MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
THE CASE OF FRANCE AND ALGERIA

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Preface

In this study of Algerian migration to France, Dr. Adler describes the many facets of that movement and its variable effects upon relations between the two countries. Placing the movement of labor in a broader historical context, the author traces Algerian emigration from 1870 to 1962 and identifies the attempts of each government to manipulate the flows to national advantage.

Dr. Adler presents a fairly comprehensive description of the various accords governing labor migration and their interconnection with the dominant foreign policy concerns of France and Algeria. He indicates how migration trends were influenced by political considerations and how each government sought to control the flow of labor. A persuasive picture of the politicization of migration is sketched out, and the reader obtains a good view of migration as an instrument of foreign policy.

In choosing to focus on Algerian migration to France, Dr. Adler has had to bypass the new migration to Algeria: concomitant with the movement of Algerians to France, and with the development of a special relationship between the two countries, there developed an emerging flow of Egyptians, Lebanese, Jordanians, and even Palestinians into Algeria. These flows represent the other side of the migration stream connecting Algeria to neighboring states. That the flows to France were, and continue to be, most pervasive should in no way obscure the emergence of new flows into Algeria. Increase in petroleum revenues has created incentives for Arab migration to Algeria and provides yet another set of constraints on a government anxious
to develop viable means of regulating the flow of labor across national borders.

Dr. Adler properly terms the issue of Algerian migration as "sensitive". Perhaps equally sensitive is the increasing movement into Algeria and the new interdependence that may emerge between Algeria and the neighboring Arab states. Dr. Adler's study is an important survey of the dominant flows from Algeria. The new flows may generate added pressure upon relations with France and disrupt the recent equilibrium in relations between the two countries.

Nazli Choucri
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MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
THE CASE OF FRANCE AND ALGERIA

1. Introduction

At a conservative estimate, there are about 13 million foreign workers currently resident in the countries of western Europe. This huge reservoir of manpower has been of vital importance to the European market-economies in sustaining rapid rates of economic growth during the 1960's and early 1970's. At the same time these foreign workers have represented a critical, although sometimes underutilized, national resource for their countries of origin. By the huge amounts of money they have transferred home and by their frequent return visits (to name only two of the more obvious factors), these workers represent a vast human transmission-belt of contact between developed and developing countries.

The international character of worker migration is at once obvious and obscure. These are foreign workers ("gastarbeiter" or guest workers in the euphemistic German) and their existence is often one of the most important aspects of countries' bilateral relations. Nevertheless it is often very hard to understand in precisely what way the "strand" of migration fits into the "web" of international relations. Is international migration to be considered an aspect apart of international politics, governed by its own rules and laws? Or, in contrast, is it possible to fit migration into a broader overall pattern? What part, in short, does migration play in the relations between sending and receiving countries? Is it likely to be a source of friction and conflict, or does it promote cooperation?
How do governments set about controlling migration when their actions clearly affect the economic, political and social circumstances of foreign governments and peoples? Are the politics of migration related to the politics of other commercial relations between countries, and if so how?

This monograph will attempt to answer some of these questions in the case of France and Algeria. After an examination of the history and evolution of Algerian emigration in the colonial period, we shall discuss the negotiations and agreements entered into by France and Algeria which regulate migratory flows. This will provide the basis for the discussion which follows of the broader aspects of the countries' relations and the part played in them by migration.
2. From Band-Aid to Crutch: Algerian Emigration 1870-1962

2.1 Migration Before World War I

Since the 19th century, France has been an importer of foreign labor. Despite a hundred years of development, two World Wars, and the ending of the colonial system, some elements of the pattern have remained stable. For example, in 1886, there were more than 1,100,000 foreigners in France. Most of these were Belgian (more than 43 percent), followed by Italians (about 23 percent), Germans (9 percent), and Spanish and Swiss (7 percent each). Three quarters of them worked in industry, the rest in agriculture. In the 19th century the foreign workers were both culturally, ethnically and geographically fairly close to the French, and by no means had a monopoly on unskilled or badly paid jobs.¹

It was not until the start of the 20th century that France had recourse to workers from Algeria, and not until the First World War that this immigration achieved significant proportions. By 1905 there were a few hundred industrial workers from Algeria concentrated almost exclusively in the Marseilles region, as well as a certain number of itinerant peddlars frequenting the resort towns. By 1912 there were between 4,000-5,000 Algerians in France, and by 1914 this number approached 30,000.²

The background to this increasing migration of Algerians is to be found mainly in the country's growing impoverishment, in turn largely a consequence of France's colonial policy. In particular, numerous authorities cite the significance of the expropriation by the colons of communal lands, and lands belonging to tribal clans.³ The frequent insurrections against French rule, such as the one in Kabylia in 1871, were the occasion for fierce military
repression as well as reprisals involving the destruction of villages and crops\textsuperscript{4} and the confiscation of lands.\textsuperscript{5} The departure of Algerians from Algeria was, however, kept severely in check almost until the outbreak of the First World War by a decree of the Governor General of Algeria in 1876 which required a travel permit for those wishing to leave. The formalities attached to the obtaining of this document were so strict that it was an effective check on emigration.\textsuperscript{6} This requirement was suppressed in 1913 and 1914 as the needs of Metropolitan France on the eve of the outbreak of the War became ascendant. But the tension between the interests of the \textit{colons} themselves, who tended to oppose the departure to France of their labor supply, and the interests of the Metropole which generally favored the easing of labor shortages by recourse to Algerians, was never completely resolved in the colonial period.

During the war Algerian labor was recruited directly by the French government, especially the Ministry of War, to work in munitions factories and elsewhere. Between 1914 and 1918 North Africa supplied France with 175,000 soldiers and 150,000 workers, of whom the great majority were Algerians.\textsuperscript{7}

2.2 Migration During the Inter-War Period

Immediately after the end of the First World War, most of the Algerians were repatriated while the country struggled both to revive its war-suffocated economy and re-integrate its demobilized army into the labor force. By 1919 only a few thousand Algerians remained in France. However the boom of the twenties soon resulted in a new and considerable influx (see Figure 2a). Simultaneously, the \textit{colons} of Algeria, fearing that the exodus would result in a shortage of labor in Algeria, started to take restrictive
Figure 2a: Algerian Migration to France, 1914-1942

measures, including, in 1924, the requirement for the prospective emigrant to obtain a work contract, a medical certificate, and an identity card. This led to a reduction in departures from Algeria, followed by an increase in clandestine emigration. In 1926, as a result of an appeal by French interests concerned to increase the flow of Algerian migration, the Conseil d'État annulled the 1924 restrictions on the grounds that the Governor-General of Algeria had exceeded his powers. The 1924 decrees were replaced in 1928 by rather more stringent restrictions requiring those who wished to emigrate to obtain an identity card, proof of not having committed serious violations of the law, medical certificate, and a "caution" of 150 francs, to pay, if necessary, for a return ticket.

During the Depression of 1929 and 1930, return migration increased sharply and between 1931 and 1935 the number of arrivals in France remained quite low. The official figures for North African labor in France fell from 65,000 in 1932 to 32,000 by 1936.

The economic upturn after 1936 was accompanied by demands in Algeria from Moslem representatives for an easing of restrictions on emigration. On July 17, 1936, the regulations were changed to permit freedom of circulation between France and Algeria with the necessity only of obtaining an identity card. Once again, emigration to France increased, only to slow down again after 1938 with the introduction of health controls and a simultaneous slowdown in the French economy.

During most of the period 1919 to 1940 there was a great degree of parallelism between the movements of Algerians to France and the movements of workers from other countries. In fact, immigration to France between the wars followed very closely the movement of the French economy, rising during
the booms and trailing off during slumps.\textsuperscript{12} Table 2a shows the evolution of the Algerian population in France compared with the evolution of the "other" foreign population. It can be seen from this table that the Algerian population of France, while following the same trends as the rest of the foreign population, was more volatile in its movements. Whereas the number of foreigners doubled between 1921 and the peak year of 1930, the number of Algerians rose by a factor of 3.5, that is, from 35,000 to 120,000. During the Depression, the total number of foreigners declined only slightly from 3,000,000 to 2,798,000, while the Algerians fell in total by 1936 to almost a quarter of their 1930 figure.

This difference can be attributed to the fact that Algerians were subject to French government regulation not only in their place of arrival (i.e., France), but also in their place of departure. The colonial government on the whole desired the restriction of Algerian emigration and tended to be successful in this policy when the economic situation in France favored the reduction of immigration in general. Additionally, it is probably true that Algerians were employed disproportionately in those parts of the French economy most affected by cyclical fluctuations such as construction and farm labor. (Granotier makes the related observation that the tendency for migrant labor to concentrate in the worst paid and least attractive jobs is a major distinguishing feature of the migration of the thirties compared to that of the 19th century.)\textsuperscript{13}

2.3 Migration After the Second World War

During the Second World War the emigration of Algerians at first declined, increased to some extent after the occupation of France when the
Table 2a
(thousands and percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population of France</th>
<th>Moslem population of Algeria</th>
<th>Foreign population in France</th>
<th>Algerians in France</th>
<th>Foreigners as % of French pop.</th>
<th>Algerians as % of foreign pop.</th>
<th>Alg. in Fr. as % of Algerian population</th>
<th>Alg. in Fr. as % of French population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>4,923</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td>5,191</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>38,060**</td>
<td>5,499***</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>0.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>38,200</td>
<td>5,588</td>
<td>2,715</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>38,500</td>
<td>6,201</td>
<td>2,798</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimate based on entries and exits 1919-1926.
** Estimate based on 1.6% annual population growth 1926-1931.
*** Estimate based on population growth 1926-1931.

Germans themselves organized Algerian immigration, and was then suspended altogether in 1942.

After the liberation of France, one of the main preoccupations of the French government was the supply of labor which would be needed for economic reconstruction. In 1945 the Office National de l'Immigration (ONI) was set up. Its task was both to organize the immigration of sufficient workers for French industry and to boost France's stagnating population growth. As a French colony Algeria, however, escaped the jurisdiction of the ONI, and despite attempts to regulate Algerian emigration the more or less unhindered passage of Algerians to France was institutionalized. In 1947 the new "Organic Law" which redefined Algeria's status as a French colony was promulgated. This included the provision that all Algerians, Moslems and French, were henceforth to be considered French citizens. Discrimination against Moslems (for example by disallowing them freedom to work in France) was outlawed. The colonial administration made various attempts to regulate the outflow, such as instituting work contracts for emigrants, but Rager points out that of sixty-five thousand emigrants in 1947 only one thousand had contracts, and by 1949 of eighty-three thousand who left in search of work, only three hundred were in fact furnished with a contract.

Figure 2b shows the evolution of Algerian emigration in the years before Algerian independence and compares it with immigration from other countries. ONI immigration follows very closely the pattern of the economic situation in France, with the post-war boom followed by the slow-down of the early fifties. A rapid increase in ONI immigration in 1956-57 marked an economic revival, and was followed in 1958-59 by a downturn resulting from the financial and political crisis of those years. The resurgence of 1960 which lasted until 1964 saw a revival of immigration.
Figure 2b: Permanent Workers Introduced by the French ONI and Arrivals from Algeria, 1945-1961

Thousands of Persons

- Arrivals from Algeria
- Workers Introduced by ONI
What is extraordinary in the case of Algeria is the fact that between 1947 and 1957 the migration pattern is almost completely contrary to ONI-controlled immigration. This is in contrast to the inter-war period, when the various attempts at regulating emigration from Algeria only resulted in its following quite closely the curve of economic activity. Paradoxically, in a period when there was legal freedom of circulation Algerian emigration seemed to be behaving perversely.

The conclusion would seem to be suggested that emigration during this period was responding not so much to "pull" factors in France, but to "push" factors in Algeria. First, one must note the growing importance of the demographic impulse. The rate of population growth averaged 1.6 percent annually from 1936 to 1948 and was increasing, averaging 2.7 percent in the period 1948-1954. In absolute terms the population of Algerian Moslems grew by 1.2 million between 1936 and 1948, and by 1.3 million between 1948 and 1954, from 6,300,000 to 7,460,000 to 8,745,000.

Second, the growing political unrest in Algeria led the colonial authorities towards the view that emigration could be a safety-valve for releasing pent-up nationalist pressure; and emigration, far from being discouraged, was encouraged. The rapid population growth meant that fears of a labor shortage in Algeria were even less firmly based in reality than during the 1920's and 1930's.

After the start of the Algerian Revolution in November 1954, emigration declined dramatically. The number of departures fell from nearly 200,000 in 1955 to just over 40,000 in 1958. This fall can almost certainly be attributed to the start of the war, and the increasing emphasis given to the question of safety and public order. In 1956 an Office Algérien de la Main-d'Oeuvre (O.F.A.M.O.) was created and given a monopoly of recruitment. To
some extent this resulted in a diminution of emigration, but the O.F.A.M.O.'s powers were limited and monopoly of recruitment was more theoretical than actual. French policy on emigration at this time was torn by several competing priorities and the consequence was a policy lacking in coherence or reason. The start of the war gave the Ministry of the Interior, whose concern was with policing, law and order, a strong hand in attempting to restrict migration to the Metropole. The view tended to be that political activities were easier to suppress in Algeria than in France. There was, however, a contrary view which argued that the "safety-valve" approach could result in less support for the nationalists in Algeria by dividing the movement and easing economic hardship. This latter view was probably more characteristic of the Ministries of Labor and Social Security, and Public Health and Population, who were on the whole anxious for immigration from Algeria to continue, but wished to see it regulated and controlled. Meanwhile the O.F.A.M.O. escaped the jurisdiction of the French Ministry of Labor and was more susceptible to the political priorities of the colonial regime. The result of this confusion was a policy which bore little relation either to the needs of labor-supply in France or to the exigencies of counter-revolution in Algeria. In the final year of Algeria's struggle for independence, 1961-62, emigration was once again on the increase, the number of departures almost matching those of the early fifties. Economic necessities in France coincided with the years of greatest terror in Algeria, provoking a large outflow after 1958.

Tables 2b to 2e illustrate the evolution in qualitative terms of the Algerian emigration to France after World War II and before Algerian independence. As far as type of employment is concerned the major trend shown by Table 2b is the growing concentration of Algerians in building and public
works (from 17 to 37 percent, 1949-1960), and in electrical and mechanical engineering. Mining and metal industries declined to a great extent and chemical industries to some extent, while agriculture and textiles remained fairly constant.

Table 2c shows the changes in terms of level of skill, the evolution being toward a decline in laborers but an increase in the proportion of semi-skilled. This shift, which does not mark a very great change in level of skill, is probably accounted for by the decline in the importance of mining activities and the growing concentration of Algerians in factory work. There was, however, a distinct shift in the percentages of skilled workers, from four percent in 1952 to eight percent by 1962. Office workers and supervisory grades remained negligible.

More remarkable, perhaps, was the evolution toward migration of families in place of the celibatory migration of earlier years. In 1954 only 4 percent of the net immigration of Algerians consisted of women and children (Table 2d). By 1957 this had jumped to nearly 17 percent, and in the last year of the War of Independence close to half of the net immigration (45 percent) consisted of women and children. This trend indicates in part a growing movement towards permanent or long-term emigration, and in part the desire of many Algerians to escape the horrors of the war in their own country. Indeed, after the independence of Algeria had been achieved the proportion of women and children among emigrants fell, although not nearly to the level of 1954.

In 1954 Algerians were the fourth largest group of foreign workers in France, after Italians, Spanish and Polish workers. At that date they represented just under 12 percent of the total foreign population. By 1962 Algerians were the second largest group, just over 16 percent of the foreign
Table 2b

Distribution of Algerian Workers in France by Branch of Activity
1949-1960 (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch of Activity</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Quarrying</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal Industries</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical &amp; Mechanical Industries</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building &amp; Public Works</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Industry</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>95,259</td>
<td>189,491</td>
<td>205,875</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Augarde, op. cit., p. 40.

Table 2c

Distribution of Algerian Workers in France by Level of Skill
1952-1962 (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Skill</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled Workers</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Workers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisory Staff</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Workers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Etudes Sociales Nord Africaines, Dix Ans de Migrations Algériennes en France. Cahier No. 59, June-July 1957; and Belloula, op. cit., p. 51.
Table 2d

Evolution of Family Emigration From Algeria to France
1954-1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net Migration Men</th>
<th>Net Migration Women and Children</th>
<th>Total (1+2)</th>
<th>Percent Family Migration (2/3%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>28,747</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>30,047</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>18,133</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>21,833</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>22,350</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>28,850</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>6,455</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>11,755</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Augarde, op. cit., p. 15.

Table 2e

Evolution of Algerian Population Compared to Total Foreign Population of France 1954 and 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pop. of Moslem Pop. of Algeria (1)</th>
<th>Foreign Pop. of France (2)</th>
<th>Algerian Mig. as %/Pop. (4)</th>
<th>Algerian Mig. as %/Foreig. Fr. Pop. (3)</th>
<th>Algerian Mig. as %/Alg. Pop. (4÷2)%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>41,119,700</td>
<td>8,745,000</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>44,072,848</td>
<td>10,196,700</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

population. The two censuses of 1954 and 1962 show that the Algerian population rose from 0.5 percent of the total French population to about 0.8 percent in those eight years, while the active Algerian population as a percentage of the active French population rose from 0.8 to 1.1 percent. As a proportion of the Algerian population, the number of Algerians in France rose from 2.4 percent in 1954 to 3.4 percent in 1962. The proportion of the total active population of Algeria in France also rose. One estimate suggests that the number of Algerians in France in 1954 was 13-15 percent of the adult male population of Algeria (20-59 years), and by 1962 this had risen to 18-19 percent. Since census data considerably underestimate the true numbers of foreigners in France, the proportions could have been higher than Table 2e reveals.

On the eve of its independence, therefore, migration had become a massive, structural, permanent feature of both the Algerian and French economies. Family migration was becoming more and more important, while the areas from which migrants came, although certain regions such as the Kabylia continued to predominate, became more widespread. Emigration was ceasing to be just a regional problem and becoming a national one. At the same time demographic pressures inside Algeria were becoming severe while the creation of employment and new jobs tended to stagnate. The war of independence itself contributed to this phenomenon, and on the whole tended to accelerate emigration.

France itself was becoming rather more dependent on labor supplies from Algeria as against other countries, and Algerians were by far the biggest group in terms of annual arrivals on the job market. Between 1946 and 1961 the number of ONI-introduced migrants exceeded the number of arrivals from Algeria only three times, in 1947, 1957 and 1958. From 1947 to 1961 the total number of entries from Algeria was 1,624,951, while the total number introduced by the ONI was only 757,127.
While "dependence" for Algeria meant an overall dependence on France as a provider of employment for nearly 20 percent of its active population, "dependence" for France involved both the growing concentration of Algerians in certain specific sectors of the economy and the increasingly preponderant role of Algeria in new immigration.
3. Migration and International Negotiations

3.1 Introduction

Between 1954 and 1962, the year of Algerian independence, the Algerian population of France doubled, and it doubled again between 1962 and 1973 when Algeria and France were no longer colony and mother country. In 1964, the semi-official Algerian newspaper *El Moudjahid* had written that "the departure of our brothers (for France) remains a necessity and serves the reciprocal interests of our two countries." By 1973 the Algerian government had suspended emigration altogether, with bitter accusations that the French authorities were not making sufficient efforts to protect immigrant workers against racist attacks.

What accounts for this reversal? Why did the emigration which in 1964 was claimed to be a necessary and reciprocal interest become by 1973 a thorn in Franco-Algerian relations, bringing Algeria to the verge of severing diplomatic relations with France? In this section we will trace the steps leading to this remarkable change in policy. We will demonstrate the major concerns of the two sides in their negotiations on the migrant question, and show how they set about regulating and controlling the flow of migrant workers.

3.2 Algerian Emigration and the Evian Accords

The Accords of Evian, which set out in great detail the nature of relations between France and the soon-to-be-independent Algeria, were finally signed on March 18, 1962, following a year of negotiations between the GPRA (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne) and the French
government. Having decided to free Algeria, General de Gaulle was at pains to ensure that relations with the ex-colony conformed as closely as possible to his conception of French interests in the area. The Algerians were to be offered, like other French colonies before them, a choice between close association with France after independence or the bleaker alternative of a more or less complete break in relations. The form of association envisaged by the General granted French aid and technical assistance in return for the safeguarding of French interests and for privileged status for French industrial and commercial concerns. In recognizing Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara, the Evian Accords guaranteed the French a privileged position with respect to discovery, exploitation and marketing of Saharan oil.

As far as the European, especially French-speaking, community of Algeria was concerned, the French position was to demand very specific guarantees respecting their future. France wanted those Europeans who wished to continue living in Algeria to have full citizenship rights while also maintaining their French citizenship. The final compromise temporarily assured Europeans their French nationality, and permitted them to return to France if they so wished. At the end of three years they would be obliged to choose between Algerian and French citizenship, but were in any case guaranteed certain rights, including freedom of religion, language and property. This latter provision provided that no measure of dispossession would be taken without fair compensation.\(^{25}\)

The question of migrant workers in France was, by all accounts, not greatly disputed, nor was it a matter for prolonged debate and discussion.\(^{26}\) Negotiations mostly focused on the more thorny problems of the Sahara and the fate of Algeria's Europeans.
General de Gaulle specifically referred to the question of migration in one of his press conferences immediately before the opening of the first Evian talks in April 1961. He said:

If the Algerian populations wish, definitively, to let themselves be led to a rupture with France, in such a way that we have no part to play in their fate, we would not create any opposition to this. Naturally, we would forthwith cease to sink our resources, our men, our money, into an enterprise which would be from then on hopeless. We would invite those of our nationals who find themselves there, and who would really be running too many risks, to leave the territories concerned. Conversely we would send back home those Algerians living in France who would cease to be French.

De Gaulle was pointedly warning Algeria of the consequences of failing to cooperate with France, and his threat to send migrant workers home was one of the detrimental effects of a complete break. The General made it quite plain that part of the economic quid pro quo of a policy of association would be the continued access of Algeria to the French labor market.

There are in fact only two clauses in the Evian Accords which refer directly to Algerian emigration in France. The first clause states:

Barring conviction for a criminal offense, every Algerian supplied with an identity card is free to circulate between Algeria and France.

And the second:

Algerian nationals resident in France and notably workers will have the same rights as French nationals with the exception of political rights.

The first clause, guaranteeing freedom of circulation, was designed not only to permit the emigration of workers to France, but also to allow Europeans who might eventually take Algerian citizenship to be free to come and go as they wished. The next part of the text goes on to guarantee Algerians the right to take out their goods, or sell their property and export the capital
sum realized. The freedom of circulation guaranteed in the Evian Accords thus encompassed both an economic concession by the French to match Algerian concessions (e.g., on oil and trade) and guarantees for the European population felt necessary by the French negotiators.

The reference to the rights of workers in France was part of the section of the Accords dealing with economic and financial cooperation, and in particular with exchanges between the two countries. These clauses establish preferential trading arrangements between the two countries for example, and provide for selling Algerian surplus production inside France. In this context it seems strange to insert a clause about the rights of workers; logically this would have fitted better in those parts of the Accords which relate to the rights of Frenchmen in Algeria. Because of its place in the context of commercial exchanges one may assume that the migration of workers was not seen exclusively as a bargain allowing Algerians to come and go freely between France and Algeria but was intended as a part of the overall cooperation linking the two economic systems.

3.3 From Laissez-Faire to Lèse-Humanité: The Nekkache-Grandval Accord, 1964

The fragility of the Evian Accords was demonstrated almost before Algeria became formally independent. The OAS terror campaign in the summer of 1962 provoked a mass outflow of the European population of Algeria, and by October 1962 over 800,000 had fled the country. Almost immediately, therefore, the Evian arrangements lost much of their substance, many of the guarantees accorded to the European population now having a very restricted field of application.29

In fact, the Evian Accords were from the first subject to a double
pressure. On the one hand the European exodus from Algeria meant that the Evian quid pro quo was no longer intact, while on the other hand French officials felt that a renewed influx of Algerians seeking work in France would strain the absorptive capacity of the French economy. The immigration of the Europeans themselves contributed to the satiety of the labor market in France.

The French government therefore requested negotiations to develop some kind of control over the arrival of Algerians in France. But the desire to control the emigration of Algerians was not unilaterally French. The Algerian authorities, in one of their early official acts, came out in support of terminating the anarchic system which existed up to that point and bringing the outflow under control. In November 1962, for example, the Algerian government set up the Office National Algérien de Main d'Oeuvre (ONAMO), one of whose tasks was to apply selective criteria to prospective emigrants and check the outflow. There was, in sum, considerable agreement between the French and Algerian governments on the need to modify the freedom of workers to come and go as they pleased. In a press conference at the end of his first visit to France the Algerian Minister of Labor, Bachit Boumaza, was at pains to emphasize that it would be necessary to "rationalize" and "filter" the emigration of Algerians so that it corresponded with the employment situations of both France and Algeria.

However, it was not until April 1964 that an agreement was finally signed by Gilbert Grandval and the new Algerian Labor Minister, Mohammed Nekkache. This last phase of the negotiations was undertaken with no participation by the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the resultant protocol granted the French almost everything they had been demanding while giving very little to the Algerians.
Figure 3a: Entries and Exits of Permanent Workers and Families, ONI and Algeria 1961-1974

Thousands of persons

- Algeria, entries
- Algeria, exits
- ONI, entries
- ONI, exits

The main thrust of the protocol was that as of July 1, 1964, the arrival of Algerians in France would be fixed according to the availability of labor in Algeria and, since at this period the supply of Algerian labor was for practical purposes infinitely elastic, according to the possibility of employing it in France. In other words the French were given the right to unilaterally determine how many Algerians they wished to see arrive on the French labor market. It was agreed that the size of this "contingent" would be examined and communicated to the Algerian authorities every quarter by the French. In addition, medical controls were to be set up in Algeria by a mission of French doctors placed directly at the disposal of the Algerian government. The emigration of families was to be governed by the existence of lodging for them. The only concessions to the Algerian position were a promise by the French to facilitate the access of Algerian workers to centers of professional training, and a further promise to negotiate a new accord on professional training in the future. Finally, a mixed commission was to be set up to examine difficulties that might arise from the application of the protocol.

Why did the Algerians accept such a one-sided agreement, which seemed to be scarcely in the Algerian interests and which very soon became itself the cause of tension between the two countries? Part of the explanation is to be found in the simple fact of Algerian weakness: as the stronger partner France was in a position to exert various forms of pressure on Algeria. The agreement clearly reflected this imbalance in the relationship between the two countries.

By itself, however, this explanation is inadequate. Between 1962 and 1964 the French had carefully avoided acting unilaterally in the matter of immigration apart from instituting medical controls in France. This shows
that the French were not anxious to provoke a major dispute with Algeria by an open breach of the Evian Accords. This simple fact ought to have given Algeria some leverage in the negotiations. Some of the participants in the negotiations are of the opinion that the agreement amounted to a simple blunder by the Algerian side, partly the result of the personal inexperience and incompetence of the Algerian Minister of Labor. It has been noted that in the final phase of the talks there was no representation in the Algerian delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would normally participate and even direct negotiations of this kind. Whatever the explanation for this lapse, it was the cause of some tension inside the Algerian government, and led to immediate criticism of the agreement by Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the Foreign Minister. 34

Finally, it should be pointed out once again that the Ben Bella government was not averse to a reduction of the migrant flow; indeed some members of the government wished to see emigration halted completely. The Algerians were dismayed by the extent of the reduction of emigration as a result of the Nekkache-Grandval agreement, but not the fact of a reduction by itself. It was not until after the overthrow of Ben Bella that the Nekkache-Grandval accord came under severe fire from the Algerians, the new administration setting a higher priority for emigration in its development plans.

3.4 Fixed Quotas and Careful Handwriting: The Accord of 1968

The inadequacies of the 1964 Protocol became obvious almost immediately. In the first place the annual contingent of Algerians was fixed by France at about 12,000 per year, a level the Algerians considered insufficient and intended to reduce French dependence on Algerian workers in favor of those
from other countries. Perhaps even more disturbing from the Algerian point of view was a series of restrictive measures taken by France in the autumn of 1964 to reduce the number of tourists coming from Algeria. The reason given for this action by the French authorities was the apparent increase in "false tourism," that is, Algerians who arrive as tourists but really came to look for jobs. The limited number of ONAMO permits being given out in Algeria was one main reason for this increase in clandestine job-hunting.

However by 1967 there was much basic agreement between the two sides. Both wanted the 1964 agreement scrapped and saw its vagueness as a continuing source of friction. Both also agreed that the ONAMO contingent should be raised somewhat and that false tourism must be ended. The French, however, argued that a better system of regulation based on some kind of residence permit was necessary. This would make it easy to distinguish between Algerians who had residence privileges in France associated with work permits and those who could only stay temporarily, such as tourists. Such regulations already applied to other nationalities.

The Algerian delegation rejected the notion that Algerians should be treated like other nationalities; they insisted on the right of free circulation and on the right of Algerians to change jobs and place of residence inside France. Additionally, the Algerians wanted a larger contingent of workers and one guaranteed for several years in advance. This was considered necessary, first in order to permit advanced planning of the Algerian economy, and second to remove any danger of the size of the contingent being used by France as a means of exerting pressure on Algeria during other negotiations. The Algerians were also extremely anxious for an accord couched in extremely precise language, and not open to the kind of unilateral interpretation which had marred application of the 1964 agreement.
The actual size of the contingent was in fact less of a priority for the Algerian side. At this time they naturally wanted the largest number possible, but the final quota was agreed to by the common diplomatic process of "splitting the difference": Algeria began by asking for a contingent of about 45,000, and the initial French position was that 25,000 was about right. In the Accord, which was finally signed on October 27, 1968, a contingent of 35,000 workers was to be allowed to enter France each year for a period of three years. After this period, a new contingent would be negotiated. By an official exchange of letters between the two governments France can request a re-examination of the size of the contingent in the event of a grave economic crisis, but there is no provision for a unilateral reduction by France.

In the Accord the 35,000 holders of an ONAMO card and a medical certificate from the French medical authorities are to be allowed to enter France to look for work for a period of up to nine months. When they find a job they are issued a residence certificate.

In total the 1968 Accord was a much more advantageous agreement from the Algerian point of view than had been the 1964 agreement. The contingent is quite large, and guaranteed for three years; the arrangements are detailed and little room exists for unilateral interpretation; and those areas in which discretionary powers are granted give a certain leverage to the Algerian side (e.g., the issuance of passports to tourists), as well as to the French (e.g., the expulsion of illegal job seekers).
3.5 The Reduction of the Contingent: 1971.

Between 1969 and 1970 few problems arose over the Accord. On the whole the Algerian press praised the 1968 arrangements and the two years were quite calm on the migration front. During 1971, several new elements entered the situation. The end of 1971 was the last year of the 35,000 contingent agreed in 1968; thus new negotiations were needed to decide on a new contingent. Second, the Algerian government was increasingly concerned over what it considered to be insufficient control over its own oil resources, and the continuing dominance of the French oil companies operating in Algeria. On February 24, 1971, the Algerian government nationalized the remaining French oil companies, provoking a severe crisis in Franco-Algerian relations. At the same time the Algerian government and press launched a massive campaign drawing attention to what it described as a "racist" press campaign in France directed at immigrant workers, and a general increase in racist attacks and acts of physical violence on Algerian workers themselves.

Still, the negotiations on migration which took place in December 1971 did not mark any great new departure. The French began by suggesting some major changes in the 1968 arrangements. In particular the French delegation wanted to bring the system for Algeria still closer to that used for other countries and wanted to institute a work contract so that Algerians would come to France only to do a specific job. The French offered to guarantee Algeria a minimum of 15,000 contracts each year and fix no upper limit: if French businessmen wanted to hire Algerians, they would be free to take as many as they wanted above the minimum.36

From the Algerian perspective, the desire of the French to completely revise the 1968 system was unwelcome. Their tactic in the negotiations which
took place in the mixed commission was to deny the competence of that body to rewrite the 1968 Accord. The Algerians said they were prepared to discuss the renegotiation of the 1968 agreements, but not before the question had been properly studied by its government. In the meantime the duty of the mixed commission was to fix a new contingent.

The new contingent was fixed at 25,000 for the following two years, that is, 10,000 per year less than the previous contingent. The December 1971 talks led to the publication of a proces-verbal which made known the decision to reduce the contingent and also noted the wish of the French delegation to alter the existing arrangements. It provided for discussion to this end at the close of 1973, and also noted the effort being made by France to improve the housing and training facilities open to Algerian workers.

3.6 The Suspension of Emigration

It was during the summer of 1973, only a few months before it would have been necessary to renegotiate the arrangements for the arrival of Algerian workers, that a series of racial incidents in the south of France radically changed the diplomatic picture.

In early August several hundred migrants held a demonstration outside Grasse Town Hall and were illegally dispersed by riot police and fire-hoses. On August 25 a mentally disturbed Algerian stabbed a Marseilles bus driver to death, and this murder provoked several attacks on Arab workers in that area.37 Between August 26 and 31 four Algerians were killed and two wounded in Marseilles in apparent "revenge" attacks.38 On September 3, 30,000 Arab workers in Marseilles went on strike to protest against "racism," and they were followed a day later by the majority of Toulon's 20,000 Arab workers.39
On September 19 the Algerian government decided to suspend all new emigration forthwith. The decision did not affect workers already in France, tourists, or other categories who remained free to come and go as they pleased. And since the 1973 contingent of 25,000 had, by September, almost been used up, the measure only directly affected about 4,000 workers who should have been part of the remainder of the contingent.  

It became clear in subsequent months that the suspension was not in fact temporary, even if that had been the original intention. At the time of writing the Algerian position is that large-scale emigration to France will never be resumed, but that some future agreement on sending workers for professional training is not ruled out.  

On December 14 a bomb was set off at the Algerian Consulate in Marseilles killing four people and wounding 16. The attack was immediately seized upon by the Algerian government as yet another blow to relations between France and the Arab world. Shortly afterward, *Le Monde* quoted an anonymous Algerian official to the effect that "cooperation with France will henceforth be seen from Algiers through the prism of immigration" since the migration question was the last major issue between the two countries without a satisfactory solution.  

A year later, in December 1974, the French Minister of the Interior, Michel Poniatowski, visited Algeria, accompanied by the Secretary of State for Immigration, Paul Dijoud. The problem of migration was clearly at the heart of the visit, and as a result the French government immediately took several measures designed to improve conditions of Algerians in France. 

The Poniatowski-Dijoud visit to Algiers was an essential preliminary for a projected official visit to Algeria by President Giscard d'Estaing the following spring, the first visit to Algeria by a French President since
Algeria's independence, and both sides looked upon it as a symbolic step of considerable importance. The visit would also have important political and economic ramifications; Algeria was in the process of deciding how to spend some 130 billion francs foreseen in its new four-year plan, a good part of which would probably be awarded in the form of contracts to French firms. In November 1974 the Algerian Minister of Industry, Belaid Abdesselem, visited France with a delegation of directors from the state-owned companies, while French industrialists visited Algeria on similar business.44

On March 1, 1975 President Giscard d'Estaing paid a sudden visit to Marseilles to "see for himself" the problem of immigration and poor housing. This was openly done as a genuflection in the direction of Algeria, the official presidential visit being only a few weeks away. The President said:

It was necessary before undertaking this journey to come to Marseilles. It is a visit which had been planned since last November .... It is important that it be known, before arriving in Algeria, that the government is preoccupied with the fate of migrant workers in France and particularly their living, housing and working conditions.45

The gesture was well-received in Algeria, and the presidential visit went ahead.

As of the spring of 1975, migration remains in suspended animation. Over 800,000 Algerians continue to live and work in France, and they and their friends and relatives continue to travel quite freely and in very large numbers between the two countries. The ban on new worker emigration stays in force, and is likely to remain.
3.7 Trends and Patterns

The direction of Franco-Algerian negotiations on migration reveals the emergence of three separate but related trends. First, we can see quite clearly a change in the relative negotiating strength of the two sides. In the early sixties Algeria seemed to be negotiating always from weakness, while France retained most of the diplomatic initiative. Despite some correspondence of interest between the two sides, it was France that was able to request the alteration of the "free circulation" clauses of the Evian Accords, and apply pressure on Algeria to comply with France's wishes. And it was Algeria that was the immediate loser as a result of the 1964 agreement.

In subsequent years it seems that Algeria has been able to press its point much more forcibly. In 1967 it obtained the doubling of the contingent even though the Nekkache-Grandval Accord remained in force. In 1968 Algeria obtained yet another increase in the size of its contingent, and this was accompanied by the detailed guarantees it had sought, in place of the vagueness of the previous agreement. Even though Algeria had to agree to the introduction of a residence permit for its citizens abroad, most of the provisions of the 1968 Accord were considerably more advantageous for Algeria than were similar agreements signed by France with other labor-supplying countries.

By 1973 we can see that Algeria was taking almost all of the initiative on the migration question. It was Algeria that decided to suspend its emigration, and the President of France who offered penance in Marseilles for the sins of his countrymen. The first evolution, therefore, is from Algerian weakness to Algerian strength in the matter of migration.
The second evolution that is noticeable is the evolution from free circulation -- enshrined as a principle in the Evian Accords -- to more and more restrictions and regulations being applied to Algerian workers. In fact the movement away from free circulation is a movement in the direction of the regulations applying to workers from the ONI countries such as Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Morocco, etc. In 1964 there were both severe quantitative restrictions and medical controls. In 1968 the quantitative restrictions were relaxed somewhat, but like ONI workers Algerians now had to have a residence permit. In addition, tourists had to have passports instead of identity cards, thus removing another carry-over from the colonial period. By 1971 the French were anxious to institute a system of contracts for Algerian workers (like the ONI system) which would be administered by the ONI itself. This initiative was rebuffed by Algeria in 1971, but France had put Algeria on notice that the contract system and perhaps the introduction of work-permits would be one of France's goals in the talks that were scheduled for the end of 1973. The talks were pre-empted by Algeria's suspension of emigration.

Third, it is noticeable that the number of workers to be allowed into France each year has been less and less of a preoccupation for the negotiators. Instead, qualitative considerations have come to predominate. In 1964 both sides were anxious above all to limit the number of workers arriving in France each year. France was also worried by the medical aspects of the problem, and although Algeria sought assurances on training for its workers the 1964 agreement is extremely vague on this point. By 1968 the size of the contingent had become of great importance for both sides, but relatively little time was spent by the negotiating teams on this point. Algeria was more concerned that the contingent be fixed for several years in advance,
whatever its ultimate size, while France was anxious to secure Algerian agreement on the question of residence permits. The 1968 agreement was also rather more specific than the earlier one on the question of professional training, even though it did not go far enough from the Algerian perspective.

By 1973 we can see that qualitative considerations completely over-shadow quantitative ones. The point signaled by the Algerian boycott of emigration was that the number of workers arriving in France annually was immaterial, but that the improvement of the living and working conditions of Algerians already abroad was not. A policy of encouraging workers to return to Algeria was instituted at this time, having as its object the return of skilled workers, of whom Algeria was short.

These evolutionary patterns call for some explanation. Why was Algeria relatively more powerful in 1974 than in 1962? Why do the French authorities wish to treat Algerian workers differently nowadays when in 1962 they were happy to allow free circulation and in 1968 were content with a contingent? In what ways have the circumstances of the two sides changed so that they are increasingly concerned with qualitative considerations and decreasingly preoccupied with head-counting?

Secondly, are these three trends related to one another? Are they separate but simultaneous changes, or are they part of a single causal chain? In the next section we will attempt to answer these questions.
4. Migration and Manipulation: Trade, Oil and People

4.1 Introduction

What is the relationship between the politics of migration and the politics of international relations? In what way does the transfer of humans across frontiers fit into the pattern of contacts which countries establish between themselves? In the 19th century it was often said that trade follows the flag, meaning that in the rear guard of the armies which established European colonies in Asia and Africa came businessmen intent upon the search for profit. Marxists have disputed this point and asserted the opposite: that the flag follows trade and the search for overseas profits was the main cause of colonialism.

Both arguments have merit. Certain trading patterns were established both because a colony was the private preserve of the power which colonized it and because imperial expansion itself was not wholly unrelated to commercial principles.

But if trade and politics were linked to one another, how did migration fit? In the colonial period trade followed the flag and, in the case of Algeria, migration followed trade. Algerians went to France in search of work because Algeria was a French colony and because of the extensive economic contact that existed.

What happened to this relationship when Algeria ceased to be a colony? What happened when the flag retreated to France, and trade between the two countries ceased to be based upon French prerogatives but upon two-party negotiation?

The central discussion in this chapter will revolve around these relationships. It will be shown that the politics of international migration
are very much tied to the politics of international economics in general and that it is not possible to understand the situation of Algerian workers in France in 1974 without first grasping the way Franco-Algerian economic relations have evolved since 1962.

4.2 Franco-Algerian Relations

It would not be inaccurate to describe the ten years following Algeria's formal accession to independence as being the history of Algeria's struggle to consummate its formal independence by extricating itself from the economic dependence which existed at the beginning of the period.

Franco-Algerian "cooperation" during this period revolved around several competing themes which recurred to heat relationships periodically. The main issues involved at the beginning tended to be those most immediately connected with the colonial heritage -- the fate of the property belonging to the colons who had fled Algeria during 1962, the use by France of military bases in Algeria itself, and short-term financial assistance to the almost bankrupt Algerian administration. The emphasis quite rapidly passed from these teething troubles to matters which resulted from the colonial experience but whose importance transcended colonialism and whose long-term significance for the two countries was far greater. Essentially these matters involved the control and development of Algeria's oil industry, the question of Algeria's wine harvest, and lastly, of course, the problem of migrant labor.

The negotiations between the two governments over these questions produced a continuous dialogue between France and Algeria that was sometimes friendly, sometimes acrimonious, and always intense. The wide range of relationships involved, the intrinsic importance to both sides of the questions
under discussion, and the virtually continuous nature of the debate, meant that issues and problems were inextricably linked to each other in the minds, attitudes and proposals of the negotiators. Formally, a series of negotiations leading to an agreement on, say, the import of Algerian wine into France, was separate from a parallel series of talks designed to regulate the posted price per barrel of Algerian oil. The timing and rhythm, the location and priorities of the two sets of talks would be different. Most of the men doing the negotiating would in all probability be different too, and would represent different government ministries. In practice, however, there was considerable overlap of personnel since the Foreign Ministries of both sides (before 1965 the French Secretariat d'Etat for Algerian Affairs) normally had the responsibility of organizing, conducting and coordinating all negotiations. Despite the formal separation it was inevitable that there be some degree of coincidence between issues and areas of concern. Even when for tactical reasons one side or the other would refuse to compromise or accept pressures outside the boundaries of subject-matter, the whole context and mood of the discussion would be unavoidably linked to the general status of Franco-Algerian relations.

The perspectives of the two sides were obviously different. From the French point of view two considerations were paramount from the start. First, the French considered it of the highest importance that they maintain a near monopoly in the exploration, production and marketing of Algerian oil. The growth in the importance of Saharan oil had been recent and dramatic. In 1959 of total French crude oil imports of 29 million tons, less than one million tons came from Algeria, but by 1963 over 35 percent of French petrol imports came from Algeria. Algerian oil was important to France in the overall development of the Gaullist strategy of political, economic and
diplomatic independence from the United States: the development of a French oil industry based upon Algerian oil reduced French dependence on American companies operating in the Middle East. The availability of Algerian oil would result in diversification of French supplies -- a consideration which in the 1950's seemed paramount after the unsuccessful Suez campaign. It would give France the opportunity to develop its own oil industry, and hence compete with the United States and Britain; and it would permit France to pay for its oil in francs, thus saving valuable foreign exchange and alleviating balance of payments problems. 47

The other major consideration for France, and in the long run perhaps of even greater significance than oil, was the overriding importance of retaining good relations with Algeria for relations with the rest of the Third World. Algeria was the most populous and resource-rich country in North Africa and had the potential to become one of the most powerful and influential countries in the Third World. Since the end of the War of Independence, de Gaulle had wanted "exemplary relations" with Algeria. As well as French economic interests in Algeria, de Gaulle seemed to want to demonstrate the impact of French culture and civilization upon a now independent country, and hold up Franco-Algerian relations as a model of cooperation between developed and developing societies. Many commentators have noted how much more willing de Gaulle was to forgive independent Algeria its sins against French interests than he was other countries like Tunisia or Morocco. 48 For France, Algeria was the "narrow door through which we must pass to reach the Third World" in Secretary of State for Algerian Affairs Jean de Broglie's phrase. He went on to say:
A quarrel between France and some other state of North Africa is nothing more than bilateral tension. A quarrel with Algeria would transcend the limits of Franco-Algerian relations and might wreck our diplomatic goals throughout the entire world.49

Having incurred considerable censure by much of the developing world for its conduct during the war with Algeria, France's post-independence policy was to rebuild its bridges with the Third World via Algeria.

The Algerians wanted to take advantage of France's willingness to extend the hand of cooperation, but were determined at the same time to limit any reductions in their freedom of choice that such cooperation might entail. The Tripoli Program50 proclaimed that the economic policy of Algeria was to be "against foreign domination" and "to break the grip of the monopolies by reorganising our economic ties abroad, first of all with France." The Program went on to call for "the gradual elimination . . . of the preferential system between France and Algeria" as well as the nationalization of "the essential instruments of foreign trade." The Program required strict control by the state of the development of the petroleum and other heavy industries, and the equally important regulation of exports and profit reinvestment by foreign companies. The Tripoli Program did, however, stop short of demanding the nationalization of most foreign industrial concerns, although calling for the nationalization of foreign financial institutions.51

4.3 The Decline in Economic Contact

The Tripoli Program expressed very clearly Algeria's intention to diversify its economic concerns abroad and reduce its economic dependence upon France. This policy was reiterated in 1964 by Bachir Boumaza, then Minister of Industry and Energy, when he said, "We wish to break our relations
of dependence with France by a greater and greater commercial opening on the world, and by a diversification of exchanges. 52

In the years immediately following independence, this policy met with only limited success. The aftermath of the War of Independence, and the chaos which resulted from the OAS terror campaign and the exodus of the European population, if anything resulted in even greater reliance on France. To save the Algerian Treasury from bankruptcy the French government contributed about one billion old francs (about 2 million dollars) per day until the end of the first year of independence. In addition, France embarked upon a massive program of economic and technical assistance, including the temporary staffing of much of Algerian business and government machinery with French nationals. 53 In 1962, 77 percent of Algeria's exports went to France, and a similar proportion of her imports came from there. 54 In 1963, 239 million dollars in aid were received from France, a sum which represented 85 percent of the total aid Algeria received that year and 34 percent of total French aid given anywhere. 55

Figures 4a and 4b show the evolution of some key indicators of Franco-Algerian economic contacts. Figure 4a demonstrates that although the proportion of trade between the two countries declines between 1962 and 1973, the decline between 1962 and 1965 is quite slow. Figure 4b shows that the decline in aid received by Algeria is only noticeable towards the end of the sixties, not the beginning (although the decline of Algeria in total French aid to the world is more marked).

In fact, the years 1964 and 1965 saw Algeria and France locked into three sets of diplomatic talks concerning matters of the utmost importance to the Algerian economy -- wine, oil and emigration.

Algeria's wine was its most important agricultural product. The wine
was introduced on a large scale by the *colons* into a country whose religion forbids it to consume alcohol. As a result the bulk of the wine crop was exported to France, without whose purchases Algerian agriculture would be in serious difficulties. Before independence France had imported 15 million hectolitres (about 330 million gallons) of Algerian wine per year. In 1963 imports had fallen to less than 7 million hectolitres. On January 18, 1964, an accord was signed by the two countries which guaranteed the import by France of certain minimum quantities of wine per year until 1968. Through this accord the Algerian government succeeded in winning a breathing-space for its on the whole unwanted wine industry for the next several years, against the very powerful French wine lobby which wanted to restrict the import of Algerian wine to negligible quantities.

The other major set of negotiations during 1964 concerned the revision of parts of the Evian Accords relating to the running of the Algerian oil industry. The Evian Accords had granted those French companies working Saharan oil the right to continue under about the same terms as before independence. At the same time French companies were given assurances that in future research and exploitation their bids would be given priority over those of other foreign countries in the case of equality of tender-price. In addition a joint Franco-Algerian organization was set up to maintain the road and communication infrastructure in the Sahara and also to oversee application of the mining laws and concession permits.

Despite rapid expansion of oil production during the years 1961, 1962 and 1963, the Algerians became increasingly dissatisfied with the state of affairs. They were concerned over the lack of trained Algerian personnel in the oil industry, the apparent reluctance of the oil companies to press ahead with new explorations due to the then unstable political climate in Algeria.
Figure 4a: Selected Indicators of Trade Interdependence, France and Algeria 1962-1973

Source: Communicated by the Direction des Relations Economique Extérieur, Ministère des Economies et des Finances, Paris.
Figure 4b: Percentage of Foreign Bilateral Aid Received by Algeria from France, 1962-1973

and with the affront to their sovereignty of this carry-over from the colonial period. A major dispute arose concerning the construction of a third Saharan oil pipeline. The Evian agreement had given the discoverers of the oil the right to transport it to the coast. The Algerian government wanted a share in the construction and operation of the proposed pipeline and after much haggling eventually decided to form a new company of its own, which subsequently paid a British firm to build the pipeline. Full control was retained by Algeria. 57

An Accord on the petrol question was finally signed after twenty months of negotiations, the signing taking place only a month after the coup d'état which overthrew Ahmed Ben Bella and installed Houari Boumedienne at the head of the Algerian government. Considered revolutionary at the time, the agreement created a French/Algerian state oil company with the countries as equal partners in the exploitation of designated oil fields. This brought Algeria into the picture at every stage of the oil cycle, research, drilling, transportation and marketing. Royalties were increased and a posted price was set that was at the time rather higher than the world price, even taking into account reduced transport costs from Algeria to France. In addition France was to give Algeria 200 million francs in annual aid for the next five years (160 million francs in 20 year loans at 3 percent interest, and 40 millions of gifts). To this was added an additional 200 millions of francs in ordinary commercial credits guaranteed by the Compagnie Française d'Assurance pour le Commerce Extérieur (COFACE). 58

Algeria thus signed agreements with France during 1964 and 1965 on all three of the vital issues which confronted it. The oil agreement was by far the most advantageous and at the time gave Algeria far more input into the running of its oil industry than any other Arab country had. The wine
agreement too appeared of great benefit to Algeria, even though it soon became meaningless owing to pressures on the French government by French wine-growers to halt the import of Algerian wine.

Only the agreement on emigration, the Nekkache-Grandval Accord, was clearly disadvantageous for Algeria. We have explained this as being partly the result of Algerian weakness, and partly the result of political ineptness. We might also add at this point the view that the migration question was not as central to Franco-Algerian relations as either oil or wine. It was not regarded with the same kind of urgency as the gaining of some control over the oil industry as the foundation-stone of a more ambitious industrialization program.

By the late sixties and early seventies, however, a clear decline took place in economic contacts between the two countries, as Figures 4a and 4b show. The percentage of Algerian exports to France declined from nearly 80 percent of Algeria's total exports in 1962 to just over 20 percent by 1973. During this period the proportion of total French imports coming from Algeria fell from nearly 10 percent to just over 1 percent. If we look at aid we see a similar trend, but with rather more fluctuation. Algeria received 40 percent of total French economic aid in 1962; by 1973 the figure had declined to 2.5 percent. For Algeria this represented a shift from 90 percent to 16 percent of foreign aid coming from France.

It is rather more difficult to get data on the amount of private French investment in Algeria, which would of course measure an important aspect of the economic relationship between the two countries. The official French insurance agency for overseas investment, COFACE, provides some insight here. In 1969 of total guarantees valued at 14,602 million francs, 1,472 million or about 10 percent were for Algeria. In 1971, guarantees stood at 18,706 million
francs, of which Algeria accounted for 885 million, or less than 5 percent. The promises of guarantees for Algeria registered in each year fell from 3,770 million francs in 1969 to 1,128 million francs in 1972. In 1973 itself, French net private long-term capital invested in Algeria was valued at 280 million francs while in the same year Japan invested over 540 million francs, and the total foreign direct investment was about 760 million francs.

It is therefore fairly clear that Algeria has succeeded in distancing itself to a considerable extent from France in its economic contacts. The slack has been taken up by other western market-economy countries, especially Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.A., and to a much lesser extent some communist countries. It should be added, however, that France still remains Algeria's leading trading partner and that the Algerian government now seems to be satisfied that the level of interactions ought to be maintained at their new lower level. Figure 4a indicates that the proportion of mutual trade has remained very stable since 1971.

What has been the consequence of this evolution for the migration question? The quantity of emigration from Algeria to France has remained relatively stable compared to the changes in trade and aid flows. In the early sixties, therefore, when Algeria and France appeared to move closer together rather than further apart, the importance of migration in the overall relationship tended to decline. Since roughly 1966-1967, when the decline in economic contacts became marked while migration remained stable, the opposite has been true. In other words, migration was less important in Franco-Algerian relations in the early sixties, but more important since then.

This is shown very clearly in Figure 4c, where we have constructed an "index of importance" of migration in relations between the two countries. The index was constructed by adding four sets of percentages showing trade,
petrol, aid and migration flows between the two countries as a fraction of Algerian flows to all countries, and comparing migration to this total percentage. When the index is transformed into a three year moving average, it shows a relatively flat or downward-drifting pattern between 1963 and 1968, and then a marked upward trend. By 1972, migration was far more "important" in Franco-Algerian relations than at any previous time.

4.4 Nationalization and Emigration

By 1967-1968 the question of Algerian emigration had become inextricably tangled with other aspects of Franco-Algerian cooperation. By this time the control and organization of the oil industry were once again emerging as a problem despite the 1965 agreement, but a serious crisis in relations over this question did not occur until a few years later. The principal disputes in 1967-1968 focused on the wine problem once again and on the continued series of nationalizations of French companies operating in Algeria.

As far as wine was concerned, the French had renounced the 1964 agreement under intense pressure from French wine-growers, and on February 13, 1967, the importation of Algerian wine was halted altogether for a while. For the year, of the 7.26 million hectolitres of imports foreseen by the 1964 agreement only 3.1 million hectolitres were imported.61

In 1968 the situation for the two sides became more complex. In March the Algerian Minister of the Interior, Ahmed Medeghri, visited Paris in order to discuss outstanding problems, including migration. As a result of this visit the French agreed to remove the limit they had set earlier that permitted only 250 tourists per week to enter France.62 In return Medeghri is reported
to have assured the French that no further nationalizations of French owned industries would take place. In view of the economic recession in France, the Algerians were prepared to postpone for a time the question of final agreement on a migration accord. An analysis of Medeghri's visit published in the Algerian daily paper El Moudjahid reasoned that a delay of several months, until the economic situation in France generated a call for more foreign manpower, might be better for Algeria in any agreement with the French government.

Shortly after the Medeghri visit however, the Minister of Industry, Belaid Abdesselam, apparently convinced President Boumedienne that continued takeovers of French companies were necessary for attaining greater economic independence. As a result, on May 13 the government took over all companies selling oil and gas products, and a week later it took control of twenty-seven French firms manufacturing fertilizers, construction materials, machinery, electrical supplies, textiles, and food. Other nationalizations, mainly of French companies, followed during the spring and summer.

The timing of these measures seemed to indicate they were calculated to take advantage of French disarray during the student unrest in May 1968; certainly many observers at the time interpreted the Algerian action in this light. On June 18 the French government announced that as of July 1 the Algerian contingent would be limited to only 1,000 per month, although it had been running at about 3,000 per month in the first half of the year. This was interpreted in Algeria as direct retaliation for the nationalizations. President Boumedienne in a June 20 speech said:

She (France) fully has the right to refuse Algerian workers, just as Algeria has the right to nationalize industrial enterprises if she wishes.
The following month, as its economic situation continued to deteriorate, the French government took measures to reduce the intake of other foreign workers, especially those introduced by the ONI. Thus even if the reduction of the French contingent was an act of retaliation Algeria suffered from it only for a month more than did other migrant-exporting countries.

The Algerian government also retaliated over the wine and migration limits by halting import into Algeria of certain French textile and metal products, and introducing new import duties which further reduced commercial exchanges between the two countries.

The overall deterioration in Franco-Algerian relations during 1968 was one of the principal factors which delayed the signing of a migration accord until the end of the year. It seems clear that the resultant agreement stemmed in part from a reorientation in Algerian priorities as compared with 1964. Wine was by now rather less of a preoccupation for the Algerian government than the continuation of its domestic industrialization program. Reforms in agriculture were ignored and emigration came to be regarded more than ever as a "safety-valve" for unemployment problems in the agricultural sector. Since agricultural revenues depended in large part on the export of wine to France, and since France was unwilling to buy Algerian wine, France could help maintain rural living standards in Algeria by accepting immigrant workers. Given the intensity of the pressure from French wine-growers the French government found it easier to make concessions over the contingent for Algerian workers than over Algerian wine. From the Algerian perspective it was cheaper to allow surplus agricultural labor to depart than it was to set about a major reform of agriculture.

By 1971 a further shift can be seen in the relative degree of importance Algeria attached to the migration question. In February Algeria finally took
over complete control of the oil industry, assuming a 51 percent interest in French oil companies and taking over all natural gas concessions. The oil industry was intended to be the nucleus of a large petro-chemical industry, providing a base for the rest of Algeria's industrialization and modernization effort. According to the Minister of Industry, Abdesselam, Algeria wanted to "sow petrol in order to harvest industry."72

The effect of this nationalization on the migration question was profound. The nationalizations provoked an immediate crisis in Franco-Algerian relations. France regarded the procedure as a violation of the 1965 agreement and was faced with the necessity of an entire reorientation of its energy policy as a result. Some observers remarked that by April 1971 Algerian-French relations were at their lowest ebb since independence.73 After 1971 France began to turn more and more to Saudi Arabia for its oil,74 and the economic separation of France and Algeria accelerated.

The dispute provoked in the Algerian government an enormous concern over the living conditions of its migrant workers in France, and convinced the authorities that the attacks and other acts of discrimination breaking out against Algerian workers were directly related to the crisis of relations. Some Algerians at least, and some other observers, thought that the reduction of the Algerian migrant contingent in 1971 was a direct act of retaliation by the French for the nationalizations. Additional evidence often cited for this interpretation was that in July 1971 the French had signed an agreement with Portugal granting that country a contingent of 65,000 migrant workers,75 but in fact the contingent for Portugal represented a decrease from previous years. The numbers in 1969 and 1970 had been 80,829 and 88,634 respectively.76 The protocol was signed with the aim of reducing this number to a maximum of 65,000 per year, and, indeed, in the subsequent two years the number of
Portuguese entries was drastically reduced.

The French reduction of the Algerian contingent in fact coincided with economic difficulties at home and with measures to reduce immigration from all sources. *Le Monde* reported in January 1972 both that unemployment had increased by 39 percent in the previous 14 months, and that in the first 10 months of 1971 ONI immigration had fallen by 15 percent. In February 1972 the French Minister of Labor, Fontanet, sent out his famous Circular which was also designed to drastically curtail immigration.

Finally, the Algerian participants in the 1971 negotiations did not themselves believe that the reduction was an act of retaliation. They seemed to accept the argument that it was due to difficult economic conditions in France.

Most important of all, the economic and psychological implications for Algeria of its final economic emancipation radically altered its conception of the migration problem. After 1971 Algeria was at last in firm control of all major sectors of its economy and far less dependent on France than formerly. Revenues accruing to the state from the oil industry increased considerably as a result of cutting out the French companies, making Algeria less dependent on the transfer of savings by Algerian workers abroad. In an interview one Algerian official noted that after 1971 the priority became the "defense" of the migrants, while the problem of the size of the migratory flow became "secondary."

The increase in oil revenues also made possible a rapid advance in Algeria's already ambitious industrialization policy. But one of the main obstacles to this policy was the shortage of skilled workers in Algeria, and the need to hire persons at great cost from foreign countries. Algerian officials began to think seriously about the availability in France of a pool
of skilled labor that might be attracted home. The 1971 "Rapport sur l'Emigration" makes the point that the return of skilled workers in the emigrant community was henceforth to be a major principle of Algerian policy.

Thus, despite the continuation of chronic unemployment in Algeria, qualitative considerations began to predominate over quantitative ones in its decisions concerning emigration.

During 1973 the migration issue began to gather steam once again, for at the year's end the 1971 agreement would expire. France had already put Algeria on notice that any new agreement could not simply be an extension of the 1968 Accord. Not only was the question of the contingent up for debate, but the whole structure of the migration system was to be changed.

Up until 1971 the prevailing Algerian attitude had been that migration was a short-to-medium term necessity for the country. Although the Algerians had made efforts to secure improvements in housing conditions and professional training for their emigrants, the major focus of policy had been on quantity -- how many emigrants could be siphoned off each year to France? French determination to bring the statute for Algerians more into line with that for other labor supplying countries, as well as the implications for Algeria of its take-over of the oil industry, led to a different attitude.

The easing of pressure on the Algerian labor market was considered, rightly or wrongly, to be less important in 1973 than it had been in 1968 or 1971. The Algerian government was prepared to barter its quantitative impact on French immigration in return for qualitative improvements in the treatment of its workers. By this was meant two things. The Algerians insisted that the migrants' living and working conditions be drastically improved and that French authorities take decisive action to deter racist incidents. Additionally, the Algerians now felt that their most important short-term priority was the
building up of skilled, highly-trained cadres who would be able to return to Algeria and fill the nation's serious gaps in qualified manpower. The importance of the "reinsertion" of migrants was increasingly stressed. The Algerian government thought that concessions could be made to France on quantitative and legal issues, in return for concrete proposals for professional training and meeting social problems. Although in public the Algerian government continued to complain that Algerians were being discriminated against in favor of Portuguese, by 1973 "qualitative" thinking was firmly instilled in the Algerian government's conception of migration problems.

At first glance the Algerian decision to suspend emigration in the face of the violence against its workers in France is a puzzling one. Racism directed against them has been a constant factor in the lives of Algerian workers, and there is some question why the violence of August 1973 should have been a watershed for Algeria's policy. Why did the Algerian government perceive racism as a determining factor in its relations with France in 1973, when it had not in earlier years?

To some extent we have explained this already: migration now represented a much larger proportion of total Franco-Algerian interaction than had once been the case. It remained the last important link with the colonial past, and the last tangible reminder of Algeria's former status. This perception was heightened by the fact that the summit conference of non-aligned nations was due to take place in Algiers on September 5, 1973. Its apparent dependence on France in labor matters was probably a source of embarrassment for the Algerian government at a time when the leaders of the Third World were gathered in Algiers to plan a "new international economic order." The Algerian government's self-image as a leader of the non-aligned world, a role it intended to play at the conference and some months later at the
extraordinary session of the U.N. General Assembly, was compromised by its inability to protect its workers abroad from racist attacks.

Some attempt was made to use the non-aligned conference to shame France and deflect attention away from Algeria. El Moudjahid printed an article which Le Monde thought was "obviously inspired by a high official" and which asked rhetorically, "What is the image that France wishes to have in the Third World? Will it be that of a country like the United States, devoured by racism?"82

On the whole, however, only a dramatic gesture, such as the immediate suspension of emigration, could bring luster to its anti-imperialist armor and prove that Algeria was not the catspaw of world capitalism.

It was therefore international rather than domestic reasoning that led to the suspension. Emigration had declined to a considerable extent as a matter of domestic concern, and as migration became less important for Algeria's economy it became more important for Algeria's prestige. It was noticeable during the crisis of the summer of 1973 that for the first time Algeria's overall policy of "cooperation" with France could be called into question over the migration issue. Indeed one Algerian official was convinced that Algeria would break off diplomatic relations with France if the incidents against Arab workers were not rapidly brought under control.83

4.5 Migration and International Relations

During the colonial period trade followed the flag (and vice versa) and migration followed trade. In the years since 1962, what has happened to this pattern? Is it possible to establish the existence of a relationship between migration flows and Franco-Algerian economic contacts in general?
It is clear that there is no particular relationship between the quantity of migration and the quantity of trade and other flows between the two countries. The numbers of Algerians entering France fluctuate greatly from year to year both absolutely and proportionately, while at the same time the trend of other economic contacts has been fairly consistently downward.

On the other hand, we have shown the existence of forces which tended to make the migration issue acquire increasing significance in the structure of Franco-Algerian relations. We have noted that the growing importance of migration as an international political issue was a critical element in the Algerian decision to halt emigration in the Autumn of 1973.

Figure 4c, which presents the upward trend of the index of importance, also contains fluctuations which are of some interest. The years when major decisions or negotiations concerning migration were undertaken by the two countries were years in which the index hit a peak. The index is high for 1963 and 1964, the years of the first French opposition to the free circulation clauses of the Evian Accords and subsequently of the Nekkache-Grandval Accord. 1965 was a trough year, while in 1966 another peak brought more unilateral French restrictions on immigration and a resumption in January 1967 of negotiations between the two governments. 1968 was another peak in the index, and was the year in which the important accord was signed fixing the 35,000 contingent and introducing residence certificates for Algerians. The index again peaks in 1971 with the revision of the 1968 Accord, and in 1973 when the Algerian initiative was taken to stop its emigration altogether.

It would therefore appear that regulations governing the flow of migrants are associated with years in which migration assumes particular significance in terms of overall economic relations between the two countries. In years in which migration peaks in terms of "importance" new sets of rules and regulations designed to govern the migration flow tend to be introduced. These
Figure 4c: Index of "Importance" of Migration as an International Issue between France and Algeria, 1962-1973

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Formula: \[ \text{Index} = \frac{1000 \times \% \text{ Algerian net immigration to France}}{\% \text{ Algerian net immigration to France} + \% \text{ Algerian exports to France} + \% \text{ French petrol from Algeria} + \% \text{ Aid from France}}. \]
may be restrictive, as in 1964, 1971 and 1973. But this is not always the case, since in 1967 and 1968 the Algerian contingent was actually increased.

What, therefore, is the relationship between economic contacts and migration? The decline in economic relations has been matched by a trend in the type of rules applying to Algerian workers in France. It was observed earlier that the legal situation pertaining to Algerian migrants shifted from the free circulation provisions of the Evian Accords to an approximation of the restrictions applying to immigrants from other countries. There has obviously been a parallel evolution; as France and Algeria's special economic relationship has disintegrated, so Algerian workers have been treated progressively less as a special case and more like everyone else. As Franco-Algerian relations became less and less "privileged," so did Algerian workers in France.

This analysis has broader applications than just Franco-Algerian relations. The Francophone countries which established a close economic community with France in 1958 were also granted freedom of circulation for workers. But by 1974, when the economic ties between these ex-colonies and France were much weaker than in 1958, France was seeking arrangements with them to abrogate their "free circulation" rights, just as it had done with Algeria. Meanwhile, the European Economic Community, with whom France has close economic contacts on the level of trade and commerce, still maintains almost complete freedom of movement for workers. The ONI countries, whose economic contacts with France are less than those of the E.E.C., Francophone Africa, or Algeria, experience the most extensive regulation of their workers. These correlations are summarized in Figure 4d.

In the case of Algeria we have seen how the Algerian government made a very conscious decision to reduce its economic contacts with France. It
Figure 4d: Relationship Between the Regulation of Immigration and Extent of Economic Contacts

Extent of Economic Contacts

- low
- moderate
- high

Extent of Regulation of Immigration

- free circulation
- some restrictions
- contracts, residence/work permits, etc.

ONI Countries

Algeria and Franco-phone in 1962

E.E.C.

Algeria in 1968
diversified its trade, nationalized French industry, and encouraged other countries to participate in important development projects. As a consequence, the extent of economic ties between the countries diminished. For this reason, France began to move away from the special rules once applicable to Algerian immigrants. A similar evolution is noticeable in France's relations with Francophone Africa. The decline in trade and other contacts with former colonies was partly a conscious decision of both sides, but there was also in the 1960's a secular trend for industrialized countries to trade increasingly with each other and decreasingly with the traditional protected markets of the colonies.

Among the consequences for France of this shift in external economic relations has been agreement to permit easier freedom of movement of persons from close economic partners, and restrictiveness toward nationals of other countries. The causal sequence would seem to be that political decisions lead to increased or decreased economic contact between countries, which in turn leads to different kinds of regulations on the migration of workers.
5. Conclusion

The politics of Franco-Algerian relations and the politics of migration between the two countries are related in three main ways.

First, the decline in economic contacts between France and Algeria was the result of a deliberate Algerian policy to diversify its foreign economic contacts. However, migration tended to continue on average at fairly high levels, and as a result its relative importance in the overall structure of relations tended to increase.

Second, the nationalization of French industries in Algeria, especially the oil industry, was part of a policy by the Algerian government of reducing French influence in Algeria. The consequences of this policy for migration were (i) to make Algeria less reliant on emigration as a solution for its domestic economic problems; (ii) to accelerate the decline in economic contacts between the two countries, with migration perceived as important in international terms; and (iii) to make Algerian officials more conscious of an acute shortage of skilled labor which might be filled by the return to Algeria of her skilled migrants.

Third, the erosion of the privileged status of Algerians in France was closely matched by the general reduction in Franco-Algerian relations since independence. The French were less willing to treat Algerians as a special case when France's "special relationship" with Algeria had suffered so precipitous a decline.

Many studies of the causes and effects of international migration fail to place enough stress on the political variables that have been seen to be important here. Our analysis shows very clearly that there are in fact close
links between the politics of migration and other aspects of the ties between the two countries. It is impossible to understand the structure, pattern and flow of Algerian migration to France without first understanding the broader context. First, one of the main "causes" of migration, or of a particular migratory pattern, is the series of general commercial and political relationships between countries. If we wish to know why there were a certain number of Algerian immigrants to France in a given year, it is not enough to refer simply to the relative demand and supply in the respective labor markets. A critical variable here is the decisions taken by the two governments about how the migratory flow should be controlled. These decisions are mainly governed by the state of relations between the governments.

Second, the migratory flow itself effects the relations between governments, and is itself a factor which influences foreign policy. In the case of Franco-Algerian relations, the migration question has become increasingly important and reached the point in September 1973 that Algeria found itself on the verge of severing diplomatic relations over the problem.

The migration-relationship is a sensitive one and has often been the cause of considerable friction between France and Algeria. Both sides have attempted at various times to use migration as a means of exerting pressure on the other although with limited success. In the years immediately following Algeria's independence France seemed to be in a position to use this leverage all the more easily, but in subsequent years the edge of the sword has turned in Algeria's favor.

In general, however, both France and Algeria have been anxious to deal with migration questions in close contact with one another. Unilateral actions occurred from time to time (France 1964; Algeria 1973) but usually with the object of persuading the other side to cooperate more fully.
FOOTNOTES


10. Ibid., p. 3.

11. Ibid., p. 3.


13. Granotier, op. cit., p. 44.

14. Ibid., pp. 53-54.


30. Some writers, such as Talha Larbi, op. cit., p. 25, imply that the desire to control migration at this time was exclusively French.


34. Ibid.


42. Le Monde, 16-17 Dec. 1973. Bedjaoui, the Algerian Ambassador in Paris, called the attack "un coup porté aux bonnes relations entre le monde arabe et la France."

43. Le Monde, 10 January 1974.

44. Le Monde, 11-12 April 1975.

45. Le Monde, 1 March 1975.


50. The Tripoli Program was the result of the meeting in Tripoli in May 1962 of all the principal nationalist leaders of the FLN. The program which was written at this meeting was the blueprint for the newly independent country and consisted of a lengthy analysis of Algeria's situation on the eve of its independence and the main socialist lines of policy to be followed by the government. See Ottoway, David and Marina. 1970. Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pp. 16-18.


58. Ottoway, op. cit., and *Maghreb*, No. 11, op. cit.


60. OECD. 1973. *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Less Developed Countries*. Paris. The reason that France and Japan add up to more than the net total is because of private capital outflows to other countries.


63. Quandt, op. cit., p. 262.


65. Quandt, op. cit., p. 262.


67. See, for example, Carmoy, op. cit., p. 24: "Taking advantage of the disturbances in France in May 1968, the Algerian government embarked on a new wave of nationalization..."


70. Ibid., 28-29 July 1968.


73. Nyrop et al., op. cit., p. 239.

74. Balta and Rulleau, op. cit., p. 104.

75. See, for example, Gerald Chaliand and Juliette Minces (1972. L'Algérie Indépendante. Paris: Maspéro.), who write: "Finally, on its side, the French state as a means of indirect retaliation, lowered by 10,000 the number of Algerian workers authorized to enter France," op. cit., p. 121; and Larbi, op. cit., who quotes Offredo, Jean, Algérie. Avec ou sans France? Paris: Ed. du Cerf.: "What reason is there not to think that the French government wished in this fashion to make Algeria pay for its attitude in the field of petrol? In fact, at the same time an accord was signed with Portugal granting that country a contingent of 60,000 (sic) workers." The Portuguese contingent was in fact fixed at 65,000, not 60,000.


80. See speech by Abdelkrim Gheraeib, President of the Amicale des Algériens en Europe, reprinted in El Moudjahid, 10 Jan. 1972, complaining about the reduction of the 1971 contingent.

81. Some idea of Algeria's self image in international affairs can be gleaned from an article by the Algerian Foreign Minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in Le Monde Diplomatique, No. 214, Jan. 1972, which begins: "Partie centrale du Maghreb, aux confins de la Méditerranée, l'Algérie par sa double appartenance africaine et arabe, occupe une position de choix au carrefour des trois continents d'Europe, d'Afrique et d'Asie. Le recouvrement de son indépendance, qui est à la fois le couronnement d'une lutte séculaire contre le colonialisme et une illustration du courant général d'émancipation née après la deuxième guerre mondiale, lui a donnée dimension historique qui lui son évolution désormais aux transformations nécessaires dans les relations internationales, marquées par l'émergence du tiers monde."


83. Interview with an Algerian official, Paris, June 1975. Another official denied this was true.