THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IN THE USSR

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IN THE USSR

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May 1977
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I. The Communications Revolution in the USSR: Expansion

Since the death of Stalin a veritable revolution in the system of mass communications took place in the USSR. The revolution entailed two basic aspects: (a) a revolutionary expansion of communications networks, (b) a meaningful change in the role of the media, of their impact on the authorities and on the population. Both aspects are reviewed in newly available statistical material and in the evidence from recent émigrés.

As can be seen from the adjoining Table No. 1 communications expansion was very rapid. In 1950 only two television stations were functioning in the USSR -- the same number as in 1940. By 1973 the number reached 1620; of these, 130 were program-initiating stations and the rest relay stations. The total number of television sets in the USSR amounted to 10,000 in 1950. By 1960 it was almost 5 million and in 1974 more than 55 million. The data for radio sets were 3.5 million, almost 28 million, and more than 60 million, respectively. In 1960 less than half of the Soviet families had a radio or radiogram, and only 8 in a hundred had a TV set. In 1973 the figures stood at 74 and 67, respectively. This means that, despite rapid progress, one quarter still had no radio set (though probably a wired loud-speaker) and one third had no TV set. Production of television sets was 11,900 in 1950 and about 6,271,000 in 1973; for radio sets the figures were 1,072,000 and 8,165,000, respectively.
total daily output of Soviet radio stations amounts to 1,500 hours. Broadcasting is conducted in 128 languages (58 of Soviet peoples and 70 foreign). In 1974 305 cities in the USSR received the Central television programs, including 103 cities receiving them in color. This was made possible by the creation of the "Orbita" systems which consists of at least four simultaneously working "Molniya" communications satellites combined with some 40 receiving stations. The nine communist countries of the Soviet sphere of influence also created the Inter-sputnik system which utilizes Soviet space and communications equipment. The first station of the system was completed in 1970 in the Mongolian Peoples Republic. Additional stations were inaugurated in Cuba (1973) and in Czechoslovakia (April 1974). For mobile TV broadcasting the USSR operates one "Mars" station located in two airplanes.

The parameters of the communications revolution are also clearly seen from data about the other areas of communication. The total number of telephones jumped from 2.3 million in 1940 to more than 13.2 million in 1972. Even more decisive was the jump in home telephones (as different from office telephones) in urban areas which is significant because in Stalin's time the telephone network was developed to serve almost exclusively the needs of the official institutions. Their number went up from 338,000 in 1950 to 3,768,000 in 1970, almost eleven times. Nevertheless, in the area of home telephones the USSR remained greatly "underdeveloped". Even in 1970 the home telephones were only a little more than a third of the total; assuming that the number of urban families in 1970 was about 35 million, it appears that only one in ten had a telephone. This figure should perhaps be upgraded because in the Soviet houses often several families occupy one large apartment; also telephones are sometimes installed
in corridors for the common use of several apartments. The total number of telephones in rural areas amounted to 221,000 in 1950 and rose to 1,483,000 in 1970. A private telephone in a home in the country is a rarity in the USSR. Even if we assume the same ratio of home telephones as in urban areas -- i.e., one third or about 0.5 million -- and since the number of rural families is 24.7 million, the result is one telephone per 50 families in the rural areas. Yet, there was a great change in the telephone connection of agricultural enterprises. Whereas in 1950 almost 80% of all kolkhozy and 22.5% of all sovkhozy were without telephone connections altogether, by 1970 only 0.2% in both categories were in that situation. This was the USSR average. In some republics, however, the situation was still rather difficult. In the Tadzhik Republic 4.5% of sovkhozy were without a telephone, and in the Turkman Republic almost 10%.

The divergence between urban and rural areas was also clear in regard to television sets. Though the rural population amounted to 45% of the total, only slightly more than a quarter of the television sets were in the rural areas (9.4 million in rural areas versus 25.4 in urban areas). Assuming the number of rural and urban families as indicated above, there were less than three sets per ten families in rural areas and more than seven sets per ten families in urban areas.10

During the period of 1950-1973 the total letters handled rose almost 3.5 times; of telegrams, more than 216 times and the number of inter-urban telephone calls went up almost six times. The total number of communications enterprises (post offices, telephone stations, etc.) rose by more than two thirds. The personnel employed at all enterprises of the Ministry of Communications rose from 512,000 in 1950 to 1,300,000 in 1970, more than 2.5 times. The actual figure of all those employed in the
communications system in the USSR is probably higher by at least one fifth since there are communications enterprises which do not belong to the Ministry of Communications. For example, the total number of telephones for 1971 is given at 12.1 million, whereas "the total number of telephones of all agencies" is given as 15.1 million. 11 If this estimate is right, the total of those employed in the communications system in the USSR (including those in the military, security, administrative, and economic organizations which are not included under the Ministry of Communications) amounts to more than 15 million in 1970. The data also reflect considerable progress in the technology of communications. The tonnage of airmail grew about twelve times between 1970 and 1973; the number of automatic telephones grew 15 times. In 1955 there were almost no postal machines and no mail-sorting machines; in 1970 the former amounted to 31,000 and the latter to 14,500. During the same time, the number of loading and unloading machines grew about 7.5 times. From 1950 to 1973 the total product of the communications system (excluding print media) in the USSR rose almost six times. From 1960 to 1970 alone the total yearly income rose by more than three quarters.

As for print media, their extension was also very rapid. In the period of 1950-1973 the yearly circulation of journals went up almost 17 times; of newspapers, 5 times and of books, almost twice. The number of films produced rose almost 7 times (from 36 to 245 per year). Cinema attendance also rose from 6 to 18 average attendances per person in a year. 12

The indices in the last two columns in Table No. 1 show the tempo of the communications expansion in the USSR. While the most rapid expansion went on in the 1950-1960 period, a high tempo was sustained in certain areas
in the 1960-1973 period such as: TV sets (per family and totals), delivery of Pravda on publication date, interurban telephone calls and airmail delivery. The total product grew more than three times during this period.
**TABLE No. 1**

*Expansion of Communication Networks in the USSR, 1950-1973*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total product (excluding print-media, in billions of rubles)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel in the main activities of the Ministry of Communications (,000)</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>1301</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>2.54*</td>
<td>1.78*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of communications enterprises (post offices, telephone stations, etc.) (,000)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mail and Telegraph</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters - total (in millions)</td>
<td>2607</td>
<td>4171</td>
<td>8020</td>
<td>8714</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airmail (,000 tons)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegrammes (in millions)</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail-sorting machines (number)</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>2716</td>
<td>14409</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Telephones</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of telephones **(,000) including: in rural areas (,000)</td>
<td>2313</td>
<td>4301</td>
<td>10987</td>
<td>14463</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>automatic phones (,000)</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>1483</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>9.11</td>
<td>3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural localities with telephones (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural Soviets</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state farms (sov khozy)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collective farms (kolkhozy)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interurban telephone calls (millions)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>3.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radio and T.V.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of broadcast receiving units (mlns) including: radio sets</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>129.6</td>
<td>159.5</td>
<td>11.99</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>radio loudspeakers (mlns)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>15.22</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>television sets</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of TV stations-relay and programme initiating</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>492.0</td>
<td>12.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families with: radio or radiogram (%)</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV set (%)</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE No. 1 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Print Media</th>
<th>Book-copies printed: (millions)</th>
<th>Journals &quot; (millions)</th>
<th>Newspapers &quot; (billions)</th>
<th>Percentage of main towns in which Pravda is delivered on date of publication</th>
<th>Number of films produced</th>
<th>Yearly cinema attendance-per head</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950 1960 1970 1973</td>
<td>1950 1960 1970 1973</td>
<td>percentage of main towns in which Pravda is delivered on date of publication</td>
<td>number of films produced</td>
<td>yearly cinema attendance-per head</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Newspapers &quot; (billions)</td>
<td>7.0 15.0 31.2 35.3</td>
<td>7.0 15.0 31.2 35.3</td>
<td>1973: 1973</td>
<td>7.0 15.0 31.2 35.3</td>
<td>0.04 0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of main towns in which Pravda is delivered on date of publication</td>
<td>n.d. 8.6 72.3 n.d.</td>
<td>n.d. 8.6 72.3 n.d.</td>
<td>1973: 1973</td>
<td>n.d. 8.6 72.3 n.d.</td>
<td>-- 8.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Films</td>
<td>Number of films produced</td>
<td>36 139 218 245</td>
<td>36 139 218 245</td>
<td>1973: 1973</td>
<td>36 139 218 245</td>
<td>6.81 1.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Transport i svyaz' 1972: 271-277

n.d. = no data
*1970 instead of 1973
**Network of the Ministry of Communications only. Together with networks of other agencies, the number in 1973 was 16,200,000.
II. The Communications Revolution: Changes in Content and Function

In the Western mind an image of Soviet media was created which regarded them as merely mouthpieces of the power elite without any leeway for autonomy or influence. The established Western notions of the USSR as a totalitarian system, according to the definitions of Ahrendt, Friedrich, and Brzezinski made it difficult (if not impossible) to envisage Soviet media as vehicles for some real discussions of problems of Soviet society as well as agents reflecting particular group interests and attitudes. This perception was a result of the many years of the Stalinist regime in the USSR, and of the numerous Soviet pronouncements about the media as "propagandists and organizers" for the Party. Such a view of the role of Soviet media may have been largely, though not fully, true in Stalin's time. It is no longer the case.

Parallel to the communications revolution in terms of the immense expansion of the modern media output in the USSR, another revolution took place. The latter pertains to a certain basic change in the relationships between the elements: Public Opinion - Media - Authorities. During the Stalinist period the main direction of the relationship between these three elements had been from top to bottom (Authorities - Media - Public Opinion), with only a small measure of feed-back in the other direction. In the post-Stalin period a process ensued which opened up possibilities of influence in the direction: Public Opinion - Media - Authorities, and through the mutual interchange, Media - Public Opinion, and Media - Authorities. In this kind of relationship the media acquires an intermediary position between the other two elements. Another aspect of this process is the considerable differentiation and autonomy of certain media units as vehicles for particular
attitudes and group interests. These may be of various kinds: bureaucratic, local ethnic, national and ideological-political (from "liberal democratic" communists to neo-Stalinists and Russian nationalists).\textsuperscript{15}

A full discussion of this rather significant development within the Soviet media (and the system as a whole) would require a major study of its own and is beyond the scope of the present paper. The following outline of the major features of this process are given.

Often the changes which occurred in the Soviet Union during the post-Stalin period were not a result of the initiative of Party leaders or officials, nor of careful planning based on systematic research. They were rather initiated, formulated, and often implemented by some influential people and groups working in the media or at academic institutions. Naturally this occurs in such cases when these people succeeded in establishing access to people in power and were capable of convincing them to accept their proposals. Moreover, in the post-Stalinist period, as the instruments of terror gradually receded into the background, the instruments of persuasion and mass information gained more and more in importance. Each person in authority makes considerable effort to create an intimate relationship with influential media people, and to promote people of his own into the various media positions. As a result a network of close contacts is created between the two sets, and a certain symbiosis of the groups in both media and government. The three outstanding examples of media-people who made history are Aleksei Adzhubei, Aleksander Tvardovsky and Aleksander Chakovskiy whose careers are relatively well known.\textsuperscript{16} The main point to make here is that each of them had a considerable influence on the political-ideological climate in the USSR and revolutionized the particular publication of which he was head. The impact of this revolution was of such momentum that Soviet journalism cannot slip back to the status quo ante.
The ways through which they reached their appointments were different, and so were their political attitudes. Adzhubei was named editor of Izvestia through the influence of Khruschev who was his father-in-law. Tvardovsky owed his appointment as editor of Novy Mir to his fame as a poet and writer and to the support of "liberals" in the Writers Union and in the Party. Chakovsky emerged as the influential editor of Literaturnaya Gazeta as a result of a reorganization of this paper into a major and greatly influential weekly for the intelligentsia. (Before that, it had appeared several times a week, in a thin format, as a paper for a narrow literary readership.)

The reorganization of Literaturnaya Gazeta was not done in accord with some plan or because of a Party decision; the initiative came rather from a group of journalists and writers who came forward with the idea and were able to persuade the authorities to accept it. Following the decision, a major government sum was invested into a new printing plant and a major reorganization of the staff was undertaken. To attract talented and resourceful writers, the management was allowed to pay the senior staff salaries which were considerably higher than those established throughout the profession. The new weekly also undertook major efforts to enroll the participation of academic and other specialists as contributors, to undertake debates on some topical issues of Soviet and international problems. As a result this weekly still occupies a somewhat unique position in Soviet journalism. Chakovsky has become a figure of some influence in the Soviet elite, and a consultant of the top Party bodies. He is a member of the Central Committee of the Party since 1969.

Adzhubei took over the central government newspaper Izvestia when it was a grey bureaucratic mouthpiece. He injected into it many of the methods of operative and competitive Western journalism: a morning and
afternoon edition, lively and informative commentaries, exclusive correspondence from representatives abroad, critical series about some of the government agencies, striking banner headlines and subtitles, stress on readers' letters, new columns answering the personal and family needs of the readers, as well as a weekend magazine with topical features. The Adzhubei revolution coincided with the abolition of limitations on subscriptions and the Izvestia readership went up so swiftly that it put Pravda into the shade.

Tvardovsky used his considerable standing in the Party and his connections with the elite to make the literary monthly Novy Mir into a daring journal of social criticism and a tribune for liberalization and de-Stalinization. Subscriptions to this journal also went up immensely. Tvardovsky was dismissed by the post-Khruschev leadership under the pressure of conservative writers in 1971. After the dismissal, the circulation of Novy Mir went down while the circulation of other journals was going up. From 165,000 copies in December 1971, the circulation dropped to 155,000 in 1972; assuming that some 120,000 are sold to libraries, enterprises and foreign subscribers, the drop amounts to almost 20% amongst the individual subscribers (10,000 out of 45,000). 18

During the post-Stalin period some of the main newspapers and journals in the USSR acquired a rather clear socio-political profile, e.g., Novy Mir occupied the liberal-democratic wing, whereas another journal of the Union of Writers, Oktyabr, was the fortress of conservatives and neo-Stalinists. Izvestia and Literaturnaya Gazeta had a liberal impact despite the fact that they were managed by establishment figures (Chakovsky is regarded as a conservative because he attacks the liberals and dissidents; but his paper also dares to attack the neo-Stalinists as well as the new-style Russian nationalities and Slavophiles). This liberal impact was a result of the critical and topical journalism which was developed by these papers.
During a certain period the three papers mentioned above became a must for every intelligent family in the USSR and their cumulative influence on the readership was immense. One of the first moves of the post-Khruschev leadership was to remove many of the key media people of the Khruschev period from their positions and to appoint trusted people of their own in their place. Amongst those removed were the editors of Izvestia (the above mentioned Adzhubei) and Pravda, and the heads of state committees for Radio and Television, and for the Press. Recent émigrés who occupied at that time important positions in Soviet media testify that the first clues to the impending change of leadership came in matters related to media. The central Party authorities issued instructions to delay the printing of newspapers. Editors of electronic media were ordered to stand by for some important state news. At the central radio and television studios in Moscow new guard units arrived with specially empowered Party-appointed officials who removed the previous pro-Khruschev chiefs from their offices and took over control. Special detachments were assigned to the central control stations of radio and television to prevent their utilization by pro-Khruschev leaders for broadcasting to the country. 19

Several studies of the Soviet media undertaken by Western specialists show that there are considerable differences in the treatment of certain crucial topics by various Soviet media. 20 The prevailing interpretation is that these result from the personal attitudes of the top people in charge of the particular medium, as well as group interests related to the function of the particular medium. For example, the main newspaper of the Ministry of Defense, Krasnaya Zvezda, is naturally regarded as a mouthpiece of the top military leadership, whereas Pravda reflects the opinions and decisions of the top Party leaders and officials. Sometimes, the Party bodies decide to strengthen
their influence and control in an area of activities by establishing a new and weighty publication, or by taking over an existing one which is issued by another body. Until 1972 the newspaper Sovetskaya Kultura had served as the organ of the Ministry of Culture and had been published in a thin format several times a week. In January 1973 it was reorganized by Party decision into a weekly organ of the CC under A.V. Romanov. It seems that the Party bodies felt that they need a stronger control in the field of culture, and they decided to achieve this through taking over the newspaper and reorganizing it. During the period of debates and experimentation with regard to the economic reform, the CC decided to publish a weekly on economic affairs called Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta. 21
III. Communication Policy and Decision Making: The Five Year Plan

The Soviet system takes pride in its planned economy which is supposed to be based on scientific and rational considerations. There is, however, no evidence that Soviet planners and policy makers base their decisions on communications, on concepts of an integrated system and on developing an optimal and dynamic balance between its various components. The scarcity of information and of studies on Soviet communications prevents a full and detailed analysis of this subject. However, a general outline based on the available knowledge from Soviet sources, Western studies and émigré evidence may be in order. 22

Formally, there is no supreme national body devoted to planning, decisions and control of the communications system as a whole. On the technical side, the closest approximation is the Board of the Ministry of Communications which is responsible for all communications hardware and for some of the software and delivery systems all over the USSR. A special body at the Ministry is presumed to be responsible for regulating the communications system, including such matters as spectrum allocation, coordination of technical facilities between media, rate fixing, etc. Budgetary arrangements and allocations for the communications system are part of the overall budget planning and execution of the Ministry of Finance. Supplies for the communications system are centrally channelled through the State Supply Committee (Gossnab). Planning of the Soviet communications system is part of the overall planning process of the national economy and of cultural development. It is performed by the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) which works according to decisions of the supreme Party bodies and under their close supervision. The latest available data is included in the State Five Year Plan for the Development of the
USSR National Economy for 1971-1975 which was approved by CC CPSU on October 12, 1971, and presented to the Supreme Soviet by Prime Minister Kosygin on November 24, 1971. A decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of November 26, 1971, gave the plan the status of a national law.\(^{23}\)

The plan includes a section on the development of communications and especially about the creation of the "Uniform Automated Communications System" with the aim of "assuring" the uninterrupted and reliable transmission of all forms of information. The first portion of the section reviews the success achieved in the development of communications during the last decade. The capacity of the telephone stations grew 2.4 times and the number of powerful television stations grew 2.7 times. The number of television sets rose 7.3 times (and in the countryside, 25 times). The growth of the cable and radio relay-lines made possible the lengthening of inter-urban telephone channels in 1970 by the factor of 2.3 compared with 1965.

During the 1971-1975 plan the total investment in radio, telephone, television and other forms of communications was to amount to 4.63 billion rubles. Although 36.3% more than in the previous five years, it was still relatively small, about $1 billion per year. The strength of radio stations was to grow 30%. The plan did not say much about the more traditional forms of communications. With regard to postal services it called for the further mechanization of loading-unloading operations and the introduction of automatic sorting and transportation equipment, so as to speed up the processing of postal items.\(^{24}\)

The section of the Plan dealing with the further development of culture also began by quoting data about successful development during the previous Five Year Plan. The total number of radio broadcasting hours grew by 14.4% and of TV broadcasting hours by 100%; book publishing grew
by 14.4%, newspaper printing by 40%, and journals by 80%. Such a growth of the production of newspapers and journals made it possible to dispense with limitations on subscriptions on the majority of periodical publications and to supply more fully the needs of the population in books and textbooks. The planned growth indices for the five year period were as follows: books, 30.1%; journals and newspapers, 20%. A special effort was to be made to almost double the number of full length films produced, especially films for television (from 50 in 1970 to 93 in 1975), as well as color films in general. In 1975 the total number of television broadcasting hours was to amount to 2,282 hours per day instead of 797 per day in 1965.

The growth in radio broadcasting hours was to be insignificant (a mere 28.5 hours within a schedule including 1368.5 hours). The Plan envisaged the further widening of radio relay and cable lines, as well as construction of a series of TV transmitters. As a result, 75% of the population of the country was to be reached by television leaving a quarter of the population without any television even in 1975. In order to facilitate simultaneous printing of central newspapers in a number of main cities in the country, further arrangements were to be made for "transmission of printed papers in color through the communications channels". The same was to be applied to the "decentralized printing of mass circulation journals". The Plan paid special attention to improving conditions of local newspapers; more than 300 new buildings for printing shops of local newspapers were to be built, and existing printing plants were to be modernized. Altogether during the Five Year Plan the Soviet printing output was to be doubled, and the stress to be on producing the most modern equipment, photo and automatic printing. Also the equipment of the existing cinema studios
was modernized and new studios were constructed. A special effort was made to produce better color films by newer methods, so as to improve the quality of the color and the preservation of film copies.  

What are the motivations of Soviet planners, when deciding upon the development of the Soviet communications network? Do they proceed in a rational and optimal fashion? Are they aware of the various alternatives when formulating the Five Year Plan on communications?

Writers on communications have set down several logical stages necessary for the proper planning and operation of the communication system. For example Schramm recommends that such proper planning should include research which would give full information as to all available communications services, and as to the various needs of the population and the system, with regard to communication development. He also calls for studies which will show the relative effectiveness from the investment into one or another media instrument.

From the information available it is not clear whether the Soviets have taken care of these pre-requisites. The available evidence rather points to the development and operation of mass media in the USSR according to ideological criteria and intuitive (common sense) decisions. Prestige as well as personal group interests are also prime movers in decision making about communications. Research and study of policy alternatives in the field of communications are not among the highly developed branches of Soviet science.

A major factor in the development of the Soviet communications is the technological example of the West and the competition of Western media services. Since Western media moved swiftly to new technologies and provided high-geared, up-to-date, and lively services, the Soviets could
not remain behind indefinitely. This is especially so since the product of some of these Western media reaches an ever wider proportion of the Soviet public in general and of the Soviet elite in particular. The elegant, multicolored, and well-produced Western journals (e.g. Amerika) which reach the Soviet public were in such glaring contradiction with the shoddy, grey, unaesthetic appearance of Soviet journals, that something had to be done. This was especially necessary with regard to the Soviet journals and books printed for the West. As a result Soviet publishing authorities ordered modern materials from abroad. Also the 1971-1975 Five Year Plan envisages a considerable effort to produce modern printing equipment in the USSR itself.  

Soviet journals such as Zhurnal'ist and Literaturnaya Gazeta introduced Western styles in layout and writing so as to make the publications more lively and aesthetically pleasing. However, so far such innovations are only a drop in a sea of old fashioned and shoddy Soviet printing productions.

According to Western researchers, Soviet émigrés and the Soviet press, the improvement in the liveliness and the topicality of the Soviet media as a result of competition with the Western media is especially felt in the field of the news. The goal of the Soviet authorities was to supply rapidly the news and to engross the Soviet citizen in the Soviet media output so that he would not have the interest or the time for the output of the Western media. Since the Soviet media used to be very slow in bringing news-features unpleasant to the Soviet elite, the Soviet population learned to tune in to Western media. Sometimes the Western media had a monopoly on certain news, since Moscow did not mention the matter for a considerable period. Soviet media has since stressed that a
certain "psychological advantage" is accrued to anyone who is first to transmit a message. Subsequent messages by Soviet media with a Soviet interpretation met with great difficulty because the first message had already "sunk in". In the words of one Soviet newspaper: "It is very important that people are informed in good time and correctly about all events taking place both in the country and abroad. There must be no gaps in the information because these may be used by ideological enemies." 31

As a result, the Soviet authorities made some change in their system of information: instead of delaying news cleared by the Party censorship or by Pravda, Soviet media editors have been empowered to transmit news immediately, subject to clearance by specially empowered editors at the media themselves. However, though Soviet news programs are at present much quicker and livelier than in the past, there still is a considerable time lag in their news services compared with the Western media. 32
IV. The Soviet Communications System: Ownership and Control

It is generally assumed that the Soviet communications system is owned and operated by the "government". A careful study and analysis of the system shows that it is far from being monolithic. The media that actually reach the Soviet citizen are even more diverse. They are owned and operated by the following:

a. the Communist Party and its organizations (e.g., the Komsomol)
b. the Government
c. public organizations (e.g., the Writers Union)
d. religious organizations
e. cooperatives (Kolkhoz)
f. private citizens (in the form of Samizdat)
f. foreign bodies (e.g., Amerika, newspapers of foreign Communist parties, foreign broadcasts).

Even those media which are owned and operated by the "government" are actually in the hands of a plethora of ministries, administrative units, economic agencies, cultural and scientific organizations, and military and security establishments. Each of these institutions has its own personnel, interests and specific conditions. Moreover within each agency and organization, the media are owned and operated by diverse sub-units, which again differ from each other greatly. 33

In view of this picture of considerable plurality and diversity, how does the Soviet system succeed in enforcing the great uniformity in its information system which is proverbial throughout the world. One answer would be that this is ensured by a single censorship system which is all prevailing and all powerful, the so-called Glavlit. In fact, control over
the media involves a number of institutions and procedures:

1. Party control over appointments in media.
2. Party control over all training for the media.
3. Party control over all owners and operators of media (apart from f and g in the list preceding).
4. The Glavlit censorship agency.
5. Military censorship.
6. Additional censorship agencies for all forms of creative activity (film studios, theatres).
7. Measures to prevent inflow of unwanted information from the outside (jamming, border control, postal censorship).
8. The security police and its network of informers.
9. The courts, the prisons and the camps.

Since the agencies of control are multiple, there must indeed be in every area a unit which is the highest controlling and decision making body. The answer to this cannot be the Party as a whole since it is a complex body. Within the Party apparatus there are several departments concerned with media. These are the departments of propaganda, culture, information, science and higher education and personnel.

The uniform line of command for all forms of media in the USSR is ensured through the Departments of Propaganda of the Party at all levels and through their heads, who are directly responsible to the Party secretaries, who deal with ideological matters. The latter are subordinate to the top Party secretary and the appropriate Party bureau at each level. At the pinnacle it is the First Secretary of the Party CC and the highest Party bodies which carry the power and responsibility. Decision making and control of media are also concentrated in the higher state bodies -- the
government and the Soviets; their standing in these matters is, however, secondary to that of the supreme Party leaders and bodies. This has been corroborated by Lenin's detailed instructions and interference in matters of media, by the well-known instances when Stalin or Khruschev personally decided on the publication or withdrawal of books, films, plays or paintings. Several days after the Bolshevik revolution the Soviet government banned "all newspapers and journals opposed to the Soviet Power". The decree on the press of November 20, 1917, was signed by Lenin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. The decree on establishing the Russian Telegraphic Agency of September 7, 1918, was signed by Y. Sverdlov, Chairman of the All-Russian Executive Committee. The decisions of Party congresses and Central Committee meetings were supreme regulative instruments obligatory in all matters of communications. For example, the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919, accepted a resolution "on the Party and Soviet Press", which outlined some of the principles for the operation of the Soviet press.

With the advent of NEP, a period of liberalized economic policies allowing a measure of private business, the Government decided to allow private publications (decree of December 12, 1921). They were closed again with the liquidation of NEP at the end of the "20's".

Traditionally, the Central Committee of the Party publishes detailed decisions on the matters of media. E. . decision of August 15, 1931, demanded that journals should have sections for book-reviews and bibliography. In 1932, on April 23, the Central Committee decreed a far reaching reorganization of literary unions. In 1940, when the world was engulfed in a world war and the German invasion of Russia was not far away, the CC was busy with a decree which castigated the faults of literary criticism and returned
again to the matter of review sections in journals. 37

To facilitate implementation of Party control the Party secretaries hold regular meetings with the heads of the various media and news agencies. Usually, the following are present at the meetings called by the head of the Propaganda Department at the Secretariat of the CPSU in Moscow:

a. the editors of the principal newspapers and magazines (M. Zimianin - Pravda, L. Tolkunov - Izvestia, M. Khaldeev - Party Life, P. Naumov - New Times, etc.)

b. the general directors of TASS (I. Zamyatin) and Novosty (I. Udaltsov)

c. several representatives of the governmental committees relevant to propaganda, such as S. Lapin, Chairman of the Radio and TV Committee, B. Stukalin, Chairman of the Publications Committee, etc.

Hazan regards this meeting as a "special committee responsible for propaganda policy" and implies that after the decisions of the meetings of this committee are approved, "directives are conveyed to the agencies directing the propaganda activities". However, according to the available evidence, this committee is an advisory and not a decision making body. The Party heads come to these meetings after they have decided on matters of policy and treatment beforehand. At these meetings they explain these policies to the media chiefs, provide them with special information, convey instructions on particular issues and answer questions. According to some sources, such meetings are sometimes attended also by one or more members of the Politburo concerned with a particular item on the agenda. The media representatives raise questions and make proposals; this is how additional ways and means for treating certain issues are hammered out at these meetings. They also serve as a channel for attracting the attention of the Party leaders to certain matters, since the participating Party officials may bring them up
L. Vladimirov, a Soviet journalist and head of the department of a major Soviet periodical who took refuge in the West in 1966 described the "instructional conference" as having several major functions. The Party officials attending it pass out advance information about "laws, decisions, appointments and decrees to be passed in the next weeks or months". The attending editors "need this information in advance, to be able to prepare public opinion". The officials also discuss in detail "general political questions" including the treatment to be given to current and forthcoming events, the coverage of planned campaigns, etc. One part of the conference "is concerned with the various shortcomings and mistakes that have appeared in certain papers and magazines during the previous fortnight...editors concerned are reprimanded on the spot" or told that "conclusions will be drawn later". According to Vladimirov it might happen that "editors have suffered heart attacks" following these conferences. Upon return to their offices from the conference each editor is obliged to pass the relevant information and instructions to the department heads and responsible officials of his publication. Again the latter pass the necessary information down the line, keeping other parts of information not intended for lower officials to themselves. The evidence available shows that all these instructions are passed orally along the line; those instructed are allowed to take notes, but extensive and explicitly written instructions on "delicate" matters are rare. Summaries of notes written by those attending the instructional conference are regarded as restricted (personal) material, not available to unauthorized readers.

Meetings similar to those at the Central Committee in Moscow are held at all lower levels -- from the Central Committees of the Republics to
the area, city, and borough. Secondary systems of supervision and campaign management in media are operated through the institutions of the Union of Soviet Journalists at all levels and through such publications as Pravda and Zhurnalist which publish reviews of the media and evaluation of their performance.
V. Censorship -- Glavlit and Others

The Soviet regime operates a widely ramified system of measures to prevent unwanted information and content from reaching the Soviet citizen. The major internal instrument for this purpose is the censorship agency, usually referred to by the abbreviation Glavlit, which stands for the Chief Administration for the Prevention of Publishing State Secrets. Censorship existed in Russia as far back as 1676. It was briefly abolished after the February revolution of 1917. Soon after the October Revolution the Bolsheviks undertook measures against media in the hands of other parties; they re-established censorship early in the 1920's. The history and laws of Glavlit are fairly well described by Hopkins, Hollander, Vladimirov and the Dewhirst collection,42 and there is no need to dwell on it here in detail. However, some matters related to this topic warrant further elaboration.

Contrary to the picture usually accepted in the West, Glavlit is only one of many censorship services in the USSR. It pertains only to print media, and even with regard to these it is not the only one. All printed material passes the military censorship and is scrutinized for ideological mistakes by the appropriate Party bodies. This accounts for the phenomenon when publications which pass the censor are subsequently withdrawn from circulation because of an adverse opinion of the ideological Party bodies. The Glavlit apparatus is an anonymous organization whose laws, rules and even whereabouts are not to be known to the population.43 The identity of the censors, their names, background, and positions are regarded as state secrets. It is strictly forbidden for authors to come directly in touch with the censorship organization. They have to submit their materials
(articles, manuscripts, monographs, works of art) to the appropriate editorial boards and publishing houses. The editors of these are responsible for reviewing the materials, operating as a "preliminary censorship". Being Party appointed, trained, and controlled, these editors reject any material which is contrary to Party line or unacceptable to the censors. They suggest deletions, rewriting and additions so as to assure a positive response by the censorship. Should the material be "anti-Soviet", the editors are duty bound to report the matter to the security authorities and to the Party. Failure to do that may be regarded as a serious breach of discipline and may have grave consequences for the responsible person concerned.

Only such material which has passed the responsible editors of the newspapers and publishing houses is submitted to the censorship. There is no way for an author to submit his material directly to the censor. The censor takes his time and may consider the submitted material for many months. Only very influential editors are in the position to intervene with Party authorities on matters submitted to censorship or rejected by it. This was the case with Solzhenitzyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich about which a controversy developed among the members of the Politburo itself. It was finally published by a personal decision of Khruschev, then the First Secretary of the Party.44

The censor returns material with his rulings and remarks to the appropriate editors. They may accept the verdict of the censor totally, or ask for explanations, and even challenge some of the censors' decisions. In such cases the editor meets with a censorship official to hammer out the differences and work out a final text. Formally, the corrected text is then returned by the editor to the author, who is obliged to make the necessary changes, additions and deletions. The author may demand explanations and
argue with the editors, but as a rule he is not allowed to bring his objections up to the censor himself. Moreover, often the editor will suggest the changes to the author as if they were his own, refraining from mentioning that these were made on demand of the censorship. Also, the censors are not obliged in any way to give the editors or authors any explanation as to the reasons for the changes they demanded or for rejecting the materials. Neither has the author recourse to appeal his case to a higher authority.

According to recent émigrés, such procedures are strictly adhered to in such places as Moscow, Leningrad or Kiev where Party discipline is strict and behaviour is bureaucratic and formalized. In smaller places in the peripheral republics the situation is very much different.

A former editor in a state publishing house of one of the Islamic republics explained that in their city the offices of most publishing houses and of the censorship were placed in the same building. Since the number of the officials was small and "everybody knew everybody", the identity of the censors was well known. The editors and directors of publications were intimately connected with responsible Party secretaries, the local official Soviets and censors. The state publishing house submitted its yearly plan outlining as required the main subjects to be treated and listing the books to be published during the next year. But when the plan was returned by the Party and Soviet authorities it often was so different from the original that the editors could hardly recognize it. Themes and books which were included in the original plan were deleted or changed out of recognition and many new themes and publications were included, about which nobody at the publishing house knew anything.

Personal favours were often made all along the line. The editor-in-chief promised the translator of a book (which he had authored) to
publish the latter's writings, which he did, despite the vehement objections of the literary editor and other officials who thought the book to be worthless. A top Party official ordered the publication of a research work of his cousin though it was rejected several times as objectionable. An historical novel was submitted which portrayed leading personalities of the local nationality in a glowing light and those of a neighboring Soviet nationality in utterly negative colors. It was published despite objections from officials and editors because of personal ties between the author and a top official of the local nationality. It was subsequently withdrawn because of massive criticism by higher (mainly Russian) Party officials and editors.

In this intimate setting editors and censors used to meet often to discuss submitted material. Often when the censors were challenged because of the changes they had decided to make, they would say: "You understand that it is not because of my whim, but because of instructions...." Then they would go over to the safe, unlock it, get out the volume with instructions, and show the pertinent place, and say: "You see, this is forbidden."

The forbidden subjects relate to all matters that may disclose "state secrets, military or economic". This is punishable under Article 75 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR by two to eight years imprisonment. Similar articles exist in the codes of the other republics. The interpretation of this formula is rather wide ranging, as can be seen from a 1956 decree of the Government of the USSR, which included as "secrets" such items as data on precious and rare metals, the state of currency reserves, storage sites and stock piles of reserves.

A recent émigré involved in sociological studies explained that a publishing house (obviously by demand of the censorship) deleted from
his manuscript evidence showing a very high rate of dissatisfaction among workers with conditions of work and wages. The tables and data had to be broken down in such a way that the reader would not be able to get compound figures showing a negative situation. Another author reported that in his articles he could give either full data about a certain factory without mentioning its name and location, or give the latter data without the former.

In a time of détente, when multiple foreign delegations visit the USSR and vice versa, and in an epoch of spy satellites, when the Americans are capable of gaining information on any object in the USSR -- what useful purpose can be served by this elaborate system of censorship pertaining to every word produced by the many media in the USSR? Knowledgeable recent émigrés faced with this question gave the following reasons:

a. The censorship system is a conservative carry-over from the former times of almost total Stalinist secrecy; it is not as indispensable today as in the past.

b. The all pervading blanket of secrecy still serves some purposes in covering up major Soviet weaknesses as well as the extent of Soviet concentration on military strength at the expense of the Soviet consumer.

c. Soviet censorship is directed first and foremost toward the Soviet citizen himself; security reasons and the "foreign danger" are utilized as an excuse for preventing the Soviet citizen from gaining information and acquiring concepts which could be detrimental to the regime.

Beyond the censorship agency itself, the Party controls the media through its factual monopoly on selection, training and appointment of all journalists. All responsible media positions are within the so-called nomenklatura -- a list of positions which can be filled only by a decision of Party bodies at various levels. Moreover, the usual practice is to interchange personnel between the media, security and government agencies, and
the Party apparatus. E.G. Sviridov, who was Deputy Head of the Propaganda Department of the CC CPSU, was appointed Chairman of the Committee for the Press at the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR (September 1969). In August 1969 M. Davtyan, former secretary of the CC of the Komsomol in Armenia, was appointed Chairman of the Committee for Radio and TV of the Armenian Republic.

Appointments and dismissals are also used to assure personal loyalty, since the Party leader at any level is interested in having "his own men" at the crucial positions dealing with media. Following the fall of Khruschev several of his men heading the various media were removed and substituted by people loyal to the new leadership.

A former top Soviet journalist related that he had a direct contact with a member of the Politburo (D. Polyansky) who used to read materials which he sent him and give his opinion above the head of the normal censorship officials.

Training for the media is concentrated at Party schools and major universities under the strict supervision of the Party. The study of Marxism-Leninism and other ideological subjects is obligatory at all such training institutions. The great majority of working journalists in responsible positions are Party or Komsomol members; at the higher levels such membership is absolutely indispensable. Working journalists are members of the Union of Soviet Journalists which is a Party-controlled organization. Similarly, all working writers must necessarily be members of the USSR Union of Writers. Writers and journalists are subject to disciplinary measures by their respective organizations. Those who would not accept Party rule are expelled, prevented from entering employment or publishing anywhere in the USSR.
S. Ivanov, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Committee for Cinematography, was harshly criticized at a session of the Secretariat of the Writers Union of the USSR for "uncritically including decadent forms of the Western cinema" in a film by K. Murakov produced in the Ukraine. Despite public self-criticism by Ivanov, who admitted "his great errors", he was dismissed several weeks later and transferred to "another, unspecified post". 48

A former Chairman of the Local Section of the Trade Union of Journalists in Leningrad testifies that a Party recommendation is indispensable for being accepted to work at any of the important newspapers down to the rayon level. In the major city centers there usually is a long list of people seeking work as journalists who remain without a position for prolonged periods of time. Some of the recent émigrés were freelance writers for Soviet publications; some of them were never able to secure a position because they lacked a proper Party recommendation since they had the "wrong" ethnic background. 49
VI. The Men in Charge of Communications

As mentioned above, one of the most effective ways of Party control of communications is the tight monopoly on training, appointments, promotions and dismissal by the appropriate Party bodies. Only a few of those responsible for media received professional journalist training. On the other hand many were trained in Party schools and at ideological departments of the Party. 50

The most frequent training pattern is a combination of higher Party training with specialized higher education, and a career which includes work both in some Party institution and in other state and public bodies. 51 S.G. Lapin, who took over the chairmanship of the USSR Committee for Radio and TV in April 1970, had until then been Director General of TASS. His previous career was mainly in the Foreign Service of the USSR. He was educated at first at the University of Leningrad, graduated from the Higher Party School (1942), was Vice Chairman for the Committee for Radio (1945-1955), and Ambassador to China (1965-1967). He is a member of the Central Committee since 1966. M.V. Zimyanin, editor of Pravda since 1965, is also Chairman of the Soviet Journalist Union and a member of the Party Central Committee (both since 1966). He was originally educated at Teachers Institute and made his career in the Komsomol and in the Party in Belorussia. In 1960-1965 he served as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

The heads of the sections in the Central Committee Secretariat who deal with media are mainly people who have done their career within the Party Apparat. D.P. Shveglin, Head of the Information Department since 1965, is a lawyer and journalist by profession who was educated at the Moscow Law Institute and the Higher Party School. He worked in the field
of education and Party affairs in Belorussia and later moved to Moscow where he is a Central Committee member. A.G. Yegorov, the editor of the Party ideological monthly Kommunist, was appointed to this position after a continuous Party career during which he served subsequently as Head of the CC Departments for Ideology and for Propaganda. The education and career of K.S. Simonov, Head of the Department of Transportation and Communication at the Central Committee is perhaps typical of other Party heads in charge of a specific technological branch. He received a technical education and had a prolonged career in railway and transportation management, before being transferred to Party jobs in his specialization.

One would normally assume that the security services have people of their own among the top communications people. However there is evidence of several of them having connections with the KGB. This is the case, for example, with N.N. Mesyatsev, who was Chairman of the Committee for Radio and TV in the years 1968-70. He began his career at the Military Legal Academy in 1938 (the year of the Great Purge), which was training military judges and interrogators. (The famous "troïka" secret tribunals were usually staffed by officers of the security forces with some legal training.) Upon graduation he worked as interrogator, subsequently moving into a Party career. He graduated from the Academy of Social Sciences in 1955 and went into the Department of Propaganda of the CC.

A typical career of the type "from worker and student to top Party boss", is that of the former Head of the CC Department of Propaganda, V.I. Stepakov. Born in 1912, he was sent as a worker activist to study at a Communist University. He graduated from Moscow Teachers Institute in 1952, was Department Deputy Head at the Moscow Board of the Ministry of State Security (1952-1953, the last years of Stalin), again went to study at the
Academy of Social Sciences and graduated in 1957. Then, after several Party jobs and one year as editor of Izvestia, he was appointed Head of the Propaganda Department and became a member of the CC.

The background of the Chairman of the Board of Znanie Society is very different from those heading the other media institutions. Being a voluntary organization of the Soviet Intelligentsia, it is headed by Academician I.I. Artobolevsky. Graduated in 1926 from the Agricultural Academy in Moscow, he later became a specialist in machine building. He holds three orders of Lenin and is a Hero of Labour. Available evidence does not point to any Party or security career in his background. However, according to evidence of émigrés, when this is the case the Party and security connections are assumed by Deputy Heads who have the proper training and personal record.

By a decree of the Supreme Soviet the heads of TASS editorial offices and top officials of this organization are subject to a special procedure in case of labour disputes. These are decided by higher authorities and not by the Trade Unions or in court. This is one of the many special arrangements, both in terms of privileges and control, which are typical for media personnel in the USSR.52

Émigrés formerly employed by influential Soviet media testify that an editor or even an ordinary correspondent from a central newspaper gets top VIP treatment when travelling for his paper in the provinces or visiting an enterprise or an institution in his own area. Vladimirov, who arrived in Alma-Ata on behalf of the Moscow journal Nauka i Zhizn, was housed in the Party Central Committee hostel which is the most luxurious in the republic and populated by select top officials and personalities.53 A correspondent of the Literaturnaya Gazeta on a visit to the industrial city of Perm was given the same treatment. A film maker from Moscow on a visit to the
northern port of Murmansk was taken without a passport or legal permission on a voyage of several days to the shores of Norway, during which he gave his word to the captain that he would not leave the boat. The captain obviously undertook a considerable risk. According to the informant, he did this to curry favor with the influential media man, since contact with him may always turn out to be of some use.

Despite the tight controls on manpower in communications, the authorities are not able to prevent some "unwanted people" from doing some work in the field. Sometimes these are officially approved people, e.g., the people in charge of the KVN program (an innovative student program which included spontaneous thought and reactions of young people to various problems) were dismissed several times over when the Party supervisors felt that the program was getting out of control. In the northern town of Norilsk a group of young professionals formed a special team named Kontur for producing lively and interesting programs for young people. After three months work the team was ordered to disband and join other production teams. However, the latter refused to accept its members. The reasons were given as follows:

1. The group failed to maintain close touch with the local Komsomol,

2. The team advocated the introduction in Norilsk of the Shchekino experiment (an economic reform measure which provided for saving in manpower and dividing the saved fund between the working personnel), without previously consulting the local Party members and,

3. The media men in the other teams resented the members of Kontur because of their professional efficiency and education. 54

Apart from professional full time journalists, there are numerous part time and freelance writers who work for the media sporadically. According to émigré evidence, many of these are quite different from the
full time journalists. They are non-Party and often anti-establishment people, bright and energetic, or quite Bohemian, who would rather earn a quick ruble by writing a piece or two a month for some publication than slave it out as full time employees under rigorous control. Some of these use the assignments from an influential publication as a strategem for posing as fully accredited representatives and for investigating real life. Despite the strict self censorship which the part time writers impose on themselves in order to get published, their materials are often refused by the responsible editors because they are not in accord with the official line, or are too revealing of unfavorable social realities. One such part time writer who described in realistic terms the outmoded and authoritarian behaviour of teachers in a school in suburban Moscow and reported the demands of the pupils for reform had his articles returned by the editor of an influential youth journal with a comment: "This is anti-Soviet material".

The Soviet authorities have major problems with some mass activities of young people which are very difficult to control. During the last several years private film making, shortwave broadcasting and tape recording have become rather popular hobbies. In order to control the field and to utilize the talent, the authorities make efforts to develop formal institutions for these activities. At the Mosfilm central studios in Moscow, a major department for amateur film making was created. Some of the foremost film-people in the USSR became interested in it, and are investing much of their time in this department. According to evidence, private film making and film shows are nevertheless widespread without official controls.
A serious problem is created by the so-called "radio hooligans" -- youngsters who use their amateur shortwave transmitters for informal chatter and communication. The Soviet press complains that such private broadcasting pollutes the air, and "causes interference with public broadcasting". Moreover, the radio hams often use their communication facility for broadcasting officially unapproved information and opinions as well as for content which is officially regarded as obscene. The Soviet authorities are taking stringent measures to curb this dangerous phenomenon. Since it is difficult to locate all the trespassers, a major public campaign is waged in the media to enroll the cooperation of the public against them. In the opinion of émigrés the authorities utilize the obscene remarks of some of the radio hams in order to suppress the many others who are "clean" and whose broadcasts are objectionable to them for political reasons.  

In 1975 some 100,000 journalists were working in all "media and propaganda agencies" of the USSR. Some 15,000 students were studying in journalist-training institutions (at day, evening, and correspondence departments), which included 21 universities, 12 Higher Party Schools, and the Academy of Social Sciences at the Party CC. About 70% of the members of the Union of Soviet Journalists had at least some years of college and 1400 had titles of Candidate or Doctor of Science.
B. THE MEDIA

I. Government Bodies In Charge Of Communications

It was pointed out above that the government is not the sole owner and operator of media in the USSR. Nevertheless, it does directly run and supervise the great bulk of the media in that country. For this purpose it set up several major organizations on a functional basis. There is, however, no single body which coordinates, plans and supervises all government media. Following are the major government bodies dealing with media:

1. The Ministry of Communications, which operates most of the technical communications facilities, as well as the network of the official mail and telegraph services.

2. The USSR Government Committee for Radio and Television.

3. The Union-Republican State Committee for Cinematography (Goskino).

4. The USSR Government Committee for Publishing, Printing and the Booktrade (Goskomizdat).

5. The independent censorship agency (Glavlit).

6. The Ministry of Culture.

7. The USSR State Planning Board (Gosplan).

Many other government ministries are concerned with media, though this is not their main field of activities. The Ministry of Defense operates publishing houses, newspapers, radio and oral communications networks for its purposes. The Ministry of Education as well as all other ministries concerned with education and training of manpower are dealing with publications of textbooks and of aids in education. They publish newspapers, books, and journals and operate communication networks for their particular purposes. Amongst such government agencies are the Committee for State Security, the
Ministry of Fisheries, the Central Statistical Board, and so on.²

Parallel to these bodies established at the USSR (federal) level in Moscow, similar agencies exist at the various levels of the Soviet administrative system: republic, oblast, province, rayon (district or county). At a rayon level there is a propaganda section at the local Party headquarters with an official in charge, subject to one of the Party secretaries and to the First Secretary who is the top official. At the local Soviet Executive Committee, which is both a local authority and a branch of the central government apparatus, there are local equivalents of the central bodies. Programs on local issues in electronic media are prepared and controlled by the local representatives of the Committee for Radio and Television. A local branch of the Ministry of Culture (raiono, gorono) is in charge of the educational network, and so on.

The distribution of newspapers and periodicals all over the USSR is in the hands of a special government agency Soyuzpechat (Union-press), which is under the Ministry of Communications. The great majority of newspapers and periodicals are distributed by subscription and delivered by the Government Post Office. The rest is sold by Soyuzpechat in its ships and kiosks all over the country. Publishing and printing is done by many organizations both governmental and non-governmental.³ However, overall supervision and management is entrusted to the Committee for Publishing, Printing and the Booktrade. The Committee also runs the sales of books in the country throughout a network of facilities of its own (Soyuzkniga).

Until 1972 the press all over the USSR was controlled by the Committee for the Press at the USSR Council of Ministers. In August 1972 it was transformed into the UNION–Republican State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Publishing, Printing and the Booktrade, with B.I. Stukalin as Chairman.⁴
II. Soviet Radio

As mentioned above, Soviet radio developed especially since the death of Stalin. Following the XX Party Congress in 1956, medium and long wave broadcasting was widely introduced in the European USSR and short wave broadcasting in the Far East and Central Asia. In the beginning of 1960 the CC of the Party sharply criticized the work of the Soviet broadcasting network. It obliged it, within a short time, to provide the Soviet listeners all over the USSR with a choice of several programs. It demanded that the broadcasters diversify the programs by introducing more interesting broadcasts and interviews through drawing on some of the best talent available.

The CC took the matter up again in 1967 in a decision which especially stressed the shortcomings in broadcasting in the rural areas. It demanded that in each republic and oblast firm dates be fixed for the completion of the wired-loudspeakers network. The CC stressed the need in introducing the loudspeakers with a three-program capacity, so that listeners would be able to chose between a) the Central (Moscow) program, b) the Mayak light program, and c) the local (republic, province, district) program. The Ministry of Radioproducts was instructed to arrange for the production of such loudspeakers. The Ministry of Trade was obliged to provide for the sale of these to the public on a subscription basis so that loudspeakers with three programs would be installed in all apartment houses, hotels, hospitals, and other public buildings. To ensure better work and servicing, all radio stations, transmitters and radio cables were transferred to the Ministry of Communications. (Previously some were in the hands of many small local agencies.) The loudspeaker is the poor man's radio; it is widespread
in the houses of the rural dwellers, the rooms of the ordinary workers, and in the dormitories of students and trainees. These people are not able to listen to the more popular and lively Mayak program at all, and during much of the broadcasting time they are actually condemned to one program only since the other is in a language which they do not understand.

At a conference at the Central Committee Propaganda Department in Moscow in the summer of 1968 the central topic was the work of the news services. Considerable improvements were noted, but the news bulletins of the Mayak station as well as the Vostok (which broadcasts to the eastern areas of the USSR) were said to be not sufficiently operative.

At another conference, which this department arranged together with the Agricultural Department of the CC, it was noted that programs for rural listeners are often broadcast at times inconvenient for people in agriculture. The broadcasters often do not know village life and make clumsy mistakes. The connection between rural editorial boards and the Ministeries and agencies concerned is often rather weak.  

The total broadcasting output of the USSR, including broadcasts abroad, was about 1500 hours per day. Internal broadcasting was in 70 languages for an audience of some 200 million people. In an official report Soviet radio and television were presented as a major industry, a branch of culture with 500 organizations and almost 50,000 employees. The 1970-1975 Five Year Plan envisaged such a development of broadcasting that it would ensure the simultaneous reception of at least two programs all over the country. For this purpose new major stations are being built especially in the Far East, Central Asia and Kazakhstan.  

Soviet broadcasting abroad was conducted in 57 languages, mostly by the station Peace and Progress which is directed to the developing countries.
Ultra-shortwave broadcasting is to be introduced for two and four program transmissions. For this purpose special stations capable of serving both radio and television are to be built.

At present the central studios in Moscow operate four major programs. The first is the main program carrying the bulletins, major news and commentaries, documentaries, and entertainment. It operates from 5 o'clock in the morning until 2 o'clock at night. The second program goes on from 6 o'clock in the morning until 1 o'clock after midnight.

The third program is mainly devoted to shows and literary broadcasting. The Soviet practice is not to put on special shows for radio or television, but rather to televise the best theatrical and light entertainment performances (operas, dramas, concerts, shows) as they appear on the Soviet stage. This station operates from 5 o'clock in the afternoon until the end of the particular show broadcasted on that particular evening.

The fourth program is on the air all hours of the day and night. This is the so-called Mayak program, which is perhaps closest to the Western-type radio service. Inaugurated in September 1964, it has become very popular because of its informal, lively presentation and its young voices. Its style is in total contrast to the old type declamatory and pathos-ridden style of traditional Soviet broadcasting. It has short news releases every half an hour and is filled with lively interesting programs.

Local radio broadcasting is conducted by some 2800 town and district editorial boards. Major facilities in some of the big cities are in an intermediary position. For example, the station in Leningrad which employs 2400 people, broadcasts for the whole country about two hours per day. Stations in the faraway lands (e.g., Far East) broadcast many hours since the Central Program in Moscow cannot be received there, especially during the local peak hours.
The Central Broadcasting Agency is subordinate to the Committee for Radio and Television which was created as an independent agency in April 1962 by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The Committee is headed by a Chairman and an Editorial Collegium of 13 members. The Committee is responsible for all broadcasting content and operates the studios and the necessary internal equipment. However, the broadcasting stations, studio buildings, transmitting equipment, and the cable lines are owned and operated by the Ministry of Communications. The Central Broadcasting Agency is subdivided into a number of main editorial boards such as Propaganda, Musical Broadcasts, Literary Programs, Information, Youth Programs, and Broadcasting for Children. The special programs such as Mayak and Yunost (Youth) are also operated by the Central Broadcasting Agency. However, as Yunost is too political and propagandistic, the young appear to prefer the Mayak programs. For the Soviet fleet abroad, which has expanded greatly in the last decade and whose personnel is especially exposed to foreign stations, Moscow operates special programs such as "Dlya tekh kto v more."
III. Soviet Television

Soviet writers ascribe some of the major inventions in the field of television to Russian and Soviet scientists. They date the beginning of television broadcasting in the USSR to the early thirties. Yet television broadcasting was introduced only since the middle fifties, when programs were broadcasted every day without interruption (1955, with a second program introduced in 1956). The first entertainment programs were inaugurated in 1956 such as "Evening of Merry Questions," which was later substituted by the very popular "Club of the Merry and Smart." This program is a game of intelligence and inventiveness, which is broadcast each time from another city, mostly with students as participants. At the end of the fifties the newscast programs were thoroughly reorganized: existing interesting and operative programs were more frequent and more such programs were introduced. In 1967 color television broadcasting was introduced, after the USSR had concluded an agreement with France acquiring the patents of the French color system.

In the early sixties the Party CC addressed itself to the problems of television broadcasting twice (in 1960 and 1962). In both cases it stressed the great potential of this medium in propagating the policies of the Party and in molding the Soviet man. The decisions demonstrated the interest of the Party leadership in TV and helped mobilize support for its development. 11

By 1970 Soviet TV was transmitted by 1466 stations, including 132 "program initiating stations". The network ensures reception for about 175 million people, 70% of the country's population (1974). For transmission to a great distance the USSR operates communication satellites, "Molniya,"
and a network of 36 stations, "Orbita". In this way some 30 million in
the distant territories of the USSR can receive the programs of Central
(Moscow) Television. Toward the end of the sixties several major broad-
casting stations and studios were completed. The greatest of these, and
apparently the largest in Europe, is the 537 meters high station in
Ostankina in Moscow. It can accommodate four thousand people simultaneously
and has major film-making studios. Other major facilities are stationed in
Leningrad and in the Vitebsk area (with stations 316 and 350 meters high
respectively). The studios and their equipment belong to the Committee for
TV and Radio, but the transmission towers and lines are in the hands of
the Ministry of Communications.

The 1971-1975 Five Year Plan foresaw further development of TV:
60 major stations serving the "Orbita" system, at least one color program
in the capitals of the republics, as well as the transmission of "other
types of information including newspaper pages." Such pages are being
transmitted by TV so that Central newspapers are printed simultaneously
in twenty major cities, apart from Moscow.12

Moscow TV now has four programs which are on the air most of the
morning and afternoon, and all hours of the evening until close to midnight.
However, from nine in the morning until six in the afternoon only the first
program is available with an interruption during midday when no television
is on the air at all. In the evening four programs are operating simultane-
ously. Two of these are devoted almost entirely to official propaganda
and scientific broadcasts. Though some of the films are in color, there
is not one program in the USSR which is fully in color. According to tes-
timony by recent émigrés, color television did not become widespread because
of the low quality of the color picture, the scarcity of good color programs,
and the high price of color sets, amounting to about a half-year average income. The Soviet Union is linked to the Intervision System in which 11 countries of Eastern Europe participate. It also exchanges programs with Eurovision. However, even a republican capital like Kishinev has difficulty in receiving Intervision programs, because of outdated equipment. In 1974 305 cities received the programs of Moscow (Central) TV; of those, 103 cities received color programs.
IV. Postal and Telephone Services

Postal services in the USSR are rather slow and inefficient. The pay of postal personnel is relatively low, many of them are elderly and female, they rarely have the necessary transportation facilities. Delays are especially frequent during bad weather when only some major modern roads are passable. As a result large areas of the countryside and even parts of major cities are cut-off. The Soviet postman carries a heavy bag, since he is also a distribution agent for all printed matter. This is why the daily paper often reaches the Soviet home sometime between late morning and the early afternoon; when there is bad weather or some delay, a Soviet citizen may receive his latest newspaper several days later. Additional complications are created by censorship of letters and postal material in general (especially foreign correspondence), as well as the vastness of the country, multiplicity of languages and alphabets, and outmoded equipment.14

To beat the slowness and unreliability of the General Post Office, as well as to guard professional and political security secrets, the various Soviet hierarchies developed transmittal systems of their own composed of special telephone lines, tele-printers, special package delivery arrangements (by air) and courier networks. According to emigré evidence, important Party and Government dispatches, as well as restricted circulars and statistical materials, are transmitted by special couriers who carry these materials in locked dispatch cases. They hand these in person to the addressees and get their signature as evidence for delivery. Each document has a separate number; the recipient is obliged to keep the material in a locked place and not to make it available to anyone else.
The ordinary citizen and firm can overcome the slowness of the postal service by using cable services which are relatively cheap and more efficient. Cables are especially widely used because of the inefficient development of the Soviet telephone system and because receiving a telegram is still traditionally regarded as a matter of prestige. For these reasons Soviet citizens send telegrams to each other on various occasions much like people in the West send greeting cards (e.g., New Year, major festivals, and death).  

The telephone services are amongst the most underdeveloped and inefficient elements within the Soviet communications system. The Soviet authorities accorded relatively high priority to investing in mass media which serve the purposes of socialization in the official ideology. But they apparently saw no great merit in devoting major resources to the development of the mass telephone network for the convenient communication between private citizens. The telephone network was therefore at first developed almost exclusively for the needs of the regime -- for communication between the official bureaucracies and their members. However, for reasons of secrecy, telephone books were totally unavailable from the mid-thirties until several years after the death of Stalin. They are still a rarity even in such major centers as Moscow and Leningrad. Printed once in many years in limited editions, they are often outdated at the time of publication. Telephone subscribers in Tashkent, the major city of Soviet Central Asia, had to wait seven years for the publication of a new telephone book. The book carried a notification that because of many changes and errors a correction supplement would be issued shortly after publication. Reports in Soviet newspapers indicate that there are still entire villages, settlements, housing estates, and even town districts with only a single telephone or without a telephone whatsoever.
Since the early sixties the Soviets have undertaken efforts to modernize and widely expand their telephone system. Early in 1972 it was reported that all rayon centers in Moldavia had semi-automatic telephone exchanges with Kishinev, and the system was being extended to direct dialing between major towns. In 1971, 7500 more flats were equipped with telephones in the city of Kishinev. The wider aspects of the development of the telephone services during the post-Stalin period were reviewed above (Part A, Section I).
V. The Media Owned by the Party and by Public Organizations

Though officially a public organization, the CPSU is indeed the uppermost part of the Soviet political system, and the locus of the ultimate power in the USSR. As such, the Party operates a system of mass media of its own. However, this does not relate to electronic media which are fully owned by the state.

First and foremost amongst the Party publications are the following newspapers: Pravda (9 million copies in 1972), which is the main daily in the USSR; Komsomolskaya Pravda, for the young communists (8.4 million); and Pionierskaya Pravda, for school children (9.8 million). These three Party papers alone amount to some 28 million copies per day; and they are only a minor part in the publications empire of the Party. The bi-weekly Partiinaya Zhizn (Party Life), has a printing of a million copies. The theoretical journal Kommunist has a circulation of 750,000. Pravda operates also a publishing house, which issues many other publications.

The Party issues many newspapers for the specific areas or professional fields, e.g., Sovetskaya Rossiya (Soviet Russia), which is the main paper for the RSFSR, Selskaya Zhizn (Village Life), the chief newspaper for the village population, Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya (Socialist Industry), a paper for the problems of industrial enterprises, and so on.¹⁷

Media which belong to public organizations are naturally staffed by people appointed by these organizations. However, the responsible officials amongst them are those who gain approval from the appropriate Party and security bodies. Some of these, however, were prominent people in their own right before their appointment and have close connections with the Central Committee. Such people are able to play an independent role of their own. As indicated above, public organizations are major owners and
operators of media in the USSR. Following are some data about these organizations and their activities.

The **USSR Union of Journalists** is the recognized professional organization for journalists in print media, radio and television. Founded in 1959 it counted some 52,000 members at the end of 1972, of whom about 80% were Party members. Like many other such unions it is managed by an elected (Party approved) board and its chairman (M.V. Zimyanin). The organization publishes the monthly *Zhurnalista*. It also publishes the weekly *Za Rubezhom* in partnership with *Pravda*. The weekly contains a digest of the world press, selected in accord with official Soviet policies, and reviews on international affairs. Since it provides a window into the world, additional to whatever is published elsewhere in the Soviet press, it is popular with the intellectual reader interested in world affairs and prints about 1,000,000 copies.\(^\text{18}\)

The Soviet trade unions own publishing houses (*Profizdat*) which published 28,000,000 copies of books in 1972. A network of Trade Union Houses contains public libraries (285 million volumes in 1972), operates theater and art activities, arranges for cinema performances and so forth. Mass adult education in the Party spirit is the domain of the Organization of the Soviet Intelligentsia, called *Znanie* (Knowledge). Established in 1947, it was managed by a board headed by the well known academician I.I. Artobolevsky. The society holds lecture series, seminars, adult education classes, public lectures and symposia all over the Soviet Union and is in fact the major agency outside the Party for oral instruction for the intelligent public. Its publishing houses of the same name -- with branches in many of the republics -- prints some 40 million copies of its books (1972). It publishes a series of popular science journals such as *Nauka i Zhizn*
(Science and Life) and distributed 3.2 million copies in 1972, as well as a journal devoted to international affairs called Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn published in Russian, English and French simultaneously. 19

A similar situation pertains to other public organizations. The Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, publishes the newspaper Moscow News available also in French, Spanish and Arabic, and journals such as Kultura i Zhizn issued simultaneously in Russian, English, French, German and Spanish. The Dossaf Organization (The All Union Voluntary Society for Assisting the Army, Air Force and Navy), a patriotic organization of civilians for promoting the knowledge of military affairs and for para-military training, issues journals such as Sovetskii Patriot, Radio, Voyennye znaniya (Military Knowledge). A one-time printing of its publications amounts to 2.5 million copies. 20

A full scale review of such organizations in the USSR and of their media operations is not the purpose of this paper. The examples given above may be sufficient, however, to illustrate the basic point about media operations by public organizations in the USSR. They do it under the multiple control of the Party and in accord with the Party spirit (partiinost). Yet it is quite natural that the media units operated by a specific organization reflect some of the specific interests of its parent body, which sometimes may be at some variance with those of the Government and Party as a whole.

Unique amongst publications in the USSR are those published by "ideologically alien" bodies. Even a system like that of the USSR finds it impossible to totally prevent such publications. Amongst these are, for example, the official organ of the Russian Orthodox Church, Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, published monthly since 1943 (also in 1932-35), or the Baptiskii Vestnik (Baptist Herald), published by the Union of Baptists
in the USSR. Other examples are journals published in other countries in Russian according to a reciprocal arrangement between governments, e.g., Amerika or Anglia. 21
VI. The Book Trade

During the first years after the Revolution the Soviet authorities practiced a free distribution of books and pamphlets. During the NEP period a limited amount of private publishing was allowed. Since then it is almost totally in the hands of the Government and public agencies. A semblance of small-scale semi-private book selling is carried on by the special shops for antique books and bazaar stalls. Though formally owned by some public organization, they are usually run by persons specializing in the field (sometimes as if they owned them).

Since the Soviet economy is largely run as a planned command economy and book publishing is managed by centrally directed and politically motivated bodies, priorities in publishing and distribution are set according to political rather than trade criteria. However, from time to time, the Party authorities respond to massive complaints and disproportions in the field of publishing by insisting that the book trade should take into account the demands and needs of the population. This was the essence of a decree issued by the CC on August 15, 1931.22

In 1935 the book trade was first put under the Ministry of Culture and then transferred to the jurisdiction of the Committee for the Press of the USSR government. With the creation of the Goskomizdat in 1972 it moved to the jurisdiction of this committee. The major book sale organizations are: Soyuzkniga (Union-Book), which was an independent organization at first and was put under Goskomizdat in 1973. The sale of books in the countryside is conducted by a branch of the co-op shops called Tsentrokoopkniga (Center Co-op-Book).
Books are sold in the book shops and kiosks belonging to the Ministry of Communications (Soyuzpechat). Some publishing houses (Nauka, Transport) have retail shops of their own. International book trade is conducted by a special organization called Mezhdunarodnaya Knisa (International Book). It is a share holder company owned by several Soviet organizations, and promotes and sells Soviet books abroad and is an authorized importer of foreign books to the USSR.

The economic reform in the USSR combined with some pressure from consumers and the authorities brought some substantial changes in Soviet publication practices. The traditional practice was for the central authorities and publishing houses to fix the printing (circulation) quotas for the various publications. The result was that some propaganda material of unpopular books which for some reason caught the central bureaucrats' fancy were issued in large printings and gathered dust on the shelves of the bookshops. At the same time many publications were printed in small numbers, sold out on the day of issue and then resold in the black market at high prices. Presently, the procedures provide that the major bookshop organizations place orders on books before publication and that these be taken into account for the purpose of fixing the number of copies printed. However, according to evidence from visitors and recent émigrés things have changed only to a degree.

Book printing and the book trade still run very much on political and bureaucratic lines. Bookshops are usually packed with unpopular propagandistic materials, whereas those of the greatest interest for the buyers are not available. Some very popular books by Soviet and Russian writers who were previously forbidden are printed in limited editions despite a tremendous demand for them. As a result a black and grey book market developed: book sellers sell such editions "under the counter."
A typical problem is raised by an engineer from the town of Aralsk, in Kazakhstan. The firm for which she works orders technical books through the two local bookshops. But out of hundreds of items ordered only several were actually received, due to mismanagement and lack of interest of the local book sellers and the central organizations. The catalogues of the major publishing houses are extremely scarce and direct ordering of the books is difficult. In an answer to this complaint the deputy chairman of the State Committee for Publishing, G. Martirosyan, admitted that larger printings of the catalogue might be of help and that direct ordering of books by readers and organizations should be honoured much like subscriptions to newspapers and journals. He put much of the blame on the lack of well trained "book specialists." The Soviet secondary and higher educational institutions in which such specialists are trained had not yet trained the latter in sufficient numbers.
VII. **Financial Aspects of Media Operations**

In the ninth Five Year Plan (1971-1975) 4.63 billion rubles were earmarked for investment into the communications network (excluding print media). This sum is 36.3% higher than in the previous five year period. It amounts to more than 1% of the total investment during 1971-1975 (432.2 billion). A comparison between government investment and the total investment in the entire economy shows that the non-governmental portion is rather small, amounting to only 15% of the total. The available evidence indicates that such investment exists in many forms: public organizations, the Party bodies, as well as economic enterprises earmark certain amounts from their budgets (and portions of profit from media operated by them) for the further development of mass media which they own. For example, the kolkhozy invest some money into the development of a loudspeaker broadcasting system or for acquiring equipment for a small local news-sheet. *Pravda* may invest some of its profits into acquiring more modern printing equipment for some of its printing plants. A firm may earmark some money from the extra funds for building a cinema at its housing estate.

It is not known, however, whether the figures for the Five Year Plan include estimates for the investment of non-governmental organizations or reflect government investment only. According to émigrés who worked in mass media owned by public organizations, the latter received planning instructions from governmental planning bodies. The organizations submit a yearly and five-yearly plan of their own and are obligated to fulfill their plans much like government organizations. Soviet overall plans for economic development and housing include planned estimates for the non-governmental sectors (kolkhoz and co-operative).25
Due to continuous paper shortages in the USSR, inexpensive printed materials are bought by the population and are used as paper for many purposes. (This writer used to buy old music sheets and used them as notebooks.) The circulation of certain printed material is also boosted as a result of the official pressures and by the prevailing cultural fashions. Certain categories of officials and active members of public organizations are expected to subscribe to the publications related to their occupation and/or organization. All trade union officials and activists are induced to subscribe to Trud, the trade union newspaper. All offices, agencies, institutions of a certain Ministry put on their desks and bookshelves books published by that particular Ministry and those recommended by the Party. During the long Lenin celebrations in 1969-1970 many millions of books on and about Lenin were sold. Young couples and Soviet professional people have libraries or bookshelves of their own with volumes of the popular writer of the moment, e.g., Sholokhov, Gorky, Pushkin and A. Tolstoy in Stalin's time; or Dostoevsky, Bulgakov, and Tvardovsky at present. The phenomenon of ordering books by the yard for decorating and fashionable purposes is also not unknown. A new apartment and studio of a successful Soviet sculptor was furnished with a library of new multi-volume editions for impression's sake.

At each Soviet enterprise there are several special funds: for development, for social needs, and for material incentives. The fund "for the development of the enterprise", draws from three sources: part of the sums that are put aside for amortization expenses, part of the profit, and part of the income from discarded properties. In 1968 the portions for each item were 57%, 15%, and 28% respectively. About 40% of the planned profit has to be diverted into the development funds. The payments for the development fund are entered into special accounts at the State Bank. This
procedure had been introduced in connection with the economic reform, which provided the enterprise with wider rights and possibilities for the renewal of equipment and for investment. However, major modernization of equipment or major further investment is still planned by the central authorities and financed from central funds.

The social fund draws a certain portion of the above plan income which the enterprise is entitled to retain for the needs of its employees. It can be used for improving medical services, additional spending on children's institutions, for workers' comfort, cultural facilities, and housing. The administration of both funds is in the hands of the enterprise managers who must consult on these matters with the trade union boards. They also have the right to shift up to 20% of the amounts from one fund to another. 28

Income of the communication enterprises includes rent for communication channels such as telegraph, telephone, and broadcasting which is paid by organizations using those channels on a long-term basis. The pay accrues for the uninterrupted work of such channels; where an interruption of more than thirty minutes occurs, there is no pay for unused time. Pay for the work transmitters (for radio communications and for radio and television broadcasting) is counted by the hour of actual use and depends on the strength of each transmitter. Within the communications enterprises there is no mutual accounting and separate pay for services. For example, the telegraph services use radio communications and interurban telephone cables for transmitting telegrams; but the latter do not present accounts to the former for these services. An authoritative Soviet text explains that this is necessary in order to facilitate the mutual interchangeability between means of electrical communications and radio communications. Otherwise, if accounts were
mutually presented, some enterprises would refrain from using more costly means and the result would be slowing down the flow of messages.

Under the economic reform each enterprise has clearly earmarked sources of income and if it overfulfills the income plan, a certain portion of the additional income is retained by the enterprise. In 1968 the total income of the newspaper delivery firm Soyuzpechat was 147 million RB, about 13.5% of its total turnover. The expenditure of the system amounted to 106 million RB, and the net profit was 41 million RB.

In order to further stimulate the work of communications enterprises the USSR government allows enterprises to develop additional services, the income from which accrues to the enterprise itself. Such additional income and its utilization are not entered into the official plan and sums which remain unutilizable during one budget year can be utilized during the next year contrary to the usual procedure. The income from the additional services can be utilized for all kinds of improvements and for incentives to the personnel.29

Though Soviet books and newspapers are relatively inexpensive, popular publications bring major profits to their parent bodies. This is a result of several contributing factors. Soviet publications are printed usually on low quality paper and newsprint is inexpensive. Because of lack of competition and low esthetic standards, there is no need in major investments for the constant renewal of the printing facilities. Many of the printing plants are old or outdated. Labor costs are low and the number of personnel in Soviet newspapers are not very great. There is an immense mass market for the major central publications, especially in the Russian language. Specialized major journals catering to a particular group of the population print many million copies. For example, the two journals for
women, Rabotnitsa (The Working Woman) and Krest'yanka (The Peasant Woman), print together 18 million copies (12 and 6 respectively). 30

We have no detailed data about the incomes of Soviet newspapers. According to a former correspondent of the Literaturnaya gazeta, there were only 150 people employed at this popular weekly which sells 1.5 million copies at 20 kopeks per copy. The total production and distribution costs amounted to a minor fraction of the total income of the paper. The newspaper transferred the great majority of its income to its parent body, the Union of Writers of the USSR. Part of this sum was given by this body to the Litfond (Literary Fund), an agency of the union, catering to the needs of the writers, and part was left for investment in the newspaper and other enterprises of the union. A certain amount of the income is transferred to the government. These sums are not officially regarded as a tax; and the government, in turn, transfers certain sums from its budget for the needs of the Writers Union and its members. 31

In the research institutes of the Ministry of Communications independent accounting was introduced in January 1962. The income of such institutes comes from three sources: (a) the state budget (to cover basic investments and research work of importance to the country as a whole); (b) income from client organizations, such as other ministries and agencies which conclude contracts with the institutes for a certain piece of research; (c) and the Ministry of Communications itself for work done for the needs of its own agencies and sub-units. The plan for 1969 envisaged 19%, 37% and 44% respectively from the various sources of income. Upon signing a contract with a client organization the research institute has the right to receive an advance payment of up to 25% of the total. For example the participation of the postal enterprises in the cost of the letter-carrier
can be raised from the norm of 30% to 75%. The communications enterprise is allowed to buy with its additional income, equipment necessary to make the work more easy, such as automobiles and bicycles. The profit can also be invested in improving housing and in environmental needs. Additional services include advertising facilities made available both to organizations and citizens, as well as special forms of parcel and message deliveries. It is not clear from the material available whether such additional services can compete with the main activities of the communications organizations and cause them some losses. 32

While the great majority of Soviet communications equipment is produced in the USSR, there is a growing connection with foreign countries. Some of the most modern printing and communications equipment in the USSR is imported from countries such as West Germany, Switzerland, Finland, Canada and countries of the Comecon. Some of the Soviet journals -- especially those for foreign consumption and for the Soviet elite -- are being printed in Finland, Hungary and Bulgaria. The USSR is a partner in the intervision network comprised of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. It also exchanges programs with Eurovision. Soviet books, periodicals, and films are being exported abroad as well as supplied without pay to foreign countries and organizations and to developing countries in particular. In the way of cultural aid Jordan television is showing films on Soviet ballet and uses Soviet newsreels for its news programs. Soviet organizations also provide various services of media to communist parties in other countries. 33
Footnotes

Note: Sources quoted more than once are referred to by an abbreviated title. For full reference, see the bibliography.

Section A

1. This revolution has been described in a number of studies, quoted in the bibliography. It has been studied by the Comcom project at the Center for International Studies at M.I.T. during 1963-1969. It was summed up in its final report, see Pool, 1969 and 1973. See also Hollander (1972) and Hopkins (1970).


3. E.g., the volumes of the 1970 census (Itogi, 1970), the latest Soviet statistical yearbooks, etc. See below Footnotes #4, 6, and 9.


8. Agitator, No. 6, 1974, back cover; Trud, May 7, 1974, p. 3; Kommunist Tadzhikistana, May 7, 1974, p. 3.

9. Data below are from Transport i svyaz, 1972, pp. 281 and 189.


13. "Near complete monopoly of control in the hands of the Party and of the government, of all means of effective mass communication was included as one of the six basic traits of a totalitarian dictatorship." See C. Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Praeger), 1960, pp. 21-22. It seems that in the subsequent discussion about totalitarianism this particular feature was not altered.
14. Inkeles, 1971, p. 265, does discuss channels of feedback from the population upwards to the authorities, such as a) clandestine expressions, b) reports of "agitators," c) letters to the editor, etc.


16. The material in this section is based on interviews with former writers for Lit. gaz. and other former media people in Moscow, Leningrad, Dushanbe, Novosibirsk, Baku, Tbilisi, etc.

17. Subscription for this weekly went up from 377,000 in 1968 to 1,428,000 in 1972. See Lit. gaz., No. 1, 1972, p. 1.


19. Interviews with recent émigrés.


21. Sovetskaya Litva, September 15, 1972, p. 4. And see Sovetskaya kultura and Ekonomicheskaya gazeta for the respective periods.

22. This section is based on Gosplan, 1972, passim, and interviews with émigrés.

23. See Gos. plan, 1972, pp. 16-64.


25. Ibid., pp. 315-319.

26. Schramm, in D. Lerner and W. Schramm, eds., Communications and Change in the Developing Countries (Honolulu: East-West Center), 1967, pp. 5-32.

27. See Section A, IV., VI., and Section B, I. and V.


30. See these publications, especially since 1970.


32. Examples were the Watergate affair and the case of the Ma'alot massacre incident in Israel. During a considerable time Soviet media ignored the matter completely, while world media were saturated with the news. A brief (greatly distorted) account appeared in the Soviet media after these matters came to a close.

33. See Section B, I. Some 2,000 factories have newspapers of their own, and about 6 million workers, kolkhoz members and others are rabselkory, i.e., volunteer correspondents for Soviet newspapers. Trud, May 5, 1974, p. 1. A former Soviet director, who made a film showing how Soviet security agencies caught Western spies who had been parachuted into Soviet territory, reported in talks with the author that he received all kinds of support and encouragement from top security officials in Moscow.

34. Censorship is one of the central issues in the struggle of the Democratic Movement in the USSR and has been widely discussed by specialists in the West. See e.g., "The Soviet Censorship (A Symposium)," Studies on the Soviet Union (Munich), New Series, Vol. XI, No. 2, 1971; M. Dewhirst and R. Farrel, eds., The Soviet Censorship (Metuchen, New York: Scarecrow Press), 1973; P. Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia (New York: American Heritage Press), 1972; Medvedev, 1972. In addition, publications at higher levels supervise those at a lower level. This control can be rather effective. See e.g., Gazeta, 1972, pp. 148-149; Zhurnal, 3, 1974, p. 4.

35. See e.g., Khruschev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown), 1970, Chapters 7, 8 and Appendix 4. A high measure of integration of media in the Party is achieved through including editors in Party bodies. See e.g., Gazeta, 1972, p. 100.


37. BSE, 1972, 9, pp. 732-733.

38. Hazan, 1972, pp. 11-12; and cf., Hazan, 1976, passim.

39. Interviews with recent émigrés, formerly employed in media.


41. Interviews with émigrés.


43. Ibid. And interviews with Soviet expatriates.


47. The most famous recent case was that of Solzhenitsyn who had been expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers.


49. Materials in this section are taken from: BSE Yezyegodnik, 1973; Portraits, 1968; Prominent Personalities, 1968, p. 752; Pravda, April 25, 1970; Kommunist (Armenia), August 26, 1969; and from interviews. And see Zhurnalyst, 4, 1971, p. 79, for the career of P.F. Alekseev, editor of Sovetskaya Rossiya. Also Zhurnalyst, 6, 1971, p. 77, for data on several top media people. For the latest list of top media managers in government and state institutions see Digest, August 21, 1974, pp. 10-13.

50. Of 534 delegates to the Congress of the Journalists' Union (in 1971), 527 were members of the CPSU. Zhurnalyst, 1, 1972, p. 2.


53. Vladimirov, 1968, pp. 80-83. "A special correspondent is the paper's ambassador, and the paper's public image depends to a large extent on the impression which he makes on the people," L. Tolkunov (chief editor of Izvestia), in Zhurnalyst, 10, 1971, pp. 32-35. A recent émigré related that when he had been a special correspondent of a central Moscow paper in a republic, he had easy access even to the republican KGB head.


55. Such illegal radio hams are labelled "radio hooligans," See e.g., Kommunist Tadzhikistana, November 10, 1972, p. 4. And see Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, August 16, 1972, pp. 470-471; Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, August 22, 1972, p. 4.
Section B

1. See Section A, IV. and footnotes there.

2. See publications such as: BSE, Yezhegodnik, Sovetskaya pechat, Pravda, August 5, 1972.

3. See e.g., the journal Raspotraneniye pechati (Moscow, monthly).


5. See Section A, I.


8. Material in this section is from Trud, May 7, 1974, p. 3; Izvestia, May 7, 1974, p. 2; SWB, SU/W785, July 19, 1974, p. B1; and talks with émigrés.

9. Consult the schedules for radio and television in the central Soviet newspapers such as Pravda and Izvestia. TV programs for schools have greatly developed since 1965. See Uchitelskaya gazeta, August 21, 1971, p. 2.

10. Talks with émigrés.


13. Agitator, 6, 1974, back cover. In 1972 only 60% of Moldavia was reached by Channel 1 and only 15% by Channel 2. Sov. Moldaviya, September 30, 1971, p. 2; and January 14, 1972, p. 3.

14. Talks with émigrés. However, delivery of mail by air is expanding. In Kazakhstan, mail is sent by air to all provincial centers and 274 sovkhozy and settlements, Kaz. pravda, September 1, 1971, p. 2.

15. Evidence from émigrés.


18. BSE, Yezhegodnik, 1973, pp. 26 and 97. In 1972, there were 129,000 "mass libraries" in the USSR, and any serious library would be unthinkable without this outstanding publication. Zhurnalist, 1, 1972, pp. 2-33. And consult Za Rubezhom (Moscow, weekly).


20. For publications of public organizations, see e.g., BSE, Yezhegodnik, 1974 under the sections devoted to each organization.


23. Ibid., and talks with émigrés.


26. See e.g., Kaz. prawda, February 2, 1972, p. 2: A check on the subscriptions taken by various organizations in Kazakhstan brought to light widespread abuse of public funds. In one sovkhoz kindergarden, no childrens' magazines were being received, but USSR Supreme Soviet Gazette and other official papers were.

27. Interview with an émigré.


29. Ibid., pp. 80-83, 93-95.

30. BSE, Yezhegodnik, 1974.

31. Interview with an émigré.


33. Ibid., p. 91. And émigré evidence.
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