GUERRILLA COMMUNICATIONS

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Xerxes ... sent a messenger to Persia with news of his present misfortune at Salamis. Now there is nothing mortal that accomplishes a course more swiftly than do these messengers, by the Persians' skilful contrivance. It is said that as many days as there are in the whole journey, so many are the men and horses that stand along the road, each horse and man at the interval of a day's journey; and these are stayed neither by snow nor rain nor heat nor darkness from accomplishing their appointed course with all speed.

--Herodotus, Book VII, Chap. 98 (Godley translation).

A necessity was perfect "intelligence", so that we could plan in certainty. The chief agent must be the generals' head; and his understanding must be faultless, leaving no room for chance. Morale, if built on knowledge, was broken by ignorance. When we knew all about the enemy we should be comfortable. We must take more pains in the service of news than any regular staff.

--T. E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Chapter 33.
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This paper is an outgrowth of the author's earlier Foreign Press Monitoring by Communist Leaderships (draft, April 1964). I had intended to incorporate the very scattered data on press monitoring during the early guerrilla insurrectionary phases of aspiring Communist regimes in that paper. However, as more materials were uncovered on Communist and other guerrilla communications than originally expected, I thought it useful to collate and analyze these in the present separate paper.

The fact that the communications aspect of current guerrilla operations are largely concealed under the cloak of close security tends to restrict this paper to historical case studies. Nevertheless, its contemporary value is suggested by the fact that certain strong common elements in the cases collected here seem to find sufficient occasional publicity in current operations to suggest that they form significantly pervasive and persistent patterns.

Many excellent books and articles are scattered through the proliferating literature on guerrilla operations. Few, however, make more than a tentative examination of the data relevant to communications. The best of the early efforts were case studies, each being a detailed account of a specific operation in a particular place during a narrowly limited period. Among such
exemplary works I would include those by Spencer Chapman, Vladimir Dedijer, and Edgar Snow. The current trend is to investigate some of the similarities cutting across specific events, places and times so as to yield generalizations that can produce an operationally useful "doctrine" of guerrilla or counter-guerrilla war.

The spottiness of the available documentation, the narrow linguistic competence of the author, and the pressure of other commitments, renders this paper only an exploratory effort. It is hoped that other persons, qualified to control the bibliography of the individual regions, will be stimulated to systematically collect data toward a cross-case study of which the present one pretends to no more than a demonstration of its feasibility and utility.

Among the numerous other case studies that could have been profitably undertaken or expanded and for which unclassified documentation or personal interview data are fairly available to Western scholars would be the following:¹

Chinese Nationalist Guerrillas (SACO, etc.), WW II
French Maquis, WW II
Palestine, 1946-49
Greek Communist Guerrillas, 1941-49
The Philippine Hukbalahap Rebellion, post-WW II
Kenyan Mau Mau Uprising, 1952-56
Cyprus, 1955-59
Hungarian Revolution, November 1956

In the absence of an agreed terminology, I will apply "guerrilla" to any armed movement, operation, or personnel operating from bases within a country in opposition to established regular military (and police) authority. Such a portmanteau definition thus deliberately encompasses such related items as guerrilla organizations, insurgent forces, and revolutionary undergrounds.

Such a broad definition deviates somewhat from Chinese Communist usage. While they too distinguish "regular" troops from "guerrillas," they consider their Red Army--and its direct descendants, the Eighth Route Army and the People's Liberation Army--to be "regulars" and its armed auxiliaries to be "guerrillas." Their term which is usually translated "guerrilla" is *yu-chi-tui*, literally means "roving and attack corps," roving to avoid annihilation and attacking to annihilate the enemy. Their distinction between *yu-chi-chan*, "guerrilla war" and *yün-tung-chan*, "war of movement," is mainly one between small local independently operating groups and larger units coordinated over time and geography.²

I would gratefully receive from readers any additional published references to, or personal reminiscences of, specific guerrilla communications use or equipment. Such information need not be restricted to the particular case studies presented

here. Indeed, I would welcome both contradictory data for the
given case studies and similar data for deviant types of cases.
I would also appreciate information on both counter-communications
operations or techniques and international channels of arms
supply to guerrillas.
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This paper is a preliminary survey of the manner by which selected guerrilla organizations have obtained and transmitted information and orders. This survey is undertaken in an attempt to identify any common patterns of structure, function, or development of guerrilla communications. Thus, it focuses on the organization, purposes and effectiveness, and types or categories of information used in guerrilla command nets and communication networks,¹ rather than with the specific content of messages.

The basic theme of this paper is the commonality of certain key factors present in case studies of guerrilla operations. The key factors examined here are the communications systems and command nets used by guerrilla organization as well as the pattern of development that these systems and nets undergo. The conclusions and recommendations presented on the basis of the analysis of these factors are confined mainly to those aspects of counter-insurgency that may be termed counter-intelligence and counter-communications.

The conclusions reached are general, and the contingent recommendations formulated are prescriptive, despite certain dangers of historical generalizations and prescriptive policy recommendations. For example, I tend to share the misgivings of Newsweek's former

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¹ See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Dictionary (JD) (Washington, D.C.: 1962) for the definitions of these terms as recently standardized in the U.S. armed services.
Southeast Asia bureau chief who argues for the general inapplicability of the Chinese Communist experience to guerrilla operations in South Vietnam. Indeed, Mao himself recognized this problem in one of his very works that is so often taken as a model to be applied in other times and climes.

Although this paper takes as its earliest case the rise of the Chinese Communists in the 1920's, it is recognized that much relevant parallel material is contained in even earlier instances of underground, guerrilla, and insurgent operations. Nevertheless, the 1920's marked a sharp break with the guerrilla past as the result of three types of technological innovation: aircraft, more efficient


\[3\] Mao Tse-tung, Problems of Strategy of China's Revolutionary War (1936). Official English translation in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1963), pp. 75-150. Originally written in December 1936. Mao writes: "China's revolutionary war...is waged in the specific environment of China and so has its own specific circumstances and nature distinguishing it both from war in general and from revolutionary war in general. Therefore...it has specific laws of its own." Op. cit., p. 76. Specifically, Mao argues (pp. 76-77) that to apply without modification even the experience of the Soviet civil war is like "cutting the feet to fit the shoes." However Mao also recognized, in his Problems of War and Strategy (6 Nov. 1938) that the 8th Route Army's military experience was "precious," because they were one of only three (USSR and Spain) "proletarian" armies. Op. cit., p. 274.

\[4\] See, for examples, Concepts Division, The Role of Airpower in Guerrilla Warfare (World War II)(Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, Aerospace Studies Institute, 1962, Chapter II (pp. 4-19), or any other historical survey of guerrilla warfare that incorporates the intelligence, communications, or command-and-control elements of such operations.
weapons, and electronic (radio) communications. While major developments have continued down to the present in these three categories, they have not proven revolutionary: a clear historical continuity persists from, say, the early 1930's to the present. Hence any case studies of guerrilla movements dating from that time are acceptable candidates as case studies. 5

This paper also points out a rather serious omission in the literature, namely, the common neglect of the historical background to a given guerrilla operation, which one can most generously explain on the basis that the authors are too absorbed in a particular aspect of a particular case to make more than passing note of the organization, recruitment, training, and even stockpiling of equipment with which the particular guerrilla phase being studied had begun. 6 For example, in the same way that the literature on the Emergency makes only passing reference to the World War II guerrilla antecedents in Malaya, the literature on the latter neglects the pre-war training, experience, and organization of the Malayan Communist Party as an underground movement. This is not simply a result of a deficiency of historical sense by the authors but—to be quite fair—often reflects the shortage of readily available documentary sources for

5 Concepts Division (62), 20.

6 The only significant exception to this general defect in the literature of which I am aware is the excellent study on underground movements by Dr. Andrew Molnar, which anticipated some of the conclusions of this paper. See Andrew R. Molnar et al., Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Washington, D.C.: The American University, Special Operations Research Office, 1963).
the pre-guerrilla stages. By their very nature, underground movements
do not publicize their inner workings; and, similarly, the often
rather detailed information available to the local Special Branch of
the police is seldom made public. However, some data has become
public and I suspect, that interested and persistent scholars could
obtain public release of much material from police, military, and
other governmental offices for at least some of the early Communist
underground and guerrilla activities.

This paper will, by a device of format, attempt to supply
analyses of both the developmental patterns and functional patterns
of guerrilla communications: the case studies being written to con-
centrate on the historical dynamics, while Chapter II analyzes the
static elements as well.
II. GENERAL PATTERNS

A. INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the single most striking point to emerge from any comparative study of guerrilla operations is the large number of similarities between them. These similarities or patterns are seen in such things as styles of organization, leadership and recruitment, parallels in organizational development, and techniques of intelligence, propaganda, and—most relevant for this paper—communication.

As previously mentioned, this monograph is an outgrowth of a study of how and why the various Communist states select and monitor the international news and information media as well as to whom and through what channels this information is disseminated within these states.¹ Because that topic was approached historically, considerable data were quickly accumulated on such monitoring operations by Communist guerrillas and undergrounds in the early stages of the Communist movements, particularly in China. These early data on China showed both certain differences and similarities with their

current practices as well as with those of other Communist states. These observations raised a question of whether or not any strong parallels might not exist in other Communist guerrilla movements. Initially, it was decided to compare the guerrilla communications of the Chinese Communists with those of another Communist guerrilla movement that ultimately succeeded to national power. The example taken was that of Tito's Yugoslav Partisans in World War II.

This choice proved a happy one because--despite their great differences in social, cultural, and political milieu--the communications systems of both the Yugoslav and Chinese Communist guerrillas developed through virtually identical stages. A pattern was evident.

It was then decided to cast about for a third case-study to test the generality of this pattern of communications. The post-World War II Communist insurgency in Malaya was selected because, as an instance of guerrilla failure, it offered the greatest promise of providing a quite different communications picture. While this proved to be true, a key point unexpectedly emerged. Namely, the nature of communications used by the Malayan guerrillas was quite inappropriate for their intended strategic requirements. They were only just barely adequate for mounting individual acts of terrorism or occasional isolated raids. Yet this, despite the MCP's avowed hope of passing through the dazzling "stages" of revolution pronounced by Mao Tse-tung and their prior guerrilla experience against the Japanese in Malaya during World War II. Thus further questions were raised that required a closer look at this early phase of MCP
guerrilla experience. Again the unexpected: These two phases proved virtually identical in terms of the organization, tactics, and communications systems employed by the Malayan guerrillas. To read this earlier and quite separate event, and yet come away with an astonishing sense of déjá vu, forced the conclusion that the communications system available to a guerrilla group imposes certain decisive constraints on the types of operations they can mount and hence on their ability to develop through the "classic" stages of successively greater and more threatening military power. Thus the Malayan insurgency appeared to be a clear case of arrested development stretched over two decades from 1941.

At this point two tentative hypotheses were formulated: 1) that the development of a guerrilla organization is in large part dependent on the type of communications available to it, and 2) that—contrary to the too easy assumption by both many writers on and practitioners of guerrilla warfare—communications responsive to the policy and strategic needs of the guerrilla organization will not automatically appear.

Given these above hypotheses and encouraged by the Malayan example of an arrested, impotent, and finally defeated incipient guerrilla movement, one may then ask what, if anything, can police and military authorities do either to inhibit the growth of insurgency by preventing the insurgents from acquiring more advanced communications systems or to begin to defeat an already powerful guerrilla organization by damaging its existing communications
systems? This problem is explored further in the text under the heading of "counter-communications warfare" where a number of possibilities and opportunities are suggested.

At this point, it was decided to probe further into the histories of the three guerrilla movements already studied: China, Yugoslavia, and Malaya. A number of highly pertinent facts began to emerge. First, it proved quite instructive to examine the communications systems used by the pre-guerrilla Communist clandestine underground organization. With few exceptions (such as A. Molnar's useful preliminary study\textsuperscript{2}), writers in the guerrilla warfare field give no more than a perfunctory passing mention of the guerrilla's underground antecedents. By so doing they miss the "obvious" fact that it is precisely the communications system possessed in this earlier phase that becomes the sole initial system available in the immediately succeeding active guerrilla phase. And however adequate this system of couriers, radios, telephones, presses, or trained technicians may be to the running of a clandestine political and espionage network, it places severe initial limitations on the types of operations necessary for guerrilla organizations.

Faced with a number of striking similarities and parallels among the three cases studied, it was decided next to add additional cases to verify whether or not and to what extent these preliminary

findings represented general patterns. These cases were chosen to expand the range of types of guerrilla operations to include non-Communist instances--both successful and unsuccessful--such as Algeria and the Četniks and two cases of behind the lines guerrillas (Soviet Partisans in the Spanish Civil War and in World War II). It was also thought proper to assign at least two of the case studies (Algeria and the Viet Minh) "blind" to independent researchers.

I have concluded tentatively, on the basis of this expansion of the types of case studies, that the patterns observed earlier do, in fact, hold.
B. PURPOSES

The purposes that communications serve for guerrillas are many. Four of these are discussed below, each of which raises special problems of channels for the guerrilla and of documentation for the researcher. These four categories were adopted as discussion points only; other rubrics would doubtless have proved as practical.

1. Tactical Military Communications

The bulk of guerrilla communications—as measured by either sheer frequency of messages or volume of wordage—is mainly concerned with tactical military and political policy matters: commands to lower echelons and reports to higher echelons or lateral elements. These communications are characterized by heavy or total dependence on word-of-mouth or written messages delivered by couriers. Only in the more advanced stages of guerrilla organization and operation do we find telephone and radio used for this purpose. Fortunately, there is sufficient documentation to reconstruct at least a broad picture of this type of operation in most individual case studies.

2. Internal Political Communications

The guerrilla's internal political communications take two main forms: First, propaganda to the civilian population and lower level guerrillas or cadre. This topic is excluded from this paper.
Second, the distribution of orders and information among the leaders. This latter is an analogue of the formal and informal organizational structure of the underground and guerrilla groups and is of immediate relevance to our topic.

3. **International Communications**

The guerrilla's international communications also has two distinguishable aspects: incoming and outgoing. These two modes often can be further differentiated in terms of both message content and channel. Except for the special case of communications among Communist parties discussed in Section 4 below, the outgoing communications consist of propaganda and diplomacy and are only peripherally relevant topics here.

It is clear that monitoring the foreign press and radio is a permanent activity of established Communist regimes. This seems to be treated as one of the essential functions of such regimes and hence is organized at the earliest moment. Indeed, it appears to be already incorporated in the organization of the clandestine Communist Party organization prior to seizure of effective governmental power. For example, we know that the future leaders of the German Communist Government were trained on just such material at Comintern headquarters in Russia during World War II. And we know that these materials accompanied the Soviet Army into Germany in 1944 and, presumably, other Soviet occupied countries as well.३

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३ For details covering the U.S.S.R., China, and East Europe see papers cited in f.n. 1, above.
4. Communications with the External Directorate or Apparat

The question of communications between a guerrilla organization being directed from outside the country where it is operating and the external authority could, of course, be treated as a special case of international communications as discussed above. However it poses sufficiently special problems of security—and therefore of documentation—as well as problems in counter-communications to warrant separate treatment. 4

Examples of external direction of a guerrilla movement are not limited to Communists. For example, the British exercised close control over some aspects of the guerrilla operations in Malaya during World War II. They also achieved substantial coordination with various local partisan groups in France, Greece, and Yugoslavia. Governments and political parties in exile have at times exercised such authority at a distance: the Polish and Royal Yugoslav Governments-in-Exile in London during World War II, the Cuban exile factions in Miami today, the Angolan rebels currently in the Congo, and the United States during World War II, both in the Philippines and with the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) operated by the OSS in China after April 1943.

Such control may be direct or indirect, simple or complex, political or military, open or covert. Thus the Royal Yugoslavs

4 For a general study of the complete topic—not just its guerrilla aspect—see my Soviet Clandestine CommunicationsNets (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T., Center for International Studies, (April 1967).
eventually effected direct radio touch with Mihailović. London's control over its Advisory Missions in Greece and Yugoslavia passed through the SOE station in Cairo. Washington's control over the SACO operations in China was subject to joint administration with the Chinese Nationalists. The Comintern directed underground operations in Southeast Asia in 1930-31 via the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat located in Shanghai. The Philippine World War II guerrillas were coordinated through the regular military chain of command from the Pentagon to MacArthur's Headquarters and thence to his subordinates.

When the governing body of an underground or guerrilla movement is located in another country, this of course provides a secure base for policy conferences, staff planning, intelligence processing, group training, medical treatment, and even a merely refreshing change of scene. However, this arrangement often suffers from two decisive communications deficiencies. First--information deficiencies--when distantly removed from the scene of action, the leaders can all too easily succumb to wishful thinking or impractical scheming as did the Comintern in its efforts to manipulate revolutions in China and elsewhere in the 1920's.
or of the NKVD to extend the Great Purge to civil war Spain.\textsuperscript{5} Second--control deficiencies--when the communications channels are primitive, the leaders' directives may reach the intended echelon only after excessive delay as in the cases cited below where the full details--as opposed to summary versions--of the decisive Comintern decision in 1935 to revive the United Front policy did not reach the Chinese Communist leadership for 13 months.

A major problem of general relevance is seen most clearly in our data on the international communications of the Chinese Communist guerrillas, both regarding their specific links with Moscow and their general links with other countries and Communist parties.\textsuperscript{6} The volume of this traffic documented in this study is much greater than is generally accepted, even by such careful researchers as Robert North, Charles McLane, and Allen Whiting. More international contacts existed through travellers and visitors than is fully recognized; and--more significant--the

\textsuperscript{5} Of course, this problem in the conduct of global operations is not exclusively a Communist vice as witness Churchill's "painful surprise" on learning from Wavell in the midst of planning the desperate landward defenses of Singapore that all heavy defense works were irrevocably designed to repulse an assault from the peaceful sea, an event that never materialized. Winston S. Churchill, \textit{The Hinge of Fate} (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), pp. 47-50. Contrary to general belief, the heaviest cannon did have all-round traverse; but, as General Wavell reported, their flat trajectory was unsuited for the required counter-battery fire against conventional field artillery.

\textsuperscript{6} In addition to the case study below on the Chinese Communists see my \textit{Soviet Clandestine Communications Nets: With Special Reference to East Asia} (April 1967).
volume of direct and indirect clandestine communications traffic by courier and radio between the Chinese and Soviet Communist leaders during the 1930's has been almost entirely overlooked.\footnote{I am greatly indebted to Francis J. Rendall for bringing my attention several additional references that support this unexpected and quite striking finding, one independently developed by him in his forthcoming \textit{Study of Sino-Soviet relations} book tentatively titled \textit{History of the Origins of the Sino-Soviet Dispute}. For example, Chiang K'ai-shek's septuagenary account of Sino-Soviet relations or the writings of Freda Utley, Irene Korbally Kuhn, or "Ypsilon."}

It has been usual even among those sources that argue most fiercely that the Chinese Communist movement was controlled from the Kremlin to find only scattered reference to direct communications. They argue that policy coordination was achieved entirely through infrequent and largely public statements of general policy guidances.\footnote{I am greatly indebted to Francis J. Rendall for bringing my attention several additional references that support this unexpected and quite striking finding, one independently developed by him in his forthcoming \textit{Study of Sino-Soviet relations} book tentatively titled \textit{History of the Origins of the Sino-Soviet Dispute}. For example, Chiang K'ai-shek's septuagenary account of Sino-Soviet relations or the writings of Freda Utley, Irene Korbally Kuhn, or "Ypsilon."} One has to go back to the "Red Scare" literature of the 1920's to find massive, if suspect, evidence from people such as the pseudonymous Eugene Pick that the Chinese Reds were manipulated in minute detail by the international Communist conspiracy.

Thus we are presented with the dilemma of how to resolve our data pointing to extensive and frequent communications and the current belief that Mao had early on pursued an independent policy. On the surface, our finding supports the conclusions of the control-from-Moscow school. Yet, the essential difference between these two theories does not, in fact, hinge on the amassing of data that demonstrate the volume or even the content of such international communications. Even when extensive traffic can
be proved—as I believe should now be accepted for the Chinese Communist movement even in their Yenan days—one must still prove that policy content coincides as well. Here the evidence for Communist China is indeed contradictory: one can prove either case by merely overlooking the contrary evidence as was commonly done by the polemicists of the 1940's and early 1950's.

The current scholarly consensus tends toward some mix of these viewpoints, recognizing that the Chinese Communist leadership sometimes adopted the Comintern or Moscow line, sometimes modified it, and sometimes diverged both sharply and wittingly from it. The recent revelations from both Moscow and Peking have demonstrated that much of the relevant evidence of differences between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union were successfully concealed. But even a proven coincidence of policy statements while clearly proving influence is still insufficient to prove outright control. Verification of control can only come from two sources: the direct evidence of revelations of the policy-makers themselves (or their closest staff advisers) and inferences drawn from their actions. The former evidence—being in the most tightly guarded area of organizational secrecy—is usually slow to come to light and even then often in the form of highly biased self-justifying memoirs. The latter—although drawing on the entirely visible signs of policy—suffers from the usual problems of trying to infer policies or motives from action or behavior.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Guerrilla organizations seldom arise "spontaneously." Their early leaders, organization, equipment, and operational techniques are usually derived in whole, and always at least in part, from local conspiratorial underground movements. These, in turn, often are supported or at least inspired from outside, as in the case of the Cypriot and Algerian as well as all Communist revolts.

One class of exception to this generalization are those non-political guerrilla operations that developed from military units left behind the lines by the advance of an occupying army. World War II examples are seen in the several U.S. Army guerrilla groups that operated in the Philippines and in the small British Army groups in Malaya and the Canton Delta. Another exceptional class is comprised of those "special forces" operations set up during a conventional war to extend military operations behind the enemy's lines. Examples here would include the NKVD's guerrillas in the Spanish Civil War, the KMT-U.S. Navy's Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO), and the Soviet Partisan groups in World War II, as well as the U.S. Special Forces in South Vietnam today. Both classes share the distinctive characteristic that they are created from and directed by an already existing regular military or para-military organization rather than a clandestine underground.

9 Molnar (63).


11 Other examples: Wingate's Raiders in Burma in WWII; the South Vietnamese infiltration parties now in North Vietnam.
D. MEDIA AND EQUIPMENT

Development of communications equipment for guerrilla command-and-control has usually passed through three rather distinct phases: 1) from couriers, 2) through telephone, 3) to radio. This communications development appears to parallel closely the three "stages" of guerrilla organizational and strategic development as propounded by Mao, Giap, and Guevara.12

1. Couriers

The use of couriers as a means of transmitting messages is such a commonplace that the literature often takes it for granted: messages merely "arrive" with the means unspecified. This is perhaps justified; but, if for no reason other than placing it on the record and making explicit the obvious, we shall discuss briefly the origins, diffusion and uses of this system as well as its advantages and weaknesses in counter-communications warfare.

The use of couriers is, of course, traceable to antiquity and seemingly came into being together with diplomacy, serving as its only communications channel. The first recorded institutionalized use is that of the Royal Messenger of the Egyptian

Eighteenth Dynasty (approx. 1570-1304 B.C.) who was simultaneously the first courier and the first diplomat. Throughout the ancient and medieval epochs--East and West--diplomacy was largely confined to ad hoc deputations dispatched to negotiate on a specific matter, to transmit certain information, or to collect intelligence data on a particular situation. The courier-diplomat would return immediately upon completion of his assigned mission, the system of a resident ambassador transmitting his reports through a diplomatic courier being unknown. As a consequence of this direct contact, and for reasons of security, oral transmission was preferred to written. Because of the hazards of the road and the dangers of interception, those messages that were written were usually concealed in ingenious ways: Cyrus received letters concealed in the belly of a hare, Ovid and Herodotus mention secret messages inscribed on the bearer's skin, and the messengers themselves often travelled incognito to avoid the spies of enemies--organized espionage systems existing at least from the time of the Emperor Justinian in the 6th century.  

The modern diplomatic practice of maintaining permanent missions abroad was a Venetian innovation and dates only from the 15th century. However, by the following century all the

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major Italian states had permanent representatives throughout Western Europe. These permanent representatives began to send back not only intermittent political reports but news-letters as well, the latter often being published for public consumption—the newspaper-surrogates of their time. 14

The development of cryptic symbols to mask the full meaning of messages probably grew up with diplomacy itself. The earliest recorded cipher—involving simple transposition of letters—was introduced by Julius Caesar, and shorthand was in existence from at least the 6th century Papacy. From the end of the 15th century the formerly simple—but effective—ciphers were gradually superseded by progressively more sophisticated cryptograms; and the use of such devices of concealment soon became general in diplomatic correspondence, many of these personal ciphers successfully resisting all but the most recent attempts to decipher. 15

The important point that seems well-established by the researches of the late Professor Thompson and Dr. Padover—although they do not make this explicit—is that the various diplomatic techniques of couriers, clandestine transmission, and secret writings are traditions gradually perfected from antiquity to the present. Although a great deal of personal ingenuity, invention, and improvisation entered into the specific details of the

14 Thompson and Padover (63), pp. 27-29.
15 Thompson and Padover (63), pp. 253-263.
application of a given technique at a given time, nevertheless the idea of the technique appears to be something that once invented was diffused to other users. Our own data verify this conclusion, suggesting that these techniques often are not merely "self-evident" solutions that are "spontaneously" rediscovered.

That couriers are a traditional communications device--and that oral messages are sometimes the preferred form in which they transmit even where illiteracy is not an obstacle--is seen spectacularly in the Chinese case. As late as 1950-1952 during the Korean War, when the Chinese Communist Army had passed well beyond its guerrilla stages into that of a regular--if primitive--army, verbal messages transmitted by courier was still the principal means of passing military orders from the middle level echelons to subordinate units. 16

2. Telephone

The telephone has been commonly used by guerrillas as a communications medium. Indeed, its use is often characteristic of the earlier stages in their development when it becomes, after couriers, the second medium to be added to their repertoire of media. (The special role of printed media is discussed below.)

In some cases such as Yugoslavia, telephone was already used in the pre-guerrilla urban underground stage. In that case the

Yugoslav Communists had tapped into the regular commercial telephone network, using it both to transmit their own internal messages and occasionally to intercept communications of their opponents.

During the stages of active guerrilla operations, telephone played two kinds of role, both of which were used by the Chinese and Yugoslav Communists. First, wire-tapping and infiltration of key technical personnel permitted continuing use of the enemy's commercial and field telephone systems. Second, the guerrillas quickly and early developed their own field telephone networks to link subordinate units scattered in the countryside. This latter "technological escalation" was effected by the simple expedient of seizing the needed equipment from the enemy--capturing telephone instruments and portable switchboards and presumably the electrical generators or batteries in raids on command posts and detailing special guerrilla auxiliary bands to steal the unprotected wire strung between the enemy's posts. These operations thus efficiently combined sabotage of the enemy's communications with supply of the guerrilla's own.

The reasons that telephone so often becomes the second media used are, of course, that it is an easily mastered technology and--as seen above--that the needed equipment can be easily seized.
3. Radio

In the usual sequence of development of a guerrilla movement, radio does not appear until later stages. The immediate reason for this circumstance is merely that the creation, operation, and maintenance of radio networks— even of the primitive portable field types—requires skilled technicians and access to sources of equipment supply and replacement. Neither of these conditions have been met by any guerrilla movement yet studied, except belatedly and after great effort. In all cases—except that of the Malayan insurgents—this problem was recognized by the guerrillas to impose a major constraint on both their further organizational development and on their expansion of field operations. And the single exception—the Malayan one—the complete lack of radio (or even field telephones) was clearly related to their failure to develop.

4. Press

Whereas couriers, telephone, and radio generally appear in that order during the organizational elaboration and operational escalation of guerrilla movements, the guerrilla's use of the printed media occupies a special role. The press—leaflets and clandestine newspapers—is usually restricted to two uses: transmission of propaganda to the general populace and diffusion of general or detailed information to lower echelon party members. While this first use may— as with the Vietcong today—assume
voluminous proportions, its use for administration is generally only as a supplement or complement to the other media. The reason is evident: while a geographically static bureaucracy can maintain secure control over the mass distribution of printed matter, closely pressed mobile units operating more-or-less clandestinely within areas subject to sudden enemy search cannot. Consequently the use of printed matter to transmit secret information or orders is sharply limited in both volume and level of hierarchy. The more secure verbal and electronic media must carry the bulk of such bureaucratic communications.
E. COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL

A key problem in establishing guerrilla communications is the supply of trained operators. Thus, while the Chinese Red Army captured its first radios in July 1930, 10 months passed before it was able to get trained operators despite the high priority effort to do so.

Conversely, the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) network that operated in China in the late 1920's and 1930's under Richard Sorge had prolonged difficulty in locally acquiring a suitable radio transceiver even after it overcame its initial difficulties in obtaining a competent operator from Moscow. This is a common problem for the guerrilla who seldom enjoys a regular source of resupply other than the booty taken from his antagonists. But even then the training or recruiting of skilled radio, telegraph, or telephone operators imposes certain marked delays or burdens on the guerrilla organization. The Chinese Communists, in particular, early on established radio and communications schools that gradually succeeded in meeting their expanding demand for communications personnel.
F. INTELLIGENCE, MONITORING, AND PROPAGANDA

Intelligence is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense as:

The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operations and which is immediately or potentially significant to military planning and operations.

Despite the stress placed on military intelligence by military writers and theoreticians, this topic is virtually neglected in monographs, biographies, and memoirs of guerrilla warfare written by leaders (e.g., Mao Tse-tung), participants (e.g., French veterans of Vietnam and Algeria), professional observers (e.g., Captain Evans F. Carlson or Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean), theoreticians (e.g., Zawodny) or researchers (e.g., Jureidini).
G. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Although the present study is based on case studies of earlier guerrilla campaigns, I believe it has relevance for certain current as well as future types of such operations. The person seeking tactical or policy guidance in his present counter-insurgency dilemmas should, of course, satisfy himself that the current operation engaging his attention does, in fact, closely match the types of cases presented here, particularly in those ways that offer the types of communications vulnerabilities and the counter-communications strategies discussed below.

1. Vulnerabilities

Each growing guerrilla movement appears to pass through a series of increasingly elaborate communications phases. This communications elaboration is simultaneously cause and effect of the growth of the organization and the widening of its objectives. It is signalled in two ways: by ramification of the communications nets and by sophistication in communications media.

Thus the communications nets elaborate from the primitive person-to-person chains of command and intelligence networks characteristic of the underground movement preceding the guerrilla phase, through ever larger and more complex and specialized networks, until--or if--the centers of national power are seized, when the typical guerrilla organization and its communications system are transformed into those characteristic of national civil bureaucracies.
Similarly, the principal communications media themselves undergo increasing sophistication: from the word-of-mouth courier system (only occasionally supplemented by radio transmitter or telephone) typical of the antecedent underground phase, through ever greater numbers of couriers and gradual shift to more rapid means of communications such as telephone, and/or finally to extensive use of radio until—or if—victory brings control over the mass media systems of the deposed government.

Two major generalizations can be made about guerrilla communications that suggest where they are most vulnerable. First, the demands for such characteristics as speed, security, redundancy, accuracy, and volume that the guerrilla leadership puts on its existing communications facilities always exceed the capabilities of the then existing system: witness the continuing and urgent efforts of the Eighth Route Army and the Yugoslav Partisans to accumulate telephone wires and receivers. Witness also the efforts of all the guerrilla groups studied—except apparently the Malayans—to obtain radio transmitters and to train operators. Note that it is only after the acquisition of such "modern" equipment and technicians that the guerrilla organization—no matter how large its active membership—can challenge its enemy with flexible, closely coordinated, armed attacks. Isolated acts of assassination, terrorism, or sabotage can be planned and successfully carried through—even frequently—with a communications
system based solely on couriers;\textsuperscript{19} and such elementary means can even effect the mounting of occasional set-piece combat operations with some chance of success.\textsuperscript{20} But only telephone, telegraph, or radio nets linking the leaders with at least the next lower echelon of command have the requisite speed to introduce flexible control in a fast-breaking operation once underway or to permit exploitation of ephemeral enemy weak-spots. This is true whether or not the antagonist possesses as rapid or faster communications. For this reason, if no other, the size of planned guerrilla attacks is generally held below battalion strength until the guerrillas obtain a level of communications proficiency permitting effective control over an ongoing operation of such size. Of course, the guerrilla could anticipate this problem of quite predictable future needs merely by prior stockpiling the equipment to be required and training in advance the technicians to operate and service it.

Second, the level of sophistication of communications equipment possessed by guerrillas has invariably been less than that of their antagonists. This situation also is not logically necessary. We can anticipate circumstances arising in an era of foreign supported "wars of national liberation" in which China or the Soviet Union or, conceivably, even the United States might

\textsuperscript{19} As in the Malayan Emergency in its early phase.

\textsuperscript{20} As with the Chinese Communists in 1928-30, or Algerian rebels in the 1950's.
provide large-scale military aid missions to guerrilla forces. Nevertheless, I know of no past or present instance in which the guerrillas have not had to operate disadvantageously in terms of communications facilities. For example, I know of no guerrilla organization that had the faster **outgoing** communications, although it is usual for them to have more accurate, more detailed, or even faster intelligence **feedback** on developments as a result of the cooperation of large numbers of underground civilian spotters, as with the Cuban, Chinese, Vietnminh, and Vietcong guerrillas.

The ability of guerrilla organizations to obtain supplies of any sort differs widely among the several cases studied. Some groups such as the post-war Malayan rebels were entirely dependent on wartime arms stockpiles and food from their civilian underground supporters. The Spanish Civil War guerrillas were supplied by the Soviet expeditionary airforce. The Yugoslav Partisans, Greek resistance fighters, and Malayan guerrillas in World War II could count on some resupply of arms and radios from British submarines and airplanes. The Algerian rebels received such equipment smuggled over the Tunisian border. The Chinese guerrillas depended on their civilian base for non-military supplies and some small-arms manufacture and with few exceptions upon capture from the Nationalists or Japanese for their military and communications equipment. In general, military supplies may be acquired in many ways: prior stockpiling,
purchase, theft, capture, manufacture, smuggling, or through regular military logistic channels. It is quite significant, however, that although the number of means of supply is large, the specific means available to any given organization are both severely limited and usually identifiable and hence theoretically well within the capabilities of the established authorities to investigate, hinder, or suppress.21

An unresearched aspect of guerrilla supply is the private commercial international—and intranational—arms trade. What, for example, is the actual, available, and potential commercial trade in military communications equipment? Who is, or could become, a buyer or seller of such equipment? Can such equipment easily flow through the usual international channels of arms or other commercial trade; and, if so, with what constraints on secrecy, speed of delivery, manner of payment, volume, standardization, ease of resupply or maintenance, and modernity? How does the underground or guerrilla client establish and maintain contact with his potential purveyor of communications or arms equipment? What communications links and transportation channels are available? What are the legal prohibitions in various relevant countries? What police, postal, or customs controls exist or could be made effective to monitor, inhibit,

21 See also my Soviet and Chinese Clandestine Arms Aid (draft, 1965), for a census of Soviet and Chinese interventions in local wars and insurgencies that focuses on the clandestine matériel aid provided and the channels through which such aid is transmitted.
or suppress such trade? Such controls could presumably be similar for both commercially or officially smuggled arms as described above.

This discussion has now brought us into the area of general questions of arms control: the clandestine or overt supply of combat matériel by foreign governments to guerrillas and the unilateral efforts of guerrillas to acquire their requirements through local or international channels.

In sum, the cases examined in this paper have exhibited a common pattern in which the underground and early terrorist phases are characterized by communications largely confined to couriers (backed sometimes by access to urban commercial media), and that of increasingly effective military operations by a corresponding increase in use of telephone and/or radio. Although this has been the historical pattern, it is not a logically necessary one. Any revolutionary underground that aims for active guerrilla status would be well advised to begin stockpiling communications equipment and personnel. Similarly, the prospective counter-guerrilla, police, or civil affairs planner should be alert to any such stockpiling and be prepared to thwart it or, better, establish controls to prevent the clandestine, commercial, or geographical transfer of such equipment into actual or potential guerrilla supply channels.
2. Counter-communications Warfare

Typically, the established régime has a pronounced superiority over the guerrillas in equipment and personnel that allows him faster communications, links him more directly to all subordinate echelons of civil and military control, and gives him the capacity—whether he seizes it or not—to engage in sophisticated counter-communications operations: monitoring, deciphering, jamming, direction-finding, etc.  

However, counter-communications is a game that the guerrilla as well as the government can and usually does play. While the authorities seek out the guerrillas' electronic communications with their more sophisticated electronic devices, the guerrilla can strive to discomfit their antagonist's transportation and communications. Thus did the Chinese Eighth Route Army and Yugoslavian Partisans tear up rails and steal telephone wires. Indeed the entire problem of thwarting supply of communications equipment discussed in the previous section could be viewed as an integral aspect of counter-communications war.

The development of counter-communications techniques paralleled that of secret diplomatic and state communications from antiquity to the present. Secret intelligence and police services existed at least as early as the 11th century in Islam; and the modern tradition in organization can be traced to the remarkable Joseph Fouché who established the most effective police-spy service in Europe, prompting the British to develop more effective countering

21a For a convenient but only just adequate public summary of this highly secret topic see John M. Carroll, Secrets of Electronic Espionage (New York: Dutton, 1966).
techniques: using Continental banking-houses rather than Napoleon's postal service for transmitting letters, using special twice-weekly couriers from Paris to London, etc.\(^{22}\)

Without an adequate network of radio transmitters, an underground lacks cohesion. Such transmitters can, of course, sometimes be discovered by the antagonist's agents; but more important to him are his radio monitoring stations, manned by his "radio police."

A detailed example is the work of the German listening service in France during World War II:\(^{23}\)

In 1942 a large central listening post was established at Charbonnières, together with a directional-finding station which registered all secret transmissions and their approximate location. Three radio-telegraphic and radio-telephonic listening cars were dispatched into the region where the secret sending post was working. They were specially built cars, into which direction-finders were fitted. The sending station which had been logged continued transmitting and the Charbonnières central station steered the three direction-finding cars close in to the secret transmitter. When the cars got fairly near to it they separated and, by taking simultaneously separate bearings, succeeded gradually in fixing the location of the secret set within a radius of 100 to 300 yards.

In open country, where there were only a few isolated farms, that was near enough for their purpose, but in thickly built-up areas it was insufficient. The crews of the police cars would then dismount and, with the use of small goniometric apparatus, find their way to the very door of the building in which the transmitter was placed. The whole thing resembled

\(^{22}\) Thompson and Padover (63), pp. 15, 202-204.

a game of hunt the thimble, in which the radio-
goniometers showed when the seeker was "hot" or
"cold."

That this counter-communications search for urban transmitters was indeed a serious problem, even for the Germans with the most advanced radio detection available in the 1940's, is further illustrated by an almost identical account discussed below in the case on the World War II Greek underground. Such cases can be multiplied. For example, the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) network in Japan directed by Richard Sorge managed to operate unmolested for eight years, and although their frequent radio transmissions were detected as early as 1938, the Japanese police were unsuccessful in their intensive efforts to locate the transmitter in Tokyo.

The most secure arrangement is normally where the radio transmitter is located outside the area of the enemy's police or military control, as in a foreign country or guerrilla redoubt. A foreign-based transmitter is, of course, rarely a practicable means of directing guerrilla operations although it is often ideal for "black" or "gray" stations,\(^2\) that is, ones that attempt to pass as something slightly other than themselves (gray)--as in the case of Radio Free Yugoslavia, which purported to be a Yugoslav Partisan station while in fact transmitting from Tiflis under Comintern sponsorship--or pretend to be one of the enemy's own stations (black)--as the Communist Rote Kapellenet-

work became following its capture by the Nazis.25

Black radio is generally an example of counter-propaganda operations, but the Rote Kapelle was more—it was a highly successful instance of counter-intelligence or counter-communications, enabling the German intelligence to play its now famous Funkspiel or "Radio Game," feeding from 1942 to 1944 a constant flow of false or misleading intelligence reports to the Soviet Union from secretly captured Soviet GRU transmitters in Belgium, Holland, France, and Germany.

Colonel Miksche summarizes the conditions for radio communications for undergrounds during World War II along the following lines: In order to maintain liaison and transmit information, agreed broadcasting times, wavelengths, call signals, and codes are required. The constant changing of these first three variables serves to confuse the enemy's listening posts, and the periodic changing of codes makes it difficult for him to understand even those messages that are intercepted. Also, the greater the number of sending stations that can be used serves also to frustrate or delay direction finding. The risk of betrayal is minimized by avoiding—where technically feasible—direct radio intercommunications within the same sector but rather connecting all the internal stations through a central radio transmitter:

abroad, or at least outside the arm of the enemy's police. In this manner, the entire liaison network is simultaneously isolated in its several parts but centralized through a secure "switchboard." Although radio technique is now highly advanced and excellent portable long-distance equipment is available, technical problems do arise. In general, radio-telegraphy is more reliable than radio-telephony and the former's morse signals are less easily intercepted by the unintended listeners because it requires a narrower wave-band (one kilocycle against the six to seven required for voice transmission). Voice transmission also suffers from the fact that the transmitting voice may be recognized, leading to the further risk of the station being identified and facilitating pinpointing its location.²⁶

Although radio has normally proved the best liaison medium, development of personal contacts, by parachute drop or other infiltration techniques, is often necessary. Their advantages, such as direct conversations, are of marked importance. Nevertheless, they can have their drawbacks. The difficulty of isolating such activities exposes underground members to the risk of betrayal. For this reason, personal contact among individuals known to each other should be avoided. Furthermore, the inherent difficulties of liaison by radio often make contact by special agents necessary. In this case, the persons most

²⁶Miksche (50), 118-119.
suitable are ones whose jobs call for frequent journeys: railway-men, postmen, commercial travellers, chauffeurs, journalists, etc. In this case the courier or contact work is normally composed of persons who are strangers, recognizing one another only by secret prearranged signals such as code-words.  

\[27\text{Miksche (50), 118-119; and Christopher Felix (pseud.), A Short Course in the Secret War (New York: Dutton, 1963).}\]
H. CONCLUSIONS

In focusing on the communications aspects of underground and guerrilla movements I do not mean to suggest that the success or failure of such movements necessarily depends on the nature or efficiency of the communications systems used. As Tipton points out in her case study on pre-1954 Vietnam, it is "the coordination and control of all aspects of the movement by means of a highly organized political unity" that takes clear priority in this matter. Nevertheless, one of the main determinants of efficient coordination and control in any organization is a communications system appropriately responsive to the needs of the organization in passing orders, receiving reports, and exchanging information. Indeed, it is the central conclusion of this paper that an appropriate communications system is the principal determinant of the type of coordination and control that leads to success in guerrilla organizations. Thus both cases of failure studied (Četniks and the MPRA) are associated with a combination of political errors and inappropriate communications systems, while most cases of guerrilla difficulties (particularly in the Kiangsi Soviet) are associated with ineffective or inappropriate communications. Conversely, all cases of growth and long-range success are associated with an appropriate and effective communications system.

In sum, both the volume of guerrilla operations (and the degree of their coordination) at any given stage and the ability
to escalate to higher stages of organizational complexity or operational scope is a function of the quantity and types of communications systems available. The lesson for the aspiring guerrilla is that he should give very high—perhaps even highest—priority to stockpiling and training specialized communications equipment and personnel well before their specific need arises. The corollary for the beleaguered counter-guerrilla soldier or policeman is that he should recognize that one of the guerrilla's greatest vulnerabilities is his communications system—particularly its equipment and technical personnel. Consequently, any effort to anticipate the guerrilla's communications requirements—qualitative as well as quantitative—and thwart his fulfilling these has an excellent chance of directly affecting his operational effectiveness and future development. Furthermore, a major effort to destroy the guerrilla's existing communications gear and technical personnel appears to be a promising means of forcing him back to earlier developmental stages—to de-escalate his overall operation.
III. CHINESE COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS: 1920-1949

Among case studies of guerrilla communications, that of the Chinese Communists is the most fully documented, although the sources are quite scattered. A rather considerable literature exists covering the entire period from the early clandestine creation of the CCP underground in 1920, through gradual development of a guerrilla force in the 1930's and 1940's, to its final seizure of national power in 1949. The relevant sources are quite varied, ranging from committed Communist sources to entirely uncritical anti-Communist ones, from contemporary diary material to decades-later reminiscences, from declassified police, intelligence and other bureaucratic documents to the memoirs of private travellers and journalists, and from carefully documented research to unverifiable assertions. Because the sources are such a mélange, it has been necessary to report even the more remotely relevant ones in the hope that sufficient overlap will give convincing verification.

This chapter surveys this entire period and then offers some speculations about future possibilities for guerrilla operations by the Chinese Communists.

A. FORMATION AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE CCP: 1920-1927

The nucleus of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was a number of rather separate small Marxist cells established in 1920 in the major urban centers of China as well as in Tokyo and Paris. That Communism came to China as a militant conspiratorial movement is seen
in the elaborate Communist security procedures and close police surveillance that accompanied the formal founding meeting and First Congress of the CCP in Shanghai in 1921.¹

Significant in this early developmental stage was the close liaison with the embryo CCP maintained by the clandestine Comintern agents Voitinsky, Yang, and Maring.² Presumably these men trained the CCP in Western Communist techniques of covert operations. The Chinese CCP (with KMT participation) sent a 30-man delegation to the Comintern-organized Congress of the Toilers of the East held in Moscow and Petrograd in 1922. Maring returned to China that same year to arrange Communist infiltration of the KMT.

In January 1924, the Kuomintang (KMT) formally adopted a Soviet-type organizational structure at its First Congress. This was the culmination of the six years since 1918 of gradual mutual approach between Sun Yat-sen on the one hand and the Soviet Government, Comintern, and CCP on the other. The two key events leading directly to this adoption of Soviet style were the formal admission in August 1922 of CCP members into the KMT with Dr. Sun's concurrence and the acceptance in late 1923 of Soviet Government agent, Mikhail Borodin, as his

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²Gregory Voitinsky guided the founding of the cells in China in 1920 with the assistance of Yang Ming-chai, an overseas Chinese. "G. Maring" (Hendricus Sneevliet), a Dutchman, was Comintern representative at that First CCP Congress.
High Adviser, 3 Borodin immediately imported a large (and ever-growing) staff of Russian cadres to begin the thorough political and military reorganization of the KMT. Thus were fused two conspiratorial traditions: the Bolshevik and the KMT, which itself had been founded (under another name) by Dr. Sun in 1894 as an illegal revolutionary party.

The Soviet advisers, from the moment of their arrival in 1923-24, were part of a conspiratorial underground. They entered with aliases—many of which have not yet been penetrated—and rather thin covers as Soviet newspapermen, 4 businessmen, or mere tourists. 5

3 Borodin (alias of Mikhail Gruzenberg) had been alleged by Western sources to have been a Comintern, CP/USSR, or Soviet Government agent in China and initially by Soviet sources as being only a private individual there, although later they admitted to Comintern links. Louis Fischer seemingly solved this question in 1941 by publishing a long-withheld letter dated 23 Sept. 1923 to Sun Yat-sen from Leo Karakhan (given Fischer in the late 1920's by that Soviet diplomat) in which Borodin was explicitly identified as the representative of the "Soviet government." Louis Fischer, Men and Politics: An Autobiography (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1941), pp. 137-138. See also Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs (2nd edition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), Vol. I, p. viii.

4 B. Whaley, Soviet Journalists in China (forthcoming, 1967), Chapter II.

B. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR: 1927-1937

On 12 April 1927, General Chiang K'ai-shek turned on his Communist and Left-KMT allies, striking swiftly and with sufficient force to drive the CCP underground. Thus began a period, lasting until final Communist victory in 1949, during which the CCP was forced to operate clandestinely with at least major segments of its organization. Even the growth of Soviets in the countryside and the brief anti-Japanese Popular Front did not bring all CCP elements to the surface. ⁶

The Communist forces regularly used the modern military communications systems of telegraph and telephone whenever they were operating in urban areas already serviced by such equipment. This was presumably true throughout their first period of collaboration with the KMT. Perhaps the last occasion when these systems were available and were used was in the planning and conduct of their disastrous Nanchang Uprising of 1 August 1927, which the Chinese Communists now celebrate as Red Army Day. On that occasion, telephones connected headquarters in Nanchang

⁶ Only very fragmentary information has been published on the activities of the CCP urban underground since 1927. Personal accounts of the underground include:

a) Gayn (44), pp. 162-172, on the Shanghai underground in 1927.

b) Vincent Sheean, Personal History (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1936), pp. 255-258, on Sheean's aborted attempt to smuggle Mme. Borodin disguised as his sister out of Peking to Russia in Aug. 1927, and pp. 247-258, 264, 284, on the flight of KMT-Left and Soviet advisers at the same time.

c) Anna Louise Strong, China's Millions (New York: Coward-McCann, 1928). Dr. Strong accompanied Borodin on his overland motorized flight to Ulan Bator.
itself with the sub-headquarters in the suburbs, telegraph service linked the various Communist and anti-Communist units in the immediate area (i.e., the 80-mile stretch from Kiukang through Lushan to Nanchang), and senior Party delegates commuted by train and riverboat between Nanchang and the CCP Central Standing Committee which, while then going underground in the distant coastal metropolises, was still in telegraphic communication with the Comintern. 7

In the winter of 1927 Mao Tse-tung and his small band of 1000 insurgents succeeded in establishing a temporary base in the mountain fortress of Chingkanshan in Kiangsi province. There, in May 1928, he was joined by Chu Teh who has collected some ten to twelve thousand veterans of the Nanchang Uprising, the Canton Commune, and the South Hunan Revolt.

When first driven into the provincial backlands in late 1927, the Red Army was cut off from modern communications and transportation. As Mao Tse-tung stated in a resolution of 5 October 1928; "The shortage of necessities and cash has become a very big problem for the army and the people inside the White encirclement. Because of the tight enemy blockade, necessities such as salt, cloth and medicines have been very scarce ... all through the past year..." 8 In a subsequent report of


8 Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 15.
25 November 1928 to the CC/CCP (in Shanghai?), Mao complained that: "The Hunan Provincial Committee promised to obtain drugs for us, but so far we have received none. We still hope the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us a few doctors with Western training, and some iodine." 9 With even the bare necessities in short supply and the CCP urban underground unable to supply, the Red Army was forced to live off the land.

Mao and Chu defended their Chingkanshan base for over a year until forced to reestablish themselves in 1931 at Juichin in the same province. There they were gradually joined by a number of veteran Communist leaders who "began to drift back through the dangerous secret route from Swatow across the bandit-ridden mountains into the Fukien Soviet, and thence to the Red capital" in Juichin. 10

Most important of these newcomers was Chou En-lai. He arrived from Shanghai, empowered as the senior Comintern representative in Juichin, bringing a radio transceiver. An effective, direct link with the Comintern--and through it to the Kremlin--now existed for the first time. Chou's control of this set greatly reinforced his Comintern authority. He had become Herzen's "Genghis Khan with telegraph" and he used this power to temporarily displace Mao as actual ruler of the Juichin Soviet. 10a

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10a See my Soviet Clandestine Communication Nets for full discussion and documentation of the CCP's communication with the Comintern.
The Chinese Communist guerrilla forces first used military field radio in 1931, three years after their introduction to the Nationalist army. This applied to Chu Teh's First Front Red Army, which had captured some small radio transceivers from Nationalist forces at Changsha in July 1930 but could get no trained operators until the following May. By the end of 1931 all Soviet districts were coordinated by radio. 11

Although these radio sets apparently were intended for coordination of military operations, they may have been used to communicate with Moscow via the Comintern and Soviet Military Intelligence cells in Shanghai, Peking, and Harbin that had been in direct contact with the USSR since at least as early as 1929 via powerful radio equipment. 12 In any case there is evidence that the Mao-Chu group in the Juichin Soviet had begun direct monitoring of Radio Moscow in 1931, using a powerful receiving set captured—with electrical dynamos—at Chian (in Kiangsi) on 5 October 1930. Moscow apparently knew of this receiving capability, because on 18 Nov. 1931 the delegates of the First All-China Soviet Congress assembled outside Juichin were notified by radiogram.

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11 Nym Wales (39), pp. 250-253, 255. This information was supplied to Miss Wales (then Mrs. Edgar Snow) by Chu Teh in an interview in 1937. It was independently confirmed by P'eng Teh-huai in his interview given Robert Payne in 1946. Robert Payne, Journey to Red China (London: William Heinemann, 1947), p. 38.

(from Moscow?) that the Chinese representatives in the Comintern headquarters in Moscow would address the Congress by radio the following day. Although reception was poor and variable, the transmission occurred on schedule. 12a

Immediately prior to the transfer in August or September 1931 of the CCP Politburo, Central Committee, and Secretariat from Shanghai to Juichin, Mao Tse-tung, at his Juichin headquarters was in regular telegraphic communication with the Shanghai CC, over 400 miles distant. 13

According to Chiang K'ai-shek's recent memoirs, the CCP's move was partly a result of the capture by KMT police in Hankow on 25 April 1931 of Ku Shun-chang, Chief of the Chinese Communist secret service (Li Li-san's so-called "Special Affairs Unit") whose revelations enabled

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12a Agnes Smedley, Red Flood Over China (Moscow and Leningrad: Co-Operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., 1934), pp. 373, 387-388. Although Miss Smedley's information is second-hand and anonymous, it is credible. This information is partially omitted, partially contradicted in the American edition of this book: Agnes Smedley, China's Red Army Marches (New York: Vanguard, 1934), pp. 297, 302-303. Apparently the Moscow edition was too free with its disclosures of links between Moscow and Juichin.

13 Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 185-6, 208; North (53), p. 158; and Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia (New York: Van Nostrand, 1956), p. 84. All three of these references to telegrams are based on Li Ang, Hung-se Wu-t'ai [The Red Stage] (Chungking: Sheng-li Chu'-pan-she, 1942), p. 158, also available in a Pei-ping: Min-chung Shu-wu, 1946, edition. Li Ang was one of several pseudonyms of Chu Hsin-fan, a CCP/CC secretarial staff member in the 1920's and 30's. Li subsequently broke with the Party and wrote his book which is somewhat muddled as to specific dates and incidents. He was executed by the Kuomintang in 1945. For biographical information see Conrad Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-1927 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 185, 197, 214.
the Nationalists to seize or put to flight virtually all Communist secret organs in Nanking, Shanghai and Hankow.\textsuperscript{14}

As early as 1932, regular telegraph communication existed between the Oy'dwan Soviet led by Chang Kuo-t'ao in Honan Province and the Central Soviet led by Mao Tse-tung at Juichin in Kiangsi Province, nearly 400 miles distant.\textsuperscript{15}

As a result of the intense pressure of Chiang K'ai-shek's blockade and successive "extermination campaigns", the Chinese Reds decided to move their base of operations to northwest China. Thus, on 16 October 1934 their capital at Juichin in Kiangsi province was abandoned and the Long March begun. The first column (Mao's) arrived in Shensi province in the northwest on 20 October 1935 and the final arrivals the northwest (Kansu) the following October. The capital was first at Waiyapao (in northern Shensi) but in June 1936 removed to Paoan whence

\textsuperscript{14}Chiang Chung-cheng [Chiang K'ai-shek], Soviet Russia in China (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, 1957), p. 72. It was Ku's revelations which were responsible for the arrest and execution of the Secretary-General of the CCP, Hsiang Chung-fa. It was only by chance that Chou En-lai, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and other top leaders escaped arrest in Shanghai. See Hsiao (61), pp. 146-147; Schwartz (51), pp. 184-185; and McLane (58), p. 9n. Snow (38), p. 47, erred in stating that Ku was martyred in 1927.

\textsuperscript{15}North (53), 174. Based on North's interview in Hongkong on 3 November 1950 with Chang Kuo-t'ao. In this interview Chang stated that although telegraph communication existed between these two Soviets, the policy differences between himself and Mao prevented close liaison. Chang admitted the vagueness of his recall of dates, and later writers have challenged his recall of events as well.
it was transferred in January 1937 to Yenan where it remained throughout this period.\textsuperscript{15a}

In 1934, immediately prior to the evacuation of Juichin on October 15th and the beginning of the Long March, communications between Juichin and Moscow travelled the following route:\textsuperscript{16}

Moscow’s telegrams at that time were routed through Sinkiang or Outer Mongolia, and were relayed by wireless to Juichin, where the Communists had a radio station. It was rare at this time for personnel to pass from Russia to Juichin, although during a part of the period 1931-1934 a German Comintern agent, Albert,\textsuperscript{16a} was in the Chinese Soviet capital. With the beginning of the Long March all contact with Moscow was lost for several months.

Even during the harassed Long March of 1934-35 the main body of the Red Army—that directed by Mao Tse-Tung and Chu Teh—maintained


\textsuperscript{16}North (52), 164, based on his interview with Chang Kuo-t’ao on 3 November 1950. McLane (58), 12n, challenges Chang’s claim of an indirect Moscow-Juichin radio link, but I believe only on incomplete and circumstantial grounds.

\textsuperscript{16a}“Albert” is the \textit{nom de guerre} of the German Communist, Otto Braun, known more commonly to visiting Western observers as “Li Teh”. He arrived at Juichin in 1933, the only one of three military agents sent by the Comintern to reach Kiangsi through the Nationalist blockade. The other two were captured en route by the Nationalists, according to Kung Ch’u, former Chief-of-Staff of the Central Red Army. Tso-liang Hsiao, \textit{Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930-1934} (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), pp. 221, 331; Stuart Schramm, \textit{Mao Tse-tung} (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Pelican, 1966), pp. 180-181; and Otto Braun, “In wessen Namen spricht Mao Tse-tung?,” \textit{Neues Deutschland}, 27 May 1964, p. 5, with recent photo of Braun at his translator’s job in East Germany.
effective internal communications according to the eye-witness account of the official historian of the event who subsequently stated that: 17

We always had radio connections with all units and also telephones. Every division had a radio, and used telephones the whole time. Our "veteran wires" from the Long March can be seen here in Yenan, still in good use.

During this entire pre-Yenan period the Chinese Communists were in appalling straights with regard to the acquisition of all types of munitions, transport, and communications. Communications equipment was in short supply, ammunition could not be wasted, and there were not even enough rifles to go around. What they had was a hodge-podge of makes and calibres. They had no tanks and little artillery. They had few trucks and no operating railways. Although they captured an occasional airplane, they had no pilots. The Red Army was generally adequately supplied with food by the peasants in their rural Soviets and a certain amount of small-scale village industry provide some ammunition, arms, and clothing. Their stock of weapons and ammunition was mainly replenished by capture and by covert purchasing from corrupt junior officers in the Nationalist Army. 18 With no access to coastal ports or frontier posts except through their urban underground, direct

17 Wales (52), p. 72. Transcript of her interview with Hsü Meng-ch'iu in Yenan in 1937 when he was the Chief of the Rear Political Department.

18 George E. Sokolsky, The Tender Box of Asia (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1932), p. 346.
importation was virtually out of the question even if the Soviet Union had been willing to give supplies, and even if foreign commercial suppliers had been willing to sell them.\textsuperscript{19}

When the Chinese Soviets relocated in the northwest following the Long March, their general situation improved somewhat mainly because they were freed of intense Nationalist encirclement.

Among other things, communications with the outside also improved. For the first time since the arrival of the German Comintern agent, "Li Teh" in 1933, a few Western journalists, fellow-travellers, and Communists were able to personally visit the Communist regions before conditions improved still further following the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War on 7 July 1937.

These travellers not only brought international information to the Chinese Communists leaders, but also gave them a direct link with international Communism as witness the following letter from Mao to the then Secretary-General of the CPUSA:\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{quote}
Dear Comrade Browder:
Taking advantage of the visit of a comrade, I am sending this letter to you, honored Comrade Browder.\ldots
We have heard from several American comrades and from other quarters that the American Communist Party and the great mass of the American people are profoundly concerned about China's anti-Japanese struggle, and they have already aided us in several ways. This gives us the feeling that our struggle is not an isolated one.\ldots

Revolutionary greetings!
Mao Tse-tung
June 24 [1937]
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{19}Even if such suppliers could have been contacted, the Communists had no foreign exchange.

\textsuperscript{20}Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York and London: Praeger, 1963), p. 291, as translated by Schram from the Mao Tse-tung Lun-wen Chi (Shanghai: Ta-chung Ch'u-pan She, 1937), pp. 156-57. It should be noted that the Chinese Communists had already declared war on Japan in April 1932, five years before the Sino-Japanese War.
Mao's letter raises interesting questions about its inspiration and transmission: Who was the "comrade" of whose presence in Yenan Mao took advantage? Who were the "several American comrades" from whom Mao heard of the American response to "China's anti-Japanese struggle"? How was this letter transmitted to Browder? When Mao speaks of a "comrade" he quite explicitly means a full Communist Party member. I presume that in this case the "comrade" is a foreign, probably American, Communist. Which foreigners were in Yenan on 24 June 1927? There are ten candidates, if, as seems likely, George Hatem was then off at the front:

1) "Li Teh," the German Comintern military adviser and veteran of the Long March to Yenan. As he remained there until 1938 or 1939, he is ruled out as the courier. (Now--1964--in East Germany.)

2) Nym Wales (nom de plume of Helen Foster Snow, then Mrs. Edgar Snow), an American leftist journalist who arrived in Yenan in May 1937. As she did not leave until 7 September, and continued to reside in the Far East until 1941, she is presumably also ruled out. (She now--1961--works in the U.S. as a genealogist.)

3) Miss Agnes Smedley, a close associate of the Soviet military intelligence ring of Sorge, arrived in Yenan in February 1937 and also left with Nym Wales unexpectedly--for medical treatment in Sian--on 7 September. She is therefore ruled out as the courier, although by her own
admission she had so acted in the past. (Miss Smedley
died in 1950.)

4) Owen Lattimore who with T.A. Bisson and the Jaffes arrived
in Yenan from Sian by privately hired car on 22 June 1937
and left on the 24th, the very date of Mao's letter to
Browder. Lattimore was then Editor of the official IPR
monthly journal, Pacific Affairs. Probably never a CP
member, although patently strongly influenced by certain
key CP Asian specialists and their policies. (Since 1963,
in England as Professor of Chinese studies at Leeds Univer-
sity.)

5) Mr. Thomas Arthur Bisson, a writer on contemporary Chinese
politics, was in China in 1937 on a one-year research leave
from the Foreign Policy Association. Subsequently identified
in U.S. Senate testimony by Professor K. A. Wittfogel as
having been a CP member since at least 1935. (He is now--
1964--on the staff of the Western College for Women.)

6) and 7) Philip J. Jaffe and his wife, Agnes Newmark Jaffe.
They were on a visit from New York and it was their urgent
schedule to catch a plane to Shanghai which necessitated
the party leaving after only two days in Yenan. Subsequently
Mr. Jaffe (pseud. "J. W. Phillips") was arrested, indicted
and fined in the 1945 "Amerasia" case." FBI and OSS testimony
in connection with the case, revealed Jaffe to be both
a heavy financial contributor to the CPUSA and a frequent
personal contact of Earl Browder. 21

2), 9), 10) Three or more anonymous Soviet nationals posing
as White Russian businessmen and their chauffeur were
(according to Wittfogel) in another automobile that travel-
led in from Sian at the same time as the Lattimore-Jaffe
Bisson party. They disappeared upon arrival in Yenan. 22

This one example is singled out and given in detail not to re-
surrect the old game of who-was-a-Communist when. Rather, it illus-
trates that Yenan was not nearly as isolated geographically, politic-
ally, or in terms of international information flow--both incoming
and outgoing--as believed by the contemporary writers and journalists
or argued by most present-day scholars such as Robert North or Charles
McLane.

The first foreigners in the Red base since the Long March were
Edgar Snow and Dr. George Hatem, both of whom arrived earlier in Sian
separately but via the same Communist underground from Peking-Tientsin.

21Wales (39), pp. 69-71, 279-280, 292, 300, gives the dates
and itineraries of all these comings-and-goings. For their subsequent
activities see de Toledano (52); U.S. Senate, IPR Hearings, 1961,
Pt. 1 (pp. 303-305 in testimony of Wittfogel) and Pt. 2 (in

22U.S. Senate, IPR Hearings, 1961, Part 1 (pp. 304-305).
According to Wittfogel’s testimony, he had been told of this encounter
by Bisson and the others on their return to Peiping.
They entered Red territory together in June 1936. Snow remained until October of that year. Hatem stayed with the Communists--initially with units in the field--under the alias of Ma Hai-teh until their victory and is still (1960) there doing research on venereal diseases in Peking.

They were followed by Agnes Smedley who was in the Red-controlled region from January through September 1937. New Zealand journalist, James Bertram, followed her in late January but only on an overnight trip from Sian to a nearby Red Army unit. Next came Harry Dunham, special correspondent for *The New York Times*, who was in the new capital at Yenan in late February 1937 on a round trip from Shanghai. At about the same time (February or March) came Victor Keen of the *New York Herald Tribune*. He was followed by Earl Leaf of UP in late March or early April. A.T. Steele of the *Herald Tribune* was in Yenan in April 1937. Next arrived Snow's wife, Nym Wales, from late April through September 1937. Smedley and Wales were joined in Yenan during 22-24 June by Lattimore, Bisson, and Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe, the last foreigners to reach Red China before the Sino-Japanese War.²²a

Now, regarding the above mentioned foreign visitors to the Communist capital, all had entered the Red area without Nationalist permission or knowledge. Indeed at least most, such as Snow, Hatem, Smedley, and the Lattimore-Bisson-Jaffe party had infiltrated via

²²a This information accurately cross-checks among the various personal accounts published by Snow, Smedley, Wales, and Bertram and in testimony by Wittfogel and Lattimore. For references on Hatem who served part-time as a radio monitor-translator in Yenan in 1938 see Whaley, *Foreign Press Monitoring in Communist Countries* (draft, 1964), Chapt. VIII.
the Chinese Communist "underground railroad" through the Nationalist police and military--and later only news--blockade lines at Sian. This is particularly relevant, because as Snow and Wales make quite explicit, this was the same channel by which Communist Party officials moved. Furthermore, it is by far the most complete roster of foreign visitors compiled to date and yet hints at possible additional visitors, suggesting a far steadier flow of both foreigners and Chinese couriers than hitherto recognized. As we shall later see, this pattern persisted to 1949, even in those periods where all individual sources and studies assert that little or no travel occurred.

The Yenan days saw periods of virtual political isolation, if not outright defection on the Chinese side and abandonment on the Russian. Moscow and the Comintern took a dim view of developments there, expecting little from the Chinese Reds by way of a contribution to world revolution and; following the Comintern's development of the Popular Front line since mid-1935, the Chinese activities took on an even less urgent character. Mao himself, in a speech to CCP cadres explaining the dissolution in 1943 of the Comintern, repeated the stock Moscow line that the Comintern had been abolished because it was "no longer adapted to the necessities of the struggle." However he added

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23 Personal accounts of such entrances are given by Snow (38), pp. 8, 11, 15-17, 22-27; Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 262-267; Wales (39), pp. 3-25, 279-280, 295-297, 300. From the references by Miss Wales we also learn that it was through Edgar Snow's good offices that the underground trips into Yenan were arranged for the Lattimore-Bisson-Jaffe party and the later trip by James Bertram.
rather gratuitously that since its Seventh World Congress in 1935, the Comintern had "not intervened in the internal affairs of the Chinese Communist Party." The term used was the mildly impolite kan-she, which could also be translated as "meddled." Nevertheless, the fact that Yenan and Moscow were often sharply divided over political questions does not mean that communications did not exist. International news was available on a continuing basis to the Yenan Reds, through their own radio monitoring, while couriers and travellers provided a direct if somewhat intermittent link.

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24 Schram (63), pp. 288-290, as translated by Schram from the Chieh-fang Jih-pao (Yenan), 28 May 1943. The Comintern was formally dissolved on 15 May 1943 by its Executive Committee then sitting in Moscow. See also McLane (58), pp. 160-161. Indeed, I suspect that this may be an oblique reference by Mao to the little appreciated likelihood that Chiang K'ai-shek owes not only his release from kidnap in December 1936 but even his life not to Chou En-lai and the other members of the CCP Politburo—as announced at the time and still generally believed—but rather to direct and urgent representations from Moscow. The apparent discrepancy between the direct and contemporaneous evidence for this likelihood was only revealed subsequently and in a relatively obscure source by Snow, Edgar Snow, Random Notes on Red China (1936-1945) (mimeographed, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947). The conventional interpretation is best expressed by McLane (58), 79-91, in the most recent detailed survey of the evidence. However McLane's otherwise comprehensive study omits Snow's contribution which tends to resolve what even McLane recognizes as certain obscure discrepancies.

25 For details see B. Whaley, Foreign Press Monitoring in Communist Countries (forthcoming, 1965), Chapter VIII, "China".
However, Yenan's international communications were often slow. The Seventh Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) was held in Moscow in July and August 1935. Yet it was not until September of the following year that a copy of the detailed proceedings finally reached the CCP leadership in Paoan. As Edgar Snow—who was there at the time—says:26

It was these reports which brought to the Chinese Communists for the first time the fully developed thesis of the international anti-Fascist united front tactics—tactics which were to guide them in their policy during the exciting months ahead.... And once more the Comintern was to assert its will in the affairs of China....

Snow gives a further striking example of the degree of the then current communications isolation from the fountainhead of international Communism:27

Incidentally, I happened to be in Pao An one day when some Inprecorrs [official journal of the Comintern] arrived, and I saw Lo Fu, the American-educated secretary of the Central Committee eagerly devouring them. He mentioned casually that he had not seen a copy of Inprecorr for nearly three years!

In 1936 the Chinese Communists managed to maintain virtually continuous radio links with all major Chinese cities—including Shanghai, Hankow, Nanking, and Tientsin—despite frequent discovery and seizure of their metropolitan transmitters by KMT police. Furthermore, Chou En-lai told Edgar Snow in June 1936 that the KMT had

26 Snow (38), 384-5.
27 Snow (38), 384.
never succeeded in breaking the Red Army's radio codes since they had first established their radio department with captured sets.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{28}Snow (38), 44. As previously noted, the establishment of the Red Army radio service occurred in 1931.
C. THE POPULAR FRONT: 1937-1945

On 7 July 1937 Japanese forces began a series of attacks in China that signalled the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. This action brought a swift formation of a KMT-CCP Anti-Japanese Popular Front toward which the two groups had been moving slowly since the Communist-engineered kidnapping of Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek the previous December. Communist military energies were now directed mainly against the Japanese invaders, using the occasion to further enlarge, train, and test their armies while proceeding to expand and consolidate their civil control. On paper, the Red Army was made part of the Nationalist forces and was redesignated the (Nationalist) Eighth Route Army (Pa-lu chün). Similarly, the Soviet Government was formally abolished and brought into the Nationalist administrative setup as the "Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area Government."

When the Japanese seized Peiping (known as Peking only when serving as the capital) the Communist's urban "underground railway" was apparently not functioning too effectively. Teng Ying-ch'ao, the wife of Chou En-lai, was then secretly there being treated for tuberculosis in a suburban temple whence she fled (disguised as a peasant woman) to Peking where the Communist underground contacted Edgar Snow (who as we have already noted had contacts with them dating back to 1936). To smuggle such a desirable prize out from occupied Peiping in July, Snow took her by train disguised as his serving-girl to nearby Tientsin where she boarded a ship for passage
to a still-free Chinese port.\footnote{Wales (39), 296, alludes to Mme. Chou’s escape but conceals her husband’s role. The detailed story is recounted by Snow (41), 6-8, 23. He gives some additional information in Snow (61), 72-73. Mme. Chou, a veteran of the Long March, was then Chief of the Women’s Work Department of the CCP and a Vice-Chairman of the Government.}

The first foreign visitor to reach Yenan following the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War was the New Zealand journalist, James Bertram, who re-entered Red Territory in late September 1937 and Yenan in October-November that same year. He was followed by the persons indicated below:

2) Agnes Smedley re-entered the Red Base following medical treatment in Sian in late September 1937.

3) Marine Captain Evans Fordyce Carlson, then a U.S. Naval Intelligence Officer, observed the Communist areas including Yenan in December 1937 and again in April-May 1938. A superb soldier, he was Colonel of the 2nd Regiment of the 2nd Marine Division in the South Pacific in World War II, but assisted Communist fronts between his retirement as Brigadier General and death in 1947.

4) Mrs. Violet Olivia Cressy-Marcks, distinctly non-Communist famed British geographer-explorer-archeologist, the first English guest of Mao Tse-tung, engaged in collecting oriental rugs and Russian icons until her recent death.

5) Miss Ilona Ralf Sues, a Polish free-lance journalist, and

6) Charles Higgins, her American colleague, visited Yenan about March 1938.
7) Haldore E. Hanson, then an AP correspondent, visited Red China three times between May and September 1938. He was in the FAO when "ripped" in 1953 soon after being named by Joseph McCarthy as a "security risk."

Even Mao's earlier plea for doctors for his army was now answered by the arrival in late March 1938 of Canadian CP member Dr. Norman Bethune sent by the joint orders of the Communist Parties of the USA and Canada. He founded a field hospital service in Red China, which following Dr. Bethune's death from septicemia on 13 November 1939 became the famous Bethune International Peace Hospital. Other foreign doctors joined the staff of this or other hospitals in the Red base area, over the years: Dr. Richard Brown, a Canadian on three months' leave from the Methodist Mission Hospital at Hankow, arrived in Yenan in April 1938 with Bethune's equipment and supplies

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and accompanied him into the field.  

The elderly progressive Belgian Catholic priest, Father Vincent Lebbe, served the Eighth Route Army with his Christian medical unit in 1939 or slightly before.  

A group of four Indian physicians was working there at the time of Snow's second visit in September 1939.  

Two Soviet surgeons (Dr. Andrew Orlov and a Dr. Gogov) entered via Lanchow about 1942 with Nationalist permission and apparently left in 1945.  

And in 1944 an "anti-Nazi" German physician, Hans Mueller, served in Yenan.

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31 On Lebbe see Edgar Snow, The Battle for Asia (New York: 1941), pp. 268, 282; Raymond De Jaegher and Irene Korbally Kuhn, The Enemy Within (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1953), pp. 14-16, 173, 200, 215-219, 225. Lebbe was soon disillusioned with the Reds and moved his medical team into nearby Nationalist areas. He was captured and many of his group liquidated by the Reds in March-April. He was released on the personal intervention of Chiang K'ai-shek but died two months later of a longstanding illness.

31a One of these, a Dr. Kotnis, also died in the Red area. Gordon and Allan (54), xv, 195, 216, 217.

32 On the Soviet doctors see Peabody (45), pp. 2457, 2469.

32a Peabody (45), 2467.
In 1939 the Nationalists placed a virtual ban on travel to Yenan, Edgar Snow's second trip there (again via Sian) in mid-September 1939 representing perhaps the last one until May 1944 when the Nationalists admitted the first of several waves of foreign journalists.\(^{33}\)

On 22 July 1944 the OSS and US Army opened in Yenan a joint observer unit, the U.S. Army Observer Section, initially consisting of Colonel David D. Barrett as CO, the late John Stewart Service of the State Department, Major Roy Cromley, and Major Melvin Casberg (M.D.). This post, with decreases and substantial increases in staff, continued to operate until after the war.\(^{34}\)

Although these western Communists and fellow-travellers and observers were an important element in the international communications of the Yenan regime, they were second in importance and trivial in numbers compared with the large number of other Asian Communists.

\(^{33}\) McLane (58), pp. 2n, 146n, 173, 175, 215n. See Snow (41), pp. 251-252, 259-261, for details of Nationalist blockade organization and procedures and efforts to evade this. For the May 1944 trip which included Gunther Stein, Harrison Forman, Israel Epstein, and TASS China Bureau Chief, N. Protsenko, see Whaley, Soviet Journalists in China (draft, 1964).

in Yenan during the Sino-Japanese War. During that period at least three major groups of Asian comrades were nurtured in Yenan and all contributed leading elements—virtually partial shadow governments—to the Communist parties of their respective countries: Japan, Korea, and Indochina. These early associations of foreign Communist leaders with the present Chinese Communist leaders continue to have far reaching effects in these countries and in their relationship to international Communist relations. Nosaka Sanzo, the prominent Japanese Communist leader and Comintern Executive Committee member who had been in Moscow since 1931, was secretly smuggled in April 1940 from Moscow to Yenan where he remained hidden under the name of "Lin Che" until 1943 when he "surfaced" publically as Director of the Japanese People's Emancipation League under his old Comintern nom de guerre of "Susumu Okano." Nosaka was soon appointed chief of the Japanese Section of the Psychological Warfare Department of the Eighth Route Army. It was only then that his presence became known to the U.S. intelligence community in Yenan and to resident and visiting foreigners, an illuminating commentary on the frequent confident conclusions by Yenan visitors that because no Russians were visible, no Moscow influence existed.

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Similarly, the Korean Communist, Mu Chong (Chinese name: Mu Ting), was in Yenan from at least 1939 as leader of an elite group of 300 Korean Communists. After the war he headed the so-called Yenan faction in the North Korean regime until being purged in 1950. And Ho Chi Minh and other Indochinese Communists were operating with both Chinese Communists and Nationalists near the Indochinese border.

Describing Eighth Route Army operations against the Japanese in mountainous Shansi province in 1937, the Acting Chief of Staff told Capt. Evans Carlson:

Our men move in mobile units which seldom exceed six hundred men in strength. Each unit carries its own radio plant, so that its movements can be coordinated by the division commander. These units are constantly raiding the Japanese lines of communication, attacking garrisons and ambushing columns on the march. The people help to keep us informed of the movements of the enemy. Superior information, mobility and a determination to prevail are our chief assets.

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37 See Chapter V below for Ho Chi Minh's relations with the Chinese Communists.

38 Evans Fordyce Carlson, Twin Stars of China (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1940), pp. 76-77. Hereinafter cited as Carlson (40b). Conversation around 16 December 1937 with Tso Ch'uan, Chu Teh's Acting Chief of Staff, at Eighth Route Army Headquarters then some 20 miles north of Linfeng in southern Shensi. Killed in action in 1942. In January 1938 Carlson was on the march with a battalion in Shensi and it did indeed have one "radio station", with its headquarters detachment. Carlson (40b), 106. See also Evans Fordyce Carlson, The Chinese Army (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p. 28, where he notes that: "In the areas where [Nationalist and Communist] guerrilla operations are conducted the mobile guerrilla units are usually supplied with radio sending and receiving sets." This previous book by Carlson is hereinafter cited as Carlson (40a).
In June 1938 Captain Carlson was at the headquarters of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Provisional Government located on Mount Wu-t'ai. He describes one of the two newspapers then produced at Wu-t'ai as:

...a [daily] four sheet mimeograph affair which contained not only local items but a résumé of current developments of the Japanese push towards Hankow, gleaned from the daily radio news letter sent out from Eighth Route Army headquarters.

These latter headquarters were then located near Linfeng, some 300 air miles distant in Shensi province. Unfortunately, Carlson does not state how this monitored radio report was delivered to Wu-t'ai, although it was probably via radio.

On the same occasion Carlson was told that one way by which the local civilians aided the Communist regulars was by stealing telephone wire from the Japanese in order both to disrupt their communications and to augment the Communists' supply of telephonic equipment. He also learned that the Border Government had its own central purchasing bureau operating inside Japanese-occupied territory buying such needed articles as radio equipment.

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39 Carlson (40b), 222, 230. The newspaper described was one just delivered to Nieh Jung-chen, the then military commander in Wu-t'ai-shan, and now (1964) a Marshal of the PLA and member of the CC/CCP.

40 Carlson (40b), 223. Interview at Wu-t'ai in June 1938 with P'eng Chen, Director of the People's Movement there. P'eng Chen was a member of the Politburo from 1945 until purged in 1966.

41 Carlson (40b), 223. Interview at Wu-t'ai in June 1938 with Nieh Jung-chen, then the local military commander.
Radio equipment was also acquired at this time by capture from the Japanese. The importance of such capture is illustrated by the stress given it by Liu Po-ch'eng in a description of a major engagement (in 1937?) between his main detachment and the Japanese in which he summed up the gains as:

This victory gave us fifty horses, a quantity of rifles, and ammunition and several radio sets. In this operation we relied on the people to bring us information, and they did not fail us.

Capture was the principal means of arms replenishment for the the Eighth Route Army. The Japanese Army and its puppet forces were probably the main source—as in their defeat of two Japanese divisions at the Battle of P'ing-hsin-kuan in September 1937 which netted them considerable arms—although a U.S. Military Intelligence report commented that:

It was, however, not so much occasional victories over the Japanese that contributed to the supply of arms to the Communist forces, as the defeats suffered by the regular Central Army and provincial forces which opposed the Japanese in the initial stage of the war. Tens of thousands of rifles were left by fallen and fleeing Chinese soldiers on the battle fields in Shansi, Hopeh, Chahar, and Suiyuan. The Chinese Communists collected vast quantities of these abandoned arms and munitions, and used them to replenish their own supplies and to arm guerrilla units and local self-defense corps which they organized among the peasants.

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42 Carlson (40b), 93. Conversation in December 1937 with General Liu Po-ch'eng, then commander of the 192nd Division at Ch'in-chou in Shensi province. Liu is now (1960) a Marshal in the PLA and has been a member of the Politburo since 1956.

42a Peabody (45), 2333.
Although the Soviet Government gave extensive arms aid to China between 1938 and 1941, all of this equipment—and the accompanying military advisory mission personnel—were provided only to the Central Government which did not choose to pass any of it along to the Chinese Communists. 42b

On his four trips in 1937 and 1938 into the Communist-held regions, Captain Carlson observed or learned many details of the Eighth Route Army's communication networks. For example, in January 1938 he noted a telephone link between Liaochou, the headquarters of the 129th Division in Shansi and a brigade headquarters 24 miles distant. 43 Again in July 1938 he found that the regional government in Wu-t'ai (in Shansi province) was in regular radio communication with the political and military headquarters (at Jen-chiu) of the Central Hopei district of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Provisional Government 130 miles away, and that the latter headquarters were linked by "both radio and wire communication" with its own sub-districts. 44

In 1937-38 when the 4th Brigade of the Eighth Route Army was created in South Shantung province in uneasy alliance with both the Central Government 69th Army regulars and the Central Government guerrillas, it had only one radio transmitter, which presumably gave

42b See the author's Soviet and Chinese Clandestine Arms Trade (draft, 1964), Chapter IV, Section 3, on Soviet arms aid to China.

43 Carlson (40b), 100.

44 Carlson (40b), 244.
contact with Eighth Route Army headquarters as well as with single transmitters also possessed by the other two collaborating forces. This radio network was used by the Nationalist Government's Military Affairs Commission to coordinate all Chinese military and civilian groups in South Shantung. It also seems that the Brigade's lower headquarters had radio receivers as well. These receivers brought them news bulletins and speeches from the Central Government as well as—presumably—orders and news from Brigade Headquarters. In addition the Brigade operated the "best network" of (radio?) "communication stations" in several key places for the collection of military intelligence. Virtually all radios and replacement parts were of Japanese manufacture and were obtained (by purchase?) from the Japanese-controlled cities. 45

During this period the Eighth Route Army had attached to all its units, the hsiao kuei (小鬼 "little devils"), boys of 10-15 years in uniform who performed numerous auxiliary tasks such as orderlies, nurses, mess-boys, buglers. They also functioned in communications. For example, in December 1937 Captain Carlson was accompanied on the march by one such boy of thirteen who has just graduated from a radio school and was on his way from Eighth Route Army headquarters to a field assignment. Carlson notes that:"Occasionally I would hear him muttering to himself: 'Dit-da-dit, da-da-da-da, dit-dit-da-dit,' as he endeavored to keep fresh in his mind

45Wang Yu-chuan, "The Organization of a Typical Guerrilla Area in South Shantung", p. 120, in Carlson (40a).
the radio code."\(^4^6\)

In 1936 Edgar Snow was told a story, by the Commander of the 15th Army Corps, of a "little devil" in his unit who was regularly used as a courier at the front.\(^4^7\)

He was given some messages to carry, and on the way he had to circle round a pao (fort) held by the enemy. Instead of taking the mountain path, he deliberately took the main road that led right in front of the enemy guns on the fort. As soon as they saw him the Whites [Nationalists] sent out a squad of cavalry to pursue him but he had a fast horse and rode bareback, and he left them far behind. "He always does this," Hsu complained, "but he is the best dispatch-rider on the front."

During World War II the command net of the Chinese Communist forces accorded with the following description: \(^4^8\)

\(^{46}\) Carlson (40b), 89. See also Snow (38), 42-43, 213, 265, 331-7, 361. This was the popular term by which they were generally known. Alternatively they were called "little Red devils". Officially they were the Young Vanguards (Shao-nien Hsien-feng Tui), a part of the Communist Youth Corps. Klaus H. Fringsheim, "The Functions of the Chinese Communist Youth Leagues (1920-1949)," China Quarterly, No. 12 (Oct.-Dec. 1962), pp. 75-91.


\(^{48}\) Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York: William Sloane, 1946), p. 206-207. By agreement with the Nationalists, the Communists were limited to their original three divisions of about 45,000 men. During this period they expanded to nearly a half million, but retained the original three division structure as a legalistic cover.
Communist regulars operated in bands of three to four hundred men each. Each band was linked to another band and to headquarters either by telephone or by radio. Each command was regional rather than mobile. The various commands pyramided into subdistricts and full districts, which were in turn responsible to the three original divisional headquarters...[that] reported back to the general staff in Yenan, which was commanded by Chu Teh. Commanders of the various districts and subdistricts flicked their scattered bands about the map like a train dispatcher routing express trains. Any number of bands could concentrate swiftly for an attack in clusters up to fifteen or twenty thousand men and then as quickly dissolve and return to their homes. If a Japanese column struck into the hills on a foraging or mopping up operation, spies instantly reported its movement to a district headquarters. The commander studied the enemy's line of march and considered his own troop dispositions; he issued orders by radio, telephone, or runner, and from the hills and villages a dozen guerrilla bands, falling in the enemy's extended columns, would prick and draw blood from his flanks like matadors with a bull. These bands could not remain concentrated for large operations, because they depended on the people of specific localities for support; it was impossible to keep striking masses maneuverable without establishing dumps of food and ammunition that would have been much too tempting to an enemy with vehicles and artillery. Each band drew its nourishment from the district in which it lived, not from a general supply system. The dispersion of the Communist forces was their great strength and also their great weakness. The Japanese could not catch enough of them at one time to do any harm. The guerrillas had no single industrial or military base whose loss would make them vulnerable as a whole. But they likewise could not challenge any important Japanese garrison post or Japanese control of the railway system defended by earthworks and heavy armament. Though they could blunt a Japanese spearhead or turn it aside, they could not stop it.

At this time, the widely scattered units of the Communist forces were integrated into a system of local governments, termed "liberated regions" by the Communists. By the summer of 1944 there were 18 such
local governments. This entire system:

...was co-ordinated from Yenan. A radio and courier network linked all Communist centers from Hainan in the south to the outskirts of Manchuria. The radios were an amateur patchwork of broken Japanese sets, second-hand tubes, and makeshift materials. But the codes, which were excellent, baffled both the Kuomintang and the Japanese, and these communications bound together with iron cords of discipline the eighteen local governments in a coalition that seemed at times a shadow government and at times the most effective fighting instrument of the Chinese people.

Ninety per cent of the vast Communist-controlled area was marked on the map as Japanese-held. It is true that Japanese garrisons and lines of communication laced the entire fabric; it is true that in no single liberated region did the Communists hold more than a few hundred miles of land completely clear of the enemy; it is true that almost every government center they established was a mobile command post ready to move or fight with the troops on a few hours' notice. But each of these governments was able to collect taxes, pass laws, fight the enemy, arm the peasants, and create a loyalty to its leadership that endured whatever savagery the Japanese marshaled against it.

From its earliest days the Chinese Red Army encouraged the development of local militia (Red Guards) to serve various auxiliary functions for the regular units. During the Sino-Japanese War, a militia (min-ping) was first put on a regular basis and was comprised of the more politically dedicated members of the local peasantry and was in turn supported by the civil defense Anti-Japanese Self Defense Corps. Among other duties, the militia served as the eyes and ears

49 White and Jacoby (46), 200-201.

of the Eighth Route Army regulars, its sentries keeping watch for Japanese and Nationalist troop movements and relaying such information from village-to-village by their lookouts stationed at line-of-sight intervals who signalled using poles by day and fires by night. These warnings were passed directly to the threatened villages. And, if the situation warranted, any near-by Eighth Route regular units were notified either by courier or by the telephone networks built and manned by the militia. However, I know of no instance of the militia having radio transmitters, one indication of the scarcity of such equipment which was husbanded by the regular army units.

In general, the organizational, geographical, supply, transportation, and communications structure of the Eighth Route Army and Border Government remained little changed throughout the Sino-Japanese War and closely resembled that in the earlier Chinese Red Army and state. True, the organization became somewhat more bureaucratized, the area of geographical control expanded, the size of the army and civil population increased markedly, local industry increased its output of clothing, paper, munitions, and both more and better transportation and communications equipment became available. Indeed, the Chinese Communists were now sufficiently numerous, well-supplied, and unified to challenge the Nationalists for control of all China in the post-World War II period.

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51 Epstein (47), 175, 177.
D. THE SECOND CIVIL WAR: 1945-1949

V-J Day signalled the formal reopening of the Chinese Civil War. The Chinese Communists themselves termed this phase the "War of Liberation", and on 5 March 1947 the Eighth Route and other nominally "Nationalist" armies were appropriately renamed the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

In a general report on the military situation delivered 25 December 1947 to the CC/CCP, Chairman Mao enunciated the following "principle of operation" among others: 53

Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army's main sources of manpower and matériel are at the front.

This reestablished the principle by which the old Red Army of the 20's and 30's had countered the rapid attrition of it's manpower. 54

Although Mao is not explicit on this point, one may assume that captured Nationalist communications equipment and operators were also pressed into immediate use by the PLA. This surely must have been true of the numerous complete Nationalist regiments and divisions


54 See op. cit., pp. 27, 29, for an earlier reference (in a report titled "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains" of 25 Nov. 1928 by Mao to the CC/CCP): "The Red Army is like a furnace in which all captured soldiers are transmuted the moment they come over."
that were brought over intact by their commanders, as for example the 25 divisions of General Fu Tso-yi which were incorporated en masse in February 1949. Speaking of that period, Col. Rigg concluded that the PLA was the only army in modern times that had "completely equipped itself from captured material"; but as a direct consequence of reliance on Japanese and Nationalist (i.e., U.S. and Soviet) equipment, possessed "a greater variety and conglomeration of weapons and equipment than any other military force in the world today."\textsuperscript{54a}

Writing of the period 1945-1948 when he was Assistant U.S. Military Attaché in China, Rigg observed that lower echelon command posts including even at battalion level were most difficult to recognize because of the informality:\textsuperscript{54b}

You come upon three serious looking officers sitting cross-legged before a soiled and wrinkled Japanese map that is spread on the ground. A tommy-gunner lurks nearby.... Dismounted messenger traffic flows in and out.... Suddenly there is a written message from the rear and as the officer reads it you notice that the message is written on the back side of an old wall poster.... A word or two is exchanged and two of the officers look questionably at the third. The commissar nods.... [The map] is folded and stuffed into a worn leather case, The three men rise...[and] the battalion command post moves forward quietly and without fanfare.

\textsuperscript{54a}Rigg (52), 5-6. See also pp. 182, 184, 272-278, \textit{et passim}, for details and statistics. For example, 133 radio sets were among the Japanese military equipment that, according to Nationalist sources, were taken by the Soviets from the Japanese Army in Manchuria. Col. Rigg implies that many of these sets may have been handed over to the PLA by the Russians who were then equipping Lin Piao's field army in Manchuria from captured Japanese Army matériel.

\textsuperscript{54b}Rigg* (52), 3-4.
Even the higher headquarters of the PLA in the field were readily identified by "the number of field telephone wires which, hastily strung, lead into a farmhouse. The army commander squats on some sacks while a subordinate yells into a U.S. field telephone, of which this army has thousands."\textsuperscript{54c}

Even the headquarters of the highest echelon, the field army headquarters, were characterized by their absence of encumbering paraphernalia. The command post of General Liu Po-cheng's Second Field Army was known as the most mobile of all: \textsuperscript{54d}

Late in the China Civil War his CP could be packed up in one hour and the maps, radios, and telephones loaded on a few horses or carried in two carts. General Liu Po-cheng's command post was rarely established in a town or village. Enemy fighters and bombers gave up trying to find it.

As recently as the Korean War in 1951, the PLA was still largely dependent on verbal orders carried by messengers to units from divisions on down. Although this might appear to grant a measure of independence to lower echelon commanders and certainly saved much of the time-consuming clerical operations common to conventional armies, Col. Rigg concluded that: \textsuperscript{54e}

\textsuperscript{54c}Rigg (52), 4.
\textsuperscript{54d}Rigg (52), 4-5.
\textsuperscript{54e}Rigg (52), 177. See also p. 195.
The PLA does not have the excellence of communications or the quantity and quality of radio equipment that is common to Western army units. Furthermore, the Chinese have big organizations and there are many battalions to be finally instructed, ordered, and redirected in combat. The net result is that control and coordination over a wide frontage is clumsy, slow, and lacking in flexibility. Red battalions often act and react on the initiative of their own commanders, but as a coordinated group of teams they lack excellence.

Even at company level, communications facilities were so poor—no "walkie-talkie" radios even by the time of Chinese entry into the Korean War—that they were forced to rely on the time-honored, simple signals orders conveyed by bugles and whistles. 54f

It is during this period that the Chinese Communist army moved rapidly out of its guerrilla phase. It soon became occupied with conventional infantry operations with division and corps as its main operational units and full-scale conventional attack—including urban siege assault—as its strategy and tactics. 55

54f Rigg (52), 213-214. The message content of these signals in Korea in March 1951 was limited to calls to attack, to withdraw, etc., according to General Robert H. Soule, CG of the 3rd U.S. Army Division there.

55 See references in f.n. 69, below. Also F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China: 1924-1949. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956). Although otherwise an excellent monograph, this latter work virtually ignores questions of military communications, transportation, supply, and intelligence. On modernization during this period, see also Rigg (52), 100, 322.
It is also during this period that the Chinese Communists captured their first urban areas with complex modern internal telephone and telegraphic networks. Finally, between October 1948 and October 1949 with the fall of the metropolitan centers of Mukden, Peking, Shanghai, and Canton, their control over the means of international radio, telegraphic, and transport was obtained.

At this point the Chinese Communists ceased to be guerrillas and, therefore, move outside the purview of this paper.56

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56 For some post-1949 data on aspects of Communist China's international communications see B. Whaley, Foreign Press Monitoring in Communist Countries (forthcoming, 1966), Chapt. VIII ("China")
E. MEDIA

This section will discuss topically--rather than, as before, chronologically--the various communications used by the Chinese guerrillas.

1. Couriers

How fast is a Chinese courier by various means of travel, over various types of terrain under various constraints of enemy action? Despite the obvious relevance of this question, I do not know of any directly apt data. However, we do have some evidence about general means of conveyance for Chinese Communist troop movement. Although the following detail is excessive to establish indirect evidence for the speed of couriers, it serves also to illustrate directly the types of coordinated troop movement with which all the media must be able to keep pace.

For example, by foot, the Chinese Communist columns retreating from Nan-chang in August 1927, marched 60 to 100 li (about 20-33 miles) per day for five days over difficult Kiangsi terrain and under gruelling conditions until they reached Fu-chou, one day behind schedule. The march-rate south of Fu-chou was readjusted to 40-50 li (13-17 miles) per day, which was deemed to be a "relatively leisurely" pace.57

57C. Martin Wilbur, "The Ashes of Defeat," China Quarterly, No. 18 (Apr.-June 1964), pp. 12, 27, 28, quoting contemporary reports of Li Li-san and Chou I-ch'un who, as Political Commissar of General Ho Lung's Independent Division, participated in the retreat. Chou was reportedly executed by Mao Tse-tung in 1930 or 1931. Li is currently (1964) a full member of the CC/CCP.
Standard march pace for Eighth Route regulars—participated in by Captain Carlson in 26 December 1937-January 1938 in a group of 45 persons carrying the standard 40 pounds of weapons and supplies—was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Pace (m.p.h.)</th>
<th>Miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.3 (=10 li)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3+</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>25-30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

with brief stops every 3 or 4 hours. That was a standard march rate, but when pressed, seasoned infantry units could march 60 and 70 miles per day, a rate which could surely be matched by single couriers.

58 Carlson (40b), 88-89, 106. In an unpublished talk to foreign correspondents in Hankow on 7 March 1938, Carlson described a one day's march—probably with the above unit—which covered 43 miles and climbed eight mountains, each man carrying 35 (sic)pounds of equipment. Epstein (39), 202.

59 Carlson (40b), 76. Interview in December 1937 with Tso Ch'uan, 8th Route Army Acting Chief of Staff. Tso also stated that Japanese columns could not then exceed 20 miles per day because they habitually took their heavy equipment and artillery. To overcome this disadvantage in mobility, the Japanese began in 1939 training thousand-man lightly-armed commando teams to conduct rapid deep penetration raids against 8th Route Army command centers and isolated detachments. This was told Israel Epstein (in 1944?) by Nieh Yung-chen, then commander-in-chief of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Liberated Area. General Nieh noted that his improved tactic was defeated by the superior advance intelligence possessed by the Chinese. Epstein (47), 158-160.
Writing in 1941, but probably referring to conditions late in 1939 at the time of his second visit to the Communist region, Edgar Snow states that "on attack march the Reds averaged 30 miles, day or night."  

In the summer of 1944 a group of American and Chinese correspondents—all mounted—were escorted in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area by a 250-man Eighth Route Army infantry detachment which, during the 3-week tour covered 30 miles a day "for eighteen days and a couple of nights, sometimes rising and dropping 5000 feet twice in a single lap" with the drop-out of only three soldiers through illness or fatigue.

Col. Rigg, in his detailed account of PLA march training and practice, observed in the 1940's that PLA battalion and smaller units could maintain the fast march rate of 50 miles a day and 20 to 30 miles at night. To illustrate the movement of entire armies, he cites the case of the difficult wintertime redeployment across primitive road networks of several of Lin Piao's armies which left Yihshien (south of Mukden in Manchuria) on 22 November 1948 and arrived at Fengtai (south of Peking) on 14 December. The 600 mile march was covered in 22 days at the mean average rate of 27 miles per day.

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60 Snow (41), 345.

61 Epstein (47), 347-348. This group, the "Chinese and Foreign Correspondents Press Party to the Northwest" included U.S. journalists Israel Epstein, Gunther Stein, Harrison Forman and Maurice Votow, TASS-man N. Protsenko, a Roman Catholic priest, nine Chinese correspondents, and two Nationalist officials. Dr. Melvin A. Casberg, a Major in the U.S. Army Medical Corps who accompanied the group on this particular march, stated that even the better trained Nationalist troops he had observed would have lost half their force in such a test and that the average ones could sustain a 30-mile-a-day pace for no more than two or three days.

61a Rigg (52), 153, 172-175. As Assistant Military Attaché in China, 1945-1948, Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg had close field contact with the PLA.
2. Telephone

A key element in the development of effective communications in the Chinese Communist forces was the telephone. Their equipment was acquired almost entirely by capture: in the early days from the Nationalists and, during the Sino-Japanese War, from the Japanese army.

Even during the Long March in 1934-35, telephone served as an important supplement to radio for linking the several units in the main body commanded by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh. This telephonic equipment was brought all the way from Juichin in Kiangsi province to Paoan in Shensi and then in December 1936 transferred with headquarters to nearby Yenan where these "veteran wires" were still in use as late as 1937.62

In one successful operation by 432 members of a local Woman's Self-Defense Corps against the Japanese communications between strong point at Peilu and Ankuo in Hopei province in March of 1942 or 1943, the leader made the following remarks in the course of her detailed account of this action:63

62 Wales (52), 72. Transcript of her interview in Yenan in 1937 with Hsü Meng-ch'iu, chief of the Rear Political Department and official historian of the Long March.

63 Forman (45), 156. Interview in Yenan in summer 1944 by Forman with Miss Tang Cheng-kuo, leader of the raid and then director of the 1500 women in the Women's Self-Defense Corps of Nankuo-hsien in Chin-cha-chi, Hopei province.
With my sentries posted to warn us should the enemy come out from his strong points, I then divided my girls into squads of about a dozen each and gave them their assignments. Some squads were to fell the telephone poles; others were to roll up the wire and carry it off—the army pays us well for telephone wire, you know. Others were set to digging ditches across the highway, while still others planted mines to trap reinforcements, which could be expected as soon as it should be discovered that communications had been out.

American correspondent Harrison Forman accompanied an Eighth Route Army detachment on an infiltration operation in 1944 at the southeast corner of the Shansi-Suiyuan base where, along the Lishih-Lanfeng highway, he noted that there were no telephone wires remaining on the poles lining the highway. The Eighth Route regulars and their Min Ping irregulars "had so often stolen the wire in the night that the Japs had given up trying to maintain a telephone service." Soon after, with another raiding party of the Eighth Route Army in the mountainous terrain of central Shansi, Forman's party was warned of the arrival of a Japanese force in one recently attacked village by the headman who was in telephone contact with the other village, six miles distant. Forman noted that:

The telephone instruments and miles of wire had all been captured from the Japs. The lines, laid mostly underground or skillfully hidden in the underbrush, provide an amazingly efficient intelligence network for prowling units of the Paluchun [Eighth Route Army] such as ours.

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64 Forman (45), 215, and photo opposite p. 219 for picture of a telephone apparently captured during this raid on Japanese strongpoints.

65 Forman (45), 227.
Israel Epstein, an American journalist for the Allied Labor News who accompanied Forman on this same trip through Shansi in the summer of 1944, observed that:

Capture and repair had provided the Liberated Areas with a fine telephone system. The Japanese had given up trying to conceal their wires from the watchful eyes of the people and strung it in plain view, relying on threats and reprisals to keep it as intact as possible. The guerrilla lines, on the contrary, were carefully hidden by camouflage and the people's silence. While traveling in Northwest Shansi we were amazed to find telephones in primeval villages at the back of beyond, with no sign of how they were connected.

In their efforts to disrupt Japanese communications, the Communists used their regular army, the local militia, and the common people to tear up Japanese-controlled rail and telephone wires. The former were then used to supply iron for the numerous primitive small-arms factories and the wire was used to both build their own military telephone networks and to provide copper for manufacturing.

Writing of the Communist guerrilla operations in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region at the time of his visit there about 1942 George Hogg noted that the three "necessary" parts of these operations were: 1) thorough organization of the entire local populace, 2) the "telephone system which straddles the countryside on rickety props," and 3) the reorganized postal service, with "'Airmail' letters marked by a chicken feather struck under the flap and sped from hand to hand by night and day...."

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66 Epstein (47), 288.
67 Epstein (47), 109, 288.
68 Hogg (44), 21. Hogg, a British pacifist, was then an INDUSCO official assigned to Northwest China. Hogg also mentions telegrams (p.19) linking General Nieh Jung-chen's Border Region Hq. with sub-headquarters and a "special messenger" (p.17) who brought across the lines a personal letter to Gen. Nieh from a Japanese commander concerning a Japanese prisoner.
3. **Telegraph**

The commercial telegraph was a major communication medium for the Chinese Communists, at least in certain places and during certain periods. This is an unusual circumstance; I know of no other underground-guerrilla case where telegraph was a significant medium. This is, of course, because access to commercial or governmental telegraph line systems (as opposed to wireless telegraphy, which is for our purposes taken as equivalent to radio) normally implies participation in the open society. Thus it was the CCP's collaboration with the KMT from 1923 to 1927 that gave them access to the urban telegraph offices in those cities under their joint control. This unusual circumstance fully accounts for the CCP's frequent use of telegraph during the 1923-1927 period.\(^{69}\) Similarly it would account for any CCP use of telegraph during the period of CCP-KMT rapprochement in the late 1930's and also after 1949 when the CCP began to capture metropolitan centers.

However, the above circumstance does not account for a number of cases (see List 1) in which the Chinese Communists were reported to have continued exchanging telegraph messages during periods when they were fighting guerrilla warfare in the hinterland.

\(^{69}\) North (53), 108, 117, and some individual examples on pp. 105 (a Moscow to Hankow message on 1 June 1937), 114 (Shanghai to Canton and vice versa in August 1927), and 116 (Shanghai to Moscow in August 1927).
LIST 1: Use of Telegraph by Chinese Communist Guerrillas, 1927

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATIONS</th>
<th>COMMUNICATIONS</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
<th>REFERENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sending</td>
<td>Receiving</td>
<td>Sender</td>
<td>Addressee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(arrived)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stalin</td>
<td>Borodin and Roy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>Hankow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>CC/CCP</td>
<td>Local CCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>Local CCP</td>
<td>CC/CCP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
G. A WORD FOR THE FUTURE

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) remains as in its guerrilla days a politically conscious army. However, in terms of organization, tactical mission, training and equipment it is now a more-or-less modern conventional army. The transition in tactics and training to large field formations occurred during the Second Civil War (1946-49); that in equipment, during and after the Korean War (1950-present); and that in organization, particularly in 1953-55. Nevertheless a guerrilla potential remains. The guerrilla tradition is proudly inculcated in the new recruits, and all officers who served before 1946--the great majority of the still active marshals, generals, and senior-colonels--are former guerrillas.70

In addition the militia (min-ping) constitute--at least on paper--a potential auxiliary guerrilla force in the event of invasion of the China Mainland. This initially appeared to be particularly true of the intense "Everyone a Soldier" recruitment campaign launched in August 1958 that by January 1959 had 220 million men and women enrolled to be transformed into an "ocean of soldiers" trained and equipped to repel an "imperialist" invasion.71 Not surprisingly,
this campaign fared no better than the contemporary "Great Leap Forward" and Commune programs. Less than 15% had received even elementary training and only half of those had even fired a rifle. In April 1960 the program was quietly deemphasized and soon, in the face of cadre apathy and pressing needs for agricultural production, training was virtually suspended and all automatic weapons and many rifles reassigned to the regular army.\(^7\)

Thus we can assume that the Chinese Communists have—as do the Russians—a considerable potential for conducting a defensive guerrilla warfare on their own terrain and we should presume that they have made detailed plans and preparations for such a contingency. Furthermore, in the event of such reconstitution of guerrilla warfare in China itself, it is certain that they would from the start have something that no other beginning guerrilla movement has ever previously had, namely, an excellent communications system. The Chinese Communist Army and state security apparatus today possesses better, more modern, and larger quantities of communications equipment and personnel than have any previous guerrilla group. Thus the types of counter-communications prescriptions made in the introductory chapter could have little if any effect on any Chinese guerrilla operations that were renewed on their own terrain.

In general, much the same conclusions can be stated about the ability and probability of the Chinese Communists to export guerrilla warfare doctrine, training, advisers, and equipment as are made below concerning the Russians. The difference in their officially expressed positions is simply that the Russians are more cautious in undertaking overt support of revolutionary wars. They assign—at least publically—a higher element of risk of escalation to the types of conflict that they find unacceptable than do the Chinese. Furthermore, the difference between current Soviet and Chinese practice is—remarkably—less still. Even in Latin America where, from their pronouncements, one would expect to find intense organizational and material aid for the several existing and incipient guerrilla movements, Chinese support has been almost entirely verbal. As Ernst Halperin argues, this is because since 1956:

The real Chinese effort in Latin America has been directed at a very different and far more modest goal: not against the great imperialist foe, the United States, but against Soviet influence in the area.

Similarly, in Africa and elsewhere, despite many alarmist press rumors, it does not appear that Chinese military aid amounts to more


than a nominal trickle. But, as with Russia, the relative current Chinese quiessance in directly and materially supporting revolutionary movements abroad is due to reasons of policy and not through lack of personnel, equipment, or the ability to deliver them, either openly or covertly. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the numbers of communications experts and the volume of communications equipment that can have a major effect on guerrilla efficiency is so small that it is not normally reported in the types of arms aid studies currently published.


IV. CHINESE NATIONALISTS GUERRILLAS: 1937-1946

An almost entirely neglected example of guerrilla operations was that conducted in China by the Chinese Nationalists. As these groups competed--often with marked success against their Communist counterparts as well as against the Japanese--a close examination should provide important insights about effective operations against Communist-led guerrillas. Because of their relative success, such a study might be even more rewarding than a study of the unsuccessful struggle of Mihailović's Četnik guerrillas against Tito's Partisans.

This chapter gives only a cursory introduction to this topic. Proper research would require a careful comparison of Communist and Nationalist guerrilla organization, development, successes, and failures. Adequate documentation to sustain such a comprehensive case study seemingly exists. However, most of it is not readily accessible, being in the form of Chinese and Japanese records and the still-classified (but presumably releasable) records of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO). ¹

¹For example, a major, unpublished manuscript by Dr. Solomon Goldberg and Ralph Mavrogordato completed in 1960 at Special Operations Research Office, The American University, Washington, D.C.
Few published sources on the Sino-Japanese War mention the Nationalist guerrillas or, if they do, it is usually in such off-hand manner as to leave the false impression that the only guerrilla organizations or operations worthy of mention were those directed by the Communists. A second—and even more misleading—type of literature was common during the United Front period. The works of this type gave glowing accounts of the Chinese Communist guerrillas but portrayed them as anti-Japanese patriots operating under Nationalist discipline; the Communist label and prior history was either entirely omitted or deemphasized to the vanishing point, and their revolutionary social and political program was defined as mere "agrarian reform." The authors of these works were of three groups: Communists and fellow-traveller propagandists deliberately attempting to deceive, naive non-Communists suppressing essential background information in a dishonest and foolish but sincere effort to preserve an imagined "friendship" among the political hotch-potch of wartime allies, and ignorant witnesses misguided by the two previous

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2 Three major exceptions should be noted who because of their generally sympathetic view of the Chinese Communists and highly critical view of the Nationalists have tended to be lumped together with the thoroughly unscholarly and outright dishonest contributions described below. These three exceptionally critical observers were Edgar Snow, Michael Lindsay, and Jack Belden.
types of writers into a further expansion of the already incorrect literature.\(^3\)

Nationalist guerrillas did operate in the Japanese-occupied areas throughout the Sino-Japanese War and made a general contribution to the conduct of the war which was, in fact, quite comparable to that of the Communist guerrillas. Some sources state that their contribution was even greater; but, short of a thorough study, I suspect such claims mask a fox-and-grapes motive. The ease with which the Communists swept away the nearby Nationalist guerrillas following Japan's surrender seems at first glance conclusive proof of the relative weakness of the Nationalists, but this could be merely a result of the known failure of Chungking to effectively support and coordinate their loyal guerrillas in the face of Communist "salami" tactics. In other words, Communist success may not prove their overall superiority in numbers, quality, or grassroots support, but only their superior organizational ability to concentrate successively larger numbers against dispersed areas of

\(^3\) The lately popular conspiratorial theories of Communist manipulation of U.S. Government policy and public attitudes towards the Chinese guerrillas--exemplified by writings of Freda Utley and Ralph de Toledano--do not stress this kind of distinction. The school of scholars and correspondents who felt it somehow wrong to inform the reading public of their misgivings about wartime allies was a large and influential one that pleased the Communist propagandists but certainly did not "conspire" with them. Even editors and publishers joined this group, as witness the incredible admission by the publishers that they deliberately withheld publication of Trotsky's biography of Stalin until after WW II. Leon Trotsky, Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946), p. [vii].
Nationalist guerrilla resistance as they did against Japanese strongpoints and, later, Nationalist armies.

The literature on Nationalist guerrillas is largely made up of some of the more obscure and seldom noted sources, although these are in no way less reliable or more controversial than those dealing with the Communist guerrillas. 4

Nationalist, or rather nationalistic but non-Communist, guerrilla operations actually began in Manchuria as resistance groups to the Japanese invasion of September 1931. These groups soon coalesced as the Volunteers of Manchuria under the leadership of Li Tu and were reported in the late 1930's to number perhaps 100,000 men organized in 10 divisions. 5

The Party and Government War Area Commission (Chan-ti Tang-chen Wei-yüan-hui) was a joint KMT-Central Government agency for the coordination of propaganda, relief, supply and social, economic and military counter-attack in the Japanese-occupied territories. It is this body through which most of the Nationalist Government's aid to its guerrillas was channelled and which deliberately sought to

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5 Carlson (40a), 44-45.
rival both Communists and independents in anti-Japanese activities. 6

Some of these Nationalist guerrilla groups—usually the more successful ones—began spontaneously, that is, were developed from local initiative rather than implanted by officials of the Central Government. One such example is the Nationalist group that operated on the Shantung Peninsula from about 1939 to the spring of 1946. 7 This group was founded by Wang Shang-chih, a Whangpoo Academy-trained (and expelled) officer who served with Feng Yu-hsiang, the famed "Christian General," in the 1920's. After the Sino-Japanese War began, Wang Shang-chih brought his two years' experience fighting the Japanese in Manchuria in 1931-1933 while serving there with an

6 Linebarger (41), 64-65. Consult Li Chai-sum, "Chinese Government Organization behind the Enemy Lines," The China Quarterly, v. 5, no. 4 (Autumn 1940), pp. 595-600, which however maintains a diplomatic silence on the competition with the Communists and independents.

7 Tipton (49), 94-127, 136-227, 243-245. Laurance Tipton was a British tobacco merchant who had spent 10 years in North China prior to the beginning of the Pacific War in 1941. Together with Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.—the distinguished Sinologist—he escaped from a Japanese concentration camp and made his way to Wang Yu-min's group where he and Hummel remained until August 1945. He provides a detailed history and critical analysis of the social, political, and military origins, development and destruction of this group. The details of the Tipton-Hummel escape arranged through the 15th Mobile Column and their continuing liaison with the concentration camp are verified by their fellow inmate, Father de Jaegher, Raymond J. de Jaegher and Irene Corbally Kuhn, The Enemy Within (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1953), pp. 239-249
anti-Japanese guerrilla band, to Shantung where from 1939 to 1940 he managed to create a loosely federated but effective guerrilla resistance movement of some 20,000 men. This group was soon officially designated by the fleeing local Nationalist civil authorities as the Second Guerrilla Area. Later it was redesignated the 4th Mobile Column by which time it had some 5,000 men under arms. In May 1943 Wang Shang-chih was captured by the Japanese in a period of over-confident incaution; but the Group continued to grow under its former deputy commander, Wang Yu-min, a school teacher-turned-guerrilla. It was soon renamed the 15th Mobile Column. In 1943, at its peak, the area controlled was approximately 2,000 square miles and the population just under one million. At that point, the guerrilla force was some 10,000 fully armed men with 1,000 additional rifles for the reserves and the Village Self-Protection Corps.\(^8\) As with the Communists, the 15th Mobile Column built from smuggled machinery some twenty factories--employing 2,000 men--that produced mortars, light machine-guns, rifles, hand grenades, and ammunition (50,000 bullets per month). However, they were always short of arms and supplemented their supplies by purchase both from unoccupied China and, illegally, from occupied territory, from puppet and even Japanese troops.\(^9\) Their inability to obtain massive arms and ammunition supplies

\(^8\)Tipton (49), 149 and maps on pp. 110 and 126.

\(^9\)Tipton (49), 120, 147, 157-158.
from Chungking and the OSS at the time of the Japanese surrender and in the face of assaults by the neighboring Communist guerrillas was the major factor in their final defeat in 1945.

Throughout its existence, radio was the main means of communication for the 15th Mobile Column. Radio contact was maintained by the roving headquarters of the Column with each of its eight regimental headquarters.¹⁰ A daily newspaper was produced that contained the latest news received from Chungking and San Francisco (OWI?) stations.¹¹ Main headquarters were in regular two-way radio contact and direct courier contact (via air) with Chungking where they also maintained a permanent liaison officer. The radio contact was delayed because of the necessity—due to weak transmitters—of channeling the broadcasts through the exiled Provincial Government's transmitter at Fuyang in the neighboring Kiangsi Province. Occasional direct radio contact with Chungking was achieved through the loaned use of their set by the local SACO team.¹²

Except for the brief early period of effective Communist-Nationalist united front, the 15th Mobile Column was engaged in the almost continuous triangular warfare that existed throughout the mainland: Nationalists vs. Japanese (plus puppets), Communists vs. Japanese, and Communists vs. Nationalists.¹³ As elsewhere in North

¹⁰Tipton (47), 147, 170, 185.
¹¹Tipton (49), 147.
¹²Tipton (49), 170, 173, 178, 199, 200, 208.
¹³On the 15th's protracted struggles against the local Communist guerrillas, see Tipton (49), 106-108, 118, 122, 202-227.
China, on the eve of Japanese surrender the Communists virtually
pulled out of the fight against the Japanese, concentrating their
activity on seizure, and consolidating their control over the rural
areas at the expense of the Nationalists. With Japan's surrender
they then moved decisively to do two things: accept the surrender
of Japanese arms and territory and crush the local Nationalist
guerrillas. The 15th Mobile Column was merely one of many such
Nationalist groups that--receiving no support from Chungking at
this critical time--fell victim to this dual strategy.

The 15th Mobile Column also engaged in a social action program
not too dissimilar from that of the Communists, but lacking their
revolutionary aspects. For example, home industries were developed
and an education program conducted, involving the creation of no less
than 1,500 primary schools (and two middle schools).

A second type of Nationalist guerrilla operation was that set
up directly by the Central Government through infiltration of
Nationalist officials and military officers into the occupied areas.

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14 Tipton (49), 147.

15 Wang Yu-chuan, "The Organization of a Typical Guerrilla
Area in South Shantung," in Carlson (40), pp. 84-130, is the account
of the origin, development and political and military competition
of the Nationalist 5th [Guerrilla] Column led by a General Sun and
the Nationalist regular forces (the 69th Army) and Fourth Brigade
of the Guerrilla Forces of the Communist 8th Route Army in South
Shantung in the late 1930's. See pp. 101-104, 110, for the 5th
Column. See throughout for other Nationalist resistance activities
in the area.
The principal organization engaged in this type of operation was the secret group directed by General Tai Li.¹⁶

In conclusion, it should be mentioned that the KMT also conducted small-scale underground and guerrilla operations against the Japanese Army and Communist guerrillas in Malaya during World War II. However we do not know anything of their communications problems in those operations.¹⁷

¹⁶ On the relations of Tai Li's men with the 15th Mobile Column, see Tipton (49), 200, 207, 210, 224. On the 15th's relations with the OSS, see Tipton (49), 205, 207

¹⁷ See the chapter of Malaya.
Remarkably, no general, comprehensive study of Soviet theory or practice of guerrilla warfare has appeared. Even the current Sino-Soviet squabbling over "revolutionary war" has failed to elicit such a study. Excepting an important four-page summary by Armstrong, the hundreds of books and articles on Russian partisans and anti-Bolshevik resistance movements are either parochially limited to specific groups, times, or places or imply that Soviet experience was only gained in the Russian Civil War and during World War II. Even the Russians have published only case studies and memoirs, or occasional highly theoretical statements such as those by Marx, Lenin, Frunze, and Tukhachevsky. The facts of Soviet experience are quite different; and the subject deserves a full-scale study, if we deem it important to understand the rôle and attitude of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the current trend in local insurgencies. This chapter can be only a most preliminary and tentative introduction to the problem.

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The central fact of Soviet partisan and counter-insurgency operations is that they are exclusively a mission of the state security apparatus. This has been the case since the early 1920's, when the Cheka took over this function from the Red Army and passed it to its several successor organizations--OGPU, NKVD, MGB, and now the KGB. Because this fundamental point is generally overlooked by Western analysts--including even those with official access to government intelligence--they prove little about Soviet--specifically KGB--guerrilla warfare doctrine or training by their carefully documented demonstrations that the Soviet army has little or none.

The second most important fact is that the Soviet state security has had considerable experience in guerrilla operations. Its experience has been large in scale, almost continuous (1918-1930, 1936-1939, 1941-1956), and highly varied in its political, geographic, and military circumstances. Thus, while the general assertion that the army's experience of guerrilla warfare was limited to the Russian Civil War and World War II is almost (but not entirely) true, it again ignores the extent of the state security's experience.

A third relevant fact--a direct consequence of assigning insurgency missions to state security rather than army--is that the full benefits of experience, training, techniques, and equipment in coping with the whole range of covert operations--espionage, counterintelligence, underground subversion, arms smuggling, and clandestine
communications—is available in the very organization that deals with insurgencies. This fusion of secret police and guerrilla functions gives the KGB a highly flexible capability. The difficulties of treating guerrilla warfare as primarily an army mission rather than a police or intelligence one is illustrated by post-war U.S. practice where, although the mission was specifically assigned to the U.S. Army, CIA soon became involved even where—as in Vietnam until 1962—Army Special Forces was openly operating. The British experienced similar difficulties in World War II by administratively separating insurgency both from other covert operations as well as from centralized intelligence, but changed this with great effectiveness during the Malayan Emergency.

Russia entered World War II with considerable prior experience of guerrilla combat. Conventional princely armies had unsuccessfully faced the long-ranging, deep-penetration cavalry raids of the Mongols in the 13th century; and—mutatis mutandis—during the Napoleonic invasion Marshal Kutusov used Cossacks as auxiliaries to harry the retreating Grand Army. In 1906 Lenin penned his article

3Christopher S. Wren, "How Special Forces Got into the Guerrilla Game," LOOK, v. 30, no. 22 (1 Nov. 1966), p. 35.


5See chapter on Malaya, below.

6James F. Downs, "Thoughts on Cavalry, Guerrilla Warfare and the Fall of Empires," Kroeber Anthropological Papers, No. 23 (Fall 1960), pp. 105-113.
"Partizanskaya Voina" (Partisan Warfare), which however was really only an operational guide to organized terrorism, holdups, and robberies. During the Russian Civil War, particularly in 1918-1920, the Bolsheviks made extensive use of partisan units and acquired counterinsurgency experience against several minor nationalistic guerrilla movements throughout the 1920's. They gained their first foreign field experience in 1920 in the Russo-Polish War and again in 1936-1939 in the Spanish Civil War. Nor should we overlook the intensive Soviet Bolshevik experience in planning, directing, advising, and partly equipping the unsuccessful Communist revolutions in Hungary (1919), Germany (1919-1923), and China (1923-1927). After all, in the Marxist-Leninist concept, "partisan warfare" is merely one of several specific forms that such "revolutionary wars" can take. Then, during World War II, the USSR used partisans on a large scale in the defense of the state against Nazi Germany. In the post-war period Soviet guerrilla experience has been of two main kinds: first, counterinsurgency experience gained in suppressing nationalistic guerrilla bands that operated in several parts of the country, particularly in Lithuania, Poland, and the Ukraine, down to 1956; second, observing—and in some cases perhaps providing training and advisers for—various insurgencies around the world: China, Greece, Korea, Congo, Latin America, and Vietnam.

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7 The initial appearance in English of this article—although present in all Russian editions of Lenin's Collected Works—was the translation by Regina Eldor with annotation by Stefan T. Possony in Orbis, v. 2, no. 2 (Summer 1958), pp. 194-208.
In summary, there are two main points to be made about the place of guerrilla war in Soviet political-military thinking. First, the guerrilla and counter-guerrilla mission is specifically assigned to the state security organs (now KGB), not the army. Second, their--that is, KGB--accumulated experience along this line is older, more extensive, more varied, and more internationally oriented than that of any other country, not excepting even China. This view--which I share with Armstrong--is opposed by Garthoff and others who argue that because the Soviet experience occurred in a uniquely Russian geographical, economic, political, and military setting it is inapplicable to the post-war guerrilla wars. Garthoff goes even further in asserting that:

...for guidance on the tactics and operations of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, and for direct support, the Soviets do not have the experience, the doctrine, the cadres, or the missionary zeal of the Chinese Communists.

While we can accept Garthoff's point about greater Chinese zeal and perhaps even doctrine, the rest is moot. If the KGB's guerrilla experts are quiescent at the moment, it is because of policy constraints and not through any lack of trained, experienced personnel possessing the most advanced covert communications technology of the KGB.

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8 Armstrong (64), 8.
A. COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN THE CIVIL WAR, 1917-1921

In March 1918, Leon Trotsky was appointed Commissar of War to command the Red Army, which had been founded the previous month. He immediately set about the two and a half year task of establishing centralized political and military control over the chaotic situation. Speaking of the period of stiffening White resistance, Trotsky wrote: \(^{11}\)

Accustomed to easy victories, the guerrilla detachments at once displayed their worthlessness; they did not have adequate intelligence sections; they had no liaison with each other; nor were they ever able to execute a complex maneuver. Hence—at various times, in various parts of the country—guerrillaism met with disaster. It was no easy task to include these separate detachments in a centralized system. The military ability of the commanders was not high, and they were hostile to the old officers, partly because they had no political confidence in them and partly to cover up lack of confidence in themselves.

Throughout 1919, these separate, ill-coordinated, Red partisan bands gradually developed some internal organization and were finally subordinated to the Red Army. As this happened, their usefulness as diversionary auxiliaries markedly increased. However, some guerrilla bands (e.g., Makhno's) shifted allegiance between the Reds and Whites while still others consistently opposed the Bolsheviks. \(^{12}\)

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Guerilla warfare has been an exclusive responsibility of the Cheka-NKVD-KGB since the Civil War. This mission was assigned to the state security organization rather than to the regular army (as is more-or-less the case in the U.S., Britain, and Red China) because of its intelligence, internal security, and counter-intelligence aspects. The Cheka gradually became involved in guerrilla operations even during the Civil War in 1919-1920, although Trotsky's Red Army evidently held main control over guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations for that brief, initial period.13

B. GUERRILLA AND COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD, 1921-1941

The endemic phase of partisan bands ended in 1921 with the conclusion of the Civil War and consolidation of Bolshevik power. However, intermittent and entirely local disturbances continued throughout the decade and some of these took on the characteristics of guerrilla war: for example, the Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas in the former Polish territories (1920-1924) and the Basmachi revolt in Bukhara (1921-c. 1930).

The OGPU (later NKVD, KGB, etc.) had sole responsibility for counterinsurgency throughout this period. To accomplish this police-military task the state security organization developed its own special para-military forces: highly mobile, élite reinforced infantry divisions. Their estimated strength was 150,000 men in 1936 and 100,000 in 1954. The state security has also incorporated the militia (usually --and since 1953--assigned to the Interior Ministries, MVD and MOOP, rather than to the State Security--KGB), the frontier guard (200,000 in 1954) and other special units such as the railway troops used to secure the state's and army's lines of communication. All these units have the specialized training and equipment to enable them to undertake counterinsurgency missions. A carefully updated study of these forces is needed; it would constitute an important contribution to our knowledge of the current Soviet state of the art in guerrilla
Not counting the post-World War I revolutionary underground warfare in Hungary and Germany, there are two instances in the period between the two world wars where the Soviet state security apparatus directly supported actual guerrilla operations on foreign soil: during the Russo-Polish War and in the Spanish Civil War.

Although the six-months Russo-Polish War of 1920 was fought along predominantly conventional infantry-cavalry lines across the terrain of western Russia and eastern Poland, some behind-the-lines guerrilla operations were conducted by Red Army detachments directed by the Cheka. Unfortunately few details are known of this presumably instructive operation. It is significant that Cheka chief Feliks Dzerzhinsky was appointed "Chief of the Rear," but this was probably more to handle defection and anti-Red guerrillas behind the Red Army than to conduct operations behind the Poles.

The Spanish Civil War broke out in mid-1936. By the end of the year the NKVD had taken over the planning and direction of the small-scale but significant guerrilla operations conducted by pro-Loyalist bands.

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15 Orlov (63), 171-172.

16 Erickson (62), 89.

17 For a detailed study see my Guerrillas in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T., Center for International Studies, 1967).
C. SOVIET GUERRILLAS IN WORLD WAR II

The case study of Soviet partisan operations during World War II is important here because of its several rare characteristics. It exemplifies the use of guerrillas to serve as behind-the-lines auxiliaries of a still quite undefeated army fighting in its own country.\textsuperscript{18} It is also important because of two other aspects: the German counter-guerrilla operations\textsuperscript{19} and the development of indigenous anti-Soviet guerrilla forces such as the major group in the Western Ukraine.

\textsuperscript{18}Comparable examples would include the Spanish guerrillas and Russian partisans in the Napoleonic Wars, Nationalist guerrilla forces in the Sino-Japanese War, and Merrill's Marauders in Burma. Even the Chinese Communist guerrillas in the Sino-Japanese War and subsequent Civil War are not perhaps too farfetched an example.

In passing it should be noted that even during World War II the NKVD had virtually no official relations with the Allied secret services regarding guerrilla operations.\(^20\) This despite the considerable overlap of such operations in China, Yugoslavia, and—to some extent—in Central Europe. The omission is striking because there was some NKVD collaboration with the British SOE and the American OSS on intelligence matters.\(^21\)

When Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa against Russia in June 1941, the meagre evidence suggests that the Soviet Government had made some preparations and rough contingency plans for partisan operations, which were seemingly intended to merely harass an invader. In any case they could have been expected to do little more—such as engage in intelligence collection—as the hastily organized groups were initially virtually without radio or air liaison. Furthermore, the NKVD’s extensive, existing underground intelligence networks were specifically instructed to avoid contacting partisans in order to prevent being

\(^{20}\)Foot (66), 30-31.

\(^{21}\)John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (New York: Viking, 1947), pp. 50-63. Also pp. 238-239 for wartime collaboration between the U.S. and Soviet military intelligence. While it was Russian reluctance that frustrated collaborative efforts in the guerrilla sphere, it should be acknowledged that it was on J. Edgar Hoover's urgent recommendation in 1944 that the White House terminated the OSS plan to allow an official NKVD intelligence liaison mission to open in Washington, D.C. Don Whitehead, The FBI Story (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. 228-229.
exposed through association with these more open and hence more readily caught groups.22

Eventually, however, the Soviet Government did manage to coordinate the partisans. The two main means of command and control of the guerrillas were air liaison and radio.23 Concerning radio, Marshal of Signal Troops, I.T. Peresypkin wrote in 1948 that:24

Communications, particularly radio, played an extraordinary role in the organization and leadership of the partisan movement.... The partisan movement needed a united leadership. Coordination of the actions of many partisan detachments was needed.

The regular state radio system was employed to broadcast twice daily a ten-minute program titled "Course for Partisans" which, in addition to reporting successful partisan operations, gave specific instructions on such practical activities as how to conduct raids and assassinations.25

22 Armstrong (64), 13-15. Even this rather negative assessment represents a change from Armstrong's earlier belief that--despite Soviet claims--they had made no plans or preparations for guerrilla warfare. Among others who concluded that the Soviet Government had no preparations for partisan war is Galay (56), 161-162.


24 Garthoff (53), 402.

25 Dixon and Heilbrunn (54), 74. This use of the national radio was similar to--and was perhaps borrowed from--the British use (in its continental SOE guerrilla operations) of the BBC beginning in the summer of 1941. Foot (66), 110-111.
Finally, it should be noted that the Soviet army and NKVD extended its partisan operations across the Russian borders deep into Eastern Europe during the war. Beginning with liaison—exclusively an NKVD matter—with Communist and other underground and guerrilla movements in 1941, this was extended in 1944 and 1945 by the advancing Soviet Army to operations of the size and type found earlier on Russian soil. This part of Soviet experience is adequately covered elsewhere. 26

D. ANTI-COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN THE USSR

There exists an extensive but highly controversial literature describing various underground organizations operating against the Soviet authorities. Their operations included active guerrilla phases in the post-World War II period in the Ukraine and Lithuania. Although widely publicized, the activities are quite controversial as to their scope, effectiveness, and degree of local popular support, as well as degree and nature of secret foreign—particularly U.S.—support. Because of these uncertainties in the quality of documentation and because of the relative lack of information on the communications of these groups, they will receive only brief treatment here.

Ukrainian Resistance

Several anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist underground groups in the Western Ukraine developed into major guerrilla bands during World War II. However, their bitter ideological and political differences prevented unification. Largest and most important of these was the Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army (UPA, Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya) numbering between 40,000 and 100,000 combatants by late 1943.

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These groups became the basis for the continuing post-war guerrilla and subversion underground centering around the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN, Organizatsiya Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv), which maintains an information center in Munich. These activities spilled over into Poland, and it is to this fact that we owe the several highly detailed accounts published by Polish military officers that effectively supplement the reluctant Soviet and Czech sources and convincingly corroborate the Ukrainian exile reports.28

The struggle against the OUN is a specific mission of the state security organization and, if nothing else, provides it with a realistic training ground for its own guerrilla warfare personnel.29 The UPA successfully ambushed regular army units, destroyed militia outposts, sabotaged bridges, and conducted similar depredations, employing raiding bands of ten to a hundred men. As with the Lithuanian, Chinese, and Viet Cong guerrillas, secret underground rooms and tunnels served as their headquarters, depots and refuges.30 Meanwhile, the OUN district authorities were generally successful in their intelligence collection, the distribution of local editions of their publications, and even in the collection of taxes. Some notion of the dimensions of UPA-OUN activity is seen in the Polish accounts. In the Polish Ukraine alone

28 An excellent, critical discussion of these highly controversial sources is in Bilinsky (64), 417-422.

29 Bilinsky (64), 117, 133-135

30 Armstrong (63), 297, 299; and Bilinsky (64), 116, 135.
in 1948 there were some 6,000 armed UPA guerrillas. After the defeat of Germany, three Polish infantry divisions were thrown against them, but unsuccessfully. Indeed, in 1947 the UPA succeeded in ambushing and killing the Polish Defense Minister, General Świerczewski, who as "General Walter" had commanded the crack XIVth International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. It was only by mounting a full scale assault in April 1947 with five reinforced divisions that open guerrilla activities were suppressed in March 1948. Over 1,500 of the guerrillas had been killed or captured in this final campaign and the total casualties since June 1945 were approximately 1,300 regular Polish army troops and 3,000 Internal Security troops killed as against 7,500 of the guerrillas. The Poles themselves admit that their success in forcing the UPA to abandon guerrilla tactics was due as much to the forcible resettlement of the local Ukrainian population as to their 10-to-1 superiority in manpower.

In the Soviet Ukraine it appears that the OUN was at least as large, well-coordinated, and active an underground as it was in Poland. However, it does not seem that UPA guerrilla operations were quite as large there, being confined more to such terrorist tactics as assassination of locally prominent Communists and burning of collective farm buildings.
Links among OUN groups were maintained by couriers and occasionally by special raids across the Soviet borders into Slovakia (two, in 1945 and 1946), Poland, Rumania (1949), and north into Byelorussia and East Prussia (1948).

There have been no reports of guerrilla bands in the Ukraine since 1956; and the one active that year has not been conclusively identified as a UPA group. To the extent that the Ukrainian nationalist movement exists today, it is seemingly only as a relatively quiescent underground. However, two recent measures of the continuing Soviet concern are 1) the political assassinations in West Germany of OUN leaders (of Lev Rebet in 1957 and Stepan Bandera in 1959) by KGB agent Bodgan Stashinsky and 2) the unusually violent Soviet press response to Western allegations of Ukrainian resistance as in Podgorny's reply in the UN General Assembly to Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker's passing remark. 32


32 Bilinsky (64), 281.
Lithuanian Resistance

Organized partisan resistance in Lithuania lasted some eight years, from 1944 until suppressed in 1952. It reached its peak in 1945-1949 when there were some 30,000 active partisans. Several groups arose spontaneously with leaders from the nationalist anti-Nazi underground in opposition to the Soviet reoccupation, flourished briefly in 1949 under a nation-wide central command and thence suppression was achieved through total-war tactics by Army-NKVD troops under the general direction of NKVD (later MVD and MGB) Colonel-General S. N. Kruglov, then Deputy Director of SMERSH.

The officially stated Soviet view is that these groups were originally set up by the Germans and maintained after the war by American, British, and Swedish intelligence. However, while some émigré contacts are likely, it does not appear that such external communications played a major rôle in either directing or sustaining these guerrillas.

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Russian Resistance\textsuperscript{34}

Anti-Communist Russian émigré organizations have abounded in the West since the Revolution. While most of these are too riven by the intense parochial differences characteristic of most émigré communities to engage in more than literary or similar cultural activities, one group managed to direct some of its energy into underground work inside the homeland, particularly after World War II. This rather odd group is the NTS (Natsionalny Trudovoi Soyuz, or National Workers' Union), espousing the national revolutionary doctrine of Solidarism since its founding in 1930 in Belgrade. Seemingly it has consistently been quite unconnected with the large Ukrainian OUN movement because of their sharp differences in goals and ideology.\textsuperscript{35}

The activities of the NTS are well-publicized not only by themselves—particularly through their Frankfurt-published newspaper, Possev, and public speakers and local offices in the U. S. and elsewhere—but also by the Soviet press. Because the publicly available information on NTS

\footnotesize{34} Carefully documented material on NTS to 1944 is in Fischer (52), 21, 214-215, etc. Much general if not fully verified information is in Nikolai Khokhlov, In the Name of Conscience (New York: McKay, 1959), pp. 151-153, 188-197, 202-203, 223-228, 245-261, 291-293, 348-349, 357. N. E. Khokhlov, by his own account, was an MVD captain who, sent to assassinate NTS leader G. S. Okolovich in Frankfurt in 1954, defected, was entrapped by the CIA into a disastrous press conference, and two years later joined the NTS. A popular, journalistic account of the NTS is Gordon Young, The House of Secrets (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1959).

\footnotesize{35} Indeed the only linkage I have seen cited is the case of the defection to the NTS of one OUN leader during the German occupation. Armstrong (63), 269.
activities comes only from these two biased sources—both of which, for their own reasons, evidently exaggerate the extent and nature of NTS operations—only brief notice will be made of them here.

What is significant is that although the NTS is the only nationalist underground resistance movement of Great Russia to seriously disturb the Soviet authorities, it has—unlike the Lithuanian and Ukrainian movements—never mounted actual guerrilla operations. It remains at the clandestine underground stage of development. In this regard it is undoubtedly significant that the only communications I have found reported for the NTS have been the typical underground courier system. Not only have contacts among the separate internal underground cells apparently been limited to couriers, but also the coordination between these field units and the NTS center abroad. Seemingly the only increase in sophistication in the international communications of the NTS is that airdrop of couriers was used, at least during the early 1950's, to supplement the usual border crossing.
E. RECENT GUERRILLA EXPERIENCE

Although the KGB has—through the successful suppression of anti-Soviet guerrilla bands on its own territory—not directly experienced any counter-insurgency operations since 1956, it has played a continuing rôle in observing, advising, and training insurgencies. First—concurrently with its own internal counter-insurgency—in South Korea in an advisory and planning capacity (1951-1953);\(^{36}\) subsequently, in an observer capacity in most recent insurgencies.

Current State of the Soviet Art

Finally, it remains to establish that sufficient continuity exists in the organizational structure and personnel of the Soviet state security of the past to carry forward into the present. The frequent mass purges of personnel and bureaucratic reorganizations that characterize the Soviet system obviously disrupt the accumulation of knowledge and experience. The analogy with the U.S. problems of having to virtually recreate guerrilla (and psywar and even intelligence) after each war illustrates the problem where only organizational disruption occurred, the experienced personnel being alive and available. While such disruptions and fluctuations are known to have affected the

\(^{36}\)See my Soviet Intervention in the Korean War (draft, 1965).
portions of the Soviet state security concerned with guerrilla operations, it is also known that continuity did exist, although not in enough detail to estimate its degree.

First, the guerrilla-counterguerrilla mission continues as a state security function, surviving even the major de-Stalinization program of Premier Khrushchev. Second, enough key senior personnel have survived each state security purge to suggest some continuity of experience.

Third, those few public Soviet policy statements imply continuity in doctrine as well. In a major programmatic speech on the topic in 1961, Premier Khrushchev summarized the Soviet position on national-liberation wars explicitly as follows:

There will be wars of liberation as long as imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only possible but inevitable, since the colonialists will not voluntarily grant the peoples independence. Therefore the peoples can win their freedom and independence only through struggle, including armed struggle.

The difference from the officially expressed Chinese position is simply that the Russians are more cautious in undertaking overt support of revolutionary wars, because they assign--at least publicly--a higher

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37 Khokhlov (59), 181-185, 195-196.

38 N. S. Khrushchev, speech of 6 January 1961, as translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v. 13, no. 4, p. 9. Only slight modifications have taken place on this point in the post-Khrushchev Soviet position, mainly in attacking Khrushchev's blurring of the "class" characters of wars. See Garthoff (66), 197 n.
element of risk of escalation to the types of conflict that they find unacceptable. Furthermore, the difference between current Soviet and Chinese practice is—remarkably—less still. Even in Latin America where from their pronouncements one would expect to find organizational and material aid, Chinese support for guerrillas has been almost entirely verbal.

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39 See discussion in Garthoff (62), 571; and Garthoff (66), 191-219.

In the case of Yugoslavia we are most fortunate because of the relative richness of readily accessible source materials that not only cover the full period that is relevant to our study but do so from a variety of distinctly separate but actively participant viewpoints: Titoist, Stalinist, Royalist, and British. The Yugoslavian case is particularly important because we can trace the development of a successful Communist resistance movement which was at the same time a successful revolutionary movement in competition with the Četnik guerrillas who are themselves important as a well-documented case of an unsuccessful operation.

A. PRE-WORLD WAR II UNDERGROUND

As a direct result of the Stalin-Tito split in 1948, the Yugoslavs have incorporated in their memoirs and publications much otherwise suppressed information on the operations and connections of the CPY-Comintern communication network linking the CPY underground in Yugoslavia with the CPY Central Committee in Vienna (and later in Paris) and the CPSU and Comintern in Moscow. Paramount among these

1Italian, German, Quisling, and Comintern sources also exist, but have not been consulted for this study. A considerable amount of data—all supportive of the conclusions in this paper—has been also found in other works by V. Dedijer, C. Fotitch, and F. MacLean, but excluded from the present survey.
writings is the semi-autobiography of Tito published in 1953 by Dedijer and made available that same year in an English translation.²

Prior to the German attack in April 1941, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was a small but active underground conspiratorial movement centered in Belgrade. During these underground days, the CPY journal Proleter [The Proletarian] was effectively distributed throughout the country in individual copies by trusted persons as they passed through Belgrade.³ Such a courier system—using apparently legitimate travellers—is, of course, a characteristic of communication channels in clandestine conspiratorial organizations, common among national CP's, the Comintern, and Soviet intelligents nets. Dedijer had been part of this movement as a member of the CPY.

The "Spaniards"

The most valuable single special asset possessed by the Yugoslav Communist underground that enabled it to quickly transmute itself into a guerrilla force was the presence of about 300 combat-blooded veterans of the International Brigades from the recent Civil War in Spain. Transport to Spain was by two routes. One—used particularly by intellectuals—involved legal exit by passport to Paris, and thence to Spain. The other—used by persons known to the Yugoslav police as


leftists--was by underground channels to Austria thence without passport to Switzerland, France, and Spain, many being arrested and returned to Yugoslav prisons.\footnote{Dedijer (53), 112-113. Until the facts become known surrounding the purge of Gorkić in 1937 and his replacement by Tito--then a Comintern functionary in Moscow--as Secretary-General of the CPY, all Titoist versions of Spain should be accepted only provisionally. For the differing accounts circulating in Communist and ex-Communist sources of the fall of Milan Gorkić and Petko Miletić and the rise of Tito see Richard Lowenthal, World Communism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 290-291, 293-294.} According to Dedijer, an attempt in 1937 by Gorkić to organize direct clandestine passage by boat of nearly a thousand Yugoslavs to Spain from the Montenegrían coast ended with the arrest of several hundred volunteers on the beach.\footnote{Dedijer (53), 112-113.}
Although some Yugoslavs were scattered among various International Brigade units, most were concentrated in the predominantly Yugoslav-manned "Dimitrov Battalion" formed in February 1937.

The Yugoslav "Spaniards" included Vladimir Copic who as a Lieutenant Colonel commanded the XVth International Brigade from February 1937 until May 1938, Veljko Vlahović, Peko Đapšević who served as company commander, Koca Popović, Ivan Čošnjak, and Alexander Ranković. Despite the relatively large contribution of men, the Yugoslav Communists did not occupy any of the directing positions that were assigned largely to the Russian, German, Italian, Hungarian, and French comrades. This is probably due to the fact that the Yugoslav Party leadership was then undergoing a major purge from which quite junior figures were emerging. As best I can determine, only Copic held any senior position in Spain, and he was soon destroyed in Stalin's purge. Nevertheless these men formed the experienced cadre for the Yugoslav Partisans.

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6 E.g., the predominantly Polish "Dombrowski Battalion." Thomas (61), 638.

7 The "Dimitrov Battalion" saw its first action at the Battle of Jarama on February 12th. During the course of this action, the battalion suffered 700 casualties among its 800 men. The Battalion was initially attached to the XV International Brigade at which time it included numerous other Balkan nations (160 Greeks, etc.). Later it was transferred to the 129th International Brigade at which time it included a substantial number of Albanians. Finally it was transferred to the XIIIth International Brigade. Thomas (61), 377, 379, 461, 639; Colodny (58), 119, 120, 122, 123, 125, 221, 229.

8 For the details of the Yugoslav Communist underground experience in Spain see my Soviet Intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (draft, 1966).
B. TITO'S PARTISANS: 1941-1944

Partisan operations in Yugoslavia during World War II are relatively well known. We have excellent accounts from Yugoslav, German, and British participants. However, the best single source for our purposes because it incorporates much passing material on guerrilla communications per se is the Diary of Vladimir Dedijer, which was published in 1946 in Yugoslavia in two substantial Serbo-Croat volumes. Although this original version is not accessible to me, the abridged English translation is. This authorized version excised nearly two-thirds of the passages of the original text but gives a faithful translation of the remaining portion which, even so, runs to over 400 pages.

Dedijer's Diary covers the period from the Axis assault on Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941 until the joint Partisan-Soviet liberation of Belgrade on 25 October 1944. The Diary consists of the author's almost daily notes, often as little as only 50 words highlighting a single day's activities and seldom more than brief summaries of incidents or developments. The author states that the text is exactly as written at the time and is—even in the abridgment—free of "the custom rather popular in some countries, of falsifying historical documents by the deletion of names, or by denial of the part they

9Dedijer (51).

10The English edition ends on 10 November 1943, the eve of Dedijer's evacuation to Cairo for head surgery. He resumed his diary on his return to Yugoslavia the following July. His subsequent biography of Tito, Dedijer (53), incorporates much of his diary material and through the English translation of this book the non-reader of Serbo-Croat has at least indirect access to much of the material omitted from the English abstract of the diary.
played before turning traitor...."

However, even if this claim of unexpurgation is true, it is true that Dedijer suppressed or at least omitted certain facts in writing his journal as, for example, neglecting to mention that Radio Free Yugoslavia was a Soviet and not a Partisan station. Indeed, his diary—published originally two years before Tito's defection—omits all references to the Tito-Stalin differences, which developed rapidly in bitterness from the very moment of Tito's rising without prior clearance from Moscow and his frequent initiatives taken either without reference to Moscow or—in several subsequently well-documented cases—in direct defiance of Stalin's clearly expressed commands. Although much of the relevant evidence was available at the time, the incompetent Royal Yugoslav régime in London, the harrassed Mihailović, and the politically naive British advisers were unaware of these developments that ultimately produced the open Tito-Stalin break in 1948.11 Only at that point did Tito commission the production of a flood of speeches, pamphlets, articles, and books designed to justify his defiance of Stalin, but incidentally giving a rather accurate—if still somewhat incomplete—picture of the covert political struggle that had determined Tito's Partisan strategy and the timing, amount, and type of Soviet assistance during the war.12


12For example Dedijer (53); Moša Pijade, La Fable de l'Aide Sovietique à l'Insurrection Nationale Yugoslave (Paris: 1950), also available in English.
I have structured this section around Dedijer's Diary because it is the single most detailed source on Partisan communications and because its extended day-by-day treatment permits a clear glimpse of the changes in communications patterns. Unless otherwise noted, all data are based on this source.

Throughout the wartime campaigns Dedijer was attached to operations which moved closely with the Tito Headquarters of the Supreme Command, first as Political Commissar of a military detachment and then--after a wound in the fall of 1941--as Editor of the CPY newspaper, Borba, and later in several other responsible positions. These circumstances--proximity to GHQ and affiliation with the Party press--give Dedijer's chronicle more than usual value.

From the time of the German attack and occupation of Belgrade, April through July 1941, Dedijer was a Party journalist in Belgrade. At that time, among other duties, he compiled a twice weekly "detailed bulletin" on international news which was multigraphed after being approved by Djilas, the Chief of the Agitprop Bureau of the CPY Politkom. In August Dedijer moved out of Belgrade on the first leg of HQ journeys which were to keep the Partisans in the countryside until the liberation of Belgrade in October 1944.

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13 Dedijer (51), 231.

14 Milovan Djilas, author, Marxist theoretician, and a principal collaborator of Tito until his expulsion from the Central Committee and resignation from the CPY in 1954. Imprisoned for publishing his unauthorized political writings, he was released in 1967.
In late August, when first attached to the Kragujevac Partisan detachment, Dedijer immediately began production of the "radio news"—prepared "most conspiratorially" in a stable—in eight copies which were posted in the eight parishes of the Gruza District.\textsuperscript{15}

Then in October 1941 Dedijer joined the Supreme Command—then at Užice in Serbia—and was immediately appointed Editor of the Party newspaper, \textit{Borba}. This paper was published roughly every day and continued publication for the duration of the war despite moving constantly about the country with the Supreme Command Headquarters.\textsuperscript{16}

Radio was for the Partisans the principal vehicle for receiving both information of current international events as well as instructions from abroad. BBC was very closely followed but was a source of considerable annoyance for the Partisans because early in the resistance movement, it tended to praise Mihailović and his Četniks and in the later stages to present the British agents and advisers to Tito as playing a more directing rôle than was the case.\textsuperscript{17} Radio Moscow was even more closely attended throughout the war both for its coverage of military developments on the Russian front and for the Serbo-Croatian language broadcasts by the Yugoslav Communists on the Radio Moscow staff.\textsuperscript{18} Also followed closely was the "gray" station, Radio Free

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{15}Dedijer (51), 27-28.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{16}Dedijer (51), 40, 42, 46, 48, 99, 179, 183, 196, 215, 217, 222, 224, 228, 230-231, 247, 274, 351.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{17}Dedijer (51), 57, 173, 176, 180, 246, 348, 349.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{18}Dedijer (51), 62, 117, 122, 126, 173, 267.}
\end{footnotes}
Yugoslavia which, while purporting to be a local Partisan operation, was established by Allied intelligence to be a Moscow-directed transmitter located at Tiflis in Soviet Georgia.  

Foreign radio was not merely listened to, it was also soon systematically monitored as a basis for the material which Dedijer and his colleagues at Partisan headquarters put in the Radio Bulletin, the first number of which was issued on 1 January 1942.

Another source of outside news and military supplies—and a major source of new radio receiver-transmitters—was the succession of British advisers who arrived in Yugoslavia by submarine and plane from 19 March 1942 on to establish and augment the British Military Mission attached

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Fotitch (48), 185, 197, 202, 228, 273, 317. Radio Free Yugoslavia broadcast in Serbo-Croat and other languages daily communiqués which Fotitch alleges were relayed from Partisan headquarters inside Yugoslavia. The English edition of Dedijer's Diary makes frequent reference to Radio Free Yugoslavia from at least as early as 15 May 1942, but implies throughout that it was a Partisan operation from inside Yugoslavia. See Dedijer (51), 117, 122, 151, 191, 202, 244, 257, 260. Djilas recently revealed that while Radio Free Yugoslavia "was located in the Soviet Union to serve the needs of the resistance movement in Yugoslavia," it nevertheless was manipulated to support Stalin's policies at the expense of those of Tito. Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), p. 10.

Dedijer (51), 58. Unfortunately Dedijer supplies no further details about this bulletin. Was it, for instance, an example of the type of "confidential" foreign news periodical intended only for trusted senior officials?
to Tito's headquarters. These teams brought with them both radio stations and trained radio-telegraphists, and occasionally these sets were turned over to the Partisans. 21

Radio was, of course, the fastest and also the most reliable and secure means of communication (and coordination) between Tito's Supreme Staff and field units. However, it was one of the critical problems, because of the scarcity of such equipment. By 13 August 1942, Dedijer characterized their radio liaison with the field units as "working well," but by 2 January 1943 it was functioning "marvellously" as a result of the recent acquisition of radio equipment by all Partisan divisions. 22 This was a period of considerable growth and success by the Partisans: by June 1943, nearly one-fifth of the country having come under Tito's control, and at least by 3 November 1943, radiograms were reaching the Supreme Staff from every part of the country. 23

Due to the rarity—particularly in the early days of the struggle—of radio equipment, the Partisans were thrown back on the principal means of communication of their underground days: the courier. The

21 Dedijer (51), 45, 78, 88, 320, 345-6. The British Mission gave Tito a link with London via Cairo which served as Headquarters for all British advisors operating in Yugoslavia and Greece. Similar Groups also operated with the Četniks even before contacting Tito and continued their liaison with Mihailović at least as late as 15 September 1943 (pp. 45, 370, 373).

22 Dedijer (51), 174, 252. Partisan "divisions" usually numbered only 3,500 men under arms, "brigades" were similarly inflated titles for units often numbering only a few hundred. Concepts Division (62), 73.

23 Dedijer (51), 391.
personal messenger served to link the widely separated Partisan units, carrying news by word-of-mouth, private letters between friends, reports from the front, and orders from the Supreme Staff. 24

With the gradual spread of radio, it is evident from Dedijer's account that couriers were gradually being replaced as a means of communication among major headquarters.

Couriers were similarly used by the Četniks of Draža Mihailović to pass detailed instructions to lower headquarters. 25

Telephone was a valuable secondary means of communication. Although in early Fall of 1942 one engagement (at Prijedor) finally saw all battalions of one Partisan division continually linked to headquarters by telephone, even by late September 1942 there was still a major problem. Unfortunately, it is not clear from Dedijer's account that these were field telephones: his explicit references being seemingly to Partisan use of regular interurban lines as, for example, in his reference to Partisan monitoring of enemy telephone messages. 26 He does, however, refer (sub datum 1 September 1942) to "local people putting up telephone posts. They were working at high speed—nearly six miles of posts daily." 27

25Dedijer (51), 132. The reference is to June 1942.
26Dedijer (51), 95, 190, 247, 254, 262, 264, 266, 322.
27Dedijer, (51), 181.
Telegraph was also used, in communicating with Supreme Headquarters, but seemingly sparingly.\textsuperscript{28} Not until 7 November 1943 was this service sufficient for Moša Pijade, journalist-painter-politician, to be engaged at Supreme Headquarters (then in Jajce) in founding Tanjug, the Telegraphic Agency New Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{29}

Speed—of both communications and movement—was an essential of Partisan survival. Hence, even the Supreme Staff kept stripped to those military and political essentials which could be transported—as often as necessary—only by men and horses. It could, as Dedijer observed:\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{quote}
be on the march a mere fifteen minutes after the word...in which time the radio station is taken down and loaded on horses, and all tents packed, all without any special flurry. We have had great experience in such things!
\end{quote}

Due to his close wartime affiliation—as a member of the editorial board and sometime Editor—with the official CPY newspaper, Borba, Dedijer gives a particularly clear account of the operation of the Partisan press under guerrilla conditions. In October 1941, Borba was published every other day in Užice.\textsuperscript{31} On 4 September 1942 the Party press was set up in Drinići. During the subsequent six months until its evacuation on 30 January 1943, this press produced 2,001,368 octavo pages of printing distributed among the several publications indicated in Table A.\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28}Dedijer (51), 135, 354.
\item \textsuperscript{29}Dedijer (51), 395. Pijade, a Serb of Jewish family born in 1889, was a CPY member since 1920. From 1953 was President of the Federal People's Assembly until his death in 1957.
\item \textsuperscript{30}Dedijer (51), 346, sub datum 22 July 1943.
\item \textsuperscript{31}Dedijer (51), 40.
\item \textsuperscript{32}Dedijer (51), 183, 185, 262-3.
\end{itemize}
This entire operation was carried out by two small presses: a hand-driven (?) cropper rented (!) from a private printer in Livno and already transported the 100 km. to Drinići, the move taking only 5 days (31 August to 4 September 1942) for shipping and setting up. When Bihać was captured on 5 November, a foot-driven cropper was obtained which was preferred because it required only one rather than two machining operations. On 15 December 1942, a telephone was installed in the press offices in Drinići linking it with Supreme Headquarters some 5 kilometers distant in Petrovac. Prior to that time the news from Petrovac was obtained by the staff having to ride by horse between the two places. As with the Supreme Staff, the press section had to be prepared to pack on short notice and to move quickly: the move from Drinići, for example, took only 4 1/2 hours from time of order to move (midnight of 29 January 1943) to obtain a truck, load it and send it on its way with the entire press supplies. The staff itself started out on foot 2 hours later. The trip from Drinići to Oštrel (10 km) was by truck, thence by train to Mlinište (50 km further), and from there 40 miles by car to Priluke (near Supreme Staff Headquarters at Livno) where the press was set up on 3 February. The move took five days. Telephone linking the press office with the Livno headquarters was installed three days later.33

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33 Dedijer (51), 181, 247, 262-266. Except for the short rail journey, the press staff travelled by foot, trucking being reserved for the press and supplies.
The underground press continued to operate throughout the Italo-German occupation in Belgrade and other cities and towns. By 1 January 1943 the Belgrade underground had even managed to issue the complete text of the *History of the Communist Party (Bolshevik)*, a job which the headquarters press failed to accomplish despite several abortive attempts.\(^{34}\)

Whereas, the urban underground publications were distributed by trusted individuals through their inter-personal networks, the Partisan output was delivered to main distribution points mainly by car. For example, of the 3,000 issues in the 14 November 1942 issue of *Borba* published in Drinici, 900 were sent off to Croatia by automobile. In this case, the vehicle had not gotten beyond Bihać even ten days later and Dedijer complained that the chauffeur should have shown some initiative by resorting to horsecart or even hourseback.\(^{35}\)

\(^{34}\)Dedijer (51), 251, 387, 392. This famous work of Stalinist historiography produced in 1938 was widely but incorrectly believed to have been authored by Stalin himself until revealed otherwise by Khrushchev in his "secret" speech to the 20th Party Congress in 1956. Wolfe (57), 218, 220.

\(^{35}\)Dedijer (51), 230-231.
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<th>No. Copies</th>
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<td>*Periodicals:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Borba</em></td>
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<td>53,000</td>
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<td>1,200-3,200</td>
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<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<td>Žena Danas [Woman Today]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stalin's speech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Foundations of Marxism (book)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Jasenovac Camp (book)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Booklet on the people's liberation committees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Map of Russian front</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stalin's photograph</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 miscellaneous types of stationery</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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</table>
C. MIHAIOVIC'S CETNIKS: 1941-1944

The World War I guerrilla group, the Cetniks, founded by Colonel (later General) Draza Mihailovic, has particular relevance for three reasons: 1) it was a non-Communist guerrilla movement, 2) it was an unsuccessful guerrilla movement, 3) it coexisted and competed in time and place with another guerrilla movement, Tito's Partisans.

While a study of this group is beyond the present scope of this paper, some excellent materials by Fotitch, Dedijer and several British wartime advisers exist.

In general, what these sources indicate is that the failure of Mihailovic's movement, though in essence brought on by a combination of weak organization, ineffective leadership on his part, weak organizational support, inadequate policies and insufficient external propaganda, was unnecessarily exacerbated by his faulty communications both within Yugoslavia and between his headquarters and the outside world.
VII. MALAYA: 1941-1960

Just as most studies of Communist-directed guerrilla operations could profit from close examination of the conspiratorial background of the local Communist Party that began the operation, so would the many accounts of the well-studied Emergency that plagued post-World War II Malaya benefit substantially from a study of the wartime anti-Japanese guerrilla operations. The many existing studies make the point in passing that the Communist Chinese guerrillas of the Malayan Emergency had obtained both their experience and their arms during operations against the Japanese. However, by limiting their remarks to such a superficial statement, they neglect two significant points that show the tactics and strategy of the MRLA to have been not mere improvisation or rediscovery of principles and operations but to be direct emulation of the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army.

A. PRE-WORLD WAR II COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND

In the same way that the literature on the Malayan Emergency makes only fleeting reference to its World War II guerrilla antecedents, so does the latter literature neglect the pre-war organization and experience of the Malayan Communist Party as an underground movement. Fortunately we do have some brief though skimpy sources describing the groundwork laid by the MCP for their later guerrilla operations.
René Onraet, one-time Inspector-General of Police in the Straits Settlements, reveals some details of MCP activities in the pre-War era in his otherwise rambling pukka sahib memoirs. Some students of international Communism and Overseas Chinese problems have also touched on this topic. Their contributions are summarized here.

Communism in Malaya has been a virtual monopoly of the Overseas Chinese there. This community in mainland Malaya has constituted some 35% of the population (75% in Singapore) during the past four decades. Intensive contact by letter, visitors, and new immigration has characterized the continuing relationship of all Overseas Chinese communities with their homeland.

B. THE MALAYAN PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY: 1941-1945

The World War II Malayan resistance movement did not produce its Dedijer; or, if it did, his diary remains a part of the secret history of the MCP. The historian of this period is, however, most fortunate in having a superb first-hand account of the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement by one of the British officers who formed a "left behind" party and worked with the Communist guerrillas until V-J Day.

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1 René Onraet, *Singapore: A Police Background* (London: Dorothy Crisp, n.d. [1947]), pp. 106-118. This contains numerous errors of checkable fact about international Communist organization and coordination (such as dating the dissolution of the Comintern to 1944). Such errors as well as the whole style and approach of Onraet do not lend confidence to the broad conclusions drawn by the author in his own special area of claimed competence.
This man, Major F. Spencer Chapman, brought remarkable qualifications to his job. He had been a noted amateur explorer in the Himalayas and Arctic—his Eskimo code baffled the Japanese—and was serving as a specialist in guerrilla training at the No. 101 Special Training School in Malaya when the Japanese attack came.

It should be noted that the Kuomintang (KMT) maintained relatively strong branches among the Chinese in Malaya. These too operated underground against the Japanese Army and Communist guerrillas and seemingly had their guerrillas operating in the forest as well. In 1944, a guerrilla force that claimed adherence to the KMT and Chungking was found to be operating on the Siam-Malaya border. It was opposed to the Communist-led MPAJA with which it engaged in clashes. The British guerrilla Force 136 was, however, able to localize this band and prevent any major fighting between the KMT and Communist forces. The total KMT armed strength was estimated at no more than 500 at a time when APAJA strength was 3-4,000. This KMT group was officially disbanded in June 1946, turning in 56 weapons. It does not seem to have reactivated itself during the subsequent Emergency.

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2F. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral (London: Chatto and Windus, 1949). Except for a brief period in India, Chapman spent the entire war behind the lines in Malaya. Leaving the Army in 1947 with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, he held posts as headmaster in schools in Germany and South Africa until his retirement to Sussex in 1962.

C. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY: 1948-1960

The Malayan Emergency was a most unusual instance of a guerrilla operation. Both the tactics and the communications of the Communist guerrillas remained at an extremely primitive level. Nevertheless some five or six thousand guerrillas managed to tie down a numerically far larger force--40,000 regular troops, 60,000 police, 250,000 home guards--for the initial ten years of the Emergency. The fact that the guerrillas had the sanctuary of the dense evergreen rain-forest covering four-fifths of the country was a major factor in this.

The guerrilla operations in World War II and during the Emergency were directly controlled by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The MCP functioned as an illegal underground group virtually from its founding in 1929 until 1937. During World War II it grafted to its underground techniques those of guerrilla tactics as taught by their British advisers. This level of operations carried them through the Emergency. Both the MCP membership and the composition of guerrilla and terrorist bands were throughout drawn almost exclusively from the nearly 40 percent of the population that is Chinese.4

4 During World War II the guerrilla force was known as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA); during the post-war period it was the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA).
Upon the Japanese invasion of Malaya in 1941 the MCP began guerrilla operations against the Japanese. Then in 1943 British Southeast Asia Command began an alliance with the MCP, which lasted—somewhat mutually uneasily—until the end of the war. During that period the guerrillas were assigned as advisers some British officers, NCO's, and radio operators who helped them establish the communications that permitted coordinated operations against the Japanese. Subsequently, substantial amounts of small arms, ammunition, and wireless sets were supplied, mainly by air drop.\(^5\) Following the war, the British attempted an only partially successful demobilization of these predominantly Chinese guerrilla units.

Rioting soon broke out, which the MCP manipulated in its efforts to overthrow British rule. Finally, in 1948 the British declared the "Emergency" and launched an all-out drive to counter the Communist guerrilla operations and terroristic acts. The period 1952-1953 was a particularly active counter-guerrilla phase and by

August 1957 the general situation was sufficiently in hand for the British to authorize admission of the Federation of Malaya into the Commonwealth as an independent member. However, even as late as July 1960 when the Emergency officially ended, there were still some guerrilla hold-outs.

Jureidini, et al., describe the organization of the MRLA as follows:

The British attempted to disband the guerrillas after the war, but MRLA kept its units fairly intact by falsifying the membership lists submitted to the British, forming the "Old Comrades Associations," and hiding large quantities of arms. The party created and controlled the guerrilla units down to the platoon level through its Central Military Committee. Coordination from the MCP Executive Committee down to the smallest bandit units proved to be an impossibility. In most cases the regiments, the largest units of the MRLA, had to be controlled by the state districts, and later during the insurrection, coordination between the companies proved impossible. There were approximately 5,000 MRLA guerrillas living in jungle camps, each containing 600 troops. The camps were later reduced to as few as three to five men. The Min Yuen, a civilian mass organization set up to assist the guerrillas in the jungle, was the auxiliary unit of the MRLA. Its main duties included furnishing the guerrillas with material supplies, functioning as an intelligence and courier network, and effecting a closer liaison with the masses.

The MRLA apparently never succeeded in developing a communication system possessing sufficient speed to allow coordination of units in single operations. Despite the fact that the British had

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6 Jureidini (62), 74-75. Min Yuen membership estimates ran as high as a half million. Actual MCP membership probably never exceeded 3,000.
air-dropped radios to guerrilla units in the war which had been an essential part of successful coordination then, they do not seem to have used radio during the Emergency.  

In 1951 or 1952 when a 12-man MRLA camp was taken, the first known guerrilla radio (a receiver only) was seized:  

This... caused quite a stir in high police circles. It was the first known case of a radio receiver being found in a bandit camp and gave rise to some fairly imaginative theories. Sergeant Porter had the forethought to bring out the aerial as well. This was quickly appropriated by experts, who took it away to measure its length and asked how high above the ground it had been stretched. In the end we arrived at the rather tame solution that they had probably got thoroughly bored with living in the jungle and had wanted to listen to Radio Malaya. The set was an ordinary battery portable, like thousands which could be bought at any retailer's.  

Without radios, telephones, or telegraph, the guerrillas were thrown back on couriers as their only regular means of communication. This function was a major responsibility of the Min Yuen, the civilian auxiliaries and allies of the MRLA regulars. However, the MRLA themselves more often carried the important documents and letters.  

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7 Crockett (54), 13.  
8 Crockett (54), 207-208.  
9 Bartlett (54), 40, 71, 72.  
10 Jureidini (62), 75.  
11 Crockett (54), 91.
These couriers constituted the only regular network of communications linking all elements of the MCP and the MRLA. As the British counter-guerrilla measures became more effective, the MCP Politburo was believed to have moved its headquarters into the safety of the deep rain forest. At that point, their only regular contact with the outside world was through couriers. These couriers were organized— in the true fashion of clandestine networks or cells— so that they did not even know one another, only the handful of members of their own cell.¹²

According to British correspondent Vernon Bartlett who visited Malaya in 1953 or 1954 for the London News Chronicle, most of the MCP propaganda was being rather well produced on simple duplicating machines in the deep jungle. He describes two issues of a Chinese-language newspaper, Current Affairs News, those for November 30th and December 13, 1953. These were produced in the Perak jungle by the "Humanity Press." Their contents were largely devoted to news of international Communism and included such recent items as the World Trade Union Congress in Vienna in October and the British Christmas strikes. If we assume that even such a press did not directly monitor foreign radio, one must presume that for such comparatively current news to appear the press must have had access to the

¹² Bartlett (54), 39-40.
press (or radio) in not too distant towns. These copies were taken from two Communist couriers killed on 29 December 1953 at the town of Sungei Siput (some 20 miles north of Ipoh along the road and railway). At the time they were carrying nearly a hundred copies of this newspaper. 13

Of course, the MCP strategy was not by choice confined to a primitive small group type operation whose sole operational results could be to terrorize and sabotage. This was to be merely the first of the three classic stages in a revolutionary war of national liberation as expounded by Mao Tse-tung. It was to lead into a second stage to be characterized by war of maneuver and thence into a third stage of full confrontation with the enemy's armed forces. This Communist strategy was completely frustrated by the effective British counter-guerrilla operations. The essence of the British strategy was four-fold: social, economic, political, and police-military.

1) Social: To isolate the hard-core guerrillas in their forest camps, denying them the intelligence and supply support of the towns and villages. This was largely achieved by the resettlement of the several hundred thousand Chinese jungle squatters who had formed the base of recruitment for the Min Yuen, the auxiliary supply and intelligence support for the MPLA.

13 Bartlett (54), 40.
2) Economic: To deny the MCP their main appeal to the Chinese squatters.

3) Political: To deny to the MCP their appeal to Malayan demands for independence. This goal was substantially achieved in 1957.

4) Police-Military: To ferret out each individual guerrilla, identifying and capturing or killing them without creating new guerrilla recruits by indiscriminate killing, wounding, and harassment of the general civil population. Accordingly, troops were used only as security guards or as raiding parties against targets specifically identified by police-intelligence methods. Building on a long tradition of "special branch" anti-Communist police staff and informer nets in Singapore, the British had dossiers (including photos and fingerprints) on virtually every guerrilla. It is a measure of the intensity of their stress on the police-intelligence aspects that many of the key British personnel assigned to the Emergency were police or intelligence officers. Thus, after 1952 the High Commissioner and Director of Operations was no less than the former Director of Military Intelligence, Field-Marshal Sir Gerald Templer. And a former chief of M.I.5 (British counter-intelligence), Sir Percy Sillitoe, was a key adviser on security matters.

Neglect of this economic aspect of the resettlement scheme was one of the key reasons for the very imperfect effort to transplant this counter-guerrilla measure into South Vietnam under the "strategic hamlet" program.

The following case study of guerrilla warfare communications in Vietnam to 1954 is divided into two parts: one entitled Internal Political Organization, and the other Communications. I consider it important that a discussion of the development of the political organization in Vietnam precede the actual description of guerilla communications; first, because an understanding of the political-military network gives one a framework on which to base a knowledge of communications media and the purposes to which these media are put; and second, because the success of guerrilla and underground movements depends not so much on the efficiency of the communications methods themselves, as on the control of all aspects of the movement by a well-coordinated political organization.
A. INTERNAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

1. Underground Organization Prior to Revolution
   a. Early Organization in 1920's and 1930's. Even as early as
      the 1920's the resistance movement in Indochina was taking shape.
      Although there were numerous small centers of resistance, abroad and
      within the country—as there had been sporadically since the first
      years of French domination—the real nucleus of the resistance move-
      ment can be found in the efforts of one man.

      This man is Ho Chi Minh, now head of the DRV, then called by
      his real name, Nguyen Van Thanh. As a young man in France he was
      exposed to Communist revolutionary doctrine and saw it as the means
      to free his country from French control.\(^1\) He became a Vietnamese
      agent for the Comintern in 1925. On his way to Vietnam from France,
      by chance he took a job as translator for Borodin, Soviet adviser to
      Sun Yat-sen, in Canton. Impressed by the success of their revolution,
      Nguyen Van Thanh organized the Vietnamese living in China into the
      Than-Nien (Revolutionary Youth League) and set up a training center
      for future cadres, which attracted other nationalists from inside
      Vietnam. Then he founded the "League of Oppressed People's of
      Asia" which published newspapers and pamphlets for clandestine dis-

\(^1\) Bert Cooper, John Killigrew, and Norman LaCharité, Case
Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941-1954
(Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, the American
University, 1964), p. 70.
distribution of these materials, more nationalists were attracted to the movement and came to join the organization in China.²

Resistance activity within Vietnam during this period apparently consisted of various isolated communist organizers, who, in spite of French repression, spread propaganda by means of leaflets and signs, and trained supporters as cadres. One of these early organizers was Nguyen Luong Bang, who later became treasurer of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) and initiated a treasury bond issue which helped to finance the Revolution. He worked for the resistance movement in the late 1920's, publishing a propaganda newspaper and organizing resistance support in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Saigon.³

Pham Van Dong, presently Prime Minister of North Vietnam, also was active during the early years of the resistance organization. He organized trade unions within Vietnam, conducted strikes, and trained cadres to carry out these operations in other areas of the country.⁴

In 1930, after several years of exile in Siam, necessitated by Chiang K'ai-shek's attack on the Chinese Communists and the efforts

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³A Heroic People: Memoirs from the Revolution (Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960), pp. 56, 62. (Referred to throughout this paper as Heroic People.)

⁴Heroic People, p. 59.
of the French to stop his operations, Nguyen Van Thanh (Ho Chi Minh)\(^5\) was able to organize the various communist factions in Vietnam into the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), which in spite of French repressive attempts, and the imprisonment of Ho by the British and by the Chinese, continued to exist clandestinely until 1945, when it was ostensibly disbanded in order to gain the support of noncommunist nationalist groups.\(^6\) [The ICP continued to control the movement from its underground position from 1946 until 1951 when it was reestablished as the Lao Dong Party.\(^{6a}\)]

In 1937 a general amnesty led to the release of a number of ICP members who were subsequently able to resume political activities. Exercising more caution this time, they divided themselves into two sections: 1) an overt group designed to engage in legal activities and 2) a clandestine group whose task was to secretly reconstruct the network of communist cells.

Truong Chinh took charge of the "overt" group and organized the overthrow of the Trotsky element in the Vietnamese newspaper *Le Travail*. After this paper was suppressed by the French, Truong Chinh published *Rassemblement* (in French) and *Tin Tuc* (in Vietnamese).\(^7\)

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\(^5\) There is no conclusive evidence concerning Ho Chi Minh's whereabouts or activities during the period between 1933 and 1941. Hoang Van Chi now suspects that Ho was secretly hidden in the Soviet Union during this period. The French, on the other hand, until 1945 when he appeared in public for the first time as Ho Chi Minh and was recognized by French intelligence as Nguyen Ai Quoc (the name associated with his nationalist activities), believed that he had died in Hong Kong in 1933. Hoang Van Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam* (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1964), pp. 31, 39.

\(^6\) *Heroic People*, p. 14.

\(^{6a}\) Hoang Van Chi (*64*), p. 30.

\(^7\) Hoang Van Chi (*64*), pp. 55-56.
The 'covert' group by 1938 had organized a vast network of secret cells and increased the number of Party members to 10,000. During the 1939-1941 period of Japanese and French occupation, however, the activities of these cells were largely stifled, and a large number of their leaders were forced to flee to China. In 1941, operations were resumed after the establishment of the Viet Minh who at this time enjoyed British and American support. Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam and sent Party members to all parts of the country to reestablish communications with the secret cells.\textsuperscript{8}

b. \textbf{Organization in the '40's: 1940-1945.} After the formation of the Viet Minh in 1941 as an effort by the ICP to organize all nationalist groups in Vietnam under a United Front, greater consolidation of the resistance movement was possible.

Late in 1941, Ho Chi Minh was imprisoned by the Chinese Nationalists for his part in the distribution of communist propaganda in Kwangsi province. Nonetheless, he was still able to communicate his orders to Vo Nguyen Giap and Truong Chinh, who led the resistance movement during his absence.\textsuperscript{9} By order of the Central Committee at the Eighth Congress of the ICP, Giap and Truong Chinh carried out the formation of two centers of resistance in the Viet Bac region: Cao Bang in the North and Thai Nguyen in the South.\textsuperscript{10}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Hoang Van Chi, (64), pp. 56-59.
\item Heroic People, p. 114.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
An Interprovincial Party Committee was formed to consolidate and organize the existing cadres and party members who had heretofore operated in relative isolation, and to send new cadres into intermediary villages with the eventual aim of establishing a network of peoples' bases from which a large-scale resistance movement could then be launched.

The establishment of these peoples' bases was essential to the success of the resistance movement since they would serve a trifold purpose as communication networks, intelligence chains, and militia. It was the job of the cadre assigned to a particular village first to win the support of the people, then to organize and train self-defense units, and then to teach them the basic methods of communication and intelligence transmission. The cadre was instructed to win the support of the people by giving advice on such matters as agricultural and health methods. After assuring his position in the village he was instructed to hold village elections and establish shadow governments. And, as part of the Viet Minh anti-illiteracy campaign launched in 1941, the cadre often taught his villagers to read and write, a policy that served a dual purpose: the Viet Minh would gain the gratitude and support of the people, and therefore could employ them to greater advantage as communications and intelligence links after the revolution was launched.
Prior to this time, however, it seems that communication was accomplished by carefully planned clandestine meetings between the cadres from several neighboring villages, who would walk many miles at night to a cave or safe-house, for example, in order to report their progress and receive instructions from the Central Committee. Occasionally meetings were held by the Central Committee at Cao Bang which all the cadres from the area attended.

Vo Nguyen Giap in an article entitled "Coming from the People" (in *Heroic People*) describes the way in which the Central Committee in Cao Bang accomplished the organization of the Viet Bac region. Initially, trained cadres were sent by the Central Committee to specific villages to win the support of the people, train self-defense units, and establish Party cells and shadow governments. If at all possible, cadres were sent to their own villages, minority tribes receiving a cadre who spoke their native tongue.

Throughout the 1930's, these cells remained relatively isolated. But in 1941 Giap ordered that attempts be made to establish liaison between the individual cells. It was especially necessary, as a precursor to the insurrection, to establish a communications link between the two resistance centers in the Viet Bac, so that eventually revolutionary action could be coordinated.

To illustrate the conditions under which these early guerrilla units operated, Giap recalls: "There were 34 of us altogether in those first units. . . . Our only weapons were flintlock rifles. And these mountains—why, at that time we could only move safely around the peaks, for the Japanese and the French were everywhere below." Joseph Starobin, *Eyewitness in Indochina* (New York: Cameron and Kahn, 1954), p. 66.
The Viet Minh planned for the establishment of this link by sending cadres to villages all along the chosen route between Cao Bang and Thai Nguyen. Only after each village was securely under Viet Minh control could they be linked up to form a chain of peoples' bases between the two centers of resistance. Giap realized the importance of establishing this clandestine route, which would allow the Viet Minh to coordinate activities in spite of severe repressive attempts by the French and later would be an essential prerequisite to the success of guerrilla activity.12

As early as 1941, Giap reports, the Viet Minh had gained considerable control of the Viet Bac region, and to counteract this the 'mandarinal hierarchy' instructed various localities to enforce vigilance by establishing sentries outside the villages. But because of the nationalist sympathies of the villagers, the sentries whose villages lay along the communications route were used by the Viet Minh as liaison posts.13

By the fall of 1943 the consolidation of the two centers was successful, but because of the "reign of terror" initiated by the French soon after to wipe out the revolutionaries, communication could not be maintained for long.

12 Heroic People, p. 115.
13 Heroic People, p. 106.
The Interprovincial Party Committee issued at this time a directive to cadres to heighten their vigilance and avoid at all costs being captured by the enemy. The safety of the cadre and his party cell was of utmost importance to the villagers and everything possible was done to hide them from the enemy.

Cadres were also urged to stand ready to go into hiding; they were asked not to stay at home at night, to be provided with self-defense measures when they traveled by day, build food reserves for at least 2 or 3 months, and maintain liaison with leading comrades to be able to disappear in any emergency.14

"Secret groups" were set up by the Committee, each one composed of four or five cadres from one or two villages who would meet at night in a hidden hut high in the mountains. Guided by a "secret signal," they would often run through a waterfall before reaching the hut to avoid being traced.

It was at these places that they [the cadres] met Party members or strong supporters or national salvation organizations from the villages. These people, risking their lives, went up hill and down dale to bring food supplies to secret groups, give them accounts of the situation, and discuss what was to be done to cope with enemy raids in each village and hamlet.15

Besides their coordinative rôle, these secret groups took part in military training exercises, studied revolutionary techniques, and conducted mass work projects.16

14 Heroic People, p. 131.
15 Heroic People, p. 132.
16 Ibid.
It is hard to understand how such a tenuous communication system could have been at all effective. The experiences of "Red Star" (a revolutionary nickname for Nguyen Luong Bang), who became the Party treasurer in 1943, serve to demonstrate the dependence of the underground movement on chance. During the summer of 1943, because of the scarcity of trained cadres, the Party organized "Red Star's" escape from prison. Repeatedly receiving word that he was to await communications from the Central Committee in various villages, he traveled from one to another for several months before finally meeting Truong Chinh through whom he was assigned the responsibility of propaganda activity in the 'safe area.'

In 1944, French repression in the North was at an unprecedented height, and the Central Committee in Cao Bang organized the "Platoon to Advance Southwards" to restore the broken communication artery between the two resistance centers. Many of the villages along the route had been burned and the people had taken refuge in the surrounding forests. A selected group of cadres traveled from Cao Bang to Cho Ra, where they stopped and set up a printing press and distributed leaflets in an attempt to reestablish liaison with the scattered peoples bases.

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17 Heroic People, p. 60

18 Tanham's definition of the Viet Minh 'base area' demonstrates its importance to the success of their revolution:

"...a closely integrated complex of villages prepared for defense; a politically indoctrinated population in which even children have their specific intelligence tasks; a network of food and weapons dumps; an administrative machine parallel to that of the legal authority, to which may be added at will any regular [army] unit assigned to operations on the area."

The reestablishment of these communications was a necessary pre-requisite to the launching of guerrilla warfare, which was ordered by the Interprovincial Party Committee after the collapse of the Petain Government in July of 1944. Giap had correctly foreseen that Japanese-French antagonism would increase following this event and that a French ouster was imminent, thereby making the time most opportune for Viet Minh guerrilla attacks in all provinces. The peoples bases, scattered though they were, had to be made aware of these developments so that their guerrilla bands could prepare to launch attacks on French (and Japanese) garrisons and outposts.\textsuperscript{19}

Up to this time guerrilla activity had been limited apparently to harrassing of enemy troops on the march which, according to the plans of the Central Committee, would gradually drive out the enemy troops and leave the Viet Minh with 'safe areas' in which to collect and store supplies, train troops, etc.

Thus, in July 1944, the Interprovincial Party Committee held a meeting of cadres in a cave in the forests to plan for the armed uprising. A decision was reached to form the Vietnam Liberation Army, and Liberation Committees, composed of cadres and political commissars who would become local provisional governments once the insurrection was launched.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Heroic People}, pp. 136-137.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Heroic People}, p. 144.
There was disagreement at this point between Giap in Vietnam, who believed that the time for general insurrection had arrived; and Ho Chi Minh, in the Kuomintang prison, who was able to veto the plans for general insurrection but approved Giap's reasoning that the weakened and dissent-ridden Japanese and French forces invited attack, in specified areas at least, by guerrilla forces.²⁰

Subsequently Giap received an order from Ho to attack Phay Khat and Na Ngan:

One day before the formation of the unit [the V.N. Armed Propaganda Unit for National Liberation], I received a directive from Uncle Ho written on a small piece of paper and enclosed in a packet of cigarettes. . . .²¹

With the outbreak of revolution fast approaching, Ho Chi Minh (now called Nguyen Ai Quoc, meaning 'Nguyen the patriot') was anxious to return to Vietnam. Thus, he was quick to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the Kuomintang who were looking for someone to organize an espionage network in Tonkin to subvert Japanese influence there. Changing his name at this time to the present Ho Chi Minh (meaning 'one who seeks enlightenment') in order to avoid being identified with his earlier communist activities in China, Ho offered his services, was accepted by Chiang K'ai-shek, and was sent to Vietnam as official head of the "Viet Nam Cach Dong Minh." This cover gave

²¹Heroic People, p. 147.
Ho a perfect opportunity to root out the nationalist organizations that had opposed the Viet Minh, while at the same time strengthening his own forces. In spite of French knowledge of his true identity, Ho continued to keep the confidence of the Chinese Kuomintang and sent them numerous, if not always accurate information. (Later in 1944 the Kuomintang finally accepted the French report on Ho’s true identity but took no action because they needed him against the French. Thus for most of that year, the Viet Minh received Chinese sanction for their operations and were able to exploit it for their own purposes.)

After the Japanese coup de force in March 1945 had conveniently destroyed one-half of Viet Minh opposition, the Bureau of the Central Standing Committee of the ICP decided at a meeting on March 9 to support the "Great National Salvation Movement against the Japanese Fascists."

And, as it became more apparent that the Japanese in their turn would be ousted from Vietnam, the Central Committee made further preparations for the general insurrection. On April 20, 1945 the Revolutionary Military Conference of North Vietnam "drew up the general insurrection preparatory plan and formed the General Command

22 Devillers (p. 105) states that the French were aware of Ho’s true identity in 1944. Hoang Van Chi (see footnote 5, p. 2) maintains, however, that French intelligence did not discover until 1945 that Ho Chi Minh and Nguyen Ai Quoc were the same man.

23 Devillers (52), pp. 103-106.

of the North Vietnam Liberation Army." 25

One of the shortcomings mentioned by the Committee at this meeting which would have to be overcome by the time of the insurrection is the following:

Many a time, it was found impossible to maintain communications and it follows that unified leadership could not be realized. 26

Prior to this statement, the Interprovincial Party Committee had urged as necessary preparation for the insurrection that:

District party committees re-adjust secret communications lines and scouting committees, and give the people a general idea of the intelligence service. 27

2. Launching the Revolution

On August 9th, three days after the bombing of Hiroshima, the ICP at its National Congress made the decision to launch the general insurrection and found the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The Viet Minh Central Committee approved these decisions; the Insurrection Committee was set up, and on August 13th gave the order for the launching of the insurrection. On August 16th, the Provisional Government of the DRV was formed by the National Congress at a meeting of more than 60 delegates held in the newly staked out "free


26 Ibid.

27 Heroic People, p. 142.
zone" of Vietnam.\textsuperscript{28}

The Congress held this "lightning session" of only three days to allow the delegates to return quickly to their local regions and lead the insurrection. Before the conference adjourned, the Insurrection Committee issued a plan of action to guide the cadres in carrying out the revolution. Several are worth mentioning because they demonstrate the emphasis the Viet Minh placed on communications and propaganda distribution.

Military Action:

10. Action in towns. Main objectives: the secret police, postal services, railway stations, bus stations, offices of the Heads of provinces, treasuries, prisons. To seize all important documents (to burn them where they cannot be taken away).

Political Action:

6. Occupy and make use of propaganda services of the enemy, requisition printing houses and private radio receivers.

Communications and Liaison:

...We must firmly maintain liaison with the commanding organs. Seize the enemy's services and means of communication and liaison (motor-cars, trains, postal services), set up radio stations.\textsuperscript{29}

There is very little information regarding the way in which the insurrection orders were communicated by the Insurrection Committee

\textsuperscript{28}The "free zone" was established in June, 1945, and consisted of six provinces in North Vietnam. Tru'o'ng-Chinh (58), p. 34.

\textsuperscript{29}Breaking Our Chains, pp. 77-78.
to its local bases. The success of the revolution was apparently greatly dependent on the simultaneous timing of the uprising in all areas. Truong Chinh implies the importance of timing in his work *The August Revolution* by mentioning as the main weakness of the Revolution the fact that all uprisings didn't take place at once. He cites Nam-Bô (South Vietnam) as the main offender--stating that Saigon was 4 days late in launching its uprising and ascribes this lateness to the relative weakness of the Viet Minh organization and the lack of homogeneity in the ranks of the United National Front in the South.  

In fact, according to Devillers, the revolution in the South was of a very different sort from that in the North. The Viet Minh apparently had only indirect control there--through one of the principal Southern nationalist organizations, the "Jeunesses d'Avant-Carde" (TNTP) whose head, Dr. Pham Ngoc Thach, was a secret member of the ICP.  

In contrast, the revolution in the North occurred immediately after the August 16th People's Congress. Here the People's Committees and Liberation Committees had gained more control and had been established to carry out political, military and administrative organization at the local level. They were formed and elected in each factory, village, district, town, province, and zone. Each committee was required to include a certain number of Viet Minh members, along with some respected local citizens. Each Viet Minh 'core group' received orders from the Central Committee beforehand as to what decisions were to be reached at the following meeting. (Breaking Our Chains, p. 49)
better able to organize the people in preparation for the insurrection. Truong Chinh reports that in many localities uprisings took place before the orders were actually received, and perhaps even before their leaders were able to return from the Congress. These people were presumably implementing the orders given in March by the ICP to launch the insurrection immediately following the surrender of the Japanese.\footnote{Tru'o'ng-Chinh (58), p. 12.}

Thus, on August 16th news of Japanese surrender spread rapidly and huge public meetings were held in all provinces. In many places armed demonstrations turned into attacks on Japanese posts.\footnote{Ibid., p. 14.} On August 18th, a communique was sent by the Viet Minh to the press and was published by all Hanoi newspapers. It described the demonstrations and speeches that had taken place on the previous night and exhorted all to join in the insurrection.\footnote{Breaking Our Chains, p. 82.} On August 19th, Hanoi was taken by the Viet Minh; insurrection forces, preceded by a vanguard shock detachment, and led by Viet Minh cadres, seized the residence of the Imperial Delegate and proclaimed the foundation of the new government.\footnote{Tru'o'ng-Chinh (58), p. 14.}

By August 20th, the Viet Minh held the three coastal territories in North Vietnam.\footnote{Franklin Mark Osanka, ed., Modern Guerilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961 (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 255.} And by August 21st, they had gained complete access to all the governmental communications equipment in Hanoi.\footnote{Devillers (52), 137.}
Verification that the revolution had been successful in all areas was achieved by Hoang Quoc Viet (a member of the Central Committee) who travelled by car after the capture of Hanoi into South Vietnam to spread the word that the DRV was successfully established. He wired Hanoi from Saigon to report that "Power was seized in all the 21 provinces passed by. The uprising has also been completed in the six provinces of Nam-Bô (South Vietnam)." \(^{39}\)

On August 29th, Ho Chi Minh officially announced the formation of the DRV and on September 2nd, read the declaration of independence of Vietnam to the People gathered in the public square.

3. Political-Military Organization During the War Years: 1945-1954
   a. From 1945 to 1949 (Generally considered the first stage in the Resistance according to Mao's three stage theory of the protracted war.)

   The success of the Vietnamese against the French was largely due to the flexibility of their political-military organization. While the French maintained a relatively rigid military organization throughout the war, the DRV constantly developed its organization in accordance with the progression of the war through its "inevitable" three

\(^{39}\)Heroic People, p. 361.
stages. (See Mao Tse-tung, "Theory of the Protracted War," Selected Works, Vol. 2, for explanation of three stages.) One can trace this development from the simple guerrilla command of 1944 to the complex general staff of 1954. 40

No attempt will be made to discuss political and military organization separately, since the DRV itself recognized the importance of a unified political-military system in guerrilla warfare, and devised a complex organization which integrated the two.

As has been mentioned, in the pre-revolution period (1941-1945) the Viet Minh relied on the cell system, whereby Viet Minh members at all levels organized both People's Committees, and local guerrilla units. These cells operated via direct orders from the Central Committee and were in charge of implementing both political and military decisions.

After the formation of the DRV in 1945, a more complex organization was required. By the constitution of 1946 Vietnam was divided into three principal administrative regions (called Bô's) each of which was divided into provinces, sectors, districts, communes, villages, and quarters. Local government at each level consisted of a Popular Assembly (elected by the people) 41 and an executive body called

40 Tanham (61), p. 33.
41 The Popular Assemblies were apparently outgrowths of the Revolutionary People's Committees of the 1944-45 period, which in turn had been formed from the earlier People's and Liberation Committees. Here is an example of Viet Minh strategy to perform a smooth transition from one stage to another. Truong Chinh remarks that the Viet Minh "use[d] People's Committees and Liberation Committees as springboards for the direct transition to the democratic republican regime." Tr'u'ong-Chinh (58), p. 26.
the Administrative Committee, chosen by the Popular Assembly. The latter committee was required to execute the orders of the higher authorities (apparently the Central Committee of each Bô). These administrative divisions did not at this time coincide with the military divisions, and military planning—while coordinated at the higher levels with the political—was carried on independently at the lower governmental levels by the military staff alone. The Popular Assemblies and the Administrative Committees were restricted to local political organization and administrative duties.

The supreme authority of the DRV was the Central Committee, which was composed of the heads and delegates of all the vertical organizations, representatives from the Comité de Pays (central committee of each Bô), and other heads of organizations (e.g., guerrillas, propaganda, finances, etc.).

Devillers mentions that, while the internal organization of each Bô was strictly maintained (subordinate officials being completely bound to the decisions of the Comité de Pays), the Bô's themselves enjoyed relative autonomy, owing mainly to communication difficulties. This was especially true in Nam-Bô (South Vietnam), where the Comité de Pays had almost absolute liberty of action, only admitting the reception of the most general political directives from the Central

Committee. 43

Noting the inefficiency of this relatively decentralized system (since because of slow communications, decisions were often made by local, untrained officials), and no longer needing to appease the Nationalists by these democratic gestures since the formation of the Lien Viet United Front in 1946 had widened their popular basis, the Central Committee in 1947 suspended the Popular Assemblies; and the Administrative Committees were absorbed by Committees of Resistance, existing on all levels and dealing with both political-military aspects of the war and local problems of health and culture. 44


It should be mentioned that South Vietnam had been a continual thorn in the side of the DRV, both because of greater French influence there and because of the communication difficulties between North and South. For instance, in 1946, a conciliatory message from Ho to Paris was "unaccountedly delayed in transmission"—speculatively because the only communications lines between Hanoi and Paris ran through Saigon, a stronghold of anti-Viet Minh sentiment. This apparent sabotage by French officials was sufficient to necessitate a military solution to the Franco-Vietnamese dispute.

Even in 1950, the Viet Minh did not have firm control of South Vietnam. The chief of command in the South was Nguyen Binh whose personal ambitions and lack of judgment (in the eyes of the Central Committee), led him to launch the counter-offensive before the order was given. (It will be remembered that Saigon was four days late in launching the Revolution.) Large losses were suffered in the South because of Nguyen Binh's mistake; it is probable that he was liquidated soon after. Cooper et al., (64), pp. 46, 87.

44 Fall (60), p. 79; and Tanham (61), p. 44.
Each committee of resistance was made directly responsible to its superior committee, (i.e., village to intervillage to district to province to zone to interzone to high command). This system was decidedly more efficient, since the administrative units had now been coordinated with the pre-existing zones of military operations (the zone being considered a more practical administrative division than the Bô). Moreover, the military commander of each interzone also served as a member of that interzone's Committee of Resistance. Because the commander was in direct touch with Command headquarters, each interzone Committee was able to coordinate administrative and military planning.

These committees were in charge of raising companies of troops from each region. Although the regular troops were under the direct control of the High Command and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the territorial military organization, the Committees of Resistance were required to supply regional troops (guerrilla units from each district) and popular troops (similar to the pre-revolution self-defense units, from each village). The popular troops were divided into three sections: Dan Quan (intelligence agents, sentries, etc.), Dan Quan du Kich (part time guerrillas), and Dan Cong (civilian porters for regular units).

45 When first organized, the VPA divided Vietnam into 14 military zones; but in 1948, hampered by communication difficulties, these zones were grouped into 6 interzones for more efficient military and administrative organization. Fall (60), p. 62.

46 Tanham (61), p. 44.

47 Tanham (61), pp. 45-46
Within this complex political-military system, an equally intricate network of Communist cells had continued to exist in spite of the fact that the ICP had been 'dissolved' in 1945 for purposes of national unity. Party members composed core groups of the Committees of Resistance at all levels, and the military organization had a similar pseudo-network of CP cells. Giap explains the Party organization within the military as follows:

...we have set up, parallel with the system of command, a system of political commissars, in the line with the principle that the commander and the political commissar are both heads of the unit. Corresponding with the maturity of the army and with the strengthening and improvement of the staffs and logistics, due consideration has been given to the strengthening and improvement of the organs engaged in political work at all levels in order to maintain and strengthen the Party work and political work in the army.48

b. Political Military Organization: 1949-1954. As the war moved through the second stage and into the third, the DRV was obliged to reform its organization in order to prepare for the launching of the counter-offensive. Because of the growth of the VPA's regular forces, and preparatory to their entrance into conventional mobile and positional warfare, the DRV found it necessary to set up a political-military organization modelled on the more centralized Chinese system. A National Military Council (consisting of

President Ho, and the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Finance) conducted the overall war effort. The VPA itself was headed by the Ministry of National Defense which, like the Chinese system, was composed of three subdivisions: a Political Bureau, a General Staff, and a General Directorate of Supplies and Maintenance.

The organization of the Communist Party network had likewise developed and consolidated. Thanks to the 1949 Communist victory in China, the ICP reemerged in 1951 as the Lao Dong Party and was thus able to gain a tighter control of the resistance movement. This development, added to the fact that anti-Communist nationalists had been largely removed from influential positions, permitted the Communist Party to make more overt use of its own network of cells within the military organizations, the results being improvement of communications, and an increase in coordination between the High Command and all subordinate levels.

We have seen that at the top governmental levels the political and military aspects of the war had been handled by an integrated command throughout. On the local level, however, as has been mentioned,

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49 In 1954 Vo Nguyen Giap was both Minister of National Defense and Commander in Chief of the VPA. Tanham (61), p. 34.

50 Tanham in discussing the CP organization, mentions that every company and battalion had its Communist cell, with a subcell in every company section and a secretary responsible for both cell and subcell. At the regimental and division level, the Party organization merged with the political organization in the form of a Subcommittee for Party Affairs under the Political Commissar. Tanham (61), pp. 35-36.
political matters were handled by local administrative committees whose chain of communications with the Central Committee was independent of the military chain of command. Even after the reforms of 1947-48, when the Committees of Resistance were established according to the military zone system, the primary liaison between the political and military on the local level seems to have been via the participation of the interzone commander in the interzone's Committee of Resistance.

During the 1950's, however, when the CP cell network could be employed with less discretion, tighter control over territorial military operations by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party was possible. As a matter of fact, if a dispute arose between the military staff and a political commissar at any level, the decision of the political commissar was final.51

The nature of this progression toward strong central government demonstrates the gradual encroachment of Communist objectives on what was originally a revolution inspired in large part by nationalist and democratic ideals. As had been noted, during the early years of the war, the DRV attempted to achieve a successful revolution with a certain amount of local autonomy, by means of representative assemblies and a specialized military and administrative system. Primarily, these democratic and relatively decentralized forms of government were employed to appease the Nationalist (and anti-Communist)

51Tanham (61), pp. 35-36.
members of the DRV at that time, but it is also possible that the Vietnamese Communists themselves considered these forms practical. Regardless of which of these assumptions is correct, the fact is that the DRV soon realized that greater centralization of control was necessary to the success of the revolution. Moreover, they realized that in the last analysis the success of the war was dependent on political victories more than on military victories. Thus tight and absolute control on all levels by the Communist Party was essential and must dominate both military and administrative operations. It is interesting to note that despite the efficiency and size of the VPA in this last stage of the revolution, the war would be won primarily because of the emphasis the Viet Minh had placed since its earliest years on a highly organized political network, which continued to exist as the underlying cohesive element in both the early guerrilla period and in this later period of conventional warfare.
B. COMMUNICATIONS

Viet Minh communications will be discussed under five main headings: 1) tactical, 2) intelligence, 3) counter-communications and counter-intelligence, 4) acquisition of communications media, and 5) propaganda via radio and the press.

1. Tactical

During the years of the Underground. As has been previously mentioned, tactical communications during the late 1930's and early 1940's were limited in large part to secret meetings of the cadres, who would compare reports on progress in each village and plan for subsequent action. Guerrilla warfare in these early periods was limited to small scale harassing attacks on a local level—aimed at gradually forcing the enemy out of specific areas—thus little coordination was needed between the various areas. Messages from the Central Committee to the cadres were apparently sent by courier—but these messages were for the most part only meeting announcements. The actual operations plans were drawn up by the Central Committee itself and disclosed to the assembled cadres. Documents, however, were never carried away from these meetings; all directions or resolutions were conveyed by way of liaison. This security practice had been taught to the cadres by Ho Chi Minh and was followed throughout the Revolution. Thus, one can assume that couriers were used

[52] Heroic People (60), p. 213.
both to send word of an approaching meeting to the cadres and to transmit directives and resolutions, the general outlines of which the cadres were already aware.

The Early Years of the War. As the Central Committee began to plan for large scale guerrilla operations, more emphasis was placed on the necessity of teaching the people about communications and intelligence transmission. They realized that only by the full support and assistance of the people could the VPA hope to succeed against the far superior strength of the French Expeditionary Corps. The people served two main purposes (not counting their rôle as militia): they communicated tactical orders from the high command to the guerrilla forces, who usually remained hidden in the forests during the day and attacked only at night; and they communicated detailed intelligence reports on the position and strength of the French troops to the Viet Minh High Command. Since the success of guerrilla attacks depended on the elements of surprise, lightning offensive, and quick withdrawal, it was imperative for the guerrillas to receive exact information on French operations without revealing their own position or movements. The French had no effective way of combatting this method of gaining intelligence. Because of their sizes and their lack of experience in the Vietnamese jungle, they

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53 Cooper, et al., (64), p. 100.
were forced to travel in the open areas and thus were visible to innumerable peasant sentries who were able to relay detailed intelligence reports via their local committees to the High Command. The French realized too late in the war that courting the people's support was vital to guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare. They made little attempt to win their favor until it was too late and allowed the Viet Minh to infiltrate and win over areas which once had been sympathetic to the French.  

Col. C. M. Woodhouse makes the following general statement which is specifically applicable to the French predicament:

There has never been a successful guerilla war conducted in an area where the populace is hostile to the guerillas, and conversely it is virtually impossible to stamp out a guerilla war in an area where the populace continues to support the guerillas ... And here rises the second important factor of communications. In an area of primitive communications the anti-guerilla force is hopelessly handicapped unless it can get the populace on its side; and it will only get the populace on its side if it can protect them against the guerillas--which it can only do if it has good communications. Conversely, the guerillas can only survive in the long run if they have the necessary communications to ensure supplies of arms and ammunition--whether from abroad by sea and air, as in the second world war, or across a friendly land frontier, as in Greece in 1947-49.  

54 For example, the "Moi" people in Central Annam had been originally hostile to the Vietnamese, who had driven them out of the Mekong delta region into the hills during the early period of the Vietnamese conquest, and considered the French their protectors. The Viet Minh made concerted efforts to gain the support of these people and eventually succeeded. The "Moi" were strategically important to the Viet Minh since they numbered one million and occupied one half of the territory of Vietnam. Nonetheless "... the Viet Minh had only limited confidence in their Moi allies, it only used them in secondary jobs, as guides or intelligence agents; quite few were armed." Jean Marchard, Dans la Jungle "Moi," (Paris: Peyronnet, 1951), p. 45.  

Middle Years of the War. As the war progressed, Viet Minh communications systems became more modern; more radios were available, until by the end of the war, units as small as companies and platoons were possessors of at least one radio set.\(^56\) In spite of this, it is apparent from the following quote from the Viet Minh manual that their communications were still largely dependent on the population. The underlying reason is that, as long as guerrilla warfare was employed instead of conventional positional and mobile warfare (which the Viet Minh used extensively only in the last few years of the war), a complicated communications system was apparently thought too burdensome for the small, highly mobile guerrilla units.

Heilbrunn cites the following passage from the Viet Minh Manual entitled 'Transmission and Liaison':

The regional detachments and guerillas form only small units. Since, unlike [our] regular soldiers, they have neither wireless nor telephone communications they must use the population for transmission and liaison.... It is advisable to create at village or community level a body specially charged with transmission and liaison; in this way secrets can be better kept and the peasants are not constantly disturbed in their daily work. In normal times as well as during periods of operation the cadres and the guerillas must take the occupations of the people into consideration when requesting them to do liaison work. They can ask the merchants, carriers and hawkers to hide documents in their packs in order to carry them to their addressees. They can use pre-arranged cries and words for sounding the alarm. One should communicate by signals, gestures or prearranged sentences. In order to apply this method successfully, villages and units in the same region must use a special system for alerts, questions and answers. The number of signals should be very limited so that the peasants do not forget them or mix them up. They must frequently be changed to assure secrecy.\(^57\)

\(^{56}\) Tanham (61), p. 66.
\(^{57}\) Heilbrunn (62), p. 87.
Last Years of the War. As the war progressed toward the "third stage" in which the large-scale counteroffensive was to be launched; the initiative taken by the VPA's regular forces; and the guerrillas relegated to a subordinate position, communications naturally became more complicated since greater coordination of effort was required. Trương Chinh in his *La Résistance Vaincra* (1947) states the steps that must be taken to rid the organization of its weaknesses in communication before a large-scale offensive can be launched:

We should give precise orders, which must reach every fighter, and strictly control the implementation of these orders. Liaison and communications must be rapid and consolidated, even in enemy-held regions. All information must be speedy and accurate. 58

From a story by Hoang-Duy, quoted in Fall's *Street Without Joy*, about the experiences of this liaison officer (message decoder?) in the attack on Plei Rinh (March 21, 1954), one learns that attack orders were issued in code by radio from Zone Headquarters to the regional commander. He then issued specific orders to his subordinate commands via telephone. According to Hoang-Duy, command posts were authorized to use the radio set only once after the first shooting had begun because of the loud rattle-like noise made by the hand generator which fed the set. 59

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The only other tactical communication media mentioned in the literature are the loudspeaker and the "tam-tam." Loudspeakers were apparently used mostly in the last years of the war (e.g., at Dien Bien Phu) by the field commanders to issue orders during the battle.① The "tam-tam" [a type of Vietnamese drum] was probably employed by smaller guerrilla units to coordinate and time their attacks. [Roger Delpey, an officer in the French Expeditionary Corps, reports that "the transmission of orders and of combat directives were made... with the aid of the tam-tam, [and] 'du scott par lumiere a feu' ...."]②

2. Intelligence

As has been mentioned above, the Viet Minh counted principally on the people's bases for intelligence information (the "Popular Antennae"). Since the earliest days of the underground, cadres had been taught to inform their villagers of basic intelligence methods. To the French, these messengers looked like fishermen or peaceable peasants; indeed most of them were women and children. According to Roger Delpey:

The children carry the notes in the bottom of their hats, the women in the most intimate places, the men under their parcels, under the soles of their feet or in an inside pocket of their pants at belt-height.③

②Delpey (61), p. 36.
Delpey mentions that messages by auto and boat were concealed in the same hiding places as were smuggled arms. Often Chinese fishermen served as liaison agents in these instances, since, being neutral in the war, they were little suspected by the French. 63

An exact knowledge of position and movements of the enemy was imperative to the success of guerrilla attacks, since they banked on being able to catch the enemy unprepared and in a vulnerable position. The Viet Minh manual outlines general methods of gaining this information:

According to conditions in a region we can organize a chain for transmission, we can select a confidential agent for the task of carrying statements of accounts or information reports to their destination..., we can use conventional signals such as drum beats, alarm bells, cymbals, rifle fire, bird calls, lighting a fire, hoisting a flag and so on, in order to keep friendly units informed about the position and the number of enemy soldiers, and we can install reserve liaison posts and chains.... All information must be passed on without delay to the superior authorities and to the neighbouring villages and units so that they can avoid the enemy and make their dispositions in time.64

Then, it lists six conditions which are necessary for success:

Full information about the enemy troops, their arms, moral, fighting spirit, their daily activities, routine, guards, patrols, possible reinforcements, the terrain, and the morale of the population. Next comes a minutely prepared plan; then speed and secrecy; the selection of the principal target for the main force which, if conditions are very favourable, may encircle the enemy; quick, unobserved and coordinated approach; and finally quick withdrawal.65

63 Loc. cit.
64 Heilbrunn (62), p. 88.
65 Ibid., p. 95.
What is most striking about these examples of Viet Minh strategy is the amount of pre-planning which even each local guerrilla operation entailed. Indeed, it was precisely to this careful pre-planning that the Viet Minh guerrilla operations owed their success.

The intelligence system of the Viet Minh had a dual aim. The Quan Bao (or Military Intelligence), formed in 1948, was composed of specially chosen Party members who were attached to all units of the regular forces (and perhaps guerrilla units and regional troops as well), and, while principally engaged in intelligence work, were at the same time intended to screen the regular forces for enemy agents. These men were given special training in physical-, self-defense-, and sensory-conditioning as well as background information on French reconnaissance methods.

The intelligence methods used were 1) radio intercept and triangulation; 2) interrogation of population; 3) enemy personnel—prisoners; 4) infiltration of enemy-held areas, as French-sympathisers.

Infiltration by both intelligence agents and guerrilla units continually frustrated French efforts to establish a clearly demarcated front from which to launch offensives and behind which could be considered a secure area. Even the Red River delta area, which remained ostensibly French territory throughout the war, was riddled with Viet Minh guerrillas and intelligence agents.

66 Prior to this, the Viet Minh had two intelligence organizations: a Surêté and a Political Intelligence Service. The findings of the Political Intelligence Service were not always available to the High Command. Tanham (61), p. 79.

67 Ibid., pp. 76-79.

68 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
3. **Counter-Intelligence and Counter-Communications**

The Viet Minh used both double agents and the radio for counter-intelligence. Because the Viet Minh guerrilla forces were greatly outnumbered, they had to depend on "surprise via speed, secrecy, and unsuspected objectives." It was extremely important, therefore, to implement all possible means to confuse, deceive, and throw the enemy off guard.

Tanham describes one of these methods:

A favorite device, "intoxication of the enemy," involved a series of deliberate deceptions. The Viet side would deliberately leak information to the enemy that would mislead him into expecting an attack in a certain place at a certain time. To this end, they would make up fake documents and plant them on double agents and on persons who apparently had "rallied" to the French cause. The numerical designation of regular units would be attached to regional units in order to confuse the French. All units would be moved back and forth to give an impression of the movement of large numbers. 69

Bernard Fall, in *Street Without Joy*, mentions two examples of counter-communications using radio. One incident took place near Muong-Chen in October of 1952, when a French master sergeant received a radioed message, in a seemingly French voice, indicating map coordinates for a drop zone near the march route and requesting supplies. The Sergeant knew that French long-range commando groups often operated behind Viet lines and would need parachuted supplies, but for some reason suspected a Viet Minh trap either to lure French

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69 Tanham (61), p. 75.
aircraft within range of a Communist flak battery or to induce them to drop much-needed supplies. He found out later that his suspicions had been correct. As the second example, Fall describes an incident in which a similar method was used to deceive the French. In 1954, during an attack by the Viet Minh on a French fort in Dak Doa, a voice in excellent French gave the cease-fire order over the post's radio set. Suspecting that the radio had fallen into enemy hands, the French troops continued to fire until, fifteen minutes later, the unmistakable voice of their sergeant ordered the post's surrender.

4. Acquisition of Communications Equipment.

Roger Delpey lists what he considers to be the main sources of the Viet Minh arms, and one can only assume, in the light of absence of data, that their communications equipment came from the same sources.

First, the Viet Minh were able to gain equipment from the Indo-Chinese guard (native troops) who were supported and supplied with equipment by the French during the period of French resistance to Japanese domination. When the French were ousted by the Japanese in March 1945, the Viet Minh were quick to win over these troops and requisition their equipment.

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70 Fall (61), pp. 71-72.
71 Ibid., p. 190.
72 Delpey (61), p. 34.
73 Devillers (52), p. 283 corroborates this, as does Burchett (56), p. 60, who adds that the French army turned over much of their supplies to the Vietnamese after their defeat, rather than surrender them to the Japanese.
The second source listed are the Japanese, who, following their surrender in August 1945, abandoned much of their equipment and even gave some to the Vietnamese rather than have it go to the Nationalist Chinese, who were about to replace them in North Vietnam. It is interesting to note that the Viet Minh had nothing to lose and everything to gain in the midst of the tangled network of alliances and hostilities in the post-war period. Because at this time their Communist aims were well concealed, they were viewed as the lesser of two evils at one time or another by the Japanese, the Chinese, the French, and the Americans, and they were able to exploit their position to gain arms and equipment from all of these countries.

In 1944-45, the United States, wishing to support the nationalist aims of the Viet Minh against the 'exploitive colonialism' of the French, sent in agents to contact the Viet Minh; liaison missions and advisors were detached near its command post and modern arms and radio

74 Hoang Van Chi refutes this information: "Contrary to what some maintain, the Japanese never gave any of their arms to the Vietminh. During the first days immediately after their surrender, the Japanese inclined to the idea of offering part of their arms and equipment to the Vietminh, but they changed their minds when Vo-Nguyen-Giap ... attacked their garrison at Thai Nguyen on August 17, 1945. The Japanese thereafter burned all their commissariat stores and later on handed over to the Chinese at Haiphong 400,000 tons of arms and ammunition." Hoang Van Chi (64), p. 67.

According to P. J. Honey in the introduction to Mr. Hoang's book, Hoang Van Chi witnessed at first hand much of what he reports in From Colonialism to Communism. The remainder is based upon very considerable research carried out by him. Hoang Van Chi, although an anti-Communist, joined the Resistance movement at the outset in order to fight for his country's independence. After the defeat of the French, he rejoined the nationalists in their struggle against Communism.
sets were parachuted in. 75

And the Chinese Nationalists, although hostile to the Viet Minh, had always resented French control of Vietnam, and therefore, although giving no official aid, did sell arms and equipment to the Viet Minh across the border. 76

Delpey lists contraband as the third and most important source of Viet Minh arms and equipment. (No doubt, this priority was superseded when the Chinese Communists gave the Viet Minh their support in 1950.) Devillers mentions two origins of contraband goods. (His information seems to be principally about the 1946 period when he was press attaché at the Headquarters of General le Clerc.)

First, given the easy access to the Chinese border from the Viet Minh base of operations, contraband trading with bands of both Nationalist and Communist Chinese irregulars, and even with the regular troops was carried on with little chance of capture by the French. 77

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75 Hoang Van Chi reports that as early as 1941 the Viet Minh were receiving U.S. aid. At this time Ho Chi Minh was supplying U.S. and British forces with information about Japanese troop movements. In return, the U.S. parachuted portable radio equipment and light machine guns to the Viet Minh. Hoang Van Chi (64), p. 59.

76 Devillers (52), p. 283.

77 Devillers (52), p. 283.
Second, arms were smuggled in along the seacoast of Vietnam: Landings were made in coves along the shores of Baie d'Along, in the Tien Yen-Hongay region, and on the coast between Moncay and Tien Yen. The junks had originated from the shores of Kwangtung, from Hong Kong and Hainan and were probably sent by the Chinese and other Viet Minh sympathizers.\textsuperscript{78}

In order to finance these purchases, the DRV issued their own currency, which at first was not trusted and used only after coercion by the Viet Minh. Soon, however, because of extensive purchase of arms and munitions in Hong Kong, the market was flooded with the newly issued piastre and its value decreased, making purchase difficult if not impossible. In order to balance their economy, the DRV found it necessary to attract foreign capital with native exports. They tried to encourage the sale of opium, ores, and material from captured French factories. Even the export of rice was managed, in spite of the fact that much of Vietnam itself was undergoing famine conditions. An import tax was charged as a further attempt to build up capital.\textsuperscript{79}

The final source of Viet Minh communications equipment is that gained by capture in battle. During much of the war, the Viet Minh badly needed both arms and communications equipment. Therefore, in spite of the importance to guerrillas of a quick retreat, the Viet Minh instructed their troops to make every effort before retreating to procure enemy supplies—particularly guns and radios. They were taught

\textsuperscript{78}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 243, 287.

\textsuperscript{79}Devillers (52), p. 285.
to storm French tanks instead of blowing them up in order to get their radio sets. 80

Particularly susceptible to Viet Minh raiding attacks were General de Lattre's "Pillboxes"--isolated thirty by thirty foot concrete bunkers, holding nine men and a sergeant, used as links between the fortifications of the "de Lattre Line" around the Red River delta area. These pillboxes were difficult to defend and thus were profitable targets for the Viet Minh--each one yielded a radio set and a small stock of arms (including a machine gun). 81

In spite of these sources of communications equipment, however, the Viet Minh faced a serious communications problem until the Chinese Communists alleviated the condition somewhat in 1950. Viet Minh equipment was scarce and diverse and they lacked trained technicians. Although they were able to repair some of the civilian telephone and telegraph lines to use for routine messages, couriers continued to be the main method of communication. An elaborate system of runners with relay systems had been devised. By the end of the war, however, with the Chinese aid, conditions had improved considerably. Units as small as companies and platoons had at least one radio and were in touch with adjacent units and higher headquarters. 82 One perhaps can assume from this that radios were still available in large part only to the regular forces--that guerrilla units continued to depend on more primitive modes of communications.

80 Fall (61), p. 285.
81 Ibid., pp. 174-177
82 Tanham (61), p. 66.
5. Communications media: Radio and the Press.

Radio:

The Viet Minh had its first access to a radio network when it occupied Hanoi after the August 1945 Revolution and took over the Bach-Mai radio station from the Japanese. Presumably they retained control of this station at least until General le Clerc entered Hanoi in March 1946. This station, nicknamed by the French Radio-Nuoc Man (a kind of pickled fish) because of its "stupid and ignoble" anti-French propaganda, broadcast from noon to evening in Vietnamese and French. Besides anti-French propaganda, the station broadcast news programs, revolutionary songs to the people, and even had international broadcasts to London, New York, and Moscow, giving often exaggerated accounts of French atrocities and urging their aid in the Vietnamese people's struggle for independence. The French in Hanoi were cut off from radio contact altogether at this time and had no way of communicating with the outside world until the arrival of General le Clerc in March 1946,83

Jean Sainteny, then Commissioner of the French Republic in Tonkin and North Annam, who since 1941 had been imprisoned by the Japanese and was in 1945 imprisoned by the Viet Minh in Hanoi, reported that the Japanese, upon their departure, had given the Back-Mai radio station

to the Viet Minh, after having promised it to Sainteny. The anti-French propaganda, he reported, was received by the population on "les pick-up" [wired receivers?] installed in numerous places in the town, and "went from the most veiled criticism to the most violent attacks." 84

It is interesting to point out that while Radio Bach-Mai was presumably the organ of the DRV, it seemed, in the following instance at least, to reflect views of the more aggressive government officials and not those of President Ho Chi Minh. Around the 25th of November 1945, Ho Chi Minh issued the statement that he was against bloodshed and was seeking a peaceful settlement with the French. Directly following this statement, Radio Bach-Mai announced: "Before the 25th, the French must be completely wiped out." 85

It may be that this is merely an example of Viet Minh deceptive strategy, but it seems to be instead indicative of a basic internal split in the DRV Government: Ho Chi Minh, who seemed sincerely to want a peaceful solution (provided Vietnam was given independence—in this desire, he was unshakable), and who spent long months in negotiations with the French, vs. Giap and his followers, who, while Ho Chi Minh was away attending negotiations, used his absence to draw the government more firmly toward a policy of 'bloody revolution.'

85Martin (48), p. 213.
In South Vietnam too the Viet Minh had a radio station which according to Burchett operated clandestinely from 1947 right up to the Geneva Conference. It was located in the Plain of Reeds (a salty mangrove swamp to the West of Saigon), and was operated by a small group of propagandists who broadcast daily hour-long programs throughout this seven year period. "The Voice of the South" consisted of news from the battle fronts, songs of resistance, and commentaries showing the lines the resistance struggle would take. Working in hideous conditions (neck-deep mud, mosquitoes), these men dismantled their transmitter every day, changed their location, and hid the parts in dispersed areas to avoid being wiped out by the French, who for seven years were not able to find them. They even kept spare parts in hidden caches in the swamp. The only drinking water was stored in ceramic pots, which, out of desperation, the French bombed in hopes of forcing these men to give up their broadcasts. However, the surrounding villages had innumerable pots and the French were never able to smash enough of them to drive the "Voice of the South" out of the swamp. 86

Newspapers

The use of newspapers and journals was naturally much more widespread than the use of radio. As has been mentioned, much of the early organization of the underground movement was carried out by newspapers, journals, and leaflets. This was, of course, in addition to the usual propaganda use to which these media were put.

86 Burchett (56), p. 142.
The first mention of specific newspapers was made by Nguyen Luong Bang (nicknamed "Red Star") who established the two first Viet Minh periodicals in 1943 in the 'safe area' in North Vietnam, where he was in charge of propaganda activity. At first he had only a single lithographic stone, but regardless, managed the clandestine publication of Cu Grai Phong (Liberation Flag) and Cuu Quoc (National Salvation, which at least in 1952 was still in operation). 

After the August Revolution, the Viet Minh were able to use the presses of the former Volonté Indochinoise in Hanoi on which to publish their own newspaper, La République. According to Sainteny, this paper, published in French, was used mostly for anti-French propaganda, and it was to combat its influence that in October 1945 he started a paper for the local French population, entitled L'Entente. 

According to Martin, however, the publication of L'Entente depended on the permission of the Chinese occupying Hanoi who had made little attempt to control the anti-French propaganda and general discrimination against the French. Permission was granted only under the condition that a committee chosen by the Commissioner of the Republic be responsible for all information and articles appearing in

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87 Heroic People (60), p. 60.

the paper. Thus, although the Viet Minh paper continued to report on the details of the Franco-Vietnamese battles raging in the South, L'Entente was forbidden to print any news concerning that conflict.\textsuperscript{89}

All my information on the Viet Minh newspapers of the later period comes from Starobin, a CP member and Foreign Editor of the official CPUSA New York newspaper, The \textit{Daily Worker}, who as a journalist himself was able to interview Xuan Thuy (General Secretary of Front Lien Viet), at that time (1952) publisher of \textit{Cuu Quoc}, the leading Vietnamese daily, which was the organ of the Front Lien Viet and had a circulation of 30,000. The DRV spoke of its Viet Bac headquarters as "The Forests" and it was here that Xuan Thuy's paper was published on newsprint made from bamboo pulp.

Xuan Thuy reported that the leading DRV weekly is \textit{Nhan Dan} (The People), the spokesman for the Lao Dong Party. This paper had separate editions for the North, Center and South with a circulation of 30,000 copies in each area.

Both these newspapers received their news by radio and the three editions of \textit{Nhan Dan} were directed by radio. Xuan Thuy mentioned several irregular journals: \textit{The People's Army}, \textit{Art and Literature}, one journal devoted to health and hygiene, and one put out by the Confederation of Labor.

\textsuperscript{89}Martin (48), pp. 206-207.
Starobin learned that there were five printing presses in "The Forests"—often as far as twenty or thirty miles away from the central office, all of which had to be moved if the battle moved too close. In the following passage he recounts further information on the DRV press from his interview with Xuan Thuy:

Free Viet Nam monitors its world news, and receives the French press regularly— from across the lines, I assumed. Its newspapers have their own correspondents everywhere. "We try to choose those who have proved themselves in battle," said Xuan Thuy.

Distribution is by horse, by truck, and sometimes the papers are carried by foot from village to village. Of course, their influence is greater than circulation. Each paper is read aloud in the branches of the Front Lien Viet and the Lao Dong Party, in the workshops, the huts and the People's Army encampments. The main editorials and features are reproduced in tens of thousands of wallapers, and there are local papers that circulate— handwritten or mimeographed—in the guerrilla areas. Often a paper will be read aloud by a town-crier, who mounts the high wooden platform that can be seen in many villages.90

90Starobin.(54), pp. 21, 123, 124.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


IX. CUBA: 1956-1959

In any set of case-studies of guerrilla warfare, the operations of Fidel Castro's organization in the late 1950's warrents close attention. Not only is it important because of its recency and the subsequent U.S. and Soviet involvement, but even more because it is being currently treated as if it were an inspiration and a model for other revolutionary and guerrilla movements in Latin America and, indeed, even elsewhere among the non-industrialized countries of Africa and Asia.

Hence this paper incorporates this case despite its present very superficial treatment here, necessitated by the pressure of time and ignoring the richness and ready availability of sources: written and eye-witness, Castroite and refugee, Communist and non-Communist.

Fidel Castro began the military phase of his revolution on 26 July 1953 leading an unsuccessful 165-man attack against the 1000-man Moncada Army Post. Returning to Cuba from exile in December 1956, Castro landed with 82 men, only 12 of whom survived to reach the Sierra Maestra mountains where they rapidly grew in numbers. In July 1958 the various anti-Batista movements were united under Castro. Complete control was finally achieved with Batista's resignation and flight on 1 January 1959.¹

By 1958 at the latest, the combat intelligence of the Fidelistas was superb. As Mrs. Dickey Chapelle, an American journalist with the guerrillas in December 1958, later put it:  

The Batista commanders could not go to the "head" without a perspiring runner arriving a few minutes later to tell Castro about it. Most of the informants were volunteers—farmers or villagers. While she states that most such reports were often incomplete or inaccurate, she adds that Fidel Castro "placed the greatest reliance on them" and illustrates this with an occasion when she was talking with Castro and his staff while a large Government patrol was only 600 yards distant. Castro personally corrected her mistaken assumption that he must be deliberately there to either attack the patrol or, at least to isolate it. Castro explained:  

On, no. It's too big. They are coming through the woods in a body, with men in pairs on either side. When the nearest pair is a few hundred meters away, people will tell me and we will leave.  

Symbolizing the "classic" nature of the Cuban Revolution, Major Ernesto "Che" Guevara published his topical summary of the strategy and tactics of the campaign, La Guerra de Guerrillas, thereby following in the tradition of Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap. Although many commentators claim Guevara's book contributes little to Mao's  

2 Dickey Chapelle, "How Castro Won," Marine Corps Gazette, (Feb 1960) as reprinted in Osanka (62), pp. 325-335; Reprinted also in Greene (62), pp. 218-231. See p. 330 for this quotation. Mrs. Chapelle was a photo-correspondent for Life, Reader's Digest and the Marine Corps Gazette who, in addition to covering the Cuban revolution, observed the FLN in Algeria, and was killed in Vietnam.  

3 Chapelle (60), p. 330.
expositions and indeed some claim it is mere imitation, I find this difficult to accept. First, the writings of these two men clearly reflect both the roles they played in their respective revolutions and the stage of development which their revolutions had reached at the time national power was achieved. As a major (comandante), Guevara was experienced as a field commander of a force of only 100 to 150 Cuban guerrillas. Indeed he himself states that because non-commissioned titles of "corporal" and "sergeant" were abolished as remnants of "tyranny", therefore "lieutenants" commanded squads (eight to 12 men) and "captains" commanded platoons (30 to 40 men).  

Even as Castro's right-hand engaged in staff work, Guevara was serving an organization which was small in size, simple in organizational structure, and primitive in its political-social superstructure. Mao, on the other hand, was the leader (and more political than military at that) of a guerrilla force which as early as 1930 had become large, differentiated, and attached to a relatively bureaucratized civil administration. Surely it is not a coincidence that Mao's writings on warfare concentrate on matters of policy and broad strategy while Guevara's are focused on the minute details of daily living and fighting by squads and platoons. While Mao's is a guide for strategic policy-makers, Guevara's is a do-it-yourself handbook for the squad and company commander.

In any case, Guevara writes on guerrilla communications, while Mao does not.\(^4\) Guevara discusses the roles of couriers and telephones in tactical intelligence collection and command-and-control. He states that:\(^5\)

Lines of communication with the exterior must have a number of intermediate points in the hands of persons who can be trusted. Here products can be stored and persons acting as intermediaries can be concealed at certain times. In addition, internal lines of communication must be established, depending on the degree of development reached by the guerrilla force. In some areas of operations during the last Cuban war, telephone lines many kilometers long were provided and roads were built. There was always an adequate messenger service to cover all areas in the shortest time possible.

In elaborating on the matter of communications he states:\(^6\)

Communications will be greatly facilitated by being able to count on a greater number of men and many ways of transmission. However, there will be much more difficulty as regards insuring that a message will reach a distant point, because trust must be placed in a number of persons. Thus, there will be a danger of the eventual capture of one of the messengers constantly crossing enemy territory. If the messages are not very important they may be transmitted orally; if they are important they should be transmitted in writing and in code, because experience shows that oral transmission form person to person can completely distort any message sent in this way.

\(^{4}\)The sole reference to communications which I have found in Mao is the following oblique one: "Modern technical developments (telegraphy, radio, aeroplanes, automobiles, railways, steamships, etc.) have added to the possibilities of planning in war," Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted War (May 1938), p. 243, in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963).

\(^{5}\)Guevara (Osanka 62), p. 345.

\(^{6}\)Guevara (Osanka 62), p. 347.
Guevara also notes that small guerrilla detachments can march between 30 and 50 kilometers (about 18-30 miles) per night. This march rate is comparable to the experience of the Chinese Eighth Route Army and can be taken as a reasonable minimum rate for couriers.

Major Guevara then proceeds to discuss questions of strategic communications and tactical intelligence:

In this type of war, the work of those not directly concerned with fighting (those who do not carry a weapon) is extremely important. We have already stated several characteristics of communications in places of combat. These communications are a branch within the guerrilla organization. Communication with the farthest headquarters, or with the farthest group of guerrillas, if there is one, must be so established that it is always possible to reach them by the most rapid method known in the region. This is as true in areas easily defended—that is in terrain suited to guerrilla warfare—as it is in unsuitable terrain. It cannot be expected, for instance, that a guerrilla force fighting in unsuitable terrain would be able to use modern systems of communications. This is because such installations can be of use only to fixed garrisons that can defend such systems.

In all these situations, we have been talking of our own war of liberation. Communications are complemented by daily and correct intelligence concerning all the activities of the enemy. The espionage system must be very well studied, well worked out, and its agents chosen with maximum care.

...Great harm can result from incorrect information, regardless of whether it tends to exaggerate or underestimate dangers.

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7 Guevara (Osanka 62), p. 346.

8 Guevara (Osanka 62), pp. 364-5.
A most important characteristic of guerrilla war is the notable difference between the information the rebel force possesses and that known to the enemy. The enemy's agents must pass through zones that are totally hostile; they encounter the gloomy silence of the populace. In each case the defenders can count on a friend or a relative.

Guevara also points out two aspects of counter-communications warfare: 1) the "enormous harm" which can be affected by the enemy's counterspies in supplying false intelligence and 2) the importance of guerrilla operations directed toward upsetting the enemy's methods of supply and destroying his lines of communications thereby forcing him to divert large numbers of troops to restore and protect such vital services. ⁹

X. ALGERIA: 1954-1962

by

Meredith Jane Aldrich*

For seven years from 1954 the Algerian nationalists fought an increasingly bitter and effective war of terrorism, guerrilla tactics, and subversion until the French government conceded self-determination to Algeria in 1962. The Algerian rebel leaders were well-educated in the requirements of guerrilla warfare, recognizing from the start that effective communications were vital. They worked continually to set up and improve lines of contact within and between leadership and army, and to establish a rapport with their native populus and with outside nations.

Despite varying degrees of Communist influence throughout the revolution, the Algerian struggle for emergence in the Arab-Islamic world remained basically nationalist inspired and controlled. The revolution did not lack experienced leadership. Thus, Mohammed Ben Bella, Mohammed Boudiaf, and Belkacem Krim had served as officers in the French army; and Mohammed Khider had been deputy from Algiers to the French National Assembly. Organizations precursor to the Front of National Liberation (FLN), such as the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), the Special Organization, and finally the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA) served as excellent training schools for rebel command. From 1956 on, the FLN core was strengthened with the addition of intellectuals and talented politicians.

*Research and original draft.
ORGANIZATION

The early narrow organization of the FLN, an inheritance from the MTLD, posed problems of communication and flexibility. Indeed the internal-external (military-political) split which was to plague Algerian efficiency for three years, existed before its formalization at the outbreak of hostilities on 1 November 1954. Before that date, members of the Internal Delegation of the CRUA, i.e., military leadership in the provinces (wilayas) held a number of clandestine meetings, while the External Delegation, i.e., political leadership, worked from its headquarters in Cairo and from vacation resorts in Switzerland. As Duchemin writes: 2

The six men who met 10 October 1954 under the chairmanship of Boudiaf to decide the day and hour of the insurrection were in liaison with Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed, and Khider, whom they were supposed to rejoin in Cairo. But the latter three were already "externals," while the group presided over by Boudiaf prefigured the first wilaya council. 2

When the insurrection began, the CRUA changed its name to the FLN and split into: the External Delegation, responsible for supplies and for securing aid from foreign states, with its headquarters at Cairo, Egypt; and the Internal Delegation, concerned primarily with the military. By August 1956 lack of communication between these two delegations plus their competition for power reached near-crisis peak. As rebel army activity increased, its organization too became a handicap,

1 Its members: Mohammed Ben Bella, Mohammed Khider, Mohammed Boudiaf, and Houssein Ait Ahmed.

which rested entirely with the wilaya commanders, among whom there was little if any liaison and coordination.

In an effort to solve these problems, the Soummam Valley Congress of 1956 replaced the delegations with a war council, the Committee for Coordination and Execution (CCE), that was ultimately responsible to a supreme policy-making body, the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA). With the CCE located in Algeria and the CNRA in Cairo and Tunis, however, inadequate communication persisted until the Cairo Conference of August 1957 answered the internal-external division by packing CCE membership with ex-externalists and extending its executive power. In September 1958 a Provisional Government was first set up, in which the CCE assumed executive and the CNRA legislative powers.

The Soummam Valley Congress of 1956 established a hierarchal chain of command in the Army of National Liberation (ANL), which was formally recognized as the military arm of the FLN. Command structure, following old civil divisions, divided Algeria into six wilayas. Each wilaya council was presided over by a colonel, who was a member of the CCE, assisted by three majors: of political affairs, military affairs, and information-liaison. This organization was duplicated on all levels down to that of sector (i.e., wilaya, zone, region, and sector).

In June 1957 the Algiers underground was reorganized and a liaison-intelligence cell added to the political and military. The Council of the Autonomous Zone of Algiers directed terrorist activities through a chain of command similar to that in the wilayas, as in its division into
regions (three being introduced), liaison-intelligence branch, etc. In 1957 the East Base (Souk-Ahras) on the Algerian-Tunisian border and the West Base (Nador) on the Algerian-Moroccan border likewise became autonomous zones and significant lines of communication to and from Algeria.

GUERRILLA FORCES

Determining the size of the guerrilla force fighting the French is difficult, but sources tend to estimate the uniformed regulars at 30,000 (perhaps double that by 1962) and irregulars at about 100,000. The very tenuous strength of the army was aggravated in the beginning by the poor communications system. Although the terrain further aggravated this situation, it hindered the native fellagha (Algerian fighter) less than it did the Frenchman. To counter the growth of the ALN, French forces increased from the original "peacetime" strength of 50,000 to some half million troops by 1960.

Recruiting and organizing a guerrilla force involved much preliminary work behind the scenes. Belkacem Krim, regional leader of the Kabylia, speaking of the years before his emergence in early 1955 said, "There was no village, no hamlet, no cell that I did not visit."\(^2a\)

By that time a primitive liaison system was operating in the Aures Mountains. Young gurads were posted on heights around suspect villages.

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with orders to give an alarm at the least sign of danger. Rebels in the hills used fires and different colored flares to signal. However much the guerrillas themselves lacked communications, they knew the advantage of sabotaging main enemy lines—cutting down telephone poles, intercepting and destroying buses and trucks, etc. When acts of sabotage forced large European transport companies to pull out of rebel-ridden areas, small Moslem outfits took over the job. Among the latter the fellaghas easily established a number of free places for their liaison agents.³

Political commissars were attached to all levels of the ALN command. These men helped prepare for a military operation by priming with propaganda and information. The area political commissar had an auxiliary in each village who was responsible for distributing Front and Army news, insuring loyalty and morale, maintaining mail service and rapid communication, and superintending elementary education. Another member of the village assembly handled security measures, provided immediate information to the Front, arranged meetings, etc.⁴ Civilian auxiliaries who acted as roving scouts (called Moussebellines), and deserters (usually Moslem) of the French Army or administration were the basic units for securing intelligence about the enemy.


Organizational and tactical effectiveness of the ALN remained of prime importance to rebel success, especially in view of its slow laborious communications, which tended to limit the size and duration of each operation. Communication depended mostly, and indeed, always below battalion level, on couriers. Peter Braestrup, a journalist reporting the ALN in Tunisia and Algeria in September 1958, illustrated the disadvantages accruing from this with an account of a planned attack related by a staff officer of the ALN 6th Battalion:

Tonight there will be a night attack. The French will be drinking tonight [Saturday night], and when they are full of wine, we attack. From long experience, the Army knows where the French artillery concentrations are. They know the routes by which the French will send relief columns to their outposts. Each [rebel] unit knows its role. To isolate the outpost, to ambush the reinforcing columns, to make diversions. Everything is arranged.

But the operation had to be abandoned when the French unexpectedly increased their activity in the area in the next few hours. The ALN units could not communicate a revised plan in time to meet the new situation, so the planned attack was cancelled.5

By fall 1958, radio equipment was just sufficiently available to allow daily contact by radio between battalion and wilaya headquarters and between the latter and main headquarters outside Algeria.6 Early the next year, both the wilaya and external headquarters received new

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modern German Telefunken sets. Yet two-way radio sets remained scarce and of a variety of sizes and makes. 7 For example: 8

Wilaya I possessed in 1960 nine wireless sets—one from Tunisia (since 1957), one from Morocco (since 1959), three bought at Constantine, two bought at Sétil, and two taken from the French army in the course of attacks. The wilaya had daily contacts with the zone of Batna, the Headquarters of Chardimaou (Tunisia) and the Headquarters of Boussouf. Hours of contact—9, 12, 17, 21.

Messages, it seems were sent often by code. 9

Propaganda broadcasts from the Provisional Government in Tunis became an important aid for unit commanders and their political commissars in indoctrinating new troops. The army published its own internal newspapers and circulated pamphlets locally.

IN THE CITIES

All key cities saw the development of underground networks, the most important of which was that of Algiers, organized in 1956-57. Urban conditions made word-of-mouth communication generally the easiest and most practical means of relaying messages. The cities too had their counterpart to the civilian auxiliaries of the wilaya units, men who served as intelligence agents and guides, or "human radar" as aptly termed by Braestrup. These tended to be influential members

7 Braestrup (60/62), p. 384.
8 Michael K. Clark, Algeria in Turmoil, (Praeger: 1959), p. 348, says that a briefcase found in the possession of Ben Bella (when he and four other rebel leaders were captured en route by air 22 October 1956 to Tunis) contained an address book with the keys to two codes.
9 Duchemin (62), p. 102n.
of the community whose daily business would bring them naturally into contact with much of the populace. Boycotts and strikes were planned by means of the "Arab telephone," in which the Moorish café (located in every casbah) acted as the local exchange.\textsuperscript{10}

**FRENCH FRUSTRATION**

"The civil and military authorities were powerless under existing regulations to control internal communications or the movements of people, to conduct night searches or to ban seditious meetings."\textsuperscript{11} Several prefatory uprisings occurred before 1 November 1954, such as the riot at Sétif on 8 May. Before order was restored on the earlier date, a taxi had left the scene bearing news of the insurgency to the Arabs in the surrounding area.\textsuperscript{12} France's later attempts to regroup the rural population in camps so as to restrict rebel influence failed when the system itself became the source of many abuses against Moslem families by the French regroupment system.

The rebel leaders stopped information leaks by threatening or coercing any natives suspected of friendship with the enemy. French Lieutenant Martin, in his efforts to arrive at an understanding with the Arab nationalists, sought out the FLN chief of his sector. His

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\textsuperscript{11}Clark (59), p. 132.
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., p. 31.
\end{flushleft}
two personal interviews with the chief on a mountain wayside were arranged through an "undercover go-between." When pressure from above forced the chief to break off all contacts, the lieutenant was notified by a letter bearing the official ALN letterhead, apparently written by someone else, and sent "by a roundabout way."\textsuperscript{13}

RALLYING BY RADIO AND PRESS

Months before the outbreak of the revolution, the "Voice of the Arabs," transmitting from Cairo, urged Algerians to join in the revolt against French imperialism in North Africa. The sudden response of numerous other attacks throughout Algeria, which the revolt in the Aures Mountains (1 November) ignited, demonstrated the existence of an already well-organized revolutionary element. So did the circulation of a tract announcing the creation of the FLN-ALN and its objectives in amazingly sophisticated language to a largely illiterate audience. Indeed, some sociologists in 1954 estimated that about three quarters of the Moslem population of Algeria was illiterate in Arabic, and about ninety per cent in French.\textsuperscript{14}

FLN press and propaganda activities were stepped up during 1957. Broadcasts from Cairo, Tunis, and Damascus were supplemented by a Radio Free Algeria set up inside the country in the spring. In

\textsuperscript{13}Servan-Schreiber (57), p. 170.

the middle of the year the two FLN newspapers, the "Algerian Resistance" and the "Freedom Fighter" (El Moujahid), were consolidated and became increasingly sophisticated in tone under the leadership of Ahmed Boumendjel. The publication was printed in Tunis and distributed weekly. The printing of handbills, leaflets, and journals always assumed a major rôle in FLN activities. Wilaya IV was in silent competition with Wilaya III to put out its own paper, the "Revolution" (1958), counterpart of the "Voice of the Mountain."

The wilaya colonel was apparently accompanied on his expeditions by a portable typewriter, a mimeographer, and the wilaya archives. A stopover for a day or more would give his secretary time to distribute administrative papers.

STRIKE IN ALGIERS

A study of the general insurrectional strike of 1957 provides some important clues to the state of communications. Ben Khedda, predecessor of Yacef Saadi in Algiers, met 24 January 1957 with communist labor leader Ouzegane to fix the date of the strike. Ouzegane proposed 1 February, to allow time for distribution in the name of the FLN of tracts both of the General Union of Algerian Workers (UCTA), which provided important intelligence services to the FLN, and of the General Union of Algerian Merchants (UGTA). But it had to be launched earlier, on 28 January, because Radio Tunis, well-listened to in the

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15 Gillespie (60), pp. 152-153.
Casbah, had already announced that date. Broadcasts from Damascus, Morocco, and Tunis, and distribution of handbills to rally widespread participation also forewarned the authorities to prepare countermeasures.

Two women liberals had charge of dissemination of FLN tracts and editions of the "Freedom Fighter" during the Algiers strike. For this purpose they had installed in a private apartment two typewriters, one with Arabic, the other with Latin letters, and a mimeographer. They delivered the papers by car to stores serving as depots.\(^{17}\)

Ouzegane's sole correspondent during the eight days of the generally unsuccessful strike was one unknown "Daniel," with whom he exchanged two couriers a week. As a security measure he destroyed all communications received, keeping only the texts of the directives he transmitted to the two unions. These he wrapped in old newspapers and placed in a basket of soiled laundry each evening.\(^{18}\)

With the crackdown by the authorities in February on all rebel activities, it became impossible for the FLN to maintain its contacts. Yacef met the crisis by tightening security measures, replacing direct contacts with mail-drops, in a hierarchy crowned by the four member Zone Council.\(^{19}\)

\(^{17}\) Bromberger (58), p. 192.

\(^{18}\) Bromberger (58), p. 186.

\(^{19}\) Bromberger (58), p. 193.
ALGIERS

Each region in the Autonomous Zone of Algiers (ZAA) possessed propaganda dispersal equipment, including a typewriter and mimeograph. The idea of multiple printing sets was to reduce to a minimum necessary transport of tracts. But in fact, Region 1 did the printing for itself and Region 2. Réda of Region 3 took charge of distributing not only for this region, but also to the authorities and newspapers. The 750 papers thus mailed were taken directly "without risk," by an accomplice postman in a light motor car of the PTT (Post-Telegraph-Telephone), to the mail sorting house. El Khiam assured the distribution of tracts in the Casbah through a special team of five men working at six in the evening when the inhabitants were returning home. Two men would follow on the heels of the patrol to give an alarm if one of the soldiers should turn, while the other three under this cover did their distributing.

In January 1957 at the height of the ZAA, Yacef Saadi had at his disposal no more than 1700 persons, including couriers and those serving as mail holders. In May, under rather brief and vague instructions sent by courier from the CCE hidden out in the bush land of Wilayas IV, he instructed Hood, the Liaison and Information Deputy,

21 Bromberger (58), pp. 197-198.
and El Khiam, the new Political Deputy, to reinstate the committees that had served while the CCE held Algiers. Among the results was a committee of intellectuals to be the FLN literature center of the zone. Its job was to advise the Zone Council on French and international politics, and to contact liberal intellectuals, Catholics, and important individuals entering Algeria. Committees of Information and Liaison drew together the regions' forces and began creating a courier reception center with intermediary maildrops for contacting the wilayas.\(^{23}\) August brought the collapse of this efficient organization of liaison within Algiers, especially above region level, and with the exterior by the arrest of Hood. His arrest brought to light what little we know of that most obscure branch of the ZAA organization.\(^{24}\)

The underground net extending into almost every Moslem home and store in Algiers and using the Casbah as headquarters served intelligence and communication-charged groups. By September 1957, the French had completely broken the formidable network and replaced it with their own \(\hat{\text{ilot}}\) (concierge-type) system.

The FLN used a great many informers and double-agents in the Algiers terrorist attacks. Children and women were often used as messengers and carriers, for they would not be searched by the French.

\(^{23}\)Bromberger (58), p. 234.

\(^{24}\)Duchemin (62), p. 234.
The "cut-out" technique was adopted so that liaison agents could not divulge much information if captured. An agent of Yacef Saadi and Ali Boumendjel arrested July 1957, for example, was able to admit little more than his personal experiences. He was in charge of giving messages to two other messengers who, in turn, only carried them to maildrops. Under no condition was he to leave the Casbah. He had contacts with many whom he knew by face alone, and he was forbidden to speak with his brother or to visit his family.25

Indeed, the high mortality of couriers often seriously delayed or blocked contacts. When in the critical days of late summer 1957, Political Deputy El Khiam of the ZAA lost his liaison agent, all his contacts fell away. He suspected that Military-Political Chief Yacef was located at 3 rue Canton, but security precautions were such that even his messenger was refused entrance because he lacked the password. After several weeks had passed, Yacef sent his own agent out to search. There remained so few maildrops not know to the police, but those were kept as final resorts, and liaisons were made by daily meetings at street corners.26

25 Duchemin (62), p. 225. For entire confession see pp. 223-229. These couriers, Hamid Dali and Boussoura Abderrahmane, were intimate associates of the organization.

FOREIGN CONTACTS

Flanked by the sympathetic Arab states of Tunisia and Morocco, where FLN bases were established, and possession a long Mediterranean coast, Algeria was favorably situated for extensive infiltration. As early as 1955 Ben Boulaid had established a supply line to the Aures Mountains, reaching south through the Libyan Desert to Egypt. Egypt remained the foreign country (despite a temporary estrangement) most wholly committed to Algerian independence. FLN broadcasts were permitted from Cairo and Damascus, friendly members of the Afro-Asian bloc helped print and disseminate FLN propaganda, and the FLN set up Algerian centers of information in foreign capitals wherever it might. In their frequent international travels FLN representatives were generally able to secure safe passage with diplomatic passports of Arab states. In 1955 the pressure became finally strong enough to force the United Nations to include the "Question of Algeria" on the General Assembly agenda.

Yet border crossing, which was always difficult—taking up to three months to travel between Algiers and Tunis, when not captured or killed on route—became even harder when the French army stepped up its action in 1958 and erected the Morice Line.27

The FLN delegation, transferred from Cairo to Tunis, sent directives to urban undergrounds by courier, and retained contact with imprisoned leaders in Paris through secret mails or occasionally by intermediary. Yet, cut off as it was from the Moslem public opinion within Algeria, the CNRA from 1957 on felt unsure of its actual power of appeal. Algerians inside tried to contact the external through intermediaries in France, Italy, and West Germany. The few detailed intelligence reports that reached Tunis were often inaccurate or distorted by their exiled recipients. For whereas the latter tended to picture a very idealistic Algerian struggle for independence, most were ready and seeking for a compromise since the economic transformation in 1957.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

With the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA), Ferhat Abbas, designated head of Information Affairs in June 1958, was promoted to the rank of Prime Minister, and Abdelhafid Boussouf became Minister of Information and Communications. Formal announcement of the formation of the Provisional Government was made 19 September 1958 in Cairo, Tunis, and Rabat. The GPRA was located in Tunis and had its foreign office in Cairo, probably in token respect for Egypt.

29 Behr (62), pp. 231-232.
Toward the end of 1958 the FLN internal organization was suffering a serious setback, with an interruption in the chain of command through the CCE and wilaya system set up in 1956. From then on there existed a military stalemate between the French and the Algerians.

Yet at the head of the communications in the Algerian cabinet was a man—Boussouf—who understood their importance to the guerrilla operations. Not only did he stand as a bridge between internal forces and the GPRA, but—as communications gradually improved and with access to German two-way radios—he became a top policymaker. At his own discrimination, he monitored information that came in from both the army of the interior and from FLN agents abroad, and distributed the subsequent reports to the other ministries and boards. He also ran an active counter-espionage system, which was committed primarily to uncovering French intelligence agents. Boussouf thus held such a position that he could readily manipulate persons as well as situations. He was a receiving center of information and a controller of lines as well as the contents of communication.  

This man together with Krim and Ben Tobbal formed the three-man General Staff which emerged at the Tripoli meeting of December-January 1959-60 in a major upset in the old GPRA leadership. These three held significant control of contacts important to power positions. Defense Minister Krim, active on the exterior since 1957, kept in touch with

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30 Behr (62), pp. 227-229.
leaders of sympathetic foreign states, with rebel leaders in Paris, and with guerrillas in the field. Communications Minister Boussouf and especially Ben Tobbal, Minister of the Interior, both former field commanders, kept a close watch on the pulse beat of the army.31 Boussouf's three-story ministry was the most impressive—if not the most important—of the FLN buildings in Tunis. Security police constantly guarded this "nerve center" which "housed some of the FLN's most costly radio equipment."32

The change in the French government at Paris, ushering in a new policy toward the Algerian problem, brought the FLN above ground for the first time. Algeria hastened to send official representatives to all countries which had formally recognized its independence.33 During the three-month interim between the signing of a ceasefire agreement and the national referendum of 1 July 1962 which announced Algeria's independence, certain spheres of administration were reserved for the French, represented by a High Commissioner. Telecommunications, ports, and airfields fell within the area of French jurisdiction.34 By the end of September, however, the Algerians were even directing the French radio in Algiers.35

31 Kraft (61), pp. 89-90.
32 Behr (62), p. 228.
33 Behr (62), p. 228.
35 Pickles (63), p. 177.
SUMMING UP

Algeria presents an example of the successful, non-Communist guerrilla war. The FLN confronted the typical problems of communication on all levels internally, with the external leadership, and with foreign nations. Although a circle of sympathetic foreign neighbors and a competent body of leaders did much to improve lines of contact, the balance of success perhaps rested on skillful improvisation on the part of the Algerians and the cumbersome weight of French bureaucracy in the field.

When one reconsiders that the FLN won a political rather than a military victory, however, it seems that the propaganda network was perhaps its paramount achievement. The FLN, indeed, used a great deal of paperwork that gave the revolution an aura of legality. Typewritten official orders, communiqués, sophisticated language and use of rubber stamps made for almost as much red-tape as in the French army. All FLN correspondence was carried on in French, or in French and Arabic. French, too, was commonly spoken in the army ranks, Arabic and Kabyle normally used only among the rural fighters. Those who knew how to read, read French. The French army, erroneously thinking that the soldiers read Arabic, wasted much paper printing tracts in Arabic which were useless without an accompanying French translation.

36For example, an ALN combattant could not be transferred from one region to another without a written order.
As the French became involved in a conflict of spiraling loss of contact and communication with the Algerian Moslem population, they lost confidence. Efforts to ruthlessly suppress the rebel movement only discredited themselves more in the eyes of the masses. For in that economically underdeveloped country where illiteracy prevails and political consciousness is reserved for only an elite core, action--favorable or unfavorable--of the rebel side or of the authorities, communicated more than the written and, often, the spoken word.
Sources of information of FLN communications during the war are difficult to find for several reasons. Most readily available published sources are written from the French point of view. FLN politics and ideology tend to be preempted to the exclusion of its operative machinery by authors writing on Algeria. Of FLN activities, communications were necessarily the most clandestine.

The case study by Jureidini published by the Special Operations Research Office of The American University gives the best summary analysis of the internal war. A short section on intelligence and an especially good chapter on propaganda media themes, adapted to suit the target audience, are included in the study. Histories of the revolution by Joseph Kraft, Michael K. Clark, Edward Behr, and others contain occasional references to the topic of communications in what are primarily political records.

The most useful books in this study were *Histoire du F.L.N.*, by J-C Duchemin, *Les Rébelles Algériens* by Serge Bromberger and Peter Braestrup's article, "Partisan Politics--Algerian Style." Future study into FLN literature would perhaps give important, deeper insight into rebel propaganda in relation to periods in the war.

Where references or inferences to a situation occurred in two or more sources, footnotes were omitted, on the assumption that very heavy footnoting makes for oftentimes dry and laborious reading.

These additional sources are incorporated in the following list of sources consulted:


APPENDIX: METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

This annex discusses, in somewhat haphazard fashion, the origins of this paper, the questions posed for research, the analytical methods used in approaching these questions, the circumstantial nature of most of the data required for the analytical methods that were adopted, and the consequent caution to be observed in accepting the general patterns identified in Chapter II.

As noted in Chapter II, the single most evident point to arise in any comparative study of guerrilla operations is the large number of similarities between them. These similarities or patterns are seen in such things as styles of organization, leadership and recruitment, parallels in organizational development, and techniques of intelligence propaganda and--most central for this paper--communication.

The fact of such similarities calls for explanation. Why do such elements often recur in the course of guerrilla operations in different times and places? At least three classes of hypotheses are commonly offered: traditional-institutional, derivative-diffusionist, and functional-pragmatic. I have adopted a synthesis of all of these for reasons explained below. These four approaches will now be discussed and both the allegation of "similarities" and the question of "why" somewhat refined and redefined.
1. The "Blueprint" Hypothesis

Comparative studies of guerrilla operations that limit themselves to case studies of Communist-organized and directed cases will probably tend to infer or assume some sort of grand design or "blueprint of world conquest". This derives, of course, from a once widely-accepted but increasingly challenged approach by writers on international Communism.¹ In its simplest form this model is based on an assumption of a monolithic international Communist movement, centrally planned and directed according to a single immutable and long-range strategic scheme embodying a set of coherent tactical directives.

This model may be challenged on several grounds. Broadly speaking, it is a static model that suppresses in its data collection the long and well-documented history of inter- and intra-Party strife and polemic that marked major periods in the history of the world Communist movement. Specifically, this model must ideally exclude consideration of such facts as the following:²


²The examples are presented and documented in the preceding case studies.
1) The Soviet guerrilla warfare advisers to Tito were appalled by his guerrilla tactics.

2) Mao's own rejection of the general applicability of guerrilla "doctrine".

3) Despite the presence and direct influence of Eighth Route Army veterans with the Malayan rebels, the Malayan Emergency failed to pass through the "Chinese" stages. The MCP never grasped the need for radio or other rapid communications as did all other Communist guerrilla movements, at least belatedly.

Perhaps even more fundamentally damaging to this theory—at least as an adequate explanation for the similarities—is the fact that many of the so-called characteristics of Communist guerrilla movements are present in non-Communist guerrilla operations, as, for example, among the Algerian ALN and the Mihailović Četniks.

Such "blueprint" theories are only the more sophisticated instances of the class of "conspiratorial theories of history", such as the "Merchants of Death" and "Jewish International Bankers," and share with them the yielded temptation to settle first upon the mature theory and then perceive as facts only those data that support the preconceived theory. Such theories also seem to accept a curious assumption that equates such congeries as superhuman organizational efficiency, diabolical cleverness, scheming Bolsheviks (or Wall Street Bankers). In such theories, the guerrilla's hurried improvisation becomes interpreted, after the fact, as the successful outcome of a calculated strategy.
2. **Derivative-Diffusionist Models**

A second class of models would have us believe that there is nothing new under the sun, that each guerrilla movement patterns itself after other earlier ones. Thus Lenin was master to Mao who was teacher of Guevara (and Giap and Dedijer) who is now followed by the Venezuelan rebels. Similarly, Mihailović's Četnics took their name and style from the former anti-Ottoman Serbian nationalists and the Vietminh were nurtured and trained in Red China during World War II. While these examples are factually accurate, they are accurate only as far as they go, and this type of model is essentially one with the Vienna School's theory of diffusion of culture traits and consequently suffers from the same flaws present in that so-called heliocentric theory. For example, the mere fact of juxtaposition of several case studies, each exhibiting common traits--such as use of couriers, coded messages, spies, and chains--will imply this model unless the author either demonstrates by independent evidence an interlocking network of influence among the cases or accumulates sufficient negative evidence to warrant the (always tentative) conclusion that the commonality of traits is fortuitous.

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3 A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New ed., rev., New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948), pp. 311-444, selected the format of a mere textbook for the initial publication of some of his data and speculations on patterns, styles, diffusion of culture traits, and simultaneous invention. See his subsequent papers and monographs for further examination of these problems.
3. **Functional-Pragmatic Models**

A third class of models permits the writer to report similar traits without troubling to establish or trace the influence between one case and another. Such models assume that a common set of social, economic, geographical, or other comparable fundamental proconditions or circumstances underlie a guerrilla movement. The Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theories of revolutionary warfare and "wars of national liberation" provide paradigms of this type.

This type of model is readily confused with a non-model exemplified by that school of historians (R. G. Collingwood, et al) who deny that any philosophy of history can be valid, that history does not "repeat itself", and the search for "cycles" in historical processes are a will-o' the-wisp. I suspect that many comparative studies of guerrilla warfare do not intend to imply any systematic parallels among their cases; but, unless this is made explicit one way or the other, the reader is apt to be misled.

4. **A Tentative Synthesis**

Three classes of models have been surveyed and judged inadequate, at best. We are still left with our original question which, however, may now be reformulated as follows: Why are the several guerrilla movements studied--varied as they are in time, locale, and political-social milieu--so similar in the types, patterns, and uses of communications media used?
I would prefer an unsophisticated explanation that borrows from all of the above models. No single explanation suffices for all case studies. Thus any given case may be explained by a directly borrowed example (diffusion), and explicitly communicated directive (central Communist rule), or local tradition (the folklore of conspiracies).

However, three caveats should be kept in mind by both the purveyor and receiver of any "patterns" that emerge from such a free-wheeling flitting amongst systematic theory. First, this approach is conducive to the identification of pseudo-patterns, mere coincidental similarities. Hence the most rigorous application of rules of historical evidence is required of the investigator.

Second, because the available evidence is largely circumstantial, it is difficult to definitively establish cause rather than mere coincidence. If, as the number of case studies is increased, the circumstantial evidence holds firm, the area of reasonable doubt diminishes accordingly. Hence the necessity of increasing the number and types of cases studies. One example of such a pseudo-pattern that has entered the folklore of counter-guerrilla writings is the oft alleged ratio of guerrillas to counter-guerrillas. Professor Lucian Pye's single statement about the cause of this in the case of the Malayan Emergency indicated the absurdity
of such a "rule":

Viewed in military terms, the man power ratio between the Security Forces and the Communists might suggest that the British have not been as effective as they should have been. However, since the operation is basically of a police nature the ratio is not greatly out of line with that between police and criminals in any community which places a high premium on law and order.

The third possible pitfall is in this paper's identification of "patterns" is the rather arbitrary attribution of the quality of "similarity" to some items and the implied assignment of all remaining items to a category of "dissimilar". In the absence of a rigorous treatment of this analytical problem, I can only plead that the categories selected are unchallenged in the literature and therefore seem to reflect some considerable degree of "common sense" consensus among the experts.

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6 This problem is commonly overlooked precisely because it is readily satisfied by the "common sense" approach. However, studies of the diffusion of folk tale "themes" as well as other more recent research in content analysis of propaganda and rumor diffusion has proved that the rigorous definition of the appropriate units of analysis is indeed a significant problem. Ithiel de Sola Pool (editor), Trends in Content Analysis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), particularly pp. 202-206.