Taiwanese were young, they out-migrated and joined the nonagricultural industries; but, upon growing older, they "retired" from these industries and shifted back to their agricultural origins. However, by the 1930's the age-specific migration rates had dropped among the older brackets, both in absolute terms and still more sharply relative to rising mobility in younger age brackets. A 1967 survey of migration to Taichung City from surrounding rural areas stressed the continuing strong attachment among extended family members, particularly among brothers and between parents and their grown children. But there was no mention of

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40 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
41 Ibid., p. 237.
any tendency to move into the city with the intent to retire later to the home place. 43

In Korea 1970 census data for both Seoul and Pusan City show almost equally balanced ratios of men and women. Moreover, temporary patterns of migration are not mentioned in recent studies of urbanization, nor could I find anyone among a number of scholars and officials interviewed in Seoul in April 1972 who believed the rapid influx of migrants to be other than permanent. 44

LATIN AMERICA

In Latin America, in contrast with Africa and much of Asia, the prevailing pattern of rural-to-urban migration is permanent. Young men and women move to the cities single and marry and form families in the city. They may retain close or loose contacts with relatives in their home places, but they have no plans or expectations to return. This pattern is so taken for granted that almost none of the many surveys conducted among migrants in the major cities of Latin America include questions on migrants' plans to stay or leave. Similarly, studies of rural areas often describe the extent and effects of contacts with the cities, but seldom discuss the extent and impact of return migration. Low masculinity rates support the general assumption that most cityward migration is permanent. Indeed in many cities women outnumber men.

43 Alden Speare, "The Determinants of Migration to a Major City in a Developing Country: Taichung, Taiwan" (no date, approximately 1970?, unpublished manuscript), pp. 21-22.
In some areas, particularly those with a large indigenous settled population, temporary migration was probably more common in the past. Early accounts of Lima describe substantial shuttle or oscillating migration by the indigenous Indians; the migrants were predominantly male.\(^45\) During the twentieth century a swelling current of rural-to-urban migration by the Indians of the high Andean plateau followed a pattern of progressively more distant and protracted sojourns away from home, as experience, job opportunities, and transportation all became more widespread.\(^46\) But many migrants from the high plateau still keep close ties with their home place, cling to their property there, and make protracted visits home.\(^47\)

Even where most migration has long been permanent, there may be more temporary movement than is generally recognized. The Colombian departments of Cundinamarca and Boyaca surround Bogotá and account for 58\% of all working-age migrants and for a still higher proportion of all migrants into the capital.\(^48\)

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\(^{48}\) Alan B. Simmons, The Emergence of Planning Orientations in a Modernizing Community: Migration, Adaptation and Family Planning in Highland Colombia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Latin American Studies Program, Dissertation Series No. 15, 1970), pp. 117, 32.
In 1968 a survey was conducted in 11 small towns and villages in these two departments, selected so as to be "typical" (in terms of size distribution and social composition) of the places of origin of migrants in Bogota. Random samples were drawn of the married male population aged 15 to 54 and "customarily resident" in the towns. A special additional effort was made to seek out the handful of "middle strata" individuals in smaller hamlets and "upper strata" (professionals, large-scale commercial farmers, wealthy shopkeepers) in the larger places. Simmons found that 20% to 30% of the sampled population in each town had spent some time in a large city, generally Bogota. Nor were these men returnees from mere visits; on average they had spent ten years in the city. Simmons did not collect data on former residents of these small towns and villages who had left and not returned. But if certain plausible assumptions are made, we can make an educated guess that returnees numbered roughly a quarter to 40% of all those who had ever left the towns and villages for longer than a season.

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49 Ibid., pp. 48-50.
50 Ibid., p. 107, and Table 4.5, p. 106.

51 Assume that 40% of all working-age males brought up in the set of towns were away at the time of the survey. Assume further that in-migration of adult nonnatives to the towns is small relative to their populations. Then nonmigrants plus returnees equal 60% of all those native to the town and currently of working age. Returnees represent (25% times 60% or) 15% of the total cohort. Returnees therefore stand in a ratio of 15:(15+40)=15:55 or 3:11 relative to all working-age men native to the town who had at one time migrated away.

Simmons states that a quarter of all adults born in the highlands surrounding Bogota now live in the capital. If the proportion of working-age males absent from the towns at the time of Simmons' survey is estimated at 25%, rather than the 40% used above, then by the same reasoning returnees stand in an even higher ratio of 19:44 or roughly 4:9 relative to all working
More limited data from Mexico hint that Simmons' findings may not be exceptional for Latin America. Browning and Feindt surveyed 1640 males between the ages of 21 and 60 living in Monterrey, Mexico. Of these 904 were migrants. The migrants were asked whether they planned to stay in the city. Two-thirds regarded their move as permanent, and many of these had sold all their possessions before leaving their home places. But 16% had definite plans to return home. (The proportion of prospective returnees rose to 25% among the more recent arrivals, but many of these were military, business, or government workers on temporary assignment to the city.) Twenty percent of the sample were undecided. 52

The same scholars conducted a smaller survey of men in the village of Cedral, an agricultural community of 4,221 (at the time of the 1960 census) in an arid, economically depressed area of Mexico 380 kilometers south of the city of Monterrey. Thirty percent of all men interviewed in Cedral had been absent from Cedral at some earlier time and had returned; half had gone to Monterrey and most of the others had left Cedral as contract laborers in agriculture. 53

51 (continued)

males native to the towns who had at one time migrated away.

Similarly, if we relax the assumption that very few adults from rural areas moved into the towns, the effect is to increase the ratio of returnees to all native migrants. Studies other than Simmons' suggest that in fact migration from rural areas into small towns in Colombia may be sizable. (William L. Flinn, "Rural and Intra-Urban Migration in Colombia: Two Case Studies in Bogota," in Francine F. Rabinovitz and Felicity M. Trueblood [eds.] Latin American Urban Research, Vol. I [Beverly Hills: Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971], pp. 84-85.)


53 Harley L. Browning and Waltraut Feindt, "Selectivity of Migrants to a Metropolis in a Developing Country: A Mexican Case Study," Demography, 6:4 (1969), pp. 347-357. The sample included 380 men aged 15 to 64. As
Still more cursory references to return migration in other Latin America nations confirm that such flows are not exceptional, but provide little or no basis for estimating their size. For example, Mario Margulis notes that young men who have migrated from the small and isolated Argentine town of Chilecito to Buenos Aires "often" return home to find a bride and "sometimes" buy land and settle back in Chilecito. 54

This survey of patterns of migration clearly is neither complete in coverage nor thorough in its analysis. However, it does demonstrate three points.

First, regions and nations vary greatly with respect to the mix of short-term, long-term, and permanent rural-to-urban moves. Scholars concentrating on a single region are likely to take for granted the characteristics of migration in that area, and to assume that similar patterns prevail elsewhere. The contrasts with respect to permanence of migration are more striking in view of the fact that many other aspects of rural to urban migration are well-nigh universal. For example, virtually every survey of migrants' motives, regardless of where the survey is conducted, shows that economic motives are dominant. The stream of migrants everywhere is concentrated among late adolescents and youths in

53 (continued)
in Simmons' Colombian study, data was not gathered on migrants who had left Cedral but had not returned. The ratio of returnees to those who had never migrated is comparable to Simmons' sample, and by the same line of reasoning we can speculate that returnees represented perhaps a quarter to a third of all those who ever migrated from Cedral. However, data from a single village is a flimsy basis for speculation. Moreover, in contrast to Simmons' study, we have no basis for assessing whether Cedral is typical of the places of origin for most rural migrants to Monterrey.

their twenties. Rural migrants in almost every setting tend to be better educated and more skilled than the average in their place of origin, although they are often somewhat below average in their places of destination. While there are exceptions to these generalizations, they are minor by comparison with the marked differences in the mix of temporary and permanent migrants.

Second, the flow is always mixed. Even where migration is largely permanent, there are sizable return flows. Conversely, where most migrants plan to return to their home places, there are also some permanent moves. A fuller understanding of migration processes in any particular nation or region calls for recognition and analysis of the minority streams.

Third, certain patterns of migration recur in widely separated areas. Cyclic migration in East Africa and Northeast Thailand or working-life migration in West Africa and India show striking similarities. Unless the parallels are coincidental they must reflect similar causal factors despite quite different cultural and political contexts.

All three considerations point toward the value of an exploration of the causes for variation in the permanence of migration.
III. CAUSES OF VARIATION IN THE PERMANENCE OF CITYWARD MIGRATION

The discussion below focuses on factors which affect whether cityward migrants view their move as temporary or permanent. These factors overlap with, but are not the same as, the major determinants of the volume of migration from rural areas and small towns to the cities.

One of the clearest findings emerging from the growing body of studies of contemporary and past migration in both industrialized and developing nations is that most migrants move to the cities to improve their economic situation or to accompany or join family members who in turn are responding to economic pressures or incentives. But one's economic situation can be substantially improved without making a permanent commitment to the city. The samlor drivers of Northeast Thailand come to Bangkok to make money, but they do not stay.

The Northeasterner...can drive a samlor for a half a year or less, provide his family in the Northeast with a standard of consumption considerably higher than they would otherwise enjoy, and even have saving to spare for some permanent improvement to the home or farm... Nevertheless, he regards himself as basically a farmer, and plans to end his days in that occupation.55

What are the differences between the samlor driver from Northeast Thailand or the Luhya tribesman from Kisa district working for a few years in Nairobi, and the ex-farmer from the Northeast of Brazil who tries his fate in São Paulo? Why do the first two regard their move as a convenient means of supplementing meager agricultural incomes (as well as enjoying the amenities and variety of city life, but only as a temporary novelty), whereas the third is often making a lifetime commitment to a

55 Textor, in UNESCO, The Social Implications of Industrialisation and Urbanization, op.cit., p. 34.
profoundly altered way of life?

Two elements must be present for a migrant to consider, or perhaps cherish, the prospect of returning home. He must want to do so, either because he is drawn back through positive ties to family, clan, lineage, or simply attachment to the area and style of life in which he was raised, or because he judges his economic prospects to be better at home than in the city. Second, he must believe that it is possible to return home. The first point is obvious. The second, while equally basic, is often overlooked. Returning to one's place of origin, like migrating in the first instance, demands money and/or time, depending on distance and transportation networks. On arriving, the returnee (like the in-bound migrant) needs a roof over his head, cash or food until he finds work, and a way to support himself and his family if he has one. For various reasons, many migrants who might like to return in principle believe that they cannot do so in practice. Not merely psychologically, but in concrete material and social terms, they can't go home again.

Economic, social, legal, cultural, and other factors in both the rural and urban areas affect the chances that migrants in the cities will want to return home and will believe that they can do so. Some of the more important factors in the countryside and in the cities are discussed below.

CAUSES IN RURAL AREAS

Heavy return migration is usually associated with more or less guaranteed access to land or to alternative means of rural livelihood. A migrant who owns enough land to support his family or who has a claim to communal land or land shared jointly with siblings or an extended family has a more
or less secure base on which to fall back if he must. Theoretical rights and actual practice may diverge, however. Gugler notes that his informants, both in towns and village, "are emphatic that a man does not lose the [land] rights he enjoyed in his home community before he went away, however long he may absent himself." But

the fact seems to be that only the lineage member's claim to some of the lineage's farmland is maintained, but that land which is not occupied and farmed reverts to the community and can be assigned to other householders in the lineage. Thus the emigrant, while his claim to a share in the communal farmland is upheld, is under constant threat that he may lose his right to a specific piece of land.\footnote{Gugler, op.cit., pp. 407-408.}

In India and Pakistan the migrant who leaves his share of his inherited land in his brother's care may have trouble reclaiming it on his return.

The possibility of buying a small plot of land is the functional equivalent of a claim to communal lands in areas where land is privately owned but ownership is not highly concentrated. This seems to be the case in large parts of Thailand, for example.\footnote{Ronald Ng, "A Study of Recent Internal Migration in Thailand," \textit{Journal of Tropical Geography}, 31:11 (1970), p. 67.} In Southern Italy also, many men who sought jobs in the industrial cities of the North during the 1960's are now returning to the South. In 1971 the return flow was estimated as roughly equal to the flow from South to North. The return is facilitated by laws which protect tenants' rights and permit subdivision of land and sale of tiny plots.\footnote{Suzanne Berger, "The Uses of the Traditional Sector: Why the Declining Classes Survive" (Cambridge, Mass., unpublished manuscript, 1972), p. 28.}

A booming demand for agricultural labor or a large enough nest egg to start a small business in the home village are also possible sources of support for the prospective returnee. In some cases skills like
carpentry learned in the city can be used in the village on a full-time basis or to augment income from agriculture. Fully a third of the urban migrants in Caldwell's Chadian sample hoped to do this, and three-quarters of his rural respondents knew of cases where returnees actually did practice their urban skills. However, many rural areas can support only a few artisans, and often such jobs are done by long-established persons; some skills are useless outside of an urban setting; and many migrants do work in the city requiring only the most rudimentary skill. In the absence of access to land or an alternative means of making a living in the countryside, the migrant's economic opportunities may be no better and perhaps worse than in the most dismal urban situation.

Rural economic circumstances interact with rural social structure. In rural societies where the extended family or clan or lineage systems are strong, a man may go away with or without his immediate family, confident that his claim to a share of communal land will be respected on his return. Thus Elkan and Fallers contrast Luo migrants to Kampala, Uganda, with migrants from other tribes:

In most tribes, particularly where land is scarce, long absences from the country are unattractive because it is difficult for a man to re-establish himself in tribal society after a long absence. In most areas he would lose his land rights, or at least be given a much less desirable plot upon his return. However, a man may return to his place in the Luo system relatively easily even after a long absence. All Luo remain members of a continuing and cohesive system, even though at any one time many of their number are outside Luoland working for wages. The Luo have what has been called a "segmentary lineage" system. Status in such systems is governed largely by patriarchal descent; in particular, political and property rights are so determined. This lineage system has important implications for mobility between town and country. Rights in land are determined by lineage membership and are perpetual.

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59 Caldwell, op.cit., pp. 144-145.
Thus a Luo who goes away to work will let a fellow member of his lineage work his land, but is entitled to the land when he returns to claim it. 60

Even where extended family or clan or lineage systems do not guarantee absentees' land rights so clearly, the social system may facilitate a migrant's maintaining a foothold in the countryside by making it possible for him to leave his wife and children to cultivate his current plot of land. In his absence members of the extended family or clan will provide protection and supervision for his immediate family. He can return at any time, assured of a physical home, a social niche, and at least some income. Thus in much of Africa and South Asia, a man who owns or shares rights to land is likely to leave his wife at home when he goes away to work, while a landless man is more likely to bring his wife with him to the city. 61 In a loosely structured rural society such as characterizes much of Latin America migrants would normally hesitate to leave wife and children unprotected and unsupervised for extended periods.

Rural family and social structure affect not only the ease of reentry but also migrants' desire to reenter. Members of tightly structured rural societies may feel a strong obligation to fill prescribed familial roles at different stages of their lives and expect to reap the rewards of prestige and deference as elders of the family, clan, or lineage.


It is commonly held in Cairo that the urban Nubian performs the duties required of him by family and tribal tradition including significant and regular monetary contributions for the support of his family in Nubia. Should the Nubian fail to meet these and similar obligations, he would be thought of as "dead"—banished from the hearts, minds, and physical presence of his family and village compatriots.62

Those living in more fragmented societies bear less clear-cut and more limited obligations to family and clan, nor do they look forward to positions of authority, honor, or protection within the rural social structure in their maturity and old age. Both the obligation and the inducement to return home is correspondingly reduced.

Similarly, ownership or access to land is not only a means of livelihood for prospective returnees, but may also be a strong emotional inducement to return. In some societies the land a man tills is his birthplace, his ancestors' burial site, his livelihood and security, and his pride. The land may have strong religious or communal connotations. Elsewhere the land is a straightforward source of livelihood, interchangeable with other sources, and perhaps unduly niggardly in its return to labor spent.

More broadly, some rural societies or segments thereof imbue their members with a sense of sharing in a highly valued life-style and life-pattern, sanctioned by tradition, while others do not. The valued traditional life style may be associated with long-settled villages, as in South Asia, highland Peru, and parts of Mexico, or with shifting cultivation or even a seminomadic livestock-based economy as among the Masai of Kenya. It may be linked with and structured in terms of extended family, caste, and clan, or organized around the entire community viewed

as "co-owners of a land-holding corporation" in which kinship plays a secondary role and the nuclear family is characteristic. The traditional system may be premised on communal ownership of land so that in principle only outsiders can be landless, or it may (as in South Asian villages) be both highly stratified and specialized so as to include large and small landholders, tenants, and landless labor as well as artisans and service workers who do not work the land. Religious and political beliefs and organization are likely to be tightly interwoven with economic and social structure and practices. The community or group has a clear-cut self-identity maintained over time; one is or is not a member.

In different regions varying proportions of the rural population participate in such subsocieties. It is my impression that much of the rural population of Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia does participate, while "corporate communities" embrace a comparatively small portion of the rural populations of Latin America, except perhaps in highland Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and Guatemala. Most landless laborers and tenants on traditional haciendas or commercial estates would not be so characterized. Nor would the large numbers of Latin American small-scale peasants who sell a cash crop accounting for a high proportion of their income and are part of what Wolf calls an "open community" in continuous and voluntary interaction with the outside world. Perhaps the opposite pole from a "tightly structured traditional society" is illustrated by rural Venezuela, much of which is characterized by shifting cultivation, ranching, and

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64 Gugler, op.cit., pp. 407-408.
mining. Though rural squatting is tolerated, no land is available for small-scale buyers. The rural population is traditionally highly mobile.

Most Venezuelan peasants were slash-and-burn cultivators (conuqueros) whose livelihood was gained from farming small plots of unoccupied land. Living in isolated villages and paying no fees for land use, the conuqueros would farm the land until it became exhausted and then move on to a new locality and repeat the process. The dimensions of this pattern can be seen from the 1963 survey data which revealed that 43% of the peasants had lived in three or more different towns in their lives.66

Nor did social structure provide much greater stability than economic patterns: ties beyond the nuclear family were rarely strong.

Not only the characteristics of his home society, but also the contrast between that society and the social and cultural customs and structure of the city will affect the migrant's propensity to return home. In particular, if the cities are dominated by people of a different race, religion, and/or language, they become quite literally foreign places. For rural Malays the cities of Kuala Lumpur, Penang, and Singapore are Chinese cities where they feel alien and ill at ease. South Indians in Bombay or Ibos from Eastern Nigeria in the Northern Nigerian city of Kano are treated, and regard themselves, as strangers and foreigners even if they stay a lifetime. Often such groups create urban enclaves and live for years or a lifetime in the alien city. If economic and social conditions in their places of origin permit, however, one would expect a stronger propensity to return home eventually, or at least to think about returning home as a strong possibility, than would occur among migrants who were

ethically homogeneous with the majority of residents in a city.

One other factor may affect particular groups or individuals. Most rural areas have norms and customs which classify certain people as social outcasts or fugitives. In many African societies there is virtually no place for barren women. Widows are in a similar position in some cultures. In others the blood feud may produce permanent fugitives. Anthropological and sociological accounts of urbanization in Africa are sprinkled with brief mention of those accused of witchcraft who cannot return home. Less often mentioned but intuitively obvious are those accused of less exotic crimes. Intensely emotional local politics and terrorism—Maumau in Kenya, La Violencia in Colombia—may convert into permanent outcasts from their native place those who were on the "wrong" side as locally defined. For reasons such as these some migrants to the cities may not have the option of returning to their places of origin, even though the economic and social organization of the rural societies from which they come accepts or welcomes most returning migrants.

While economic and social factors often reinforce each other to induce or discourage return migration, each can also act as a partial substitute for the other. If economic prospects are roughly equal in rural and urban areas for some categories of migrants, the presence or absence of social ties will determine return flows. Thus in Ghana,

Although a good deal of emphasis is placed, especially by the educated, on the joys of town life compared with the dullness of the village, the majority of explanations are in economic terms. It is interesting to note how many respondent households assume that the coming into being of economic opportunity in the village will attract many migrants back even if, according to a

67 See, for example, Caldwell, op.cit., p. 149.
considerable number of the replies, equal opportunity exists in the towns... Northerners place much more emphasis on preference for village life, over half responding in this way, in spite of the fact that village life in the North is much harder in terms of deprivation of goods and facilities than it is anywhere further south.\textsuperscript{68}

Similarly, in Kenya close to four-fifths of Rempel's sample of migrants, asked whether they would prefer to work at the same job (and for the same wages) in the city or in their home district, chose the latter.\textsuperscript{69}

In contrast, close analysis of wage differentials between rural and urban areas in Colombia indicate that once one controls for skill level, the gap is (and has for some time been) quite modest. Unskilled construction workers in the large cities are paid roughly 15\% to 25\% more than they would receive for similar work in rural areas. This difference shrinks and may disappear if one takes into account higher urban prices for staple consumer goods.\textsuperscript{70} Yet return migration is far smaller than in Ghana or Kenya.

In cases where migrants are strongly attached to their home place, economic factors are probably crucial in determining whether they become short-term single-shot sojourners, develop a "rural-urban pool" pattern, or tend toward working-life commitment. The first two patterns require enough land to provide at least subsistence for themselves and their families. This is implicit in Weisner's account of the Kenyan rural-urban pool and in O'Barr's similar discussion of farmers from a district of Tanganyika. Such motives also were characteristic of the Northeastern

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., p. 152.
\textsuperscript{69} Rempel, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{70} Berry seminar at AID, November 29, 1971.
samlor drivers described by Textor. In contrast, where strong social or cultural ties pull migrants back to their places of origin but land or alternative sources of support are simply not adequate for subsistence, a pattern of working-life migration is more likely to emerge. This seems to be a more frequent pattern in West Africa and the Indian subcontinent.

Thus far no mention has been made of distance, which might reasonably be expected to affect commitment to the city or lack thereof. More precisely, the cost and/or difficulty of returning home might be assumed to influence migrants' plans. However, the evidence suggests that distance affects the frequency of visits home, but not the propensity to return home eventually. Northeasterners in Bangkok, for example, come further than migrants from most other parts of Thailand, yet are more prone to return after a fairly short stay. Caldwell's surveys in Ghana found no significant regional differences in migrants' plans to return home, nor in replies to the question (asked of rural respondents), "Do many people who have gone from the village stay in the town when they are old, and die there?" Caldwell comments:

[The lack of regional contrasts] probably arises at least partly from counter-balancing factors. Thus a migrant from the traditional North to the southern towns crosses a wide cultural, social, and economic gulf, and, on his first arrival in the urban area, often feels an urgent desire to return to an area which he understands and where he is understood. But his final return also presents greater problems. For, although the Accra-born may never have regarded him as a townsman, he has experienced great change and is often hesitant about returning to a society so very different from the town. This is not lessened by the fact that distance of his home area will have on average meant less frequent trips home than has been the case amongst rural-urban migrants originating further south. Even in the case of the final return the distance factor can be important; the return
is more expensive and more final—the temptation to stay on in town a little longer to save a little more is often very strong.\textsuperscript{71}

Similar mechanisms undoubtedly operate elsewhere.

**CAUSES IN URBAN AREAS**

The migrant's experiences in the city also clearly affect his desire and ability to return home. The simplest theory is that good conditions attract and hold migrants while widespread unemployment or the absence of housing and amenities will both discourage new arrivals and promote return migration. Clearly this is true to some extent. But urban economic opportunities and amenities relative to rural conditions affect different categories of migrants differently.

Migrants strongly committed to return to their home place, as is the case for many in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, may prolong their stay in the city if they make good or hasten their return home if urban conditions are generally bad (as in a recession) or if their individual luck runs out (for example, they are fired or the relatives or friends with whom they are staying say they must leave). But even the best of urban conditions will not convert all of those in this category from temporary to permanent urbanites. Substantial numbers of well-educated and successful Africans may spend their working life in the city but retire to their home village. Indeed, Ross found that wealthier and better educated respondents in his sample of working- and middle-class neighborhoods in Nairobi retained closer ties with their home places than the less successful men, partly because they gained more respect and deference.\textsuperscript{72} In Nigeria also, high-income earners and senior civil servants may spend much of their vacation

\textsuperscript{71}Caldwell, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 186-188.

\textsuperscript{72}Ross, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 229-231.
in the village and plan to retire there. "The prestige to be gained in the village makes the relationship particularly gratifying to the new urban elite" whose status is newly achieved and perhaps not clearly recognized in town but is "overwhelming and recognized as such" at home. Some successful men reportedly have been requested by their communities to return as leaders:

Many play a role very similar to that of a man prominent in the traditional context. Like their traditional counterpart they adopt the conspicuous spending pattern expected of the wealthy. They display their wealth in a house and a car; they compete with each other in their generosity to individuals and for communal undertakings, their standing gains its most vivid expression in the number of dependents who gather around them.73

More important, because far more numerous, are those who get by but do not grow rich in the cities. One the one hand, these have less reason to stay in the cities, at least after they have retired from the labor force. And while they will have grown accustomed to urban amenities, the gap between their life style and that of the village is narrower than for the successful and highly educated man. On the other hand, as Plotnicov stresses, those in this category have less savings to permit a comfortable rural retirement and to meet the demands of village kin who regard the urban returnees as an inexhaustible source of favors and assistance. Yet most of these, too, continue to think in terms of going home. For the purposes of this study, what is important is not whether they actually reach home, but whether they continue to cherish the hope and expectation that they will do so. In short, those migrants with a strong inclination to return, usually based on cultural and social factors, are likely to cling to the goal of returning home sooner or later, regardless of whether

73 Gugler, op. cit., p. 415.
they do well or poorly in the city.

Some in-migrants would like to return in principle but recognize that they have no prospect of being able to support themselves (or be supported by others) in their home place. The landless or very poor, the social outcasts and fugitives from local feuds or politics, and those who come from areas where social and economic organization precludes re-entry are committed to the city more or less involuntarily. Others, including some who have the option to return, are committed to the city by choice. They may value the greater economic opportunities in the city more than any social or cultural loss entailed in staying there. Or they may have developed a positive preference for urban social patterns and cultural life styles, in addition to perceived economic advantage or perhaps despite perceived economic disadvantage. It is easy to imagine that the son of a comfortable merchant in a small Latin American town might prefer to be an ill-paid clerk in the lively capital city rather than return to assist with and eventually inherit his father's business. For a range of reasons, then, many migrants to the city have a strong preference for staying or have no alternative option.

Migrants precommitted to the city are affected differently by urban conditions than are those with an inclination to return to their home place. Steady employment and good housing will merely strengthen their assumption that they are permanent residents. But they will also hang on and make do in the face of very bad conditions.

The undecided migrant, who has the option to return home and some inclination to do so, but who does not feel a strong commitment to return, is most affected by urban conditions. Recession, epidemic, or individual
misfortunes will send him home; reasonable employment and housing opportunities will convince him to stay.

To recapitulate: patterns of return migration (as well as migrants' behavior in the city, discussed in Section IV below) can be understood in terms of the interaction of two sets of factors: (1) conditions in the cities relative to those in rural areas, and (2) the incidence among incoming migrants of a predisposition to regard their move as temporary or (voluntarily or involuntarily) permanent. The predisposition is itself the joint product of desire to return to the home place (largely determined by social and cultural characteristics of rural life) and the ease or difficulty of reentering the rural or small-town economy and society (largely determined by kinship structure and access to land).

A theoretical model of this type helps to explain differences in patterns of return migration which are not adequately explained by simpler hypotheses. For example, a number of African scholars have suggested that temporary migration and the heavy flow of returnees from African cities are partly or largely determined by prevailing wages for unskilled or semiskilled labor too low to support a family and/or by the absence of adequate housing for families. In parts of white-settler dominated East and Southern Africa, Africans were not permitted to acquire land or build houses in urban areas prior to independence. The settlers viewed the towns as

'the White reserves as opposed to the Native Reserves', areas where Europeans lived by right and followed their way of life within a structure of European institutions...Africans were by definition temporary sojourners...This thinking was incorporated into the legal and administrative structure from the earliest days of settlement.\footnote{Mitchell, in Jackson (ed.), op. cit., p. 161.}
Therefore, it was argued, migrants had no choice but to leave their wives and children in the rural areas since there was no place for them to live and no way to support them in the city. Moreover, their contribution from cultivating the home plot was essential to the family income, and the food they grew was often sent to the city while the wage-earner sent home cash.

But prevailing (as distinct from legal minimum) wages for low-level labor in many Latin American cities also will not support a family, and housing conditions are abysmal. Yet millions of Latin American migrants bring their families with them and view their move as permanent. Subsistence wages are supplemented by odd jobs and whatever earnings wives and children can contribute. One or two rooms large enough for a growing family are self-built on squatter land, often on steep hillsides or marshy wastelands at the city's edge. The different patterns cannot be explained by the contrasts in urban opportunities. Nor is the rural hinterland inherently more crowded or less fertile in Latin America in general (although there are, of course, parts of Latin America where the land is overcrowded). The crucial differences lie in rural social and economic organization. Maintaining a base in the rural areas is neither particularly attractive nor feasible for the Latin American.

Differences in migrants' precommitment to the city also help to explain variation in the propensity to return among different groups of migrants within any one country or city. For example, Simmons found that returnees from Bogotà to towns and villages in the neighboring departments of Cundinamarca and Boyacà were drawn even more disproportionately than were permanent out-migrants from the better educated and higher status families in those towns. Forty-seven percent of the returnees were sons
of farm owners, compared with 32% of the migrants who stayed in Bogotá; in contrast, 23% were sons of landless agricultural workers or tenants on small plots, compared with 33% of those sampled in Bogotá. Returnees' fathers had a mean of 4.3 years of schooling; the fathers of migrants in Bogotá had only 2.8 years of education. A number of returnees also came from commercial families in the towns. It seems highly probable that many of the returnees had the option, or were encouraged, to return in order to help with the family farm or shop, which they might eventually inherit.

Desmukh's study of "floating migration" in Delhi sheds light on conditions under which moves may be permanent in a setting where much migration is temporary. Desmukh studied low-income migrants from Marathi-speaking areas of Madhya Pradesh who had left their village homes after 1939 in search of employment and had been floating from town to town or town to village up to the time of the study in 1953 and 1954. Nine hundred forty nine families in eight towns were contacted, presenting roughly 10% of the total "floating" migrant population from preidentified areas of origin. Within this group much more detailed information was gathered from 55 families in Delhi. Only 10% of the larger group planned to go back to the village. This figure stands in sharp contrast to, for example, Zachariah's findings on the actual volume of out-migration (most of which is almost certainly return migration) from Bombay. It also diverges from the accounts of other migrant groups in Bombay and near

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75 Simmons, op cit., pp. 102-103.
77 Desmukh, in ibid., p. 221.
Among the many reasons emerging from Desmukh's study several stand out particularly sharply. Sixty-four percent of the families in his sample were landless. Of the 6.5% who owned land, half had sold all their movable property including plow animals and implements and had decided to sell the land also since they could not save enough to repay their debts and resume cultivation. Nineteen percent had been tenant farmers; of these, 70% had been unable to meet their rent payments. Only 27 out of 182 former tenant families believed they were in a position to get a sizable holding for reasonable rent; most of these had migrated due to poor crop years and wanted to return to their home village. Seventy-eight percent of the families in the survey were untouchables, complicating their prospects for finding land or work. These workers did not stay because they were doing well in the city; many were in low-paid and insecure construction jobs. Nor is there any reason to believe their values and traditions differed systematically from those of other migrant groups expecting to return home eventually. The "floating migrants" stayed because they could not go home.

**THE TREND TOWARD PERMANENT MIGRATION**

The discussion of major factors influencing commitment to the city also bears on the long-run trend toward greater permanence. Like the pattern of migration at any given time, the trend over time is affected by both rural and urban conditions. In urban areas industrialization provides a growing number of jobs at wages which cannot be matched in rural areas and may try to encourage labor stability by various other

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78 Prabhu, in *ibid.*; Husain, in *ibid.*

79 Desmukh, in *ibid.*, pp. 177, 175.
means. But if the foregoing argument is accurate, changes in rural conditions play an even greater role in the shift toward permanent migration.

In many areas increasing rural population pressure reduces the prospects for making a living on the land. Technological innovations which increase productivity can counteract this pressure to some extent, but only if combined with appropriate changes in land tenure. Often the necessary changes in tenure are lacking. Rural social organization and cultural values are steadily altered by the spread of education, media, and travel, as well as by the side effects of technological and economic changes.

In some areas gradual erosion by modernization is flooded by cataclysmic political or military events. Partition of India, the war in Vietnam, Maumau in the Kenyan central highlands, La Violencia in parts of Colombia, wars of secession in Nigeria and Bangladesh not only produced thousands, even millions of refugees, many of whom cannot return home, but have also permanently altered social and economic structure in and attitudes toward rural areas.

Fast or slowly, the conditions which permit large-scale return migration are disappearing. Nonetheless, such patterns will persist in much of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia for decades, perhaps generations. They will in turn shape aspects of urban development in ways which may be visible long after the shift to permanent migration is largely completed.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF TEMPORARY VERSUS PERMANENT MIGRATION

The anticipation of ultimate permanent return to the home village plays a major role in determining savings and spending patterns and the maintenance of personal relationships, as well as deciding the need for journeys to make periodic revisits while living in the town. It helps to explain all kinds of aspects of urban society, for rural-urban migrants form a substantial part of such society...although it should be noted that it is generally accepted that the urban-born children of rural-urban migrants are much more likely to see their days out in the town than are their parents.80

The consequences of temporary versus permanent migration, while almost surely substantial, are more difficult to trace than are the causes. The search for consequences takes migration as an independent variable and tries to track its impact on various dependent variables, for example, demand for housing and urban services, the use of savings, the range and nature of migrants' social contacts within the city, or the level and nature of their political participation. But each of these dependent variables is affected not only by migrants' degree of commitment to the city but also by many other factors. For example, the climate and terrain, the extent to which public and private employers take responsibility for providing housing for their workers, and cultural stress or lack of stress on privacy all affect the demand for various types of housing and are independent of patterns of permanent versus temporary migration. In short, multiple causation greatly complicates the task of tracing consequences of varying migration patterns.

Still more subtle and complex analytic problems are raised by factors

80Caldwell, op.cit., p. 198.
which are distinct from, but strongly associated with, commitment to the city. The two most obvious factors are length of urban experience and strength of ties with place of origin. These factors can be disentangled only by studies specifically designed to do so. Few if any such studies exist. Therefore what follows must take the form of hypotheses.

The discussion below focuses on effects in urban areas of different migration patterns. But variation in the mix of permanent and temporary migrants also has a powerful effect on places of origin. The most obvious and well-documented effects are upon demographic structure and social organization. Return migration also directly affects the distribution of education levels and skills in rural areas. The volume and form of migrants' remittances varies with their plans to return. And the intensity of their continued interest in their home places and their eventual return plays a role in rural politics and in the links between rural areas and provincial and national governments. Some of these points are the mirror images of effects in urban areas which are explored in greater detail below.

CONSEQUENCES IN THE CITIES: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

The implications for rural areas of permanent versus temporary migration have been much analyzed (especially by anthropologists) in sub-Saharan Africa and have received a certain amount of attention in Asia. In contrast, the implications for the city of variation in the permanence

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81 See, for example, Mitchell, in Jackson (ed.), op. cit., pp. 167, 169.  
82 See Caldwell, op.cit., pp.143-145, and Simmons, op. cit., pp. 106-107, for discussions of the transfer to rural areas of skills and education gained in the city, in Ghana, and in Colombia.
of migration remain largely unexplored.

**Demand for Services and Housing**

Demand for urban-located services, particularly hospitals and maternity clinics, and public transport and for amenities such as play space and day-care facilities will clearly be reduced if much of the labor force leaves its dependents in the countryside and if ill or elderly migrants in the city choose to return home. The effect will be to ease the burden on municipal authorities. However, from the perspective of national development the effects may be negative: unit costs of providing basic education and health services are probably higher (if quality is held constant) among dispersed than concentrated populations.

The mix of migrants affects demand for housing as well as services. Temporary or uncommitted migrants will be reluctant to invest more than an essential minimum in housing, even if they can afford to spend considerably more. Usually they will prefer to rent rather than purchase or build their own shelter. Therefore large concentrations of temporary urban migrants are usually associated with a prevailing pattern of single-room rental units, often shared by several male migrants or by two or more families.

Where climate, land availability, and the authorities permit, some short-term migrants may build squatter shacks. Thus Southall writes of migrants to Kampala-Mengo in Uganda:

Many thousands lived in peri-urban areas where urban and rural conditions blended and accommodation and food were cheap. They rented rooms from other Africans or put up their own simple thatched huts, often living a communal bachelor existence, demanding and getting practically nothing in the way of increased material amenities such as roads, power and light, water, drainage, sanitation, religious and educational services or police protection... [T]his was true of....the masses of unskilled, uneducated, poorly
Investment in Housing

The migrants' degree of commitment will affect not only the nature and quality of housing desired, but also -- to carry the same point one step further -- their willingness to invest in urban housing. While some short-term migrants to Kampala built flimsy huts, only the longer-term migrants or those permanently committed to the city were willing to invest in the more substantial of the African housing estates started by the government during the 1950's. These houses could be purchased through a variety of arrangements. However,

With the exception of the Luo, and of the Sudanese who have lost their tribal home and are dependent upon the town, there are hardly any other peoples besides the Ganda who feel sufficiently secure in the town to commit themselves in large numbers to such a long-term proposition.\textsuperscript{84}

In contrast, literally millions of migrants in Latin American cities and in Turkey and Korea have invested hard-won savings and their own labor to improve their city houses and neighborhoods. This holds in legal, squatter, and quasi-legal neighborhoods. Examples of the latter are the "barrios piratos" or "clandestinos" of Bogotá (Colombia) or the "barrios brujos" of Santiago (Chile) where residents paid for their lots rather than simply squatting, but various legal difficulties call into question either their titles to their lots or the legality of the entire settlement. Given reasonable assurance of secure tenure and marginally workable terrain, they have converted tar-paper and found-lumber shacks into solid one- or two-story houses over a period of perhaps 5-15 years. Some squatter

\textsuperscript{83} Southall, in Miner (ed.), \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 314-315.
\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 315.
sections of Lima (Peru) or Seoul (Korea) merge with and cannot be distin-
guished from neighboring legal working-class or lower middle-class
areas. (Of course, where a squatter settlement is repeatedly threatened
with eradication or is inherently extremely insecure or undesirable, as
in the case of settlements built in or near the beds of rivers which
flood periodically, even permanent migrants will not invest).85 As per-
manent migration becomes more widespread in Africa the self-improvement
processes which operate in many squatter settlements in Latin America,
Turkey, and Korea may appear also in African cities.

While temporary migrants are reluctant to invest in housing in the
city, they are often eager to do so in their home places. In Caldwell's
sample of Ghanian urban migrants over a fifth claimed to have already
built a house in their village to which they could retire. An addi-
tional 6% were in the process of building and a further 44% planned to
build before they finally returned to their villages.86 O'Barr's
account of migrants out of Usangi Division near Kilimanjaro in
Tanzania also notes that all try to build a house in their home place.
If a migrant can afford it, he may also build a city house, but the country

85For accounts of the upgrading process in Latin American cities, see John
F. C. Turner, "Uncontrolled Urban Settlement: Problems and Policies" (mimeo,
1966), prepared for the U.N. Centre for Housing, Building, and Planning,
Inter-Regional Seminar on Development Policies and Planning in Relation to
Urbanization, Pittsburgh, October 24-November 7, 1966 (condensed version
available in United Nations, International Social Development Review [No.1],
of Economic and Social Affairs, 1968]); and William Mangin, "Latin American
Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution," Latin American Research
Review, 2:3 (1967), pp. 65-98. For a discussion of types of squatter
86Caldwell, op.cit., p. 146.
one is usually the better of the two.  

In Enugu, Nigeria, migrants also give priority to the rural house, despite the fact that high returns are available from urban rents. 

Whoever can afford it will not fail to enhance his prestige by building a house in his home village. It will demonstrate his success, that he is not a "useless man." The presence of this house displaying his achievement will perhaps be most important the day he is brought home to be buried in his compound according to custom.

And in Port Harcourt, even in the very poorest section of the city, with a disproportionate concentration of young households, 30% of household heads already owned a house in their village and many others planned to do so as soon as they could afford it.

Port Harcourt, in short, is composed of a transient population most of whose members are constantly on the move between the city and their home towns. A man may establish a seemingly permanent residence within Port Harcourt itself and, if he can afford to, he will acquire land and build a house. ...But his first building will almost invariably be erected in his home town.

To summarize: Among those migrants who manage to save some money house building is often the major form of investment. Temporary migrants will build first and best in their home places, while committed migrants will invest in their city houses. The implications for the flow of private savings available for urban housing and associated amenities are sizable. Over some decades the contrasts in savings and investment patterns between cities where many migrants are temporary and those where most migrants are

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87 O'Barr, op.cit., p. 11.  
88 Gugler, op. cit., p. 408.  
89 Ibid., pp. 414-415.  
90 Wolpe, op. cit., p. 76, note 48, citing a survey by Ostrum.  
91 Wolpe, Ibid., pp. 76-77.
committed should produce substantial differences in the patterns of residential construction and the proportion of owner-occupied dwellings.

The contrast in savings and investment patterns stemming from different degrees of commitment to the city also has implications for the "sites-and-services" approach to the problem of low-cost housing in the mushrooming cities of the developing nations. Sites-and-services provide lots with minimum services (sewerage, bulldozed rights-of-way for future streets, perhaps water taps) on which settlers may build their own houses. The approach assumes that settlers will be both able and willing not only to build an initial shanty, but also to improve their housing gradually. Where most migrants are permanent, sites-and-services is a practical way to assist groups too poor to afford so-called "low-cost" conventional housing. But where the bulk of migrants are temporary or are so committed to return eventually to their home place that they give priority to investments there, then sites-and-services programs are likely to produce permanent shantytowns and/or rentier districts.

Remittances and Other Uses of Savings

Other uses of savings are also affected by migrants' commitment to the city. Target workers like the Northeast Thai samlor drivers in Bangkok may live as frugally as possible, sending or taking back as much money as they can for consumption and investment in land, livestock, and implements at home. Short-term migrants in Kampala have similar goals.

Their principal motive is to obtain the capital that will enable them to enjoy a higher level of living at home for the rest of their lives. They want money to buy bicycles on which to carry crops to market, for waterproof roofs for their houses, or to
pay the bride price of wives who will help grow the crops. In other words, they want money not to pay for recurring purchases, but to equip their farms or homesteads.92

Working-life migrants are much less likely to direct their savings to productive investment at home. As already noted, they may invest in a retirement house. They will probably send remittances to supplement the income of close relatives at home, especially parents. They may also foot the bill for the education of younger kinsmen. In Ghana roughly 63% of all urban households with one or more migrant members sent money home, and 53% claimed to do so at least once a month.93 These claims are verified by reports from rural households receiving payments. Moreover, "of all village households who receive money, probably only about one-sixth have to ask for it specifically each time."94 Most migrants continue to send money even though they have lived for many years in the city, although those who have brought their wives and children to join them and whose parents have died may send less regular or generous contributions.95 Surveys of African urban household expenditures routinely include remittances. For example, a study of middle-income workers in Nairobi in 1963 found that roughly 10% of income went for remittances, excluding school fees.96

Permanent migrants are most unlikely to use their savings either for productive investment or for housing in their home place. They may or may not...

92 Elkan and Fallers, in Moore and Feldmen (eds.), op.cit., p. 251.
93 Caldwell, op.cit., p. 154.
94 Ibid., p. 156
95 Ibid., p. 156
not continue to send remittances, but the incentive to do so is reduced. In contrast to writings on Africa, studies of Latin American rural-urban migrants rarely mention remittances except as sporadic gifts sent home on special occasions. I have come across only one study—of Indian migrants in Lima—which suggested that migrants try to send home regular remittances and may even sacrifice their health in their zeal.97 There are, of course, some temporary migrants in Latin America. But if many of these are the children of wealthier rural and small-town farmers and merchants, as Simmons' data imply, sending home remittances would be absurd.

Consumer Demand

Consumer demand is also affected by patterns of migration. Where dependents are left at home, the urban-located demand for food and clothing is correspondingly reduced. In parts of Africa sojourners in the city may receive substantial contributions of food from their families at home to the point where some commentators conclude that cityward migration is a net drain on the rural economy.98

It seems plausible that demand for certain types of consumer durables which cannot be readily transported or used in rural areas (refrigerators, for example) may also be reduced. Demand for readily transferable items such as bicycles and transistor radios presumably is not reduced, and may even be increased, by a high proportion of short-term migrants in the urban labor force.99

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97 Fried, in Opler (ed.), op.cit., p. 130.
99 See Caldwell, op.cit., p. 163.
Labor Turnover

From the point of view of employers, short-term single-shot or cyclic migration may mean high employee turnover rates and resulting inefficiencies. For example, two studies of turnover in processing industries in Southern Rhodesia around 1960 found average monthly turnover of roughly 4%. At this rate only half of the men employed at the beginning of a year remain in service at the end. The problem is often discussed in terms of the incompatibility between workers' attachment to their home place and the acceptance of a commitment to industry.

However, this may misstate the problem. Even where workers remain attached to their home place, they may be willing to stay in town for many years. Gugler stresses that migrants to Enugu, most of whom plan to retire to their home places, nevertheless regard losing their employment or their trade as "the worst calamity that could befall them." And Prabhu's study of workers in Bombay notes that although virtually all of his sample hoped to return eventually to their home villages, their average length of residence in Bombay was 21.5 years. About half of them "have been successfully sticking to or have been continuously retained in their first jobs" -- a quite remarkable record of stability! Even where the bulk of migrants come for shorter periods, as in East Africa, some groups, such as the Ganda and Luos in Uganda, come for extended stays and provide a more stable work force. The stability and efficiency of labor depends, not

100 Ibid., p. 168.
101 Gugler, op. cit., p. 405.
103 Elkan and Fallers, in Moore and Feldmen (eds.), op. cit.
so much on migrants' continuing attachment to their home place as on the mix of types of migrants.104

CONSEQUENCES IN THE CITIES: SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Family Structure

Differences in the mix of short- and long-term migrants affect not only urban economic organization but also social structure. The most obvious and direct area of impact is upon family structure and relationships. There are many excellent studies of the impact of urbanization on family organization in various cultures, but both my lack of familiarity with the topic and the apparent wide diversity of patterns suggest that I should not attempt to generalize.

One observation, however, may be in order. A high proportion of temporary migrants among the nonnative population of a city is often associated with large numbers of apparently "broken" or "incomplete" families and of people living with friends or relatives rather than their nuclear family. Moreover, it is often assumed that the large numbers of temporarily single men concentrated in the cities promotes widespread prostitution and venereal disease, drinking, gambling, and other undesirable social conditions. But temporary migration is often linked with

104 Elkan and Fallers note that some kinds of industries are more strongly affected by high labor turnover than others. Those hardest hit are industries or services which must use large numbers of low-level workers. (Ibid., pp. 254 ff.) It is also worth noting that some employers may tolerate or even encourage turnover to keep wages low and discourage unionization. See Morris D. Morris, "The Labor Market in India," in Moore and Feldman (eds.), op. cit.; and Daniel Thorner, "Causal Employment of a Factory Labour Force, 1851-1939," The Economic Weekly Annual (Bombay, January 1957), pp. 121-124.
extended family or clan ties in the city as well as in the places of origin, mitigating the disruptive or unfortunate social consequences. Single men (or women) temporarily in the city are likely to stay with kinsmen and friends from their home area, who provide moral support, companionship, and a degree of social surveillance. The rural social forces which produce widespread temporary migration are also likely to stimulate active tribal, home town, and clan associations serving similar functions. Moreover, rural norms and customs are most likely to be retained precisely among those who plan to return home in the foreseeable future.

Conversely, where temporary migration is the dominant pattern, some of the people in the city most cut off from family ties may be those who feel they cannot or will not return home eventually. Thus O'Barr describes the two young sons of a very large and landless family from the Usangi Division of Tanzania. The youths had cut ties with their father, although he had tried to keep in touch with them; they did not send money home, nor did they see much of their kin in the cities where they were living.¹⁰⁵

In terms of the society as a whole temporary migration may well help to preserve traditional extended family and clan ties which would be much more seriously damaged by the permanent departure to the city of some members of the family or clan. Temporary short-term and even longer term migration may become integrated with traditional social structures and procedures. (See, for example, Elkan and Fallers' account of the role

¹⁰⁵ O'Barr, op.cit., p. 17.
of moderately long-term migration for the Luo of Kenya.\textsuperscript{106} Individual families may plan temporary sojourns in the city rationally to maximize extended family welfare.

In a particular family in Rhodesia the men of working age deployed themselves alternately in town and in the rural subsistence activities while one of their number was qualifying as a teacher. Later when the younger man has qualified as a teacher the older could cease going to town to work since there was a constant income from the salary of the teacher, who as it happened was employed locally.\textsuperscript{107}

Mitchell cites a study of the Mambwe in Zambia to the same effect.\textsuperscript{108}

To note that temporary migration may help preserve extended family systems is not to suggest that it is therefore either desirable or undesirable. Such systems have both costs and benefits for individuals and societies. The basic point is simply that the permanent or temporary character of rural-urban migration is an important factor mediating the effects of growing urbanization on family structure. More specifically, the apparent association between temporary migration and incomplete or "weakened" families may be somewhat misleading.

\textbf{Informal Social Contacts}

The permanence of migration is likely to affect not only family structure but also the range and selection of migrants' formal and informal social contacts beyond the family circle. Most migrants tend to choose their close associates from among relatives and others from their home

\textsuperscript{106}Elkan and Fellers, in Moore and Feldman (eds.), \textit{op.cit.}


region or village. But those committed to the city are more likely, other things being equal, to make a greater number of contacts in the city and to be more open to relationships beyond these familiar circles.

No study of which I am aware tests migrants’ commitment to the city as a partial determinant of the number and variety of their social contacts. Such a study would have to hold constant other factors which also affect social integration, including sex, age, marital and family status, education, and length of urban experience. Clues are available from a few studies, however. A study of unemployed migrants in Lagos and Nairobi notes that they rely at first upon their relatives. But the unsuccessful jobseeker may then choose "to turn to his friends rather than return to his village."\textsuperscript{109} While Gutkind was focusing on a different point, his account suggests that a loosening of psychological bonds to family and home place goes along with willingness or even preference for friends, including not only long-time associates from the same village but "more casual friendships ...contracted at the Labour Exchange, at a street corner or a football game."\textsuperscript{110} In Caldwell's sample of Ghanaian migrants, the great majority of whom planned to return home eventually, 54% felt they had more good friends in their home village than in the city. The younger migrants were more likely to claim a number of friends in the city. Caldwell suggests that this was due partly to "an increasing tendency to arrive in the town about the same time as several of their friends from


\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
the same rural areas," e.g., a reflection of a growing volume of migration. However, he also saw the larger circle of friends as resulting from a stronger orientation toward urban life among the young.\textsuperscript{111}

In contrast to Caldwell's findings in Ghana, ties with old village friends and even with relatives in the city seem less dominant among Karpat's sample of in-migrants to Istanbul, most of whom regard their move as permanent. Thirty-two percent of the men and 39% of the women reported personal relationships with relatives in the city; 26% and 19% respectively said that they had contact with old village friends who had also come to Istanbul; 39% and 37% claimed to have made new friends in the city who were neither relatives nor from their home village. Moreover, it was clear that the squatters of an older age and who had stayed long in the city seemed less attached to their relatives and showed increasing interest in new friends.\textsuperscript{112}

**Formal Associations**

Temporary migrants are less likely than permanent ones to join formal associations of any kind, but to the extent that they do become members of an organized group it is highly likely to be rural-focused, that is, concerned with providing aid and sociability to home-place migrants in the city, with maintaining home-place customs, and with improving conditions in the home place. Gugler notes:

The frequently used term "tribal unions" is inaccurate in that most of these associations do not represent tribes but much smaller units...[They] are based on common origin from a determined area that may be phrased as village, town, clan, division, or state. ...They are frequently indispensable for the immigrant's survival in town in economic as well as psychological terms....Strong norms, underpinned by sanctions, may make membership quasi-compulsory.

\textsuperscript{111}Caldwell, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 185-186.
\textsuperscript{112}Karpat, \textit{op.cit.}, p. V/15.
Most urban dwellers will recognize the claim and the majority attend and contribute regularly.\(^{113}\)

Only as ties with the home place loosen and migrants become more committed to the city do they become members of associations based on urban neighborhood, occupation, or other affiliations or identifications not linked with the place of origin. Thus in Kisangani, the associations having the broadest geographical and ethnic representation are those which draw the largest proportion of their members from among the evolués.\(^{114}\)

Southall summarizes the process as comprising three stages. At first, "most migrants' ties to the town are too tenuous to provide a basis for the development of lasting voluntary associations, founded on either ethnic or non-ethnic identities." Later, more or less permanent ethnic associations emerge. Finally, nonethnic associations make an appearance.\(^{115}\)

Since "ethnic associations" are usually based on place of origin, the theory implies that associations not linked to home place will appear with the growth of an urban population more or less committed to the city.

The reverse does not hold. Associations based on place of origin do not necessarily die out as more and more of the population view their city homes as permanent. Like sending money home, belonging to home-place associations in the city may reflect close ties with the home place and intent to return, or only the former. Thus in Lima there are a great many

\(^{113}\) Gugler, op.cit., pp. 410-411.


\(^{115}\) Reference from Hanna and Hanna, op.cit., pp. 149-150; the authors do not give a precise citation for the reference to Southall.
home-town and district clubs. "Practically every town of over 1000, and many of less, seems to have a club in Lima, and virtually every district has a club".\textsuperscript{116} One such club claimed as active members roughly a tenth of all the migrants from the district living in Lima. An additional 40-50\% occasionally attended a meeting or a fiesta.\textsuperscript{117} While far short of the near-universal membership described by Gugler as typical in Nigeria, these estimates suggest quite widespread participation among migrants who are probably mostly permanent. Consistent with Southall's hypothesis, however, Lima has not only a great many home-place associations but also a proliferation of social clubs based on other ties--"professional clubs, occupational clubs, sport clubs, neighborhood clubs, music clubs, drinking clubs, pistol clubs, automobile clubs, equestrian clubs, mountain climbing clubs, etc."\textsuperscript{118}

The point is that temporary migrants are likely to join home-town associations if they join any formal organizations, while permanent migrants may or may not belong to such associations, but are also likely to expand into other types of formal affiliation.\textsuperscript{119}

\textbf{POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE CITIES}

Permanent versus temporary migration patterns probably affect at least two dimensions of politics: the incidence and level of political participation, and the content of politics, that is, the issues on which political action focuses. In both cases, of course, the permanence of

\textsuperscript{116} Mangin, in Heath and Adams (eds.), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 314.

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 320.

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 313.

\textsuperscript{119} In some countries or among some groups where rural religious affiliations are both strong and institutionalized, even temporary migrants may be likely to become associated with a religious group, which may or may not also be organized along home-place lines.
migration is only one determinant among many others.

It is widely assumed that urban experience stimulates political participation. More precisely stated, urban residence often provides more ready access than does rural life to various politicizing forces: education, mass media, exposure to political campaigns and partisan organizers, contact with government officials, potential organizational affiliations, factory experience. Length of urban residence per se has been shown to have little bearing on the level of participation in national politics, once one controls for socioeconomic level and organizational involvement. But education, skilled and prestigeful jobs, and a wide range of organizations obviously are more prevalent in urban than in rural settings.

Other findings from the general study of political participation suggest that urban residence may sometimes reduce participation. Robert Dahl has argued that the larger the place of residence, the less likely is the citizen to be involved as an active participant in local political life. Cross-national survey research offers some confirmation for this theory. Lipset long ago cited findings that participation is reduced

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Inkeles, surveying factory workers and control groups in six developing countries (rather than the broader stratified sample approach used by Nie, *et al.*) also found that length of urban residence had no impact on levels of political participation once one controlled for age, education, and factory experience. (Alex Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries," *American Political Science Review*, 63:4 [1969], pp. 1137-1138.)


by a heterogeneous political environment as the hypothesis about participation best verified by empirical research.

In general, then, the impact of urban experience on political participation is complex and ambiguous. Variation in commitment to the city further complicates the picture. Briefly, it seems likely that:

1. Controlling for the most obvious differences in individual characteristics (sex, age, marital status, education, socio-economic status), migrants who are either clear-cut sojourners or are firmly committed to the city are more likely to be politically active than those who are uncertain of their plans and are involved neither in their home community nor in the city. In other words, the level of participation varies with the strength of commitment, regardless of whether the commitment is to the home place or to the city.

2. Again controlling for individual characteristics, to the extent that they are active politically at all, short-term migrants are likely to be interested and active in home-place politics; committed urbanites in urban-focused issues and contests; and long-term or working-life but nonpermanent migrants may split their interests between city and home place. In other words, whatever the level of participation, the content or degree of involvement in urban local politics varies with the length of the intended stay in the city.

The suggestion that short-term migrants are unlikely to take any active
role in urban politics rests on several fairly obvious considerations. First, such migrants have little reason to be interested in many of the issues at the core of urban politics—property taxation, real estate regulations, zoning, location and assessments for improved services and facilities, and so forth. This is not true of all important issues: for example, even short-term sojourners in principle have an interest in policies and programs affecting employment, wages, and prices of basic foods. But—and this is the second point to note—migrants of this type are not likely to be affiliated with labor unions, merchants' associations, or the other types of organizations which usually organize political action on such issues. They may belong to home-town associations or to religious groups, but these are much less likely to provide a channel for political action on issues of this kind. Third, participation tends to be related to age and position in life cycle. Middle-aged persons tend to be more participant than either youths or the elderly, and married people are more active politically than singles. "The most apathetic group are the young unmarried citizens who are only marginally integrated into their community."\(^{123}\) While these findings are based on research in developed nations, and the effects of changing "political generations" may partially invalidate them in some modernizing countries, the basic mechanisms which reduce interest in politics among the young and unattached probably apply globally. Since a high proportion of short-term migrants fit this description, it would seem to follow that they are not likely to be active politically.

However, not all short-term migrants are young and unattached. Older migrants who are more established in their home communities and even some of the younger men or women may already have an active interest in home-place politics before they migrate. Perhaps especially if they own land and a house in their home place, such people are likely to take a strong interest and even to play an active role in rural politics while they are in the city. Tightly organized home-place associations facilitate such participation. It is also possible that their urban experience may politicize initially passive short-term migrants, particularly if they work or study in urban settings where they are exposed to political discussion and activity. They may then carry their increased awareness with them on their return home. But urban-focused issues and contests are unlikely to claim much of their attention.

Longer-term but still temporary migrants are likely to split their political attentions between town and country. Their involvement in urban politics probably depends on their integration into urban life more generally. If they join a variety of organizations or buy or build homes or businesses in the city, they will take a more active interest than if they confine their contacts to home-town people and associations and do not acquire property.124

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124 Cross-national survey research covering both industrialized and modernizing nations has found that among a range of causal variables organizational involvement is the single variable which predicts most strongly to political participation. (Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, op.cit., p. 365.) And several studies of participation in U.S. communities find that home ownership is an important determinant of participation in local politics. (Robert R. Alford and Harvey M. Scoble, "Sources of Local Political Involvement," American Political Science Review, 62:4 [1968], pp. 1197 ff.; M. Miller, cited in Milbrath, op.cit., p. 133.)
Even long-term temporary migrants who are well-integrated into urban life continue to split their political attentions between the city and their home place. Thus Wolpe writes of Ibos (who are known for their adaptability to urban life) living in Port Harcourt, Nigeria:

Port Harcourt is, fundamentally, a community of "strangers," of immigrants who have been drawn to the city by the prospects of trade or by the hopes...of wage employment, and who acquire only a tangential identification with their community of adoption. In their politics, as in their personal and social lives, they are instrumentally oriented to what the city can offer in the way of material advantages, but they remain expressively oriented to their communities of origin...A man may establish a seemingly permanent residence within Port Harcourt itself and, if he can afford to, he will acquire land and build a house. He may send his children to school within the Municipality and become an active member of the local Church. If members of his family become ill, they may be cared for at Port Harcourt's modern...General Hospital. He could...even stand for political office within the Municipality...But Port Harcourt will seldom acquire the status of a second "home"; it will remain only his place of business.125

The Intermingling of Urban and Rural Political Concerns

For people living actively in both a rural and an urban world the distinction between "rural" and "urban" interests and issues may be quite artificial. Home-place issues and rivalries are likely to spill over into and mingle with urban concerns and contests. Ross found that his Nairobi respondents tended to be more involved and interested in home place affairs, and also more politically participant, the higher were their incomes and their education levels. Although Ross does not discuss the question, it seems likely that the higher status and more politically active respondents focused part of their political attention and effort on home-place concerns, in addition to contributing money and helping kinsmen (which Ross does note).

125 Wolpe, op.cit., pp. 74-76.
In many parts of Africa energetic leadership in urban-based home-town associations is a springboard to both urban and rural political leadership. In Lima, too, leadership in the (home-town) club may well lead to leadership in the town. This is particularly true since practically all local appointments throughout the whole country are made in Lima. Officials of the clubs meet many people and play a role somewhat like that of various immigrant club leaders in the United States fifty years ago. Various political parties like their members to be club leaders and often aspirant politicians are attracted. Club office...is often a form of political mobility.126

In Port Harcourt (and probably elsewhere in Africa) municipal councillors running for reelection are apt to be judged as much or more on their performance in channelling benefits to their home towns as on their actions vis-a-vis Port Harcourt.127

In short, part of what appears to be urban political behavior may in fact be an extension of rural politics. For example, in Calcutta Myron Weiner found that support for the Congress Party (in the 1957 and 1962 elections for State Assemblymen) was strongly correlated with the ratio of men to women in each constituency, an index of the proportion of migrants in the district. Third factors such as voting turnout, literacy, and the number of slum dwellers in the constituency did not affect the remarkably strong relationship. Weiner offered several possible explanations for the migrants' support, despite their poverty, of a party viewed as moderate or conservative: among the reasons were habit held over from rural areas where the Congress Party was dominant, and the favorable comparison of

127 Wolpe, op.cit.
even very inadequate urban services with still worse conditions in the
 countryside. To these might be added an additional, entirely compat-
 ible possibility: many of these migrants were supporting the Congress
 Party as the option as most favorable to their rural interests, which
 they continued to regard as important and perhaps overriding.

**Commitment to the City and Urban-Focused Politics**

Both rural and urban interests are reflected and interact in compli-
cated ways in the political behavior of temporary urban migrants. But
we can only speculate as to how lack of a long-term commitment to the city
may affect sojourners' definitions of the urban side of their political
interests. Wolpe suggests that even those sojourners who are active in
city politics are interested solely in what the city has to offer them.
The implication is that anything akin to "booster spirit"--a concern for
the long-term and overall reputation and improvement of the city as a
community--is highly unlikely. The point should not be overstated.
"Public-regarding" attitudes in urban politics are rare enough among
stable urban populations and are often a respectable (and sometimes an
unconscious) facade for upper middle-class and elite interests and pre-
ferences. Nonetheless, identification with a city as "home" and a desire
to promote community welfare are not empty abstractions. And it seems
probable that permanent commitment to the city is a necessary (although
far from a sufficient) condition for such values to emerge.

128Myron Weiner, *Party Building in a New Nation* (Chicago: University
If most sojourners are comparatively unconcerned with many of the issues of urban development, the question arises of which groups are in fact concerned with these issues in cities where sojourners predominate. The committed population in such cities is likely to include several quite distinct elements. Where the city has grown rapidly from a small base, as may happen where raw materials have been discovered, a major industry is established, or a site is designated as a new seat of local or even national government, the great majority of the new population will of course be in-migrants. But there will be people indigenous to the area, and some of these with money and foresight may retain or acquire land which later multiplies in value manyfold. Both elite and nonelite "natives" to a locality are likely to feel that they have a special claim to a voice in local affairs, not only because they are committed to the area but also because it is "their" territory or homeland.

A second category permanently committed to the city is the alien commercial and professional community or communities which are a prominent feature of many cities in developing nations--Chinese in Southeast Asia, Indians and Pakistanis in East Africa, Lebanese and Syrians in parts of West Africa. Under colonial regimes such groups often had semiprivileged positions by virtue of their comparatively high education, skills, sophistication, and wealth. Under nationalist regimes their political position is often precarious, yet these same assets may permit them to continue to exert substantial influence on local and municipal issues which concern them.
A third category of permanent migrants, normally neither cohesive nor politically self-conscious, are those forced out of their home areas—the landless and the social outcastes. One might speculate that this component of the city's permanent population (in societies where temporary migration is the norm) would be more isolated and apathetic than many temporary migrants. A fourth and growing category are those migrants (or their children) who prefer the life styles and opportunities offered by the city, although the social and cultural context and their individual circumstances permit and encourage them to return to their (or their parents') place of origin. To list these categories is to suggest that unless and until the fourth group grows large, the first two sets are likely to play a role in local urban politics quite disproportionate to their numbers in the urban population.

Where a substantial part of the cities' populations are permanent, certain forms or channels of political activity are likely to appear which are not found among heavily transient populations. Commitment to the city is almost certainly a precondition for neighborhood improvement associations. Such societies of homeowners (or, in squatter settlements, of aspiring homeowners) appear in most of the cities of Latin America. They may serve any or all of several functions: internal regulatory services (adjudicating disputes, organizing security squads); self-help development activities (laying a water pipe, constructing sidewalks); social activities; passive or active agents of liaison between the neighborhood and local authorities. Sometimes more active and sophisticated associations extend lobbying and pressure tactics into politics per se, bargaining with
political leaders or parties to exchange political support for assistance for the community.

Nor are such associations solely a Latin phenomenon.

Practically every major squatter settlement in Turkey has its Dernek (Society for Gecekondu Improvement)...Representatives of the Government and the political parties come to the Dernek (children are often dispatched to fetch the gecekondu leaders from the coffee shop) to discuss business with the settlement leaders. ...The Derneks thus create a degree of integration in the settlement and establish normal relations with the city and the government as a whole.

Sewell's discussion of a squatter neighborhood in Ankara also mentions the "Aktepe Help and Improvement Association," dedicated to the construction

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of a school and a road in the settlement. Even where much of a city's migrants are temporary, neighborhood improvement societies may appear in sections settled by committed migrants. Thus Ross describes an energetic and exceedingly well-organized organization in one unit of the Mathare Valley settlement outside of Nairobi. This is consistent with the facts that 71% of the residents owned at least a one-room shack and that many regarded themselves as permanent urbanites because they owned no rural land, had been on the wrong side of local divisions during the Maumau era, were prostitutes or were otherwise precluded from returning to their places of origin.

MIGRATION PATTERNS AND NATIONAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS

Up to this point the discussion has focused on political effects of temporary versus permanent migration at the level of urban politics. However, patterns of cityward migration may also affect national political development. It is a commonplace observation that the politics of many developing nations are the politics of the cities. The capital city in particular is the focus for most meaningful political activity in nations where political and administrative systems are strongly centralized and

132 Marc H. Ross, The Political Integration of Urban Squatters (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 184-186. Commitment to the city is a necessary but not sufficient condition for neighborhood improvement associations. Even where most migrants are permanent, associations may fail to appear for any of many reasons, including lack of neighborhood cohesion and leadership, ethnic or economic heterogeneity, official discouragement or outright repression, or the availability of alternative individual or collective channels for pursuing the goals of secure land tenure and adequate housing and services.
educational, military, commercial, and industrial establishments highly concentrated. In such settings migrants who remain concerned for the welfare and development of their rural or small-town places of origin can act as a bridge between politicians and bureaucrats in the city and rural concerns and interests. They may play this role even where return migration is relatively light.\textsuperscript{133}

The club members often defend local interests in the various government ministries, and usually are in the forefront of attempts to get new schools, roads, water systems, sewers, clinics, and other public services and advantages for the town or district. Since few towns can afford full-time lobbyists in Lima, and since these things can only be done in Lima and the delays are legendary, this function of the clubs is quite important for the towns. Centralization is so extreme that to buy chalk for a school in the jungle one has to go through Lima. The feeling is also very strong, and rightly so, that any document sent to any ministry has to be followed by an agent from day to day and desk to desk or it will disappear. The club members do this job and it frequently seems that regional loyalty ... is nearly as important as kinship and compadrazgo, to many ministry bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{134}

In a single meeting of one club, three out of five items of business concerned home-town affairs. These were an effort to persuade the Venezuelan government (" 'all that oil money' ") to finance a bust of San Martin for the Plaza San Martin in the town; an attempt to dislodge two unpleasant and incompetent school teachers from their positions in the town school; and the preparation of a petition to the Congress asking for expropriation

\textsuperscript{133}While neither the ratio of men and women in Lima nor the accounts of various rural communities suggest that return migration from Lima is substantial relative to out migration, Mangin does indicate that there is a good deal of movement between the capital and home towns. Moreover, some of the movement must be more than visiting, because he mentions that home-town clubs based in Lima and counterpart clubs in the home area have "frequent interchange of members and many dual members as people move back and forth from Lima to the town." (Mangin, in Heath and Adams (eds.), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 316.

\textsuperscript{134}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 315.
of some land from a nearby hacienda which was alleged to have been stolen from the home-town communal lands. 135

It would be interesting to trace the impact of this "bridging" function in terms of the allocation of government funds among rural areas and between all rural areas and the cities. Perhaps more important, one might also explore the effects on rural perceptions of the accessibility and responsiveness of government.

Where a nation or region is ethnically divided, the changing mix of temporary and permanent migration may have a different set of implications for national political development. Even comparatively small regional differences among groups of people may cause considerable tension where one group moves in large numbers into another's territory. Thus Southern Italians crowding into Northern Italian cities or U.S. "hillbillies" from Appalachia moving to Detroit or Chicago create concern, hostility, and discrimination among the longer established urban groups. Where differences of race, language, and/or religion are more marked, as in Nigeria, India, and many other developing nations, migration which crosses ethnic boundaries may generate support for strong nativist reactions (as, for example, in Bombay) or create still more explosive tensions (as in Nigeria). Where the movement is largely temporary, these tensions are normally minimized. Where "foreign" migrants clearly are settling in, buying land, building houses, and establishing business or industries, the threat to nativist interests and status is much greater and the reaction correspondingly intense. Thus one factor contributing to growing ethnic tensions in many developing nations

135 Ibid., p. 321.
may be the shift from largely temporary toward more permanent migration. 136

To recapitulate: The consequences of varying patterns of temporary and permanent migration extend to economic, social, and political realms in both rural and urban areas. Among the economic factors affected are demand for services, uses made of savings, investment in housing, consumption patterns, and the stability of the labor force. Demographic balance in rural and in urban areas, family structure, the range and composition of migrants' informal social contacts in the cities, and their propensity to join various types of formal organizations are also influenced by the character of migration. Individual migrants' commitment to the city will partly determine the urban political issues which rouse their concern, and the extent to which they focus their political activity (be it regular or intermittent) on rural issues, urban issues, or a mixture of the two.

Looking at urban politics as a whole, the mix of migrants will affect which groups are most active in urban-focused politics; the interplay of rural and urban issues, rivalries, and alliances; and the importance or unimportance of particular channels of political participation such as home town associations and neighborhood improvement associations. At the level of national political change, the character of migration will bear on the extent to which migrants act as a political bridge between rural and urban worlds, and the degree and nature of tension produced by movement across ethnic boundaries.

136 See Weiner, op.cit., pp. 30-35, for a discussion of the costs and benefits of in-migration for local people. While the discussion does not distinguish between permanent and temporary movement, the situations which impose costs on local groups imply permanent migration.
The character of migration is not the sole determinant of any of these factors. It bears more strongly on some than others. Where it is a powerful causal factor, as in the case of investment in housing, its effects are more uniform and predictable than where it is one factor among many, as in the case of family structure.

The list of consequences outlined here makes no claim to be complete or accurate. The data necessary to verify or disprove the hypotheses, singly or as a group, are not available. Some of the proposed relationships may be overstated; others may simply fail to stand up to empirical testing. Each, however, is supported by common sense and fragmentary evidence—both of which can be seriously misleading. Each has some importance in terms of long-run social, economic, and political evolution in developing nations. If most of the hypotheses are accurate, then the mix of temporary and permanent migration, and changes in the mix over time, should be regarded as major factors influencing patterns of urban development. If this study stimulates research designed to test that proposition, it will have served its purpose.