THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
INDIAN NATIONAL INTEREST

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I

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations is not the first international organization to which India has belonged. India was also a member of the League of Nations. But whereas India's representation in the League was more British in character than Indian, India's representation in the United Nations is completely independent and Indian in nature. However, to gain a proper understanding of India's attitude toward the United Nations it is necessary for three reasons to examine what the Indian leaders thought of an international organization in the days of the League and prior to India's membership in the United Nations as an independent nation.

Firstly, those who led the Indian independence movement have headed the independent government of India ever since its inception. Secondly, even when Mr. Nehru and others were struggling for Indian independence they held their own views about India's role in international affairs. And thirdly, when power was transferred to Indian hands, India's new representatives came to the United Nations with definite ideas of what they conceived the aim of this organization to be and what they expected from it. Therefore, to comprehend fully India's attitude toward the United Nations it is proper to look into the picture which India's leaders had before them of the assembly of nation states when India became a full fledged member of the United Nations in the real sense of the word.
India and the League of Nations

India's nationalist leaders did not look upon the League of Nations with favor for two obvious reasons. One reason was that, with India under the domination of the British, to talk about India's membership in the League amounted to a farce. The Indian delegates were selected carefully by the British Government and they simply carried out the orders of their masters. Indian representation amounted to "an additional voice and vote for the British Foreign Office," in the halls of the League.1 Thus the Indian leaders felt that so long as truly Indian views were not aired in the assembly it was idle to think and talk about India's participation in the League of Nations.

The second reason for the unpopularity of the League of Nations lay in the fact that in the eyes of the nationalist elements in India, the League was completely dominated by the great powers with the result that it acted as their tool to protect their international interests and maintain the status quo. Mr. Nehru wrote in 1933:

... there can be no doubt that the League has been a tool in the hands of the great Powers. Its very basic function is the maintenance of the status quo—that is, the existing order. It talks of justice and honour between nations, but it does not enquire whether the existing relationships are based on justice and honour.2

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1 Rammanohar Lohia, India's Foreign Policy (Allahbad: All India Congress Committee, 1938), p. 3

Inasmuch as India's leaders sought to upset the status quo, in their view the objectives of the League were opposed to their own aims. Therefore, they saw no need for supporting the League of Nations.

With the march of events, however, a dislike for the League of Nations did not prevent the Indian leaders from recognizing in due time that some sort of international organization was necessary to protect the peace and prevent aggression. Thus when Italy invaded Abyssinia, not only did the Indian National Congress condemn the actions of Italy and express sympathy for the cause of the nation victimized but at the same time it denounced the League of Nations for not taking any effective steps to stop the aggression and protect the peace. One of the resolutions adopted by the Indian National Congress in 1936 stated:

The Congress expresses the sympathy of the Indian nation for the Ethiopian people who are heroically defending their country against imperialist aggression, and considers Abyssinia's fight as part of the fight of all exploited nations for freedom. The Congress condemns the Great Powers and the League of Nations for their policy in regard to the Italo-Abyssinian War.\(^3\)

Similarly, in the case of China, Republican Spain and Czechoslovakia, the Indian National Congress expressed sympathy for the cause of each of these nations and regretted that the attitude of the League of Nations had been a negative one in every instance. The Congress Party even made manifest its desire to go along with the idea of applying sanctions against an aggressor. The Congress Party's Pamphlet on this matter read:

\(^3\)Indian National Congress 1934-36 (Allahbad: All India Congress Committee, 1936), p. 76. (As quoted by K.P. Karunakaran in India and the United Nations.)
The League's sanctions include economic sanctions against the aggressor and, also, military assistance to the aggressed nation. The Congress should have no difficulty in accepting the policy of economic sanctions against the aggressors. In fact the present resolution to boycott Japanese goods is an indication that it is prepared to apply economic sanctions against an aggressor nation.  

India's Attitude Toward International Organization on the Eve of the Second World War

Evidently, then, even though the Indian nationalist leaders condemned the League of Nations for its composition and objectives, in time they had come to recognize the need for collective action and usefulness of an international organization. On the even of the Second World War the Indian leaders appeared ready to accept the framework of an international body to settle disputes between nations. Writing at that time Mahatma Gandhi said in one of his articles:

I do want to think in terms of the whole world. My patriotism includes the good of mankind in general... Isolated independence is not the goal of the world States. It is voluntary interdependence. The better mind of the world desires today not absolutely independent states, warring one against another, but a federation of friendly, interdependent States.  

On the same subject, Mr. Nehru has written:

When we (the leaders of the Indian National Congress Party) talked of the independence of India, it was not in terms of isolation. We realized, perhaps more than many countries, that the old type of complete national independence was doomed and there must be a new era of world co-operation. We made it repeatedly clear, therefore, that we were perfectly agreeable to limit that independence in common with other nations, within some international framework.

6 The Discovery of India, p. 427.
However, it is important to note that while the opinion of the Indian leaders was veering around to an acceptance of an international order, they still held the view that to be an effective and useful instrument the international agency would have to have a number of essential characteristics. In their mind these essential characteristics included the following important conditions: the great powers were not to be permitted to monopolize the international agency for preserving their interests; the international agency was expected to apply the same standards of judgment and conduct to all nations alike, whether small or great; and India could contribute to the successful functioning of this body only as a free and independent country. India's leaders could see the utility of a world organization under these conditions alone.

The Second World War and the domestic situation in India during that period created some deep impressions in the minds of the Indian intelligentsia. While England proclaimed to the world that her fight against Nazism and Fascism was a struggle in defence of freedom and democracy, she refused to grant India the independence which India felt was necessary to wage war effectively on the side of the allies. The United Nations were occupied in annihilating the forces of tyranny and totalitarianism; strangely enough at that very hour India was fighting for her freedom against one of the United Nations. Soon after the Four Freedoms of President Roosevelt and the Atlantic Charter were proclaimed to the world, Mr. Churchill made the announcement that
the Charter did not apply to India. In this atmosphere when the Indian leaders heard talk of a new world order at the end of the war, they were beset by serious doubts as to what kind of world order it would be.

The advent of the war had created a new hope in the minds of the nationalist elements in India that their aspirations for a free India might be realized without a bitter struggle against Britain. The onslaught of the Axis Powers, in fact, brought forth the comment from many responsible quarters that Britain's hour of peril should not be utilized as India's hour of opportunity. There was even a readiness on the part of the Indians to fight alongside Britain in her moment of distress and need, but there was awareness of the fact that India could not participate in the war without some promise of eventual freedom once the war had been concluded. As the war progressed and the Indians discovered that Britain was adamant about retaining complete control over India, then and in the future, the Indian leaders started to question the sincerity of the pronouncements made by the Western democracies in the name of liberty and democracy.

In his reflections on that period Mr. Nehru has written that there were many people in the West and vast numbers in Asia and Africa who felt that the war was above all a war for the soul of the peoples of the world. These peoples ardently believed that allied victory would permit the creation of a new world order "which would afford some guarantees against that utter failure of human society which the World War represented." However, as the conflict progressed all hopes faded
away.

... the eyes of the leaders of the United Nations were turned elsewhere; they looked back to the past and not forward to the future. Sometimes, they spoke eloquently of the future to appease the hunger of their people, but their policy had little to do with these fine phrases. For Mr. Winston Churchill it was a war of restoration and nothing more, a continuation, with minor changes, of both the social structure of England and the imperial structure of her empire. President Roosevelt spoke in terms of greater promise, but his policy had not been radically different.

As the war entered its final stage in Europe and allied victory appeared certain, the Indian leaders felt that the ideals for which the Western democracies were supposed to have fought the war had receded into the background and the struggle had assumed a purely militaristic character. To them the world appeared doomed to be dominated by power politics in the future as in the past.

There was an awareness in Indian circles, however, that due to two world wars, world conditions made it imperative that nation states submit in the future to some type of world association. Speculating about the future shape of the world, Mr. Nehru wrote in his jail cell sometime in 1944 that to remain isolated from the rest of the world was now out of the question for any country. To avoid continuous friction the countries of the world had to co-operate in the future. But he also held that this co-operation could come about only if all the nations of the world were treated on a basis of equality; if racialism and foreign domination were eliminated and if steps were taken to improve.

\[7\text{Ibid.},\ p.\ 491.\]
the standard of living of backward countries so that a common level of well being and cultural advancement could prevail. 8

On the eve of the birth of the United Nations Organization, then, although the leaders of India were convinced about the desirability of the establishment of an international organization, they were skeptical about the aims and objectives of the great powers which were to be the main pillars of this world organization. India's leaders were decided that nations hitherto neglected must not be denied their due in the future. And India's leaders were determined that, as a member, free India would do everything possible to prevent the big powers from monopolizing the new world agency as their tool. Looking back, it appears that these sentiments have dominated India's attitude toward the United Nations throughout India's membership as an independent country.

**India and the United Nations**

The United Nations Organization came into being formally in October 1945. India was made an original member of the organization. The nationalist leaders of India were at this time too deeply engrossed in negotiations with the British for the independence of India to devote major attention to the new world organization. However, when the Indian leaders assumed power in New Delhi in September 1946, they demonstrated their acceptance of the UN by sending their own representatives to the UN without challenging the action of the British in committing

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The original membership of India. In September 1946, as the Vice-President and Member for External Affairs in the Indian Government, Mr. Nehru said in one of his first broadcasts that India would give the United Nations her wholehearted cooperation.

There was hardly any doubt that free India was willing and eager to belong to the United Nations Organization. But before long it became very clear that even as a militarily weak nation, India had no intentions of being a silent member of the United Nations. The new rulers of India held some strong views about the basis of world cooperation and they were ready to put the United Nations to the test to see if that agency could serve as an instrument of international cooperation as conceived by India’s foreign policy makers.

Soon after their arrival at the United Nations, representatives of free India made several important moves. During the second part of the first session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1946, India charged the Union of South Africa with practicing discrimination against residents who were of Indian descent. During the same period, in the Trusteeship Council, India labored hard for the liberalization of the trusteeship agreements between the trust territories and the administering authorities so that the people of the trust territories could draw the greatest benefit from the arrangements. Also in the Trusteeship Committee, India led the case against permitting the Union of South Africa to incorporate South West Africa in the Union’s territory and persistently maintained that South West Africa must be put under the United Nation’s
trusteeship. In 1947, India was quick to bring the Indonesian case before the U.N. hoping to put a speedy end to the Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia by this action. And when the Indian Prime Minister addressed the United Nations General Assembly for the first time in 1948, among other things he warned the member nations that the world was bigger than Europe alone and that they would fail to solve any problems if they attacked them under the belief that the problems of the world were mainly European problems. In this address he also stressed that there were vast tracts of the world that had taken no active part in world affairs in the past, but he gave notice that the people of these lands had no intention of being ignored any more.

These steps on the part of India during the early period of her membership in the United Nations set the tone for India's approach to international relations and the United Nations in general. But India discovered that the Western Powers, especially Great Britain and the United States, with their own national interests to consider, were not prepared to condemn the Union of South Africa and completely abandon her. India also found that in seeking to liberalize the trusteeship agreements she was faced with lack of support from the United States and opposition from Britain and France. Even in the case of Indonesia the response from the Western colonial powers was not to India's satisfaction. This trend caused India to feel disappointed. If the influenced exercised by the small powers in the initial stages of the

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U.N., combined with India's independent membership in the U.N., had led the Indian leaders to believe that the United Nations was free from power politics of the militarily strong nations, unlike the League, then the Indian leaders had a rude awakening. India did not relish the thought that balance of power considerations influenced the voting behaviour of the major powers to a greater extent than considerations of justice or compliance with the Charter of the United Nations. Speaking before the Indian Constituent Assembly on January 22, 1947, Mr. Nehru said:

In order to strengthen this big structure (the United Nations), it is desirable for all countries not to insist, not to stress on separate groups and separate blocs. I know that there are separate groups and blocs today.¹⁰

The course which the Kashmir problem had to follow in the United Nations created the conviction in the Indian mind that every single issue brought before the United Nations was subject to the pressures of power politics.

India brought the Kashmir case before the Security Council on December 30, 1947 after having assured herself that all direct appeals to Pakistan to settle the matter peacefully had proved futile. In bringing the matter to the U.N. Mr. Nehru maintained; "We have indeed been overscrupulous in this matter so that nothing may be done in the passion of the moment which might be wrong."¹¹ But in spite of every


care that India felt she had taken to be on the right side, morally and legally, India was greatly disturbed to see that the Security Council was not prepared to act quickly, nor were the major powers in the Council prepared to accept at face value the charges of India against Pakistan. To India's consternation it seemed to her that "the Security Council was anxious not only to treat aggressor and aggressed on the same basis but to put India rather than Pakistan in the dock."\(^1\text{2}\)

India's spokesman asked the Security Council why it could not condemn Pakistan and compel her to arrange for the withdrawal of the invading tribesmen when the Security Council had without hesitation condemned Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria for giving assistance to the rebels fighting the government forces in Greece? India maintained that this was clearly a case of power politics. Possibly Prime Minister Nehru had expected that his policy of non-alignment would give India a certain amount of immunity from pressures of power politics. Mr. Nehru had described India's reference of the Kashmir issue to the Security Council as "an act of faith." To his surprise he found that India was subject to the same pressures in international politics as any other nation and it appears that India's attitude towards the U.N. underwent a change at this juncture.

The character of this change is well revealed in the statement Mr. Nehru made in a television interview in London on June 12, 1953. Asked whether the United Nations had proved or be of help in solving the Kashmir issue, Mr. Nehru replied:

\(^{12}\text{Frank Moraes, op. cit., p. 397.}\)
It has not proved helpful, with the best will in the world. I think because in the nature of things these problems are more easily dealt with directly than through third parties.\textsuperscript{13}

Whereas India had keenly sought the U.N. intervention at one time, the Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was implying that India might avoid doing the same in certain situations in the future. That is exactly the course India pursued in the years to come.

When in October 1950, in the middle of the Korean war, Communist China invaded Tibet, India was incensed. However, not only did India refrain from bringing the question before the world assembly but she also failed to support the Tibetan delegation's complaint before the U.N. In fact India recommended that the U.N. not take up the matter because China assured her that the problem could be settled peacefully by negotiations between Tibet and China.

Whatever else India might have had in mind, it appears certain that in following this course India was making sure that the problem of Tibet was not subjected to cold war pressures, which, to India's way of thinking, would have resulted if the U.N. had taken up the problem. In the final analyses, this would have neither resolved the issue nor assisted in bringing the conflict to an end. On the other hand a U.N. discussion of the Tibetan problem would have brought Western interference in an area where India felt the West had no interest or business. The question of appeasement does not arise because speaking legally India had no leg to stand on in opposing the Chinese action in Tibet.

\textsuperscript{13} Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), June 27, 1953.
When the issues of Indo-China and Formosa threatened to explode into a world war, India advocated and favored direct negotiations between the major parties involved in the conflict in preference to a general United Nations discussion of these problems. Similarly, when in July 1956 the sudden nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt created a crisis with world-wide repercussions, India not only took a leading part in the negotiations that followed between countries intimately affected by this Egyptian move, but Mr. Nehru told foreign newspaper correspondents that India favored direct negotiations on the Suez dispute even though she would not oppose any move to take the matter before the Security Council.14

This is not to suggest that India had come to believe that the United Nations should be circumvented whenever possible. But by 1950 India had arrived at a stage where she accepted the fact that the cold war between the communist and anti-communist blocs had become all-pervasive in the realm of international politics. Since the United Nations was not exempt from the influences of the cold war, India sought to utilize the organization within the limitations imposed upon it by the realities of the general international situation. The Indian Prime Minister revealed this attitude on the part of India when he stated before the Indian Parliament in 1952:

14 The Hindu (Madras), September 25 and 29, 1956.
If it (the United Nations) did not exist today, undoubtedly, the countries would come together to build something like it again. I do not want that to happen. I attach the greatest importance to the United Nations but I must repeat that the United Nations has swerved from its original moorings and gradually become a protector of colonialism in an indirect way. This is a dangerous deviation. Instead of looking upon it as a great organization for peace, some of its members have gradually begun to think of it as an organization through which war can be waged. The original idea behind the formation of the United Nations was vastly different and, though the old Charter remains, somehow facts begin to belie it more and more.\textsuperscript{15}

In the light of all these facts, it could be said that, broadly speaking, India's attitude toward the United Nations has passed through two phases. From 1947 to 1950, India looked at the United Nations as an organization which would fulfill the aspirations of the small and struggling nations, help to settle disputes, and bring world pressure to bear on those who may commit or contemplate aggression. During this period India worked through the Trusteeship Council to help dependent peoples and root out colonialism, tried to remove racial discrimination by United Nations action in South Africa, and endeavored to limit conflict by bringing the Kashmir and Indonesian disputes before the Security Council. All this was done with a feeling underneath that Asia would not be subjected to the cold war pressures and that power politics would not dominate the United Nations.

However, during this period India began to realize that the cold war had become all-pervasive and could not be evaded. India, therefore, started to adjust her actions so as to meet better the challenge of reality. It could be said that by the time the Korean issue reached the United Nations in 1950 India was ready to enter the second phase of her attitude toward the United Nations. She now eagerly sought to prevent any of the major blocs from utilizing the U.N. as their agent vis-a-vis the other bloc. India opposed the "uniting for peace" plan maintaining that it enhanced the coercive functions of the U.N. rather than its mediatory functions which would result in creating a psychological atmosphere unhelpful for preservation of peace. But in reality India appears to have opposed this resolution because she was fearful at heart that if one big power could muster enough votes behind it, then that power could use the armed strength of the U.N., created by the "uniting for peace" resolution, to advance its own immediate interests or the interests of one group of powers. Following the same trend, in the course of the debates on the Korean issue India attempted to mobilize Arab and Asian opinion in the U.N. behind her in an effort to prevent the U.N. from being committed to a course of action which in her eyes might have brought it in direct conflict with one of the major powers. This was not a noble gesture, but rather an attempt to protect India's interest, which would have suffered in case a major conflagration broke out. Then again India favored keeping those disputes away from the U.N. which she felt would be solved more easily if they were not subjected to cold war pressures.
India thus continued to uphold the United Nations but her actions in the world assembly assumed a negative character. They appear to have been guided by an under-lying fear, however baseless it might have been in the eyes of some, that the two major blocs were drifting toward a headlong collision. India did not want to be a party to this collision, nor did she want the U.N. to be a party to the collision. India seems to have been convinced that such an attitude alone would further the Indian national interests and objectives.

In the pages ahead an attempt will be made to spell out India's national objectives and to see how India has utilized the U.N. to advance her cause.
II

INDIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Undoubtedly, almost every activity of India on the international scene or for that matter on the domestic scene could be interpreted as being a product of some national objective. However, a close scrutiny of the Indian foreign policy over the last decade or so reveals that a few major national objectives have formed the core of India's policies during this period. All other goals of India appear to have been eclipsed by these objectives or else become an adjunct of these objectives. The chief national objectives of India may be stated as follows:

1. Peace and non-involvement in a major war.
2. Securing India's interests in Kashmir and Goa.
3. Economic and social development of the country.
4. Abolition of colonialism and racialism.

India's Search for Peace and Non-involvement in a Major War

The domestic problems which the government of India had to face when the country achieved freedom were of an overwhelming character. They were many, but the ones which affected policy both at home and abroad were: the problem of stability after partition, the problem of integration of former "princely states," and the economic problem. Then again, even while the Indian government was grappling with these, the Communist Party of India in response to the "Calcutta line" in 1948
let loose an orgy of violence, murder and loot which threatened to isolate certain parts of India from the rest of the country. Leaders of India recognized that to create an atmosphere of stability and order at home was the need of the hour. It was under the impact of this situation that Prime Minister Nehru, speaking before the Constituent Assembly in March 1948, said that even though he was Minister for external affairs, he was at the moment not interested in external affairs—it was internal affairs that occupied his mind. Under these circumstances international peace appeared a prime necessity to the policy makers of India so that they could attend to the problems at home without involvement elsewhere.

By January 1950, when India was declared an independent republic, it seemed that India had survived the trials of partition and internal unrest. At the same time, it had by now become very clear to Mr. Nehru and his colleagues that rapid industrialization was absolutely imperative for maintaining in the future that independence which India had won after a hard and bitter struggle over a long period. Once again, to have the opportunity to develop economically and socially made peace on the international scene a matter of survival. Thus the compelling need for internal stability and economic and social development has made the pursuit of peace abroad the single most important objective of India's national policy. It could be said that peace as a foreign policy objective is part of the national policy of almost every country. On the

16 *Independence and After*, p. 216.
other hand India's overwhelming need to create solidarity and stability at home has meant that unlike some other countries, she could neither think in terms of major preparations for defense from external threat, nor withstand the shock of a new world war. Under the circumstances she has sought peaceful conditions on the international horizon in order to preserve her newly won independence and realize the fruits of that independence.

As a result of the critical situation inside the country, India has further resolved that even if another major war did break out she would so maneuver her position that she would not necessarily become involved in the war. As Mr. Nehru put it in June 1952:

\[\ldots\] If and when disaster comes it will affect the world as a whole and, therefore, it hardly matters what your policy or my policy is. Be that as it may, our first effort should be to prevent that disaster from happening. If that proves to be beyond us, we must, at any rate, try to avoid disaster or to retain a position in which we shall be able to minimize, as much as possible, the consequences of disaster, even if it comes.\footnote{Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 215.}

Thus peace and non-involvement in a major war have remained the twin objectives of India's national policy. As a militarily and economically weak nation India has sought to realize this objective in many different ways. She has called for active United Nations intervention to preserve peace when it appeared that no other alternative was open, but aside from that she has pursued the policies of non-alignment, mediation and has attempted to build a "third voice" in the U.N. to further her ends in this direction.
In such cases as Kashmir, Indonesia, and Suez, India has sought and advocated United Nations intervention to bring the hostilities to an end and restore peace. It is significant that in each of these cases neither of the two major powers was immediately involved. Moreover, the situation in each instance reached a stage where direct negotiations between the parties became impossible and U.N. intervention seemed the only alternative to prevent the conflict from spreading. Also the venue of conflict in each case was Asia. These factors seem to indicate that in India's eyes U.N. intervention is by no means a substitute for direct negotiations, but is a useful alternative when direct negotiations offer no solution. It is also indicated that India appears to believe that U.N. intervention is most effective when the two major powers are not directly involved in a situation. And aside from the fact that in Kashmir India was directly involved, it is evident that India took the lead in calling for U.N. help in the other two cases because she felt duty bound to do something when the area of conflict was Asia. (In this connection it is interesting to note that India does not consider U.N. intervention in Kashmir useful any more since she feels that power politics of the major powers have entered the Kashmir problem.)

One more feature peculiar to the above situation needs mention here. In the instances cited above, while India sought the intervention of the United Nations, she neither advocated nor supported armed intervention on the part of the United Nations. This shows that India has depended upon the pressure of major powers and world opinion to accomplish
the desired results. But supposing armed intervention became necessary on the part of the U.N. to preserve peace, as in the case of Korea? The statements of India's spokesmen do not supply any satisfactory answer to a question of this sort. There is, of course, the evidence of India's action in the case of Korea where, while India voted in favor of opposing aggression she failed to supply any army units when the U.N. called for them, although she did supply an ambulance unit. Similarly, while India did supply troops for the U.N. Emergency Force in the Suez crisis, she maintained that the country concerned--Egypt--had been consulted and had consented to the Indian move. In this respect it is also significant that India has opposed the maintenance of special armed units for U.N. use in case of emergency, as suggested by the "Uniting for Peace" plan. The only plausible explanation for this is that India believes small-nation conflicts can be solved by exerting world pressure on the parties involved, especially if the two major powers co-operate.

On the other hand India neither desires her armed forces to participate in a conflict between the two major powers nor does she want an occasion to arise when one of the major powers, by mobilizing enough votes behind it, might utilize the armed strength of the U.N. against the other major power. The fear of conflict between the two major powers causes India more concern than anything else and it is in an attempt to prevent a crisis of this order that India has donned the role of a neutral, mediator and "third voice."
When Mr. Nehru took over the reins of India's foreign affairs he let it be known from the start that India would follow an independent course in international affairs and not align itself with any group of nations. India has, therefore, shunned any military alliances which would mark her as being hostile to one group of nations or the other. This has not only enabled India to claim that she relies solely on the U.N. and the goodwill of the nations of the world to curb hostile actions, but it has also permitted India the flexibility of maneuver in the U.N. on the basis of which India could in turn assume other roles such as that of a mediator, the leader of neglected nations, and defender of peace. India's uncommitted vote in the U.N. has gained far more weight due to its so-called neutral character than would have accrued to it on the basis of India's military and economic strength. India's ability to vote with the West in condemning North Korean aggression and then to vote with the Soviet bloc to seat Communist China in the U.N. has secured India the right to air at times a third point of view which has proved to be the rallying point of all neutralist forces. Thus if India meant to use non-alignment as a point of departure whenever she felt that certain decisions in the U.N. would involve her in situations against her interest, non-alignment has also proven to be a far more valuable asset which has given India the freedom of action permitting her to play an active and important role in the U.N.

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18 Independence and After, p. 243.
The Indian Prime Minister was also sustained, however, by other reasons in his belief that a non-alignment policy was most suited to serve the Indian interests. One of these reasons was his recognition of the fact that as a militarily weak nation India would have very little voice in policy-making in any group of nations presided over by strong nations. Mr. Nehru did not feel that India's interests could be advanced by placing the country in a subordinate position to more powerful nations.

At the time of independence if India were to join a group of nations in an alliance, the natural thing would have been to join the Western democratic nations. Not only had India adopted a democratic system of government, she was also a dominion of the British Commonwealth until 1950. Besides, India's army, navy, air force and many administrative services were manned by British personnel for many years after independence. India's economy was closely tied to the British economy. However, having tasted freedom after a long struggle with a powerful Western nation, India was in no mood to return to a status which had the slightest resemblance to a state of subservience to some Western country. It had become a matter of prestige with the Indian leadership to follow an independent line of action. India was unwilling to play a secondary role all over again. Thus, non-alignment was the only answer to the increasing pressure from the two powerful camps that were interested in lining up the nations of the world on one side or the other. As India's Prime Minister explained:
... By aligning ourselves with any one Power, you surrender your opinion, give up the policy you would normally pursue because somebody else wants you to pursue another policy. I do not think that it would be a right policy for us to adopt. If we did align ourselves we would only fall between two stools. We will neither be following the policy based on our ideals inherited from our past or the ones indicated by our present nor will we be able easily to adapt ourselves to the new policy consequent on such alignment.\textsuperscript{19}

Another reason for India's non-alignment lay in the fact that Mr. Nehru viewed the struggle between the Soviet bloc and the anti-communist nations in a very different light than was seen by most of the nations in the West. Contrary to the thinking of the West, Mr. Nehru did not see the cold war as a battle of ideologies in the strict sense of the word. Even as early as 1945, he wrote that the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter were fading in the background. He felt the struggle was becoming purely military in nature, of physical force against force with philosophy playing no part. "In England, America and Russia we revert to the old game of power politics on a gigantic scale." Speaking before the Parliament in December 1950, Mr. Nehru said:

> The most relevant fact at the moment is that there are some great nations in this world with concentrated power in their hands that influence all the other nations. That being so, there is a conflict between these powerful nations—an ideological conflict as well as a political conflict. Either these nations will have a war and try to suppress or defeat one another or one group will triumph over the other. There seems to be no other way. Although there is a great

\textsuperscript{19}J. Nehru's Speeches, pp. 192-93.
deal of talk about ideologies, I doubt if they come into the picture at all except as weapons.  

Interpreting the struggle between communist and anti-communist group of nations as being primarily a phenomenon of power-politics, India did not feel called upon to join a crusade for preserving democracy in the world since in her eyes that was not the issue at stake. The Indian leaders saw the cold war as primarily a problem confined to the European theatre, a problem which was the product of past rivalries between nations of Europe. Therefore, it was best for an Asian country like India to avoid getting entangled in this conflict.

In this power struggle between the mighty nations, mostly European, Prime Minister Nehru did not see India threatened with external aggression from the Communist side or any other side. In a television interview in London in June 1953, when asked if he saw any threat to India externally from Communist pressure he replied: "Well, whatever the internal position might or might not be, I see absolutely no danger—external danger to India from Communist or any other source."

If this was the world picture Mr. Nehru had in his mind, it is not difficult to see why he felt that non-alignment was the most suitable policy for India.

20 J. Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 184. (Mr. Nehru asked in the Indian Parliament once: "How many countries of the free world have democracy?")

21 See Mr. Nehru's speech before the Indian Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1949. Independence and After, pp. 231-232.

22 Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), June 27, 1953.
There is one more significant reason which possibly caused India to pursue the "neutral" path. As already noted, the economic condition of India after independence was far from satisfactory, and was in fact bad. This not only resulted in India's desire for peace on the international stage so that she could draw on the resources of all the countries willing to help, but this emergency also called for un-divided attention over a period of years. Possibly, India could have licked the economic problem much better if she has become associated with the "Western bloc," thus enabling her to draw upon the vast resources of the United States more freely. But the Indian leaders appear to have been inclined to feel that an association with a bloc would have resulted in placing greater emphasis elsewhere rather than on the economic problem. A statement by Mrs. Vijaya Laxmi Pandit, India's one-time representative to the U.N., seems to reflect this sentiment.

Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly in 1947 she said:

It has now become almost a platitude to say that a clash of ideologies underlies the rift that is so noticeable in the world today. We, who come from the East, who are intimately familiar with the dire want, the poverty and suffering and starvation that prevail there, may be forgiven for thinking that ideology is less important than practice. We cannot eat an ideology, we cannot brandish an ideology, and feel that we are clothed and housed. Food, clothing, shelter, education, medical services—these are the things we need . . . The conflict of ideology, or whatever it may be, that is plunging the world into gloom and tension, seems so sadly irrelevant to these great human problems; problems that vitally affect a half, and perhaps more than a half, of the world's population.23

Clearly then, it was a combination of multiple elements which motivated India to adhere to a policy of non-alignment. Nevertheless, in the main non-alignment has been a means to achieve the end of peace and non-involvement in a major war.

Similarly, India's efforts to act as a "mediator" were also motivated by this very important objective of her foreign policy. Prime Minister Nehru was aware of the fact that in the second half of the twentieth century the world had shrunk considerably. No more could a war be with certainty kept away from one's boundaries while the other nations were embroiled. In addition, the nuclear revolution foreshadowed an end to civilization if another world war developed. Mr. Nehru showed that he was conscious of this fact when he said before the Canadian Parliament in 1949 that the peace of one country could not be assured unless there was peace elsewhere also. 24

This bent of mind can be said to have led India to become active on the international scene and lend her weight and voice towards prevention of an international conflict. India further devoted her efforts towards helping to localize the conflict if it did break out. In these endeavors India discovered that her policy of non-alignment was a great asset. India's professed "neutrality" enabled her to approach the two sides in the cold war as a go-between. 25 But armed with her "neutrality" and eager to assist in maintaining world peace, India was unable to put

her abilities to the test in this realm until such time as the occasion was considered ripe by the major Powers to require the services of a nation uncommitted yet significant enough to be accepted as a "mediator" by all.

The Korean conflict was the first such occasion where India had the opportunity to exercise the function of a "mediator," and by virtue of that fact was the first occasion which gave prominence to India's role in the international arena.

Facts in the case are by now common knowledge. The Indian delegate voted for the first two Security Council Resolutions. But even though India accepted the second Resolution she did not comply with its call to provide armed forces to assist South Korea against the invaders. This attitude on India's part was explained by Mr. Nehru in the Parliament. He indicated that while India had gone along with the principle that aggression must be resisted, India could not help thinking of the possibility that the area of conflict might spread beyond Korea. This was certainly undesirable from India's point of view, and from then on India turned her attention towards establishing her bonafides as an uncommitted nation primarily interested in bringing the conflict to an end. "The Indian Government was determined before all else to prevent a general war and was prepared to suffer or ignore much for this purpose."26

Thus urged by the desire to prevent the conflict from spreading, India directed her efforts towards bringing about rapprochement between two rival groups. Besides helping to sponsor resolutions in the Security Council to put an end to the fighting, India's efforts included personal appeals to the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Communist China. It is worthy of note, however, that all of India's endeavors came to naught until the time that the two major parties were convinced that decisive victory was out of the question for either under the circumstances, and thus they arrived at a settlement of the issue. Then and then alone India's earlier mediatory efforts received recognition, and it appears as a result India was appointed the chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

The second time India is considered to have played such a role was in the case of Indo-China. India did not interest herself actively in the Indo-China struggle until it became evident that the United States and Soviet Russia were on the verge of intervening in the affair directly. As the fighting between the French and the Viet Minh forces intensified it appeared certain than any overt intervention on the part of the two great Powers would set off a larger conflagration. It was at this stage that India came forward with proposals to halt the fighting and approached the two sides to settle the issue peacefully. While it was the Geneva Conference of the big powers, where India was not a party, which provided the final solution for the Indo-China
tangle, India's representative Mr. Krishna Menon was present at Geneva during the conference and is credited with having assisted behind the scenes in finding the formula to end the conflict. And ultimately when the decisions reached at Geneva were implemented through the agency of the U.N., India found herself a member of the three international commissions appointed in Indo-China.

The problem of Formosa was the third instance where India's efforts to prevent an outbreak of war took the form of attempted mediation. On this occasion too only when America and Communist China seemed on the brink of conflict did India take steps to see if she could help in bringing the parties to a round table to discuss the matter and thus prevent an incident which could touch off World War Three.

Evidently, in all three cases the chief motive behind India's policies of mediation was her overwhelming desire to help prevent the outbreak of a major war. India's sustained efforts in this direction have evoked the comment in many quarters that India was trying to build herself as the "mediator" between the two major Powers. It is maintained here that this neither appears to have been an objective of Indian foreign policy nor does India seek the role of a "professional mediator" of international disputes.

It should be noted that India was permitted to play or played the role of the "mediator" only when peace was endangered and when some conflict threatened to involve the whole world in a war. More important
up on the opposite sides ready to jump into the fray. Realizing that such an action on their part could start another world war possibly involving the use of nuclear weapons which could result in mutual annihilation under such circumstances, these Powers appeared to welcome mediatory efforts. It is under these conditions that India, eagerly sought to intervene and was given encouragement from both sides. Moreover, on all such occasions when India's moves were welcomed the arena of conflict was Asia. India played no such role when the Berlin blockade occurred; never did she seek nor was she asked to interfere in the matter of German unification.

Here India's role in the Suez Canal issue needs to be taken into account. When Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, India supported Egypt's position as against Britain's stand. Thus when India tried to mediate the dispute her efforts do not appear to have borne fruit due to two possible reasons. Firstly, because it seems Britain was not eager to seek mediation as she felt confident that she could achieve a decision in her favor if the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. remained uninvolved in the dispute. Secondly, because India's sympathies may have been considered too one-sided to allow her to do an impartial job of mediation. Then again when Britain and France decided to launch a military attack against Egypt, the United States efforts in the U.N. seemed to be more "impartial" as between the parties than that of India, who was ready to condemn Britain and France unequivocally for what she termed was an attempt on
the part of the colonial powers to revert to old methods of repression. India, therefore, cannot be said to have played the mediator's role in the Suez Canal dispute.

It also seems certain that India would not aim to be the "mediator" in the interests of her own foreign policy objectives. Firstly, the role of a mediator is a negative one. It could fall in line with the aspirations of a country like Switzerland, but India, whose leaders look forward to the day when that nation can play its due part as a world power, would consider this role a barrier to the future ambitions of the country. Secondly, India's interests are at stake in issues like Kashmir and Goa. She is eager to gain support for her position on these issues from every quarter and in this attempt India has found herself ready to bargain with either of the camps involved in the cold war, on the basis of _quid pro quo_. This naturally dilutes the almost rigid impartiality expected from an uncommitted nation aspiring for a mediatory role. Thirdly, India's policy makers would rather be preoccupied with efforts to advance the country economically and socially, an essential source of security in the long run, than channel the energies of the nation towards solving the quarrels of others. Fourthly, a weak country like India could mediate between two mighty powers only when the powers were in a mood to use her services. Such a state of affairs is hardly relished by the leaders of India. It is not in consonance with their idea of India's dignity.
It is in the light of these factors that it is maintained here that to be assigned the permanent role of a "mediator" has been in no way an objective of Indian foreign policy. But that is not to say that India would not seize the opportunity to act as a mediator if she found that to guard her vital interests it was the only avenue open to her through which she could intervene and make her weight felt.

In an attempt to keep a major conflict away from her shores India also appears to have directed her energies towards creating a "third voice" in the United Nations which could prevent either of the powerful blocs in the U.N. from utilizing the U.N. as their sole agent. India has felt that the "third voice" would not only halt the march of the two mighty nations towards a conflict but it would also act as a pressure to squeeze concessions from the militarily strong nations.

India's efforts in this direction can be said to have started in the year 1948. When Mr. Nehru visited the United Nations in Paris in November, 1948, the Indian delegation organized a meeting of the Asian delegates in the United Nations. The express purpose of this meeting was to encourage prior consultation among the Asian delegates on the various issues before the United Nations. A significant move towards this goal was made when India called a conference of the Asian nations to consider the case of Dutch aggression in Indonesia. On January 20, 1949, delegates from nineteen nations met in New Delhi to frame and submit proposals to the Security Council to restore peace and freedom to Indonesia and to devise machinery and procedure by which the represented
governments could keep in touch with one another for consultation and concerted action.

If the Conference accomplished nothing else it certainly succeeded in drawing the attention of the world to the Indonesian case and the urgent nature of the situation. It also brought about united action in the U.N. on the part of the nations who had gathered in New Delhi. Ultimately, this action can be said to have assisted in accelerating the course of events to bring a settlement between Indonesia and Netherlands.

Since India's efforts in the Indinesian case had the active sympathies of the Arab states, the coming into existence of the Arab-Asian bloc in the U.N. is dated around this period. In a matter of a few years, however, the Arab-Asian bloc snowballed into the Asian-African bloc in U.N. after the Bandung Conference in April, 1955.

There is hardly any doubt that India's word carries great weight in the councils of the Afro-Asian bloc. And the path India would like this group of nations to tread is fully revealed in one of the speeches Mr. Nehru delivered before this group at Bandung.

The Indian Prime Minister urged that the countries present not be "yes men" of any power; he gave warning to the rest of the world that Asian and African nations would offer co-operation in the future only on equal footing. He called upon those attending the Bandung Conference to pursue a policy of non-alignment saying:

If we are camp followers of Russia or America or any other country of Europe, it is, if I may say so, not very creditable to our dignity, our new independence, our new freedom, our new spirit and our new self-reliance.28

Since the veto power has reduced the significance of the Security Council, greater reliance has come to be placed on the General Assembly even in the area of peace and security. The requirement that all important questions must obtain two-thirds vote in the General Assembly for adoption has given the Afro-Asian bloc countries greater opportunity for influencing the decisions made in the General Assembly than was ever envisaged by the big powers.

It is true that the Afro-Asian bloc is neither one unit, since it contains such antagonists as India and Pakistan, and Egypt and Iran, nor can it be said that India is the leader of this group of nations. But the voting pattern of this group certainly reveals that the group is united solidly where action in some areas is concerned, whereas by either splitting or abstaining on questions involving the big powers the group not only prevents one powerful nation from being able to mobilize the entire U.N. behind it but it makes it difficult for the powerful nations to sponsor motions in the Assembly without taking the sentiments of the group into account.

28 Text of Prime Minister's speech at the concluding session of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung (New Delhi: Press Information Bureau, Government of India, April 24, 1955), p. 6
On such issues as the independence of Tunisia, Morocco and racial discrimination in South Africa, the Afro-Asian group presented a solid front. When Egypt was attacked in 1956 the nations in thes group voted as a bloc to call for a cease-fire and bring about the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli troops. But when the American resolution to condemn Soviet aggression in Hungary was voted upon, eleven Afro-Asian countries abstained while sixteen of them voted with the United States against the U.S.S.R. Similarly, when the vote was taken on the motion that the Soviet resolution, condemning alleged American aggression in East Europe and alleged American attempts to establish "colonial domination" in the Middle East, be not included in the agenda of the General Assembly, the Afro-Asian bloc was divided in its opinion and voting.

Evidently the "third voice" India has attempted to establish is by no means "one voice." India has, however, tried to win as many nations as possible to her way of thinking that one of the best ways to preserve peace and keep out of war is to shun military alliances based on the proposition that an attack on one is an attack on all. By creating a belt of such like-minded nations India has hoped to keep hostilities away from her shore and has further hoped that these nations could become a powerful pressure group in favor of peace.

In this connection, India is not against collective defense if regional agreements are made for the purpose. India did not object to Nato in the beginning. But when collective defense widens its area
where it appears to become the protector of "colonialism" then India opposes it.

India does not feel Asian countries are threatened from any source, i.e., neither Soviet Russia nor China. As such any defense pacts made by Asian countries have no meaning to India. If Western and Asian countries sign defense pacts then the Asian country involved is, in Indian eyes, doing it for some purpose other than defense against communism. Also the Western countries are in this way seen to be forcing their way into an area where they have "no business." The Indian conclusion is that they are needlessly trying to bring Asia into the cold war.

In India's eyes military pacts obviously aimed against certain nations do not help to reduce tension, and, in fact, heighten tension in areas where there was none before. In this view military pacts only increase the chance of war, since mutual fear can result in conflict.

On the other hand, pacts of friendship and non-interference would according to this logic result in lessening tension and chances of conflict.

If conflict does occur, Indian leadership believes that world opinion, through the U.N., would accomplish the desired result.

When the representatives of Asian and African nations in the United Nations caucus frequently to discuss important matters of policy their endeavor is to present a common front on as many issues as possible. They nourish the hope that they can in this manner thwart the attempts of big powers to make use of the U.N. for the purposes of cold war.
India Attempts to Secure Its Interests in Kashmir and Goa

Securing India's interests in Kashmir and Goa has been one of the most important objectives of India's foreign policy. India's interest in Kashmir boils down to an acceptance of the status quo in Kashmir by the international community—leave that part of Kashmir in India which is at present in her hand and let Pakistan keep the part that she now occupies. India's interest in Goa calls for incorporation of that territory in India.

The issues of Kashmir and Goa emerged into the international picture as soon as Kashmir went on the Security Council agenda, and the Portuguese authorities refused to negotiate an agreement for the peaceful transfer of Goa to India. From then on each move made by India on the foreign policy scene had to take into account the interests involved in Kashmir and Goa, vital interests because they related directly to Indian territory.

In the case of Goa India has had to rely on her efforts outside the United Nations since for various reasons the Goan issue has not entered the U.N.; one of the main difficulties has been to find the proper provision under which it could be brought before the U.N. However, since India did seek the intervention of the United Nations in Kashmir, this has turned into a very crucial aspect of the United Nations for India.
On January 1, 1948, India brought the Kashmir case before the Security Council. Her basic complaint was that Pakistan was aiding the tribal elements who had invaded the Kashmir territory earlier, on October 20, 1947. India requested the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to desist from assisting in the invasion of Kashmir State and to deny the invaders the use of Pakistan's territory for carrying out their operations.

Pakistan flatly denied the allegation and counter-charged India with carrying on a policy of genocide against the Muslims. 29

In the debate that followed India was unhappy to see that the Security Council was permitting Pakistan to sidetrack the main issue. It was India's view that in allowing Pakistan to talk about the persecution of minorities in India, etc., the Security Council was not only letting hostilities continue but was also acquiescing in Pakistan's attempts to use the Security Council platform for propaganda purposes. India was enraged, for in her eyes, the issue could not have been more clear cut. The territory of Kashmir State had been invaded, and since this invasion by the tribes could not have been possible without crossing Pakistani territory, the Indian contention was that Pakistan should be prevailed upon to stop providing the tribal raiders with grounds for their hostile operations. India's delegate asked why the Security Council could not compel Pakistan to stop helping the invaders when the Security Council had without delay condemned Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria for giving aid to the rebels fighting the Government forces in Gr

Bulgaria for giving aid to the rebels fighting the Government forces in Greece.

If India was unhappy with the Security Council attitude she was more than unhappy to find that American and Britain were not supporting her position. It seemed to India that Britain and America were pursuing a course entirely unsympathetic to her. The Soviets, however, were maintaining a somewhat neutral attitude in the Kashmir issue at this stage because their attitude toward both India and Pakistan was one of indifference and semi-hostility.

The Kashmir issue assumed new proportions when it was revealed in December 1953 that the U.S.A. and Pakistan were contemplating a military aid pact. Mr. Nehru let it be known in repeated utterances that the whole context of the Kashmir situation had changed in view of the decision by the United States to strengthen Pakistan militarily. The Indian Prime Minister felt that these conditions had become all the more difficult to be fulfilled in the light of the new development.30

There were other repercussions of U.S. military aid to Pakistan which in the Indian view were also serious. It was observed that through this action the cold war had been brought to India's door; that the 'no-war' area India was attempting to build in Asia had been punctured. Also, this move, followed by the Baghdad Pact and the South East Asian Treaty, was interpreted by India as amounting to continuing and increased

30 See Mr. Nehru's speech as reported in Hindustan Standard (Lucknow), April 14, 1956.
intervention by the Western European countries in Asian affairs. Above all, it seemed to India that the West had openly thrown its lot with Pakistan against India. Many Indians, perhaps misunderstanding American failure to consult with them before making an alliance with Pakistan at a tense moment in Indo-Pakistani relations, tended to interpret the pact as an act of pressure or even spite due to the professed and practiced neutrality of India. India had been wary of the Western moves in the Kashmir issue from the very beginning.

... it is clear that the first doubts in Nehru's mind over Western policy and motivations in international affairs were implanted by what seemed to him and India the wholly inexplicable attitude of the Security Council on Kashmir. 31

With the coming into force of the U.S.-Pakistani military pact, India was convinced that, whatever the West's reasons, India could not expect America and Britain to have an impartial stand on the Kashmir issue. In fact India was convinced that Pakistan had signed the pact with America mainly to get the American support in the Kashmir problem. With a sense that India's interests in Kashmir were now positively threatened, India was ready to accept support from any quarter to counteract this threat. Whereas once India had brought the Kashmir issue to the Security Council calling for its intervention, now India sought to nullify Security Council action in this sphere, since in India's eyes most of the major powers in that body were prejudiced in favor of Pakistan.

31 Frank Moraes, op. cit., p. 397.
The Soviets could not have better timed their change of heart about the Kashmir issue. Moreover, the West had made it easier for them to choose which side to back by joining in a formal defensive alliance with Pakistan.

When the Soviet leaders visited India in November 1955, they let it be known that they were solidly behind India on the Kashmir issue. Arriving at the airport in Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, Mr. Bulganin said:

> We have visited in India many cities ... and we are now full of the impressions of all that we have seen in this great country. ... But without visiting the northern part of India, we could not have formed a complete picture of the country.³²

The change in the Soviet attitude towards the Kashmir problem was most welcome to India. Even if this statement of Marshal Bulganin brought Kashmir directly into the cold war (which India felt had already been done to an extent by the U.S. military aid to Pakistan), India did not seem to mind it. She appeared to believe that the Soviet Union had come to India's rescue to counterbalance the anticipated American support for Pakistan in the Security Council growing out of the military tie between the United States and Pakistan.

By gaining Russian support, India had been assured that the Security Council would not be able to pass a resolution which India would find hard to accept and implement. This would save India the embarrassment

and loss of prestige which could result from India's non-acceptance of an approved Security Council resolution. But this also placed India in an unfortunate position. For India's dependence on Russia to protect this vital Indian interest made it incumbent upon India not to take a stand on any issue which could be openly anti-Soviet. This is well revealed in India's approach to the Hungarian issue in 1956.

When the Security Council failed to deal with the Hungarian situation due to the Russian veto, on November 4, 1956 it requested the emergency session of the General Assembly to take up the Hungarian question. When on that day in the second emergency special session of the General Assembly the President of the Assembly inquired of the members whether there was any objection to the inclusion of the item "The situation in Hungary" in the agenda, the Soviet delegate opposed the discussion of the matter saying that it would amount to an interference in the domestic affairs of Hungary. In the voting that followed the Indian delegate voted with the Soviet bloc in opposing the inclusion of the Hungarian issue in the agenda. However, by an overwhelming vote the General Assembly decided to discuss the issue.

Later during the discussion the United States put forward a draft resolution which called on the Soviet Union to halt its attack and withdrew its forces from Hungary. The resolution also called on the Secretary General of the United Nations to investigate the situation directly and report back to the Assembly. This U.S. resolution was adopted but India
abstained during the voting. On November 8, 1956, in trying to explain India's vote, India's delegate Krishna Menon maintained that India was unable to associate herself with the U.S. resolution because certain parts of the resolution were unacceptable to India even though India's sympathies were with Hungary. Mr. Menon did not make manifest which parts of the resolution India specifically objected. But obviously India was not prepared to call upon "the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to desist forthwith from all armed attack on the peoples of Hungary and from any form of intervention, in particular armed intervention, in the internal affairs of Hungary."33

On November 9, the General Assembly adopted another resolution on Hungary which called on Russia to withdraw her troops from Hungary so that free elections could be held there under the auspices of the United Nations. It is worthy of note that Pakistan was a co-sponsor of this resolution. India opposed this resolution along with the Soviet Union. In explaining the Indian stand in the Indian Parliament on November 16, 1956, Mr. Nehru said that India could not subscribe to the idea that any sovereign state could be asked to hold elections under the supervision of the United Nations.34

In view of the fact that the Indian Prime Minister had condemned the Soviet action in Hungary before the UNESCO meeting in New Delhi on November 5, 1956\(^{35}\) and that he did the same on many subsequent occasions, India's vote in the United Nations can only be explained in one way. For reasons growing out of other Indian political interests, India was unwilling to join in any U.N. criticism of the Soviet Union. This was all the more important because at about this time Pakistan was threatening to request the Security Council to open up the Kashmir question again.

The Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, having completed the task of formulating a constitution for Kashmir, was hoping to adopt this Constitution on January 26, 1957, India's Republic Day. This Constitution had a clause which recognized the integration of Kashmir with India. Pakistan was hoping to block the adoption of the new constitution by Kashmir through the intervention of the Security Council. Moreover, Pakistan had plans to ask the Security Council to call for holding of plebiscite in Kashmir under the auspices of the United Nations. Since India had only a year earlier gained Soviet support for India's cause in Kashmir, India, it appears, was depending upon Soviet Russia to support her side if and when Pakistan tried to move the Security Council in the matter, with the help of the United States and Britain.

\(^{35}\)The Hindu (Madras), November 5, 1956.
But Soviet Russia might not have responded if India had sided openly with Russia’s opponents in the Hungarian issue.

Subsequent events seem to sustain the belief that India had played a calculated game. On January 16, 1957, the Security Council opened debate on Kashmir at the request of Pakistan’s Foreign Minister. In the ensuing discussions India had Soviet support, while the United States and Britain backed Pakistan’s case. It had become clear that India was scrutinizing issues before the U.N. in the light of how they would reflect upon her interests in Kashmir. If, to start with, India had sought the services of the U.N. to solve the Kashmir problem, now India sought to restrain the U.N. from acting in the Kashmir issue.

India’s Efforts Toward Economic and Social Development

One of the very important objectives of India’s national policy during the last decade has been the economic and social development of the country. India’s leaders are fully aware of the fact that in the world today internal stability and external defense depend more on the economic and social development of the country than anything else. As Mr. Nehru commented in one of his speeches:

... The third reason for war and revolution is the misery and wants of millions of people in many countries and, in particular in Asia and Africa. ... The basic problem of the East, therefore, is to obtain these necessaries of life. If they are lacking, then there is the apathy of despair or the destructive rage of the revolutionary.36

36 Nehru’s Speeches 1949-1953, p. 400.
India's stress on the "Five Year Plans" has demonstrated that rapid industrialization and social uplifting of the people has a priority among the goals India's leaders have in mind for that country. In making progress towards this direction India has reached out to seek assistance from every source prepared to aid her.

India has found the United Nations system a valuable source of help in this regard. UNICEF and WHO have provided valuable assistance in eradication of such diseases as malaria. India has secured the services of technical personnel in various areas through the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and regular technical assistance program of the United Nations. Above all, in her drive to industrialize rapidly India has found the services of the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Finance Corporation of great utility and benefit in providing the capital needed for industrial expansion.

This aspect of the United Nations is a very important one for India. Wishing as she does to secure the economic aid without any political strings attached, in Indian eyes there could be no better source of economic help than the United Nations, where India would not be indebted to any one single nation for the help rendered. But India has seen that the type of large-scale aid she needs cannot come from the United Nations as the situation exists today. Those nations that can afford to render large-scale economic aid prefer bilateral arrangements in this connection. India has thus concentrated on obtaining aid directly
from a nation like the United States, rather than depending upon the U.N. to meet her demands. Nevertheless, India has stressed the need for expanding the usefulness of the United Nations in this area.

**India's Policy of Abolition of Colonialism and Racialism**

India became independent on the 15th of August 1947, after being dominated by the British for about two centuries. Indian independence, though a result of multiple factors, was for the Indians the culmination of a long and hard-fought struggle which at times had very bitter overtones. During this struggle the Indian people and especially the Indian leaders, encountered certain mental and physical experiences which left an indelible mark on their memory. As a consequence certain attitudes took root in the minds of those who once formed the bulwark of the Indian independence struggle and who since independence have been responsible for moulding India's policies at home and abroad. One of these attitudes was a natural aversion to foreign rule. A country having suffered approximately two hundred years of alien rule could not have been expected to condone colonialism after becoming free. The indignities and humiliation experienced by the Indian leaders made them vow that they would not only oppose colonial rule once they were free but they would work actively to abolish it from those parts of Asia and Africa which were suffering from the same type of Western European domination as the Indians.
Opposition to foreign rule was one major attitude which was fostered by British control of India. Another attitude was fixed in the Indian mind as a result of this experience; anti-racialism. For the Indian mind racialism was the direct consequence of colonialism and imperialism. It was racialism of the European practiced against the Asian.* Having been a victim of the phenomenon at home, after independence the Indian leaders felt it their duty to oppose any notion that a people could be deprived of their liberties and rights for reasons of race. The ideal became an active part of Indian foreign policy when within the country there was a demand that now that India was independent the government had to do something to alleviate the condition of persons of Indian descent in the Union of South Africa who were suffering discriminatory treatment due to their Indian origin. This situation made the racialism issue a live one for India and it found an important place in the foreign policy of the country.

Thus the British rule in India had succeeded in seeding two important attitudes in the Indian mind, and the abolition of colonialism and racialism has since remained an important objective of Indian policy on the international scene.

*When India talks of colonialism she refers to the nineteenth century colonial domination of Western European countries over parts of Africa and Asia. The Indian leaders consider Soviet domination of Eastern Europe as belonging to a different category than the old type colonialism, and would rather that it was treated separately.
In pushing towards this objective India has found the United Nations to some extent rewarding, even if not completely satisfactory. As indicated, one of the first complaints India brought before the U.N. was that of discrimination against people of Indian descent in the Union of South Africa. While the United Nations has failed to solve the problem, the forum of the United Nations has enabled India to spotlight the discriminatory practices of the Union of South Africa with the result that not only are the eyes of the world focused upon this problem, but the Asian-African countries have been united on this issue and see it as a test case for measuring the sincerity of the Western democracies on the matter of freedom and equality.

In her attempts to root out colonialism through the channels of the U.N., India has succeeded in applying continuous pressure against those countries which even today hold colonies in parts of Asia and Africa. India's attempts to assist Indonesia to gain independence with the help of the United Nations did bear fruit, but even if India and the like minded nations did not succeed in bringing about U.N. intervention in Tunisia and Morocco, their success in having the General Assembly debate the issues does seem to have had the effect of pressuring France to seek a solution to these problems.

India has carried her fight against colonialism to another front in the United Nations. Through the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council, India has sought adoption of measures which would enable the United Nations to assist the people of trust territories to gain self government as early as possible. While in these efforts India has at times
run headlong into opposition from members such as Britain and France who administer trust areas, India has found this channel a useful one to embarrass the Western colonial powers and to attack the practice of colonialism. A militarily weak country like India could not find a better method to achieve her goal of abolition of colonialism and racialism than to work through the agency of the United Nations.

III

INDIA'S POSSIBLE PLANS FOR THE NEAR FUTURE IN THE UNITED NATIONS

There is hardly any doubt that India has found the United Nations to be a valuable and useful agency in various ways. As such, India without question can be expected to continue her support for this international organization. In the present international atmosphere, where two mighty giants overshadow the power and resources of all other countries, India finds the U.N. the one arena where weak nations like herself can wrest concessions from these super powers. Besides, with the military capacity of the two powers having reached a stage where neither one can launch an attack on the other without in turn suffering incalculable damage himself, dependence on moral factors has emerged as a significant bargaining unit. This has given India a place of greater prestige and importance in the U.N. than she could have commanded on the basis of her economic and military strength. Wielding this position of advantage in the U.N., India has been able to achieve greater success in accomplishing her objectives on the
international scene than she would have been able to do otherwise. Therefore, in spite of the fact that in India's eyes the U.N. is far from an ideal organization, India can well be depended upon to uphold the U.N. in the years to come.

In speculating about India's future behaviour, however, a few questions call for an answer at the very outset. These questions can be summed up as follows:

(a) If Mr. Nehru were to leave the Indian scene in the next few years, how will this affect the Indian position in the U.N.?

(b) What might be the influence on Indian policy of possible communist expansion in South East Asia or towards the borders of South Asia?

(c) Could a change in Western attitude toward the Kashmir problem or a solution to the Kashmir problem affect Indian policy?

(d) India's need for foreign economic aid is crucial. India has found that the United States is the only country which can help her in an effective manner in this respect. Will India's dependence upon the United States for heavy economic aid influence India's foreign policy in a way that might reflect upon India's actions in the United Nations?

(a) As Mr. Nehru's personality spreads all over the Indian scene, one of the most interesting problems that occupies the mind of the students of Indian politics is "what after Nehru?" It is not possible here to discuss in detail the merits of all the alternatives open. But one thing appears certain over the next few years. Even if Mr. Nehru leaves the scene, the Indian National Congress Party will continue not only due to the fact that the other political parties of India have shown very little...
strength during the last two general elections, but also because they show no signs of gaining greater popular support for years to come.

Since to a large degree the strength of the Indian National Congress party rests on the personal appeal of Mr. Nehru, some maintain that in his absence the Congress party is apt to lose its following; it is also expected that the dissident elements of the Party which lie dormant in the presence of Mr. Nehru are apt to rise in revolt against the present leadership in his absence. While it is hard to gauge the extent of dissatisfaction and friction within the Congress party, surface reports indicate the possibility of some elements leaving the party in the future in case of change in leadership, but without indication that the party will split wide open due to struggle within. Even if certain elements in the Congress party did break away in the future, it does not appear that they will be able to add to the strength of the opposition in a way that will enable it to take over control of the Indian government. For the main opposition to the Congress party comes from the left, divided between the Socialists and the Communists. The Communist party has so far failed to gather much popular support on the national level, and the next two decades do not seem to promise any better future for this party unless the economic efforts of the present government fail completely and the Socialists are unable to channel the dissatisfied elements their way. On the other hand the Socialists are disunited among themselves. The contending camps of the Praja Socialist Party and the Socialist Party of India have been unsuccessful thus far in providing common ground for all Socialists to
gather under one flag. Hence the field seems wide open for the Indian National Congress party to continue to enjoy the majority support on the national level for quite some time to come.

With the prospects of the Congress party very good for remaining in power for the next fifteen to twenty years, it is likely that there will be very few changes in the main outlines of Indian foreign policy during these years. By and large it has been Mr. Nehru's own hand which has guided India's foreign policy ever since Indian independence. It is well to see, however, that certain individuals have participated behind the scenes in the Indian foreign policy formulation who will continue to do this job for the Congress party government even in the absence of Mr. Nehru. People like Krishna Menon, India's present defense minister, N.R. Pillai, the secretary-general of India's external affairs ministry, K.P.S. Menon, currently India's ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mrs. Vijaya Laxim Pandit, currently India's high commissioner in Great Britain, and K.M. Pannikar, currently India's ambassador to France, have had a great deal to do with formulation of Indian foreign policy in the past. When Mr. Nehru is gone, these will be the persons who will be responsible for guiding India's foreign policy if the Congress party stays in power. Since that seems assured, the next years to come may well see no major change in Indian foreign policy if Mr. Nehru leaves the Indian scene.

(b) What might be the influence of possible communist expansion in South East Asia or toward the borders of South Asia? It should be
noted that at this time the Indian leaders feel convinced that her internal problems are a burden enough on Communist China to prevent her from seeking an adventurous course which would lead her to attempt to extend her present boundaries in those directions. Whether this belief will prove itself true or false in the years ahead is hard to predict. But if communist expansion did take place, it appears that India will rely on direct negotiations to accomplish the desired results rather than turn to the U.N. for succour. To begin with, Communist China is not a member of the U.N. and as such it would be difficult to direct U.N. pressure against Communist China. Aside from that, India would be interested in limiting Western European interference in Asian affairs as much as possible; this would further discourage India from coming to the United Nations.

(c) If the Kashmir issue were solved or if the Western attitude toward the Kashmir problem were to change in a way that India would consider more acceptable, would this cause a change in Indian policy? India's attitude toward the Kashmir problem is a fixed one. A solution of the issue totally acceptable to India does not appear probable in the near future. Moreover, as long as the military aid pact between Pakistan and the United States continues and as long as the South East Asian Treaty and Baghdad Pact prevail, it is hard to see how the West could take a stand in Kashmir which would be antagonistic to Pakistan and in favor of India. Under these circumstances the situation in regard
to Kashmir offers no chance of altering the Indian position. If, however, some satisfactory arrangements could be worked out between India and Pakistan, it appears certain that would diminish India's reliance on Soviet Russia to protect India's interests in the Security Council. While this cannot be expected to change India's overall policy of non-alignment, it will leave India more free to condemn Soviet Russia if another "Hungary" should arise; more important still, it might open up channels of Indo-American and Indo-Western cooperation in the U.N., the scope of which is difficult to judge at this juncture.

(d) India's great need for economic aid seems to be leading India toward a direction where India's dependence on the United States is increasing. Will this compel India to side with the West more often in the United Nations? It is possible that as a result of this India may use greater discretion in voting upon certain measures sponsored by the Soviet bloc which may tend to be openly anti-west; in fact India may adopt caution in sponsoring measures herself which would seem anti-west. But India will not compromise her non-alignment policy regardless of how much she depends upon the United States for economic assistance. India would consider it short-sightedness on her part to abandon the "neutral" path, for she has benefitted from it enough in the past not to want to relinquish it in the future.

It appears then that the factors discussed above will have very little bearing on the behavior of India in the U.N. in the years to come. Under the circumstances it could be said that India's actions in
the U.N. during the years ahead will weave a pattern somewhat as follows:

As long as India has to wrestle with the problem of internal stability and internal development to provide a foundation for future security, India's need for peace and non-involvement in a war will continue to dominate India's foreign policy objectives. Therefore, it could be said that India will seek to utilize the services of the U.N. as best as she can to accomplish this end. Mainly India will try to prevent one of the major powers from gaining too much control over the U.N. In this connection India will oppose major organizational changes. India will also try to gain this objective by encouraging unity in the Afro-Asian bloc on all issues and by further influencing them to steer clear of cold war issues. India will continue to pursue her non-alignment attitude to gain prestige and leadership in the "third bloc" and to evade involvement in a conflict which would bind her to certain commitments of a nature contrary to her general interests. India will seek to keep those disputes out of the U.N. which she feels would have better chances of solution if not subjected to the pressures of cold war; disputes between Asian nations or small nations outside Europe may be said to fall in this general category from India's point of view.

In this connection it is significant to note that India would now prefer to solve the Kashmir problem outside the United Nations. In a speech on April 14, 1956, Mr. Nehru is reported to have said that he had suggested to the Pakistan leaders than India and Pakistan should hold
mutual discussions and settle the problem of Kashmir on the basis of the present cease-fire line.37

But while the Security Council is seized of the Kashmir issue, and in the absence of Pakistan's agreement to settle the question outside the U.N., India's future moves will tend to be concentrated on preventing the Security Council from passing any resolution which in its operation will be contrary to India's interests. In this endeavor India will seek Soviet Russia's help as long as the United States and Britain continue to support Pakistan's position. This will in turn cause India to refrain from supporting any moves in U.N. which Soviet Russia may consider openly hostile.

In the field of economic development India would like to draw upon the resources of the U.N. to a greater extent than she has been able to do so far. To enable India to do so, India will push the establishment of the SUNFED at the earliest possible date. For instead of depending upon individual countries like the U.S., India would rather seek aid from an International Development Authority so that there would be no chance of political strings being attached to the aid nor would India be embarrassed before the opposition parties at home.

Last of all India will continue to put pressure on the Western colonial powers through the U.N. to relinquish their control on foreign

37 Hindustan Standard, April 14, 1956.
territories. This not only makes India the champion of the oppressed and undeveloped countries but in turn weakens some of the traditional European powers, further increasing the influence of India.

All in all India will pursue a path not very dissimilar to the one followed by her during the last four to five years.